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HARRIET RUDOLPH AND DIETMAR REGENSBURGER

The European Wars of Religion

An Interdisciplinary Reassessment of Sources, Interpretations, and Myths



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An Interdisciplinary Reassessment of Sources, Interpretations, and Myths

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Contents

Introduction

Wolfgang Palaver, Harriet Rudolph, and Dietmar Regensburger

Three major events in recent decades have brought the relationship between violence and religion into the centre of academic and socio-political debates: It began with Ayatollah Khomeini's revolutionary establishment of an Islamic republic in Iran in 1979, increased with the outbreak of ethno-national conflicts – often at least partly accompanied with religious differences – in parts of the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia after the end of the Cold War, and culminated with the terrorist attacks of 9/11 in the United States. All these events led to an increasing and on-going discussion about the relationship between violence and religion that is nowadays even more intensified against the backdrop of violent conflicts in Asia and Africa which, in public discourse, are frequently linked to religious movements of various kinds.[1]

It was especially against the increasing challenges coming from jihadism that many Western thinkers started to defend the modern separation between politics and religion by referring to the so-called European Religious Wars as a very dangerous threat in the past that was only overcome by the establishment of the secular nation state and its neutrality in regard to religion. In Eric O. Hanson's book *Religion and Politics in the International System Today* we find a good example how a reference to the European religious wars is used to distinguish between the West and the Islamic world: 'The West chose secularism in response to religious war within the society. Islam did not have a Thirty Years War'.[2] Similarly, Monica Duffy Toft, an American international relations scholar, makes the point that 'because Islam had no Thirty Years War, the Islamic world did not inherit the West's now instinctive rejection of the idea that violence in the name of religion enhances one's religious credibility [...], and church and

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[1] Mark Juergensmeyer, *The New Cold War? Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State* (Berkeley, 1993); David C. Rapoport, 'Some General Observations on Religion and Violence', in *Terrorism and Political Violence* 3 (1991): 118–39; Jeff Haynes (ed.), *Religion and Politics in Europe, the Middle East and North Africa* (London, 2010); Niels Kastfeld (ed.), *Religion and African Civil Wars* (London, 2005).

[2] Eric O. Hanson, *Religion and Politics in the International System Today* (Cambridge, 2006), p. 107.

state should be the same'.[3] Much more prominent and internationally discussed was Mark Lilla's book *The Stillborn God: Religion, Politics, and the Modern West* that also provided a secularist narrative referring back to the time of Hobbes and the European Wars of Religion.[4]

It seems, however, much too simple to rely on this secularist narrative that scapegoats religion as the ultimate root of violence and claims that only a world in which all religious attitude are completely privatized might be able to prevent further outbreaks of violence. As Mark Juergensmeyer, a leading expert on religious terrorism, has pointed out the current danger of a global confrontation between secular nationalism and religious politics will not be solved by solely blaming religion for the escalation of conflict but by understanding what religious people all over the world miss in secular nationalism and by the 'revival of tolerant forms of moderate religion' that may help to overcome the current crises.[5] Historical evidence has proved that religion can be one root of violence. However, violent conflicts and – even more – wars are usually caused by a multitude of diverse factors. It is certainly necessary to discuss the ambivalence of the effects of religions on human societies but it is inadequate to identify these solely with violence.[6]

These more general observations about the manifold relationship between violence and religion apply also to the discussion about the European Religious Wars. Again, it seems very short-sighted to emphasize only the religious roots of these wars. In a much broader sense, these military conflicts can be understood as the birth pangs of the emergence of the modern state with its own affinity to violence showing traces of a 'barbarism lurking within the very core of modernity'.[7]

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[3] Monica Duffy Toft, 'Religion and Political Violence', in Mark Juergensmeyer, Margo Kitts, and Michael K. Jerryson (eds), *The Oxford Handbook of Religion and Violence* (New York, 2013), pp. 332–44, here p. 340.

[4] Mark Lilla, *The Stillborn God: Religion, Politics, and the Modern West* (New York, NY, 2008); cf. Wolfgang Palaver, Andreas Oberprantacher, and Dietmar Regensburger (eds), *Politische Philosophie versus Politische Theologie? Die Frage der Gewalt im Spannungsfeld von Politik und Religion*, Edition Weltordnung – Religion – Gewalt 7 (Innsbruck, 2011).

[5] Mark Juergensmeyer, *Global Rebellion: Religious Challenges to the Secular State, from Christian Militias to Al Qaeda*, Comparative Studies in Religion and Society 16 (Berkeley, 2008), p. 266; cf. Mark Juergensmeyer, 'Religion in the Global Jihadi War', in Kjell-Åke Nordquist (ed.), *Gods and Arms: On Religion and Armed Conflict* (Cambridge, 2013), pp. 16–32.

[6] R. Scott Appleby, *The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence, and Reconciliation*, Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict (Lanham, MD, 2000); Thomas Scheffler (ed.), *Religion between Violence and Reconciliation*, Beiruter Texte und Studien 76 (Beirut, 2002).

[7] Samuel N. Eisenstadt, 'The Reconstruction of Religious Arenas in the Framework of Multiple Modernities', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 29/3 (2000): 591–611,

It is also important to note that not secularization was the immediate result of these wars but the attempt to establish religiously largely homogeneous territories – *cuius regio, eius religio* – a confessionalization of the state that was deeply intensified from the end of the sixteenth century onwards and that did not end in 1648.[8] The secularist perspective on the wars of religion caused many modern thinkers to disregard the potential of religion to act as promoter of stability and peace and effectively ignoring the testimony of many religious people and movements to that avail.[9] Such an anti-religious bias also fails to explain adequately the rise of ideological fundamentalism, which seems to represent much more a modern phenomenon than an offspring of traditional religions.[10]

The current debate on violence and religion has resulted in an enormous amount of scholarly publication. Many collections of essays, special issues of journals, and even large handbooks have recently been published that were dedicated to this topic.[11] However, it is striking that the European Wars of

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here p. 611; cf. Jan Philipp Reemtsma, *Vertrauen und Gewalt: Versuch über eine besondere Konstellation der Moderne* (Hamburg, 2008).

[8] For the research paradigm of confessionalization developed by the German historians Wolfgang Reinhardt and Heinz Schilling following studies by Ernst Walter Zeeden cf. Thomas Kaufmann, 'Konfessionalisierung', in Friedrich Jaeger (ed.), *Enzyklopädie der Neuzeit*, vol. 6 (Darmstadt, 2007), pp. 1053–70; Helga Schnabel-Schüle, 'Vierzig Jahre Konfessionalisierungsforschung – eine Standortbestimmung', in Rolf Kießling and Peer Frieß (eds), *Konfessionalisierung und Region*, Forum Suevicum 3 (Konstanz, 1999), pp. 23–40; Kaspar von Greyerz et al. (eds), *Interkonfessionalität – Transkonfessionalität – binnenkonfessionelle Pluralität: Neue Forschungen zur Konfessionalisierungsthese*, Schriften des Vereins für Reformationsgeschichte 201 (Gütersloh, 2003).

[9] Heather Dubois, 'Religion and Peacebuilding: An Ambivalent yet Vital Relationship', *Journal of Religion, Conflict, and Peace* 1/2 (2008): http://www.religionconflictpeace.org/volume-1-issue-2-spring-2008/religion-and-peacebuilding (accessed 23 April 2014); Hélène Cristini, 'A Different Model for Solving Political Conflicts: A Comparative Study of Religions', *Peace & Change* 32/4 (2007): 574–89; also Bernd Oberdorfer and Peter Waldmann, *Die Ambivalenz des Religiösen: Religionen als Friedensstifter und Gewalterzeuger* (Freiburg i. Br., 2008).

[10] Cf. the discussion of the concept of confessional fundamentalism in Heinz Schilling (ed.), *Konfessioneller Fundamentalismus: Religion als politischer Faktor im europäischen Mächtesystem um 1600*, Schriften des Historischen Kollegs 70 (München, 2007).

[11] Andrew R. Murphy (ed.), *The Blackwell Companion to Religion and Violence* (Malden, MA, 2011); Juergensmeyer/Kitts/Jerryson, *Oxford Handbook of Religion and Violence*; Nordquist, *Gods and Arms*; David Martin, *Does Christianity Cause War?* (Oxford, 1997); Peter Partner, *God of Battles: Holy Wars of Christianity and Islam* (Princeton, NJ, 1998); J. Harold Ellens (ed.), *The Destructive Power of Religion: Violence in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam*, 4 vols. (Westport, CT, 2004); Mathias Hildebrandt and Manfred Brocker (eds), *Unfriedliche Religionen? Das politische Gewalt- und Konfliktpotenzial von Religionen* (Wiesbaden, 2005).

Religion are seldom treated explicitly in these interdisciplinary endeavours, though they are mentioned quite frequently. There are several reasons for this omission. One can probably be found in the fact that the secularist narrative on the religious wars is most commonly found in philosophy, political science and sociology, rather than among historians who have studied this field more thoroughly but who are usually under-represented in most of these publications. It was in the 1970s that the German writer and Nobel laureate Heinrich Böll reviewed Ernst Walter Zeeden's book on the period of the religious wars in the German weekly *Die Zeit*.[12] Böll was astonished to find out that contrary to what he had learned in school these wars were, according to Zeeden, not so much about faith but about politics and economic interests.

Not surprisingly, since the 1970s historians have published a particularly large number of monographs and anthologies on specific wars, which were usually regarded as religious wars, on the European Wars of Religion in comparative perspective,[13] and on the relation between religion and violence in early modern times in general.[14] Compared to studies on religion and violence in other scientific contexts, historical research on this topic area was initiated to a much lesser extent by current political developments but rather by the fact that the relationship between confessionalization, the legitimate use of force as well as the illegitimate use of violence, and the process of state formation represents a key topic in historiography with regard to early modern times.

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[12] Heinrich Böll, 'Ein Jahrhundert wird besichtigt. Die Dreißigjähigen Kriege: Gestern und heute', *Die Zeit*, October 21, 1977; Ernst Walter Zeeden, *Hegemonialkriege und Glaubenskämpfe 1556–1648*, Propyläen-Geschichte Europas 2 (Frankfurt a.M., 1977); see also Johannes Burkhardt, *Der Dreißigjährige Krieg* (Frankfurt a.M., 1992), p. 126.

[13] Compare, for example, Peter Herrmann (ed.), *Glaubenskriege in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart* (Göttingen, 1996); Klaus Schreiner and Elisabeth Müller-Luckner (eds), *Heilige Kriege: Religiöse Begründungen militärischer Gewaltanwendung. Judentum, Christentum und Islam im Vergleich*, Schriften des Historischen Kollegs Kolloquien 78 (München, 2008); Franz Brendle and Anton Schindling (eds), *Religionskriege im Alten Reich und in Alteuropa* (Münster, 2010); Gabriel Palmer-Fernandez (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Religion and War* (New York, 2004); Lucien Bély and Christophe Duhamelle (eds), *Les affrontements religieux en Europe (1500–1650)* (Paris, 2009); Philip Benedict et al. (eds), *Reformation, Revolt and Civil War in France and the Netherlands 1555–1585* (Amsterdam, 1999); Wolfgang Kaiser (ed.), *L'Europe en conflits: Les affrontements religieux et la genèse de l'Europe moderne, vers 1500 – vers 1650* (Rennes, 2008). For specific regions and conflicts discussed in the present volume, see the literature in the footnotes of the following chapters.

[14] Cf. Kaspar von Greyerz and Kim Siebenhüner (eds), *Religion und Gewalt: Konflikte, Rituale, Deutungen (1500–1800)*, Veröffentlichungen des Max-Planck-Instituts für Geschichte 215 (Göttingen, 2006); Andreas Holzem (ed.), *Krieg und Christentum: Religiöse Gewalttheorien in der Kriegserfahrung des Westens*, Krieg in der Geschichte 50 (Paderborn, 2009); Arnold Angenendt, *Toleranz und Gewalt: Das Christentum zwischen Bibel und Schwert* (Münster, 2007).

Many historical studies have called into doubt well-established notions and prejudices. For example, historians have stressed that there have been military conflicts before the Schmalkaldic War and after the Thirty Years War, which were marked considerably by religious dimensions and therefore could be categorized as religious wars.[15] Consequently, in modern historiography the age of religious wars may comprise various periods in time – a fact that points to different definitions of the term religious war as well as to different regions of examination.[16] Even certain conflicts within these periods, which had usually not been addressed as religious wars in the past, for example, the Anglo–Spanish War (1585–1604), have been analysed in the light of religious difference between the combatants.[17] Recent research has also addressed later wars such as the Crimean War, the American Civil War or the Bosnian War as religious wars, though none of these authors argued that these wars were fought primarily for religious intentions.[18] In the Bosnian case, Michael A. Sells pointed out that, for a certain period of time, religion was not blamed for the escalation of violence in public discourse but violence was mainly attributed to 'ethnic cleansing' and 'balkanism' referring to ideas of (Hunnish and Turk) barbarism.[19]

Furthermore, the strict separation of medieval crusades from early modern religious wars by definition has been scrutinized. Certain scholars have provided evidence of strong links between both phenomena on the level of concepts such as 'holy war' and 'war against heresy', of individual and collective perceptions as well as practises.[20] This assessment among other new perspectives and interpretations was fostered by an increasingly 'cultural' reading of these military conflicts that focused on the experiences and perceptions of people in times of

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[15] See, for example, Norman Housley, *Religious Warfare in Europe. 1400–1536* (Oxford, 2010); David Onnekink (ed.), *War and Religion after Westphalia, 1648–1713* (Farnham, 2009).

[16] To give just a few examples: 1095–1648, 1400–1650, 1517–1648, and 1562–1715. Cf. Mark W. Konnert, *Early Modern Europe: The Age of Religious War. 1559–1715* (Peterborough, Ont., 2006); Cathal J. Nolan, *The Age of Wars of Religion, 1000–1650: An Encyclopedia of Global Warfare and Civilization*, 2 vols. (Westport, CT, 2006).

[17] Robert E. Scully, '"In the Confident Hope of a Miracle": The Spanish Armada and Religious Mentalities in the Late Sixteenth Century', *Catholic Historical Review* 89/4 (2003): 643–70.

[18] Orlando Figes, *The Crimean War: A History* (New York, 2011); Randall M. Miller, Harry S. Stout, and Charles Reagan Wilson (eds), *Religion and the American Civil War* (New York, 1998).

[19] In Sells's opinion violence was fostered by a dangerous connection between religious ideas and nationalist zeal. Michael A. Sells, *The Bridge Betrayed: Religion and Genocide in Bosnia* (Berkeley, 1996); cf. also G. Scott Davis (ed.), *Religion and Justice in the War over Bosnia* (New York, 1996).

[20] Norman Housley, *Later Crusades 1274–1580: From Lyons to Alcazar* (Oxford, 1992); Janus Møller Jensen, *Denmark and the Crusades, 1400–1650* (Leiden, 2007).

war, on the languages and media of war, and on cultures of remembrance which individuals and social groups connected to these events afterwards. Historians have not only focused on the impact of the religious divide on the escalation of violence but also on the potential of religions to reconcile societies and to bring about the idea of tolerance towards religiously deviant social groups.[21]

Recent historiography has also been very much concerned with the idea of nation and nationhood.[22] Historians have emphasized that nation is not a solely modern concept, we have already known that before, but above all it is not necessarily connected to the concept of statehood. National identities cannot be considered elitist concepts fabricated to secure people's loyalty to the emerging state. Therefore the idea that people might by motivated to kill for the sake of religion was not simply replaced by the idea that people might be motivated to kill for the sake of nation. In late medieval and early modern times there are various connections between nation, religion, and violence because religious ideas played a decisive role in the fashioning of nationhood. Additionally, the existence of a Westphalian System, a term that was supposed to describe an early modern state system of a highly secular character consisting of sovereign states and allegedly existing for over 300 years following the Peace of Westphalia, has been rejected.[23] Although all these studies have contributed to a nuanced understanding of the complexity of the so called religious wars, this understanding has hardly spread to other scientific disciplines and even less to the popular discourse which is reflected in mainstream media and school books.

Another problem is related to the concept of religion that is used to label these wars as wars of religion.[24] In today's Western world, the general understanding

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[21] Ole Peter Grell and Robert W. Scribner (eds), *Tolerance and Intolerance in the European Reformation* (Cambridge, 1996); Irene Dingel (ed.), *Das Friedenspotential von Religion*, Veröffentlichungen des Instituts für Europäische Geschichte Mainz Suppl. 78 (Göttingen, 2009).

[22] See in general Reinhard Stauber, 'Nationalismus vor dem Nationalismus? Eine Bestandsaufnahme der Forschung zu "Nation" und "Nationalismus" in der Frühen Neuzeit', *Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht* 47 (1996): 139–65; Dieter Langewiesche, '"Nation", "Nationalismus", "Nationalstaat" in der europäischen Geschichte seit dem Mittelalter – Versuch einer Bilanz', in *idem*, and Georg Schmidt (eds), *Föderative Nation: Deutschlandkonzepte von der Reformation bis zum Ersten Weltkrieg* (München, 2000), pp. 9–32; explicitly with reference to religion recently Eva Doležalová (ed.), *Confession and Nation in the Era of Reformations: Central Europe in Comparative Perspective* (Prague, 2011).

[23] Heinz Duchhardt, 'Westphalian System. Zur Problematik einer Denkfigur', *Historische Zeitschrift* 269 (1999): 305–15; Benno Teschke, *The Myth of 1648* (London, 2003).

[24] Cf. Kjell-Åke Nordquist, 'Linking War and Religion: Some Observations', in *idem*, *Gods and Arms* (Cambridge, 2013), pp. 142–63, here p. 155. For the following also the chapter by Rudolph, pp. 87–118, where she refers to the problem resulting from differing or not specified meanings of the term 'state' which hamper a balanced assessment of the part

of religion often refers to a private spiritual matter that is separated from secular matters like politics, law, and economy. However, this secularist understanding of religion emerged exactly during the time of these wars, though its establishment as a normative idea was hardly asserted before the nineteenth century. In early modern times, we encounter diverse meanings of this term in political debate, legal and theological discourse, not to speak about the understanding of religion of ordinary people.[25] Even in regard to the most challenging problems of the Global Jihadi War of today Mark Juergensmeyer opts for a wide understanding of religion that does not follow the secularist separation from political and social concerns: 'The elusive term "religion", in the broad sense, can point to a moral sensibility toward the social order that in many ways is remarkably similar to the civic values of those who feel most ardently about secularism. This is especially so in the non-Western world'.[26] From a theological point of view the modern Western definition of 'religion' has become highly questionable, too. Believers in all parts of the world do not understand their spiritual lives as being restricted to a separate realm that is disconnected from politics, economy or law.

The distinction between religion and spirituality brings us finally to the importance of theology in the discussion of the relationship between violence and religion.[27] We already referred to Juergensmeyer's remark that our world of today needs a revival of moderate forms of religion instead of fundamentalist ones. This hints towards a more substantial understanding of religion. The Swedish peace researcher Kjell-Åke Nordquist follows insight of Jürgen Habermas that in our current world especially theologians are supposed to contribute to the formation of more peaceful theologies that have to be developed inside the different religious traditions.[28] It is most important for them to reflect on the theological legitimation of violence and on the structure of religious institutions

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the emerging state played in the wars of religion and which, at the same time, exacerbate interdisciplinary debate to a considerable extent.

[25] From a theological perspective, Ernst Feil, *Religio: Die Geschichte eines neuzeitlichen Grundbegriffs*, 4 vols, Forschungen zur Kirchen- und Dogmengeschichte 36, 70, 79, 91 (Göttingen, 1986, 1997, 2001, and 2012).

[26] Juergensmeyer, *Global Rebellion*, p. 18.

[27] Friedrich Schweitzer (ed.), *Religion, Politik und Gewalt: Kongressband des XII. Europäischen Kongresses für Theologie*, Veröffentlichungen der Wissenschaftlichen Gesellschaft für Theologie 29 (Gütersloh, 2006); Hans G. Kippenberg, *Gewalt als Gottesdienst: Religionskriege im Zeitalter der Globalisierung* (München, 2008); Reinhard Hempelmann and Johannes Kandel (eds), *Religionen und Gewalt: Konflikt- und Friedenspotentiale in den Weltreligionen*, Kirche – Konfession – Religion 51 (Göttingen, 2006); Adel Theodor Khoury, *Krieg und Gewalt in den Weltreligionen: Fakten und Hintergründe* (Freiburg i. Br., 2003).

[28] Nordquist, *Gods and Arms*, pp. 161–2; Jürgen Habermas, *Zwischen Naturalismus und Religion: Philosophische Aufsätze* (Frankfurt a.M., 2005), pp. 9–11.

that contributed to the excess of violence in the times of the so-called religious wars. Philosophical approaches and religious studies can only flank but not replace highly needed intra-religious reflections.

The chapters in this volume focus especially on terms repeatedly used and misused in public debates such as 'religious violence', 'religious warfare' in the context of military conflicts that were addressed as 'religious wars' in the past. The authors were not only asked to concentrate on the role of religion in the context of military conflicts, but also on the role of the emerging state in terms of the escalation of violence in the so called age of religious wars as well as in recent military conflicts. By using different methodological and theoretical approaches historians, philosophers, and theologians engage in an interdisciplinary debate that will not only contribute to a better understanding of the religio-political situation of early modern Europe but also to a broader understanding of violent conflicts that are interpreted as religious conflicts today such as, for example, the so called 'war on terror', the civil wars in the former Yugoslavia, and recent civil wars and conflicts in Africa and the Middle East.

This volume brings together reflections from different disciplines on the European Wars of Religion as well as on the tricky relation between violence and religion in early modern and modern history, which has been neglected in the public debate for too long. It aims at contributing to a more nuanced understanding of the complexity of violent conflict in the past as well as in present times, in which religions have served only as one stimulating factor among others if at all. In the first part of this volume, several historians discuss specific military conflicts in early modern times that were repeatedly addressed as religious wars by contemporary or later generations. This section examines the suggestive and volatile relationship between war and religion in the period between the beginning of the fifteenth century and the middle of the seventeenth century in different parts of Europe such as Bohemia, France, the Holy Roman Empire, England, and the Swiss Confederation.

The first article by the Czech historian Pavel Soukup discusses the relation between violence and religion in the context of a series of military conflicts in Bohemia generally known as the Hussite wars (1419–71), which have also been addressed as the 'Hussite Revolution', the 'Bohemian Reformation'. Soukup demonstrates that by focusing mostly on the Bohemian side of the conflict, traditional Czech historiography characterized these events as defensive wars of the 'Bohemian nation' against a foreign monarch and his allies though a relevant number of Bohemian estates in fact had sided with the emperor. This opinion was already held by those Bohemian estates which opposed the emperor's rule. Their military opponents on the other hand interpreted the conflict as a 'crusade' against heretics or as an 'imperial war' against rebels. All these terms reveal that contemporaries as well as historians tended to ascribe religion either a rather limited or a vital, partly even decisive role in these events. Without dismissing all

these competing discourses, Soukup comparatively analyses in which ways both sides exploited the concept of 'holy war' and the language of sacred violence to construct religiously connoted notions of the enemy to mobilize people to go to war. Both sides backed their dealings with learned theology while at the same time fostering apocalyptic expectations. According to Soukup, the Hussite wars should be regarded as a forerunner of the early modern wars of religion, rather than as part of the medieval crusading tradition.

In his chapter, the German historian Thomas Lau focuses on the relation between religion and violence in the Swiss Confederacy, the first region in Europe to experience a military conflict which was influenced by confessional affiliation of its main opponents. At the same time, it was also the first one in which the Kappeler Wars (1529–31) were hedged by the agreement (*Landfrieden*) of the Swiss cantons to disagree on religious matters and to drop religious disputes from confederal meetings in the future. As a result, the Swiss Parliament turned into a minefield of issues the delegates were expected to keep silent on. Lau explores the mechanisms leading to the construction of the multiple dividing lines between Protestant and Catholic cantons but he also discusses how these lines could be crossed at certain occasions. In both respects the threat of violence or even a full-scale war was of crucial importance. Violence resulted from the disruption of confederal communication; on the other hand it also served as a dynamic element forcing the religious parties to embark on new paths of inter-confessional communication to preserve peace in the Helvetian nation. This nation was distinguished by its federal political system as well as by an interdenominational quality. Leading representatives of both sides were convinced that a permanent peace might only be achieved if the political elite succeeded in controlling their own hawks which meant that radical priests and ministers had to be kept outside politics. They imagined relations between Protestant and Catholic cantons to be marked by a balance of power which, at the same time, represented a balance of honour that was to be preserved by all means to avoid military intervention by powerful neighbours such as the Catholic Habsburg emperors.

By looking at the so called 'French wars of religion' (1560–98), the Swiss historian Philip Benedict deals with a whole series of military conflicts to which the label 'wars of religion' is still most frequently attached in academic as well as popular discourse. That holds true at least in the English and Romance language speaking world while German speaking authors usually prefer the term 'Huguenot Wars' referring to a war either conducted by the Huguenots or against these. Interestingly, the German phrase ascribes the main cause for the outbreak of violence to the emergence of a new confessional faction in sixteenth-century France, whereas the first one addresses religion as a main factor in these conflicts without taking a confessional side. Benedict emphasizes that the debate whether these conflicts mainly resulted from religious discord or rather from a struggle

for power between the leading French dynasties of high nobility was already underway amongst contemporaries. As in the case of the Schmalkaldic War as well as the Thirty Years War, contemporaries already applied the label 'war of religion' as well as synonymous expressions to highlight the fundamental part of religion in these conflicts. Consequently, this term was not invented afterwards by the modern state to justify its claim to the monopoly on legitimate use of force. According to Benedict, the defence and the control over respectively the elimination of a certain confession served as an important cause to legitimize violence for both sides, and even for the intervention of foreign co-religionists; it was also able to motivate people to commit exceptionally cruel violence against followers of another confession – a procedure which was supported by certain members of the clergy.

Contrary to the conflicts in Switzerland, which are dismissed by most scholars while discussing the phenomenon of religious wars in early modern Europe, the German historian Harriet Rudolph concentrates on two military conflicts which have been, and in public discourses still are, considered as classical examples of religious wars: the Schmalkaldic War (1546–47) and the Thirty Years War (1618–48). Both these events have framed the notion of an *age of religious war* for a long time, even if they differ greatly in scope, duration, and complexity. After emphasizing that there is no dominant interpretation of both conflicts in present times, Rudolph introduces a set of criteria that may be used as points of reference to assess the part that religious issues played in the context of early modern warfare. While also addressing other classifications of these conflicts as wars of state formation (Johannes Burkhardt), civil wars, wars of independence, and hegemonic wars, she argues against rashly dismissing the concept of religious war as a research tool which enables historians to assess the relevance of religious difference between combatants in the context of early modern and modern wars. In the age of religious war, religion was deeply intermingled with politics; in both these conflicts, religious disunity significantly raised the stakes for quite a number of political actors, though confessional convictions did hardly serve as a predominant factor for the outbreak of military violence and during the course of these wars. However, if solely blaming religion as a war-monger seems inappropriate in terms of both these wars, so does as well laying the blame on the emerging modern state.

The English historian Charles W. A. Prior analyses the emergence of concepts in British historiography in the context of a military conflict that is usually called the 'English civil war' or the 'Puritan Revolution' (1642–49), though it in fact included multiple kingdoms and multiple Christian movements. While the first term is marked by a mere descriptive quality without emphasizing specific causes for the outbreak of violence, the second refers to the attempt of the members of a certain Christian faction to overturn the whole political system. By this means, these military conflicts represent historical incidents in which religion

and politics were inseparably interconnected – an interpretation which can be compared to the interpretation of the Hussite wars as a 'Hussite Revolution', though the opposing Bohemian estates neither aimed at introducing an entirely different political system nor was such a system established as was the case in England, even if only for a short period of time. By taking into account the different notions which have framed the approach to religious politics between 1560 and 1649 in England, Prior argues that the conflict resulted from a fundamental disagreement about the nature, location, and limits of the power of the state over religion. He applies the term 'reformation politics' to emphasize the profound intertwining between religion and politics in a period of time, in which the English Reformation produced a fundamental restructuring of power. In this specific regard, he uses the term 'England's wars of religion', without implying that religious disunity served as the key driver in the whole conflict that was also marked by tensions within certain confessional factions.

In the last chapter of the first part, the German historian Luise Schorn-Schütte analyses the broad debate on the right of resistance between a large number of contemporary authors from different parts of Europe, who were arguing on behalf of territorial as well as imperial estates and representatives of the ruling dynasties. This debate was further stirred by the confessional divide and its fundamental religious, political, and social impact on European societies. To back-up their arguments, both parties in this discourse referred to antique Roman Law and medieval feudal law, whereas at first Protestant authors mainly tried to legitimize the right of resistance by referring to theological concepts. By addressing Catholic princes who proceeded against Protestants within their realm, as rulers which violated the sovereign contract that was thought to rest in the idea of the covenant in the Old Testament, they argued that the estates might consider themselves to be entitled to use violence against their rulers. Only afterwards Catholic authors all over Europe argued based on Divine Law, too. The author analyses the patterns of argument that can be found in the context of legitimizing or delegitimizing the right to resist against political authorities in comparative perspective in terms of realms (Holy Roman Empire, France, England, and the Netherlands) and Christian confessions (Catholic, Lutheran, Calvinist). By this means, she offers a theoretical background for the militant conflicts that contemporaries or later generations addressed as religious wars.

Whereas the chapters of the historical section strictly focus on late medieval times and on the first half of early modern times as the period most frequently considered as the age of religious war in public discourse, the chapters of the second part of this volume, written by philosophers and theologians, deal with the complex relation of violence and religion from ancient and medieval Christianity up to present day conflicts, where religion is or seems to play an important part in the escalation of violence.

US theologian William T. Cavanaugh suggests in his article that it is highly misleading to signify the European Wars of Religion as wars 'of religion' as opposed to wars for 'secular' reasons as the religious/secular distinction as we now understand it was not born until after the wars were concluded. Rejecting attempts to isolate religion as *the* cause of these wars he points out that the so-called 'religious wars' could also be called the wars of early modern European state formation. His aim here is not to replace one mono-causal explanation with another but to deconstruct the idea that the state saved Europe from the violence of religion, a myth that due to Cavanaugh has been perpetuated from Thomas Hobbes to John Rawls among others. He argues that the rise of the state was not a solution to the wars but a significant cause of them and that 'religion' – as we understand it nowadays – was a by-product of the same process. What evolved from these wars was – according to Cavanaugh – not a secularization in the sense of a strict separation between political and theological concerns but a secularization in the sense of a transfer of power or property from ecclesiastical to civil control. He concludes: 'What we have seen is not the fading of the holy, but the transfer of the holy from the church to the state, a secularization of the holy'.

Paul Dumouchel, Canadian philosopher, also deals with the rise of the modern state as an institution that was able to monopolize the moral authority that distinguishes between good and bad violence. Drawing on Hobbes's *Leviathan* he shows how political powers succeeded in wresting the ability to define legitimate violence from the churches. He argues that the wars of religion correspond to the moment when states in Europe became modern by monopolizing – for the first time – the ability to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate violence, which up until then was disseminated amongst various authorities (family, church, local powers, clannish or feudal solidarities, etc.). Contrary to Cavanaugh he argues that the expression 'wars of religion' should be retained to describe these episodes and that there is nothing surprising in the involvement of states in these conflicts. Rather it reflects the states' struggle to wrest away from the church(es) its role in the management of violence. Finally, based on a reading of Hobbes's third and fourth part of *Leviathan* which is dedicated to religion, Dumouchel rejects both the myth of political and religious violence as in some way justified, legitimate or sacred. For him both forms of violence are not substantially different or better than ordinary criminal violence, their legitimacy or sacredness is – according to Dumouchel – nothing else but our willingness to accept them.

The Canadian theologian and philosopher Bruce Ward offers in his response to Dumouchel a different reading of Hobbes. While Dumouchel claims that Thomas Hobbes's essentially theological justification of the separation of church and state is the key to understanding the relation between violence and the modern state, Ward proposes that Hobbesian liberalism is a necessary but not sufficient condition for what he calls the modern hybrid military-humanitarian

state. A close reading of Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau does show that religion *itself* is not the source of violence. The primary source for it is human passion – intensified and justified by the pretence of religion. Ward supports Dumouchel's insistence of Hobbes's theological separation of church and state as necessary to the genesis of the modern state. But for him this is not sufficient to understand the violence of the modern states. Here he pleads to take into account the close connection of the modern state with a 'progressivist humanism that does not stop at separating heaven and earth, but purports to bring heaven down to earth'. In his conclusion he claims that it is the 'appeal of this humanism' that is mainly responsible for the widespread acceptance of the phrase 'Wars of Religion', although the historical evidence is highly questionable.

The topic of confessional wars is also taken up as a starting point by German theologian Ralf Miggelbrink. Referring to Luise Schorn-Schütte's historical explanation of confessional wars as constitutional conflicts of rising modern states he nevertheless points out that this destruction of common perception of European religious wars should not absolve Christianity of responsibility for the emergence of violence. By referring to the biblical topic of divine wrath and historical sources from early Christendom up to the Second Vatican Council he questions the roots of violence and ways of transformation. The author points out that a theological view of history has to emphasize the perception of failure and guilt in the history of Christianity. The idea of ecclesiastic unity and with it the fight against heretics did also include the use of brute force, of violence. It was not until the Second Vatican Council that the Catholic Church dismissed the idea that claims of universal relevance can be achieved by means of oppressive violence. It was this council that finally rejected the theological idea of 'compelle intrare' and substituted it with the right of religious freedom and the necessity of dialogue.

Moving towards a recent conflict the Slovenian theologian and philosopher Janez Juhant reflects as a contemporary witness who was personally involved in these events on the complex interrelation of religions, ideologies, and violence in the civil wars of the former Yugoslavia. Juhant's chapter starts from the observation that although religion in communist countries was completely expelled from the public sphere even post-Marxist intellectuals share a silent consensus that religion is necessarily a source of violence and unable to contribute anything positive to societal change. Summing up the aftermaths of World Wars I and II for this region as well as the consequences of both these wars for the emerging Communist state, Juhant argues that religion served as a scapegoat and illustrates his interpretation through an analysis of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Siding with William Cavanaugh he stresses the importance of unresolved economic, political, and social problems of the pre-Communist and Communist eras for this conflict. Opposing Scott Appleby's analysis of the war as a primarily religious one Juhant claims that people were principally fighting for territory or their naked survival. Whereas Appleby and others argue that the

presence of different religions inflamed the conflict, the author holds responsible the lack of a religious-spiritual dimension in the Communist state of Yugoslavia that enabled the outbreak of these wars after the breakdown of communism.

The final chapter, by the Austrian theologian Wolfgang Palaver, starts with a critical view of Richard Dawkins's and Stephen Pinker's approach to religion. Both of them represent for him the widespread 'master narrative' about the relationship between religion and violence, blaming primarily religion for violence. Like Miggelbrink, Palaver points out that his critique of the European Wars of Religion as a myth does not intend to present an 'exculpatory apology' of Christianity. Rather, for him it is essential to have a closer look at the 'perversion of Christianity' (Ivan Illich) prior to the European Wars of Religion for a deeper understanding of these conflicts. Referring to Ernst Kantorowitz and Gerd Althoff he argues that during the Middle Ages there was a dramatic shift in the self-conception of the church, namely a secularization, immanentization, and politicization of the church itself. This secularized church served as a mirror image for the modern state and its institutions. Whereas a purely functional concept of religion will hardly be able to uncover significant differences between these two types of church and the state, the author pleads for a more substantive view of religion. In the works of Charles Taylor and René Girard he finds helpful resources for developing a new 'grand narrative' that enables a better understanding of the complex relationship between violence and religion in general and an appropriate understanding of the so-called European Wars of Religion.

The twelve essays collected in this volume represent insights from different subjects in the human sciences such as historiography, theology, and philosophy to a very complex issue: the relationship between violence, religion, and state formation in pre-modern and modern times. Resulting from an ongoing debate within the interdisciplinary research group 'religion – politics – violence' which was supported by the Austrian Research Fund and the research platform 'world order – religion – violence' at the University of Innsbruck, the chapters demonstrate what can be gained by an interdisciplinary approach to a phenomenon such as the European Wars of Religion which serves as an ever-present argument in mainstream media and political debate to legitimize or to delegitimize current political decisions. However, comparing the questions raised, the methods applied, and the theses established by the authors in their chapters it becomes also obvious what a challenge such an interdisciplinary approach represents and what difficulties and even pitfalls may emerge while engaging in interdisciplinary debate. Each discipline favours its own terminologies, structures of argument, and means of evidence, not to speak about methodological and interpretive diversity which we may find within one and the same subject. Consequently, not all views and interpretations are shared to the same extent by all editors who have been responsible for selected parts of this volume. Harriet Rudolph has overseen the chapters in the first part of

this volume; Wolfgang Palaver and Dietmar Regensburger have taken care of the chapters in the second section.

In public discourse the formula 'wars of religion' owns an almost topical quality which is instrumentalized by various political actors to promote diverse political agendas. It is certainly one important task of all historical oriented human sciences to deconstruct such attempts which mostly propagate distorted views on processes of development and events in the past. Apart from that, there is the historical experience of an escalation of violence in military conflicts between followers of one religion but different religious convictions, practises, and institutions in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries which was, until then, unparalleled in terms of frequency and geographic range. Frequently, physical violence was combined with verbal and symbolical violence – an issue which could not be addressed in this volume to a satisfying extent. This unsettling history of a deeply intensified violence of various kinds in times of the religious divide is part of collective European memory, even though not all regions of Europe were affected by aggression and war in the same ways, to the same extent or at all. It calls for a further substantial debate between representatives of different branches of the humanities which each have to reflect on their own attitudes towards religion, the modern state, and conceptions of the human being before being able to come up with convincing interpretations regarding the relationship between violence, religion and politics in past and present times.

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PART I
Historical Approaches

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Chapter 1
Religion and Violence in the Hussite Wars

Pavel Soukup

The Hussite wars are a long studied and yet somewhat obscure subject. Historians have offered a number of interpretative concepts to describe the events in Bohemia and the Lands of the Bohemian Crown in the period from 1419 onwards. The terms used most frequently for these events and developments – that of 'Hussite Revolution' and 'Bohemian Reformation' – are also the most contested at the same time.[1] Any account of the achievements of Hussitism and of its persecution must take into consideration both the religious and the political and military aspects involved. This applies also to the series of military conflicts following the first Prague defenestration of 1419. To describe these events, the term 'Hussite wars' seems to be the most widely accepted (although not entirely free from objections either).[2] Its convenience may consist in the fact that it is mostly understood as descriptive rather than interpretative. As soon as one wants to apply a term involving some classification, it becomes difficult to find an expression suitable for more than a segment of the military affairs and ideological attitudes in question. The term 'holy war' is certainly applicable to both sides in strife, but it emphasizes only one aspect of an ideology while there were other competing discourses at play.[3] Moreover, it suggests affiliation to one certain tradition of medieval thought on warfare. Alternatively, the Hussite wars

[1] The case for 'revolution' was made by Alexander Patschovsky, 'Das Revolutionäre an der hussitischen Revolution', in *Mediaevalia Augiensia: Forschungen zur Geschichte des Mittelalters* (Stuttgart, 2001), pp. 407–28; for 'reformation' by Winfried Eberhard, 'Zur reformatorischen Qualität und Konfessionaliserung des nachrevolutionären Hussitismus', in František Šmahel (ed.), *Häresie und vorzeitige Reformation im Spätmittelalter* (München, 1998), pp. 213–38.

[2] Instead of speaking about 'Hussite wars', Zdeněk V. David prefers the term 'Bohemian Wars of Religion'. See his *Finding the Middle Way: The Utraquists' liberal challenge to Rome and Luther* (Washington, 2003), p. XII, and the same author's translations for the series *The Bohemian Reformation and Religious Practice* (9 volumes since 1996). On terminological issues, see Phillip Haberkern, 'What's in a Name, or What's at Stake When We Talk about "Hussites"?', *History Compass* 9 (2011): 791–801.

[3] See Pavel Soukup, 'Svatá válka v představách husitských mistrů: K formování a zdrojům husitského učení o válce', in Miloš Drda and Zdeněk Vybíral (eds), *Jan Žižka z Trocnova a husitské vojenství v evropských dějinách* (Tábor, 2007), pp. 277–89.

have been treated under the larger heading of 'religious warfare'. This opens the floor to a possible comparison of the ideological framework within which both the Hussites and their adversaries fought and thought during their wars.[4]

Other terms tend to focus on one side of the conflict only. Speaking of the 'crusades against the Hussites' does not encompass the entirety of the Hussite wars, unless we want to subsume the Hussite counter-crusade under this headline.[5] Nor does it encompass even the entirety of anti-Hussite warfare, for some actions were not undertaken as crusades. On the other hand, it is impossible to make a clear distinction between the crusades and 'imperial wars on the Hussites' (*Reichskriege*) – another term used to describe the anti-Hussite undertakings – because of the many overlaps and the double legitimacy of some expeditions. Terms such as 'war on heresy' tend to highlight one attitude in fighting the Hussites while it is questionable if that was the prevailing one.[6] Yet it was not only the members of international crusading armies, assembled following a papal proclamation, who believed they were engaging in sanctified warfare. Local contingents of Bohemia's neighbouring countries employed emphatic language of religious conflict without any papal involvement. And the Hussites themselves portrayed their fight as war for the faith in the first place and produced remarkable theological support for their cause. This gives some attraction to the subject of religious violence in the Hussite wars but it also adds to its complexity.

The aim of this essay is to suggest thematic strands and areas upon which future comparative research can be carried out. After outlining briefly the course of events, it will focus on ways in which the religious agenda was expressed in documents emanating from or relating closely to the Hussite wars. The fact that both sides of the conflict used religious rhetoric on their behalf is in itself nothing surprising. In this article, this fact is used as a point of departure for a general overview of some of the central themes of religious discourse, which underlay the Hussite wars. Topics to be analysed include the language of sacred violence, the rhetorical construction of the enemy, and the backing of armies on both sides with theology. A discussion of the religious factors in organizing and mobilizing for the war can be supplemented with parallel and competing

[4] Norman Housley, *Religious Warfare in Europe, 1400–1536* (Oxford, 2002).

[5] This is the approach of both Frederick G. Heymann, 'The Crusades against the Hussites', in Kenneth M. Setton and Harry W. Hazard (eds), *A History of the Crusades, vol. 3* (Madison/London, 1975), pp. 586–646, and Thomas A. Fudge (ed.), *The Crusade against Heretics in Bohemia, 1418–1437: Sources and documents for the Hussite Crusades* (Aldershot, 2002).

[6] Friedrich von Bezold, *König Sigismund und die Reichskriege gegen die Husiten*, 3 vols (München, 1872–77); Peter Hilsch, 'Die Hussitenkriege als spätmittelalterlicher Ketzerkrieg', in Franz Brendle and Anton Schindling (eds), *Religionskriege im Alten Reich und in Alteuropa* (Münster, 2006), pp. 59–69.

discourses such as eschatology and apocalyptic expectations, national sentiments and stereotypes, and conflicting political interests for which religious rhetoric could have served as a vehicle. As this article cannot substitute a comprehensive analytical treatment of the topic, many points should be taken as hypotheses and suggestions for further research. The same applies to the closing reflections upon the problem, notably to what extent the Hussite wars can be seen as preparing the way for the wars of the Confessional Age.

Hussite Wars: An Overview

The unease in the historiography as for describing the military actions in and around Bohemia in the Hussite period with only one term mirrors the complexity of events between 1419–71.[7] The war began in the aftermath of the Hussite coup in the New Town of Prague, which was followed by the death of King Wenceslas IV. The Hussite-dominated Bohemian estates made the succession of Wenceslas's brother, Roman and Hungarian King Sigismund, dependent on his guarantee that they could develop their religious beliefs and practises in the manner they wished. For Sigismund, this was hardly acceptable as the Hussites were heretics sentenced by both the Council of Constance and the pope. In order to pacify his rebellious subjects, Sigismund asked Pope Martin V to issue a crusading bull against the Hussites, which the pope proclaimed on 1 March 1420. In spring of the same year, the army of crusaders set out from Wrocław, entered Bohemia, and seized Prague. However, having lost the battle of Vítkov on 14 July, the hope for starving the city into submission became increasingly unlikely and Sigismund dissolved the army. The second crusade was proclaimed in May 1421 by Cardinal Branda Castiglioni who replaced Ferdinand of Lugo as the papal legate in charge of the Hussite crusades. The army dominated by Rhineland electors fled from Bohemia in October 1421 after the abortive siege of Žatec. Sometime later, Sigismund attacked from the east taking Kutná Hora but he was defeated early in 1422 near Německý Brod (nowadays Havlíčkův Brod).

In the years which followed, tensions between different Hussite parties led to internal military conflicts within the Hussite camp. From the spectrum of Hussite factions, few blocks crystallized as leading political and military powers. Besides Hussite nobility, it was the city of Prague and some radical brotherhoods, which emerged from the revolutionary turmoil – the South-Bohemian Taborites and the East-Bohemian Orebites, called Orphans after

[7] Comprehensive recent accounts are František Šmahel, *Die Hussitische Revolution*, 3 vols (Hannover, 2002) and Petr Čornej, *Velké dějiny zemí Koruny české*, vols 5 (1402–1437) and 6 (1437–1526) (Praha/Litomyšl, 2000–2007).

the death of Jan Žižka. Since the early 1420s, Prague, Tábor, and the Orphans formed so-called military unions consisting of the core communities, controlled towns, and allied noblemen. These were the main players in internal Bohemian politics and also undertook expeditions abroad. From the mid-1420s onwards, the Hussites began raiding neighbouring regions and in 1428–33 they organized several larger expeditions to Silesia, Lusatia, Hungary, Saxony, Franconia, Brandenburg, and Prussia. The power landscape of Bohemia and Moravia was complemented with a number of Catholic nobles and some royal cities such as Plzeň or České Budějovice in Bohemia and most of the Moravian towns, which supported Sigismund's claim to the throne.

In 1426, another crusade was unsuccessfully negotiated under the aegis of new legate Giordano Orsini. Simultaneously, a military incursion into Bohemia, formed of forces drawn from Saxony and Meißen, was decisively defeated by the Hussites near Ústí nad Labem. It was not until the summer of 1427 that a new crusade was directed against Bohemia but it achieved no success. Subsequent attempts by Duke Philip II of Burgundy and the legate Henry Beaufort at organizing an anti-Hussite crusade also had no effect. The next anti-Hussite crusader thus became Cardinal Giuliano Cesarini. He started his mission in January 1431 and was firmly determined to implement the crusading plan this time. Despite the death of Pope Martin V and despite the fact that Cesarini was designated president of the upcoming Council of Basel, he accomplished this organizational task. Yet the crusade was another military disaster: on 14 August 1431, the crusaders fled before the Hussite army from near Domažlice.

Solution of the conflict through negotiation had been occasionally attempted by both sides from the very beginning of the war. After the Domažlice crusade was defeated and the Council of Basel had been convened, this possibility became feasible. In October 1431 the Council invited the Hussites to negotiations and in January 1433 the 'heretics' arrived at Basel to hold disputations on a scholarly, theological basis. Reaching a compromise proved difficult. A final treaty was not made possible until the radical brotherhoods were defeated by an alliance of Bohemian Catholics and moderate Hussites in the battle of Lipany in 1434. During the years 1435–36 pacts were concluded between the representatives of the Bohemian and Moravian Hussites and both the Emperor Sigismund and the Council of Basel. The treaty, called the Compactata, guaranteed free choice between Catholic and Hussite (or Utraquist) confession. It became part of the land code and as such it secured the survival of the Utraquist Church in Bohemia up to the classical Reformation and beyond. With the Compactata, Sigismund was finally able to take the Bohemian throne although he died the following year (1437). By 1457 Sigismund's lineage of Habsburg heirs was extinct and in 1458 the Bohemian Estates elected the Hussite nobleman George of Poděbrady as King of Bohemia.

The papacy never confirmed the compromise reached by its rival, the Council of Basel. After conciliarism retreated from its position within the Catholic Church, the popes took actions against the previously tolerated heretics. Pius II rescinded the Compactata in 1462. His successor Paul II excommunicated King George and declared him deposed in 1466. On 26 April 1467, a crusade against the Hussite king and his supporters was proclaimed in Wrocław by the papal legate Rudolf of Rüdesheim. The war was initially fought mainly by the Czech Catholic opposition. In spring 1468 the Hungarian King Matthias Corvinus joined the crusading alliance, becoming its most eminent member. Matthias invaded George's territory and gained control over Moravia as well as the dependencies of the Bohemian Crown, Silesia and Lusatia. George was able to prevent Matthias from attacking Bohemia and started talks with the Hungarian king. In the course of negotiations, on 3 May 1469, Matthias accepted the title of the Bohemian king, taking up the offer made by the Czech Catholic lords. The war continued until George's death in March 1471. The Bohemian crown would remain divided between two kings until the death of Matthias in 1490.

The events just outlined have always been an important part of the historical narrative. Since František Palacký (d. 1876), the Hussite Era has been a prominent period of study in Czech medieval history.[8] In historical research, the 'holy war' of the Hussites has received more focused treatment than the anti-Hussite crusades so far. Norman Housley's monograph length treatment of fifteenth-century religious warfare opens with a chapter on Hussite concepts of war where Hussite Bohemia is called the 'crucible of religious warfare'.[9] Many aspects of religiously motivated violence of the Hussites have been explained in book chapters and articles. Even within the study of later crusading, the Hussite wars – although a relatively neglected topic compared to the wars in the Balkans – attract some attention. The biggest deficiency is the lack of comparative research into both sides of the conflict. In fact, a study is rare to find, which discusses both sides of the armed conflict in an equal way, insofar as religious motivations and legitimacy of warfare are concerned. In the ever-flourishing field of Czech Hussite studies, the wars are mostly seen as the defensive actions of the Bohemians against foreign invasion, against Catholic forces with crusading aspects often downplayed, while historians specialized in the history of the crusades rarely enter the specific area of Hussite studies. Another deficit is the insufficient diachronic comparison with religion and warfare of the subsequent period. To contrast the Hussite wars with the early modern Wars of Religion, the former have often been classified as a 'war on heresy' (*Ketzerkrieg*) and relegated to the Middle Ages. Yet such distinction is

[8] For a survey of historiography of the Hussite period see Šmahel, *Hussitische Revolution*, 1, pp. 1–84.

[9] Housley, *Religious Warfare*, p. 33.

seldom based on a thorough comparative study spanning both periods. Even if the fatal demarcation line drawn in the year 1500 and dividing the Middle Ages from the Early Modern Period has hardly any advocates today,[10] it still seems to be powerful enough to discourage scholars of religious warfare to compare Hussite wars to both the crusades and the conflicts of the Confessional Age.

The Language of Sacred Violence

Let us now briefly explore the discourse present during the wars of the Hussite period. How did the opposing parties refer to their struggle and what motivation did they display? The papacy could simply rely on the concept of a crusade, which, in terms of legal theory, administrative practice, and underlying theology, had been well established for a long time. The first crusading bull against the Hussites from 1 March 1420 promised indulgences to those who would partake or support with money the expedition against the Hussites. The traditional term *negocium* was used to describe the war. In the appointment of the legate Branda from 13 April 1421, the spiritual rewards were explicitly linked to those usually granted for the defence of the Holy Land. The warriors were described in crusading terms as 'faithful knights of Christ, warriors and wrestlers marked with the sign of the life-giving Cross which redeemed us from damnation'.[11] The first crusading bull set as its aim the extermination of the Wycliffite and Hussite heretics, and this rhetoric did not change until the end of the Hussite wars. Crusading calls were not the place to discuss the nuances of military tactics. In terms of religious warfare, the ultimate aim of the undertaking was to eliminate heresy. The 'rooting out' of heresy was portrayed as defensive action to protect souls of the faithful, up to that point King Sigismund was called 'warrior and defender of Christian faith'.[12]

Generally the crusading calls do not elaborate much upon the justification of holy war. They focus rather on the practicalities of the combat against heresy, determining the purview of the legates and the details of granting indulgences and the commuting of vows. The papal letters from 1467–68 show an even more technical approach. As for religious ideology in warfare, they employ the same language and set the same targets as the earlier anti-Hussite crusading bulls. Again, they aim at 'eliminating' and 'exterminating' heresy. Unlike the

[10] For strong statements against this line, see Howard Kaminsky, 'The Problematics of "Heresy" and "The Reformation"', in Šmahel, *Häresie und vorzeitige Reformation*, pp. 1–22, and Berndt Hamm, 'Abschied vom Epochendenken in der Reformationsforschung: Ein Plädoyer', *Zeitschrift für historische Forschung* 39 (2012): 373–411.

[11] *Monumenta Vaticana res gestas Bohemicas illustrantia*, vol. 7/1, (ed.) Jaroslav Eršil (Praha, 1996) [hereafter MVB 7], no. 565, pp. 247–9; no. 734, pp. 311–13.

[12] *MVB 7*, pp. 311 and 384.

documents from the early 1420s, they also use technical terms such as *cruciata* and *crucesignati*. Religion remains the main vehicle of legitimacy. The legate should look for an 'apt catholic captain general' who would 'take up this burden for the glory of God and defence of the faith'.[13] Eventually this captain was found in Matthias Corvinus. Upon entering the war against the King of Bohemia, he issued a manifesto declaring his own motivation. It was the obedience to the Holy See and the protection of 'catholic people' against heretics. Instead of comparing spiritual benefits of the expedition to the classical Crusades to the Holy Land, Corvinus linked his anti-Hussite campaign to his contemporary struggle against the Turks in the Balkans. 'I think', his letter says, 'this war is not less pious than that one I have been waging for such a long time against the Turks, the most fierce enemies of all faithful'.[14]

Occasionally the language of papal letters reflects a change in the practical approach to the war against the Hussites. For example, two letters left the papal chancery on the same day of 1 December 1422. In one of them, the term *sancta expedicio* is employed, which makes one think of a single concerted campaign. In the other, the pope reflects the imperial diet's considerations on waging a 'continuous war (*guerra continua*) against the heretics which would last unremittingly until the extermination of this plague'.[15] The German chroniclers of the Hussite wars also seem to have distinguished between the big expeditions and local, frontier warfare. This division is reminiscent of the distinction between *passagium generale* and *particulare* with respect to the crusades directed to the East. Indeed, Andrew of Ratisbone speaks of an *expedicio generalis et magna* referring to the 1431 campaign which was 'the fourth general and big expedition to Bohemia arranged to exterminate the Hussites'. He is also clear about the aim, when he speaks of an *expeditio ad delendum hereticos* referring to 1421. The German translation by Leonhard Heff has '*rayse*', a term reminiscent of the Baltic crusades.[16] In the case of these 'general passages' against the Hussites, the chroniclers would usually note all the crusading apparatus: the joint effort of the pope and the king in organizing the expedition and the indulgences granted by the curia. This is what the chronicler Hermann Korner of Lübeck mentions when describing the 1431 expedition. His account of the disastrous defeat also remains indebted to the classical crusading scheme: it was because

[13] Hermann Markgraf (ed.), *Politische Correspondenz Breslaus im Zeitalter Georgs von Podiebrad*, Scriptores rerum Silesiacarum, 9 (Breslau, 1874) [hereafter SRS 9], no. 365, pp. 233–6.

[14] *SRS 9*, nos 390 and 392B, pp. 262–3 and 267–70.

[15] *MVB 7*, nos 1009–10, pp. 413–14.

[16] Andreas von Regensburg, *Sämtliche Werke*, (ed.) Georg Leidinger (München, 1903), pp. 476 and 150. Constantin Hruschka, *Kriegsführung und Geschichtsschreibung im Spätmittelalter: Eine Untersuchung zur Chronistik der Konzilszeit* (Köln/Weimar/Wien, 2001), p. 417.

of the crusaders' sinfulness (*vmme vnser sunde willen*) that God did not grant them victory. Nevertheless, the crusade was 'God's business' (*Godes werk*) and its participants 'inflamed by God's spirit against the sons of perfidy' (Andrew of Ratisbone), while its shortcomings were caused by the devil.[17]

The Hussite chroniclers also saw victory as a gift from heaven. 'So the Bohemians gained a great victory with the help of God', the Old Czech Annals comment on the battle of Domažlice. It was all the more satisfying as the same chronicler noted the enemy's claim for divine support. He mentioned the presence of the papal legate and bishops in the army, 'granting remission of sins and release from hell to all who would stain themselves with Czech blood'.[18] In the case of the 1421 crusade at Žatec, the chronicler Lawrence of Březová also pointed out the crusaders' belief in the power of indulgences (superstitious from the Hussite point of view) and their cruel behaviour, which he considered the reason why God gave victory to the Hussites. 'More cruel than heathens, [the crusaders] killed or burned old and young people of both sexes in order to be granted an indulgence', Lawrence says. 'The cries and screaming of women, virgins and widows rose up to the ears of Lord Jesus and the wrath of God and just revenge struck the hostile army'.[19] The Hussites always portrayed their war as defensive. In their interpretation, it was only because they were attacked by the crusade that they were waging war. A letter sent by representatives of the Prague towns to the other parts of the kingdom after the first crusade bull had been issued in 1420 complains that 'the Church raised the cruel cross against all of the faithful in our kingdom with bloody hands and announced it through a corrupted mouth and venomous lips'. According to the authors of this manifesto, the Cross of Jesus Christ ought not to be used as a symbol of war since it is 'full of the patience and goodness of God, which cannot prepare battles, weapons or missiles'.[20]

Despite these pacifistic stylizations, the Hussites also found themselves fighting for the faith. As late as June 1433 the Taborite leader Prokop the Bald reminded the envoys of the Council of Basel to Prague that it was the crusaders who started the war: 'Your party, spurred by the erection of the bloody cross, began and launched the martial attack, without any demerits of ours calling for that, and brutally devastated the Kingdom of Bohemia with sword and fire. Supported by the power of the Lord, we have resisted this unjust oppression

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[17] Hruschka, *Kriegsführung*, pp. 403 and 385; von Regensburg, *Sämtliche Werke*, p. 482. More on the chroniclers' depiction of the anti-Hussite crusades in Hruschka, *Kriegsführung*, pp. 122–42.

[18] František Šimek (ed.), *Staré letopisy české z Vratislavského rukopisu* (Praha, 1937), p. 60.

[19] *Fontes rerum Bohemicarum*, vol. 5, (ed.) Josef Emler, Jan Gebauer, and Jaroslav Goll (Praha, 1893) [hereafter *FRB 5*], p. 512.

[20] Bohuslav Havránek, Josef Hrabák, and Jiří Daňhelka (eds), *Výbor z české literatury doby husitské*, vol. 1 (Praha, 1963), pp. 444–6, here p. 445.

until recently'. Looking back at more than a decade of mostly successful military campaigns, Prokop admitted that there were 'some spiritual profits' which arose from the warfare: it had made some people accept the Hussite programme of the Four Articles and forced the Council to start negotiations.[21] In its openness, this was a rather unique comment from the part of the Hussites who mostly insisted on the exclusively defensive character of their fight and often voiced their conviction that their truths would prevail simply because they were indeed true. However, the military successes naturally gave the Hussites some confidence. Peter Payne, speaking on behalf of the Hussites when they met with King Sigismund in Bratislava in 1429, pointed out the divine support enjoyed by the Bohemians by calling Jesus Christ the 'invincible soldier and Prague warrior' and reminded the king that no one ever could defeat God. He repeated some of the objections to being invaded by cruel and unjust crusades but displayed the Hussite self-confidence by saying: 'Truly we do not fear anyone if we fear God and we shall lose nothing if we possess God'.[22]

Rhetorical Construction of the Enemy

Peter Payne called the adversaries of the Hussites 'unlucky, fighting for the devil', and classified their kings, princes, and prelates as being of the sort of Antichrist. The rhetorical construction of the enemy was an obligatory part of warfare. As we have seen, the papal letters and Church documents in general employed the terms 'Wycliffite and Hussite heretics'. Some Latin authors used derivatives from the name of Jan Hus other than *Hussitae*, such as *Hussones* or *Hussonistae*. In German, the word *hussen* became common, a term coined by the Nuremberg chancellery. In the north-eastern part of the empire, the word *ketzern* seems to have been more frequently used. In the course of the negotiations between the Hussites and the Council of Basel, the term 'Bohemians' or 'Bohemians and Moravians' became the official usage of the Council. This was following the report of the first Basel embassy to Bohemia in 1432 that pointed out that the Bohemians feel offended by the word 'Hussite', considering it derogatory or abusive.[23] The Hussite chroniclers had used the term 'Bohemians' for their own troops as a matter of course. If they wanted to refer specifically to the religious divide, they would add the adjective 'faithful' (*věrní Čechové*). When speaking

[21] *Monumenta conciliorum generalium seculi decimi quinti: Concilium Basileense. Scriptorum t. I,* (ed.) František Palacký and Ernst Birk (Wien, 1857) [hereafter MC 1], p. 419.

[22] F. M. Bartoš (ed.), *Petri Payne Anglici Positio, replica et propositio in concilio Basiliensi a. 1433 atque oratio ad Sigismundum regem a. 1429 Bratislaviae pronunciatae* (Tábor, 1949), pp. 81–90, here pp. 81 and 87.

[23] *MC 1*, p. 186. On naming the Bohemian heresy, see Ferdinand Seibt, *Hussitica: Zur Struktur einer Revolution* (Köln/Graz, 1965), pp. 10–14.

of the enemy, they usually used the geographical terms of origin. 'Germans, the electors, with all their adjacent regions, invaded Bohemia' as the Old Czech Annalist concisely put it when discussing the 1431 expedition. Especially during the first anti-Hussite crusade, the Bohemians were amazed by the range of different nations taking part in the invasion. Subsequently, the chroniclers often referred to the armies as 'Germans' and 'Bohemians' for the sake of brevity.[24] However, using geographical terms seems not to be common in anti-Hussite chronicles, perhaps because the word 'Bohemians' would unjustly subsume Bohemian Catholics under the label of heresy.

In referring specifically to martial conflicts, the anti-Hussite chroniclers spoke most often of 'heretics'; sometimes they made clear which party was the right one, such as when Korner referred to the Hussite army as *agmina inimicorum Christi*, 'the troops of the enemies of Christ'.[25] It is interesting to see what terms the authors used to emphasize religious difference. The troops facing the heretics would be called 'Catholics' in Latin, such as when Andrew of Ratisbone speaks about the battle of Domažlice. In the vernacular, however, it may have been difficult to find an equivalent to this word. Thus, in both German and Czech, the term 'Christians' appears to denote the anti-Hussite party. In a speech to the Nuremberg diet of 1467, the Czech Catholic representative juxtaposed the term heretics with 'good Christians' (*křesťané dobří*). The term 'Christians', however, was not necessarily used with the specific intention to show that the Catholic Christians were 'good', whereas the Hussite Christians represented 'bad Christians'. If used in a simple juxtaposition of 'Christian vs heretic' (such as Hermann Korner's *Cristene heer* for the crusading army), it rhetorically pushed the Hussites outside Christianity.[26] The Hussites could also rely upon a theoretical basis with which they could describe their Catholic opponents as heretics. Yet this was rarely explicitly attempted outside of theological writings and, in general, they did not use the term 'heretics' for describing their enemies.

As we have already seen in the previous chapter, one of the most powerful rhetorical strategies in religious combat was accusing the rival of committing deliberate and unnecessary cruelty. The tirades about Hussites burning land, sacking monasteries, destroying church buildings and equipment, and killing men as well as raping women became an obligatory part of anti-Hussite discourse. Perhaps rather than reflecting Hussite iconoclasm, this was a manifestation of a stereotype of the period, for inhumane cruelty belonged to the standard portrait

[24] For the examples used here see Šimek, *Staré letopisy*, pp. 38 and 60; Jiří Daňhelka (ed.), *Husitské skladby Budyšínského rukopisu* (Praha, 1952), pp. 41–2; the latter gives a comprehensive list of nations partaking in the first crusade.

[25] Hruschka, *Kriegsführung*, p. 386; Jakob Schwalm (ed.), *Die Chronica novella des Hermann Korner* (Göttingen, 1895), p. 470.

[26] Von Regensburg, *Sämtliche Werke*, p. 478; *Archiv český*, vol. 20, (ed.) František Dvorský (Praha, 1902) [hereafter *AČ 20*], p. 547; Hruschka, *Kriegsführung*, pp. 385–6.

of heretics. For example, Hermann Korner deployed the commonplace of sheep and wolves to compare both sides of the conflict: 'And so the devil's wolves, the Bohemian heretics, full of inhuman wrath, drove into the sheep of Christ'.[27] Yet the Hussites also claimed the name of innocent sheep for themselves. Their manifesto from February 1421 complained about the crusaders attacking like Gog and Magog the 'defenceless sheep of Joseph, completely naked and guiltless, ignorant of wars and armour, lacking every human help, horses and weapons', which nevertheless triumphed over such a number of powerful and military experienced kings and princes. Later in the same letter the crusaders were denounced as having committed outrageous cruelties in Bohemia, including robbery of simple farmers, setting property on fire, and dividing babies from their mothers and killing young and old.[28]

Of course, this was not only rhetoric as both sides were certainly guilty of pillaging territory. Since they relocated the war to German territories in the mid-1420s, the Hussites could no longer refer to their war as exclusively repelling foreign invasion. It is interesting to compare the reaction to the war crimes committed on both sides. On 13 February 1422, after the second crusade was terminated, Pope Martin V issued a letter assuring all participants of the Hussite war that they had not made themselves guilty of murder. Of course, the pope admitted, many heretics were killed and their cities burnt. Perhaps, as he continues, some churches were damaged and some priests were killed. But the Catholic warriors were not automatically excommunicated because of this and clerics taking part in the expedition did not incur irregularity. After all, the war on heretics was waged in order to 'vindicate the injury made to Christ'. A year later, on 1 April 1423, the Hussite captain Jan Žižka, the victor over Sigismund in the same second crusade, summoned his warriors and allies to the town of Německý Brod. The purpose of this assembly was 'to do penance at the very place where we have sinned'. The reference is to the sack of the town after the Hussite victory over the crusaders. In Žižka's understanding, the illicit pillaging was an offence to God who had been at the Hussite side. 'God Himself deigned to fight for us', Žižka says; 'we, however, did not receive this help with due gratitude'. Instead of receiving grace from the pope, the Hussites had to make a pilgrimage to the

[27] Hruschka, *Kriegsführung*, p. 396; on the anti-heretical stereotypes as applied to the Hussites, see Paweł Kras, 'Český kacíř – husita', in Martin Nodl and František Šmahel (eds), *Člověk českého středověku* (Praha, 2002), pp. 248–69; for Hussite iconoclasm see the recent discussion by Milena Bartlová, 'Der Bildersturm der böhmischen Hussiten: Ein neuer Blick auf eine radikale mittelalterliche Geste', *Wiener Jahrbuch für Kunstgeschichte* 49 (2010): 27–48.

[28] F. M. Bartoš, 'Manifesty města Prahy z doby husitské', *Sborník příspěvků k dějinám hlavního města Prahy* 7 (1933): pp. 253–309, here p. 287.

theatre of sin and display their penance.[29] Of course, these are just two examples, and undoubtedly there were inherent penitential aspects involved in crusading, too. However, these examples still show some difference between the two sides of the Hussite wars – one emphasizing long-term ecclesiastical tradition and the other building on recent religious revival.

Theological Backing of 'Holy Warriors'

The quest for a life in accordance with evangelical principles also played an important role in the Hussite discourse of Holy War. The reconciliation of the belligerent prototypes found within the Old Testament with the commandments of peace from the New Testament was not easy.[30] Hussite theoreticians accepted only those arguments contained in the Bible or based directly on its doctrines. In a certain sense, the Hussite masters of the University of Prague undertook on their own the same work which the Christian canonists and theologians did between the eleventh and thirteenth centuries. They evaluated Christian teaching on war against the evangelical backdrop and filtered the Christian tradition in order to obtain an acceptable set of rules allowing them to reconcile their defensive warfare with the scrupulous conscience of a reformed Christian community. In the internal debate on warfare 1419–20, Prague theologians pursued a double aim. The first one was to justify the physical defence of the Hussites within the framework of licit Christian warfare. Even though menaced by both Czech Catholic troops and the first crusade, the groups around Hussite preachers, especially in the countryside, were unsure whether or not they were allowed to take up arms to defend themselves. Prague university masters, above all Jakoubek of Stříbro, resolved this problem making use of the traditional theory of just war. In order to guarantee the rightful and thus Christian character of their war, some of the masters extended the number of conditions of just war beyond the classic triad of just cause, right intention, and legitimate authority. At the same time, they struggled with the last of these three principles as they were waging war against their king. In an extreme case, they argued that a war

[29] *MVB 7*, no. 900, pp. 369–71; František Svejkovský (ed.), *Staročeské vojenské řády* (Praha, 1952), pp. 21–2, translation in Frederick G. Heymann, *John Žižka and the Hussite Revolution* (Princeton, 1955), p. 492.

[30] The following discussion is based on my forthcoming 'L'exégèse biblique au service de la guerre sainte: la légitimation de la violence dans les guerres hussites', in Daniel Baloup and Benoît Joudiou (eds), *Croisade et discours de guerre sainte à la fin du Moyen Âge: Légitimation, propagande, prosélytisme* (Toulouse).

fought on behalf of a community of faithful instead of that of an unfaithful prince was justified.[31]

Despite the fact that he allowed for physical warfare under certain circumstances, Jakoubek of Stříbro insisted on the priority of spiritual combat. The internal purgation of each combatant before entering the war should serve as a guard against excessive violence and other martial misconduct. These kinds of arguments were targeted at the members of the Hussite party themselves. Indeed the second aim of the Prague theologians' tracts on warfare from early in the Hussite wars was to control the theological doctrines and military actions of Hussite radicals. The debate on this topic between the priests from Prague and from Tábor extended well into the 1420s. In the eschatologically inspired beginnings of Tábor, the language of sacred violence drew heavily on the New and especially the Old Testament. One of the Taborite millenarist articles said, paraphrasing almost literally Exodus 32:29 and Jeremiah 48:10: 'Item, the secular and spiritual people ought to consecrate their hands in the blood of the wicked. Item, cursed is he that withholds his sword from the fleshly blood of the enemies of God'.[32] Facing the radically violent interpretation of the Old Testament, Jakoubek insisted on a spiritual and moral understanding of the above quotations. He supplied the Jeremiah quote with the following glosses: 'Cursed is he that withholds his sword of the word of God from the blood of the sin'.[33]

At the same time, Jakoubek acknowledged that there were cases when 'the Lord approved of a sword fight', as in the example of David, Samson, and Phineas. Despite all restrictions of excessive violence – or indeed with the help of them – the Hussite masters allowed for holy war on behalf of God. With Jakoubek being so scrupulous with respect to warfare, it was Jan of Příbram who became the theorist of Hussite Prague's holy war. His short tract 'On War' (*De bello*) stated the necessity and duty of physical struggle if the Law of God and its worshippers were under threat. Příbram enumerated conditions of just war and had no scruples in making the war holy once these conditions were fulfilled. In his treatise, he made extensive use of the books of the Maccabees. He concluded with a long quote from Matathias's speech to the army of the Lord's warriors which could have been easily used verbatim by any Hussite commander facing the crusaders' invasion: 'The success of war is not in the multitude of the

[31] The best discussions regarding the Hussite debates on warfare can be found in Seibt, *Hussitica*, pp. 16–57, and Howard Kaminsky, *A History of the Hussite Revolution* (Berkeley/Los Angeles, 1967), pp. 318–28 and 517–50.

[32] *Archiv český*, vol. 3, (ed.) František Palacký (Praha, 1844), p. 219 [hereafter *AČ 3*]; *FRB 5*, pp. 413–14.

[33] Jakoubek ze Stříbra, *Výklad na Zjevenie* I, s. 535. For a more nuanced view on the exegetical approaches see Pavel Soukup, 'The Masters and the End of the World: Exegesis in the Polemics with Chiliasm', in Zdeněk V. David and David R. Holeton (eds), *The Bohemian Reformation and Religious Practice*, vol. 7 (Praha, 2009), pp. 91–114.

army, but strength comes from heaven. They come against us with an insolent multitude and with pride to destroy us and our wives and our children and to take our spoils. But we will fight for our lives and our laws and the Lord himself will overthrow them before our face: but as for you, fear them not'.[34]

These classic biblical models of warriors for the faith could hardly be missing among the spiritual arsenal of the crusaders. It is noteworthy, however, that it was only with some delay that more elaborate biblical rhetoric appeared in the anti-Hussite crusades. Early crusading appeals did not refer to biblical models as much as to the canonical and liturgical crusading concepts. A more thorough reflection on religious warfare followed only after several bitter defeats from the crusaders. Andrew of Regensburg attempted to comfort and encourage the crusaders with references to the exodus of the Jews and the struggle of the Maccabees. Initial losses and suffering were, in his opinion, good omens that the Catholics would eventually deserve victory. Emboldening a group of knights from Franconia eager to fight the Hussites, Andrew quoted from Matathias's speech and reminded them that a small company can defeat a multitude. He also cited the words of Judas Maccabeus that it is the favour of heaven, which grants victory in war.[35] The Augustinian friar Oswald Reinlein, preacher of the Cross against the Hussites in 1426, employed Maccabean ideas in his set of prayers in favour of the war on heretics. Encouraging the extermination of the Hussites, Oswald reached for Exodus 32 in its literal sense. The slaughter of those guilty of idolatry through the Levites is taken as a direct parallel to the imminent extermination of Bohemian heretics: 'A similar fight has come for us: To kill everyone adherent to the perverse heresy of the Hussites, be it a brother or someone close, so that our hands, that is our deeds, are consecrated to the Lord'.[36] Another Catholic author, the chronicler Ludolf of Żagań, also applied the image of consecrating one's hands in the blood of enemies to the fight against the Hussites.[37]

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[34] Wien, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, ms. 4302, fol. 194r (quoting I Mcc. 3:18–22). For a partial edition, see Jaroslav Goll, *Quellen und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der Böhmischen Brüder*, vol. 2 (Praha, 1882), pp. 56–7.

[35] Andreas von Regensburg, *Sämtliche Werke*, p. 445. Quoted are I Mcc. 2:51 and I Mcc. 3:18. See Norman Housley, 'Explaining Defeat: Andrew of Regensburg and the Hussite Crusades', in Michel Balard, Benjamin Z. Kedar, and Jonathan Riley-Smith (eds), *Dei gesta per Francos: Etudes sur les croisades dédiées à Jean Richard* (Aldershot, 2001), pp. 87–95.

[36] Nürnberg, Stadtbibliothek, ms. Cent. I 78, fol. 69ra (the prayer of the Maccabees at fol. 70rb).

