EUROPEAN STUDIES

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Edited by
Yvonne Maria
Werner and
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EUROPEAN ANTI-CATHOLICISM IN COMPARATIVE AND TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE
THE ROLE OF A UNIFYING OTHER: AN INTRODUCTION

Yvonne Maria Werner and Jonas Harvard

Tales about treacherous Jesuits and scheming popes are an important and pervasive part of European culture. They belong to a set of ideas and practices that, when grouped under the label anti-Catholicism, represent a phenomenon as old as Protestantism itself. From the beginning anti-Catholicism had a transnational character, which grew up and was sustained through the widespread links that were developed during the Reformation. In the nineteenth century this took on a new aspect, when the secularist movements adopted and transformed confessional criticism in a new internationalist dimension that was articulated across the whole of Europe, as well as in North America. Secular liberals and conservatives, Protestants and others, in both predominantly Catholic or Protestant countries all used well-established negative images of the Catholic Church to position themselves politically and culturally. The widespread existence of anti-Catholicism in many different settings makes it an important object of study, and an eminent vehicle for cross-cultural comparisons (Verhoeven 2005).[1]

International research has emphasised the importance of anti-Catholicism for the processes of identity formation across Europe, both for established Protestant Churches and for national liberal movements. The connection between anti-Catholicism and other 'anti' movements such as antisemitism, anti-feminism, and anti-socialism has also been pointed out. Much like these movements, anti-Catholicism was a transnational

[1] This introduction as well as the chapters by Jonas Harvard, Ainur Elmgren and Yvonne Maria Werner has been copy-edited by Dr. Charlotte Merton.

cultural phenomenon, and similarly negative accusations and stereotypes regarding Catholicism existed in a number of countries. Anti-Catholic literature formed an international genre that spread across the European continent (Clark and Kaiser 2009; Verhoeven 2010, Borutta 2011).

The purpose of this volume is to show how different national contexts affected the proliferation of anti-Catholic messages over the course of four centuries of European history, from 1600 to 2000. Factors such as the legal status of various faiths and their opportunities for proselytising, the relation between state and church, transnational cultural relations, and the development of different media and channels for communication all provide clues as to the general patterns governing anti-Catholicism as a societal force.

In early modern European society, state and confession were intimately connected. The established religion underpinned national identity, and non-conformity to established churches was subject to legal penalties. Europe was divided into confessional spheres in accordance with the principle *cuius region, eius religions*, which was confirmed by the religious Peace Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 and had the status of international law. Anti-Catholicism as well as anti-Protestantism was thus a part of the legal and cultural system of the time, and in several countries it was bound up closely with questions of monarchical succession. However, the question of tolerance and religious liberty was a matter of continuous debate throughout the early-modern period, which became more urgent in the later eighteenth century. Freedom of religion, proclaimed as a human right both in the United States Declaration of Independence in 1776 and in the French Declaration of the Rights of Man in 1789, was part of the modern project. It was an expression of a new way of understanding the relationship between the individual person, society and state authority; civil rights should not depend on religious affiliation and nobody should be discriminated because of religion (Rémond 1996; Ihalainen 2005).

In the nineteenth century, liberals of different shades began to see religion as a private matter. Significantly, anti-Catholicism persisted, shifting to target the Catholic Church and the papacy on matters of national integrity, progress and modernity. Protestant religious groups also maintained a guard on their identities against the charge of popery. Anti-Catholic movements were especially strong in religiously heterogeneous countries such as Germany, Switzerland, and the Netherlands, but

also played an important role in France, Italy, and other Catholic countries (Drury 2001, 98–131). Anti-Catholicism increased further when the Catholic Church strongly condemned both Protestantism and the modern development towards a secular society. In many countries, in particular those dominated by liberal forces, this resulted in veritable clashes between the Catholic Church and the state. During these conflicts, measures such as exclusion and expropriation laws and the expulsion of Catholic orders and congregations were used by state authorities (Clark and Kaiser 2003; Sorrel 2003).

This overall framework of transnational symbolic communication must be seen in relation to the theories of religious culture and national identity that have been developed in social and ecclesiastical historical research. In each country, the specific role of anti-Catholicism was linked to domestic religious developments. Hartmut Lehmann speaks of de-Christianisation and Christian revivalism as two connected phenomena in the Western world during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Lehmann 1997, 32–66, and 2004). Focusing on Great Britain, France, and Germany, Hugh McLeod has pointed to the close connection between confessional culture and national identity. He draws attention to the fact that, despite the downturn in religious adherence, Christianity continued to provide a normative body of values (McLeod 2000). Peter van Rooden points to similar tendencies in the confessionally divided Netherlands, where Catholics and Protestants each formed their own national identity (van Rooden 1996).

Regarding Great Britain and the US, several studies have confirmed that anti-Catholicism was an important aspect of British and North American culture. Denis Paz thus shows the impact of anti-Catholicism as a popular culture phenomenon, with different groups developing their own version of anti-Catholicism and using it as a weapon in the political debate (Paz 1992). According to Robert Lockwood, Catholicism in the US was portrayed as an antithesis of 'the American way of life', resulting in repeated boycotts and attacks on Catholics. Here anti-Catholicism often made common cause with antisemitism and general racism. Justin Nordstrom demonstrates how anti-Catholicism became prominent by dint of its 'critical overlap' with discourses of progressivism, masculinity, and nationalism. The transnational character of anti-Catholicism is emphasised by Susan Griffin in her work on anti-Catholic stereotypes in British and North American literature (Lockwood 2000; Nordstrom

2006; Griffin 2004). John Wolffe, who is the author of the first chapter in this volume, has examined the cultural and social dimensions of anti-Catholicism in British nineteenth-century society, relating them to the values and impact of evangelicalism at various levels of society. British anti-Catholicism has been studied also by Erik Sidenvall, who argues that the anti-Catholic discourse continued to serve as a unifying framework for British Protestantism until the 1860s, when the Catholic reform movement disarmed anti-Catholic rhetoric (Wolffe 1991; Sidenvall 2005).

Along similar lines, recent German researchers have pointed to the central importance of anti-Catholicism for the development of a German Protestant national identity. Several researchers have pointed to the fact that in Protestant and national liberal circles, Catholicism served as an effective counter-image to the modernity these groups claimed to represent (Hübinger 1994: Kuhlemann 2001; Blaschke 2000, 38–75). The fight against Catholicism culminated in the *Kulturkampf*, or culture wars, of the 1870s. Yet, as Manfred Kittel has demonstrated, anti-Catholicism continued to constitute an important element in Protestant national identity in the twentieth century, with it an important feature of both German nationalist and national socialist propaganda. In the eyes of many Protestants, this made the Nazi Party appear to be a Lutheran party (Kittel 2000).

In particular, the *Kulturkampf* and its aftermath has been an important field of study in the research on anti-Catholicism in Germany. An innovative interpretation is offered by Michael Gross, who claims that the proponents of German liberalism not only portrayed Catholicism as an un-German and outdated form of religion, but also as a threat to the masculine and Protestant character of the German nation. According to Gross, biology was at the center of liberal anti-Catholicism, and not religion (Gross 2004). Manuel Borutta, one of the authors in this anthology, offers a different interpretation of gender as a driving force and limit of this conflict. By situating the *Kulturkampf* within the transnational context of the European culture wars he also shows that these conflicts already started in the first half of the nineteenth century and mutually influenced each other. According to Borutta, anti-Catholicism was an intra-European Orientalism, producing theories of secularisation which were transferred to the social sciences after 1900 (Borutta 2010, 2011). Numerous studies have traced developments in Catholic countries such

as Spain, France, and Italy, where the Catholic Church continued to be an important power in society. In these countries, anti-Catholicism took the form of radical anticlericalism and was an important factor in the countries' political struggles (Viallet 1991; Rémond 1999; Borutta 2012).

What specific forms did this burgeoning anti-Catholicism take? How and with what purpose was such rhetoric used in political and Church-related debates? What role did anti-Catholic notions play in the development of the state churches? And how were such notions expressed in popular culture, literature, the press, or the arts? These are some of the questions that this book seeks to answer, using a selection of case-studies dealing with the phenomenon of anti-Catholicism in Britain, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden, and including some observations on the United States.

A key point of departure for the analysis is the concept of the 'unifying other', proposed by Linda Colley and used previously to explain anti-Catholic sentiment in English political thought (Colley 1992; Fatovic 2005, 37–58). The significance of the Catholic Church as a unifying other was twofold. Firstly, the Catholic Church by its very nature constituted a transnational structure, and the influence of the pope and the Roman curia was thus perceived as a potential threat, inimical to the very idea of the national sovereignty that was growing stronger in the nineteenth century. Secondly, in the communicative landscape of the nineteenth-century circulation of opinion, the transmission of materials between countries increased rapidly, as papers and publishers copied stories from one another. In some cases this circulation was further facilitated by the existence of linguistic similarities. Anti-Catholicism presented a shared symbolic language, which was both understood and perceived as relevant by the public all over the Western world.

The chapters in the current volume in different ways all add to the body of knowledge about anti-Catholicism as a transnational phenomenon. In the first part, more general perspectives are presented. John Wolffe points to the importance of a comparative and transatlantic perspective, which he illustrates by examining the relations between British and North American anti-Catholicism in terms of chronology, causation, and consequences. He concludes that anti-Catholicism was a highly complex phenomenon, which had different theological, political, nationalistic, cultural, and social manifestations. Manuel Borutta compares anti-Catholicism in Italy and Germany in the era of the culture wars, focus-

sing on media and visual strategies of 'othering' and the role played by categories such as confession, class and gender, and nation and race. Whereas anti-Catholicism in Germany was expressed within the framework of the perceived Protestant nature of the German nation, it took on the character of anticlericalism in Catholic Italy. Borutta also discusses the impact of secularisation theory in explaining the culture wars in the two countries.

The second part of the volume is concerned with anti-Catholicism and national identity. Laura Stevens analyses the concept of the Whore of Babylon in anti-Catholic rhetoric in eighteenth-century Britain. In her reading, it was not only used as an invective in connection with the pope or the Catholic Church, but also reflects the significance of interiority, aesthetics, and gender to Protestant spirituality and identity. Clare Haynes addresses similar questions, using the example of the Raphael Cartoons, to explore how Protestants in Britain related to Catholic religious art from the eighteenth century up to the present and the impact of anti-Catholicism in this process. The main question is how taste for Catholic art was articulated in relation to the antipathy for Catholicism itself.

Identity is also the focus of Edwina Hagen's chapter on anti-Catholicism in the process of Dutch nation-building in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Although Catholics were gradually accepted as responsible citizens, Catholicism continued to serve as a counter-image to Protestant identity, albeit in a new way that saw nationalism and Enlightenment ideas substitute older religious identity constructions. Meanwhile, Catholics themselves developed and used enemy constructions to mark identity and community. Taking the example of Germany, Olaf Blaschke illustrates the fruitfulness of examining anti-Catholic movements in the light of Catholic anti-Protestantism. He opposes the tendency in some research on anti-Catholicism to describe Catholics only as victims, and points to the similarities of enemy stereotypes and accusations used by both sides.

The relation between Catholic missionary activities and anti-Catholic reactions in the media and parliamentary debates is shown by Yvonne Maria Werner. Her analysis of the debates on the Catholic Church from the mid nineteenth century to the 1960s reveals changes in the perception of the 'Catholic danger'. Whereas anti-Catholicism was prompted by a desire to shield Protestant religious unity at the beginning of the pe-

riod, the objective later became more and more secular. Yet the supranational character of the Catholic Church and its demands for independence from state power continued to be regarded as a threat to Swedish national identity and integrity. Kristin Norseth, meanwhile, shows the importance played by individuals in campaigning against Catholicism. The focus in her study is a Norwegian female writer and feminist who wrote passionate anti-Catholic tracts in the inter-war period and became involved in legal battles against the Catholic Church in Norway. By attacking the Catholic Church she saw herself as defending the liberal and modern values of Norwegian society and culture, which stemmed from the nation's Lutheran heritage.

Anti-Catholicism and political culture is the subject of the third part of the volume. Jes Fabricus Møller and Uffe Østergård discuss anti-Catholicism in Denmark in a long-term perspective. In the early modern period, Danish legislation was dominated by a vociferous anti-Catholicism, and the debates on the new Danish constitution of 1849 revealed the enduring importance of anti-Catholic feelings and fears. One conclusion is that Lutheranism has continued to be an integral part of Danish national identity and political culture up to the present. In a Nordic perspective, the Jesuits were traditionally viewed as the ultimate representatives of the 'Catholic peril' and all the evils that were customarily associated with Catholicism. This is illustrated in Ainur Elmgren's and Bernt Oftestad's chapters. Elmgren explores the prevalence of the Jesuit stereotype in Finnish political culture, which she views both in a broader European context and against other enemy images. She notes the connection between anti-Catholicism and anti-Communism, and finds that Jesuit stereotypes were sometimes used in veiled attacks on the Russian Empire. In Norway, the Jesuit order was expressly forbidden in the liberal constitution of 1814, and although often criticised as being incompatible with modern principles, the ban was only removed in 1956. Oftestad interprets the longevity of the ban against Jesuits as reflecting not only Norway's strong anti-Catholic tradition, but also the prevalence of confessional Lutheran nationalism.

The 'Jesuit danger' and the possibility of Catholic proselytising were used as arguments against the relaxation of religious legislation in Sweden as well. Jonas Harvard gives several examples of this as he examines the debates on these issues in the Swedish Parliament in the 1850s and 1860s. He shows how anti-Catholicism came to be connected to the

question of the role of Church and religion in the public sphere. Catholic religious practice, which was described as superstitious, emotive, and showy, was used as a counter-image to the supposedly more enlightened and intellectual Protestant tradition. These distinctions between Protestant and Catholic were also used in the Scottish debate, as is illustrated in Andrew Newby's chapter on the reactions in the Scottish media to Catholic missionary activities in Scotland and northern Scandinavia. His point is that Scottish anti-Catholicism must be interpreted as an outflow of currents of thought similar to those found in other northern European countries, where Catholicism was constructed as a symbol of anti-modernism and repression. He also highlights the importance of Scotland's distinctive Presbyterianism, which formed the basis for resistance against Catholicism, and Scotland's sense of identity as a 'stateless nation'.

Through all of these case-studies and examples of anti-Catholicism runs the theme of the unifying other. Whether it be national identity or political culture, a variety of liberal, conservative, secular, Protestant, and other forces gave shape to this counter-image, taking on the function of a pattern from which one's owns ideals and beliefs could be chiselled out. Periods of extreme anti-Catholicism were triggered either by events within the Catholic Church itself or by legal changes, controversies over the extension of religious freedom, or the actions of vocal individuals. Such outbursts frequently reiterated similar stereotypes, which were part of a long-term transnational cultural heritage that circulated across borders through different channels of communication. As this volume shows, although the specific shapes and purposes of anti-Catholicism of all types were determined by the cultural, political, and theological circumstances of each setting, from the nineteenth century on it was the case that anti-Catholicism constituted a powerful European cross-cultural phenomenon.

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Part 1– General Perspectives

NORTH ATLANTIC ANTI-CATHOLICISM IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY: A COMPARATIVE OVERVIEW

John Wolffe

Abstract

Taking as its starting point the visit of the American George Barrell Cheever to Europe in 1844, this chapter sets up a broad comparative framework for the analysis of nineteenth-century anti-Catholicism. Comparative approaches to the subject are as yet undeveloped in the face of the understandable tendency of scholars to root their work in the specificities of particular nations, regions and localities. There are however striking similarities in the chronologies of anti-Catholic movements in the North Atlantic world that highlight the value of studying them in parallel. Causation was complex and diverse, but the factor highlighted here is the context of religious competition between Roman Catholicism and expansionist Protestant evangelicalism. Consequences were paradoxical: constitutional links between church and state were weakened as national religious cohesion was promoted, and religious antagonisms stimulated the long-term advance of liberty and pluralism.

In June 1844 George Barrell Cheever, minister of the Allen Street Presbyterian Church in New York, arrived at Liverpool at the beginning of what was to be an extensive European tour. When he saw a Roman Catholic priest being charged duty on the books he was bringing into England, Cheever reflected:

> If there were a moral custom house, and all the assertions of the Roman priesthood had to be stopped and pay duty on concealment and falsehood,

> all the revenues of the Holy Catholic and Apostolic Church would not be sufficient to get her wares out of bondage.

Cheever went on to predict a great war of religion in Europe in which the forces of 'Romanism' and 'despotism' would be arrayed against the 'system of civil and religious freedom called Protestantism'. Ireland would break free from Great Britain, but would rapidly become enslaved to the Roman Catholic Church. The whole world would be convulsed. Even in the United States there was a danger that 'the same foreign and Romish elements that have already produced such fearful riots in our cities' would foment a civil war (Cheever, 1844, *NYE*, 8 August).

Cheever travelled on to Oxford where he judged that Tractarianism was having an 'immense' impact on the students, the nation's future rulers and religious teachers. In his view the 'Oxford system' of Anglicanism was 'not one whit better than Romanism'. It was likely to lead to extensive conversions to Roman Catholicism, while others would conclude 'This being Christianity I reject it' and hence succumb to infidelity (Cheever, 1844, *NYE*, 12 September). Crossing to the Continent, the American judged French Protestantism to have 'the form without the power' of religion, and hence vulnerable to the advance of resurgent Roman Catholicism (Cheever, 1844, *NYE*, 26 December). Even in Geneva he feared that the there was danger from 'the Resurrection of Romanism' (Cheever 1846a, 20). Visiting the Catholic canton of Valais, which he perceived as subject to the despotism of the Jesuits, he noted extensive 'poverty, disease and filth', which he attributed to the inability of the people to escape 'the superstition of Romanism' (Cheever 1846b, 13–17, 19). At Einsiedeln he observed the pilgrims with disdainful fascination, deploring their 'ignorance and superstition' and 'the degrading nature of Romanism' and buying votive figures, which he thought would 'do well to go with the images of Egyptian idols, which I got in Thebes' (Cheever Papers, Cheever to Elisabeth and Charlotte Cheever, August 30, 1844). Turning south to Italy, he rounded off his travels with a 'most interesting and delightful' visit to the Waldensian valleys, a popular destination for Protestant pilgrims (Cheever Papers, Cheever to Charlotte Cheever, September 21, 1844).

It would be easy to dismiss Cheever's polemic as a blend of prejudice and paranoia, but for the student of anti-Catholicism it contains a logical consistency of its own and serves to introduce several important themes. His sense that Catholicism threatened international and domestic security

and personal liberty was widely shared by liberals and Protestants across Europe. Even if the continent's religious divisions did not actually lead to major military conflict, the tensions they generated still engendered what the authors of a recent collection of essays have termed 'culture wars' (Clark and Kaiser 2003). Fears that the Catholic majority in Ireland presented a threat to the stability of its political union with Britain stimulated the endeavours of Protestants to proselytise and to seek to neutralise Catholic political influence (Bowen 1978). The United States indeed saw vicious sectarian riots in 1844, and for a time in the 1840s and 1850s, Catholic immigration was perceived by many as a much greater threat to the integrity of the republic than the smouldering tensions over slavery that were eventually to erupt in the Civil War (Feldberg 1975; Billington 1938). The growth of Anglo-Catholic influence within the Church of England was to give rise to decades of internal strife (Wellings 2003). At the popular level Catholicism was perceived as not merely spiritually deadening false religion, but as a socially inhibiting perpetuator of poverty and degradation. By contrast true Protestantism, wherever it could be found, was seen as the foundation of a prosperous and secure social order in this world as well as of personal salvation in the next (Wolffe 1991, 121–23).

Cheever's travels and reflections well illustrate the interconnectedness of nineteenth-century anti-Catholicism. He visited Europe three times during his career, making extensive contacts with British and continental counterparts and sending back to the United States extensive reports on his travels (York 1955). Nor was he an isolated case. Other American anti-Catholic leaders were also inveterate travellers: Robert Baird, the most energetic of them all, crossed the Atlantic eighteen times, while working assiduously on behalf of the Foreign Evangelical Society, which sought to advance Protestantism in continental Europe (Baird 1866). Baird is of particular interest on account of his book *Visit to Northern Europe* (Baird 1841), which was a survey of Scandinavia, including numerous pithy judgements on religion and morals that revealed characteristically American presuppositions, particularly regarding the negative consequences of links between church and state. European short-term visitors to North America were rather more unusual, but of course Protestant as well as Catholic permanent emigrants were numerous. Thus there was a steady flow of interest and information back and forth across the Atlantic, which has left an extensive imprint on the historical

record. In Britain as in America, there was considerable concern to support Protestants in continental Europe against perceived Catholic oppression, focused on the work on the Continental Society in the 1820s and by the Evangelical Alliance and the Protestant Alliance later in the century (Wolffe 2007, 207–25). And within the United Kingdom anti-Catholic movements in England, Scotland and Ireland were in close symbiosis with each other, with strong links and interchanges between personnel, and sharing of information and ideology (Wolffe 1991). As the Catholic Church itself was a transnational institution it was natural that its opponents should also look for linkages and cooperation beyond the confines of their own location.

Hence the endeavour to understand and interpret North Atlantic anti-Catholicism in a comparative framework appears a plausible and worthwhile one. It is, however, an undertaking that needs to be constructed on the foundations of scholarship that has hitherto been predominantly national, regional or local in its scope. This situation is entirely understandable given the natural tendency of conscientious scholars to set manageable limits to their fields of investigation. In this respect the comparative history of anti-Catholicism differs little from the comparative history of any other historical theme. However, this tendency is augmented by the widespread conclusion of researchers that anti-Catholic attitudes were particularly significant in shaping the distinctive identity of whichever nation or other grouping is under consideration. This is of course an important comparative conclusion in itself, but it tends to obscure other connections and commonalities. Hence Ray Billington's seminal 1938 study of the mid-nineteenth century United States, *The Protestant Crusade* was subtitled *A Study of the Origins of American Nativism*, thus linking anti-Catholicism to the formation of a distinctive American national consciousness. Indeed the concept of nativism, defined by John Higham as 'intense opposition to an internal minority on the grounds of its foreign (ie 'un-American') connections' (Higham 1988, 4) has dominated American scholarship in the field, establishing a frame of reference that has made it difficult to recognise parallels outside the United States. Research on Britain has avoided such pre-emptive categorisation of anti-Catholicism, but is still prone to highlight connections between Protestantism and the development of British national identity (Colley 1992, 11–54). In relation to Ireland, scholars are preoccupied with the role of anti-Catholicism in contributing to the social, cultural and political divi-

sions of the island, viewing it through the particular prism of its specific circumstances and events (Elliot 2009). A substantial number of local studies offer rich documentation of the specificities of anti-Catholicism in shaping the identities of particular communities and regions on both sides of the Atlantic (Gallagher 1987; Scott 1993; Bendroth 2005; Doyle 2009). Although very valuable in itself, such work tends to lack a wider comparative context.

It is true that there were significant objective differences in national, regional and local contexts. The widely uneven distribution of Catholics from total absence in parts of rural England to majorities in the south of Ireland and in Quebec had a significant impact on the dynamics of local anti-Catholicism. The trajectories of anti-Catholic movements in Scotland and Wales need to be distinguished from those in England; it is important not to generalise about Ireland from Ulster evidence; in the United States the South differed markedly from New England and the mid-Atlantic states, and there were further significant contrasts with the more recently-settled West; in Canada, even putting aside French-speaking Quebec, there were notable differences between Ontario and the Maritimes, and even between the Maritimes themselves. Everywhere volatile urban contexts need to be distinguished from the more stable but still profound antagonisms of rural and small town life. The unintended bias of the existing literature, however, is towards highlighting distinctives rather than commonalities, and any attempt to balance that perspective must necessarily itself be a selective and provisional enterprise.

To date very few scholars have attempted to look at anti-Catholicism in a comparative framework. Hartmut Lehmann led the way with a short but suggestive essay published in 1991, and during the 1990s the present author published two essays making bilateral comparisons between Britain and the United States in the mid-nineteenth century (Lehmann 1991; Wolffe 1994; Wolffe 1998). In 2001 Marjule Anne Drury offered a review of recent literature on Britain, the United States and Germany, but while her thoughtful treatment of Germany is a valuable resource for English-speaking scholars her coverage of Britain and the United States is limited and superficial, thus restricting her capacity to make convincing comparisons (Drury 2001). The following year Stephen Kenny published an overview of anti-Catholicism in North America, giving equal attention to the United States and the Canada, but did not attempt any wider comparisons with Europe (Kenny 2002). Susan Griffin examines

both British and American texts in her 2004 study of anti-Catholicism and nineteenth-century fiction, but while the literary angle is an important one it only represents one perspective on a complex phenomenon (Griffin 2004). The weightiest contribution to date is also the most recent, Timothy Verhoeven's 2010 monograph on anti-Catholicism in France and the United States. This is not perhaps the most obvious bilateral transatlantic comparison to make, but by demonstrating its significance and richness Verhoeven points up the potential for comparisons between Britain, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Scandinavia and North America (Verhoeven 2010).

The geographical scope of the present chapter is the largely English speaking countries adjoining the north Atlantic, the present-day United Kingdom, United States, Canada and Republic of Ireland, or to put it another way those regions that in diverse and sometimes contested ways were in the nineteenth century ultimately governed from London or Washington DC. Of course these regions also included significant non-English speaking minorities, Gaelic and Welsh in the British Isles, and a multiplicity of other European as well as indigenous languages in North America, some of which were associated with significant anti-Catholic literatures and subcultures of their own. Herein lay a further channel of connection to developments in continental Europe. Meanwhile English-speaking anti-Catholicism has been a global rather than merely North Atlantic phenomenon. Developments in Britain and America were being paralleled in Australia as early as the 1840s, and both Australia and New Zealand experienced significant sectarian strife in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. South Africa is also an interesting case, because of the interface of English and Dutch traditions of anti-Catholicism, where in the 1820s suspicions of Jesuit conspiracy were already being voiced (Wolffe 2008). There is no space here to explore these wider contexts further, but they would require attention from any fully rounded comparative project.

Three headings for comparison are offered: chronology, causation and consequences. First, it is striking that for the first sixty years of the nineteenth century at least, anti-Catholic activity across the North Atlantic world followed very similar chronological patterns of rise and fluctuation. The period between 1800 and 1820 was a relatively quiet one, with the exception of the ongoing political and constitutional debate in the United Kingdom over Catholic Emancipation, which only intermittently

stirred popular passions. In 1819, when the Philadelphia-based Catholic Matthew Carey published his *Vindiciae Hibernicae* intended to expose Protestant misrepresentations of Irish history he believed the work to be 'unnecessary' in America 'as the prejudices on the subject, which it was intended to combat, had scarcely any existence here' (American Antiquarian Society Circular by Carey, 1825). In Ireland in these years there was a major expansion in provision of Protestant schools aiming to educate Catholic children out of their faith, but their supporters implicitly recognised that success would be dependent on the avoidance of confrontational language.

The 1820s, however, saw a significant growth in polemical anti-Catholicism. In Britain, the Continental Society was founded in 1819, with a view to supporting evangelists to work in mainland Europe, a task characterised by a preacher in 1822 as calling the redeemed to flee from the impending 'fall of the mystical Babylon' (Wolffe 2007, 209). Also in 1822, the new Anglican Archbishop of Dublin, William Magee, delivered a charge to his clergy in which he criticised them for being too conciliatory, and urged them boldly to denounce the errors of Roman Catholics (as well as Protestant Dissenters) (Brown 2001, 93–4). Magee's charge inaugurated a period in which the proselytising agenda of the educational societies became much more apparent, and explicit anti-Catholicism more widespread, culminating with the formation in 1827 of the British Reformation Society, which aimed at nothing less than the wholesale conversion of Ireland to Protestantism (Brown 2001, 120–36; Wolffe 1991, 29–41). Meanwhile across the Atlantic in Philadelphia the polemical temperature was also rising with Matthew Carey provoked by an allegedly libellous attack on Roman Catholics 'in an Address delivered to a Society of Irish Orange Men styling themselves the Gideonite Society' to found his own 'Society for the Defence of the Catholic Religion from Calumny and Abuse' (Carey 1826).

In the early 1830s anti-Catholicism on both sides of the Atlantic became more organised and sustained. In the second half of 1834 in particular there was a striking near simultaneity of seminal symbolic events. In Massachusetts on the night of 11/12 August rioters from Boston, allegedly incited by the anti-Catholic preaching of clergy in the city, attacked and burnt the Ursuline Convent at Charlestown (Bisson 1989). On 30 October, at Hillsborough, near Belfast, Irish Protestants held a mass meeting intended to show Anglicans and Presbyterians tak-

ing a united stand in defence of the Church of Ireland and against al-
leged Catholic attempts to subvert Protestantism in Ireland and the un-
ion with Britain. The Hillsborough meeting was followed by a sustained
campaign of public meetings in England and Scotland in 1835 and 1836
in which Irish Protestants sought to mobilise sympathy for their cause,
and disseminated allegations regarding the alleged socially and religious
subversive activities of the Roman Catholic Church (Wolffe 1991,
77–84). There were no direct links between Charlestown and Hills-
borough. Indeed it would be surprising if there had been, given that the
Tory aristocrats primarily responsible for organising the Hillsborough
meeting would have been appalled by the kind of violent direct action
perpetrated by the Boston mob. However the key point is that simulta-
neously on both sides of the Atlantic antagonism to the Roman Catholic
Church had reached a level that prompted high profile public measures.

The 1840s and 1850s saw something of a high-water mark both in
popular sectarian violence and in political campaigns against Roman
Catholics. Examples of particularly ugly riots were those in Philadelphia
in 1844; Belfast, Prince Edward Island in 1847; Dolly's Brae, County
Down in 1849; Stockport, England in 1852 and Belfast, Ireland in 1857,
but there were numerous smaller outbreaks throughout the North Atlan-
tic world during these decades (Feldberg 2010, 117–68; McGovern 2004;
Millward 1985, 207–24; Doyle 2009, 76–106). Political attempts to con-
trol and exclude Roman Catholics also reached their height, notably with
the futile but symbolic British legislation of 1851 against the recently-
established Catholic episcopal hierarchy and the short-lived electoral
triumphs of the American (or 'Know Nothing') party in the mid-1850s.

Between the mid-1850s and the mid-1860s, external events, notably
the Crimean War and the American Civil War, somewhat deflected pub-
lic attention from the Roman Catholic Church. Nevertheless the hiatus
was only a temporary one, and there were further riots in the 1860s: for
example in Belfast in 1864 and in several English towns in 1867 in re-
sponse to the activities of the Protestant lecturer William Murphy (Doyle
2009, 160–91; Arnstein 1982, 88–107). The indications are that antago-
nism continued strong throughout Britain and North America for the
remainder of the century. Indeed there are grounds for arguing that, with
the formation of organisations such as the American Protective Associa-
tion in 1887 and the Protestant Truth Society in 1889, there was actually
a rising tide of anti-Catholicism in the late 1880s and 1890s (Kinzer

1864; Wellings 1993). However in England in particular much of the animus that had earlier been directed against the Roman Catholic Church was now focused on ritualist clergymen in the Church of England, who were seen as advancing Popery by subverting the Protestantism of the establishment from within.

Secondly, we turn to consider the causes of anti-Catholicism. Such discussion needs to be rooted in the recognition that nineteenth-century anti-Catholicism was a highly complex phenomenon, variously theological, political, nationalistic, cultural and social in its manifestations (Wolffe 2011, 247). It had correspondingly diverse causes, but these were sufficiently interconnected for a single stimulus to have a substantial and widespread impact. It is therefore unhelpful when considering the century as a whole to highlight a particular kind of explanation, whether a sociological one of prejudiced hostility to strangers or minorities, a theological one of specific ideological differences, or a political one of defence against perceived threats to national security and integrity. Nevertheless, some useful generalisations can be made.

Nineteenth-century anti-Catholicism drew on significant longstanding traditions, notably Reformation theology, Protestant popular culture, and constitutional conventions that defined the United Kingdom state as essentially Protestant, and the American one as fundamentally secular. However these factors do not in themselves provide a sufficient explanation: they were rather latent preconditions brought to life by other more specific and short-term developments.

In particular this was an era of intense religious competition in which Roman Catholics were not merely passive victims of Protestant antagonism, but contributed by their words and actions to increasing the hostility they experienced. In this respect too there was a striking correlation between events on both sides of the Atlantic, notably in the autumn of 1850. On 7 October 1850 the newly appointed Cardinal Wiseman published his notorious 'Flaminian Gate' pastoral letter, with language that was liable to offend even the most mild-mannered of Protestants. Wiseman spoke of his 'rule' as Archbishop of Westminster over the counties of Essex, Hertfordshire and Middlesex, and continued:

> The great work, then, is complete; what you have long desired and prayed for is granted. Your beloved country has received a place among the fair Churches, which, normally constituted, form the splendid aggregate of Catholic Communion; Catholic England has been restored to its orbit in the

ecclesiastical firmament, from which its light had long vanished (…)
(Quoted in Ward 1897, i. 542)

A month later on 10 November, John Hughes, Catholic Archbishop of
New York delivered a lecture provocatively entitled 'The Decline of
Protestantism'. Hughes like Wiseman was primarily seeking to encourage
his Catholic flock, but his words could hardly fail to outrage Protestants.
He concluded that 'Protestantism has declined, is declining, and is des-
tined to decline', and acknowledged that anti-Catholics were entirely
correct in their reading of the intentions of the Catholic Church:

> Everybody should know that we have for our mission to convert the world,
> including the inhabitants of the United States, the people of the cities, and
> the people of the country, the officers of the navy and the marines, com-
> manders of the army, the Legislatures, the Senate, the Cabinet, the Presi-
> dent, and all! (…) There is no secret about this. The object we hope to
> accomplish in time is to convert all pagan nations, and all Protestant nations
> – even England with her proud parliament and imperial sovereign. There is
> no secrecy in all this. It is the commission of God to His Church, and not a
> human project (*The Complete Works of the Most Rev John Hughes DD*, ii,
> 100–1).

Language such as this gave Protestants a legitimate sense that the Catho-
lic Church presented a serious challenge to their own identity and sur-
vival. That challenge moreover was presented in political and social
terms, as well as specifically religious ones. To put the point bluntly, anti-
Protestantism needs to be recognised as a significant factor in giving rise
to anti-Catholicism.

   The triumphalism of mid-century Catholic prelates such as Hughes
and Wiseman nevertheless contrasted with the non-confrontational tone
of their predecessors up to the early nineteenth century, who had been
concerned not gratuitously to provoke Protestant hostility to their small
minority communities (Wolffe 1991, 17). The intervening decades had
seen substantial expansion in Roman Catholic populations throughout
the North Atlantic world outside southern Ireland, in part because of
Irish and other migration, in part because of natural increase. Conse-
quently Catholics became more visible, as reflected for example in new
and more ambitious church buildings such as St Chad's Cathedral in
Birmingham opened in 1839, and in claims to distinctive educational
provision for their children. There is no simple correlation between the
proportion of Catholics in a society and the intensity and prevalence of
anti-Catholicism. However, broadly speaking, it appears that both a small

inconspicuous minority that clearly posed no objective threat, and a Catholic majority that it would have been unwise to provoke, were conducive to relatively muted anti-Catholicism. In regions such as Yorkshire, north-east Scotland, and Maryland, where Catholics had a long continuous minority historic presence, they appear to have been more acceptable than where they were perceived as newcomers. A manifestly growing minority, however, was likely to stir strong antagonisms – even if still a very small one as in Sweden (Werner, this volume). This was the situation in England, Scotland, and the north-eastern United States during the first half of the nineteenth century. In Ireland and Canada too, the presence of Catholics was becoming more conspicuous in previously predominantly Protestant parts of Ulster, the Maritimes and Ontario. Canada, however, despite tensions at local levels, has more readily accepted national political leadership from Roman Catholics than either the United Kingdom or the United States:[1] the majority Catholic population in Quebec has had to be accommodated.

Catholic expansion and growing assertiveness provoked a particularly vigorous response from the parallel Evangelical movement in North Atlantic Protestantism, which was similarly possessed of an absolute conviction of its divinely sanctioned calling to convert the world. Evangelicalism was not initially as explicitly anti-Catholic as Reformed versions of Protestantism, but during the 1820s and 1830s the experience of confrontation in Ireland and awareness of growing Catholic numbers in England and North America combined with eschatological speculation to bring about a hardening of attitudes. While theological in its origins and inspiration, Evangelical anti-Catholicism thus stimulated a wide range of responses. For example, it impinged on politics through education controversies, and on popular anti-Catholicism to the extent that some listeners at Evangelical sermons were also likely to have been members of the Orange Order, or other similar bodies. Moreover Evangelicals and Catholics were engaged in competing efforts on the ground to secure the adherence of the virtually unchurched poor of new industrial towns. Evangelicals also, through the agency of organisations such as Edward Nangle's settlement on Achill Island, and Alexander Dallas's Irish Church Missions to Roman Catholics, made serious efforts to proselytise in Ireland. These campaigns naturally provoked Catholics, but

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[1] Notably from Wilfrid Laurier, prime minister from 1896 to 1911.

they also reinforced an Evangelical self-image of crusading purpose
sustained by further evidence of the perceived social as well as spiritual
corruption of popular Roman Catholicism (Wolffe 1991; Wolffe 1994;
Bowen 1978).

While Evangelical zeal thus gave added intensity and vigour to North
Atlantic anti-Catholicism, it was also in some respects a moderating
factor. Evangelicals saw individual Roman Catholics as potential con-
verts with souls to be saved, and directed their polemic rather against the
beliefs and hierarchy of the Catholic Church. The distinction was un-
doubtedly rather too subtle always to be sustainable on the ground but it
was nevertheless a significant one. This was the case particularly in the
United States where the indications are that in the 1850s there was little
or no overlap between the core memberships of Evangelical organisa-
tions seeking to convert Catholics and nativist ones seeking to exclude
them from public life (Wolffe 1994, 186–7). Moral scruples also seem to
have made many Evangelicals reluctant to resort to the more lurid kind
of attacks on alleged Catholic sexual perversions.

The framing of anti-Catholicism in a context of religious competition
rather than one of religious hatred and prejudice leads naturally into the
final section of this chapter, considering the consequences of nineteenth-
century North Atlantic anti-Catholicism. It can be seen as a symptom of
the vitality of mid-century Christianity, also reflected in the intense com-
petition between Protestant denominations in both Britain and North
America. Anti-Catholics were prone to characterise infidelity and indif-
ference not as challenges in their own right, but rather as arising from
reaction to the excessive credulity allegedly required by Catholicism. In
the short term such competitiveness seems actually to have assisted the
process of reconfessionalisation and Christian resurgence in the North
Atlantic world. In the longer term, however, its consequences were more
ambivalent, as with the rise of Darwinism and radical criticism of the
Bible, more secular critiques of Christianity gained increased substance,
and anti-Catholicism was more likely to be perceived as futile infighting.
This was especially the case in relation to the rather sterile anti-ritualist
campaigns of later nineteenth century Anglican Evangelicals. Hence
eventually in the mid to late twentieth century we have seen something
of a convergence between Catholics and conservative Protestants in a
common defence of traditional Christianity, and the transmutation of
anti-Catholicism into a primarily secular rather than Protestant frame-

work (Noll and Nystrom 2005; Jenkins 2003). This transition was well illustrated by the opposition to the recent visit of Benedict XVI to Britain, when traditional Protestant protests from the likes of Ian Paisley were very small scale and inconspicuous relative to the much larger secularist demonstrations coordinated by the 'Protest the Pope' campaign (protest-the-pope.org.uk).

Anti-Catholicism in the North Atlantic world has often been constructed as persecution, or at least oppression, of a religions minority. However, a seemingly paradoxical consequence was actually the promotion of religious liberty and the severing or weakening of ties between church and state. Even the most militant of Anglo-American anti-Catholics did not seek to deny Catholics freedom of worship, and once Catholic Emancipation was passed in the United Kingdom in 1829 there were few who sought to deny them civil rights. On the other hand any hints of state sanction or support for Catholicism were fiercely contested. The alignment between anti-Catholicism and the staunch upholding of the separation of church and state was most apparent in the United States, but it was also apparent among British Nonconformists. Anglican anti-Catholics were militantly opposed to any contamination of the purity of the church-state relationship as they saw it through any countenance of Catholicism, and thus vigorously resisted Sir Robert Peel's measure in 1845 for the permanent state support of the Catholic seminary at Maynooth in Ireland. When a few years later the British government explored the possibility of wider concurrent endowment of the Roman Catholic Church in Ireland, they abandoned the policy through fear of an anti-Catholic outcry (Wolffe 1991, 237). The long term logic of this decision was the disestablishment in 1869 of the Anglican Church of Ireland. A parallel development was the extension during the 1850s of the Evangelical Alliance's initial concern for the situation of Protestants oppressed under Catholic regimes in continental Europe also to cover religious minorities under Protestant governments such as Prussia and Sweden. They also took up the case of Edgar Mortara, a Jewish boy seized from his family by Catholic authorities in Bologna (Wolffe 1991, 283-4; Wolffe 2007, 222–3).

Anti-Catholicism has often promoted national identity and cohesion, leading Catholics in their turn to assert their deep patriotic roots through for example the claims of English Catholics to continuity with an idealised national medieval past, and the formation of the Knights of Colum-

bus by their American counterparts (Lothian 2009; Kauffman 1982). It is important, however, to balance this perspective by highlighting the role of anti-Catholicism in promoting international connections. To some extent this process operated within the United Kingdom, strengthening ties between England, Scotland, Wales and Ulster through a sense of shared Protestantism cementing a feeling of British identity (McLeod 1999). Such a consciousness was also important in sustaining imperial ties with Canada, Australia and southern Africa in the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Wolffe 2008). It is probably no coincidence that the weakening since the 1960s of that sense of shared 'Britishness' has coincided with the decline of anti-Catholicism into marginality in most parts of the United Kingdom outside Northern Ireland, Merseyside and Clydeside. On a wider canvas too, anti-Catholicism helped to sustain a sense of North Atlantic connection in tension with European ones (Thomas 2005, 155–66). Such ties were not immune to other calculations of national interest, but were nevertheless significant. Within Europe too the fact that Protestant affinities with Germany were eventually overwhelmed in the tide of war in 1914 should not obscure their significance up to the beginning of the twentieth century. In 1901 the Kaiser still believed that the greatest threat to European stability lay in Vatican intrigues, and that Britain and Germany should 'pull together' to resist them (British Library, Diary of Bishop Boyd Carpenter, fol. 55).

A comparative framework, as set out in this chapter, offers particular scope for identifying the genuine distinctiveness of anti-Catholicism in the Nordic countries, alongside wide characteristics common to the Protestant world as a whole. Future work on Scandinavian anti-Catholicism would usefully pay particular attention to actual personal and other linkages, to the activities and influence of British and American visitors to Scandinavia such as Robert Baird, to the transmission of ideas around the North Atlantic, Baltic and North Sea worlds, and to the role of Scandinavian emigrants to North America. It is also valuable to explore the continuing contemporary legacy of historic anti-Catholicism, not only its recent resurfacing in secularised form due particularly to revelations of clerical child sex abuse, but also because it provides vital context for understanding present-day attitudes to the idea of Europe and to the presence of Muslims in western societies.

Let us return finally to George Barrell Cheever. On 24 August 1844 he wrote to his mother from Geneva of his expectation of a 'religious

crisis' in France and Switzerland and of his hopes to gather materials to enlighten his own countrymen on developments there. A month later, from Turin, after visiting the Waldensians, he told her he was now anxious to return to New York as soon as possible 'that I may, if God permit, lay before the Churches and the people some of the details of my visit, while their interest and importance are still fresh in my mind.' (Cheever Papers, Cheever to Charlotte Cheever, August 24, September 21, 1844) Cheever, and others like him in both Britain and America, were not isolated xenophobes, but rather men and sometimes women of wide experience and cosmopolitan connections who viewed the world through the perspective of profound anti-Catholic convictions. If we are properly to understand nineteenth-century anti-Catholicism we also need a similarly broad comparative perspective.

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SETTEMBRINI'S WORLD:
GERMAN AND ITALIAN ANTI-CATHOLICISM IN THE AGE OF
THE CULTURE WARS

Manuel Borutta

Abstract

This article analyses the progressive anti-Catholicism of liberal and democratic forces that was responsible for the outbreak of the culture wars in the nineteenth century. Liberals and democrats connected anti-Catholicism with projects of bourgeois and secular modernity. They wanted to spread bourgeois values such as the belief in freedom, progress and rationality, the separation of public and private spheres, a heterosexual matrix and modern work ethics compatible with industrial capitalism. Moreover, they aimed to secularise modern societies: to privatise religion; to differentiate religion from other spheres of such as politics, science and arts; or to substitute faith with knowledge. I will position this progressive anti-Catholicism within the European context of the culture wars. I will first define these transnational conflicts and the crucial role played by Catholicism, then compare the anti-Catholicism within the culture wars of different confessional and national contexts – Germany and Italy – and finally explore cross-border aspects such as anti-clerical media transfers and scandals, Orientalist constructions of a Catholic 'Other', and the appropriation of these anti-Catholic theories of secularisation by social scientists after the culture wars.[1]

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[1] This chapter is translated from the German by Kate Maye-Saidi.

'No, no, I am a European, an Occidental, whereas the order of progress you describe is purely Eastern. The Orient abhors activity' (Mann 1969, 259). With these words, the free mason Lodovico Settembrini distanced himself from the point of view of the Jesuit Leo Naphta in Thomas Mann's novel *The Magic Mountain*. Settembrini's progressive views are in sharp contrast to Naphta's Catholic fundamentalism. The fellow mason preached reason and analysis, progress and work, democracy and republic, national state and humanism, bourgeoisie and capitalism, education and social reform, natural science, and hygiene and cremation; the Jesuit, in contrast, lauded the baroque, quietism and mystic, the Middle Ages and church cosmopolitism, sympathy and Christian communism, command, obedience and sacrifice, and self denial and terror. From the perspective of the novel's hero, Hans Castorp, the verbal power struggle between the two antipodes remains tied. He finds it difficult to decide between the two extremes. At the end, he is tired and confused. But for all of this, Castrop feels emotionally closer to Settembrini after he recognises elements of his own bourgeois Hanseatic Protestant culture in him. Naphta, in contrast, is the epitome of the uncanny other of this culture. As brilliant and shrewd as his accomplishments may be, he will always remain an outsider. In the end, he commits suicide to avoid a real duel with Settembrini thereby becoming the victim of his own fundamentalism. This virtuosic battle of words between the unequal 'pedagogues' in the *Magic Mountain* is an allegory of the European culture war of the nineteenth-century. The novel, which was started in 1913 and published in 1924, appeared at the end of the era of the culture wars. In it, Thomas Mann allows the polar ideologies of the culture wars collide once again, from a post-culture war perspective with ambivalent denouement. Instead of taking a side, the novelist plays an ironic game involving anti-Catholic and anti-liberal stereotypes.

In the following, progressive anti-Catholicism à la Settembrini will be considered in the context of the culture wars as this fundamental conflict of European history provided a social fundament, widened the medial spectrum and increased the political effect of anti-Catholicism and changed it in many respects. This will be demonstrated in the examples of the culture wars of Germany and Italy. Both conflicts played important roles in the history of the culture wars: while Germany is considered a prime example of a conflict that was especially rigorously waged, it has long been contested that there was anything akin to anti-Catholicism or a culture war in Italy. Both cases will be systematically compared against this backdrop. Anti-Catholicism itself will be closely examined in the

process: Which discourses and medial and visual strategies of othering were deployed? Which roles did the different categories such as confession and nation, class and gender play in it? And what was its relationship to antisemitism and racism, and to the theories and practices of secularisation?[2]

Transnational Context: The Age of the Culture Wars

'In the whole of Europe,' wrote the Catholic reform theologian Albert Ehrhard in Vienna in 1902, those 'conflicts between governments and the Catholic Church arose and to a certain extent still exist, which our epoch will record maybe once with the description 'age of the culture wars' (Ehrhard 1902, 290). Culture wars were a transnational phenomena, which began in countries like Switzerland on the eve of the 1848 revolution(*Vormärz*) and spread into other countries such as Spain, Portugal and France and Italy during the twenthieth-century. The heyday was during the final third of the nineteenth-century when liberal governments took power in many countries, which resulted in countries like Brazil and Mexico, for example, also experiencing culture wars (Brunialti 1892, VII).

The culture wars were about the place and meaning of religion. On the one hand, there were progressive powers, for whom it was about the secularisation of society and who in fact understood different things by this: the liberals wanted a differentiation of politics and religion, a privatisation of religion, the submission of the Church to the state, a secularisation of public institutions such as schools, but also liberation from the restrictions of the Church and religious discrimination. Democrats and radicals, socialists and anarchists, and free-thinkers and positivists wanted even more: the separation of church and state and the replacement of faith with knowledge. These different projects of secularisation generated the opposition of religious forces who advocated a continuance or expansion of religiosity in the public sphere and politics as well as the primacy of the Church and religion over the state and knowledge. This religious opposition was transconfessional. The culture wars are therefore not only to be understood as bi-confessional conflicts be-

[2] Detailed literature and source documentation for the following in: Borutta 2011. For further research on late modern anti-Catholicism, see also Gross 2004; Verhoeven 2010. On early modern anti-Catholicism, see Niccoli 2005; Dykema/Oberman 1993; Scribner 1981; Goertz 1995.

tween Protestants and Catholics; they were also waged within confessions and involved multi- and monoconfessional, and Christian as well as non-Christian societies and milieus equally (Borutta 2011).

