England's Wars of Religion, Revisited

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Edited by
Charles W.A. Prior and Glenn Burgess

ENGLAND'S WARS OF RELIGION, REVISITED

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England's Wars of Religion, Revisited

Edited by

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University of Hull, UK

ASHGATE

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Preface

It has long been argued that religion played a major role in the constitutional crisis that gripped the British kingdoms of Charles I in the 1630s and 1640s. From the revolutionary Puritanism identified by Gardiner and his heirs, to the more complex arguments about soteriology and Protestant identity that are the hallmark of more recent work, the particulars may shift with the historical tide, yet the problem of religion – howsoever that is defined – continues to be central to discussions of the Civil Wars. So much was abundantly clear to contemporaries, who cloaked their partisan positions in religious garb, and who, when it all seemed to be over, retired to write the history of the tumult in strikingly confessional terms. Beyond this the scholarly consensus evaporates. For neatly matching the (near) agreement that religion bulked large in the conflicts, there is a fundamental debate about how and in what ways this was so. One only has to look, for example, at the small but vibrant literature on the topic of Britain's 'wars of religion' to see how an apparently persuasive interpretation could nevertheless be confined to a series of scattered articles, many of which offer contrasting interpretations of the central theme. In other words, that such an apparently clear and uncomplicated route into the Civil Wars should be so difficult to establish is one of the more stubborn of historiographical puzzles in what is undoubtedly now the post-revisionist age.

The present collection seeks to clarify the debate by revisiting the question of the extent to which the conflicts of the 1640s can be seen as wars of religion. Each chapter has been commissioned in order to offer a range of reflections on John Morrill's suggestion that the English Civil War should be seen as a war of religion. That process of reflection constitutes the central theme, and the collection as a whole reflects a desire to address the shortcomings of what have come to be the dominant interpretations of the Civil Wars, especially those that see them as secular phenomena, waged in order to destroy monarchy and religion at a stroke. Instead, a number of chapters (by Burgess, Prior, Mortimer, and Worden) present a portrait of political thought that is defined by a closer integration of secular and religious law and addresses problems arising from the clash of confessional and political loyalties. The integrated church-commonwealth established in England by the Reformation generated complex patterns of discourse, themselves fleshed out in the course of disagreement about the proper functioning of the state. This pattern of ideas was, in part,

derived from insular and vernacular ideas about religious kingship and the identity of the Church, yet it was also a debate carried on in a wider European context (see Asch and von Friedeburg). This renewed focus on the patterns of political discourse must lead us to rethink the culture of allegiance that Morrill hinted at in the lecture that inspires this collection; that is to say, what was it that 'drove minorities to fight'? This question is clarified here in chapters that re-visit the thinking of central figures of the period. All too often, scholars have concentrated on those who maintained a principled stand against Crown and Church. Yet this overlooks the extent to which the dispute over the constitution took place within a political culture comprised of many elements of fundamental agreement, and this perspective helps us to present richer and more nuanced readings of some of the period's central figures (see chapters by Cromartie, McGee, and Foxley), and to draw firmer links between the crisis at the centre and its manifestation in the localities (Braddick). A further contribution of this collection lies in the perspective it offers on the after-effects of religious war, and the power of memory and history to shape subsequent debates on religion and the state. The restoration of church and Crown complicates those interpretations of the 1640s that seek to portray them as driven by or witnessing the triumph of secular republicanism; instead, we begin to recognise that religion and monarchy may have been non-negotiable aspects of English self-understanding, and therefore central to shaping languages of politics, often in startling ways (Coffey, Collins). The underlying methodological question concerns the extent to which historical narratives have been shaped by an incipient desire to find the seedbed of modernity in the early modern period, and the degree to which this perspective risks robbing the period of its central dynamic force.

Chapter 1

Introduction: Religion and the Historiography of the English Civil War

Glenn Burgess

Speaking to a meeting of the Royal Historical Society on 16 December 1983, John Morrill concluded his paper with a flourish. 'The English Civil War', he declared, 'was not the first European revolution: it was the last of the Wars of Religion'.[1] The remark was both a reflection on the implications of recent historical writing (Morrill's own, and that of many others); and a challenge to critics of the revisionist historiography that had contested Whig and Marxist accounts of the English Civil War since the late 1970s. It is a challenge that has only to a degree been met in the quarter century since John Morrill spoke. Christopher Durston and Judith Maltby have suggested that Morrill's words were '*at the time* ... a controversial statement', but it is not apparent that they have become any less controversial since 1983.[2] Frequently cited, the claim made in Morrill's statement has seldom been systematically evaluated, and the scholarship that builds directly upon his argument is limited.[3] This

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[1]   *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 5th series, 34 (1984): pp. 155–78.

[2]   Christopher Durston and Judith Maltby (eds), *Religion in Revolutionary England* (Manchester, 2006), p. 1.

[3]   The *ISI Web of Knowledge* database records 24 works citing the TRHS article; there are a further fourty-four citations of *The Nature of the English Revolution*, in which the essay was reprinted. Work that engages with the issues includes Anthony Fletcher, *The Outbreak of the English Civil War* (London, 1987), ch 3; Patrick Collinson, 'Wars of Religion', in *The Birthpangs of Protestant England: Religious and Cultural Change in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries* (London, 1988), pp. 127–55; I.M. Green, 'England's Wars of Religion?: Religious Conflict and the English Civil Wars', in J. van den Burg and P.G. Hoftijzer (eds), *Church, Change and Revolution* (Leiden, 1991), pp. 100–21; J.C. Davis, 'Religion and the Struggle for Freedom in the English Revolution', *The Historical Journal*, 35 (1992): pp. 507–30; Peter Lake, 'The Moderate and Irenic Case for Religious War: Joseph Hall's Via Media in Context', in Susan Amussen and Mark Kishlansky (eds), *Political Culture and Cultural Politics in Early Modern England: Essays Presented to David Underdown* (Manchester, 1995), pp. 55–83; Glenn Burgess, 'Was the English Civil War a War of Religion? The Evidence of Political Propaganda', *Huntington Library Quarterly*, 61 (1999): pp. 173–201; Burgess, 'Religious War and Constitutional Defence:

book as a whole takes up the challenge implicit in Morrill's words, while the present chapter is an attempt to place them in historiographical context. It will survey – necessarily selectively – the ways in which religion has featured in the historiography of the Civil War, and attempt to identify both the distinctiveness of Morrill's contribution and the key problems that it leaves us to confront. The other chapters in this book address these problems from a variety of perspectives.

The Marginalisation of Religion in the Historiography of the English Revolution

What, it might be asked, is new in the claim that religion was essential to the English Revolution – the 'Puritan Revolution' as it has long been known to some? Its first great historian, the Earl of Clarendon, had claimed that much of the 'wild-fire among the people' that he discerned in 1642, 'was not so much and so furiously kindled by the breath of the Parliament as of the clergy, who both administered fuel and blowed the coals in the Houses too'. Clarendon's view of them was none too charitable:

> These men having creeped into, and at last driven all learned and orthodox men from, the pulpits, had ... from the beginning of this Parliament [that is, November 1640], under the notion of reformation and extirpating of Popery, infused seditious inclinations into the hearts of men against the present government of the Church, with many libellous invectives against the State too.

As their confidence grew, and restraints on them reduced, these clergy 'profanely and blasphemously appl[ied] whatsoever had been spoken and declared by God Himself or the prophets against the most wicked and impious kings, to

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Justifications of Resistance in English Puritan Thought, 1590–1643', in Robert Friedeburg (ed.), *Widerstandsrecht in der frühen neuzeit* (Berlin, 2001), pp. 185–206; Edward Vallance, 'Preaching to the Converted: Religious Justifications for the English Civil War', *Huntington Library Quarterly*, 65 (2002): pp. 395–419; William Lamont, 'The Religious Origins of the English Civil War: Two False Witnesses', in David J.B. Trim and Peter Balderstone (eds), *Cross, Crown and Community: Religion, Government and Culture in Early Modern England, 1400–1800* (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2004), pp. 177–96. For parallel discussions, see Timothy George, 'War and Peace in the Puritan Tradition', *Church History*, 53 (1984): pp. 492–503; Barbara Donagan, 'Did Ministers Matter? War and Religion in England, 1642–1649', *Journal of British Studies*, 33 (1994): pp. 119–56.

incense and stir up the people against their most gracious sovereign'.[4] However disreputable or worldly their motives might have been, these clergy used their learning and their authority to invoke God's name in the cause of violent resistance, and to clothe the rotting body of rebellion in the resplendent robes of reformation.

Since the publication of Clarendon's *History* in 1702–4 every history of the Civil War has had something to say about the role of religion in generating and sustaining the conflict. David Hume – the next great historian of the period – found in it some ambiguous lessons about the political consequences of religious enthusiasm. (The category of enthusiasm included, in Hume's eyes, Presbyterians, Independents, Covenanters, Levellers and Quakers.) Enthusiasm produced 'the most cruel disorders in human society', infusing 'the deluded fanatic with the opinion of divine illuminations, and with a contempt for the common rules of reason morality and prudence'. But it was not all bad. The fury usually abated quickly; and, compared to superstition, enthusiasm had beneficial consequences. Whereas the former sustained priestly tyranny, the latter was a 'friend' to civil and ecclesiastical liberty. Enthusiasm had no patience with priestcraft, and experience showed that it was 'naturally accompanied with a spirit of liberty' because enthusiasts were 'bold and ambitious' men, unwilling to accept 'slavery'.[5] Enthusiasm – the 'fanatical spirit' – was let loose in the English Revolution, and it was not a pretty sight to behold. Though the dangers posed by Charles I to constitution and law were effectively neutralised before the Civil War, his enemies pushed on all the same. This was because 'the fears and jealousies, which operated on the people, and pushed them so furiously to arms, were undoubtedly, not of a civil, but of a religious nature'. The result was that 'the fanatical spirit, let loose, confounded all regards to ease, safety, interest; and dissolved every moral and civil obligation'. But religious fanaticism was never pure, it 'must often be counterfeit, and must ever be warped by those more familiar motives of interest and ambition'. In Hume's view, this was 'the key to most of the celebrated characters of that age. Equally full of fraud and ardour, these pious patriots talked perpetually of seeking the Lord, yet still pursued their own purposes'.[6]

For neither Clarendon nor Hume was religion all that there was to the Civil War. Clarendon placed more weight on individual political miscalculation, and

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[4]   Clarendon, *The History of the Rebellion and Civil Wars in England*, (ed.) W. Dunn Macray, (Oxford, 6 vols, 1888), II, pp. 319–20 (Bk VI, par. 39).

[5]   David Hume, 'Of Superstition and Enthusiasm', in *Essays Moral, Political, and Literary*, (ed.) Eugene F. Miller (Indianapolis, 1987), pp. 77–9.

[6]   David Hume, *The History of Great Britain: The Reigns of James I and Charles I*, (ed.) Duncan Forbes (Harmondsworth, 1970), pp. 502–3.

upon self-interested conspiracy, which religion served to disguise. Hume was aware that, while religious zealots brought about a process both necessary and lamentable, the real story to tell was of the unintended development of political liberty that arose from the clash of parties.[7] Royalists could argue that 'authority, as well as liberty, is requisite to government', and that the consequences of the enthusiastic pursuit of liberty might produce anarchy, which would encourage the ultimate acceptance of despotism. But Parliamentarians could reply that, though zealous rebellion might mean that 'monarchy, the antient government of England, be impaired', nonetheless 'allowing that matters are really carried beyond the bounds of moderation, that the current, at least runs towards liberty, and that the error is on that side, which is safest for the general interests of mankind and society'.[8] Hume could agree with both. But the outcome (of a process rooted in fanaticism) tended to bear out the Parliamentarian or Whig case. Though moderation and balance were always to be preferred, 'extremes of all kinds ... to be avoided'; though changes were 'much too violent both for the repose and safety of the people', they did nonetheless serve to increase liberty. By 1689, this put 'the nature of the English constitution beyond controversy' and left England with 'the most entire system of liberty, that was ever known amongst mankind'.[9] Even so, it was through 'delusions', 'imposture', 'fiction', religious ones amongst them, that this result was achieved.

Several questions about the causes and nature of the conflicts of the seventeenth century are implicitly posed by these early interpretations. How should we understand the relationship between religious elements and other elements, whether political, legal, social or economic? Can it be said that any one of these factors is the driving force for historical change, while the others are of secondary consequence? Can religion be properly separated from politics?

Since 1700 or thereabouts, the history of the seventeenth century has with rare exceptions been written to answer these questions in ways that separated its religious dimensions from its political ones, and tended to give priority to the latter. The key underlying assumptions were that political-constitutional issues were fundamental, and that religious parties came to take different sides on these constitutional issues, often for contingent reasons. The actions of religious groups, whatever their intentions, were primarily of importance in the longer term for their constitutional effects. The consequence of this was – for better

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7   Good accounts of both are in John Burrow, *A History of Histories: Epics, Chronicles, Romances and Inquiries from Herodotus and Thucydides to the Twentieth Century* (London, 2007; pbk 2009), pp. 320–38; R.C. Richardson, *The Debate on the English Revolution Revisited* (London, 1988), pp. 27–35, 49–53.

8   Hume, *History*, (ed.) Forbes, pp. 473–6.

9   David Hume, *The History of England* (6 vols, Indianapolis, 1983), vol. 6, pp. 533–4, 531.

or worse – to make religious parties, like the Puritans, of importance primarily for the way in which they furthered (or hampered) political and constitutional progress. Bolingbroke – writing before Hume, and with the intention of denigrating the consequences of the English Revolution – was one who made these assumptions clear. He noted that under Elizabeth, 'the *Parties in the Church* made none in the *State*'. James I was responsible for making religious groups into political ones. James labelled all dissenters Puritans, and suggested that they were all a threat to order in the commonwealth. This defined as politically subversive groups that were originally purely religious and had claimed only some freedom of conscience while remaining politically quiescent. Consequently, 'those *Sects*, who were not dangerous at first, became so at last'. 'They who are oppress'd by Governments, will endeavour to change them', and James's actions 'drove into *that Party* ... all Those, who stood up even in Defence of *civil Liberty*'.[10] Bolingbroke lamented the consequences; others might view them more positively. But nearly all shared his view that religious parties became in the Civil War surrogates for political parties:

> *Cavaliers* and *Roundheads* divided the Nation, like *Yorkists* and *Lancastrians*. No other Option was left at last. To reconcile these Disputes by *Treaty* became impracticable, when neither side would trust the other. To terminate them by the *Sword*, was to fight not for *preserving the Constitution*, but for the *Manner of destroying it*. The Constitution might have been destroy'd, under Pretence of *Prerogative*. It was destroy'd under Pretence of *Liberty*. We might have fallen under *absolute Monarchy*. We fell into *absolute Anarchy*. The Sum of all is This. We were destroy'd by *Faction*; but *Faction* prevail'd at *Court* near forty Years before it prevail'd amongst the *People*. *Churchmen* and *Royalists* attack'd the Constitution. *Puritans* and *Commonwealths-Men*, and, above all, a motley Race of *precise Knaves* and *enthusiastic Madmen* ruin'd it. But the *last* could never have happen'd, if the *first* had not; and whoever will dispassionately trace the Causes of thay detestable *Civil War*, will find them laid in the Conduct of King *James the first*, as early as his Accession to the Throne of *England*.[11]

Bolingbroke thus found, as did so many others, mechanisms for avoiding any thought that religious zeal might have formed the main plot in the story of the English Revolution. This seems, on the face of it, a consequence of the way in which the foundations of historical discussion of the English Revolution were built in the eighteenth century amidst the constitutional wrangling that took

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[10] Henry St John, Viscount Bolingbroke, *Remarks on the History of England* (London, 1743), pp. 277–9, 281.

[11] Ibid., p. 232.

place between Whigs and Tories; but it was also one of the ill effects of early onset Enlightenment, contracted by England in the later seventeenth century. History became implicated in the repudiation of enthusiasm and fanaticism, and the attempt to uncover the evils of priestcraft. Even the evidence from the seventeenth century itself might be altered, as it was by John Toland, who edited for publication the memoirs of the regicide, Edmund Ludlow, and in so doing converted him posthumously from Puritan zeal to Whiggish constitutionalism. Here was the very model of a 'Puritan' lieutenant-general, rendered fit to serve the Whig cause and to play his part in Whig histories.[12] Religion was not absent from these histories; but it was often tamed.

Whether in Clarendon, Bolingbroke or Hume, there was a tendency to see religion as important not in itself but as a vehicle for secular concerns. The tendency did not end with them. In the following century the historian who put the study of seventeenth century English history on a sure scholarly footing, Samuel Rawson Gardiner, helped establish one of the English Revolution's many labels – 'the Puritan Revolution'.[13] But the label was not accompanied by a willingness to put religious matters at the centre of his account. His attitude to religion was not untypical of the Victorians, Thomas Carlyle aside. For while Carlyle was uncommonly well attuned to expressions of religious inspiration and zeal, and was able to do something like justice to this aspect of Oliver Cromwell,[14] Gardiner was more typical of the Whiggish tendency to make Puritan zeal into something more liberal and more moderate than it actually was. The Puritanism he portrayed was 'a sober, restrained, upright movement, not a zealous or dogmatic one'.[15] Notwithstanding his attachment to the idea of a 'Puritan revolution', Gardiner believed that the 'essence' of this event was the desire 'that the authority of the king should be restricted'. Other matters, including church government, were 'secondary consequences'. While there was general agreement in the early 1640s that 'the Church, like the State, should be regulated by Parliamentary law rather than by the Royal authority', whether this implied the abolition or merely the restraint of bishops was more debatable.[16]

Yet Gardiner was not quite as blind to the zealous nature of Puritanism as he is sometimes portrayed. His faults as a historian were not an inability to see what

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[12]   Blair Worden, *Roundhead Reputations: The English Civil Wars and the Passions of Posterity* (London, 2001), chs 1–4.

[13]   Though the phrase originated with Carlyle: Worden, *Roundhead Reputations*, p. 270 and n.

[14]   Ibid., ch. 10.

[15]   Ibid., p. 289; also pp. 292–3.

[16]   S.R. Gardiner (ed.), *The Constitutional Documents of the Puritan Revolution 1625–1660* (Oxford, 3rd edn, 1906), pp. x, xxxiv.

was before him in the evidence; they were related instead to his determination to reconcile all things with 'the law of human progress'.[17] He saw, as Morrill was to see, that on matters to do with parliament, law and liberty, 'some working compromise' would have been possible in 1642. It was religion that made for irreconcilability. The 'glory of Puritanism', lay accordingly in 'the strengthening of the will'. Puritans were wrong or misguided about many things, but 'they were brave and resolute, feeding their minds upon the bread of heaven, and determined in themselves to be servants of no man and of no human system'. As a result, while 'the noblest elements in the King's side were favourable to peace, the noblest elements on the side of Parliament were favourable to war'. This was because the 'man of intellect' sees violence as a threat to the amelioration of human oppression, but the 'man of strong moral purpose' thinks that evil might be removed from the world 'by the intervention of power' – that is, by the sword. Puritanism was important not just because it might be (ambiguously) identified as the vehicle for a good liberal cause, but because it equipped men with a willingness to use violence.[18]

Both of these facets were visible in Gardiner's portrait of John Pym, to him Puritanism's first leader in the Civil War. 'Above all existing law, above all popular right, he placed religion', Gardiner said of Pym. But this religion drove him to political engagement rather than to the cultivation of his own soul. He wanted 'divine laws ... applied to the government of society'. Gardiner appreciated, though, that for men like Pym religion might take precedence even over political principle.

> If Pym had been a mere Parliamentarian, wishing to substitute the sovereignty of the many for the sovereignty of one, his work would have been, intellectually at least, comparatively easy. His difficulties arose from his recognition that more than the form of government was at stake, and from his belief that religion – or, in other words Puritanism – must be upheld if the nation were to live, even against the will of the nation itself.

Pym's significance did not lie in his pursuit of a religious cause. It lay in the way in which he stood up to the government by 'force and intrigue' that Charles I pursued. His religion was, in fact, no more noble than that of his opponents:

> It is true that the religion of Falkland and of Jeremy Taylor was as elevated as that of Winthrop and Baxter, but the pressing question of the day was not whether

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[17]   Ibid., p. x.

[18]   S.R. Gardiner, *History of the Great Civil War 1642–1649* (London, 4 vols, 1901), vol. 1, pp. 9–11.

one belief could subsist side by side with the other, but whether one was to be imposed on the other by the aid of army plots and Irish cessations.

Pym led a 'resolute and devoted minority' of people, who, by means that would in different circumstances have amounted to 'crimes', endeavoured to protect the nation from 'the shifty politics of Charles I'. However much religion might have compelled John Pym to action, it is the political consequences of those actions that should lead the historian of the Puritan Revolution to praise him.[19]

The religious dimensions of the English Revolution were, then, diminished very early and very successfully, to long-lasting effect. For Gardiner as much as for Hume, the significance of Puritanism lay primarily in the way in which the cunning of history had made Puritans the servants of *political* liberty, whether they wished to be so or not. Twentieth-century historians would add economic freedom and social egalitarianism (within limits) to the good causes fostered by the Puritan Revolution; but they nonetheless perpetuated the view that the historical role of religion was best understood in relation to its non-religious effects. The master narrative of the English Revolution lay in its advancement of political and civil liberty.

Liberty and Religion

One aspect of the process that marginalised religion in the English Revolution is of particular significance, and it can best be appreciated through an examination of the historian who invented the label 'English Revolution' (deliberately drawing in this way a parallel with – and a critique of – the French Revolution).[20] For François Guizot, the English Revolution was a success, while the French was a failure. Why? The answer lay primarily on the ultimate moderation and conservatism of the English Revolution, to which religion was important. An obscure review of his pamphlet, *Pourquoi la révolution d'Angleterre, a-t-elle réussi?: Discours sur l'histoire de la révolution d'Angleterre* (1850) noted that at the heart of the explanation it offered was the claim that 'the English Revolution had a thoroughly religious character, and hence in no way broke with all past traditions'.[21] Guizot certainly appreciated more than many historians of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the religious character of the English

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[19]   Ibid., pp. 256–8.
[20]   J.C.D. Clark, *Revolution and Rebellion: State and Society in England in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries* (Cambridge, 1986), p. 37; Richardson, *Debate*, pp. 77–80.
[21]   Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, review in *Neue Rheinische Zeitung: Politich-Ökonomische Revue*, 2 February 1850, from http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1850/02/english-

Revolution, and the role in it of those burning to bring further reformation to the imperfectly reformed Church of England. In some of his remarks, at least, Guizot saw the impetus behind the English Revolution originating in a religious struggle. Because 'the Crown placed itself at the service of the despotism of the Church', then 'to secure its defence in religion, the spirit of liberty invaded the political arena'. And 'thus Sectaries became Republicans'.[22] It was, he said in the 1850 pamphlet, 'in the name of Faith, and of religious liberty, that ... commenced the movement which ... has been agitating and exciting the world'. It would be wrong to see Protestantism, in England or elsewhere, as just a cover for 'worldly interests'. The struggle of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was 'not merely to shake off a yoke, it was also to profess and practice a faith'.[23] But, though religion fuelled some of the excesses of the Revolution (notably the regicide), it also provided in the long term a moral basis for the alignment of monarchy and Protestantism that was securely achieved by the end of the century.

This was not enough, though, for Carlyle:

> M. Guizot's notions on the English Revolution are not quite mine. On the whole, our English Puritans did believe in God and Jesus Christ and Eternal Justice, not merely in the *Tradition* of God and in Jean-Jacques [Rousseau] and Progress of the Species and finally in *Parliamentary Majorities*; which really makes all the difference in the world. So that often I could say, with all my admiration of M. Guizot's clear precise insight and felicitous deliverance of the same, 'Alas, here again is the Tragedy of Hamlet with the part of H[amle]t omitted by particular desire!'

The part of Hamlet was religious zeal: religion of the sort that overrode all other things, religion that consumed, religion that drove men to destruction. Carlyle, going on in his letter to comment on Guizot's earlier *History of the English Revolution* (1826), noted that if he were to continue his account 'he must actually learn to conceive a man, various men, to whom all the "successes" and Parliamentary majorities in Nature w[oul]d seem as *nothing* compared with any violation of the will of Him who made Nature; – a kind of man that leads

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revolution.htm (accessed 7/4/09). The review is also in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *Articles on Britain* (Moscow, 1971, reprint 1975), pp. 88–95.

22   François Guizot, *Monk's Contemporaries: Biographic Studies of the English Revolution*, trans. Andrew R. Scoble (London, 1851), p. 30.

23   François Guizot, *Why was the English Revolution Successful? A Discourse on the History of the English Revolution*, trans. William Hazlitt (London, 1850), pp. 1–2.

us into spheres of History very unusual indeed in these poor times!'[24] This man was, of course, Carlyle's Cromwell.

For all of its attention to religion, Guizot's work, like that of most other historians from Hume to Gardiner, was indeed vulnerable to Carlyle's criticism. This was because Guizot had a secularised and a 'liberal' understanding of liberty. Appreciating that the English Revolution was at its heart a struggle for 'liberty', Guizot nonetheless did not appreciate what 'liberty' might have meant to the Puritans of mid seventeenth century England. For him, the English Revolution:

> was thus essentially devoted to the defence or achievement of liberty. For the religious party it was a means, and for the political party an end; but with both, liberty was the question, and they were obliged to pursue it in common. There was no real religious quarrel between the Episcopal and the Puritan party; little dispute about dogmas; or concerning faith; not but that there existed real differences of opinion between them, differences of great importance; but this was not the principal point. Taking everything together, the English revolution was essentially political; it was brought about in the midst of a religious people and in a religious age; religious thoughts and passions were its instruments; but its chief design and definite aim were political, were devoted to liberty, and the abolition of all absolute power.[25]

There is much valuable insight in Guizot's view, but we should join Carlyle in asking whether the liberty for which Puritans fought really was a political goal, and whether a post-Enlightenment (secular) and liberal understanding of the relational terms 'liberty' and 'absolute power' can be so readily used to understand seventeenth century uses of the term 'liberty'. Even religious liberty meant for Guizot a form of negative liberty, the right to practise religious faith without interference from authority. It was about 'free inquiry' and the freedom from despotisms, ecclesiastical and secular.[26]

Carlyle, in contrast, gave the readers of his work on Cromwell two key pieces of advice. The first was not to dismiss Puritans as 'superstitious, crack-brained persons'; the second:

> Not to imagine that it was Constitution, 'Liberty of the people to tax themselves', Privilege of Parliament, Triennial or annual Parliaments, or any modification of

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[24]   Carlyle to Sarah Austin (17 February 1850), *The Carlyle Letters Online*, http://carlyleletters.org (accessed 7/4/09).

[25]   François Guizot, *The History of Civilization in Europe*, trans William Hazlitt, (ed.) Larry Siedentop (London, 1997), pp. 216–17.

[26]   Ibid., pp. 212–13.

these sublime Privileges now waxing somewhat faint in our admirations, that mainly animated our Cromwells, Pyms, and Hampdens to the heroic efforts we still admire in retrospect. Not these very measurable 'Privileges', but a far other and deeper, which could not be measured; of which these, and all grand social improvements whatsoever, are the corollary. Our ancient Puritan Reformers were, as all Reformers that will ever much benefit this Earth are always, inspired by a Heavenly Purpose. To see God's own Law, then universally acknowledged for complete as it stood in the holy Written Book, made good in this world; to see this, or the true unwearied aim and struggle towards this: it was a thing worth living for and dying for! Eternal Justice; that God's Will *be* done on Earth as it is in Heaven: corollaries enough will flow from that, if that be there; if that be not there, no corollary good for much will flow.[27]

Guizot was a long way from a perception of this sort. He saw the importance in the English Revolution of liberty; he failed to see what 'liberty' could mean in the mouths of the men described by Carlyle.

This difference of view suggests to us many things about the ways in which the religious character of the English Revolution was diminished. It was therefore seen as a conflict about liberty understood as secular, political and negative. The possibility that liberty might be none of these things was lost as historians worked hard – possibly for good purposes, but certainly to the distortion of the past – to suggest that, while religious zeal might contingently have helped to secure liberty and constitutional monarchy for England, and might even have given men the courage to stand up for liberty, nevertheless true liberty was not a religious matter.

Twentieth-century historiography saw the emergence among American scholars of a much more sophisticated approach to the politics of Puritanism, though it was an approach that ultimately did more to reinforce than to question the idea of Puritanism as a 'revolutionary ideology' that inspired the pursuit of liberty.[28] Much of the impetus behind American scholarship on Puritanism, which went in many directions, lay of course in its importance in the history of New England, and there is a long tradition of American writing on early modern

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[27] Thomas Carlyle, *Oliver Cromwell's Letters and Speeches with Elucidations* (London, Everyman edn, 3 vols, 1908), vol. 1, pp. 64–5. Important accounts of the impact of Carlyle's account of Puritanism are Raphael Samuel, 'The Discovery of Puritanism 1820–1914: A Preliminary Sketch', in Raphael (ed.), *Island Stories: Unravelling Britain (Theatres of Memory, Volume II)*, (ed.) Alison Light (London, 1998), pp. 276–322; and Timothy Lang, *The Victorians and the Stuart Heritage: Interpretations of a Discordant Past* (Cambridge, 1995), ch. 3.

[28] Michael Walzer, 'Puritanism as a Revolutionary Ideology', *History and Theory*, 3 (1964): pp. 59–90.

religion, from Miller to Theodore Bozeman, Stephen Foster and beyond, only fitfully taken into account by scholars of old England. Yet it has offered some quite distinctive perspectives on the subject. Perry Miller's *The New England Mind* (2 vols, 1939, 1953) is perhaps the most influential work of this sort. Miller emphasised in Puritanism the centrality of federal theology, and therefore of the idea of covenant, which he linked to the idea of the social contract. The 'primary interest' of this theology lay in reconciling God's absolute decrees with the idea that human beings were damned or saved by their own voluntary actions. He remarked,

> Men of the seventeenth century could not organise their church and state upon the premise of voluntary relations until they had found a larger sanction for voluntarism than economic interest; not until they had secured a contractual basis for damnation and salvation, and even for the most transcendent of Christian mysteries, for the very Trinity itself, could they venture to look for a similar foundation for the commonwealth.[29]

This seemed to emphasis the theological priorities in Puritan thought, but Miller's view was more complicated than this passage might imply. He was aware that ideas of political contract (between rulers and ruled) and religious covenant (between God and humankind) might well have separate origins, and asked the question, which (for Puritans) came first? The answer: 'it would … appear likely … that social theory gave impetus to the religious, and that the federal theology was the lengthened shadow of a political platform'. But that was not quite the whole story either. Federal theology 'could not have been merely a subtle rationalisation of that [political] platform, because it clearly served other [theological] purposes in addition to justifying parliamentary opposition [to the crown]'.[30] Miller wrestled with his material to find a way of taking the religious imperatives behind Puritanism seriously; like many others, he found it difficult to capture precisely the interplay of the religious and the political.

Arguably, though, it was the major contribution of American Puritan scholarship to explore in greater depth and with greater subtlety precisely this interplay. This is very evident in the work of those scholars – like Miller, scholars of literature rather than of history – who worked on John Milton and his world, foremost among them William Haller.[31] For Haller, the key concept

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[29] Perry Miller, *The New England Mind: The Seventeenth Century* (Cambridge MA, 1939, reprint 1982), p. 400.

[30] Ibid., p. 413.

[31] The greatest achievement of this scholarly community was the Yale UP edition of Milton's *Complete Prose Works*, the introductions to which remain some of the most detailed accounts of

that served to link religion and politics (via law) was *equity*. In his account of the 1640s, which followed his seminal work *The Rise of Puritanism* (1938), equity served to mediate between the key terms of his title, which in itself is not a bad encapsulation of the central interpretative problem that we are exploring: *Liberty and Reformation in the Puritan Revolution* (1955). Equity joined conscience to law, with potent consequences.

> None denied that civil obedience was expected of every man but, said the preachers, when rulers attempt to invade the spiritual freedom vouchsafed to believers under the gospel, then obedience to rulers must give way to obedience to God and to conscience. This doctrine was well calculated to appeal to the king's parliamentary opponents. The preachers asserted a right grounded upon the law of God revealed in conscience and the Scriptures, a law which, they claimed, took precedence over all other commands. The lawyers and gentry of the house of commons, in the course of their long contention with Charles and his father before him, had committed themselves to a conception of the state which also put law above the will of kings and on the side of the subjects' inherent rights as represented by parliament. The basis of this conception was the doctrine of the common law as set forth by Sir Edward Coke, but in the dispute which now ensued over sovereignty and obedience, the defenders of parliament supplemented and extended their argument with momentous if confusing results by appealing also to the doctrine of equity or natural law as expounded to English lawyers by Christopher St German. Thus the preachers of the Puritan brotherhood and the lawyers and gentry of parliament were able to join forces against the king in 1642 in the name of conscience, law, and equity combined.[32]

The strength of this account is that it finds homology between religious and political/legal ideas, without reducing one to the other, thus helping us to understand the parliamentary side of 1642 as a coalition of people with different priorities but able to speak a common language. Haller extended his account to embrace the Levellers, who represented the 'secular revolutionary spinning out of the Puritan reformer'.[33]

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pamphlet debates in the English Revolution.

[32]   William Haller, *Liberty and Reformation in the Puritan Revolution* (New York, 1953, reprint 1963), p. 70.

[33]   Ibid., p. 256. Another important product of this scholarly tradition was the Toronto scholar A.S.P. Woodhouse's introduction to his edition of the Putney debates, *Puritanism and Liberty* (London, 1951), working hard a distinction between the realms of grace and of nature. J.C. Davis, 'The Levellers and Christianity', in Brian Manning (ed.), *Politics, Religion and the English Civil War* (London, 1963), ch. 6 is in effect a meditation on Woodhouse's interpretation.

There are in this, perhaps, faint pre-echoes of another remarkable product of American scholarship on Puritanism, Michael Walzer's *Revolution of the Saints* (1965). Unlike Marxist historians (for example), neither Haller nor Walzer thought that the revolutionary potential in Puritanism arose because religious language was a code used to talk about other more important matters (social, economic, political). Both saw something in the culture or psychology of Puritan religion that could, in some circumstances, make people into political revolutionaries. The danger in Puritanism came from its religion and theology, not from somewhere else. Walzer found in the figure of the Puritan 'saint' a model of the modern revolutionary. The Puritan concern with discipline and order arose as a way of coping with a world of insecurity and disorder, which required the saint to be 'reborn as a new man, self-confident and free of worry, capable of vigorous wilful activity'.[34] Characterised by discipline and zeal, the saints made politics into 'a kind of work, to which the chosen are required to commit themselves'.[35] They were neither modern nor liberal, even though they had a modernising influence; and if they shared characteristics with the Jacobin and the Bolshevik, they did so not because they shared secular and liberal ideas but because they shared in the psychology of revolution.

These accounts of Puritanism display a distinctive willingness to take the demands of religion seriously, and something of this willingness seems gradually to have seeped into the minds of others. As the scholarship on Puritanism blossomed one might discern a shift in the climate of opinion, a shift of which scholars of Morrill's generation were part. Yet there are also broad similarities between Haller and Walzer's (different) views of the revolutionary character of Puritanism, and the views of an older Whig historiography. This is most obvious in a shared willingness to link Puritanism, modernisation, progress, and radical politics (albeit sometimes with acknowledgement that 'radical' did not imply 'liberal'). Morrill's essay of 1983/4 can be understood as constituting a reaction against just the things that all of these views had in common – the idea of 'revolutionary' Puritanism. Some subsequent work has developed the point even further, suggesting a view of Puritanism and the Puritan Revolution that emphasises some of its authoritarian, illiberal, conservative and unprogressive features (though not all of this would surprise Walzer).[36] The view remains hotly contested.

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[34] Michael Walzer, *The Revolution of the Saints: A Study in the Origins of Radical Politics* (Cambridge MA, 1965), p. 313.

[35] Ibid., p. 318.

[36] A seminal contribution is J.C. Davis, 'Religion and the Struggle for Freedom in the English Revolution', *The Historical Journal*, 35 (1992): pp. 507–30.

Twentieth-Century Debates: Hill to Morrill

American scholarship on Puritanism had a broad impact, though it is hard to trace in very specific ways. The master narrative of the English Revolution through to the early twentieth century was, as we have seen, primarily concerned with advancement of political and civil (secular) liberty, but the writings of Haller (in particular) meant that twentieth-century historians would find it difficult to dismiss too categorically the role of religion in the English Civil War. Many nonetheless did their best to maintain strongly secular interpretations, and they did so with new ammunition, turning to social history and 'history from below' to reconfigure that traditional account.

The early work of Christopher Hill, probably the pre-eminent historian of the English Revolution by the 1960s and 1970s, is revealing. In 1940, announcing a new interpretation of the English Revolution, Hill summarised the orthodox Whig and liberal interpretation of the seventeenth century: 'the Parliamentary armies were fighting for the liberty of the individual and his rights in law against a tyrannical Government'. His comment was 'all this is true – as far as it goes'.[37] It is a telling comment, indicating that Hill did not reject the liberal interpretation of the period so much as he enriched it. Whereas, for earlier historians, the 'liberty' for which men fought in the 1640s was the property of the 'nation', for Hill it was at best the property of a class. The Whig view was right in seeing the Revolution as progressive, but progress did not benefit all alike. The liberal interpretation merely perpetuated the fiction that 'the interests of the bourgeoisies are the interests of the nation'. In reality, 'the class that took the lead in the revolution and most profited by its achievements was the bourgeoisie'.[38] Where was religion in this? Like many of his predecessors religion was important for Hill as a vehicle for secular issues. He accepted that the Revolution was a 'religious as well as a political struggle'. That was because religion pervaded everything else, and could be implicated in any sort of conflict. 'But the fact that men spoke and wrote in religious language should not prevent us realising that there is a social content behind what are apparently Puritan ideas. Each class created and sought to impose the religious outlook best suited to its own needs and interests'.[39] Social consciousness was rooted in social being.

Hill never altogether abandoned these positions. In 1982, the year before Morrill's address to the Royal Historical Society, he remarked that 'Puritanism … was mainly a political movement with a revolutionary ideology, though its

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[37] Christopher Hill (ed.), *The English Revolution: Three Essays* (London, 1940, n.e. 1949), pp. 10–11.

[38] Ibid., p. 14.

[39] Ibid., p. 17.

ideas were expressed in religious idiom'.[40] Nonetheless his views were a good deal more sophisticated and subtle than they can be made to sound.[41] His account of Winstanley's religion, for example, attempted to position itself between secularising and mystifying extremes.[42] But at the core of his mature view was the claim that 'religion was not a self-sufficient motivating factor'. Different views of God carried with them different views of social and political order. Because 'contemporaries thought of religion as necessary to the maintenance of civil order and of the state power which defended that order',[43] then heterodox religion could be a political and social challenge.

Hill was quick to comment on John Morrill's assertion that the English Civil War was not the first modern revolution but the last of the wars of religion. He noted (oddly) that 'German Marxist historians are saying something similar when they call the Peasant's Revolt of 1525 the first bourgeois revolution'; and continued, 'we should beware of isolating 'religion' as a self-sufficient factor unrelated to this-worldly concerns'.[44] This identified a fundamental problem that emerges from the historiography. It is a problem that John Morrill came to recognise applied to his 1983 essay – how could the religious be separated from the social and the political? He had not wished to claim that the Civil War was only about religion, though, as with other early modern religious wars, 'religious poles are the ones around which most other discontents formed'. But that did not resolve the problem.

> There are no historians nowadays who would deny that religion was *an* important
> dynamic within it [the Civil War]. But many would suggest that the use of the
> term 'religion' itself is unhelpful ... [R]eligion is so interpenetrated into every
> aspect of early modern thought, that to say that it is the religious aspects of their
> thought that matters in making and shaping the conflict is a tautology.[45]

That is not so different from Christopher Hill:

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[40] Christopher Hill, *England's Turning Point: Essays on 17th Century English History* (London, 2000), p. 167.

[41] For a sympathetic analysis see David Underdown, 'Puritanism, Revolution and Christopher Hill', in Geoff Eley and William Hunt (eds), *Reviving the English Revolution: Reflections and Elaborations on the Work of Christopher Hill* (London, 1988), pp. 333–41.

[42] Christopher Hill, *Religion and Politics in 17th Century England (Collected Essays II)* (Brighton, 1986), pp. 185–6.

[43] Ibid., p. 11.

[44] Ibid., p. vii.

[45] Morrill, *Nature of the English Revolution*, pp. 36–7.

To say that politics and economics were discussed by reference to the Bible may lead us to suppose that men and women were influenced by 'religion' as men and women are not in the twentieth century. The nineteenth-century idea that the seventeenth-century English Revolution was a 'Puritan' revolution, and the modern version that it was 'the last of the religious wars', illustrate this point. The execution of Charles I was defended in religious terms, but we should hardly regard it as a religious act today. Milton thought it a religious duty to hate god's enemies, who were mostly also his political opponents. We must differentiate between the Biblical idiom in which men expressed themselves, and their actions which we should today describe in secular terms. But at the same time we must avoid the opposite trap of supposing that 'religion' was used as a 'cloak' to cover 'real' secular motives. This may have been the case with a few individuals; but for most men and women the bible was their point of reference in all their thinking. So when scholars laboriously demonstrate that Levellers or Milton or Winstanley were 'primarily motivated by religion', they have proved no more than that these thinkers lived in the seventeenth century.[46]

The problem identified in these passages is implicit through much of the historiography that has been surveyed. All historians have recognised the religious character of the events of mid seventeenth century England; most, though, have also seen their non-religious dimensions as the key to their significance and meaning.

John Morrill's 'Religious Context of the English Civil War' drew, as its footnotes make clear, inspiration from two main historiographical developments.[47] One, certainly, was the research that grew out of the 'gentry controversy' (much of it Morrill's own). This had led historians to examine in detail the 'county community', native habitat of the gentry, and thence to the discovery that the issue that seemed to divide the county communities in the early 1640s, and was the best predictor of allegiance, was religion.[48] But the more important impetus can be found in the work of such historians as Patrick Collinson, William Lamont and Nicholas Tyacke, who in various ways – questioning and modifying the work of Haller and others – suggested a Puritanism that was more mainstream, less oppositional or revolutionary

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[46]   Christopher Hill, *The English Bible and the Seventeenth-Century Revolution* (London, 1993), p. 34. For Morrill's view of Hill – largely appreciative of his writing about religion – see 'Christopher Hill's Revolution' in Morrill, *Nature of the English Revolution*, ch. 14.

[47]   For these influences see Morrill, 'Religious Context', in Morrill, *Nature of the English Revolution*, p. 53 nn. 21–2; p. 55 n. 34; p. 61 nn 64–6.

[48]   Much of the work is summarised in J.S. Morrill, *The Revolt in the Provinces: The People of England and the Tragedies of War 1630–1648* (London, 1999).

than older accounts allowed. It stressed the things that Puritans shared with a broader religious culture.[49] Especially important, historiographically, was Tyacke's essay 'Puritanism, Arminianism and Counter-Revolution',[50] which led many to the conclusion that it was not the 'revolutionary' force of Puritanism that lay behind the English Revolution. Rather, it was Charles I and Laud who were the revolutionaries. They had brought changes to the church – labelled or perhaps mis-labelleled 'Arminianism' – which offended more than just the Puritans. Their changes threatened the theological 'Calvinist consensus' that had served to bind together Puritans and conformists, producing a grass roots religious ferment of spontaneous iconoclasm, destruction of altars, and so on, in the early 1640s. It was the vehemence, scale, and escalation of Puritan demands, and the fact that – unlike the constitutional and legal demands made of Charles I by the Long Parliament in 1640–41 – they could not be satisfied, that might justify calling the Civil War a war of religion.[51]

Morrill's essay appeared at a time when early revisionist accounts of the Civil War and its origins were under attack, and it may be read, perhaps, as an exercise in regrouping. Drawing as much on his knowledge of the localities as on his knowledge of Westminster politics, Morrill suggested that in 1640 Charles I faced the overwhelming hostility of his subjects, inspired by three 'distinct and separable perceptions of misgovernment' – the localist, the legal constitutionalist, and the religious.[52] Only the last had the momentum and the passion to push the country to Civil War. It developed a rhetoric of militancy. By 1642, old constitutional problems were solved; and new ones theoretically under-articulated. The same was not true of religious matters. Alternative views of the church and its structure were loudly debated, though alternative views of the civil polity were not. Religious issues polarised people in the localities, as their petitions to the Long Parliament showed. A key ingredient in this was what Morrill elsewhere referred to as 'Puritan dynamism', fuelled by fears of a popish plot; but it was not the only ingredient: loyalty to prayer book Anglicanism helped to win Charles I supporters and to construct a Royalist party.

The distinctiveness of this position rests on three closely related things. Firstly, it reverses the priority given in much (though not all) of the historiography to legal and constitutional matters over religious ones. It takes religion seriously as

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[49]   See especially Patrick Collinson, *The Religion of Protestants*; William Lamont, *Godly Rule*.

[50]   In Conrad Russell (ed.), *The Origins of the English Civil War* (London, 1973), ch. 4.

[51]   All of this has sparked intense and extensive debate amongst historians, which cannot be summarised here. For recent attempts to survey the field see John Spurr, *English Puritanism 1603–1689* (Basingstoke, 1998); and John Coffey and Paul Lim (eds), *The Cambridge Companion to Puritanism* (Cambridge, 2008).

[52]   Morrill, Nature of the English Revolution, p. 47.

a motivating force and as a language of legitimation; it accepts as unproblematic that men may do things for religious reasons even when that drives them to act against their political instincts. Second, while alert to the potential for Puritan zeal – iconoclasm and the spontaneous destruction of Laudian altars – and to the role of enthusiastic minorities in driving the country into conflict, Morrill was well aware that the reaction to Charles and Laud was also rooted in a religious mainstream, in a 'religion of protestants', of which Puritanism was a part. Thirdly, and closely related, there is an awareness that this religion of Protestants was characterised by a widespread attachment to the faith of the prayer book, if not to altar-wise communion tables or to episcopal church government.[53] The question that divided people by 1642 was whether this faith was better defended by the king's critics in parliament (and their Scottish Presbyterian allies), or by Charles I and his bishops, whose track-record before 1640 seemed questionable. By 1642, however, Charles's supporters included many who had opposed in 1640–41 the legal and constitutional policies of the personal rule. What drove them back, or helped to drive them back, into supporting their king was in good part their attachment to the Church of England. Their opponents, on the other hand, were reconfirmed in the view that without further root and branch Reformation the Protestant identity of the church could not be made secure.

Thus religious perceptions shaped the allegiances of Royalists as well as Parliamentarians; and a central feature of the division of 1642 was the competition between two different understandings of the identity of the English church. As Conrad Russell was to suggest, if one were 'to look back again at the 1620s, and attempt to ask the question what issues, what attitudes distinguish a future Royalists from a future Parliamentarian during those years', then the answer was not 'issues of law and liberty', but issues of religion, especially the clash between 'Arminians' and 'Calvinists', but also to a degree matters of foreign policy, themselves seen in powerfully religious ways.[54] But Russell was wary of suggesting that this implied a return to the idea of a Puritan Revolution, for that notion implied 'the existence of a large body of people alien from, and opposed to, the church of England'.[55] This shares something with Morrill's interpretation – that it was divisions and tensions within a broad religion of Protestants as

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[53] See further Morrill, 'The Church of England 1642–1649', in Morrill, *Nature of the English Revolution*, ch. 7; and also Judith Maltby, *Prayer Book and People in Elizabethan and Early Stuart England* (Cambridge, 1998). My phrase 'religion of protestants' echoes Collinson (cited above), and, of course, William Chillingworth, *The Religion of Protestants A Safe Way to Salvation* (Oxford, 1638).

[54] Conrad Russell, 'Issues in the House of Commons 1621–1629: Predictors of Civil War Allegiance', *Albion*, 23 (1991): pp. 23–39 (quotes from 23, 30).

[55] Ibid., p. 38.

much as revolutionary Puritanism that was of critical importance.[56] It also shares in the distinctive realisation that religion – affection for the episcopal Church of England, at least in its Elizabethan and Jacobean forms – was critical to the creation of a Royalist side by 1642. Rival petitioning campaigns developed from late 1641, but 'petitions on religion tended to polarise opinion, petitions on constitutional issues tended to reinforce peace and consensus'.[57] Charles I's enemies did not in 1642 defend their resistance to the king on the grounds that he was a tyrant who subverted law and constitution; they defended themselves with the religious argument that Charles had to be rescued from the grip of a popish plot, in which his bishops were the main players.[58]

After 1983

In illustrating these claims, John Morrill drew upon the Declaration of the Lords and Commons of 3 August 1642.[59] In that document Charles's enemies repeatedly identified their objectives in these terms: 'the defence and maintenance of the true Religion, the Kings Person, Honour and Estate, the Power and Priviledge of Parliament, and the just Rights, and Liberties of the Subject'.[60] The problem for anyone who wishes to insist on the label 'England's Wars of Religion' is why, in this list, priority should be given to the religious objectives over the political ones – why was this a war for true religion more than a war for the liberty of subjects? In this case, there is an answer. The Declaration plainly tells us which has priority. The king's advisers were seeking the reintroduction of popery. Their attack on parliament and law was merely instrumental, a step towards religious change. Therefore it was the defence of the Protestant religion that was fundamentally at stake in the conflict of 1642.

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[56]　Though Morrill, as we have seen, would certainly not deny the reality of 'Puritan dynamism': see his critique of Russell, in Morrill, *Nature of the English Revolution*, pp. 269–71.

[57]　Morrill, 'Charles, I, Tyranny and the English Civil War', in Morrill, *Nature of the English Revolution*, ch. 15, p. 305, drawing especially on Fletcher, *Outbreak*. Also Morrill, Context', pp. 67–8 for an earlier account of pro- and anti-episcopal petitioning.

[58]　Morrill, 'Charles I, Tyranny, and the English Civil War'. The account is influenced by Caroline Hibbard, *Charles I and the Popish Plot* (Chapel Hill NC, 1983); and by Lamont's attribution to the Puritans of a 'protestant imperial' outlook.

[59]　Morrill, 'Charles I, Tyranny, and the English Civil War', pp. 305–6 (where it is wrongly dated).

[60]　*A Declaration of the Lords and Commons ... Setting forth the Grounds and Reasons, that Necessitate Them ... to Take Up Defensive Arms* (London, 1642), p. 15. This statement of ultimate objectives could be traced back at least to the *Protestation* of May 1641: Gardiner, *Constitutional Documents*, pp. 155–6.

However, less than two weeks later, in a Declaration of 15 August, the Lords and Commons seemed to put things the other way around: the king's evil advisers 'carried a wicked designe to alter Religion, and to introduce Popery, Superstition and Ignorance (the ready way to an Arbitrary and Tyrannical Government)'.[61] Religious change now seems instrumental, tyranny the objective. Which was it?

(i) Liberty (and Religion?) in the English Revolution

One answer, prominent in the recent historiography, has amounted to a restoration of the argument that Thomas Carlyle rejected but which has been otherwise prominent in the historiography: the English Revolution was a struggle for liberty, and this liberty was a secular concept (albeit with religious trappings). For those who approach history in a strongly post-Enlightenment mode, the story of liberty remains essentially a secular or secularising history. This is evident, for example, in one of the most recent synoptic accounts of the history of liberty. Taking issue with Lord Acton's claims for the importance of religion to the development of modern liberty,[62] A.C. Grayling suggested that Acton was 'wrong in his premise'. The struggle for liberty of conscience was an important part of the struggle for liberty; nonetheless, more generally, 'the history of liberty proves to be another chapter … in the great quarrel between religion and secularism'.[63] For Grayling, as for many of us since the Enlightenment, liberty is fundamentally about freedom *from* religion, not freedom *through* religion.

There has been a considerable body of recent work that has modified the Whig-liberal account of liberty in early modern England. It has self-consciously sought to resurrect a forgotten 'republican' or neo-Roman idea of liberty that existed before liberalism. Liberty in the liberal sense is purely 'negative' (freedom from interference, usually by the state), and consequently is rights-based (freedom being a right that can be defended morally and legally). But republican liberty involves more than this. It has its negative dimensions,

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[61]   *A Declaration and Resolution of the Lords and Commons … Concerning His Majesties Late Proclamation for the Suppressing of the Present Rebellion* (London, 1642), pp. 3–4.

[62]   Acton, often cited as one of the great liberal and Whig historians, is a more eccentric figure in the development of Whig historiography than is sometimes allowed. He would appear to agree with the Stoic claim that 'true freedom … consists in obeying God'; he thought that the Christian idea of conscience, in providing a higher law that could limit even democratic states, was central to the idea and development of liberty; and he gave a very religion-centred account of the 'Puritan revolution' – 'more fitly called the Puritan reformation': John Emerich Edward Dalberg-Acton, First Baron Acton, *Essays in the History of Liberty: Selected Writings … Volume I* (Indianapolis, 1985), chs 1, 2, 4; quotations from pp. 24, 93.

[63]   A.C. Grayling, *Towards the Light: The Story of the Struggles for Liberty and Rights That Made the Modern West* (London, 2007, pbk 2008), p. 7, also pp. 17–18, 230–39.

but also more 'positive' ones. To be free, you must not just possess rights, but also accept that for your possession of them to be secure it is necessary for you to live in a society in which rulers or the state cannot, even in the future, take those rights from you. A free man is one who is not dependent on the will of anyone else, and to live in a society in which this is possible the free man must agree to share in the political life of his community. He must, in a sense, rule himself (in multiple senses of that phrase). A person who is not free is a *slave*, this polarity of freedom and slavery being derived ultimately from Roman law.

The recovery of this alternative understanding of liberty has been historiographically important, and it has been used to provide a reading of the pamphlets and parliamentary declarations of the 1640s that identify the struggle with Charles I as resistance to enslavement.[64] This approach has, deliberately, done nothing to mitigate the secularity of our approach to the history of liberty (quite the contrary); but problems are discernible. For example, Quentin Skinner's recent account of Hobbes's theory of liberty – the first fully developed theory of negative liberty – notes that, in rethinking his understanding of the subject in *Leviathan*, Hobbes was able to confront more effectively two groups of adversaries. One group was 'the seditious clergy, whether papist or Presbyterian'; the other were 'the democratical gentlemen', inspired with republican principles by reading the Greek and Roman classics.[65] And yet, Skinner says almost nothing of substance about the ways in which Hobbes's approach to liberty might have been developed in a religious context; nor does he explore the possibility that the 'republican' accounts of liberty might actually have born some similarities to those of some religious thinkers (which may be why Hobbes's theory of liberty was effective against both).

This new 'republican' understanding of the idea of liberty in early modern England, forged by historians in the last decades of the twentieth century has been both influential and valuable; and yet its insistent secularisation remains troubling. Some of the contributions to this book – especially those of John Coffey and Jeffrey Collins – explore further this matter.

(ii) Religion and Politics

The central problem bequeathed by John Morrill's essay, and inherent in the question of how to interpret the parliamentary Declarations of August 1642

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[64]   For an account of the 1640s that reads similar documents in the opposite way to Morrill see Quentin Skinner, 'Rethinking Political Liberty', *History Workshop Journal*, 61 (2006): pp. 156–70. See further the essays in Quentin Skinner, *Visions of Politics, Volume II: Renaissance Virtues* (Cambridge, 2002).

[65]   Quentin Skinner, *Hobbes and Republican Liberty* (Cambridge, 2008), pp. 139–40.

is, of course, the separation of religion and politics. Can it ever be meaningful, when the two are seemingly intertwined, to suggest that more importance attaches to one than to the other? As we have seen, this has been a question inherent throughout the historiography of the English Civil War. It was raised explicitly by Hill's response to Morrill; and acknowledged in Morrill's reflections on his own work.

John Morrill's 1983 lecture did two notable things: it accepted that religious belief might have been a serious motivating force, regardless of whether it was also a vehicle for other things; and in doing this it loosened the traditional focus on revolutionary Puritanism in order to recognise the importance of religion to many Royalists, and the spectrum of religious beliefs even among Parliamentarians. Yet, Morrill's account rested, like much of the historiography, on making a sharp separation between religion and politics, even while it reversed the tendency to subordinate the former to the latter. The problem with which we are left, then, is precisely that of making the separation at all. We might take religious belief seriously; but that does not make it the most important factor, and nor does it help us to separate it from other things. This furthermore is a problem that has not been confronted by historians who adopt a secular and 'republican' understanding of the Parliamentary cause. They, equally, have given no answer to the question of why we should attach more importance to Parliamentary demands for constitutional and legal liberty than their demands for further Reformation.

The way forward lies in paying close attention to the variety of ways in which contemporary discourse distinguished, linked and drew together religious and political matters. Religious issues that were most contentious were often ones that in their nature involved matters of law and authority (episcopacy, the 1640 Canons), though not all did so. Seemingly 'secular' arguments could function of ways of avoiding, disguising or ameliorating religious discord and religious difference. Puritan ministers, accepting that the faith could not be propagated by force, might construct a legal argument to justify their resistance to Charles I. In each of these areas – and in many areas – there are intricate discursive connections between religion and politics. And there is no alternative to tracing the intricacies. Early modern people had many ways of functionally separating religion and politics (which does not mean that they saw politics in secular terms). Natural and divine law, the two tables of the Decalogue, church and commonwealth, reason and revelation, public and private – each distinction could play a role in enabling people to think through problems generated by the political consequences of confessional difference, sometimes embracing ideas that subordinated political stability to religious zeal, sometimes seeking distance

from that zeal. The task for us is to trace both the ways of separating, which are also the ways of connecting, religion and politics.

Fortunately there is a considerable body of scholarship – all of it appearing since Morrill spoke in 1983 – that has charted at least some of this territory. It recognises that early modern people certainly could, as need arose, distinguish religion from politics (though not often in quite those terms), but that they also had specific ways of putting them back together again. The historian's task is in the first instance an empirical one: that is, we need to uncover these patterns of discourse. At the heart of the ways in which this is being done is an idea that can be expressed in different ways. Colin Davis uses a term drawn from the writings of John Owen: 'the "Church-State" created by the Tudor Reformation'.[66] John Pocock points us in the same direction:

> The Act in Restraint of Appeals (1533) formulates the English doctrine of sovereignty, laying it down that England is an 'empire', exercising a final and unappealable jurisdiction over itself in both church and state. This is the sovereignty to be defended and debated through civil wars, dissolutions and revolutions to the end of the English *ancien régime*.[67]

The royal supremacy in the church – declared (not created) by statute in 1534; re-declared in 1559 – created a church-state, and a church 'by law established'.[68] Within this entity debates of a peculiar sort could arise: debates about the relationships between common law and the church; debates about whether or not royal sovereignty over the church was exercised with or without parliament; debates about the authority, beneath the king, of bishop and convocation. Many historians have come to appreciate that the English Civil War was a crisis within this peculiar Reformation polity. They have not always agreed with one another, but together they have begun to rethink the politics and political thought of the Reformation church-state, and of the English Revolution.[69] This points us to

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[66]   J.C. Davis, 'A Short Course of Discourse: Studies in Early Modern Conscience, Duty and the "English Protestant Interest"', *Journal of Ecclesiastical History*, 46 (1995): pp. 302–9, quote from p. 303; Davis, 'Backing into Modernity: The Dilemma of Richard Hooker', in Miles Fairburn and Bill Oliver (eds), *The Certainty of Doubt: Tributes to Peter Munz* (Wellington, 1996), pp. 157–79, at p. 166 and n. 46.

[67]   J.G.A. Pocock, 'A Discourse of Sovereignty: Observations on the Work in Progress', in Nicholas Phillipson and Quentin Skinner (eds), *Political Discourse in Early Modern Britain* (Cambridge, 1993), ch. 17, p. 381.

[68]   See my comments on the latter in Burgess, 'Was the English Civil War a War of Religion?'.

[69]   This work might include Jonathan Scott, *England's Troubles: Seventeenth-Century English Political Instability in European Context* (Cambridge, 2000); Charles W.A. Prior, *Defining the Jacobean Church: The Politics of Religious Controversy, 1603–1625* (Cambridge,

better ways – more precise ways, better rooted in the language of the past – to understand the interconnectedness of religion and politics. The chapters in this volume, which do not seek to advance any common thesis, nonetheless continue this line of development.

2005); Jeffrey Collins, *The Allegiance of Thomas Hobbes* (Oxford, 2005); Alan Cromartie, *The Constitutionalist Revolution: An Essay on the History of England, 1450–1642* (Cambridge, 2006); Glenn Burgess, *British Political Thought 1500–1660: The Politics of the Post-Reformation* (Basingstoke, 2009).

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Chapter 2

Sacred Kingship in France and England in the Age of the Wars of Religion: From Disenchantment to Re-enchantment?

Ronald G. Asch

I

If the threat of being killed within the next few days concentrates one's mind wonderfully as Dr Johnson has argued, then few early modern monarchs' minds can have been as completely concentrated as that of James VI and I. The thought that he was surrounded by religious radicals who were only too eager to depose and kill him was certainly at the heart of much of his political pronouncements and actions. Or as James I himself put it: 'Let a cat be thrown from a high roofe to the bottom of a cellour or vault, she lighteth on her feet and runneth away without taking any harm. A King is not like a cat, howsoever a cat may looke upon a King: he cannot fall from a loftie pinacle of Royalty, to light on his feet upon the hard pavement of a private state, without crushing all his bones to pieces'.[1]

Some historians and many of his own contemporaries have seen James I who took pride in being called a 'rex pacificus' as a coward, walking around in permanent fear of assassins. However, a man who was nearly killed when still an unborn child in his mother's womb by rebels and conspirators and who was later almost blown up with his entire court and parliament by men whom he had to consider as religious fanatics, not to mention incidents like the Gowrie conspiracy or the Earl of Bothwell's alleged attempt to hire a team of crack witches to prevent his liege lord's return from Denmark, can perhaps be forgiven for being of a slightly nervous disposition. Although Bothwell and the Ruthvens do not quite meet this description it was in particular the religious fanatics

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[1] 'A Remonstrance for the Right of Kings', in *Political Works of James I*, (ed.) Charles Howard McIlwain (Cambridge MA, 1918, reprint New York, 1965), pp. 169–268, at p. 245; I have written this article while a fellow in the Freiburg Institute for Advanced Studies (FRIAS). References are limited to a minimum.

James VI and I was afraid of. During his lifetime two French kings were killed by religious assassins, Henry III in 1589 and Henry IV in 1610: what is more they were not just killed; prominent French Catholic theologians tried to justify such actions as deeds which gave those who perpetrated them an almost saint-like status.

Calvinist theologians were generally even when they subscribed to a right of resistance more cautious about justifying political murder, but at least in Scotland there was no lack of Presbyterian ministers in the late sixteenth century from John Knox onwards who thought that circumstances could arise which made it not just permissible but necessary to depose a bad king or queen. Now both Scotland and France may have been extreme cases not entirely typical, but then of course when we look at Sweden in the 1590s where Sigismund Wasa was deposed because he was a Catholic or at Bohemia in 1608–12 and again in 1618 to 1620, monarchy was clearly under threat at the end of the sixteenth and the beginning of the seventeenth century; it could only survive if monarchs proved able either to surmount the tensions of religious warfare or to vanquish their enemies in close alliance with one of the religious factions as the Austrian Habsburgs did in 1620.

Monarchy in a way had to reinvent itself in this period if it was to survive. Nowhere is this as clearly visible as in France, the European country where religious warfare had the strongest impact. Many conflicts in this period, however, which are sometimes subsumed under the label 'wars of religion' were not necessarily religious in nature at all. For a conflict to be considered a war of religion the motives of those who actively participated in the war are hardly the decisive criterion. These motives can never be ascertained by the historian with sufficient certainty and often even the participants themselves would have found it difficult to distinguish between the various roles they played and their 'true self'.[2] What is more important, it seems, is the sanctification or sacralization of violence and of death. We can speak of a religious war when those who are killed in such a war fighting for the true faith are seen to some extent as martyrs or certainly as men or women who have some claim to a place in heaven because they have suffered for their faith.[3] Equally, as Denis Crouzet has shown, if

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[2]   Cf. Ronald G. Asch, 'Religiöse Selbstinszenierung im Zeitalter der Glaubenskriege: Adel und Konfession in Westeuropa', *Historisches Jahrbuch* 125 (2005): pp. 67–100.

[3]   For the notion of a religious war see Franz Brendle and Anton Schindling (eds), *Religionskriege im Alten Reich und in Alteuropa* (Münster, 2006), and Konrad Repgen, 'Was ist ein Religionskrieg', in Konrad Repgen, *Von der Reformation zur Gegenwart. Beiträge zu Grundfragen der neuzeitlichen Geschichte* (Paderborn, 1988), pp. 84–97. Cf. John Morrill, 'Introduction: England's Wars of Religion', in John Morrill, *The Nature of the English Revolution* (London, 1993), pp. 33–44.

violence ceases to be a mere means to an end (for example, to gain a military victory or to intimidate an enemy through terror), if violence becomes part of a cleansing ritual whereby the stains which heresy or idolatry have left on the body politic are wiped out, then indeed we can speak of a religious war.[4]

In this sense the French Civil Wars between 1562 and 1598 can clearly be seen as a genuine war of religion – perhaps the paradigmatic model for all other similar conflicts – despite the fact that the motives for fighting which we can ascribe to many of the participants often seem to be secular in nature. What is important in our context is that these wars clearly fostered a process, which led in France to a thorough redefinition of kingship's sacred character and its relationship with the church. This redefinition of kingship in France did not only have a considerable impact on ideas of monarchy in England and Britain as a whole, developments in France itself were also affected to some extent by events in Britain, in particular during the controversy over the Oath of Allegiance and its aftermath. In many ways we can consider the history of the two monarchies as closely intertwined in this period. Although France was and remained a largely Catholic country and England was a Protestant monarchy, both monarchies shared a strong tradition of sacred kingship which distinguished them from other European countries and both monarchies faced the problem of readjusting the relationship between secular and spiritual authority in the early seventeenth century.[5] Despite the difference in the religious situation the two monarchies were looking for similar solutions in their endeavour to separate the secular and the spiritual sphere, as the attempt of the French Third Estate to design an oath which was modelled on the English Oath of Allegiance in 1614 shows clearly enough. In some sense one might speak of a *histoire croisée* of the two countries, if one were to borrow this concept from historians working mainly on later periods of history.[6]

And in what follows I shall argue that the history of kingship can be no means be written as a story of inevitable and steadily progressing secularization and disenchantment. In France the revived *réligion royale* survived until the eighteenth century and for this very reason the religious critique of the monarchy articulated in particular by the Jansenist movement was at least as important in undermining the Ancien Régime as the critique of the *philosophes* as Dale

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[4]   Denis Crouzet, *Les Guerriers de Religion. La violence au temps des troubles de religion (vers 1525–vers 1610)* (Paris, 2 vols, 1990).

[5]   Cf. Marc Bloch, *Les rois thaumaturges* (reprint Paris, 1983). Cf. Paul Kléber Monod, *The Power of Kings. Monarchy and Religion in Europe, 1589–1715* (New Haven CN, 1999), pp. 33–80.

[6]   Michael Werner (ed.), *De la comparaison à l' histoire croisée* (Paris, 2004).

van Kley has convincingly shown.[7] In England the shift and transfer of religious elements in the system of legitimation underpinning political authority and the metamorphosis of the religious context of kingship may have been stronger than in France in particular in the later seventeenth century, but nevertheless religious elements in the prevailing political culture remained of crucial importance far into the eighteenth century. What we do find in England as much as in France is, however, a dialectical relationship between the attempt to emphasize the sacred character of kingship and its demystification, or as Kevin Sharpe has put it recently, 'After the break from Rome every monarch had needed and sought to publicize himself or herself as sacred. But in publicizing themselves they had demystified kingship'.[8] This statement implies a tension between the claims early modern monarchs made that their office was sacred in nature and the appeal to a wider public audience, which gave this audience implicit access to the *arcana imperii*, but such tensions were certainly not limited to Protestant monarchies. In an age of religious conflict Catholic rulers had to redefine their position in relationship to the sacred as well and were not necessarily always more successful in doing this than Protestants.

II

In France the religious conflict since the 1560s posed a twofold challenge to the monarchy. On the one hand there were the Calvinists. For them God was radically transcendent, so transcendent that the sacramental character of Holy Communion itself became doubtful or was reduced to a merely symbolical dimension. But if the ceremonies of the church were somehow deflated in their importance if not rejected outright, how could the ceremonies of the *réligion royale*, the great rituals of state such as the *sacre* and the state funerals or even the more secular *lit de justice* retain their power as ritual performances? These

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[7]   Dale K. Van Kley, *The Religious Origins of the French Revolution. From Calvin to the Civil Constitution, 1560–1791* (New Haven CN, 1996). Cf. Wolfgang Mager, 'Die Anzweiflung des oberhirtlichen Kirchenregiments im Widerstand des jansenistischen Lagers gegen die Anerkennung der Bulle *Unigenitus* (1713) in Frankreich – Ein Beitrag zur Entstehungsgeschichte des modernen Konstitutionalismus', in Neithart Bulst (ed.), *Politik und Kommunikation. Zur Geschichte des Politischen in der Vormoderne* (Frankfurt/M., 2009), pp. 147–249.

[8]   Kevin Sharpe, *Selling the Tudor Monarchy. Authority and Image in Sixteenth-Century England* (New Haven CN, 2009), p. 480. For the idea of divine right kingship in England see Glenn Burgess, 'The Divine Right of Kings reconsidered', in Glenn Burgess, *Absolute Monarchy and the Stuart Constitution* (New Haven CN, 1996), pp. 91–124.

implications of Calvinist theology explain to some extent why Francis I and his successors rejected the option of an alliance with Calvinism right from the start or, as Dale van Kley has put it, 'The French monarchy was in general too implicated in sacramental conceptions not to have taken an attack on the Mass very personally'.[9]

On the other hand the political theology of the radical Catholics who were organized in the Holy League posed perhaps an even greater threat to the monarchy. For the radical Catholics the religious character of the *sacre* and the coronation were not in doubt; but were they also effective when the anointed ruler was a heretic? To believe so was to assume that the coronation had the same or a similar performative power a true sacrament like the mass had.[10] This of course was to tread on theological ground which was rather shaky. Nevertheless we do find authors, not least so, in the early seventeenth century, when the ancient *réligion royale* had been revived, who argued, that the *sacre* conferred a special divine grace on the king which he could never loose.[11] For

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[9]   Van Kley, *Origins*, p. 23. Cf. Christopher Elwood, *The Body Broken. The Calvinist Doctrine of the Eucharist and the Symbolization of Power in Sixteenth-Century France* (New York, 1999).

[10]   For the context of this problem see also Dávid Diósi, 'Die mittelalterliche Kaiser-/Königssalbung als "Sakrament". Das Aufkommen der Königssalbung im Abendland', *Studia Universitatis Babes-Bolyal, Theologia Catholica Latina*, 47 (2002): pp. 135–48. For the discussion of the *sacre* in relation to the problem whether a heretic like Henry King of Navarre (Henry IV) could be crowned (and if he could be king if he were incapable of being crowned) see also *Responce des vrayes catholiques François à l'avertissement des catholiques Anglois, pour l'exclusion du Roy de Navarre de la Couronne de France* (1588), pp. 167–72 and 451–2. This tract is attributed alternatively to Louis Dorleans or to Denis Bouthillier, Sieur de Fouilletourte.

[11]   André Valladier, *Parenese royale, sur les ceremonies du sacre du tres-Chrestien Louis XIII, Roy de France et de Navarre* (Paris, 1611), p. 33: 'Pour ma part, je tiens pour infaillible, que le roy, qui est deuement sacré, de la saincte ampulle, n'y apportant point d'obstacle, de péché mortel, ne peut qu'il ne prospere son regne, et ne peut mourir de mort violente'. He further argued: ' ... estant une mienne croyance [sic], que la ceremonie du sacre, qui n'est pas sacrement, opere plus, ex opere operantis, que non pas, ex opere operato', that is what was important was the dignity of the person thus sanctified. As Louis XIII was still a boy when he was crowned he could not have committed a mortal sin, and thus could be sure to have received a real promise of divine grace during his coronation. For the coronation see also Benno Stiefelhagen, *Die Bedeutung der französischen Königskrönung von Heinrich IV. bis zum Sacre Ludwigs XIV.* (Diss. phil. Universität Bonn, 1988). Cf. further Richard A. Jackson, *Vive le Roi! A History of the French Coronation from Charles V to Charles X* (London, 1984), and Anton Haueter, *Die Krönungen der französischen Könige im Zeitalter des Absolutismus und in der Restauration* (Diss. phil. Universität Zürich, Zürich, 1975), and most recently Ruth Schilling, 'Monarchische Herrschaft und politisch-religiöse Legitimation: Die Sakralität der

some the *sacre* was like the ordination of a priest, it gave the king an indelible character, 'donnant encore une authorité de préexcellence, d'image de Dieu, et imprimant un caractère c'est à dire une marque de cette image, en l'âme des Rois'.[12] For others, however, the *sacre* had its effect more *ex opere operantis* than *ex opere operato*, that is, it depended on the character of the king so crowned and was only fully effective if he had not committed a mortal sin, as even royalist authors of the early seventeenth century were to argue.[13] This was a dangerous argument. It could be used to justify a right of resistance against alleged tyrants and it sounded very much like the interpretation the Donatists – condemned by the church as heretics – had given to the sacraments of the church in late antiquity, and in fact the political theology of the League could be seen as a sort of Donatism, or as Dale van Kley has put it, 'The League's threat to the French monarchy, in still other words, consisted above all in a sort of political Donatism – a tendency to allow the moral deficiencies of the King's mortal body and its entourage to invalidate the sacral efficiency of his office'.[14]

Given such a danger it seemed to be safer to downplay the importance of the *sacre* altogether. Most French lawyers and civilians, as opposed to the theologians, from the late Middle Ages onwards, had in fact been content to affirm that the *sacre* and the coronation only confirmed the king in the possession of a dignity which he had already obtained by mere hereditary right; the character of the coronation was much more declaratory than performative.[15] But if the *sacre* was a mere ceremony without any performative quality, what about the claim of the monarchy to be more sacred than other European monarchies, in fact to be the only truly sacred monarchy in Christendom?[16] This very claim was forcefully revived in the war against Spain after 1634, not least because this war – fought in alliance with heretics – was so difficult to justify otherwise. It comes

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französischen Könige im 17. Jahrhundert', in Matthias Pohlig et al. (eds), *Säkularisierungen in der Frühen Neuzeit: Methodische Probleme und empirische Fallstudien* (*Zeitschrift für Historische Forschung, Supplement 41*, Berlin, 2008), pp. 124–58.

[12]   Besian Arroy, *Questions decidées sur la iustice des armes des rois de France, sur les alliances avec les heretiques ou infidelles et sur la conduite de la conscience des gens de guerre* (Paris, 1634), p. 31. Cf. p. 28 on the similarity to the ordination of priests. See also Stiefelhagen, *Königskrönung*, pp. 220–35.

[13]   Valladier, *Parenese royale*, as in footnote 11.

[14]   Van Kley, *Origins*, p. 29.

[15]   Haueter, *Krönungen*, pp. 300–2. Cf. Jacques Krynen, *L'empire du Roi. Idées et croyances politiques en France, XIIIe – XVe siècle* (Paris, 1993), pp. 349–51.

[16]   Marie-France Renoux-Zagamé, 'Du juge-prêtre au roi-idole. Droit divin et constitution de l'Etat dans la pensée juridique française à l'aube des temps modernes', in Jean-Louis Thireau (ed.), *Le droit entre laïcisation et néo-sacralisation* (Paris, 1997), pp. 143–86, in particular p. 147.

as no surprise that Cornelis Jansen, the Bishop of Ypres, writing for Spain, not for France, in the 1630s, tried to debunk such pretensions by pointing to the dangers of political Donatism inherent in the theology of the French *sacre* and the *réligion royale* in general and by stressing that the French coronation was by no means anything like a true sacrament, but a mere symbol and sign for the grace one wanted a king to obtain from God.[17] Jansen was writing for a monarch, the king of Spain, who was not crowned at all, but such a sober and reductive view of the coronation could not satisfy the adherents of the League in the late sixteenth century. For them a king who was not crowned was like an adulterer, the kingdom was not his wife but only his concubine,[18] though one of the most important parts of the coronation for the radical Catholics was, of course, the coronation oath, which for them was a sort of treaty between kingdom and king.

III

If this treaty was broken or not contracted at all – as in the case of Henry IV before he was crowned in Chartres – the king became a usurper and tyrant. Thus the attacks against Henry III in the late 1580s and later on Henry IV in the 1590s were truly ferocious in style. It may suffice to quote some of Jean Boucher's numerous sermons and tracts to show this. Boucher was a leading member of the theological faculty of the Sorbonne, a well-known preacher and one of the intellectual leaders of the Holy League in Paris. In 1589 Boucher published his famous tract *De iusta Henrici tertii abdicatione* in which he justified the murder of the last Valois whom he depicted as a tyrant, sodomite and heretic. For Boucher only priests and bishops and in particular the pope could derive their authority immediately from God; kings and princes were constituted by the people, not directly by God or, as Boucher proclaimed, 'Omnino Rex nemo nascitur, – nobody in the entire world is born as a king'. Therefore royal

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[17]   [Cornelius Jansen] Alexandri Patricii Armacani, *Mars Gallicus*, *editio novissima* (1639), p. 31, against Besian Arroy. Jansen also wrote: 'Ex quo fit ut ceremoniae, quae adhibentur, gratiarum ... que petuntur a deo, potius signa quam causae sint', and 'unctio quippe corporalis significat unctionem spiritus sancti ad interiora penetrantem, quo petitur, ut ungatur spiritus regis' (p. 40). Cf. above Stiefelhagen, *Königskrönung*, pp. 237–54.

[18]   Guillelmus Rossaeus [William Reynolds], *De iusta rei publicae in reges impios et haereticos authoritate* (Antwerp, 1592), p. 58. But cf. the *Responce des vrayes catholiques*, which argues (pp. 451–2) that the king need not necessarily be crowned but he must have the capacity to be crowned (which a heretic has not), otherwise he cannot rule France.

authority was inferior to that of the pope who could depose princes.[19] Later in his sermons on the 'simulated' conversion of Henry IV Boucher was to write that kings, because they were constituted by the people, could easily be replaced by new princes elected according to tradition, even if one were to assume that they had all died without issue. However, if all priests and bishops were to die, Christ would have to come down from heaven in person to consecrate new ones, as their authority depended on an unbroken apostolic succession, an argument which was designed to demonstrate that the priesthood was truly divine in character whereas kingship was human.[20]

For Boucher and other radical Catholics, God was indeed present in this world in the sacrifice of the mass – the piety of the Tridentine Catholics like Boucher was centred to an almost obsessive degree on the mass – but also in the lives and actions of his saints.[21] And for Boucher and other supporters of the League, men such as Jean Chastel who tried to kill Henry IV in 1594 or Jacques Clément who had actually managed to stab Henry III to death in 1589 were if not saints at least true heroes and saint-like or prophet-like figures.[22] Their saint-like status was so important for the radical Catholics who approved of this sort of tyrannicide because a king who had committed sacrilege and had blasphemously laid hands on the 'choses sainctes et sacrées' could in the last resort only be killed by someone who was himself a hero and a saint who was 'beni, oing et sacré' – blessed, anointed and sacred – as Jacques Baron argued in his *Origine ... et demonstration de ceste excellente et heroyque maison de Lorraine et Guyse* in 1589.[23]

As Denis Crouzet and Robert Descimon have argued, the royalist opponents of the League tried to counter such claims by stressing and redefining the sacred character of kingship but also by denying that God could act in this world through men or women who were directly inspired and authorized by him and

[19]   Jean Boucher, *De Iusta Henrici tertii abdicatione a Francorum regno, libri quatuor* (Paris, 1589), fol. 17v.

[20]   Jean Boucher, *Sermons de la simulée conversion de Henry de Bourbon* (Paris, 1594), 4th sermon, p. 243 (misprinted as p. 443). Cf. Robert Descimon and José Javier Ruiz Ibáñez, *Les Ligueurs de l'exil. Le refuge Catholique Français après 1594* (Paris, 2005), p. 32.

[21]   Ann W. Ramsey, *Liturgy, Politics and Salvation: The Catholic League in Paris and the Nature of Catholic Reform, 1540–1630* (Rochester, NY, 1999).

[22]   [Jean Boucher], *Apologie pour Iehan Chastel. Parisien, executé a mort*, par François de Verone Constantin, [pseudonym] (1610).

[23]   Jacques Baron, *Origine, genealogie et demonstration de ceste excellente et heroyque maison de Lorraine et Guyse* (Paris, 1589), p. 29. Cf. David El Kenz, 'Les usages subversifs du martyre dans la France des troubles de religion. De la parole au geste', in Frank Lestringant (ed.), *Martyrs et martyrologes* (*Revue des Sciences Humaines*, 269, 2003), pp. 33–51, at p. 46.

thus became his immediate instruments in secular politics.[24] Opposing these ideas Etienne Pasquier in his *L'Antimartyr de Frere Jacques Clément* mocked those who claimed that Clément, the dominican who had killed Henry III, had a personal vocation as a scourge of tyrants and as a martyr and hero, a sort of new prophet. Where was it written in Scripture that God in that time (*in illo tempore*) would call forth Jacques Clément, native of the Sorbonne? Nowhere, of course, as Pasquier emphasized.[25]

While the *catholiques d'état* saw the presence of the divine in this world and the claim of individuals to be saints or prophets with a political mission in the present day with much more scepticism than the Leaguers, they re-emphasized the divine nature of kingship. While politics and everyday life were disenchanted, sacredness was concentrated (in a manner of speaking) in the person of the king, as Denis Crouzet has argued. Henry III had already tried such a strategy which in his case was closely linked to flamboyant displays of personal piety, and a new and quite elaborate etiquette at court, but this strategy had failed. Henry III had seen himself according to Crouzet emphatically as *rex et sacerdos* (as a priestly king). By monopolizing the sacred in his person he had excluded his subjects from the sphere of the 'mystère politique'.[26] But the divine character which Henry III had claimed for kingship was in a manner of speaking disproved by Henry's violent death at the hand of an assassin which demonstrated that he was a mere mortal.

Henry IV was to pursue a different strategy of sacralization; his self-representation emphasized the messianic character of his rule as a sort of secular mission which was to redeem the world, and which was opposed to the spiritual messianic idea which the Leaguers subscribed to. At the same time the king was represented as a new Hercules, not a Hercules triumphant but a suffering hero, who sacrificed himself for mankind, following the stoic reading of the Hercules myth popular at the time. Thus Henry IV's murder in 1610 did not disprove the divine nature of kingship but rather reaffirmed it as giving the king an opportunity to offer his life as the supreme sacrifice, a sacrifice which had frequently been anticipated in earlier moments of crisis.[27] This at least is Denis

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[24] Descimon/Ruiz Ibáñez, *Les Ligueurs*, pp. 21–8. For Crouzet's arguments see footnote 27.

[25] Étienne Pasquier, 'L'Antimartyr de frere Jacques Clement de l'Ordre des Jacobins', in Étienne Pasquier, *Ecrits politiques. Textes réunis, publiés et annotés par Dorothy Thikett* (Geneva, 1966), pp. 185–246, at p. 215.

[26] Crouzet, *Les Guerriers*, vol. 2, p. 552.

[27] Denis Crouzet, 'Les fondements idéologiques de la royauté d'Henri IV', in Jacques Pérot and Pierre Tucoo-Chala (eds), *Henri IV: Le Roi et la reconstruction du royaume* (Pau, 1990), pp. 165–94, at pp. 174–6, 180–82, 190. Cf. Denis Crouzet, *Dieu en ses royaumes.*

Crouzet's interpretation which is plausible in arguing that the reconstituted monarchy of Henry was based not so much on a merely secular notion of politics and reason of state as articulated for example by Jean Bodin but on a redefinition of the relationship between politics and the sacred which reaffirmed the validity of the *réligion royale*.

Seen from a different angle, however, the first Bourbon could only gain the crown by making important concessions to the political vision of the radical Catholics. By taking part regularly in the religious rituals which the militant Catholics cherished and by healing a great number of sick men and women in the traditional miraculous way, Henry ensured that kingship become once more part of a political culture for which the belief in the performative quality of symbolic acts was central. He and his successor 'became de facto committed to an epistemology of ritual that was based on the conviction that ritual enactment has the capacity to transform reality', as Ann Ramsey writes.[28]

In any case the *réligion royale* which Henry IV reaffirmed was closely linked to a particular Gallican vision of the relationship between church and state, a relationship which was, within the framework of Catholicism, almost Erastian in nature, leaving little room for papal interventions even in matters of national ecclesiastical politics, let alone secular affairs.[29] It was such a Gallican vision of the church–state relationship which the Third Estate defended in 1614, when it called for an oath of allegiance in France rejecting the papal deposing power and reaffirming the divine origin of royal authority.[30] Although the First Estate

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Une histoire des Guerres de Religion (Seyssel, 2008), pp. 446–57. For the re-enchantment of kingship after 1593/94 see also Annette Finley-Crosswhite, 'Henry IV and the Diseased Body Politic', in Martin Gosman et al.(eds), *Princes and Princely Culture, 1450–1650* (Leiden, 2003), pp. 131–46, and Penny Roberts, 'The Kingdom's two Bodies? Corporeal Rhetoric and Royal Authority During the Religious Wars', *French History*, 21 (2007): pp. 147–64, at pp. 159–61.

[28] Ann W. Ramsey, 'The Ritual Meaning of Henry IV's 1594 Parisian Entry', in Nicolas Russell and Hélène Visentin (eds), *French Ceremonial Entries in the Sixteenth Century: Event, Image, Text* (Toronto, 2007), pp. 189–296, at p. 200. Cf. p. 202 where Ramsey affirms: 'Henry's use of sacred time worked as a kind of re-enchantment of the French monarchy ... The affirmation of a link between the sacrality of the monarchy and the truth of religious ritual was particularly fateful for the future of both ritual and the Bourbon monarchy. Henri, had, in effect, reconfirmed an older essentialist interpretation of ritual'.

[29] For the Gallican tradition see Jotham Parsons, *The Church in the Republic. Gallicanism and Political Ideology in Renaissance France* (Washington DC, 2004), and Alain Tallon, *Conscience nationale et sentiment religieux en France au XVIe siècle* (Paris, 2002).

[30] James Michael Hayden, *France and the Estates General of 1614* (Cambridge, 1974), pp. 131–48. Pierre Blet SJ, 'L'article du tiers aux états généraux de 1614', *Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine*, 2 (1955): pp. 81–106. Pierre Blet SJ, *Le Clergé de France et*

opposed this demand of the Third Estate, there were Catholic theologians who sympathized with the first article of the *tiers état* and may in fact have had a share in devising it. One of the most prominent of these anti-Jesuit theologians was Edmond Richer who wrote a long tract *de potestate ecclesiae in rebus temporalibus* after the Estates had ended.[31] Richer summed up most of the arguments which a number of royalist writers had elaborated over the last four or five decades against a right of resistance based on religion. According to Richer the sole purpose of the state was to make sure that its subjects could live in peace; whether the ruler himself was a good Catholic or not was hardly of any relevance to this. As long as a king protected his subjects against foreign attacks and made sure that they could live in peace he could not be considered a tyrant and even if he was a bad ruler one could do nothing about it; in the same way in which God gave good and bad harvests and mild or stormy weather he gave good or bad rulers to mankind – this just had to be accepted.[32]

Richer denied almost any right of resistance against rulers and argued that an excommunication pronounced by a bishop or the pope which risked disturbing the political order was automatically invalid. In thoroughly subjecting the church to a state whose purpose was primarily a secular one Richer seems almost like a predecessor of Thomas Hobbes at times. However, although Richer's arguments seemed favourable to an absolute monarchy and were certainly strongly anti-papal, they remained rooted in the tradition of conciliarism. Thus Richer insisted not only on a residual distinction between ecclesiastical and secular

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la Monarchie. Étude sur les assemblées générales du clergé de 1615 à 1666 (Rome, 1959), pp. 40–82, and E. Nelson, 'Defining the Fundamental Laws of France: The Proposed First Article of the Third Estate at the French Estates General of 1614', English *Historical Review* 115 (2000): pp. 1216–30.

[31]   Édouard Puyol, *Edmond Richer. Etude historique et critique sur la rénovation du Gallicanisme au commencement du XVIIe siècle* (Paris, 2 vols, 1876). Monique Cottret, 'Edmond Richer 1539–1631. Le Politique et le Sacré', in Henry Méchoulan (ed.), *L'état baroque. Regards sur la pensée politique de la France du premier XVIIe siècle* (Paris, 1985), pp. 159–77. For Richet's role in the debates with Rome see also Sylvio Hermann de Franceschi, *La Crise théologico-politique du premier âge baroque. Antiromanisme doctrinal, pouvoir pastoral et raison du prince: Le Saint-Siège face au prisme Français (1607–1627)* (Rome, 2009), pp. 317–524.

[32]   Edmond Richer, *De potestate ecclesiae in rebus temporalibus et defensio articuli quem tertius ordo comitiorum regni Franciae pro lege fundamentali ejusdem regni defigi postulavit, anno Domini 1614 and 1615* (Cologne, 1692), pp. 138 and 159. Cf. also Richer's *Libellus de ecclesiastica et politica potestate* (Paris, 1611) translated into English as *A Treatise of Ecclesiastical and Political Power* (London, 1612).

authority,[33] much as he subjected the former to the latter, but also saw the power of kings and princes rooted in the sovereignty of the community – ultimately, the will of the people.

This may explain why the conciliarist Gallicanism which Richer espoused did not in the long run appeal to the defenders of a strong monarchy, although it seemed to solve the problem of any resistance based on religious arguments and justified by papal intervention. But the link between conciliarism and Gallicanism which in practical politics was mirrored by the alliance between the Parisian *parlement* and the Sorbonne was seen as dangerous,[34] and in the long run the *catholiques d'état* preferred an alliance between the monarchy and a papacy which had been shorn of most of its political ambitions and had abandoned its claim to control and if needs be punish all Christian rulers.[35]

One needed an independent ecclesiastical authority to underwrite the monarchy's claims to a sacred status and to legitimize the King's rule over the national church; a mere national synod could not or would not fulfil this role;

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[33]　Richer, *De Potestate ecclesiae*, pp. 321 and 136, where Richer affirms 'claret sub lege gratiae statum politicum essentialiter distinctum et separatum esse a statu sacerdotali sicut potestatem ministerialem ab absoluta potestate politica quae corporibus et temporalibus dominatur'.

[34]　Richer himself in his last will claimed that he had been – falsely – accused of subverting monarchy itself because his attacks on the spiritual monarchy of the pope could too easily be transferred to the secular monarchy of the king. See 'Edmundi Richerii Testamentum', in *Collectio variorum tractatuum in quibus praecipuae controversiae inter Romanum Pontificem et Ecclesiam Gallicanam de auctoritate Papae et politica potestate agitantur* (Paris, 1717), p. 33 (Pagination irregular). For the attempt to denigrate Richer and his followers as enemies of the king's absolute authority see also de Franceschi, *La Crise*, pp. 678, 880. Franceschi's work is of fundamental importance for the entire debate.

[35]　Descimon/Ruiz Ibáñez, *Les Ligueurs*, p. 32. Cf. with a somewhat different argument Sylvio Hermann de Franceschi, 'La genèse Française de catholicisme d'état et son aboutissement au début du ministériat de Richelieu. Les catholiques zélés à l'épreuve de l'affaire Santarelli et la clôture de la controverse autour du pouvoir pontifical au temporel (1626–1627)', *Annuaire-Bulletin de la Société de l'Histoire de France*, 525 (2001): pp. 19–63, at p. 57: 'Une nouvelle mystique royale est en train de parvenir à maturité. Elle est œuvre conjointe des catholiques d'État et des anciens zélés; en insistant sur le caractère divin de la monarchie, ils attaquent directement, pour le marginaliser davantage encore, l'une des doctrines constitutives du gallicanisme classique, qui insistait sur la nécessité de respecter l'existence d'assemblées consultatives intermédiaires dans le gouvernement du royaume'. See also idem, *La Crise*, where de Franceschi has developed this argument at greater length, see in particular p. 679: 'En France l'autorité monarchique était parvenue à construire une transformation à quoi Jacques Ier avait vainement essayé d'obliger les récusants, soit l'affirmation de la supériorité du moderne rapport civil des sujétion sur le lien traditionnel d'appartenance confessionel'.

thus if James I could argue in 1604 *no bishop no king*, the French monarch was in the last resort forced to accept the principle *no pope no king*, however reluctantly, although admittedly the implications of this principle did not become fully apparent until the 1690s and the last years of Louis XIV's reign. It took in fact the Glorious Revolution of 1688 in England to alleviate the tensions between the pope and the most Christian monarch, which had led Louis XIV to reaffirm the Gallican tradition in 1682 in dramatic form and the pope to excommunicate the French king in 1687 in secret.[36]

IV

Edmond Richer wrote his tract on the distinction between secular and ecclesiastical authority more than seventy years earlier, at a time when controversies about the nature of kingship and the church in France and England seemed to be more closely intertwined than ever before since the reformation, as I have already pointed out. The first article of the Third Estate denying the pope's deposing power could be seen as a copy of the English oath of allegiance and in fact the pope himself had alleged as much in a letter he had written to the First Estate, and in which he had spoken of a flame which might lead to a general conflagration and which had its origin *ex miserabili anglicano incendio*, in this regrettable English fire.[37] What the pope saw as a danger to his authority James I saw as a chance for forming an alliance between moderate Catholics and moderate Protestants against the theocratic claims made by both Rome and Geneva. Although the reunion of Christendom which he seemed to envisage at times was probably never a realistic option, there were clearly elements in the

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[36]   Jean Orcibal, *Louis XIV contre Innocent XI. Les appels au future concile de 1688 et l'opinion française* (Paris, 1949), pp. 73–5.

[37]   Richer, *De Potestate ecclesiae*, p. 14, quoting the Papal Breve of 15 February 1615: 'cum non immerito timere possemus, evolaritne in Galliam flamma ex miserabili Anglicano incendio ad conflagrationem et destructionem'. For the English Oath of Allegiance see Johann P. Sommerville, 'Papalist Political Thought and the Controversy over the Jacobean Oath of Allegiance', in Ethan H. Shagan (ed.), *Catholics and the 'Protestant Nation'. Religious Politics and Identity in Early Modern England* (Manchester, 2005), p. 162–84, Stefania Tutino, *Law and Conscience. Catholicism in Early Modern England, 1570–1625* (Aldershot, 2007), pp. 117–34, and Michael C. Questier, 'Loyalty, Religion and State Power in Early Modern England. English Romanism and the Jacobean Oath of Allegiance', *Historical Journal*, 40 (1997), pp. 311–29. The Interaction between events in England and France is examined at length by de Franceschi, *La Crise*, in particular pp. 129–57 and 472–523.

