

THE
**IRON
PRINCESS**

Amalia Elisabeth
and the Thirty Years War

Tryntje Helfferich

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Contents

Note to the Reader	<i>vii</i>
Introduction	<i>1</i>
I An Imperial Princess	<i>16</i>
2 Teetering on the Brink	<i>41</i>
3 The Imperial Mandate	<i>62</i>
4 Deeper into the Labyrinth	<i>84</i>
5 An Amazing Consequence	<i>98</i>
6 To the Lord God Nothing Is Impossible	<i>116</i>
7 The Long Struggle	<i>140</i>
8 A Manly Resolve	<i>161</i>
9 Westphalian Maneuverings	<i>179</i>
10 Pressing the Attack	<i>197</i>
11 Satisfaction	<i>214</i>
Conclusion	<i>233</i>
Abbreviations	<i>247</i>
Notes	<i>249</i>
Acknowledgments	<i>311</i>
Index	<i>313</i>

Note to the Reader

AMALIA ELISABETH'S name is usually spelled "Amalie" in the German literature, and sometimes "Amelie" or "Amelia." She herself spelled her name as "Amalia," so I have chosen that variant. For other proper names I have given the usual German or French spelling, though to avoid confusion I have made an exception for those place names, such as Hesse-Cassel or Brunswick (i.e., Hessen-Kassel and Braunschweig), where a customary English version exists. All translations throughout this work, unless otherwise noted, are mine.

Seventeenth-century currencies were not fully stable, but for the first years of the war an imperial thaler (Reichsthaler) was equal to approximately 2 French livres; after 1640 the exchange rate had slipped to 1:3. The Reichsthaler was usually a money of account, not of ordinary usage. For usage, there was the Gulden (fl.), equal to 0.66 Reichsthalers, which was usually subdivided into 60 Kreuzer (kr.) or 240 Pfennige or, as in Hesse, into 24 Albus or 288 Heller. For comparison purposes, in Baden-Württemberg in 1617 one goose cost 20 kr., in 1635 one liter of Munich brown beer cost 10 kr., and in 1640 three hundred liters of wine cost 13 fl. 35 kr., which was the same as fifty-one days' labor for an ordinary workman (for this see Jürgen Rauser, *Waldenburger Heimatbuch*, 14).

A note on dates: since not all states at this time, especially Protestant ones, had adopted Pope Gregory XIII's 1582 calendar reform, contemporary correspondence used either the old style or the new (a difference of ten days), or gave both dates. To assist readers, all dates appear here in the new style in the body of the text, and as double dates in the notes for correspondence that either used the old style or gave both dates.


Holy Roman Empire, 1648

- Boundary of the Holy Roman Empire
- Other boundaries





Hesse, 1638–1650



- Hesse-Cassel in 1638
- Areas added to Hesse-Cassel by 1650 (from Hesse-Darmstadt)
- Areas added to Hesse-Cassel by 1650 (from other states)
- Hesse-Darmstadt in 1638

Introduction

AT THE AGE of thirty-two, having served as wife to the landgrave of a small German state, having borne him twelve children, eight of whom had already died, having supported his challenge to the emperor and having fled with him into exile, and then having watched him slowly die, Amalia Elisabeth of Hesse-Cassel took the reins of power into her own hands. Her subsequent rule, which lasted from 1637 until 1650, encompassed some of the most violent and destructive years in European history. Her iron determination to undo her husband's mistakes, protect her children's birthright, and strengthen the Calvinist church propelled her squarely into the bloody fray.

To the latter seventeenth century, Amalia Elisabeth of Hesse-Cassel was a towering figure, one to whom, in the words of a contemporary, "the empire owes a great part of its liberty." And if she did not receive universal applause, she did possess an army of at least twenty thousand men, and was thus a woman of whom every European leader was exquisitely aware. Today, however, few, even among scholars of the Thirty Years War, know much if anything about her. Her story, along with its consequences and import, has been lost. I suspect this is largely because she was a woman, for her role in the Thirty Years War rivaled that of Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar, Cardinal Mazarin, or even King Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden. Indeed, she was singularly responsible not only for the shape and duration of the last decade of the war, but also for the form and

character of the treaty that ended it, and so for the future religious and constitutional makeup of the empire.¹

The Thirty Years War, with which Amalia Elisabeth's life would be so entangled, was unprecedented in European history both in its enormous scope and in its long-lasting repercussions. The issues involved in the war were many and complex. Hanging in the balance was the structure of the Holy Roman Empire, the future of Protestantism, and the territorial boundaries and security of almost every state in Europe. In the end, the war foiled the emperor's attempts at centralization, preserving each individual German state's right to conduct its own foreign policy; settled for good the problem of religious conflict within the empire; legalized German Calvinism; and completely redrew the map of Europe. The war also crippled the Spanish economy, saw the beginning of French attempts at hegemony, and set into motion the Franco-German quarrel over Alsace that would so define Europe's future. The war spared almost no one, for it was the first great pan-European war, involving in some way France, Spain, Sweden, Denmark, the United Provinces, the Spanish Netherlands, Bohemia, Poland, Transylvania, the papacy, the Italian states, Portugal, the Swiss Confederation, Russia, England, and even the Americas. The war had an especially brutal and lasting impact on the Holy Roman Empire, for it served as the principal battleground and as a result lost as much as 40 percent of its population. Even more than 350 years after the signing of the Peace of Westphalia, the Thirty Years War is a horror still fresh in cultural memory. A study of German villagers performed in the 1960s, for example, showed that many believed the Thirty Years War was the "greatest historical calamity to befall their villages."²

The cause of the war has long been a contentious issue, but confusion and disagreement over the rights, sovereignty, and nature of states, especially within the empire, was one of its driving forces. Indeed, it would be hard to explain this period without accounting for the shifting relationship between early modern estates (or parliaments) and states on the one hand, and between states and composite states or empires on the other, or without addressing the numerous adjustments such states were forced to make to their military, governmental, and diplomatic infrastructures in order to respond to the pressures of the time—particularly the structural problems brought on by the spread of Protestantism.³

The study of the war has also been obstructed by a major problem, that of sources. The extent and complexity of this war forced states to deal

with unprecedented political, military, economic, ideological, and social problems, which in turn led them to produce an unprecedented amount of correspondence, acts, minutes, and treaties, leaving the modern historian virtually swamped by the documentation. Furthermore, the international nature of the war meant that such paperwork was produced in numerous languages and is now scattered in archives all across Europe. This problem of sources has seriously hindered historians' efforts to grasp the war in its entirety, for it is impossible for any one person ever to read all the relevant documents. So although the Thirty Years War set the stage for some of the key religious and political developments in European history and its aftermath continues to shape modern European culture and conceptions of national identity, this extremely significant and fertile area of study has yet to be fully investigated. The classic English-language general texts, C. V. Wedgwood's *Thirty Years War* and Geoffrey Parker's *Thirty Years' War*, as well as Peter Wilson's recent *Thirty Years War: Europe's Tragedy*, are all excellent, despite being hindered by the difficulty of summarizing such a complex subject. It is particularly encouraging, as well, that German-language scholarship on the Thirty Years War and Peace of Westphalia is currently booming, relatively speaking, with splendid modern editions by Johannes Burkhardt, Fritz Dickmann, Konrad Reppen, and Heinz Duchhardt, to name just a few. Despite such efforts, however, when one considers the forests sacrificed for scholarship on World War I and II, the number of studies of the Thirty Years War is downright minuscule, and our knowledge of the period is sadly limited.⁴

Tied together with the problem of sources is the problem of breadth. Given the impossibility of covering such a huge war thoroughly, many scholars have narrowed their focus. In this, studies tend to slip into one of two patterns. Either they attempt to survey the entire war by stressing only the roles of the larger powers, such as France or Spain, or they produce an isolated and purely local, though much more in-depth, study of the period. This is a fair strategy, but its problems are clear. Either one oversimplifies the conflict by ignoring the many subtexts that helped to define the war, or one loses the larger perspective that gives meaning to local behavior. An example of this failure to integrate local and general history is the extremely common interpretation that the general war lasted thirty years, but the 1635 Peace of Prague ended its German phase. Popular authors such as Peter Milger put it more bluntly than most, stating that after 1635 "not only was there no longer war among the states of the

empire, there was also no longer any reason for it.” As comical as it may sound, he argued, the Thirty Years War lasted only seventeen years, with the succeeding thirteen years being fought between the great powers for their own ends, though admittedly on German soil. Yet to argue that the reasons for internal strife had been extinguished is patently untrue, and to argue that the German civil war had ended while Hesse-Cassel and other German rulers still fought, the problems of the Palatinate and the emperor’s hereditary lands remained unresolved, and the place of Calvinism within the empire was still vague, is ridiculous. And even though no serious scholar would go quite as far as Milger, most studies of the Thirty Years War lose interest in internal German conflicts after the year 1635 and turn instead to the larger French-Swedish-Spanish-imperial contest. This interpretation has colored scholarship for well over a century, with everyone from Friedrich Schiller to Michael Roberts arguing that, as Roberts stated, “the peace of May 1635 reconciled the emperor with so many of his enemies, opposition to the Habsburgs thereby fell almost exclusively into the hands of the foreigners.” Well, yes and no. Yes, there is no doubt that the 1635 Peace of Prague did bring most of the German princes to the side of the emperor. But no, the exceptions were significant enough to disprove the rule. Contemporaries were fully aware of the danger to peace posed by such exceptions, with the elector of Saxony himself warning the emperor that the war in Germany would continue as long as Hesse-Cassel and other German princes were excluded from the peace. The disinterest of many historians in the decade stretching from 1635 to 1644 (the beginning of the Congress of Westphalia) is caused, I believe, by an underappreciation of the role of the smaller states in the war. So even though a handful of German states continued to fight the Habsburg emperors, and even though the war might well have ended soon after 1638 had the emperor agreed to satisfy Amalia Elisabeth’s demand for religious security, the full significance of these facts has as yet failed to affect many historians’ views.⁵

In order to overcome these twin problems—impossibly numerous sources and a subsequent neglect among historians to incorporate the actions of the smaller states into the larger historiography—this study does not attempt to survey the entire war or the motivations of every individual who fought it. Instead, this study covers only the last third of the war, and that from the viewpoint of one key participant. Such a narrowing of focus has allowed me to limit the overwhelming number of sources neces-

sary while simultaneously permitting a much more extensive range of documentation. The foundation of this project has been the Hessische Staatsarchiv Marburg with its wealth of unpublished personal and diplomatic correspondence (especially Amalia Elisabeth's own), documents and letters of Hessian councilors, and documents relating directly to Hesse-Cassel's prosecution of the war. But in order to use this investigation to make a larger argument about the Thirty Years War, I have also incorporated numerous documents from the other key parties involved in the war and in the peace negotiations, especially the instructions and correspondence of the French, Swedish, and imperial sides, and of other smaller German states. These additional sources from across Europe have not only provided valuable insights into the goals and policies of the landgravine and of those in her employ, they have also allowed a more complete analysis of the interplay among states and the impact these interactions had on the course of the war.

The precipitating moment for this study occurred in the autumn of 1637, when at the death of her husband, Wilhelm V, Amalia Elisabeth suddenly became regent to their young son and heir. The landgravine also deftly stepped into her husband's place as protector of Hesse-Cassel's political, religious, dynastic, and diplomatic interests, despite the considerable opposition of her own nobility and advisors and the initial disdain of the international community. With astonishing skill she continued and forwarded a long and bloody war against half of Europe while playing off against each other such major powers as Sweden, France, and the emperor. In the end, she managed not only to save Hesse-Cassel from destruction, but even enlarged its boundaries. Furthermore, her considerable influence with the larger powers meant that her war aims significantly affected both the nature and the outcome of the war, and thus the very face of Europe. For example, her stubborn championship of the rights of the smaller German states played a key role in shaping the future constitutional structure of Germany, while her powerful defense of Calvinism ensured its acceptance with Lutheranism as a tolerated, and legitimate, religion within the empire, an outcome of immense importance for the future of both Germany and Europe.

In this, Amalia Elisabeth was quite different from most female leaders of the time. As the ubiquity of war and the ravages of disease killed numerous male leaders at an early age, many women became regents or, less often, rulers in their own right. And while there are certainly examples of

strong-willed and powerful regents or queens, many such women lost, or delegated, their power to male relatives or councilors. Queen Christina of Sweden, for example, depended utterly on her prime minister, Oxenstierna, while the French queen regent, Anne of Austria, allowed her government to be controlled by Cardinal Mazarin. Amalia Elisabeth, however, both firmly rejected the assistance of well-meaning male rescuers and withstood the furious legal and military attacks on her regency by her enemies. That she would desire to do such a thing is interesting, but that she could succeed is astounding.⁶

Amalia Elisabeth's motivations in taking on the gargantuan task of ruling in her husband's place are tied to her conception of her role. First and foremost, she saw her role as that of mother and protector of her children. Thus her principal duty as regent, she told her estates, was to "perform and administer such a high and difficult office" in order to ensure the "well-being of our beloved children" and the "restoration of their dear fatherland." In this, the preservation of the honor and standing of the house of Hesse-Cassel was as important as the preservation of lands, peoples, and rights. Even when offered a peace that might have maintained most of her territory intact, for example, she refused partially on the grounds that any concession, however minor, would irreparably harm her children by forever demeaning the honor of their house. This role of mother-protector was one that she stressed frequently in her correspondence, and one that seemed to make the most sense to contemporary observers. "Her only plan and intention," a French diplomat wrote, "is to conserve and advance her children. This is where all her cares and worries go." Motherhood and its requirements thus served to justify her actions to those who might otherwise deplore them.⁷

Amalia Elisabeth's war aims stemmed not only from her desire to support and maintain the inheritance, rights, and honor of her children, but also from her belief that she must accept her husband's charge to take up his roles along with her own. So in addition to her responsibility toward her children, she also agreed to uphold her husband's legacy, take responsibility for his state, serve as military and political leader to his people, and become protector of the state church and head of the Hessian dynasty. She must be both mother and prince. This was a heavy burden, as her husband's death had left her stranded with her two sons in the Hessian military quarters in East Frisia, surrounded by an army that would quickly mutiny at the least suggestion of their ruler's weakness or inability to pay.

Her infant daughters, along with the greatest part of her husband's governing council, were besieged in the landgrave's resident city of Cassel. Imperial armies roamed the Hessian countryside, burning and looting, and Landgrave Georg of Hesse-Darmstadt, head of a rival branch of the family, waited less than a week after the death of his cousin Wilhelm V to inform the panicked councilmen that they must either immediately surrender the country and the administration of Hesse-Cassel to him or die a slow and painful death.

Amalia Elisabeth told her councilors that she would gladly renounce her burden if she could, but this was not possible. She had a responsibility to God, the world, her husband's memory, and above all her "beloved children along with their land and people," to take up the regency and administration. To set her duty aside would violate everything she believed in. "I would rather take the most extreme measures," she wrote, "than to agree to anything that is so against my honor and reputation, against the love and devotion that I owe to my beloved husband who now rests with God and to the dear children he has left behind, and also against my own conscience."⁸

Amalia Elisabeth's conscience and deep belief in her responsibilities toward God are further keys in understanding her actions. Her militant Calvinism, with its stress on humankind's absolute duty to obey God's commands and to struggle always to safeguard the true church, was intertwined with all of her decisions. She saw herself as one of those singular women "raised up by divine authority," in Calvin's words (paraphrasing Isaiah 49:23), to be "the nursing mothers of the church." Thus by taking up the Hessian administration and continuing the war she was doing God's work, fulfilling her destiny as chosen by God. In other matters, however, God's will was unclear, and she could only follow her conscience. "I have no other means," she wrote,

than humbly to beg God from my heart that He give me and others inspiration for what we should do. For things are very difficult, and it is particularly hard to make a decision. But when one should choose the better of two evils, in my small opinion if the one is somewhat better than the other, and one might emerge from it maintaining so much the better faithfulness, then there is nothing left to say. For God's counsel, which is known only to Him, is still hidden from our eyes.

Yet while she firmly believed that God would “not abandon such a righteous affair or all honest hearts who depend on and support Him,” but rather would “gloriously succor, bless, and rescue them,” she also believed that life on earth was a painful struggle and that God required her personal sacrifice. “I am, and will remain,” she wrote, “a poor martyr in this world as long as it shall please God.” For God had given her a heavy cross to bear. He had placed onto her frail shoulders the duty not only to preserve and even to extend the true church in her own time, but also to ensure that this church would be safe for generations to come. She could thus not abandon such a weighty responsibility, or the fate of her state or her sons, to any man, but instead meekly submitted to God’s awesome power and put all her hopes and trust in the irresistible force of Providence.⁹

In this effort Amalia Elisabeth pursued a strategy different from many of her German coreligionists. For while the principal strategy of the Reformed (as German Calvinists, influenced greatly by not just John Calvin, but also Ulrich Zwingli and Heinrich Bullinger, called themselves) had been to argue that the Reformed faith was merely a variant of Lutheranism—which enjoyed legal recognition and protection under imperial law—Amalia Elisabeth believed this gave the emperor a dangerous loophole for future persecution. He could merely declare that the German Reformed were not, in fact, Lutherans, and all protections and rights would disappear. Both the present and future liberty of her church, therefore, depended entirely on the good will and word of the Catholic emperor—something she thought extremely dubious. Given the clear and continuing enmity of both Catholics and Lutherans to Calvinists, she argued, an unwritten or even stated toleration would not be nearly enough. Only by forcing the emperor to grant specific recognition of Calvinism as a separate, distinct, and legal religion of the empire would she and her church gain lasting security. By stubbornly refusing to allow her such religious satisfaction, the emperor ensured that she would keep fighting, and so lost a priceless opportunity to end the war in his favor a full decade before its actual conclusion. While some scholars have downplayed the larger significance of religion in the war, the Hessians had no doubt of it. “We see clearly,” the Cassel secret council wrote the landgravine in 1638, “that the entire peace project rests almost entirely and solely on the point of religion.”¹⁰

The legal recognition of Calvinism was an issue not just of faith, however, but of internal territorial control and princely sovereignty—“the German liberties,” as Amalia Elisabeth and her allies termed them—the

rights of the individual princes over their own internal affairs. Such recognition would allow her and her heirs not only to hold in their hands all matters of religion in Hesse-Cassel, but also to establish the nature of the school system and to have the legal right to keep all ecclesiastical properties seized in the earlier years of the Reformation. And just as her desire to force religious reform on the imperial constitution was closely tied to issues of power and sovereignty, it was also tied to her belief that she must uphold the Hessian administration given to her by both human and divine law, ensure the inheritance of her children, protect the territorial integrity of Hesse-Cassel, and maintain the honor of her house. What was good for the church and the glory of God, in other words, was what was good for her state and her children. It was also good for the empire as a whole, for in her view the imperial constitution required that all imperial estates, without exception, be granted the same legal rights and privileges. It was the recent violation of this fundamental and ancient principle that had so damaged the integrity of the empire and caused, she argued, “an extremely harmful division and dangerous rift” among its members. She was not fighting a war *of* religion, therefore, but a war *for* religion or inextricably intertwined *with* religion. The difference is a vital one, and one that ties Amalia Elisabeth’s experience to the broader scholarly interpretation of the Thirty Years War. For while some have argued that the tendency of rulers in this period of the war to ally with those who embraced other religions is proof that the war, which they argue began as a religious one, was now driven solely by the machinations of politics, this proves nothing of the sort. The distinction itself is a false one. To Amalia Elisabeth, as to her husband and father-in-law before her, there was little difference between alliances with Calvinists and alliances with Catholics or Lutherans, for all alliances were simply tools in achieving larger objectives, objectives that served both religious and political aims.¹¹

This study thus underlines the need for a careful analysis of religion and politics when attempting to understand the motivations for war, and reinforces the argument that one cannot understand international relations entirely in terms of rational choice or *raison d’état* (terms frequently used interchangeably). International relations are not like a game of chess, bound by fixed rules and focused on a simple, universally applicable goal. States can interact in seemingly unpredictable ways, and the goals are as varied as the participants. Amalia Elisabeth’s choices, for example, which seemed bizarre and politically destructive to some of her contemporaries, possessed

their own internal rationality and order. Her actions were not senseless, but were based on a strong belief both in their properness and in their ultimate success, and were focused unflinchingly on a single multifaceted result. Rationality, in other words, is in the eye of the beholder, and is thus an absolutely useless tool in understanding international conflict. The only way to understand war is to understand the motivations of its individual participants, as well as the forces that may influence them.

Since Amalia Elisabeth's motives often seemed mysterious to those around her, and her actions fell outside those of ordinary women, contemporary descriptions of her, either positive or negative, often flailed. Observers struggled for some way to explain her, portraying her as some sort of superwoman, an Amazon, or an evil mythical beast such as a harpy. A Danish diplomat, for example, described her as "the heroine of our century," a "new Penthesilia," and a "hermaphroditic genius" who spoke, like an ancient oracle, with two tongues; while an Austrian Jesuit priest, less impressed, described her as being one of the three "Gorgon sisters," along with Queen Christina of Sweden and Anne of Austria. To those whose interests were different, her stubbornness seemed wild, unreasonable, unseemly, and contrary not only to a sane consideration of reasons of state, but to the natural and supernatural order as well. Her husband's cousin, Georg of Hesse-Darmstadt, who wanted Hesse-Cassel for himself, criticized her "female imbecility" and blamed her for bringing her state to "total ruin," for causing the death of "so many thousand innocent subjects," and for exposing her people to the most unthinkable distress, fire, and sword. Her seemingly blatant disregard for the misery within and growing danger to her lands and state was unconscionable for a leader of a state, while her refusal to hand over her armies to a strong man and her stubbornness itself were contrary to the natural actions of a woman.¹²

To those who favored her actions, however, and especially to her allies, Amalia Elisabeth was a paragon of virtue and a queen among women. "In my humble opinion," the French agent Tercy wrote, she "is no more lacking in courage, judgment, and experience in affairs than this great queen whose name she carries, and even the looks of her face." The contemporary playwright Samuel Chappuzeau was no less enthusiastic, stating that she was a "great genius" who "showed to all the world that the scepter rests well in the hands of a woman, when endowed with the qualities that she possessed." This acclaim, however, challenges many contemporary depictions of the proper role and competence of women. The French prime

minister Cardinal Richelieu's description of her as "a courageous woman, who surmounted the infirmity of her sex by her virtue," for example, strongly suggests the contrast between contemporary theory and action when it came to women of power. Even John Calvin, who ordinarily scorned the government of women as "a monstrous thing," and "like a tyranny . . . [that] is to be tolerated till God sees fit to overthrow it," agreed that some extraordinary women, such as the biblical figure Deborah, could be "supernaturally called" to rule "by the Spirit of God." So while women were inferior rulers in theory, incapable of clear rational thought and sensible action, in practice certain women of strong will and ability could surmount or overcome their gender roles and could thus be treated like men.¹³

The first pillar of Amalia Elisabeth's success was her own stubborn determination. As her sincere admirer Richelieu put it, "she defended herself with courage, not least by the force, as by the justice of her cause." Had she been a weaker person, less resolute and principled, she surely would have folded in the face of what her advisors saw as impossible odds. But in only a few years she managed to overcome opposition from her own secret council, the Hessian estates, her military and especially her husband's principal general, Peter Melander, her husband's relatives, neighboring states, dubious allies, and the armies of the empire—and all this from exile. Her ability to see the larger tactical situation and to think quickly also aided her, as did her gift for manipulating people. These things, in combination, allowed her to move immediately after the death of her husband to grab control of his councilors, army, and state with a skill and speed that surprised even her admirers.¹⁴

Though the military failures of her husband forced Amalia Elisabeth to rule in absentia for years, she benefited a great deal from some of his earlier successes, particularly his taking of a great part of western and northern Germany, lands that included much of Westphalia and all of East Frisia. Wilhelm V and then Amalia Elisabeth used these vast conquests to create a more centralized and responsive military state, financed not by the intransigent Hessian aristocracy but by the "contributions" forcefully extracted from the newly subject residents of these conquered territories. While the aspirations of many other European kings and princes were impinged upon by traditional restrictions and the unwillingness of local estates to pay taxes, Amalia Elisabeth was able to sidestep these difficulties. Since she supported her army through her conquests and

foreign subsidies, and not solely off the yields of her own hereditary lands, she could pursue her larger military, political, and religious goals with impunity. So even while Hesse-Cassel was burnt, looted, invaded, and generally destroyed by imperial armies, she remained a powerful actor, controlling one of the largest and most experienced armies in Europe, an army, one contemporary noted, “of twenty thousand men, always nimble, always ready, and always victorious.” That this army was firmly entrenched in strategically important lands, lands that belonged to some of the greatest princes of the empire, including the electors of Mainz and of Cologne, was also quite a negotiating perk, and one she used both as a carrot to encourage the loyalty of her allies and as a stick to threaten her enemies.¹⁵

By freeing her from the purse strings of the Hessian estates, these lands also gave Amalia Elisabeth much greater flexibility and centralized control in conducting her domestic policy. Unlike Landgrave Moritz, her father-in-law, whose inability to maintain control resulted in his forced abdication, Amalia Elisabeth gained the upper hand and could ignore her subjects’ demands as she wished. She cared for her people and was distressed at their suffering, but the stakes were too high for compromise, and God would ensure that all would turn out well in the end. Thus while her desperate council, estates, and people repeatedly begged and threatened her to make a speedy peace, any peace, she felt no great urgency. This lack of urgency also defined her international relationships, for though she depended heavily on the subsidies of the French for extraordinary expenses, she could use her conquered territories to maintain her army at a certain level indefinitely. Thus relatively free from many of the usual internal and external pressures of war, she could delay until she got what she wanted. This was a tremendous strategic advantage, and she milked it for everything it was worth.¹⁶

This use of conquered territories and freedom from responsibility to her own people is both a key aspect of Amalia Elisabeth’s success and a clue to why the war continued well past the point when most people had had quite enough of death and bloodshed. Since her army, like those of many other great states and rulers of the age, could live almost indefinitely off the land, the war was self-sustaining, at least at a certain level of activity. And given the constant inflow of additional funds from powers such as Spain, Bavaria, and France, which allowed large annual levies of new men both to fight in battles and to maintain sufficient garrisons within occupied territories, it was extremely difficult to knock any party out of the war by

force. Depleted forces could be replenished and strengthened, so only by completely destroying the land on which a state or army depended could someone hope to gain a great advantage, and even then an army might well (and did) simply move to new quarters. Until a ruler's individual goals or interests were met, therefore, or until someone lost his (or her) nerve, the war could continue forever.¹⁷

That rulers often joined the larger conflict in attempts to solve local problems complicated the situation even more. Amalia Elisabeth and her husband, for example, put themselves in the role of condottieri, or mercenary generals, fielding armies for the benefit of their great allies the French and Swedes. Yet they saw themselves not as mere private military contractors at the beck and call of an employer, but as sovereign imperial princes with independent political, religious, and dynastic goals. They had no great love for the Catholic French or Lutheran Swedes; such foreign alliances and relationships merely offered a solution to otherwise intractable domestic problems. And they were far from alone in this. Many other imperial princes, such as the Elector Palatine or the dukes of Brunswick-Lüneburg, also sought foreign intervention in homegrown conflicts. For although the empire had judicial structures designed to resolve internal territorial and dynastic disputes, these structures had not proven sufficient to deal with the challenge of religious division. The roughly representative Reichskammergericht (Imperial Supreme Court) had become paralyzed and dysfunctional in 1608 after a power struggle between the Protestant and Catholic members, so the Reichshofrat (Imperial Aulic Council), which was under the exclusive control of the Catholic Habsburg emperors, became the only practical means for German princes to resolve their disputes. However, since many Protestants now suspected the Reichshofrat of corruption and Catholic bias, they saw no remaining legitimate recourse for their complaints. Such structural problems radicalized princes such as the landgraves of Hesse-Cassel, who argued that without concrete, specific, and fundamental constitutional changes, there would never be any justice or liberty in the empire. The bitter territorial and dynastic dispute between Hesse-Cassel and Hesse-Darmstadt, therefore, which might earlier have been solved by a judicious ruling from the Reichskammergericht, instead escalated into bloodshed, driving these two houses to take opposite sides in the larger war.

In the past, historians of the empire, influenced no doubt by early modern Protestant propaganda, have scorned it as unnatural or dysfunctional,

arguing that its peculiar structure had retarded the proper progression of Germany into a nation-state like France or England, and that, suffering as it did under a totally unworkable constitutional structure, it was doomed to fail. Recently a number of scholars have argued the contrary: the empire was flourishing, its institutions were vigorous, stable, flexible, and beloved by its people, and despite its clear problems, it worked remarkably well. This has been an important corrective, but in attempting to counteract the overly negative views of the empire popular in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, such current scholarship may well have overstated the case. To a large number of imperial princes of the seventeenth century, especially the Elector Palatine, the elector of Brandenburg, and, of course, the landgraves of Hesse-Cassel, the once glorious imperial constitution had been defiled and dismembered, and was now rotten to the core, unjust, prejudicial, and corrupt. While there was no internal interest in the empire's dissolution, but enormous respect for its fundamental principles of compromise, peace, and the protection of rights and liberties, such princes came to believe that without solid constitutional guarantees, the emperor would push through innovative changes that would elevate him to an absolute monarch, thereby belittling and oppressing the imperial princes and estates, and forever damaging the very foundations of the Holy Roman Empire. These princes were extremely conservative in their own eyes, wanting only to preserve and protect what they believed to be the aristocratic nature of the empire, and thus to maintain their sacred and traditional rights to internal jurisdiction and sovereignty (*Landeshoheit*) over their own lands and people.¹⁸

Such structural problems within the empire were also confounded by the sheer number of independent and semisovereign states, princes, and even cities involved in the war. With so many combatants, each with his own goals, and each of whom might at any one time lose or win a major battle, die, drop out of the war, or switch allegiances, there was almost no way to know which side would eventually win. This made decision-making difficult, but also aided those smaller states, such as Hesse-Cassel and Brunswick-Lüneburg, that desired to play larger roles, since the great powers were constantly forced to juggle coalitions in order to get on top. Such complexity also helps explain the failure of repeated rounds of negotiations to resolve the conflict. Every year, as a result of the various military campaigns and the constant shifts in the warring states' circumstances or rulership, the material conditions upon which all decision-making was

based changed. “One sees only how fortune miraculously changes,” Amalia Elisabeth wrote. “The ball is round—quickly good, quickly otherwise.” This constant flux ensured that any attempt at diplomacy was undermined by changes in the existing situations and by expectations, hopes, and anxieties about changes to come. In a situation where no one power could ever dominate the others and where the success or failure of each side remained eternally undecided, peace was elusive, no matter the desire or exhaustion of the parties. In the words of a local chronicler, this meant year after year of “misery and want, famine and death.” “In sum,” he stated, “it was such a miserable business that even a stone would have been moved to pity, not to mention a human heart. For we were hunted like wild animals in the forests.”¹⁹

Chapter 1

An Imperial Princess

AMALIA ELISABETH was born on 8 February 1602 in the castle of the German town of Hanau. As the daughter of Count Philipp Ludwig II of Hanau-Münzenberg and his wife, Katharina Belgica, she was born a countess, and so a member of the large aristocracy of the peculiar political structure called the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation, or Germany for short. As a child, Amalia Elisabeth received an excellent education, traveling and studying multiple foreign languages, and especially French, which she learned to speak as fluently as her native German. Her education was also furthered by her parents' decision to send her as a young girl to Heidelberg and the lively and sophisticated court of the Calvinist elector Friedrich IV of the Palatinate, whose wife, the extremely active Louise Juliana, was Amalia Elisabeth's aunt. Heidelberg would be Amalia Elisabeth's home for over four years, and she would return home to Hanau only in 1612, at the death of her father.¹

The state of Hanau-Münzenberg was a relatively small one, and one with little serious influence or power in the swirl of seventeenth-century European politics. It did, however, command a strategic position along one of the empire's key waterways, the Main, and as one of only a handful of Calvinist states had gained the friendship of its much more powerful coreligionists. Amalia Elisabeth's mother, for example, was no less than a daughter of the famous Calvinist Dutch hero Prince William of Orange, by his first wife, Charlotte of Bourbon. Such relationships gave

Hanau-Münzenberg prestige beyond its size, and meant that at her birth Amalia Elisabeth was niece to the current prince of Orange and second cousin to the king of France. In fact, she was first or, at the most, second cousin to members of almost every great house of Europe.²

Not that this meant a great deal. Given the personal and dynastic nature of European politics, every notable person was already closely related many times over to every other notable person. The Holy Roman Emperor Rudolf II, for example, was not only nephew, but also brother-in-law and cousin to the Spanish king Philip II, and was brother-in-law to Philip's daughter. The elector Maximilian of Bavaria was not only brother-in-law, but also son-in-law and cousin to Emperor Ferdinand II. Furthermore, at the time of Amalia Elisabeth's birth, Europe, and especially the Holy Roman Empire, was struggling with problems that not even family ties or ancient hereditary alliances could overcome. The recent appearance of Luther and Calvin, with their radical new (or old, depending on whom you believed) ideas about religion and the relationship of church and state, had posed a stark challenge to traditional structures and authority. The deep antagonisms among states, princes, and social groups brought on by the rapid diffusion of religious difference and its concomitant political bickering had merely been added to existing grievances caused by hereditary jealousy, economic competition, and long-cherished hatreds. Europe had become wracked by conflict as each state tried to address its problems in different ways, but usually by force of arms. In the empire, years of war had been ended by the 1555 Religious Peace of Augsburg, which had theoretically solved both the religious and political problems of the empire. Yet this treaty had merely postponed war while deepening the grievances behind it, for not only had it left out any mention of Calvinism, it had also left unclear other serious constitutional issues, such as the extent of the right of princes to reform their territories (the so-called *ius reformandi*). The Peace of Augsburg had also left Protestant German princes deeply distrustful of the Habsburg emperors and of imperial courts and institutions in general, which they believed were unfairly biased toward Catholics.

Not only was the empire riven by new and intense religious distrust and antagonism, but by the seventeenth century it had also developed an incredibly complex, multilayered, hierarchical, and occasionally unworkable political system. At the bottom, and comprising the largest part of the populace, were the ordinary peasants, most of whom were precariously dependent on subsistence-level agriculture and who usually had no way to

influence the larger system other than petitions and revolts. More significant politically were the minor nobles or knights, local clergy, and burghers (city-dwellers), who were considered mediate to the empire (that is, subject to the authority of individual imperial princes). These usually had the right to meet in a local Diet, a collective representative grouping known as the estates of their local territory (such as the estates of Hesse-Cassel), where they were able to wield a great deal of influence through their traditional oversight of taxation. Above these local notables were the imperial princes, who ruled territories of various sizes, from an enormous state such as Saxony all the way down to a single tiny district such as the castle and village of Anholt. These princes, along with numerous free imperial cities and even some individual barons and knights, were considered estates (or states) of the empire, which conferred upon them special rights and privileges, the most important being the status of immediacy to the empire (that is, subject to no one but the emperor) and, for most, the right to sit and vote in the imperial Diet.

Since the so-called Golden Bull of 1356, this empire had become a strange type of pseudorepublic or composite state, with estates and princes loosely tied together under an emperor chosen by the seven greatest German princes, called electors. Three of these were ecclesiastical princes (the archbishops of Mainz, Cologne, and Trier); four were secular princes (the king of Bohemia, the duke of Saxony, the margrave of Brandenburg, and the Prince Palatine of the Rhine). The status of elector, which was hereditary, gave the possessor primacy of rank below only the emperor and a seat both in electoral Diets and in the electoral college of the imperial Diet, which in some ways served as an upper parliamentary house (balancing the power of the other two colleges of princes and of cities), but was most often a tool used to perpetuate the power of the electors over the rest of the empire. Like the emperor's power, the structure of the empire was also limited, for though there was a common system of justice and a roughly representative Diet, there was no imperial army and no established imperial system of taxation. Each prince saw to his own defense, minted his own coin, and drew his own revenues, while "he that is call'd their King," according to one contemporary observer, "has no Revenues from the Empire, but is forced to live by his own Juice." In 1512, in an attempt at internal reform, Emperor Maximilian I divided the empire into ten Circles, each of which had its own Diet, system of internal justice, and mechanisms for raising money and protecting itself from foreign or domestic

enemies. Yet this internal division did little to improve the functioning of the empire, as the Circles, like other imperial structures, were soon unable to respond to the growing religious discord. "Germany," in the words of the same observer, "is an Irregular Body, and like some mis-shapen Monster, if it be measured by the common Rules of Politicks and Civil Prudence." "Thus the best account we can possibly give of the Present State of Germany," he concluded, "is to say, That it comes very near a System of many Sovereign States, in which one Prince or General of the League excels the rest of the Confederates, and is clothed with the Ornaments of a Sovereign Prince; but then this Body is attack'd by furious Diseases." This system, in other words, was as unstable as it was confused, for there was a continual struggle between those at the bottom to protect and enlarge their liberties and those at the top to tighten and institutionalize their control. Thus Germany was plagued by conflicts between territorial estates and their local princes, between the princes themselves, and between princes or imperial estates and the emperor. Yet it should be noted that the imperial princes and estates were not, despite this observer's assessment, fully sovereign. Indeed, while they possessed enormous internal autonomy, the individual imperial principalities, duchies, counties, free cities, abbeys, and so on were all tied together by legal, historical, dynastic, practical, and sentimental bonds, and each and every ruler within the empire recognized both the hierarchical characteristic of the whole body politic and the role of the emperor as its head.³

Yet the nature of this hierarchy was contested and was a topic of enormous interest to both theorists and politicians of the time. Up to the sixteenth century, it was generally understood that the Holy Roman Empire was a direct descendant of the Roman Empire, which had transferred to it in toto its law and imperial character. With the pressures of the Reformation, however, some began to consider a redefinition of the nature of imperial sovereignty and to rethink the relationship between the estates and the emperor. This effort to reunderstand the empire was greatly aided by the work of the French theorist Jean Bodin, who rejected the Roman precedent and argued that the emperor was merely the first among equals in an empire that was, more than anything, a confederation of sovereign states and thus an aristocracy. This theory was extremely popular among the Protestant imperial estates, and was championed and developed by such German theorists as Hermann Vultejus, professor at the Lutheran university of Marburg. Some, however, such as the early seventeenth-century scholar

Johannes Althusius, argued that the empire was instead a mixed state, both monarchy and aristocracy at once, for the emperor possessed indivisible sovereign power, but shared its administration with the imperial estates. Yet another point of view came from men like Dietrich Reinkingk, a professor at the University of Giessen, who in 1619 insisted that the empire was neither an aristocracy nor a mixed state, but a unitary monarchy where the emperor alone held sovereign power. While not every ruling prince or princely councilor read all or even some of these theorists, their arguments certainly penetrated into the ruling political discourse. Most obviously, these ideas formed the basis of one of the driving principles of the war, the so-called German liberties, or the rights of the princes to maintain their appropriate and traditional level of sovereignty within both their territories and the empire at large. So compelling and useful was this concept that it became the rallying cry of all those in opposition to the imperial power, and was also opportunistically taken up by the Danes, Swedes, French, and other foreign potentates as a justification for involvement in imperial affairs.⁴

Amalia Elisabeth's state of Hanau-Münzenberg, like Hesse-Cassel or Baden-Durlach, was an offspring of the convoluted interrelationships among the numerous German states, one defined by intricate family ties and complex inheritance treaties, as well as the failure of many states to embrace the practice of primogeniture. The result was a mess. On the one hand was the gradual fractioning of once great states into two, four, or even six or more hyphenated states that possessed the names of both the greater state (i.e., Hesse) and the family seat (i.e., Cassel or Darmstadt). On the other hand, and occurring simultaneously, was the accretion of partial or full states onto other states. Thus the county of Münzenberg was split in 1255 between two other counties, Hanau and Falkenstein, which then added that name to their own (i.e., Hanau-Münzenberg). One gains a good sense of this complexity by looking at Amalia Elisabeth's official title after her marriage: "landgravine of Hesse, born countess of Hanau-Münzenberg, countess of Katzenelnbogen, Dietz, Ziegenhain, and Nidda." As other princes also owned pieces of these states, and borders were not merely noncontiguous but sprinkled all over the map, conflicts were frequent and solutions difficult. Furthermore, under unwieldy imperial law, these new partial or aggregated and frequently antagonistic dynastic states might be forced to share a single vote or, on the contrary, might each enjoy two or more votes in the imperial or regional Diets. Intrastate relations were

often even further inflamed by the imaginative stipulations for inheritance that princes inflicted on their successors, and by the sometimes bizarre divisions or forced sharing of titles, lands, institutions, people, and goods. These local peculiarities only helped to complicate the already complex political structure of the empire by breeding new and bitter local disagreements and encouraging political gridlock. For many of these hyphenated states, moreover, such internal dynastic disputes spilled beyond state boundaries to mix with the larger issues of the time. This meant that by the beginning of the seventeenth century, the political and religious problems left unsolved by the Peace of Augsburg were now entangled with preexisting and emerging local and dynastic grievances. This unhappy mix of political infighting and religious conflict had already sparked more than a half-century of intermittent European conflict, and the bloodshed was to continue, defining the lives of those people, such as Amalia Elisabeth, unlucky enough to live in interesting times. The Thirty Years War, which began in 1618 with a revolt in Prague and spread to include all of Europe, was the explosion that blew all of these seething disputes to the surface.⁵

The history of the state of Hesse-Cassel, whose interests Amalia Elisabeth was to take on as her own, is a prime example of how this complex interplay between local grievances and the larger religious and political conflicts of the empire influenced the course of the Thirty Years War. In the sixteenth century Hesse was a strong, influential, and unified state. Its leader, the famous and immensely powerful Landgrave Philipp of Hesse, known as the Magnanimous, brought no end of trouble to the Catholic emperor Charles V by embracing the new Protestantism, sponsoring and protecting Martin Luther, establishing the first Protestant university at Marburg, and leading the Schmalkaldic League to protect what he and others saw as the liberties of the individual German princes against imperial encroachment. On his death in 1567, however, Philipp's testament divided his lands among his four sons, with his eldest son gaining only about half of the inheritance, including the city of Cassel. The rest was divided among the other three sons, with about a quarter, including Marburg with its great Lutheran university, going to the second son; an eighth, including St. Goar and the fortress of Rheinfels, to the third; and another eighth, including the city of Darmstadt, to the youngest son.⁶

The territory of Hesse that these sons inherited included numerous large fiefs and small cantons, and was filled with great cities, massive

fortresses such as that at Ziegenhain (described as “one of the strongest places in the universe” and approachable only by a road through an otherwise impassable marsh), and many flourishing towns that carried on profitable trade in and export of agricultural products, cloth, leather, coal, and iron. The land was rich, fertile, and excellent for producing grain, which was widely planted and abundant. There was thus plenty of bread and beer, which contemporaries deemed excellent. The Main was the largest river in Hesse and, as a major tributary of the Rhine, carried heavy ships filled with goods for trade. In 1479 Hesse had also gained access to the Rhine itself through the lower county of Katzenelnbogen and its strategically important fortress of Rheinfels, where the landgraves collected tolls from passing Rhine traffic, money that allowed them to create a rich and vibrant court. The Fulda, another great Hessian river, had, according to one contemporary observer, “so many salmon that one can catch hundreds at a time.” The rivers thus supplied the people of Hesse with fish, but also salt, gold, and good wine from the vineyards on the riverbanks. Since most of the rivers in Hesse were navigable, the people had easy transportation both within the landgraviate and to neighboring territories such as Westphalia and the bishopric of Paderborn to the west, Brunswick to the north, the abbey of Fulda to the east, Nassau, Solms, and Falkenstein to the south, or to any of the many other small and medium-sized German states and principalities bordering Hesse. The country also had numerous rolling hills, prairies, and wide forests filled with stags and boar that the people hunted regularly, such that meat was easily available at large markets.⁷

Although Landgrave Philipp had hoped to keep his sons together by requiring them to share certain local rights, duties, and institutions, their lines slowly began to take different political paths. This divergence became painfully obvious with the expiry of the Hesse-Marburg line in 1604 and the testament of its final landgrave, which specified that the lands of Hesse-Marburg (known as the “upper principality” to differentiate it from the lands of Hesse-Cassel, the “lower principality”) be evenly divided between Hesse-Cassel and Hesse-Darmstadt, the Hesse-Rheinfels line having already died out. The northern half, including the city of Marburg, would go to Hesse-Cassel; the southern half, including the city of Giessen, would go to Hesse-Darmstadt. This bequest was modified by two conditions. First, the Lutheran faith had to be preserved within these lands, and second, neither inheritor was allowed to contest the will. Moritz of Hesse-

Cassel, known as the Learned, accepted the testament, but Ludwig of Hesse-Darmstadt immediately violated it by contesting it, claiming that the inheritance should be divided by head, not by line, a method that would give three-quarters of the inheritance to Hesse-Darmstadt (as Ludwig had two brothers). The dispute went to the regional courts, which decided to ignore both Ludwig's offense and his demand, judging that the estate should be divided equally, as stipulated in the original testament.⁸

The problem was not so easy to solve, however, and this minor territorial dispute soon swelled into a major religious and constitutional one. For on the urgings of his second wife, in 1603 Moritz had abandoned the faith of his grandfather Philipp and converted to Calvinism. Then, invoking the *ius reformandi* (right of religious reform) granted to princes of the empire by the Peace of Augsburg, Moritz had proceeded to reform not only his own territories, but also his half of the Marburg inheritance, issuing to every religious institution and school, including the university at Marburg, what he euphemistically called "points of improvement" for religious worship and instruction. Ludwig, who remained a pious Lutheran and saw himself as a true inheritor of Philipp the Magnanimous's role as protector of the faith, took in the Lutheran faculty members forced to flee the newly Reformed university of Marburg and began his own rival Lutheran university at Darmstadt. Having added this new outrage to his earlier complaint against the Marburg testament, he appealed to the Reichskammergericht for justice in 1606.⁹

This put local Hessian affairs right into the center of the religious conflict in the empire, for the Peace of Augsburg had recognized the legality only of Catholicism and Lutheranism. As a Calvinist, Moritz thus certainly had no right to reform his territories. Or did he? The wording of the Peace included not Catholics and Lutherans, but Catholics and "adherents of the Confession of Augsburg," a written statement of faith presented by German Lutheran princes to the emperor in 1530. Both Lutherans and Catholics firmly believed that "adherents of the Confession of Augsburg" meant Lutherans only; Reformed jurists argued that Calvinism was merely a variation on the Confession of Augsburg (a *confessio augustana variata*), which would mean they enjoyed the same legal rights and liberties as Lutherans, including the right to reform their territories as they saw fit. Lutheran and Catholic legal scholars disagreed, holding that the spread of Calvinism in Germany was not only illegal, but damnable to boot. By

reforming his lands, the landgrave thus became part of a growing trend that both Catholics and Lutherans viewed with absolute horror. He also exposed one of the key points of contention in the empire—the extent of the religious sovereignty of the individual German estates. Since the Peace of Augsburg, German political philosophers had worried over this issue, and some had either implied the oversight of religion as part of princely rights, or had made an explicit link between the princes' *ius territoriali* (sovereign territorial rights or jurisdiction) and their *ius reformandi*. In 1604, for example, the brothers Stephani had popularized the phrase *cuius regio, eius religio*, roughly translated as “whose realm, his religion,” a concept that Protestants (and later generations of history teachers) eagerly adopted to describe the Peace of Augsburg and what they saw as its enshrinement of each prince's right to establish his territory's religion. By this argument, the right of reform was indivisibly tied to the political authority of the individual imperial estates, so all estates of the empire, without exception, could claim it as part of their dual internal jurisdiction over both secular and ecclesiastical affairs. But even if all philosophers had agreed on this link between the *ius reformandi* and the *ius territoriali*, and they did not, there was also no agreement on the very nature of the right of reform. Protestants argued that the *ius reformandi* granted at the Peace of Augsburg gave them the right to transform or alter their states' religions, while Catholics denied this broad interpretation, claiming instead that the *ius reformandi* only gave princes the right to oversee and supervise existing territorial churches.¹⁰

Over the years following the death of the landgrave of Hesse-Marburg, the territorial, religious, and constitutional conflict increasingly alienated the two remaining branches of the Hessian dynasty. Moritz of Hesse-Cassel accepted what Jean Bodin and his own Calvinist legal scholar, Hermann Vultejus, had written: that the Habsburg emperor had overstepped his legal bounds and violated the traditional German liberties by trying to make a strong monarchy out of a federal union of sovereign states. Moritz thus moved further into the camp of those opposing the emperor, becoming one of the founders of the militant Protestant Union in 1609 and supporting its battles against the emperor's Catholic League. Moritz also moved to ally with the more fervent anti-Habsburg states, for example by cementing ties with the ever anti-Habsburg Catholic French and by the 1619 marriage of his son Wilhelm to the blond, pretty, seventeen-year-old Amalia Elisabeth, whose earlier betrothal to the

Bohemian nobleman and defenestrator Albrecht Jan Smiřický von Smiřice had been dissolved by Smiřický's death in 1618. Ludwig of Hesse-Darmstadt, however, radicalized by the dispute over the contested inheritance and by Moritz's support for the pillaging of Hesse-Darmstadt by Protestant Union troops, took the opposite side in what would later be called the Thirty Years War. With the support of his own Lutheran legal scholars, especially Gottfried Antonius and his students, Ludwig openly strengthened his ties with his Catholic neighbors, the electors of Mainz and Cologne, and with the imperialist Catholic League, even to the point of stipulating in his testament that his successors should never raise their weapons against the emperor or enter into any alliance directed against him.¹¹

These policies would be quite costly for Moritz of Hesse-Cassel, but they paid off splendidly for Ludwig of Hesse-Darmstadt. The Reichskammergericht having been rendered almost entirely ineffective by religious division and princely fears of anti-Protestant bias, the Reichshofrat had taken up the intra-Hessian dispute, but this court, overburdened by an enormous increase in its caseload, now functioned at a snail's pace. Only in 1623 did the Reichshofrat finally hand down its ruling, granting the entire Marburg inheritance, plus back taxes and enormous financial and territorial reparations, to Hesse-Darmstadt. To ensure payment, Hesse-Darmstadt was also given the southern half of Hesse-Cassel, along with Moritz's territory of Schmalkalden, as collateral. This seemingly punitive ruling smelled of imperial manipulation to Moritz, but despite his protests and claims of legal impropriety, the following year imperial troops under General Tilly enforced the judgment of the courts by occupying the contested territory for Hesse-Darmstadt.¹²

While Moritz faced this serious external challenge from his cousin and from imperial armies, he had simultaneously been battling an additional threat from within. The difficulties presented by both the conflict with Hesse-Darmstadt and the growing dangers and financial burdens of the larger war had sparked a power struggle between the landgrave and the Hesse-Cassel estates. Moritz's policy was driven by his desire to protect his rights: his rights to his half of the Marburg inheritance, his rights to establish and enforce the religion of his lands, and his rights to act within the empire as a sovereign prince, endowed with inalienable constitutional liberties and absolute jurisdiction over his territories. This policy had put him in direct conflict with his estates, which had the power to approve all local taxation, and which were officially composed of representatives from

the local nobility (primarily the knights, but usually also including representatives from the clergy and the university) and the towns (including representatives of the countryside). The Hessian estates wanted to avoid or limit any involvement in the war, and to increase their power by reunifying those Hessian political institutions (such as the Hessian *Landtag*, or territorial Diet) split by the conflict between the two dynasties. Furthermore, like the landgrave, the estates also wanted to protect or increase their traditional rights and privileges against any encroachment, religious or political. But where Moritz wanted freedom from the emperor, the estates wanted freedom from the landgrave.¹³

Thus the conflict between emperor and prince was mirrored in the conflict between prince and estates, and Moritz lost on both fronts. Hampered by his estates' open favoring of the imperial side and their stubborn refusal to pay taxes or levy men, even for self defense, Moritz had been forced to put aside his dreams of great action and declare neutrality in 1621. Having tasted success against their prince, however, the estates had continued to push for further concessions, demanding that he release his few remaining troops and fortifications and calling for the punishment of his favorite councilor, Dr. Wolfgang Günther. Moreover, despite Moritz's fervent pleas, the estates had baldly refused to oppose Hesse-Darmstadt's annexation of the Marburg inheritance in 1624, allowing General Tilly's troops free entry into the territory. Emperor Ferdinand II hastened to capitalize on Moritz's weakness by trying to entice the estates into open revolt in 1625, offering the Hessian nobility the status of free imperial knights and releasing all of Moritz's subjects from their duties and loyalties to the landgrave. This was a bit farther than the estates were willing to go, however, and they rejected open treason. Instead, they seized on Tilly's 1626 demand that Moritz "willingly cede and hand over to his son the government and rule," and forced his abdication. He believed that this would merely place his eldest son and future successors into the same impossible situation he now faced, but bitterly acknowledged that this was "in fact the hidden intention of our blinded people and estates."¹⁴

Such was the ascension to power of Moritz's son Wilhelm V, who soon signed the so-called Hauptakkord (principal agreement) with Hesse-Darmstadt on 4 October 1627. By this agreement, which was more than Moritz could have obtained and which at least saved Hesse-Cassel from destruction, Wilhelm regained the southern half of Hesse-Cassel that had been occupied by imperial troops as surety for the payment of reparations,

but permanently surrendered to Hesse-Darmstadt the entirety of the Marburg inheritance, down to the sheets on the beds. Wilhelm also agreed to hand over the lower county of Katzenelnbogen (including Rheinfels) and ceded temporary possession of Schmalkalden until payment was received of the still enormous, though now somewhat moderated, sums required by the imperial judgment of 1623. The local and mostly Lutheran nobility and towns of these regions, convinced that they would be better off under Ludwig's recent successor, Georg II of Hesse-Darmstadt, than under Wilhelm, wasted no time in proclaiming their new loyalty. The taking of the entire inheritance was both a religious and dynastic triumph for Georg, who later commissioned a portrait of himself standing fully armed in front of the Marburg fortress. For while Georg was a cautious and even hesitant ruler, revered by his own people and renowned within Europe for his piety and love of peace, he was willing to fight to defend the Lutheran church and the preservation of what he saw as his rights and his honor. This triumph was thus all the more sweet, as the Hauptakkord also stripped away the primacy of the elder Hesse-Cassel dynasty, legally establishing the equal diplomatic status of the two lines. But Georg was not the only relative to take advantage of the new landgrave Wilhelm's weakness. Moritz's second wife, Juliane of Nassau-Dillenburg, also used this opportunity to carve out for herself and her sons a full quarter of all the present (and future) lands of Hesse-Cassel, known from then on as the Rotenburg Quarter.¹⁵

The Hauptakkord was not just a defeat for Wilhelm V, it was an utter humiliation, but it taught him and his wife, Amalia Elisabeth, some hard lessons about what they could expect from their Darmstadt cousins and what happened to those who played with a weak hand. This agreement was pivotal for the future role of Hesse-Cassel in the Thirty Years War for a number of reasons. First, it convinced the landgrave that Hesse-Cassel was fundamentally threatened on all fronts—from below by the Hessian estates, from the side by Hesse-Darmstadt and other princes, and from above by the emperor. Second, it demonstrated to him what his father, grandfather, and great-grandfather had already believed—that the very structure of the empire was broken, and that to heal it the emperor's power over the princes must be curtailed. Finally, it brought into the light the seeming anti-Calvinist partisanship of imperial courts and convinced the landgrave that only solid constitutional protections and equal rights for Calvinism would ensure justice. Rather than accept the Hauptakkord, therefore, Wilhelm would do whatever possible to destroy it. Unlike his

father, who was too arrogant and idealistic to maintain a stealthy policy of wait and see, Wilhelm had a good grasp of strategy and a tendency to seize on immediate gains without giving up his ultimate goals. His policy was thus to try to negotiate to obtain improved conditions from Ferdinand II, from neighboring electors and princes, and from Georg of Hesse-Darmstadt, all the while hoping for an opportunity to reverse his considerable losses and end his humiliation.¹⁶

Despite his success at salvaging something through the Hauptakkord, the first few years of Wilhelm's reign were difficult, marked by the continued brutal occupation by Tilly's imperial troops of parts of Hesse-Cassel and by Wilhelm's constant quarrels with his estates over every petty matter of internal affairs. Furthermore, as the larger war progressed, the sweeping victories of the emperor and his allies convinced Ferdinand II to issue, in March 1629, the Edict of Restitution. This edict, made without consulting the imperial princes, was a striking statement of imperial power and, simultaneously, a crushing blow to Wilhelm's ideals and security, for it declared that all Catholic Church lands taken since 1555 must be returned, it denied the legality of Calvinism, and it vastly increased the emperor's legal authority at the expense of the princes' rights. And there was nothing Wilhelm could do about it. The entry of the Swedish king Gustavus Adolphus and his army into northern Germany in 1630, however, electrified Wilhelm, finally offering him an opportunity to realize his goals and gain some leverage over his rivals. By the preliminary treaty of Stralsund in November 1630, and then the August 1631 Treaty of Werben, the eager landgrave became the first German prince to ally officially with the Swedes against the emperor. This alliance was extremely beneficial for both sides. The Lutheran Swedes gained proof that their invasion of the empire (which was of course motivated more by their own interests than any fellow feeling for their neighbors and coreligionists) was actually a rescue of the downtrodden Protestant princes, and received access to southern Germany through Wilhelm's holdings along the Rhine. Wilhelm gained an ally of enormous strength and vigor, a champion who seemed determined to assist the cause of Protestantism and the German liberties against a rapacious emperor. The Treaty of Werben was also a conspicuous way for Wilhelm to demonstrate his belief in these liberties, for by its very existence it boldly asserted his sovereignty and the ancient right of individual German states to form foreign alliances as they saw fit, without reference to the emperor or the empire.¹⁷

Now able to act on his desires, Wilhelm moved to expel General Tilly's troops from his lands and openly entered the war at the head of his armies. Opposition within Hesse-Cassel to this move, and to Wilhelm's appropriation of the forced military contributions from the Hessian countryside that had previously been going to Tilly, was instant and fevered. Again only narrowly avoiding open treason, the Hessian nobility met to discuss appealing to Tilly for protection, and both they and the towns refused to support Wilhelm's preparations for war. Although this tactic had successfully crippled Moritz's war effort, the influx of funds Wilhelm had seized allowed him to abandon the traditional aristocratically furnished citizen militia in favor of a larger, more responsive, and professional recruited army. Furthermore, his quick territorial successes in Westphalia and the Swedish king's decision to grant him those lands as his own (in lieu of direct financial support) allowed Wilhelm to finance his war effort independently. His armies, no longer dependent on grudgingly proffered Hessian taxes, could live quite nicely off conquered territories whose estates (unlike Wilhelm's own) had no traditional claims against him, no way to resist demands to feed and house Hessian soldiers, and no option but to produce whatever extraordinary revenues he required. This ability to keep the ever larger Hessian war machine functioning without local approval or assistance broke the power of the Hessian estates. It also allowed the continual and smooth functioning of the army even if Hesse-Cassel itself were lost to the enemy.¹⁸

In the first few years after the entry of Sweden, the war went well for Hesse-Cassel and its allies. Wilhelm, who sported the dashing mustache and goatee combination popular at the time, often led his armies himself, eager to win glory and fame on the battlefield. His considerable territorial successes gave him a new independence, enormous confidence, and the ability to maintain an army of around twenty thousand troops. The war went so well, in fact, that for those first years it even seemed as if Sweden and its Protestant German allies would triumph absolutely, and Wilhelm harbored dreams of gaining full freedom and rights for the Reformed, vastly curtailing the powers of the electors and the emperor, becoming lord of a huge territory covering much of northwest Germany, and even gaining the title of an electoral prince. His only disappointment was the Swedish king's recognition, in late 1631, of Georg of Hesse-Darmstadt's neutrality—a step that barred Wilhelm from retaking the Marburg inheritance by force. Wilhelm used his success, however, to arrange a

lucrative agreement with France in February 1634, receiving the title of general of France and a tidy pension of 36,000 livres. The relationship between France and Hesse had been long and friendly, going back at least as far as the close ties between Henry II and Philipp the Magnanimous. Although Philipp had been a Lutheran, he was nothing if not anti-Habsburg, and so was fully a man after Henry's own heart when it came to diminishing the powers of the emperor. After Philipp's death and the division of his lands among his sons, France continued to cultivate friendly relations with the senior Hesse-Cassel line of the family, and for the most part Philipp's son Wilhelm IV and his grandson Moritz were quite happy to oblige. Wilhelm V was also eager to take part in this arrangement—despite his continuing disquiet over France's religion and possible pretensions in the empire, not to mention a sneaking suspicion that France was no different from the emperor in wanting nothing more than world domination.¹⁹

While Wilhelm was engaged in leading his armies around Germany, battling imperial and Catholic League troops and securing his new territorial gains, Amalia Elisabeth kept peace and order at home, serving as *de facto* ruler in her husband's absence. This role was not a foreign one to her, as she had been surrounded by strong and powerful women from her early childhood, including her aunt, Louise Juliana of the Palatinate, and her own mother, Katharina Belgica, who had ruled Hanau-Münzenberg as regent since the death of her husband in 1612. Amalia Elisabeth also had some practical political and business experience, having aided her husband and her new state since 1623 by taking a leading role in numerous diplomatic missions as well as skillfully managing Hesse-Cassel's extensive trade in wine, animals, and grain. This experience served her well in dealing with the considerable difficulties, among them famine, plague, and enemy attacks, that befell the state while Wilhelm was away.²⁰

For despite the early efforts of Wilhelm and his allies against the emperor, the military situation had deteriorated by 1634. With the defeat of Hessian troops under Wilhelm's principal military officer, Lieutenant General Melander, at Herford in April of that year, followed quickly by the loss of Donauwörth and Regensburg to the emperor, and then the crushing defeat of the Swedes at Nördlingen in September, Wilhelm and his allies' earlier optimism came tumbling to earth. "The situation of things has changed," wrote the councilors of Johann Georg, the Lutheran elector of Saxony. "The conclusion of this pernicious war is necessary at

any price.” Most other German princes agreed, and under pressure from the elector of Saxony, who was the recognized leader of the Protestant party in the empire, they agreed to a compromise peace made at Prague on 30 May 1635. The peace gave Ferdinand II a huge strategic victory, as it brought most of the smaller German princes and all but one of the electoral princes to his side, and it forced these princes to support his armies through mandatory contributions and quartering.²¹

But like the Peace of Versailles after World War I, the Peace of Prague carried within it the seeds of future conflict. While the elector of Saxony saw this peace as an important step toward recreating imperial unity and healing the rifts that had so troubled the empire, his own chief court preacher, Matthias Hoë von Hoënegg, was convinced that not every imperial prince deserved peace and reconciliation. Calvinists in particular, he warned, had caused the current chaos in the empire, and were attempting to undermine not only its divinely established structure and order, but all social hierarchy. Von Hoënegg had enormous influence over the elector, and his militant opposition to Calvinism, combined with the jealousy and hatred of other Lutherans toward their Reformed brethren and the general distaste of Catholics, meant that the Peace of Prague, like the Peace of Augsburg eighty years earlier, only provided specific protections for Catholics and “adherents of the Confession of Augsburg.” Despite the promises of the emperor and the elector of Saxony that Calvinists were, by implication, embraced by the peace and so would not be molested, their legal status remained dangerously vague. This was a serious flaw in the agreement, and it was only compounded by the issue of inclusion. Von Hoënegg had a friend in his opposition to Calvinism in Georg of Hesse-Darmstadt, who, as the elector’s son-in-law, also had a great deal of influence over the shape of the treaty. These two had already managed to deny Wilhelm of Hesse-Cassel access to a previous congress at Frankfurt in 1631, and they succeeded again in 1635. Wilhelm and a number of other princes, including the son of the outlawed Elector Palatine, the duke of Saxe-Weimar, the duke of Württemberg, and the margrave of Baden-Durlach, had particularly offended the emperor with the fervor of their opposition to him, or had offended him, the elector of Saxony, and other Catholic and Lutheran princes by their Calvinism and disruptive behavior. Georg and von Hoënegg thus had little difficulty in persuading a confident emperor to exclude these princes from the main peace and deny them the amnesty and restitution it provided. Wilhelm was thus informed

by both the bishop of Worms and the elector of Saxony that he must throw himself on the emperor's mercy and agree, sight unseen, to all of the emperor's terms before he could share in the protections of the peace.²²

Though his estates urged him to agree to whatever the emperor required, Wilhelm refused. He found the conditions not merely difficult, but impossible. The treaty failed to recognize Calvinism and, by limiting the validity of the peace's religious articles to forty years, also put in doubt the future security of Protestantism in general. "They intend," Wilhelm told his few remaining allies, nothing less than "a suppression of the evangelical religion and of German freedom." One of the landgrave's agents agreed. "Johann Georg has put his coreligionists into disgraceful chains," he wrote; "his forefather Elector Moritz would not have behaved so." The treaty also endangered Wilhelm's cherished German liberties, since it prohibited the traditional right of individual states to make war and form alliances, required them to surrender their armies to the emperor, and allowed the emperor to collect war taxes and quarter troops in their territories. Furthermore, although the treaty effectively voided the 1629 Edict of Restitution, it was still disastrous for Wilhelm's territorial security and goals, as it established a fixed date to which land ownership would revert (the so-called normal year) that put all secular possessions back to their status as of 1630 and ecclesiastical possessions to that of 1627. This would simultaneously validate Wilhelm's 1627 loss of Marburg and invalidate all of his new territorial gains.²³

At first, therefore, Wilhelm assured Oxenstierna, the Swedish chancellor, of his continued determination to oppose Ferdinand II, and the two conducted talks at Magdeburg for a renewed alliance and offensive while Wilhelm and his lieutenant general, Melander, collected Hessian reinforcements for the Westphalian front. Yet the Peace of Prague had dramatically shifted the momentum of the war. With mutinous troops and under pressure from the elector of Saxony, who had so enthusiastically embraced the treaty that he now turned his full army against his former allies, Sweden had been pushed into a full retreat, forced back almost to the North Sea. Although Oxenstierna appealed to the elector of Saxony to allow the excluded princes to join the Peace of Prague, warning him of the danger of such exclusions to the chances for general peace, the Swedes now planned on abandoning their German allies if necessary in order to make their own separate peace. The French agent St. Chamond reported to his court that not only had Oxenstierna's people and guards already

boarded ships to leave for Sweden, but the Swedish chancellor had also personally advised the landgrave to jump at any honorable peace while he still could. Setting aside his misgivings and outrage, therefore, in October 1635 Wilhelm agreed to a military truce with the imperialists and directed his wary councilors to begin negotiations for the terms of his acceptance of the Peace of Prague.²⁴

This sudden turn caused the French to panic, thinking that they were now about to lose not only the dispirited Swedes, but also Hesse-Cassel. The plan of the French prime minister, Cardinal Richelieu, for the war required a strong system of alliances, strategically placed and ready to harry the emperor and his Spanish cousins and allies on a number of different fronts. Thus the French had not only supported their most powerful ally, the Swedes, and courted the Hessians and other German princes, they had also allied with the Dutch and with Italian states such as Mantua and Savoy. Hesse-Cassel, with its strong placement controlling part of the Rhine, the Weser, and a large section of Westphalia, was a cornerstone of the French plan for northern Germany; the loss of these areas coupled with the loss of the Swedes would destroy the allied cause. Richelieu, faced with the looming possibility that the war would be over—and lost—within months, and imagining the hordes of Germans a victorious Habsburg emperor would send streaming over the French border, vigorously encouraged his allies to continue the war, promising to provide both extensive financial and military support. No longer would the French merely offer tacit support and funding for proxy armies. Now France herself would enter the war.²⁵

The emperor, overeager to bring all of Germany under his control, now made a critical error. While negotiations proceeded between Wilhelm and the imperial mediator, Heinrich Christoph von Griesheim, a councilor of the elector of Mainz, the emperor attempted to force a quick agreement by sending his troops into Hessian military quarters in Westphalia. Instead of frightening Wilhelm into submission, this merely added new evidence to his already firm belief that nothing the emperor promised or said could be trusted. This belief was strengthened even further when the landgrave obtained a copy of secret correspondence between Ferdinand and his agents at Rome that showed that the emperor, despite his promises to Wilhelm and other Calvinists, had no intention of including the Calvinists as adherents of the Confession of Augsburg. Wilhelm now had two options. First, he could accept the emperor's painful conditions,

among them final acceptance of the *Hauptakkord* and loss of Marburg, abandonment of his extensive territorial gains in Westphalia and elsewhere in northern Germany, and surrender of the Hessian army to the emperor. In return, he would gain peace, but one that offered little protection for his religion or his rights and would mean the loss of the leverage he had gained over his estates. It might also be no peace at all, because by handing over his army to the emperor he would surely invite war with his former allies, the Swedes and the French. Second, he could continue the war alongside a dispirited Sweden and an ill-prepared France, fighting not only against the emperor, but now also against almost all his fellow German princes, and so lose all hope of imperial mercy and perhaps also his lands, people, and religion.²⁶

Neither option was satisfactory, so Wilhelm chose a third, one made possible by the shifting, unstable coalition politics of seventeenth-century Europe. He would stall as long as he could, hoping for the fortunes of war to change while remaining well-armed and ready for any contingency, defensive or offensive. Meanwhile, he would continue to negotiate with all parties, hoping thereby to get the best results—both by preserving at least one choice out of two, and by using these simultaneous negotiations to play both sides off each other. Thus he not only continued to negotiate with the French, Swedish, and Dutch while his agents busily worked with the imperialists, he also made very sure that each side knew that negotiations continued with the other. This strategy of encouraging the larger powers to enter into a bidding war for his loyalty was extremely effective, and it set a pattern Amalia Elisabeth would follow after his death. It was also a dangerous strategy, requiring as much dexterity and courage as standing one-legged on the middle of a teeter-totter.²⁷

The Swedes, very much aware of French desperation, were also trying to use their negotiations with the emperor to good effect. They believed, like Wilhelm, that true security lay in both territorial gains and fundamental changes in the structure of the empire, and they too assumed that the emperor was not trustworthy. Yet they did not entirely trust the French either. So the Swedish strategy, just like Wilhelm's, was to wait and see, being careful to keep all options open while simultaneously using that openness to pressure both the French and the imperialists into offering better conditions. Ferdinand II, however, was not much of a gamesman, and instead of bidding higher to win the Swedes and Hessians, he bid lower. Although Wilhelm's agents had come to a compromise agreement

with von Griesheim at the landgrave's hunting lodge at Sababurg in December 1635, the emperor refused to ratify it. Instead, he insisted that the negotiations begin anew—without any concessions on his side—and with a new mediator, the bishop of Würzburg. Meanwhile, he began to make secret plans for a full occupation of Hesse-Cassel if the negotiations fell through, and sent thousands of troops to its borders. The emperor, in other words, was so confident after the Peace of Prague that he felt no need to be moderate. Wilhelm's demands to reinstate the cease-fire in the Westphalian quarters and remove the imperial troops already in Hessian territories were ignored. The emperor also refused to break the imperial blockade of Hanau, technically governed by Amalia Elisabeth's brother, Jakob Johann, but under Swedish occupation since 1631 and now fully controlled by one of their generals, the Scot James Ramsay. And while the emperor and his negotiators blustered and threatened, signaling to Wilhelm that they were in no way flexible, the French used every trick they knew to seduce him and the Swedes back to the allied cause, offering flowery compliments and promising large subsidies to field an army against the imperialists.²⁸

If the emperor had expected his aggressive strategy to cow his remaining enemies, he was sorely disappointed. For by the spring of 1636 not only had the Swedes decided to accept an interim treaty of alliance with the French at Wismar, they had also appointed the able Scottish general Leslie to oversee and revive their remaining north German forces. Furthermore, Duke Georg of Brunswick-Lüneburg, who had recently assumed leadership of this branch of the Welf family, including his elder brother Duke August of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel, was also rethinking his acceptance of the Peace of Prague. His biggest concern was the imperial stipulation that he surrender the secularized bishopric of Hildesheim to Archbishop-elect Ferdinand of Cologne. Duke Georg thus began secret talks indicating to the French that he might be tempted to join them. Wilhelm, propelled by the new vigor of the Swedish forces, his suspicion of the emperor, and the extravagant offers of the French, also promised to rejoin the allied side. Thus in May 1636, under the influence of the war party at the Hessian court, which was led by Amalia Elisabeth, Wilhelm broke off all negotiations with the emperor and, joining with Leslie's forces, moved his troops to relieve Hanau and the besieged Hessian fortresses of Amöneburg and Stadtbergen. The emperor, on his part, fired back demands that Wilhelm drop this military action, disarm his Westphalian troops, and dismiss all Swedish troops in his employ if he wanted any imperial

mercy. Wilhelm refused. Making his break with the emperor official, he signed a preliminary agreement with the French at Minden on 12 June 1636 and later signed a formal and even more advantageous treaty at Wesel on 21 October.²⁹

By this time, however, in his fury over Wilhelm's rejection of the Peace of Prague and new military offensives, Ferdinand II had decided to declare Wilhelm an enemy of the empire. This imperial ban or patent, dated 19 August 1636, worried the emperor's eldest son, Archduke Ferdinand, who was head of the imperial armies and king of Hungary and Bohemia, and he warned his father not to make it public. His principal concern was that it failed to specify who was to gain the administration of Hesse-Cassel. This was something that might alienate the other German princes—especially the electors of Saxony and Brandenburg, who shared ancient inheritance treaties with Hesse—by making it appear that the emperor or his son desired to gain the lands for themselves. The emperor, after discussions with his minister Maximilian, Count von Trauttmansdorff, agreed that the patent was problematic. He did not wish to give the German princes any reason for suspicion, and the imperial general Götz was occupied in Westphalia and would not be able to execute the patent yet anyway. The emperor instructed his son, therefore, to continue his military offensive against Wilhelm, but also to allow the peace negotiations to proceed. Then, if Wilhelm agreed to all of the emperor's conditions, they should accept him into the Peace of Prague. This would allow them to regain the lands Wilhelm had seized from the elector of Mainz and other loyal princes, and to turn Wilhelm's entire army against France. But on the other hand, the emperor wrote,

experience and his actions have more than enough shown that the landgrave has never intended to accommodate himself to the peace, but rather desires to persist to fight me and those electoral princes, princes, and estates assisting me, so . . . this forces us to take up weapons and to assert and enforce through legitimate force what we cannot get through kindness and gentleness.