Catholicism, however, was often the focus of attention. For one, it was blatantly opposed to the separating of politics from religion: Catholic symbols and rituals had claimed public space since time immemorial. The Papal States and the Pope embodied the amalgamation of state and the Church as global symbols that were visible in Rome from afar. For another, Catholicism, was opposed to the mentioned projects of secularisation in an especially spectacular way. After secularisation at the beginning of the nineteenth-century, which had been traumatic for the Church, there was a huge modernisation of religious practices, symbols and institutions from the 1820s onwards. 'New Catholicism' was the result of a dynamic, conflict-filled interplay of rival theological schools, religious centres and peripherals. The Roman Curia was only one of many protagonists, albeit an increasingly powerful one. The establishment of Catholic media, associations, monasteries and parties, the feminisation of the religion, and the expansion of the Catholic mission – Rome could influence all of these processes, but never completely guide them. Important impetus for change started from below or from the periphery, for example, in the case of visions of Mary and the establishment of 'political Catholicism' (Clark 2009). The Risorgimento struggle for Rome and the Italian annexation of the Church State in the 1860's were of huge significance for the intensification of the conflict between liberal states and the Catholic Church. This was because the Curia reacted to this extensive deterritorialisation with a centralisation and globalisation of Church structures (Chadwick 1998, 181–185, 197–199). Ultramontanism now became dominant within the Curia, which was very significant for culture wars in countries with large Catholic populations. As an increasingly global actor, Rome sought to influence forms and expressions of Catholicism outside Italy more strongly and to countervail the secularisation politics of liberal governments everywhere, which was perceived as a violation of state sovereignty by the latter.   For this reason, the conflict between the *Catholic* Church and liberal states gained even more attention and became a synonym proper of the culture wars (Jedin 1971; Becker 1983; Chadwick 1998; Clark/Kaiser 2009).

Beyond Bismarck: The German Culture Wars

Notwithstanding the transnational spreading of the culture wars, they were long considered a genuinely German phenomenon and reduced to the conflict between the state and the Catholic Church in Prussia and in the German Empire after 1871; it was explained through supposedly national characteristics such as the alleged 'illiberalism' of German liberals, the Machiavelli 'genie' of Bismarck and the special ratio of Catholics to Protestants (2:1) in the *Kaiserreich* (for a comprehensive discussion on the research on the German *Kulturkampf* see, Gross 2004, 3–22; Borutta 2011, 20–26). This fixed notion that comprised Bismarck, Prussia, the period of unification and the opposition of Christian confessions does not, however, do justice to the complexity of the German culture wars.

For, in the first place, there were culture wars in Prussia and other German states before 1871 (Kißling 1–3: 1911–1916). The 'Cologne Troubles' of 1837, which came about after the Prussian imprisonment of a Cologne Arch Bishop due to a dispute about confessional intermarriage, caused furious protests by the Catholic Church and the Rhineland population (Schrörs 1927). In 1844, the Trier pilgrimage to the Holy Robe caused an outcry amongst intellectuals and the beginning of the 'German-Catholic' movement (Schieder 1996). After the revolution of 1848, this progressive anti-Catholicism did not receive a lot of attention from the Prussian government because they saw a surety of stability in the Catholic Church (Hyde 1991). Only after the Unification of Germany did Bismarck embrace the educational and church political objectives of the liberals. At this time, the culture war had been well under way in the states run by liberals such as Baden and Bavaria (Evans 1999). In Berlin, which was run by left liberals, there had been the the storming of a Catholic orphanage run by Dominicans and Franciscans in Berlin-Moabit in as early as 1869 (Gross 2004, 170–184; Borutta 2009). The Prussian culture war, in contrast, began in 1872, when liberal Adalbert Falk became the minister for culture (Ross 1998). In the inner-German comparison, Prussia was more a latecomer then a pioneering force in the culture war.

Secondly, Bismarck was considerably less sovereign in the culture war than has long been assumed. He was not only led by rational, power political motives in this conflict, but by anti-Catholic emotions and prejudices. Since his schooldays, he had seen Catholicism as an exotic anachronism. Like the liberals, he believed in anti-ultramontane conspiracy

theories, like them he perceived the Centre Party as an illegitimate hybrid of politics and religion, like them he declared Catholic election success to be due to clerical influence, and like them he demanded the separation of church and education. Contrary to a rumour spread by the liberals themselves after the failure of the culture war, they did not fall victim to a Machiavelli strategy invented by Bismarck, which caused them to agree to 'illiberal' punitive laws betraying their own principals. The relationship between Bismarck and the liberals can, in fact, be considered as the opposite: the most powerful political protagonist had liberal objectives himself after the Unification of Germany. When one examines his speeches, writings, and decisions, Bismarck behaved like a liberal during the culture wars; he was just as caught up in the anti-Catholic discourse (Borutta 2011, 315–324).

Thirdly, confession was only one of many factors of the German culture wars. Other aspects such as class and gender, regional and national identities were also of significance: in Bavaria the boundaries of the conflict were between urban citizens and the rural population (Stache 1981). In Rhineland, where anti-Catholicism remained in the bourgeois-male domain, class also played an important role after gender (Schloß-macher 1996). Democrats and liberals treated Upper Silesian Catholics with contempt, if nothing else, because they were Polish (Borutta 2011, 88–95, 296–301, 322–323). The weight of the factor of confession therefore varied greatly – even within Prussia.

Confession *did*, however, play an important role in the German culture wars. After the Reformation, the Protestant elite had defined the nation in a confessional way, excluding Catholicism (Breuer 2001). Furthermore, North German Protestant proponents of the Enlightenment considered it static and incapable of developing und saw in it an obstacle for the building of the nation (Carl 2001). In the nineteenth-century, this point of view was adopted by rational critics of Romanticism and canonised by liberal Protestant scholars (Smith 1995, 19–49). As of *Vormärz*, the term 'Catholicism' became a transreligious synonym for religious orthodoxy, which was also used to stigmatise conservative movements in Protestantism and Judaism (Borutta 2011, 69–71). Germany was a triconfessional land (Smith 2001) and within Catholicism, Protestantism and Judaism, proponents and opponents of modernity fought one another. Anti-ultramontane Catholics such as Johannes Ronge (Schieder 1996), the founder of 'German Catholicism', and Ignaz von Döllinger

(Weiß 1990), the founder of the Old Catholic Church whose members rejected the dogma of Papal infallibility, contributed to the social, medial and territorial expansion of the culture war. In states where there was a Catholic majority in the population, the culture war was rigorously waged. After the Unification of Germany, Bavarian liberals passed imperial laws such as the Pulpit Law and the suppression of the Jesuits (Grohs 1990). By contrast, the Protestant churches opposed liberal secularisation politics, with the result that the anti-Catholic consensus of German Protestants crumbled at the beginning of the Prussian culture war (Lamberti 1989). Liberal Jews also ultimately played an important role in this conflict. They attacked the Catholic Church and religion just as intensely as their Protestant contemporaries and also criticised Catholic attacks on Jews in the process (Joskowicz 2005).

Was progressive anti-Catholicism therefore possibly only a reaction to Catholic antisemitism? In other contexts, it has been pointed out that, 'hostility to Catholicism in the nineteenth century could engender greater sympathy for Jews' (Verhoeven 2010, 11). In the Kingdom of Sardinia, the expulsion of the Jesuits in 1848 coincided with Jewish equality, for whose emancipation many democrats and liberals in German had also fought. At the same time, there is little indication that the anti-Catholicism of liberal Protestants in the culture war was caused or even encouraged by increasing Catholic aggression towards Jews (Blaschke 1997, 42–56). The relationship between anti-Catholicism and antisemitism does not seem to be of a causal nature. Notwithstanding, both phenomena exhibit remarkable analogies. The tendency to dehumanise characterises not only the portrayal of Jews, but also that of the Catholic clergy; as with antisemitism, there was an easy transition to racism. Sexual stereotypes, national enemy concepts, transnational conspiracy theories and syncretisms such as the phrase 'Juda-Jesuitismus' attest analogies and connections, and convergences and relationships between anti-Catholicism and antisemitism, which have yet to be systematically examined (Healy 2003, 126–127).

Fourthly, the German culture war also received additional dynamic through the process of partial political democratisation: the introduction of general equal male suffrage in 1868/71. The Catholic clergy and laypersons reacted to anti-clerical laws and attacks with political organisation and mobilisation in election campaigns and petition movements. In Bavaria, they responded to the separation of school and church with the

founding of a Catholic political party, the *Patriotenpartei*. In Prussia, the
Centre Party was founded after the Moabit *Klostersturm*. Catholic election
success in Baden, Bavaria and in the *Kaiserreich* radicalised the conflict;
Bismarck and the liberals claimed that the clergy influenced voters. In
Bavaria and the Empire, like in Piemont in 1857, there was therefore an
annulment of Catholic mandates and the passing of Church political
laws. The Pulpit Law was passed to protect Catholic laypersons from
clerical influence while school laws were passed to free them from cleri-
cal tutelage. In the analysis and revocation of Catholic election success
and mandate, however, liberals themselves incapacitated Catholic voters
rhetorically, thus confirming their anti-liberal and anti-bourgeois preju-
dices. As a result the bond between the Catholic clergy and laypeople
became even stronger. The liberal topos of clerical influence was detri-
mental for liberal popularity amongst Catholic voters and citizens (An-
derson 2000, 69–105; Borutta 2011, 289–326).

Beyond the Roman Question: The Italian Culture Wars
That Thomas Mann put an Italian in the anti-Catholic role – and not a
German – attests to his stark awareness of the substantial contribution of
Italian liberals and democrats to the secularist project of modernity.
There *was* a dramatic culture war in Italy that affected the history of the
nation from the Risorgimento to fascism and, in addition to this, – due
to the liberal attack on the Church State and the resulting ultramontani-
sation of the Catholic Church – also influenced the culture wars of other
states greatly (Papenheim 2009; Borutta 2012). Yet, in Italy itself, the
culture war was not understood as such for a long time. There, the cul-
ture war was considered a specific Prussian-German phenomenon, which
began of Bismarck's initiative, and which was not comparable in its
rigour with Italy's dispute between state and church. The title of
Lill/Traniello (1993) – 'Il 'Kulturkampf' in Italia e nei paesi di lingua
tedesca' – is misleading insofar as the Italian contributors of this volume
do not consider the Italian conflict as a proper culture war. In this way,
the Italian culture war has been disregarded by Italians historians for a
long time. The anti-Jesuit campaign of the 1840s, the conflict between
state and church in post-revolutionary Piedmont, and the struggle for
Rome were considered independently of one another. However they
must bee seen as elements of *one* culture war (Borutta 2012; for a more

detailed discussion of the research on 'the Italian culture war', see Borutta 2011, 28–33)

There are, of course, excellent studies on Italian anti-*clericalism* (Spadolini 1963, 151–177; Scoppola 1973; Verucci 1996; Lyttelton 1983; Viallet 1991). Yet, for a long time, the anti-*Catholicism* of Italy's many Settembrinis was underestimated and obscured through the concept of 'anti-clericalism'. Recent interventions have dramatised the Italian culture war and demonised the Risorgimento's anti-Catholicism (Galli della Loggia 1993; Pellicciari 1998, 2000, 2004). However, by exaggerating the violence of the conflict, reproducing anti-Masonic conspiracy theories and confining the Risorgimento to a teleology which stretches from Reformation intolerance to the modern totalitarianisms of the twentieth century, they continued the culture war of the nineteenth century and did not therefore succeed in changing the dominant paradigm (against recent attempts to continue the culture war of the nineteenth century and to attack the Italian concept of 'laicità', see Traniello/Bolgiani/Broglio 2009).

As an alternative to these tendencies to disregard or mystify the phenomenon, I want to suggest an analytical use of the term 'anti-Catholicism'. The aggression of Italian progressives was not directed at the clergy in general, but at the Catholic clergy in particular. At the same time, they attacked central elements of Catholic piety such as processions, belief in miracles, visions of Mary and the pilgrimages. Because they imagined the Catholic Church as a perfect machine of command and submission – with the Pope and the Jesuits at the head, the rest of the clergy in the middle and the believers as the subordinates at the bottom –, *all* Catholic symbols and rituals quickly came under suspicion. In this respect, an anti-Catholic moment was inherent to Italian anti-clericalism, which successively developed during the course of the culture war.

The Italian culture war initially began *within* Catholicism as a controversy between reformers and conservatives about the appropriate relationship between the nation and religion, and the state and the Church. In the beginning, liberal Catholics saw a potential ally for the national cause in Pius IX. While the reform theologian Vincenzo Gioberti wanted to see the Pope at the head of an Italian federation, prominent Jesuits turned against any reconciliation of Catholicism with the principle of the nation. Gioberti therefore began a campaign against the Jesuits, which in

the context of the revolution of 1848, caused anti-Jesuit riots and the expulsion of the Societas Jesu from most Italian states. When the Pope rejected the national cause in 1848, the national movement broke with the Catholic Church. In the Kingdom of Sardinia, moderate liberal governments passed anti-clerical laws, which provoked the rancorous opposition of the Catholic Church and its followers. As a result of these disputes, anti-clericalism became a mass phenomenon in Piemont, which allied the government and opposition. The press was proactive as an anti-clerical pressure group. The expansion of church laws throughout Italy after 1860 escalated the conflict on a national level. Of major importance for the radicalisation of the conflict was the Roman question. In the struggle for Rome, the Risorgimento took an anti-Catholic turn. Mazzini's vision of a 'Third Rome' envisaged a dissolution of the medieval 'Rome of the Popes' through a modern 'Rome of the nation' (Borutta 2012).

After the conquest of Rome in 1870, the conflict was displaced to the city itself. Liberal Italy wanted to triumph over papal Rome through modern urban structures, national memorials and majestic architecture (Tobia 1991; Berggren/Sjöstedt 1996). The Roman question put a burden on the relationship between the state and church. The Curia held up its claim to a Church state, refusing to recognise the nation state while, at the same time, forbidding Catholics from participating in national elections. In contrast to German Catholics, Italian Catholics had therefore no political representation on the national level (Formigoni 1998).

National Differences

The comparison between Germany and Italy reveals three central differences, *firstly*, the influence of the confessional situation. In the *Kaiserreich*, which was dominated by Protestants, liberals anticipated a similar liberation of the 'German spirit' from 'Roman coercion' after the Unification of German, like in the Reformation. Not only were they on a secular civilising mission in the culture war, they also envisioned a conversion of German Catholics. The idea was that German Catholics should break away from Rome in order to be able to participate in national and universal projects of modernity as well as in progress and history. They should no longer be *Roman* Catholics. In the beginning, the liberal culture war was quickened in the *Kaiserreich* by the Protestants who were the two-thirds majority; the Italian liberals were more pessimistic in this

regard. They felt that there was no religion compatible with modernity in Italy; Waldensians and Jews were too few in number and reform-Catholic powers in the Church were marginalised after 1850. At the same time, the almost monoconfessional structure of the country also affected the environment of liberals. While one could live in Germany without ever coming into contact with Catholics, this was impossible in Italy. Further, most of the liberals had been brought up Catholic; they had to first of all overcome their own Catholicism.

A *second* distinction was related to the different levels of democratisation of the two societies. While the German culture war was radicalised through the introduction of democratic male suffrage, census suffrage hindered a political mobilisation of church loyal Catholic lower classes in Italy. The socially excluding political system there meant that a minority of radical anti-clerical forces had huge influence on government decisions. Clearly Italy's liberal church politics was only possible because of the low level of democratisation of its political system.

The *third* difference was the Roman question – the unique feature of the Italian culture war. Because the Pope held to the principle of world sovereignty, the liberals, pushed by the democrats, had to resort to military force to seize the capital. The Roman question influenced the Italian culture war on many levels. It aggravated the conflict right up until the Italian conquering of Rome and the Church State, and later alleviated the conflict somewhat because the ruling liberals wanted to avoid further provocation of the Curia and Catholics in Italy and abroad.

Common Features

At the same time, however, the German and Italian culture wars also exhibit many similarities: in both societies the culture war was part of nation building. Both national states emerged after wars against 'Catholic' powers. The Prussian victory over Austria and France as well as the Italian victory over the Papacy were celebrated as the beginning of new eras. They coincided with a militarisation of culture war discourse. The rhetoric of the wars of unification diffused into the inner-political sphere to a certain extent. The culture war appeared to be a continuation of the unification wars within the borders of the national state. The fact that many liberals saw the defeat of Catholicism as an objective of cultural nation building was an aggravating factor. The hegemonial culture in Germany was influenced by liberal Protestants and in Italy by secularists; Catholic culture was in stark contrast to this. For this reason, the liberal

concept of a nation in both countries had anti-Catholic dimensions. In fitting with the popular pedagogical traditions of the Enlightenment, liberals wanted to introduce Catholics to their concept of national culture. A further common feature was therefore also in the pedagogical dimension of the culture war, which is apparent in the duel between the two educators in *The Magic Mountain*: the liberal project of educating of the masses formed a positive counterpart to the negative project of secularisation. It carried traits of a secular civilising mission; liberals sought to spread their bourgeois values during the culture war. The boundaries lay in the tension between the concepts of universalistic claim and particular provenance, and in the inconsistencies and ambivalences of their project for a bourgeois society.

a) Anti-Catholicism as Orientalism

Edward W. Said's *Orientalism* (1995) has often been criticised for drawing a monolithic ('Occidentalist') image of the West (MacKenzie 1995, 1–19). However, his concept also enables us to analyse asymmetric relations *within* 'the West'. Settembrini's identifying of Naphta's Catholic hierarchy with the Orient in *The Magic Mountain* is less due to the originality of Thomas Mann than it is part of a long tradition. Since the Enlightenment, Catholicism was 'orientalised' by progressive Europeans: excluded from the universal process of history and civilisation, and explicitly associated or identified with 'primitive' and 'static' cultures in Africa, America and 'the Orient'.

In Germany, this *exotisation* began in 1781, when the Protestant Berlin reformer Friedrich Nicolai described south German Catholicism as an inner-German colony in a controversially discussed travelogue; it was continued when romanticists such as Novalis or Friedrich Schlegel discovered Catholicism, the Middle Ages and the Orient as sources of aesthetic inspiration. Catholicism was also identified with the Orient in the Hegelianist criticism of Romanticism, but negatively connoted. Until the early 1860s, liberals ridiculed Catholicism as a transitory relic of the premodern era. Only after dogmatic offensive of the Curia that followed was it perceived as a serious threat to the liberal project of modernity. For German liberals, the syllabus of errors and the dogma of Papal infallibility were expressions of despotism, theocracy and barbarianism alien to the Occident. They saw in Catholicism an outmoded, alien and grotesque religion that was incapable of progress and belonged to a lower

level of civilisation that therefore had to disappear (Borutta 2011, 49–116).

The Italian liberals had, in contrast, been brought up Catholic. Catholicism only became alien to them when they grew out of it. It was not only the moderate liberals who saw childhood religiosity as a necessary stage of human development; going on biographical works, it seems that going to church and catechism counted as normal parts of the infantile phase. From adult citizens, however, they expected a distancing from the Catholic Church and religion, a process that they themselves had also gone through. The exotisation was therefore directed exclusively at the Pope, the Church State and part of the clergy for a long time in Italy, and rarely towards Catholicism or the Catholics as a whole. Only at the turn of the century, when the elite increasingly accepted and aestheticised popular Catholicism as a part of the Italian 'national character' did this begin to change. The de-historicisation of Catholicism was, in contrast, constitutive for the Italian culture war. This was also due to the pejorative attitude of educated Europeans towards contemporary Italy: since the Reformation, not only Rome and the Church State but also Italy were declared antiquated or excluded from the historical process. In the view of educated Europeans, Rome and Italy had a glorious past, but no relevance in the present or future. The Enlightenment criticised Rome for being different to modernity. According to the logic of disenchantment, everything should change there. Romanticism, in contrast, celebrated Rome for being different to modernity. As a landscape of ruins or museum, grave or graveyard, the city was a refugium und aesthetic study object for Europeans weary of modernity until the middle of the nineteenth-century. In both cases, Rome's alterity was interpreted as the simultaneity of the non-simultaneous. Many protagonists of the Italian national movement felt like they were in European exile when confronted by this orientalist discourse. They adopted the European concepts of the dead city and nation in an innovative manner and made it the starting point of their struggle. The name 'Risorgimento' (resurrection, regeneration), after which, first the national movement, and then the epoch of nation building, was called, was programmatic: Italy had been declared dead in Rome, which meant that it should 'rise again' here. Out of the European diagnosis of 'Roma è morta' became the Italian battle call 'Roma o morte' after 1848. Catholicism was henceforth also imagined as different to modernity in Italy. Protestantism, in contrast,

was considered a positive model of a religion, which was compatible with modernity (Borutta 2011, 120–150; 2012, 200–206).

The exclusion of Catholicism from the Occident was a transnational phenomenon: like other 'Romanic' nations, Italy was considered in modern Europe backwards, because it was Catholic. Protestant dominated nations like Germany and Switzerland were, by contrast, perceived as dynamic and progressive (Baumeister 1987; Patriarca 2010). These notions are evident in Max Weber's famous 1903 essay *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. In it the German sociologist developed the thesis that there was an affinity between the capitalist spirit and the Calvinist predestination doctrine. Unlike in the cases of Buddhism, Hinduism and Taoism, Weber did not systematically analyse whether Catholicism was compatible with capitalism – despite grave objections from renowned colleagues and striking counterexamples such as capitalism in early modern Italy and Catholic industrial magnates of the nineteenth-century. The incompatibility of Catholicism and capitalism was not an object of examination for Weber, but a premise. Catholics, in his view, did not have much of a 'tendency to economic rationalism', unlike Protestants, which was due to the 'permanent intrinsic character of their religious beliefs, and not only in their temporary external historico-political situations' (Weber 1930, 40). Weber based this sweeping assumption on one single study on the economic situation of Baden Catholics and Protestants by one of his students and projected its findings onto the early modern period and the rest of the world.

The 'Weber thesis' has been controversially discussed amongst historians and sociologists ever since. Although its empirical content has been doubted, it still frequently serves to document Europe's reputed 'uniqueness', where, however, Protestant Europe is always meant. In this manner, Catholicism has continued to be excluded from the Occident till the present day (Borutta 2011, 116–120). It has only been more recently that Islam seems to have taken the place of the primary religious other of secular western modernity construction. A systematic comparison of modern anti-Catholicism and the current islamophobia would presumably unearth surprising similarities and continuities in addition to the time-conditioned differences.

b) Anticlerical Media, Scandals and Violence

Both culture wars were characterised by anti-clerical violence, which could be expressed in different forms – executively, legislatively, in a judicative manner, medially as well as physically. State repression, parliamental debates and legislative procedure were often accompanied by media campaigns and physical altercations with the result that the different forms of violence were mutually influenced. In Italy, this anti-clericalism was directed exclusively towards the Catholic clergy, in Germany it was primarily directed towards Catholic clergy. In the following, this anti-Catholic anti-clericalism will be examined more closely.

An important source of anti-clerical aggression was the bourgeois culture. Reformists, democrats and liberals identified with bourgeois values and principles such as freedom and independence, work and efficiency, marriage, reproduction and family, as well as the separation of the public and private spheres. The lifestyle of the Catholic clergy, which was ideally framed by vows of obedience and ascesis, poverty, and celibacy and enclosure, were considered the antithesis of bourgeoisie (Blackbourn 1993; Gross 2004; Borutta 2011).

The medial representation of the Catholic Clergy played an important role in the culture war. The clerical life style was portrayed as amoral and perverse in novels and pamphlets, daily newspapers, satirical magazines and cartoons. As a result, there was an essentialisation of the clerical other; Catholic clergy were given an obscure sexual and sexually perverted identity; they were feminised, sexualised and pathologised. Celibacy and cloisters were depicted as inhuman institutions of Church coercion that generated sexual double standards and perversion (Healy 2003; Gross 2004; Verhoeven 2010; Borutta 2011).

This manner of portrayal was no mere instrument of propaganda; it also alluded to a certain understanding of human nature. In the sense of a proliferation of discourse on sex (Foucault 1998), clerical sexuality was not only denounced, but also defined through continual quasi academic meticulousness, and this with the purported 'law' of human nature; generative heterosexuality.

For this purpose, anti-clericalism could choose from an abundance of texts and images from different countries and yielded a multitude of cultural translations as well as extensive transfer. Anti-clerical authors and poets, and painters and illustrators often availed of imported artwork. Novelists such as Denis Diderot, Alessandro Manzoni, Eugène

Sue, and caricaturists like Grandville and Wilhelm Busch contributed to European culture literary and visual models, which were then imitated, adopted and transformed (Kaiser 2009; Borutta 2011, 155–218).

As a result of the discovery and invention of clerical sex scandals, Catholic clerics were portrayed as sexual monsters (Borutta 2011, 205–209). Through the generalisation of individual 'cases', the whole clergy came under suspicion; the moral claim of the Church was thus delegitimised. There was a transnational dimension to the medial techniques and transfer of scandalisation: the Mortara affair of 1858, for example, where there was a forced baptism of a young Jewish man (Kertzer 1997; Verhoeven 2010) and the Ubryk affair of 1869 where a insane nun was discovered in a Krakow cloister incited and affiliated anti-Catholics in Europe and America (Gross 2004, 157–170). The scandalisation of clerical sexuality covered a lot of ground: the further away the place of clerical wrongdoing occurred the more difficult it was to investigate the delict. For this reason, anti-clerical newspapers also informed their readers of clerical wrongdoing from all over the world on a daily basis. Fantasies of destruction, and vermin and epidemic metaphors were deployed to advance anti-clerical discourse closer to modern biological racism (Borutta 2011, 177–183, 209–213).

Violent incidents and laws against Catholic clergy and institutions were often the result of medial representation of clerical alterity (Borutta 2011, 218–265). Aggression was notably directed against orders and cloisters. Like anti-Jesuitism (Cubitt 1993; Healy 2003), anti-monastism became an especially strong movement of anti-clericalism from the period after the Enlightenment (Gross 2004, 128–184; Borutta 2011, 159–167, 226–265). The Piemont liberals gave as reasons for the abolishment of Catholic orders in 1855 their pointlessness and harmfulness. Prior to this there had been a moral campaign against the clergy, which came to a climax during the cholera epidemic of 1854 because after this the clergy was accused of abusing religious gatherings for political ends and of encouraging the spread of the plague. The pathologisation of practicing Catholics and Catholic institutions lead to a call for the secularisation of cloisters so they could be used for 'useful' purposes. Under the banner of nation, capitalism and biopolitics, the bourgeois society no longer wanted to tolerate the deviant lifestyle of the clergy in orders. As early as 1850, Genoa's radical satirical magazine *La Strega* had proposed making 'a clean sweep of all the dormitories, refectories and purgatories'

and suggested opening the monasteries. According to the magazine, virgins were praying for redemption from their 'useless' lives behind the convent gates. These 'doves' actually only wanted to see their home again and to bear children. All monks and nuns should 'go home' and look for a husband or a wife (8.10.1850). Even the moderate liberal Camillo Benso di Cavour called the monasteries a 'source of ignorance, superstition and poverty' or 'leprosy' (Romeo 1977–84, vol. 1, 302–3, vol. 2/2, 788; Pellicciari 2008, 108). In parliamentary debates, he pointed out that the 'immobile', 'useless or harmful' orders hindered progress in science, the arts, industry and agriculture, because, instead of educating, they preserved 'old traditions' and circulated 'legends', driving the poor to beg. With regard to Protestant and Catholic states in Europe, Cavour applied a 'mathematic formula' saying that the economic prosperity of these societies was inversely proportionate to their number of monks (APS 17.2.1855, 2574–6, 2864–6). In Prussia, monasteries were prohibited in 1875 for similar reasons. There was, however, a gender specific difference between the two countries; while many female orders were spared prohibitions, the tolerance for male orders was much less. In Germany, where the reformist Luther had renounced the ascetic life, tolerance towards the latter was closer to zero (Borutta 2011, 257–263, 384–386).

Conclusions

Despite its martial rhetoric, the culture wars of the two countries were, to a certain extent, limited. Even in severe Prussia, anti-clerical laws were not always implemented. This was due, on the one hand, to external factors such as opposition from Catholic clergy and laypersons; the lack of state services, such as poor relief, care of the sick and education (Ross 1998, 95-120); socialism as the new common enemy of liberals and Catholics; and new collective colonial projects of the state and Church outside Europe. As the culture wars subdued, the liberal civilising mission was increasingly displaced from the inner colony of Catholicism to outer colonies. Henceforth, it was no longer about civilising the imagined 'inner Orient' but the 'real' Africa (Borutta 2011, 115–116). In addition to this, the religious processes of re-Christianisation and confessionalisation were countervailing secularisation. Furthermore, there was a religious revival amongst women and the lower classes in rural areas in the nineteenth-century. All of these factors contributed to

the constraining of the culture war and the easing of the pacification of the conflict between the state and the Catholic Church.

The boundaries of the culture war also lay, however, within anti-Catholic discourse. Class, gender and generation gaps functioned as frontiers of the culture war; since the Enlightenment the project of secularisation was primarily directed at bourgeois men. Most notably, Italian liberals left women, children and the lower classes as well as the Catholic religion and Church out of the culture war. Despite their, to some extent, fundamental anti-clericalism and anti-Catholicism, there was ultimately a coexistence of secular and religious cultures that proceeded along the boundaries between urban and rural areas and the differences between the generations, classes and sexes. Secular education and culture for the male bourgeois Italy, opium for 'minors' – liberal secularisation can be surmised as such. More so than in Germany, there was a an institutional differentiation between church and state analogous to the gendered spheres of the private and public spheres in Italy; while the state added authority to its claim to power in the male connoted public sphere of politics, the Church concentrated on the private spheres of the bourgeois society, but also on the female connoted social domains of charity and welfare. Instead of a separation, there was a coexistence of church and state that, while certainly not without its tensions, was mainly peaceful in and around 1900 (Borutta 2011, 353–389).

Progressive anti-Catholicism is therefore ambivalent. In keeping with recent research (Gross 2004; Pellicciari 1998), its long concealed aggressiveness should be emphasised. Hate directed towards Jesuits and ultramontanes, as well as monks and priests, contradicts the rational self-image of democrats and liberals. For them, it was not the 'better argument' that counted in the culture war; instead they discriminated, essentialised and marginalised the Catholic other. They advocated and justified state coercion; they trivialised, defended and propagated physical violence. Even moderate liberals proved themselves to be intolerant and irrational in the culture war; they were not prepared to recognise cultural difference. To some extent, their anti-Catholicism even exhibited analogies and parallels to biological scientific racism and antisemitism; their concept of the enemy and stereotypes, and metaphors and conspiracy theories were all similar. Notwithstanding this, it would be anachronistic to interpret this fundamental anti-Catholicism as 'illiberal', as it was an intrinsic component of liberalism. Furthermore, it should not be

trivialised as 'mere' rhetoric, as it motivated and legitimised political decisions and activity.

The aggressiveness of anti-Catholicism should, nevertheless, not be made absolute. For in addition to the concepts of the enemy and anti-Catholic texts and images that were produced there were also ambivalent constructions of the Catholic other, which were less a product of disgust and more one of a fascination with an exotic, mysterious, seemingly irretrievably lost, childishly naive quasi paradisiacal world. While industrialisation was gathering steam, even those who had distanced themselves from the Church regarded the ruins of cloisters with sorrow and melancholy. They made pilgrimages to Oberammergau to enjoy simple passion plays (François 2001, 287). Even during the culture war nuns and church folk were mostly portrayed as victims. Like the cloisters, they served as projection surfaces of the secret desires and fantasies for liberal male citizens (Gross 2004, 164, 174; Borutta 2011, 59, 61–62, 95–101, 162, 191). Furthermore, the culture wars were not wars in the military sense (Anderson 2001, 326, 331 fn. 27). Despite this, there were many physical altercations– especially in Italy (Borutta 2011, 337–347). The general rule, however, was no violence as the case in Germany was and completely different to Spain, for example (Cueva 2009, 181–201). The war itself was mostly waged through legal, parliamentary, discursive and medial media, which is not, in the face of the martial rhetoric of the conflict, self-evident. This may have been due to a fear of the recurrence of bloody conflicts like those of the early modern religious wars and or the French revolution and to the new political, social and medial forums where conflicts could now take place. The widespread forgoing of fatal violence was a characteristic of both Culture wars; it was also thus a characteristic of progressive anti-Catholicism.

Progressive anti-Catholicism was therefore characterised through two contrary tendencies; an aggressive logic of assimilation that had the disappearance of Catholic difference as its objective; and a a more moderate logic of coexistence that formulated the conditions for a coexistence of the bourgeois society and the Catholic religion, and of the state and the Catholic Church. These conflictive logics corresponded to the central variations of the secularisation theory: the 'demystification' of the world, the 'privatisation' of religion as well as the 'differentiation' of religion and other 'spheres' of society such as politics, science and art.

The secularisation theory is therefore often used as an explanation for the culture war in which case the conflict was interpreted as the result of a functional differentiation of politics and religion applied quasi in the logic of history. It seemed then in this sense a struggle for modernisation that was, despite being repressive and intolerant, justifiable and also unavoidable given the results. In this way, the secularisation theory indirectly and implicitly retrospectively legitimised the culture war.

However, apart from the fact that this perspective is teleological, it obscures the historical correlation between the two phenomena because the explanans 'secularisation theory' was closely linked to the explanandum 'culture war'. It is only conditionally suitable for the explanation because it was part of the phenomenon itself. The secularisation theory was a product and a motor of the culture war. Even before 1848, democrats and liberals, in the face of religious revival movements, developed alternative models of the state and church as well as theories of a secularisation of society. After the revolution, liberal governments sought to realise these theories. This provoked the opposition of religious authorities who averred the public political character of religion and worked on the expansion of the religious into modernity. This collision of the projects of secularisation and sacralisation and of the differing concepts of the place and significance formed the essence of the culture war of the nineteenth-century.

The question of how secular or religious (in the confessional sense) the liberals actually were is difficult to answer as little is known about their religious practices and beliefs. There were few self-proclaimed atheists amongst them (mainly in Italy). Most of them did not want to destroy religion but reserve it for 'minors' – women and the lower classes in the homeland and the 'uncivilised' in the colonies, in order to hinder revolt and to safeguard social stability. They simply wanted to oust Catholicism from the public political spheres. In this respect, the conflicts of the nineteenth-century between liberal governments and the Catholic Church were more a struggle based on opposing conceptions of religiosity than a collision of secular and religious forces.

After the culture wars there was scientification of anti-Catholicism. In the guise of religious sociological secularisation theories of eminent authors like Max Weber and Émile Durkheim, it entered the self-definition of western modernity. The dichotomising of Catholicism and modernity was 'naturalised' in the process; the conflicting character of the

culture war was obscured by the objectivist tone of seemingly neutral academic analysis. Research of the genealogical connection between anti-Catholicism, the culture wars and the secularisation theory is only in the early stages (Tyrell 2008; Borutta 2010). It certainly requires further examination.

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Part 2 – Anti-Catholicism and National Identity

HEALING A WHORISH HEART: THE WHORE OF BABYLON
AND PROTESTANT INTERIORITY IN RESTORATION AND
EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY BRITAIN

Laura M. Stevens

Abstract

This paper examines a centerpiece of anti-Catholic rhetoric, the
Whore of Babylon, in Britain from 1660 to 1789. It argues that dur-
ing this era the Whore came to stand less for the Roman Catholic
Church and more for Protestants' own tendencies to drift towards
beliefs and practices that resembled Catholicism, especially through
an emphasis on external display over spiritual substance. In such
writings 'whorishness' suggests a relationship with God that is medi-
ated by elements marked as false including set prayer, priestly vest-
ments, or a belief in salvation through works. There was a double
valence to the usage of the Whore, however, for it is also the case
that, within moderate circles, to make use of this figure of Babylon
also suggested an extremism that in its fanaticism resembled Catholi-
cism. Treatments of the Whore in this place and time thus were gov-
erned by a duality that positioned her beyond the pale of legitimate
religious debate. Held up as a lens onto a monstrous Catholicism, she
also blurred the line between Catholic and Protestant, revealing anti-
Protestant qualities in those most eager to defeat her.

The Whore of Babylon, from Revelation 17, plays an almost ubiquitous
role in the British rhetoric of anti-Catholicism, linked so closely to the
Roman Catholic Church that her name provided a ready shorthand for
the perceived evils of Rome. The centrality of this scriptural interpreta-
tion, in which the Whore of Babylon stands for the Pope or for Rome, is
apparent in the casual matter-of-factness informing one of the earliest

publications to link the Whore to the Pope, William Tyndale's *The Practise of Prelates*. Without elaboration, Tyndale follows a reference to 'The greate baude the hore of babylon' with a parenthetical comment '[sc. the Pope]', indicating an unquestioned allegorical alignment of these figures (Tyndale 1530, no page).

Much has been written about the Whore's significance to the anti-Catholic rhetoric of early modern England, particularly her function as monstrous female and her association with the gender inversions Protestants attributed to Catholicism. Frances Dolan's work has been central to this illumination of the gender panic underlying anti-Catholicism under the Stuart monarchs. She has pointed out, for example, that 'The epithet, 'whore of Babylon', widely used to denounce the pope as the Antichrist and the Roman church more generally, yokes together the familiar seduction and corruption of the unruly feminine and the more outlandish threat of the foreign', thereby summoning misogyny and xenophobia in service of anti-Catholic feeling (Dolan 2005, 43). More recently Alison Conway has explored how late seventeenth- and eighteenth-century literary treatments of the royal mistresses, both Catholic and Protestant, provided venues for the working out of Protestant Britain's spiritual and political anxieties. 'Anti-Catholic xenophobia', she notes, 'was unable to protect Protestantism from its own self-doubt …. The Church of Rome, the Whore of Babylon, came to be imagined less as a singular threat than as part of a larger problem of Protestant self-division' (Conway 2010, 3).

I would like to take Conway's comment as a starting point for a more widely ranging effort to ask, what exactly are the features of a whore within the logic of anti-Catholicism? How and where did English or Scottish references to the Whore of Babylon move beyond condemnations of actual whores and actual Catholics, and what was the effect on Britain's conceptualisation of itself as a Protestant nation?[1] Finally, what did a writer or speaker convey about his or her beliefs when making use of this inflammatory term?

This query focuses on the period ranging from the Restoration of the monarchy in 1660, which marked the collapse of a Puritan ascendancy in England, to the beginning of the French Revolution in 1789, which provoked a new species of anti-Catholicism bound up with fears of

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[1] Because this study encompasses the formation of Great Britain through Acts of Union in 1706 and 1707, there will be some slippage in my use of 'British' versus 'English' or 'Scottish'.

domestic revolution and later of Napoleonic invasion. I attend especially to readings of the Whore of Babylon that do not focus on the Pope, on Catholics lurking at the boundaries of Britain, or on crypto-Catholics infiltrating the country from within, but instead on tendencies towards Catholicism that are seen as inherent in Protestant practices. In taking this approach I seek to extrapolate from Anthony Milton's analysis of an early seventeenth-century 'Church of England whose precise doctrinal and ideological identity was still unclear, as different groups within the church contended over just how the English Church was to be understood as both 'Catholic and Reformed'. Rather than being defined by a conflict between well-formed coalitions of, for example, Calvinists and Arminians, England's doctrinal terrain was marked by a highly contested effort to answer these questions: 'To what extent had the relationship with the English Church truly separated from Rome, and what was her precise relationship with the Reformed Churches of the continent?' (1995, 5).

Just as the internecine struggles of the early Stuart Church of England become more intelligible when one reads them as efforts to determine how much Catholicism should be retained, the religious landscape of the Restoration and eighteenth century was characterised, I would argue, by an ongoing contemplation of Catholicism as a force more nebulous than its standard characterisation as expelled tyrant, insidious infiltrator, or savage persecutor. Because, as Margaret Aston has noted, 'idolatry....was regarded as a spiritual whoredom' (1988, 468), and because so many aspects of Catholicism were condemned by Protestants as idolatrous, accusations of whoredom were applied with flexibility to attack anything that could be made to suggest Catholicism, especially through an emphasis on adornment or priestcraft. This was true, for example, when the Jacobite and nonjuror Charles Leslie dismissed Dissenters from the Church of England by saying, of their attitudes to this Church, 'They call her Episcopacy a Ragg of the Whore' (Leslie 1704, 36).[2] I will argue that 'whorishness' acquired particular traction as an allegory for a soul less than fully committed to Christ, as is seen in a contrast between external

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[2] Jacobites did not accept the Hanoverian succession of the British monarchy but instead supported the ousted Stuart James II and his descendants. Nonjurors were clergy who refused to take oaths of allegiance to James II's daughter Queen Mary and her husband William III, because they already had sworn their allegiance to a still-living monarch. For this refusal they lost their positions in the Church of England.

display and internal substance deployed through the performance of gender.

While not the most prominent interpretation of the Whore of Babylon, a reading of her that is focused on the threat of Catholicism from within remains present throughout the century. After the Revolution of 1688, however, in which the openly Catholic king James II was pushed off the throne, a second approach to her emerged. This was a meta-reading of the Whore as nominal Protestant, cited with irritation by Protestants who had moderate, solidly Anglican, or High Church inclinations, as the ultimate example of the ridiculous accusations they suffered from fanatics. The quote above from Leslie is one example. In the eighteenth century, the Whore has a divisive impact on her British Protestant readers that complicates her more traditional alignment with the Pope. In both strands of interpretation, though, there is a focus on a highly abstracted understanding of Catholicism that has less to do with belief than with a kind of theatricality, a focus on display at the cost of internal essence, brought to bear on the practice of religion on the one hand, or, on the other, on extreme and uncivil forms of complaint about that practice. While the specific doctrines, actions, or attitudes that are attached to the Whore vary greatly, then, what binds these interpretations together is the alignment of monstrous femininity with an excessive focus on appearance or performance. To accuse someone of Whoredom thus acquires a double rhetorical edge, potentially revealing the accuser as fanatical, as tainted with ignorance, and thus as forming a certain resemblance – in the eyes of Protestants – to a Catholic.

Seeing how treatments of the Whore of Babylon range through the century requires, first, some consideration of her place within the Book of Revelation. One of the Whore's most vivid characteristics is her iconicity: she is entirely a figure on display, rich with symbolic features that are explained in some detail. Like the Wife of the Lamb and the Woman Clothed with the Sun, the Whore's oppositional counterparts in Revelation, she exists almost purely to symbolise and be read, usually with the goal of distinguishing between true and false churches.

Consider *An Exclamation Against the Whore of Babylon the Mother of Harlots*, one of many anonymously authored pamphlets that were published amidst the wave of heightened anti-Catholic feeling triggered by the Popish Plot, an apparent (later shown to be fictitious) conspiracy of Catholics to assassinate King Charles II. The stated goal of this pam-

phlet, as indicated by its subtitle, is to provide an interpretive guide, so that 'any indifferent Reader, Protestant or Papist, may judge which is the one which is the other' (*Exclamation* 1679, title page). The text itself contains two columns that, in precisely organised juxtaposition, list the features of 'Christ' across from those of '*Anti-Christ*' as they are conveyed through verses from Revelation. 'The King of Saints: chap. 15.3', for example, is placed across from '*The King of Locusts,* chap. 9.11', just as 'The Redeemer, chap. 5.9', stands in opposition to '*The Destroyer, chap.* 9.11'. (Catholic features are designated by italics, of course, while Protestant attributes merit the plainer sort of font.) The female figures of Revelation feature centrally, with the Lamb's Wife and the Woman Clothed with the Sun placed in direct opposition to the Whore (*Exclamation* 1679, 2).

This hermeneutic guide promises protective as well as curative effects to its readers. Even as it attacks Catholics as 'Anti-Christians' who '*worship the dragon and Beast*' and '*shed the blood of the Saints*' (*Exclamation* 1679, 4-5), the document presents itself as engaged in the recuperations of papists from the clutches of Rome. To be a Catholic, the text conveys, is to have one's vision clouded by the Antichrist's confusions and seductions. Turning a papist towards the true faith of Protestantism, then, involves teaching that person to see clearly: 'Here behold now and see', the pamphlet concludes, 'all these particulars set forth to the open view of every mans [sic] eye'. From this unclouding of vision will follow the ability to interpret correctly, mapping the right meanings onto the images and events contained in scripture. Salvation thus also involves an amplification of interpretive skill: '[L]et us, which have happily escaped, and those that are yet amongst them, which in honest simplicity of heart mistake things, learn hereby to discern between Christ and Antichrist, the true Spouse, and the filthy Whore' (*Exclamation* 1679, 6). The female figures of Revelation are crucial to this project. Telling false religion from true, and thus saving one's soul, requires that one crack the code of feminine comportment, discerning a wife from a whore.

But what precisely is involved in this project of reading women's bodies and behaviours for signs of spiritual righteousness? Visibility itself emerges as a suspect trait, for even as women in the Book of Revelation are shown to mean different things, their modes of presentation are entirely opposed: The Woman Clothed with the Sun is, as her title indicates, veiled by celestial lights, with the sun surrounding her body,

twelve stars on her head, and the moon under her feet (Rev. 12.1). We learn a good deal about what she does and what is done to her, as she escapes from the dragon poised to eat the child to whom she is giving birth. Because we are given little access to her appearance, though, the process of interpreting her is largely one of abstraction. The Wife of the Lamb deflects precise description even more obviously, appearing only as an impenetrable source of radiance, standing for the walled Jerusalem. As the King James Version notes, 'her light was like unto a stone most precious, even like a jasper stone, clear as crystal' (Rev. 21.11).[3] Blinding, luminescent, and transparent, she literally resists being seen.

The Whore, by contrast, is present almost precisely *to* be seen, drawing one's gaze to herself through her adornment: 'And the woman was arrayed in purple and scarlet colour, and decked with gold and precious stones and pearls, having a golden cup in her hand full of abominations and filthiness of her fornication' (Rev. 17.4). The Whore exists in the text as a lacquered object, an effigy that is an exquisite multi-layered shell, filled with nothing but the blood of saints. Although the many jewels that she wears do glitter, nothing emanates from inside her, as is the case with the Wife of the Lamb and the pregnant Woman Clothed with the Sun. Also unlike the Lamb's Wife, whose light and walls deflect visual as well as physical penetration, the Whore of Babylon is entirely available to interpreters in ways that reinforce the permeability and promiscuity of her body. Her very forehead displays her title, 'Mystery, Babylon the Great, the Mother of Harlots and Abominations of the Earth', and the angel guiding John offers him a detailed reading of this mystery (Rev. 17.5–18). Rich with explicit if confusing symbolism, she epitomises an outlook and a mode of existence that are empty because of their focus on consumption and display. Her visible exterior thus stands for an interior that simply is not there. This emptiness, this directedness toward external exhibition, is an aspect of the Whore echoed by the connotation

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[3] All biblical quotations are from the Authorised Version, also known as the *King James Bible* or KJV, because this translation was ordered by King James in 1604 and published in 1611. Although the Geneva translation remained popular with Puritans, it was not legal to print it in England after 1616, and in spite of imports from the Netherlands it went out of print in 1644. The only translation readily available in England by the mid-seventeenth century, the KJV also had been adopted by theologians and laity alike as the standard English Bible (McGrath 2001, 280-85).

of performance in the Hebrew Bible's condemnations of those who 'play the whore'.[4]

While this is not the most obvious feature of The Whore of Babylon's representation in English anti-Catholic invective, a significant number of writings from this era do cite her while condemning the spiritual flaws of display. The Catholic Church, its Pope, and its believers obviously are the central objects of these attacks, but even during episodes of peak anti-Catholic feeling such condemnations often have a secondary target through this focus on ornamentation. That is, criticising modes of worship that attend to exterior forms rather than internal essences, and thus engage in a form of idolatry, provides the basis for condemning practices, people, or denominations that, while Protestant in name, are read as Catholic.

This is true of the Baptist Benjamin Keach's poem, *Sion in Distress or The Groans of the Protestant Church*, first published in 1670 but then revised during and just after the Exclusion Crisis, the Parliamentary movement to exclude James, Duke of York, the openly Catholic brother of Charles II, from succession to the throne.[5] This long poem presents a dialogue among Sion, her sympathisers, and a very threatening Whore of Babylon, who eventually is placed on trial with the victims of Catholic persecution throughout Europe testifying against her. The poem is rich with standard condemnations of the Whore's promiscuity and bloodthirstiness, but her presence also provokes specific pronouncements about excessive or immodest adornment. Early on, for example, Sion rhetorically asks, 'Did filthy Lust and Whoredome ever rage / With more excess then [sic] in the present Age?' (Keach 1683, 12). She first criticises immodest women directly, observing, 'Bare Breasts, and naked Necks, a Harlots Dress, / Are strong Temptations unto Wickedness' (Keach 1683, 13). This attack on unchaste women eventually provides the platform for a condemnation of ornamented churches:

> No useless Pomp, no Artificial Dress
> Becomes Religion; Chastity abhors
> The *Garb*, the *Painting*, and the *Gate* [sic] of *Whores*.