English church settlement which appealed to French Gallican Catholics.[38] On the other hand many of the theological and political arguments which French *politiques* and Gallicans employed in their battle against the League fell on fruitful ground in England, both among 'loyal' Catholics who tried to fight the influence of the Jesuits and among Anglican writers who looked for ammunition to refute a right of resistance based on religious arguments.[39]

However, whereas in France the traditional *réligion royale* had been revived after its crisis in the 1580s under new forms which gave the king a decisive position as a mediator between the divine and an otherwise increasingly secularized sphere of politics, the sacredness of monarchy as an institution was clearly more problematic in a Protestant country such as England. Elizabeth I had relied on her personal charisma and on the role as a providential heroic monarch which so many sermons, pamphlets and paintings ascribed to her, saving her country from the dangers of popery. However, she had also relied on traditional ceremonies and practices to emphasize her position as a sacred monarch, washing the feet of the poor for example on Maundy Thursday – thus imitating Christ – and regularly healing the scrofula.[40] James I as a Calvinist felt uneasy about healing the sick,[41] and certainly did not see himself as a Protestant *roi connêtable* and holy warrior. Instead he tried to assume the role of a biblical prophet and a theologian, stressing the position of the king as *persona mixta cum sacerdote*, as Andreas Pecar has recently pointed out.[42] This was true in particular for his reign in Scotland where this seemed to be the only way to counter the claims of Presbyterian theologians that they alone were entitled

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[38]   William Brown Patterson, *King James VI and I and the Reunion of Christendom* (Cambridge, 1997).

[39]   John H.M. Salmon, *Gallicanism and Anglicanism in the Age of the Counter-Reformation*, in John H.M. Salmon, *Renaissance and Revolt. Essays in the Intellectual and Social History of Early Modern France* (Cambridge, 1987), pp. 155–90. Cf. Lisa Ferraro Parmelee, *Good Newes from Fraunce. French anti-League Propaganda in Late Elizabethan England* (Rochester NY, 1996).

[40]   Carole Levin, *The Heart and Stomach of a King. Elizabeth I and the Politics of Sex and Power* (Philadelphia, 1994), pp. 10–38. Cf. Sharpe, *Selling*, pp. 358–473.

[41]   Raymond Crawfurd, *The King's Evil* (Oxford, 1911), pp. 82–3.

[42]   Andreas Pečar, 'Der König – Theologe und Prophet? Biblizistische Selbstdarstellung Jakobs VI./I. im Spiegel seiner Schriften', *Zeitschrift für Historische Forschung*, 35 (2008): pp. 207–34, at p. 224. Cf. Jane Rickard, *Authorship and Authority. The Writing of James VI and I* (Manchester, 2007), pp. 74–80. For James I see also Ronald G. Asch, *Jakob I. (1566–1625), König von England und Schottland. Herrscher des Friedens im Zeitalter der Religionskriege* (Stuttgart, 2005), and Alan Stewart, *The Cradle King. A Life of James VI and I* (London, 2004).

to act for the true ruler of the church, Christ, but this outlook continued to influence his vision of kingship after 1603.

Nevertheless the problems James faced went deeper than a few conflicts with overweening Scottish ministers. Whereas the real threat which the French monarchy faced in the 1580s and 1590s was a sort of over-enchantment of the world, if we follow the interpretation which Denis Crouzet has put forward in his *Guerriers de religion*, the problem in England was rather the opposite. Calvinism had disenchanted the world, at least as far as the visible and corporeal presence of the divine in the world was concerned (less so with regard to a belief in providence of course); it left therefore little room for sacred kingship in its traditional sense or the ceremonies and rituals which gave kingship a special religious legitimacy.[43] The jury is still out on the question whether James I pursued an ecclesiastical policy which aimed at consensus and reconciliation between the various religious factions within the church of England at least until about 1618, or whether his policies were rather in themselves divisive being inspired by the desire to stamp out the rigid theocratic Presbyterianism which James had encountered in Scotland and everything which bore any resemblance to it, be it ever so remote.

What is clear, however, is that strict Calvinism had little to offer to a king in search of sacred kingship, unless of course he was prepared to accept the role of a providential leader in a religious crusade against Antichrist and the new Babylon, Rome, and that was the last thing James wanted to do. So James was thrown back on what the ceremonialists and conformists such as Lancelot Andrewes and John Buckeridge had to offer him, and they had to offer some reasonably substantial ideas of sacred kingship.[44] What was at the heart of the

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[43]   For this problem see Robert Zaller, 'Breaking the Vessels: The Descacralization of Monarchy in Early Modern England', *Sixteenth Century Journal*, 29 (1998): pp. 757–78; cf. Robert Zaller, *The Discourse of Legitimacy in Early Modern England* (Stanford CA, 2007), pp. 6–51. However, see also Alice Hunt, *The Drama of the Coronation, Medieval Ceremony in Early Modern England* (Cambridge, 2008). Sceptical about the notion of a disenchantment of the world through the reformation is however Alexandra Walsham, 'The Reformation and "The Disenchantment of the World" Reassessed', *Historical Journal*, 51 (2008): pp. 497–528. See also, Bob Scribner, 'Reformation and Descralization: From Sacramental World to Moralised Universe', in Bob Scribner and R. Po-Chia Hsia (eds), *Problems in the Historical Anthropology of Early Modern Europe* (Wiesbaden, 1997), pp. 75–92.

[44]   Peter Lake, 'Lancelot Andrewes, John Buckeridge and Avant-garde Conformity at the Court of James I', in Linda Levy Peck (ed.), *The Mental World of the Jacobean Court* (Cambridge, 1991), pp. 113–33; Peter Lake, 'Anti-Puritanism. The Structure of a Prejudice', in Kenneth Fincham and Peter Lake (eds), *Religious Politics in post-Reformation England. Essays in Honour of Nicholas Tyacke* (Woodbridge, 2006), pp. 80–97; Lori A. Ferrell, *Government by Polemic. James I, the King's Preachers and the Rhetoric of Conformity* (Stanford

theology which Andrewes, Buckeridge and likeminded clergymen preached was, in a manner of speaking, an attempt to re-enchant a world which the impact of a rather arid Calvinist theology and a piety centred exclusively on the word had rendered all too sober. As opposed to the pure and unadulterated ministry of the word the conformists emphasized the visual, the importance of symbols and ceremonies and not least that of the sacraments themselves. And such a ceremony was also the coronation and the act of anointing a king.[45]

In one of his many sermons to commemorate the Gowrie conspiracy, in this case in 1610 the year when Henry IV of France was murdered, Lancelot Andrewes discussed the special position of an anointed king, taking as his text one of James's favourite verses from Scripture, 'Touch not mine anointed' (I Chronicles chapter 16 and Psalm 105 respectively). According to Andrewes sacred authority conveyed by the coronation and the unction on a king could never be lost, whatever a king did: 'God's claim never forfeits; His character never to be wiped out or scraped out, nor Kings lose their right, no more than Patriarchs did their fatherhood'.[46] Therefore the papists – and when Andrewes spoke of papists he often meant Puritans as well – were quite wrong when they argued that kings could be deposed.

But in emphasizing the sacredness of kingship, Andrewes nevertheless made a distinction between the special religious sanction the unction at the coronation gave, and divine grace. He pointed out that royal 'unction gives not grace, but a just title only'. Even tyrants or heathens such as Cyrus the king of the Persians could rule as anointed kings, and the first king of the Jews, Saul, although anointed, had never as a man been holy or even particularly godly – 'with his anointing there came not grace to him'. The unction gave 'the administration

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CA, 1998); Anthony Milton, 'The Creation of Laudianism. A New Approach', in Thomas Cogswell et al. (eds), *Politics, Religion and Popularity in Early Stuart Britain. Essays in Honour of Conrad Russell* (Cambridge, 2002), pp. 162–84. Cf. Charles W.A. Prior, *Defining the Jacobean Church. The Politics of Religious Controversy, 1603–1625* (Cambridge, 2005); and Kenneth Fincham (ed.), *The Early Stuart Church, 1603–1642* (Basingstoke, 1993).

[45]   For the early Stuart coronations, clearly influenced by men such as Andrewes (as Dean of Westminster in 1603) and later Laud (as bishop in charge in 1626), see Roy C. Strong, *Coronation. A History of Kingship and the British Monarchy* (London, 2005), pp. 243–65, and Dougal Shaw, 'The Coronation and Monarchical Culture in Stuart Britain and Ireland, 1603–1661' (PhD thesis, Cambridge University, 2002).

[46]   Lancelot Andrewes, 'A Sermon preached before the King's Majesty, at Holdenby on the fifth of August, A.D. MDCX', in Lancelot Andrewes, *Ninety-Six Sermons* (5 vols, Oxford, 1841), vol. 4, pp. 43–76, at p. 58. For this sermon see also Robert Zaller, 'Breaking the Vessels: the Desacralization of Monarchy in Early Modern England', *Sixteenth Century Journal*, 29 (1998): pp. 757–78, at pp. 759–60.

to govern, not the gift to govern well, the right of ruling not the ruling right'.[47] Interestingly enough this sermon by Andrewes was quoted seventy years later by a Tory clergyman during the Exclusion crisis when defending divine right kingship word by word – a sign that this tradition of kingship *iure divino* was revived at the Restoration.[48]

As far as Andrewes was concerned, it was important for his argument to underline that kingship itself was sacred, not the king as an individual let alone as a Christian. Otherwise it would have been too easy to argue that ungodly kings could be deposed or at least brought to reason by active resistance. Moreover a legitimate ruler did not need the ceremony of the coronation to claim his right, he was anointed because he had inherited the crown, or as Andrewes put it, 'The ceremony doth not any thing only declareth what is done. The party was before as much as he is after it'. And 'who is anointed? On whom the right rests. Who is *inunctus*? He that hath it not'.[49]

Nevertheless there was an element of logical tension if not contradiction in Andrewes's line of argument here; on the one hand monarchy belonged squarely to the realm of nature not to the realm of grace or, as Andrewes's companion Buckeridge put it in his contribution to the Oath of Allegiance controversy, 'regnum autem regi non contulit gratia sive ecclesia sed natura et res publica', 'not grace or the church give the kingdom to the king but nature and the commonwealth'. For this very reason a bad king could not be deposed whereas a bad pope or bishop could very well be deposed, lacking the grace which was essential for rendering his rule legitimate.[50] On the other hand, this merely natural institution, kingship, bore somehow the imprint of God's own image and was therefore sacred. For this reason Andrewes could see Christ's 'Noli me tangere' which in his interpretation had to be seen as an admonition not to discuss the mystery of God's decrees and the nature of his majesty in too much detail as a principle which could also be applied to the *arcana imperii*, the

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[47]   Andrewes, 'Sermon on the fifth of August', pp. 57–8.

[48]   Thomas Barlow, *The Original of Kingly and Ecclesiastical Government* (London, 1681), p. 20. Chapter III (What is meant by Anoynting of Kings): 'If Religion make Kings, there there should have been of old no Kings, but those of Iudah, and now now no Kings, but those of Christendome. It is Ius regnandi that is meant by this Royal Anointing, and Unction confers not grace, but declares a just title only, Unxit in regem, he anointed him King, includes nothing but a iust title, excludes nothing but usurpation: gives him the administration to govern, not the gift to govern well, the right of ruling, not of ruling right'.

[49]   Andrewes, 'Sermon on the fifth of August', p. 58, cf. p. 51.

[50]   Joannes Episcopus Roffensis [John Buckeridge], *De potestate Papae in rebus temporalibus ... adversus Cardinalem Bellarminum* (London, 1614), p. 676: 'gratia sive ecclesia non tollit quod a natura datum est'.

mysteries of kingship.[51] This was an argument which James I was all too eager to employ to defend his policies against criticism. Thus he argued in 1616: 'That which concernes the mysterie of the Kings power, is not lawfull to be disputed: for that is to wade into the weaknesses of Princes, and to take away the mysticall reverence, that belongs unto them that sit in the Throne of God'.[52]

If the legitimate heir to the crown was ipso facto anointed, one might assume that the coronation and the actual unction were entirely superfluous as ceremonies, but it was difficult to conceive of kingship as a sacred institution if this sacredness did not become visible at some point, and for making the sacred character of kingship visible rituals such as the coronation or the healing of the sick or other ceremonies and public performances were in the last resort as indispensable as the liturgy of the church was for making God's majesty in some sense visible and tangible – something mere words could never achieve. This was at least the theology Andrewes and Buckeridge subscribed to in so far as the celebration of the Eucharist was concerned and this was bound to have an impact on their political theology as well.[53] In any case, it would be a mistake to assume that a coronation ceremony which no longer had a clear constitutional meaning and did no longer change the legal status of the man or woman who was crowned but only affirmed their status was therefore devoid of any deeper symbolic meaning. Rather one can argue with Alice Hunt, 'The fact of kingship is given dramatic expression through this ceremony and its regalia, and the notion ... that royal authority is synonymous and embodied in its symbols is recast [after the Reformation, RGA]'.[54]

The image of divine right kingship which Andrewes and other conformists developed must be seen in a wider context than that of a history of political thought or political theology as such. It was not a mere theory; rather it was closely linked to a new ideal of churchmanship and a certain kind of post-Calvinist piety. In fact as Malcolm Smuts has argued recently, 'Since the 1590s, conformist clergy had attempted to link divine right arguments to a liturgical emphasis characteristic of anti-Puritan theology ... they sought in addition to show that Christianity's sacred texts and rituals were suffused

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[51]	Lake, 'Avant-garde Conformity', p. 119.

[52]	*King James VI and I: Political Writings,* (ed.) Johann P. Sommerville (Cambridge, 1994), 20 June 1616, p. 211.

[53]	Buckeridge rejected a piety which was centred exclusively on the word, neglecting rituals and images as 'a gargleism only, to wash the tongue and mouth' and Andrewes argued in a similar way against 'sermon hypocrites'. Lake, 'Avant-garde Conformity', pp. 117–18, quoting John Buckeridge, 'A Sermon preached at the funeral of Lancelot Andrewes'.

[54]	Hunt, *Drama*, p. 87.

with royalist symbols, indicating that submission to kings was fundamental to Christian piety'.[55]

It is interesting to compare Andrewes's thought on the meaning of the royal unction and on the role of an anointed king with a radically Calvinist position, admittedly from a later period. When Charles II was crowned as king of Scotland in January 1651, this was the nearest the Scottish Presbyterians ever got to creating the sort of sober, humble and de-sacralized kingship they had always hoped for, although the new king Charles II himself was hardly the right candidate for this kind of monarchy.[56] The coronation was staged as a mostly civil, rather than religious, ceremony and the king was not anointed, but as the minister Robert Douglas who gave the sermon pointed out, 'the anointing with grace is better than the anointing with oil'. If the king was a good Christian he was truly the Lord's anointed. And 'it is more worth for a King to be the Anointed of the Lord with Grace than the Greatest monarch of the World'; however, Douglas also remarked 'few kings are so anointed'. As for the material unction with oil, it had no place in a Christian coronation. In the time of the Old Testament kings had in fact been anointed but so had priests and prophets; moreover this act of anointing was only 'typicall' that is it prefigured the life of God's only true Anointed, Christ, and his mission. 'Christ being now come, all these ceremonies cease. And therefore the Anoynting of Kings may not be used in the New Testament'.[57]

Clearly if kingship was sanctified not by a religious ceremony but by God's grace then this grace could be lost or withdrawn, and kings therefore lose everything that rendered their government legitimate. A theology of kingship which stressed on the contrary the force of ceremonies, their 'performative' character, in revealing if not in constituting the legitimacy and sacredness of kingship seemed to offer a far more reliable foundation for monarchical rule. The debate about the role of ceremonies such as kneeling in receiving the communion which gave rise to such acrimonious disputes in the Jacobean church and even more so in the Scottish Kirk was thus a controversy not just about the liturgy of the church but at least indirectly also about the ceremonies which gave kingship its special and potentially sacred character as Lori Ferrell as

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[55] Malcolm S. Smuts, 'Force, Love and Authority in Caroline Political Culture', in Ian Atherton and Julie Sanders (eds), *The 1630s: Interdisciplinary Essays on Culture and Politics in the Caroline Era* (Manchester, 2006), pp. 28–49, at p. 36.

[56] Shaw, *Coronation*, pp. 76–182.

[57] Robert Douglas, *The Form and Order of the Coronation of Charles the Second, King of Scotland, England, France and Ireland. As it was acted and done at Scoone ... 1651* (Aberdeen, 1700), pp. 20 and 18.

pointed out.[58] At least Andrewes and other conformists tried to give the debate a twist which implied that their opponents were not only troublesome in religion but also disloyal in political matters. Ceremonialists such as Buckeridge were certainly not alone in rejecting a right of resistance by mere subjects in particular when Catholic authors claimed such a right for their co-religionists, but it was nevertheless easier for them than for strict Calvinists to develop a consistent model of divine right kingship and to confer an aura of sacredness on monarchy thus making it immune against attacks by any ecclesiastical authority Protestant or Catholic.

V

Defenders of a strong monarchy both in France and in Britain faced similar problems at the beginning of the seventeenth century. In an age of rebellion and regicide kingship had to reinvent itself. The idea of an emphatically sacred divine right monarchy was an answer to this threat. In France the traditional *réligion royale* was revived while the claims of the extremer Catholics that both the pope and heroic individuals who were directly inspired by God could challenge the monarch's authority were firmly rejected. Against the over-enchantment which the enthusiastic piety of the Catholic League fostered a more secular vision of politics was propagated for which the church was firmly subjected to the authority of a secular ruler who was primarily responsible for the well being of his subjects in this world and not for the salvation of their souls. However, much as the clericalist vision of politics promoted by men such as Jean Boucher was rejected in the last resort the French crown needed the Papacy to underwrite the king's claim to a sacred status and to contain the potentially politically disturbing tendencies of conciliarism. Hence the later alliance between the crown and the papacy against Jansenism which becomes visible in particular near the end of Louis XIV's reign.

In England in a Protestant country it was in many ways much more difficult to maintain or to revive the medieval *réligion royale* which England had shared before the Reformation with France. Doing so entailed almost automatically a debate about the role and meaning of all ecclesiastical ceremonies, not just the coronation. Reinvesting ceremonies with a deeper meaning beyond the threshold of what might be considered a mere diaphoron, however, risked undermining the precarious compromise on which the Church settlement rested in England. Moreover, in the same way in which the French king needed the pope's authority

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58   Ferrell, *Government*, pp. 140–66.

to underwrite his claim to some kind of sacred authority, much as the papacy's political pretensions were rejected, James I needed a strong episcopacy, which was based at least implicitly on a *iure iure divino* concept of the episcopal office.[59] Thus sacred kingship designed to combat a Presbyterian or Catholic clericalism gave rise to a new clericalism within the Church of England itself and ultimately to the religious divisions which were of such crucial importance for the outbreak of the Civil War and for the alignment of individuals and communities in this conflict.

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[59]   For episcopacy iure divino see Anthony Milton, *Laudian and Royalist Polemic in Seventeenth-Century England: The Career and Writings of Peter Heylyn* (Manchester, 2007), pp. 88, 117–20, and idem, *Catholic and Reformed: The Roman and Protestant Churches in English Protestant Thought, 1660–1640* (Cambridge, 1995), pp. 454–75. See also Johann P. Sommerville, 'The Royal Supremacy and Episcopacy "iure divino", 1603–1640', *Journal of Ecclesiastical History*, 34 (1984): pp. 548–58.

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Chapter 3

The Continental Counter-Reformation and the Plausibility of the Popish Plots, 1638–1642

Robert von Friedeburg

Could the prosecution of Protestants across the English Channel, in France, in Bohemia and in the Empire since 1620,[1] have helped to galvanize fears about popish plots into defensive action and to transfer religious commitment unto an understanding of the situation in 1642 as warranting self-defence? Does the European Counter-Reformation provide an ingredient to the 'semtex' of the 'psychological underpinnings of Puritanism'[2] that was allowed to ignite through the disintegration of royal government between 1638 and 1642? Since J.P. Cooper's remark that 'consciousness of what had happened abroad, of what

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[1] See, for instance, Thomas Kaufmann, *Dreissigjähriger Krieg und Westfälischer Friede* (Tübingen, 1998), pp. 24–154; Heinz Schilling, *Konfessionalisierung und Staatsinteressen* (Paderborn, 2007), p. 532 ff; Robert Bireley, *The Jesuits and the Thirty Years War: Kings, Courts, and Confessors* (Cambridge, 2003); Robert von Friedeburg, 'The Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation', in Howell Lloyd, Glenn Burgess, and Simon Hodson (eds), *European Political Thought, 1450–1700: Religion, Law and Philosophy* (New Haven, 2007), pp. 102–66. See especially pp. 141–6 on the Catholic Politica.

[2] John Morrill, 'England's Wars of Religion', and 'The Causes of Britain's Civil Wars', in Morrill, *The Nature of the English Revolution* (London, 1993), pp. 33–44; 245–72, 268–9 For religion as the central motif distinguishing those whom Charles chose to reconcile and not to reconcile, see Conrad Russell, *The Fall of British Monarchies 1637–1642* (Oxford, 1991), pp. 401, 526–7. For the extraordinary levels of mobilization of men under arms during the Civil Wars see David L. Smith, *A History of the Modern British Isles 1603–1707* (Oxford, 1998), pp. 145–9; on the importance of religion in motivating ordinary soldiers to fight see Glenn Burgess, 'Religious War and Constitutional Devence: Justifications of Resistance in English Puritan Thought, 1590–1643', in Robert von Friedeburg (ed.), *Widerstandsrecht in der frühen Neuzeit* (Berlin, 2001), pp. 185–206, 204–5.

absolutism meant in practise was one factor which made some Englishmen think it necessary to fight a Civil War',[3] this question has raised little research.[4]

David Cressy's detailed account of the upheaval during 1640–42 dedicates a whole part to pamphlets, but Germany appears only once in the index, though Cressy quotes 'England's Doxology' from 1641 with its warning: 'Look upon the Empire of Germany, what a havoc and desolation has the sanguine hand of war made there'. He adds Thomas Morton's 'England's Warning-Piece' from 1642 to illustrate the emphasis on the devastation Civil Wars produce and the main conclusion that most seem to have drawn from this, that Civil War must be avoided at all cost.[5] As we shall see, that was indeed an important though not the only possible conclusion that could be drawn from the plight of Germany. In what follows, a first section will review the place of the atmosphere of fear and conspiracy theories from November 1641 onwards on the one hand, and the major threats to Protestantism, in particular in Germany, since 1620 on the other (I). A second section will review some of the conclusions drawn from these events in pamphlets published in 1638 to 1642 (II). A third section will question what we can learn from these findings (III).

I

Since the 1580s the house of Habsburg had pursued an intensifying Counter-Reformation campaign within the Empire, in the *Erblanden* and in Bohemia. Both Catholic (for example, the Bavarian Wittelsbach) and reformed dynasties began to steer politics in the Empire toward confessional confrontation.

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[3]   J.P. Cooper, 'Differences between English and Continental Government', in Cooper, *Land, Men and Beliefs* (London, 1983), pp. 97–114, 104.

[4]   Exceptions are (though only for the later sixteenth century and not covering the 1640s) J.H.M. Salmon, *The French Wars of Religion in English Political Thought* (Oxford, 1959); Ian Roy, 'England Turned Germany? The Aftermath of the Civil War in European Context', *TRHS*, 5th series, 28 (1978): pp. 127–44; Julia Schleck, 'Fair And Balanced' News From The Continent: English Newsbook Readers and the Thirty Years War', *Prose Studies*, 29/3 (2007): pp. 323–35; see also the contribution of Mike Braddick in this volume. Interest in this issue runs directly against Conrad Russell's assumption of English political insularity with regard to the other British kingdoms, let alone with Europe, see Russell, *Fall of British Monarchies*, p. 525, also for blaming mainly Charles, his support of Laud and his unwillingness to reconcile with the Puritans, 530. For criticism of his argument see Morrill, *Nature of the English Revolution*, pp. 252–72, 258–9; for a recent 'defence' of Charles, see Mark Kishlansky, 'Charles I: A Case of Mistaken Identity', *Past and Present* 189 (2005): pp. 41–80.

[5]   David Cressy, *England on Edge: Crisis and Revolution, 1640–1642* (Oxford, 2006).

Frederick V's acceptance of his election as king of Bohemia in 1619 was part of this confrontational attitude and set in train a further escalation of conflict. His election entangled the German Habsburgs policies tightly with that of their Spanish cousins. According to the Spanish Royal Council specialist on the Empire, Balthasar Zuniga, Spanish reason of state demanded intervention in the Empire in order to recover Bohemia for Ferdinand II. For the election of Frederick of the Palatinate as king of Bohemia brought about the threat of a Protestant electoral majority in the Empire and thus the hypothetical possibility of a Protestant emperor. Such an emperor, however, might have threatened the enfeoffment of Spain with Imperial fiefs in Italy and a subsequent weakening of Spain's position vis-à-vis heretics elsewhere, including Flanders, where Zuniga had been an envoy in the service of Philip III. To counter this threat, a master plan was devised by the Spanish ambassador in Vienna, Count Onate. He suggested recruiting the Bavarian Wittelsbach and the Catholic League with Spanish money and giving the Palatinate electoral dignity to the Bavarian Wittelsbach as part of the distribution of the war-bounty. None of this was specifically 'Jesuit' or popish, but a mixture of Bavarian, Austrian and Spanish reason of state. But the result remained nonetheless devastating for Bohemian and subsequently German Protestants. Thus, English pamphlets and sermons painting a Continental Catholic threat, though endowed with zealous religious hyperbole, were not entirely based on fiction.[6]

As Bohemia was recaptured by the Catholic League and Protestant noblemen lost lands and lives, their lands being given to Catholic followers of the Habsburg cause from all over Europe, the plight of Protestants found its way into English sermons, where 'ordinary parishioners' wondered about their fate.[7] Given the dramatic nature of the Counter-Reformation across the Channel, from the massacres among Protestants in Paris and Antwerp in the 1570s to the fall of La Rochelle 1628, and from the persecution of Protestants in Bohemia to the Catholic triumphs in Germany during the 1620s and 1630s, it is little wonder that Protestants on the British Isles cared and worried.[8]

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[6]   Maximilian Lanzinner, 'Spanien: Bayern an der Seite einer Weltmacht im Dreissigjährigen Krieg', in Alois Schmid and Katharina Weigand (eds), *Bayern Mitten in Europa: Vom Frühmittelalter bis ins 20. Jahrhundert* (Munich, 2005), pp. 153–67.

[7]   Thomas Cogswell, 'The Politics of Propaganda: Charles I and the People in the 1620s', *Journal of British Studies*, 29 (1990): pp. 187–215, esp. p. 188.

[8]   In this respect, Cooper is well supported in his main conclusions by more recent assessments on the situation in France and Germany; see, for instance, Lucien Bely, *Louis XIV, le plus grand roi du monde* (Paris, 2005), pp. 58–98; Lucien Bely, *La France en XVII siecle. Puissance de l'Etat, controle de la societe* (Paris, 2009), pp. 551–601; Tomas Kos, 'Die Konfiskationen von 1620 in (erb)-länderübergreifender Perspektive. Thesen zu

No matter how controversial the causes of the British Wars of Religion, historians seem broadly to agree that while even during 'the early part of the reign of Charles I, nearly every conflict between subject and sovereign ... resulted from fear', an 'experience of anxiety, mistrust, and fear' was overshadowing in particular the period after the news on the rebellion in Ireland had reached England. In the wake of the Irish Rebellion, allegations of popish plots multiplied and contributed significantly to the 'polarization of opinion in England'.[9] Most historians agree that until October 1641, and indeed even until whatever triggered the failed arrest of the Five Members of Parliament in January 1642, no Civil War had been on the horizon.[10] But once the Parliament had moved to raising arms and the king had left London, the issue of the defence of the realm by the Parliament as Great Council of the king gained significance.[11] A good deal not only of the actual raising of the militias, opposed by ordinary subjects as in Somerset and Kent,[12] but also of the legitimacy of whatever remained in London of the Parliament originally assembled, did rest less on the plausibility of the constitutional rationale of the Great Council of Parliament, or of Parliament as supreme court of jurisdiction itself, or on other explanations made as the crisis went along,[13] but on the plausibility of the dangers associated with the alleged immediate threat of the Irish rebellion, a possible popish invasion and on the

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Wirkungen, Aspekten und Prinzipien des Konfiskationsprozesses', in Petr Mat'a and Thomas Winkelbauer (eds), *Die Habsburgermonarchie 1620–1740* (Stuttgart, 2006), pp. 99–130; Arno Strohmeyer, *Konfessionskonflikt und Herrschaftsordnung. Widerstandsrecht bei den österreichischen Ständen, 1550–1650* (Mainz, 2006), pp. 342–87.

[9]   Kishlansky, 'Charles I', p. 80; Cressy, *England on Edge*, p. xi; Russell, *Fall*, p. 415. For an example of the immense regional popular mobilization and willingness to take up arms for a defence against a popish plot, see John Walter, *Understanding Popular Violence in the English Revolution: The Colchester Plunderers* (Cambridge, 1999); John Morrill, 'The Attack on the Church of England in the Long Parliament', *Nature of the English Revolution*, pp. 69–90. On the nature of the rebellion in Ireland, see See Jane H. Ohlmeyer, *Civil War and Restoration in the Three Stuart Kingdoms* (Dublin, 2001), pp. 100–26.

[10]   Alan Cromartie, *The Constitutionalist Revolution: An Essay on the History of England, 1450–1642* (Cambridge, 2006), p. 260.

[11]   Michael Mendle, 'The Great Council of Parliament and the First Ordinances: The Constitutional Theory of the English Civil War', *Journal of British Studies*, 31 (1992): pp. 133–62.

[12]   See T.P.S. Woods, *Prelude to Civil War, 1642: Mr Justice Malet and the Kentish Petitions* (Salisbury, 1980).

[13]   On either 'legislative sovereignty' or 'adjucative supremacy' in the words of Alan Cromartie, *Constitutionalist Revolution*, p. 264. On the idea of the Great Council see Mendle; on the impression that theory does not count here for a lot, since members of Lords and Commons made up what seemed necessary after decisions had been taken, see Russell, *Fall*, p. 482.

subsequent struggle for control of armed forces between King and Parliament. This threat might have been a major contributing factor as to why in 1642, in contrast to 1688, the 'centre failed to hold'.[14] And it is this threat that might have gained in plausibility by decades of news about the Continental Counter-Reformation.

Pamphlet propaganda was an important ingredient in shaping the perception of threats and fears, one of 'the two seed plots of this warre'.[15] To an extent, it was a tool with a view to 'capturing the middle ground'. And it appears that Charles' opponents had achieved such a capture to a significant extent by January 1642.[16] Hardly any Englishmen participating in the events of 1640 to 1642 had been a contemporary to the sixteenth-century French wars of religion. But almost all had been exposed to the steady flow of information on the Thirty Years War and the alleged overwhelming of Protestantism in Bohemia and the rest of the Empire during the 1620s and 1630s. Many had been touched by the 'patriot propaganda' in favour of French Huguenots at La Rochelle and of the pamphlet literature and sermons asking English subjects to mind the plight of their Bohemian brethren abroad.[17] But the material available to Englishmen on these threats emphasized both: the danger of the papists and the terrible consequences of Civil War. It was anything but pointing into the direction of taking up arms in any straightforward way precisely for that latter reason. But references in pamphlets published during 1638–43 shifted from insisting that civil unrest had to be avoided at all cost to concluding that in order to forestall a similar fate the country had to be put in a state of defence.

II

The 1620s and 1630s had seen a reasonable steady flow of pamphlets informing readers about the plight of Germany. These might, for simplicity's sake, be

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[14]   John Morrill, 'County Communities and the Problem of Allegiance in the English Civil War', Morrill, *Nature of the English Revolution*, pp. 179–90, 188.

[15]   As a scholar from Oxfordshire put it in 1642, quoted in Jason Peacey, 'Henry Parker and the Parliamentary Propaganda in the English Civil Wars', PhD Dissertation, University of Cambridge (1994), p. 1. See also Jason Peacey, *Politicians and Pamphleteers. Propaganda during the English Civil Wars and Interregnum* (Aldershot, 2004).

[16]   Conrad Russell, *The Causes of the English Civil War* (Oxford, 1990), p. 133; Russell, *Fall*, pp. 450–51. On the dissemination of radical views see David Como, 'Secret Printing, the Crisis of 1640, and the Origins of Civil War Radicalism', *Past and Present*, 196 (2007): pp. 37–82.

[17]   See Cogswell, 'Politics of Propaganda'.

divided into a number of different genres. There were straightforward news items. They added a number of events, either focusing on specific theatres of events, as in 1620 'The last news from Bohemia', or earlier on the Cleve-Julich War of Succession, or more general, as 'The certaine and True News, from all the parts of Germany and Poland to this present 29 of October 1621'. There was also information on specific issues, like the 'Articles of agreement between the princes of the Union [that is, the Protestant Union] and the Lord Marquis Spinola' from April 1621. They would emphasize their neutrality in relating the information and the 'notability' of what they had to tell, the 'matters of great weight and consideration' that they related.[18]

Of a similar provenance were printed letters or other documents of a more or less authentic nature informing the reader about certain details and background.[19] 'His Majesties Manifest touching the Palatinate Course', printed in Edinburgh 1641, belongs to this category, together with the added 'Humble Remonstrance of the Estates of Parliament to his Sacred Majesty, concerning the Prince Elector Palatine' of September 1641. More or less regular 'courantos' and news books, advertising themselves as being in continuous business of informing the readers,[20] probably make up the majority of the printed pamphlet material.

Of another provenance were detailed descriptions of plundering, sufferings or specific events with a view to make a specific point, like the 'Tragical relation of the plundering, butchering, ravishing of the women and frying of the town of Pawwalke in Pomerland' (1631), on the one hand, and reflections connected to descriptions, like the 'Bewayling of the Peace in Germany' (on the peace of Prague, from a French point of view, 1635), or the 'Lamentations of Germany, Wherin, as in a glasse, we may behold her miserable condition, and reade the woeful effects of sinne' (1638), emphasizing the destruction of the country and its population. The 'Devotions and Formes of Prayer Daily used in the King of Sweden's Army' (1632), part of a larger enterprise on 'Swedish Discipline', stressed the connection to the discipline of the people of Israel and their wars, and the Swedish king's piety (pp. 29–32). None of the above is meant to suggest that the more or less detailed news pieces of the above category were more objective then this second category. On the contrary,[21] but the 'News' items did hesitate in making direct conclusions on what they had to tell.

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18   Like an anonymous pamphlet of 1622, 2 August.

19   Like the 'Letter sent from Mannheim concerning the late defeate of the Duke of Brunswicke by Tilly, 1622'; or the 'Apology of the Illustrious Prince Ernestus, Earle of Mansfield ... 1622'.

20   Like September 2 Number 37 1631 'The continuation of our forraine avisos ... '.

21   For instance, both the 'Humble Remonstrance' of the Scottish Estates concerning the leaving of soldiers out of the country, and the response of the king, printed, insisting of

In the period 1638 to 1643 a rough and ready estimate of the approximate total of publications concerning Germany and the Thirty Years War, in the widest of senses, runs around 70, as opposed to an approximate total of about 130, for the two decades from 1618 to 1637.[22] These were unequally distributed across these six years, with around a dozen in 1638, less then five in 1639 and 1640, and ten and twenty-nine in 1641 and 1642, including different versions of the same pamphlet. There had been, already in 1619, individual publications using fake news to alert Protestants of what was going to come, for example 'A conference held at Angelo Castle between the Pope, the Emperor, and the king of Spain', describing the strategic plans for the extermination of heresy, that is, Protestantism, in Europe, including a shrewd assessment of the risks and dangers facing each of the three princes even from their Catholic neighbours, and the mobilization of 'assassins' of the likes of Ravaillac and Clément and authors of pamphlets like Suarez, Parsons and Bellarmine. The conversation, in verse-form, thus primarily invigorated the Protestant reader against the dangers from popish plots for Christian princes.

The publications from 1638 to 1643 still contained a regular flow of news, both broad and detailed, from 'Abstracts of forreigne occurrences' over a couple of months to detailed descriptions, such as the 'True and brief relation of the bloody battle between Duke Bernhard of Weimar and general of the Emperor' (1638). But now, both warnings and prophecies concerning the disastrous nature of any Civil War and the dangers to England and Scotland if any such thing should happen, and applications of whatever was to be learnt from the events in Germany took a larger share. 'The Lamentation of Germany ... Wherein, as in a Glasse, we may behold her miserable condition, and read the woefull effects of sinne' (1638) is one example of this tendency.

Indeed, by 1638 and the confrontation between the Scottish tables and the king, Germany had become infamous for the utter devastation brought about by Civil War. One sort of conclusion with respect to 'the cup of wrath' that it was now drinking (Lamentations, preface) were the sins it had committed earlier, and the subsequent need for reform at home. Following the sign of a 'blazing star' in 1617, the pamphlet depicts graphically torture, rape, starvation, robbery, not to mention the eating of human flesh by Croats and starving Germans alike. Pamphlets like 'A lamentable list of certain Hideous Frightful and Prodigious signs' collected since 1618 and having been appearing until the year of publication made a similar point. John Drury's 'Motive to Induce the Protestant Princes to work for Ecclesiastical Peace' of 1639 pursued his agenda

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his right to order Scottish soldiers at his will, had direct political intentions.

[22]   This is arguably not very much, seeing that figures run for 800 (1640), 2,000 (1641) and more than 4,000 (1642). See Cressy, *England on Edge*, p. xiii.

to reduce confessional strife among Protestant princes to allow them to be better prepared to 'oppose the Austrian and Papal designs against Protestants' (p. 8, no. 7). Henry Parker's 'Manifold miseries of Civil Wars and discord in a Kingdome: by the examples of Germany, France, Ireland and other places, with some memorable examples of God's justice, in punishing the authors and causers of rebellion and treason' of 1642 is an example of an important current in many pamphlets, an overriding concern with the perils of Civil War. As late as 1642, even the author of the 'Observations upon some of his majesties late Answers and Expresses' simultaneously warned against the terrible consequences of internal strife.[23] Of a slightly different provenance were reminders of the consequences of religious fanaticism, like 'A warning for England especially for London in the famous History of the Frantic Anabaptists and their wild Preachings and Practises' (1642). But all these agreed in their fundamental direction of argument. No matter what the problems in matters of religion, Civil War had to be avoided at all cost, for the undermining of all order and the slide into chaos was worse then any other set of circumstances.[24]

Many more references to the plight of Protestants on the continent were emphasizing the misery of war, and many indeed connected certain events on the continent, and possibly soon at home, with cosmic signs and predictions. For instance, 'Brightman's Predictions and Prophecies concerning the three churches of Germany, England and Scotland, foretelling the fall of the pride of the Bishops in England by the Assistance of the Scottish Kirk' (1641) proved the working of divine providence in the disasters in Germany and the Scottish Assistance for England. In a 'Revelation to Mr Brightman's revelation' of the same year, the torturing of Protestants in Germany is vividly related to a curious citizen (pp. 10–11), and the narrow escape of the Scottish churches from the plotting of the 'Frenchman Spaniard and Pope' (17), and the need to extirpate any 'lukewarmness' (24) from the Church of England in order to forego God's wrath and endure Germany's fate. Prophecies based on the interpretation of a comet as the original cause for the 'present miseries of Germany, England and Ireland' (1642), warnings against sedition, as further editions of the '*Warning for England especially for London in the famous History of the Frantick Anabaptists*' (1642) demonstrate the interest in linking, in various ways, the momentous events in England and Scotland and Ireland to the plight of Germany.

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[23] On Parker's later career see Michael Mendle, *Henry Parker and the English Civil War: The Political Thought of the Public's 'Privado'* (Cambridge, 2003); Jason Peacey ('Henry Parker', p. 84) dismisses this piece as 'inconsequential', for it did not seem to fit Parker's 'Observations'.

[24] See David Cressy's conclusion in *England on Edge*, p. 413: 'Nobody wanted war'.

There was also, however, allegedly specific information on 'Jesuits Plots and Counsels, Plainly discovered to the most unlearned, Also how their counsels brought Germany into these long and bloody wars …' (1642). The pamphlet with this title argued, for example, that it was 'well known, the Jesuit's plots and counsels are utterly against Parliaments, and all Government were commons have any hand', because 'one man is easier dealt with then many' (pp. 1–2). Therefore Venice allegedly abandoned its commons under their influence. 'The King of Spain, guided by their counsels, lost the Low Countries by endeavouring to make them slaves' (p. 2). Such 'counsels' entered England with the 'French Queen and her Jesuits'. Such counsels divided the 'Protestant Princes in Germany at the beginning of the wars there … Oh that the Lord would please to make England wise by all the misery of our neighbours about us! Especially Germany – [(in the margin): when the Emperor laboured to reduce it to slavery] – who had suffered such long and woeful calamity, and was brought into it by the same ways the Papists now go about to bring misery upon us: for they pretended the authority of the Emperor, whom they had on their side, and great Love and friendship to those Protestants called Lutherans, and laboured to incense them against those Protestants called Calvinists, who are reformed and farthest from popery, and did at length so divide them, as the Duke of Saxony with his great strength took on the Emperors side, and so the Landgrave of Darmstadt and others who had great countries under their command' (p. 3). The pamphlet deplores the state of neutrality some German princes tried to take, for precisely this neutrality allowed the war to rage 'for about a dozen years' (p. 3), since it allowed the neutral princes to be suppressed, too. Indeed, 'our troubles [in England] would soon be ended, if the Lord please to give all the Protestants wisdom to side with the King and Parliament, and join them together, not with King and a faction of Papists and Arminians that would engrosse his majesty to themselves' (p. 4).

Even more urgent conclusions could be drawn. 'Camilton's Discovery of the Devilish Designes and Killing Projects of the Society of Jesuits of late years, Projected and by them hitherto acted in Germany, Intended, but graciously prevented in England, Translated out of a Latin Copy' and dedicated to the 'High Court of Parliament' (1641) asked God to deliver the land from 'all sedition and privy conspiracy, from all false doctrine and heresy'. Based on the alleged Latin original of the German Jesuit Johannes Camiltonus, this piece came as the reprint of a warning to the German electors written in 1607. Since all these plans were 'not till eleven years after the publication of this book brought upon the German Nation', 'our English Nation' was now supposed to have the benefit of hindsight from learning about these plans, because:

the same wheel of mischief that wrought all the worst of Germany since the year 1618 hath for some years last past been set also at work in England, Scotland and Ireland: witness all the factions and fractions in Church and State, the disturbances and discontents between the Prince and the people, the fearful division betwixt the Clergy and the Clergy, betwixt the Court and City, and betwixt the King and his commons, yea, even betwixt the two Crowns of England and Scotland, all which have received their birth and breeding from the devilish designs of those sons of division, the Society of the Jesuites ... And have undoubtedly broken out, and produced in short time, the like effects among us, that they have done in Germany, had not Almighty God in mere mercy to this Nation, and in his divine compassion to his poor Church in England thus ready to perish, stepped in to our rescue, by his blessed hand of providence stirring up the spirits of our noble Peers to represent to his sacred majesty the eminent danger, and graciously inclining his Royal Heart to hearken thereto in short time.

This pamphlet was a straightforward indictment of the Society of Jesus for their 'manner of wickedness', in particular their 'Whoredome, covetousness and Magicke' (p. 2). They were allegedly present everywhere, from taverns to the court. They recruited followers and abducted and tortured innocent people, from Graz in Austria to Fulda in Central Germany (pp. 10–11). Their aim was to manipulate the princes of German in order to 'bring the tyranny of the Spaniard, and the primacy of the pope, into Germany' (p. 20). The Edict of Restitution (1629), the hostility of the Bavarians against the Palatinate (p. 21), the failure of Saxony to support the Protestant cause more wholeheartedly (p. 21), all these 'things could never have fallen within compass of mine understanding, nor ever did, before such times as I heard them from the Principals and Head of the Society of Jesuits, together with many other particulars, which I held myself bound in Conscience to reveal the world, for the good of my country, and of the church of Christ ... '.

In a postscript to the reader, using a memorable formulation, the author rests assured that:

by this time thou [the reader] art able to discern the face of the times, and of thy self to make a true parallel betwixt Germany and us, and doth see evidently the foot steps of that mystery of Iniquity, which by the contrivements of the pragmaticall Society of Jesuites hath for many years been set at work amongst us. As there the foundations of their work was laid in working up on their diversities in opinions, and seconded by an advantage taken upon the several humours of the princes, propounding to each one some such ends as his nature most affected: So may I truly say they have done here also. To that other end was the pestilent Doctrine of

Arminius introduced merely to make a party that might prove strong enough in time to oppose the Puritan faction, as they styled it ... yet I offer myself that any man of ordinary understanding will confess, that within the space of this year last past our Land was already white to their harvest, the King's Majesty was wrought to an evil opinion of his people, the commons were grown discontented with the present government, two adverse armies were lodged in our land, and all this with a new whole Army of evil consequences brought on by the secret contrivements of our Adversaries, and on all hands the way was so prepared, Altars set up and Priests enough in readiness, that nothing was wanting to ripen their harvest for the fickle, but a Proclamation for setting up publique Masse in all our Churches: which things when I seriously considered, and now of late looking again upon the Regions, I discern what an alteration God hath begun to work amongst us by the pious endeavours of this happy parliament, I cannot but take up that saying of the Psalmist Ps 124 1,2,3, If the Lord had not been on our side, may England now say: if the Lord had not been on our side, when men rose up against us, they had then swallowed us up quick, when their wrath was against us ... If the plots of the pascificant Arminians had once set up the bridge of reconciliation, whereon the Protestant and Papist should have met, and the trap door had taken effect, then the swelling waves had gone over our Souls indeed ...

It is worth dwelling upon this section's formulation on the 'pascificant Arminians' and their trap in setting up a 'bridge of reconciliation'. Fortunately, to this tract, reconciliation was prevented. This passage is important with respect to our thinking about the actual transferral of religious commitments to a willingness to let Civil War happen. As Conrad Russell put it, 'commitments in matters of religion' became decisive for determining 'where and by whom the rule of law was threatened'.[25] Some of the arguments from the example of Germany, such as the above, were clearly meant to channel a commitment in matters of religion into perceiving compromise and reconciliation as dangerous pathways into destruction. For anyone submitting to such an argument, concessions to the king, in particular once the Irish Rebellion seemed to provide a concrete and immediate threat, were not a viable option anymore.[26]

Another example of how the events on the Continent could help to shape the reaction to the crisis at hand is Calybute Downing's 1641 'A Discursive Conjecture upon the reasons that produce a desired event of the present troubles of Great Britain, different from those of lower Germany, the Netherlands'.[27]

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[25]   Russell, *Causes*, p. 141.

[26]   Russell, *Fall*, p. 487.

[27]   On Downing, see Jason Peacey, 'Henry Parker and the Parliamentary Propaganda in the English Civil Wars', PhD dissertation, University of Cambridge (1994), pp. 16–17.

The intention was to inform all 'wise man', but in particular 'his majesty', about the 'Belgique confusions' (4). Downing works by comparison: the troubles in the Netherlands allegedly started with Philip's personal visit, the troubles in Scotland with Charles personal visit (6, 7); the initial troubles addressed the problem of bishops (9); 'notorious Innovations ... transacted in Rome' (10) meant to 'tie short ... [the] nobility' (10), 'the states being not so sleepy, as to suffer themselves to bee supplanted by a cunning consequent of a pernicious and unpleasing president, could not but stirre'. 'Now you shall find Philip the second, for achieving of his end afornamed, chose those himself instruments fit for usurpation and absolute dominion, and without doubt was the leader of these ministers ...' (12), 'indifferent instruments were driven to degenerate; to serve one man's will, and lay the foundations of all mans misery' (14). His examples are Archbishop Granville and the Duke of Alva, and he urges the reader, 'compare them with whom you see cause, and then take a view how their masters dealt with them, and it will be the shortest and surest rule of the uses they meant to make of them' (15). For despite the complaints of the nobility 'the king did not then remit him [Alva] to the state, for the trial of his pretended integrity, only cast a jealous eye upon him' (18). Instead of going himself to the Netherlands, Philip had 'no mind either to go himself or make good the pacification' (21).

In contrast, Downing hold, 'let us reflect a little and see how his Majesty carried the like proceedings to a more prosperous point, giving full way to sequester and punish all malignant delinquents' (25). To Downing's mind, Philip's reason to act as he did had been to become 'Head of the Holy League concluded in the Counsel of Trent, to make the Western World his Holy Land, and a fight Monarchy' (26). At the same time, it is 'most honourable, just, and safe for a supreme Potentate, who hath the sole power of choosing his own ordinary ministers, in exigents of state to give up notorious and manifest Ministers of ill Councils, both of state and justice ...' (34). '... And if private men may upon favour procure a privilege above, at least besides law, as in omitted cases, sure the state for the avoiding of present pressing evils and the obtaining of future good, may assume the power, as supposed to go the kings ways, to meet with those common enemies that keep no compasse' (35). '... Now that these men be let fall, as the proposers, as well as the executioners of ill advice, against the fundamental laws, and universal well being of his majesties dominions and accordingly proceeded withal by the Parliament ...' (36). Clearly, Downing did not propagate Civil War here, but he did insist that sacrificing his servants to parliamentary prosecution was the only legitimate option Charles had, not a compromise that he struck in order to accommodate and that should be bold in

favour of Charles and of a further willingness of Parliament to also compromise on other issues.

In the same year, Downing published 'A Discoverie of the false Grounds the Bavarian party have layd, to settle their own faction, and shake the Peace of the Empire, considered in the case of the Prince Elector Palatine ... with a discourse upon the Interest of England in that Cause' (1641). They 'dare not proclaim, nor profess the true reasons, which are Ambition, & usurpation, to the suppressing of liberties and Religion ...' (4). Downing argues that the reaction of Emperor Ferdinand II upon the election of Frederick of the Palatinate to the Crown of Bohemia 'was cast upon that course by the current necessity and excursion of the War' (5). The 'Elector that hath royal Dominium in a successive way is not such a simple subject, that he can be a rebel or a traitor to the Emperor of Germany ... Now such subjection cannot be pleaded for as due to the Roman Emperor ...' (9), for 'the government of Germany was Aristocraticall, giving the Emperor only the pre eminence to be President in the extraordinary' (12), and the subsequent denial of the reinstitution of the Elector was thus due to the instigation of the 'Jesuits and Bavarians' (9), a point that is actually borne out by research, for Bavaria did block any agreement with the Palatinate for its own reasons.[28]

In September 1640, the very same Downing had addressed the Company of Artillery in London with a sermon becoming (in)famous, and then published by order of Parliament, that addressed as one of the first the possibility of resistance against the king. Though couched in biblical terms, it refers early on to the threat of the Jesuits (7), that 'Novel College of Austrian Augurs' (7). From Moses and the war against the 'Amalekites cruelty' in Exodus 17 (9) and the conclusion that Moses had 'justifiable cause of a legal war' (10), Downing moves on stating that 'war itself is an appeal to heaven' (11), 'that states that move neither upon anger nor upon hatred but upon judgment and interest, necessity, public utility, universal safety ... cannot be mistaken in those affairs' (11), and that 'the first ground of a war is a war in just defence' (12). After spelling out the just wars of Israel, Downing comes back to his own time and the Jesuits:

> Let us speak out, they are the Jesuits, and the Iesuited faction, with their adherents, for they are of our kindred in religion, by extraction a Bastard brood that when we came out of Egypt mystical, they smote the hindmost, yea they have tried all ways to ruin church and state, by treasons, rebellions, invasions, divisions, civil wars, are fruit of their faction, fermented from cunning and mystical hatred, they have been the Abettors and plotters, the great Sticklers in all the disturbances of the Western World. (22)

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[28]   Lanzinner, 'Spanien: Bayern an der Seite'.

Their prosecution is necessary and legal, it is pursued in France, Poland and Venice (25), and since 'we profess ourselves protestants, and they protest us for heretics, and therefore we are no further safe, then they are cut short in power' (26). Consequently, those who 'revile the wisdom and representation of a state in parliament as a faction, a pack of Puritans … have taught the princes of Christendom Principles of tyranny' (29).

Listeners and readers were then asked to consider 'what you positively perform against them', though not as 'mere private men', but 'take care that Apostates are severely punished' (32–3). Finally, he asked the listeners and readers to

> consider, that in an exigent, an unexpected turn of state, perniciously procured by these British Amelekites: there are certain ways to come to the King for relieve and redress, which at other times are not allowable … Though it be not according to law, yet if you will fast and pray … Judicious Bishop Bilson speaks close in the Case, and I dare not condemn him [36, marginal note to Bilson, *Christian Subjects*, p. 28] … Secondly, consider that when a party by power breaks the Laws of the Land, that they may break the laws of God, and thereby force you to go along as their friends, or put you to make a stand, and so conclude you the State enemies, where the laws of the land are thus made by them too short for our security, the Laws of Nations come in for our relieve … salus populi should be sola and suprema lex … So for the safety of the body of the state, there are arcana, Latitudes allowed for security, especially when the enemies … have concluded, they lose not reputation, nor abuse religion, if they get their ends: In such a case Rationall Grotius is clear, that in gravissimo & certissimo discrimine, lex de non resistendo non obligat … (36–7).

The issue of the argument of self-defence in a state of necessity and its reception across the English Channel has been addressed elsewhere. When Bishop Bilson wrote, his point was to emphasize that while the constitutional situation in Germany and the Netherlands did allow the Dutch and German estates to defend themselves against the Spanish king and German emperor and that thus Elizabeth did legitimately support such defence, the situation of the English monarchy was fundamentally different. English subjects or estates, to Bilson, had no such right. Bilson, then, did not emphasize necessity and self-defence, but the constitutional rights of Dutch estates and German princes as independent magistrates in their own right. Thus, Alexander Balloch Grosart's 1937 entry into the *Dictionary of National Biography*, that Bilson's 'weapons forged to beat back the king of Spain were used against the Stuarts', is not entirely accurate.[29] In

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[29]   See Robert von Friedeburg, *Self-defence and Religious Strife in Early Modern Europe, England and Germany, 1530–1680* (Aldershot, 2002), for discussions of Bilson (pp. 171–6) and Grosart (p. 175).

the examples cited above, neither Downing nor Camilton's Discovery argue that Parliament or the Commons had a similar constitutional position as the German electoral princes, or that England was a loose federation of principalities, each with a right to self-defence against a figurehead-monarch. Rather, their examples merged argument from the people of Israel and their holy wars, from self-defence and its legitimacy in a case of necessity, with examples from the wars on the continent, the reality of Catholic prosecution and the terrible consequences of remaining unprepared for military self-defence. The story of the popish designs in the Netherlands and Germany transferred biblical and natural law legitimacy of God's war and self-defence into contemporary Europe to impress readers with the apparent immediate relevance of godly and academic argument for their own safety. Preparation for defence appeared to be a more prudent option then unconditional commitment to avoidance of Civil War. The conspiracy of 'pasificant Arminians' gained an awful concreteness.

Glimpses of evidence allow us to see to what extent such references to the Continent, and especially to Germany, had any receptive audience at all. Sir Simonds D'Ewes, in a speech delivered to the House of Commons 7 July 1641, referred to the Palatinate problem and recalled 'that the Jesuits have consulted for many years last past, as well as before, as since the furious wars in Germany, by what means to ruin the Evangelical princes and party there. Their chief aim hath been, so to divide the Protestant Princes amongst themselves, as they might be made use of each against other, for the ruin each of other' (5). From the war of succession over Julich-Cleve onwards they found means to do so, primarily through 'Ferdinand of Graz'. 'Pseudo Lutherans' such as the Saxons were another means at hand (6), the dissolution of the Protestant Union a result of their machinations (7); the fatal consequences were the fall of the Palatinate and of Bohemia (8–9). D'Ewes then deplored the lack of sufficient support for the Protestant cause from England during the 1620s (11) and the plan for a Spanish match. He concluded that the 'force and power of Great Britain' was then 'by subtle and wicked instruments divided against it' (12), but could be united again. He also reminded the audience of the fatal consequences of the popish plot, visible in the 'space of above twenty years last past, draw[ing] all the kingdoms and states of Europe into … engagement … a million of men, women and children destroyed by the sword, by flames, by famine, and by pestilence, and the sometime populous and fertile Empire of Germany reduced to a most extreme and calumnious desolation'.

In a letter from Samuel Hartlib to Alexander Henderson from 1642, published in 1643, Hartlib argues that to his mind the true origin of the war in Germany was not the 'quarrel of the Bohemians' (2), but 'there were other fore-going plots laid against the freedom of the Protestant Religion and their

Liberties in Germany'. The Palatinate had been a haven to Protestants; the university of Heidelberg had become a 'nurse to Protestant learning – this is why it was plotted against the Palatinate' (3). Protestants were divided in Germany amongst themselves, and 'out of Germany they have kept the thoughts and intentions of us in Great Britain busy another way, to divert us from giving assistance unto our afflicted brethren' (3). But 'the sum of all is this, that since they gained so much ground against the Protestant cause in Germany, that they thought their hopes might be brought to some good perfection, they have raised upon that foundation some further resolutions determined in the Papal conclave, how to deal in time to come with other Protestants, to bring them back again to Rome, or else to divide them, and distract them, so that they shall easily become prey to the Papists, as those of Germany are become. This resolution is to make propositions of peace, and of agreement betwixt Protestancy and popery. How far this Plot, and by what means it was advanced here in Great Britain, and how God had disappointed it, I need not relate ...' (4). Indeed, when printed, a minority reasonable enough had followed parts of Parliament to eschew compromise and rather engage in Civil War.

III

While in particular during the wars for domination of the Baltic among Sweden, Denmark, Poland and Russia, other then religious motives dominated,[30] there were severe religious tensions behind the original confrontations leading into the Thirty Years War. The fundamental disagreements among Protestants and Catholics about the legality of reformation in ecclesiastical principalities, the disintegration of the Imperial judiciary in the wake of the quarrel over the administration of Magdeburg, the struggle over Donauwörth and its occupation by the duchy of Bavaria, the conflict in Bohemia – all these issues were religious in nature, though they raised constitutional issues in their wake. By the same token, a large number of Lutheran dynasties, primarily in electoral Saxony and Hesse-Darmstadt, had no reason to worry about the security of their confessional arrangement and every reason to side with the Emperor for other, political objectives. There were considerable differences in the aims and strategies among

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[30]   Robert Frost, *The Northern Wars: War, State and Society in Northeastern Europe, 1558–1721* (Harlow, 2000); Anton Schindling, 'Kriegstypen in der frühen Neuzeit', in Dietrich Beyrau et al.(eds), *Formen des Krieges: Von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart* (Paderborn, 2007), pp. 99–120; Franz Brendle and Anton Schindling (eds), *Religionskriege im Alten Reich und in Alteuropa* (Münster, 2006), in particular Franz Brendle, Anton Schindling, 'Religionskriege in der frühen Neuzeit' pp. 15–52.

Lutheran dynasties just as among Catholic dynasties – for instance between the Catholic German Habsburg and the Wittelsbach about the actual realization of the electoral transferral – and between reformed and Lutheran dynasties. The Archbishop and electoral prince of Mainz led the princely opposition against Habsburg's military preponderance in 1629/30; the Lutheran Hesse-Darmstadt and Calvinist Hesse-Cassel dynasties arguably fought against each other the most prolonged and bitter conflict of all those making up the Thirty Years War.[31]

A good deal of this significant relative emancipation of dynastic and political war-aims from confessional allegiance had to do with the overwhelming importance of the princes as main political players. Limited primarily by their scarce financial resources, it remained nevertheless their initiative to prepare and go for war. War propaganda accompanied the war – it was hardly essential for waging it. Territorial estates within the princely territories, whether in Catholic Austria, mixed Julich-Cleve or Reformed Hesse-Cassel were, in any case, overwhelmingly hostile to any war effort, whatever reason was presented to them. While steadfast in the confessional allegiance they had chosen, they stuck to the notion that wars of their princes were not what was going to serve their ends.[32] Protestant pamphlet literature reflected this stand. There was the Protestant equivalent of the Catholic 'hate in print,'[33] primarily aiming at the popish Antichrist, the Black Legend of Spanish blood-thirst, and occasionally, as during the fighting in Pomerania in the early 1630s, references to Old Testament

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[31]   Heinz Schilling, 'Der Westfälische Friede und das Neuzeitlich Profil Europas', in Heinz Durchhardt (ed.), *Der Westfälische Friede* (Oldenburg, 1998), pp. 3–32; Axel Gotthard, *Konfession und Staatsräson. Die Außenpolitik Württembergs unter Herzog Johann Friedrich, 1608–1628* (Stuttgart, 1992); Axel Gotthard, 'Politice seint wir Bäpstisch'. Kursachsen und der deutsche Protestantismus im frühen 17 Jahrhundert', *Zeitschrift für Historische Forschung*, 20 (1993): pp. 275–319; Heinz Schilling, 'Gab es um 1600 in Europa einen Konfessionsfundamentalismus? Die Geburt des internationalen Systems in der Krise des konfessionellen Zeitalters', in *Jahrbuch des Historischen Kollegs, 2005* (Munich, 2006), pp. 69–93; Heinz Schilling, Das schwedische Kriegsmanifest vom Juli 1630 und die Frage nach dem Charakter des Dreissigjährigen Krieges, in *Europa und die Europäer. Quellen und Essays zur modernen europäischen Geschichte* (Stuttgart, 2005); Horst Rabe, *Reich und Glaubensspaltung* (Munich, 1989), pp. 364–405; Volker Press, *Kriege und Krisen. Deutschland 1600–1715* (Munich, 1991); Georg Schmidt, *Geschichte des Alten Reiches* (Munich, 1999), pp. 150–54.

[32]   Strohmeyer, Widerstandsrecht; Robert von Friedeburg, 'Why did Seventeenth-Century Estates Address the Jurisdictions of their Princes as Fatherlands? War, Territorial Absolutism and the Duties of Patriots in Seventeenth-Century German Political Discourse, in Randolph C. Head, Daniel Christensen (eds), *Orthodoxies and Heterodoxies in German-Speaking Lands: Religion: Politics and Culture 1500–1700* (Leiden, 2007), pp. 169–94.

[33]   Luc Racaut, *Hatred in Print: Catholic Propaganda and Protestant Identity During the French Wars of Religion* (Aldershot, 2002).

crusading, calling all men to arms and referring to the Wars of the people of Israel under God.[34]

But more characteristic was the overwhelming Lutheran plea for peace to be achieved by a proper understanding of the 1555 peace of Augsburg and its implementation that had, to estate assemblies all over Germany, secured each by his confession for quite a while.[35] Since 1630, the fact of foreign intervention and the prolongation of bloodshed were lamented in print all over Germany, while a number of dynasties, such as the German Habsburgs, the Bavarian Wittelsbach, and the House of Hesse, fought on for their specific dynastic aims. In particular the Calvinist Hesse earned the bitter resentment of its people for the bloodshed it incited. Though the Counter-Reformation was a grim fact in many parts of Germany, in particular Eichsfeld, around Munster and in the lands of the Habsburgs, estates there were reminded by their fellow Lutherans elsewhere that resistance to princely politics was not an issue, and that in many of these cases, the stipulations of 1555 allowed Catholic princes to do as they did. There was virtually no place for popular mobilization in the political landscape; if popular mobilization occurred at all, then in resistance actions against princely politics.[36] There was a reading public of lower noblemen, estate assemblies, university scholars and citizens of cities such as Nuremberg, but the pamphlets written for them had hardly any impact on the actual prosecution of the war. Only on the territorial level itself, where princes and estate opposition clashed occasionally, pamphlet production addressed directly those whose decision counted.[37]

Having said this, what we know from issues of allegiance even in localities that can clearly claim to be Puritan model stronghold shows a different, though equally problematic light on the issue of pamphlets, petitions, propaganda and 'public opinion'. Though in England, Scotland and Ireland, families of the nobility and higher gentry played a vital role in taking the political lead and eventually leading the war effort,[38] influence like that of the Barringtons in Essex

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[34]   Friedeburg, *Self-Defence*, pp. 133–9. See also Jacob Fabricius, *Einunddreissig Kriegsfragen. Von dem itzigen erbärmlichen Kriege in Deutschland* (Stettin, 1631).

[35]   Thomas Kaufmann, *Dreissigjähriger Krieg und Westfälischer Friede* (Tubingen, 1998).

[36]   Friedeburg, *Self-defence*, ch. 4.

[37]   See for example the case of Julich Cleve, where the Prince Elector of Brandenburg found it necessary to seek support in the principality by publishing a pamphlet denouncing estate opposition ('Cleefsche Patriot', 1647) and the estates countered with their 'Ontdeckinge van den valschen Cleefschen Patriot' of the same year.

[38]   J.S.A. Adamson, 'The Baronial Context of the English Civil War', *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 5th series, 40 (1990): pp. 93–120; Mark Kishlansky, 'Saye no More', *Journal of British Studies*, 30 (1991): pp. 399–448.

did not rest on an embryonic bureaucratic apparatus of a territorial state.[39] Nor could the gentry in any county count on unquestioned obedience from their tenants and labourers, less still from other members of the 'middling sort'.[40] A case in point is the village Earls Colne. Located in the Sussex–Essex cloth belt, it was part of one of the most 'ferociously Protestant regions'. Indeed, it housed Nonconforming ministers qualifying as:

> Puritans and common villagers refusing to kneel at communion, among them local church wardens and constables. During the 1590s to 1620s, it saw a veritable Puritan reformation of manners, including a viable Sabbatarianism against neighbourly recreations. Of the family of the resident owners of the two manors, one became a saint who ultimately left for New England and one a colonel in the army of the Eastern Association during the Civil War. Yet for all these pieces of evidence on the Puritanism of many of its inhabitants, it is problematic to conclude any collective sense of 'Puritanism' among the village population or any sense of unquestioned obedience to the religious choices of the lords of the manor. Indeed, the local reformation of manners remained embedded in fierce local conflicts and added to already existing economic and social tensions.[41]

Over nearly half a century of local conflict, a staunch local opposition to the religious and economic regime of the Puritan squires developed: 'The

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[39]   William Hunt, *The Puritan Moment: The Coming of Revolution in an English County* (Cambridge, 1983), pp. 233–73.

[40]   See Morrill, *Nature of the English Revolution*, pp. 179–90, 189–90.

[41]   Robert von Friedeburg, 'Reformation of Manners and the Social Composition of Offenders in an East Anglian Cloth Village: Earls Colne, Essex, 1631–1642', *Journal of British Studies*, 29 (1990): pp. 347–85, 352–6. In addressing a point of view as Puritan, I follow the suggestions by John Morrill ['The Northern Gentry and the Great Rebellion', *Northern History*, 25 (1979): pp. 66–87] and Peter Lake, *The Boxmakers Revenge: Orthodoxy, Heterodoxy and the Politics of the Parish in Early Stuart London* (Yale, 2001), pp. 389–93. Lake, 391–2, rightly emphasizes that Puritanism as such had little to do with social control as a functional tool to increase local cohesion, and indeed, in Earls Colne, the Puritan aspects of the Reformation of manners, such as the Sabbatarianism and the indictment of neighbours for playing football at Sunday, led to severe problems of social control. See Friedeburg, 'Reformation of Manners', pp. 373–7. The fact that contemporaries were well aware precisely of the disruptive features of the Puritan reformation of manners, that nevertheless could contain elements of what is conveniently labeled as social control, was long ago summarized by Keith Wrightson, 'Two Concepts of Order: Justices, Constables and Jurymen in Seventeenth Century England', in J. Brewer and J. Styles, (eds), *An Ungovernable People: The English and Their Law in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries* (London, 1980), pp. 21–46.

Harlakenden family's commitment to the Puritan mission served to separate them, and their supporters, from the village as a whole'.[42] No matter how Puritan the county of Essex and the village of Earls Colne and its leading gentry family, or how potentially persuasive their pressure as local lord of a manor on tenants and subtenants, the inhabitants of this village could be anything but bullied into submitting to the course of its local gentry leadership. Local opposition confronted supporters of the Harlakendens in physical attacks, disturbed the local church service conducted by the minister of the Harlakendens and kept playing football on Sunday. In 1638, a man was even presented for 'pissing in the clock chamber [and] easing himself near the chancel door'. In 1641 a Thomas Harvy was questioned by the justice of the peace for removing the Prayer Book from the church, throwing it into a nearby pond, recollecting it the next morning, cutting it then into pieces and burning some of them, throwing some away and keeping some in his pocket.[43]

It is questionable whether such practices should be addressed as 'Puritan anti-formalism' or as primarily or only motivated by Puritan opposition to Laudian ceremonialism eventually targeting the Prayer Book. The 1641 Essex petition in defence of the Prayer Book recently analysed by John Walter that seems to refer to precisely this Earls Colne incident in the fourth head – 'some burneing the booke saiing itt is a popishe booke: harvee' – might be primarily motivated in this way, but that does not allow the conclusion that all disturbances related to the Prayer Book can be understood to be 'deriving their legitimation from godly preaching'. They may not all have been motivated by 'the Fall of Laudianism',[44] but also by a perception of a general disintegration of order, a disintegration the large majority of humble Puritans feared as much as any Englishman. Indeed, violent disturbances such as those mentioned for Earls Colne were not much later identified with Quakers, a group of which established itself in Earls Colne and counted among its members descendants

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[42]   Friedeburg, 'Reformation of Manners', pp. 373–7. The full story of the economic and social background to the struggle within Earls Colne between the lords of the manors and some tenants is given by H.R. French, R.W. Hoyle, *The Character of English Rural Society. Earls Colne 1550–1750* (Manchester, 2007), pp. 81–178, at p. 173.

[43]   Friedeburg, 'Reformation of Manners', pp. 376–7. For a fuller account, see Robert von Friedeburg, *Suendenzucht und sozialer Wandel: Earls Colne (England), Ipswich und Springfield (Neuengland) c.1524–1690 im Vergleich* (Stuttgart, 1993), pp. 163–76.

[44]   See John Walter, 'Confessional Politics in Pre-Civil War Essex: Prayer Books, Profanations, and Petitions', *The Historical Journal*, 44 (2001): pp. 677–701, at pp. 680, 688; quotation at pp. 684, 685.

of those very tenants who had fought the Puritan Harlakendens since they had taken up the local manors in the 1590s.[45]

This case bears out John Morrill's point that while the gentry was clearly divided over both religious allegiances and manifold local conflicts, no less so were the tenants, yeomen and the local 'middling sort'[46] and that the visible lines of actual division in any given locality could often be rooted to conflicts going far back before the Civil War and not directly related to it.[47] As indeed John Walter has shown, as signs of a weakening of central authority were perceived, in the shadow of increasing national turmoil old reckonings were addressed by participants whose intensity of feelings about confrontation between 'Laudianism' and 'Puritanism' is not immediately deductible form their plain actions, even less their willingness to take up arms in any national course.[48] While in turn, 'popular disorder' appeared to be the 'Achilles' heel of the parliament's cause'[49] and the leading Essex petitioners in defence of Prayer Books, indeed supporters of the king, eagerly singled out Harvy's case in their own campaign defaming the Oath of Protestation,[50] this does not necessarily prove what these petitioners wanted to prove, that Harvey had anything to do with Puritan ministers like Josselin, Puritan gentry like the Earls Colne Harlakendens or Puritan middling sort like the Earls Colne constables and church wardens struggling to defend order in both a civil and godly sense. There could well have been a large majority of Puritan moderates with no liking at all for disturbances of the likes of Harvy.[51]

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[45]   Friedeburg, 'Reformation of Manners', pp. 373–7; Friedeburg, *Suendenzucht*, pp. 173–7. John Walter mentioned that Ralph Josselin, the local Puritan minister, did indeed not count Harvey to be a Puritan hothead, but mentions him as being in a conspicuous relation to one Robert Abbot, but Walter did not connect this information to the available information on this Robert Abbot, indeed a later local Quaker and son of one of the major opponents to the Harlakenden's and their local regime. See Walter, 'Confessional Politics', p. 688, and Friedeburg, 'Reformation of Manners', pp. 376–7.

[46]   Morrill, *Nature of the English Revolution*, pp. 191–213, 210. Looking at the Earls Colne example, it is thus problematic to talk about 'seeing the middling sort use the political space' (Walter, 'Confessional Politics', p. 697), for that could insinuate a unity of purpose, interest and action difficult to square with local realities.

[47]   Morrill, *Nature of the English Revolution*, pp. 191–213, 207.

[48]   Ibid., pp. 208–9; Walter, 'Understanding Popular Violence', passim.

[49]   Walter, 'Confessional Politics', p. 687.

[50]   Ibid., pp. 688–9. On the subsequent debate about the Oath of Protestation and what it meant see Friedeburg, *Self-defence*, p. 209.

[51]   For the increasing monopolisation of the offices of constable and church warden by members of certain village groups, see Friedeburg, 'Reformation of Manners', p. 375; Friedeburg, *Suendenzucht*, pp. 128–35. On the 'silent majority' see Cogswell, 'Politics of

A close look at this locality thus disperses notions of 'public opinion' or actions of social groups as such (whether gentry or 'middling sort'). Puritanism, after all, was at least as much about order and the maintenance of authority.[52] Order and the rule of law were the slogans of all responsible subjects; disorder delegitimized any course of action and was regularly seen to be a consequence of actions of the irresponsible enemy that threatened to incite 'labourers and poor people', while 'freeholders' supported the parliamentary course of action.[53] The defence of order, of hierarchy and the avoidance of civil unrest united the majority of moderates, however inclined to the ecclesiastical and constitutional disputes of the day. This defence was thus regularly used to gain the middle ground in pamphlet propaganda.[54] Thus the core issue remains how minorities could overwhelm the majority at the centre.

IV

The evidence from Section II must thus be subjected to a pincer movement. On the one hand, the lack of any straightforward case for certain patterns of allegiance, safe certain issues of religion among an activist minority, and

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Propaganda', pp. 188–90; John Morrill, 'William Davenport and the Silent Majority of Early Stuart England', *Journal of the Chester Archaeological Society*, 58 (1975), pp. 118–21.

[52]   The view of Puritanism held here is rightly characterized by Lake as excluding 'an altogether more subversive and herterodox dissenting underworld' from what is addressed as Puritanism and is borne out by the Essex and Earls Colne Puritan elites concern for order throughout. Consequently, the appearance of the Quakers in Earls Colne is related to earlier local conflict, but not seen as a child of the preachings of Thomas Shepard or Ralph Josselin. See Lake, *Boxmaker's Revenge*, p. 397.

[53]   See for instance 'Lamentable News from Ireland ... with a true and perfect relation of the particular passages at York, London 1642, quoted in Friedeburg, *Self-defence*, p. 215; and Lake, *Boxmaker's Revenge*, p. 398.

[54]   Morrill, 'Northern Gentry', pp. 208–9. The Earls Colne Harlakendens did, though they served in the Army of Parliament, massively supported Puritan ministers and ranked one saint in their midst, never took the cause of 'popular inclusion' ... popular assent and election not elite selection, as constitutive of legitimate authority and its exercise'. Peter Lake does not cite these political stands as essential to Puritanism, but as issues that the Puritan Denison would continuously cite in order to boost his cause; see Lake, *Boxmaker's Revenge*, pp. 389–90, 391. I take it, though, that given a specific local background, that could be the case in a given local debate, such as for local subject Denison in his struggle with the parish elite, it is not meant to characterize Puritanism as such. More than that, as Lake himself put it, evidence of Puritanism is not in itself explaining the onset of Civil War (Peter Lake, Review of William Hunt, *The Puritan Moment* in *The English Historical Review*, 101 (1986): pp. 237–9, 238.

the pressures under which individuals were making their decisions under varying local circumstances qualify the impact any single or any combination of argument in print could have had to provide the trigger to transfer deep held religious commitments into a readiness to take up arms. While possibly many ordinary Englishmen like John Rous were concerned about the plight of 'Protestants in Germany' since the 1620s[55] and most Earls Colne churchwardens and constables supported the local Puritan Reformation of Manners during the 1620s and 1630s, none of that converts them into the likes who cited Stephen Williams' inciting sermons as a motive to fight a Civil War[56] or into men like Harvy who tear into pieces or burnt the Prayer Book.

On the other hand, neither did information about the very real threats for Protestantism in Germany by the cooperation of the German and Spanish Habsburgs convert a rather lukewarm Member of the Commons such as Sir Simonds D'Ewes[57] into someone pushing for confrontation. Rather, by June 1642, he was worried about the dangers from the meaner sort and that 'all right and propertie all meum and tuum must cease in civill wars'.[58] And even if he had been more straightforward, precisely his learnedness seems to have been a problem when it came to persuading others.[59] Many publications like those of Downing or Camilton's Discovery were precisely too detailed on Continental events or too sophisticated in their analysis to be able to address a larger, wavering public.

None of these points entirely invalidate the case for taking the impact of the Continental Counter-Reformation on British people's minds serious. There is significant evidence for the urgency with which for example the 'knights, gentlemen, ministers and other inhabitants of the county of Essex' demanded to 'put the Country in a posture of defence'; for the willingness to take up arms against 'Papists and ... savage blood suckers', not only to defend religion, but also 'clothing and farming', to prevent that 'many thousands are like to come to sudden want'. A 'warlike posture' for the 'defence' of the country's 'safety' seemed to many obviously and immediately necessary,[60] quite beyond and independent of the 'the emotional and theological roots of many of the specific doctrinal

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[55]   Cogswell, 'Politics of Propaganda', p. 188.

[56]   Burgess, 'Religious War', pp. 204–5.

[57]   See Sears McGee's contribution to this volume.

[58]   BL Harleian MS 163 fol. 153 v, quoted in Walter, 'Understanding', p. 238.

[59]   'his demands upon the homage and patience of the House were excessive ... He became a glutton, a very horse-leech in his importunity for highly-seasoned compliments to his erudition, and humble submission to the authority of his quoted records' (BL, Harley MS 379, fol. 90, quoted after J.M. Blatchly, Sir Simonds D'Ewes, *DNB*).

[60]   See *Three Petitions ... The other two of the county of Essex* (London, 1642), pp. 4–5, 6.

experiments and disputes of the 1640s and 1650s', of the whole complex set of phenomena addressed as Puritanism.[61] Neither the Puritanism 'aligned with the forces of law, order, hierarchy and orthodoxy' of 'the likes of Denison and Wallington', the 'more subversive and heterodox underworld' of Etherington[62] and possibly Harvy, nor their interaction with each other necessarily brought about an organized force in arms ready by summer 1642. For that was ultimately mobilized and run by gentry like the Harlakendens in Earls Colne and their local clients among churchwardens, constables and yeomen, equally committed to order.[63] To the Harlakendens and the minority of their own supporters in Earls Colne, a threat to religion, lives, livelihood, and safety in the most comprehensive sense, if notorious and devastating, could very well have motivated to support the Militia Ordinance, at least as long no direct influence from any other organized armed force – such as the Dutch professional army of William III in 1688 – would have made such an action untenable and unwise. If one had heart anything about the plight of Germany and believed in the imminence of an invasion from Ireland or France, willingness to guard one's very livelihood under the leadership of the only institution allegedly still being able to do that did not necessarily need involve disorder or sedition, quite the contrary. For self-defence is about the plausibility of a threat, not about the coherence of a religious or political programme. None of that translated into a sustained war effort over years, as the Eastern Association's problems with mobilizing support amply demonstrate. Those who flocked to arms did so for the Earl of Warwick, not for Parliament as such, addressed themselves as 'Essex Soldiers' and disbanded as Warwick stepped down.[64]

Arguments painting with occasionally quite accurate references the story of the Continental Counter-Reformation and the very real plight of Protestants under the sway of the Habsburg Alliance might have also had their impact on another group, but in an entirely different way. They may have helped to solidify lingering notions of what was to be done among the emerging *in*-group of those religiously persuaded to do whatever it took to complete England's reformation and to combat Antichrist. To those, the background of the Continental Counter-Reformation might have given help to 'raise enough sense of one's own

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[61] Lake, *Boxmaker's Revenge*, p. 410.

[62] Lake, *Boxmaker's Revenge*, p. 397.

[63] Clive Holmes, *The Eastern Association in the English Civil War* (Cambridge, 1974), pp. 20–59, on the pressure exerted by pro parliamentary gentry in favour of the war effort; Hunt, *Puritan Moment*, pp. 293–307; on the formation of a Pro-Puritan local leadership among Earls Colne's church wardens and constables and the exclusion from local office of those opposing the Harlakenden's see Friedeburg, *Suendenzucht*, pp. 128–35.

[64] Holmes, *Eastern Association*, pp. 36–219, at pp. 39–40.

righteousness' (Russell) to make that final step.[65] Members of the action-party at Parliament like Pym might very well have wanted to believe the king wanted to go to Ireland to lead an army of Catholics,[66] and decades of gruelling news from the Continental Counter-Reformation might have helped to sustain such a scenario. We face here the rather complicated relationship of religious readiness as a fertile ground for other information to pull the trigger, an issue that has been addressed by John Morrill elsewhere.[67] It is against this complicated web of the 'political sociology' of mobilization that the news from Germany must be understood.

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[65]   Russell, *Fall*, p. 487.

[66]   Russell, *Fall*, p. 488.

[67]   John Morrill, 'Sir William Brereton and England's Wars of Religion', *Journal of British Studies*, 24 (1985), and John Morrill's comment in County Communities and the Problem of Allegiance in the English Civil War, in *The Nature of the English Revolution*, pp. 179–90, 188.

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Chapter 4
The Mind of William Laud

Alan Cromartie

This chapter sets out from an obvious disjunction. Attempts to write the history of the early Stuart church have worked, on the whole, with a two-party model that stresses the importance of the faultline between those variously described as 'Laudians' or 'Arminians' or 'avant-garde conformists' and their old-fashioned 'Calvinist conformist' enemies; attempts to write the history of the early Stuart state have culminated, on the whole, in the discovery of what was at least partially a conflict of religions. But the English fought the wrong War of Religion. The two contending military parties were not those one might have predicted from the history of the church: they weren't defined, that is to say, by attitudes to Laud (or to whatever forces he was felt to symbolise), but to the threat or promise of a godly reformation.

One way of shedding light upon this puzzle is to enquire what the idea of 'Laudianism' is for. The answer, surely, is that it has functioned as a convenient label for discontinuity: whatever precisely the content that is assigned to it, the notion picks out something *new* about church policy from some time in the 1620s onwards; it is by definition a departure from a presumed pre-Laudian consensus. This fact has two important implications. First, Laudian-focused history has tended to encourage a hunt for proto-Laudian precursors; the abruptness of the shift it presupposes requires that power was reassigned from one group to another, that is, from the orthodox 'Calvinist conformists' to a discrete minority tradition. But secondly, this history has been teleological (consider the phrase 'avant-garde conformist'); the appeal of the novel ideas has been taken for granted. Because the end-point of the change – the 'Laudian' church – is a given, it has neglected an important question: if 'Calvinist' and 'Laudian' were rival schools of thought that coexisted for a generation, why was the cultural/intellectual traffic so overwhelmingly in one direction?

If this analysis has truth in it, there is a *prima facie* case for saying that there is something wrong with the whole model: that 'Laudianism' was not, in fact, the triumph of a party, but the outcome of a cluster of related tendencies that left their mark, in varying degrees, on almost all of the conformist clergy. There was, of course, a spectrum that ran from Catholic to Puritan, and Laud himself (as we

shall see) came from one end of it. But precisely for that reason, it is significant that he was never truly isolated and his ideas were never marginal. There were sharp disagreements within the non-Puritan mainstream of the early Stuart church, especially about the appropriateness and feasibility of trying to coerce the noncomformists. But the clerical elite was not divided between convinced adherents of distinct theologies; and the seductive notion of a proto-Tractarian 'movement' has led researchers in the wrong direction.

This chapter sets out to escape from the two-party model by taking a fresh look at Laud himself. Its focus is not on his actions, but his writings. William Laud was after all an academic, 'a man', as Viscount Saye and Sele complained, 'of a meane birth, bred up in a Colledge ... whose narrow comprehensions [sic] extended it selfe no further, then to carry on a side in the colledge, or canvas for a proctors place in the University'.[1] Moreover, the papers he left are well-adapted to intellectual biography: his college background is well-documented; he was exceptionally articulate in speeches and in private correspondence; he chronicled his feelings in a frank diary; and he composed a formidable anti-Catholic work – the celebrated *Conference with Fisher* (1624; second edition 1639) – that was admired even by his fairer-minded critics.[2] With the exception of the *Conference*, which has been scandalously under-studied, these sources have been frequently consulted, but no one has attempted the unpretentious task of using *all* the volumes of his nineteenth-century *Works* to sketch his theological opinions.[3]

I

As Viscount Saye and Sele had accurately perceived, the best place to start is his Oxford college background. Laud's college – St John's – was a curious institution with a distinctive kind of churchmanship. It had been founded by Sir Thomas White to educate the priests of Mary's church. Down to his death in 1567, it was, at best, quite poorly integrated into the Reformation Church of England. In September 1566, for instance, White requested and obtained a leave of absence for a longstanding fellow who was probably ordained but had mysteriously not graduated. He saw no reason to conceal the fact that the whole

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[1]   *A speech of the right honourable Lord Vicount Saye and Seale* (1642), p. 2.

[2]   *A collection of speeches made by Sir Edward Dering* (1642), p. 3.

[3]   Nicholas Tyacke's valuable chapter 'Archbishop Laud', in Kenneth Fincham (ed.), *The Early Stuart Church, 1603–1642* (Basingstoke, 1993), pp. 51–70 is really concerned with 'the contribution made by Laud himself' (p. 51) to a wider high church 'movement'; it presupposes the two-party model.

purpose of the leave of absence was to assist his friend John Feckenham, last Abbot of Westminster Abbey, who was a prisoner in the Tower of London.[4] This was more than just a private act of kindness: Feckenham was not by any means a spent political force, but an unbowed opponent of the Royal Supremacy. He had, moreover, written a manuscript pamphlet that sparked an international confessional debate. It had already been attacked in print by Robert Horne, Bishop of Winchester, its nominal addressee;[5] and Horne's response would soon itself be countered by a *Counterblast to M.Horne's vayne blaste against M.Fekenham* (Louvain, 1567) by the exiled Roman Catholic writer Thomas Stapleton. In other words, White and his college were giving aid and comfort to subversives.

White's gesture had some long-term implications. As Horne was *ex officio* the college Visitor, St John's was affronting the senior Protestant churchman who might, in time, investigate its doings. It seems unlikely to be accidental that White soon afterwards transferred the power of visitation to Thomas More's biographer William Roper and to Sir William Cordell (Cardinal Pole's executor and Master of the Rolls). Another conservative lawyer, Edmund Plowden, was used as 'councellor in the College matters'.[6] These men were not simply old-fashioned. Both Roper and Plowden were definitely loyal to the pope; Cordell conformed when he was asked to do so, but was invariably described as being 'Catholic'.[7] Cordell retained the power of visitation until his death in 1581, and helped, in that capacity, to shape the college culture that was to shape the mind of William Laud.

It would be wrong, as we shall see, to think about that culture as 'Anglo-Catholic', but the Protestantisation of St John's was both a lengthy and a gradual process. It seems to have started with the self-exclusion of the more militant conservatives; during the seven years after White's death, at least twelve of the fellows he appointed, most notably the charismatic Edmund Campion, are known to have taken Roman Catholic orders.[8] Partly in consequence, the college had no possible internal candidate when it next came to choose a president, and

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[4]   W.H. Stevenson and H.E. Salter, *The Early History of St. John's College, Oxford* (Oxford, 1939), p. 420.

[5]   *An answeare made by Rob Bishoppe of Winchester* (1566). According to Horne's Preface (dated February 25 1566), Feckenham's tract had been 'secretly scattered' by February 1565. On the work's origins, see fos 1–3.

[6]   Stevenson and Salter, *Early History*, p. 151. For Plowden's links with White and with the college, see also ibid., pp. 399, 405, 418, 488.

[7]   On Cordell, see Michael Questier, *Catholicism and Community in Early Modern England: Politics, Aristocratic Patronage, and Religion, c.1550–1640* (Cambridge, 2006), pp. 154–5 and n.

[8]   Stevenson and Salter, *Early History*, p. 394.

had to accept Toby Matthew, the future Archbishop of York. From this point on, we can be sure that college services were reasonably scrupulously conformist. Their spirit may also have altered; it was probably at this moment that somebody secreted the 'great brasen crucifixe', the banners of Our Lady and St John, and the array of gorgeous copes that White's niece returned to the college in 1602.[9]

It is noticeable, however, that Cordell remained in control. One sign of where the real power rested was the continuing presence in the college of a conservative named Henry Russell. Russell had graduated in 1559, but was (anomalously) still a layman. He owed his long survival to a loophole in the rules; in 1566, as he approached the fatal date at which he would have had to take Anglican orders, he had convinced the founder and his colleagues that he should be permitted to reclassify himself as one of the foundation's civil lawyers. The founder agreed that his tenure should simply start again; as lawyers were permitted a delay of fourteen years before they were obliged to take priest's orders, this was really an indefinite extension.[10] Though Russell in some sense accepted the royal supremacy (he must have recited the oath as late as 1570, the year when he took the degree of BCL), there cannot be much doubt of his religious preference; in 1574, the visitors reminded him 'that he should in all things obey the religion now received in England and sincerely profess the same'.[11] This censure in no way impeded his college career. In 1576, he was permitted to become lessee and Principal of Gloucester Hall (the Hall – a glorified boarding house – was college property); in 1577, he became vice-president. The same year, a government survey reported that his Hall was 'greatly suspected in religion and yet the principal there presenteth nothing'.[12] Cordell probably admired this characteristic; when Russell left the Hall in 1580, he made a serious offer 'to place him in thoffice of the steward of my house. I doe confesse that I do like and love the man very much'.[13] Next year, Russell was present when his old friend Edmund Campion was arrested.[14]

The point about these details is not that all the fellowship were secret Catholics (whatever exactly that difficult term might imply), but that the college was an institution that was relaxed about Catholicism; conversely, it was somewhere of which a hardline papist could entertain a favourable impression. During the 1580s, its culture was shaped by two men who remembered the 1560s: the president, Francis Willis, who served in that position from 1577 to

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[9]   Ibid., p. 472.

[10] Ibid., pp. 327–8.

[11] Ibid., p. 476.

[12] Ibid., p. 437.

[13] Ibid., p. 497.

[14] Questier, *Catholicism and Community*, p. 154 n.

1590; and the brilliant and erudite John Case, author of lucid works on Aristotle, who lived the whole way down to 1600. Both men had signed a document permitting Campion to hold a travelling fellowship without first taking Church of England orders.[15] Both also had a motive for not following him abroad: in the early 1570s, they married.[16]

Cordell appointed Willis and told him what to do, but Willis's attachment to old-fashioned attitudes did not require external reinforcement; it was two years after Cordell's death, in 1583, that the fellows chose to hire a second chaplain 'in consideration of dayly service twyce a day sayed in the church according to the Founder's meaninge & accordinge to the Statutes ... for the more ease of the chaunter now ther'.[17] If the accounts are any guide, the college took communion almost monthly; it is particularly interesting that several such services were held in quick succession around Easter (in other words, that virtually daily reception was thought, in some conditions, to be desirable).[18] But conservative chapel religion was something different from grudging minimal conformity; if Willis was *investing* in the English liturgy, he cannot have been hostile to its content.

John Case, by contrast, had no formal role (he ceased to be a fellow when he married), but evidently had much influence. In 1583, he was the likely inspiration of 'a philosophie lesson, partly naturall and partly morall';[19] a definite proof of his closeness to the college was his decision, the next year, to present it with £100 in cash.[20] Case's religion was ambiguous. He certainly had Catholic admirers: Sir William Cordell was prepared to trust him with 'a boye that I have great care of, both for that he is my kynnesman and my godson';[21] and he also charmed the wealthy recusant Sir Thomas Tresham into a benefaction of £100 in books.[22] But though these facts are certainly suggestive, Charles Schmitt has convincingly argued for the sincerity of his commitment to the Church of England. The later rumours that he died a papist reveal that he lived a Protestant.[23]

The chain of continuities extended down to Laud. Laud's tutor Buckeridge came up in 1578, towards the end of Cordell's time as college Visitor; the

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[15] Stevenson and Salter, *Early History*, p. 187.

[16] Their marriages (in 1573 and 1574 respectively) admittedly post-dated their colleagues' exodus (ibid., pp. 207, 337).

[17] Ibid., p. 240.

[18] Ibid., pp. 238, 260, 261–2, 264–5, 266.

[19] Ibid., pp. 224.

[20] Ibid., p. 256.

[21] Ibid., p. 499.

[22] Ibid., p. 297 n. 3.

[23] Charles Schmitt, *John Case and Aristotelianism in Renaissance England* (Kingston, Ontario, 1983), pp. 12–14.

future archbishop appeared on the scene in 1589, when Francis Willis was still president. The college they were joining had a distinctive culture that seems to have inspired much loyalty. That culture was not mindlessly nostalgic; when the college's vestments re-surfaced in 1602, the president described them as 'old superstitious church ornaments ... to be converted to the benefit and some better use of the college'.[24] But though it is too simple to characterise the fellows as church-papists, their views were certainly conservative, and there were still occasional conversions (a couple of fellows converted as late as 1602).[25]

Laud's education thus took place within a close-knit college in which conventional Puritanism was virtually unknown, but popery was an attractive option: the alternative expression of a heartfelt piety. At one point, he had shared a room with a future Catholic convert.[26] His later pastoral experience included fairly regular encounters with people tempted by Catholicism; at his trial, he astonished his accusers by listing twenty people he had rescued.[27] It is therefore not particularly surprising that the whole thrust of his theology was to convince the loosely-speaking high-church waverer: popery was an *intellectual* challenge, but noncomformist godliness was simply a practical menace to the ideals of decency and order.

It is the experience of St John's that ties together his known attitudes. By seventeenth-century standards, Laud was very tolerant; when his friend Sir Kenelm Digby was converted, the letter he felt moved to write was touchingly restrained, especially in its resigned acceptance 'that all differences in opinion shake not the foundations of religion'.[28] He saw himself (to quote his will) as 'a true member of [Christ's] Catholic Church, within the communion of a living part thereof, the present Church of England, as it stands established by law'.[29] But his pride in this 'part' of the church was unaffected. In early 1627, he had a troubling dream:

> I dreamed, that I was reconciled to the Church of Rome. This troubled me much; and I wondered exceedingly, how it should happen. Nor was I aggrieved with myself only by reason of the errors of that Church, but also upon account of the

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24 Stevenson and Salter, *Early History*, p. 472.

25 W.E. Costin, *The History of St John's College, Oxford 1598–1860*, Oxford Historical Society, New Series 12 (1958), pp. 13–14.

26 ODNB, s.v. 'Laud'.

27 *The Works of the Most Reverend Father in God, William Laud, D.D.*, (ed.) W. Scott and J. Bliss (Oxford, 7 vols, 1847–60), vol. IV, pp. 63–6.

28 Ibid., VI, p. 454.

29 Ibid., IV, p. 442.

scandal which from that my fall would be cast upon many eminent and learned men in the Church of England.[30]

It was bad to condone papist errors, but worse to betray the eminent and learned who were a feature of his own communion; his loyalty was given less to a theology than to an image of his fellow clergy. That image of a learned and conformist ministry was surely a projection of his background.