[37] Johann Loserth, 'Beiträge zur Geschichte der husitischen Bewegung 3: Der Tractatus de longevo schismate des Abtes Ludolf von Sagan', *Archiv für österreichische Geschichte 60* (1880): 343–561, here p. 534; for a discussion of the background of the uncompromising combat, see Thomas A. Fudge, '"More Glory than Blood": Murder and Martyrdom in

While more eloquent concepts of spiritual warfare were applied by the crusaders with certain delay, it does not mean that they were not interested in the theological aspects of the fight against Hussite heresy. A striking feature of the Hussite wars is how intense theological polemic accompanied the war. Even after the Wycliffite and Hussite doctrines were condemned and the crusade launched, theologians continued to produce treatises refuting Hussite 'beliefs'. Some of them were produced within the direct context of the crusade, sometimes even in the military camp. The first refutations of the Hussite programme of the Four Articles of Prague were composed during the first crusade and in response to the Hussite propaganda. Legate Fernando of Lugo authored the first official standpoint on the Four Articles, while Pier Paolo Vergerio put to paper a short memorandum from the fruitless disputations after the battle of Vítkov. Another short tract responded to a leaflet given to the Duke of Austria, which contained a copy of the Four Articles. There was a similar situation during the second crusade in 1421. The Elector Palatine took theologians with him to the expedition. When a Hussite manifesto was directed to the military camp near Žatec, the Elector commissioned two professors of Heidelberg University, Johannes of Frankfurt and Conrad of Soest, with composing two separate refutations. This suggests how important the theological backing was for the crusaders. In contrast to the Turkish wars where the enemy was classified as the 'infidel' without any hesitation, those who fought against erroneous Christians needed proof of their errors. The vast amount of anti-Hussite writings suggests furthermore the specific character of the war against the Hussites as compared to fighting other heresies such as the Cathars and Waldensians, both on ideological and military levels. Theological polemics going on before, throughout, and after the period of crusades reveal the unease in mastering a movement, which combined academic dissidence with political and popular support.

Religious Factors in War Mobilization

Of course, it is difficult to say precisely to what extent religion played a role in the individuals' motivation for taking part in the war. The confessional difference was crucial for the employment of religious language and theological concepts, and both sides advertised their war as a struggle for the faith. As for other possible motivations, the simple fact of defending one's home against invasion mattered for the Bohemians and Moravians from the very beginning. This became a motivation of the Catholics too, once the Hussites began their foreign campaigns. Many combatants joined the armies as mercenaries. Professionals

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the Hussite Crusades', in Zdeněk V. David and David R. Holeton (eds), *The Bohemian Reformation and Religious Practice*, vol. 5/1 (Praha, 2004), pp. 117–37.

were preferred to volunteers by both Catholic and Hussite commanders. The crusading army typically consisted of three kinds of combatants. In addition to hired mercenaries, troops were enlisted with the help of imperial institutions and networks and through recruitment by the papacy, i.e. by crusade preaching. The imperial diets set quotas for cities and princes, determining how many combatants they ought to contribute to the empire's military forces. The preaching of the Cross was aimed primarily at fundraising but volunteers could also join the army in exchange for an indulgence. From the military point of view, the option of being granted an indulgence for financing someone else (possibly a skilled soldier) who would fight the Hussites might have been more welcome to the crusading army's commanders. To some extent the crusaders were supported by Bohemian and Moravian Catholics, although many of the Catholic noblemen were opposed to the idea of a crusade devastating their land.

Hussite armies already employed mercenaries in the 1420s and even more so during the second Hussite war in the 1460s. At the beginning of the war period, however, religiously motivated volunteers formed the most important part of the Hussite army. In 1423, Jan Žižka organized a professional army for the first time. The model developed in Žižka's East-Bohemian brotherhood was adopted by the Taborites a couple of years later. It consisted of forming an administratively independent unit called the 'battlefield-working community', whose only occupation was fighting. In case of need, it was joined by the militia of the respective union's towns called the 'home community'. In addition to their expertise in military matters, the advantage of the field-working troops was that, unlike militias and mercenaries, their contract or obligation never expired. Given the Taborite circumstance of being continually engaged in holy war, fighting for the faith was still the primary legitimating factor behind this professional army.[38]

Whatever the motivation of the warriors may have been, the appeals for war retained religion as the principal argument for waging the war. Certainly additional discourses, both concurrent and competing, featured alongside religious imagery, but religion had a prominent place in mobilizing people and resources on both sides. The papacy had recourse to the mechanism of crusading recruitment as it had developed since Lateran II. Both Martin V and Paul II sent legates to the German lands, to the Kingdom of Bohemia and to Hungary and commissioned them with organizing the crusade against the Hussites. In some cases, notably in the cases of Branda Castiglioni or Giuliano Cesarini, the same legates were also responsible for Church reform in Germany.[39]

[38] An overview in Čornej, *Velké dějiny* 5, pp. 428–54; Čornej, *Velké dějiny* 6, pp. 266–8; for more on Hussite warfare see Jan Durdík, *Hussitisches Heerswesen* (Berlin, 1961).

[39] A thorough study of Martin V's legates is Birgit Studt, *Papst Martin V. (1417–1431) und die Kirchenreform in Deutschland* (Köln/Weimar/Wien, 2004); see also eadem, 'Legationen als Instrumente päpstlicher Reform- und Kreuzzugspropaganda im 15. Jahrhundert', in Gerd

Typically, the legates travelled to one of the imperial diets shortly after their arrival in Germany and gave a speech to the electors and other participants. The subsequent preaching of the Cross was entrusted to local bishops who would choose appropriate preachers to take the task over. Sometimes the legate himself commissioned preachers and sent them to particular provinces. Branda's detailed instructions for the liturgy of the Cross from 1421 served as a model for the future.[40] The wide transmission of crusading documents and their repeated publication by both the legates and the bishops show the impact of crusading propaganda. Although much more research of manuscript evidence is needed, it seems at the present stage that documents of the crusade against George of Poděbrady survive in even larger numbers than those issued by Martin V and Branda. This raises the question of whether the anti-Hussite crusading propaganda in this later stage profited from the infrastructure built after the fall of Constantinople in 1453.

The Hussite mobilization and propaganda was partly carried out in the form of written manifestos.[41] These letters were composed in Czech, German or Latin and sent out to both Bohemia and abroad. One intensive letter propaganda campaign was undertaken in 1420–21, another in 1430–31. At the beginning of the war the Hussites explained their religious programme and their aims. They denounced the injuries caused to the Kingdom of Bohemia by the Council of Constance, King Sigismund, and the papal nuncio, and declared why they were waging a defensive war. In the early 1430s, the Hussites tried to improve their reputation in Germany after the raids directed to the regions beyond the Bohemian border. Once again they declared the purity of their faith and intentions and attempted to gain support from the laity against the corrupted Catholic Church. Prospects of recruiting military allies among the princes and cities of the Holy Roman Empire were illusory. Nor did the Hussite manifesto to Venice, aimed at winning support from the traditional rival of Sigismund of Hungary, succeed. However, Hussite diplomacy oriented towards Poland and Lithuania was not entirely unfruitful. Before and during the second Hussite war, King George pursued an active diplomacy on a European scale. In fact, the readiness of some Catholic princes to maintain diplomatic relations with the

Althoff (ed.), *Formen und Funktionen öffentlicher Kommunikation im Mittelalter* (Stuttgart, 2001), pp. 421–53.

[40] Alois Madre, 'Kardinal Branda an Nikolaus von Dinkelsbühl: Eine Anweisung zur Kreuzzugspredigt gegen die Hussiten', in Remigius Bäumer (ed.), *Von Konstanz nach Trient: Festgabe für August Franzen* (München/Paderborn/Wien, 1972), pp. 87–100.

[41] See Karel Hruza, '"Audite et cum speciali diligencia attendite verba litere huius". Hussitische Manifeste: Objekt – Methode – Definition', in Christoph Egger and Herwig Weigl (eds), *Text – Schrift – Codex: Quellenkundliche Arbeiten aus dem Institut für Österreichische Geschichtsforschung* (Wien/München, 2000), pp. 345–84.

Hussites does not fit into the traditional image of a 'war on heresy' and is more reminiscent of the early modern Wars of Religion.[42]

Warriors on both sides remained committed to the notion that victory is granted by God and that they can and should deserve it through pious behaviour and penitence. In the Hussite debate on warfare from 1419–20, the point of the conditions for just war proposed by the university masters and the reason for their promotion of the spiritual battle as the most important was to ensure the minimum moral qualities of the army so that it remained eligible for victory. The same purpose was behind Jan Žižka's military ordinance from 1423. The divine support was furthermore secured through religious or sacred rituals. Žižka dubbed his soldiers – by far not all of them of noble origin – to knighthood immediately before the battle of Kutná Hora in 1421 and after the victory of Německý Brod in 1422. The crusaders' emphasis on the moral and righteous conduct of warriors grew with time and was stimulated by military defeats. Only after the collapse of the first crusade, for example, did Cardinal Branda issue more detailed instructions for crusading *suffragia*. According to the Hussite chronicler Lawrence of Březová, the archbishops present in the army of the second crusade crossed the Bohemian border on foot, showing humbleness 'so that God would grant them luck and victory'. In his exhortation to the Franconian knights, Andrew of Ratisbone linked his hope for eventual victory with moral purification of the warriors. To secure superiority over the enemy, one's own carnal desires, guile, and longing for vainglory must be overcome. The imperial diets in the latter part of the 1420s issued military ordinances for expeditions to Bohemia, which also contained regulations concerning the morals and piety of soldiers. They banned misdemeanours such as dice and prostitutes or pillaging, and they also ordered that every soldier partook in weekly confession and in masses as often possible. Spiritual service should also be provided: 'Item every troop ought to have four or five learned priests who would preach to the people and teach them how to behave and fight for the holy Christian faith, so that it all turns out for the very best'.[43]

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[42] See Werner Paravicini, 'Bericht und Dokument: Leo von Rožmitál unterwegs zu den Höfen Europas (1465–1466)', *Archiv für Kulturgeschichte* 92 (2010): 253–307.

[43] *FRB 5*, p. 512; SRS 9, p. 234; von Regensburg, *Sämtliche Werke*, p. 442; *Deutsche Reichstagsakten unter Kaiser Sigmund*, vol. 9, (ed.) Dietrich Kerler (Gotha, 1887) [hereafter DRTA 9], pp. 36 and 539; see also Pavel Soukup, 'La noblesse hussite, entre chevalerie et guerre sainte', in Martin Nejedlý and Jaroslav Svátek (eds), *La noblesse et la croisade à la fin du Moyen Âge (France, Bourgogne, Bohême)* (Toulouse, 2009), pp. 147–62.

Additional Discourses: Eschatology, Politics, and Nationalism

All of what I have called additional discourses to that of Holy War was more or less connected to religion. The eschatological scenario as an incentive for war worked for both sides. The image of heretics as false prophets implied the embedding of the fight against them in the scenario of last days as outlined by Jesus in Matthew 24. Eschatological considerations connected the imperial idea with the Last Emperor's fight against the infidels, as it is mirrored in Sigismund's statement that he would go to liberate the Holy Sepulchre after he was done with the Turks and the Hussites.[44] But eschatology was definitely much more important in Hussite warfare than among their adversaries. In the winter of 1419–20, the radical preachers in the Bohemian countryside turned suddenly from evangelical pacifism to apocalyptic violence. Expecting the end of the present age, they began to prepare the way for the second coming of Christ by destroying the henchmen of Antichrist. Eschatological warfare was closely connected to the origins of the Taborite party. It was strongly disapproved of by the Hussite theologians in Prague and also by the Taborite 'party of order'. Jan Žižka himself took care of physically exterminating the radical Eucharistic heresy, which emerged from Tábor's Adventist period. This does not mean that he abandoned the eschatological perspective on his own military activity. He still considered it as destroying the forces of Antichrist, as is clear from his letter to the town of Domažlice: 'And therefore, dear brethren, be it known to you that we are drafting men from all sides against such enemies and destroyers of the Czech land. Therefore you, too, order your priests to arouse the people to arms against such forces of Antichrist'.[45] The Taborite bishop Nicholas of Pelhřimov was not ready to accept the physical liquidation of Antichrist's minions as the primary form of fulfilling the eschatological scenario. Much like the Prague masters he insisted on the priority of the spiritual struggle and saw the fight against Antichrist as the preachers' task. However, he considered his Tábor community the avant-garde in the eschatological battle and insisted on its right to self-defence.[46] As a result, eschatological elements continued to play a role in Hussite warfare.

The conviction that they were the only true followers of Christianity served as the basis for Hussite messianism. The confessional divide, however, prevented the application of the label of the 'chosen people' to the entire Czech-speaking

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[44] DRTA 9, p. 74. See Norman Housley, 'The Eschatological Imperative: Messianism and Holy War in Europe, 1260–1556', in Peter Schäfer and Mark R. Cohen (eds), *Toward the Millennium: Messianic Expectations from the Bible to Waco* (Leiden, 1998), pp. 123–50.

[45] Svejkovský, *Staročeské vojenské řády,* pp. 17–18; Heymann, *John Žižka*, p. 488.

[46] Howard Kaminsky, 'Nicholas of Pelhřimov's Tabor: An Adventure into the Eschaton', in Alexander Patschovsky and František Šmahel (eds), *Eschatologie und Hussitismus* (Praha, 1996), pp. 139–67, here pp. 153–4.

community. On the one hand, even before the outbreak of the wars, Hussite university masters formulated surprisingly modern concepts of nation based on language and blood and comprising members of all social strata. On the other hand, being of the correct faith always prevailed over ethnicity as a criterion of group allegiance.[47] Yet the foreign invasions and the fact that crusading armies consisted mostly of German-speaking warriors fostered the depiction of the conflict as one based on national principles. According to one Hussite manifesto, the pope incited 'our natural enemies, the neighbouring Germans' to fight unjustly against the Hussites. After their victory at Vyšehrad in 1420, the Hussites denounced Sigismund, claiming that he induced Germans and Hungarians, 'the most cruel enemies of our tongue', to conduct war with the final aim being 'that there are no more Czechs in Bohemia'.[48] In the second Hussite war, patriotism was enhanced with the memories of the successful struggle of the first Hussite generation. Messianic conviction is expressed in the appeal to defend 'that which the Lord bestowed on you more than on any other nation and tongue', i.e. the divine truth. The group sentiment, although strongly national, was limited to those adhering to the Hussite faith, as in the following hostile image of the pope: 'The slayer of Christ's truth does not sleep but wanders around with his bulls, with his legates and wicked envoys, seeking to devour the lovers of Christ's truth and true Czechs'.[49]

The same limitation, to the 'faithful' or 'just' only, appeared a generation earlier in Jan of Příbram's *De bello*. The author documented the need for the defence of the *patria* with the example of the Maccabees. A just war should be fought 'for the defence of the fatherland and the just brethren, by compatriots against the foreigners who want to destroy one's home land'.[50] Yet the Maccabean prototype of chosen people could have been applied within the framework of medieval patriotism without any nationalistic connotations. The Viennese preacher Oswald Reinlein updated some prayers from the Old Testament with references to the contemporary Hussite wars. In one taken from II Maccabees 1:24–9, he inserted a reference to the 'Austrian fatherland' while ranking the Hussites among biblical *gentes*. Given the multi-ethnic character of crusading armies, it was difficult for the anti-Hussite propaganda to develop nationalistic concepts of the self. A more straightforward way was to colour the Hussites with xenophobic stereotypes. The negative image of heretics could in some instances be transferred to the nation. When Martin V called the Hussites beasts and cattle it was because of their heresy. The Catholic polemicist Geoffroy of

[47] František Šmahel, 'The Idea of the "Nation" in Hussite Bohemia', *Historica* 16 (1969): 143–247; 17 (1970): 93–197.

[48] *AČ 3*, pp. 212–13; *FRB 5*, p. 445.

[49] *AČ 20*, p. 559.

[50] Goll, *Quellen und Untersuchungen* 2, p. 57.

Lérins, who had no direct experience with Bohemia, applied these terms of abuse to all Bohemian people, enumerating their vices and savage qualities.[51] Yet, for an image of positive identification, the anti-Hussite party had not many other choices than referring to the concerns of 'Christendom'.[52] A question for further research is, to what extent – if at all – it was comparable to the idea of Christendom in the anti-Turkish *antemurale* ideologies.

The respective political interests were, of course, another powerful factor in the Hussite wars. They could coincide with the religious divide, but this was not always the case. If so, however, religious motives were welcome in justifying and advertising political aims. In 1467, the envoy of the Czech Catholic nobility to the imperial diet of Nuremberg proclaimed that the Catholic noblemen's struggle against the Hussite king (George) was not a personal one, but one for the faith.[53] At the outbreak of the wars, the Hussite estates refused to allow Sigismund to succeed to the Bohemian throne. This was because they believed he would threaten both the Hussite religion and the commonwealth of the kingdom.[54] When the land diet at Čáslav deposed Sigismund in 1421, they portrayed themselves as acting in defence of the right Christian faith. Hussite theorists quickly resolved the problem of justifying the war against their sovereign. Jan Příbram admitted twofold legitimacy: either by a prince, or through divine authorization (*Deo auctore*).[55] Yet the stances of Bohemian noblemen were not exclusively defined by religion. Considerations of class values and familial loyalties prevailed in some instances over religious allegiance. A large part of the Hussite nobility thus helped in overcoming Hussite radicals, whereas Catholic noblemen proved hesitant to join the crusade troops in devastating Bohemian territory.[56]

The anti-Hussite crusades built upon the condemnation of Hussitism at the Council of Constance, which was confirmed by Pope Martin V. From the legal point of view, the crusade was a means to enforce the sentence after admonition

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[51] František Palacký (ed.), *Urkundliche Beiträge zur Geschichte des Hussitenkrieges*, vol. 1 (Praha, 1873) [hereafter *UB 1*], p. 323; Augustin Neumann, 'Francouzská hussitica', *Studie a texty k náboženským dějinám českým* 4 (1925): 1–172, here p. 62.

[52] For just one example, see *UB* 1, p. 314.

[53] *AČ 20*, p. 546

[54] The grievances included having subjects of the kingdom killed, having invaded the land with an army, taken Crown jewels abroad, and having violated the liberties of all estates.

[55] Goll, *Quellen und Untersuchungen*, p. 56.

[56] Robert Novotný, 'Die Konfessionalität des böhmischen und mährischen Adels in der Zeit der Regierung Sigismunds von Luxemburg', in Karel Hruza and Alexandra Kaar, *Kaiser Sigismund (1368–1437): Zur Herrschaftspraxis eines europäischen Monarchen* (Wien, 2012), pp. 57–74; Robert Novotný and Pavel Soukup, 'La défense de la foi à l'époque hussite: l'engagement des noblesses tchèque et allemande', in Arianne Boltanski and Franck Mercier (eds), *Le Salut par les armes: Noblesse et défense de l'orthodoxie (XIIIe–XVIIe siècle)* (Rennes, 2011), pp. 93–108.

and inquisition proved to be ineffective. But it was, in fact, deeply influenced by political, dynastic, and other interests. From the Catholic side, the Hussite wars were marked profoundly by a double leadership. As crusades against the enemies of the faith, they were fought under the papal aegis. At the same time the fight against the Hussites was considered and organized as a war of the empire, as it was of direct interest to the emperor-elect and heir of Bohemia, Sigismund of Luxemburg. On the side of the empire the rhetoric of defending the faith also played an important role, as it was connected with internal power struggles between the emperor and the electors.[57] At a meeting in Bingen in 1424, the imperial electors claimed a share in ruling; indeed they demanded full political authority in all matters of the empire during the emperor's absence in the realm. The argument was the defence of the faith: 'For the almighty God honoured us and assigned us to repulse ... any crime in the holy Church and Christendom and Holy Roman Empire, and especially against the holy Christian faith'.[58]

The war against the Hussites was not just a card in the internal political game of the Holy Roman Empire. The papacy also faced strong opposition in the form of conciliarism. In fact, the first phase of the anti-Hussite crusades was largely influenced by the fact that they took place in a period flanked by two reform councils. After the experience of the crusades during the Great Schism, considered by reformists as a misuse of the concept for the political and partisan purposes of the competing popes, the conciliarists were far more cautious about any possible abuses. In 1421, for example, the jurist Job Vener censured in one of his writings the overly generous granting of crusading indulgences. Resorting to crusading tradition, he compared the modern indulgence decree with the canon *Ad liberandam* issued by Innocent III. Vener was actually even stricter in his writings than Innocent's decretal.[59] One could argue that it was under the influence of reform concepts, as discussed at the general councils, that the Hussite crusade appears rather traditional in character. Conciliarist concepts

[57] Sabine Wefers, 'Die Wirkung des Hussitenproblems auf den politischen Zusammenhang von König und Reich im Zeitalter Sigmunds', in Josef Macek, Ernö Marosi, and Ferdinand Seibt (eds), *Sigismund von Luxemburg: Kaiser und König in Mitteleuropa 1387–1437. Beiträge zur Herrschaft Kaiser Sigismunds und der europäischen Geschichte um 1400* (Warendorf, 1994), pp. 94–108.

[58] Dietrich Kerler (ed.), *Deutsche Reichstagsakten unter Kaiser Sigmund*, vol. 8 (Gotha, 1883), no. 294/295, pp. 344–51, here p. 347; see Christiane Mathies, *Kurfürstenbund und Königtum in der Zeit der Hussitenkriege: Die kurfürstliche Reichspolitik gegen Sigmund im Kraftzentrum Mittelrhein* (Mainz, 1978), pp. 137–72; Sabine Wefers, *Das politische System Kaiser Sigmunds* (Stuttgart, 1989), pp. 111–26.

[59] Hermann Heimpel, *Die Vener von Gmünd und Strassburg 1162–1447: Studien und Texte zur Geschichte einer Familie sowie des gelehrten Beamtentums in der Zeit der abendlandischen Kirchenspaltung und der Konzilien von Pisa, Konstanz und Basel*, 3 vols (Göttingen, 1982), pp. 898–912, with an edition at pp. 1354–65.

of peace and collective agreement also played a role in the unprecedented termination of the crusade by the Council of Basel in 1431. Once again, the war (and peace) with the Hussites had a symbolic value in the competition between political rivals; in this case, between the council and Pope Eugene IV. Moreover, it was the change in the power balance within the Roman Church, which set the crusades in motion once again three decades later.

Conclusion: Hussite Wars and the Wars of Religion

This short overview has shown how religious rhetoric took primacy during the Hussite wars. Other discourses, influential as they were, also operated mostly in connection with religion. Of course, religion was used within war propaganda as late as the Seven Years War. It is thus important to see if religion was not merely used as a pretext for covering other reasons and motivations for using violence. In the Hussite wars, however, this seems not to have been the case. Admittedly, many of the chief participants had their own objectives, which were not strictly of a religious nature. This was especially true of Sigismund of Luxemburg who was ready to set anti-heretical rigour aside if it had helped him acquire the Bohemian throne. But religious matters triggered even Sigismund's struggle for the paternal crown. In fact, hardly any pragmatic consideration of the parties involved in the wars can be seen as separate from matters of faith. In the Hussite wars, therefore, religious motives were dominant in the perception of warfare of all four crucial groups of contemporaries: the decision-makers, the participants (active warriors and passive victims), the authors and their public, and those carrying the martial *memoria*.[60]

Yet since this justifies the classification of the Hussite wars as religious conflict, it does not answer the question of whether they rank completely among medieval wars on heresy or herald the Wars of Religion of the Confessional Age. A definite answer cannot be expected. The complex nature of pre-modern warfare does not allow for simple and clear-cut categories. The early modern Wars of Religion were far from uniform in character. The perception and presentation of religious warfare assumed different features according to the circumstances and the confession of the participants. Moreover, there is no clear line between medieval and early modern religious wars. The persistence of crusading language and representation into the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries complicates matters. While the crusade as an organizational form, i.e. a war organized by

[60] These four groups' perception was defined as decisive for the evaluation of religious wars by Franz Brendle and Anton Schindling, 'Religionskriege in der Frühen Neuzeit: Begriff, Wahrnehmng, Wirkmächtigkeit', in *iidem* (eds), *Religionskriege im Alten Reich und in Alteuropa* (Münster, 2006), pp. 15–52, here pp. 19–20.

the papacy, gradually disappeared, some of its constitutive spiritual features, such as the penitential aspects and devotional backing, seem to survive even in the Protestant milieu.[61] It is possible, nevertheless, to outline which aspects the Hussite wars inherited from medieval crusading and the manners in which they foreshadowed the future Wars of Religion.

One notable difference between the Hussite wars and sixteenth-century religious wars is that in the fifteenth century, the perceived unity of religious struggle still persisted. In the Early Modern period, the confessional wars within Christendom were considered something substantially different from the war against the Turks or Native Americans.[62] In the fifteenth century, however, all theatres of holy war were still seen as equivalent. It is not only the transposing of the denigrating label of the 'Turk' or 'worse than the Turk' to Christian enemies which is in question. Such transposition took place in both the late Middle Ages and Early Modern period.[63] But the evidence suggests that the war against the Hussites, or indeed the war of the Hussites against the Catholics, was considered equivalent to fighting the Turks both on a symbolic level and as a practical military enterprise to defend Christendom. On the Catholic side, this equivalence was warranted by the fact that both the Turkish wars and the war on heresy were conducted within the conceptual and organizational framework defined by the papacy, that is, as a crusade. From the sixteenth century on, this framework was losing its plausibility – but it took some time until it was completely abandoned.

As it has been underlined above, the war against the Hussites was fought simultaneously as a crusade and as an imperial war. The difference here to the religious wars of the sixteenth century in the Holy Roman Empire does not consist so much in the employment of the crusading model against the Hussites. As late as 1546, the pope issued indulgences for confessional war in the empire,[64] and possibly the papacy saw the fight against the Protestants in very similar terms to the fight against the Hussites. I see the difference between the anti-Hussite crusades and the sixteenth-century wars of religion in the empire rather in what

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[61] Géraud Poumarède, *Pour en finir avec la croisade: mythes et réalités de la lutte contre les Turcs aux XVIe et XVIIe siècles* (Paris, 2004); Norman Housley, 'Křížové výpravy v letech 1450–1650: mobilizace a paměť', in Pavel Soukup and Jaroslav Svátek (eds), *Křížové výpravy v pozdním středověku: Kapitoly z dějin náboženských konfliktů* (Praha, 2010), pp. 219–29; on the devotional aspects of Protestant warfare Janus Møller Jensen, *Denmark and the Crusades, 1400–1650* (Leiden/Boston, 2007), pp. 209–338.

[62] Brendle/Schindling, *Religionskriege*, pp. 21–2.

[63] Housley, *Religious Warfare*, pp. 131–59.

[64] Konrad Repgen, 'What is a "Religious War"?', in E. I. Kouri and Tom Scott (eds), *Politics and Society in Reformation Europe: Essays for Sir Geoffrey Elton on his Sixty-Fifth Birthday* (London, 1987), pp. 311–28, here pp. 322–3, with an interpretation different from the above.

alternatives there were to religious legitimacy. The Schmalkaldic War, though its main incentive was religious, was officially fought with no connection to confession, as far as the proclamations of the emperor were concerned. Charles V presented the conflict meticulously as a punitive action against the disturbers of the public peace, i.e. as a rebellion against the empire. The Hussite wars took place in a different legal context, notably before the Imperial Public Peace (*Ewiger Landfriede*) of Worms was agreed in 1495. Sigismund, although he was fighting a rebellion, which sought to subvert his rule, found it of indisputable advantage to display openly his religious motivation (whatever his real motives at the moment may have been). The early modern art of disguising the real motives behind a certain war also mattered very much with respect to the religious peace. Both the Augsburg Peace of 1555 and the Westphalian Peace of 1648 were agreed on a secular basis.[65] This was not the case with the Compactata of 1436. To reach a truce in the Hussite wars, religious divides first had to be settled in an acceptable way. Since the Roman Church's agreement with the Hussites rested on religious grounds, conflict was prone to restart once the ecclesiastical constellation changed.

On the other hand, the Hussite wars do show some features of confessional warfare. While the Compactata did not ensure a permanent religious peace between the Roman Church and the Hussites, it did allow Utraquism to develop as an independent confession. The Utraquist Church survived under the aegis of the Hussite estates and was thus able to escape the destiny of medieval heresies, i.e. being marginalized as a clandestine sect. Of course, the Hussite theology did not go as far as Lutheran Protestantism and the social realities of the time and place did not allow for a thorough process of confessionalization. Yet by the time of the second Hussite war the conditions for the creation of a practically independent Hussite confession had been fulfilled.[66] If we admit the emergence of the Bohemian Reformation in the fifteenth century,[67] the concept of Bohemian Wars of Religion becomes *ipso facto* more plausible. Leaning on their theological method, the Hussites produced an equally if not more developed war ideology than the crusaders did. This gave the Hussite wars a dimension different from previous crusades. In the preceding religious wars of the Middle Ages, the enemy either stood outside the Christian community or the rivals portrayed each other as not being in line with the right Christian belief or practice. In terms of crusading against heretics, it was during the Hussite wars that the enemy of the

[65] Brendle/Schindling, *Religionskriege*, pp. 16–17 and 35–7.

[66] Winfried Eberhard, *Konfessionsbildung und Stände in Böhmen 1478–1530* (München, 1981).

[67] *Idem,* 'Zur reformatorischen Qualität'; for a recent summary of discussion over the Hussite Reformation see Pavel Soukup, 'Kauza reformace: Husitství v konkurenci reformních projektů', in Pavlína Rychterová and Pavel Soukup (eds), *Heresis seminaria: Pojmy a koncepty v bádání o husitství* (Praha, 2013), pp. 171–217.

crusaders first came up with such an elaborate and theoretically underpinned concept of holy war.

In the internal Christian conflicts of the Middle Ages, the sources of the religious justification of war were largely identical and the credibility of the religious claims depended on their military or political enforcement. As a result, only one version of supportive ideology could survive in the long term within Medieval Latin Christendom. In the Hussite wars, too, both sides built on the same tradition of sacred violence. But with the outcome of the religious division being as it was, the potential emerged for the first time to build confessional blocs, which would sustain the conflicting ideologies. When seen as a conflict of two opposing Christian groups, each with its own theology and fully developed ideology of holy war, the Hussite wars stand much closer to early modern Wars of Religion than any previous religious warfare. If they are invoked only as a contrastive example of the last great medieval war on heresy, full justice is not done to their character.[68]

[68] This study is part of the project 'Cultural Codes and Their Transformations in the Hussite Period' (P405/12/G148) funded by the Czech Science Foundation (GA ČR) and resolved at the Institute of Philosophy of the Czech Academy of Sciences. The research leading to it was supported by the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation. I am indebted to Mark Whelan for his helpful suggestions.

Chapter 2

Religion, War, and Violence in the Swiss Confederation

Thomas Lau

The Endangered Paradise

When in 1688 Pierre de Montenach was ordained bishop of Lausanne, a long lasting conflict was about to be settled. Ever since the conquest of Lausanne by Bern's troops in 1536 the question where the bishop was to reside remained unanswered. Although it had been decided officially in 1613 that the episcopal see was to be transferred to Fribourg on a temporary basis, the town's council showed a deep-rooted unwillingness to accept an ecclesiastical prince to reside in their town. The very fact that new bishops were usually handpicked clients of the Duke of Savoy, who was guardian of Lausanne's ecclesiastical property, made the situation even more complicated. It was close to impossible to find a compromise between the council and the distrusted dukes.[1]

As a matter of fact, it took decades of embittered political fighting before a solution came into reach. Fribourg showed her willingness to host the bishop. In return a member of the town's most distinguished family was elected into the office. It was this very fact that changed the situation completely. Pierre de Montenach was the first of a long line of bishops who could count on the welcome and support of Fribourg's citizens.[2]

The new settlement was artistically visualized in a painting most probably used as the centrepiece of the bishop's house altar.[3] It showed a garden being enclosed by walls. Among its vineyards, lambs were leading their innocent life. Peace, piety, and order dominated the scenery. The garden motif the painter

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[1] Patrick Braun, 'Bischof Strambino im Streit mit dem St. Nikolausstift, 1663–1680', in Jean Steinauer et al. (eds), *Das Kapitel St. Nikolaus in Freiburg: Hort des Glaubens, der Kultur und der Macht* (Bern, 2011), pp. 103–12.

[2] Thomas Lau, 'Patria Catholica – patrizische Aufstiegsstrategien und regionale Identitätsbildung im Stand Freiburg Mitte des 17. Jahrhunderts', in Steinauer, *Kapitel St. Nikolaus*, pp. 85–102.

[3] Musée d'art et d'histoire Fribourg MAHF 2010–066.

made use of was an old one.[4] Antique and Christian scholars had compared the innocence of the individual but also of a community with a garden – an enclosed area being kept fertile by a virtuoso gardener. What made the garden precious was the difference between the gracious rule of order inside and the inharmonious disorder outside. This garden, however, was under attack. Wild creatures – foxes, wolves, snakes, pigs, and bears – tried to storm the walls. These symbols of the seven original sins proved to be appallingly successful. The right side of the fortification was already destroyed. The enemies had cast breaches into the battlement and invaded the sacred ground.

The situation was not entirely hopeless. In the very centre of this endangered paradise, a new fence was created that kept the monsters from devastating the garden's left part. The fight was therefore still undecided. The distinctive silhouette of two towns being situated in the garden's background served as the key to the entire metaphorical scenery. On the left, the prominent tower of Fribourg's St Nicolaus church symbolizes the new residence of the bishop, on the right, the cathedral church of Lausanne located directly on the lakeside stands for the old one. The garden was thus to be identified as the diocese of the bishop being divided between the pious faithful Catholic town of Fribourg and their infamous Protestant rivals in Bern. A fragile fence was the demarcation line between them, between order and disorder, God and the devil. In front of the intact walls of the garden's left side a female personification of Fribourg kneels and prays for the salvation and the reconstruction of the lost paradise.

In heaven, the virgin queen herself observes the scene. Being surrounded by six sainted bishops, she points at an angel. The little godly servant hastily obeys her command and takes a heavy bishop's cross to the centre of the painting. The precious gift is to be given to a family being symbolized by her coats of arms – the Montenach. This anointed noble breed evidently was chosen by God's mother herself to fulfil the town's and diocese's destiny. The eyes of the praying Friburga consequently turn to the family's coat and arms. God had given her a protector and pastor who will beat the ferocious bear and gather the lambs with his arms.

Though of poor artistic quality, the painting is a unique document describing not only the situation of Lausanne's bishops in the late seventeenth century but moreover the very dilemma of religious division in early modern Switzerland. The artist himself left no doubt on the fact that the worldly order had to reflect the heavenly empire. Any pollution of God's given order was a temporary disturbance caused by the devil – being symbolized by a black goat at the right side of the garden. God's children were expected to fight his machination and to restore

[4] Thomas Maissen, 'Die Schöpfung der Helvetia in der bildenden Kunst und in der Dichtung', in Stefan Hess et al. (eds), *Basilea: Ein Beispiel städtischer Repräsentation in weiblicher Gestalt: Begleitpublikation zur Ausstellung 'Basilea – die unbekannte Stadtgöttin' in der Skulpturhalle Basel* (Basel, 2001), pp. 84–101.

order. A permanent breach, a change of structure was unthinkable. It would have been a neglect of God's direct command – almost an act of blasphemy. However, as long as Fribourg remained faithful, the violent attacks of the evil were useless and doomed to failure. Moreover, the furious onslaughts of the demons served as proof for God's blessings. Their hatred was to be welcomed. God's army would end the violence of the heathens in a triumphant victory.

Johann Caspar Weissenbach, a contemporary of the painter, shared this optimistic view into the future. Weissenbach was the author of the play 'Eydgnoßsisches Contrafeth' (Portrait of the Confederacy) being performed for the first time in Zug in 1672. Weissenbach compared the crisis of the community to an illness of a living body – the body of Helvetia.[5] The Lady was placed in a once flourishing and now devastated garden. Her disgrace was caused by the disunity of her children and – of course? – by the influence of Protestant preachers. Nevertheless, Nicolas of Flue, the Swiss Saint, and Virgin Maria, the patron saints of the confederacy, have not given up their most beloved child. If she puts her hope in God, the power of evil is unable to prevent Helvetia from recovering.[6]

The author of the stage play and the painter in Fribourg both strongly believed in the restoration of unity. This hope was based on three basic ideas – the belief in the existence of a blessed past, the conviction that the heritage of the glorious time was still preserved in their own part of the country, and the imagination of a distinct territorial entity being the new Promised Land. Memory, Religion, and Territory were to constitute Switzerland, its Cantons, and regions as indivisible entities. The nation suffered but it was still alive.

Weissenbach and the unknown painter from Fribourg were two among numerous Protestant and Catholic artists, historians, writers, and politicians who tried to explain a situation that was regarded as a deep-rooted crisis of the Helvetian nation. Most of them fervently clung to the idea of unity, they constructed images of the past and utopian fantasies of the future, and they claimed to represent the true virtues of glorious times. At the same time they blamed the

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[5] Johann Caspar Weissenbach, *Eydgnoßsisches Contrafeth auff- und abnemmender Jungfrawen Helvetiae: von denn edlen ehrenvesten vornehmen, vorsichtigen unnd weisen Herren gesambter Burgerschafft Löbl. Stadt Zug: durch offentliche Exhibition den 14. und 15. Sept. Anno 1672 vorgestellt* (Zug 1672).

[6] Thomas Maissen, 'Von wackeren alten Eidgenossen und souveränen Jungfrauen: zu Datierung und Deutung der frühesten "Helvetia"-Darstellungen', *Zeitschrift für Schweizerische Archäologie und Kunstgeschichte* 56/4 (1999): 265–302; Lynn Blattmann, '"Heil Dir Helvetia, hast noch der Söhne ja ...": Nationalisierung als Geschlechterkonzept', in Urs Altermatt, Catherine Bosshart-Pfluger, and Albert Tanner (eds), *Die Konstruktion einer Nation: Nation und Nationalisierung in der Schweiz 18. – 20. Jahrhundert* (Zürich, 1998), pp. 121–9; Georg Kreis, *Helvetia – im Wandel der Zeiten: Die Geschichte einer nationalen Repräsentationsfigur* (Zürich, 1991); Angela Stercken, *Enthüllung der Helvetia: Die Sprache der weiblichen Staatspersonifikation im 19. Jahrhundert* (Berlin, 1998).

other side for breaking the rules. Violence, ferocity, and blasphemy signified the evildoers, while the unyielding protection of the innocent characterized God's servants.[7] This interpretation of social practices and networks of communication was evidently intended to legitimate inter-confessional cooperation without levelling religious antagonism. Both sides depended on each other. The violence and insults of the religious opponent served each religious party as cornerstones of identity building.[8] Pointing to the common cause of fighting, the ferocious Protestants could play down intra-confessional antagonism – like the dispute on the bishop's residence in Fribourg. The opponent's presumed unwillingness to risk a full-scale war reduced the political risks of making use of confessional antagonism for intra-confessional purposes.[9]

In praising the past and glorifying the future, Catholics and Protestants gave the present the character of a transitional period of minor importance. The end of God's plan was thought to be plain and open to everybody. The way this end was to be pursued however was unclear and covered in darkness. It was this very idea enabling the political elites to increase the number of their political options without risking the stability of the federal system they depended on. The confederates tacitly agreed to disagree. They provoked the other side and even demonstrated their military preparedness. At the same time they showed self-restraint when a war was about to be fought.

The Balance of Honour

The confederation of the 13 independent cantons was anything but an isolated garden. As a matter of fact the confessional split that divided Europe had divided the country since the early sixteenth century as well. The four most prominent urban centres (Bern, Zurich, Basel, and Schaffhausen) had introduced the reformation. Seven cantons – led by the rural cantons in the central Alps – had remained Catholic, in two cantons (Glarus and Appenzell) the confessional question remained undecided, and in the condominiums the peasants were free to choose for the confessional side they preferred.

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[7] Thomas Lau, *Stiefbrüder: Nation und Konfession in der Schweiz und in Europa (1656–1712)* (Köln, 2008).

[8] Anton Schindling, 'Das Strafgericht Gottes: Kriegserfahrungen und Religion im Heiligen Römischen Reich Deutscher Nation im Zeitalter des Dreißigjährigen Krieges. Erfahrungsgeschichte und Konfessionalisierung', in Matthias Asche and Anton Schindling (eds), *Das Strafgericht Gottes: Kriegserfahrungen und Religion im Heiligen Römischen Reich Deutscher Nation im Zeitalter des Dreißigjährigen Krieges* (Münster, 2001), pp. 11–51.

[9] Ulrich Pfister, 'Konfessionskonflikte in der frühneuzeitlichen Schweiz: eine strukturalistische Interpretation', *Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Religions- und Kulturgeschichte* 101 (2007): 257–312.

The country however did not fall apart and the main reason for this unexpected stability lay in Switzerland's valuable resources that could be exploited only in a coordinated manner. This was especially true for the marketing of their mercenaries who counted among the finest and most feared troops in Europe.[10] As a matter of fact, the cantons made a living out of the European conflicts that were – at least in part – caused by religious disputes. The money being earned in foreign conflicts helped to ease domestic conflicts.

The violence their highly professional troops exercised on the continent's battlefields helped to keep violence between the confederates within acceptable limits. Switzerland therefore was part of European politics and those who governed the cantons had to keep in mind the interests of friends and enemies. Being a diplomatic battlefield and a marketplace of European interests, the Swiss cantons carefully observed any change on the European stage.[11] Military, political, and economical developments outside the country were not to be ignored. To accommodate with new forms of interreligious communication, however, was difficult. The structures of the confederacy seemed to be almost frozen in an uneasy balance of power between Catholics and Protestants. Any change, any development could end in a disaster.

As a matter of fact, Huldrych Zwingli – Zurich's influential reformer – had been convinced that the Confederacy could survive only as a religiously homogenous body. From his point of view, the new Protestant creed was the cornerstone of a deeper and more successful political integration of the cantons. Zwingli's reformation was not a religious and social movement; it was also a political one. He called for the end of the mercenary system that calmed conflict with – what he called – 'blood money'. To sell Swiss sons to Europe's monarchs, to send them to senseless wars, would, he pointed out, in the end destroy the moral fundament and the political credibility of the confederation. Therefore the cooperation of mercenaries was to be replaced by a cooperation of Christian communities. The Swiss should fight for God and not for money. Their ferocity should serve the common good and the Christian church. The territories and the influence they gained in this common fight, Zurich's reformer was convinced, would help to heal the wounds of Swiss antagonism and would turn the country into an earthly paradise. Zwingli actually called for a new economy of violence.[12]

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[10] Cf., in general, Thomas Maissen, *Geschichte der Schweiz* (Baden, 2010); Volker Reinhardt, *Die Geschichte der Schweiz: Von den Anfängen bis heute* (München, 2011).

[11] Andreas Würgler, *Die Tagsatzung der Eidgenossen: Politik, Kommunikation und Symbolik einer repräsentativen Institution im europäischen Kontext 1470–1798* (Tübingen, 2014).

[12] Huldrych Zwingli, 'Eine freundschaftliche und ernste Ermahnung der Eidgenossen. 1524', trans., Hans Ulrich Bächtold, in *idem*, *Schriften, Bd. I.*, (ed.) by Thomas Brunnschweiler and Samuel Lutz (Zürich, 1995), pp. 313–29.

His death on the battlefield of Kappel in 1531 had ended this vision. If the alliance of 13 cantons was to survive, her elite had to find a way to resolve common issues beyond religious dissent. In the first and the second 'Landfriede' (Public Peace) they agreed to accept confessional diversity in the condominiums and the right of each canton to decide her confessional adherence in its own right.

In territories they ruled as common governors the decision on religious matters was thus transferred to the local parishes. A conversion from the Catholic to the Protestant belief however was banned after 1531. The second 'Landfriede' left the opportunity to change side open only for Protestant communities who decided to return to the old church. Whenever this actually happened, the Catholics exclaimed their triumph and the Protestants had to react. They had to show their very ability to preserve and protect the truly reformed church. In churches being used by both denominations (the so called Simultaneum) they deliberately changed the interior. For example, baptismal fonts and altars, that were rearranged only for the reason to prove the ability to defend the own cause, served as a means of symbolic communication.[13]

Although these breaches of the religious peace were debated fervently at the Swiss Parliament (Tagsatzung), the Catholics usually gave in knowing that the Protestants were in desperate need to succeed. The prosperous towns of Zurich, Basel, Bern, and Schaffhausen were at the Tagsatzung in minority and though their clergy were famous for their radical rhetoric they kept neutral while in the empire religious wars were fought. For them symbolic acts, that gave them the chance to demonstrate their town's commitment to the religious cause, were highly important. The Catholics were very understanding in these matters. The balance of power, which was also a balance of honour, was to remain untouched. The main task of the Swiss elite was to keep up this balance. As representatives of their cantons, they knew exactly which taboos were not to be touched, which questions should not to be asked, which acts were to be ignored.

Fathers taught young politicians what could be done and what could not be done. They travelled permanently and attended meetings with allies, partners, and subjects. Inter-cantonal communication therefore was only one – though an important – aspect of their day-to-day political life.

Religious antagonism had also forced the confederates to intensify the inner-religious communication. Protestants and Catholics alike strengthened their political, social, and cultural bonds in festivities, formal alliances, and frequent protests against their adversary's encroachment on their sacred rights at the Tagsatzung. Both sides were evidently convinced that the federal peace could only be kept if the religious parties acted homogeneously. The complicated religious balance was based on discipline. Those politicians who stood for a hard line against

[13] Daniela Hacke, *Koexistenz und Differenz: Konfession, Kommunikation und Konflikt in der Alten Eidgenossenschaft (1531–1712)* (Zürich, 2011).

the religious enemy were to be given the chance to distinguish themselves. When the situation got serious, however, they were expected to keep silence.

Interreligious Alienation and its Consequences

The very fact that the other side did not cross the red line of confessional conflict stabilized as a matter of course the relationship of trust between Protestants and Catholics. However, it was a fragile stability. Although both acknowledged the other side's reluctance to break the peace, they were unsure about the motifs of their adversaries and proved to be critical in respect of internal debates on the other side of the religious boundary.

In 1651 Lucerne's councillor, Ludwig von Pfyffer, analysed the relationship between Protestants and Catholics in his 'Fidelis et arcana remonstratio'.[14] Like Weissenbach and the painter in Fribourg he compared Switzerland to a paradise. Blessed by God, the country was the natural enemy of the devil. He tried everything to pollute and finally destroy this brave people of peasants who had risen from obscurity to punish the haughty aristocrats. As a matter of fact the Lord of evil had succeeded in bringing conflict and heresy to the new Israel. Although the Catholics were able to defeat the Protestant troops and to keep their territories religiously pure, the future of the country was open.

A war between both sides, he argued, was definitely in nobody's interest. In case of a military defeat, Catholics and Protestants alike would most probably turn to the emperor for help. The true winner of any civil war in Switzerland would be her most fervent enemy – the house of Habsburg. Interest thus dictates the Swiss to keep peace. The Catholics for sure knew this. On the Protestant side, Pfyffer explained, things were completely different. Zurich was under the spell of charismatic preachers who called for bloodshed. On several occasions they had given reason to the Catholics to defend their rights by force. At the last moment, the Catholic councillors who preferred negotiations to violence averted war. Although this attitude was laudable, one has to bear in mind that the Protestants had always betrayed their compatriots after these negotiations. The contracts they had signed in the past were not worth the paper they had been written on. The time of compromise was evidently coming to an end. The military preparedness of the Catholics was to be improved immediately. Pfyffer

[14] Fidelis et arcana Remonstratio, das ist, treu und geheimbe Warnung, an die Hochlobliche Catholische Eydtgnosschafft, und insonderheit an die hohclob. Statt Lucern, als derselbigem erstes Orth, zu bessrer Defension, und mehrere Versicherung in Friden und Kriegs Zeiten, derselbige orthodoxische Religioin, auch hochberühmten wohlhergebrachten Freyheiten und Gerechtigkeiten, so wohl ggen frömden Königen, Fürsten und Ständen, als gegen Vatterlänischen Fründen udn Feinden (ZHL Ms. 21 fol.).

was addressing deficiencies in the defence system of the town and their ability to attack the enemy. According to him, war was about to come.

Although Catholics and Protestants both were interested in keeping peace and showed their readiness to come to tacit agreements with the other side, each party permanently tested one's own ability to increase its power. Both parties played their game with concealed cards. They demonstrated their readiness to fight and pointed to the internal pressure they stood only to tip the balance of power slowly in their favour. Although the confederates still proved to be able to talk on issues both religious parties shared an interest in (like economy or alliances with France), the alienation between the religious parties was considerable.

An incident from the year 1683 reported in the chronicles of the monastery of Einsiedeln, offers a fascinating insight into the inability of the contemporaries to predict the attitude of the other side in religious issues. Pater Pirminius, a priest from Thurgau, had been found guilty of committing several crimes and was sentenced to lifelong retreat in Einsiedeln.[15] In April 1683, the monk who served breakfast to the prisoner found his cell empty. Pirminius had used his bed sheets to escape and fled to Zurich. After intense debates the authorities of Einsiedeln decided to follow him. A delegation of priests, worldly authorities, and Pirminius's relatives was commissioned to hunt the criminal and take him back.

They made a clandestine journey to Protestant Zurich. The Catholics, who preferred to ride during the night, visited no inn. When it became evident that Pirminius was staying at the town itself, they reluctantly resolved to negotiate with the Protestant authorities. One of them was sent into the city and actually succeeded in meeting her mayor. To the utter surprise of the other delegates, he got a warm welcome. The Catholics were given the opportunity to talk to the fugitive who had already professed his intention to convert to Protestantism.

The following conversation between him and his hunters actually made him change his mind. Prayers, good words, threats, and moral pressure finally proved to be successful. Pirminius agreed to return to his prison. When the delegates took their leave, Zurich's mayor wished them farewell. Smiling at the delegates, he even thanked them for their visit. Guests like Pirminius, he told them, were quite undesirable for this town. Unfortunately the councillors were expected to protect converts. However, if somebody could persuade them to revoke their intention, nobody was unhappy about that decision.

The mayors showed the difficult situation both sides were in. On the one hand they had to show their commitment to the Protestant cause. A refusal to give asylum to converts would have caused fervent protests by the clergy. On the other hand these converts were usually suspected to have changed their creed in order to cover criminal acts, to end an unpleasant marriage or to escape debts.

[15] StiftsA Einsiedeln A HB 4, 1683, pp. 82 *et passim*.

Cooperation however was possible. The case of Pirminius was solved in a face-keeping manner. But did this demonstration of goodwill really change the relationship between the adversaries? As a matter of fact, the councillors of Zurich were interested in a solution but their Catholic neighbours showed to be unable to assess their political intentions and their reliability.

On the Brink of Disintegration – the First War of Villmergen

Under these difficult circumstances, confessional minorities pursuing a hidden belligerent agenda could easily cause considerable unrest. This became evident when, on 22 September 1655, a small group of refugees came to Zurich.[16] They reported they were Protestant citizens from the Catholic canton of Schwyz. After being converted by a minister from Zurich, they had been detected by their government and felt forced to leave their homes. Some of their relatives who had hesitated to leave had already been taken under arrest. They who luckily made it to Zurich asked for asylum.[17]

Unsurprisingly, the councillor who met them first reluctantly agreed to help. They were allowed to stay for one night or two but after this short period of time they were expected to leave the town as quickly as possible. The case of the refugees, the councillor made clear in his response, must not disturb the religious peace between the confederates. Only hours after this provisional decision was issued, the council changed its mind. A majority of its members overruled the cautious decree and granted asylum to the converts from Schwyz. Moreover, they made the cause of these refugees their own and protested against imprisonment of those Protestants who were still living in Schwyz.[18] Swiss federal law, they explained in a letter directed to the councillor of Schwyz, protected converts.[19] As citizens of the confederacy, these enjoyed the right to freedom of conscience. Although the government of Schwyz was entitled to prohibit the exercise of Protestantism, they were obliged to offer their citizens the opportunity to leave their territory. The personal safety of the converts, however, was to be guaranteed and their possessions had to remain untouched.

Schwyz reacted with outrage. In their answer the councillors of Schwyz made clear that a Swiss citizenship did not even exist, nor did federal law protect

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[16] Walter Utzinger, *Bürgermeister Johann Heinrich Wasers eidgenössisches Wirken 1652–1669: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der zweiten Hälfte des 17. Jahrhunderts* (Zürich, 1902).

[17] Alois Rey, 'Geschichte des Protestantismus in Arth bis zum Prozeß von 1655', *Mitteilungen des Historischen Vereins des Kantons Schwyz* 44 (1944): 1–179.

[18] StA Schwyz 441/001, Zürich an Schwyz, 15/25 September 1655.

[19] StA Zürich, Speech of Protestant Delegates, 24 October 1655.

the citizens of Schwyz.[20] Switzerland, they pointed out, was not a confederacy of people but of the cantons and the federal law served as an instrument to find compromise between the governments in case of conflict.[21] Zurich's letter was thus regarded as provocation. The Protestant neighbour had deliberately crossed numerous red lines by accepting religious refugees and touching legal questions that had carefully been left open for decades. The contemporaries – especially in Bern – were taken by surprise by this behaviour and wondered what Zurich's councillor intended to do.

In the weeks that followed, the strategy of the Protestant 'Vorort' (presiding city) Zurich unfolded step by step. Being aware of the fact that a military confrontation could only be won with assistance of the Protestant city of Bern, numerous letters were sent to their councillors, Zurich did everything to win over the reluctant Protestant ally. Bern's decision-makers showed little inclination to get involved in this matter. They agreed however to inform Schwyz that they expected the Catholic authority to remain calm. In case the Protestant minority in Schwyz remained unharmed for the time being, they would do everything to pacify Zurich.[22]

Zurich, however, did everything to provoke the Catholic neighbour. Topics were discussed the Protestants were expected to keep silence on. A cascade of impoliteness, tactlessness, and pure aggression moved the Catholic government of Schwyz to a fatal step. In order to restore her reputation, the council sentenced the Protestant dissenters to death. The very day they were executed, Zurich and Bern declared war on Schwyz and her Catholic allies.

The political string puller who had caused the conflict could easily be detected. It was an alliance of Protestant hard liners who had called for political action for years and of sober politicians from Bern and Zurich who regarded a war as the only way to reform the confederacy. Both groups wanted to change a political system that was based on a fragile balance of power – an equilibrium that was tested permanently by both sides.

Local conflicts on confessional issues – like the affair in Schwyz in 1655 – were anything but rare in Early Modern Switzerland. The confederal elite usually calmed them and made use of them in order to increase their influence on those who asked for their help. Moreover, the interest they showed in these local matters and the confrontation they sought at the confederal level helped to avoid civil wars – both sides finally agreed on silent compromises. It was an efficient system but at the same time it was a very inflexible one. Those who wanted a more powerful government, that could ease local unrest by central law courts and guarantee Swiss neutrality with a coordinated foreign policy, proved

[20] BBB Ms. Helv. VI 112.

[21] StA Zürich A 235 1, Report, 24 October 1655.

[22] StA Zürich A 235 2, Report, 26 November 1655.

to be as unsatisfied as the radical Protestants that wanted to act as protector of the true believers on a European stage. It was a dangerous alliance for both participants were insiders of the system. They knew what rules were to be respected in order to keep the peace. Now they crossed these red lines only to force the other side to make war.

The result of the confrontation they had caused, however, was an unexpected one. The Catholic side defended Zurich's attacks on the town of Rapperswyl and organized almost simultaneously a surprise attack on Bern's army at Villmergen.[23] Bern's military leader Sigmund von Erlach explained to his council that, regarding the defeats the Protestants had suffered, victory was possible only with the assistance of foreign partners. The council refused and the war was ended.[24]

To pacify both parties, however, proved to be a difficult task. Both sides accused the other of having committed war crimes, and it took considerable diplomatic skills of the neutral cantons – especially of Basel's mayor Wettstein – to restore the balance of honour between both parties.[25] Especially Switzerland's German neighbours admired the end of the War of Villmergen as a triumph of patriotism and reason. While Germany had been torn apart in bloody wars, the confederacy, a German pamphlet pointed out, returned rapidly to peace.[26]

In many ways the Swiss system of avoiding a collapse proved to be successful even in war times: the neutrality of those cantons, that were obliged by legal provision not to take up arms in case of a military conflict, was respected. The defeated party did not turn to foreign powers for help. The winners respected the rights and privileges of the defeated during the peace process. The confederates had fought a war but they did not dissolve the confederacy.[27] A short, limited war was undesirable but it was not regarded as a disruption of political order. As a matter of fact, the mutual conviction, that the destruction of the Swiss confederacy would not be in anybody's interest and would, moreover, conflict with God's will, certainly eased the way to find a way out of the military conflict. Similar ideas and convictions however proved to be unable to stop the escalation of wars in France, the empire or in England.[28]

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[23] StA Luzern 13/2435.

[24] StA Bern B II 352, Nr. 62, pp. 88, 102.

[25] Julia Gauss and Alfred Stoecklin, *Bürgermeister Wettstein: Der Mann, das Werk, die Zeit* (Basel, 1953).

[26] Frieden in Parnassi (BBB Ms. Helv. VI 67).

[27] Paul Schweizer, *Geschichte der Schweizerischen Neutralität* (Frauenfeld, 1895), p. 140. See also Gutachten der juristischen Fakultät Basel vom 10.4.1656 (Burgerbibliothek Bern), Ms. Helv. VI 67.

[28] Mack P. Holt, *The French wars of Religion* (Cambridge, 1995), p. 134; Clive Holmes, *The Eastern Association in the English Civil War* (Cambridge, 1974), p. 33; Peter Gaunt, *The English civil Wars* (Oxford, 2003), pp. 75 *et passim*; Friedrich von der Decken, *Herzog Georg von Braunschweig und Lüneburg: Beiträge zur Geschichte des dreissigjährigen Krieges nach*

It was not the patriotism of her councillors but most probably the oblivious disinterest of Europe's great powers in a Swiss civil war that saved Switzerland from the fate of her neighbours. There were many good reasons for this military abstinence. One of them was the disastrous result of the military interventions by Spain and France in the Grisons federation during the civil war in the years from 1618 to 1632.[29] Being loosely associated with the Swiss Confederacy, this Republic proved to be completely ungovernable. None of the great powers were able to perpetuate a military success. Instead of getting control over the polycentric political body, the occupying forces were absorbed by countless local conflicts. A direct rule over the Grisons was evidently not possible.[30] It was, however, quite easy to influence her political decisions by patronage and bribe. What was true for the Grisons was also true for her big sister, the Swiss Confederacy. Instead of repeating the mistakes they had made in the Grisons, the great Powers preferred to intensify their diplomatic networks in Switzerland and tried to control the open market for mercenaries with bribes and persuasion.[31] France and Spain not only accepted Switzerland's neutrality in European conflicts, they were actually primarily interested in keeping the country outside of the wars.[32] Therefore, their ambassadors tried to gain influence not by tearing the country apart but by mediating in domestic conflicts.[33]

It was this well-founded self-restraint of the European kingdoms that made Switzerland a special case – a political body that could be imagined as a garden being surrounded by wilderness. However, the balance of power between the religious parties in the Confederacy, on the one hand, and the pacifying influence of the diplomats, on the other hand, were hardly sufficient to keep Switzerland out of the European wars. The history of the first War of Villmergen demonstrated how easily the Confederacy could disintegrate. It had been

Originalquellen des Königlichen Archivs zu Hannover (Hannover 1833), pp. 135–47; Peter H. Wilson, *The Thirty Years War: Europe's Tragedy* (London, 2009), p. 569.

[29] Andreas Wendland, *Der Nutzen der Pässe und die Gefährdung der Seelen: Spanien, Mailand un der Kampf ums Veltlin (1620–1641)* (Zürich, 1995).

[30] Randolph C. Head, *Early Modern Democracy in the Grisons: Social Order and Political Language in a Swiss Mountain canton 1470–1620* (Cambridge, 1995).

[31] Christian Windler, '"Ohne Geld keine Schweizer": Pensionen und Söldnerrekrutierung auf den eidgenössischen Patronagemärkten', in Hillard von Thiessen et al. (eds), *Nähe in der Ferne: Personale Verflechtung in den Außenbeziehungen der Frühen Neuzeit* (Berlin, 2005), pp. 105–33.

[32] Frieda Gallati, 'Eidgenössische Politik zur Zeit des 30jährigen Krieges', *Jahrbuch für Schweizer Geschichte* 43/44 (1918/19).

[33] Hillard von Thiessen, 'Diplomatie vom type ancient: Überlegungen zu einem Idealtypus des frühneuzeitlichen Diplomaten' in Hillard von Thiessen and Christian Windler (eds), *Akteure der Aussenbeziehungen: Netzwerke und Interkulturalität im historischen Wandel* (Köln, 2010), pp. 471–503.

caused by a small group of politicians and ministers who intentionally made use of the distrust between the religious parties – a distrust being nourished by communication structures, which were based on tabooing insoluble religious and political problems. Permanent peace was only possible if the political elite succeeded in controlling the hawks. The priests and the ministers had to be kept outside politics.

The Birth of the Republic

No less pernicious to the domestic peace of the confederacy was the participation of parts of the Swiss elite in the European wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.[34] The mercenaries brought invaluable political contacts and immense economical wealth into the country. However, the alliances with France, Spain, Venice, the Netherlands, Genoa or Savoy also created economical dependencies. This became obvious when in 1649 the French crown threatened to collapse under the burden of her accumulated debts. The price for the victory over the house of Habsburg now was to be paid. Taxes and fees were increased, revolts (the so called 'Fronde') took place and as early as in 1648 the crown was declared to be bankrupt.[35] The Swiss whom the crown owed more than 6 Million Livre faced considerable financial unrest. Their mercenaries were not paid any longer, the officers were unable to transfer money to their families in Switzerland, and the creditworthiness of the Swiss dropped dramatically. The bankruptcy of France, which had been caused by the Thirty Years War, threatened to destabilize Switzerland. The solution, the federal elites found, was remarkable. A delegation, that threatened to call all Swiss troops back if Mazarin would not pay the crown's liabilities, was sent to Paris. A debt repayment schedule was signed and, though it was never fulfilled, the crisis was averted.[36]

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[34] Heinz Schilling, 'Formung und Gestalt des internationalen Systems in der werdenden Neuzeit – Phasen und bewegende Kräfte', in Peter Krüger (ed.), *Kontinuität und Wandel in der Staatenordnung der Neuzeit* (Marburg, 1991), pp. 19–46; Johannes Burkhardt, 'Konfession als Argument in den zwischenstaatlichen Beziehungen: Friedenschancen und Religionskriegsgefahren in der Entspannungspolitik zwischen Ludwig XIV. und dem Kaiserhof', in Heinz Duchhardt (ed.), *Rahmenbedingungen und Handlungsspielräume europäischer Außenpolitik im Zeitalter Ludwigs XIV.* (Berlin, 1991), pp. 135–54; Axel Gotthard, *Konfession und Staatsräson: Die Außenpolitik Württembergs unter Herzog Johann Friedrich (1608–1628)* (Stuttgart, 1992).

[35] Geoffrey Treasure, *Mazarin: The Crisis of Absolutism in France* (London, 1995); Hubert Carrier, *Le labyrinthe de l'Etat: Essai sur le débat politique en France au temps de la Fronde (1648–1653)* (Paris, 2004); Michel Pernot, *La Fronde* (Paris, 1994).

[36] Yves-Marie Bercé, 'Le Role des Suisses pendant la Fronde', in *Cinq siècle de relations franco suissses. Hommage à Louis Édouard Roulet* (Neuchatel, 1984), pp. 73–87.

Financial and economic pressure thus forced the confederates to imagine Switzerland not only as a Lost Paradise that was to be restored in the future but to represent her as a strong and unified state.[37] This new imagination was not based on a change of structures but on a change of attitude. Like those who compared Switzerland to a devastated garden the creators of the idea of Swiss identity recurred on the concept of the countries exceptionalism. They also accepted the existence of a presumably ancient Helvetian tradition and the claim that the country's borders existed ever since. These elements of the well known imagination of the Swiss crisis however were supplemented by new juridical arguments that referred on the concepts of sovereignty and by the modern experience of a well kept neutrality during the Thirty Years War.[38]

In 1683 Zurich's renowned copper engraver Conrad Meyer published a single leaf print titled 'The welfare of the Confederacy' showing a Helvetia Triumphans who celebrated her victory over all sins and all evil.[39] Only five years later Johann Carl Balthasar, a councillor from Lucerne, commissioned a painting for his town palace showing a well-to-do Helvetia surrounded by the peaceful and successful republics Venetia and Roma.[40]

This new opportunity to perceive Switzerland did not substitute the idea of a community in crisis. The painters from Fribourg and Weissenbach worked actually at the same time when the imagination of the Swiss republican Paradise was created. Both concepts coexisted and were made use of by the same people. The imagination of a strong republic, however, was based on the promise that the elites were able to fulfil the dream of a strong government. It was this promise which the new faith in the creditworthiness of the Swiss cantons by the financial markets was based on. Once the promise was made, the elite found themselves more and more often in the situation to fill the idea with life. The very fact that the republic was to be guided by a strong secular elite made republicanism even more interesting for the councillors of Switzerland. The collective imagination of a paradise regained helped to diminish the influence of those radicals that threatened the stability of the federal balance of power anyway.

The new optimism did neither stabilize the fragile balance of power in Switzerland nor did it open an opportunity for a structural modernization. Finding solutions and restoring the balance of honour had not become easier

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[37] Marco Jorio (ed.), *1648: Die Schweiz und Europa. Aussenpolitik zur Zeit des westfälischen Friedens* (Zürich, 1999).

[38] Thomas Maissen, *Die Geburt der Republic: Staatsverständnis und Repräsentation in er frühneuzeitlichen Eidgenossenschaft* (Göttingen, 2006).

[39] Conrad Meyer, *Wolstand der Eidgnoßschaft, Neujahrsblatt der Bürgerbibliothek Zürich 1683*, Radierung ZHL Graphische Sammlung.

[40] Georg Carlen, *Manierismus und Frühbarock: Barockmalerei in der Zentralschweiz* (no place, no date); Adolf Reinle, *Die Stadt Luzern, II. Teil*, Die Kunstdenkmäler des Kantons Luzern 3 = Die Kunstdenkmäler der Schweiz 31 (Basel, 1954), pp. 182–6.

because the practice of tabooing all matters, which the parties could not compromise on, was still in use – it was only perceived in a new bright way.

Late seventeenth-century Switzerland thus was a Janus-faced country that could be imagined in different ways depending on interests and circumstances. On the one side, it could be regarded as a peaceful and successful republic in the best tradition of European republicanism. On the other side, it was periodically shaken by the outbreak of religiously motivated violence leading the country to the edge of destruction. Early modern Switzerland fluctuated between these two options, these two possible realities.[41]

[41] Barbara Weinmann, *Eine andere Bürgergesellschaft: Klassischer Republikanismus und Kommunalismus im Kanton Zürich im späten 18. und 19. Jahrhundert* (Göttingen, 2002).

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Chapter 3

Were the French Wars of Religion Really Wars of Religion?[1]

Philip Benedict

Even to ask the question posed in the title of this essay might seem unnecessary, since no other conflict in late medieval or early modern history includes the phrase 'wars of religion' in the label conventionally affixed to it. In fact, however, historians from the sixteenth century to the present day have debated whether the civil wars that roiled France from *c.*1560 to 1598 arose primarily from religious differences or aristocratic ambition. Consider these two quotations from the years 1579–81, the first from a Catholic historian and the second from a Protestant:

> Those who have considered things closely have known that neither religion alone nor the oppression of the Protestants caused the kingdom's troubles, but also the hatreds that existed among the great nobles because of their ambitions and rivalries.[2]

> Those who, in speaking generally of the true sources of the strange tumults that our fathers began but have not yet finished, attribute the source only to the difference in religion, are immediately contradicted by those most clairvoyant in affairs of state, who find only human passions. ... For my part I will suspend judgment on these questions.[3]

These quotations show clearly that by 1580 historians already felt compelled to address the question of the relative importance of religious and political causes, even if they believed, as did the author of the second quotation, the Protestant La Popelinière, that 'human and divine passions follow so closely and intermix so

[1] The author would like to thank Barbara Diefendorf and Mark Greengrass for helpful comments on an earlier, very different version of this essay and Harriet Rudolph for her editorial suggestions about this version.

[2] François de Belleforest, *Les grandes annales et histoire générale de France* (Paris, 1579), vol. 2, fo. 1617v.

[3] Lancelot Voisin de La Popelinière, *Histoire de France* ([La Rochelle], 1581), vol. 1, p. 286.

often that even the best informed can scarcely say which is the cause'.[4] Historians today are more likely to speak of religious, political or social 'factors' than of 'human and divine passions', but the same basic question still engages them.

That the broad terms of debate for understanding a past event should already have been set at the time of the event itself is a common phenomenon. Historians have similarly argued about the role of the Enlightenment in causing the French Revolution and about the importance of slavery in the American Civil War ever since those events took place. That late sixteenth-century Frenchmen disagreed about the importance of religion in sparking their troubles nonetheless deserves to be stressed, for William T. Cavanaugh's stimulating but misguided recent contribution to this centuries old debate has claimed that it is both anachronistic and erroneous to categorize the violence that shook sixteenth-century France as religiously motivated, since the very idea of religion in its modern sense as an organized set of practices and beliefs distinguishable from the secular realm was not yet well formed.[5]

When a scholar who is not a specialist in the history of sixteenth-century France can construct and gain wide hearing for an argument that is so plainly contradicted by contemporary texts, it is an indication that those who are specialists in the period have inadequately explored the subject. That is what the first part of this essay will attempt to do. Examining how people at the time understood the troubles they lived through, the paper will show that contemporaries could and did distinguish between religious and non-religious matters. Both powerful political considerations and the very way in which contemporaries understood the word religion led some to downplay its centrality to the conflicts. Others insisted upon its importance and spoke of the conflicts as 'wars of religion', if not usually in those precise three words.

The essay will then go on to sketch quickly the broad contours of interpretation of the civil wars from 1600 to the past generation, when the general trend has been to 'put religion back into the Wars of Religion'.[6] After outlining why this approach has gained the upper hand among historians from different countries, part two will ask how the question posed in the title of this essay may best be answered today. The goal here will be to specify just how and how fully religion sparked and prolonged violence in later sixteenth-century France, and in what senses the term 'wars of religion' can usefully be applied to this period.

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[4] Ibid.

[5] William T. Cavanaugh, *The Myth of Religious Violence: Secular Ideology and the Roots of Modern Conflict* (Oxford, 2009), esp. pp. 159–60.

[6] Mack P. Holt, 'Putting Religion back into the Wars of Religion', *French Historical Studies* 18 (1993): 524–51.

Contemporary Perceptions and Conceptions

Although some recent historians extend accounts of the Wars of Religion to a further cycle of uprisings and conflicts during the 1620s, attention will be focused here on the civil wars that followed one another in close succession during the last four decades of the sixteenth century.[7] Isolated incidents of disorder began shortly after growing numbers of those already drawn to evangelical or Protestant ideas withdrew from 1555 onward from the Church of Rome to join illegal, newly founded Reformed churches whose establishment was in significant measure directed from Geneva. Eight months after the sudden death of King Henry II in a jousting accident, royal authority was badly shaken in early 1560 in an episode known as the conspiracy of Amboise, when armed conspirators tried to separate the young king Francis II from his most trusted councillors, the cardinal of Lorraine and the Duke of Guise, and to kill the latter or bring them to trial. Around the same time, armed bands of Protestants and Catholics began to clash in several portions of southeastern France. In January 1562, the crown sought to calm matters by granting the Reformed full freedom of worship, but this provoked a hostile reaction from many leading Catholics, most notably the first prince of the blood Anthony of Navarre, who had previously inclined toward Protestantism. New episodes of anti-Protestant violence and the return to court in force of the leading Catholic noblemen convinced the Huguenots that they had to take up arms to protect themselves and to defend their newly-granted rights. So began the first of eight formally declared civil wars over the subsequent 36 years. For the first two thirds of this period, the most fundamental issue at stake was always that of the extent of freedom of worship extended to the Reformed, a question regularly linked to that of whose advice the crown would follow. Following the death of the last of the king's brothers and the consequent emergence of the Protestant Henry of Navarre as the heir apparent in 1584, struggle focused on whether or not a Protestant – or, after Henry's conversion in 1593, an ex-Protestant who had already relapsed once after a prior conversion to Catholicism – could be allowed to succeed to the throne. The intermittent periods of nominal peace and toleration between these eight civil wars were also troubled by episodes of crowd violence and massacre, the largest and most notorious of which was the Saint Bartholomew's massacre of 1572.

The claim that it is anachronistic to attribute sixteenth-century conflicts to religious as opposed to secular motives derives largely from a line of argument

[7] Histories that adopt the longer chronology include Mack P. Holt, *The French Wars of Religion, 1562–1629* (Cambridge, 1995) and Nicolas Le Roux, *Les guerres de religion, 1559–1629* (Paris, 2010). Other up-to-date syntheses are Olivia Carpi, *Les Guerres de Religion (1559–1598): Un conflit franco-français* (Paris, 2012) and the especially outstanding Arlette Jouanna, et al., *Histoire et dictionnaire des guerres de religion* (Paris, 1998).

initiated by Wilfred Cantwell Smith in his important book of 1962, *The Meaning and End of Religion*.[8] Cantwell Smith highlighted the difficulty of arriving at an adequate definition of religion that can be deployed as a fixed category across cultures and epochs by tracing the changing meanings of the word in the West. He showed that, after initially connoting something akin to 'worship' or 'true piety' in ancient Rome, *religio* became largely synonymous with clerical status or a way of life bound by monastic vows for the better part of the Middle Ages. The ancient connotation was also recovered with the Renaissance, while between the fifteenth and the seventeenth centuries the word additionally took on haltingly what we now consider its basic meaning, designating a system of beliefs and rituals concerning the divine. A generation after Cantwell Smith, Foucauldian and post-colonial anthropologists and religious studies scholars globalized and radicalized his insight by suggesting that the application of the word in this last sense to non-Western belief systems or practices only came in the wake of colonial expansion, extending a Western concept to an alien reality that it often fit awkwardly. Only with the Enlightenment did the dichotomy between religious matters and a secular sphere come to be firmly established.[9]

French sources of the mid-sixteenth century reveal, however, that the word 'religion' was used to designate the two rival ecclesiastical communities that formed within the kingdom as soon as dissident evangelicals began to withdraw from the Church of Rome to hold their own assemblies. The documents are full of talk of 'ceux de la nouvelle religion', of the presence of 'deux religions' in the country, and of 'seditions qui semblent nous menacer pour le fait de la religion'.[10] The word 'religion' retained other connotations as well. Many people continued to have difficulty entertaining the notion that more than one religion could have adherents who believed it out of sincere conviction rather than wilful ignorance

[8] Wilfred Cantwell Smith, *The Meaning and End of Religion* (New York, 1962).

[9] Important expressions of this view include Talal Asad, 'The Construction of Religion as an Anthropological Category' in his *Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam* (Baltimore, 1993); Daniel Dubuisson, *The Western Construction of Religion: Myths, Knowledge and Ideology* (Baltimore, 2003); and Timothy Fitzgerald, *Discourse on Civility and Barbarity. A Critical History of Religion and Related Categories* (Oxford, 2007). Martin Riesebrodt, *The Promise of Salvation* (Chicago, 2010), offers a cogent critique.

[10] For just some appearances: Loris Petris, *La plume et la tribune: Michel de L'Hospital et ses discours (1559–1562)* (Geneva, 2002), pp. 361, 397–403, 433–9; 'L'édit de Nantes et ses antécédents (1562–1598)': http://elec.enc.sorbonne.fr/editsdepacification (accessed 16 April 2014), *passim*; 'Exhortation aux princes et seigneurs du Conseil privé du Roy pour obvier aux seditions qui semblent nous menacer pour le fait de la religion' in *Mémoires de Condé* (London, 1743), vol. 1, p. 892; Étienne Pasquier, *Lettres historiques pour les années 1556–1594*, (ed.) D. Thickett (Geneva, 1966), p. 78; Jean Philippi, 'Histoire des troubles de Languedoc' in Louise Guiraud (ed.), *La Réforme à Montpellier: Preuves* (Montpellier, 1918), p. 57.

or base passion. That there were multiple sets of beliefs and practices called religions was nonetheless most definitely an idea in common currency by 1560.