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[4] In the King James Version: Lev. 21.9, Deut. 22.21, Judges 19.2, Ez 16.28, Eccl. 23.23. My thanks to Christoph Heyl for suggesting this connection.

[5] Qutoations are from the third edition, the title of which is spelled slightly differently than that of the first (1670). The third edition includes additions made in reference to the Popish Plot (Keach 1683).

> Why should my Friends a Virgin-Church pollute
> With any Relicks of that Prostitute?
> Why Gawdy things, that never had a Name
> In sacred Records, our Protestants shame?
> Why are our *Rites* enamel'd with their *Gloss*?
> Why must our *Gold* be mingled with their *Dross*? (Keach 1683; 22–23; Italics
> in original)

The logic of this passage is clear: ornamentation, whether it be physical paint or the 'Gloss' of excessive ritual, amounts to the corruption of a Virgin.

To some degree this is an unremarkable argument for a Baptist to make, particularly under the intolerant measures of the Restoration Church of England, as is his assertion that disunity among Protestants makes them vulnerable to Catholic incursions (Keach 1683; 30). Still, that the Whore becomes the vehicle for this critique is noteworthy. So is the fact that her 'artificial Dress' is treated as the central aspect rather than the symptom of her whoredom. To dress a church, Keach argues, is to participate in a kind of harlotry that stands as an analogue for idolatry, because to do so indicates a desire for more than the unmediated presence of God. Thus even in a text that locates the Catholic threat almost entirely in non-Protestant forces, a reference to the Whore of Babylon articulates fears about the Catholic inclinations lurking within Protestant churches.

The era of the Popish Plot and the Exclusion Crisis, during which Keach's poem circulated, marks a peak episode of anti-Catholic fears that abated after the removal of the openly Catholic king James II and the eventual securing of a Protestant succession. Certainly the Jacobite rebellions of 1715 and 1745, which were waged in opposition to the solidly Protestant Hanoverian kings George I and then George II, reinvigorated intense expressions of anti-Catholic feeling. To a great extent, however, Britain's religious invective turned in other directions, focusing on battles over how much toleration the Church of England should grant to Dissenters, defenses of Christianity against various forms of skepticism, and, at mid-century, reactions of more settled elements of the Churches of England and Scotland against George Whitefield, the Wesley brothers, and other revivalist figures over their claims that the national Churches had become spiritually moribund.

The Gordon Riots of 1780, however, which broke out over the introduction of a Catholic Relief Act to Parliament, marked a resurgence of

anti-Catholic feeling that verged upon hysteria. Archibald Nimmo's *Popery, or, The Scarlet Whore of Babylon*, a response to the Relief Act, is filled with vitriol for Catholics and for those who would show toleration to them. Although distant in time and approach from *Sion in Distress,* this sermon shows surprising overlap in that it expresses anti-Catholic sentiment through a condemnation of feminine performance. In this case, however, the actual target is male Britons who weaken their nation through a focus on fashion: 'How effeminate are our young men, dressing themselves up in all the airy dress that possibly they can?' (Nimmo 1779, v). A male attentiveness to appearance, a sort of late eighteenth-century foppishness, both evidences and makes more possible a crumbling of male fortitude. That Nimmo would cite 'airy dress' as a cause of a nation's weak response to Catholics is not as random an argument as might at first seem, given the traditional articulation of anti-popery through a focus on substanceless adornment. To focus so much on appearance is, in a sense, to partake of whoredom, creating the crucial preconditions for a weakening of Britain's defence against actual Catholics.

These expressions of anti-Catholicism suggest worries not that the nation will be invaded or its residents seduced by Catholics, but that Britons independently will adopt the sins of popery through a preoccupation with aesthetics over spiritual substance. This is hardly a surprising interpretation when we consider the Hebrew Bible's depiction of Israel as a whore for its backsliding into idolatry. Some of these references link disloyalty to an emphasis on excessive display, and hence a distraction from spiritual essentials, as in Ezekiel 16.16: 'And of thy garments thou didst take, and deckedst thy high places with divers colours, and playedst the Harlot thereupon'. Such worries about self-directed anti-Catholic feeling become more acute when examined alongside Protestant spiritual and pastoral writings that meditate on Ezekiel's condemnation of Israel's 'whorish heart' (6.9), as seen for example in John Glascock's seventeenth-century funeral sermon for Anne Petter: 'A whorish heart can be content with a divided Christ, nothing lesse then an whole Christ can satisfie a sincere Christian' (Glascock 1659, 5). Here a whorish heart suggests a person who allows him or herself to be distracted from a focus on Christ, or one who is content to have a relationship with God that is mediated by external elements including set prayer, priestly vestments, or a belief in salvation through works. All of these elements can

seduce the Christian from an unmediated focus on God, and in their focus on opulence and display they suggest the weakening of an insufficiently resolute soul.

There is a flip side to this interpretation of the Whore, however. Even as some Protestants hurled accusations of Whoredom at those they saw as less purely Protestant, the same accusations were presented by their victims as evidence of an extreme, irrational theology. *The Mystery of Fanaticism,* for example, a tract of 1712 that names its author as 'A Divine of the Church of England', cites the Whore of Babylon while communicating frustration at the high-strung attacks Dissenters have made on the Established Church:

> They revile the Church of *England* as Popish, and stile its Worship *Antichristian*: Our excellent Liturgy passeth with them for Mass-service, and all its decent Ceremonies for Idolatry and Superstition; the Surplice is a Rag of the Whore of Babylon;…and kneeling at the Holy Sacrament, as bad as falling down to a Graven Image (*Mystery* 1712; 15).

The placement of the Whore within this list makes sense, as her elaborate presentation is linked to the traditional – and, to Dissenters, inappropriately ornate – liturgical garb of Anglican ministers. However, underlying this summary of accusations is an effort to denigrate such attacks through their making reference to the Whore. That is, by citing Dissenters' references to the Whore, the author shows readers how unreasonable those Dissenters are. In so doing this author seeks to maintain the high moral ground, rising above the extremes of radical Nonconformity as well as Catholicism. There is thus a double valence to the usage of the Whore: even as she is cited sincerely to attack an excessive focus on appearance, which suggests a kind of shadow-Catholicism, it is also the case, within self-consciously rational and moderate circles, that to make use of the Whore of Babylon is to venture into an extremism that in its very fanaticism suggests Catholicism.

It is no accident, I think, that several complaints about Protestants who accuse other Protestants of Whoredom place those accusations in the mouths of women. *The Westminster Dream,* for example, by Isaac Bickerstaff, a pseudonym of Jonathan Swift that may have been appropriated by another author here, presents an ironic commentary, through the vehicle of a dream vision, on the trial of Henry Sacheverell in 1710 for his anti-Whig and anti-Dissenter sermons. Among the colorful figures included in this text is 'a Female Quaker that was foaming and

raging against Dr. *Sacheverell*, (who just then passed by) in such a violent manner, that she fell in a Fit'. Exhibiting in caricatured form the ecstatic seizures that led opponents to use the term 'Quakers' for members of the Society of Friends, the woman shouts at Sacheverell: '*Oh thou wicked Hireling, thou Priest of Baal, thou Lamb of the Whore of Babylon…*' (Bickerstaff 1710, 4; Italics in original). It was not unusual for opponents of Quakers to attack them as Catholics, partly because of points of theological over-lap, and partly because it was an easy way to marginalise them. This episode harnesses misogyny to anti-Catholic critique, suggesting that a female radical Protestant who would hurl such epithets at an Anglican is more closely aligned with the Whore's idolatry and extremism.

Seven decades later the member of Parliament John Wilkes used similar strategies to ridicule the ardent anti-Catholicism of the Presbyte-rian Kirk (or Church) of Scotland. In a speech before the House of Commons he described the Kirk as 'a censorious, ill-bred, abusive, per-secuting Prude,' who 'reviles' the Church of England 'for wearing clean white Linen, and listening to the profane Organ.' The true object of the Kirk's anger, however, is 'an Italian lady', whom 'she would tear…Limb from Limb. She delights in the foulest and most opprobrious Expres-sions, and…calls her…the Whore of Babylon'.[6] For Wilkes, the fact that Scottish Presbyterians reference the Whore while attacking Catholics shows the fanaticism of their own position. Enhancing the content of his criticism is the characterisation of the Kirk as an 'abusive' woman who, in her vulgarity and violence, echoes seventeenth-century depictions of the Whore of Babylon.

One might even detect ambivalence in Joseph Addison's treatment of anti-Catholic rhetoric after the first Jacobite rebellion. In his periodical *The Freeholder* he praised women who show their support for the newly crowned Protestant Hanoverian King George by painting their fans with images of the corruptions of Rome. One woman, he notes, 'has filled in her fan with the figure of a hugely tawdry Woman, representing the Whore of Babylon, which she is resolved to spread full in the face of any sister-disputant, whose arguments have a tendency to popery'.[7] In his

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[6] I am grateful to Andrew Newby for calling my attention to this speech.

[7] 'Popery,' a term that suffers from imprecise definition, is an approximate syn-onym for Catholicism in early modern England, but with more emphasis on the hierarchical structures and wide-ranging influence of the papacy than on Catholic doctrine and ritual.

recent study of women as vehicles of patriotic sentiment on the British stage, Brett D. Wilson has encapsulated his argument with Addison's phrase from this same essay, 'a race of female Patriots'. I fully accept his assertion that 'the public-spirited woman who fights for political principles' was central to the formation of nationalist rhetoric in the wake of the Glorious Revolution (Wilson 2012, vi). In this reference to the Whore, though, I question whether Addison is conveying a whole-hearted endorsement of women who adorn themselves with grotesque images, even if those images are symbolic weapons of patriotic aggression. His praise seems to hold an edge of discomfort as he compares these female Whigs to 'ancient British women [who] had the figures of monsters painted on their naked bodies, in order…to make themselves beautiful in the eyes of their countrymen, and terrible to their enemies' (Addison 1716, 88–89). Addison does not align this focus on display with anti-Catholicism, but he suggests a contagion of monstrous performance brought about by the threat of a Catholic coup. Female anti-Catholic patriotism slides into primitive grotesquerie, mirroring the same focus on opulent display that Protestants find so distasteful in Catholicism. Even a text entirely opposed to the return of a Catholic monarch to the British throne conveys rhetorical distance, through ironic detachment and condescension, of the effort to resist Catholics through reference to the Whore. Women might engage in such tactics, Addison suggests, but in so doing they remove themselves from the arenas of reasonable debate, adopting the practices of ancient savages. In this way they render themselves almost as terrifying as Revelation's Whore.

The Whore of Babylon provided vivid and symbolically rich material for early modern anti-Catholic propaganda. She also provided occasions for a subtler meditation on the significance of interiority, aesthetics, and gender to Protestant spirituality. Much of this meditation took place through expressions of concern about the corruption Britain could undergo entirely on its own, without the depredations and seductions of Catholicism. In condemning Catholicism as whorishness, early modern British Protestants were compelled to contemplate the fragile commitment within their own souls, finding themselves perpetually at risk of developing a whorish heart.

To cite this figure in attacking other Protestants, however, could provoke counter-accusations that one was guilty of a rhetorical extremism veering toward fanaticism. Those who expressed the most fervent

concern with avoiding the idolatry implicit in a religion of display therefore could be marked as the parties most guilty of undermining true religion with excessive forms of attack. This fanaticism also could be construed as a distraction from inner essentials that in its violence, its immoderation, and its way of calling attention to itself also resembled a highly abstracted, even caricatured, form of Catholicism.

Treatments of the Whore in this place and time were governed by a duality that eventually positioned her beyond the pale of legitimate religious debate. Held up as a lens onto Catholicism in all its monstrosity, she also blurred the line between Catholic and Protestant, revealing anti-Protestant qualities in those most eager to defeat her. Intensifying this cycle of accusation among Protestants were rich and varied articulations of misogyny: just as the Whore presented an iconic image of unruly femininity that would weaken the true church, fanatical expressions of anti-Catholicism were often placed by critics in the mouths of women who by their sex as much as by their conduct invalidated the substance of what they had to say.

Whatever attitude they adopted towards the Whore of Babylon, when British Protestants regarded this figure as a symbol of Catholicism they were also compelled to ponder the essence and the boundaries of their own identity. This is hardly a new thought, even if delineating its particular manifestations is a worthwhile project. For what is true of eighteenth-century British anti-Catholicism is of course true of most forms of prejudice: the object of hatred or fear illuminates nothing so much as the self that expresses those emotions. In the case of the Whore of Babylon, British treatments of this figure reveal a country fervently convinced that religion was a core component of its collective identity, and that its religion was one defined by an escape from a corrupt, malevolent, and powerful church. What exactly the true church was, and how to avoid succumbing to or becoming the corrupt one, were questions driven by, and in turn driving, the difficult process of defining this nation.

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HOW TO LOOK? ROMAN CATHOLIC ART IN BRITAIN
1700-2010

Clare Haynes

Abstract

Exploring a generally overlooked aspect of anti-Catholicism this
article explores how Protestants accommodated themselves to the
canon of European art, which was largely dominated by Catholic
religious painting. It does so by pursuing a single case study, the
reception of the Raphael Cartoons in Britain from 1700-2010. These
paintings, despite their Catholic provenance and content, remained
canonical, celebrated as religious works of art of magisterial concep-
tion and execution. For them to function in this way, Protestants had
to manoeuvre carefully between the objects, their understanding of
Catholicism and their own religious faith. The article thus traces a
history of accommodation or naturalisation of Catholic culture in
which a series of uneasy balances were struck between antipathy and
appreciation, which allowed the Cartoons to function as objects of
social capital. Even in 2010 when religious objections to the content
of the Cartoons seemed to some, at least, unimportant, they were still
the stimulus for anti-Catholic comment, which related not to the
objects themselves but to the papacy, both past and present.

To mark the first state visit by a pope to Britain in 2010, the Vatican
Museums lent four tapestries made for the Sistine Chapel in the 1510s to
the Victoria and Albert Museum, London (V&A) for an exhibition. The
tapestries were reunited for the first time with the designs or cartoons
made for them by Raphael (1483-1520) since they had been in the work-
shop of Pieter van Aelst (c.1450-) in Brussels, where the tapestries were

made. In an article discussing the exhibition, one of *The Guardian* newspaper's art critics, Jonathan Jones, wrote:

> It is a brilliant gesture by the Vatican to lend some of its most splendid treasures … The Sistine Chapel has come to London … These truly are religious, and Catholic masterpieces: the central character is not the artist, not even Saint Paul or Saint Peter, but Catholicism itself … this makes the pope's gesture unusually astute. There could be no better aesthetic advertisement for Catholicism. This exhibition reveals Raphael as the pope's artist – giving his all for Leo, and now for Benedict (Jones 2010a).

Jones's enthusiasm for the exhibition was shared and it was well attended. My interest in Jones's report is not, however, the enduring power of Raphael's art but his approach towards the Catholic Church. At first glance, there is nothing in it that is anti-Catholic. However, the exchange of Catholicism for the individual popes in the last sentence is striking and the use of the words astute and advertisement could be seen as suggesting cunning or ulterior motive. More fundamentally, to claim that the subject of the *Cartoons* was Catholicism, not the lives of St Peter and St Paul, appears to suggest that the paintings were the product of political calculation rather than the expression of sincere religious belief. To some extent, of course, Jones's meaning is made by the reader but he has made his position clearer in other articles, including one on the recent Benetton advertisement, which showed the Pope apparently kissing Ahmed el Tayyeb, imam of the al-Azhar mosque in Cairo (Jones 2010b-d). There he revisited some of the same issues and in particular the notion that Raphael was primarily an image-maker for Popes Leo X and Benedict XVI. My point is not to isolate or criticise Jonathan Jones, who is an intelligent and engaging writer about art, but to demonstrate that the *Cartoons* present a problem for British spectators just as, in fact, they have done since they first arrived in 1623.

For Jones, and many of us looking at the *Cartoons* in the 21st century, the problem is not, however, precisely the same one that it was in the past. It is nonetheless a connected one: how to look at, and appreciate, a work of art that expresses views that you do not share. Jones used, in his characteristically direct and articulate way, the most common present-day solution. Unlike when they were made, and for centuries after, when the truth of Raphael's subject matter meant a great deal, Jones argued for a quite different moral basis for the *Cartoons'* status as masterpieces: their greatness lay in their artistic 'authority and humanity', not in their depic-

tion and interpretation of Christian truth. Thus the *Cartoons* are now about us, as human beings: they seem 'to encompass every extreme, every aspect of existence'. They are works of 'sublime conviction' but it is the conviction of an artist in art, not a man in his God, which Jones refers to. The Biblical narrative of the paintings thus approximates to a pretext for art and the depiction of human action and feeling, rather than the representation of events of signal importance and divinity that they were for Raphael, Leo X and their contemporaries.

Jones lies in a long line of British interpreters who have endeavoured to free the *Cartoons* from their original context. Where Jones used a secular, ahistorical approach, past interpreters have almost always sought to maintain, while reconfiguring, the paintings' identity as Christian works of art. The *Cartoons* did, after all, depict events described in the New Testament. One of them, *Christ's Charge to St. Peter,* did present, however, a particular challenge for it was recognised as a representation of the Catholic understanding of the apostolic succession. This was an obstacle not simply in doctrinal terms, for the *Cartoons* were recognised as history paintings: the most elevated genre of painting, reserved for complex and highly skilled narrative works dealing in profound and universal truths. Thus British Protestants were dealing with two problems, not just one: in addition to the doctrinal issue, they had also to deal with that impossible thing – a history painting that was false.

By the second decade of the eighteenth century, the reputation of the *Cartoons* had reached its apogee, which would be maintained for more than a century (Haynes 2006). Referred to simply as 'the Cartoons', the seven paintings were considered such exemplary masterpieces that until well after the Second World War, students and established artists copied them, often repeatedly, as a matter of course. Huge numbers of engravings were made of them, which circulated widely (Meyer 1996 & Evans 2010). What was remarkable and must be emphasised was that they were accepted not simply as canonical works of art but as works of profound religious insight. Thus Jonathan Richardson (1667-1745), the portraitist and writer, wrote in 1719 that

> I conceive as highly of St. *Paul,* by once walking through the Gallery of *Rafaelle* at *Hampton* Court, as by reading the whole Book of the Acts of the Apostles tho' written by Divine Inspiration (Richardson 1719, 20).

Richardson was a religious man, who believed strongly in the edifying power of the *Cartoons* (Gibson-Wood 2000). They were also fundamental

to his theory and promotion of art, so that in general and especially in relation to each of the constituent parts of painting – of invention, expression, colour and so on – Richardson turned to one or more of the *Cartoons* for demonstration. They were simply the best known, and the most reliable, benchmarks of artistic practice and through copying, art theory and reproductions they became thoroughly embedded in British culture.

However, there were two difficulties with their complete naturalisation in British society. Firstly, they raised an obvious question: where was the British art that could compete with Raphael's? So far from Raphael's standards were British artists thought to be, some believed that Roman Catholicism was, and always would remain, a better nurse to the arts than Protestantism. This question exercised thinkers throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, to whom it was axiomatic that religious art was absolutely central to artistic production of the highest kind (Haynes, 2012). But the most direct challenge came, as has been alluded to, from the content of *Christ's Charge to St Peter*. Raphael depicted two distinct New Testament passages (Matthew 16:18-19 and John 21: 15-17), one describing the moment when Christ had said to Peter 'I will give unto thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven' and the other when, after the Resurrection, Christ appeared to some of the apostles and said to Peter 'Feed my Sheep'. This elision, bringing together the two most important texts used as the grounds of papal authority, had been commonly made for centuries (Shearman,1972, 65 & Evans 2010, 75). Two approaches were adopted to deal with this fundamental problem, while the painting continued to be described as powerful, close to sublime. The first was to acknowledge the Catholic doctrine it represented before offering an alternative interpretation; the second was to omit any reference to the problem and to simply gloss over it. Both strategies can be usefully examined for what they show us about anti-Catholicism at work in relation to high culture.

Richardson was characteristically very direct in dealing with the issue in the course of a discussion of the license that painters, like poets, use to communicate a subject.

> Such an improvement *Rafaelle* has made in the Story of our Saviour's directing S. *Peter* to Feed his Flock commonly called the Giving him the Keys. Our Lord seems, by the Relation of the Evangelist, (at least a *Roman Catholick*, as *Rafaelle* was, must be suppos'd to understand it so) to commit the

Care of his Church to that Apostle preferably to the rest, upon the Supposition of his Loving him better than any of them: Now tho' the History is silent, 'tis exceeding probable that S. *John*, as he was the beloved Disciple, would have expected this Honour, and be piqued at his being thought to Love his Master less than S. *Peter*. *Rafaelle* therefore in that *Carton* [*sic*] makes him address … our Lord with extream Ardour, as if he was intreating him to believe he loved him no less than S. *Peter*, or any of the other Apostles. And this puts one upon imagining some Fine Speeches that it may be supposed, were made on this Occasion, whereby *Rafaelle* has given a Hint for every Man to make a Farther Improvement to himself of this Story (Richardson 1715, 44-45).

Thus Richardson acknowledged the Roman Catholic meaning of the narrative that Raphael painted but he provided an alternative, Protestant, reading of the Cartoon, focussing the reader's attention on the figure of St John and then the other apostles.

Such a solution contravened conventional theories of history painting, where the spectator's part was to reach an understanding of the artist's conception and to apply the moral or religious lessons that he taught. Richardson offered his readers an alternative, specifically Protestant, adjustment to Continental art theory. Adapting the concept of Aristotelian probability, he widened the scope of poetic license to include spectators, suggesting they should feel free to interpret the painting in their own lights. We can see here a process of appropriation only a little different from the one exemplified by Jones. The authority of the *Cartoons* was apparently unassailable for no-one suggested that the Catholic message of this cartoon was a hindrance to it or the set being identified as among the greatest works of art ever made. Understandably, anti-Catholicism was very rarely expressed in more direct, or aggressive, ways in relation to these objects, which could only serve to undermine them. However, the difficulty was glaringly apparent and many followed Richardson in acknowledging it.

Other writers, including Richard Steele (1672-1729), chose to ignore the problem and settled on offering an interpretation that was a little at odds with the picture surface.

The figures of the eleven [are drawn] according to their characters. Peter receives his master's orders on his knees with an admiration with a more particular attention. The two next with a more open extasie, though still constrained by the awe of the divine presence. The beloved disciple, who I take to be the right of the two first figures, has in his countenance wonder drowned in love; and the last personage, whose back is towards the specta-

> tor and his side towards the Presence, one would fancy to be St Thomas, as abashed by the conscience of his former diffidence (Steele 1711).

The centrality of St Peter and the keys to the composition and narrative of the Cartoon is overlooked and instead the painting is celebrated for the depiction of the character and emotions of the apostles who *collectively* receive Christ's charge. This strategy imposed a constraint on the writer, for he was unable to discuss the painting as the integrated achievement of thought and skill that history paintings were supposed to be.

In both approaches to this painting we can detect traces of a more general phenomenon – that Catholic art was understood as a test of judgement. Thus Richardson argued very explicitly in his essay on art appreciation:

> It is the glory of the Protestant church, and especially of the church of England, [which is] the best national church in the world. I say it is the glory of the Reformation that thereby men are set at liberty to judge for themselves. We are thus a body of free men; not the major part in subjection to the rest … we are all connoisseurs as we are Protestants … we have thus resumed our natural rights as rational creatures (Richardson 1719, 230-31).

Richardson expresses clearly the nature of the religious challenge that canonical art presented. Together with the fragile strategies adopted in front of particular paintings, we can see the processes of accommodation of Catholicism that are rarely visible elsewhere in this culture. Hardly watertight in their reasoning, these means of appropriation allowed Catholic culture to continue to support the social hierarchy and to serve as orthodox examples.

Richardson's analysis and appreciation of the *Cartoons* remained authoritative well into the nineteenth century. Thus when the Rev. William Gunn (1750-1841) published his *Cartonensia* in 1831, he quoted from Richardson frequently. His praise for Raphael was fulsome.

> We dwell with fondness and gratitude on the memory of him, who set before us the clearest views of pictorial excellence, and Christian purity that art has ever delineated; and the effusions of his genius seize upon the heart, without waiting for the slower consent of the understanding. Though, therefore, we admit, that where enthusiasm begins, reason ceases, yet in Raphael, when from admiration and extasy we wake, we find the vision true (Gunn 1831, 7).

As a committed Anglican clergyman, Gunn surely did not mean to imply that Raphael's work was entirely truthful. Indeed, discussing a cartoon

that Raphael may have designed of *Christ's Descent into Limbo*, Gunn described its subject as an 'extraordinary fiction' (Gunn 1831, 83). Nevertheless, in interpreting *Christ's Charge to St Peter*, Gunn made no explicit reference to errors of doctrine, or to Raphael's religion, adopting Steele's approach. His comments merit attention.

> However slightly the incident is touched by the sacred historian, however slight it may appear in the narrative, in Raphael the whole is full, animated and connected; rounded, and wound up to the highest pitch; and, for conception, discrimination of character, composition, and expression [it] stands forward as one of his most remarkable works (Gunn 1831, 79-82).

Gunn seems unwilling to let Raphael's intentions intrude on his experience of the cartoon as deeply affecting. We must note his satisfaction lay in the properties of Raphael's painting, specifically in the depiction of the figures, rather than its idea. His description of the subject as 'slight' is probably an indirect acknowledgment of the Cartoon's fragile moral status. Gunn used Richardson's description of the responses of the apostles but he withheld Richardson's criticism. The reason for his reticence may be the political circumstances in which the book was completed: Catholic Emancipation had been pushed through in 1829 and he may well have thought that a direct reproach of Catholicism on this most serious and sensitive of issues would have been untactful. Gunn's own views on Roman Catholicism at this period are hard to discern although as a younger man, on his Grand Tour, he had expressed conventional anti-Catholic views. Significantly, although it is unacknowledged, Gunn derived his comments on the 'slightness' of the subject, word for word, from John Opie (1761-1807), quoting from his lecture 'On Invention' given to the Royal Academy in 1807, which was a year of considerable anti-Catholic agitation. Opie's comments should be compared with Henry Fuseli's two years later in his second lecture 'On Invention' to the Royal Academy. There Fuseli commented:

> The artist's most determined admirer, if not the slave of pontifical authority, ready to substantiate whatever comes before him, must confine his homage to the power that interests us in a composition without a subject (Wornum 1848, 450).

Certainly in the next prominent treatment of the *Cartoons*, the Rev. Richard Cattermole (1795?-1858) felt no such inhibition and indeed attitudes towards Catholicism seem to have hardened again by 1837, when his popular *The Book of Raphael's Cartoons* was published. The *Charge to St*

Peter affected Cattermole quite as much as it had Gunn and in praising it he argued 'what a glorious palpable exposition have we here of a precious, an affecting passage of the word of God!' However, unlike Gunn, Cattermole was very explicit about the religious context in which the *Cartoons* were made. Thus he described the Roman church as 'unscrupulous' in allowing portraits of God the Father to be made. He argued that no artist should have made such an attempt for 'if a reflective piety had not prevented it, the hand of the artist ought to have been deterred by the palpable inadequacy of his mind and materials to embody that awful and abysmal idea'. It was 'impossible to contemplate … with entire satisfaction' even those of Raphael, who might have been excused as he was more capable than any other artist of combining 'divine grandeur and infinite benevolence' (Cattermole 1837, 32-34). Cattermole did not say explicitly that Raphael was an idolator, nor did he say he was not. The uneasy tension between Raphael's greatness as an artist and his religion was consequently maintained. In discussing *Christ's Charge to St Peter*, Cattermole was explicit in his condemnation of the doctrinal errors the work contained. Indeed, unlike any of the other writers we have so far considered, he debated with the painting, rebutting the claims of papal succession, quoting eight Biblical texts to counter Raphael's two. However, the balance we have come to expect was restored immediately: 'having entered this slight protest against an historical perversion' we must 'be content to proceed in considering the subject before us as it presented itself to his mind' (Cattermole 1837, 67-70).

Cattermole was, in fact, taken to task for criticising the Cartoon on religious grounds. George Fletcher wrote:

> It is mortifying to reflect, that our national understanding and appreciation of works like these (…) are liable to be estimated from such literary notices as we have been here examining, and that so we may rightly be deemed unworthy to possess what we are unable to feel and comprehend (Fletcher 1840, 381-2).

Fletcher had missed, or disregarded, the importance of this criticism to a larger point, which Cattermole went on to elucidate. For, as Richardson and Steele had done 120 years before, Cattermole saw in the combination of power and error in this painting a profound lesson for Protestantism.

> In the church of Rome … [paintings] are regarded as the books of the unlearned; and that church in all things 'wise as the serpent' – but *not* 'harm-

less,' has used them as such; - partly, it is to be lamented, for evil, partly for good...But why should the church of England disdain, in this as in other things, to secure the use while she discards the abuse? Why may we not hope that … instead of finding our eyes repulsed by the sight of bare walls, [we might] have our minds enriched through that avenue with the ever-living ideas presented by the Bible, embodied in glowing forms, if not by Da Vinci, Raffaelle, and Corregio, yet by artists whose hands, enlightened patronage, an equally earnest purpose, and a purer faith may teach almost as divine a 'cunning?' (Cattermole 1837, 79-80).

Thus Raphael's was an exemplary art, which, despite all, demonstrated the power of painting to encourage in its spectators 'pure' religion, a religion that was free from idolatry. The only uncertainty was whether in fact Protestantism could produce such art, could teach 'almost as divine a cunning'. This may have looked rather unlikely in 1837, although Cattermole did express hope that in the current climate of 'mighty contention' a situation might arise in the Church of England where art might flourish.

Whilst the Evangelical and Oxford Movements had begun to change the nature of anti-Catholicism, a Roman Catholic art historian, Alexis-François Rio (1797-1874), was beginning to change perceptions of Raphael and the conventional history of art on which all the writers we have so far considered relied. *De la poésie chrétienne* was published in France in 1836 and while its influence at home was limited, it made a considerable impact in Britain. Rio, who was active in the French liberal Catholic movement was motivated by a strong faith and a concern for its revival. Rio argued that early Christian art spoke of a purer religious conviction than did the art of the period now called the High Renaissance. Raphael still held an important place in Rio's history of art but it was his early work that was now lauded, not the later works, such as the *Cartoons*. Rio saw in the gradually increasing influence of classical art, on individuals and schools of artists, the inevitable exclusion of mysticism, which was the essential characteristic of 'true' Christian art. This new view of the history of art was widely welcomed for it spoke to those values of conviction, devotion and simplicity central to British Romanticism, as well as Evangelicalism (Haskell 1980 & Lightbown 1985).

One of the writers who did most to communicate Rio's ideas to a British public was Anna Jameson (1794-1860) (Fraser 1992, 98-99 & Gilley 1992). A prolific writer on the arts, Jameson faced the challenge of adapting and communicating what was essentially a Catholic history of

art for her Protestant audience. She did this in a number of ways but I will concentrate here on her hugely popular book *Sacred and Legendary Art*, which was first published in 1848. Jameson's book was solely about Christian art: it did not deal with non-Christian mythology. Thus, with Lord Lindsay's *Sketches of the History of Christian Art* (1847), which was also directly inspired by Rio's work, it marked a new departure in British literature on the arts by concentrating solely on religious subject matter. Jameson revealed her anxiety not to be misunderstood as a crypto-Papist:

> Knowing that I cannot escape criticism, I am at least anxious that there should be no mistake as to purpose and intention. I hope it will be clearly understood that I have taken throughout the aesthetic and not the religious view of those productions of Art which, in as far as they are informed with a true and earnest feeling, and steeped in that beauty which emanates from genius inspired by faith, may cease to be Religion, but cannot cease to be Poetry; and as poetry only I have considered them (Jameson 1857, vii).

Lindsay expressed the same concern in his correspondence. He depended on the term 'Christian Mythology' to make his point (to which Cardinal Wiseman objected, in his review of the book), as well as references to 'ludicrous' stories or the extremes of asceticism (Brigstocke 1981, 27-60). Whether it was possible to separate poetry from religion, or in what poetry consisted, Jameson did not say but that such a strategy was possible was symptomatic of the new conditions in which art history was being written, as Jameson herself recognised. She observed two significant changes in approaches to pre-Reformation history. Firstly, that as taste for medieval paintings had developed, so had a 'desire to comprehend the state of feeling which produced them, and the legends and traditions on which they are founded; - a desire to understand, and to bring to some surer critical test' (Jameson 1857, 2). These objects were to be understood on their own terms. This was only possible because it was informed by a new understanding of medieval religion, that the development of myths among the people was natural (and morally sustaining) in the absence of the vernacular Bible and, remarkably, that the Church had fought to exclude excesses. As she herself acknowledged, in a rather damning assessment of the art literature of the eighteenth century:

> Then, and up to a late period, any inquiry into the true spirit and significance of works of Art, as connected with the history of Religion and Civilisation, would have appeared ridiculous – or perhaps dangerous:- we should

have had another cry of "No Popery" and acts of parliament forbidding the importation of Saints and Madonnas.

Rather she believe confidently that

> Upon these creations of ancient Art we cannot look as *those* did for whom they were created....We are critical, not credulous. We no longer accept this polytheistic form of Christianity; and there is little danger, I suppose, of our falling again into the strange excesses of superstition to which it led (Jameson 1857, 7-8).

Her use of the word 'ancient' suggests the moral distance she placed between herself and these works of art and she was absolutely right in observing that this point of view had not been available until recently.

Nevertheless, Jameson did not ignore matters of Protestant opposition to Catholic beliefs, pausing more than once to show that she recognised the issues at stake. Thus in discussing the representation of St Peter she acknowledged that many Protestants believed Peter's episcopacy in Rome to have been 'altogether apocryphal'. However, she quoted Johann Karl Ludwig Gieseler's recently translated *Textbook of Ecclesiastical History*, which suggested that there was perhaps some truth to it. She expressed her satisfaction with Gieseler's view in precisely the same elliptical terms as her opening remarks 'even to Protestants, it is not agreeable to be at Rome and be obliged to reject certain associations which add to the poetical, as well as to the religious, interest of the place' (Jameson 1857, 203). It will be no surprise that in discussing the *Cartoons* Jameson had no difficulty with their content. Thus, she wrote:

> 'The delivery of the keys to Peter' and 'the Charge to Peter' ('feed my sheep') either in separate pictures or combined into one subject, have been of course favourite themes in a Church which founds its authority on these particular circumstances (Jameson 1857, 198).

The possibility of handling Catholic works of art without expressing direct opposition had never before been sustained in this way but Jameson's account did not amount to a neutral or positive view of Catholicism. While her historicising approach marked a new development, Jameson also acknowledged that her readers would bring their own views to her text, which she felt bound to respect and allow for. Jameson's historicising was fragile, as she recognised in occasional comments on particular Catholic doctrines: it could not naturalise these works completely, for they sometimes 'ceased to be Religion'. Jameson

was certainly not aiming to achieve the separation of art from religion – its functions were still essentially moral and religious. Significantly, her approach was not commonly adopted and others continued to voice their objections.

Thus, John Ruskin (1819-1900), who was, like Jameson, an enthusiast for Rio's work, drew very different conclusions from it. In 1853, in a lecture on Pre-Raphaelitism, a movement of which he was an influential advocate, Ruskin laid out what he had learned and adapted from Rio. He argued, with characteristic hyperbole, that the downfall of art could be traced to a single moment in its history: Raphael's work in the *Stanza della Segnatura* in the Vatican. 'In the first chamber which he decorated in that palace, [Raphael] wrote upon its walls the *Mene, Tekel, Upharsin* of the Arts of Christianity'. Art degenerated when Raphael painted the frescos of *Poetry* and *Philosophy* (known as *Parnassus* and *The School of Athens*) alongside *Theology* (*The Disputation of the Sacrament*).

> Called to Rome especially to adorn the palace of the so-called head of the church, and called as the chief representative of the Christian artists of his time, Raphael had neither religion nor originality enough to trace the spirit of poetry and the spirit of philosophy to the inspiration of the true God, as well as that of theology; … on the contrary, *he elevated the creations of fancy on the one wall, to the same rank as the objects of faith upon the other*. The doom of the arts of Europe went forth from that chamber … and thenceforward execution was looked for rather than thought, and beauty rather than veracity (Ruskin 1904, 12: 148-9).

Ruskin saw in all subsequent painting the rejection of art's essential moral and specifically religious purpose. Ruskin's position on this chronology did change over the course of his long life, as did his religious views. Specific painters, such as Veronese and Tintoretto, he viewed as general exceptions. They were notably both from Venice, whose politics of papal resistance Ruskin was sympathetic to (Tate 2000, 131-145). Significantly, he also believed that among the Pre-Raphaelites, in whose defence the lecture was largely written, there were artists whose adherence to strict truth heralded a new dawn in art (Ruskin 1904, 12: 157-160).

Ruskin developed these ideas further in the third volume of *Modern Painters* published in 1856:

> In early times *art was employed for the display of religious facts;* now, *religious facts were employed for the display of art*. The transition, though imperceptible, was

consummate; it involved the entire destiny of painting. It was passing from the paths of life to the paths of death (Ruskin 1904, 5:77).

So 'the Cartoons of Raphael … were [neither] representations of historical or possible fact … They were … cold arrangements of propriety and agreeableness, according to academical formulas'. In order to drive his point home, Ruskin asked his readers, in a famous passage, to imagine for themselves the circumstances that Raphael depicted in *Christ's Charge to St Peter*. He even described Christ's appearance to the Apostles described in John 21 as the event to which men turn 'in hours of doubt or fear … with [most] anxious thirst to know the close facts of'. Thus he raised the stakes still further. Ruskin imagined for his readers the physical and emotional details of the event and asked them to 'try to feel that a little, and think of it till it is true to you'. The instrumentality of this request becomes clear, as he demanded:

> Then, take up that infinite monstrosity and hypocrisy – Raphael's cartoon of the Charge to Peter. Note, first the bold fallacy – the putting *all* the Apostles there, a mere lie to serve the Papal heresy of the Petric supremacy, by putting them all in the background while Peter receives the charge, and making them all witnesses to it. Note the handsomely curled hair and neatly tied sandals of the men who had been out all night in the sea-mists and on the slimy decks. Note their convenient dresses for going a-fishing, with trains that lie a yard along the ground, and goodly fringes … The simple truth is, that the moment we look at the picture we feel our belief of the whole thing taken away (Ruskin 1904, 5: 81-2).

The corruption of art was entwined with Popery in Ruskin's mind. Indeed he went on to argue that Raphael's art was 'instantly rejected by the healthy religion of the world' i.e. Protestantism. Although he made one or two exceptions, Ruskin was categorical that 'the task, or privilege, yet remains for mankind, to produce an art which shall be at once entirely skilful and entirely *sincere*'. Nevertheless, he went on to suggest that the art of Turner and the Pre-Raphaelites, particularly Holman Hunt, formed 'the first foundation that has ever been laid for true sacred art' (Ruskin 1904, 5: 82, 87).

The directness of Ruskin's attack on 'Papal heresy' is in striking contrast to the other treatments of the painting we have explored. The reasons for this lie not in Ruskin's own religious views, for he valued the spirituality of much of the Catholic art he surveyed, but in his judgement of contemporary British art. Ruskin had no need to keep the reputation of this Cartoon or any other painting intact because he had real confi-

dence in a Protestant alternative. Ruskin led his readers away from the 'dull' and untruthful canon that Raphael dominated towards a new form of Protestant sacred art that had truth, 'mundane' and spiritual, at its heart. This was a signal moment in the reception of religious art in Britain.

However, not everyone was convinced that a new age had arrived. When Henry Strachey (1863-1940) considered contemporary views of Raphael in his popular monograph on the artist in 1902, he included a chapter entitled 'The Case Against Raphael'. Quoting the passages we have just considered, Strachey chastised Ruskin for his narrow view and for his preference for early painters 'who stuck gold platters on the heads of their virgins, and made them stand on impossible clouds'. We are here only a short step away from the eighteenth-century view of such paintings as 'superstitious'. Strachey proceeded to pit Ruskin's views against those of the leading French (and Roman Catholic) art historian Eugène Muntz, who wrote that Raphael

> Wished, above all, to show himself the faithful interpreter of the sacred writings; and he has succeeded. It is possible to say that none but he entered so profoundly into the spirit of the Gospels. The public he addresses is not the fine society admitted to the ceremonies of the Sistine, it is rather the disinherited, to whom nascent Christianity had given such a large hospitality.

Strachey concludes that Muntz's analysis is more correct: 'to many … the '"Cartoons" will seem nearer to the New Testament story than the laboured archaeology and orientalism of such artists as Mr Homan Hunt and M. Tissot' (Strachey 1902, 107). Strachey says nothing about the problems of Catholic iconography, nor Muntz's unhistorical view of Raphael's intended audience, which were both germane to Ruskin's objections. Instead, in the final paragraph of his book we meet an argument we recognise.

> Raphael was essentially a man who dwelt in the world; there is hardly to be found in his work a spirit of mysticism, but he never was occupied with the pomps and vanities like Veronese. He seems always telling us how noble a thing is man. This deep sympathy with humanity is in truth the secret of his power. No other of the greatest painters touches so many and such different natures, and no other has appealed so surely to the common humanity that is in us all (Strachey 1902, 111).

Thus 110 years before, Henry Strachey had expressed the same views about the *Cartoons* as Jonathan Jones – Catholic art could be just art. This was not the end of the expression of anti-Catholicism in relation to art but it shows that a set of historical values had developed in Protestant art criticism, which allowed art like Raphael's to be celebrated without reference to religious difference. Before this, all religious art had to be judged according to standards of religious truth. Ruskin's criticism of Raphael's art was fundamentally a criticism of his religion and that of his Church. They were inseparable for Ruskin and while he found much of religious value in Catholic art, the possibility of something better, purer and Protestant allowed him to break from the position of dependence that all previous commentators had acknowledged, either implicitly or explicitly.

Through this case study of the British reception of Raphael's *Cartoons*, we have explored anti-Catholicism in relation to art here as a set of practices of accommodation: of weighing parts of Catholic culture against others; of weighing, for example, the Papacy against religious expression that was moving, shared and truthful. We have seen that looking at Catholic art was an opportunity to assert and affirm Protestant principles (and anti-Catholicism) through the exercise of judgment. Unlike its religious doctrines, Roman Catholic art was not rejected at the Reformation because it was never solely religious in function. The social, political and cultural work it did mattered enormously – it still does, as the exhibition at the Victoria and Albert Museum in 2010 showed. It is remarkable that anti-Catholicism is still being expressed in relation to it too.

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DUTCH CIVIC VIRTUES, PROTESTANT AND ENLIGHTENED: ANTI-CATHOLICISM AND EARLY CULTURAL NATIONALISM IN THE NETHERLANDS AROUND 1800

Edwina Hagen

Abstract

This article investigates Dutch manifestations of anti-Catholicism as a constitutive aspect of early forms of cultural nationalism during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. In these decades the process of Dutch nation-building entered its formative phase. The new national consciousness arose in close connection with successful spread of Dutch Enlightenment ideas. Notions and conceptions such as virtue, reason, inner piety and tolerance merged into the idea that enlightened citizens should be morally committed to the nation. In this, the role of religion was considered to be crucial: it provided individual citizens with the 'right' kind of moral consciousness, a key-notion in fighting the decline that was thought to be the main problem of the Republic at the time. These upcoming nascent representations of the nation state gave rise to a new anti-Catholic ideology, which was to grow in importance after the 1760s. Long existing religious prejudices thus were reproduced in other more modern forms.

Introduction

> Unstreitig ist im Ganzen genommen mehr Aufklärung in protestantischen, als in katholischen Ländern; und unstreitig ist mehr Industrie und mehr Volksglück in protestantischen Ländern (Ewald 1790, 74).

These words were written by Johann Ludwig Ewald, who was a best-selling author during the late eighteenth century in the Netherlands. Although he was a German, the anti-Catholic sentiment his words clearly

express could also easily apply to the Dutch view of that time. As in German, English, American and Scandinavian ones, anti-Catholicism also played an important role in Dutch notions of national identity. Around 1800 the Netherlands became increasingly dominated by – even obsessed with – the self-image of a Protestant and enlightened nation. However, the existence of a considerable Catholic minority confronted the propagandists modern journalists, literary authors and revolutionary politicians rather than clergymen – of this new conceptualisation of the Dutch society, with its strong emphasis on shared general Christian values among enlightened Protestants, with a new problem.[1] While all Dutch citizens were encouraged to identify culturally and morally with Protestantism, the Catholics could not be seen as anything other than a threat to the religious unity of the enlightened nature of the nation. At the same time the political culture underwent the influence of the Patriotic (1780–1787) and Batavian (1795) revolutions, which strongly promoted the idea of legal and political equality for every citizen.

Few theses have been published on Dutch anti-Catholicism. Research has been done for instance by John van Zuthem on orthodox Protestant 'political' anti-Catholicism in the years between 1872 and 1925 (van Zuthem 2001). There is a clear reason for the neglect of anti-Catholicism as a topic of Dutch research. For many Dutch church historians, religion is a product of tradition, whereas researchers of nationalism tend to describe their subject as a modern and purely secular phenomenon. Only in recent years have a few Dutch scholars aspired to research which views on religion and secularised ones on nationalism intersect. In several publications Peter van Rooden, Theo Clemens and Ton van de Sande called for special attention to be given to anti-Catholicism as an underpinning factor of national identity in the years around 1800 (van Rooden 1995, 27–39; Theo Clemens van de Sande 1989, 85–106). The first article on the subject dated from 1975. It was written by J.A. Bornewasser and only dealt with the nineteenth century (Bornewasser 1989, 362–375).

By contrast, in Britain anti-Catholicism has been rather well documented as an important element in the emergence of nationalist ideology.

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[1] This article is based upon my dissertation (Hagen 2008), which deals with Dutch manifestations of anti-Catholicism in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. I prefer to use 'anti-papism' instead of 'anti-Catholicism' because in the Dutch language it has a wider meaning, including negative emotional connotations.

Among British historians, Linda Colley's statement that anti-Catholic Protestantism was a strand in the ideological basis of Britain's nation building is widely accepted (Drury 2001, 98–131). Colin Haydon also has stated that anti-Catholicism was quite prevalent because 'it encouraged a sense of patriotism' and 'provided a negative definition of what was good and acceptable, by showing its wicked, deviant antithesis' (Haydon 1993). As Haydon's reviewer Margaret Hunt stated, Haydon left his readers with the mistaken impression that England's particular brand of anti-Catholicism was more unusual and distinct than it actually was, a flaw that is also compounded by the absence in his book of any comparison to other European countries. Hunt missed particularly 'any sustained discussion of the robust tradition of anti-Catholicism in the Netherlands' (Hunt 1996). A fair comment perhaps, but usable Dutch research findings were just not available at that time.

An Age Old Religious Prejudice

Dutch anti-Catholicism's 'modern' style adduced new enlightened arguments in confirmation of an age old religious prejudice. The exclusion of the Dutch Catholics as such was certainly not a new phenomenon. The Dutch banned the Catholic religion in the 1580s, and from then on the Republic became a so-called Mission territory under the leadership of an apostolic vicar; in the early eighteenth century this was replaced by an apostolic nuncio in Brussels. The Dutch reformed church was treated in a privileged manner, although it was never given the status of a state church (Eijnatten 2003). Roman Catholics, who represented a good third of the population, were tolerated but nevertheless treated as second class citizens. They had to practice their faith clandestinely: their worship was only tolerated on the condition that it was discretely conducted in 'semi-clandestine churches' that were not publicly visible to the people in the street; they had to go through great trouble to receive dispensation of anti-Catholic measures and they were forbidden to hold religious processions. Moreover, they were excluded from all higher governmental positions and functions (Po-Chia Hsia and van Nierop 2002; Margry 2000).

In 1672 and 1747 there were various anti-Catholic disturbances but they were not in the first instance directed against Dutch Catholics. Rather, they happened in reaction to invasions by the French. In 1734 a collective panic, comparable with the Gunpowder Plot (1605), fed by rumors that the Catholics were planning to take over the Republic, led to

a huge, nation-wide wave of anti-Catholic sentiment (Frijhoff 1977, 170–233). Anti-Catholic agitation also came from Dutch authors inspired by the Enlightenment, such as Pieter Rabus (1660–1702) and Jacob Campo Weyerman (1677–1747). Their anti-Catholic views were mainly coloured by the fear of Catholicism as a dangerous international power (de Vet 1980 and 1985; Hanou 1985, 88–94; Black 1983, 364–381). By contrast, to Justus van Effen (1684–1735), founder of *De Hollandsche Spectator* (1731–1735) and predecessor of the Dutch Enlightenment, Catholicism was not so much a threat as morally inferior religion (van Oostrum 2004, 325–365).