Such suspicions, added to the emperor's concerns that Wilhelm was winning the propaganda war against him, made for strong arguments on either side of the issue and so proper action extremely difficult. The final decision of when to publicize the patent, the emperor decided, was his

son's to make. "As to the administration of Hesse-Cassel," he wrote, "that would belong to you, unless you have something against it, or until I think of something better."³⁰

By late November the emperor had indeed thought of something better, and the role of future administrator of Hesse-Cassel was shifted to Georg of Hesse-Darmstadt. This change helped remove the taint of suspicion from the exercise, which might otherwise endanger the Peace of Prague, it served to provide a territorial and financial reward for Georg's continued firm support and loyalty to the empire, and it exploited the long enmity between Hesse-Cassel and Hesse-Darmstadt to the emperor's advantage. Georg would now be responsible both for the pacification of Hesse-Cassel within the empire and for the final humiliation and degradation of the Hesse-Cassel line under that of Hesse-Darmstadt. Georg also received the right to reveal the patent at the moment he saw fit.³¹

The emperor and his son had good reason to be concerned about raising the suspicions of their German allies, for they were beginning to grumble. Johann Georg, the elector of Saxony, for example, initially so successful, was now suffering heavy losses at the hands of the Swedes, who, backed by the newly flowing subsidies from France, had turned around and begun to fight back (providing yet another reason the emperor did not want to divert troops to the Hessian front). The elector's grand plan to bring peace and unity to the empire had backfired, and the exclusion of Wilhelm and other princes had made the situation worse, not better. This, coupled with the emperor's violation of his promise in the Peace of Prague that Protestants would not be harassed, did little for either Johann Georg's humor or his reputation. "I am being held in humiliating contempt everywhere," he complained to the emperor. But while such blatant disregard for the religious articles of the Peace of Prague may have tarnished the elector of Saxony's good name, it did quite a lot for Wilhelm's argument that the emperor was duplicitous and added increased urgency to his cause. Backed by French money and Swedish troops, Wilhelm launched a rapid assault against Georg of Hesse-Darmstadt in June, overrunning his lands. Georg complained bitterly about this, proclaiming that it was clearly Wilhelm, not the emperor, who was a schemer and insincere opportunist. This unprovoked attack proved, Georg argued, that Wilhelm had only used the negotiations over the Peace of Prague to stall until he could join with the Swedes to relieve Hanau and attack Hesse-Darmstadt. Georg also argued that Wilhelm was a traitor to his fatherland,

since he intended to hand over part of Hesse-Darmstadt's lands to benefit the foreign Swedes.³²

The emperor did not need Georg to tell him that Wilhelm was a traitor. He had been outraged by Wilhelm's rejection of imperial mercy in favor of an open alliance with France and Sweden, and by the landgrave's announcement of this fact by invading Hesse-Darmstadt. The emperor thus instituted his earlier plans for a full-scale invasion, sending General Field Marshal Götz to attack the Westphalian quarters and Hesse-Cassel itself. By the beginning of 1637 imperial troops under Götz and Tilly, along with an army of Croats under General Isolani, were swarming over Wilhelm's lands, burning and looting as they went. According to a petition the Hessian estates sent to Wilhelm later that year, the Croatian troops "had cut off noses, ears and tongues. They had gouged out eyes, and poured liquid lead and tin into people's mouths and ears. The women had been raped, their breasts had been cut off, and children had been baked in ovens like bread." The French resident to Hesse-Cassel, la Boderie, learning of the imminent defection from the allies of the duke of Brunswick-Lüneburg (whose waffling would eventually become legendary), became concerned that discouragement and suspicion would cause Wilhelm to waver as well, and he begged the French court to capitalize on any and all good news in order to keep the landgrave from collapsing. And indeed, Wilhelm was deeply dissatisfied with the French, especially as they failed time and again to produce the promised subsidies. Infighting among the allied generals and the Swedes' continued negotiations with the emperor for a separate peace did not make the situation more encouraging. With few remaining options, however, Wilhelm threw himself into the allied cause. In an attempt to rescue Hesse-Cassel he raised new troops at great cost and also pulled as many of his existing troops as possible from his fortresses to join the Swedes under General Leslie. The allied armies, however, performed poorly, while the newly reinforced imperialists won victory after victory.³³

Forced to retreat ever farther, despite some limited assistance from the Swedes and Dutch, Wilhelm was facing the imminent loss of all Hesse-Cassel to imperial armies. This led him to make a radical but effective move, and one that would soon become, though he did not know it at the time, the salvation and backbone of Amalia Elisabeth's war effort. He first sent her and their two young sons, Wilhelm and Philipp, to Dresden (leaving their four daughters—one not yet a year old—under the care of a

governess at the fortress at Cassel) and then set in motion a plan he had been working on since the beginning of the year: the occupation of the neutral Calvinist duchy of East Frisia. East Frisia was the perfect fallback position. It had been mostly overlooked and little damaged by the war, and its government—and thus its ability to defend itself—was weak from extended and continual bickering between its count and its estates. Furthermore, East Frisia was ideally located and was protected on three sides—by the sea to the north, the United Provinces to the west, and discouraging moors to the south. The only serious obstacle to Wilhelm's occupation was the government of the United Provinces, the States General, which had long since taken advantage of East Frisia's weakness to gain considerable influence over and interest in its affairs. The armies of the United Provinces, however, were led by the prince of Orange, Frederick Henry, who also served as the stadtholder (or governor) of most of the provinces, and so had a unique influence over their foreign policy. Frederick Henry was both a friend of Wilhelm and the uncle of Amalia Elisabeth, and there is good evidence to support the idea that Wilhelm's invasion of East Frisia, which took place at the end of August 1637, was performed with Frederick Henry's full knowledge and acceptance. The East Frisians, however, were outraged, and Count Ulrich of East Frisia, who also happened to be the son-in-law of Georg of Hesse-Darmstadt, sent an urgent plea to the States General for assistance, which never came. Facing little serious military opposition, Wilhelm brutally crushed the count's resistance and, through the mediation of the Dutch government, imposed military contributions on the people.³⁴

By this time the progress of the war had again shifted. The emperor had died in February 1637, and had been replaced by his son, now Ferdinand III. Furthermore, the 1637 season had gone better than expected for the allies. The Swedes were now more confident, were masters of all Pomerania and Mecklenburg, and had taken some key strongholds in Brandenburg and important cities such as Erfurt. The French too were, in Wilhelm's words, "having some good progress," though at this point they were merely happy that they had managed to keep some allies fighting in the empire at all. For, as their agent St. Chamond wrote to the court,

this has discharged our frontiers from all the armies that are now waging war against each other in the empire, and that otherwise would have all joined together against the kingdom, since the emperor is at

peace in his [hereditary] lands and is not making peace with anyone except on condition of having his troops.

For Wilhelm, too, there were some small successes. He had managed to spare enough troops from his retreat to secure a number of key fortresses in Westphalia and Hesse-Cassel (though the Hessian countryside and its contributions had been completely lost), and, by joining part of his army to that of the French general Rantzau and of the Swedish lieutenant general King, was attempting to retake part of the territory that he had recently lost in northern Germany. But despite the French payment of 100,000 Reichsthalers in back subsidies for new levies of troops, and despite the contributions he was now drawing from East Frisia, Wilhelm was having serious trouble maintaining himself, let alone furthering the larger campaign. Trying to get increased assistance from his allies and friends, he sent his councilors across Europe, but Hessian officers, sensing a sinking ship, began to approach other states for employment.³⁵

It was then that catastrophe struck. On 1 October 1637, after fourteen days of lingering illness and bad fever, Wilhelm V died in exile at the main quarters of the Hessian army at Leer, in East Frisia. And while this painful shift in fate was extremely bad news for the allied cause, it was even worse for his wife. The man who had just died was her husband of seventeen years, the man by whom she had borne fourteen children, only six of whom were still living, and the man whose military and political strategy had now ended with his death in exile. Whatever sorrow Amalia Elisabeth had at the passing of her husband, the death of Landgrave Wilhelm V put the future success, and even survival, of her person, her children, and her state in extreme jeopardy. "Through such a premature, unexpected death," wrote Wilhelm's chief advisors to their counterparts back in Cassel,

his esteemed, beloved wife, as well as his princely children and posterity, along with his land and people and all of us, not only are blessed with the highest sadness, grief, and heartache, but are also, in addition, following the times and events, in a most arduous and dangerous situation.

It is difficult to imagine Amalia Elisabeth's state of mind watching her husband slowly die. For not only did she now have to wrestle with her personal grief, she had to do so facing the worst of all possible circumstances.³⁶

Chapter 2

Teetering on the Brink

THE REACTION in Hesse to the death of Wilhelm V was shock, fear, and panic, along with some grief and some grim satisfaction. Observers across Europe waited and watched with keen interest to see how Amalia Elisabeth would respond to events, as a great deal might now turn on her decisions. Nevertheless, to many observers, both in Hesse and in the rest of Europe, it was only a matter of time, and a brief time at that, until she was either overthrown by a rival claimant or forced to accept unconditional surrender. Although Wilhelm had two male heirs to succeed him, the eldest of these was then only eight years old. This left Hesse-Cassel with the prospect of a long-term regency government, an unenviable position in the best of times. The instability of regency governments was amply demonstrated, time and again, by the experiences of such notables as Anne of Austria, the widow of Louis XIII of France, or any number of small-time German princess-widows left to fend for themselves after their husbands died in battle or expired from disease. During the Thirty Years War, the ordinary difficulties of premature succession, such as internal upheaval, attempts at usurpation by alternate claimants, and external opportunism, were aggravated, forcing many regency governments either to drop completely out of the war or to become little more than fawning stooges of one or another greater power. The odds were poor, therefore, that Amalia Elisabeth would be able to hold on to power, and even poorer that she would then be able, or choose, to continue the war.¹

The problem for Amalia Elisabeth, as for other regents, was one of control. Yet unlike these other regents, she had become the ruler of an army more than the ruler of a state. This put her in an even more difficult position, for though the Hessian army was large, experienced, and safely secured in military quarters and fortresses, in order to maintain control she would have to become a unique creature—a female condottiere. The condottieri, often sovereign princes in their own right, were mercenary generals, or more precisely military entrepreneurs, who supported huge armies off the lands they conquered and the subsidies of their royal employers. These men, for they were exclusively men, controlled many of the armies that fought the Thirty Years War. In return for money, land, honors, and power, they applied their armies to the purposes of their employers, but often also to their own ends. Albrecht von Wallenstein, Bohemian nobleman and commander of the imperial army, is the most famous example, but one could also mention Count Ernst von Mansfeldt, Duke Christian of Brunswick-Lüneburg, and Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar. Amalia Elisabeth's husband had begun this complex transformation from sovereign prince to military entrepreneur when he had signed his alliances with Sweden and later France. These alliances had tied him to these great powers both as employee and as sovereign ally—an uncomfortable position that simultaneously annoyed Wilhelm by diminishing his status and offended his allies by exalting it. With the loss of Hesse-Cassel to the enemies and the forced flight of the Hessian court to East Frisia, Wilhelm had further pushed himself into the role of condottiere, his status dependent more on his ability to field an army than on the size or even existence of his original state.²

Amalia Elisabeth had now inherited this role along with the problems it engendered. The existence of any seventeenth-century army depended entirely on the payment and the loyalty of the officers and troops. Lacking either, the seemingly powerful Hessian army—and thus the exile state of Hesse-Cassel—could melt away within weeks. The uncertainty caused by Wilhelm's defeats and illness had already begun this process, with infantrymen disappearing overnight and officers sounding out the Swedes and French for employment possibilities. The division of the Hessian forces into three distinct armies in Westphalia, Hesse, and East Frisia, not to mention those regiments serving under Swedish control, made the organizational difficulties all the more complex. Only quick action and money to reassure the army could stop its rapid disintegration; yet the debts al-

ready incurred by Wilhelm were enormous—over 2 million Reichsthalers. Since Hesse-Cassel itself was completely burnt, looted, and occupied by imperial troops, and since the Hessian estates were entirely disgusted with the war and with the landgraves in general, Amalia Elisabeth, like her husband, could draw few funds from there. She had to depend on contributions from her occupied territories and the subsidies of the French, both of which depended, in turn, entirely on her ability to control the army—a dangerous dilemma. Had Wilhelm's son been of age he could easily have solved the crisis by stepping into his father's double roles, but Amalia Elisabeth, as a woman, could only become a ruler, not a general.³

It took a great number of people by surprise, therefore, when Amalia Elisabeth took personal command of the army, indicating in no uncertain terms that she and she alone was in charge. Among those first forced to come to terms with this were Karl Ludwig, Prince Palatine (son of the late Friedrich V, Amalia Elisabeth's first cousin), and Wilhelm's half-brother, the twenty-year-old Landgrave Friedrich of Hesse-Eschwege, commonly known as Fritz "the Brave" or "the Mad." Both of these men had assumed that Amalia Elisabeth would swoon with gratitude at their gracious offers to take over her armies, strongholds, quarters, munitions, and artillery, and both were unprepared for the biting and indignant response they got instead. The intention of her husband, she stated, had not been to give up all of his troops and fortresses. Karl Ludwig could talk to her, she told his ambassador, when he was no longer a penniless, landless, friendless outlaw. His impertinence was outrageous, she said, for he was proscribed and despoiled of all of his lands, while she held not only her hereditary states but four times as much conquered enemy territory. This was not strictly true, but it certainly got her point across to the Palatine ambassador. Fritz, who had arrived at the Hessian military quarters within days of his half-brother's death, was similarly rebuked by Amalia Elisabeth, who informed him that he could either leave empty-handed or accept a lesser position commanding only a few of her regiments. This did not please Fritz at all, but since she had already dispatched most of her free regiments to her lands in the bishoprics of Münster and Paderborn, and since the roads were now too poor for Fritz to chase after them, there was nothing he could do but remain there and fume.⁴

The only concession Amalia Elisabeth would make to her gender was to delegate day-to-day operations to Wilhelm's principal general and top military officer, Lieutenant General Peter Melander, count of Holzappel.

He was a prime example of the continuing fluidity of social classes into the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century, as in 1589 he had been born Peter Eppelmann, the son of a mere farmer from a small town in western Hesse. On the death of his father in 1592, young Peter had been adopted and taken as heir by his uncle, Johann, a learned man who served as the secretary of the Dutch stadtholder Moritz of Orange and who, in proper Humanist manner, had Greekified his German name (Eppelmann) into the more scholarly “Melander,” a name Peter then also adopted. In 1606, through the careful accumulation of funds and patrons, Johann Melander had managed to buy the family into a title of German lower nobility, which gained them also the new moniker “von Holzappel.” Peter Melander had not followed his uncle into ministerial service, but had joined the Dutch army as befitted his new role as a knight. This was only the beginning of a long and distinguished military career, for in subsequent years he had gained considerable experience in the armies of both the Venetians and the Swiss, including service during the War of the Mantuan Succession (1628–1631), one of the many local European conflicts that became intertwined with the larger international politics of the day. In 1633 Melander joined Wilhelm’s army, where he was promoted to lieutenant general (a military position inferior only to the landgrave himself) and named a councilor. Melander was an arrogant and dangerous man, but one who commanded the firm loyalty of the Hessian troops, though his own loyalty was an uncertain thing. He had a reputation for desiring honor and preferences, but was not a man to take chances. Action, however honorable, was not an option unless he was amply rewarded and guaranteed to avoid blame for failure. His greed was legendary. He boasted to an agent of the French court that “he was only to serve great kings who had the means to recompense their faithful servants.” Yet despite his many flaws, Melander was a skilled general, and Wilhelm had stipulated in his testament that his wife should retain him. This alone would have been sufficient reason for her to do so, but it was also a strategic move, for it would provide continuity with Wilhelm’s reign and help to reassure her allies and soldiers while giving pause to her enemies. The considerable advantages Melander would reap in turn by serving under a weak female regent led to rumors that he had poisoned the landgrave, or at least had it done for him. This was a dubious claim, but as one observer noted, Melander “considered himself much better in his present condition than any count or general of the emperor,” adding that now, believing himself “the only

master of the Hessian army . . . he will do even more than he would have dared to do during the life of the prince.”⁵

Since Melander openly enjoyed being a big fish in a little pond, Amalia Elisabeth kept him there by playing to his sense of his own self-worth. This included not only establishing him in a position second only to herself, but also arranging for him to receive an additional large pension from Sweden and recommending his promotion to sublieutenant general of the king of France. This quick and resolute action, showing no weakness or doubt, paid off, for despite other offers Melander stayed loyal, her army remained intact, and all but two commanders of Hessian fortresses acquiesced to her rule. A number of high officers in the Hessian army did attempt to follow Melander’s lead in another respect, exploiting the change of rule for personal profit, but Amalia Elisabeth was determined to hold them and their petty blackmails in check. She was also quite willing to defer to Melander’s expertise, as long as he continued to remember who was ultimately in charge.⁶

Aside from the military, Amalia Elisabeth had only the unsteady bulwark of the Hessian bureaucracy. At the death of Wilhelm, the day-to-day government of Hesse-Cassel was in the control of what the Hessians of this period usually called the *heimgelassene Rat* (“left-at-home council”). This name was apt, for it had indeed been left behind to mind things when the landgrave and his family fled to East Frisia. The *heimgelassene Rat* was a rump part of three somewhat amorphous and generally overlapping entities, the secret (or privy) council, the war council, and the government council, though it is unclear how, when, or even if these councils were separated, or if their duties were as clear-cut as the names would suggest. During Wilhelm’s reign it seems that they were, in practice, a single body. This secret council (as I will call it from here on) was ordinarily staffed by a group of around six of the most trusted of the landgrave’s councilors and an additional six or so extraordinary members from the military and the countryside. Its highest officials were the statthalter, who was the council president as well as the governor of Cassel, and under him the chancellor. Their duties, as in the rest of the Hessian governmental system, were vague and changed from regime to regime. Although much of the minor day-to-day administration of Hesse-Cassel and the general oversight of the state finances was given over to the chancellery, the members of the secret council served as the central governing body, deciding the most important issues, negotiating with the estates, dealing with all foreign affairs, and serving as

the principal diplomatic agents. They also advised the landgraves on the war and managed, with the assistance of the war commissioners and top military leaders, the government of the military quarters. At Wilhelm's death, these councilors were in a position to increase their influence in the Hessian state, for Wilhelm's testament stipulated that Amalia Elisabeth should be guided by a special regency council, five men taken from the existing ranks of the secret council, who were to be her coregents and coadministrators of the state. The testament also specified that in important matters she should seek the advice and approval of an additional council of sixteen men, all landholders—six from the knighthood, six from the cities, and four university professors. Yet the power of these men to govern and their exact relationship to the regent was unclear. Furthermore, for most regency governments of the time, councilors, or more frequently a single councilor, became the true government under a figurehead ruler. Consider, for example, the power of Chancellor Oxenstierna under the Swedish queen Christina, or of Cardinal Mazarin under the French queen Anne of Austria. No one knew if this might happen in Hesse-Cassel as well.⁷

But Amalia Elisabeth's moves to control Melander and her army were matched by her clever manipulation of her husband's secret council. Instead of dismissing the councilors in favor of her own men, as Wilhelm had done on his elevation, Amalia Elisabeth flattered them, begged them for their advice, and separated them—leaving most of the secret council stranded in Cassel and ordering others to the courts of France, Holland, and Sweden. The dispersal of her councilors had the positive effect, one observer noted, of limiting their incessant bickering and jealousy, but it was also a good way for Amalia Elisabeth to keep an eye on things abroad, since it was not at all certain how Hesse-Cassel's allies, or its enemies, would react to her rule. She also used the secret council's exuberantly and effusively stated loyalty as a club to force or shame them into obeying her. In one letter, for example, she firmly reminded the councilors that she expected them to do more than protest their loyalty, but actually to demonstrate their eagerness to serve her, her son, and the fatherland. Her most effective strategy, however, was to manipulate the secret council through delay. She repeatedly avoided agreeing to things she disliked by claiming that no serious decision on such-and-such a matter could be made without the presence of Melander, or of numerous councilors, or of both, or that an important decision required more

thought. She was quite happy to delegate unimportant details, but she still firmly claimed, as with her military advisors, the final say in all major decisions.⁸

She was helped in her effort to control her government, if not in her effort to wage effective war, by the utter confusion of the secret council. Wilhelm's death in exile had caught them by surprise, and they seemed to feel abandoned and helpless, unsure what to do or how to do it. Their own numbers had also suffered serious losses, with the recent deaths of both the statthalter, Herman von der Malsburg, and the chancellor, Dr. Heinrich Lerßner. The remaining councilors, led by the vice statthalter, Johan Berndt von Dalwigk, and the vice chancellor, Helfrich Deinhardt, were uneasy about Amalia Elisabeth's running the government by herself, and tried tactfully to encourage her to confer closely with Wilhelm's generals and the councilors who were then with her in East Frisia. For while the secret council had been left behind at Cassel to deal with day-to-day matters, Wilhelm had brought with him his most trusted advisors, Nicolaus Sixtinus, Johannes Vultejus, and Reinhard Scheffer. These men, like the rest of the Hessian secret council, were from distinguished Hessian families with long records in university and public service (and a tendency to intermarry). Nicolaus Sixtinus's father had been a legal professor and Hessian councilor, and Sixtinus had followed in his footsteps by pursuing a successful legal career before serving on both Moritz's and Wilhelm V's councils. Under Wilhelm, in particular, Sixtinus had played an influential role in Hessian foreign and domestic policy, and he would soon become one of the landgravine's favorites as well. Johannes Vultejus was the son of the famous Marburg professor and legal theorist Hermann Vultejus, who along with Jean Bodin had so influenced the constitutional thinking of Moritz and his son. Though born in Marburg, he had traveled widely and served both at the Reichskammergericht at Speyer and as a councilor in the service of the Swedish secret council president. After the death of Gustavus Adolphus, Vultejus had returned to Hesse, where his skills and experience had quickly led to a post in Wilhelm's secret council. Reinhard Scheffer was also from a distinguished line of Hessian jurists and chancellors (on both his father's and mother's sides) and, like Sixtinus and Vultejus, had been a trusted advisor to Wilhelm. He was more of a hot-blooded military man than either of the other two, however, and had also served since 1635 as general commissary (a top military post) in the Hessian quarters of Westphalia and Münster.⁹

Amalia Elisabeth began her reign as her husband had ended his, depending heavily on these men for honest and useful advice. This pattern began on the very day of Wilhelm's death, for it was Melander, Scheffer, and Sixtinus who were given the responsibility of notifying the secret council of the awful news. The purpose of this first letter of Amalia Elisabeth's reign was multifold, and it was carefully crafted. Not only did it fulfill the key purpose of informing the people and government of Hesse-Cassel that their landgrave was dead, it also quickly began her process of establishing control. Although large parts of the countryside in Hesse-Cassel had been lost to the enemies, her husband had still held the fortresses and had remained the legal ruler, and Amalia Elisabeth had no intention of losing this position for her son. Pushed to the limit of despair by years of war, starvation, and disease, however, the people of Hesse-Cassel could explode into open revolt at any moment. The estates, which had long been semitreasonous, would not require much urging to become fully so. Failing this, they might simply use the opportunity to reestablish some of the power lost under Wilhelm's reign. This possibility was made more likely by Hessian history, which, as in France, provided a strong precedent for the interference of the estates in regency governments. Most recently, in the sixteenth century, the Hessian estates had exercised a right to cogovernance during the minority of Philipp the Magnanimous. It would be child's play for any German lawyer of the time to argue that such precedent had the force of law. This was yet another uncertainty in Amalia Elisabeth's ascension, and again she did not hesitate a moment. This first letter, although supposedly written by Melander, Scheffer, and Sixtinus, showed her sure touch and skill with manipulation. It began with reassurance for both the secret council and the people that a firm hand was on the rudder and that help would be arriving soon. The letter also carefully established the theme of continuity of rule, with its authors sending a message that despite the death of the landgrave, his advisors and his policies lived on. This was then balanced and reinforced by a frank statement of the grim emergency of the situation. In such difficult times, the letter stated, group unity, loyalty, and attention to duty were more important than ever, not only out of love for one's prince, but also out of love for one's country. Now was not the time to make trouble.¹⁰

These parallel themes of reassurance, continuity, and emergency established the framework of Amalia Elisabeth's future strategies of control. Yet the bulk of this letter, and of many subsequent ones, was given over to

a much more practical mechanism of control—the oath of loyalty. This oath was the key step in the succession of young Wilhelm VI to his father’s throne and thus in establishing Amalia Elisabeth’s regency. Taken before God and man, the oath was both morally and legally binding, and would firmly tie the people, estates, and soldiers to her young son and his heirs following the principle of agnatic primogeniture. Through her advisors as well as personally, Amalia Elisabeth pushed the secret council to have everyone in every part of her territories, including the countryside and the occupied lands, perform the oath immediately. The councilors, led by von Dalwigk and Deinhardt, jumped at the chance to show their loyalty. As soon as they received her instructions they immediately shut the city gates and administered the oath to all residents, clergy, soldiers, and officials in Cassel. They also moved to ensure the administering of the oath in the other Hessian cities and fortresses, sending various councilors empowered to administer it at Hersfeld, Ziegenhain, Schwalmstomb, Diehmelstomb, Spangenberg, Allendorf, Milsugnen, Lichtenaw, and Waltcappell, and arranging for it to be administered in other areas subject to Hessian rule. Not only did the oath proceed quickly and without incident, the councilors reported, but people had been happy to oblige, wishing their new lord luck and health, and there had been no opposition or complaint from the usually difficult Hessian estates, who had been called to meet in Cassel in response to their lord’s death.¹¹

The landgrave’s insistence on speed in this matter was due to the fact that although Wilhelm’s testament had specifically named his son as heir and her as regent, there could be a number of other claimants to either position. The first of these to appear were the sons of Wilhelm’s stepmother, Juliane. Juliane was a powerful and dangerous woman, and one who, like Amalia Elisabeth, fought furiously to ensure the rights of her children. She had already taken advantage of Moritz’s and Wilhelm’s weakness to carve out the Rotenburg Quarter, and she could be counted on to seize any new opportunity to further her sons’ cause. Her son Fritz was the one who had appeared at Leer to take command of the army, but after Amalia Elisabeth’s curt dismissal he had quickly given in and sworn allegiance to his nephew. Juliane’s eldest son, however, Hermann of Rotenburg, known as Hermann the Lame (for being, according to the French agent Tercy, “crippled in body and spirit”), was Amalia Elisabeth’s most serious rival. He was not only the legal ruler of the Quarter but also Wilhelm V’s eldest half-brother and so the closest adult male relative to the

young heir. Hesse-Cassel's lack of a strong legal tradition of primogeniture gave Hermann the best claim for both the regency and the actual succession. Furthermore, unlike Amalia Elisabeth, Hermann was in Hesse and so might easily step into the power vacuum. But Hermann, like the estates, failed to block the oath. One observer suggested that he had been swayed by his calculation of astrological observations and had been too overcome by the death of his own wife in childbirth only days after the death of his brother to put up a fight. This observation was a bit too sanguine, however, for Hermann had actually caused some initial consternation by sealing himself up within the fortress of Ziegenhain, the principal stronghold of the Rotenburg Quarter. The secret council had to negotiate very carefully until, after a few days of general nervousness, he finally acquiesced.¹²

The oath of fealty to young Wilhelm VI gave Amalia Elisabeth legitimacy as the mother and regent of the rightful landgrave. It became the principal bulwark of her regency, the foundation on which she would build the next thirteen years of her rule. Yet even this foundation was insufficient, for the emperor had the legal right to adjudicate contested successions. In addition to the oath, therefore, she also justified her rule to her subjects, and perhaps also to herself, by referring always to the policies of her husband and to the legally and morally binding orders in his testament that she serve as regent and administrator. She continuously stressed that all of her actions and policies were nothing more than either specifically following the orders of her husband, or at the very least more generally following his policies. Her rule, she argued, just like her secret council, her military, and her government, was merely an extension of his. Although the head of state had changed, she reassured her people, things would still go on exactly as before. This was a strategy she used with foreign princes as well. In response to the Prince Palatine's request to lead her armies, for example, she had argued that such a thing would violate her husband's intentions, and had even produced copies of his letters to support this. To show her subservience to her husband even after his death, she kept on hand not only his letters, but also his preserved corpse—to retain with her until they could return, together, to his capital city of Cassel. Thus when the secret council petitioned her to take up peace negotiations with the emperor where they had been left off over a year before, she berated them for their quick repudiation of her husband's legacy. It was folly, she told them, to settle for the terms hammered out, and rejected, by her husband at Würzburg and Sababurg, since things and times had changed so radically

since then. Were they to agree to renew negotiations on that basis they would have to expect numerous additional conditions—conditions that would clearly violate her late husband's intent.¹³

There was a problem, however, with Amalia Elisabeth's strategy of invoking her husband's name, desires, and decrees to give herself legitimacy: she was extremely jealous of her power. Granted, she was determined to continue her husband's policies, for the most part, and her son was now the rightful landgrave, but she did not look kindly on those who forgot who actually ruled, and she was greatly offended by any attempt to usurp her authority. Thus she chided the secret council and vice statthalter for addressing letters to those around her, and even to her son, when the topics concerned her, and she made a point of personally responding to such letters when they were dutifully directed to her attention. She was firmly in charge and was quite able and willing to use her position to dictate to the military and secret council as she saw best. In addition, though she took pains to follow her husband's wishes in terms of appointments and salaries, she did so only as convenient, telling her vice statthalter that she could always change such things later if she liked. In other words, she honored her husband's wishes and intent, but made it quite clear that she had no intention of following them slavishly if they were flawed or became counterproductive.¹⁴

Another leg of Amalia Elisabeth's legitimacy was her position as regent to her son, who was, she stated again and again, the rightful heir of the father. Thus, especially at the beginning of her reign, she stressed repeatedly both her role and her responsibilities as mother. These responsibilities were both natural and supernatural, established by human law and tradition as well as by the law of God, and were not to be ignored or trifled with. She was merely trying to preserve, as a good mother, her children's birthright, territory, and religion. This was a constant theme, expressed both to her subjects and to foreign powers. But just as there were some drawbacks to a legitimacy based on her dead husband, there were also problems with a legitimacy based on a minor child. What influence did the child have? Should he be included in the decision-making process? Was he, or Amalia Elisabeth, the head of state? She would have to balance her desire to justify her rule through her son's status with her need to establish her own authority.¹⁵

In addition to husband and son, Amalia Elisabeth also leaned on God as a sign of her legitimacy. She had not chosen this burden, God had set it

upon her frail shoulders. God had given her this task to complete, and by God, she would do so. It would thus not only be treasonous, but also blasphemous, she suggested, for someone to oppose her. It would also be unthinkable for her to refuse her duty as God's chosen agent, for as Calvin had written, "We are not ours, but the Lord's." Her husband's death and her subsequent role as regent were all part of God's larger plan, and she told her secret council that she must now entrust everything "in Christian patience to the almighty righteous God. And we must," she concluded, "in this case submit ourselves to His fatherly will, in the comforting hope and expectation that He, in His merciful consolation, will stand by or strengthen us and help us to carry and surmount the heavy cross He has given us." Thus she used every card she had been dealt to gain control of her state. Not only was she regent by the grace of God, she was also the legal authority, the dutiful and obedient wife, and the caring and appropriately fervent mother. This is not to suggest, however, that she took up these roles cynically or merely out of necessity. There is instead every indication that she believed absolutely that she had a duty and responsibility to fulfill them as well as she possibly could.¹⁶

These strategies to establish her legitimacy, along with her more concrete actions to seize the reins of her military, bureaucracy, and people, helped her gain internal control—at least for now. The next step, dealing with her allies and enemies, would be an even more difficult task, for she faced a dangerous and complex international situation. Over the years of the war her husband had gained for Hesse-Cassel two principal foreign allies, the Swedes and the French, and three principal enemies, the emperor, the Catholic League, and Georg of Hesse-Darmstadt. Yet with Wilhelm's death, the landgravine was now much too weak to muster an adequate defense, let alone a new offense, without the full support of her allies. Failing this, she might be forced to come to terms with, or even join, her enemies. Thus Hesse-Cassel's long-standing foreign relationships were now in doubt, and the course of its foreign diplomacy in play. The beginning of the new campaign season was only months away, but if she wanted her state, her religion, and her children's inheritance to survive, she would need to proceed carefully but forcefully, lest in vacillating too long between the parties she should gain neither, and fall, as the old German saying went, between two stools.¹⁷

The suggestion that Amalia Elisabeth's allies might abandon her came quickly after the death of her husband. Although Sweden had been

Wilhelm's closest ally since Gustavus Adolphus first landed on German soil, the Hessian-Swedish relationship had cooled since the death of the king late in 1632. Chancellor Oxenstierna, who became the de facto ruler of Sweden under Gustavus Adolphus's minor daughter Christina, had shifted Swedish policy to be much less accommodating toward the Hessians, and had even attempted to rescind some of the king's extravagant territorial gifts. Wilhelm had managed to thwart this effort, but had expressed his continuing frustration by refusing to ratify the renewal of the Hessian-Swedish alliance, though the two had nevertheless continued to cooperate militarily. With Wilhelm's death the situation had changed, however, and at the Swedish court there was little faith that Amalia Elisabeth would be strong enough to maintain Hesse-Cassel in the war, and thus little interest in renewing the alliance or in rushing to her aid. They were, anyway, in poor shape to do so, for in the last year imperial troops had advanced against the Swedish forces under General Banér, boxing them in against the North Sea in Pomerania, and though the Swedes had begun to push back, the situation was still unfavorable. If they could gain some territorial concessions from the emperor, the Swedes were reasonably willing to let their allies hang in the wind, but they also acknowledged that their diplomatic situation would be significantly improved with the armies of Hesse-Cassel on their side. Given this uncertainty, the Swedish court had its resident at Cassel, Hermann Wolff, send a letter to Amalia Elisabeth, assuring her of their "unwavering affection" toward her, but offering her nothing concrete.¹⁸

Back in Cassel, the councilors knew they should negotiate an agreement with the Swedes, but had no idea what Wilhelm had wanted, what he had ordered before his death, or what Amalia Elisabeth now intended to do. Even worse, Wolff informed them that he had decided to return to Sweden. Frustrated and confused, they referred the problem to the landgravine and begged her to confer closely with Melander and her other military advisors. By this time she had packed up her sons, her court, and the body of her dead husband, and moved from the military quarters at Leer to a much more comfortable residence at Delfzijl, some thirty miles to the northwest. From her new home she attempted to calm her councilors. She apologized to them for her failure to return and praised them for their quick action in administering the oath and seeing to affairs on the home front. "Your eagerness to serve the fatherland and our princely children," she wrote, "is clear to see." To assist in this difficult transition, however, she had decided to send them her secretary, Friederich Jacobi, as

well as General Commissary Scheffer, Commissary Horn, and Lieutenant General Melander, who would report to the secret council orally on her wishes and report back to her on the state of the country. The worst thing, she told her councilors, was for them to panic. For “if one does not simply give up and rush, but instead proceeds carefully,” she admonished, “God will still, without doubt, grant one a good, reputable peace.”¹⁹

Wolff’s departure had struck the secret council as ominous, but Amalia Elisabeth was not so easily discouraged. She would try to use the ambassador’s return to the Swedish court for her own purposes. In a personal letter to him, she wrote that she hoped he might stop by to visit her on his way to Stockholm. As he was a native-born Hessian and one who had served both her husband and her mother-in-law in the past, she played on his love for his fatherland and asked that he speak to the court on her behalf. She reminded him of Hesse-Cassel’s importance to the allied cause, but also stressed her feminine weakness and need for protection. Her strategy with Wolff, in other words, required her to perform a delicate balancing act—she did not want the Swedes to think she was so weak that she would not be able to continue the war, but only so weak that she required their immediate assistance. Despite rumors that she was beginning to hear, she told Wolff, that the imperial general Götz was using the death of the landgrave as an opportunity to seize or blockade further portions of Hesse-Cassel’s lands, she was dubious about the threat. Her sources had told her that Götz’s army was foul-tempered and mutinous, and that any moves he might be making toward Hesse-Cassel were caused by a dire need for supplies and quarters for his men, not by any military strategy. Hesse was in such bad shape anyway, she told Wolff, that Götz “will have a great deal of difficulty finding that which he seeks there.” To bolster this message of both desperation and confidence, she also wrote personally to Chancellor Oxenstierna, expressing her trust that he would help to allievate the “heavy cross” she carried after her deplorable loss, and she sent new orders to her agent at the Swedish court, Hans Heinrich von Günderröde, to negotiate on her behalf. Although one French agent thought Günderröde “the bravest and most loyal knight of the [Hessian] court,” Amalia Elisabeth did not entirely trust him. She was concerned that he would instead use his considerable leverage with the Swedish imperial council to gain a better position and salary.²⁰

While Sweden was Hesse-Cassel’s oldest ally in the war, France was its principal financial supporter, and the French, like the Swedes, were

hesitant. The death of Wilhelm, which had occurred almost simultaneously with the deaths of the dukes of Savoy and Mantua, was one of a series of blows to Cardinal Richelieu's system of alliances, as Savoy, under the regency of Louis XIII's sister Christine, immediately dissolved into civil war, and Mantua, under Maria Gonzaga, soon changed sides by allying with the Spanish. Hesse-Cassel, however, was France's only remaining German ally, and so stood as the sole enduring proof of France's claim that its goal in this war was to protect the German liberties (a problem shared by the Swedes). More concretely, Amalia Elisabeth controlled not only East Frisia and much of the militarily important area of Westphalia (including portions of the bishoprics of Münster and Paderborn), but also a large, well-equipped, and well-trained army. These had all been reasons for France to offer a generous treaty to Wilhelm V back in 1636, and they were even more important in France's decision to support his widow now.²¹

On hearing the news of Wilhelm's death, therefore, the French court had responded quickly, sending out its agent Tercy to visit the Hessian exile court. Tercy arrived in East Frisia on 26 October with the expectation that the death of the landgrave would soon mean, as it recently had in Savoy, the overthrow of the regency court. His orders were to do his best to pick up the pieces, and to report back on just how bad things were. This report, however, was not bad at all. Expecting the worst, he had instead found affairs "in rather good shape." He wrote that although it seemed that Hesse-Cassel

should be overthrown by the deplorable loss, it has nevertheless very well maintained itself and powerfully reestablished itself by the spirit and the admirable conduct of Madame the landgrave, who in my humble opinion is no more lacking in courage, judgment, and experience in affairs than this great queen whose name she carries, and even the looks of her face.

Tercy was sure that "this great lady," especially when advised by the king, would continue to serve France just as had her husband.²²

In addition to Tercy's fact-finding mission, the French court sent out instructions to the resident ambassador at the landgravine's court, la Boderie, to tell her that the French king had been deeply saddened by the death of Wilhelm, to remind her of the affection and loyalty her husband had

always exhibited toward France, and to bring her and her son into “an inviolable union” with France. But while the French wanted desperately to maintain their treaty with Hesse-Cassel, they were wary that Amalia Elisabeth would attempt to use the death of her husband to her advantage. “His Majesty does not intend,” the court told la Boderie, “to be obliged because of this to more than what is carried by the treaty [of Wesel].” La Boderie should, therefore, offer only the same conditions Wilhelm had enjoyed, giving the young heir the same pension his father had received (36,000 livres) and the same title (lieutenant general of the king’s army in Germany). The landgravine was also to receive her own pension and be given an expensive cross of diamonds. La Boderie was pleased with her reaction to his offers and, echoing Tercy’s assessment, told the French court that she “displays great courage and resolution in continuing the conduct of her late husband.”²³

At the same time the French were trying to convince Amalia Elisabeth of their undying devotion to her and her family, however, they were putting into effect a contingency plan, the first step of which was to stall. At the news of the death of the landgrave, Richelieu’s ambassador at Hamburg, Claude de Mesmes, comte d’Avaux, had ordered the immediate halt of all subsidies to the Hessians, and though Tercy, la Boderie, and d’Avaux all repeatedly promised the landgravine their immediate reinstatement, the French thought it wise, until they were sure of her intentions and abilities, not to pour their money down a deep hole or, even worse, see their money go straight into the pockets of their enemies. D’Avaux even ordered stopped at Amsterdam the payment of 50,000 Reichsthalers in back subsidies that had been owed the Hessians for a very long time. This greatly pleased the French court, which agreed that it had been quite proper to hold off on the payment “until it is seen if the young landgrave will follow the example and conduct of his father.” This statement was one indication, among many others, that at this early date the French were still looking to the son, not the mother. She was the regent, yes, but the son was the true ruler, and so the focus of their concern.²⁴

D’Avaux then had the delicate task of trying to reassure Amalia Elisabeth about France’s good intentions and dedication to her and her son’s interests, while trying to explain why they had stopped her subsidies. His draft minute to her suggests that he was at some loss as to how to approach this, and he ended up by offering the condescending suggestion that this was all for her own good, for “in the trouble in which the [Hessian] court

is in on the death of the prince,” he told her, “it would be easy for someone who is ill intentioned to impose on you in this extreme affliction.” “It is not the interests of his Majesty but yours which has made me suspend for a few days the payment of this debt.” The landgravine was not amused. She instructed her agent at the French court, the secret councilor Adolf Wilhelm von Krosigk, to demand immediate payment. This the French also gingerly sidestepped, and the regular job of lying to Amalia Elisabeth about the continued failure to pay was taken up by the French resident at her court, la Boderie. Although the Swedes were behaving in exactly the same cautious manner, the French court instructed d’Avaux to intervene with them on Amalia Elisabeth’s behalf, and thus get them to shoulder the risk alone.²⁵

Another aspect of the French contingency plan was to attempt on their own initiative what they still suspected she could not manage on hers—stabilizing the Hessian government. She had already made good progress on grasping the reins of her administration, they knew, but could she now keep a firm hold? In order to help her do so, the French temporarily recalled their General Rantzau, who controlled a number of regiments within the Hessian army, feeling that he might cause “all sorts of trouble.” The loyalty of other Hessian officials was also of concern, so the French court authorized la Boderie to spread cash around to anyone who might be useful, including tidy sums for the landgravine’s vice statthalter, Johan Berndt von Dalwigk, and for many of her principal military advisors and generals, including G nderode, Scheffer, and the colonels Geysso and St. Andr . Key to this interventionist policy, however, was maintaining the loyalty of Amalia Elisabeth’s lieutenant general, Melander. Given the stakes, all interested parties wanted to gain Melander for their sides, and the prize, which was the considerable power of the entire Hessian army, could go to whoever could win and keep him. As the French court somewhat obviously informed la Boderie, “Melander, having to have the command of the armies of the said landgrave, will be from now on very important.” La Boderie was thus instructed to use “all of his conduct and industry to render him very affectionate to France,” and to offer Melander not only a patent for him to command the king’s German troops as sublieutenant general (as Amalia Elisabeth had requested), but also the honorary title of field marshal of the king and a sizable increase in his pension. Given Melander’s greed, such a bribe might work to keep him fighting, but could hardly make him affectionate to France. He had written years before that as

soon as the Hessians made peace, he would join the imperial side just so he could fight against the French.²⁶

The goal of the French was not to encourage Melander to take over, leaving Amalia Elisabeth as a mere figurehead, or even for him to leave her employ for their own, but to ensure that he would refuse to consider any separate treaty without the orders of the king. The French, along with everyone else, did not trust Melander entirely, so they preferred that he merely support and serve the landgravine, discourage any divisions within Hesse-Cassel that could hurt the allied cause, and keep Hesse-Cassel fighting on the right side. If this failed to produce the desired result and Amalia Elisabeth dropped out of the war, it would be disastrous were Melander and the Hessian army to fall into the hands of the emperor. La Boderie thus had firm instructions that if the landgravine were to come to peace, he should try to use the generous offers of money and titles to convince Melander to give his oath of loyalty to the French crown.²⁷

Just as Sweden and France had a great deal to gain from a continued alliance with Hesse-Cassel, Amalia Elisabeth had a great deal of interest in receiving continued support from them. She wrote privately to her counselor Vultejus that she desperately needed allies and could not possibly conclude any separate treaties without first consulting them and gaining their consent. This, she reminded her secret council, was also something her husband had firmly believed. The financial and military support of the allies was invaluable, and without them she could never achieve her sweeping goals of territorial gains, religious protections, and constitutional changes. So just as she had pleaded with Ambassador Wolff and the Swedish court to “raise up, with your well-meaning support, the pressure and burden that has fallen upon our all-too-weak shoulders,” she also attempted to gain the protection of the French. She begged the court “very humbly” for the French king to continue “to conserve her with all her children and states under the wings of his favor and protection, [and] to prolong the treaty and alliance of the father with the children as long as it pleased his Majesty.” She skillfully played a damsel in distress, throwing herself on the mercy of her protectors.²⁸

The landgravine matched this show of humility and female weakness with something more unusual in a female regent of the time—a complete inability to compromise. She had no interest in continuing a war that could not be won, or in receiving less aid than she needed, or wanted, to maintain herself, her court, her army, and her strongholds. Thus despite

the hopes of the French that she would be satisfied with less, or perhaps the same, financial support her husband had received, she wanted even more. "Because it was necessary," she told Tercy,

to have some extraordinary means to maintain the affairs that were shaken by such a deplorable accident, she hoped that his Majesty would offer some extra liberalities in order to garnish the strongholds with supplies and with munitions, in order to perfect the troops and incomplete companies, [and] in order to content the officers.

She was thus attempting, as the French had suspected she might, to use her very weakness to her advantage. Though she swore to both the Swedes and the French "on the salvation of her soul" that she would always be led by her dead husband's intentions and example, she also exploited her apparently feeble condition to gain a stronger negotiating position than her husband had enjoyed. This, combined with her large army and her control of Westphalia, East Frisia, and the fortresses of Hesse-Cassel, gave her what she believed was enough leverage to pressure (or bluff) her desperate allies into giving her better terms. She wrote to Chancellor Oxenstierna expressing her continuing devotion and affection toward the Swedes, but also threatening that were she to fall, she would drag the allied cause down with her. Similarly, she assured la Boderie and Tercy that she would rather lose everything than fail in her loyalty to the king, but it was surely no accident that Tercy was in her presence when he heard, and duly noted in his report, her boast to the Palatine ambassador that she could "obtain a rather advantageous peace from the emperor whenever and as many times as she wanted." This was quite a claim, and was sure to make an impression on the French court.²⁹

We may never know if the landgravine truly believed this, but only a day after Tercy sent off his report of this conversation, something happened that made it a lie. On Sunday, 21 October 1637, the Hessian secret council convened an emergency late-night session to compose a panicky report to young Wilhelm VI. "Today, at the end of the penitence, prayer, and feast day, as the [city] gate was opened," they reported,

a letter of Landgrave Georg of Hesse was presented by a trumpeter, in which His Highness told us that your lord father, Landgrave Wilhelm of Hesse of blessed Christ-mild memory, who rests with God, had been

declared an open enemy of the Holy Roman Empire and his lands and people stripped from him by the former Roman imperial majesty Ferdinand II in November of 1636. This imperial declaration . . . was also subsequently renewed and repeated by the current Roman imperial majesty on July of this year, and the administration of his land and people in the name of the Roman imperial majesty transferred to Landgrave Georg to lead.

Georg of Hesse-Darmstadt had chosen the moment of Hesse-Cassel's greatest weakness in decades for his surprise announcement. He was now, according to imperial law, the administrator of Hesse-Cassel and, as imperial commissioner, responsible for overseeing its surrender. This was not negotiable, Georg's messenger related, and was backed up by an imperial mandate that declared void Wilhelm's testament, the oath to his young heir, Wilhelm VI, and young Wilhelm VI's government and all that depended on it. The mandate required all subjects and officials to swear loyalty to Georg as imperial administrator of Hesse-Cassel and to reject all orders to the contrary. It demanded that all foreigners be expelled, all foreign alliances broken, and all Hessian troops be surrendered to the emperor; it required the restoration of all occupied lands to the rightful owners, and full acquiescence to the terms of the 1635 Peace of Prague. Then, and only then, the mandate stated, would Hesse-Cassel be returned to imperial grace and accepted into the peace. All councilors, soldiers, and subjects of Hesse-Cassel were required to accept the mandate in all its points without excuse or hesitation—or face its forced execution by imperial troops and so the forfeiture of all of their bodies, lives, honor, and goods. Georg's messenger helpfully provided the councilors with copies of the applicable documents, which only added to their horror.³⁰

Amalia Elisabeth was now balanced uneasily between the great powers of Europe. On the one side were her allies—Sweden and France—whose policies she favored and whose aid might allow her to thwart the execution of the mandate and continue the war, but whose loyalty was suspect; and on the other side were her enemies—the emperor and Landgrave Georg—who seemed to have the advantage, but whose demands for immediate unconditional surrender were less than appealing. If she refused the emperor she could lose everything her husband had ever fought for, as well as her religion, her state, and her beloved children's inheritance. If she agreed to the emperor's conditions, however, she would incur the wrath

of a spurned Sweden and France, lose forever the Marburg inheritance, break her vow to her husband that she would undertake the administration of his state, yet still have no assurance that her son would ever regain his rule or that her religion would be tolerated. Neither option was acceptable. She was perched precariously between two stools—and a fall could be fatal.

Chapter 3

The Imperial Mandate

LANDGRAVE GEORG'S sudden production of the imperial mandate was a serious blow to Amalia Elisabeth's carefully managed strategy of control. According to her secretary, Friederich Jacobi, things were so bad in Cassel as to be indescribable. Although rumors of major troop movements westward from Thuringia into Lower Hesse by the imperial general Götz had reached the landgravine earlier, she had dismissed them. But this was no desperate grab for supplies by a pathetic band of exhausted men, as she had thought. Instead, Georg and Götz had carefully laid their trap, moving a sizable force of seven or eight thousand men toward Hesse-Cassel before unveiling the imperial mandate, hoping thereby to make a more forceful impression. This it did, for Götz, headquartered in the now-fortified village of Helmershausen and strengthened by Landgrave Georg's own troops, was fully and firmly entrenched in Hesse-Cassel before the landgravine was able to make a single move. Though part of the imperial army had broken off to attack her troops under Melander, the bulk of the enemy freely wandered the countryside, seizing all crops and livestock that had survived earlier plundering, and burning the town of Geismar and numerous other villages. Loud shooting, Jacobi reported to Amalia Elisabeth, was audible from Cassel itself. Götz sent a letter to the council warning them to surrender or suffer total devastation, and boasted that he not only controlled the countryside but also would soon take the fortresses, most of which he had already blockaded. This boast was premature, for the Hessian fortresses,

including Cassel, were admirably defended. When the imperial troops tried to take the fortress of Trendelburg, for example, they were forced to withdraw, having succeeded only in burning the surrounding city to the ground. Whatever such small successes for the defenders, however, the presentation of the imperial mandate seemed to all present in Hesse-Cassel to mark a dangerous, and decidedly grim, turning point in their part in the war.¹

The vice statthalter and council sent a bold response to Götz, warning him to break off his attack lest Melander unleash a threefold response on the territories of Cologne, but this was a bluff; Jacobi's reports stressed to the landgravine the panic, confusion, and disarray of the Hessian secret council in the face of this challenge. Though the people and secret council love you, and though they are true patriots, Jacobi wrote, "they are in this place very perplexed and perturbed." It was only a matter of time, the councilors believed, until Georg managed to take the fortresses and then force the people to swear loyalty to him. This process would be so much the easier for him, they wrote to young Wilhelm VI, because of the dire situation in the countryside after years of war. There was nothing they could do but instruct the people to deal with Götz's troops as best as they could and to remain true to their oath to the landgrave. "But this," the councilors admitted, "neither can nor will happen." Such pessimism and paralysis was only aggravated by the secret council's inability to communicate properly with the Hessian exile court in East Frisia. Jacobi reported that large troop movements in the area meant that he, Colonel Geyso, and Commissary Horn had made it through to Cassel only by luck, and this was not something that could be tried again. Messengers were no more successful, so a great deal of official correspondence was lost. Even when letters got past the enemy forces, there was still the sheer distance between Cassel and Delfzijl and the general difficulty of travel within the empire because of bad weather, poor roads, warfare, and bandits. This forced correspondents to send multiple coded copies of important letters, often by different routes, to ensure safe delivery. More important items, such as money or jewels, were riskier. The French agent, d'Avaux, for example, complained to the French court that it was a good thing he had not trusted the diamond necklace meant for Amalia Elisabeth to his messengers, for they had been "robbed blind twice in two weeks." Even if letters managed to get past the hazards of the road, they regularly took two to three weeks to get from one place to another. Correspondents

often had to wait at least a month (and more when some thought was required for the answer) to receive a reply likely irrelevant by then—a severe complication in deciding matters of immediate importance.²

Given the obstacles, it was impressive that the secret council's first panicky letter informing young Landgrave Wilhelm VI of the postmortem outlawing of his father and the transfer of the administration to Landgrave Georg arrived in Delfzijl on 2 November, a relatively speedy twelve days after it was sent. This letter presented the landgravine with some serious problems, and not just the ones associated with Georg and his legions of imperial collection agents. The uncertainty of the foreign allies as to who was in charge, Amalia Elisabeth or her son, was matched, it seems, by the Hessian secret council itself, for the letter was addressed not to the landgravine, but to her nine-year-old son. In response, she had her son compose a reply in order to dispel any lingering confusion over her authority. In this letter, young Wilhelm reiterated his mother's earlier stress on the extreme importance of loyalty, unity, and duty to prince and fatherland, and simultaneously exerted a careful pressure on the secret councilors to stand firm and remember what they were fighting for. The letter also showed the secret council its mistake in writing to the son and not the mother. The young prince explained to the councilors that he could not fully understand the issues or give advice on how to solve them because of his age. He instructed them to be ruled instead by his mother. "I'll pray day and night," he wrote, "for God's mercy, that you will not abandon me in this great difficulty, me whom all the world has abandoned, and also attend to the thoughts and intentions of my esteemed mother."³

This was a theme Amalia Elisabeth herself then echoed in her own letter to the secret council. While Wilhelm VI was their lord, she told the councilors, the burden of leadership lay on her shoulders alone, for her son was of no age to understand or respond to important issues. She told them that she had read the letter they had sent to her son and was greatly disturbed by the news. Yet despite the pressure, they must continue to stand by their oath, for "God, nature, all divine and secular law, and his late father's disposition have established my son in the government of the land." She was especially concerned that her councilors make every effort to convince the people to stand firm, something for which, she told them, "God and also our beloved son when he reaches adulthood will bless you, not to mention the eternal praise all the world, even the enemies themselves, will shower on you should you in such a just cause remain firmly

by your natural hereditary lord.” And if such eternal praise were not enough to keep the secret council in line, she also had the weapon of divine displeasure. “God will, in the end,” she reminded them, “stand with loyal and honest hearts, but God will not be pleased with those who should, but unnaturally fail to protect widows and orphans.” With these lines she reiterated the theme of her entire reign. She was both the rightful regent to a divinely and legally ordained ruler, and a poor widow in need of protection.⁴

Having dealt with this question of authority, she then moved on to confront the pressing military problem. If the enemy managed to take the fortresses all hope would be lost, but if not, imperial troops could roam the countryside as much as they wanted and still not have the upper hand. The peasants and the countryside would suffer, but the government would prevail. Thus she could not stress enough in this letter to her councilors that they must hold on to the remaining Hessian strongholds. She had smelled panic in her councilors’ letter, and it worried her. To reassure them, she attempted to paint a rosy picture of the larger situation. The enemies should not be able to take the fortresses with the few troops they had, she wrote, and assistance would soon arrive. She herself had sent 20,000 Reichsthalers in emergency aid and had instructed Melander to send additional troops. Further help would also be coming from her many international allies, and according to their colleague Krosigk, who was now in Hamburg, the prospect of a general peace was right around the corner. This information had been echoed by the French agent d’Avaux, she told them, who had personally reassured her that the emperor was now being more reasonable, for he saw that the entire empire was exhausted and feared that further warfare might encompass his own hereditary lands or be complicated by a new war with the Turks. And even if the general peace fell through, she reassured the councilors, a highly placed source had told her that they could get a good particular peace if only they did not panic and precipitously give away the strongholds.⁵

This optimistic depiction of events was not simply the landgravine’s attempt to steady a frantic secret council. Despite circumstances that had caused the utmost despair and consternation in Cassel, she acted as if she were supremely confident. Time, she seemed to believe, was on her side, for with time even the worst situation could be transformed into victory. Thus she did not immediately surrender and beg for peace, which her secret council, Georg, and Ferdinand III all expected her to do. Instead, even

while facing Götz's invasion and Georg's pretensions, she was moving aggressively on a plan hatched by her husband to block the forced peace of her brother, the count of Hanau-Münzenberg, with the emperor. She hoped that if that treaty failed, then she, her brother, and the Scottish General James Ramsay, who was still in command of the fortress at Hanau, could then act in concert to attack the enemy. This would not only aid her and the entire allied cause and facilitate the eventual general peace, it would also provide more long-term advantages, for her brother had agreed that in return for her assistance against the imperialists, Hesse-Cassel would gain the eventual incorporation of his state.⁶

Amalia Elisabeth was a firm believer in the strategic importance of delay, but the source of her confidence, a confidence that would push her admirers into paeans to her glory and drive her enemies into paroxysms of frustrated anger, was her absolute faith in God's power and mercy. "We have the firmest trust in the Almighty," she wrote, "that He will not abandon us to this, our heavy cross, but tenderly grant us patience, consolation, and willpower." She only needed to hold on to what she knew was right, without flinching or failing in her duty, and God would surely provide. "God will still," she argued, "if one simply does not give in too early and act precipitously, but rather proceeds carefully, grant us a good, reputable peace without any doubt." Here she agreed fully with Calvin's admonition that "His blessing alone makes a way through all obstacles, and brings everything to a joyful and favourable issue." With time things would surely improve, and she would be able to maintain her son's inheritance, protect her religion, and make a peace that would stand up to the judgment of God and posterity.⁷

The secret council's lack of faith was disturbing, but a new obstacle in Amalia Elisabeth's attempts to retain control of her state was also emerging. Her distance from affairs in Hesse, the extreme threat posed to both the land and people, or perhaps the messages of the stars now brought the previously inactive Landgrave Hermann to Cassel. This made the secret council extremely uneasy, and Jacobi reported that Hermann seemed to be biding his time there, waiting to see what the landgravine would do. Hermann, like all of her other internal Hessian opponents, wanted Hesse-Cassel out of the war immediately, and his presence at Cassel was suspicious. Any move by him now to supplant her as regent would provide the peace party with a new powerful leader, and give her internal enemies a semilegitimate alternative to her. This possibility was of grave concern at

her exile court, where Hermann and his brothers were universally derided as “sons of a prostitute.” Hesse-Cassel’s allies were also worried, for even if Hermann were unable to seize control, he could still cause enough internal division to knock Hesse-Cassel out of the war. The French court, therefore, tried to convince the landgravine to return to Cassel as soon as possible in order to hinder any attempted coup. But she was not about to put herself under the thumb of her enemies by returning, and instead assured the French king that she was prepared to use extreme measures if necessary to defuse her relatives’ pretensions. The French agreed with this policy, but also appealed directly to her brothers-in-law and urged her to do the same, suggesting that she try to induce Hermann, in particular, to desist in “all designs prejudicial to the landgrave of Hesse, his nephew.” For the house of Hesse-Cassel, they argued somewhat obviously, “will subsist without a doubt much better if it is united than divided.” To sweeten the deal, they suggested that either Amalia Elisabeth or themselves offer Hermann some positive inducement, such as a pension, to make the problem disappear without the need for violence.⁸

Such internal conflicts in Hesse-Cassel were a boon to Georg and the imperialists, who decided to try to increase the divisions even more. Reports soon emerged from Cassel that General Götz and Georg had attempted to bypass the landgravine by appealing directly to the Hessian estates, urging them to renounce their loyalty to the young landgrave in return for imperial protection and mercy. The elector of Saxony, Johann Georg, whose house had a long relationship with that of Hesse, had done likewise, asking the estates to return to their patriotic duty and divinely established responsibility to the emperor and the empire. Not only did Wilhelm’s crimes not apply to them, he wrote, but any duty they owed the landgrave had died with him. The elector also sounded a continuing theme of Amalia Elisabeth’s opponents: opposition to foreign intervention in German affairs. How could they make themselves dependent on foreign powers, he asked the estates, to the increased disturbance of the empire? We know, he told them, “very well with what apparent pretensions and sweet images numerous estates and lands have been led away from their duty to observe imperial laws, and under the name of increased liberty, to want to tie the true, ancient German liberty to the subject yoke of foreign nations.” This was an argument designed to appeal to German patriotism, and it struck a chord. The estates had expressed little faith that their foreign allies would lift a finger to support them, and were also wary

of getting too close to such powerful states, suspecting that siding with the Swedes and French would merely trade one servitude for another. On his part, Ferdinand was sure that this kind of appeal would be successful, for the Hessian estates, he assumed, were just waiting for him to release them from the landgrave's service in order to return to their loyalty to the fatherland and to him, their true and beloved overlord.⁹

And yet, despite the emperor's confidence, Amalia Elisabeth's quick action on the oath of fealty had already muddied the situation. Any overt act against her or her son would mean breaking an oath taken before God, and this the Hessian estates were not yet prepared to do. Wavering between fears of one side and of the other and generally unsure of themselves, they finally rejected the appeals of the imperialists. The Hessian councilors, with what they seemed to think was superhuman discretion and loyalty, also decided to wait to recognize Georg's administration until they had been directed to do so by the young landgrave—a directive they thought would be quickly forthcoming. Meanwhile, they would hold out as long as they could. Their first official response to Georg's graphic threats, therefore, was to stall, asking why he had withheld the imperial patent for so long, and arguing that "such significant things required better and more careful reflection, and that it should not come to such extremities, but that they wanted to refrain from their resolution."¹⁰

Such tactics did not impress Georg, who was not a patient man. His trumpeter delivered a stinging demand that the secret council declare immediately whether it would comply with the imperial mandate, and a further demand that representatives from the secret council appear for negotiations at Marburg by 7 November 1637. In response to the questions about the timing of the mandate, Georg lied, and quite badly. He told the councilors that he had been suffering from a long illness and had been away at Langenschwalbach for a cure, but had finally been prompted to act by the desires of the Hessian estates for peace and by his sudden recollection of Wilhelm's past criminal acts. The secret council responded by asking again for more time, begging that the meeting at Marburg be delayed until the end of November. Georg, disgusted, instead appealed directly to the Hessian estates through a published letter, which he ensured would receive wide publicity by having it hand-delivered to all the nobility and estates of Hesse-Cassel. This letter was especially dangerous, as it also demanded that representatives of the estates attend a special *Landtag* (unified Hessian Diet) to be held at Alsfeld. The secret council, however,

not to be outdone in this propaganda war, shot back with its own letter prohibiting this, which it also spread far and wide, and which had the desired effect. The councilors then demonstrated their opposition to the emperor's mandate by convening a meeting in the kitchen hall at the fortress of Cassel, where they read Wilhelm's testament to a large group of people, including nobility, university professors, members of the ministry, and all the servants present.¹¹

While Georg and the secret council fought over control of the Hessian populace, interested parties began to congregate at the landgravine's court at Delfzijl. The prince of Orange, whom Wilhelm had specifically named as an executor of his testament in the vain hope that this might encourage him to lend some assistance, had an agent there, as did the Dutch States General and the Prince Palatine, who had initially attempted to gain Amalia Elisabeth's troops for himself and was now attempting to get her to take his. This attempt was no more successful than his first, for she believed it was simply a ploy to drag her into his affairs. The French, of course, were still well represented by their resident ambassador, la Boderie, but the Swedes, much slower off the mark than others, had no diplomatic agent at her court. Ambassador Wolff, however, now agreed to visit the landgravine on his way to Stockholm, and the Swedish general Leslie stopped by to discuss the military situation and to ask to lead the Hessian troops in Pomerania.¹²

Even Georg sent an agent, Commissary General Heussener de Wundersleben, who arrived on 9 November and whom Amalia Elisabeth charmed. Heussener told her that if she allowed Georg to have the administration of Hesse-Cassel, Georg would help reconcile her son to the emperor and would neither interfere in young Wilhelm's education nor alter Hesse-Cassel's existing churches and schools. This proposal she refused, arguing that the dangers of such an administration were unimaginable and thus, out of conscience, she could not agree. After further negotiations, Heussener suggested a compromise. She would retain the regency and control of internal affairs, but Georg would be the over-regent, responsible for all of Hesse-Cassel's foreign policy. This was quite a concession, but it would reverse the traditional status of the two Hessian lines, defy her husband's testament, and make her and her son dangerously dependent on Georg. Plus she simply did not trust Georg to hold to his word. She told Heussener that she did not want to decide such an important thing without the advice of Melander, the secret council, close relatives, friends, and

estates. But neither she nor they, she added, could set aside her husband's decrees in religious and other matters, especially concerning the raising of his children. She wished to abide in the future, she went on, by the well-known peaceable disposition of her husband (something Georg and the emperor might have had a good laugh about, had fewer of their people died at Wilhelm's hands) and would happily do everything that might help unify the house of Hesse. She then offered the empty promise that within the regency and administration entrusted to her, she would honor and respect Georg and faithfully follow his good advice. Playing the grieving-widow card once again, she stated that she only hoped that Georg would offer to protect her and her children in this difficult time, as Georg himself would like to see happen were his own wife placed in such a situation. While surrounding her argument with an appeal for time to consider and with faint and not very heartening assurances, she both implied that she would continue the war until her demands were met and made it quite clear that she had no intention of allowing Georg to step in as either *de jure* or *de facto* ruler of Hesse-Cassel.¹³

Meanwhile, the division between the secret council and the landgrave was rapidly growing. While she was optimistic, or at least determined to hold out for her principles despite the possible consequences, the secret council, stranded and besieged in Cassel, was appalled by her continued stubborn faithfulness to her husband's military strategy, especially the plan to aid Hanau, an assistance that would only further enrage the emperor. Without her knowledge or approval, therefore, the secret council decided to proceed with the negotiations with Georg. It sent to Marburg some of its finest men, including Major General Franz Elgar von Dalwigk, Christian von der Malsburg, Johann Antrecht, Johan Lohrentz Stöckeroth, and Hennrich Wagehalß (the mayor of Homberg), all of whom left on 1 November in order to arrive in time for Georg's mandated date for the negotiations to begin. Landgrave Hermann, not to be left out, also sent a delegate. The councilors excused this action as being required by "the most extreme necessity." They did not want to violate their duty, but if they spurned these proffered negotiations they would be responsible for a great evil in the land. At any rate, it was highly doubtful that their goals could "be obtained through a continuation of the war and resumption of arms," for they were "not capable of fighting war further, but rather must attempt everywhere to get peace." The people suffered from high taxes and famine, and the plague was loose in the cities, forcing the

best merchants to flee. “The subjects and soldiers are becoming difficult,” the councilors wrote, “since the people are losing everything they own, their peace, and even their hope for peace.” As for the soldiers, they had no munitions and neither pay nor anything to eat but bread and water, and although they were still at their posts, Götz had offered them a safe conduct if they would only lay down their arms. “If one gives them money,” the secret council reported, “the soldiers will quiet down, remain with the companies, and be willingly used, so it is imperative that so much money be got here monthly as to free them from need, because not a dollar more can be raised from the countryside.” But “should our troops be cracked open,” the secret council warned, “it would then be much too late to negotiate.” Furthermore, the larger military outlook was poor, for the imperial general Jean de Werth now controlled the entire Rhine, and facing no opposition would soon march on Hesse to join with Götz. Even if this did not happen, Landgrave Georg and his allies had quite enough men on their own to take Cassel by force. “Should we then be attacked, and be able to hold out a year and a day,” the secret council added,

it would finally not be enough, since no relief would come and the enemy, as one sees in all places, would play the master. So one should well consider if one prefers to stand at the extreme and peak and rely on the uncertain help of foreign, far-off potentates, or to stand in peace and calm and maintain land and people. We really think this, and not out of any cowardice, but upright, patriotic feeling and hearts, and true affection, love, devotion, and loyalty to you and our young prince.