Furthermore, contemporaries could and did distinguish between religious and other motives or concerns in two ways. The first is suggested in the quotation from La Popelinière in the first paragraph of this essay, where the historian structures his reflections about the causes of the conflicts around the dichotomy between religion and the human passions. This connects to the continuing strength within the vocabulary of the time of the connotation of 'religion' as 'true piety'. Learned sixteenth-century men and women generally believed that knowledge of the divine was engraved at least faintly in every person's conscience, where the divine passions warred with the baser, human ones. Given that knowledge of true piety was inscribed within each person's heart, whenever a person embraced false or heretical beliefs, he or she was clearly not heeding religion's call, but had succumbed to the pull of some base passion. La Popelinière was exceptional among the late sixteenth-century historians of France's civil wars in that, even though he himself was a Protestant, he sought to write impartially 'as the good historiographer should'.[11] His refusal to pick apart the divine and the human in the motives of the different actors was a function of this quest for impartiality. The great majority of more partisan authors consistently refused to accept that those on the other side acted out of religious motives. Instead, so the diagnosis always ran, they acted 'under the cloak of religion' moved by ambition, greed, or lust. Only within one's own party was true religious motivation ever to be found. Even there partisans of the cause had to work actively to hold their baser passions in check to ensure the primacy of true piety and move God to reward the cause with victory. Hence, the oath of association for those rallying to the banner of the Protestant Prince of Condé in 1562 required all to swear, 'we bring no private passions to this alliance and are concerned only with the honour of God, deliverance of the king, conservation of the royal edicts and ordinances, and punishment of those who disobey them'.[12] The war that was supposed to be raging within each human breast between true religion or the love of God and private or base passions, together with the concomitant refusal of most belligerents to accept the religious *bona fides* of the

[11] 'La Popelinière to Theodore Beza, La Rochelle?, 15 january 1581' in Henri Meylan, Alain Dufour, et al. (eds), *Correspondance de Théodore de Bèze* (Geneva, 1960–), vol. 22, p. 19. See also George Huppert, *The Idea of Perfect History* (Urbana, 1970), ch. 8; G. W. Sypher, 'La Popelinière's "Histoire de France": A Case of Historical Objectivity and Religious Censorship', *Journal of the History of Ideas* 24 (1963): 41–54; Kevin Robbins, 'Rewriting Protestant History: Printing, Censorship by Pastors, and the Dimensions of Dissent among the Huguenots – the La Popelinière Case at La Rochelle, 1581–85' in A. Pettegree, et al. (eds), *The Sixteenth Century French Religious Book* (Aldershot, 2001), pp. 239–55.

[12] *Mémoires de Condé*, vol. 3, p. 259.

enemy, was one reason why the question of whether or not the conflicts were truly wars of religion was already debated at the time.

Another way in which contemporaries separated religious and non-religious concerns was through the distinction they regularly made between matters of religion and matters of state or the secular order. A second reason why they debated whether the civil wars were really about religion was that the programmes of the warring parties regularly mentioned concerns of both kinds. Those who took the oath of association of the Prince of Condé, for instance, not only swore to uphold the 'honour of God', by which they meant protecting Reformed rights of worship and defending the true faith against a feared Catholic conspiracy to annihilate it. They also vowed to deliver the king, to defend his laws, and to punish those who violated them. Their claim was that the king had been taken under the wing of the great Catholic noblemen and forced to act against his will, that these noblemen intended to undo the royal edict of January, and that the Duke of Guise was responsible for the recent, illegal massacre of Vassy.[13] The 1560 conspiracy of Amboise provides another example of an initiative with multiple goals. It sought at once the moderation of the persecution of heresy, the removal of the leading members of the Guise family from their place of pre-eminence within the king's councils, which they were said to have usurped illegally, and their punishment for maladministration. The Catholic League formed in 1585 provides a third example. While seeking to prevent a heretic from ever acceding to the throne of France, it also protested against recent tax increases and the excessive authority bestowed on certain royal favourites. How such a range of concerns might lead to uncertainty and debate about what really moved those involved in these causes is revealed by a 1585 letter of the jurist and political observer Etienne Pasquier. After noting the complaints expressed in an early League manifesto, he wrote: 'the most careful men cannot well judge whether the movement is directed against the state or the new religion'.[14] The distinction between religious and political matters was made not only by observers but also by participants. A manifesto of the Amboise conspirators posted on walls in Paris in 1560 declared: 'While some of those who have risen against [the Guises] wish to live according to the reformation of the Gospel, ... this cause alone would never have led them to take arms, were there not the civil and political cause of their oppression of your Majesty, your Estates and the laws and customs of France'.[15]

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[13] Philip Benedict, 'Pour quoi luttaient les protestants en 1562? Sur la dissémination et réception des "Déclarations" du prince de Condé' in Gabriele Haug-Moritz and Lothar Schilling (ed.), *Médialité et interprétation contemporaine des premières guerres de Religion* (Berlin, 2014), pp. 24–36.

[14] Pasquier, *Lettres historiques*, p. 252.

[15] 'Les Estats de France opprimez par la tyrannie de Guise' in *Mémoires de Condé*, vol. 1, p. 410.

If contemporaries were thus able to distinguish between affairs of religion and 'civil and political' matters, but if both kinds of concerns were mixed in the manifestos of the time, which did they judge more important? Were France's 'wars, massacres and troubles' principally civil wars or religious wars in their eyes? Opinions were divided. In the titles that they chose for their works, early chroniclers of these events most often spoke simply of 'troubles' or 'wars'.[16] When they added modifiers, some used the term 'civil wars'.[17] Others chose the labels 'the troubles stirred up by the Calvinists' or 'the troubles and civil wars of our time on grounds of religion'.[18] The first known occurrence of the exact three-word phrase 'wars of religion' appears in 1593 in the manifesto of a Catholic nobleman explaining why he abandoned the League and rallied to the banner of Henry IV after the king's conversion: had he continued to fight, he asserted, his combat could 'no longer be called a war of religion (*guerre de Religion*) but one of State, of ambition and of usurpation'.[19] But longer circumlocutions amounting to the same thing had become common decades earlier. A portion of the municipal chronicle of Montpellier probably written in 1574 speaks of 'that most bloody and pernicious civil war on grounds of religion (*celle tant sanguynolente et pernicieuse guerre civille pour le faict de la relligion*)' that began in 1562.[20] A 1573 Protestant treatise specifically distinguishes between, on the one hand, wars fought for the possession of territory, for honour, or to avenge an insult, and, on the other hand, 'wars for religion' (*guerres ... pour la religion*)

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[16] E.g. Loys de Perussiis, *Discours des guerres de la Comté de Venayscin et de la Provence: ensemble quelques incidentz* (Avignon, 1563); Philippi, 'Histoire des troubles de Languedoc'; [Nicolas Regnault], *Discours veritable des guerres et troubles avenus au pays de Provence* (Lyon, 1564); Gabriel de Saconay, *Discours des premiers troubles avenus à Lyon* (Lyon, 1569); Pierre Matthieu, *Histoire des dernières troubles de France sous Henri III et Henri IV* (Lyon, 1594).

[17] *Memoires de la troisieme guerre civile, et des derniers troubles de France* ([Geneva], 1571); Pierre Brisson, *Histoire et vray discours des guerres civiles es pays de Poictou, Aulnis ... Xaintonge et Angoumois* (Paris, 1578).

[18] 'Relation des troubles excités par les calvinistes dans la ville de Rouen depuis l'an 1537 jusqu'en l'an 1582', a chronicle of *c.*1581 published in the *Revue Rétrospective Normande* (1837); Jean Le Frère de Laval, *La vraye et entiere histoire des troubles et guerres civiles, avenues de nostre temps pour le faict de la religion, tant en France, Allemagne que païs bas* (Paris, 1573). This last was the most frequently republished and influential Catholic history of the era, with subsequent editions in 1574, 1575, 1576, 1578, and 1582, so its choice of terms is particularly significant.

[19] Louis de L'Hospital, *Manifeste à la noblesse de France*, quoted in Arlette Jouanna et al., *Histoire et dictionnaire des guerres de religion* (Paris, 1998), p. 396.

[20] 'Chronique du Petit Thalamus' in Guiraud, *La Réforme à Montpellier. Preuves*, p. 221; see also p. 208 (for the date when these words were written), p. 218.

'where the glory of God, the welfare of his Church, and the peace and salvation of the souls and consciences of the faithful are at stake'.[21]

Some patterns stand out clearly in the relative importance that different observers accorded religious and political considerations in these troubles. The first is that, while Protestants and Catholics both consistently denied the religious motivation of the other side, Huguenot historians also frequently downplayed their own camp's religious motivation and sought insofar as possible to separate the institutions of the Reformed churches from the political action of the Protestant party, especially when writing about events from 1560 to 1570. They had good reason to do so. At the very moment when Calvin wrote the first version of his *Institutes of the Christian Religion* in 1534–35, the Anabaptist kingdom of Munster seemed to confirm the worst fears of princes about the possibility that the spread of heresy would unleash the demons of rebellion, sexual license, and social levelling. The French Protestant movement was under permanent pressure thereafter to deny that it was by nature seditious, pressure that became especially intense in the wake of the failed conspiracy of Amboise, for if the Reformed churches could be linked to this attempt to seize the king's person, the accusation gained considerable plausibility. Even though the conspiracy recruited men and money through the network of churches, involved a number of French pastors, and went ahead with the knowledge, if not the approval, of Geneva's ministers, *The History of the Tumult of Amboise*, a printed work that appeared shortly after the movement's failure and that would be the first of many histories of the event written by Protestants over the subsequent years, cast the enterprise as a purely political cause, a campaign by noblemen of both faiths alarmed by Guise tyranny.[22] This interpretation of the event became standard in Protestant histories for centuries.[23] Similarly, a Protestant historian who wrote in 1576 about the reign of Francis II (1559–60), Louis Regnier de La Planche,

[21] 'Question, asavoir s'il est licite sauver la vie aux massacreurs et bourreaux prins en guerre par ceux de la Religion assiegez en ceste ville' in *Mémoires de l'Estat de France sous Charles IX* ([Geneva], 1578), vol. 2, p. 257.

[22] The text is reproduced in *Mémoires de Condé*, vol. 1, pp. 6–20. On the details of the conspiracy see Henri Naef, *La Conjuration d'Amboise et Genève* (Geneva/Paris, 1922); Lucien Romier, *La conjuration d'Amboise* (Paris, 1923); Robert M. Kingdon, *Geneva and the Coming of the Wars of Religion in France 1555–1563* (Geneva, 1956), ch. 7; Arlette Jouanna, *Le devoir de révolte: La noblesse française et la gestation de l'Etat moderne, 1559–1661* (Paris, 1989), ch. 5.

[23] Philip Benedict, *Graphic History: The* Wars, Massacres and Troubles *of Tortorel and Perrissin* (Geneva, 2007), p. 133; *idem*, 'La conviction plus forte que la critique: La Réforme et les guerres de religion vues par les historiens protestants à l'époque de la Révocation', in *idem*, Hugues Daussy, and Pierre-Olivier Léchot (eds), *L'identité huguenote: Faire mémoire et écrire l'histoire (XVIe–XXIe siècles)* (Geneva, 2013), p. 221–39; Henri Lutteroth, *La Réformation en France pendant sa première periode* (Paris, 1859), pp. 191–8.

asserted that the fundamental causes of France's calamities during that period were political: the corruption of the political system under the preceding kings Francis I and Henry II, who had allowed themselves to be led by the nose by their counsellors; the division of the political elite into the Guise and Montmorency factions; the monopolization of power under Francis II by the former; and the passivity of the Third Estate.[24] Protestant historiography cast the outbreak of the first civil war in 1562 as a sequence of events that began with the Duke of Guise's incitation of the massacre of Vassy and continued with his voyage to court, where he and his fellow 'Triumvirs' took the king and queen mother hostage against their will, in response to which the Huguenots mobilized at the appeal of the Prince of Condé.[25] In fact, men and money were also raised through the network of Reformed churches at the behest of its leading pastors.[26] However, to suggest that the Huguenot party acted at the call of a prince of the blood to rescue the king and oppose the illegal violence of the Duke of Guise was to position the Protestants as the defenders of the crown as well as to counter the accusation that heresy necessarily involved sedition. In pamphlets written amid the events, it also was a strategy to appeal to Catholic malcontents. The strategy worked to cast the wars as conflicts between rival noble factions fighting for the king's ear.

While early Protestant historians tended to downplay the religious component of the conflicts from 1560 to 1570, government officials caught in the middle of the storm initially saw things differently. As incidents of disorder multiplied in the wake of the early public Protestant assemblies, the royal prosecutor (*procureur du roi*) of Cognac wrote to the governor of the Angoumois as early as April 1559: 'We are in great combustion in this city because of the situations recurring daily arising from this new doctrine, with even husbands repudiating their wives and wives separating from their husbands because of the diversity in religion'.[27] The 1563 edict of pacification ending the first nationwide civil war began: 'All are aware how it has pleased Our Lord to permit this our kingdom to be afflicted and troubled for several years now by many troubles, seditions and tumults among our subjects arising from the diversity of opinions in the matter

[24] *Histoire de l'estat de France tant de la république que de la Religion sous le règne de François II* (n.p., 1576), pp. 5–6.

[25] See for instance Jean Crespin, *Histoire des martyrs*, (ed.) D. Benoit (Toulouse, 1889), vol. 3, pp. 264–5; [Theodore Beza], *Histoire ecclésiastique des* Églises *réformees au royaume de France*, (ed.) G. Baum and E. Cunitz (Paris, 1883–89), vol. 1, pp. 803–11, vol. 2, pp. 1–38.

[26] Pierre-Hyacinthe Morice, *Mémoires pour servir de preuves à l'histoire ecclésiastique et civile de Bretagne* (Paris, 1742–46), vol. 3, pp. 1302–3; *Correspondance de Bèze*, vol. 4, pp. 71–2, 254–60; Ann H. Guggenheim, 'Beza, Viret and the Church of Nîmes: National Leadership and Local Initiative in the Outbreak of the Religious Wars', *Bibliothèque d'Humanisme et Renaissance* 37 (1975): 33–47.

[27] Daniel Touzaud, 'Histoire de la Réforme en Angoumois', *Bulletin et Mémoires de la Société Archéologique et Historique de la Charente* 8th ser., 6 (1915), p. 174.

of religion and from their scruples of conscience'.[28] A neutral party observing the same conflict from abroad argued the same case even more forcefully. Writing from Basel, the pioneering defender of freedom of conscience and opponent of capital punishment for heresy, Sebastian Castellio, asserted:

> I recognize that some Evangelicals say they did not take up arms for religion but to maintain the edict [of pacification]. Let them cover up as much as much as they want. Since the edict itself concerned religion, since the killings at Vassy on account of which the Evangelicals rose up happened because of religion, and since they subsequently seized and sacked churches and destroyed statuary, it is better to state the truth openly: no matter how many other things may be mixed into the affair, the principal cause of this war is the desire to uphold religion.[29]

On the other hand, at least one irenic administrator at court came with time to put the blame on aristocratic rivalries. The chancellor Michel de l'Hospital, who may have had a hand in drafting the preamble to the 1563 edict of pacification, wrote on his deathbed in 1573 that the wars began when 'the faction and league that ran things in the time of the late king François [i.e. the Guises] could not abide that others governed [and] induced the king of Navarre and other lords at court . . . to take up arms on the pretext of piety and religion'.[30]

Meanwhile, all important Catholic historians whose works were published during the later sixteenth century judged the principal cause of the civil wars to be the destabilization of the political order by the incorrigibly factious and violent Huguenots. Since the Huguenots were heretics, their motives could not be truly religious. Their embrace of heresy had led them to throw off Christian obedience. Still, incited by their ministers and their false beliefs, they had initiated the cycle of civil wars by attempting to seize the king at Amboise in 1560, by taking control of many of the kingdom's leading cities in April 1562 and immediately desecrating hundreds of churches and savagely attacking priests and nuns, and by attempting again to seize the king at Meaux in 1567. Even the Fourth Civil War, sparked by the Saint Bartholomew's massacre, revealed the Protestants' persistent refusal to respect the royal will. According to a raft of Catholic histories, the slaying of thousands of Huguenots in the days following 24 August 1572 was a just and long overdue punishment of those who already had caused so much devastation and who had once again threatened the person and authority of the king in the aftermath of the failed assassination attempt against the admiral Coligny two

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[28] 'L'édit de Nantes et ses antécédents (1562–1598)': http://elec.enc.sorbonne.fr/editsdepacification, 2 Édit d'Amboise, preamble (accessed 16 April 2013).

[29] Sebastian Castellio, *Conseil à la France désolée* (Geneva, 1967), p. 20.

[30] Michel de L'Hospital, *Discours et correspondance. La plume et la tribune II*, (ed.) Loris Petris (Geneva, 2013), p. 273 (Latin original), 280–81 (French translation).

days previously. The subsequent civil war stemmed from the Huguenots' refusal to obey the king's subsequent orders to cease assembling for worship and to open the gates of their principal strongholds to the crown's lieutenants.[31] The Catholic historian François de Belleforest, cited in the first paragraph of this essay, granted that aristocratic rivalries also contributed to the strife, yet he constructed the lion's share of his narrative around successive Protestant risings, highlighting 'the fury with which these new Goth-Vandals attacked poor churchmen and put them to death'.[32] The especially influential history of Jean Le Frère de Laval placed its account of French events from 1560 to 1572 within a longer narrative running from the Hussite wars through Luther's emergence as a reformer to the Peasants' War of 1525, the Anabaptist kingdom of Munster, and the Schmalkaldic wars, a choice of subjects clearly meant to illustrate the recurring link between heresy, sedition, and violence. All of these events, Le Frère asserted, were attributable to wicked ministers who stirred up revolt in the name of reform, the worst being 'those werewolves, those succubi, those *Empuses*, those *Lucifuges*' who rose out of Lake Geneva.[33]

Many contemporary observers and historians also recognized that the relative importance of religious and political issues varied from conflict to conflict. In the aftermath of the Saint Bartholomew's massacre, for which the king publicly assumed responsibility and after which he ordered an end to Reformed assemblies, it was impossible for the Protestants to claim that their latest mobilization sought to defend the crown and its edicts. The already-mentioned 1573 treatise that distinguishes between wars for religion and wars for territory or honour unhesitatingly classifies this Fourth Civil War as a war for religion. Even while acknowledging that religion was also at stake in the earlier conflicts, it asserts that this war was different, since it arose in reaction to cruelties of unparalleled scope and was more purely a campaign for justice against those with the blood of the faithful on their hands than had been the prior conflicts.[34] Not long thereafter, however, the Huguenots allied with a number

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[31] Henri Hauser, 'Un récit catholique des trois premières guerres de religion: les *Acta Tumultuum Gallicanorum*', *Revue Historique* 108 (1911): 59–74, 294–318, and 109 (1912): 75–84; Thomas de Beauxamis, *La marmite renversée et fondue de laquelle nostre dieu parle par les saincts Prophetes* (Paris, 1572), ff. 20–22; Gabriel de Saconay, *Geneologie et la fin des Huguenaux et decouverts du Calvinism* (Lyon, 1572), *passim*; 'Relation des troubles excités par les calvinistes dans la ville de Rouen', *passim*, esp. pp. 35–6, 45–6; Le Frère de Laval, *Vraye et entiere histoire des troubles et guerres civiles*, esp. pp. 510 *et passim*; François de Belleforest, *Les grandes annales et histoire générale de France* (Paris, 1579), vol. 2, ff. 1602–87; L. Cailhava (ed.), *De Tristibus Franciae Libri Quatuor* (Lyon, 1840), *passim*.

[32] Belleforest, *Grandes annales et histoire générale de France* esp. fos 1631, 1686.

[33] Le Frère de Laval, *Vraye et entiere histoire des troubles et guerres civiles*, 'épitre au lecteur', unpaginated.

[34] 'Question, asavoir s'il est licite sauver la vie aux massacreurs', pp. 257, 259.

of discontented Catholic noblemen willing to advocate toleration for both faiths. The pamphlets and manifestos of this period emphasized their shared grievances about royal misgovernment. 'They speak but little of religion, which only plays a secondary role', the Venetian ambassador wrote about the Fifth Civil War (1574–76).[35] 'Nobody even thought of speaking of religion', echoed the Catholic historian Claude Haton. 'All that was set out was the liberation of the duke of Alençon, ... the king's tyranny in taxing his subjects so ... and the need to call the Estates-General to subject the king to its laws and ordinances'.[36]

When Henry of Navarre became the heir apparent, the cards were completely reshuffled. The supporters of the Catholic League insisted that their chief concern was to preserve the Roman faith. When a Breton nobleman left home to fight for the cause in October 1589, he left a document for his family asserting that he fought only for 'the glory of God and the defense of religion'.[37] Oaths and manifestos of the League say the same thing.[38] But the many Catholics who supported Henry of Navarre's claim to the throne could hardly concede that true Catholic piety obliged one to support the League. As its first important historian, Pierre Palma Cayet, insisted, the long and particularly devastating Eighth Civil War (1585–98) that followed its creation was 'a war for the state and not a war for religion'.[39] In his view and that of the other so-called *politiques*, the League was primarily a vehicle for its noble leaders, led once again by the house of Guise, to seek to usurp power. It gained support with the help of Spanish doubloons and lowborn fanatics animated by resentment against their social superiors. To the extent that Catholic zeal entered into the equation, it was a false zeal.[40]

The long war for the Bourbon succession also differed from the earlier Protestant–Catholic conflicts in a second important way. Whereas every civil war ended with an edict of pacification that preserved the rights of both faiths to exist within the kingdom, the League was decisively defeated and discredited. As a result, the *politique* version of the history of the League shaped perception of the movement for centuries to come, while each side in the Protestant–Catholic conflict had descendants concerned to uphold its view of what

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[35] Niccolò Tommaseo (ed.), *Relations des ambassadeurs vénitiens sur les affaires de France au XVIe siècle* (Paris, 1838), vol. 2, p. 227.

[36] Claude Haton, *Mémoires*, (ed.) Laurent Bourquin (Paris, 2001–07), vol. 3, p. 139.

[37] Hervé Le Goff, *La Ligue en Bretagne. Guerre civile et conflit international (1588–1598)* (Rennes, 2010), p. 66.

[38] *Dialogue d'entre le maheustre et le manant*, esp. p. 122; [Simon Goulard], *Mémoires de la Ligue* (Amsterdam, 1758), vol. 3, p. 285.

[39] Pierre-Victor Palma Cayet, *Chronologie novenaire* (Clermont-Ferrand, 2007, first published Paris, 1608), p. 23.

[40] Ibid., p. 24.

happened.[41] Furthermore, while both Protestant and Catholic historians had rapidly published partisan accounts of the earlier phases of conflict blaming the other side for the violence and stressing their own innocence and suffering, the Protestant histories were consistently more amply documented and less partisan in tone.[42] As a result, they would be used more extensively by later historians. The history of the League would be written by the winners. The same would not be true of the earlier Protestant–Catholic conflicts.

I have begun to explore elsewhere how historians of the subsequent centuries assessed religion's role in the civil wars.[43] In its most basic outline, the story runs as follows. No work did more to fix perceptions of this era for centuries to come than Jacques-Auguste de Thou's massive and deeply researched *History of His Own Time*, published in instalments and steadily revised between 1604 and 1620. This eminent jurist and early supporter of Henry IV drew the ire of his fellow Catholics for his reliance on previous Protestant histories, which he appreciated for their ample documentation.[44] In sharp contrast to virtually all prior Catholic histories, he devoted more attention to massacres of which the Protestants were victims than to incidents of Huguenot iconoclasm or anti-Catholic violence. Although he rarely accepted the explanations of important events proffered by the bulk of Huguenot historians, he followed them in stigmatizing the members of the house of Guise as largely responsible for the initial hostilities, a view that prior Catholic historians had rarely shared, but that now seemed plausible to *politiques* in light of the role played by the second Duke of Guise in the insurrections of the League. Although he noted instances in which both Protestant ministers and Catholic preachers fanned the flames of war, his complex and extraordinarily detailed telling of the conflicts cast them above all as a chain of events driven forward chiefly by Guise ambition, the duplicity of Catherine de Medici, and the inability of her flawed sons to rule effectively – in short, as more the product of aristocratic rivalry, court intrigue,

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[41] Marco Penzi, '"Damnatio memoriae": La "Ligue catholique française" e la storiografia, tra "politiques", rivoluzionari, mistici e liberali', *Quaderni Storici* 118 (2005): 263–84.

[42] Henri Hauser, *Les sources de l'histoire de France: XVIe siècle (1494–1610)* (Paris, 1906–15), vol. 3, p. 14.

[43] Philip Benedict, 'Shaping the Memory of the French Wars of Religion: The First Centuries', in Erika Kuijpers, et al. (eds), *Memory before Modernity: Practices of Memory in Early Modern Europe* (Leiden, 2013), pp. 112–25. I expect to explore this subject further in the future.

[44] Much evidence about the reception of de Thou's history is provided in the two great editions of the work: De Thou, *Historiarum sui temporis libri CXXXVIII* (London, 1733), 7 vols and *Histoire universelle* (The Hague, 1740), 11 vols.

and poor government than religious disagreement.[45] To present the conflicts in this manner, of course, was also to suggest that two religions could coexist in one kingdom without necessarily destroying public order so long as wiser leadership and fuller commitment to the general interest prevailed. This was an apt story at a time when the crown wished to bind up nearly forty years of civil strife.

A counter-current of Catholic historical writing attributing the civil wars chiefly to Protestant aggression persisted from the seventeenth through the nineteenth century, but it grew increasingly marginal. Other prominent historians of the seventeenth century, notably the Italian military man and administrator Enrico Caterina Davila and the royal historiographer of Louis XIV François Eudes de Mézeray, reinforced the essentially political narrative of events offered by de Thou.[46] The multiplication of source publications and the opening of public archives over the subsequent two centuries transformed the understanding of many specific episodes of the wars, but the overall vision of the conflicts established by de Thou and Mézeray endured into the twentieth century with remarkable little change, for the leading historians of the first half of the nineteenth century, Guizot and Michelet, drew on their work and were sympathetic to the Protestant cause, while the university historians who shaped the vision of the national past under the Third Republic were locked in a struggle with conservative Catholic historians and little sympathetic to their view of the wars as the product of Huguenot sedition.[47] The most important historian of the Wars of Religion of the first part of the twentieth century, Lucien Romier, still interpreted the conflicts as growing chiefly out of the factional rivalries at the court of Henry II.[48] To the extent that new interpretations emerged in the first two thirds of the twentieth century, they came from secular historians on

[45] Estelle Grouas, 'Aux origines de la légende noire des derniers Valois: l'*Histoire universelle* de Jacques-Auguste de Thou' in Hugues Daussy and Frédérique Pitou (eds), *Hommes de loi et politique (XVIe–XVIIIe siècles)* (Rennes, 2007), pp. 75–88.

[46] Enrico Caterina Davila, *Historia delle guerre civili di Francia, 1559–1598* (Venice, 1630); François de Mézeray, *Histoire de France*, 2nd edition (Paris, 1685), vol. 3.

[47] Herbert Butterfield, 'Lord Acton and the Massacre of St Bartholomew', in *idem*, *Man on his Past: The Study of the History of Historical Scholarship* (Cambridge, 1955), pp. 171–201; Charles-Olivier Carbonnel, *Histoire et historiens: une mutation idéologique des historiens français 1865–1885* (Toulouse, 1976), *passim*; David Nicholls, 'Social History of the French Reformation: Ideology, Confession and Culture', *Social History* 9 (1984): 25–43.

[48] Romier, *Les origines politiques des guerres de religion*, 2 vols (Paris, 1914); *La conjuration d'Amboise* (Paris, 1923); *Catholiques et huguenots à la cour de Charles IX* (Paris, 1924); *Le royaume de Catherine de Médicis: La France à la veille des guerres de religion*, 2 vols (Paris, 1925); Nicholls, 'Social History of the Reformation', pp. 32–3.

the left inclined to see religion as false consciousness masking class or economic interests, the true wellsprings of action.[49]

The pendulum swing of interpretation that has put religion back into the Wars of Religion began in 1973 with the publication of Natalie Zemon Davis's influential article 'The Rites of Violence'.[50] Denis Crouzet's ambitious two-volume *Les guerriers de Dieu*[51] furthered it, as did a raft of histories of the civil wars in particular cities or provinces initiated by my *Rouen during the Wars of Religion*.[52] In line with broader currents within the historical profession, these works shifted the focus of research from high politics to crowd violence and the experience of ordinary people. Putting the political and economic explanations of the conflicts proposed by historians of the first two thirds of the twentieth century to the test, they found them wanting. When they examined closely the numerous incidents of insurgency, massacre, and iconoclasm that were an important element of the troubles of the time, they found that it was simply not accurate to assert that those who composed the rival faiths were drawn from urban social groups with conflicting economic interests, as Henri Hauser had suggested at the dawn of the twentieth century; or that the Catholic League was consistently led by a *bourgeoisie seconde* disempowered by the growth of venality of office, as Henri Drouot had argued in 1937; or that massacres and waves of iconoclasm were particularly likely to occur in periods of high grain prices, as Janine Garrisson-Estèbe had asserted in 1968.[53] The importance of Davis's 'Rites

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[49] Henri Hauser, 'The French Reformation and the French People in the Sixteenth Century', *American Historical Review* 4 (1899): 217–27; *idem*, *Études sur la Réforme française* (Paris, 1909); Henri Drouot, *Mayenne et la Bourgogne: 1587–1596, contribution à l'histoire des provinces françaises pendant la ligue* (Paris, 1937); Janine Estèbe, *Tocsin pour un massacre. La saison des Saint-Barthélemy* (Paris, 1968); Nicholls, 'Social History of the Reformation', pp. 33–5.

[50] Natalie Zemon Davis, 'The Rites of Violence: Religious Riot in Sixteenth-Century France', *Past and Present* 59 (1973): 51–91; reprinted in Alfred Soman (ed.), *The Massacre of St. Bartholomew: Reappraisals and Documents* (The Hague, 1974) and in Davis's much-translated volume of essays, *Society and Culture in Early Modern France* (Stanford, 1975). For testimony to its importance, see John Bossy, 'Unrethinking the Sixteenth-Century Wars of Religion' in Thomas Kselman (ed.), *Belief in History: Innovative Approaches to European and American Religion* (Notre Dame, 1991), pp. 267–85, esp. pp. 280–82; Graeme Murdock, Penny Roberts, and Andrew Spicer (eds), *Ritual and Violence: Natalie Zemon Davis and Early Modern France*, Past and Present Supplement 7 (Oxford, 2012).

[51] Denis Crouzet, *Les guerriers de Dieu: La violence au temps des troubles de religion (vers 1525–vers 1610)*, 2 vols (Seyssel, 1990).

[52] Philip Benedict, *Rouen during the Wars of Religion* (Cambridge, 1981). Carpi, *Guerres de Religion,* pp. 688–9, offers the most up-to-date list of the many local and regional studies.

[53] Davis, *Society and Culture*, pp. 1–16, 169–70; *idem* and Janine Estèbe, 'Debate. The Rites of Violence: Religious Riot in Sixteenth-Century France', *Past and Present* 67 (1975):

of Violence' lay in its demonstration of how well the forms, gestures, and targets of different forms of religious violence could be illuminated by attending to the core moral and religious values of those involved.[54] As local studies tried to make sense of the pattern of conflict over time, they observed that the breakdown of order locally often preceded the outbreak of formal civil war; France came apart locality by locality as much as it did as a result of divisions at the centre.[55] When historians tried to determine the extent to which ties of clientage or factional rivalry within the aristocracy determined party affiliation in 1562 or 1588, they found that these considerations did not take them very far. In 1562, Montmorency and Guise, the great rivals for power at the court of Henry II, joined hands in the anti-Protestant coalition. The Protestants were led by younger sons or collateral branches of two rival houses, the Bourbons and the Montmorencys, both of whose *capo di capo* fought against them.[56]

The Problem Today

In light of the vast amount of research devoted to this era in the past generation, how can we now best answer the question: were the French Wars of Religion truly wars of religion? In 1987 a German historian of the Thirty Years War, Konrad Repgen, did all early modern historians a service by asking the necessary

127–35; Benedict, *Rouen during Wars,* pp. 71–94, 180–86, 245–6; Crouzet, *Guerriers de Dieu*, vol. 1, pp. 61–75.

[54] Subsequent studies vindicated and extended this approach, notably Crouzet, *Guerriers de Dieu*; Barbara Diefendorf, *Beneath the Cross: Catholics and Huguenots in Sixteenth-Century Paris* (Oxford, 1991); Olivier Christin, *Une révolution symbolique: L'iconoclasme huguenot et la reconstruction catholique* (Paris, 1991),

[55] Benedict, *Rouen*, pp. 237–8; Denis Crouzet, *Le genèse de la Réforme française 1520–1562* (Paris, 1996), pp. 572–92.

[56] Important studies of the force and limits of clan rivalries, family networks, and ties of clientage as determinants of political affiliation include Kristen Neuschel, *Word of Honor: Interpreting Noble Culture in Sixteenth-Century France* (Ithaca, 1989); Stuart Carroll, *Noble Power during the French Wars of Religion: The Guise Affinity and the Catholic Cause in Normandy* (Cambridge, 1998); Mark W. Konnert, *Local Politics in the French Wars of Religion: The Towns of Champagne, the Duc de Guise and the Catholic League, 1560–95* (Aldershot, 2006); David Potter, '"Alliance", "Clientèle" and Political Action in Early Modern France: The Prince de Condé's Association in 1562', in David Bates, et al. (eds), *Liens personnels, réseaux, solidarités en France et dans les Îles Britanniques (XIe–XXe siècle)* (Paris, 2006), pp. 199–219; Michel Nassiet, *Parenté, noblesse et États dynastiques XVe–XVIe siècles* (Paris, 2000), pp. 64–5; and *idem*, *La violence, une histoire sociale: France, XVIe–XVIIIe siècles* (Seyssel, 2011), ch. 9.

preliminary question 'What is a "religious war"?' and offering a new reply.[57] He pointed out that for virtually every conflict of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries that has been labelled a religious war, historians have debated whether the paramount motives of the key actors were religious or political. Repgen's chief focus was on inter-state wars. In such cases, a range of considerations including competing dynastic claims, security concerns, and treaty obligations also regularly shaped the decision to go to war. It is often impossible to determine in the final analysis whether these concerns or religious aims were the most important, not just because human motivation is often complex, but also because the evidence often does not permit a confident answer. Repgen therefore proposed that historians think of the label 'religious war' as a 'legitimization type', not a 'motivation type'. A regular feature of early modern wars was that rulers declaring war issued written declarations explaining why they did so. Studying numerous such justifications, Repgen found that the reasons offered to legitimate going to war could be classified into twelve recurring categories. One of these he labelled 'religious war'; this was when recourse to arms was declared necessary to prevent the true religion from being exterminated, to defend or extend legally recognized rights of worship of co-religionists, or to eliminate a dangerous heresy. Formulated with regard to wars between states, Repgen's proposal that we think of the category 'religious war' as a legitimization category can be applied to civil wars as well, for as we have already seen it was also conventional at the time for a party raising the banner of revolt to justify its actions in a formal declaration.

Repgen's suggestion that we think about 'religious war' as a legitimization category rather than a motivation category has the advantage of simplicity, since it enables historians to pin the label 'religious war' on a conflict on the basis of a clear, easily verifiable criterion, without having to sound the depths of the human psyche. But its heuristic payoff is greater than that. It also serves to highlight that religious war may be defined in terms of the issues at stake in a conflict as well as in light of their participants' motivation. Furthermore, Repgen and historians working in his wake have made the interesting discovery that the formal justification for declaring war on a neighbouring state that involved citing the need to come to the aid of true Christians threatened with persecution only appeared in the mid-sixteenth century, shortly after the Reformed theologians Peter Martyr Vermigli and Heinrich Bullinger first began to include the defence of endangered foreign co-religionists among the legitimate grounds for war

[57] Konrad Repgen, 'What is a "Religious War"?', in E. I. Kouri and Tom Scott (eds), *Politics and Society in Reformation Europe: Essays for Sir Geoffrey Elton on his Sixty-Fifth Birthday* (London, 1987), pp. 311–28.

in their discussions of the just war.[58] The famous 'monarchomach' treatise *Vindiciae, contra tyrannos* of 1579 was an important expression of this point of view. Its fourth, often overlooked chapter asked 'Whether neighbouring princes may by right, or ought, to render assistance to subjects of other princes who are being persecuted on account of pure religion, or oppressed by manifest tyranny?' and answered in the affirmative.[59] In a Europe marked by a series of structural features that already encouraged frequent warfare – conflicting dynastic claims to many territories, high mortality rates that regularly engendered succession crises in ruling families for lack of a direct heir, an aristocratic culture that valorized feats of war and rewarded conquest, Machiavellian calculations of domestic security – the belief of certain rulers that they had an obligation to come to the aid of the true religion when it was threatened added still another cause for conflict. It rarely trumped all of the others. It nevertheless made an already unstable international system yet more unstable and increased both the scale and duration of conflicts that had a religious component. Calvinist and Catholic court preachers and confessors seem to have been more inclined than their Lutheran counterparts to support this point of view.

While thinking of religious war as a legitimization type has significant heuristic value, it also has its limits. First, the formal justification offered by a ruler for going to war may mask rather than reveal the true nature of the war. At the outset of the Schmalkaldic war, Charles V publicly declared that the purpose of the war was to punish the electors of Hesse and Saxony as violators of the peace of the empire for their recent aggression against the Duke of Brunswick, but he wrote to his sister Mary of Hungary that his true goal was to roll back Protestantism.[60] Surely there is a loss of understanding if we exclude this conflict from the category of religious wars because it was not formally justified on religious grounds. Second, it is not always the case that evidence about the motivation of different actors is lacking. Where such evidence is available,

[58] Repgen, 'Religious War', pp. 318–23; Cornel Zwierlein, 'La loi de Dieu et l'obligation à la défense: de Florence à Magdeburg (1494–1550)', in Paul-Alexis Mellet (ed.), *Et de sa bouche sortait un glaive: Les monarchomaques au XVIe siècle* (Geneva, 2006), pp. 70–72; *idem*, 'The Thirty Years' War a Religious War? Religion and Machiavellism at the Turning Point of 1635', in Peter Schröder and Olaf Asbach (eds), *The Ashgate Research Companion to the Thirty Years War* (Aldershot, 2013), pp. 232–3.

[59] Stephanus Junius Brutus, *Vindiciae, contra tyrannos* (ed.) George Garnett (Cambridge, 1994), pp. 173–85. A recent history of humanitarian intervention has located here the origins of foreign intervention in the domestic affairs of another nation in the name of trans-national justice. Brendan Simms and D. J. B. Trim (eds), *Humanitarian Intervention: A History* (Cambridge, 2011).

[60] Repgen, 'Religious War', pp. 318–20; Daniel Nexon, *The Struggle for Power in Early Modern Europe: Religious Conflict, Dynastic Empires and International Change* (Princeton, 2009), pp. 173–4.

understanding the precise motivations that moved actors in the conflict is clearly a worthwhile goal of investigation, even if to do so we must not content ourselves by saying that they acted out of religious belief, but must specify the specific doctrines or arguments that sparked their actions.[61] Third, in the case of domestic conflicts such as those in later sixteenth-century France, conflict took the form not only of formally declared civil wars, but also of crowd violence, massacres, and skirmishes between armed bands – the kind of incidents that led contemporary histories to speak of 'troubles' as often as they did of 'wars'. Here, formal legitimizing statements are often lacking, yet the past generation's work on French religious violence has shown how much can be inferred about the values and concerns that prompted different forms of crowd violence through close attention to the actions and targets of the crowd, juxtaposed against the legitimizing discourses offered by contemporaries.[62] It would be an unfortunate step backward to forfeit the benefits of these insights by adopting an excessively rigid criterion for defining a religious war.

Employing the term 'religious war', then, either as a legitimization or a motivation type, were the French Wars of Religion truly religious wars, and if so just how did religious motivations or issues generate or contribute to the conflicts? Using the term 'religious war' as a legitimization type, the eight successive civil wars from 1562 to 1598 were unquestionably all wars of religion, even if religion was rarely the sole issue at stake in every one. The Protestant party recurrently legitimated the taking up of arms as necessary to protect Reformed rights of worship and even the very survival of the true Christian faith and its adherents. Leading Catholic noblemen and important Catholic associations or leagues recurrently declared that they fought to prevent the toleration of heresy in the Most Christian Kingdom, which they saw as antithetical to the very nature of the kingdom and ruinous to its welfare. The chief aim of the Catholic League of 1585 was to ensure that the French throne was occupied by a Catholic; other declared goals of the movement included ensuring that the decrees of the Council of Trent were published in France and that the country cease allying with infidels and heretics. At every set of peace negotiations that brought to an end the eight successive nationwide civil wars, the question of the terms under which the Reformed religion was to be permitted within the kingdom was at the heart of the negotiations. Most simply and fundamentally, the later sixteenth century was a period of wars of religion in France because, once Reformed Protestants began setting up churches of their own and gained enough strength to meet in public in many localities across the kingdom, the most important

[61] Philip Benedict, 'Religion and Politics in the European Struggle for Stability, 1500–1700', in *idem* and Myron P. Gutmann (eds), *Early Modern Europe: From Crisis to Stability* (Newark, DE., 2005), pp. 126–9.

[62] See especially Davis, 'Rites of Violence' and the studies cited in note 53.

question with which the kingdom's governing authorities had to grapple, and the one that sparked the most intense passion and the most recurrent conflict on all sides, was that of whether or not to tolerate two religions within the same kingdom, and if so, on what terms.

Using the terms religious war or religious violence as motivation types, we can also label the troubles that roiled France from *c*.1560 to 1598 as instances of religious violence since deeply held and hotly contested theological convictions sparked much of the crowd violence and even certain actions undertaken by armies in wartime. Recent historians disagree about which specific beliefs of the two rival confessions particularly encouraged violence, but at the very least the following assertions seem tenable.[63] The initial establishment of Reformed churches sprang from the conviction of Calvin and his followers that: (1) many features of contemporary Catholic worship were so profoundly idolatrous and contrary to divine precept that true Christians were duty bound to abstain from them; (2) the correct forms of Christian worship and proper institutions of a Christian church were clearly stated in the Bible; and (3) believers could legitimately establish churches following the Gospel model despite any governmental prohibitions to the contrary, because, in matters of the spirit one must obey God not man. Once the Reformed began to gather in assemblies of their own that they believed to be legitimate, it was but a short step, that many churches took quickly, to placing armed guards around the assemblies for self-defence or to freeing arrested co-religionists from jail. Conversion to Protestantism also unleashed a psychological dynamic of rejection of the old faith that many converts felt moved to express publicly in acts of iconoclasm or sacrilege. Having been duped for too long by false claims about Christ's physical presence in the Eucharist or the favours saints might do for supplicants who addressed their shrines and relics with respect, converts now wanted to show their neighbours that the statues they worshipped were just pieces of wood, that the relics might well be animal bones, and that the Blessed Sacrament was a little circle of baked dough. When they consequently defaced statues or tore the consecrated host from the hands of a priest to trample on it, those who remained convinced of the sacredness of these objects were scandalized. They feared for the safety of the entire community unless proper expiation was done. That expiation could take the form of demonstrating renewed veneration for the desecrated object via public processions, or of having self-appointed guardians take up posts near a street-corner image to make sure that those who passed it showed the proper respect and beat them up if they did not. At the same time they expected

[63] See on this the overlapping but not fully congruent interpretations of Davis, 'Rites of Violence'; Crouzet, *Guerriers de Dieu*; and Philip Benedict, 'The Dynamics of Protestant Militancy: France, 1555–1563', in *idem* et al. (eds), *Reformation, Revolt and Civil War in France and the Netherlands 1555–1585* (Amsterdam, 1999), pp. 35–44.

the civil authorities to purge the most offensive heretics from the community by banishment or fire; when the authorities ceased to do this, numerous preachers asserted that it was the community's responsibility to do it in their stead. This is the dynamic that bred the multiplication of riots and massacres from 1560 onward that made the regulation of religious practice question number one for the civil authorities seeking to maintain public order. The Protestant antipathy to what they believed to be false idols and clerical fraud also led the Huguenot armies to engage in iconoclasm and target Catholic clergymen during wartime. Castellio, we may recall, cited this behaviour as evidence that the First Civil War was a war of religion.

Recent historians have also paid new attention to the place of religion in the Catholic League, showing that cities under League domination witnessed a burst of processional activity and spiritual ferment mixing penitential, mystical, and crusading elements, and that for a number of figures central to the subsequent flowering of French Counter-Reformation piety, their spiritual experiences amid the League were decisive.[64] Engagement in these new forms of Catholic devotion did not inevitably lead to support for the *Sainte-Union*; some champions of penitential initiatives and new religious orders remained loyal to Henry III, who himself was an enthusiastic auto-flagellant.[65] Still, it is now clear that pious Catholics from the political elite faced a searing question of conscience when they had to decide whether or not to continue to serve this king who, for all his exterior manifestations of piety, ordered a cardinal of the church killed without trial, was consequently excommunicated by the pope, and then allied himself with the heretic Henry of Navarre after initially swearing that he would do all in his power to uphold the principle that only Catholics could occupy the throne. Few would maintain any longer that those who responded to this dilemma by supporting the League were moved chiefly by ambition and resentment.

If we think in terms neither of legitimization nor of motivation but of institutional dynamics, we can see that religion fed into the formal civil wars in another way too, albeit one that was less consistently present than the preceding elements. For certain conflicts, troops were raised through paramilitary structures

[64] Denis Richet, *De la Réforme à la Révolution: Études sur la France moderne* (Paris, 1991), pp. 69–96; Benedict, *Rouen*, pp. 190–208, 246–7; Robert Harding, 'Revolution and Reform in the Holy League: Angers, Rennes, Nantes', *Journal of Modern History* 53 (1981): 379–416; Crouzet, *Guerriers de Dieu*, vol. 2, chs 17–19; Jouanna, *Histoire et dictionnaire*, pp. 359–71; Barbara B. Diefendorf, *From Penitence to Charity: Pious Women and the Catholic Reform in Paris* (Oxford, 2004).

[65] See especially Ariane Boltanski, *Les ducs de Nevers et l'État Royal: Genèse d'un compromis (ca. 1550–ca. 1600)* (Geneva, 2006); Benoist Pierre, *La Bure et le Sceptre: La congrégation des Feuillants dans l'affirmation des États et des pouvoirs princiers (vers 1560–vers 1660)* (Paris, 2006), part 1.

attached to the rival churches. During the years 1560–62 both the synods of the French Reformed churches and the leading ministers in Geneva were more involved than early Protestant historians let on in raising money and troops for projected risings, in setting up a national network of military units attached to the church, and in mobilizing and deploying these units in the First Civil War.[66] With time, Huguenot military mobilization and decision-making passed more fully under the control of the high nobility, local captains, and political councils, but the Genevan pastors continued to raise money for military operations meant to allow disbanded churches to reassemble when proscribed, while the supra-regional political assemblies that coordinated the cause's military and political actions were linked to the churches at least through the presence of numerous ministers and church elders in these assemblies.[67] On the Catholic side, Holy Ghost confraternities in the towns of Burgundy that required their members to possess arms as well as to perform a range of devotional and charitable activities participated in the defence of the region against feared Protestant aggression between 1567 and 1571.[68] In these same years Toulouse's Catholics organized a sodality that received a crusading bull from Pope Pius V granting plenary indulgences to its members fighting for faith, king, and country.[69] If the Catholic Leagues of 1576 and 1585 were sworn associations of a non-confraternal type, the rising promoted by the second League following Henry III's extra-judicial targeted assassination of the duke and cardinal of Guise received the support of both the Faculty of Theology of Paris and Pope Sixtus V. By the right that they claimed to oversee temporal political affairs, both declared the French to

[66] *Correspondance de Bèze*, vol. 4, pp. 71–2, 254–5; 'Lettres adressées à Jean et Guy de Daillon comtes du Lude, gouverneurs du Poitou', *Archives Historiques du Poitou* 12 (1882): 112–13; Robert M. Kingdon, *Geneva and the Coming of the Wars of Religion in France 1555–1563* (Geneva, 1956), pp. 68–113; Alain Dufour, 'L'affaire de Maligny vue à travers la correspondance de Calvin et de Bèze', *Cahiers d'Histoire* 8 (1963): 269–80; Benedict, 'Dynamics of Protestant Militancy', pp. 35–44; *idem*, 'Prophets in Arms? Ministers in War, Ministers on War: France, 1562–1574' in Murdock/Roberts/Spicer, *Ritual and Violence*, pp. 163–96; *idem* and Nicolas Fornerod, 'Les 2150 "églises" réformées de France de 1561–1562', *Revue Historique* 311 (2009): 529–60; *idem*, *L'organisation et l'action des* églises *réformées de France, 1557–1563: Synodes provinciaux et autres documents* (Geneva, 2012), pp. lxxxiv–cxii.

[67] Mark Greengrass, 'Financing the Cause: Protestant Mobilization and Accountability in France (1562–1589)', in Benedict, *Reformation, Revolt*, pp. 233–54; Janine Garrisson-Estèbe, *Protestants du Midi 1559–1598* (Toulouse, 1980), pp. 205–9; Scott Manetsch, *Theodore Beza and the Quest for Peace in France, 1572–1598* (Leiden, 2000), esp. pp. 73–91.

[68] Robert R. Harding, 'The Mobilization of Confraternities Against the Reformation in France', *Sixteenth Century Journal* 11 (1986): 85–107, esp. pp. 86–91.

[69] Norman Housley, *Religious Warfare in Europe 1400–1536* (Oxford, 2002), pp. 195–8; Pierre-Jean Souriac, *Une guerre civile: Affrontements religieux et militaires dans le Midi toulousain (1562–1598)* (Seyssel, 2008), pp. 117–27.

be absolved from their duty of allegiance to their king. The Faculty of Theology also resolved that clergymen and students could bear arms for the League and those who died doing so would be martyrs. The sacraments were refused laymen who did not support the cause.[70]

Finally, the French Wars of Religion also had an international dimension; indeed, they were perhaps the first European civil wars whose duration was substantially amplified by the new legitimization of foreign intervention in support of threatened co-religionists. The Reformed electors Palatine were the German rulers who most fully embraced the ideas that Christian princes belonged to a supra-national community in Christ owing one another mutual aid, and that the Catholic powers were seeking collectively to eliminate the true faith throughout Europe and so had to be opposed by force. They sent troops into France five times to aid the beleaguered Huguenots. Without their aid, it is almost certain that the Protestants would have been crushed in several of the civil wars.[71] The English also came to the aid of the Protestants in 1562–63 and of Henry of Navarre in 1591–94. The Spanish, the Savoyards, and the papacy all sent troops at different times to fight for the Catholic cause. Spanish intervention in the wars of the League was particularly important. It unquestionably prolonged that conflict by several years, and may have been decisive in sparking it.[72]

The past generation's worth of research has emphatically not shown that political or other non-religious factors were irrelevant to the civil wars. It is perhaps clearer than ever now that after the elder Duke of Guise was killed in 1563 by a Protestant assassin believed by many to have been encouraged by the admiral Coligny, the rivalry between the houses of Guise and Châtillon became a bitter vendetta that had a significant effect on events.[73] A recent book

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[70] Henri de L'Epinois, 'La légation du cardinal Caetani en France', *Revue des Questions historiques* 30 (1881): 460–525; Anne-Cecile Tizon-Germe, 'Juridiction spirituelle et action pastorale des légats et nonces en France pendant la Ligue (1589–1594)', *Archivum historiae pontificiae* 30 (1992): 159–230; Thierry Amalou, 'Le magistère de la Faculté de théologie de Paris pendant les guerres de religion', unpublished seminar paper, Geneva, 17 April 2013.

[71] Bernard Vogler, 'Le role des electeurs palatins dans les guerres de religion en France, 1559–1592', *Cahiers d'Histoire* 10 (1965): 51–85; Cornel Zwierlein, 'Les saints de la communion avec le Christ: hybridation entre églises et états dans le monde calviniste dans les années 1560', in Florence Buttag and Axelle Guillausseau (eds), *Des saints d'État? Politique et sainteté au temps du concile de Trente* (Paris, 2012), p. 39.

[72] Valentín Vázquez de Prada, *Felipe II y Francia (1559–1598). Política, Religión y Razón de Estado* (Pamplona, 2004); DeLamar Jensen, *Diplomacy and Dogmatism: Bernardino de Mendoza and the French Catholic League* (Cambridge, MA., 1964); Le Goff, *Ligue en Bretagne*.

[73] Nassiet, *La violence*, pp. 282–7; Arlette Jouanna, *La Saint-Barthélemy: Les mystères d'un crime d'État* (Paris, 2007), pp. 51 *et passim*.

by Hugues Daussy shows that the attempt of the leading Protestant nobles to take the king under their control in 1567 that sparked the Second Civil War did not recruit its participants through the network of church synods and may have arisen in good measure out of the aristocrats' pique at being marginalized at court.[74] In the Fifth Civil War, as has already been indicated, the Protestants made common cause with Catholic moderates and malcontents. Religious riots and massacres in peacetime became rare after 1572. International intervention in the wars was motivated by more than religious solidarity.[75]

By emphasizing the religious component of the Wars of Religion, certain recent historians can even be said to have moved close to the viewpoint of those early modern Catholic historians who asserted that Calvinism was inherently seditious. The Dutch historian Judith Pollmann has observed that the model of religious violence constructed by historians of France links the emergence of religious rioting so closely to the core beliefs of each religion that it would seem to suggest that similar violence ought to have broken out wherever large Reformed minorities took shape in majority Catholic polities, yet in the Netherlands, where the emergence of a large Calvinist movement quickly gave rise to iconoclasm, no violent reaction by ordinary Catholics comparable to that in France ensued.[76] More broadly, harsh confessional polemic hardly led to civil war and crowd violence on anything like the French scale everywhere in post-Reformation Europe.[77] Additional considerations must clearly also be invoked to explain why the emergence of confessional differences sparked violence of such exceptional scale and duration in France.

Fortunately, the past generation's research has also suggested what these might be. First, as Colette Beaune has shown, by the close of the Middle Ages, France had developed a distinctive proto-national identity that identified the realm as the Most Christian Kingdom and linked its prosperity to its freedom from heresy. This was given ritual expression at each coronation when the new king swore to preserve the kingdom from this taint.[78] Such convictions made

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[74] Hugues Daussy, *Le parti huguenot. Cronique d'une désillusion (1557–1572)* (Geneva, 2014), pp. 566, 570–83.

[75] The English sought to reclaim their lost continental footholds and demanded the cession of a Channel port in return for their aid in 1562. The Spanish Habsburgs were eager to weaken their longstanding French rivals and saw an opportunity to wrest the royal succession for the Infanta after 1590.

[76] Judith Pollmann, 'Countering the Reformation in France and the Netherlands: Clerical Leadership and Catholic Violence 1560–1585', *Past and Present* 190 (2006): 83–8.

[77] Mark Greengrass, 'Europe's "Wars of Religion" and Their Legacies', in John Wolffe (ed.), *Protestant–Catholic Conflict from the Reformation Era to the 21st Century* (Houndmills, 2013), pp. 28–9.

[78] Colette Beaune, *Naissance de la nation France* (Paris, 1985). See also Alain Tallon, *Conscience nationale et sentiment religieux en France au XVIe siècle* (Paris, 2002).

the emergence of a powerful heretical movement appear particularly alarming in France, while the coronation oath appeared to legitimate Catholic crowd violence as a substitute for royal justice when the crown ceased to prosecute heresy as a crime. The peaceful coexistence of three, four or even one hundred religions was perfectly possible in the little territories of Germany 'where religion smells like nothing so much as wine', one of the most important pamphlets of the Catholic League maintained; it was impossible in France 'where the State rests on the catholic religion which [the French] have naturally engraved in their heart, and which cannot be torn from it without toppling the crown'.[79] Catholic clerics in France also produced a substantial corpus of published defences of the faith against Protestant doctrine in the vernacular far earlier than their counterparts in the Netherlands, which may have encouraged lay anti-Protestantism.[80] Furthermore, Calvinism, with its capacity to generate underground counter-churches, was more disruptive of the status quo than Lutheranism, which looked to the secular authorities to institute religious change. France was among the first strong princely states where the Reformation emerged with Reformed hues. This occurred just before the sudden death of King Henry II left the country with a series of immature monarchs, while the end of the Italian Wars deprived a warrior nobility of other battles to fight, making the problems of order created by the creation of two rival churches within the kingdom particularly difficult to solve. The Reformed churches quickly grew to a size where they could never be eliminated by the degree of force that the crown was willing to use; yet they never became large enough or proved tactically clever enough to impose their practices throughout the kingdom. Finally, as so often in pre-modern European political history, the vagaries of royal demography contributed to the exceptional longevity of the wars. Had Henry III sired a son, the last, especially long and destructive phase, of the civil wars would probably not have come about.

These last considerations remind us once again that to speak of the conflicts that shook France from 1560 to 1598 as religious wars is not to say that they can be understood with reference to nothing but religion. Circumstances relating to France's national traditions and royal demography contributed to

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[79] [Louis Dorléans], *Advertissement des Catholiques Anglois aux François Catholiques, du danger où ils sont de perdre leur Religion, et d'experimenter, comme en Angleterre, la cruauté des Ministres s'ils reçoyvent à la Couronne un Roy qui soit Heretique* (1586), in L. Cimber and F. Danjou (eds), *Archives curieuses de l'histoire de France* (Paris, 1834–40), vol. 11, p. 171.

[80] This is emphasized by Pollmann, 'Countering the Reformation', pp. 96–111. On the French Catholic reaction, see also Crouzet, *Guerriers de Dieu*, vol. 1, part 1; Marc Venard, 'Catholicism and Resistance to the Reformation in France, 1555–1585' in Benedict, *Reformation, Revolt*, pp. 133–48; Barbara B. Diefendorf, 'Simon Vigor: A Radical Preacher in Sixteenth-Century Paris', *Sixteenth Century Journal* 18 (1987): 399–410; Larissa J. Taylor, *Heresy and Orthodoxy in Sixteenth-Century Paris: François Le Picart and the Beginnings of the Catholic Reformation* (Leiden, 1999).

making these religious troubles particularly severe. Aristocratic rivalry and vendetta played a part, as on the local level did social tensions and institutional rivalries. Nevertheless, it is with good reason that if there is one set of conflicts in early modern European history to which the label of religious war is most conventionally and most often fixed, it is the French Wars of Religion. No other set of conflicts of the time illustrates so clearly so many of the ways in which the emergence of religious differences in the wake of the Reformation contributed to civil strife and international war. Fuelled by the conviction that in matters of the spirit it was necessary to obey God rather than man, a network of Calvinist churches emerged between 1555 and 1561 that put the question of how to deal with the presence of two religions in one country front and centre for the ruling authorities. This was an explosive issue in any country at the time because it was widely accepted that religious uniformity was a precondition of political stability and that governments had a duty to defend God's honour and the true religion. It was particularly explosive in France because national myths tied the kingdom's prosperity to its purity from heresy. Conflicting doctrines about what was sacred and what was polluting, aggressively expressed in public spaces by deeds as well as words, gave rise to local disorders that were straightforward illustrations of how rival religious beliefs can engender violence when a new church suddenly challenges an old one. When the crown sought to resolve the growing disorder with a measure allowing Reformed worship, and when this in turn appeared to be challenged by Catholic violence, the Protestants took up arms to defend their rights of worship and to forestall what they feared to be a plot to eliminate them, a step that was easy for them to take since they had already put in place a paramilitary organization that they believed to be quite strong. All of the eight formal civil wars that followed in tragic sequence from this initial raising of the standard of revolt, even the fifth, were wars of religion in the sense that religious rights were at stake in the conflict and invoked in the justifications for taking up arms. In several of these conflicts troops were marshalled through church networks or confraternities. Foreign co-religionists entered the conflicts out of confessional solidarity in a manner typical of this and the next century, providing one of the reasons why neither side could decisively defeat the other and bring the cycle of civil wars to an end. Here are the most fundamental ways in which France's 'wars, troubles and massacres' were 'troubles on grounds of religion', as many contemporaries recognized them to be.

Chapter 4

Religious Wars in the Holy Roman Empire? From the Schmalkaldic War to the Thirty Years War

Harriet Rudolph

In addition to the French Wars of Religion, chiefly two military conflicts have shaped the idea of *religious war* in early modern times: The Schmalkaldic War (1546–47), which has been repeatedly called the first religious war, and the Thirty Years War (1618–48), which was – and in popular discourse frequently still is – addressed as the last war of that kind. Hence, both events have framed the notion of an *age of religious war* for quite a long time, even if they differ greatly in scope, duration, and complexity. How one understands these wars remains highly relevant for any assessment of the explanatory strength which the term *religious war* provides to historians, political scientists, social scientists, and philosophers concerning other military conflicts in early modern and modern times.

Evaluating historical studies of both conflicts, published from the nineteenth century onwards, we may observe diverse strands of interpretation, marked by different assessments of the part religion played in terms of the causes, the conduct, and the impact of these wars.[1] In the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries, German historiography was strongly influenced by confessional affiliation. Most Protestant historians understood confessional difference as one of the driving forces for the escalation of violence in these conflicts. In contrast to that, some Catholic historians argued that wars of religion had never taken place in the Holy Roman Empire, and that the idea of religious wars had been invented by foreign powers such as France and Sweden, to divide 'Germany' and

[1] In the present context, I can only refer to a limited number of studies. For the issue of religious wars in German historiography compare, for example, Andreas Holzem (ed.), *Krieg und Christentum: Religiöse Gewalttheorien in der Kriegserfahrung des Westens*, Krieg in der Geschichte 50 (Paderborn, 2009); Klaus Schreiner and Elisabeth Müller-Luckner (eds), *Heilige Kriege: Religiöse Begründungen militärischer Gewaltanwendung. Judentum, Christentum und Islam im Vergleich*, Schriften des Historischen Kollegs Kolloquien 78 (München, 2008); Franz Brendle and Anton Schindling (eds), *Religionskriege im Alten Reich und in Alteuropa* (Münster, 2006).

to justify military intervention.[2] From the second half of the twentieth century onwards, interpretations were also influenced by a shifting relevance of historical approaches, such as political history, social history, *Alltagsgeschichte*, and cultural history, as well as certain ideological currents and political preconditions in the field of historical studies. For example, it seems hardly surprising that Marxist historiography largely neglected the part the religious divide might have played as a cause of war. However, in recent times the formerly quite distinct boundaries between different approaches have blurred, as have explanations and readings of these conflicts. At the moment, we may notice several contradictory tendencies with regard to the impact of religion in both the Schmalkaldic War and the Thirty Years War.

On the one hand, historians feel inclined to apply stricter standards of valuation to qualify both the wars in question as religious wars. On the other, this term is increasingly applied to military conflicts that had usually not been classified in this way in the past. Some scholars have pointed out that there had been military conflicts such as the Hussite wars (1419–36), which could be labelled as religious wars.[3] Amongst others, David Onnekink has argued that after 1648 the idea of religious war survived and that there were indeed wars which contemporaries addressed in such a way: for example, the War of the Spanish Succession (1701–14).[4] Daniel Nexon emphasized that secularist foundations of international relations theory explained its far-reaching neglect of religion as a factor determining the courses of action in foreign relations. Since the European state system was believed to represent a secular concept, Nexon argued, the relevance of religious ideas for its development was underestimated.[5] Some German historians by now consider the process of confessionalization to have reached well into the period after 1648.[6] In other words, violent confessional

[2] Cf. Edmund Jörg, 'Wie man in Deutschland Religionskriege macht', *Historisch-politische Blätter für das katholische Deutschland* 53/3 (1864): 165–78. By referring to Frederick II of Prussia who also exploited the idea of religious war to serve his own interest at the beginning of the Seven Years War, the author is in fact arguing against an 'undeutschen Fridericianismus' which, in his opinion, is currently impeding national unity. Ibid., p. 177.

[3] Compare the chapter by Pavel Soukup in this volume. Some scholars significantly expanded the timeframe of the *age of religious war*. Cf. Cathal J. Nolan, *The Age of Wars of Religion, 1000–1650: An Encyclopedia of Global Warfare and Civilization*, 2 vols (Westport, CT., 2006).

[4] David Onnekink (ed.), *War and Religion after Westphalia, 1648–1713* (Farnham, 2009).

[5] Daniel H. Nexon, *The Struggle for Power in Early Modern Europe: Religious Conflict, Dynastic Empires and International Change* (Princeton, 2009), p. 291.

[6] Heinz Schilling, *Konfessionalisierung und Staatsinteressen 1559–1660* (Paderborn, 2007).

conflicts in a state as well as in the emerging European state system did not cease with the signing of the Peace of Westphalia.

For quite some time now, historical research has been deeply concerned with the changing patterns, functions, and perceptions of violence in general and especially with the relationship between violence and religion.[7] More and more historians have concentrated on the influence of religious convictions on acts of violence in early modern times, as a period which was both deeply religious and very violent. In historical perspective, a nexus between religion and violence cannot be considered a myth.[8] However, the question remains in which ways both phenomena could be linked, to what aim, and with which effects. At least three impediments seem to hamper a balanced assessment of this issue.

Firstly, there is a terminological problem. For example, what is meant by religion and which phenomena should be labelled as political? In current debate, the term religion often merely refers to religious doctrine, which is an understanding most early modern people would not have favoured. Frequently, religion is set against politics: Were the main actors led by religious sentiments or by political interests? Was the conflict about constitution or religion? Did reason of state or religion guide rulers' actions? These are not sensible questions for evaluating the character of early modern wars, because the terms applied are neither precise nor representative of distinct alternatives. In the Holy Roman Empire both issues, faith and rule, were even more closely linked after the religious divide than they had been before. Contemporaries (though hardly everyone at every time to the same extent) regarded the entire social order as instituted by God and thus attributed a religious or even sacred quality to it. As a result of the Reformation, almost all matters of belief became political, because Catholic and Protestant authorities alike claimed *cura religionis* as belonging to their realm.[9] Hence, religious uniformity could be considered to

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[7] Cf. Kaspar von Greyerz and Kim Siebenhüner (eds), *Religion und Gewalt: Konflikte, Rituale, Deutungen (1500–1800)*, Veröffentlichungen des MPI für Geschichte 215 (Göttingen, 2006); Reinhard Hempelmann and Johannes Kandel (eds), *Religionen und Gewalt: Konflikt- und Friedenspotentiale in den Weltreligionen*, Kirche – Konfession – Religion 51 (Göttingen, 2006); Irene Dingel (ed.), *Das Friedenspotential von Religion*, Veröffentlichungen des IEG Mainz, Suppl. 78 (Göttingen, 2009); Manfred Brocker and Mathias Hildebrandt (eds), *Friedensstiftende Religionen? Religion und die Deeskalation politischer Konflikte* (Wiesbaden, 2008).

[8] Cf. the chapter by William Cavanaugh in this volume.

[9] Thomas A. Brady, 'Limits of Religious Violence in Early Modern Europe', in Greyerz/Siebenhüner, *Religion und Gewalt*, pp. 125–54, here p. 132; see also Konrad Repgen, 'Was ist ein Religionskrieg?', *Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte* 97 (1986): 334–49, here p. 336. Alternatively, ecclesiastic institutions also instrumentalized the emerging state to assert their own authority.

be part of the reason of state.[10] At the same time, Protestantism served as an important means to oppose the emperor's rule. For Protestant princes, the idea to defend one's own belief was closely linked to the need to defy any attempt by the emperor to lessen the political participation of the imperial estates. By contrast, in their position as 'defenders of the Catholic church', the emperors considered any heresy a manifestation of rebellion against legitimate rule. Thus the Reformation was not 'treated'[11] as a political question; in fact, it genuinely was a political question, and even more so as a large number of ecclesiastic lords exerted both ecclesiastic and worldly rule in their territories.

Secondly, moral and ideological convictions as well as political concerns affect the methods of research and the interpretation of results to a much larger extent than applies for other subjects in early modern history. That is particularly true for the time after 9/11. Two of the underlying questions posed are: Is religion a good thing or an evil one? Does it tend to secure peace or incite conflict? For example, if peace were supposed to be at the core of Christian faith, how might this religion have caused wars in the past? Authors of recent studies on religion and violence feel inclined to emphasize almost ritually that religion is not necessarily prone to violence. Some of them even argue that 'atheist polemicists [...] stridently promote their beliefs about the inherently poisonous and violent character of religion, seeming to derive great emotional comfort from, but not see any irony in, their total war against religion'.[12] We should avoid such value judgments based on individual moral convictions whilst analysing the character of warfare in the past. As Jacob Sturm, magistrate in the reformed imperial city of Straßburg, observed in the first half of the sixteenth century, 'in our times scarcely anything else so unites people's minds or drives them apart as unity or disunity in religion does'.[13] This is one of the reasons why territorial princes considered uniformity of belief a pivotal aim of rule and why they were able to employ religious ideas to motivate people to support war.

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[10] Thus, it is hardly convincing to argue that in 1620 a confessional war might have been avoided, 'if reason of state had replaced confessional zeal'. Axel Gotthard, 'Der deutsche Konfessionskrieg seit 1619: Ein Resultat gestörter politischer Kommunikation', in *Historisches Jahrbuch* 122 (2002): 141–72, here p. 168.

[11] Brendle/Schindling, *Religionskriege*, pp. 170, 179–80. Likewise, religious schism was not 'redefined' 'as a question of public peace'; in fact, it was a question of public peace.

[12] Obviously, these authors failed to see the irony in their own conclusions: This is a highly polemical remark, which appears out of place in an academic volume, especially such a valuable one, the more so because the phrase 'total war' implies something quite different as not only historians very well know. Graeme Murdock and Andrew Spicer, 'Afterword', in Graeme Murdock, Andrew Spicer, and Penny Roberts (eds), *Ritual and Violence: Natalie Zemon Davis and Early Modern France*, Past and Present Supplement 7 (Oxford, 2012), pp. 275–86, here p. 285.

[13] Quoted after Brady, 'Limits', p. 130.

Thirdly, despite increasing efforts in international cooperation, scientific debates about both wars are still shaped by national and language boundaries. Whereas the Schmalkaldic War was examined mainly by German-speaking historians, the Thirty Years War has been studied intensively by European and non-European scholars, who have applied different methods and pursued diverse objectives. From an Anglo–American perspective, the Thirty Years War was primarily analysed as a *hegemonic war*.[14] According to this perspective, the course of action, which sovereigns such as Philip IV of Spain or Louis XIII of France followed during the war, was chiefly explained by referring to their attempt either to achieve a hegemonic position themselves or to impede their military opponents from gaining one. From a German perspective, both wars have intensively been analysed regarding their dimension as *constitutional conflicts*.[15] Struggles about the distribution of power between the estates and the monarch were at stake during the entire reign of Charles V (1519–56), and decisively influenced the application of military violence before, during, and after the Schmalkaldic War. In the Thirty Years War, their formative impact may be noticed in all its phases, though in different ways and degrees. To a certain extent, these military conflicts may also be denoted as *civil wars*, resulting either in a further limitation (Bohemia), in an expansion (Holy Roman Empire) of the estates' power or even in the status of full sovereignty (Dutch General-Estates, Portugal). In the latter case, the Thirty Years War was described as a *war of independence* from Spanish rule. Johannes Burkhardt interpreted the Thirty Years War as a *war of state formation*, thus referring to its structural causes as well as to its long-lasting impact.[16] In his opinion, military conflicts in certain territories (*Staatsbildung*) and wars between different territories (*Staatenbildung*) constituted a necessary accompaniment of an enduring and violent process of state building in early modern Europe.

I shall not qualify all of these interpretations in detail here, because my chapter aims at evaluating select arguments which have been used either to describe both wars as religious wars or to challenge this notion by emphasizing those issues

[14] Cf. already Sigfrid H. Steinberg, *The Thirty Years' War and the Conflict for European Hegemony 1600–1660* (London, 1966) (placing this war in a wider struggle over hegemony); Herbert Langer, *The Thirty Years' War* (Dorset, 1980); Geoffrey Parker, *The Thirty Years' War* (London, 1987); and focusing on Germany Richard Bonney, *The Thirty Years' War 1618–1648* (Osprey, 2002).

[15] A constitutional perspective is also predominant in Peter H. Wilson, *Europe's Tragedy: A New History of the Thirty Years War* (London, 2009).

[16] Johannes Burkhardt, *Der Dreißigjährige Krieg* (Frankfurt a.M., 1992), pp. 26–7. The violent nature of state building is a fact scholars have been aware of for a long time. Cf. Charles Tilly, 'War Making and State Making as Organized Crime', in Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol (eds), *Bringing the State Back In* (Cambridge, 1985), pp. 169–86.

which seem to prove that religion only played a minor or even insignificant part in these events. Furthermore, I question the assumption that the idea of religious wars is a modern one and that 'religion' as well as 'Protestant' and 'Catholic' are anachronistic categories, which contemporaries would not have applied. The first section focuses on the concept of religious war on a theoretical level. I suggest applying the term not as a means of describing a certain historical reality (a certain war), but to use it as a methodological concept that enables us to assess the relevance of religion in terms of the causes, the conduct, the experience, and the outcome of early modern and modern wars. At the same time, I introduce a set of characteristics that may be used as points of reference in historical analysis. The second section addresses conflicting notions of the Schmalkaldic War, whose nature was already strongly disputed by contemporaries. The third section deals with the Thirty Years War as a highly complex military conflict in terms of which no predominant interpretation currently exists in historiography. In the last section I compare both wars according to the criteria I have established in the first section.

Religious War as a Research Concept

The terms that one applies in historical analysis are of fundamental importance for both the focus of a research project and its results. *War* may be defined as a violent confrontation, which affects a whole territory or even more than one realm. It may be conducted by military forces or by armed civilians. The term implies a certain amount of organization, although spontaneous rioting may be part of it. *Religion* is much more difficult to define. In the present context, the term is supposed to cover a system of beliefs (doctrines) as well as a set of spiritual practices (rites, rituals) and institutions (organizational forms) by which early modern people tried to connect their own existence to God.[17] Christian religion

[17] A vast amount of literature on this subject has been published which cannot by summarized at this point. For the theological and juridical discourse in the period investigated, Ernst Feil, *Religio*, vols 1–3, *Forschungen zur Kirchen- und Dogmengeschichte* 36, 70, 76 (Göttingen, 1986, 1997, 2001). As valuable as Feil's ample work in general is, it is not very helpful in the present context because contemporary theological concepts of religion with their emphasis on religion as a virtue obviously lagged behind common conceptions of religion. His claim that the term 'religious peace' was not applied in the middle of the sixteenth century (271) is wrong. Compare Josef Leeb (ed.), *Der Reichstag zu Regensburg 1556/57*, vol. 1, 218–20 (München, 2013). In regard to 'war of belief', Feil refers only once to Bodin in all three volumes dealing with the period in question; Feil, *Religio*, vol. 2, p. 156. There is no literature on the question of how ordinary people would have defined religion: certainly not as a 'social construction' or 'system of symbols'. Kaspar von Greyerz, *Religion and Culture in Early Modern Europe, 1500–1800* (Oxford, 2008), pp. 4–8.

was supposed to secure the salvation of one's soul as well as to organize the mundane existence of its followers. There were not only varieties of Christianity in early modern times, but even varieties of its confessions.[18] For example, there was a Papal Catholicism, which was thought to be universal, and there were local manifestations of Catholicism, which could differ significantly from each other. In the age of confessionalization, worldly Catholic rulers tried to enforce their own versions of true belief and proper religious practices, as did ecclesiastic Catholic rulers and Lutheran rulers in their position as *Landeskirchenherr*. Catholic rulers also drew on religious orders, such as the Jesuits, which possessed a sub-territorial and, at the same time, a supra-territorial quality with regard to their space of action as well as their notion of Catholicism. The number of varieties of Christianity and the relations amongst them changed over time.