Under the influence of the American Revolution and the ideas of the Enlightenment, a number of people in the Dutch Republic declared themselves to be revolutionary 'patriots' who wanted a more equal society and democratic government. In the early eighties of the eighteenth century this movement ruled several cities and regions, but this only lasted until 1787, when the authority of the stadtholder William V, Prince of Orange, was restored with the help of the Prussian armies. Meanwhile, the patriots kept their revolutionary spirits up and carried on organising subversive activities in secret meetings. In 1795 they managed - with armed support of the revolutionary French Republic - to overtake the power of the stadtholder. On January 19 they proclaimed the Batavian Republic (Schama 1977; Frijhoff, and Spies 2004; van Sas 2004).

This historical development had a great impact on the Roman Catholic citizens: in 1796, with the separation of State and Church announced by the Batavian revolutionaries, they were given equal status by law, although they still enjoyed very little social, let alone political, influence. A restoration of ecclesial organisation was not to be. Following the granting of their new legal rights, the Catholic emancipation process, which had barely started, experienced a severe backlash. Anti-Catholicism became rampant. As I argue in this article, this should be seen as a spin-off of the Protestant fear that the emancipation of the Catholic minority constituted a threat to the propagated Protestant character of the nation.

The Availability of an Obviously Hostile Other
This fundamental shift, which Dutch anti-Catholicism experienced under the influence of early nationalism around 1800, cannot be understood without reference to the background against which this change stands

out. A marked contrast with Britain is that the Dutch did not have the availability of 'an obviously hostile Other', as Catholic France was considered to be to the British. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Dutch of course struggled for independence against Catholic Spain, as Linda Colley has indicated in passing, but the opposition came from Calvinists as well as from Catholics. Moreover, the parallel with the British antagonistic attitude towards France holds no water since the Low Countries revolted in large part from motivations that were precisely the opposite of political 'nationalism' in the modern sense. The Revolt broke out for various reasons, but the most important of them was that the provinces wanted to stay independent from all other powers (Rowen and Harline 1994, 67–81). Overall, anti-Catholic rhetoric in anti-Spanish (and later anti-French) propaganda was of minor importance as the religious aspect of the struggle was played down in general (Bosch 1994, 5–30).

In order to establish a united front, the propaganda was directed at all religious denominations, including Catholics. If at all, anti-Catholic attacks only played a role in a very early stage of the Revolt. In 1568 its main leader, William of Orange, tried to gain some military help from Protestant foreign powers by stressing the need for more religious freedom. For the same matter, a great number of pamphleteers denounced the more sinister faults of the Catholic clergy of the Netherlands in general and the Inquisition in particular (Swart 1974, 36–57). Noticeably, these attacks should not be seen as an integral part of the so-called Black Legend, since they were not aimed at the Spanish in particular.

Unlike the British, the Dutch thus did not define themselves through confrontation with Catholic enemies. Only among a very small group of Dutch militant Calvinists did motivations of religion function as stimuli for the war against Spain. As the notion of an elect nation flourished among English-speaking Puritans, among these Calvinists the idea of Holland as a new Israel evolved out of numerous comparisons that were made with the history of the Jews. It provided the basis of a political theory that took shape in the same time. At the heart of this Calvinist political theory lay the struggle against the idolatry of Rome, the whore of Babylon. As Israel had proved its election by fighting against surrounding heathens, the Dutch Canaan had to prove itself in the same way (Groenhuis 1981, 118–133). But this ideal never became a dominant one, since the Calvinists in the Netherlands remained a minority. The

notion of a Dutch Israel was also preached until the end of the eighteenth century, though from the 1750s onward the anti-Catholic component gradually lost its prominence (Huisman 1983, 74; 96).

'Modern' Anti-Catholicism

The focus of this article on anti-Catholicism as a constitutive aspect of early forms of Dutch cultural nationalism during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries is justified by the fact that in these decades the process of Dutch nation-building entered its formative phase. The new national consciousness arose in close connection with the successful spread of Dutch Enlightenment ideas. Notions and conceptions such as virtue, reason, inner piety and tolerance merged into the idea that all enlightened citizens should be morally committed to the nation. In this, the role of religion was considered to be crucial: it provided individual citizens with the 'right' kind of moral consciousness, a key notion in fighting the decline that was thought to be the main problem of the Republic at the time.

As has been repeatedly stressed by various Dutch scholars, this vision fostered a political goal, but it largely manifested itself in cultural and literary forms. In creating an ideal self-image of the nation, men and women of letters took the lead (Frijhoff 1992, 292–307). In numerous writings they stressed the importance of a strong awareness of the national past as well as the moral and religious education of the citizens. These upcoming nascent representations of the nation state also gave rise to a new anti-Catholic ideology that was to grow in importance after the 1760s. Long existing religious prejudices reproduced themselves in other, more modern, forms.

Two comparable but distinct phases can be traced within Dutch cultural nationalism: the 'cult of the Fatherland' in the 1760s and 1770s and the 'community of feeling' of the early 1800s. In between the two phases falls the Patriotic Period (1780–1787) and the Batavian Revolution (1795), when nationalism became more politicised. Early forms of Dutch nationalism spread successfully because of the emergence of a periodical press, such as spectatorial periodicals, political weeklies and general cultural journals. Other expressions of nationalism are also strongly present in printed source material such as literary-historical writings, historical novels, schoolbooks, sermons, pamphlets, poems and travel-journeys and even theatre plays.

Above all possible sources especially spectatorial weeklies – of which many started to appear from the second half of the eighteenth century – contributed to the creation of a national 'communication society' in which a new image developed of an enlightened Dutch society, an 'imagined community' in the phrase of Benedict Anderson (Anderson 1983).[2] In literature they are characterised as typical representatives of the Dutch Christian Enlightenment who in religious matters followed a moderate course. An analysis of a selection of the spectatorial weeklies, about fifty in total, which were published in the Netherlands between 1750 and 1800, shows nevertheless that their interdenominational views did not stop them from making anti-Catholic remarks and comments. Their anti-Catholicism could be described as a natural part of their religious attitude, which largely manifested itself only in the form of metaphorical expressions, clichés and casual remarks. It was primarily aimed at the orthodox Protestants, who were being accused of papist ideology. Catholics were rarely directly attacked. Anti-Catholicism thus played an important role in the spectatorial battle against superstition. Superstitious beliefs were regarded as something that undermined the religious morals of citizens, and Roman Catholicism served as the ultimate example of superstition. Most spectatorial journalists argued that popish superstition belonged to the past or to other countries, not to the enlightened Dutch. Within the spectatorial articles, examples of popish superstitious excrescences nearly always appeared within the context of underlining the importance of reason in religion.

A second, frequently appearing counter image was the Inquisition, which represented the opposite of what Protestants regarded as their most important achievements; freedom of press, of thought and of investigation. A third counter image was monasticism. Even though there were hardly any monasteries in the country, since the Catholic religion in the 1580s was banned, monks were depicted as exactly what virtuous individual citizens were not supposed to be: lazy, economically unproductive and hedonistic. In conclusion, the spectatorial picture of Catholicism was highly stereotypical. It offered a negative mirror image, which reflected the specific nature of what the spectatorial authors believed was the core of their own religion: Reason. With that, the spectatorial portrayal of Catholicism does not say so much about the 'Catholic other' but

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much more about the spectatorial definition of Dutch national self-es-
teem and of religion.

Although prejudices against the Catholics were highly ideological and
even 'mythical', they were not entirely baseless. They certainly had politi-
cal grounds, which became apparent in the writings of the Patriots and
Orangists during the revolutionary years of the 1780s. Politically they
were rivals, but both parties believed in the idea that religion – defined in
generally enlightened terms – could provide a unifying moral basis to the
nation. Just like the authors of the spectatorials, they believed that reli-
gion enabled the citizens of the Republic to shape their inner selves in a
moral sense, which would help them to become upstanding members of
the community regardless of their religious background. This ideology
included Catholics as well as the other religious groups so long as they
'behaved' themselves. To most Patriots it was clear that the Catholics
should be no longer excluded from public office. Positions in govern-
ment and administration should be available to them, but – as the major-
ity of the patriots kept believing – only the lower ones. On an ideological
level some of the invented historical myths of the country's greatness in
the past took on a markedly anti-Catholic nature. The Reformation was
heavily glorified because it liberated the Netherlands from Catholic su-
perstition and because it was seen as the forerunner of the Enlighten-
ment; Laurens Janszoon Coster was worshipped as the inventor of book
printing. He even became a Protestant hero. It was because of his (sup-
posed) invention that people could read the bible themselves and could
stop obeying the Pope. Freedom of publishing, press and printing were
depicted as typical Protestant values, which were supposed to be espe-
cially characteristic for the enlightened Dutch.

Contrary to the Patriots the Orangists believed in the Stadtholder as
the protector of the public reformed church and with that the religious
and political status quo. Two political events increased the prominence
of the Catholic issue in the press. The first was a proposal made by Wil-
liam V on 9 October 1783 to exclude all non-reformed citizens from
public office. The second was the decision by the States of Holland on
25 January 1787 to abolish the practice of 'recognition money', costs
Catholics had to meet in order to receive dispensation of anti-Catholic
measures (plakkaten). When the Catholics gained these political suc-
cesses, the tone of the orangist journalists shifted from a rather mild to a
very hostile one. Overall, most anti-Catholic remarks in the weeklies (and

pamphlets) were directly aimed at their political enemy, the Patriot movement, rather than at the Catholics themselves. They were designed to erode the reputation of the patriots by calling them Jesuit intriguers and by recalling popish plots against the Protestants in the past, while simultaneously depicting patriot leaders as crypto-Catholics. In general anti-Catholicism in the orangist press manifested itself when authors attacked the pro-French politics of the patriots, who criticised Stadtholder William V's preference for an alliance with England. According to them the 'enlightened' French still worshipped the 'Whore of Babylon' and given the opportunity would reintroduce papist practices such as the Inquisition to the Netherlands, ruining its precious Protestant character.

A first change in tone into a more anti-Catholic one could be observed in some of the writings of patriots who fled to the Southern Netherlands and France in 1787 (Rosendaal 2003). An increasingly negative attitude in particular was noted within the national debate after 1795, when the Batavian Revolution started. Some revolutionaries defended the separation of church and state (1796) with the argument that it protected the Republic against a Catholic overthrow. When the Roman Catholics, representing a good third of the population, were given equal status by law and began to exercise their new legal rights, Batavian revolutionaries came up with all kinds of moral objections. A restoration of the procession and monastic culture was not to be. Moreover, Catholics were not considered to be ready for taking up political responsibilities. They first had to educate and culturally elevate themselves. Their religion became more and more stigmatised as foreign, outwardly pious, superstitious, intolerant and morally inferior, and therefore not suitable for the required religious and moral education of the citizens.

Still, it should be noted that only one author, Stephanus Hanewinkel, cited popish superstition as a valid reason for the political exclusion of Catholics. As members of the formerly privileged Reformed Church, most orangists loathed the increasing political participation of dissenting groups. They also objected strongly against sharing church buildings with the Catholics. The reformed Protestants saw themselves as the only legitimate owners because the buildings were obtained two hundred years ago, when the Catholics were 'still more loyal to the Pope than to their own nation'.

Various cultural forms of nationalistic anti-Catholicism could also be traced in the three main Dutch cultural Protestant journals of the late

eighteenth century: the orthodox reformed *Nederlandsche bibliotheek* (1774–1788); the more liberal reformed *Vaderlandsche bibliotheek* (1789–1811) and the dissenting Protestant or heterodox *Vaderlandsche letteroefeningen* (1761–1876). Study of these journals reveals evidence that the expressions of anti-Catholicism were heavily influenced by the political and religious positions of the different editorial staffs. Orthodox Protestants did not write much about Catholicism. More importantly, there was a total lack of interest in helping the Catholics to become more civilised and enlightened, presumably because they did not seen them as potential members of the political nation. Batavian reformed Protestants, on the other hand, praised Catholic advocates of the Revolution to the skies. Nevertheless, after 1796, when thorny issues like the dividing of the church buildings became more and more a hindrance to national reconciliation, good old fashioned 'Catholic-bashing' took over.

The *Vaderlandsche oefeningen*, mostly run by Protestant dissenters, concentrated on the moral side of the Catholic emancipation. Among other things, its mission was to teach Catholics civilised manners and values like innate piety and tolerance. In many articles, ideal role models – living proof that Catholicism and the Enlightenment were combinable – were invoked, such as the supposedly enlightened Pope Clemens XIV and bishop Fénelon. Negative examples were provided by referring to evil characters in convent novels and plays. The bulk of the reviewed titles came from England, but even more from Germany. Popular books were for instance *Briefe über das Monchswesen, von einem Catholischen Pfarrer an einem Freund* (subscribed to Georg Michael La Roche, 1772); Johann Martin Millers' *Siegwart. Eine Klostergeschichte* (1776) and Felix Joseph Lipowsky's *Gemaelde aus dem Nonnenleben* (1809). The editorial staff of the *Vaderlandsche oefeningen* also entertained its readers by quoting many accounts of travelers about their horrible experiences during their stays in Catholic countries. Towards the turn of the century the tone of the journal changed. Instead of politely advising, it became almost demanding. The Catholics were given no other choice than to adapt to Protestant enlightened values.

Most striking in the years around 1800 is also the popularity among Dutch audiences – especially among dissenting Protestants – of French Revolutionary theatre plays featuring monastic settings. Two of those plays were, for instance: Jacques-Marie Boutet di Monvel, *Les Victimes cloîtrées* (1791) and Marie-Joseph Chénier, *Fénelon, ou Les Religieuses de*

Cambrai (1791). Both plays were translated into Dutch and played in theatres all over the country with great success. Most of such plays follow the same plot: a young innocent girl is trapped in a convent by some external force, often her own parents. Inside the convent an abusive abbess or another evil character forces her to take the veil (Carlson 1966). Parallel to the French legislative process by which the convents were gradually abolished, the heroine is rescued by her lover and friends, whereas in the plays from before 1790 she commits suicide. Also very popular was Diderots *La religieuse* (1796). This novel, which was translated into Dutch in 1798, was reprinted three times within the same year. It could be argued that the convent plays encouraged the audience to fight against all kinds of moral and religious force, which also perfectly matched with the idea of the propagated values of what the Dutch nation stood for. But it should also be said that this self declared 'neutral' confessional interpretation was not shared by everyone. In Brabant one of the plays, La Harpe's *Melanie*, was abandoned after heavy protests by local Catholic clergymen. Strikingly, this all happened after Catholics obtained their equal rights and became more demanding. Precisely in the year when the emancipation process underwent a serious backlash, 1798, Denis Diderot's *La religieuse* suddenly also became very popular. This novel, which was originally written in and published in 1796, was translated into Dutch in 1798. It was reprinted three times within the same year.

Based upon research on sources as mentioned above, I would argue that among enlightened Protestants and Patriots from about the 1770s and 1780s onwards, Catholics were progressively accepted as true lovers of the Fatherland who deserved a more equal status since they were considered to be responsible political citizens. Catholics in 1796 obtained equal rights, yet a new 'moral' (non-theological) kind of anti-Catholicism became rampant as a result. It disputed their patriotic loyalty but manifested itself most frequently and fiercely in the enlightened Protestant conception of innate piety based upon reason, which was heavily promoted as an important civic virtue. It could be located within cultural and literary writings because in those texts the relationship between confession and citizenship was more intensively discussed than in purely political ones.

The Anti-Catholic Dimension of the Nation's Dutch Imagination

In this article I have focused on the phenomenon of anti-Catholicism as an aspect of the imagined nation. John D. Brewer identified three levels of anti-Catholicism: as a set of ideas, as directed at individuals, or as 'patterns of indirect and institutional discrimination and social disadvantage experienced by Catholics just because they are Catholics' (Brewer and Garreth I. Higgins 1998). In the Netherlands of the late eighteenth century Catholics were not politically discriminated against officially, but they were in a more subtle, cultural way. The central issue and question of course is, how did ideology and reality interacted the Netherlands? Was anti-Catholic discourse, as can be traced in the media of that time, actually used in daily life or even at an institutional level? In other words, to what extent did Catholics suffer from anti-Catholic prejudices in daily and especially political practice? This requires of course a different approach, such as research based upon local archives or political documentation.

In the Dutch case the four different categories of anti-Catholicism which John Wolff has defined – constitutional, theological, popular and cultural – all happened more or less in succession. The theological and popular variations clearly disappeared halfway through the eighteenth century. The last popular disturbance happened in 1747, and pornographic pictures also were no longer part of it. From the 1770s it was taken over by a cultural form of anti-Catholicism, which was heavily fed by German, English and French publications. It was expressed as an integral part of journals and articles on various topics, instead of pamphlets that were specially dedicated to the subject. Especially after the separation of church and state it was also politically activated and even turned into a constitutional matter for a while, at least in political debates. Religion was considered to be a private affair, but because it was also propagated as a moral basis for citizenship anti-Catholicism could come back again via the backdoor, not as a political, but as a moral objection.

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ANTI-PROTESTANTISM AND ANTI-CATHOLICISM IN THE 19TH CENTURY: A COMPARISON

Olaf Blaschke

Abstract

Anti-Catholicism and anti-clericalism loom large in historical scholarship nowadays because these issues illustrate the functional patterns of bourgeois society and its tendency of secularisation. It would be a misunderstanding, however, to see Catholics only as victims. Among them anti-Protestant intolerance and resentments were as rampant as were anti-Catholic stereotypes among non-Catholics. What were the differences between anti-Catholicism and anti-Protestantism? Why has the narrative of anti-Protestantism not been told yet?

Offending Jews and mocking Catholics became very popular in 19th-century Europe. Jewish emancipation was attended by growing discrimination against them, while the emancipation of Catholics (Ireland, Great Britain, partly Germany) and the rising self confidence of ultramontane Catholicism amid bourgeois societies yielded increasing discrimination against Catholics and clergy. Though anti-Catholicism was a major issue, it is understandable why this field has been less scrutinised than antisemitism, faced with the deadly consequences of the hostility against Jews. But what about anti-Protestantism? Why is anti-Catholicism explored a hundred times more frequently than anti-Protestantism? In recent years, anti-Catholicism in France, Belgium, Italy, Sweden and Germany has been studied thoroughly. All the more remarkable is that hardly anything has been done on anti-Protestantism. Anti-Catholicism, as a topic, seems to be much more attractive than anti-Protestantism. Recalling all that has been said about the conflicts between church and state in the 19th century, about the confessional divide in Germany and

the age of culture wars, we are left with the image of the Catholic Church as the victim of hegemonic Protestantism in Germany or of laicistic attacks in France and Spain. Comparisons have been drawn between antisemitism and anti-Catholicism but no similar comparison has been made with anti-Protestantism. Plenty of images and caricatures illustrate ultramontane papacy trying to conquer the world. Similar images about Jews are very familiar to us (Kaiser and Clark, eds. 2003; Blaschke 2008; Borutta 2010).

Anti-Catholicism and Antisemitism as the 'Ignominy of the Century'

In 1896, Heinrich Keiter, the editor of a Catholic newspaper, put together a meticulous list of works of literature in which priests, monks, Jesuits, or nuns were attacked or mocked. The title of his book is telling: *'Confessional Well-poisoning: The True Ignominy of the Nineteenth Century.'*

Keiter was referring directly to a remark made by Emperor Friedrich III (1888) who had described antisemitism as 'the ignominy of the century.' The priest and editor contradicted the liberal-minded emperor's statement that antisemitism was the primary scandal. On the contrary, Keiter said, the true ignominy of the century was anti-Catholicism. 'Feelings of hatred towards Rome are being systematically cultivated. They are swelling and forming an avalanche, and antisemitism remains just a tiny ball in comparison.' Keiter dramatised anti-Catholicism by contrasting it with antisemitism (Keiter 1896, 2-3).

In fact, anti-Jewish prejudices and anti-Catholic prejudices had many elements in common, as both were considered international phenomena and both religious groups seemed to be planning a conspiracy against the world order. What is more, in countries like Germany, Switzerland or the Netherlands, Catholics and Jews were minorities to look down upon. Indeed, Catholics comprised about 36 percent of the population in Germany. The Protestant majority sneered at their Catholic fellow citizens as well as ultramontane Catholicism in general. The Pope, Jesuits, and priests became the targets of caricatures. Common Prussian Catholics found it difficult to work their way up in administration and in the military, in politics, and education. Thus, contemporary Catholic politicians lamented Catholic inferiority and imparity.

Anti-ultramontanism, anti-Catholicism and anti-clericalism determine our view of the confessional conflict of the time. Scholarly contributions are so numerous and almost impossible to count in their entirety. Google

listed 10,000 results when in September 2010 I entered the German term 'Antikatholizismus', but only a meagre 204 results for 'Antiprotestantis-mus', which means a 2% ratio of 49:1. Among those results, many dealt with the time of the counter-Reformation and Irish anti-Protestantism, and were thus not germane to our subject (Google search 2010.09.24). Twenty months later, in May 2012, the ratio had hardly changed: 40,400 hits for 'Antikatholizismus', 635 hits for 'Antiprotestantismus' (1.6%). For the English terms, I was given 1,6 Million results for the key word 'anti-Catholic', but only 72,000 for anti-Protestant (4.5%). Similarly, there were 488,000 results for 'Anti-Catholicism' and 17,000 for 'Anti-Protes-tantism' (3.6%) (Google search 2012.05.27). Not even five percent of what is said about anti-Catholicism is said about anti-Protestantism. The article database JSTOR provides 35 Articles touching upon 'Antikatholizismus' and only two about 'Antiprotestantismus'; in English 3484 articles dealing with 'anti-Catholicism' are detected and 89 about 'anti-Protestantism' (again only dealing with the early modern period, Ireland, England and France), while 27,254 deal with 'antisemitism'.[1] The same asymmetry – antisemitism: 88.7 percent, anti-Catholicism: 11 per-cent, anti-Protestantism: 0.3 percent – shapes the results from German and other National Catalogs.

In this collection of essays, 12 contributions deal with anti-Catholi-cism and only one with anti-Protestantism. The bookshelves are loaded with titles on anti-Catholicism. Plenty of publications focus on anti-Ca-tholicism, anti-ultramontanism and anti-clericalism, such as those by Rene Rémond, Michael B. Gross, Manuel Borutta, but there are also essays and articles such as the one by Wolfram Kaiser (Kaiser 2003, 47-76).

Anti-Catholicism is dealt with in chapters of books about feminism, liberalism, the bourgeoisie etc. But there is almost nothing to be found on anti-Protestantism. The only decent survey of everyday stereotypes used by Catholics and Protestants was conducted by Christel Köhle-Hezinger and dates back to 1976. Günther Hirschmann's book on his-torical novels dealing with the *Kulturkampf*-era contains some remarks on hostile stereotypes about Protestants. In addition, there is an essay by Steven Hause about anti-Protestantism in the French III Republic, which was published in 1989. If there are hundred texts about anti-Catholicism,

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[1] Search in 319 History Journals: http://www.jstor.org/action/showJournals #43693404 (2012-03-08).

there are two about anti-Protestantism (Hirschmann 1978; Altgeld 1992; Hause 1989, 183-201)

The Forgotten Anti-Protestantism

Why has Catholic anti-Protestantism in Germany fallen into oblivion, compared with the scholarly prominence of Protestant anti-Catholicism? I would like to suggest four possible reasons:

1. German Catholicism could not afford, and did not want, to be anti-Protestant. As a defensive minority, Catholics in the age of the culture wars preferred to stay in the background because they claimed tolerance and equality for themselves. May be, anti-Protestantism did not exist, so there is nothing to study. This could easily explain the difference in scholarly attention.

2. Another possible answer is that there was more anti-Catholicism than anti-Protestantism. The prejudices and aggression directed at Catholics were louder than the anti-Protestant voices. Protestantism needed anti-Catholicism for its identity more than vice versa. Swedish Protestants required anti-Catholicism more than Italian Catholics needed anti-Protestantism. In Catholic countries opposition tended to be directed inwards. In Italy, France and especially in Spain, priest were the victims of bloody persecutions in the 19th and 20th century. Therefore, it seems to be in accordance with reality that anti-Protestantism has been studied proportionally less than anti-Catholicism. As Günther Hirschmann concluded, the expression of anti-Catholicism in many historical novels was more intense and qualitatively more frequent, than of anti-Protestantism. Of 427 examined novels, published between 1859 and 1878, 90% denigrated the Catholic.[2]

3. Catholicism proved to be a more rewarding target than Protestantism. Mysterious monasteries and Jesuits amidst wafts of incense, a traditionally powerful papacy, priests wearing the soutane and manipulating women in the confessional, baroque demonstrations during the Feast of Corpus Christi or during mass pilgrimages - all of this was more likely to arouse protest than the sober atmosphere of Protestant churches. In

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[2] Written by 156 authors, 45 of whom were Catholic.

other words: Protestantism offered less material for the satirist and the caricaturist than did Catholicism, thus we are left with more anti-Catholic voices than anti-Protestant sources.

4. The history of historiography provides another explanation. German historiography was eminently Protestant in its outlook until the 20th century. Whoever examined the foundations of the bourgeois society inevitably discovered anti-Catholicism as a cultural code. In the late 19th century, eminent historians like Heinrich von Sybel and Heinrich von Treitschke proved how progress was driven by Prussian Protestantism. Catholicism was anti-modern and could damage legal, bourgeois and political achievements. However, those writings should be included in the category 'anti-Catholicism'.

Roots and Roles of Anti-Catholicism
In the paradigm of anti-clericalism – often synonymous for anti-Catholicism – strong dichotomies become apparent. The well-known binary elements can be grouped according to different categories: religion, politics, conception of history and all the way to a gender perspective. Christel Köhle-Hezinger wrote the classic book about religious stereotypes in everyday life during the 19th century. The only protestant autostereotype she could find – the only positive thing Protestants thought about themselves – was that Protestants described themselves as being nationals, aligning themselves with qualities such as German efficiency etc. To portray oneself as being more pious than the Catholics was difficult. Most of all, hegemonic Protestantism existed on dissociation from Roman Catholicism. Protestantism was, in the eyes of many believers, nothing more than the negation of Catholicism. Anti-Catholicism stabilised a crumbling Protestantism. Thomas Nipperdey summarises in 1988: 'Despite co-operation and coexistence in the professional sphere, in everyday life, in business, in the parliaments – the confessional division and tension was one of the fundamental and vital basic facts of German life. For ordinary Protestants, (...) Protestantism shrunk to mean anti-Catholicism; both notions kept each other alive: because one was born Protestant, one stayed anti-Catholic and because one was anti-Catholic, one felt "Protestant"' (Nipperdey 1988; Blaschke 2000, 38-75, and 2002). Already in 1911, the Catholic historian Johannes Kißling was well

aware of the instrumental character of anti-Catholicism. In his History of the *Kulturkampf*, Kißling writes:

> The need of Protestantism for a confessional polemic is idiosyncratic, according to its emergence, history and most inner nature. Day by day, through its forgetfulness and fragmentation that mock the term 'church', Protestantism wonders which arguments could justify the divide from the Catholic Church. All along, the preferred line of argument has been the negative one, directed against the Catholic Church (Kißling, 1911, 298).

Here we encounter a first and essential stereotype: Protestantism as a negation. Nevertheless, Protestantism did not only consist of negations of Catholicism and socialism. The negations served as a projection screen for its owns strengths. Protestants situated themselves in the brightness of enlightenment and progress, while ultramontane Catholicism, in their view, was spreading nothing but medieval darkness. In 2004, Michael B. Gross illustrated the central function of anti-Catholicism in Prussia-Germany from the middle of the 19th century, in which he highlighted the lesser known but important gender perspective. Gross described how the Catholic German bishops decided to unleash an extensive missionary campaign. Between 1848 and 1872, Jesuits, joined by Redemptorists, Franciscans and other religious orders, led more than 4000 'missions to the people' (Volksmissionen). They held masses, and performed exorcisms, but the most important instrument for restoring Catholic faith was their theatrical and sensational sermons. The missionaries avoided political propaganda or polemics against Protestantism. Again, it seems that there was no anti-Protestantism. Government officials, however, began to argue that the Jesuits threatened their authority and destroyed confessional peace. Gross thus demonstrated the enormous impact of the missions on Protestants, which, somewhat paradoxically, also promoted a reawakening of popular Protestant religiosity, as well as provoking sharp responses from envious Protestant pastors. Protestant anti-Jesuitism and anti-Catholicism grew, and with them liberal anti-Catholic hysteria. In other words, what Gross tried to explain is: where does anti-Catholicism come from?

Parallel to the people's missions, another aspect of the Catholic revival was the dramatic spread of monasteries in Germany, especially those with female congregations. Liberals regarded these as medieval relics, contrasting starkly with the modern spirit of the age. There was

liberal anti-monasticism hysteria. It included bourgeois fantasies about sexual abuse and stories about nuns secretly hidden away in dungeons.

The Catholic revival, missions and monasteries were all closely linked in the liberal mind via misogyny. Catholicism was viewed as irrational and feminine: the missions were followed by an uncontrollable, emotional mob, primarily women, while the monasteries were predominantly female. Indeed, the missionary crusade, together with new religious congregations, charitable societies and pilgrimages, introduced Catholic women to public life. For German liberals, the 'women question' and the Catholic problem became one and the same: the state and the public sphere were masculine, while the domestic sphere and the Church were seen as feminine, with this separation being directly threatened by the newly revived, feminised Catholicism. Such fervent anti-Catholic tendencies culminated in the *Kulturkampf* legislation, which was not simply an attack on the Catholic Church but an attempt by liberals to preserve an entire moral, political and social order, including sexual identities and hierarchies. Anti-Catholic intolerance was a central and inherent feature of liberalism.

Gross's point about the 'biologisation' and gendering of the *Kulturkampf as a struggle between male and female principals* is surely overstated. The *Kulturkampf* is defined solely according to the ideas of liberal men. How did Catholic men perceive the *Kulturkampf*? Another point of critique is that Gross downplays Catholic anti-Protestantism. I argue that Catholic anti-Protestantism grew again in the early 19th century. The responsibility for confessionalism lay not on the shoulders of one denomination only. Was anti-Protestantism an inherent feature of Catholicism just as anti-Catholicism was an inherent feature of liberal Protestantism?

The German historian Heinrich von Treitschke in the late 19th century demonstrated the inherent dualism of Protestant thinking with utmost precision: Prussia was male, France female, Luther and the Reformation were strong, brave, German, and masculine, while Catholicism was devious, un-German, submissively cowering before Rome, sentimental, and female (Treitschke 1918, 246-48). Liberal and Protestant anti-Catholicism may also be more widely known than anti-Protestantism because anti-Catholicism institutionalised itself, for instance in the 'Protestant's Association' (Protestantenverein) in 1865 and since 1886 in Willibald Beyschlag's 'Protestant League', with a membership of half a million by 1914. The Protestant League polemicised grimly against Ca-

tholicism. In contrast to it, the 'Catholic People's Association' (Volks-verein) was founded in 1890, acting much less anti-Protestant. But should it not be possible and would it not be fair to juxtapose evangelical-bourgeois dichotomies with Catholic ones? (Müller-Dreier 1998; Klein 1996).

Anti-Protestant Resentments among Catholics

Both terms existed in the 19th century – anti-Catholicism as well as anti-Protestantism. One piece of early evidence dates back to the year 1829 and comes from the theologian Wilhelm Traugott Krug (1770-1842), a professor of philosophy in Leipzig and University principal in 1830. In his concise dictionary, it clearly says: 'Anti-Catholicism see: Catholicism and Protestantism; named this way, because one opposes the other.' The entry on anti-Protestantism says: 'Anti-Protestantism is Catholicism as the antipode of Protestantism.' 'Anti' serves solely as an opposite princi-ple, meaning that basically, both major confessions are the negation of the other, the antipode of each other, with anti-Catholicism beinig inher-ent to Protestantism and anti-Protestantism being inherent to Catholi-cism (Traugott Krug 1829, 199; 1832, 173, 179).

The Catholic theologian Ignaz von Döllinger expressed a similar view in 1865: a 'merging of the Catholic with the Protestant Church, so that the characteristics of both may be incorporated in a united church' was impossible. 'For the Catholic and Protestant essences do not react to each other like two aspects of one thing, reciprocally complementing each other and forming a richer and more harmonic whole when joined together. They rather behave like opposites, one being the negation of the other' (Döllinger 1865, 477; Grors 1921, 487-488). Catholic theolo-gians, politicians in the *Zentrum*-party and Catholic historians always declared that they respected and tolerated Protestants. Despite this rheto-ric, there did in fact exist a virulent anti-Protestantism in the 19th century, from theologians and politicians all the way down to rural workers.

The entire Catholic milieu was oosing with anti-Protestant senti-ments, which could even be detected under thick layers of tolerance. How was tolerance understood? The eminent Catholic encyclopaedia of 1854 defines tolerance as: 'the sentiment and determination of the mind by which we patiently endure and do not fight something which we consider disgusting or evil and yet which we cannot or must not change. At times, for the sake of a public cause or in order to avoid a greater

damage, we even know how to formally admit and acknowledge it.' The 'misbelievers' would have to be converted out of charity. This also applies to Protestants. The church had the right and the function 'to descend to the hostile territory.' (Wetzer und Welte, 11:72-81) Later terminological development made a clear distinction between a necessary dogmatic-theoretical intolerance and a practical-bourgeouis tolerance. Dogmatic tolerance is explicitly discarded. There was no way to be tolerant of heretical Christian denominations. This position was to survive until the Second Vatican Council (1962-65). The chart shows Catholic counter-stereotypes which match the well known stereotypes used against Catholics. While Protestants considered the ultramontanes to represent darkness, Catholic polemicists like Conrad von Bolanden had a contrasting view. For him, the *Kulturkampf* was 'a struggle of pagan darkness against the light of divine revelation' (Hirschmann 1978, 114). Both parties instrumentalised the metaphor of light and darkness and claimed light for their side.

Steven Hause has established four categories for the anti-Protestantism of French extremists such as Edouard Drumont and Charles Maurras:

1. Protestants – although they only constituted 1.7 % of the French population – were a threat to the nation and were of Germanic descent.

2. They were notoriously rebellious, living up to their name as Protestants. This is why they were to blame for the French Revolution.

3. Protestants were aiming to proselytise France or, should that fail, to deChristianise it. Protestants were not seen as good Christians. The celebrated Leo Taxil even went as far as to put 'Lutherans' on a level with 'Luciferians'.

4. There was the danger of French society being protestantised. Protestants were said to be disproportionally represented in universities, politics and administration (Hause 1989, 183-201 ; Leroy-Beaulieu 1902; Sacquin 1998 ; Bauberot and Zuber 2000; Sacquin 1998).

Protestant Auto and Hetero-Stereotypes		Catholic Auto and Hetero-Stereotypes	
Self-Image	Anti-Catholic Prejudice	Self-Image	Anti-Protestant Prejudice
Religion, Religiousness			
devout, but endangered	pious, dependent on clerics	pious, faithful	religiously endangered, non-believers
	hypocritical, bigoted, ultramontane	truth, Mother Church, loyal to the pope	heretics, secularized faith
Reformation as liberation	anti-reformationist	loyal to the church	Reformation as deformation
light, Enlightenment	dark, darkness	light of faith	darkness of heretic belief
	slaves to the Jesuits	not anti-Jesuit	hate Jesuits
Nation, Nationalism			
nationally reliable, German, clean, diligent, dutiful	unreliable, un-German, lazy, slaves to Rome, ultramontane, inter-national	loving God and the fatherland	exaggeratedly nationalistic
lesser German solution	greater German solution (Habsburg)	greater German solution (großdeutsch)	lesser German solution (kleindeutsch)
State and Politics			
loyal to the State	hostile to the state	loyal to the state, but not unconditional	deifying the state
liberal, open to reform (vs. 'Confessionelle', i.e. 'Confessionals')	antiliberal, medieval, clerical	loyal to the church, Christian	to be blamed for liberalism
Narration of History, Backward or Forward-Looking Perspective			
progressive	romanic-reactionary	consequent, loyal	hostile to the church
narration of advancement	medieval stronghold	stronghold against fashions and revolutions	narration of decay
Education			
superiority	inferiority	nobleness of the heart	suppressive
reason, science, Enlightenment	hostile to science, stupid	compatibility of faith and reason	deceitful science, rationalism
Moral			
	mendacity, immoral life in monasteries	moral superiority	Inferiority, moral decline (children born out of wedlock, suicides, divorces)
Enemies and Heroes			
reformers (Hus, Luther, Calvin, Gustav Adolf)		identification with saints and Counter-Reformers (Borromeo, Ignatius)	
	Jesuits, priests, monks		Prussian professors
Luther exposes papism, is faithful and translates the Bible			Luther comes up with desire-theology; Bible translations even older
Gustav Adolf a hero (G-A. Verein)			Gustav Adolf an usurper
	Tilly the destroyer of Magdeburg	Tilly the savior of Magdeburg	
Gender Specific			
masculine, German, heroic, strong	female	re-masculinization around 1900	
bourgeois, domestic	rural extended family or celibate	domestic	libertine

Parallels of this anti-Protestantism to anti-Catholicism and to antisemit-ism are evident: hostility towards the nation and towards Christianity, disproportionality and *Judaisation*. In Germany, Catholic anti-Protestant-ism was less nationalistic and less harsh. For the most part, the strongest argument of Catholics was Catholic superiority to Protestantism, which had fallen away from true faith, while Catholics laid claim to sole repre-sentation of the truth. Compared with all the other Christian deviations and branches, Roman Catholicism was presented as the oldest and larg-est, thus the only true Church, reaching back directly to Jesus Christ. Impressive graphs visualised this triumphant history (graph in Hammer-stein 1894, attachement)

In the famous *Syllabus Errorum* of 1864, Pius IX. condemned eighty false teachings, among them indifferentism, liberalism, socialism, and communism. The encyclical condemned it as false to say that 'human reason, without any reference whatsoever to God, is the sole arbiter of truth and falsehood, and of good and evil' (No. 3) or to think that the Church ought to be separated from the State, and the State from the Church (No. 55). However, sentence 18, too, was supposed to be false teaching: 'Protestantism is nothing but a different form of the same Christian religion which makes it as possible to please God as the Catho-lic Church does.' Believing that Protestantism is only a different form of Christianity was false and worth to be condemned. This was unequivocal and the First Vatican Council put more wood on the fire with the confir-mation of the dogma of papal infallibility in 1870. Phrases such as the 'so-called' Protestant Church or that 'which nowadays calls itself the evangelical Church' were frequent (Aschbach 1846, 236-239). Protes-tants were not really accepted as members of a church, they only thought they were, while good Catholics know they were not.

In 1857, Jean-Batiste Malou, bishop of Brügge (1848-1864), wrote an anti-Protestant book with the title 'La fausseté du protestantisme démontrée' (the fallaciousness of Protestantism proved): 'The true Church is there to teach the truth and to condemn errors, among them Protestant biblical missionaries. All the characters of the true Church of Jesus Christ are missing in Protestantism, all the characters of error are manifest in it.' Malou was sure that there could be no reasonable motive to belong to Protestantism, whose confusion of doctrines resembles the tower of Babel. 'God's Church is Catholic by name, by right and by faith. Protestantism essentially is particularistic, local and individual.' The

Church was apostolic and holy, Protestantism was rooted in blasphemies. It was time to quit and come back to the Catholic Church. There would be no animosity against the separated brothers, since it was not their fault that they were seduced to Protestantism but the fault of their fathers. For Malou and his adherence it didn't matter that Protestants were no real threat to Belgium, since only 0.5 percent of the population were Protestant (Malou 1857, 4-6, 152, 156-157, 162; Koll 2004, 99-134, 114). The dispositiv for the Belgium situation (anti-Protestantism without Protestants) was Sweden, where anti-Catholicism blossomed among people who never had the chance to ever meet a Catholic. Anti-Protestantism without Protestants and anti-Catholicism without Catholics remind of antisemitism without Jews: these ideologies and resentments served to target an out-group and to stabilise the identity of the in-group. It would be misleading to look for any real background of the stereotypes in the victimised groups concerned (Blaschke 2009).

If anti-Protestantism was not formulated as explicitly as Malou's, it is often to be found to be present between the lines. The Reformation, it was said, did not bear its name rightfully, for it was 'not reformation, but deformation of ecclesiastical, social, academic, artistic, political life' (Wetzer und Welte 1897; Reichensperger 1872). Protestants – according to the master narrative of history – initiated decay in the 16th century, they sowed destruction and discord. European civilisation is solely the product of Catholic tradition (Balmes 1854; Nicolas 1852).

Thus the French Revolution was a product of their reformation. Protestantism was in a state of perpetual decay, as even the level-headed Catholic politician and publisher Karl Bachem claimed in 1931 (Bachem 1931, 329-377). Protestantism was a religion of the here and now, of a this-worldliness. It killed the practical striving for heaven. A quote from Josef Burg's 'Controversial Encyclopaedia' of 1905 illustrates this:

> The Catholic will never devote the entire energy of his striving as exclusively as the non-believer or the average Protestant to the earthly goods. He knows of higher and more important interests.

From this resulted 'the divinity of the Catholic Church.' The inferiority of the Catholic, in this respect, evidenced a moral superiority because, more children were born out of wedlock and there were more divorces, and suicides among non believers and Protestants (Burg 1905 and 1909). Around the turn of the century, the Augsburg Catholic journalist Hans Rost examined the phenomenon scientifically and, based on statistical

data about Protestant alcoholism and suicide, popularised his conviction that Catholics were superior to Protestants (Rost 1911 and 1913). Frequently, Protestants were mentioned with non-believers in the same breath.

The Catholic missionary of the Society of Jesus, Franz Xaver Weninger, preached in Germany, France and, as he regretted, much too seldom in the United States of America. He was struck with the profound attention with which Americans honoured his efforts:

> I noticed on such occasions, and, indeed, in all my intercourse with the native inhabitants, so many excellent qualities of mind and heart, that I could not but view, with the sincerest feelings of compassion, so noble and intelligent a people seduced by religious error, when it would be so easy for them, by a little candid inquiry, to overcome the prejudices of education and habit, and discover that the Catholic Church is the only means of salvation for men (Weninger 1863, vi).

What did Catholics say about the biggest Protestant hero, about Martin Luther? Around Luther, three major prejudices circulated: First, his renunciation of the church had not been due to a particular religious faith, as the Protestant Luther-biographies asserted, 'it was not an aspiring and pious soul's path of honest wistful struggle'. The truth is that Luther simply could not control his desires. Out of ambition and pride he wanted to overcome his desires. 'Of course, the result is nullified. Instead of having fulfilled the law and overcome desirousness,' Luther had to give up and came to the sad conclusion: 'desirousness is entirely insurmountable.' When his house of cards collapsed in the storm of passions and pride, he sought to bring theory into accordance with his experience of unconquerable desires. Instead of humbly begging for God's support, instead of praying, what did he do? He developed a sort of desire-theology.

Second, his 'merits' – in inverted commas – were to be doubted. German bible translations had existed before. Thirdly, there has been much discussion about Luther's death in 1546. Some Protestants claimed he had been murdered by papists. This was a radical Protestant assumption. The radical Catholic rejoinder came from Catholic politician Paul Majunke. He claimed that Luther committed suicide, that he had hung himself from his bedpost out of sheer desperation at his deeds. More common was that Luther had been found bloated by too much food and sweet foreign wine (Weninger 1863, 537-545).

Arguments from history were strong ones in the 19th century. Whenever there was the opportunity – at the anniversary of historical personalities or dates – the parties instrumentalised history for their own sake. Their reading of history impaired schoolbooks, history books, theatre plays, novels, literature and articles in the press. In Belgium, which was more than 99 percent Catholic, Luther, Calvin and other Protestant theologians were discredited as they were in France and Germany. Major historical actors and events in Belgian history remained contested, among them Phillip II of Spain (1527-1598) and the Eighty Years War which began as a revolt of the seventeen Dutch provinces for independence (1568-1648) under the leadership of William I., Prince of Orange (1533-1584). While liberal authors saw Phillip as a brutal tyrant who tried to suppress freedom and to re-Catholicise Belgium, Catholic authors made Protestants responsible for the escalation of violence during the war and for the destruction of national unity. They fought, not for freedom, but, according to Catholic schoolbooks, for their own egoism. William was seen as a traitor of his fatherland and of God, trying to corrode Catholicism in Belgium (Koll 2004, 99-134).

Thus, negative attitudes towards the Protestant Church certainly existed. But they were only a small part of the ensemble of Catholic prejudices. Sometimes, in the battle against intermarriage and interdenominational schools, Catholics did form coalitions with the conservative and orthodox Protestants. For Catholicism, the struggles against liberalism, Freemasonry, and socialism, not to forget the Jews, were of more importance than that against Protestant brothers and sisters.

Yet, Protestantism belonged to that particular ring of enemies that encircled the Catholic castle. In 1911, Kißling demonstrated elaborately that 'German Protestantism was in large parts responsible for the church persecution of the 1870s. Many Protestants demanded a fight against their Catholic fellow citizens, spurred on by anti-Roman Lutheran rage' (Kißling, 1911, 314). 'Christendom here - atheism there' was a widely spread trope. Protestants could fall in the category of Christianity or of atheism, depending on their conduct. Confessionalism and antisemitism were expressed in everyday life, for example, on postcards, in newspapers and at the workplace. Surveys of village and city life show that Catholics, Protestants and Jews were anxious not to cross each other's paths. Armin Owzar proves to what extent people of different creeds,

nationality or political opinions lived distinctly in Hamburg. But Hamburg was a big city (Owzar 2006).

In interdenominational rural communities it was much harder to avoid each other completely. Tobias Dietrich has documented the conflicts that erupted time and again because of, for example, the service timetable in the jointly used community church. Catholics called Protestants 'Blauköpp', while Protestants named them 'Kreuzköpp'. However, in an emergency situation, when a house fire had to be extinguished, villagers acted interconfessionally. What is more, economic life would not have functioned properly, if the Catholic baker had not accepted flour from the Protestant miller (Dietrich 2004, 397; Pahl 2006).

Visitation reports from the second half of the 19th century repeatedly convey: 'There was always peace between the two confessions'. We have ample reasons to distrust these comments. The need to mention this coexistence explicitly suggests that there was the potential for conflict. The formula was identical with that employed to describe Christian-Jewish coexistence: there existed no conflicts, everything was peaceful, people accepted each other, and tolerance prevailed. In reality, Christians did not like Jews. Mixed marriages between Christians and Jews were not welcome. But still, in the eyes of some Christians, it appeared to be even more dangerous to have contact with a Christian of another confession. 'You may play with the Jews, but not with the Lutherans', mothers from the rural Sauerland would remind their children until the 1920s (Dietrich and Blaschke 2002, 137-62).

We don't know how these mothers were influenced by the important piece of evidence of anti-Protestantism which appeared a decade earlier, the Borromeo encyclical. The papal encyclical was released on May 29th 1910 in *Osservatore Romano* in remembrance of the 300th anniversary of the canonisation of the cardinal and archbishop of Milan, Carlo Borromeo. The encyclical began by praising the achievements of Borromeo as a Counter-Reformer. Then it described 16th century Protestants as arrogant, greedy and chaotic, their quest for reformation as materialistic and corrupt. The document became the cause of German Empire's 'greatest confessional-political "affair"' (Müller-Dreier 1998, 385). It says:

> In those days passions ran riot and knowledge of the truth was almost completely twisted and confused. A continual battle was being waged against errors. Human society, going from bad to worse, was rushing headlong into the abyss. Then those proud and rebellious men came on the scene who are

'enemies of the cross of Christ (...) Their god is the belly (…) they mind the things of earth.' These men were not concerned with correcting morals, but only with denying dogmas. Thus they increased the chaos. They dropped the reins of law, and unbridled licentiousness ran wild. They despised the authoritative guidance of the church and pandered to the whims of the dissolute princes and people. They tried to destroy the Church's doctrine, constitution and discipline. They were similar to those sinners who were warned long ago: 'Woe to you that call evil good, and good evil.' They called this rebellious riot and perversion of faith and morals a reformation, and themselves reformers. In reality, they were corrupters. In undermining the strength of Europe through wars and dissension, they paved the way for those modern rebellions and apostasy (Bachem, 1931, 332).

German Protestants felt insulted and were scandalised. The encyclical caused an outrage, which was fuelled by exaggerated translations. 'Men (...) who mind the things of the earth' (qui terrena sapiunt) became 'Men (...) who mind brutish things'. A feeling of embarrassed unease was even felt by Catholics. Numerous Catholic newspapers refrained from printing the encyclical. It became the focus of a lively debate in German parliaments, such as the Prussian House of Representatives. The Prussian Prime Minister, and German Chancellor, Bethmann Hollweg, commissioned the Prussian envoy to the Holy See to present a note of protest to the Roman Curia. The *Osservatore Romano* expressed their regret if the encyclical had caused misunderstandings. Bethmann Hollweg, in turn, ensured that the royal government did everything in order to keep and protect confessional peace.

Conclusion

About one hundred years ago the Catholic-Protestant antagonism climbed to an extreme. Otto Sickenberger (1867-1945), who was dismissed from the priesthood because he married and converted to reform-Catholicism, in 1904 published a collection about the 'extreme anti-Protestantism' that he observed within Catholic life and thinking. He interpreted the history of Catholic and Protestant hostility as a history of stimulus and response. The confessional antagonism of his time was not fought with weapons any longer, as it had been 300 years earlier but with spiritual weapons, which led to extreme positions within each denomination (Sickenberger 1904).