Even if the country, once lost, could be regained through the help of the foreign powers, which was doubtful, the councilors argued, still their religion—which this war was about in the first place—would be lost, for the allies had little sympathy for Calvinism. Therefore, the secret council concluded, if we can get Georg and the emperor to recognize the terms of the accord negotiated, but never completed, between Wilhelm V and the bishop of Würzburg, as well as the regency and administration of the landgravine, and if we can settle Georg’s private demands on the basis of the 1627 Hauptakkord, “we should then not only conclude it, but if it could be brought so far, to thank God for it.” This grim view was echoed by Jacobi, who warned the landgravine that time was short and it was important for her to reconcile herself to what was going on. The council had sent its

delegates to Marburg without power to agree to anything, he told her, but “only time will tell what will happen.”¹⁴

By this point, contradictory reports had begun to trickle into Delfzijl that suggested there had already been an accommodation and the secret council had meekly handed over the fortresses. Hearing such rumors, Amalia Elisabeth had begun to suspect the secret council of treason, or at least treasonous weakness. It would be a serious mistake, she told the councilors in a letter of 16 November, for them to panic and rush into a peace with the emperor. First, when it came to religion, the emperor and his minions were untrustworthy. In Hanau, she told them, reports were emerging that the imperial ratification of Hanau’s peace had arrived, but the emperor had altered the religious article in a number of particulars, including the issue of religious lands, weakening the position of Calvinism in that state. This showed once again that Hesse-Cassel (or any Reformed imperial estate) would have little hope of maintaining its religion under an imperially backed administration, but also suggested that her plan to incorporate Hanau, or at least keep it from falling into the hands of the enemies, might still be feasible, despite the secret council’s disapproval. Indeed, she tried to reassure the councilors, the military picture was not as bad as they thought. She was even now gathering reinforcements and had great hopes that the English would join the war on their side, and that the prince of Orange would also aid them. “We have the firmest faith,” she reminded the councilors, “that God will have everything work out for the honor of His holy name and the best for His troubled church.” In the meantime, they simply needed to maintain themselves and the fortresses until help arrived or the fortunes of war shifted in their favor. “For if we lose this place,” she told them, “we will never get it back.”¹⁵

Soon thereafter, however, the landgravine learned from Melander that the news of the secret council’s premature surrender had not been true. “God be praised and thanked,” she wrote her councilors, “that all of this is false,” for “our entire estate and the well-being of the land” is based on the preservation of the fortresses. As to the Marburg negotiations, she assured her secret council that she would happily agree to a good, honest peace—but only when it was “something that one can be responsible for before God and the world.” In this, she believed, the main stumbling block was Georg’s pretensions for the administration of Hesse-Cassel, “for we,” she wrote, “have been appointed to that same administration.” Her appointment was unbreakable, she argued, since it had been decided by

her husband after considerable thought and the advice of the secret council itself, and she had then personally sworn to him to undertake it. Since the secret council was determined to negotiate, however, it should at least let Georg know that she would rather take up extreme measures than allow him to control the administration and claim the regency, for “such a thing will not stand, that we will allow something that goes so against our honor and reputation, against the love and loyalty that we owe to our beloved husband, who rests with God, and his dear, left-behind children, against the high promise and vow that we gave to our lord, and also against our own conscience.” Georg’s compromise proposal, giving him control of the administration and foreign affairs and Amalia Elisabeth the regency, would also be completely unworkable. This, she argued, would create two factions in the government, one dependent on her regency and one on Georg’s administration, which would cause bickering and lead to confusion—thus defeating Georg’s ostensible goal of uniting Hesse. Still, it would not be wise to seem too disagreeable, so she advised that the secret council’s delegates at Marburg should reassure Georg, as she herself had done with Heussener, that she was happy to accept his good advice and protection.¹⁶

In dealing with both her allies and her enemies, Amalia Elisabeth had decided that caution was the best policy. Unlike her councilors, who thought her state and her religion could only be preserved by a separate peace with the emperor, she seems to have believed her best security lay with the allies. But until she could be assured of their complete support and protected by rock-solid alliances, she would allow the secret council to keep talking—even though she thought it highly improbable there would ever be an agreement, and had no doubt that Georg wanted nothing more than the complete extirpation of the Hesse-Cassel line. Meanwhile, she would do everything possible to distance herself from the secret council’s negotiations, both in order to placate her allies and to make it easier to renounce the final treaty if necessary. Simultaneously, she had no compunction about using the possibility of the negotiations’ success as a means to frighten her allies into providing more concrete aid. So while the delegates of the secret council met with Georg in Marburg, her agents across Europe continued their frantic efforts to undermine the delegates’ work by attempting to gain firm offers of money, troops, military supplies, and diplomatic assistance against Georg and the emperor. Yet she also cautioned her agents to temporize when pressed for specifics. They should neither give too strong assurances that she would continue the war,

nor seem too cold toward the idea. Her agents should assure the allies that she wanted nothing more than to continue the policy of her husband, and remind them of her considerable strategic territorial holdings and experienced army. At the same time, however, the agents should excuse the continuing negotiations with Georg and the emperor by stressing the desperateness of her situation, the strong demands of her estates and people for peace, and the weakness of her female shoulders. The contradiction of her argument—that she was so powerful they could not live without her, but so weak she could not possibly reject a separate peace with the emperor without better terms from them—did not seem to bother her. She had everything well in hand. All she had to do now was keep her panicked countrymen from giving away the game.¹⁷

Panic was not confined to the borders of Hesse-Cassel. From Hamburg, the French agent d'Avaux reported that “the Swedes are entirely on the border of the sea, and of the precipice. All we need is one misfortune in order to finish them off.” The duke of Saxe-Weimar, long the shining hope of the French and their allies, was also not accomplishing much, and had been forced by General Jean de Werth, as the Hessian secret council had glumly noted, to abandon a number of important fortifications on the Rhine. The Hessian military situation was also poor, for in addition to the loss of the Hessian countryside, Amalia Elisabeth's men had intercepted letters that suggested that Götz now intended to take the war to her door—invading East Frisia itself. As weak and undefended as she was there, this could be disastrous, for she had no confidence that Melander would be able to deal with Götz alone. She thus sent instructions to her agent in Amsterdam, Sengel, to negotiate secretly with the Dutch States General, and especially with her uncle the prince of Orange and with her mother, Katharina Belgica (who had retired to the United Provinces), to obtain any financial, military, or diplomatic aid possible in both the looming invasion of East Frisia and the continuing conflict with Georg.¹⁸

The military situation was now bad enough that the French had become concerned about a possible domino effect. The Hessians, the duke of Saxe-Weimar, and the Swedes, d'Avaux wrote to the court, are all “feebler than the enemies that are opposed to them.” Were just one to come to a separate peace, he continued, the others would either follow suit or be completely overwhelmed—in which case the imperialists would descend with all their forces on France, which would be inundated with Germans by the next year. In order to stop this calamity, d'Avaux advised the

French king to provide the subsidies already owed to Sweden and Amalia Elisabeth, and to pay Melander to fortify his army and raise an additional five to six thousand men, which would provide a diversion, aid the duke of Saxe-Weimar, and help remove an excuse for Sweden or the others to make peace.¹⁹

D’Avaux’s schemes and worries illustrated a serious problem for the allies—they did not trust each other. Theirs were alliances of convenience, with the parties united solely by their shared hatred of a common enemy and desire for their own advantages. Each party fully believed that the others would jump at a separate peace if offered enough of an incentive, and the worse the military situation, the greater the danger someone would bolt. Amalia Elisabeth took full advantage of this in her dealings with her allies, wielding the tactic of delay and the prospect of a separate peace with the emperor with great skill, but she was not alone. Melander was also skilled at such blackmail, causing d’Avaux to become concerned that the lieutenant general would convince Amalia Elisabeth to drop out of the war. To stop this, d’Avaux demanded an assurance, in writing, that Melander not entertain any separate treaty settlements without express order of the French king. As a precaution, the French also decided to increase their payments to Melander, as well as to the landgravine’s vice chancellor, Deinhardt, whom they believed to be quite pro-French, to some of her colonels, and to her private secretary. General Rantzau, who still technically commanded the French troops serving under the landgravine, also pressured the French court, demanding large sums and increased authority lest he be obliged to seek a new master. Such behavior disgusted d’Avaux, who complained when the Swedes also used such tactics, sneering that “these people act like merchants and want to hold in one hand the treaty with their allies and in the other with the enemy.”²⁰

Amalia Elisabeth’s strategy might have offended d’Avaux, but it was far more effective than that of her secret council. The councilors’ delegates had been eager to settle on any reasonable terms, but Georg felt no need to be reasonable. In his role as imperial commissioner he was charged with ensuring the surrender of Hesse-Cassel to the emperor and the settlement of the religious issue, matters the Hessians referred to as the *publica*. In this, however, Georg had dashed the secret council’s hopes by refusing to treat on the basis of the earlier Würzburg negotiations or any other agreement, demanding that the entire process proceed as new, without a single concession on the imperial side. While the councilors found

such demands unjust, they were even more appalled when it became clear that Georg was using the situation to press his own personal gains. Here his territorial and financial demands (the *privata*) were even more painful, which boded ill for the future of the young landgrave and the preservation of Hesse-Cassel's territorial and religious integrity, and the secret council told its delegates at Marburg to stand fast and not agree to anything. Meanwhile, Georg's agents at the courts of his brother-in-law, Duke Georg of Brunswick-Lüneburg, and his father-in-law, Elector Johann Georg of Saxony, persuaded these princes to write on his behalf to Melander and the Hessian estates, who began to waver. In desperation, the secret council called a meeting of knights and local estates to explain the situation, to encourage them to remain true, and to warn them away from any new oaths to Georg. The councilors also wrote to a large number of German princes asking for mediation and arguing that Georg's unjust and unreasonable personal demands were the real impediment to the larger peace. This way, the secret council wrote Amalia Elisabeth, "all dispassionate people and the whole wide world" could see that it was Georg, not the government of Hesse-Cassel, who was to blame. In another letter to their agent at the imperial court, Johan Friederich Breithaupt, the councilors expressed their true concern. From all that Georg had done, they wrote, "we can gather or judge nothing else, than that on the Darmstadt side they are solely aligned, and all of their actions are directed, such that this princely Hesse-Cassel line, if not completely crushed, would still be made so small that no lord could lead it."²¹

Amalia Elisabeth, meanwhile, was continuing with her efforts from East Frisia to slow what she believed to be the secret council's headlong rush into a separate peace with Georg. Her first task in this was to try once again to dispel her councilors' suspicions of her. In a letter of 11 December she dismissed accusations that she had been inactive or uninterested in their problems, or that in her "distressed and shattered state" she could not negotiate. This was nonsense, she wrote, for the problem was that she very much doubted, as she had always said, that the Marburg negotiations would reach the desired goal. The negotiations were a mistake, she told them once again, for although Georg had been assuring other princes that he did not want to take her lands or destroy her religion, her earlier dealings with him had convinced her that this was a lie. "And we also think," she wrote, "that in this respect, especially in the points of religion, which are the most important, the greatest difficulties and, in the end, even

when everything is right, such incredibly disreputable clauses will occur, that it would cause us to have so much more evil a reputation among the allies.” To Amalia Elisabeth, therefore, the negotiations at Marburg offered only the destruction of her church and the loss of her honor. Furthermore, as the delegates of the secret council were seriously outgunned and outclassed at Marburg, she argued, they had no way to press their objections, frame the basis of the negotiations, or even decide what would be discussed when. So if the secret council must proceed, she wrote, it would need a person or persons of higher rank to counter Georg’s stature and provide the delegates with some dignity and authority.²²

This advice was yet another indication of the landgravine’s strategy, for she firmly believed that one must always negotiate from a position of strength. And here her greatest strategic assets were the territorial possessions in East Frisia and Westphalia. These were her salvation, her unbeatable ace in the hole. “For there is no one who doubts in the least,” she told the secret council, “that, should we ask to have nothing more than what was included in the Würzburg treaty, the emperor will grant us what we want, much sooner and more than the state of Hanau, because of the places that we still have in our hands.” The princes of these occupied lands, she argued, would in their own best interests force the emperor to settle quickly with Hesse–Cassel. The states of Holland, for example, “would have gotten us peace with the emperor on account of the single city of Lippstadt,” the king of Denmark had proposed to bring her and her sons to full restitution with the emperor in return for her leaving East Frisia, and the count of East Frisia himself, Ulrich II, had also offered to help bring her to a good peace at his own cost and expense. “And all such and other good means and ways for peace,” she wrote, “would do more for our distinguished lord and husband’s and this princely house of Hesse’s good reputation and advantage, than if one attempts to get peace with supplications at the place where it has always been hindered because of private issues.” If the negotiations with Georg failed or if he demanded too much, she wrote the secret council, “then that which would have been accomplished in other ways much easier, better, and with better reputation will be hindered,” and “other means and ways will be ten times harder to attain.”²³

Amalia Elisabeth’s stress on the importance of negotiating from a position of strength did not stop with mere arguments. Instead, the very next day she decided to make it quite clear to both the secret council and to Georg that she had no intention of abiding by the dictates of the imperial

mandate or satisfying Georg's claims. This she did by formally accepting the regency granted her by her husband's testament. "Although we have good cause," she told her secret council,

in these difficult times, not only because of the increasing war unrest and danger in the Holy Roman Empire, but also because of the destroyed, miserable, and ruined situation in Hesse-Cassel, and especially because of the varied present offenses thrown at us in our distressed widowhood, to completely relinquish this regency and administration, and instead to live the remaining days of our life in peace, quietly and alone, rather than subjecting ourselves to great worry, effort, disturbance, and unrest, all of which difficulties, and more, will plague this regency and administration; yet when we rightly consider and deliberate if we could possibly oppose or set aside the great trust that our beloved lord and husband held for us, or if we could also with good conscience oppose such a decree made by His Highness [Wilhelm] and stemming from true zealous fatherly provisions, then we must confess that such considerations surpass all other difficulties. Thus we then, with a fervent appeal to the Almighty, . . . accept the aforementioned regency and administration . . . [and] may God grant His almighty blessing from above so that we are ruled with His spirit, so that all may redound to His holy name's honor, the maintenance and extension of the true religion, the return of lasting peace, and the refreshing, comfort, and well-being of the devastated fatherland and lower principality of Hesse.

This duty was not merely thrust on her by her husband, therefore, but also by the will of God. For God had intended her to perform this office, she told her estates in a subsequent letter, and no one could doubt that "God would not abandon such a righteous affair," but would, on the contrary, powerfully aid any just person who would pursue it. With God on her side, and with the continued loyalty and support of the Hessian people, she argued, she was sure she could overcome all difficulties and manage the burden of such an incredibly demanding office. Furthermore, by accepting the administration of Hesse-Cassel, she clearly hoped to present a *fait accompli* that would hobble Georg's claims and force him to back down. "Our intent is directed," she explained, "so that when we directly undertake the regency and administration, and thereby at the same time

appear to be in its possession, Landgrave Georg of Hesse will then so much the sooner back down and allow his proposed ideas for it to fall.”²⁴

After extensive discussions among themselves, however, the secret councilors were still determined to conclude an agreement with Georg. First, they wrote the landgravine, if they did not agree, the emperor would execute the imperial mandate and they would lose land, people, and religion. Second, if the people thought that the secret council had refused a reasonable peace they would revolt, take the promised imperial protection, and give Georg their obedience, “because,” the councilors wrote, “it is impossible for them to withstand the burden of war any longer.” Third, the financial situation was desperate, and without money the soldiers would either mutiny or desert. Fourth, since the *publica* gave them roughly the same protections as those gained by the other German states at the Peace of Prague, they could not answer to God or man if they refused it and continued such an unholy war. Nor could they “desire or obtain more than all other electors and princes who have relied on the imperial word of honor.” This was the right thing to do even if the emperor broke his word in the future, for they could then “complain about it to the Almighty, and ask Him to order things to be right.” To buttress this argument, the council surveyed the top clergy in Cassel, who determined that the terms of the *publica* sufficiently protected the Hessian church. In this way the secret council was attempting to use Amalia Elisabeth’s own religiosity against her. God, the councilors were arguing, would act as their security. One simply had to have faith.²⁵

The *privata*, however, was a different story. Here most of the councilors were not satisfied, and they recommended that the landgravine refuse many of the terms proposed by Georg, who was insisting on things the secret council could not, with honor, accept, including territorial renunciations that would leave Hesse-Cassel with even worse terms than those in the despised 1627 Hauptakkord. The negotiations on these matters had to be removed from Georg’s hands, the councilors argued, if they were ever to be successful. In an attempt to do just that, therefore, the secret council moved forward with a plan, favored by the landgravine, to gain a new imperial commission made up of the electors of Mainz and Cologne, the bishop of Würzburg, and the dukes of Neuburg and Saxe-Eisenach. With their help, the secret council hoped, the rest of the empire, and indeed the entire world, would become aware of Georg’s unjust and dishonorable demands.²⁶

But Georg, alert to the danger of delay, was now doing everything possible to weaken Amalia Elisabeth and frighten her and her secret council into submission. Although the stipulations of the Marburg negotiations forbade it, for example, General Götz brought an additional eight regiments of imperial troops into quarters in Hesse-Cassel, and the secret council was powerless to resist. The emperor, meanwhile, who was keen to gain the Hessian army, or at least keep it from going to the French and Swedes, tried again to lure Melander to his side. At the death of Wilhelm the emperor had offered Melander a countship, 50,000 Reichsthalers, and a position of general of the imperial army, but Melander had very publicly turned him down. Although Melander had then protested his undying loyalty to Amalia Elisabeth “with a thousand oaths and protestations,” everyone agreed, and Melander himself acknowledged, that he was a greedy man. The emperor would just have to find the right price. He thus told Georg to approach Melander again, this time stressing the offer of the title of count, which was designed to appeal to the peasant-born lieutenant general’s yearning for higher nobility, in return for either the entire Hessian army or at least “a good part thereof.” If Melander insisted that in case of peace he would have to dismiss all or part of the troops, Georg should see to it that those men swore never to serve against the emperor, empire, or the Habsburgs. While these negotiations proceeded with Melander, however, the emperor had a sneaking suspicion that this was all part of some elaborate ploy cooked up by the Hessians, who were just leading him on, stalling for time.²⁷

It is difficult to determine if this suspicion was true, and it seems much more likely, based on Melander’s future actions, that it was not, but stalling was certainly one of Amalia Elisabeth’s favorite tactics, and it was beginning to have some effect. The landgravine’s military occupation combined with uncertainty about the Marburg negotiations now began to spur other German princes into action. Duke Georg of Brunswick-Lüneburg, for example—who was at that time maintaining an uneasy neutrality sandwiched between the imperialists and the Swedes—appeared worried that the Hessian situation had become extremely dangerous. He had thus responded to the secret council’s appeals to intervene by writing to the elector of Saxony and offering his mediation. The duke also sent his agents to Georg of Hesse-Darmstadt to ask the landgrave to drop his personal demands against Hesse-Cassel for the sake of peace in the empire. Margrave Christian of Brandenburg also wrote to Landgrave Georg, tell-

ing him that he was very disappointed to see this kind of squabbling among such close relatives, especially in such difficult times. The margrave argued there would be disastrous results if they failed to bring Amalia Elisabeth to peace, and so suggested compromise. Hesse-Cassel's allies, whose troops were intermixed with the landgravine's, he told Georg, were ruining "old electoral and princely houses" to such an extent "that neither they nor their descendants will be able to raise them up again." But Georg, Christian argued, had in his hands the power to stop the depredations of foreign troops in the empire and to end the uncertainty of continued war. "We have no doubt," Christian concluded, "that Your Highness will, without respect for all of your own private desires, much more prefer and be inclined to help the general good of our so highly troubled and suffering fatherland, and also will assist the return of peace, which is so extremely necessary."²⁸

Other princes, however, were not so eager to see things Amalia Elisabeth's way. Johann Georg of Saxony, in particular, had put his entire reputation and authority behind the 1635 Peace of Prague and was now one of the emperor's staunchest supporters. He was outraged by the numerous complaints he had received that Georg was delaying peace. "Your Highness and many others well know," the elector replied to such a letter from the duke of Saxe-Eisenach, "Landgrave Georg's peaceful intentions." The elector was also extremely annoyed by the impertinent attitude of the Cassel secret council. Not only had it continued to argue publicly that young Wilhelm VI was innocent of all crimes, and so the imperial mandate against his father did not apply to him, it had also attempted to take Hesse-Cassel's opposition to the Peace of Prague and subsequent military action against the emperor and "cover it with the mantle of pure righteousness and innocence." In a surprising rewriting of history, the elector argued that it was well known that the emperor had always intended to include Wilhelm V in the full amnesty associated with the Peace of Prague, but had only demanded that the landgrave agree to the peace without this security in order to test his loyalty. Since Wilhelm V had refused the peace, his goal had clearly been to diminish the emperor and contribute to the disorder of the empire. This was the depth of his depravity, the elector wrote, and the secret council, by swearing the people and soldiers to young Wilhelm VI's service without the permission of the emperor, had only added to it. Until Amalia Elisabeth unconditionally declared her devotion and obedience to the emperor, therefore, the elector would have nothing to do with any of

them. Thus, aside from hoping that Georg would remember that everyone but him was more concerned with the tranquility of the empire, Johann Georg made no move to rein him in.²⁹

Meanwhile, those with less patience and ability to handle high-stakes gamesmanship than Amalia Elisabeth were not managing the stress very well. On his part, Landgrave Hermann seems to have come to believe that the landgravine had no idea what she was doing, and was going to get them all into serious trouble. Having decided that his best plan was not to challenge either his sister-in-law or his cousin, Landgrave Georg, for the regency or administration of Hesse-Cassel, Hermann was now completely focused on a lesser, but for that perhaps more feasible, goal—protecting his and his brothers' own hereditary lands in Rotenburg. In a letter to Amalia Elisabeth, he complained that under her brief tenure things had only gotten worse. The forced military contributions were increasing, the disorder in the countryside remained unaddressed, and all of his and his brothers' pleas and remonstrations were ignored. Furthermore, past treaties between their houses were no longer adhered to, and while she enjoyed foreign subsidies, he and his brothers received nothing, but instead suffered damages at the foreigner's hands. His treasury was so depleted that they had nothing to live on, and his brothers were unable to complete their foreign studies. Although he had asked, in a brotherly way, that Amalia Elisabeth, for his, the land's, young Wilhelm VI's, and her own interest, make peace and do whatever was necessary to get back into the emperor's good graces, she had not. This left him few options. "In case you and yours still cannot or will not give up the war," he warned her, "do not blame us, in our current anguish and calamities, if we seize the means to preserve the Quarter from ongoing damage and destruction."³⁰

The courage of the Hessian secret council, meanwhile, was at an all-time low. Vice Statthalter Dalwigk had begun to act noticeably strange, seemingly made sick with worry, and one councilor noted to a friend that if the landgravine did "not soon return so that the land is kept in devotion, it will soon get another lord." Buffeted by the continuing hostility of Georg and the emperor, as well as a stinging rebuke from the elector of Saxony, the threats by Hermann to make a separate treaty of his own, and the continuing pressure of the estates for peace, the secret council was reduced to begging. It tried again to move Amalia Elisabeth to act and to return, pleading for her support of the Marburg negotiations and stressing the great emergency and the extremely poor condition of the countryside,

now made even worse by the recent invasion of the new imperial regiments. Her councilors found all of this simply too much to bear. “We had hoped,” they wrote her on 2 January 1638, “that the enemy troops, when they recognized the obvious and notorious poverty of the poor countrymen of this land, would evacuate and leave, yet instead they have done the opposite.” But even before the councilors had a chance to send out this letter, the situation became even worse. Landgrave Georg, struggling himself with the growing pressure coming from other German princes to conclude quickly with Hesse-Cassel, presented the secret council with an additional original copy of the imperial mandate and another ultimatum that it obey within a month, or else. After thorough discussions among themselves and another rushed letter to Breithaupt in Vienna ordering him to do something, anything, the councilors decided that they had run out of options. In a postscript to their letter, therefore, they informed Amalia Elisabeth of their decision to order the Marburg deputies to conclude quickly both the *publica* and the *privata* and assured her that they would inform her when the treaty was ready for her ratification. As far as the secret council was concerned, the war was over.³¹

Chapter 4

Deeper into the Labyrinth

THE LANDGRAVINE, however, was still very much in the game. By 3 January 1638, Amalia Elisabeth, who had now left Delfzijl for much better lodgings at the nearby city of Groningen, had only just received a copy of the preliminary terms of the agreement. They shocked her. It was good, she wrote the councilors, that they had not proceeded to a conclusion, for they had become involved in something very insidious and dangerous and had clearly lost control of their own delegates. She tried again to impress on them that the desire for immediate peace among the German princes was something that could work to their advantage, not their disadvantage, if only they played it right. To bring the secret council back in line with her intentions, she instructed it to send an assembly of councilors to her and send someone to the elector of Mainz, most of whose lands she controlled, to inform him that it was “solely and alone” because of Georg’s insistence on his own private advantage that Hesse-Cassel had not withdrawn from his lands, nor from those of the elector of Cologne, and it was because of Georg that neither the elector nor the princes of the neighboring lands yet had peace.¹

Amalia Elisabeth had now reiterated to her councilors her dedication to solving the country’s problems and urged them to stand firm in the negotiations with Georg, but they simply did not understand, or fully appreciate, her strategy of delay. In a letter of 14 January and in a personal mission to her court by the representatives of the estates, led by the Hessian knight

and general commissary Otto von der Malsburg, the councilors explained their position. “We have,” they wrote, “once again been obliged, however much we did not want to come to this, to resume the previous negotiations with His Highness [Georg].” At any rate, they argued, “God will, without doubt, restore in another way to our young lord that which we must, due to the current situation and time, now agree to.” They had no doubt of her “true motherly concern” for the country, but they saw “no other means other than this to emerge from this labyrinth.” Focused only on the local situation, the councilors were still playing by outdated rules. Before 1618 any prince who conquered another’s state would have had a free hand to set the terms of surrender or negotiation. But things had changed a great deal in the last twenty years. The military contribution system, first developed by the Spanish army and then used to great effect by Wallenstein, now allowed Amalia Elisabeth and other princes to remain powerful actors despite heavy losses, even up to the loss of their original hereditary states. So while the secret council saw the enemy’s control of the Hessian countryside as an overwhelming strategic advantage, she saw only the need for careful diplomatic maneuvering. And where they had come to believe that her possession of conquered territories was something that caused hatred and distrust in the empire, she saw opportunities ripe for exploitation. The secret council’s determination to act precipitously in the negotiations, she believed, was not helping them out of the labyrinth, but only drawing them deeper in.²

Theoretically, Amalia Elisabeth could maintain her armies off the land at a certain level indefinitely, but the imperialists were pressing her hard in Westphalia, and the imperial quartering in Hesse-Cassel had stripped that country bare. East Frisia, which she was carefully husbanding for contributions, was yielding her an agreed-on amount of 15,000 Reichsthalers monthly, but could only produce so much without suffering permanent damage. Without an influx of funds from some other source, she would have trouble maintaining sufficient troops either to keep her fortresses or repel the imperialists. As a part of her strategy of using every seeming disadvantage to her benefit, she sent her councilor Vultejus to Hamburg, the unofficial diplomatic center of the time. He had a delicate mission, for his instructions were to use extortion. The situation was so grave, he should tell the French ambassador d’Avaux, that without immediate assistance and relief she would be forced against her will to make a separate peace with the emperor. Vultejus should, however, make sure to reassure d’Avaux and

Johan Adler Salvius, the Swedish ambassador, that her sincerest intention was to remain with the allies and wait for a general peace—if only it were made possible for her to do so. But she was not at all confident that this maneuver would work. She hoped it would net her both the back subsidies and sufficient additional funds to support her armies and allow an additional levy of new men, but could not be sure that the allies would respond with any more fervor for her cause than they yet had, or that the French and Swedes were not each secretly planning their own separate peace with the emperor. Of course she was herself doing exactly that, though for leverage reasons quite openly. The best course, she had decided, was to fish both sides of the bridge, hoping thereby to get the better catch.³

While Vultejus attempted this tricky diplomatic balancing act, the secret council back at Cassel had been trying, though without any real hope of success, to arrange the ouster of Georg as imperial mediator. The council sent out numerous letters, for example, complaining that Georg had acted like a bully and a brute, and, as they told one prince,

had insisted on such extremely great private demands that even the entire lower principality of Hesse would not be sufficient to satisfy them, and that appear to be directed to nothing less than the complete ruin and undoing, as well as dispossession and removal from land and people, of our young hereditary lord.

“The true gracious God,” they told another prince, “as a father and protector of widows and orphans, would justly reward you” for any intercession. Though these appeals had some positive response from the duke of Neuburg and the bishop of Würzburg, neither seemed especially eager to get directly involved. The electors of Mainz and Cologne did not deign even to respond. The councilors’ appeal to the imperial court was just as ineffective, since the Hessian agent at Vienna, Breithaupt, had shown himself to be almost entirely useless, good for little more than making complaints and passing on letters.⁴

The secret council was not particularly discriminating in sending out its numerous appeals, and the elector of Saxony, Johann Georg, was deeply offended when he received one. The councilors begged for his intercession, he complained, but were clearly unrepentant and even boastful of their actions against the emperor. Laying out the imperial argument against Amalia Elisabeth, he railed once again against the Hessians for their

temerity. You seem to want to be completely free of imperial laws that are to your disadvantage, he wrote them, to reap the rewards of illegally occupied lands belonging to other German princes and states,

and to call as just what is spoken of as unjust in the holy laws, and to desire most forcefully to reinforce that which is nothing according to the degree of the laws, and is fundamentally against the imperial convention, and to persist in this so long until the emperor, electors, princes, and estates must condescend to direct the general imperial decrees toward you and your conceit, which you trust better to be pushed through under the domination of foreigners (and thus at the same time the beloved fatherland and the whole German nation would go to rack and ruin), and you would want to rent asunder all the volumes of the holy imperial constitution under the name of German freedom.

Wilhelm V had been an open and notorious enemy of the empire, the elector continued, and under imperial law the children of criminals were just as complicit as their fathers. To avoid destruction, he stated, Amalia Elisabeth would have to submit unconditionally.⁵

Landgrave Georg, however, was beginning to feel the weight of increasing complaints that this local Hessian problem was endangering other imperial princes. On 23 January the secret council's delegates at Marburg reported that Georg appeared extremely anxious, and had insisted that they work day and night to complete the treaty. Cowed and overawed by Georg's presence and the fact that he worked in the emperor's name, the delegates were more than accommodating. Still, they did at least attempt to present Amalia Elisabeth's positions. On the point of religion, for example, they stated that the emperor's wording was purposely vague and lacked clear protections for the Reformed. Without including the phrase "free public exercise of religion," they argued, the emperor could infringe on their religious liberty. "It would be one thing," the Cassel delegates told Wolff, Georg's statthalter, "to have the religion and the exercise of religion, and another thing to have the exercise and the public exercise of religion, for a private person could well have the religion, but yet not the exercise, or have the exercise, but yet not the public free exercise." Wolff countered that there was a great difference between a private person and a state of the empire, and that a state that had the religion and its exercise also had its public exercise, so "it, along with its subjects, would not be

endangered in the least.” The negotiations continued on in this fashion, but in the end this point and the rest of the agreement remained as Georg and the emperor had specified, closely mirroring the terms of the Peace of Prague. Amalia Elisabeth was required to relinquish all foreign alliances, surrender all ecclesiastical lands taken since 1627 and secular lands taken since 1630 (including Westphalia and East Frisia), submit all troops to the emperor, and yield the secularized territory of Hersfeld (which Hesse-Cassel had held since at least 1606, but had been under Hessian domination since the early fifteenth century) to the emperor’s brother, Archduke Leopold Wilhelm. Finally, although she would retain the regency and internal government of Hesse-Cassel, she would do so only under the advice and supervision of Georg, as over-administrator, and only as long as she ruled through the secret council and estates and obeyed all imperial laws. In return she would gain vague and limited religious security, a full amnesty, and freedom from reparations.⁶

News on the progress of the negotiations reached the secret council just as it was reeling from the sudden deaths of Vice Statthalter von Dalwigk and Amalia Elisabeth’s youngest daughter, Louise. The councilors had expected to be forced to compromise, but this—this was beyond their wildest fears. The delegates had acted in good faith, but had given way on every single point; there was no way the landgravine would ever agree to such terms. The leaders of the Hessian church, who gathered together at Cassel to discuss this treaty, decided, however, that if the draft version could not be changed, then “one should still, in the name of God, leave it by their version, in the hope that they mean it honestly and do not seek any deceit with it. In the case, however, that they should then oppress us, God would without doubt graciously protect us in our upright well-meaningness.” The secret council was not so confident. Despite its desire for peace and fear of the imperialists, it wrote to the landgravine advising her not to agree to the ceding of Hersfeld, or to the point of religion as it was written, and least of all to giving the administration to Georg, which would require her not only to ask for, but also to obey, his advice, leaving her as nothing more than a noble-born nanny.⁷

The relinquishment of the Hessian army also disturbed the councilors, who had not authorized their delegates to bend in this matter. Georg, who was in close consultation with the emperor both through his agent at Vienna, Johann Jakob Wolff von Todenwarth, and by direct correspondence, advised the emperor that the secret council’s delegates were still

insisting that their troops be fully discharged before they could be taken up anew by the imperialists. If they merely handed the troops over to the emperor, the delegates argued, they would be abetting the imperial onslaught on their foreign allies, which would both violate their consciences and earn the dangerous enmity of their old friends. This Hessian stubbornness was not pleasant news for the emperor, since it would cost him a great deal to reenlist the Hessian army after it had been discharged. He therefore sent his major general von Westerhold to Marburg to try to force the delegates to yield, and instructed Georg to try again to hire Melander for the imperialists, even though there was still a great deal of suspicion of Melander at the imperial court, helped not in the least by the rumors that he had already signed secretly to join French service.⁸

Melander was not the only one the emperor mistrusted. Ferdinand also had serious doubts, he told Georg,

if the proposed negotiations were honestly and truthfully meant on the side of Hesse-Cassel, or if they are much more attempting long prolongations and the winning of time, so that, as also happened two years ago, they can in the meanwhile enjoy the quarters they possess and the opportunity to recruit, and thereafter in the coming spring strike out with a newly strengthened exercise. In the meantime, however, we would have had lost the best timeliness to attain the same effect.

This suspicion of Hessian duplicity tempered the emperor's confidence about the outcome of the Marburg negotiations, and made him concerned about the cease-fire Götz and Melander were currently negotiating, since this could be yet another Hessian ploy. He thus instructed Götz and his other generals to keep a careful eye on the Hessians, "and if he should in the least notice that they want to place some advantage into the hands of our and the empire's enemies, and to hand over to them their collected troops, he should jump on this immediately and not lose any time at all in stopping this as best as he can." Melander, like the emperor, had also become concerned about the Hessians' plans for the coming military season, though of course for different reasons. The current indecision was dangerous, he wrote to another general, "for meanwhile things would get away from us, and finally we would fall between two stools, which would certainly not be good for either the young lord or his lady regent, the princely lady widow."⁹

On 31 January the despondent delegates at Marburg informed the secret council that they had now completed a final draft of the *publica*. Despite their hope for a moderation of the earlier terms, they had to report that the Darmstadt delegates had, in the end, compromised on nothing but the point of Hersfeld, which the emperor would surely veto anyway. The delegates admitted that they had simply been overwhelmed and frightened, and that the landgravine had foreseen the types of pressures that had been used against them, “as if Her Highness had been present here, and had seen and heard everything with her own eyes and ears.” When they had tried, for example, to include in the so-called full amnesty Carl Rabenhaupt von Sucha, a Hessian colonel who had especially displeased the emperor, they had been accused of trying to delay. If they did not remove his name, they had been told, “in a short time in Colonel Rabenhaupt’s name many hundreds would also be hung up on the gallows in front of Cassel itself.” This pattern of intimidation had been repeated on every point. “But what could we do?” they argued to the secret council; “we fear that all other ways to arrange our welfare, other than these ones, are cut off.”¹⁰

As the next two days wore on, the delegates suffered the same indignities in the final negotiation of the *privata*. Georg refused to alter his original demands, and insisted that “not one letter should deviate” from the preliminary agreement. He also produced a letter he had composed for Amalia Elisabeth to sign, a letter in which she threw herself on the emperor’s mercy and begged for his ratification of the agreement. Even worse, the delegates reported that Major General Westerhold had arrived, and it now seemed clear that neither he nor Georg would honor earlier promises not to take from her or her lands “a single dime or penny” for the support of their troops after the conclusion of the treaty. The delegates saw no way around this. It was better, they believed, that they at least cooperate to avoid the troops taking what they wanted by force.¹¹

In the countryside, meanwhile, food was short and the occupying imperial troops were now starting to burn towns and farms. The cities still under the landgravine’s control had been compelled to shoulder the entire financial burden for the support of the seven Hessian-controlled fortresses of Cassel, Ziegenhain, Spangenberg, Trendelburg, Friedewald, Hertzberg, and Witzenhausen, and the secret council feared imminent revolt. Food alone for the garrisons was costing over 500 Reichsthalers every ten days, and pay for all twenty-four companies of infantry, three companies

of cavalry, and two companies of dragooneers was requiring another 4,000 Reichsthalers a month. So far they had been able to supply the fortresses, they told the landgravine, “though very miserably and with real need.” The secret council’s grim view of the military and financial situation in Hesse-Cassel was backed up by reports from the military officers. The commander of the fortress of Ziegenhain, Justin Ungefug, reported that although the fortress itself was sound, “the soldiers are maintained only with water and bread, and neither officer nor soldier has been paid the least dime in two months, the soldiers are naked and bare, and not even the smallest amount has been delivered from all contributions.” The officers of the garrison of Cassel, on their part, were extremely upset by the secret council’s recent reduction of their salaries. This was doubly outrageous, they argued, since they had been using their own monies to pay for the food and clothing of their soldiers, and many officers were now ruined or sick and lacked clothing and shoes of their own. They had not even, they complained, been reimbursed for the funeral expenses of their fellow officers. Such grumblings from the officers were concerning, but the secret council got a much larger fright when it discovered that a certain cavalry captain named Schmalhausen had boasted of attempting to hand over the fortress of Ziegenhain to the enemy three years ago. Schmalhausen, who was, it turns out, a voluble drunk, had also publicly called Wilhelm V a traitor and castigated him for abandoning his poor people, for which, he argued, Wilhelm’s death in exile had been only a just punishment. Schmalhausen had gone on to state that Georg of Hesse-Darmstadt was both right and justified to take Hesse-Cassel, and had then openly glorified the Lutheran religion. The secret council moved quickly to make an example of him, throwing him in jail and issuing a large fine. This was perfectly acceptable to the landgravine, for this case presented a challenge not just to her rule and security, but also to her honor.¹²

At Groningen, over a month after the fact, Amalia Elisabeth now received word of the death of her youngest daughter Louise at Cassel, news that only reinforced her determination to persevere. “We see from this,” she wrote, “in what way the Almighty has been pleased to afflict us more and more with suffering by the sending to us of so many troubles. Still we have, however, once more therein resolved that we will bear with patience what comes from His godly will, and we shall submit ourselves to Him.” Such additional troubles were not long in coming, for soon she received news of the final stages of the Marburg negotiations. This made

her very angry. She was angry at the secret council, angry at the delegates, and angry at Georg for his stubbornness. The delegates must hold firm, she wrote, against such prejudicial, unjust, and unanswerable points, and delay any further negotiations. The French too earned her ire, as they still refused to pay the promised subsidies and still had not come to an agreement with the Swedes. Even so, d'Avaux wrote on 20 February to beg her to stand firm and reassure her that the king would protect her interests in peace and war. She need not concern herself that Sweden and France had still failed to ratify the treaty of Wismar, he lied, since this would soon happen, and the two crowns were closely united. Furthermore, he pointed out, the allies were once again doing well, as shown by the recent successes of the duke of Saxe-Weimar, who had managed to cross the Rhine and seize some strongholds, and the Swedes, who had restored themselves somewhat in Pomerania, forcing the imperialists to evacuate the area of Stralsund. But she wanted more than assurances; she wanted cash. She wrote back to the French court flatly demanding the 50,000 Reichsthalers in subsidies due since September, and warning them that "the time to employ this sum to the profit of common affairs is passing." If they were not even willing to fulfill the terms that had been agreed to at Wesel, she seemed to suggest, what hope was there of additional aid in the future? Calling the bluff of the French, she told them that she was writing "in order to discharge herself entirely of what could happen in case the payment of the said due and desired subsidy is in any way retarded." France, in other words, should either put up or shut up.¹³

Landgrave Georg was giving the same advice to the estates of Hesse-Cassel, who had come together at Ziegenhain to discuss the current crisis. The conference at Marburg, he wrote to the estates, had produced an agreement, and now was the time for the landgravine to ratify it. He made the same case to the duke of Brunswick-Lüneburg, urging him to appeal to her for a speedy ratification. Her "all too slow resolutions," he told the duke, were either reckless or downright wicked. It would be unjustifiable if she hindered the completion of the treaty and so "through her own will, caused the destruction of this entire so-important work, and thus made the evil still worse." Melander, too, Georg complained, was causing difficulties, disputing military aspects of the treaty, "doubtless solely and alone for his own private profit." With statements like this, Georg may have been cynically ignoring the fact that a speedy ratification of the Marburg agreement would be very much to his own profit, but it seems from his

letters that he had instead managed to convince himself that he was acting solely for the greater good.¹⁴

Amalia Elisabeth had no such illusion. Her informants at the imperial court had told her that the emperor was willing to compromise, but Georg “will hinder it for his private benefit, and at the same time will proclaim thither and yon as if the fault lay with us.” She thus wrote the emperor directly, using her occupied lands once again to make the point that she was not to be trifled with, and playing on the emperor’s desire to focus on the French and Swedish threat. There would be continued civil war in Germany, she warned the emperor, until she had an acceptable treaty. She also appealed to the duke of Brunswick-Lüneburg for assistance, sending the diplomat Dr. Wilhelm Burkhardt Sixtinus, the brother of Nicolaus, to discuss this matter with the duke in person at Hildesheim. Once at Hildesheim, however, W. B. Sixtinus got involved in a bitter contest with two of Georg’s agents, Heinrich von Langen and Dr. Justus Sinold (known as Schütz), who were also there to gain the duke’s assistance and to persuade him to help acquire Melander and the Hessian army for the imperialists. W. B. Sixtinus advised the landgravine of this move, but suggested that the imperialists’ eagerness to gain her troops might actually work in her favor, for if Melander “is still steadily Hessian,” which he had no reason to believe was not the case, he could “do a great deal of good with the situation, such that one and the other aspect of the set-out accord, where not completely changed, could still be mitigated and declared, or even set aside.” But Landgrave Georg was ready for this tactic. No one, he told his agents at Hildesheim, not even General Götz himself, should be allowed to alter, and thus delay, the completion of the Marburg treaty. He had come too close to be denied now, and there would be no further negotiations or discussions. “I have done more for peace than anyone had any reason to expect,” he complained personally to Götz. “Rather things must nonetheless finally, one way or another, win their end; and because the lady landgravine has gained everything for her sons, my young cousins, that she should with reason ever have sought, and I have given way in everything that I could, I must now expect success.”¹⁵

This success was close enough for Georg to taste, for Amalia Elisabeth’s secret council, after vigorous discussion, had come to a decision. In an extraordinary document, dated 28 February, the councilors presented fourteen reasons why she should not ratify the Marburg agreement,

counterarguments against these points, and fourteen reasons why she should ratify it. These arguments, some good, some laughable, indicated that the councilors were both unsure of the practicality of the treaty and queasy about its ethics, but believed there was no other option. Failing to see their own leverage, they gave in to their fear. "In sum," they concluded, "the loss of the land is certain, its recovery, however, is completely uncertain, and it is very much to be feared that the subjects' great patience that they have held up to now and their continuing good affection will, for the most part, be altered." This peace might be a bad one, but war was much worse. "One holds on to what one has," the councilors advised the landgravine, "for one does not know what one obtains." This was a sentiment also heartily endorsed by the Hessian estates, who begged the secret council to push for ratification, though with little expectation that this would occur. "We hope to God," they wrote from their conference at Ziegenhain, "that our gracious princess and lady will not only not make difficulty with the completion of the peace agreement made at Marburg, but will also speed it along as much as possible." They warned that she "is only the guardian of her children and in this quality regent of the country, [and] if by continuing the war some greater evil happens and some damage to the country, she will be much more guilty and responsible for it, this coming to be imputed to her alone, than she would be of all that could occur to her [after] having consented to the desire of all the members of the empire and of her estates."¹⁶

Still unaware that a final agreement had been reached at Marburg, Amalia Elisabeth wrote to the secret council on 3 March about the terms of the draft *publica*. The agreement was both impractical and unconscionable, she wrote to the secret council, and not only would she not agree to such a thing, but she had seen with great outrage and amazement that the delegates themselves believed the terms unjust and yet still had agreed to them "without authority or plenipotence from us." This was especially galling, she wrote, since

we are very much inclined toward peace and determined to agree to everything that is just and answerable, and especially want to let nothing lack in our appropriate submission to His Imperial Majesty. It is well-enough known, however, that what would go against conscience, against honor and reputation, against justness, against our highly esteemed beloved lord and husband's left-behind testament and last will,

so then against the previously established hereditary treaties, the Hauptakkord and conclusion, that is something we cannot agree to.

This point, that she would only agree to an honorable and moral treaty, was something she had repeated to them again and again, but the secret council would not listen. From the councilors' perspective, besieged in the fortress of Cassel, it made no sense. To her, however, their insistence on rushing headlong into a conclusion in the Marburg negotiations against her consent and admonitions had only worsened her and her son's condition, "which could have been put on good feet by some other intended peace negotiations." She could only hope that things could still be remedied. "In the meantime," she commanded in the same letter, "you will not get deeper into the Marburg negotiations."¹⁷

For Georg, the delay was intolerable. Not only had Amalia Elisabeth failed to indicate that she would agree to any treaty with him, but her troops had been busy plundering her neighbors for contributions. Such acts, Georg warned the secret council, would not amuse the imperial court and might well cost young Wilhelm his land and people. Soon thereafter, Georg was inflamed anew by reports from General Götz that Scheffer had appealed to him to take over the imperial mediation and that Melander had written him complaining that Georg had strong-armed the Cassel delegates into an unjust and unratifiable agreement. Amalia Elisabeth was continuing to play the imperialists off against him, making a strong case that the entire war was hinging on the specific demands of a single greedy prince, and encouraging them to intervene if they wanted to bring her to peace. Georg was forced once again to write to the secret council, telling it to get Scheffer and Melander in line lest the treaty be destroyed, decrying the attempt at trickery and delay, and defending both his demands against Hesse-Cassel and the actions of his Marburg delegates. He also vented his frustration with these events in a letter to Langen and Schütz at Hildesheim. "We can almost not be amazed enough," he wrote them, "at the persistence of the Lower Hessians' shameless assertions." But Georg was now extremely worried. Amalia Elisabeth was trying to go around him, and despite his insistence to the Cassel secret council that the emperor would never hand the mediation over to another prince, he could not be sure this was true. Her stubbornness might defeat him, "for if on a slightest scruple the Hesse-Cassel people hold back their ratification," he confided to his agents, "then everything will be lost." When Langen and

Schütz then reported back that W. B. Sixtinus had not abandoned his efforts to gain the mediation of the duke of Brunswick-Lüneburg, Georg's fury was intense. In yet another threatening letter to the Cassel councilors, he raged that such behavior was unanswerable and would lead to the division and total ruin of Hesse-Cassel "through the female imbecility of a woman who does not come from related electors and princes, but rather from the line of a foreign count." Her stupidity, he told the secret council, would bring many thousands of her subjects "into the most extreme and inestimable misery, fire, and sword." The secret council and estates should instead heed his own "urgent fatherly well-intentioned warning," and insist that she drop her objections to the agreement.¹⁸

This would not happen. Georg and the emperor thought they could force her to agree to terms worse than those imposed on any other prince of the empire, but she wanted better ones. First, she wanted to be expressly relieved of all future imperial contributions and quartering. Second, she wanted her legal and religious rights and privileges specifically stated, not tacitly understood or subject to future reinterpretation. Third, she refused either to grant Georg the right of overadministration of her state or to cede the territory of Hersfeld. Finally, she insisted that she could and would not give her army to the emperor or disband it without sufficient funds to satisfy the troops' back pay. This last point especially annoyed Georg, who argued that the emperor would be extremely offended at a demand to pay troops that had been used against him. But her insistence here was, like all her decisions, very calculated. The issue was both practical, in the immediate sense, and contingent, in that it had serious tactical and ethical repercussions. Mercenary standing armies of this time could survive and continue by living off the land they occupied, both by demanding food and lodging from the occupied population and by collecting forced monetary contributions. A military leader absolutely required cash only at two times—at the levying of the troops and at their dismissal. If she was not able to acquire the money to dismiss her troops, they would either plunder their quarters or go over en masse to whoever could pay them. The former would violate the Marburg treaty and dangerously infuriate the princes whose lands she held, and the latter would either violate the treaty (if they went over to the allies), or violate her conscience and honor (if they went over to the emperor). Either scenario would leave her entirely defenseless and with new enemies. So while Georg of Hesse-Darmstadt and other imperial allies scolded her and her

secret council for insisting on this point, she was not so stupid as to miss its broader implications. Neither, she knew, was the emperor, who had his generals standing by with large supplies of cash, ready in case the Hessian troops were dismissed. Since Georg was not about to compromise, and since this and other terms of the Marburg treaty were, to her mind, impossible, her only remaining option was to continue her strategy of delay, counting on the hand of Providence to see that everything worked out in the end.¹⁹

Chapter 5

An Amazing Consequence

ON 3 MARCH 1638, events rapidly began to justify the landgravine's faith. On that day Duke Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar met Jean de Werth and the imperialists at Rheinfelden and, in a three-day battle, dramatically shifted the balance of the war in the allies' favor. The news sent back to Cassel was enthusiastic. With this victory, French forces were now installed on the left bank of the Rhine, and reports told of the capture of the duke of Savelli, Jean de Werth, Major General Guillaume de Lamboy, and up to eighteen hundred soldiers, mostly officers. "This business could also cause an amazing consequence," wrote one observer, "since nothing like this has happened during this war." Two days later Swedish and French diplomats at Hamburg completed a new treaty, by which the Swedes were promised desperately needed annual subsidies of 1 million livres to revive their war effort. All this gave these allies new optimism about their chances in this war. It also gave the French reason to hope that the landgravine would now reject the Marburg agreement. "I have done everything possible toward Madame the landgrave," d'Avaux wrote to Richelieu, "in order to prevent her from making a mistake. I hope that this new treaty [with Sweden] will assure it, but everything depends, my lord, on that which has been done by the Duke Bernhard [at Rheinfelden]." Indeed, for the landgravine the consequence of this event could be pivotal, for the events of this war were tightly interconnected, and any change in the larger fortunes had a strong influence on local situations, just as local situations, in turn, influenced the larger war.¹

Yet the secret council did not react with much enthusiasm to the news of either the victory at Rheinfelden or the new Franco-Swedish treaty. Their focus was local, not universal, and they may well have been more impressed by the recent shocking loss of Hanau, which Colonel Metternich, a commander of the elector of Mainz, took by storm. This sudden offense against Hanau, which had been at peace since Wilhelm's relief of it in 1636, seems to have been sparked by the emperor's fear that Ramsay was prepared to hand the fortress over to the French, but it was also surely intended as a way to pressure the Hessians. If so, it worked. Rhinefelden was an opportunity, yes, the council argued, but one that must be taken in context and one that could be used only to seal the existing agreement. The landgravine should not let these events delay her ratification, for if the treaty could be concluded, they argued, "one should in no way reject this, but rather grab it without further delay, as we then hope that the current news will so much more noticeably facilitate our affair and the general peace." In an attempt to gain divine intervention in support of this goal, the secret council established a general day of prayer on 17 March. During the service and indeed right in the middle of the morning sermon, however, a messenger arrived with threatening letters from Georg, so that just as with the original presentation of the imperial mandate, the councilors were once again disturbed in their worship. In response to Georg's complaints about Amalia Elisabeth's failure to ratify the Marburg agreement, her councilors played to his misogyny. "We had no idea," they protested, "that Your Highness would be upset about this," since it was only understandable that the landgravine, "as the ordained regent in this difficult and highly important affair, which concerns her minor princely children and pupils and also their land and people," should want, "as an irresolute and weak woman," to confer first with other electors and princes before making any binding decision. Georg, they said, should thus excuse her and not blame her "as if she neglected things or didn't understand or recall the difficult conditions."²

If Georg thought that Amalia Elisabeth's delays were caused by her stupidity, he was gravely mistaken, for on 3 March, the exact day of the victory at Rheinfelden, Melander and Schefffer's negotiations with General Götz had finally given Hesse-Cassel a cease-fire. The timing was no coincidence, for the imperialists now needed all available forces to counter the duke of Saxe-Weimar's new offensive. And while this cease-fire, by freeing imperial troops, was thus something of a slap in the face of the

French and Swedes, it was a huge strategic victory for Amalia Elisabeth. It reminded the allies that they ignored her at their peril, it gave her time to regroup her military, and by releasing some areas around Cassel and Ziegenhain from imperial occupation, it gave her a way both to support her garrisons and to mollify her subjects somewhat. To the latter end she informed her estates and secret council that the treaty had finally arrived in Groningen, and she was considering everything and would soon send back von der Malsburg and the deputies of the estates with her decision. She excused the long delay and insisted that she was just as eager as they were to bring peace to the fatherland; “but,” she reminded them, “only in so far as can be done through means that are just, possible, and not against our honor, faith, office, and duty.”³

As Amalia Elisabeth was now quickly regaining her footing with her dual strategy of delay and divide, Georg’s control over the situation was just as rapidly slipping away. In addition to the threat of intervention from imperial generals, who were eager both to gain the Hessian army and to turn to face the French and Swedish threat, the pressure was only increasing from Amalia Elisabeth’s neighbors, especially the elector of Mainz, who was enormously frustrated with Georg’s failure to bring her to peace. In a letter to Georg of 20 March, which he forwarded to the secret council and so to Amalia Elisabeth, the elector of Mainz gave proof of the wisdom of her strategy. Officials of his lands, he complained, had reported that they were now forced to pay double contributions, first to the imperialists and then to the troops of Hesse-Cassel quartered in the area. This was intolerable, and it was imperative that Georg complete the Marburg treaty immediately. The emperor, who was facing not only the renewed offensive by Duke Bernhard but also threats from the Turks, was also concerned about Georg’s failure to get results. The Marburg agreement had arrived in Vienna on 23 February, but now, well into March, there had not yet been a request from Amalia Elisabeth for the imperial ratification. The Hessian agent to the Viennese court, Breithaupt, reported that the imperial councilors were deeply disturbed by this, as the emperor had previously decided to ratify everything but the point of Hersfeld if only he were asked to do so by the landgravine.⁴

Such a request was not delayed: it was not coming at all. Amalia Elisabeth saw no justification, or need, to ratify something she viewed as both “invalid” and “iniquitous.” Invalid, she told her councilors in a letter of 24 March, because it had been made without her authority and because its

terms, including the dismissal of the troops without back pay, the forced payment of contributions from her to the emperor, and the ceding of the overadministration to Georg, were impossible. Even if she ratified the treaty it would still be invalid, since she had no authority, as regent, to agree to anything that would irreparably damage her sons' estate. Indulging, as Georg had done earlier, in the self-deception that her goals were pure while others' were not, she then argued that the treaty was iniquitous because Georg had put his private interests above the public good, and because it required the loss of lands, limitations on her people's amnesty, and different treatment for her than for any other prince of the empire. It violated her conscience, she went on, by forcing her to agree to unjust things and to swear to what would cause great damage, what was contrary to previous oaths, what was abhorrent to Wilhelm V's memory, and what would violate his testament. Furthermore, it left uncertain the security of her religion and of the true church and paved the way for future disunity within the house of Hesse. In sum, she wrote the secret council, she could not ratify the treaty as it now stood, for it "contains various aspects which run against our honor and conscience, and, in the end, everything will be based on our responsibility." Melander fully agreed. He told the estates that he was "in truth, very sorry" that the secret council had agreed to the negotiations at Marburg, since this treaty was even worse than the 1627 Hauptakord. He had thus advised the landgravine not to ratify it, "for such a thing would not please the Almighty, who is just as much a God of justice and righteousness as of peace, and it could also hinder more than further our prospective beloved young lord in the quiet and beneficial possession of his land and people."⁵

With her refusal to ratify the final Marburg agreement, Amalia Elisabeth had reasserted her control in the strongest way possible. If the secret council, Georg, and the emperor had thought she would meekly submit, they had made a grave mistake. Instead, her dissatisfaction, coupled with the new strategic situation, now encouraged her to pursue an alliance with the Swedes and French even more vigorously. For this purpose she empowered G nderode with a new mission to Stockholm and Paris. He was to inform her allies that her fondest desire was to remain with them, and that the peace negotiations had been nothing more than a sop to her people and council. In this way she had been able "to keep things in suspense" and consolidate her position. G nderode should once again stress, however, the desperateness of her situation, and exaggerate the success of

the Marburg negotiations in order to frighten the allies into agreeing to her terms. For the negotiations with the Swedes, G nderode should request concrete and substantial military support. For the French, he should specify, among other things, that they must make no peace or truce without her interests being expressly included, or without an assurance that she and her children be allowed to live unmolested in Hesse-Cassel “with the same privileges and liberties of conscience of which their ancestors and predecessors have enjoyed until the year 1618.” All back subsidies due must also be paid promptly, and she must receive the promise of even larger subsidies in the future, “affairs being considerably weakened” since the death of her husband and “without which it is notorious that she could not maintain herself.” Finally, if she and her children were defeated and forced to flee, the king must take them in and maintain them. Were all of this to be granted, G nderode should say, then she thought she would be able to pacify her subjects and “contain each one in his duty.”⁶

G nderode’s mission was enthusiastically welcomed. In Stockholm, according to one observer, he “was received with as much honor and caresses as if he had been ambassador of a king.” The French, too, were happy to learn of this new mission, but they begged the landgravine to instruct G nderode to be as accommodating as possible when he arrived, reminding her that they and the Swedes had both put aside reasonable demands for the common good. In order to leave nothing to chance, the French also attempted to buy even more firmly the loyalty of those of Amalia Elisabeth’s councilors who might be useful. This long-standing strategy, which was cheaper than giving the landgravine the subsidies that they knew she wanted, included payments to G nderode himself, who was already receiving a pension of 2,000 livres and whom the French ambassador to Amalia Elisabeth’s court, la Boderie, recommended that they recompense further; and, of course, payments to Melander, whom la Boderie offered another 18,000 livres in return for serving as a French general. Melander refused this proposition politely, arguing that he could not swear to fight for the French until they and Amalia Elisabeth were officially allied. As for the landgravine, la Boderie warned the court that if they wanted to bind her to an agreement, she would surely demand “something more than what is carried by the treaty of Wesel.” He advised the court that in any negotiations she would not fail to stress the importance of her strongholds and her troops, which he had heard numbered almost twenty thousand and were all “in very good shape.” The practicalities of arranging a general Euro-

pean peace conference were also a continuing embarrassment, for the landgravine's agents had complained to la Boderie that as the French had not even been able to obtain passports from the emperor for the Hessian ambassadors to attend such a conference, they did not see how a general peace could possibly get them any better terms than they could gain through a separate one. More serious, however, was the matter of religion, for the landgravine suspected that the king had some secret alliance with the Catholic duke of Bavaria to limit the spread of Protestantism. This suspicion, la Boderie argued, had been the main reason, aside from the money, for her failure to come to terms.⁷

The secret council, which still held out for a peace with the emperor, remained skeptical of any foreign alliances. "This is all an uncertain thing," they had advised the landgravine the previous month, "on which one cannot depend nor put any reliance, also because of the disparity of the confederates who would pull on a single yoke." Knowing the councilors' feelings, and believing that they were incapable of keeping a secret, she did not mention to them G nderode's new diplomatic offensive. Georg, however, had his sources, and he wrote to the secret council on 15 March complaining of rumors that she had signed with the allies. The councilors had no idea what he was talking about. The embarrassment of being once again left out of the loop, combined with the landgravine's stark criticism of the Marburg agreement, infuriated them. They had done their best, and for their pains they had been left to bear the blame for the failed negotiations—and the brunt of any imperial attack.⁸

The secret council was outraged that it had been used, but the landgravine's strategy had been coldly calculated. By delaying the establishment of the regency government stipulated by her husband's testament, she had deprived the secret council of any legal authority to negotiate on its own. Since she had then neglected to send any powers or authorization in her name but still allowed, grudgingly, the secret council and its delegates to go forward in its negotiations with Georg, she had given herself the option to benefit from any successful agreement but be free to repudiate completely any failure. The delay in the negotiations, which she had done her very best to extend, had also allowed her valuable time to consolidate her position. The secret council's rush to a conclusion, however, had now forced her hand. It had also removed her reasons for not appointing a regency council. Indeed, such a step would give her a further excuse to delay, because, as she told her secret council, she could

not possibly make such an important decision as the final rejection of the Marburg treaty without the advice and consent of her coregents. She thus informed her secret council on 26 March that she would soon send men to Cassel to take over, and fully establish, the new regency government.⁹

Back in Vienna, the landgravine's stubborn refusal to ratify the treaty had finally worked exactly as she had hoped—the emperor blinked first. Overwhelmed with numerous appeals from the princes of the empire to bring Amalia Elisabeth to peace, and fearing also that she would sign with the foreign crowns and that her army would then fall to them, the emperor decided that Georg had become a liability. So although her request for the imperial ratification of the Marburg agreement had never come, on 22 March the emperor sent it anyway, but not to Georg—to the elector of Mainz, along with a commission to oversee the conclusion of the treaty with Hesse-Cassel and even to compromise if necessary. If the landgravine agreed to hand over her troops to him and turn away all foreigners, she would be specially exempted from the quartering and contributions required from every other imperial state, even those that had been loyal to the emperor for the entire war.¹⁰

Feeling the ground shift under him, Georg of Hesse-Darmstadt now undertook a last-ditch attempt to convince Amalia Elisabeth to accept the treaty as is. But he was in a much weaker position than he had been only a month previously. In an attempt to mollify her, he interceded with the imperial generals about their presence in Hesse-Cassel and took credit for the emperor's offer to free her from imperial contributions and quartering. But Georg's moderation had come too late. He, not the landgravine, was now the one in a precarious position. In his personal appeal to her of 12 April, therefore, Georg abandoned his usual threats and bluster and tried to be pleasant. He told her that his only goal had always been peace within Hesse and maintenance of his young nephew's lands, and he tried to appeal to her reason, arguing that her best move, logically, was to ratify the treaty immediately. It would be, he wrote, a tragedy if

through you, by means of the cunning schemes of people who hate peace, the general calm were hindered, your beloved young sons were subjected to the increased danger of losing their land, everything were put in the balance and brought to extremes, and the God-sent means

should be turned down, especially as one can now be certain of the emperor's ratification.