Concerning the term *religious war*, narrow as well as broad definitions have been applied in public discourse and in scientific research.[19] Some scholars use the term war to imply wars which are solely fought for religious reasons. That is a definition which no serious historian would ever use, because war in general is a multi-causal phenomenon and the character of a certain war might change over its course.[20] There are also much broader definitions such as 'wars, in which religion has some influence on the aims of war, on the nature of war (the way, in which combatants conduct war) or on the motivations of participants'.[21] In that case, we shall probably not find any war in the history of humankind, which was not a religious one. The German historian Konrad Repgen has argued that we should only speak about religious wars in terms of wars that political leaders officially legitimized by using religious arguments, because historians are unable to establish the 'real' intentions of political actors in the past.[22] The question of

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[18] Compare for the following Brady, 'Limits', p. 130.

[19] Friedrich Beiderbeck, 'Religionskriege', in Friedrich Jaeger (ed.), *Enzyklopädie der Neuzeit* (Darmstadt, 2009), pp. 1091–1108; Johannes Burkhardt, 'Religionskriege', in Gerhard Krause and Gerhard Müller (eds), *Theologische Realenzyklopädie*, vol. 28 (Berlin, 1997), pp. 681–7.

[20] Peter Partner argued that 'historiography that sets up purity of intention as a criterion for holy war is mistakenly moralistic in its methods'. Peter Partner, *God of Battles: Holy Wars of Christianity and Islam* (Princeton, NJ, 1998), p. 309. Cf. Natalie Z. Davis, 'The Rites of Violence: Religious Riot in Sixteenth-Century France', *Past and Present* 59 (1973): 51–91, here p. 65. According to Norman Housley 'the danger today lies much less in the offering of an exclusively religious interpretation of any war than of religious values being dismissed as camouflage or propaganda'. Norman Housley, *Religious Warfare in Europe. 1400–1536* (Oxford, 2010), p. 7.

[21] Burkhardt, 'Religionskriege', p. 681.

[22] Repgen, 'Religionskrieg', pp. 334–49. This applies to all kinds of motives which might have determined people's actions in the past, though scholars frequently discuss questions of individual motivation.

motives is indeed a tricky one, but historians should at least be able to discuss well-founded assumptions by analysing the strategies that political actors pursued before the war, during military campaigns, and in the aftermath of war. In addition to that, Repgen's narrow definition does not take into account the complex character of warfare, which, for example, encompasses the experience of war by ordinary people whose perception was hardly defined by official declarations.

Some historians prefer the term *confessional war* because the combatants in both the wars represented different Christian confessions, not different religions.[23] However, contemporaries did not distinguish between *religio* and *confessio*, as demonstrated by the formula 'cuius regio, eius religio', coined around 1600 to summarize the main principle of the Augsburg *Religious Peace* (1555).[24] Likewise, in political discourse they addressed 'religious' grievances (*Religions-Gravamina*), not 'confessional' ones. If there could be only one true belief, speaking of confessions must have seemed pointless. Even in scientific debate, the category *religious war* has certain advantages over the category *confessional war*. For example, it may be applied to intra-religious wars in the context of other religions, such as Islam, whose different movements also struggled violently to gain dominance in certain periods of time; though these are usually not referred to as confessions. Whilst most historians who dealt with the question of religious warfare in the past did not care to define the term – though some complained about the lack of a precise definition – I would suggest the following criteria to assess the impact of religion in a certain war.

Combatants regarded each other as being religiously different (1) to an extent, that only one side may represent true faith. Differences of that kind did not necessarily cause violence and even less, war. However, if religious beliefs are considered mutually exclusive, the probability of violence increases. That particularly applies to intra-religious conflicts in a certain realm because, in early modern times, the entire social and political order was thought to have

[23] Cf. Gotthard, 'Konfessionskrieg', p. 169. In contrast, Johannes Burkhardt, 'Konfessionsbildung und Staatsbildung: Konkurrierende Begründungen für die Bellizität Europas?', in Holzem, *Krieg und Christentum*, pp. 527–52, here p. 529. Already in the eighteenth century, the term *Reformationskrieg* was applied to diverse military conflicts covered in this volume. Cf., for example, Johann Gottfried Gregorius, *Cosmographia novissima oder allerneueste und accurate Beschreibung der gantzen wunderbaren Welt* [...] (Erfurt 1715), p. 915.

[24] The text of this imperial law mentions the word religion more than fifty times. Only a very few times is the term 'Augsburgische Confession' applied with regard to the *confessio augustana* handed over to the emperor at the imperial diet in 1530. In this context, the concept of confession is solely used to describe a specific set of beliefs, the Lutheran confession, whereas Catholicism is regularly described as the 'old religion'. Once even the phrase *Augsburgische Confessions-Religion* (§ 15) appears. Most of the time both these confessions are addressed as religions.

been established by God. Therefore, such conflicts necessarily implied conflicts over rule. In any case, we should look for the application of verbal and symbolic strategies emphasizing religious difference rather than merely ask how religious ideas were used to mobilize people to support war.

Hence, the aim to eliminate religious difference or at least to weaken deviant forms of belief acted as a motive and/or justification (2) for conducting war. Since arcane as well as official documents referring to motives may be misleading, we should not focus on single statements, but take into account the whole performance of a certain actor in a certain conflict. There is no sense in assuming that religious difference must have been very profound (confessionalization must have reached a certain level) or that political actors should have had a precise idea of their own religious convictions before they decided to go to war.[25] In a given situation, the amount of danger they attributed to an adversary who qualified as such precisely (even if not solely) because of his religious affiliation would have been sufficient.

The political discourse of war (3) was distinguished by ideas and concepts conveying the notion that religious difference between combatants served as a driving force in the present conflict. Was the opponent characterized as an 'infidel', 'heretic', 'servant of the devil', 'archenemy' or the 'Antichrist'? Did people apply religious affiliation as a marker to separate friends from enemies, such as 'we, the Protestants' or 'they, the Catholics'? Did they, for example, describe combatants as believing 'themselves to be God's warriors, acting at his command and, in the most explicit sense, implementing his purpose for his creation'?[26] Did they label the war in question as a religious war (alternatively: war of belief, war on heresy, crusade or holy war)? In the course of research, the entire lexical field of these phrases and their contemporary semantics must be taken into account.

The conduct of war was characterized by specific practices (4) highlighting religious difference between both sides of the conflict. Were there extended prayer services before battle, which enforced the doctrines of one's own religion and condemned religious convictions and practices of the enemy? Did combatants use religiously connoted battle cries or carry religious symbols in battle? Did they destroy idols or sites of belief to extinguish heresy or to demoralize their enemies? Were there confessionalized habits of violence: for example, specific

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[25] Cf. Gabriele Haug-Moritz, 'Der Schmalkaldische Krieg (1546/47) – ein kaiserlicher Religionskrieg?', in Brendle/Schindling, *Religionskriege*, pp. 93–105, here p. 95.

[26] Housley, *Religious Warfare*, p. 11; cf. Philip Benedict, 'Religion and Politics in the European Struggle for Stability, 1500–1700', in Greyerz/Siebenhüner, *Religion*, pp. 156–73, here p.165. For Calvinist interpretations Michael Walzer, 'Exodus 32 and the Theory of the Holy War: The History of a Citation', *Harvard Theological Review* 61 (1968): 1–14; David Martin, *Does Christianity Cause War?* (Oxford, 1997), p. 150.

relationships between physical, verbal, and symbolic manifestations of violence?[27] May we notice ritualized acts of violence as formalized, maybe even celebratory acts, connected with transcendent ideas: for instance, to commit violence as an instrument of God's will?[28] In cases such as these, committing violence might have been considered sacred.

Church institutions (5) played an important part in the conduct of war: by organizing alliances, raising financial support or mobilizing people to go to war by referring to the issue of true faith. If early modern people could be convinced by members of the clergy that they were expected to fight for the salvation of their soul, they would certainly have fought more eagerly than for the sake of territorial gain of their monarch. However, the contribution of church institutions alone should not be considered sufficient to confirm the religious character of a certain war, because their involvement has been – and still is – common in the context of warfare. In addition, there might be a problem of demarcation because certain church institutions held a double function as representatives of ecclesiastic as well as secular rule.

Military alliances (6) were formed according to religious boundaries, though an alliance between political actors with different confessions does not necessarily prove that religious issues were not at stake. At a certain moment, an inter-confessional or inter-religious alliance might have been considered inevitable or a 'lesser evil' in terms of its long-term religious consequences than any alternative. Hence, there is no point in compiling long lists of inter-religious or inter-confessional military cooperation to prove that there was no 'true' religious war in early modern times. One should better ask: To which extent did the main actors use notions of confessional solidarity[29] to force certain powers to support one's own campaign by subsidies or to take part actively in battle? Likewise, the employment of multi-confessional mercenary armies cannot serve as a sufficient argument against the religious character of a certain war. That mercenaries served confessionally diverse rulers, analogous to craftsmen or scholars, constituted a common practice in the period investigated. On the contrary, the necessity to rely on confessionally diverse actors might have induced political leaders to avoid openly advocating religious war.[30]

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[27] Cf. Bob Scribner, 'Preconditions of Tolerance and Intolerance in Sixteenth-Century Germany', in Ole Peter Grell and Robert W. Scribner (eds), *Tolerance and Intolerance in the European Reformation* (Cambridge, 1996), pp. 32–47, here pp. 45–6.

[28] With such rituals the idea of purification might have been connected: towns, regions or whole states had to be cleansed of their heretic or pagan population. Natalie Z. Davis, 'Writing "The Rites of Violence" and Afterward', in Murdock et al, *Ritual and Violence*, pp. 8–29, here p. 15.

[29] Repgen, 'Religionskrieg', p. 334.

[30] Benedict, *Religion*, p. 168.

The war in question led to serious consequences with regard to matters of religion (7), such as the prohibition or acceptance of a certain belief in a certain realm. For example, we may observe the forced displacement of dissenters and coerced mass conversions or the return of religious refugees combined with a revitalization of formerly suppressed religious practices and institutions. As a result of the religious aftermath of a particular military conflict, the followers of a certain belief possibly claimed to represent the winners of the war. Were there confessionalized celebrations of peace, in which the outcome of war was addressed as a victory of the true belief?

While assessing the character of a certain military conflict, historians should take into account the multiple manifestations in which war exists in human society.[31] Hence, they must prove to which extent the criteria mentioned above apply to all of these wars. For example, there was the war, which was legitimized and governed by political elites, usually monarchs or princes pursuing their own interest. There was the war, which was fought by soldiers and their military leaders in a series of military events. There was another war which combatants and civilians, rulers and subjects, men and women experienced, suffered, and tried to make sense of. This war affected the daily routines of individuals, their quality of life, and the ways in which they interpreted their mundane existence. How ordinary people understood a certain war did not necessarily depend on the 'real' aims, which had motivated their rulers to go to war. It was rather a question of mental structures and preferences of interpretation already existing before the outbreak of war. In the present context, the overwhelming experience of the confessional divide and the simultaneous process of the Ottoman expansion since the 1520s must be taken into account, even if the extent to which people in the Holy Roman Empire were affected by these developments differed. As media wars, both wars were accompanied by the publication of a noteworthy (Schmalkaldic War) or even vast (Thirty Years War) number of broadsheets and pamphlets commenting on current military events, the political aims of the main actors, and the various consequences of war. They also offered patterns of interpretation for why people had to confront violence and how war might have been brought to a conclusion. The extent to which these patterns merely reflected or else shaped the sentiments of their recipients is hard to establish. While analysing the form, content, and semantics of print media, we have to take into account the successive evolution of a media system, which was marked by an increasing differentiation of production, distribution, and sale. Finally, there was the war *of* remembrance in the sense of the ways in which both wars were

[31] These manifestations of war were certainly related to each other, but in different ways and to different degrees, which have to be scrutinized thoroughly in every single case. All these wars were 'real' in their own quality and the nature of all of them is relevant for historical research.

present in the communicative and cultural memory (Aleida and Jan Assmann) of a given society . This war, which could develop into a war *over* remembrance, depended strongly on current social needs and political interests.

Religion in the Schmalkaldic War (1546–1547)

Before the Schmalkaldic League finally confronted Emperor Charles V and his allies under the pretext of a pre-emptive war in 1546, there had been at least five steps of escalation predating the actual outbreak of war.[32] The first step constituted the qualification of Protestants as breakers of imperial peace (*Landfriedensbrecher*) at the imperial diet of Augsburg in 1530. As a result, in 1531, a number of Protestant estates founded the Schmalkaldic League: as an alliance meant to defend each of its members against any aggression 'because of the Christian, just and righteous cause', i.e. the Protestant faith.[33] Some years later, the League was described as an 'earthly republic' and a 'Christian alliance' which had been established for 'God's Word and honor and our souls's salvation, and not for anything worldly [*zeitlichs*]'.[34] In 1534, Duke Ulrich of Württemberg was reinstalled as ruler of the duchy of Württemberg, owing to a successful military campaign of Philip of Hesse, one of the two leaders of the Schmalkaldic League. Thus one of the largest imperial territories was won for the Protestant cause. The next step was marked by establishing the 'constitution of defence' in 1535, leading to a military build-up of the League and followed by a considerable growth in the number of its members in spite of increasing conflicts within the League. The fifth step represented again a military confrontation: In 1542, an army of both Philip of Hesse and John Frederick of Saxony expelled the Catholic Duke Henry of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel from his territory, after the latter had threatened to conquer the Protestant imperial cities of Goslar and

[32] Cf. in general Thomas A. Brady, *Protestant Politics, Jacob Sturm (1489–1553) and the German Reformation* (Atlantic Highlands, NJ., 1995), pp. 142–291; Gabriele Haug-Moritz, 'Krieg', pp. 93–105; *idem*, *Der Schmalkaldische Bund. 1530–1541/42: Eine Studie zu den genossenschaftlichen Strukturelementen der politischen Ordnung des Heiligen Römischen Reiches Deutscher Nation* (Leinfelden-Echterdingen, 2002); Georg Schmidt, 'Der Kampf um Kursachsen, Luthertum und Reichsverfassung (1546–1553) – ein deutscher Freiheitskrieg?', in Volker Leppin et al. (eds), *Johann Friedrich I. – der lutherische Kurfürst*. Schriften des Vereins für Reformationsgeschichte 204 (Göttingen, 2006), pp. 55–84.

[33] Brady, *Politics*, p. 144; also Brendle/Schindling, *Religionskriege*, p. 168.

[34] Quoted after Brady, *Politics*, pp. 142–3, 158. The last phrase shows how people distinguished religious matters from power politics which they denoted as 'zeitlichs'. With this argument, the Protestant imperial city of Ulm argued against an alliance with the Catholic King of France.

Brunswick. Both of these cities belonged to the League but a mere threat could hardly invoke the mutual defence clause.[35]

Only once he had settled his military conflicts with France and the Ottoman Empire by establishing truces, Charles V decided to proceed against both princes by inflicting the imperial ban and ordering troops to prepare a military confrontation with the League. As a result of an alliance with the pope, a large contingent of *Landsknechts* and considerable subsidies were sent by the pope, Paul III, to extinct what, in his eyes, was the 'pestiferous' heresy of Protestantism.[36] In contrast, by carefully avoiding any reference to the religious divide in official statements, Charles V placed himself above any religious dispute in the empire. He based this procedure solely on imperial law, by deeming his opponents as disturbers of the *Landfrieden*; even so he once referred to the suppression of the (Catholic) clergy by Protestant rulers. By claiming to conduct a *Reichsexekution* he tried to prevent other Protestant powers in and outside of the empire from getting involved on the part of the Schmalkaldic League. He was even able to form an alliance with the Protestant Duke Moritz of Saxony, who would hardly have sided with Charles V if the latter had openly declared this war to represent a war against Protestantism. This inter-confessional alliance frequently serves as an argument against the relevance of religious convictions as a driving force for the escalation of violence in the Schmalkaldic War, though it merely demonstrates that one political actor had had indeed very mundane issues in mind.[37] However, by assessing the data historians have collected concerning the self-perception of Charles V, there can be no doubt that he wanted to restore the religious as well as the political order of the empire by fighting the main exponents of Protestant heresy. Charles V was not only a deeply pious monarch but he imagined himself to represent the 'last emperor' fighting the ultimate battle against the Antichrist.[38] In 1546, he argued that his claim to conduct a *Reichsexekutionskrieg* served as

[35] This military campaign was celebrated in Protestant media as God's Victory and as a just war. For example, a Taler issued by the imperial city of Brunswick showed a risen Christ flag standing on a skeleton referring to the triumph of the Protestant side in the War of Wolfenbüttel. Cf. also Gabriele Haug-Moritz, 'Widerstand als "Gegenwehr": Die schmalkaldische Konzeption der "Gegenwehr" und der "gegenwehrliche Krieg" des Jahres 1542', in Robert von Friedeburg (ed.), *Widerstandsrecht in der frühen Neuzeit: Erträge und Perspektiven der Forschung im deutsch-britischen Vergleich*, Zeitschrift für historische Forschung, Suppl. 26 (Berlin, 2001), pp. 141–61.

[36] Kenneth Meyer Setton, *The Papacy and the Levant, 1204–1571*, vol. 3 (Philadelphia, 1984), pp. 417, 484.

[37] To Moritz of Saxony, the Schmalkaldic War offered the unique chance to gain an elevation in rank and an expansion of territory. Likewise the Catholic Duke of Savoy supported the Protestant Union at the beginning of the Thirty Years War to become King of Bohemia.

[38] Housley, *Religious Warfare*, p. 25; also Brendle/Schindling, *Religionskriege*, p. 169.

a mere 'fig-leaf' and 'pretext' of his military actions – a strategy that, even in his own imagination, was hardly able to convince his opponents.[39] Towards his sister he confirmed that religion lay at the core of the conflict, though he wisely avoided admitting this fact in official statements.

In their declaration of war issued on 11 August 1546, his opponents justified their right to resist with an existential Catholic threat against Protestant faith. By referring to God's law as well as the law of nature, they claimed to defend 'our true Christian religion which the pope understands to be heresy'.[40] By doing so, they exerted moral pressure on Protestant powers outside of the League as well as legal pressure on Protestant estates within it to back their military actions against the Catholic emperor. We cannot establish for sure that John Frederick of Saxony or Philip of Hesse believed themselves to be acting as defenders of the true faith. However, the notion that early modern rulers were solely led by power interests, whilst only ordinary people acted out of religious motivation (and could easily be manipulated by referring to matters of belief) represents an inappropriate simplification. Whatever both princes 'really' intended to fight for, they did in fact defend the Protestant cause because, in the 1540s, Protestantism was seriously under threat by a Catholic counter-reaction.

Pro-Protestant print media reinforced the notion that a war of religion ('Krieg in Religion sachen') was fought by both sides.[41] Pamphlets as well as leaflets promoted the idea of a struggle between the defenders of true faith and the Antichrist. In this reading, the present war 'revealed the end-times and the coming of Judgment Day, as prophesized in Daniel's vision in the Old Testament and by chapter 24 of Matthew's gospel and John's Apocalypse in the New'.[42] Whereas some authors identified the enemy of the true faith to be the emperor, who was repeatedly addressed as a tyrant, others focused on the pope, who had openly advocated the notion of a 'war on heresy', and his 'devilish' practices against which the German nation had to stand up to defend the 'Teutsche Libertet'. [43] Some authors even linked the idea of Protestantism as the only true

[39] Repgen, 'Religionskrieg', pp. 344–5. Even though the message of this statement seems to be quite obvious, Repgen interpreted it somewhat differently.

[40] Ibid., p. 346.

[41] Cf. Religion-Hendel, Pasquillus/ der halbe Poet/ vom Krieg/ so Kaiser Carl der fünfft/ sampt dem Bapst/ wider Teütschland/ inn Religion sachen/ zů f[ue]ren/ fürgenommen [...], Augsburg 1546.

[42] Gabriele Haug-Moritz, 'The Holy Roman Empire, the Schmalkald League, and the Idea of Confessional Nation-Building', *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* 152/4 (2008): pp. 427–39, here p. 438.

[43] Cf. [Valentin Schrot], Vrsprung vnnd vr=//sach diser Auffrur/ Teutscher Nation [Augsburg, 1546]; also Georg Schmidt, '"Teutsche Libertät" oder "Hispanische Servitut". Deutungsstrategien im Kampf um den evangelischen Glauben und die Reichsverfassung (1546–1552)', in Luise Schorn-Schütte (ed.), *Das Interim 1548/50. Herrschaftskrise und*

faith with that of a German nation: the true German was a follower of Protestant belief.[44] Such ideational links between the concept of religion and the concept of nation may be observed to a much larger extent in the Hussite wars, and they became even more relevant from the eighteenth century onwards.[45] Since there did not yet exist a market of print media in the proper sense, it is even more difficult to assess the relationship between messages promoted by print media and perceptions favoured by media consumers.

The Schmalkaldic League was defeated in the Battle of Mühlberg in 1547. Consistent to Charles's politics before and during the war, the immediate outcome of the war did not refer to religious matters. For example, initially John Frederick was condemned to death as a breaker of the *Landfrieden*, though, in the end, he was able to save his life and some of his territories for his sons by signing the *Capitulation of Wittenberg*. However, at the imperial diet 1548 in Augsburg (*Geharnischter Reichstag)*, Charles V asserted the *Augsburger Interim* as a means to restore religious unity in the empire by making some concessions to Protestantism while generally enforcing Catholic doctrine. The following events, the Princes' Rebellion (1552) and the *Religious Peace of Augsburg* (1555) may not sufficiently be explained merely by referring to the attempt of an inter-confessional princes' opposition to rearrange power relations between the emperor and the imperial estates. For example, Moritz of Saxony now endeavoured even more to support the Protestant cause after he had achieved his long-desired status as an electoral prince.[46] The alliance of the opposing imperial estates with Henry II of France served as a means to counteract an extension of the House of Habsburg's power as well as to establish a permanent legal acceptance of Protestantism in the empire. The imperial recess (*Reichsabschied*) of Augsburg should not be 'secularized' by emphasizing the large amount of regulations in it, which did not refer to religion.[47] This document certainly constituted an element of an enduring process of imperial reform, though not only one among others, but the most important until 1648, according to the perception of contemporaries who addressed it explicitly as 'religious peace' (*Religion Friden*). By doing so, they referred to the events before which they had obviously interpreted as a 'Krieg in Religionssachen' (*bellum religionis causa*).

Glaubenskonflikt (Gütersloh, 2005), pp. 166–91; in general, Heinz Duchhardt (ed.), *Reichsständische Libertät und habsburgisches Kaisertum* (Mainz, 1999).

[44] Haug-Moritz, 'Holy Roman Empire', pp. 435–6.

[45] For the 'decisive role [of religion] in the fashioning of nationhood' compare Housley, *Religious Warfare*, pp. 26–9.

[46] Brendle/Schindling, *Religionskriege*, p. 171.

[47] For this assessment compare Peter H. Wilson, 'Dynasty, Constitution and Confession: The Role of Religion in the Thirty Years War', in *International History Review* 30/3 (2008): 473–514, here p. 503.

Since the aftermath of the Schmalkaldic War did not result in a religiously reunited empire, Charles V exploited his military success as a victory of Catholicism mainly in the context of his Spanish court culture. For example in 1548, when he had his equestrian portrait painted by Titian, all religiously connoted messages of this highly suggestive and complex rulers' portrait, such as the idea of the emperor as St George or as *miles christianus*, could be related to his fight against Protestantism as well as against the Turks because the majority of contemporary and later onlookers could hardly know that the emperor's armour and the landscape in the background were meant to refer to the battle of Mühlberg.[48] This specific meaning could have been conveyed much more explicitly, but then it would have contradicted Charles's own interpretation of this event as a conflict over rule and not over religion. His most important ally, Moritz of Saxony, had good reasons to downplay the issue of religion in his own (limited) politics of remembrance. His successor, August of Saxony, who was responsible for erecting the most important memorial monuments for Moritz, avoided in both any reference to the part Moritz had played in the Schmalkaldic War. The first monument, executed by Hans Walther II and installed on Dresden's city walls in 1553, celebrated the handover of the electoral dignity from Moritz to August in the same year.[49] The viewer is unable to establish, however, how the Albertine line had got hold of this dignity. Moritz is pointedly depicted in the armour he had worn in the *Battle of Sievershausen* (1553) while executing the imperial ban against another disturber of peace, Margrave Albrecht Alcibiades of Brandenburg. He is thus glorified as victorious *defensor patriae* who sacrificed his own life to enforce the *Landfrieden*. Significantly, above his head the resurrected Christ appears, indicating his side wound. In the magnificent tomb in the cathedral of Freiberg (1558–63), Moritz is once more celebrated as the winner of Sievershausen and also, referring to his participation in the campaigns against the Turks, as *miles christianus*.

Notwithstanding these substantial efforts to direct the *memoria* of Moritz, it was the catchy formula 'Judas of Meißen', coined by contemporaries, which has survived until today in collective Saxon memory with regard to the Schmalkaldic War. It serves as a reminder of Moritz's betrayal of the Protestant cause as well as of his own relative, John Frederick of Saxony, as the most important exponent

[48] Jörg Oberhaidacher, 'Zu Tizians Reiterbildnis Karls V. Ein Untersuchung seiner Beziehungen zum Georgsthema', in *Jahrbuch der Kunsthistorischen Sammlungen in Wien* 78 (1982): pp. 69–90; Harriet Rudolph, '*Hercules saxonicus*. Über den Versuch der symbolischen Absicherung einer fragilen Rangerhebung', in *Archiv für Kulturgeschichte* 93/1 (2011): 57–94.

[49] Heinrich Magirius, 'Die Monumente für Kurfürst Moritz an der Festung in Dresden und im Freiberger Dom', in Karlheinz Blaschke (ed.), *Moritz von Sachsen: Ein Fürst der Reformationszeit zwischen Territorium und Reich*, Quellen und Forschungen zur sächsischen Geschichte 29 (Leipzig, 2007), pp. 260–83.

of Protestantism in the Holy Roman Empire at that time. After his surrender in the battle of Mühlberg, the former elector had himself depicted in paintings and broadsheets as a Christian martyr, whom because of his sacrifice God would later reward.[50] Most pro-Protestant leaflets and pamphlets tended to omit the decisive fact that the Protestant side had actually lost the war.[51] The disastrous defeat of Mühlberg was interpreted as a temporary ordeal by God who, in the end, would assist his true followers John Frederick and Protestantism, in order to win the last battle against Catholicism. Only some years later, German Protestant princes and other Protestant powers such as Denmark and England supported the Huguenots in the French Wars of Religion and, again, we may observe various combinations of religious and power political motives which were responsible for intervening in this conflict.[52]

Religion in the Thirty Years War (1618–1648)

In general, the Thirty Years War is considered to have consisted of certain phases of war embracing a variety of military conflicts, which might as well be regarded as different wars.[53] Hence, the question whether this war should be considered representative of a religious war would have to be divided into sub-questions, with reference to each of these wars. We would have to analyse the sources with regard to all of the criteria that have been established to serve as points of reference for each single war and even for specific events in these wars, such as the Battle of the White Mountain (1620). Because this method may hardly be

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[50] Matthias Müller, 'Bilder als Waffen nach der Schlacht: Die Stilisierung Kurfürst Johann Friedrichs von Sachsen zur "imago pietatis" und die Fortsetzung des Schmalkaldischen Krieges in der konfessionellen Bildpropaganda', in Oliver Auge (ed.), *Bereit zum Konflikt: Strategien und Medien der Konfliktzeugung und Konfliktbewältigung im europäischen Mittelalter*, Mittelalter-Forschungen 20 (Ostfildern, 2008), pp. 311–39.

[51] Gabriele Haug-Moritz, 'Zur Konstruktion von Kriegsniederlagen in den frühneuzeitlichen Massenmedien: Das Beispiel des Schmalkaldischen Krieges (1547–1552)', in Horst Carl (ed.), *Kriegsniederlagen: Erfahrungen und Erinnerungen* (Berlin, 2004), pp. 345–74, here p. 361.

[52] I thank the unknown reviewer for reminding me of this fact which I had omitted in the first version of this chapter. Cf. Paul D. Lockhart, *Frederik II and the Protestant Cause: Denmark in the wars of religion 1559–96* (Leiden, 2004); David Gehring, *Anglo-German relations and the Protestant Cause. Elizabethan foreign policy and pan-Protestantism* (London, 2013).

[53] For recent German studies compare Christoph Kampmann, *Europa und das Reich im Dreißigjährigen Krieg. Geschichte eines europäischen Konflikts* (Stuttgart, 2008); Peter Claus Hartmann (ed.), *Der Dreißigjährige Krieg: Facetten einer folgenreichen Epoche* (Regensburg, 2010).

implemented in this section, I focus on select questions mainly referring to the first three phases of the Thirty Years War. I skip its last phase, which is usually considered the most international and the least religious. At the same time, I limit my focus to events the Holy Roman Empire was directly affected by and omit the conflicts between the Dutch States-General, France, and Spain.

Before the Thirty Years War actually broke out, some members of the empire's political elite already assumed the impending war to represent a religious one. Since the end of the sixteenth century, dispute and mistrust between Catholic, Lutheran, and Calvinist estates had grown. The *Religious Peace of Augsburg*, though it had brought the empire three decades of peace, was increasingly considered to represent a 'rotten' peace, which each confession merely tried to interpret for its own benefit.[54] From 1586 onwards, a number of violent confrontations between Catholic and Protestant estates such as the *War of Cologne* (1586) and the *Jülich-Kleve-Berg Affair* (1609–14), a conflict over succession which nevertheless was strongly influenced by the confessional affiliation of its main actors, had already happened in the Holy Roman Empire.[55] After 1600, the main imperial institutions (imperial diet, *Reichskreistag*, and *Reichskammergericht*) were increasingly paralyzed and thus no longer able to facilitate any peaceful agreement. In 1617, the Protestant estates demonstratively celebrated the 100th jubilee of Luther's *Thesenanschlag*, inducing the pope to announce a Catholic jubilee to counteract Protestant festivities. Both sides exploited these events to indoctrinate their own religious convictions whilst at the same time disparage and ridicule their confessional adversaries. In addition to that, a revival of eschatological ideas advanced the notion that the final battle against the Antichrist was imminent.[56] Pre-war political discourses were thus marked by confessionalized images of the enemy and conspiracy theories to an extent which has been labelled as 'confessional fundamentalism', in order to emphasize the violent nature of inter-confessional arguments at that period.[57]

Mutual suspicion, fear of aggression, and religious hatred were considerably instigated by the print media, in which mainly Catholic and Calvinist publicists

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[54] Gotthard, 'Konfessionskrieg', p. 155.

[55] Cf. Joachim Whaley, *Germany and the Holy Roman Empire, vol. I: Maximilian I to the Peace of Westphalia 1493–1648*, Oxford History of Early Modern Europe (Oxford, 2012), p. 427; for the latter conflict cf. Deborah Anderson, *On the Verge of War: International Relations and the Jülich-Kleve Succession Crises (1609–1614)* (Brill, 1999), pp. 8 *et passim*.

[56] Housley, *Religious Warfare*, p. 198; also Volker Leppin, *Antichrist und Jüngster Tag. Das Profil apokalyptischer Flugschriftenpublizistik im deutschen Luthertum 1548–1618* (Gütersloh, 1999).

[57] Heinz Schilling (ed.), *Konfessioneller Fundamentalismus: Religion als politischer Faktor im europäischen Mächtesystem um 1600*, Schriften des Historischen Kollegs 70 (München, 2007). For critical assessments of this term compare the chapters by Eike Wolgast and Winfried Schulze in this volume.

spread the thought that war was the last remaining remedy to defend true faith, because the religious opponent had already prepared to attack. In 1616, the well-known publicist Caspar Schoppe, a former Lutheran and one of the principal Catholic propagandists, published a pamphlet in which he accused the Calvinists of aiming at obliterating Catholicism as well as Lutheranism in the Holy Roman Empire.[58] He argued that, were the Calvinists to be victorious, the imperial constitution and the entire social order would be overthrown, because Calvinism was allegedly linked to 'democratic' forms of rule. Consequently, Catholic as well as Lutheran rulers had to extinguish Calvinism in order to defend not only true faith but also their own position of power. Two years later, Schoppe published another leaflet under the significant title 'Classicum belli sacri', which was widely distributed in the Holy Roman Empire and beyond.[59] He explicitly asked the emperor to conduct a *holy war* to extinguish all Protestant heresies in the empire, which he considered being in immediate danger. According to him, Ferdinand II was obliged to persecute every town, prince or human being who tried to change their 'religion', because doing so constituted an act of disobedience that was not to be tolerated for the sake of either religion or order.

Though there were also publications which tried to calm down the heated atmosphere, Protestant reaction was not long in coming. Amongst others, an anonymous author published a pamphlet with the title 'Classicum belli sacri: Der mächtige Alarm zum Religions-Krige' which, by commenting on Schoppe's work, attempted to prove the overall intent of Catholicism to extinguish true faith in the empire. Hence, the reader was supposed to conclude that Protestants had better be ready for war, too.[60] In this pamphlet the Latin phrase *bellum*

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[58] Caspar Schoppe, Newer Calvinischer Modell deß heiligen Römischen Reichs/ Das ist/ Augenscheinlicher Beweiß/ daß die Calvinisten den Religion und Profanfriden/ und die gantze Verfassung deß heilige[n] Römischen Reichs umbzustossen [...] vorhabens seyen, [S.l.], 1616.

[59] Caspar Schoppe, Classicum belli sacri sive Heldus redivivus: hoc est ad Carolum V. imperatorem suasoria de Christiani Cesaris erga principes ecclesiae rebelles officio, Pavia 1619 (published several times in Latin, German, and other languages, also short versions).

[60] Alarm zum Religions-Krieg in Teutschland: Das ist: Gasparis Scioppii [...] im Jahr 1619. zu Pavia in offenen Druck gegebenen Lateinischen Büchlein [...], [S.l.], 1619 (several editions); cf. Ein gründliches und ohnpassionirtes Bedencken/ Was von deß Abtrinnigen Man[n]s Caspari Scioppi blutdürstigen Buch/ genant Classicum Belli sacri, das ist/ Sturmglock zum Heyligen Krieg [...], s.l. 1619; Janus Meder, Variorum Discursuum Bohemicorum Nervi Continuatio: sive Antiscioppius oder Symsons Backenzahn: mit welchem der in- über- vnd durchteuffelte Caspar Sciop zerschmettert wirdt [...], [s.l.] 1619; Schoppische Blumen: Auß einem zu Ticin ... 1619 ... in Druck außgegangenen Buche: Caspari Schoppii Classicum sacri belli oder Lermenschlag zum Heiligen Kriege [...], [s.l.], 1619.

sacrum was translated as 'religious war', though other authors preferred the term *holy war* to the same context. This demonstrates that contemporaries did not necessarily distinguish a *bellum religiosum* from a *bellum sacrum*. In any case, looking at this and other examples of printed warmongering before the outbreak of war and during its early stages, we may observe how the interpretation of current conflicts as religious ones significantly raised the stakes and created deep distrust between the adversaries, thereby considerably impeding any form of cooperative conflict management.

However, once war had broken out, people were obviously not quite certain as to what kind of violent confrontation the current conflict actually represented. In 1627, the anonymous author of a pamphlet discussed the question whether this war indeed constituted a 'religious war' or rather a 'war of regions'.[61] In his argument, he explicitly set fighting for religion against fighting for territory, even if he finally linked both issues – by stating that according to the Peace of Augsburg, territorial rule also allowed determining the religion of a territory's inhabitants. At the same time, he disapproved of the attempt to disguise the present confrontation as a 'war of reputation' because he considered the reputation of rulers to function only as a pretext for justifying the application of violence. Implicitly, he even referred to the issue of hegemony by repeatedly mentioning 'popish', Jesuit, and Spanish plots which allegedly aimed at gaining dominance over the entire empire as well as Europe. Finally, he also criticized Lutheran officers and soldiers, who would not care about religion but only about money and goods, as 'epicurean world sows'.[62] To this author, fighting for material gain appeared particularly morally reprehensible because, as a result of the religious divide, the present war did indeed constitute a *religious war*. To restore peace, he listed three measures: the electorate princes should search for solutions to the conflicts based on imperial law; all German princes should be united by consensus; and, finally, trustworthy councillors as well as honest patriots should be engaged at princes' courts. In this context, the idea of a German nation is meant to overcome the disintegrating impact of religious disunity in the empire.

In European collective memory, the Thirty Years War began in 1618 with the so-called *Defenestration of Prague*, even though a sweeping military conflict was by no means inevitable at this stage. Nevertheless, the expressive combination of physical and symbolic violence committed by leading members of the Protestant Bohemian estates is indeed worth mentioning, because it deliberately referred to

[61] Politischer Discurs/ Von jetzigen Kriege in Teutschland [...]. Darinn man augenscheinlich sehen kan/ ob dieser Krieg ein Regions: oder Religions Krieg sey, [S.l.], 1627 (several editions). In this pamphlet, the Schmalkaldic War, whose history serves as a prologue for the present war, was declared to have been a religious war, even though people at that time had allegedly not applied this term.

[62] Politischer Discurs, no page number.

a similar act signifying the outbreak of the Hussite wars two centuries before: In 1419, violence had culminated with the defenestration of thirteen representatives of the town council; anybody who survived the fall had been killed immediately. Though both events symbolized a religious conflict inextricably interlocked with a conflict over rule, on closer examination, they appear to be significantly different. The 1419 defenestration was a spontaneous incident, provoked by a member of the town council. By quoting this act, the 1618 defenestration embodied a formalized, even celebratory quality. However, it was neither thought to serve as a symbolic declaration of war, nor should it be interpreted in this way. Representing a controlled and limited escalation of violence, the defenestration was directed against Catholic officials of the king, not against the king himself. Only after Ferdinand II declined to answer the *Gravamina* of the Bohemian estates with an offer of negotiations, preferring instead to conduct a punitive action, was the road to war opened. And only when the newly founded Bohemian Confederation (1619) replaced as King of Bohemia the Catholic Ferdinand II with the Calvinist Frederick of the Palatinate did a military confrontation, which would necessarily involve many more participants than two Bohemian kings and the Bohemian crown territories, become inevitable.

Whilst King Ferdinand II had good reasons to dismiss any religious foundation of the Bohemian 'rebellion' – the exact same as Charles V had had during the Schmalkaldic War – historians should not play down the relevance which the Protestant estates of Bohemia attributed to the measures Ferdinand II had applied to suppress deviant forms of Christian belief in Bohemia. It is not likely that Bohemian opposition to Habsburg rule would have taken such a violent course if both Matthias and his successor Ferdinand II had indeed respected the *Majestätsbrief* (1609) as a constituent part of the Bohemian constitution. In a formal speech delivered by Count von Thurn shortly before the defenestration, measures concerning religion constituted the primary object of protest. To contrast matters of religion and matters of constitution in opposition would again be misleading, even more so since one of the motivations for protest had been that the Habsburg kings had exchanged leading Protestant Bohemian officials with Catholic ones, whom they considered to be more loyal to Habsburg rule. By emphasizing confessional affiliation as the main incentive for such dealings, the Protestant estates referred to a demarcation line, which could be much more easily drawn than the line between loyalty and disloyalty to the king.

Both issues, *libertas et religio*, had moved the Bohemian estates to oppose Ferdinand II, though since 1609, *libertas in religione* had already been part of the Bohemian constitution. The formula *pro libertate et religione*, which had already been used by Protestant rulers in the Schmalkaldic War, was supposed to sum up all of the rights and privileges of the estates that had to be defended from all attempts of limitation by Habsburg rulers. After 1555, the *libertas* of the imperial estates included the *ius reformandi.* This was not supposed to

represent only one amongst various other rights, but the most important one. As in the Bohemian case, it was particularly emphasized in Protestant discourse at the time. In the Thirty Years War, the formula *pro libertate et religione* was revitalized again and again: for example, by the Danish king at the beginning of the Danish–Lower Saxon War in 1624.[63] It appeared in pro-Protestant printed pamphlets and leaflets as well as on the flags of the troops of Protestant military leaders. By contrast, the troops of the Catholic League utilized the principle *Pro ecclesia et imperio*, qualifying the opponent as an enemy of the (Catholic) church and, at the same time, of the Holy Roman Empire.

Despite all of the intellectual mobilization for conducting a religious war, the Thirty Years War did not develop into a war between the Protestant empire and the Catholic one. The various constellations of military alliances rather illuminate how, in this context, the idea of religious war was applied as a political argument to legitimize the demands and strategies of certain rulers. For example, John George I of Saxony justified the fact that he aligned with the emperor by claiming that the Bohemian estates were not defending religion but instead opposing their legitimate ruler. Even regardless of the close relations between the Habsburg emperors and the Albertine electoral princes during the last seventy years, John George I had good reasons to do so: Bohemia was a direct neighbour of Saxony; the majority of its Protestant estates did not belong to the Lutheran confession. With respect to the violent events in Bohemia, the Saxon elector was neither interested in the spread of heresy and rebellion in his own territory, nor did he profit from the Palatinate gain of the Bohemian crown, which left him to represent the only Lutheran elector. However, precisely because John George possessed a sense of his confessional affiliation and the moral obligations resulting from it, he felt the need to justify his policy by declaring the present conflict a rebellion, and not a religious war.

To give another example, in 1628 the president of the emperor's *Hofkriegsrat*, Collalto, argued against issuing the *Edict of Restitution* due to the possibility of great vileness, even a religious war resulting from such a measure.[64] He obviously expected the Protestant estates to be ready to start another war to prevent its implementation. In the end he was right: the dismissal of the *Edict of Restitution* was one of the reasons moving the most powerful Protestant powers Saxony and Brandenburg to join an alliance with the Swedish king in 1631. In 1632,

[63] Janus Møller Jensen, *Denmark and the Crusades, 1400–1650* (Leiden, 2007), p. 317. This formula was even applied during wars after the Thirty Years War, for example, by William III of Orange in the context of his invasion in England in 1688. Cf. Frits Broeyer, 'William III and the Reformed Church of the Netherlands', in Esther Mijers and David Onnekink (eds), *Redefining William III: The Impact of the King-stadholder in International Context* (Farnham, 2007), pp. 109–23, here p. 117.

[64] Dieter Albrecht, *Die auswärtige Politik Maximilians von Bayern: 1618–1635*, part II, vol. 5 (Göttingen, 1962), p. 202.

Pope Urban VIII refused to proceed by canon law against the King of France by arguing that an alliance between Catholic and Protestant powers would be tolerable, because the present confrontation would not represent a war of religion.[65] Referring to this very argument, he rejected the Habsburg project of a general Catholic alliance against the King of Sweden, even though, only one year before, he had interpreted the conquest of Magdeburg and the subsequent atrocities against its Lutheran inhabitants by Catholic troops as a well-earned punishment from God for a community of heretics. His predecessor Gregor XV had financially supported the emperor's military campaigns to strengthen the Catholic cause. In 1623, Urban VIII himself urged the transfer of the Palatinate electoral dignity to Maximilian of Bavaria, precisely because another Catholic electoral dignity would support Catholicism in the empire.

Looking more deeply into this seemingly contradictory behaviour, it becomes obvious that the popes and other European sovereigns as well as certain imperial princes decided the question of whether a religious war was conducted or not according to their predominant political aim at a certain moment. In 1632, the defence of the Catholic Church had to take second place behind the imagined threat of a Habsburg hegemony, which would affect and – in the case of the Mantuan succession – already had affected the political interests of the pope as a territorial ruler. To gain financial support by the popes, even Emperor Ferdinand II did not shrink back from advocating a religious war against Protestant powers such as certain imperial estates and the King of Sweden.[66]

Whatever Gustav II Adolf had 'really' intended to achieve by his intervention in 1630, which marked the beginning of the third phase of this war, he probably did indeed save the Protestant cause in the empire. When Ferdinand II was at the height of his power after the end of the Danish–Lower Saxon War in 1629, he issued his *Edict of Restitution*, ordering the restitution of all Catholic possessions, which had been confiscated by Protestant rulers since 1552. As had already been the case in the 1540s, in the early 1630s, Protestantism was again seriously under threat in the empire. For the Swedish king, chiefly territorial expansion, a regional hegemony in Northern Europe in combination with security concerns might have been at issue for his decision to go to war; religion certainly did not serve as the main incentive. However, in the case of a fully re-catholicized empire, Protestantism as a whole would have been weakened considerably. In fact, with the exception of the neighbour and rival Denmark, no other Lutheran territory would have survived in Europe. Although Gustav II Adolf emphasized secular explanations in his official justifications of war, because he wanted to secure financial support of the Catholic King of France,

[65] Repgen, 'Religionskrieg', p. 343.

[66] Robert Bireley, *The Jesuits and the Thirty Years War: Kings, Courts, and Confessors* (Cambridge, 2003), p. 184.

he did refer openly to religion as one of his motives in other contexts. He even started a downright public relations campaign, staging himself as the 'Lion from Midnight' who supported the hard-pressed German Protestants against the Catholic Antichrist.[67]

Next to the celebration of Gustav II Adolf as a long desired saviour of Protestantism, certain events in the Swedish War developed into media events, such as the Conquest of Magdeburg in 1631. The devastation of this Protestant town and the multiple atrocities committed by Catholic troops against its population instigated the publication of numerous illustrated broadsheets and leaflets which interpreted the event as the so called 'Wedding of Magdeburg', symbolized by the town as a virgin either voluntarily marrying the leader of the emperor's troops Tilly (Catholic version) or being raped by him (Protestant version). This event seemed particularly suitable to be symbolically elevated by print media because this town had, until 1552, resisted the implementation of the *Augsburger Interim*.[68] Amongst all issues which could have been addressed in this context, matters of religion seem to have been considered the most suitable to gather Protestant people to support the war against the Catholic emperor and his allies, because the inhabitants of the Holy Roman Empire were still familiar with the idea of fighting for the sake of religion. In the third phase of the war, chiefly pamphlets and broadsheets of Lutheran provenance advocated the idea that Protestantism had to be defended against the Catholic emperor and his allies and that a religious war took place in the Holy Roman Empire.[69] After the signing of the Peace of Prague (1635), forming an alliance between the emperor and the imperial estates to defend the empire against foreign enemies and suspending the *Edict of Restitution*, the idea that a religious war was conducted did no longer prevail.

Comparison

At this point, only select issues can be emphasized, the more so because in regard to some of the criteria mentioned in the first section, either we have

[67] To give just another example: the author of a pamphlet argued that it would have been 'good and justified' if the Swedish king had earlier entered the war because his friends and relatives in terms of religion and blood were threatened and had begged him to do so. Ursachen. Warumb der Durchläuchtigste und Großmächtigste Fürst und Herr/ Herr Gustavus Adolphus Der Schweden [...] König [...] Endlich genötiget ist/ Mit einem Kriegsheer auff den Teutschen Boden sich zubegeben [...], s.l. 1630.

[68] Cf. Thomas Kaufmann, *Das Ende der Reformation. Magdeburgs 'Herrgotts Kanzlei' (1548–1551/2)* (Tübingen, 2009).

[69] Christian Mejer, Kurtze Erinnerung Vom Evangelischen Wesen/ So bey jetzigem ReligionsKrieg in acht zu nehmen [...], [S.l.], 1634.

not discovered an adequate amount of meaningful sources or else these have not been sufficiently analysed thus far. However, there can be no doubt that notions of religious difference amongst the main opponents contributed to the escalation of violence in that they significantly raised the stakes. In the context of both wars, however, it seems inappropriate to separate 'religious passions' from 'strategic interests'.[70] In the perception of the opponents, the survivability and the strength of Protestantism in the empire depended on the political power of its main representatives. For Protestant estates, the idea to defend one's own belief was inextricably linked to the need to defy all of the emperor's attempts to lessen the political participation of the imperial estates, i.e. the Bohemian estates. Likewise, Charles V and Ferdinand II fought against rebellion and against heresy. As legitimate defenders of the Catholic Church, they considered heresy a manifestation of rebellion. In addition to that, as far as the historical record suggests, Charles V and Ferdinand II seem to have been deeply pious men: They likely 'really' imagined themselves as acting as defenders of the true faith.

With regard to religious beliefs as motive or as argument to legitimize one's own conduct of war, there are some striking similarities between both the Schmalkaldic War and the first phase of the Thirty Years War. Whilst the emperors exclusively addressed their opponents as notorious disturbers of the *Landfrieden*, the leaders of the Schmalkaldic League and the Protestant estates of Bohemia indeed referred to the suppression of faith as a legitimate reason for resistance. In the later phases of the Thirty Years War, both the Kings of Denmark and Sweden also avoided referring to religion in official documents, despite the fact that Gustav II Adolf had himself staged in print media as the saviour of the Protestant faith in the Holy Roman Empire. In the end, we cannot prove the extent to which religious considerations in fact had an impact on the decision of both kings to join the war. However, by comparing all of these strategies of legitimizing the decision to go to war, it becomes obvious that territorial expansion and dynastic competition could be disguised by referring to faith as well as religious aims could be covered by referring to legitimate rule and constitution.[71]

Keeping that in mind, it seems even less adequate to argue that the idea of religious war was invented by the early modern state to legitimize its monopoly on legitimate use of force. Furthermore, it is misleading to look solely at the existence of an exact term (religious war) in a specific period – instead of to search for the existence of an underlying idea. Contemporaries would hardly have seen any difference between a 'war that was conducted in regard to matters

[70] Nexon, *Struggle*, p. 293.

[71] Franz Brendle, 'Der Religionskrieg und seine Dissimulation: Die "Verteidigung des wahren Glaubens" im Reich des konfessionellen Zeitalters', in Holzem, *Krieg und Christentum*, pp. 457–69.

of religion' (*Religion Sachen*) and a 'religious war'. The idea of religious warfare was already established before it became solidified as a standard term, which had happened indeed prior to the Thirty Years War. Neither should we address the idea of religious wars as a modern one, nor represent the terms 'religion' as well as 'Protestant' and 'Catholic' as anachronistic categories, which contemporaries would not have applied. Such an interpretation may only prevail if one carefully avoids studying a noteworthy number of primary sources, which were produced in the time of both these military conflicts.

Both wars were marked by a considerable output of print media advocating the idea that certain political actors indeed conducted a religious war. In the Schmalkaldic War, only pro-Protestant media spread such an interpretation, whereas pro-Catholic media largely supported the emperor's interpretation. In the Thirty Years War, publicists of all three confessions advocated the idea of religious warfare: Before the outbreak of war and in its first phase, above all pro-Catholic and pro-Calvinist media tended to interpret this conflict as a religious war; in the third phase, mainly pro-Lutheran publicists argued in this fashion. In contrast to that, a considerable amount of media was published in all phases of this war that did not refer in any way to the religious divide as a cause of violence. Nevertheless, the Thirty Years War must indeed have been perceived as a religious war by a noteworthy number of people from the start because, even before the war had broken out, it had been announced as representing such. Since the overwhelming amount of confessionally biased prints were obviously not published on the rulers' orders, religious interpretations seem to have met already prevailing patterns of perception in regard to the Thirty Years War whilst, at the same time, enforcing them.

Looking at the war, which was conducted, experienced, and interpreted by ordinary people, combatants, and civilians alike, we face a serious problem in terms of the historical record. In regard to the Schmalkaldic War, only a small number of egodocuments (*Ego-Dokumente*) have survived and these do not offer much information on the ways in which contemporaries interpreted this war and whether they perceived it as a conflict over matters of rule or religion (or both). Even at the times of the Thirty Years War, most diaries tended to focus on basic questions such as life and death, giving birth to children, marriage, and being seriously ill. If their authors addressed matters of belief, they did so in a rather general way: for example, by asking God for help. The same applies to the way in which proceedings in wartime were recorded. If the authors narrated war-related events at all, they usually did not care to interpret such events at length. Hence, there is no opportunity to assess properly with regard to the Schmalkaldic War, if combatants committed ritualized forms of violence, which would have reflected religious differences between both sides of the conflict. Even in the Thirty Years War, there seem to have been only some events in which religiously connoted violence was committed to a noteworthy extent

and in a way that unambiguously referred to religious difference. That applies to the Battle of the White Mountain (1620) and to a number of other events aiming at or resulting in religious change.[72] Whereas physical violence in the Schmalkaldic War was committed mainly by military actors against military actors (with the exception of some pillaging), in the Thirty Years War, this phenomenon appeared much more complex. Violent acts were committed by military actors against military actors, by military actors against civilians (and vice versa), and by civilians against civilians. Violence was ordered by military leaders, territorial rulers or local governments but was also inflicted by people without any order to do so. Physical violence occurred amongst individuals, social groups, and whole communities. With respect to this war, a number of accounts have survived emphasizing one's own religious affiliation in contrast to the enemy's, which is described in religious terms.[73] However, most of these were produced by members of the clergy, leading to the conclusion that mainly this social group tended to perceive the conflict as a religious war. On the other hand, the majority of early modern people, even literate ones, were still not used to reflecting on matters of belief in writing, beyond general references to God's impact on human existence.

The involvement of church institutions in the Schmalkaldic War was limited to the pope's military support of Charles V, who precisely interfered because he considered this war a fight against heretics who, furthermore, defied his authority as supreme head of Christendom. In the course of the Thirty Years War, papal policies changed according to the most pressing agendas: from financial support of Ferdinand II at the beginning, to a rather passive attitude or even an anti-Habsburg policy around and after 1630. The impact of the Jesuit Order, considered a notorious warmonger for a long time, has been put into question over the last decade.[74] For ecclesiastic estates, Catholicism was deeply connected to their position of power as territorial rulers, which was felt by some to be threatened by Protestant estates. However, not all ecclesiastic lords endorsed military campaigns to fight Protestantism in the empire; neither did they side

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[72] Cf. Olivier Chaline, *La Bataille de la Montagne Blanche (8 novembre 1620): Un mystique chez les guerriers* (Paris, 2000); Hans Medick, 'Orte und Praktiken religiöser Gewalt im Dreißigjährigen Krieg: Konfessionelle Unterschiede und ihre Wahrnehmung im Spiegel von Selbstzeugnissen', in Hempelmann/Kandel, *Religionen*, pp. 367–82.

[73] Cf. Benigna von Krusenstjern and Hans Medick (eds), *Zwischen Alltag und Katastrophe: Der Dreißigjährige Krieg aus der Nähe* (Göttingen, 1999); Matthias Ilg, Matthias Asche, and Anton Schindling (eds), *Das Strafgericht Gottes: Kriegserfahrungen und Religion im Heiligen Römischen Reich Deutscher Nation im Zeitalter des Dreißigjährigen Krieges* (Münster, 2001).

[74] According to the Jesuit historian Bireley, this religious order was neither marked by a monolithic structure nor did it advocate unlimited violence against all followers of new confessions. Bireley, *The Jesuits*.

with the Catholic emperor without questioning his actions. Nevertheless, from the perspective of the ecclesiastic electoral princes, for example, both the wars represented religious wars in the sense that their outcome would define to a decisive extent the strength of Catholicism in the empire.

In the preliminary stages of both of the wars, alliances defined by confessional affiliation were established; though these shaped the military conduct only to a limited extent. In the first case, not all members of the Schmalkaldic League joined the military campaign of its *Hauptleute*; in the second, the Protestant Union proved to be insignificant, because it already dissolved in 1621.[75] However, in the Schmalkaldic War, Protestant estates indeed fought against the Catholic emperor. That the Protestant Duke of Saxony wanted to become an electorate prince and thus decided to ally with the emperor, as did Protestant leaders of mercenary soldiers, hardly changes the underlying confessional structure of the conflict. In the Thirty Years War, the situation appears much more complex, the more so because there were already rulers with three different confessions. Nevertheless, alliances such as the Coalition of Haag and the Coalition of Heilbronn were indeed chiefly, though not exclusively, defined by confessional affiliation. It is in the third phase of this war that we in fact observe confessionally adjusted military alliances on the side of the fighting powers. In contrast to the beginning of the war when, to an overwhelming extent, armies of each side had comprised combatants having the same confessional affiliation, mercenary troops in the third phase of the war were much more confessionally mixed. That the King of France pursued his own power political agenda, resulting from a long-lasting Habsburg–French antagonism, does not change the fact that religious difference between military opponents was one significant underlying structure of the conflict in the first three phases of war, in which confessional solidarity was frequently used as a political argument. This applies as well to the peace negotiations at the end of the fourth phase, when the confessional affiliation of the participants shaped to a remarkable extent the diplomatic procedures.

Both of these wars yielded substantial changes in terms of religion. In the first case, Charles V tried to restore religious unity by means of the *Augsburger Interim* (1548). As a result of the Princes' Rebellion (1552), not only was the *Interim* abolished, but also the *Confessio Augustana* was accepted and ultimately confirmed by the *Religious Peace of Augsburg* (1555). In the case of the second war, all its phases resulted in regulations concerning the realm of religion: after Ferdinand had defeated the army of the Bohemian estates in the Battle of the White Mountain (1620), he resumed his policy of counter-reformation in

[75] Cf. Albrecht Ernst and Anton Schindling (eds), *Union und Liga 1608/09: Konfessionelle Bündnisse im Reich – Weichenstellung zum Religionskrieg?*, Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für geschichtliche Landeskunde Reihe B, vol. 178 (Stuttgart, 2010).

Bohemia from the pre-war years, which he could now considerably intensify under the pretext of punishing rebels and impeding further disturbances of order. The re-catholicization of the Bohemian crown territories was confirmed by the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. In 1623, no formal truce was established, though the defeat of Frederick of the Palatinate resulted in transferring his electorate dignity to Maximilian of Bavaria. As a result, a Catholic majority amongst the electorate princes was established. After the second phase, Ferdinand II issued the *Edict of Restitution* (1629). This measure, which he probably thought to serve only as a beginning of a re- catholicization policy on the imperial level, indicates quite clearly that for this emperor, a defence of the true faith had been at stake from the start, though he had to suspend this edict for twenty years in the Peace of Prague (1635). Finally, the Peace of Westphalia (1648) led to a whole set of rules regarding the Christian confessions accepted by imperial law, the exercise of religion, and options for people with divergent confessions as well as to a constitutional system defined by parity status of Protestant and Catholic estates in the most important imperial institutions. Neither the *Peace of Augsburg* nor the *Peace of Westphalia* should be characterized as a 'secular' peace. Both settlements were understood to represent a Christian peace; they referred to a social order which was supposed to have been established by God; and they tried to settle religious conflict, even if not exclusively.[76]

Conclusion

The aim of historical research is not only to analyse certain wars in the past but also to be able to assess their character. In so doing, specific criteria are highlighted, while others tend to move out of focus and thus be potentially underestimated. Each classification is a simplification and an interpretation, which should be challenged by means of comparative analysis. In this context, one should apply a consistent set of criteria, which is why I have introduced seven points of reference with regard to the category *religious war*: the perception of religious difference between the combatants by contemporary people (1); matters of belief as motive and/or justification for conducting war (2); multiple references to religious disagreement in the public and half public discourse of war (3); individual and collective practices in battle highlighting religious difference between both sides of the conflict (4); an involvement of church institutions in the conduct of war above the usual (5); the impact of religious beliefs on the formation of military alliances (6); and changes with

[76] The adjective 'secular' is much too often applied in this context, referring likewise to 'mundane', 'worldly', 'civic', 'profane' or 'temporal' (*zeitlich*). These expressions do not describe the same thing.

respect to the exercise of religion or the legal status of religious minorities as a result of war (7). These points of reference should be applied to the various ways in which war was experienced in early modern societies: as a means to serve strategic interests of rulers; as military conduct in a narrow sense; as individual and collective experience of people; as a war of the media; and, finally, as a war of remembrance.

In order to classify a specific war as a war of religion, religion does not necessarily have to figure as a predominant driving force. However, it should have a considerably bigger impact on the dynamics of warfare than in other military conflicts of the same period of time. It does not make sense to assume that all causes, events, experiences, and consequences of warfare must solely or at least primarily refer to the realm of religion. After all, nobody has felt inclined to apply such a precondition in regard to other types of war. If religious difference had an impact on war, which is clearly discernible and can be proved by evaluating diverse information offered by primary sources, the category *religious war* is able to cover a specific nature of a sample of military conflicts in comparison to other wars in the same period that are not described as religious wars. To what extent does this apply to both the Schmalkaldic War and the Thirty Years War?

Summarizing my arguments, there is hardly any doubt that both of these wars can indeed be analysed as religious wars, albeit only a certain number of the criteria established in the first section provably apply to them; and the extent to which they do so changed in the course of these wars. However, by focusing on the impact which the religious divide had on the escalation of violence, the multitude of factors that caused the outbreak of these wars, affected their conduct, defined their length as well as reach, and determined their long-lasting impact would be overlooked to a large extent. The category *religious war* is thus able to offer profound insight only in regard to certain dimensions of these wars. It seems hardly appropriate as the predominant or even unique characterization of both conflicts, particularly for the Thirty Years War. On the other hand, that is also the case if we bring into play other categories, such as *hegemonic war* or *civil war*; or if we refer to dynastic competition or constitutional crises as determining factors.

For example, the overwhelming majority of all military conflicts in medieval and early modern times were shaped to a considerable extent by dynastic rivalry. By classifying these wars as dynastic wars, we are only emphasizing a dimension that is quite common in the majority of pre-modern wars. Anti-hegemonic policy as well as hegemonic policy, which in the period investigated was still linked to the idea of a *monarchia universalis*, indeed determined the conduct of the Thirty Years War to a certain extent. That is particularly true with regard to the Habsburg Emperors and the Kings of Spain, France, and Sweden. However, hegemonic concerns explain neither the outbreak of the Thirty Years War nor the policy of certain imperial estates in the war. With regard to the Schmalkaldic

War, hegemonic ideas affected French policy before and after this war, but hardly during the war. In addition to that, if we argue that religion was only instrumentalized to legitimate one's own conduct of war, we could as well argue that the idea of hegemony was utilized in exactly the same way: as the idea of a balance of power would be by political actors from the end of the seventeenth century onwards. There is no sure way of establishing that the French kings and leading French politicians were 'really' afraid of Habsburg hegemony.

Though the concept of 'state formation wars' seems to be able to include many more dimensions than all of the other categories, quite a number of difficulties emerge when looking more closely at the events in question. Neither the Protestant princes in the Schmalkaldic War nor the imperial estates in the Thirty Years War aimed at the formation of sovereign states. Nor did Charles V and Ferdinand II really attempt to eliminate the political participation of the imperial estates. Both sides preferably tried to rearrange the balance of power according to their own advantage and their current radius of operation. Most of all, 'war of state formation' is not a very precise term, because statehood was an issue in almost all early modern wars. Consequently, its claim of validity has been extended from the Thirty Years War to more or less every war in the early modern period. Indeed, there are also wars in the fifteenth century as well as in the nineteenth century, which could be described as 'wars of state formation'. Therefore, this concept hardly enables us to gather the specific character of both the conflicts in question and of other European wars in which religion played a part that was considerably more significant than in other military conflicts of the same period. In addition to that, it seems to convey the notion that fully developed states would not conduct war, which has been proved wrong often enough.

History has the unnerving (or fascinating, if you will) tendency to represent a very complex and inconsistent phenomenon. Looking at the vast amount of primary sources historians are confronted with in regard to the Thirty Years War, whilst keeping in mind the far greater amount of sources that have not survived, most historians are not fond of grand narratives, such as the *Westphalian System*, which was able to tame religious passions by establishing a secular European peace order on the basis of the European law of nations. As most of them know very well, Bellona, the goddess of war, was not tamed at all by the Peace of Westphalia. Quite the contrary: a whole series of military conflicts occurred in the second half of the seventeenth and at the beginning of the eighteenth centuries, some of them long-lasting and affecting large regions of Europe. All of these wars promoted processes of inner and outer state formation. However, addressing the state as a general war-maker trivializes the process of state building in early modern times – a process which led to various effects: some of them peaceful, some of them violent. By destroying the myth of the state as a general peacemaker, one should not try to establish a new myth:

the myth of religion as a genuine peacemaker that was merely instrumentalized by early modern rulers to pursue mundane political aims and to legitimate the use of force. Furthermore, to be instrumentalized in such a way, religiosity must have had clearly discernible effects – which ones, historians should analyse more thoroughly in the future.

Chapter 5

England's Wars of Religion: A Reassessment

Charles W. A. Prior

In 1983 John Morrill concluded a lecture before the Royal Historical Society in London with the observation that the English civil war was 'the last of the wars of religion'.[1] This was profoundly suggestive, given the fact that religion had shaped political action and debate since the English Reformation, and that it remained a dominant feature of the ideological conflict that generated war among the British kingdoms. While many historians took pains to avoid erecting billboards along a high road to civil war, it is nevertheless the case that the reign of Charles I (1625–49) witnessed a sudden upsurge in the politicization of religion.[2] This culminated in the 'Bishop's Wars' (1639–40), a conflict which stemmed from the attempt by the English to bring the fiercely independent (and Presbyterian) Scottish Kirk into line with the magisterial episcopacy of the established church. Defeated by the Army of the Covenant, Charles I was forced to summon a parliament to secure funds to continue the Scottish campaign, but after 11 years of the 'personal rule' members of parliament were in no mood to grant supply to a king making war on fellow Protestants.

Between 1640 and 1642, religion took its place among the issues of principle that drove the war of words in the Long Parliament, and in the newly-freed press. Here, complex arguments about church and state intermingled with lurid accounts of the sectarian violence that characterized the Irish rebellion. And from 1642, religion was a constant element in shaping alliances, and became a standard bargaining point in a succession of attempts at settlement. As armies engaged one another in the field, representatives of the main religious groupings argued their positions in the Westminster Assembly; this discussion about liturgy, ecclesiastical governance, and religious toleration took place within the nascent empire, and helped to shape the ideological development of the

[1] John Morrill, 'The Religious Context of the English Civil War', *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* 34 (1984): 155–78, at p. 178.

[2] For a discussion, see Charles W. A. Prior, *A Confusion of Tongues: Britain's Wars of Reformation, 1625–1642* (Oxford, 2012).

'Puritan' colonies of the British Atlantic.[3] In England, the victorious New Model Army was a godly force led by a general who took his cues from the Bible, and whose regime continued to wrestle with the politics of religion in its domestic and imperial policies.[4]

Morrill's lecture and subsequent essay appeared at a time when historians were mounting a challenge to the notion that the crisis of the 1640s was a 'puritan revolution'.[5] However, the strident historical debate of the 1980s and 1990s did not resolve the question of what role religion played in a conflict that involved multiple kingdoms, where the ecclesiastical establishment was intimately bound up with arguments about law and constitutionalism. Recent scholarship, by contrast, has sought to reintegrate religion and politics, and the result is that ecclesiological argument is much more firmly embedded in analyses of the events that led to the fall of Charles I, but which did not put an end to divisive debates on the proper relationship of church and state in mid-seventeenth-century England.[6]

This chapter presents a brief sketch of the key historiographical issues that have framed the approach to the religious politics of Britain between 1560 and 1649, and focuses in particular on the question of 'reformation politics'. That is, the English Reformation created a church 'by law established', and linked religious uniformity with the authority of the Crown as supreme ecclesiastical governor. Church and civil government were drawn into closer proximity, and the result was that religion was intensely politicized. However, where some have argued that the civil war was part of a process that consolidated the logic of a state-driven and legalistic reformation, the argument here is that the key driver of the conflict was a fundamental disagreement about the nature, location, and limits of the power of the state over religion.[7] This was a question that extended beyond the local politics of England, and which reveals a theme that illustrates what is perhaps the fundamental internal tension in the reformed polities of early modern Europe. In England, debate on civil religion, that is, a tradition of

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[3] Chad B. van Dixhoorn and David F. Wright (eds), *The Minutes and Papers of the Westminster Assembly, 1643–1652*, 5 vols (Oxford, 2012); Michael Winship, *Godly Republicanism: Puritans, Pilgrims and a City on a Hill* (Harvard, 2012).

[4] Jeffrey Collins, 'The Church Settlement of Oliver Cromwell', *History* 87 (2002): 18–40; Blair Worden, *God's Instruments: Political Conduct in the England of Oliver Cromwell* (Oxford, 2012).

[5] Glenn Burgess, 'Introduction: Religion and the Historiography of the English Civil War', in Charles W. A. Prior and Glenn Burgess (eds), *England's Wars of Religion, Revisited* (Farnham, 2011), pp. 1–25.

[6] The present chapter takes up and expands themes from Charles W. A. Prior, 'Religion, Political Thought and the English Civil War', *History Compass* 11 (2013): 24–42.

[7] For a detailed discussion of this theme, see Charles W. A. Prior, 'Rethinking Church and State in the English Interregnum', *Historical Research* 87 (2014): 444–65.

theorizing the relationship between religion and civil government, was bound up with discussions of church government in the decades that preceded the civil war, and took a prominent place in the process of negotiation and settlement during the 1640s. The premise of these debates was that religion and civil government were complementary, rather than exclusively antagonistic.

The Politics of Religion

One of the most significant reorientations in the study of early modern political and religious history took place between 1973 and 1991. During this period, a group of historians began to mount a sustained methodological assault on what they described as 'Whig' history. Its hallmarks were a progressive narrative, driven by ideology, which placed the civil war within a larger story of the evolution of democratic ideals and institutions.[8] The so-called 'revisionists' were led by Conrad Russell, who overturned the certainties of the Whig account by producing a series of densely-narrated studies of early seventeenth-century English politics.[9] For example, Russell argued that the government of Charles I experienced a 'functional breakdown' as opposed to a constitutional crisis; and where Whig approaches were defined by a narrow Anglo-centrism, Russell – following John Pocock – was alert to the problem of multiple kingdoms.[10]

However, one of the most important features of Russell's account was his approach to religious divisions, and here he drew on the work of Nicholas Tyacke. Where the standard account emphasized tension between an Anglican establishment and revolutionary puritanism, Tyacke focused on the disruptive nature of Arminian theology.[11] In an article published in 1973, itself a distillation of a doctoral thesis that was ultimately published in 1987, Tyacke built upon the work of Patrick Collinson, who argued that Calvinist theology was the bond that united the various theological and pietistic groups within the Church of England. Where James VI and I managed to avoid disturbing this consensus, Charles I and

[8] Glenn Burgess, 'On Revisionism: An Analysis of Early Stuart Historiography in the 1970s and 1980s', *The Historical Journal* 33 (1990): 609–27.

[9] The 'revisionists' were not an organized and self-conscious school; rather, they were contemporaries who worked independently, but who produced what amounted to a collective assault on the assumptions of the historical traditions in which they were trained. See Ronald Hutton, *Debates in Stuart History* (Houndmills, 2004), ch. 1.

[10] Conrad Russell, *The Causes of the English Civil War* (Oxford, 1990); *idem*, *The Fall of the British Monarchies, 1637–1642* (Oxford, 1991); J. G. A. Pocock, *The Discovery of Islands: Essays in British History* (Cambridge, 2005), ch. 5.

[11] For an assessment of Tyacke's work, see Peter Lake, 'Introduction: Puritanism, Arminianism and Nicholas Tyacke', in *Religious Politics in Post-Reformation England: Essays in Honour of Nicholas Tyacke*, (ed.) K. Fincham and P. Lake (Woodbridge, 2006), pp. 1–15.

his clerical ally William Laud actively sought to establish an Arminian theology within England, and it was this policy that ignited a Calvinist backlash which helped to precipitate the functional breakdown of the government.[12] However, a no less fervent backlash came from Tyacke's critics, and the result was a prolonged series of exchanges where those who risked an assault on the citadel were branded (and ultimately dismissed) as neo-Whigs and Anglicans.[13]

John Morrill developed an alternate view of the role of religion in the outbreak of civil war in a series of important essays. Where Tyacke focused on theology, Morrill closely examined the ways in which religion 'drove minorities to fight'; this perspective retained a focus on the local effects of civil war, and combined it with a keen attention to the issues that cropped up in the press and in debates in parliament.[14] Chief among these were clericalism and 'popery' – a catch-all term that denotes the antipathy toward Catholicism that stemmed from England's own reformation past, and from the continental and imperial dimensions of the confessional struggles in early modern Europe.[15] In contrast to Tyacke's detailed network analysis and focus on high politics, Morrill's approach was more expansively political and linked religion with 'perceptions of misgovernment' that formed the basis of criticism of Charles I. Notwithstanding, the argument rested on the premise that 'legal-constitutionalist' and 'religious' modes of opposition were distinct. Given that the essay was concerned to argue that religion was pre-eminent among perceptions of mis-government, this separation of religion and politics was a methodological gap that needed to be traversed.[16]

Morrill's essays managed to put the concept of the 'war of religion' on the historiographical map. However, while a number of scholars actively engaged with Morrill's work, they tended to focus on religion as a shaper of allegiance and a driver of conflict, rather than adopting the concept of a *war of religion* as an explanatory device.[17] There are several possible reasons for this. First, while there

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[12] Nicholas Tyacke, 'Puritanism, Arminianism and Counter-Revolution', in Conrad Russell (ed.), *The Origins of the English Civil War* (London, 1973), pp. 119–43; *idem*, *Anti-Calvinists: The Rise of English Arminianism, c. 1590–1640* (Oxford, 1987).

[13] For the main contributions to this debate, see Prior, 'Religion, Political Thought', p. 34, n. 25–8.

[14] Morrill, 'Religious Context', p. 157; *idem*, 'The Attack on the Church of England in the Long Parliament, 1640–1642', in Derek Beales and Geoffrey Best (eds), *History, Society and the Churches* (Cambridge, 1985), pp. 105–24; *idem*, 'Sir William Brereton and England's Wars of Religion', *Journal of British Studies* 24 (1985): 311–32.

[15] Morrill, 'Religious Context', p. 173.

[16] In a later reflection, Morrill acknowledged this point: John Morrill, 'Renaming England's Wars of Religion', in Prior/Burgess, *England's Wars of Religion*, p. 308.

[17] Anthony Fletcher, *The Outbreak of the English Civil War* (London, 1987), ch. 3; Patrick Collinson, 'Wars of Religion', in *idem*, *The Birthpangs of Protestant England: Religious and Cultural Change in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries* (London, 1988), pp. 127–55;

were undoubtedly tensions between Catholics and Protestants, the religious politics of the war were dominated by conflicts between Protestants, and did not assume a confessional posture.[18] Second, although the case of the Irish rebellion presented examples of violent sectarian conflict, England itself witnessed only sporadic episodes of religious violence – as with Scotland, the main targets were the clerical establishment.[19] Finally, while the problem of religion was obviously a major factor in precipitating the conflict, no historian would suggest that it took precedence among a range of other issues of pressing constitutional urgency. Rather, the theme that links a number of recent interpretations is the manner in which religion and politics were intertwined; this work not only bridges the gap between religion and constitutionalism, but also moves beyond the narrow focus on theology that was the hallmark of Tyacke's Arminian counter-revolution.