II

Laud's early career in the college was unremarkable. He took his degrees in the usual way in 1594 (BA) and 1598 (MA), acted as grammar reader, and then, after 1601, as divinity lecturer.[31] At this stage, there are no grounds for believing that he was isolated or indeed unpopular. Oxford was much less polarised than Cambridge; the godly's natural leaders – Laurence Humphrey and John Rainolds – had been successively absorbed into conformism. Moreover, mainstream attitudes were shifting. As early as 1594, graduates incepting in divinity debated the surprisingly strong thesis that 'Equality of ministers in the Church is inconsistent with divine law'.[32] A couple of years later, in 1596, John Dove maintained that 'baptism removes original sin'; eight years later again, at Hampton Court, Dove was a brave defender of the controversial claim that the necessity of baptism requires some provision for baptism by women.[33]

One explanation of such shifts was study of the Fathers.[34] Patristic study was not unique to England (most Protestant theologians mined the Fathers in search of anti-Catholic arguments), but the old-fashioned character of English liturgy and institutions meant that patristic practice could exercise what might be called Catholicising pressure in every field of the church's life. It was increasingly implied that patristic doctrinal consensus was in a positive sense normative (not

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[30]   Laud, *Works*, IV, 201.

[31]   Costin, *History of St John's College*, p. 27.

[32]   'Aequalitas ministrorum in Ecclesia jure divino non constat' (*Register of the University of Oxford*, vol. II (in 3 parts), (ed.) Andrew Clark (Oxford, 1887), vol. II, part I, p. 197).

[33]   'An baptismus tollat originale peccatum (Aff.)' (ibid., p. 198); R.G. Usher, *The Reconstruction of the English Church* (2 vols, 1910), vol. II, p. 342.

[34]   On which now see Jean-Louis Quantin, *The Church of England and Christian Antiquity: The Construction of a Confessional Identity in the 17th Century* (Oxford, 2009). Quantin's argument is too complex to be engaged with here, but he has documented both the increased pervasiveness of the practice of appealing to the Fathers and the church's total failure to find it an agreed theoretical basis.

just that it had the negative effect of exposing Roman Catholic innovations). Richard Kilby asked, in 1596, 'if the faith of the ancient fathers is the same as ours'.[35] Next year, Richard Field insisted (in a uniquely wordy formulation that in itself betrays anxiety) that 'the doctrine of predestination once handed on by Augustine is the same as that handed on in our own times by Calvin and contains nothing contrary to Catholic truth or the rule of faith'[36] and that 'the orthodox fathers who said the will is free and those who today say it is unfree believe the same thing'.[37] Even the young George Abbot implicitly appealed to post-scriptural history when he maintained that 'the general authority which the popes usurp grew from the indulgence of princes and the ambitious cunning of the bishop of Rome, not from Apostolic tradition'.[38]

This slight but perceptible shift in local culture perhaps explains the startling fact that Laud's first taste of politics was as the holder of *elective* office: in May 1603, he was elected by the convocation (the resident Masters of Arts) to serve a term as one of the two proctors. As proctorial elections were notoriously hard to control, he must, at this stage, have been quite a popular figure. Still more remarkably, the main achievement of his year in office was a collaboration with George Abbot. This was the publication of Oxford's reply to the 'millenary petition' that Puritans had recently presented to King James: *The answere of the vice-chancellor* [that is, Abbot], *the doctors, both the proctors, and other the heads of houses in the university of Oxford* (1603). This document, which is uncompromising on every issue that the godly raised, was shaped by some unusual circumstances: the Chancellor, Lord Buckhurst, was alarmed by the petition;[39] Congregation was disrupted by the plague;[40] and though the vast majority of heads do seem to have agreed to its production,[41] they probably did not expect its printed publication (Laud's colleague as proctor was certainly left in the dark).[42] But Laud's capacity to play a part in such a coup suggests that he was still a mainstream figure.

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[35]   'An eadem sit fides antiquorum patrum et nostri' (Clark, *Register*, p. 198).

[36]   'Doctrina praedestinationis olim tradita ab Augustino et nostris temporibus ab Calvino eadem est nec quicquam continet Catholicae veritati aut fidei regulae contrarium' (ibid., p. 199).

[37]   'Orthodoxi patres qui arbitrium liberum esse dixerunt et qui hodie servum esse dicunt idem sentiunt' (ibid., p. 199).

[38]   'Generalis authoritas quam pontifices usurpant, ex principorum indulgentia et Romani episcopi ambitiosa astutia crevit, non ex Apostolica traditione' (ibid., p. 199).

[39]   For Buckhurst's view, see British Library, Additional MS 28, 571, fo.179.

[40]   The start of the Michaelmas term was delayed till December (*Register*, vol. II, part II, p. 268).

[41]   Its critics only knew of three exceptions (ibid., p. 183).

[42]   BL Add MS 28, 571, fo.186.

His troubles probably began with his 1604 BD disputation, which held that baptism was 'necessary'.[43] It is relevant, however, that most of the bishops were happy to accept this formulation[44] and that James himself endorsed the adjective; as James's exposition of his opinion showed, the idea that baptism was 'necessary' did not imply Augustine's view that unbaptised babies were damned.[45] Abbot was present at the disputation and raised no theological objection.[46] But Abbot's silence may have been resentful; it would have taken courage to veto a degree sought by a proctor, especially one who would doubtless appeal to the monarch.[47] If so, the disputation set a pattern: on at least three occasions in this phase of his career, Laud was rescued from his enemies at Oxford by the good offices of friends at court. The first of these occasions – in October 1606 – was what his *Diary* described as 'The quarrel Dr Ayr[a]y [the vice-chancellor] picked with me about my Sermon at St Mary's'.[48] We do not know the words that caused offence, but it is clear Laud's principal protector was James's own physician, William Paddy. Ayray was an ex-Puritan; Paddy was a good Johnian who studied in the barely-Protestant college of 1570–73 and who remained a college benefactor.[49] This figure from the past informed Lord Buckhurst[50] that 'two or three very learned men about the court' had seen and approved the sermon; and also, more importantly, that Laud was prepared to appeal if he were censured. Buckhurst was duly much relieved when Ayray opted, or felt forced, to drop the idea of taking matters further.[51]

Laud must, though, have had friends at Oxford as well as at court. In 1608, when he took his DD, he was permitted to defend three characteristic positions:

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[43]   Peter Heylyn, *Cyprianus Anglicus* (1668), p. 54.

[44]   William Barlow, *The summe and substance of the conference* (1604), pp. 15–18. Barlow's version of events was not yet printed, but any clergyman with court connections would of course have heard oral accounts. For a fuller discussion, see Alan Cromartie, 'King James and the Hampton Court conference' in Ralph Houlbrooke (ed.), *James VI and I: Ideas, Authority and Government* (Aldershot, 2006), pp. 71–3.

[45]   Barlow, *Summe and substance*, 17. For a careful account of 'necessity', see Barlow's own *A defence of the articles of the Protestants religion* (1601), pp. 140–48.

[46]   Or so Laud maintained in his *History of the trials and troubles*, which also noted that the grace had passed unanimously (*Works*, IV, p. 318). The clerk of the Lords omits the claim that Abbot was present at the disputation, recording only that the future archbishop 'approved of my disputation by giving me my degree' (HMC, House of Lords, vol. XI (n.s.), p. 447).

[47]   When Laud became the Chancellor, he saw to it that 'no Graduate in Divinity shall be Proctor: nor take any further degrees in his year of Proctorship' (Laud, *Works*, VII, p. 638).

[48]   Ibid., III, p. 133.

[49]   Bodleian Library, Rawlinson MSS A 289, fo. 78.

[50]   Now strictly speaking the first Earl of Dorset.

[51]   Rawlinson A 289, fo. 78.

1. Whether a bishop only may confer orders (affirmed)?
2. Whether episcopacy is an order distinct from the priesthood and superior to it by divine right (affirmed)?
3. Whether there ought to be order in the church (affirmed)?[52]

By contrast, the supralapsarian Sebastian Benefield was not permitted to defend the ultra-Calvinist thesis that 'God does not will that certain individuals should be saved'.[53] By comparison with Benefield's harsh position, Laud's high episcopalian assertions were evidently relatively unobjectionable. Though an obvious objection to his doctrine was that it unchurched most other Protestant churches (including, at this stage, the Church of Scotland), he would have been expected to 'distinguish' between the church's ordinary arrangements and the irregular but valid orders that were possessed by other Protestants; as tends to be forgotten, the introduction of *distinctiones* was the whole purpose of a disputation. When he became archbishop, his behaviour was perfectly consistent with this standpoint. Though he maintained, in private correspondence, that non-episcopal churches were always culpable for failing to acquire themselves bishops,[54] he did not suppose that their orders were utterly void. He told King Charles that it was 'no way fit' for English ministers who worked in Holland to 'assume power of ordination; for then it will be a perpetual seminary to breed and transplant men ill affected to the Government into this kingdom'; he did not suggest that the clergy produced by this method would not, in a full sense, be ministers at all.[55] In the same memorandum, his criticisms of the Stranger churches did not so much as mention ordination.[56]

Laud's successive divinity theses suggest an aggressive defender of basically acceptable positions; his views were less provocative than his insistence on asserting them. It was not perhaps surprising he was misunderstood. The spread of hostile attitudes was illustrated by a strange misfortune. The future bishop

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[52] '1. An episcopus tantum possit ordines conferre.- Aff. 2. An epicopatus sit ordo distinctus a presbyteriatu eoque superior jure divino – Aff. 3. An debeat esse ordo in ecclesia – Aff'. It is not quite clear if 'ordo' in thesis number 3 refers narrowly and specifically to 'orders' (*Registrum universitatis Oxoniensis*, p. 206).

[53] 'Deus non vult singulos homines salvos fieri' (ibid., p. 205). The Latin is ambiguous, but Benefield's known views (see ODNB, s.v. 'Benefield') make it virtually certain that he was defending particular reprobation.

[54] Laud, *Works*, VI, p. 573.

[55] Ibid., VI, p. 25.

[56] Ibid., VI, p. 25–7. Laud himself required episcopal ordination for prebendaries at Canterbury Cathedral (this is implied at ibid., VI, p. 271). But even the rigorous Matthew Wren permitted a man who lacked it to hold a benefice (Norman Sykes, *New Priest and Old Presbyter* (Cambridge, 1957), pp. 89–91.

Joseph Hall's *Epistles* – a piece of middle-brow *belles-lettres* first published in 1608 – included an epistle to a 'Mr WL … expostulating the cause of his unsettlednesse in religion'.[57] This 'WL' did not resemble Laud (the 'WL' who fits the bill was John Donne's brother-in-law),[58] but some of Hall's readers soon made the identification, which passed, through Laud's Arminian biographer Peter Heylyn, into the mainstream scholarly tradition.[59]

We can, however, be confident that those who knew him best did not suspect him of Catholicism; within his Oxford college, he had his enemies, but they did not object to his religion. The existence, and the strength, of the feeling against him was shown by a much-cited but misunderstood event: the 1611 presidency election. In this election to replace his patron and ex-tutor Buckeridge, it seems that Laud was always the frontrunner; but half the college coalesced behind John Rawlinson, who was the Principal of St Edmund Hall, and also, more importantly, the Stop-Laud candidate. Laud himself played no part in the process (he was absent and allegedly unwell), but both sides were conspicuously ruthless. The anti-Laudians conspired to stop pro-Laudians taking their degrees;[60] the Laudians condoned a 'foule cryme' that would normally have merited expulsion[61] and offered one fellow a benefice worth £80 p.a.[62] In the end, the Laudians triumphed by one vote, which was cast by an extremely junior fellow, a defector from the Rawlinsonite party, who had been hidden in London in case he changed his mind, then introduced by a back door to the place of the election.[63] At this point, a discovery was made. The vote had been confined to graduate fellows, but there were precedents that showed that the non-graduates were also part of the electorate.[64] Egged on by anti-Laudians outside the institution, the Rawlinsonites naturally appealed, in the first instance to the Visitor, who opted to declare the election void.[65] Eventually, the paperwork was passed up to the monarch. After an afternoon of careful study, James acknowledged that Laud's supporters had overstepped the mark, but nonetheless upheld his victory.[66]

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57 Joseph Hall, *Epistles, the second volume: conteining two decades* (London, 1608), p. 55.
58 R.C. Bald, *Donne and the Drurys* (Cambridge, 1959), pp. 70–83.
59 Heylyn, *Cyprianus Anglicus*, pp. 54–5.
60 Bodleian Library, Tanner MSS 338, fos. 323, 326–7, 330.
61 Ibid., fo. 328; corroborated at fo. 340.
62 Ibid., fo. 328v.
63 Ibid., fo. 328v, 330–330v.
64 Ibid., fo. 337–8.
65 Ibid., fo. 345–345v.
66 Ibid., fo. 356.

Since Heylyn, it has been assumed that this dramatic contest reflected theological divisions: that Rawlinson was 'Calvinist' while Laud was some kind of Arminian. The episode does show that Laud had bitter enemies, including George Abbot and Sebastian Benefield, who were against him on religious grounds. But the anti-Laudian Visitor, Thomas Bilson, had generally high-church opinions and the fellows themselves were indifferent to his theology: within the college community itself, the only mud *not* thrown at Laud's supporters was accusations of unorthodoxy. It is indeed quite possible that Laud was the less popish candidate. Rawlinson's published writings suggest high-churchmanship; he seems to have thought of baptism, for instance, as automatically efficacious.[67] As he subsequently left St John's some money,[68] he cannot have had much objection to the religious tone that Laud and his supporters were to foster. In any case, Laud's college opponents were frank: they wanted 'rather anye then Laud because of his feared severitie in governmente';[69] the only example given of the severity to be expected was that his patron Buckeridge had stopped a fellow having Catholic pupils.[70]

III

My argument so far has reached a rather surprising conclusion. Within what was admittedly a most unusual college, Laud's views were in no way exceptional; outside it, they seem to have fallen within a broadly acceptable spectrum. That well-informed layman, the king, must have heard much from Abbot about his theological shortcomings, but James consistently supported him. It is notable, for instance, that Laud first became a chaplain a few months *after* the disputes around the college presidency election.[71] In 1615, in a similar turn of events, James forced the archbishop's brother Robert Abbot to apologise about an Oxford sermon in which Laud found himself 'abused almost an hour together, being pointed at as I sat'.[72] Next year, Laud was given the deanery of Gloucester (in succession to the generally admired Richard Field, who was arguably the church's most distinguished theologian). Thereafter, his progress was relatively steady. In 1617, he accompanied James to Scotland, where he again attracted

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[67] John Rawlinson, *The four summons of the Shulamite* (1606), pp. 42–3.

[68] Costin, *History of John's College*, p. 116.

[69] Tanner 338, fo. 330.

[70] Ibid., fo. 340.

[71] Laud, *Works*, III, p. 135.

[72] Ibid., VII, 3; Peter White, *Predestination, Policy, and Polemic: Conflict and Consensus in the English Church from the Reformation to the Civil War* (Cambridge, 1992), p. 277, n. 22.

unpopularity without, however, losing the king's favour. At this stage, he also enjoyed the admiration of the most influential senior churchman, John Williams, Bishop of Lincoln, who did his utmost to persuade the monarch to promote him.[73] In 1621, James made a 'gracious speech … concerning my long service. He was pleased to say, he had given me nothing but Gloucester, which he well knew was a shell without a kernel'.[74] Soon afterwards, Laud was given the see of St David's. In 1622, he further strengthened his position when he became confessor to the favourite, George Villiers, the Marquis (later Duke) of Buckingham.[75] During the last three years of James's reign, his *Diary* records a succession of occasions on which the king, or Buckingham, or both consulted him about religious matters.[76]

Laud was, then, a successful courtier, but it is reasonable to suppose that his success depended on his learning. Fortunately, we have a source that gives a sense of the ideas he stood for: the notes he entered in his personal set of Cardinal Bellarmine's *Disputations*. These notes cannot be dated with any certainty, but the pattern of citation makes it likely that most of them were entered soon after 1610 – the year that he became a royal chaplain. He was, however, adding further notes at least as late as 1623, that is, in the last period of his service to King James.[77] This range of dates is definitely suggestive; the *Disputations* were a standard work – a comprehensive survey of Protestant–Catholic debates from a fair-minded Catholic perspective – but we know that the king liked discussing the same volumes (he had a set he took on hunting trips).[78] It thus seems possible that Laud internalised a bias towards materials, arguments, and topics the royal theologian would find acceptable. If so, the notes say something about 'court

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[73] John Hacket, *Scrinia reserata: a memorial offer'd to the great deservings of John Williams DD* (1693), pp. 63–4. Hacket regarded Laud as a vindictive martinet, but he commented unfavourably on Abbot's 'suspicion (in my judgement most improbably founded) of [Laud's] Unsoundness in Religion'.

[74] Laud, *Works*, III, p. 136.

[75] Ibid., III, p. 139.

[76] Ibid., III, pp. 138–40, 141, 145, 155–6.

[77] The originals can be consulted in Archbishop Marsh's Library in Dublin (I am grateful to the Librarian, Dr Muriel McCarthy, for her helpfulness when I inspected them). The transcription in *Works*, VI, pp. 607–708 necessarily omits Laud's underlinings, but is in general reliable (the one significant mistake is recorded at n. 79). The notes cite datable works by Blackwell (London, 1607: *Works*, VI, pp. 631–3), Junius (Geneva, 1607: 635, 639), Rainolds (London, 1609: 689–90), Owen (London, 1610: 622, 633), and Carleton (London, 1610: 633). The only later works mentioned are Gerard John Vossius's *Historia Pelagiana* (Leyden, 1618: 702, 705), Scaliger's *Notes* on the New Testament (London, 1622: 640–41), and Vedelius's critical edition of the Ignatian letters (Geneva, 1623: 707).

[78] Hacket, *Scrinia Reserata*, p. 227.

theology', the assumptions that reigned and the methods that were prized in conversation at the king's own table.

There is no doubt, however, they were private, that is, that Laud envisaged no further readership; often, he simply underlined a word he thought important or used a bare cross-reference to jog the memory. This unselfconsciousness is quite important because it is the guarantee of an important fact: in the mid Jacobean period, a man like Laud at the 'high' end of the court religious spectrum nonetheless understood himself as a Reformed divine. The notes quite simply presuppose that Calvin is the Church of England's spokesman and even Beza ought to be defended.[79] Though they occasionally refer with a degree of pride to the distinctive features of the Church of England's *practice*,[80] they nowhere suggest that the English have a theology that is in any way more moderate. This is a remarkable finding. As we have seen, Laud came from a conservative milieu. If anyone might have developed a *via media* between Tridentine popery and a Reformed position, it was a fellow of his institution. But at no point in this private document did he dissociate his church from Calvin; he never took the easy route – the route that would be taken by Richard Montagu – of simply denying the relevance of continental thinking.

Thus he presented his ideas about the Eucharist as an authentic Calvinist position. So far from believing communion was only a 'symbol', Calvin had written that 'Christ offers himself in the Supper with all his goods, and we receive by faith'. 'Is this', Laud enquired, 'nothing else than to recall to memory?'[81] But though Laud took a relatively high view of what the Reformer had meant by a 'spiritual presence', he drew the line at corporal transformation. He made numerous verbal concessions – in deference to the usage of the Fathers, he was relaxed about the view that ministers performed a 'sacrifice' – but he was absolutely clear that the 'true and real sacrifice' of a communion service consisted in 'commemorative' action.[82]

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[79]   For Beza, see Laud, *Works*, VI, pp. 697, 703. Peter White's pioneering discussion understandably supposed that the remarks about predestination at Laud, *Works*, VI, p. 696 were also meant as a defence of Beza (White, *Predestination*, p. 278). But White fell victim to a mistranscription. The paragraph in question refers to the quotation from Augustine at 'De amissione gratiae', lib.II, c.xii § Quod etiam (Laud underlined the words italicised and placed a small cross in the margin): 'non ... ex materia *nobili, aut indifferenti* fecerit vasa in contumeliam, sed quod ex *materia damnata, and contumeliosa* fecerit vasa'.

[80]   Laud, *Works*, VI, pp. 653, 676, 681.

[81]   'Deinde sunt et haec verba "Christus se cum omnibus bonis suis in coena offert, et nos recipimus fide," &c. Hoccine nihil aliud quam revocare in memoriam?' (ibid., VI, p. 652).

[82]   Ibid., VI, p. 670–71.

The assumption that Laud had abandoned the Calvinist doctrine is almost solely traceable to an ill-judged remark that he first made, then printed, in 1637. In an otherwise brilliant onslaught on a tract by William Prynne, he noted that the altar was 'the greatest place of God's residence upon earth ... yea, greater than the pulpit, for there 'tis *Hoc est corpus meum*, "This is my body"; but in the pulpit 'tis at most *Hoc est verbum meum*, "This is My word."'[83] Both then and since, this statement has been interpreted as a repudiation of Protestant ideas. But the notes supply a context for his disastrous slip: during this earlier phase of his career, he had been angered by Bellarmine's claim that 'in the opinion of our adversaries, the preaching of the word of God better signifies and offers Christ to us than any Sacrament'. He riposted 'But of little men (*parvorum*), but of fools, and Bellarmine cannot answer for such among his own'.[84] In other words, Laud's willingness to magnify the altar was part of his longstanding *anti-Catholic* position. Moreover, he himself explained his dictum. According to a note set down by his chaplain Richard Sterne, somebody had objected: 'tis the word which makes the body'. Laud commented: 'Corpus conficitur [the Body is made] was used by some of the ancient Fathers sano sensu [in a healthy sense], but is abused by the Romanists at this day to prove Transubstantiation'; strictly speaking, he insisted, 'the sacrament is made, not the body'. Moreover, Laud concluded his reply by pointing out that 'a lewd minister may deprave the word, and make it void many ways; but he cannot hurt the sacrament digne recipientis'.[85] The last two words ('digne recipientis', that is, 'of a person worthily receiving') reveal that he took it for granted that the Presence had something to do with the faith of the receiver – in other words that any transformation took place within the context of reception.

Thus the framework of Laud's Eucharistic doctrine was actually quite traditional; whatever is said of the spirit of his thinking, there is no sign that the substance of his theory departed from the Jacobean norm. The same can be said of his attitude towards predestination. Investigation of the notes reveals an Arminianising impulse, but also supports his subsequent denials that he himself was an Arminian. Like most English theologians of this period (including all the 'Calvinists' James chose to send to Dort),[86] Laud thought the object of

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[83]   Ibid., VI, p. 57.

[84]   Bellarmine: 'Immo opinione adversariorum, melius verbi Dei praedicatio nobis significat, and offert, quam ullum Sacramentum' ('De sacramento Eucharistiae', I, xiii, § Ad haec, si). Laud: 'Sed parvorum, sed insipientium, et pro talibus apud suos non potest respondere Bellarminus' (Laud, *Works*, VI, p. 652).

[85]   Laud, *Works*, VII, p. 661.

[86]   Anthony Milton (ed.), *The British Delegation and the Synod of Dort* (1618–19), Church of England Record Society, 13 (2005), p. 225.

predestination was man considered as already fallen; he seems already to have felt (as he memorably put it in 1641) that to 'say that God from all eternity reprobates by far the greater part of mankind to eternal fire, without any eye at all to their sin' was to make 'God, the God of all mercies, to be the most fierce and unreasonable tyrant in the world'.[87] Moreover, he felt strongly on the subject, so much so that his doctrine was much less 'Calvinist' than his conventional Catholic opponent's.

Bellarmine had distinguished between two separate acts of reprobation: God's 'positive reprobation' was a response to sin; his 'negative reprobation' was his free will to permit a state of affairs that would foreseeably result in a given individual's damnation. In the case of the as yet unfallen angels (who were of course analogous to Adam), the grace that he supplied was hypothetically sufficient, but was infallibly foreknown to be inadequate: 'when he willed to give them only that grace which he did in fact give them, he simultaneously willed not to predestine them to glory, but to permit that they should fall away from salvation'. Laud was evidently unhappy with this theory: 'But what if', he objected, '[God did not give them] that grace alone, if they used it well?' In other words, the further grace that God would have afforded, grace that would hypothetically have saved the fallen angels, was granted on condition of good behaviour; Laud was evidently relaxed about the notion that God's immutable decrees might be conditional. The Cardinal's conclusion preserved God's sovereignty:

> if God had willed absolutely to save them, his wisdom would not have lacked a way to do it. No cause can therefore be given, why God should have willed to give grace to some angels, by which he infallibly saw they would be saved, but to others grace by which he infallibly saw they would not be saved, except that he willed to save the former and did not will to save the latter.[88]

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[87] Laud, *Works*, VI, p. 133. For English sensitivity about this issue, see Milton, *British Delegation*, p. 241, though the delegation's phrase 'destinates to damnation' is probably not quite synonymous with Laud's 'reprobates to eternal fire'.

[88] The full passage runs: '... probari potest, reprobationem Angelorum negativam, non pendere ex praevisione peccati, nam praevidit Deus Angelos, qui perierunt, infallibiliter perituros, si eam solam gratiam illis daret, quam re ipsa illis dedit: ergo cum eam solam gratiam illis dare voluit, simul voluit eos non praedestinare ad gloriam, sed permittere, ut exciderent a salute; nam si Deus absolute salvare voluisset, non defuisset eius sapientiae ratio, qua id faceret. Nulla igitur caussa reddi potest, cur Deus aliis Angelis dare voluerit gratiam, per quam videbat infallibiliter salvandos, aliis vero, per quam videbat infallibiliter non salvandos, nisi quia voluit illos salvare, istos non voluit salvare' (Bellarmine, 'De gratia et libero arbitrio', II, xvii § Eadem ratione).

Laud replied: 'But what if he willed, but not absolutely'.[89]

His most subversive thought along these lines responded to a rather complex passage in which the text distinguished God's 'necessary knowledge' (*necessaria cognitio*) from his 'absolute will (*absoluta voluntas*) of creating and predestining the angels'. The former, being necessary, is logically prior to the latter. But God's *cognitio* is distinct from his *praevisio* (that is, his 'foresight'): 'to will to furnish grace to the angels is prior to seeing the works proceeding from that grace'.[90] In other words, Bellarmine thought that *necessaria cognitio* precedes *absoluta voluntas*, which in its turn precedes *praevisio*. Laud was ready to go further, treating not just *cognitio* but *praevisio* as well as prior to God's sovereign *voluntas*. He asked 'But is it [*voluntas*] prior to seeing the works that will proceed from that grace? By the reason just given it can be seen that the answer is no. For to wish to give that grace is free. But to see the works and uses of that grace if he should give it is necessary'.[91]

If Laud had extended such arguments to cover postlapsarian human beings, he would, of course, have been 'Arminian', but there is no sign that he ever did so: his notes betray no squeamishness about the fate of fallen human beings that God had freely chosen not to rescue. His theological anxiety appears to have been focused upon the harsh idea that God creates some people *in order to* damn them. There is no sign that he wanted to assign to the elect an active role in being justified.[92] The clearest index of his attitudes was his theology of perseverance. The late Elizabethan orthodoxy had been that to be justified was also to be saved (that is, the justified were the elect); and that when justifying grace was granted, it was never even temporarily withdrawn. In other words, King David enjoyed justifying grace when he was committing adultery and murder. But a less antinomian position, allowing for a temporary loss of justification, had made considerable strides in England. Some much more daring spirits additionally appealed to the opinions of St Augustine, who had denied, in certain moods, that everybody who was justified was granted the *additional* grace of final

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[89]   'Sed quid si voluit, sed non absolute?' (Laud, *Works*, VI, p. 700).

[90]   'Prius autem est velle gratiam Angelis praebere, quam videre opera ex illa gratia procedentia, ut notum est, cum caussa sit prior effectu' (Bellarmine, 'De gratia et libero arbitrio', II, xvii § Porro non solum).

[91]   'Sed num prius est quam videre opera ex illa gratia processura? Ex praeassignata ratione videri potest quod non. Nam velle dare illam gratiam liberum est. Sed videre opera et usus illius gratiae, si daret, est necessarium' (Laud, *Works*, VI, p. 700).

[92]   Nicholas Tyacke has suggested that the quotation from John Cassian at *Works*, I, 56 amounts to a confession of 'Arminian sympathies' (Tyacke, 'Archbishop Laud', p. 60). But the force here of the reference to the 'freedom' of the will is just to draw attention to its 'mobility', that is, to its capacity for evil.

perseverance. The Dort delegation rejected this position, but did not wish the synod to condemn it.[93] Laud's attitudes were well within this spectrum. He thought that justification could temporarily be lost, but he defended Calvin's view that those who are regenerate cannot be finally impenitent, adding emphatically 'And this is true'.[94]

These notes raise complex and minute interpretative questions that could, no doubt, be answered in several different ways; they certainly give no reason to doubt his later claim that 'I am yet where I was, that something about these controversies is unmasterable in this life'.[95] But the evidence just presented is consistent with two facts. One is that he was tolerant of the Arminians, so much so he was willing to promote them even if they had failed to dissemble;[96] in a passage written in cipher, he deplored his Calvinist colleague James Ussher's willingness 'to sacrifice honest men for [his] humor, and to lose any frend to be revengd upon, not an enemy but an opinion'.[97] He made some efforts to uphold the royal policy of stopping them pronouncing on the subject, but he understood the impulse behind what he described as 'that great bugbear called Arminianism'.[98] The other is that he never made a statement, publicly or in private correspondence, that could not reasonably be reconciled with moderate Jacobean orthodoxy.

The really subversive feature of his thinking was not the conclusions he actually drew, but the potential of the style of thinking that he favoured. He seems, for instance, to have been uneasy about the standard Protestant idea of 'imputation', at least if the non-imputation of sins were taken to imply that 'the filth of the sins remains, though it is covered'.[99] This may be why he noted the subsequent remark that the word 'imputation' is seldom or never found in the church Fathers (Bellarmine rather memorably objected that 'if someone were to put an Ethiopian in a white shirt, he wouldn't be correct to say "this Ethiopian is white"').[100] To someone prone to idolise the Fathers, this comment had far-reaching implications: it raised the possibility of a theology that had been purged of sixteenth-century concepts.

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[93] White, *Predestination*, p. 198.

[94] Laud, *Works*, VI, p. 704. One implication of this point is that Laud did *not* believe that the mere act of baptism gives justifying grace.

[95] Ibid., VI, p. 292.

[96] Ibid., VII, p. 368.

[97] Ibid., VII, p. 281.

[98] Ibid., VII, p. 275.

[99] 'Quod sordes peccatorum maneant, sed tectae' (Ibid., VI, p. 695).

[100] 'Si quis enim aethiopem candida veste indueret, non recte diceret, hic aethiops est albus' (Laud, *Works*, VI, p. 703; Bellarmine, 'De justificatione', II, vii § Quarto refellitur).

It was therefore not surprising that he felt deep admiration for the Dutch scholar G.J. Vossius, whose great *Historia Pelagiana* (1618) is one of the most recent works referred to in the notes.[101] Vossius was not Arminian (he was offered patronage by the rigorously Calvinist James Ussher); he had, however, deployed patristic learning to qualify many routine Reformed assertions.[102] When Ussher produced his *History of Gottschalk* (1631),[103] a supralapsarian tract in historical form, it was to Vossius that Laud wrote complaining of Ussher's 'rather narrow' interpretation of the theology of St Augustine 'which has not permitted that venerable Father to be consistent with his elders in the Church, or with himself'.[104]

Perhaps the most revealing of Laud's marginalia were comments that connected his preferred patristic method with his romantic vision of the clergy. Bellarmine had mentioned a grouping – or anyway a current of opinion – he called 'Schwenkfeldians and libertines', pretenders to immediate inspiration. These people apparently quoted II Corinthians 3: 6, where Paul refers 'ministers of the New Testament, not of the letter, but of the spirit, for the letter killeth but the spirit giveth life'. Laud asked

> whether this passage doesn't make very much against them? Not of the letter, that is, not of the bare letter, but also of the spirit, that is, either of the spirit that is the author of this letter, or of the spiritual grace which is contained beneath the letter.
>
> He has made us too the ministers of this Spirit, therefore both the spirit and spiritual instruction are to be expected in the ordinary proceeding of the church, from the spirit underlying the letter acting through us ministers, rather than through immediate revelation.[105]

A subsequent note rejected the Cardinal's reading of the text 'my sheep hear my voice', which raised the possibility of what he called 'internal inspiration'.

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[101]   Properly: *Historia de controversiis quas Pelagius eiusque reliquiae moverunt* (Leyden, 1618). Laud, *Works*, VI, pp. 702, 705.

[102]   On Vossius' reputation, see White, *Predestination*, pp. 282–3.

[103]   *Gotteschalci et praedestinarianae controversiae ab eo motae historia* (Dublin, 1631).

[104]   'Ille S. Aug. sensus restrictior, qui venerabilem illum Patrem nec antiquioribus in Ecclesia, nec sibi ipsi, constare permisit' (Laud, *Works*, VI, p. 299).

[105]   'Annon hic locus contra eos vel maxime facit? non literae, i. non literae nudae, sed et Spiritus, i. aut Spiritus qui author est huius literae, aut spiritualis gratiae quae sub litera continetur. Et nos fecit ministros huius Spiritus, ergo in ordinario ecclesiae processu, a Spiritu sub litera per nos ministros, non per immediatam revelationem, et spiritus et instructio spiritualis expectanda' (ibid., VI, 608).

Laud insisted 'not mine only immediately through revelation, but mine in and through scripture; through the ministry of the church'.[106]

The ministry of the church was at its most authoritative in the Apostles' own behaviour: Apostles, it seemed, were infallible in virtue of their office. In principle, their words possessed the authority of Scripture; if in practice there was room for scepticism, this was because their statements could only be retrieved by fallible historical enquiry:

> the authority of an Apostle speaking and an Apostle writing is the same, but only to those who are as certain about his voice as about his writing; to us, however, they're not perhaps quite the same, because we are infallibly certain about scripture, but not about traditions. I believe for the most part the ancient writings about apostolic traditions, but not as certainly as I believe sacred scripture, because I do not so certainly know them to be apostolic.[107]

The compromise struck here is typical. The claim that Laud made for the Apostles' wisdom seems theologically extraordinary, but the practical implication of his careful formula was to safeguard the special place of Scripture. The Laudian believer may feel a veneration for the Fathers, but it is the Bible alone that evokes an 'infallibly certain' response. His major work, the *Conference with Fisher*, involved him, among other things, in a considered defence of this position.

IV

The *Conference with Fisher* had a complex genesis. In late May 1622, the Duke of Buckingham's mother was hesitating on the verge of a conversion to Catholicism. The king had characteristically responded by encouraging a formal disputation between her Catholic tempter, the Jesuit Fisher, and the then Bishop of Ely, Francis White. The next day, James himself had taken the lead, asking that Fisher justify a fairly standard list of what he saw as Catholic abuses. But James's old-fashioned approach was unsuccessful; as Fisher explained,

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[106] 'Non meam solam immediate per revelationem, sed meam in et ex scriptura; per ministerium ecclesiae' (ibid., VI, p. 618).

[107] 'Eadem est authoritas loquentis et scribentis Apostoli, sed iis tantum qui tam certi sunt de voce, quam de scriptura eius; nobis autem forte non ita, nam infallibiliter certi sumus de scriptura, de traditionibus non item..scriptis illis vetustis de apostolicis traditionibus magna ex parte credo, non tamen tam certo credo atque scripturae sacrae, quia non tam certo scio esse apostolicas' (ibid., VI, p. 618).

It was observed, That in the second Conference, all the speech was about particular matters; little, or none, about a continuall, infallible, visible Church, which was the chiefe and onely point (in which the person doubting) required satisfaction.[108]

As James was bored or busy, Laud inherited the task of dealing with this fundamental question. When Fisher released a short manuscript account of his own memories of the proceedings, Laud duly added his own commentary. In deference to the royal policy of tempering confessional disagreements, he did not, however, present his remarks as a first-hand account, but as a treatise written by his chaplain; the elaborately recriminatory title described it as *An answere to Mr Fisher's relation of a Third Conference between a certain B (as he stiles him) and himselfe. The conference was very private, till Mr Fisher spread certain papers of it, which in many respects deserved an answer. Which is here given by R.B. Chaplaine to the B. that was employed in the Conference.* The resultant composite work was ready for print by late October 1622. Unfortunately, Laud then faced about two years' delay while White composed 600 crushing pages arising from the first day of debate. In consequence, the *Conference*'s so-called first edition is really a pseudonymous appendix to a much longer, duller piece of work; Laud's slight if subtle treatise (just seventy-four pages long) was physically difficult to find. This was unlucky for his reputation.

The *Conference* is focused on two questions, each of which is exceptionally revealing both of its author's own priorities and of his understanding of his church and its position. One is the status of a general council. As a good member of the Church of England, Laud was committed to the view that general councils could err.[109] But he regarded a true general council as the embodiment by representation of the entire church militant at any given moment. This meant that its rulings were de facto binding until they were reversed by its successor; the power of reversing its own rulings was after all a power that 'no *Bodie* Collective, Ecclesiasticall, or Civill, can put out of itselfe, or give away to a *Parliament*, or *Councell*'.[110]

The other, which needs fuller exposition, was the relationship between the church, the Bible, and the Christian's reason. Here Roman Catholics could appeal to Hooker, who had denied (against the Puritans) that Scripture could be self-authenticating. Laud's treatment of this point was long and careful. He wrote that

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[108]   R.B., *An answere to Mr Fisher's relation of a third conference* (1624), p. 2.

[109]   By Article 21: 'Of the Authority of General Councils'.

[110]   Laud, *Conference* (1624), p. 65.

[Hooker's] words are these. 'The Scripture is the ground of our Beleefe. The Authoritie of man' (that is the name he gives to Tradition) 'is the Key which opens the doore of entrance into the knowledge of the Scripture'. I ask now, when a man is entred, and hath viewed a house, and by viewing, likes it, and upon liking, resolves unchangeably to dwell there; doth he set up his resolution upon the Key that let him in?[111]

On this view, the authority of any given church is the occasion of a scriptural faith, but not, strictly speaking, its 'ground'. There were four candidates for such a ground: the authority of the apostolic church, the qualities inherent in Scripture itself, the authority of the present church, and the findings of the individual's reason. Laud's own conclusion was a complex hybrid that carefully *denied* a place to reason:

here's double Authoritie, and both Divine, that confirms Scripture to be the Word of God, Tradition of the Apostles delivering it, and the internall worth and argument in the Scripture, obvious to a soule prepared by the present Churches Tradition, and God's grace.[112]

Strictly speaking, the 'grounds' were the witness of the apostolic church and the internal qualities of Scripture, but both the authority of the *present* church and the infusion of prevenient grace ought to be seen as being preconditions.

Laud's formal position, then, was unambiguous: 'Reason, without Grace, cannot see the way to Heaven, nor beleeve this Booke, in which God hath written the way'.[113] But though salvific faith depends upon God's intervention, Laud thought that:

a man may be *assured*, nay *infallibly assured* by Ecclesiasticall and humane proofe. Men that never saw Rome, may be sure, and infallibly beleeve, that such a Citie there is, by Historicall and acquired Faith. And if consent of humane storie can assure me this, Why should not consent of Church-storie assure me the other, *That Christ and his apostles delivered this Bodie of Scripture as the Oracles of God?*[114]

His enemy Henry Burton knew exactly what to think about this picture of the role of reason: he was elevating a 'historical' faith (the kind of faith the devils have when they believe and tremble) to the status of a justifying faith; reducing

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[111]   Ibid., p. 29.
[112]   Ibid., p. 26.
[113]   Ibid., pp. 20–21.
[114]   Ibid., p. 35.

faith to nothing but the outcome of rational assessment of human testimony.[115] Such a position was indeed advanced in Laud's godson William Chillingworth's *The Religion of Protestants a safe way to salvation* (1638), but it is obvious that Laud went out of his way to exclude this kind of doctrine.[116]

So much had happened in the English church that it might have been expected that the enlarged edition that Laud put out in 1639 would be significantly different. But if Laud changed his mind on any question, he thought it better to conceal the fact. He dropped the fiction that the work was written by his chaplain, but the first edition's text was barely altered except by the addition of new material. From a purely theological perspective, this new material has two main points of interest. The first (as Anthony Milton notices)[117] is a concern with legalistic details designed to exculpate the church from the grave charge of schism. The other is a sizeable excursus in which he sets out his personal understanding of the English Church's Eucharistic doctrine. The essence of his theory (which he supports by reference to Jewel) is that the presence is 'real' without being 'corporal' and that the 'sacrifice' made by the priest is strictly speaking a commemoration.[118] It is obvious that the purpose of this passage is to defend the altar policy, but Laud made the most of a broadly defensible case and might have expected a serious-minded answer. The fact that no such answer was forthcoming suggests his formulation was well within the pale of the existing English orthodoxy.

V

At some time after the king's restoration, the church-historian Roger Ley (d. 1668) composed a pen-picture of Laud. Ley was a moderate figure, an anti-Arminian conformist with a taste for ceremony, and his detached contemporary verdict corroborates the thrust of this discussion: he thought that the Archbishop had a *secret* policy of working to promote Arminianism;[119] but he was ready to accept

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[115] *A replie to a relation of a conference between William Laude and Mr Fisher the Jesuite* (1640), pp. 135–78.

[116] Laud was suspicious of Chillingworth, but delegated the task of vetting his treatise to the relevant authorities at Oxford (Laud, *Works*, V, p. 165).

[117] ODNB, s.v. 'Laud'.

[118] Laud, *Conference* (1639), esp. pp. 286–7, 294–6, 305–6. The treatment of 'commemorative sacrifice' at pp. 305–6 is barely different from the discussion at Williams, *Holy table*, p. 105.

[119] British Library, Stowe MS 76, fo. 326.

that Laud was opposed to the Catholic corporal presence.[120] He had a personal memory, moreover, of Laud as an effective pastoral speaker. When he was Bishop of London (1628–33), Laud had impressed three points upon his clergy. The first was that 'it is the sign of a living body if it does not tolerate division'.[121] The second was that gestures were like a walnut's shell; they were not themselves the fruit (which was 'interior religion'), but they protected and they nurtured it. The third was that the church should catechise children whether or not they understood the words that they recited; 'in grammar schools (he said) the boys often don't see the meaning and application of rules, but later with advancing years (*per aetatem*) they are more fully informed'.[122] These points were no doubt most attractive to people predisposed to find some meaning in external order, but their appeal did not depend on narrowly doctrinal premises.

Ley might, then, have had sympathy with Peter Lake's idea that there was a distinctive 'Laudian style' – a recognisable agglomeration of social and religious attitudes.[123] One obvious source of that style would be Hooker's *Polity* (the English work that Laud most often cited).[124] It is not clear, however, that an ideal-type can really rescue the two-party model; as Lake himself stresses, 'scarcely any of the constituent parts of Laudianism as it is here discussed were novel in the 1630s and not all of them, viewed in isolation from the others, constituted exclusively Laudian opinions'.[125] There is, moreover, no evidence that any substantial body of non-Puritan divines was actually hostile towards Hooker; if the 'Laudians' and 'Calvinist conformists' turned out, when it came to Civil War, to have a lot in common, it may be they had Hookerian shared ground.[126] Their willingness to spend money on the furnishings of churches lends tangible support to this suggestion.[127]

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[120]   Ibid., fo. 327.

[121]   'Vivi corporis est signum, si non patitur divisionem' Ibid., fo. 327 v.

[122]   'In scholis grammaticis (inquit) pueri saepe regularum sensum et usum non percipiunt, sed postea per aetatem plenius edocti' (ibid., 327 v). For the same point, see *Conference* (1639), p. 80 n.

[123]   Peter Lake, 'The Laudian Style: Order, Uniformity and the Pursuit of the Beauty of Holiness in the 1630s', in Fincham (ed.), *Early Stuart Church*, p. 161.

[124]   Apart from the numerous references in the *Conference*, see Laud, *Works*, I, pp. 38, 44; VI, p. 636.

[125]   Lake, 'Laudian Style', p. 163.

[126]   Michael Brydon, *The Evolving Reputation of Richard Hooker: An Examination of Responses, 1600–1714* (Oxford, 2006) confirms the impression that 'Calvinist conformists' understood him as belonging to 'an anti-Puritan moderate Reformed tradition' (p. 20).

[127]   Kenneth Fincham and Nicholas Tyacke's magnificently detailed *Altars Restored*: *The Changing Face of English Religious Worship, 1547–c.1700* (Oxford, 2007) distinguishes 'Laudian' re-edification from the more general phenomenon of Jacobean and Caroline improvements in

Such questions can hardly be settled by study of an individual's writings; nor can a close analysis of Laud's theology cast light upon its popular reception. But this chapter's principal concern has been with Laud's ideas, and what was striking about those ideas was their essential loyalty to an established framework. He did, however, play a part within one long-term process that was to be more fatal to that Calvinistic framework than any mere Arminian deviations. The achievement of which he was proudest was certainly his chancellorship of Oxford (an office, incidentally, to which he was elected without the least external interference).[128] The *History* he compiled of his performance in this role went out of its way to document three lines of policy. The first was a passion for order in every conceivable sphere from caps and gowns to student drunkenness. The second was an ostentatious rigour in banning discussion (either way) of the Arminian points;[129] the 'school-points' of predestinarian doctrine were to be banished even from the Schools. The third bore some relation to the second. In a confidential letter of 1635, he told the Bishop of Winchester that scholars of New College, Oxford seemed only to be examined about Calvin. He commented that '[the first] two years, and some years after, should be allowed to logic, [natural] philosophy, mathematics, and the like grounds of learning, the better to enable them to study divinity with judgement'.[130] But more was going on here than anti-Calvinism; Laud was, to be sure, discouraging reading of Calvin, but he was also offering a positive ideal: a fluent generalist mind, well trained in spoken Latin, at the expense, perhaps, of a real grip on genuinely demanding subject matter. We find the same ideal at work in university examinations, set up by the Laudian statutes of 1636, in which theology was not involved. The regents were told to 'examine through all the arts and sciences in which the candidates were bound to have been auditors, asking fundamental questions in each one, not propounding studied subtleties to gravel and discourage young students'.[131]

In this respect, at least, Laud stood for cultural tendencies that were to dominate the long-term future. Laud was a theologian of some significance, but most of the 'Laudian' works that caused a scandal were rather vulgar English-language pamphlets; though he promoted the defence of trivial features of the

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church furnishing and fabrics. There do appear to have been different ways of justifying such expenditure (see pp. 122–5 for some defensive rhetoric from Jacobean consecration sermons). But the impulse to improve was clearly widespread and even improvements classified as 'Laudian' were often attractive to people described as 'moderate Calvinists' (p. 355).

[128] Kenneth Fincham, 'Oxford and the Early Stuart Polity', in Nicholas Tyacke (ed.), *Seventeenth-Century Oxford* (Oxford, 1997), p. 199.

[129] E.g. Laud, *Works*, V, pp. 15, 191 and n., 287–8.

[130] Ibid., V, p. 117.

[131] Ibid., V, p. 212–13.

church's practice,[132] he stifled more ambitious speculations. Over the course of his career, with his encouragement, the English clerisy had made a choice: in turning against the scholastic pursuit of a system, they turned away from anything resembling a rigorous standardised theology. In its place, in very varying proportions, they put patristic scholarship and an appeal to reason. Laud's emphasis was of course upon the former, but he encouraged cultural conditions that would eventually secure the triumph of the latter. The stable, successful, dislikeable church of the later Stuart period owed much to this invisible adjustment. Whatever he contributed to causing Civil War, he set in train a process that lasted well beyond the Restoration.

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[132]   For the contrast with Abbot's policy, see ibid., V, pp. 39–40.

Chapter 5

Cannons and Constitutions

Charles W.A. Prior

The introduction of new ecclesiastical Canons in the autumn of 1640 can be seen as a major impetus for what John Morrill has called the 'attack' on the Church of England.[1] Coming as they did in the wake of the ecclesiastical 'innovations' of the Personal Rule, and with an army of Scots Covenanters occupying Newcastle, the Canons stood out as yet another example of an assault on the twin sanctities of law and 'true' religion'. The Grand Remonstrance condemned them as containing many 'matters contrary to the King's prerogative, to the fundamental laws and statutes of the realm, to the right of parliaments, to the property and liberty of the subject'.[2] So much was confirmed by a wave of pamphlets, squibs, and graphic satires.[3] Yet, while we might be tempted to dismiss this material as so much anti-episcopal invective, it was nevertheless a conduit for the transmission of complex ideas about the defects of ecclesiastical polity to a wider audience.[4] The riots at the Court of High Commission and the destruction of its records in November of 1640 were dismissed by Laud as mere spectacles fomented by sectaries, but the mob's choice of targets was salutary. It would seem, therefore, that one of the burdens of sustaining the argument that the events of the 1640s were 'wars of religion' is to make sense of what Morrill described as the 'legal-constitutionalist' perception of misgovernment, and link it to that which he labelled the 'religious'.[5] This chapter argues that the polemical reaction to

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[1]   The research on which this chapter is based was carried on in the Library of York Minster and the Rare Books Room of the Cambridge University Library. I am grateful to the staff of both institutions, and acknowledge the financial support of the British Academy, and the hospitality of the President and Fellows of Wolfson College, Cambridge. John Morrill, 'The Religious Context of the English Civil War', *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 5th series, 34 (1984): pp. 155–78.

[2]   *A remonstrance of the state of the kingdom of England* (1641), p. 29.

[3]   Helen Pierce, 'Anti-Episcopacy and Graphic Satire in England, 1640–1645', *Historical Journal*, 47/4 (2004): pp. 809–48.

[4]   David Cressy, *England on Edge: Crisis and Revolution, 1640–1642* (Oxford, 2006), ch. 5; Michael Braddick, *God's Fury, England's Fire: A New History of the English Civil Wars* (London, 2008), ch. 4.

[5]   Morrill, 'Religious Context', p. 157.

the Canons of 1640 offers a number of clarifications of this problem, which contemporaries recognised as stemming from the legal and political legacies of the Reformation. To the extent that these legacies were contested, there emerged a body of political thought that sought to establish clearer links between true religion, authentic law, and the liberties of the subject.

The Laws of Church and Realm

The outcry over the illegalities associated with the Caroline Church drew on a deeper problem concerning the relationship between the laws of the Church and the laws of the realm.[6] In the Jacobean period, divisions over the use of High Commission for ministerial deprivations constituted one of the more serious rifts in the Church, and these ran in channels opened by the 'Admonition' to the Parliament, as well as the work of Richard Cosin and James Morice.[7] The problem in both contexts was the relation of the Church to a body of 'authentic' law. As Morice argued, if the Church usurped the law-making role of parliament then not only 'Crown and sceptre' but also the 'freedome and libertie' of subjects were in peril.[8] One central development in the Jacobean period in particular was the emergence of a 'constitutionalist' pattern of ecclesiastical polity, which emphasised that the realm contained only one legitimate source of law – that elaborated by Parliament, interpreting and sometimes building upon the precepts of the common law. As has been pointed out, one spur to the development of this position was the tendency on the part of the higher clergy to shift their ecclesiological points of reference away from the 'historic' character of British Protestantism, and toward a view of the Church that connected it

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[6]   This topic awaits a systematic study, but see Stuart Barton Babbage, *Puritanism and Richard Bancroft* (London, 1962), ch. 9; Claire Cross, *The Royal Supremacy in the Elizabethan Church* (London, 1969), ch. 1; Louis Knafla, *Law and Politics in Jacobean England: The Tracts of Lord Chancellor Ellesmere* (Cambridge, 1977), ch. 2, 6; Norman L. Jones, *Faith by Statute: Parliament and the Settlement of Religion, 1559* (London, 1982); Julian Davis, *The Caroline Captivity of the Church: Charles I and the Remoulding of Anglicanism, 1625–1641* (Oxford, 1992).

[7]   Charles W.A. Prior, *Defining the Jacobean Church: The Politics of Religious Controversy, 1603–1625* (Cambridge, 2005), ch. 3; Ethan H. Shagan, 'England's Inquisition: Constitutional Conflict and Ecclesiastical Law in the 1590s', *Historical Journal*, 47/3 (2004): pp. 541–65.

[8]   [James Morice], *A briefe treatise of oaths, exacted by ordinaries and ecclesiasticall iudges* (1590), pp. 55–6.

with precedents from the Continent and the world of Jewish antiquity.[9] The position that emerged in response was that the Church could not develop laws that were superior to those of the realm. As one writer argued with reference to canons introduced by Bancroft in 1604,

> I know but two sorts of law in the kingdom, the one customary or common law as we call it, the other statute or parliament law. But the canons and constitutions of the convocation house are neither common law nor statute law, therefore no laws of England, or of the kingdom.[10]

Here, the suggestion that the Canons were an inferior branch of law was less central than was the definition of what an authentic law actually was – a product of the courts and the statutory body of law generated by Parliament.

It is well known that the Canons were not approved by Parliament, and that James VI and I employed letters patent to bring them into force.[11] This controversial use of a legal instrument required further justification, and hence the King invoked the Henrician 'Act for the submission of the clergy' which, on some interpretations, granted the Church freedom to devise and implement canons without parliamentary consent, and on others represented an assault on the common law.[12] Indeed, what the Act also stated, and what Bancroft's opponents were anxious to demonstrate, was that no ecclesiastical canon could contravene 'the customs, laws, or statutes' of the realm.[13] In the wake of the introduction of the Canons many writers argued that clerical deprivations and the use of oaths *ex officio* represented clear violations of the common law. This was nowhere more coherently argued than in Nicholas Fuller's legal opinion on High Commission, in which he posited a necessary agreement between Church and realm, described as the,

> right distribution of the Iurisdiction of the Church in England, and Iurisdiction of the Common Lawes in England, set forth and proved upon good grounds of

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[9] Alan Cromartie, *The Constitutionalist Revolution: An Essay on the History of England, 1450–1642* (Cambridge, 2006), p. 146.

[10] BL, Cotton MS Cleopatra, F II, fol. 187–8. Cited in *The Anglican Canons, 1529–1947*, (ed.) Gerald Bray (Woodbridge, 1998), p. lvii.

[11] For details, see *Anglican Canons*, pp. liv–lxi.

[12] *The Tudor Constitution: Documents and Commentary*, (ed.) G.R. Elton (Cambridge, 1982), doc. 175.

[13] Ibid., p. 349.

the ancient lawes and statutes of the Realm [would] continue a peace between the Church and Commonwealth of England for ever.[14]

That is to say, the balancing of ecclesiastical and civil 'jurisdiction' lay within the competence of the law, and in the precedents of statute.

This discussion of the scope and nature of law inevitably led to an examination of the relationship between laws of Church and realm. There were a number of foundational texts in the treatment of this question, but as definitive as they appeared, they nevertheless contained serious points of ambiguity. For example, the Act of Appeals (1533) noted that 'divers sundry authentic histories' testified to the fact that England was an 'empire', and that the King was possessed of an 'imperial crown' and ruled over a 'body politic, compact of all sorts and degrees of people divided in terms and by names of spirituality and temporality'.[15] This not only introduced the concept of imperial kingship and gave it an historical pedigree, but also defined a political community – a body politic – that was the subject of sovereign power.[16] However, the body politic was described as being 'divided' into spiritual and temporal components: how did the one relate to the other? Subsequent treatments of the problem reveal the extent to which writers could employ this ambiguity in order to define a more sacral concept of royal ecclesiastical supremacy. In a printed sermon which appeared in 1607 and again in 1634, Francis Mason offered a loose summary of the language of the Henrician Act of Appeals and gestured as well to the Elizabethan Act of Supremacy. In the process he elaborated a pattern of ecclesiastical polity that ran counter to the constitutionalist version described above:

By the ancient lawes of this Realme, this kingdome of ENGLAND *is an absolute Empire and Monarchie*, consisting of one head, which is the *King*, and of a *bodie politicke*, which bodie politicke the law divideth into two generall parts, the *Cleargie* and the *Laitie*. Now the King of England being an absolute Soveraigne, and consequently by the law of God supreme governor over all persons and causes Ecclesiasticall & Temporall, within his owne dominions, may by the *ancient prerogative and lawes* of Englande, make an *Ecclesiasticall commission*.[17]

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[14]   Nicholas Fuller, *The argument of Nicholas Fuller of Grays Inne Esquire* (1641), p. 2; Prior, *Defining*, p. 132.

[15]   *Tudor constitution*, doc. 177.

[16]   For a useful discussion, see Glenn Burgess, *British Political Thought, 1500–1660: The Politics of the Post Reformation* (Basingstoke, 2009), pp. 31–44.

[17]   Francis Mason, *The authority of the Church in making canons and constitutions concerning things indifferent* (1607), p. 15.

Mason's gloss of the passage replaced one precedent with another: the Act of Appeals had described the imperial basis of the ecclesiastical supremacy as lying in histories and chronicles, rather than the ancient laws of the realm.[18] The distinction lay in the fact that histories were narratives, and subject to contest and debate, whereas laws were more rigid, and less amenable to flexibility in interpretation; the former opened up the plane of political discourse, while the latter closed it off. Likewise, Mason's assertion that the 'absolute' sovereign was so by 'consequence' of divine law ran counter to the language of the Elizabethan Oath of Supremacy, a declaration contained within a statute and thus binding according to the laws of the realm alone.[19] While the notion of the body politic remains intact, the definition of 'temporal' power is significantly narrowed, and a word that could construe either legislature, laws, or subjects was replaced with one that merely denoted those members of the Church who were *not* the clergy. Moreover, these are divided from one another by the 'law' – whether this law emanates from the realm or the Scripture, Mason does not say. The answer is perhaps implied in what the passage omits: the vernacular elements of history and statute are presented as being inferior to sacred law. Hence, the common law does not vanish altogether, but is instead transformed by its combination with sacral concepts of kingship.

As a number of scholars have noted, this flexibility of interpretation is what gave post-Reformation political thought its internal dynamic.[20] This explains why history, law, and religion became central to discussions of the laws of ecclesiastical polity, and especially the nature and limits of the royal ecclesiastical supremacy.[21] To be sure, the powers of the Crown were the subject of a great deal

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[18] *Tudor Constitution*, doc. 177, p. 353.

[19] *Tudor Constitution*, doc. 184, p. 375.

[20] J.G.A. Pocock, 'The History of British Political Thought: The Creation of a Center', *Journal of British Studies*, 24 (1985): pp. 283–310, esp. pp. 287–91; Conrad Russell, 'Whose Supremacy?: King, Parliament and the Church, 1530–1640', *Lambeth Palace Annual Library Review* (1995): pp. 53–64; Conrad Russell, 'Parliament, the Royal Supremacy and the Church', *Parliamentary History*, 19 (2000): pp. 27–37; D. Alan Orr, 'Sovereignty, Supremacy and the Origins of the English Civil War', *History*, 87 (2002): pp. 474–90. John Guy, 'The Henrician age', in J.G.A. Pocock et al. (eds), *The Varieties of British Political Thought, 1500–1800* (Cambridge, 1993), p. 39. Jeffrey Collins has argued that Hobbes occupied the end of a long period where the 'universal church' was subjected to the power of 'emerging' states. In England this took the form of a vernacular and national idea of ecclesiastical polity, which partly explains Laudian insularity. Jeffrey R. Collins, *The Allegiance of Thomas Hobbes* (Oxford, 2005), p. 10.

[21] Colin Kidd, 'The Matter of Britain and the Contours of British Political Thought', in David Armitage (ed.), *British Political Thought in History, Literature and Theory, 1500–1800* (Cambridge, 2006), p. 55.

of comment, in the works of Hooker, Jewel, and a host of others.[22] However, such texts were inferior to *the* texts – the untidy sufficiency of Acts which had been introduced, repealed, and restored between 1534 and 1559. The fact that the powers described in statutes were given legitimacy by the sanction of parliament (the body of the realm) meant that they were opened up to legal scrutiny, and reconciled with existing bodies of law. Defenders of the Church (clerics, not lawyers) sought to address this by elaborating theories of godly kingship derived from the Bible, texts like the *Leges Edwardi Confessoris*, or from vernacular narratives of 'British' ecclesiastical lawgivers such as King Lucius.[23] Because these sources lay more firmly within the realm of history than they did in the law, they shifted the question away from purely legal considerations and toward the more complex and disputed discourses of sacred and mythical history.[24]

Some critics of the Church regarded the legalistic and state-driven nature of the Reformation as a principal source of its weakness: for Catholics such as Thomas Stapleton the Church was merely an act of state.[25] Yet as the argument with the Catholics gave way to an argument among English Protestants, the question of the relationship between these sacred narratives of royal (and episcopal) supremacy and that of the common and statute law of the realm became increasingly urgent. Did these powers originate in the Apostolic and, hence, pre-common law age, or were they conveyed *de novo* by reformation parliaments? This explains the desire on the part of common lawyers to wrestle the whole question back to an interpretation of the kinds of powers described in the Acts of Reformation, and to reconcile them with the dense and authoritative traditions of the common law.[26]

The remainder of this chapter explores aspects of this problem by way of a close reading of a singular contribution to the debate over the Canons of 1640. *Englands complaint to Iesvs Christ, against the bishops canons* appeared some time in November of 1640, and offered a detailed argument in defence of the ecclesiastical sovereignty of Parliament. Recently, David Como has placed the work within the context of what he calls the 'radical' Puritan underground, and

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[22]   Burgess, *British Political Thought*, ch. 1 passim.

[23]   Felicity Heal, 'What Can King Lucius Do for You? The Reformation and the Early British Church', *English Historical Review*, 120 (2005): pp. 593–614.

[24]   Colin Kidd, *British Identities before Nationalism: Ethnicity and Nationhood in the Atlantic World, 1600–1800* (Cambridge, 1999), ch. 5.

[25]   Thomas Stapleton, *A counterblast to M. Hornes vayne blaste against M. Fekenham* (1567), pp. 427–8.

[26]   Cromartie, *Constitutionalist Revolution*, chs 5–6.

has characterised it as 'a sophisticated statement of political radicalism'.[27] Como argues that the source of this radicalism was a combination of a contractual theory that defined the obligations of the monarch, with defences of rights and liberties of subjects articulated by the ancient constitution – the product of this mingling was a theory of resistance.[28] However, it is also the case that there are other contexts and debates that shed light on the work, and while acknowledging the insights offered by Como's reading, I am nevertheless inclined to disagree with it. In sum, the work is not as radical as Como suggests, and contains abundant evidence that the author's aim was to *defend* the royal supremacy over the Church against the incursion of the bishops. This was accomplished by separating the person of the monarch from the function of the royal supremacy over the Church; hence, what was to be defended was a concept of law-making power over the realm and the Church, with the proviso that this power was only justly exercised when it preserved the religious and civil liberties of subjects. Indeed, the most striking aspect of the work is its clear elaboration of a concept of liberty, itself comprised of civil and religious aspects. From the proposition that the Church should be always rooted in law and Scripture, the author argues that subjects who are deprived of their civil and religious liberties are reduced to the condition of slaves. However, the villain of the piece is not the king, but the bishops and their attempt to promulgate a body of law that negated the ancient laws of the realm, while at the same time departing from the foundations of the 'true' Church in England, howsoever those foundations were disputed.

Whose Reformation? Tradition and Innovation

Rather than a radical departure from existing patterns of discourse, *Englands complaint* should be seen as a systematic response to the constitutional matters raised by the Canons of 1640.[29] The argument of this anonymous pamphlet is largely confined to three of the seventeen Canons: the first, which elaborated a theory of regal power; the sixth, which contained the 'et cetera' oath; and the

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[27]   David Como, 'Secret Printing, the Crisis of 1640, and the Origins of Civil War Radicalism', *Past and Present*, 196 (August 2007): pp. 37–82 at p. 66.

[28]   Ibid., p. 67.

[29]   This debate had been building for some time, and its chief works re-appeared in the context of debate on the Canons of 1640. [Marprelate], *Reformation no enemie* (1641); *Hay any worke for Cooper* (1642); [Richard Bancroft], *A sermon preached at Pauls Crosse* (1636, 1637); *Daungerous positions and proceedings* (1640); Alexander Leighton, *An appeal to the parliament, or Sions plea against the prelacy* (1640); [Paul Baynes], *The diocesans tryall* (1641); [William Bradshaw], *Englishe puritanisme* (1640).

seventh, which was concerned with rites and ceremonies. In sum, the Canons offered a pattern of ecclesiastical polity, containing a theory of kingship, a doctrine of obedience, and a pattern of ecclesiology. The pressing political question turned on the degree to which the King endorsed the Canons, and whether he had fully grasped their political significance.[30] In the preface appended to them, the King's support was very clearly expressed, yet was he aware that the Canons stood to greatly enhance the power of the clergy? And then there was the matter of the 'et cetera' oath, which amounted to a pledge in favour of perpetual episcopal government, despite long-standing disputes on the issue in the press and, more recently, in skirmishes between the King's army and the Covenanters. In other words, the Canons turned a range of hotly disputed points of ecclesiastical polity into matters of law, but the source and legitimacy of this law was, at best, questionable. As had been the case with the Jacobean Canons, those of 1640 were given force via a combination of letters patents and Henrician Acts designed to define the respective powers of what Henry Parker called the 'mitre and diadem'.[31]

However, they appeared at a moment when the issues of parliamentary sovereignty and the perceived innovations in the Church were associated with increasingly virulent anti-clericalism, running from denunciations in the press and in Parliament, to riots and ribald verse that sustained the ire of the London crowds. Hence, it seems that at first the anonymous author was willing to attribute ecclesiastical 'innovations' to those around the blameless King:

> Now for our parts, we doe appeale to thy righteous judgement, *O searcher of all hearts*, whether we have been apt causelessly to suspect or surmise the least evill of our King, but on the contrary, have been ready to interpret all his actions in such a sense, as perswading ourselvs, whatever things were amisse in Church or Common-weale, or whatever *Innovations* brought in, yea although under the *name* of *Royal Authority*, yet the King was ignorant of them, and his *name* therin abused by some bad Officers about him.[32]

Here was a Caroline spin on the theme of 'evil counsel', whereby the actions of the King were not accompanied by a clear justification of why these actions were

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[30]   The royal licence for the Convocation stipulated that any canons issuing from it could not be 'contrary or repugnant to the doctrine, orders and ceremonies of the Church of England already established'. *Records of Convocations, v. 15: York, 1625–1861*, (ed.) Gerald Bray (Woodbridge, Suffolk, 2006), p. 39.

[31]   [Henry Parker], *The true grounds of ecclesiastical regiment* (1641), p. 10.

[32]   *Englands complaint to Iesvs Christ, against the bishops canons* (1640), sig. A2v–3r. Hereafter *EC*, followed by signature.

carried out, since the forum for such justifications – Parliament – had assembled only fleetingly in the spring of 1640. Given this, subjects could only speculate on whether the King himself occupied the role of agent or patient. The bishops made a much clearer target, thanks to the attempt at the ecclesial acculturation of the Scots, and to Laud's unrepentant defence of episcopacy *iure divino* before Star Chamber in 1637.[33]

With respect to Laudian ecclesiology, the question was whether the policies of the 1630s were meant to reform, rather than to innovate.[34] The author of *Englands complaint* referred to the introduction of altars and images 'not confirmed by law', and suggested that the new Canons were intended to lend these 'innovations' the legitimacy of legal sanction, 'we see with open eyes to our hearts grief, those things to be concluded as by Law (Canons of Prelates now being made binding Laws) and so confirmed by the *Letters Patents* of the King, for him his Heires, and lawfull Successors: *O Lord*, what shall we think?'[35] This amounted to a permanent reformation, carried forward on the slight shoulders of letters patent, and which would be binding during future reigns. As was common in the 1640s, the author treated the Elizabethan settlement as emblematic, for it represented the restoration of the Church via parliamentary statute, and was thus incorporated within the body of the common law.[36] The Convocation that produced the Canons was the occasion for the undermining of the 'foundations' of this settlement:

> So as we cannot be any longer ignorant (except we will be wilfully blind) that the *Doctrine of the Church of England established* in Queene *Elizabeths* dayes, hath now suffered not onely an *Innovation*, but an utter *eversion* and *extirpation* of the very foundations thereof: And this *Innovation*, this *eversion*, being now finally concluded on in a Synod, confirmed by the King, and enjoyned to be Sworne unto all those aforesaid.[37]

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[33]   John Morrill, 'A British Patriarchy?: Ecclesiastical Imperialism under the Early Stuarts', in Anthony Fletcher and Peter Roberts (eds), *Religion, Culture, and Society in Early Modern Britain: Essays in Honour of Patrick Collinson* (Cambridge, 1994), pp. 209–37; William Laud, *A speech delivered in the Starr-Chamber* (1637), pp. 6–9.

[34]   'So as we are apt to thinke that those *Innovations* brought in since and under his Raigne, have either crept in by stealth and by degrees without his knowledge, or been craftily suggested as being no *Innovations* at all, but rather *renovations* of the decayes of the old Religion'. *EC*, sig A3r.

[35]   *EC*, sig A3v.

[36]   Parker, *True grounds*, pp. 53–4.

[37]   *EC*, sig. A3r–3v.

The evidence of this royal confirmation was apparently found in the King's preface to the Canons, where – claimed the author – Charles had 'diligently and with great comfort read, and considered all the said Canons'. However, these words do not appear in the preface, which instead contains a number of declarations of a desire to 'return unto the true former splendour of uniformity' of the kind embodied in the 'pious examples' of Edward VI, Elizabeth, and James VI and I.[38]

It is here that we begin to recognise the signs of the struggle over the interpretation of the legal and constitutional elements of the religious settlement that defined so many positions in 1640.[39] The preface to the Canons made repeated assertions that the aim of the new laws was not to innovate; instead, they were defended as necessary measures to *restore* practices that had fallen into 'disuse', or to confirm 'rites and ceremonies' that were 'approved of and used' by the Edwardine and Elizabethan churches.[40] In other words, the Canons did not signify a departure from previous ecclesiastical settlements, but a codification and perfection of them. While the preface acknowledged that ceremonies were 'quarrelled at' owing to a 'pretence of zeal', there was no attempt to engage with the substance of these arguments, beyond condemning them as a disruption of the peace and quiet of the Church. In elaborating this position, the preface to the Canons was no different from a succession of conformist defences of disputed aspects of doctrine and discipline. What was different was that the statement came amid a growing clamour over the imposition of liturgy and episcopacy in Scotland, and the continuing dispute over altars and episcopal courts in England. It was this point that our anonymous author was keen to exploit as evidence of an attempt to undo the Church by law established:

> Now o Lord, all these things weighed and layd together, Solemn and Sacred *Protestations* against *Innovations* on the one side, and a mighty flood of *Innovations* on the other side, which by *Royall Authority* have made a terrible universall invasion and irruption both into thy Spirituall *Kingdome*, and this Temporal, threatning speedily to sweep all away at once.[41]

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[38]   *Anglican Canons*, p. 556.

[39]   For a useful examination of this topic, see Anthony Milton, *Laudian and Royalist Polemic in Seventeenth-Century England: The Career and Writings of Peter Heylyn* (Manchester, 2007), ch. 3.

[40]   *Anglican Canons*, pp. 554–5.

[41]   *EC*, sig. A3v. A little further along, the argument becomes more pointed: neither the King's word nor the King's laws can be trusted: 'Wouldst thou have us still to dreame or imagine, that here are no *Innovations* at all brought in either of *Doctrine*, or *Ecclesiasticall Government*, and all because the King hath so frequently, so solemnly before God …

One of the more durable commonplaces in early Stuart political thought was the idea that the Church and commonwealth were combined into a single body.[42] Most often, it was employed as an argument against dissenters who constituted a faction against the Commonwealth. As Edward Forset explained, commonwealths – which he likened to bodies – were possessed of 'both the civil and spiritual side', and that the same civil and spiritual bonds that held the commonwealth together also defined the sovereign powers of the head.[43] It was this that lent legitimacy to the punishment of non-conformity. In other hands, the argument was employed to argue that the means by which nonconformists were punished represented a threat not only to the purity of true religion, but also the laws of the land.[44] Yet these points of dispute should not obscure the fact that contemporaries saw little separation between the laws of the Church and the laws of the realm. Rather, the pressing question concerned the relationship of one to the other.

Bodies, Soules, and Estates

As has been noted, the discussion in *Englands complaint* is largely focused on three Canons. The first segment of the work was devoted to a wide ranging meditation on the nature of tyranny and liberty, itself a reaction to the 1st Canon, 'Concerning the regal power'. This contained a sort of political catechism on the 'lawful and independent' authority of the Crown, that was to be declaimed from the pulpits 'upon some Sunday in every quarter of the year'.[45] The meaning of 'lawful' is interpreted in the context of the 'good laws of the Kingdome', by which is meant the binding powers of statute and common law. However, the definition of the independent power of the King was another matter:

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protested to the contrary? Or, that the *Innovations* concluded in this Synod, are therfore no *Innovations*, because ratified and confirmed by the *Kings Letters Patents*, and by all strength of *Royall Authority*, and because commended by the King to be such, as he *is perswaded wilbe very profitable to the whole Church and Kingdome*' (sig. A3v).

[42]   For examples, see Charles W.A. Prior, 'Ecclesiology and Political Thought in England, 1580–*c.* 1630', *Historical Journal*, 48/4 (2005): pp. 855–4, esp. pp. 868–75.

[43]   Edward Forset, *A comparatiue discourse of the bodies natural and politique* (1606), p. 56–7. Cf. Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* (1651), pp. 205–6.

[44]   Prior, *Defining*, ch. 3.

[45]   *Anglican Canons*, p. 558. The Canon is divided into six numbered clauses, with clause 2 being further sub-divided into six sections, designated by letters A–F.

> And as for *Independent*, we *acknowledge* his *Sovereignty* such in respect of any
> Forraigne *Power*, or *Potentate*: but not *independent* in respect of *God*, whose
> Deputy he is: nor *independent*, or absolute, as all *Tyrranicall States*, as that of the
> *Turke*; seeing the Kingdome of *England* is tempered, seasoned, and conditioned
> with good *Laws*, which are the ordinary rules of good and just Government of the
> Subjects, the due execution whereof in the administration of the Kingdome is an
> essentiall part of the *Kingly office*, which cannot be separated one from the other.[46]

The essential point is that the law is the foundation of the polity. It *prevents* the tyrannical independence of the Crown and its decline into 'Eastern' despotism, and it *provides* for the 'good and just' government of subjects. That is, the law generates two related political goods: people are free from the tyranny of kings, while at the same time being free to enjoy the full scope of their liberties. The exercise of legitimate power depends on the observation of both the laws of God and of the realm, a position that can be seen to refute the argument, set forth in the 1st Canon, that the 'sacred order of kings is of divine right'.[47] Nevertheless, the King is described as being Gods 'deputy', and the power he holds is contrasted with the Asiatic despotism of the Muslim world, where tyranny thrives in the absence of Christianity.[48]

To return to the definition of 'lawful' that our author is seeking to elaborate, we see that the concept comprises both the laws of the realm and the laws of God. From this point the discussion moves on to consider section 2.f of the 1st Canon – that dealing with the matter of the duties of subjects and sovereigns. Controversially, the Canon stipulated that 'supply' was due according to the 'law of God, nature and nations' – whether this included Parliament was not clear. To this our author offered the vital clarification that it was indeed the duty of subjects to give 'support' to the King, and 'the ordinary way of it is (according to the ancient Laws and Government of the Realme) by Parliament'.[49] However, the Canon also noted that the King was obliged to defend the property and freedom of subjects; perhaps this was intended to answer critics of impositions and the

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[46] *EC*, sig. A4v.

[47] *Anglican Canons*, p. 558.

[48] It is vital to recognise that the author of *Englands complaint* did not deny the King any power in the realm of religion; rather, the proviso was that such power as the King had was to be used in the preservation of the Church and not to 'alter Religion at his pleasure'. *EC*, sig. A4r.

[49] *EC*, sig. Br. See also William Hakewill, *The libertie of the subject* (1641); Janelle Greenberg, *The Radical Face of the English Constitution: St Edward's 'Laws' in Early Modern Political Thought* (Cambridge, 2001), p. 160.

Forced Loan, but the author of *Englands complaint* seized the opportunity to expand his definition of the elements of liberty:

> And it is here acknowledged in the Canon, that it is a part of the Kingly Office to support his Subjects in the property and freedome of their estates: now the property and freedome of the Subjects Estates is this, to possesse every man his peculiar goods not as Slaves, to be at the Princes command, when he will call, as it is in the Turkish Tyranny: but as free men … And least of all are we to yeeld to any illegal exactions, when we see that our yeelding therein is a betraying of our Religion, Lawes and Liberties, and tends to the maintaining of an absolute Tyranny over our soules, and bodies, and goods.[50]

While this passage reflects elements of the melding of Protestantism and republicanism that Jonathan Scott has described, our author's position is more firmly rooted in English constitutional traditions.[51] That is to say, we are presented with a concept of feudal liberty, where the 'will' of the King is checked by the law; the law acts as a bar to tyranny, and in so doing serves to protect the liberties of subjects.[52]

The crucial phrase in this passage is that which lists 'souls, bodies and goods' as the root of all freedom – the secular is incomplete without the sacred, and vice versa. It is vital to recognise that this tradition of liberty developed over time, and was powerfully influenced by the Reformation. For example, in the period of the Norman Conquest, brute oppression gave way to 'charters' to defend liberty. However, this was in the age before Reformation and the advent of godly kings, and thus the issue of religious freedom was not a matter which fell within the ambit of royal sovereignty. This all changed with Henry VIII, and so religion came to be included in notions of 'property and freedom':

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[50] *EC*, sig Br. The theme of slavery also appears in the discussion of the 'et cetera' oath, considered below, in which the 'et cetera' oath 'doth make us vassals and bondslaves to the *Prelacy*, we must be their sworn Subjects, and tye our selvs by *Oath* to uphold their tottering Kingdome'. *EC*, sig. Gv. For a graphic depiction of the passage, see [Alexander Leighton], *A decade of grievances* (1641).

[51] Jonathan Scott, *Commonwealth Principles: Republican Writing of the English Revolution* (Cambridge, 2004), ch. 2.

[52] John Guy, 'The "Imperial Crown" and the Liberty of the Subject: The English Constitution from Magna Carta to the Bill of Rights', in Bonnelyn Kunze and Dwight Brautigam (eds), *Court, Country and Culture: Essays in Honour of Perez Zagorin* (New York, 1992), pp. 65–87.

> For the maine and prime *property and freedom of our Estates*, is our *Religion* wherein we acknowledge no King over our *soules*, but thee alone, o Lord. And it is the duty of all Kings (as thou requirest) to maintaine the true *Religion*, which is not to be regulated according to mens fancies, but according to *thy* word onely. And for the better maintaining, guarding, and securing of our *Religion*, have we not need to looke carefully to our *Liberties and Laws*, when through the open breach of them a maine inrode is made into our *Religion*, so as our yeelding to pay *Impositions* contrary to the Laws of our Countrey, hath strengthened these enemies of thy *Truth* and *Religion* to bring their wicked plots to passe, to the enslaving of both *bodies*, *soules* and *estates* under their *Tyrannicall yoake*, and that without all hope of remedie?[53]

That it was part of the duty of kings to maintain the true religion is a position that one finds in St Edward's 'Laws', and abundant references to that text in the works of scions of the Church like Foxe and Bilson.[54] The source of true religion is not the whim of particular men (*adiaphora*) but the Word alone; the laws of the land existed to 'secure' the true faith, not to add to and thereby corrupt it. For years conformists had defended the power to establish elements of doctrine and discipline as part of the *adiaphora*, whereas their opponents had railed against ceremonies of human devising – precisely what is meant above by 'mens fancies'.[55] Yet when coupled with the matter of impositions, the extension of the realm of the *adiaphora* comes to represent a further example of tyranny over 'bodies, souls, and estates'.

This linking of the worlds of spiritual and secular goods was most persuasively illustrated via a discussion of the over-reaching jurisdiction of the High Commission. The best guarantor of the 'right and propriety' of goods is the law of the land, yet this was subverted by episcopal courts:

> For the best and surest Tenure, by which every free-borne Subject holds the right and propriety of his goods, is the Law of the Land. But let the Subject be brought into one of their *Ecclesiastical Courtes* as aforesaid (whether into their *High-Commission*, or other *Courts* where the *Arch-prelates* sit party Judges) and be his cause never so *innocent*, never so *cleare*, as against which no Law of the Land doth lye, yet first of all in those Courts he cannot have any benefit of the Law at all.[56]

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[53]　*EC*, sig. Bv.

[54]　See Greenberg, *Radical Face*, p. 96; Thomas Bilson, *The true difference betweene Christian svbiection and unchristian rebellion* (1585), p. 251.

[55]　Prior, *Defining*, ch. 5.

[56]　*EC*, sig. Bv–B2r.

This is the reverse of Erastianism: the law of the land does not run in ecclesiastical channels, and in the court of High Commission, the door is closed to the common law and any true defences of the liberty and property of subjects. This parallel body of law and legal jurisdiction represents more than an *imperium in imperio*: it is an attempt to fashion a new body of legal authority in the realm, and to disrupt the balance of ecclesiastical polity 'to the end, that the *Civil* State may be subservient to the *Ecclesiasticke*'.[57]

The 1st Canon also included a specific treatment of the question of whether subjects had the right to bear arms against the King: those who did deserved 'damnation', suggesting that resistance was less a crime of treason than it was an assault on a divinely ordained monarch.[58] The author of *Englands complaint* set out to discuss this passage at some length, and emphasised the fact that a breach of the laws should be healed before more drastic action was taken:

> First, we hold that no *private person* ought to take up *arms* against his Prince: but Secondly, if a *King* maintain a Faction about him, which goe about to oppresse his whole *Kingdome*, and *People* in their *Laws* and *Liberties*, and most of all in the true Religion, so as he will not rule them by the good *Lawes* of the Kingdome, but seeks to make all his *Subjects*, *Slaves* by bringing their *soules, Bodies, estates* under a miserable bondage: is it not high time for the whole *State* either to labour to heale the breach, or of *necessity* (when there is no other remedy) to stand up as one man to defend themselves and their Countrey, untill the Faction shalbe utterly cashered, and so the King reforme himselfe, and renew the *Covenant* and *Conditions* of the Kingdome to the good and just Satisfaction of the People. And whereas this point trencheth upon the *Scots*, at this time, what doe they stand upon, but in the first place, *to free their Religion from anti-Christian usurpation, and their good Laws and Liberties from a violent violation, and forcible invasion?*[59]

Rather than a radical attack on law and religion, we are presented here with a measured defence of them, and a scenario (illustrated by the example of the Scots) of a 'just' war fought to resist invasion and the corruption of native law. Central to this argument is a deft elision of the world of spiritual and secular goods, and hence religion became a central element of the 'right and propriety' of subjects. To have one's religion imposed upon or altered left

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57   *EC*, sig. B2r.
58   'For subjects to bear arms against their kings, offensive or defensive, upon any pretence whatsoever, is at least to resist the powers which are ordained of God, and though they do not invade, but only resist, St Paul tells them plainly they shall receive to themselves damnation'. *Anglican Canons*, p. 559. The reference is to Romans 13.
59   *EC*, sig. B3r–3v.

subjects in the condition of slaves, and having been brought into this condition of bondage, the people (in some cases) had the right to defend themselves. Yet who were they fighting against? Not the King, but the 'faction' around him, whose destruction clears the way for the King to *reform* the covenant to the 'satisfaction' of the people. Yet this was not a purely theoretical point, as is demonstrated by the example of the Scots, who resorted to arms to defend their religion from the imposition of liturgy and ceremonies. As our author remarks in connection with his discussion of the 3rd Canon ('For the suppressing the growth of popery'), 'What other, but these practices, have been the coales that have kindled the fire in our neighbour Countrey, and are like also to set our own houses on fire?'[60] In other words, Laudian ceremonialism had been the occasion for the Scots to rise and defend their laws and liberties – this was an imperial crisis driven by the attempt to fashion a uniform imperial church. This attempt to 'anglicise' the Kirk had taken place against the backdrop of similarly unwelcome impositions on the cherished heritage of the Edwardine and Elizabethan church, and it now seemed that, like the Scots, the English would have to rise to the defence of their own laws and traditions. The first step in this process was to identify these laws and traditions, and to account for how they had come to be threatened, and by whom.

Liberty and Reform

The suggestion that we should view the text as evidence that some in the realm were resigned to 'violent resistance' is difficult to reconcile with the evidence of the work, that seeks to restore the ecclesiastical polity rather than to lash out at the King.[61] In a passage that Como does not cite, we are presented with a very clear statement that reveals that it was the monarch not monarchy *per se* that was the point of contention.[62] And even here, it would be stretching a point to say that what is being called for is resistance, rather than root and branch reform:

> Besides all this, if they looke upon temporall respects, are they sure the King of this Land will always be of the mind, to maintaine and continue such an *Hierarchie*? What, if *God* should be pleased in *mercy* to his *Church*, to open the eyes of the *King* to let him see how he and his *State* is abused by this *Generation of Prelates*,

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[60] *EC*, sig. B4r–4v.
[61] Como, 'Secret Printing', p. 68.
[62] Como's reading does not consider any of the text beyond signature B.

so as to root them out? Againe, though the Office of *Kings* be *immortal*, yet their *persons* are not: another King may succeed that is of another mind.[63]

We now know that it was the 'generation' of prelates who found themselves the targets of the law, and subsequently tenants in the Tower. Read as a whole, *Englands complaint* has more to do with the defence of the powers of the Crown than it does with their destruction. Further evidence of this can be seen in the discussion of the 6th Canon, which contained the despised and controversial 'et cetera' oath. This was regarded as a coercive measure that obliged the clergy to participate in the undoing of the Thirty-Nine Articles; having imposed altars, kneeling and a whole range of innovations, the bishops now assumed to themselves the sovereign power over the Church that was the King's alone:

> For all *Ministers*, and others of any degree forementioned, must sweare to the ratifying of the disanulling of the *Articles of Religion*, as aforesaid: to the setting up and bowing to *Altars*, with all the other *Ceremonies* and *Innovations* about them: to the maintaining of an *anti-Christian Tyranny* exercised by the *Prelates*, under the name of *Christ* and his *Apostles*: and so in Summe, they must become Sworne vassals to these *Tyrants*, and Sworne Enemies to thy Majesty and *Kingly Sovereignty*.[64]

The oath abetted the introduction of episcopal absolutism, whereby the bishops ensured the continuance of their power via the use of oaths notarised by the civil authority. Given the Laudian 'innovations', this was akin to Counter-Reformation by statute, and here lies the heart of the crisis of ecclesiastical polity: bishops sought extra-parliamentary means by which to ensure conformity to a Church whose rites and ceremonies departed from the pattern of the Elizabethan settlement.[65] To defenders of the Edwardine, Elizabethan and Jacobean settlements, this represented a wholesale attack on the idea that the church was 'by law established'. To be noted is that our author is seeking to restore the ecclesiastical sovereignty – defined as the power to make laws for the Church – to its rightful holders: not simply the King, but King in Parliament.

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[63] *EC*, sig. C3r–3v.

[64] *EC*, sig. C3r.

[65] This is where 'popery' as a common term of abuse seems to have its place, for in Catholicism contemporaries saw anti-Erastianism in practice, in the sense that the King was always subordinate to the pope. To say that England was 'backsliding to Popery' was simply an evocative way of encapsulating the concept of a counter-Reformation by quasi-statute; the London crowd not versed in the intricacies of the common law would still get the basic point (*EC*, sig. D2r).

By far the longest section after that on the Oath is the sixteen-page discussion of the 7th Canon, on rites and ceremonies. Ceremonial practice was an issue that had deep roots in the Jacobean Church, where debates on kneeling at communion were carried on along lines that can be traced through the Caroline controversy over bowing and the use of altars.[66] In 1640, the dispute was less about the scriptural and historical warrants for altars. That argument was, for the moment, over.[67] Rather, it was a question of whether the practice could be reconciled with what the laws over the Church already stipulated, and it was up to the nation's lawgivers to offer an interpretation of the law. In this context, 'backsliding' toward popery was akin to altars being introduced in far-flung parishes, whose curates were Laudian sympathisers:

> And because some Parochiall Churches by some Ministers of the Bishops Faction have lately intertained Altars: is this sufficient to acquit them of Illegality of Innovation, of Romish Superstition and Idolatry, in making hereupon a Canon for the setting up of Altars in all the Churches of England? Dare these Canonists bring this their mettall to be tryed in a Parliament- test.[68]

Should this happen, then it would be clear from the text of the Elizabethan injunctions that the altars described in the 7th Canon were in violation of a law that remained in effect.[69] Indeed, the Canons themselves were non-binding, since they emanated from a mere 'conventicle', rather than from a law-making body that reflected the 'consent' of the realm:

> But this new *Government, as it is now established*, if it shall be found to be both without, and against the *Law of the Land*, of what *Authority* will it prove to be? Will it secure as well the people in yeelding their conformity, as the *Synod* in pressing their new *Injunctions*, from having sunk deep into a *Premunire?* And have not the *Prelates* fallen from their dependence on the *Kings Authority* as touching the *Title and exercise* of their *Episcopall Iurisdiction*, which they claime now altogether from *Divine Authority?* So as depriving themselves of the *Kings Authority*, and the *Scripture* plainly denying unto them *divine authority* (as before) what *authority* is left to their *Government*, to which the *people* of *England*

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[66]　See Prior, *Defining*, ch. 5.

[67]　For debate on altars over the seventeenth century, see Kenneth Fincham and Nicholas Tyacke, *Altars Restored: The Changing Face of English Religious Worship, 1547–c.1700* (Oxford, 2008).

[68]　*EC*, sig. D4r–4v.

[69]　A little further along, the author notes that the Laudians 'doe overthrow and deny the onely *Altar Iesus Christ*' (sig E[v]). See William Prynne, *A quench-coale* (1637), p. 125.

ought *willingly* and universally to *submit themselves?* Or is this their *Government* (with all their new-old *Rites* and *Ceremonies*) of *Authority*, because this their *Synod* (with the *Canons* thereof) is established and confirmed by the *Kings Majesty?* Doe they not know, that matters of *Religion* concerning a whole Nation, ought not to be concluded, without the Counsell and consent of the whole *Body representative* of the Land, to bind the Land to obedience and conformity to any such *Canons or Constitutions* so concluded? Otherwise, such a *Synod* is a meere *Conventicle*, and of no force, and not a lawful *National Synod*, which is of force to bind the Nation to conformity.[70]

The author here defines the ecclesiastical polity in national terms, and all laws made for that polity must be based on the consent and agreement of parliament. In moving to establish a new ecclesiastical constitution, the Convocation has usurped the rightful place of Parliament. Also to be noted is our author's emphasis on the bodies of law that lend due authority to those who would make laws for the Church, that is, the laws of the realm and the law of Scripture. The position that emerges from the work closely resembles Jacobean defences of the 'orthodoxy' of the Church. John Pocock has observed that this orthodoxy is no light matter to define, and consisted of the proposition that the Church by law established was domiciled within the channels of civil sovereignty, yet not thereby severed from the invisible association of the 'true' church.[71] In effect, the Canons represented a departure from this proposition.

The defence of the 'orthodoxy' of the Church is a theme which dominates the closing sections of the work. Here we find further discussion of the 6th Canon and the 'et cetera' oath, which was interpreted as an attempt to erode the statutory basis of the ecclesiastical supremacy that was set forth in the Oath of Supremacy. Once again, the issue that lends shape to the argument shows little sign of political 'radicalism', but is instead a defence of the ecclesiastical supremacy as defined by the Acts of the Reformation. The attempt to lend episcopacy the sanction of a law that was itself independent of parliament was something that could not be reconciled with statutes that remained in effect:

It's against the *King* and his *Prerogative Royall*, who by the Statutes and Customes of this Kingdome hath power to appoint any of his naturall Subjects to exercise all manner of Ecclesiasticall Jurisdiction under him, as appeareth by *Stat.* I. *Elizab. cap.*I. and *Stat.25.Hen.8.cap. 19 and 37. Hen.* 8. *cap.* 17. but this *Oath* spoyles his

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70   *EC*, sig. Fr–v.

71   J.G.A. Pocock, 'Within the Margins: The Definitions of Orthodoxy', in Roger D. Lund (ed.), *The Margins of Orthodoxy: Heterodox Writing and Cultural Response, 1660–1750* (Cambridge, 1995), pp. 39–40; Prior, *Defining*, ch. 2.

Majesty of all such power, investing onely *Arch-bishops, Bishops, Deanes, &c.* with Ecclesiasticall power, and takes from his Majesty what his Predecessor *Henry* the 8 ... had.[72]

The Oath therefore runs counter to the Oath of Supremacy, 'in taking of which we acknowledge the Kings Majesty to be Supreme Governor of the Church'.[73] Here again, we are presented with a defence of the royal ecclesiastical supremacy, enshrined in Acts dating from 1534 and 1559. The author clearly recognises that the 'et cetera' oath represents an attempt to give canonical legitimacy to the idea of episcopacy by divine right. The argument that bishops held power *iure divino* was less frequently used than were defences of the episcopal office based on the position that since there were bishops in the Apostolic church, then the office was suitable for the Church of England.[74] The statutes that comprised the legal foundation of the reformation were less clear about the function and jurisdiction of bishops, whereas the Canons simply obliged subscribers to disavow the 'alteration' of the government of the Church by bishops. Nevertheless, the author of *Englands complaint* saw the Oath as an instrument whereby episcopal absolutism would receive a broad sanction:

> [T]his *Oath* is a plot to sweare in the conceit of Episcopacie to be *jure divino*: of late they have step'd off from their ancient *foundation*, thinking it weaknesse, either to depend upon *humane Laws*, or Princes *favours*; and have published to the whole world, that their standing is by *divine right*.[75]

This implies that the great historical debate was over: the bishops were unable to prove that there were historical precedents for episcopal supremacy, so they abandoned the historical field and resorted instead to the argument from *iure divino*. Yet here they fell afoul of the law, in drafting Canons whose sanction lay in letters patent – an inferior branch of law – and which represented the

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[72]   *EC*, sig. F3v. The statutes cited are The Act of Supremacy (1559); The Act for the Submission of the Clergy (1534); and an Act authorising the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of civil lawyers (1545). Once again, the Convocation is dismissed as being illegal, lacking 'the *Act of Parliament* to confirme it a *Nationall Synod*, to bind the whole *Nation*, which the *Synod* presumes to doe, both in *Ministers* and *People*'. *EC*, sig. F3.

[73]   *EC*, sig. F4r.

[74]   See, for example, Thomas Aston, *A remonstrance against presbytery* (1641); Prior, *Defining*, ch. 4.

[75]   *EC*, sig. F4r.

erection of a foreign power within the realm. This is precisely the charge that would eventually be levelled at Laudian 'projectors':[76]

> [T]his *Oath* doth prejudice power of *Parliaments* and opposeth in the *Convocation* that power which is proper unto *Parliaments*: For the Clergy in the *Convocation* house can doe nothing *Authoritative* without the *Parliament*, especially not make *Oaths* and impose them *ad placitem*. It's the judgement and resolution of the Lawyers generally, *that no Oath can be made, nor any authoriesd to give it but by Parliamentary power*, which this hath not, being made after the *Parliament* was ended. We hope the *Parliament* now coming will speedily call them to purpose, if they shall be found within compasse of a *Praemunire*, as some doe judge them to be, or if not, yet to make them feel the Censure of that great *Court*, for Combining against the *authority* of it, and projecting (if possible) to suppresse it for ever.[77]

It thereby fell to the Parliament to ensure that the Church was protected by the very body of laws that called it into being. The Canons were clearly seen as an attempt to exclude Parliament from the governance of the Church, and to establish – in the court of High Commission – a jurisdiction that denied to the King his power over the *ecclesia*, and the common law its proper jurisdiction over the liberty and property of subjects.