Perhaps he thought that the suggestion that she had been manipulated into her actions would make her more receptive to his appeal, or perhaps he actually thought that this was true. In either case, this showed once again how little he understood his cousin's widow.¹¹

The elector of Mainz, desperate to remove Hessian troops from his own lands, never mind the problems of the other imperial princes, wrote to the secret council to inform it that his delegates would soon arrive at Cassel to arrange the final conclusion of the *publica*. The council, also eager to embrace peace but given no power to negotiate by the landgravine, urged her to send Melander, Scheffer, and the other men she had chosen for her new regency government. Again, however, the secret council's desperate pleas for speed were met only by delay. She would use the time she had won, she decided, to extend the cease-fire and further cement her military control over her occupied territories. This would put additional pressure on Georg and the elector of Mainz to moderate the terms of the Marburg treaty, and would give her time to continue her negotiations with the foreign crowns.¹²

Indeed, by 21 April Georg had become so worried at the thought of the imminent Mainz mediation undoing all his work, that he agreed voluntarily to something he had sworn just months ago he would never do—renegotiate the *privata*. He assured the secret council that this was meant to show his “good intent,” and that he knew these negotiations would be successful, if only Amalia Elisabeth did “not intend to push the thing too far.” This was a vain hope, and her councilors, impotent to answer the repeated complaints of Georg and the elector of Mainz over continued delays, begged her to give some explanation “in order to shut the mouth of objectionable people, especially of those neighbors who always cry out as if Your Highness was never serious about the peace, but rather we have always acted, and still do, as if we wish to lead around the emperor with all sorts of shams.” Georg was clearly one of these “objectionable people,” and he issued an appeal to “all true Lower Hessian patriots” to push for peace. This worried the secret council, which warned her of the growing possibility of revolt, and urged her once again to leap at the new chance for peace the emperor had provided. “Time can easily change,” the councilors reminded her, and instead of gaining better conditions, one might soon be forced to endure more painful ones.¹³

But Amalia Elisabeth was now more convinced than ever that her strategy had been sound and her faith in God would be rewarded. On receiving Georg's proposal to renegotiate the *privata*, she was ecstatic. It seems, she wrote in a minute of 2 May to her secret council, "that His Highness is somewhat more lenient, milder, ~~and more polite~~ [her deletion]" than before. "We suffered the previous," she went on, "with patience and trusted in God, who is righteous, in unwavering certainty that He would not abandon us and our beloved children, as widow and orphans. Our entire trust steadfastly persists in this." God, she believed, had finally answered her prayers, for with a pliant elector of Mainz mediating the entire agreement and a frightened Georg giving way on the *privata*, it now seemed probable that she could still gain a satisfactory separate peace from the emperor even if the French and Swedes were to disappoint her. In order to take advantage of this new situation, she decided that the time was finally right to send Reinhard Scheffer and Nicolaus Sixtinus (also named as a coregent in Wilhelm's testament) to Cassel; Melander, however, was still needed in Westphalia. Her instructions to Scheffer and Sixtinus were to renegotiate the Marburg agreement in *privata* and *publica*, but also to try to bring back into line the Hessian estates and especially the knights, who had been trying, under the leadership of Erbmarschall (a hereditary office and title) Riedesel, to increase their power in any new government. The two were also instructed to collect enough funds to raise an entire regiment of troops and secure the fortresses, "so that in the continuation of arms they could remain, as much as possible, continuously engaged with the proposed general peace."¹⁴

Georg, meanwhile, under pressure from both the imperialists and his own desire for gain, had decided that he needed to be more active if he was to have any chance of salvaging the Marburg treaty. He knew that Amalia Elisabeth's plan had been to delay until the constant petitions of the princes of the empire forced the emperor to intervene, which had worked, but he could not understand the sheer recklessness of it. Where Amalia Elisabeth saw Providence, Georg saw blind luck. The vicissitudes of war were uncertain and dangerous, and her refusal to accept an eminently reasonable agreement was akin to betting her entire state on a roll of the dice. It was completely irresponsible. How could he deal rationally with such a woman? In his instructions for his agents Langen and Schütz, whom he sent to Cassel to renegotiate the *privata*, he told them to try both to determine her intentions and, if possible, to push the secret council to

negotiate without her. Whatever happened, they should try to get what was in the Marburg agreement, but in the end were authorized to retreat to the terms of the 1627 Hauptakkord. If even this failed to satisfy the landgravine and her secret council and the negotiations failed, they should try to ensure that the agreement of peace between the two lines still held. This last point was so important because Georg was now deathly afraid that the new military momentum of the allies had made him into a tempting military target. This was no idle fear, for he had received a warning from a high-ranking source in the Cassel government that there was even now a plan in the making to attack him.¹⁵

Langen and Schütz arrived in Cassel on 18 May and were welcomed the next afternoon in the chancellery. In conference with Otto von der Malsburg, Vice Chancellor Deinhardt, and Licentiat Stückerodt, who was Hermann's representative, Langen and Schütz dutifully argued as Georg had instructed them. "It has always been claimed," they told the Cassel delegates, "that arms are carried for religion, land, and people and for the sake of peace. All this one has now gained. In war the vicissitudes of fortune are known, and in the end it falls upon the weakest, and nothing is sought through war, but the peace one already has in one's hands." Such arguments yielded nothing, and both sides parried back and forth over fault and intent. By the morning of the second day Langen and Schütz, despairing at achieving anything through the council, began private negotiations with Juliane, which she held at her kitchen table. Georg's desperation was clear to the secret council, and Deinhardt reported to Amalia Elisabeth that "it was soon noticed that they wanted to get the *privata* out of the hands of the elector of Mainz and instead wanted to settle it with the council." Deinhardt recommended against abandoning their new advantage, arguing that "it will be difficult to proceed with them without the [Mainz] commissioners." Meanwhile, the common people suffered, for the secret council reported to the landgravine that Westerhold had recently entered Hesse-Cassel to extract further contributions, and had done so violently and brutally, such that the peasants had fled their homes and there were shortages in horses and seed, both of which were causing additional deterioration of the Hessian garrisons. Despite their urgent desire for immediate peace, however, the councilors were not authorized to act without the presence of the new government, which the landgravine had told them would still not arrive for a while. Langen and Schütz were upset at the continued delay, and could not decide if they should wait

there or go on to Hildesheim to beg the duke of Brunswick-Lüneburg's help to avert open warfare between the Hessian lines. Finally they decided on the latter.¹⁶

On the morning of 27 May Nicolaus Sixtinus finally arrived at Cassel; Scheffer arrived a few days later. Langen and Schütz's mission to Hildesheim, meanwhile, had succeeded, and their return to Cassel on 31 May was followed closely by the arrival of the duke's vice chancellor, Johannes Stuckius. This mediation did little for Georg's cause, however, for in a little over a week of thorough negotiations, Scheffer and Sixtinus forced Langen and Schütz into a complete capitulation. The agreement that followed, dated 9 June, made under the constant threat of involving the Mainz commission and contingent on the later completion of the *publica*, was nothing less than a repudiation by the Darmstadt delegates of every demand and claim made since 1627. Georg would gain nothing for all the years of Wilhelm's flagrant opposition to the emperor, nor would he benefit from the opportunities that should have arisen from Wilhelm's untimely death. Hesse-Cassel would remain the senior line of the family, and Amalia Elisabeth, not he, would be its administrator and regent. The landgravine was delighted at the agreement, which arrived in Groningen on 19 June, and she wrote to both her secret council and Georg expressing her pleasure. Georg was happy to hear it. The military situation had continued to tilt against the imperialists, and he seems to have thought himself lucky to gain any peace at all. Both he and Amalia Elisabeth ratified the new agreement and forwarded the ratifications to the duke of Brunswick-Lüneburg at Hildesheim for confirmation.¹⁷

The landgravine's ratification of the new *privata* was partly due to her satisfaction with its terms and partly due to her disgust with the progress of the negotiations with the foreign crowns. Since the death of her husband she had struggled to maintain a war-ready army, but "the hoped-for assistance of the foreign powers," Vultejus wrote the secret council on 4 July, "was not as strong as one had really hoped and the difficulty of the military burden required." It seemed that the Dutch, too, though her coreligionists and close relations, would remain aloof from her and her problems, and she could expect nothing or almost nothing from them. Vultejus thus indicated that as long as the conditions of the *publica* were satisfactorily arranged by the Mainz commission, the landgravine was now ready to lay down her arms and sign a separate peace with the emperor. She could "no longer oppose with conscience" the prayers and entreaties

of her people and her fellow princes to come to peace. This was a radical departure from her earlier stated belief that the interests of Hesse-Cassel and the security of Calvinism lay with the allies and a general peace, not the emperor and a separate one, and it is hard to tell how much was meant for the consumption of the secret council and how much she sincerely meant. She was, however, clearly upset with the allies' failure to take her seriously.¹⁸

The new negotiations on the *publica*, which, after numerous delays and changes of venue, finally began at Mainz on 11 July, instantly stalled. The largest stumbling block seemed to be the emperor's concern about the prospect of a slippery slope. He could not allow this treaty with Amalia Elisabeth to create a dangerous precedent that might encourage other princes to challenge his supremacy, or might limit his power in the empire. Thus he now repudiated his earlier offer to free Hesse-Cassel from the contributions and quartering required of every other prince of the empire, and refused to allow Hesse-Cassel the right to attend any future general peace negotiations. "His Imperial Majesty also did not want to allow such a point in the Hanau treaty," the elector of Mainz explained, "for should such be allowed, it would be understood that the entire empire would then be able to enjoy such freedom." This problem was especially acute in the discussion of the point of religion. While Commissary Horn and Count Albrecht Otto zu Solms-Laubach (Amalia Elisabeth's brother-in-law), who were representing her at the negotiations, insisted that she receive specific religious protections, the emperor refused to grant her any more security than that already specified by the Peace of Prague. The elector of Mainz was extremely frustrated by this impasse, demanding to know why she would not accept what had satisfied other "enthusiastically Calvinist" electors and princes, and chided her delegates that they "placed in His Imperial Majesty an all-too-large mistrust." Even worse, her delegates were insisting on wording that would include the Reformed within the 1555 Peace of Augsburg, and thus extend religious toleration and legalization to all Calvinists in the empire. The elector of Mainz wrote to the emperor expressing his concerns that Amalia Elisabeth knew full well that these extraordinary and radical demands were impossible, and that she was simply using them as a way to drag out the negotiations and win time.¹⁹

Of the remaining points, the only others that were not quickly resolved were the dismissal of the landgravine's troops and the matter of

Hersfeld. For the first, the Cassel delegates now insisted on a payment of 50,000 Reichsthalers, a sum promised by the elector of Cologne back in 1635 to disband the Hessian army; yet the elector of Mainz argued that this needed to be worked out between Melander and the elector of Cologne. As for Hersfeld, the emperor continued to demand that this territory be granted to Archduke Leopold Wilhelm. This, he now argued, was on firmly religious grounds, for it would violate his conscience for a Catholic area to fall into the hands of the Calvinists. The Cassel delegates responded that Hersfeld had been under their control for decades and there had been no public exercise of Catholicism there for the last century. Another good response, though one the delegates did not use, might have been that the emperor had claimed only a few months ago that removing Hersfeld from Hesse-Cassel's control was a purely punitive act. After long discussions and a personal interposition by Archduke Leopold Wilhelm, the elector of Mainz suggested that perhaps Amalia Elisabeth would accept a small annual pension of 3,000 Reichsthalers in return for ceding the land.²⁰

At last, very late in the game, the French awoke to the danger. On 8 August the court wrote to la Boderie in a panic, instructing him to do whatever was necessary to block Amalia Elisabeth from accepting the separate treaty with the emperor. For if she did, her army would fall into the hands of the imperialists, an act that could irreparably shift the momentum of the war in their favor. La Boderie was told also to try to gain Melander's support for breaking the Mainz peace by offering him again the 18,000 livres, but "if it is necessary to double or even triple this sum," the instructions stated, "His Majesty would do it happily." If this failed, la Boderie should try to gain the Hessian army for France, working either through Melander or the Hessian colonels. Similar instructions were forwarded to the French ambassador to Holland, d'Estampes, who was told to offer the landgravine a full 200,000 Reichsthalers if she would reject the Mainz treaty, and to offer Melander the position of French field marshal and, if necessary, as much as 54,000 livres in annual pension if he would keep Hesse-Cassel allied with France and induce her to sign the 1636 French-Hessian Treaty of Wesel. But the French had been too slow to the danger. With the intercession of Duke Georg of Brunswick-Lüneburg, the *publica* was completed by 21 August 1638, well before la Boderie's or d'Estampes's instructions had even arrived.²¹

As finally agreed, the *publica* gave her almost everything she had demanded, including the territory of Hersfeld for her son. Furthermore, the agreement had not only included the emperor's specific recognition of her and her people's right to practice the Reformed religion in her territories, it had extended that right to other Calvinist princes of the empire. Thus Amalia Elisabeth, who had been called "an irresolute and weak woman," and who had begun her reign besieged, exiled, and discounted by the princes of Europe, had now pulled off an astounding victory. She had refused to compromise her principles, had insisted continuously on protecting her religion, her rights, and her son's inheritance, and had proved beyond the shadow of a doubt that she was not to be taken for granted or daunted by threats. Using her diplomatic skills, her utter faith in God, and especially the occupied quarters won by her husband, she had manipulated her people, her estates, and her husband's ruling council into giving her what she wanted, and had simultaneously played and won a dangerous diplomatic game with the great powers of Europe. She had forced Georg of Hesse-Darmstadt, who had originally thought he could use her imagined weakness to take over Hesse-Cassel and, perhaps, reunite the great house of Hesse under his leadership, to abandon his glorious dreams and accept a *privata* that gave him nothing more than he had possessed in 1627, and be grateful for it. She had compelled the emperor, who had been greedy for the end of the German civil war and confident he could bring her into an easy submission, to renege on his promises to Georg and instead appoint as his mediator a man, the elector of Mainz, whom she held under the thumb of her armies. Finally, she had rudely surprised and panicked the French and the Swedes, who had been openly dubious about her skills and contemptuous of her demands.

With her delegates' incredible success at the Mainz negotiations, Amalia Elisabeth's position, both domestically and internationally, was now the best it had ever been. But while negotiations had concluded and a treaty had been produced on 21 August 1638, it would take days, even weeks, for the news of her triumph to reach all the interested parties, and even longer for them to decide how they should respond. For it was in no way certain that the principals would honor what their delegates had fashioned. On the one hand, the Hessian delegates had been forced to renounce key aspects of the landgravine's military security. She would have to dismiss her army and make no effort to block their subsequent uptake

by the emperor. On the other, the elector of Mainz, in his eagerness to have peace in the empire and the Hessian troops out of his territories, had bent quite far on the issue of the legalization of Calvinism—farther than the emperor might be willing to go.

News of the official completion of the Mainz treaty arrived reasonably quickly at Cassel, on 25 August. Yet there was only a three-week time limit established for the ratification of the agreement by both parties—Amalia Elisabeth and the emperor—and four days had already been lost while Commissary Horn brought the news and a copy of the agreement from Mainz. Scheffer and Sixtinus, therefore, with the backing of the rest of the secret council, quickly made ready to carry the treaty personally onward to Groningen for the landgravine's signature. Unfortunately, things did not proceed as rapidly as everyone would have liked. Scheffer left immediately with the original documents, but had to take a detour to Cologne in order to arrange a number of additional matters that had not, in the end, been included within the main treaty. These included the terms of the elector's payment to the landgravine of the 50,000 Reichsthalers and the specific timeline for the evacuation of Hessian-occupied fortresses and territories. Sixtinus was also delayed, forced by illness to postpone his departure until 28 August.²²

While awaiting the landgravine's ratification, the Hessian government busied itself with the routine business of running a state during wartime: seeing to local defense, trying to mollify squabbling generals, and juggling stretched finances. Even worse were the incessant pleas and requests from the countryside, as the Hessian people begged the councilors for some end to the burdens of war, especially the twin problems of high taxation and the lodging of troops. Following the landgravine's instructions, the council also began work on the long-delayed process of formally establishing the full regency government of five coregents to assist her (three professors and two noblemen) and a regency council of sixteen upstanding landowners with the powers to advise and consent. At the time of Wilhelm's death his testament had been out of date, for only three of the five men he had specified as coregents, Vice Statthalter Johan Berndt von Dalwigk, Vice Chancellor Helfrich Deinhardt, and Secret Councilor Nicolaus Sixtinus, were still alive, and von Dalwigk had died soon afterward. As the landgravine had already made clear that Melander and Scheffer were to fill the coregency posts of statthalter and chancellor, respectively, and that as specified by her husband, both Sixtinus and the current vice chancellor,

Helfrich Deinhardt, would also take up positions as coregents, only one vacancy, the vice statthalter, remained. On Tuesday, 24 August, the secret council met to rectify this problem and in a unanimous vote chose one of themselves, Philipp von Scholley, who was a prominent nobleman and also an advocate for the power of the Hessian estates. He was not Amalia Elisabeth's first choice, but when she learned of the appointment she decided not to contest it.²³

The council then selected the sixteen regency councilors—six from the knighthood, four university professors, and six representatives for the cities of Cassel, Eschwege, Homberg, Hersfeld, Allendorf, and Grebenstein—and asked these men to appear at the castle on 1 September. The meeting, which took place in one of the three great halls, was contentious. Erbmarschall Riedesel, the traditional honorary leader of the estates, complained about the exclusion of the nobles from the selection process and the appointment of Melander, whom Riedesel did not recognize as a true Hessian nobleman, as statthalter. Riedesel had, since the beginning, also long pressed for an alteration of Wilhelm V's testament in order to increase the number of knights on the regency council. So far, his attempts had only served to make the landgravine more intransigent. "My belief in this regard," she wrote after learning of Riedesel's earlier demands, "is in no way to budge from the testament. For I find myself constantly called to do so by Landgrave Georg and others, but if I weaken in the least, then there will be a great deal of dispute in the future." "I am somewhat surprised," she went on, "that clever people would even ask such a thing." Now, given her continued refusal to allow any change to the existing makeup of the regency council, the knights seem to have launched an unofficial boycott of it. This may have been partly out of pique, but despite the inclusion of one of their own, von Scholley, as a coregent, they also seemed to have some suspicion that the creation of a (landgravine-controlled) regency council might challenge the power of the (noble-controlled) Hessian estates. Thus immediately after the men were informed of their election, one of the knights, Melchior von Lehrbach, challenged Vice Chancellor Deinhardt by asking if the establishment of the new council would lead to the dissolution of the upcoming meeting of the estates. The vice chancellor denied this, but also reinforced the idea that the council would be both toothless and under the landgravine's thumb when he commented that the seating of the regency council would not actually take place "until (God willing) the happy arrival [in Cassel] of Her Highness." Four of

the six knights subsequently declined their elections, arguing, variously, that they were sick and thus unable to perform their duties, understood much too little to be qualified, or were too busy with other duties to be able to manage the burdens of government service. One, Christian von der Malsburg, failed even to show up at the initial meeting and had to be tracked down. His list of excuses for why he could not serve was particularly long. He not only was sick but also complained that he had already racked up great debts while participating in the Marburg negotiations, could not afford further public service, and had already done plenty for the Hessian fatherland and the landgraves. He had better things to do anyway, like overseeing remodeling and new construction on his personal estates. The secret council informed Amalia Elisabeth of these extraordinary excuses from the knights, declaring them as a whole “dubious.” The entire process, however, serves to highlight the continuing conflict between the landgravine and the Hessian knights. This antagonistic relationship—based both on religious and political differences—meant a continuous threat to the landgravine’s claims of internal sovereignty and efforts at control. Despite her efforts since her husband’s death, in other words, her position as ruler was still not secure, and only peace and her safe return to Cassel would allow her finally to cement her power over the Hessian nobility.²⁴

The Mainz peace promised just that opportunity. With the complete agreement in hand, the vice chancellor and secret council met with representatives of the estates in order to examine the details. Their findings, which they elucidated in a lengthy report to the landgravine, detailed for her all the possible advantages and disadvantages that might result were the agreement ratified. And while they refused to offer a firm opinion of their own on the proper course of action, they telegraphed their inclinations from the very first page by stressing the human cost of the war, which, they argued, had already bled the people of Hesse-Cassel completely dry. This message was only reinforced by their next letter, sent two days later, which included a long litany of complaints about the burdens on the populace caused by continued military occupation by both foreign and Hessian troops, and a reiteration of the “wailing, cries, and lamentations” of the poor Hessian people, who, they insisted, were faced with such terrible financial and other burdens that they now had no other recourse than to flee their homes. With peace so tantalizingly close at hand, the secret council also rushed to reassure the elector of Mainz that the

certain delay of the landgravine's ratification would be purely due to logistics, "as the established time is somewhat brief," they wrote, and "the distance, however, far, and it will be difficult for Her esteemed Princely Highness's ratification to be delivered by the appointed, and now rapidly approaching, date."²⁵

Chapter 6

To the Lord God
Nothing Is Impossible

THE SECRET COUNCIL might have been even more concerned about delays in the ratification had they known what was happening at the landgravine's court in Groningen. Still unaware of the final completion of the Mainz treaty, she and her courtiers were reeling from the effects of a terrible sickness that had been sweeping through the city for weeks and that on 27 August took the life of her youngest son, Philipp, after seven days of fever. God, she wrote her vice chancellor, had delivered her son "from this vale of tears and into eternal heavenly joy and blessedness." Yet for her, this loss had "reopened the fresh and still so painful bloody wound" of the deaths of her husband and daughter. Even worse, for the last two weeks the same fever and convulsions that had killed Philipp had been ravaging her only remaining son and heir, Wilhelm. His death would not only be devastating personally, but would also certainly mean the dissolution of Hesse-Cassel as an independent state. Although her private correspondence suggests she was dangerously close to despair, she reassured her vice chancellor that she was determined to "maintain the utmost patience on account of the entire land" and "on account of the dead." On their behalf and to fulfill God's plan, which "surpassed all understanding," she declared herself determined to set aside her grief and tackle the continuing challenges to her rule and her state.¹

The arrival of Sixtinus at Groningen on 26 August did little to improve either the landgravine's mood or her situation. Yes, he was able to give her

a detailed report of the negotiated Mainz settlement in all its glory, but a number of serious obstacles stood in the way of her timely ratification of it. The most significant was the capture of Scheffer. Shortly after departing Cologne for the landgravine's court, he had been attacked and seriously wounded by a group of soldiers from the Spanish Low Countries, and was now being held for a ransom of 400 Reichsthalers. Still in his (or rather the Spanish soldiers') possession were the original treaty documents for her signature. These would take some time to recover or replace, and Scheffer's absence also meant that she did not yet know how talks at Cologne had proceeded—information she insisted on having before issuing her ratification. Adding to her great frustration was Melander, who, she complained to Vultejus, was taking his own sweet time out in the field, supposedly trying to organize for the eventual disbanding of the troops, but instead merely delaying until he could find a way to use the situation to his own benefit. His goal, she was sure, was to find some way to come out on top, driven as he was by an unquenchable "desire for command."²

Vultejus, who served as the landgravine's closest advisor and confidant at this time, and from whom she seems to have hidden none of her fears and hopes, was himself ill and had now been in his room, weak and feverish, for weeks. Her numerous scrawled notes to him indicate that she felt his absence from her side keenly, and missed his counsel as she struggled to deal not only with her loss of her son, but also with the issues of the ratification and troop disbandment, and with the numerous problems dutifully forwarded to her by the Hessian council. These problems included an ongoing matter of honor between two of her generals, a demand for increased pay from another, more appeals from war-weary and desperate Hessians, and everyday bureaucratic issues of pensions and appointments. She also faced requests and letters from foreign powers, visits from foreign dignitaries and her late husband's relations, and another concerted push by the East Frisians, under Dutch mediation, to ease or eliminate the Hessian occupation. "God plagues us quite hard on all sides," she wrote Vultejus, "yet gives us no greater burden than that which we are able to bear, and helps us to overcome everything with Christian patience." If this was the case, God was testing her endurance, for even the stalwart and pious landgravine was having problems coping. "I admit that I am always going around as if in a dream," she wrote, "and then forget everything that I have to do."³

The uncertainty of the situation especially troubled her. "Time is passing," she wrote Vultejus, "our peace comes ever closer, and in the end we

sit between two stools.” “Even without this,” she continued, “those at Cassel do not trust me much.” She had heard good news from her agent in Hamburg about progress on a general Europe-wide peace congress, but it would be dangerous for her to depend on such a possibility; a great deal could happen in the meantime, and it was possible that her foreign allies would forget all about her in their rush to gain their own territorial satisfactions. There thus seemed few options remaining. “The peace negotiations have certainly gone much too far,” she wrote, “and I really cannot see how one could now retreat with honor and reputation; indeed, a great deal depends on a good resolution. When the substance of what we have demanded is present, in this circumstance I do not see how it can be changed. God grant only that we indeed succeed. . . . Yet one sees how strangely fortune plays out; the ball is round: sometimes it is good, sometimes not.”⁴

As September dragged on, she became increasingly upset by Scheffer’s continued failure to appear, though she acknowledged that as someone who had been almost fatally wounded and taken hostage, he had a good excuse. But while Scheffer’s absence was frustrating, Melander’s nonappearance was infuriating. He had no good reason, as far as she could tell, for his failure to attend at her court, but was instead merely sitting pretty at The Hague waiting, she complained, on his own convenience. “In the meantime,” she fumed to Vultejus, “there is great umbrage on all sides, and I, unlucky creature, am then blamed for everything, and charged that I do not wish to see a peace. Each week there comes one warning after another.” The army was also getting restless, and she had reports that upper and lower officers were all plotting together against her. There would soon be, she feared, some kind of major disaster in the ranks. Melander should have seen this coming and should have been there to tamp it down, yet he was simply letting it play out as it would. She did not trust him at all. She was right not to, of course, for Melander was not at all interested in furthering her goals or in keeping her army under control. Instead, he was at that very moment entertaining repeated lucrative offers from the French and imperialists, both keenly interested in obtaining the Hessian army for their side in the war if the Mainz agreement went into effect.⁵

While she had not fully succumbed to the sickness sweeping her court, she was now suffering from stress, overwork, and debilitating and disorienting migraines. It was all starting to be simply too much, and she complained of further memory lapses and confusion. The weather was also poor, and she was having trouble with the cold, which stiffened her fingers and made it hard for her even to hold a quill to write. Trying to make

sense of her situation, she began to see her suffering more and more as part of God's plan and her troubles as crosses to bear. "I am, and shall remain," she wrote Vultejus, "a poor martyr in this world for as long as it pleases God." But God did not seem willing to lift these burdens from her any time soon. "I see that I am all too unlucky," she mused to Vultejus. "Perhaps it would be better if I no longer existed." Farther to the south, the pressure of events was getting to others, too. Georg of Hesse-Darmstadt, in particular, had reacted badly to his failures in dealing with her and had, according to reports, completely upended his administration by firing large numbers of his staff, including his statthalter. His exclusion from the final Mainz negotiations and the continued refusal of the elector of Mainz to discuss its details with him certainly did not help to moderate his violent mood, and he reportedly had become convinced that the treaty included secret terms designed to prejudice the rights of his sons.⁶

While Amalia Elisabeth and Georg both dealt with the pressures of the moment in their own ways, the elector of Mainz and the Hessian council were also getting nervous, and were writing increasingly agitated letters to each other and to her about her failure to send the ratification. This was especially a problem after 28 September, the date on which the emperor's ratification, also late, finally reached the elector of Mainz. For while a copy of the treaty seemed unable to reach the hands of the landgravine in Groningen, it had traveled reasonably expeditiously into those of the emperor in Prague, who had ratified it on 2 September. Now she was the only one holding back peace. The council warned her that continued delay might well cause the emperor to reconsider the entire matter. The elector was upset, they continued, both by her slowness and by the continued seizure of contributions from his lands by her troops. He was joined in his annoyance by the elector of Cologne, who reported not only continued extractions, but the imposition of new ones. Such behavior, the elector of Mainz complained to the secret council, was "diametrically opposed" to the terms of the new treaty. To be fair, she was quite willing to use her own lands, as well as those of her enemies, to support her military forces. Her secret council had been appalled, for example, by her command of 17 September to expect a certain Lieutenant Colonel Winther who would be lodging his troops within Hesse-Cassel. This meant, of course, that the people of Hesse would have to house and feed his men.⁷

Yet the landgravine still refused to issue her ratification. Although she does not seem to have had a full official copy of the agreement, this was not strictly necessary. Thus it is unclear what she was waiting for. She

herself claimed that her delay was due to her firm insistence on having the full details from Scheffer on how the vital military issues (the evacuation of the fortresses and occupied territories and the disbanding of her army) had been resolved. Such important matters were at stake, she told the secret council, that she could not possibly rush into a ratification. Yet while Scheffer had finally been freed from his captivity by 28 September, he had still been unable to reach Groningen, delayed this time not by bandits but by minor military maneuvers between Melander and imperial Field Marshal Hatzfeldt (although officially a cease-fire was still in effect). Scheffer reported to her that he would be unable to reach her until 13 October at the very earliest. Yet the absence of Scheffer seems a dubious excuse for her failure to issue her ratification, as details of his negotiations at Cologne had most likely already reached her, even without his physical presence at her court.⁸

A second and more credible explanation for Amalia Elisabeth's delay could be her hope that through the foreign crowns she might still be able to regain half of the Marburg inheritance. The Swedes and French were desperate to encourage her in this. On 3 October, for example, she received a letter from Chancellor Oxenstierna's secretary, Georg Müller, specifically requesting that she wait to issue her ratification of the Mainz peace, and instead integrate her private affairs into a general peace negotiation, which Müller assured her would soon be taking place at Lübeck. In this way she would have the terms of the agreement confirmed and guaranteed by the three crowns of Sweden, France, and England. Rather than give a firm answer to the Swedes, she stalled him, as was her wont. The French, too, were still trying to block the Mainz peace, and the landgrave, never one to burn bridges, continued to assure them of her passion for France—even as her private correspondence shows her continued hopes for a good peace with the emperor. As late as 13 September she had Sixtinus deliver false assurances to the French agent at her court, Mr. du Maurier, to the effect that the Mainz treaty was being pushed entirely by the Hessian estates, was not what she wanted, was not yet concluded, and was in any case very unlikely. By October, however, as the French court began to suspect that she was indeed lost to them, and as all efforts to woo Melander for the French cause had also failed, La Boderie was ordered to try again to gain her troops by returning to her court and there secretly negotiating with her colonels. The French could not afford to wait for the final ratification of the treaty of Mainz lest the imperialists gain the upper hand and secure the Hessian army for themselves first.⁹

Another intriguing possibility behind the landgravine's delay in ratification, especially after Scheffer finally reached her in late October, was her distrust of Emperor Ferdinand III. It had seemed unlikely to her, and to many at her court, that the emperor would agree to the religious terms as written. Yet she and many other afflicted and desperate Calvinists, as she wrote to Vultejus, could take some comfort that perhaps a "divine intelligence" would guide the emperor's hand. "To the lord God nothing is impossible," she reasoned, "for He has the hearts of the emperor and of kings in His hands, and He directs and guides them like a stream of water." In case God had not chosen to intervene in this matter, however, her ratification of the treaty might be seen as a tacit agreement to any alterations the emperor made.¹⁰

By 24 November a copy of the emperor's ratification finally made its way to Cassel. It may well be that the elector of Mainz had purposely withheld it as long as he could so as not to destroy the chance for peace, for the secret council found it both insulting and horrifying. No mere application of seal and signature, it instead proved the wisdom both of Amalia Elisabeth's fears and of her strategy of delaying her ratification until she saw the emperor's. Not only had he, for whatever reason (misogyny? petulance?), refused even to mention the landgravine in his ratification—claiming instead, incorrectly, that the treaty was made between the elector of Mainz and the Lower Hessian Estates—but also, as at Hanau, he had attached a signing statement by which he completely rewrote the article concerning religion, reverting it to an earlier wording agreed at Marburg.¹¹

At Mainz, the negotiators had specified that Amalia Elisabeth, her sons, heirs, lands, and people, as well as "all other electors, princes, and estates of the Holy Roman Empire who also belonged to the same religion" were not now or in the future to be excluded from the Peace of Prague on account of the words "the unaltered Augsburg Confession" or on account of their religion, but were instead to be given the same protections the Peace granted to Lutherans. Furthermore, the Reformed were "to be permitted the free public exercise of their religion, and to be neither oppressed nor challenged on its account." This was, in the end, farther than the emperor would go. Thus instead of accepting wording that would have given all Calvinists the same legal rights as Lutherans, he had narrowed the terms down to cover Hesse-Cassel alone. Furthermore, he had stated, Amalia Elisabeth would be granted the same rights as "the elector of Brandenburg, the prince of Anhalt, and all other electors, princes, and estates of

the Augsburg Confession in the Upper and Lower Saxon Circles who had already been admitted into the peace agreement.” This was not reassuring, for while most Calvinist scholars of this period insisted that Calvinism was merely a variant of the Augsburg Confession (and so enjoyed the rights granted Lutherans by the 1555 Religious Peace of Augsburg), Catholics and Lutherans denied this point categorically. There was now a legal confusion over the nature of Calvinism—was it a variant of Lutheranism or a different animal altogether? From the beginning of her reign, she, like her husband before her, had continued to see this uncertainty as nothing but a trap. Thus her goal had been to avoid the whole issue of adherence to the Augsburg Confession and instead to use this separate treaty between Hesse-Cassel and the emperor as a way to create a new, more binding legal precedent that would clearly and finally legalize her church. Otherwise the emperor or his successors might someday simply declare Calvinism not to be a variant of the Augsburg Confession and then proceed with a perfectly legal forced conversion of her lands to Catholicism. But the emperor had refused to accept this. Even more disturbing, moreover, was his removal of the phrase in the Mainz treaty stating that she and her people were to “be permitted the free public exercise of their religion.” His version stated instead that they “should neither be oppressed nor challenged on account of their said religion and of its public exercise.” This gave him an important legal loophole. He could not “oppress” them “on account of their religion,” but what did this mean in practice? Could he still allow them fewer legal rights than Lutherans or even issue a general ban against the public exercise of Calvinism? The distinction may seem fine to our eyes, but it was far from trivial to all the parties concerned. “Be permitted free public exercise” had been an important enough phrase to the Hessian delegates for them to insist on its inclusion in the final treaty and, at the same time, important enough to the emperor for him to strip it out and thereby risk the entire peace.¹²

From the Hessian point of view the emperor’s ratification presented a major blow to the possibility of peace. “We see clearly,” the secret council wrote the landgravine, “that the entire peace project rests almost entirely and solely on the point of religion.” So what was to be done? The Hessian delegates to the Mainz negotiations thought it might be possible to renegotiate this issue; but if the emperor would not budge from his new formulation, could it be accepted in good conscience? After much thought and debate, the members of the council voted that indeed it could. The

ongoing war was intolerable, the nobility was increasingly restless, and God knew when they would get a better opportunity for peace. They were strengthened in their decision by the parallel vote of the leaders of the Hessian church—not too surprising, as these men had already shown their willingness to compromise even further on the point of religion back in January. Surely, the churchmen argued, it was better to end the war now and count on God to work everything out in their favor later on. The theological faculty of the university, however, was not so sanguine about God’s willingness to step in. They also noted that the emperor’s phrasing could very easily be read even more exclusively than the council had feared. “It may appear at first,” they noted, “as if one should not be oppressed on account of religion.” But, they argued, in fact the new wording only protected them from *being excluded from the Peace of Prague* on account of their religion. Since the Peace of Prague itself offered no protections whatsoever for Calvinist practice or worship, this entire point was thus meaningless. Even worse, since the 1629 Edict of Restitution and its criminalization of Calvinism were still technically in effect, the emperor’s new wording would leave their religion entirely unprotected.¹³

Horn was dispatched to Groningen to deliver all of these opinions to the landgravine, and he arrived on 19 December, just in time to travel with her the almost 125 miles back south to Dorsten, a city Wilhelm had seized from the elector of Cologne in 1633 and had then converted into a significant Hessian stronghold. This city was both more secure than Groningen and closer to Cassel, and after a difficult and harrowing week’s journey across flood- and war-ravaged lands, the landgravine, her son, and her court settled safely, though not at all comfortably, into their new home in exile. Vultejus, however, was dispatched to Hamburg, where he might better be able to monitor any developments in the preparations for a universal peace conference. Melander finally made an appearance there in Dorsten with his new wife, and an annoyed landgravine then sent him to Cassel. He was accompanied by Sixtinus, Scheffer, a large armed escort, and the bodies of Amalia Elisabeth’s son and husband, which she had faithfully brought with her through all the many travels of her exile court. These would be greeted at Cassel by an assembly of councilors, professors, ministers, city administrators, students, and ordinary citizens, who, under the tolling of all the church bells, accompanied the caskets to the castle, where they would remain until the landgravine herself could safely return.¹⁴

On 5 January, after long consideration of Horn's report on the emperor's ratification, Amalia Elisabeth sent her decision to the secret council. Yes, she understood that the ministry at Cassel and the council itself felt that even in its new formulation, the emperor's ratification provided "sufficient assurance" in the point of religion. However, past and current experience had forced her to consider with "eyes wide open" how Calvinists were regarded in the empire. Her conscience and her reputation were on the line, and she had to think of "the critical judgment" of "God, all the world, and dear posterity, both during our life and after our death." Her arguments in this letter thus offer yet another valuable insight into the continued importance of religion in the second half of the Thirty Years War. The religious motivation was especially important at the top of the political ladder, for while peasants, burghers, nobles, and even members of local and state governments were focused mostly on the effects of the war on daily life, leaders such as Amalia Elisabeth, who was both deeply religious and obsessed with her role as landgravine and regent, were focused mostly on duty to God and posterity. "This had been," she told the council,

the sole principal work with which our most honored dearly beloved lord and spouse, of most praiseworthy memory, concerned himself from the beginning of this war up until his blessed final end. For this reason he took up and bore arms, withstood so much trouble, effort, and danger, and finally also lost his life. Furthermore, the land incurred the most extreme ruin and irrecoverable damage, and the subjects spent their lives, limbs, and goods in order to assure freedom of thought and the free exercise of their traditional religion, and to preserve the same for their children and descendants. So should one now consider this matter so negligently, and not even get out of it an assurance of mere words that one ought to be allowed, quietly and untroubled, the free public exercise of religion?

If only the emperor could be convinced to accept the original wording of Mainz! Even an alternate wording worked out by the Reformed theologian and rector of the University of Cassel, Johannes Crocius, she argued, would mean the peace could still be salvaged. To this end she instructed Horn once again to contact various parties who might intercede on their behalf with the emperor and the elector of Mainz, and to ride himself,

along with Count Albrecht Otto of Solms, to Mainz to negotiate their case in person. Privately, however, she was not optimistic. “Many think it very much in doubt,” she wrote Vultejus, “if His Imperial Majesty will agree to extend farther than he already has in the point of religion.” Her only hope was that the fall of the great fortress of Breisach to the besieging army of Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar on 17 December (a great victory for the antiimperialists) might weaken the emperor’s resolve. Yet her future now depended more than ever on the possibility of a universal peace, and she begged Vultejus for positive news from Hamburg. To the elector of Mainz, she explained that although he must think her “somewhat cautious and zealous,” she could not act otherwise; mistrust on account of religion had simply become too firmly rooted in the empire. The elector, meanwhile, was doing his best to convince the Hessian councilors that even with the imperial wording, they could consider their religion “fully assured,” and should not let the entire peace fall on account of the single point of religion.¹⁵

Although Amalia Elisabeth and her councilors knew now that the Mainz peace was in deep trouble, this was not yet general knowledge among her allies, the French and Swedes. Both were thus still deeply concerned about the possibility that the Hessian army might fall into the hands of the imperialists. The Swedish secretary, Georg Müller, had now written to her twice, trying to get her assurances that she would not let this happen, and this message was reinforced by communications from the Swedish ambassador Hermann Wolff. The Swedish field marshal, Banér, meanwhile, used the stick approach toward gaining alliances—invading Mecklenburg and Brunswick-Lüneburg in order to pressure the neutral Welf dukes, and then making threatening moves toward Hesse. As for the French, their ambassador to Holland, Jean d’Estampes, became convinced that the landgravine’s departure from Groningen meant the Mainz peace was concluded, and rushed to Wesel to try to buy her troops and Me-lander for France. Once he determined that she had not yet begun to disband her army, he detoured to Dorsten to attempt, like the Swedes, to convince her to set aside her ratification and instead await the general peace conference. The funds he had brought to buy her officers were so excessively large, however, and his purpose so well-known, that his mere presence caused a disturbance that annoyed the landgravine considerably.¹⁶

Georg of Hesse-Darmstadt, meanwhile, was steeping in his own frustrations, for the implementation of the Hessian family agreement (the

privata) was fully contingent on the successful completion of the larger Mainz agreement. The delay was also troubling to the elector of Mainz, whose lands remained at the mercy of Hessian extraction of contributions until Amalia Elisabeth's troops could be disbanded. Her councilors attempted to use this fact to press him to intervene with the emperor to adopt the original point of religion. They made it clear to the elector that there was a direct connection between the delay of the treaty and the suffering of his lands. But he was in an impossible position. Although he was desperate to free his lands from the Hessian occupation, he saw little chance that the emperor would change his mind on the point of religion. All he could do was try once more to convince the landgravine to accept the same assurances given other Calvinists by the Peace of Prague.¹⁷

Yet she refused to come to peace without her religious guarantees. And as January 1639 had dragged on, her intransigence seemed to be paying off, aided no doubt by the weakness of the imperial army under Gallas and, on the contrary, the strength of the Swedish under Banér. On 28 January she told Vultejus that she had recently been assured by well-informed sources that not only would the elector of Cologne satisfy her on all points, but the emperor too was ready to give her what she wanted on the wording of the religious article. Her sources were correct; the emperor was waffling and would indeed soon express himself willing to compromise. Yet his flexibility only went so far: he still refused—perhaps at the urging of the elector of Saxony himself—to allow her treaty to create religious toleration for other Calvinists. But she was just as stubborn. She instructed Horn that this point was entirely nonnegotiable.¹⁸

Interestingly, at the same time the Cassel secret council was assuring the elector of Mainz that only necessary contributions were being extracted from his lands, the council was writing to Melander demanding that he shift the financial burden of war farther toward the Hessian-occupied lands of Westphalia and Münster, and away from the Hessian homeland. “For those quarters are the maidservant Hagar’s son,” they told him. “This land, however, is the son of the free lady of the house Sara, the true heir Isaac, and therefore one should justly maintain a distinction between the two, and the true heir ought to be spared before the maidservant’s son.” The council’s concern over the condition of Hesse-Cassel was considerable. They reiterated both to the landgravine and to Melander that the people were suffering, their homes in ashes, their food and livestock gone. Harassed by soldiers and desperate for improved conditions, those

who still lived were fleeing, even to neighboring Catholic areas. Such appeals to the landgravine, which the council had been making since her ascension to the regency, finally penetrated. Melander and Sixtinus, along with Scheffer—who had been dispatched to Cassel in early February in order to take advantage of a possible chance to reimpose Hessian control over the abbey of Corvey—were now tasked with overseeing the collection of more exact data on war damages. The result was one of the most extraordinary documents of the war, known as the Hessian Mannschaftsregister, or census, of 1639. By order of the Hessian government issued on 26 February, every city, town, and locality was instructed to produce an accurate count of the number of households in its jurisdiction, the number of cows, sheep, pigs, horses, and oxen each possessed, along with working plows and harnesses, and the amount of land then under cultivation. The results were striking. Though there was strong incentive for local officials to overstate losses, since the obvious purpose of the survey was to facilitate, not mitigate, central taxation, the data returned to Cassel (which in many cases also included an accounting of local government debt) indicate a land under enormous stress. The area around the central capital of Cassel, which was relatively protected by the presence of the powerful fortress, but had been hit both by Tilly's occupation in 1626–1627 and by a bad bout of the plague in 1636, had seen a population decline of almost 38 percent since 1624. Other areas, especially those such as Hersfeld, which lay on the popular route between Thuringia and the Rhine and was occupied by imperial troops numerous times, suffered much more, with population losses in the city itself of around 50 percent, but in the surrounding towns reaching 80 percent. More striking still was the loss of livestock—especially sheep and pigs—throughout Hesse but especially in these areas regularly frequented by soldiers. Some areas claimed not a single remaining farm animal or plow, not a single measure of sown grain. In just one example, the twenty-one communities that made up the area of Niederaula saw the number of households drop from 835 to 146 (plus 15 widowers), the number of sheep from 183,000 to 0, pigs from 2,062 to 3, cows from 1475 to 59, horses from 463 to 14, oxen from 352 to 4. The number of *viertel* (around a fifth of an acre) under winter cultivation shrank from 1,403 to 14. Even allowing for exaggeration, these losses are simply staggering.¹⁹

By early 1639, the landgravine had now been toying for over a year with the creation of a third party in the empire, one that might help to advance

the goal of imperial reform by serving both as a counterbalance to the emperor, whose goals included the persecution of Calvinism and the strengthening of the imperial power, and to the foreign powers, whose goals included territorial advancement in the empire and who were only tolerant of her demands for religious liberty out of necessity. This was a plan many others in the empire had also found appealing over the years, including her late husband, Wilhelm, who had taken part in the formation in 1631 of the (rather ineffective) Leipzig Alliance with Sweden and other Protestant German princes, designed to defend by force the German liberties and the imperial constitution. Now, with the almost certain failure of her separate treaty, she began to explore more thoroughly this option of a powerful third party that would create an independent German counterbalance to the two existing power blocs, and allow her and other German princes the option of maintaining an armed neutrality until their constitutional, religious, and territorial demands were resolved. This plan was also indicative of a strong and growing pro-German imperial patriotic and irenicist movement. Such German patriotism lay, for example, at the heart of the great *Societas Fructifera* (Fruitbearing Society), which was dedicated to advancing German literature and preserving the German language from foreign dilution. Since its founding in 1617, however, it had also served both to foster closer relationships among the leading German Protestant nobility, and to encourage their conception of a German fatherland tied by a common heritage, values, and political order. By this point in the war, although the society still maintained a somewhat antiforeign and Protestant bias, the membership had been increasingly expanded to include Catholics and foreigners, along with many leading generals in the war, such as Axel Oxenstierna and Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar. Her advisor Sixtinus was a member, as were other men within her inner circle, and numerous Hessian clergy, military officers, and professors.²⁰

Melander, too, was skilled at working his carefully tended relationships among the elites in German society, and he now made overtures to the Catholic elector of Cologne and the elector of Saxony. Negotiations also advanced quite far with his friend the Catholic duke of Neuburg and with Duke Georg of Brunswick-Lüneburg, whose substantial army occupied portions of Lower Saxony and whose foreign policy decisions also bound the other dukes of this branch of the Welf family. Key to the scheme, however, was the involvement of Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar. Especially after his glorious victories along the Rhine in 1638, Bernhard was eager to

throw off French oversight and was filled with a burning ambition for territorial gains. He saw himself as the logical military commander of this new third party, and had already been making moves to create it under his own auspices. Negotiations between the landgravine and Bernhard were facilitated by Joachim de Wicquefort, a Dutch merchant serving as her diplomatic agent at The Hague, but Bernhard's arrogance made the talks somewhat difficult. Relations with Duke Georg of Brunswick-Lüneburg were much more promising, as he and his brother, August, had become increasingly alienated by the imperial occupation of their territory of Wolfenbüttel, and Duke Georg was also dismayed by the emperor's recently renewed demands for military taxes and a full union of Brunswick troops with the imperial army. The Swedish raiding of the Welf duchies had also become tiresome, so Duke Georg was now eager to join a third party that could bolster his attempt at armed neutrality. Thus Duke Georg, in addition to pressuring the adoption of neutrality by the entire Lower Saxon Circle, which indeed voted in favor of this plan in March, also entertained separate and secret negotiations with the Hessians, led by the landgravine's councilor Nicolaus Sixtinus. On 5 April these two powers, which together controlled major portions of northern and western Germany, came to a full defensive agreement, the Treaty of Hildesheim.²¹

Even while working toward a German third party, however, the landgravine had continued to reach out to the foreign crowns. In March she had dispatched Vultejus to the French court, where he had been ordered to report personally to Cardinal Richelieu on the progress of the Mainz negotiations, and to try, yet again, to parley this into a more favorable alliance. Richelieu was no fool, but saw here the opportunity to deny the emperor the Hessian army. In April and again in May the cardinal wrote to the landgravine and poured on all of his charm, reassuring her of his serious desire to make a deal and stressing his eternal and passionate devotion and desire to serve her and her son. Meanwhile, the French agent in Cassel, d'Estrade, demanded that she give a categorical response to their offer of an alliance. She put him off by explaining that Melander was ill, and he must then be patient. In Hamburg, however, d'Avaux had begun to tire of this game, and argued to the court that France no longer needed Hesse-Cassel or Amalia Elisabeth. Her inactivity, he argued, had already done as much damage as was possible by weakening the Swedes in Westphalia and absolutely ruining the Prince Palatine (the latter was rather unfair, as the Prince Palatine had mostly ruined himself). It was unlikely,

he continued, that she would sign with the emperor, and the king should just ignore her. Richelieu did not agree, and despite his fears that she and Melander would attempt to drag out negotiations (and despite ongoing plans to create a common French-Swedish army in Westphalia that excluded her entirely), in May he authorized new talks with the Hessians.²²

The official neutrality of the Lower Saxon Circle and the alliance of Hesse-Cassel with Brunswick-Lüneburg were all very well, but by no stretch was this a grand third party able to dictate imperial and international politics. And meanwhile, though Melander had secretly arranged with the imperial generals for further extensions of the cease-fire in Westphalia, the war was never far from Amalia Elisabeth's door. Furthermore, Bernhard's death in July put a permanent end to her hopes for his inclusion in their association. To determine the proper course of action, therefore, she now called for a meeting in Dorsten of all of her leading councilors. This meeting took place on 5 August, and it set the course for the next five years of Hessian policy. Present were the commissaries von Uffeln and Scheffer, the hofmarschall (the official in charge of a princely court) Jakob von Hoff, Sixtinus, Vultejus, and Krosigk. Melander did not attend. Their discussion produced a relative consensus that additional negotiations with the emperor would certainly yield nothing, and that the landgravine should focus all her efforts and hopes on a universal peace treaty. Yet since Hesse-Cassel was not strong enough to go it alone until that time, it needed allies. There was some discussion of the possible alliances with Neuburg and Cologne, but von Hoff and Sixtinus, in particular, were concerned that ties with Catholic princes might end up more dangerous than helpful. With the others concurring that a sufficiently strong third party was probably, alas, unfeasible, the only solution was for her to renew Hesse's relationship with the French and Swedes. Yet these two crowns, though better than the emperor, were also not to be trusted; the French were notoriously slow at providing promised aid, while the Swedes were willing to use violence to get their way. At that very moment, for example, Swedish troops under Königsmarck were threatening Hessian territory, looking for provisions and quarters and in the process causing considerable alarm at the Hessian court.²³

Given the situation with the allies, who would surely attempt to use the weaker landgravine as they saw fit, the council advised dissimulation. As long as there was a chance that her armies might be transferred over to the

emperor, she had leverage. Thus until she had a clear and favorable new agreement with the foreign crowns, it was not in her interest to allow the now-pointless Mainz negotiations to end. The advice that she pursue simultaneous negotiations with all sides matched exactly her already long-standing diplomatic practice, and she willingly adopted it. In the meantime, there was the increasingly desperate financial situation to consider. The harvest of 1639 was shaping up to be an unusually good one, and two years of truce had helped the recovery process considerably, but the *Mannschaftsregister* showed that her territories were still in horrifying shape. Even knowing this, she had already increased the amount of contributions her armies collected from Hesse and its occupied territories of East Frisia and Westphalia (a policy that generated further bitter complaints from home and abroad), and her councilors were now convinced that they had already far overstretched the limits of this system of financing. Something must be done to improve matters if they were to be ready to reenter the war by the following spring campaign season. They reached no firm resolution on this matter, but did agree that the instability of the military situation made it advisable to have all the soldiers and officers swear an additional oath of loyalty—this time to the landgravine herself.²⁴

By this point, however, French and Hessian diplomats had made great strides toward an agreement, and on 22 August they completed their work. This alliance, the Treaty of Dorsten, was based on the earlier Treaty of Wesel (which had tied her husband to the French party), but the terms were even more generous. The treaty gave her almost everything she had wanted from the French—from the same subsidy money her husband had enjoyed (200,000 Reichsthalers annually), including the present year, to the king's promise to protect Protestants in conquered territories and preserve her religion. Her requirement that the French also agree to guarantee the rights of all Calvinists in the empire was refused—to her great annoyance—but she did gain their promise that the king “would make no peace treaty or truce with the king of Hungary [i.e. the emperor] and his adherents without the knowledge and inclusion of the said lady, or without the satisfaction of her interests.” In return, she promised to allow the free exercise of Catholicism in all territories she conquered, and to supply and use an army of seven thousand infantry and three thousand cavalry on behalf of, and in full conjunction with, the allies. Furthermore, she agreed not to sign a separate peace with the emperor without consulting France,

but kept the right to close armistice agreements with him and make war alliances with other imperial princes on her own.²⁵

Although Amalia Elisabeth and the French had now formed an alliance, her distrust of the foreign crowns had led her to insist on a secret clause by which she was entitled to execute and publicize the treaty only when she reached a similar agreement with Sweden. Not one to let an opportunity slide, therefore, for a few weeks she also continued to negotiate openly with the emperor, aided by yet another extension of the cease-fire between Melander and the imperialists. She does not seem to have nurtured any great hopes for these diplomatic efforts, even though earlier that year, as the Swedish General Banér had defeated Archduke Leopold Wilhelm in Chemnitz, Saxony, and then moved on to ravage Habsburg hereditary territories in Bohemia, the emperor had become more accommodating. Yet the death of the duke of Saxe-Weimar in July had once again stiffened the emperor's resolve, and although he had provided another modified ratification of the Mainz agreement on 8 August (which offered full religious liberty and rights within Hesse, with guarantees even her most suspicious advisors found ironclad), this too had failed to satisfy her exacting religious scruples. Her security was tied, she argued again and again, to the security of the other princes and estates of the empire, and her religious liberty depended on the full and unassailable legal recognition of Calvinism within the entire empire. Nothing else would do.²⁶

This was something the emperor had difficulty stomaching. Yet Ferdinand, assured by the elector of Mainz that this was a point on which she would not yield, and desperately eager to find some way to lure her from the foreign crowns, now came up with another alternate wording of the religious article. This would match the wording of his earlier ratification, but would add back in the stipulation that all other electors, princes, and estates of the Holy Roman Empire who also belonged to the same religion as the landgravine were not now or in the future to be excluded from the Peace of Prague on account of their religion. The emperor then appealed to the electors of Bavaria and Mainz, as well as his own court theologians for their opinions on this. In September these men, surprisingly, conceded that this wording could be offered her; indeed, the emperor's own Jesuit confessor, Johannes Gans, spoke in favor of this move in a vote in mid-September. Further support came even from the elector of Saxony and Georg of Hesse-Darmstadt. Previous scholars have seen this as an extraor-

dinary and even astonishing concession: the emperor, supported by Catholic and Lutheran electors, had now seemingly agreed to the full legalization of Calvinism. Had she accepted this concession, such scholars argue, Calvinists would have enjoyed religious liberty nine years sooner, and the war too might well have been considerably shortened. However, it is unlikely that the emperor truly intended to grant Calvinists full legal rights at this point. Given the approval of this new wording by the elector of Saxony, known for his strong anti-Calvinist stance and annoyance at the landgravine's demands (and one of the principal opponents of Calvinist claims in past and subsequent years); and given the emperor's own religious sentiment and his statement only a few weeks earlier that he could not "be answerable before God and the entire world" for an extension of religious liberty to Calvinists, it seems entirely likely that this was a calculated effort to trick the Hessians with a legalistic formulation. As the landgravine's own theological faculty had pointed out, the assurances seemingly offered by such wording could mean exactly nothing. Calvinists could not be excluded from the Peace of Prague on account of their religion. But what did that gain them? It provided neither the full legalization of their faith nor the *ius reformandi*. This interpretation is supported also by a statement of the emperor's theologians at the time, who expressed the opinion that the new wording only concerned "the mere formality in which the words are clothed, and hence simply comes down to a logical gripe." Gans himself, when questioned about the concession by the very concerned papal nuncio, responded that "these are trifling matters; it is greatly to be doubted that more universal [concessions?] will be made." This strongly suggests that Gans believed the landgravine was gaining protections only for herself, not for all Calvinists in the empire.²⁷

On 11 September the emperor wrote to the elector of Mainz with the news of his concession and a copy of the new ratification bearing the revised formulation of the religious article. If this was still not enough for the landgravine, he wrote, than they would have to leave matters in the hands of the Almighty Himself. By this time, however, she, frustrated by the long delays from Vienna and convinced in her bones of imperial duplicity and hostility toward legal rights for all Calvinists, had long since given up any hope for her talks with the imperialists. This decision was made much easier by the new agreement already signed with France, and by Ferdinand's continued insistence that she provide him with her army at the conclusion of their peace. It was then reinforced by his moves at the

same time to take Hildesheim from Georg of Brunswick-Lüneburg and give it to the elector of Cologne. Indeed, the approach of imperial armies to Duke Georg's border had the effect of frightening him into an even closer alliance with Amalia Elisabeth, resulting in the 9 November Treaty of Münden, by which the two strengthened the earlier Treaty of Hildesheim and agreed to coordinate their foreign policy and negotiations with the foreign crowns and the imperialists. Vultejus explained to the Hessian council that the failure of talks with the emperor and his hostile moves made it clear that "the house of Austria fully intends to subjugate Germany completely and extirpate liberty and the Evangelical religion." Thus the only way to preserve both the German liberties and Protestantism (and the very existence of states such as the Palatinate), he wrote, was for all of them to place themselves under the protection of France, even if it meant helping the French king gain the imperial crown. To this end, he asked members of the council to sound out in secret the rulers of Baden-Württemberg and Brandenburg, along with the Prince Palatine, to see if, and under what terms, they might also be willing to be united under France.²⁸

Meanwhile, on 30 September Amalia Elisabeth had moved her court once again, this time to the city of Lippstadt, due east of Dorsten and only some sixty miles northwest of Cassel. There, over the next few months, her agents continued talks with the French and Swedes on the exact manner of her reentry into the war. This delay meant that by January 1640, Melander and the Hessian armies had still failed to join with the allied forces in the empire. And although Colonel Geysso had undertaken some small offensive moves in Waldeck, Paderborn, Frizlar, and Schmalkalden, and Melander had taken a few places in Westphalia, they had not done enough damage to lead the imperialists to declare an open breach of the two-year-old cease-fire. This was no accident, both as Melander was on excellent terms with the imperial commander there, and as her councilors had all agreed at that meeting of August 1639 that they should wait as long as possible to engage the enemy and at least until the spring, so as not to jeopardize her quarters in Westphalia and Hesse. Indeed, her delaying tactics were so blatant and her demands of the Swedes so far beyond those her husband had ever made, that both the Swedish generals Königsmarck and Banér, disgusted, advised Oxenstierna that they believed it doubtful that she had any intention of ever joining her army to theirs, and that she was merely focused on maintaining her quarters and even increasing them at their expense.²⁹

After long years of fruitless negotiations with the landgravine, the Swedish ambassador, Wolff, was similarly frustrated by the failed renewal of the Hessian-Swedish alliance, which had been in abeyance since the death of her husband. He left her court in September and returned to Sweden, publically assuring her that an alliance on the basis of the one between her late husband and Gustavus Adolphus was surely possible, while privately seeming to have reached the same conclusions as the French agent d'Avaux a few months before: she was dealing in bad faith, was planning on selling out the Swedes to get better conditions from the emperor, and had already caused more trouble than she was probably worth. This assessment was even more starkly expressed in a letter from the Swedish councilors in Germany to the Swedish court, where they laid out her many offenses, including (among many other things) her unwillingness to engage the enemy, her misuse of Swedish equipment, her greediness for and unfair confiscation of good quarters and supplies at Swedish expense, her sparing of her own territories, her failure to assist their troops, her constant double-dealing and duplicity, and her obvious use of negotiations with the Swedes merely to buy time and an improved imperial offer.³⁰

While she was clearly stalling, she also had some serious concerns about these foreign alliances, but especially the Swedish one. The Swedes were demanding that she cede to them control of foreign policy, not entertain any alliance negotiations without their approval, and accept all Swedish enemies as their own, which would require her to poison her peaceful relationship with friendly princes such as the duke of Neuburg. Furthermore, they would require her to unify her quarters, fortresses, and army with theirs, which would deprive her of her only source of power and tax her already stressed resources, and to give supreme command of the new combined army to their field marshal, Leslie—a point at which Melander, unsurprisingly, balked. Religion was also a major sticking point. By the terms of the 1631 Treaty of Werben, Gustavus Adolphus had promised Wilhelm V only that “in matters of conscience” he would help the Hessians gain satisfaction at a general peace congress “for all spiritual and legal grievances,” but she wanted more. She demanded Swedish support for full toleration and legalization of Calvinism throughout the empire, a demand guaranteed to stick in the craw of the Lutheran Swedes. The French agent d'Avaux saw her stubbornness on this point as a matter of design; he strongly suspected she was purposely using excessive religious demands in

order to slow down the Hessian-Swedish alliance and thus further delay the full implementation of the Treaty of Dorsten. It helped his opinion of her not at all that he now had reports from Hessian-occupied Paderborn that Catholic clergy were being so severely taxed by her men that they were forced to abandon their own churches—behavior, he complained, that could only bring “prejudice to the piety and reputation of His Majesty [the king of France].” French complaints about such behavior had little effect, however, and widespread plundering of Catholic properties, such as the cloister of Marienmünster, continued unabated. Still, for the good of their war effort, the French could do nothing but push the Swedes to make a deal. The Swedish ambassador at Hamburg, Salvius, told d’Avaux that though they might be willing to offer the landgravine a guarantee for the exercise of Calvinism in her territories, they would not support a more general legalization in the empire. In other words, the antagonism between Lutheranism and Calvinism was still causing problems at this late stage of the war, and seriously hindering the relationship between two longtime allies.³¹

The landgravine laid out her disquiet with the French terms in a memo sent to their court on 26 January 1640. First, as with the Swedes, she expressed her concern about the extent of French support for her religion. She argued that the Treaty of Dorsten, as currently crafted, did not go far enough in protecting her. Instead, she now demanded that the French crown promise to preserve her religion *in its current form*, to require in any general peace treaty that she be given the same freedoms as the Lutherans and as the rest of the empire, and to come to her aid in case the emperor attempted to impose Catholicism after the signing of a general peace. Second, she insisted that the French-Swedish alliance be put on a more permanent footing, and that the two crowns agree to coordinate their efforts until a final peace. Without the Swedes, she argued somewhat obviously, the allies had little chance of success. Third, she complained that she could not possibly begin a campaign without money. The Treaty of Dorsten had promised her 200,000 Reichsthalers in subsidy to wage war, but also an additional 220,000 Reichsthalers to put her armies and fortresses in a condition even to begin. The French had not yet paid this sum, so she had been forced to borrow in order to meet “a great infinity of expenses,” including costs of levying twenty-four companies of cavalry and numerous infantry, buying ammunition and cannons, and supporting the troops in the strongholds and the countryside. Krosigk, in discussions

with the French at The Hague, told them that she had instructed him to leave immediately should they fail to pay not just reimbursement for these expenses, but the full amount promised her.³²

It is an indication of the ongoing importance of Amalia Elisabeth's army in the strategic thinking of both the Swedish and French courts that her stubbornness continued to pay off. Despite the frustration of Wolff, for example, and his assessment that her demands were "difficult," he reminded the Swedish court of the long and loyal relationship between the Swedes and Hessians and warned that it was very important for the landgravine not to fear that Sweden would never gratify her, since then out of mistrust or displeasure she might hand her army and quarters over to the enemy and ratify the treaty with the emperor. The French had similar fears, and their agent in The Hague, d'Amontot, advised that failure to pay the sums owed her would not only "make her extremely unhappy" and delay her final declaration for them, but also convince her to listen to those on her council who were advising a deal with the emperor. In the end, then, French fears over the possible loss of her army seem to have been even greater than Swedish fears, as the French agreed to amend the Treaty of Dorsten in the ways she required, including a promise "to preserve her religion in the same freedom and exercise as it is at present." As for the payment of subsidies, they insisted on getting something for their money. Thus on 1 February, she agreed to the Treaty of Lippstadt, an interim agreement between her and the duke de Longueville, the commander of the French Army of Germany, which required her to field six thousand troops for the next two and a half months in return for an advance of 150,000 Reichsthalers.³³

Even while these negotiations were taking place, the landgravine's agents once again renewed direct talks with Ferdinand III's agents, and she continued to look for ways to argue her case to the empire as whole. This project was aided in February by the new meeting of the imperial electors at Nuremberg, which was designed to address the numerous ongoing internal problems of the empire. These included complaints about the Edict of Restitution; the article in the Peace of Prague that established a forty-year expiry of the agreed-on 1627 ecclesiastical normal year (or date to which the religious situation reverted); and the difficult question of those princes and estates of the empire who were still denied amnesty and restitution. The latter point was an especially troublesome barrier to peace, as the Swedish and French were still using such exclusions, along

with a larger demand for the preservation of the German liberties, as justification for continued military interference in the affairs of the empire. The emperor, who sent his own deputies to Nuremberg in an attempt to control the proceedings, thus stressed to the electors the importance of resolving this problem, but he was especially keen to bring Hesse-Cassel and Brunswick-Lüneburg back into the fold. If he could unite their armies to his, he could simultaneously deny them to his enemies. Only with the combined military forces of all the estates of the empire, he argued, could they hope to eject the foreign crowns from the fatherland and bring peace to the empire.³⁴

Amalia Elisabeth correctly saw the emperor's growing military frustration as an opportunity. In an open letter to the electors, she urged them to use this meeting to "set aside the divisions and misunderstandings that have occurred in the Holy Roman Empire between the head and members, and also among the members themselves." She advocated a rejection of the partial amnesty created by the Peace of Prague, and instead urged a universal amnesty and restitution of territories back to 1618, along with the full religious and secular liberties that the imperial estates had enjoyed before the war (though the extent of the German liberties had even then been a contested issue). This demand was doomed to failure, as it would entail a massive transference of territories back into the hands of the Protestants. Still, the delegates did express some willingness at least to address her complaints and those of other princes. The elector of Bavaria even suggested that all excluded estates of the empire, even those that had subsequently come to some kind of accommodation with the emperor, now be granted the same restitution and amnesty enjoyed by regular signatories of the Peace of Prague. Yet tension between the elector of Bavaria, who was clearly attempting to use the electoral Diet as a way to bring peace to the empire on his own terms, and the emperor, who was concerned about the elector's secret negotiations for a separate peace with France, led the emperor to a difficult decision. His father's policy, and his to this point, had been to reinforce his power by acting solely on his own authority or in consultation with the electors alone—thus denying the ability, and by inference the very right, of the lesser princes and estates of the empire to participate in imperial sovereignty. This policy had, understandably, led to considerable grumbling among many princes, especially Protestant ones like the landgraves of Hesse-Cassel, who argued that the empire was not a monarchy or oligarchy, with all power held by

the emperor and electors, but a broad aristocracy, with power vested among the many princes and estates. Ferdinand III, however, argued the contrary, and portrayed his philosophical opponents as not only damaging to imperial unity, but treasonous to the empire. Yet at this point he had no choice. To bypass the threat to his authority posed by an overactive electoral Diet and to find some way out of the war, he would now call a full meeting of the imperial Diet, the first since before the war began.³⁵