If there was a post-revisionist trend in historiography, its main characteristic was renewed interest in how religion formed part of a wider debate on sovereignty and constitutionalism.[20] Here, the concept of Erastianism is employed as a tool for understanding the tension over the most pressing political question of the early modern period – the 'place of the Church in the realm'.[21] For example, Alan Orr has argued that a major contributor to 'religious perceptions of misrule' during the reign of Charles I stemmed from a dispute over 'sovereignty', and chiefly the question of the location of sovereign power over the church. The Laudian clergy attempted to seize control of the church, and in so doing they trespassed upon the sovereignty of the Crown. As Orr argues, this was to subvert what was essentially an Erastian understanding of the relationship between church and state, which was based on the idea that 'the power to determine doctrine

I. M. Green, '"England's Wars of Religion?": Religious Conflict and the English Civil Wars', in J. van den Burg and P. G. Hoftijzer (eds), *Church, Change and Revolution* (Leiden, 1991), pp. 100–21; J. C. Davis, 'Religion and the Struggle for Freedom in the English Revolution', *The Historical Journal* 35 (1992): 507–30; Glenn Burgess, 'Was the English Civil War a War of Religion? The Evidence of Political Propaganda', *Huntington Library Quarterly* 61 (1998): 173–201; Edward Vallance, 'Preaching to the Converted: Religious Justifications for the English Civil War', *Huntington Library Quarterly* 65 (2002): 395–419.

[18] For the model of confessional state applied to England, see Michael Braddick, *State Formation in Early Modern England, c. 1550–1700* (Cambridge, 2000), ch. 7.

[19] Ethan Shagan, 'Constructing Discord: Ideology, Propaganda, and English Responses to the Irish Rebellion of 1641', *Journal of British Studies* 36 (1997): 4–34.

[20] In its earliest stages, the substantive contributions of this work were obscured by a debate over the structure of early seventeenth-century political thought, which some described as a consensus and others as a binary model of absolutism versus constitutionalism. See Glenn Burgess, *The Politics of the Ancient Constitution: An Introduction to English Political Thought, 1603–1642* (University Park, PA, 1992); Johann P. Sommerville, *Royalists and Patriots: Politics and Ideology in England, 1603–1640*, 2nd edition (London, 1999).

[21] J. G. A. Pocock, 'The History of British Political Thought: The Creation of a Center', *The Journal of British Studies* 24 (1985): 283–310, at p. 287.

and exercise discipline within the Church of England rested ultimately with the civil magistrate, whether that be king, parliament, or king-in-parliament, rather than with any ecclesiastical body, whether episcopal or presbyterian'.[22] Orr's interpretation signalled a major departure from revisionism, and integrated religion more centrally within a broader discourse of sovereignty.[23]

In more recent work, the themes of constitutionalism and the state are given renewed prominence, and the civil war is now placed within a wider narrative of the texture of early modern political thought. It is, in short, a chapter in the history of the evolution of the modern state. For example, Alan Cromartie has argued that the civil war should be seen as a 'constitutionalist revolution', distinguished by the emergence of the common law as 'omnicompetent', a 'universal science' – capable of finding answers to all political questions. This revolution was driven, in part, by an attempt to defend the law against an increasingly 'absolutist' church whose courts and legal structure comprised a separate jurisdiction which undermined the sovereignty of secular courts.[24] Similarly, Jeffrey Collins has argued that Thomas Hobbes regarded the civil war as an 'ecclesial crisis', a 'culmination' of a long process whereby the powers of the church were subsumed by 'emerging modern states'.[25] The account of sovereignty that appeared in *Leviathan*, Collins suggests, was a direct response to the re-emergence of a dualist conception of church and state. Central to both interpretations is the doctrine of Erastianism, which placed all religious power in the hands of the civil magistrate. In each case the aim of 'revolution' is to *restore* this doctrine as the guiding principle of the organization of religious power within the state, a principle that was itself established by an Erastian process of reformation.

This focus on Erastianism situates religion firmly in the context of the political theory of the state.[26] On the one hand, Cromartie and Collins emphasize the tension between civil and ecclesiastical sovereignty that was the major political

[22] D. Alan Orr, 'Sovereignty, Supremacy and the Origins of the English Civil War', *History* 87 (2002): 480.

[23] Conrad Russell took up aspects of these questions in two important essays: 'Whose Supremacy?: King, Parliament and the Church, 1530–1640', *Lambeth Palace Annual Library Review* (1995): 53–64, and 'Parliament, the Royal Supremacy and the Church', *Parliamentary History* 19 (2000): 27–37.

[24] Alan Cromartie, *The Constitutionalist Revolution: An Essay on the History of England, 1450–1642* (Cambridge, 2006), 3; for the law as 'universal science', see Alan Cromartie, 'The Constitutionalist Revolution: The Transformation of Political Culture in Early Stuart England', *Past and Present* 163 (1999): 76–120, at p. 81.

[25] Jeffrey Collins, *The Allegiance of Thomas Hobbes* (Oxford, 2005), p. 10.

[26] That the evolution of the state toward its modern form depends on civil control over religion is a standard feature of discussions of the political theory of states. See Quentin Skinner, *The Foundations of Modern Political Thought*, 2 vols (Cambridge, 1978), II, pp. 351–8.

legacy of the Reformation, while on the other hand, they present a narrative in which the state emerges as the culmination of a process that successfully marginalizes the church from the sphere of politics. In addition, both scholars take a particular position on the related questions of the character of the state and the character of political thought, especially as they bear upon the religious and constitutional causes of the English civil war. That is, arguments over the limits of clerical power and the authority of 'secular' magistrates in the sphere of religion served as the impetus for the development of legal and secular concepts of sovereignty.[27] As Collins argued, Erastianism was the 'core ideological and political' issue in the revolution begun by the Long Parliament and consolidated by the Cromwellian regime.[28]

Recent work by historians of religion has taken a very different view of these issues. In some cases, the whole concept of political theory has been called into question, and Peter Lake in particular has challenged a view of 'high politics' that has concentrated on 'essentially static and "traditional" ideals of monarchy and the ancient constitution'.[29] Others, namely Michael Winship, have emphasized the links between religion and constitutionalism, stemming from the fact that the church was 'deeply entangled' with the 'civic state'.[30] However, while Lake and Winship adopt contrasting positions on the matter of constitutionalism in the sphere of religious politics, they are largely agreed that the principal political dynamic is driven by what amounts to a 'puritan opposition' to the religious policies of the Crown and church.[31] This interpretation, in turn, complements a wider body of scholarship that is concerned with the religious character of political mobilization and resistance.[32] Yet, when read against the work of those

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[27] Collins, *Allegiance of Hobbes*, pp. 17, 278; Cromartie, *Constitutionalist Revolution*, p. 274.

[28] Collins, *Allegiance of Hobbes*, p. 6, chs. 4 and 5.

[29] Peter Lake, 'The "Court", the "Country" and the Northamptonshire Connection: Watching the "Puritan Opposition" Think (Historically) about Politics on the Eve of the English Civil War', *Midland History* 35 (2010): 28–70, at p. 33 n. 6, 66. Lake's assertion that the common law was 'static' overlooks the fact that historians now regard it as historically complex and dynamic; see J. W. Tubbs, *The Common Law Mind: Medieval and Early Modern Conceptions* (Baltimore, 2000), p. 130.

[30] Michael Winship, 'Freeborn (Puritan) Englishmen and Slavish Subjection: Popish Tyranny and Puritan Constitutionalism, c. 1570–1606', *The English Historical Review* 124 (2009): 1050–74, at p. 1051; Peter Lake, 'Puritanism, (Monarchical) Republicanism, and Monarchy', *Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies* 40 (2010): 463–95, at p. 464.

[31] See also Nicholas Tyacke, 'The Puritan Paradigm of English Politics, 1559–1642', *The Historical Journal* 53 (2010): 527–50.

[32] Glenn Burgess, 'Religious War and Constitutional Defence: Justifications of Resistance in English Puritan Thought', in Robert von Friedeburg (ed.), *Widerstandsrecht in der frühen Neuzeit* (Berlin, 2001), pp. 185–206; Paul Seaver, 'State Religion and Puritan

scholars who emphasize the primacy of the state in the religious politics of the period, a contrast quickly emerges: historians of religion have drawn a portrait of politics which centres upon the state's failure to command the religious allegiance of subjects, rather than on its ability to reduce questions of religion to matters of state. In this analysis, which has clear affinities with the work of Russell, the state does not emerge – it is by turns absent or ineffectual.

Reformation Politics

In many ways, our understanding of the religious dynamic of the English civil wars is not helped by an uncritical focus on 'the state'. The chief weakness of this approach is that it assumes that the Reformation generated an Erastian consensus, which posited the supremacy of the state over the church.[33] In fact, despite the ambitions of various regimes to enforce conformity in the church, a number of practical and political obstacles stood in the way. For example, while Catholicism was officially illegal, the state of James VI and I was unable to completely enforce its Oath of Allegiance, or to fully eradicate recusancy and 'church papists'.[34] Similarly, while Richard Bancroft condemned Presbyterian conventicles as attempts 'to establish an ecclesiastical tyranny' which usurped the religious authority of the Crown, a vibrant Presbyterian culture persisted in England for the entire early Stuart period.[35] For their part, non-conformists railed at attempts to force them into line: ministers deprived of their livings insisted that all discipline had to accord with the 'King's law', while others claimed that since the Crown's ecclesiastical supremacy was part and parcel of this law, then all religious commands were lawful.[36]

Resistance in Seventeenth-Century England', in James D. Tracy and Marguerite Ragnow (eds), *Religion and the Early Modern State* (Cambridge, 2004), pp. 207–52.

[33] Perez Zagorin, *How the Idea of Religious Toleration Came to the West* (Princeton, 2003), 188; Alexandra Walsham, *Charitable Hatred: Tolerance and Intolerance in England, 1500–1700* (Manchester, 2006), 51.

[34] Michael Questier, *Conversion, Politics and Religion in England, 1580–1621* (Cambridge, 1996), ch. 5; *idem*, 'Loyalty, Religion and State Power in Early Modern England: English Romanism and the Jacobean Oath of Allegiance', *The Historical Journal* 40 (1997): 311–29.

[35] Richard Bancroft, *A sermon preached at Paules Crosse the 9 of Februarie, being the first Sunday in the parleament* (London, 1588), p. 74; Polly Ha, *English Presbyterianism, 1590–1640* (Stanford, 2011), chs 6–7.

[36] William Bradshaw, *A myld and just defence of certeyne arguments .... in behalfe of the ministers suspended and deprived* (1606), p. 93; Gabriel Powel, *A consideration of the deprived and silenced ministers arguments, for their restitution to the use and libertie of their ministerie* (1606), p. 42.

Even if we confine our definition of the 'state' to the narrow terms of Crown in parliament, it remains the case that this body did not hold a monopoly on coercive power, which was dispersed throughout the clerical hierarchy of the church. As one writer noted, there existed an 'entercourse of politique administrations', both civil and ecclesiastical, neither of which was 'prejudiciall or contrary to the other'.[37] Moreover, ecclesiastical discipline took on a range of forms, running from the judgments of the courts of High Commission and episcopal visitations, down to sermons that warned of the dangers of sectarianism and dissent from the teachings of the established church.[38] In short, a variety of religious practices in England existed within a church in which the mechanisms of coercion ranged from formal to informal.

A more promising approach lies in understanding that the Reformation had a profound effect on how political power was both structured and understood.[39] The English Reformation took place within a culture whose political language and self-understanding was shaped by the common law. As it is today, the authority of the common law in the early modern period was based on precedent and tradition, recorded in proceedings of parliament, and in 'national' documents like Magna Carta. That text was foundational in the sense that it dealt with the most important legal relationship in the realm: that which existed between the king and his subjects. The question that emerged in the context of the Reformation was how this relationship was altered (if at all), now that the king ruled over 'bodies, soules, and estates' of his subjects. The assumption of supremacy over religion put serious strains on the standard idea of kingship. While the rhetoric and symbolism attached to the office was rife with sacred associations, it was nevertheless true that kingship was a legal office whose powers and privileges were firmly rooted in the custom and tradition of the vernacular law. With Reformation, the king met his subjects on a wholly new plane.[40]

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[37] John Tichborne, *A triple antidote, against certaine very common scandals of this time* (1609), p. 19.

[38] For High Commission, see Geoffrey R. Elton (ed.), *The Tudor Constitution: Documents and Commentary* (Cambridge, 1982), pp. 221–32; Kenneth Fincham (ed.), *Visitation Articles and Injunctions of the Early Stuart Church*, 2 vols. (Woodbridge, 1994/1998); Francis Holyoke, *A sermon of obedience, especially unto authoritie ecclesiasticall* (1610); Joseph Hall, *A common apologie of the Church of England* (1610); Ethan Shagan, *The Rule of Moderation: Violence, Religion, and the Politics of Restraint in Early Modern England* (Cambridge, 2011), ch. 3.

[39] Ethan Shagan, *Popular Politics and the English Reformation* (Cambridge, 2003), p. 29; J. G. A. Pocock, 'A Discourse of Sovereignty: Observations on the Work in Progress', in Nicolas Philipson and Quentin Skinner (eds), *Political Discourse in Early Modern Britain* (Cambridge, 1993), p. 381.

[40] Jacqueline Rose, *Godly Kingship in Restoration England: The Politics of the Royal Supremacy, 1660–1688* (Cambridge, 2011), ch. 1; for monarchy and symbolism, see Kevin

The foundational text of the English Reformation is the Act of Appeals (1533), which asserted that precedents for the regal supremacy were to be found in 'authentic' histories and chronicles. What the Act omitted was any firm identification of which texts these were, and hence the 'long Reformation' was defined, in part, by a feverish climate of historical recovery and narration; the chief motivation for this (particularly in the early stages of the Reformation) was to answer the objections of Catholic historians who rooted the historical identity of the church in the succession of popes, rather than the actions of ancient British kings.[41] However, one crucial development of the drive to narrate a history of the vernacular church was the emergence of a tradition that demonstrated that church and realm were 'co-extensive'.[42] The confluence of church and state that was fashioned by reformation represented the beginning of a narrative of constitutionalism, but it was neither secular, nor did it culminate in a polished concept of sovereignty. [43] Given that supremacy over the church was one of the 'marks' of sovereignty, political argument turned on the question of the extent to which the king, parliament, or clergy were jointly or severally the agents of this power, and whether it was constrained by the common law.[44] It is this nexus between religion and the state that lay at the heart of disputes over ecclesiology and sovereignty; these disputes, in turn, served not only as a major impetus for civil war, but were a vital forum for the deliberation of questions of the proper relationship between religion and the civil sphere.

History and Sovereignty

To fully understand the relationship of religion and the state, we must look carefully at how sovereignty operated in the context of a co-extensive church and realm. Here, the line between history and sovereignty is considerably blurred, especially in a culture where historical scholarship underpinned understandings

Sharpe, *Selling the Tudor Monarchy: Authority and Image in Sixteenth-Century England* (Yale, 2009), chs 3–4, 7.

[41] Graham Nicholson, 'The Act of Appeals and the English Reformation' in Claire Cross, David Loades, and J. J. Scarisbrick (eds), *Law and Government Under the Tudors* (Cambridge, 1988), pp. 19–30.

[42] Elton, *Tudor Constitution*, p. 353; John Guy, 'The Henrician Age', in J. G. A. Pocock, et al. (eds), *The Varieties of British Political Thought, 1500–1800* (Cambridge, 1993), pp. 13–46, at p. 39.

[43] Burgess, *Politics*, p. 105; Colin Kidd, *British Identities Before Nationalism: Ethnicity and Nationhood in the Atlantic World, 1600–1800* (Cambridge, 1999), ch. 5.

[44] Prior, *Confusion of Tongues*, ch. 2.

of regal, juridical, and imperial power.[45] There are three reasons for this. First, as is clear from the example of the common law, the political history of the realm was comprised of narratives of its founding and the development of its legislation, political culture, and institutions; hence, history furnished an account of the attainment of sovereignty.[46] Yet these histories were not the work of a single hand, and so a range of interpretations entailed a range of possible arguments.[47] An illustration of this can be seen in the House of Lords' debates, which took place in the spring of 1641, on the question of whether bishops should retain their seats in the upper chamber. Regardless of their position on the issue, speakers and writers put forward contrasting interpretations of a range of legal and historical precedents: were the bishops 'barons' in their own right, based on powers traceable to the Apostolic church, or was their status conveyed at the time of the Conquest and thus a 'grant' of the Crown?[48] And finally, the elision of sovereignty and history generated a plurality of narratives, all of which could be contested. Again, in the debate on bishops, arguments were predicated on claims to 'antiquity', but positions diverged on the question of whether the customs of the realm were aligned with the political episcopacy of the Apostolic church, or whether the clergy occupied places in the Lords as the result of legal arrangements that were peculiar to the composition of the historic English parliament.[49] Often, the fit between the civil and the sacred was disputed on the grounds that one was based on transient custom, while the other remained constant through time; as Joseph Hall argued: 'if Antiquity be the rule, the civill Politie hath sometimes varied, the sacred never'.[50]

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[45] J. G. A. Pocock, 'Historiography as a Form of Political Thought', *History of European Ideas* 37 (2011): 1–6; D. Alan Orr, *Treason and the State: Law, Politics, and Ideology in the English Civil War* (Cambridge, 2002), ch. 2; David Armitage, *The Ideological Origins of the British Empire* (Cambridge, 2000), ch. 2.

[46] J. G. A. Pocock, *Political Thought and History: Essays on Theory and Method* (Cambridge, 2009), chs 10, 13.

[47] Orr, *Treason and State*, pp. 39–45.

[48] *A speech of Mr John White, counsellor at law, made in the commons house of parliament, concerning episcopacy* (1641), p. 2; [Henry Pierrepont], *Two speeches spoken in the house of lords, by the Lord Viscount Newarke* (1641), sig. A2r; Joseph Hall, *An abstract of those answers which were given in the assembly of the lords in the high court of parliament, unto the nine reasons* (1641); Wallace Notestein (ed.), *The Journal of Sir Simonds D'Ewes: From the Beginning of the Long Parliament to the Opening of the Trial of the Earl of Strafford* (Yale, 1923), pp. 147–63.

[49] Cornelius Burges, *An humble examination of a printed abstract or answers to nine reasons of the House of Commons* (1641), p. 2; Gerard Langbaine, *Episcopall inheritance: Or a reply to the Humble Examination of a printed abstract* (1641), ¶2r–3v.

[50] Joseph Hall, *The shaking of the olive-tree: The remaining works of that incomparable prelate, Joseph Hall, D.D. Late Lord Bishop of Norwich* (1660), p. 5.

Hall's statement reveals that civil history operated in a context where sacred authority was a commanding presence. This is not to say that England was a theocracy, but rather to point out that political discourse consisted of a blend of spiritual and temporal concepts, texts, and narratives. To speak of authority in the religious sphere was inevitably to speak of the distribution of power over institutions, and specifically whether this power derived from custom and law, or from scripture or the 'authentic' practice of the ancient Christians or their Hebraic antecedents.[51] For a number of historians, this jumble of languages is a defining feature of post-Reformation political thought: Glenn Burgess has demonstrated that languages of theology, common, and civil law constituted elements of a language of consensus; Donald Kelley has noted the dominance of 'polyhistorical learning' that combined classical, jurisprudential, and Biblical languages in political argument; while, in a similar vein, John Coffey has described the 'discursive pluralism' that defines political thought before, during, and after the English civil war.[52] Applied to history and sovereignty, therefore, this notion of pluralism suggests that there were multiple roots into the past, and thus a number of narratives on which to ground an account of the relationship between religion and civil power.

Debates on ecclesiology offer abundant examples of the eclectic nature of post-Reformation historical culture and its engagement with the problem of church and state.[53] This is because they deal with a topic which inevitably impinged on politics, that is, the question of authority and sovereignty in the spiritual realm. While purely theological topics are certainly relevant to these issues, by far the most widely and hotly-debated questions concerned ecclesiastical governance, the conduct of ritual, and the nature and scope of the regal and clerical supremacy – at the root of these matters are the vital themes of the relationship of church and state, and the problem of sovereignty.[54] There are a number of striking features about these exchanges: first, the participants

[51] Charles W. A Prior, *Defining the Jacobean Church: The Politics of Religious Controversy, 1603–1625* (Cambridge, 2005), chs 4, 5; *idem*, 'Hebraism and the Problem of Church and State in England, 1642–1660', *The Seventeenth Century* 28 (2013): 37–61.

[52] Burgess, *Politics*, ch. 5; Donald Kelley, 'Elizabethan Political Thought', in Pocock, *Varieties*, p. 72; John Coffey, 'Quentin Skinner and the Religious Dimension of Early Modern Political Thought', in Alister Chapman, John Coffey, and Brad Stephan Gregory (eds), *Seeing Things Their Way: Intellectual History and the Return of Religion* (Notre Dame, 2009), p. 67.

[53] A. Milton, *Catholic and Reformed: The Roman and Protestant Churches in English Protestant Thought, 1600–1640* (Cambridge, 1995), ch. 6, 9; Felicity Heal, 'Appropriating History: Catholic and Protestant Polemics and the National Past', *Huntington Library Quarterly* 68 (2005): 109–32.

[54] Milton, *Catholic and Reformed*, 449; C. Kidd, 'The Matter of Britain and the Contours of British Political Thought', in David Armitage (ed.), *British Political Thought in History, Literature and Theory, 1500–1800* (Cambridge, 2006), p. 55.

were often very prominent figures in the public life of the realm, among them lawyers, members of parliament, and representatives of the clergy; second, this literature is defined by a recognizable set of scholarly procedures, including the accumulation of references, animadversion, and a rigorous attention to issues of philology and history; and third, these procedures led writers deep into sacred history, both in its Hebraic and Apostolic settings.[55] One pressing question was how these narratives of authority could (if at all) be reconciled with the 'patriotic antiquarianism' that sustained the more insular and vernacular narrative of the realm and its church.[56]

Arguments about the power of bishops led to an examination of the roles assumed by the Apostles in the early Church. Perhaps the most widely debated examples were Timothy and Titus, contemporaries of the Apostles who were claimed to hold the equivalent of modern bishoprics in Ephesus and Crete.[57] The issue at hand was the nature of episcopal power: were they pastors, responsible for guiding and teaching the clergy and laity, or were they prelates, exacting discipline and ensuring the unswerving conformity of all members of the Church.[58] A further point concerned the power of the ecclesiastical court of High Commission, which exercised sweeping jurisdiction over church discipline, yet did so in ways that seemed to usurp the royal supremacy and trample upon the common law.[59] In order to sort out these contradictory views, writers scrutinized a range of texts that shed light on the history of the ancient church. For example, in 1636, William Prynne published 175 pages of closely-argued text whose aim was to 'unbishop' Timothy and Titus. Not only did he engage in painstaking exegesis of the scriptures, but he also reported the opinions of a range of patristic commentators and historians, including Eusebius, Theodoret, Chrysostom, Nicephorus of Antioch, as well as writers from the English tradition, including the Elizabethan scholar-bishop Matthew Parker, the polymath Peter Heylyn, and the antiquarian John Speed; packed into the margins were also abundant

[55] Two examples are Ussher and Heylyn: Alan Ford, *James Ussher: Theology, History and Politics in Early-Modern Ireland and England* (Oxford, 2007); ch. 6; Anthony Milton, *Laudian and Royalist Polemic in Seventeenth-Century England: The Career and Writings of Peter Heylyn* (Manchester, 2007), ch. 3.

[56] Kidd, *British Identities*, 101.

[57] *The determination of the qvestion, concerning the divine right of episcopacie: By the famous and learned divine Dr. Abrahamus Scultetus* (1641); Simonds D'Ewes, *The Greeke postscripts of the epistles to Timothy and Titus cleared in Parliament* (1641).

[58] David Calderwood, *The pastor and the prelate, or reformation and conformitie shortly compared* (1628), 50.

[59] Elton, *Tudor Constitution*, pp. 221–6; Ethan Shagan, 'The English Inquisition: Constitutional Conflict and Ecclesiastical Law in the 1590s', *The Historical Journal* 47 (2004): 541–65, esp. pp. 544–9; Paul Halliday, *Habeas Corpus: From England to Empire* (Cambridge, MA, 2010), pp. 106, 220–21.

references to English statutes, and decisions made by dozens of counsels of the Church.[60] There was nothing unusual in Prynne's tactic of piling citation upon citation, since the same kinds of texts were employed by defenders of preletical episcopacy as well as their opponents.[61] The departure lay in his conclusion that preletical episcopacy was sanctioned neither by the practice of the ancient church, nor by the laws of the realm.

A very similar process of narrative and argument is evident in disputes over ceremonial ritual and practice, which led to an examination of the laws and precedents that formed the basis of worship. This was an issue that cut to the heart of the identity of the church, and a notable feature of the Reformation was the widespread attack on the remnants of Catholic ceremonial. However, the Church of England retained a style of worship that preserved certain rituals while divesting them of anything more than reverential significance; instead of idolatry, to kneel at communion was an example of a decent 'custom', employed in the same manner that Christ, in celebrating the Last Supper, dined in the Roman fashion.[62] The argument that ritual was merely custom meant that discussions of ceremonial practice were thrust into the sphere of historical argument, and in these debates one notes the influence of Hebraic sources. For example, while Richard Hooker argued that the 'fashion' of the English Church was 'framed according to the pattern of the Iewish temple', the bishop John Williams rejected any link between the customs of the Jews and those of the English.[63] In the same debate on the use of altars in the church of Charles I and William Laud, William Prynne noted that Hebraic precedents were simply 'shadows of things to come'. Instead, he offered a strident defence of the vernacular identity of the rituals of the church, based in instruments like the Elizabethan Injunctions of 1559, combined with evidence of 'table worship' from the New Testament.[64] His

[60] [William Prynne], *The Unbishoping of Timothy and Titus* (1636), pp. 13, 14–17, 58, 80, 93; see also Prynne, *A catalogue of such testimonies in all ages as plainly evidence bishops and presbyters to be both one* (1637).

[61] William Prynne, *Lord Bishops, None of the Lords Bishops* (1640); Peter Heylyn, *The historie of episcopacie* (1642); Jeremy Taylor, *Of the sacred order and offices of episcopacy* (1642).

[62] [Thomas Hutton], *The second and last part of Reasons for refusal of subscription to the Booke of common prayer* (1606), 57; Bryan Spinks, *Sacraments, Ceremonies and the Stuart Divines: Sacramental Theology and Liturgy in England and Scotland, 1603–1662* (London, 2002).

[63] Richard Hooker, *Of the lawes of ecclesiastical politie: The fift booke* (1597), p. 23; John Williams, *The holy table, name & thing, more anciently, properly, and literally used under the New Testament, then that of the ALTAR* (1637), p. 24; see also Achsah Guibbory, *Christian Identity, Jews, and Israel in Seventeenth-Century England* (Oxford, 2010), ch. 2; John Weemes, *An explanation of the ceremonial lawes of Moses* (1632); R.T., *De templis, a treatise of temples* (1638).

[64] William Prynne, *A quench-coale* (1637), p. 13.

conclusion was that the altar was not only illegal since it violated a standing law, but also a departure from the pattern of worship established by Christ and handed to the Apostles. Here again, dispute over an element of ecclesiology led writers along several paths in sacred history, and these intersected with the vernacular history of the realm and its laws.

A third theme that emerges in the political ecclesiology of the early seventeenth century concerns the sacralization of authority. Once again, we find a number of sacred competitors to a purely vernacular narrative of the power of British kings. Given the fact that Christ gave no law and evinced little interest in the politics of kingship, writers turned to the Hebrew Bible – as they had for centuries.[65] Henry VIII's legal counsellors bolstered his claims to the regal supremacy over the church by urging forward the examples of Hezekiah, who destroyed pagan symbols, and Jehoshaphat, who rescued his people from idolatry. In his treatise on royal power, Thomas Bilson employed a list of biblical kings as exemplars, and the comparison was applied to living monarchs: Elizabeth was styled as 'Deborah', and James VI and I cultivated the notion – which would in turn shape how he was commemorated – of himself as 'Great Britain's Solomon'.[66] Printed defences of regal power expanded these comparisons into fully-developed arguments for sacral kingship. The lawyer and antiquary John Hayward noted that 'it was a custom among the Jewes, to have the same men both Princes and Priests'. In a tract of 1610, John Panke remarked that it was necessary to begin 'from the common wealth of *Israel*' as it was where the doctrine of regal power 'hath its strength and force'. And, in his contribution to the debate on altars in the 1630s, Peter Heylyn argued that the kings of England inherited the regal supremacy of the 'Kings of *Iudah*'.[67] Finally, the new ecclesiastical Canons which appeared in 1640 began with an extensive discussion of kingship, noting that the 'order of kings' was 'established by express texts both of the Old and New Testaments', commanding 'in their several dominions all persons of what rank or estate soever, whether ecclesiastical or civil'.[68] While elements of this statement resemble the language of the Act of Appeals, it is also the case that histories and

[65] E. F. Kuehn, 'Melchizedek as Exemplar for Kingship in Twelfth-Century Political Thought', *History of Political Thought* 31 (2010): 557–75; J. H. Geerken, 'Machiavelli's Moses and Renaissance Politics', *Journal of the History of Ideas* 60 (1999): 579–95.

[66] Thomas Bilson, *The true difference between Christian subjection and Unchristian rebellion* (1585), p. 199; Guibbory, *Christian Identity*, pp. 23–41.

[67] John Hayward, *A reporte of a discourse concerning supreme power in affairs of religion* (1606), p. 15; John Panke, *Eclogarius, or briefe summe of the truth of that title of Supreame Governour given to his Maiestie in causes spirituall, and ecclesiasticall, from the Kings of Israel, in the old Testament* (1610), p. 12; Peter Heylyn, *A coale from the Altar* (1636), p. 103.

[68] Gerald Bray (ed.), *The Anglican Canons* (Woodbridge, 1998), p. 558; Charles W. A. Prior, 'Cannons and Constitutions', in Prior/Burgess, *England's Wars of Religion*, pp. 101–23.

chronicles have given way to 'express texts' from the Bible – here, the foundations of regal power lie exclusively within the confines of sacred history.

Finally, these treatments of the nature of kingly and priestly authority were paralleled by discussions of the form that the co-extensive church and state should assume. Here again, sacred history supplied a range of precedents. For example in 1584 the law student-turned-clergyman Edmund Bunny dedicated a text to the students of Gray's Inn, advising them those 'occupied in the laws of the Realm' should have 'som recourse withal unto the righteous laws of God, & to the government that he of old to his people ordained'.[69] For Bunny, the laws of the Hebrews were not a matter of transient custom, but part of a general stock of knowledge for how to order commonwealths.[70] A similar kind of argument appears in a sermon preached before parliament by William Laud in 1625, where he pressed the point that 'the Temple' and 'the State' of the Jews existed as a unity, which meant in turn that there was no distinction between 'spiritual and temporal Authority'.[71]

Others explicitly rejected the link between the Hebraic tradition and that of the post-Reformation polity. Alexander Leighton argued that political institutions were the products of custom and circumstance, and that 'God hath not prescribed any particular unalterable forme of government to this or that commonwealth … but hath left it various to the varieties of States'.[72] This kind of argument was common to Presbyterians like Leighton, whose ecclesiology tended to emphasize the binding power of vernacular law over the Kirk, a tradition to which Hebraic and Apostolic precedents were utterly alien. Instead, writers described the Kirk and the people as a 'consociation' and a 'perfect republicke', self-governing and thus sovereign over themselves in ways that neutralized the power of an over-mighty clerisy.[73] Even this argument could be subtly modified: Gerard Langbaine blended Hebraic sources with Aristotelian precepts on the duties of citizens, in order to describe the commonwealth and church as a 'mixt government' in which the clergy, as citizens, had a legitimate ruling function.[74] In advancing this

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[69] Edmund Bunny, *The scepter of Iudah: or, what maner of government it was, that unto the common-wealth or Church of Israel was by the law of God appointed* (1584), sig. A3v.

[70] Richard Ross, 'Distinguishing Eternal from Transient Law: Natural Law and the Judicial Law of Moses', *Past and Present* 217 (2012): 79–115.

[71] William Laud, *A sermon preached on Munday, the sixt of February, At Westminster, at the opening of parliament* (1625), pp. 3, 33.

[72] Alexander Leighton, *An appeal to the Parliament; or Sions plea against the prelacie* (1628), p. 190.

[73] [Anon.], *Reasons for a Generall Assemblie* (1638), sig. A2r, B2r; see also, Thomas Edwards, *Reasons against the independent government of particular congregations: also against the toleration of such churches to be erected in this kingdome* (1641), pp. 11–12.

[74] Langbaine, *Episcopall inheritance*, pp. 19–20; *Certaine briefe treatises, written by diverse learned men, concerning the ancient and modern government of the Church* (1641), pp. 7–25.

claim, he pointed to the Sanhedrin – the court of judges that gave law to ancient Israel – and suggested that the episcopal bench had inherited its powers, while others questioned this line of interpretation by suggesting that the Sanhedrin was elected by 'common consent'.[75] Once again, we see that writers journeyed into the sacred past and returned with all manner of evidence that supported various conceptions of the nature, location, and scope of sovereignty over the church.

These examples reveal that patterns of ecclesiastical sovereignty could be drawn from sources outside the statutes that created the church 'by law established'. Indeed, at the root of most debates on ecclesiology – the power of the clergy, the conduct of worship, the legality of ecclesiastical courts and canons, and the nature of the regal supremacy – was a very complex historical argument about the relationship between history and sovereignty. The essential point here is that since there were multiple roots into the historical past, the concept of sovereignty and the character of the relationship between the spiritual and temporal spheres was notably fluid. From this it follows that if we insist on characterizing the dynamic between religion and politics as being dominated by an Erastian understanding of the distribution of power over the religious sphere, replacing a dualist model of church and state with a concept of the state as supremely sovereign and wholly disentangled from the church, then we may be closing off a vital perspective that reveals how sovereignty itself was understood.[76] Given that the conflict of the 1640s was centrally concerned with issues of religion and public power, then it follows that our understanding of the crisis of sovereignty lies in how the concept was debated on its contemporary contexts.

Healing and Settling: Civil Religion

Rather than constructing an analysis of religious politics on the premise that the relationship between church and state was adversarial, a more promising approach lies in understanding the 'correlation' between ideas of religion and government.[77] A central preoccupation of all commentators on the politics of religion in the civil war period was the need to balance the ends of religion and the ends of government; in short, contemporaries sought to develop normative

[75] Langbaine, *Episcopall inheritance*, p. 17; William Prynne, *The fourth part of the soveraigne power of parliaments and kingdomes* (1643), p. 149; for consent, see Polly Ha, 'Ecclesiastical Independence and the Freedom of Consent', in Q. Skinner and M. Van Gelderen (eds), *Freedom and the Construction of Europe. Volume 1: Religious Freedom and Civil Liberty* (Cambridge, 2013), pp. 57–76.

[76] Collins, *Allegiance of Hobbes*, pp. 278–9.

[77] Here I borrow a term from Colin Kidd, 'Civil Theology and Church Establishments in Revolutionary America', *The Historical Journal* 42 (1999): 1007–26.

rules to formalize the maxim that religion was the 'stay' of all 'wel-ordered commonwealths'.[78] As Mark Goldie has argued, civil religion was 'one of the most pervasive political languages' in early modern Europe.[79] However, its use as an explanatory concept has been greatly diminished by its association with the 'secular creeds' of liberalism and republicanism on one hand, and on the other by the default narrative of modern political science, which is centrally preoccupied by the separation of church and state.[80] As I have argued, in the case of early modern England the statist narrative levels out many of the important nuances in contemporary understandings of the link between religion and public power. Perhaps the most important nuance is one that tends to be overshadowed by an emphasis on conflict: that is, the protracted attempt to arrive at a *settlement* of the relationship of church and state.

To return to Morrill's central argument: religion clearly assumed a prominent role in discussions of the 'misgovernment' of Charles I. Given the legacy of reformation politics, regal sovereignty over the church constituted a major aspect of this debate. Second, the Long Parliament's assault on the clerical apparatus of the Church was part of a wider attempt to redress the balance of sovereignty, and once discussion between king and parliament broke down in June of 1642, the conflict moved to a new phase. Here, a process of negotiation was carried on in parallel to the actual fighting between the king's army and the allied forces of the English parliament and Scots Covenanters; conflict and negotiation converged at points when a settlement was sought, and the common feature of all attempts at settlement was that religion and government were intertwined.

Arguably, the first instance of the process of accommodation was defined by the contractualism of the Solemn League and Covenant (1643), which was both a military alliance and a programme (embodied in the Westminster Assembly) for the reform of the church in ways that ensured the 'preservation and defence

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[78] Hooker, *Lawes of ecclesiastical politie*, p. 1.

[79] Mark Goldie, 'The Civil Religion of James Harrington', in A. Pagden (ed.), *The Languages of Political Theory in Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge, 1987), p. 199.

[80] Kidd, 'Civil Theology', p. 1010; Goldie, 'Civil Religion', pp. 197–201; for the secularizing narrative, see Mark Lilla, *The Stillborn God: Religion, Politics, and the Modern West* (New York, 2007); for contrasting accounts of the link between civil religion and modern liberalism, see Ronald Beiner, *Civil Religion: A Dialogue in the History of Political Philosophy* (Cambridge, 2011) and Cary Nederman, 'Civil Religion – Metaphysical, Not Political: Nature, Faith, and Communal Order in European Thought, c. 1150–c.1550', *Journal of the History of Ideas* 74 (2013): 1–22. An alternate view of civil religion focuses on its instrumental character: it becomes of a tool of statecraft, a *politique* device to ensure obedience and loyalty. Yet this usage differs very little from the Erastian model of state control over religion as the best means of ensuring civil peace. See Collins, *Allegiance of Hobbes*, pp. 37–42.

of the true religion and liberties of the kingdomes'.[81] From this point, religion was bound up in all subsequent attempts at settlement: would the king accept the Covenant; would he agree to modified episcopacy, or be forced to abolish it; would limited Presbyterianism be established, and the Independents persecuted?[82] In short, negotiations for settlement were essentially concerned with the shape of the post-war constitutional order, and even when the Army and its Independent allies emerged as the dominant powers, deliberations 'about settling the supreme power' continued, most notably in the Putney debates.[83] Indeed, discussions of ecclesiology expanded to include the relationship of public power and individual conscience; one salient feature of the debate on toleration is that both advocates and opponents based their positions on the notion that toleration and persecution each had the potential to generate political conflict.[84]

The role of religion in this process of settlement is clarified if we resist the temptation to portray the religious politics of the English civil war as being shaped by a logic of secularism. Likewise, we should also be wary of the equal and opposite impulse to see all past politics as a manifestation of a theocratic desire to transform government into a moral science.[85] The English, Scots, and Irish went to war, in part, because each people held that there was a 'special conformation' between religion and government, yet they differed among and between themselves as to how this conformation could best be understood and applied. As John Milton argued at the beginning of the conflict between the king and the Long Parliament: 'Tis not the common Law, nor the civil, but piety and justice, that are our foundresses; they stoop not, neither change colour for *Aristocracy*, *democraty*, or *Monarchy*'. Milton clearly regarded religion as something that should remain aloof from the quotidian concerns of politics,

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[81] John P. Kenyon (ed.), *The Stuart Constitution: Documents and Commentary*, 2nd edition (Cambridge, 1986), p. 241.

[82] For an examination of religious concessions and the role of court divines as royal counsellors, see Anthony Milton, 'Sacrilege and Compromise: Court Divines and the King's Conscience, 1642–1649', in Michael Braddick and David L. Smith (eds), *The Experience of Revolution in Stuart Britain and Ireland* (Cambridge, 2011), pp. 135–53.

[83] A. S. P. Woodhouse (ed.), *Puritanism and Liberty* (London, 1938), p. 128.

[84] Avihu Zakai, 'Religious Toleration and its Enemies: The Independent Divines and the Issue of Toleration during the English Civil War', *Albion* 21 (1989): 1–33; John Coffey, 'Puritanism and Liberty Revisited: The Case for Toleration in the English Revolution', *The Historical Journal* 41 (1998): 961–85; Mark Hanin, 'Thomas Hobbes's Theory of Conscience', *History of Political Thought* 33 (2012): 55–85.

[85] A way between these extremes is charted by Alexandra Walsham, 'The Reformation and "the Disenchantment of the World" Reassessed', *The Historical Journal* 51 (2008): 497–528.

where others argued that religion was one of the 'ligaments of a Christian state'.[86] Between these two views lay the ideological ground on which Britain's religious wars were contested.

[86] John Milton, *Complete Prose Works of John Milton: Volume I, 1624–1642*, (ed.) D. M. Wolfe (Yale, 1953), pp. 576, 605–6; Thomas Cobbet, *The civil magistrates power in matters of religion* (1652), 93.

Chapter 6

Justifying Force in Early Modern Doctrines on Self-defence and Resistance

Luise Schorn-Schütte

Preface

In early modern Christianity, the use of force as a means to push through religious aims appears to have been a *contradictio in adjecto*. After all, the commandment to love one's enemies and neighbours is central to Christian theological ethics. At the same time, however, historians are familiar with the perception that the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries are a period of fierce wars of religion or confession. Indeed, the justification for war as regards Europe's confessional divide became an enduring political and theological theme. Furthermore, in almost every European region, the question of religion became tied to the intensely controversial issue – even prior to the Reformation – of defining the participation of the estates vis-à-vis political rule. By the middle of the sixteenth century, religion and politics became inseparably entangled, and the legitimacy of force thus became a theological and political problem that for several centuries appeared detached from the Christian commandment to uphold the common peace. At about the same time, contemporaries began to recognize a legitimacy deficit, which spawned an abundance of publications: statements, rationalizations, systemic texts, and polemics. These all sought to justify the claim that force needed to be used against confessional or religious believers of other faiths, in spite of the commandment to uphold the common peace. Participating in these debates were learned jurists and theologians (of each of the three confessions), political advisors from the nobility, and high nobility sovereigns themselves. Some of these arguments appeared across Europe simultaneously if independently of one another. In other cases there is evidence of a reciprocal reception. Yet there was no general argumentative structure, which was acknowledged by all those concerned.[1]

[1] Robert von Friedeburg has clearly pointed this out in a systematic overview. See Robert von Friedeburg, 'Bausteine widerstandsrechtlicher Argumente in der Frühen Neuzeit (1523–1668): Konfessionen, klassische Verfassungsvorbilder, Naturrecht, direkter Befehl Gottes, historische Rechte der Gemeinwesen', in Christoph Strohm and Heinrich de Wall (eds), *Konfessionalität und Jurisprudenz in der Frühen Neuzeit* (Berlin, 2009), pp. 115–66, here pp. 121–2. New research is presented in my recent publication Luise Schorn-Schütte,

In order to best set up this diversity, I will first outline its chronology, using as my example the Holy Roman Empire (1523–50), which included particularly multifaceted lines of argumentation. The *Magdeburg Confession of 1550* (*Confessio Magdeburgensis*) represents a first culmination of these debates. In the following part, I provide a cursory overview of the theological and political patterns of argumentation within the empire itself and compare them with those in other European regions in order to demonstrate that we are dealing here with a pan-European debate.

Chronology

During the Antiquities and Middle Ages, force was naturally used against enemies of other religions. As of the mid-sixteenth century, those debating the use of force resorted as a matter of course to these familiar arguments. By standing in this long tradition, in other words, they had evidence that should and indeed was able to protect them against any accusation of rebellion.[2]

Defence Alliances, the Character of the Imperial Constitution and the Juridical and Theological Legitimization of Self-defence or Resistance, 1529–1538

It began in the Holy Roman Empire. From the late 1520s onwards, and in the course of clashes between the imperial Catholic estates and the emperor on the one hand, and the imperial protesting estates on the other, confessional alliances were initiated that were also considered to represent defence alliances. On 6 June 1529 in Rodach, the protesting estates (the Electorate of Saxony, the Landgraviate of Hesse, and the imperial cities of Straßburg, Ulm, and Nuremberg) decided in a 'secret understanding' about the need for immediate negotiations concerning a solid defence alliance. For the time being, they assured each other of armed assistance should the opposing camp (the emperor and the Catholic estates) use military force. This planned defence alliance was a tinderbox for any major cause of conflict, since it concentrated on whether the alliance could also be directed against the emperor or, to use the contemporary legal term, on whether the emperor could legitimately be 'exempted'. In this way, the question of the

Gotteswort und Menschenherrschaft. Politisch-theologische Sprachen im Europa der Frühen Neuzeit (München, 2015). In the present chapter, the English word 'self-defence' is always a translation of the German words 'Notwehr' or 'Gegenwehr' or the combination 'Not- und Gegenwehr'. The word 'resistance' stands here exclusively for 'Widerstand', a concept that differs substantially from 'Not- und Gegenwehr' as will be shown.

[2] On the late medieval traditions of these debates, see Diethelm Böttcher, *Ungehorsam oder Widerstand? Zum Fortleben des mittelalterlichen Widerstandsrechtes in der Reformationszeit (1529–1530)* (Berlin, 1991).

'right of resistance' (*Gegenwehr*) in the case of a military attack by the emperor was officially addressed for the first time. In subsequent discussions, theological and legal evidence became entangled in a condensed field of theological and political arguments.[3] The procedures of the imperial diet had not been foreseen as a means of resolving conflicts about confessional debates. These emanated from the late Middle Ages, when the unity of Christianity was taken for granted. Therefore all fundamentally new conflicts that reached the imperial diet over the course of the Reformation movement and of the divide within the Curia, had to be resolved by available imperial *legal* instruments.

The character of imperial authority

Learned jurists, theologians, and political decision-makers of the protesting estates intensively discussed this core issue, resulting in the accumulation of quite a few arguments. These either followed traditional juridical logics and/or added theological lines of legitimacy. For the contemporaries, the entire debate revolved around the right of resistance (*Gegenwehr*) and self-defence (*Notwehr*). The concept of a resistance movement (*Widerstand*), however, does not appear in sixteenth-century imperial legal sources.[4] The starting point was the statement of loyalty from the imperial estates to the emperor (or 'exemption'/ *Ausnehmung*), which according to long-standing tradition was binding for the imperial princes (*Lehnsverhältnis*). It was analogous to the feudal relationship insofar as the emperor was not himself party to it. The implementation of these rules, which had initially appeared unambiguous, became highly controversial between the protesting and Catholic estates as well as within the group of 'Protestants' themselves. In the case of a definitive defence alliance among the latter, the relationship to the emperor would have to be unequivocally clarified.

The fact that positions even varied among 'the Protestants' on this point shows how precarious the relationship between emperor and imperial estates had become. Three coexisting and conflicting contemporary perspectives may be identified. Firstly, the emperor was the head of the empire, who had protective and judicial authorities; secondly, he was '*princeps*' (chief): that is, one characterized him as the legal successor of the Roman emperors, which was tied to a claim to rule and exercise power; thirdly, according to medieval tradition, he was the '*Advocatus ecclesiae*' (advocate of the Church) – that is, the protector of an undivided church. For this, too, he had a political claim, which

[3] Much research has naturally been undertaken about these events and about the differentiated connections between theological, juridical, and political debates. For a study that is still authoritative, see Eike Wolgast, *Die Wittenberger Theologie und die Politik der evangelischen Stände: Studien zu Luthers Gutachten in politischen Fragen* (Göttingen, 1977); cf. Luise Schorn-Schütte, 'Politische Kommunikation in der Frühen Neuzeit: Ein Forschungskonzept', in *Jahrbuch des Historischen Kollegs 2007* (München, 2008), pp. 3–36.

[4] Cf. Böttcher, *Ungehorsam,* p. 13, with note 10.

Charles V took quite seriously.[5] Among the protesting estates, it was chiefly Philip I, Landgrave of Hesse, who pressed for rapid clarification. According to him, once the emperor, alone or on behalf of one of his allies, attacked for religious reasons, the 'exemption' would have to be suspended. Thus should the emperor proceed on religious grounds and with military force, no member of the defence alliance could refuse military assistance. Coercive measures against the Protestant doctrine were understood as based on religious grounds. Learned theologians and jurists who resided in the Landgrave's territory supported his argumentation. They designated legitimate any 'resistance' (*Gegenwehr*) against an emperor who had set military force in motion.[6]

The Electorate of Saxony's policy was initially more restrained. John, Elector of Saxony (1503–54), and his councillors attached a great deal of importance to an intensive discussion on the aims and legitimacy of a Protestant military defence alliance. At this time, however, there was no controversy in John finding legitimacy in an emperor's 'limited exemption', since the latter was, as all other authorities (princes and Electors), subject to God's law.[7] As rumours increased about the emperor wishing to attack the protesting estates in autumn 1529, it became ever more important to John to also have the theologians hold a vote on the problem. He thus requested a new expert opinion from the theologians of Wittenberg. Since Philip Melanchthon, Luther, and Justus Jonas were on their way to Marburg for discussions with Zwingli, the Wittenberg parish priest Johannes Bugenhagen was left as the text's sole author. On 29 September 1529 he delivered it to Elder Chancellor Gregor Brück.[8] Bugenhagen's elucidations differed in quite a number of points from Luther's. Indeed, in his independent theological position, he described the obligation of worldly authorities and pointed to their limitations. This would later be taken up as a reference. Bugenhagen argued that according to Romans 13, v. 1, all authority emanated from God. *Therefore* it is the duty of all authority, which is limited to worldly obligations, to protect the pious and punish the wicked. Further, the lesser authority (*magistratus inferior*) had the duty to broadly obey the higher authority (*magistratus superior*). When the higher authority directed its prerogatives against God's word, however, it

[5] Cf. ibid., p. 17, and Eberhard Isenmann, 'Widerstandsrecht und Verfassung in Spätmittelalter und früher Neuzeit', in Barbara Stollberg-Rilinger and Helmut Neuhaus (eds), *Menschen und Strukturen in der Geschichte Alteuropas: Festschrift für Johannes Kunisch* (Berlin, 2002), pp. 37–71, here p. 51.

[6] Cf. Böttcher, *Ungehorsam*, p. 18, as well as the instructions of Landgrave Philip I to his councillors in *RTA JR* vol. 8, pp. 125–32 (4.7.1529).

[7] Cf. ibid., p. 20.

[8] This expert opinion is printed in Heinz Scheible, *Das Widerstandsrecht und die Protestanten* (Gütersloh, 1960, 2nd edition 1980), pp. 25–9. For a detailed interpretation, see Wolgast, *Die Wittenberger Theologie*, pp. 136–9 and Böttcher, *Ungehorsam*, pp. 23–5, among others.

violates its genuine authoritative duty of protecting the pious and punishing the wicked, and in so doing, it removes itself from office and the lesser authority need not obey. Bugenhagen found the Biblical basis for this argumentation in the Book of Samuel I, 15, v. 26: 'For you have rejected the word of the Lord, and the Lord has rejected you from being a king'.[9] The lesser authority had the additional obligation of denouncing the failing of the higher authority, and for the subjects' protection, military force might ultimately be applied.

Bugenhagen reinforced the Hessian viewpoint with the following argumentation. Firstly, he recognized the two-pronged authority as a feature of the imperial constitution: there could be no question of subordination by the lesser to the higher authority in the sense of subservience. Thus he emphasized this argumentation's imperial legal tradition. Secondly, he verified with Biblical evidence (theological textual interpretation) that an authority that went against God's commandment forfeited its office, that it was an unjust authority, and that it therefore might expect not to be obeyed. On the contrary, in certain circumstances the subjects had to be protected from it – even if that meant with force. The Landgrave took these positions up in an epistle to Margrave Georg of Brandenburg-Ansbach in December 1529, integrating them in a further differentiated argumentation.[10] His main piece of evidence was the imperial legal tradition: the lesser authority was still an authority in its own right. Therefore, although the imperial estates may be subordinated to the emperor, they are not his subjects. They have the right therefore in certain circumstances to resist the emperor as the *magistratus superior* – understood in the contemporary sense as the right to defend against a military attack. In addition, according to the epistle, the imperial law would be supported by the example of the Old Testament's Kings and Prophets and ultimately by the validity of Roman contractual law, whereby the emperor and the imperial estates have a contractual relationship. Furthermore, accordingly, the emperor must uphold the law. If he fulfils this duty, the imperial estates must be obedient; if he does not, the estates, which had elected him to fulfil his duty, are no longer obliged to be obedient.[11] According to Philip I's argument, this point had arrived, since the emperor intended to prevent the imperial Protestant estates from exercising their religious beliefs. He even went so far as to threaten the 'protesting' princes with force and thereby, without any legal grounds, deprive them of their ruling functions. Against that, the imperial estates would be legitimately entitled to take up resistance (*Gegenwehr*) on the basis of the contractual relationship. Furthermore it had the support of medieval feudal law (*Lehnsrecht*). Should the emperor as feudal lord

[9] Quoted in Böttcher, *Ungehorsam*, p. 23.

[10] *RTA JR* vol. 8, pp. 487–91; cf. Böttcher, *Ungehorsam*, pp. 57–61, with extensive references to previous literature.

[11] Ibid., p. 489.

break the allegiance (*Treue*), the vassals (the imperial estates) were justified in protecting themselves with force against the feudal lord's currently unjust force.

In his epistle, Landgrave Philip I also addressed the highly controversial question among Protestants of whether worldly law could have precedence over divine law. As articulated in the Bible, the Gospel was not to be defended by the sword. This was council clerk (*Ratsschreiber*) Lazarus Spengler's position in Nuremberg, a city that likewise initially belonged to the protesting estates.[12] Philip I opposed Spengler's position, arguing that the Bible's statements – that is, the *loci classici*, such as Romans 13, v. 1, which appeared to refute the authority in certain circumstances – had to be understood in their historical context.[13] Apostle Paul's commandment to obey Roman authorities had arisen at a time when the early Christian communities were unprotected. This was not comparable to the one in which current 'hereditary princes' found themselves. No one could depose them, and they might thus unhindered fulfil their duty to protect their subjects.[14]

Following the imperial diet of Augsburg (1530), Saxon policies assumed an intermediate position: between the ones taken by the Hessians and by Spengler.[15] Even the Elector of Saxony was now convinced of having a right to resistance against an unlawful attack by the emperor. In October 1530, in order to accentuate this position more clearly within the sought-after alliance, Wittenberg jurists, led by Elder Chancellor Brück, drafted their own counsel, which rigidly argued along the lines of the categories of Roman law. At the centre of the discussion was the question of whether there could be a right to self-defence and/or resistance vis-à-vis the emperor. This was expressly acknowledged in an anonymous expert opinion, which emerged in the run-up to what would then become the published *Consilium* of Wittenberg jurists.[16] The author

[12] See Lazarus Spengler's expert opinion (1529) in ibid., pp. 468–83. It is also published as note 17 in Scheible , *Das Widerstandsrecht*. On Spengler and the Nuremberg Circle, see Berndt Hamm, *Lazarus Spengler (1479–1534): Der Nürnberger Ratsschreiber im Spannungsfeld von Humanismus und Reformation, Politik und Glaube* (Tübingen, 2004); an edition of Spengler's writings is forthcoming; cf. Berndt Hamm, Wolfgang Huber et al. (eds), *Lazarus Spengler: Schriften. vol. 1: Schriften der Jahre 1509 bis Juni 1525 and vol. 2: Schriften der Jahre September 1525 bis April 1529* (Gütersloh, 1995 and 1999).

[13] Cf. *RTA JR* vol. 8, p. 489; Diethelm Böttcher's study, *Ungehorsam*, pp. 60–61; Wolgast, *Die Wittenberger Theologie*, pp. 212 *et passim*, and Isenmann, 'Widerstandsrecht', pp. 57–62.

[14] Cf. Böttcher, *Ungehorsam*, p. 60; Isenmann, 'Widerstandsrecht', p. 58.

[15] As a consequence of these differing opinions, Nuremberg did not join the Schmalkaldic League; for details, see Gabriele Haug-Moritz, *Der Schmalkaldische Bund (1530–1541/42): Eine Studie zu den genossenschaftlichen Strukturelementen der politischen Ordnung des Heiligen Römischen Reiches Deutscher Nation* (Leinfelden-Echterdingen, 2002).

[16] For more details, see Böttcher, *Ungehorsam*, pp. 136–7.

characterized the right to resist the emperor as an example in which the right of self-defence could be applied. In contrast, the correct juridical question of the subsequently published expert opinion by the Saxon jurists was more cautious. It asked: 'Is resistance against an unjust judge allowed?' The unequivocal answer was 'no, it was not'. Yet four justified exceptions were given. These offered the rationale of the right of self-defence[17] as an excellent place to start.[18] The authors deduced arguments from the ecclesiastical legal doctrine on resistance against unjust judges. This chiefly had strategic reasons, since what it did was merely support a legal argument that had anyway been put forward, whereby lesser authorities in the case of an unjust ruler or an unjustified attack might have a right to self-defence or resistance against the higher authorities. Decisive for the juridical experts was the ability to base this evidence on traditional lines and thereby avoid treating it as an entirely new doctrine of resistance (*Widerstand*).[19]

Theological and juridical patterns of legitimization

The cooperation that existed between learned theologians and jurists in the debates of the late 1520s and early 1530s is a remarkable phenomenon, for it proves something which has been frequently undervalued: namely, that there was close communication between both of these learned groups in the German-speaking areas.[20] A third cooperation – apart from the Hessian and Saxon positions – arose during the negotiations to establish a Protestant defence alliance, which since 30 January 1530 had taken place in Nuremberg. Since the camps around Lazarus Spengler on the one hand, and the Saxon and Hessian politicians, jurists, and theologians on the other could not find agreement in their discussions on self-defence and resistance, Nuremberg's superintendent Andreas Osiander the Elder (1498–1552) and the city legal counsel (*Ratskonsulent*) Valentin Kötzler (1499–1564) were invited to offer their comments[21]: Osiander approved of the imperial estates' right of self-defence and resistance; in 1531 Kötzler published an expert opinion that shed light on the proximity of the arguments. An exchange between Nuremberg's two learned political advisors was obvious.[22] Osiander formulated two core arguments:

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[17] Based on Roman law, contemporaries interpreted the right to self-defence as the right of the *pater familias* (father of the house) to use force in certain circumstances in order to protect his family (wife and children) against an attacker. This would not count as murder but as self-defence.

[18] Cf. Böttcher, *Ungehorsam*, pp. 138–46.

[19] Ibid., p. 145.

[20] For details, see Luise Schorn-Schütte, 'Politische Kommunikation in der Frühen Neuzeit: Obrigkeitskritik im Alten Reich', *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 32/3 (2006): 273–314.

[21] See Isenmann, 'Widerstandsrecht', pp. 58–9 and note 66.

[22] The expert opinion is mentioned in ibid., p. 67, note 88.

Firstly, according to Romans 13, it is indisputable that the obedience of the subjects towards worldly authorities is the basis of all worldly order, because all authority is appointed by God. Their duty is to protect the good and punish the wicked. Like quite a number of his contemporary jurists, Osiander referred in this interpretation to the pre-Reformation humanist tradition of the French theologian Jacobus Faber Stapulensis.[23] Any authority who does not fulfil this area of responsibility is no longer a Christian authority, but a tyrannical one. There is no command to obey such an authority. Rather, it is the duty of all office holders to put an end to the tyrannical order, if necessary also by force, in order to restore good order.

The second argument allowed Osiander to characterize the relationship between the authorities of the Holy Roman Empire. Since power is conferred to the emperor by election, those that exercise the right to vote – the Electors – are also justified in removing his power anew should he not fulfil what he had agreed to as an obligation of good authority in his electoral contract (*Wahlkapitulation*).[24] Osiander is only being consistent in his argumentation when he differentiates between higher and lesser authorities that are nevertheless on an equal footing with one another. Like the jurists and theologians of Hesse and Saxony, he characterized the empire as an aristocracy. To further legitimize his opinion he enlisted feudal law arguments: Feudal relationships are based on reciprocity. If one side fails to comply with its obligations, then the other side is justified in revoking its own. The point here is not about disobedience but acting in accordance with the legal form,[25] which was the exclusive responsibility of the respective office holders.

Neither Luther nor Melanchthon shared the positions that have thus far been depicted. Initially, both firmly rejected a right of self-defence or resistance against the emperor. From about 1538 onwards, however, pressured by the political situation, Melanchthon changed his position.[26] Since his lines of argumentation were not identical to those illustrated above, the basis of the debate was extended. He founded his argument for the legitimacy of resistance or self-defence on his doctrine on natural right (as *lex naturae*, this being a doctrine of natural law); this too was solidly anchored in medieval traditions. In this doctrine, which

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[23] Jacobus Faber Stapulensis (Jaques Lefèvre d'Étaples), *c.*1455–1536, made the first translation of the Bible into French. For more, see Karl Heinrich Graf, 'Jacobus Faber Stapulensis', *Zeitschrift für Historische Theologie* 22 (1852): 3–86 and 165–237; cf. Sheila Porrer, *Jacques Lefèvre d'Étaples and the Three Maries Debates* (Geneve, 2009).

[24] Gerhard Müller and Gottfried Seebass (eds), *Andreas Osiander d. Ä. Gesamtausgabe. vol. 3: Schriften und Briefe 1528 bis April 1530* (Gütersloh, 1979), p. 454.

[25] Osiander, *Schriften und Briefe 1528 bis April 1530*, pp. 465–6.

[26] Cf. Isabelle Deflers, *Lex und ordo: Eine rechtshistorische Untersuchung der Rechtsauffassung Melanchthons* (Berlin, 2005); Merio Scattola, *Das Naturrecht vor dem Naturrecht* (Tübingen, 1999), and Eike Wolgast, 'Melanchthon als politischer Berater', in *Melanchthon: Erlanger Forschungen Reihe A, vol. 85* (Erlangen, 1985), pp. 179–208.

was widely taken up among subsequent generations of Lutheran theologians, Melanchthon did not aim at describing single individual rights, which he thought ought to be based in human nature. Rather, he intended 'to reconstruct the all-encompassing order of the world to justify its theological basis and to prove by philosophical arguments that juridical norms constituted only a particular area in practical philosophy'.[27] The doctrine of natural law forms part of an overriding order and creation is a God-given order, namely an *ordo perpetuus*, which manifests itself 'in nature [...], in human conscience and in political society'.[28] In the course of the discussions on the Schmalkaldic League and the Schmalkaldic War of 1547, this doctrine of natural law became a further feature of the debates regarding the right to be allowed or even obliged to resist an unchristian/unjust authority, which might thus be characterized as tyrannical.[29] Melanchthon, in his introduction to the 1546 edition of Luther's '*Warning to my dear German people*', emphasized that there was a natural right to self-defence – one which God had sown in human beings – against an unchristian, tyrannical authority. Just as the father of the house (*pater familias*), according to natural self-defence, is allowed to kill a murderer who has intruded into his home – in order to protect his family – the same goes for subjects vis-à-vis an unjust authority. In this way, Melanchthon equated this right of self-defence, which from the Roman private law was highly familiar in the contemporary debate, with the right of self-defence of subjects against an unjust ruler who wished to thwart his subjects from the true faith, thereby making him an illegitimate ruler (tyrant). Referring to the sense of justice that is inherent in all human beings, Melanchthon described this right as *a natural right*.[30]

Thus from the end of the 1530s onwards, the image of the unchristian tyrant gradually gained in significance even in Luther's argumentation. That is, the end of time, the apocalypse, according to Luther, was real, and the *Beerwolf*, who was supposed to announce this end, was identical to the pope. Resistance against him was thus justified, indeed a natural right. If the emperor wished to protect the *Beerwolf*-pope, then it was equally legitimate to resist the emperor.[31]

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[27] Scattola, *Naturrecht*, p. 35.

[28] Ibid., p. 53.

[29] See also Merio Scattola, 'Widerstandsrecht und Naturrecht im Umkreis von Philipp Melanchthon', in Luise Schorn-Schütte (ed.), *Das Interim 1548/50: Herrschaftskrise und Glaubenskonflikt* (Gütersloh, 2005), pp. 459–87, here p. 475.

[30] Scattola, *Naturrecht*, pp. 57–8; this argumentation may also be found in John Witte, *Law and Protestantism: The legal teachings of the Lutheran Reformation* (Cambridge/UP, 2002), pp. 122–40. Witte, however, does not refer to any of the most recent research.

[31] Scattola, *Naturrecht*, p. 57 with note 126, referring to quotations by Luther. On the importance of the doctrine of the Antichrist for the debates on self-defence, see Thomas Kaufmann, *Konfession und Kultur: Lutherischer Protestantismus in der zweiten Hälfte des Reformationsjahrhunderts* (Tübingen, 2006), pp. 43–66, especially p. 46 with note 22.

This rationale of resistance was a justification pattern exclusively articulated by the theologians of the 1530s and 1540s. The outlined entanglement between theologian and juridical traditions as illustrated in this section was decisive for the jurists as well as for the vast majority of theologians.

The Resistance and Self-defence Debate Surrounding the Schmalkaldic War and the Interim, 1546–1550

The experiences of the Protestant defence alliance, of the military defeat against the emperor in the Schmalkaldic War, and of an imperial law on religious observance, the Interim of 1548, which related exclusively to the Protestants – yet was rejected by them as an illegitimate coercion of conscience – profoundly marked the two first generations of learned Protestant theologians and jurists. In response to the tense situation following Luther's death (18 February 1546) and prior to the outbreak of the Schmalkaldic War, Wittenberg theologians launched a proactive media campaign. This was connected with two epistles written in the summer of 1546, in which the two leaders of the Schmalkaldic League justified and defended themselves against the emperor's accusations that they had (1) breached the *Landfrieden* (public peace, *constitutio pacis*), (2) incited the subjects to disobey, and (3) allied themselves against the emperor in order to subject the empire to their tyrannical rule.[32] It was thus an answer to Charles V's imperial ban (*Reichsacht*) of 20 July 1546, in which Charles characterized himself as 'endeavouring in a paternal way' to uphold the peace, the well-being, and the liberty ('*libertet*') of the 'Germanic lands'.[33]

Arguments by high nobility office holders: The legitimacy of force as just war
Scholars have recently worked out that these contrasting positions were closely tied to contemporary debates on the nature of just war.[34] Legitimate authorities (*auctoritas principis*) that were entitled to wage such a war could do so in order to enforce the law (*causa iusta*) and restore peace (*recta intentio*).[35] Once Electors, city councillors, and/or princes simultaneously claimed to be an authority in this sense, they asserted the parallel right of waging a just war. Spanish political theologian Francisco Suárez (1548–1617) described this phenomenon as

Contrary to Kaufmann's contention, however, we must stress that the Antichrist doctrine was not the source of the debates described as of the late 1520s. Rather it was the entanglement of legal and theological traditions. For more information on apocalyptic doctrines, see Anja Moritz, *Interim und Apokalypse: Die religiösen Vereinheitlichungsversuche Karls V. im Spiegel der magdeburgischen Publizistik 1548–1551/52* (Tübingen, 2009), especially pp. 211–81.

[32] See Moritz, *Interim*, pp. 99, 102.

[33] Ibid., p. 99.

[34] Ibid., pp. 91–108, for an extensive treatment.

[35] For a recourse to the justification given by Thomas Aquinas, cf., ibid., p. 96.

'*bellum iustum ex utraque*'. In addition to the three estates doctrine and the debate on natural right, the reference to the *auctoritas principis* became a key ground of legitimacy for just rule and thereby for permitting self-defence or resistance – for both confessional factions![36]

Since the 1530s, the application of force by authorities that were entitled to it on the basis of a theory of *bellum iustum* had been discussed quite concretely with regards to conflicts in several territories of the Holy Roman Empire. However, in contrast to the emperor – who, in order to justify his actions against the protesting imperial estates, claimed the restoration of *Landfrieden*, that is a legal norm, and who denied any religious legitimacy for the declaration of war against the Schmalkaldic League[37] – other office holders among the high nobility explicitly emphasized a religious foundation. This holds true for the Landgrave of Hesse's arguments in the early 1530s, when at issue was the re-instatement of Duke Ulrich of Württemberg to his territory. This also holds true for the justification of the pre-emptive military strike against Catholic Duke Henry (the Younger) of Braunschweig-Wolfenbüttel in the spring of 1542, which the Elector of Saxony expressed to his allies in the Schmalkaldic League: 'Duke [Henry] himself may admit that his actions were taken *on behalf of religion*'.[38] And this holds equally true for the justification of the use of armed force, as Elisabeth of Brandenburg, Duchess of Calenberg-Göttingen, asserted in 1551 in a publication entitled 'The extent to which one owes obedience to the higher authority'.[39] In this light, military action against Catholic Duke Henry appeared justified, because once reinstated in his territory, he began rolling back the Reformation. In the Duchess's understanding, this was coercion to idolatry, and the application of force was legitimate on religious grounds. In her justifications, the Duchess used arguments Andreas Osiander had formulated back in 1531.[40] On the one hand, the imperial constitution recognized a two-pronged authority and therefore the estates – as *magistratus inferiores* – needed no longer obey

[36] The question of whether the conflict between the emperor and the estates in 1546–47 could be interpreted as a religious war (and thus as a *bellum iustum*) was discussed intensively in the nineteenth century by Wilhelm Maurenbrecher and Georg Waitz, in *Historische Zeitschrift* 17 (1867): 139–55.

[37] Cf. Franz Brendle, 'Um Erhalt und Ausbreitung des Evangeliums: Die Reformationskriege der deutschen Protestanten', in Franz Brendle and Anton Schindling (eds), *Religionskriege im Alten Reich und in Alteuropa*, 2nd edition (Münster, 2010), pp. 71–92, here p. 74. Brendle calls this denial dissimulation, since the motivation was actually of a religious nature.

[38] Ibid., for more information on the two events; the quotation is on p. 82.

[39] Andreas Osiander, *Etliche schöne Gebet und Trostsprüche [...]* (Königsberg, 1551) [version of HAB: Yv 2304 8° Helmst.].

[40] See above notes 24 and 25. A comparison of the texts demonstrates that the 1551 edition is identical to Osiander's texts of 1531.

the *magistratus superior*. Furthermore, should the emperor no longer fulfil his obligations as established by feudal law, they should depose him in order to restore order. On the other hand, the commandment of the *New Testament* (i.e. Apostle Paul's Epistle to the Romans) should be followed, whereby the authority is obliged to protect the good and punish the wicked. By demanding idolatry, the authority behaves wickedly and thus has itself relinquished its office; it may in turn be removed by force in order to reinstate order.[41]

In the Duchess's argumentation there is no question of dissimulation. The religious rationale supporting the use of force is openly stated. The protection of the subjects' religious freedom is connected to the duty of safeguarding the *Landfrieden*. The significance here is the extension of the scope of validity of this traditional commandment. Just as theologians and jurists from the end of the 1520s linked Biblical legitimacy and legal traditions, so too did high nobility office holders a couple of decades later. In addition, the Duchess's texts show that there is an intimate connection between a duty of protection from threats directed inwardly and one directed outwardly. The right deduced from this link expressively refers to resistance (*Gegenwehr*). This term was, as mentioned above, highly controversial among contemporaries, but it was nonetheless familiar in the framework of the disputes between the different confessional territories.[42]

The restoration of order: Self-defence as a natural right and the three-estate doctrine

An abundance of printed materials, sermons, and expert opinions appeared in the wider context of the Schmalkaldic War and the imperial religious edicts of 1547–48. In addition, there was a very real protest movement against the Interim, which in quite a few imperial cities and in almost every northern German Hanseatic town culminated in the opposition by the council and clergy of Magdeburg in 1550.[43] In the face of the threatening situation which had arisen for the leaders

[41] Osiander, *Etliche schöne Gebet und Trostsprüche*, fol. D IIIv/ D IVr; for Duchess Elisabeth's political argumentation, see Luise Schorn-Schütte, 'Wie ferne man den Oberherrn Gehorsam schuldig: Elisabeth von Calenberg-Göttingen als Autorin der politiktheologischen Debatte des 16. Jahrhunderts', in Eva Schlotheber et al. (eds), *Herzogin Elisabeth von Braunschweig-Lüneburg (1510–1558): Herrschaft, Konfession, Kultur*, Quellen und Darstellungen zur Geschichte Niedersachsens 132 (Hannover, 2011), pp. 56–65.

[42] This dimension is still inadequately recognized in recent research on just war. Cf. Anton Schindling, 'Gerechte Kriege im Zeitalter der Glaubenskämpfe? Krieg und Religion im Heiligen römischen Reich deutscher Nation im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert', in Fuchs Edelmayer et al. (eds), *Plus ultra: Die Welt der Neuzeit. Festschrift für Alfred Kohler* (Münster, 2008), pp. 191–210, especially pp. 201–4.

[43] For the special case of Magdeburg, see Thomas Kaufmann, *Das Ende der Reformation* (Tübingen, 2003). Regarding the role of this group, see also Moritz, *Interim*, pp. 104–8 and pp. 149–210.

of the Schmalkaldic League – that is, the Elector of Saxony and the Landgrave of Hesse – as a result of the emperor's war preparations, a few Wittenberg theologians published coordinated tracts, which were aimed at making the political theological position of the Protestants understandable to a broader public and simultaneously feeding the political decision-makers with supportive arguments. Apart from a new edition of Luther's texts, these writings were penned, inter alia, by Justus Menius, Georg Maior, Justus Jonas, Philipp Melanchthon, and Johannes Bugenhagen. As a result, the approach introduced by Melanchthon continued: that is, a justification of self-defence based on natural right.[44]

Natural law, according to the consensus among contemporary (although not exclusively) Protestant theologians and jurists, encompassed maintaining the general order that God wanted (*ordo perpetuus*). To the extent that the emperor, in league with the pope, threatened this order by waging a war against the Protestants in order to suppress their religious freedom, he obstructed its preservation. Thus he violated the obligation of his office, necessitating others preventing him from doing this. The use of force to this end was justified, because at the same time it helped preserve good order. This argumentation may be found in the widely read writings of the superintendent of Eisenach, Justus Menius (1499–1558),[45] which were published in two editions in 1547 and entitled *Lessons on self-defence* (*Von der Notwehr Unterricht*). The second edition was partially revised by Ph. Melanchthon.[46] Synthesizing both one finds a narrative of justification relating to the apocalypse – which Menius wrote, taking up Luther – within which the critique of the emperor was remarkably explicit, as well as a narrative of justification (with Melanchton's contributions) on the natural right to self-defence.[47] For Menius, the general order is identical to the order of the *three estates* or the three regiments: *oeconomia*, *politica*, and *ecclesia*. All three are rooted in the Fourth Commandment, and the domestic, political, and clerical regiments have their source in parental force, which God

[44] See Kaufmann, *Konfession*, pp. 48–66; Scattola, *Naturrecht*, pp. 55–76; Scattola, 'Widerstandsrecht', pp. 475–87. Theological pamphlets protesting the Interim have recently been edited: see Irene Dingel (ed.), *Reaktionen auf das Augsburger Interim: Controversia et Confessio*, vol.1 (Göttingen, 2010).

[45] Regarding Menius and his importance for Protestant economic and patriarchal literature, see also Schorn-Schütte, 'Politische Kommunikation in der Frühen Neuzeit'; for additional elaboration, see Walter Behrendt, *Lehr-, Wehr- und Nährstand, Haustafelliteratur und Dreiständelehre im 16. Jahrhundert* (Berlin, 2009) wherein he states that the '*oeconomia christiana*' was a 'bestseller', pp. 101–2.