Much the same point was made by John Ley, in a tract devoted to a minute examination of the 'et cetera' oath. He asked why it was that the Canons employed an oath to protect the authority of bishops, while neglecting that of the King:

> But yet there is no Oath required, to oblige any subject to a perpetuall approbation of his Regall power, as supreme Governour of the Church, as there is for Archbishops and Bishops: nor is the penalty for *publicke opposition* thereof so dangerous, as *for a private forbearance of the Oath* (though with a timerous and tender conscience.) For, for not taking of the Oath, a Minister may for ever bee deprived of all hee hath within three moneths; but for publicke opposition against the Kings power, he shall not suffer to much.[78]

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[76]   D. Alan Orr, *Treason and the State: Law, Politics and Ideology in the English Civil War* (Cambridge, 2002), pp. 130–31.

[77]   *EC*, sig. F4v.

[78]   John Ley, *Defensive doubts, hopes and reasons, for the refusall of the oath, imposed by the sixth canon of the late synod* (1641), pp. 57–8. Of course, Ley was forgetting the Oath of Supremacy, albeit largely absent for want of being frequently tendered.

The diminution of the royal power was the crux of the matter. As I have argued, resistance to the Jacobean Canons was predicated on the argument that clerical deprivation represented an imposition by episcopal courts on the jurisdiction of the common law, what Nicholas Fuller called 'the high inheritance of the Realme'.[79] Part of that inheritance was a Church governed by the Crown with the counsel of Parliament, and it was this that the Canons so directly threatened. Instead of a developed theory of the tyranny of an absolutist monarch, the reaction to the Canons served to clarify and bring together long-standing arguments concerning the struggle between royal and sacred power.[80] Indeed, by 1640, these arguments had been well-rehearsed, and came to be employed as part of a larger struggle to assert the traditional laws of the realm against a series of financial, religious, legal, and constitutional 'innovations' that drove Charles and his subjects closer to war.

A War of Reformation?

Where does all of this leave 'Britain's wars of religion'? To quote John Morrill once again, it was religion that 'drove minorities to fight'.[81] *Englands complaint* offers us an insight not only into what many were fighting for, but also why. It was not a neo-Roman vision of a free state, nor the hope for a kingless republic, or indeed a radical future of any kind. Instead, it was the past that remained the subject of bitter contest, and, most crucially, all of the matters that sprang from that amorphous phrase 'by law established'. Glenn Burgess has noted that we need a study which addresses all of the meanings that these words could take on, and the debates in which such meanings were the subject of contest.[82] Clearly the controversy over the Canons of 1640 is one such debate, in that it provided a forum for a discussion of the vexed problem of the proper location of sovereignty in a political complex where the very definition of that concept consisted of civil and ecclesiastical elements. Yet we should also recognise the centrality of the binding power of law in English political culture, where the authority of law and statute was so complete that it was used, in turn, to sever links with Rome and call a national church into being; to restore those links and Catholicism under Mary Tudor; and to re-establish the Church in Protestantism in 1559. Around these statutes there accrued a body texts

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[79]   Fuller, *Argument*, p. 3.
[80]   For a masterful summary, see Collins, *Allegiance*, ch. 1.
[81]   Morrill, 'Religious context', p.157.
[82]   Glenn Burgess, 'Was the English Civil War a War of Religion?: The Evidence of Political Propaganda', *Huntington Library Quarterly*, 61 (2000): pp. 173–201, at p. 200.

and a tradition of political thought, both of them the results of a process of deliberation over the character of ecclesiastical polity. Rather than dismiss these works as polemical sources, and question the stability of the concepts and categories that they treat, we should recognise that the Reformation was more than a contest over doctrine and the way to salvation, but that it was also a fundamental driver of political thought.

Our anonymous author's defence of the ecclesiastical sovereignty of Crown in Parliament should be interpreted as a defence of the authority of the law, understood in terms of the magisterial reformation carried on by a succession of Protestant lawgivers, bearing with them the sanction of the common law.[83] While the precise liturgical and ceremonial terms of those settlements was a more or less constant topic of dispute, the notion that the monarchy retained vital symbolic and legal powers over the Church was something that lay in very remote points in English history. It was this body of tradition that served as the basis for the reaction to the Canons of 1640, a reaction that touched off a renewed interest in the proper relationship between the laws of the Church and the laws of the realm. As is clear from *Englands complaint*, that debate also generated a vernacular concept of liberty, not neo-Roman or secular, but a fulsome and complex intermingling of civil, religious and historical elements, bound to the realm and its customs. It was this definition of liberty that the Canons of 1640 were seen to threaten, and it was in its defence and that of the bodies, souls and estates of subjects, that drove the attack on the Church of England.

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[83] This is not to suggest that there was a consensus among common lawyers on the matter of the secular powers of the Church.

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Chapter 6

Prayer Book and Protestation: Anti-Popery, Anti-Puritanism and the Outbreak of the English Civil War

Michael J. Braddick

News of the Irish rebellion offered a means to confirm what John Pym had been saying for a long time – that armed popery was in active conspiracy against the true religion in the Stuart kingdoms. In speeches in Parliament in the 1620s and, more influentially, in the early days of the Short and Long Parliaments, he had connected this with conspiracy against the liberties of Parliament, the body which had legislated for Protestantism and was its guardian in England.[1] Not everyone had bought this all the time, and Pym did not control Parliament, but this news from Ireland was quickly recruited by people of his views as evidence of a conspiracy that reached into the heart of the King's counsels: 'diseases which proceed from the inward parts, as the liver, the heart or the brains, the more noble parts, it is a hard thing to apply cure to such diseases'.[2]

These months were crucial to the failure of the Long Parliament as an institution in which conflicts were reconciled and grievances redressed. Writing later, in 1647, Thomas May thought that 'At this time began that fatal breach between King and Parliament to appear visibly, and wax daily wider, never to be closed, until the whole Kingdom was by sad degrees brought into a ruinous War'. The reason was trust, and public polemic: 'From henceforth no true confidence appeared between him and that high Court; every day almost contributed somewhat to the division, and Declarations … were published to the world …

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[1]   Conrad Russell, *The Fall of the British Monarchies 1637–1642* (Oxford, 1991), pp. 216–30; Anthony Fletcher, *The Outbreak of the English Civil War* (London, 1981), pp. xix–xxv.

[2]   Quoted from Russell, *Fall*, p. 419; for an influential revision of our view of Pym's influence see John Morrill, 'The Unweariableness of Mr Pym: Influence and Eloquence in the Long Parliament', in Susan Dwyer Amussen and Mark A. Kishlansky (eds), *Political Culture and Cultural Politics in Early Modern England: Essays Presented to David Underdown* (Manchester, 1995), pp. 19–54.

[which] did so far heighten them, and sharpen by degrees the stile, till those Paper-contestations became a fatall Prologue to that bloudy, and unnaturall War, which afterward ensued'.[3]

When Parliament returned from its September recess political fortunes had been balanced. Settlement in Scotland had followed a wide-ranging legislative programme in the early summer: with the Scots gone, and many grievances redressed the King might have hoped that his troubles would soon be over. A warm welcome in London reinforced these hopes and handbills were posted in London against 'the Puritans and their leaders'. But there were others who wanted more: who hoped for further reformation, not just the dismantling of Laudian 'innovation'; or, fearful, who sought more concessions for fuller security against popish counsels. The danger of these latter influences had been manifest in the army plots and the Incident, in Scotland. Both the hopes, and the fears, of those seeking further concessions from the Crown were evident on the first day of the new session, when Parliament was presented with a copy of the Utopian tract *Macaria* and there was apparently an attempt to assassinate Pym by sending him the dressing of a plague sore.[4] Whereas *Macaria* appealed to those who hoped that institutional reform might produce social and religious renewal, the establishment of the good life, the plot to assassinate Pym seemed to illustrate the dependence of English Protestantism on divine providence as a defence against popish plotting.

The Irish rebellion tipped the balance in the tone of this mobilisation for parliamentary reformation – towards anti-popery and the necessity for a firm defence of parliamentary authority, towards fear rather than hope. An immediate response was to revive the Grand Remonstrance which staked out positions that served as a bulwark of the constitution and thereby protected the true religion. It had its origins in the Grand Committee on the Grievances of the Kingdom in early 1641, but had languished until the summer, when Pym and friends took over the committee and beefed up the drafting. The final touches were put to it immediately after news of the rebellion reached London and it was quickly presented, and published.[5]

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[3]   Thomas May, *The History of the Parliament of England* (London, 1647), Book 2, pp. 19–20.

[4]   Michael Braddick, *God's Fury, England's Fire: A New History of the English Civil Wars* (London, 2008), esp. pp. 156–61. For the handbills see Peter Razzell and Edward Razzell (eds), *The English Civil War: A Contemporary Account*, vol. 2: *1640–1642* (London, 1996), p. 137, 8/11/41. I have checked these transcriptions against *Calendar of State Papers, Venetian*, but cite here the more accessible text.

[5]   Fletcher, *Outbreak*, esp. pp. 81–7.

This went in tandem with the use of Pym's connections in the London presses to give publicity to these issues. In the week of the Grand Remonstrance John Thomas, a publisher with connections to Pym, launched *Heads of Proceedings*, the first newsbook.[6] Thomas also published a pamphlet about a gunpowder plot in Derbyshire in January 1642, which supported contemporary demands for parliamentary control of military resources and the disarming of papists. William Bowden was also active in this market publishing anti-papistical cheap tracts. This is likely the WB who published the famous pamphlet about the plague sore which shared a woodcut image used by Thomas in his account of the Incident in Scotland. It seems, therefore that there is a publishing connection between the pamphlet about the gunpowder plot in Derbyshire, Catholic atrocity pamphlets, newsbook publishers and John Pym; all publicly warning of the threat of armed popery in active conspiracy.[7] The Venetian ambassador's reports, which give considerable credence to charges of Puritan conspiracy, recounted in an official dispatch how Puritans in Parliament had sought to make maximum advantage out of the Incident:

> the commissioners of Parliament, anxious to establish their credit with the people and to render the name of their prince more hateful to them, do not hesitate to take advantage of this opportunity, and announce that carried away by ambitious thoughts of securing for himself an absolute royalty, the King not only laid these snares against those persons who had courageously resisted his designs, in their zeal for the welfare of the community, but that he is meditating fresh attempts in this kingdom also to the prejudice of liberty and of the most active Parliamentarians.[8]

This seeking 'credit with the people' was the root of the stronger accusation, that unrest was being deliberately whipped up for partisan purposes – something not far removed from two of the articles of the accusations against the five members: that they had sought to alienate the people from their King and had 'by force and terror sought to compel the Parliament to join with them in their traitorous designs, and to that end have actually raised and countenanced tumults against

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[6]   Joad Raymond, *The Invention of the Newspaper: English Newsbooks 1641–1649* (Oxford, 1996), esp. pp. 121–5.

[7]   Braddick, *God's Fury*, pp. 173–4. John Hammond also used the image: see Michael J. Braddick, 'John Hammond and the Explosion of Print: Commercial and Political Opportunities', in Giles Mandelbrote and Jason Peacey (eds), *Collecting Revolution: The History and Importance of the Thomason Tracts* (London, forthcoming).

[8]   Razzell and Razell, *English Civil War*, pp. 134–5, 1/11/41.

the King and Parliament'.[9] It was certainly a crucial feature of the politics of the months before the Civil War, and fed directly into attempts to secure military forces, as we will see.

The Irish rebellion was immediately and probably inaccurately presented as a confessional rising, and the terms in which it was reported echoed quite closely narrative forms familiar to readers of Foxe's 'Book of Martyrs'.[10] News of the rebellion dominated the public prints, and there were Catholic scares around the country, as refugees arrived in London and charitable funds were raised for their relief.[11] In early December petitions were presented to mark the anniversary of the presentation of London's Root and Branch petition. Revival of this campaign, the positive counterpart of the anti-popery campaigns, seems to have been quite consciously coordinated with parliamentary politics and Pym's political friends were prominent in their organisation.[12] In London a concerted campaign secured a decisive shift in the politics of the Common Council.[13] This is probably the context for the more or less sacrificial executions of Catholic priests in Dorset shortly afterwards, who in more ordinary times might have hoped to escape the execution of their penalty.[14]

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[9]	*The Constitutional Documents of the Puritan Revolution 1625–1660*, (ed.) S.R. Gardiner, 3rd edition (Oxford, 1906), pp. 236–7.

[10]	Keith J. Lindley, 'The Impact of the 1641 Rebellion upon England and Wales, 1641–5', *Irish Historical Studies*, 18:70 (1972), pp. 143–76; Ethan Howard Shagan, 'Constructing Discord: Ideology, Propaganda, and English Responses to the Irish Rebellion of 1641', *JBS*, 36:1 (1997), pp. 4–34; Nicholas Canny, *Making Ireland British 1580–1650* (Oxford, 2001), ch. 8. For the broader impact on England see Joseph Cope, *England and the 1641 Irish Rebellion* (Woodbridge, 2009).

[11]	Robin Clifton, 'Fear of popery', in Conrad Russell (ed.), *The Origins of the English Civil War* (London, 1973), 144–67, at pp. 159–60; Fletcher, *Outbreak*, pp. 204–6; Lindley, 'Impact'. See also Robin Clifton, 'The Popular Fear of Catholics during the English Revolution', *PP*, 52 (1971), pp. 23–55

[12]	Fletcher, *Outbreak*, esp. pp. 191–213. For Pym's use of the petitions see Russell, *Fall*, pp. 468–9.

[13]	Keith Lindley, *Popular Politics and Religion in Civil War England* (Aldershot, 1997), pp. 187–97. For influential earlier accounts see Valerie Pearl, *London and the Outbreak of the Puritan Revolution: City Government and National Politics 1625–1643* (Oxford, 1961), esp. pp. 132–59; Robert Brenner, *Merchants and Revolution: Commercial Change, Political Conflict and London's Overseas Traders, 1550–1653* (Cambridge, 1993), esp. pp. 359–74.

[14]	The Venetian ambassador, understandably sensitive to this kind of possibility, certainly saw it in this perspective: Razzell and Razell, *English Civil War*, p. 173, 31/1/42. His reports from this period note the increasing pressure on the Capuchins and worship at Somerset House. For further context see Caroline Hibbard, *Charles I and the Popish Plot* (Chapel Hill, 1983), esp. pp. 219–20; and Fletcher, *Outbreak*, pp. 59–60.

This was associated with a renewal of street politics in which the language of anti-popery was given a distinctive twist – blaming the decay of trade on the failure to achieve settlement. Again the Venetian ambassador blamed Puritan leaders for the fact that:

> The ordinary course of all trade has been interrupted and those who obtain their daily food by the work of their hands alone are reduced to the limits of despair. These ignorant people, persuaded by those who profit from trouble, that these calamities proceed from the bishops and Catholic lords in Parliament, have appeared more than once at the Houses of Parliament this week, and tumultuously demanded the bishops and of the Catholic lords also, and that the goods of both shall be distributed for the relief of their present needs, threaten orally and in writing that necessity will compel them to take more violent measures; and so fresh disturbances may break out in this city at any moment.[15]

In the light of recent work on popular politics before the wars, we might be less willing to see this as ignorant and the result only of orchestration. This kind of appropriation or domestication is now familiar from studies of grain rioters, those seeking poor relief, or redress of some other material grievances. There was a well-attested capacity to take advantage of the rhetoric of their governors in trying to persuade or embarrass them into acting on their behalf.[16]

What made this connection between economic depression and popery plausible was the effect on trade of the continued failure to reach settlement, that latter political problem the product, it was said, of the power of popish interests in the Lords to block progress towards a secure Protestant settlement. In the summer of 1641 cloth merchants had begun to avoid tying up their capital in stocks of cloth: fearing forced loans and debasement of the coinage they kept their ready money by them. This, in turn, meant that work in clothing districts dried up, since merchants were not buying cloth, or putting out the raw materials to weavers. This prompted petitions from eleven counties and six towns making the connection between this and popish obstruction. These conditions apparently persisted through the winter. In London, the slump led

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[15] Razzell and Razzell, *English Civil War*, p. 177, 14/2/42.

[16] John Walter, *Crowds and Popular Politics in Early Modern England* (Manchester, 2006), esp. chs. 1, 2, 5, 6; John Walter and Keith Wrightson, 'Dearth and the Social Order in Early Modern England', reprinted in Paul Slack (ed.), *Rebellion, Popular Protest and the Social Order in Early Modern England* (Cambridge, 1984), pp. 108–28; Steve Hindle, 'Exhortation and Entitlement: Negotiating Inequality in English Rural Communities, 1550–1650' in Michael J. Braddick and John Walter (eds), *Negotiating Power in Early Modern Society: Order, Hierarchy and Subordination in Britain and Ireland* (Cambridge, 2001), pp. 102–22.

to the intervention not only of 'poor labouring men, known by the name of porters, the lowest members of the City of London',[17] but also by 'many poor and distressed women in and about London'. Like many women petitioners they laid claim to respectability by claiming that their political intervention was driven by the need to protect their families from starvation. The petition was, nonetheless, extraordinary: poor women were claiming that the slump was the product of the political crisis, and that a popish plot existed to plunge England into a war, once Ireland had been overrun. On these grounds a large crowd of poor women attended the Houses to demand that the Kingdom be put in a posture of defence, that popish lords and bishops should be excluded from the House of Lords and that those who were hindering reformation should be identified and punished. The following day, 400 women attended the Houses for an answer and became involved in a scuffle with the Earl of Lennox in which, perhaps symbolically, Lennox's staff was broken.[18]

Print played an important role here, at least in the capital – the petition of 31 January of many thousands of poor men was circulated in print, with instructions attached about where to assemble, and to wear the petition as a token of affiliation.[19] In the counties the petitioning campaigns similarly sought to mobilise support from those outside the gentry circles in whose custody parliamentary and county government normally resided. The printing of petitions, and the coordination of their delivery with important debates within Parliament, suggests that the aim of these county petitioning campaigns was not simply limited to an expression of the voice of the county. More than this, they were part of wider mobilisations based on ideological positions – print was used to generalise and amplify the local, and to accelerate these campaigns.[20]

This mobilisation of opinion among the middling and even the poorer sort was the subject of contemporary debate, which is significant in itself – if

[17]   Lindley, *Popular Politics*, pp. 130–37; Fletcher, *Outbreak*, pp. 188–9, 223–4; John Walter, *Understanding Popular Violence in the English Revolution: The Colchester Plunderers* (Cambridge 1999), pp. 256–9, Clifton, 'Popular Fear', pp. 41–2.

[18]   Lindley, *Popular Politics*, pp. 134–6; Patrick Higgins, 'The Reactions of Women, with Special Reference to Women Petitioners', in Brian Manning (ed.), *Politics, Religion and the English Civil War* (London, 1973), p. 185. For women in food riots see Walter, *Crowds*, ch. 2. The image of a Parliament of women was a common one in contemporary satire.

[19]   For this practice see Jason Peacey, '"Scattered about the Streets": Thomason's Annotations and Print Ephemera', in Mandelbrote and Peacey (eds), *Collecting Revolution*; David Como, 'Sowing Sedition, Raising Riot: Pamphlets, Placards and Street-Politics, *c.*1635–1645', (unpublished paper). I am grateful to Professor Como for permission to cite this article.

[20]   Fletcher, *Outbreak*, ch. 6; David Zaret, *Origins of Democratic Culture: Printing, Petitions, and the Public Sphere in Early-Modern England* (Princeton, 2000).

Tillyard was to be believed then we might think there ought not to have been any debate. The Root and Branch petition had been signed by 15,000 people who queued patiently at a number of sites around London in order to sign, thirty at a time. Parliament took a long time to get round to debating it, and when the discussion started the first day was taken up with the process, rather than the content. Its theatrical presentation, by a crowd of signatories, was denounced by George Digby: 'no man of judgment will think it fit for a Parliament, under a monarchy, to give countenance to irregular, and tumultuous assemblies of people, be it for never so good an end'. '[W]hat can there be of greater presumption, than for petitioners, not only to prescribe to a Parliament, what, and how it shall do, but for a multitude to teach a Parliament, what, and what is not, the government according to God's word?' Perhaps it was hypocritical, therefore, that Digby's speech was published. At least Nathaniel Fiennes, whose parliamentary speech was also published, had argued in favour of the petition and its presentation by what he thought was an orderly crowd. He estimated that 300–400 of the signatories had been there, offering some guarantee about the authenticity of the 15,000 signatures claimed. He also urged a cautious argument that the fact that a large number of people wanted a change in the laws might, in some cases, be a good reason to change the laws.[21]

Root and Branch reform was the positive face of the call for further reformation, a call frequently mobilised on the basis of the threat of popery, rather than the promise of Protestantism. The totem of the anti-papist activists was of course the Protestation, a national oath to defend the true religion from popery. In the debates about the Protestation it had been suggested that the people should be asked to swear to defend both the doctrine and the discipline of the Church of England, but this proposal had been defeated.[22] It became instead a call to defend the doctrine but not necessarily the discipline of the Church and this effectively sanctioned the interpretation of the Protestation as a call not just to roll back the Laudian innovations, but to promote further reformation. For those who believed that the reformation was an ongoing process rather than an event in the past the Protestation came to sanction their campaign – against vestments, stained glass, the use of the sign of the cross in baptism and so on.[23]

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[21]   Keith Lindley, *Popular Politics and Religion in Civil War London* (Aldershot, 1997), pp. 16–17.

[22]   Fletcher, *Outbreak*, p. 113.

[23]   Walter, *Understanding*, pp. 295–6; Walter, '"Affronts and insolencies": the Voices of Radwinter and Popular Opposition to Laudianism', *EHR*, 122 (2007), pp. 35–60, esp. p. 37; John Morrill, *Cheshire 1630–1660: County Government and Society during the English Revolution* (Oxford, 1974), pp. 36–7.

Anti-popery, in these campaigns, was only fixed in its meaning at the most abstract level; in the rough and tumble of practical polemic its meaning and value were of dynamic and shifting value. An established language, which had respectable value in debates about liturgy and doctrine, was deployed for quite partisan and particular purposes, with radicalising effects. The distinction between anti-popery and anti-recusant or anti-Catholic hostility was collapsing and the claim that popery in Church and state was the result of the practices of actual Catholics allowed for the use of anti-popery as an explanation of the need for constitutional innovation. By the spring of 1642 a Pym-ite reading of the connection between popery and Catholic plotting was widely disseminated, a vehicle for arguments about the constitution of the Lords and the decay of trade and, increasingly, about the need for safeguards on the use of the military resources of the Crown.

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These campaigns were not without their counterpoint, of course. By the autumn of 1641 there was a rival totem in the Prayer Book. Those who wanted to protect the English church from this zeal, and the attendant threat of sectarianism, saw in the Prayer Book a bulwark against both popery and Puritanism: it could be seen as the safeguard of both the doctrine and the discipline of the Church of England. This Prayer Book campaign built on anti-Puritan polemic, now refigured primarily in terms of ignorant zeal and the threat of sectarianism.[24] The autumn of 1641 was crucial for these campaigns too. This is important context for the Adamite 'sensation', for example, which was launched during the September recess. The pamphlets, *A discovery of 29 Sects* and *A Nest of Serpents*, did not dispute doctrine, but rather drew attention to the behavioural consequences of particular belief. False prophets led the brethren to sin, and illustrating the sins falsified the doctrine: in this case the practice of going naked in imitation of Adam before the Fall. It is quite possible that the sect was entirely fictitious, since hardly any details were actually given and neither Edwards nor Ephraim Pagett discussed the sect as an actually existing threat to religious order in their more fully documented works. It seems unlikely they would have left

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[24]   For the history of anti-puritan polemic see Peter Lake, 'Anti-Puritanism: The Structure of a Prejudice', in Kenneth Fincham and Peter Lake (eds), *Religion and Politics in Post-Reformation England: Essays in Honour of Nicholas Tyacke* (Woodbridge, 2006), pp. 80–97; Peter Lake with Michael Questier, *The Antichrist's Lewd Hat: Protestants, Papists and Players in Post-Reformation England* (New Haven and London, 2002); Patrick Collinson, 'The Theatre Constructs Puritanism', in David L. Smith, Richard Strier and David Bevington (eds), *The Theatrical City: Culture, Theatre and Politics in London, 1576–1649* (Cambridge, 1995), pp. 157–69.

the Adamites out, if they had known about them. But the polemical purpose
of these pamphlets was clear: the comical and titillating sins of these misled
brethren symbolised the dangers of the attack on episcopal authority, tradition
and learned divinity.[25] It was a common form of polemic through the rest of the
decade.

Anti-Puritan polemic echoed in real actions – for example, in shooting at
the head of a roundhead atop a maypole in rural Herefordshire, a carnivalesque
hostility to Puritanism of a venerable kind, but here linked to specific
parliamentary projects.[26] It was also associated with local petitioning campaigns
that drew in large numbers of signatures: 14,350 in Somerset, 6,000 each in
Cheshire, Devon and Nottinghamshire, 30,000 in the six counties of north
Wales.[27] After November 1641, however, these campaigns faced a massive
stumbling block in the successful representation of the Irish rebellion as a
confessional rising against Protestants. In Essex successive drafts of a petition
against sectarian excess and attacks on the Prayer Book survive among the papers
of Henry Neville, a prominent supporter of the personal rule and opponent of
the Puritan networks in the county protected by the Earl of Warwick. Prepared
for the Michaelmas sessions, at which a friendly Grand Jury seems to have been
empanelled, the petition got no further. Perhaps the increased purchase of
anti-popery after the Irish rebellion impeded further progress.[28] Nonetheless,
and despite the massive weight of anti-popery in the public discourse in the
aftermath of the Irish rebellion, there was a rival press output. Brave voices
denounced exaggeration and presented an alternative view in terms of the sins of

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[25]   David Cressy, *Agnes Bowker's Cat: Travesties and Transgressions in Tudor and Stuart
England* (Oxford, 2000), ch. 15. For the political context see Braddick, *God's Fury*, esp.
pp. 149–54

[26]   Jacqueline Eales, *Puritans and Roundheads: the Harleys of Brampton Bryan and the
Outbreak of the English Civil War* (Cambridge, 1990), p. 143.

[27]   Fletcher, *Outbreak*, p. 290.

[28]   John Walter, 'Confessional Politics in pre-Civil War Essex: Prayer Books,
Profanations, and Petitions', *HJ*, 44 (2001), pp. 677–701. The speculation about the impact
of the Irish rebellion is mine, not his: for anti-Catholic scares in the county during the
autumn of 1641 see Clifton, 'Fear of Popery', p. 160; Clifton, 'Popular Fear', pp. 29–31;
John Walter, 'Anti-Popery and the Stour Valley Riots of 1642', in David Chadd (ed.), *History
of Religious Dissent in East Anglia, III* (Norwich, 1996), 121–40. Despite the economic
problems of 1642 Essex was unusually generous in response to Parliament's Act for a Speedy
Contribution and Loan for the Relief of His Majesty's Distressed Subjects of the Kingdom
of Ireland, passed in January 1642: Cope, *1641 Irish Rebellion*, pp. 11–12, 127–42, esp.
table 1, p. 129. The role of the clergy was crucial here: for networks of godly clergy in Essex
see Tom Webster, *Godly Clergy in Early Stuart England: The Caroline Puritan Movement,
c.1620–1643* (Cambridge, 1997).

rebellion, rather than of popery.[29] The title of one pamphlet signalled a clear view about the roots of the problem: *No pamphlet, bvt a detestation against all such pamphlets as are printed, concerning the Irish rebellion, plainely demonstrating the falshood of them*.[30] The Venetian ambassador noted how the executions of Alban Roe and Thomas Reynolds (alias Green) in January 1642 had taken place 'to the extreme regret of not only the Catholics but the Protestants as well, who unlike the Puritans, abhor the shedding the blood of such innocent victims'.[31]

This was not, until a very late stage, a division between parliamentarians and royalists, but rather a competition among parliamentarians (who were also monarchists) seeking to secure control of the key institutions of government by mobilising support outside them. Sir Edward Dering is a crucial figure in this respect. An early and outspoken critic of the personal rule, he drew back from the pursuit of further reformation, as it tended towards (in his view) spiritual anarchy. Alarmed by the threat of sectarianism and ignorant zeal he successfully engineered a confrontation with a rival Puritan and parliamentary group at the Kent assizes in March 1642, steering through a petition in defence of the existing liturgy and Church government, and against sectarianism. Even with a packed grand jury, nine of the jurymen disowned the petition saying that it contradicted petitions previously sent up – clearly a tactical argument but one that arose from the increasingly partisan use of institutions previously understood to serve as the 'voice of the county'. These struggles were revisited at quarter sessions in Maidstone in April, and at the summer assizes in July. The commons sent a committee to sit on the bench at the summer assizes, but this was resented by those legally on the bench, and there was even some jostling as their colleagues failed to make room for them to sit down. At another point rival groups 'hummed' each other as they tried to speak. This partisan struggle was very public too: it was said that 2,000 people witnessed the reading of the petition on 25 March.[32]

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[29]   Shagan, 'Constructing Discord'.

[30]   Anon., *No pamphlet, bvt a detestation against all such pamphlets as are printed, concerning the Irish rebellion, plainely demonstrating the falshood of them* (London, 1641).

[31]   Razzell and Razzell, *English Civil War*, p. 173, 31/1/42. This tripartite distinction was a staple of his analysis of religious politics in these reports.

[32]   Alan Everitt, *The Community of Kent and the Great Rebellion* (Leicester, 1966), pp. 95–107; Fletcher, *Outbreak*, pp. 307–10; Russell, *Fall*, 498–500. For Dering see Derek Hirst, 'The Defection of Sir Edward Dering, 1640–1641', reprinted in Peter Gaunt (ed.), *The English Civil War* (Oxford, 2000), pp. 207–25; S.P. Salt, 'Dering, Sir Edward, First Baronet (1598–1644)', *ODNB*, 15, pp. 874–80; Jason Peacey, 'Popularity and the Politician: Sir Edward Dering and the Public, 1640–1644' (unpublished paper). I am grateful to Dr Peacey for permission to cite this article. The issue of consistency with previously stated positions recurred in the chaotic polemical conditions of the 1640s. Its

Again this local campaign was, at least potentially, part of a broader and partly coordinated mobilisation. In April the Venetian Ambassador reported that its organisers 'have had it printed, to the annoyance of the Parliamentarians' and that 'we hear that Somerset and other counties, following its example, are contemplating making the same petition'. The danger of this was clearly appreciated: 'To prevent this happening, since it might greatly enfeeble the machinations of Parliament while promoting the interests of His Majesty to the height of their original greatness, severe orders have been sent to the authors of these movements to make their appearance'. The aim was 'at least to defer, if not to extinguish completely, the first sparks of this fire which threatens to break out in so many quarters'.[33]

In mid May a copy of the petition was 'contemptuously consigned to the flames by the common hangman, as seditious', although this did not prevent its presentation. The escalation continued, as two of the leaders were arrested, prompting others to depart 'full of wrath', putting it about 'that they will come back very soon in greater strength and numbers for the purpose of compelling Parliament' to return to respectable politics.[34]

> Parliament on its side, apprehensive of the consequences such bold demands may involve, has been intriguing with some Puritans of the same county to get them to present a contrary petition, whereby they may discredit the first and so dissipate all idea among the people of other counties of combining for the same purposes, as not a few of them showed an inclination to do.

The main point here is clear – these demonstrative presentations, and the circulation of printed copies of local views, were intended as a contribution to a national mobilisation of opinion and turned local institutions into vehicles for partisan mobilisation.

This phenomenon of mobilisation was crucial to the politics of the 1640s – the attempt to secure control of the institutions of government by mobilising opinion outside them. It effectively invited the relatively humble to participate in the formal political process: poor women could call for the exclusion of bishops and jostle aristocrats. It was also significant for the content of debate, however,

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counterpart was a claim that the true nature of the cause was increasingly revealed under the pressure of events: see Michael J. Braddick, 'History, Liberty, Reformation and the Cause: Parliamentarian Military and Ideological Escalation in 1643' in Michael J. Braddick and David L. Smith (eds), *The Experience of Revolution in Stuart Britain and Ireland: Essays for John Morrill* (Cambridge, 2011), pp. 117–34.

[33] Razell and Razzell, *English Civil War*, pp. 204–5, 18/04/42.

[34] Ibid., p. 217, 16/5/42; *CSPD*, 1641–3, p. 316.

since these rival mobilisations were neither mutually exclusive nor perfectly compatible: it was in theory possible to be a supporter both of the Prayer Book and the Protestation, for example, and only political circumstance forced a choice. Increasingly their appeal rested on fears – of popery or sectarianism, of prerogative or popularity – rather than on a positive vision. Their force lay in an emphasis on threat. It was these rival mobilisations that made negotiation so difficult: 'such an unhappy genius ruled those times … that no endeavours proved successfull; nor did any actions produce the right (though probable) effects'.[35] Competition between these rival mobilisations, among diverse and overlapping publics, fostered conflict and escalation, not the least feature of which was the rhetorical radicalisation that gave rise to some of the most distinctive political speculations of seventeenth-century Europe.[36]

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Following the collapse of government by King-in-Parliament this became, during the spring and summer of 1642, a battle for provincial institutions: the militia, quarter sessions and grand juries. Here another tension becomes clearer – the religious polemic did not map neatly onto the resulting constitutional questions. This tension had already been clear in the Long Parliament, in concerns that the threat of popery might not justify the judicial murder of the Earl of Strafford at the behest of the London mob, for example, or that the Grand Remonstrance was simply no way to talk to a King. There was a party of order, but also a party of mixed government, convinced that the King, not Parliament, was now its best hope. The use of ordinances and the creation of a perpetual Parliament became staples of anti-parliamentary argument, and were not incompatible with a view that Laudianism had been popish.[37]

From January 1642, this tension became even more marked. Charles's attempt to arrest the five Members was immediately seized upon as evidence of Pym's argument, closing the gap between the now-obvious threat of armed popery to the true religion in Ireland and to the liberties of Parliament in England. It was used to justify measures in Parliament to take control of military resources, the issue that polarised the counties in 1642. By the summer

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[35] May, *History*, book 2, p. 18.

[36] Michael J. Braddick, 'Mobilisation, Anxiety and Creativity in England during the 1640s' in John Morrow and Jonathan Scott (eds), *Liberty, Authority, Formality: Political Ideas and Culture, 1600–1900* (Exeter, 2008), pp. 175–93.

[37] Fletcher, *Outbreak*, esp. ch. 9; Russell, *Fall*, chs. 12–13; Brian Manning, *The English People and the English Revolution* (Harmondsworth, 1976), ch. 3; Michael Mendle, 'Nolumus Leges Anglie Mutari: how Royalists Hijacked the Ancient Constitution' (unpublished paper). I am grateful to Professor Mendle for permission to cite this article.

rival militia musters were taking place: one by order of the Militia Ordinance justified by the need to defend religion and Parliament; the other by the authority of the Commission of Array and justified by the need to defend the Crown from this outrageous assault on its prerogatives by Puritan populism.[38]

Here then there is a dynamic to the claims of royalist claims to legality. Stretching forward from the answer to the Nineteen Propositions, and in the face for example of the escalating use of ordinances by a Parliament with increasingly thin attendances, the royalist position on this issue was a reasonably promising one. An immediate contrast is with the use of Proclamations, which was rather sparing, although increasingly used in order to explain the royalist position on the command of the kingdom's military resources. Certainly, the King and his advisers clearly understood the significance of seeking 'credit with the people'. The Venetian ambassador interpreted the proclamation of 10 December 1641 enjoining worship according to the established laws of the realm and forbidding the introduction of new rites as an attempt to drive a wedge between the Protestants and the Puritans, while his proclamation of 16 March 1642 calling for the implementation of the laws against Catholicism was

> to provide if possible an apology for his action and shake off by this means the damaging slur which they have attempted to fasten on him, to wit that secretly in his heart he cherished a leaning to Catholicism and a wish to encourage the propagation of that religion in this country. This is the most powerful weapon with which they are able to hold the interests and tranquillity of this good King seriously prejudiced, and accordingly he tries sedulously to shield himself against it.[39]

Not only were proclamations issued increasingly frequently as the crisis over military resources escalated, they were also of increasing length. Like the declarations of the paper war they seem intended not simply state the law and the immediate need for its implementation but to persuade a wider public. The Venetian ambassador in fact noted this with approval: and an unconscious distinction between successful manipulation of the ignorant by the Puritans and the successful appeal to moderation and loyalty by royalists has often been echoed in much modern historiography on this point. In any case, there were real practical consequences – in June the fresh printed orders against obeying militia orders without the King's express commission were so effective that when the Earl of Holland tried to muster the Middlesex militia,

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[38]   Braddick, *God's Fury*, chs. 6–7.

[39]   Razzell and Razzell, *English Civil War*, p. 156, 27/12/41, p. 197, 4/4/42.

many roundly refused to obey and many who went to the place of assembly, before
performing the usual exercises boldly demanded whether this was being done by
order of the King, and when they were told it was by order of the Parliament, a
portion of them returned to their homes with flags flying and drums beating.

The Venetian ambassador believed that this proved 'that the majority of
the people in their hearts preserve that natural respect which is due to their
legitimate sovereign': it might have been, for some at least of the militia men,
part of a gathering reaction against parliamentarian radicalism, rather than a
timeless and reflex royalism.[40]

It is difficult to find correlations between the success of these military
mobilisations and previous mobilisations in support of Prayer Book or Root
and Branch reform. In the first place politics had moved on under the pressure
of events and in the second constitutional issues played differently: those hot for
the fight with popery were not necessarily keen to see the power of ordinances
extended to this degree, or the King stripped of his prerogatives in the ways
characterised by the Venetian ambassador as beating 'down the monarchy [in
order] to establish a democratic state upon solid foundations', something being
done, moreover, 'by the terror of fresh disturbances'.[41] We might therefore
have expected strong correlations between Prayer Book petitioning and the
implementation of the Commission of Array, but in fact that connection
is tenuous. There were attempts to implement the Commission of Array in
twenty-two counties: fourteen had seen Prayer Book petitions but on the other
hand twelve had seen Root and Branch petitions. Taking the opposite approach,
seven counties with Prayer Book petitions saw *failed* attempts to implement the
Commission of Array while half of the counties which implemented the rival
Militia Ordinance had also seen Prayer Book petitions. Clearly support for the
Prayer Book in a county did not secure its militia for the King.[42]

There was perhaps a stronger correlation between Root and Branch petitions
and support for the Militia Ordinance – sixteen of twenty-three counties that

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[40]   Ibid., pp. 228–9, 13/6/42. The lack of success of the levies for Bishop's Wars
contrasted with the continued success of other aspects of royal government, suggesting a
selective and politically-informed refusal to obey those royal commands. The alternative view,
that both represent failed attempts at persuasion at least has the advantage of consistency
over the implicit view that reluctance to obey the royal summons in 1638 and 1639 was
a matter of ignorance while refusal to obey the parliamentary summons in 1642 reflects a
simple loyalty to the monarch.

[41]   Razzell and Razzell, *English Civil War*, pp. 173, 174, 7/2/42.

[42]   The comparisons between petitioning campaigns and mobilisation of the militia in
this and the following paragraphs are derived from Fletcher, *Outbreak*, maps 1, 5, 7, 9.

supported musters under the Militia Ordinance had also seen Root and Branch petitions. Moreover, the Militia Ordinance was implemented in two waves – before and after the issue of the rival Commission of Array. Being early or late might be interpreted as a sign of particular enthusiasm – by being quick off the mark, or by proceeding in the teeth of explicit public objection by the King. Early mustering might be a sign of particular keenness, however; evidence for a body of people persuaded of the need to support reform with defensive arms since twelve of the fourteen early counties had also seen Root and Branch campaigns.

It is clear, though, that these languages did not map neatly onto one another, creating a single clear division across the country. They clearly appealed differentially, and did not produce unified county responses; indeed quite the opposite.[43] A principal conclusion, therefore, is that differing groups could mobilise for differing purposes in the same counties, packing juries, hijacking sessions and promoting petitions through networks of fellow travellers.[44] County neutralism, in this respect, might be a response to this process rather than a reflection of disengagement from the arguments – as in Parliament, the perceived corruption of political behaviour attendant on attempts at mobilisation was an issue in itself, and one on which people took a stand even against those making arguments with which they agreed.[45] The language of county-mindedness did not correspond to an actual solidity behind purely localist positions, or (much like the language of parliamentary privilege) to the absence of local ideological division.

In order to try to win this battle, Charles purged the Commissions of the Peace in the summer of 1642, and ordered a letter to be read out at the assizes declaring the Militia Ordinance to be illegal.[46] This battle for the provinces made the militia, quarter sessions, assizes and grand juries sites of partisan

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[43]   See, for example, Clive Holmes's conclusion about reactions in the summer of 1642: 'So East Anglia, too, exhibits Professor Everitt's "confused, mercurial" reactions to the civil war. In no county was the outbreak of hostilities greeted by the total and unqualified adherence to the Parliamentary cause of previous historiography': *The Eastern Association in the English Civil War* (Cambridge, 1974), p. 67.

[44]   Networks of like-minded clergy were no doubt crucial in this. See Webster, *Godly Clergy*, for an account of such networks.

[45]   Peter Lake, 'Puritans, Popularity and Petitions: Local Politics in National Context, Cheshire, 1641', in Thomas Cogswell, Richard Cust and Peter Lake (eds), *Politics, Religion and Popularity in Early Stuart Britain: Essays in Honour of Conrad Russell* (Cambridge, 2002), pp. 259–89

[46]   For the purge see Fletcher, *Outbreak*, pp. 298–30. It seems to have been a tactic he had tried before: Alison Wall, 'The Great Purge of 1625: "the late Murraine amongst the Gentlemen of the peace"', *Historical Research*, 82 (2009), pp. 677–93.

conflict, rather than occasions for the display of the organic unity of the political community. The plurality of mobilisations corroded the legitimacy of these institutions, and anxiety about this was an important strand of the county-mindedness of 1642, rather than a view that the issues being fought were not of local interest. It does not seem to have affected the success of the military mobilisations: in only five of twenty-one purged counties was the Commission of Array subsequently successful and in nine it failed. Seven of them subsequently implemented Militia Ordinance.[47]

There is then an immediate context not just for anti-popery – which appears more a means of mobilising opinion in order to influence or take control of the institutions of government than as an irrational and timeless prejudice – but also for neutralism – which has a similarly situational significance. These petitions and musters gave effect to the views of networks of activists who took control of county institutions – they were not the voice of the county. Thomas Knyvett's famous quandary, faced with the Militia Ordinance and the King's declaration against it, speaks to this as much as to a bucolic innocence about national politics – he was, after all, subsequently in arms and suffered for it.[48] This county-mindedness in 1642 is not necessarily, or in all cases, a product of a disengagement from national politics, or even of a lack of interest in the national argument but of a difficulty of deciding between alternatives. Here, it is crucial that the terms in which support was being mobilised did not match very neatly onto the practical measures being proposed, nor did they set out to allay fears of the resulting innovation.

For, once again, these were clearly not mutually exclusive appeals – it was possible to be in favour of the Protestation but not convinced of the need to take control of the militia, or perhaps to be in favour of the Prayer Book but not willing to support the Commission of Array in direct contradiction of a parliamentary ordinance. Anti-sectarian polemic, of course, marked a deep divide within parliamentary ranks, rather than the boundary of royalist and parliamentarian: the greatest works of sect-baiting were those of the Presbyterian mobilisations within the parliamentary coalition. By the same token, most royalists could hardly be described as being in favour of popery, and their discomfort at the negotiation of the Cessation with the Irish

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[47]   Comparing maps 6, 7, 9 in Fletcher, *Outbreak*.

[48]   For Knyvett, see John Morrill, *Revolt in the Provinces: The People of England and the Tragedies of War 1630–1648*, 2nd edition (Harlow, 1999), pp. 60–61. For a revision of 'neutralism' see Fletcher, *Outbreak*, ch. 12. For the local politics of petitioning see ibid., chs. 6, 9; Lake, 'Petitions'; Walter, 'Confessional Politics'.

confederates reflects the power of anti-popery to disrupt that coalition.[49] As Whitelock noted, 'This gave many occasion to many invectives and pasquils, That the queen's army of French and Walloon papists, and the King's army of English papists, together with the Irish rebels, were to settle the protestant religion and liberties of England'. This difficulty played an important part in Sir Edward Dering's justification for his desertion of the royalist cause: his shifts of loyalty away from and back towards parliamentarianism had at their heart the uneasy balance of his contempt for both popery and sectarianism, and how to read that balance in the light of events.[50] It is less surprising then, that some of those who engaged with these mobilisations in 1642 'changed sides' when new questions were put in 1643 or that, to take a minor but not insignificant example, the King heard a sermon on the dangers of popery at the moment of his greatest military triumph – as he pursued the Earl of Essex to Lostwithiel.[51] In other words, these religious discourses, even if they had served efficiently to distinguish two sides, did not necessarily provide a clear guide to action in the face of competition for control of the military resources of the kingdom. The providential stories that promoted support for defensive arms against Puritan conspiracy, or for learned divinity and the legal forms of worship,[52] provided no real guide in the face of the rival demands for musters in the summer, or the still more complicated demands of 1643.

In general the paper war was more engaged with the constitutional questions raised by parliamentary measures of 'defence', which culminated in the Nineteen Propositions, and it has tended to attract a cohort of historians interested in those questions more than in the politics of religion.[53] Against the background

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[49]   This was particularly true of the Scots: Richard Cust, *Charles I: A Political Life* (Harlow, 2005), pp. 373–4.

[50]   Bulstrode Whitelock, *Memorials of the English Affairs*, vol. 1 (Oxford, 1853 edn), p. 219. For Dering's unease about royalist popery, and Cessation in particular, see Salt, 'Dering'.

[51]   *Richard Symonds's Diary of the Marches of the Royal Army*, (ed.) C.E. Long, reprinted with a supplementary introduction by Ian Roy (Cambridge, 1997), p. 53: 'Sermon on Sunday [11 August 1644] before the King ... speaking against popery; that one of the greatest arguments against them is denyall of reading the Scriptures: for how can he be an honest guardian that will not suffer the heire to look into his father's will?'.

[52]   For examples, see Braddick, *God's Fury*, pp. 201–3.

[53]   For an introduction see David Wootton (ed.), *Divine Right and Democracy: An Anthology of Political Writing in Stuart England* (Harmondsworth, 1986). A good, if not consensual, overview is offered by Russell, *Fall*, pp. 478–87. It is a huge literature, of course, but for influential work on what was at stake in these exchanges see M.J. Mendle, 'Politics and Political Thought 1640–1642', in Russell (ed.), *Origins*, pp. 219–45; Michael J. Mendle, *Dangerous Positions: Mixed Government, the Estates of the Realm, and the Making of the Answer to the XIX Propositions* (Tuscaloosa, 1985); Quentin Skinner, 'Classical Liberty

of the broader political narrative it seems that these issues probably played better for the royalists: it was on these questions, more than on the basis of the anti-sectarian counter-blast to anti-popery that they found their army. But in fact this is to replace one reduction with another. What seems truer of the evidence surveyed here is that there were more than two sides, and that activists of all stripes could find networks available to promote their campaigns in most counties. After all, fourteen counties saw attempts to implement both the Militia Ordinance and the Commission of Array.[54] Each of these mobilisations was a different enterprise, mobilised by different networks and institutions, but enjoying appeal among the same local population. Each one asked for different kinds of response. County institutions were the focus for these mobilisations, but solidarities were clearly not determined by county identities. In the face of this fluidity and complexity, it seems to me, mobilisation is a more helpful concept than allegiance in analysing these local politics.

Support was mobilised among wider publics primarily in terms of religious threats – popery and sectarianism were staples of cheap print, petitions and demonstrative politics. But they did not map neatly onto opposed programmes for the English church, and did not therefore clearly distinguish two sides. Instead, polemic claimed to define what was at the heart of the opposing coalition: as the Grand Remonstrance had it, 'As in all compounded bodies the operations are qualified according to the predominant element, so in this mixed party, the Jesuited counsels, being most active and prevailing, may easily be discovered to have had the greatest sway in all their determinations'. The danger was that this essence might become the whole: 'if they be not prevented, are likely to devour the rest, or to turn them into their own nature'.[55] Despite these efforts, though, these polemical positions did not clearly mark out the two sides. Indeed, as the crisis unfolded and further innovations were required in order to sustain the military efforts, anti-sectarianism was perhaps more important as a polemic within the parliamentary coalition than as a means of distinguishing the two sides in the war; while opposition to popery, though muted, remained a commitment for many within the royalist camp. This is an important perspective on the instability of the two coalitions – the mismatch between the polemical tools at hand and the purposes to which they were being put. And it has a further

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and the Coming of the English Civil War', in Martin Van Gelderen and Quentin Skinner (eds), *Republicanism: A Shared European Heritage* vol. 2 *The Values of Republicanism in Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge, 2002), pp. 9–28; Quentin Skinner, 'Rethinking Political Liberty', *History Workshop Journal*, 61: 1 (2006), pp. 156–70; Skinner, *Liberty before Liberalism* (Cambridge, 1998); Skinner, *Hobbes and Republican Liberty* (Cambridge, 2008).

54   Comparing maps 7, 9 in Fletcher, *Outbreak*.
55   *Constitutional Documents*, Gardiner, pp. 207–8.

implication – the practical programmes being pursued related to the balance of the constitution, for which there were no such ready stereotypes to hand. On this point, significantly, both sides claimed to be fighting for the same thing, and the question was really which side made that claim with most plausibility.[56] Many of those whose recorded commitment to royalism in these months survives were moved by the implausibility of the parliamentary claim, or that Parliament could fight the King's army in order to protect him: as Lord Paget put it 'a preparation of arms against the King, under shadow of loyalty'.[57] In this sense, the attempt by publicists to present this as a war of religion foundered because it was not a war between confessions, but rather a struggle over the identity of a single church; and this attempt, and its failure, provides an important context for the force of other forms of argument.

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This view of the role of religion in the outbreak of the war has concentrated on polemic and mobilisation and it bears out similar analyses of earlier periods. Two long-standing archetypes – anti-popery and anti-Puritanism – could exercise a powerful effect on political choices, but their exact meaning was highly variable and situationally determined.[58] Neither were they mutually exclusive and, for all these reasons, they were not a good guide to action in the circumstances of 1641–2. This offers a vital contrast with the Covenanters's campaign – there was no certainty in England about whether the end of Laudianism should also signal the end of episcopacy or, if it did, what should replace the bishops. In place of a unifying text which embodied an agreed history of the true religion, English partisans grappled with the ambiguous legacy of English reformation. The difficulties of the identity problem – where were the boundaries of the reformed religion to be set in relation to tradition? – made anti-popery and anti-Puritan seductive and powerful languages, but also highly unstable in their precise, practical meaning. Again, echoing work on earlier periods, we can see here in place of a clear distinction between elite and popular politics, or national and

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[56] See, for one example among many, Jasper Mayne, who argued in 1647 that King and Parliament 'challenged to themselves *Defence* of one and the same Cause': protestant religion and the liberty of the subject. He hoped to show, however, that Parliament's claims 'were an empty pretence': Glenn Burgess, 'Royalism and Liberty of Conscience in the English Revolution' in Morrow and Scott, *Liberty*, pp. 9–28, quotations at p. 19.

[57] Quoted in Braddick, *God's Fury*, p. 227. For further examples see pp. 226–8 and notes.

[58] Peter Lake, 'Anti-Popery: The Structure of a Prejudice' in Richard Cust and Ann Hughes (eds), *Conflict in early Stuart England, 1603–1642* (Harlow, 1989), 72–106; Lake, 'Anti-Puritanism'.

local politics, a developing emphasis on the relationship between politicians and their publics: the attempt to mobilise opinion, or seek credit with the people, in stabilising the meaning of these key terms.[59]

How the messages were received depended on the local valence of the general issues, as the best recent work on popular politics has demonstrated.[60] Those local conditions were to a substantial extent the product of social and economic structure, but were also the product of local history and political culture – the temperature of local preaching, the experience of engagement with the law and institutions of the state and so on. These complex and cross-cutting mobilisations might have quite unpredictable effects when acting on those histories and political ecologies. More conventional studies of allegiance have tended to produce a more static and fixed view of political commitments – an emphasis on mobilisation allows for greater fluidity, differing degrees of commitment and for the appropriation of the languages of national politics for local purposes.

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Perhaps the most important motive force for John Morrill's revisionism was an impatience with the efforts to taxonomise allegiance – the desire to place people in boxes[61] – but he was also rebelling against the constraining effects of the anachronistic design of those boxes in Whig and Marxist histories. His achievement in relation to the former issue has been transformative, alerting us to the hesitancies and anxieties of those experiencing the revolution, of their ambiguous affiliations and measured commitments.

On the second point, of the nature of the boxes into which we try to put people, his contribution was perhaps more polemical – to substitute for one set of categories associated with modern revolutions another associated with wars of religion. Much subsequent criticism has suggested that 'religion' is too crude a category for Stuart political culture. On that point, I have favoured the term 'Reformation politics' as a definition of the terrain within which political argument took place, and seen in the 1640s a weakening of that style and the emergence of something more like 'Enlightenment politics'.[62] Here, though, I

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[59] Peter Lake and Steve Pincus, 'Rethinking the Public Sphere in Early Modern England', *JBS*, 45 (2006), pp. 270–92.

[60] Walter, *Understanding*; Andy Wood, 'Beyond Post-revisionism?: The Civil War Allegiances of the Miners of the Derbyshire "Peak country"', *HJ*, 40 (1997), pp. 23–40; Daniel C. Beaver, *Hunting and the Politics of Violence before the English Civil War* (Cambridge, 2008).

[61] See John Morrill, *The Nature of the English Revolution* (Harlow, 1993), p. 180.

[62] Braddick, *God's Fury*, esp. pp. xxiii–xxv, 590–92.

have been trying to make a slightly different point, about the situational and dynamic content of *any* labels that we might want to apply. Since the publication of Morrill's essay much work on national and local politics, and on popular politics, has emphasised communication and connection, representation and the potential sophistication of local views of church, state and local political economy. Local and popular politics are not now likely to be seen as static or passive, simply worked on by those driven forward by zeal. As I have suggested here, we can see not only anti-popery and constitutionalism as situationally determined and dynamic political positions, but county-mindedness and neutralism too. The difficulties of making these languages work accounts too for the creative dynamic of political argument in the 1640s.

Work following in Morrill's footsteps has therefore tended to further problematise the categories initially associated with his argument about the 'wars of religion' – suggesting that anti-popery and anti-sectarianism (and, by extension, orthodoxy) were positions of shifting significance, and that it is difficult therefore to see this as a clash about fixed positions: it is better perhaps to see it as a conflict fought through these categories. This further revision is in some ways, however, a testament to his achievement on the first point – it is with reference to the complexities, anxieties and difficulties that contemporaries experienced, reinforced by our greater sensitivity to what connected political and religious debate at various levels of the polity, that we have come to find the notion of 'wars of religion' itself in need of revision. It was also a problem that contemporary polemicists and theorists had posed for themselves, and from the attempts to deal with these difficulties a revolution emerged.

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Chapter 7

Sir Simonds D'Ewes:
A 'respectable conservative' or a
'fiery spirit'?

J. Sears McGee

John Morrill's justly renowned article on 'the religious context of the English civil war' appeared in 1984, and in it he asserted that during the first year of the Long Parliament, it was impossible 'to distinguish "moderate" and "radical" constitutionalism. Future Royalists like Hyde, Falkland, Dering and even George Digby, were no less "hard-line" than future Parliamentarians like Pym, Selden and D'Ewes'. The critical divide was about religion, not the constitution. 'None of those who defended the pre-Laudian church order in the debates of mid 1641 subsequently became a Parliamentarian; few of those who demanded a fresh start [in religion] supported the king'.[1] He went on to argue that those who demanded extensive religious change – a religious 'fresh start' – were those without whom there would have been no Civil War. In 1993, Morrill wrote that 'what turned constitutional opposition to an unconstitutional taking up of arms' was the presence of men who insisted on 'a second Reformation'. They were the men 'who determined to fight' because they had 'a fire in their belly that made them see religion not simply as an academic squabble about dogma, ritual and about how the primitive Church was governed, but as about how people related to one another' and 'about how the ideal Christian community was to be constructed … and *must* be constructed'.[2]

This chapter does not take issue with Morrill's fundamental premise about the centrality of religion, but it does argue that our understanding of the coming of Civil War can benefit from another look at the thinking of Sir Simonds D'Ewes, the man whose journals of the debates in the Long Parliament give us our fullest and richest account of its proceedings. Morrill's neat distinction between constitutional grievances and 'academic' disputes about dogma and

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[1]   John Morrill, *The Nature of the English Revolution* (London: Longman, 1993), p. 65.

[2]   Ibid., pp. 39, 44.

ritual does not work in D'Ewes's case. Constitutional disputes were important for D'Ewes, but he did not insist on 'a fresh start' in religion. There can be no doubt that he had serious constitutional concerns. Peter Salt has amply documented D'Ewes's hostility to the ship money mulct, quoting, for example, D'Ewes's characterization of it in his autobiography as 'the most deadlie and fatall blow' which 'the libertie of the subjects of England … had been sensible of in five hundred yeares last past'. Further, Salt noted D'Ewes's privately made assertion that ship money was tantamount to slavery because it was an 'unlawfull arbitrarie and unlimited taxation'.[3] Salt's evidence buttressed Conrad Russell's earlier description of D'Ewes as 'a firm principled opponent of Ship Money'.[4] D'Ewes's desire to defend the constitution as he understood it was deeply rooted – but this did not mean that his religious opinions did not weigh even more heavily when he made his decision to adhere to the Parliamentary side.

Morrill also wrote that D'Ewes exemplified what he calls 'conservative respectable Puritan-parliamentarianism'.[5] This is true enough, but the nature of his Puritanism and its effect on his political outlook requires careful analysis. In 1618, D'Ewes went up to St John's College, Cambridge, his father's college. Paul D'Ewes, a lawyer and one of the Six Clerks of Chancery, insisted that his son leave Cambridge for the Middle Temple in the summer of 1620. Though Simonds initially disliked the study of the common law, he came to love it and was called to the bar in 1623.[6] In 1626, his marriage to a Suffolk heiress, Anne Clopton, freed him from the necessity of practising law, but his legal training shaped his political outlook for the rest of his life. Charles I awarded him a baronetcy in the summer of 1641. Such titles were being sold by the crown at that time to raise desperately needed cash, but it is possible that D'Ewes was seen as a potential convert to Royalism. That D'Ewes's beloved younger brother Richard was an officer in Charles's army may have encouraged the thought that the MP for Sudbury might be won over. Richard certainly thought so when he wrote to his brother from York on 17 June 1642 urging him to come there and become 'an eye wittness of the iustice and equity of the kings proceedings'. He

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[3]   Salt, 'Sir Simonds D'Ewes and the Levying of Ship Money, 1635–1640', *The Historical Journal*, 37: 2 (1994): pp. 257, 258. I am deeply indebted to Peter Salt for making available translations of many of D'Ewes's Latin letters and his invaluable advice on many points as my research has proceeded.

[4]   Russell, *The Fall of the British Monarchies* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), p. 132.

[5]   Morrill, *Nature of the English Revolution*, p. 146.

[6]   A full account of his upbringing and education will appear in the biography of D'Ewes that I am writing.

even offered to arrange for two horses, 'a Grey Gelding and a Bay Meare', to facilitate the journey north.[7]

Despite such blandishments, Simonds stayed in London. His theologically stoked 'fire in the belly' remained hot enough to keep him in the House of Commons until Colonel Pride excluded him in 1648, although his involvement diminished after 1645. This Suffolk MP's voluminous papers in the Harleian manuscripts total over sixty volumes. They contain a rich and varied body of documents, including juvenilia (such as letters to his parents and notebooks from his schoolboy days), notes and drafts for a variety of writing projects (most of which he never finished), countless sermon notes, and more than 1,400 letters written by him or sent to him between 1620 and his death in 1650. Historians have long drawn voraciously upon four of those volumes (three containing the Long Parliament journals and a fourth which is the autobiography he began writing in 1637 and completed in 1638). But the rest of this vast corpus has received surprisingly little attention from scholars. This may be because D'Ewes was in some respects an awkward and difficult man. Many found his pedantic and priggish personality unattractive. His acute social insecurity offends modern sensibilities. He was defensive about his descent from a Flemish artisan who had immigrated to England during Henry VIII's reign, and he struggled to convince himself and others that his ancestry included powerful aristocrats in the southern Netherlands. That is not all. D'Ewes was not only a zealous Puritan but also at times displayed political ineptness, excessive legalism, humourlessness and self-importance. He certainly had biases that make it necessary to use his journals with care, and John Morrill has raised reasonable doubts about how many of the speeches D'Ewes inserted in his journals were actually given in the House of Commons.[8] An assiduous note-taker and a very cautious politician always seeking to avoid damage to his family and estate if at all possible, D'Ewes might have inserted speeches he never voiced as a kind of running commentary from a socially conservative but politically and religiously committed Puritan and Parliamentarian into the record he created so industriously.

All of that said, however, D'Ewes's personal papers in the Harleian manuscripts show him to be much more interesting than has been realized and make possible a more nuanced reading of important aspects of religious and constitutional conflict in early Stuart Britain. In D'Ewes we have far and away the most fully documented example of a kind of 'conservative respectable Puritan-parliamentarianism' without which it is difficult to imagine how the overthrow of Charles I could have occurred. Even if he was, as Morrill suggested,

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[7]   British Library Harley MS 383, fol. 203r. I am grateful to Richard Cust for information about the sale of titles on the eve of the Civil War.

[8]   John Morrill, 'Paying One's D'Ewes', *Parliamentary History*, 14 / 2 (1995): pp. 179–86.

'the Walter Mitty of the Long Parliament', we should not conclude that we have nothing to learn from a Walter Mitty who was not only a regular attender and recorder but a deeply informed and well connected observer whose whole life had prepared him to play the role he set himself as MP for Sudbury.[9] The problem is to determine how to use such a source, and the solution is to make a thorough study of Simonds D'Ewes's path to the Long Parliament. Who was he, and what drove him, despite his legal and social conservatism, to defy King Charles I?

Although we will soon turn to D'Ewes's religious convictions, one further comment on his political and constitutional principles and concerns is essential at the outset. It must be emphasized that his legal education from 1620 to 1626 led him to identify thoroughly with the ethos of the common law. He was, for example, incensed when James I appointed John Williams, Bishop of Lincoln, to the office of Lord Keeper in 1621. In D'Ewes's view, no shortage of 'diuers able wise law[y]ers' existed at the time. These lawyers were 'verie honest & religious men fitt for the place', and they avoided the 'fawning & flattery' at which certain clergymen excelled.[10] When in November 1625, the new king, Charles I, dismissed Williams, D'Ewes exulted. The office of Lord Keeper was, he wrote, 'most proper to a common law[y]er &most vnfit for a clergiman, who should not ambitiouslie seeke to imbarke himselfe into Lay-emploiments &offices'.[11] His hostility on this ground to clerics like Williams would reassert itself against Laud and others later, and still later against Melvillian Presbyterians.

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[9]　　Ibid., p. 183. I will however demonstrate in the biography that D'Ewes insisted upon incontrovertible documentary proofs in his antiquarian and genealogical researches and expressed the utmost scorn for those who settled for myth, hearsay or manufactured data in order to claim social rank they did not deserve. Although by no means conclusive, this insistence on fidelity with respect to documentary sources works against the notion that he inserted undelivered speeches into his Long Parliament journals. See also Maija Jansson's answer to Morrill in *Parliamentary History*, 15/2 (1996): pp. 215–20 and Morrill's response in the same journal and issue, pp. 221–30.

[10]　　Harley MS 646, fol. 58v (1:188). This volume is a fair copy of the autobiography in D'Ewes's hand. My citations are from this manuscript and are followed by the location in *The Autobiography and Correspondence of Sir Simonds D'Ewes*, (ed.) J.O. Halliwell (London, 2 vols, 1845). Halliwell modernized and bowdlerized the text, and his transcription is occasionally flawed. For example, he misread 'causal' as 'casual' (fol. 51r; 1: 155), and he has the Elector Palatine fleeing to 'Siberia' after the battle of White Mountain (1: 152); the MS has 'Silesia' (fol. 50r). D'Ewes's geography was better than Halliwell's.

[11]　　Ibid., fol. 82v (1: 281). For the similar views of a much earlier lawyer, Edmund Dudley, and for Henry VIII's practice of appointing laymen to offices formerly often held by clergymen, see Alan Cromartie, *The Constitutionalist Revolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 40, 60.

One of its sources was his immersion in the common law. D'Ewes also had social and religious grievances toward Williams. He derided the bishop's social origins repeatedly. The summer of 1623 was rich in news and gossip about the Spanish marriage for Prince Charles, and in D'Ewes's cipher diary, the entry for 11 July reported that 'Williams the Keeper ... that base upstart' had 'mooved the question to the Privie Counsell for a toleration' of Roman Catholic worship in England if the Spaniards made that a condition for the marriage.[12] D'Ewes abominated the very idea of such a toleration because for him it was a part of a plot to overthrow Protestantism. In the same diary, he noted that by February 1624, Williams, 'whoe before was of the popish faction', performed a sharp about-face when speaking in the House of Lords: 'but now after the Princes returne out of Spaine and the breech of that match, this upstart turned the note of his tune another way' and jumped on the anti-Spanish marriage bandwagon then gaining momentum.[13] It should be remembered that D'Ewes is the source of the oft-quoted characterization of Laud as 'a little low redd faced man, of meane parentage'.[14]

That familiar remark about Laud is in D'Ewes's autobiography, a work which he wrote in 1637 and 1638. The autobiography is a splendid source for his mature views on religious and political matters. It must, however, be studied alongside his correspondence and the 1622–4 cipher diary because they reveal ways in which some of those views had changed over time, changes that do not appear in the autobiography. Consider, for example, his observations on James I and Charles I. In a cipher diary entry for 2 January 1622, he noted that he had talked with visiting friends about their abhorrence of the Spanish match, and his horror of it was expressed repeatedly in the diary until the prince and the duke returned from Spain and denounced the Spaniards. In the same entry, D'Ewes displayed anger about James's imprisonment of Sir Edward Coke 'and alsoe for [James's] intention to breake upp the parliament to the great discontent of all his truly religious and loyall subjects'.[15] Five days later

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[12] *The Diary of Sir Simonds D'Ewes (1622–1624)*, trans. and (ed.) Elizabeth Bourcier (Paris: Didier, 1974), p. 146. D'Ewes had a copy of Williams's letter to the judges (2 August 1622) telling them that the king had ordered him to issue 'Writts vnder the great Seale' for the release of Catholics who were imprisoned 'for anye such recusancye whatsoever, or for refusing the oath of Supremacye, or for having or dispersing Papists Bookes, or praying of Masses, or anye other point of recusancye wch doth touch or concerne religion onlye, and not matter wch shall appeare to bee totallye Civill or Politicall'. Harley MS 360, fol. 47.

[13] Ibid., p. 181.

[14] Harley MS 646, fol. 158v–159r (2:100). This follows his characterization of the death of Archbishop Abbott as a 'heauie losse' for 'our English church'.

[15] *Diary*, pp. 55–6.

he wrote a catty description of an incident at court in which James refused to eat until Buckingham abandoned his tennis game and attended him instead. When the marquess arrived, James 'fell upon his necke'. Six days later, D'Ewes wrote that James's rumoured intention to dismiss the parliament demonstrated that the king was 'moore unjust towards the parliament then ever any king had done'.[16] On 15 January, D'Ewes entered an account of a lengthy conversation with the Temple's preacher, William Masters. They concluded that James's 'actions did tend to an absolute monarchye and for his riches twas thought that hee shared with the Marquess [of Buckingham] and had much treasure liing by him'.[17] On 29 August, D'Ewes spoke with a friend from Cambridge about the sin of sodomy, its frequency in the 'wicked cittye' of London, and the danger that God would requite it with some fearful punishment, 'especially it being as wee had probable cause to feare, a sinne in the prince as well as the people'.[18] The other side of the coin of his hostility to the Spanish marriage was James's failure to offer effective assistance to the Elector Palatine and his wife. On 7 July 1622, D'Ewes, after another conference with Mr Masters, opined that 'the kings base feare was the cause of his lukewarmnes, both at home and abroad'.[19] In February 1623, D'Ewes described James as an 'unnatural father' for his failure to help his daughter and her husband.[20] The diary also bristles with anger and frustration toward James for the influence he permitted to the Count of Gondomar, the Spanish ambassador.

After this barrage of blistering remarks about James in the cipher diary from 1622–4, it comes as something of a surprise to read some of the statements about the king in D'Ewes's autobiography. For example, early in the work, he alluded to the appropriateness of celebrating 'the memorie of Great Brittaines happines vnder King James his peaceable raigne who neither oppressed his people with new taxes; nor ensnared anye godlie ministers with such iniunctions as they could not with a safe conscience submitt vnto'.[21] When he wrote of James's death in May 1625, D'Ewes registered his astonishment that

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[16]	Ibid., pp. 56–7.

[17]	Ibid., p. 19.

[18]	Ibid., pp. 92–3. This entry also included a report that a Frenchman 'whoe had buggered a knights sonne' and was facing punishment by the London recorder in the Guild Hall when Chief Justice Montague (Coke's successor) intervened at the king's behest ('as twas thought') to shield him.

[19]	Ibid., p. 85.

[20]	Ibid., p. 119.

[21]	Harley MS 646, fol. 31v (1: 105).

all men generallie sleight and disregard the losse of soe milde & gentle a
Prince ... For though it cannot bee denied but that hee had his vices & deuiations,
& that the true Church of God was wellneare ruined in Germanie, whilst hee sate
still & looked on, yet if wee consider his vertues & learning ... his care to
maintaine the doctrine of the Church of England pure & sound, his opposicion
against James Arminius Conradus Vorstius & other blasphemous Anabaptists &
his augmenting the liberties of the English rather then oppressing them by anie
vnlimited or illegal taxes ... wee cannot but acknowledge that his death deserued
moore sorrow & condolement from his subjects then it found.[22]

This statement, written some twelve or thirteen years later, was in fact a lament
over how much worse things had become under Charles I so far as D'Ewes
was concerned. Experience of Charles's policies led him to realize that James's
failings were not as damaging as he had feared at the time, especially in relation
to the havoc wrought by his son's regime. The 'vnlimited or illegall taxes' such
as ship money that James had not imposed had been levied vigorously by his
son and heir. It is, however, significant, that in this summary of James's reign,
D'Ewes showed much more concern about 'the true Church of God' at home
and abroad than about taxes. He faulted James for his failure first to defend and
then to recover his son-in-law Frederick's domains, but in retrospect he realized
that James had at least been doctrinally sound and that the Church of England's
declension had accelerated sharply under his heir.

We must now examine that declension as D'Ewes perceived it. Even before
1625, D'Ewes's worry about Arminianism was increasing. This concern first
appeared in the autobiography in D'Ewes's summary of notable international
developments that had occurred in 1617. He wrote that this year 'prooued
fatal to the Christian worlde at leaste to the Reformed churches professing the
true religion, being the better parte of it'. In the Netherlands, he continued,
'the hereticall faction of the Anabaptists under the new & false name of
Arminianisme, beganne openlie to defend ther Pelagian blasphemies; which
to this day [1637], like ill weedes haue growen to such a ranknes, as they haue
almost outgrowne the truthe itself'.[23] It is uncertain whether he knew much
about Arminianism and the Synod of Dort as early as 1617. At the time, he
was a fifteen-year old schoolboy in Bury St Edmunds. He certainly learned a
good deal about it at Cambridge between 1618 and 1620, but the absence of his
cipher diary for those years makes it impossible to know precisely what and how
much he knew. Certainly the Calvinism that ran in his family was reinforced in

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[22]   Ibid., fos. 77v–78r (1: 264–65).
[23]   Ibid., fol. 29r (1: 97).

Cambridge. He mentioned in his autobiography that he particularly admired the lectures by Dr John Davenant, the Lady Margaret professor of divinity and later Bishop of Salisbury, because of the clarity with which Davenant 'confuted the blasphemies of Arminius, Bertius & the rest of that rabble of Jesuited Anabaptists'.[24] The tutor his father selected was Dr Richard Holdsworth, a thoroughgoing Calvinist. Since Paul D'Ewes had sat at the feet of the famous Puritan Laurence Chaderton while he was at St John's, this comes as no surprise. Simonds remained in frequent contact with Holdsworth long after he went down in 1620, praising him in a letter to his father as 'my Tutor the mirror of preachers'.[25]

The earliest mentions of Arminianism in D'Ewes's papers other than in the retrospective autobiography appear in the 1622–4 diary. When D'Ewes visited Cambridge for the commencement at the end of June in 1622, he heard in the University Church 'one Mr Lucye the Marquesse of Buckingham's chaplaine whose sermon had in it anabaptisme, poperye and almost atheisme'. He added that at about the same time another preacher in Oxford was in trouble for less objectionable remarks while Lucy was not even questioned, an indication that 'in truth the Marquesses shadow was not to be trodd upon'.[26] Although the word 'Arminian' did not occur in this passage, it must be noted that for D'Ewes it was interchangeable with 'anabaptisme'. D'Ewes's regular practice during his Middle Temple years (1620–26) was to hear three sermons each Sunday, and he frequently gadded to sermons by such Calvinists as Josiah Shute, William Gouge, Richard Stock, Cornelius Burges, and James Ussher. In the Temple Church, he most often heard its preacher, the Calvinist William Masters.[27] The word 'Arminian' first appeared in his cipher diary when he noted the existence of an 'arminian sect' in Holland on 13 February 1623.[28] His first mention of Arminianism in England came on 22 February 1624. He wrote that in the Temple Church 'wee had one verie bad sermon savouring of Arminianisme, a verie dangerous heresie, being but revived pelagianisme, or rather revised, which was first broached in the low Cuntries and had now of late spread exceedinglie

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[24]	Ibid., fol. 42r (1: 120).

[25]	Harley MS 379, fol. 28r. Late in 1623, he also persuaded his father to offer a benefice to Holdsworth, 'but hee was provided'. *Diary*, p. 172. He heard Holdsworth's Good Friday sermon at St Paul's Cross in London in 1623 and characterized it as 'elaborate and honest', both terms of high praise in the D'Ewes lexicon (p. 130). He also heard Holdsworth preach twice in London in March, 1628 (pp. 186, 188).

[26]	*Diary*, p. 84.

[27]	He tried to hear John Preston at Lincoln's Inn several times, but missed him. See ibid., p. 170.

[28]	Ibid., p. 117.

in Cambridge and in most partes of England'.[29] Nicholas Tyacke has correctly noted that 'direct evidence … of lay attitudes' about this matter is 'relatively hard to find', and in the 1624 parliament he found only two 'Calvinist activists recorded', John Pym and Thomas Wentworth.[30] D'Ewes, though not an MP until 1640, was certainly a vigorous anti-Arminian in the early 1620s (and probably during his time in Cambridge as well).

A striking feature of D'Ewes's religious thinking is the intricate linkage between its different components and the extensive historical context in which he embedded them. For him, soteriology and liturgy were the most important determinants of religious truth. The fullest published exposition of his beliefs appeared in a closely printed essay of sixty-five pages in quarto titled *The Primitive Practise for Preserving Truth* that appeared in London in 1645. But the building blocks of his understanding of the history of Christianity as a whole and of Christianity in Britain can be found in his writings long before 1645. Indeed, they emerge clearly in letters that he wrote to close friends with whom he corresponded extensively beginning in the late 1620s. In the first section of *The Primitive Practise*, he focused on what was for him a critical period in British history, the fifth century, and it was critical because that was the heyday of Pelagianism. For D'Ewes, Pelagianism was the most dangerous and malignant heresy ever to assault the true religion, and in his view the year 466 was especially important in Britain because it was when the heresy received a powerful check. British followers of Pelagius had murdered the rightful king and his son and installed Vortigern, 'a Pelagianized traytor against his Soveraign' on the throne. Vortigern, both traitor and heretic, foreshadowed the blood-soaked linkage between heresy and treachery that would repeat itself in the actions of John of Leyden and the Anabaptist rebels who seized Münster in 1545 and of 'that wicked Jesuited varlet, Ravaillac' (who murdered Henry IV of France in 1610). The best known English example of this horror was the Jesuit Henry Garnet and the Gunpowder traitors in 1605. It was, D'Ewes wrote, 'among the ancient Protestant Brit[o]ns in Wales, about the yeer of our Lord, 466' that 'the Church Christian Orthodox and truly Catholike', so often the target of persecution, managed to turn the tables and 'trample upon heresie'. Godly bishops intervened and suppressed the Pelagians in late fifth-century Britain. Unfortunately, the success of the truth was only temporary, and once

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[29] Ibid., pp. 181–2. In his autobiography he took pleasure in recording that the Anabaptist and Pelagian heresies and the idolatry of bowing at the altar were not yet in vogue in Cambridge when he left in 1620. Harley MS 646, fol. 47v (1: 142).

[30] Tyacke, *Anti-Calvinists: The Rise of English Arminianism, c.1590–1640* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), pp. 125, 130.

in power Vortigern gave the English bishoprics to 'hereticall and lazie droanes, who had well-neere ruined the true Church of God in those dayes'.[31]

When D'Ewes looked at the broader history of Christianity in this 1645 tract, he stressed that the fifth-century victory over the Pelagians, like that over the Arians earlier, had not lasted. On the contrary, he insisted that 'Falshood, Heresie, mens Inventions, burthensome Superstitions intermixed with Gods Worship, and Idolatry, or any divine Creature adoration, consisting in mens bowing to, or towards Images, Crosses, Altars, Communion-tables, Reliques, or the like' had repeatedly been 'generally and publiquely established' by means of 'sharp and cruell persecution … upon the goods, estates, liberties and lives of the godly'.[32] When he turned to the sixteenth century, D'Ewes asserted that Martin Luther, although 'learned and pious', had admitted when he was dying that he had erred in maintaining two doctrines, 'those two monsters of Consubstantiation and Ubiquity', for fear that the people were not yet ready for the full truth about the Mass. Luther had hoped that these two 'weeds' would be gradually rooted out by his successors, as indeed they were in 'the French and Helvetian churches'. Among other Protestants, however, Luther's hopes were not realized. Instead, various 'Pseudo-Lutherans' had 'suckt in the poyson of the Anabaptists (the Devils Master-engine in this latter age, with the Jesuites, to restore Pelagianisme to the World)'. These men had added 'old blasphemies that concern the advancement of mans free-will above Gods grace … to Luthers new Masse' with catastrophic consequences. These evil doctrines were then brought to the Low Countries by 'James Arminius the Anabaptist, or Pseudo-Lutheran' who was rightly denounced by James I as 'the Enemy of God'.[33] Clearly, D'Ewes's knowledge of the history of Christian doctrine contributed more to his mature and more favourable opinion about the first Stuart king than did James's relatively constitutional proceeding with respect to taxation. From D'Ewes's perspective, James deserved credit for not levying illegal taxes, but he deserved infinitely more credit for opposing Pelagianism in all its forms.

In this way, D'Ewes created a family tree for the soteriological doctrines and liturgical practices that he believed had opposed God's truth since the dawn of Christianity. For him, the essence of that truth was the high Calvinist doctrine of salvation and a liturgy free of the least trace of 'idolatry and superstition'. The root of the tree of heresy and blasphemy had been planted by Pelagius in fifth-century Wales and in Rome, where Pelagius taught, and the branches eventually included popery, Anabaptism, Socinianism and Arminianism. We tend to

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[31]   *Primitive Practise*, pp. 1, 57. He usually referred to Henry IV as 'Henry the Great'.
[32]   Ibid., p. 1.
[33]   Ibid., p. 3.

distinguish fairly sharply between these entities, but D'Ewes saw them as birds of the same feather. This was because he treated any doctrine that played up human free will as a variation on the Pelagian theme.

This genealogy of heterodoxy appears repeatedly in his voluminous correspondence and elsewhere in his papers. In numerous letters he wrote in the late 1620s and 1630s, D'Ewes passed on the foreign news that he assiduously gathered. Saddened by the many Habsburg victories in the Thirty Years War that he had to report, the successes of the great Swedish king, Gustavus Adolphus, gave him hope for the future. He often accompanied the military and diplomatic news with restatements of his historical and theological animus toward all the offshoots of Pelagianism. In February, 1627, for example, he began his letter to his dear friend, kinsman, and fellow Suffolk gentleman Sir Martin Stuteville with an anguished cry of woe: 'S[i]r, When I thinke of the dreadfull ruine of Gods church abroad, & the imminent desolation w[hi]ch threatens vs at home, I could wish even to dipp my pen in teares not inke, nay rather in bloud then teares'. He compared the calamitous situation of the Protestant side in the aftermath of Christian IV's defeat at Lutter to that described by Gildas a millennium earlier in Britain. Gildas 'complained of the sinns of those times which brought on that desolating conquest by the Saxons; the same sinns in a deeper die & under a heavier burthen doth England at this day groane of'. 'It makes my soule', D'Ewes said, 'to anticipate our hastening fates'.[34] He lived in dread that as the pagan Saxons had been God's agents to scourge sinful British Christians long before, so the Habsburgs would perform a similar service in the seventeenth century. Having reminded himself of Gildas's lamentation, he heightened the comparison for his friend Stuteville by stating that

> Brittaine then & Wales long after enioied the same true & pure religion wee now doe; till Gregories pedler Austine the monke vainlie stiled Englands Apostle first conuerted the Pagan Saxons & then peruerted the Brittains true religion; but yet our times haue much more light then thers; & therfore our sinns crie louder for vengeance; in w[hi]ch ther is alsoe this difference; the welsh Morgans heresie whoe tooke to himselfe the new greeke name of Pelagius ... is now of late miserablie defended & swallowed downe vnder the foolish title of brainsicke Arminius.[35]

In *The Primitive Practise*, he would later amplify his depiction of the initial establishment of Roman Christianity in England by asserting 'that the Gospel

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[34] B.L. Harley MS 383, f. 55r.
[35] Ibid.

was planted here in the Primitive time, that the Protestants Religion flourished here neare upon foure hundred yeares before Austine the Monke, the first Popish Archbishop of Canterbury, poysoned the purity of Gods worship with his burdensome trinkets and ceremonies'.[36]

By July 1630 the Swedish invasion of Pomerania and what D'Ewes had called a little earlier 'the now burning dissensions of the two houses of Austria and Bourbon,'[37] meant that, for the time being at least, things were looking up for Protestants. But D'Ewes, ever cautious, could always find causes for alarm. He wrote to Stuteville that 'the violent encreasing of that grace-disgracing heresie in the Lowcuntries' was all too likely to bring down the Dutch to 'a sadd issue'. Arminians were, he reported, making serious inroads not only in Amsterdam and Dort but indeed 'most of all the other townes in Holland are more or lesse infected'. Mercifully, the provinces of Zeeland and Friesland 'are yet little infected',[38] but the monitory 'yet' indicated that he feared that they too were gravely threatened by this spiritual plague. On 10 June 1635, D'Ewes expressed to a close friend, Albert Joachimi, the Dutch ambassador to England and a Contra-Remonstrant, his hopes of good results if, as seemed likely, the French intervened and joined the Swedes against the Habsburgs. He was pleased about a marriage that then seemed to be in the offing between the eldest daughter of Queen Elizabeth of Bohemia and the king of Poland and about peace negotiations between the Poles and the Swedes. But, as always, there was bad news too. Nothing could 'be expected in Germany, as I fear, while the Lutherans remit nothing from the error of the ubiquitous Pseudo-Lutheran and Anabaptist, and nothing from the revived blasphemies of Pelagius'.[39] On 28 September 1639, D'Ewes returned to this theme in a letter to Archbishop James Ussher, his friend and fellow student of early British history. Describing the brief history of the Pelagian heresy he was working on, he wrote that he was fully aware of 'the purity of the Church under the [ancient] Britons' and of the 'ambition of their countryman Morgan, the apostasy, the heresy … the tricks of Vortigern himself … [and] the ecclesiastical invasion of the realm by the Pelagians'. Moreover, he continued, 'I find it alive again, among the Papists … and] in those execrable Anabaptists (designated by the new and accursed name

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[36]   *Primitive Practise*, p. 28. See Glanmor Williams, *Welsh Reformation Essays* (Cardiff, 1967), ch. 9.

[37]   B.L. Harley MS vol. 383, f. 93r.

[38]   B.L. Harley MS vol. 383, f.102r.

[39]   B.L. Harley MS 377, fol. 262r. I am deeply indebted to Peter Salt for making available to me translations of D'Ewes's Latin letters to Sir Albert Joachimi, Ussher, Johannes de Laet, and others, and for his steady encouragement and wise counsel as my work on D'Ewes has proceeded.

of the very vain Arminius) and in the Pseudo-Lutherans'. These modern heretics he called 'tricksters' who 'impudently lie in saying they tread in the footsteps of Luther, when Augustine himself scarcely drew his pen more forcefully against a servile will, on behalf of the grace of God, than did Luther'.[40]

Clearly, D'Ewes's understanding of the Personal Rule of Charles I in Britain was underpinned by an extensive historical and international background. His perception of the international situation was wholly dominated by his hopes and fears about the Calvinist cause at home and abroad. Nowadays, we are accustomed to thinking of international relations in terms of 'geopolitics', but the best term for D'Ewes's outlook on Christendom in his time would be 'theopolitics', an apt neologism suggested to me by Peter Salt. In 1623, D'Ewes had begun, alongside his legal studies, to go to the Tower of London to study the archives of national history. He formed a plan to write what he called the 'true Historie', of Britain, 'the exactest that euer was yet penned of anie nation in the Christian worlde' based on these sources, but when he described these youthful plans while writing his autobiography in 1637–8, he added an ominous qualification. He said he would write the work 'if I bee not swallowed vpp of euill times'.[41] A brief introduction survives in his papers, but the book remained unwritten. He regarded it and various other writing projects he began but never finished as casualties of 'euill times', meaning the emergence of the Laudian regime in the Church of England and the resurgent Tridentine Catholicism on the Continent. Both threatened to extinguish what in a 1638 letter to Joachimi he called 'orthodox religion', which was that of 'the Evangelical brothers of the Helvetickan purer confession'.[42] In his *Primitive Practise*, he described it slightly more broadly when he wrote of the truth that 'the Divine Providence vouchsafed to the Scottish, French, and Helvetick Churches upon their first Reformation'.[43] He meant, in other words, not Luther's tradition but Calvin's.

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[40]   B.L. Harley MS 378, fol. 46r. He had used the term 'trickster' in the same way on 25 Jan 1638 in another letter to Joachimi: 'these tricksters, for shame, lurking in the dukedom of Saxony, and boasting falsely that they followed Luther ... have stirred up so many tragedies for the past eighteen years now in Germany'. B.L. Harley MS, vol. 377, fol. 278r.

[41]   Harley 646, fol. 70r (1: 235–36).

[42]   Harley MS 377, fol. 278r. His usage of 'Helvetickan' was not his coinage but a commonplace for controversialists. From a position 180 degrees away, the Catholic convert Benjamin Carier in 1614 claimed that the 'English monarchy' was 'in danger of being turned into a "Helvetian or Belgian popularity"' by the Calvinists. Tyacke, *Anti-Calvinists*, p. 6.

[43]   *Primitive Practise*, p. 65. On p. 4, he denounced the Saxon Lutherans for their allegiance 'to the Popish party [rather] then to the purer Churches of Christendome, of the French and Helvetick confession'. For other evidence of his identification of the Huguenot and Swiss 'Evangelicall party' as 'orthodox' in doctrine and piety and his detestation of the Lutherans, see pp. 34, 40, 50, 51.

During the 1620s and 1630s, D'Ewes forged a solid link between the advocacy of free will in the matter of salvation and the practice of the heinous sin of idolatry. His reading of history convinced him that Pelagianism in its various guises invariably brought in its wake the worship of idols against which God thundered and for indulgence in which the Israelites had time and again suffered his wrath. This discussion has so far concentrated on D'Ewes's view of Christendom broadly considered, although its implications for England in the 1630s are obvious enough in his statements. It is now necessary to focus more sharply on the situation as he experienced it personally in Cambridge, London, and Suffolk. Historians have long mistakenly identified D'Ewes as a Presbyterian, but the fact is that he sought only to advance an 'orthodoxy' that he defined in soteriological and liturgical rather than ecclesiological terms.[44] If 'true' doctrine and worship was available in a church governed by bishops (as he believed it had been under Elizabeth and James and at times in the distant past), he could be an episcopalian. He greatly admired Archbishop George Abbot and exulted in his friendship with Archbishop James Ussher. He praised such bishops as James Montagu, John King, Nicholas Fenton, John Davenant and other Calvinist episcopalians. This did not in the least prevent him from hurling anathemas toward the new breed of anti-Calvinist bishops who elevated ceremonies, demanded conformity, and restrained godly preaching. His home parish in the country, St George Stowlangtoft, lay in the diocese of Norwich, and he quarrelled bitterly with Richard Corbet and Matthew Wren, the bishops of Norwich from 1632–5 and 1635–8 respectively. In a June 1640 Latin letter to George Speed, the incumbent at Stowlangtoft, he described Corbet and Wren as 'impious bishops'. Corbet, he claimed, was 'the most wicked of all bipeds' and his successor Wren a man of 'a most damned life'.[45] D'Ewes had heard Laud preach at Whitehall in March 1624 and then wrote that he 'was suspected to bee somewhat popish'.[46] When Laud's famous June 1637 Star Chamber speech was printed, D'Ewes read it with horror because it confirmed Laud's 'allowance & practice of the adoring or bowing to and towards the altar with other tenents which made mee euen tremble when I read it'.[47]

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[44]   On his hostility to both Laudian and Presbyterian clerics, see my article, 'Sir Simonds D'Ewes and the "Poitovin Cholick": Persecution, Toleration and the Mind of a Puritan Member of the Long Parliament', *Canadian Journal of History*, 38 / 3 (2003): pp. 481–91.

[45]   Harley MS 377, fol. 19 (7 June 1640). He had first taken notice of Wren when he had been sent to Madrid in March 1623 as one of three chaplains to Prince Charles. D'Ewes said that this trio 'weere choosen as men altogether free from the suspition of being Puritans'. *Diary*, p. 185.

[46]   *Diary*, p. 185.

[47]   Harley MS 646, fol. 159r (2: 101).

It is in his many condemnations of the 'impious bishops' in England and their counterparts as persecutors of the godly elsewhere in Christendom that we can find the best evidence of the grievances that set alight the fire in D'Ewes's belly, the anger – verging at times on rage – that led him to take the Parliamentarian side in the 1640s despite his disagreements with Pym and others about how the cause should be pursued. In the 1634 section of his autobiography, he explicitly named Laud and Wren as examples of the kind of English clerics who had sought 'euer since the year 1630, to increase the multitude & burthen of the ceremonies & intermixtures in the Church, that soe they might oppresse the consciences, or ruine the estates of manie godlie Christians, falselie by them nick-named Puritans, although free from all schismaticall & idle opinions'. He went on to say that he could 'honour & esteeme a vertuous or learned papist' because such men, having been brought up in the Roman Catholic faith, honestly believed in its validity. What appalled him were those who claimed to be 'protestants as Bishopp Laud Bishopp Wren & ther wicked Adherents', men who 'swallow vpp the preferments of our church' while at same time they 'inueigh against poperie in worde onlie' when their real purpose was to 'plott the ruine of the truth & gospell'. They upheld and printed 'the most grosse & feculent errors of the Romish synagogue' and made 'Gods day to bee profaned, his publike seruice to bee poisoned by idolatrie and superstition'. As if that were not enough, they also caused God's

> faithful & painfull ministers to bee censured suspended depriued & exiled: &
> [thereby] to threaten a speedie ruine to the power of Godlines, this my soule
> abhorrs as the highest stepp of wickednes, and of preuarication against God & his
> honour. I cannot but account the pope, the Cardinalls, and the Jesuites themselves
> Saints, in comparison of these men. For as a few traitors within a beseiged cittie,
> are of greater danger for the ruine of it then a whole armie without, soe doubtlesse
> what Theodore Beza saieth of the Pseudo Lutherans of Germanie is true of these
> men, that they doe noe less impudentlie and furiouslie weaken & vndermine the
> gospell & truth; then if they weere hired by the pope himselfe at great rates ... I
> dare boldlie to averre, that it is impossible for anie true Protestant, that knowes
> but the truth in some indifferent measure, & leades his life in some proportion
> like a pious Christian, euer willinglie & by way of choice and election to turn
> Papist, ... But I see by dailie experience, when diuines, scholars, and others, are
> giuen vpp to a prophane vitious, and an atheisticall life; they soe farre detest &
> hate such as bee godlie, as by a iust iudgment of God they are at leng[t]h giuen

vpp to the hatred of the truth it selfe alsoe:& readilie take in ther defence &
creede any popish, Pelagian or Anabaptisticall tenents .[48]

D'Ewes's concluding allegation that anti-Calvinists who hated and scourged
the godly lived 'vitious' lives was no mere rhetorical or polemical flourish. He
searched energetically for stories that unmasked persecutors of the godly as
morally depraved in one way or another. He was utterly convinced that erroneous
theology led to evil behaviour. Wren, he claimed, lived 'a most damned life'. In
The Primitive Practise of Preserving Truth, D'Ewes drew upon Jacques-August de
Thou's account of the French Civil Wars of religion for lurid stories about the
private lives of the cardinal of Lorraine and other leaders of the Guise faction,
the fierce persecutors of the Huguenots.[49] 'Infinite almost, was the treasure
[that the cardinal] spent upon his Minions and pleasures, (his very expenses for
maintenance of his dogs ... amounting unto twenty thousand pounds yearely at
least)'. Henry Duke of Guise had only just risen 'from the bed of his adulterate
lust, the very morning hee was murthered, having not been able to conquer the
chastity of a Gentlewoman attending the Queen-mother before that night'.[50]
Then the murdered duke's sister, the duchess of Montpensier, hell bent to avenge
her brother and driven by extreme 'malice against the Protestant party', went so
far as to seduce Jacques Clément, the friar who fatally stabbed King Henry III
in 1589. D'Ewes wrote that 'shee prostituted her body to that Jesuite Goate' in
order to 'incourage him the more in the accomplishment of the murder, and
so to stupefie and harden his soule by that fatall sinne of lust, that it might not
startle at the commission of any other wickednesse whatsoever'.[51] Clément was
a Dominican, not a Jesuit, but the error seems the fault not of D'Ewes but of his
source de Thou, a *politique* enemy of the Guise-led Catholic League and adviser
to the then Huguenot Henry of Navarre.[52]

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[48]   Ibid., fols 162v–63r (2: 113–14).

[49]   D'Ewes began reading de Thou's *History of His Own* Time in the first edition (in
Latin) in 1633. He idolized de Thou (1553–1617), a French Catholic, and modeled his
own autobiography on the Frenchman's work. De Thou and other such *politiques* provided
valuable evidence to D'Ewes and others in England that there was an older, historically valid,
and 'tolerant' version of Catholicism that could be opposed to that of the post-Tridentine
'papalists'. This made it easier to argue for the relative novelty of the new kind of 'poperie' and
defend the antiquity of Reformed Protestantism.

[50]   *The Primitive Practise*, p. 25.

[51]   Ibid., p. 27. I am quoting here from the second issue of the pamphlet. The first issue
has 'Jesuited wretch' instead of 'Jesuit Goate'. This is one of several changes that heighten the
tone of his rhetoric.

[52]   Mark Greengrass considers that the preamble to the Edict of Nantes was probably the
work of de Thou. *France in the Age of Henri IV*, 2d edn (London: Longman, 1995), p. 102.