These times are gone. But some traditions were revived in recent years under the increasing influence of Josef Ratzinger, Prefect of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith since 1981 and Pope since

2005. In the year 2000 the Congregation declared that the ecclesial communities 'which have not preserved the valid Episcopate and the genuine and integral substance of the Eucharistic mystery, are not Churches in the proper sense.' This notion was confirmed in 2007: The 'Christian Communities born out of the Reformation of the sixteenth century', because of the absence of the sacramental priesthood, 'have not preserved the genuine and integral substance of the Eucharistic Mystery' and can not be called 'Churches' in the proper sense (CDF 2000 and 2007).

In historical scholarship, anti-Catholic anti-clericalism has remained the more attractive topic. It sheds light on the functional patterns of bourgeois society and its tendencies towards secularisation. Were the Catholics, then, only victims, more tolerant than their confessional opponents? Was there no anti-Protestantism? As this essay has shown, anti-Protestant resentments were rampant among Catholics, just as anti-Catholic stereotypes were widespread among non-Catholics.

What were the differences? Catholics rarely stepped out so publicly as, for instance, the Evangelical League. Anti-Catholicism was latent and manifest, Catholic anti-Protestantism remained largely latent and implicit. The Catholic view of Protestantism was characterised by pity and compassion, as if an erring or sick person had to be cured. Anti-Protestantism was encompassed by anti-Liberalism. It thus had an anti-modern tendency, whereas anti-Catholicism was seen as something modern. The observations of contemporaries were not entirely wrong: Protestants were more in need of the negative foil of anti-Jesuitism than were Catholics, who could lean upon a firm system of dogmas and upon the hierarchy of their universal church.

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'THE CATHOLIC DANGER': THE CHANGING PATTERNS OF SWEDISH ANTI-CATHOLICISM – 1850-1965

Yvonne Maria Werner

Abstract

In the 1860s, Sweden's harsh religious legislation was liberalised. The Dissenter Act legalised conversions to other Christian denominations, but it put in place many obstacles to leaving the Established Church, and many of the legal restrictions were obviously anti-Catholic in intent. Anti-Catholic sentiment was also expressed in conjunction with the legislative proposals and parliamentary debates on the question of religious freedom that preceded the Act on Freedom of Religion of 1951. The fact that full religious freedom was introduced so late stemmed largely from fears that the Catholic Church would grow strong under the protection of more liberal religious legislation. The chapter addresses anti-Catholic rhetoric in Sweden from the mid 1800s to the early 1960s with focus on the debates in the media and in Parliament. It is found that there was a shift in the perception of the 'Catholic danger'. At the beginning of the period, anti-Catholicism was prompted by a desire to shield Protestant religious unity; later the objective became more and more secular. Even if the country's Lutheran heritage still played an important role for Swedish cultural identity, common values were no longer prompted by religion, but purely by politics and ideology.

In the autumn of 1921, the Catholic Apostolic Vicar of Sweden, Bishop Albertus Bitter, submitted a petition to the newly instituted National Board of Education requesting that inaccurate statements about the Catholic Church's doctrine and practice in schoolbooks on history and church history should be corrected. The petition, of which 3,000 copies

were printed and distributed to schools across the country, referred to the national school curriculum, issued two years before, which stated that teachers should avoid anything that might be perceived as a hurtful attack on individuals' political and religious views. Several examples were given of how these principles had been offended in the description of the Catholic Church, not least concerning the worship of Mary and the saints, indulgences, and the Jesuit order. The Catholic leadership in Sweden thus hoped to benefit from the demands for a more secular education that had long since been advocated by Swedish liberals and socialists (Bitter 1921; Werner 1996, 78–99).

The effect of the Catholic schoolbook petition was dramatic, for it gave rise to one of the largest press campaigns against the Catholic Church in Sweden in modern times. The petition was rejected by an almost unanimous press, and the newspapers proclaimed themselves embarrassed by what they described as an impudent attempt by the Catholics to win influence over the country's education policy, placing it under 'papal censorship'. The National Board of Education, which investigated the issue, concluded that Catholic criticism of the Swedish schoolbooks was unfounded and on the whole thoroughly exaggerated. There the matter rested. The Catholic intention of bringing about a reassessment of the impression of the Catholic faith and practice given in Sweden's schoolbooks thus failed, and the only thing achieved by the petition was a violent press campaign against the Catholic Church (von Engeström 1921; Wadensjö 1968, 208–10).

It was not the first time that the Catholic Church had been subject to this type of media attack, nor would it be the last. The next press campaign was already underway in the summer of 1923, this time triggered by the visitation to the Nordic countries by Cardinal Willem van Rossum, prefect of the Roman Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith. The cardinal's visit, which was part of the Catholic Church's increased missionary activity in Scandinavia, provoked fierce debates in the press, with many conspiracy theories and anti-Catholic attacks. The fact that the Bridgettine order had established what was ostensibly a rest home, but was suspected to be a disguised convent, in the Stockholm suburb of Djursholm, and that Swedish High-Church priests had participated in some of the events organised in connection with the cardinal's visit, merely fuelled anti-Catholic sentiment (Werner 1996, 256–266).

These fears were especially strong within the Church of Sweden. The cardinal's visit coincided with a petition in Swedish churches in support of the Latvian Protestants' objections to a Protestant church in Riga being returned to the Catholics, which stirred up the atmosphere further. At the meeting of the General Assembly of Swedish Priests – an association for Established Church clergy – held in the city of Norrköping in September 1923, the 'Catholic danger' was a major theme. It was decided to set up a 'Protestant Committee to Protect Protestantism', with links to the *Internationaler Verband zur Verteidigung des Protestantismus* formed in Berlin the same year, which had the fight against Catholicism as its primary purpose. Similarly, at the Church of Sweden's General Synod in 1923 and the Scandinavian Bishops' Conference in 1924, 'Papist' propaganda was a central theme (Jergmar 1972, 111, 118).

Until 1860, Sweden was a Lutheran confessional state, and as late as 1858 six women converts to Catholicism were sentenced to exile for apostatising from 'the pure Protestant faith'. This incident provoked a storm of protest across Europe and contributed to forcing a change in Sweden's religious legislation. The result was the Dissenter Act, which legalised conversions to other Christian denominations, although anyone hoping to leave the Established Church, which from now on was labelled the Church of Sweden, faced endless restrictions that had a deliberately anti-Catholic sting. The members of so-called 'foreign' religions were excluded from being teachers at state schools, and were denied access to the public teaching and nursing colleges. Since the majority of the members of the Protestant Free Churches chose to remain in the Established Church, these discriminatory regulations primarily affected Catholics (Palmqvist 1958, 334–457). This was also the case with the new Dissenter Act of 1873, whose purpose was to impose a legal framework on the vigorous revivalist movements. Anti-Catholic sentiment was also expressed in connection with the legislative proposals and parliamentary debates on the question of religious freedom that preceded the Act on Freedom of Religion of 1951. That full freedom of worship was introduced so late stemmed largely from fears that the Catholic Church, under the protection of liberalised religious legislation, would intensify its missionary work in Sweden (Kellberg 1990, 299–309). The debate in the press once again illustrated the deep-seated anti-Catholic sentiment in the country.

What form did anti-Catholic criticism take? To what extent did it draw on national Lutheran confessional traditions? What was the role of foreign influences? And how did anti-Catholic rhetoric change over time? These are the questions I will address in this article, and in so doing I will shed light on anti-Catholic rhetoric in Sweden from the mid 1800s to the early 1960s.

For the Protection of Lutheranism

With the Dissenter Acts of 1860 and 1873 the correlation between Swedish citizenship and Lutheran confession was broken. The purpose of the Acts was to create a framework for the vibrant Protestant Free Church movement, and the fact that the new legislation also benefited the Catholic Church was seen as a necessary evil. The issue had been a matter of debate since the 1840s in the Swedish Parliament, which at that time was still made up of four Estates. The reason why it had taken so long to arrive at a decision was due in no small part to the strength of anti-Catholic opinion in Parliament. The greatest resistance came, not unexpectedly, from the Estate of the clergy: they described Catholicism as a superstitious and unbiblical heresy and a threat to the country's Lutheran social order and culture. Marian dogma, the cult of the saints, and the importance of good deeds as a means to justification were taken as examples of such unbiblical teachings and traditions, and the supranational character of the Catholic Church and its hegemonic claim to be the one true Church were described as a threat to Swedish national integrity. In the parliamentary debates, voices warned against Jesuit infiltration and Catholic proselytising, to which the lower sections of the population were said to be particularly susceptible. Several parliamentarians were afraid that, as one of them put it, the country would be studded with Catholic convents (Palmqvist 1958, 364–457; Sidenvall 2007, 253–268; Harvard 2006, 79–83). It was bad enough that the Catholic Church was allowed to operate in Sweden – the line should be drawn at permitting monasteries.

The debate continued along the same lines even after the replacement of the parliamentary estates by a modern, bicameral parliamentary system and the establishment of a new representative body for the Church of Sweden, the General Synod, in the late 1860s. Interestingly, it was mainly the conservatives who continued to criticise the Catholic Church, while the representatives of the liberal movement movement – which played a

dominant role in the anti-Catholic polemics on the Continent – were more passive, and in some cases even defended Catholic rights. However, this was not an expression of Catholic sympathies per se, but instead reflected the fact that the evangelicals were strongly represented in the Liberal Party and feared that more severe religious legislation would also affect the Protestant Free Churches. Increased Catholic activities in Sweden in the latter half of the nineteenth century led to repeated attempts by religious conservatives to tighten up the Dissenter Act, as evidenced by the debates in Parliament as well as in the General Synod (Hessler 1964, 249–252; Werner 1996, 30–73).

In Church circles a watchful eye was kept on Catholic activities in the country, and calls for tighter legislation to meet the 'Catholic danger' were heard from time to time. The meeting of the clergy in Stockholm in the autumn of 1888 heard a proposal for Sweden's national commemoration days to be used to warn against the dangers of Catholicism. On the commemoration day for Gustavus Adolphus the following autumn, the *pastor primarius* (first pastor) in Stockholm, Fredrik Fehr, used his sermon to call for vigilance against Catholic propaganda. A bazaar in Stockholm in April 1890 for the benefit of the Catholic Sisters of Saint Elizabeth and their health-care activities prompted him to convene the Stockholm clergy at Storkyrkan, the main church in the capital, to discuss this new threat to what he chose to term 'evangelical freedom'. The clergy duly passed a resolution urging the Swedish people not to support Catholic health care in the capital. Fehr was a prominent representative of the so-called 'liberal theology', a Protestant movement that strove to adapt the Christian message to modern society and its mentality, and to bring it into line with the new scientific worldview. Liberal theologians were notably active in the fight against the 'Catholic threat' (Werner 1996, 171–180).

There were connections between these events and the efforts at around the same time to tighten up the Dissenter Act. The debates were ostensibly prompted by the Catholic Church's strict marriage laws. In the Swedish Parliament, proposals were put forward to prohibit prior agreements on children's Catholic education in mixed marriages, the aim being to ensure that the children of such marriages would be brought up as members of the Church of Sweden, as was the law in the event that no prior agreement had been reached by the parents. In the debates in Parliament and the General Synod, several speakers pointed to Catholic

expansion abroad and the need to prevent similar developments in Sweden. They justified their position by arguing for the importance of safeguarding Protestant religious liberty and protecting the individual from Catholic dogmatism, moral constraint, and 'pushy priests' (FK 1903, 15:29–30; AK 1910 5:14–18, 26–37; Werner 1996, 48–54). In the press, sharp criticism was directed against what was termed the Catholic Church's sneaky attempt to use religion to control individual consciences and to 'ensnare souls'. Some of these press debates were later published in book form (Hammargren 1930).

Conservative churchmen also used this type of rhetoric, and from the late nineteenth century references to the true faith or the responsibility for people's salvation became more and more rare. True, there were several among the clergy who would have liked to have seen a return to old Lutheran unitary religious order, but the Church of Sweden's weakened position in society on the one hand and its close ties to government on the other made it increasingly difficult to call for it openly. Rather, it was the political ramifications that were in focus, and Catholicism was thus presented as a threat to individual liberty and national security. Suspicion of the Catholic clergy led to restrictions on Catholic parishes. In the 1910s they were thus deprived of their right to be institutions of record, and this task was taken over by the Church of Sweden. In the debates, this measure was justified by the need to prevent the Catholic Church from exerting pressure on Catholics who did not want a Catholic marriage, or who wished to defy Catholic doctrine by remarrying. The initiative for this action, however, came not from the Protestant clergy but from the government, and it was motivated by state rationale, not by theological arguments (Werner 1996, 58–64).

The situation may thus have changed, but the values and principles at issue remained broadly the same. Catholicism was seen as a threat both to basic societal values and to Sweden's political culture, not to mention individual freedom, but all these concepts were gradually filled with new content. The resultant shift in perspective left anti-Catholic attitudes in Sweden more akin to those on the Continent, which originated in the contradiction between the liberal (and socialist) principle of religion as a private matter and the Catholic Church's demands for uninterrupted influence over politics and society (see the Introduction to this volume). It also illustrated the importance of Lutheran cultural heritage. As several researchers have shown, the legacy of Christian confession was an im-

portant factor in the construction of nineteenth-century national identities. In Protestant Scandinavia, the connection between Lutheranism and Nordic national identity remained relevant long after the disappearance of religion as an all-encompassing norm in daily life (Thorkildsen 1997, 138–60; Blückert, 2000).

The Swedish Welfare State and Anti-Catholicism

During the inter-war period 'the Catholic danger' was a perennial topic of debate in the Swedish media, which can be seen as response to the Catholic Church's internationally strengthened position after the First World War and its increased missionary activities in Scandinavia. The issue was addressed at the Swedish Bishops' Conference in 1920, and four years later the Swedish bishops issued a joint statement urging vigilance against 'Papist propaganda' (Wadensjö 1968, 215–219; Werner 2005, 164–177). Catholic activities in Sweden and abroad were followed closely by the media, and the leading daily newspaper, *Dagens Nyheter*, published a special series of articles on 'Catholic propaganda' (*DN* 9 & 10 September 1923; Hammargren 1925).

Cardinal van Rossum's tour of Scandinavia led, as mentioned, to sharp attacks on the Catholic Church in the press. These attacks became even more vituperative after the publication of a booklet in Dutch a year later, in which the cardinal described his impressions from the Scandinavia trip. In the booklet, which was intended to encourage Dutch Catholics to donate money to the Catholic mission in Scandinavia, the cardinal gave a very optimistic picture of the opportunities for Catholic missionary activity in the North. Thus he stressed that the Nordic people were increasingly turning away from Protestantism and directing their gaze towards the Roman 'Mother Church'. The Catholic Apostolic Vicar of Sweden, Bishop Johannes Müller, spoke in the same spirit in conjunction with his fundraising trips in Catholic Europe (van Rossum, 1923; Wadensjö, 1968, 215–219; Werner 2005, 164–177). The Swedish. Sweden's Archbishop Nathan Söderblom was sharply critical of what he described as the Catholic Church's misguided missionary work in Protestant countries. In his opinion, the Catholic Church, through its exclusive claim to truth, had put itself outside true catholicity and developed into a sect, whose monolithic principle of unity constituted a threat to modern society (Werner 1996, 322–324).

When studying newspaper and Church magazine articles on the Catholic Church, one is struck by the military metaphors. There is much talk of the Catholic Church's 'plans of attack' against Scandinavia and wish to 'encircle' Protestantism, and similarly of 'occupation troops' in form of Catholic priests and women religious, and the Protestant 'defence preparedness' to meet this threat. The Catholic Church, in other words, was characterised as a danger to society and political developments in Sweden, and there were warnings of an approaching Catholic missionary offensive against the Nordic countries. There were frequent references to developments in countries such as Germany, the Netherlands, and Britain, where there was a growing Catholic minority. It was also characteristic for Catholicism to be described as anti-progressive, authoritarian, and oppressive. Left-wingers expressed concerns that Catholicism would inhibit Swedish democratic development, while conservatives described Catholicism as a threat to the country's cultural identity and national independence. Although the media occasionally ran positive portrayals of Catholic events and ceremonies, the basic trend was for Catholicism to be depicted as something strange and different that did not belong in Swedish society (S-T 27 September and 10 November 1923; DN 15 July 1923, 20 July 1925, SD 17 November 1921, 4 February 1923, 12 July 1924, 14 March 1930; NDA 6 January 1918, 17 July 1923, 12 and 20 July 1924, 11 July and 12 August 1925; 24 March 1930).

Suspicion of Catholic religious orders and monasteries was especially strong. An article in the Young Church movement's magazine *Vår Lösen* (Our Watchword) from 1922 warned against Catholic monasticism, which it labelled a prime means of Catholic propaganda and an expression of the oppressive Catholic system. Several articles that year described Catholic monasteries as a threat to social morality and state authority and as anti-liberal establishments, whose very existence was contrary to modern liberties such as freedom of speech and thought (NDA 26 January; SD 2 February; SM 1 March; S-T 5 and 6 February 1922). Interestingly, women were described as being particularly susceptible to the temptations of monastic life, and again and again there were warnings against the girls' schools run by Catholic religious institutes in Scandinavia. In the 1930s, the focus was on two Catholic establishments for women in the Swedish capital, namely the French School of the Sisters of St Joseph, a French congregation at work in the capital since the 1860s, and the St Ingrid Nursing Home for young women, run by the

French Dominican Sisters. It was suspected that these institutions were used as means to proselytise. The Catholic Church was duly subjected to vicious attacks in the media, and from all sides calls were heard for increased government control of Catholic activities (Åmell 2004, 121–142; Werner 2009, 35–39). Celibacy was another common focus for attacks. The celibate life was denounced as unethical and, as was particularly evident in the debates on female monasticism, a threat to society's moral order. The alternative women's role represented by the female religious institutions conflicted with the Protestant ideals of womanhood then current in Scandinavia. Married life and women's duties as wives and mothers were emphasised, while celibate monastic life was rejected as unnatural and unchristian (Markkola 2000).

As before, the fiercest attacks came from the conservatives, while the social democrats showed a certain understanding for Catholic claims. Hence the editor of the socialist newspaper *Arbetet* (The Work), Arthur Engberg, somewhat unexpectedly defended the Catholic schoolbook petition discussed above. Yet this was not an expression of Catholic sympathies, but rather a means to get at the Church of Sweden. Engberg soon changed tack, and by the end of the 1920s he was an advocate of a cohesive Swedish state church system: the Church of Sweden should be used as a tool for a radical cultural policy, and Catholicism was chief among the movements that had to be held at bay. As a church minister from 1932, Engberg kept close watch on the Catholic Church (Hessler 1964, 249–252; Stråth 1993, 17–21; Alvunger 2006, 45–61).

However, it was not just the media that took a critical stance on the Catholic Church and spread anti-Catholic views: the textbooks used in state schools served much the same purpose. This was the background to Bishop Bitter's petition, after all. In the textbooks for history and religion, the Catholic Church was described as a corrupt apparatus of power, hell-bent on selling forgiveness of sins, and wedded to the principle that the end justified the means. The Jesuits, who were depicted as cunning and devious, appeared as the foremost exponents of this Catholic striving for power, and conflicts in the early modern period were frequently attributed to malign Jesuit influence. Catholic worship was described as superstitious and primitive, and the Virgin Mary and the saints were said to have the status of demigods. Monasticism was portrayed as a refuge for lazy men and oppressed women, and the Reformation as liberation from spiritual darkness and religious despotism. Similar

descriptions are also to be found in encyclopaedias and reference books, and in even more extreme form in contemporary pamphlet literature (Hidal 1988, 248–251; Palmqvist 1993, 151–157).

Freedom of Religion and Catholicism

The deep-rooted distrust of the Catholic Church was much in evidence during the referral and parliamentary discussion of the Bill that led to the Act on Freedom of Religion in 1951. One of the issues that prompted most debate was the right to establish monasteries. The current Dissenter Act explicitly prohibited monastic orders and monasteries; the government Bill now proposed that the monastery ban should be repealed and replaced with a provision that allowed the establishment of monasteries on certain conditions. This was ultimately the line taken by Parliament (Inger 1962, 138–165; Alvunger 2006, 157–170; Werner 2009, 26–29).

But during the parliamentary readings, the monastic issue was subject of heated debate and a series of separate votes. In these debates, in which differences of opinion did not follow the usual party lines, a strong distrust of the Catholic Church in general and of monasticism in particular was very much on show. Several speakers pointed to Catholicism's political dimension and the central position of monastic life in the Catholic system, while others argued that monastic institutions constituted a threat to individual rights and freedoms, and therefore should not be allowed in Sweden. But what particularly worried them was that the monasteries could be used as tools for Catholic propaganda and to lure in converts. There were also warnings, not least from Social Democrat speakers, about the negative consequences of an increasing degree of Catholic influence in the country. Catholicism was described as a reactionary ideology, hostile to freedom, and incompatible with Swedish society's democratic values (FK 1961, 17:11–18; AK 1961, 17:18–25).

The fact that a majority of the members of Parliament in the end endorsed the government's proposals was due in part to the fact that a ban on monasteries was incompatible with the European Convention on Human Rights, which Sweden had signed only shortly before. Indeed, it should be noted that the monastic issue was actually one of the reasons why the Swedish government had long hesitated about accession to the European Court of Justice, for it was feared that this would force Sweden into an unconditional repeal of all its restrictions on the establishment of monasteries. Similarly, the strong Catholic presence in post-war

European politics played a certain role in this connection, and the Swedish foreign policy debate often presented the first steps towards European integration as a Catholic project that had to be guarded against (Kellberg 1990, 299–309; Werner 2006, 81–106; Stråth 2000, 366–383).

The debate gained fresh momentum when a group of Belgian Carmelite sisters applied for permission to establish a monastery in Glumslöv in southern Sweden. Several leading figures argued that the application should be turned down, and there was talk in the media of 'spiritual concentration camps' and 'orgies of self-torture' (*S-T* 13 November 1961; *SvD* 1 August 1963; *DN* 4 August 1963; *Arbetet* 4 August 1963). Nevertheless, in 1961 the government submitted a Bill for approval by Parliament. Once again the discussion did not follow clear party lines, although the most critical comments this time came from the Social Democrats. As in the debate on the issue a decade before, the discussion was more about the perception of the Catholic Church than about the matter at hand. Opponents stressed the Catholic Church's political aspirations and the incompatibility of monastic life both with Swedish legal tradition and with modern notions of individual rights and freedoms. It was also pointed out that the Catholic Church, in its determination to improve its footing in Sweden, was quick to invoke religious freedom, despite rejecting this principle as heresy in its doctrinal teaching. The parliamentary Chambers took various decisions, which meant that the proposal was defeated, yet even so the government, referring to the European Convention on Human Rights, decided to authorise the establishment of the monastery (FK 1961, 20:19–65; AK 1961:17:36–81; Inger, 1962, 138–165).

An important reason for Swedish resistance to the monasteries was that they were perceived as the purest expression of Catholicism and Catholic life. Critics made much of the principle of authority, which of course was particularly prominent in monasticism. The same views were apparent in the anti-Catholic rhetoric across the Western world, but equally in the Catholic Church's own teachings. This explains why the 'culture wars' between church and state that from the mid nineteenth century onwards raged in many countries mainly affected members of religious orders and congregations (de Maeyer et al. 2004). Yet in the Swedish debate the Protestant legacy is discernible. While the Lutheran tradition emphasises the importance of marriage and family life, the ideals of celibacy and ascetic monasticism are regarded as superior forms

of Christian life according to Catholic teaching (Werner 2002, 14–5, 80–4).

Concluding Reflections

Anti-Catholicism was a legacy of the Reformation. As a consequence of the disintegration of Protestant cultural unity and the ongoing secularis-ation of Swedish society, there was a shift in the perception of the 'Catho-lic danger'. As late as the early twentieth century, the overall aim had been to preserve religious unity on Lutheran grounds. Fifty years later the objective was to defend the Protestant-inspired democratic ideology that had now become the self-evident foundation of Swedish society. Even if the Lutheran legacy still played an important role for the Swedish cultural identity, common values no longer reflected religion, but politi-cal and ideological reasons. In both perspectives, the Catholic faith, with its hierarchical order and demands for obedience and submission to the Church's teaching, appeared as alien and dangerous, not least from a political point of view, and the supranational character of the Catholic Church and its demands for independence from state power were re-garded a threat to national identity and integrity.

   The debate about the Glumslöv monastery in the 1960s was the last major expression of anti-Catholic sentiment in Swedish politics; it marked the end of an era. Anti-Catholic statements were to continue, but the criticism expressed was neither as solid nor as overwhelmingly nega-tive as before. Today there is no talk in Sweden of a 'Catholic threat', and anti-Catholic rhetoric mainly focuses on Catholic teaching on sexual morality and the family. This change in attitude can be seen as resulting from the profound transformation of the Catholic Church following the Second Vatican Council (1962–5) and the subsequent reforms that paved the way for a more open form of Catholicism, but was also due to changes in Swedish society, which followed similarly lines of develop-ment towards greater openness and cultural diversity. In both cases, past strategies of delimitation and uniformity were abandoned in favour of more pluralistic views (Werner 2006, 13–19, 24–24, 81–106). Today it is Islam that is portrayed as a threat to the Nordic community of values. The rhetoric is closely allied to that used in the 1960s against Catholi-cism. This is evident not least with regard to women's issues, and the veil has taken the place of the monasteries as supposedly bearing witness to

forced subordination and oppression (Hvitfelt 1998, 72–84; Roald 2003, 189–212).

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AROUSING ANTI-CATHOLIC SENTIMENTS ON A NATIONAL SCALE: THE CASE OF MARTA STEINSVIK AND NORWAY

Kristin Norseth

Abstract

This article is a case study concerned with a key figure in the history of anti-Catholicism in Norway in the 20th century, the highly profiled author and professional lecturer, Marta Steinsvik, and her critics of the Catholic Church. Her awareness of 'the menace of Catholicism' was provoked in 1925 when the Norwegian Parliament discussed a motion to abolish the ban on Jesuits in the Norwegian constitution from 1814. By attacking the Catholic Church, she defended the liberal and modern values of Norwegian society and culture, based on a Protestant and Lutheran heritage. She represented what can be termed 'confessional nationalism'. On the international scene, she was one of many contemporaries conveying well-known anti-Catholic propaganda and stereotypes, while in Norway, she left a legacy of anti-Catholicism lasting well into the 1950's.

Introduction

In 1928, Marta Steinsvik (1877-1950) published a highly polemic book with the title, *St. Peters himmelnøkler (St. Peter's Keys to Heaven)*, which caused a sensation as well as a lawsuit. A second enlarged edition was published in 1930, the very year the Lutheran state church, the Church of Norway, celebrated the 900th anniversary of the death of St. Olav, who is attributed with the christening of Norway, and who was regarded as a national hero. Borrowing from foreign anti-Catholic literature, Steinsvik delivered a sharp criticism of the Catholic Church in general, and the Jesuits in particular. When first published, Steinsvik was criss-crossing the country under the auspices of *Folkeakademiet* (The People's Acad-

emy), presenting her lecture 'I Moderkirkens favn' ('In the Bosom of the Mother Church'). Her lecturing tours drew large audiences, and stirred both public debate and sentiment. The lecture itself comprised 40 of the 1930 edition's 612 pages, with the rest of the book consisting of her 'corrections' of a Catholic defence brochure and a documentation of the lawsuit. In addition, she included numerous excerpts from national and local newspapers and magazines, giving critical and applauding assessments of the first edition of her book and her lecture.[1] The book is a valuable source, not only to an individual's crusade against Catholicism, but also to anti-Catholic sentiments in Lutheran Norway. Marta Steinsvik serves as an interesting case for studying the international phenomenon of anti-Catholicism in a given national context.

The Author

In the 1920s, Marta Steinsvik, a widow and mother of five children, was a well-known feminist, publisher, debater and public lecturer (Solbrekken 2012, 250). She and her husband, the anarchist and leftist Rasmus Steinsvik (1863-1913), belonged to a circle of intellectuals and artists of national significance who represented an ideological synthesis of nationalism and liberalism. In 1902, she began studying oriental languages and the history of religions, and sparked by an interest in the ideas of Rudolf Steiner, she joined the Theosophical Society in 1908 after attending one of his lecturing visits to Norway. In 1918, she began studying theology at *Det teologiske Menighetsfakultet* (MF Norwegian School of Theology), a private institution founded in 1908, in opposition to the liberal theology taught at the Theological Faculty at the University of Oslo. By then, she had 'returned home to Christianity', as she put it, and wanted to became a minister in the Church of Norway. Nevertheless, she never completed her theological studies (Norseth 2011, 239).

In her own way, Marta Steinsvik represented the new type of women who emerged in the late 19th century, daring to express their individuality and autonomy, thus being looked upon as unorthodox and controversial. Although married and a mother, she studied at the university and took on public roles outside the domestic realm. In the public sphere, she strongly promoted her convictions through speaking and writing,

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[1] All excerpts come with a date, author and source. Due to limited space, I only refer to the pages where they appear in Steinsvik 1930.

both of which had a strong political impact (Steinsvik 1930, 62-3). She is remembered for having engaged in three major public debates. Firstly, she engaged in the endeavour to give women access to the priesthood. Her *Kvendi og Preste-embættet* (*Women and the Office of Ministry*) was published in 1917, and in 1934, when Parliament debated changing the legislation on ordained ministry, she published *Kvinner som prester* (*Women as Ministers*). The booklet was sent to all of the members of the Norwegian Parliament, and was referred to in the debates in 1934 and 1938 (Hinnaland Stendahl 2003, 117). Secondly, she campaigned against Catholicism, stirring a debate that left a long lasting imprint. From her viewpoint, she was spreading information at a time when the Roman Catholic Church was working intensively to undermine not only the Protestant Church, but also democracy. Thirdly, she published *Frimodige ytringer (Plain Talk)* in 1946, which was a severe criticism of the Norwegian authorities' legal purges after World War II. As a result of this, she was investigated by the authorities on the suspicion of giving incorrect information (Mordt 1948, 8-9; Solbrekken 2012, 605-20).

Marta Steinsvik left behind a comprehensive literary production, and her most controversial books were usually published privately, by herself or by her supporters.[2] She was admired and controversial, and no publishing house dared to publish the second edition of her *St. Peters himmelnøkler*. Some of them declined because, according to Steinsvik, they did not want 'any disputes with the Catholics'. Others considered that the market was satisfied, with the first edition of 3,000 copies having sold out (Steinsvik 1930, 118-19), though they were proven wrong. In 1930, 3,000 new books were put into the market, and in 1932, a third edition was launched. Anti-Catholic sentiments seem to have become quite high in a population totalling 2.8 million in 1930, as the soil had been fertilised for years, with the Luther jubilee in 1917 serving to strengthen the confessional consciousness that had already been raised by the confessional traditions taught in all schools. Religion, i.e. Lutheranism, was compulsory, and the teaching material portrayed Catholicism as dangerous and alien, while the Jesuits were described as 'cunningly' working on re-Catholicising Norway (Haakonsen 1951). Adding to this, was years of critical assessments of Catholic belief and practices in literature published by the socially and politically influential

[2]At present, her archive is deposited at *Blaafarveverkets dokumentsjonssenter og arkiv*, Modum.

Lutheran lay movement. Marta Steinsvik therefore presented what many considered 'solid documentation' on an anti-liberal, anti-social, anti-modern and authoritarian Catholicism opposed to the ideals and spirit of the reformation and Martin Luther.

The Historical Context

In 1925, the Norwegian Parliament discussed a motion to abolish the ban on Jesuits in the Norwegian constitution from 1814 for the second time, thereby allowing Jesuits' admittance to Norway. The public debate on an abolishment started at the beginning of the decade on a rather benevolent note, as in 1923 the prefect of the Roman Congregation of Mission (Propaganda Fide), Cardinal van Rossum, made a pastoral journey to Scandinavia that aroused great interest, but also provoked harsh campaigns in the press in Norway as with the other Scandinavian countries as well (Eidsvik 1993, 301-02; Slotsvik 2009, 57-68; see Werner's chapter). The 1920s was marked by ideological conflicts and social turbulence in politics, culture and religion, and in the Church of Norway, members of the conservative lay movement gained a majority of the seats in the newly established parish councils in 1920, and conservative theologians took a firm stand against liberal theology and its supporters. At the same time, the state church and the Lutheran lay movement were attacked by socialists and the rapidly increasing Marxist influenced Labour Party (Agøy 2011, 288-326).

The tiny Catholic community, which numbered less than 3,000 members in 1920, had gradually become more visible and vocal to the public, in large part because of their hospitals and educational institutions since the re-establishment of the Catholic Church in Norway in 1843 (Tande 1993, 471). Conversions were rare, although some were felt to be quite provocative, e.g. that of the famous author Sigrid Undset in 1924, who soon became an active Catholic polemicist. In 1928, she was awarded the Nobel Prize in Literature for her medieval novels, which conveyed an image of a positive and attractive Catholicism that differed from the Protestant stereotypes (Oftestad 2006, 211-29). In 1925, the teacher and director of the well-reputed Voss Folkehøyskole (Voss Folk High School), Lars Eskeland, converted to the Catholic Church. Two years later, in 1927, he had to leave his position at the school, and in accordance with legislation demanding that the directors of Norwegian schools be members of the state church, the Norwegian Parliament

voted in favour of withdrawing financial support of the school if he remained at his post (snl.no/Lars Eskeland; Slotsvik 2009, 68-72). By 1925, a conflict between Catholicism and Protestantism was in the air, and the general atmosphere of conflict made it possible to treat the theme the way it did.

The Menace of Catholicism

It was the Parliament's discussions on the Jesuit question in 1925 that led to Marta Steinsvik's anti-Catholic involvement. Under the heading 'Jews and Jesuits', she wrote a series of articles in *Aftenposten*, a major daily newspaper. She feared the power of Jewish money, expressing anti-semitic views in accordance with the current views of the day. From 1925 and onward she toured the country, lecturing on 'the Jewish menace' and retrieving her arguments from *The Protocol of the Elders of Zion,* an anti-Semitic hoax describing a Jewish plan for global domination (Solbrekken 2012, 331-42). Her heaviest criticism, however, was directed toward the moral theology and practice of the Jesuits. Faced with the missionary zeal of the Catholic Church towards the Scandinavian countries, she saw it as her obligation to 'enlighten' the Norwegian population on 'the menace of Catholicism'. She argued that 'outwardly', the Catholic Church might appeal to Protestants, particularly to the young and 'immature' ones, but that a Catholic conversion, which in her view meant throwing oneself 'in the bosom of the Mother Church', was fatal to the individual. She likened it to being put into the 'iron maid', a torture instrument that she attributed to the Catholic inquisition, which she described as the 'the most appropriate symbol' for the 'papist' church. She even insinuated that these types of means were still used by the Catholic hierarchy, although in secret. According to her, being attractive from the outside and deadly on the inside was the hallmark of the Catholic Church. She saw it as her duty to inform about the dark sides of the Catholic Church in order to help prevent people from converting to Catholicism, while convincing those who had already taken this fatal step to return to Protestantism (Steinsvik 1930, 20, 29, 49, 52-3, 60).

Her lecture is full of quotations drawn from foreign literature that were mostly written by Protestants and former Catholics (Steinsvik 1930, 479-95). She never questions her sources or tries to understand them in their context, and she does not discuss her own interpretations and translations. She also does not reflect on the problems of methodology, nor

show any insight into Catholic philosophy and theology. What she did present was internationally well-known anti-Catholic stereotypes that had circulated in Protestant circles in Europe as well as in the United States (Jenkins 2003; Wolffe in this volume). Steinsvik applied the material to the specific Norwegian historical situation and national traditions, and saw herself as conducting cultural warfare in the spirit of St. Olav, emphasising that his teaching had 'nothing to do with that of Rome and the pope' (Steinsvik 1930, 55, 421). She stripped a Catholic saint of all traces of Catholicism, and transformed him into a national hero and original founder of a national 'Evangelical' state church in a liberal democratic country. She called King Olav 'Holy Olav', rejecting the title 'saint' for its Catholic connotations, thus following the pattern of the Swedish Archbishop Nathan Söderblom, who in 1916 'Protestantised' St. Bridget (Steinsvik 1930, 50, 55; 326-414; Bliksrud 2005, 171).

'In the Bosom of the Mother Church'

Her starting point was the motto of the Catholic Church, *'Semper eadem'* (*Always the same)*, in addition to the 1870 dogma on the infallibility of the pope when speaking 'ex cathedra Petri'. In accordance with a common view in Protestant and liberal circles, she interpreted papal infallibility from a broad perspective, applying it to the pope as a person and a ruler of the church who had the force to deliberately change all dogmas and church decrees (Steinsvik 1930, 21-2). In her interpretation, this served to confirm the Catholic Church as being anti-modern and illiberal, opposed to progress and both social and political reform, which also enabled her to draw on examples from different periods of history and countries to prove her arguments and sustain her insinuations. As with many Protestant historians of her day, she associated the Catholic Church with the 'dark Middle Ages' (Steinsvik 1930, 510).

In 1871, the pope proclaimed St. Alphonsus Maria de Liguori (1696-1787), a scholastic philosopher and theologian most known for his moral theology, as a Doctor of the Church. According to Steinsvik, this meant that his moral theology was made compulsory in the education of all Catholic priests. Even though Liguori was not a Jesuit, she interpreted this as a display of gratitude to the Jesuits for their support of the dogma of infallibility, granting them power over the pope and the church. She interpreted Liguori's moral teaching as an expression of the principles attributed to the Jesuits that the end justifies the means, and sustaining

her critique by referring to the works of the German theologians Johann J. I. von Döllinger and Adolf von Harnack, she accused the Jesuits of representing 'unethical' moral principles and described their influence as 'a poisoning process' (Steinsvik 1930, 21-3, 26, 28).

In the views of Steinsvik, the Jesuit moral teaching permeated the entire Catholic Church and caused perversion in two respects. Firstly, the compulsory confession made it easy for Catholic priests to seduce women by asking 'obscene' questions. In her account, there are traces of prudish Victorian views on sexuality and of scepticism towards Southern Europeans, and she asserted that seduction was common in Catholic countries, implying the sexual immorality of Catholics, especially in relation to Southern European women. The root of this evil was clerical celibacy, which she condemned as unnatural and destructive. She also contended that the hierarchical Catholic system served to protect priests and the Church from scandal (Steinsvik 1930, 31-41). Secondly, the institution of the confessional 'was proven' to serve as a 'huge, well organised spy centre' through which 'the Roman Church' controlled its members, received reports and exercised influence on politics and society. Since she regarded 'unreserved obedience' to the church as a prerequisite for Catholics, she claimed that every Catholic citizen represented a threat to democracy in any Protestant country. She held that the Catholic Church strove to gain power to change the constitution of a country 'according to the laws of God', with her conclusion being:

> In case of a conflict between the pope and e.g. Norway, every Norwegian Catholic is obliged to side with the pope. Then he is a traitor to Norway. If he doesn't want to be guilty of treason towards his country, then he has to leave the Catholic Church. But then he is no longer a Catholic (Steinsvik 1930, 40).

In a public letter to the Norwegian authorities, Lars Eskeland, to whom she refers to several times, designated it a lie that the Catholic Church restrained the freedom of individuals. In her lecture Steinsvik twists his argument, and insinuates that he and other converts are 'decoys to the nation' (Steinsvik 1930, 21, 28, 41, 48, 52-3, 59). She acknowledged the authentic piety of individual Catholics, but criticised them for being 'impersonal tools in the hands of their confessors' and 'immature', as they belonged to a church which was 'a stiffened uninspired shell of religious dogmatic'. 'The Roman Church is a church for the spiritually immature' she wrote, and continued:

> When growing in a personal sense of responsibility to God, becoming adult and mature in religious matters, the individual will feel obliged to break with Rome. They have to break with Rome (Steinsvik 1930, 59).

In accordance with the ideas of the Enlightenment, she is critical of dogmas and institutional religion. What mattered was the inner spirituality of the individual self, and she left the Catholic Church and Catholics no honour. Catholicism suppressed the freedom of the individual, and she concluded that as Catholics had their spiritual and secular authority in Rome, they did not really belong in the Norwegian democracy.

Her general argumentation had a bearing on her assessment of the Jesuit paragraph, and since the Jesuit order had a dominant position within the Catholic Church, the constitutional ban on the order should not be lifted. If it was, she feared that the 'liberating work of the Reformation' would be undermined. Her polemic was deeply rooted in a Protestant theology of a liberal, spiritualistic type that focused on an inner personal piety and freedom obtained through the Reformation (Steinsvik 1930, 57-9, 421-22), while her liberalism was theologically motivated and synthesised with nationalism. Lutheranism and the 'the independent' national state church guaranteed the freedom of the individual; thus paragraph 2 in the constitution, with its ban on Jesuits, secured both liberalism and nationalism. The religious freedom that she defended did not include Catholics, which was pointed out by the Catholic parish priest in Oslo, Frans Krijn, who took up the debate with Steinsvik in publishing a defence brochure, which had a printing of 5,000 copies (Krijn 1927, 70).

Protestant Responses

Although many people did not identify with Steinsvik's argumentation, they largely supported her mission. 'All over the country the lecture has been most benevolently reported in the newspapers,' she reported. Her remark is sustained by dozens of readers' letters in the press, her repeated lecturing tours and the country-wide collection that was initiated to help support her financially (Steinsvik 1930, 60-67, 529-30, 586-89; Krijn 1927, 5-6). Archbishop Söderblom, a leading figure in the emerging Protestant ecumenical movement, and himself a critic of the Roman Catholic Church, wrote her a letter of approval that was published on the 1930 edition's opening page (Steinsvik 1930, 7, 16; Werner 1996, 265-66,

322-38). Book reviews, mainly written by clergy in the Church of Norway, described the book as 'solid', 'a killing blow', 'an apologetical masterpiece', 'a prophetic call', 'a hot-tempered polemic written out of an aggressive courage', 'a standard work', 'impressive research', 'an event' and 'monumental'. It was recommended to '…every home interested in what we hold dearest, the foundation of Norwegian culture, our Protestant religion, founded in the Bible' (Steinsvik 1930, 8-12, 66-67). She obviously hit home, playing the chord of national confessionalism. However, though few in number, there were also critics who found her book 'one sided', 'reductionist' and 'disheartening', even 'disgusting'. One expressed the need for a more sophisticated critique than Steinsvik's, and recommended a book by the German theologian Wilhelm Herrmann, which had been recently been published in Norwegian (Steinsvik 1930, 9, 13-16). Even though not everybody 'rejoiced' in her 'smearing of the largest Christian church in the world', most of those who publically expressed their views praised her, among them the majority of the Lutheran clergy, ministers, deans, bishops and theological professors from both theological faculties (Steinsvik 1930, 9, 11, 13-6, 66-7, 529, 531-34, 577-78).

Catholic Responses

Catholic priests and lay people defended themselves and their Church in the newspapers. As Krijn put it, they felt 'publically executed' in 'a modern inquisition' blessed by the Protestant clergy and the people. As a result, he criticised Steinsvik for her methods and use of sources proven to be unreliable and incorrect, and attempted to clarify, explain and correct obvious 'lies' and misinterpretations (Krijn 1927, 5-6). Others expressed moral indignation at her 'unclean agitating means', and accused her of 'deceiving people and arousing hatred'. Krijn's defence brochure was described in *Aftenposten* in 1927 as a 'cultivated' and 'constrained' response to Mrs. Steinsvik's 'invectives', and was recommended for 'all sensible Protestants' under the heading 'listen to the other part' (Steinsvik 1930, 60-68, 429-31).

Not without sting and irony, Krijn refuted her on all major points, explaining the confessional and regulations binding the priests to professional secrecy, and recommended that she study the Catholic Church's laws and regulations available in Norway. He defended Catholic women's moral reputation, celibacy and religious orders, and clarified the issue of papal authority. He sketched the education of priests, demon-

strating that Liguori was not the standard handbook in moral theology. He used Norwegian Protestant authors to show that the weighing of intentions that Steinsvik had described as an expression of 'Jesuit moral' was also part of Protestant moral teaching, as was the case with celibacy, which was understood as being the restraint of sexuality before wedlock and occasionally also when married (Krijn 1927, 8-23, 32-52). He also corrected obvious mistakes. Steinsvik's 'correction' to Krijn's booklet shows that she did not concede when proven wrong, but instead elaborated and twisted the arguments (Krijn 1927, 71-8; Steinsvik 1930, 64, 281-84).

Lars Eskeland called her book a 'dirty work' and 'a violation of truth and decency', accusing her of being devoid of any knowledge of Catholic teachings and customs (Steinsvik 1930, 11, 54-5). Sigrid Undset, who was already deeply engaged in public polemic, attended her lecture in 1927, and when the floor was opened for questions 'from Catholics and others', she did not utter a word (Steinsvik 1930, 65-67; Slapgard 2007, 292-98). A little later she signed a protest together with 43 other Catholic women, hence refuting the accusations of Steinsvik that woman were being seduced by the priest in the confessional (*Aftenposten,* April 6, 1927). Seen in this context, Undset's so-called conversion novels, *The Wild Orchid (Gymnadenia)* from 1929 and *The Burning Bush (Den brennende busk)* from 1930, may be seen as a narrative response to Steinsvik and the anti-Catholicism of those days (Slapgard 2007, 325-27, 339-40).

The Lawsuits

When Celestine Riesterer, the Catholic parish priest in Kristiansand, called her a 'fabricator of lies in the service of hell' in a response to Steinsvik's articles in 1925, she demanded that he publically withdraw this and some other statements. He did not, so she then sued him for libel. When the case was rejected by the public court in 1926, she took it to the civil court. After some procedural prolonging, the case finally came up in early 1928, and Riesterer had to retract some of his statements but was acquitted, while Steinsvik was ordered to pay the court costs (Steinsvik 1930, 429-36, 505-8). She failed in getting the case re-opened, and her appeal to the Supreme Court was rejected, although it was decided by the latter that she did not have to pay the court costs (Steinsvik 1930, 510-13, 560-68; Slotsvik 2009, 72-75). Steinsvik and her attorney interpreted this as 'full victory', which was disputed by Riesterer

and his attorney. The discussion on the verdict by the Supreme Court continued in the press, which helped to keep anti-Catholic sentiment alive throughout the 1930s, as did Marta Steinsvik herself. She continued to tour the country, presenting the same lecture as before, always on the alert to any Protestant movement she might perceive as being influenced by Catholicism. Consequently, she mistakenly accused Frank Buchman and the Oxford group movement of the 1930s of being 'camouflaged Catholicism' and an instrument in the hands of the Catholic Church (Solbrekken 2012, 520-24).

In the 1930 edition of her book, she accused the court's magistrate of having misled the jury and sided with Riesterer, thereby insinuating that he was pro-Catholic and unworthy of his office. She claimed the sentence was an obstruction of the constitution, as well as an obstruction of the people's confidence in the 'unreserved honesty of the court of justice' (Steinsvik 1930, 538-40, 554-5, 559, 602-3). In 1932, she was sued for libel by the authorities on behalf of the magistrate of the Riesterer-Steinsvik court, but her attorney held another opinion on the necessity of her criticism and withdrew, even though he shared her view on Catholicism. In the end, she was acquitted, having to retract only one of her accusations. The verdict raised a hot-tempered public debate, with some calling it a miscarriage of justice (Mordt, 1948, 7-8, 96-100), although it could also be interpreted as an expression of deeply rooted anti-Catholic sentiments in Norway. Still, it seems that the many lawsuits may have harmed her reputation, leaving an impression of her not being trustworthy (Steinsvik 1930, 526-27, 530; Mordt 1948; Solbrekken 2012, 524).

An Activist and a Symptom

Marta Steinsvik was both an activist and a symptom of the general cultural currents of her day. Her 1925 articles in *Aftenposten* unleashed a landslide of aggressive and popular anti-Catholicism that spread to every corner of the country. The articles most probably influenced the Parliament's discussions on the Jesuit paragraph, one of its members foreseeing 'a battle between Rome and Wittenberg' in Norway (Steinsvik 1930, 424). In this battle, Steinsvik saw herself as a leading figure, cleansing the country of superstition and imminent dangers to political stability. She fought a cultural warfare ideologically inspired by the German *Kulturkampf* of the 19th century, defending nation and modernity against a transnational institution she conceived of as representing 'the dark Mid-

dle Ages' (Clark and Kaiser 2003, 1-10; see Borutta in this volume). On the international scene, Steinsvik was just one of many producers and reproducers of anti-Catholic propaganda, reflecting common standard themes and arguments used in the religious conflicts in the United States in the 1920s (Jenkins 2003), and Germany, Holland and England saw court cases similar to hers (Steinsvik 1930, 511, 525-26; Krijn 1927, 30). She not only gave voice to vague sentiments, but she also, with arguments taken from international anti-Catholic literature, offered a theory of an international religious conspiracy of political significance, which was one of several in circulation.