[46] Justus Menius, *Von der Notwehr Unterricht* (Wittenberg, 1547) [version of HAB: H: YT 5.4° Helmst. (7) (VD 16 M 4592)]. On the history of this text, see Kaufmann, *Konfession*, p. 59, including reference to additional research in note 126.

[47] Cf. Scattola, *Naturrecht*, p. 35.

established.[48] Should a tyrannical authority violate this order, the subjects need no longer be obedient, for they would then be flouting God's commandment. Rather it is their duty to restore order, and to that end the natural law of self-defence is at their disposal, which legitimizes the use of force.[49]

To the extent that he equates God's order with the combination of the three estates, Menius added a new aspect to the contemporary debate on the right to self-defence and resistance, which steadily grew in importance: The combination of the three estates is the divine order. As soon as this equilibrium is disturbed, such as when an office, a regiment, or an estate interferes in another estate's duty, all concerned are justified in restoring order by preserving the equilibrium. In this context the right to self-defence receives additional legitimacy from the three estates doctrine. Furthermore, Menius underlined the origins of the *status politicus* in the domestic paternal force. There, in the interests of restoring order, both the children vis-à-vis an unjust father of the house and the subjects vis-à-vis an unjust ruler may legitimately exercise self-defence. Indeed, in the Monarchomach European literature of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, this father–child metaphor to legitimize self-defence was engaged in over and over.[50] Ultimately Menius, with the help of the three estates doctrine, took an additional argumentative step: Since all three offices or estates fulfil duties on an equal footing, it is the fathers of the house, as representatives of their homes, who act.[51] In view of a chaotic reality, each has the right to intervene in the pursuit of order. Menius emphasizes thereby that the lesser authorities are also within the rights of *pater familias* to exercise self-defence and to apply force.

Over the last years scholars have worked out the significance of the three estates doctrine for contemporary normative debates as of the middle of the sixteenth century.[52] Remarkably, theologians took over the leadership in this. Only at the beginning of the seventeenth century does one find a similar pattern of argumentation in juridical texts.[53]

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[48] Menius, *Von der Notwehr Unterricht*, Bl C4v–D1r.

[49] Ibid., Bl. D2r–v.

[50] See Scattola, 'Widerstandsrecht', p. 481.

[51] Ibid., p. 480. Menius shares this interpretation with Melanchthon.

[52] For reference to previous literature, see Luise Schorn-Schütte, 'Die Drei-Stände-Lehre im reformatorischen Umbruch', in Bernd Moeller (ed.), *Die frühe Reformation in Deutschland als Umbruch* (Gütersloh, 1998), pp. 435–61; for literature in English, see Witte, *Law and Protestantism*.

[53] Cf. Martin Heckel, *Staat und Kirche nach den Lehren der evangelischen Juristen Deutschlands in der ersten Hälfte des 17. Jahrhunderts* (München, 1968), p. 140.

The Confessio Magdeburgensis *of April 1550*

The *Magdeburg Confession of 1550*, which was often cited and influential and most recently has attracted much scholarly interest,[54] integrated available aspects addressed by theologians and jurists on the contemporary 'language of resistance/self-defence'. Its authors were theologians of Magdeburg, but the text emerged amidst reciprocal consultation with the city's legally trained or advising councillors.[55] It is evident that both groups worked closely together. Thus it is even more remarkable that all aspects of the communication that circulated among the contemporaries (the three estates doctrine, the debate on the right to self-defence or resistance, and the issue of the character of the imperial constitution) were discussed and embedded into a coherent narrative of justification. The preachers' *Confession* and the announcement of the council in March and April 1550[56] are thus remarkable proof of the presence of the arguments in the empire and of the close cooperation between both groups of learned political advisors.

Magdeburg was a member of the Schmalkaldic League. In February 1547, the city had committed itself and other members of the League 'to remain loyal to God's cause, the Fatherland and the Elector'.[57] The war ended quickly at the Battle of Mühlberg in April ιοεν, whereby the Protestants suffered a defeat and the Schmalkaldic League dissolved. The city council, however, not least in view of anticipated economic disadvantages, categorically rejected the demand (dated 29 April 1547) that the city surrender, whereupon the emperor imposed an imperial ban (27 July 1547). Magdeburg now found itself outside the Holy Roman Empire's community of *Landfrieden*. On 30 June 1548, Charles V ordered the Electors of Saxony and Brandenburg to implement the ban. The period between July 1547 and July 1550 (ending with the Augsburg diet, which began on 26 July 1550) was thus characterized by a power vacuum and an obscure legal framework. This is precisely the period in which quite a number of proclamations and memoranda also appeared. Some were written by preachers who had gathered in the city; others were written by the city's councillors, the

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[54] See Luise Schorn-Schütte, *Evangelische Geistlichkeit in der Frühneuzeit: Deren Anteil an der Entfaltung frühmoderner Staatlichkeit und Gesellschaft* (Gütersloh, 1996), pp. 394–6; the latest and most thorough study is Kaufmann, *Ende der Reformation*, especially pp. 176–98, with reference to earlier literature (p. 157, note 1) and an extensive discussion of the question of authorship; cf. Moritz, *Interim*, and Nathan Rein, *The Chancery of God* (Farnham, 2008).

[55] Cf. Moritz, *Interim*, p. 259 with note 242.

[56] Der Von Magdeburgk Ausschreiben an alle Christen. Anno M.D.L., den XXIIII. Marcij (VD 16 M126); Bekenntnis/ Unterricht und Vermahnung/ der Pfarrherrn und Prediger/der christlichen Kirchen zu Magdeburg, Anno 1550. Den 13. Aprilis ..., Magdeburg 1550 (VD 16 A2333).

[57] Moritz, *Interim*, p. 72 with note 131, including a reference to past regional historiography.

mayors, and the representatives of crafts and trade. These writings appeared as current juridical and theological debates, like combustion trapped under a burning glass and justifying the actions of both sides.[58] The main focus of the publications by the council was the legitimacy of its right to self-defence and simultaneously the debate about whether the imperial accusation of rebellion might be warranted. All writings included an adherence to the Augsburg Confession (*Confessio Augustana*) and likewise a rejection of the Interim. This became concrete in reference both to the command 'to obey God rather than men' (Acts of the Apostles 5, v. 29) and to the Old Testament role model of King Daniel (Book of Daniel, 6), who is said to have resisted the tyrannical King Darius.[59] In the third announcement, dated March 1550, a further argument was employed, one that had played an important role in previous discussions: The emperor had governed from his office over to the office of God and thereby deprived himself of his legitimacy. A command of obedience thus ceased to exist. At the same time, the emperor was said to have violated the old liberties (*alte Freiheiten*) as well as his obligation to protect the religious faith of those entrusted to him.[60]

At this point the councillors' contentions became entangled with those of the theologians, who would within a few weeks' time (15 April 1550) make clearly related arguments in the *Magdeburg Confession*. The document is divided into three main parts: part two's explanation of the self-defence doctrine exhibits the most explicit ties to the councillors' arguments. Part one lays out the ecclesiology of the Magdeburg theologians. With the characterization of the three estates doctrine, a 'basic theory'[61] is revealed which, with its purpose of limiting power, certainly reaches beyond the Church's realm.[62] In contrast to Luther, the authors of the *Confession* regarded the imperial constitution as irrefutably comprising a two-pronged sovereignty of authorities. The lesser authorities (imperial estates, including imperial cities) were considered authorities in their own right, and thus were not subject to the higher authority, the emperor. In the case of a

[58] For more information on the Council's announcements, see Kaufmann, *Ende der Reformation*, pp. 133–5; on the authors who had a theological background and on their publications: ibid., pp. 157–9, including reference to previous literature and a further discussion of the history of author and of printing.

[59] Cf. ibid., pp. 136–7 and Moritz, *Interim*, pp. 178–9; on the reading of the Book of Daniel in early modern political theory, see Klaus Koch, *Europa, Rom und der Kaiser vor dem Hintergrund von zwei Jahrtausenden Rezeption des Buches Daniel* (Hamburg, 1997), pp. 102–15.

[60] Kaufmann, *Ende der Reformation*, p. 145 with note 156.

[61] Cf. ibid., p. 180.

[62] For a thorough characterization of the *Confession* from the perspective of church historiography, see ibid., pp. 176–98; the nuances between general historians and church historians are also mentioned in Rein, *Chancery of God*, especially ch. 5, pp. 179–81.

transgression of office or of the emperor's abuse of office, the lesser authorities had the right and obligation to oppose the *magistratus superior* even with force, in order to restore order – because a sovereign who has abandoned his office in this sense was no longer an authority.[63] The *Confession* thus emphasizes explicitly that the right of self-defence (*Notwehr*) is a legitimate use of force in the framework of the imperial constitution. The authors thus joined in the intensively led discussions that began in the 1530s among politicians, theologians, and jurists.[64]

The characterization of the imperial constitution, which was addressed in the *Confession*'s preliminary remarks, is the precondition of the self-defence doctrine, which was explained in part two. It is repeatedly emphasized that these notions of order were not novel and that the accusation of rebellion was void – because both legal and theological legitimacy was based on the restoration of the true doctrine and tied to traditional liberties and rights. The basis of all human action was the divine, natural, and worldly law, which was identical to the Gospel *and* to the estate's freedoms.[65] Furthermore, according to the *Confession*, an authority that aims at forcefully obstructing its subjects from God's true word – that is, coerces them into idolatry – breaks its oath of protecting their exercise of religion. Likewise, it infringes on God's office. There was a right of self-defence against such an authority. One preferred not to speak of this legal right, of course, because there was always the risk of provoking turmoil and riots. In the concrete case of the emperor's siege of Magdeburg, however, it was legitimate to resort to the right of defence against a tyrant who wanted to reinstate papal idolatry. Such an action was not directed against the divine order, but against the Devil's order.

According to the *Confession*'s authors, single individuals were not entitled to this right. Rather, it fell under the exercise of an office.[66] This was the basic principle of both worldly and God-given order. Lesser and higher authorities were obliged to foster the good and punish the wicked.

Systematization

The various patterns of argumentation which were articulated in the Holy Roman Empire during the approximately thirty years in which the right to self-defence and resistance were debated, may be systematized from various perspectives as follows:

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63 Cf. note 56, Bekenntnis/ Unterricht und Vermahnung, fol. B IVr.

64 Ibid., fol. B IIv.

65 Ibid., fol. H Iv and H IIv.

66 Ibid., fol. K IIv.

Arguments for Self-defence in the Sixteenth-Century Holy Roman Empire

	Historical constitutional law: characterization of imperial constitution	Natural law / natural right of self-defence	Sovereign's contract: *capitulatio caesarea* / feudal law	Use of violence against authorities	Doctrine of three estates: biblical arguments (*politica christiana*)
Politicians					
Philip of Hesse	Superior and inferior magistrates		X	Self-defence (*Gegenwehr*)	
Elisabeth of Calenberg	Inferior and superior magistrates		X	Self-defence (*Notwehr*); authorities as wrongdoers: violent means permissible; *bellum iustum* as justification	
Theologians					
Philip Melanchthon		Tyrant ≠ magistrate Self-defence (*Gegenwehr*) as natural right		Self-defence (*Gegenwehr*) as natural right	
Johannes Bugenhagen	Inferior and superior magistrates		X	Self-defence (*Gegenwehr*) as restoration of order	Protect the pious, punish the wicked
Andreas Osiander	Inferior and superior magistrates		X	Unjust authority absolves of obedience. *Gegenwehr* justified to restore order	Romans 13: duty of authority to protect Christian subjects
Justus Menius (1547)	Inferior and superior magistrates	Self-defence (*Gegenwehr*) as natural right	X	Restoration of the good order	Doctrine of three estates

Confessio Magdeburgensis (1550)	Inferior and superior magistrates		X	Authorities transgressing into another office can be deposed	Doctrine of three estates

Legal Scholars

Johann Wick	Empire = aristocracy; Roman law	Self-defence (*Notwehr*, *Gegenwehr*)	X	*Notwehr*; *Gegenwehr* as legal institution	
Hessian legal scholars	Imperial estates = equal authorities		X	*Gegenwehr* based on Imperial constitution, *Notwehr* as legal institution	
Basilius Monner	Imperial estates = equal authorities		X	*Gegenwehr* based on Imperial constitution; *Notwehr* based on Roman Law / private protection	
Eberhard von der Tann, legal scholar and chancellor	Imperial estates = equal authorities		X	*Gegenwehr* based on Imperial constitution	X
Gregor Brück, Saxon legal scholars	Imperial estates = equal authorities		X	*Gegenwehr* based on Imperial constitution; *Notwehr* based on Roman law / private protection	
Lazarus Spengler	Imperial estates = subjects of the emperor			Passive obedience	

In every European region the category of historical 'constitutional' law may be identified. This holds true as much for France's *Monarchomachs* as for the English cities in their arguments against Charles I in the middle of the seventeenth century.[67] It appears sensible to extend this category with Biblical texts as a pattern of legitimacy, for these had appeared in the context of the Holy Roman Empire since Bugenhagen. This includes the argumentation used for the debate in the empire whereby God's covenant with Adam constituted the core of human community. One may deduce from this a duty of worldly authorities (king and estates) to uphold this covenant: inter alia to protect the Church. The failure of upholding this must lead ultimately to known consequences, including a legitimate recourse to force.[68] This so-called federal theology was relevant primarily in Calvinist contexts of the sixteenth century (in Ireland, Scotland, France, and parts of the Holy Roman Empire). Yet considered from a more general viewpoint, going beyond single confessions, it should chiefly be understood as proof of the unity of worldly rule and the Church.[69] Thus federal theology corresponds to the interest of the *politica christiana*, whose relevance for the empire has been addressed above.

In view of applying the 'Bible as a political argument' in European debates, utilized by all confessions[70] and which has been described elsewhere as 'Biblicism',[71] it is not surprising that the *Confessio Magdeburgensis* was taken up in countries such as England, the Netherlands, and France: as too was the idea of the legitimate use of force, which it addressed. Its reception was favoured by a 'broad public in France, the Holy Roman Empire, and the Netherlands that was ready to take up whatever existed in terms of building blocks and expand them

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[67] Cf. note 1, von Friedeburg, 'Bausteine'.

[68] Ibid., pp. 137–8.

[69] This interpretation may be found in Horst Dreitzel, 'Althusius in der Geschichte des Föderalismus', in Emilio Bonfatti, Giuseppe Duso, and Merino Scattola (eds), *Politische Begriffe und historisches Umfeld in der Politica Methodice Digesta des Johannes Althusius* (Wiesbaden, 2002), pp. 49–112, here pp. 57, 61.

[70] Due to lack of space, the Catholic argument shall not be considered; in general, see Eckehard Quin, *Personenrechte und Widerstandsrecht in der katholischen Widerstandslehre Frankreichs und Spanien um 1600* (Berlin, 1999); Harald Ernst Braun, *Juan de Mariana and Early Modern Spanish Political Thought* (Farnham, 2007). On the debate in the Holy Roman Empire around the mid-sixteenth century, see Luise Schorn-Schütte, *Das Andere der Frühen Neuzeit. Die politica christiana als politische Sprache im Europa der Frühen Neuzeit* (forthcoming, 2015).

[71] Cf. Andreas Pecar and Kai Trampedach, 'Der "Biblizismus" – eine politische Sprache der Vormoderne?', in Andreas Pecar and Kai Trampedach (eds), *Die Bibel als politisches Argument: Voraussetzungen und Folgen biblizistischer Herrschaftslegitimation in der Vormoderne* (München, 2007), pp. 1–18.

according to the particular situation and to whatever appeared useful'.[72] Recent research has shown that such a learned 'public' did actually exist. However, their paths followed no general pattern. The introduction of scholarly texts and the exchanges between individuals (for instance, between sixteenth-century English religious refugees [*Exulanten*] and their Protestant fellow believers in other European regions) was just as plausible as the increase of parallel 'cultures of knowledge' at the university level and frequented by jurists and theologians.[73] The point is not to declare one region as 'the source' of the debates but rather to establish that the exchange took place and developed according to diverse regional and constitutional traditions.[74]

The **aristocratic republic of Poland,** for example, went its own way in legitimizing force. In 1573 the imperial diet passed an Article on the right of the Sejm to self-defence or resistance, which established that should the king breach the law, the estates of the diet (members of the Sejm) would be freed from their duty of obedience and might also use force to remove the law-breaking king.[75] From conflicts that were entirely concrete – which emerged with the newly elected King Henri III, the brother of King Charles IX of France – it becomes clear that the basis of legitimacy for the Polish estates was the existence of a contract of rule (*Herrschaftsvertrag*). This was not a new idea of the late sixteenth century but part of a debate pursued as regards the limits of the Polish Commonwealth. Since that time, the legal bases for such were formulated in legal and political theories at the University of Krakow. There, one defined the right to self-defence and resistance as an estates' right, under certain circumstances, to refuse to follow the king's command. In the *Privilege of Mielnik* (1501), the estates received the right to criticize the king and to remind him to fulfil his duties. Over the course of the next decades it was elaborated – i.e. Biblical and Roman law arguments were integrated – and institutionalized

[72] Friedeburg, 'Bausteine', p. 135; cf. Robert von Friedeburg, *Self Defence and Religious Strife in Early Modern Europe: England and Germany, 1530–1680. Reformation Theories of Legitimate Resistance*, St. Andrews Studies in Reformation History (Aldershot, 2002), pp. 160–66.

[73] On the culture of knowledge, see Scattola, *Naturrecht*; on the paths of adoption, see Luise Schorn-Schütte, 'Kommunikation über Politik im Europa der Frühen Neuzeit', in *Jahrbuch des Historischen Kollegs 2007* (München, 2008), pp. 3–36.

[74] On the debate about the methodological foundations of adopting texts in the early modern period, see also Cornel Zwierlein, *Discorso und Lex Dei: Die Entstehung neuer Denkrahmen im 16. Jahrhundert und die Wahrnehmung der französischen Religionskriege in Italien und Deutschland* (Göttingen, 2006), pp. 22–4.

[75] Cf. Maciej Ptaszynski, 'Die Not- und Gegenwehrlehre als Aspekt der politischen Sprache auf den polnischen Reichstagen des 16./17. Jahrhunderts', in Luise Schorn-Schütte, Therese Schwager, et al.. (eds), *Konflikte um Gewissen, Teilhaberechte und das Recht auf Gegenwehr: Normwandel im Europa des 16. Jahrhunderts* (Frankfurt a.M., 2014).

by politicians and legal scholars until the constitution featured an interpreted right to resist the king with force should he attack (as a result of his own right to use force) in order to subdue the *Sejm*'s estates. In such a case the king becomes a tyrant – for he had removed himself from his office – and his dethronement, by force, was thereby legitimate. The Article was set as a constitutional norm in this sense in 1573.

As this cursory description should make clear, the legitimacy of the use of force as understood in Poland was based upon historical constitutional law. It comprises a contract of rule and the legal establishment of the refusal of obedience. This argument was embedded in the traditions of Roman law and of the use of biblical *Exempla* to describe the character of the authorities. The Bible was never applied as a political argument at the end of the sixteenth century, however. Law as the determining factor always remained decisive. The successful steps that led from the late fifteenth-century's conciliarism (*Konzyliarizm*) of the Krakow school of law towards the late sixteenth-century's 'constitutionalism' were made without the reference of any kind to *politica christiana*.

In **Lower and Upper Austria,** the conflict over the same time period was dealt with differently.[76] Because of the particularly harsh course taken by the Catholic princes towards re-Catholicization, the Protestant landed estates considered themselves obstructed from the public exercise of their religious faith. They described this policy as a 'burdening of conscience' and demanded their freedom of belief. The prince had violated his authorical duty of protection, they argued, since he had an obligation to defend his subjects exercising their beliefs. Clearly, the Austrian estates had adopted the concept of authority that had broadly emerged during discussions on the Schmalkaldic War and the Interim in the Holy Roman Empire. The right of resisting against a violation of the authority's duty of protection was deduced from the Bible, 'which served as some kind of political textbook'.[77] In so doing, the theological rationales of the rights of resistance in Austria were connected with the juridical ones.

Indeed, what was at issue in the Lower Austrian confessional conflict was the legitimacy of resistance (*Abwehr*) measures vis-à-vis the authority's religious policies. Yet by applying the same comprehensible logic, the opposition simply turned the argument around and claimed that very freedom of conscience for itself. Thus the conflict became a question of principle about the importance of the freedom of conscience among various social groups. This problem persisted across Europe well into the middle of the seventeenth century (e.g. in England and between the two Hessian Landgraviates). In order to be able to use the patterns of justification in this question, which since the 1530s

[76] Cf. Arno Strohmeyer, *Konfessionskonflikt und Herrschaftsordnung: Widerstandsrecht bei den Österreichischen Ständen 1550–1650* (Mainz, 2006), especially pp. 62–129.

[77] Ibid., p. 112.

had been argued by the Holy Roman Empire's jurists and theologians as a debate on the duties of the authorities, the Lower Austrian gentry, and also a few individual nobles, turned for advice to some of the empire's Protestant university theological faculties. The requests always led to the same question: 'To whom is more obedience due? To the prince who as emperor represented also the higher authority or to God and the commandments of the faith?'[78] Should obedience be due to God, then self-defence and resistance, including by force, was justified against the emperor.

The responses from the Wittenberg and Rostock faculties, for example, were restrained; they advised against violent actions in order to avoid exposure to the accusation of illegitimate insurrection. At the same time, however, the actions of the authorities were characterized unrestrictedly as 'unjust', 'since it violates the honour of God and because the lesser authorities are obliged to protect the religion and foster its propagation'.[79] In the face of the politically delicate situation that a theological expert opinion – as a piece of advice for a problem between estates in a foreign territory – might provoke, the restraint voiced by the theologians is contextually understandable. The formulations that were used were clear in their aims. They did not contradict the characterization of the natural right of self-defence that had been introduced during the Interim debate. Self-defence was considered a defensive action against an unjustified attack to protect the family or the subjects, and it was therefore explicitly rejected as an insurrection. An expert opinion written in 1585 by Wittenberg theologians on behalf of the Protestant estates of knights and lords of Lower Austria, however, intentionally left this option open. The consistently dense argumentation in all these expert opinions was tellingly based on the Bible, in particular the repeated reference to the Ten Commandments. In accepting the decree of the Catholic authority (the emperor), the estates would be renouncing God, which was considered a cardinal sin. Moreover, such an acceptance would be a burden of conscience for all subjects; the landed estates, as lesser authorities, had to refuse this. Thus non-compliance with the decree did not translate into insurrection.[80]

The inclusion of these two regions of central Europe – which have only recently become an interesting aspect and focal point for this kind of research – confirms: In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the debate on the right to self-defence and resistance profoundly shaped all parts of Europe. Furthermore, the legitimization of the use of force was part of a tradition bound up in differentiating the limitations

[78] Ibid., p. 114

[79] Ibid., p. 116.

[80] On the intra-theological differentiation of the concept of conscience surrounding the Interim debates, see Henning Jürgens, 'Flacius gegen Melanchthon. Die "Herrgotts Kanzlei" und der Kampf gegen das Interim', in Volker Leppin and Mariano Delgado (eds), *Ringen um die Wahrheit. Gewissenskonflikte in der Christentumsgeschichte* (Stuttgart, 2010), pp. 203–20.

and divisions of rule. The triggers for such conflicts were always confessional divisions. However, the traditions in which the arguments and political actions were embedded followed the specific patterns of the various regions.

PART II
Approaches from Philosophy and Theology

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Chapter 7

Secularization of the Holy: A Reading of the 'Wars of Religion'

William T. Cavanaugh

When I teach my course on theology and politics, my students and I begin by reading two texts side by side: the creation and fall story in Genesis, and selections from Thomas Hobbes's *Leviathan*. Though it might seem as though these texts are up to two completely different tasks – one religious, the other political – it seems to me that they are after the same basic goal: a story of overcoming primordial chaos that explains the way things are in the present. The story of the Wars of Religion serves a similar purpose for us in the West today. What I call the creation myth of the Wars of Religion goes like this: once upon a time, different theological ideas split Christendom into Protestant and Catholic camps. Both sides were initially unable to envision a society in which religious difference was tolerated, and so Protestants and Catholics began killing one another. Only after a century or so of unremitting bloodshed did an exhausted Europe decide that peace depended upon subordinating religious differences to loyalty to the state. Catholics and Protestants could enjoy peace only as fellow citizens whose public loyalty to the state trumped theological divisions. From the chaos of the Wars of Religion emerged the peaceful and secular post-Westphalian order.

Stories are usually told for a reason, and this story has proven so useful that it is nearly ubiquitous in Western culture; it is repeated by people on the street who know little about European history and by academics who should know better. It was a staple for early modern state-building theorists like Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau and for anti-religious Enlightenment figures like Voltaire, Gibbon, and d'Holbach. It was a key element in Protestant Romantic historiography in the nineteenth century, in which throwing off the yoke of the 'Romish Church' coincided with the creation of a prosperous system of sovereign states. As Friedrich Schiller wrote, 'by a strange course of events, religious disputes were the means of cementing a closer union among the nations of Europe'.[1] Such ideas continued in the twentieth century to inform the myth of Westphalia

[1] Friedrich Schiller, *The History of the Thirty Year's War in Germany*, trans., Rev. A. J. W. Morrison (State College, PA, 2000), p. 7, found at http://www2.hn.psu.edu/faculty/jmanis/schiller/30yrswar.pdf (accessed 20 January 2014).

as the beginning of a secular state system and the consequent secularization of international relations. In the twentieth century, the story of the Wars of Religion was also used to promote the marginalization and privatization of Christian practices in domestic public life in Western countries. In the United States, for example, religion was cited in Supreme Court cases before 1940 as a unifying element in American society, but starting in 1940 the Court began to use the tale of the Wars of Religion as evidence that religion has peculiarly divisive tendencies and should therefore be kept out of public, state-sponsored activities. Following the 1940 decision denying Jehovah's Witnesses the right to dissent from saying the pledge of allegiance, the tale of the Wars of Religion was used by the Supreme Court in banning voluntary religious education in public school buildings, prayer in public schools, nonsectarian remedial education conducted by public school teachers in parochial school buildings, and other practices that were seen as threatening the 'wall of separation' between Church and state.[2] Liberal political theorists like John Rawls, Judith Shklar, and Charles Larmore made the Wars of Religion a crucial trope in explaining why liberal polities necessarily came to be. The superiority of liberal to Muslim social orders was attributed by Bernard Lewis in part to the sobering wisdom gained in the West from the Wars of Religion, an experience and a wisdom that the Muslim world had never had.[3] Contemporary commentators in the twenty-first century have not ceased to invoke the Wars of Religion to promote the secularization of domestic politics. Russell Blackford, professor at the University of Newcastle and author of *Freedom of Religion and the Secular State*, argues that the lesson John Locke took from the Wars of Religion is 'the plausible one that religious organisations are focused on otherworldly doctrines and are ill-adapted for the exercise of secular power'.[4] Blackford argues that public policy decisions should be based therefore on 'worldly reasons'. Religious values, as essentially otherworldly, should not count in public debates over sexual issues, for example;

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[2] See my history of such cases in William T. Cavanaugh, *The Myth of Religious Violence: Secular Ideology and the Roots of Modern Conflict* (Oxford, 2009), chapter 4.

[3] Bernard Lewis, 'The Roots of Muslim Rage', *Atlantic Monthly* (September 1990): 'Muslims, too, had their religious disagreements, but there was nothing remotely approaching the ferocity of the Christian struggles between Protestants and Catholics, which devastated Christian Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and finally drove Christians in desperation to evolve a doctrine of the separation of religion from the state. Only by depriving religious institutions of coercive power, it seemed, could Christendom restrain the murderous intolerance and persecution that Christians had visited on followers of other religions and, most of all, on those who professed other forms of their own'.

[4] Russell Blackford, 'Why the secular state has no moral mandate' *Religion and Ethics: ABC website* (January 25, 2012): http://www.abc.net.au/religion/articles/2012/01/25/3415283.htm (accessed 20 January 2014).

only 'appropriate secular standards' like individual and public health should matter in public policy debate.

When a historical event carries such weight in public and academic discourse alike, it is particularly important that we get the history right. Unfortunately, the users of the story of the religious wars rarely bother to discuss historical evidence of any kind. The story has become mythical in the sense that it is simply part of the structures of understanding of Western societies. It is unquestioned. The reason why it is so difficult to think outside the myth is that myth and reality have become mutually reinforcing. Western society is structured by the myth, and the structures of Western society make the categories under which the myth operates seem natural and inevitable. The notion that religion is otherworldly, for example, is made more plausible by the exclusion of reasons that are considered religious from public discourse. But they are excluded from public discourse based on the notion that religion is inherently otherworldly. The logic is perfectly circular. It does not seem to occur to many people that the categories under which the argument is carried on ought to be investigated. If these are wars 'of religion', what did 'religion' mean to the combatants? If religion is inherently otherworldly, as Locke apparently concluded, how did religion become entangled in something as worldly as war? Did the combatants perhaps *not* think that religion is inherently otherworldly? If so, how does Locke conclude that it really is otherworldly? Is it possible that, in claiming that religion is otherworldly, Locke is not so much stating a fact about the world but inventing a way of looking at the world, a way that corresponds to certain political arrangements that he favours?

In what follows I will suggest that a consideration of the historical evidence shows that the myth of the Wars of Religion is highly misleading. By no means do I deny that Christians killed each other, often drawing on Christian principles to justify the violence. My argument is rather that it is misleading to call these wars 'of religion' as opposed to wars for 'secular' reasons because the religious/secular distinction as we now understand it was not born until after the wars were concluded. My main contribution to the discussion of the Wars of Religion is to bring historiography of the wars into conversation with histories of the idea of 'religion' and the religious/secular divide. Historians of the early modern period have as yet been mostly content to take modern categories like 'religion' and 'politics' and the 'secular' for granted, and have taken little notice of the histories being done of such terms. This is especially regrettable because the wars themselves have a crucial role to play in the very creation of these categories. I have space here only to give a brief synopsis of the evidence I present in much greater detail in my book *The Myth of Religious Violence*. I will summarize the historical evidence – including some taken from more recent studies that appeared after my book went to press – and then conclude with some comments for what dismantling the myth implies for recent discussions of secularization.

The Historical Evidence

For the myth of the Wars of Religion to be true, all of the following components must be true:

1. *The combatants opposed each other based on religious difference.* In other words, Catholics and Protestants killed each other. Catholics did not kill Catholics, and Catholics did not collaborate with Protestants. Different kinds of Protestants might be expected to kill each other, that is, Lutherans versus Calvinists, but Lutherans did not kill Lutherans.
2. *Combatants killed each other for religious reasons, as opposed to political, economic, social reasons.*
3. *Religious causes must be at least analytically separable from political, economic, and social causes at the time of the wars.*
4. *The rise of the modern state was the solution to the wars.* In other words, the transfer of power from Church to state was necessary to tame the violent tendencies of religion.

Let us consider each of these four components in turn.

1) The combatants opposed each other based on religious difference

The myth of the Wars of Religion relies heavily on the idea that religious difference is itself prone to violence if it is not removed from the public sphere. The Reformation is related to the Wars of Religion as cause is to effect; first came theological divisions, then came war, inevitably, until the Europeans finally realized that theology must be marginalized from politics for the sake of peace. As Quentin Skinner puts it:

> the religious upheavals of the Reformation made a paradoxical yet vital contribution to the crystallizing of the modern, secularized concept of the State. For as soon as the protagonists of the rival religious creeds showed that they were willing to fight each other to the death, it began to seem obvious to a number of politique theorists that, if there were to be any prospect of achieving civic peace, the powers of the State would have to be divorced from the duty to uphold any particular faith.[5]

We would expect, then, unrelenting hostility across Europe from the Reformation to the Peace of Westphalia. But the first of the so-called Wars of Religion, the

[5] Quentin Skinner, *The Foundations of Modern Political Thought* (Cambridge, 1978), vol. 2, p. 352.

Schmalkaldic War, did not occur until nearly 30 years after Martin Luther nailed his 95 theses to the door in Wittenberg. The Holy Roman Emperor spent most of the 1520s at war against the pope and the Catholic French, not Lutherans. Charles V's troops sacked Rome, not Wittenberg, in 1527. The Peace of Augsburg in 1555 was not a temporary respite in religious hostility. As Peter Wilson points out, it ushered in 'the longest period of peace in modern German history, not matched until 2008 by the 63 years following the Second World War'.[6] The point is that theological differences in and of themselves did not make war inevitable.

This point is made more forcefully by the fact that Catholics often fought Catholics, and Catholics and Protestants often found themselves on the same side, in the so-called 'Wars of Religion'. A number of Protestant princes fought for Charles V in the Schmalkaldic War, while Catholic Bavaria refused.[7] In 1552, Lutheran princes allied with the Catholic King Henry II of France to make war on the Catholic emperor while most Catholic princes of the empire refused to come to Charles's aid.[8] In my book I list 20 examples of Protestant–Catholic collaboration during the French 'Wars of Religion', both among the nobility in resistance to the Crown, and amongst the peasants in resistance to the nobility and the monarchy. At the same time, the Catholics were divided between two main parties, the Catholic League and the Politiques, who often found themselves on opposite sides of the violence.[9]

The Thirty Years War is often invoked as the lengthiest and most savage of the religious wars. It is used to epitomize the futility of religious squabbling, the intractability of religious conflicts, and the necessity – exemplified by the Peace of Westphalia – of the modern state system for taming religious conflict. However, it is precisely in the Thirty Years War that the idea of Catholic–Protestant violence is most heavily qualified by the facts on the ground. Neither Protestants nor Catholics presented a united front, to put it mildly.[10] Protestant princes such as the Elector of Saxony John George supported the Catholic emperor early in the war, even citing Luther to urge his fellow Lutherans to support the emperor.[11] The Catholic French supported Protestant princes from early on. In 1628, while the Calvinist Dutch were helping the French crown to defeat the Calvinists at La Rochelle, Catholic Spain was supporting the Protestant Duke of Rohan in

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[6] Peter H. Wilson, *Europe's Tragedy: A New History of the Thirty Years War* (London, 2010), p. 10.

[7] Wim Blockmans, *Emperor Charles V 1500–1558* (London/New York, 2002), p. 94.

[8] Richard Dunn, *The Age of Religious Wars 1559–1689* (New York, 1970), pp. 49–51.

[9] Cavanaugh, *Myth*, chapter 3.

[10] Wilson, *Europe's Tragedy*, pp. 197–207. 'More fundamentally, the Protestant princely dynasties were divided among themselves by a range of conflicting interests that inhibited any stable grouping based exclusively on confession'; ibid., p. 204.

[11] Geoffrey Parker (ed.), *The Thirty Years' War* (London, 1984), p. 94.

his battle against the French crown in Languedoc.[12] With Pope Urban VIII's approval, Cardinal Richelieu began subsidizing the Swedes in 1631 and began sending troops in 1634, such that the latter half of the Thirty Years War was largely a battle between Europe's two great Catholic dynasties, the Habsburgs and the Bourbons. The Lutheran Swedes – who in 1643 attacked Lutheran Denmark[13] – made themselves unwelcome in the empire, provoking most Protestant princes to rejoin their forces to the Imperial armies by 1635.[14] By 1638, the Scottish Presbyterian Robert Baillie could observe: 'For the Swedds, I see not what their eirand is now in Germany, bot to shed Protestant blood'.[15] To this sampling of evidence of rulers' neglect of confessional loyalties we may add the crucial observation that those doing the actual fighting in the Thirty Years War were largely not zealots but mercenaries, led by soldiers of fortune who switched allegiances from Protestant to Catholic princes and back with ease. Sir James Turner acknowledged that he 'had swallowed, without chewing, in Germanie, a very dangerous maxime, which military men there too much follow, which was, that soe we serve our master honestlie, it is no matter what master we serve'.[16]

2) Combatants killed each other for religious reasons, as opposed to political, economic, social reasons

Peter Wilson's new and exhaustive study of the Thirty Years War concludes that it 'was not primarily a religious war':[17]

> Religion certainly provided a powerful focus for identity, but it had to compete with political, social, linguistic, gender and other distinctions. Most contemporary observers spoke of imperial, Bavarian, Swedish, or Bohemian troops, not Catholic or Protestant, which are anachronistic labels used for convenience since the nineteenth century to simplify accounts. The war was religious only to the extent that faith guided all early modern public policy and private behaviour.[18]

Wilson alludes to other factors driving the war, and the usual scholarly procedure is to argue over which factors were most important. Twentieth-century historiography of the French wars of the sixteenth century, for example, tended to dismiss the importance of religious factors up until the 1970s, whence

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12 James B. Collins, *The State in Early Modern France* (Cambridge, 1995), p. 29.
13 Parker, *Thirty Years' War*, p. 174.
14 Ibid., pp. 142–3.
15 Quoted in ibid., p. 182.
16 Quoted in ibid., p. 195.
17 Wilson, *Europe's Tragedy*, p. 9.
18 Ibid.

followed an emphasis on religion as the most important factor. The presence of Catholic vs Catholic and Protestant vs Protestant violence – along with Protestant–Catholic collaboration – would indicate that religious factors were not significant at least in those cases, and if Catholics killed Catholics for political and economic reasons, could it not be the case that Catholics killed Protestants for political and economic reasons as well? These kinds of considerations, along with Marxist and Durkheimian reductions of religion to more basic economic and social processes, led many historians in the first part of the twentieth century to minimize religion as an independent factor in the French 'Wars of Religion'.[19] Starting in the 1970s with Natalie Zemon Davis's work, however, the pendulum has largely swung the other way, such that now the majority of scholars working on these wars emphasize the role of religious convictions in motivating the violence, while maintaining the importance of other factors as well.[20] That 'religion' has gone from being dismissed to being blamed is not necessarily progress. At the very least, however, we can acknowledge that any simple tale of doctrinal zealotry run amok must be qualified by the recognition that other factors besides religion – political, economic, social, etc. – were at play in these wars, an acknowledgement that is always present in some form in historians' treatment of the wars, but usually absent when the Wars of Religion are used by political theorists, jurists, journalists, and others as the founding myth of secular social arrangements.

3) Religious causes must be at least analytically separable from political, economic, and social causes at the time of the wars

To acknowledge the various factors involved in the wars is to regard them as at least analytically separable, even if they are inevitably mixed on the ground. There is good reason to think, however, that acknowledging the various factors is itself anachronistic and distorting of the historical evidence. If the last sentence of Wilson's quote above is correct, then trying to separate out religion from politics and other factors in these wars is misleading. This is the case not because our forebears 'mixed' religion and politics, as if they were two essentially separate things that were subsequently joined. It is the case because the categories of religion and politics as two essentially separate things were being *invented* at the time of the wars, and were furthermore a *result* of the wars themselves. In my book *Myth of Religious Violence*, chapter 3 on the so-called Wars of Religion depends on my summary and extension, in chapter 2, of a large and growing body of scholarship showing that 'religion' as something essentially distinct from 'secular' phenomena like politics is not embedded in the nature of things

[19] I summarize examples of this kind of scholarship in Cavanaugh, *Myth*, chapter 3.

[20] Natalie Zemon Davis, *Society and Culture in Early Modern France* (Stanford, 1975).

but is a creation of the modern West, a creation that was subsequently exported to the rest of the world through the process of colonization.

The terms *religio* and religion were not simply absent from the discourse surrounding the wars, although it should be noted that the most cited instance of such usage, *cuius regio, eius religio*, was not part of the original Peace of Augsburg, and appeared only in early seventeenth-century discussions of the settlement's implications. The more important point is that, even when the terms *religio* and 'religion' in the various languages were used, they did not generally mean what moderns take these terms to mean, which is religion as a set of doctrinal convictions that is essentially separate from non-religious or 'secular' concerns like politics, economics, society, and so on. Timothy Fitzgerald has done perhaps the most detailed analysis of these concepts in the early modern period. According to Fitzgerald: 'One could argue that, in the sixteenth century, "religion" is used rarely, and where it is used it is tightly drawn and specified and embedded in the practices of Christendom, whereas the opposite seems to hold today. Today, religion is used so openly and prolifically that it seems obvious that its meaning and ideological function have changed greatly, and that therefore there is danger of confusion in projecting our meanings back into earlier eras'.[21]

The medieval use of 'religion' had little in common with the modern use. According to Augustine's *City of God*, the 'normal meaning' of *religio* is 'an attitude of respect in relations between a man and his neighbor'.[22] In a thorough genealogy of the concept in my book, I show that the primary use of the religious/secular distinction in the medieval period is to distinguish between two types of clergy, those who belong to orders like the Franciscans and Benedictines and those who belong to a diocese. When 'religion' enters the English language, it takes this meaning as well, such that around 1400 the religions of England are the various orders. *Religio* has a secondary meaning in the medieval period as a virtue, one of the nine sub-virtues annexed to the cardinal virtue of justice in Aquinas' *Summa Theologiae*. But *religio* is not – as religion is in modernity – a universal human

[21] Timothy Fitzgerald, *Discourse on Civility and Barbarity: A Critical History of Religion and Related Categories* (New York, 2010), p. 162.

[22] Augustine, *City of God*, trans., Henry Bettenson (Harmondsworth, 1972), X.1 [373]: 'The word "religion" would seem, to be sure, to signify more particularly the "cult" offered to God, rather than "cult" in general; and that is why our translators have used it to render the Greek word thrêskeia. However, in Latin usage (and by that I do not mean in the speech of the illiterate, but even in the language of the highly educated) "religion" is something which is displayed in human relationships, in the family (in the narrower and the wider sense) and between friends; and so the use of the word does not avoid ambiguity when the worship of God is in question. We have no right to affirm with confidence that "religion" is confined to the worship of God, since it seems that this word has been detached from its normal meaning, in which it refers to an attitude of respect in relations between a man and his neighbor'.

impulse, a set of doctrinal propositions, or something that forms a binary with politics or the secular or anything that falls outside of the direct purview of faith. As Aquinas makes clear: 'Every deed, in so far as it is done in God's honor, belongs to *religio*'[23] and this includes the acts of justice by which a king governs.[24] Here I must disagree with José Casanova's contention that religion 'became one of the terms of a dyad, religious/secular, that served to structure the entire spatial and temporal reality of medieval Christendom into a binary system of classification separating two worlds, the religious-spiritual-sacred world of salvation and the secular-temporal-profane world'.[25] *Religio* is a very minor term in the medieval period, not half of reality.[26] The temporal/spiritual binary is furthermore not a spatial distinction but a temporal one; the temporal, as the name implies, is the time between the first and second comings of Christ during which coercive authority is temporarily necessary. Such authority by no means stands outside of the sacred or even of the church. Until the Investiture Controversy, kings have liturgical functions, and even in late medieval apologies for the predominance of civil authority such as the 'Norman Anonymous' and Marsilius of Padua, lay authority is simply the application of the Gospel to worldly concerns.

When the term 'religion' is used in the sixteenth century, it tends to mean something like 'worship' or 'Christian truth'. Distinctions of religion/politics and religious/secular – where 'secular' means something like 'non-religious' – are absent from the writings of Luther, Calvin, Henry VIII, and the other protagonists of the Reformation. With regard to the English case, Fitzgerald notes: 'For most English-speaking people throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and probably this is true for much of the eighteenth and nineteenth as well, "Religion" meant Christian Truth, and since most English-language discourses on "religion", as it is understood in English, were written by Protestants, Religion meant Protestant Truth as against Catholic and other superstitions. Religion permeated everything. It was usually contrasted not with "the secular" (which also had a different usage), but with superstition'.[27] When

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[23] Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, II–II.81.4 ad 2.

[24] Ibid., II–II.50.1 ad 1, and *idem*, *On Kingship to the King of Cyprus*, trans., Gerald B. Phelan (Toronto, 1949), p. 60 [Bk. II, ch. 3].

[25] José Casanova, 'The Secular, Secularizations, Secularisms', in Craig Calhoun, Mark Juergensmeyer, and Jonathan VanAntwerpen (eds), *Rethinking Secularism* (Oxford, 2011), p. 56.

[26] Wilfred Cantwell Smith's detailed study of the term 'religion' in the medieval period concludes: 'It is nowadays customary to think of this period as the most "religious" in the history of Christendom. Despite this or because of it, throughout the whole Middle Ages no one, so far as I have been able to ascertain, ever wrote a book specifically on "religion". And on the whole this concept would seem to have received little attention'; Wilfred Cantwell Smith, *The Meaning and End of Religion* (New York, 1962), p. 32.

[27] Fitzgerald, *Discourse*, p. 171.

Fitzgerald here says that 'religion permeated everything', he does not mean that religion and politics or religion and the secular were essentially distinct things that were intertwined and then subsequently separated. Rather, '"separation" does not describe the historical reality, but only pretends to ... I would say that their "separation" is rhetorical, and as such has been their genesis. In that sense, they are invented categories, not preexisting generic domains that have always existed in all languages'.[28]

As early as the late fifteenth century, the modern concept of religion as a universal human genus of which 'religions' are species was developing in Platonists such as Nicholas of Cusa and Marsilio Ficino. In later figures like Richard Hooker, Hugo Grotius, Herbert of Cherbury, and John Locke, the idea of religion as expressed in doctrinal beliefs and essentially distinct from secular pursuits takes shape. The first modern use of the religious/secular binary in English appears in William Penn and John Locke after the so-called Wars of Religion. The religion/politics distinction as we know it is even later.[29] This is not just a matter of quibbling over terminology. The important point is that we cannot call these wars 'of religion' – as opposed to 'non-religious' wars of politics, economics, etc. – if there simply was no distinction between these factors at the time the wars were fought. The Eucharist, for example, was not 'religious' in the modern sense; debates over the Eucharist in the sixteenth century were as much about how God wished the community of believers to be ordered as about what was happening on the altar. The point again is not that Christians did not kill each other, often for reasons that appealed to Christian theology; the point is that there is no way to single out 'religion' from 'political' and 'social' causes when people did not carve up their world in this way.

My argument is not that people never distinguished between 'religion' and other matters in the early modern period. Philip Benedict's essay in this volume shows that people in France argued already in the sixteenth century about whether or not the wars were 'religious'. According to Benedict, many denied that the wars were religious because by 'religion' was meant 'true piety', so it was common to deny that one's opponents operated from 'religious' motives. This is clearly not, however, what moderns mean by 'religion'. Benedict also claims that the modern distinction between 'religion' and 'politics' was operative in sixteenth-century France, but he does so by showing that 'the programs of the warring parties regularly mentioned both kinds of matters', which, it seems to me, rather lends credence to the observation that 'religion' and 'politics' were not viewed as two entirely separate kinds of human endeavour. Benedict cites the 1585 comment by Etienne Pasquier that 'the most careful men cannot well judge whether the movement [the Catholic League] is directed against the state

[28] Ibid., pp. 172–3.

[29] Ibid., pp. 46–7, 231–99.

or the new religion' as evidence of, in Benedict's words, 'the distinction between religious and political matters', but such evidence would appear to bolster my claims rather than undermine them. My point is not that people were unable to distinguish between, for example, new forms of Eucharistic practice on the one hand and matters of taxation on the other. My point is that matters of theological doctrine, such as the Eucharist, could not yet be thought of as *adiaphora* to matters of state, such that disagreements over the Eucharist could be consigned to the realm of purely 'religious' squabbles with no business interfering in the serious public matters of politics. Benedict and others in this volume provide ample evidence that the wars were 'religious' in the sense that theological motives and legitimations were undoubtedly present, and I have never questioned that such was the case. The wars were not, however, religious *as opposed to* merely mundane wars about 'political' matters such as the centralization of state power.

Christendom, everyone assumed, was a theopolitical whole; though Christians had many different ideas about how the community should be ordered, only gradually did the idea develop that there was something called 'religion' that was essentially distinct from more worldly concerns. This takes its modern form most clearly in John Locke's endeavour:

> to distinguish exactly the business of civil government from that of religion, and to settle the just bounds that lie between one and the other. If this be not done, there can be no end put to the controversies that will be always arising between those that have, or at least pretend to have, on the one side, a concernment for the interest of men's souls, and, on the other side, a care of the commonwealth.[30]

Locke's solution to the conflicts that have plagued Europe is to separate religion from worldly, secular concerns. He does not think he is inventing something new here, but rather separating out two essentially different things that have somehow gotten mixed up together:

> ... the church itself is a thing absolutely separate and distinct from the commonwealth. The boundaries on both sides are fixed and immovable. He jumbles heaven and earth together, the things most remote and opposite, who mixes these two societies, which are in their original, end, business, and in everything perfectly distinct and infinitely different from each other.[31]

But of course Locke was witnessing events that were proving that the boundaries were anything but fixed and immovable. The creation of the religious/secular and religion/politics binaries was the effect of the shifts of power from ecclesiastical

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[30] John Locke, *A Letter Concerning Toleration* (Indianapolis, 1955), p. 17.

[31] Ibid., p. 27.

to civil authorities in the early modern period, shifts that began well before the Reformation. Conflicts between ecclesiastical and civil authorities were as old as Constantine, and they were frequent precisely because both types of authority were considered as operating within the same framework of a Christian social order; both were to contribute to the salvation of Christians. In the late Middle Ages and into the early modern period, however, the balance of power decisively shifted. As ecclesiastical courts were abolished, as lands and revenues passed from ecclesiastical to civil control, as local allegiances and the transnational ideal of Christendom were replaced by allegiance to nascent national identities, and as control over appointments to the Church's own offices were transferred to civil authorities, the creation of religion as something essentially separate from politics and other secular concerns facilitated the idea that the ecclesiastical authority's proper area of concern is essentially otherworldly and therefore not in essential conflict with the concerns of civil authority. As Brent Nongbri's recent book-length treatment of the creation of the modern category of religion puts it, figures like Locke and Jean Bodin 'began to conceive of religion as a distinct, privatized sphere of activity that should support and not disturb the affairs of the newly emerging nation-states'.[32]

Locke's treatment of this new arrangement as if it were simply embedded in the nature of things is itself a political move that legitimates the new arrangement. If we simply accept the religion/politics distinction as a useful way of talking about the various factors involved in the wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, then we are guilty of the same anachronism, essentialism, and political justification of the current order as is Locke. We may indeed wish to argue that liberal social arrangements are the best ones available, but we should then be aware that we have moved from the descriptive to the normative. To impose the religion/politics distinction on the wars in question is no longer doing history, but building a political theory based on an inaccurate reading of the facts. It risks taking sides in the wars with the victors, assuming that the way they divided up the world is simply natural.

4) The rise of the modern state was the solution to the wars

Given that differing theopolitical visions were often at stake, it should go without saying that the above does not imply that the wars in question were fought for political as opposed to religious reasons. None of the above, furthermore, should

[32] Brent Nongbri, *Before Religion: A History of a Modern Concept* (New Haven, 2012), pp. 9–10. Locke's new 'assemblage of ideas – religions as groups of individuals who freely choose to associate with each other and adhere to a particular set of writings for the purpose of salvation, and who ideally operate in ways that do not interfere or overlap with the concerns of the state – now begins to look quite similar to modern conceptions of religion'; ibid., p. 103.

be understood as exonerating Christians or the churches of responsibility for the violence. The wars were fought by Christians, and the churches were deeply implicated in supporting the war efforts of civil authority. Indeed, ecclesiastical authority had in many places been subordinated to or absorbed into civil authority, and this was a crucial part of the problem. What this fact suggests, however, is that the transfer of power from church to state was not the way the violence of 'religion' was eventually tamed. It suggests, rather, that the rise of the state was a cause, not the solution, to the violence.

The idea that the transfer of power from church to state solved the wars of religion is a common one among liberal political theorists. Francis Fukuyama, for example, puts the tale this way: 'There was a time when religion played an all-powerful role in European politics, with Protestants and Catholics organizing themselves into political factions and squandering the wealth of Europe in sectarian wars ... Contrary to those who at the time believed that religion was a necessary and permanent feature of the political landscape, *liberalism vanquished religion in Europe*'.[33] John Rawls, Judith Shklar, Jeffrey Stout, and others tell the same story. The problem with this tale is that it skips from the wars to liberalism without any acknowledgement that liberal government did not appear until a century and a half after the end of the Thirty Years War, and then only on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean.[34] The period following the Peace of Westphalia found what is commonly called 'absolutism' reigning in Europe. European politics was generally confessionalized until the French Revolution.

Some liberal political theorists acknowledge that it was absolutism, not liberalism, that the wars left in their wake, but the common narrative is that absolutism was a necessary step on the way to the modern liberal state. It was necessary in two ways. First, it advanced the transition from a ramshackle collection of principalities and a decadent empire to the modern, centralized sovereign state. Second, it was necessary to tame the violence that had wracked Europe for more than a century, violence that was in part the result of the chaotic, Rube Goldberg contraption that was pre-modern Europe.[35] As long as Catholicism was the glue that held Christendom together, the contraption could survive. When the Reformation introduced religious difference, however, violence was the inevitable result. This version of the myth of the Wars of Religion has the virtue of recognizing that liberalism did not solve the wars. Nevertheless, the state is still seen as saviour from the violence, not least because it tamed the

[33] Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York, 1992), p. 271; italics in the original.

[34] The Dutch Republic is a partial exception here.

[35] See the summary of this view in Wilson, *Europe's Tragedy*, pp. 807–12. Max Weber's idea of a state as that which secures a monopoly on legitimate violence is important here.

authority of the church by absorbing many of its powers and revenues, and by supervising the church's governance.

The above narrative sees the sovereign state as the end result of a natural, evolutionary process from less centralization to more, with generally pacifying results. There is good reason, however, to resist this Whiggish narrative that sees present arrangements as inevitable. Peter Wilson argues that the empire was in fact remarkably stable: 'The large number of relatively weak elements made it difficult for anyone to act alone, discouraging extremism and diluting any agenda to a minimum that all could agree'.[36] There was a dispersed political authority that Wilson describes in this way:

> This cumbersome process certainly made it difficult for the Empire to act decisively, but it gave it a particular strength that ensured it survived the most prolonged and bloody civil war in its history. The modern democratic state assumes responsibility for implementing decisions once they have been taken by majority vote. The dissenting minority now confront the full power of the state and, if they choose to resist, the situation can descend into violence as there is no legal basis for their failure to comply. No such separation existed in the Empire, because law-making and law enforcement remained common matters for the emperor and the imperial Estates. The minority continued to confront the majority, not the Empire itself. It was as if the process of decision-making was not yet complete and the majority view remained provisional until accepted by the minority.[37]

As Charles Tilly and others have argued, there was nothing inevitable about the rise of the state.[38] There was, furthermore, much of good that was lost in the destruction of the old order, especially the role of intermediary associations between the individual and the state.[39]

More important for my present purpose is the idea that the rise of the modern state was necessary to tame the inevitable violence that religious difference introduced after the Reformation. To hold such a view, one must ignore the volumes of scholarship that have been produced on the coercive aspects of state-building itself. Charles Tilly's pithy comment 'War made the state, and the state made war' sums up his view that the apparatus that grew into the modern state in Europe was the unintended result of the elites' need to more efficiently extract resources from the population for the purpose of making war.[40] Furthermore,

[36] Ibid., p. 24.

[37] Ibid., pp. 24–5.

[38] See Charles Tilly, 'Reflections on the History of European State-Making', in *idem* (ed.), *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* (Princeton, NJ, 1975), p. 26.

[39] Wilson, *Europe's Tragedy*, pp. 777, 809.

[40] Tilly, 'Reflections', p. 42.

the idea that the state absorbed the powers of lesser bodies like the church in order to end the violence ignores overwhelming evidence that the assertion of centralized power over such intermediate bodies was a significant source of the violence in the first place.

Heinz Schilling argues that the invention of sovereignty demanded both the 'integration and concentration of all political, social, economic and other power under the supremacy of the ruler', and 'at the same time the process of state-building meant territorial integration and a dissociation from the "outside" world, which as a rule was implemented in an offensive, not infrequently even aggressive manner. All the states of the early modern age aimed to augment their state territory through expansion and the annexation of as much territory as possible'. Schilling continues:

> The internal process of state-building was no different to the external one and the accompanying birth of the early modern Europe of the great powers was accompanied by massive disruptions. Internally the rulers and their state elites used violent means against the estates, cities, clergy and local associations which laid claim to an independent, non-derived right of political participation which the early modern state could no longer grant under the principle of sovereignty. Externally in addition to the above-mentioned tendencies of territorial adjustment between the states, conflicts were mainly over 'rank', since at this stage there was no generally acknowledged system of states. Therefore, at the end of the middle ages, Europe entered a long phase of intense violent upheaval both within and between states.[41]

Michael Howard similarly describes the wars of the period in question in terms of resistance to the centralizing efforts of rulers:

> The attempts by the dominant dynasties of Europe to exercise disputed rights of inheritance throughout the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries became consolidated, in the sixteenth century, into a bid by the Habsburgs to sustain a hegemony which they had inherited over most of western Europe against all their foreign rivals and dissident subjects, usually under the leadership of France. The result was almost continuous warfare in Western Europe from the early sixteenth until the mid-seventeenth centuries.[42]

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[41] Heinz Schilling, 'War and Peace at the Emergence of Modernity: Europe Between State Belligerence, Religious Wars, and the Desire for Peace', in Klaus Bussmann and Heinz Schilling (eds), *1648: War and Peace in Europe*, 3 vols (Münster, 1998), vol. 1, p. 14.

[42] Michael Howard, *The Invention of Peace: Reflections on War and International Order* (New Haven, 2000), p. 15.

Similar tensions motivated violence within France. As Donna Bohanan writes: 'The expansion of monarchical authority brought central government into direct conflict with the many groups, duly constituted bodies, and regions in whose interest it was to oppose and obstruct the process of state-building'.[43] For these kinds of reasons, José Casanova has suggested, 'the so-called "religious wars" could also more appropriately be called the wars of early modern European state formation'.[44]

It would be overstating the case to try to identify 'state-building' as the single cause of the wars in question. The wars were no doubt complex, and a monocausal explanation such as that of 'religion' should not be replaced by another monocausal explanation. Rather than try to suggest an explanation for the wars, my purpose here is the purely negative one of arguing that the idea that the state saved Europe from the violence of religion is highly implausible. The narrative as it is commonly told depends upon the idea that the Protestant–Catholic division caused the violence that the rise of the state helped solve. The Reformation and the formation of the sovereign state are treated as two essentially different movements, one religious and one political, in temporal sequence, as if the latter were a response to the former. But in fact the two processes were deeply intertwined, and the process of state formation preceded the Reformation in significant ways. In the fifteenth century and early sixteenth century, the French and Spanish crowns signed concordats with the papacy which gave them effective control over church appointments and revenues. The church became part of the royal clientage system. It is crucial to note that the Reformation failed in France and Spain, where the crown had largely already absorbed the church and therefore had no interest in upsetting the status quo. As Pope Julius III wrote to Henry II of France, 'in the end, you are more than Pope in your kingdoms ... I know no reason why you should wish to become schismatic'.[45] The Reformation succeeded in England, Scandinavia, and many German principalities where breaking with the pope allowed the Crown to absorb powers and revenues previously independent of royal control. Gustav Vasa, for example, welcomed the Reformation to Sweden in 1524 by transferring the receipt of tithes from the church to the crown. Three years later he appropriated the entire property of the church.[46] To point this out is not necessarily to question Gustav Vasa's theological convictions. Theological ideas

[43] Donna Bohanan, *Crown and Nobility in Early Modern France* (Basingstoke/New York), p. 32.

[44] José Casanova, 'Eurocentric Secularism and the Challenge of Globalization', *Innsbrucker Diskussionspapiere zu Weltordnung, Religion und Gewalt*, no. 25 (2008): http://www.uibk.ac.at/plattform-wrg/idwrg/idwrg_25.pdf (accessed 7 February 2014), here pp. 9–10.

[45] Quoted in David Potter, *A History of France 1460–1560: The Emergence of a Nation State* (New York, 1995), p. 227.

[46] Skinner, *Foundations*, vol. 2, pp. 60–61.

of course played an important role in the Reformation. But the Reformation is misunderstood if it is seen as a 'religious' movement with 'political' effects. The success of the Reformation is as much an effect of state-building as it is of the ideas of Martin Luther on the proper interpretation of Paul. As historian Brad Gregory writes: 'Simply put, no Protestant regime was even possible save through dependence on secular rulers'.[47] As Gregory points out, the difference between the 'magisterial Reformation' and the relatively neglected 'radical Reformation' is simply the difference between those reformers who forged alliances with state-building elites and those who did not.[48]

The 'confessionalization thesis' much discussed over the last few decades indicates that religious divisions in early modern Europe were a result not merely of ecclesiastical disputes over doctrine but also of state-building elites' attempts to reinforce their own power through the building of strong confessional identities. As Luther Peterson summarizes it:

> The confessionalization thesis is a fruitful instrument in explaining the transformation of medieval feudal monarchies into modern states, in particular how the new states changed their inhabitants into disciplined, obedient and united subjects. According to the thesis, a key factor in that change is the establishment of religious uniformity in the state: the populace was taught a religious identity – Catholic, Lutheran, or Calvinist – through doctrinal statements (confessions and catechisms) and liturgical practices. This distinguished 'us' as a religious and political community from 'other', often neighboring, religious-political societies. The ruler was sacralized as the defender and – in Protestant lands – leader of the church, rightfully overseeing the church of his land. These state-led churches also aided state development by imposing moral discipline on the communities.[49]

Historians analysing confessionalization in the early modern period tend to see it not as something completely new that the ideas of the Reformers introduced into Europe, but rather as being in continuity with the process of state formation that had been in motion since well before Luther. As Casanova notes, 'this early modern dual pattern of confessionalization and territorialization was already well established before the religious wars and even before the Protestant Reformation'.[50] R. Po-Chia Hsia writes:

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[47] Brad S. Gregory, *The Unintended Reformation: How a Religious Revolution Secularized Society* (Cambridge, 2012), p. 152.

[48] Ibid., pp. 150–51.

[49] Luther D. Peterson, 'Johann Pfeffinger's Treatises of 1550 in Defense of Adiaphora: "High Church" Lutheranism and Confessionalization in Albertine Saxony', in John M. Headley, Hans J. Hillerbrand, and Anthony J. Papalas (eds), *Confessionalization in Europe, 1555–1700: Essays in Honor of Bodo Nischan* (Aldershot, 2004), pp. 104–5.

[50] Casanova, 'Eurocentric Secularism', p. 9.

> The process of political centralization, discernible in the fifteenth century – the adoption of Roman Law, the rise of an academic jurist class, the growth of bureaucracies, and the reduction of local, particularist privileges – received a tremendous boost after 1550. Conformity required coercion. Church and state formed an inextricable matrix of power for enforcing discipline and confessionalism. The history of confessionalization in early modern Germany is, in many ways, the history of the territorial state.[51]

According to Hsia, state officials more than clergy took responsibility for advancing confessionalization, but the upper clergy was nevertheless largely scripted into the state-building project. Where confessionalization was often actively resisted was at the local level: 'To enforce confessional conformity, local and particular privileges had to be swept aside: estates, towns, cloisters, and nobility resisted confessionalization behind the bulwark of corporate privileges'.[52]

In summary, I think the evidence suggests that there is no way to isolate 'religion' as the cause of the wars in question, and that the rise of the state was not the solution to the wars but was a significant cause of them. My further hypothesis is that 'religion' is in fact a by-product of the same state-building process that helped produce the wars. The unprecedented spatial division of 'religion' from 'secular' endeavours like politics facilitated the transfer of power from clerical to lay control. Henceforth, as in Locke's scheme, the clergy would be responsible for 'religion', an essentially otherworldly endeavour which could nevertheless be useful for the promotion of good order within a state. The civil authorities would be responsible for all worldly, 'secular', pursuits. This can be seen as another act in the centuries-long struggle between ecclesiastical and civil authority in Europe, and perhaps the final victory of the latter. This is not to say that the state has triumphed over the church; that too is a distinction being born in these wars. This was an intra-church affair, the struggle between clerical and lay authority, not something that was done to the church from outside. The wars, unquestionably, marked yet another failure of late medieval and early modern Christians to live up to the Gospel.

Conclusion – the Secularization of the Holy

The so-called Wars of Religion are commonly cited as one of the primary motivators toward secularization in the West. As should be obvious, however, secularization as the separation of civil from ecclesiastical power was not the

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[51] R. Po-Chia Hsia, *Social Discipline in the Reformation: Central Europe 1550–1750* (London/New York, 1989), p. 6.

[52] Ibid., p. 177.

immediate result of the wars, nor is such a process complete even today in most European states. France is the exception, not the norm. What came in the wake of the Peace of Westphalia was not secularization in the sense of the marginalization of Christianity from public concerns, but rather the subordination of ecclesiastical to civil power that was indeed something new. One could argue that, in the long run, this subordination of ecclesiastical power led to the marginalization of the church from importance in the everyday lives of people and the eventual atrophying of Christian habits like going to church on Sunday. What confessionalization and *laïcité* have in common is the aggrandizement of civil power. What explains the transition from the former to the latter is that eventually states discovered that they could have obedient citizens by tolerating 'religious choice' rather than imposing confessional uniformity.

The crucial point is that the so-called 'Wars of Religion' did not result in a 'Great Separation' between political and theological concerns, as Mark Lilla would have it.[53] It is rather that the theological was absorbed into the modern state when the ecclesiastical power was absorbed into the civil power. Eventually the state discovered it could do without the direct support of the church. What it could not do without was precisely the theological, which mutated from some form of Christian devotion to devotion to the state itself, Hobbes's 'mortal god' or Carl Schmitt's stand-in for the miracle working of the medieval God. Gregory sums up the process in the wake of the early modern wars of state formation:

> Always and only on the terms of sovereign secular rulers, churches in general would exert only as much public power and authority as they were permitted. In the confessionalizing sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, that was usually quite a lot. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, as nationalist and imperialist states not only controlled churches but also diverted to themselves the primary, deepest devotional allegiance and mandatory obedience of their citizens in what John Bossy called a 'migration of the holy' from church to state, it was usually much less. And in the early twenty-first century, when sovereign states rule together with the market, it is almost none.[54]

Something quite different from 'disenchantment' was going on here. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the emergent state was not drained of the sacred; to the contrary, the absolutist state was often sacralized. Already in the late fifteenth century, Charles VIII was welcomed to Rouen with the titles 'Lamb of God, saviour, head of the mystical body of France, guardian of the book with seven seals, fountain of life-giving grace to a dry people, and deified bringer of

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[53] Mark Lilla, *The Stillborn God: Religion, Politics, and the Modern West* (New York, 2007).

[54] Gregory, *Unintended Reformation*, p. 153.

peace'.[55] In France, the process reached its apogee after Westphalia in the reign of the Sun King, Louis XIV. In England, a royal cult grew up around Elizabeth I, in which the queen appropriated elements from Corpus Christi feasts, with her person substituting for the host.[56] Perhaps most crucially, the lethal loyalties of the people were beginning to coalesce around the territorial state and eventually the idea of the nation. The idea of killing and dying *pro patria* was already taking shape in late fifteenth-century France.[57]

Confessionalization helped align Christian identities with citizenship in the emergent sovereign state, rendering the support of the God of Jesus Christ to the state. A further movement, however, would more directly identify the sacred with the nation, without the mediation of the church. There is a whole raft of scholarship on nationalism as a religion and on civil religion that seems germane here. Even in the long run, in other words, I am not convinced that the modern world was disenchanted by the effects of the wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. There was indeed a secularization in the sense of a separation of civil and ecclesiastical authorities. But the other secularization, the creation of a disenchanted world, might better be understood as a secularization in the original sense of the word, as a transfer of power or property from ecclesiastical to civil control. What we have seen is not the fading of the holy, but the transfer of the holy from the church to the state, a secularization of the holy. The religious/secular binary does not relate to the wars of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Europe as cause/cure. The wars are perhaps better understood as what happened when the holy was transferred from one locus to another.

[55] John Bossy, *Christianity in the West 1400–1700* (Oxford, 1985), pp. 154–5.

[56] Richard McCoy, *Alterations of State: Sacred Kingship in the English Reformation* (New York, 2002), pp. 58–66.

[57] Potter, *History*, pp. 18–19.

Chapter 8

The Modern State or the Myth of 'Political Violence'

Paul Dumouchel

Max Weber defines the state as the holder of the monopoly of the legitimate use of force over a given territory and he adds that this monopoly is only possible because those who are subject to the authority of the state, to some extent accept it or consent to it. I think that this definition effectively captures the essential of what constitutes the modern state – a state which I believe is in a process of radical transformation – but I propose one modification to the wording of this definition: the modern state is the holder of the monopoly of legitimate violence. I prefer 'legitimate violence' to 'the legitimate use of force' because it indicates more clearly that between legitimate and illegitimate violence, the only difference is that it is legitimate, in both cases what we are dealing with is violence. Max Weber's wording suggests that there is between the 'legitimate coercive force' of the state and illegitimate violence a difference in nature, as if 'coercive force' was something radically different from violence. This is not to say of course that legitimacy is simply a sham, an illusion or a lie, its effects as we will see are very real. Further, the word 'use', used by Weber, suggests rationality in the state's recourse to force, 'the monopoly of legitimate violence' implies no such connotation (nor does it exclude it). Finally, the modified formulation also aims to draw our attention to the fact that violence and legitimacy are intimately linked. Legitimacy, political legitimacy, I argue, is inseparable from the ability to make the distinction between good and bad violence and that ability is ultimately rooted in violence itself.

A second important aspect of the modern state concerns its function. According to just about every modern political theory the fundamental, in the sense of the primary, function of the state is to protect its citizens against violence, to protect them both from the violence which they may exercise against each other, and from the violence of external enemies. These two aspects of the modern state are closely related for it is through its monopoly of legitimate violence that the state protects its citizens from violence. Further, this function of the state does not only exist in the minds of political theorists and philosophers, a modern state that works, as opposed to a failed state, is one that can effectively impose its monopoly of legitimate violence over its whole territory and thereby protect

its citizens from other forms of violence. Historically the modern state appears in Europe when a territorially based central authority managed to put an end to private wars and to impose its sole authority over the entire domain over which it exercises its jurisdiction. That implied of course taking away from the Church, or Churches, some of the authority it had in determining between good and bad violence. In reality, no state ever perfectly succeeds in monopolizing legitimate violence, any more that it perfectly succeeds in protecting its citizens from other forms violence. However, we can say that securing the monopoly of legitimate violence constitutes the 'ideal type' of the modern state, the goal towards which they strive, and that protecting its citizens from violence is not only its central rationale and claim to legitimacy, but also constitutes its primary function.

Given that, what is it then to hold the monopoly of legitimate violence? What exactly does this mean? It is not simply to have at one's command the ultimate means of force or to be able to exercise supreme violence, though it certainly does require one to command superior means of force. Holding the monopoly of legitimate violence also requires one to have the authority to determine the difference between good and bad violence. Any institution which does not have that ability does not hold the monopoly of legitimate violence, no matter how powerful it is. In a society like ours, religion, ethics, customs, reasons, and the laws all guide us in discriminating good actions from bad actions, however, only the state has the *moral authority* to distinguish good violence from bad violence, to separate violence that is permissible from violence that is forbidden, to determine what is legitimate violence as opposed to illegitimate violence. Only the state *de facto* has this authority, though many other instances may claim to have it in terms of beliefs and opinions, in normal (and in many not so normal) circumstances only the state can enforce this distinction in action, and usually effortlessly bring agents to perform it.

The rise of the modern state is the rise of an institution that managed to monopolize, over a given territory, the moral authority that distinguishes between good and bad violence. That authority was previously distributed among many different instances: the family, religion, local powers and customs, clannish and feudal solidarities, etc. The modern state did not take this monopoly away from any one particular instance, for example religion, but managed to unify under its rule an authority which was formerly divided, and sprang from different sources.

How did the state manage to forge this monopoly? In political theory, according to social contracts theories it is the unanimous transfer to the state of their right to defend themselves by the members of society, that is to say, the transfer of their right to exercise violence and vengeance that grounds the state's legitimacy, in other words, the transfer of each one's violence to the state constitutes the foundation of both its monopoly of violence and its legitimacy in the exercise of that violence. Furthermore, according to these theories, this unanimous transfer transforms violence, it makes it *legitimate*. It metamorphoses

violence into something that is hardly violence anymore, 'coercive force'. Good violence is not quite violence, for it leads to the peace and harmony of the community, rather than to chaos and destruction.

In the real world, rather than in the logical fictions of political theorists, how did the state succeed in monopolizing these disseminated authorities? How did it effectively wrest away from other moral authorities the crucial ability to set apart good violence from bad violence? In answering that question I propose we consider that in insisting on the central idea of a 'transfer' from the citizens to the state, social contract theories are approximately correct. The state monopoly of violence is established when it manages to give its own violence as a surrogate for the violence of all. It is founded on and maintained through the transfer to the state of the violence of all. The state's monopoly of violence rests on the fact that individuals recognize the violence of the state as their own. This transfer generally remains veiled. It is not readily visible because the violence of the state is not usually perceived as violence, but as necessary 'coercive force' whose goal is peace. However, when political violence becomes an issue, for example in situations of civil wars or terrorism, the mechanism of transfer underlying the state's legitimacy becomes more apparent.

Criminal violence, for example, is by definition illegitimate while the state's is legitimate. In both cases, the crucial difference lies it seems in the authority responsible for the violence. Agents that are authorized by the state to resort to force on its behalf simply enact the state's monopoly of legitimate violence, while individuals who are not so authorized engage in illegitimate violence when they resort to force to obtain their ends. However, political violence is special in that like criminal violence it is perpetrated by agents who do not have the proper authority to resort to the use of force, yet unlike criminal violence political violence is not immediately considered as illegitimate by everyone. What grounds this surprising (partial) legitimacy of political violence? Is it the political beliefs of certain agents? That is unlikely, for politically motivated violence is often judged criminal by many who share the beliefs of its perpetrators, and illegal acts of force are many times viewed as in some way legitimate by many who do not share their authors' political beliefs or commitments. The legitimacy of such violent acts comes from the fact that some people recognize the violence that occurred as in some way good, understandable, as at least partially justified. It is that agreement, and that agreement only, that transforms a riot or a murder into a political event and that gives it its legitimacy. Even if many agents are persuaded that they would not have committed such violence themselves, they refuse to simply condemn its authors and in this way they make it their own. The legitimacy of political violence has no other ground.

Political violence can therefore be defined as any violence that becomes legitimate through the simple fact that it occurred. Whenever that happens, that violence always constitutes a challenge to the state's monopoly of legitimate

violence and it is only once the state has begun losing its monopoly that its own violence also tends to be perceived as political violence. The state's monopoly of legitimate violence results from that most everyone, nearly all the time recognizes as his or as her own the violence of the state.

The above hypothesis concerning the origin of the state's monopoly of legitimate violence suggests a strong resemblance between the foundation of the modern state and the event of collective violence which, according to René Girard, is at the origin of the sacred. In both cases, the unanimous transfer of violence creates an authority that determines the difference between good and bad violence and gives rise to an institution that safeguards the peace and tranquillity of the community. In social contract theories, as is the case in many myths, the violent character of this transfer generally remains hidden.[1] It is in the context of this understanding of the state and of its relationship to violence that I wish next to consider the idea of 'Wars of Religion' in relation to the rise of the modern state and what William Cavanaugh has called the 'myth of religious violence'.