When D'Ewes published *The Primitive Practise* in 1645, he said in his preface that he had written it in 1637 when his county and the diocese 'newly groaned under the Prelaticall tyrannie of Bishop Wren'. In any case, his treatise could not have been published then because, as he put it, 'the Presse was then only open to matters of a contrary subject'.[53] In the mid 1630s, the Laudian ascendancy was at its apogee so far as the printers of London and the diocesan officials were concerned. In the spring of 1636, Bishop Wren initiated his visitation of his diocese of Norwich, having been translated there from Hereford in 1634. His commissioners sat for three days beginning on the twenty-ninth of March at Bury St Edmunds. D'Ewes was in residence at his manor house at Stowlangtoft, just ten miles to the northeast. In his autobiography, D'Ewes wrote that Wren's agents

> examined the church-wardens vpon manie new & strange articles neuer before
> vsed in the visitacions of former Bishopps since the Reformacion of religion in
> the beginning of Queene Elizabeth's raigne. This ensadded the soules of all men
> that had any truth of pietie; ... And wheereas to auoid idolatrie superstition and
> offence at the beginning of the reformation of the church in this realme, the altars
> were remooued and taken away in most churches of England, communion Tables
> placed instead of them; now the communion Tables were remooued out of the
> middle of the chancels, & ordered to be sett vpp close to the East wall of the same
> chancels, wheere the ground was to bee raised and the table to bee railed in.

The result of Wren's innovations was costly. For Norfolk and Suffolk, D'Ewes estimated it at between £30,000 and £40,000 'to the extreame oppression of the poore inhabitants (whose soules alreadie groaned vnder the burthen of the shipp-monie taxe)'.[54]

From D'Ewes's perspective, however, the spiritual cost was even greater. There is a fair copy of an essay of nearly 5,000 words in his hand which is headed 'A shorte discourse digested into a few sections or Paragraphs clearlie proouing both Historicallie & Dogmaticallie, that All Creature-Adoracion is Idolatry'. It is undated, but there are good reasons to believe that he wrote it in reaction to Wren's visitation in 1636. He inscribed his text inside a rectangular box of rules, leaving wide margins, a treatment he afforded only to things he wrote to which he attached particular importance (such as the autobiography and some of the Latin letters). D'Ewes began by describing the 'blasphemous Imagerie' showing carved, engraved and painted pictures of God beloved of 'some of the moore

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53   *Primitive Practise*, sig. A3r.
54   Harley MS 646, fol. 171v (2: 141–2).

ignorant papists' although not by 'learned & moderate Romanists'. In addition, he contended that the worship of 'Christs humane nature separated & abstracted from the Deitie is idolatry' and that therefore 'the Mass is iustly accounted the greatest idoll in the world'.[55] He identified the 'first Altar adorer' as 'Montanus the hereticke', the teacher of Tertullian as 'Bellarmine himselfe doth freely confes'. Over time, 'the popes & ther Vassals grew worse & worse' and adopted heretical practices from Montanus, Pelagius, and others.[56] The concluding section of the treatise begins by drawing from Bishop Thomas Morton's *The Grand Imposture of the (now) Church of Rome* (1628) in which Morton asserted that just as the presence of diseases such as leprosy and the plague were 'necessarie causes of separacion from vnsound houses soe Idolatrie vsed in Gods worshipp'. Morton pointed out that it was on just such grounds Martin Luther and his adherents left 'the Romish Babilon'. D'Ewes added that 'ancient Protestants' in Languedoc such as the Albigensians and Waldensians had remained in the Roman Church and quietly acquiesced in 'many errors & burthensome ceremonies' that had 'then begunn to pester & incumber the publike worshipp'. It was not until the Romanists insisted that they practice 'bowing to & towards the Hoast, Images, Altars, reliques & such like Idols' that they refused to perform obeisance to 'Idolls, Altars & Breaden God'. Cruel persecution of them ensued. 'What', D'Ewes then asked, 'shall become of Gods saints in any protestant church wheere adoracion is given to an altar or communion table & that made the object of idolatrie'? What were the godly to do when 'the horrible Idoll of the Masse [was] erected and sett vpp in a Church professing itselfe absolutelie Protestant? Cann they with a quiet spirit or safe conscience bee present at such abominations'?[57]

D'Ewes concluded his essay by praising the 'godlie Bishopps of England in the first reformation vnder Queen Elizabeth' who had not only put an end to 'all Idolatrous actions in Gods seruice, but as neare as they could all the old monuments themselues that had been abused in the practice of Idolatrie'. In particular, he singled out one of Wren's predecessors as Bishop of Norwich, John Parkhurst. He quoted a letter that Parkhurst had written to two Suffolk gentlemen on 22 December 1567 concerning the 'old ornaments of supersticon' at in the parish church at Ixworth. The bishop urged them to try to persuade the patroness of the church, a woman 'knowen to favor papistrie', to destroy the 'old ornaments of supersticon belonging to that parishe'. But if she refused to remove 'such trashe', they should 'compell her therunto'. D'Ewes could scarcely have drawn a sharper contrast between a godly bishop like Parkhurst and his 'wicked'

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[55]   Harley MS 593, fol. 159r. Throughout D'Ewes cites sources among the Fathers and various theologians and writers (including especially de Thou).

[56]   Ibid., fol. 160r.

[57]   Ibid., fol. 161v.

successor Wren.[58] Ixworth is just a mile or so north of Stowlangtoft, and D'Ewes would have known it well. His stepmother Elizabeth Denton moved there after his father's death in 1631.

This is not to suggest that his animus against what he considered Catholic idolatry began in 1636. For example, in his cipher diary entry for 14 June 1623, he reported having heard that there had been a mutiny aboard the ships of the flotilla being prepared to go to Spain to bring back Prince Charles and the Duke of Buckingham. It was triggered by an attempt of the vice-admiral, Lord Morley (a recusant) to replace the communion service with 'his damnable masse'. The mariners 'weere so farr provoked' as to come close to throwing him overboard and indeed would have done so had they been at sea instead of in a harbour.[59] In his essay on idolatry, he reiterated a distinction he had long made between 'the moore temperate & iudicious papists' such as de Thou and Catherine de Medici who accepted the argument that images should 'be remooued out of all places, where diuine worshipp was ... celebrated' and their more numerous but less careful fellow Catholics who committed idolatry indiscriminately.[60] Criticism of Catholic worship appeared frequently in his correspondence and writings throughout his life, but before 1636 he tended to mention it in generic terms. For example, he began early in 1627 to compose a lengthy treatise on 'our Indications of certainty in the matter of salvation' and completed the initial draft in January 1628. The word 'altar' does not appear in it, but there is a denunciation of 'the worship of idols both in the mass and in images'.[61] Indeed, in the same work, although he expatiated against the advance of Arminianism and popery on the continent, he wrote that 'at present with ancient and pure religion flourishing amongst us' England remained free of the idolatry imposed by the Hapsburg armies in the German states.[62]

There was nevertheless a sudden change in the tenor of D'Ewes's opposition to and concern about idolatry in 1636 that probably led him to write the essay quoted above that survives in volume 593 of the Harleian manuscripts. Nearby in this same volume lies a valuable clue to the cause of this change. D'Ewes's many volumes of papers contain hundreds of his notes on sermons. Only rarely did he identify the preacher he heard or the date or the place. But he did provide these details in a case that is relevant here. On 3 October 1636, John Nowell,

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[58]   Ibid.

[59]   *Diary*, p. 142.

[60]   Harley MS 593, fol. 162v.

[61]   Harley MS 189, fol. 8r. He wrote it initially in English and then translated it into Latin, and this is the version that survives in his hand. I am again grateful to Peter Salt for the translation.

[62]   Ibid., fol. 32r.

chaplain to Bishop Wren, preached at Stowlangtoft, and the sermon nicely exemplifies what Alexandra Walsham means by 'charitable hatred'. The bishop himself attended that day, and Nowell was an opponent of nonconformity and a 'ritualist' according to Kenneth Fincham.[63] Nowell's text was Galatians 6:2 about the need to bear one another's burdens. Nowell insisted that this meant that those who 'sinne obstinately are to bee dealt roughlie withall' and that 'to resist order is to bee enforced with punishment'. Moreover, 'it is dangerous to affect singularitie especially in going to heauen'.[64] Since D'Ewes would under no circumstances have invited Wren or his chaplain to come to Stowlangtoft, this sermon must have been the result of an order by Wren intended as a shot across D'Ewes's bow, a warning that he faced punishment if he persisted in his 'singularitie' (a code-word for nonconformity).

Simonds D'Ewes was a proud man, and to be thus insulted and traduced as a Puritan from the pulpit in his home parish by the minion of an 'impious bishop' must have angered him deeply. In the *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, J.M. Blatchly opined that D'Ewes 'toyed with the idea of going to New England'.[65] But his papers show that he had been investigating the possibility of emigration for years, and this incident must have increased his interest in Massachusetts even more.[66] The confrontation with Wren almost certainly triggered his decision to begin writing his *Primitive Practise* in 1637 with its insistence that persecution for conscience's sake was unchristian. It may well have led D'Ewes to begin writing his autobiography in 1637 in order to create the record that would explain to his family and his posterity why he had taken them to Massachusetts. The timing of these works supports the notion that he took up his pen to write them still smouldering from Wren and Nowell's attack on 3 October 1636.

Simonds D'Ewes was an odd duck in many ways, but he was not alone in his deep commitment to a certain understanding of the essence of the Elizabethan church and his fury against the resurgence of what he thought of as the Pelagian

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[63]   Kenneth Fincham, 'Episcopal Government', in Kenneth Fincham (ed.), *The Early Stuart Church, 1603–1642* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1993), p. 85.

[64]   MS Harley 593, fol. 167v.

[65]   J.M. Blatchly, 'D'Ewes, Sir Simonds, first baronet (1602–1650)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (Oxford University Press, 2004), http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/7577 (accessed 14/10/04).

[66]   A letter from William Hammond in Massachusetts dated 26 August 1633 to D'Ewes shows that he was looking into investing in cattle to send to New England (Harley MS 386, fol. 34), and Stuteville was reporting news about New England to him as early as 14 August 1630 (Harley MS 383, fol. 104). On 22 December 1634, D'Ewes wrote to Joachimi about the 'marvellous things' that God was accomplishing in 'our new American England ... for the good of His Church and the protection of this Kingdom' (Harley MS 377, fol. 259). From that point on, his regular letters to Joachimi often reported on events in New England.

heresy in the form of Laudianism. That the Elizabethan church had in fact been a less coherent entity than he thought is not the point. In this, if not in some other ways, he and John Pym were soul mates. D'Ewes sought not a radical religious settlement, but a recovery of the purity of religion that he was convinced Britons had enjoyed before either Roman Christianity or Pelagianism had reared their ugly heads. From this perspective, the godly had in the sixteenth century recovered the truth that 'impious bishops' and popes had hidden from them for so long. The time would come when the enemies of that truth would get their comeuppance just as Bloody Mary's regime had given way to Elizabeth's. It would happen when God decreed that the time was right. Until then, the godly had to choose between suffering spiritual tyranny at home and worshiping God correctly even though in exile. The Prayer Book Rebellion in Scotland gave D'Ewes hope that God might be moving to save his truth in Britain sooner rather than later and that a decision about Massachusetts could be delayed for a time. In this respect, D'Ewes was indeed a 'fiery spirit', and he embodied one of the varieties of religious zeal that mightily strengthened the Parliamentarian party in the early 1640s. On the eve of his departure to represent Sudbury in the Long Parliament, he wrote to a friend in Cambridge that he fully expected to face at Westminster the 'hatred' of 'the impious bishops and the whole crowd of the heterodox' when he exposed their 'ikon slavery and [their] impious opinions against the grace of God, and their tyrannical rule, ... my conscience forcing me on'.[67] His conscience forced him to fight not for a 'fresh start' for the Church of England, but for re-establishment of the purity it had enjoyed among the ancient Britons and again in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. The calling of the Long Parliament gave him reason to hope that the duration of the Laudian era would be brief and that it was his duty to devote his considerable energies into the restoration of the 'true Church of God'.

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[67] MS Harley 377, fo. 204r. His correspondent was the Arabist, Abraham Wheelock.

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Chapter 8

Wars of Religion and Royalist Political Thought

Glenn Burgess

Was the English Revolution a war of religion? The question is not just difficult to answer; it is equally difficult to know exactly how to answer it. No doubt those involved in the conflicts of the 1640s had many different motives, rationalisations or justifications for their participation, some of them religious, some of them not. This chapter wishes to shift the ground a little by asking about the perceptions of some people. Its focus is on Royalists in general, and one Royalist in particular, Thomas Fuller. It does not assert any general claim about the nature of the English Revolution, an event that was in any case too multifaceted to be encapsulated by any single label. But it is illuminating to ask, as I do, what conceptual and discursive tools contemporaries had for understanding the English Civil War as a religious war, and how they might have applied them.

In pursuing this theme, the chapter looks at three things:

1. What prior conceptual framework existed through which the English Revolution might have been apprehended by contemporaries, and what space was there in such a conceptual framework for the idea of a war of religion?
2. How does the 'war of religion' hypothesis help us to understand the patterns of Civil War polemic, in particular the pattern of Royalist polemic?
3. How do retrospective historical accounts of the 1640s (from the Royalist perspective) map on to the understanding of the English Revolution as a religious war?

I. Conceptual Frameworks

Early modern historians have spent considerable time in discussing what they might mean by the idea of a 'war of religion', and it was, of course, part of the force of John Morrill's application of the label to the English Revolution that these events should be understood as falling under a distinctively early modern category, locating the English Revolution in a post-Reformation rather than a proto-modern historical period, and thus making some claim about the sort of long-term narratives in which it ought to figure. That latter claim was powerfully developed in parallel work by Jonathan Clark, challenging more overtly the modernising, revolutionary meta-narratives of Whig history. In much current European historiography the idea of a 'war of religion' is integral to the 'confessionalisation' model of post-Reformation historical change, identified most strongly with Heinz Schilling; and some of the application of the concepts 'war of religion' and 'confessional state' to the English case are more or less conscious offshoots of this historiography.[1]

This chapter will side-step the task of constructing an analytical model of a 'war of religion', against which to measure the various events competing for the label. Instead, I want to ask a different, though not unrelated question, namely what concepts English (or European) people in about 1640 had that could map on to what we might call a 'war of religion'. And in answering this question, I will try to depend less on theoretical accounts of just war or holy war, and more on the application of assumptions and concepts to particular cases.

We might start with a work conveniently published in 1639 by Thomas Fuller, who was to become associated with the Royalist cause, though not without first pursuing a failed and ultimately unsustainable attempt to persuade the groups in conflict into some sort of peaceful accommodation. Fuller's *History of the Holy War* was the first work in English devoted entirely to presenting the history of the crusades.

Fuller's final verdict on the crusades was not flattering:

> Thus after an hundred ninety and foure years ended the Holy warre; for continuance the longest, for money spent the costliest, for bloodshed the cruellest, for pretenses the most pious, for the true intent the most politick the world ever saw.[2]

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[1]   For full references to the literature see Peter H. Wilson, 'Dynasty, Constitution, and Confession: The Role of Religion in the Thirty Years War', *International History Review*, 30 (2008): pp. 473–708.

[2]   Thomas Fuller, *The Historie of the Holy Warre* (Cambridge, 1639), IV.33, p. 228.

Nonetheless, Fuller's discussion of the legitimacy of the crusades is worth pursuing a little further, because it opens up a number of perspectives on the conceptual framework that his contemporaries might have brought to bear on events closer to home. The reasons advanced in favour of the holy war were divided into two groups, coming 'either from piety or policie'. The pious arguments included the need to relieve the distress of Syriac Christians, the fact that the blasphemy of the Turks meant they forfeited their rights to their lands, the need to 'increase the patrimony of Religion by propagating the Gospel', and the fact that God gave testament to his approval 'by many miracles'.[3]

Fuller did not clearly declare his view on the merits of all of these arguments. He certainly noted problems with the argument that war could be used to propagate the gospel, noting the objection 'that Religion is not to be beaten into men with the dint of sword'. Defenders of the crusades might, though, reply that 'it may be lawfull to open the way by force, for instruction, catechising, and such other gentle means to follow after'.[4] The upshot was not clear; but Fuller did note that it was an argument from 'policie' on which 'most stresse is laid … as the main supporter of the cause'. This argument considered the crusades justified because they met the criteria for being a just war: they constituted 'a preventive warre grounded upon a just fear of an invasion'. Such wars were 'chiefly of a defensive nature'. Given the raids by 'Mahometans' on Italy, and the inroads made by the enemy in Spain and Aquitaine, the Christian West might be thought to have had a justified fear of invasion against which they could protect themselves. Religion was not central to this argument.[5]

Fuller analysed as well the reasons against the war, and came to the view that they 'have moved the most moderate and refined Papists, and all Protestants generally in their judgements to fight against this Holy warre'. Among these reasons was the view that the Turks had legitimate title to their lands. Judaea ceased to be God's kingdom when the Jews ceased to be his people, and the Turks held the land by right of prescription.[6] He did not advance specific reasons against the claim that it was a just defensive war; but the implication of various remarks was that it was 'superstitious', and begun with bad intent.

When Fuller came to make his concluding observations on the sorry history that he had recounted, he returned to the subject of the legitimacy of religious wars, beginning this discussion with praise for Francis Bacon's *Advertisement*

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[3] Ibid., I.9, p. 13.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid., I.9, p. 14.

[6] Ibid., I.10, p. 16.

Touching an Holy War (written in 1622).[7] Bacon's own work is difficult to interpret: it is a mere fragment; there are multiple speakers representing different views, and the only speaker to develop his points in the fragment is Zebedaeus, the 'Romish Catholick Zelant'; others more likely to represent Bacon's own views, the 'politick' or the 'Moderate Divine', perhaps, have little to say. But Fuller derived from Bacon, at any rate a set of criteria: 'three things are necessarie to make an invasive warre lawfull; the lawfulnesse of the jurisdiction, the merit of the cause, and the orderly and lawfull prosecution of the cause'.[8] But this later discussion too was inconclusive, again casting doubt on whether the Christians really did have title to the lands of the Turk which they were supposedly reclaiming, but taking an even dimmer view of the faults in the execution and conduct of the war that doomed it to failure.[9] It was attended by superstition, failure to keep promises made to the infidel, and corruption to serve the interests of the papacy.[10] The so-called miracles that allegedly attested to divine approval could all be reduced to one of four categories: 'falsely reported'; 'falsely done'; 'truly done, but by the strength of nature'; or 'done by Satan'.[11]

The upshot of Fuller's analysis would appear to be that a religious war might – *might* – be legitimate only if it were a defensive war to protect people living in a political society of one faith from likely attack by the armies of a people of different faith. This was the conclusion advanced by Francis Bacon in his 1624 advice to King James about the legitimacy of war with Spain, that:

> *Warres* Preventive upon *Just Feares*, are true *Defensives*, as well as upon Actual *Invasions*: And againe, That *Warres Defensive* for *Religion*, (I speak not of *Rebellion*,) are most just; Though *Offensive Warres*, for *Religion*, are seldom to be approved, or never, unlesse they have some Mixture of *Civill Titles*.[12]

As James Turner Johnson has noted, Bacon was here assimilating religious war to the categories of the just war tradition, and Fuller did the same. This had long allowed princes to go to war to defend the religious rights of their subjects. Johnson is surely also right to suggest that what encouraged this Bacon to advance such an argument was the post- Reformation situation in which religion

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[7]   Bacon's Advertisement was first published in *Certaine Miscellany Works of the Right Honourable Francis Lo. Verulam, Viscount S. Alban*, (ed.) William Rawley (London, 1629).

[8]   Fuller, *Holy War*, V.9, p. 242.

[9]   Ibid., pp. 242–4.

[10]   Ibid., IV.10–12, pp. 245–51; I.11, pp. 16–18.

[11]   Ibid., IV.10, pp. 245–7.

[12]   Bacon, *Considerations Touching a War with Spain* [1624], in *Certaine Misecellany Works*, (ed.) Rawley, p. 4.

became one of the key cultural markers of difference and rivalry between states, so that a credible threat by a ruler of one faith to invade the lands possessed by a ruler of a different faith was a reasonable ground for defensive just war.[13] Fuller seems to have come to the crusades with this point in mind, though without being at all sure that the crusades met this criterion for a just war. In arguing thus, Bacon (and Fuller) were also consciously broadening the theological just war tradition to allow, as humanist writers did, the possibility of pre-emptive strikes by loosening the grounds on which it might be reasonable to anticipate of attack, as well as by allowing religion to have a role in determining this.[14]

There is another, rhetorical or polemical, dimension to Fuller's account that also needs to be noted: it is strongly anti-Catholic. As already noted, it was all Protestants and 'refined Papists' who rejected the legitimacy of the holy war, and self-interested papal leadership that helped to explain why it had been such a disastrous experience for Christendom. The paratext (with which Fuller's *Historie* was amply endowed) emphasised this dimension of the work even more emphatically, shaping the way any reader might interpret the history recounted.[15] The frontispiece itself (Figure 8.1) presented the crusades negatively. As the accompanying 'Declaration' put it, 'as you look / Upon this Frontispiece, you'l plainly see / Their dismall end and sad catastrophe'. Peter the Monk is at the front of the Christian forces, followed by kings, but behind them prelates and friars are prominent, all headed for disaster. The narrative of the frontispiece follows a U shape, beginning in the top left with 'we went out full, ending in the top right with 'But return empty'.

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[13]   James Turner Johnson, *Ideology, Reason, and the Limitation of War: Religious and Secular Concepts, 1200–1740* (Princeton NJ, 1975), pp. 90–92. Johnson summarises the place of religion in just war accounts of the legitimate grounds for going to war in his *The Holy War Idea in Western and Islamic Traditions* (University Park, PA, 1997), pp. 52–60.

[14]   Richard Tuck, *The Rights of War and Peace: Political Thought and the International Order from Grotius to Kant* (Oxford, 1999), ch. 1, esp. p. 19. Also on the 'humanist' / 'theological' distinction Pärtel Piirimäe, 'Just War in Theory and Practice: The Legitimation of Swedish Intervention in the Thirty Years War', *The Historical Journal*, 45 (2002): pp. 499–523.

[15]   On the importance of paratext to the Renaissance book see Randall Anderson, 'The Rhetoric of Paratext in Early Printed Books', in John Barnard and D.F. McKenzie (eds), *The Cambridge History of the Book in Britain: Volume IV 1557–1695* (Cambridge, 2002), pp. 636–44.

Figure 8.1   Frontispiece from Thomas Fuller, *The Historie of the Holy Warre* (1639)

Source: © Trustees of the British Museum

In addition to the frontispiece, Fuller's *Historie* was presented with an array of commendatory verses, of which one might be quoted here. The poem was by Hugo Atkins, entitled 'On the Title of this Book':

> How comes stern Warre to be accounted *holy*,
> By nature fierce, complexion melancholy?
> Ile tell you how: Sh'as been at Rome of late,
> And gain'd an indulgence to expiate
> Her massacres; and by the popes command
> Sh'as bin a Pilgrime to the Holy land,
> Where freeing Christians by a sacred plot,
> She for her pains this Epithet hath got.

More succinctly Henry Vintner noted 'Here, Reader, thou may'st judge and well compare / Who most in madnesse, Jew or Romane, share'.

There are three themes to take forward from this. First, that – as one commentator has put it – 'within Western culture holy war has developed as a subcategory within just war tradition'.[16] That is to say, that in confronting the question of the legitimacy religious war seventeenth century people would be likely to turn sooner or later to the just war tradition, a body of ideas both theological and juristic, but also one that was beginning to show the imprint of more permissive humanist ideas that allowed what we might call liberal or humanitarian interventionism. Second, there was much unease about the place of religion in this tradition, evident in the hesitancy of Fuller and the self-consciously provocative Bacon. At best, religious causes might be invoked for certain types of defensive war; but there was always some doubt about whether religious causes could ever be advanced by violent means. Religious reasons for war were seldom advanced, at least by the learned, in any pure form, and tended always to be blended with legal arguments. Note also, in remarks already cited, Bacon's careful exclusion of 'rebellion'. His argument was advanced in a political context in which religion was a surrogate for national and political identity, and was not intended to apply to other sorts of religious or confessional difference or dispute. Thirdly, there is more than a hint that holy wars were papal corruptions of just wars, in which a religious cause was invoked to provide a cloak of sanctity for wars that sought to further papal interests. They were a covert means by which the papacy might seek to exercise temporal power, and good Protestants were naturally sceptical.

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[16]   Johnson, *Holy War Idea in Western and Islamic Traditions*, p. 43.

These themes are seen in other writers. The English Catholic controversialist Cardinal William Allen declared roundly that 'there is no war in the world so just or honourable, be it civil or foreign, as that which is waged for religion' – that is, for the Catholic faith – and this meant that the sword might, in the right circumstances, be used against princes who abandoned or threatened the true faith (that is, against Protestant princes).[17] Though there were English Protestants who also defended religious war, mainly those urging involvement in the apocalyptic events of the Thirty Years War,[18] the predominant response was different. Thomas Bilson simply took the statement as further evidence of the Papist willingness to destroy the rights of kings. Allen's praise of religious war, he claimed, was aimed at rulers and 'the violent expelling them from their Princely seates'; and it clearly embraced wars *of the subiectes against their* Prince'.[19] Protestants, by implication, repudiated such things. Many certainly did. Sir Walter Ralegh, in one of the essays he wrote in the Tower after 1603, embedded a substantial discussion of the crusades into a longer account of the evils of papal war-mongering. He was in little doubt of their illegitimacy. The crusades were led by the Catholic Church, claiming a right to make war for religious purposes. But, Raleigh commented:

> The truth is, that the Saracens affirm no less of the wars which they make against Christians, or which arise betwixt themselves from difference of sect; and if every man had his due, I think, that the honour of devising first this doctrine (viz. that religion ought to be enforced upon men by the sword) would be found appertaining to Mahomet the false prophet. Sure it is, that he, and the caliphs following him, obtained thereby, in short space, a mighty empire, which was in a fair way to have enlarged itself, until they fell out amongst themselves; not for the kingdom of heaven, but for dominion upon earth: and against this did the popes, when their authority grew powerful in the west, incite the princes of Germany, England, France, and Italy; their chief enterprise was the recovery of the Holy Land, in which worthy but extreme difficult action, it is lamentable to remember what abundance of noble blood hath been shed, with very small benefit to the Christian state.[20]

17　　William Allen, *A True Sincere and Modest Defence of English Catholics*, (ed.) Robert M. Kingdon, (Ithaca NY, 1965), pp. 160, 165, 171–3.

18　　The best overview remains Johnson, *Ideology, Reason and the Limitation of War*, ch. 2, though my reading of the evidence sometimes differs from his.

19　　Thomas Bilson, *The True Difference betweene Christian Subjection and Unchristian Rebellion* (Oxford, 1585), p. 380.

20　　Sir Walter Ralegh, 'A Discourse of the Fundamental Cause of Natural, Arbitrary, Necessary, and Unnatural War', in *The Works of Sir Walter Ralegh, Kt* (8 vols, Oxford,

The popes had a miserable record of using religious zeal to incite men to war, to the detriment of kings and the benefit of the popes themselves. Religion was generally but a 'pretext' in their wars; most Christians did not accept that the church possessed coercive authority; and kings ought in consequence to know that 'there was great reason why all discreet princes should beware of yielding hasty belief to the robes of sanctimony'.[21]

Royalists of the 1640s could, then, draw upon a number of arguments in their encounter with armed Puritan zeal – that religious war was a Papist activity, that good Protestants recognised it as a threat to their princes; that allowing religious grounds for war risked putting the sword into the hand of anyone who might claim religious pretexts for their actions, whether infidel or Christian, whether Papist or Protestant.

II. Polemical Patterns

I have argued elsewhere that the polemical interchanges between Royalists and Parliamentarians in the early years of the Civil War were shaped by a broadly shared acceptance of the principle that wars for the sake of religion were illegitimate, with the result that Parliamentarians defending the legitimacy of their war did so on legal grounds, though these legal grounds included what they saw as a defence of the integrity of the church by law established.[22] On this reading, the unease felt by Fuller and Ralegh about whether religion could be invoked as a legitimating reason for a just war was not just shared by many of the divines who defended the Parliamentary cause in 1642 and 1643, but made more definite: wars 'purely' of religion could not be just wars.[23] Many Puritans acknowledged this in the early 1640s, even though there were Puritan precedents for a theory of holy or religious war. This chapter will, however,

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1829), vol. 8, pp. 264–5. The essay was first published in Ralegh, *Judicious and Select Essayes* (London, 1650).

[21]   Quotations from ibid., pp. 270, 269, 266.

[22]   Glenn Burgess, 'Was the English Civil War a War of Religion? The Evidence of Political Propaganda?', *Huntington Library Quarterly*, 61 (1999): pp. 173–201.

[23]   My interpretation has been questioned by Edward Vallance, 'Preaching to the Converted: Religious Justifications for the English Civil War', *Huntington Library Quarterly*, 65 (2002): pp. 395–419, but I think this reading of the evidence is too inclined to co-opt general statements that Puritans were fighting in God's cause as arguments of legitimation, though his evidence may suggest some modification to my arguments. The situation was altered also by the 1643 Solemn League and Covenant, which grounded a number of different arguments.

explore the other side. What does Royalist polemic do with the idea of a war of religion?

Royalists had, in some ways at least, an easier time of it. An obvious tactic for them was to undermine the legitimacy of their opponents' cause by portraying it as primarily a war of religion (or of fanaticism), while portraying the king as the defender of order and decency. Thus an insistent theme in Royalist propaganda, and more generally in Royalist political culture, was the portrayal of their opponents as religiously inspired, and therefore mad, bad and dangerous to know. To illustrate this I want to present two bodies of evidence, the first a 'moment' from the pamphlet wars of the early 1640s, the second an examination of Royalist ballads.

John Bramhall's *Serpent Salve* aimed its polemic particularly at Henry Parker, and it advanced the claim that his ideas (and those of other Parliamentarian writers) were an outgrowth of Scottish-style Presbyterianism.[24] The case was made with unusual sophistication, and it is a case that many modern historians have themselves advanced. The essential problem was first identified: 'Of all heretics in policy, they are the most dangerous, which make the commonwealth an amphisbœna, a serpent with two heads ... the king and the parliament'. In such a commonwealth all was unstable, for no one knew whom to obey.[25] How was such a conclusion drawn from ecclesiological premises? Bramhall analysed the argument carefully. First, civil authority was subordinated to the needs of the church. Princes might have 'power ... to reform the church'; but once it was reformed, they had no 'more to do than execute their [the clergy's] decrees'. This identified their goal: advancement of the true faith. Whatever path seemed to head for that goal, they followed. '[W[here they have hope of the king, there the supreme magistrate may, nay, he ought to reform the Church', even contrary to the law; 'But what if the king favour them not? Then he is but a conditional trustee, it [authority to reform religion] belongeth to the state and representative body of the kingdom'. If the nobility proved reluctant, appeal could be made to the people. It was this fixture on religious goals and flexibility about means that led to the politics of Buchanan and the Parliamentarians.[26]

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[24]   In 1649 Bramhall was to publish a careful attack on the political principles of Scottish Presbyterianism, *A Fair Warning to Take Heed of the Scottish Discipline*, in *The Works of the Most Reverend Father in God, John Bramhall, D.D.*, (ed.) A.W. Haddan, (Oxford, 5 vols, 1842–5), vol. 3, pp. 235–87.

[25]   John Bramhall, *The Serpent-Salve; or, A Remedy for the Biting of an Asp* [originally York, 1644], in Bramhall, *Works*, iii, p. 297. On this work and its context see Nicholas Jackson, *Hobbes, Bramhall and the Politics of Liberty and Necessity: A Quarrel of the Civil Wars and Interregnum* (Cambridge, 2007), ch. 2.

[26]   Bramhall, *Serpent Salve*, pp. 302–3.

It led also to a cavalier attitude to legality. In the beginning, the propaganda of the king's enemies spoke 'nothing but encomiums of the law, treason against the fundamental laws, and declarations against Arbitrary government'. But, 'Now the law is become a 'formality', a Lesbian rule. Arbitrary government is turned to necessity of state. It is not examined what is just or unjust, but how the part is affected or disaffected, whether the thing be conducible or not conducible to the cause. We are governed, not by the known laws and customs of this realm, but by certain far-fetched, dear-bought conclusions ... from the law of nature and of nations'. The result? '[F]arewell Magna Charta and the laws of England for ever'.[27]

Whether Bramhall's analysis of the roots of Parliamentarian politics contains any truth is a question that could be argued over for some considerable time; but what is particularly worth noting – and this is the 'moment' on which I wish to focus our attention – is Bramhall's most effective and clinching piece of evidence. Repeatedly, he cited of a passage in a speech to the Lords by Robert Greville, Lord Brooke, of 19 December 1642:

> They who think that humane Laws can bind the conscience, and will examine the Oathes they have taken, according to the interpretations of men, will in time fall from us: But such who religiouslie consider that such morall precepts are fitter for Heathens then for Christians, and that we ought to lead our lives according to the Rule of Gods Word; and that the Laws of the Land (being but mans invention) must not check Gods children in doing the work of their heavenlie Father, will not faint in their dutie.[28]

Perfect evidence! But the speech was a forgery, a piece of Royalist propaganda written by Hyde, containing the speech by Brooke, paired with one in favour of

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[27]   Ibid., pp. 303–4.

[28]   *Two Speeches Made in the House of Peers, On Munday the 19 Of December, For, and Against Accommodation. The One by the Earl of Pembroke, the Other by the Lord Brooke*, (n.p., 1642) [Thomason: E84 (35); 19 Dec. 1642], pp. 6–7. The real Lord Brooke was rather more careful to portray himself as a defender of the ancient constitution:

> 'tis for the King wee fight, to keep a Crown for our king, a Kingdom for our Soveraign and his posterity, to maintain his known rights and priviledges which are relative with the peoples liberties, from a sort of desperate State incendiaries, that in seeming to fight for his Majesty brandish open arms against his sacred Crown and Dignity ... [He fought for] the cause which is for Almighty God, their Reigion, the Lawes of the Land, the Subjects Liberty and safety ...' [Robert Greville, Lord Brooke, *A Worthy Speech Made at the Election of his Captaines and Commanders at Warwick Castle* (London, 1643), pp. 5–6, 7].

peace and accommodation attributed to Pembroke.[29] According to Clarendon's own account – which took immense pride in his capacity to write with deception – Brooke asked Portland to get the Lords to order the pamphlet burnt by the Common hangman, but was thwarted by Pembroke, who did not wish to have the last page of his speech (also forged but nonetheless expressing what he actually thought) burnt along with the first page of Brooke's.[30] Brooke was, allegedly, furious. Whereas Parliamentarians generally defended the view that they fought for God's cause in a war that was legally and constitutionally justified, the forgery suggested that he cared nothing for claims of legal legitimacy, which were at best a sham. Religious zeal drove him and Charles's opponents, and this religious zeal would lead them, if convenient, to do violence to king, laws and all good order.

It was not just in pamphlet wars between the learned that Royalists constructed their opponents in this way. A broader, more popular Royalist political culture did the same, as we can see from some of the ballads used to bolster morale, recruit soldiers, and just to entertain.[31] All of the ballads referred to are from the collection of Alexander Brome, published in 1662 under the title *Rump: Or an Exact Collection of the Choicest Poems and Songs Related to the Late Times*. Like Fuller's *Holy War*, this book was encountered by its readers via an illustrated frontispiece and title page. The latter already announced an insistent theme of the collection.

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[29]   Graham Roebuck, *Clarendon and Cultural Continuity: A Bibliographical Study*, (New York, 1981), pp. 79–80. For this and other forgeries see Jason Peacey, *Politicians and Pamphleteers: Propaganda During the English Civil Wars and Interregnum* (Aldershot, 2004), pp. 254–8.

[30]   Clarendon, *Life*, pp. 954–5, in Edward Hyde, Earl of Clarendon, *The History of the Rebellion and Civil Wars in England ... Also His Life Written by Himself*, (Oxford, 1 vol. (ed.), 1843).

[31]   For ballads generally see Adam Fox, *Oral and Literate Culture in England 1500–1700* (Oxford, 2000), ch. 6; Richard Simmons, 'ABCs, Almanacs, Ballads, Chapbooks, Popular Piety and Textbooks' in Barnard and McKenzie (eds), *Cambridge History of the Book*, ch. 23, esp. pp. 510–12; Christopher Marsh, 'The Sound of Print in Early Modern England: The Broadside Ballad as Song', in Julia Crick and Alexandra Walsham (eds), *The Use of Script and Print, 1400–1700* (Cambridge, 2004), pp. 171–90.

Figure 8.2   Title Page to Alexander Brome, *Rump: Or, an Exact Collection* (1662)

Source: © Trustees of the British Museum

The main flanking figures are 'the Puritan' and 'the covenanter', two confessionalised identities, and between them, at the top, is a figure encountered in some of the ballads, the incendiary outdoor preacher using a barrel as his pulpit – a tub-preacher.

As one would expect, the ballads tend to portray the Parliamentary-Puritan opponent in a mixture of ways – a rebel against orthodox religion, law and authority.[32] 'Colonel Vennes Encouragement to his Souldiers', for example (set to the tune, and with the refrain, of 'Clean Contrary Way') was a satirical indictment of Parliamentarian hypocrisy.

> 'Tis to preserve his Majesty, that we against him fight .
> Who fight for us, fight for the King, the clean contrary way.

But its initial characterisation of the enemy was in religious terms:

> 'Tis for Religion that you fight, and for the Kingdoms good,
> By robbing churches, plundering them, and shedding Guiltlesse blood,
> Dow with the Orthodoxal train, and all Loyal Subjects slay,
> When threes are gone, we shall be blest the clean contrary way.[33]

Taken as a whole the ballads leave little doubt about the centrality of a religious characterisation of the enemy, closely linked to themes of social subversion (the ignorant upstart preacher) and to a willingness to turn the world upside down. An important Royalist recruiting song began thus:

> What though the Zealots, pull down the Prelates,
> Push at the Pulpit, and kick at the Crown,
> Shall we not ever, strive to endeavour
> Once more to purchase our Royal Renown?
> Shall not the Roundhead first be confounded?[34]

The figure of the 'zealot' is crucial – the figure is religiously or confessionally identified, but subversive on a broad front, religiously, socially and politically.

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[32]   Sir Charles Firth, early in the twentieth century, produces a series of articles on Tudor and Stuart political ballads, the most useful of which for our purposes is C.H. Firth, 'The Reign of Charles I', *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 3rd series, 6 (1912): pp. 19–64.

[33]   Alexander Brome, *Rump: Or, An Exact Collection of the Choycest Poems and Songs Relating to the Late Times* (London, 1662), pp. 149–50.

[34]   Ibid., I, p. 145.

Another song (to the tune of 'Cuckolds all a-row') provides a full satirical portrait of the figure.

> Wee'l break the Windows which the Whore
> Of Babylon hath painted,
> And when the Popish Saints are down,
> Then *Burges* shall be Sainted;
> There's neither Crosse nor Crucifix
> Shall stand for men to see,
> *Romes* trash and trumpery shall go down,
> *And hey then up go we.*

That basic portrait established, the song then draws the subversive consequences from this religious inspiration.

> Wee'l down with all the *Versities*
> Where Learning is profest,
> Because they practice and maintain
> The language of the Beast.
> ...
> The name of *lords* shal be abhorr'd,
> For every man's a Brother,
> No reason why in *Church* and *State*
> One man should rule another.[35]

The first stanza of 'Mr Hampdens Speech Against Peace at the Close Committee' also suggests that religious zeal underpinned the Parliamentary cause:

> But will you now to Peace incline,
> And languish in the Main design,
> And leave us in the lurch?
> I would not Monarchy destroy,
> But only as the way to enjoy
> The ruine of the Church.[36]

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[35]   Ibid., I, pp. 14–16. (The song was first published by Frances Quarles in 1646, and as one commentator has remarked, were it not for its Royalist provenance it might be taken to be a Puritan song – another act of polemical ventriloquism: Charles Mackay, *The Cavalier Songs and Ballads of England from 1642 to 1684* (London, 1862, reprint n.d.), p. 30.)

[36]   Brome, *Rump*, I, p. 9.

One more example might suffice. 'Englands Woe' (tune of 'Greensleeves'), in which 'Zealous Pryn' makes an appearance, sadly noted:

> Had Statesmen read the Bible throughout, and not gone by the Bible so round about,
> They would have ruled themselves without doubt, *which no body can deny*,
> But Puritans now bear all the sway, they'll have no Bishops as most men say,
> But God send them better another day, *which no body can deny*.[37]

Royalists, then, devoted a considerable effort to constructing their opponents as, at bottom, religious zealots.[38] However the Puritans might attempt to disguise their real inspiration, the truth was clear. Religious zeal drove them to attack church and king, nobility and university, learning and order. This propaganda effort – carried out in pamphlet and woodcut, in song and ballad – was rooted in the widespread belief, evident in Fuller before the Civil War and in some of the patterns of pamphlet exchange in the early 1640s, that religious wars were, if not quite by definition illegitimate, then at least highly problematic. It was difficult – many thought impossible – for a holy war to be a just war; and the difficulty lay in part in the issue of hypocrisy, the ease of using religious justification to disguise self-interest and the lust to destroy.

Edward Vallance has asked whether this Royalist polemic was right in portraying Parliamentarians in this way, arguing in broad terms that it was, and drawing his evidence primarily from the defences of the Protestation and Solemn League and Covenant.[39] Though not persuaded by this argument, I am more concerned here to ask whether Royalists believed their own propaganda – that is, whether they believed that they were faced by opponents eager to fight a war of religion. It would be unwise to generalise too far: there is no reason to suppose that all Royalists perceived things in the same way (or, indeed, that the same person or group perceived things in the same way in 1642, in 1646 and in 1649). Nonetheless, there are developments in Royalist argument in the mid-to-late 1640s that might suggest that some Royalists understood themselves to be involved in a war of religion.

It is possible in broader perspective to understand the English Revolution as contributing both positively and negatively to the formation of an early Enlightenment ideology characterised by a commitment to ending wars of religion, by a variety of means (which might even involve the reconstruction

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[37]　Ibid., I. p. 24.

[38]　It is not surprising that in his commentary on the ballads Firth could remark 'Religious far more than political differences prevented any compromise': Firth, 'Reign of Charles I', p. 52.

[39]　Vallance, 'Preaching to the Converted'.

of a sort of confessional state). If this ideological development came about in part from reflection on the lessons to be learnt from the experience of England's wars of religion, then it is important to note that Royalists were as capable as other groups of reaching towards Enlightenment, so to speak. The case of Thomas Hobbes is well enough known, and the trajectory of his religious ideas certainly compromised his 'Anglicanism', whether or not it also compromised his Royalism (a matter of some debate at the moment).[40] But we can find other Royalists of the later 1640s also advancing ideas that challenged Anglican ecclesiological orthodoxies, and which derived from their own perception that the Civil War was a war of religion.[41] To take just two examples, Jasper Mayne (like Hobbes, whom he knew, a client of the Cavendish family), developed the view that civil societies did not need religious foundations. Indeed, because religion was always uncertain ('*Opinion* built upon *Authority*'), it could only provide an always contestable foundation. Therefore, it was wrong to disrupt civil societies for religious reasons. Mayne's most startling expression of this view – which came in a discussion of Grotius – was to entertain the possibility (no more than that) that even a society of atheists might be conceivable:

> I have not met with any *demonstrative* Argument, which hath proved to me, that there is such a necessary dependence of *Human society* upon *Religion*, that the Absence of the *One* must inevitably be the Destruction of the *other* . '[T]is possible that a Countrey of *Atheists* may yet have so much *Morality* among them, seconded by Lawes made by common agreement among themselves, as to be a *People*, and to hold the society of *Citizens* among themselves.[42]

These people might observe the laws of nations for simple 'utility'.

If that was to challenge the Anglican-Royalist church-state from one angle, another angle was found by Michael Hudson, writing in 1647. He challenged the idea of the Royal Supremacy at its heart, arguing for a complete separation of church and state. He admitted that Christian kings should and would seek to support their churches, but argued that they could not by law impose evangelical duties on those who did not accept them:

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[40] A good introduction to some of these debates is Patricia Springborg (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Hobbes's Leviathan* (Cambridge, 2007).

[41] The following material is derived from Glenn Burgess, 'Royalism and Liberty of Conscience in the English Revolution', in John Morrow and Jonathan Scott (eds), *Liberty, Authority, Formality: Political Ideas and Culture, 1600–1900 – Essays in Honour of Colin Davis* (Exeter, 2008), ch. 1.

[42] Jasper Mayne, *Ochlo-machia: Or, The Peoples War, Examined According to the Principles of Scripture and Reason* (Oxford, 1647), p. 26.

But for other persons, who are not of the same perswasion concerning the Religion of these Evangelicall duties, but beleeve the practise thereof to be superstitious and dishonourable to God, and another forme of worship to be the onely acceptable service unto him: in regard the practise of Evangelicall duties in such persons, cannot proceed from faith and trust in God, whereby they may expect a blessing from him upon their service and devotion, but rather that curse and damnation, which Saint *Paul* affirmeth to be the just merits of all acts of worship which are not of faith, but either of doubtfulness, or (which is worse) of perfect hypocrisie and dissimulation, *Rom.* 14. Last; The enforcement of such a conformity by the Magistrate in Evangelicall worship and service in such persons contrary to their consciences, must necessarily render him guilty, not onely of their sinnes ... but also of sacrilegious intrusion upon those sacred prerogatives which God hath reserved wholly unto himselfe ...[43]

It is a view of religious toleration not unworthy to be placed alongside the views of William Walwyn or John Locke. These ideas developed amongst Royalists essentially because they realised that one of the core reasons for the fact that England was facing religious war lay in the too-close identification of loyalty to the monarch and political order with confessional loyalty. The problem was not *just* the zealots on the other side; the forcing of conformity helped to produce such zealots. For some Royalists there was a war of religion going on, and they were prepared to think imaginatively about how the world could be constructed so that such things did not recur. For such Royalists, surely, there is no doubt that they believed their own construction of their opponents as religious zealots to be sound.

III. Royalist History and Making Sense of the English Revolution

Finally, I would like to explore some of the ways in which Royalists looking back on the 1640s from the perspective of the 1650s and 1680s considered that they had experienced a war of religion. Again there is no reason to suppose that views are going to be unanimous; but as with the other topics explored in this chapter, we can learn something from exploring the ways in which Royalist historiography can be said to concern a war of religion.

An obvious place to start might be with Thomas Hobbes's *Behemoth*, written in the late 1660s. Hobbes's diagnosis of the causes of England's mid-century

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[43]   Michael Hudson, *The Divine Right of Government: 1. Natural and 2. Politique* (London, 1647), pp. 152–3.

turmoils was a complex one, but religion was never far from his attention. Writing to the Earl of Devonshire in mid 1641, he stated his certainty 'that the dispute for [precedence] betwene the *spirituall* and *civill power*, has of late more than any other thing in the world, bene the cause of *civill warres*, in all *places of Christendome*'.[44] In *Leviathan* Hobbes gave a related, though not identical, analysis of the problem of Civil War. Again, it was one that put religion at the forefront:

> The most frequent praetext of Sedition, and Civill Warre, in Christian Commonwealths hath a long time proceeded from a difficulty, not yet sufficiently resolved, of obeying at once, both God, and Man, then when their Commandments are one contrary to the other.[45]

Behemoth continued this analysis, and (in Jeffrey Collins's words) 'establishes Hobbes's belief that the English Civil War was fundamentally a religious war fought in defence of Erastianism'.[46] Perhaps the most important feature of the work – highlighted in Collins's splendid account – is that it shows how Hobbes (like Hudson and Mayne, though in different ways) saw the roots of religious war not just in the zeal of the king's enemies but also in the mistaken beliefs about church and state of his supporters. Hobbes explicitly attributed to bishops a papal claim to spiritual power that was in essence boundless. 'What power', he asked, 'then is left to Kings and other civil sovereigns, which the pope may not pretend to be his *in ordine ad spiritualia*?' 'None or very little', was the reply. 'And this power not only the pope pretends to in all Christendom; but most bishops also in their several dioceses, *jure divino*, that is, immediately from Christ, without deriving it from the pope'.[47] The key problem, in Hobbes's analysis was independent clerical authority, represented not just by Presbyterians (who bore the brunt of Hobbes's attack) but by Laudians too, and there is no doubt that hostility to the ecclesiology represented by the Laudian bishops of the Church of England is an insistent undertone in *Behemoth*, at least in the text that Hobbes's originally wrote before it was expurgated.[48] This does not make Hobbes a non-Royalist; but rather it testifies to a potential within Royalism – a body of ideas more diverse and internally divided than is sometimes recognised

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[44] *The Correspondence of Thomas Hobbes*, (ed.) Noel Malcolm (Oxford, 2 vols, 1994), vol. 1, p. 120.

[45] Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, (ed.) Richard Tuck (Cambridge, 1991), ch. xliii, p. 402.

[46] Jeffrey R. Collins, *The Allegiance of Thomas Hobbes* (Oxford, 2005), p. 82.

[47] Thomas Hobbes, *Behemoth, or The Long Parliament*, (ed.) Ferdinand Tönnies, (Chicago, 1990), p. 6.

[48] Collins, *Allegiance of Thomas Hobbes*, pp. 82–7.

– of people who, precisely because they appreciate that they have experienced a war of religion – come to challenge the Royalist-Anglican conjunction as a threat to royal authority (or sovereignty in general) and political order.[49]

There are in these remarks various controversies lurking, none of which can be pursued here. Instead, we might conclude by returning to the person with whom we began, Thomas Fuller, who devoted much of his time after the king's execution and the defeat of the Royalist cause to historical scholarship. His *Church History of Britain* was first published in 1655. It is not an easy work to interpret for our purposes. Fuller went out of his way to be even-handed and to avoid overt judgement, and he repeatedly invokes a distinction between church history and civil or state history to avoid controversial topics. For example, after pursuing the story of the Scottish National Covenant, he indicated that events 'laid the foundation of a long and woeful war in both kingdoms'. But he was not going to recount the story of that war, in part because 'being a civil business, it is alienated from my subject'. But even Fuller was not altogether persuaded by his own coyness, for he continued: 'If any object that it is reducible to ecclesiastical story, because one, as they said, termed thus *bellum episcopale*, 'the war for bishops', I conceive it presumption for so mean a minister as myself (and indeed for any under that great order) to undertake the writing thereof'.[50]

Tact and modesty aside, key features of Fuller's understanding of the 1640s are visible in the *Church History*. They were certainly clear enough to Peter Heylyn, who was outraged by the work, labelled Fuller a 'Puritan', and levelled several other, even less likely, charges against him.[51] Fuller's work provoked Heylyn to defend Laud and Laudianism, implicitly given some of the blame in the *Church History* for provoking the conflicts of the 1640s. Nonetheless, Fuller's was a Royalist history, and it is notable that, though he was writing ecclesiastical history, he frequently referred to 'Royalists' in recounting the controversies of the 1640s, as for example when giving the reasons why 'the first sort of royalists, episcopal in their judgements' would not attend the Westminster Assembly. The first of the reasons given for non-attendance was that 'they had no call from the king; (having read how anciently the breath of Christian emperors gave the first being to counsels;) yea, some on my knowledge had from his majesty a flat command to the contrary'.[52] Fuller seems to have remained attached to a

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[49]   Amongst Royalist historical analyses, the antithesis of this view is, of course, expressed in Clarendon's *History of the Rebellion*.

[50]   Thomas Fuller, *The Church History of Britain*, (ed.) J.S. Brewer (Oxford, 6 vols, 1845), vol. 6, p. 154.

[51]   See Anthony Milton, *Laudian and Royalist Polemic in Seventeenth-Century England: The Career and Writings of Peter Heylyn* (Manchester, 2007), pp. 174–80.

[52]   Ibid., p. 251.

Constantinean reading of the royal supremacy, as well as to episcopacy as a form of church government. He was consequently well aware that the most powerful impulse behind the Civil War was not the desire of the Assembly to impose a quasi-Scottish Presbyterianism, but Parliament's desire to construct an Erastian church (something of which his fellow Royalist of a different stamp, Thomas Hobbes, might heartily approve). After setting the context, by exploring Erastus's views that the power of excommunication 'in a Christian state principally resides in the secular power', he went on to note that 'though the wise parliament made use of the Presbyterian zeal and activity for the extirpation of bishops, yet they discreetly resolved to hold a strict hand over them'. The presbytery imposed in England was not 'absolute', as the Scots' was, but 'depended on the state': 'the parliament kept the coercive power in their own hands'.[53] The conflict being delineated was certainly ecclesiological, but it might be seen as a conflict between two forms of Erastianism, royal and parliamentary.[54]

Fuller's presentation of the arguments alleged against the Solemn League and Covenant reinforce these points – though presented impartially, there can be little doubt that the account is weighted towards endorsing them. The objections portrayed the Covenant as contrary to royal authority, for its subscribers lacked the royal consent to take it. Just as 'parent had power by the law of God to rescind such vows which their children made without their privity, by the equity of the same law this covenant ius void, if contrary to the flat command of him who is *Parens patriae*.[55] The Solemn League and Covenant was equally mistaken about church government:

> Neither papal monarchy, nor Presbyterian democracy, not independent anarchy are so conformable to the scriptures as Episcopal aristocracy, being (if not of divine in a strict sense) of apostolical institution, confirmed with church practice (the best comment on scripture when obscure for 1500 years).[56]

It was on this basis – as a defender of royal supremacy and episcopacy – that Fuller mounted a restrained but still potent attack on Laud. He 'is most accused', Fuller noted', for over meddling in state matters; more than was fitting, say many; than needful, say most, for one of his profession'. He 'overshot himself' by imposing

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[53] Ibid., pp. 286–8.

[54] We should not forget that Erastianism should not be seen loosely as a form of secularisation but is an ecclesiological position, as Figgis long ago emphasised: John Neville Figgis, *The Divine Right of Kings* (Cambridge, 2nd (ed.), 1922), pp. 293–342 ('Erastus and Erastianism').

[55] Fuller, *Church History*, vol. 6, p. 260.

[56] Ibid., p. 263.

the Scottish prayer-book 'over a free and foreign church and nation'. He made 'the shallowest pretence of the crown deep enough … to drown the undoubted right of any private patron to a church living'.[57] Fuller devoted considerable attention to the Convocation and Canons of 1640 – Fuller had himself been a member of the former, and subscribed the latter – presenting, though without giving a lot away, many of the arguments that surrounded both. Perhaps most relevant to his anti-Laudianism were two objections. First, the charge that the 1640 Canons, in declaring church government unalterable, 'intended to abridge the liberty of king and state, in future parliaments and convocations'. And second, 'the exception of exceptions', that they were 'illegally passed, to the prejudice of the fundamental liberty of the subject'.[58] It is difficult to know exactly how far Fuller accepted any of these arguments, directed at events in which he had been a participant; but they help to build the picture of a Laudian church that was at the least incautious in respecting the proper relationship of civil to ecclesiastical authority.

A second charge against Laud himself was more overtly made. Fuller noted that from the time of his metropolitical visitation in 1633, 'conformity was more vigorously pressed than before'.[59] The altar controversy was pursued with 'needless animosity' on both sides, leading Fuller to remark:

> Indeed if moderate men had had the managing of these matters, the accommodation had been easy, with a little condescension on both sides. But as a small accidental heat or cold … is enough to put him in a fit who was formerly in *latitudine febris*, so men's minds, distempered in this age with what I may call a mutinous tendency, were exacerbated with such small occasions which otherwise might have been passed over, and no notice taken thereof.

This was immediately followed by 'For now came the censure of Mr. Prynne, Dr. Bastwick, and Mr. Burton', making it clear that Laud was one of the main objects of the criticism.[60]

Fuller's *Church History* does, for all its studied neutrality, build the picture of a religious war, provoked by imprudent men who imperilled not just the royal supremacy that they had invoked as support for their own actions, but episcopacy too.

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[57]　Ibid., p. 300.
[58]　Ibid., pp. 176–7.
[59]　Ibid., p. 108.
[60]　Ibid., p. 112.

IV. Concluding Remarks

Was the English Revolution a war of religion? The value of this question does not rest on finding an answer to it, but on the way in which seeking answers to it illuminates the period and the evidence that survives from it. This chapter has attempted to demonstrate the utility of the question by making two points.

First it is meaningful to ask whether early modern people could develop a concept of a war of religion, could employ it in their passionate engagement with events, and could look back on the experience of Civil War and understand it to have been a war of religion. But at every stage of this, we have to note, the characterisation of events is controversial, a move in a game as well as an historical or theoretical claim. Perception and polemic were always intertwined. There could be value in characterising your opponents as religious zealots, but you might or might not really perceive them to have been so. You might indeed perceive them to be zealots, and yet still engage with them in legal and constitutional terms. As a feature of the ideas of the seventeenth century, a war of religion is a polemical and argumentative construct, but no less a part of the reality of the past for all that.

My second (but perhaps primary) point concerns what we learn about Royalism. A good many Royalists identified religious zeal as the driving force behind their enemies' actions; but they responded to this perception (and polemic) in a variety of ways, both during the 1640s and later, when looking back. Looking at Royalists through this lens – rather than, say, in terms of their constitutional ideas on civil politics – makes it clear just the degree to which the experience of living through what they could see as a war of religion fractured Royalist thinking. Royalists had different views on the precise nature of the royal supremacy, and even more on the Laudian experiment and its role in events, though most remained committed to what we might call Royalist-Anglicanism, the combination of royal supremacy and episcopacy by apostolic succession. Both Fuller *and* Heylyn lie within this mainstream. But it is also true that from within Royalism – Hobbes, Hudson, Mayne – we find a variety of challenges to it from men willing to question various parts of the equation. They might defend a king's civil authority by restricting his ecclesiastical authority – or by increasing it; they might enhance the royal supremacy by jettisoning bishops, who could represent a threat to it. There is a greater diversity and creativity in Royalism than we have often appreciated, and in good part diversity was generated by the experience of living through what

was perceived as a war of religion.[61] It was a war of religion in two senses – a war against Puritan zealots, who threatened church and state for religious motives; and a war about ecclesiology, involving therefore dimensions both legal and theological.

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[61]   Some valuable recent work has begun to develop a more complex picture of Royalism: see David Scott, 'Rethinking Royalist Politics, 1642–9', and Anthony Milton, 'Anglicanism and Royalism in the 1640s', both in John Adamson (ed.), *The English Civil War: Conflicts and Contexts, 1640–49* (Basingstoke, 2009), chs 1 and 2; and the essays in Jason McElligott and David L. Smith (eds), *Royalists and Royalism during the English Civil Wars* (Cambridge, 2007).

Chapter 9

Natural Law and Holy War in the English Revolution

Sarah Mortimer

At the start of the first Civil War, in August 1642, Parliament claimed it took up 'defensive arms for the preservation of his Maiesties person, the maintenance of the true religion, the lawes and liberties of this kingdome, and the power and priviledge of Parliament'. Many Parliament-men were convinced that England was in a dire situation, threatened by a coalition of politicians and ecclesiastics (probably masterminded by Rome) who sought to reduce the land to slavery and popish subservice. Parliament's military action was, they argued, necessary to secure the commonwealth against the king's evil counsellors, and their malevolent design 'for the Alteration of Religion, and the Subversion of the laws and liberties of the Kingdom'.[1] Parliament's declarations show, as John Morrill argued so persuasively in 1984, that religious passions and beliefs played an important part in precipitating Civil War.[2] But Parliament, as Morrill recognised, also appealed to natural principles of self-defence and, as far as possible, existing law and precedent. Since then, there has been much interest in both the religious and what Morrill termed the 'legal constitutional' cases for war, much of which – like this volume – has been stimulated by Morrill's pioneering work. Yet the relationship between these languages remains obscure. In particular, the connections between Scripture and the concepts of natural law and self-defence have never been fully spelled out. This chapter will, therefore, focus on the different interpretations of the relationship between natural law and Christian teaching provided by Parliamentarians and Royalists during the first Civil War. In other words, it will examine how religion and the civil world fitted together in the minds of some of the protagonists.

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[1] *A declaration of the Lords and Commons assembled in Parliament setting forth the grounds and reasons that necessitate them at this time to take up defensive arms* (London, 1642), sigs. A1r, A2r.

[2] John Morrill, 'The *Religious Context* of the English Civil War', *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 34 (1984): pp. 155–78; reprinted in Morrill, *The Nature of the English Revolution* (London, 1993), pp. 45–68.

The balance between law and religion in the early stages of the Civil War especially among the Parliamentarians, has recently started to attract the attention of historians. Glenn Burgess in particular has shown how the leading Parliamentary spokesmen preferred to argue from the law and to insist upon the legality of their cause, although some of their audience took their message in more apocalyptic directions.[3] Following on from his argument, I want here to discuss the different ways in which participants in the early stages of the Civil War understood the connections between natural law, on which English law was assumed to rest, and divine law. For these connections were more complicated, and more controversial, than is often assumed. In general, Parliamentarians argued that both Scripture, English law, and the law of nature urged men to defend themselves and their societies from popery and arbitrary government. It was, therefore, a legal and religious duty to take up arms against the king. Royalists, on the other hand, rejected these notions, and some began to insist that Christianity could not be aligned so smoothly with the natural law. The Parliamentarians, as we shall see, brought the religious and the political aspects of their cause together, but some Royalists sought to break these two apart. As this suggests, the early 1640s witnesses a heated discussion about the boundaries between Christianity and the natural world, one which forced English writers to revisit questions central to both Protestant theology and political debate.

I

From the time of the Reformation, Protestants who found themselves at war with their rulers had sought to justify their actions by appealing to principles of natural law, particularly the concepts of self- and communal defence. Their reliance upon the language of nature has led some historians to underplay the religious or confessional element in their cause, but it important not to jump to this conclusion too quickly. Natural law was generally seen as God's law, and as such it acted as a bridge between civil or natural arguments and theological imperatives. The demands of the natural law could be recast as religious duties – and Protestants were particularly successful in doing this. Later Protestants, particularly the Calvinists, would even draw on the understanding of natural law developed by Catholic scholastics, especially those from the school of Salamanca, as Quentin Skinner has shown.[4] Yet Luther and Melanchthon had broken

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[3]   Glenn *Burgess*, 'Was the English Civil *War* a *War of Religion?* The Evidence of Political Propaganda', *Huntington Library Quarterly*, 61 (1998): pp. 173–201.

[4]   Quentin Skinner, *The Foundations of Modern Political Thought*, (Cambridge, 2 vols, 1978), esp. pp. 319–21.

decisively with the Thomist way of thinking about nature and its relationship to grace, bequeathing to their Protestant heirs – Reformed as well as Lutheran – a distinctive political, as well as theological, legacy. Many English writers and theologians took up this Protestant line on the law of nature, but there were others, especially on the Royalist side, who began to challenge it. Indeed, the arguments developed in civil-war England concerning the relationship between politics and religion, and therefore of the law of nature, were both sophisticated and innovative, although these qualities have not always been recognised, and the arguments themselves often overlooked.[5] In a volume exploring the religious dimension to the conflicts of the seventeenth century, therefore, it seems fitting to explore further this debate as it occurred in England.

Prior to the Reformation, there had been a variety of models of natural law, not least because it formed an important part of both religious and political thinking. Indeed, Catholic theology had helped to secure the place of natural law in the medieval conceptual world, as part of a wider discussion of the different kinds of law, governing the different spheres of human and divine activity. Natural law was important, but it was directed towards the needs and purposes of this life, and most theologians agreed that it needed to be refined, altered, and improved by grace. Thomas Aquinas, for example, argued that natural law was valuable but incomplete, and he expressed the mainstream view when he explained that Christ had added some new 'counsels of perfection' for those who sought to excel in the spiritual life.[6] As this suggests, natural law was not straightforwardly the correct standard for Christians – it had to be completed by divine law, revealed through Christ. As they examined this issue, some sixteenth-century Catholics even began to explore the possibilities of a state of 'pure nature', but they always insisted on the need for grace over and above this.[7] Moreover, most Catholics argued, Christ had left his church, governed by the pope, to encourage and enforce the values of divine law. This distinction between natural law and divine law was crucial, because it ensured that the temporal state and the church could remain separate entities, and it enabled both rulers and churchmen to describe the relative powers of each. By the late sixteenth century, moreover, it provided the foundation for Catholic claims about papal deposing power.[8]

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[5] For further discussion see Sarah Mortimer, *Reason and Religion in the English Revolution* (Cambridge, 2010).

[6] T. Aquinas, *Summa Theologica* Ia IIae, Qs 107, 108.

[7] M.W.F. Stone, 'Michael Baius (1513–89) and the Debate on "Pure Nature": Grace and Moral Agency in Sixteenth-century Scholasticism', in J. Kraye and R. Saarinen (eds) *Moral Philosophy on the Threshold of Modernity* (Dordrecht, 2005), pp. 51–90.

[8] Harro Höpfl, *Jesuit Political Thought: The Society of Jesus and the State c.1540–1630* (Cambridge, 2004), pp. 350–66; Bernice Hamilton, *Political Thought in Sixteenth-Century Spain:*

Early Protestants rejected this Catholic vision, insisting instead on the harmony between natural law and divine law. They refused to accept that Christ had brought any new precepts, arguing that God provided just one Law, at least in the sense of one set of ethical standards, and that Christ's role was to atone for men's sins. Philip Melanchthon in particular maintained that natural law was – and remained – God's law for Christians, and that it had not been affected by Christ's preaching in any way. Partly this was because the Reformers sought to eradicate the concept of 'counsels of perfection', for it was this notion which underpinned Catholic ideas of works, sainthood, and the value of the monastic life. But they also feared radicals and Anabaptists, whose message was based upon the egalitarian, and often rather impractical, teaching of Christ – for the Reformers did not want Scripture to be used to undermine the social and political order. Furthermore, Protestants realised that if natural law represented God's standard for all peoples, covering both civil and religious matters, then magistrates were fully justified in taking control of their churches.[9] From the start, therefore, Protestant thought was much less open to any kind of distinction between natural and divine law, at least when it came to ethics or morals; and the concept of 'pure nature' was alien to them.[10] In this sense, there was an important confessional element to natural law thinking. And in England, as we shall see, the Protestant version was both endorsed and challenged.

When Protestants discussed the law of nature, they explained that it contained the principles necessary for the preservation of both individual human beings and the communities of which they formed part. These principles were implanted by God at the creation, and sparks of this knowledge remained even after the fall. In the Scriptures, however, and especially in the Ten Commandments, human beings could find a clearer account of the natural law; the Sixth Commandment (on Reformed numbering) prohibited murder, including suicide, providing divine endorsement for the principle of self-defence.[11] Soon, and especially in the Netherlands, it became common to argue

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A Study of the Political Ideas of Vitoria, De Soto, Suarez, and Molina (Oxford, 1963), pp. 69–97.

[9]   C. Bauer, 'Melanchthons Naturrechtslehre', *Archiv Für Reformationsgeschichte*, 42 (1951): pp. 64–100; *Philippi Melanthonis Opera quae supersunt omnia*, (ed.) K. Bretschneider (Halle, 1834–60), vol. xxi, pp. 711–20; 1011–13; James Estes, 'The Role of Godly Magistrates in the Church: Melanchthon as Luther's Interpreter and Collaborator', *Church History*, 67 (1998): pp. 463–83.

[10]   For a discussion of Calvin's ideas on this issue which links them to the broader Protestant tradition see Paul Helm, *Calvin at the Centre* (Oxford, 2009), pp. 308–39.

[11]   Harold Berman, *Law and Revolution II: The Impact of the Protestant Reformation in the Western Legal Tradition* (Harvard, 2006) pp. 79–81; on suicide see M. Bell, 'The Theology of Violence: Just War, Regicide and the End of Time in the English Revolution' (D Phil, University of Oxford, 2002), pp. 140–50.

that in order to defend oneself and one's community, and thereby to follow the natural law, it was important to ensure that constitutional rights and property were respected.[12] Indeed, Protestant understanding of the natural law enabled men to defend both life and liberties here on earth, allowing them to combine the secular and religious elements of their arguments. (The Catholics, on the other hand, tended to differentiate more clearly between the different aspects of their case, between the natural law right of self-defence and a religious duty to defend the faith.)[13] From the second half of the sixteenth century, Protestants – and especially Calvinists – in France, Germany, the Netherlands and Scotland could tie together the civil, natural and religious dimensions of their causes. They called upon all citizens to defend the laws and well being of the land, for this was their duty as men and as Christians. At times the Calvinists argued that citizens should put aside confessional differences, but they still retained a recognisably Protestant approach, in which Christian ethics and natural law could be straightforwardly combined.

II

When the Parliamentarians came to write tracts during the 1640s, justifying their own positions, they drew heavily on continental traditions of resistance and natural law. In *A Plea for Defensive Arms* (1643) by Stephen Marshall, an influential account of the Parliamentarian cause by a leading divine, the arguments of this Reformed synthesis are prominent. Here he drew on human reason, natural law and biblical teaching to show that Parliament's actions were consistent with all these imperatives. Both God and nature commanded men to defend their lives, laws and religion when they were assaulted. His was a strong argument for the unity of natural law and Christian teaching, and one that was common among Parliamentarian writers.

Marshall was writing early in 1643, a dangerous time for the Parliamentarians. Their initial attempt to overwhelm Charles with force had failed, and the King himself had come close to victory at both Edgehill and Turnham Green. Negotiations were taking place at Oxford, and a settlement on terms broadly acceptable to Charles looked very much on the cards. Not only did Charles have the military initiative, he also – and quite clearly – had English law on his side. By this point it was clear that Parliament had gone well beyond anything they could

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[12]   Martin Van Gelderen, *The Political Thought of the Dutch Revolt 1555–1590* (Cambridge, 1992), e.g. pp. 121–2, 269.

[13]   See, for example, Peter Holmes, *Resistance and Compromise: The Political Thought of the Elizabethan Catholics* (Cambridge, 1982), esp. pp. 152–5.

justify from precedent, and those determined to fight on to victory appealed increasingly to natural law, rather than the established laws of the land. When existing law failed to defend the community, they argued, it was necessary to look instead to the law of nature, the law underpinning all civil societies and given by God to enable human social life. Nature encouraged all creatures to preserve themselves; and, as Marshall and others argued, if even the lowliest animal had the right to repel a predator then surely the whole community ought also to have this right. If it were agreed that each individual had a private right of self-defence, so the argument went, then how much more must the community, represented by Parliament, have a duty to repel any unjust force, even by resistance.[14] Particularly well known is the argument of Henry Parker, who insisted that all societies had a fundamental right and duty to preserve themselves in being. Such a duty did not necessarily need to be sought in the dusty annals of English legal history, because it came directly from a natural law implanted by God in all creation.[15] When negotiations collapsed in April 1643, and hostilities resumed, the argument from self-defence – carried out by individuals if necessary – seemed all the more compelling. Indeed, it would be a central theme of Parliamentarian rhetoric, especially among the fiery spirits anxious to prevent settlement on soft terms with Charles.[16]

The argument from self-defence and natural law could easily be fused with the language of theology and divine service, because the Parliamentarians agreed that the duty of defence was itself religious. God wanted all peoples to prosper and flourish, not least because this would enable them to serve him more effectively. Moreover, because the Parliamentarians assumed that divine law could not differ from natural law, nor from the true light implanted in all peoples (at least in civil and ethical matters), then they could insist that all Christians must join with Parliament in thwarting Charles's wicked designs. Along these lines, then, Marshall could insist that Christ's call to turn the other cheek was applicable only where it would lead to a greater good for the community as a whole. It was a confirmation, and not a rejection, of the values of the earthly community.[17]

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[14]   See for example S. Marshall, *A plea for defensive armes* (London, 1643); W. Bridge, *The truth of the times vindicated* (London, 1643); H. Palmer, *Scripture and reason pleaded for defensive armes* (London, 1643).

[15]   H. Parker, *Observations upon some of His Majesties late answers and expresses* (London, 1642); on Parker see M. Mendle, *Henry Parker and the English Civil War: The Political Thought of the Public's Privado* (Cambridge, 2003), pp. 70–89.

[16]   This theme is discussed in David Wootton, 'From Rebellion to Revolution: The Crisis of the Winter of 1642/3 and the Origins of Civil War Radicalism', *English Historical Review*, 105 (1990): pp. 654–69.

[17]   Marshall, *Plea for defensive arms*, p. 6.

In the tracts by two leading Parliamentarian divines, William Bridge and John Goodwin, we see the same arguments. Both authors explain at length that the impulse to preserve both self and community comes from God as well as nature, and that it must be heeded by all Christians. For Bridge, this means not only that men must defend themselves from immediate attack, but also that they must ensure that justice and good government were upheld in their communities. He was quite explicit about the connection between divine and natural law, insisting that 'voice of nature is the voice of God: now nature it selfe teacheth, that in a community, or body politicke, there must be justice administred, otherwise the community can never be preserved'. This is to extend the principle of self-defence significantly, so that it encompassed major political reform.[18] John Goodwin's argument was similar, in that it relied upon a robust conception of legitimate defence. In his *Anti-cavalierisme* (1642), he insisted that all Christians were bound in conscience, by the laws of God and nature, in conscience to defend the lives of 'faithful Governours', and by that it was clear that he meant Parliament, rather than the king.[19]

Although a strong intellectual case for resistance was developed by Protestant rebels both on the continent and in Britain, they faced some obvious potential pitfalls. Resistance to authority is explicitly condemned in the New Testament and nowhere in the Bible is there much support for the specific idea of self-defence, as distinct from prohibitions on murder. Christ had encouraged his followers not to defend themselves against their enemies, or those who sought to injure them, while St Paul had called upon the Roman Christians, in apparently unequivocal terms, to 'obey the powers that be' (Romans 13:1). The solution, of course, was to show that such texts had to be interpreted in a particular way, that Paul only directed the Christians to obey magistrates who fulfilled their official duties. Both Herbert Palmer and Stephen Marshall explained that by the 'powers that be' Paul meant the offices, rather than the particular persons, and both denied that such an exemplary Christian could be asking his readers to submit meekly to tyranny. To argue thus, however, Parliamentarians needed to read the passage through the lens of the Old Testament and the natural law, placing it within the wider web of Christian obligations and duties, to others and to oneself. If Christianity and natural law were held firmly together, then Paul's injunction to obey could become a mandate for the overthrow of any supposed magistrates who did not fulfil their God given duties. English Parliamentarian divines made the most of this reading of Romans 13 and similar passages. Francis Cheynell, Stephen Marshall and their allies refused to believe that tyranny,

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[18]   Bridge, *Truth of the times vindicated*, p. 4.

[19]   J. Goodwin, *Anti-cavalierisme, or, Truth pleading as well the necessity, as the lawfulness of this present vvar* (London, 1642), p. 10.

whether ecclesiastical or political, could be God's ordinance and urged men to oppose it.[20]

Parliamentarians also found themselves forced to reinterpret church history, particularly Tertullian's account of the patience and fortitude of the Christians under the Roman empire.[21] Tertullian, writing in the early part of the third century, had explained that Christians preferred to be killed rather than to kill, and that they suffered the assaults of their enemies without seeking revenge. While he might have provided encouragement for his contemporaries, he left the Parliamentarians with the task of explaining to the English people why the martyr's crown was no longer appropriate for them. One solution was to argue that Christianity was now established by law, as it had not been in the third century, and to insist that the martyrs had not been able to appeal to the law as Englishmen now could.[22] Secondly, some Parliamentarian divines – especially Goodwin – felt that the ideas of one Church Father ought not to trump the clear message of the Old Testament, which was after all part of the canonical Scriptures. Finally, Goodwin even suggested that God had provided new light since the time of Tertullian, reinforcing the message of liberty found in the gospel and indicating that such meekness was no longer appropriate.[23] His opponents were quick to point out the destabilising possibilities of such an argument, for it threatened to allow all Christians to reinterpret God's message as they saw fit.[24] Parliamentarians themselves recognised that their synthesis of Christianity and natural law was not without problems, but believed that these could be resolved by some nimble exegesis, much of which was directly inspired by continental discussions of the same issues.

Indeed, few Europeans would have been surprised by the Parliamentarian propaganda, shot through as it was with the language of defence, conservation and natural law. Parliamentarians wove together the religious and political threat to their nation, urging men to respond for the sake of their goods, their lives

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[20]   See e.g. S. Marshall, *Plea for defensive arms*, p. 5; Bridge, *Truth of the tines vindicated*, p. 14; Goodwin, *Anti-cavalierisme*, p. 7; F. Cheynell, *Chillingworthi Novissima* (London, 1644), unpaginated prefatory letter.

[21]   Tertullian makes this case in his *Apology*, ch. 37. The issue was raised in H. Ferne, *The resolving of conscience* (London, 1642) p. 24 and answered by e.g. Goodwin, in *Anti-cavalierisme*, pp. 23–32.

[22]   Burgess, *Was the English Civil War a War of Religion?*, *passim.*

[23]   Goodwin, *Anti-cavalierisme*, pp. 22–8, see also John Coffey, *John Goodwin and the Puritan Revolution: Religion and Intellectual Change in Seventeenth-Century England* (London, 2006), p. 87.

[24]   H. Hammond, *Of Resisting the Lawfull magistrate under colour of religion* (London, 1643), pp. 17–18.

and their souls. God did not want Englishmen to stand idly by as victims, but to stand up for themselves, just as the Dutch, French and German Protestants had done.[25] Parliamentarians could argue thus because they believed that God wanted England to survive and to flourish. The demands of Christianity could not be anything other than conducive to the life of the civil community. And so, when civil life seemed to be under threat, it was always legitimate to appeal to nature as well as to Christianity. For these twin concepts provided the standard of true civil life, binding on all people as men and as Christians.

III

Faced with the need to counter these Parliamentarian arguments, the Royalists offered to English men and women a very different picture of both Christian duties and of the natural laws. They refused to accept that God would countenance Parliamentarian resistance, and they set out to show why. To do so, they had, of course, to challenge the whole tradition of Protestant resistance theory, and in the process to rethink the relationship between natural law and Christianity. In the rest of this chapter I want to show how and why some of Charles' supporters tried to divorce the traditional marriage of natural law and religious duty. They could draw on some hints they found in continental texts, particularly those from outside the Protestant tradition, but they did much of the intellectual work themselves. The result was a novel and quite radical argument, and one from which many even of their fellow Royalists drew back.[26]

The Royalist drive to win hearts and minds began early in 1642, when Charles and his advisers, Edward Hyde chief among then, began to emphasise the king's commitment to rule within the laws and the established constitution. It was not Charles but Parliament, they claimed, that was violating the fundamental laws and thus threatening to plunge the kingdom into anarchy. By presenting the Royalist cause as a defence of the ancient constitution, they undoubtedly appealed to many people across the country.[27] Yet by the summer of 1642, as I

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[25]   Robert Von Friedeburg, *Self-Defence and Religious Strife in Early Modern Europe: England and Germany, 1530–1680* (Aldershot, 2002) and Martin Van Gelderen, 'So meerly humane: Theories of Resistance in Early Modern Europe' in Annabel Brett and James Tully (eds), *Rethinking the Foundations of Modern Political Thought*, (Cambridge, 2006), pp. 149–70 both make the case for a European perspective to English ideas, albeit in different ways.

[26]   See also, Mortimer, *Reason and Religion*, pp. 88–113.

[27]   For royalist polemic in 1642, and Hyde's role as a propagandist, see David L. Smith, *Constitutional Royalism and the Search for Settlement, c.1640–1649* (Cambridge, 1994); Paul Seaward, 'Edward Hyde, first earl of Clarendon', *ODNB*.

have suggested, Parliamentarian pamphleteers like Henry Parker had taken the argument several stages further. No longer did they invoke primarily English law but instead they claimed to be acting according to the law of nature, the ultimate and foundational principle of all societies. Parker's case drew strength from the numerous tracts and sermons written by Parliamentarian divines, in which religious and political arguments were conflated and the natural right of self-defence became the duty of the true Protestant. Some Royalist writers began to realise that they would need to challenge these ideas if they were to regain the polemical initiative. They began to rethink the very notion of natural law, seeking to strip from it its religious charge; and in the process they began to distinguish Christ's commands from the principles on which a civil society could best be run. The Parliamentarians had woven a thick web of religious, civil and natural duties; some Royalists set out to disentangle the various strands.

It was William Chillingworth who developed the first serious critique of the Parliamentarians' understanding of nature and grace, and who saw that religion could be decoupled from natural law and used against the Parliamentarians. Chillingworth was a forthright Oxford academic of broadly Arminian theological views; his *Religion of Protestants* had already troubled Calvinists. He was also a staunch Royalist and his vociferous support for Charles in Oxford soon provoked resentment. In about 1641 or 1642 he penned a short manuscript entitled 'Of the unlawfulnesse of resisting the lawfull Prince although most impious, tyrannical & Idolatrous'. It began by acknowledging 'That Grace doth not destroy or correct but p[er]fect nature', but went to to emphasise that the need to understand this relationship correctly. The rebels's argument, Chillingworth felt, was 'noe better than Machiavellian copper', their scriptural claims were debased and devalued because they were mixed with self-interested realpolitik. His answer was, he explained, to begin from Scripture and its clear injunction to 'pay all manner of Subjection and obedience, not only to lawfull Princes, but to the most Impious Infidell and Idolatrous Princes'. For Chillingworth, it was impossible to plead any other rule against this clear divine command. For, he wrote, 'lex nulla valeat contra jus divinum' – no law is valid against divine law, and certainly not any imagined law of necessity or nature. For him, Scripture provided an independent and superior standard of morality, and he began to suggest that there might be a difference between the laws natural and divine.[28]

Chillingworth never put these ideas into print before his death in 1644, but some of his friends developed them in particular, strongly polemical, ways. Two of these friends were Dudley Digges and Henry Hammond. Digges was one of the very few people remembered in Chillingworth's will while Hammond

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28		Lambeth Palace Library MS 943, fos 895r–897v.

had been a university debating partner before he took up the clerical living of Penshurst, returning to Oxford in 1643.[29] Hammond and Digges shared Chillingworth's view that the Parliamentarians's fatal mistake was their appeal to the laws of nature and necessity, as if these were the central obligations for a civilised Englishman and a Christian. They thought that the Parliamentarians had misunderstood the meaning of natural law as well as the teaching of Christ and the Apostles; natural law as conceived by the Parliamentarians was in their view a recipe for anarchy as well as eternal damnation. And so they set out to show that Parliamentarians should abandon their resistance, for the sake of their earthly lives as well as their souls.

Henry Hammond attacked the Parliamentarian rebels in his *Of resisting the lawful magistrate under the colour of religion*, published in 1643 and then reissued early the next year with a specific rejoinder to Marshall's tract. Hammond consistently viewed the Parliamentarians' argument in religious terms, denouncing them for taking up arms on the pretext of reformation. He held that Christianity could never be promoted by violence, nor could it be used to defend resistance against the supreme magistrate. But Hammond's argument was rather broader than the title of his tract might imply, for he did not simply want to show that no one could take up arms against their sovereign for a religious cause. Rather, he set out to prove that Christ and the Apostles had forbidden their followers from making use of the individual right of self-defence or self-preservation against the magistrate. He accepted that this right might still be valid against a robber or a thief, but this was because the laws and magistrates give us the liberty to defend ourselves in these circumstances. The right could not be used against the supreme magistrate, however, for if, he wrote, private men may have permission to resist, or repel force with force, there will be tumults and commotions everywhere. In other words, Hammond was arguing that the Apostles were astute civil philosophers as well as great religious leaders. For they realised that no society could ever be stable if people constantly appealed to their natural rights of self-defence. Only when men renounced all thought of such resistance would they gain the double blessings of peace and eternal life.

Here, Hammond was largely following Hugo Grotius, the Dutch jurist, historian and biblical critic – proof of the strong influence of continental thought on the Royalist cause. Hammond had to be selective in his use of Grotius' ideas, however. In *De Jure ac Belli Pacis* (1625), Grotius had discussed the respective rights of sovereigns and subjects and, although he was careful to circumscribe

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[29]   P. Des Maizeaux, *The life of William Chillingworth: author of 'The religion of Protestants'*, (ed.) and trans. J. Nichols (London, 1863), p. 353; D. Lloyd, *Memoires of the lives, actions, sufferings and deaths of those noble, reverend and excellent personages ...* (London, 1668), p. 542; H. de Quehen, 'Henry Hammond', *ODNB*.

closely the circumstances in which resistance could take place, he did accept that in cases of extreme necessity it was legitimate even for Christians.[30] On these grounds, the Parliamentarians could appeal to Grotius' words to support their own position. But there was another strand to Grotius' thought, even in 1625. For Grotius had begun to rediscover the notion, previously a Catholic preserve, of the distinction between natural law and Christian precepts. It is well known that Grotius studied the political writings of leading Catholic authors, not least because they provided him with useful resources for his writings against Spain.[31] He seems also to have been sympathetic to the case they made for 'counsels of perfection', however. In *De Jure Belli ac Pacis* he wrote of the 'divine Counsels' given by Christ, counsels which ought not to be taken as precepts for all human beings. This was to suggest that there might be two tiers of laws and obligations – and that the Christian ought, perhaps, to adhere to more stringent rules than the law of nature.[32]

By the early 1640s, moreover, Grotius was far less sympathetic to resistance theories than he had been in 1625. By this time he was extremely troubled by the violence in Europe, and more and more convinced that religious passions were responsible for rebellion and sedition. So much so, that he began to present Christianity as a particularly peaceful religion, and to suggest that true Christians ought not to take up arms against their magistrate – whatever the provocation. In the early 1640s he was involved in a heated controversy with the Calvinist divine André Rivet, in which he stressed the need for Christians to be patient in all circumstances. In several passages he suggested that a Christian could not take violent actions against the supreme magistrate without incurring divine displeasure, suggesting that what might be legitimate for a pagan or non-Christian society may no longer apply to a community of true Christians.[33] Indeed Grotius was supportive of Charles' position at this time, and there was plenty of material in the Grotian corpus which could be used against the Parliamentarians.

It is worth adding that Grotius was not only drawing on Catholic theology as he developed his arguments, but also on those Protestant writings which

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[30]   Hugo Grotius, *De Jure Belli ac Pacis*, in *The Rights of War and Peace*, (ed.) Richard Tuck, (Indiana, 3 vols, 2005), vol. I, pp. 356–8.

[31]   As demonstrated in e.g. P. Haggenmacher, *Grotius et la doctrine de la guerre juste*, (Paris, 1983); Martin Van Gelderen, 'From Domingo de Soto to Hugo Grotius: Theories of Monarchy and Civil Power in Spanish and Dutch Political Thought', *Il Pensiero Politico*, 23 (1999): pp. 186–206.

[32]   Grotius, *Rights of War and Peace*, vol. I, p. 225. Grotius' later Huguenot editor, Jean Barbeyrac, included a long gloss on this passage in which he rejected Grotius' position and reaffirmed the Protestant line. This gloss is included in Tuck's edition.

[33]   H. Grotius, *Opera Omnia Theologica* (London, 3 vols, 1679), vol. III, pp. 622; 661–3.

took a similar view. For, by the 1620s and 1630s, there was a sizeable body of Remonstrant and Socinian writing which presented Christ as a legislator who gave new ethical precepts to his followers. Moreover, the early Socinians had applied these ideas to the question of resistance directly, and their leader, Faustus Socinus, had (at least initially) upheld a pacifist position. Although few Remonstrants were willing to renounce all violence, some of their number felt the pull of pacifism and began to question the legitimacy of violence and warfare for Christians. In these communities, therefore, the distinctions between the realms of nature and grace were revived, often with explicit reference to Catholic authors, and put to political effect.[34] This reintroduction of a more subtle and nuanced approach to natural law and Christian ethics proved to be highly influential in England, where it was taken up by some of the leading Royalist authors.

Hammond included those Grotian ideas which furthered his own case in the second and all subsequent editions of his tract *Of resisting the lawful magistrate*, with due acknowledgment of his source. In a section entitled 'Of taking up the Crosse' Hammond contrasted 'this duty of a Christian' with the laws of the Old Testament and of nature, suggesting that the kind of patience required from Christians towards their rulers was far greater than anything required from the Jews or pagans. Resistance, indeed, was 'lesse allowed, but [instead] become more unlawfull by the Evangelicall Law'. Evidently Hammond felt on surer ground when he shifted the argument away from what might be allowed under the natural law, to what was acceptable for Christians.[35] In the process, however, he was taking a significant step away from the mainstream Protestant understanding of the relationship between natural law and Christianity – and the heterodox aspect of his argument deserves to be recognised, and certainly was at the time.

Grotius and Hammond agreed that natural law could not function as the sole normative standard for a Christian society, an argument they attributed to rebellious Calvinists. Both saw nature as granting men *rights* of self- defence – rights which could be renounced and traded in for the benefits of peace and security. Both were, therefore, moving away from a world in which the moral landscape was shaped and structured by natural law. Instead, they began to conceive of a distinct civil sphere, in which natural rights were constrained and confined by agreements, promises and obligations, especially the obligation to obey the supreme magistrate. And they believed that the obligations of the civil world were underpinned by Christianity. Where the parliamentarians saw continuity between nature, and social and Christian duties, Hammond

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[34]　For a full discussion see Sarah Mortimer, 'Human Liberty and Human Nature in the Works of Faustus Socinus and His Readers', *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 70 (2009): pp. 191–212.

[35]　H. Hammond, *Of Resisting the Lawfull magistrate under colour of religion* (2nd edition, Oxford, 1644), pp. 41, 56.

followed Grotius in treating these separately. Hammond even told his readers that it was this aspect of Grotius' writing which appealed to him: the Dutchman was, he said, 'an excellent casuist, exactly distinguishing the severall obligations of Nature, of *Moses*, and of Christ'.[36]

Digges agreed with his Oxford friends that Christianity was not a religion which supported rebellion, resistance or even insubordination, but like them he did not want merely to pin his hopes on a sudden upsurge in Christian piety of the pacifist kind. Instead, he wanted to show as clearly as possible that the Parliamentarian appeal to nature was, on civil and secular grounds, illegitimate. It was not in the earthly interests of the Parliamentarians to plead a natural right of self-defence, for this was a sure road to anarchy and instability. Fundamentally, he argued that the Parliamentarians did not understand that civil society was created by a historical process, and that many tiers of laws and obligation now overlaid the natural condition. Men, Digges said, gave up their rights to defend themselves and to revenge any injury inflicted upon them when they entered civil society. Instead, they appointed magistrates who would protect them and ensure that all evildoers were punished. This was a sensible option, for it prevented the conflict that would arise if each tried to exercise his own natural rights. And once these rights had gone, they could not be reclaimed, however much the individual might suffer. Otherwise, the whole agreement on which society was based would fall apart.[37] Read in the context of the Treaty of Oxford, Digges' argument seems designed to undercut all attempts at Parliamentarian self-justification, and to encourage Charles to hold firm against his opponents.

Digges' argument was strong, but it was not watertight. For, as he well realised, there would be some who found themselves at a disadvantage in society, and who would feel that in giving up their natural rights they had made a poor bargain. The classic example was that of someone incorrectly convicted of a capital charge and sentenced to death. But Digges may also have been thinking here of the hard-line Parliamentarians, like the Five Members, who had gone too far in their opposition to Charles to make a safe retreat. It had to be in their own earthly interest to seek to reactivate that original right of self-defence. But Digges had an answer to this problem: Christianity. Christ commanded his followers to obey their rulers and not to resist or undermine them, even at the cost of their own life. If they obeyed peacefully, then they would not lose their chance of eternal life, of a reward which far surpassed any earthly inconveniences or troubles. Digges was quite clear that such an obligation, to submit even at the

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36   Hammond, *Of Resisting the Lawfull magistrate*, ibid.
37   [D. Digges,] *An Answer to a Printed Book* (London, 1642), p. 20.

cost of one's life, could not be found in nature, but only in Christianity.[38] On this point Hammond and Grotius had been rather more fuzzy, running together the civil and the heavenly benefits of non-resistance. Digges realised that the argument would be clearer if the two were separated. Usually men gained in this life if they eschewed resistance, but even if they did not, they could be sure that God would remember their patience when they reached Heaven. Although Digges probably did not expect that his argument would change the minds of any Parliamentarian leaders, he could at least point out the contradictions between their conduct and the early Christian martyrs who had preached and practised obedience.

But perhaps the most strident rejoinder to Parliament's rhetoric of Christian defensive action came from another Oxford man: John Webberly. Indeed, his work was so extreme that when Francis Cheynell discovered it he immediately confiscated it and we know of it only from Cheynell's subsequent comments. Webberly, the Sub-Rector of Lincoln College and protégé of Bishop John Williams, had taken time out from arranging quarter for the Royalist troops in Oxford in order to engage in more scholarly activities, but he hoped that these would be no less helpful to his master's cause. He had found a work by the anti-Trinitarian Faustus Socinus in which the case for Christian non-resistance was made with eloquence and sophistication, and he determined to translate it for the benefit of his contemporaries. The translation would, he believed, show the Parliamentarians that their claims to be serving God were nonsense; a true Christian would never take arms against his king.[39]

What probably appalled Cheynell most about the book was its discussion of property, for Webberly explained to his readers that a Christian must not defend his goods and possessions by force. Webberly had argued, following Socinus, that the laws by which a Christian should live were to be found in the Gospel, not in nature or the Old Testament. From Cheynell's brief comments, it appears that the work Webberly was translating was one in which Socinus criticised the Lutherans because they refused to accept the stringent demands of Christian ethics.[40] In it, Socinus insisted that Christians, unlike the Israelites, had no homeland to defend, and so they must not resort to violence to preserve their lives and possessions. If this is so, then Webberly had chosen to translate a work in which the Protestant synthesis of natural law, self-defence and Christian duty was systematically dismantled, well aware of the damage such a book could

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[38]   D. Digges, *The Unlawfulness of subjects taking up arms* (London, 1644), pp. 120–22.

[39]   F. Cheynell, *The Rise, Growth, and Danger of Socinianism* (1643), preface; on Webberly see A. Clark, *Lincoln College* (London, 1898), pp. 99, 111.

[40]   The work of Socinus which best fits Cheynell's description is *Quod regni Poloniæ et magni ducatus Lithuaniæ homines ...* ([Franeker], 1610).

do to the intellectual foundations of Parliament's cause. Yet, as Cheynell pointed out, Webberly's ideas were just as likely to harm his own side, for they implied that no Christian, not even the king, had anything he could call his own here on earth – and this was not an ideology likely to appeal to landed gentlemen, let alone Charles himself.[41]

In the early 1640s, therefore, it is possible to see the development of two different approaches to natural law. Parliamentarians were anxious to present natural law as a religious duty, while some of the Royalists preferred to contrast Christian ethics and precepts with the lesser, earthly rights which humans had from nature. The political implications of these two different approaches to natural law are, I hope, clear. On the Parliamentarian account, the right of self-defence, which shaded into a right of resistance, could never be lost because it was embedded in a system of natural law whose source was, ultimately, God. Men had a religious and civil duty to preserve themselves and their society, and their souls and their fortunes would suffer if they did not. For Digges and Hammond, however, there was no such connection between self-defence, natural law and Christianity. A Christian could not invoke a natural right against the realities of civil life and the clear commands of the Apostles; resistance simply could not be defended from the natural law. They feared that any easy identification of natural and divine law would encourage sedition and rebellion on both religious and political grounds, and they sought to recover and then develop a sense of distance between the laws. In the process, the Royalists hoped to show that the Parliamentarians were confused, that they were too quick to assume that religion and politics went hand in hand, and that neither the civil nor the spiritual case for resistance could be sustained.