The Steinsvik case sustains the theory of anti-Catholicism as a conflict on the meaning of religion and politics in society and as part of the modernisation and secularisation processes, therefore becoming an integrated and undisputed aspect of the self of the modern West (Clark and Kaiser 2003, 1-10; Jenkins 2003, 1-22; Borutta 2010, 11-45). The Norwegian case also shows that the processes do not necessarily imply abandoning institutional state religion as long as it complies with the concept of the modern self and hegemonic ideologies. Synthesising religion and political liberalism, Steinsvik represented what might be termed confessional nationalism, understanding religion as a means for securing unity within the society. Her nationalism served to exclude and marginalise a category of citizens, namely the Catholics, since they were members of a church that in her view represented a threat to Norwegian national identity and culture, in addition to modern development and progress. In order to support those values, she was ready to sacrifice the principle of religious freedom. The Steinsvik case also exemplifies the effects of powerful rhetoric, and supported by the majority, she successfully spread inaccurate, one-sided and twisted allegations and information, consciously aiming at changing emotions and attitudes. Her activities had impact all over the country, thus making her a major contributor to the maintenance of anti-Catholic prejudices in Norway.

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Part 3 – Anti-Catholicism and Political Culture

LUTHERAN ORTHODOXY AND ANTI-CATHOLICISM IN DENMARK – 1536-2011

Jes Fabricius Møller and Uffe Østergård

Abstract

This article shows how anti-Catholicism has influenced Danish society and the politics of the Oldenburg Monarchy[1] since the Reformation. Scandinavian historians have typically had a materialist approach to history but it is argued that religious convictions played a crucial role. Legislation was dominated by a very explicit anti-Catholicism, also in the written absolutist constitution (Lex Regia, 1665). No persecutions took place and there are several examples of how Catholics were allowed to stay, work and worship, especially in the periphery of the Oldenburg conglomerate state. Absolutism was abolished in 1848-49 but the new constitution still gave a privileged position to

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[1] The 'Oldenburg Monarchy' is the most precise designation for the conglomerate state normally referred to as 'Denmark'. This choice helps to place the state on a par with the Habsburg Monarchy, which similarly consisted of states within the Holy Roman Empire as well as some outside. The parallel is lopsided as the most important parts of the Oldenburg Monarchy (Denmark and Norway) were exclaves, i.e. situated outside the empire, whereas the emperor of the Holy Roman Empire came to reside in Vienna, the seat of government, from where he ruled over a number of lands that belonged to his empire. However, from 1526 he was also King of Hungary and many other entities outside the empire, which is why the state in 1867 was renamed Austria-Hungary, *kaiserlich und königlich*. The term 'Oldenburg Monarchy' draws attention to the composite character of 'Denmark' which lasted until its defeat by the Prussians in 1864. 'Denmark' is an often used shorthand for the monarchy as is 'Austria' for the Habsburg state. Yet, this is inexact. In Danish, the Oldenburg state in the 18th and 19th centuries was referred to as '*Helstaten*', in German '*Gesamtstaat*'. Both concepts refer to a rather typical early modern composite state. All the designations point to the composite and multinational character of the Oldenburg Monarchy, that only vanished after a civil war in 1848-1851 and its final demise in 1864. For an argument for going a step further and calling the state the 'Oldenburg Empire' (Østergård 2012).

the Lutheran state church, which is upheld until today. Although religious tolerance gained ground already in the beginning of the 19th century Lutheranism remained an integral part of Danish national identity.

The Lutheran Reformation of 1536

The Reformation in the Oldenburg Monarchy was a revolution from above as a result of a prolonged civil war between 1520 and 1536. The victorious Christian III (1503-1559) was the son of Frederik I, duke of Schleswig and Holstein (Friedrich in German which was his preferred language), who, in 1523, had deposed his brother's son, Christian II (1481-1559) on the initiative of the aristocratic (and Catholic) Council of the Realm (*Rigsråd*) which was opposed to his many reforms. The struggle primarily concerned politics but religion played a significant role and all the competing Nordic princes at the time were heavily influenced by the theological discussions that followed Martin Luther's (1483-1546) criticism of the papacy in 1517. Inspired by Luther, the young Christian III, as the duke of the small principality of Haderslev in Schleswig, introduced Martin Luther's reforms of the Church in the 1520s, while his contemporary, Gustavus Vasa (1496-1560), after being elected King of Sweden in 1523, initiated a more gradual reform that lasted from 1527 to around 1600. Ultimately, the consequences in the two states were, however, comparable and the two Nordic monarchies are, in reality, the most successful and comprehensive examples of the compromise at the Peace of Augsburg in 1555, '*cuius regio, eius religio*', i.e. that the religion of the country should be that of its ruler. Therefore, the two monarchies were also the most anti-Catholic powers in Europe with virtually no Catholic inhabitants.

Nordic historical research has traditionally chosen to emphasise the material interests of the kings in the property and power of the Church as the primary reason for the Reformation. Power and land were certainly important, however, recent research by modern Church historians such as Martin Schwarz Lausten has convincingly demonstrated that, both the competing pretenders, Christian II and Christian III, were deeply preoccupied with theological questions. Christian II,[2] regardless of his

[2] Christian II has earned a bad reputation in Sweden where he is remembered with the epithet 'Tyrant' because of his responsibility for the so-called 'Stockholm massacre' of November 8th-9th, 1520. After having conquered Stockholm, he had more than 80

personal life, was a devout believer who spent much time engaged in theological disputes even in situations where his political life was at risk. In the middle of political turmoil with Sweden in open rebellion, he sent envoys to the Diet of Worms in 1521 in order to follow the trial against Luther and was, all his life, strongly influenced by the humanist, Erasmus of Rotterdam. Nonetheless, after being deposed from the throne in 1523, he decided in favour of Luther the following year, even though, from a political point of view, it was practically suicide as he was dependent on his brother-in -law, the Habsburg Emperor Charles V (1500-1558). Christian's only chance to regain his throne was in fact to obtain help from the most prominent protector of Catholicism in Europe, Emperor Charles V, to whose sister, Elizabeth, he was married. The Habsburgs even went so far as to remove Christian's children after the death of Elisabeth in 1526, in order to give them a Catholic upbringing. Nevertheless, it was not until 1530 that he finally renounced Lutheranism and reverted to Catholicism in order to secure military help against Frederik I (Schwarz Lausten 1995). This, however, brought him into conflict with his allies among the urban Protestant middle classes in Denmark, especially in Copenhagen and Malmö, and he eventually lost to his uncle, Frederik I. After a stalemate in Norway, he was tricked into negotiations and was imprisoned in the castle of Sønderborg in Schleswig in 1532. Christian II remained imprisoned until his death in 1559.

Traditionally, Scandinavian historians have explained the Reformation as a result of narrow political considerations by the kings who coveted the land and treasures belonging to the Church. This narrow-minded materialism, however, reveals more about nineteenth and twentieth century historians than about the sixteenth century. The Lutheran teachings and the evangelical preachers' formulations were important foundations of the new state that resulted from the Reformation in Denmark, Norway, Schleswig, Holstein, Iceland and the Faroe Islands. The religious basis of the monarchy is easily overlooked, however, as the power strug-

high-ranking Swedish noblemen executed, charging them with high treason and heresy. This event is one of the most debated topics in Nordic history. Modern research has convincingly demonstrated that the main instigator of the crime was the Swedish archbishop Gustav Trolle who wanted revenge over his adversaries, and that, the trial formally lived up to the demands of Canon law (Skyum-Nielsen 1964). Politically, however, the deed had disastrous consequences and united the Swedish people against the Danish king who later in 1523 was deposed after an uprising among the nobility in the Jutland Peninsula due to his expansionist foreign policy (Venge 1972).

gle between the king and the high nobility continued, especially in Denmark. In Sweden, the high nobility had been decimated by Christian II in 1520 and was in no position to resist the centralisation under Gustavus Vasa. Yet, the Reformation in Sweden was a much more gradual process that lasted from 1527 to the victory of Karl IX in 1598 over the Catholic king Sigismund Vasa of Poland and Sweden (1536-1632).

In Denmark, the total victory of Christian III in the war against Lübeck, the successful subjugation of the peasant uprisings in Jutland and the conquest of the Protestant towns of Copenhagen and Malmö that had supported the imprisoned Christian II. allowed him to discard the Catholic Church completely. On August 12th 1536 he ordered the arrest of all nine bishops blaming them for the miseries of the civil war and introduced the pure Evangelical-Lutheran doctrine throughout his lands. In an elegant turn of phrase, they were accused of having demonstrated 'obedience towards the realm smaller than that which could lie on the back of a fly' (Schwarz Lausten 2004, 126; in Danish 'Den lydighed de følte over for riget kunne ligge på rumpen af en flue'). The prize the king had to pay for the revolution within the church was the distribution of much of the confiscated property from the Catholic Church to the high nobility, even though many of them as members of the Council of the Realm (*Rigsråd*) had supported the Catholic cause.

Sixteenth-century Europeans did not differentiate between 'church' and 'society'; these institutions were perceived just as inseparable as 'church' and 'state'. In medieval thougt, which still ruled people's thinking, no such distinction existed. Paradoxically, it was Martin Luther himself who laid the foundation for the split by differentiating between the secular and the spiritual arm, paradoxically because he did not himself distinguish between church and state (Lyby 1983, 9-46). In this regard, Luther still shared the medieval universalistic-theocratic worldview, according to which only one body existed, one *Corpus Christianum,* encompassing the Christian countries as a sacred whole. This 'Christian body' had, however, both temporal and eternal needs and therefore required two arms and two judicial systems to represent it. However, the tasks of the secular and ecclesiastical arms were not independent of each other. They had to be co-ordinated since they each, in their own way, had to strive to perform the same task, namely guiding Christians through the dangers of life on earth towards the hereafter (Lyby 1983, 10).

Luther differentiated between two 'regiments', each of which had its own sphere and was respected on its own terms. The unity between the two regiments was created by God ruling over both of them. The secular arm was assumed to be Christian and to govern the secular sphere with responsibility to God. In the 'spiritual realm', one was *only* expected to preach the gospel and not to interfere with the country's political rule. As mentioned above, the introduction of Luther's thinking took the form of a revolution from above in the Nordic countries. By royal decree a new management of the church was introduced. The new political order signified that the bishops were stripped of the direct political (and financial) influence they had secured during the medieval power struggles between church and state. According to the new Lutheran doctrine, the secular arm was under the obligation to create a reasonable framework for the Evangelical Church but could otherwise govern as it wanted, only duty-bound to God (and the nobility). The situation did not remain unchanged, however, in Denmark, Sweden and the German states that introduced the Lutheran faith. Christian III accepted Philipp Melanchton's theory of the relationship between the princes and the state (Schwarz Lausten 1987, 19, 125). As a Christian authority, the king was not only responsible for his subjects' secular well-being but also for the salvation of their souls. He could not leave this to the church alone, but together with the church, he had to participate in turning all of the population into true Christians.

The background for this division of labour was that the church organisation did not have any purpose in itself for Luther as it did for the Catholics, for whom the tradition of the church is the authoritative expression of God's will. According to Luther's teachings, the Lutheran Church was not divine but human. How the organisation worked depended on whether it 'served and advanced God's commands'. These principles were clearly expressed in the Danish Church Ordinance (constitution) of 1537, in which a distinction was made between 'Our Lord Jesus Christ's Ordinance' and the 'King's Ordinance'. Christ's ordinance is God's alone, and the king had no power to change it. It commanded that 'God's word, both the laws and the gospel, shall be preached properly, the sacraments shall be properly performed, children shall be taught properly and vergers, schools and the poor shall have their food'. In contrast, the King's Ordinance concerns all the conditions that must be

regulated so that Christ's Ordinance can be obeyed (Schwarz Lausten 2004, 130).

In practice, these principles turned out to be far-reaching. The division of labour meant that Christian III exerted a firm rule over the Church through his especially appointed diocesan administration officials (*stiftslensmænd*) and the bishops. The latter were even for a short period called 'superintendents' to underline their role as officials of the state, and, at the same time, mark the breaking of the Catholic tradition of all bishops being ordained by archbishops who could trace their position back to St. Peter, in the so-called 'apostolic succession'. The new bishops were installed by Johann Bugenhagen (1485-1558), a close friend of Martin Luther and a professor at the University of Wittenberg, who supervised the installation of the new order in the Oldenburg monarchy 1537-39. The king's direct rule over the church was emphasised at his coronation in 1537, in his preface to the Church Ordinance of 1537 and on many other occasions. The new organisation of the church did not correspond entirely to Luther's thoughts on the separation of church and state. It was rather in accordance with the views of Melanchton on the secular authorities' rights and duties. Despite the differences between the two prominent Protestant theologians, the Danish reformers ignored the international debate over the so-called 'Philippism' (i.e. Melanchton's ideas) and claimed to follow what they called the 'Wittenberg theology' (Schwarz Lausten 2004, 154-160). The king tolerated no departures from the true doctrine and Danish Lutheranism in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries became more orthodox than most other Protestant churches. This extreme Lutheran orthodoxy left no room for accommodating Catholics until the introduction of absolutism in 1660.

Fear of theological debates in general, and Catholicism in particular, led the government in 1569, ten years after the death of Christian III, to introduce heavy censorship and formulate the so-called 'Foreign Articles' in which the Evangelical-Lutheran beliefs of the Danish Church were laid out in a brief form in these 25 articles, primarily directed against Catholics and Anabaptists. No foreigner was allowed into the country unless he signed these articles (Koch and Kornerup 1959, 131-33; *Danske Kirkelov* 2, 126-24, 129). One of the most prominent of the new reformers, Niels Palladius (1510-1560), brother of Peder Palladius (1503-1560) who was superintendent of Zealand and a prolific writer, in a manual for priests on how to how to preach sermons, explicitly com-

pared the 'true, Evangelical-Lutheran priest' with the 'false priest' who was 'Catholic, lazy, drunken and immoral' (Schwarz Lausten 2004, 160). Catholics and Catholicism were seen as the main danger.

Consequences of the Lutheran Reformation

The teachings of Luther, Melanchton and Bugenhagen have had a profound and long lasting impact on Danish society and laid the groundwork for the modern understanding of society. Some modern scholars have argued that the Reformation laid the foundation of mass democracy and the welfare state in the long run, although the thesis is by no means uncontested.[3] This long term influence was due to the emphasis in Luther's teaching on the role of congregations and the direct relationship between each individual and God. Clergymen did not occupy a privileged position as a special, holy class, but were rather seen as technical experts who could organise the church services and read the Holy Scriptures in the original Greek, Latin and Hebrew. Their role was to be preachers, not intermediaries between the public and God as in the Catholic Church. This understanding gave parishioners much more latitude and they became the principal institution within the church. The parishioners in principle were accorded the power to choose the priests while the right to appoint the priests, *jus vocandi,* was exercised by the king or the aristocratic owners of the manors while the church selected the candidates to be appointed as bishops (Schwarz Lausten 1999, 40). In the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries this right became important with the rise of Pietist revivalist movements (Wåhlin 1987, 363-87). These movements were often in opposition to clergymen and the church but nonetheless remained broadly within the national church. In Sweden, in contrast, the free churches to a much greater extent broke away from the official church, which partially explains why it was possible to separate state and church in 2000.

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[3] The thesis of a direct link between Lutheranism and the modern welfare state is primarily argued by Tim Knudsen (2000, 20-64) and one of the present authors, Østergård (2011, 78-101). It has been criticised by several historians of the Danish welfare state and is by no means shared by all specialists of religious affairs, among others, the other co-author of the present article, Fabricius Møller. Even though we disagree on the causal relationship, we do agree on the crucial importance of Lutheran orthodoxy for the development of modern and contemporary Denmark, in particular its political culture. See Østergård 2010, 36-59.

The basis for the princely ruled the church was, however, the same, namely a clear authority structure coupled with an almost radical-democratic respect for the common believers who constituted the parishes. In the long run, the influence of the parishes became a distinguishing feature of the democratic Nordic societies since the universal welfare schemes of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries came to be administered locally. Throughout most of the nineteenth century, the local parish priest played a key role in this de-centralised part of government (Møller 2010, 229-46; Nørr 1981 and 1994), and local government (called 'kommune' since 1837-41) was thus shaped over the mould and matrix of the local church as an administrative unit of the state. The local governments were responsible for tax collection, tax assessment and distribution of poor relief. This local element in administration is unique in a European context and is, together with the universal benefits for all national citizens, the most characteristic element of the Nordic model of welfare (Knudsen 2000; Østergård 2011). Therefore, some argue that Lutheranism, after a series of intermediate stages, led to the local administration of laws and regulations passed by the national government as well as centrally determined social benefits; i.e. the Nordic model of universal welfare for the entire nation administered by locally anchored democratic units.Another link between the welfare state and Lutheranism is the fact that eugenically motivated sterilisation laws were introduced first in the Lutheran Nordic countries. These laws were passed between 1929 and 1935 and they were considered an essential part of the welfare state (Møller 2002) but because the laws implied a surgical regulation of human reproduction, they were only feasible in countries with no strong Catholic Church.

However, this interpretation of the religious and ecclesiastical origins of the welfare state is disputed. One should definitely be careful not to romanticise Lutheranism in the light of what Denmark eventually came to be. The break with the Catholic hierarchy initially gave free rein to fanaticism, intolerance and superstition as illustrated by, for example the witch trials, which were much more gruesome in seventeenth-century Northern Europe than in the more hierarchical Catholic lands to the south (Henningsen 1980). Witch-burning in Denmark-Norway culminated under the pious fanatic Christian IV (1588-1648). The rejection of Catholicism also led to a catastrophic drop in the level of higher education since the universities in Copenhagen and Uppsala were transformed

into primitive seminaries, where students were indoctrinated with an orthodox Lutheranism. The religious fanaticism in Scandinavia and the close connection between the state and the church of the Lutheran orthodoxy are portrayed in an abundantly clear way in the Swedish historian Peter Englund's description of the Battle of Poltava in Ukraine on June 27, 1709 (Englund 1988). His description of the significance of religion for the military in Sweden could apply just as well to the militarily less efficient Danish state. At the same time, it applies to the rest of the society, which was essentially organised with war in mind in these two states, at the time the most militarised in Europe.

It should be noted, however, that this religious rigour did not prevent a Protestant state as Denmark from hiring Catholic mercenaries in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and providing for the religious needs of these soldiers with Catholic priests and services (Petersen 2002). Nevertheless, the Oldenburg monarchy lost to Sweden which established a near hegemony over Northern Europe between 1645 and 1720 (Roberts 1979). Only the introduction of absolutism in 1660 saved the Oldenburg Monarchy which concurrently marked the beginning of a more tolerant attitude towards Catholics.

Absolutism in Denmark – A Fortress of Lutheran Orthodoxy

With the exception of religious affairs, the role of the Oldenburg king before 1660 was weaker than in Sweden. Thus, at times, in the period between 1560 and 1660, it is fair to characterise the Oldenburg monarchy as governed by the nobility in uneasy co-operation with an elected king, somewhat comparable to the elected monarchy in Poland-Lithuania (in Polish called *Rzeczpospolita,* i.e. *res publica* in Latin) rather than the centralised monarchy it became after the near total defeat by Sweden in 1658.[4] Just as in Poland, the result came close to a dissolution of the state after its defeat by the more centrally governed Sweden in 1658. This fate was averted at the last moment when the Great Power of that the day, the Netherlands, changed sides and came to the aid of the Danish king against Sweden in 1659-60.

After its narrow rescue from defeat and near dissolution, Denmark in 1660 instituted the most absolutist rule in all Europe, modelled on the

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[4] Among Danish historians, the system of governance is usually referred to as aristocratic government, in Danish 'adelsvælde'.

French example (Fabricius 1920). The Oldenburg monarchy comprised the Kingdoms of Denmark and Norway (until 1814), the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein (until 1864), Iceland (until 1918/44), the Faroe Islands, Greenland, the Danish West Indies (until 1917) as well as trading posts in West Africa and in India (until 1848). Absolutism was even formulated in a constitution from 1665, the so-called *Lex Regia* which defined the obligations and duties of the king. His primary obligation was to uphold and protect the Lutheran version of Christianity. The first paragraph of *Lex Regia* reads: The King 'must honour, serve and worship the one true God according to the way that He in his holy and true word has revealed to us and according to what our Christian Faith informs us in the shape and form given by the Augsburg Confession 1530' (Jørgensen 1973, 43, our translation). Apart from Christian principles, *Lex regia* was influenced by debates on natural law in the seventeenth century (Horstbøll and Østergård 1991), This latter inspiration, however, is less pertinent to this paper where we focus specifically on the law's Christian character.

These articles were further specified in the penal and civil code of Denmark and Norway (*Danske Lov* from 1683 and *Norske Lov* from 1687) which stated that converts lose their right of inheritance and that people who have frequented 'Jesuit schools' are not allowed access to positions in schools or churches. One of the paragraphs explicitly stated that 'Monks, Jesuits and papist clergymen of the liking are … not allowed in the kingdom'. Transgressions were punishable by death.[5] As far as is known, no death sentences were ever passed, but expulsion was used on more than one occasion. After the middle of the eighteenth century, no Catholics were prosecuted and only on rare occasions were they harassed by the authorities.

In principle, the Oldenburg Monarchy was an orthodox almost totalitarian state which permitted no non-evangelicals within its borders, and, in particular, no Jesuits. As we have seen previously, fear of a Catholic counterrevolution prevailed through most of the seventeenth century until the introduction of absolutism in 1660. During the long reign of Christian IV, who disastrously intervened in the Thirty Years War in

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[5] Danske Lov of 1683 § 2-1-1. In book 6 of the same law on 'misdeeds', the positive definition of the Evangelical faith was supplemented by provisions against Catholics and the Catholic Church in the realm *Danske Lov* 6-1-1 to 6-1-5 (*www.hf.ui.no/ PNH7chr5home.html*).

1626 as protector of the Protestant cause in the German states, Lutheran orthodoxy peaked as did the persecutions of witches. Hans Poulsen Resen (1561-1638), a professor at the University of Copenhagen and from 1615 bishop of Zealand, initiated investigations among those noblemen, clergymen and commoners who, while studying abroad, had encountered other religious truths than those dominating at home, in particular the Catholic faith. That the fear of a Catholic counterreformation was not completely unfounded has been demonstrated by studies in the Papal archives, primarily Vello Helk's detailed biography of the Norwegian Jesuit Laurentius Nicolai Norvegus (1539-1622) and his attempts to re-Catholicise the Nordic countries (Helk 1966). Laurentius, who in the Nordic countries is remembered under his nickname 'kloster (monastic) Lasse', was utterly unsuccessful. However, it should be remembered that the even more solidly Protestant Sweden as late as the 1590s was confronted with a Catholic pretender to the crown, Sigismund III Vasa of Poland, heir to the throne of Sweden after his father Johan III, and that later in the century, Queen Christina of Sweden would convert to the Catholic faith.

Examples of Religious Tolerance
Lutheran orthodoxy permeated all legislation even though the laws rarely mentioned the concept 'church' – this term was reserved for the Catholic Church – but talked of 'religion' or 'faith'. The established church was not so much a state church (this term only came into common use in the 1830s) as the state was a religious state. In reality, though, apart from the intolerant phase under the long reign of Christian IV, it was somewhat less discriminating. Primarily this was due to the weakness of the state, but nevertheless, there was less discrimination than official regulation would seem to indicate. There was no unified religious legislation in the Oldenburg monarchy. On the contrary, tolerance and exceptions from the mono-confessional character of the state were numerous, especially in the peripheries of the far stretched realm where the power of the state was weakest. Yet even at the heart of the state, i.e. within its professional army, the Lutheran monarchy as earlier mentioned had to accept confessional differences and provide priests of different denominations. According to the infantry regulations from 1747, Lutheran, Catholic and Calvinist recruits were accepted. This was due to the fact that the majority of the mercenaries until 1803 were recruited in the German-speaking

states where subjects were allowed more religious freedom. According to a thorough investigation of the mercenary army from 1774 to 1803, the garrison in Copenhagen in 1780 was composed of 64,3 % Lutherans, 3,8 percent Calvinists (in Danish *reformerte*) and 32 percent so-called 'Papists' (Petersen 2002, 166).

In 1672, Niels Stensen or Nicolaus Steno[6] (1638-1687) received a call from the king of Denmark to become royal anatomist, regardless of his Catholic faith (he had converted to Catholicism in 1667). Another example of religious tolerance is that, in the 1690s, a Catholic landowner in the county of Ribe, Hieronymus von Büren, exercised *jus vocandi* for six Protestant churches (Christensen 2002). In Copenhagen, foreign embassies and legations were allowed to have chapels and chaplains of their own. This exemption was passed as a particular rule for the French ambassador in 1671 and as a general rule in Christian V's Danish Law of 1683 and the Norwegian Law of 1688 (*Danske* and *Norske Lov*). The Austrian Embassy in Copenhagen in the eighteenth century served as a *de facto* church for the immigrant Catholic families in Copenhagen and from 1768 also *de jure* after mutual agreement with the emperor in Vienna (Frosell 1990). In 1805, Catholics received a separate section of the municipal cemetery on the northern outskirts of Copenhagen (Assistens

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[6] Niels Stensen, (in Latin *Nicolaus Stenonis*) was a Danish anatomist, geologist and theologian and the most prominent Danish Catholic in history. He studied medicine for three years at the University of Copenhagen 1657-60 while he also wrote a manuscript in Latin on theology with the title *In nomine Jesu – Chaos* (1659). In 1660, he continued his studies of medicine in Leiden. In 1664, he returned to Copenhagen, but as he did not obtain a position at the university he moved on to Paris where he published important anatomical discoveries. In 1666, he arrived in Florence where the Medicis provided for him and enabled him to continue his anatomical studies which soon made him famous all over Europe in combination with his geological studies of the formation of the mountains in Toscana and theological studies. In 1672, Stensen was invited back to Copenhagen by the new king Christian V as the royal anatomist (anatomicus regius) regardless of his conversion to Catholicism in 1667. Although he performed successful dissections, his stay was a disappointment, as he was not appointed professor. Instead he returned to Florence. At his inaugural lecture at the Institute of Anatomy in 1673, he formulated the important phrase: '*Pulchra sunt quae videntur, pulchriora quae sciuntur, longe pulcherrima quae ignorantur.* In 1675, he was consecrated as a priest and two years later appointed bishop of Hannover, later of Northern Germany, Denmark and Norway as a whole until his death in Schwerin in 1687. His body was transported back to Florence where he lies buried in the Medici church of San Lorenzo. Stensen was beatified on October 23, 1988 by Pope John Paul II. The Jesuit school in Copenhagen, the only Catholic gymnasium in the Nordic countries, is named after him, Niels Steensens Skole. See Snorrason 1983, 85-93.

Kirkegaard). Furthermore, Catholics, Calvinists and Jews were allowed to practice and build churches and synagogues in the free town of Fredericia, founded in 1682. Friedrichstadt in Holstein granted a similar freedom of religion. In Altona in Holstein, Catholics were allowed a church already in 1658. The reason for this early toleration of Catholics (and Jews) was the commercial competition from neighbouring Hamburg. In Holstein (Nordstrand, Glückstadt, Rendsborg and Kiel), Catholics were later allowed private religious services (Hellinghausen 1987).

The Reformation reached remote Iceland at a somewhat later date. It was only in 1550 that, the Catholic bishop Jón of Skálholt was violently deposed and beheaded together with his two sons (sic!). On November 17th 1786, all Christian denominations in Iceland were granted freedom to practice their religion and the building of a Calvinist church was even announced. Yet, this act was not so much a result of religious tolerance, as a result of Iceland being on the verge of demographic collapse because of depopulation caused by natural disasters and economic decline (Karlsson 2000 128-133; 177-181; Schou 1822, 146). Another testimony to religious tolerance is that, in the Danish West Indies, Catholics were granted freedom of religion in 1754 (Rasmussen 2009; Nybo Rasmussen 1999). In 1840 the number of Catholics in the Danish West Indies reached 12.443 (Frendrup. 2008, 7). In Denmark proper the number of Catholics in the middle of the 19th Century was less than a thousand (Møller 2012). Yet again, this act rather testifies to the weakness of Danish rule in these islands where the majority of the planters were non-Danes. The two small trading posts in India, Tranquebar and Serampore, enjoyed full freedom of religion, even though the colony in Tranquebar had been founded in 1705 with the intention to convert Indians to Christianity (Oommen and Raun 2005).

Hans Egede's mission to Greenland in 1721 was originally motivated by a desire to locate the medieval Norse settlers whom nobody had heard from since regular contacts had dried out after 1450. As these poor souls were assumed never to have heard God's true words but only the Catholic perversion, it was possible for the eager Norwegian missionary to gather support for his venture, although more mundane commercial interests were more important for his supporters among the merchants in the Norwegian city of Bergen (Gad 1984, 142-173). After his arrival in Godthaab, today's Nuuk, Hans Egede had to satisfy himself with saving the souls of the Inuit people who now inhabited the south-

western parts of Greenland. In this respect, he was very successful. Egede and his sons' missionary activities were followed by Pietist missionaries (the Bohemian Brethren or Moravians) later in the eighteenth century with the result that the Greenlanders today are by far the most religious in the Danish realm.

The exceptions from the rule of religious intolerance and suppression of Lutheran orthodoxy are not surprising considering the nature of power under absolutism. The king did not exercise his power so much by enforcing laws as by bestowing privileges and making exemptions in individual cases, thus binding the subordinates to the crown as clients who enjoyed special privileges. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, these exemptions were motivated by the need to attract foreign merchants, capable soldiers and officers for the army and prominent academics as professors at the university and the Royal Academy of Arts founded in 1754. Others could be skilled workers as, for example, Bohemian artisans for a glasswork on Zealand or Irish planters in the West Indies (Rasmussen 2009). Only the enlightened absolutism of the later eighteenth century and the rise of political liberalism in the nineteenth century paved the way for religious tolerance as an ideal.

Tolerance was first explicitly legislated on behalf of the Jews who achieved formal equality in 1814. Both Jews and Catholics were allowed the right to vote in the elections for the four Assemblies of Estates of the monarchy which were established in 1834, but only Christians were eligible for office (Jensen 1931-36). No Catholics were elected in the short life of these estates that were dissolved in Denmark proper in 1848, while they lived on in the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein until 1863. Jews and Jewish religious life were integrated within Danish society relatively early after heavy discrimination for centuries. Yet, even after 1814, the Mosaic Community (*Mosaisk Troessamfund*) was still subjected to supervision by the Bishop of Zealand. On the other hand, this supervision accorded the Synagogues a status parallel to the established church (Schwarz Lausten 1992, 2000 and 2005).

Catholics, on the contrary, never achieved formal equality or were allowed a national organisation in Denmark before freedom of religion was introduced with the Constitution of 1849. This became clear in September 1841, when a new *Vicarius Apostolicus* for Northern Germany and the Danish realm, the conservative Belgian Jesuit Johann Theodor Laurent, was appointed by Rome. As he explicitly argued for the inde-

pendence of the church in relation to the state, his appointment was met with criticism in Denmark. The most prominent theologians in the Danish Church, the bishop of Zealand Jakob Peter Mynster and Henrik Nicolai Clausen, professor of theology at the University of Copenhagen and a leading national liberal politician, regarded the pope as head of a foreign state. Based on this perception, they argued against formal acceptance of the establishment of the Catholic Church in Denmark, because control from the outside over Catholic priests in Denmark would violate the sovereignty of the Danish state and thus represent a threat to the supremacy of the Danish King over all religious activities in the country. Ordinary Catholic priests, on the other hand, were not banned from the Kingdom of Denmark, only merely tolerated as individuals. The end of the affair was that the appointment of the controversial Laurent was revoked and a more conciliatory substitute found (Hellinghausen 1987; Rasmussen 2009).

On a cultural level, the general revaluation of the Middle Ages after 1800 also brought about a more conciliatory view on Catholicism. The new emphasis on the historical nature of society – the romanticist view of Walter Scott or the professionalised *Geschichtswissenschaft* by Leopold von Ranke – saw the Catholic Church as representing the Middle Ages and therefore as a thing of the past. Thus Catholicism was no longer seen as an immediate threat to the one true faith, but a stage the world had to pass through to arrive in the present, much in the same way that Judaism was considered a precursor to Christendom. Romantic poets and writers like Hans Christian Andersen, Adam Oehlenschläger and Heinrich Steffens expressed their admiration for the religious sincerity and spiritual integrity in medieval Christianity (Andersen 1842; Steffens 1803, 1996; Oehlenschläger, 1805). The same goes for the extremely influential poet, priest and politician N. F. S. Grundtvig.[7] All these writ

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[7] The clergyman, poet, historian and educational thinker N. F. S. Grundtvig, who lived from 1783-1872 is generally coiedered the single most influential intellectual who has exercised a lasting influence on Danish education, politics and church. His thinking is still reflected today in the organisation of the church, in the so-called *folkehøjskoler* (folk high schools), in Danish nationalism and national identity and the organisation of the welfare state in the 20th century. The anti-institutional thinking of Grundtvig has come to permeate all of the Danish educational, political and business system even though it is difficult to estimate the importance of the Grundtvigian schools in precise quantitative terms. Grundtvigism ended up in creating two competing elites in the economy, in politics, in the school system and in culture and helped agrarian and libertarian values to make inroads into the mainstream of Danish culture

ers criticised their own age for being shallow and materialistic in contrast to the austerity of life, authentic faith and spirituality they found among medieval monks.

The Debate on Freedom of Religion in the Constitutional Assembly

The revolutions of 1848 also reached Denmark in March 1848 with the accession of a new king after the unexpected death of the intelligent king Christian VIII, who had disappointed liberal opinion in Denmark by not dissolving absolutism as had been expected after his role in writing the free constitution in Norway in 1814. Frederik VII was a very different man and quickly acquiesced when the liberal members of the magistrate in Copenhagen demanded a constitution. The Danish joke is that the members of the magistrate put on their hats and were politely granted what elsewhere in Europe took bloody revolutions to achieve. The truth is, however, that the transition to democracy in the Oldenburg monarchy was a bloody affair because of the civil war that broke out in Schleswig and Holstein between German and Danish speakers when the king gave in to the national liberals in Copenhagen (Vammen 1988:88; Østergård 2012). This side of the story, though, is not pertinent to the question of freedom of religion, because religious difference did not play any role in the conflict which rather was over language and nationality.

The constitutional Assembly of 1848–49 that wrote the constitution which to a large degree still is in existence, dealt, among other topics, with the freedom of religion and the role of the state church. The solution was, on the one hand, to grant extensive freedom of religion, on the other hand, to preserve the state church. The constitution provided no equality of religion, only freedom of religion for individuals, which is basically still the case today. Roughly one out ten members of the constitutional assembly were theologians or clergymen, and religious questions played a prominent role in the debates. No Catholics were elected though they had the right to vote and were eligible for office. An analysis of the debates indicates that anti-Catholicism was an important element among the conservative deputies, especially the former mentioned Bishop Mynster. More widespread as an invective was the word 'Jesuit'

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and thus have contributed heavily to defining 'Danishness'. His writings are heavily tied to the Danish language and have proven virtually impossible to translate. An attempt to evaluate his importance in a comparative context will be undertaken at a seminar at Harvard University December 2012.

which was used synonymously with 'deceit' or 'hypocrisy'. The Reverend Marckmann remarked:

> History shows us that Catholic propaganda that certainly rests as little today as it has ever done, always with great eagerness promotes the dissemination of the Catholic faith mainly with the help of the Jesuits that in the most subtle ways have worked for their religion and caused great calamities in all countries (*Grundlov* sp.1600).

The merchant Bernhard Philip Ree, a converted Jew, stated: 'It is the same with Jesuits as with monastic orders. History has provided sufficient evidence that no one has promoted immorality under the guise of sobriety more so than the monks' (*Grundlov* sp. 3090). Such statements, though, were exceptions. Advocates of freedom constituted a majority, but even among them one does not find a single positive reference to Catholics and Catholicism. In the debate over the future of the state church, Ireland was sometimes referred to as an example of a situation where the state church (Irish Anglican) was not identical with the religion of the majority who were Catholics. Sympathy for the Catholic majority was expressed several times by the leading national liberal theologian Henrik Nicolai Clausen, not for confessional reasons, but for democratic or national reasons (Glædemark 1948, 245). The mayor of Horsens in Jutland, N. D. A. Ræder, with explicit reference to the Norwegian constitution of 1814 proposed a paragraph to prohibit Jesuits and monastic orders. The Norwegian constitution also prohibited Jews but they were not included in Ræder's proposal. The fact that Ræder was defeated by 79 votes against 37 is evidence that religious tolerance had gained considerable ground, but also demonstrates that anti-Catholicism was a factor that could not be completely ignored.

Although freedom of religion was an established principle after 1849, cultural and institutional resistance against Catholicism prevailed. Hans Lassen Martensen, the influential professor of theology and Mynster's successor as bishop of Zealand,[8] claimed in the 1870s that, Catholicism was a foreign religion and that Jews were a danger to a modern civilised state (Martensen 1873 and 1882). Regardless of these positions, both

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[8] Hans Lassen Martensen (1808-1884) was philosophically inspired by Hegel. Although he originally had supported the Danish religious reformer, poet and educator N.F.S. Grundtvig, he later turned into one of the latter's most prominent adversaries. His conservative position was supplemented by a strong social consciousness, expressed in his *Social Ethics* (English in 1882).

Jews and Catholics gradually became well integrated minorities in twentieth-century Denmark. The year 1909 marked a symbolic turning point when Count Ludvig Holstein-Ledreborg (1839–1912), an aristocrat and a Catholic convert since 1867, was appointed Prime Minister in a short-lived liberal government after parliamentarism had been introduced in 1901.

Catholics and Anti-Catholicism in Modern Denmark

It has been argued that only with the rise of Pietist religious revivalist movements against the rationalist orthodoxy of the state church in the eighteenth century Christian beliefs came to dominate the daily lives of larger parts of the rural population. Formally, the country had been Christian for many centuries, but according to the research by church historians as Hal Koch and P. G. Lindhardt it was only with the so-called religious 'revivals' against the rationalist orthodoxy of the state church in the eighteenth century that Christian beliefs became internalised into the beliefs of many peasants in the modern sense of religiosity. Until then the majority had only been Christians in the way that they attended service and lived by the rules of the church – which in the Lutheran Denmark was identical with the state (Kornerup et al. 1950–66).

As a consequence of the repression by the religious, i.e. state authorities, the religious movements gradually turned into political movements in the course of the nineteenth century (Wåhlin 1987 and Sanders 1995). In an uneasy alliance with the national liberals in the towns and the intellectuals (mostly theologians), these movements gained power in the ethnically homogenous nation state after 1864, culminating in 1901. This process can best be described as the establishment of an ideological hegemony. In the long run, it may even be argued that the Danish welfare state is a result of secularised Lutheranism in national garb rather than international socialism (Østergård 2006 and 2011; Werner 2005). 'Denmark for the people' as the Social Democratic platform formulated its program in 1934. Today, all the Nordic countries are Lutheran. They are also strongly secularised but it can be argued that even this secularisation in itself is a result of the democratisation and nationalisation of Lutheranism. However this may be, there is not much room for supra-national Catholicism in this symbiosis of nationalism and Lutheranism. Jews have managed to integrate into this society which appears so secu-

larised, but in reality is based on Lutheran beliefs, only because they have identified completely with the nation and practise their religion in a discrete way.

The strong ties between nationalism and the established Lutheran church were reinforced by the religious revivalist movements in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in combination with the national liberals, even though they parted ways after the Danish defeat at the hands of the Prussians in 1864. The fact that the religious movements turned into political and social movements is normally ascribed to the enormous influence of the afore mentioned priest, educationalist, historian and poet Nicolai Frederik Severin Grundtvig and his followers, priests as well as laymen. They are usually categorised together under the label of 'Grundtvigism' or 'Grundtvigians'. The Grundtvigians never succeeded in organising themselves into one coherent movement, which is why the movement is best understood as an ideological hegemony, rather than a specific creed (Møller 2005; Werner 2003). The opposite was the case for the religious organisation of the so-called 'Inner Mission' (*Indre Mission*), which was set up in 1861 as a theological alternative to Grundtvigism and the official church. Yet, this movement, contrary to Sweden, remained within the official 'People's Church'. This was possible precisely because of the organisational freedom Grundtvig achieved as a member of the Constitutional Assembly 1848–49 and as a member of parliament in the following decade.

Organisationally, the set up of the established church, 'the People's Church' (*Folkekirken*) can be best described as 'well-organised anarchy', as the professor of church history and folk high school principal, Hal Koch (1904–1963), who was an ardent supporter of this system, once termed it (Møller 2009). Although it is a national church, it has never been regulated in accordance with the constitution of 1849, even though this was envisaged in it. The vague and undefined relationship between state and church is presently subject to discussion, especially with regard to the relationship between so-called 'real' Danes and the many immigrants of other religions, especially Islam, which over the recent two decades has become the second largest religion. Likewise, the lack of clarification makes it virtually impossible for the Danish national church to enter into more binding ecumenical co-operation such as the Porvoo Declaration of 1995 on the relationship between the Evangelical churches and the Anglican Church.

Martin Schwarz Lausten has described how the proposals for closer co-operation between the Nordic and Baltic Evangelical churches and the Anglican Church were rejected by the Danish bishops in 1995. The bishops claimed that the declaration's view on bishops and priests was contrary to the underlying basis of the Danish Lutheran Church. As earlier described, on its establishment in 1536, the Lutheran church broke with the apostolic succession, i.e., the direct connection to the Apostle Peter, whom Jesus chose to be his representative on earth. This continuity was broken when Johann Bugenhagen, who himself was not anointed, consecrated the first Danish bishops. Consequently, the bishops refused to sign the joint declaration. Other organs of the church have since signed the declaration but it is still hotly debated to which degree this signature I binding for the church as such. The same applies to the 'Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification' between Lutherans and Catholics which has been rejected (Schwarz Lausten 1999, 116–117). The problem is that not many priests and laymen in the Danish national church recognise the bishops' right to speak on behalf of the church, not even after a hearing among the parishioners as the one that took place in these cases. According to this point of view, no one except the individual parish has the right to express an opinion on anything and nobody can speak for the entire church – except on organisational and sometimes doctrinal matters where the parliament is the highest authority.

The Danish People's Church is still supported by almost 80 percent of the population who demonstrate their loyalty to the symbiosis of nation, state and church by their membership and the paying of a separate so called church tax (Dabelsteen 2011). This symbiosis of nationalism and Lutheranism does not leave much room for complete acceptance of other denominations. Even though the active anti-Catholicism of the days of Lutheran orthodoxy may have vanished, it still surfaces every now and then. In the heated debates over Denmark's membership of the European Community in 1972, the very notion of 'Rome' in the Rome-treaty was a sufficient argument for many to reject the entire venture. Whether they were thinking of conservative family values, Rheinland capitalism (i.e. Germany) or Catholicism was never made clear. The mere mention of 'Rome' was in itself sufficient to evoke reminiscences of 'Papism'. Another instance arose when Pope John Paul II visited Denmark in June 1989 as part of his apostolic pilgrimage to

Norway, Iceland, Finland, Denmark and Sweden. The Polish born Pope was the first to visit countries with Lutheran majorities. In addition to celebrating mass with Catholic believers, he participated in ecumenical services at places that had been Catholic shrines before the Lutheran reformation, Nidaros (Trondheim) in Norway, St. Olav's Church near ðingvellir in Iceland, Åbo Cathedral in Finland, Roskilde Cathedral in Denmark and Uppsala Cathedral in Sweden. In Denmark, the Pope was kindly accepted by the Lutheran church establishment as a visitor and also allowed to attend service in the cathedral in Roskilde – as a private citizen on the explicit condition that he did not preach! Old habits die hard, even in a people that no longer knows the theological content of its religion which nevertheless still constitutes the backbone of contemporary Danish state and society (Blückert 2004).

It may be debated to what extent Denmark today is to be considered a Lutheran state. However, it is quite evident that a democratic version of Lutheranism, which developed in the course of the nineteenth century, has played a stronger role in forging today's Danish national identity than international socialism and liberalism. This may sound surprising, as Denmark is one of the most secularised countries in the world and church attendance is very low. However, it has been argued that the Lutheran religion has actually permeated almost all aspects of society (Dabelsteen 2011). Religion as a cultural mentality explains much of the homogeneity and cohesiveness in Danish society, which together with the country's peripheral position in Europe made it possible to realise social democratic aims.

Most recently, three Danish scholars have undertaken an investigation of the role of religion in the Danish national consensus (Gundelach, Iversen & Warburg 2008). Their findings confirm the intimate connection between Lutheranism and Danishness. Jan Lindhardt, former bishop of Roskilde, has described the relationship as follows: 'Danes do not need to go to church because they live in their Danishness every day' (Østergård 2011). By this apparently paradoxical statement, Lindhardt refers to the synthesis of religion, nation and people in Grundtvig's thinking that lies behind the national church organisation. Today, religion has come to mean much less, as most Danes are unaware of the theology behind his thinking, though continue the habit of belonging to the church. Danish society is often perceived as the most secularised in the world, and yet religion plays an important role, as can be seen in its

unease with other religions, in particular Islam. As a consequence of their integration into Europe and immigration, Danes have become aware of their own particularities in culture and religion. Thus, national identity, national church, welfare schemes, educational traditions and state-building are closely connected and ever present in the self-identification of modern Danes. But this mental complex apparently no longer requires an open anti-Catholic stance. Whether the national identification still builds on an implicit anti-Catholicism has proven impossible for us to discern.

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THE JESUIT STEREOTYPE: AN IMAGE OF THE UNIVERSAL ENEMY IN FINNISH NATIONALISM

Ainur Elmgren

Abstract

This chapter places Finnish nineteenth- and twentieth-century anti-Jesuit stereotypes in their European historical context. The stereotype is tracked down in a thematically diverse source material consisting of fiction, non-fiction, and political propaganda, in comparison with antisemitic and anti-Socialist enemy images. Originally rooted in a Protestant national narrative, the 'Jesuit' was increasingly employed in other political contexts, and often as invective with a specific meaning. Several writers connected the history of the Society of Jesus, and specifically the accusation of holding the belief that 'the end justifies the means' (so-called 'Jesuit morality'), with the history of the Communist movement or with Finnish history in general. The new enemies of the nation influenced the development of a metaphorical 'Jesuit', detached from its origins in anti-Catholic propaganda, but still retaining its negative meaning, and thus indirectly perpetuating anti-Catholic attitudes.

The nineteenth-century European image of the Jesuit as the enemy, derived from criticism within the Catholic Church itself, from Protestant propaganda, and from the works of various political writers, was composed of a number of dominant themes. The first anti-Jesuit images came in response to the role of the Society of Jesus in the Counter Reformation. The military structure of the order and the efficiency of its organisation were widely admired – and feared. Some early critics found their material in Jesuit publications, and from the writings of Ignatius of Loyola picked up on the motto *Perinde ac cadaver*, 'like a corpse'. Yet

where Ignatius' meaning was that the Jesuit should be ready to obey and serve with complete self-discipline, critics saw blind submission and fanatical devotion to a false authority—the Jesuit should let himself be dragged around like a dead body by his leaders (Healy 2003, 159).

The real or alleged political influence exercised by the Society was also inferred from its own publications, which grew influential in just a few decades, but also brought suppression from secular and ecclesiastical authorities, both Protestant and Catholic alike, with Society accused of promoting rebellion and tyrannicide among the common people (Höpfl 2004, 7). Even in the early years, Jesuits were suspected of operating in disguise and masking their sinister intent of global domination. This web of accusations developed into a conspiracy theory that has been called the 'Jesuit legend' or the 'Jesuit plot' (Nelson 2002, 104). The plot was fed with intra-Catholic criticism of the Society. The moral philosophers among the Jesuits were drawn into a critical debate by the mathematician Blaise Pascal and the French Catholic Jansenist movement in the seventeenth century (Jonsen and Toulmin 1990). Jesuit casuistry became a byword for moral permissiveness. Although never articulated by a Jesuit, the simplified formula 'the end justifies the means' became a vulgarisation of all the accusations aimed at the casuists (Healy 2003, 153; Schupp 2005, 142–143). This 'Jesuit morality' became a pervasive trope in fiction and non-fiction.

The Jansenists' arguments were recycled in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries by anticlerical writers across Europe, especially, but not exclusively, by Protestants. As the original context was lost, the Jesuits were generally suspected of 'Machiavellianism' for the sake of worldly power. With the increasing popularity of physiognomy, signs of racial difference were introduced to this enemy image. In popular culture, physical descriptions of characters whose appearance reflected these traits were common (Jesuit physiognomy), overlapping other stereotypes (antisemitism, racial stereotyping of South Europeans, homophobia) (Healy 2003, 168, 172; Janes 2009, 156). The American writer Francis Donnelly, SJ, mocked both literary clichés and pseudoscientific attempts to define a 'Jesuit physiognomy' in the early twentieth century (Donnelly 1915, 211–214). Turns of phrase such as tightly pressed lips (signifying the secrets contained inside), movement (the Jesuit glide), and physical traits such as prominent noses and a lean, ascetic build were used to visualise the Jesuit stereotype in fiction (Janes 2009, 157). In visual art,

such as political caricatures, the thin, black-clad Jesuit was contrasted to the fat and ruddy parish priest (Scheyer 1964, 103).