Chapter 7

The Long Struggle

WITH A GROWING PUSH for peace in the empire by the imperial princes and electors, a weakened emperor ready to deal, and a new advantageous treaty with France in hand, on 26 March 1640 Amalia Elisabeth and her son finally returned to Cassel. Her homecoming was bittersweet, for while the long years of her exile court were now over, her treaty obligations with France meant the imminent return to the struggles of war and an end to the uneasy peace she had enjoyed since Wilhelm's death. Still, the return to Cassel reunited her with her daughters Emilie (fourteen), Charlotte (twelve), and Elisabeth (five), who greeted her and their brother with great joy, and allowed her to complete a long-postponed task—the proper burial of her husband, Wilhelm, and her son Philipp. The arrangements made, on 3 May 1640 these two, along with Amalia Elisabeth's infant daughter Louise (who had died in Cassel in January 1638 while her mother was still far away), were interred in a formal ceremony. The three caskets were paraded from the castle to the church, preceded by five companies of infantry and another of cuirassiers, and the entire route was lined by further musketeers and pikemen. After these came 454 schoolchildren singing Psalm 125 (“The Lord Is Round About His People”), followed by ministers of religion, university professors, court and government officials, trumpeters, noblemen, pages, and black-clad horses and riders—some bearing banners and the landgrave's coats of arms, others bearing ceremonial swords, jewels, and a golden crown. Finally came the bodies themselves: first the

little princess, then her brother, then the landgrave, all accompanied by further dozens of noblemen and retainers. Following after the caskets were the young heir, Wilhelm VI, accompanied by representatives of the French king and of Elisabeth of Bohemia, then the landgrave's half-brother Hermann and uncle John Casimir, prince of Anhalt-Dessau (who had married Wilhelm V's sister, Agnes, in 1623). Other lords and counts came next, then the landgravine herself, accompanied by additional counts, then her three surviving daughters, further noblewomen, the councilors' wives, and numerous burghers. Once the entire procession had reached the church, an elaborate religious service and funeral oration was performed, followed by a ceremonial double volley fire by all the accompanying soldiers and the firing of forty-eight cannons. In all, it was an impressive display, marred only by Lieutenant General Melander's failure to appear. He was, it seems, more comfortably engaged at Düsseldorf, at the home of his friend Wolfgang Wilhelm, the duke of Neuburg.¹

Such ceremonial events were a key part of early modern life, and an important means for rulers to shape or encourage political stability and harmony. For the landgravine, this event was also an opportunity to demonstrate publicly the extent of her respect for her husband and to reinforce to the residents of Hesse-Cassel the power and authority of the now-returning princely court. But as a female regent, her control over her state was tenuous, as her council had reminded her again and again during her years of exile. The problem was made even more difficult by both popular and elite ideas about women's competence and proper social roles. Contemporary political and religious theory (often drawing on such sources as Aristotle and Augustine, both of whom had dim views of women in general) was almost unanimous in the opinion that women were incapable of governing and, indeed, female rule was contrary to both human and divine law; or as the humanist philosopher Justus Lipsius argued, "man is born to virtue, to rule . . . woman, however, is not fit for the scepter or for public dignity." This sentiment was most famously illustrated by *The First Blast of the Trumpet Against the Monstrous Regiment of Women* (1558), a tract directed against the three Marys (Mary I, queen of England; Mary of Guise, queen regent of Scotland; and her daughter, Mary Stuart, queen of Scotland) by the Scottish Reformer John Knox. *The First Blast* forcefully expressed what many believed: women rulers were both "repugnant to nature" and in violation of God's creation, for He had purposely deprived women of both authority and dominion over men. Despite the general

consensus, however, there were contrary voices. Some came from women themselves, but a few leading theorists—such as Lipsius himself and John Calvin, who made exceptions for the biblical heroine Deborah—were willing to accept female rule under some circumstances. For example, if a woman's rule did not violate a country's law or custom, if there was an emergency, or if the woman possessed extraordinary characteristics or had, in Lipsius's words, "with a manlike providence cast off all imperfections belonging to women." These were rather large theoretical hurdles for women rulers to overcome, and though some queens or female regents certainly used these and similar exceptions as justifications for rule (the English queen Elizabeth, for example, famously claimed that she "had the heart and stomach of a king" and so was just like a man inside), such arguments were not easy to make.²

Now back home, the landgravine's use of a carefully crafted public spectacle confirmed that she intended to continue a different strategy of control, one she had initiated immediately after the death of her husband. Her right to rule, her actions implicitly argued (as she had explicitly stated before), was based precisely on her very nature as a woman. As a dutiful wife and devoted widow, a good mother, and a properly pious Christian lady, her only interest was to ensure the preservation and well-being of her children's lands, church, and people. These female roles invested her with special responsibilities and required her, out of wifely, motherly, and godly duty, to take up her husband's roles as prince, military leader, custodian and tutor to their children, and supervisor of the true Hessian church. Interestingly, she was not alone in this strategy, for it was also one adopted by numerous other female rulers and regents of the time, including her own mother, Katharina Belgica (who served as regent of Hanau-Münzenberg for fourteen years), Juliane of Hesse-Rotenburg (Amalia Elisabeth's mother-in-law), and Elisabeth of Bohemia (wife of Friedrich V). The Medici family, in particular, gave rise to numerous female regents who stubbornly maintained both their power and their femininity in the face of male opposition. These included such notable women as Catherine de Medici of France, who (due to the high child mortality rates of the time) was regent to three successive minor sons during the sixteenth century, and Amalia Elisabeth's contemporary Claudia de Medici, who ruled the Tirol for her minor son and, like the landgravine, showed herself determined to enlarge his inheritance. A comprehensive list of other such queens and regents of the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries would be enormous, especially

if one were to include the powerful group of imperial abbesses, who ruled their ecclesiastical territories in much the same way as other imperial princes, but whose gender was a key part of their projection of authority. Amalia Elisabeth's own daughter, Elisabeth, would become abbess of the Protestant Herford Abbey in 1686, a post that carried with it the privilege of a seat in the imperial Diet as part of the college of prelates of the Rhine. The extraordinarily frequent appearance of women as queens, rulers, or regents in early modern Europe suggests, as one scholar has recently noted, that whatever the legal and philosophical barriers to women rulers, princely states commonly used female regency as a tool to ensure the continuation of rule and maintain territorial power within a dynasty.³

The formal interment of Amalia Elisabeth's husband and children was both a testament to her devotion and a public spectacle designed to reinforce her rule, yet it was not nearly enough to counter the extraordinary hostility she faced from some of her own people. Indeed, on her return to Cassel, relations between her and the Hessian populace were as strained as they had ever been. Her nobility and estates, in particular, were seething with long-pent-up anger and frustration, and her government's recent scandalous murder trial of a member of one of the most prominent Hessian families, von Dalwigk, had not helped to smooth matters. Of special concern, however, were the widespread fears over the looming reignition of the war and what this might mean for Hessian territory and lives. The landgravine and her supporters argued that the French alliance was necessary and any future warmaking defensive, but others, even in her own government, disputed this point. Long irate with both her domestic and foreign policies, some now leapt at the opportunity to express their disapproval. Pamphlets critical of her policies had begun to appear in Cassel earlier in the year, and she told the council to ban and confiscate these, and not to allow any further publications without prior governmental approval. Also of concern was the ongoing tension between Lutherans and Calvinists within her territories, which had, she was displeased to hear, resulted in a recent sermon printed and disseminated by a Lutheran pastor from the occupied city of Unna warning his congregation about the errors of Calvinism; a false church, he argued, that worshiped the Devil as its god.⁴

Such claims outraged the landgravine. Since Moritz, the landgraves of Hesse-Cassel had taken a keen interest into the proper functioning of the Reformed church in their territories, and Wilhelm V's testament had instructed Amalia Elisabeth to take a vigorous role, such that "no division

or alteration occurs in the churches and schools in our principality and lands, on account of our ceremonies and our religion, which bring salvation.” Interestingly, more than once since she had been gone, her ministers had asked her to provide her opinion on various religious matters, such as problematic marriages. She herself was extremely religious, and prayer was a regular part of her and her children’s lives, as were frequent attendance at sermons and bible readings by her court preacher, the renowned theologian Theophilus Neuberger. For private worship and study she read the Bible, and she had a large library of religious texts, including Calvin’s *Institutes*, numerous collections of sermons, prayer books, catechisms, and Reformed theological works by such men as Pierre Du Moulin, Theodore Beza, the Cassel professor Johannes Crocius, and her own superintendent, Neuberger. Even some Catholic and Lutheran texts, such as Martin Luther’s *Small Catechism*, made it into her library, but she was much less an irenicist than her husband, who had been at least willing to consider some reconciliation with Lutherans on the basis of their shared hostility to Catholicism. For her, on the contrary, protecting the true church was a matter of honor—and one reason why she was so hostile to the claims of her Lutheran nobility for freedom of worship. This was also behind her emphasis, now that she had returned to Cassel, on instituting regular and extraordinary days of prayer and fasting for her entire land, and for her offer of asylum to foreign Calvinists. Even so, she always worried that she had not done enough, either for herself or for her family and her people.⁵

With public criticism stifled by increased censorship, opponents of Amalia Elisabeth now looked to the upcoming meeting of the Hessian estates as a forum for expressing their fear and frustration. This meeting, called by her, began the day after the burial and lasted until 10 May, and was designed to address the establishment of the regency government, as well as ongoing problems of taxation and debt in the countryside. Yet while the Hessian nobility had clearly hoped to use the Diet both to vent their anger and to increase their influence over the landgravine, in the end they merely demonstrated their own weakness. First, some of the knights tried to overturn the testamentary stipulations for the regency, and asked the collected estates to agree instead to the precedent of 1514, when the knights and estates, not the then-landgravine, Anna of Mecklenburg-Schwerin, had chosen the regency governors. Failing this, they at least wanted additional noblemen named to the regency council. But these demands were rejected by the rest of the delegates and by the landgravine herself, who insisted

that she alone had the right to choose who would advise her. Furthermore, despite her frequent insistence in the past that Wilhelm's testament not be changed in the least, she now used her new power over the estates to reshape the regency council in a way that suited her. Rather than appointing three professors and two noblemen to serve as her coregents, she named four of her favorites—Vultejus, Sixtinus, Scheffer, and Deinhardt—and only one nobleman, von Scholley. In the larger regency council as well, she showed her scorn for the claims and demands of her semitreasonous nobility by lowering their numbers from six to three, which would allow their being easily outvoted by the nonnoble councilors. The knights could do nothing but watch in frustration as she deftly outmaneuvered them.⁶

Disunity within the estates also allowed the landgravine to persevere in other ways. The most contested issue was taxation, as contribution levels had doubled in recent months, and members of the estates all agreed that this was outrageous and that much of the money was wasted on an oversupply of military officers. They disagreed, however, on what a fair system of taxation would be. For their part, the cities demanded that noble and church goods and capital be taken into account for tax purposes and that the nobles and clergy be banned from competing with the urban breweries. The knights rejected this and instead demanded the continuation of their traditional rights and privileges, including their tax exemption. With no one willing to compromise, the estates in the end ceded to the landgravine the right to arrange for a fair and just distribution and raising of contributions from the countryside, just as she had already been doing. Eager to take advantage of the moment, the knights also voiced their numerous complaints against her and her council. These concerned her treatment of their subjects (including work obligations owed by the peasants to the landgraves and forced military service), their own financial burdens, internal tariff barriers that hurt their trade in wool and mutton, the state's monetary policy (which they opposed), the poor maintenance of the roads, their right to Lutheran baptism and communion in their own homes (which she still denied them), and their right to oversee their own Lutheran pastors, baptisms, burials, and marriages (which she also opposed). None of these complaints concerned her overly much, and she refused to reconsider her existing policies.⁷

Of more importance to the landgravine was the imminent return of Hesse-Cassel to active participation in the war. This meant imposing her

will on an unruly and unhappy people, but it also required serious military preparation. Since the signing of the Treaty of Dorsten with France, she had moved to reinforce her fortresses and strengthen her forces, which had weakened significantly over the years of military inaction. By March, when she had openly recognized her new alliance with France, her efforts and expenditures had brought her troop numbers back up to almost fifteen thousand infantry and four thousand cavalry. These would soon include numerous Hessian peasants who answered her call for recruits (despite their nobles' outraged objections) and congregated in the fields outside Cassel, from where they would be sent to join the more seasoned soldiers in their quarters. Despite her treaty obligations from the February Treaty of Lippstadt, however, she still hesitated to break her cease-fire in Westphalia with the imperial commander there, Wahl. This policy of neutrality outraged the allies, who charged her with double-dealing, but was of course firmly supported by Melander, who still held out hopes for a third-party-created peace within the empire and the expulsion of the foreign powers.⁸

The landgravine's hesitation to undertake a hot war, after years of only minor skirmishes, was certainly not due to moral scruples over taking human life or concern for the suffering of her people. Nor was it due to either timidity or indecision, though her allies and enemies always charged her with these traits—and she often encouraged this misperception when it suited her needs. No, the biggest problem of military action for her was one that would now dog her for the rest of the war: how to finance it. Here she faced a grim reality. Her occupation of numerous territories in Westphalia and East Frisia gave her influence and leverage, but not much, if any, ready cash. Instead, the income she extorted as contributions from local populations went almost entirely, and often insufficiently, for the maintenance of the garrisons required to hold these lands. Thus in practical military terms these lands were almost useless. The troops who manned the fortresses could not be moved into the field for open combat, and the occupied territories could not be relied on to support any additional men or horses. This was to be the cause of innumerable conflicts between the landgravine and her allies, for they would stubbornly refuse to believe that she was poor, and the French, in particular, whose subsidies and pensions would end up being the only real means for her to field a fighting force, repeatedly accused her of embezzling funds or willfully withholding resources.⁹

Given the practicalities of the financial situation, it was only in late April, after returning to Cassel and after considerable prompting from the French and Swedes, that the landgravine had finally agreed to have her troops act in conjunction with the foreign crowns; and only on 1 May did Melander, very reluctantly and angry that he had been excluded from the discussions on this matter, move a large force of three thousand Hessian cavalry, three to four thousand infantry, and eight hundred dragoons from Lippe to outside Mühlhausen. There, on 12 May, they were joined by the troops of Georg of Brunswick-Lüneburg, who in return for support by the French of his interests at future general peace negotiations had sent another six thousand men under von Klitzing to the allied cause. A few days later these men joined the army of the Swedish general Banér, composed of approximately twenty-two thousand men marched north from Bohemia to Erfurt. They were also joined by the French forces under the duke de Longueville, which, thanks to some careful dealing by French diplomats, were further bolstered by the troops of the now-deceased duke of Saxe-Weimar (also known as the Bernhardines). Thus with the French Army of Germany (as the conjoined French-Weimar army was now known), the Swedes, the Hessians, and the Brunswick troops, the allies had perhaps forty-two thousand men. This was, in other words, to be a major new offense, bringing together for the first time the entire combined forces of the allies, which would, if all went as planned, finally crush the imperial forces and end the war with one stroke.¹⁰

Amalia Elisabeth had great hopes for this conjunction, which she thought should allow the allied forces to challenge a similar number of imperialist and Bavarian troops gathered in northern and central Germany. Yet her hopes would be in vain. Rather than stand and fight, the main imperial army under Piccolomini quickly entrenched itself and refused to engage in anything but minor skirmishes. These resulted in the capture and flight of numerous Hessian troops and left many Hessian regiments, according to General Banér's slightly sarcastic report to the Swedish crown, empty but for the standards and pennants. Frustrated, the allied generals began to quarrel incessantly over strategy—with Longueville now recommending an advance to the Rhine and Melander one toward Franconia. There were also significant personal antagonisms, exacerbated by tension caused by Banér's role as supreme commander. Since negotiations for the new offense had begun back in 1639, the Swedes had demanded the full subservience of the Hessian and Brunswick armies under theirs, but both the

smaller German powers had strenuously resisted this. The resulting conjunction, however, had given Banér considerable direction over Melander and von Klitzing, and Banér was far from diplomatic in wielding it. Each of the generals, including Longueville, was sure his understanding of the situation was the correct one, and Banér complained to the Swedish court of these men's "long-winded debates, damaging objections, and private considerations." Melander, unhappy from the beginning, soon began to argue for a reseparation of the armies—a suggestion Longueville fully supported but the landgravine dismissed as both unwise and dishonorable. By June, relations had become so strained that Longueville indeed separated himself and moved his army to quarters in the upper principality of Hesse (i.e. Hesse-Marburg). This territory was of course under the authority of Georg of Hesse-Darmstadt, but as an ostensibly neutral power with no army, he was powerless to resist the French army's wholesale looting. Banér, meanwhile, desperate for supplies, was stymied by the imperialists' solid entrenchments in the mountain passes of Thuringia, the failure of the French to pay the promised subsidies, and the landgravine's refusal to move against the imperialists in Westphalia or to supply the army from her occupied lands in the area. Furious at both the enemies and his supposed allies, he ignored Hessian and Brunswick complaints and demands, and on 1 July moved the remains of the allied army south and west across the Werra river into Hesse-Cassel.¹¹

This occupation outraged Melander and seriously concerned Amalia Elisabeth, who instructed Melander, when she learned of Banér's intentions, to try to persuade the Swede to move his hungry troops somewhere else, preferably the lands of the enemy. She also implicitly criticized Melander for the poor condition of, and numerous desertions from, the Hessian forces. He, in turn, blamed her both for a new onslaught on Hessian-controlled territory by the imperial forces of Wahl, and for the horrible condition of his troops, which he claimed was due to her Swedish allies, for "always, everywhere we go, whether we have the advance or take up the rear, the Swedes have already plundered and ravaged everything many days earlier." Such open contempt of his erstwhile ruler was not entirely unusual for him, but this, along with his continued refusal to give up on the now impractical idea of a German third party, left her entirely fed up with her lieutenant general. He was also not at all popular at the French court, which correctly interpreted his moves as not just obstructionist and anti-Swedish, but also anti-French, and which actively campaigned

against him with the landgravine and her councilors. All of this—their long-standing personal conflict caused by his arrogance and insolence, his poor relationship with her allies, and now the new bad blood engendered by the stresses of this military conjunction and by his disquiet at the return of Hesse-Cassel to the war—would finally lead to a complete rupture between Amalia Elisabeth and Melander.¹²

As early as March Melander had threatened to quit if he was not given independent command and full military and political autonomy. Instead he had been forced to suffer the ignominy of serving under Banér as supreme commander of the allied army. Although Amalia Elisabeth had managed to talk him down at that point, he continued to balk at this involuntary subservience and again offered his resignation in June. She had suggested that if he wanted to resign he should come to Cassel personally to do so. He agreed, arriving at the beginning of July, and once again demanded his release from service, boldly announcing to her and her council that her policies were to blame for the imminent and certain destruction of Hesse-Cassel. She accepted his resignation. Many within the Hessian nobility fully shared Melander's poor opinion of her. Her insistence on returning to open war was also unpopular among the common people, as it had already begun to cause scarcity in Cassel itself, including shortages in staples such as bread, butter, cheese, and herring. Furthermore, the prevalence of hot-blooded and quarrelsome soldiers in the streets had led to an epidemic of dueling and street fights. This got so bad that in mid-September she issued an edict banning all such public displays of violence, along with any purposeful provocations or challenges, on pain of both financial and bodily punishment. Among those openly critical of her at this time was General Commissary Otto von der Malsburg, not one of her favorite people at any point, who wrote to Melander bemoaning his resignation, which, von der Malsburg stated, would presage the downfall of Hesse-Cassel and which he personally felt even more keenly than the death of his own mother. Amalia Elisabeth, however, was satisfied. She was finally rid of a contentious and arrogant rival, someone who had constantly undermined her authority and angered her allies, and someone for whom she now, according to the French, carried "a mortal hatred." Yet the whole situation did not do anything to improve her reputation either at home or abroad. She looked weak, which only fed into the common perception that, in the words of the Swedish general Banér, she "had no command," but would do whatever her councilors stipulated.¹³

Melander, who may well have seen himself as irreplaceable, was nevertheless quickly replaced as lieutenant general and head of Amalia Elisabeth's army by Count Kaspar von Eberstein, whom Melander himself had recommended to her as a suitable successor. This might have disqualified Eberstein in her eyes, but he was a skilled tactician and experienced soldier, and she was not going to let Melander's approval affect her choices. Born from a noble Pomeranian family and holding territories in Naugarten and Massaw, Eberstein had served in the Swedish army with distinction until 1631, when he had accepted a position from Wilhelm V of Hesse-Cassel. The following year Eberstein had commanded a Hessian contingent under Swedish command at the battle of Lützen, and since that time he had gained a good reputation as a skilled and prudent commander with diplomatic tact and a willingness to follow orders. Well, a good reputation among his allies. To the imperialists and others, his penchant for looting, attacking and extorting money from Catholic properties, and robbery of passersby made him more a bandit chief than a general. According to one contemporary account of an attack in May 1639 by Eberstein on the Saxon village of Elterlein, his troops "made the people run for the forests, raped women and young girls, broke into all the churches and sacristies, stole horses and cattle, robbed people, ate up whatever bread, meat, beer and anything else they found, and left things covered in shit; they behaved so barbarously, that these mountains had never seen such a devil."¹⁴

Melander, after leaving Cassel in high dudgeon, now spent long weeks in Düsseldorf with his friend the duke of Neuburg, who, according to the French, was completely under Melander's influence. With Neuburg's enthusiastic support, Melander soon approached the exiled Palatine court, suggesting that he lead a new army of English troops to defend the allied cause. Amalia Elisabeth informed the French that should Melander be given such a command, they could expect no help from her. Others, including the prince of Orange, were similarly unenthusiastic, and the plan, like many involving the Prince Palatine, fell apart. Instead Melander undertook diplomatic missions on Neuburg's behalf both to The Hague, to confer with the French, and to the imperial court at Vienna. While at Vienna in October 1641, he encouraged the emperor's attempts to woo him with advancements and titles. Two months later he would be granted, along with his brother Jacob and Jacob's two sons, the title of hereditary count of the empire.¹⁵

But while Melander, like Achilles in his tent, was still sulking at Düsseldorf in the summer of 1640, demanding full back pay from the landgravine (which would not be forthcoming), the rest of the Hessian army was suffering, along with pretty much everyone else, through an entirely unproductive campaign season. As the months passed the various armies, beset by bad weather and cold and struggling to find sufficient provisions for man and beast, moved through a series of miserable advances and retreats across northern Germany. Hesse-Cassel itself saw considerable through-passage of troops throughout the summer, with imperial forces approaching the city of Cassel several times and other skirmishes damaging the Hessian-controlled territory of Waldeck. The foreign occupation eased by October, but the landgravine then had to diffuse a situation with the commander of her troops in East Frisia, Duke Friedrich of Württemberg-Neuenstadt, who was refusing to recognize Count Eberstein's authority over him and his troops. This required her to travel herself to Groningen to demand his obedience. She had greater military success toward the end of the year, when, thanks partially to a deal negotiated in September with Wolfgang Wilhelm of Neuburg, her troops entered into the duchy of Cleves, which he claimed. Only a few days later these men, led by Eberstein and Colonel Karl von Rabenhaupt, managed to take a number of areas on the left bank of the Rhine, including the fortress of Kalkar. The Hessians then began frantically reinforcing this major outpost against an expected attack from General Lamboy and the Spanish in nearby Jülich. They also feared the opposition of the imperial general Hatzfeldt, who brought additional reinforcements into the area at the end of the year, helping himself to a large number of its cities. Meanwhile, her diplomats at The Hague, Krosigk and Joachim de Wicquefort, made a simultaneous, though in the end futile, effort to gain promised military assistance from the Dutch States General for preservation of this territory. Still, her efforts in Kalkar gave her an important bulwark on the left bank of the Rhine, which she would expand on over the course of the next season. She would also use this occupation to force the duke of Neuburg to agree to a regular annual payment of 36,000 Reichsthalers for his holdings in the duchy of Jülich and a further 24,000 for Berg. Though she constantly assured him that she took only what was absolutely required for the maintenance of her troops, and then only out of necessity, it seems possible that her enmity for Melander spilled over a bit onto Melander's friend.¹⁶

The imperial Diet, which Ferdinand III had called in early 1640, was scheduled to open in Regensburg on 26 July 1640 but only began, after the usual numerous delays, on 13 September. As the emperor had hoped, the delegates of the princes and cities quickly showed themselves more tractable than the electors, and bowed to his demand that negotiations take the Peace of Prague as their starting point. For his part, Ferdinand expressed himself willing to bend for the sake of peace within the empire, a magnanimity that was partly due to his concerns about the independent noises coming from the princes, but also encouraged by an increasingly poor military situation toward the end of 1640. For in addition to his own setbacks, the Spanish Habsburgs (his cousins, allies, and major financial backers) seemed suddenly to be imploding, with a revolt in Catalonia in October followed quickly by another in Portugal. Thus with both the princes and the emperor ready to deal, the Diet looked to Ferdinand like it might produce some good effects.¹⁷

Yet while an imperial Diet technically should include all the eligible princes and estates of the empire, a handful—those who were open enemies of the empire or who had still refused to accept the Peace of Prague—had not been invited to Regensburg. This group included not only Amalia Elisabeth and her allies, the dukes of Brunswick-Lüneburg, but also the heirs of the Prince Palatine, the imprisoned (since 1635) elector of Trier, the margrave of Baden-Durlach, and a number of Protestant administrators of ecclesiastical territories claimed by the Catholic Church by virtue of the Edict of Restitution. The problem of unreconciled estates had been a serious issue for the electoral Diet, but was an even larger concern now, as Amalia Elisabeth and Georg of Brunswick-Lüneburg (the only two of these estates with functioning independent armies) had, as of mid-May, joined their forces with those of the French and Swedes. This was something the emperor and his supporters had desperately hoped to avoid, as it had tilted the balance of the war markedly against them. The elector of Bavaria, in particular, had become increasingly concerned about the new military situation, and was worried about the growing inability of the war-torn countryside to support and supply his and the other imperial forces. Given the difficulties they would face in continuing a war for additional months and years, he argued, some kind of accommodation was absolutely necessary to bring the Hessian and Brunswick armies over to the imperial side and so force the foreign crowns to a speedy resolution.¹⁸

This was exactly the result Amalia Elisabeth had hoped to get from her alliance with the foreign powers, and she pushed her advantage further by appealing directly to the other Protestant estates of the empire, arguing that the admittance of Hesse-Cassel and Brunswick-Lüneburg to the Diet would be to the benefit of both the Protestant religion and the German liberties. Indeed, the excluded estates were all Protestant, which gave an enormous advantage to the Catholics at the Diet and allowed them to set the tone of the proceedings and dominate all votes through majority rule. Therefore with the support of Bavaria, the Protestants, and others, in October the Diet voted to send safe-conducts for Hessian and Brunswick representatives to travel safely to Regensburg, though they would still be excluded both from attending the actual sessions and from voting on any agreement. Seizing this small but significant opening, she quickly dispatched Reinhard Scheffer and Johann Vultejus. Their orders were to coordinate their diplomatic strategy and actions with the representatives of the duke of Brunswick-Lüneburg, a delegation led by the duke's secret councilor, the great constitutional theorist and lawyer Jacob Lampadius, whose conception of the empire as fundamentally aristocratic resonated strongly with the landgravine and her councilors.¹⁹

The first goal of the Hessian delegates was to ensure that both Hesse-Cassel and Brunswick-Lüneburg received a vote and seat at the negotiating table. Thereafter, they were instructed to argue that the alliance with the foreign crowns was a purely defensive act, that Hesse-Cassel and Brunswick-Lüneburg now had a unique ability to use their influence with the foreign crowns to further European peace, and that the landgravine desired only to conserve the empire and further the liberties of the estates (*libertate statuum*). This horrible and devastating war, they should argue, was a result of the emperor's efforts to undermine the very nature of the empire. All princes had a right to make war and peace and to form alliances, so the imperial Diet, not the emperor and electors alone, should have the final say for all major issues and diplomatic negotiations. Indeed, without the princes' inclusion no peace could possibly be legally binding. Furthermore, the imperial constitution and legal structure demanded equal rights and privileges for all imperial estates without exclusion or exception. The failure of the emperor and electors to obey this fundamental and ancient principle, she claimed, and their efforts to injure or debauch the German liberties, had damaged the integrity of the empire and "caused an extremely harmful division and dangerous rift" among its

members. To resolve this problem, the empire must be reestablished firmly on its ancient aristocratic base. The emperor and electors must be stripped of their special powers and privileges (for they were merely estates of the empire like all others), and all power must revert into the hands of the collected estates. To accomplish this, there must first (echoing her demand to the electors) be a general amnesty and restitution for all estates of the empire—including the Prince Palatine—back to 1618; not, as at Prague, to 1627 or 1630. Indeed, the entire Peace of Prague should be dissolved. In addition, any resolution of this great war must include not only every imperial estate, but also the foreign powers of Sweden and France. In this way the peace reached would be universal, not merely imperial. These first points were so important, the instructions stated, that without them there was “no hope for a lasting peace, nor could the Holy Roman Empire regain its integrity.” This idea of the empire as an aristocracy was not new, of course, but had long been espoused by others, especially the Electors Palatine. The Hessian and Brunswick vision of an aristocratic empire was even more radical, however, for as nonelectors they advocated an even broader sovereignty—one where the Electoral College would be diminished or even eliminated in favor of a wider aristocracy of all imperial princes and estates.²⁰

Back in Cassel, on 1 November the landgravine called for another meeting of her estates, which then assembled on November 20. Her first concern was with the maintenance of the garrisons in Hessian fortresses, which were unable to support themselves locally and seemed to be turning to brigandage and theft. This she had tried to prevent with new stricter jail sentences and the establishment of neighborhood watches, but this was not the best solution. She was also concerned about the costs of sending the delegation to Regensburg, and asked the estates to supply the necessary funding. They were not cooperative in either case, demanding instead the reduction of the garrisons and the raising of all funds from contributions on occupied territories, such as the bishopric of Paderborn. Unsatisfied, she dismissed them. They continued to assemble for another two days, however, and on 24 November presented a list of grievances in which they demanded to be informed of, and consulted on, all future and current matters relating to the well-being of Hesse-Cassel, “especially as entering into war, or making alliances or peace, or any other important matter that concerns land and people, should not belong to some few, but the entire body of the estates.” She was furious at this impertinence, and

on 8 December chided the estates for their unseemly presumption and “sharp words.” Then, as if to demonstrate her scorn for their insistence on consultation, she began to put into motion a plan to take advantage of a new diplomatic opportunity that had at that very moment presented itself. With the death of its last direct male heir, Otto V, the county of Schaumburg was now to be divided, according to older inheritance treaties, among Hesse-Cassel, Brunswick-Lüneburg, and the counts of Lippe. She eagerly seized her portion and unified its people with Hesse-Cassel through a formal oath of allegiance. She named the celebrated Latin poet Christian Bockelmann as her superintendent, and allowed the widow of the former ruler, Prince Ernst von Holstein-Schaumburg, to continue to hold the city of Stadthagen for her lifetime, but made her pay a lump sum of 100,000 Reichsthalers and an annual fee of another 2500 Reichsthalers for the privilege. The landgravine thus, without firing a shot, enlarged her children’s inheritance.²¹

On 15 January 1641 the delegates of the landgravine and Brunswick-Lüneburg got their first chance to address a special committee of the Regensburg Diet, convened under the leadership of the vice chancellor of the elector of Mainz, and negotiations continued through the spring and summer and dragged on into the autumn. The disagreements were serious, and although there was some talk of extending amnesty and restitution for all princes based on the model of the Peace of Prague, this was still conditional, as the Hessians and other currently excluded states would only be pardoned if they actively joined the battle against the French and Swedes. Amnesty for the Prince Palatine was a bigger problem. The lands and electoral title claimed by Friedrich’s heir, Karl Ludwig, remained firmly in the hands of the duke of Bavaria, who was not about to give them up and who demanded that this issue be entirely off the table. Stubborn Hessian and Brunswick support for the Prince Palatine’s full restoration merely earned them the duke’s enmity. The landgravine’s demand for the inclusion in the Regensburg negotiations of her powerful foreign allies, the French and Swedes, was just as contentious and had been rejected by the emperor out of hand even before the Diet began, as he very much preferred to sort out the internal problems of the empire before turning, with a united front, to deal with the foreign crowns. The French and Swedes, on the contrary, had a great interest in keeping the emperor’s bargaining position weak, so they encouraged the Hessians’ futile insistence on this point. The foreign crowns were so desperate to disrupt the

Diet that in January 1641 General Banér suddenly arrived with his army and attempted to cross the frozen Danube River and overrun the city. The emperor's forces managed a vigorous defense, which earned him the temporary admiration of the collected estates, but it was the fortuitous breakup of the river's ice that defeated Banér's surprise attack and saved the Diet from external disruption.²²

Internal disruption was another matter. That the terms proposed by the Diet were insufficient for the landgravine was to be expected, but a new and more serious challenge to the emperor's control of the assembly now arose from the Brandenburg delegation. In 1635 the Brandenburg elector, Georg Wilhelm, had allowed himself to be bullied into signing the Peace of Prague, accepting the emperor's assurances regarding his lands and his Calvinist religion. Over the subsequent years he had then seen his territories devastated by imperial and Swedish forces and Pomerania lost to Swedish control. In December 1640 he died and was succeeded by his twenty-year old son, Friedrich Wilhelm, who judged the situation with new eyes (and new advisors after the death of the influential councilor Count Schwarzenberg), and now radically shifted Brandenburg's foreign policy. He directed his delegates at the Diet to declare the Peace of Prague an invalid basis for its resolutions, make common ground with the Hessians by demanding an amnesty back to the beginning of the war, and insist on the elimination of the word "unaltered" before all uses of the phrase "Augsburg Confession" in the Diet proceedings. Furthermore, he argued that the domination of the Diet by Catholics meant that Protestant complaints were not being, and indeed could not be, satisfied. Only a full universal peace congress that included the French, but especially the Protestant Swedes, could come to an equitable resolution.²³

Friedrich Wilhelm's arguments against the emperor were, like the Hessian ones, supported by the work of such political theorists as Jean Bodin and even Johannes Althusius, but were also reinforced, perhaps not coincidentally, by the 1640 publication of a pamphlet (pseudonymously written by the Swedish historian Bogislav Philipp von Chemnitz) titled *Dissertatio de ratione status in Imperio nostro Romano-Germanico*. This work, which seems to have circulated among the princes and their delegates at Regensburg, argued that all power within the empire rested with the many imperial estates, not with the emperor, and that the empire was fundamentally an aristocratic body, not a monarchy. Far from protecting the integrity of the empire, therefore, Ferdinand's attempt to wield absolute power had

led to imperial weakness and degeneracy. This was all Amalia Elisabeth's argument exactly! The abrupt shift in the policies of the Brandenburg delegation made it clear that Friedrich Wilhelm's defection from the imperial side was imminent, but there was little Ferdinand could do to stop it.²⁴

As long as there was hope that she might gain satisfaction from the imperial Diet, the landgravine, to Ambassador Wolff's great annoyance, continued to stall the Swedes, insisting that they finalize their alliance with the French before she would agree to a firmer relationship with them. French-Swedish negotiations on this matter continued in Hamburg through the spring, attended by a Hessian delegation under the supervision of her resident there, Christoph Deichmann, but without significant progress. In May 1641, however, the Swedish general Banér died, temporarily putting their entire military project in question and leaving the Swedish army mutinous and in danger of total collapse. In response to an uncertain situation, the Swedes began secret talks for a separate treaty with the emperor, who was now willing to offer Oxenstierna all of Pomerania in return for peace. The French negotiators at Hamburg, led by Claude d'Avaux, were fully aware of the new diplomatic discussions between Ferdinand and Oxenstierna and, desperate to retain the Swedes, considerably upped their annual subsidy offer, which finally had the desired result. On 30 June the French and Swedes agreed to the Treaty of Hamburg, which formally renewed their alliance until the end of the war and committed both to keep fighting until both crowns were satisfied.²⁵

The spring of 1641 also saw considerable changes for the Hessian military and diplomatic effort, for in April Amalia Elisabeth's close ally Georg of Brunswick-Lüneburg had died and been replaced as head of the family by his cousin, Duke August of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel. Where Duke Georg had supported her strategic initiatives, Duke August was less enthusiastic. He soon made it clear that he would be willing to make a separate peace with the emperor in return for the restoration of the imperially held fortress of Wolfenbüttel and a guarantee that Brunswick-Lüneburg would be spared imperial occupation and granted neutrality. These negotiations began soon after Georg's death, but took on more urgency as the Welf territories were again ravaged by major troop movements from both sides and a bruising battle at the end of June outside Wolfenbüttel between the Swedes under Gustav Wrangel (joined by the troops of Eberstein and other allies) and the imperial army under Piccolomini and Archduke Leopold Wilhelm. This was a victory on paper for the allies, but it did little to

win the heart of Duke August, who continued his talks with the imperialists in the city of Goslar. Nothing could have pleased the emperor more. He told Archduke Leopold Wilhelm, who was involved in negotiations with von Klitzing and other leading Brunswick officers to gain their troops, that the “continuing dissension among the enemies” was “a gift of God.”²⁶

The Hessians were not only distracted by the imperial advance into the Welf territories and the ongoing negotiations at Goslar—to which Amalia Elisabeth sent Günderode and Vultejus, attempting to monitor the talks and if possible take part in any advantageous deal her ally reached with the emperor—but also were facing a major challenge to their control of areas along the Rhine. In July, the imperial General Hatzfeldt moved a large force of twelve thousand men to near Dorsten, where Amalia Elisabeth had lived for most of 1639. Originally an area belonging to the elector of Cologne, Dorsten had been part of the Swedish donation to Wilhelm V, who had occupied it in 1633 and strengthened it into a powerful fortress. Dorsten was strategically significant, as its position on the Lippe River secured one of the principal paths into Holland and made it the most important Hessian fortress on the right bank of the Rhine. It was also a major source of military funding for the landgravine; she was at this point drawing as much as 20,000 Reichsthalers a month from the area in contributions. Johann von Geysso, the commander there, struggled for months under Hatzfeldt’s siege and bombardment of the fortress from all sides, while Amalia Elisabeth begged her allies for assistance; but the battered allied forces were unwilling to leave their entrenchments outside Wolfenbüttel, and by the time Eberstein, reinforced by three thousand Swedes and Bernhardines, finally came to the relief of Geysso, it was too late. On 19 September, the Hessian garrison was forced to surrender, thus depriving her of an important bulwark in her control of this territory. The loss of Dorsten was followed in October by the surprise of six companies of Hessian cavalry at Alpen and then botched initiatives by the Hessian colonels Rabenhaupt and St. André at Kaiserswerth on the Rhine and at Hamm on the Lippe. Eberstein and the bulk of the army, meanwhile, retreated to the Rhine and the duchy of Cleves. There he settled outside the city of Wesel, hoping that his five thousand men and sixteen large cannons might discourage Wahl and the imperialists from trying to enter the neighboring Hessian-controlled territory of Münster. Yet with winter coming and the supply situation desperate, the landgravine’s forces were now in extremely bad shape.²⁷

Her support for Brandenburg, meanwhile, but especially for the Palatine cause, had so soured the duke of Bavaria that he had begun to campaign for her delegates' exclusion from the proceedings at Regensburg. This had given the emperor all the cover he needed, and on 23 August 1641 his officials had ordered the Hessian and Lüneburg delegates expelled from the Diet and the city. Unbeknownst to the emperor, however, the Diet was already ruined, for Friedrich Wilhelm, after secret negotiations, had agreed to a truce with the Swedes in July 1641. Before finally dissolving in October, however, the Diet did manage to achieve three important results, announced in its final pronouncement or recess. First, the Diet proclaimed a general amnesty for all estates willing to reconcile with the empire on the terms discussed earlier. Yet political considerations meant this amnesty was flawed by a caveat known as the effective suspension (*effectus suspensivus*). By this rule, all reconciled estates would be granted restitution of their ecclesiastical territories on the basis of the 1627 normal year, but since the remaining unreconciled estates were primarily Protestant, and since many of their lands were currently held by Catholic supporters of the emperor, this restitution and amnesty would not take effect until *all* imperial estates had come to peace. In other words, Protestant territorial restoration would not happen until the war in the empire was over. The second achievement of the Diet was to set up new, more limited negotiations to continue the work begun at Regensburg. This meeting, a *Deputationstag* or Deputations Diet, was scheduled to open in May 1642 at Frankfurt, though in the end it was delayed until February 1643. Third, the Diet voted to agree to support new international peace talks in the two Westphalian cities of Münster and Osnabrück. These talks, planned to begin on 25 March 1642, would deal with the international problems of the war and thus would include representatives of the Swedes, the French, the emperor, and the electors. Yet, significantly, the Diet suggested that the negotiations also allow "each and every imperial prince" to send delegates. This was an extraordinary decree, which, though it abandoned the usual constitutional concept of a Diet of three imperial colleges (the electors, princes, and cities), came close to accepting the universal inclusion of all estates in imperial foreign policy, as demanded by Hesse-Cassel and Brunswick-Lüneburg.²⁸

A philosophical agreement by the Diet for the Hessian position was lovely, but in practice it did nothing to constrain the emperor. It also did nothing to bolster the dangerously exposed Hessian military position or

to improve the landgravine's ability to feed her troops. And now the weakness of her war effort began seriously to alarm the French. La Thuillierie, a French agent at The Hague, warned Richelieu that he feared "affairs will get worse in Germany." The landgravine's councilors were "in a state of torment" over the military situation, he wrote, which might well lead her to consider the terms offered her at Goslar by Archduke Leopold Wilhelm. Indeed, the report of her agent there, Vultejus, indicated his enormous concern about the state of affairs, which he repeatedly described as "an emergency." In November, in a private letter to Krosigk, who was fast becoming one of her more trusted councilors, Amalia Elisabeth admitted that she was not sure she would be able to keep fighting.²⁹



Amalia Elisabeth as a young woman, by Christian Gottlieb Geysler.
(Stadtbibliothek Trier)



Amalia Elisabeth's portrait for the Peace of Westphalia, around 1650–1654, by Pieter de Jode after Anselm van Hulle, in *Pacificatores Orbis Christiani*, 1697.

(LWL-Landesmuseum für Kunst und Kulturgeschichte, Münster/Carmen Hickstein)



Landgrave Wilhelm V of Hesse-Cassel, 1633, copy after Friedrich van Hulsen (Hulsius).

(LWL-Landesmuseum für Kunst und Kulturgeschichte, Münster/Sabine Ahlbrand-Dornseif)



Landgrave Georg II of Hesse-Darmstadt in front of Marburg, around 1645, by Peter Troschel.

(Bildarchiv Foto Marburg/Art Resource, NY)



Ferdinand III, Holy Roman Emperor, around 1650–1655, copy after Anselm van Hulle, in *Pacificatores Orbis Christiani*, 1697.

(LWL-Landesmuseum für Kunst und Kulturgeschichte, Münster/Carmen Hickstein)



Reinhard Scheffer, 1649, by Conrad Woumans after Anselm van Hulle.
(LWL-Landesmuseum für Kunst und Kulturgeschichte, Münster/Carmen Hickstein)




Johannes Vulteius, by Matthäus Merian, in *Theatrum Europaeum*, vol. 6, 1663.
(Universitätsbibliothek Augsburg)




ADOLPHVS GVILIELMVS À CROSIEG,
*Illustriſſimæ Landgraviæ Haſſo-Caſſelanae à Conſiſ
Interioribus, eiuſdemque ad Tractatus Pacis Vni:
verſalis Monafterij Legatus Plenipotentiarius, &c.*

Adolf Wilhelm von Krosigk, by Matthäus Merian, in *Theatrum Europaeum*,
vol. 6, 1663.

(Universitätsbibliothek Augsburg)



Hessian surprise attack against the forces of the duke of Lorraine, April 1644, by Matthäus Merian, in *Theatrum Europaeum*, vol. 5, 1651.
(Universitätsbibliothek Augsburg)



The siege and retaking of Homberg by Colonel Rabenhaupt, 1648, by Matthäus Merian, in *Theatrum Europaeum*, vol. 6, 1663.

(Universitätsbibliothek Augsburg)

Chapter 8

A Manly Resolve

THE POOR STATE of Germany, the shortage of men available to levy into armies, the insufficiency of supplies for men and beasts, and the endless back-and-forth of never-ending war in which no one side ever seemed to gain a decisive advantage, were dragging on all concerned. Since 1639, representatives of the Swedes and French had been meeting with the imperialists in the cities of Cologne and Hamburg, where they had long struggled to find some general solution to the international aspect of war. After an enormous amount of wrangling, by 1641 this had finally yielded a general agreement on the forming of a peace congress, the choice of venue, and a general framework for negotiations. To speed the resolution of the different issues involved, the negotiations would be split in two. The French would meet with the emperor in the Catholic Westphalian city of Münster; the Swedes would meet with the emperor approximately thirty miles away in Lutheran Osnabrück. Both cities would be declared neutral zones for the duration of the negotiations. All this the Regensburg Diet had ratified in October 1641, and soon afterward, on 25 December 1641, the diplomatic representatives of the emperor and the foreign crowns at Hamburg also gave their approval. The planned international peace congress was initially set to begin on 25 March 1642, but the emperor would delay his actual ratification of the Hamburg preliminary agreement until July of that year, hoping for a military advantage to change his diplomatic position. What with this and other delays, the start date for the talks, which

now were also to include both Spain and the United Provinces, was eventually moved to 11 July 1643. A major victory for the Hessians was their inclusion in the Hamburg agreement as a “warring party” and ally of the foreign crowns. This gave the landgravine, along with the few other named German princes (including the duke of Brunswick-Lüneburg, the Prince Palatine and his brother, and the elector of Trier) a right to attend the congress, though what was meant by “attend” was still not at all clear.¹

As 1642 was about to dawn, therefore, the situation in the empire was still uncertain, and much depended on the upcoming peace congress, for which the major parties were already choosing their plenipotentiaries and drafting their initial diplomatic instructions. After the discouraging setbacks in late 1641, Eberstein had attempted to reinvigorate the Hessian army and with concerted recruiting had managed to bring together a reasonable acting force of seven thousand men, ready for a new offense along the Rhine. Conditions and morale were so low in the Hessian army, however, that massive desertions soon reduced these numbers by half. Since some of the troops had been pressed into service unwillingly, with the Hessian officers along the Lower Rhine behaving, in the words of one local official, “no different from the Turks on the borders of Christendom,” this is not particularly surprising. The grim outlook, should the imperialists decide to focus their rage on Hesse itself or the landgravine prove incapable of successful military action, was also discouraging to senior officers, who sounded out other armies for more secure positions.²

Despite her fears and misgivings, however, Amalia Elisabeth was not giving up. Following months of negotiations, the Hessians and French had decided to attempt a major new push along the Lower Rhine, hoping thereby to stabilize the allied control of the area and keep her forces from falling apart. In late December, therefore, Eberstein took his now rather meager three thousand men to join the troops of the French general Guébriant, who had arrived with a few thousand men earlier that month—also a rather pathetic showing for the French Army of Germany, and again an indication of the great difficulties generals in these times faced in their recruiting and provisioning of troops. To avoid the kinds of problems earlier conjunctions had faced, the two generals agreed to swap supreme leadership every four days. That resolved, however, the troops were forced to linger on the right bank of the Rhine, waiting impatiently for the Dutch to construct a bridge of lashed-together ships to get men, horses, and cannons across the water.³

Finally, on 12–13 January, the combined Franco-Hessian army, reinforced by the remaining Bernhardines, crossed over to the left bank of the Rhine into the electorate of Cologne. There they took the city of Uerdingen, and on 17 January fielded a successful attack on the imperial-Cologne army under Lamboy outside Kempen. This victory won Guébriant a promotion to marshal of France, and dramatically improved the Hessian situation along the left bank of the Rhine in newly occupied areas of Cleves, Berg, and Jülich. It also gave Eberstein's troops, and those of the French, significant new sources of food and supplies, which they greedily and indiscriminately extracted by force from the local peasantry and burghers. The Hessian army also gained new recruits, as hundreds of defeated soldiers quickly swapped to the side and pay of the victors.⁴

While Eberstein and Guébriant were advancing into Cologne, the emperor was once again missing a prime diplomatic opportunity at Goslar. He was simply not willing to grant the landgravine enough to make her come to terms; his negotiators demanded not only that she conform herself to the terms of the Peace of Prague, but also that she return all of her territorial conquests, including the diocese of Hersfeld. She, on the contrary, continued to insist on the return of the Marburg inheritance and religious security not just for Hesse-Cassel, but also for other Reformed territories. Duke August of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel was not as stubborn, however, and in January 1642, on behalf of himself and the other Welf dukes, he came to an agreement with the emperor. With this deal, the Peace of Goslar, the dukes agreed to renounce their foreign alliances, drop all hostile acts against the empire, contribute financially to the imperial defense, and cede Hildesheim to the elector of Cologne. In return, they would regain Wolfenbüttel and be welcomed into the Peace of Prague and the general amnesty. Although the Brunswick troops were to be disbanded and not joined to the imperial army, the loss of these men and the new neutrality of the key strategic Brunswick territories in Lower Saxony were huge blows to the landgravine. The emperor had managed to separate her from her closest German ally, and now had the ability to move his armies right to her borders unhindered. This, according to Vultejus's report back to Cassel, had been the emperor's precise intention all along.⁵

Meanwhile, the pressures on the landgravine from home were continuing. Even many in her own council and government had opposed her re-entry into the war, and this philosophical difference had only been exacerbated by her clear intention not to share power. Not only had she made

the Treaty of Dorsten with the French without the approval of her supposed coregents and regency council, but she had also failed to consult them when signing the March 1640 agreement to recognize the treaty and begin military operations. The subsequent loss of Melander and the return of war to the Hessian countryside had only enhanced the bitterness of those who resented her policies and despised what they saw as her political heavy-handedness. Corruption within her government was also a problem, forcing her to bring to trial a number of her finance ministers. The tenseness of the situation in Cassel can be seen in a fragment of a letter by Colonel Hans Heinrich von Günderode, who argued that she had lost the support of the entire population and her own councilors, and that as a mere regent she lacked the strength to keep control of the situation. Only “an absolute lord” could still, perhaps, salvage the situation. Given such opposition from her subjects, along with the difficulty she faced in maintaining a war effort, she once again began negotiations with the imperialists. These took place at Hildesheim and Brunswick, and were moderated by the dukes of Brunswick-Lüneburg. Announcing her own preference for an honorable peace or at least an armed neutrality, she asked her councilors and military advisors to consider seriously all the pros and cons of making a separate peace with the emperor, even given his refusal to move beyond the religious terms he had agreed to earlier at Mainz.⁶

All of this horrified her allies, of course, especially as she let them know, through Krosigk at The Hague, exactly what she was doing. This was typical of her, but was also a way of indicating her displeasure with the continuing failure of the French to pay her as much as she wanted when she wanted, including the promised subsidies and pensions. Tension between the allies was also heightened by the continuous squabbling between their generals over the spoils of war. For the Hessians, who lacked the massive tax base of the French crown, every town and territory under their control meant provisions, contributions, military pay, and a continuation of the war, so every piece of territory was worth fighting for, even if it meant alienating their friends. Thus Eberstein demanded Hessian garrisoning of newly captured towns along the left side of the Rhine, including Kempen, Düren, and Neuss, which served as the allies’ principal headquarters on the Lower Rhine. He also quarreled with Guébriant over the proper division of contributions, for he claimed the French were simply seizing everything for themselves, leaving nothing for the Hessians. Krosigk, sent to resolve these issues, tried to organize an equal distribution, yet Guébriant refused to

yield to the Hessian offers. There were also disagreements between the two sides over religion, as Eberstein, a staunch Calvinist, was allowing his troops to celebrate the Reformed communion in the Catholic basilica of St. Quirin at Neuss, which drew outraged protests not only from Guébriant, but also from the papacy and the Spanish. The Hessians' occupation of this area earned them extraordinary complaints from the Catholic duke of Neuburg as well, who demanded they respect his neutrality and reduce extracted contributions. Piling on, the Dutch States General issued formal protests over the tax imposed by the Hessians on the Rhine city of Uerdingen, which they complained was damaging to regional trade. She did what she could to resolve these issues, instructing Krosigk to negotiate at The Hague with la Thuillerie and to arrange with the Dutch for additional provisions for her troops. But all in all, the Hessians were extraordinarily lucky that the imperial forces under Hatzfeldt were in even worse shape than they were. Although Hatzfeldt was reinforced by troops from Wahl and then in August from cavalry regiments under Jan von Werth, with no provisions and no money he was entirely unable to take advantage of the landgravine's weakness or the disarray of the allies.⁷

Indeed, by September 1642, it was no longer possible for the allies to ignore the inability of so many armies to subsist in the area over the winter. In return for the use of twenty-four companies of cavalry and a thousand musketeers of Eberstein's men, Guébriant moved his forces eastward across the Rhine toward quarters in Franconia, taking the opportunity to pass through Brunswick to try to intimidate the dukes into rejoining the allied side. The departure of the French left Amalia Elisabeth's forces vulnerable, but Hatzfeldt was still stymied by a total lack of supplies. As he could expect no assistance from the imperial court, which was at that very moment dealing with its own problems, in October he too moved out, leaving nine regiments with von Werth in order to deny the landgravine sole mastery of the area. The main focus of the war, to her great relief, had shifted to the south, where the Swedish army, now under the supreme command of Lennart Torstenson (and accompanied by two Hessian cavalry regiments, one led by her brother-in-law, Fritz), had again advanced deep into Habsburg hereditary lands, taking Silesia and Moravia and coming within a few miles of Vienna itself. After taking the fortress of Olmütz, Torstenson moved on into Saxony, where he besieged Leipzig. There, on 2 November, his army met the imperialists under Archduke Leopold Wilhelm and General Ottavio Piccolomini at Breitenfeld. On

the same field where Gustavus Adolphus had crushed the imperialists in 1631, the Swedes were once again triumphant. The imperialists lost their baggage train, numerous cannon, and almost ten thousand men captured, wounded, or killed. Soon thereafter Leipzig surrendered to the Swedes. This great victory gave the allies some hopes that the tide had turned in their direction once again, and helped push the emperor and his Spanish cousins into more serious preparation for the upcoming Westphalian peace congress.⁸

Yet Torstenson had expended so much of his resources that he was unable to follow up on his victory. Rather than attempt another joint Franco-Suedo-Hessian operation, however, since that had clearly been a disaster, the Swedes hoped to return to the earlier division of labor among the allied forces. At Cassel, Ambassador Wolff explained the new strategy for the 1643 campaign. If her troops, in conjunction with the French Army of Germany, would keep Hatzfeldt and Wahl busy enough in Westphalia and along the Rhine, the Swedes would have a free hand in the Habsburg hereditary lands. She agreed, but after two years of expensive and difficult war, her intention was now to do only the bare minimum. Meanwhile she would consolidate and perhaps even extend her existing territorial holdings, rebuild her tattered forces and strained resources, and gather her strength. A powerful ruler who controlled large portions of the empire was someone people would have to consider, and whose interests could not be dismissed at the upcoming peace congress. Hesse-Cassel was not the only state attempting to disentangle from the war at this point, of course. Others, such as the bishop of Bamberg and Würzburg, had followed the example of the elector of Brandenburg in 1641 and had made deals with the Swedes—getting a recognition of neutrality in return for the payment of regular contributions, just as the Brunswick dukes were doing with the emperor. The duke of Neuburg, too, was managing to maintain his feeble neutrality by allowing recruiting by both sides in his lands and paying contributions to whomever he had to. But paying protection money was something the German princes had been doing since the beginning of the war. Stuck between the big players, the lesser princes and cities had often had no other choice if they wanted to survive.⁹

Amalia Elisabeth, however, had something that many of the smaller or weaker powers did not: enormous territorial holdings and an army to match—at least on paper, as most of her troops were tied up in garrisons in the occupied lands. She was also the only remaining German prince at

war with the emperor and allied with the foreign crowns. Her situation was thus extraordinarily dangerous, and one that would require all of her vaunted dexterity and flexibility. Her strategy was now threefold. First, she would continue negotiations with the imperialists under the auspices of the Brunswick dukes. After all, if she could forge a similar agreement that allowed her to remain neutral, she might yet be able to survive the war. Second, from the French she would demand not only the as yet unpaid subsidies they owed her, but also increased financial support. Through von Polhelm, her resident in Paris, she stressed to the French the desperate state of her lands and the great poverty of her troops, who received no pay and thus tended to desert; without further assistance, including funds for new recruiting and supplies, matters would disintegrate rapidly. Given the vast amounts being spent by the French for their ongoing campaigns in Italy and Spain, such payments would be difficult; still, d’Avaux was worried enough that he suggested the king offer her something extra in the hope that it would encourage her to end the Brunswick negotiations. Yet although a special payment of 60,000 Reichsthalers was granted her in mid-September, in December, according to the French agent la Thuillierie, Krosigk was again demanding “great sums of money for the losses suffered by her this last campaign.” She also insisted that the French cede her Kempen, which would allow her a more thorough control of her territories along the Lower Rhine and, more important, the ability to extract contributions from the surrounding areas. To make her case more forcefully, she directed Krosigk to join von Polhelm in Paris, where he could issue these demands in person at the French court and encourage a more prompt payment of the subsidies.¹⁰

And finally, the Swedes. In a letter to the Swedish court in December, she reminded Queen Christina of the territorial donations given to Wilhelm by Gustavus Adolphus (and confirmed by Christina and Oxenstierna in 1633), and asked that the crown now recognize her rights to all the territory between the Weser and the Rhine rivers, including Fulda, Paderborn, Corvey, Münster, Hersfeld, Osnabrück, Waldeck, Lippe, Grubenhagen, and the Wetterau. Given the length of the war and the wide (and ever-expanding) breadth of it across Germany, she wrote, her soldiers required these additional quarters. The need was extraordinarily great, she argued, for Hesse-Cassel itself had been repeatedly burnt, plundered, and occupied by not only the imperialists but also, after the death of her husband, the Swedes, the French, the Bernhardines, Georg of Brunswick-Lüneburg, and

even her own troops. Furthermore, over the last two campaign seasons, French regiments had stripped bare her quarters in the diocese of Münster, and the loss there of Dorsten meant she could no longer enforce the payment of contributions from the countryside. Not that the people could even afford to pay contributions, she added, since the territory along the Rhine was now so devastated by war that it could barely provide basic survival rations for the troops in the garrisons, let alone furnish additional provisions or munitions, or allow for the necessary new fortifications. In Westphalia, she went on, the imperial forces were raising their demand for contributions so high that the ordinary people were fleeing, leaving nothing for her men. As for East Frisia, she was unable to extract more there without giving offense to the Dutch States General or the Prince of Orange. All this together, she told the Swedes, meant that she needed more land if she was to continue to maintain arms for the common cause.¹¹

The landgravine's concerns about East Frisia were not unfounded, for by the end of 1642 her control there was being increasingly challenged by the local Frisian estates and their count, the generally dissolute and ineffective Ulrich II. When the Hessians under Wilhelm V had first arrived, they had promised only to remain six months; it had now been over six years. The Frisian estates had long protested the ongoing extractions of the landgravine, far in excess of the initially agreed-on amount, and their anger was sharpened further at the beginning of the year when she refused to lessen their financial burdens despite the horrible flooding that had swept through the countryside. Count Ulrich, who had married the sister of Georg of Hesse-Darmstadt in 1631, was now spurred by his estates and by his wife to set aside his usual pleasures and take action. He thus appealed for assistance directly to the prince of Orange (to whose son he had recently married his daughter), demanding the removal of the landgravine's men from his lands. He also appealed to the States General, who, never entirely comfortable with her occupation of this territory right on their borders, responded to his urging by sending their agent, Mr. Lintelo, to Cassel to try to arrange a Hessian withdrawal. The landgravine greeted Lintelo politely, and agreed to halve the East Frisians' monthly contributions to only 6,500 Reichsthalers. As for an evacuation, she stated she could not possibly agree unless four preconditions were met: the county must be secured against any enemy occupation, her troops must be provided with another suitable territory to occupy, she must be paid a large sum as a sign of gratitude, and the whole plan must be approved by both

France and Sweden. This was all nonsense, of course. Not only were the terms impossible, but a withdrawal was entirely out of the question for her; the contributions and security she gained from the possession of East Frisia had been the backbone of her success to date. To ensure that the French backed her up, she asked their agent at her court, Beauregard, to ensure that the king express “some opposition” to any withdrawal. To make sure Ulrich faced disunity at home, she also courted a number of the leading Frisian nobles, granting them financial exemptions and military posts. This was classic Amalia Elisabeth. Publicly presenting herself as too weak and womanly to make such major decisions for herself, she then worked behind the scenes to ensure that she got her way.¹²

Back home in Cassel, meanwhile, the same horrible flooding that had hit East Frisia in January 1643 had also swept through the Hessian countryside, leading to widespread damages, even in the city of Cassel itself. Soon thereafter, in February, came the death of Amalia Elisabeth’s mother-in-law, Landgravine Juliane. The funeral was held in Cassel on 2 April, attended by officials and family members, including Juliane’s sons, the landgraves Hermann, Ernst, and Fritz. While at Cassel, the three brothers agreed on the continued oversight of their Rotenburg Quarter by Hermann, and named numerous new men to the quarter’s governing council, including a new secret council president from the von Polhelm family. But they made no trouble for Amalia Elisabeth. Also surprisingly easy for her to handle were the Hessian estates, whom she called in March to help manage the difficult financial state of the realm. Under her guidance, they agreed to an extraordinary tax to improve the damaged Cassel city walls and approved a six-year continuation of the drink tax. Of course the estates also took this opportunity to rehash their usual grievances against the landgravine’s policies, the Jews, taxes, and so on, but as there was little internal agreement, she was able to impose her will. The knights’ complaints about the continued persecution of Lutheranism, for example, were strongly countered by the much more Calvinist burghers and so were easily dismissed.¹³

But while Amalia Elisabeth was skillfully managing her domestic opposition, she was having increasing difficulty with Georg of Hesse-Darmstadt. Concerned that the turn in the war in favor of the foreign crowns might mean his claim to the Marburg inheritance could be undone at a general peace congress, Georg’s agents in Hamburg, Paris, and Stockholm had been vigorously soliciting both the French and the Swedes.

The efforts with the French were entirely useless, but the appeals to the Swedes had, at least initially, borne fruit, as Georg had received in August 1642 a letter of protection from the Swedish court for his university at Marburg, which, with the support of Georg's extraordinarily gifted uncle, the mathematician and linguist Landgrave Philipp III of Hesse-Butzbach, had become a home for exiled or refugee Lutheran academics and a center of Lutheran learning. The trick, however, was to get the Swedes to intervene in his favor in other ways. This was not too far-fetched a hope, for although Gustavus Adolphus had granted Amalia Elisabeth's husband numerous territories, his sympathy for the Lutheran Georg had meant that this donation had excluded Hesse-Marburg. Indeed, the king had even (against Wilhelm's protests) agreed to accept Georg's neutrality. Now, although Georg aggressively used his religious affiliation with the Swedes in order to earn their support, Oxenstierna refused to get involved in what he saw as a messy intra-Hessian dispute.¹⁴

The Swedes were thus not too great a concern for the landgravine, but the French were another matter. In December 1642 Cardinal Richelieu had died and been replaced as prime minister by his protégé, Cardinal Jules Mazarin, and soon afterward, on 14 May 1643, Richelieu was followed into the grave by Louis XIII. France now faced a regency government under Louis XIII's widow, Anne of Austria. For France's allies and enemies, this transition was of extraordinary interest: would the French government, now headed by a Habsburg queen regent (the sister of the king of Spain, no less!), shift French foreign policy to be more pro-Habsburg and thus once again change the face of the war? For Anne and Mazarin, whom she asked to stay on as her prime minister, the problem was more immediate: could they solidify their control over the French state? In this they were lucky, as only days after the death of the king, the young and inexperienced French general the duke d'Enghien defeated the Spanish army of General de Melo at Rocroi in the Spanish Netherlands. This fortuitous victory was a propaganda triumph for the new government, and it encouraged Mazarin to attempt even more in order to gain a stronger negotiating position for the imminent peace congress in Westphalia. The Hessians, who had been watching with trepidation as the events in Paris unfolded, were soon reassured, for it now seemed that both Anne and Mazarin were determined to guide French foreign policy in a direction entirely consistent with that of Richelieu. Mazarin also indicated to the Hessian agents at his court that the landgravine figured prominently in his

future plans for the empire. Some long-delayed French subsidy payments were released to the Hessian treasury, and Mazarin also ceded Amalia Elisabeth control of Kempen. Furthermore, once she and her officers agreed to allow the future entry of French soldiers into her quarters in Jülich and the electorate of Cologne, Mazarin also authorized the return to her of the troop contingents Guébriant had borrowed some months before.¹⁵

At Frankfurt am Main, meanwhile, the Deputations Diet had begun to meet in January 1643, and discussions had focused on a resolution of the internal problems of the empire, especially the question of the broken imperial court system, which was seen as a major hindrance to peace among the imperial estates. Here arguments centered on the Protestants' old demand for parity, which they defined as a mutual and reciprocal equality (*aequalitas mutual et reciproca*), and for an equal say in imperial institutions, including an equal number of judges for both faiths in both the Reichskammergericht and the Reichshofrat. Since the Diet was dominated by Catholics, however, their majority vote put an end to any hope for a resolution that would satisfy Protestants. The larger question of a Europe-wide peace was just as contentious, with the electors arguing that they were fully competent to represent the well-being of the entire empire at the Westphalian Congress, but the majority in the princely college advocating that they too, as a body, must be present and given full voting rights. In April the Swedes attempted to force the matter. Without prior consultation with the emperor, Salvius, the Swedish ambassador, sent all Protestant estates at the Diet an invitation to the congress. Echoing the landgravine's constitutional arguments, he argued that the emperor had "de facto usurped all *jura majestatis* [sovereign rights]. Such is the true path to absolute domination and the servitude of the estates," he continued, "the crowns [of France and Sweden] will accordingly block this. Their security rests on the liberty of the German estates." This invitation had little effect, however, as the emperor, correctly seeing this Swedish invitation as an attempt to break up the Diet and diminish his power, decreed that the invitation was invalid and the Diet must continue as it was. Talks staggered on for months, but though delegates tried to deal with the questions of amnesty, the Palatine situation, and various other religious and legal matters, the negotiations achieved nothing throughout 1643. Much of the problem was the continued dissension among the princes: Catholics hoped to delay any resolution of internal imperial matters until the

international peace was signed and the foreign powers out of the picture; Protestants hoped for the opposite. One thing most delegates could agree on, however, was their antagonism toward Amalia Elisabeth, and in May they composed a letter admonishing her. Her refusal to come to terms with the emperor and her continued alliance with the foreign crowns was, in their estimation, delaying the final peace in the empire. Furthermore, because of the *effectus suspensivus* approved by the Regensburg Diet (by which no reconciled imperial estate would gain final amnesty until all estates had made peace with the emperor), her stubbornness was hindering many other princes' full restitution. Though she attempted to defend herself as a peace-loving princess, she was clearly not winning any friends.¹⁶

But the landgravine's strategy by 1643 did not depend on her fellow princes; it depended on her influence with the foreign crowns, her territorial holdings, and her military might, which now presented her with a tempting prospect. With the emperor busy elsewhere, Georg was undefended, as he had practically no military forces of his own. She, however, was newly strengthened in Westphalia and along the Lower Rhine; the time might be right for her to take the initiative. But first she would avail herself of a new opportunity to increase her children's inheritance. The 1641 death of her young nephew Philipp Ludwig III in exile at The Hague had left the county of Hanau-Münzenberg without a direct male successor. Johann Ernst, a cousin from the related family of Hanau-Münzenberg-Schwarzenfels, had gained the title and lands, but after his death in January 1642 the county was then claimed by a much more distant relative, Friedrich Casimir, the underage count of Hanau-Lichtenberg. This was a strongly contested succession, for others, including the electors of Mainz and Saxony as well as Georg of Hesse-Darmstadt, also had some theoretical claim to the inheritance. Yet Amalia Elisabeth supported Friedrich Casimir's candidacy, and she had a unique influence: not only had she been born a countess of Hanau-Münzenberg, but she was also owed vast sums by its government for her earlier efforts on its behalf, including loans of over 40,000 Reichsthalers made to her mother, Katharina Belgica, for Hanau's defense. She now further strengthened her negotiating position by sending soldiers into the territory of Fulda, on the border of Hesse-Darmstadt, to discourage Landgrave Georg, while her allies, Guébriant and Königsmarck, moved additional troops into similar protective formations around Hanau. With this military and diplomatic support, Friedrich Casimir was able to seize the succession. In return, on 5 August 1643 he agreed to a new in-

heritance treaty. Should his direct male line die out, the county of Hanau-Münzenberg would be incorporated into Hesse-Cassel. Thus she had ensured that her childhood home would one day be absorbed within the Hessian fold. In the meantime (and this would, in the end, not occur until 1736) and as security for earlier loans, Hesse-Cassel would be granted the territories of Schwarzenfels and Naumburg. Friedrich Casimir, a Lutheran like all members of the house of Hanau-Lichtenberg, also had to guarantee the continued freedom of Calvinism, limiting the practice of the Lutheran communion to the court chapel alone.¹⁷

This resolved, Amalia Elisabeth now turned her focus again to Georg of Hesse-Darmstadt. Since 1642, both the imperialists under Wahl and the Swedes under Königsmarck had been using portions of the Hesse-Darmstadt-controlled upper principality of Hesse-Marburg as military quarters and a source of regular contributions. In October 1643, however, as Königsmarck moved out to meet Hatzfeldt, the landgravine, with the consent of both the Swedish and French courts, moved in. This was a widespread though small-scale invasion, with as many as twenty-eight companies under Colonel Geyso making the main push, another three companies under Major-General Ernst Albrecht von Eberstein (a Frankish relative of the Hessian lieutenant general) occupying Fritzlar, and further companies being sent into Grebenau, Lauterbach, Hersfeld, Waldeck, Salzkotten, and the area outside the city of Marburg. By November the Cassel troops had overrun major parts of the countryside and had taken fortified towns such as Frankenberg, Kirchhain, and Alsfeld, though they were unable to conquer the major fortresses, including Giessen. Colonel Geyso then demanded from the people of the upper principality the same contributions they had been paying the Swedes, but as the Swedes had not surrendered their claims to these funds, the already devastated countryside now faced a double taxation. This led to fevered and bitter correspondence from Georg and from the local nobility, who were forced to sell their personal possessions to cover the costs. In response to a Darmstadt delegation to her court, Amalia Elisabeth announced that her troops would “make use of their quarters in Upper Hesse as long as they wished, and until she was satisfied in the Marburg succession matter at the general peace negotiations.”¹⁸

The occupation of some of the countryside outside Marburg was thus part of her larger strategy, beginning in 1643, to ensure that the Marburg conflict would be resolved in her favor before she stepped down as regent.