The 'Wars of Religion'

William Cavanaugh objects to calling 'Wars of Religion' the inter-states and intra-states conflicts that shook Europe during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and that led to the establishment of the modern state. He invokes three different types of reasons to justify his rejection of the received expression. First, there are what may be called political reasons. The expression 'Wars of Religion' entertains, he argues, the parallel myths of religious violence and of the peaceful state. It comforts the impression that the reasons for these long gone conflicts were of a religious nature and that the modern state stepped in to end the violence, something which it would have done by privatizing religious practice. The truth however, as Cavanaugh rightly argues, is that states were major actors in those conflicts, and that their actions repeatedly propelled and intensified the violence. They wilfully encouraged the conflagration to the extent that it served their interests and took sides across the borders of denominations, in contradiction to the claim that the causes of these wars were essentially religions. These parallel myths, he further argues, encourage the liberal fiction of the peaceful state and of religions as naturally violent and dangerous unless maintained within strict limits by the state's power and authority. Further, this

[1] Generally, but not always, for example Hobbes distinguishes between commonwealths by institutions, which rests on a contract, and commonwealths by acquisition, which are acquired by force.

understanding of the political history of the Western world has recently served to justify the violent and discriminatory policies of Western democracies.

The second and closely related set of reasons is historical. Historically, it is simply false, claims Cavanaugh, that these conflicts were first and foremost religious quarrels. Of course doctrinal differences and the opposed interests of distinct Churches did play an important role. However, when we look more closely it becomes clear that there were many other powerful motives at work and, as mentioned above, that the lines of opposition did not always follow denominational divisions. Protestants and Catholics often found themselves on the same side in many warring episodes; it therefore seems hard to claim that the reasons for these conflicts were essentially religious. Calling them religious wars hides the complexity of the phenomena and tends to minimize the active participation of states in perpetrating the violence.

Finally there is a methodological objection. There are more and more reasons to think that religion as we now understand the term, as a privatized system of beliefs, is a recent invention, a social construct which arose to a large extent through the action of the state. Talal Asad and Daniel Dubuisson, for example, both argued that religion understood in that sense is inseparable from the modern state and is the result of its actions on previously existing religious practices and disciplines.[2] Therefore, says Cavanaugh, calling the wars of religion the 'Wars of Religion' is contradictory and anachronistic, for when these wars took place, 'religion' as we know it did not yet exist. It gives the false impression that when talking about religion we are dealing with some kind of eternal essence, that religious practices have always been what they are now and this helps to dissimulate the role of the state in the formation of 'religion' in the modern sense, a form of religiosity which is a result of the separation of the Church and state. This last point is fundamental and 'religion' in the modern sense is, as will be suggested later, what happens to the sacred once it has been deprived by the modern state of its ability to make the distinction between good and bad violence.

In short, argues Cavanaugh, the expression the 'Wars of Religion' is politically dangerous, historically misleading, and methodologically inappropriate; there is no reason to retain it. I agree with what may be called the thrust or 'substance' of each of these three arguments, that is to say, the criticism of which they rest; however I am not quite convinced by the conclusions he draws from them. Consider first the political objection, even if it is true that the expression the 'Wars of Religion' can be used to bolster the parallel 'myths' of the peaceful state and of the violent character of religion and even if it is true that these false opinions have recently (and not so recently) been used to justify the violent

[2] Talal Asad, *Formations of the Secular Christianity, Islam, Modernity* (Stanford, 2003); Daniel Dubuisson, *The Western Construction of Religion: Myths, Knowledge, and Ideology* (Baltimore, 2003).

policies of modern nation states, it does not follow that the conflicts which tore Europe apart in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were not wars of religion. These are two entirely independent issues. All that follows from the political abuse of the expression the 'Wars of Religion' is that we should be careful not to be misunderstood when we use it, especially in a political context.

Second, depending on how one tells the story, the methodological objection, it seems to me, could very well lead to a perfectly opposite conclusion. For if one reads Cavanaugh's argument carefully, what he is claiming in fact is that religion as we understand it was born out of the 'Wars of Religion' and of the settlement which modern states imposed on previously existing religious practices and disciplines. In fact the century and a half of conflict that came before the victory of modern states played a major role in the process of transformation of these practices and in their reduction into sets of beliefs. The cultural transformations that led to the institution of religion as we know it when it is understood in this way – and this I gather is the way Cavanaugh thinks it should be understood – seems to me to constitute one reason more, rather than one reason less, for calling these conflicts the 'Wars of Religion'. It is frequent for major historical events and especially wars to be named in reference to their consequence or outcome rather than to their cause, for example wars of independence or of liberation. Given the important role played by doctrinal differences and opposed denominations in these conflicts, the fact that they partially shaped religion as we know it only adds more meaning to the expression the 'Wars of Religion'.

This leaves us with the second set of objections, the historical reasons. First we should note that the complexity of the actors' motives of itself does not prove anything. In fact, close study of civil wars as well as of political violence in general shows that this complexity of motives is always the case.[3] For example, more than half of the political denunciations made to the Gestapo were classified by the Gestapo itself as 'malicious denunciations'. According to the Nazi police, which can hardly be suspected of bias towards the innocence of suspects, these denunciations did not have any political foundation and reflected private quarrels only.[4] Even though individual agents exploited political violence to their private advantage it does not follow that political motives were absent or did not play any important role. *Mutatis mutandis* the same applies here and no mere quantitative estimate of the different causes or motives can resolve the question. Everything depends on how one reads the evidence.

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[3] See for example, Paul Dumouchel, *The Barren Sacrifice* (Michigan State University Press, 2015); Robert Gellately, *Backing Hitler Consent and Coercion in Nazi Germany* (*New York,* 2002); Stathis Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War* (*New York*, 2006); Abdherammane Moussaoui, *De la Violence en Algérie les lois du chaos* (Arles, 2006).

[4] See Gellately, *Backing Hitler*, pp. 136–41.

Calling 'Wars of Religion' the more or less 130 years of ever renewed conflicts across Europe that ended with the victory of the modern state – that is to say, that paved the way for the fact that by the early eighteenth century in Europe there was no credible political alternative to the centralized modern state – is necessarily an attempt to impose a grand narrative upon a collection of somewhat disparate events, a narrative which more detailed scrutiny of any particular episode will always belie to some extent.

So the real questions are whether such grand narratives are necessary or useful and, if they are, if the expression the 'Wars of Religion' points in the right direction. Such expressions are 'names', signposts, whose goal is to capture an important aspect of a historical transformation. Beyond the issue of the name, the more fundamental question is: what is the relationship between violence and historically different forms of religious practices?

Violence and Religion

One who accepts, as I do, the 'substance' of Cavanaugh's methodological argument is rapidly led to a quandary. If the term 'religion' is to be reserved to designate the institutionalization of religious activities in modern states, an institutionalization that is inseparable from the invention of secularization and of the secular state, how are we going to refer to what came before? Cavanaugh sometimes speaks of religious disciplines and practices or of religious virtues, saying for example, that faith which was a virtue came to be thought of as a belief. This is certainly a momentous transformation, but in the context of the present discussion on the role of these disciplines, practices, and virtues in the wars that led to the establishment of the modern state, the question is: what are we going to focus on? How are we going to isolate the relevant elements? The difficulty comes from the fact that these practices were everywhere and that to some extent they were part of everything. Merchants' guilds had patron saints, as did hospitals and city boroughs; in fact no organization whatsoever was without a religious dimension. There were also specialized institutions like monasteries, abbeys, and parish churches, and specialized practitioners, the clergy, priests, and members of religious orders, but it is claimed there was nothing like religion in the present sense of the term, an institution that is separate and independent from other aspects of life. Perhaps.

There was however prior to the rise of the modern state and to the period when the narrative of the 'Wars of Religion' begins, the Church with its hierarchy, its wealth and power, its canon law, and its moral authority which was the only one that extended across Christendom, that is to say far beyond the border of any individual state. This institution was often in conflict with the various states and other forms of political powers, like cities,

guilds, leagues, local lords and their vassals, all powers that were not yet to be qualified as 'secular', but which nonetheless were different and distinct from the ecclesiastic power for at least two fundamental reasons. First, unlike the Church they were local powers. Their influence, even that of the more powerful ones, was much more limited in time and space. Second, they were 'personal' powers that rested on direct allegiances between persons and not on a universal commitment that extended equally to everyone.

From the time when it stopped being persecuted by the Roman Empire, the Church rapidly became actively engaged in the 'management of violence' in a close relationship with the political power. However, with the collapse of the empire things changed radically as the Church became the only 'universal' moral authority. The Church provided the basis of a unity and community that extended beyond the limits of existing political powers. It is on this community, that existed in a somewhat different way than political entities did, that its new role in the management of violence rested, as it constituted the only moral authority that was to some extent recognized by all parties in any conflict between members of this community. With the institutions of the Crusades, of 'Holy War', and of the 'Peace of God' the Church progressively came to offer its own violence as good violence, as a coercive force that aimed towards peace. It attracted political actors in the service of its repressive enterprises, offering them both material and spiritual benefits in return. The Church's coercive ventures also challenged the value of the person to person allegiances that were fundamental to feudal society. For example, the third council of Lateran (1179) made the obligation of vassals to their lord conditional on the lord's compliance with the Church's order to punish and expulse heretics. The Church came to include as targets of its legitimate violence, not only heretics themselves, but also those who refused to actively persecute them. The point is not so much that in doing this the Church claimed a prerogative which until then had been reserved to kings and sovereigns, the right to dispossess a vassal. Rather it is that it considered that failure to participate in the sacred violence it promoted liberated vassals from their obligation to their lord.

The point is not to make a value judgment on the role of the Church or its involvement in violence during the Middle Ages, but to remind us that from the very beginning it was active in the social management of violence, a management which was itself violent and which led to disputes with political powers concerning the definition of legitimate violence. Therefore, the active participation of states in the 'Wars of Religion' should in no way surprise us, the entanglement of religious and political violence had been the rule since the beginning of the Middle Ages. These conflicts between the Church and the state or between the papacy and the empire, contributed to weakening person to person allegiances that were at the heart of the feudal system and whose decline was a necessary condition for the creation of the state's monopoly of legitimate

violence. The appearance of the modern state which replaces reciprocal duties between identifiable agents with abstract universal obligations requires that personal ties lose their ability to determine legitimacy in the use of violence. The modern state appeared when political powers also succeeded in wresting away from the Churches the ability to define what constitutes legitimate violence as opposed to illegitimate violence. It did this by imposing a separation of the Church and the state through creating a secular power that defined its own authority as political, and by making the Church dependent on this new power.

How did this happen? The short answer is that this happened when Church disputes came to constitute occasions of larger conflicts and of greater violence rather than function as necessary moments in a process leading to the restoration of a more lasting peace, in other words, when the Church failed in its role of managing violence. Why did this happen? Answering that question would require one to be able to provide the long answer to the previous question, something which cannot be done in the context of this short reflection, but also something that I certainly am unable to do. Instead, in the last section of my chapter, I wish to present rapidly the answer of one of the great advocates of the modern state: Thomas Hobbes. In his history of the English Civil War *Behemoth or The Long Parliament* (1679) Hobbes provided his long answer to the question 'How did this happen?'; in *Leviathan* (1651) he had already sketched an answer to the question 'Why?' It is a philosophical or theological answer that is based on his anthropological conception of religion and of the place of revelation in human history. That is the answer I wish to briefly summarize.

Hobbes on Religion and the State

When I was an undergraduate student – which I grant is a long time ago – students' editions of Hobbes's *Leviathan* only contained the first two parts of the book, 'Of Man' and 'Of Common-wealth'. The last two parts dedicated to religion where omitted. The common opinion was, first that Hobbes, clearly, was an atheist who had only written about religion in order to escape condemnation and punishment, therefore there was no reason to take what he had written in any way seriously, and/or, the claim went on, we were now living in a world where the political importance of religion has all but disappeared, therefore there is little reason or profit for a student in reading this 'old stuff'. Today, opinions concerning Hobbes's religious faith, as well as concerning the relevance of religion to politics, have changed dramatically. However, independently of what his beliefs on the topic may have been, there are good reasons to seriously consider what Hobbes wrote about religion and its relation to the state.

First, it is certainly significant that as time went by religion came to occupy a more and more important place in Hobbes's political thought. Thus while in his

first work, *Human Nature and De Corpore Politico* (1640), Hobbes dedicated about ten per cent of the text to the issue of religion, in the *De Cive* (1642) religion already occupies one third of the work, and in *Leviathan* (1651) one half of the book, the third and fourth parts are entirely dedicated to religion and in part I the topic is further the subject matter of chapter 12 'Of Religion' and in part II of chapter 31 'Of the Kingdome of God by Nature'. Second, Hobbes had some very 'original' opinions concerning religious matters, some of which were publicly condemned as heretic beliefs. For example 'mortalism', which he professes in *Leviathan*, chapter 38, had been declared three years earlier by Parliament a capital offence punishable by death.[5] Given this, it seems unlikely that Hobbes was insincere in what he wrote about religion. As Peter Geach says: 'There could be no reasonable motive in such a society (17th century England) for a man to insinuate the atheism he really held by profession of an unpopular heresy'.[6]

In *Leviathan* chapter 12 Hobbes argues that religion is inseparable from politics and that the religion of the gentiles was part of their politics while the politics of the Hebrews was part of their religion, so that, he concludes, everywhere and at all times religion and politics served the same purpose which is to make men 'the more apt to Obedience, Lawes, Peace, Charity and Civil Society' (173).[7] This statement, which is the fundamental tenet of Hobbes's natural understanding of religion, is also somewhat misleading, because what Hobbes really meant was 'everywhere else and at all other times', because here and now (seventeenth-century England and Europe) things are different. Today – that is when Hobbes is writing – religion has become an occasion of conflict and disorder. There is in Hobbes a very simple explanation for this fact: the conflict comes from the ambition of the clergy and other 'Godly men' who exploit the ignorance of the people and flatter their passions. We can however find in Hobbes a different and more profound explanation, which sends back to what may be called 'Christianity's exceptionalism', in regard to Hobbes's anthropological understanding of religion as naturally conducive to civil peace and harmony. This exceptional character of revealed religion, which to some extent is already present in Judaism according to Hobbes, ultimately finds its origin in God's attitude towards man. While religion is a human invention it is moulded to encourage civil harmony and uphold the power of the sovereign,

[5] On Hobbes's mortalism, see Paul Dumouchel, 'Mortelle et matérielle: l'âme chez Hobbes', *Carrefour Revue de réflexion interdisciplinaire* 23/1 (2003): 5–15; on the condemnation of mortalism by parliament see Christopher Hill, *The World Turned Upside Down: Radical Ideas During the English Revolution* (Hammondsford, 1972), p. 179.

[6] Peter Geach, 'The Religion of Hobbes', *Religious Studies* 17/4 (1981): 549–58, here p. 552.

[7] All quotations from Hobbes *Leviathan* are from the C. B. Macpherson edition (Hammondsford, 1968) page numbers are given in the text between parentheses.

revealed religion essentially implies an immediate submission to God's will. In the Ancient Testament, argues Hobbes, where God had elected Israel as its particular kingdom, this immediate submission meant that there was no civil power independent or even different from the religious authority of the Judges, which is why originally Israel had no king.

Yet men are naturally rebellious. For Hobbes, the election of Saul as King of Israel marks the beginning of a separation of powers between religion and politics which should never have taken place, and which he compares to the Fall of Adam and Eve.[8] Yet, says Hobbes, God consented to it. This point is fundamental. Why did God consent to the rebellion of Israel? Because, according to Hobbes, God never accepts any forced action, but only the free consent of the soul. Unlike earthly sovereigns, God does not coerce his subjects into obedience. Because he is all powerful and eternal, God is in no danger from their rebellion, and because he is eternal, he can afford to wait. However, once that as a result of God's leniency the separation between civil and ecclesiastical power is introduced into the world it becomes an occasion of conflict. This division of moral authority gives men a pretext to rebel against the civil power whenever it suits their desire and an excuse to not follow the precepts of religion whenever that is more consonant with their passions. Nonetheless, this division is part of God's plan for humanity. Hobbes's fundamental ambivalence towards Christian religion follows from this. In his eyes Christianity is both the best and only true religion – for it corresponds to God's promise to mankind of a world of perfect peace and of eternal life under His government – and the worst religion, politically the most disastrous religion which ever existed, one that permanently threatens the stability of the community.

Christianity, according to Hobbes, radically transformed the political problem of religion by introducing between political power and spiritual authority a separation which does not exist elsewhere. How is this difficulty to be resolved in a Christian commonwealth? By pushing the separation to its ultimate consequence, for in Hobbes's mind the difficulty in many ways comes from the fact that the separation between the Church and the state is not sufficiently complete. The conflicts of his times, he thought, resulted from the fact that different religious groups tried to exploit the power of the state to their own advantage and to the oppression of other religious groups, and from the fact that the state tried to exploit religious dissidence to its own advantage. Therefore the best solution, according to Hobbes, if it could be done without contention, is the 'independency' of the first Christians. That is, for everyone to follow his own religious opinion, for the state has no interest in meddling in

[8] On the similarity between the Fall and Saul's election as king according to Hobbes see Paul Dumouchel, 'The Political Problem of Religion: Hobbes's Reading of the Bible', in M. A. Stewart (ed.), *English Philosophy in the Age of Locke* (New York, 2000), pp. 1–27.

religious difference and Christianity being essentially non-coercive has nothing to do with the power of the state.

Translated into a different language, Hobbes is saying is that there is a theological basis for the separation of the Church and the state. He is not saying that religions are violent while states are non-violent; he is saying exactly the opposite. Religions, inasmuch as they are human inventions, like the state aim towards the peace and harmony of the community, but like the state they resort to violence and coercion in order to reach that goal. Revealed religion, because it has nothing to do with violence and coercion, should be completely separated from the state which cannot exist without violence. What Hobbes is also saying, is that if this separation is not sufficiently established, parties in religious disagreements will inevitably be tempted to exploit the state's violence to their own advantage.

The myth of political violence is the belief that politically motivated violence is in some sense or in some way justified, legitimate, and therefore different from ordinary criminal violence, while it is violence only, like any other violence, and its legitimacy nothing but our willingness to accept it. Similarly, I think that the myth of religious violence is not that religions are particularly violent. That is a false yet common opinion, but it is not a myth. The myth of religious violence is the belief that religiously motivated violence is in some way justified, legitimate, sacred, and therefore different from ordinary criminal violence, while it is violence only and its legitimacy, its sacredness, nothing but our willingness to accept it.

Chapter 9

The Modern Military–Humanitarian Hybrid State: A Response to Paul Dumouchel

Bruce K. Ward

The Modern State and Violence

Paul Dumouchel begins his chapter by clarifying just what the state is, and the *modern* state in particular. His adoption, with some modification, of Max Weber's definition of the state as the 'holder of the monopoly of legitimate *violence*' has the merit of highlighting the intrinsic association of the state with human violence, more precisely with the management of human violence.

The state is not a modern invention. In his recent book, *Religion in Human Evolution*, Robert Bellah traces its historical origins to the archaic societies of ancient Mesopotamia, and Shang and Western Zhou, China, where, he argues, there is evidence of the state as a distinct 'secondary formation' which preserves and promotes its own existence as an end in itself. The evidence, moreover, points to the attempt of these archaic states to centralize violence; human sacrifice, for instance, becomes the sole prerogative of the priest-king.[1] What, then, is it about the modern state's 'monopoly of legitimate violence' that makes it distinctively *modern*? Dumouchel's answer is twofold: 1) the centralization or 'monopolization' of the violence by the state is more complete than in pre-modern cultures, where relatively independent 'pockets' of legitimate violence, for instance, within kinship groups, are still retained; and 2) more importantly, the legitimacy of the state's violence is derived from the consent of those subject to it: 'The state's monopoly of violence rests on the fact that individuals recognize as their own the violence of the state'. Here, he refers to the legitimating function of the social contract theories, which are so central to early modern political thought.

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[1] See Robert Bellah, *Religion in Human Evolution: From the Paleolithic to the Axial Age* (Cambridge, MA, 2011); for instance, his discussion of sacrifice and the institution of ancient Hawaiian chieftainship, pp. 202–9.

Although his focus is on the modern state, Dumouchel does not overlook its archaic roots, pointing out, with reference to René Girard's work, the parallel between ancient myth and modern social contract theory as justifications of an institution that safeguards the peace of the community by expelling 'bad' violence with 'good' violence. The connection made here between mimetic theory and modern political philosophy is highly suggestive, and developed further, it could lend solid substance to Girard's claim that human political and legal institutions, including modern ones, have their ultimate origin in archaic sacrifice.[2]

Dumouchel's reliance on Weber's definition of the state, reinforced by his reference to mimetic theory, goes a long way in itself to dispelling what he calls the 'liberal fiction of the peaceful state'. Yet the primal association of violence with the state is not the whole story here. The modern state arrogates to itself not only the monopoly of violence, but also the *moral authority* to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate violence. As I have noted, Paul Dumouchel locates this moral authority in the supposed consent of those subject to the state. While I find this explanation valid as far as it goes, I am not sure it goes *far enough* in capturing the distinctive nature of the claim to moral authority that makes the contemporary state *modern.* To illustrate both the extent and the peculiar paradox of this claim to moral authority, in a 2009 army manual for American troops in Iraq and Afghanistan, humanitarian aid is described as a 'non-lethal weapon'. In keeping with this notion, about one-quarter of all US humanitarian aid money now comes under the Pentagon's budget.[3] In this new hybrid military–humanitarian reality signified by the US global superpower, we have violence – but we have also 'compassion' and concern for human rights, amounting indeed to a 'sacralization' of human rights. In order fully to understand the modern state, I would suggest that we must speak not only with Max Weber of the 'monopoly of violence', but also with Ivan Illich of the 'institutionalization of compassion'.[4] This is to say that between the archaic state and the modern state the historical presence of Christianity, and the new horizon of agapic love that it opened, is decisive. I will return to this issue.

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[2] See, for instance, René Girard, *I See Satan Fall Like Lightning* (Maryknoll, 2001), chapter 7, "The Founding Murder."

[3] For an account of humanitarian aid as 'a form of "soft" imperialism', see Samantha Nutt, *Damned Nations: Greed, Guns, Armies & Aid* (Toronto, 2011), pp. 91–5.

[4] See Ivan Illich, *The Rivers North of the Future* (Toronto, 2005), pp. 47–58.

'Wars of Religion': The Fiction of Violent Religion and Peaceful State

In the second part of his chapter, Dumouchel turns his attention to William Cavanaugh's historical critique of the liberal myth of the 'Wars of Religion' as a rhetorical invention of the early modern state in its efforts to eliminate the last remnants of medieval ecclesiastical order and assert undisputed sovereignty over its subjects.[5] Dumouchel indicates his agreement with the substance of Cavanaugh's arguments, differing only on the conclusions drawn from them, a difference centring primarily on whether the expression 'Wars of Religion' continues to serve any meaningful or useful historiographic purpose. He argues, convincingly in my view, that there remain legitimate reasons for calling the conflicts that tore Europe apart in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries 'Wars of Religion', so long as we are well aware of the 'political abuse' to which this terminology has been subject in contemporary secular–religious culture wars. My own comments on this question will focus more on political philosophy than on history. One might expect, as Cavanaugh seems to claim, that the great early modern advocates of the liberal state – Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau – would fully endorse the expression 'Wars of Religion' – indeed that they invented it to serve their polemical interests.[6] But a close reading of their works reveals something more complex. They certainly do express deep concern about religious violence, especially where it takes the form of persecution of Christians by other Christians.[7] However, their focus on religious violence is accompanied by an analysis that makes it perfectly clear that religion is not *itself* the source of the violence. The primary source is human passion: for Hobbes and Locke, the desire for power (*dominande libidine*); for Rousseau, prideful self-love (*amour-propre*). For them, the problem of religious violence is not a problem of religion in itself, but a problem of human passion intensified and justified by the 'pretence' of religious faith.[8] It is the problem of the *dogmatic personality*, expressed so aptly by Dante in his *Paradiso*: 'Opinions too soon formed/ Deflect men's minds from truth into error/ To which their pride then binds their intellect'. As Rousseau writes to the Archbishop of Paris: 'it is *amour-propre* and pride that is the cause of persecution. The less reasonable a form of worship is, the more its establishment

[5] For details of Cavanaugh's argument, including the relevant historical evidence, see, for instance, William Cavanaugh, *Theopolitical Imagination* (London, 2002), pp. 9–52.

[6] See, for instance, Cavanaugh, *Theopolitical Imagination*, pp. 31–42; especially his discussion of Locke on p. 39: 'Locke's concern ... is the division produced by the "Wars of Religion" which have plagued England and the continent'.

[7] For instance, John Locke, *A Letter Concerning Toleration* (Amherst, 1990), p. 14.

[8] See, for instance, Locke, *A Letter Concerning Toleration*, p. 50. For a more complete discussion of the early liberal philosophers on the question of religious violence, see Bruce K. Ward, *Redeeming the Enlightenment: Christianity and the Liberal Virtues* (Grand Rapids, 2010), pp. 121–30.

is sought by force. A person who professes a senseless doctrine cannot tolerate its being seen for what it is. Reason then becomes the greatest crime. Whatever the cost, others must be deprived of it, because one is ashamed to be lacking it in their eyes'.[9] This more nuanced psychological analysis of the early liberal philosophers has been largely lost among contemporary secular liberals, who seem to assume that when religion disappears, so will the dogmatic personality.

If the great liberal political philosophers are not being heard on this matter, it is even less likely that careful historical analysis will overcome the contemporary secular fable about the peaceful state and the inherently violent nature of religion. Cavanaugh is right that the 'Wars of Religion' is a misleading and self-serving historical designation; and Dumouchel is right that it might nevertheless be of some use in conveying an important aspect of an historical transformation. But what transformation exactly? The truly interesting question here is the one that has been raised by José Casanova: Why, in the face of so much contrary historical evidence, does the expression 'Wars of Religion' continue to have so much appeal for so many contemporary modern people?[10] This question brings me back to the distinctive nature of the modern state's claim to moral authority, and to the next two parts of Dumouchel's chapter.

No Medieval Church – No Modern State

In the third part of his chapter, Dumouchel turns his attention from early modern Europe to what came between the ancient and modern states – the Western Christianity of the Middle Ages. His focus is on the complicity of the Church in 'managing violence' in a close relationship with the political powers. The point he makes here, at least indirectly, is an extremely important one. Even if we agree with Cavanaugh's argument that the 'Wars of Religion' are a political invention of the fledgling modern state in its struggle to overcome the medieval ecclesiastical order, this should not lead us to gloss over the undeniable element of truth in the liberal story: that Christianity has at various times in its history

[9] Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 'Letter to Beaumont', *The Collected Writings of Rousseau*, vol. 9 (Hanover, 2001), p. 55.

[10] See José Casanova, 'Eurocentric Secularism and the Challenge of Globalization', *Innsbrucker Diskussionspapiere zu Weltordnung, Religion und Gewalt* no. 25 (2008): http://www.uibk.ac.at/plattform-wrg/idwrg/idwrg_25.pdf (accessed 7 February 2014). As Casanova says: 'It is indeed astounding to observe how widespread the view throughout Europe that religion is intolerant and creates conflict is ... Contemporary Europeans obviously prefer to selectively forget the more inconvenient recent memories of secular ideological conflict and retrieve instead the long forgotten memories of the religious wars of early modern Europe to make sense of the religious conflicts they see today proliferating around the world and increasingly threatening them' (p. 11).

acted as a persecuting religion. The historian, Perez Zagorin, has calculated that, during the Reformation era, in the years 1520–65, there were some three thousand legally sanctioned executions for heresy.[11] He points, moreover, to the existence of a fully elaborated Christian 'theory of persecution' invoked by both Roman Catholic and Calvinist Protestant authorities during that period. The willingness of the Church to get into the business of managing violence has doubtless leant support to the secularizing rhetoric of the 'peaceful state', helping to bring about its triumph.

Dumouchel's point, however, is a larger and more subtle one. He argues that the medieval Church was the indispensable forerunner of the modern state in setting the precedent of an institution claiming the moral authority to distinguish between good and bad violence according to abstract universal principles. Further, in its universal extension of the obligations of charity beyond 'one's own', Christianity weakened the local, personal, feudal allegiances which had thitherto helped to determine the legitimacy of violence. This made it easier for the modern state to monopolize 'good' violence, at least once it had wrested this capacity away from the Church. If I understand him correctly, Dumouchel is presupposing that although the Church succeeded in undermining traditional, local systems of violence-management, it did not succeed in replacing these with any genuinely Christian agapic network.[12] A vacuum was left for the state to fill with its answer to violence.

Separation of Church and State: Prophylactic Measure and Theological Ideal

In the final part Dumouchel focuses on the means by which the modern state sidelined its rival the Church as the moral authority for legitimating violence. According to him, it did so by imposing a separation of church and state, a solution theorized and justified in a powerful manner in the political philosophy of Hobbes. Or perhaps I should say the 'theology' of Hobbes, since one of Dumouchel's more intriguing points is that Hobbes's justification for the separation of church and state is a seriously theological one, whatever we think about the vexed question of his personal beliefs. The historical evidence tends to support Dumouchel's claim. Zagorin for instance, shows in detail how the anti-persecution arguments of sixteenth-century sectarian Christian theology – Anabaptist, Spiritualist, Dutch Arminian, Socinian – against Roman Catholic and Calvinist persecutors

[11] See Perez Zagorin, *How the Idea of Religious Toleration Came to the West* (Princeton, 2003), p. 88.

[12] This is more explicit in Paul Dumouchel's, *Le Sacrifice inutile: Essai sur la violence politique* (Paris, 2011), pp. 225–33.

were later appropriated by the early liberal philosophers, especially those such as Hobbes and Locke who had sectarian connections.[13]

The principal thesis of Hobbes's theological justification of the complete separation of church and state was the following: Christianity, properly understood, that is 'true Christianity' as revealed in the Bible is: 1) fundamentally non-violent; 2) fundamentally a matter of interior belief; 3) fundamentally oriented towards another world (for Hobbes, this is 'not-yet', while for Locke, it is 'not-here'). As Locke was to assert in agreement with Hobbes 'he jumbles heaven and earth together, the things most remote and opposite, who mixes the church and the state'.[14] Dumouchel makes no evaluation of this theology; but I will venture to do so: If perhaps not #1, then certainly #2 and #3 signify bad theology in their disregard for the incarnational nature of Christianity. The reduction of Christianity to a matter of inward belief oriented to 'another world' renders it fundamentally non-efficacious in this world. Yet on the other hand, the theology of the persecutors, both Roman Catholic and Calvinist, which purported to bring about peace and reconciliation through 'good' violence, is no better. This unpalatable either/or of peaceful irrelevance or violent power-wielding testifies to a profound theological crisis characterizing western Christianity by the early modern period, a crisis which Hegel was later to define as a fundamental confusion about how to relate, while distinguishing, transcendence and immanence, the 'here-below' and the 'beyond'. The crux of the matter, according to his analysis in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, was a divorce between transcendence and immanence, or God and the world, that gave the world over entirely to the domination of necessity, while goodness was banished to the other, heavenly realm.[15]

Dumouchel is right, in my view, to insist on Hobbes's theological separation of church and state as *necessary* to the genesis of the modern state. But, as I have already indicated in another context, I do not think this is *sufficient*. Hobbes's strict version of this separation leaves us with a state that is, to say the least, minimalist in the moral sense. To arrive at the modern state of today, with its hybrid military–humanitarian face, we require after Hobbes the next, humanist, wave of liberal thought inaugurated by Rousseau and culminating in Hegel, which attempts to inject transcendent Christian moral values, such as compassion and reconciliation, into the immanent power-field of Hobbesian politics. We need to take into account the close connection of the modern state with a progressivist humanism that does not stop at separating heaven and earth, but purports to

[13] Zagorin argues that tolerance as a solution to religious violence had its source in religion itself rather than being an invention of Enlightenment liberals. See, for instance, Zagorin, *How Religious Toleration Came to the West*, p. 289.

[14] Locke, *A Letter Concerning Toleration*, p. 32.

[15] See G. W. F. Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Mind* (New York, 1967), the chapter entitled 'The Struggle of Superstition with Enlightenment'.

bring heaven down to earth. Inseparable from this humanism, as Charles Taylor has argued in great detail, is a historical consciousness that identifies the rise of the secular state with a human 'emancipation' from the oppressive 'irrationality' of the religious faith of earlier history, and with a concomitant moral 'advance' that grounds the imperative of universal compassion and respect for the other within a purely human solidarity.[16] I would suggest that it is the appeal of this humanism, with its markedly 'stadial consciousness', that explains the widespread acceptance of the expression 'Wars of Religion', despite the historical evidence which brings it into question. It helps to explain also the phenomenon of the 'militarized humanitarian intervention force', which has become so characteristic of the modern western state.

[16] See Charles Taylor, *A Secular Age* (Cambridge, MA, 2007), pp. 569–89. For his critique of a compassion based on exclusively immanent moral sources, see pp. 690–703. For the expression, 'militarized humanitarian intervention force', see Samantha Nutt, *Damned Nations*, p. 85. For an extensive analysis of what the American theologian, Stanley Hauerwas, has called 'killing compassion', and its relation both to liberal thought and Christian theology, see Ward, *Redeeming the Enlightenment*, ch. 4.

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Chapter 10

Confessional Wars and Religious Violence in Christianity from a Theological Viewpoint

Ralf Miggelbrink

Do Confessional Wars Prove the Violent Nature of Biblical Religions?

Are confessional wars generally an example of the peaceless nature of religious convictions? Is this violent character of religion basically more intense if religion defines itself in particular as creed of the one and only God?

In the present historical discussion, this suspicion against religion and especially against Christianity is broadly rejected. Nevertheless, the discussion about the destructive nature of monotheism still refers to a potent narrative which explains modern states as the overcoming of early modern confessional wars: The brutality of confessional conflicts brought up the modern state with its claim to be a form of rescue from the endlessly destructive violence and irrationality of religious convictions. In the times of Enlightenment, these modern states brought an end to a dark medieval history of violence by means of modern institutional order. Thus, the overcoming of religious violence can be understood as a process of modernization by which religion itself first becomes totally private and then probably unnecessary.[1]

In this first part of my article, I refer to Luise Schorn-Schütte's historical explanation of confessional wars as constitutional conflicts of rising modern states[2], which seems to invert the argument of violent religion: Confessional wars did not only rise from religious convictions but from political interests. The increased brutality of confessional conflicts was not a result of the especially religious irreconcilability of divergent convictions. It was rather a result of the tactical and strategic rationality of modern government and its enhanced military standards.

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[1] Cf. José Casanova, *Public Religions in the Modern World* (Chicago, 1994), pp. 3–74.

[2] Cf. Luise Schorn-Schütte, *Konfessionskriege und europäische Expansion: Europa 1500–1648* (München, 2010).

A theological point of view, however, should not accept the temptation to blame modernity in general for its rationalized and intensified form of violence. It should not just look for a welcome exculpation of Christianity. A theological point of view cannot quiet down with just blaming protagonists of confessional violence in the past and thereby searching exculpation. A theological point of view always has to focus on those aspects which should indeed be regarded as forms of personal guilt.[3] Personal guilt, however, is never guiltiness, in general. The perception of personal guilt always aims at an encouragement of responsibility. In theological terms this means that the perception of guilt always implies an aspect of salvation and overcoming the hopelessness of involvement within structures of injustice. In a real Christian perspective, the awareness of one's guilt is always carried by the divine promise of forgiveness and thereby enables the individual to overcome its depressing power. If the perception of guilt is just a form of comfort, which carries away the uncomfortable to put it in front of the neighbour's door, there is no redemptive power in such a perception of guilt at all. Therefore, a theological perspective cannot rest with the insight that religion alone cannot be blamed for confessional violence. A theological perspective cannot be satisfied with a blaming of modernity in general. Blaming the modern age could lead to an idealization of the medieval times, as it really seems to become a characteristic of certain church milieus in our days. Such an evasion from their own historical stem will not be helpful for churches and Christian groups to evolve a critical form of participation in the modern age. A critical participation however allows an appreciation of religion apart from its undifferentiated blaming or esteem.

Confessional Wars and Constitutional Conflicts in the Holy Roman Empire

Luise Schorn-Schütte rejects the common narrative of confessional wars as the beginning of the modern age before its time. Confessional wars do not primarily reveal the violent nature of religion in general or of Christianity or monotheism in particular. The confessional wars root deeply in constitutional conflicts of the early modern societies. Religious convictions are not the origin of violence, but a motivating element that indeed intensified the conflicts.[4] The cause of the confessional wars in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was not a conflict rising from different religious convictions. It was rather the development of emerging states and nations in Europe which triggered the rioting. Within the borders of the Old Empire, this development brought up a conflict between a rather aristocratic and a rather monarchic concept of governance. Where the

[3] Cf. Ralf Miggelbrink, 'Sündige Kirche? Das Schuldbekenntnis des Papstes und die ekklesiale Dimension der Sünde', Ökumenische *Rundschau* 54 (2005): 462–77.

[4] Cf. Schorn-Schütte, *Konfessionskriege*, pp. 92–5.

monarchic concept was clearly successful, as it was in France and England, a confessional uniformity was defended by the traditional means of religious suppression.[5] The oppression of the Saxons by Charlemagne with its remarkable violence and cruelty as a simple war of conquest, the baptism of the Saxon princes is rather a symbol of submission and peace agreement than an act of religious violence. The crusade against the Albigenses in the thirteenth century, however, appears to be a first significant case when religious homogeneity is achieved by violent and oppressive means within Christianity itself. The same political motivation of a homogeneous reign still works in the suppression and displacement of the French Protestants in the seventeenth century. Wherever deviant religious convictions arise, they are oppressed in favour of the reign's unity, which cannot be imagined without the unity of religious belief.

Nevertheless, this traditional mechanism did not work in the Holy Roman Empire in times of reformation. The empire had never been a strong political unity. In times of reformation, its political importance declined with the rising power of princedoms. This empire was not able to guarantee religious unity as a symbol of the reign's unity, because the reign's unity declined in favour of the power of rising princes. Strong regional princes like the Elector of Saxony took the confessional conflicts as an opportunity to strengthen their own influence and importance and to hold their ground against the old powers of papacy and emperor. The construction of modern states goes together with a uniformity of confession *wherever* the rulers have the power to provide confessional homogeneity like in England or France. The weakness of the Holy Roman Emperor led to the increasing militant conflicts of confessions within its borders. The Holy Roman Empire was not a state in a modern sense. Modern states develop since the age of Reformation within and often against the old empire. These modern states then are the framing of further developments like especially the Enlightenment and modern age in general. The developing modern states also are engaged to guarantee confessional homogeneity within their borders. The Protestant princes, who seemingly defended liberty of religion and confession against the emperor, now show themselves as oppressive against confessional deviance in their own states, which includes the interdiction of Catholic celebrations which is significant for the Elizabethan era in England and which endured in some regions of Germany up to the nineteenth century.

Confessional Wars and Christianity

So far, historic research rejects the thesis that confessional wars revealed the bloody nature of Christian religion and thereby promoted a secular conception of state and society. Historic research also rejects a meaningful connection

[5] Ibid., pp. 28–50.

between the Early Modern Ages and the confessional conflicts on the one hand and modernity on the other. The close view of the historian allows the destruction of common narrative, which explains modernity as emerging out of that seventeenth-century butchery, with which Christianity definitely failed as a power that could inspire further history. On the one hand this may be understood as an exculpation: Religion and Christianity are not the causes of confessional wars. On the other hand, this exculpation is based on a *very close* view on historical interdependences. This very close view allows the perception of many details, but it is averse to connecting ideas. If you want to know what Christianity is, you must describe how it works in specific societies. Luise Schorn-Schütte, for example, describes the religious situation in the middle of the sixteenth century as a crisis of the church with its morally collapsing hierarchy on the one hand and on the other hand, as a boom of religiousness with many donations, rituals, processions, pilgrimages, and the flourishing of the *devotio moderna*. She explains that people derived comfort by their belief in resurrection and eternal life. But this description shows only a specific historical figure of Christian belief.[6]

In general it may be said that you gain a more specific historical understanding of historical phenomena in their respective time by taking a closer view on them. This, however, will never lead to an understanding of Christianity as a concept linking various times. The more differentiated a perception, the less it will allow a conjunctive idea. Christianity, however, if it does exist at all and if it is not understood as a term that means very distinctive and special forms of 'Christendom' (that therefore should be referred to in plural), than Christianity needs to be perceived with regard to conjunctive ideas and convictions that can be explained to remain substantially identical despite their obvious change. The theologian's task is, therefore, dissimilar to that of a historian. While the historians prove their quality by their close and differentiated attention to the differences, the theologians cannot pass the assumption of a meaningful connection of history in general and of Christianity in particular. Otherwise they could no longer argue the salvation of all mankind by the life and death of *one* man.

The Inescapable Struggle about Truth in Christianity

A more philosophical perspective on Christianity cannot ignore the fact that the idea of a monotheistic God that does not only reveal himself in History, but also becomes God incarnate with a strong institution dedicated to the authentic tradition of this incarnation, establishes a claim for unity in history. This unity is not based on common human needs like in archaic or classic religions, but

[6] Ibid., pp. 24–5.

on a unifying *belief*, which defines itself in opposition to common human needs and traditions.[7] This belief made Christianity a dogmatic religion which included confessional conflicts from its very beginning. Christianity has always worked on the overcoming of these conflicts in argumentation, in councils, condemnations and, since patristic times, also violence against heretics. It is this model of violent oppression that breeds the war against the Albigenses. And it is this model of legal violence against heretics which the emperor tried to apply against the Reformation.

The attempt to oppress the Reformation failed because of the emergence of early modern states. They took the opportunity to amplify their relevance by opposing the emperor and the pope. They indeed tried to improve their status rather than to struggle for religious freedom which, nonetheless, is in principle developed by the Reformation. Yet, religious freedom as a civil right was neither among the ideas of a seventeenth-century prince nor of a seventeenth-century theologian.

The confessional wars have been finished in agreements, which formed the beginning of a new age. Christianity learned from the Reformation and the confessional wars that unity in belief cannot be guaranteed by oppressive violence. Nevertheless, Christianity cannot simply give up the conviction of a unifying creed. Therefore, Christianity has to develop new means to achieve unity in creed. This has become evident with the confessional struggles of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In those centuries, a long tradition of confessional dialogues has begun. In all times and regions, in which a confessional unity was a consequence of political dominance, there was no room for dialogues at all. Dialogues always become relevant when both sides realize that there is no chance to survive without coming to terms with each other verbally.[8]

Dialogue needs a basic acceptance of the other despite deviant ideas. Since the end of confessional wars up to now, the churches have been forced to relate to one another and to start dialogues on their common belief. This development led to a fundamental relativization. In medieval times the church delegated her proper service for religious community to the state, which seemingly guaranteed communion by violent oppression. In principle, the confessional wars ended this illusion and forced the 'one and only Church' to face her real historical task of making communion grow in mutual knowledge and understanding. Where communion is still established by custom, privilege, and violence, the lesson of the confessional wars has not yet been learned. The Roman Catholic

[7] Cf. Ralf Miggelbrink, *Der eine Gott: Christlicher Monotheismus des Bundes und der Schöpfung* (Münster, 2006).

[8] The Second Vatican Council declares that ecumenical agreement should always be strived for in fraternal dialogues (*Unitatis Redintegratio*, 18) and that believers and people who do not believe nevertheless stand together in 'a sincere and prudent dialogue' (*Gaudium et Spes*, 21).

Church has in principle accepted this task since her own renovation in times of counter-reformation. Since the Second Vatican Council, the Roman Church has accepted her role as a moderator for unity in ecumenical dialogues that are based on a principal acceptance of the other as Christians too.[9]

The history of confessional wars leads to the insight that Christianity cannot be blamed for all destructive violence of the seventeenth century. Nevertheless, the Christian confessions have to face this lesson: The historical religion of revelation has to reconcile with its inner pluralism that demands a practice of constructive dialogues. This lesson has finally been accepted by the Second Vatican Council, which decides to pursue the Christian concept of a mankind unified in creed by means of accepting the situation of pluralism. This necessarily implies a self-relativization.[10]

Does the Biblical Concept of Divine Wrath Feed a Violent Idea of Religion?

The narrative of religious violence that has been domesticated by the rationality of modernity can be questioned by historical probabilities. Nevertheless, the problem remains that the fundamental authority of all Christian confessions, the Holy Bible, is a book containing plenty of texts that describe violence not only from the perspective of victims but often also with acceptance of violence or even with a divine legitimation of violence. In some parts the Bible even seems to glorify violence. One of the most disturbing ideas in this context is the concept of divine wrath. It is not only a side issue but a guiding theme that has its place in the very centre of biblical thought. In the following I am going to argue for an understanding of the biblical key note of divine wrath as biblical opposition to violence.[11]

[9] A complete documentation of this ecumenical process of dialogues since 1931 finds itself in the up to now four volumes of the book series *Dokumente wachsender* Übereinstimmung*: sämtliche Berichte und Konsenstexte interkonfessioneller Gespräche auf Weltebene* (Paderborn, 1983–2012).

[10] Cf. Hans-Joachim Sander, 'Relativitätsprobleme des Glaubens in GS', in Peter Hünermann and Bernd Jochen Hilberath (eds), *Herders theologischer Kommentar zum Zweiten Vatikanischen Konzil, vol. 4* (Freiburg i.Br., 2005), pp. 593–6.

[11] Cf. René Girard, *Things Hidden since the Foundation of the World* (Stanford, 1987).

The Disturbing Biblical Theme of the Wrath of God

Divine wrath and divine mercy are universal religious ideas in antiquity.[12] Gods have to be treated correctly. Otherwise, especially in the case of cultic[13] neglect they may feel tantalized. If gods are not given what they are entitled to, their rage rises against their people.

In some biblical texts the divine wrath occurs as a concept that offers a religious way to handle the incomprehensible strokes of fate. Especially in the psalms, harm and diseases are often connected to the idea of God hiding his face from the praying man (Pss. 13:2; 44:25; 88:15; 104:29) or abandoning him, who cries for God (Ps. 23:2), or even with facing him enraged (Ps. 74:1). This concept combines a vivid expression of the incomprehensibility of fate with a vivid protest that is addressed to God himself. In a monotheistic context the unique God is actually the only instance that can be accused for everything occurring in the world.[14] Thus, the depressing realization of divine wrath as the cause of suffering is combined with the encouraging idea that there is someone who can be addressed when man suffers from unforeseeable events. The divine '*force majeure*' can be addressed with complaints and, thereby, the idea of divine rage helps to save the individuals. The horrible is not just accident but an act of an addressable Person. Especially in the psalms, there is a widespread use of complaint addressed to God. In the Book of Job, the keynote of divine wrath is used to blame God for the injustice of his action (Job 6:1–13). Nevertheless, there is comfort in complaining because complaint always implies an appeal to change things. The complaints of Job even more point out that there is a right to expect divine justice towards humans.

Wrath and the Biblical Concept of Justice and Divine Benediction

In other biblical texts, however, the theme of divine wrath does not refer to the issues of explaining suffering and comforting the sufferers. Most of the biblical texts on divine wrath are composed according to the leading idea that the one and only God demands obedience to the rules and laws of God from all mankind and that the almighty God punishes those who rebel against the statutes of God.

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[12] Cf. Reinhard G. Kratz and Hermann Spieckermann (eds), *Divine Wrath and Divine Mercy in the World of Antiquity* (Tübingen, 2008).

[13] Cf. Hildegard Cancik-Lindemaier, 'Tun und Geben: Zum Ort des sogenannten Ofers in der römischen Kultur', in Bernd Janowski and Michel Welker (eds), *Opfer: Theologische und kulturelle Kontexte* (Frankfurt a.M., 2000), pp. 58–85.

[14] Cf. Walter Groß, 'Keine Gerechtigkeit ohne Zorn Gottes – Zorn Gottes in der christlichen Bibel', in Günter Kruck and Claudia Sticher (eds), *Deine Namen stehen vor mir wie Bilder: Zur Rede von Zorn und Erbarmen Gottes in der Heiligen Schrift* (Mainz, 2005), pp. 13–30; here pp. 17–21.

Especially due to the fact that the first and most prominent divine law is the rule not to obey any other god than YHWH alone (Deut. 5:7), one cannot resist the idea that YHWH is a particular deity among others but much more intolerant than these. The whole of antiquity knew a great variety of deities for each human area of life. All of them were considered to have special human attributes that are connected to certain responsibilities. Since all these human attributes and areas of life were strictly universal, Roman, Greek, and Egyptian deities had different names but not different attributes and areas of life as their responsibility, so that the names of the gods were in fact translatable from one into another language, which Jan Assmann has described as a situation of religious peace and understanding beyond the borders of different cultures and nations.[15] The love of a man to a woman means almost the same in Greece, Rome, and Egypt despite the different names of deities that make people love each other.

YHWH, on the one hand, is the God with an own people and, on the other hand, YHWH is a god with a universal claim. Therefore, YHWH cannot really be regarded as a national deity. On the contrary, 'his nation' must be regarded as deriving its identity from its universal mission. YHWH demands that every man should obey the law of God. This demand becomes even more serious because, in the beginning of biblical religion, YHWH reveals as the God that behaves totally different from other gods. Other gods in general express and sanctify the experienced *status quo* of their nations and of the lives of their worshippers. YHWH, on the contrary, demands to overcome the *status quo*. The YHWH-religion can be explained as discovering the difference between *is* and *ought*.[16] In my opinion, this is the core of Jan Assmann's idea that the biblical religion defined itself as an ethical religion. In general, religion and ethics have different tasks. Ethics tell people how to behave correctly. Religions tell people how to get along with the contingency of life in general. But YHWH offers comfort only for those who follow a religious ethic that defines itself in opposition to the experienced realities. YHWH defines himself as the God liberating slaves and disburdening the oppressed.

Therefore, YHWH cannot be mixed up with a national deity. The People of YHWH is not prior defined by its community due to derivation or birth, but by its obedience to the Law of God. In the beginning, the Law of God is the law of deliberation, which has its archetype in the Exodus. In the further explanation

[15] Cf. Jan Assmann, *Mose der* Ägypter*: Entzifferung einer Gedächtnisspur*, 2nd edition (München, 2000), pp. 17–24.

[16] The discrimination between *ought* and *is* can be estimated as a 'lasting insight' of David Hume. Vittorio Hösle integrates this basic insight of modern philosophy into a rationalist concept of theology that avoids to deduce from the difference between *is* an *ought* the necessity of a more or less voluntaristic idea of God as a '*cosmic commander*' that ineluctably implies an authoritarian concept of religion and politics: Vittoro Hösle, *God as Reason: Essays in Philosophical Theology* (Notre Dame, 2013), pp. 1–23, esp. pp. 4–6.

of this law in the Old Testament, two concepts become supremely important. (1) The action of God roots in God's *benevolence* towards every mankind which finds its religious articulation in the act of *benediction*. *Benediction* as core action of biblical religions means articulating divine benevolence in the name of God and praising God for God's benevolence towards every human being. Religious *benediction* means that human beings get attuned to divine *benevolence* as the core attribute of God. (2) In so far, divine benevolence towards every man is strictly universal. It is fundamentally averse to any sectionalism.

This is the systematic reason for an astonishing parallelism of the divine reasons of the wrath of God. Divine wrath is often caused by anti-social behaviour of the people, especially in the prophetic books of the Old Testament. On the other hand, the wrath of God is caused by disobedience towards the divine demand of exclusive worship of YHWH alone. In the most predominant number of cases, the divine motives for rage can be subsumed into two types: Firstly, God gets enraged if people do not worship him alone and exclusively. Secondly, God gets enraged if people do not respect the life and the rights of the poor. Both motives systematically belong together: YHWH defines *Himself* as the God of benevolence and benediction towards all man. Therefore, YHWH gets enraged when people are oppressed. On the other hand, oppression is the practice of not worshipping the one and only God who defines himself as benediction of all man.[17]

The wrath of God, therefore, is not oppressive, because God does not fight to enforce a divine will as a particular will. The will of God is never a particular will in the interest of particular people. It is strictly universal benevolence and therefore never oppressive. Wrath as the outside of strictly universal divine benevolence can hardly be considered being the motive of a divine action that interrupts the normal course of things. The prophets in the Old Testament do not describe the appearance of God's wrath as extraordinary occurrences like thunder and flash. The outside of God's wrath are collapsing societies that bring forth strife, wars, conquest by foreign people, destruction of cities, captivity, and social disorder. From a historical point of view, one could say: Biblical authors use the theme of divine rage to interpret phenomena of social disintegration. Thereby they reveal that social disorder roots in the denial of respect towards every human being, which is nothing else but denial towards the one and only God of universal benevolence and benediction.

Today, this position is still not beyond dispute. Many people think that peace and welfare can be achieved by intelligent social organization and do not really demand that everybody shows a participation in universal benevolence as the essence and will of God. Is there no alternative opportunity to this

[17] Cf. Ralf Miggelbrink, *Der zornige Gott: Die Bedeutung einer anstößigen biblischen Tradition* (Darmstadt, 2002), pp. 33–41.

demanding concept of peace based on universal benevolence? This concept is so demanding for it always implies the necessity of a follower to change his/her way of life, in so far as it is conducted by selfishness. The change of one's way of life is a basic theme of biblical religions. Salvation means living in the way that God demands. This guidance must really be *divine* for it implies the fundamental overcoming of normal human behaviour. The Bible explains normal human behaviour as being in opposition to the divine *benevolence* towards every human being because it is influenced by a constitutional reality of sin, which traditionally is named 'original sin'.

The biblical God defines himself as opponent to what is explained to be normal human nature in the anthropological concepts of socio-biologists and micro-economists.[18] In these concepts a fundamental selfishness of humans is considered as an anthropological principle which thereby derives ontological dignity. Theology can be defined as the kind of scholarship that deals with the question for fundamental principles in a rational way. From the biblical message about God theology takes the inspiration to avoid hastily making deductions from empirical observations when trying to understand what is referred to as human. Man cannot thoroughly be understood from his/her everyday behaviour. The Bible tells stories about unusual and thereby liberating human actions. The Bible tells stories about the fundamental difference between what *is* and what *ought to be*. The discovery of this difference opens up the possibility to a human life guided by reason in freedom. This discovery reveals the idea of God who is not the world and who, therefore, is the power that can change the world according to reason and benevolence.

The idea of fundamental benevolence in contrast to the regular idea of competition within the arena of survival really leads to human self-definition in opposition to every-day-experience. This may be realized when people that are inspired by the Bible show themselves benevolent and helpful. This agreeable side of universal benevolence, nevertheless, has an uncomfortable outside. If universal benevolence is announced as the divine principle of the universe that is going to overcome, it implies bad news for all concepts that base on selfishness and competition. They will succumb sooner or later, but their breakdown will be harmful for many people.

People, however, who will suffer from the breakdown of false anthropological concepts will not precisely be those who are responsible for them. Biblically, there is a clear difference between the rage of God as an inspired human interpretation of catastrophes within time and history that are caused by human neglect towards divine principles of being, on the one hand, and the Last Judgment,

[18] Cf. Ralf Miggelbrink, *Lebensfülle: Für die Wiederentdeckung einer theologischen Kategorie*, Quaestio Disputata 235 (Freiburg i.Br., 2009), pp. 13–67.

on the other hand.[19] While the Last Judgment (Matt. 25:31–46) leads to final justice beyond history, the rage of God is a narrative to deal with injustice and disaster within time and history.

Apocalypse and Violence

The utmost narrations of religious violence find themselves in the apocalyptical texts of the Holy Bible. Among those the Secret Revelation of John emerges as a text of extreme cruelty. Furthermore, it is important that Christians cannot declare this text to belong to the seemingly more violent Old Testament. Such expatriation of violence from the New Testament of Christ's love worked for a long time as a hermeneutic strategy of Christian exculpation to the disadvantage of Judaism. The Secret Revelation of John, however, contains numerous descriptions of extreme violence as the work of God. Especially in the sixteenth century, the text inspired millenniarists like Thomas Müntzer (1489–1525), who read the text as prophecy announcing violent divine help for the impoverished people of Thuringia. Primarily inspired by the Revelation, Anabaptists raised a regime of terror in the Westphalian city of Münster, which ended in a horrible massacre. This inglorious history of misappropriations lasts up to some modern religious myths that are knotted with German National Socialism and its idea of their empire lasting a thousand years: It is the idea of a messianic kingdom of peace and welfare that lasts for one thousand years that stems from the Revelation (Apc. 20:2–7). Because in the Revelation it is combined with the story of a violently effected bondage of Satan, it tends to inspire power politics throughout the centuries.

The origin and the intention of the Revelation of St John, however, followed a clearly different inspiration which can explain the glorification of violence although it cannot serve as its justification. The authors of the apocalyptic texts since the times of Hellenism were quite the opposite of militant opponents to Hellenists or Romans in Palestine. They expected salvation from the activity of God alone and represent a politically passive and expectant position in clear contradiction to the stance of the Maccabees.[20] The cultural religious and political circles from which the apocalyptic texts derive are decided religious non-violent. Their texts, however, inspired liberation movements as well as oppressors to interpret their own historical situation as a stage, where even totally destructive violence can be justified.

The Christian idea of the end of history was originally introduced as a comfort for the pious with regard to the military superiority of their enemies and their own economic despair. Facing the brutal force of an inhuman reality,

[19] Cf. Miggelbrink, *Der zornige Gott*, pp. 56–67.

[20] Ibid., pp. 67–73.

apocalyptic literature maintains the right of what *ought to* be, although there is no hope that what *ought to* be will ever become real in this world.

Violence as a Means to Promote Christianity?

It is the Constantinian shift which gave Christianity the function to work as a state religion that had to promote the unity of the empire. From the beginning of this new function difficulties arose from the nature of Christianity as a community of binding religious convictions. Christianity is not a religion expressing and serving the *status quo*. It stems from Judaism as a religiously motivated opposition against any *status quo*. Its position within the Roman Empire is therefore alike that of the Jewish communities which clearly distinguish themselves from their pagan contemporaries and are quietly engaged in marking differences.

The *Traditio Apostolica* by Hippolytus of Rome (170–235) gives an insight how early Christians strived to maintain their identity as a community attending Christ's Parousia and designing themselves in opposition to the Roman Empire instead of serving the stability of it.[21] This concept could not last as the exclusive self-concept of Christianity after the Constantinian shift. It was Augustine of Hippo (354–430) who integrates the fact of the Roman Empire in the Christian self concept. The empire and thereby political power in general is to serve the proliferation of God's truth revealed by Christ and represented in history by his church. From this basic decision to bring the pagan state into service for Christianity and thereby give up the sectarian self-concept, it is not so far away from making use of the emperor's power in favour of the ecclesiastical unity of creed. The first step in this direction, however, is made by the emperor. He has an idea of unity that traditionally fits to the use of violence. He is not interested in clerical quarrelling but in the consolidation of the empire which can be achieved by a unifying religious creed. Therefore, it is Constantine who calls the Christian bishops together for the first council taking place in his summer residence in Nicaea. The creed of Nicaea afterwards is proclaimed as imperial law. The opponents of the church's doctrine had to face punishment like banishment, although Constantine himself preferred the Arian faith. The emperor, however, regarded religion as a matter of state and politics. Differences of theological convictions appeared to him as being almost senseless quarrelling.

[21] In the *Traditio apostolica* (cap. 15–21) baptism is described as an utmost grave passover from a world of vices to a people of virtue, united by their hope towards God and his Christ. Christoph Markschies calls the early Christian community consequently a 'sect'. Christoph Markschies, *Das antike Christentum: Frömmigkeit, Lebensformen, Institutionen* (München, 2006).

The Christians, however, had to face the challenge of politics: Can a certain dogmatic creed lead to a salvific belief if the believer is forced by violence to accept the theological position that underlies the dogmatic definition? It is Augustine of Hippo who contributed a central argumentation to solve the problem whether salvific belief could derive from oppressive violence or not. In his conflict with the African Donatists, Augustine refers to the Lucan parable of the royal wedding (Luke 14:16–24)[22], where Luke writes: '*force* [all people in the streets, i.e.: everybody] *to enter* [the wedding celebration, i.e.: the kingdom of God, the church]' (Luke 14:23). Augustine took the words '*compelle intrare*' from the Vulgate-version of the parable as a divine mandate of the Christians, which have the role of the servants to use means of *compulsion* in order to make people join the church. This argument became the more important the more the Christian church in medieval times became the exclusive guarantor of unity that exceeds regional boundaries. Therefore, it is not astonishing that the most influential theologian of the Middle Ages, Thomas Aquinas, also refers to Augustine's reception of the biblical *compelle intrare*.[23] Thomas, however, knows that belief is a matter of *will* ('*quia credere voluntatis est*') and that consequently nobody who has the will to not believe, may be forced to accept the Christian creed. This is the reason why Thomas Aquinas rejects the idea of forcing the Jews to accept the Gospel. Only those who have already decided to accept the Christian creed can be forced by violence to comply with the promise which they gave when accepting the creed.

The biblical text seems to be adequate precisely for Christian theologians which accept their task to promote the unity of the empire by means of religion without betraying the Christian belief. The force used to urge someone into the ecclesiastic conformity is neither the feast of the Lord nor the Kingdom of God nor the Church in its real meaning. The force is just an exterior means that is intended to help those who just believe in a deficient way.

This sophisticated argumentation by which theologians brought together deliberate belief and compulsion in the matter of Christian creed has left its mark on European religious politics throughout centuries. The fight against heretics has begun in antiquity. It culminates in the crusade against the Albigenses in the thirteenth century and in the confessional wars. It is still present where churches do not hesitate to exploit their privileged situation in confessional homogeneous regions in order to force people in a certain ecclesiastical unity. The Second Vatican Council decidedly rejected the theological the idea of '*compelle intare*'. In the *Declaration of Religious Freedom* it defines, in 1964: 'This Vatican Council declares that the human person has a right to religious freedom. This freedom means that all men are to be immune from coercion on the part of individuals or

[22] Augustine of Hippo, *Epistola* 93, 5; 173, 10; 185, 24.

[23] Thomas de Aquino, *Summa Theologica* II–II, q. 10, a. 8.

of social groups and of any human power, in such wise that no one is to be forced to act in a manner contrary to his own beliefs, whether privately or publicly, whether alone or in association with others, within due limits. The council further declares that the right to religious freedom has its foundation in the very dignity of the human person as this dignity is known through the revealed word of God and by reason itself. This right of the human person to religious freedom is to be recognized in the constitutional law whereby society is governed and thus it is to become a civil right'.[24] From then on, any compulsion to achieve religious homogeneity within the Church and between different Churches or religions could no longer be accepted by the Catholic Church. Only the way of dialogue remains to promote Christianity and Christian insights in the real nature of humanity.

[24] Second Vatican Council, *Dignitatis Humane*, 2, 1

Chapter 11

Religion and Violence: The Case of Wars in the Former Yugoslavia

Janez Juhant

Introduction

To explain the complex issue of the Yugoslav wars in the context of religions and violence is a very difficult task. This issue has so many historical, socio-political, religious-theoretical, and cultural grounds that it is nearly impossible to provide a sufficient account within this writing. In addition, the Yugoslav wars were also a problem for the Marxist transition of different nations with various social and cultural backgrounds. The comprehensiveness of this issue, especially of its spiritual dimension, has to be read as a continuous development of interlaced cultural, political, and religious processes. To deal with the recent Yugoslav crisis means to respect a specific genealogy and a development that is delayed when compared to other European nations. For this reason it is challenging to parallel development in the former Yugoslavia with other European countries. As most of the wars in modern times the First and Second World Wars were huge, cruel, and sad massacres. The Crusaders – an original German Christian religious and spiritual movement, which also had an important role in Slovenia – stressed the necessity of the renewal of Christianity after the disaster of WWI. Edvard Kocbek the leading figure of the Slovenian Crusaders was a personalist and a friend of Emanuel Mounier (the founder of the revue *L'Esprit* in October 1932). Kocbek criticized the prevailing Church's understanding of the War in Spain, which plead for a revolutionary Republic. During the difficult time of WWII, he gathered Slovenian-left Catholics and inspired them toward a revolutionary project, hoping that the communists would become the revolutionary force and the Catholics would become the spiritual force for the necessary transformation of the Slovenian nation. While the revolutionary forces deeply transformed the Slovenian nation, the spiritual transformation has remained in many aspects incomplete.

The role of religions in the Yugoslav crisis is a very complex issue. To speak about it from an American or European point of view, without including the complexity of these topics in their own context, would lead us to many misunderstandings. The Yugoslav conflict couldn't be described simply as an 'ethno-religious chauvinism', exposed as 'religious violence' and stressing the

need for religious education and formation for peace.[1] The wars in the former Yugoslavia were a social, political, and national problem, which included religious implications as well. The peace-formation is not only a religious task but also an obligation of the whole society. When religion in communist countries was expelled from the societal spheres it became difficult to expect that religion would play an important role in the time of crisis. Religious education is an investment for the future. Modern societies faced a general problem regarding how to construct a new 'religious' formula in the sense of a new religious illuminated humanism. What emerged is more like '*verdrängter Humanismus – verzögerte Aufklärung*' (repressed Humanism and delayed Enlightenment).[2] Religion was attacked and expelled several times from the societal sphere. It was difficult to quickly establish an ethical and religious consciousness. The communist revolution introduced opposing values: killing, stealing, and lying. Hidden liberal attacks and pressure (*Kulturkampf*) presented grounds for struggle. The Marxist revolutionary methods increased and legalized this struggle not only by words but also by iron means. Post-Marxist societies were unable to change it immediately.

The violent educational and political oppression against religion shaped individual and societal consciousness, established a militant 'atheistic' ideology, built an 'atheistic' society, and continues to be a burden in post-Communist countries. The phenomenon of systematic and violent 'atheisation' of individuals and the whole society in (post) totalitarian times in my opinion remains. The term 'religious violence' in these societies is a reactive consequence of 'atheisation' or previous rejection of religion. The Croatian sociologist Vrcan stated that the 'utopian universalism' of the Communist period caused the reaction, i.e. the 'politisation of religion' and 'religiolisation of politics', which consequently led into 'delaisation of politics' and 'desecularisation of social life'.[3] If this is the case as Cavanaugh critically mentions then religion was going to become simply politics, equated with political absolutism, or 'totalitarian communism'[4] because the societal ground for (true) religion was not established.

According to Vrcan[5] the communist atheization excluded any influence of religion in the public sphere, while the formation of the national state made this possible again. However, the old habits of class enemy continue to prevail. What

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[1] See R. Scott Appleby, *The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence, and Reconciliation* (Lanham, MD, 2000), pp. 58, 75.

[2] Michael Benedikt, Reinhold Knoll, and Josef Rupitz (eds), *Verdrängter Humanismus – verzögerte Aufklärung* (Wien, 1995–98).

[3] Srdjan Vrcan, 'A Christian Confession Possessed by Nationalistic Paroxysm: The Case of Serbian Orthodoxy', *Religion* 25/4 (1995): 357–70, here pp. 361, 363.

[4] William T. Cavanaugh, *The Myth of Religious Violence: Secular Ideology and the Roots of Modern Conflict* (Oxford, 2009), pp. 19, 32.

[5] Vrcan, 'Christian Confession', 363.

Vrcan denotes as the delaisation or desecularization is not an implementation of religious values, but a means to become better based on the exclusion of others, as pointed out by Cavanaugh[6], as a span of religion in the national political attempts, which is typical for the modern liberal state. 'The war is being fought in more traditional way, involving substantial emotional and personal commitment, based on hatred. Moreover, it is not a war waged against total and unknown strangers, but mostly against neighbours and co-inhabitants'.[7] Any type of aggression is established on hatred. In the case of the post-Yugoslav wars, the main question among the Serbs was how to retain their inhabited territories. Slovenian mufti Nedžad Grabus stated:[8] 'The religion was an expression of Serbia's aggression on BIH, because this war was a war for land and control of territory. The religion was a sign of identification, mobilisation and motivation for the defence of one's country. The religion was manipulated, especially the genocide in Srebrenica'. In Girardian terms: religions were a scapegoat for covering the complex unsolved problems in these societies, and for the leading classes an excuse to implement wars by violence.

This chapter follows the hypothesis[9] that the Marxist violent exclusion of the other, and in a particular way the exclusion of the religious other from the individual and societal mental sphere, caused and is still causing an unease, which creates a silent consensus that the religions are necessarily a source of violence, that is about to become an universal political category. Even post-Marxist sociologists and intellectuals – most of them were trained to expel religion from societal consciousness – are not ready to accept the positive contributions of religions to societal change. The Slovene Marxist sociologists are still supporting the predominance of Marxist values in the society; the religions can be seen only as a support of the present regime. Under the Marxist's red star, the development of the societies in the twentieth century was checked, and the religions, especially Catholics, were frequently accused of 'religious violence'. This was the Marxist slogan for their ideological totalitarian bloody violence. This slogan in some countries of transition disappeared, while in others it remained even in post-Marxist time. Religion, already driven out of the individual and public consciousness, remains a proper scapegoat for many societal problems. Because the 'ideology of success dominated'[10] and the remnants of rivalry were not removed, exclusion of class-enemies became a common practice.

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[6] William T. Cavanaugh, *Theopolitical Imagination* (New York, 2010), pp. 30 *et passim*.

[7] Ibid., p. 361.

[8] In a personal mail to the author on 27 October 2013.

[9] This hypothesis seems to be a 'post-Marxist one'. At the same time, we can see that the issue of silent non-violent atheization in the political spheres is also the case in postmodern societies.

[10] René Girard, *The Scapegoat* (Baltimore, 1989), p. 157.

Still Girard argued that Christianity contributed very much to the real picture of victimization and victims, but many modern authors didn't want to realize this.[11] 'In the future, all violence will reveal what Christ's Passion revealed, the foolish genesis of blood-stained idols and false gods of religion, politics, and ideologies'.[12] Nazism attempted to absolve Germany and then the whole of Europe from caring for the victims; Marxism and other left ideologies until now implemented this care for the victims in their totalitarian tools. The Yugoslav so-called 'self-governance' system was much more sophisticated in doing this; the consequences were the victims of wars and still are (in different modes the victims) until today.[13] The exclusion of religion via accusation and establishing of violence is a '*proprium*' of modern ideologies, which reaches its full realization in the totalitarian systems, especially atheistic Marxism. The consequence of this 'bad conscience' was the burdening of religions with predictive 'violence', to diminish one's own violence, to excuse him, to 'kill' the religious tradition of brotherhood of all people, and to change societies with violent revolutionary methods. It has fatal consequences in the Balkans and in the wars of the former Yugoslavia.

In the first section I attempted to present the revolutionary changes in Communist totalitarian systems both with the exclusion of religions in the societal sphere and with the usurpation of religions for the political purposes of the system, which viewed the place of religion as the scapegoat for all societal negativities. In the second section Bosnia and Herzegovina (BIH) will be presented as a European neuralgic point. The next section will define the unsolved national and political problems of Yugoslavia, which became, during the Communist period, a melting pot and at the same time a boiling point of nations. Subsequently the meaning of religions for the nations will be discussed. Then Cavanaugh's observations about religious violence will be investigated. As an historian and an example of the thesis of 'ethno religious' violence in the war in BIH Scott Appleby's position will be examined and illuminated through Cavanaugh's critique of the myth of religious violence. We will approach the question: what kind of war was the war in BIH? This opens the issue regarding the post-totalitarian dilemmas. The next section looks at the communist revolutionary methods, which caused misuse of religion as violent; to excuse the struggle against it will also be discussed. The conclusion will give an outline how an emphatic society and reconciliation could be achieved.

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[11] René Girard, *I See Satan Fall Like Lightning*, trans., James G. Williams (Maryknoll, NY, 2001), chap. XIII.

[12] Girard, *The Scapegoat*, p. 212.

[13] Girard, *I See Satan*, chap. XIV.

The Struggle Against Religion in (Post) Communism

Bosnian Islamic theologian Enes Karić states that 'in the modern West Islam as a religion, Islam as a culture, and as a civilization is excluded out of concept of "Judeo-Christian civilization"'.[14] Probably the same problem could be stated in many Islamic countries with the Judeo-Christian concept of society. But also in Christian countries the concept of Christian religious view is more and more questioned. Despite this, in modern society, religion is still seen and evaluated as a cultural power or the ground of cultural identity[15], whereas in post-Communist countries there is the tendency to diminish the influence of religion or to exclude it completely out of the societal consciousness in order to come to a 'neutral' status of it. We can recognize this tendency in post-totalitarian societies, namely to subordinate the religion to political and societal circumstances, which was the case of wars in the former Yugoslavia.

Gianni Vattimo asserts that Christianity played an important role regarding the origins of modern socio-cultural heritage.[16] But the Enlightenment's attempt was to establish an autonomous anthropological or societal concept of 'just', 'moral'[17] or modern 'neutral' civil religion, in which God is an 'empty sign'.[18] We can find signs of this distinction in the works of many thinkers. Beginning with Locke[19], and after Locke, 'the religious-secular binary is a new creation that accompanies the creation of the modern state'.[20] Kopelowitz adds that the 'distinction between the "religious" and the "secular" occurs in societies in which the individual rather than (the) group is the primary component of social organization'. Individual persons were the ground of the modern state and the religion was thus considered to be a personal matter, and not a state issue. However this development causes dualism between the societal and

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[14] Enes Karić, 'Kdo je danes "drugi"?' ['Who is Today the "Other"?'], in: Nedžad Grabus and Nenad Striković (eds), *Z dialogom do medsebojnega spoštovanja* [*With Dialogue towards Mutual respect*] (Ljubljana, 2012), pp. 13–27, here p. 23.

[15] José Casanova, *Public Religions in the Modern World* (Chicago, 1994), pp. 5–6.

[16] Gianni Vattimo, *Glauben-Philosophieren* (Stuttgart, 1997).

[17] Immanuel Kant, 'Grundlegung der Metaphysik der Sitten', in: *idem*, *Werke: In zwölf Bänden; Theorie-Werkausgabe* vol. VII., edited by W. Weischedel (Frankfurt a.M., 1956), pp. 11–121.

[18] Robert N. Bellah, *Beyond Belief: Essays on Religion in a Post-Traditionalist World* (Berkeley, 1991).

[19] John Locke, *A Letter Concerning Toleration* (Indianapolis, In, 1955), p. 17; cf. Cavanaugh, *Myth*, 80; Ezra Kopelowitz, 'Negotiating with the Secular: Forms of Religious Authority and their Political Consequences', in: Larry Greil and David Bromley (eds), *Defining Religion: Investigating the Boundaries Between the Sacred and the Secular* (New York, 2003), 86–7.

[20] Ibid.

an individual sphere or a kind of schizophrenia of person. On the one side the individual has his 'own' religion; on the other he belongs to the national, political, and to the religious community. The Marxists benefited from it to subordinate the person under the totalitarian order. In particular the Catholic and other Churches trained their believers in obedience to make them available for their task. Religion was considered as a 'private matter' but at the same time politics was trying to find a common (a-theistic) ideological ground or to span religious elements in state affairs. José Casanova enumerates four reasons for this modern development: 'the Protestant Reformation; the formation of modern states, the growth of modern capitalism, and early modern scientific revolution'.[21] The last one was used as a parade horse of Marxism. These all implied the new organization of modern societies with individualization and a search for the new ideological non-religious grounds on which the society will be founded. This was not always the path toward subsidiarity but rather toward ideologization or totalitarianization in the totalitarian systems, which remains an anthropological problem of former Marxist societies. In the very beginning it was the question of the role of religion in (modern) society. At the same time the struggle between the religious sphere of man and mankind on the one hand and the civil, so called 'a-theistic' sphere on the other culminated in societal battles in the Modern Era. This was evident particularly in the twentieth century as the totalitarian regimes took total possession over the societal sphere, including religion. These 'conversions' were accompanied by big societal disturbances, struggles, and wars.[22] A private, individual religious sphere as a basis of the modernity was usually violently 'integrated' by so-called 'a-theistic ideologies' or worldviews.