European bourgeois nationalism developed an uneasy relationship with the international Church in the nineteenth century. To Protestant-dominated or laic states, the Catholic Church represented dangerous internationalism in much the same way as the democratic radicals appeared to the nobility or the rising international labour movement appeared to the established order of the bourgeois nation-states. In France, Gallicans were pitted against Ultramontanists in their appeal to the Pope's authority. The Jesuits were suspected of being the Pope's agents, and they were often either expelled or threatened with expulsion from their traditional teaching positions at Catholic schools. The assertion of the Immaculate Conception as dogma in 1854 and papal infallibility in 1870 were widely seen as Jesuit plots to increase the spiritual power of the Catholic Church. The traditionally respected Jesuit education was denounced as being based on mysticism, irrationality, even 'Jesuit magic' (Healy 2003, 175). Victorian anti-Catholic writings often combined fear of a foreign 'Jesuit plot' against Britain with fear of revolt among the lower classes. Jesuits were shown as master manipulators of social discontent (Moran 2007, 44, 48). The Jesuit plot developed simultaneously as a conspiracy theory and a literary device. Already in the first half of the nineteenth century, the parallels to antisemitic conspiracy theories were striking, as were those to the anti-Masonic conspiracy theories of the French aristocracy and other opponents of the French Revolution (Donskis 2003, 38–39). The contradictory trope of the 'Jesuitic revolutionary' began to take shape in the mid-nineteenth century. In 1840, the Finnish philosopher Johan Vilhelm Snellman connected Europe's young radicals to the negative stereotype of the Jesuits:

> Abstract notions of human rights and liberties have … achieved victory and all that exists is despised to such extent that notions of right and wrong have been so mindlessly confused that finally they have openly professed the Jesuit principle: 'the end justifies the means' (Snellman 1992, 311–313).

Meanwhile, these were the very radicals to use the Jesuits as reactionary symbols of reactionism. The French best-selling author Eugène Sue chose the Jesuits as the main antagonists in *Le Juif errant*, a successful *roman-feuilleton* of 1844 (Hutson 1889, 306). It has been suggested that Karl Marx first created a literary connection between 'Jesuit and Jew' in his polemical article 'On the Jewish Question', published in 1844 (Mar-

cus 1987, 116). Marx picked up the old accusation of bending the letter of the law, and turned it at the Jews—and at the bourgeois world in general.

In the 1870s, the newly unified German Empire set out to monopolise education for the benefit of the State. The stereotypical Jesuit served as a *bête noire* for nationalists, liberals, and socialists alike in the ensuing *Kulturkampf*. The cartoonist Wilhelm Busch published several caricatures of scheming Jesuits threatening the unity of the family and the harmony of the nation at one and the same time (Busch 1986, 37, 103, 165). In Busch's 'Pater Filucius', the eponymous main figure conspires against the good German Michel with the help of a stereotypical Frenchman and the 'Inter-Nazi'— the Workers' International. Anti-Jesuits accused Jesuits of being incapable of loyalty to any nation (Healy 2003, 127). All these accusations were also applied to socialists and Jews. Converted Jews were in fact barred from entering the Society of Jesus, even though converts had been recruited in the early years of the order's history. The defaming power of the stereotype was so strong that some writers used it regardless of its factual absurdity. Some anti-Catholics even treated Ignatius of Loyola's Basque heritage as a racially distinguishing trait, making him 'un-Aryan' (Healy 2003, 126–127; Maryks 2009, 50).

The 'Jewish Jesuit' seems especially absurd in light of the antisemitic rhetoric that flourished in the pro-Catholic propaganda of the same period. In defensive leaflets addressed to Catholics in Germany during the *Kulturkampf*, the state's attack on the Catholic Church was blamed on 'Talmud morality' and was said to be a smokescreen for the true agenda of the 'stock-jobbers'—Jews conspiring against Christianity (Blaschke 1997, 60–66). Many groups with anti-Catholic agendas thrived on the same antisemitic catchphrases. Fictitious characters, however sophisticated, nevertheless reinforced the conceptual connection between three early twentieth-century threats to the Protestant, bourgeois, capitalist West—revolutionary Marxism, Catholic reaction, and the racial Other (Toiviainen 1977, 278–279; Marcus 1987, 119). Nazi propagandists also evoked a metaphorical connection between 'Talmud morality' and 'Jesuit morality', in addition to that antisemitic chimera, 'Judeo-Bolshevism' (von Papen-Bodek 2004, 180). The principle of absolute obedience to one cause, and the right to distort the truth in service of it, could be used to unite Loyola, Lenin, and the Elders of Zion. *Perinde ac cadaver* and let

the end justify the means: the real dictum and the fictitious slogan were ineluctably linked to conspiracy theories, with disastrous effects.

The history of the Jesuit reductions in Paraguay played a certain role in the formation of this trope. The egalitarian yet theocratic organisation of this 'Jesuit state' interested Voltaire, who devoted two works to it: *Essai sur les mœurs et l'esprit des nations* (1756) and *Candide* (1759). In Voltaire's view, the reductions were a threat to Spain's and Portugal's interests, and the Jesuits were guilty of abusing their power over credulous Indians and European monarchs alike (Cro 1990, 71–73). In the early patriotic historiography of Sweden and Finland, post-Reformation Catholic influence was seen as having tainted both John III and his son Sigismund, not to mention Queen Christina, the daughter of Gustavus Adolphus. Jesuit agents spying in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Sweden and Finland appear in novels as well as the non-fiction of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Ivalo 1898, 276; Koskinen 1926, 16; Zetterberg and Tiitta 1992, 104, 107). These increasingly fictional stereotypes influenced the discourse of Catholicism in the Protestant parts of Europe. As late as the 1930s, the Finnish writer Olavi Paavolainen (1903–1964) complained that it was barely possible for an inhabitant of a Protestant country to find objective literature on Catholicism, and that the educated parts of the population were often better informed on fashionable Asian religions than on the most influential Church in Europe (Paavolainen 1938, 174). He himself knowingly subverted the stereotype by heaping praise on the Jesuit reductions, the 'Dictatorship of Gentleness'.

The leading Jesuit stereotype in the Finnish literary canon was created by Zacharias Topelius in his collection of historical fiction, *Fältskärns berättelser* (The Barber-Surgeon's Tale), published in 1853–1867. The first collection of stories was serialised in the newspaper *Helsingfors Tidningar* and reached a national audience through continuous reprints and re-edits, and, having been written in Swedish, several Finnish translations, the first in 1867 (Klinge 1997). The first collection relates the fate of a Finnish officer in the Swedish army in the Thirty Years War. In war-torn Germany, he falls in love with a young Catholic lady whom the conspiring Jesuit Pater Hieronymus recruits to murder Gustavus Adolphus. Hieronymus is a fanatical schemer, and his appearance is explicitly meant to reflect his cunning and ruthless character, in addition to branding him as 'foreign'.

The outstanding Finnish contribution to the genre of 'Jesuit physiognomy' was Albert Edelfelt's illustrations to Topelius' tales. The lurking figure of Hieronymus bears a more than passing resemblance to the depictions of lanky priests in German caricatures, while the Swedish artist Carl Larsson depicted him in a manner similar to foreign predecessors, such as Honoré Daumier's counter-revolutionary, gun-toting Spanish priests (Topelius 1899, 63, 89). Just as the Reformation had a paradigmatic position in early modern Swedish historiography, it achieved the same status through the pens of the first nationalist Finnish historians, albeit with minor adjustments: the Reformation became yet another step towards the historically determined autonomy (and later independence) of Finland. This was a success story that needed convincing villains. The devious Jesuit was the perfect accessory to evil autocracy in the guise of the Catholic Empire, while also permitting a veiled attack on the Russian Empire, whose subjects the Finns had become in 1809 (Tommila 1989, 113).


Figure 1. Projekt Runeberg http://runeberg.org/faltskar/

Gustavus Adolphus was the chief Christian hero of both Sweden and Finland; not only praised as the saviour of the chosen, but as an ideal for humanity, a global champion of liberty and justice (Rein 1930, 315; von Bonsdorff 1935, 118). In a speech given at Helsinki University on 6 November 1932, on the anniversary of his death, his task in the Thirty Years War was described in anachronistic but topical terms: 'The existence of the free, democratic North European culture was at stake.' (Hornborg 1932, 286) The messianic image of the king was kept alive in the national mythology with the help of Topelius' works. The growing number of Finnish-language histories drew inspiration from these fictional sources as well. In history books for the general reader, as well as school textbooks, the shock troops of the Counter Reformation were described in no uncertain terms: a common claim was that the Jesuits gave Catholic rulers permission to break their oaths to their Protestant subjects, violating their kingdoms' legal foundations (Grotenfelt 1902, 288; Palmén et al. 1908, 394–398). This can also be interpreted as a reference to the struggle to maintain Finland's autonomous status within the Russian Empire.

The aggressive Catholic Church was nevertheless an enemy image of the past. More pressing questions than the purity of the faith were on the national agenda during the centuries of first autonomy and then independence. As the Established Church, it was the Lutheran Church of Finland that was the bearer of the nation, representing the Chosen People. Biblical narratives gave a religious anchoring to the national mythology of a people freed from bondage and reaching for salvation (Elmgren 2008, 216–226). Topelius saw himself as a witness of the world's degeneration, and hoped for the impending return of Christ and the salvation of the world, where the young Finnish people had been chosen by God to replace Israel (Forsgård 1998, 116–119). Priests were engaged in the national project from the very start, and the most militant movements of the twentieth century had a significant number of clerical leaders (Alapuro 1973, 53, 63). Secular philosophy also supported this development. Snellman's modified Hegelianism placed service to the 'national spirit' at the core of all human endeavours. According to some interpreters of Snellman's thought in the 1930s, political action in a national spirit was Man's highest religious duty. Christianity promised to reward all good deeds, but political deeds in harmony with the national spirit were the best way to raise the individual to the full consciousness of his role

as the executor of the Higher Will (Elo 1934, 246–256; Harva 1938, 473; Forsman 1939, 118).

Figure 2. Projekt Runeberg http://runeberg.org/faltskar/

Most twentieth-century references to Jesuits in Finnish texts show the influence of Topelius' tales and their illustrations. In historical fiction the old stereotypes could survive longer than in political rhetoric, so that there the Jesuits continued to exercise their power as conspirators and manipulators of royalty, constantly associated with qualities such as intelligence, leadership, power, and ambition (Waltari 1942, 283; Paloheimo 1945, 93). Joel Lehtonen introduced similar themes in a short story where the main character is all but seduced by a cunning Jesuit into conversion and a clerical career. Lehtonen and other educated Finns were not immune to the allure of the monastic path, but the image was overshadowed by the stock villain (Tarkka 1977, 130). Olavi Paavolainen belonged to the few but notable authors of the early twentieth century who felt this allure. Paavolainen's major works of the 1930s were daring

attempts to capture the Zeitgeist on a global level. He also took pleasure in challenging the prejudices of the Finnish audience: 'three hundred years ago in the jungles of Paraguay the Jesuits founded the most perfect Communist society among the Indians,' he declared. He was not being facetious (Paavolainen 1938, 195; Kurjensaari 1975, 193). He saw the suppression of their 'admirable missionary work' as yet another step on the bloody path of colonialism in the Americas (Paavolainen 1978, 246). His unconventional views on totalitarian states made him a controversial figure both before and after the Second World War.

Topelius established the Jesuit plot in Finnish fiction, and in his works we may also find an early invective 'Jesuit' (Topelius 1901, 101). The character Sivert in a short story set in the countryside evokes the scorn of his neighbours who call him 'that Jesuit', 'scoundrel and traitor'. On a more abstract level, the Jesuit was also used as a metaphor of cunning and shrewdness by writers who had grown up in the early twentieth century (Halsti 1975, 157). 'Jesuit' was also used as an insult in private correspondence, in the sense of a moralistic Philistine: witness the correspondence between the writer Ilmari Kianto and his benefactor and antagonist, the politician Santeri Alkio (Alanen 1976, 133). In Kianto's works, the Jesuit as a moralising backstabber is a frequent trope (Kianto 1923a, 303; Kianto 1923b, 300, 304). The invective was used differently by the poet Kaarlo Sarkia in 'Poem on Ugliness', an exploration of the pain of existence addressed to 'Life's enemy, thou Jesuit of the night, twister and skilled in the powers of death' (Sarkia 1976, 337). This 'Jesuit' is a metaphor for some destructive force, perhaps Sarkia's own depression—an aspect of evil beyond humanity. The association between 'Jesuit' and evil is clearly stated in a comparatively recent Finnish dictionary: figuratively (not 'pejoratively', note) the word 'Jesuit' is defined as 'treacherous' and 'ruthless' (Aikio and Vornanen 1982, 304). This negative interpretation has in turn been used to prove the moral deficiency of the original Society of Jesus (Rosenqvist 1914, 11).

The illustrations of Topelius' works served as possible sources for the mysterious 'Jesuitical' adjective used in visual descriptions in the posthumously published private diaries and correspondence of people educated in the early twentieth century (Kuula 1968, 115; Kallas 1978, 467). These descriptions are rarely detailed and seem to assume that the reader will know what a 'Jesuit nose' or face looks like; they rarely contain other evaluations except the purely emotional. The 'Jesuit-faced' people are

dour, lugubrious, depressing. In Maria Jotuni's novel about a dysfunctional marriage, *Huojuva talo*, originally written in the 1930s, the protagonist Lea's first thoughts when meeting her future – abusive – husband connect his appearance to contradictory elements: 'He resembles a Jesuit, or something strange, a hangman or a savage peasant, something primitive like that.' (Jotuni 1991, 85) The Jesuit character was reduced to a metaphor or an invective, relying on the reader having grown up with Topelius' Pater Hieronymus to appreciate the analogy. In later fiction, the Jesuit became an evil spirit, but as unreal as spirits are in secularised Lutheranism. A 1962 novel set in the early twentieth century contains a retelling of 'The Surgeon-Barber's Tale'. The Jesuit is trying to persuade someone to do 'what was not right or honest', and he is exorcised like a demon with the words, '*Abi male spiritus!*' (Ingman 1962, 50)

In the 1930s, the conflict-oriented political climate in Finland and the increasing power of Fascist regimes in Europe caused leftist literary critics to accuse right-wing poets of degenerate and barbaric mysticism. The critic Raoul Palmgren cited as an example a poem written by Heikki Asunta, an anti-Communist activist, in 1934: 'Away, red-coated priest of Novgorod, | away, wily Jewish Jesuit!' (Palmgren 1935, 227; Asunta 1934) The combination of three enemy images defined the poet's political position. In the first two lines, the Jesuit spectre is conflated with the antisemitic caricature of the Jew and anti-Communism's Red Peril. Anti-Communism (and opposition to any Marxist-inspired movement, including Social Democrats and labour unions) was one of the chief objectives of Finland's centre–populist and right-wing activists in 1920s and 1930s. Antisemitism played a minuscule role and anti-Catholicism lacked a purpose in Lutheran-dominated Finland. So why the conflation? Was the Red Peril not terrifying by itself, especially in a country that had recently experienced a bloody and failed socialist revolt? How did the negative Jesuit stereotype become detached from its original anti-Catholic context?

A number of aspects of the Jesuit stereotype were applied to the Bolsheviks, Communist movements or socialist states, including 'Jesuit morality' or the idea of the 'Jesuit state' (representing ideological dictatorship or a utopian society). A direct comparison beckoned: a ruling avant-garde duping the credulous masses. However, the Jesuit stereotype was connected to the past through popular historical fiction, and therefore represented 'reaction'. Snellman's semi-Hegelian nation-state was a pro-

gressive project with a determined course through the future, and from the viewpoint of the Finnish bourgeois nationalist there was no reason to differentiate between the various groups who, through their actions or their mere existence, brought that course into question – reaction and misguided radicalism were two sides of the same coin. Yet the metaphor could also be turned back on the bourgeois nationalist (Paavolainen 1966, 143).

The rhetorical connection between Communism and the Jesuits was already established by the late 1930s. The exiled Leon Trotsky felt compelled to reply to it in his article 'Their Morals and Ours'. Trotsky not only defended Communism from accusations of being identical with Stalinism—he included a defence of the Society of Jesus against the stereotype of 'Jesuit morality' (Trotsky 1938, 163–173). While the enemies of Communism lump together their ideological hate objects to make all their enemies appear the same, they all fall into the very trap of letting the end, their favourite abstract principle, justify the means. In showing that the Jesuits were more concerned with personal responsibility than their detractors were and that the early Jesuits in their militant discipline were 'superior' to the average priest, Trotsky implies that there is no shame in being compared to the true Jesuits. But the analogy is still a false one – to Trotsky, the early Jesuits represented 'reaction', and their downfall began when they adapted themselves to the spirit of bourgeois society and compromised their vows, that is, ceased to be Jesuits. By revealing the 'Jesuit morality' behind the secular bourgeois philosophers attack on the Jesuits and the Bolsheviks alike, Trotsky attempted to reveal the 'deceit' of moral abstractions serving the interests of the bourgeoisie (Deutscher 2003, 355–356).

Just as 'Jesuit morality' was a well-known cliché in the early twentieth century, those who had spent their formative years in the inter-war period also used the invective connected to this stereotype (Lindström 1914, 208; Rosenqvist 1914, 11; Jukola 1930, 371; Kuusi 1985, 251). In this context, the 'Jesuit' was a man who distorted the meaning of another person's words to his advantage. Even in the 1960s and 1970s, when a new generation took over the leading positions in the cultural elite, it was possible to state 'The Jesuits are not dead; they are not even ailing' (Salama 1979, 154–155). Use of the invective 'Jesuit' could certainly be justified if the end was noble enough. The poll position of the 'Jesuit' among the choice invective heaped on political enemies was confirmed by a

statement by Arvo Tuominen, himself a former leading Communist, in an article in honour of the seventy-fifth birthday of the Social Democrat leader Väinö Tanner:

> we note to our astonishment that there are some words commonly belonging to the terminology of political denigration that will not be used in connexion with Tanner's name. Such words are: coward, weakling, backstabber, turncoat, Machiavellian, and Jesuit. For some reason, even the Communist pen does not lend itself to these words while denouncing Tanner, and if it does, very rarely and reluctantly (Tuominen 1956, 127).

Väinö Tanner had been sentenced to five-and-a-half years in prison in the war-responsibility trials imposed on Finland by the Allies in 1946, but he received adulations from Left to Right. Tanner's determined leadership during Finland's wars and his sacrifice for the sake of peace with the Soviet Union earned him respect even among his opponents. In contrast, the Social Democrat Minister of the Interior, Väinö Leskinen, had to endure accusations of using Jesuitical rhetoric (Eduskunta 1969, 928). In parliamentary transcripts, the phrase can still be traced through the 1990s and 2000s, albeit sparingly used. For example, in the period 1994–2011, Jesuit-derived words and phrases were used thirteen times in parliamentary debates by nine speakers. Only one reference was made to the historical Society of Jesus, associating it directly with 'the Inquisition' and comparing it to Islamist extremism (Eduskunta 1999a; Eduskunta 1999b). The phrase 'Jesuit morality' occurred most often, and was almost always directed at political opponents at the local level (the single exception was an attack on US foreign policy).

Voltaire's despotic Jesuits returned in post-war political debate. The conservative author Kauko Kare became a notable 'dissident' against President Urho Kekkonen's Soviet-friendly domination of foreign policy in the 1960s and 1970s. Kare referred to an episode in Voltaire's *Candide*, where the naïve traveller arrives in Paraguay and is prepared to fight the 'Jesuit state'. His servant Cacambo praises the wisdom of the Jesuits: their reign is ideal, because the people are perfectly subdued. In America, the Fathers lead their obedient armies to kill the Spanish, and in Europe, Jesuit confessors send the Spanish to heaven. The shrewd Cacambo persuades Candide to join the Jesuits to be compensated in this world or the next (Kare 1967, 30). Less than two decades before the publication of his book, the leader of a 'great eastern neighbour' had passed away,

and the Finnish Candides and Cacambos had outdone themselves with their hero worship.

The all-purpose usefulness of the 'Jesuit' villain transcended its existence as a literary device in historical fiction. It developed into a metaphor and an invective. One of the more specific uses was in a context that may be described as 'reactionary radical' or 'radically reactionary'. In applying the Jesuit pejorative to political enemies, the writer returns to the roots (Latin, *radix*, hence, radical) of the enemy image of the Protestant nation-state (Strauss et al. 1989, 324). Childhood memories of seminal patriotic legends were mobilised among a receptive audience. The factual basis was irrelevant to the effectiveness of this tactic.

The Soviet Union filled the threatening position of the Catholic Empire in Finland's national mythology. Both the alluring might of the seemingly utopian Jesuit state fitted into this narrative, as did 'Jesuit morality'. The content of 'Jesuit morality' was simplified from 'the end justifies the means' to 'might is right', and it was strongly disseminated during the later part of the Second World War, as representatives of the Baltic states urged Finland to make common cause with the Axis powers (Siiras 1942, 59–60; Paasikivi 1958, 187). In the Finnish anti-Jesuit discourse, the conflation of enemy images revealed something about the particular ideology that a writer was defending. Having once been an enemy image in its own right, the 'Jesuit spectre' was now used to enhance other perceived threats: it evolved into a literary device and was used as an invective without wider ideological implications. Derivations of the original stereotypes could be used without a more or less political message to support. However, the continuous use of such specific phrases as 'Jesuit morality' speaks volumes about Finland's isolation in the larger European cultural context.

Even once the Catholic Church had faded away as a historical obstacle in the young nation's mythic path to independence, anti-Jesuit phrases continued to be used in political discourse. One reason might have been the imprint of Christian eschatology on Finnish nationalism. An existential enemy was necessary to motivate the continuing struggle for a unified and successful nation-state. In the twentieth century, this enemy was Russia, but tropes defining other, more ancient enemies were easily applied to it. The main source of anti-Jesuit imagery was found no earlier than the nineteenth century, when the most influential works of fiction for several generations were written. It was the development of modern

Finnish nationalism as a political philosophy that gave the Jesuits their proverbial place among the enemies of the nation. Today, the metaphorical Jesuit is a mere ghost, an echo of past propaganda, used without deeper reflection on its origins and purpose. However, I have found a rare subversion of this stereotype in the party newspaper of the True Finns, a centre–populist party that has gained popular support in recent years. 'We are Jesuits in the true sense of the word', wrote the chairman of a local party group, adding that 'a good cause can only be fought with good means.' The writer confessed that he, too, had been taught another interpretation of 'Jesuit morals' in school, but 'the truth was completely different' (Orre 2009, 12).

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NORWAY AND THE JESUIT ORDER: A HISTORY OF ANTI-CATHOLICISM

Bernt T. Oftestad

Abstract

In 1956 the Norwegian Parliament removed from the constitution the last remnant of an anti-liberal and anti-democratic tradition, inherited from the Reformation and the confessional state of the 17th century. In 1814 Norway had received its own constitution (here abbreviated Grl), which contained a ban on the Jesuit order: Jesuits would not be tolerated in the country (paragraph 2). Twice – in 1895 and 1925 – the Government made a move to abolish the paragraph, but did not succeed. The liberal and social democratic representatives in the Parliament considered the paragraph to be in conflict with freedom of religion. The political authorities, however, could not ignore the anti-Catholic sentiments in the population, especially among the clergy and the practising members of the Lutheran state church. After World War II, when Norway signed the European Declaration of Human Rights, the paragraph had to be repealed.

Introduction

As a consequence of the restoration and reconstruction of Europe after the Napoleonic wars, the European superpowers separated Norway from Denmark and gave it as a reward to Sweden, which had militarily contributed to the defeat of Napoleon. Denmark had, conversely, stood by the French emperor. During the spring of 1814, with the Swedish army remaining on the continent, the Norwegian aristocracy grasped the opportunity to establish their nation as an autonomous modern state based on a rather liberal and democratic constitution. The ideology reflected in the Norwegian constitution was inspired by the political ideals of the

Enlightenment. At the same time, the 'fathers of the constitution' were rather conservative. In some respects they did not change, but on the contrary prolonged and secured the old legislation and traditions from the ancient absolutist and confessional regime in Denmark-Norway: the Evangelical-Lutheran religion should remain the official religion of the state, governed by the confessional king. All inhabitants were bound to bring up their children in the same manner (Grl § 2.1–2). But the new state should nevertheless be founded on modern liberal ideals, above all religious freedom, constitutionally secured. In spite of this, the freedom of religion was in some respects limited. The state should protect the citizens against aggressive Catholicism: 'Jesuits and monastic orders shall not be tolerated.' In addition, the 'Jews should still be excluded from admission to the kingdom' (Grunnloven 1814). The Constitution was definitively passed on 17th May 1814, but nobody present observed that the paragraph explicitly securing freedom of religion had disappeared (Eidsvoll og Grunnloven 1814). Years later the failure was registered, although none who were present in 1814 could give any plausible explanation. Although the Norwegian Constitution founded a liberal and democratic state, it did not explicitly secure freedom of religion as one of its basic political principles. The paragraph which could have guaranteed it highlighted not only anti-Catholicism, but even antisemitism and failed to underline the modern and liberal framework of the national revolution in Norway (Oftestad 1998, 85–97; Furre 2002).

The Historical and Structural Background

Although posterity complained about the illiberal defect of the Constitution, the Jesuit paragraph was evidently in accordance with the dominant ideological mentality of that time. In the 18th century the Jesuit order was suppressed and expelled from Portugal and banned in France. The anti-Catholic and anti-clerical Enlightenment held the Jesuit order as extremely highly dangerous. Regarded as an efficient political instrument of the pope, the political authorities of the nation states fought the Jesuits as a threat against the independence of the secular state nation from the papacy. In the end Pope Clemens XIV was compelled to dissolve the Jesuit order in 1773, though in1814 it was re-established (Bangert 1986, 363–430).

In the 19th and 20th century, Norwegian society was transformed in accordance with liberalist and democratic ideals, and yet the constitu-

tional ban on the Jesuit order remained until 1956. In 1897 and 1925 the Parliament discussed a repeal of the paragraph, but the required majority was not reached. When the Norwegian state in the 1950s accepted the European Declaration of Human Rights, the Jesuit paragraph had to be abolished. Even then the repeal of the paragraph met with considerable opposition.

The long history of the Jesuit paragraph is a manifestation of the strong anti-Catholicism within the Norwegian society – among the political elite and the ordinary people in the state church alike, as well as the theological intelligentsia. Some practical and ideological structures which formed the cultural and religious development of the Norwegian society were decisive for the impact of anti-Catholicism: 1) the dominant Lutheran state church, which even until recently formed the religious and ethical identity of the nation and the civic society; 2) the pietistic revivals, partly inspired by Anglo-American Protestantism; 3) the consolidation of Norway as a distinct and proud nation – a project of importance up to World War II; and 4) liberalism, in this context functioning in an ambiguous way – substantially anti-Catholic, but in practice pluralistic, admitting religious freedom even to Catholics, including the Jesuit order.

It is impossible to establish an adequate understanding of the conflicts concerning the Jesuits without considering the structure of the state religion. The administrator of the religion was formally the constitutional, confessionally obliged King. But because of the introduction of the parliamentary system of government in 1884, the secular political authorities in Cabinet and Parliament had to decide confessional questions concerning the theological content of the doctrine of the state religion, and in this case the effect of religious freedom.

Most of the political parties identified themselves with a Norwegian Christian heritage. In different ways a majority of politicians were, along with the overwhelming number of the people, associated with the established church. Most of them intended to protect the Lutheran confessional state. But a growing minority of the population did not identify themselves with the Christian religion at all, holding atheistic, rationalistic or socialistic views. They were well represented in the Parliament. Consequently, their rejection of the confessional state included the abolition of the Jesuit paragraph.

The prevention of a religious organisation's existence by legislation had no chance of being maintained over the long term in a modern and

liberal democracy such as 20th century Norway. It is, however, astonishing that such a tradition was politically intact as late as in the 1950s. When the paragraph was eventually repealed, it also marked the spiritual and ideological shift that had taken place in the Norwegian society. The deconstruction of the confessional and ecclesial character of the state religion was now accomplished, the pluralistic state having conclusively defeated the confessional.

Liberalisation and Catholicism

After the Reformation, the Protestant princes, among them the King of Denmark-Norway, had to defend the Lutheran doctrine against supposed Catholic heresies. In particular, they needed to protect their people against the perceived Catholic menace, especially the attacks from the Jesuit order, thought of as the best soldiers of the pope. Harsh laws against Catholicism and the Jesuit Order were passed (Garstein 1963/1980). If monks and Jesuits were found in the country, they would be punished with the death penalty according to king Christian V's Norwegian Law of 1687 (6, § 3). It was this mentality that was embedded in the Norwegian Constitution, though in a softer way.

   In 1845, non-Lutheran churches were permitted to establish communities in Norway and propagate their faith among members of the state church. Shortly thereafter, Methodists, Baptists and the Catholic Church had established themselves in the country, the first Catholic community being founded as early as in 1843. In 1851 the ban on the Jews was abolished, allowing them into the country (Oftestad 1998, 107–18). The old religious structure of the state religion was not formally altered. Still, fundamental religious changes took place, partly within the state church, partly beyond its borders because of the growth of the free churches. Within the state church a dynamic lay movement organised itself at a national level. It was stimulated by revivals and engaged in mission work at home and abroad, particularly in Asia and Africa. Revivals are dynamic movements crossing and breaking confessional boundaries. The decades prior to the 20th century saw the coming of an inter-confessional Protestant revivalist culture, aiming at re-Christianising the country and establishing a new Christian hegemony by means of a great national revival (Rudvin 1979, 123ff). The authority of the Bible was to be restored among the people and biblical ideals should inspire public legislation. Catholicism was regarded as an almost non-Christian religion – un-

biblical, ritualistic, hierarchical, promoting ancient superstitions, disturbing the project of re-Christianisation, because of its false doctrines and its disintegrating effect on the established Protestant tradition in Norway.

The modernisation of the state church developed in another way as well. By the end of the 19th century, the theological faculty at the University in Kristiania (Oslo) was deeply inspired by liberal Protestant theology, mainly from Germany. The liberals attacked the Catholic Church because of its doctrinal tradition and sacramental life, and they did not tolerate Catholic ethics. Famous anti-Catholic German theologians such as Adolf von Harnack (1851–1930) and Wilhelm Herrmann (1860–1922) were well-known and studied in Norway. Wilhelm Herrmann's book *Römische und evangelische Sittlichkeit* (1903) was translated into Norwegian in 1928. The Norwegian wing of liberal Protestantism was influenced by the 'anti-Catholic affect' among the Protestant German theologians.

An important concern of liberal theology was the aversion toward confusing juridical and religious concepts. Resulting in a legalistic ecclesiastical practice, typical for the Catholic Church, it represented a deviation from the Gospel (Andresen et al. 1988, 202–20; Oftestad et al. 2005, 244–57). Although the liberal theologians loathed the Catholic Church, its doctrine, piety and theological framework, they had to realise that the Norwegian Jesuit paragraph was in deep conflict with the fundamental religious and cultural principles of liberal Protestantism.

The First Confrontation – 1897

In 1891 a new Law on dissenters (Dissenterloven) was passed, to the satisfaction of, amongst others, the Catholic Church. The new legislation raised a discussion on the paragraph in the Constitution against monks and Jesuits (Grl § 2, 3). The Parliament member Hans Andersen, himself a Baptist, proposed to change the Constitution to secure legally the freedom of religion. Without suspending the Lutheran religion as the religion of the state, he proposed an addition to Grl § 2, declaring all religious communities to have right of free religious practice. Consequently, the limitations imposed on the Catholic Church concerning monks and Jesuits should be removed. The Parliament discussed the proposal in 1897. Although a majority in the Parliament supported the proposal from Andersen, the majority was not sufficient to change the constitution, as two-thirds of the members were needed for it to be passed (Storthings Forhandlinger 1892 and 1897; Dissenterloven 1845).

As a Baptist, Andersen was deeply committed to the idea of religious freedom. His proposal was supported by the liberal members of the Parliament, many of them being freethinkers or supporters of a modern version of Christianity. The liberal party, Venstre, held a secular liberalism. This party had some years earlier defeated the old aristocratic regime, introduced the parliamentary system of government and achieved a dominant political position in Norway. Its political and cultural aim was a modern, democratic and liberal Norway. Limiting the freedom of religion, in this case the freedom of a religious institution, was intolerable. But at the same time, Venstre exposed its ambivalence towards the Catholic Church. Its prime option was an explicit declaration of religious freedom in the constitution. Additionally, they proposed that the ban on monastic orders should be repealed, but that the Jesuits should still be refused entrance to the country. Norwegian society should be defended against influences from the most ultramontane and intolerant organisation in the Catholic Church (Storthings Forhandlinger 1897, del 7, 851ff).

Antipathy in the Parliament against the Jesuits was mainly motivated by nationalistic sentiments, as the core of the Norwegian culture was fundamentally Lutheran and Protestant. By the turn of the 20th century, the Norwegian mentality was dominated by what can be characterised as a form of confessional nationalism. In a Protestant Norway the Jesuit order had no cultural legitimacy. In the Parliamentary discussion in 1897, Catholic monasticism was regarded as an 'unfamiliar plant' on Norwegian soil, because the population held another view on religious community and relations. In the Catholic countries, monasticism was a natural religious practice, but even in some of them the Jesuits were unwanted. The German *Kulturkampf* against the Catholic Church some decades earlier evidently had made an impression on the political elite in Norway. But when the Jesuits were rejected in Norway, the reason was social and political, not religious or theological, because Catholicism was a legal religion in Norway. The parliamentarians abstained from a more concrete description of the negative aspects of the Jesuit order (Storthings Forhandlinger 1897, del 7, 851ff).

Two years prior to the debate in the Parliament, one of the theological professors at the University in Kristiania/Oslo – the church historian Andreas Brandrud (1868–1957) – had published a book about the Norwegian Jesuit Laurentius Nicolai Norvegus (Lauritz Nilssøn, 'Kloster-

lasse' 1538–1622). He was one of the leading figures of the counter-reformation, having tried to reintroduce Catholicism in Sweden and Norway. In the book, Brandrud, a liberal protestant theologian, conveyed the traditional attacks on the Jesuits, rejecting especially their concept of moral, the 'probabilism' and 'reservatio mentalis' (Brandrud 1995). The book received enthusiastic reviews in the newspapers and was highly esteemed by the liberal intelligentsia and in religious circles. Now Norway, on the outskirts of Europe, was definitively related to mainstream European anti-Catholicism. The Catholic Church in Norway, though, had already seen the rising challenge from militant anti-Catholicism. In 1894 the Catholic bishop, Johannes Olav Fallize (1844–1933) had published a booklet accounting for the controversial subject 'monks and Jesuits'. Here he refuted the myths about the Jesuits and explained the misunderstandings about their moral doctrine and practice (Fallize 1894). Still the Parliament maintained the ban on the Jesuits.

Scandinavia – A Catholic Mission Field

Almost thirty years later the Jesuit question came once again onto the political agenda. The debate of the 1920s turned out more intense than before, as the anti-Catholic sentiments had gradually become more aggressive. The prevailing anti-Catholic atmosphere had its origin in and reflected a national tradition, but it represented at the same time a reaction provoked by the policy of the Catholic Church.

In 1919 Pope Benedict XV published an encyclical about the mission of the Church, *Maximum illud* (svdcuria.org/public/mission/docs/encycl/mi-en.htm). In this encyclical the pope admonished lay people and clergy to renew their engagement in mission and intensify the spread of the Catholic faith. From the Catholic perspective the Protestant countries were regarded as mission fields, but the Catholic Church tended to neglect the homogenous Protestant culture in the Nordic countries, and recognise how tiny the Catholic minorities were. At the beginning of the 1920s, the Catholic Church openly expressed her intention to re-catholicise the Nordic countries. Stimulated by the visit of the Dutch cardinal prefect Wilhelmus van Rossum (1854–1932) in 1923, the Catholic minority grew more active in the public sphere. They envisaged the re-catholicisation of Scandinavia as a realistic scenario. Priests, especially from the Netherlands, were sent to Norway to fulfil the Catholic mission. 'Norway, returned to the Mother Church' was the motto of the

Catholic bishop in Oslo, Johannes Smit, installed in 1922 (Eidsvik 1993, 286–321; Werner 2005, 164–77; Poels 2011). Cardinal van Rossum was prefect of the Congregation for the Propagation of Faith – Sacra Congregatio de Propaganda Fide. The Protestant majority noticed the new mentality among Catholics and realised that the re-catholicising of the Nordic countries was an official policy of the Catholic Church. In this mission the Protestants regarded the Jesuit order as the spearhead.

Although the number of converts did not increase to a degree worth mentioning, some individual conversions were rather impressive. In 1924 the celebrated author Sigrid Undset converted to the Catholic Church. Her novel Kristin Lavransdatter conveyed a moving picture of Catholic piety in the middle Ages. Her novel efficiently promoted Catholicism among the cultured strata of the population (Oftestad 2003, 127–135, 136ff). However, in spite of the Catholics totalling less than 3000, most of them immigrants, the Norwegian majority feared the Catholic offensive, the so-called 'Catholic Menace'. In a situation dominated by an anti-Catholic atmosphere, the abolition of the ban on the Jesuit order was once more discussed in Parliament.

The Second Confrontation – 1925

In 1921 a Jesuit was invited to Norway to lecture on Catholicism. Formally illegal, the visit was cancelled, but because of this incident, the cabinet decided to start a political process towards an abolition of the Jesuit paragraph. Four years later, in 1925, the case was definitely concluded (Stortingsforhandlinger 1923 and 1925; Øksendal 1968, 27–67; Sverdrup-Thygeson 2009, 54–83)

As part of the process the political authorities had to consult with the bishops in the state church and the two theological faculties: 'The theological faculty at the University in Kristiania/Oslo' and 'The Norwegian School of Theology' (MF), a conservative private institution established in 1908. The majority of the consulted experts did not find any obstacle to the abolition of the Jesuit paragraph. Nevertheless, a rather important minority, two bishops out of seven, one professor at the University, and all the professors at The Norwegian School of Theology voted for the maintenance of the old paragraph. The cabinet decided to follow up the advice from the majority of the consultants.

A heated debate commenced as soon as the cabinet's proposal was made public. The negative opinion from the Association of the Clergy in

the State Church (Den norske kirkes presteforening) deeply impressed the politicians. The new stand taken by the bishops was especially remarkable. Now all of them warned against the Jesuit order. The traditional allegations against the Jesuits were repeated, and once again publicly refuted by Catholics (Sæter 1924).

In the Parliament the representatives of the liberal and socialist parties voted, certainly on different premises, for an abolition of the Jesuit paragraph. Both parties were hostile to the old confessional state and detested the use of coercive measures to uphold religious homogeneity. Freedom of religion had to be realised without any exception. But the majority in the Parliament rejected the idea that the Jesuit case concerned the freedom of religion. The Catholic Church was fully accepted as a legal denomination in Norway, enjoying the same freedom as all other dissenting churches. They argued that the Jesuit order was a militant organisation, with a bad moral reputation, and committed to fighting liberal values. Moreover, the political authorities had to be aware of the opinion of the bishops and the religious committed groups within in the state church, all of them cautioning against the Jesuits. The peaceful religious situation should not be disturbed, and the confessional unity of the nation had to be defended. The free denominations did not represent any threat against the unity of the nation, but a religious organisation of the militant kind could change the present situation. In accordance with this argumentation, the Parliament rejected the abolishment of the Jesuit paragraph.

It is evident that the political process leading up to the debate in the Parliament and the success of the conservative wing stimulated illiberal, anti-Catholic sentiments in Norwegian society, reaching its peak around 1930. In the pietistic and radical Protestant circles the anti-Catholic tradition was stable. Catholicism was regarded as a religion full of superstition, as ritualistic and autocratic, and therefore as a dangerous enemy of true Christian faith. Missionaries from Norway had bad experiences with the Jesuits on the mission fields, especially in Madagascar. The Protestant spiritual influence from the United States on the lay people in Norway was growing in the first decades of the 20th century, and comprised a strong element of anti-Catholicism (Jenkins 2004). The cultural elite and the dominant political parties disliked the authoritarian and illiberal characteristics of the Catholic Church, but it was impossible for them to neglect the liberal ideas basic to the Norwegian state and society.

In the long run the access of the Jesuits could not be prevented. The anti-Catholic sentiments remained alive up to World War II, stimulated by the propagandist Marta Steinsvik (1877-1950), an aggressive feminist who was dedicated to fighting the Catholic Church, especially the Jesuits (Norseth, this volume).

In 1933 groups within the Lutheran lay movement founded the Christian Democratic Party (Kristelig folkeparti). Before the war the party had few representatives in the Parliament and lacked substantial political influence. After the war it became a parliamentary success (Solhjell 2011). The representatives were almost entirely recruited from the Protestant anti-Catholic circles. The party wanted to restore Christian ethics in civil society, especially within education. Its aim was to combat secularisation, and in doing so they defended the confessional Lutheran state. At the same time, the party supported a liberalistic and democratic policy, always being on the alert to secure the freedom of the religious communities, their social and educational institutions included. The party thus tried to hold together two different political strategies. In reality it ended up representing an ideological synthesis of modern liberalism and Protestantism. In keeping with nationalistic confessional traditionalism and modern Protestantism, the party promoted an aggressive anti-Catholicism. Although being an ardent protector of religious freedom for Christian dissenters, the Christian Democratic Party resented the Catholic Church as it represented a threat to the traditional religious homogeneity in Norway. In this respect the party saw Catholicism as a dangerous secularising threat. Naturally, therefore, the Christian Democratic Party unanimously voted against the repeal of the Jesuit paragraph when the Parliament discussed it in 1956.

The Jesuit Paragraph and Human Rights

In 1951 the Norwegian government ratified the European Convention of Human Rights, which secured the freedom of religion: 'Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom (…) to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance.' The Norwegian constitution had no explicit declaration on the right to religious freedom corresponding with the European convention. On the contrary, it limited a certain religious practice. Therefore, the ratification in 1951 was endowed with a reservation concerning the freedom of religion. The reservation attracted nega-

tive attention in the European community, and the Norwegian Government realised that the old Jesuit paragraph had to be abolished. The question raised in Europe was: How could the constitution of a modern state contain such a paragraph? Then in 1952 the Government announced a proposition recommending that the Parliament should abolish the paragraph (Stortingsforhandlinger 1952; Frøvik 1988).

It was thirty years since the Jesuit paragraph had been a political topic in Norway. Following the war and the occupation, the country experienced a new national unity. The political, cultural and social conflicts during the interwar period seemed to have faded away (Oftestad 2005, 281ff). Even the Catholic Church appeared to be harmoniously situated in Norwegian society. During the 1950s the Church came out of her former social and cultural ghetto and came forward in a new and impressive way. The number of Catholic converts increased, and even people from the cultural elite joined the Catholic Church (Eidsvig 1993, 328ff). The anti-Catholic sentiments were still alive, however, especially among the organised lay people of pietistic observance within the state church. Some of the free Protestant denominations, such as the Pentecostals and the Adventists, harboured an aggressive attitude towards the Catholic Church. As soon as the question of a possible abolition of the Jesuit paragraph was put on the parliamentary agenda, the old religious and cultural conflicts between the Catholic and the Protestant faith were re-exposed. But something had changed. Outside of religious circles people did not resent the Catholic Church in the same way as before. They were inclined to regard Catholicism as an exotic religious element in the culture, an attitude reflecting the secularisation of Norwegian society.

Just after World War II the Norwegian Labour Party (Det norske arbeiderparti) came to power, governing the country until the 1960s. Being a social democratic party, it fought the confessional state as well as the powerful pietistic lay movement. Consequently, it supported freedom of religion and religious pluralism even within the state church, to prevent the influence of the conservative religious tradition (Rudvin 1979, 174ff).

The Government had to consult with the bishops of the state church and the theological faculties, just as it had done thirty years earlier. This time all the bishops except one supported the repeal of the Jesuit paragraph. The majority realised that the prohibition was impossible to maintain in a modern society. The two theological faculties were split. Yet, the

majority of the professors saw the revision of the Constitution politically necessary. Minorities at the respective faculties warned in a traditional anti-Catholic manner against the repeal. The lay people in the state church and the free Protestant churches were deeply worried about the possibility of the accession of the Jesuit order. Some of their leaders protested and delivered a petition to the Parliament. If we consider the arguments against the Jesuits maintained by the consultative bodies, we observe the stability of the anti-Catholic tradition. When the proposition was later discussed in the Parliament this tradition did not only demonstrate its stability, but was vehemently contended. The anti-Catholic sentiments were still alive even among persons belonging to the political and cultural elite. In the 1950s the Cold War influenced the mentality of the people in Western Europe. Some of the most aggressive anti-Catholic propagandists contended that the Catholic Church and the totalitarian ideologies of communism and fascism had many common features (Valen-Sendstad 1952; Valen-Sendstad 1953).

In 1956 the Christian Democratic Party was represented in the Parliament by a group of 12 members. The group voted unanimously against the repeal of the Jesuit paragraph. They were not alone, as representatives from the conservative and agrarian parties also felt compelled to defend the country against the Jesuits. The majority, however, found no reason to preserve the last remnant of the anti-liberal tradition in the Constitution and voted for a change of Grl § 2. The Jesuit paragraph was abolished (Stortingsforhandlinger 1956).

A Stable Tradition

In 1956 the same arguments that had dominated the debate since the 1890s were used once again: the old fables of the moral theology of the Jesuits, their anti-Protestantism and the negative experiences with the Jesuits from the Norwegian mission fields. In addition, there were more recent accusations that the Jesuits had supported the Franco regime and the treacherous Marshal Philippe Petain in France, regimes and persons despised by the majority in Norway. The Jesuit order was, as the Catholic Church in general, anti-democratic and anti-liberal. Why then should a liberal and democratic country such as Norway open itself up to the influence of a movement to be feared and opposed? The Catholic Church did not deserve to benefit from Norwegian liberal democracy. Protestantism in Norway had to be protected because the Lutheran state

church had qualities that exceeded the Catholic spirituality. The anti-Catholicism was a consequence of confessional nationalism (Stortingsforhandlinger 1955, del 7. Sak nr. 10).

Although the Christian Democratic Party and some politicians of high prestige in the Parliament tried to prevent the abolition of the Jesuit paragraph, the political elite accomplished the definite liberalisation of the Constitution – a victory for the modernisation of Norwegian society and for the Catholic Church. If some had feared an invasion of the Jesuit order, they were relieved, as not even a handful of Jesuits found their way into Norway in the following years.

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CATHOLICISM AND THE IDEA OF PUBLIC LEGITIMACY IN SWEDEN

Jonas Harvard

Abstract

In the Swedish religious and political tradition, the connection between Lutheranism and Swedish national identity stayed relevant long after the disappearance of religion as an all-encompassing norm in daily life. The current chapter investigates the role of anti-Catholic ideas for the formation of norms regarding the relation between religion and critical debate in the public sphere in Sweden in the period 1850–1870. Increased religious freedom awakened fears that the Catholic Church would start a propaganda invasion. In debates in the Swedish Parliament, a number of ideas regarding the habits of the Catholic Church in making proselytes, were contrasted to how the Lutheran state church should behave in order to attract followers. In Sweden there were few Catholics, and the negative images were part of a shared European legacy.

In the autumn of 1857, while the Swedish Parliament was debating an extension of religious liberty, the influential regional paper *Östgötha-Correspondenten* published a stern warning against opening the doors to other faiths than Protestantism. What was most striking about current European ecclesiastical movements, wrote the paper, was the reawakening of the Catholic propaganda and its 'desire for conquest'. Using the new 'wand' of 'freedom of conscience', it had both made progress within government cabinets and recruited followers in the press. Now, it was only waiting to build its altars on the 'ruins' of the church of Sweden. How could the Swedish press not see the lurking danger, asked *Östgötha-Correspondenten*, how could it continue to disseminate its 'utopian phrases'

at a time when Rome was about to deal the Evangelical church the final blow (24 October 1857)?

A very different prospect was offered by the well-known clergyman Robert Baird, who during a visit to Stockholm had been asked to assess the dangers of a Catholic advance should full freedom of religion be introduced. His answer, reprinted from the Stockholm paper *Aftonbladet* by the southern Swedish newspaper *Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfarts-tidning*, was based on his impressions from the US. There, he said, despite the immense freedom enjoyed by the Catholic Church, it was losing rather than winning followers through its proselytising. The growth in the number of Catholic believers was exclusively due to emigration, he claimed, and he was assured that Sweden, like the other Scandinavian countries, had 'the least to fear from papism of all the Protestant world' as long as its population 'did its duty' and made proper use of the press, the pulpit, and the teaching of the Catechism in Sunday school (20 October 1857).

In the Swedish religious and political tradition, Lutherans carried out a relentless struggle against 'popery'. The above statements about the Catholic Church were part of a larger narrative, according to which Gustavus Adolphus had participated in the Thirty Years War (1618–1648) to save European Protestants from Catholic oppression. This connection between Lutheranism and Swedish national identity remained relevant long after the disappearance of religion as an all-encompassing norm in daily life (Thorkildsen 1997, Blückert 2000).