The key, she decided, was to conquer the Marburg inheritance, force Georg into a new agreement that replaced the Hauptakkord, and then present her allies and the imperial estates with a *fait accompli* that would make all subsequent diplomacy much easier; the Westphalian agreement would merely have to certify an existing possession. To make the pill easier for the princes to swallow, she also prepared a legal rationale for her claims, which her officials, including Wilhelm Burkhardt Sixtinus, chancellor of Fulda, sent out for the approval of academic faculty at universities across the empire, Italy, France, and the United Provinces. While the legal underpinning of her case is reasonably complicated, the main points were that the 1627 Hauptakkord had been both illegal and forced, that Wilhelm V's oath to uphold it had been made under duress, that it lacked key signatures, and that the subsequent imperial judgment of its legality had been the result of a partisan, corrupt, and retaliatory imperial court system. Even if all these were rejected, however, she made an even more fundamental charge: the oath given by Wilhelm V was good only for himself and was not legally binding on either her or her sons. Georg and his legal advisors decried this as absolute nonsense, and attempted to match her propaganda effort by appealing to other university faculty (at Cologne, Rostock, and Altdorf), having a short defense of his claims published in the European capitals of Paris, Stockholm, and Copenhagen, and presenting copies of this defense to the delegates at the Frankfurt Deputations Diet.¹⁹

Despite the religious ties between Georg and the Swedes, by this time the Swedish court had finally expressed tentative backing for the landgravine's claims to Marburg, though they assuaged their religious scruples by making their support contingent on her agreement to maintain the Lutheran religion there. This new Swedish attitude was partly due to her earlier diplomatic efforts and her continued military importance, but a great deal of the credit goes to the personal appeal of her brother-in-law, Landgrave Fritz, who was a favorite of the Swedish queen Christina and was engaged to her foster sister, Eleonora Katherine of Pfalz-Zweibrücken. The landgravine also pressured the French, using both Krosigk and her resident in Paris, von Polhelm, to remind Cardinal Mazarin and Queen Anne of their obligations to her. By October the French too had acquiesced and promised to back her demands for the Marburg inheritance at Westphalia. Such diplomatic efforts by the landgravine prompted the Swedish ambassador Salvius to state with some amusement that "it was a

special act of heavenly Providence that three women, Christina, Anne, and Amalia [Elisabeth], should be setting the objectives for the superior might of the two greatest powers of Christendom, the Roman emperor and the king of Spain.”²⁰

Through the end of the 1643 campaign season, and despite continuing pressure from the foreign allies, the landgravine maintained a studied disinterest in the larger war and, on the contrary, a focus on preserving and controlling her own lands. A French plan to have her troops march from their quarters along the Lower Rhine into Franconia, for example, where they would help divert the Bavarians, was entirely rejected. Her councilor Krosigk wrote Mazarin in late October that the Hessians could not possibly advance without losing control of their conquests there, and even if they could, the neighboring territories had now been so stripped of all provisions that her soldiers “would ruin themselves for lack of subsistence.” Again, he insisted, she must have further subsidies. Furthermore, she demanded that the French more closely adhere to the agreement struck earlier to allow French soldiers passing through her occupied territories to take only necessary provisions. The income she gained from her occupied lands, she told the king, were “the sinews of war, and the only means that remain for the subsistence of her arms.” Frustrated by her constant demands for additional support before she would act, the French and Swedes pushed her to extract additional contributions. This she did in East Frisia, with French approval, reinstating the level she had reduced only a few months before in response to the people’s pleas. But since the beginning of her reign, the landgravine had followed a careful policy of what one might term contribution farming. Overtaxing these territories could push the local nobility into open revolt and might also damage her ability to survive long term. “For if we once should completely ruin them,” she explained to her councilors, “thereafter all contributions that we could expect from them would cease, and we would lose more through overly hard extractions and pressures than we would win.” Furthermore, she argued, it was easy for these foreign crowns to push her, as after the war they would pass back across the border and into their own states. She and her son, however, still had to live here—something that would be easier without the prospect of the “eternal hatred” of her neighbors, relatives, and friends.²¹

It is impossible to overstate the importance of the landgravine’s territorial holdings in her strategic thinking at this stage of the war. These lands, and the contributions and influence they furnished her, were at the heart

of every decision she made, every military or diplomatic effort. With even the Brunswick dukes now returned into the imperial fold, she was one of only a small handful of German rulers still under the ban of empire and excluded from imperial amnesty. This meant she had no hope of preserving her state and her children's inheritance without a successful diplomatic result at the peace congress, and for this she needed every advantage and bit of leverage she could get. The Congress of Westphalia had been scheduled to begin in July of this year, and already a handful of delegates had begun to assemble. It was thus with the greatest urgency that in November 1643 she drafted instructions for one of her councilors, Jakob von Hoff, to negotiate with the Swedish plenipotentiaries to the congress, Salvius and Johan Oxenstierna (the chancellor's son). Her most pressing need was to gain her allies' support for the full inclusion in the congress of all imperial estates—including the right to vote—as a precondition for all negotiation. This was something the emperor and the electors were still blocking, but which the Swedes had already expressed some support for. She was also certain that her view on this was shared by many other princes, but that their fear of the emperor, Saxony, and Bavaria was keeping them quiet. Were Sweden to speak again on their behalf, she argued, they would soon join their voices to hers, stand up for their princely honor, and "embrace a manly resolve."²²

To speed things along, a few days later the landgravine herself drafted a series of appeals to numerous Protestant and Catholic princes and to the Frankfurt Deputations Diet in general, asking them, for "the advancement of the well-being of the fatherland," to demand their immediate inclusion in the Westphalian congress. Unfortunately, as Amalia Elisabeth had told von Hoff, she knew that matters could not be resolved rapidly, "given the vast expansiveness of the issues and multiplicity of interests." In the meantime, she was determined to maintain herself in something as close to an armed neutrality as she could, one that would allow her to have "weapons in hand," ready for use if necessary. Another emerging complication, however, was the new push by members of the Lower Rhenish-Westphalian Circle to organize a unified defensive league under the leadership of the elector of Cologne and in conjunction with the troops of the Electoral Rhenish Circle. The duke of Neuburg, still smarting at his abuse at the hands of both sides, was an enthusiastic proponent of this plan, which amounted to a new third party, and urged Eberstein to attend the organizing meetings at Düsseldorf. Yet this defensive league was both

an opportunity for the landgravine and a danger. A unified Circle defense could strengthen her hand, but it was more likely to create a rival power in northwestern Germany, which might then easily turn against her and her continuing occupation in that region, “hemming in, hindering, and indeed even disarming her armies,” she told von Hoff, and then having a free hand to bring all of its forces “down upon [her allies’] necks.”²³

Amalia Elisabeth thus encouraged the Swedes to look into the Circle defensive league, which she warned them was both “suspicious” and “possibly dangerous,” and requested more concrete assistance in the person of the Swedes’ major general, Königsmarck. If he could bring his troops from Pomerania to reinforce hers, this would allow her to maintain her military bulwark on the Rhine and in the diocese of Münster, which protected the Swedish quarters along the Weser and Elbe rivers. Unfortunately for her, however, helping her was the last thing on the Swedes’ minds. In September, the Swedish army under Torstenson had suddenly retreated from Moravia, marching rapidly across the empire to the northwest. Then, on Oxenstierna’s command, in late December the Swedes advanced into Danish-controlled Jutland. This surprise move was part of an effort to wrest control of the Baltic from King Christian IV and block a possible attempt by the Danes to intervene in the war on the side of the emperor. The new Swedish-Danish conflict was a great opportunity for Sweden but also freed the imperial army to move against the French and Hessians. This was especially worrisome for the landgravine, as the successes of the French early in 1643 had faded badly in the last months of the year. In August they had been victorious at the fortress of Thionville on the river Moselle, which d’Enghien wrested from a Spanish garrison, but in November the military situation was eroded by the mortal wounding of Guébriant during the taking of the city of Rottweil. This was followed almost immediately by the horrific defeat at Tuttlingen of the French army under Guébriant’s successor, Rantzau, by the Bavarian general Franz von Mercy. Having lost all of their baggage and artillery, as well as most of their officers, the sad remnants of the French Army of Germany had fled back to the Rhine.²⁴

The defeat at Tuttlingen had been both embarrassing and expensive for the French, who from now on would, like the Swedes, depend almost exclusively on German mercenaries and proxies for their efforts in the empire. For the landgravine the defeat was even worse, for it had left her dangerously exposed. Her plans to conquer all of Hesse-Marburg had

been within days of implementation when news of the Tuttlingen disaster had reached her, and it had led to their immediate cancellation. Without the French and Swedes to watch her back, a full occupation was out of the question. Winter was upon them, and the desperate condition of her troops and her people would only worsen in the coming months. All companies, except some belonging to Geyso in Kirchhain, were recalled to Fulda, and all conquests in the upper principality, save Kirchhain, Homberg an der Ohm, and Alsfeld, were released. General Hatzfeldt, taking advantage of the departure of the Swedes and humiliation of the French, was now bringing every resource he possessed into Franconia, ready, in Amalia Elisabeth's words, "to call up a vast army in the spring" with the intention of besieging Erfurt or even Cassel, "which," she feared, "he especially has his eyes on." The prospect was daunting, as she was entirely unprepared for the coming campaign season. She could barely supply provisions for her soldiers, let alone reinforce them or provide them with suitable quarters in the ruined lands at her disposal. Thus by the end of 1643, with the French in full retreat in the empire and the Swedes distracted in Denmark, Amalia Elisabeth's great plans lay in ruins, and she now stood weak and alone: the sole remaining active opponent of the emperor.²⁵

Chapter 9

Westphalian Maneuverings

AS 1644 BEGAN, Amalia Elisabeth's situation was once again desperate. She had already sent von Hoff to explain this to the Swedish plenipotentiaries at Osnabrück in early November 1643, and now she focused her entire diplomatic efforts on France. She chose for this task Krosigk, whose proven diplomatic skill, fluency in French, and courtly manners were designed to woo the French to her side. One should recall, she wrote Krosigk, that it was for the maintenance of their liberties that the princes had initially taken up arms, and it was for this reason that they still wielded them. It was thus imperative, she told him, that the French demand as a precondition for the negotiations the inclusion in the congress of each and every prince and estate of the empire, with full right of suffrage. The continued importance to her of this point may seem confusing, as she had by now so alienated her fellow princes that their presence might well appear to hinder, rather than advance, her goals. Yet her effort here was tied to her understanding of the very nature of the empire, and was related to her overarching political and religious aims. A valid peace could not be made without the princes' participation, she argued, for it was "publicly known" that the right to make war and peace (*ius belli ac pacis*) was not the special possession of the emperor and electors alone, but was an ancient German liberty belonging to all the princes and estates of the empire. The emperor's refusal to recognize this was a sign, she claimed, that he was trying to make himself the sole arbiter of the empire, "thereby all the sooner to gain

absolute dominion.” Without the right of war and peace, she argued, all other rights belonging to the imperial princes and estates would be at the mercy of the emperor’s whim. So important was this issue that it even overshadowed religious differences. “For in these common matters concerning the German liberties,” she wrote, “the adherents of both religions must stand as one man.” For her, then, the threat was both political and religious, since her argument was that the *ius reformandi*, or right of princes to reform the religion of their territories, was tied inextricably to and contained within the *ius territoriali*, or territorial sovereign rights (i.e., the German liberties). These rights belonged inherently to every imperial estate and gave them not just a say in imperial policy but also command over their own governments, their local estates, and the religion in their lands. Thus only by preserving the general sovereign rights of the princes could she secure her own power within Hesse-Cassel. Here her relationship with the foreign crowns would be decisive in shaping the coming peace. While she was certainly not the only imperial prince with a belief in the empire’s fundamental aristocratic nature, she was the only one who could push the French and Swedes into echoing that claim. It is a testament to her firm vision that she never seems to have noticed the striking similarity between her own position (that the right to make war, alliances, and peace was not the sole province of the few, but belonged to the entire body of the estates) and that of her own Hessian estates, or the similarity between the emperor’s response to her and her response to her estates.¹

The French plenipotentiaries, d’Avaux and Servien, were at that moment still hanging around at The Hague (to the annoyance of the Dutch, who were sick of French lecturing). Krosigk thus joined Joachim de Wicquefort, the landgravine’s agent there, and in addition to their efforts to gain French support for the inclusion of the imperial estates at Westphalia, both men also tried to get more money. In appeals to both the French plenipotentiaries and the French court, Krosigk and Wicquefort reiterated the dangerous situation she now faced. The enemies were “making a trophy of this last defeat [at Tuttlingen],” Krosigk warned Cardinal Mazarin, and the “unexpected engagement of the arms of Sweden” in Denmark was giving the imperialists the freedom “to vomit and discharge all their rage on Madame the landgravine and her armies.” Hatzfeldt, Krosigk had learned, was readying an army of perhaps fifteen thousand men in the territories of the elector of Cologne and all along the area between the Weser and Rhine rivers, with the intent of seizing the entire area of Westphalia.

The landgravine had been entirely abandoned by the Swedes, Wicquefort added in a letter to the French superintendent of finances of the same day, the Dutch were talking big but delivering nothing, and thus “only France remains which can contribute to her support.” The landgravine, he continued, was fully “exposed to [the enemies’] discretion, and to her total ruin,” and unless the French did “something quickly and powerfully for her conservation. . . . one will shortly see the ruin of her armies and the loss of her state.” Krosigk also added a threat. “If the means mentioned above are insufficient for Her Highness,” he cautioned,

she will be obliged to act simply in the defensive, to make a reduction of her troops, and to lower the number of the officers through whom, however, the levies and recruits are necessarily raised—even though by this means the small number [of men] that Her Highness will keep will not be secure. And there is another inconvenience—that the army of Hatzfeldt, having nothing to fear, could turn against the armies of France.

In a plan later seconded by d’Avaux and Servien, Krosigk also suggested that the French provide the landgravine with two regiments of cavalry and two of infantry, perhaps as many as four thousand men. This levy, which Krosigk insisted the French must then pay for and support, would allow the Hessians to be “all the more capable to execute the things that might be asked of us.”²

Mazarin, desperate to revive flagging French fortunes in the empire, agreed with this plan, and at the end of January issued a commission to Colonel Jean-Gaspard-Ferdinand Count de Marsin to raise and command these troops for Amalia Elisabeth’s use. Loath to pay for more than the initial costs of levying these troops, however, he refused to see to their subsequent provisioning. This was not acceptable to her, and Krosigk complained to Mazarin that “to lead troops into the state of the landgravine without paying them would be to put them upside-down instead of helping her, and to take away from her the last means of making war.” The cardinal was more generous with additional subsidy monies demanded by her councilors. Despite having already strained French finances to the breaking point by allocating an extraordinary expenditure of 2 million livres (around 800,000 Reichsthalers) to restore the French Army of Germany under its new head, Henri de La Tour d’Auvergne,

Vicomte de Turenne (Amalia Elisabeth's first cousin), he now authorized an additional subsidy of 50,000 Reichsthalers for the Hessians. This, he hoped, would allow her "to sustain the entire burden which could fall on her hands" and to "form a considerable body capable of holding in check all the forces of the enemies who will be in that area." In expectation of the rapidly approaching campaign season, Lieutenant General Eberstein quickly began new levies of troops, burning through the full amount in no time, and in February d'Avaux informed the cardinal that an additional 30,000–50,000 Reichsthalers might be required. The enemies, d'Avaux argued, "not only intend to ruin Madame the landgravine, or oblige her to become neutral, they plan in the same way to grab the posts and passages to cut the path to the Swedes, and to prevent them from defending their conquests and helping their allies." Krosigk repeated this warning, writing the cardinal that the landgravine feared that Hatzfeldt "will either finish us off, or, seeing our weakness and inability to hurt him, will save us for the end." The French plenipotentiaries also worried about her loyalty, and cautioned the cardinal that she might "think of assuring herself by some treaty that would be neither for the service of the king or for the public." The loss of her armies would devastate the allies' plans, and could easily lead to the emperor's total control over the empire. And, as d'Avaux warned Mazarin, "once [the imperialists] are the masters, that's it for Germany."³

The landgravine's great fears in early 1644 were caused not only by the French military embarrassments of late 1643, of course, but by the Swedish decision to see to their own interests rather than hers. This decision was paying off for them, as by February 1644 Torstenson had conquered the entire Jutland peninsula, while farther north General Gustav Horn had occupied the Danish provinces of Scania and Halland. Königsmarck, meanwhile, was busy near the Danish-controlled bishoprics of Werden and Bremen, extracting an agreement for a payment of 94,000 Reichsthalers in return for not attacking. Such rapid victories gave the Hessians some hope that the Swedes would be able to act in the empire in the 1644 campaign after all, especially as they learned that Torstenson had arranged with Rákóczy, the duke of Transylvania, to provide the emperor a distraction on his eastern border. But if rumors were true, this would be blocked by the Ottoman sultan, and the Danes might be assisted in the spring by the emperor, the Poles, and even the grand duke of Muscovy. Additional rumors were even more troubling, as they suggested a possible Danish

intervention against the landgravine herself. Should things get messy, the Swedes would simply be too far away to help, and getting even the already promised money from the French was like pulling teeth. As for the Dutch Estates General, Wicquefort noted that they “know full well the interest that they have in the conservation or in the ruin of the said Lady Landgrave, but their resolutions being difficult when it is a question of giving money, they will not think of helping us until the water reaches up to their mouth.”⁴

Georg of Hesse-Darmstadt was familiar with the feeling of an approaching flood. Since autumn 1643, when the landgravine had made the first steps in a military resolution of the Marburg inheritance conflict, Georg had been hard pressed to match her forces. His long-stated preference for neutrality (though indeed this had in practice meant a proimperial stance) had left him woefully unprepared to defend himself and his territories. The circumstances of the larger war in November 1643 had saved him for the moment, but the landgravine’s troops still occupied portions of the upper principality in spring 1644. Now all that stood between Georg and defeat was her fear of overextending herself without sufficient support from her allies. Luckily for him, instead of pressing the attack in early 1644, she decided to wait for a more opportune time and a better financial outlook. Some further small support for her did appear in March from Cardinal Mazarin, who authorized an additional 20,000 Reichsthalers in subsidies and told the French plenipotentiaries to be ready to pay even more, for “at the present juncture, 10,000 ecus more or less must not prevent her from being happy.” She wanted more, of course, a lot more. Indeed, according to Wicquefort, even 100,000 “will not suffice.” Krosigk explained to Mazarin yet again that her soldiers lacked provisions, her artillery needed maintenance, her fortifications were unfinished, and she needed money for new levies (especially as the cardinal had decided that Marsin’s levy was now to be directed to Turenne, instead of to her). Eberstein had already been forced to dip into his own funds for recruiting—expending a full 30,000 Reichsthalers in the process—and the landgravine herself had gone into debt with a number of merchants. Furthermore, Krosigk complained, their costs for war munitions were enormous, as they were being gouged by the Dutch. “The stronger the army of Her Highness,” he reminded Mazarin, “the more efficient will be the diversion she will make, whether the enemies come looking for us, or whether we go looking for them.”⁵

The Hessians conveniently forgot to mention to the French their plans for a full invasion of Marburg, but did seem to have been genuinely afraid of the massive forces they saw arrayed against them. First, the imperial army under Hatzfeldt, which they estimated would soon have ten thousand men and was readying for an invasion of Hesse; then the Bavarian army, which they had heard would reach twenty thousand by May; and then the rising specter of the new Westphalian Circle army, a clearly hostile force (as the landgravine had feared) that was to be directed by the elector of Cologne, commanded by the former Catholic League general Gottfried von Geleen, and supported by the count of Gronsfeld and Melander (who had been named an imperial field marshal in February 1642) as commissioners for the emperor. These forces were moving to encircle the landgravine, and she was not ready. In March, while Krosigk was begging and threatening the French for more money, she sent her brother-in-law, Landgrave Fritz, to meet with General Torstenson and remind him of his previous promise “powerfully to assist” the Hessians in time of need. She also sent Scheffer and Günderode to meet with General Königsmarck, who had been left to protect the Swedish army’s flank in the empire. She had heard, they told Königsmarck, about a possible attempt by Hatzfeldt to drive her troops from the upper principality and then move northward against the Swedes. Convinced by her arguments, Königsmarck agreed to work in conjunction with her to stop this threat, and in April he brought three regiments to the Hessian border on the Werra River, where they were joined by Geysso with twenty Hessian cavalry companies from their quarters in the upper principality. Eberstein and another large body of Hessian troops she directed to Lippstadt, in Westphalia, to block any imperial advance there. Hatzfeldt, indeed looking to challenge her, took some of her small towns in Fulda, but then, lacking adequate support, retreated toward Franconia, allowing Königsmarck and the Hessians to advance into Saxony.⁶

Along the Lower Rhine, meanwhile, the Hessian army still held numerous fortresses, but these were constantly threatened by imperial and Spanish incursions into the unprotected countryside. In April, Colonel Rabenhaupt, the commander of the Hessian contingent at Neuss, heard of just such a push by the proimperial duke of Lorraine. Perhaps influenced by the presence of the young heir, Wilhelm VI, who was making a visit accompanied by his uncle Landgrave Ernst, Rabenhaupt decided to press the attack. He gathered together nine companies of cavalry from that

garrison, plus an additional four hundred men from the surrounding towns of Kempen and Linn, and moved into Jülich in the cover of night, where he launched a surprise dawn attack against the forces of the duke of Lorraine, who was lodging in the village of Merode outside Eschweiler. There they were entirely victorious, seizing two medium cannons and a great deal of booty, burning the town and, according to one local chronicler, “offering an example of untold brutality and lack of control against the opposite sex.” Yet the noise of this attack and wild pillaging alerted a nearby body of imperialists to the enemy incursion, and reinforcements under the command of Count Christian von Nassau-Siegen—a relative of the landgraves and, until two years before, a lieutenant colonel in Amalia Elisabeth’s army—confronted the unwary Hessians. Christian himself was killed in the resulting fray, but his forces completely devastated the Hessians, seizing numerous officers, including Rabenhaupt himself, who was eventually returned for a tidy ransom. The two landgraves escaped back to the safety of Neuss, Wilhelm slightly injured. The Hessian resident at The Hague, Wicquefort, informed the French of this humiliating disaster, explaining that he “did not know” how the landgravine could possibly “repair this loss” given her current financial straits.⁷

At Westphalia, the imperial delegates had now been waiting since July 1643 for all the other diplomatic delegations to appear. At long last, on 17 March 1644 the French plenipotentiary d’Avaux arrived, followed shortly thereafter by the papal nuncio and mediator, Fabio Chigi, on 5 April the French plenipotentiary Servien, and the next day the Swedish delegation, headed by Johan Oxenstierna and Salvius. As the Spanish and the Venetian mediator, Alvise Contarini, had already arrived, the actual negotiations to resolve the war could finally begin. Even with the major parties now present, however, the talks went nowhere, as the delegates found themselves entirely consumed with preliminary questions of precedence and appropriate terms of address. The question of the right of the individual German princes and estates to attend the congress also remained unsettled, with both the French and Swedes in favor of anything that would weaken the power of the Habsburg emperor, and Ferdinand III, of course, strictly of the opposite opinion. On 6 April the French, pressed by the Hessians and Swedes, issued an open invitation to all imperial estates. This outraged the emperor but, as with the earlier Swedish invitation, had little effect. Though many princes agreed with the landgravine’s constitutional interpretation, all efforts to turn the Westphalian peace congress

into a full imperial Diet were still being blocked by the emperor with the support of the Catholic electors. The landgravine thus issued her own statement to the Frankfurt delegates. It was “now or never,” she pleaded, and either they sent their representatives to Westphalia to assert their sovereign rights and do their part to save the “injured fundamental constitution of the empire” or they must be prepared to lose these rights in the future.⁸

Taking her own advice, in late May the landgravine began laying plans for her delegation to the congress. Here the painfully arranged format of the talks caused her some difficulties, for her allies, the French and the Swedes, were each negotiating separately with the emperor and doing so in entirely different cities over thirty miles apart. The only solution, and one that would in the end be unique to her, was to send two separate teams, each of equal diplomatic status. Krosigk and Vultejus were tasked to coordinate Hessian diplomacy with the French at Münster; Scheffer and Johann Antrecht were ordered to do the same with the Swedes at Osnabrück. Other leading members of the delegation included the young diplomats Sebastian Zobel (assigned to the Münster delegates as secretary), Johann Caspar von Dörnberg (who had previously negotiated for the landgravine in Paris), and Baron Johann Dietrich von Kunowitz (a Moravian Calvinist banned by the emperor for rebellion and thus keenly interested in the question of amnesty). These diplomats were aided by another lesser secretary and Latin translator named Wübbenhorst, two senior assistants for the delegates (both named Caspar) who were also the delegations’ accountants, a groom, a steward, two scribes, three servants, two cooks, a confectioner (!), and Vultejus’s wife (the only woman in the delegation), who would remain with him during the entire period of the congress and bear him two children there. Krosigk, a nobleman with extensive experience in diplomacy and the style of a born courtier, was assigned as senior delegate at Münster; Scheffer, an old, trusted, and long-serving member of the secret council, had that honor at Osnabrück. Both teams were to keep in constant communication to ensure that Hessian interests would proceed in tandem at both sites. That all the men worked well together and without any major personal conflicts was a special bonus denied many of the other diplomatic teams at the congress.⁹

In formal but secret instructions of 4 June, the landgravine laid out for the delegates their mission. The issue of the inclusion of the princes was still the first priority, for the princes must “conserve their own rights, and

not allow themselves to be led by the horns.” For other matters relating to the empire as a whole, that is the *publica*, she instructed her delegates to seek an unlimited and unconditional general amnesty and restitution to 1618, a date that would in one fell swoop resolve a large number of the various *gravamina* (complaints) of the princes—and wipe out all the imperial judgments and penalties made against Hesse-Cassel since the war had begun, including the 1623 imperial judgment, the 1627 Hauptakkord, and the 1636 banning of her husband. Also important for her—and an argument that placed her delegates within the most radical wing at the congress—was that the congress recognize that the empire was a “mixed aristocracy,” not a “pure empire,” and that the estates as a whole shared sovereignty, with “*jura magistratus, armorum et legum*” (right of magistracy, both military and legal). The emperor was merely the ceremonial head of the body politic, the electors merely holders of special honors; neither had more rights or liberties than the other imperial estates. Only when the emperor and electors were forced to recognize this, she noted, would the estates’ religious complaints also be resolved. And as a part of this resolution, she hoped to see the annulment of the 1629 Edict of Restitution and of the Peace of Prague, which, she argued, was rife “with all kinds of disadvantages, incriminations, and defects.” It was also important to her that Protestants be granted parity within the imperial structures of the empire. This meant not a majority vote on religious matters, which would give Catholics the advantage, but an accommodation between two equal sides (*itio in partes*). This principle of parity was important also for her conception of the princes’ sovereign religious rights, since her legal theorists argued that parity also required an equal right of religious reform (*ius reformandi*), so that what was allowed for the estates of the one religion in their territory should also be equally free and available for the other.¹⁰

But Protestants were not all of one mind or one type. One may recall that the 1555 Peace of Augsburg had given the *ius reformandi* not to Catholics and Protestants, but to Catholics and “adherents of the Confession of Augsburg.” Yet even if Lutherans and Catholics were to agree to allow the *variata* as a valid part of the Augsburg Confession (a big if), who then would decide who belonged to it? Should a simple self-statement of inclusion be sufficient, or did there need to be some kind of external judgment or oversight? If so, who would judge? The Edict of Restitution had resolved this complex issue by excluding the *variata* completely, stating that only those belonging to the unaltered and original Augsburg Confession

(Lutherans) enjoyed the *ius reformandi*. This issue of including the Reformed had come up at the 1635 Peace of Prague as well, but the elector of Brandenburg, the prince of Anhalt, and other Calvinist princes had not then insisted on specific assurances for Calvinism, but had allowed the emperor to convince them they were included by implication. This had been entirely insufficient protection for Amalia Elisabeth, so she had attempted to bypass the problem in the failed Mainz negotiations. She and the elector of Brandenburg had tried again to resolve matters at the imperial Diet of Regensburg in 1641, but again, to no avail. Now was another—perhaps the final—chance for this religious uncertainty to be resolved, and she thus instructed her delegates to ensure that the Reformed princes and estates, who had for so long and with such injustice been excluded from the Religious Peace of Augsburg, now “be expressly declared” as included within the new Peace of Westphalia “with all of its clauses.” This, rather than the tricky question of who belonged to the Augsburg Confession, was her preferred path to legalization. Time would show how, or how much, the Hessians would be able to work with other Reformed princes on this matter, but even “if we should be alone on this, simply abandoned and not seconded,” she told her delegates, “in the end no one will be able to blame us if we especially monitor this point for ourselves and our family, and that we safeguard the same as best we can.”¹¹

In many ways, the landgravine’s diplomatic and military position was enviable. She was the only remaining German ally of the French and Swedes, had a sizeable and experienced army, and held territories across the empire, lands belonging not only to the electors of Cologne, Mainz, Brandenburg, and the Palatinate, but also to the bishops of Münster and Paderborn, the counts of East Frisia, Lippe, and Neuburg, the abbot of Fulda, and others. This gave her an enormous influence, far outweighing that normally held by a mere landgravine. Of course, it also made her widely hated. “For this princely house of Hesse-Cassel,” she wrote in her instructions, “has aroused a great outrage among the majority of the estates, on account of the arms we have unavoidably wielded against the emperor and his adherents up to now.” The imperial vice chancellor, Ferdinand von Kurtz, for example, listed her as the third greatest enemy of the emperor, in his estimation falling just after the Turks and the Swedes, but above the French and the States General. Thus everything depended on a continued close relationship with the foreign crowns. The French had promised at the Treaty of Dorsten to make no peace without the satisfaction

of her interests, but it might require some arm-twisting to ensure they lived up to their side of the deal. The Swedes too had made some promises, but were clearly uncomfortable with the landgravine's claims against their fellow Lutheran Georg of Hesse-Darmstadt.¹²

Armed with their instructions, the three Hessian delegates (Antrecht was unable to participate due to illness after a stroke and would be replaced in December 1645 by Nicolaus Christoph Müldener) traveled to Westphalia, arriving in mid-June 1644. After settling into their new quarters, they presented their credentials to the Swedish and French plenipotentiaries and made a formal visit to the Venetian mediator in Münster. Further visits with the representatives of other Protestant estates were specified in the landgravine's instructions, though these had not yet arrived, for the Hessians were the first delegates of the lesser princes to arrive. Intimidated by the emperor's command of 14 June that the estates not accept the French and Swedish invitations, the only others who would arrive before the end of the year (or, in the landgravine's words from a few months earlier, the only ones who shared her "manly resolve") would be those from neighboring Brunswick and from the bishop of Osnabrück. In November the representatives of the Franconian Circle informed the emperor that they planned to attend, but not until December did a few more minor Protestant delegates (from Mecklenburg and Lübeck) appear.¹³

While the landgravine's diplomats cooled their heels in Westphalia, enjoying their remarkably well-appointed lodgings, her ability to juggle multiple problems was tested even further, as Count Ulrich of East Frisia had now decided to retake his country. With the connivance of the prince of Orange, in May 1644 he hired nine companies of Dutch infantry and two of cavalry, bringing his army up to around two thousand men. His efforts to rearm were met with howls of outrage from the burghers of Emden and portions of the East Frisian nobility, who argued that he had no right to engage troops without the approval of the collected Frisian estates, and that the number of troops was too small to do anything more than anger the Hessians. This was indeed the case. On the landgravine's orders, Eberstein, who had perhaps four thousand men in place, brought a further one thousand into the area to secure it. These he established in a camp at Jemgum, around thirteen miles from Emden, and gave free rein to loot the surroundings. Double contributions were imposed on the count's supporters. Meanwhile, the landgravine complained about Ulrich to the Swedes, the French, and the States General. From Osnabrück, Johan Oxenstierna

warned the count that even if he were victorious against the landgravine, he would then face a new enemy in the Swedish army under Königsmarck. The French, too, seeing that the Hessians were planning to “drop all their other affairs” in order to deal with this existential threat in East Frisia, attempted to intervene by sending a special envoy to the States General and the prince of Orange, asking that they use their influence to stop this looming conflict. One great fear expressed by the French plenipotentiary Servien was that the landgravine might act precipitously and launch a full attack on Ulrich, leading to a messy and distracting situation that would limit Eberstein’s ability to act in conjunction with Königsmarck, and so allow Gallas and the imperialists to aid the Danes. This too was the argument the landgravine asked Wicquefort to use with the States General and the Prince of Orange. The continued participation of the Hessians in the larger war, in other words, was still key for the allies, and the French resident at The Hague, Brasset, also reminded the Dutch that the landgravine “remains alone of the princes of the empire in a rigorous action, so that it is proper to give her courage so that she perseveres to the end.” The imperialists and Spanish, he noted, “are trying by all means to debauch this virtuous princess,” and “Mr.s the Estates would find themselves very astonished to see Westphalia filled with imperial troops, who would be running along their frontiers instead of Hessian ones.”¹⁴

Georg of Hesse-Darmstadt would never have thought to describe Amalia Elisabeth as virtuous. The troops she had stationed in the upper principality had been left with limited oversight, and so were happily plundering and extorting the local residents. Complaints from Georg and his nobility were ignored, but he now took what steps he could against these constant threats and the sure reignition of the landgravine’s offense in the next campaign season. Rebuilding and reinforcement of the critical fortresses of Giessen, Rheinfels, and other strongholds was of immediate importance, but he also desperately needed to recruit new troops. Unfortunately, his levies were severely hindered by the lack of available men, the incompetence of his staff, and the poverty of the regime—he had to hock his private silverware in Frankfurt to raise needed funds. The officer shortage was also pressing, though in June 1644 he managed to lure into his service Ernst Albrecht von Eberstein, who was happy to leave Amalia Elisabeth and take a new post as major general and commander of the fortress of Giessen. This poaching was surely satisfying, but was only a minor

victory, as Georg's new troops and officers were involved in constant quarrels with local residents and even with his own court officials, and he had enormous difficulty supplying them with sufficient food and weaponry. His diplomatic efforts were somewhat more successful. His councilor von Todenwarth gained promises of support from the imperial court, and Georg also appealed again to the Frankfurt Deputations Diet and sent councilors and letters to the courts of Johann Georg of Saxony and many other possibly sympathetic princes, hoping to gain their efforts on his behalf.¹⁵

Over July and August 1644, using a two-month cease-fire arranged by the French baron de Rorté, Count Ulrich of East Frisia reinforced his military position and readied himself for war. Then, in late August, he sent his troops out in a surprise attack against the Hessian post at Victorbur. The advantage he gained from this was only fleeting, as it resulted in an enraged Eberstein leading a complete plundering and misuse of the count's own hereditary lands. Further minor hostilities continued until September, when negotiators from the States General arrived in Emden. Eberstein refused to negotiate officially until the count disbanded his troops, and in early October the landgravine attempted to force the matter, announcing that she had ordered Geyso to leave the Rhine, where he was aiding the French in a major new operation, and instead to join Eberstein with another three thousand men. This threat was enough to move matters, and talks were well under way by mid-October, when Eberstein suddenly died at his camp in Jemgum. Krosigk, who had come from Münster to assist, was left to try to heal the rift, and with assistance from Baron de Rorté and the representatives of the States General, the sides quickly came to peace. This agreement, known as the Treaty of Emden, maintained both Ulrich's troops (fixed at no more than a thousand men) and Hessian occupation and extraction of contributions (11,000 Reichsthalers a month). In a letter to the French plenipotentiaries, Brasset blamed the landgravine herself for sparking this conflict, arguing that the Hessian occupation "is becoming more unbearable to their friends than it is formidable to their enemies. . . . This is truly an unfortunate distinction to have to put up with—esteeming this princess and at the same time screaming against the violence of her arms." The Treaty of Emden was only intended as a temporary solution, but would remain the status quo until the end of the war. It was soon signed by Geyso, who on his arrival took over military affairs in East Frisia and was promoted by the landgravine to major general. Soon thereafter she ordered him to

join his forces with those of Königsmarck, while Torstenson, having brought the Danes to a truce, once again headed directly for the emperor's hereditary lands in Bohemia.¹⁶

At Westphalia, meanwhile, both the French and Swedes, pressed by the Hessian and Brunswick deputies, had continued to demand the admittance of all the princes as a precondition for talks, and had sent out additional invitations in September, in October, and again in mid-December 1644. In January 1645 the emperor relented somewhat, allowing the princes to send delegates. This was only a small concession, for he still forbade them from any actual participation and denied them any constitutional claim to cogovernance or the right to make war and peace. Yet the princes still did not come, and their refusal actually to appear made the ongoing delay more and more annoying to the foreign crowns, who had already, despite their promises, made their first exchange of initial proposals in December. Amalia Elisabeth asked them to be patient, explaining that "one can only recover slowly from such a difficult sickness; there is not only confusion in the war, but also in the councils of the princes."¹⁷

In the landgravine's council chambers, the slow progress of the Westphalian negotiations and the imminent prospect of the foreign crowns acting without the presence of the German princes now spurred her to issue a new set of instructions. She asked her delegates to reiterate to the foreign crowns all the reasons why it was important to wait, but in case this effort failed, the delegates should be ready to coordinate with whatever like-minded princely delegations they could. Above all, they should maintain good relations and open communications with the delegates of the elector of Brandenburg, a coreligionist whose policies had also agreed with the landgravine's at the Regensburg Diet. As a sign of their new relationship, negotiations had begun the previous year to arrange the marriage of the sister of Elector Friedrich Wilhelm, Hedwig Sophie, to the young landgrave Wilhelm VI. The landgravine had also agreed to release to the elector the fortress of Kalkar and parts of Cleves, which Friedrich Wilhelm hoped (falsely, it turned out) would allow him to defeat his territorial rival in the area, the duke of Neuburg. More specific requirements for Hessian demands in *publica* were laid out for the delegates by the landgravine's councilors, led by Vice Chancellor Deinhardt. According to these propositions, the war in the empire could be traced to three primary problems. First, the emperor had, contrary to precedent and law, deprived the princes and estates of the empire of their privileges and freedoms; second,

the Catholics had persecuted and unjustly hounded the Protestants; and third, the Protestants had themselves been divided and mutually hostile, such that the Reformed had been deprived of their religious rights. The solution to these problems, Deinhardt argued, was to restore the kingdom of Bohemia to its prewar religious and legal status; to bar the emperor from proclaiming any prince or estate an enemy of the empire, and to restore any who had already been so named; to limit the jurisdiction of the Reichshofrat and void any past judgments it had given outside its competence; to assert that the *ius belli ac pacis* belonged not to the emperor and the electors alone, but to all imperial estates; to establish the Religious Peace of Augsburg as an immutable imperial law and place any controversies about it before the entire empire for resolution; to establish a normal year of 1618 for ecclesiastical and secular territories and goods; to enforce parity between the religions in all imperial bodies; expressly to include in the Religious Peace any Calvinist prince or estate who merely asserted adherence to the Augsburg Confession; to include Protestants among the Reichskammergericht judges and assessors in equal numbers with the Catholics; and finally, to increase the number of electors to ten, to match the ten circles, by including the kings of France, Sweden, and Denmark.¹⁸

This last, rather surprising, proposition was not one taken up by the landgravine, but most of the others found favor and would appear in a March 1645 document written by Scheffer and outlining the *gravamina* of the imperial Protestant estates. Scheffer's draft project, created at the request of the Swedes, added only a demand for the consent of the estates in all laws (and legal interpretations) and taxation. With the approval of the landgravine, a version of this document was given to both the French and Swedes at Westphalia. Yet having these propositions accepted by the allies and included in their demands was a trickier matter. By the Treaty of Dorsten, the French had promised "to preserve her religion in the same freedom and exercise as it is at present," but this was a bitter weed for the Catholic French to stomach. Despite appeals to both Servien and d'Avaux (whose constant quarrels disturbed the Hessian delegates greatly and complicated their diplomacy), and to the French resident at Cassel, Beauregard, as well as a special mission by the young diplomat Dörnberg to Paris, the late April 1645 French peace proposal drafted by Servien included only the 1618 normal date for political matters (not religious) and a demand for the princes' territorial rights, and mentioned the empire's religious issues only to state that they should be settled to the "common satisfaction." The Hessians

were furious. Vultejus complained that it was extremely difficult to negotiate with these “false people who are constantly at each other’s throats,” while Sixtinus advised that when dealing with the French one should simply “leave lying the stone that is unliftable.” Even Krosigk, who had to date been the strongest advocate of a pro-French relationship, was disenchanted. Amalia Elisabeth, informed of d’Avaux’s particular disinterest in furthering her religious demands, mused that it seemed the French “will be more difficult in this than even the Catholic [estates].” She thus appealed again to the French court while her delegates turned their efforts to courting the Lutheran Swedes, who seemed more receptive to their advances in religious matters. The two crowns’ proposals of June 11 indicated this division. While the French now excluded all mention of religion, not only did the Swedish proposal include a normal date of 1618 for both secular and religious matters (and included Bohemia and the emperor’s other hereditary lands), but many other Hessian demands also appeared there word for word, including the explicit inclusion of the Reformed in the Religious Peace of Augsburg. “Thank and praise God!” Scheffer exclaimed when he learned of this success. Even so, the landgravine found the foreign crowns’ behavior toward her insulting to her authority and reputation, and it rankled that she must always beg them for every crumb of support. As Krosigk noted, she “was an adherent of the crowns, not their vassal.”¹⁹

At the city and court of Cassel, at least, Amalia Elisabeth’s independence and status as a ruling princess was unquestioned. Despite the difficulties of war, she oversaw a flourishing court culture that dazzled visitors with its magnificent balls, feasts, and musical events. Not one to sit brooding in her study, she instead made a point of enjoying the company of her children, friends, and courtiers, and dining at the homes of her councilors. She ensured that her daughters were provided with the finest silk dresses from Paris, and her kitchens were well and generously stocked with delicacies. Sixtinus, her closest confidant at this time, was reported to be quite fond of a good Hochheimer or Mosel wine, which he drank sometimes to excess. She and her daughters were entertained as well by a steady stream of visitors, including diplomats, military officers, various noble dignitaries, relatives, and eager artists looking for sponsorships. The young landgrave in particular had a reputation as a connoisseur of fine art, and in August 1642 had been the recipient of the first known mezzotint engraving, a portrait of his mother by the former Hessian courtier Ludwig von Siegen. Suitors for the girls also made frequent appearances. In July Emilie

wrote to her brother that a certain Count von Wittgenstein was madly in love with her, and had taken to singing to her about it publically and with vigor. When even that grew tiresome, the girls and their mother could always walk among the castle grounds or play with Wilhelm's dog, Monsieur Teutsch. Yet despite these distractions, the landgravine remained, as always, keenly interested in the affairs of the empire and of her own estates and, according to the memoirs of one of her younger councilors, Detlev von Ahlefeldt, could speak eloquently and intelligently on both matters of state and of war.²⁰

And she had much to talk about. Although there were some initial setbacks in Baden-Württemberg in the spring of 1645, in March Torstenson had pulled off an extraordinary bloody victory at Jankau, in Bohemia, that led to the death or capture of the majority of the imperial-Bavarian soldiers, the death of Götz, and the almost complete destruction of the famed Bavarian cavalry. Then in May the French under the duke d'Enghien and Turenne, reinforced by Königsmarck and by Geysso (who brought six thousand Hessian troops from Westphalia to the allied army, bringing their numbers up to perhaps fifteen thousand) had convinced the Bavarian general Mercy, at that moment besieging the Hessian-controlled fortress of Kirchhain (defended by a garrison of only six hundred troops under the landgravine's lieutenant colonel Heinrich von Uffeln), to retreat to the left bank of the Main River. The allies had moved forward to press the attack, traveling through the lands of Georg of Hesse-Darmstadt, whose limited defenses were entirely incapable of matching the combined power of the armies facing him. At Darmstadt, the allied generals had demanded supplies, including two hundred thousand pounds of bread, fifty cartloads of wine and beer, and vast quantities of peas and lentils for the troops; and for each general an additional cartload of wine, one of beer, five hundred pounds of rye bread, one hundred pounds of wheat bread, four calves, eight ewes, twelve lambs, young chickens, turkeys, geese, fish, butter, spices, and more. The burghers and nobility had to struggle to fulfill these demands, as the city's defenses were too weak to oppose the soldiers, who, unsatisfied with their rations, engaged in almost unbridled looting until Königsmarck intervened. After a little more than a day the armies had moved on, pursuing Mercy to southern Germany and leaving the stunned residents of Darmstadt to lick their wounds.²¹

In July, Königsmarck broke off to pursue a separate, successful effort to knock Elector Johann Georg of Saxony out of the war, a shocking reality

that would be made official by the 6 September Truce of Kötzschenbroda. Mercy, meanwhile, joined now by significant forces from the Westphalian Circle army under Geleen, entrenched himself at Allerheim, near Nördlingen. There, on 3 August, his army met that of d'Enghien, Turenne, and Geysso. This battle (sometimes known as Second Nördlingen) is counted a victory for the French and Hessians, but it led to major losses on both sides. Mercy was killed and the Bavarians forced to retreat, and soon Elector Maximilian, who had already been attempting to get the French to recognize his neutrality, began more serious overtures for a separate peace. Yet while the French then occupied the city of Nördlingen, d'Enghien fell ill, and Turenne, left unreinforced, was compelled to abandon French conquests in the area and return to the Rhine by the end of the year. In Austria, Torstenson too fell ill in late 1645 and, unable to take either Brünn or Vienna or to capitalize on his successes, retreated into Thuringia, ceding command of the Swedish forces to Gustav Wrangel.²²

Chapter 10

Pressing the Attack

THE INCREDIBLE ALLIED VICTORIES against the imperialists in 1645 had a marked effect on the peace congress at Westphalia. After the battle at Jankau, more and more imperial princes had been emboldened to send delegates to the congress, and on 29 August, shortly after the defeat of Mercy at Allerheim and only a few days after the official peace treaty between the Swedes and Danes, the emperor caved. Buffeted by horrible military defeats, the defection of Saxony, and perhaps the imminent loss of Bavaria as well, Ferdinand invited the imperial estates to attend the congress and recognized their right of suffrage. Following a flurry of discussions, the estates then agreed to meet in three colleges, as in an ordinary imperial Diet, but in two cities, with the Protestants residing at Osnabrück, the Catholics at Münster. This maintained the Catholic majority, as each college still had to unify its vote, but it at least gave Protestants a chance to speak with a single united voice. It was thus in both Osnabrück and Münster that on 25 September the emperor presented to the collected estates his formal response to the proposals of the foreign crowns. Acquiescing to their demands for imperial reform, he recognized not only the estates' *ius belli ac pacis*, but also their right to form alliances and to approve all laws, taxation, and the internal quartering and levying of troops.¹

After years of effort, the landgravine's view of the empire as a mixed aristocracy, not an absolute monarchy, had now been partially accepted. Yet instantly a new problem arose: as a declared enemy of the emperor,

Hesse-Cassel, along with three other estates, was barred from participating in an imperial Diet. The Hessians vainly protested, but in the end the emperor's hand was forced by the loud complaints of the foreign crowns and then, in late October, the declaration of the collected Protestant estates at Osnabrück that they would not continue without the excluded princes. On 19 November the Hessians and others were formally admitted. This retreat was just one more for Ferdinand III, who, given the changing tide, had already drafted new instructions in October for his friend and chief minister of state Maximilian, Count von Trauttmansdorff, to proceed to Westphalia and there do whatever necessary to make peace. Trauttmansdorff was secretly instructed to give way on almost every front if absolutely necessary, including an amnesty and restitution back to 1618, the inclusion of Protestants in the imperial courts, and even parity of religion. As for the Hessian matter, the emperor instructed Trauttmansdorff to try to push the landgravine to accept the agreement already made between them at Mainz. "However," he added, "since things may still stick on the Marburg matter, one should strive to settle the matter in favor of the Darmstadt line, especially because justice is on their side. In the end, however," he continued, "one should endeavor so that both sides set aside something and the affair is settled."²

The emperor's fervent desire that the intra-Hessian dispute be "settled" once and for all was shared by many others at the congress. This included both those who favored Georg and those (very few) who were pro-Amalia Elisabeth, and reports from her delegates in November indicated that there was a great deal of opposition to allowing the Marburg dispute (seen by most as a purely private Hessian affair) to be included within, and possibly damage, negotiations over the general peace. Luckily, by late 1645 the simultaneous advances of the allies into the Habsburg hereditary lands, Saxony, and Bavaria had given her both the breathing room and the confidence to resolve matters on her own. This began shortly after Allerheim, as in September the French under Turenne helpfully occupied the lower county of Katzenelnbogen while she ordered the commander of her fortress of Lippstadt, Colonel André, to advance into the upper principality of Marburg. André, reinforced by around a thousand fresh troops from Westphalia and East Frisia, arrived at the fortress of Giessen on 3 October and bombarded it in vain. Stymied, he instead overran and plundered numerous smaller nearby communities. A few days later Geysso, with an additional four thousand men, also crossed over into the upper principality

and, after looting the area for supplies, joined with André and the other Hessian commanders in Wetzlar to plan their advance. Soon thereafter her forces took Butzbach, a city not strictly belonging to Georg but under his protection and, since 1643, the seat of the widow of Landgrave Philipp III of Hesse-Butzbach. Having looted, secured, and garrisoned this area and put it under contribution, Geyso's army then moved toward the city of Marburg, which they besieged and pummeled with heavy artillery. Pleas from civic and university officials were ignored, and on 11 November the city surrendered. Students and professors fled, and soldiers were lodged in the university buildings. Geyso then began a siege of the fortress and princely residence. Georg was furious, and complained to the Swedes and others that not only had Geyso and his troops been extraordinarily destructive in taking the city, this had been done despite the presence of two of Georg's own sons and other noble children there for classes. It gave the impression, he argued, that the landgravine intended to destroy him and his family entirely.³

There is no evidence for Georg's claims, but there is also no doubt that Amalia Elisabeth was determined to best Georg and seize back for herself and her children the territories she felt he had wrongly acquired. This also meant ensuring that Georg's delegation to Westphalia—which he had sent out in June 1645 and which included his vice chancellor, Justus Sinold (aka Schütz), and Wolff von Todenwarth—be blocked from winning any new diplomatic support. This was not an easy proposition, as the Swedes were clearly sympathetic, and the imperial delegates again expressed support for the Hesse-Darmstadt position that the Hauptakkord was immutable imperial law, and should neither be renegotiated nor annulled. Conversations between the delegations of both Hessian dynasties at Westphalia were similarly unhelpful, as both sides held firm to their positions. In a meeting of November, Schütz told Vultejus that there was no way Landgrave Georg would agree to new talks over the Hauptakkord; Vultejus countered that the Hauptakkord was fundamentally flawed, and without a new agreement there would be no peace. Both delegations also appealed to the Swedes and French, who were unable to offer a satisfactory solution, and further interventions from the elector of Cologne's delegate, Dr. Peter Muschmann, from the newly arrived Trauttmansdorff, and from the Protestant princes failed to budge either party.⁴

Discussions of religion were similarly difficult. While the emperor in his response of September had also acquiesced to the inclusion of the

Reformed in the Peace of Augsburg (an enormous victory for the landgravine), he had done so only with the condition that they “themselves so choose and live quietly.” To the Hessians, this somewhat confusing addition suggested (correctly, it turns out) that the emperor meant only to grant Reformed princes toleration, not the legal right to reform their lands as they saw fit. Lutheran delegates in Osnabrück, who took up the issue in October and November, followed the emperor’s lead, agreeing to allow Reformed estates the civil protections of the Peace of Augsburg but not the *ius reformandi*, lest they then, in the words of the delegate from Strassburg, use this power to infect Lutheran territories “like a cancer.” The Darmstadt delegate, even now facing the landgravine’s possible occupation and forced conversion of Hesse-Marburg, fully agreed. “One must consider,” he argued, “that they cannot live quietly, and if they have the *ius reformandi*, in fifty years there will be no Lutherans.” Yet the landgravine’s religious demands could not be avoided, the Franconian delegate noted, because of “the power of the Reformed.” A possible compromise, some Lutherans suggested, was a secret agreement among Protestants to grant Calvinists the *ius reformandi* against Catholics, but not against Lutherans, and in return Lutherans would tolerate Calvinism where it had existed in 1618. This tepid proposition, which gave neither legal security nor inclusion in the Religious Peace, was rejected by the landgravine, who told her delegates that she would rather “let everything come to extremes” than to lose this point. In frustration, the Lutherans turned to the Swedes for mediation.⁵

By now, however, the Swedes were having second thoughts about the wisdom of their earlier position, and Oxenstierna, who also did not share his fellow delegate Salvius’s religious tolerance, walked back their support. In a series of meetings with other Reformed deputies, particularly those from Brandenburg and Anhalt, Scheffer, the unofficial leader of the Reformed at the congress at this time, attempted to work out an alternative proposal that would overcome Lutheran fears and bring the Swedes back to the Reformed side. Their solution (favored by the landgravine) was designed to defuse “the old conflict over the unaltered and altered Augsburg Confession.” The Reformed would be included within the Religious Peace of Augsburg without conditions, but both they and Lutherans would agree to abide by a form of the Ecclesiastical Reservation. This Reservation was the decree inserted (without Protestant approval) into the 1555 Peace of Augsburg by Emperor Ferdinand I that stripped the *ius reformandi* from

prince-bishops or other ecclesiastical rulers, such that any who converted from Catholicism were forced to resign their offices rather than be allowed to convert their territories to the new faith. Protestants had long rejected the validity of this point, yet the concept now offered a way forward. Lutherans and Calvinists could agree to a mutual partial rejection of their *ius reformandi*, such that any ruler who converted from one type of Protestantism into another (due either to conscience or to a new succession) would not be allowed to alter the religion of his or her people. No one was yet willing to accept such a limitation on the princes' rights, however, and with no hope of progress, the problem of Calvinism was set aside. Meanwhile, although the Cassel delegates participated in a general formulation of the official *gravamina* of the Protestant estates, issued on 25 December, from now on they allowed the other delegates (especially the Brunswick-Lüneburg delegate Lampadius and the Saxe-Altenburg delegate Thumshirn) to take the lead. This was due partly to their focus on the foreign crowns as the best path to achieve their war aims, but also to the continued loud opposition among leading Lutherans—especially the elector of Saxony—either to the inclusion of the Reformed in the Peace of Augsburg or to their right of reform, which gave the Hessians little confidence that the *gravamina* would include them—as indeed they did not.⁶

On 28 December Scheffer formally presented the landgravine's own demands to the assembled princely delegates at Osnabrück. These included a 1618 normal year for both amnesty and restitution; the annulment of all judgments, edicts, and so on made since 1618; the creation of an impartial imperial court system; and the explicit inclusion of the Reformed in the Peace of Augsburg. Yet in addition to these general points, which were already well known, she now proclaimed her private demands for the establishment of a particular decree of amnesty and security for herself, her family, and all of her officials, officers, and subjects; imperial confirmation of the law of primogeniture for the house of Hesse, which would restore the seniority of the Hesse-Cassel branch, give it a vote in any future Deputations Diets, and ensure the smooth succession of her son; the restoration of Hesse-Cassel's proper portion of the Marburg inheritance and of lands seized by force from her and her husband; the dissolution of the Hauptakkord and all other edicts or judgments against Hesse-Cassel since 1618; the confirmation of her treaties with Hanau and her inheritance in Schaumburg; a financial recompense of her war expenses

and damages; and the satisfaction of her soldiers on the same basis as the Swedish army. In addition, and in a move that caused both shock and outrage among the assembled delegates, she insisted on keeping large portions of her occupied territories in the archbishoprics of Mainz and Cologne, the bishoprics of Paderborn, Münster, the abbeys of Fulda and Corvey, and elsewhere. Knowing there would be opposition to such territorial demands, she had instructed her delegates to stand firm—at least at first—and to look to Sweden and France for support. These should be reminded on the one hand of Gustavus Adolphus's donation, and on the other of the services she had done the French and their promise to see to her reasonable satisfaction. And despite earlier hesitation by the French, on 7 January 1646 their plenipotentiaries (accompanied by the Hessian delegates) met with the Venetian mediator, Contarini, and pronounced their total support for her demands in general. Similar protestations came on the same day from the Swedes in Osnabrück, though both powers were clearly more concerned with their own territorial pretensions, with the French demanding places such as Alsace, Breisach, the Breisgau, and Philippsburg, and the Swedes requiring Silesia, Pomerania, the archbishopric of Bremen, and the bishopric of Verden. She knew this well, and wrote Krosigk that given their own demands, the foreign crowns could not expect that she, unlike them, would "be satisfied only with money."⁷

While the landgravine's diplomats worked diligently at Westphalia, she pursued a different strategy to resolve her conflict with Georg. As the occupation of the territory of Marburg by Geyso in October and November 1645 had clearly not provided sufficient motivation, she now directed Geyso to offer further convincing. The siege of the Marburg fortress, begun in late November, was thus intensified, and on 25 January 1646, after heavy shelling by Geyso and cut off from all outside communication, the fortress commander, Willich, surrendered. Georg, furious, blamed Willich, who was recalled to Giessen and publicly executed, along with his lieutenant, in the main square. A few weeks later the landgravine's bureaucrats, including Vice Chancellor Deinhard and Fulda president von Polhelm, arrived in Marburg to take over. There they imposed on the citizens a general oath of fealty to the landgravine as their new ruler, and then moved on to the surrounding towns and countryside. Hoping to seize important documents on the Marburg inheritance that Georg's officials had secured in the archives, the landgravine's representatives demanded the keys to the archive doors from the archivist. He stubbornly refused to reveal their

location and was imprisoned, and by the time the Cassel officials could open the door by force, the documents had disappeared.⁸

Over the course of late February and early March, numerous other towns in the upper principality accommodated themselves to the new political situation. Yet the Marburg estates, peppered with demands from Georg for continued loyalty, refused, despite the threats of the landgravine and her agents. So too did a number of university professors and ministers, who had for months openly preached and published pamphlets advocating resistance and disobedience to her authority. In response, she issued an ultimatum: either these men took the oath of loyalty to her and agreed to stop such rebellious behavior, or they must leave Marburg and lose their offices and positions. Meanwhile, the steady flight of Lutheran faculty and students from Marburg had caught the attention of the Swedes, and in response to an appeal from Georg, Torstenson wrote the landgravine a letter of admonition. Her private actions had consequences, he told her, and she should carefully reconsider steps that might cause “considerable harm to the confederates” and result in “inconvenience and disadvantage for the allied arms.” Relations with the Swedes were clearly in need of careful tending, especially as the Swedish resident to Cassel, Hermann Wolff, had died at the end of 1645. To facilitate communication between the two courts, ease tensions, and push the Swedes to support the inclusion of the Calvinists into the peace, in February she sent to Stockholm two of her close confidants, the hofmarschall Jakob von Hoff and the secret councilor Regner Badenhäusen.⁹

Georg’s efforts to counter Amalia Elisabeth’s occupation did not stop at Torstenson. In addition to fostering secret talks with Peter Melander, imperial commander in Westphalia since 1645, Georg also appealed directly to the emperor and to Archduke Leopold Wilhelm, as well as to the Catholic electors of Bavaria, Cologne, and Mainz, while his estates sent a request to Duke Christian Ludwig of Brunswick-Lüneburg for mediation. Ernst Albrecht von Eberstein, who had been promoted to Georg’s principal general, meanwhile began major troop recruitments in surrounding areas, though this was hindered, as before, by a serious shortage of funds. Still, with support from both the emperor and the elector of Bavaria, by April Georg had accumulated perhaps three thousand cavalry and seventy-five hundred infantry. With these forces, which included four regiments on loan from the emperor, Georg was now ready to contemplate a counterstrike. This began on 28 April, when Eberstein moved a large force to Butzbach,

which he besieged and quickly retook from the small Cassel garrison. Butzbach looked to be only the beginning of Georg's resurgence, as Geyso's forces were simply spread too thin either to defend themselves properly or to pursue a more forceful offense. While the landgravine had under her command a vast number of men in theory, most of these were required to man the garrisons and collect the contributions throughout her numerous occupied territories. Thus her dependence on contributions to fund her military hindered her ability actually to wage a war against Georg, as it meant her effective troop strength was considerably smaller than her theoretical one. Furthermore, the current poverty of the territories of central Europe so limited what she could draw from them, that in late March her agents, in a letter begging the French court for an extraordinary subsidy of 100,000 Reichsthalers, admitted that they were now falling a full 30,000 Reichsthalers short each month for the soldiers' pay alone.¹⁰

Luckily for Amalia Elisabeth, however, Georg's army would get no farther than the retaking of Butzbach. The interference of the imperialists and Bavarians in the Hessian affair had concerned the French and Swedes, who saw here a possible new and troubling front in the war, and who sensed a looming disaster for their sole German ally. In April, therefore, the Swedish general Wrangel turned his army to her aid, advancing with an enormous force of twenty-three thousand men to Westphalia, which he plundered, and then to the Weser River, where he met Geyso in May. After taking and burning most of Obermarsberg, the Swedish-Cassel army, reinforced by further troops under Königsmarck and the French-employed Bönnighausen, moved once again deep into the upper principality. By 30 May they had reached Marburg and Kirchhain, and a little over a week later Giessen, where Georg himself was. Yet the Swedes did not desire the overthrow of the Lutheran landgrave, but only a nonproblematic resolution to this vexing intra-Hessian conflict. Swedish negotiators with Eberstein thus demanded only the dismissal of the four imperial regiments. Eberstein refused, and for the next weeks the Swedish and Cassel troops ranged the countryside, with the Swedes seeking to hunt out imperial troops and the landgravine's men opportunistically seizing and looting additional small towns near Giessen.¹¹

At Westphalia, matters had also continued apace. In March Scheffer had attempted, once again, to have the Protestant estates approve his religious proposals. Catholics were opposed to any expansion of religious rights to

Calvinists, but determined to leave the matter to the Protestants to work out—hoping this might divide and weaken them. Lutherans, with the tacit support of the young Oxenstierna, were still willing to go no farther than toleration, but Wesenbeck (the Brandenburg deputy) and Scheffer did what they could to change minds. The German Reformed were and had always been, they protested, adherents of the Augsburg Confession, and were thus by definition included in the Religious Peace. They now asked, therefore, only for a simple statement of nonexclusion. But Lutherans, especially the elector of Saxony, remained adamant, and further progress on the topic was hindered by strong disagreements between the Brandenburg deputies (who were opposed to any attempt to differentiate Calvinists from Lutherans) and the Hessians (who thought the best protection lay in a clear legal distinction). Yet the Lutherans were no more united, with a wide variety of opinions arising among the princes on how to proceed. Pressured by the Hessians, the Swedes grudgingly attempted to resolve the issue with new proposals, such as a normal year of 1618 for all Protestant estates, but this was far from satisfactory either for the landgravine or for other Reformed.¹²

Also in March the congress first took up the landgravine's territorial demands, which she now specified for the first time. These included her house's original portion of the Marburg inheritance (including Marburg itself), the diocese of Hersfeld, the lower county of Katzenelnbogen, and Schmalkalden. In addition, she demanded territories in her occupied lands, including Fritzlar, Naumburg, Neustadt, and Amöneburg in the electorate of Mainz (which were situated within Hessian territory); the county of Arnsberg (including the towns of Medebach, Hallenberg, and Winterberg) in the bishopric of Cologne; the bishopric of Paderborn (including Marsberg, Volkmarsen, Beverungen, and Kugelsberg); the town and bailiwick of Buchholz (with the burgravate of Stromburg) in the territory of Münster; and the towns of Geis, Fursteneck, and Rockenstuhl in the abbey of Fulda (with the area of Vacha). All this was, to put it mildly, not well received, and was much more extensive than anyone had suspected. The delegates for Georg of Hesse-Darmstadt were especially loud in opposition, proclaiming her demands to be "unchristian, unjust, illegal, scandalous, and the worst precedent." Further hostility came not only from the emperor and the estates of the empire, who rightly noted that her demands violated the principle of an imperial amnesty and normal year, but also from her own allies. The French, in particular, who had

long argued that the war was not a religious one, found themselves in a very uncomfortable position, as her territorial demands included mostly Catholic lands, and although she had so far gone to great lengths to allow free Catholic worship in her occupied territories, still the French were barraged with complaints about their seeming support for the plundering of Church lands and alienation of good Catholic peoples. With their treaty requirements clashing with their religious dictates, they hoped instead to divert her by suggesting that she be satisfied by “a sum of money” and the Marburg inheritance. The latter proposition, however, was strongly opposed by the Swedes, who correctly viewed this as a French attempt to subject Lutherans, rather than Catholics, to Calvinist rule. At any event, most of the delegates at the congress lacked the proper instructions on how to proceed in the face of the landgravine’s extraordinary claims, and so voted in late May and early June to send the matter to the emperor for resolution. Trauttmansdorff, attempting to balance the outrage coming from Catholics (and from the emperor himself) with the stubborn insistence of the landgravine and her allies that she be satisfied in some way, was able to propose only a minor settlement of 60,000 Reichsthalers, which the Hessians dismissed out of hand. In July, a discouraged Trauttmansdorff explained to the mediators that the satisfaction of Amalia Elisabeth was now the first of five major problems hindering the resolution of the peace. Yet this matter too seemed, at least for the moment, to be unresolvable.¹³