Theology and politics were almost invariably intertwined in the conflicts that beset early modern states. England in this respect was no different from the rest of Europe – the Parliamentarians made use of a religiously charged language of natural law to justify their political as well as their religious agenda. This is perhaps not too surprising, although it would merit further investigation. Some Royalists were rather more inventive, however. They began to see that the whole concept of natural law as it currently stood could be challenged, recast as natural rights, and thereby stripped of its religious elements. That way, Christianity could be preserved as a religion of non-resistance, but placed at one remove from political circumstances. Discussion on this point did not end with the first Civil War, but continued through the decade and beyond. Indeed, the relationship between nature and Christianity, civil magistrate and church, would continue to vex and to exercise people in England and the continent for many years to come.

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[41]   Cheynell, *The Rise, Growth, and Danger of Socinianism*, pp. 23–6, 47, 52.

Chapter 10

Oliver Cromwell on Religion and Resistance

Rachel Foxley

In the essay from which this volume takes its starting point, John Morrill argued that the English Civil War 'was not the first European revolution: it was the last of the Wars of Religion'.[1] This influential claim was fleshed out by various lines of argument within Morrill's work, particularly in the analysis of the events of the first two years of the Long Parliament and the watershed moments and issues which divided the elite into the warring sides. A recognition of the crucial importance of religion in the causes of the war has remained widely current in the literature, taking different forms in the work of revisionists and post-revisionists. The evidence that religious alignment was critical to the political choices of many, especially the most highly motivated minority, at all levels of society, is overwhelming.[2] The prime exemplar of religious motivation in the fighting of the Civil War is Oliver Cromwell himself: so deeply, consistently and quotably Puritan in his interpretation of the war that there seems little further to be said. And yet Cromwell denied that religion was a legitimate ground for resistance, and insisted that the Civil War was being fought for civil liberty rather than for religion. By taking that assertion seriously, I will attempt here to bring Cromwell's providentialism back into relation to his constitutionalism, suggesting that the relationship between the two is less contradictory and more mutually supporting than might be supposed.

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[1]   John Morrill, 'The Religious Context of the English Civil War', *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* 34 (1984): pp. 155–78, reprinted in his *The Nature of the English Revolution* (London, 1993), pp. 45–68, quotation at p. 68.

[2]   John Adamson, *The Noble Revolt: The Overthrow of Charles I* (London, 2007) for recognition of the Puritan motivation of his 'noble revolt'; John Walter, *Understanding Popular Violence in the English Revolution: The Colchester Plunderers* (Cambridge, 1999) for popular action; Mark Stoyle, *Loyalty and Locality: Popular Allegiance in Devon During the English Civil War* (Exeter, 1996) for a religious interpretation of regional and local patterns of allegiance.

We must distinguish between several senses in which the Civil Wars and the arguments associated with them might be characterized as religious. Firstly, the wars might have been seen as religious by those who fought and suffered in them because they were seen as an event in the unfolding of spiritual history, playing a role in the providential purposes of God. Secondly, we might see the *motivations* of those who fought or sided with king or Parliament as religious, even if their declared aims were not: differences between the religious cultures of the two sides might be visible to historians analysing patterns of allegiance. Further, the justifications which contemporaries did themselves articulate might be religious in one of two different senses: they might simply employ the resources of the Christian tradition to reassure the consciences of prospective soldiers; or they might go further and attempt to justify the war as one in defence of true religion and justified by that specifically religious end.

For many Puritan contemporaries, the English Civil War was indeed a religious struggle, one which would fulfil spiritual purposes ultimately known only to God, but at least glimpsed by the godly. The language of many sermons is filled with this portentous sense of God's providence in the war. Baskerville has pointed to the sense of the 'militarization of the universe' which is found particularly in the sermons of Jeremiah Burroughs, a strong advocate of the notion that the Lord would 'bring great things to pass' from the events of the war. Baskerville notes too the language of Stephen Marshall, the famous preacher of *Meroz Cursed*, who asserted that God must have a purpose in setting people on to the sword; in the case of Marshall, we know that some of his hearers and readers took his language as a religious commission to fight. Indeed, for Burroughs, any war had to be 'undertaken … for God and according to God's will; it must be by commission from this great general'.[3] For Burroughs, 'there are none in heaven but were bred Souldiers', but these Christian warriors were acting in arenas beyond their control when they engaged in actual wars: 'Who so fit to be used in the battels of the Lord, as they who have most interest in the Lord?'[4] God's purposes will be fulfilled through his human instruments, whether fit or unfit; the relationship of human agency to these divine battles is complex. Indeed, the instrumentality required of the godly might militate against any sense of active human choice.[5]

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[3]   Stephen Baskerville, *Not Peace but a Sword: The Political Theology of the English Revolution* (London, 1993), pp. 32–3; Glenn Burgess, 'Was the English Civil War a War of Religion? The Evidence of Political Propaganda', *Huntington Library Quarterly*, 61/2 (1998): pp. 173–4 for reaction to Marshall's sermon.

[4]   Jeremiah Burroughs, *The Glorious Name of God, the Lord of Hosts* (1643), p. 92.

[5]   J.C. Davis, 'Living with the Living God: Radical Religion and the English Revolution', in Christopher Durston and Judith Maltby (eds), *Religion in Revolutionary England*

In the reaction to Marshall's *Meroz Cursed* we have evidence for religious motivation among some of those who fought for Parliament, but historians have often had to look for religious motivation in those who fought the war in a more indirect way, seeking out alignments between the religious culture of particular communities and their allegiances in the war.[6] The evidence from such studies, as well as our knowledge of the choices of particular individuals, again speaks strongly in favour of the war as a 'religious war', if by that we mean a war where religious alignment played a significant role in the formation of the sides.

When we come to the justifications which people offered for engaging in war, matters become a little more complicated. Naturally, the war had to be made compatible with the teaching of Christianity if consciences were to be satisfied about its justness. This might, however, be done in more or less religious ways. Royalists could most easily invoke the support of biblical teaching to argue that 'the powers that be are ordained of God', and hence that the royal armies were merely putting down entirely unlawful resistance: indeed, the simple legend 'ROMANS XIII' on a regimental standard could be relied on to convey this message.[7] For parliamentarians, arguments for arming against the king were harder to come by, and tended to legitimate the war effort by drawing on political traditions of argument which might have had their origins in the resistance theory of the sixteenth-century wars of religion, but which in the context of the English Civil War (though perhaps not of the Scottish covenanting movement) tended to be articulated in their more secular and constitutionalist forms. In England, parliamentarians generally argued for a 'secular right' rather than a 'religious duty' to resist, although that secular right was of course squared with Christian teaching about political life.[8] Even in the case of justificatory arguments directed at Christian consciences, the

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(Manchester, 2006), pp. 19–41.

[6]   Stoyle, *Loyalty and Locality*.

[7]   Ian Gentles, 'The Iconography of Revolution: England 1642–1649', in I.J. Gentles, J.S. Morrill, and Blair Worden (eds), *Soldiers, Writers and Statesmen of the English Revolution* (Cambridge, 1998), p. 98.

[8]   John Coffey, *Politics, Religion and the British Revolutions: The Mind of Samuel Rutherford* (Cambridge, 1997), pp. 181–3, on Rutherford, by contrast, as arguing for a 'religious duty' rather than a 'secular right' of resistance; p. 148 and note for the contrast between Rutherford and the English writers here. In England, even an extreme case like John Goodwin felt the need to justify action with civil authority as well as religious: John Coffey, *John Goodwin and the Puritan Revolution: Religion and Intellectual Change in Seventeenth-Century England* (Woodbridge, 2006), p. 94; Burgess, 'Was the English Civil War a War of Religion?', pp. 187–90. Glenn Burgess, 'Religious War and Constitutional Defence: Justifications of Resistance in English Puritan Thought, 1590–1643', in Robert von Friedeburg (ed.), *Widerstandsrecht in Der Frühen Neuzeit : Erträge Und Perspectiven Der*

argumentation used was itself often primarily secular in character, though placed within a Christian framework.

When it comes to the question of the grounds on which resistance was urged, similar conclusions may be drawn. While religion tended to provide the first and most unquestionable argument that active obedience to a magistrate was not always necessary (one could not obey a command which was against God's word), among English parliamentarians it fell far behind the constitutionalist arguments which had been developed as a justification for active resistance to magistratical power. This was not inevitable: the Scottish Covenanters were arguably far more willing to justify resistance on religious grounds than the English parliamentarians were, and it has been pointed out that Scottish and English uses of the different Questions of the Huguenot *Vindiciae, contra Tyrannos* were different, with the English favouring the more secular third question over the first two.[9] It was not simply a matter of secular argument trumping religious grounds, however; there was a more positive and systematic argument, which laid out, in Jeremiah Burroughs' words, that 'The good of a Church is spirituall, and God hath given it spirituall means enough to preserve its spirituall good. But the good of a Kingdom is civill and naturall, therefore it must have civill and naturall meanes to preserve it selfe by in case of danger'.[10] For some of the most religiously motivated, it was precisely their thinking on the nature of true religion which ruled out the legitimacy of religious resistance by force of arms.

This is particularly significant as it is this criterion – whether resistance could be used to defend the true religion and overthrow religious misrule – which was most likely to have been contemporaries' criterion for seeing the Civil War as a 'war of religion'. On the parliamentarian side, the groundwork for discussion of this question of the legitimacy or otherwise of resistance on grounds of religion has been provided by Glenn Burgess, who has convincingly demonstrated that the vast majority of mainstream Puritan authors rejected religious resistance, justifying their support of the parliamentary cause in ways which deliberately avoided legitimizing any 'war of religion'.[11]

Forschung Im Deutsch-Britische Vergleich (Berlin, 2001), pp. 198–9, for the very marginal voices in England defending religious war.

[9]   J.H.M. Salmon, *The French Religious Wars in English Political Thought* (London, 1959), p. 87, contrasting Rutherford and Prynne.

[10]   Jeremiah Burroughs, *The Glorious Name of God*, postscript: 'A briefe Answer to Doctor *Fernes* Booke', p. 9. Cf. Palmer et al., *Scripture and Reason* (1643), p. 47, again arguing that spiritual safety should be ensured by spiritual means.

[11]   Burgess, 'Religious War and Constitutional Defence'; Burgess, 'Was the English Civil War a War of Religion?'.

In short, our sense of the Civil War as a 'war of religion' depends largely on our view of contemporaries' motivations in fighting, their sense of the war as an event in spiritual history, and, to some extent, to their use of arguments deriving from religion and directed towards people's consciences in the paper battles of the propaganda war. However, these were not contemporaries' criteria for identifying a 'war of religion', and they tended to deny that their own side, at any rate, was fighting one. Burgess's account of the parliamentarian divines meshes closely with my reading of Cromwell's scattered comments on this topic, and provides strong grounds for thinking that Cromwell was doing no more than following the standard Puritan line here.

Oliver Cromwell, like the Puritan authors already mentioned, certainly believed that the war he was fighting was one which served God's purposes. Those who had helped to take Bristol were 'instruments of God's glory, and their country's good; it's their honour that God vouchsafes to use them'.[12] After the bloody taking of Basing House, Cromwell again looked forward to the 'glorious work for the happiness of this poor Kingdom' which God would eventually bring forth from the war.[13] Perhaps owing to his growing faith in the chain of providences vouchsafed by God to him and his men, Cromwell was even more assertive about God's role in events in the second Civil War – 'these things that have lately come to pass have been the wonderful works of God; breaking the rod of the oppressor, as in the day of Midian, not with garments much rolled in blood, but by the terror of the Lord; who will yet save His people and confound His enemies, as in that day'[14] – and perhaps yet more vehemently so in his wars in Ireland and Scotland following the regicide. He saw God as positively prospering the righteous cause, and took on board the martial idea of God as the 'Lord of Hosts' – the watchword used at Dunbar, as Cromwell reminded his army colleagues in London.[15] Any ultimate judgement about the rightness of war or peace was determined by God's will: 'Peace is only good when we receive it out of our Father's hand, it's dangerous to snatch it, most dangerous to go against the will of God to attain it. War is good when led to by our Father, most

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[12]   S.C. Lomas (ed.), *The Letters and Speeches of Oliver Cromwell, with elucidations by Thomas Carlyle* (London, 3 vols, 1904) [hereafter 'Carlyle/Lomas'] I, p. 217. Note: Cromwell's letters are cited from Carlyle/Lomas; Cromwell's speeches are cited from Ivan Roots (ed.), *Speeches of Oliver Cromwell* (London, 1989) [hereafter 'Roots'], which follows the text of Charles L. Stainer (ed.), *Speeches of Oliver Cromwell, 1644–1658* (London, 1901); Roots silently accepts some variants listed by Stainer. See J.S. Morrill, 'Textualizing and Contextualizing Cromwell', *Historical Journal*, 33/3 (1990), 629–39.

[13]   Carlyle/Lomas I, p. 225.

[14]   Carlyle/Lomas I, p. 321.

[15]   Carlyle/Lomas II, p. 175.

evil when it comes from the lusts that are in our members'.[16] Contemplating his possible appointment to head the expedition to Ireland in 1649, Cromwell echoed Burroughs' view of God as the 'great general', arguing that '[i]t matters not who is our Commander-in-Chief, if God be so'.[17] In profound senses, then, the first Civil War, and perhaps even more those which followed, were religious struggles for Cromwell, and he, like the Puritan divines, expected a glorious divine issue from these events. Naturally, Cromwell's motivations for fighting were deeply religious.

On the question of the justification for the war, Cromwell again seems to line up with the majority of his English Puritan colleagues in the parliamentarian cause. He rarely articulated his reasons for fighting the war, but when he did he did so largely in terms of the secular and constitutional political thought which Puritans, even ministers, also used. Like them, I will argue, he held out against the notion that resistance on grounds of religion could be legitimate.

My starting point here is Cromwell's famous retrospective assertion about the purpose of the Civil War:

> religion was not the thing at the first contested for, but God brought it to that issue at last, and gave it to us by way of redundancy, and at last it proved that which was most dear to us.[18]

Historians have found this irresistibly quotable, but have also been unable to resist criticizing Cromwell's memory or honesty in saying it, as the claim seems so self-evidently absurd.[19] In reaction to this tendency, another tradition within the literature has maintained that Cromwell's statement can be perfectly well accepted as accurate, provided it is understood not as a claim about religious motivation in the Civil War in general, but as a claim about the slower development of an ideal of religious *liberty*. John Morrill exemplifies this argument:

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[16]   Carlyle/Lomas III, pp. 389–90.

[17]   Speech of 23 March 1649, Roots, p. 4. Cromwell's high-mindedness here masks a long-standing campaign for his appointment as commander of a force for Ireland: see Patrick Little, 'Cromwell and Ireland before 1649', in Patrick Little (ed.), *Oliver Cromwell: New Perspectives* (Basingstoke, 2009).

[18]   Oliver Cromwell, speech of 22 January 1655 (dissolution of First Protectorate Parliament), Roots, p. 67.

[19]   To take one recent example, Alan Cromartie, *The Constitutionalist revolution: an essay on the history of England, 1450–1642* (Cambridge, 2006), p. 1: 'Though Oliver Cromwell in retrospect maintained that what he later came to call "religion" was "not the thing at the first contested for", such statements reflected a subsequent shift in perspective'.

> This sentence is often misquoted to mean that Cromwell, godliest of the godly even in 1642, thought that the civil war was fought for primarily non-religious reasons. The context here makes it clear that what he meant was that the civil war had not begun as a war for religious liberty. Cromwell could now see that it had begun as a war to impose an alternative religious authoritarianism.[20]

While there are also historians who have taken Cromwell at his word, and asserted that he was indeed committed to the political cause as the justification for fighting the Civil War, they have not expounded the underpinnings of his argument here in detail.[21] I will attempt to set Cromwell's statement in the context of his thought more broadly, and the Puritan arguments laid out by Glenn Burgess, and to explore the significance of this view for our understanding of Cromwell's religious and political thought.

Let us first, then, return to Cromwell's words:

> religion was not the thing at the first contested for, but God brought it to that issue at last, and gave it to us by way of redundancy, and at last it proved that which was most dear to us.

The first point to make is that the contrast Cromwell is drawing here is only partly a chronological one. The 'first' and 'last' have distracted us from a more important distinction: that between what humans 'contest' for and what God brings about. The key words here are 'issue' and 'redundancy': while humans struggle, according to their consciences, for legitimate secular causes, it is God who directs the spiritual 'issue' of events. These ultimate outcomes may be the most important, but they may also be ones which humans cannot or do not directly strive for, at least not with the sword, or not in resistance to constituted authority. God, if He so chooses, may reward human action with an 'issue' which humans alone would be powerless to bring about: in the case of the Civil War, 'religion' was just such a 'redundancy', a free gift of God's abounding grace.[22]

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[20]   J.S. Morrill, 'Introduction', in Morrill (ed.), *Oliver Cromwell and the English Revolution* (Harlow, 1990), p. 18 footnote.

[21]   Robert S. Paul, *The Lord Protector: Religion and Politics in the Life of Oliver Cromwell* (Grand Rapids, Mich., 1964), p. 392. Barry Coward, *Oliver Cromwell: Profiles in Power* (London, 1991), p. 21, and John Adamson, 'Oliver Cromwell and the Long Parliament', in Morrill (ed.), *Oliver Cromwell and the English Revolution*, p. 55, both take Cromwell at his word (the Civil War was fought primarily for the defence of Parliament), while still interpreting 'religion' here as meaning 'religious liberty'.

[22]   The *Oxford English Dictionary* gives no specific theological meaning for 'redundancy' and its grammatical variants, but it is a term which crops up frequently in discussions of

Do we have evidence that it was, in fact, Cromwell's view that one could not fight for religion? This is a question which is surprisingly little treated in the literature on Cromwell, since his pervasively, obsessively providentialist view of the war has distracted us from this more basic technical question. But his answer to it is clear. Writing to his brother-in-law Valentine Walton, in response to criticism from fellow army-men, he wrote:

> because some of us are enemies to rapine, and other wickednesses, we are said to
> be factious, to seek to maintain our opinions in religion by force, which we detest
> and abhor. I profess I could never satisfy myself of the justness of this War, but
> from the authority of the Parliament to maintain itself in its rights; and in this
> Cause I hope to approve myself an honest man and single-hearted.[23]

This was a statement made in 1644, and although it responded to public controversy, it did so in a relatively private letter. Cromwell did not often expand on the political theory underlying his concern with Parliament's rights, but he was capable of doing so when pushed. Arguing, in response to Hammond's doubts in 1648, that forms of government arise by human institution (although political power itself is from God), and that they are 'limited, some with larger, others with stricter bands, each one according to its constitution', he concluded that 'there are cases in which it is lawful to resist', when the duty of obedience lapses owing to government breaching its constitutional limits.[24] Cromwell was familiar with the secular theoretical framework in which Parliament articulated its role in the war, and adept enough at employing it, at least when occasion demanded.

Throughout the letters of the first and second Civil War years Cromwell's emphasis was constantly on the favour of God and the need to 'acknowledge' or 'own' it. And yet he was quite clear that religion was *not* what he was fighting for. Even while pleading with Parliament after Naseby to ensure liberty of conscience for the victorious soldiers (by not enforcing the taking of the Solemn League and Covenant), Cromwell made clear that it was not liberty of conscience that the men were, or could have been, fighting for:

Christ's grace: see for example Christopher Love, *Grace: the truth and growth and different degrees thereof* (1652), p. 198: 'There is fulnesse in Christ, there is grace enough in Christ, in him there is fulnesse of sufficiency, of efficiency, and of redundancy', where redundancy is used alongside the technical terms of 'sufficient' and 'efficient' grace.

[23]   Carlyle/Lomas I, p. 181: 5/6 Sept 1644.

[24]   Carlyle/Lomas I, p. 393.

Honest men served you faithfully in this action. Sir, they are trusty; I beseech you in the name of God, not to discourage them. He that ventures his life for the liberty of his country, I wish he trust God for the liberty of his conscience, and you for the liberty he fights for.[25]

The liberty the soldier fights for is not 'the liberty of his conscience', which must be sought through God's providence rather than through parliamentary power over conscience. The human aims are, by definition, civil – 'the liberty of [the] country' – and can be cared for by Parliament; the divine aims cannot be granted by any human power and have to be trusted to God – though their fulfilment may in some sense be epiphenomenal on these human efforts, always via God's grace.

In the 1650s, however, Cromwell did begin to include religion as part of the cause which he had fought for all along. By this stage, perhaps, he was taking a longer view on events: that providentially achieved 'issue' could be reckoned up alongside the original constitutional arguments for the war, and the original niceties and constraints of casuistical justification of the war were less immediate. By 1657 Cromwell could talk of civil liberties and the interests of God's people, and declare that if he were 'asked why I engaged all along in the late wars, I could give no account but it would be wicked, if it did not comprehend these two ends'.[26] By 1658 he took it for granted that his audience in Parliament 'very well know' what the 'cause' and the 'quarrel ... was at the first': it was 'the maintaining of the liberty of these nations; our civil liberties, as men; our spiritual liberties, as Christians'.[27] But the 1650s statements of the cause which place religion (or religious liberty more specifically) alongside civil liberty as the elements of the cause which was fought for and may now be brought to completion, whether or not they represent a looser statement of feelings which were current in the 1640s, do also raise the question of how civil and religious aims coexisted for godly parliamentarians, both in the first Civil War and later.

It is a seeming paradox that a deep belief in the spiritual significance of the war, and a correspondingly deep sense of religious motivation in fighting it, could go along with an insistence, at least at the time, that the war was not a case of resistance on grounds of religion but should be defended entirely in civil terms.[28] However, whether civil and religious ends were (nominally) dissociated as in the 1640s, or associated as in the 1650s, there was a need to line up the political and religious desiderata so that there was no danger of one being sacrificed to the

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25   Carlyle/Lomas I, p. 205: to Speaker Lenthall, 14 June 1645.

26   Roots, p. 116.

27   Roots, p. 169.

28   Burgess, 'Religious War and Constitutional Defence', p. 201.

other. I am suggesting that the ban on fighting war on religious grounds was, in itself, deeply religious, rather than merely an attempt to maintain respectability and ward off royalist slurs of unconstitutional zealotry.[29] Individuals who were deeply motivated by religion were thus also deeply motivated to understand the war they were fighting in secular terms, and ideally, to explain how it was that this secular struggle would serve the cause of religion. This connection could itself be made in more secular or more spiritual ways: by arguing that Parliament *was* defending religion in defending its civil rights, because those rights protected religion; and by arguing that God through his providence would reward the Parliament's political struggle with religion. Cromwell, like his Puritan contemporaries, can be seen to use both of these modes of argument, alternating between what we might call a zealous Puritan constitutionalism, and an intermittent resort to the providential character of political necessity.

The Puritan constitutionalist argument held that religion could be defended by force, but only where religion itself was protected by law.[30] The resistance theory which applied was therefore essentially a secular resistance theory; even if the assault on the liberties of the subject was directed entirely at religion, it would have to be achieved via the violation of civil laws, and it was this violation which could be resisted. England was held to be in the happy position of having legal protection for the Protestant religion, and God's benevolence towards England was partly expressed through this fact. This understanding in itself tended to serve as an argument for the systematic linkage of civil and religious misrule. Although civil misrule might, of course, exist without religious misrule, for those of a Puritan disposition the religious motives of their opponents even in their civil violations seemed self-evident: Edward Bowles, a parliamentary army chaplain, argued that 'In all places a temporall tyranny is a great step to Ecclesiasticall; and especially in our Kingdome, where our Religion is fenced in with positive Law, they must breake this hedge before they can spoile the vineyard'.[31] Violation of civil rights, therefore, was prima facie evidence, for Bowles, of an intent to attack the true religion.

While Cromwell did not explicitly articulate this argument in the 1640s, in the 1650s it became part of his armoury for defending the proposition that civil and religious interests were compatible. Looking back in 1658 to the start of the Civil Wars, he pointed to Parliament's fears of innovation in both civil

[29]   Burgess, works cited, mentions both motivations in his discussion of the divines' arguments against resistance on grounds of religion.

[30]   Burgess, 'Was the English Civil War a War of Religion?', pp. 198–201 discusses the divines' extensive use of this argument.

[31]   Edward Bowles, *Plaine English, or, A discourse concerning the accommodation, the armie, the association* (1643), p. 4.

and religious matters, and noted that it was those who should have least role 'meddling with civil things' who pushed for these innovations – 'which was verily thought would have been a very good shelter to them, to innovate upon us in matters of religion also'.[32] In the 1650s, Cromwell did tend to subordinate civil liberty to the cause of the godly, but he used the doctrine of civil protections for religious liberty to argue the importance of both:

> The other thing cared for [after religion and religious liberty] is the civil liberties and interests of the nations, which although it be, and indeed ought to be subordinate to a more peculiar interest of God, yet it is the next best God hath given men in the world, and better than any words, if well cared for, to fence the people of God in their interest.

Using this argument, he could deny – vehemently and somewhat defensively – the proposition 'that the interest of God's people and the civil interest are inconsistent'.[33]

The second way of linking religion and politics was through providence. Cromwell's comment that the war was not fought for religion, but that God eventually brought it to that 'issue', is consistent with the hopes expressed by many at the start of the first Civil War. While the certainty that God had indeed rewarded the parliamentarians with 'religion' was the fruit of hindsight, the sense that the war fought by humans would be directed to spiritual ends by God's providence, and an expectant faith in God to do so in accord with the hopes of the Puritan minority, were current right from the start of the war. Puritan divines argued that engaging in resistance to abusive civil authorities, on civil grounds, would prove, through God's providence, to be an effective resistance to the forces of religious tyranny. Jeremiah Burroughs circuitously explained that, although the people could not resist on a solely religious cause, God 'will so order things' that the 'papists' will violate civil law and be resistible 'in a just way' by 'inferiour Magistrates, assisted by the people'.[34] It was the providence of God which ensured that civil and religious right coincided, and enabled a 'just' resistance led by inferior magistrates. Burroughs' explicit rejection of resistance on grounds of religion did not stop him from seeing the Civil War as an event charged with religious meaning: 'the time is (we hope) at hand for the pulling down of Antichrist'. Since it was the people rather than kings who would fulfil this work, 'There is a necessitie that in these times peoples Consciences should

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[32] Roots, p. 169; cf. p. 146 for a similar argument.

[33] Roots, p. 116 (3 April 1657).

[34] Jeremiah Burroughs, *The Glorious Name of God*, postscript: 'A briefe Answer to Doctor Fernes Booke', p. 14.

be further satisfied in their liberties in this Case then formerly': somehow, the people's attention to their own, presumably civil, liberties would set in motion the events predicted in Revelation.[35] Clearly, the parliamentarian war effort was to play a role in the great events of spiritual history, even though it was not explicitly waged in order to pull down Antichrist.

I have already suggested that Cromwell's famous statement on the justification of the war retrospectively identified a providential link between the war fought for political aims and the 'religion' with which the parliamentarians were rewarded by God. Cromwell's providentialism is overwhelmingly apparent to any reader of his words, but it is perhaps important to consider its interaction with the rest of his political thought. It would be easy to think that Cromwell had one secular constitutionalist mode of thought – however little he tended to say about it – and another religious providentialist mode which at times of crisis entirely overwhelmed the more 'secular' view of politics.[36] Certainly, providentialism came to the fore at times of rupture to constitutional norms, most obviously in Cromwell's deliberations around the time of the regicide, and he rowed back from it in more secure periods. However, those times of rupture, too, induced in Cromwell a mode of thought which blended secular political considerations with religious and providential ones. While providentialism is by definition a religious mode of thought, God's providential actions could apply as much to politics as to religion, and Cromwell could express the need for interruptions to constitutional norms in terms of political necessity as well as of providence.

Cromwell's turn to providence to settle vital political questions was most agonized and passionate around the time of Pride's Purge and the regicide. While his extraordinary letter to Hammond of 25 November 1648 began by rehearsing the rational political arguments, starting with a constitutionalist defence of lawful resistance, it moved – uncertainly, but urgently – in the direction of providentialism. Notably, however, it did so via the staging post of *salus populi* and political necessity. Even before Cromwell reached his overtly providential response to the situation, his political argument had already moved beyond the bounds he set for it in 1644. The current treaty with Charles I might actively endanger the public safety (*salus populi*) which was the ultimate criterion of political action. Cromwell's thinking now began to advance along

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[35]   Jeremiah Burroughs, ibid., p. 14.

[36]   Cf. Ernest Sirluck, 'Milton's Political Thought: The First Cycle', *Modern Philology*, 61 (1964): pp. 209–24, which sees in Milton two competing conceptions of political life: firstly a contractarian, secular theory of popular sovereignty, and then, displacing it in the later works of this period, a providential view of politics in which the rule of a chosen and godly few secures meaningful liberty.

lines familiar from the army's politicization in 1647 and the arguments of the Levellers. He asked Hammond to consider:

> Whether this Army be not a lawful power, called by God to oppose and fight against the King upon some stated grounds; and being in power to such ends, may not oppose one name of authority, for those ends, as well as another, the outward authority that called them not by their power making the quarrel lawful, but it being so in itself?[37]

As in 1644, the 'quarrel' might still be justified on the 'stated grounds' of the rights of Parliament, but now it was the simple fact of the violation of those rights of Parliament, rather than Parliament's authority in leading the resistance, which justified those who fought. In 1644, it had been 'the authority of the Parliament to maintain itself in its rights' which justified the fighting of the war – a very different matter. Thus far Cromwell was, he claimed, following the principles of human reasoning; but he then overlaid this argument with his providential sense that the army was 'called', and that what was 'justified *in foro humano*' might not be the overriding consideration. However, he still saw the providentially armed New Model as called by law as well as by God, and as defending the secular *salus populi*. Even when God accepted the zeal of Phineas – a recurring motif of Cromwell's at this time – providence was not simply overwhelming secular constitutional norms: Phineas restored a justice which had been neglected by those tasked with implementing it, even if he did so by neglecting proper procedure.[38] Clearly this providential acceptance of a turn to zeal, a temporary bypassing of forms, was a change in Cromwell's thought, and the resulting resort to force was a watershed which divided some radicals from others. But even here, Cromwell fought shy of resting his entire faith on a providence that might, translated back into 'human' terms, look like a justification of resistance on purely religious grounds. The zeal of the saints still flowed in a 'lawful' channel, to restore lawful government and secure the ends

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[37] Carlyle/Lomas I, p. 396. Johann Sommerville, 'Oliver Cromwell and English Political Thought', in Morrill (ed.), *Oliver Cromwell and the English Revolution*, p. 241, points to this use of *salus populi* in changing circumstances to argue in favour of a natural law rather than ancient constitution theory in Cromwell's thought, mixed with providential ideas.

[38] Carlyle/Lomas I, p. 521. Cf. Martin Dzelzainis, 'Anti-Monarchism in English Republicanism', in Martin van Gelderen and Quentin Skinner (eds), *Republicanism: A Shared European Heritage. vol. 1. Republicanism and Constitutionalism in Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge, 2002), pp. 27–41, arguing that the regicides tried to draw the sting of the accusation of 'private zeal' by regularising Phineas's action and denying any special commission from God in its performance.

of the justifiable resistance against the king for which Cromwell had enlisted at the start of the war.

In the crisis of 1648–9, Cromwell grappled with the relationship between the world and the divine, nature and providence. While I have tried to show that a turn towards providential modes of thought did not constitute simply a decision to pursue religious ends through force, but to some extent was an extension of the pursuit of constitutional ends, it is true that the line between fleshly and spiritual reasons and ends came under severe pressure in the circumstances of the regicide crisis. The challenges of rule in the 1650s also required Cromwell to grapple with the relationship between secular and spiritual life. Cromwell's sense of the chasm between nature and grace is evident, but he often recurred to the role of nature: this life as a basis for the next; civil order as a vessel for the nation's spiritual life. These arguments framed his attitude to magistracy and resistance, but also to religious toleration. Anxious in many contexts not to contaminate the spiritual with 'earthly mixtures', Cromwell ultimately recognized the need to house the spiritual within protective, but perhaps minimal, structures of civil life, both individual and national.

Cromwell's rejection of religious war in the first Civil War was based partly on his thinking about the relationship between worldly and spiritual means, and this thinking was in itself deeply religious. Cromwell's letters of the 1640s did not elaborate these points, but after the regicide, in the extraordinarily revealing documents in which he justified waging war in Ireland and Scotland, Cromwell set out passionately his views on the evils of using warfare for spiritual ends. Here he expressed his outrage at the false principles invoked by the Commonwealth's enemies, and specifically the clergy, in those two kingdoms. Even though Cromwell believed that in Scotland, unlike in Ireland, 'God hath a people here fearing His name, though deceived',[39] he was as passionate in his denunciation of Scottish as of Irish clergy. The Scottish Presbyterian and Irish Catholic clerical castes who were the agents and motivators of his military enemies in the two kingdoms had fallen into the same crucial error.

It was in this context, rather than the context of the English civil war, that Cromwell did deploy the concept of a war of religion – and he did so to condemn his enemies for fighting one. The Catholic clergy in Ireland were fighting a '*Bellum Proelaticum et Religiosum*, in the primary intention of it', and their willingness to admit that their cause was partly for the rights of their church and its hierarchy would, even without any other guilt, be damning for Cromwell ('this alone would be your confusion'). Evidently the particular *type* of 'religious war' – not just religious but 'prelatical' – would have been particularly

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39   Carlyle/Lomas II, p. 109.

likely to put itself beyond the pale in Cromwell's eyes, scornful as he was of his enemies' 'Church (falsely so called)' and its 'Archbishops, Bishops and Prelates'. Their willingness 'to engage people and nations into blood' for *this* cause was particularly damning.[40] Yet in both the Scottish and Irish contexts Cromwell did spell out more clearly what was wrong with such 'religious war'.

It is undeniable that Cromwell's main target, in Scotland and in Ireland, was the overweening clericalism of Catholics and Presbyterians, and it might be thought that it was merely the 'ministers of Christ' for whom it was not 'lawful' to 'contend' with the sword.[41] These clerics could not and would not be allowed to 'to overtop the civil power, or debase it'.[42] Yet Cromwell's Irish and Scottish polemics ultimately developed a much more far-reaching argument about the proper pursuit of spiritual ends. To pursue spiritual means by blood or force, according to Cromwell, was unlawful, and, indeed, nonsensical: 'surely if these, that are outward things, may not thus be contended for; how much less may the doctrines of Faith (which are the works of Grace and Spirit) be endeavoured by so unsuitable means!'[43] Cromwell warned the Scots to be careful of using

> the instruments of a foolish shepherd, to wit, meddling with worldly policies, and mixtures of earthly power, to set up that which they call the kingdom of Christ, which is neither it, nor, if it were it, would such means be found effectual to that end; and neglect, or trust not to, the Word of God, the sword of the Spirit, which is alone powerful and able for the setting up of that kingdom, and, when trusted to, will be found effectually able to that end, and will also do it.[44]

Such 'mixtures of earthly power' were exemplified, of course, by the alliance of the supposedly godly, reformation-driven Covenanters with so worldly and opportunistic a power as Charles Stuart.[45] Their making of this deal was a fundamental mistake partly because God would never reward such worldly methods with success in religion:

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[40]   Carlyle/Lomas II, p. 9. Cromwell also made it clear that he felt that the religious motives of the Irish had 'precedency' in their cause, and that they were merely 'mak[ing] use of the King of Scots' name' to attract potential support from men of royalist tendencies even beyond Ireland: Carlyle/Lomas III, p. 419.

[41]   Carlyle/Lomas II, p. 9.

[42]   Carlyle/Lomas II, p. 122.

[43]   Carlyle/Lomas II, p. 9.

[44]   Carlyle/Lomas II, p. 109.

[45]   Carlyle/Lomas II, p. 123.

> When they purely trust to the sword of the spirit, which is the Word of God, which is powerful to bring down strongholds and every imagination that exalts itself, which alone is able to square and fit the stones for the new Jerusalem; then and not before, and by that means and no other, shall Jerusalem, which is to be the praise of the whole Earth, the city of the Lord, be built; the Sion of the Holy One of Israel.[46]

Any overarching spiritual end must be sought by spiritual means, and seeking spiritual ends by blood was the mark of antichristian, rather than Christian, action: the Irish clergy 'are a part of Antichrist, whose Kingdom the Scripture so expressly speaks should be laid in blood'.[47] Certainly, the clergy must not appropriate the civil sword, and it was a sin to which they were particularly prone; but Cromwell believed that *any* coercive use of the sword for spiritual ends was useless and illicit.

When we transfer these ideas back from the post-regicide period to the beginning of the Civil War, do we have evidence that Cromwell was already thinking similarly? Certainly his concern with the improper assumption of worldly power by the clergy was already there: this was one of the primary motivations for the campaign against the 'lordliness' of the Laudian bishops, in which Cromwell played an important part.[48] The example of Christ himself, and the lack of resistance to the Roman empire, though 'usurpers and intruders upon the Jewish State', was used to back up the claim that spiritual authorities had not begun to intrude on matters of civil power 'till Antichrist, assuming the infallible chair, and all that he called church to be under him, practised this authoritatively over civil governors'.[49] Again, the proper, and thoroughly Christian, practice of the true church in not resisting civil powers is contrasted with the tendency of antichristian clergy to overwhelm the civil power if they can; but this does not mean that the principle of the use of spiritual means for spiritual ends is one only to be observed by the clergy. Cromwell frequently seemed to align himself with the simpler view that spiritual ends could not be sought by the temporal sword, but only by the instruments of the spirit, and in particular the word of God.

This does, of course, raise the question of the nature and extent of the authority which civil powers could ever have over spiritual matters. Jeffrey Collins has argued that a determined Erastianism was the mainstay of Cromwell's religious settlement in the 1650s, and that it was a solution favoured not only

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[46]   Carlyle/Lomas II, p. 123.

[47]   Carlyle/Lomas II, p. 11.

[48]   W.C. Abbott (ed.), *Writings and Speeches of Oliver Cromwell* (Cambridge, Mass., 4 vols, 1937–47) I, pp. 123–4, 155.

[49]   Carlyle/Lomas II, p. 127.

by the 'magisterial Independents' who advised Cromwell, but very much in tune with Cromwell's own thinking since the 1640s.[50] Collins thus reads Cromwell's rebukes to the clergy for challenging the civil magistrate as defences of the civil magistrate's power in religion. However, it is less than clear that this is Cromwell's primary intention. Cromwell did indeed, as Collins points out, criticize the Irish clergy for wanting it thought that 'the secular power hath nothing to do to appoint or superintend their spiritual conventions'. However, Cromwell's indignation was not an assertion of the right of the civil magistrate in religion, so much as another denunciation of the clergy taking on power even beyond the spiritual realm: the rebellious Irish clergy rejected secular supervision over their 'spiritual conventions (as they call them) although in the said meetings they take upon them to intermeddle in all secular affairs'.[51] Again, for Collins, this attitude went right back into the first Civil War: during the process of Presbyterian settlement, 'Cromwell's regular interventions consistently urged Parliament to maintain its own ultimate authority over the church'. Yet these interventions, in some cases at least, can more easily be read as pleas for liberty of conscience to be vindicated against those who would deny it, including, of course, the Presbyterian clergy. Cromwell's letter to Lenthall after the storm of Bristol did indeed discuss in positive terms the power of the sword which God had put into the Parliament's hands; it also elaborated on the limits of that power:

> As for being united in forms, commonly called Uniformity, every Christian will for peace-sake study and do, as far as conscience will permit; and from brethren, in things of the mind we look for no compulsion, but that of light and reason. In other things, God hath put the sword into the Parliament's hands, for the terror of evildoers, and the praise of them that do well. If any plead exemption from it, he knows not the Gospel: if any would wring it out of your hands, or steal it from you under what pretence soever, I hope they shall do it without effect.[52]

In a sense this passage is, as Collins argues, a defence of Parliament's authority over the church; but it is one which exemplifies Cromwell's awareness of distinctions between spiritual and temporal, inner and outer realms. In 'things of the mind' the magistrate's sword has no role; in '*other*' things its power is immense. The biblical text which Cromwell uses here, 1 Peter 2:13–14, counsels submission to 'every ordinance of man', as governors are 'sent ... for the punishment of evildoers and the praise of them that do well'; the godly are not

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[50]   Jeffrey R. Collins, 'The Church Settlement of Oliver Cromwell', *History*, 87/285 (2002): pp. 18–40, at p. 23.
[51]   Carlyle/Lomas II, p. 6.
[52]   Carlyle/Lomas I, p. 218.

exempt, but are advised to suffer under the secular powers 'that with well doing ye may put to silence the ignorance of foolish men'. Throughout the epistle, Peter contrasts the flesh and the word or spirit, commanding obedience in outward things, but emphasizing that his followers must serve God 'in your hearts'. The thrust of the Bible passage is thus not to endow civil authorities with spiritual powers, but rather to stress that the inner freedom of the believer is compatible with obedience to sometimes ungodly magistracy. While Cromwell's selective quotation reinforces the sense that he did see a genuinely moral role for the magistrate, the 'Gospel' teaching on obedience to magistracy to which he referred depended on the separation of the spheres of grace and nature, and Cromwell was true to that in his thought both on magistracy and on toleration.

Collins tends to interpret toleration, in Cromwell's thought, more as a weapon against the Presbyterian clergy than as a desideratum in its own right. Demands for Parliament to consider the issue of toleration, however, were not necessarily assertions of Parliament's power in matters of the spirit. Rather, even while urging upon Parliament attention to the tender consciences in the army, Cromwell made sure to credit the appropriate powers for the different ends he wished to achieve: 'I wish he [the soldier] trust God for the liberty of his conscience, and you for the liberty he fights for'.[53] Liberty of conscience did depend on parliamentary action, but Parliament should act to deny itself the power to tyrannize over consciences, rather than appropriating positive religious powers to itself.

Evidently, Cromwell's toleration was not as complete in its separation of the state from the church(es), or as far-reaching in its generosity, as that of some radicals. However, Cromwell's strongest assertion of the right of the magistrate to supremacy in the national church was accompanied by his most forceful claim for freedom of conscience – a 'natural right'.[54] While the distinction between the inner and outer man was the keystone of his thought on toleration, this did not necessarily yield extensive toleration: anti-tolerationists dismissed the argument about the freedom of the inner man as self-defeating, arguing that the incoercible inner man would not be affected by their restrictions on the outer. While inner freedom might seem inadequate to those who argued that internal belief needed the liberty of external expression, Cromwell and other moderate tolerationists conceded only a limited degree on this point. He did accept that conscience might impose limits on how far a godly man could accept external strictures over 'forms', but any genuinely godly man would 'for peace-sake study and do, as far as conscience will permit' to attain uniformity. Indeed, Cromwell's

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[53]   Carlyle/Lomas I, p. 205.
[54]   Roots, pp. 51–2.

belief that true religion resided in internals opened up the possibility that the true Christian might be willing to be coerced in some (irrelevant) externals. Cromwell's repeated assertion that Catholics might enjoy freedom of conscience on the same basis as anyone else – internally, they might believe what they liked, but they would never be allowed the Mass[55] – has seemed a rather cruel and disingenuous excuse for intolerance of Catholic worship. Perhaps Cromwell's innocent tone in these protestations reflects his inability to believe that a true religion could depend on such externals. If there were any genuine religion in Catholicism, it would be entirely separable from the outward authorities and rituals of that denomination. Cromwell's anti-formalism perhaps had a more positive and more demanding theological content than we might assume: it was not that forms were not essential, so much as that avoidance of formalism was essential.[56]

But even if rigid *forms* were to be avoided, guidance and discipline of the outer man was not. Cromwell took the disciplining of 'evildoers' seriously, but his concern was with evildoers rather than evil-thinkers, and he was reluctant to punish even certain types of outward expression of inward beliefs. One passage which has been cited in evidence of a narrow Cromwellian tolerationism again turns out to exemplify this distinction:

> As for profane persons, blasphemers, such as preach sedition, the contentious railers, evil speakers who seek by evil words to corrupt good manners, persons of loose conversations, punishment from the Civil Magistrate ought to meet with them, because, if these pretend conscience, yet walking disorderly, and not according but contrary to the Gospel and even to natural light, they are judged of all, and their sins being open, makes them subjects of the magistrate's sword, who ought not to bear it in vain.[57]

It was those whose outward behaviour not only evidenced some extreme inner belief, but was in itself dangerous or needlessly offensive, who needed to be punished by the magistrate: 'blasphemers' rather than heretics; 'evil speakers'

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[55] Carlyle/Lomas I, p. 493; II, *A Declaration of the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, for the Undeceiving of Deluded and Seduced People ... In answer to certain late Declarations and Acts, framed by the Irish Popish Prelates and Clergy, in a Conventicle at Clonmacnoise*, at p. 17.

[56] J.C. Davis, 'Against Formality: One Aspect of the English Revolution', *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 3 (1993): pp. 265–88.

[57] Roots, p. 67 (continuation of 'religion was not the thing at the first contested for' speech). Cf. also Roots, p. 32, where Cromwell criticizes those who use the defence that the magistrate cannot meddle with their inner lives to justify behaviour which 'break[s] out visibly to all'.

who 'preach' and 'rail'. But this passage does, of course, also illustrate Cromwell's belief in the godliness of outward order, which in its most basic and minimal forms was taught not only by the gospel but by nature itself. The correlation between outward behaviour and inner state enabled limits to be imposed, not on the genuine exercise of conscience, but on behaviour which could not be conscientious because it did not acknowledge these minimal, undeniable truths and decencies.

On a larger scale, too, outer order acted as a vessel within which true spiritual development could be expressed, guided, and protected. As the 1650s developed, there were moments when Cromwell found it necessary to reject the type of religious providentialism which would overthrow forms in the name of the spirit. Partly this was due to a sense that the normal political order is approved by God precisely when it separates itself from the spiritual imperatives of grace – as Sommerville points out, this uncontroversial view of political life was endorsed by Cromwell when he rejected the notion of 'founding *dominium in gratia*', and is thus of a piece with Cromwell's rejection of clergy usurping civil power.[58] However, it was also a rejection of a type of providentialism which had never really been Cromwell's. When Cromwell called on providence or on necessity to justify extraordinary action, it was not in an attempt to build the new Jerusalem by using earthly power, however divinely approved that power seemed to be. Rather, it was often an attempt to avoid 'confusion'; to restore the operation of precisely those earthly norms which protected spiritual life. Even at one of his most providential moments, the calling of the Nominated Assembly, Cromwell defended 'extraordinary' means in terms of 'necessity' as well as providence, and was clear about the key purpose of taking these actions: 'to the end that the government might not be at a loss'.[59] Again, the better future that he urged the members to work towards was not simply a holy city for the elect. His concern that they 'have a care of the whole flock' was based partly on a hope that the division between sheep and goats was not to be perpetual, at least on earth. Protesting – perhaps too much – his enthusiasm for a return to elected parliaments, he aligned the political with the religious redemption of the nation's people: 'I would all the Lord's people were prophets, I would they were fit to be called and fit to call [that is, to be elected and elect to Parliament], and it is the longing of our hearts to see them once own the interest of Jesus Christ'. In due course 'God may fit the people for such a thing', partly through the ministrations of the Nominated Assembly, whose efforts would be 'the most

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[58]   Sommerville, 'Oliver Cromwell and English Political Thought', pp. 235–6.
[59]   Roots, pp. 19–20.

likely way to bring them to their liberties'.[60] Even at his most providentialist moments, what Cromwell envisaged was not a narrow and theocratic rule of the saints, but an English parliamentary rule transformed from within by the reformation of the nation.

Just as in 1653 Cromwell thought that part of the task of the godly nominees was to 'bring [the people] to their liberties', so, with the growing presence of Fifth Monarchist challenges to worldly government, he rejected the argument of the enthusiasts who denounced liberty and property as not being badges of the kingdom of Christ. He defended property not just as a relatively lowly, insecure, sometimes acquisitive English gentleman, but also as the zealous Puritan constitutionalist who had fought for the 'liberties' of subject and Parliament partly because they guaranteed the liberties of the godly. Again, the ultimate danger these enthusiasts posed was that of 'confusion'.[61] Where providence might prevent confusion, Cromwell welcomed it; where it seemed to promote it, he condemned it vehemently. Property had to be defended alongside liberty, because liberties, or the right to them, were in a sense a form of property, and the institutions of government were there to guarantee these rights, from the most to the least secular and tangible. Cromwell summed up his view of the dangers of 'confusion' perfectly when he said 'Was not everything grown almost arbitrary? Who knew, where or how to have a right?'[62] Those rights, of course, included religious liberty.

So Cromwell did believe that outer norms were necessary, even for inner, godly ends. This outward control and structure proved necessary as a guarantee of religious toleration, too. Both in religion and in politics, self-interested and pushy 'sects' were what threatened the 'confusion' which Cromwell dreaded.[63] Cromwell's increasing disillusionment here – earlier in the 1640s he was more likely to be accused of an overbearing religious factiousness than to accuse other 'sectaries' of it – reflects the perceptions of some other advocates of liberty of conscience, most notably the savage disappointment in the intolerance of the gathered churches expressed by William Walwyn's *Vanitie of the Present Churches*.[64] An unpoliced religious toleration, at least under current conditions, seemed in Cromwell's eyes more likely to produce a religious war of all against all

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[60]   Roots, p. 24.

[61]   Roots, p. 34. For Cromwell's complex attitude to property in his own life, see Patrick Little (ed.), *Oliver Cromwell: New Perspectives* (Basingstoke, 2009), esp. Simon Healy, '1636: The Unmaking of Oliver Cromwell?', pp. 20–37.

[62]   Roots, p. 30.

[63]   Roots, p. 180; cf. p. 30; p. 51.

[64]   Jack R. McMichael and Barbara Taft (eds), *The Writings of William Walwyn* (Athens, Georgia, 1989), pp. 308–33.

than a shared paradise of natural liberty. Hence the need for a godly 'constable', to prevent liberty descending into an unholy brawl.[65]

Given the crucial role of religious motivation, John Morrill's injunction that we consider the English Civil War alongside the confessional conflicts of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries is well taken. However, the wars in England and even in Scotland were not simply confessional conflicts. As internal struggles for the soul of national churches and the control of the national structures which might determine the future of those churches, the conflicts were indeed animated by some of the inherited fears generated by the true 'wars of religion'. But these struggles within polities with established, national, Protestant churches did not just use political argument as a vehicle; they were, necessarily, wars of politics as well as of religion. It was not just the scars of religious war, and the limits imposed by political theory, which drove many contemporaries away from any simple identification of their cause with religion. For many of the most religiously motivated, the spiritual imperative to avoid mixtures of earthly power constantly pulled their thinking back to the indirect ways in which the civil life of the nation protected religion. For these men, God's providence could intervene to safeguard political order in times of secular 'necessity'; it could also bring forth the 'issue' of 'religion' out of the worldly turmoil of a politically justified Civil War. In the end, I suggest, taking the religious motivation of Cromwell and his colleagues seriously must lead us back to a fuller sense of their politics, rather than diverting us from it.

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[65]   Roots, p. 133.

Chapter 11

Oliver Cromwell and the
Cause of Civil and Religious Liberty[1]

Blair Worden

The period from the Revolution of 1688 to the outbreak of the Great War of 1914 is the Whig era of English history, when politics turned on Whig (or, from the mid-nineteenth century, Liberal) principles and on reactions against them. Through it there runs a favourite Whig catchphrase: 'civil and religious liberty' (together with a number of variations on it: 'religious and civil liberties', or 'freedoms', or 'rights', and so on). The terms served basic components of Whig or Liberal power: the alliance of a political programme with Dissent and Nonconformity, and the principle of religious toleration. When Whig historians described the seventeenth century, they applied the catchphrase to it. Until around the time of the Reform Act of 1832, when public enthusiasm for the memory of the parliamentarian cause of the Civil Wars began to rival the veneration for 1688, it was safer and more usual to associate the 'blessings' of 'civil and religious liberty' with the second upheaval, which had preserved the ancient constitution, than to the first, which destroyed it.[2] In the eighteenth century it was mainly left to commonwealthmen and their friends, among them Catharine Macaulay and Cromwell's biographer William Harris, to identify the opposition to Charles I as the cause of 'civil and religious liberty'.[3] In the Victorian age, however, it became a commonplace that the parliamentarians

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[1]   In writing this chapter, which belongs to a longer study, I have been most grateful for the advice of John Coffey, David Como, John Seed, and David Wootton. I have profited too from contributions to a conference on 'Civil and Religious Liberty' held by Yale University and Royal Holloway College London in New Haven in 2008. The arguments are my own.

[2]   E.g. John Withers, *The Whigs Vindicated* (1715), p. 7; Peter Peckard, *The Nature and Extent of Civil and Religious Liberty* (1783), p. 34; Joseph Priestley, *An Essay on the First Principles of Government, and on the Nature of Political, Civil and Religious Liberty* (1771), p. 34; John Seed, *Dissenting Histories: Religious Division and the Politics of Memory in Eighteenth-Century England* (Edinburgh, 2008), p. 124. Cf. Thomas Sprat, *The Bishop of Rochester's Second Letter* (1689), p. 54; Benjamin Disraeli, *Sybil* (1845), bk. I, ch. 3.

[3]   William Harris, *An Historical and Critical Account of the Life of Oliver Cromwell* (1762), table of contents and pp. 43, 202; Catharine Macaulay, *The History of England*

had fought for 'civil and religious liberty'.[4] The nineteenth-century cult of Cromwell proclaimed that the protector 'took up arms' for the 'blessings' of 'civil and religious liberty'.[5] He was 'the man who made civil and religious liberty possible'.[6] He 'carried into the practice of the seventeenth century that famous motto which is the glory of the greatest Englishmen of the nineteenth, "civil and religious liberty all over the world"'.[7]

At first sight the application of the term to the Puritan Revolution seems emblematic of the anachronistic distortion with which the modern world has charged Whig history. The phrase 'civil and religious liberty' did not exist in the Civil War, and it is doubtful if the participants would have understood it. Yet Whig historians spoke more truly than they knew. The phrase 'civil and religious liberty' was the creation of the Puritan Revolution. Nowhere to be found in the England of 1640, it is everywhere in the England of 1660. In its development, Oliver Cromwell played a decisive part. He proves to have been, inadvertently, a founder of a Whig way of thinking.

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The parliamentarians fought against Charles I for a political and a religious cause. But what was the connection between the two issues? Were they tied by some common principle? Or had they merely been brought together by the government's simultaneous attacks on parliaments and Puritans? The king's opponents agreed that during his personal rule, when 'The Puritan and Patriot were equally persecuted',[8] there had been 'oppression' both of 'estates' and of 'consciences',[9] both 'temporall and spirituall tyrannies'.[10] What the opponents of

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from the Accession of James I (5 vols, 1769–72), vol. 2, pp. 59, 134, vol. 5, p. 195; cf. Helen Darbishire (ed.), *The Early Lives of Milton* (1932), p. 215.

[4]   See e.g. Pamela Horn, 'Nineteenth Century Farm Workers', *Northamptonshire Past and Present*, 4 (1972), p. 168; Ben Weinstein, '"Local Self-Government is True Socialism": Joshua Toulmin Smith, the State, and Character Formation', *English Historical Review*, 123 (2008): p. 1224; Blair Worden, 'Thomas Carlyle and Oliver Cromwell', *Proceedings of the British Academy*, 105 (2000): pp. 166–7 and n. 226.

[5]   *York Herald* 9 December 1848; Alessandro Gavazi, *Justice to Oliver Cromwell* (1869), pp. 6, 12.

[6]   Stuart Reid, *Sir Richard Tangye* (1908), p. 201.

[7]   Merle d'Aubigné, *The Protector* (Edinburgh, 1847), p. 305.

[8]   John Bryan, *A Discovery of the Probable Sin* (1647), p. 10.

[9]   See *Constitutional Documents of the Puritan Revolution*, (ed.) S.R. Gardiner (Oxford, repr. 1958), p. 137; Stephen Marshall, *A Peace-Offering to God* (1641), p. 45; *Puritanism and Liberty*, (ed.) A.S.P. Woodhouse (1938), pp. 395, 444.

[10]   *The Complete Prose Works of John Milton*, (ed.) D.M. Wolfe et al. (New Haven, 8 vols, 1953–82), vol. 1, p. 725; cf. Joseph Caryl, *The Workes of Ephesus Explained* (1642), p. 47.

Charles I did not say, and what earlier antagonists of popery and tyranny had not said,[11] was that a principle of liberty connected their political concerns and their religious ones. In the parliamentary opposition to Charles I's policies, 'liberty' meant liberty in secular affairs. Parliament claimed to be acting for 'public liberty' or 'native liberty' or, more commonly, for the 'liberty' or 'liberties' of 'parliament' or 'the subject' or 'the people': liberty which, together with the rule of law and the rights of property and the 'privileges' of institutions and individuals, had been attacked by the illegal taxation and the arbitrary imprisonments of Charles's regime. Parliament did not speak of 'religious liberty'. Rather it complained of threats to, or 'innovations' in, 'religion', in 'the true religion' or the 'Protestant' or 'reformed' religion. To that end it deployed the language not of liberty but of discipline, of purity, of the extirpation of popery and idolatry. The parliamentarian language before the Civil War persisted during it. It explained that Parliament was contending both for 'religion' and, in the civil sphere, for 'liberty' or 'liberties'. Parliament's was the 'cause' of 'religion and liberties',[12] of 'Religion and Liberties both together',[13] which had become 'intwisted'.[14] The parliamentary Protestation of 1641, the Vow and Covenant of 1643, and the Solemn League and Covenant of the same year repeated those professions, as did the rulers of the Commonwealth from 1649.[15]

How then did the phrase 'civil and religious liberty' come into being? In the 1640s 'civil liberty' was not a common term, and 'religious liberty' was still less common. 'Civil liberty' was used to mean liberty in the civil or secular sphere

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[11]   My argument differs here from those of M.P. Winship, 'Freeborn (Puritan) Englishmen and Slavish Subjection: Popish Tyranny and Puritan Constitutionalism, *c.*1570–1606', *English Historical Review*, 124 (2009): pp. 1050–74; and Nicholas Tyacke, 'The Puritan Paradigm of English Politics 1558–1642', *The Historical Journal*, 53 (2010): pp. 517–50.

[12]   Francis Woodcock, *Ioseph Paralled by the Present Parliament* (1646), p. 24.

[13]   Herbert Palmer, *The Necessity and Encouragement, of Utmost Venturing for the Churches Help* (1643), p. 62.

[14]   Thomas Coleman, *Gods Unusuall Answer to a Solemne Fast* (1644), p. 16.

[15]   Gardiner, *Constitutional Documents*, pp. 156 (*pace* John Vicars, *Jehovah-Jireh* (1644), p. 200), 269 ; Michael Braddick, *God's Fury, England's Fire* (2008), p. 293; *The Parliamentary or Constitutional History of England* (23 vols, 1762–3), vol. 14, p. 179; C.H. Firth and R.S. Rait (eds), *Acts and Ordinances of the Interregnum* (3 vols, 1911), vol. 2, p. 456. Cf. e.g. T.H. Lister, *Life and Administration of Edward, Earl of Clarendon* (3 vols, 1837–8), vol. 1, p. 250; Thomas Coleman, *The Christians Course and Complaint* (1643), ep. ded.; W.C. Abbott, *Writings and Speeches of Oliver Cromwell* (Cambridge, Mass., 4 vols, 1937–47), vol. 2, pp. 283–5; and the succession of parliamentarian declarations and remonstrances published before and during the Civil War and conveniently reprinted in Clarendon's *History of the Rebellion*.

of life.[16] It meant, that is, the same as those more common phrases, 'public' or 'native liberty' or 'the liberty of the subject'. In the early stages of the Puritan Revolution 'religion' was one area of grievance, 'civil liberty' another. So in 1641 the MP Nathaniel Fiennes blamed the prelates not only for 'the introducing of … superstition and idolatrie' but for 'the evils which wee have suffered in our civill liberty'.[17] In 1642 Milton, who wrote of 'civil liberty' more than most, remarked of the bishops that 'they who seek to corrupt our religion are the same that would inthrall our civill liberty', with the result that the causes of 'religion, and … native liberty' had become 'inseparably knit together'.[18]

The term 'civil liberty' would become widespread – and would overtake 'native' and 'public liberty' – only when changes in religious thinking had brought the term 'religious liberty' into common use. When we do find 'religious liberty' before the Civil Wars it belongs to a different order of experience from 'civil liberty' and has no grounds of alliance with it. It has the same meaning as phrases that had wider currency: 'Christian liberty' and 'spiritual liberty' (or sometimes we find 'Gospel liberty'). Those terms would likewise undergo shifts of meaning that made their association with 'civil liberty' seem first comprehensible and with time instinctive; but in 1640 that was in the future. 'Civill liberty' was about the relationship of the outward man, which 'is man's prerogative', to the state or the magistrate. 'Christian liberty' had long been understood to be about the relationship of the inward man, 'which is God's prerogative', to Christ, whose blood has purchased it.[19] By Christ's blood, it was agreed, 'we are made free … but this oure liberte is spirituall and not temporal'.[20] Spiritual liberty emancipates the soul from 'the bondage of sinne',[21] from 'the power of sin, Satan, death, hell, and condemnation'.[22] It liberates us from fear, from our lusts and passions and wills, from the 'flesh' and from the 'self'. The central text of Christian liberty was Galatians 5:1: 'Stand fast therefore in the liberty wherewith Christ hath

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[16]   In a less common distinction, but one more familiar to historians of political thought, 'civil liberty' could distinguish, from 'natural liberty', the liberty for which a particular framework of law or society provides or to which subjects have consented. See e.g. Stephen Marshall, *An Expedient to Preserve Peace and Amity* (1647), pp. 12–13.

[17]   *A Speech of the Right Honourable Nathanael Fiennes* (1641), p. 9.

[18]   *Complete Prose Works of John Milton*, vol. 1, pp. 923–4.

[19]   William Perkins, *A Commentarie or Exposition, vpon the Fiue First Chapters of the Epistle to the Galatians* (Cambridge, 1604), p. 366; George Downame, *The Doctrine of Christian Libertie* (1634), pp. 2, 9; *Leveller Manifestoes of the Puritan Revolution*, (ed.) D.M. Wolfe (1944), p. 181.

[20]   Thomas Becon, *A Pleasaunt Newe Nosegaye* (1553), unpag.

[21]   Marshall, *Expedient*, p. 29.

[22]   William Perkins, *A Godlie and Learned Exposition upon the Whole Epistle of Jude* (Cambridge, 1606), p. 77.

made us free, and be not entangled again with the yoke of bondage'. By common interpretation of that passage, the word 'yoke' referred to the Jewish law, and to the Jewish rites and observances – circumcision, or rules governing the eating of meats – which were abrogated by the Gospel. But the text could also mean much more than that, especially to Puritans, who incorporated Galatians 5:1 into their vision of the process of conversion and salvation. They applied II Corinthians 3:17, 'Where the spirit of the Lord is there is liberty', to the same theme.

Not merely did civil liberty and spiritual liberty belong to different orders of experience. In one respect they had opposite rules. In Puritan eyes – though not in theirs alone – Christ's servants undergo an experience which, to those who have not shared it, seems a paradox. They exchange the 'yoke of bondage' for a glorious subjugation, the 'yoke', or 'absolute subjection', of Christ's 'law of liberty'. To be 'bound' by that subordination is the source of 'the truest liberty', of 'perfect liberty'.[23] The 'liberty of the subject' protects us from civil power, but Christian liberty brings 'power' to the believer's spirit.[24] It is a condition independent of the political or social arrangements of mankind. Following Luther,[25] Calvin emphasized that 'spiritual liberty may very well agree with civil bondage'.[26] Luther and Calvin stressed the point because they were alarmed by what they believed to be a widespread misunderstanding or misapplication of the doctrine of Christian liberty by Anabaptists and antinomians,[27] who allegedly deployed it to challenge social or political authority or godly morality. Protestant divines in England repeated Luther's and Calvin's warnings. The Westminster Confession of Faith explained that people 'who, under pretence of Christian liberty ... oppose any lawful power ... resist the ordinance of God'.[28]

The charges levelled at the sects were of doubtful validity, at least in England.[29] Yet the suspicions behind them are understandable. 'Christian liberty' might be an ideal of the spirit alone, but its attainment was conditional on the allocation and exercise of worldly power. Indeed the term had a second meaning, a

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23   John Brinsley, *The Sacred and Sovreraigne Church-Remedie* (1645), p. 28; Francis Cheynell, *A Plot for the Good of Posterity* (1646), p. 38; Marshall, *Expedient*, p. 29; Mary Cary, *The Resurrection of the Witnesses* (1648), pp. 21–2; David Como, *Blown by the Spirit. Puritanism and the Emergence of an Antinomian Underground in Pre-Civil-War* (Stanford, Calif., 2004), pp. 297, 298.

24   John Lilburne, *A Light for the Ignorant* (1638), p. 14.

25   Woodhouse, *Puritanism and Liberty*, pp. 224–5.

26   Ibid., p. 192. Cf. Desiderius Erasmus, *An Exhortation to the Diligent Study of Scripture* (repr. Amsterdam, 1973), sig. G5v; Anthony Burgess, *A Treatise of Original Sin* (1658), p. 306.

27   Harro Höpfl, *The Christian Polity of John Calvin* (Cambridge, 1982), pp. 35–8.

28   Woodhouse, *Puritanism and Liberty*, Introduction, p. 66.

29   See Como, *Blown by the Spirit*, pp. 281–307, 352.

more practical one and, it was agreed, one far below 'the trewe libertye', 'the spirituall lybertie of Christe'.[30] It – or, more commonly, 'ecclesiastical liberty' – signified the immunity or exemption of churches from the secular power. English Protestants often gave a hostile meaning to 'ecclesiastical liberty', to refer to the privileges claimed and abused by the Catholic Church in its relations with the lay power.[31] But they also spoke in defence of 'ecclesiastical' or 'Christian' liberty against the threat which popery posed to Protestantism.[32] Paul had enjoined that Christ's followers, whose bond with him had made them his 'freem[e]n', must not be 'the servants of men' (I Corinthians 7:23). The injunction was normally taken, uncontentiously, to signify that Christ's followers can serve him only if they guard their souls against the enslavement of worldly pursuits. But what happened if man, who cannot serve two masters, was ordered by rulers of Church or state to observe religious practices that disobeyed Christ's precepts? Most Protestants agreed that in that sense Catholicism, which denied 'the true light and liberty of the gospel',[33] and which withheld from those who were subjected to it ordinances that were among the means to salvation, strove to 'oppresse Christian libertie'.[34] On that premise it was argued, across the spectrum of Protestant opinion, that 'our liberty in the gospel' entitled or obliged Protestants in Catholic lands to refuse the imposition of false worship.[35] Establishment Protestants were less comfortable when the devotional practices of the Church of England were themselves identified as impediments to salvation or as revivals of Jewish ceremonialism, and were thus likewise portrayed as affronts to Christian liberty. Under Laud, when the base of establishment Protestantism narrowed, the conviction that official ecclesiastical policy was contrary to Christian liberty broadened.

The term 'Christian liberty' took on other practical dimensions. It was common theological ground that the abrogation of Jewish ceremonies had made many matters of worship 'things indifferent'. Establishment Protestantism maintained that, precisely because they were indifferent, the state or the Church was entitled to enforce its own choices. In opposition there came the claim that

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[30] See e.g. *The Sermone of Doctor Colete, made to the Conuocation at Pauls* (1530), sigs C4v–5.

[31] Clarendon, *History of the Rebellion*, vol. 2, p. 72, vol. 3, p. 483.

[32] E.g. Thomas Bilson, *The True Difference between Christian Subiection and Unchristian Rebellion* (1585), p. 382.

[33] Ian Breward (ed.), *The Work of William Perkins* (Abingdon, 1970), p. 520.

[34] Henry Bullinger, *A Confutation of the Popes Bull* (1572), sig. K3v.

[35] See e.g. Christopher Goodman, *How Superior Powers Oght to be Obeyd* (1558), p. 223; George Abbott, *The Reasons which Doctour Hill Hath Brought, for the Upholding of Papistry* (1604), p. 353; Hopfl, *Christian Polity of John Calvin*, p. 37.

unfettered worship in things indifferent was a privilege of 'Christian liberty'. Were the vestments which the ministers of the Elizabethan Church were required to wear, it was asked, 'consistent with ecclesiastical and christian liberty?'[36] Baptists and separatists maintained that any participation in false worship, even perhaps in any worship imposed by the state, was a sin against 'Christian libertie', or against 'the Liberties and Priviledge of all the Subjects of Christ', an offence which Christ's servants should not 'dare' to commit.[37] The requirement to 'worshipp inventions & traditions of men', explained the separatist Henry Barrow, is 'contrary to ... our Christian libertie'.[38] In the Puritan Revolution, advocates of the separation of Church and state, or of the abolition of tithes, or of worshipping 'beyond parish bounds', would proclaim the incompatibility of existing practice with 'Christian liberty' or 'Christian liberties'.[39]

The fragmentation of Puritanism in the Puritan Revolution gave a new vigour and urgency to the practical dimensions of Christian liberty. The conception of Christian liberty as liberty of the soul did not pass away. Within individual minds, however, it merged or jostled or stood in tension with new emphases. Nonetheless Christian liberty was increasingly equated with the practical freedom to believe or worship as the individual conscience prescribed. It was in that sense that 'Christian liberty', or 'religious liberty', or 'liberty of conscience', made common cause with civil liberty.

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The initial impetus for the coming together of civil and religious liberty was the unprecedented intensity of the political conflict of 1640–42, which more or less united Parliament against both the Laudian Church and absolutist monarchy. A particular spur was the imposition of the 'et cetera oath' imposed by the Laudian Canons of 1640. The measure struck both at the conscience and, because the Canons threatened to extend the powers of both Church and state, at the liberty of the subject. In protest we find statements that 'if our goods and persons be

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[36]   Hastings Robinson (ed.), *The Zurich Letters* (Parker Society, Cambridge, 2 vols, 1842), vol. 1, p. 153.

[37]   William Haller (ed.), *Tracts on Liberty in the Puritan Revolution* (repr. New York, 3 vols, 1979), vol. 2, p. 114; Abraham Boun, *The Pride and Avarice of the Clergy* (1650), p. 104.

[38]   Henry Barrow, *A Collection of Certaine Sclaunderous Articles* (1590), sig. F4; see too Tyacke, 'Puritan Paradigm', p. 531.

[39]   *Complete Prose Works of John Milton*, vol. 7, p. 307; Ellis Bradshaw, *An Husbandmans Harrow* (1649), p. 22. Cf. William Prynne, *A Vindication of Foure Serious Questions ... both in the Pulpit ... and in the Presse* (1645), p. 2; Thomas Edwards, *The Third Part of Gangraena* (1646), p. 236.

free, much moore our soules and an oath ensnares them';[40] that the perpetrators of such 'conscience-oppression' would not 'suffer men to enjoy Church or civill liberties';[41] that the House of Commons must 'secure to us not onely liberty of person and estate, but also liberty of Conscience from Church tyranny'.[42]

Those linkings of the two spheres of liberty were tentative. Their authors seem inhibited by the difference of scale between the spiritual and secular spheres.[43] We might almost describe the linking of the two concepts in 1640–42 as a straining for literary effect, a display of neat lateral thinking that makes its impact by unfamiliar juxtapositions. It is during the Civil War that we find a conceptual shift. The spur now was not the clash between Crown and Parliament. It was the divisions within the parliamentarian cause, which began in 1643–4 and tore the Puritan cause apart, over liberty of conscience. In 1644–5 the Congregationalist minister John Goodwin and his allies pronounced that 'Christian libertie', or 'the liberties' bought 'by Christ's blood', included 'the RIGHTS', promised by the Gospel, of autonomous 'Congregations'.[44] Goodwin was extending to Congregationalism, as earlier Congregationalists had done,[45] the equation between Christian liberty and ecclesiastical immunity that English Protestants resented when it was deployed by Catholics. It had also been adopted, to English dismay, by Scottish Presbyterians.[46] Yet Congregationalists, and separatists with

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[40]   *The Journal of Sir Simonds D'Ewes*, (ed.) Wallace Notestein (New Haven, 1923), p. 162.

[41]   Jeremiah Burroughs, *Sions Joy* (1642), p. 28.

[42]   Thomas Hill, *The Trade of Truth Advanced* (1642), p. 33.

[43]   Cf. Robert Sanderson, *Two Sermons* (1635), p. 11.

[44]   *A Paraenetick, or, Humble Addresse to the Parliament and Assembly for (not loose, but) Christian Libertie* (1644), p. 5; John Goodwin, *Innocency and Truth Triumphing Together* (1645), p. 38.

[45]   Winship, 'Freeborn (Puritan) Englishmen', p. 1063.

[46]   In Scotland the social and political power of the Kirk had allowed the concept of civil and religious liberty to develop earlier than in England, with a different meaning. There the phrase brought the liberty of subjects together, not with freedom of worship or faith, but with the immunity of the Church. Thus in 1638 the Covenanter movement which resisted Charles I had spoken for 'our liberty, both Christian and civill': 'a strange phrase', replied the king, 'to proceed from dutifull or loyall hearted subjects'. Walter Balcanquhall, *A Large Declaration concerning the Late Tumults in Scotland* (1638), pp. 282, 366. For Scottish usage see also *Ane Shorte and Generall Confession of the Trewe Christiane Fayth and Religion* (1581), p. 1; David Calderwood, *An Exhortation of the Particular Kirks of Christ* (1624), p. 16; Alexander Henderson, *The Answeres of Some Brethren of the Ministrie* (1638), unpag. ('To the second'); Clarendon, *History of the Rebellion*, vol. 1, p. 204. In Massachusetts, whose Congregationalism was as intolerant as Britain's Presbyterianism, the *Body of Liberties* of 1641 codified 'rights, freedoms, immunities, authorities and priviledges, both civil and ecclesiastical': John Witte, The *Reformation of Rights … Early Modern Calvinism* (Cambridge,

them, went beyond Catholic or Presbyterian usages. In their minds ecclesiastical liberty implied the freedom not merely of ecclesiastical institutions but of the individuals whose consent had brought them together: individuals who, on the less fundamental matters of doctrine, might legitimately disagree among themselves or err on the path to truth, and with whose relationship with Christ man must not interfere. From that perspective, the practical liberty of the individual conscience was essential to salvation. To Presbyterians there could be no such liberty. Faith, in their eyes, allowed no place for individual judgement, which would unavoidably lead to heresy and blasphemy. In 1649 the Scottish Presbyterian Samuel Rutherford explained that the allowance of 'many religions', and the dissemination of 'blasphemies in the name of the Lord', were 'contrary to the true religious liberty'.[47] Congregationalist thinking, by contrast, had long taken 'Christ's ecclesiastical government', and its 'liberty and power', to be 'not only tied to the publike notions of the whole congregations, but extended to everie action of every Christian', so that 'everie member thereof' had a 'right' in it.[48] By the 1640s Congregationalism and separatism were widespread enough, and, through the support of Oliver Cromwell and others in high places, were powerful enough, to reshape the vocabulary of religious liberty.

The 'right' claimed by Congregationalism came from Christ, not from man, and was due to men only as subjects of Christ. Yet once the claims of liberty in religion had been made for individual believers, parallels with the liberties of the subject came into view. Though the rights of believers came from God, not man, they became, like civil liberty, a human entitlement. The convergence of the two spheres began not among the theologically more orthodox of the Congregationalist divines, whose conversion to liberty of religious profession was gradual and limited, but among such doctrinally experimental figures as Goodwin and John Milton and the Levellers William Walwyn and Richard Overton.[49] By 1643 Walwyn was explaining that little could be done for

2007), p. 286. The terminology of civil and religious liberty may also have appeared in Ireland before its rise in England: John Bramhall, *The Serpent Salve* (1643), p. 194.

[47] Samuel Rutherford, *A Free Disputation against Pretended Liberty of Conscience* (1649), p. 268. Cf. Rutherford's *The True Primitive State of Civil and Ecclesiastical Government* (1649), p. 5; Thomas Edwards, *Antapologia* (1644), p. 301; Richard Baxter, *Two Treatises* (1696), p. 107.

[48] *The Writings of Henry Barrow, 1587–1590*, (ed.) Leland H. Carlson (1962), p. 609; Winship, 'Freeborn (Puritan) Englishmen', p. 1063; cf. William H. Goold, (ed.), *Works of John Owen*, (Edinburgh, 16 vols, repr. 1965–8), vol. 8, p. 390.

[49] Here I believe we still have much to learn from William Haller's Introduction to his edition of *Tracts on Liberty in the Puritan Revolution* (1934); from A.S.P. Woodhouse's Introduction to his collection of documents *Puritanism and Liberty* (1938); and from Haller's book *Liberty and Reformation in the Puritan Revolution* (1955). A luminous essay by

'common freedom' 'unlesse liberty of Conscience be allowed for every man'.[50] In 1644 Goodwin spoke for 'Liberty' both 'of the Kingdome' and 'of the Conscience', and asked how it was that ecclesiastical dissenters remained subject to punishment at a time when 'all other liberties' were being 'vindicated'.[51] In early 1645, Milton, whose plea for liberty of religious expression, *Areopagitica*, had appeared a few months earlier, lamented that 'in this age many are so opposite both to human and to Christian liberty'.[52] In the same year Overton asserted that, where there was 'persecution' in religion, 'the Liberty of the Subject (now in controversie) cannot be setled in this Land', so that there could be 'no freedome, rights, or liberty either civil or spirituall'. Overton is thought to have been the author of a tract of March 1646 which proclaimed that if believers 'cannot be free to Worship God ... according to their particular Consciences, all Liberty to them is taken away: for what is all other Liberty, where that is not'?[53] In the same year Walwyn described 'Liberty of conscience' as 'the principall branch' of the people's 'safety and Freedome'.[54]

Behind the convergence of liberty of conscience with the liberty of the subject there lay the spread, in politics and religion alike, of the principle of consent. There was also the 'Arminianism of the Left', the reaction of Milton, Goodwin and others against predestinarian thinking. Although doctrinal Calvinists, Cromwell among them, would soon catch up with the language of civil and religious liberty and adopt it, the pioneers were writers who believed salvation to be attainable by all, and who thus took liberty of religious profession to be, no less than civil liberty, the business of all. Yet if the spheres of civil and religious liberty became linked, no inherent connection between them was explained. As often happens in the history of ideas that find political application, changes of perception were indebted not so much to cerebral exploration as to

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J.C. Davis, 'Religion and the Struggle for Freedom in the English Revolution', *The Historical Journal*, 35 (1992): pp. 507–30, offers a very different perspective from that of Haller and Woodhouse. I hope that my argument indicates how the two approaches might be reconciled.

[50]   *The Writings of William Walwyn*, (ed.) Jack R. McMicheal and Barbara Taft (Athens, Georgia, 1989), p. 102. Cf. the outlook in the same year of the Congregationalist Sir Cheney Culpepper: M.J. Braddick and M. Greengrass (eds), 'The Letters of Sir Cheney Culpepper (1641–1657)', *Camden Miscellany*, 32 (Cambridge, 1996), pp. 137–41, 176–7.

[51]   *A Paraenetick*, p. 2; John Coffey, *John Goodwin and the English Revolution* (Woodbridge, 2006), pp. 117–8. Cf. *Certain Briefe Observations and Antiquaeries* (1644), p. 5; John Goodwin, *A Short Answer to A.S.* (1645), p. 3.

[52]   *Complete Prose Works of John Milton*, ii. 587.

[53]   *The Last Warning to all the Inhabitants of London* (1646), p. 4. Cf. *Writings of William Walwyn*, p. 169; Marchamont Nedham, *Interest will not Lie* (1659), p. 23.

[54]   *Writings of William Walwyn*, p. 172. Cf. ibid., p. 273; Woodhouse, *Puritanism and Liberty*, pp. 355–6.

pressures, practical and emotional, of events. Men who in the Civil War fought and suffered for a cause that was both political and religious found a unifying bond in the conjunction of the two kinds of liberty. The conviction arose that liberty of conscience had been, or at least ought to have been, an initial war aim of the parliamentarians, alongside their demands for liberty of the subject. The 'liberty' of independent congregations, Goodwin told Parliament in 1644, was the 'expectation' in which 'Wee have fought, and adventured purse and person'.[55] Five years later Walwyn claimed that when in 1642 Parliament invited men 'to fight for the maintenance of the true Protestant Religion, the Libertyes of the People, and Priviledges of Parliament, and the Liberty of the Subject', 'many', hearing their cause defined in those 'generall terms', 'did believe the Parliament under the notion of Religion, intended to free the Nation from all compulsion in matters of Religion'.[56] The contribution of the 'saints', and especially of sectaries and separatists, to Parliament's successes on the battlefield inspired the feeling that liberty of conscience should be among the fruits of victory. Here, to Cromwell, was the lesson of Naseby. As he told the Commons after the victory, a soldier who 'ventures his life for the liberty of his country' should be rewarded with 'the liberty of his conscience'.[57]

In time Cromwell would be the enemy of the Levellers and be viewed with suspicion or hostility by countless sectaries, but those conflicts lay ahead. Saints ventured to compare the deaths of their fellows in battle with the death of the Redeemer.[58] Their contribution to the nation's deliverance from both political and religious oppression heightened indignation against the punishment, or the threat of punishment, of religious dissenters by Parliament or the courts 'for exercising their consciences'.[59] Why, asked aggrieved soldiers in 1647, should men who had 'engaged their lives' for 'our country's liberties and freedom' be 'abridged' of the 'freedom to serve God according to our proportion of faith, and [be] like to be imprisoned, yea, beaten and persecuted, to enforce us to a human conformity never enjoined by Christ'?[60] Similar thinking was prompted

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[55]   *A Paraenetick*, p. 5.
[56]   *Writings of William Walwyn*, p. 298. Cf. ibid., pp. 94, 169, 207; Haller, *Tracts on Liberty*, vol. 3, p. 249; Woodhouse, *Puritanism and Liberty*, p. 459; Blair Worden, *Literature and Politics in Cromwellian England* (Oxford, repr. 2009), pp. 177–8.
[57]   Abbott, *Writings and Speeches*, vol. 2, p. 360.
[58]   *A Paraenetick*, pp. 2–9.
[59]   *Writings of William Walwyn*, p. 123.
[60]   Woodhouse, *Puritanism and Liberty*, p. 399.

by the exclusion of religious dissenters, on the grounds of their religion, from the holding of secular offices.[61]

In the army's debates at Whitehall in 1648 we find John Goodwin suggesting that liberty of conscience might itself be a 'civil right', and Henry Ireton affirming, as 'a common right and freedom', the principle that 'any man submitting to the civil government of the nation should have liberty to serve God according to his conscience'.[62] Goodwin's and Ireton's statements seem to have had a muffled and disconcerted reception. They appear to have induced conceptual puzzlement. So does the Levellers' claim, in their *Agreement of the People* in 1647, that liberty of conscience was 'a native right',[63] to be protected alongside native freedoms in civil life. Inhibitions on the verbal alignment of civil and religious remained. Within the army and among its allies they were nonetheless being weakened. In 1648 the prospect arose of a deal between Charles I and the Presbyterians at Westminster that would destroy the cause, political and religious, to which the army was committed. In July a petition to Parliament from London, apparently penned by the army's associate the Congregationalist divine Philip Nye, warned against the 'invasions ... intended upon our Religious and Civil Liberties' by the promoters of the prospective 'Personall Treaty' between king and Parliament.[64] Charles's re-enthronement, declared the army in November, would bring a return to 'the same Principles and Affections, both as to Civil and Religious Interests, from which he hath acted the past Evils'.[65] The regicide, though it repelled that threat, heightened alertness among its supporters to the interdependence of those 'Interests'. Three months after the king's execution the Congregationalist divine John Owen, soon to be Cromwell's chaplain and intimate spiritual counsellor, explained to Parliament that 'the peculiar light of this generation is that discovery which the Lord hath made to his people, of the mystery of Civill and Ecclesiasticall Tyranny. The opening, unravelling, and revealing the Antichristian interest, interwoven, and coupled together in civill, and spirituall things ... is the great discovery of these days'.[66] Five months later Milton, writing in defence of the regicide, announced the same revelation.

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[61]   *Writings of William Walwyn*, p. 282. Cf. Woodhouse, *Puritanism and Liberty*, p. 409; Gardiner, *Constitutional Documents*, p. 455.

[62]   Woodhouse, *Puritanism and Liberty*, pp. 126–7, 141, 143.

[63]   Gardiner, *Constitutional Documents*, pp. 334–5.

[64]   British Library, Thomason Tracts, 669 f. 12 (63): *To The Right Honourable the Lords and Commons*; cf. Woodhouse, *Puritanism and Liberty*, p. 135.

[65]   *Parliamentary or Constitutional History of England*, vol. 18, p. 187.

[66]   John Owen, *The Shaking and Translation of Heaven and Earth* (1649), p. 35. Cf. the statement of John Cook quoted by Davis, 'Religion and the Struggle for Freedom', p. 521; *Mercurius Politicus* 8 September 1653, p. 2708.

Looking back on Charles's reign he concluded that those 'twisted Scorpions', 'temporal and spiritual Tyranny', those 'two burd'ns, the one of prelatical superstition, the other of civil tyrannie', had 'very dark roots' which 'twine and interweave'.[67] Remembering the popular support for the restoration of the king in the previous year, he reflected on the proneness of the people 'not to a religious onely, but to a civil kinde of Idolatry'.[68] Previously, despite his readiness to use the phrase, civil liberty had been a low priority to Milton.[69] Now he had revised his estimate. Early in 1651 he declared that civil and spiritual tyranny had a common source, 'the assigning of infallibility and omnipotency to man'. Paul's injunction to us not to be 'servants of men', Milton now decided, was an endorsement 'not only of evangelical liberty but also of civil liberty' ('*non solum de evangelica solum, sed de civile libertate*').[70]

Outside the ranks of the champions of the regicide, however, the association of civil and religious liberty had made little headway. It would enter the mainstream of political argument only after Cromwell, with a politician's gift of semantic redirection, had adopted it.[71]

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Cromwell may seem an unlikely candidate for that achievement. Liberty of conscience had always mattered to him far more than civil liberty, which he had been ready to confound in religion's cause.[72] Freedom of religious profession was to him a means to the advance of godliness, not a human right. His goal was liberty for the godly, not – unless it helped the godly to obtain it – for the rest.[73] The military coup which made him protector, that blatant affront – as the coups of 1648–9 had been – to most conceptions of civil liberty, was supported by

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[67]   *Complete Prose Works of John Milton*, vol. 3, pp. 446, 509, 549, 570.

[68]   Ibid., p. 343.

[69]   Worden, *Literature and Politics*, pp. 160–61.

[70]   *The Works of John Milton* (New York, 18 vols, 1931–8: 'Columbia edition'), vol. 7, p. 145, 155–7, 211 (cf. vol. 8, pp. 131, 135); Blair Hoxby, '*Areopagitica* and Liberty', in Nicholas McDowell and Nigel Smith (eds), *The Oxford Handbook of Milton* (Oxford, 2009), pp. 225–6.

[71]   Bulstrode Whitelocke would remember after the Restoration that in discussions with Oliver Cromwell in 1651–2 he had expressed a commitment to 'our civil and spiritual liberties', but I suspect that his memory, on this as on other matters, was distorted by the subsequent development in linguistic practice. See Whitelocke, *Memorials of the English Affairs* (Oxford, 4 vols, 1853) vol. 3, pp. 374, 472, and Blair Worden, 'The "Diary" of Bulstrode Whitelocke', *English Historical Review*, 108 (1993), pp. 122–34.

[72]   Cf. the accusation against him in *The Fair Dealer* (1660), pp. 4–5.

[73]   Blair Worden, 'Toleration and the Cromwellian Protectorate', *Studies in Church History*, 21 (1984): pp. 199–233.

many seekers of liberty of conscience who were ready to sacrifice civil liberty for it. When he did think about civil liberty, his words could let slip that it was again the godly whose freedom he had most in mind.[74] Those priorities are visible in the statements of many others who took up the new language.

But Cromwell was not only the head of the godly party. He was the ruler of England. He knew he could not hope to win the nation to the cause of liberty of conscience unless he could make it seem the partner of civil liberty. 'I hope', he told MPs in 1657, that 'I shall never be found to be one of them that go about to rob the nation of' its 'civil rights and liberties'. On the contrary he would do what he could 'to the attaining of them'.[75] He also grasped that the political prominence achieved by his military and sectarian supporters would be intolerable to the same mainstream opinion unless those followers in turn accepted a responsibility to civil as well as religious liberty. Some of them, at least, took the point. In July 1654 his son-in-law Charles Fleetwood, Lord Deputy of Ireland and a chief political patron of the sects, who had reluctantly accepted the protectorate, told Cromwell's Secretary of State John Thurloe of his own subscription to the principle of 'liberty, as liberty, take it in either sense, as well civill as spirituall. The truth is, thos two interests are so intermixed in this day, that we canot sever them; and that will be found more than a phansy, when thoroughly discussed'.[76] Through the alignment of civil and religious liberty Cromwell aspired to merge what he too called two 'interests': 'the Interest of Christians' and 'the Interest of Englishmen'.[77] From 1653 he helped to shape the future of political language by his determination to equate 'the cause of Christ', or the concerns of the 'people of God', with 'the good' of 'the nation' (or, when his thoughts extended to the newly conquered Ireland and Scotland, 'the nations') or of 'the whole people' or of 'men as men'[78] Since, in his own mind, the cause of Christ was of immeasurably the greater import, his pleas that the 'interests' be placed beside each other have their uncomfortable moments.[79] Nonetheless he protested at the 'pitiful fancy', 'wild and ignorant', 'that the interest of God's people and the civil interest' were 'inconsistent'. Rather, 'he sings sweetly that sings a song of reconciliation betwixt' 'the liberty of the people of God and of the nation'.[80]

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[74]   Abbott, *Writings and Speeches*, vol. 3, p. 583, vol. 4, p. 389.

[75]   Ibid., vol. 4, p. 513.

[76]   *A Collection of the State Papers of John Thurloe*, (ed.) Thomas Birch (7 vols, 1742), vol. 2, p. 493.

[77]   Abbott, *Writings and Speeches*, vol. 4, p. 445.

[78]   Ibid., vol. 3, pp. 59, 61.

[79]   Ibid., vol. 4, pp. 260–61, 276, 389, 445.

[80]   Ibid., p. 490.

Civil and religious liberty became, in Cromwell's speeches to the protectoral parliaments, the issue over which the Civil War had been fought: the 'cause', the 'quarrel ... that was at the first'.[81] It had, he asserted, been his own cause too. 'If I were to give an account before a higher tribunal than any that's earthly, why I engaged in the late wars, I could give no account but it would be wicked, if it did not comprehend these two ends' of 'Civil Liberty' and 'the Liberty of men professing Godliness'.[82] His opening statements to the first Parliament of the protectorate proclaimed that 'the ground of our first undertaking' the Civil War had been 'to oppose that usurpation and tyranny that was upon us, both in civils and spirituals'. For 'liberty of conscience and liberty of subjects' were 'two as glorious things to be contended for as any God hath given us'.[83] The protectorate, he recalled, had delivered the nation from the rule of Barebone's, when 'both' principles had been 'abused' by sectaries, who, while demanding toleration for themselves, had 'imposed' intolerance on men who 'with their blood' had earned 'civil liberty, and religious also'.[84] He told the same Parliament that the outcome of the Civil War had revealed God's intention to provide for 'a liberty of worship with the freedom of ... consciences ... and freedom ... in estates and persons', and that he himself would not want to remain protector 'an hour longer than I may preserve England in its just rights, and may protect the people of God in ... a just liberty of their consciences'.[85]

In urging the connection of the two, as on the other fronts in the 1650s, he found assistance from the favourite journalist Marchamont Nedham. Nedham's hand is visible in the declaration which justified Cromwell's forcible expulsion of the Rump in April 1653, and which complained of the Parliament's failure 'to settle a due liberty both in reference to civil and spiritual things'.[86] In February 1654, in writing for the protectorate a tract that Cromwell would himself cite in expounding the principle of civil and religious liberty,[87] Nedham exploited, as Cromwell and so much of the early propaganda for the protectorate did, the reaction against the rule of the saints in Barebone's Parliament in the previous year. The experiment of Barebone's, declared Nedham, 'would have utterly confounded the whole course of Natural and Civil Right, which is the only

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[81] Ibid., p. 705.

[82] Ibid., p. 445.

[83] Cf. the quotation of those words at the outset of *The True State of the Case of Liberty of Conscience* (1655), p. 1.

[84] Abbott, *Writings and Speeches*, vol. 3, pp. 434, 436–7.

[85] Ibid., pp. 583, 587.

[86] Gardiner, *Constitutional Documents*, p. 400; Worden, *Literature and Politics*, pp. 305–6.

[87] Abbott, *Writings and Speeches*, vol. 3, p. 587.

Basis or foundation of Government in this world'. Under the protectorate, by contrast, 'the Rights and Liberties of the People' would be provided for on that 'Basis', both in 'all the principal Points of Civil Interest and Freedom' and in 'the Liberty of tender Consciences'.[88] Perhaps it was at Nedham's suggestion that Cromwell told the Commons in September 1654, what we could not imagine him working out for himself, that 'Liberty of conscience is a natural right'.[89]

When defending the Instrument of Government before the Parliament of 1654–5, Cromwell insisted that it 'provided for' 'a just liberty to the people of God, and the just rights of the people in these nations'.[90] Yet by February 1657 he had concluded that, as he then told the army officers, the Instrument would 'neither preserve our religious or civill rights'. The army itself, he told it, was too ready to 'grow upon the civill liberties' by purging parliament, while parliaments, as its recent treatment of the Quaker James Nayler had demonstrated, was prone 'to grow upon your liberty in Religion'.[91] So he exchanged the Instrument for the Humble Petition and Advice, which, as he time and again proclaimed, would at last 'accomplish the end of our fighting'. It would supply a 'settlement' that would 'give' the nation 'the greatest provision that ever was made' for 'liberty … civil and spiritual', for 'civil and religious liberties'.[92] MPs eager for Cromwell to accept the Humble Petition knew the language to speak to him. The new constitution hailed the nation's deliverance through the Civil Wars from 'tyranny and bondage, both in our spiritual and civil concernments';[93] and the MPs who negotiated with Cromwell over its terms lined up to emphasize the provision made by the new constitution 'both for spiritual and civil liberties.[94]

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In the final year of Cromwell's life, 1658, the linguistic story we have been following takes a further turn. It is now that 'civil and religious liberty' becomes more than a familiar concept. It becomes a slogan. Between his death and the Restoration, the claims of 'civil and religious liberty' were invoked by every

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[88]   [Nedham], *A True State of the Case of the Commonwealth* (1654), pp. 18, 40–41.

[89]   Abbott, *Writings and Speeches*, vol. 3, p. 459 (cf. ibid., vol. 4, p. 513; *True State of the Case of Liberty of Conscience*, p. 10).

[90]   Abbott, *Writings and Speeches*, vol. 3, p. 587.

[91]   Ibid., vol. 4, pp. 418–19.

[92]   Ibid., vol. 4, pp. 454, 485, 490, 512–13, 706, 708, 720. Cf. *A Declaration of his Highness for a Day of Solemn Fasting and Humiliation* (1658).