This chapter analyses the role played by anti-Catholicism as a counter-image in the Swedish debate on the role of religion in the public sphere in the mid nineteenth century (See further Harvard 2006). Clearly, in Swedish political discourse in the nineteenth century, Catholicism served as an important point of reference. It represented, among other things, something that might best be termed the idea of *unethical persuasion*. Whereas the military threat from Russia historically symbolised the risk of a territorial invasion of Sweden, Catholicism presented the threat of an invasion of the minds of the Swedish people. The supranational and centralised Catholic Church was accused of immoral proselytising and of using means of persuasion that deprived individuals of the power over their own beliefs.

The establishment of religious freedom in Sweden began with the new constitution of 1809, drawn up in the spirit of the Enlightenment, and its famous sixteenth paragraph, which allowed the free practice of religion as long as it did not disturb the existing order. Important further

steps came with the removal of the prohibition on unauthorised religious gatherings in 1858 and the subsequent Dissenter Acts of 1860 and 1873. These changes severed the formal connection between Lutheran belief and Swedish citizenship. Although the process was not fully complete until the Act on Freedom of Religion was passed in 1951, Sweden by the mid nineteenth century had already become a country whose citizens could belong to different Christian creeds, at least in theory.

The removal of Sweden's prohibitive religious laws opened for the possibility that the Catholic Church would make use the greater freedom to make converts. It was in the face of such perceived threats that a range of anti-Catholic opinions came to the fore. The argument of this chapter is that the negative images of Catholicism were used in public debate as a contrast to a specific construal of the 'Swedish' ideal of the public sphere, based on the liberal democratic tradition. By aligning themselves with the broad sweep of European anti-Catholicism, both liberals and orthodox conservatives sought to present both themselves as modern and the Protestant faith as being based on scientific reasoning. The key issue is the elements of this negative relief. What notions of individual responsibility, rules for public argument, and methods of proselytising were ascribed to the Catholic Church, and how did they relate to the norms that were said should apply to Sweden?

In the literature on the political debates about religious liberty, the anti-Catholic counter-images have not attracted much interest (Hessler, 1964, Brohed, 2001, Waller 1964). It is clear, however, that the discussion of religious freedom reactivated the old fear of the Catholic Church that had been deeply rooted in the Swedish mentality ever since the Reformation. This image was both new and old at the same time, and its role in opinion-making has not been previously investigated. To this end, the present chapter reconstructs the emergence of a particular ideal of public debate, be it on religious or other issues, drawing on such sources as the published proceedings of key parliamentary debates on religious legislation and the relevant press coverage.[1]

A Transnational Context and Imagery

As this book argues, anti-Catholicism was a transnational phenomenon. The fact that it served as a counter-image against which national identi-

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[1] Rikets ständers protokoll med bihang, Stockholm 1853–1866, and 1867–1873. Until 1866, the Swedish Parliament was made up of four states (nobility, clergy, burghers, and peasants); thereafter it was bicameral.

ties and ideals were developed can be seen in many countries. The ideals defined against the backdrop of this negative image were not necessarily religious. Just as Lutherans developed their theological positions in contrast to those of the Catholic Church, secular participants in a variety of debates used Catholicism as a demonising stereotype to enhance their arguments against their adversaries. To call someone a Jesuit could be effective, irrespective of the subject discussed.

In this sense, anti-Catholicism presented a repository of ready-made positions that could be used to bolster arguments in many different societal fields. It was a multifaceted, European phenomenon that had a direct impact on debates on politics and gender, as well as on faith and ethics. In the British case, it has been argued that anti-Catholicism 'in one form or another' constituted 'an English characteristic at least since the Reformation' (Paz 1992, 2). Clare Haynes, in her study of British travel literature, states that even after the emancipation of the Catholics in 1829, 'anti-Catholicism played a highly significant role in the construction of Protestant identity' in Britain, and that 'the view of Catholicism as an idolatrous and corrupt religion' was 'conspicuously rehearsed and maintained in print' (Haynes 2010, 206). In the German case, anti-Catholicism played a similarly crucial role in the development of secular identities. Michael Gross has showed how German liberals, by distancing themselves from Catholicism, at the same time approached modernity. Through the *Kulturkampf*, this became so central to political life that German liberalism seems almost unintelligible if anti-Catholicism is removed from the equation (Gross, 2004). The chapters in this volume show similar processes at work, in both predominantly Protestant or Catholic countries and countries with mixed religious maps.

What is particular about the Swedish case is that Catholics remained a tiny minority, consisting mostly of immigrant labourers, throughout the nineteenth century. In many other countries where anti-Catholic feeling was strong, Catholics constituted, or had historically constituted, a significant share of the population. Sweden thus represented a case of anti-Catholicism without Catholics. In contrast to the revivalist movements, which were indeed active and recruited large followings, especially in the Northern parts of the country, the converts to Catholicism in the country were few, even after the relaxing of the statutory prohibitions. Against this background, the repeated references to a 'Catholic danger' in Sweden seem hard to understand. In the Swedish case, anti-Catholicism thus

developed both as an ideological construct fitted to particular rhetorical purposes, and to some degree as a reaction to developments within the Catholic Church. Negative sentiment in Sweden fed upon the strong terms in which the Catholic Church condemned both Protestantism in particular and modern developments towards a secular society in general. Pius IX's condemnation of liberalism in 1864 and the acceptance of the dogma of infallibility in 1870 served to create a strong air of anti-modernity about the Catholic Church, which in many ways lasted until the Second Vatican Council in the 1960s (Werner 1996).

Sweden also became part of a European anti-Catholic tradition through the mechanisms of the media. Textual and visual representations of treacherous Jesuits and scheming popes were important elements in the religious imagery that circulated in nineteenth-century Europe. Such representations became widespread through the general nature of media production of the day, when an editor's best weapon was for the most part not the pen, but a pair of scissors (Jarlbrink 2009). Just as religious tracts travelled across borders, so did news and comment on religious issues. Across Europe, newspaper editors took an avid interest not only in what *The Times* saw fit to print, but also in what was written in French and German papers. In the absence of modern copyright laws, papers did not hesitate to run translated versions of important texts by foreign colleagues. The international character of the Catholic Church made it a point of reference that transcended national borders, and it has been argued that the reactions against ultramontanism in themselves helped fuel an increased circulation of material through Europe's media networks. The culture wars were thus an important catalyst in the establishment of a transnational public sphere. The translation and circulation of books, articles, and pamphlets directed against the pope, the Catholic Church, and its bishops were an important dimension of the European anticlerical movement in the mid nineteenth century. Anti-papal caricatures such as those printed in *Punch*, *Kladderadatsch* or *Le Charivari* contributed to a ready repertoire of religious textual and visual imagery, available to publishers across the continent (Kaiser 2003, 64–73).

The Mediated Authority of Reason
The gradual introduction of religious freedom in Sweden prompted a discussion about what rules should govern the attempts by different congregations to proselytise. A series of major political debates were held

in Parliament between 1853 and 1873, in which different ideals of the public sphere were linked to Protestantism and Catholicism—and which also had an eye to the future. How was the church of Sweden to attract followers in a religious environment based on voluntary association rather than compulsory inclusion? It was widely thought that the Protestants' methods of missionary work were less well developed to begin with, and Swedish prelates were fearful that the means of proselytising used by Catholics were stronger than their own. Thus, in short, if the door were left open for the Catholics to use those means to impact citizens, the Lutherans would lose the battle. Conservatives feared that if there were freedom of religion, 'Catholics would not fail to use this possibility to make conquests amongst us too.' No church, they claimed, was so 'anxious to expand its influence, and knows how to use all available inner and outer means to that end, as the Catholics' (BG 1853–1854: 4, Asker, 102). There was also a very real fear that Catholic propaganda would 'lead souls astray' (PR 1856–1858:7, Sondén, 263).

For the church of Sweden, opening up to a society-wide critical discussion in matters of religion meant that the spiritual element of the legitimacy of the church—the divine imperative to operate on earth—would be replaced by, or at least supplemented by, a worldly legitimacy: the ability to cater to the spiritual needs of the population. This meant there was a pressing need for arguments that would improve the ability of their own faith to attract followers. Such new grounds for judging the validity of religious teachings posed a range of theoretical and practical problems. One of the most difficult was the question of how to guarantee that the individual's choice of road to salvation was not based on inappropriate persuasion, false premises, or hopes for material advantage.

To prepare for such a battle between salvation narratives, it was argued that the church of Sweden needed 'breathing space': whereas Catholic propaganda had well-established routines and access to Jesuit competence in the field, the church of Sweden was not used to fighting daily battles in the public sphere, and thus needed time to become versed in the methods of religious argument called for by modern times. If the light of Lutheranism were allowed to beam forth on the population 'undisturbed', few would stray from the true path. The problem was that foreign faiths would use 'all available means to capture the weak and influence children and youngsters'. Given the fanatical drive to complete

conversions that was characteristic of the Catholic Church, it was seen as naïve to expect that conversions would be few. The power of the truth – to wit Lutheran Evangelical teachings – would not survive in the face of more aggressive methods of persuasion (PR 1856–1858:7, Björling 292).

As this was thought the probable developments, it was thus considered the State's duty to protect the weak from the ability of a 'more powerful, but not therefore better, spirit to influence a weaker, although more pure, one' (RAP 1856–1858:6, Tersmeden, 420). There seemed no doubt that Catholics were longing to make inroads so that they could exercise their 'usual spiritual and political oppression.' (BG 1859–1860:1, Brun, 92) Although some Members of Parliament argued that a certain amount of competition only could do the church of Sweden good, they too worried that the larger freedoms would see the country 'blessed' by a lengthy visit from the Jesuit fathers, since the Swedish freedom of religion would be 'a sweet smell to them' (AK 1873:3, Nilsson, 17). An important precondition for this outlook was that the Catholic eagerness to make converts was considered an integral part of the faith: for a Catholic it was a matter of conscience to make as many disciples as possible, and the disciples of this church would not rest as soon as they got an opportunity to make proselytes (FK 1873:2, Widén, 3).

The Role of Visual and Printed Media

As religious authority had ceased to be embedded in a binding legal framework upheld by the state and was now in the hands of a presumably rational public discussion, the media in all its forms became more important. All kinds of formats could serve as vehicles for this public debate, including the whole range of expressive means such as printed images and texts, and the spoken word, either in the form of sermons or in direct dialogue at public gatherings. With regard to media use, it was thought that Lutheranism attracted followers by presenting arguments for the faith in a rational and well-informed manner, using textual media of an academic nature, whereas Catholicism targeted emotion and superstition through illiterate imagery. This ascribed linkage between what was seen as a blind faith in authority and the use a means of public discourse less suitable for rational reasoning, such as images and lavish ceremonies, served to underline the dichotomy between the rational and modern Protestant faith and backward and superstitious Catholicism.

Typical examples of this notion that the Catholic Church used less rational means of attracting followers were presented during the debates of 1869 and 1873. Concerns were raised that the grandeur and visual elaborateness of Catholic liturgy would attract weaker souls thither. Why, it was asked, should Sweden allow alien faiths, 'in the streets and on public sites, to develop the processions and the external pomp', which 'incomprehensible to the masses, would be both an allure and a cause of aggravation' (FK 1869:4, Nordström, 298)? A proper religion worked its ways with quiet teachings, far from the marches and processions intended 'through outer splendour, to impress the masses and bring followers to the cult': such ceremonies had nothing to do with expressing actual religious belief, but were mere attempts to increase the number of followers. Indeed, it would create annoyances if 'a Catholic procession with Host, images of saints, and censers occurred on the streets of Stockholm' (AK 1869:4, Mörner, 307). Over and over again, critics repeated how Catholicism would seduce the unknowing Swedes with its 'outward pomp' (AK 1873:3, Sjöberg, 4).

Gender was an issue here, since the sentimental traits of the cult were thought could easily 'make an impression on the mind of a young woman.' (AK 1873:3, Carlén, 6) Against these worries stood the more confident belief that Swedes would not easily fall prey to such temptations. The sight of someone carrying candles and relics was surely not enough to induce a change of religion? If so, it was proof of an utter lack of conviction. Making converts was hard enough in other areas: why would it be so easy in the case of religion (AK 1873:3, Larsson, 10)?

Now, the true way for a Lutheran to convince the doubtful of the validity of his faith was through loving admonition and proper teaching. The mere use of coercion was Jesuitical by nature, and would only serve to distance believers from the church of Sweden. The Swedish clergy should work to win the love of the people through 'love and Evangelical charity' (RAP 1853–1854: 8, Cederström, 181). Ideally, those who had strayed would be brought back by the use of 'proper and enlightening texts' (PR 1856–1858:7, Björck, 190).

Rome and the Question of True Convictions
Clement Fatovic has argued that anti-Catholic ideas were central to the development of many of the most important political theories of the seventeenth century, noting that 'liberal and republican conceptions of

liberty alike exhibited both individualistic and collective features shaped by an ideological confrontation and conceptual contrast with the evils represented by Roman Catholicism' (Fatovic 2005, 39). Borrowing a term from Linda Colley, he suggests that popery played the role of 'unifying other' in the formation of Britishness, and goes so far as to write that

> The injunction to think for oneself, which has become the touchstone of liberal individualism, was largely a response to the intellectual subservience of Catholics to religious authorities (Fatovic, 48).

Although a sweeping generalisation, his claim points to a defining feature of Catholicism in the eyes of liberal religious or secular thought: the subservience of the individual critical conscience to the authority of dogma. As a foundational element in anti-Catholicism, such acceptance of authority was juxtaposed to secular thought, which put its faith in the power of reason and argument.

In the debates in the Swedish Parliament in response to the supposed dangers of 'the proselytising of the Catholic Church and its relentless attempts to recruit followers from other faiths', it was suggested that instead of relying on legal measures hindering competing faiths, that the clergy of the Swedish church should start preaching the teachings of evangelical faith in greater accordance with the proven conclusions of research and science (AK 1873:3, Andersson, 59). The claim that Lutheranism's 'inherent power' was strong enough to survive any attempts at conversion was a way of saying that the field of religion should be open to competition between opinions through public debate, and that the Lutheran faith was the best choice (AK 1873:3, Sparre, 61). This idea of public competition under the implicit guidance of reason was set in direct opposition to the supposed Catholic acceptance of dogma highlighted by Fatovic.

While the worst-case scenario was that religious freedom might become a Trojan horse, unleashing Jesuits, Mormons and revivalist Readers on an unsuspecting Sweden, there was also the view that by very dint of their bad reputation the Jesuits could also be considered the least dangerous. The bitter hatred of Catholicism the Swedes had imbibed as 'mother's milk' could help to 'keep the nation beyond the reach of the influence of their proselytising' (BG 1853–1854:1, Stolpe, 354).

Of course, the key conflict was that once legal protections were removed and the public sphere was open for different teachings to try to attract followers, Lutheranism also had to do its best in reaching the

souls of potential followers. The conservative Bishop Fahlcrantz admitted as much in a longer speech against religious freedom:

> The words 'propaganda' and 'proselytising' generally have negative connotations, but nevertheless these things are not only natural, but also a duty to be performed by all those who consider themselves to be in possession of what should belong to everyone. … However, no confession vows allegiance to this duty as openly and steadfastly as Catholicism. It is therefore no insult when its zealous propaganda is mentioned, but rather praise. What is blamed is instead the faith it tries to disseminate and the means it uses (PR 1856–1858:4, Fahlcrantz, 619–20).

Despite this seemingly open attitude, Fahlcrantz pointed to what he saw as a fundamental problem with allowing Catholics to spread their faith: it was false. Since Lutheranism had been proven correct by research and scientific study, he argued, Catholic theologians could never hope to convince anyone of the truth of their teachings, but only, with less educated people, convince them of the *semblance* or appearance of religious truth. This also meant that society should put an end to the incorrect uses of the word 'conviction': true conviction was something other than opinion, which was something that one wished was true:

> Real conviction, which exists in the true Lutheran about the validity of the accuracy of his confession, has the most reliable exegetic foundation. Nevertheless, equally this means that a Catholic cannot have real conviction of the true validity of his confession (PR 1856–1858:4, Fahlcrantz, 628).

Such statements presented the need for propaganda and active proselytising as stemming from the lesser value of the teachings being disseminated. Truth, as represented by Lutheranism, needed no artificial aids.

The Mildness of Lutheran Debate

The general purpose of allowing public debate on religious matters was the presumed goal that it would provide a better understanding of religious truth, but the question of religious truth was a difficult one for many speakers in Parliament. Depending on what was emphasised, the general principle of free debate could lead to radically different recommendations. If unity were stressed, it would seem that too great a freedom would only leave room for more untruthful confessions to prosper.

> All battles between opinions presume a will to move from a multitude of standpoints towards a unity of conviction, a conviction of the truth, whose victory should be the higher purpose of the battle. When in each and every

question, the truth can be only one, it is clear that the more opinions fight against one another, the more numerous are the lies and misconceptions that are thus on the march (BG 1856–1858:5, Stolpe, 694).

That Catholicism could attract followers, despite the untrue confession it represented, was a testament to the dangers of allowing free debate. Swedes lapsing into the Catholic faith would thus have to be considered either confused and uninformed about the available confessions, or deeply immoral in their choices (PR 1856–1858:4, Fahlcrantz, 628–30).

However, how then was acceptance of the Lutheran faith to be distinguished as more valid? The answer was found in how different confessions tried to make converts. Where the church of Sweden, through 'tolerance towards different confessions', demonstrated a conviction in the truth in its own teachings. All efforts should concentrate on spreading the Evangelical creed through 'conviction, meekness, and Christian Zealousness' (BG 1856–1858:5, Bager, 623). Not by force, but by model behaviour, would the church of Sweden be strengthened.

Despite efforts to make legal provisions against attempts to make converts 'through deceitful means, threats or promises of worldly advantages', it did not seem possible to cover all the methods used by Catholics. Converts could be made 'in other ways' since the 'so-called deceitful means' referred not to 'psychological, but rather to outer influences'. Thus, in spite of attempts to institute legal protection against unwanted means of proselytising, no fool-proof framework could entirely protect the population from falling for less sincere religious propositions (PR 1856–1858:4, Thomander 578).

Communication Ideals and Resistance to Conversion

Despite loud claims to the contrary in the Swedish debate, it seems that media use historically has not been a distinguishing feature, separating Catholics from Protestants (or from secular liberals). In a longer perspective, we find an interesting line of development from the early days of the Reformation, when Protestants celebrated the use of the printed word as a counterbalance to papal power, and Catholics allegedly adopted a negative attitude to the new means of communication. Research has shown, however, that Protestant teachings were conveyed to the largely illiterate populace using hybrid media, combining text with image and sound. Reformers used 'drama, music and art in their bid to undermine the prestige of the papacy' (Walsham 2000, 74–6). Thus, the

historical legacy of media use is complex, and lends little support to sweeping claims made about the attitude of different faiths to different means of communication. That publicity and conversion strategies have not only interested Catholics is obvious, of course. There is even evidence that the renewed anti-Catholicism of the 1910s in itself led to a more active search for media outlets by Protestant believers, who testified to 'the power of publicity' and condoned 'the use of contemporary publicity techniques to restore church attendance' (Ferré 1993, 519, 525).

Given the firmness of the conviction that propaganda was a distinguishing feature of the Catholic Church, it can be doubted whether such an explicit acknowledgement of the need for active marketing on the part of Protestants was what one Carl Hasselrot had in mind, when in a joint sitting in Parliament in 1857 he delivered the following diatribe against Rome, printed *in extenso* by Swedish papers. In it, he pretty much summed up the general position of Sweden's religious liberals:

> If it cannot be contested that truth, where it freely and spiritedly is able make its voice heard, always emerges from the battle against untruth victorious, we may from this deduce that our pure Evangelical church, if it is based on God's pure words and living truth, need not fear the battle against other confessions. It does not need, as does Catholicism, to surround itself with darkness and defend its position with intolerance in order to prosper (*Göteborgs Handels- och sjöfarts-tidning*, 23 October 1857).

In his speech, he quoted the assessment of Catholicism by Robert Baird, mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, expressing his lack of concern at an oncoming wave of Catholic propaganda. Why, asked Hasselrot, would the Swedish people, who had enjoyed the 'freedom and light' of pure Evangelical teachings, ever feel comfortable in 'the darkness of papism' and let themselves be wound up in the 'strangulating wires' of Rome, which suppressed all spiritual and political freedom (*Göteborgs Handels- och sjöfarts-tidning*, 23 October 1857)? To politicians such as Hasselrot, freedom of religion and a lively public debate on religious issues in themselves made Swedish society more Evangelical. Modernity and Enlightenment were Protestant ideals, not Catholic ones.

Conclusion

This chapter shows how negative conceptions of Catholicism were used in Swedish political debate as a relief against which different ideals re-

garding the public sphere were discussed. In the debates, three features in particular ascribed to the Catholic Church were assumed to make it incompatible with Swedish public ideals. First, there was its belief in the infallibility of its own standpoints, rather than openness towards different points of view. A critical public discussion presumed a will on the part of the participants to reconsider standpoints based on the arguments of others. Second, there was its stated intention to expand the faith through active proselytising, instead of merely presenting itself and allowing people to make their own judgements. This was seen as incompatible with a Lutheran public ideal, which held that the faith should be disseminated 'quietly' and by the setting of good examples. Third, there was what was disparaged as a willingness to use means of persuasion that spoke to the emotions rather than to the rational mind. This included both outer means such as elaborate processions designed to impress, and inner means such as psychological persuasion.

As these examples show, against the background of Catholicism, the defining features of the Swedish public sphere were specified as the openness of religion to criticism rather than a conviction of infallibility, information rather than persuasion, quiet discussion and texts rather than public displays and ceremonies. On a general level, these 'Swedish' ideals mirrored those of Enlightenment and modernity. The belief in a public critical debate rested on the supposition that, if different arguments were presented, the discussion would gravitate towards truth. Since the Lutheran faith represented truth, it needed no artificial aid. From a secular point of view, such ideals could also be reconciled with the general principles of public debate, and were not only limited to religious issues. As long as debate was free, reason would prevail—in all areas of society. The notions of anti-Catholicism that were instrumental in this process of definition and self-discovery in Swedish politics were very much part of a European and transatlantic ideological tradition.

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Abbreviations
AK: Andra kammarens protokoll. 1867–1873. In *Riksdagens protokoll med bihang*. [Proceedings of the Second chamber]

BG: Borgarståndets protokoll. 1853–1866. In *Rikets ständers protokoll med bihang*. [Proceedings of the Burgher estate]

FK: Första kammarens protokoll. 1867–1873. In *Riksdagens protokoll med bihang*, [Proceedings of the First chamber]

PR: Prästerskapets protokoll. 1853–1866. In *Rikets ständers protokoll med bihang*. [Proceedings of the Clerical estate]

RAP: Ridderskapet och adelns protokoll. 1853–1866. In *Rikets ständers protokoll med bihang*, [Proceedings of the Nobility]

SCOTTISH ANTI-CATHOLICISM IN A BRITISH AND EUROPEAN CONTEXT: THE 'NORTH POLE MISSION' AND VICTORIAN SCOTLAND

Andrew G. Newby

Abstract

Anti-Catholicism, as a part of a more general discourse on sectarianism, intolerance and national identity, has been a regularly debated topic in Scotland for centuries. Recent Scottish historiography, partly driven by contemporary debates over sectarianism, has focused on the ethnic elements of anti-Catholicism, especially in terms of reactions against large-scale Irish immigration during the nineteenth century. This case-study, locating Scotland at the centre of a transnational 'Northern' mission, will supplement and refine this historiography by situating Scottish anti-Catholicism in British, European and Imperial contexts, and relating the phenomenon to Scotland's sense of identity as a 'stateless nation'. A hypothesis of this article is that Scotland's anti-Catholicism can be understood in terms of similar currents of thought across northern Europe, and not just as a reaction to a perceived local cultural threat from immigrants.[1]

When asked in 2007 whether 'institutionalised anti-Catholicism' existed in modern Scotland, Cardinal Keith O'Brien's answer was 'a definite yes' (*The Herald*, January 13, 2007). An alternative interpretation, however, is that 'the sectarianism of Scotland is a myth: popular in some places but a myth nonetheless (Bruce 2011). Anti-Catholicism, as a part of a more

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general discourse on sectarianism, intolerance and national identity, has been a regularly debated topic in Scotland for centuries. Since the reconstitution of the Scottish parliament in 1999, the place of Catholics in Scottish society has remained a contested issue, among academics and in broader society. The great success of comparative and transnational Irish-Scottish studies since the 1970s has arguably contributed to an overemphasis on what might be called the ethnic elements of a tension between two communities, a tension which is subsequently mapped on to confessional differences. Many of the articles in the influential *Scotland's Shame* (2000) were shaped by, and helped to shape, the idea that Scotland at the beginning of the twenty-first century was scarred by sectarianism (Devine 2000; Edwards 2000). With memories of the Northern Ireland conflict still fresh, the presence of a strong Orange Order, and persistent football-related tension between two well-supported Glasgow clubs ostensibly on both sides of the denominational divide, the Irish context has remained vital for the examination of Scottish anti-Catholicism (Murray 2000). There is no easy way to separate 'religious' and 'racial' or 'ethnic' elements of the debate, but the modern historiography has concentrated especially (though not exclusively) on clashes of working class Irish and Scots in urban contexts and has therefore tended to mask other notable elements of anti-Catholicism that were present in nineteenth-century Scotland (Gallagher 1987). This article will take the example of a short-lived Roman Catholic mission to the far north of Scotland – an area with little experience of Irish immigration – as a means of examining broader European / British strands of Scottish anti-Catholicism in the mid-Victorian era.

In the mid-1500s, Scotland had remained a Catholic enemy to Reformed England (Heal 2003). Yet, when the Reformation came to Scotland, it came rapidly and thoroughly. Protestantism became a part of Scotland's European identity, although within Britain it was the Calvinist Presbyterian nature of this Protestantism which was the most important element of Scotland's autostereotype (Stevenson 1997, 60). This long-standing self-image was presented as hard-won and ferociously maintained. In the face of regnal union with England in 1603, civil war in the 1640s, full incorporating political union in 1707, and centuries of anglicising cultural influences, Scotland had retained vital elements of nationhood. The 'Glorious Revolution' of 1688, may have confirmed the common Protestant culture of England and Scotland, but it also reinforced Scottish religious distinctiveness (Kidd 2003, 50-1; Lenman 1997, 65). Presbyterianism was the central element: in eschewing episcopacy it

underlined Scotland's supposedly democratic society; in its teaching it promoted hard work; and vitally in its doctrine it distanced Scotland from what was often constructed as the proto-Catholic Anglicism of the English. Eighteenth-century English commentators noted Presbyterianism's continued centrality to Scottish national identity, as well as its asceticism, and often combative anti-Catholicism:

> The Kirk of Scotland appears to be a censorious, ill-bred, abusive, persecuting Prude, who can give nobody a good word. She is always talking against her Sister of England, a sober, decent matron whom she reviles for wearing clean white Linen, and listening to the *profane* Organ. But the greatest object of her Rage is an Italian lady, with whom she is a real State of Warfare. She would not only tear all her fine Cloaths from her back, but she would tear the lady herself Limb from Limb. She delights in the foulest and most opprobrious Expressions, and on solemn Occasions, as well as in common Conversation, calls her *Whore*, and the *Whore of Babylon* (Wilkes 1779).

Catholicism existed in post-Reformation Scotland on a minute scale, with small congregations in the north-east and south-west, as well in the western Highlands and Outer Hebrides (Kehoe 2011, 66–8). The social and political turbulence of the eighteenth-century, not only in the aftermath of the Acts of Union but also relating to the various Jacobite rebellions, ensured that suspicion of Catholicsm remained, but this suspicion was aimed more at continental Catholicism, or at individuals suspected of being secret Catholics, than at the rather small Catholic communities in Scotland (Donovan 1979). In Linda Colley's influential thesis, Protestantism was one of the central facets of Britain's eventual submersion of its component nationalities beneath a British identity, with continental Catholicism being cast as a potent other (Colley 1992). In a specifically 'North British' context, the extent to which the Scottish Enlightenment was precipitated by Presbyterian values has been, and remains, contested. In the mind of Victorian Scots, however, the values of progress represented by the Enlightenment, and individuals like David Hume and Adam Smith, reinforced the divide between Protestant and Catholic Europe (Zafirovski 2007, 172–73).

Shared British Protestantism / anti-Catholicism may have assisted in reconstructing Scots as 'Britons', though Colley's thesis also argues that the Catholic emancipation movement could not have developed in the 1820s without a shift in British public opinion (Kehoe, 70–1; Drury 2001). While this thesis is tenable, it must also be noted that the emancipation issue stirred antipathy towards Catholics and Catholicism, with

Irish and English Protestants hoping to form common cause with their Scottish counterparts to resist the 'legions of Papal Rome – numerous, cunning, inveterate, and deadly.' (*Morning Post*, February 25, 1829) Even if British public opinion had adopted a certain tolerance as a facet of modernity, several factors in the 1840s and 50s ensured that anti-Catholicism was never far from the surface. In Scotland, the internal strife within the Church of Scotland, which led in 1843 to the Disruption and establishment of the more evangelical Free Church, prompted a great deal of anti-Catholic rhetoric from both sides. As noted above, the Great Famine in Ireland led to a large influx of Catholic migrants after 1845, and the London government's decision in 1845 to give financial support to the Irish Catholic seminar at Maynooth also unsettled Protestant opinion (Kehoe, 71; Cahill 1957; Norman 1967; Machin 1967).

Although another contributory factor to British anti-Catholicism, the restitution in 1850 of the Catholic Hierarchy in England and Wales (the 'Papal Aggression'), did not immediately concern Scotland, events were naturally followed very closely, and strong responses were seen from north of the border ('Anti Popery – County Meeting at Rothesay,' *Glasgow Herald*, January 3, 1851; Ralls 1974, 243; Paz 1979, 331–32; Sidenvall 2005, 19). It prompted the establishment in Scotland of organisations such as the Scottish Reformation Society, and the journal Bulwark, which aimed at monitoring global Catholicism, and ensuring that it could not gain a foothold in Scotland (Wallis 2005, 4–7). Thus, a combination of factors, rather than a reaction to Irish immigration, underpinned anti-Catholicism in northern mainland and islands of Scotland, and the 1850s saw numerous examples of anti-Catholic lectures and vandalism towards Catholic churches (*John O'Groat Journal*, February 14, 1851; February 6, 1852).

A new wave of Catholic migration from Ireland augmented the Scottish Catholic population around the start of the nineteenth century – although as recent research has stressed, it would be wrong to assume that the Irish and Scots Catholics formed a common identity – and this increased dramatically as Irish famine refugees arrived in Scotland after the 1840s (Kehoe, 70–1; Brown 1993, 19). A proportion of anti-Catholicism in Scotland – as in Lancashire, London and other parts of Britain which experienced large-scale Irish immigration – can be attributed to class, ethnic and national antagonism towards Irish Catholic paupers. And yet, Scotland's position as a part of Great Britain ensured that

broader elements of European and British anti-Catholicism persisted: Protestant anti-clericalism; hatred of Catholic theology; Anglo-Saxon ethnocentrism; national (British) cultural identity; and evangelical theology (Wallis, 1).

The Tercentenary of the Scottish Reformation in August 1860 precipitated a 'National Commemoration', which highlighted the main elements of Scotland's self-image as a nation:

> (…) on the 17th of August next, the precise day occurs on which, three hundred years ago, Popery was formally abjured by the Scottish people, and abolished by the civil authorities in Scotland. This was the most blessed event that ever took place in our native land, and from it has flowed unnumbered blessings to old and young during these three centuries throughout all our borders.
> ('To the Young People Attending the Schools of Scotland,' *The Bulwark, or Reformation Journal*, May 1, 1860).

Scotland was imagined as a land of progress, the driving force behind the greatness of the British Empire; a land of social equality, where men from any background could rise to prominent positions through intelligence and hard work; and above all, a Protestant, Presbyterian land, adhering to a creed which provided the basis for the other great achievements ('Tri-Centenary of the Reformation,' *Gospel Magazine*, September 1, 1860; *The Home and Foreign Record of the Free Church of Scotland*, August 1, 1860; Brown 1992). On the first day of the National Commemoration's events, the Rev. Dr Guthrie stressed this imperial theme before a large and excitable crowd at the Free Church Assembly Hall in Edinburgh: 'The French are in many respects a great, a clever, a brave, and gallant people; but without a free Bible they resemble a top that can only be kept up by continual revolution. Other nations envy Britain's fortune; let them seek Britain's faith (…)'(*Caledonian Mercury*, August 15, 1860). Later that evening, in the same venue, John MacGregor, of the Protestant Alliance, 'directed attention to the fact that Popery was the same now as ever, the mother of superstition and ignorance.' Following MacGregor, the Rev Dr. James Begg argued 'if anything distinguished the Reformation in Scotland more than another, it was the sweeping social change it made' (*Caledonian Mercury*, August 15, 1860; Rodger 2001, 363–64). Other than in passing references to the anti-modern attitudes and spiritual bankruptcy said to prevail in Europe's Catholic regions, there were few racial or ethnic claims made in relation to the Irish people, either in Ireland or in Scotland.

It seems to have been little more than a remarkable coincidence that August 1860 also saw the extension to Scottish territory of the Prefecture Apostolic of the Polar Regions. As Scotland congratulated itself on its post-Reformation history, with bonfires, impassioned public speeches, and prayers 'that the influence of the Scottish Reformation be extended to all parts of the world' a short, bald Russian priest disembarked at Lerwick in the Shetland Islands (*Caledonian Mercury*, August 13, 1860). This man, Etienne Djunkowsky, was the Prefect Apostolic of this 'Polar Mission', which had been established with a great deal of enthusiasm, and funding, by Pope Pius IX in 1854 (Newby 2010). After founding a mission station and church at Alta, in northern Norway, the mission grew to encompass Iceland (1857) and the Faroe Islands (1857–58), before arriving in Scotland in 1860. Although the northern islands of Orkney and Shetland were undoubtedly peripheral in the mental geography of many Scots, they were nevertheless situated at the geographical core of Djunkowsky's jurisdiction. In an area of negligible Irish immigration, a transient population of European Catholics among whaling and fishing fleets, and only a smattering of Scottish Catholics, the strong local reactions against the Polar Mission sets Scottish anti-Catholicism in a broad context, indicating that currents of Protestant European thought coursed throughout the whole of Scotland, not only among populations reacting to a perceived Irish threat.

The extension of the Prefecture Apostolic of the Polar Regions in 1860 to include parts of northern Scotland presents an interesting case study in regard to anti-Catholic attitudes. Unlike central-lowland Scotland, there was no large-scale immigration of Irish Catholics into the northern mainland or Northern Isles (Orkney and Shetland), although local reactions – especially between late 1860 and early 1862 (when Djunkowsky left his position as Prefect Apostolic) – made inferences to the sporadic presence of Irish travellers.

After the mission's establishment in Norway, initial reports in Britain came not from Scotland, but from London. The combination of suspicion and sarcasm towards Pius IX's plans demonstrate that anti-Catholicism in Britain was much broader than reactions against Irish immigrants, but remained intimately bound, as had been demonstrated earlier in the decade over the Papal Aggression, to the idea of Protestant progress and supposed personal liberties (Dainotto 2007, 84). In addition to anti-Catholicism, Russophobia was one of the most enduring features of

social and political discourse in Victorian Britain, and Djunkowsky's nationality added an extra layer of suspicion to the general British reaction to the Polar Mission. The Crimean War created a heightened sense of antipathy towards Russia in the 1850s, and the idea of a Russian Catholic establishing a Papal-sponsored mission in northern Norway stimulated chariness, and even fear, in the London press (*Daily News*, December 29, 1855; *The Times*, January 23, 1856). Alta, a harbour town lying relatively close to the Russian border, played host to a considerable amount of Russian trade.

As a result, Russian activity in Northern Finnmark was closely monitored in Britain, and the London Daily News noted that 'it is a curious coincidence, and may serve to awaken attention in Norway, that the ruling spirit of this catholic mission in Finmark (sic) is a Russian (…)' (*Daily News*, November 5, 1856). As the mission spread out to incorporate the Faroe Islands and Iceland, less attention was paid in the British press, indicating that there was little perception of a genuine threat coming from Rome – and certainly that any spiritual threat from Rome was worth less consideration than the potential strategic threat from St. Petersburg.

Having had difficulties with other local Catholic missions in Denmark and Sweden, and possibly motivated by a desire to be slightly less isolated from Rome, Djunkowsky began to promote the idea of re-centring the Polar Mission around Scotland. He spent some days in London lobbying for this relocation in August 1860, before heading to Orkney and Shetland (*Freeman's Journal*, August 8, 1860; August 23, 1860). Supported from London by Cardinal Wiseman, himself a dependable Ultramontane, Djunkowsky met with Bishop James Gillis (Vicar Apostolic of Eastern Scotland) and James Kyle (Vicar Apostolic of Northern Scotland), and received permission for the absorption of Shetland, Orkney and Caithness into his polar mission (Djunkowsky to Kyle, August 26, 1860, September 7, 1860; *Caledonian Mercury*, January 23, 1861; *Annals of the Propagation of the Faith*, July 1, 1861).

In contrast to the earlier interest shown in the mission, its motivation, and its aims, when it was established in Norway, there was scant attention paid by the London press when Djunkowsky and his Icelandic assistant, Ólafur Gunlögsson, arrived in Scotland. Local newspapers noted events with interested amusement, though developing gradually into a combination of aggression and condescension (*Caledonian Mercury*, Sep-

tember 5, 1860; *John O'Groat Journal*, October 11, 1860; *Orkney Herald*, October 16, 1860; *Aberdeenshire Journal*, October 17, 1860). The 'National Commemoration' of the Reformation in Scotland, which was as active in the Northern Isles as elsewhere, meant that although Djunkowsky's claim that the region had been without the service of a Catholic priest for 'three centuries' had been an approximate claim in Norway, it was precise almost the week in Scotland (*Orcadian*, August 11, 1860; August 25, 1860). It also ensured that local assertions of Protestant identity were given an added vigour, and that the idea of a 'Popish Invasion' was given even shorter shrift that it might have been in other circumstances (*Orcadian*, September 22, 1860; September 29, 1860). Evangelical Revivals were also widely reported on Orkney and Shetland at this time, and while Djunkowsky dismissed these as 'the devil's last dodge,' he also took encouragement from the social flux that they might cause, as he had done with the Laestadian revivals in Northern Norway in the early 1850s (*Orcadian*, January 19, 1861; March 30, 1861; February 23, 1861; *Northern Ensign*, May 2, 1861).

Djunkowsky's active and energetic mission work in Finnmark had made him a well-known figure in the region. Likewise, during his time in the north of Scotland, Djunkowsky became something of a local celebrity. Even hostile newspapers, at least initially, credited the Prefect Apostolic's scholarly and linguistic ability, noted his charisma, and 'courtly manners.' (*John O'Groat Journal*, November 8, 1860). They also, however, poured scorn on the quantity and quality of his supposed converts and adherents in Lerwick (*Northern Ensign*, November 8, 1860; November 8, 1860). Unlike reports in parts of lowland Scotland, however, which tended to conflate supposed violent aspects of the Irish Catholic immigrant character, local reactions to the mission on Shetland and Orkney focussed on the organisation, methods and dogma of Catholicism:

> As I learn from your last paper (…) that very serious and uncalled-for efforts are being made to introduce (Popery) with all its evils into our hitherto Protestant and peaceful country, perhaps you will allow me to give you two specimens of its character and results from undoubted witnesses… what a pity that such things should be introduced into protestant, Sabbath-keeping Kirkwall! And may we not also ask now any who believes the bible or loves his country can lend any countenance to a system so hostile both to God and man? ('Spectator', 'Popery', *Orcadian*, September 29, 1860)

As demanded by Bulwark and other Protestant voices, however, local ministers were active in ensuring that any potential threat was repelled by

dint of reason, refuting Catholicism's 'delusions' and 'mummeries' (*Northern Ensign*, November 8, 1860).

Djunkowsky's earlier reports from Norway stressed the very masculine, adventurous elements of the mission, in line with contemporary tales of polar exploration (Werner 2007, 6). His time in the Northern Isles of Scotland was also presented as an adventure, battling to restore Catholicism to a people who, while willing to receive his words, remained in thrall to their ever-hostile Calvinist-Presbyterian ministers (*Northern Ensign*, February 14, 1861; February 21, 1861; *Tablet*, May 18, 1861). Although the Glasgow Free Press faithfully printed Djunkowsky's reports, these were invariably fed back to the northern papers, and aggressively refuted (*Orcadian*, February 23, 1861). The report of a miracle in Shetland, in which an elderly female resident converted on her deathbed to Catholicism, was the most fiercely contested event during the mission's time in Scotland (*Northern Ensign*, March 28, 1861; Newby, 2010, 67). The Northern Ensign was particularly incredulous, claiming that the missionaries were pedalling falsehoods merely to bolster the mission's fundraising activities in Catholic Europe.

The northern newspapers continued their vehement rebuttals of the missionaries' claims, dismissing the miracle as 'an impudent and foundationless hoax.' (*Northern Ensign*, July 4, 1861) An active counter-attack against the propaganda of 'Romish priests' was presented as an important part of Protestant duty (*Northern Ensign*, May 2, 1861). The Edinburgh Bulwark demanded that the 'Protestant ministers of the North' were 'up and doing' in their denunciations of Catholicism (*The Bulwark, or Reformation Journal*, March 1, 1861). The reproduction of Martin Farquhar Tupper's poem, 'Down with Foreign Priestcraft' in June 1861, emphasised the Northern Ensign's message (*Northern Ensign*, June 6, 1861; Paz 1992, 65–6).

> What! Shall these Italian knaves
> Dream again to make us slaves
> From our cradles to our graves
> Down with foreign priestcraft!
> (*Northern Ensign*, June 6, 1861)

Tupper himself recalled in his memoirs that this particular poem had been a favourite among mid-century ultra-Protestants, and had been produced and widely distributed in pamphlet form (Tupper 1886, Ch 22). This circulation of anti-Catholic literature underlines that discourse

in northern Scotland was not distinct from anywhere else in Britain or, indeed, Europe. Local ministers continued to denounce the teachings of Rome, and the Ensign's promotion of such lectures and sermons highlights the perceived differences between Catholic and Protestant societies:

> Now that Romish emissaries are warily and industriously exerting themselves to proselytise in these northern parts, it becomes all who value scripture truth, civil and religious liberty, social order, and the general interests of society to combine in meeting the enemy, and furnishing the youth of the district with such a knowledge of Rome and its snares as will induce them to abstain from giving the slightest countenance to its abettors (*Northern Ensign*, June 6, 1861; *John O'Groat Journal*, August 22, 1861).

The Glasgow Free Press published enthusiastic letters from Djunkowsky and Bernard during the Spring of 1861, as firm assertions of progress in the Northern Isles and Caithness were combined with requests for funds from the faithful elsewhere in Scotland. Also using his experience of Norway, Djunkowsky saw education as a means not only of inculcating the Catholic faith into young children, but also of fishing for converts among parents via the provision of free schooling (Djunkowsky to Kyle, April 3, 1861). Opponents of the new Catholic school in Thurso warned of the dangers of trusting free education from the Catholic Church (Letter from 'No Surrender', *John O'Groat Journal*, May 16, 1861; *Northern Ensign*, April 11, 1861). The following poem, printed in the John O' Groat Journal, underlines the local hostility:

> That the kirk is in danger
> Has been cried lang sin syne
> John Knox blew his trumpet
> For a reforming time
> Robbie Burns gae a blast although in wild rhyme
> To second the ane gi'en by the divine.
>
> In Caithness just now the Pope's cloven toe
> May clearly be seen wherever you go
> Stephen's in Thurso as busy as a Turk
> The Bishop himself is here at his work
> (*John O'Groat Journal*, May 9, 1861).

Having therefore been reported initially by local reporters with a mixture of condescension and wry amusement, the presence of a mission in the north of Scotland came to provoke strong anti-Catholic sentiments.

Djunkowsky's reports about the increase in baptisms, marriages and Protestant conversions inspired fierce rhetoric in the pages of the Northern Ensign (*Glasgow Free Press*, April 6, 1861). As Scotland's only Catholic paper in the 1860s, the Glasgow Free Press considered itself duty-bound to raise funds for the mission in the urban lowlands, not least by promoting the alleged successes of the mission. It also hoped to expose what it believed were the bigoted attitudes of the Scottish press, and especially the Ensign. This contributed to the creation of a mutual vendetta between the two papers during 1861, featuring accusations of lies, delusion and exaggeration on both sides. It is also interesting to note that the Free Press argued that anti-Catholic attitudes were also anti-British in the sense that religious intolerance opposed the supposed national love of liberty ('The Catholics and the Irish in the North of Scotland,' *Glasgow Free Press*, May 4, 1861). Indeed, a letter in Djunkowsky's defence, from 'A Protestant', condemned Scotland as 'the most bigoted country in the world.' (*Glasgow Free Press*, March 9, 1861) The line of thought reflects Djunkowksy's own arguments in Norway, where he condemned institutional discrimination against non-Lutherans, and stated that, as a result, Norway lagged behind 'most other countries of Europe.' (Taylor 1858, 296–7) Djunkowsky himself left his position as Prefect Apostolic in late 1861, to be replaced by the more conciliatory figure of Bernard Bernard. The mission itself assumed a much lower profile, and acted more as a local station for peripatetic Catholics in whaling and fishing fleets, rather than as an active mission directed at making local converts (Newby, 71–2). Anti-Catholic attitudes continued to be displayed in local newspapers in northern Scotland, but in more general terms rather than as reactions to perceived local provocations.

Conclusion

Although any sense of threat aroused by the North Pole Mission dissipated to a large extent after Djunkowsky's departure in late 1861, it is clear that the main facets of opposition were in line with general British and European anti-Catholic attitudes. Djunkowsky's most vociferous criticism came from the Northern Ensign, which consistently promoted the idea that 'the Romish church is the most grasping, greedy, selfish and unfeeling on the face of the earth.'(*Northern Ensign*, February 21, 1861) The role of evangelical Protestant theology, especially in the context of

the National Commemoration, was strong, as was the perception of an expansionist Papacy:

> In the North of Scotland, and, indeed, in Scotland at large, you know little of Popery. You hear and read of it 'as a tale that has been told,' as something which does not affect you – although I have not the slightest doubt but you will speedily feel the effects of the cloven foot which is even now amongst you (…) We have literally to fight for every inch, and we have to oppose not only our open foes, but what is far worse, the foes of our own household, those milk-and-water Protestants who would have us give up everything to satisfy the insatiable ambition and domineering pride of the scowling slaves of Rome ('No Surrender,' 'Popery and its True Colours,' *John O'Groat Journal*, February 14, 1861).

National cultural identity also played a role. Despite a lack of large-scale Irish migration, the occasional occurrence of Irish 'ragmen' in the mission's narrative – not least the hawker who acted as Mary Nicolson's spiritual adviser in advance of the 'miracle', but also among the 'moral dregs' who were said to make up Djunkowsky's flock – underline the sense of social and moral superiority of the British Protestant type. The regular interventions by the Glasgow Free Press, an Irish Catholic newspaper based in Scotland, also generated antipathy towards the Irish. Vitally, the Northern Isles, with their strongly Norse identity, contributed to the creation of a non-Celtic autostereotype in Scotland, which in turn fed strongly into British cultural identity (Andersson Burnett and Newby 2008; Kidd 2003; Ferguson 1998; Huttenback 1976, 17). During his time in Norway, Djunkowsky had used prevailing historiographical trends and argued that Norway's pre-Reformation history had been a Golden Age. Scotland, however, was convinced that it was living through its own Golden Age in the mid-1800s, and despite appeals to Britain's sense of modernity and tolerance, the Prefect Apostolic found it impossible to construct a strong argument linking Scotland's Imperial achievements back to the Catholic past (Newby, 59–60).

Hatred of Catholic theology was prominent in reporting of the mission, in respect of miracles, but also the way in which dogma relating to 'Peter's Pence, indulgences, hush-money, purgatory fees, masses (…)' were allegedly used to 'bleed her votaries.'(*Northern Ensign*, February 21, 1861) Djunkowky's abrasive character certainly contributed to the antipathy of the local press, and it must also be noted that the existence of the North Pole Mission antagonised existing Catholic missions in Norway and Sweden in the 1850s – perturbed by this Ultramontane initiative –

and Catholic clerics in Ireland in the later 1860s, who feared that their own funds might be diverted to Scotland, Norway or Iceland ('Collection for the North Pole,' *Freeman's Journal*, November 18, 1867).

It is something of a paradox that the London press reacted most strongly against the idea of the North Pole Mission when it was centred around Northern Norway, indicating that while there was little genuine concern that the Pope would manage to make a considerable impact on Northern Europe, there was nevertheless anxiety that any social or political flux in the region could provide opportunities for the extension of Russian influence. After the mission arrived in Orkney and Shetland, the London may have paid little attention, but the ferocious local responses are instructive in presenting Scottish anti-Catholicism in a context generally unencumbered by parallel discussions of Irish immigration.

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