By late June, meanwhile, the open military involvement of the Swedes in the Hessian conflict and the repeated pleas of Georg had finally roused the imperialists to act; the massed forces of Archduke Leopold Wilhelm, Hatzfeldt, Werth, and Geleen, perhaps forty thousand men in all, moved toward Hesse, and on 9 July this army met the Swedish-Cassel forces outside Kirchhain. Yet the great clash many expected never happened. Arrayed in their battle formations, the two giant forces engaged only in tentative forays and minor skirmishes. After a week of this, the imperial generals, frustrated by a lack of provisions and an epidemic that had broken out among the horses, retreated south to the Wetterau and the vicinity of Friedberg (around sixteen miles north of Frankfurt am Main). Partially supplied from Cassel and now almost entirely unopposed, Wrangel and Geyso, joined by a further eight thousand men sent by the French marshal Turenne, continued their harassment of Georg, besieging and then seizing the city of Homberg an der Ohm by force. As punishment for

the Darmstadt regiment's resistance there, Geysso allowed his men the traditional privilege of a day and a half to loot at will. The allied army then moved south toward Lollar and Staufenberg (just north of Giessen), which they plundered for fresh supplies. The imperialists, meanwhile, were similarly destructive to the countryside and peasantry of the Wetterau. Finally, on 12 August, Wrangel and the Swedes moved out, hoping to find better provisions in Franconia, where they also planned to conjoin with the main body of Turenne's army. Geysso accompanied the Swedes as far as the border and then returned with the bulk of his forces to the safety of Hesse-Cassel. The imperialists under Archduke Leopold Wilhelm followed after the Swedes, hoping—in vain it turned out—to block them from making an assault on Bavaria. Geleen and his Circle army, meanwhile, moved back to the Lower Rhine to counter any further attacks by the landgravine's forces there.¹⁴

With Hesse-Darmstadt and Hesse-Marburg now rid of foreign armies, Georg and the landgravine were once again seemingly back where they had begun. Yet on 5 August, shortly before his departure, Archduke Leopold Wilhelm had concluded an agreement in the emperor's name to give Georg both financial and military support for the reconquest of his lands. With this new formal alliance and its assurance of reinforcements, on 24 August Georg ordered Eberstein to attack. Two days later Darmstadt troops had surrounded Kirchhain, which they bombarded. To avoid a sack and preserve the lives of his soldiers, the Cassel commander, Johan Friedrich von Uffeln, surrendered within a day. His men, including the few Swedish troops under his command, were allowed to retreat to the safety of Ziegenhain.¹⁵

Back in Cassel, the landgravine's people were simply appalled at her ignition of a Hessian civil war. Not only had it invited foreign armies into greater Hesse, but having to supply her and her allies' troops was putting ever greater financial burdens on the people. In early May, for example, she had demanded that each of the two estates of Hesse-Cassel furnish four thousand *viertel* (a measurement of volume) of rye and barley for the supply of the garrisons. The food was to be collected within three weeks and delivered to Cassel and Ziegenhain. The nobility, offended at this unapproved and in their opinion illegal tax, refused. In October, Erbmarschall Riedesel, the traditional head of the Hessian estates, called for a meeting of the combined nobility of greater Hesse, hoping somehow to find a solution to the conflict; a way, in the words of the nobility, "to still

the blood-drenched weapons and consolidate the resulting damaging rift within the unified princely house of Hesse.” But the landgravine had other ideas and other priorities. Fully believing that a real resolution to the Hessian conflict could only be made at the point of a sword, she allowed their meeting but rejected their efforts at actual interposition. Instead, she used this Diet to demand again her nobles’ contribution of grain for the troops. Rather than refuse entirely and face her wrath, they agreed to a payment of one thousand *viertel*, which they insisted was voluntary and should not be construed as violating “their ancient freedom, rights, and justice.” The nobles also took this opportunity to reiterate their long-standing complaints and grievances, and, frustrated by her refusal to respect their privileges, voted to launch a suit against her with the Reichskammergericht—an interesting indication that even at this stage of the war, there was still a general understanding that the empire’s institutions were valid.¹⁶

Georg, in the meantime, had continued his assault on the landgravine’s forces in the upper principality. Bolstered by imperial support in the person of Kaspar Mercy (the brother of the late imperial field marshal), who brought approximately two thousand Bavarian troops, Eberstein began a vigorous push to retake all he had lost. In short order he managed to force Geyso and the Cassel troops into defensive positions in Ziegenhain and to overwhelm the Cassel-occupied fortress of Rauschenberg. Mercy was soon recalled to assist the imperialists, but Eberstein had momentum on his side, and on 3 September he took Blankenstein and numerous other territories in the upper principality. Frustrated in his attempts to take back Marburg, however, and weakened by the constant conflict, Eberstein retreated back to Giessen to allow his troops some rest. This gave Geyso an opportunity to regroup as well, and on 12 September he appeared before the walls of Kirchhain with a force of four thousand men, six heavy cannons, and some smaller artillery pieces. The Darmstadt commander quickly surrendered, but only after the loss of hundreds of his men and officers. To keep the fortress from once again falling into Georg’s hands and serving as a point of opposition to the landgravine, Geyso ordered its fortifications destroyed.¹⁷

Eberstein, roused from his quarters by this new assault, now moved back north, forcing Geyso to abandon his plans to retake Alsfeld and pushing him once again back to shelter under the friendly guns of Ziegenhain. On 22 September Eberstein was reinforced by Melander, who arrived with only a small body of men. The two generals took back Kirchhain, whose

walls they began to rebuild, but were unable to dent Geयो's hold on Ziegenhain. Furthermore, only a few days later, Melander was recalled to Westphalia to protect the lands of the elector of Cologne against a new offense by the landgravine's Rabenhaupt (now a major general), who had taken advantage of Melander's absence to attack imperial positions along the Rhine, including the fortress of Zons, just south of Düsseldorf. This diversion worked brilliantly, but on his return to the area the frustrated Melander seized back from the Hessians a number of territories, including the important city of Paderborn—one of the places most useful to the landgravine for pressing her demands at the Westphalian congress.¹⁸

Amalia Elisabeth, whose glorious assault on the upper principality was now seriously threatened, called on her allies for help. They sent reinforcements: a measly three hundred men from the French, and then a much more useful three thousand from the Swedes under the command of Count von Löwenhaupt. With these extra men, after a hard-fought siege Geयो was able finally to take the fortress of Alsfeld by 15 October, and then to move on to other smaller areas. Georg, desperate for a solution, pushed Eberstein to proceed against Hesse-Cassel itself in order to divert Geयो from the upper principality. Despite his misgivings, Eberstein advanced toward Cassel, but his army was intercepted by Geयो's outside Frankenberg. There, on 20 November, at a place known as "dead man's heights," Geयो's forces won the day. The number of dead and captured was not particularly large, but the victory in open battle was important for psychological reasons. The landgravine's forces had triumphed, Eberstein now carried the whiff of incompetence, and Georg was saddled with large costs to ransom back his captured men. Furthermore, while Eberstein retreated into winter quarters to recuperate, the Swedes and Hessians ravaged the countryside, taking back the cities of Wolkersdorf and Rauschenberg and forcing them to swear allegiance to the landgravine.¹⁹

At Westphalia, Georg's delegates at the congress did everything they could to arrange a cease-fire and mediation, but to no avail. The imperialists had meanwhile been pushing the French and Swedes to separate their demands from hers, and now the French, in particular, had begun to weaken. Servien tried to convince Vultejus that there was no danger here, but of course there was, and both she and her delegates knew it. On a brighter note, the Hessians now learned from the Venetian mediator, Contarini, that Trauttmansdorff seemed willing to offer her half of the Marburg inheritance and a further 200,000 or even 300,000 Reichsthalers

in compensation. The rest of the congress, however, showed no interest in granting her demands, which she presented once again for their consideration on 17 November, attached to those of the Swedes. Unlike earlier demands, she now insisted on 200,000 Reichsthalers compensation in return for her evacuation of the places in Cologne and the bishopric of Münster that she had already agreed to leave, plus additional funds for the satisfaction of her army. So here the landgravine, feeling rather confident, had taken the emperor's possible offer of a financial settlement in lieu of lands and simply added it to her existing territorial demands. This garnered heated opposition among the French, the imperialists, and pretty much everyone else, complaints that were repeated, Krosigk reported, "ad nauseum." In private, therefore, her delegates began to float the idea that she should accept a compromise: her continued occupation of certain territories only as collateral for a final payment of a full 1 million Reichsthalers.²⁰

As her diplomats talked and as Hessian armies battled each other across the upper principality, destroying and looting homes, farms, and towns, life went on for the landgravine back at her court in Cassel. In early November she sent her son, Wilhelm VI, accompanied by von Hoff (now returned from Sweden), on a grand tour to France, by way of Brunswick and Frisia. Her hopes were that he would thereby acquire the kinds of experiences and diplomatic skills that he would need as landgrave, and that he would help to cement the sometimes troublesome relationship with the French. The official betrothal of Wilhelm to Hedwig Sophie of Brandenburg was already arranged by the time he left, so even before he reached Paris, where he met with Mazarin, the young king Louis XIV, and Queen Anne, he had already done quite a bit to build diplomatic bridges for his mother—though the expenses for his lavish Parisian lifestyle were yet another drain on her finances. Her brother-in-law, Landgrave Fritz, had also done his part by his marriage to the Swedish queen's cousin the countess Eleonore, on 16 September. In celebration of this wedding, Queen Christina granted Fritz territories in Eichsfeld and promised to support a good resolution of the Marburg inheritance, which would enlarge Fritz's own holdings in Rotenburg. Amalia Elisabeth's relatives were thus being enormously helpful for her; the Hessian nobility, on the other hand, was still doing everything it could to undermine her rule. In January 1647 she had to forbid yet another attempt by them to meet. Though she was aging rapidly under the pressures of rule, clearly her force of will was just as strong as before, prompting a slightly long-suffering comment from her coun-

cilor Kleinschmidt, who reminded Badenhausen in Stockholm that one “needed to accept with patience whatever Her Princely Highness orders and desires, and to do one’s best; for once one enters Hessian service, one is then obligated to obey her orders in all possible matters.”²¹

By this point, serious negotiations in Westphalia had now been dragging on for years, and more and more parties were ready for it to end. One major sticking point, however, was the question of territorial requirements of the foreign crowns. The Swedish satisfaction was especially tricky, as Oxenstierna’s demand for all Pomerania was being opposed by Friedrich Wilhelm of Brandenburg, whose land this was. Trauttmansdorff offered a solution—a partition between the two sides. This was a negotiation the landgravine’s delegates were carefully monitoring, as both parties were important friends of Hesse-Cassel. At Münster, Vultejus informed her that he feared Brandenburg’s stubbornness would drive the Swedes into launching “a new terrifying war at the empire’s expense.” She agreed that this was possible, but improbable. “We still cannot imagine,” she wrote Vultejus, “that the elector of Brandenburg would rather challenge the Swedes for all of Pomerania and thus put himself and all his remaining lands into uproar and danger, than come to a just agreement with them and, through their authority, gain for himself an equivalent state for the half he releases to them.” She was right: in mid-February Friedrich Wilhelm, having accomplished little in his brief push to gain more land in Cleves and knowing he had no chance to retake Pomerania from the Swedes, decided to take a deal. The Swedes gained Western Pomerania, Bremen, Verden, and Wismar as fiefs of the empire, while Brandenburg was allowed to keep Eastern Pomerania, but also gained as recompense the archbishopric of Magdeburg and the bishoprics of Halberstadt, Kammin, and Minden. As part of this deal, however, both he and the Swedes also agreed to renounce their earlier support for sweeping constitutional changes to the role of the electoral college in the empire. With no support from anyone but Amalia Elisabeth, the dukes of Brunswick, and a few other small states, this proposition, so important to her, was now as good as dead.²²

Amalia Elisabeth also had her own territorial and financial demands to worry about, which had gone nowhere, despite the halfhearted efforts of her allies to counter imperial and princely opposition. The duke de Longueville (who had joined his French colleagues in Münster in June 1645) was one exception, for he clearly admired the landgravine, whom he described as “a virtuous lady.” After listening to the bishop of Osnabrück

claim that giving ecclesiastical lands to the landgravine was like stripping the clothes from Christ and the Virgin Mary and putting them instead on a heretical woman, Longueville told him and the other princes present to “get over yourselves, get over yourselves! And give her any satisfaction she desires.” Such support was gratifying, but behind the scenes the French were far from enthusiastic about her territorial demands in Catholic areas, and Longueville’s public endorsement did little to advance her negotiations with the imperial delegates, to quiet the opposition she faced at the congress, or to lessen the constant complaints from the residents of places whose contributions she was still extracting. Irritated, she stubbornly instructed her delegates to brush off all objections on these issues.²³

The problem of Calvinism also lingered. Knowing that she could expect little here from her fellow princes or from either the French or Swedes, at the end of 1646 she had attempted to gain the assistance of the prince of Orange and the States General through a personal intervention by Vultejus at Münster and a special mission to The Hague of von Hoff—though this mission was primarily aimed at discouraging the Dutch from making a separate peace with Spain, which she feared would allow Habsburg forces then to focus on her. Although earlier efforts to rouse the Dutch to her aid had been only marginally effective, in September the Dutch plenipotentiaries approached the Swedes to urge them to reconsider their support for the Reformed, and then in January 1647 the Dutch also addressed the Protestant delegates, asking them to resolve the religious conflict for the common good. This spurred the delegates to take up the issue once again, and they soon agreed in principle to the idea of a specific article in the treaty concerning the Reformed. Yet the actual wording of this article was a problem. The Swedes, harassed by a barrage of appeals from the landgravine’s agents, both at Westphalia and Stockholm, now stepped somewhat closer to Scheffer’s idea of a mutual revocation of the *ius reformandi*, favoring a formulation that allowed a Lutheran prince’s reformation of Calvinist territory only with the approval of the local estates, but barred all Calvinist reformation. This was still not equality, and Scheffer and other Calvinists continued to demand both fully equal status and legal parity as a third religious group within the empire. Just as Lutherans had required parity to avoid being outvoted by Catholics, they argued, the Reformed must now gain just such a protection from Lutherans. Tension between Lutherans and Calvinists thus continued, and Georg of Hesse–Darmstadt, with assistance from his father-in-law, the elector of Saxony, exploited this to try to sepa-

rate Amalia Elisabeth from her Swedish allies. Yet Georg's efforts were in vain, and in February Königsmarck once again crossed the Main into the upper principality. There he joined some of the landgravine's forces under Rabenhaupt and once again besieged Kirchhain, which, though defended by a stout party of four hundred Darmstadt troops, quickly fell, yielding a bounty of sixteen cannons for the victors. Having taken back this key border fortress for the landgravine, the Swedes then retreated to their winter quarters.²⁴

Chapter 11

Satisfaction

ON 20 AND 26 FEBRUARY 1647 the imperialists offered their first official responses to the landgravine's demands. They rejected entirely her demand for a special amnesty of 1618 for herself, posing instead a date of 1624 and requiring that she evacuate all occupied territories, as keeping these lands was "diametrically opposed" to the universal amnesty. They confirmed the imperial court judgments of 1623 and 1627 and thus Georg's full rights to the Marburg inheritance, but accepted the principle of an amicable reconciliation decided to the common satisfaction of both Hessian houses, and agreed to request that Georg renounce his court-approved reparations against Hesse-Cassel (which amounted to millions of Reichsthalers). In addition, in compensation for the punitive loss of Schmalkalden and other areas in 1627, they offered her only 13,000 Frankfurt gulden and land worth 7,000 gulden annual income, though this amount would be calculated on the prewar value of the lands, not on their current (much reduced) value. These ceded lands, the imperialists insisted, must also be in the vicinity of Hesse-Cassel, and the people of these lands must be allowed to continue as Lutheran in perpetuity. Finally, although they denied absolutely that she was owed any other satisfaction or reparations whatsoever, they would grant her Hersfeld and portions of Schaumburg. Though some softening can be seen in these points, there were also some enormous additional concessions that indicate the emperor's growing eagerness for peace. First, and as Contarini had already suggested, Trauttmansdorff

agreed to provide her with 200,000 Reichsthalers to take the place of her territorial demands and for her army, and second, he agreed to accept Hesse-Cassel into the 1555 Peace of Augsburg, granting it all rights and privileges given to adherents of the Augsburg Confession (including the *ius reformandi*). Both the monetary compensation and the promise of religious freedom were clear victories for her. Yet even now she was not entirely satisfied, and her delegates' response to the emperor, issued on 3 March, reflected her insistence on more land, more money, and religious liberty not just for herself, but for all Calvinists in the empire. This prompted Contarini to remark in a letter to a colleague that in his opinion "the landgravine wants war, because through contributions she controls a large stretch of country up to the ocean, whereas by peace she would be restricted to a small area."¹

Meanwhile, military events outside Westphalia were conspiring to alter the playing field. The Swedish-French assault on Bavaria had been devastating, and in December 1646 a demoralized Archduke Leopold Wilhelm had resigned and been replaced as head of the imperial forces by Gallas. Yet Gallas was both ineffective and ill from long alcoholism, and in January he allowed the Swedes and French to seize Bregenz and the entirety of western Tirol. This, and growing frustration over the state of the war, now led to the open defection of Bavaria; on 14 March, Maximilian agreed to a cease-fire with the French, Swedes, and Hessians at Ulm. He thus joined Saxony in forsaking the imperial war effort, and agreed to sign on behalf of his brother, the elector of Cologne. Others, including the Circles of Swabia and Franconia, also joined the new agreement. With the writing on the wall, the elector of Mainz, Anselm Casimir, quickly agreed to maintain neutrality as well. All the imperial electors had now abandoned the war and seemed to be united in their desire for a rapid peace. The emperor stood alone, for even his Spanish cousins were unhelpful, dealing as they were with their own problems at home. Gallas, unable to continue his command, was relieved of it in April, a week before his death. He was replaced by Melander, who now rose to the position of supreme commander of the imperial army—an extraordinary elevation for someone as lowborn as himself, but the only position that could ever have satisfied his own ego.²

On 7 April the Cassel delegates once again presented their demands to the congress. With the landgravine encouraged by the successful recent retaking of Kirchhain and by the Truce of Ulm, these demands were very similar to her November requirements, and included both the claims for

extensive territorial reparations in Paderborn, Fulda, Münster, and Mainz, as well as the further 200,000 Reichsthalers satisfaction, the satisfaction of her troops on the same basis as the Swedes, and the full inclusion into the Peace of Augsburg of all imperial Reformed. As for the Marburg matter, as before, she demanded not only her share of the inheritance, but also everything taken from Hesse-Cassel as reparations in 1627. Such stubbornness earned her only an unending pressure from the estates and the emperor to drop her land demands in return for money. This was also true of the French, who were increasingly upset by the religious implications of this war. Her occupation of Neuss, for example, had yielded fevered complaints since she had taken it in 1642, and new outrages against the Catholic population in early 1647 had roused the French to criticize their ally yet again. She defended herself in a letter to Longueville, insisting that her respect for the king had prompted her to grant liberty of religion to the people of Neuss, but that her governor there must be free to pursue “crimes and conspiracies” in order to avoid “very dangerous consequences.” Her territorial demands against Landgrave Georg also caused enormous frustration among the delegates at Westphalia. All past attempts at their mediation had failed, and although Georg had offered some minor concessions in March, this was again insufficient for her. The Darmstadt representatives now once again took their complaints to the collected princes, stressing Georg’s love of peace and, on the contrary, her crazed, war-loving, irresponsible selfishness, an argument that resonated among many. In this matter at least, the French strongly supported her, causing Trauttmansdorff to complain that Longueville “has spoken with such great zeal for Cassel in this matter, as if it concerned the crown and scepter of the king of France.” Indeed, Longueville’s passionate support for her claims in general struck many Catholics as outrageous, and the papal nuncio cautioned him that he would “thereby make himself reviled by all of Christendom.” After numerous further talks between the imperialists and Darmstadt delegates on the one side, and the French, Swedes, and Cassel delegates on the other, Georg upped his offer—moving from a proposal to give the landgravine a quarter of the Marburg inheritance to giving her a third. Yet while he accepted a sharing of the university of Marburg, still he refused to allow the city and fortress of Marburg to leave his hands—something unacceptable to the landgravine. Marburg itself thus remained the key conflict, and for good reason. This was the jewel of the entire inheritance, a lovely, vigorous, prosperous city centered around a glorious castle high on a hill,

where Philipp the Magnanimous himself had once resided and historically the very center of Hessian power and prestige. Much of the rest of the territory under dispute was fine countryside dotted with small towns—but nothing to get too excited about.³

On 22 April the French plenipotentiary d'Avaux reported back to the court that they had now worked out another possible deal with the imperialists on the issues of the Hessian satisfaction. First, Trauttmansdorff had agreed to offer the landgravine 600,000 Reichsthalers and the right to hold certain lands as surety until she received full payment. Then, in the Marburg matter he would approve a plan floated by the two crowns: she would regain the territories of Schmalkalden, Lower Katzenelnbogen, Umstadt, and Rhens (lands given Hesse-Darmstadt as compensation in the Hauptakkord but not part of the inheritance) and be granted three-eighths of the Marburg inheritance itself. The city, fortress, and university of Marburg, however, would go to Georg in perpetuity, though she would be compensated with the four territories of Bückeberg, Sachsenhagen, Stadthagen, and Schaumburg. D'Avaux was dubious that her deputies would accept this, and he told the French court he suspected neither she nor the Swedes had any real interest in peace. Again, as with Contarini's earlier cynicism, this was an overstatement, as she simply had no real interest in a peace that did not satisfy her.⁴

Two days later, on 24 April, the landgravine's agents issued a new set of demands. These reiterated her previous claims not only to half the Marburg inheritance with the city and university of Marburg, but also to the areas taken from Hesse-Cassel by the Hauptakkord. As for territorial compensation in her occupied lands, she now added further towns in Fulda, but otherwise reduced her demands, including some to be held only as surety until she was paid 200,000 Reichsthalers. In addition, however, she wanted a further 400,000 to be paid her after the conclusion of the peace and, in a move sure to garner fierce opposition from almost everyone, toleration for the Reformed in the places she eventually evacuated. All this showed a slight willingness to bend toward the imperial proposals, yet she was still clearly unwilling to go too far. Furthermore, her tempering may well have been a result of major problems among her allies, including a serious weakening of Swedish support for her demands for the university of Marburg and the legalization of Calvinism—though they strongly supported her claim to keep Catholic territories—and, on the contrary, the hostility of the French, especially d'Avaux, toward her insistence on holding

Catholic lands—though they strongly supported her claim in the Marburg matter. She despaired at her inability to advance her demands. “Everyone is against us,” she wrote her son, “which the current negotiations at Münster and Osnabrück sufficiently demonstrate, for our affairs move neither forward nor backward.”⁵

In May, Krosigk reported that the French still hoped they would bring the Swedes to share “a better disposition” in the Marburg matter. Still, this might be difficult, as both Swedish plenipotentiaries were actively working against the Cassel plan, and Wrangel too was arguing in favor of Georg. As for the territorial satisfaction in her occupied lands, the French told the Hessians that they thought the imperialists would now agree both to her retaining four Mainz territories within Cassel (Fritzlar, Naumburg, Neustadt, and Amöneburg) as well as some places in Fulda, and to the 600,000 Reichsthalers. They told Krosigk that she had thereby “landed a big fish.” Krosigk was confident that the French would instead push them to take a million Reichsthalers in return for a full evacuation, but even so they would still be doing pretty well. Indeed, he informed her that he and the other delegates, Vultejus, Scheffer, and Müldener, agreed that this was the best she could do, given the international situation and the attitude of the foreign crowns, and that if she accepted it, a final peace could be made “in an hour.”⁶

While her delegates attempted to push the landgravine toward a more moderate stance, she herself was writing Wrangel, vigorously rejecting another proposed cease-fire between the two Hessian houses. She warned the Swedish general that all previous cease-fires had merely been used by Georg to rearm and replenish his troops with imperial and Bavarian help. Georg’s lies, she wrote, were well known, and his use of imperial troops against her had resulted in orders to the French general Turenne to treat Georg as an open enemy. This was a message Turenne himself delivered to an unhappy Darmstadt delegation led by Eberstein, who visited Turenne’s military quarters in May. There Eberstein begged the French general to intervene with the landgravine, but Turenne refused, explaining that he would support her as long as she and the French were allies. A similar message met the delegation when they traveled to Wrangel’s headquarters a few days later, though Wrangel did express his personal sympathy for their cause. Meanwhile, back in Hesse, the French applied even more pressure on Georg when Turenne again occupied the Katzenelnbogen countryside, while another two French regiments appeared at Darm-

stadt and demanded a ransom not to take the city. When this did not appear, they forced their way in, prompting the Darmstadt soldiers to retreat into the safety of the fortress. With an undefended city at their mercy, the French now demanded a ransom of 44,000 Reichsthalers and the surrender of all Darmstadt troops to augment their own army. The latter demand was a common practice at this stage of the war, when finding new recruits could be both difficult and expensive.⁷

French extortion at Darmstadt was bad enough for Georg, especially as some of his own daughters were present in the fortress at the time, but now a new menace emerged—the landgravine began to organize another major offensive. For this, she decided to appoint a new lieutenant general to replace the now long-dead Count Kaspar von Eberstein. Rather than choose one of her two leading military officers, the majors general Geyso and Rabenhaupt, she picked the Dutch Calvinist Kaspar Kornelius Mortaigne de Potelles, then serving as an officer in the Swedish army. Only thirty-eight years old, he was now, with the permission of Queen Christina, elevated to the command of the Hessian forces. With a functional army of perhaps six thousand men, in mid-May Mortaigne moved to retake the landgravine's territories, and then moved on to lands in Hesse-Marburg and Hesse-Darmstadt, assisted by another offense led by the Swedish general Königsmarck. Georg's lieutenant general Eberstein hurried to respond, marching out from Giessen with a small body of troops to try to surprise Mortaigne from the rear. This was almost instantly blocked by a contingent of Cassel troops under Landgrave Ernst, who chased the Darmstadters back to the safety of their fortress. With the upper principality again in her power (save for Giessen, which her forces blockaded), she directed her army to take back the cities and fortresses of Katzenelnbogen. This was done under the command of Rabenhaupt, whose force of two thousand men took Hohenstein on 16 June, and then advanced on to Reichenberg and the fortress of New Katzenelnbogen. Mortaigne meanwhile moved the majority of his army along the Rhine to Kaub, which he took on 22 June. He then marched his men toward the great fortress of Rheinfels, the second strongest in Georg's control.⁸

Two days earlier, on 20 June 1647, the landgravine's agents at Westphalia issued yet another set of demands. These were again very similar, yet now, following her delegates' advice, she agreed to give back all her occupied territories in return for 1 million Reichsthalers. This major concession was not something she came to easily, but the general opposition

she faced from the emperor, the French, and the imperial estates to any territorial reparations, as well as the steady satisfaction of the demands of the crowns, forced her to abandon this demand rather than lose all hope of satisfaction. Soon thereafter, in July, the congress delegates once again took up the vexing problem of, in the words of the elector of Mainz, “the pretended Princely Hesse-Cassel satisfaction and their contentious Marburg succession.” Such discussions engendered so much criticism and pressure that the Cassel delegates were obliged to reduce their reparations claim to 800,000 Reichsthalers. Yet with strong support from the French, who saw here a way to drag out the war in the empire and so win some temporary advantage, Amalia Elisabeth remained otherwise inflexible, and stubbornly rejected the various divisions of the Marburg inheritance proffered by Trauttmansdorff. The congress delegates could do nothing but appeal to the French to intervene with their allies, “so that on account of the *privata* of the lady landgravine, the entire Roman Empire might not be stranded even longer in this fundamentally ruinous war, with the most extreme and obvious danger, and many thousands of people in miserable torment.” At any rate the congress itself was in disarray, as Trauttmansdorff had now announced his departure from Westphalia, and many wondered if anything could be resolved without him.⁹

Meanwhile, Amalia Elisabeth continued to try to solve her Marburg problem “dagger in hand,” as her delegates had advised her was sometimes necessary. On 14 July the fortress of Rheinfels fell into her hands after a two-week siege. Mortaigne was fatally wounded in the attack, but this was the kind of victory she needed to press her demands against Georg. Georg personally appealed to the emperor and Melander, but no help was forthcoming either from them or from the congress, where Amalia Elisabeth had specifically ordered her secret councilor Pagenstecher to block “all hope” of assistance to Georg from the plenipotentiaries of the estates. Seeing no other option, Georg now asked her to negotiate peace. For this he tasked a delegation led by his brother Johann, whom he had already sent to Cassel in May to attempt to gain a cease-fire. She agreed to talks, for she was as eager to conclude as was Georg. The military situation had been extraordinarily fluid so far, and her current significant advantage could quickly disappear. In a letter to her son she expressed her worry “that the great blessings that God has shown us may also be once again taken away on account of our great thanklessness and lack of repentance.” A good resolution of the Marburg affair, she feared, was now a race

against the clock. So on 17 August, after only a few weeks of talks, her councilors delivered to the Darmstadt representatives what they insisted was their final resolution, which amounted to a return to something near the situation before the imperial judgment of 1623. This outraged Georg, who raged in a letter to one of his diplomats that this “was not something that concerned hazelnuts, but land and people, and indeed, half a principality and the earthly well-being of ourselves and also our entire line and posterity. And such abruptness and threats are not only poor manners, but are also almost unheard of in such important negotiations.” At the end of the month he recalled his delegates to receive additional instructions that stressed to them the importance of standing firm.¹⁰

Georg was emboldened to maintain a hard line by yet another shift in the military situation—exactly the circumstances the landgravine had feared. On 15 August the elector of Cologne renounced the Truce of Ulm and reentered the war, with his army under the command of Lamboy. In part this was due to his frustration with the Swedes, who had continued to attack his holdings in Westphalia, but it was also due to his fury at the landgravine. Although she had promised to consider ending or lowering her contributions in his territories as part of the Truce of Ulm, she had in the end done no such thing. She dismissed his complaints. The damages done to her lands by the Catholic League since the beginning of the war, she argued, had given her the right of conquest, and he would surely do no less to her if he could than she now did to him. Somehow the elector found this less than convincing, and on 17 August, in an attempt to wrest from the landgravine her core territory in East Frisia, his general Lamboy launched an attack there with six thousand men. The Hessians, taken by surprise, suffered the loss of their border posts and then the fortress of Jemgum. Further losses were only avoided when they followed the Dutch model and flooded the countryside. Königsmarck and Rabenhaupt, abandoning a siege of Paderborn, rushed to assist, and the landgravine prayed that they would arrive in time, for “should this go awry,” she wrote her son, “then we are certainly lost, for the enemy is becoming very arrogant and proud. . . . I worry that there will be no peace, and then God help us! I really see no way that we can then get ourselves through, for the quarters can bear this no longer, and are so ruined and wasted that it cannot even be described.” With the advance of the Swedish-Hessian army and the complications of a flooded countryside, however, Lamboy retreated once again, and they were saved.¹¹

The landgravine's skills at multitasking were in clear evidence throughout these later months of 1647, as in addition to managing her war effort and her diplomatic forays, on 16 September she arranged an engagement between her daughter Emilie and Henri Charles de La Trémoille, prince of Tarent and Talmont, a French Calvinist and officer in Amalia Elisabeth's army. The war was never far from her thoughts, however, especially after Maximilian of Bavaria, ecstatic over a new deal offered by the emperor that would cede to him the former Palatine electoral title, the Upper Palatinate, and a hefty financial settlement, also rejoined the war on the imperial side—shifting the balance of power in the war even further. The deal over the Palatinate resolved a messy problem, but also altered the imperial constitution, since Karl Ludwig would be granted a new eighth electoral title and be returned his lands in the Lower Palatinate, including the old Palatine capital of Heidelberg, where Amalia Elisabeth had lived as a child. The risk posed to her by the Bavarian reentry into the war was real, but in a letter to her son in Paris she downplayed the danger. The Bavarians, she wrote, “now intend to devour alive the Swedes and the poor Hessians. This almost makes me joyous, however, since God in heaven laughs at such an onslaught and will certainly interrupt and annihilate such a plan.”¹²

In addition to the ongoing complexities of war and diplomacy at the imperial level, the landgravine was also still troubled by the opposition of her estates, who were continuing to demand, despite the sad failure of all their past efforts to overpower or overawe her, that she respect their ancient traditions and rights. This hostility bubbled again to the surface in September, when Erbmarschall Riedesel attempted to call yet another meeting of the Hessian knights. This meeting, which was to take place at Kirchhain (not the most comfortable location after all these years of war!), was not something the landgravine wanted to deal with, so she once again forbade their assembly. In response, forty-seven knights sent her a remonstrance, declaring that they were allowed by tradition to meet without the permission of the landgraves. They then added this complaint to the one already sent to the Reichskammergericht in 1646.¹³

October also saw the return of the Darmstadt delegation to Cassel, led by the councilor von Boyneburg, and hope rose again for a successful conclusion to the Hessian civil war. Indeed, by 19 October an agreement was reached—a true compromise. All past rulings (including the 1623 imperial judgment and the 1627 Hauptakkord) were declared void, which also voided the millions in fines and reparations Hesse-Cassel had owed by

their terms. Furthermore, the landgravine was given back Schmalkalden, Umstadt, Rhens, and Lower Katzenelnbogen (though Landgrave Johann was given a portion, for which she would be compensated). Following a concept worked out in April by the French and imperial delegates at Münster, she would agree to drop her until-now firm insistence on half the Marburg inheritance and instead receive a quarter plus a portion of another quarter, where this portion included Kirchhain and was worth an annual income of 8,000 gulden (around a third of the quarter—giving her a bit more than five-sixteenths of the entire inheritance); the rest would belong to Georg. The city, fortress, and university would be shared between the two, and should there be no agreement on university administration, each Hessian dynasty would be free to start its own university. The areas in the upper principality under her control would be allowed to maintain their religion in the form it was in 1604, i.e., Lutheranism (a condition that outraged the Reformed ministers of Cassel), but in the other territories ceded her (such as Schmalkalden), the confessions would be equal. As for the issue of precedence and seniority, this would belong to Wilhelm VI during his lifetime, and thereafter precedence would alternate between houses, beginning with Hesse-Cassel. Both houses would split evenly the Rhine tolls and other similar taxes. This agreement, carefully crafted by the delegates, did not sit well with Georg; now more confident than before, he refused to sign and imprisoned von Boyneburg for exceeding his mandate. Hoping to resolve matters at the congress instead, Georg broke off the Cassel negotiations entirely.¹⁴

Georg's increasing stubbornness was no accident, for the reentry of Bavaria into the war had markedly improved the prospects of the imperial war effort, plus Georg's appeals to the emperor were finally gaining traction. In late October, Lamboy brought his men to join Melander, and the two generals, reinforced by Bavarian troops under Jost Maximilian von Gronsfeld, advanced to Hesse-Cassel, where they were joined by Eberstein and his Darmstadt troops. Melander was home again, this time at the head of a twenty-thousand-man army. Although the emperor had asked Melander to assist Georg, a personal motivation for this attack is also entirely likely, for Melander had chosen to bring the entire force of the imperial army to Hesse, rather than use it to push the attack against the Swedish army as it retreated from Silesia. Advancing over the Werra River, Melander's great force passed through Fulda and Hersfeld, wreaking devastation as it went and scattering the residents before it. With their

families, livestock, and whatever they could carry, the poor people of Hesse fled into the woods or, with the landgravine's permission, the safety of the fortresses. Melander sent one contingent of four thousand troops under Montecuculi to Cassel, where they settled within sight of the city's cannons. His main military camp, meanwhile, was established about twelve miles away at Gudensberg, and from there he issued a demand to the Hessian estates for a ransom of 100,000 gulden and a further 100,000 a month as a war tax. When they and the landgravine refused, his troops proceeded to extract plunder by force. She was furious, yet helpless to do anything more than cling tenaciously to her fortresses, which were too strong for the imperialists to take. In a letter to her son, she described the treasonous Melander as "an unthankful, evil man." "We will fight until our last rites," she proclaimed; "God have mercy on us and steer away all attacks by godless, evil people!"¹⁵

On 15 November Melander's general war commissioner, the imperial war councilor Count von Traun, wrote the landgravine threatening that if she continued to refuse to surrender, he would destroy all Hesse with sword and fire. Gronsfeld, in a letter to a Hessian nobleman, criticized her for her "impolitic and unpatriotic" alliances with foreigners. She "has the choice of peace in her hands," he warned; "if she uses this great position for the welfare of the empire, she will be counted among the earthly goddesses; if not, and should she not recognize the imminent danger to herself, then her land will experience such things as have never happened in a thousand years." When his threats had no effect, Melander tried to appeal to his old friend Otto von der Malsburg, attempting to win him over with letters of protection for his personal lands and urging him to get the estates to negotiate. Von der Malsburg, interestingly, was not impressed (though he eagerly accepted the letters of protection). He reminded Melander of Hesse-Cassel's excellent defenses, which Melander himself had established, and of the fact that neither Wilhelm V nor Amalia Elisabeth had ever given in to extortion from their enemies, but, on the contrary, had taken out their rage on the innocent residents of other places, such as Westphalia. He then urged Melander to retreat for the good of the people he had once served and whose religion he shared. Melander declined, and issued yet another demand to Amalia Elisabeth to submit to imperial mercy and abandon her foreign alliances. If she did so, he wrote, she would achieve all her war aims; if not, her state would be destroyed. The landgravine, secure in her fortress at Cassel, again refused. As always, she

put her ultimate goals above the immediate interests of her people; and still she mourned for her subjects. "Oh, the poor people," she wrote her son, "who have laid out in the open air with their small children in the rain and wind for over three weeks now; they grieve me to the heart, and yet it cannot be helped until the good Lord desires. It now stands in His hand and power alone."¹⁶

Yet the landgravine's earlier actions also influenced matters, for she had denied valuable resources to the enemy by instructing the common people to flee and the nobility to refuse to provide any aid or contributions. In late November, with supplies dwindling and soldiers deserting in large numbers, an annoyed Gronsfeld moved his Bavarian forces out to Hersfeld and then on to Franconia. Despite a severe shortage of provisions, Melander and Lamboy remained, but sent large contingents to Fritzlar, Kirchhain, Frankenberg, and elsewhere to seize whatever meager contributions and food they could find. Georg of Hesse-Darmstadt, meanwhile, had been pressing Melander to reconquer Marburg, and now the general agreed. Although the landgravine's commander there was able to block three efforts by Melander's forces to storm the city walls, they eventually fell, and the defenders, along with many of the city's women, children, and elderly, fled up into the safety of the fortress, which was too strong for the attackers to take. In frustration, the hungry imperial troops engaged in some plundering and mishandling of the people, which led the enraged landgravine to retaliate by having her men blow up Georg's castle of Blankenstein. With Marburg pacified, Melander, overconfident, now moved his headquarters into a house in the city. There, on 29 December, just as he was sitting down to dinner with some noble guests, the Cassel defenders (armed with inside knowledge of his whereabouts and uncannily precise aim) fired a barrage of cannonballs down into the house. The dining room table was blown to splinters, wounding numerous imperial officers and the visiting margrave of Baden, who had some teeth knocked out. Melander himself was so severely injured by flying debris that those present thought he would surely die from blood loss alone. This was the final straw, and on 2 January 1648, the wounded Melander packed his bags and, along with his now massively depleted army, retreated to Fulda, abandoning Georg to his fate. Wrangel and Königsmarck, meanwhile, had taken advantage of Melander's distraction in Hesse in order to regroup in Brunswick, where they extracted a wealth of supplies, including over fourteen thousand horses, and where they were soon joined by Turenne. In January

the well-appointed, well-rested Swedish-French army advanced into Hesse to assist the landgravine, but as Melander had already moved out, they followed him as he retreated to southern Germany. Rabenhaupt arrived soon afterward from East Frisia, and over the course of January and February dislodged the last stubborn imperial holdouts from the landgravine's territory. Melander's decision to attack the landgravine rather than the Swedes had thus been a fruitless, if destructive, exercise, which had cost him and the emperor a priceless opportunity to shift the balance of the war in their favor.¹⁷

To her relief at the salvation of Hesse-Cassel was added joy, as in February 1648 her nineteen-year-old son and heir Wilhelm VI finally returned from his long trip abroad. Events at Westphalia too were falling into place, as the January Peace of Münster between the Spanish and Dutch had precipitated a major push for a resolution at the congress. This was spearheaded by a new German third party, led by Maximilian of Bavaria and the new elector of Mainz, who reinforced the imperial estates at Osnabrück in their effort to seize the initiative from the emperor and the die-hard Catholic estates, and to resolve on their own the remaining issues—including the problem of the Reformed. On 24 March, therefore, the delegates at Osnabrück accepted “those who call themselves Reformed” as Protestants, granting them all the rights and privileges given to Catholics and Lutherans by the Peace of Augsburg. Also agreed was a Protestant form of the Ecclesiastical Reservation, such that any Lutheran or Calvinist prince who converted to the other confession would be barred from imposing his new faith on his people. In this way, the point of religion both rejected and accepted the distinctness of Calvinism from Lutheranism, a difficult balancing act that greatly concerned the elector of Brandenburg, who saw here a trick and unsuccessfully attempted at the last minute to block the article from inclusion in the final peace. After long years of fighting, arguing, and demanding, Amalia Elisabeth had finally won her most important war aim. Her delegates and those of Brandenburg had led the fight, and this victory, which would grant Calvinists not just toleration, but full legalization with all the same rights and privileges granted Lutherans and Catholics, was due in no small part to her relentlessness and iron determination over the years.¹⁸

The Marburg matter, however, remained a thorn in her side. And not only was it entangling the empire in further warfare, it was also delaying the larger peace, for her delegates, backed by the foreign crowns and especially

Sweden, were now insisting that the congress resolve this before dealing with the few remaining significant issues, the most contentious of which were the Swedish satisfaction and the return of and amnesty for Protestants in Habsburg hereditary lands (known as the *tandem omnes* article in reference to its first two words). Yet the sole remaining intra-Hessian disagreements concerned control of the city and university of Marburg and 3,000 gulden worth of land (a mere 2,000 Reichsthalers!). The sheer insanity of this fact caused great grumblings among the delegates. The Saxe-Altenburg deputy, Thumshirn, for example, wondered aloud if the relatively minor issues not yet resolved between the two Hessian houses were sufficient reason “to leave the Roman Empire in the flames of war.” With both Georg and Amalia Elisabeth facing ever-increasing criticism that they were allowing petty personal interests to block universal peace, and with Georg’s support from the emperor increasingly irrelevant (given the new aggressiveness of the imperial estates at Osnabrück), in early April the two Hessian houses reopened negotiations at Cassel under the mediation of Duke Ernst of Saxe-Gothe. To spur the two sides to greater efforts, on 8 April the Protestant estates issued an ultimatum: the Hessians must make a binding agreement within the next two weeks or the delegates would make one for them.¹⁹

The collected estates at Osnabrück were similarly impatient with the landgravine’s other remaining demands, and insisted that she moderate them for the good of the entire empire. Facing enormous pressure, in mid-March Krosigk had again lowered her reparations claim to 600,000 Reichsthalers, but the landgravine insisted that this sum be collected solely from Catholic princes, specifically the electors of Mainz and Cologne, and the rulers of Münster, Paderborn, and Fulda. The emperor, the elector of Bavaria, and others maintained that the cost be borne instead by all those lands and princes now paying her contributions, a group that also included the elector of Brandenburg, the duke of Neuburg, the count of East Frisia, and the landgrave of Hesse-Darmstadt. This was out of the question for the landgravine. The first was her friend and ally, the second had already gained an agreement from her for no further extractions after the peace, the third had gained the same through the mediation of the Dutch, and the fourth was a fellow Hessian and one whose future friendliness was of the greatest importance. There was also disagreement over her demand to hold certain places as surety for her reparations—places she would be granted in perpetuity should payments not be satisfied. With the

elector of Cologne outraged at the possible loss of lands to the landgravine and the elector of Bavaria insisting that they simply had to resolve this issue, on 8 April, the same day they passed the ultimatum in the Marburg matter, the delegates offered her most of what she wanted. This included a special amnesty of 1618 for her and all of her heirs and subjects; the diocese of Hersfeld; and her rights over and use of the territories of Schaumburg, Bückeberg, Sachsenhagen, and Stadthagen in the bishopric of Minden. Furthermore, in return for her deoccupation of territories in the archbishoprics of Mainz and Cologne, as well as in Paderborn, Münster, and Fulda, she would be granted 600,000 Reichsthalers for reparations and the maintenance of her troops, to be paid within nine months after the ratification of the peace by all those who were, since 1 March 1648, already paying her contributions (though the elector of Brandenburg and the landgrave of Hesse-Darmstadt were exempted by a special statement from the imperial and Swedish delegates). To ensure the payment she would hold as security Coesfeld (in Münster), Neuss (in the archbishopric of Cologne), and Neuhaus (the seat of the bishop of Paderborn), and would maintain there her fortresses and all necessary officials, although their number should not exceed twelve hundred infantry and one hundred cavalry. On receipt of the first 300,000 Reichsthalers she would be obliged to return Neuss, but could keep Neuhaus and Coesfeld until the entire sum was paid to her, with late payment charged a 5 percent annual interest rate. There would be no additional money for the satisfaction of her armies—something the collected delegates were united on. The Brunswick-Lüneburg delegates, for example, furious over her extractions of contributions from their lands, stated that the Hessians had already, and to excess, fleeced the empire, and had either already given this money to the troops, who so had nothing to complain about, or had instead “stuffed the extorted money into their sack, in which case they were themselves responsible to give it out once again.” Such criticism did not please the landgravine, who directed her delegates to stand firm. They were supported, as usual, by the Swedes, to the great consternation of the collected imperial delegates, who again bemoaned the Cassel delegates’ selfishness in the face of the “calamities in the upper Circles and in all places of the Roman Empire.”²⁰

On 24 April the landgravine and Georg (represented by his eldest son, Ludwig, and an additional four councilors), finalized their peace treaty at Cassel. This agreement, like the one worked out months before, was both a repudiation of the Hauptakkord and a compromise, but this time Georg,

aware of the new impotence of the emperor to aid him at Westphalia, acquiesced. Amalia Elisabeth gained back the lower county of Katzenelnbogen, Schmalkalden, Umstadt, and Rhens, though as before, Georg's brother Johann kept part of Katzenelnbogen (though the landgravine was compensated with other comparable territories, and these lands would also revert to Hesse-Cassel on the expiry of Johann's male line). As for the Marburg inheritance, Georg was given his family's original half, Amalia Elisabeth was given a quarter (including Rheinfels), and the remaining disputed quarter was divided unevenly between them. She received a portion equal to 5,000 gulden annual income, or around a fifth of the quarter, while Georg received the rest. This was less than she had gained a few months earlier, yet this portion now included the most valuable parts of the inheritance, including both Kirchhain and the city and fortress of Marburg. To recompense Georg for this great loss, she agreed to give him the relatively minor lump sum of 60,000 gulden (approximately four years' worth of income from the city). The university was to be shared by both houses; Hesse-Darmstadt would choose professors in the fields of theology and philosophy; Cassel would choose those in law and medicine. Both the religious terms of the treaty and the matter of precedence were decided as in the October 1647 agreement, and the treaty also resolved long-standing conflicts over various other feudal rights, debts, tolls and taxes, documentation and registers, and so on. Hessian institutions long split, such as the Hessian estates, courts, and so on, were once again to be united. The announcement of this peace, which took place in her castle and was attended by numerous Hessian signatories, along with Georg's son Ludwig, Amalia Elisabeth, and Wilhelm VI, was celebrated in grand style, with a moving speech by Duke Ernst of Saxe-Gothe and a ceremonial destruction of the 1627 Hauptakkord, which Duke Ernst cut in half with his own hands. Only the news of the recent death at The Hague of Amalia Elisabeth's mother, Katharina Belgica, darkened the festivities. The peace was soon signed by Duke Ernst, Georg, Amalia Elisabeth, and the three Rotenburg landgraves, and a copy was then forwarded to Westphalia for inclusion in the final agreement.²¹

At Westphalia, remaining issues included the emperor's unflinching demand for an exceptional situation for the Habsburg hereditary territories and the satisfaction of the Swedish army. Although both these matters were of great interest to the landgravine, for her the most important remaining point was the satisfaction of her own troops. This was a serious

problem, as the soldiers would surely refuse to disband without their back pay, and might also take out their rage on the poor occupants of the lands around them. She could not raise the necessary funds from additional contributions, given the devastation of the empire, and subsidies from the French had only become more unreliable over time. This was exactly the problem facing the Swedes, and on 4 June, as their own demand was being discussed in earnest by the delegates at Osnabrück (against the wishes of the emperor, who was firmly opposed), the Swedes asked the princes and estates to consider Hesse-Cassel's requirements as well, arguing that since the landgravine's army had been allied with the Swedes' own, it should be treated similarly. Yet while the congress soon agreed to a payment of 5 million Reichsthalers for the Swedish army (considerably less than the 20 million the Swedes had originally demanded), the Hessians were instead admonished for wanting to be treated differently from any other estate of the empire. Even worse, the landgravine's delegates were outraged to learn that they were not to be excluded from the Swedish satisfaction, and that their share would come to around 100,000 Reichsthalers.²²

Back in Cassel, the landgravine's court life continued, with the usual stream of visitors and ordinary matters of state. On 25 May, however, a special day of celebration had occurred when her daughter Emilie married Prince Henri Charles of Talmont, whom the landgravine promoted to major general. The arrival of news of the defeat and death of Melander at Zusmarshausen in Bavaria on 17 May (the last great battle of the war) by the combined forces of Turenne and Wrangel would only have cheered her further. With the imperial army crushed, French-Swedish troops then proceeded to ravage an undefended Bavaria, while Königsmarck moved unopposed toward Prague and the Hessians distracted Lamboy in Westphalia and on the Lower Rhine. Lamboy had begun a concerted effort to drive the Hessians out of the region back in March, forcing the outnumbered Geyso to retreat into the fortress of Gesecke (around twelve miles southwest of Paderborn), which Lamboy had then besieged. Landgrave Ernst's attempt to relieve the fortress was relatively unsuccessful, for while Geyso used the disturbance to retreat with the majority of his forces to nearby Lippstadt, Ernst and many of his troops were captured and held for ransom. With the fortress still defended by a small contingent of Hessian troops, however, Lamboy decided to abandon the siege and follow Geyso, whom the landgravine had now elevated to be her new lieutenant general. Both armies crossed back over the Rhine, and on 14 June they met at

Grevenbruch, where Geyso was victorious, putting Lamboy's troops to flight. The Hessians were reinforced by additional forces in August, and wrested the city of Düren from the imperialists in September. Lamboy, outmaneuvered in Westphalia, advanced instead toward Hesse, a move that successfully distracted Geyso and Landgrave Fritz from yet another fruitless assault on Paderborn. The possible endangerment of Hesse-Cassel angered Amalia Elisabeth, who was suffering from increasingly poor health and in no mood for this. In an attempt to ameliorate her pain, in June she had visited the baths at Bad Wildungen (around twenty-two miles southwest of Cassel) with her two eldest daughters, Emilie and Charlotte, and then when this was unsuccessful had instead tried Wiesbaden in August and September—again to little effect. She accepted Geyso's apology for his missteps against Lamboy, but the Westphalian delegates were less forgiving of her continued warmaking and of her diplomats' loud excuses. In response to the Saxon delegate's complaint that Scheffer should just be quiet, he boldly exclaimed that even if he were quiet, the two crowns would speak for him, and so too would the thousands of troops in the field.²³

By October 1648, both the French and Swedish satisfactions had been agreed, only a few matters remained to be resolved at Westphalia, and peace was in the air. Yet one problem remained for the landgravine—the satisfaction of her troops. The Hessians insisted on three points: that Hesse-Cassel, unlike other states of the empire, be exempted from paying the satisfaction of the Swedish troops; that immediately after the ratification of the peace, and in order to deal with urgent military expenses, Amalia Elisabeth be given an advance payment of 100,000 Reichsthalers from the 600,000 owed her for reparations, but that this sum then also be deducted from future imperial taxes she might owe; and that she also be paid an additional 200,000 for the satisfaction of her army. The congress blocked the first of these demands, but the problem was resolved when the Swedes agreed to hold her blameless for her portion. The other two demands were similarly controversial, especially as her troops were even then making clear her disdain for peace. Given the seemingly unshakable support she had from the crowns, however, the frustrated delegates at last agreed to consider an advance payment of 100,000 Reichsthalers after the conclusion of the peace. As this sum would also be deducted from future taxes, the actual value of this offer was doubled. They hoped thereby to have satisfied her; they had not. On 17 October, the Cassel delegates managed to

extract a promise from both crowns that they would not sign a peace without Amalia Elisabeth's military satisfaction, though the Swedes questioned "whether the landgravine was prepared to make herself despised by the entire empire over this matter." But of course she was. With every other issue settled, however (except for a few constitutional problems deferred for consideration at a new imperial Diet), the foreign and imperial delegates arranged for a ceremonial signing of the two treaties in Münster on 24 October. Yet at eight o'clock that very morning the French plenipotentiary Servien and a Swedish secretary, true to their word, appeared before the collected delegates and informed them that neither France nor Sweden would sign until the estates granted Hesse-Cassel both the advance of 100,000 Reichsthalers and yet another 100,000 deducted from her portion of an extraordinary tax for disbanding the imperial forces under Lamboy. One can only imagine the consternation this demand raised among the delegates, who, apprehensive about the possible delay of, or even damage to, the peace, agreed within hours to both an oral and written promise of the 100,000 Reichsthalers advance (deducted from future taxes) but nothing else. That was good enough for the crowns, and thus the landgravine, only hours before the final conclusion of the peace, gained the last possible piece of her satisfaction. The finished agreements were signed that evening by the delegates of the foreign crowns, the emperor, and the German estates, including Krosigk, who signed the treaty between the emperor and France, and Scheffer, who signed the treaty between the emperor and Sweden.²⁴

Conclusion

THE PEACE OF WESTPHALIA, which consisted of two separate treaties, the Instrumentum Pacis Osnabrugensis (IPO) and the Instrumentum Pacis Monsteriensis (IPM), was not a complete victory for the landgravine. The special influence of the electors remained, so her constitutional argument that the empire was a broad aristocracy, not an absolute monarchy or an elite oligarchy, was partially defeated. But in one significant way, her understanding of the aristocratic structure of the empire was satisfied and endorsed. The princes and estates had not only been included in the peace, they had also been named its fellow guarantors (along with the emperor and the two crowns). Yet this was only the beginning. Article VIII, 2 of the IPO stated that each and every elector, prince, and estate of the empire

shall enjoy without contradiction the right of suffrage in all deliberations about the affairs of the empire, especially in the consideration or interpretation of laws, the declaration of war, the imposition of taxes, the establishment of levies and quartering of soldiers . . . as well as when peace or alliances are to be made. . . . First of all, however, the individual estates shall have the eternal and free right to make alliances among themselves or with foreigners for their conservation and security, yet only where such alliances are not directed against the emperor, the empire, the public peace, or especially against this treaty, and where

they preserve in all ways the oath by which all are bound to the emperor and empire.

This was as clear and thorough a statement of princely rights as one could ever want. Indeed, scholars of international relations have seen in this article and in this peace in general a total victory for the principle of state sovereignty and the beginning of what they term the Westphalian System, a form of international relations based on the equal interactions of sovereign territorial states. This is taking things a bit too far. The peace did not address the international state system, only the rights of the imperial estates within the imperial structure, and it certainly did not eliminate the contemporary conception of the empire as hierarchical and based on complex webs of social prestige and traditional rights and privileges. For example, although the estates of the empire were now expressly permitted the right to make foreign and internal alliances (something they had long practiced and had only been barred from at the Peace of Prague), they were still required to maintain the ancient principle of *Reichstreue* (loyalty to the empire), and in practice very few even attempted to use this right or to practice an independent foreign policy after 1648 (with Austria and Brandenburg-Prussia being the main counterexamples). In addition, although the estates of the empire were now guaranteed a vote on matters of importance in future imperial Diets, the electoral princes (whose numbers had been increased to eight and later nine) still not only controlled the electoral college but also, due to their significant land holdings, held almost a third of the votes in the princely college. Furthermore, the very smallest imperial princes remained generally impotent after the peace, as they continued to share votes (with as many as one hundred sharing only a handful of collective votes) or, for imperial knights, were expressly denied any votes at all. Nor did the peace finally resolve all arguments over the nature of the empire or the relationship between emperor and estates, though it did calm the storms of disagreement and create at least a general framework for future consensus. Within individual imperial principalities or territories, moreover, the Peace of Westphalia changed little (except in the matter of religion, discussed below). Just as before, princes and cities continued to control their own internal government, limited by existing imperial law, interstate treaties or agreements, and the traditional rights of local estates and representative bodies.¹

Yet this was still a success for the landgravine. Her intention had never been to break free of the empire, or to reject the emperor as its head; she

only wanted a legal recognition of her part in the larger sovereignty of the empire, one she believed (and the peace indeed confirmed) was shared by emperor and imperial estates together. This had put her into direct conflict with Ferdinand III, who had, like his father before him, attempted to operate as if only he, or he and the electors, spoke for the empire as a whole. Amalia Elisabeth had also not wished to eliminate social prestige and hierarchy, but only to ensure the preservation of traditional princely privileges she believed were being threatened—and the diminishment of the electors had seemed to offer a path to that end. There is no evidence that she was opposed to the idea of electors in principle, but she certainly felt the system, as it had developed, was being abused to her detriment. The shifting policies of her husband (who had first championed a diminishment of the power of the electoral college, then attempted to gain an electoral title, and then, when that seemed impossible, again advocated the broad aristocratic program) are a strong indication of this ends-based strategy in Hesse. This trend can also be seen in Hesse-Cassel's postwar efforts, beginning especially under the landgravine's grandson, Karl, to acquire for Hesse-Cassel an electoral seat—a strategy that finally succeeded in 1803.²

Amalia Elisabeth's drive to gain recognition of the role of the princes in the larger sovereignty of the empire was also tied to her desire to protect and ensure what she saw as her own traditional rights over her people, lands, and church, a view her Calvinist theologians assured her was correct. Hence she saw no contradiction between her vigorous rejection of the repeated claims of the Hessian estates against her power, and her simultaneous demand for exactly such rights for the imperial estates against the emperor. In both cases, she was trying to save the empire from damage caused by what she viewed as innovation and attacks on the appropriate and divinely instituted authority of the imperial princes. Yet here the unique circumstances of Hesse-Cassel's wartime experience put her in a good position not just against the emperor, but also against the Hessian estates, which, since she did not have to depend on them to approve taxation, but had sufficient funds from contributions extracted from occupied lands and from French subsidies and pensions, lost all leverage over her. Furthermore, the new administrative and financial system necessary to oversee the large, dispersed Hessian army and the many lands they occupied (a system begun by her husband but then maintained and expanded by her), also led to a strengthening and centralization of her government's control and an extraordinary shift in power relationships within Hesse-

Cassel. Under Landgrave Moritz the estates had been powerful enough to fire princely councilors and even, in the end, force the landgrave's abdication. But Amalia Elisabeth, despite the seeming weakness of her position as mere regent, was able not only to minimize the estates' influence in the regency council, but also to impose unusual taxation on them, bar their meetings, and make use of conflict between the cities and the Hessian knights to bypass their concerns over her policies. Thus she had much more freedom and flexibility in her domestic and foreign affairs than had previous Hessian rulers, and she used this freedom to centralize her control and establish a more absolutist state. She was not alone in this attitude or effort, of course, for even without her advantages, many other rulers had been simultaneously attempting the same balancing act: demanding rights and privileges from the emperor while decrying or suppressing such demands from their local estates and aristocracies.³

As for the landgravine's insistence that the *ius territoriali* contained within itself the *ius reformandi*, the treaty stated that all princes and estates enjoyed the possession of "territorial rights both in ecclesiastical and political affairs," and this point, that princes possessed the *ius reformandi*, was repeated numerous other times throughout the peace. But what exactly was the nature of this *ius reformandi* after 1648? Important first of all was the clear and explicit inclusion of Calvinists in all the rights and benefits granted Catholics and Lutherans by the Peace of Augsburg, and this not as adherents of the Confession of Augsburg or as a *confessio variata*, but as a separate confession entirely. This had been, one can say without fear of contradiction, the principal war aim of the landgravine since her ascension to power. From now on, no matter what happened in the empire, the legal status of Calvinism was secure. No longer would she and her fellow religionists have to try to associate themselves with the rights of the Lutherans. By gaining an express recognition of both the distinctiveness and the legal rights of Calvinists, she had won long-term security within the empire for her church. And here, as in the inclusion of the imperial princes and estates in the peace, one can see her actions and strategy as a determining factor. Her influence over the foreign crowns pushed the Swedes (however grudgingly) to add her religious demands to their own, and in many ways it was this pressure on the congress and emperor, plus her own military might, that forced the necessary concessions.⁴

Another significant result of the peace for the landgravine was the establishment of a new normal date of 1 January 1624 for the restitution of

ecclesiastical properties. This meant the retention by and restitution to Protestants of numerous territories, especially in the northern portion of the empire, and the final end to the 1635 Edict of Restitution. Furthermore, although individuals were allowed freedom of conscience (a rather new and untested idea) and the freedom to emigrate for religious reasons, the religious status of the empire was now fixed as of 1624, and the expansion of the Ecclesiastical Reservation to Protestants meant that any prince who converted in the future from Lutheranism to Calvinism (or vice versa) would not be permitted to convert his people, change their religious practices or laws, or molest or persecute them in any way. Indeed, by dint of the new normal date, no further imposed religious reform was allowed anywhere in the empire. But if this was the case, what was the meaning of the *ius reformandi*? Interestingly, this now looked much more like the Catholic interpretation, argued since the Peace of Augsburg, that the *ius reformandi* merely meant the oversight and supervision of territorial churches, something that was already common practice. Protestants such as Amalia Elisabeth had argued that the *ius reformandi* was much more extensive, including both oversight and the right to full conversion. Now the Catholic version would be enshrined into law.⁵

Thus the final religious solution was not exactly as Amalia Elisabeth intended. For her personally, this meant little, as she did not intend to alter Hesse-Cassel's religion further, and now both her church and her control over that church were secured. On the other hand, her Lutheran subjects also gained protection from future oppression, since the peace required both freedom of conscience and free private worship for religious minorities existing in 1624. It would fall to her son to attempt to heal the long-simmering rift within Hesse between Lutherans and Calvinists. This was not entirely possible, but Wilhelm VI would at least make steps in that direction through the 1661 colloquy he called to begin a civil conversation among theologians from both sides. The larger question of the future of Calvinism is a more interesting one. It would never be as powerful in the empire as Catholicism and Lutheranism, and since the religious makeup of the empire was now roughly fixed, reigning Calvinists would always be outnumbered by princes of other confessions. Indeed, if anything, the later seventeenth and eighteenth centuries saw the return of a number of Protestant princes to the Catholic fold. Among these, the landgravine would have been horrified to know, was her own descendant Friedrich II, who proclaimed his conversion in 1754. Yet here the restrictions to

princely sovereignty found in the Westphalian peace protected the Reformed church in Hesse, for even had Friedrich wished to transform the religion of his people, the terms of the peace did not permit him to do so.⁶

The peace had also given Protestants a major victory by resolving the question of the relationship between Protestants and Catholics on the principle of parity in imperial Diets and “amicable agreement,” rather than majority vote, for any religious matter before the collected estates (parity in the imperial courts had been a rather more vexing problem, and was one of the few issues put off for resolution at a future imperial Diet). Of course, such parity subsumed Calvinists into the larger group of Protestants, and indeed, when the *Corpus Evangelicorum*, the body of all Protestant princes, was established in 1653 as part of this agreement (Catholics formed their own *Corpus Catholicorum*), it would, like similar Protestant groupings of the past, be dominated by Lutheran Saxony. Still, the landgrave’s efforts meant that despite the dearest-held desires of numerous Catholics and Lutherans, the Reformed Church survived and even flourished in the empire, its existence and rights protected under imperial law for all time.⁷

The peace had resolved not just empire-wide issues, but the landgrave’s private matters as well, including the revocation of all judgments against her and her house since the beginning of the war; a special redundant statement specifically including Hesse-Cassel into the Peace of Augsburg (just to be sure); the confirmation of her territorial holdings in Hersfeld and Schaumburg; a financial compensation of 600,000 Reichsthalers in reparations (which no other prince of the empire received); her maintenance of the fortresses of Neuss, Coesfeld, and Neuhaus as security for payment; and the confirmation of her successful agreement with Georg of Hesse-Darmstadt, which had returned over a quarter of the Marburg inheritance, Schmalkalden, Katzenelnbogen, and more to her house. In all, a full fifteen paragraphs of the treaty (inserted verbatim into both the IPO and IPM) were dedicated to her affairs. Considering that the Elector Palatine, whose actions in Bohemia had precipitated this war, had twenty-one paragraphs, this is yet another indication of her importance in both the war and the peace.⁸

In other ways, too, the treaty generally, though not fully, met the landgrave’s war aims. Amnesty in Hesse and in the rest of the empire was set to the prewar status of 1618 (except in the Habsburg hereditary lands, where it was fixed at 1630 to allow the emperor to maintain his full re-

Catholicization); the Prince Palatine was at least partially restored to his lands and title; and Sweden held its imperial territories in fief to the empire, though France gained full—if imprecise and later contested—sovereignty over its lands in Alsace. Numerous other particular territorial reshufflings were caused by local conditions or by the demands of the foreign crowns, but these were of no great concern to her one way or another. She had begun her reign in dire straits: a dead husband, in exile in a military camp surrounded by a mutinous army, the Marburg inheritance fully lost, burdened by millions in debts, Hesse-Cassel itself under imperial occupation, a semitreasonous nobility, and in imminent danger of the complete loss of her state, her church, and her role as regent to her children. Now she had pushed through at least a portion of her constitutional program and ensured that the rights of the imperial estates were enshrined in law, won the legalization of Calvinism and the rights of Protestants in general, regained a large part of the Marburg inheritance, expanded her children's inheritance, cemented her power over her people and church, and come out with a financial settlement large enough to resolve many of her debts and to dismiss her troops.⁹

With the war over, the landgravine's work was not done, of course. There was a great deal of rebuilding to do, and a great deal of organization required to implement the peace. This was made more difficult as she was increasingly sick and in excruciating pain. So debilitating was her illness that, to her great distress, she was unable to perform the honorary duty of elevating the young daughter of Landgrave Fritz during her November 1648 christening or, in the end, even to attend the affair, which was celebrated with great ceremony and even fireworks. In a letter to Wilhelm, who left that month for a short visit to Berlin to see his future bride, she complained that she "felt worse and worse," and later explained that she could hardly walk and so had to be carried everywhere. Her daughter Charlotte was concerned, but assured her brother that though their mother was not improving, she was also, "thank God, not worse."¹⁰

On 26 December the landgravine officially ratified the peace, although only on 18 February 1649 did the exchange of the ratification documents by the foreign crowns and the emperor finally occur. There was also family and other business to take care of, as early 1649 saw the courtship of her daughter Charlotte by the elector Karl Ludwig of the Palatinate, the departure of Emilie to be with her husband in France, a ceremonial day of prayer to celebrate the peace in mid-April, and then a trip to Bad Ems in

late April with her daughters Charlotte and Elisabeth, in yet another attempt at a medical cure. This effort was more successful than the last, and she reported that she was feeling much better, though she still lacked any mobility and the food and wine were outrageously expensive. She was quite pleased by a visit from the archbishop of Trier, who was very polite and also gave her two cartloads of wine. In May her oldest sister, Charlotte of Hanau, joined her at Ems. This was delightful, but her sister's condition was so poor that Amalia Elisabeth worried that she was close to death. In June the landgravine returned home, not because she was cured (indeed she was still almost completely unable to walk), but because, as she complained to her son, "daily all kinds of foreign visitors to the baths are arriving . . . and I have to make room and place for them since we only have this house as a rental." The same month Wilhelm VI departed again for Berlin, where on 14 July he married his Brandenburg princess, Hedwig Sophie, before the couple returned to Cassel in August. The landgravine threw an enormous festival for their homecoming. The city was strewn with decorations and triumphal arches, and there were jousts, stag hunts, and feasts to which all the local dignitaries and neighboring princely families were invited. This would be a good marriage, and on Wilhelm's untimely death in 1663, Hedwig Sophie would, like Amalia Elisabeth, become a talented and dedicated regent to their young son, Wilhelm VII. According to one who knew her, Hedwig Sophie "has a great appearance, is of nice height, chubby, and very majestic. She lacks a noble pride," this observer noted, "and kindness and generosity are her dominant virtues, but she is also very religious and charitable. Piety is the base of all virtues, but ruling a state also requires a spirit, prudence, and steadfastness, and she has all these qualities." So Amalia Elisabeth could be proud of her daughter-in-law, who would carry on the great tradition of Hessian female regents. But this was all in the future. Now, soon after the happy occasion of the return of her son and his bride, she was faced with yet another loss, for on 20 July came the death of her sister Charlotte.¹¹

The year 1650 saw more excitement, as Amalia Elisabeth's daughter Charlotte married Karl Ludwig on 22 February in an elaborate ceremony at Cassel. The Prince Palatine was ecstatic at his beautiful and shapely blond bride, whom he brought back to his capital of Heidelberg in April. But this would not be a happy marriage for long, as Charlotte had a nasty temper. Indeed, the quarrels would become so extreme that the couple (who were the parents of the famous Liselotte von der Pfalz, sister-in-law

to Louis XIV of France) eventually divorced in 1657. Even more pleasing for the landgravine than all these marriages was the birth in Cassel in April of her first grandchild and Wilhelm VI's first daughter, Charlotte Amalia, who would one day be the wife of Christian V of Denmark and mother of a king. By this point the landgravine had seen to most of the requirements for the implementation of the peace (though the last security fortresses in her occupied territories would only be released in July 1651), and so, given the steady deterioration of her health and Wilhelm's twenty-first birthday on 23 May, she decided to step down as ruler of Hesse-Cassel. On 3 September, therefore, she ordered published a proclamation of her intent to abdicate the next month at Cassel.¹²

The abdication ceremony was something to remember. At eight o'clock in the morning on 5 October, the guests gathered in the castle for a sermon delivered by the court chaplain, Johann Stockenius, who took as his subject King David's abdication in favor of his son Solomon. Then the knights accompanied Wilhelm VI to his chambers, returning again at eleven o'clock, when they and the prelates entered the Golden Room. There they joined the representatives of the city, the government, doctors, professors, secretaries, chamberlains, lawyers, mayors, and leading burghers from Cassel, and then also the nobles of the court, the secret and governing councilors, and the landgravine herself, who, unable to walk, was carried in on her usual litter by two attendants. Young Wilhelm and his mother were seated together, Wilhelm on a black, velvet-covered chair. When everyone had assembled and all was still, Vultejus, standing among the other councilors, stepped forward and spoke on the landgravine's behalf. He stressed the extraordinary effort, worry, fear, burdens, and adversity she had faced since she had taken up the regency thirteen years earlier. Now, in the name of the Holy Trinity, he told them, she transferred that government to her son and wished him all of God's blessings and fortune. Furthermore, he said, as a mother, she reminded and admonished him to fear God, to be just, and to follow other Christian virtues. At this, she released all the prelates, knights, and people from their remaining duties to her as regent, and transferred these duties over to her son. Those present then proclaimed their loyalty to Wilhelm and swore their allegiance. After the oath, Hofmarschall Jacob von Hoff rose to thank Amalia Elisabeth for her long service, wished her long life, and prayed that the Almighty would bless the new government of this land. He then turned to the collected assembly and once again urged them to

follow their oaths and assured them that in return, His Highness the landgrave would continue to maintain their traditional rights and privileges. This speech was followed by another from Erbmarschall Riedesel, who congratulated Wilhelm on his ascension and assured him that they would indeed offer their loyalty, but requested that Wilhelm, in turn, actually protect and maintain their rights and privileges. This was not particularly subtle of Riedesel, but given the long-standing hostility between the landgraves and the estates, one could not expect much more. After all these speeches, the landgravine and Wilhelm retired to their rooms, while the others milled around congratulating each other until the final feast was laid out and everyone ate.¹³

Now free of the burden of state, the landgravine, accompanied by her daughter Elisabeth, visited Heidelberg to see Charlotte in March 1651. While there she was happy to be greeted by the residents as a second Deborah, and to be present for the birth of her first grandson, Karl. Her physical misery was enormous, and she suffered from frequent fevers and from a painful operation performed by a local surgeon. Yet she had an incredible will to live. She had not yet failed entirely, she wrote her son, and “may God grant this further, for He knows that I am still, in soul and body, both useful and blessed. I hope that the great pain that I currently endure will finally subside.” Just in case, however, she now saw to her last will and testament. In early July she and Elisabeth returned to Cassel, and shortly thereafter, at eight o’clock in the evening on 28 August, she died. Grateful for the continued loyalty of the citizens of the capital city of Cassel, who had suffered such hardships during her reign, in her testament she gave 3,000 Reichsthalers to the city’s poor, and provided for a beautiful memorial votive tablet to be constructed within the church of St. Martin, where she was buried and where she lies today.¹⁴

Over the years, despite all her worries and pain, she had persevered, refusing to budge from her principles or her demands. In many ways her stubbornness paid off, but the costs had been terrible, both to her own health and especially to the lives and goods of her people and of the empire at large. It is impossible to say with certainty that the war would have ended in 1638 or 1640 had she agreed to the first or second Mainz agreements, or in 1642 had she come to peace at Goslar, but it seems quite likely that it would at least not have lasted so long. The weight of her army on the imperial side might well have been the tipping point, and given the foreign crowns’ insistence to the end that they fought for the German

liberties, how many more years could they have gone on without any German allies at their side? But we shall never know what could have happened, since she never gave in, even at the end when her own body began to fail her.