[93]   Gardiner, *Constitutional Documents*, p. 447.

[94]   *A Collection of Scarce and Valuable Tracts … the late Lord Somers*, (ed.) Walter Scott (13 vols, 1809–15), vol. 6, pp. 355, 364, 366, 385.

parliamentarian group, and were used both to justify and to oppose each of the successive coups in which the Puritan cause destroyed itself. On the accession of Richard Cromwell a series of addresses from the shires, orchestrated by Marchamont Nedham,[95] recalled Oliver's commitment to the combination of 'civil' and 'Christian' or 'gospel' liberties, and urged Richard to sustain 'the just liberty of the people of this nation, both religious and civil', 'our just rights and liberties in our spirituals and civils'.[96] Richard himself, following the practice of his father, told the Parliament he summoned that he had 'nothing in my design, but the maintenance of the ... liberties, both civil and Christian, of these nations, which I shall always make the measure and rule of my government'.[97] During the revolution that produced the overthrow of Richard and the restoration of the Rump in the late spring of 1659, politicians and soldiers bombarded each other, and the nation, with pledges to 'just Rights and Liberties, Civil and Religious' and so on.[98] In May 1659 the restored Rump announced its devotion to the same principle.[99] Supporters and opponents of John Lambert's political manoeuvres in the autumn of 1659 joined the chorus. So did champions of the restored Rump after its second deposition. So did its antagonists on the Committee of Safety and among the army officers.[100] The same language pervaded the linguistic currency of negotiation and manoeuvre between George Monck and the contending parties during the moves that preceded the Restoration.[101]

The language could be adopted by different groups because, in the way of slogans, it was imprecise. It had become, like the phrase 'the good old cause', with which it became allied, a substitute for practical commitments and explanations.[102] 'Ye know (Friends)', declared the commonwealthman George Bishop in 1659, 'that the Good Old Cause was (chiefly) Liberty of Conscience ... and the Liberties of the Nation, which with the Liberty of Conscience were bound up, and joined together, as two lovely Twins that cannot be divided, but

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[95]   *A True Catalogue, or, An Account of the Several Places ... where ... Richard Cromwell was Proclaimed* (1659), pp. 14, 53–4, 75–6.

[96]   Ibid., pp. 20, 30, 33; *Mercurius Politicus* 23 September 1658, pp. 845, 846; 5 November 1658, p. 21.

[97]   Quoted by Patrick Little and Richard Smith, *Parliaments and Politics during the Cromwellian Protectorate* (Cambridge, 2007), p. 138.

[98]   *Parliamentary or Constitutional History*, vol. 21, pp. 340–41, 345, 400, 416.

[99]   Ibid., p. 380.

[100]   Ibid., p. 462, vol. 22, p. 15; *The Diary of Bulstrode Whitelocke*, (ed.) Ruth Spalding (Oxford, 1990), p. 549.

[101]   *Parliamentary or Constitutional History*, vol. 22, pp. 51, 171.

[102]   Ibid., p. 94 (cf. ibid., vol. 21, p. 400); Henry Stubbe, *An Essay in Defence of the Gold Old Cause* (1659), preface. Cf. *Parliamentary Intelligencer* 27 Feb. 1660, pp. 136–7; Ann Hughes, *Politics, Society and Civil War in Warwickshire* (Cambridge, 1987), p. 313.

with the mutual suffering, if not the Dissolution of each other'.[103] The claim that the Civil Wars had been fought on behalf of 'civil and religious liberty', and that its friends had suffered in its cause, had become a mantra.[104] Yet Cromwellians and commonwealthmen understood different things by the phrase.

There were divisions about its meaning even within the Cromwellian regime. Following the collapse of Oliver Cromwell's last parliament in February 1658, a succession of declarations by army officers and regiments reminded the nation of the cause for which they now claimed to have fought, and of which Cromwell had been the instrument: 'our civil and spiritual liberty', 'that precious prize of liberty, religious and civil'.[105] The wording of the documents illustrates the two competing political tendencies which by the time of Cromwell's death had reduced policy-making to virtual paralysis. On one hand there were those, mostly civilians, who saw the Humble Petition as a means to restore something like the ancient constitution and make Cromwell king. On the other were those, the army officers Charles Fleetwood and John Desborough at their head, who had been uneasy at Cromwell's elevation and who, though most of them accepted the Humble Petition, resisted the monarchical tendency of the regime. In the coded language of late protectoral politics, the two parties offered rival intimations that civil and religious liberty was safe with them and only with them. The army's call in March 1658, under Fleetwood's management, for the 'settlement' of 'our civill and spiritual liberty', which 'we hope' the Humble Petition has 'already in good measure provided for',[106] stands in contrast to the statement to Richard Cromwell's parliament by his prominent civilian adviser Nathaniel Fiennes that 'both our civil and spiritual liberties have been squared, stated and defined' in the Petition, 'with a great deal of care and exactness'.[107]

Cromwell's deployment of the language of civil and religious liberty had altered the vocabulary of political debate. Unfortunately the new language could work against his government as well as for it. It was probably in the autumn of 1654 that a 'well-wisher' of Fleetwood, who wanted the Lord Deputy to break with the protectorate, told him that the Instrument of Government left 'our natural and civill rightes in our persons and estates ... at the pleasure'

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[103]   George Bishop, *Mene Tekel* (1659), p. 4.

[104]   *The Army's Plea for their Present Practice* (1659), p. 6; *The Parliamentary Intelligencer* 27 Feb. 1660, p. 136; *A Brief Account of the Behaviour, &c.* (n.d.: 1660), p. 26; *The Memoirs of Edmund Ludlow*, (ed.) C.H. Firth (2 vols, 1894), vol. 2, p. 240 n; Barry Reay, *The Quakers and the English Revolution* (1985), p. 19.

[105]   *Mercurius Politicus* (1 April 1658), p. 420, 15 July 1658, p. 658. Cf. ibid., 8 April 1658, p. 432; 15 April 1658, p. 455.

[106]   Ibid., 1 April 1658, p. 420.

[107]   *Parliamentary or Constitutional History*, vol. 21, p. 273.

of the protector, 'and the liberty of our faith in Christ and his worship … no lesse' so.[108] In 1656 the commonwealthman Sir Henry Vane wrote an attack on the protectorate which earned him imprisonment, and which was intended to restore to the people 'their just natural Rights in civil things, and true freedome in matters of conscience'.[109]

By 1658 there were men in the army and the churches who, unlike Vane and unlike Fleetwood's correspondent, had endorsed Cromwell's elevation five years earlier, but who now regretted that decision. Their unease surfaced in the military unrest of February which led to the dismissal of William Packer, the commander of Cromwell's own cavalry regiment, and other officers. Packer and his sympathisers 'begin to see that they have bin fooled under the specious pretence of Liberty of Conscience to betray the Civill Liberties of theyr owne native country, so that one of them told' Cromwell 'to his head that if he could not have that without the other, he would adventure or seeke it elsewhere'.[110] Next year, as a member of Richard Cromwell's parliament, Packer ruefully remembered his own endorsement of Oliver's elevation. He had supported it, he recalled, because of the Long Parliament's failure to provide 'liberty or freedom of conscience', and in the hope that Cromwell would supply it. But now, he said, those 'good people of this nation' who had earlier 'feared' Parliament's 'severity in that point' had come to understand the congruence of 'the two great interests of religious and civil liberty', which, Packer hoped, 'shall never be parted'.[111] John Milton underwent a similar change of allegiance. He had served the Rump, but had subsequently disowned its memory. In 1653–4, despite his earlier pronouncements on the interdependence of civil and religious liberty, he had committed himself, albeit with severe inner doubts, to the military regime of the protectorate, hoping that it would fulfil his hopes, as the Rump had not, of liberty of conscience. In 1659 he renounced the protectorate in favour of the cause of the commonwealthmen. Like Packer he accordingly revised his estimate of the Long Parliament. Its members, he now decided, had been 'the authors and best patrons of religious and civil libertie, that ever these Ilands brought

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[108]   Birch, *Collecttion of … John Thurloe*, vol. 6, p. 246. For the date of the letter compare the reference to a 'speech' by Cromwell to Parliament in ibid., vol. 6, p. 244 with Abbott, *Writings and Speeches*, vol. 3, p. 455.

[109]   [Sir Henry Vane], *A Healing Question Propounded* (1660), pp. 3, 5.

[110]   C.H. Firth, (ed.), 'Letters concerning the Dissolution of Cromwell's Last Parliament', *English Historical Review*, 7 (1892), p. 110.

[111]   *Diary of Thomas Burton*, (ed.) J.T. Rutt (4 vols, 1828), vol. 3, p. 159.

forth'.[112] His writings of 1659–60 are pervaded by the conviction that 'the whole freedom of man consists either in spiritual or civill libertie'.[113]

One person's liberty is another's tyranny. In the last two years of the Puritan Revolution the vocabulary of civil and religious liberty became commonplace not only in the ranks of Cromwellians and commonwealthmen and advocates of free religious profession who had fostered it, but outside them. Conservative forces within the Puritan cause followed where the MPs who commended the Humble Petition in 1657 had pointed. So did politically neutral opinion. To posterity the drive towards the return of monarchy in 1660 may look a reactionary and therefore illiberal force, but to a high proportion of its protagonists it seemed a movement for the return of liberty and of the end of military and sectarian tyranny. In the language of civil and religious liberty, which had been forged by spokesmen for that tyranny, such men found a ready-made instrument. Their subscription to it was already well under way under Richard Cromwell.[114] Although there was Presbyterian indignation against the vocabulary of civil and religious liberty,[115] it was more common for Presbyterians to deploy it to their own ends. Presbyterian supporters of the rising of Sir George Booth in August 1659 demanded 'the settlement of sacre[d] and civill rights'.[116] In the last months of the Puritan Revolution, when commonwealthmen protested that the 'specious pretence' of the demand for a 'Free-Parliament' – the movement that would soon restore the monarchy – was endangering or ruining 'the Liberties of all good people, Civil, and Religious',[117] a host of Presbyterian petitions called for a 'free parliament' as a means to secure 'our Civil and Religious Rights and Liberties'.[118] Oliver Cromwell, having sensed the political possibilities of the alliance of civil and religious liberty, had let loose a movement he could not control. In the short-

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[112]   *Complete Prose Works of John Milton*, vol. 7, p. 274; cf. ibid., vol. 7, p. 318.

[113]   Ibid., vol. 7, p. 379.

[114]   *Mercurius Politicus* 30 December 1658, p. 311; 27 January 1659, p. 187; 28 July 1659, p. 623.

[115]   *Englands Settlement Mistaken, or, A Short Survay of a Pamphlet Called England's Settlement upon the two Solid Foundations of Civil and Religious Liberties* (1660), esp. pp. 7–10.

[116]   *The Nicholas Papers*, (ed.) G.F. Warner (Camden Society, 4 vols, 1886–1930), vol. 4, p. 177.

[117]   *Parliamentary Intelligencer* (26 December 1659), p. 6; 12 March 1660, p. 183.

[118]   See e.g. Thomas Fuller, *A Happy Handfull* (1660), pp. 20, 37, 49; cf. William Prynne, *The First and Second Part of the Signal Loyalty* (1660), pp. 45–6. Among the rulers of the disintegrating English regime in Ireland, commonwealthmen and Presbyterians likewise vied for control of the same language: Fuller, *Happy Handful*, p. 57; *Parliamentary Intelligencer* 16 January 1660, p. 34; *The Declaration of Sir Charls Coot* (1660), p. 3.

term, through its adoption by both commonwealthmen and Presbyterianism, it helped destroy first the protectorate and then the goals he had pursued through it. In the long term it nourished a Whig tradition which eschewed the vision of a godly commonwealth that had been the guiding objective of his life.

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Chapter 12

England's Exodus:
The Civil War as a War of Deliverance

John Coffey

In a series of recent publications, Quentin Skinner has argued that 'from the parliamentary perspective, the civil war began as a war of national liberation from servitude'.[1] Skinner suggests that early Stuart Englishmen deployed a concept of liberty that had its roots in ancient Rome. For the Romans, slaves were persons subject to the arbitrary will of another; a free citizen and a free state, by contrast, were not under the dominion of others, but capable of acting in their own right. On this view, people could be deprived of their freedom not merely by direct interference or violation of personal liberties and property rights, but also by any prerogative or discretionary powers which made the freedom of subjects dependent on the good will of the king. In 1642, the Parliamentarians argued that if the crown could veto legislation, this would reduce Parliament and the freeborn people it represented to a state of complete dependence on the will of the king. As Skinner puts it: 'If there was any one slogan under which the two Houses finally took up arms, it was that the people of England never, never, never shall be slaves'.[2]

This interpretation of 1642 contrasts sharply with that presented by John Morrill in his famous essay on 'the religious context of the English civil war'. Indeed, one could be forgiven for thinking that these two distinguished historians were addressing entirely different events. According to Cambridge University's recently retired Regius Professor of Modern History, the Civil

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[1]   Quentin Skinner, 'Classical Liberty, Renaissance Translation and the English Civil War', in *Visions of Politics* (Cambridge, 3 vols, 2002), vol. II, p. 343. See also 'John Milton and the Politics of Slavery' in *Visions of Politics*, vol. II, pp. 286–343; 'A Third Concept of Liberty', *Proceedings of the British Academy*, 117 (2002): pp. 237–68; 'Classical Liberty and the Coming of the English Civil War', in M. van Gelderen and Q. Skinner, (eds), *Republicanism: A Shared European Heritage* (Cambridge, 2 vols, 2002), vol. II, pp. 9–28; 'Rethinking Political Liberty', *History Workshop Journal*, 61 (2006): pp. 156–70; *Hobbes and Republican Liberty* (Cambridge, 2008).

[2]   'Classical Liberty and the Coming of the English Civil War', p. 28.

War was a Renaissance affair, a 'war of liberation' inspired by classics-loving 'democraticall gentlemen'. According to the University's Professor of British and Irish History, the Civil War was a post-Reformation tragedy, a 'war of religion' spearheaded by Bible-pounding Puritan zealots.[3]

I want to suggest that these rival readings of the Parliamentarian cause are not as incompatible as they appear on first sight – indeed, that they direct us towards the conflicted character of Parliamentary ideology. My point here is not simply that we need to learn from Thomas Hobbes, who recognised that a balanced account of Parliamentarian discourse will have to do justice to both the classical and the biblical, the Renaissance and the Reformation, 'the democraticall gentlemen' and the Puritan preachers.[4] Rather it is that when we turn to what Anthony Fletcher called 'the Puritan core of the Parliamentarian party',[5] we find that they themselves were in two minds about what they were fighting for. On the one hand, as Morrill rightly suggests, they framed this war as a clash between true and false religion, between defenders of Reformed Protestantism and promoters of popery. This was another battle – perhaps a climactic one – in the cosmic war between Yahweh and the idols, Christ and the Antichrist. But at the same time, the godly saw the Civil War as England's Exodus, a war of liberation from political and ecclesiastical servitude. Indeed, deliverance from slavery was among the most important leitmotifs of the Puritan Revolution. Inadvertently, then, Skinner has alerted us to a theme that is every bit as prominent in the pamphlets and sermons of the Bible-reading Puritans he overlooks as it is in the writings of his neo-Roman gentlemen.[6]

These two ways of thinking about the Civil War – as a war of religion and a war of liberation – were not necessarily incompatible, and in different ways, many Puritans subscribed to them both. But they were in tension, and could be used to support rival purposes. So they help us to make sense of the otherwise puzzling paradoxes of English Puritanism during the 1640s. For if this was the decade of William Dowsing, Thomas Edwards and Matthew Hopkins, it was also the heyday of John Milton, John Lilburne and Gerrard Winstanley. In order to understand the Puritan Parliamentarians, we need to reckon with both the zeal for true religion and the passion for liberation.

In emphasising the role of 'deliverance' in the thought of the Puritan revolutionaries, I am taking my cue from a short but suggestive study entitled *Exodus and Revolution*, published in 1985 by the Jewish political theorist,

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[3]   See especially John Morrill, *The Nature of the English Revolution* (1990), pp. 33–90.

[4]   Thomas Hobbes, *Behemoth, or an Epitome of the Civil Wars of England from 1640 to 1660* (1679).

[5]   Anthony Fletcher, *The Outbreak of the English Civil War* (1981), p. 417.

[6]   There was, of course, some overlap between the two groups.

Michael Walzer. Without providing intensive documentation, Walzer argued that the biblical Exodus was 'crucial ... to the self-understanding of the English Puritans during the 1640s', and offered 'a paradigm of revolutionary politics'. For Parliamentarians, as for later political movements, the Exodus was an example of 'national liberation', the deliverance of an enslaved people.[7]

But in pursuing this line of enquiry, I am also inspired by John Morrill. Few historians have shown such sensitivity to the ways in which intensive reading of the Bible shaped the imaginations of English Puritans like William Dowsing and Oliver Cromwell.[8] Several years ago, Morrill published an essay entitled 'A Liberation Theology?' That piece focused on the Puritan mind, and on personal empowerment, but it also argued that the Exodus story was of fundamental importance to Oliver Cromwell, whose 'years in the fens were his years in the desert, released from slavery to sin by God's free will, but not yet able to enjoy the fruits of his call'. It suggests that Cromwell saw a parallel between his own wilderness years and those of the English during the Revolution, and that this 'underlay the constant reference to himself throughout the Protectorate as the new Moses'.[9]

In the rest of this chapter, I want to build on the work of Morrill, Walzer and Skinner, and explore the 'liberation theology' of the Puritan Revolution. The term is an anachronism, of course, one that dates from the 1960s.[10] Unlike modern liberation theologians, my subjects were not engaged in a systematic attempt to reconstruct Christian doctrine from the viewpoint of the oppressed.[11] Moreover, liberation was a very rare word in seventeenth-century English, used in only one book title and not at all in the King James Bible. But what we are

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[7]   Michael Walzer, *Exodus and Revolution* (1985), pp. 3, 6–7, 32. Walzer's earlier work, *The Revolution of the Saints* (1965) focused entirely on the Puritans, but did not explore their use of Exodus.

[8]   See John Morrill, 'William Dowsing: The Bureaucratic Puritan', in Morrill, Paul Slack and Daniel Woolf (eds), *Public Duty and Private Conscience in Seventeenth-Century England* (1992), pp. 173–203; Morrill and Philip Baker, 'Oliver Cromwell, the Regicide and the Sons of Zeruiah', in Jason Peacey (ed.), *The Regicides and the Execution of Charles I* (2001), pp. 14–35; 'How Oliver Cromwell Thought', in John Morrow and Jonathan Scott (eds), *Liberty, Authority, Formality: Political Ideas and Culture, 1600–1900: Essays in Honour of Colin Davis* (2008), pp. 89–112.

[9]   John Morrill, 'A Liberation Theology? Aspects of Puritanism in the English Revolution', in Laura Lunger Knoppers (ed.), *Puritanism and its Discontents* (2003), pp. 40–41.

[10]   See Christian Smith, *The Emergence of Liberation Theology: Radical Religion and Social Movement Theory* (1991).

[11]   Gerrard Winstanley may count as the exception to the rule. See Christopher Rowland, 'The Common People and the Bible: Winstanley, Blake and Liberation Theology', in Andrew Bradstock (ed.), *Winstanley and the Diggers, 1649–1999* (2000), pp. 149–60.

dealing with in the 1640s (as in the 1960s) is a political theology of deliverance based on the Book of Exodus, the key text for modern liberation theology. And if we turn to Henry Cockeram's *English Dictionarie* of 1623, we find that 'deliverance' is defined, in one word, as 'liberation'.[12]

I. Parliamentarians

By the mid-seventeenth century, the story of Israel's Exodus from Egyptian bondage had comforted and tantalised Calvinists for several generations. The title page of the Geneva Bible bore a striking illustration of the Hebrews pinned against the shore of the Red Sea with the Egyptian army bearing down upon them. In 1560, when the new translation was published, British Protestants had just been through their own deliverance – after the brutal oppression of the 1550s, the accession of Elizabeth and the success of the Scottish Reformation seemed like their very own crossing of the Red Sea. For Dutch Calvinists, the Exodus acquired semi-official status as a national saga. Simon Schama has written that we 'find the Exodus story everywhere in early modern Dutch culture' – in sermons, songs, silver plaques, wall tiles, engravings, paintings, and the stage. William the Silent was hailed as the Dutch Moses and regaled with theatrical performances of 'Moses's Deliverance of the Jews'.[13] Yet Dutch Calvinists could hardly make up their minds about the Dutch Revolt. Was it a confessional war for the true religion or a struggle for national liberation?

That ambiguity is arguably close to the heart of early modern Calvinist political thought. As Carlos Eire has demonstrated, idolatry is the concept that stands out like 'some sort of red blinking light' in Calvinist resistance theories in the second half of the sixteenth century.[14] Iconoclasm was a marked feature of Calvinist revolts, and Calvinist texts depicted contemporary conflicts as a rerun of Old Testament clashes between the godly and idolaters. But the concept of 'slavery' also enjoyed a high profile. Already in the *Institutes*, Calvin contemplated the possibility that God might raise up extraordinary 'deliverers' like Moses to rescue his people from bondage, and that hint was taken up by Goodman, Knox and Du-Plessis Mornay, who all cited Moses in their discussion

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[12]   Henry Cockeram, *The English Dictionarie: Or an Interpreter of Hard English Words* (1623), 'The Second Part', n.p.

[13]   Simon Schama, *The Embarrassment of Riches: Dutch Culture in the Golden Age* (1987), pp. 104–13.

[14]   Carlos Eire, *War Against the Idols: The Reformation of Worship from Erasmus to Calvin* (1986), p. 308.

of godly liberators.[15] The juxtaposition of these concepts – idolatry and slavery, iconoclasm and deliverance – was not accidental, for Calvinists were close readers of Exodus and Deuteronomy. If the Exodus was a story that pitted the true God against the idols, it was also an epic tale of deliverance from slavery.

'Deliverance' was a keyword in the vocabulary of English Protestantism. Although it rarely appears in book titles before 1600, there was a flurry of pamphlets celebrating deliverance from the Gunpowder Plot, and the term was often applied to two earlier instances of national salvation from popery: the Reformation and the defeat of the Armada. Although 'deliverance' could refer to rescue from various kinds of peril, death or demonic possession, its core meaning (as Cockeram suggested) was emancipation from slavery.[16] Crucially, the concept highlighted the powerlessness and passivity of slaves. Deliverance was not something you did for yourself; it was something done for you by someone else. In a religious context, it was a word that pointed to God as the great Deliverer. Colin Davis has recently written that 'If we are to understand the political mindset of mid-seventeenth-century England, we, like our ancestors if in a different way, need to acknowledge the living God'.[17] Getting to grips with Exodus politics forces us to do just that, for the most important actor in that particular story was not Pharaoh, or Moses, but Yahweh. Yet even in the biblical narrative, Yahweh often used people to do his work. So Exodus politics fostered activism, not passivity. Throughout the 1640s, Puritans would look to their political statesmen and military commanders as 'deliverers' or 'instruments of our deliverance'.

The appeal to Exodus is evident from the earliest days of the British Revolutions. In April 1638, as people across Scotland gathered in emotionally charged meetings to sign the National Covenant, its co-author, Archibald Johnston of Wariston, was struggling to come to terms with living at the centre of this breathtaking upheaval. '... the Lord hes wrought wonders', he wrote in his diary, 'yea greater wonders, in this land by weaker instruments in ane unlkylier way nor [than] he wrought eyther in Aeygipt by Moyses, or Jesus himselth did in Judah upon the bodies of men'. 'I assure myselth', he continued, 'this churche is in hir journey out of hir Aegiptian captivitie ... I am persuaded he schal bring

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[15]   See John Coffey, 'Civil and Religious Liberty in Calvinist Resistance Theory', in Q. Skinner and M. van Gelderen (eds), *Freedom and the Construction of Europe* (Cambridge, forthcoming).

[16]   See for example Anthony Munday, *The Admirable Deliuerance of 266 Christians ... from the Captiuitie of the Turkes, who had been Gally Slaues Many Yeares in Alexandria* (1608).

[17]   J.C. Davis, 'Living with the Living God: Radical Religion and the English Revolution', in C. Durston and J. Maltby (eds), *Religion in Revolutionary England* (2006), p. 20.

hir at the end to the possession of the true Canaan of hir holy puretie, liberties, and priviledges'. Although the people might prefer 'the onions of Aegipt to the grapes of Canaan', God would bring them through the wilderness, quench their thirst at the waters of Meribah, enable them to confront the giants of Canaan, and 'enter to the possession and fruition of thir holy liberties'. Israel's Exodus had 'happened to them for ensamples ... quhilk may be best applied to us of any people'. 'Let us evin then', he concluded, 'read over the history of Gods dealing with the Jeues and their voyage, that we may learne to mark his dealing with our auin Izrael'.[18]

In England too, the Exodus story was used to dramatise the fear that the English had been enslaved to arbitrary power. In the opening debates of the Short Parliament, Sir Francis Seymour delivered a speech in which he compared 'our affairs to the bondage of the Israelites in Egypt'. This was, of course, an incendiary analogy, and it certainly shocked some contemporaries – for if England was Egypt, who was Pharaoh?[19] Ironically, Seymour was a future Royalist, but his belief that the English were being treated like the Hebrew slaves was widely shared, especially by the godly. Francis Rous told Parliament that the prerogative taxes of the 1630s were so oppressive that 'there hath not such a thing been done since Israell came from the Egipt of Roome'.[20] He implied that while the Reformation had been England's Exodus, the Personal Rule had taken the nation back to Egyptian bondage.

As this suggests, Parliamentarians worried about ecclesiastical as much as political slavery. They were as exercised by tyranny over conscience as they were by royal prerogative powers. Puritan preachers accused the Caroline bishops of binding Christian consciences by enforcing conformity to their ceremonies. Jeremiah Burroughs described Rome as the 'spirituall Aegypt' and explained that 'the Antichristian party ... hold the Israel of God under bondage, cruell bondage, as the Egyptians did the Israelites'.[21] Calybute Downing, addressing the Artillery Company in September 1640, preached on a text from Deuteronomy

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[18]   *The Diary of Sir Archibald Johnston of Wariston, 1632–39*, (ed.) G.M. Paul (1911), pp. 340, 343–5. For further Covenanter references to Exodus see *The Intentions of the Armie of the Kingdom of Scotland* (1640), p. 4; [John Corbet], *The Congratulatorie Epistle* (1640), pp. 40; Samuel Rutherford, *A Sermon Preached before the Honourable House of Commons* (1644), p. 19: 'He hath divided our Red Sea'.

[19]   *The Oxinden Letters, 1607–42*, (ed.) D. Gardiner (London, 1933), p. 162. A record of the speech can be found in *Proceedings of the Short Parliament of 1640*, (ed.) E.S. Cope and W.H. Coates (1977), pp. 140–43 with the reference to Egypt on p. 143.

[20]   *Proceedings of the Short Parliament of 1640*, p. 148.

[21]   Jeremiah Burroughs, *Sions Joy* (1641), p. 45.

about how the Amalekites tried to prevent the Hebrews entering Canaan.[22] The two preachers had highlighted different moments in the Exodus story, but both agreed that papists (and crypto-papists) were holding England back from the Promised Land.

In the Fast Sermons preached by Puritan divines before Parliament, such as the one delivered by Cornelius Burges at the opening of the Long Parliament in November 1640, we find that the entire history of ancient Israel was interpreted as a story of 'deliverance upon deliverance'. The Exodus was the foundational narrative of the Jewish nation, and Puritans repeatedly invoked Israel's experience of 'Egyptian bondage' under Pharaoh and his 'cruel taskmasters', and the nation's passage through the Red Sea. But the preachers also reminded their hearers that after it reached the Promised Land, Israel fell under the 'yoke' of other oppressors and had to be liberated by judges or 'deliverers' like Gideon, Deborah and Samson. Finally, the Jews had endured seventy years of 'Babylonish captivity', only to be delivered once again in a second Exodus, when intervention by an army from the north led to Cyrus's 'Proclamation of Libertie'. England, the preachers declared, had recapitulated the Jewish experience, for she had also enjoyed 'a Catalogue' of 'many, great, stupendous, and even miraculous deliverances'. She had been delivered from popish bondage by Edward VI and by Elizabeth I ('that glorious Deborah'). She had experienced further 'deliverances' in 1588, 1605, and now again in 1640–41.[23] In 1641, the word 'deliverance' appears again and again in the titles of books and pamphlets – almost thirty compared with just a handful in 1639. Stephen Marshall, the great Puritan demagogue, announced in September 1641 that 'this wonderfull yeer' had been a year of 'Jubilee', a year of liberation for slaves (see Leviticus 25). 'This yeer have we seen broken the yokes which lay upon our estates, Liberties, Religion, and Conscience; the intolerable yokes of Star-Chamber, and terrible High-Commission'. Addressing the 'Right Honourable and Noble Senators', he declared that they were at the start of their own 'Passover'.[24]

Although Exodus was a story of miracle and divine deliverance, it left room for human agency – for a Pharaoh who hardened his heart, and a Moses who

[22] Calybute Downing, *A Sermon Preached to the Renowned Company of the Artillery, 1 September, 1640* (1641), passim. John Adamson analyses the sermon and its significance in *The Noble Revolt: The Overthrow of Charles I* (2007), pp. 67–70.

[23] Cornelius Burges, *The First Sermon preached to the House of Commons ... Novemb. 17 1640* (1641), passim; quotations at pp. 9, 3, 6, 40, 53.

[24] Stephen Marshall, *A Peace Offering to God* (1641), pp. 33, 40, 42, 45. For other references to 1641 as a year of Jubilee see John Vicars, *Jehova-jireh ... Or Englands Remembrancer* (1642), title page; *The Rat-Trap: or the Jesuites taken in their owne Net, andc. Discovered in this yeare of Jubilee or Deliverance from the Romish faction, 1641* (1641).

demanded 'Let my people go!' In addressing MPs and Lords as Mosaic deliverers, the preachers begged the question about Pharaoh's identity. The main burden of the Fast Sermons was to prepare godly politicians for the arduous task of leading an Exodus. In April 1642, Joseph Caryl warned MPs that some of their constituents would murmur like the Children of Israel, becoming angry at their deliverance, and condemning their leaders for alienating Pharaoh or bringing them to the peril of the Red Sea or the drudgery of the wilderness. The people would moan that 'while he attempted to recover their liberty [Moses] would endanger their lives'. Yet MPs must not shrink from their calling as liberators. God wanted Parliament 'to loose the bands of wickedness, to undoe the heavy burdens, and to let the oppressed goe free' (Isaiah 58:6).[25] William Sedgwick upheld Moses as 'a good patterne for publike persons' – he had refused a position at Pharaoh's court and made 'Israels deliverance' his sole goal. Like him, MPs should be 'delivering rulers', 'impudent in seeking deliverance'.[26] Thomas Carter noted that 'at present we are in the midst of a Red Sea', but he assured MPs that God had 'a Canaan reserved for England', and urged them to imitate Moses in their prayerfulness for the people.[27]

It is hard to gauge the impact of Fast Sermons on Parliament itself, but official parliamentary statements did reflect the clerical emphasis on ecclesiastical bondage. In *A Remonstrance in Defence of the Lords and Commons in Parliament* (1642), the Parliamentarians explained that 'All true hearted Subjects ought to fight to maintain the purity and substance [of Religion] ... that their consciences may not be brought into the subjection of Roman slavery'. The Parliamentarian fear of slavery was not simply an apprehension of regal bondage, it was also (as the *Remonstrance* makes clear) a fear of 'the popes tyrannie', and 'loads imposed' by 'ambitious Clergy'. Parliamentarians worried that 'the malignant party' (led by the bishops) would become 'masters of our Religion and liberties to make us slaves'.[28]

That message was also clearly articulated in works of resistance theory, such as the first clerical defence of Parliament's war, John Goodwin's *Anti-Cavalierisme* (1642). Quentin Skinner has remarked that Goodwin's tract provides 'perhaps the clearest summary' of the classical distinction between liberty and dependence, and hence between free men and slaves.[29] Goodwin addressed his audience as 'free men and women' who enjoyed 'the disposal of

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[25]   Joseph Caryl, *The Works of Ephesus Explained* (1642), pp. 26, 51.

[26]   William Sedgwick, *Zions Deliverance and her Friends Duty* (1642), pp. 37–8, 46, 49, 52.

[27]   Thomas Carter, *Prayers Prevalencie for Israels Safety* (1643), sig. A2r, p. 33, 36–8.

[28]   *A Remonstrance in Defence of the Lords and Commons in Parliament* (1642), pp. 3–5.

[29]   Skinner, 'Rethinking political liberty', pp. 158–9.

your selves and of all your wayes'; but he warned that they could lose their liberty by becoming subject to the 'arbitterments and wills' of 'domineering' Royalists who would 'make themselves Lords over you'. But the language he used was biblical in provenance too. He urged them not to 'exchange your Quailes and Manna from Heaven, for the Garlike and Onyons of Egypt'.[30]

Unlike Roman law, biblical narrative did not provide Parliamentarians with legal arguments to justify their rebellion. But it gave them something just as important – a story that legitimised resistance and forced them to choose between the garlic and onions of their Egyptian captivity and the long and arduous trek towards freedom. The familiar biblical account put narrative flesh on abstract concepts of liberty and slavery, invested them with intense spiritual significance, and did justice to the biblical proportions of contemporary events. It offered a powerful means of dramatising the contemporary concern about enslavement, mobilising popular support behind the cause, and reassuring Parliamentarians that God would deliver them. And it steeled would-be revolutionaries for years of struggle, peril, wandering and warfare. As Walzer observes, 'the Exodus isn't a theory of revolution'. Instead it is 'a story' which has been repeatedly appropriated down the centuries by political actors who have located the events of their own times within its 'narrative frame'.[31]

Parliamentarian preachers prompted their congregations to inhabit the biblical narrative. Hearers imagined themselves and their nation enduring Egyptian bondage, sharing the first Passover meal, being pursued by Pharaoh's army, crossing the Red Sea, murmuring against their deliverers, wandering in the wilderness, camping at Mount Sinai, or standing on Mount Pisgah looking out over the Promised Land. The story was so familiar that there was no need for a detailed rehearsal – a simple allusion could conjure up a vivid scene. Although few preachers developed the Exodus analogy at length, it was cited so insistently that the godly developed a sustained sense of re-enacting sacred history. In their minds, Puritan Parliamentarians were treading in the footsteps of the Hebrews, leaving Egyptian bondage behind, and marching towards the Promised Land.

Crucially, this was a story that could capture the imagination and put fire in the belly. John Morrill argued that 'the localist and the legal-constitutionalist perceptions of misgovernment lacked the momentum, the passion, to bring about the kind of civil war which England experienced after 1642. It was the force of religion that drove minorities to fight, and forced majorities to make reluctant choices'.[32] Perhaps that's right, but even so, the godly in 1642 were fired

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[30] John Goodwin, *Anti-Cavalierisme*, pp. 38–9, 46.

[31] Walzer, *Exodus and Revolution*, p. 7.

[32] Morrill, 'The Religious Context of the English Civil War', in *The Nature of the English Revolution*, p. 47.

by more than a zeal for 'the true Reformed religion'; theirs was also a passion for deliverance. Far from being dry and dusty, deliverance was one of the most intoxicating ideas of the English Civil War. And the battle cry – liberation from slavery – was one that could galvanise a powerful coalition of the godly and their fellow-travellers.

Exodus continued to have its uses throughout the first Civil War. In a sermon preached at Great Yarmouth in 1643, John Brinsley drummed up support for Parliament by suggesting that though the Reformation had delivered the English from 'Egyptian-Roman bondage', they were now on the edge of the Red Sea, being pursued by Pharaoh; they must 'stand fast ... choosing to *Dye Free-Men* [rather] then to *live slaves*'.[33] And while Puritan clergy carefully avoided any explicit identification of Charles I with the Egyptian tyrant, it was an analogy that hearers could draw for themselves. The Royalist divine, Edward Symmons, complained of the Parliamentarians, 'How often have they compared [the king] to Pharaoh ... '.[34] Godly militants were more outspoken in praising their military commanders for leading them out of slavery –the Earl of Essex especially was hailed as England's 'Moses'.[35] Yet the prospect of wilderness wanderings was in view from the early years of what became the *Long* Parliament. Already in 1642, William Sedgwick was warning that 'Israels deliverance from Egypt' was 'long' and 'difficult' – the Hebrews had faced 'strategems, plots, taxations ... burthens ... changes and uncertainties ... [and] worst of all, Pharaoh raised armies against them'. Even after 'that great deliverance through the red sea, they were forty years in the wilderness, beset with many Wants'. They grew 'weary of their deliverance' and said: 'Let us goe backe to Egypt'.[36] In a 1643 Fast Sermon, William Greenhill warned, 'let not Eng: become a house of bondage, a 2d Aegypt'.[37] By 1645, the Presbyterian Thomas Case was lamenting 'Deliverance-Obstruction', – the people of God were now wandering in the wilderness, and failing to press on to the Promised Land of Reformation.[38]

In seeking to press on to Canaan, and erect a new system of religious uniformity, the Presbyterian divines learned not to linger over the emancipatory

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[33]   John Brinsley, *Stand Still* (1647), pp. 59–60.

[34]   Edward Symmons, *Scripture Vindicated* (Oxford, 1644), p. 84. He went on to list the names of other biblical tyrants, but Pharaoh was the first.

[35]   For examples, see William Prynne, *The Popish Royal Favourite* (1643), 'Epistle Dedicatory', sig. ¶2r; J[ohn] P[rice], *A Spiritual Snapsacke* (1643), p. 4; and the funeral sermon for Essex preached by Richard Vines, *The Hearse of the Renowned* (1646).

[36]   Sedgwick, *Zions Deliverance*, pp. 6–7. See also Edmund Calamy, *Gods Free Mercy to England* (1642), pp. 47–8.

[37]   William Greenhill, *The Axe at the Root* (1643), p. 39.

[38]   Thomas Case, *Deliverance-Obstruction, or the Set-Backs of Reformation* (1646).

promise of the Exodus. Instead, like Luther and Calvin before them, they tried to rein in the libertarian impulses of radical Reformers. Although they still employed the language of slavery and deliverance, they now used Exodus to drive home other points – the necessity of firm leadership, obedience to divine law, strict adherence to covenants, and effective forms of church government and discipline. However, by deploying the language of deliverance, mainstream Puritan preachers had unleashed a vocabulary they could no longer control. For the Exodus narrative of liberation from slavery quickly fell into the hands of Independents and sectaries. As Thomas Hobbes later observed, 'there was no so dangerous an Enemy to the Presbyterians [that is, the mainstream Puritan divines], as this Brood of their own hatching'.[39]

II. Independents

As early as 1641, Henry Burton drew on the Exodus in his sermon, *England's Bondage and Hope of Deliverance*. Burton coined the term 'Independent' to describe self-governing congregations who were no longer 'beslaved under the yoke of Prelaticall tyranny, under Egyptian Task-masters'. 'Independency' was about liberty from subjection to domineering human authorities.[40] By the mid-1640s, the Independent coalition had turned the language of liberty and slavery against the Presbyterians who sought a crackdown on sects and heresies. Hugh Peter warned that England was 'not yet over the Red Sea', and could end up retracing Israel's forty-two stopping places in the wilderness.[41] John Lilburne told William Prynne that 'we are brought into Egyptian bonds ... by the Blacke-Coats'.[42] Elsewhere he wrote that just as watermen cry 'Westward ho!', 'most men have more than cause to cry in the Watermen's language Aegypt hough, hough, the house of bondage, slavery, oppression, taxation, heavy and cruell, heavy and cruell, wee can no longer beare it, we can no longer beare it, we can no longer beare it'. As in Pharaoh's Egypt, 'our great and mighty men' acted as 'Tyrannous Task-masters', laying intolerable burdens on the shoulders of the poor, while 'Spirituall Task-masters' roared 'like lions for their prey of Tythes'.[43] Lilburne's friend, William Walwyn, referred to the present time as 'this day of Jubile', but he condemned Presbyterian plans for religious uniformity – it was as if 'the

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[39] Thomas Hobbes, *Behemoth, or the Long Pzarliament*, (ed.) Paul Seward (2010), p. 291.

[40] See Henry Burton, *The Protestation Protested* (1641), sigs. B3v, C3v.

[41] Hugh Peter, *Gods Doings and Mans Duty* (1645), p. 30.

[42] John Lilburne, *A Copie of a Letter* (1645), p. 2.

[43] John Lilburne, *England's Birthright Justified* (1645), pp. 43–5.

Israelites, after the Egyptian bondage, had become Task-masters in the Land of Canaan one to another'.[44] Francis White accused the Presbyterians of wanting to keep the people in 'servile bondage', Henry Parker warned of enslavement under Presbyterian yokes, and Clement Writer called them 'our Ecclesiastical Task-masters'.[45] Writing in 1648, the London Independent John Price claimed that the English had reached 'the very edge of Canaan' only to find that the Presbyterians were planning 'to return again to the bondage of Pharaoh'.[46]

The Scottish Covenanters, who had been allies of the Parliament, now came to be viewed as the agents of Pharaoh.[47] When Cromwell defeated them in war, Peter Sterry suggested that deliverance from the Gunpowder Plot was less sweet than deliverance from the 'Scotch plot', and would even replace remembrance of the great deliverance from Rome at the Reformation. England had been delivered twice from these 'Two Spiritual Egypts'.[48] Following the Battle of Worcester, John Goodwin wrote a psalm of deliverance, praising God for rescuing England from 'the house of slavery' and the 'iron yoke' of the Scottish clergy.[49]

Goodwin was a particularly radical Independent, but the same line of argument was used by John Owen, who by the late 1640s had emerged as one of the leading Independent divines and a confidant of Cromwell. Owen's understanding of Britain's Civil Wars was deeply informed by his reading of the Book of Revelation as well as the Book of Exodus, and he repeatedly used both narratives to frame contemporary events. If Exodus depicted the people of God as enslaved by Pharaoh's taskmasters, Revelation presented them as slaughtered by the forces of Antichrist. In Owen's eyes, the Civil War was a war of deliverance

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[44]   Walwyn, *Tolleration Justified* (1646) in *The Writings of William Walwyn*, (ed.) Jack R. McMichael and Barbara Taft (1989), pp. 140, 156. In 1642, Walwyn had compared opponents of the Puritan-Parliamentarians to 'stiffe-necked and unwieldy Hebrews, that wisht they were slaves in Egypt againe, where the much loved Flesh pots were' (p. 70).

[45]   Francis White, *The Copy of a Letter* (1647), p. 3; Henry Parker, *The Trojan-Horse of Presbyteriall Government Disembowelled* (1646), pp. 17–18; [Clement Writer], *The Jus Divinum of Presbyterie* (1646), p. 36.

[46]   [John Price], *The Pulpit Incendiary* (1648), pp. 39–41.

[47]   On the reaction against the Covenanters see Crawford Gribben, 'The Church of Scotland and the English Apocalyptic Imagination', *Scottish Historical Review*, 58 (2009): 34–56.

[48]   Peter Sterry, *Englands Deliverance from the Northern Presbytery* (1652), pp. 24, 29.

[49]   John Goodwin, *Two Hymns, or Spiritual Songs* (1651), pp. 10–11. As I have shown elsewhere, deliverance from slavery is one of the key motifs in Goodwin's revolutionary writings. See John Coffey, *John Goodwin and the Puritan Revolution: Religion and Intellectual Change in Seventeenth-Century England* (2006), pp. 90, 95, 151, 163–4, 168, 191, 193, 240, 255, 293.

from Egyptian bondage and Babylonian persecution.[50] In April 1649, he told the Commons that the kings of the earth had acted like Pharaoh and given their power to Antichrist, making war on the lamb and persecuting his followers as heretics. 'The great discovery of these days', he stated, was the overthrow of 'spiritual and civil slavery'.[51] Following the Battle of Dunbar, Owen persuaded the Covenanter Alexander Jaffray that God had destroyed the Scottish army for this very reason, and he was exultant after the final routing of the Scots at the Battle of Worcester in 1651. In a thanksgiving sermon to Parliament in October 1651, Owen again imagined the Puritan Revolution as England's Exodus and as a key moment in the downfall of Antichrist. The Covenanters – 'our oppressors in Scotland' – had been 'Pharaoh-like'. But like the Israelites, the English were being delivered from Egypt (a temporal bondage to a tyrannical monarchy), and like the saints of Revelation they were being delivered from Babel ('a discipline full of persecution'). 'If ever any persons in the world had cause to sing the song of Moses and the Lamb', declared Owen to the Commons, 'we have this day'.[52]

For the Presbyterians, this was a bitter pill to swallow. The Covenanter, Samuel Rutherford, complained that Henry Burton depicted the Scots as tyrants, when it was they who had rescued the English from 'Egyptian taskmasters'.[53] His compatriot, George Gillespie, accused Independent 'New Lights' of bringing 'grosse Egyptian darknesse', but he was keen to tell 'tender consciences' not to fear that 'we are leading them back to Egypt'.[54] Christopher Love warned the godly that the goal of the New Model Army was 'under the notion of Liberty to bring you into bondage'.[55] Yet even as they tried to reclaim the language, the Presbyterian clergy recognised the irony – by portraying the Civil War as a war of liberation from servitude, they had supplied their would-be critics with rhetorical ammunition.

As the New Model Army swept all before it, triumphant Independents trained their sights on England's Pharaoh. In December 1648, Hugh Peter preached to the newly Purged Parliament and was said to have compared the army leaders to Moses, and urged them to lead the English out of Egyptian

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[50]   The Exodus analogy is used throughout Owen's thanksgiving sermon on the fall of Colchester on 28 September 1648: 'Ebenezer: A Memorial of the Deliverance of Essex County', *The Works of John Owen* (16 vols, 1850–53), VIII, pp. 77–126. It appears repeatedly in his later sermons during the Revolution.

[51]   *Works of John Owen*, VIII, pp. 263–4,

[52]   *Works of John Owen*, VIII, 323–6.

[53]   See Samuel Rutherford, *A Survey of Spiritual Antichrist* (1648), sig. A2v–A4v.

[54]   George Gillespie, *A Treatise of Miscellany Questions* (1649), pp. 129, 195.

[55]   Christopher Love, *Works of Darkness* (1647), p. 7.

bondage by rooting up monarchy.[56] In a sermon to the Commons on the day after the regicide, John Owen offered a vivid description of the Exodus and hoped that England would be 'delivered' once and for all from 'Pharaoh-like spirits'.[57] In his defence of the regicide, the prosecutor John Cook drew an explicit parallel between the 'imperious exultations' of King Charles ('Whats the House of Commons? Whats the Army?') and the arrogant interrogations of Pharaoh ('Who is the Lord? and Who is Moses?').[58]

Royalists, however, were not content to surrender potent biblical narratives to the Parliamentarians. In his speech on the scaffold outside Tower Hill on 10 January 1645, Archbishop Laud had turned Exodus against his foes: 'I am going apace, as you see, towards the Red-sea, and my feet are upon the very brinks of it, an Argument, I hope, that God is bringing me to the Land of Promise'. For Laud, the Red Sea became a picture of martyrdom, preceded by eating the bitter herbs of Passover; the Egyptians were his Parliamentarian pursuers, and he himself was Aaron the high priest. This drew an indignant response from Henry Burton, who agreed that Laud was 'indeed as neer the Red Sea as Pharaoh', because he had been 'pursuing the people of God'.[59] But allegations of Parliamentarian oppression were gaining in credibility. In 1648, the disgruntled MP Clement Walker laid out a litany of complaints against the Independents, and suggested that by the use of free quarter 'we are reduced to the condition of conquered Slaves, no man being master of his owne Family, but living like Bond-slaves in their own houses, under these Aegyptian Task-masters'.[60] In *Eikon Basilike*, Charles I was made to chide those who have pursued 'the oppressed Church … to the red sea of a Civill Warre, where nothing but a miracle can save either It or Him [that is, the Church or the King]'. The king prays: 'through this red sea of our own blood bring us at last to a state of piety, peace and plenty'.[61] In an ironic comment on the regicide,

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[56]   See Clement Walker, *Anarchia Anglicana, or the History of Independency, The Second Part* (1649), p. 49. On this sermon see Hugh Trevor-Roper, *Religion, the Reformation and Social Change* (1967), pp. 332–3, and David Underdown, *Pride's Purge: Politics in the Puritan Revolution* (1971), pp. 164.

[57]   *Works of John Owen*, VIII, pp. 150–51, 135.

[58]   John Cook, *King Charls his Case* (1649), pp. 36. On the last page of his tract, p. 43, he warns against returning to Egypt.

[59]   Henry Burton, *A Full and Satisfactorie Answer to the Archbishop of Canterbury's Speech* (1645), p. 5–7. See also Burton, *The Grand Imposter Unmasked* (1645), pp. 3–4; Hezekiah Woodward, *The Life and Death of William Laud* (1645), p. 9.

[60]   Clement Walker, *The History of Independency* (1648), Part I, p. 39.

[61]   *Eikon Basilike* (1649), pp. 106–7, 89.

Henry King asked: 'But what! Could Israel find no other way/To their wish'd Canaan than through This Red Sea?'[62]

Untroubled by their critics, Independents glorified their 'wonder-working God' for his miraculous deliverances. The Baptist Edward Barber praised Cromwell, Fleetwood and Pride, comparing them to Moses, but hoping that like Joshua, they would take England all the way to the Promised Land.[63] An elegy on the death of Henry Ireton declared that 'only Moses' could compare to him, for he had led the people to the edge of Canaan and then 'gently d'yd'.[64] In a sermon celebrating English victory at Dunbar, John Fenwick compared the battle to 'that famous Deliverance of his People at the Red Sea', called Cromwell 'our Englands Moses', and declared that 1650 marked the beginning of the Jubilee.[65] When defending the Protectorate in 1654, John Price compared Cromwell's critics to the disaffected Hebrews in the wilderness, 'murmuring' against Moses.[66] Two works systematically explored the parallels between the Exodus and England's godly revolution. The Warwickshire preacher John Flowre argued that the English had replicated the Hebrews' slavish condition, happy deliverance, rebellious carriage, and subsequent judgements. He acknowledged that it was 'a common cry amongst the people. O what happy days were the days of old! What peace! What plenty then!' But it was sheer folly to claim that 'we live in slavery under the present Rulers and Governours'. England had come out of 'our Royal slavery'. 'Who would have thought twenty years since that this late then servile and oppressed *Kingdom*, should have been so soon metamorphosed into a *free State*?'[67] Following the death of the Lord Protector, Henry Dawbeny published an extravagant treatise of three hundred pages comparing the parallel lives of Moses (the 'Pattern' and 'Prototype') and Cromwell ('our late Mosaicall Highness'). Dedicated to 'His Most Serene Highness', Richard Cromwell, 'our second Joshua, in the place of our second Moses', this was a long way from the republican sentiments of Flowre.[68] In his own speech to Parliament in January

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[62]   Henry King, *A Groan at the Funeral of the Incomparable and Glorious Monarch, Charles the First* (1649), p. 3.

[63]   Edward Barber, *The Storming and Total Routing of Tythes* (1651), sig. A2r.

[64]   Thomas Manley Jr and Fisher Payne, *Veni, Vidi, Vici* (1652), n.p.

[65]   John Fenwick Sr, *England's Deliverer the Lord of Hosts* (1651), title page, pp. 5, 14.

[66]   John Price, *Tyrants and Protectors* (1654), sig. A4r.

[67]   John Flowre, *Englands Late Miseries, Mercies and Miscarriages* (1651), pp. 14, 17, 19, 28.

[68]   Henry Dawbeny, *Historie and Policie Re-viewed, in the Heroick Transactions of His Most Serene Highnesse, Oliver, late Lord Protector; from his Cradle, to his Tomb: declaring his Steps to Princely Perfection; as they are drawn in Lively Parallels to the Ascents of the Great Patriarch Moses, in Thirty Degrees, to the Height of Honour* (1659), sigs. A4r, a2r. The thirty degrees are helpfully listed at the end of the work. His efforts attracted the scorn

1659, Richard remarked that his father had 'died full of days, spent in great and sore travail; yet his eyes were not waxed dim, neither was his natural strength abated, as it was said of Moses'.[69]

Cromwell himself apparently accepted his Mosaic role, perhaps reluctantly. In the late 1640s, Clement Walker alleged that at a meeting of army officers in Whitehall, Cromwell had prayed for a full hour, and '*desired God to take off from him the Government of this mighty People of England, as being to heavy for his shoulders to beare*: An audacious, ambitious and hypocritical imitation of Moses'.[70] In two speeches to Parliament, Cromwell suggested that the 'stupendous' events he had witnessed between 1640 and 1653 amounted to England's Exodus. At the opening of the Barebones Assembly, he expressed the hope that God would fill MPs with 'such a spirit as Moses had'. The English people still had to be convinced that 'men fearing God have fought them out of their thraldom and bondage under the regal power', but Cromwell cited Psalm 68, which prophesied that God 'will bring His people again from the depths of the sea, as once He led Israel through the Red Sea'. At the start of the first Protectorate Parliament, the Independent divine Thomas Goodwin preached a sermon tracing Israel's journey 'out of Egypt towards the land of Canaan'. The sermon was never published, but in his own speech to the Parliament, Cromwell gave his formal stamp of approval to this reading of Scripture and Providence: 'you had to-day in the sermon ... much allusion to a State, and dispensation in respect of discipline and correction, of mercies and deliverances, – the only parallel of God's dealing with us that I know in the world, which was largely and wisely held forth to you this day; Israel's bringing-out of Egypt through a wilderness, by many signs and wonders towards a place of rest: I say, *towards* it'. On this account, the Exodus was far from over. Israel was still in the wilderness, yet to cross the Jordan into the Promised Land. In September 1656, Cromwell felt the need to warn Parliament that England did not need 'a captain to lead us back again into Egypt'.[71] Just as Moses had led the children of Israel out of Egyptian bondage, so Cromwell himself felt called to liberate the people of God from tyranny over conscience.

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of William Winstanley, *Englands Worthies* (1660), p. 560. Dawbeny's work is discussed in Laura Lunger Knoppers, *Constructing Cromwell: Ceremony, Portrait and Print, 1645–1651* (2000), pp. 155–8. Another work published after Oliver's death also cited Moses in defence of the Cromwellian Protectorate: Samuel Slater *The Protectors Protection* (1658), pp. 6, 36, 40, 45, 58.

[69]　*Diary of Thomas Burton*, (ed.) J.T. Rutt (4 vols, 1828), III, p. 8.

[70]　See Walker, *Anarchia Anglicana*, p. 153.

[71]　*The Letters and Speeches of Oliver Cromwell*, (ed.) W.C. Abbott (Oxford, 4 vols, 1937–47), vol. III, pp. 62, 64–5; 434–5, 442; IV, p. 263.

III. Radicals

Yet Cromwell had no monopoly on the Exodus story, and it was also taken up by radicals to serve quite different ends. For some of these readers, the message of Exodus was reinforced by secular narratives about the loss of liberty. To Milton and other republicans, the story of the ancient Roman republic provided another 'historical typology' by which to make sense of contemporary events. In imaginations at once biblical and classical, England was both ancient Israel and ancient Rome.[72] Various radical groups also turned to the story of the Norman Yoke.[73] It loomed large in the mind of Lilburne, and was sometimes linked directly with the Exodus myth. The Diggers paired 'that Norman Yoke and Babylonish power', 'Norman task-masters' and 'furious Pharaoh'.[74] George Wither juxtaposed the 'Norman Yoke' and 'Pharaoh's bondage'.[75] Writing in 1659, Henry Stubbe reflected: 'I often, communing with my own soul in private, use to parallel our bondage under the Norman yoke, and our deliverance there from, to the continuance of the children of Israell in Egypt, and their escape from that slavish condition'.[76] These grand narratives appealed because they resonated with contemporary fears of enslavement, but their ready availability also predisposed the godly to think in terms of bondage and deliverance.

The language of slavery, liberty and deliverance is especially prominent in the writings of the Levellers. In a steady stream of pamphlets with titles like *Englands Lamentable Slaverie* and *Englands New Chains Discovered*, they turned established Parliamentarian rhetoric against the Lords, the Commons and the Commonwealth regime. While they drew on Norman Yoke theory and (to a lesser extent) on classical history, their language had unmistakeably biblical resonances. Walwyn talked of John Lilburne in providentialist style as 'this worthy instrument of England's delivery'.[77] Overton reminded MPs that they had been chosen 'to deliver us from all kind of Bondage'.[78] The third

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[72] Compare Skinner, 'John Milton and the Politics of Slavery' with W. Chernaik, 'Biblical Republicanism', *Prose Studies*, 23 (2000), 147–60; W.S.H. Lim, *John Milton, Radical Politics and Biblical Republicanism* (2006); E. Nelson, '"Talmudical Commonswealthsmen" and the Rise of Republican Exclusivism', *Historical Journal*, 50 (2007): 809–35.

[73] See Christopher Hill, 'The Norman Yoke', in *Puritanism and Revolution* (1958), pp. 58–125.

[74] See *Winstanley: The Law of Freedom and Other Writings*, (ed.) C. Hill (1973), pp. 87, 115, 128,

[75] George Wither, *British Appeals* (1651), p. 49.

[76] Henry Stubbe, *An Essay in Defence of the Good Old Cause* (1659), p. 7.

[77] *Writings of William Walwyn*, p. 152.

[78] [Richard Overton], *A Remonstrance of Many Thousand Citizens* (1646), in Dom Wolfe (ed.), *Leveller Manifestoes of the Puritan Revolution* (1944) p. 113. For further

Agreement of the People, the Levellers stated their commitment to 'taking off every yoak, and removing every burthen, in delivering the captive, and setting the oppressed free'.[79] At times, deliverance language was explicitly connected to the Exodus story. In 1649, Lilburne complained that the 'inslaving corruptions' of the day were 'as bad in a manner as the old bondage of Egypt'.[80] Another tract urged all who shared a 'desire of deliverance, or freedome from their worse then Egyptian bondage' to act against the regime, warning those in power that if the opportunity arose their enemies 'will swallow and devour them up alive', 'like a raging sea on Pharaoh and his host'.[81] In 1657, the former Leveller, Edward Sexby, addressed Cromwell in his bitter satirical pamphlet, *Killing noe Murder*, suggesting that if the Protector died, 'You will then be indeed the deliverer of your country, and free it from a bondage little inferior to that from which Moses delivered his'. Styling himself 'Your Highness's present slave and vassal', Sexby lamented that 'the champions of our liberty' had become 'the instruments of our slavery'. He justified assassination by appealing to the slaying of an Egyptian taskmaster by Moses himself.[82]

When the Digger prophet, William Everard, came to Whitehall in April 1649, he and Gerrard Winstanley refused to remove their hats to the Lord General Fairfax and announced that since the Norman Conquest, 'the people of God have lived under tyranny and oppression worse than that of our forefathers under the Egyptians'. 'But now', Everard continued, 'the time of deliverance was at hand and God would bring His people out of this slavery and restore them their freedoms in the enjoying the fruits and benefits of the earth'.[83] Whilst the idiom would have been immediately accessible to Fairfax, the Diggers' communalist vision of Exodus was novel and jarring. Once again, a radical group was giving its own distinctive twist to the familiar narrative. In *The True Levellers Standard Advanced*, the Diggers elaborated on their understanding of Exodus in the voice of Yahweh himself, explaining that Israel's 430 years 'under Pharaoh's bondage'

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examples of deliverance language see pp. 138, 152, 172, 210, 231.

[79]   Wolfe (ed.), *Leveller Manifestoes*, p. 410. They were quoting Isaiah 58:6 and Luke 4:18, each of which referred back to the Jubilee of Leviticus 25. All three texts are favourites of modern liberation theologians.

[80]   John Lilburne, *The Legall Fundamental Liberties of the People of England* (1649), p. 64.

[81]   *The Levellers (Falsely so called) Vindicated* (1649), in A.L. Morton, (ed.), *Freedom in Arms: A Selection of Leveller Writings* (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1975), pp. 316–17.

[82]   Edward Sexby, *Killing noe Murder* (1657) in David Wootton (ed.), *Divine Right and Democracy* (1986), pp. 360–64, 377.

[83]   *The Declaration and Standard of the Levellers of England Delivered in a Speech to his Excellency the Lord General Fairfax* (1649), p. 2.

pointed towards the plight of the people of England who 'hath lain three times so long already ... under your bondage and cruel task-masters'. But 'the time of deliverance' had come. Now was the time to cry like Moses, 'Let Israel go free'; the time to 'break in pieces' private property and 'make the earth a common treasury'. Alongside this reinterpretation of the meaning of deliverance, the tract also provided a radically new gloss on the great Exodus themes of the Law, Idolatry, the Sabbath and the Ten Plagues. Those who refused to play their part in the new Exodus would be visited by plagues, 'thou being the antitype will be more stout and lusty than the Egyptian Pharaoh of old, who was thy type'. They might say ('Pharaoh-like'): 'Who is the Lord that we should obey him?' But they would soon learn 'that he that delivered Israel from Pharaoh of old is the same power still'.[84]

The Diggers looked forward to a Promised Land 'set at liberty from proprietors', and they pointed out that in 'the land of Canaan' every portion was 'the common livelihood of such and such a tribe, and of every member in that tribe, without exception, neither hedging in any, nor hedging out'.[85] Whilst this idealised vision was more economically radical than the programme of the Levellers, the Diggers were less politically threatening. Indeed by 1652, when their communal projects had been broken up by landowners, Gerrard Winstanley was putting his faith in the commander of the New Model Army. *The Law of Freedom in a Platform* was dedicated to Cromwell and praised him for casting out 'an oppressing Pharaoh', and gaining 'the highest honour of any man since Moses'. Winstanley challenged the General to complete England's Exodus by leading the way to a Promised Land without private property.[86]

Others looked to prophets rather than to generals. In 1650, Joshua Garment received a vision about John Robins: 'This is he that shall ... divide the Seas, and lead the Hebrews to their own Land, even as Moses did out of Egypt ... Deliverance will be this year'. Garment publicised the message in *The Hebrews Deliverance at Hand* (1651), and Robins and his followers were soon branded 'Ranters'. They came to the attention of John Reeve and Lodowick Muggleton, who in turn identified themselves as Moses and Aaron, as well as the Two Witnesses of the Book of Revelation.[87] Another rival prophet, Thomas Totney,

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[84]   *Winstanley: The Law of Freedom and Other Writings*, pp. 92–5. See also p. 148.

[85]   *Winstanley: The Law of Freedom and Other Writings*, p. 106.

[86]   *Winstanley: The Law of Freedom and Other Writings*, p. 275. On the 'Jewish' identity of the Diggers see Claire Jowitt, '"The Consolation of Israel": Representations of Jewishness in the Writings of Gerrard Winstanley and William Everard', in Bradstock (ed.), *Winstanley and the Diggers*, pp. 87–100.

[87]   Joshua Garment, *The Hebrews Deliverance at Hand* (1651), pp. 3–5; *The Acts of the Witnesses: The Autobiography of Lodowick Muggleton and Other Early Muggletonian*

also fused Exodus and Apocalypse. As Ariel Hessayon explains, 'Totney believed himself called in the manner of Moses to assemble the children of Israel – the 144,000 of them, the thirteen tribes of Israel. He was to prepare for the second coming of Christ. He saw himself as the new Abraham – and so he circumcised himself as a sign of the renewed covenant; [and] as the new Moses, to lead God's chosen people from Egypt to Canaan'.[88] With these figures the Judaising tendency within English Puritanism was taken to its ultimate extreme.[89] Although Abiezer Coppe took a rather different approach, he too addressed himself to 'Late Egyptian, and now bewildered Israelites'. With characteristic invention, he posed as one of Israel's spies to the Promised Land, explaining that he had brought back 'one cluster of Grapes' that would persuade people not to hanker after the fleshpots of Egypt, but 'hasten to spiritual Canaan'. His reading of Exodus was centred on inner liberation, not on a programme of political change. Coppe addressed disoriented and disillusioned Puritans wandering in the spiritual wilderness and thirsting for 'some sweet sips' offered by antinomian spirituality.[90]

With the Quakers, the spiritualising interpretation of Exodus reached its zenith. Unlike Independents, Levellers or Diggers, most Quakers were disinclined to read Exodus as a political story of a nation's liberation from civil and ecclesiastical bondage. Disenchanted by the godly politics of the Revolution, their hermeneutic turned inwards, stressing the need to be freed from bondage to 'outward Egypt' (that is, the forms and ceremonies of conventional Protestantism). Exodus was once again read typologically, as an earthly foreshadowing of a spiritual reality. The saints were like the Hebrews, liberated from the Egypt of this world, and brought across the wilderness of spiritual dryness into the joys of a spiritual Promised Land.[91] Samuel Fisher depicted the Presbyterian and Independent clergy to 'the Counsellors of Egypt', who warned Pharaoh of the growth of the Israelites.[92] Here too, the Hebrews represented the Quakers not the English people. Political hopes had given way to faith in a spiritual insurgency. At least one Quaker writer directly rebuked the

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Writings, (ed.) T.L. Underwood (1999), pp. 7–9, 40–41, 54, 142–3; Ariel Hessayon, 'John Robins', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*.

[88]   Ariel Hessayon, 'Thomas Totney', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*.

[89]   On Puritans as 'judaizers' see Walzer, *Exodus and Revolution*, p. 123 and David Katz, *Philosemitism and the Readmission of the Jews to England* (1982).

[90]   Abiezer Coppe, *Some Sweet Sips* (1649), title page.

[91]   See for example, Mary Garman et al. (eds), *Hidden in Plain Sight: Quaker Women's Writings, 1650–1700* (1996), pp. 140, 147.

[92]   Samuel Fisher, *An Additional Appendix to the Book entituled Rusticus ad Academicos, or, The country correcting the Clergy* (1660), p. 8.

'priests' who 'compared Oliver to be like unto Moses and Richard to be like unto Joshua, who should carry them into the Promised Land'.[93]

Fifth Monarchists, by contrast, continued to read Exodus politically. John Spittlehouse identified numerous parallels between England's Revolution and Israel's Exodus: Egypt represented 'our Antichristian slavery'; Pharaoh, 'our late King'; Moses and Aaron, the Parliament and Assembly of Divines; the Red Sea, 'Prelacy'; the death of Moses, the death of General Essex; Joshua, General Fairfax; the River Jordan, 'Presbytery'.[94] During her visionary trances at Whitehall, newsbooks reported that Hannah Trapnell declared that God had brought the Saints over the Red Sea and the Jordan into the Promised Land.[95] In 1653, following the expulsion of the Rump, Fifth Monarchists hailed Cromwell as the new Moses, and lobbied him to implement their own distinctive agenda. Spittlehouse now argued at length that Cromwell was England's Moses, whose appointed role in history was to overthrow earthly monarchies and replace them with the fifth monarchy of God.[96] Undeterred by allegations that he was suffering from 'a fantastick humour', Spittlehouse pursued the analogy in a later pamphlet dedicated to Cromwell, advising the Lord General that if he erected the correct model of government he would surpass Moses by crossing the Jordan into Canaan '(viz., over the Narrow Seas, into *Holland*, *France*, and so to *Rome* itself)'.[97] In a broadsheet addressed to 'His Excellency the Lord Generall Cromwell', John Rogers compared the expulsion of the Rump to the Passover, and described Oliver as 'the great Deliverer of his people (through God's grace) out of the house of Aegypt'. Rogers wanted Cromwell to promote godly rule, by setting up a council of seventy God fearing men. As he told Oliver, 'thousands of glazed eyes are upon you, with hungry longings for such a Government'. In a much longer work, he argued that Israel must not be governed by Egyptian law, but should follow the example of Moses, by replacing the common law with the

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93   Hugh Barbour and A. Roberts (eds), *Early Quaker Writings* (1973), p. 397. However, some Quakers continued to use the language of 'deliverance' for the nation as a whole. See Edward Burrough, *A Declaration from the People called Quakers, to the Present Distracted Nation of England* (1659).

94   John Spittlehouse, *Rome Ruin'd by Whitehall* (1649), 'To his Excellency the Lord Generall Fairfax'.

95   See Joad Raymond (ed.), *Making the News: An Anthology of the Newsbooks of Revolutionary England, 1641–1660* (1993), p. 165.

96   John Spittlehouse, *A Warning-Piece Discharged, or Certain Intelligence communicated to his Excellencie the Lord General Cromwel* (1653), pp. 6–25.

97   John Spittlehouse, *The First Addresses to his Excellencie the Lord General* (1653), sig. A2r–v.

law of God.[98] For Fifth Monarchists, the Exodus story was not merely about liberation from Egyptian bondage, but about the rule of God.

Republicans read Exodus quite differently. Already in 1645, William Ball had written that the liberation of Italian city states, Swiss cantons and the Dutch republic from imperial yokes was analogous to Israel's Exodus, though God had worked the former by 'ordinary' and the latter by 'miraculous' means.[99] After the regicide, godly republicans celebrated the abolition of monarchy and the establishment of a free commonwealth as a great leap forward towards the Promised Land. Writing in 1651, the poet, George Wither, rejoiced in England's deliverance from 'Egyptian thralldome' and 'Pharaoh's Bondage'; like Pharaoh in the Red Sea, Charles I had drowned (as it were) in the sea of blood shed in the Civil Wars.[100] When Cromwell considered accepting the offer of the crown in 1657, Baptist and Independent leaders warned him not to forget earlier deliverances and 'return unto Egipt'.[101] The republican Henry Stubbe also feared attempts 'to reinslave us', but noted that the striking 'resemblance of events' between Israel's Exodus and England's revolution provided assurance that 'the same providence' was at work in these 'parallel' cases. 'The Age wherein we live hath been all Miracles', wrote Stubbe, 'brought about by our Jehovah'.[102] Stubbe's mentor, Henry Vane, concurred. In a speech reviewing the course of England's crisis before Parliament in 1659, he framed his narrative in the terms of Exodus. In 1640, Parliament had found the nations in 'a grand thraldom of oppression and tyranny', and Charles I had 'hardened his heart'. But 'Providence led us on step by step', 'to create and establish a free state; to bring the people out of bondage'. Vane believed that the English could be like the Dutch who maintained their republican liberties, 'unless like the Israelites, we will return to Egypt, weary of our journey to Canaan'.[103] James Harrington, as a former servant of the king, did not share Vane's Puritanism and had no interest in depicting Charles I as Pharaoh. But in the 1650s he was happy to hold up Moses as a great lawgiver and constitutional founder.[104] For republicans,

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[98]   John Rogers, *To his Excellency the Lord Generall Cromwell* (1653); John Rogers, *Sagrir, or Dooms-Day Drawing Nigh* (1653), sig. A4v.

[99]   William Ball, *Constitutio Liberi Populi* (1645), in Joyce Malcolm (ed.), *The Struggle for Sovereignty: Seventeenth-Century English Political Tracts* (2 vols, 1999), vol. I, p. 286.

[100]   George Wither, *British Appeals* (1651), pp. 24, 49. See also Wither's reference to Pharaoh in *Carmen Eucharisticon* (1649), p. 4.

[101]   John Nickolls, *Original Letters* (1753), pp. 142–3.

[102]   Henry Stubbe, *Malice Rebuked* (1659), pp. 1–5. See also Stubbe, *A Letter to an Officer in the Army* (1660), p. 36.

[103]   *Diary of Thomas Burton*, (ed.) J.T. Rutt (4 vols, 1828), vol. 3, pp. 173–80.

[104]   See especially James Harrington, *The Art of Law-giving* (1659).

England's Exodus (like Israel's) was to culminate in the construction of a stable republican constitution. As Algernon Sidney later explained, 'the design of the English had been to make a republic on the model of that of the Hebrews, before they had their Kings ... '.[105]

John Milton was a very different kind of republican, but as Quentin Skinner has shown, he viewed the Civil War as a war of liberation from slavery.[106] What is missing from Skinner's analysis are the biblical and providentialist dimensions of Milton's politics. Milton located himself within the tradition of Calvinist resistance theory and shared its twin obsessions with idolatry and slavery. In *Samson Agonistes*, the Philistines worship idols and enslave the Hebrews. The hero is both an iconoclast who destroys the temple of Dagon, and a deliverer who liberates his people from national servitude. In his early anti-prelatical tracts, Milton had lambasted the bishops as 'Egyptian task-masters', and looked forward to the day when the English can take up their harps to celebrate their crossing of the Red Sea.[107] In *Eikonoklastes*, he chided the Royalists for peddling 'Pharaoh's divinity', and suggested that like Pharaoh (and Charles I) 'Kings of this World have both ever hated, and instinctively feared the Church of God'.[108] In his commonplace book, Milton recorded a quotation from Andre Rivet's commentary on Exodus, and noted that 'Sulpicius Severus says that the name of kings has always been hateful to free peoples, and he condemns the actions of the Hebrews in choosing to exchange their freedom for servitude'.[109] In the first *Defence of the English People*, he appealed – like modern liberation theologians – to Mary's Magnificat with its vision of the poor being raised up, and the mighty humbled. In his incarnation, wrote Milton, Christ had 'assumed the form of a slave, but never failed to preserve the heart of a liberator'. Of the English, Milton said that 'their sins were taught them under the monarchy, like the Israelites in Egypt, and have not been immediately unlearned in the desert, even under the guidance of God'.[110] Milton had admired Cromwell as 'our chief of men', but disillusionment seems to have set in during the Protectorate. As David Armitage has persuasively argued, Milton seems to have concluded that England was reliving Sallust's nightmare narrative of a virtuous republican Rome undone by

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[105]   Quoted in Jonathan Scott, *Commonwealth Principles: Republican Writing of the English Revolution* (2004).

[106]   Skinner, 'John Milton and the Politics of Slavery'.

[107]   See *The Complete Prose Works of John Milton*, D.M. Wolfe et al., (8 vols, 1953–82), vol. I, pp. 545, 701, 706, 793.

[108]   *Complete Prose Works*, III, pp. 496, 509–10.

[109]   *Complete Prose Works*, I, pp. 446, 440.

[110]   *Complete Prose Works*, IV.i, pp. 375, 386–7.

its imperial expansion. Cromwell had started out as England's Moses, but ended up as its Sulla.[111]

At the Restoration, as England embraced monarchy and episcopacy once again, Royalists compared Charles II to Moses.[112] In a speech before the king at the Banqueting House, Sir Harbottle Grimston welcomed the 'miraculous' and providential 'deliverance of your people from Bondage and Slavery'.[113] When Samuel Butler wrote *Hudibras*, he mocked the reign of the saints and its biblical legitimations. 'Delivered from the Egyptian awe / Of justice, government and law', the godly had set themselves against: '… the Egyptian bondage / Of holy-dayes, and paying poundage'.[114]

Radical Puritans bemoaned the Restoration as a return to Egyptian bondage. Milton famously rebuked his fellow countrymen for 'backsliding' by 'choosing them a captain back to Egypt'.[115] His friend Moses Wall blamed the return to Egypt on liberators turned oppressors.[116] Algernon Sidney complained that 'We could never be contented till we returned again into Egypt, the house of our bondage. God had delivered us from slavery and showed us that he would be our king; and we recall from exile one of that detested race …'[117] The popularity of this trope is indicated by the young John Locke, who initially welcomed the Restoration and scorned those who lamented that 'we are returning to Egypt'.[118]

For radical Puritans like Lilburne and Milton and Sidney, the Civil War was more than a conflict between true and false religion; it was a war of liberation, a war in which the Lord of hosts fought alongside 'his Englishmen' to deliver them from national servitude. Like the Dutch 'Libertines' before them, they had no intention of escaping from old priests only to fall under the domination of new presbyters. This was a war against Protestant popery as well as Roman. And it was a war fought with words as well as swords. From the perspective of Royalists and Presbyterians, the language of liberty had got out of hand and into

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[111]　David Armitage, 'John Milton: Poet against Empire', in David Armitage, Armand Himy and Quentin Skinner (eds), *Milton and Republicanism* (1995), pp. 206–25. See also Elizabeth Tuttle, 'Biblical Reference in the Political Pamphlets of the Levellers and Milton, 1638–1654', in *Milton and Republicanism*, pp. 61–81.

[112]　See for example James Ramsay, *Moses Returned from Midian* (1660).

[113]　*The Speech of Sir Harbottle Grimston* (1660), pp. 3–4.

[114]　Samuel Butler, *Hudibras* (1684), Part III, Canto II.

[115]　*Complete Prose Works*, VII, pp. 325, 387, 463.

[116]　See his letter to Milton dated 26 May 1660 in Ann Hughes (ed.), *Seventeenth-Century England: A Changing Culture. Volume I: Primary Sources* (1980), p. 248.

[117]　Algernon Sidney, *Court Maxims*, (ed.) H.W. Blom, E.C. Mulier and R. Janse (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 197–8.

[118]　John Locke, *Political Essays*, (ed.) M. Goldie (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 40.

the wrong hands. Appropriated by radical Puritans, it had been turned against its original users.

IV. Exodus and Revolution

Parliamentarians, Independents and radicals provide a striking example of the 'innovating ideologists' whose *modus operandi* has been analysed by Quentin Skinner. Faced with the rhetorical challenge of legitimising 'questionable actions', they successfully deployed an existing vocabulary (the Protestant language of slavery and deliverance) for their own controversial purposes.[119] Our case study also reinforces Skinner's contention that Parliamentarians viewed the Civil War as 'a war of liberation from national servitude'. The language of slavery and liberty is every bit as prominent in the 1640s as Skinner suggests, and draws its strength from classical, biblical and Anglo-Saxon roots. But as well as complementing Skinner's findings, this chapter suggests the shortcomings of his analysis. Our innovating ideologists did not merely work with key concepts and terms, they also gave shape to the chaotic events of the revolution by locating them within grand narratives. In the history of the Roman republic and the Norman Yoke they had secular stories of enslavement; in the story of the Exodus they had a religious epic of emancipation. The ubiquity of biblical narrative in the 1640s and 50s reminds us that the English Revolution was also a Puritan Revolution. Contemporaries rarely talked about 'liberation', a word that we associate with modern secular revolutions (political and sexual). Instead they spoke of 'deliverance', a term with profoundly biblical resonance that pointed to the God of Exodus. If Puritan Parliamentarians waged the Civil War to achieve independence from the domination of bishops and kings, they also professed their utter dependence on the Lord of Hosts.[120]

John Morrill's work has always recognised this. Few historians have offered such a searching exploration of the religious passion and biblical imagination

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[119]   Quentin Skinner, 'Moral Principles and Social Change', in *Visions of Politics*, vol. I, pp. 145–57.

[120]   A point well made by J.C. Davis, 'Religion and the struggle for freedom in the English Revolution', *Historical Journal*, 35 (1992): 507–30. See also Jeffrey R. Collins, 'Quentin Skinner's Hobbes and the Neo-Republican Project', *Modern Intellectual History*, 6 (2009): 343–67; John Coffey, 'Quentin Skinner and the Religious Dimension of Early Modern Political Thought', in Alister Chapman, John Coffey and Brad Gregory (eds), *Seeing Things Their Way: Intellectual History and the Return of Religion* (2009), pp. 46–74.

of the Parliamentarians.[121] And Morrill was right to argue that many Puritans *interpreted* the Civil War as a war of religion – viz., a confessional struggle fought to save England's true Reformed (and lawfully established) religion from a popish plot. But the war of religion thesis can produce a one-sided understanding of the Puritan-Parliamentarians and their cause. Its predictive power is variable. It fits with some important features of the 1640s: iconoclasm, witch-hunts, blasphemy acts, the execution of Catholic priests, the purging of the parish ministry. But if we see England's Puritans simply as confessional warriors, we are likely to be puzzled by tolerationists, Levellers and republicans. As a provocative gesture, the claim that the English Civil War was 'the last of the wars of religion' has done its job – stimulating years of fruitful research and debate. But if it is taken as a formal re-categorisation of the Civil War, from the pigeonhole labelled 'modern revolutions' to the one named 'wars of religion', it is more problematic. For a simple dichotomy between atavistic post-Reformation wars of religion and modern post-Enlightenment revolutions simply won't work.

One of the curious features of Morrill's original argument was the claim that we have been misled by 'seeking parallels ... between the English Revolution and the events of 1789 and 1917'.[122] There is no mention here of 1776, perhaps because Christopher Hill had never given much thought to the American Revolution. Yet if we are 'seeking parallels', we would do better to look at America than at France or Russia. For as John Pocock has argued, 1641, 1688 and 1776 were 'Three British Revolutions'.[123] All three, for example, occurred within cultures profoundly shaped by British Reformed Protestantism – indeed, we could almost call them 'Three Protestant Revolutions'.

Each of these revolutions was legitimised as a great 'Deliverance' and a new Exodus. The events of 1688–9 were imagined in emphatically biblical and providentialist terms.[124] Gilbert Burnet – the leading clerical apologist for the Glorious Revolution – told the House of Lords that the English 'have had such a series of Deliverances as perhaps cannot be matched in History, since that of the Israelites coming out of Egypt'.[125] A correspondent of John Locke compared the intervention of William of Orange to 'the Isralites deliverance from Aegypt by the hand of Moses'.[126]

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[121]   By contrast, John Adamson's otherwise powerful narrative, *The Noble Revolt* (2006), shows relatively little interest in the religious mentality of its protagonists. See Blair Worden, 'Godly Mafia', *London Review of Books*, 24 May 2007, p. 13.

[122]   Morrill, 'The Religious Context' in *The Nature of the English Revolution*, p. 68.

[123]   John Pocock, *Three British Revolutions: 1641, 1688, 1776* (1980).

[124]   See Tony Claydon, *William III and the Godly Revolution* (1996).

[125]   Gilbert Burnet, *A Sermon Preached before the House of Peers* (1689), p. 5.

[126]   See Mark Goldie (ed.), *John Locke: Selected Correspondence* (2002), p. 129.

Although the American Revolution has been described as 'a profoundly secular event',[127] religious and denominational traditions continued to function as prime carriers of political ideology and as shapers of allegiance. In the 1770s, as in the 1640s, High Church Anglicans formed the core of the loyalists, while the rebels received overwhelming backing from the Presbyterian and Congregationalist heirs of the Puritans.[128] The 'blackcoat regiment' of Reformed clergy provided vital support for the Patriot cause. Indeed, Donald Lutz has even estimated that 'at least 80 per cent of the political pamphlets during the 1770s and 1780s were written by ministers'.[129] One recent historian of the American Enlightenment has called eighteenth-century British America 'a Bible culture of extraordinary vitality'.[130] So it is hardly surprising that the War of Independence was repeatedly presented as a 'deliverance' from national servitude and a new Exodus. When the British abandoned Massachusetts in 1776, Washington and other officers sat through 'an excellent sermon' on a text from Exodus: 'Let us flee from the face of Israel, for the Lord fighteth for them against the Egyptians'.[131] In *Common Sense*, the most popular pamphlet of the Revolution, Tom Paine described George III as 'the hardened, sullen-tempered Pharaoh of England'.[132] In July 1776, both Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Jefferson suggested that the Great Seal of the United States should bear an image of the Hebrews' Exodus. Neither proposal was implemented, but they show that even the most religiously sceptical of the Founders were well aware of the political power of the biblical narrative.[133] In the wake of the Revolution, George Washington wrote to the Jewish congregation at Savannah, Georgia, declaring that the God who 'long since delivered the Hebrews from their Egyptian oppressors' is the same God whose 'agency has lately been conspicuous, in establishing these United States as

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[127]   Jon Butler, *Awash in a Sea of Faith: Christianizing the American People* (1990), p. 195.

[128]   See Carl Bridenbaugh, *Mitre and Sceptre: Transatlantic Faiths, Ideas, Personalities and Politics* (1962); J.C.D. Clark, *The Language of Liberty, 1660–1832: Political Discourse and Social Dynamics in the Anglo-American World* (1994); Kevin Phillips, *The Cousins' Wars: Religion, Politics and the Triumph of Anglo-America* (1999); James Bell, *A War of Religion: Dissenters, Anglicans and the American Revolution* (2008).

[129]   Donald Lutz, *A Preface to American Political Theory* (1992), p. 136.

[130]   Robert A. Ferguson, *The American Enlightenment, 1750–1820* (1997), p. 77.

[131]   Charles Royster, *A Revolutionary People at War: The Continental Army and American Character, 1775–83* (1979), p. 97.

[132]   Bruce Kuklick (ed.), *Paine: Political Writings* (1989), p. 24.

[133]   See Derek H. Davis, *Religion and the Continental Congress, 1774–1789* (2000), pp. 138–40.

an independent nation'. On his death, Washington was widely eulogised as the American Moses.[134]

But if deliverance loomed large during the American Revolution, the spectre of idolatry assumed a far lower profile. There were no Catholic martyrdoms or iconoclastic riots, no witch trials or blasphemy acts. The Declaration of Independence failed to mention a single religious grievance. Embarrassed by the intolerance of their ancestors, American Presbyterians even excised clauses in the Westminster Confession that affirmed the magistrate's coercive power in matters of religion.[135] Tom Paine talked of idolatry, but it was the idolisation of kings that Milton had exposed in *Eikonoklastes*. Monarchy, Paine tells us, is 'the popery of government'.[136] While the Patriot preachers drew on a long tradition of Reformed resistance theory, it was a tradition that had evolved dramatically, though not beyond recognition. The old concepts were still in place – deliverance, idolatry, covenant, providence, millennium, Antichrist, even 'the Curse of Meroz'. But they had been filled with new content, and had to compete with new ideas.[137] The Calvinist war of religion was a thing of the past. But the war of deliverance was marching on.

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[134] See Robert P. Hay, 'George Washington, American Moses', *American Quarterly*, 21 (1969), pp. 780–91.

[135] See Jeffry Morrison, *John Witherspoon and the Founding of the American Republic* (2005), pp. 107–9.

[136] *Paine: Political Writings*, pp. 8–9, 11.

[137] See Ellis Sandoz (ed.), *Political Sermons of the American Founding Era* (1991). See also Alan Heimert, *Religion and the American Mind* (1966); Nathan Hatch, *The Sacred Cause of Liberty: Republican Thought and the Millennium in Revolutionary New England* (1977); Ruth Bloch, *Visionary Republic: Millennial Themes in American Thought, 1756–1800* (1985); Donald Weber, *Rhetoric and History in Revolutionary New England* (1988); Keith Griffin, *Revolution and Religion: The American Revolutionary War and the Reformed Clergy* (1993); Christopher Grasso, *A Speaking Aristocracy: Transforming Public Discourse in Eighteenth-Century Connecticut* (1999); Jerome Dean Mahaffey, *Preaching Politics: The Religious Rhetoric of George Whitefield and the Founding of a New Nation* (2007); Nicholas Guyatt, *Providence and the Invention of the United States, 1607–1876* (2007).

Chapter 13

Restoration Anti-Catholicism: A Prejudice in Motion

Jeffrey Collins

I

Of all of the contributions made by revisionism to the field of early modern British history, the most significant has been its refocusing of our attentions onto the religious dynamics of political upheaval; and of all published efforts to advance this aspect of the revisionist case, John Morrill's classic 'The Religious Context of the English Civil War' has surely been the most influential. That piece was in every sense an agenda-setting essay. It reintroduced ideas and dynamic belief into a Civil War historiography that was then dominated by functional analyses of institutional breakdown. It attended to religious issues and factions without facilely treating them as mere adjuncts to broader constitutional struggles. Most importantly, the essay spoke for a generational revolt against the casual social scientific secularity of mid-twentieth-century historical writing. This resistance to epiphenomenal readings of religion was, for Professor Morrill and many others, most obviously aimed at a then still-breathing Marxist historiography. The cudgels in that particular battle have long since been victoriously laid down.

But for those of us in the field who work primarily on the history of political thought, this aspect of Professor Morrill's work continues to be of great relevance. This is partly true because his history stands today as an interpretive counterpoint to that of his former Cambridge colleague, Quentin Skinner. No historians have shaped the study of early modern Britain more than these two figures, presiding, as they have, over industrial-strength doctoral production lines, rival Cambridge seminars, and pre-eminent monograph series. Oddly, their engagement, and that of their students, is often a bit of a shadow boxing match. This is probably to be blamed on Professor Skinner's narrowly linguistic understanding of context (which directs his attentions away from political and social history), and his lack of interest in the British problem (which has been

one of Professor Morrill's chief concerns).[1] Nonetheless, their interpretations of the British revolutions are very different and at times incompatible. Indeed, Quentin Skinner might be read as one of the last great representatives of the reflexive secularism that once dominated twentieth-century historiography. He is, of course, no Marxist, but one might suggest that he has replaced Christopher Hill, Lawrence Stone, and their colleagues as the chief interlocutor of those who, following John Morrill, understand the English Revolution primarily as a religious war.

Professor Skinner is, of course, famous for his 'tin ear' on religion, which is something of an intellectual scandal given the methodological claims that he promotes. This neglect of religion is sometimes treated as a personal tic of his, but it cannot be so casually explained.[2] Partly Professor Skinner's lack of interest in religious context is methodological. At various times he wears the hat of a Nietzschean, rather more regularly that of a Weberian. But consistently, he manifests a fundamentally sociological notion of ideas as ideology, ideas as weapons of political warfare in which no thinker or utterance can 'be raised above the battle'.[3] As any student of the social sciences will know, the proto-anthropologists and sociologists of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were obsessed with religion, because religious ideas claimed, above all others, to transcend (ideally) political interest. Thus, if the science of man could explain religious belief in sociological, anthropological, or psychological terms, it could explain most anything else. The study of 'ideology' was in some sense shaped by this very enterprise of 'scientifically' examining the social and political function of religion.[4] Though Professor Skinner is much less interested in religion than his forerunners, he is nevertheless heir to this quasi-sociological outlook. Religious ideas, like all other ideas, are ideology. Religious beliefs command no special power in motivating political action. (And here we hear echoes of the Marxist treatment of religion as epiphenomenal.) Religion, for the sociologist, performs integrative social functions. It is something natural and irrational – important,

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[1]   As Morrill himself points out of intellectual historians generally. See his 'Thinking About the New British History', in David Armitage (ed.), *British Political Thought in History, Literature, and Theory, 1500–1800* (Cambridge, 2006), p. 28.

[2]   See, for instance, David Wootton, in his review of Skinner's collected essays, *Visions of Politics*: 'The Hard Look Back', *Times Literary Supplement*, (March 4, 2003).

[3]   Quentin Skinner, 'Surveying the *Foundations*', in Annabel Brett, James Tully, and Holly Hamilton-Bleakley (eds) *Rethinking the Foundations of Modern Political Thought* (Cambridge, 2006), pp. 242–4.

[4]   Mark Goldie, 'Ideology', in Terence Ball, James Farr, and Russell Hanson (eds), *Political Innovation and Conceptual Change* (Cambridge, 1989), pp. 266–91; Pierre Manent, *The City of Man*, trans. Marc A. LePain (Princeton, 1998), chapter 2 in particular.

perhaps, to the social historian, but not to be seriously investigated as a discursive tradition of ideas. Professor Skinner often seems to share these mental horizons with his intellectual ancestors.

The school of interpretation over which Morrill has presided acts as a corrective to many of these historical tendencies. As an experiment, read in sequence 'The Religious Context of the English Civil War' and Skinner's republican reading of the Long Parliament, 'Classical Liberty and the Coming of the English Civil War'. Both are exceptional performances, of course, but only the former approaches a fully rounded and plausible general interpretation.[5] The unwillingness of Skinner to accommodate the now dominant religious interpretation of the English Revolution has been a serious shortcoming of his work. Any compelling contextualization of early modern political thought must take Quentin Skinner's subjects and methods and place them in a historiographical setting that John Morrill, more than Skinner, has defined.

The remainder of this chapter will attempt to vindicate, against the implication of Professor Skinner's historical perspective and in keeping with that of Professor Morrill's, the value of scholarship on early modern religion, not merely as an exercise in historical reconstruction, but as a resource for ongoing theoretical debates about liberal politics. The subject of the chapter will be anti-Catholicism in late seventeenth-century England.

Anti-Catholicism was a proclivity shared by many early modern theorists of enlightened statecraft, regardless of whether we classify those theorists as 'liberal' or 'republican'. Like many religious topics, it is one deeply relevant to Skinner's interest in the modern state, but not one well suited to his interpretive model. Too many historians of political thought take religious context as a given, an alien feature of a God-saturated age best left to the tender mercies of the 'ecclesiastical historian'. But cordoning exercises of this sort will not do, if the full significance of contextual work on political theory is to be realized.

II

Anti-Catholicism as a subject is in some sense ubiquitous in histories of seventeenth-century Britain. No history of the Civil War, Restoration, or

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[5]   Quentin Skinner, 'Classical Liberty and the Coming of the English Civil War', in Martin van Gelderen and Quentin Skinner (eds), *Republicanism: A Shared European Heritage* (Cambridge, 2 vols, 2002), pp. 9–29. The real insights of this essay are marred by a tendency to assert, rather than demonstrate, the 'neo-classical' roots of parliamentary political arguments that are often attributed to the common law tradition, contractarian thinking, or (in other cases) 'anti-Popish' religious inclinations.

Glorious Revolution can fail to account for this pervasive political pathology of the age. But there is a way in which anti-Catholicism continues to be constructed mostly from the dominant Protestant sources and perspectives. The rank bigotry of the old Whig history is largely gone, but English Catholicism continues to function as a monolithic other in many histories – and this lack of differentiation allows more subtle liberal preconceptions to persist without challenge in the historiography. The risk is constant that, no matter how 'neutral' historians are, the very manner in which they circumscribe Catholicism and anti-Catholicism encourages them to replicate the ideological constructions offered by seventeenth-century actors.[6] The most obvious example of this is the prevalent suggestion, in much historical work, that the anti-Catholic intolerance of England's Protestant ruling class was not directed against Catholic religious belief as such, but was instead directed at the political threat of 'Romanism' or 'popery'.

The standard accounts of English Catholicism (and of hostility toward it) schematically exploit the division, which traced back to the Counterreformation, between the 'regulars' and the 'seculars'.[7] The former, mostly Jesuits, are presented as hard-line, ultramontane papalists with dreams of reconverting the kingdom. The latter are presented as humble, workaday priests and their mostly rural flocks, conservative Catholics of the pre-Reformation sort, uninterested in papal jurisdiction and seeking only to maintain their traditional religious practices. The ever unfolding tragedy of English Catholicism, in these accounts, is that the quietism and loyalism of the 'secular' faction was constantly betrayed by the foreignness and scheming habits of the 'regulars'. Thus the excommunication of Elizabeth, the Gunpowder Plot, Catholic intrigues at the Caroline and Restoration courts, all served to unfairly dim the prospects of the bluff, loyal Catholics rusticating in the English countryside.[8] This mapping of early modern English Catholics does not always lead astray. It is, however, a model of exceptional rigidity, and it is often deployed with clumsiness. Its assumptions

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[6]   This is partly a function of source bias. In John Marshall's very fine history of Locke's tolerationism, for example, Marshall's admirable efforts at historical objectivity are at times undermined by a somewhat credulous tendency to recount the persecution of Huguenots and Waldensians from largely Protestant sources. John Marshall, *John Locke, Toleration, and Early Enlightenment Culture* (Cambridge, 2006), pp. 26, 59, and elsewhere.

[7]   On the development of this distinction between 'conservatism' and 'recusancy', see John Miller, *Popery and Politics in England, 1660–1688* (Cambridge, 1973), pp. 5–7, 28–42; see also John Kenyon, *The Popish Plot* (1972), in its first chapter.