In modernity the experiences of religion were marked by many ideological and political dimensions, which were fixed by liberal, freemason[23], socialist or so called civil, humanistic, 'neutral', or non-liturgical worldview of man.[24] Modern understanding of religion contained more political than religious connotations. Religion was expanded in the socio-political and strategic circumstances of modern development, as was the case with the religions in BIH: 'The traditional religion is privatized, while the religion of politics occupies the public realm'.[25]

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[21] Casanova, *Public Religions*, 21.

[22] See Stella Alexander, *The Triple Myth: A Life of Archbishop Alojzije Stepinac* (New York, 1987); Richard Pipes, *A Concise History of the Russian Revolution* (New York, 1995); Timothy Snyder, *Bloodlands: Europe between Hitler and Stalin* (New York, 2012).

[23] Alexander, *Triple Myth*, p. 30.

[24] Eric Hobsbawm, 'Introduction: Inventing Traditions', in *idem* and Terence Ranger (eds), *The Inventing of Tradition* (Cambridge, 1983); Cavanaugh, *Myth*, 113.

[25] Cavanaugh, *Myth*, 116.

Bosnia and Herzegovina as European Neuralgic Point

Ivo Andrić states in *Bosnian Chronicle*[26] that Bosnian Franciscans were not preparing people properly for the future changes in Europe. He also indirectly accuses Franciscans of not reacting at the appropriate time to implement freedom and liberty or to assist people to equip themselves for life in freedom. Similarly, he is concerned with this issue in *The Bridge on the Drina*.[27] He states that a big and strange struggle, which in Bosnia lasted for centuries between partisans of two religions, was actually a struggle for land and power under a mask of religion, a struggle for a special way of life and ordering of the world. The rivals not only stole from each other women, horses, and weapons but also songs. Many verses of these songs were seized from each other as precious booty. In these struggles the imperial powers, Turkey, Austro-Hungary, and Serbia were involved and Andrić states that BIH was (and still is) a neuralgic point of relations between East and West, between Islam and Christianity, and consequently between the nations in BIH, Turks and Bosniaks, who were known in that time as Muslims, Serbs, and Croats. The territory of BIH was always crucial for the future of Europe.

Politically Bosnia was a kingdom in the Middle Ages. The Bogomils ('dear to God'), a dualistic sect, played a very important role in its history. They were at different times a national Church between Byzantium and Rome. Some suggest the Bogomils were an indigenous Christian sect considered heretical by both the Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox churches. The Kingdom of Bosnia needed to seek patronage by Byzantium and the Kingdom of Hungary. Later the Turks took power over Bosnia (1463) until the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy subjugated Bosnia and Herzegovina (1878) and formally annexed it (1908).

The Bogomils were much more prone to the acceptance of Islam than Orthodox-Serbs and Catholic-Croats. The two peoples, Muslims and Serbs, for centuries lived peacefully together, while things changed with the Serbian uprisings (1804–13 and 1815). In general, the uprising of modern liberal and national movements caused magnification of tensions among different nations in Europe and in the rest of the world. The uprisings in Serbia resulted in the Turks needing more people (janissaries) from Bosnia to protect their power over the disobedient nations. Still Andrić, who understood his native land BIH very well, saw complexities of its human basis and the consequences of these struggles for Land and Europe. In the three wars of the twentieth century these tensions culminated in Yugoslavia and in Europe.

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[26] Ivo Andrić, *Travniška kronika* (Ljubljana, 1989). [engl.: *Bosnian Chronicle* -a.k.a. *Chronicles of Travnik*, trans., Celia Hawkesworth (London, 1996)].

[27] *Idem*, *Most na Drini* (Ljubljana, 1980). [engl.: *The Bridge on the Drina*, trans., Edwards F. Lovett (Oxford, 1995/1959)].

The barriers among nations in this region were not solved for centuries. On the contrary, these nations were often burdened with the problems of other Europeans. So the wars in the former Yugoslavia and especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina were a conglomerate of accumulated historical and societal problems. The problems were exacerbated by the Communist regime and have emerged again in more powerful form after the changes in 1989. Partially because of the disunity and differing political interests of world politicians these wars could not be prevented. This situation is similar to the war in Syria in 2012.

WWI began in Sarajevo. In WWII and afterwards, Yugoslav communists had an important role in an anti-fascist alliance. Yugoslavia in times of the 'cold war' was a litmus test of European policy. It played a guiding role in the club of the 'Non-Aligned Movement' and it was very influential in European and world policy. Still the first Yugoslavia was pushed into these happenings through inner crisis, which profited the communists regarding revolution. They ascended to power in Yugoslavia with the support of English and Soviet policy. Yugoslavia as a Communist country with a so-called *social self-government socialism* was actually a big lie (or actually a lie based upon a lie) because all decisions in the society were controlled and all the details determined by the leading communist class. The communists merely covered the problems and through the power of totalitarianism suppressed the burning national, social, and mental problems of Yugoslav individuals and nations. Most of them had a background in religious education and those with roots in Catholicism were usually the most fanatical fighters against the Catholics.

The Complex Problems of Yugoslav Nations

Hannah Arendt's *The Origins of Totalitarianism*,[28] with its highlights and downfalls, struggles and contradictions, is a very instructive work on the rise of modernity in Europe. According to her the leading motif of European development was the broadening of power, in which the underclass was usually left with empty hands. The smaller nations had no chance of success against imperialism. This occurred not only because of political bargaining but also because of the prevailing conviction that imperialism (the power of the biggest) is able to establish world-ruling power and solve the problems of modern people. In this sense the racial and pan-national movements prevailed over the concept of nation. The small ones remained without citizenship – there was no place for small nations, 'e.g. Slovaks in Czechoslovakia or Slovenes and Croats

[28] Hannah Arendt, *Izvori totalitarizma* (Ljubljana, 2005). [engl.: *The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York, 1951)*].

in Yugoslavia'[29]. Because the imperial and pan-national movement prevailed the Wilsons idea of self-determination by nations didn't work. The history of Yugoslavia is a history of failed promise regarding self-determination of nations and non-fulfilled hope of nations for liberty and cooperation.

Yugoslavia after WWI wasn't the Yugoslavia of the Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs, the nations who emerged from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, but a Yugoslavia of Serbian monarchy. The Slovenes were divided among four different states. Italy appropriated a great part of the territory where the Slovenes lived. In 1922 the 'fashist party' came to power and seized all national rights; even speaking and singing Slovene in the Church was not permitted. In Austria – in the regions of Carinthia and Styria – the Slovenes were treated as traitors and separatists by Austrian liberal and national ideologists. After 1938 they were prosecuted by the Nazis.[30] Within the territory of Hungary the Slovenians were similarly oppressed. For the Croats the unification with the South-Slavs in Yugoslavia opened the struggle for the survival of their nation. This developed primarily because of tension with the Serbs and this was for them grounds toward forming an Independent State of Croatia under German protection during WWII. The decisive struggle for survival touched Bosnian Muslims and other nations of Bosnia. The Islamic people of BIH organized themselves to fight against Serbian and communist Partisans. The Serbs like other nations were divided by the revolutionary Communist process in national governmental foundations, Chetniks of Draža Mihailović and partisans under Yugoslav communists Tito and Ranković. WWII with the downfall of the Yugoslav kingdom provides a core example of seeking new solutions regarding political reparations used in the European policy after the WWI.

During the Nazis' occupation in WWII, Slovene communists first cooperated with the occupiers (because of the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact 1939) and later, after Hitler attacked the Soviet Union, they started the revolution. They established with cunning tactics, together with 'left-wing' Christian and liberal parties, a *Liberation Front* (*Osvobodilna fronta*), which was a Trojan horse to accomplish the revolution in Slovenia.

The Catholic Church played a very important role in the history of the Slovenes. Among Yugoslav communists, Slovene communists were the most influential, ideologically sharp and orthodox Marxists. The anti-Catholic struggle was one of the cornerstones of their power in Slovenia. For their revolutionary purposes the communists from the *Liberation Front* against the occupiers usurped the resistance organizers, subordinated the liberals and Christians, and began to kill the potential opponents. In 1942 in the parts of Slovenia under Italian fascist authority the Slovenians were subjected to revolutionary terror.

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[29] Ibid., p. 348.

[30] Maja Haderlap, *Engel des Vergessens* (Göttingen, 2011).

Several democrats, especially Christians, were executed. This was an unbearable situation.[31] As a sign of domination the Italians took several nationally conscious Slovenes as hostages and later killed them. Some of these hostages were also condemned by the communists. If they refused to submit themselves to communist power Christians and democratic members of the Liberation Front were executed in a similar way. Many parish priests were terrorized and killed. At the conference of priests in Novo mesto, Father Jože Oražem stated that 'the members of the Liberation Front were propagating misleading principles and pursuing godless ideas ... When usurpers are threatening a people's freedom, limiting their movement ... then a physical self-defence is permitted ... to defend in an organized way the villages and neighbourhoods from unjust tyrants ....'[32]

Because the Church couldn't accept the executions of Slovenes with Bishop Gregorij Rožman from Ljubljana it supported the defence of homes and people attacked under the protection of Italian occupiers. After the war Bishop Rožman left Slovenia and was, in his absence, accused by the military court during a trial on 21 August 1946 in Ljubljana. The accusation specified that he supported the aim of 'anti-people activities'. This actually means that he supported the protection of attacks on innocent Catholic people against communist plans.[33] The communists declared this self-defence and self-protection of Catholics as an attack on the communist Liberation Front. It was viewed as a collaboration of the Church with the occupiers and also seen as an anti-national activity. Social and defensive aspects of these activities were engineered under religious cover.

After WWII Slovenia, in association with other Yugoslav communists, took power over the country and began to terrorize people. The victims were Slovenes who opposed communism. After the War the 'domobranci' (Home Guard), some accompanied by their wives and children and other civilians were returned by the British forces to the Yugoslav communists. Approximately 15,000 people were placed in communist concentration camps and, soon after, most of them were killed. In Slovenia after the war, along with Slovenians there were several groups of Croatians, Serbian Chetniks, and civilians who, without being sentenced by the court, were executed. In the first years of communism several actual and imagined opponents, primarily Christians, many priests, owners of enterprises, farmers etc. were expelled from the country or killed. Several tens of thousands emigrated. All people had to submit themselves under the political terror and pressure of the totalitarian dictatorships. In Slovenia there are approximately 600 mass graves. Among them is *Huda Jama*, where some

[31] Erika Prijatelj, 'Le sacré et le territoire slovène', *Théologiques* 16/1 (2008): 39–63, here p. 43.

[32] Archdiocese archives *Poročilo z dekanijske konference v Novem mestu* [*Report from the deanery conference in Novo mesto*] (Ljubljana, 1942), F 37.

[33] Tamara Griesser-Pečar, *Cerkev na zatožni klopi* [*The Church in the Accusations Dock*] (Ljubljana, 2005), p. 148.

victims were still alive, were enclosed in a 100 metre barrier shaft of concrete, steel grate, gravel, and other materials. Because the victims were mummified in these underground conditions the disclosure of Huda Jama on 3 March 2009 shocked the world.

Many of these graves have still not been investigated. There are over 100,000 people buried in them. After the Resolution of Informbiro and the separation of the Yugoslav Communist Party from Moscow in 1948 the Yugoslav communists established several concentration camps for the imagined and real adversaries of the new regime. Goli otok is the most recognized among the settlements. The Church and Catholics supported the suffering people under the Communist occupation and terror even though the Church was viewed as class enemy No. 1 and a continuing danger for the people.

The communists prepared the 'final solution' for all nations by imposing total communistic rule over them. They suppressed the actual national, social, cultural, and religious problems of the nations. These unjust directives violated the social and religious dimension of ordinary man and small nations, in order both to hide their inability to deal with the complex problems of society as well as to promote the hope and rights of the ordinary man.[34]

Religion as a 'Violent' Scapegoat

Religion was an identification sign employed to cover the social and political problems, and all politicians used religion for their purposes. Initially the problem arose within the Independent Croatian State of Ustasha. The communists accused the Croatian Catholic Church of fighting against them and cooperating with the Croat independent Ustasha state against their Partisan movement. Later, when the communist revolution took power in Yugoslavia, the Catholic Church was not ready to cooperate with them to establish a ('communist') national or state Church. This tension noticeably surfaced at the communist trial of Archbishop Alojzij Stepinac (arrested on 18 September 1946)[35] in Zagreb, which demonstrates that the real power of the archbishop during the Ustasha government was not as strong as assumed. The accusation was accentuated much more on the opposition of the Catholic Church to the Communist regime in the sense that Stepinac 'in his fanatical hatred of everything that is of the people, progressive and democratic had begun preparing a fifth column long before the war ....'[36] This 'hatred' means Stepinac withdrew from the atheistic

[34] Franjo Komarica, *U obrani obespravljenih* [*In Defence of the Rightless*] (Zagreb, 2001).

[35] See Alexander, *Triple Myth*, pp. 143–81.

[36] Ibid., p. 147.

regime. Despite the conversion of the Serbs arranged and performed by the Ustasha political regime it remains a very sensitive religious question, which posed the issue, what could the archbishop do? There were some priests, notably Franciscans in BIH, who were involved in the matter of political conversion by Ustasha for national rather than religious reasons. Some Catholic priests and archbishops also supported these conversions for human purposes to save the lives of 'converted' orthodox Serbs. There were some priests, primarily in BIH, who cooperated with the Ustasha government and were involved in the atrocities against the Serbs. In both cases, conversions of the Serbs and the accusation of Stepinac, religion was involved in political affairs.

The burning historical, social, cultural, and religious questions were simply covered by the pressure of the communist system and emerged following the fall of the totalitarian regime. Actually for the people the social, economic, and cultural foundations took priorities over religious ones. Vrcan states, with B. Barber, that even the universalism of the Middle Ages was merely belongingness and also were forms of enlightenment as 'monotheistic traditions of Judaism, Christianity and Islam'.[37] The community in communism was a construct with forced belongingness. In the Communist regime the community meant to belong only to the party; all other belongings were not permitted. In the opinion of Vrcan this led to nationalism, which was nurtured by elements of cohesion. I would say that the important national and social questions in the time of communism were not solved even in the year 1970 but repressed. They appeared in their fullness on the day after the fall of the regime.

In his book *The Ambivalence of the Sacred. Religion, Violence, and Reconciliation* R. Scott Appleby, analysing problems associated with the history of the Yugoslav nations, stresses the importance of religion in these processes. His view differs from that of Hannah Arendt, who acknowledged the rights of Slovenians and Croatians for self-decision. In general Appleby sees the situation from the point of view of the USA and the policy of several other countries, which lacks understanding regarding national sovereignty of small nations. In 1989 foreign minister James A. Baker convinced 'Yugoslavs' that Slovenia (and the other former republics of Yugoslavia) would never achieve independence. It is not easy for the Americans to see the problems of national minorities because of the American vision of politics, where ethnicity implies a more political than ethnical concept.[38] The nations of former Communist regimes desired to build the national state as their right as it was by the European political community who accepted the unification of Italy or Germany in 1871 or the reunification of Germany in 1990. Other nations could achieve these modern benefits later.

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[37] Vrcan, 'Christian Confession', p. 360.

[38] Rogers Brubaker, 'National Minorities, Nationalizing States, and External National Homelands in the New Europe', *Daedalus*, 124/2 (195): 107–32, here p. 125.

According to Appleby after the downfall of Yugoslavia there was 'ethnoreligious extremism' and 'sacred violence'. He believes that 'religion was a key component of national and ethnic identification throughout the Balkans during the conflict'.[39] He is convinced that this is true 'even among the large numbers of nonbelievers who continued to accept the broad cultural tradition of their more pious ancestors' religious beliefs'. According to him 'religion is intrinsically a part of the sense of ethnicity'.[40] We can admit that religion is closed to ethnicity by Serbs and Croats, among the (Slavic) Muslims in Sanđak (south-east Serbia) and also regarding the identity of Muslims in BIH. This differs in the case of the national identity of the Albanians of Kosovo, which was by no means dependent on religion but played a decisive role in the beginning of the Yugoslav conflict. Albanians and Serbs estimate it as a national conflict, despite the fact that the Serbs covered it by religious symbols mapping the territory of Kosovo as 'ancient Serbian land'. Vrcan asserts this belief by stating that the Serbian Orthodox Church like most others orthodox churches, view the union between nationality and religion as very close;[41] however nationality prevails. We have to admit that the religious symbols supported national-political endeavourers. The historical development opened for the Yugoslav nations (for the Serbs in the First Balkan War of 1912) new possibilities; the foundation was liberal and not religious. Later, in 1991, the case among Croats and Slovenians was the same. The fatal questions were the national, social, and cultural which were combined with religion. The political changing of elites prevailed as Appleby certifies.[42] Surprisingly despite this Appleby states, 'yet it was religion, wed to ethnicity in each case that clearly distinguished one "ethnic" group from the others' that allowed the people and especially leaders of nations 'to provide "primordial" and "age-old" justifications for people intent on hating one another'.[43] But these tensions were not religious but social and national, increased by the Marxist revolution as the way to exclude class-enemies. Now it is possible to see them as national and political and not religious. But this 'age-old justification' opposes the statement from Andrić that the people lived peacefully for centuries with

[39] Appleby, *Ambivalence*, p. 63.

[40] Ibid.

[41] Vrcan, 'Christian Confession'.

[42] Appleby, *Ambivalence*, p. 71.

[43] Ibid., p. 63. In general, Appleby's thesis is that the sacred is ambivalent and potentially violent. In the case of post-Yugoslav wars he could not avoid to accuse the religions for violence, so 'Croat Catholicism (was) reinforced by Roman Catholic Church' (p. 64). With Sells he is speaking of 'tenuous … human capacity for acknowledging religiously based evil' (p. 71). Religions should be violent because of religious emotional and non-rational elements (p. 64). In opposition to this Cavanaugh with revealing the myth of religious violence stresses much more the political elements of the liberal or national state as causes for struggles and wars of modernity (Cavanaugh, *Theopolitical Imagination*, pp. 20–30).

each other.[44] According to Andrić the process of differentiation began with the processes of autonomy of the modern person combined with and culminated in liberal national states. In the consciousness of Slovenes, Croats, and other nations of the first and second Yugoslavia it was only a realization for the liberal state of Serbs; the other nations did not attain their national and political rights. Therefore the conflicts came to their first crisis in WWI and later in 1989.

William Cavanaugh and Religious Violence

To understand the origins of the conflicts regarding the downfall of Yugoslavia it is very useful to consider the observations of William T. Cavanaugh on religions and violence. He is dealing with the judgments of these conflicts by R. Scott Appleby and others. We will ponder the position of Cavanaugh on religious violence in the modern world and take into account his view of Appleby on this topic. Cavanaugh argues in his book *The Myth of Religious Violence: Secular Ideology and the Roots of Modern Conflict*, 'that in "Western" societies, the attempt to create a transhistorical or transcultural concept of religion that is essentially prone to violence is one of the foundational legitimating myths of the liberal national-state. The myth of religious violence helps to construct and marginalize a religious Other, prone to fanaticism, to contrast with the rational, peacemaking secular subject'.[45]

According to Cavanaugh the concept of religion was and still is changing and because of it we do not have a universal concept of religion. But for many religions always something irrational, fanatical, and violent is included, 'to legitimate the coercive measures against the Other'.[46] According to those authors there is a difference among religions and secular ideologies, but surprisingly the 'former are essentially more prone to violence ... more dangerous',[47] are 'absolutist, divisive, irrational'[48] as are the nationalisms, Marxism, capitalism, and liberalism. Cavanaugh opposes the general terms like 'religious violence', 'West', 'religion', 'religious', 'secular'. Then he establishes that the contributions of those authors on diverse topics like history and politics are good and 'have important insights to share on origins of violence', but dealing with the category of religion they fail. He asserts so far: 'The idea that religion has a peculiar tendency toward violence must be investigated as a part of ideological legitimization of the Western national-state'.[49] The authors are prone to assume that religion as such

[44] Andrić, *Most na Drini*.
[45] Cavanaugh, *Myth*, p. 4.
[46] Ibid., p. 5.
[47] Ibid., p. 6.
[48] Ibid., p. 8.
[49] Cavanaugh, *Myth*, p. 9.

is violent, mostly because it has irrational, hidden components. The writers did not investigate the problems around the building of the modern national states and the conflicts among the old and new elites. 'The rise of the modern state did not usher in a more peaceful Europe, but the ascendency of the state did accompany a shift in what people were willing to kill and to die for. *Dulce et decorum est / pro patria mori* would take on normative status. I argue that legends regarding wars of religion are not simply objective history, but are an ideological accompaniment to shifts in Western configurations of power, especially the transfer of lethal loyalty to the emergent state'.[50]

Cavanaugh proposes to analyse the wars through the last centuries to show that most of them are combined with the rise of modern states. 'Historians generally acknowledge – as political theorists do not – that other factors besides religion were at work in the wars of religion. These factors are political, economic, and social'.[51] Cavanaugh asserts that it is almost impossible to separate these reasons for wars from one another. Religious factors were involved but other factors are equally important. He shows that 'religious wars' were actually wars for political domination in modern Europe.

Cavanaugh asserts three types of arguments in relation to religious violence. The first one is that religion is absolutist. This is like John Hick's claim that 'unsurpassability of Christian revelation could only lead to treating non-Christians as inferior and their need to be colonized'[52]. The second one is that the religion is divisive, which means, 'the indictment of religion is based on religion's tendency to form strong identities exclusive of others ...',[53] as Martin Marty and others claim. The last type, which posits that 'religion is non-rational'[54], is important for our purposes.

Bhikku Parekh, Charles Selengut, and Scott Appleby, who try to show that this was implemented in the wars of the former Yugoslavia, share the final argument. This type of argument supposes an absolutism of religion, but argues that religions have irrational residues: 'Fervor', 'rage', 'passion', 'fanaticism', 'zeal' and similar words are used to describe the mental state of religious actors who are driven to violence. We proceed to examine Appleby's arguments and Cavanaugh's critique of it to see how this functioned in the Yugoslav crisis.

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50 Ibid., p. 12.
51 Ibid., p. 11.
52 Ibid., p. 18.
53 Ibid., p. 26.
54 Ibid., p. 17.

R. Scott Appleby and Religious Violence

Cavanaugh states that 'one of the most critically aware examples of the argument based on the no rational aspect of religion comes from historian R. Scott Appleby ... Religion is indeed "powerful medicine", but its driving passion can be used in the service of peace as well as in the service of violence'.[55] Both aspects of religion are present. Appleby illustrates this regarding a terrorist attack by a young Palestinian on Israelis and concludes that the societies gave to religion a paradoxical status, 'as bearer of peace *and* sword'.[56] He stresses the importance of the idea of the holy by Rudolf Otto. Otto believes that the holy transcends human ability to understand the holy, which is a mystery – *mysterium tremendum and fascinans* – and could be demonic, barbaric, moving emotions. Appleby posits that some religions contributed to peace, such as among Protestants in South Africa, while others such as Islam of Hezbollah contributed to war. He states that there was an inner evolution in the religions e.g. for Catholics at the Second Vatican Council. However, he is convinced that religion and ethnicity are much combined and so he concludes: 'Ethnoreligious violence, legitimated by religious and nationalist claims, was frequently the result'.[57] Therefore the core conclusion is: 'Religion was a key component of national and ethnic identification throughout the Balkans during the conflict – even among a large number of nonbelievers who continued to accept the broad cultural traditions of their more "pious ancestors" religious beliefs'.[58] The religious identification actually increased during the war to find consolation in the bleak situation of war and destruction.

Appleby provides an historical overview of BIH and of the relationship between Serbs and Croats, especially in the NDH, *Independent States of Croats*, under Hitler. The same similarity describes the role of Mussulmen in the Ottoman Empire, in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and during both World Wars. He stated that the people were prosecuted because of their religious belonging under the Communist regime of Tito[59] and that the 'religious illiteracy – the low level or virtual absence of second-order moral reflection and basic theological knowledge among religious actor – is a structural condition that increases the likelihood of collective violence in crisis situations'.[60] In this climate the religions (or more precisely, the religiously motivated people) were

[55] Ibid., p. 44.

[56] Appleby, *Ambivalence*, p. 27.

[57] Appleby, *Ambivalence*, pp. 61–2.

[58] Ibid., p. 63.

[59] See Stanko Gerjolj, *Ideologie und Bildung: Ideologisch-politischer Totalitarismus im Bildungs-und Erziehungswesen im Kommunismus und der Versuch einer Demokratisierung am Beispiel Sloweniens*, Texte zum Ost-West-Dialog 12 (Gießen, 1997).

[60] Appleby, *Ambivalence*, p. 69.

implemented as an excuse for political violence as their 'sacred duty', despite the ground being a national-political one.[61] In this sense Appleby claimed that religious belongings and symbols motivated[62] violence against other believers, so he stressed that the cultural and religious symbols of Muslims and Churches were destroyed by the Serbian army and then by Croat nationalists, despite the motives being more ethnic than ethno-religious. Approximately 1,400 mosques were demolished.

What Kind of War was the War in BIH

As stated in the introduction, the Slovene mufti Nedzad Grabus, born in BIH, states that the war in BIH was a war for territories. The Muslims defended their territories first against the Serbian aggression then against the 'Croat Defense Council'. There was no religious war because the people did not fight for this or that religion but primarily for territory or their survival. Many other people from this area in the time of war up to today confirmed this notion to me. The destroying of mosques, churches, libraries, and other religious and cultural signs resulted from the enemies' intent to destroy the vital points of the collective life of nations. Therefore the wars in BIH and those of other states of the former republics of Yugoslavia and in other post-Communist countries open the complex dimensions of social, cultural, and political life of these nations under communist pressure. The political openness gave the opportunity for the people and nations to attempt to live their own life and to challenge new political national elites to realize their national aspiration. This freedom opened possibilities for articulating religious, national, social, political, and individual interests. These complex interests of people were often covered by the simple term the 'religious' or as an identification of religious and national problems, without reflecting on the complexity of historical, social, national, international, and religious dimensions.[63] The years of change (falls of the Communist regimes) opened the question of individual, national, political, and religious freedom. We believed that we could implement all of this peacefully through democratic processes. Nonetheless there were few suppositions for it. The majority of the new elites were former communists and devoid of any religious attitudes but knew very well the importance of symbols for mobilization of the people. Ideological and political mass media were implemented. They were a mix of

[61] Ibid., pp. 81 *et passim*.

[62] Ibid., p. 70.

[63] Wolfgang Palaver, 'The Yugoslav Crisis: A European Perspective', in: Pax Christi on the Crisis in the Former Yugoslavia (ed.), *Cry Out for the World to Hear us* (Brussels, 1992), pp. 23–8.

former communist rituals, new religious aspirations, attempts, and hopes that the time for individual and national resurrection was coming. This was occurring internationally not only by orthodox Serbs, Catholic Croats, and Slovenes. This was combined with the problem of Islam's role in Europe and in the global World. Islam was perceived as a foreign element in Europe and in the USA. Despite this it increasingly became more and more important. The memory of Turkish invasions in Europe rose again and became an excuse for European and World politicians (especially those from France and Great Britain[64], who were historically prone to Serbs) to provide a basis for a simplified perception of Muslims in Europe.[65] Beside this the political constellation of Yugoslavia and its perception among the international policy played an important role. It was supported by Yugoslav diplomacy, which was primarily in the hands of Serbs or closely aligned diplomats. The religious dimension was emphasized not only to better mobilize the nations for this undertaking but also to hide or to diminish economic, political, and social dimensions. Thus the actual global and domestic political and social issues were often set aside. It is my understanding that this is the point of the critics of the myth of religious violence by Cavanaugh.

Appleby extends the social and national problems on the religious dimension, despite the fact that he acknowledges that communism swept national and other problems under the carpet.[66] Cavanaugh states:

> Appleby's analysis of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia gives a richly detailed description of Christian and Muslim participation in the violence, the use of Christian and Muslim symbols to legitimate violence, and the complicity of some churches and mosques in condoning the violence. What it does not do is to provide a serious warrant for attributing violence to a *sui generis* serious interior impulse labelled religion. Appleby appropriately criticizes those apologists who, in analysing the conflict in former Yugoslavia' downplayed the religious dimension of the war and argued that political economic, and cultural factors were far more prominent in causing and sustaining it – as if 'culture' were a category somehow independent of religion'. Unfortunately, Appleby continues to treat religion as if it were a category somehow independent of culture.[67]

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[64] This was confirmed by the former president of the EU Commission Jacques Lucien Jean Delors to the author of this article at the XIIth IAUP (International Association of University Presidents) Triennial Conference *Touchstones for a Modern University Culture* on 12 July 1999.

[65] Appleby (*Ambivalence*, p. 327) quotes a Muslim leader describing the war in his republic as 'a kind of crusade against Islam and Muslim in Bosnia and Herzegovina', whose purpose was 'to eliminate Islam and Muslims in this part of the world' (Paul Mojzes, *Yugoslavian Inferno: Ethnoreligious Warfare in the Balkans* (New York, 1994), p. 46).

[66] Appleby, *Ambivalence*, pp. 64 *et passim*.

[67] Cavanaugh, *Myth*, p. 48.

Both Appleby and Cavanaugh stress the importance of religious symbols for Serbs. Many but not all leading orthodox bishops and priests supported the political leaders S. Milošević, R. Mladić and R. Karadžić. They allowed themselves to be usurped for nationalist purposes. In this sense Vrcan cites Djordević that among Serbian Orthodoxy the 'traditionalism is prevailing'[68]. The level of ordinary ecumenical and religious consciousness among Serbs certifies Atanasije Jeftić, professor of Serbian Orthodox Faculty from Belgrade – at the time of the war the bishop of Zahumje-Herzegovina – who said to me that our colleague, professor of Theological Faculty of Ljubljana, Franc Perko – later catholic archbishop of Belgrade – is a good guy, but the matter of ecumenism is like this: 'You (Catholics) are there, we are here'. Religious education was blocked under the Communist regime, not only by ordinary people but also by intellectuals, including theologians – viewing the problem of freedom as a relic of the totalitarian past. Professor Jeftić, like many Serbian, Croat, or Slovene theological and other humanistic intellectuals, was a well-educated theologian but incapable of being an enlightened cosmopolite. Religious education among the Orthodox (Serbs, Macedonians, Montenegrins) and Muslims in Bosnia in the 1970s was very weak.[69] Appleby asserts that 'the majority of urban Yugoslavians became ipso facto "irreligious"'.[70] But religion was for post-communists usurped by politicians to implement their social and national interests. In Slovenia, Milan Kučan used the same tactic to preserve power trying to usurp religious motivation with presupposition that the religious sphere must remain private because Church and public religiosity would be harmful. Examples by Cavanaugh who criticized authors and many other intellectuals of the world show that the enlightened attitude of intellectuals is no broader regarding virtues or as Girard states concerning the relation to truth. Cavanaugh:

> We must conclude that there is no coherent way to isolate religious ideologies with a peculiar tendency toward violence from their tamer secular counterparts. People kill for all kinds of reasons. An adequate approach to the problem must begin with empirical investigations into the conditions under which beliefs and practices such as jihad, the invisible hand of the market, the sacrificial atonement of Christ, and the role of the United States as worldwide liberator turn violent. The point is that any distinction between secular and religious violence is unhelpful, misleading, mystifying, and should be avoided together.[71]

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[68] Vrcan, 'Christian Confession', p. 365.

[69] Leonard. J. Cohen, 'Bosnias "tribal Gods": The Role of Religion in Nationalist Politics', in: Paul Mojzes (ed.), *Religion and the War in Bosnia*, American Academy of Religion 3 (Atlanta, GA, 1998), pp. 43–75, here p. 47.

[70] Appleby, *Ambivalence*, p. 69.

[71] Cavanaugh, *Myth*, p. 56.

The Post-totalitarian Dilemmas

The post-Communist condition of the former Yugoslavia and other post-Communist countries are in some sense indicators of unresolved problems of a pre-Communist time and a test of a societies' capability to address them. This includes the very complex problem of the relationship between religion and the development of modern society. The denial of problems in the communist era intensified them and afterwards solving them became much more complicated.

The liberals were a decisive factor in the fusion between the Kingdom of Serbia and the South Slavs from the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy in 1918. Previously Slovene liberals fought against the Catholics because they couldn't achieve a majority in the political sphere. They made use of these changes and connected themselves with the Serbian liberals to acquire power over the Slovenes. Despite the fact that the Slovene Peoples Party was the most influential among the Slovenes, a liberal alliance with Freemasons' lodges in Europe succeeded in influencing the political process in Versailles and afterwards in the country.[72] The Freemasons were very active all over the world.[73] The Serbian liberal government, with the help of these international alliances, took power over other nations without granting them a constitutional basis. This caused tensions among Yugoslav nations. Serbs, as the most powerful nation among them, usurped the governing other nations. The culmination of this was the royal dictatorship of King Alexander on 6 January 1929, which ended with the assassination of Alexander in Marseille (10 October 1934), organized by the Croatian Ustasha movement. The liberals in Yugoslavia started a campaign directed against the Catholic Church. The endeavour for a concordat between (first) Yugoslavia and the Holy See failed at the end of 1937 because Serbian liberal circles supported by the Serbian Orthodox Church and Yugoslav communists rejected such an agreement.[74] In the difficult circumstances of this cultural struggle the Catholic Church sought a legally guaranteed position from the state, but this was against the conception of liberal circles. The orthodox Christians in Serbia (in Macedonia under Serbian patronage) retained such a position under the Serbian national kingdom. The Muslims tried to preserve the position of the former Islamic Ottoman state. The difficulty remained for the Catholic Croats and Slovenes. They held partial rights in the kingdom of Yugoslavia and were even more oppressed in the communist Yugoslavia. As Griesser-Pečar claims: 'The Roman Catholic Church was particularly deeply harmed. Against this enemy Nr. 1 of the Communist regime up to the democratic changes of 1990/91 the Communist government mobilized a lot

[72] Alexander, *Triple Myth*, p. 30.
[73] Casanova, *Public Religions*, p. 116.
[74] Alexander, *Triple Myth*, pp. 31–7.

of tough measures'.[75] Like in other countries, as Casanova states, the religious worldview was replaced by a scientific or atheistic one. In totalitarian regimes it was a systematic and open struggle against the Christian Churches and other religious communities.

They were supported by Freemasons and later during the war they played a decisive ideological role for the communists. Slovene liberals were the most important ideological vehicles of the Yugoslav communists. The struggle against religion was one of their main goals. In the propaganda against other Christian political groups they implemented detailed methods of prosecution and control. The changes in 1989 could not immediately remove the consequences of this consciousness especially among post-Communist leaders. Therefore on one side the Ustasha needed the Church, and on the other side struggled against the Catholic leaders who opposed the victimization of the Serbs and of other groups. The case was the same in the wars following the changes in 1989. Bishop Komarica was against the division of BIH and he criticized the Croat President Tudjman because he conceded to the ethnic cleansing of the Croats in BIH and in Krajina.[76] The Croat operation *Oluja* (*Storm*) from 4 to 7 August 1995, which ended the war in Croatia, pursued the same goals. The national, post-Communist, liberal, and anti-religious elites decided to take power in their milieus. The old communist classes needed to be replaced by new national-liberal ones and religions were simply the means for this undertaking.

The history of the development of Yugoslav societies gives us sufficient reasons for the modern conflicts in this area. The comparison to European development shows that the history here was condensed: imperialism clashed here; for a long time power silenced the national questions; social problems were not resolved. The Churches and religions as in most European lands chose the easier path of fellow travellers and did not take measures to develop new ways for new times as Andrić said about the Franciscans in BIH.[77] The real power in the society rested in the hands of the communist elites. Following the example of Tito all leaders in new republics usurped power transforming it into new democratic authority. Usually the old elites were replaced. The only exception was Slovenia where, following the war, the Serbs' elites remained. In Kosovo and Vojvodina the national Hungarian (Vojvodina) and Albanian (Kosovo) elites were replaced by elites who subordinated them to new Serb-national elites. In Croatia the Serbs were removed from leadership positions, similarly in other republics. The major problems were in BIH. The replacement of former

[75] Tamara Griesser-Pečar, *Das zerrissene Volk. Slowenien 1941–1946: Okkupation, Kollaboration, Bürgerkrieg, Revolution* (Wien/Köln/Graz, 2003), p. 537.

[76] In a personal conversation on 5 December 2004 in Ljubljana; see Komarica, *U obrani obespravljenih*.

[77] Andrić, *Travniška kronika*.

elites was an immediate cause of crisis. Actually in the former Yugoslavia the communist elites were primarily Serbs and they were widespread in the other republics of Yugoslavia. The attempt to form national (listic) states required the replacement of old elites with the new national ones.[78]

The wars in Yugoslavia raised the consequences of collectivism and its problems to the surface. The new political elites were allowed to gather their nations but were not permitted to replace the old totalitarian habits with new democratic ones. The revolutionary logic, which is opposed to the religious one, still remained. According to Berdjajew, the communist man was a rough man, a man of violence.[79] It also meant that violence rather than democracy prevailed over Christian societal values, sensibilities, and mentalities.

Anti-religious Violence

The post-Communist societies are an abridgment of the complex labyrinths of modern society. According to Jacques Monod[80] the exclusion of a spiritual dimension is a completely new moment in the history of humankind and the history of (post)-Marxism demonstrates that the solving of societal problems by austere means is just a temporary solution. Marxist societies were – in Girardian terms – prone to finding a scapegoat and primarily these were religious persons. In such difficult times of violent implementation of communism in Slovenia the bishop Anton Vovk from Ljubljana was watched by secret police almost every night and was attacked on the train and on the train station of Novo mesto during his journey to Novo mesto on 20 January 1952. Gasoline was poured over him and he was set on fire. He survived but the attack left him with serious health issues. During the war in BIH Prijedor Ivica Grgić, a parish priest, was murdered because he was a very talented and perceptive Catholic cleric. The Serbs intended that that area be an ethnically clean Serbian territory.

The Yugoslav crisis is a sad consequence of such societal distress. The other Churches and religions were scapegoats for the unsolved problems of (post-) Communist society. The believers were often and still are subjected to (verbal) attacks and violence. Similarly Christians in several Islamic countries are tools of unsolved socio-political problems. The politicians and their intellectual or religious advisers often used the partisans of other religions to target their political ambitions, hiding the political and imperial motives with so called 'religious'

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78 Brubaker, 'National Minorities', p. 122.

79 Nikolai Berdjajew, *Wahrheit und Lüge des Kommunismus* (Wien, 1977).

80 Jacques Monod, 'Zufall und Notwendigkeit: Philosophische Fragen der modernen *Biologie', in: Willi Oelmüller, Ruth Dölle-Oelmüller, and Carl Friedrich Geyer (eds), Philosophische Arbeitsbücher 7: Diskurs Mensch* (Paderborn, 1990), pp. 272–82.

ones. Such orientation leads to the myth of religious violence. The liberal ambitions were difficult to implement without including the societal virtues. Communitarians argue against liberals (Rawls) and this is simply a problem of post-totalitarian societies. According to Cavanaugh it is easier to accuse the other than to reflect upon oneself: 'In addition to abnormalization of the Other, secularist discourse – and the myth of religious violence in particular – helps to form consent for foreign policies by diverting attention away from scrutiny of past policies and theirs effects'.[81] In communist society the other, especially the religious other, was declared a class enemy and projected as a violent, societal destructive agent. Under this prejudice the religious other could be attacked.

For its many avid consumers in the West, the myth of religious violence serves on the domestic scene to marginalize discourses and practices labelled religious, especially those associated with Christian churches, particularly in Europe, with Muslim groups. The myth helps to reinforce adherence to a secular social order and the nation-state that guarantees it. '... The myth of religious violence is also useful, therefore, for justifying secular violence against religious actors; their irrational violence must be met with rational violence. ... The myth of religious violence should finally be seen for what it is: an important part of the folklore of Western societies. It does not identify any facts about the world, but rather authorizes certain arrangements of power in the modern West. It is a story of salvation from mortal peril by the creation of a secular national state'.[82]

Tony Judt's analysis of European history is a good example of the missing role of intellectuals with critical relations to the political power.[83] This was the case in the Yugoslav crisis too. The domestic (and world) intellectuals, religious leaders, and politicians were not able or not ready to reason out problems. This is a very delicate question regarding the estimation of the religious dimension of politics, as Cavanaugh asserts. It depends on which political side one is involved. But the difference is that the Islamic societies are able to find scapegoats in the western societies; meanwhile the western liberal societies accuse Islam to be a violent religion (terrorism). In the opinion of non-Serbian intellectuals after the changes of 1989 the Serbian intellectual elite was accused of going its own way and being not ready to dialogize the 'Yugoslav' question with the others. Surprisingly many orthodox bishops were not ready for it too. Everybody assumed these reactions to be nationalistic not religious. Despite the fact they supported their own state, the Croat Catholic bishops were pushed into the war and had to protect their people. Many of

[81] Cavanaugh, *Myth*, p. 207.

[82] Ibid., pp. 225–6.

[83] Tony Judt, with Timothy Snyder, *Thinking the Twentieth Century* (New York, 2012), pp. 98 *et passim*.

them, especially the bishops of BIH, criticized the Tudjman policy of ethnic cleansing in BIH. Some of them stated that, despite the national and political tensions among these nations, the war could not begin without the blessing of the world political community. In the same way bishop Komarica repeatedly asserted that he had trustworthy information from Western diplomats about the case. He accused Western politicians that as Christians they were not able to protect their sisters and brothers in faith.[84]

The myth of religious violence is personal and a societal ideational problem. In communism the religion was a cause of people's misery. In the post-Communist societies the culture struggle (*Kulturkampf*) still prevails as is the case in Slovenia with an open medial anti-religious struggle, which aims at the exclusion of religion from the societal consciousness. The students on some faculties of the University of Ljubljana remain shamed by some professors because of religious conviction. The myth of religious violence is often transmitted as a violent relation between the consumer and competitive society.[85] The more we are oriented toward austere goods and engaged in the worldly dimensions of life, the more difficult it is to solve the problems without excluding others. The new dimension of myth of religious violence was opened following the expansion of the socio-political importance of Islam in western culture.[86] There are many political positions founded on this paradigm and authors are often encouraged to fabricate 'religious' reasons for political decisions. The religions were often the focus of unjustified fears without any real significance as Martha Nussbaum points out.[87] Fear as a 'narcissist emotion' can effectively cover up really important societal, economic, and political problems. Even when religions lose central societal importance their emotional grounds cause unjustified fear, which is ground for different accusations. The accusation that 'religion is violent' is often a reason for hiding real political origins or of other problems.

Violence as a Lack of Spiritual Dimension

According to David Martin violence is not a matter of religion but a matter of survival and greed, which ignores the basic concept of religion. This is

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[84] Komarica, *U obrani obespravljenih*.

[85] Robert Kurz, *Weltordnungskrieg: Das Ende der Souveränität und die Wandlungen des Imperialismus im Zeitalter der Globalisierung* (Bad Honnef, 2003).

[86] Cavanaugh, *Myth*, p. 222.

[87] Martha C. Nussbaum, *The New Religious Intolerance* (Cambridge, MA/London, 2012), p. 31.

implemented in complex historical circumstances in various ways.[88] Today we are facing a new challenge, a new moment in modern civilization, which Jacques Monod describes 'as rejection of centuries old spiritual tradition where spirituality is a decisive source of knowledge'.[89] The separation of politics and other spheres of societal life from religion is a complex process. The enlightenment project needs to be completed by addressing an important anthropological dimension of each person – the spiritual one. The lack of a religious–spiritual dimension caused wars in post-Communist countries, because the people had no ethical grounds to challenge the otherness but only posed the borders to the other viewing the other as a class enemy. Enlightenment's ideologies, especially in their violent communist forms, opened struggles against religion. 'However, as the Newtonian Enlightenment crossed the Channel, it became patently radicalized and militantly antireligious. Science was transformed into a scientific and scientist worldview which claimed to have replaced religion in the same way a new scientific paradigm replaces an outmoded one'.[90] As much as exclusiveness consumed societies, this struggle was becoming more cruel and inhumane. The sideways of societies, caused by the unwillingness of the ruling classes (tsars, pashas, kings, including religious leaders[91]) to establish better social conditions, was a source of protest, revolutions, and wars. A very proper scapegoat was religion and the Churches, which were accused as the source of this social misery. In actuality the Christians contributed to this situation. The Darwinian paradigm of exclusion of others prevailed and 'the ideology of success dominated'[92] and led to the destruction of others[93] with 'the invisible hand of market'.[94] The ideas of racism, nationalism, chosen classes and races, and of 'better people' prevailed; all others were excluded. The story of both Yugoslavias confirms that the absence of a spiritual culture could not solve the burning societal problems. The anti-religious sentiment expressed by the exclusion of religious others could be overcome only by a dialogical, empathic, and plural society. This is a challenge for Europe, the world, and in particular for post-Communist countries. Nevertheless, as Cavanaugh states for the USA: 'Christian theological arguments have had minimal influence on the actual development and marketing of U.S. foreign policy'[95], could be

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[88] David Martin, *The Future of Christianity: Reflections on Violence and Democracy, Religion and Secularization* (Farnham, 2011).

[89] Monod, 'Zufall und Notwendigkeit', p. 281.

[90] Casanova, *Public Religions*, p. 24.

[91] Pipes, *Concise History*, part I.

[92] Girard, *Scapegoat*, p. 157.

[93] Kurz, *Weltordnungskrieg*, p. 70.

[94] Cavanaugh, *Myth*, p. 226.

[95] Ibid., p. 225.

applied more generally. The books supporting this direct way of politics are *New York Times*' bestsellers.[96]

Liberal Enlightenment is, therefore, a project based on '*a mistake about the world,* the *seculum*'.[97] This mistake is conditioned by the refusal of the religious consciousness among modern challengers of former Christianity, which make their attempts much more combative. Graham Ward also exposes a cultural view of religion and its importance in the modern plural society. He compares religion to other cultural forms of a postmodern lifestyle, especially to 'neo-tribal forms of relation'.[98] But he is arguing that religion is 'providing a symbolic capital empty of content and yet pre-eminently consumable', and on the other side 'we have strong theological commitments increasingly confident about voicing and voicing aggressively their moral and spiritual differences'.[99] He cherishes hope that religions as cultural forms in the postmodern world will meet each other, deepening their beliefs' substance, and enriching each other. According to Ward the 'search for the true religion is over. It is over for two reasons: first, because postmodernity does not trade in truths, it trades in interpretations and information; second, because where truth remains important it is partially for the true faith – whether that faith is Judaism, Christianity, Hinduism or Islam'.[100]

Ward continues saying that 'at the moment we are not returning to the Wars of Religion. Given the vapid meaning of "religion" today, it is difficult to see how wars could be waged in its name. Each orthodoxy can operate in the same civic space. The common enemy, at this time, is the ideology of liberalism itself, its self-righteous religious veneer and the collapse of a moral order brought about by an aggressive consumerism that delights in transgressing boundaries'.[101]

Our suggestion originates from Girard.[102] To reach the truth presupposes that one (and the total collective) is clear about his/her own concepts and aims, which requires enormous individual efforts and complex societal processes toward truth. To be honest to him/herself and to others (to enemies) means to cooperate. This way of reconciliation is grounded on empathic personalities and societies.[103] Religions encourage us to walk the way of respect and

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96 Ibid., p. 212.

97 Martin, *Future*, p. 179.

98 Graham Ward, *True Religion* (Oxford, 2005), 137.

99 Ibid., 138.

100 Ibid., 139.

101 Ibid.

102 Girard, *Scapegoat*.

103 Jeremy Rifkin, *The Emphatic Civilization: The Race to Global Consciousness in a World of Crisis* (New York, 2009); Frans De Waal, *Das Prinzip Empathie: Was wir von der Natur für eine bessere Gesellschaft lernen können*, trans., H. Kober (München, 2001).

recognize the dignity of each person.[104] 'Transcendent personalism provides good reasons to tolerate many other and different views'.[105] The respect of person is fundamental in overcoming the problems of violence. This is not only a societal but also an individual spiritual problem, which involves the question what it means to be human, and whether we are ready to accept our spiritual dimension. We cannot define ourselves only by negation. Rather we have to discover a positive personal ground, which is personally exchangeable and could transcend our limitations and offer us the courage to be open to each other.[106]

[104] Vojko Strahovnik, 'Globalization, Globalized Ethics and Moral Theory', *Synthesis philosophica*, 24/2 (2009): 209–18, here p. 215.

[105] Bojan Žalec, 'On Not Knowing Who We Are: The Ethical Importance of Transcendental Anthropology', *Synthesis philosophica*, 26/1 (2011): 105–15, here p. 113.

[106] I would like to thank Vojko Strahovnik, Erika Prijatelj, Wolfgang Palaver, and Tamara Griesser-Pečar for helpful comments in preparing this contribution.

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Chapter 12

The Debate About the European Wars of Religion as a Challenge to Interdisciplinary Cooperation

Wolfgang Palaver

In the Western world, especially in Europe, religion has often been accused of being the main root of violence in our world. Closely connected to this accusation is a master narrative that it was the European Wars of Religion that led to the secular state enabling people to live in peace and tolerate each other. This master narrative identifies religion with violence whereas the secular state is seen as the tool for peace towards which the modern world seems to be heading. A quote from Richard Dawkins's book *The God Delusion* illustrates the widely shared identification of religion with violence referring also to the European wars of religions by mentioning the Gunpowder Plot (1605) a failed assassination attempt against King James I of England by English Catholics:

> Imagine, with John Lennon, a world with no religion. Imagine no suicide bombers, no 9/11, no 7/7, no Crusades, no witch-hunts, no Gunpowder Plot, no Indian partition, no Israeli/Palestinian wars, no Serb/Croat/Muslim massacres, no persecution of Jews as 'Christ-killers', no Northern Ireland 'troubles', no 'honour killings' ... Imagine no Taliban to blow up ancient statues, no public beheadings of blasphemers, no flogging of female skin for the crime of showing an inch of it.[1]

I do not want to belittle at all the excesses of violence that happened during these so-called European Wars of Religion between 1520 and 1648. It was truly one of the bloodiest periods in modern Western history.[2] The cruelty in these wars was so exorbitant that terms like 'massacre' or 'cannibal' became part of common parlance during these years.[3] But if we think we can look down on these violent

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1 Richard Dawkins, *The God Delusion* (Boston, 2006), pp. 1–2.

2 Steven Pinker, *The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined* (New York, 2011), p. 293.

3 Russell Jacoby, *Bloodlust: On the Roots of Violence from Cain and Abel to the Present* (New York, 2011), p. 12.

excesses from a morally higher ground that has overcome all violence we would overlook all those violent periods that came later like the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars or World Wars I and II. It was the Austrian writer Robert Musil who, by reflecting on his experiences during World War I, rejected typical modern claims that cannibalism is something of the past. He became convinced that human beings might turn into cannibals at any time: 'Human nature is as capable of cannibalism as it is of the *Critique of Pure Reason*'.[4]

Of course, Dawkins's polemical quote shows undoubtedly how much he overlooks the fact that in more recent centuries it were more often institutions and actors with no direct links to religions that caused the most severe excesses of violence. We can turn to Stephen Pinker's study *The Better Angels of Our Nature* to find a more balanced account about the roots of violence. Pinker does not immediately point towards religion but talks more broadly about ideology as the common ground of huge violent outbursts from the time of the Crusades to the contemporary world:

> It's ideology that drove many of the worst things that people have ever done to each other. They include the Crusades, the European Wars of Religion, the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, the Russian and Chinese civil wars, the Vietnam War, the Holocaust, and the genocides of Stalin, Mao, and Pol Pot. An ideology can be dangerous for several reasons. The infinite good it promises prevents its true believers from cutting a deal. It allows any number of eggs to be broken to make the utopian omelet. And it renders opponents of the ideology infinitely evil and hence deserving of infinite punishment.[5]

Pinker sees the European religious wars as part of those ideologies that generate violence. Although he even links fascism and Marxism to religion – which illustrates a too broad use of this term – he does not overlook that religions have also worked against violence.[6] In the end, however, he parts from those new atheists like Dawkins who focus too much on religion to explain the causes of violence:

> Religion plays no single role in the history of violence because religion has not been a single force in the history of anything. The vast set of movements we call religions have little in common but their distinctness from the secular institutions that are recent appearances on the human stage.[7]

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[4] Robert Musil, *The Man without Qualities*, trans., Sophie Wilkins, 2 vols (New York, 1995), vol. I, p. 391; cf. Robert Musil, *Precision and Soul: Essays and Addresses*, trans., Burton Pike and David S. Luft (Chicago, 1995), p. 121.

[5] Pinker, *The Better Angels*, p. 556; cf. p. 328.

[6] Ibid., p. 677.

[7] Ibid., p. 678.

Despite this more balanced view of the relationship between religion and violence he does not, however, really detach himself from the usual understanding of the religious wars seemingly necessitating the emergence of the secular state. Both Dawkins and Pinker represent the spectrum of approaches on the relationship between violence and religion that is typical of today's scientists and that is also close to the typical master narrative going along with the common understanding of the European Wars of Religion.

When I myself worked in the 1980s on the relationship between religion and politics in the political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes I saw no real alternative to the widespread master narrative comprising the times of the European Wars of Religion.[8] William Cavanaugh's early article on the myth of the religious wars showed me for the first time from a theological point of view that these wars should rather be understood as the birth pangs of the modern state than as religious wars as such.[9] Later José Casanova underlined in some way this perspective from a sociological perspective in his keynote lecture at the 2008 meeting of the working group 'Religion – Politics – Violence' at the University of Innsbruck.[10] Casanova called the usual understanding of the European Wars of Religion a 'foundational myth' that he describes in the following way:

> The religious wars of Early Modern Europe did not ensue, at least not immediately, into the secular state but rather into the confessional one. The principle cuius regio eius religio, established first at the Peace of Augsburg, is not the formative principle of the modern secular democratic state, but rather that of the modern confessional territorial absolutist state. Nowhere in Europe did religious conflict lead to secularization, but rather to the confessionalization of the state and to the territorialization of religions and peoples. Moreover, this early modern dual pattern of confessionalization and territorialization was already well established before the religious wars and even before the Protestant Reformation.[11]

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[8] Wolfgang Palaver, *Politik und Religion bei Thomas Hobbes: Eine Kritik aus der Sicht der Theorie René Girards*, Innsbrucker Theologische Studien 33 (Innsbruck, 1991); Wolfgang Palaver, 'Hobbes and the Katéchon: The Secularization of Sacrificial Christianity', *Contagion: Journal of Violence, Mimesis, and Culture* 2 (1995): 37–54.

[9] William T. Cavanaugh, '"A Fire Strong Enough to Consume the House": The Wars of Religion and the Rise of the State', *Modern Theology* 11/4 (1995): 397–420; cf. William T. Cavanaugh, *The Myth of Religious Violence: Secular Ideology and the Roots of Modern Conflict* (Oxford, 2009), pp. 123–80.

[10] José Casanova, 'Eurocentric Secularism and the Challenge of Globalization', *Innsbrucker Diskussionspapiere zu Weltordnung, Religion und Gewalt* no. 25 (2008): http://www.uibk.ac.at/plattform-wrg/idwrg/idwrg_25.pdf (accessed 22 February 2014).

[11] Ibid., p. 9.

But how are historians today interpreting the European religious wars? At first, I have to admit that I supposed that most of them would rather buy into the usual master narrative. But this biased view of historians was definitely wrong. Several historians have recently developed a much more nuanced view of the religious wars and the emergence of the modern nation state. Luise Schorn-Schütte, a German historian whose book I was reading at first when I tried to come to a better understanding of the perspective of historians, emphasizes the dovetailing of religion and the political against all too simplified concepts that focus only on religious or political dimensions of these wars.[12] Also those historians that participated at our meeting of the working group 'Religion – Politics – Violence' at the University of Innsbruck in 2012 – I mention especially Brigitte Mazohl and Harriet Rudolph – did not question the critique of the all too simply master narrative about the emergence of a peaceful secular state out of the wars of religion. Also, in his book from 2009, William Cavanaugh clearly states that with very few exceptions '*no* academic historian ... tells the story that way'.[13]

What I would like to emphasize regarding Cavanaugh's analysis is his valuable insight that the modern state itself tends to fulfil a religious role if we think of nationalism and modern wars. In order to strengthen the religion of nationalism the myth about the European religious wars had to be invoked. The most striking example Cavanaugh mentions in his book is a Supreme Court case in the United States from 1940 in which the 'compulsory pledging of allegiance to the U.S. flag' was upheld against Jehovah's Witnesses.[14] Cavanaugh quotes Justice Felix Frankfurter who invoked the threat of 'bitter religious struggles' to justify the enforcement of national unity.[15] Cavanaugh summarizes this typical use of the myth of religious wars in a striking way:

> In the West, revulsion toward killing and dying in the name of one's religion is one of the principal means by which we become convinced that killing and dying in the name of the nation-state is laudable and proper.[16]

Quite recently, Stanley Hauerwas, a widely recognized US-American theologian and Cavanaugh's doctoral father published a book that criticized the recent wars of the United States as a counter liturgy underlining by this indirectly how the allegiance to the state has turned into a quasi-religious obligation: 'War is

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[12] Luise Schorn-Schütte, *Konfessionskriege und europäische Expansion: Europa 1500–1648*, C.-H.-Beck-Geschichte Europas (München, 2010). See also her article in this volume.

[13] Cavanaugh, *The Myth of Religious Violence*, p. 155.

[14] Ibid., p. 184.

[15] Ibid., pp. 184–5.

[16] Ibid., pp. 4–5.

America's central liturgical act necessary to renew our sense that we are a nation unlike other nations'.[17]

The Storytelling Animal: Why Humans are in Need of Grand Narratives

If it is true that more and more scholars – historians, sociologists, philosophers, and theologians – deconstruct and criticize the myth of religious violence coming along with the usual master narrative about the European religious wars, the question remains why this myth still dominates the Western intellectual milieu. Why are there so many social philosophers, journalists, jurists, and other people still relying on this myth? I think the main problems lie in the fact that there is no alternative master narrative that could step in for the deconstructed older one. During our debate in 2012 some historians told us that the main task of history is to deconstruct master narratives and that the complexity of historical structures and processes does not easily allow the task of construction. Interestingly, also, William Cavanaugh distances himself from such a claim in his recent book: 'I do not have an alternative theopolitics of my own to present in this book. The purpose of this book is negative: to contribute to a dismantling of the myth of religious violence'.[18]

Modern history is, of course, first of all forced to focus on sources, documents, and facts and not on grand narratives. But human beings need master narratives to make sense out of all those facts and findings history collects from the past. The philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre rightly emphasized the fact that humans are story-telling animals: 'Deprive children of stories and you leave them unscripted, anxious stutterers in their actions as in their words. Hence there is no way to give us an understanding of any society, including our own, except through the stock of stories which constitute its initial dramatic resources'.[19] Today, the importance of narratives has become even more obvious. The American literary scholar Jonathan Gottschall, a leading thinker in the movement toward a more scientific humanities whose research draws on literature, art, and science, underlined in his recent book *The Storytelling Animal* the importance of narratives and stories for human life: 'Humans are creatures of story, so story touches nearly every aspect of our lives. Archaeologists dig up clues in the stones and bones and piece them together into a saga about the past. Historians, too, are storytellers'.[20] According

[17] Stanley Hauerwas, *War and the American Difference: Theological Reflections on Violence and National Identity* (Grand Rapids, MI., 2011), p. 4.

[18] Cavanaugh, *The Myth of Religious Violence*, p. 14.

[19] Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory*, 3rd edition (Notre Dame, 2007), p. 216.

[20] Jonathan Gottschall, *The Storytelling Animal: How Stories Make Us Human* (Boston, 2012), p. 15.

to Gottschall, also, religion is very much linked to the human need for stories: 'Religion is the ultimate expression of story's dominion over our minds. ... We have religion because, by nature, we abhor explanatory vacuums. In sacred fiction, we find the master confabulations of the storytelling mind'.[21] Gottschall has a very balanced view of religion seeing its beneficiary social function as well as its dark sides. For the present task Gottschall's insight into the necessary link between history and storytelling is most important. Already the term history itself refers us directly to the term story. The German term *Geschichte* too, comprises both these meanings.

Gottschall's reference to archaeology is really a good and eye-opening example. Michael Balter's book about the archaeological work in Çatalhöyük, the Neolithic proto-city settlement in Anatolia, provides a strong case for the importance of storytelling. Balter reports about a session by Ruth Tringham on 'storytelling' in which she argued 'that it was the archaeologist's job to go beyond the dry data and create "narratives" about the past'.[22] A colleague of her summarized this insight in his diary the next day: 'Interesting discussion last night about archaeology and storytelling – i.e. putting flesh on the bare bones. It's something we are duty bound to do but the question is how. I have always felt that excavation directors should be scientific novelists'.[23]

What we can observe in the field of archaeology is, of course, also true of history that, too, relies on storytelling. But the fact that history narrates its findings and observations does not automatically mean that is has to buy into master narratives. There is nevertheless a certain pressure on history to do exactly this. It was again the Austrian writer Robert Musil who clearly realized in the early 1920s that even history is – willingly or not – forced to contribute to a broader narrative framework. He realized that scientific thinking in the modern world led to an overwhelming 'plenitude of facts' and that:

> faced with an excess of facts, historical research necessarily grew ever more pragmatic and exact: the result was a nightmare, a mountain of facts growing larger by the hour, knowledge won, life lost – a failure of the soul. ... For roughly since our grandfathers' generation – that is, in a time of growing pragmatization of all thought, during which philosophy shied away from philosophizing – history had to assume as a side office philosophy's task of interpreting life, and as a result appears afflicted with two guilty consciences: a pragmatic one that scoffs at the outmodedness of a philosophy of history, and a philosophical one that sighs

[21] Ibid., pp. 119, 121.

[22] Michael Balter, *The Goddess and the Bull* (New York, 2005), p. 152.

[23] Ibid.

> about soulless pragmatism, since one can't do without sweeping perspectives that bring order to things.[24]

Musil, of course, knew also that not only history was affected by this excess of facts but that it characterized all sciences in our modern world contributing to a growing specialization going along with an increasing lack of synthesis that, however, should not be seen as something negative but as a reminder that no offer of synthesis is acceptable that does not match with the facts:

> True ... the development tended more towards breadth than depth. As they multiplied, the exact sciences splintered into specializations, and attempts at synthesis, however impressive their individual achievements may have been, could not keep pace; one might almost say that all the disadvantages of a democracy of facts had been established; here too the mountain, the pressure of rising alps, displaced them, as it had already buried the human achievements of history. But it is nearly always presented, quite erroneously, as if it were a merely negative characteristic of our time, that it – briefly put – has no philosophy, and this lack is portrayed as a sign of its inability to produce one. It is much more a sign that can also be evaluated as positive, for pragmatists accustomed to climbing on the firm rungs of facts can only laugh at the philosophies offered by our custodians of culture. This age has no philosophy less because it is unable to produce one than because of its unwillingness to accept offerings that don't fit the facts.[25]

We have to agree with Musil that facts cannot be dismissed or ignored. Historians have a special obligation to insist on the importance of facts, sources, and documents and there are some good reasons that they do not buy too quickly into some master narrative. But historians share with all the other disciplines the responsibility to develop a narrative framework to bring all the facts into a synthesis. It may be true that it is very difficult to develop a master narrative that brings all facts into one big framework. Maybe there are even several different master narratives that have to fulfil this role. This may be true at least for some time.

In order to develop such a narrative framework the collaboration of many different disciplines is necessary. Whereas historians have a special obligation to take care that the facts are taken seriously it is the main responsibility of philosophers, social theorists, and theologians to contribute to a broader narrative framework. It needs the collaboration of all these different disciplines to bring both these two approaches together. Only through collaboration can we build a counterforce against the growing specialization that leaves us with

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[24] Musil, *Precision and Soul*, p. 123.

[25] Ibid., p. 126.

nothing but mountains of facts lacking a narrative synthesis that we storytelling animals are so much in need of.

A Future Master Narrative Needs a More Substantive View of Religion

In the following I would like to provide a rough sketch how a new master narrative that could replace the old myth about the religious wars could look like. The debate about the European Wars of Religion is often also a debate about the rise of Western modernity and its relation to Christianity. Frequently we come across two camps that fight each other fiercely but give all too simple answers to this difficult question. Those who hate religion and see modernity as something only loosely related to Christianity hold up the typical myth about the European religious wars identifying violence with religion. On the other side we find those who hate modernity and side with religion blaming modernity for all that is evil and the violence in our world. This second camp views modernity as an antithesis to Christianity blaming modernity to be the main root of violence. Both these two perspectives are false. We have already criticized the common myth about the wars of religion with its much too simple identification of violence with religion. But also the opposite perspective is false by overlooking or minimizing violent acts by religious people. During our meeting in Innsbruck in 2012 it were especially the historians who insisted that all those facts pointing towards a religious dimension in these wars should not be dismissed too quickly. But also William Cavanaugh does not claim that Christianity or the churches are free of violence. In his book he clearly rejects such an exculpatory apology:

> I have no doubt that ideologies and practices of all kinds – including, for example, Islam and Christianity – can and do promote violence under certain conditions. What I challenge as incoherent is the argument that there is something called religion – a genus of which Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, and so on are species – which is necessarily more inclined toward violence than are ideologies and institutions that are identified as secular. Unlike other books on religion and violence, I do not argue that religion either does or does not promote violence, but rather I analyse the political conditions under which the very category of religion is constructed. This book, then, is not a defense of religion against the charge of violence.[26]

But how can we criticize the usual myth about the European Wars of Religion without succumbing to an exculpatory apologetics of the Christian past? In order to overcome this problem I suggest that we follow Charles Taylor's insight that the

[26] Cavanaugh, *The Myth of Religious Violence*, p. 5.

work of the social critic and theologian Ivan Illich might help us to come to a new understanding of how Christianity and modernity relate to each other:

> The place of Christianity in the rise of Western modernity has been under discussion for more than a century. Those who are sympathetic to religion tend ... to give it an important place, and those who are less so ... tend to minimize its role. ... for or against modernity, for or against religion ... Illich changes the very terms of the debate. For him, modernity is neither the fulfilment nor the antithesis of Christianity, but its *perversion*.[27]

We have to look for perversion of Christianity prior to the time of the European Wars of Religion to reach a better understanding of the so-called religious wars. In the following I will focus on important developments inside the Church during the Middle Ages to show that perversions of Christianity contributed to the later outbreak of violence in these wars. In Cavanaugh's book we find an important hint to Ernst Kantorowicz's work on the political theology of the Middle Ages that shows how the modern state became sacralized by taking over certain functions and roles that were previously occupied by the church. Cavanaugh refers to the idea of martyrdom that became more and more connected to the earthly fatherland.[28] Indeed Kantorowicz recognizes a perversion of the earlier Christian understanding of martyrdom in the Crusades leading ultimately to the modern death for the nation, *pro patria mori*: 'By the middle of the thirteenth century, however, the crusader idea of a holy war was all but completely secularized, and its place was taken by a quasi-holy war for the defense of the realm or of the nation symbolized by the "crown" of France'.[29] In his book *The King's Two Bodies* Kantorowicz remarks that 'in the thirteenth century the crown of martyrdom began to descend on the war victims of the secular state'.[30] These insights of Kantorowicz show us how much the modern state is in continuity with the church.

But it is important to follow the work of Kantorowicz even more closely to discover his recognition of an important shift in the self-understanding of the Church long before the period of the so-called wars of religion. This shift consisted in a secularization, immanentization, and politicization of the Church itself:

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[27] Charles Taylor, 'Foreword', in David Cayley (ed.), *The Rivers North of the Future: The Testament of Ivan Illich as Told by David Cayley* (Toronto, 2005), p. ix.

[28] Cavanaugh, *The Myth of Religious Violence*, pp. 175–6.

[29] Ernst H. Kantorowicz, '"Pro Patria Mori" in Medieval Political Thought', *The American Historical Review* 56/3 (1951): 472–92, here p. 482. Cf. Koselleck, Reinhart, *Begriffsgeschichten. Studien zur Semantik und Pragmatik der politischen und sozialen Sprache* (Frankfurt a.M., 2010), pp. 219–20.

[30] Ernst Kantorowicz, *The King's Two Bodies: A Study in Mediaeval Political Theology* (Princeton, NJ, 1997), p. 244.

> After the investiture struggle there arose, for many reasons, the 'danger of too much stress being laid on the institutional, corporational side of the Church' as a body politic. It was the beginning of the so-called secularization of the medieval church, a process which was balanced by an all the more designedly mystical interpretation of the administrative body. The new term *corpus mysticum* linked the building of the visible church organism, it is true, with the former liturgical sphere; but, at the same time, it placed the church as a body politic or a political organism on one level with the secular bodies politic which by that time began to assert themselves as self-sufficient communities.[31]

The reference to the investiture struggle in this regard is very important because we know today, especially through the work of the German medievalist Gerd Althoff, how Pope Gregory VII and his theologians developed a self-understanding of the church that claimed a political role in the world legitimating also violence against those who were disobedient in a way that was definitely parting from the practices of the past.[32] Violence in this sense was an essential dimension of the Papal Revolution of 1075 that led to the Crusades as well as to a series of wars and rebellions.[33] Also the papal bull *Unam sanctam* of Boniface VIII from 1302, according to which the pope governs the church as well as the world, is a consequence of this legacy of a church that clearly focuses on political ambitions in this world. It is this church – that parted significantly from its earlier self-understanding – that serves as a mirror image for the modern state as we can discover it for instance in the work of Thomas Hobbes. It was Hans Barion who pointed out 'that Thomas Hobbes' theory of state sovereignty is, to the last detail, the antithetical counterpart to John of Salisbury's hierocratic teaching'.[34]

Looking at these two mirror images of church and state we can recognize a certain continuity between violence and religion because the modern state functions to a certain degree like the church that so much focused solely on worldly power. A functional concept of religion does not allow us a real distinction between these two types of church and state. But if we take the significant break with the past into account that happened during the Papal

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[31] Kantorowicz, 'Pro Patria Mori', p. 485.

[32] Gerd Althoff, *'Selig sind, die Verfolgung ausüben'. Päpste und Gewalt im Hochmittelalter* (Stuttgart, 2013).

[33] Harold J. Berman, *Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Tradition* (Cambridge, MA., 1999), pp. 103–6.

[34] Carl Schmitt, *Political Theology II: The Myth of the Closure of Any Political Theology*, trans., Michael Hoelzl and Graham Ward (Cambridge, 2008), 115; cf. Hans Barion, 'Rezension von: "Saggi Storici Intorno Al Papato Dei Professori Della Facoltà Di Storia Ecclesiastica" (Roma, 1959)', *Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte* 77, no. Kanonistische Abteilung XLVI (1960): 481–501; Carl Schmitt, 'Die Vollendete Reformation. Zu Neuen Leviathan-Interpretationen', *Der Staat* 4/1 (1965): 51–69.

Revolution we have to turn to a more substantive view of religion to understand this break. We have to distinguish between types of religion that are seeking primarily worldly power and are therefore prone to violence and those religious attitudes that are reaching out for a transcendent good that does not end automatically in rivalry, violence, and war.

Such a more substantive view of religion can again draw on the political philosophy of Charles Taylor for a broader narrative framework. Especially his book *A Secular Age* will be of great help in this regard. Regarding the question of violence it should be assisted by René Girard's mimetic theory. Charles Taylor himself points to Girard in a very interesting and easily overlooked passage where he recognizes that Girard overcomes a purely immanent perspective to escape the danger of violence:

> The only way to escape fully the draw toward violence lies somewhere in the turn to transcendence, that is, through the full-hearted love of some good beyond life. Here we enter on a terrain, that of religion and violence, which has been explored in a very interesting way by René Girard.[35]

Turning to transcendence in this way is related to the spirituality that was opened up by the axial age as José Casanova briefly pointed it out during our 'Innsbruck' meeting in 2012.[36]

René Girard's mimetic theory is today one of the most important theories of religions that focuses on the question of violence.[37] It recognized the complex relationship between violence and religion and is also aware of its historical development. Whereas the archaic sacred is a type of religion that provides peace in a tribal community by expelling or killing a member of the tribe that is later transformed into its god, the Abrahamic religions are exposing the scapegoat mechanism by following the revelation of a transcendent God who sides with the victims of collective persecution and who is essentially nonviolent. In one of his more recent interviews Girard expresses 'the gradual transformation of the *sacred* into the *holy*' in the following way:[38] 'The God of the Bible is at first

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[35] Charles Taylor, *A Secular Age* (Cambridge, MA., 2007), p. 639.

[36] Cf. José Casanova, 'Religion, the Axial Age, and Secular Modernity in Bellah's Theory of Religious Evolution', in Robert N. Bellah and Hans Joas (eds), *The Axial Age and Its Consequences* (Cambridge, MA., 2012).

[37] Wolfgang Palaver, 'Mimetic Theories of Religion and Violence', in Mark Juergensmeyer, Margo Kitts, and Michael K. Jerryson (eds) *The Oxford Handbook of Religion and Violence* (New York, 2013).

[38] René Girard, *Evolution and Conversion: Dialogues on the Origin of Culture. With Pierpaolo Antonello at João Cezar De Castro Rocha* (London, 2008), 218; cf. René Girard, *Battling to the End: Conversations with Benoît Chantre*, trans., Mary Baker, Studies in Violence, Mimesis, and Culture (East Lansing, MI., 2010), *passim*.

the God of the sacred, and then more and more the God of the holy, foreign to all violence, the God of the Gospels'. Michel Serres, Girard's colleague and friend, underlined also this essential distinction in his laudatio at the reception of Girard into the Académie Française:

> The holy is distinguished from the sacred. The sacred kills, the saint pacifies. Nonviolent holiness roots out envy, jealousy, ambition for high position, sanctuaries of mimeticism, and thus delivers us from rivalries that exasperate us towards the violence of the sacred. Sacrifice devastates; sanctity gives birth. … The sacred unites violence and lying, murder and falsity; its gods are modeled by the collective in its fury. Inversely, the holy brings love and truth into accord.[39]

We have to apply this distinction between two different types of religion – between the sacred and the holy – in order to develop a new grand narrative that can help us to understand the so-called European Wars of Religion more properly. In regard to the times of the religious wars it was especially the relation to transcendence that determines how strongly people were drawn to violence. In the times of the Crusades and the times of the secularization of the Church before the time of the so-called religious wars her transcended goal became less and less important leading to an increase of violence that accompanied this immanentization. The lack of a transcendent perspective also characterizes Hobbes's political philosophy leading to an ontology of violence that remains a permanent challenge for our modern world.[40] In both these cases we are closer to the violent sacred than to the holy that helps us to overcome our violent struggle for worldly superiority by opening up towards the transcendent God of love.

[39] Michel Serres, 'Receiving René Girard into the Académie Française', in Sandor Goodhart et al. (eds), *For René Girard: Essays in Friendship and in Truth*, Studies in Violence, Mimesis, and Culture (East Lansing, MI, 2009), p. 16.

[40] Cf. Wolfgang Palaver, *René Girard's Mimetic Theory*, trans., Gabriel Borrud, Studies in Violence, Mimesis, and Culture (East Lansing, MI, 2013), pp. 95–9.

Index