[8]   'Loyal Catholicism' was an unstable and contested category, not least among English Catholic factions themselves. For an example, see Michael Questier, *Catholicism and Community in Early Modern England: Politics, Aristocratic Patronage and Religion, c.1550–1640* (Cambridge, 2006), pp. 124–9, 157–69, 290–92.

remain planted within the historiography of the Elizabethan era, when these factional divisions within Counter-Reformation Catholicism had much greater saliency, and when figures like Robert Cecil himself were capable of relying upon the distinction between secular priests and Jesuitical 'vipers'.[9]

For present purposes, what is important to note is the manner in which the dominant historical scheme for understanding early modern Catholicism essentially echoes seventeenth-century Protestant apologetics. Faced with charges of bigotry and intolerance, England's ruling elite tirelessly distinguished between political 'popery' and religious Catholicism. It was only the former that they would expressly seek to eradicate. This justification for anti-Catholic legislation finds its most famous formulation in the writings of liberalism's *paterfamilias*, John Locke. I will here refer to it as the 'Lockean' defence of anti-Catholicism, but it is important to note its old vintage, and its appeal across a wide array of Protestant and 'Enlightened' factions. If the proto-liberal Locke could appeal to the distinction between religious Catholicism and political popery, so could republicans such as Milton and absolutists such as James I.[10]

In his *Letter Concerning Toleration*, Locke denied toleration to any religion teaching, either expressly or covertly 'that men are not obliged to keep their promise; that princes may be dethroned by those that differ from them in religion; or that the dominion of all things belongs only to themselves'.[11] Catholics, in Locke's scheme, had 'delivered themselves up to the protection and service of another prince'.[12] Thus did Locke effectively claim to tolerate Catholics religiously, but to suppress them for political sedition.[13]

Again, this distinction had a long history and, as an apologetical strategy, it continues to appeal. Historians have deployed the schema endlessly, and scholars

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[9]   Jenny Wormald, 'Gunpowder, Treason, and Scots', *Journal of British Studies*, 24 (1985): pp. 141–68, at p. 147.

[10]   Examples are provided by Marshall, *John Locke*, p. 682.

[11]   John Locke, *A Letter Concerning Toleration*, (ed.) James Tully (Hackett, 1990), p. 62.

[12]   Ibid., p. 63.

[13]   There has been some debate about Locke's intentions as regarded the toleration of Catholics. In the *Essay on Toleration* of 1667, Catholics were expressly denied toleration because of their 'pitiless cruelty'. In the various versions of his later *Letter on Toleration*, Locke tended to speak in a more guarded way about Catholics. He clearly envisioned that their theology might be tolerated (even transubstantiation, which implied a critique of the Test Act). Most, however, have read his generic references to the danger of believers who 'deliver themselves up to the Protection and Service of another Price' as directed at Catholics. Jeremy Waldron disagrees, and in doing so demonstrates an unfamiliarity with the contextual resonance of these passages (a minor flaw in an otherwise very fine book). Jeremy Waldron, *God, Locke, and Equality: Christian Foundations of John Locke's Political Thought* (Cambridge, 2002), pp. 118–223.

of toleration continue to accept the Lockean line as an accurate characterization, one that effectively justifies an asymmetrical historical account in which France and other countries remain the height of medieval intolerance because they persecuted Protestants, while England retains its tolerationist credentials despite persecuting Catholics. Thus does James Tully write, with surprising complacency in an otherwise sure-footed introduction to the *Letter Concerning Toleration*, that Locke's refusal to tolerate Catholics was based on 'the calculus of interest and duty, not prejudice'.[14]

This line of thinking should be challenged. However logically impeccable, the distinction of political Romanism from religious Catholicism cannot fully account for seventeenth-century (and particularly Restoration) anti-Catholicism. Often, the Lockean apology for anti-Catholicism served to politely veil and excuse religious prejudice. Exposing this history is a critical step in understanding modern debates over the question of whether liberalism is either theoretically neutral or, alternatively, is a sectarian doctrine.

There are many ways in which one might test the Lockean defence of anti-Catholicism, and pressure the presumption that Restoration anti-Catholicism was aimed at preventing the 'Catholic International' from overthrowing English sovereignty. The present chapter will look closely at a particular part of this question, but a few preliminary points are in order. First, it is of course true that much Restoration anxiety about Catholicism was not an anxiety about foreign allegiance and conspiracy at all, but was in fact an anxiety about the Stuarts themselves.[15] There was a sinking fear that Charles II was a crypto-Catholic, and a panicked knowledge that James II was an open one.[16] Both were in a position to deploy the levers of the Royal Supremacy on behalf of their co-religionists, and perhaps even in a grand conspiracy to reconvert the kingdom. Fear of these possibilities was indeed the dominant emotion propelling most Restoration anti-Catholicism, and it is important to recognize that Lockean logic does not work to justify this fear. A Catholic English King with impeccable hereditary claim,

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[14]   Tully, intro to Locke, *Letter*, 8. An even more deferential view is Perez Zagorin, *How the Ideal of Religious Toleration came to the West* (Princeton, 2003), p. 266; Jonathan Israel is very keen to deny Locke's tolerationist credentials, but he largely dwells on his unwillingness to tolerate atheism, free-thinking philosophy, and 'sexual minorities'. Israel, *Enlightenment Contested: Philosophy, Modernity, and the Emancipation of Man, 1670–1752* (Oxford, 2006), pp. 135–44.

[15]   A point made by Jonathan Scott, 'England's Troubles: Exhuming the Popish Plot', in Tim Harris, Paul Seaward, and Mark Goldie (eds) *The Politics of Religion in Restoration England* (Oxford, 1990), pp. 118–20.

[16]   The import of this latter factor was obviously enormous. For one interesting example of its capacity to split Anglican from Catholic courtiers, see Andrew Barclay, 'The Rise of Edward Colman', *The Historical Journal*, 42 (1999): pp. 109–31.

operating (arguably) within the legal limits of their own prerogative authority over the church, cannot be rationally accused of seditiously dividing sovereignty. Efforts to restrain Catholic monarchs in this regard rest on a religious critique of Catholicism, not a political critique of 'popery'. Within the logic of the 'Lockean' justification for anti-Catholicism, such resistance efforts are more apparently a violation of sovereignty (in the interest of a religious faction) than a defence of it.[17]

So a great deal of Restoration anti-Catholic agitation was not 'covered', so to speak, by the Lockean defence. This is not to suggest that political actors at the time did not whip up anxiety about Catholic rebellions on behalf of international 'popery'. But historians, even here, have been somewhat lackadaisical in critically examining the plausibility of this rhetoric. The era of widespread domestic Catholic plotting was long passed by the 1660s, as was recognized by many critical observers up to and even during the mania of the Popish Plot.[18] The fear of international Catholicism was most often riveted on France, but here again the fear was that France might enable the political plans of English sovereigns, not that France would raise an anti-Stuart rebellion. France, in any case, throughout the 1660s and 1670s, was widely conceded to be a polity of considerable religious toleration.[19]

Furthermore, France functioned as a much less certain 'standard bearer' for the cause of international 'popery' than had sixteenth-century Spain. The interests of the papacy and those of France were very far from aligned in the 1660s and 1670s. The papacy was gravely concerned with the threat posed to

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[17]   At the start of this tradition, Thomas Hobbes made this perfectly clear when he conceded the pope's own absolute sovereignty in his own lands, and even the legitimacy of other sovereigns adopting Catholicism as a national religion by virtue of their own prerogative authority. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, (ed.) Richard Tuck (Cambridge, 1996), p. 373 and elsewhere. It would be interesting to know more about the evolution of Hobbes's politics in the 1670s, when this latter possibility loomed as a potential disaster. In a brief memo for the Cavendishes, Hobbes justified the right of Charles II to name his own successor. But, as Hobbes well knew, the King was not inclined toward this Whiggish, exclusionist exercise of his absolutism, and Hobbes does not comment on the more likely outcome – the succession of a Catholic absolutist heir. See Hobbes, 'Questions Relative to Hereditary Right', in *Writings on Common Law and Hereditary Right*, (ed.) Alan Cromartie and Quentin Skinner (Oxford, 2005), pp. 177–8.

[18]   Plots, real and rumoured, were far more likely to have been nonconformist and republican in nature before the Popish Plot. Alan Marshall, *Intelligence and Espionage in the Reign of Charles II, 1660–1685* (Cambridge, 1994), pp. 186, 201.

[19]   For one of many examples of how the French monarchy could be used as an exemplary tolerationist polity before the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes, see John Sturgion, *A Plea for Tolleration* (London, 1661), p. 15.

Christendom (particularly Poland) by the Ottomans, a cause that the French had scandalously subordinated to their rivalry with Catholic Spain.[20] As for the global jurisdiction of the papacy, Louis resisted it like a latter day Henry VIII (a resistance which culminated with the Four Articles of 1682).[21] Innocent XI and his retinue in Rome worried about France's use of force in securing conversions after the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes, and questioned what good such conversions would do if all of the French bishops were, in any case, 'schismatic'. Innocent was in many respects Louis's most persistent enemy before 1688. Further, he refused James II financial support because it was needed (he claimed) to defend the church against France, and he considered James's downfall the providential result of his desire to erect a Gallican-style national church.[22] For informed observers, these facts of geopolitics made the notion of a popish conspiracy against the English throne difficult to swallow.[23] The rhetoric warning of such a conspiracy was very often a coded way of critiquing the Francophilic tendencies of the Stuarts themselves, and was more clearly a religious critique than a political one.

A final, basic point about the Lockean defence of anti-Catholicism is that did not suit very well as a defence of the Test Act, which was the most devastating tool used against Catholics. Oaths of Allegiance and Supremacy, abjurations of papal deposing power, and so forth, had been standard parts of the legal restrictions on Catholics and might be presented plausibly as an effort to ascertain political loyalty rather than religious orthodoxy. But the Test Act, of course, required both a sacramental test and a religious oath against transubstantiation. One could not escape its provisions with promises of loyalty, and to the extent that it was supposedly aimed at political 'popery', it comprehensively conflated political sedition and pure theological belief. This feature of the Test led critics such as Henry Care to denounce it for tending toward the 'profaneness and the scandal

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[20]   James Collins, *The State in Early Modern France* (Cambridge, 1995), pp. 101–3; W.R. Ward, *Christianity under the Ancien Régime, 1648–1789* (Cambridge, 1999), pp. 28–30.

[21]   Robin Briggs, *Early Modern France, 1560–1715* (Oxford, 1977), pp. 155–70.

[22]   Ludwig von Pastor, *The History of the Popes: from the Close of the Middle Ages*, trans. Dom Ernest Graf (London, 1957), vol. 32, pp. 247–92, 30–47, 499–509.

[23]   Indeed, the supposed weakening of the papacy – rather than its strength – was a significant element of anti-Catholic polemic during the Restoration. See Michael Mullett, *Catholics in Britain and Ireland, 1558–1829* (London, 1998), p. 78; for an interpretation of Gallicanism within the political project of the later Stuarts, see Steven Pincus, *1688: The First Modern Revolution* (New Haven, 2010).

f Christianity by prostituting the most Sacred Ordinances, as Qualifications or Inlets to Secular Advantage'.[24]

These are basic facts about the context for Restoration anti-Catholicism, but they are not facts that are foregrounded in most historical work. This is true despite the fact that they dramatically problematize the 'Lockean' defence of the non-toleration of Catholics (which is itself implicitly or explicitly credited in many histories). What is also striking, however, about Restoration anti-Catholicism, is its extreme flexibility as a political discourse. The Lockean defence, to reiterate, was based upon the distinction between papalists and Catholic loyalists. The former were characterized by their clericalist instincts, scheming tendencies, willingness to dissemble about their loyalty, and so forth.[25] In current terminology, they were political perfectionists, unwilling to compromise their religion by privatizing it. Catholic loyalists, supposedly, did not politicize their religion in this way, were willing to eschew the political authority of the papacy, accept their minority status, and de-link their political allegiance from their religious views. Locke's theory, and its long history in English political discourse tracing back to the Tudors, should have provided toleration for the latter.

It largely failed to achieve this effect. Where the distinction between Catholic religious fault and Catholic political fault was drawn, it was often not used to defend the loyalty of more politically malleable Catholics, but to impugn their loyalty in a different way. For there was, indeed, a complex history within the English Catholic community, which did in fact pit papal loyalists against Catholics of a more independent, pro-English, politically passive, and even anti-Roman type. This schism, of course, dated back to the Counter-Reformation itself, to the battles between seculars and regulars over the governance of the English Catholic chapter, and differing views on the excommunication of Elizabeth, the Jacobean Oath of Allegiance, and so forth. Before the war this divide provided room for some conniving to informally tolerate politically passive Catholics.[26] But the divide, crucially, became a much more pronounced one during the years of the English Civil War and the Restoration. These decades saw the virtual schism of the English Catholic community between more papally inclined Catholics and the so-called Blackloist faction.

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24   Henry Care, *Draconia: Or, an Abstract of all the Penal-Laws touching Matters of Religion; and the Several Tests thereby Enjoyned, Now so much Controverted with Brief Observations Thereupon* (London, 1687), p. 17.

25   On the literary construction of this figure, quintessentially a Jesuit, see Arthur Marotti, *Religious Ideology and Cultural Fantasy: Catholic and anti-Catholic Discourses in Early Modern England* (Notre Dame, 2005), pp. 42–65.

26   John Bossy, *The English Catholic Community, 1570–1850* (London, 1975), pp. 35–43.

Blacklo was the alias of the philosopher-priest Thomas White. White ranks as one of the central figures in the complex universe of seventeenth-century English Catholicism. Trained at English colleges on the continent, then a teacher of philosophy, White strove to wed aspects of traditional Aristotelianism with the new natural science. But his chief importance was as a staunch critic of the papacy and its efforts to keep the English Catholic church under Roman control. White was a vehement defender of the independence of the English chapter, and of its right to elect bishops on its own authority. He loathed the Jesuits as vassals of Rome, and he rejected the monarchical authority (both political and intellectual) claimed by the Counter-Reformation papacy. This blend of philosophical and political views drew to White a set of followers, which included English priests such as John Sergeant, Henry Holden, and Peter Fitton, as well as the prominent Catholic laymen, such as Kenelm Digby. 'Blackloism' was attacked by the Jesuits and the papacy, but it persisted throughout the latter half of the seventeenth century as a schismatic tension within English Catholicism.[27]

Indeed, during the Civil War and Interregnum, partly because of their close association with none other than Thomas Hobbes, the leading Blackloists composed works of political theory that were staunchly anti-Roman and remarkably loyalist toward the existing English governments of the Interregnum. These went well beyond, indeed, the loyalism prefigured by the Elizabethan and Jacobean secular priests.[28] A series of tracts by the Blackloist priest John Austin, Thomas White's own *The Grounds of Obedience and Government* (1655), and Henry Holden's 1652/8 *Divinae Fidei Analysis*, all put forth a strikingly conciliarist and quasi-Erastian (or Gallican) defence of political passivity under Protestant governments. White and Digby were long-time associates of Thomas Hobbes, and these works deployed Hobbesian notions of natural right, contracted government, and obedience to de facto authority. They condemned the staunchly divine right legitimist notions of the Jesuits, and offered remarkable concessions to Interregnum governments which were,

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[27]   For general accounts, see Beverly Southgate, *'Covetous of Truth': The Life and Work of Thomas White, 1593–1676* (Dordrecht, 1993); Robert Bradley, 'Blacklo and the Counter-Reformation: An Inquiry into the Strange Death of Catholic England', in Charles H. Carter (ed.), *From the Renaissance to the Counter-Reformation* (New York, 1965); Bossy, *English Catholic Community*, pp. 62–4; and Stefania Tutino, *Thomas White and the Blackloists: Between Politics and Theology during the English Civil War* (Aldershot, 2008).

[28]   The old notion that the Catholics were reliable royalists is rebuked by Keith Lindley, 'The Lay Catholics of England in the reign of Charles I', *Journal of Ecclesiastical History*, 22 (1971): pp. 218–20. For a survey of various efforts to explain Catholic contributions to the royalist war effort, see Questier, *Catholicism and Community*, pp. 499–511.

after all, violently anti-Catholic. In secret negotiations with Oliver Cromwell after the regicide, and then periodically throughout the 1650s, they promised disarmament, the expulsion of the Jesuits, oaths eschewing the pope's temporal power, and parliamentary oversight over the English Catholic chapter that extended to actual approval of its bishop.[29]

This history – which discredited the Blackloists in the eyes of the Stuart court, and gave them some entrée into the attentions of Oliver Cromwell – reveals a great deal about the complexities of religion during the English Revolution.[30] But aside from its implications for our understanding of the Revolution, the Blackloists' history during the 1650s had a long afterlife during the Restoration. The Blackloist schism within the English chapter was profoundly destabilizing throughout the Restoration. There were endless battles (eventually successful), to have many of White's political and theological doctrines condemned by the Inquisition. The schism over Blackloism divided the personnel of the chapter, and led to vicious fights over important posts such as the secretaryship. In the broader Catholic universe, Blackloism was understood to be an even more staunch form of Gallicanism, and this resulted in struggles over ecclesiology that paralleled those of Catholic Europe.

And here is where some of the hypocrisies of Restoration anti-Catholicism begin to betray themselves. Given the prominence of the Blackloist faction within the English Catholic community, one would expect that the Lockean logic of the age would have provided this group of Gallican-style Catholics with some support in the arena of public debate. Here, after all, we find the ideal Lockean Catholics. Natural rights, contract, artificial sovereignty, a repudiation of divine right legitimacy, a de factoist understanding of obedience – all were offered by the Blackloists in exchange for protection and religious toleration. The continued minority status of Catholicism was to be accepted, political scheming eschewed, and the oversight and regulation of the Protestant state admitted to. And the Blackloist faction was no marginal cohort. White was perhaps the most famous Catholic political theorist of the era; Kenelm Digby, the best-known Blackloist layman, was a prominent philosopher and courtier. Henry Holden was a professor of divinity at the Sorbonne, and the Blackloist John Sergeant

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[29] Jeffrey R. Collins, *The Allegiance of Hobbes* (Oxford, 2005), pp. 136–40, 177–80. For a fuller account, see, Jeffrey R. Collins, 'Thomas Hobbes and the Blackloist Conspiracy of 1649', *The Historical Journal*, 45 (2002): pp. 305–31.

[30] For one thing, his dealings with the Blackloists betrays an Machiavellian or realist side to Oliver Cromwell himself, complicating simple readings of him as either a Puritan zealot or a proto-liberal tolerationist. For more on Cromwell's inconsistent attitudes toward Catholics, see Albert Loomie, 'Oliver Cromwell's Policy Toward the English Catholics: the Appraisal by Diplomats, 1654–1658', *Catholic Historical Review*, 90 (2004): pp. 29–44.

served as secretary of the English Catholic chapter during the Restoration. In fact, the hostile Catholic observer George Leyburn characterized the entire chapter as a 'pack of Mr Blacloes friends'.[31]

The Blackloist paradigm, in other words, did not exist in obscurity. Indeed, the influence of the Blackloists during the 1650s was sufficient to cow Rome itself, to some extent. As Stefania Tutino has demonstrated, Rome's presumed hostility to the English Commonwealth can be too easily assumed. On several occasions in the 1640s, Rome refused to act in support of the Stuart cause lest an offended parliament move more boldly against Catholics. And there were many at the Roman court who hoped that, with the Anglican martyr Charles I out of the way, the Commonwealth 'would be more favourable towards the Catholic religion, for its own political advantage'. It was for this reason that, when the Inquisition condemned some of Thomas White's theological novelties in 1655, they refrained from condemning his political writings, lest they 'upset Cromwell by acting' against his interest.[32] The Blackloists' political calculus, in short, could enjoy a wide appeal and influence.

If the almost hegemonic use of what we have here called the Lockean logic to defend anti-Catholicism were true, than the Blackloist schism was a chance to prove it. Catholics themselves understood this, and made appeals based on the distinctions among Catholics in an effort to defend themselves and their religion. Thus, in 1673, the Catholic George Digby, Earl of Bristol and kinsman of the Blackloist Kenelm Digby, declared himself 'a Catholic of the church of Rome, not a Catholic of the Court of Rome', and went so far as to support the Test Act itself.[33] The history of Blackloism, in short, if highly destabilizing to the English Catholic community, should at least have provided willing Restoration Catholics with ideological shelter.

What we find instead is that the Blackloists provided English Protestants with an opportunity to attack Catholic political principles both coming and going. The dominant mode of anti-Catholic discourse continued to attack them as perfidious servants of the pope, ready to fire London, assassinate the king, enslave the nation. This sort of polemic rolled off the page with ease when the targets were Jesuits and foreigners. It was a particularly useful way to flay the phenomenon of court Catholicism.

But alongside this dominant rhetoric, the very different profile of the Blackloists was blackened with very different strategies. Here, it was the political passivity and pliability of these Catholics, their understanding of interest and

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[31]   Leyburn, *Doctor Leyburn's Encyclical Answer* (1610), pp. 86, 16.

[32]   Stefania Tutino, 'The Catholic Church and the English Civil War: The Case of Thomas White', *Journal of Ecclesiastical History*, 58 (2007): pp. 232–55.

[33]   *ODNB*; Kenyon, *Popish Plot*, p. 17.

rights, their Erastianism – those doctrines that we would recognize as markers of their assimilation of *jus-naturalism* – that, in fact, damned them. At critical moments in the history of the Restoration, the memories of the Blackloists' Hobbist principles, and their willingness to obey Oliver Cromwell, were publicly refreshed. This tended to occur at moments when Catholic toleration was feared to be on the Stuart agenda.

In the years immediately following the Restoration, for instance, Kenelm Digby and John Winter were involved in efforts to lobby Charles II for Catholic toleration.[34] Digby had managed to regain some of his influence at the court of Henrietta Maria. Winter, who had contributed treasure and his own military service to the royalist war effort, was disliked but continued to enjoy some court influence. Their efforts to secure toleration for Catholics represented a revival of the Hobbesian logic of Blackloism in a new political context. This is made evident by Winter's 1662 *Observations upon the Oath of Supremacy*, in which he went so far as to defend Catholics accepting the royal supremacy over the church, partly by invoking a quasi-contractual notion of 'loyal subjecthood', partly by excoriating, in the manner of Blacklo himself, 'the unlimited and immoderate attributes given to popes by Cannonists'.[35]

This should have been music to the ears of Charles II, who was very fond of this classic distinction between seditious papalists and traditional, loyal, Catholics. 'I supposed no man will wonder', the King had informed Parliament, 'if I make a difference between those [Catholics] that have changed their religion and those that were bred up in that religion, and served my father and me faithfully in the late wars'.[36] But the efforts of Digby and White were clearly compromised on this occasion by their involvement in the Blackloist political machinations of the Interregnum. Digby had been a prime negotiator with Oliver Cromwell, as had Winter, who had been sent into Ireland by Cromwell himself with 'large offers of toleration'. It is thus no surprise that the Cavalier Parliament began to move against Winter in 1663, attempting to annul his patent for the harvesting of timber.[37] Nor can the Earl of Clarendon's political dominance after 1660 have been particularly helpful to Digby and White. Hyde had closely followed the Blackloist conspiracy of 1649, had bitterly condemned Digby for his betrayal,

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[34]   Miller, *Popery and Politics*, pp. 96–7. Miller notes the failure of the effort, but does not observe the likely harm done Digby and Winter's cause by their Blackloist past.

[35]   [John Winter], *Observations Upon the Oath ... Commonly Called the Oath of Supremacy* (London, 1662), p. 14.

[36]   Quoted in Kenyon, *Popish Plot*, p. 17.

[37]   *ODNB*. Winter was saved by prorogation on this occasion, but in 1665 the effort began again.

and had banished other members of the faction from the exiled court.[38] He had even aired details of the Blackloist treachery in print, as part of a cleverly designed piece of political propaganda printed anonymously in 1656. There he had condemned those who would 'resolve all Obligations of Government into the good will and pleasure of the Governour'. Among those who had bent their knee to 'Machiavel's Prince' and 'Hob's Leviathan' were the Blackloists Thomas White and Kenelm Digby.[39]

These efforts to deploy Blackloist political logic in defence of Catholic toleration elicited printed reminders of Blacko's Interregnum perfidy. The well connected and popular Anglican controversialist William Assheton, for instance, published his *Evangelium Armatum* in 1662, clearly attempting to beat back the tolerationist effort. After quoting the supposedly seditious words of Independents and Presbyterians, Assheton wrote that 'it will not be amiss to lay down some of the positions of the papists and the Hobbians' that had inclined in a similar direction. He then proceeded to quote passages from the works of both Hobbes and Thomas White. Assheton defended this bringing of 'the Papists and the Hobbians upon the same stage', for they were guilty of 'vending doctrines no less pernicious to the Civil than to the Ecclesiastical state'. The Blackloists were thus discredited along with Hobbes as a pack of Cromwellians.[40]

Nor did this unwelcomed publicity for the 'Hobbist' Catholics emit only from staunch divine right royalists. The political writer and economist Roger Coke, a man of advanced views and an eventual supporter of the Glorious Revolution, rehearsed these connections in his 1660 work, *Justice Vindicated from the False Focus put upon it by Thomas White, gent., Mr Thomas Hobbes and Hugo Grotius*, and then again in his 1662 *Survey of the Politicks of Thomas Hobbes, Thomas White, and Hugo Grotius*. In other writings, Coke himself espoused the views of a contractarian Erastian, claiming that 'natural' obedience to sovereignty must be divorced from religion.[41] In flaying the Hobbists and the Catholics, however, he excoriated them for a radical subordination of natural law to sovereignty, a subordination that undermined not just law but true religion.[42] In the interest

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[38]   Collins, 'Hobbes and Blackloist Conspiracy', pp. 322–3.

[39]   [Edward Hyde], *A Letter from a True and Lawfull Member of Parliament ...* (1656), pp. 45, 65. On this tract, which purported to be from a MP purged in 1648, see David L. Smith, *Constitutional Royalism and the Search for Settlement, c.1640–1649* (Cambridge, 2002), p. 278.

[40]   [William Assheton], *Evanglium Armatum,* 'To the reader', p. 53.

[41]   Roger Coke, *A Treatise wherein is Demonstrated that the Church and State of England are in equal danger with the Trade of it* (London, 1671), pp. 14–16.

[42]   Roger Coke, *Survey of the Politicks of Thomas White, Thomas Hobbes, and Hugo Grotius* (1662), epistle to the reader.

of besmirching White's religion and the political cause that he and Digby had espoused, Coke cast them in a Hobbist guise that was not overly compatible with the more conventional 'anti-Romanism' that he put to polemical purposes in other texts.[43]

In this way was the contractual, natural rights logic of Blackloism – exactly that feature of their thinking that might most commended them as loyal subjects according to the Lockean logic – turned against them. Thomas White and Digby themselves clearly understood this as an effort to discredit their efforts at Catholic toleration. They engaged in very jittery correspondence over the public rehearsal of their political past. In these letters, White and Digby insisted that their compliance with Cromwell had been born of necessity, and had been a grudging effort to preserve their lives and estates.[44] Indeed, this logic had served to defend many a Protestant royalist from charges of disloyalty in the eyes of the king. But Digby and White seemed to recognize the much greater harm that charges of Cromwellianism would do to English Catholics.

They were not along in recognizing this. When the staunch Anglican apologist Peter du Moulin, in the same year, attempted to rebut several pamphlets insisting on the loyalty of Catholics and arguing for their toleration, he derided Catholic claims by recalling their purported self-interest and neglect of the Stuart cause during the Civil War and Interregnum.[45] Some of this polemic was predictably thrown at the Jesuits, but du Moulin also recalled, with specificity, the Blackloist conspiracy to join with Cromwell and the 'Independent army' in the wake of the regicide. He also refuted at some length Thomas White's *The Grounds of Obedience and Government*, detailing how its natural rights logic and de factoist theory of obligation had buttressed 'Oliver's Tyranny'.[46] Du Moulin claimed to be writing at the express direction of the dean and Archbishop of Canterbury, who were concerned about recent efforts to prove the loyalty of English Catholics.[47]

The composition of polemic aimed at undermining a toleration for Catholics helped to fuel the assent of the careerist William Lloyd, eventually Bishop of

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[43]   See the lurid accounts of Roman conspiracy in his popular *A Detection of the Court and State of England during the Last Four Reigns* (London, 2 vols, 1694), vol. 1, pp. 12–13, 47–8, and elsewhere.

[44]   White to Digby [undated], BL Add. MS 41846, fos. 84–6.

[45]   P. du Moulin, *A Vindication of the Sincerity of the Protestant Religion in Obedience to Sovereigns* (1663, third edition 1668), pp. 36, 56–9. Du Moulin all but chided Charles II for his inflating of a 'few' loyal Catholics into a wider cause.

[46]   Ibid., pp. 60–63.

[47]   P. du Moulin, *A Replie to a Person of Honour, His Pretended Answer to the Vindication of the Protestant Religion* (London, 1675), p. 2.

Worcester. Lloyd was by no means hostile to toleration in all contexts. He had a reputation for softness when it came to dissenters, and, when it came to Catholics, was fond of drawing the classic distinction between Jesuitical papists and native loyalists. Indeed, in a tract of 1676 he went so far as to argue that providing toleration to the latter of these would divide English Catholics and was the 'true way to suppress popery'.[48] In this way did Lloyd take the 'Lockean' line on Catholicism to its logical conclusion. It is thus all the more remarkable how willing he proved to excoriate Catholics for displaying such anti-papal political quiescence during the Interregnum. In a popular 1667 tract, Lloyd riposted Catholic claims of loyalism in these terms: 'after [the king's fortune had declined] where were you? In all those weak efforts of gasping loyalty, what did you? You complied, and flattered, and gave sugared words to the Rebels then, as you do to the royalists now'. In the wrong context, Catholic political 'compliance' was as pernicious as staunch papalism. To buttress these charges Lloyd dipped into the pamphlet literature of the 1650s, and quoted extensively from the tracts of the Blackloist John Austin. Austin had used the political logic of Hobbes's *Leviathan* itself in order to justify obeying Cromwell in exchange for toleration.[49] Lloyd found it convenient to rehearse this inconvenient historical detail.

The polemical use of Blackloism to condemn English Catholics tended to flow most readily when the English church feared that the Stuarts might renew efforts to tolerate their Catholic subjects. The polemics of the early and mid 1660s were all part of the successful opposition to Charles II's first Declaration of Indulgence. Gilbert Burnet's later account of this battle reveals just how threatening the blandishments of Blackloist Catholicism appeared to devotees of the Church of England. According to Burnet's admittedly coloured account, Charles II's 1662 Declaration of Indulgence was intended primarily to succour Catholics, and particularly those willing to take the Oath of Allegiance and renounce the pope's deposing power. These included 'a few honest Priests, such as Blacklow, Serjeant, Caron, and Walsh', and a group of Catholic laymen grouped around the Earl of Bristol and Henry Bennet.[50] Thus, not long after the triumph over Protestant nonconformity, the church faced a threatened rapprochement between Gallican-style English Catholicism and the ever suspect

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[48]   Lloyd, *Considerations Touching their True Way to Suppress Popery* (1676), quoted in *ODNB*.

[49]   William Lloyd, *The Late Apology in Behalf of the Papists Re-Printed and Answered, in Behalf of the Royalists* (London, 1667), pp. 13–15, 44.

[50]   Burnet attributed his knowledge of these machinations to Peter Walsh and the Earl of Strafford. Gilbert Burnet, *History of his Own Time from the Restoration of Charles II to the Conclusion of the treaty of the Peace at Utrecht* (London, 4 vols, 1753), vol. 1, pp. 270–71.

Charles II. Clarendon and the bishops unsuccessfully fought the Declaration in council, but – according to Burnet – also sought to sow dissention among English Catholics by proposing that 'all the regulars, and particularly the Jesuits' should be exempted and banished. 'The Earl of Clarendon set this on; for he knew well it would divide the Papists among themselves'. Clarendon's party also allegedly engineered the Commons motion making it a capital offence to charge the King with Catholicism. This was intended as a shot across the bow, warning the King how 'odious a thing his being suspected of popery would be' and disabusing him of his notion that 'the old Cavaliers were become milder with relation to popery'.[51] In Burnet's account of these struggles, the principled political contractualism, anti-papalism, and loyalism of the Blackloists briefly promised to protect them, but in the end only served to as a useful means for hostile authorities to sow discord in the English Catholic community.

Published reminders of the Blackloists' Cromwellian perfidy only aided this latter end. If the philosophical spirit of the Blackloists was guided by Thomas White, the most politically prominent 'Gallican' Catholic on the Restoration scene was probably Peter Walsh. An Old English Catholic of Ireland, Walsh was educated in Louvain, became a Franciscan, and adopted Jansenist theological and Gallican ecclesiological views. Associated with James Butler, first Duke of Ormonde during the Civil War, Walsh became a leading opponent of the hard-line papalism of Giovanni Battista Rinuccini, the papal nuncio. This opposition ensured his excommunication in 1646 but commended him to Ormonde and the royalists. Walsh adopted a pronounced loyalism and anti-papalism reminiscent of White's, but unlike White and Digby he never wooed Oliver Cromwell and remained a lifelong Stuart loyalist. As one authority has written, 'after the Restoration of Charles II in May 1660 there were few Irish Catholic clerics better placed than Walsh or with greater potential to influence Irish politics'.[52] He largely failed to do this, but his relentless trumpeting of Catholic loyalism made him a threat in Protestant eyes. In 1662, to the king's apparent satisfaction, Walsh presented Charles II with a declaration of allegiance signed by dozens of Irish Catholic clergy and gentry.

Efforts by Walsh and Ormonde to heighten support for this remonstrance failed in the face of opposition from within the Catholic Church, but Protestant polemicists took the threat of it seriously, particularly as it dovetailed with the efforts of Bristol and others to secure toleration of English Catholicism along similar lines. Robert Boyle published a bombastic attack on Walsh, attempting to undermine claims of Catholic loyalty by recalling the horrors of the 1641

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[51]   Ibid., p. 272.
[52]   M.A. Creighton, 'Peter Walsh', *ODNB*.

rebellion.[53] This, however, was a blunt scalpel to wield against Walsh, who had spent the 1640s asserting royalism against the papal nuncio himself. Other attacks on Walsh recognized this, and the need to more directly discredit his brand of Gallican Catholic ecclesiology. For instance, the anonymous author of *A Journey into the Country* attacked standard Jesuit and papal doctrines on obedience, but also asserted that 'all papists, denying the Jurisdiction of the Pope here, both in Civil and Ecclesiastical matters, yet holding Communion with the Church of Rome in matters of worship, against our established Laws, are grievous Offenders'. The author rejected any distinction between the 'church and court of Rome', and suggested that any priestly oath of loyalty to the monarchy could not be trusted. He admitted 'that there are now great differences of opinion among the English Papists themselves with reference to the Pope', but presented the 'moderates' as 'pretenders' prone to 'faithless Ingagements'. Catholic royalists, he alleged, had served their own interest rather than the King's during the Civil War. As for the devisers of oaths of allegiance in latter years, the tract singled out Serjeant, White, and Walsh for 'cheat[ing] the Pope all his life and cheat[ing] the King at his death'. By dividing their allegiance in politics from their religious loyalties, Gallican Catholics were fundamentally incapacitated as subjects. 'You disown the Pope only by half ... and yet you still give [the King] no security for perfect Obedience, as a true English man, and against the breach of the peace of the Church, if you conform not to his lawful Commands in his waies of Worship'.[54]

The author of *A Journey into the Country* thus trumped the mild Erastianism of Walsh – in which mere civil obedience would ensure toleration for pacified religious minorities – with a stronger, Hobbesian version whereby monarchs were rendered 'ecclesiastical persons'. The author needed to make his attack on the former more compelling in the face of Walsh's inconvenient loyalism. To this end he dusted off some Elizabethan history about the non-binding nature of Catholic oaths. But as this rhetorical strategy undoubtedly seemed a bit hoary, the author had a more recent tale of treason to relate: the Cromwellian past of the Blackloists. This he eagerly deployed to undermine Walsh's claim that he would defend the Stuart crown against the pope himself. And if this bit of hypocrisy were not enough, the *Journey's* author discredited Walsh as a viable spokesman for Catholic loyalism by noting that he had been excommunicated for his anti-papalism. 'Is it to be thought that he should yield due obedience to our King, to save his Neck, who refuses due Obedience to his Supreme head of his Church to

53   Robert Boyle, *The Irish Colours displayed in a reply of an English Protestant to a late letter of an Irish Roman Catholique* (London, 1662), pp. 1–6.

54   Anon, *A Journey into the Country; Being a Dialogue between an English Protestant Physitian and an English Papist* (London, 1675), pp. 3, 12–14.

save his soul?'[55] Thus was the balancing act attempted by Erastian Catholics such as White and Walsh destabilized ideologically. If they were Catholic, they were disloyal; if loyal, they were no longer Catholic. A similar strategy was deployed by Gilbert Burnet, who admired Peter Walsh as the 'honestest and learnedest man' among the Catholics, and as a man inclined to loyalty, and for this reason (in Burnet's view) 'almost wholly Protestant'. Having thus reassured himself, Burnet was then able to present the broader effort to secure Catholic toleration through political loyalty as a self-serving and duplicitous ruse.[56]

If the 1662 Indulgence effort had evoked determined efforts to discredit Catholics as subjects, a decade later, the King's second failed effort at such an indulgence (this one even more tainted with crypto-Catholicism) elicited more denunciations of Catholic disloyalty, and more rehearsals of the Blackloist history. For instance, anxiety over a possible toleration for Catholics seems to have sent John Cosin, then Bishop of Durham, hunting through his personal archive seeking details on the Blackloists' past political machinations. During his time in exile, Cosin had known Henry Holden and had procured a copy of Holden's 1648 *Articles Proposed to the Catholics of England*, which had laid out the parameters of a possible deal with the Independents. Two decades later, in late 1669, Cosin wrote to Durham from London to his assistant Myles Stapylton: 'I think I left among my manuscript papers ... H. Holden's Epistle to his party, the Roman Catholicks in England, perswading them to submit to Cromwell's government as long as it lasted. I pray you seeke out this letter, and let me have a copy of it ... as soon as you can'.[57] It is highly likely that Cosin required Holden's epistle as ammunition against any justification of an indulgence for English Catholicism.

Lloyd, for his part, reprised his critique of the Blackloists in his 1673, *Seasonable Discourse shewing the necessity of maintaining the established religion in opposition to popery*. And around this time the Oxford fellow and religious controversialist Henry Foulis had published his windy *The History of the Romish Treason and Usurpations*. Here, prominently situated in a voluminous account of Catholic treachery through the centuries, Foulis lavished considerable attention on the Blackloist writings of the Interregnum, and the efforts of John Austin in particular to secure (partly by exploiting the arguments of *Leviathan*) toleration from the 'bloody and murdering Rump'. Foulis, like many anti-Catholic polemicists, paid lip service to the loyalism of some lay Catholics, but with the same broad brush painted Jesuitical papalists and Blackloists alike as King

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55 Ibid., pp. 19, 22, 29.
56 Burnet, *History of his Own Time*, vol. 1, pp. 272–4.
57 Quoted in Anthony Ian Doyle, 'Gallican and Anglican: Henry Holden and John Cosin', *Recusant History*, 30 (2010): pp. 67–70.

killers. Foulis was forced to concede that both Thomas White and the Erastian Catholic Redmond Caron (on whom see below) had denied papal infallibility, but this concession only permitted him to condemn them for opening up a theological subjectivity that would empower any and all seditious designs.[58] In this way did he render null the supposedly all-important distinction between lay Catholic loyalism and Jesuitical treason.[59]

The poisonous potency that the political attack on Blackloism had for the cause of Catholic toleration can also be gauged by the writings of Roger Palmer, the Catholic Earl of Castlemaine (and the humiliated husband of the king's notorious mistress, Barbara Palmer). Palmer was among the most prominent defenders of Catholic loyalism, and advocates for their toleration, in the Restoration age. His credentials as a patriot were irreproachable (he fought the Dutch at sea under James II and published a popular and jingoistic account of their exploits). Castlemaine's best known work, his *Catholique Apology* of 1666, endeavoured to secure toleration and assure Charles II of Catholic loyalty. It refuted many lurid theories about Jesuitical threats, but, revealingly, was equally pressed to distance English Catholicism from the Blackloist influence that continued to be felt in the chapter. Castlemaine denied that White's political principles were widely adopted in English Catholic circles, and noted that they had been condemned by the papacy. This appeal to papal judgement was an exceptionally awkward rhetorical manoeuvre, as Castlemaine himself was attempting to cultivate the image of politically loyal Catholics. But White's application of this logic of obedience during the years of Cromwell had discredited it in some respects, and thus was Castlemaine forced into these logical gyrations.[60]

The years of the Popish Plot saw the most dramatic airing of the Blackloist past. The Plot had triggered bloody internecine battles within the English chapter. John Sergeant, the Blackloist, had offer evidence against the Jesuits that was very likely perjurious and had resulted in the death of the Jesuit Robert Pugh in Newgate in 1679. Pugh had written vehemently against the influence

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[58]   Henry Foulis, *The History of Romish Treasons and Usurpations together with particular account of many gross corruptions and impostures in the Church of Rome* (London, 1671), Preface. On Foulis see *ODNB*.

[59]   The hypocrisy of Foulis's polemic was unintentionally exposed when he excoriated the Catholic biographer of Bishop Fisher, Thomas Baily, of Cromwellianism based on loyalist sentiments expressed in his biography. Foulis was under the impression that these sentiments were directed toward Cromwell, when in fact they were aimed at Queen Elizabeth. (See Thomas Baily, *The Life and Death of that Renowned John Fisher* (London, 1655 edition), p. 179. Foulis was reading an edition published sixty years after Baily's death.

[60]   R. Palmer, *The Catholique Apologie* (1666, 3rd edition 1674), pp. 76–81.

of White and his followers, and had collected a series of intercepted letters between White, Digby, Sergeant, Holden and the other Blackloists. These letters dated from the 1640s and 1650s and implicating them in Cromwellianism. The Jesuit Robert Warner, revenging Pugh's death, arranged to have these published in 1680 as *Blacklo's Cabal*. Much of our historical knowledge of the Blackloist conspiracy, in other words, has been preserved precisely because it was printed in an effort to remind English readers, in a fraught context, that English Catholics had not proven loyal to the Stuart house during the Civil War.

Indeed, if Protestants were happy to exploit the political embarrassment of Thomas White and his followers, so too were Blacklo's enemies within the English Chapter. When the Nuncio of Brussels and George Leyburn, president of Douai College, sought to discredit Thomas White's 'pernicious doctrines' in 1661, they urged the pope to publically repudiate him. 'His Majesty', the Nuncio wrote of Charles II, 'will be grateful when he happens to remember that Albio dared writing in favour of Cromwell … '.[61] The favour enjoyed by White and Digby under Cromwell's Protectorate had partially protected them from Rome in the 1650s, but the logic of realpolitik swung against them after 1660.

Protestants were more than happy to avail themselves of the polemical opportunities presented by these fractures among the Catholics, fractures that were dramatically widened by the specious Popish Plot and its 'authors'. William Assheton's *Evangelium Armatum*, which had happily exposed Thomas White's Cromwellian past, was republished in 1681. William Lloyd's indefatigable fulminations against the Blackloists were cranked up anew. The anonymous 1681 *Ursa Major and Minor*, probably by the elderly royalist author Fabian Philips, recounted the history of English Catholic perfidy and accused both Thomas White and his friend Thomas Hobbes of having accepted pensions from Cromwell. A few years later, the Whiggish churchman William Wake, in a roving tour through the annals of Catholic sedition, attacked the party of Thomas White and condemned them for 'treating with Cromwell'.[62]

It is important not to conflate the Restoration discourse against Blackloism with other efforts to tar Catholics with the sins of the Civil War. William Prynne was merely the most famous exponent of the crackpot view that the Protestant sectarians of the 1640s and 1650s were actually Jesuit agents engaged in meticulously crafted psychological operations against England's church and king. These theories circulated widely, and, like similar conspiracy-oriented accounts of the Great Fire of London, the Popish Plot, and so forth, they evidence the often unhinged nature of anti-Catholic rhetoric after 1660.

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[61]   Quoted in Tutino, *White and the Blackloists*, p. 123.

[62]   William Wake, *A Brief History of the Several Plots Contrived and Rebellions Raised by the Papists* (1692), pp. 88–9.

But anti-Blackloist polemic was not unhinged. It was, in fact, highly informed and clear-eyed. The Civil War had indeed fractured the English Catholic community, and had indeed driven that loyalist, Gallican wing of the chapter into a remarkably compliant posture vis-à-vis the Cromwellian government. Protestant writers lost no time in exploiting this political embarrassment, even if, in many respects, it gave the lie to their self-justificatory claims that they only sought to coercive Catholics for their loyalty to the papacy. For generations, Catholics had been urged to abandon the pope and Jesuits, obey their English Protestant sovereigns, lay down arms, accept the disciplinary surveillance of the secular state, and pull back their religious allegiances into the private sphere. In the 1650s, exploiting exactly that natural rights discourse that would eventually inform Locke's own political theory, the Blackloists had met all of these demands, only to find that, after 1660, they were in no better position than their hard-line Jesuit brethren. Now they stood condemned for their compliance, for obeying the wrong sovereign.

Indeed, the Blackloists figured much more centrally than has traditionally been recognized in the anti-Catholic discourse of the age. Church of England men determined to preserve their religious monopoly, and suspecting the King's Catholic sympathies, delighted in the opportunity to expose the perfidy of exactly those Erastian Catholics who, in the pre-war context, might have been most trusted by the Stuarts. For years the Anglican clergy in exile had listened nervously as Charles had spoken of the loyal Catholics of the north who had rescued him after the Battle of Worcester.[63] Virtually every major royalist who had corresponded with the exiled court had channelled their letters through the English Benedictine nuns at Ghent and their abbess Anne Knatchbull.[64] Many, including Clarendon, knew of the King's promise to aid English Catholics in order to reward their loyalty in exile. Catholic tracts immediately after the Restoration plausibly congratulated the many Catholics who had sacrificed blood and treasure for the Stuart cause.[65] If Catholic toleration were to be impeded, it was imperative that their reputation for loyalism be undermined. The Blackloist betrayal proved perfect grist for this mill.

No one embodied this hypocrisy more clearly than Charles II himself. Charles was, in theory, attached to the principle that his long-standing and loyal Catholic subjects should not be conflated with Jesuitical schemers, and should enjoy some latitude for their religion. Furthermore, understanding the difficulties of their position, Charles had countenanced the compliance, under

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[63]   John Miller, *Charles II* (London, 1991), p. 31.

[64]   Claire Walker, 'Prayer, Patronage, and Conspiracy: English Nuns and the Restoration', *The Historical Journal*, 43 (2000): pp. 1–23.

[65]   Questier, *Catholicism and Community*, pp. 506–7.

Cromwell, of many Protestant royalists. But he felt nothing but anger at the Blackloists (he knew of White's 'damned book', and had angrily denounced it; he had banished the Blackloists from his exiled court).[66]

Historians of the Restoration have tended to present anti-Catholicism in remarkably monolithic terms, concentrating most of their attentions on the political critique of papalism, on fears of court Catholicism, and on the geopolitical threat of Catholic France. But the role of Blackloism in discomfiting English Catholics after 1660 has been underestimated. It is crucial to recognize just how badly the Blackloist conspiracy had damaged the image of precisely those secular Catholics whose greater loyalty to the kingdom had been traditionally assumed. Charles II wished to distinguish, as his predecessors had, between activist Counter-Reformation style Catholicism and residual, quietist English Catholicism. But the history of Restoration anti-Catholicism is, in part, the history of the increasing irrelevance of this distinction.

Of course, anti-Blackloist polemic largely undermined the 'Lockean' defence of non-toleration for Catholics. Catholics were, implicitly, expected to be pliable, contracted, autonomous subjects when it came to their religious allegiance, but devout Stuart loyalists and divine right legitimists when it came to their political allegiance. Even thinkers such as William Lloyd and Roger Coke, themselves devotees of the new contractarian break from divine right theory, hypocritically condemned the Blackloist participation in the new paradigm.

Contemporary Catholics were very aware of these hypocrisies. White himself bitterly denounced those 'prevaricatours' who exploited contingencies in order to twist his own doctrine of 'subjection' and obedience into a seditious 'antimonarchicall' principle.[67] The Franciscan friar and theologian Redmond Caron echoed these complaints. Caron was a tireless advocate for the rights of Kings. While in European exile during the 1650s, and then back in London during the Restoration, he wrote works (many dedicated to Charles II) which marshalled essentially Gallican/Blackloist arguments in favour of obedience to Protestant sovereigns. But he was under no illusions as to how effective such appeals would prove. In his 1660 *Vindication of the Roman Catholics of England*, Caron rued how widely it was assumed that Catholics were 'enemies to the King' and 'favourers of the Phanaticks'. 'In the King's prosperity', he complained,

> the Catholicks were accused of being the King enemies ... but when Kings were turn'd out, and new Governments crept in, then they were charged with a contrary crime of being friends to the King, and enemies to Commonwealths

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[66]   Beverly Southgate, '"That Damned Book": The *Grounds of Obedience and Government* (1655) and the Downfall of Thomas White', *Recusant History*, 17 (1985), p. 249.

[67]   White to Digby, 29 April, BL Add. MS 41846, fol. 84.

and Protectors. Now again [with the Restoration] ... the accusers turn their tongue, and say that they are the Kings enemies and favorers of phanaticks; so that according to those men, whoever become masters, the Catholicks must still be traitors.[68]

The contradiction was at times glaring, and historians of the period would be well served to recognize it. The failure of historians to investigate the nuances of Catholic experience has prevented them from seeing the fundamentally instrumental nature of the Lockean case (broadly understood) against Catholic toleration.[69] Nineteen years ago, in a seminal essay, Peter Lake warned his colleagues not to internalize the contemporary assumption that Catholicism itself, or 'anti-popery', were 'wholly irrational and unitary thing[s], which merely [have] to be identified rather than analysed or explained'.[70] There remains considerable resistance to this advice.

III

Finally, a few words on the relevance of this history. Historians of political thought and political theorists alike have been captivated by the presumed historical opposition pitting proto-liberalism against republicanism, interest against virtue, individualism against community, stability against glory. (There are, in fact, rightward and leftward variations on this theme, which may be our first indication that the terminology of the model is underdetermined.) But in any case, whatever its analytic value or intrinsic interest, the model cannot account for much of the actual political history that conditioned early modern political thought. When we turn to investigate the English Revolution, for

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[68]   *ODNB*; [Caron], *A Vindication of the Roman Catholicks of the English Nation* (London, 1660), pp. 16–17. Caron conceded that some Catholics threw themselves on the mercy of Cromwell to keep their estates, but noted that many Protestant royalists had as well, as had Protestants in France (pp. 18–19).

[69]   The extent to which Locke himself struggled with these contradictions is an interesting question, which would require more space to explore. John Marshall suggests that Locke may have been a sympathetic reader of Peter Walsh (discussed above). But it must be said that the toleration of loyalist Catholics is never directly espoused in his published work. Marshall, *Locke and Toleration*, pp. 682–94. For an early statement of Locke's opposition to toleration for 'papists', expressed in a letter to Henry Stubbe, see Locke to Stubbe, Sept. [?], 1659, in *John Locke: Selected Correspondence*, (ed.) Mark Goldie (Oxford, 2002), p. 13.

[70]   Peter Lake, 'Anti-Popery: The Structure of a Prejudice', in Richard Cust and Ann Hughes (eds), *Conflict in Early Stuart England: Studies in Religion and Politics, 1603–1642* (London, 1989), p. 73.

instance, the best work (Morrill's above all) points us toward the determinative role of religion, and toward the epic struggle to redefine the nature of Christendom. This struggle, whereby the modern state freed itself from the corporate institutional and intellectual authority of Catholic Christianity, does not entirely account for the process of revolution, but it explains far more than the conflict between republicans and liberals. Indeed, the broader religio-political struggle against the dualist patterns of Christendom typically threw these factions into allegiance against common enemies. And for this reason, a tight focus on the small differences between 'republican' and 'liberal' thinkers leaves a great deal out of the picture. Historical clarity requires a wider lens.

Nor is a recovery of this religious context for the emergence of modern political thought of merely historical interest. Indeed, despite the tendency of many historians of republicanism to treat religious history as 'arcane', the moral and religious implications of modern political theory is of pervasive relevance, in both domestic and geo-political contexts. Wars are not fought, nor elections contested, nor jurisprudence crafted, over the neo-republican critique of liberal hegemony. The strain between dominant liberalism and traditional religious identities, however, retains the capacity to drive politics in these ways. The history of religious toleration, particularly for traditional Catholic Christianity, maps closely over modern debates about the philosophical implications of liberal conceptions, such as individual autonomy, claims for the state's 'moral neutrality', and the supposed secularity of 'public reason'. Debates over these questions – classically between Rawls and communitarians such as Michael Sandel – usefully expose the contestable nature of many liberal assumptions. Does the liberal state actually preserve moral neutrality, or does its notion of individual autonomy and contract constitute an unacknowledged comprehensive philosophy? Does the liberal notion of public reason legitimately require the exclusion of religious speech from public debate, or is this coercive? Does the liberal state have a legitimate interest in actively cultivating liberal autonomy (with its tax policies, grants, education policy, and so forth)?

These are not merely currently important debates, but historically recognizable ones, to which the writings of Hobbes, Spinoza, Locke, and others contributed. And to investigate the plight of Catholics in Restoration England in the light of these debates is not just to examine a subject analogously relevant, but directly so. One might suggest, in particular, that the refusal to allow Restoration Catholics into the Lockean bargain, and the particular effort to tar them with Hobbesian sins, prefigured modern liberal strategies of disenfranchisement. Whereas for Protestants, a hardnosed realism about political obligation and allegiance (that is, a rejection of divine right legitimacy) might be understood as intrinsic to modern contractual citizenship,

for Catholics such realism could be portrayed as seditious and self-regarding perfidy, different in type but functionally equivalent to foreign allegiances ('popery'). This logic in turn relied on various religious stereotypes of Catholics as superstitious, conniving, and incapable of 'private judgment' (prefiguring an incapacity for Rawlsian 'public reason').[71] It turns out, in other words, that an attention to the religious context for early modern political thought is not just a precondition for accurate history, but is also a precondition for politically relevant history.

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[71] On this last point, in a later setting, see Andrew Thompson, 'Popery, Politics, and Private Judgement in Early Hanoverian Britain', *The Historical Journal*, 45 (2002): pp. 333–56.

Chapter 14

Renaming England's Wars of Religion

John Morrill

> Have we been so confused in seeking parallels between the British crisis of the 1640s and the wave of rebellions on the Continent (brought on by war and the centralizing imperatives of war) that we have missed an obvious point? *The English civil war was not the first European Revolution: it was the last of the Wars of Religion.*[1]

I

Revisionists of the 1970s and early 1980s were very keen to invoke the law of unintended consequences to explain a Civil War which they claimed came out of relatively clear skies. Now I find myself contemplating a palpable historiographical instance of the law of unintended consequences when a throwaway line at the end of a paper has become the load-bearing wall for a volume of high distinction a quarter of a century later. The line came to me in a moment of exhilaration as I realized (a couple of days before I gave my lecture on 'the religious context of the English Civil War' to the Royal Historical Society) that I had, against all the odds in a very busy teaching term, actually managed to get down what I wanted to say, and within a 7,000 word limit. I did not write the lecture around that pay-off line; it simply came to me as I reached for a way of ending with a firework.[2]

The emphasis was on the first half of the sentence, of course. I saw it as a rhetorical device for saying that we should see the crisis of the mid-seventeenth century as a fully early modern event not as a precociously modern one. It was a nail in the Whig coffin, not a manifesto for post-revisionism. But it obviously

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[1]   J.S. Morrill, 'The Religious Context of the English Civil War', *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 5th series, 34 (1984), p. 178, reprinted in a collection of my essays, *The Nature of the English Revolution* (1993), p. 68.

[2]   At any rate that is how I remember it. Blair Worden tells me that as we walked around Selwyn Gardens in about 1980 or 1981 and I was telling him about a (never-written) book I was planning on the period 1638–62 which I had half-seriously proposed to call *The Inglorious Revolution*, he told me to call it *England's Wars of Religion*. Such is his memory and in my experience his memory has always been better than mine. So he may well be the true honorand of this collection!

caught a historiographical moment and became celebrated (in more than one sense) and gradually came into its own, as evidenced in this collection. Having said that, most of the chapters above engage with my essay and not with its final flourish. The central themes of the book interrogate the role of religious ideas in shaping the conflicts of the seventeenth century. Indeed (despite its title) it is striking how little effort there is in the volume to define what constituted 'a war of religion', and no engagement with my own brief gloss on the term in a review of the essay I wrote myself a decade later:

> No scholar thinks that the European wars of religion were only about religion ... (They) concerned competing visions of state formation ... and the social distribution of power at a time of economic and demographic change; but ... religious poles are the ones around which most other discontents formed, religious arguments dominated the debate on the choices people made, and religious dynamism determined the stages through which the wars ran.[3]

This seems unexceptionable enough and leaves room for religious ideas to be holistic, to incorporate discussion of political forms as well as about the ends of government, but it does not address the real problems with my original formulation, and this volume quite properly focuses on close engagements with a methodological frailty in my paper, the attempt to distinguish the 'legal-constitutionalist' perceptions of misgovernment before Parliament and people in the years before 1642 from the 'religious' ones. So the authors of the chapters of this volume who engage directly with what I spoke/wrote twenty-five years ago are less keen to interrogate the final sentence than to characterize the essay as a whole and to do so courteously and fairly (see, for example, the summaries on pp. 17–20, 144–50). A lot of what I have to say here will address the issue of how to relate religious and secular discourses. But let me prepare the ground with something else.

II

In the chapters above many sentences from my 1983 article have been plucked out, but perhaps I can draw attention to one other not referred to in the preceding chapters which seems to me central to the preoccupations of this book: 'Talk of "popery" is not a form of "white noise", a constant fuzzy

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[3]   I made some effort to comment on what the Wars of Religion were in the collection of essays in which 'The religious context' was reprinted: Morrill, *Nature of the English Revolution*, pp. 33–8; the quotation is from p. 37.

background in the rhetoric and argument of the time against which significant changes in secular thought were taking place. This has been a fundamental error in the intellectual historians of the English Revolution'.[4] What I was saying there, more obliquely than perhaps I should, is that many intellectual historians are as prone to the cardinal sin of anachronism, of interpreting the past in the categories of the present, as any other kind of historian, indeed more so. Oliver Cromwell told Oliver St John 'This scripture hath been much stay to me: read it; Isaiah eighth, [verses] 10,11,14;– read all the chapter',[5] an important clue to his dialectic engagement with Scripture.[6] Well, I can say, with equal conviction: 'this book hath been much stay with me, read it, Lamont, *Richard Baxter and the Millennium* pages 20, 21, read the whole chapter'. Willie Lamont drew on Patrick Collinson's distinction between vertical and horizontal approaches to history.[7] He characterized the former as discarding the dross of the seventeenth century particular and contingent ('the prejudices and contentiousness of that age') in order to extract the residual gold, in this case of the piety which has moved Christians throughout the next 300 years; and he characterized the latter as engaging precisely with the sense of inaccessibility that differentiates the past from the present ('the world in which the King is equated with God and the pope with Antichrist; where witches fly in the night and women give birth to monsters; where Jesuits peddle lies and the Apocalypse conveys truth – this is not what S.R. Gardiner had in mind when he wrote of the Puritan Revolution. But this is the world of Richard Baxter').[8] In relation to the debates in this book, Lamont explores how Whig and Marxist historians had abused Baxter's autobiographical compendium, the *Reliquiae Baxterianae* (1696) in order to impose upon him a social-determinist reading of the origins of the Civil War and the thesis that 'the English civil war began as a constitutional conflict and ended as a religious one', when in fact Baxter was a true believer that the king had sanctioned the disarming of Protestants in Ulster that turned into the general massacre of, Baxter constantly asserted and clearly believed, 200,000 men, women and children. Lamont shows how at the time Baxter would have agreed with John Bowles's sermon-narrative, *Murder Will Out* (1643) in which

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[4] Morrill, *Nature*, p. 63.

[5] *Letters and Speeches of Oliver Cromwell*, (ed.) Thomas Carlyle (3 vols, 1904), vol. 1, p. 350.

[6] J. Morrill, 'How Oliver Cromwell Thought', in J. Morrow and J. Scott (eds), *Liberty, Authority, Formality: Political Ideas and Culture 1600–1900* (Exeter, 2008), pp. 94–6.

[7] See especially, 'Towards a Broader Understanding of the Early Dissenting Tradition', reprinted in P. Collinson, *Godly People* (London, 1983), pp. 527–62, esp. pp. 527–8.

[8] W. Lamont, *Richard Baxter and the Millennium* (London, 1979), pp. 20–22 (note the date of publication in relation to my original article).

the full horror of the popish plot was unveiled, prefaced by copious allusions to the Book of Revelation. Influenced by Lamont's passionate account of the turmoil in Baxter's mind, concealed in his circumspect rewriting of history and his part in it decades later,[9] I wrote in 1982 that 'Talk of "popery" is not a form of "white noise", a constant fuzzy background in the rhetoric and argument of the time against which significant changes in secular thought were taking place'. I stand by that statement.

My targets in 1983 were of course all those who read religion in a post-Enlightenment way: the whole Whig tradition, with its positivist (and thereby anachronistic) reading of texts, the work of Christopher Hill (especially the aspect summed up by his remark that 'Puritanism ... was mainly a political movement with a revolutionary ideology all its ideas were *expressed in a religious idiom*';[10] and (a special *bête noire* of mine at the time) Lawrence Stone, both as the most impatient of all scholars in imposing social meaning on all recorded words, but who was also capable of writing in 1972 that the Irish Rebellion was one of the 'chance events' that precipitated Revolution.[11] At one level, the whole of the essay was an exercise in creating a more nuanced 'horizontal history' of the religious and political *psychology* behind the outbreak of Civil War.[12]

We have come a long way in the past thirty years and the chapters in this volume are very comfortable about the need to evaluate what mattered to the people of the seventeenth century, with how they made sense of the world they were living in, with its particularity and inaccessibility, and we have learnt to engage with their epistemology and their hermeneutic. In this volume, I especially enjoyed Sears McGee's exploration of Simonds D'Ewes's longstanding and pre-eminent deep anxiety about the corruption of true religion, located in a gloomy 'theopolitics'. Indeed, I relished the moments where McGee coolly documents the red mist that descended on D'Ewes even in his diary, as when, in an incoherent anxious rage, he reported to himself on 'one Mr Lucye, the Marquesse of Buckingham's chaplain whose sermon had in it anabaptisme,

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[9]   Lamont, *Baxter*, pp. 76–9ff.

[10]   Cited above, with commentary by Glenn Burgess, at pp. 15–16. I have added the emphasis.

[11]   L. Stone, *The Causes of the English Revolution, 1529–1642* (London, 1972), pp. 137–8.

[12]   When I gave the essay published as 'Sir William Brereton and England's Wars of Religion', [*Journal of British Studies*, 24 (1985): pp. 311–32], as a plenary address to the NACBS Annual Conference in Toronto in 1983, I was confronted by a really hostile and negative commentator. Afterwards, to console me, the president, Barbara Shapiro, said that what my commentator had failed to grasp was that I had demonstrated how a historian can grasp not the intellect but the psychology of actors in the past: that my paper had been an exercise in *political psychology*. It is a phrase which has stuck with me and shaped much of my work ever since.

poperye and almost atheism' (p. 154); or in his belief that Bishop Wren and his confreres 'upheld and published the most gross and feculent[13] errors of the Romish synagogue' (p. 167). Not for the last time we need to ask ourselves, can we take such language at face value? Is this how he *really* felt? When is language used for effect, or with a calculated sense of what the audience needs to hear and as a mask for the speaker or writer's own views? Was D'Ewes kidding himself when he wrote in a cipher he had devised himself? Here we can be fairly sure he meant what he said, meant indeed to release the pent-up emotion, to commit to paper what he dare not speak openly.[14]

Another example would be John Goodwin, writing his *Anti-Cavalierisme* (1644) as a work of deep polemic, urging his listeners not to 'exchange your quails and manna from Heaven for the garlike and onions of Egypt' (p. 261). As John Coffey points out, this language sits comfortably in a tract that Quentin Skinner has read as 'perhaps the clearest summary of the classical distinction between liberty and dependence and hence between free-men and slaves' (p. 260). Here, if anywhere, religious language is being treated as white noise. Coffey invites us to see it as drawing on both classical and biblical patterns of thought and evidence, but can we decide which (if either) was primary, and is it meaningful to attempt to do so? If, as Jeff Collins rather irreverently puts it, Quentin Skinner has a tin ear for religion, then perhaps I should own up to tin ear for Cicero. I certainly **want** *Anti-Cavalierisme* to be a work in which the religious, biblical language is the essence, the classical language the vehicle, and so I find it. But can I prove it rather than rely on a tin ear to teach me? Let us take the example John Coffey actually gives us: how can we judge the sincerity of Goodwin's references to quails and manna, to garlic and onions? For all his balance, I find in Coffey's exegesis more explanatory force in Goodwin's deployment of the biblical language of deliverance than in the neo-liberal language of liberation, even if, as he pleads, they are compatible. Indeed is there in Goodwin's classicism anything as rich in resonance as his evocations of Scripture? Thus there was more to Goodwin's reference to quails and manna, garlic and onions than sparkling rhetoric. Garlic and onions are, after all, the consequence of human cultivation. In Egypt the Israelites ate what they eked

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[13] *OED* defines 'feculent' as 'laden or polluted with filth; foul, fetid', with a derivation from faeces.

[14] The obvious parallel is with the diary of Robert Woodford, town clerk of Northampton, who recorded all his loathing of the religious and constitutional abuses of the Personal Rule (and his self-loathing for his failure to strike out against it, but who stopped his diary as soon as he was liberated by the Long Parliament to take action to reform church and state; John Fielding, 'Opposition to the Personal Rule of Charles I: The Diary of Robert Woodford, 1637–41', *The Historical Journal*, 31 (1988): pp. 769–88.

from the soil. Quails and manna, however, were pure gift from God, sent to feed the hungry and demoralized Israelites in the desert, and owed nothing to human effort or even human foraging skills.[15] Goodwin is saying that true liberty is a total trust in God's providence and in the profusion of his goodness to those who learn to trust. That looks like a pretty load-bearing sentence to me.

It might seem that the centrality of the Bible as a text to which people turned to make sense of a world plunged into crisis and as *a* (if not the) guide to action no longer needs much defence. But in fact, there are still influential voices that need persuading. Anachronism and positivism are in full retreat. But what of intellectual historians who are interested in ideas and how they are expressed and defended? Can they be as 'vertical', as 'denominational' as prone to anachronistic evaluation of the early modern ways of thinking (that which becomes part of a tradition being privileged) as the old social determinist historians? For example within the last few years, a very distinguished English Literature scholar, whose work I greatly admire, made an uncharacteristically petulant attack on my account of the seventeenth-century crisis as England's Wars of Religion. In criticizing me for saying that 'it was religious arguments which proved to be solvents of resistance to resistance theory',[16] he wrote: 'a treatment of these scriptural materials was a routine feature of political discourse'. He then shows that the same religious texts could be used on both sides of an argument, the case he uses being the biblical arguments for and against Regicide.[17]

This is startling but not untypical. If I said about Harrington or Milton: 'a treatment of these classical materials was a routine feature of political discourse' and therefore of no significance to the polemical force of their work, you would jeer at me, and rightly so. That would be a clearly absurd claim and I do not make it: why then should a treatment of religious materials be seen as merely routine? I would suggest that in this passage Dzelzainis gets it precisely wrong. The inference of what he says is that biblical exegesis is never load-bearing, always capable of being denied and cancelled out, a white noise against which interesting things are being said in classical or renaissance discourses. I would make the claim that close biblical exegesis, and careful biblical hermeneutic, were both sufficient unto themselves for some of those engaged in persuading themselves and others to a course of action (with Cromwell as the obvious case in point), but that they were read for the most part by minds that strived to

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[15]   The reference is to Exodus 16.

[16]   Morrill, *Nature of the English Revolution*, p. 43.

[17]   M. Dzelzainis, 'Anti-monarchism in English Republicanism', in M. van Gelderen and Q. Skinner (eds), *Republicanism: A Shared European Heritage* (Cambridge, 2 vols, 2002), vol. 1, pp. 35–41.

harmonize them with the rules of good governance and the ethical conduct of social life they had learned at school. For educated Christians, the teachings of the Bible and the ancients were what mathematicians would call 'commutative'. My claim is simply that it is not sufficient to treat the biblical arguments in commutative texts as a white noise and the classical allusions as substantive.

In 1983 I was really stressing that what happened inside people's heads was not just a rationalization of self-interest; I was still shaking myself free from the positivism that had so long dominated the historiography. But I think I was more uncertainly and less consciously taking on another form of 'whiggism'. Glenn Burgess was later to show me that revisionist anti-Whiggery was first and foremost an attack not on teleology but on anachronism, on interpreting the past in the categories of the present.[18] If the Whigs were looking for progress as changing economic and social realities created modern ways of understanding the world, intellectual historians were also prone to privileging texts in the past that speak to *our* present as well as (sometimes but not to) *their* present. So I was pleading (and I insist that it needed saying in 1983) that if we are to understand the political crisis of the seventeenth century we needed to take religious language and discourse seriously; that we needed to see the Bible and the Fathers as sources of political thought; and that we took the force of ideas as having not just explanatory force for us as historians but having determining force in explaining people's actions.

Too much political thought – this is something I have been guilty of myself – envisages political decision-making as being a cerebral activity in the seventeenth-century equivalent of the armchair or the swivel chair: rational men making rational decisions in the calm of the study. But we also need to take into account thought that happens (in the case of the most articulate men of the Army, literally) on the hoof, and in crowded and tense meetings.

When in 1647 they did not know whether to continue to involve the king in the making of the post-war settlement, the army held a series of prayer meetings (even at the height of the Putney Debates);[19] when they were not sure whether to accept the invitation to cross to Ireland to avenge the massacres to shed what was left of their blood, they held a prayer meeting and it was as result of that that lots were cast as to which regiments would form the army of conquest – following the precedent in the Book of Acts for the selection of an Apostle to replace

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[18]   Glenn Burgess, 'On Revisionism: An Analysis of Early Stuart Historiography in the 1970s and 1980s', *The Historical Journal*, 33(1990): pp. 609–30.

[19]   I will explore this at length in my forthcoming book *Living with Revolution: The Peoples of Britain and Ireland 1646–1662*. In the meantime, see J. Morrill and P. Baker, 'The Case of the Armie Truly Restated', in Michael Mendle (ed.), *The Putney Debates of 1647: The Army, the Levellers and the English State* (Cambridge, 2001), pp. 103–24.

Judas Iscariot.[20] When Colonel Jerome Zanckey came away from a meeting in a plague-affected house in Kilkenny which decided to cleanse twenty-eight counties of Irish-born papists,[21] he did not remember Tacitus: 'wherever they make a desert they call it peace'.[22] Rather:

> When I meditated upon the crying guilt of blood, the severe justice of God, the sore judgements to be inflicted upon Babylon, which are now accomplishing, the severity of God against Saul, Jehoshophat, courting these that should have trampled upon, and sparing where the Lord commanded, destroying to destroy, and the end for which I ingaged herein at first, which was sealed upon my heart.[23]

Zanckey's outburst encapsulates not merely the self-assured appropriation of biblical texts by a middling-sort godly layman, but a crucial aspect of how he viewed his world. And so I still maintain that those on the parliamentarian side who focused on the rights and wrongs of resisting tyrants, who wondered how far to flex the muscles they had developed in a Ciceronian gym may have been confident enough to *lecture* Charles I in 1642 but they were not confident enough to take up arms against him and they remained amongst the paralysed majority or amongst the uneasy band of reluctant well-wishers of the cause, *unless* in addition, they felt a moral imperative to re-form the reformation. This is why, as I insisted in the only essay I have written that has 'Wars of Religion' in the title, that we need to remember,

> the hazards of agglomeration, of drawing up – whether for the 1620s or for the 1640s – a catalogue of grievances against the king and his ministers and a list of all those who expressed concern about one or more items from the catalogue and then assuming that everyone on the list subscribed to everything in the catalogue … Historians should emulate mechanical engineers, one of whose functions it is to determine where the stress points are in, say, a bridge. There will always be stress points, and changes in the structure can shift the patterns of stress. But it

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[20]   *The Clarke Papers*, (ed.) C.H. Firth (Camden Society, 4 vols, 1891–1898), vol. 3, p. 209.

[21]   S.R. Gardiner, 'The Transplantation to Connaught', *The English Historical Review*, 14 (1899): pp. 700–34.

[22]   In Latin: *Ubi Solitudinem Faciunt, pacem appellant*. This grim epigram is from Tacitus, *Agricola*, para. 30.

[23]   *Ireland Under the Commonwealth*, (ed.) R. Dunlop (Manchester, 2 vols, 1913), vol. 1, docs 105, 126 (i–iii), 131 and 131 (i–ii), 175, 269; vol. 2, 296, 349.

is also the task of engineers to estimate how and in what circumstances the stress will become too great, resulting in fractures and ultimately in collapse ...[24]

Having reviewed the condition of England, I found that it was the corrosive force of religious argument that caused collapse in very special circumstances. For with levels of political violence declining decade by decade from the late sixteenth century (fewer and fewer treason trials, less and less resort to arms to settle local disputes, less brigandage, more litigiousness as a sign of more reliance on legal process), there was no slide into war. In the absence of rival claimants to the throne, with no foreign interest in destabilizing England, Catholicism pacified and 20,000 Puritans in New England, Civil War looked less likely in the 1630s than in any decade for 200 years. As I put it in 1985,

> England had the kind of civil war that it had because Early Stuart government was so strong. Since the title [of the Stuarts] was so secure, since there were no rival claimants,[25] the easiest remedy for the seriously aggrieved – to rally to the banner of a pretender – was unavailable. This certainly reduced the risks of civil war, but it also meant that if civil war did come it would be more radical and more violent (since it would involve the questioning of deeper and more fundamental values).[26]

What I claimed for the 'religious context of the English civil war' was that it was force of religious belief, and the force of religious language that made possible the particular Civil War and the particular kind of Civil War that England had in particular circumstances.

Is that more than mere assertion, rooted in years of reading, but with a tin ear? Does it not presuppose that we as historians can get beyond what people say to what they believe? I am not a strong swimmer in illocutionary waters, but I will say this. What I have written above seems to me to be consistent with an important footnote in 'The Religious Context of the English Civil War', where I consider how we can gauge the sincerity of parliamentary 'propaganda'. Was circumspection, I wondered, a ploy to avoid alienating moderate opinion, or evidence of a genuine (in this case constitutional) reticence?

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[24] Morrill, 'Sir William Brereton', p. 322.

[25] And since Charles and Henrietta-Maria's fecundity had provided a security for the succession ('the heir and the spare') that had only existed for brief periods over the previous 250 years.

[26] Morrill, 'Sir William Brereton', pp. 322–3.

> I prefer the view expressed here because (1) [MPs] displayed no such reticence on religious matters despite the fact that it cost them moderate support; (2) their private thoughts appear to reflect their public statements; (3) their rhetorical reticence led to a reticence of action which threatened the success of the military operations.[27]

I do not myself think that, as historians, we should necessarily go to linguistic philosophy for ways of getting at the intentions of speakers and actors in the past. We make judgements about the intentions of those we know in our present on the basis of judgements just like those listed above; and it is simply one of the skills needed by and available to historians to read the recorded words of people in the past in the same way as they read the speech acts of friends and colleagues in the present. As I have tried to demonstrate in a series of essays, the approaches listed above can give convincing accounts of why, for example, MPs and their spin doctors stopped calling the king a tyrant in 1641–2 and why Cromwell took so long to commit himself to the king's trial and execution, and why he did commit himself when he did.[28] I will stand on my record; and note that problems of sincerity are not prominent concerns of the authors of this volume. They seem comfortable making their own assessments on these matters.

III

So the case for taking religious language seriously, and seeking to understand how it was understood in the seventeenth century, is the common purpose of all these chapters and they add impressively to our understanding of many aspects of the period. Many do not really bear *directly* on whether what happened in the mid-seventeenth century was a war of religion, but they all do so *indirectly*, by testifying to the ways in which passionate religious engagement is part of the warp and woof of daily life for clerical and lay elites. I had previously seen Simonds D'Ewes as a bit of a fusspot, more obsessed with legal precedent than with the Second Coming, a man who did nothing to make Civil War happen, but who knew which side to be on when it happened anyway. Now I have been taught to see him as a much more interesting and religiously obsessed person. Alan Cromartie's chapter on 'the mind of William Laud' is fascinating for the

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[27]   Morrill, *Nature of the English Revolution*, p. 59 n. 56.

[28]   J. Morrill, 'A Liberation Theology? Aspects of Puritanism in the English Revolution', in L.L. Knoppers (ed.), *Puritanism and its Discontents* (Newark, Delaware, 2003), pp. 27–46; J. Morrill, 'Rewriting Cromwell: A Case of Deafening Silences', *Canadian Journal of History*, 38 (2003): pp. 553–78.

way it recreates the complicated world of Oxford where 1559 constituted no clean break, where as late as the late 1580s Laud could enter 'a close-knit college in which conventional Puritanism was virtually unknown but popery was an attractive option: the alternative expression of a heartfelt piety' (p. 80). His lifetime obsession was to engage critically but respectfully with what he took to be intellectually credible Catholicism and to be dismissive of hardcore and intellectually threadbare Puritanism. Cromartie teaches us that we streamline history at our peril, and denomination-ize it too quickly. Mike Braddick very shrewdly and correctly observes that my own revisionism had as an important motive force an 'impatience with efforts to taxonomise allegiance' (p.144); but the recovery of a horizontal religious history can help us much more widely and much more importantly to de-taxonomize *religious* history, to strip it of over-rigid denominational identities. In resolving a large part of his own puzzlement about how Laudians could cause the Civil War but not be a party to it, Cromartie has opened up much bigger hermeneutic questions; and in this volume he is followed through the breach by Sears McGee, Sarah Mortimer and Jeff Collins.

IV

But the nub issue in this book is the one laid out by Glenn Burgess in his historiographical introduction:

> Morrill's account rested, like much of the historiography, on making a sharp separation between religion and politics, even while it reversed the tendency to subordinate the former to the latter. The problem with which we are left, then, is precisely that of making the separation at all. We might take religious belief seriously: but that does not make it the most important factor, and nor does it help us to separate it from other things. This furthermore is a problem that has not been confronted by historians who adopt a secular and 'republican' understanding of the parliamentary cause. They, equally, have given no answer to the question of why we should attach more importance to parliamentary demands for constitutional and legal liberty than their demands for further reformation. (p. 23)

One response to this challenge is to be found in a recent collection of essays that has addressed this issue head on, *Seeing Things Their Way*,[29] and which takes on

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[29]   A. Chapman, J. Coffey, B. Gregory (eds), *Seeing Things Their Way: Intellectual History and the Return of Religion*, (Notre Dame, Indiana, 2009), esp. chs 1, 3, 6.

most of the issues relating to anachronism, either in a ruthless filtering out of religious ideas and categories, or in imposing a post-Enlightenment, rationalist prioritization in deciding which religious ideas are allowed through the mesh.

But there is another answer to Burgess's challenge, better dealt with in this book. If we allow that there was in the seventeenth century a series of clearly defined discourses or 'languages' each with its own 'dialects' and each of which has things to say about politics – most obviously the languages of law (common and civil [roman and canon]), humanism (history, ethics, republicanism), and theology (salvation and the means of salvation), then it is no surprise to find that while there were at the time 'professional' writings in each of the languages, there were (especially but not exclusively) polemical writings that drew on two or more of them. And more importantly, it is clear that each of the languages could claim, as within its hinterland or indeed within its domain, every aspect of the political, of church–state relations, of the nature and extent of the confessional state. Each of those languages has things to say about the nature of sovereignty, legitimation of secular authority and institutions, the rule of law, the social distribution of wealth and power, the relationship of peoples and their rights within complex polities (multiple kingdoms, dynastic agglomerates, composite commonwealths); and things to say about issues which have to do with protecting the sovereignty of God and his Word and with the institutions appropriate to bringing sinful men and women into a knowledge of and obedience to His Will, and with what the state can require of subjects or citizens in respect of religious belief and practice and hence issues of witchcraft, divination, sacrilege.

It follows that when I, or others, have tried to make 'a sharp separation between religion and politics' we have not been saying that there are separate realms of politics and religion, but that different languages played different roles in creating parties, movements, wars, revolutions. For example, there was a common law case for and against ship money _and_ for and against prelatical episcopacy; there was a humanist case for and against ship money _and_ for and against prelatical episcopacy; there was a theological (in Sears McGee's neologism, _theopolitical_) case for and against ship money _and_ for and against prelatical episcopacy. I certainly had not thought this through before I read this book, but what I was driving at nearly thirty years ago was that those who became militants on both sides (more obviously on the parliamentarian side, less clearly on the royalist side) were those for whom religious (theopolitical) language was primary and insistent. Those who experienced ship money as an abuse of the royal prerogative wanted to see the king's discretionary powers hedged about; those who instead or more usually _as well_ saw it as further evidence of a popish plot which was itself part of the brief triumph of Antichrist before the Second Coming were the ones who saw a need to make war on him. This is where Mike

Braddick's development of Peter Lake's work on eschatological typologies in his discussion of the anti-popery and anti-Puritan comes into its own.

This book is a very serious and very effective effort to examine the role played by religious thought in the period *and in the historiography* (the distorting lens through which we view the past) tackle this issue. Two of the most wide-ranging and challenging chapters address it historically and historiographically. Burgess himself shows how religious issues and religious passions have been treated by historians from Clarendon to the present, the ebb and flow of willingness to interrogate Enthusiasm. Blair Worden shows how the phrase 'civil and religious liberties', a mantra from the Glorious Revolution to the First World War, was in embryo if not alive and well by the end of the Interregnum. This was/is a mantra that successfully blurred distinctions and blinded us from seeing any need to separate out how legal (common law), classical and religious (biblical, church-historical) languages could have affected different players at different times in different ways and created particular trajectories and outcomes. One could emphasize one or the other but within a reassuring cocoon of necessary connectedness.

Worden's close reading of the tracts of the 1640s and 1650s and the gradual emergence as firm and insistent meanings of 'civil liberty' and 'religious liberty' first as quite separate and then as conjoined terms, is really the starting point for this volume. It has been placed last amongst the above chapters because so much of it deals with the period after the Restoration. But Worden's readings are in effect a context for all the others and help, I think, to resolve many of the tensions to be found within and between other chapters as they wrestle with Burgess's challenge about how to address 'the sharp separation'. I have no problem to owning up to my own one-sidedness here. For example, I, more than anyone, have taken an extreme position about Oliver Cromwell's biblo-centrism.[30] He read the Bible incessantly and was engaged in deep personal dialectic with it. He cited nothing but the Bible throughout his surviving letters and speeches, and I took that as a demonstration that he was influenced by nothing else. In her exceptionally interesting and challenging chapter, Rachel Foxley has shown the blinkered nature of my reading of Cromwell. I am not quite ready to confess to having a tin ear for Cromwell's classicism, but I certainly wear scripturally rose-tinted spectacles. Foxley is one of several authors to show the discomfort Puritans had with resistance theory drawn from religious traditions and she is at her most challenging in showing that when Cromwell deployed the concept of a war of religion, it was to condemn his enemies for fighting one (p. 222). I may have said that religious zeal guided how the militants on both sides

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30   Morrill, 'How Oliver Cromwell Thought', pp. 89–112.

'read' the politics, and that religious militants were, as a result of their religious militancy, supporters of the need for a war, and promoters of a different kind of post-war settlement, but it has taken Rachel to make me see that even for Cromwell that assertion is not sufficient. One has to explore connections, not take them for granted.

Similarly Charles Prior teaches us that even so 'obviously' a religious subject as the canons of convocation of 1640 needs to be read through a range of languages or discourses and not just religious ones. Whatever confessional preconceptions and styles of religious practice each commentator brought to the discussion, this was, as he shows, based on a disputed 'past that remained the subject of bitter contest, and, most crucially, all of the matters that that sprang from that amorphous phrase "by law established"'. So to understand the debate, we need to understand the ways in which history was constructed and how the common law mind interacted with the mind of faith and biblical injunction in each person.

Rachel Foxley's recovery of Cromwell's belief that a war of religion was waged by royalists against the people of God and not vice versa is beautifully counterpointed by the demonstrations by Glenn Burgess in his chapter on royalist political thought and by Sarah Mortimer in her chapter on natural law and holy war. For they show that the royalists levied the same charge against their enemies: they 'sought to undermine the legitimacy of their opponents' cause by portraying it as primarily a war of religion (or fanaticism) while portraying the king as the defender of order and decency' (p. 178). I have always argued that once war started, each side pressed into service every kind of argument sometimes coherently, sometimes incoherently, to justify their actions. The arguments used to justify the raising of armies in late 1642 or for that matter to justify Regicide ex post facto are of course many and various. But for that reason I have taken much less interest in such material than in the pamphlets of 1641 and 1642, as militancy takes shape before our very eyes.

V

Just one more point before I sum up on the value of this book's title. It is a point that overlaps with much I have already said, but needs a paragraph or two to itself: the historical and historiographical problem of anti-clericalism.

This is, of course, at one level the extreme demonstration of the contrast between Collinson's vertical (denominational) and horizontal (the past in its own terms) approaches. But it goes deeper. Nothing needs fuller and more careful attention than the nature and extent of anti-clericalism in the mid-

seventeenth century. The claims of the Catholic clergy (and of many Laudians) to be the channel through which efficacious grace brought men and women to salvation was scorned by most non-Catholics; but the claims of many Protestant clergy to be (by ordination in the Established or Dissenting Churches) the sole authorized preachers of the Word of God, to have a superior and ultimately decisive authority to interpret Scripture, generated an especially powerful reaction amongst many highly educated laymen. In the course of the century Selden, Milton, Hobbes and Locke are simply four of the most prominent intellectuals who had seemed by education and life-circumstance destined for ordination but who opted out and became major commentators on biblical texts, reviled as a result by the clergy not only for what they said but for having the temerity to say it. This in turn made them virulently anti-clerical and this has in turn made them too often and wrongly to be treated as though they were atheists. Contempt for the Church(es) and for its spokesmen was no more then (than now) a source of disbelief in God.

Nonetheless the presumption of clerical privilege in the breaking of Scripture had an effect on the history as well as the historiography. It made some contemporaries, especially some very influential ones, including Henry Parker and Marchamont Nedham, engage much more with the non-scriptural discourses of clerical authors. And, as I said above, almost all of the narrative accounts of the mid century crisis ignore clerical voices and privilege those engaged in secular politics, or indeed the voices of pen-men hired for their ability to ventriloquize in any language likely to win the debate. Here Parker and Nedham are the star examples.

Of course there are major problems still not fully resolved about how far the public and published preachers of the 1640s are men who formed the consciences of the leading politicians and how far they were simply putting the political aspirations of those secular politicians into religious language, but what has now been recovered is that on both sides trained theologians were at the forefront of all the debates of the period and cannot be left out of the narrative of the Revolution. This is now part of the mainstream of interpretation. And this tends to support the argument that we need to distinguish those who thought about and sought to justify what *had happened* from those who thought about *what to make happen*. When the Long Parliament or its successors wanted to make their own supporters or a mass of concerned quietists feel more comfortable about what had been done, they sent for Henry Parker or Marchamont Nedham to draw on a variety of political and religious languages: they were hired pens, willing to defend any cause except a Presbyterian or clericalist one. When the Long Parliament or its successors wanted to get people off their backsides into decisive action, they reached for their Bible or sent for the preacher, and they

read it, or heard *him*, in a commutative way. Those preachers created ways of looking at history for those who incessantly heard them.

VI

The conference that lies behind this volume was entitled 'Britain's Wars of Religion'. In my summing up at the conference, I protested that 'Britain' had not been taken seriously. The editors have retreated to England in giving a title to this book.

Would I still say that 'England's Wars of Religion' was a useful or helpful title? Not really. I prefer Britain's Wars of Religion, so long as we look at the wars between as well as within each of England and Wales, Ireland, Scotland. Since 1983, much of my work has explored the relationships within and amongst the kingdoms and peoples that become the Tudor/Stewart dynastic agglomerate or (as I have more euphoniously termed it) the British state system. If what *England* experienced in the mid-seventeenth century was a war of religion, it was a war of religion within and between the kingdoms and peoples of England, Ireland, Scotland (and Wales). That is a dimension completely absent from my 1983 essay, and despite all my efforts pretty much absent from this volume too. There is a slightly puzzling lack of puzzlement in this volume about how *England* could have a late manifestation of Europe's wars of religion when it was not a confessional war between Protestants and Catholics, but a war amongst Protestants, initially for control of a Protestant confessional state, and then for a loose Protestant state with a contested degree of liberty and equality for 'all species of Protestant' (Cromwell's phrase).[31] Let us take one example: the importance of anti-popery. Several of the chapters in this volume demonstrate the power of anti-popery (and its antitype anti-sectarianism) in the literatures of the period. It is a point made with particular force and effect in Mike Braddick's rich reading of the polemics of the early 1640s. He notes, as does Charles Prior, that Charles I's fiercest critics in 1641–2 and for some time afterwards did not want to reduce the authority of the Crown, but to redirect it. These opponents perceived the need for a strong monarch with discretionary power to guard against the ever-present threat of popery and (and this is a new threat) from the aggressive attempts of a new clerical elite to usurp that power. In other words, we can revive the point so strongly made by Lamont a generation ago that many Puritans had an exalted view of the royal supremacy and a great

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[31]   *Cromwell*, vol. 2, p. 417.

fear that it was being subverted.[32] Braddick and Prior both show us with great skill how 'seductive and powerful' and how 'unstable in their precise, practical meanings' these languages of anti-popery and anti-popery and anti-Puritanism were. A very similar argument about the legacies of the Revolution can be found in Jeff Collins's compelling account of Blackloism and its relations with the Interregnum and Restoration courtiers and governors.

One way of deepening these points is to recall an article by Carole Wiener which has ceased to be fashionable. She argued in 'The Beleaguered Isle: A Study of Elizabethan and Early Stuart anti-Catholicism',[33] that anti-popery could either be seen as being 'the enemy without', the pope and the Catholic monarchs in thrall to him, linked to the fifth column of alienated nobility radicalized by Jesuit chaplains, those behind the assassination plots, the Armada, Gunpowder Treason, *or* as being the enemy within, the conspiracy at the heart of government that sought to take over the government of the king by persuading him to appoint Catholics or their fellow travellers to key offices, and at the very least to desensitize the king to the threat of popery, at worst take over his mind completely. That more and more people would, with increasing conviction, see the latter threat superseding the former one is one of the most potent sources of distrust as we move through the reign of Charles I and it is that which underlies the story that Braddick has unfolded for us, surely. But what creates the unstable, imprecise pattern of anxieties he writes about is that the 'enemy within' fears did not replace the 'enemy without' but contended with them.

The great benefit of the chapters by Ronald Asch and Robert von Friedeburg in this collection is that they take us into Sears McGee's 'theopolitical' world. Asch shows us that Kings of England (and of course of Scotland and Ireland) were caught up in the revival of sacral kingship in the age after the age of assassinations. James VI and I did not inherit the English throne by positive law. He was debarred both by the will of Henry VIII and by his third and the latter's final Act of Succession: he inherited instead by natural law and the sacralization of his rule and his insistence on indefeasible divine right drew on precisely the arguments that Asch examines and which as he says are anathema to Calvinists 'disenchanted with the sacral'. James was a Protestant king who drew down theories of kingship devised to strengthen Catholic monarchs. Robert von Friedeburg's chapter addresses the theopolitical point even more directly: the dozens of pamphlets that he draws our attention to that make the English aware of the devastation visited on the Protestant people of Germany

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[32]   W. Lamont, *Godly Rule: Politics and Religion 1603–1660* (1969), chs 1–3.

[33]   C. Wiener, 'The Beleaguered Isle: A Study of Elizabethan and Early Stuart Anti-Catholicism', *Past and Present*, 51 (1971): pp. 27–62.

and the Low Countries in the expressly confessional wars there (pp. 50–51), the parallels drawn by popular and influential preachers between what was happening on the Continent and what was happening in England (pp. 54–60). By 1641–2 many Englishmen had been told, and had come to accept, that there were Jesuits determined to bring Europe's wars of religion to English soil. So these chapters prepare the way for the discussion of anti-popery in the later chapters.

This is where the Irish Rebellion of 1641 needs to take pride of place. It appears as a (quite loud, admittedly) offstage noise in a couple of chapters, but it is what allows us to speak of England's war of religion if we want to be narrow, more properly 'Britain's Wars of Religion' (or Britain and Ireland's wars of religion if we are being fastidious). For it is a fact that Irish Catholics caused the death of thousands of British Protestant settlers in Ireland in 1641;[34] it is a fact that this becomes an obsessive concern of the English press and English opinion in the period between the rebellion in October 1641 and the outbreak of war in the summer of 1642, it is a fact that the printed reports from Ireland were wildly exaggerated and inaccurate,[35] it is a fact that Phelim O'Neill, the leader of the rebels, claimed (as was widely reported) to have a warrant from Charles I to disarm the settlers.[36] It is fair to say that there was very little of interest to the intellectual historian in the hundreds of newsbook reports and alarmist pamphlets (the 'papists are coming here next'), but it is also fair to say that the lessons learnt from the rebellion by those trying to work out how to respond to the crisis in England drew on whatever was their primary discourse. For those fearful of anarchy and the collapse of the rule of law, preventing the collapse of England into war was a yet more urgent priority. For those who saw it as the ultimate demonstration of the popish plot, who read the pamphlets (as many of them encouraged their readers to do) through the lens of Foxe's *Book of Martyrs* or of Catholic massacres in the Thirty Years War,[37] the need to defend themselves against the war of religion being waged by popery with a view to the extermination of Protestantism and truth everywhere was an easy connection to make.

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[34] For the more than 8,000 depositions of survivors, see the full transcripts linked to images of the originals at http://1641.tcd.ie. The fullest analysis to date is in N. Canny, *Making Ireland British 1580–1660* (Oxford, 2001), pp. 461–534.

[35] J. Cope, *England and the 1641 Irish Rebellion* (2009), ch. 4.

[36] R. Dunlop, 'The Forged Commission of 1641', *The English Historical Review*, 2 (1888): pp. 527–33.

[37] E. Shagan, 'Constructing Discord: Ideology, Propaganda, and English Responses to the Irish Rebellion of 1641', *Journal of British Studies*, 36 (1997): pp. 4–34.

I will leave it at that. In my Ford Lectures of 2006, hopefully soon to be published, I have argued that we can and should see the whole of the period 1638–62 (and especially 1646–62), as Britain and Ireland's wars of religion, driven much more by ethnic and confessional divisions than by social ones, much more a struggle to redefine the historical (past, present, future) relationship between the peoples of these islands than one concerned with the meaning of and institutional arrangements to protect liberty in just one of them. The fact that I can get away with calling them 'Britain's Wars of Religion' on this side of the Irish Sea, but need to call them 'Britain and Ireland's Wars of Religion' on the other side of it is just one example of the fact that History matters.

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