Her confidence and obstinacy continuously surprised and horrified many in Hesse and elsewhere in Europe, who saw such faith as nothing but reckless and unjustifiable hubris. But for her, confidence was almost the same as faith in God's mercy and justice, the same as belief in divine Providence and in following one's sacred calling. It was inconceivable, in other words, that she could fail if she put her faith firmly in God's hands. "I expect," she argued to her councilor Johannes Vultejus in the dark days of 1639, "that God will presently, through His grace, change things and bring us out of dishonor, and I place my hope and confidence in this entirely." That her attitude of stubborn dedication to providential rescue was shared by many in her inner circle only reinforced her worldview. "It is clear as day," one of her agents proclaimed to Vultejus in 1641, "and is confirmed by the word of God . . . that after this stormy weather He will weigh the anchor of His wisdom and speed us with a good wind to the port of peace we desire." In this understanding, shaped in large part by the landgravine's Calvinism, all her suffering and her "many crosses" were part of God's plan and a test of her endurance. She was, as she told Vultejus in 1638, "a poor martyr in this world for as long as it pleases God." Surrender was not an option, only obedience to God's will.¹⁵

The landgravine's diplomacy was shaped by this stubborn confidence, but also by her own personal style. She believed she must always negotiate from a position of strength, and she was never afraid to delay making decisions until she was ready. She was also not afraid to be branded a double-dealer, and her reign is remarkable for the almost constant negotiations she carried out with all sides simultaneously. Her achievements at Westphalia, furthermore, were due almost entirely to her successful effort to make herself militarily and symbolically irreplaceable to the foreign crowns, and then to her clever balancing of their different interests and concerns. Playing one party against the other worked for her, and when something worked she stuck with it. The same was true of those around her. If they were loyal, she was too, and luckily for her, the men who served as her closest confidants throughout her reign—especially Vultejus, Krosigk, Sixtinus, and Scheffer, but also a handful of others—were extraordinarily skilled and gifted men. The monies they received from foreign crowns

may well have influenced their diplomacy from time to time, but such payoffs to a ruler's councilors and agents were the norm, not something that would shock or even surprise a seventeenth-century prince, let alone worry him. In addition to her shrewd use of her councilors, she frequently used her family connections and her gender, which she managed to transform from a serious disability into a negotiating tactic, presenting herself as the poor stupid woman, the sad and desperate widow, or the helpless maiden in need of rescuing. She was none of these, of course, and most people figured this out rather quickly. Her children and her husband's dynastic house were important to her, extremely important, and one can see that this drove much of her policy and her military activities. Tied to this was the question of honor and reputation, which was combined, in her writing, with the idea of the final judgment of posterity. Thus she was not overly concerned with the temporary disgust or hatred directed toward her for extorting money from various territories or peasants, for battling fellow Protestants and allying with Catholics and foreigners, or even for delaying peace until she was satisfied (though such criticisms did pain her). Instead she tried to focus on following her conscience and on the long-term judgment of God and history.¹⁶

While one cannot speak for God, history has been extraordinarily kind. The eighteenth-century scholar André Michel de Ramsay asserted that Amalia Elisabeth "joined to all the virtues of her sex the qualities of a great captain. . . . Economical and liberal, just and generous, religious but not superstitious, this princess possessed political talent to the greatest degree: her court was the school of all the princes of Germany." Her early nineteenth-century biographer Karl Wilhelm Justi, professor of the University of Marburg, described her as "unquestionably the greatest princess of her century."

Her mature plans and her wise rule declared to posterity her great spirit, and her virtues, which were seldom domestic, proclaim her noble sentiments. If the so-often profaned name of hero is only deserved by such people as have powerfully and unbendingly withstood great obstacles and adversity, then Amalia is worthy of the name of a hero.

I would not go so far as Justi, though one must admit that many "heroes" of history are similarly culpable for enormous suffering, devastation, and death. To modern eyes, such responsibility is more difficult to stomach.

Yet there is no way to deny that the landgravine believed, firmly, unshakably, and with a fierce determination one can only admire, that she was fighting a just war. She did not want the resultant bloodshed, nor did she purposefully seek it out. Instead, she showed only dedication to her cause and a willingness to do anything and everything necessary to achieve it. In many ways, therefore, her official portrait for the Peace of Westphalia, a copperplate engraving created in the year of her death by the Dutch artist Pieter de Jode the Younger, captured her essence.¹⁷ Looking stern and disapproving yet slightly amused, she stares out from the image, wearing a wide lace collar and simple pearl necklace but otherwise in her typically stark Calvinist mourning dress, which she had worn ever since the death of her husband. To her left are symbols of war; to her right symbols of peace. Her image itself is encircled by an oval frame bearing the French motto “Pur et Loyal.” One cannot come any closer to an understanding of Amalia Elisabeth of Hesse-Cassel. Over all her years as regent, through war and peace, though suffering and joy, she demonstrated an iron will: pure in her determination and loyal to her family, her faith, and her honor.

Abbreviations

AAECP	Archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Paris, Correspondance Politique
AAEMD	Archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Paris, Mémoires et documents
AN	Archives Nationales, Paris
APW	Acta Pacis Westphalicae
AssNat	Bibliothèque de l'Assemblée Nationale, Paris
ASVen	Archivio di stato di Venezia, Venice
BMaz	Bibliothèque Mazarine, Paris
BN	Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris
HHStA	Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv, Vienna
HStAD	Hessische Staatsarchiv Darmstadt, Darmstadt
HStAM	Hessische Staatsarchiv Marburg, Marburg
LHA Koblenz	Landeshauptarchiv Koblenz
Riksarkivet	Riksarkivet, Stockholm

Notes

Introduction

1. Samuel Chappuzeau, *L'Allemagne Protestante, Ou Relation nouvelle d'un Voyage fait aux Cours Des Electeurs, et des Princes Protestans de l'Empire . . .* (Geneva, 1671), 173. “Universal applause” quote in Richelieu, *Mémoires du Cardinal de Richelieu, sur le Règne de Louis XIII*, vol. 9 (Paris, 1838), 129. For scholarship on Amalia Elisabeth, see Karl Wilhelm Justi, *Amalie Elisabeth: Landgräfin Von Hessen: Versuch einer Darstellung ihres Lebens und Charakters* (Giessen, 1812). More modern is Ilsa Bechert's dissertation, which, sadly, survived World War II only as brief summary. Ilsa Bechert, “Die Außenpolitik der Landgräfin Amelia Elisabeth von Hessen-Kassel: Oktober 1637 bis März 1642” (diss., Philipps-Universität zu Marburg, 1946). Two more modern studies include Simone Buckreus, *Die Körper einer Regentin: Amelia Elisabeth von Hessen-Kassel (1602–1651)* (Göttingen, 2008), and Kerstin Weiland, *Hessen-Kassel und die Reichsverfassung: Ziele und Prioritäten landgräflicher Politik im Dreißigjährigen Krieg* (Marburg, 2009). Other studies on aspects of her reign include Louise van Tongerlo, “Beziehungen zwischen Hessen-Kassel und den Vereinigten Niederlanden während des Dreißigjährigen Krieges,” in *Hessisches Jahrbuch für Landesgeschichte [HJL]* 14 (1964), 199–270; Klaus Malettke, ed., *Frankreich und Hessen-Kassel zur Zeit des Dreißigjährigen Krieges und des Westfälischen Friedens* (Marburg, 1999); Erwin Bettenhäuser, “Die Landgrafschaft Hessen-Kassel auf dem Westfälischen Friedenskongress 1644–1648” (diss., Johannes-Gutenberg-Universität zu Mainz, 1983); Gerhard Petri, “Das Militärwesen von Hessen-Kassel in der Zeit Landgraf Wilhelms V. und der Landgräfin Amalie Elisabeth 1627–1649” (diss., Rheinischen Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität zu Bonn, 1996).

2. Estimates for population losses vary. Some areas suffered far greater casualties than others, depending on location and, to some extent, luck. John C. Theibault, *German Villages in Crisis: Rural Life in Hesse-Kassel and the Thirty Years' War, 1580–1720* (Atlantic Highlands, N.J., 1995), 1–2. He cites for this 1960s study Wilfried Schlauf, *Politik und Bewußtsein* (Cologne, 1971), 127–128.

3. A sign of the fluidity of early modern conceptions of the state can be found in something as simple as the fact that the same word (*Stand*) was loosely used in German to mean “state” (territorial entity) and “estate” (parliament), and even “class” (social rank). For ease of reading, I use the term “state” or “estate” to refer to territorial or political entities within the empire, although these bodies were not fully sovereign in the modern sense. For more on the nature of the empire as a state, see Georg Schmidt, *Geschichte des alten Reiches: Staat und nation in der frühen Neuzeit 1495–1806* (Munich, 1999), 177–193; Matthias Schnettger, ed., *Imperium Romanum-irregulare corpus-Teutscher Reichs-Staat: Das Alte Reich im Verständnis der Zeitgenossen und der Historiographie* (Mainz, 2002).

4. C. V. Wedgwood, *The Thirty Years War* (Garden City, N.Y., 1961); Geoffrey Parker, ed., *The Thirty Years' War*, 2nd ed. (London, 1997); Peter H. Wilson, *The Thirty Years War: Europe's Tragedy* (Cambridge, Mass., 2009); Johannes Burkhardt, *Der Dreißigjährige Krieg* (Frankfurt am Main, 1992); Fritz Dickmann, *Der Westfälische Frieden*, 7th ed. (Münster, 1998); K. Reppen, *Dreißigjähriger Krieg und Westfälischer Friede: Studien und Quellen* (Paderborn, 1998); Heinz Duchhardt, ed., *Der Westfälische Friede: Diplomatie, politische Zäsur, kulturelles Umfeld, Rezeptionsgeschichte* (Munich, 1998). There are, of course, many more works on this period than I can possibly mention here. The classic study of the empire in this period is Moritz Ritter, *Deutsche Geschichte im Zeitalter der Gegenreformation und des dreissigjährigen Krieges (1555–1648)* (Darmstadt, 1962).

5. Peter Milger, *Gegen Land und Leute: Der Dreissigjährige Krieg* (Munich, 1998), 305; Friedrich Schiller, *The Thirty Years' War* (New York, 1861), 329; Ritter, *Deutsche Geschichte*, 600; Parker, *Thirty Years' War*, 138, 141–157; Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv, Vienna [HHStA], Reichskanzlei [RK] Friedensakten 17a, fols. 78–83, Johann Georg (letter sent) to Ferdinand II, Hall, 15 March 1636. For a contemporary understanding of the war, see also M. Merian, *Theatrum Europaeum, oder Warhafftige Beschreibung aller denckwürdigen Geschichten*, 6 vols. (Frankfurt am Main, 1643–1652). Konrad Reppen has been especially prolific about this historiographical debate. See, for example, K. Reppen, “Seit wann gibt es den Begriff ‘Dreissigjähriger Krieg’?,” in *Weltpolitik, Europagedanke, Regionalismus: Festschrift für Heinz Gollwitzer*, ed. H. Dollinger et al. (Münster, 1982), 59–70, and K. Reppen, “Noch einmal zum Begriff ‘Dreissigjähriger Krieg,’” *Zeitschrift für historische Forschung* 9 (1982), 347–352.

6. See Pauline Puppel, *Die Regentin: Vormundschaftliche Herrschaft in Hessen 1500–1700* (Frankfurt, 2004); Rajah Scheepers, *Regentin per Staatsstreich? Landgräfin Anna von Hessen (1485–1525)* (Königstein, 2007).

7. Hessische Staatsarchiv Marburg [HStAM] 4d Nr. 39, fols. 78–79, Amalia Elisabeth [AE] (copy) to the Prelates, Knights, and Estates, Delfzijl, 3/13 December 1637; Archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Paris, Correspondance Politique, [AAECP] Allemagne 14, fols. 368–371, Tercy (letter sent) to Richelieu, Leer, 10/20 October 1637. For more on the importance of honor in the war, see Christoph Kampmann, *Europa und das Reich im Dreißigjährigen Krieg: Geschichte eines europäischen Konflikts* (Stuttgart, 2008).

8. HStAM 4h Nr. 1448, fols. 88–89, AE (letter sent) to Cassel Secret Council [SC], Delfzijl, 2/12 December 1637, Sixtinus (own hand minute) in HStAM 4d Nr. 39, fols. 75–76, copy in HStAM 4d Nr. 39, fols. 74, 77; HStAM 4d Nr. 39, fols. 39–42, AE (copy) to SC, Delfzijl, 15/25 November 1637, Sixtinus (own hand minute) in HStAM 4d Nr. 39, fols. 43–44, letter sent in HStAM 4h Nr. 1448, fols. 57–58.

9. Calvin's quote is from a letter to William Cecil of 1559. See Steuart Adolphus Pears and Hastings Robinson, *The Zurich Letters*, second series (Cambridge, 1845), 34–36. For the long quote, see HStAM 4d Nr. 50, fol. 61, AE (own hand minute) to Vultejus, n.d.; HStAM 4d Nr. 39, fols. 78–79, AE (copy) to the Prelates, Knights, and Estates, Delfzijl, 3/13 December 1637. For the martyr quote, see HStAM 4d Nr. 50, fols. 50–51, AE (own hand letter sent) to Vultejus, 7/17 March 1639. For a discussion of Calvinism in this period, see Robert M. Kingdon, "International Calvinism and the Thirty Years War," in *1648: War and Peace in Europe*, ed. Klaus Bussmann and Heinz Schilling (Münster, 1998) [WPE], 229–235.

10. The council's quote is in HStAM 4d Nr. 38, Vice Chancellor [VC] and SC (letter sent) to AE, Cassel, 20/30 November 1638, rec. Groningen, 9/19 December. Not only were German Reformed influenced by theologians other than Calvin himself, but the term "Calvinism" was often seen as pejorative in the seventeenth century. For ease of reading, however, I use here "the Reformed" and "Calvinists" interchangeably. For more on this, see Richard A. Muller, "Referencing and Understanding Calvin in Seventeenth Century Calvinism," in *Calvin and His Influence, 1509–2009*, ed. Irena Backus and Philip Benedict (Oxford, 2011).

11. Her quote is in HStAM 4e Nr. 1411, AE to the Evangelical Electors and Estates at the Regensburg Reichstag. For a discussion of the importance of religion in the war and of the historiography of this debate, see Burkhardt, *Der Dreißigjährige Krieg*, 128–177. See also K. Repgen, "What Is a 'Religious War?'," in *Politics and Society in Reformation Europe* (London, 1987); K. Repgen, *Dreißigjähriger Krieg*, 3–20; Josef V. Polišínský, *Der Krieg und die Gesellschaft in Europa 1618–1648*, vol. 1, *Documenta Bohemica Bellum Tricennale Illustrantia* (Prague, 1971); Paul Sonnino, "From D'Avau to Devot: Politics and Religion in the Thirty Years War," *History* 87, no. 286 (2002), 192–203. Note that the term "German liberties" is also associated with such additional terms as *ius territoriali*, *superioritas territorialis*, *Landesobrigkeit*, and *Landeshoheit*, which were used almost synonymously to mean territorial sovereignty limited only by duty and loyalty to emperor and empire.

12. Hugo Grotius was one of many who referred to the landgravine as an Amazon. See, for example, Grotius to L. Camerarius, 25 September 1638, letter 3774, pub. in P. C. Molhuysen et al., eds., *The Correspondence of Hugo Grotius*, digital 1st ed. (October 2009), <http://grotius.huygens.knaw.nl>. Other contemporary views of Amalia Elisabeth are in Bettenhäuser, *Landgrafschaft*, 14; Pauline Puppel, "Die 'Retterin Hessesens' oder 'Schwester der Gorgo'? Landgräfin Amelie Elisabeth und die Hessische Ritterschaft," *HJL* 57 (2007), 99–125; Dietrich Christoph von Rommel, *Geschichte von Hessen*, vol. 8 (Cassel, 1843), 790–791. Georg's confusion and contempt is in HStAM 4d Nr. 93, fols. 10–11, Georg of Hesse-Darmstadt (copy) to VC and SC of Hesse-Cassel, Giessen, 3/13 March 1638. See Chapter 7 for more on gender roles.

13. AAACP Allemagne 14, fols. 368–371, Tercy (letter sent) to Richelieu, Leer, 10/20 October 1637; Richelieu, *Mémoires*, 172; Chappuzeau, *L'Allemagne Protestante*, 179–180. Calvin's "tyranny" quote is from Jean Calvin and Jules Bonnet, *Letters of John Calvin*, vol. 3 (Philadelphia, 1858), 38. "Monstrous" quote in John Calvin, *Commentary on Timothy, Titus, Philemon*, trans. Reverend William Pringle. (Grand Rapids, Mich., 1999).

14. Richelieu, *Mémoires*, 130.

15. Chappuzeau, *L'Allemagne Protestante*, 173.

16. For more on the role of contributions and military innovation in the development of early modern states, see Michael Roberts, "The Military Revolution, 1560–1660," in

Essays in Swedish History (London, 1967), 195–225; Geoffrey Parker, *The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500–1800* (Cambridge, England, 1988); Simon Adams, “Tactics or Politics? ‘The Military Revolution’ and the Habsburg Hegemony,” in *Tools of War*, ed. J. Lynn (Champaign, Ill., 1990), 28–52; David Parrott, *Richelieu’s Army: War, Government and Society in France, 1624–1642* (Cambridge, England, 2001); David Parrott, “The Military Revolution in Early Modern Europe,” *History Today* 42 (1992) 21–27; Jeremy Black, *A Military Revolution? Military Change and European Society, 1550–1800* (London, 1991). For the French use of the contribution system, see, for example, AAACP Hollande 22, fols. 328–333, La Thuillierie (copy) to Chavigny, 23 December 1641. For more on mercenaries, see Michael Sikora, “Söldner—historische Annäherung an einen Kriegertypus,” *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 29 (2003), 210–238.

17. For Geoffrey Parker’s good survey of the historiographical debate on why the Thirty Years War lasted as long as it did, see Parker, *Thirty Years’ War*, 196–202. For more on the limitations of the contribution system, see Tryntje Helfferich, “A Levy in Liège for Mazarin’s Army: Practical and Strategic Difficulties in Raising and Supporting Troops in the Thirty Years War,” *Journal of Early Modern History* 11, 6 (November 2007), 475–500.

18. For the breakdown in imperial justice and institutions before the war, see Sigrid Jahns, “The Imperial Justice System as Mirror of the Imperial and Religious Constitution,” in *WPE*, vol. 1, 455–463; Wedgwood, *Thirty Years War*, 13–53; Wilson, *Thirty Years War*, 197–238. Wedgwood holds the older view of the empire as broken and thus stresses the inevitability of the war, while Wilson is an example of the more modern interpretation. Peter H. Wilson, *The Holy Roman Empire 1495–1806*, 2nd ed. (Basingstoke, England, 2011); Peter H. Wilson, “Still a Monstrosity? Some Reflections on Early Modern German Statehood,” *Historical Journal* 49, 2 (June 2006), 565–576. See also Eva Ortlieb, *Im Auftrag des Kaisers: Die kaiserlichen Kommissionen des Reichshofrates und die Regelung von Konflikten im Alten Reich (1637–1657)* (Cologne, 2001); James A. Vann, “New Directions for Study of the Old Reich,” *Journal of Modern History* 58 (1986), 3–22.

19. HStAM 4d Nr. 50, fols. 6–8, AE (own hand letter sent) to Vultejus, early September 1638. The quotes from the chronicle are in Tryntje Helfferich, ed., *The Thirty Years War: A Documentary History* (Indianapolis, 2009), 316, 324. A good discussion of the impact of the war on the populace can be found in Ruth E. Mohrmann, “Everyday Life in War and Peace,” in *WPE*, vol. 1, 319–327. See also the sometimes heart-breaking descriptions of this period by local Hessian chroniclers in Rudolf Kunz and Willy Lizalek, eds., *Südhessische Chroniken aus der Zeit des Dreissigjährigen Krieges* (Hepenheim, 1983).

1. An Imperial Princess

1. There is little information available about Amalia Elisabeth’s early life. What we do have appears in Karl Wilhelm Justi, *Amalie Elisabeth: Landgräfin Von Hessen: Versuch einer Darstellung ihres Lebens und Charakters* (Giessen, 1812), 35–36.

2. Marguerite de Navarre, grandmother to King Henry IV of France, was sisters with Jeanne d’Angoulême, great-great-grandmother of Amalia Elisabeth, making them second cousins twice removed.

3. Samuel Puffendorf, *The Present State of the German Empire* (London, 1696), 48–49, 152–154. For an analysis of Puffendorf’s thinking, see Peter Schröder, “The Con-

stitution of the Holy Roman Empire after 1648: Samuel Pufendorf's Assessment in His Monzambano," *Historical Journal* 42, 4 (December 1999), 961–983. For a good discussion of the complexity of the early modern political scene—which was dominated by dynastic agglomerations and other forms of composite states—see Daniel H. Nexton, *The Struggle for Power in Early Modern Europe: Religious Conflict, Dynastic Empires and International Change* (Princeton, 2009).

4. For more on political theories of the empire at this time, see for example Notker Hammerstein et al., *Staatsdenker im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert: Reichspublizistik, Politik, Naturrecht* (Frankfurt am Main, 1977). For another good discussion of these issues see Peter H. Wilson, "Still a Monstrosity? Some Reflections on Early Modern German Statehood," *Historical Journal* 49, 2 (June 2006): 565–576.

5. For a discussion of the complex relationship between nobles and landgraves in Hesse, see Fritz Wolff, "Grafen und Herren in Hessen vom 16. bis zum 18. Jahrhundert," in *Das Werden Hessens*, ed. Walter Heinemeyer (Marburg, 1986), 333–347. For Hanau, see Gerhard Köbler, *Historisches Lexicon der deutschen Länder: Die deutschen Territorien und reichsunmittelbaren Geschlechter vom Mittelalter bis zur Gegenwart*, 6th ed. (Munich, 1999). For a study of how a state managed noncontiguous territories, see Ronald G. Asch, *Verwaltung und Beamtentum: Die Gräflich Fürstenbergischen Territorien vom Ausgang des Mittelalters bis zum Schwedischen Krieg 1490–1632* (Stuttgart, 1986).

6. For Hesse-Cassel before the war, and the complex pressures on the landgraves, see Holger Gräf, *Konfession und internationales System: Die Aussenpolitik Hessen-Kassels im konfessionellen Zeitalter* (Darmstadt, 1993). For information on Philipp, including his decision to divide his estate, see also Walter Heinemeyer, *Philipp der Grossmütige und die Reformation in Hessen: Gesammelte Aufsätze zur hessischen Reformationsgeschichte* (Giessen, 1997).

7. Samuel Chappuzeau, *L'Allemagne Protestante, Ou Relation nouvelle d'un Voyage fait aux Cours Des Electeurs, et des Princes Protestans de l'Empire . . .* (Geneva, 1671), 160–178.

8. When the Hesse-Rheinfels line died out in 1583, this land had been divided peacefully among the remaining brothers, with Hesse-Cassel getting Rheinfels itself. For a summary of Philipp's attempt to keep certain state functions unified, see Heinemeyer, *Philipp*, 226. For more on this period in Hessian history, see also Rommel, *Dietrich Christoph von Rommel, Geschichte von Hessen* (Cassel, 1843), vol. 8.

9. Gunter Thies, *Territorialstaat und Landesverteidigung: Das Landesdefensionswerk in Hessen-Kassel unter Landgraf Moritz (1592–1627)* (Darmstadt, 1973). The *confessio augustana variata* was the result of revisions to the Augsburg Confession by Luther's close confidant Phillip Melancthon in 1540 and 1542. These changes were designed to help heal the rift between Protestants, and the 1540 confession was indeed signed by Calvin.

10. For more on the development of ideas on, and the practice of, the *ius reformandi* see Bernd-Christian Schneider, *Ius Reformandi: Die Entwicklung eines Staatskirchenrechts von seinen Anfaengen bis zum Ende des Alten Reiches* (Tübingen, 2001).

11. For the engagement of Amalia Elisabeth [AE] see Margret Lemberg, "Im Strudel der böhmischen Ständekatastrophe: Das unvollendete Verlöbniß des Albrecht Johann Smiřický mit Amalie Elisabeth von Hanau und der Kampf um das Erbe," in *Bohemia: Zeitschrift für Geschichte und Kultur der böhmischen Länder* 35 (1994), 1–44. See also Thies, *Territorialstaat*; K. Repgen, ed., *Krieg und Politik 1618–1648: Europäische Probleme und Perspektiven* (Munich, 1988), 243. For the ethical difficulties this stipulation later caused for Ludwig's successor, see Kurt Beck, "Die Neutralitätspolitik

Landgraf Georgs II. von Hessen-Darmstadt: Versuch und Möglichkeiten einer Politik aus christlichen Grundsätzen,” *Hessisches Jahrbuch für Landesgeschichte [HJL]* 22 (1972), 162–228 (here p. 169). For theoretical influences on Hesse-Cassel’s later war aims, see Klaus Malettke, “Scheffers Gesandtschaft in Osnabrück: ‘Stände seyn nicht nur Rätthe, die man hören, sondern deren Rätthen man auch folgen müsse,’” in *Der Westfälische Friede: Diplomatie, politische Zäsur, kulturelles Umfeld, Rezeptionsgeschichte*, ed. Heinz Duchhardt (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1998), 504–505, 513–514.

12. Dieter Albrecht, “Die Kriegs- und Friedensziele der deutschen Reichsstände,” in *Krieg und Politik 1618–1648: Europäische Probleme und Perspektiven*, ed. Konrad Repgen (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1988), 242–243; Repgen, *Krieg und Politik*, 243.

13. Moritz’s struggles are in Gräf, *Konfession*. See also Thies, *Territorialstaat*; Volker Press, “Hessen im Zeitalter der Landesteilung (1567–1655),” in *Das Werden Hessens*, ed. Walter Heinemeyer (Marburg, 1986), 267–331. For the Hessian estates, see Günter Hollenberg, “Primat der Innenpolitik? Die Politik der hessen-kasselischen Landstände im Dreissigjährigen Krieg,” in *Frankreich und Hessen-Kassel zur Zeit des Dreißigjährigen Krieges und des Westfälischen Friedens*, ed. Klaus Malettke (Marburg, 1999), 123–135; Karl E. Demandt, “Die hessischen Landstände im Zeitalter des Frühabsolutismus,” *HJL* 15 (1965), 38–108. For the strained relationship between the Calvinist Moritz and his mostly Lutheran aristocracy, see Gerhard Petri, “Das Militärwesen von Hessen-Kassel in der Zeit Landgraf Wilhelms V. und der Landgräfin Amalie Elisabeth 1627–1649” (diss., Rheinischen Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität zu Bonn, 1996), 13, 15. For a comparison with Württemberg after the war, see Peter H. Wilson, *War, State and Society in Württemberg, 1677–1793* (Cambridge, England, 1995).

14. For Tilly’s demand and the reactions of Moritz, see Walther Keim, “Landgraf Wilhelm V. von Hessen-Kassel vom Regierungsantritt 1627 bis zum Abschluss des Bündnisses mit Gustav Adolf 1631 unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Beziehungen zu Schweden. 1. Teil. Bis zur sogenannten Haager Reise 1629,” *HJL* 12 (1962), 130–210. For more on the conflict between Moritz and his estates, see Franz von Geyso, “Beiträge zur Politik und Kriegführung Hessens im Zeitalter des Dreißigjährigen Krieges und Grundlagen einer Lebensgeschichte des Generalleutnant Johann Geyso,” *Zeitschrift des Vereins für hessische Geschichts- und Landeskunde* 53–55 (1921, 1924, 1926); Hollenberg, “Primat der Innenpolitik?,” 126–128.

15. For a copy of the Hauptakkord, see Jean Dumont, ed., *Corps Universel Diplomatique du Droit des Gens*, vol. 5:2 (Amsterdam, 1728), 524–532. For more on Georg, see K. H. Frohnweiler, “Die Friedenspolitik Landgraf Georgs II. von Hessen-Darmstadt in den Jahren 1630–1635,” *Archiv für hessische Geschichte und Altertumskunde, Neue Folge*, vol. 29 (1964), 141. The new line of Hesse-Rotenburg became official on 12/22 February 1627. The Quarter was in the eastern part of Hesse-Cassel and included not only Rotenburg, but also Sontra, Eschwege, Plesse, and more. The Cassel landgraves oversaw its foreign affairs and religion, but the Rotenburg landgraves held other local rights. For more on the weakness of Moritz and the role of Juliane in the creation the Quarter, see Margret Lemberg, *Juliane Landgräfin zu Hessen (1587–1643): Eine Kasseler und Rotenburger Fürstin aus dem Hause Nassau-Dillenburg in ihrer Zeit* (Darmstadt, 1994), 321ff.

16. For more on Wilhelm’s personality and strategy, see Keim, “Landgraf Wilhelm V. . . . 1 Teil.”

17. For a discussion among the Hessian landgraves over the Edict of Restitution, which includes Wilhelm’s argument for Calvinism as part of the Augsburg Confes-

sion, see *Wechselschriften ausgelassene kaiserliche Edikt* (Cassel, 1632). For Hessian-Swedish relations, see Riksarkivet, Stockholm, Germanica 1370, Preliminary Treaty Between Sweden and Hesse-Cassel (copy), Stralsund, 11/21 November 1630; Riksarkivet Germanica 1370, Treaty Between Sweden and Hesse-Cassel (copy), Werben, 12/22 August 1631; Riksarkivet Germanica 1370, Wilhelm V (copy) Ratification of the Swedish Donation, Frankfurt, 17/27 May 1633 (signed 28 February 1632); C. Hallendorff, ed., *Sveriges traktater med främmande makter*, vol. 5:2 (Stockholm, 1909), 71–74, 77–87. See also Keim, “Landgraf Wilhelm V . . . 1 Teil;” Walther Keim, “Landgraf Wilhelm V. von Hessen-Kassel vom Regierungsantritt 1627 bis zum Abschluss des Bündnisses mit Gustav Adolf 1631 unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Beziehungen zu Schweden. 2. Teil,” *HJL* 13 (1963), 141–210. Lemberg and Gräf argue that it was actually Juliane, Wilhelm’s stepmother, who arranged the first contact, as well as the later agreement, between Cassel and Stockholm. Lemberg, *Juliane*, 380–387; Gräf, *Konfession*, 320–322. For more on Swedish justifications for war, see Jenny Öhman, *Der Kampf um den Frieden: Schweden und der Kaiser im Dreissigjährigen Krieg* (Vienna, 2005); Erik Ringmar, *Identity, Interest and Action: A Cultural Explanation of Sweden’s Intervention in the Thirty Years’ War* (Cambridge, England, 1996); B. F. Porchnev, *Muscovy and Sweden in the Thirty Years’ War: 1630–35*, trans. Brian Pearce (Cambridge, England, 1995) 1–62, 165–207. For Denmark, see Paul Douglas Lockhart, “Religion and Princely Liberties: Denmark’s Intervention in the Thirty Years War, 1618–1625,” *International History Review* 17, 1 (February 1995), 1–22.

18. By an agreement made in February 1632 and then formalized on 17 May 1633, Wilhelm was given control of the areas of Fulda, Paderborn, Corvey, Münster, Hersfeld, Osnabrück, Waldeck, Lippe, Grubenhagen, and the Wetterau by Gustav Adolphus, with the caveat that he had to conquer many of these lands for himself. Meike Hollenbeck, “Hessisch-kaiserliche Verhandlungen über die Annahme des Prager Friedens,” in Malettke, *Frankreich und Hessen-Kassel*, 111–122. For more on Landgrave Wilhelm and Amalia Elisabeth’s use of contributions, see Petri, “Das Militärwesen von Hessen-Kassel,” 67–76. See Chapter 7 for more on early modern military financing.

19. For the relationship between France and Hesse in this era, see Malettke, “Zu den Beziehungen zwischen Frankreich und Hessen-Kassel im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert: Einführende Bemerkungen,” in Malettke, *Frankreich und Hessen-Kassel*, 19–32; Klaus Malettke, *Frankreich, Deutschland und Europa im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert*, ed. Peter Krüger and Klaus Malettke (Marburg, 1994); G. Menk, “Landgraf Wilhelm IV. von Hessen-Kassel, Franz Hotmann und die hessisch-französischen Beziehungen vor und nach der Bartholomäusnacht,” *Zeitschrift für Hessische Geschichte* 88 (1980/81), 55–82; Ruth Altman, “Landgraf Wilhelm V. von Hessen-Kassel im Kampf gegen Kaiser und Katholizismus 1633–1637. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des 30jährigen Krieges” (diss., Marburg, 1938); Sven Externbrink, “Kleinstaat im Bündnissystem Richelieus: Hessen-Kassel und Mantua 1635–1642. Ein Vergleich,” in Malettke, *Frankreich und Hessen-Kassel*, 135–157. For the dreams and designs of Wilhelm, see Albrecht, “Die Kriegs- und Friedensziele,” 244–246. See also Geyso, “Beiträge zur Politik”; J. R. Kretzschmar, *Der Heilbronner Bund, 1632–1635*, 3 vols. (Lübeck, 1922).

20. For Wilhelm and Amalia Elisabeth’s mission to Saxony in 1623, and the pair’s larger 1626 mission, including visits to Coburg, Eisenach, Weimar, Dresden, and Berlin, see Lemberg, *Juliane*, 302–303, 319–320. For Amalia Elisabeth’s role as ruler in Wilhelm’s absence, see such acts as her official acceptance of the renewed powers of

the Swedish ambassador to the Hessian court and other correspondence. Riksarkivet, AE to Oxenstierna, 15/25 May 1634, pub. in Axel Oxenstierna, *Rikskansleren Axel Oxenstiernas Skrifter och Brefvexling*, ser. 2, vol. 7 [2:7] (Stockholm, 1895), 661–663. For Amalia Elisabeth's female role models and business sense, see Erwin Bettenhäuser, ed., *Familienbriefe der Landgräfin Amalie Elisabeth von Hessen-Kassel und ihrer Kinder* (Marburg, 1994), xvi–xvii. For more on the Hessian countryside during the war, see Kunz and Lizalek, *Südhessische Chroniken*; John C. Theibault, *German Villages in Crisis: Rural Life in Hesse-Kassel and the Thirty Years' War, 1580–1720* (Atlantic Highlands, N.J., 1995). For more on the Hessian economy, see Petri, "Das Militärwesen von Hessen-Kassel," 6–7.

21. For a local Hessian reaction to the defeat at Nördlingen, see Kunz and Lizalek, *Südhessische Chroniken*, 252–253. For the Peace of Prague, see Dumont, *Corps Universel*, vol. 6:1, 88–105. See also Robert Bireley, "The Peace of Prague (1635) and the Counter Reformation in Germany," *Journal of Modern History* 48, no. 1 (March 1976), 31–70.

22. For Saxony's attitude toward the Peace of Prague, see Rommel, *Geschichte von Hessen*, vol. 8, 354–355. See also Dominic Phelps, "The Triumph of Unity over Dualism: Saxony and the Imperial Elections 1559–1619," in *The Holy Roman Empire 1495–1806*, ed. R. J. W. Evans, M. Schaich, and P. H. Wilson (Oxford, 2011), 183–202; F. Müller, *Kursachsen und der Böhmisches Aufstand 1618–1622* (Münster, 1997). For von Hönegg's arguments at Prague see Matthias Hoë von Hoënegg, *Unvermeidliche Rettung Churfürstl. Durchl. zu Sachsen gethaner Gewissens-Frag . . .* (Schürer, 1635), 283–284. See also Hans Knapp, *Matthias Hoe von Hoenegg und sein eingreifen in die politik und publizistik des dreissigjährigen krieges* (Halle, 1902). For the Hessian view of the peace, see Hessische Staatsarchiv Marburg [HStAM] 4h Nr. 2116, fols. 65–74, *Das herrn Vice Cantzlers bedencken*, n.d. For Hesse-Darmstadt's actions in denying Hesse-Cassel access to the Frankfurt Congress, see Beck, *Neutralitätspolitik*, 169. For Hoë von Hoënegg, see Jörg-Peter Findeisen, *Der Dreissigjährige Krieg: Eine Epoche in Lebensbildern* (Groz, Vienna, Köln, 1998). For the *Nebenrecess*, in which Wilhelm and the others were excluded from the main peace, see Dumont, *Corps Universel*, vol. 6:1, 99–105.

23. For Wilhelm's anger at his exclusion from the Peace of Prague and the reaction of his estates, see HStAM 4h Nr. 2116, fols. 65–74, *Das herrn Vice Cantzlers bedencken*, n.d. The impact of the internal Hessian confessional split is also in Petri, "Das Militärwesen von Hessen-Kassel," 15–16. For Wilhelm's quote and the reaction of Hessian Calvinists, see Rommel, *Geschichte von Hessen*, vol. 8, 362–375. For more on Wilhelm's complaints about the Peace of Prague, see Hollenbeck, "Hessisch-kaiserliche Verhandlungen," 112–113. For more on Hersfeld, see Karl E. Demandt, *Geschichte des Landes Hessen*, rev. 2nd ed. (Cassel, 1980), 347–359.

24. For Wilhelm's talks with Oxenstierna, see Hallendorff, *Sveriges traktater*, 5:2, 319–320. The aims of the nobility of Hesse-Cassel are in Demandt, "Die hessischen Landstände," 49. See also Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Paris, Correspondance Politique, [AAECP] Hambourg 1, fols. 329–350, St. Chamond Relation, 1635–1637. On the Swedes making a separate peace, see AAECP Hambourg 1, fols. 178–180, St. Chamond (letter sent) to Louis XIII, Wesel, 8 February 1637; Riksarkivet Salvius Samling, vol. 8, Memorial for Johan Adler Salvius, Stockholm, 28 April/8 May 1636, pub. in *Acta Pacis Westphalicae [APW]*, ser. 1, vol. 1, 205–209, copy in Riksregistratur 1636, fols. 308–312. The Swedish willingness to abandon the war is in Riksarkivet Salvius Samling, vol. 8, Instructions for Sten Bielke and Johan Adler

Salvius, Stockholm, 23 March/2 April 1637, pub. in *APW* 1:1, 210–217, copy in Riksregistratur 1637, fols. 194ff. For Oxenstierna's appeals to the elector of Saxony to include Hesse-Cassel in the peace, see HHStA Reichskanzlei [RK] Friedensakten 17a, fols. 24–34, Oxenstierna Memorial (copy), Stralsund, 12 December 1635. For the advice of Wilhelm's council that Ferdinand could not be trusted see Albrecht, "Die Kriegs- und Friedensziele," 247. For this see also Altman, "Landgraf Wilhelm V.," 103.

25. AAACP Hambourg 1, fols. 329–350, St. Chamond Relation, 1635–1637. On the importance of Hesse-Cassel for the French see, among others, AAACP Hambourg 1, fols. 97–104, Instruction for Mr. de Rorté, 15 April 1636. See also AAACP Hambourg 1, fols. 182, St. Chamond (letter sent) to Bouthillier, Wesel, 8 February 1637; AAACP Hambourg 1, fols. 211–214, St. Chamond (letter sent) to Louis XIII, Hambourg, 15 April 1637. D'Avaux's instructions are in AAACP Allemagne 14, fols. 258–274, Memoire and Instructions to D'Avaux, 10 April 1637. On the Dutch reaction to Wilhelm's negotiations with the emperor, including their fear that Wilhelm's conquered territories, which abutted their states, would go over to the imperialists, see Louise van Tongerlo, "Beziehungen zwischen Hessen-Kassel und den Vereinigten Niederlanden während des Dreissigjährigen Krieges," *HJL* 14 (1964), 228.

26. Hollenbeck, "Hessisch-kaiserliche Verhandlungen," 113–119. For the landgrave's use of the secret imperial letter, see Rommel, *Geschichte von Hessen*, vol. 8, 374. As the emperor's comments on Calvinism were intended to reassure the pope, it is hard to tell if the emperor was being genuine. For the Hessian perspective, see also HStAM 4h Nr. 2116, fols. 65–74, *Das herrn Vice Cantzlers bedencken*, n.d.

27. For Wilhelm's policy toward the French, see AAACP Hambourg 1, fols. 329–350, St. Chamond relation, 1635–1637. For a discussion of the negotiations between Ferdinand and Wilhelm, see HHStA RK Friedensakten 17a, fols. 24–34, Oxenstierna memorial (copy), Stralsund, 12 December 1635. Friedrich Schiller's argument that "the Landgrave William of Hesse long wavered, or affected to do so, in order to gain time, and to regulate his measures by the course of events," is in Friedrich Schiller, *The Thirty Years' War* (New York, 1861), 325. For this see also Hollenbeck, "Hessisch-kaiserliche Verhandlungen," 117. For Tongerlo's argument that the attempts of Wilhelm's agents to gain assistance from the Dutch were hindered, not helped, by the ongoing negotiations with the imperialists, see Tongerlo, "Beziehungen," 228.

28. Riksarkivet Salvius Samling, vol. 8, Instructions for Sten Bielke and Johan Adler Salvius, Stockholm, 23 March/2 April 1637, pub. in *APW* 1:1, 210–217, copy in Riksregistratur 1637, fols. 194ff. See especially the comment: "Men för oss är at considerera, ded vij ingen säkerheet hafve at förvänta, medh mindre Tysklandh kommer i sit förre postur." On Swedish efforts to try to start a bidding war between the French and imperialists, see Riksarkivet Salvius Samling, vol. 8, Instruction for Johan Adler Salvius, Stockholm, 13/23 September 1637, pub. in *APW* 1:1, copy in Riksregistratur 1637, fols. 676ff. For French fears, see AAACP Allemagne 14, fols. 258–274, Memoire and Instructions to D'Avaux, 10 April 1637; AAACP Hambourg 1, fols. 211–214, St. Chamond (letter sent) to Louis XIII, Hamburg, 15 April 1637. For the French discussion of back dues for Wilhelm, see AAACP Allemagne 14, fols. 412–414, Memoir (copy) to D'Avaux, 26 June/6 July 1637. See also AAACP Allemagne 14, fols. 444, Memorandum About a Truce, 14–16 July 1637; AAACP Allemagne 14, fols. 415–418, Memoire (copy) to D'Avaux, 6/16 July 1637. For the Hessian view of negotiations with the emperor, see HStAM 4h Nr. 2116, fols. 65–74, *Das herrn Vice*

Cantzlars bedencken, n.d. For imperial thinking, see HHStA Kleinere Reichsstände Hessen-Kassel 1636–1648 [KRHK] 155, fols. 20–27, Wilhelm V's Demands in Negotiations with the Emperor, Neustatt ahn der Sahla, 2/12 April 1636; HHStA RK Friedensakten 7a, Memoire for Schlick, 26 May 1636. For the French, see AAACP Hamburg 1, fols. 329–350, St. Chamond Relation, 1635–1637. Baron de Rorte's instructions (though St. Chamond ended up with the job) for dealing with the landgrave and the fact that the French were at this point offering Wilhelm 400,000 livres a year are in AAACP Hamburg 1, fols. 97–104, Instruction for Mr. de Rorté, 15 April 1636. For more on the role of Scots, see Steve Murdoch, ed., *Scotland and the Thirty Years' War: 1618–1648* (Leiden, 2001).

29. For Duke Georg's negotiations with the French to reenter the war in conjunction with the Hessians, see AAACP Hamburg 1, fols. 97–104, Instruction for Rorté, 15 April 1636; AAACP Hesse 1, fols. 60–61, La Boderie (duplicata) to Bouthillier, Cassel, April 17, 1636. Wilhelm's secret council strongly advised against his abandonment of the Peace of Prague. HStAM 4d Nr. 6, Cassel Secret Council [SC] to Wilhelm, Cassel, 9/19 September 1636, cited in Hollenbeck, 118; AAACP Hamburg 1, fols. 329–350, St. Chamond Relation, 1635–1637. By the Treaty of Wesel the French gave Wilhelm subsidies of 200,000 Reichsthalers a year and added guarantees not to suppress Protestantism in any conquered areas. AAACP Hesse 1, fols. 76–77, Treaty of Minden, 12 June 1636; AAACP Hesse 1, fols. 113–119, Treaty of Wesel, 21 October 1636. See also Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris, [BN] Ms. Fr. 10212, fols. 55–71, Instruction to Cologne, between 11 November and 22 December 1636, pub. in *APW* 1:1, 38–55; HStAM 4h Nr. 2116, fols. 65–74, *Das herrn Vice Cantzlars bedencken*, n.d.; HHStA RK Friedensakten 17a, fols. 24–34, Oxenstierna memorial (copy), Stralsund, 12 December 1635. For the Swedes' reconsideration of the war see Riksarkivet Salvius Samling, vol. 8, Memorial for Johan Adler Salvius, Stockholm, 28 April/8 May 1636, pub. in *APW* 1:1, 205–209, copy in Riksregistratur 1636, fols. 308–312. For Amalia Elisabeth's role in pushing for the relief of Hanau see Fritz Geisthardt, "Peter Melander Graf zu Holzappel 1589–1648," in *Nassauische Lebensbilder*, ed. Karl Wolf (Wiesbaden, 1950), 36–53.

30. HHStA KRHK 155, fol. 77, Ferdinand II Declaration Against Wilhelm V, Regensburg, 19 August 1636, copies in HHStA KRHK 155, fols. 74, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84; HHStA KRHK 155, fols. 75–76, Ferdinand III (minute) to Ferdinand II, 31 August 1636; HHStA KRHK 155, fols. 85–88, Ferdinand II (minute) to Ferdinand III, Regensburg, 12 September 1636.

31. According to Petri, the emperor had also considered plans to divide Hesse-Cassel between himself and Landgrave Georg. Petri, "Das Militärwesen von Hessen-Kassel," 1. For the Hessians' view of the cause of the ban, see HStAM 4h Nr. 2116, fols. 65–74, *Das herrn Vice Cantzlars bedencken*, n.d. For Ferdinand's justification of the ban, see HStAM 4d Nr. 39, fols. 112–116, Ferdinand III Declaration (copy) to the Council, Knights, and Estates of Hesse-Cassel, Vienna, 17/27 November 1637. Ferdinand III renewed his father's patent in April 1637. For more on his thinking, see Lothar Höbelt, *Ferdinand III 1608–1657: Friedenskaiser wider Willen* (Graz, 2008); Mark Hengerer, *Kaiser Ferdinand III. (1608–1657): Vom Krieg zum Frieden* (Vienna, 2008).

32. HHStA RK Friedensakten 17a, fols. 78–83, Johann Georg (letter sent) to Ferdinand II, Hall, 15 March 1636; HHStA RK Friedensakten 7a, fols. 142–150, Imperial Council (memoire) to Ferdinand III, 1 April 1638. On Wilhelm's negotiations with the emperor, see HStAM 4h Nr. 2116, fols. 65–74, *Das herrn Vice Cantzlars bedencken*,

n.d. Landgrave Georg wrote the Reichshofrat that Wilhelm's "simulated accommodation" was "pure pretense." HHStA KRHK 154, Reichshofrat Memorial to the Emperor, 23 July 1636.

33. The discussion of Götz is in HStAM 4h Nr. 2116, fols. 65–74, *Das herrn Vice Cantzlers bedencken*, n.d. Description of the August 1637 petition from the Lower Hessian estates is in Ronald G. Asch, "'Wo der soldat hinkombt, da ist alles sein': Military Violence and Atrocities in the Thirty Years. War Re-examined," *German History* 18, no. 3 (2000), 293. For la Boderie's concerns about Wilhelm and a discussion of the imperial advance, see AAACP Hambourg 1, fols. 148–150, La Boderie (letter sent) to Bouthillier, Wesel, 12 January 1637. St. Chamond's opinion of Wilhelm is in AAACP Hambourg 1, fols. 329–350, St. Chamond Relation, 1635–1637. For a discussion of Hessian/French defeats, see AAACP Hambourg 1, fol. 182, St. Chamond (letter sent) to Bouthillier, Wesel, 8 February 1637. See also AAACP Hambourg 1, fols. 178–180, St. Chamond (letter sent) to Louis XIII, Wesel, 8 February 1637.

34. One clue that Frederick Henry was wise to Wilhelm's plans was the complete inactivity of his garrisons stationed in Emden and Leerort in response to the invasion. Tongerlo, "Beziehungen," 230–234. Years later there seems to have been general agreement among the States that Wilhelm had asked for, and received, permission from them to take East Frisia as temporary emergency quarters. AAACP Hollande 32, fols. 34–39, Brasset (letter sent) to Mazarin, The Hague, 11 July 1644. For Emperor Ferdinand III's take on this invasion, see HStAM 4d Nr. 39, fols. 112–116, Ferdinand III Declaration (copy) to the Council, Knights, and Estates of Hesse-Cassel, Vienna, 17/27 November 1637.

35. AAACP Hambourg 1, fols. 329–350, St. Chamond Relation, 1635–1637; BN MS Baluze 167, fols. 108–110, D'Avaux (own hand minute) to Chavigny, 29 September 1637. For the increased confidence of the Swedes, see Riksbarkivet Salvius Samling, vol. 8, Instruction for Johan Adler Salvius, Stockholm, 13/23 September 1637, pub. in *APW* 1:1, copy in Riksarkivet Riksregistratur 1637, fols. 676ff. Wilhelm's quote is in Oxenstierna, *Skrifter*, 2:7, 658. The treaty made between Wilhelm V and the East Frisians on 13/23 September 1637 was for 12,000 monthly plus food and quarters for the support of twenty-five hundred men, plus a further 300 from the territory of Harlingerland. The city of Emden had made a separate agreement which shielded it from the heaviest extractions and from quartering of troops. Onno Klopp, *Geschichte Ostfrieslands von 1570–1751* (Hannover, 1856), 313–314.

36. For a contemporary report of the death of Wilhelm, including the news that the autopsy had revealed a severely damaged liver, see M. Merian, *Theatrum Europaeum, oder Warhafft Beschreibung aller denckwürdigen Geschichten*, 6 vols. (Frankfurt am Main, 1643–1652), vol. 4, 836, 838, 849. For Wilhelm's death see also HStAM 4d Nr. 39, fols. 6–7, Scheffer, Sixtinus, and Melander (minute) to SC, Leer, 21 September/1 October 1637, copy in HStAM 4h Nr. 1448, fols. 5, 10.

2. Teetering on the Brink

1. For general reaction in Hesse, see Hessische Staatsarchiv Marburg [HStAM] 4d Nr. 39, fols. 16, 21, Cassel Secret Council [SC] (letter sent) to Amalia Elisabeth [AE], Cassel, 2/12 October 1637, minute in HStAM 4h Nr. 1448, fols. 6, 9. For the reaction of Wilhelm's daughters, "We cannot reveal our grief-stricken hearts to you sufficiently with words. The eternal God has hit us hard," see HStAM 4a Nr. 49:10, Charlotte and

Emilie to Wilhelm and Philipp, 11/21 November 1637, pub. in Erwin Bettenhäuser, ed., *Familienbriefe der Landgräfin Amalie Elisabeth von Hessen-Kassel und ihrer Kinder* (Marburg, 1994), 13–14. For an example of those who were pleased at Wilhelm's death, see HStAM 4d Nr. 90, Charges against Ludwig Schmalhausen, [16/26 February 1638]. The French believed that her government would “be overthrown by the deplorable loss.” Archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Paris, Correspondance Politique, [AAECP] Allemagne 14, fols. 368–371, Tercy (letter sent) to Richelieu, Leer, 10/20 October 1637.

2. For more on condottieri in the Thirty Years War, see Fritz Redlich, *The German Military Enterpriser and his Workforce: A Study in European Economic and Social History*, 2 vols. (Wiesbaden, 1964–1965); David Parrott, *Richelieu's Army: War, Government and Society in France, 1624–1642* (Cambridge, England, 2001). See also Geoff Mortimer, *Wallenstein: The Enigma of the Thirty Years War* (Basingstoke, England, 2010).

3. The amount of the Hessian debt is reported in Dietrich Christoph von Rommel, *Geschichte von Hessen*, vol. 8 (Cassel, 1843), 486, as 2,095,000 Reichsthalers. This compares with Demandt's claim that Wilhelm had “over two million” (at 5–7 percent interest) in debt in 1635. Karl E. Demandt, *Geschichte des Landes Hessen*, Revised 2nd ed. (Cassel, 1980), 253. For the French claim that her army consisted of about two hundred companies, both complete and incomplete, four hundred pieces of artillery, and that she held fortresses in Hesse and around twenty-three key strongholds belonging to the enemies, see AAECP Allemagne 14, fols. 368–371, Tercy (letter sent) to Richelieu, Leer, 10/20 October 1637.

4. AAECP Allemagne 14, fols. 368–371, Tercy (letter sent) to Richelieu, Leer, 10/20 October 1637. For the French court's suspicion of the Prince Palatine's attempt to take over the Hessian army and for their opinion that Amalia Elisabeth should do as she wished within the boundaries of their treaty, but that Melander should still have direct control of the troops under the Prince Palatine, see AAECP Hesse 1, fols. 183–184, Louis XIII (minute) to La Boderie, 19/29? October 1637.

5. For the French view of Melander, see AAECP Hambourg 1, fols. 148–150, La Boderie (letter sent) to Bouthillier, Wesel, 12 January 1637; Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris, [BN] MS Baluze 167, fols. 167–175, D'Avaux (minute) to Chavigny, 1 December 1637. Melander's life is covered in Fritz Geisthardt, “Peter Melander Graf zu Holzappel 1589–1648,” in *Nassauische Lebensbilder*, ed. Karl Wolf (Wiesbaden, 1950), 36–53. See also the somewhat hagiographic biography by Wilhelm Hofmann, *Peter Melander, reichsgraf zu Holzappel: Ein charakterbild aus der zeit des dreissigjährigen krieges* (Munich, 1882). Melander's boast is in AAECP Allemagne 14, fols. 368–371, Tercy (letter sent) to Richelieu, Leer, 10/20 October 1637. Decken argues that Melander planned to take the entire Hessian government in his own hands, with Amalia Elisabeth as a mere figurehead. Friedrich von der Decken, *Herzog Georg von Braunschweig und Lüneburg*, vol. 3 (Hannover, 1834), 179.

6. For the Swedish proposal to Melander, see Ilsa Bechert, “Die Aussenpolitik der Landgräfin Amelia Elisabeth von Hessen-Kassel: Oktober 1637 bis März 1642” (diss., Philipps-Universität zu Marburg, 1946), 5. For the Hessian military situation, see HStAM 4h Nr. 1448, fols. 21–22, AE (letter sent) to SC, Delfzijl, 14/24 October 1637, doublet in HStAM 4h Nr. 1448, fols. 37–38, minute in HStAM 4d Nr. 39, fols. 19–20; HStAM 4d Nr. 39, fol. 22, AE (Sixtinus hand minute) to the Statthalter and SC, Delfzijl, 18/28 October 1637. For Amalia Elisabeth's willingness to delegate, see

HStAM 4h Nr. 1448, fols. 13–14, AE (letter sent) to SC, Leer, 11/21 October 1637, minute in HStAM 4d Nr. 39, 13–14, doublet in HStAM 4h Nr. 1448, 42–43. Melander's future trouble remembering who was in charge is in AAACP Allemagne 14, fols. 368–371, Tercy (letter sent) to Richelieu, Leer, 10/20 October 1637.

7. Odo Becker, *Der Geheime Rat in Hessen-Cassel* (Darmstadt, 1911); Hans Philippi, *Repertorien des Hessischen Staatsarchivs Marburg, inventory 4, Politische Akten nach Philipp d. Gr., 1567–1821, part h, Kriegssachen 1592–1806/14*, vol. 1, 1592–1670 (Marburg, 1981), x–xi; Gerhard Petri, “Das Militärwesen von Hessen–Kassel in der Zeit Landgraf Wilhelms V. und der Landgräfin Amalie Elisabeth 1627–1649” (diss., Rheinischen Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität zu Bonn, 1996), 20–65. See also HStAM 4d Nr. 38, SC Memoire on the Establishment of the Regency Council, Cassel, 23 August/2 September 1638.

8. For a French observer's belief that Amalia Elisabeth's councilors were mostly out for their own profit, see AAACP Allemagne 14, fols. 368–371, Tercy (letter sent) to Richelieu, Leer, 10/20 October 1637. See also HStAM 4d Nr. 39, fols. 10–11, AE (minute, Sixtinus hand corrections) to SC, Leer, 6/16 October 1637; HStAM 4d Nr. 39, fol. 25, AE (Sixtinus hand minute) to the Statthalter and SC, Delfzijl, 14/24 October 1637; HStAM 4h Nr. 1448, fols. 21–22, AE (letter sent) to SC, Delfzijl, 14/24 October 1637, doublet in HStAM 4h Nr. 1448, fols. 37–38, minute in HStAM 4d Nr. 39, fols. 19–20. The comment on Hessian service is in HStAM 4h Nr. 1694, fols. 841–845, Kleinschmidt (letter sent) to Badenhausen, Cassel, 19/29 October 1646.

9. For the secret council's confusion, see, for example, HStAM 4d Nr. 39, fols. 17–18, SC (letter sent) to AE, Cassel, 2/12 October 1637, minute in HStAM 4h Nr. 1448, fol. 6. Information on Scheffer and the tendency of a few families to control the Hessian bureaucracy is in Klaus Malettke, “Scheffers Gesandtschaft in Osnabrück: ‘Stände seyn nicht nur Rätthe, die man hören, sondern deren Rätthen man auch folgen müsse,’” in *Der Westfälische Friede: Diplomatie, politische Zäsur, kulturelles Umfeld, Rezeptionsgeschichte*, ed. Heinz Duchhardt (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1998), 503–506. Discussion by the secret council of Scheffer's past occupation is in HStAM 4d Nr. 93, fols. 12–14, Vice Chancellor [VC] and SC (copy) to Georg of Hesse–Darmstadt, Cassel, 7/17 March 1638. For Vultejus, see Johannes Kretzschmar, “Vultejus, Johann,” in *Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie*, vol. 40 (1896), 390–391. See also Johann Gottfried von Meiern, *Universal-Register über die Westphälischen Friedens- und Nürnbergischen Executions-Handlungen und Geschichte* (Göttingen, 1740), 69. Other members of the secret council at the time of Amalia Elisabeth's ascension included Chamber President Melchior von Lehrbach, Dr. Johann Antrecht, Dr. Justus Jungmann, Adolf Wilhelm von Krosigk, and Nicolaus Christoph Müldener.

10. HStAM 4d Nr. 39, fols. 6–7, Scheffer, Sixtinus, and Melander (minute) to SC, Leer, 21 September/1 October 1637, copy in HStAM 4h Nr. 1448, fols. 5, 10.

11. *Ibid.*; HStAM 4h Nr. 1448, fols. 21–22, AE (letter sent) to SC, Delfzijl, 14/24 October 1637, doublet in HStAM 4h Nr. 1448, fols. 37–38, minute in HStAM 4d Nr. 39, fols. 19–20; HStAM 4d Nr. 39, fols. 16, 21, SC (letter sent) to AE, Cassel, 2/12 October 1637, minute in HStAM 4h Nr. 1448, fols. 6, 9; HStAM 4d Nr. 39, fol. 8, Councilors (minute) to SC, Leer, 22 September/2 October 1637. The French reaction to events at her court is in AAACP Allemagne 14, fols. 368–371, Tercy (letter sent) to Richelieu, Leer, 10/20 October 1637. Excerpts of this report also appear in Richelieu, *Mémoires du Cardinal de Richelieu, sur le Règne de Louis XIII*, vol. 9 (Paris, 1838), 128–130.

12. HStAM 4d Nr. 39, fols. 16, 21, SC (letter sent) to AE, Cassel, 2/12 October 1637, minute in HStAM 4h Nr. 1448, fols. 6, 9. Hermann's disability required him to wear an iron brace on his foot. His wife actually died a few days before Wilhelm. For this, a discussion of Hermann's astrological interests, and the quote about Hermann's nickname see AAACP Allemagne 14, fols. 368–371, Tercy (letter sent) to Richelieu, Leer, 10/20 October 1637. Wilhelm got primogeniture recognized for Hesse-Cassel in the 1627 Hauptakkord, but its official status was unclear. Lemberg's discussion of this and argument that fear of Hermann caused the secret council to refuse his request to have his wife buried in Cassel is in Margret Lemberg, *Juliane Landgräfin zu Hessen (1587–1643): Eine Kasseler und Rotenburger Fürstin aus dem Hause Nassau-Dillenburg in ihrer Zeit* (Darmstadt, 1994), 327–328, 332, 349, 391. For the death of Hermann's wife, see HStAM 4a Nr. 47:26, Hermann (letter sent) to AE, Ziegenhain, 16/26 September 1637. In addition to Hermann's interest in astrology, he also was a keen observer of weather patterns. His data have been used to prove the "little ice age" theory of the seventeenth century. W. Lenke, *Klimadaten von 1621–1650 nach Beobachtungen des Landgrafen Hermann von Hessen*, vol. 9, no. 63 (Offenbach, 1960).

13. AAACP Allemagne 14, fols. 368–371, Tercy (letter sent) to Richelieu, Leer, 10/20 October 1637; HStAM 4h Nr. 1448, fols. 21–22, AE (letter sent) to SC, Delfzijl, 14/24 October 1637, doublet in HStAM 4h Nr. 1448, fols. 37–38, minute in HStAM 4d Nr. 39, fols. 19–20. For the embalming of Wilhelm's corpse and its placement at the main church at Groningen until it could be brought back to Cassel, see M. Merian, *Theatrum Europaeum, oder Warhafftige Beschreibung aller denckwürdigen Geschichten*, 6 vols. (Frankfurt am Main, 1643–1652), vol. 3, 838. For the theological underpinning to her subservience to her husband, see Calvin, *Commentary on Timothy*, 1 Timothy 2:11–15, and John Calvin, *A Sermon of M. John Calvin upon the Epistle of Saint Paul, to Titus*, trans. L. T. (London, 1579), sermon 11, 2:3–5.

14. HStAM 4d Nr. 39, fol. 22, AE (Sixtinus hand minute) to the Statthalter and SC, Delfzijl, 18/28 October 1637. Her pressure on the secret council to obey is in HStAM 4d Nr. 39, fol. 9, AE (minute, Secretary Jacobi hand) to SC, Leer, 26 September/6 October 1637. For Melander referring letters back to her, see HStAM 4d Nr. 39, fols. 39–42, AE (copy) to SC, Delfzijl, 15/25 November 1637, minute in HStAM 4d Nr. 39, fols. 43–44, letter sent in HStAM 4h Nr. 1448, fols. 57–58. For her jealousy, see AAACP Allemagne 14, fols. 368–371, Tercy (letter sent) to Richelieu, Leer, 10/20 October 1637.

15. AAACP Allemagne 14, fols. 368–371, Tercy (letter sent) to Richelieu, Leer, 10/20 October 1637; HStAM 4d Nr. 39, fols. 39–42, AE (copy) to SC, Delfzijl, 15/25 November 1637. For Calvin's admonishment that women see to the proper care and upbringing of their children, see Calvin, *Sermon upon the Epistle of Saint Paul*, sermon 11, 2:3–5.

16. HStAM 4d Nr. 39, fol. 9, AE (minute, Secretary Jacobi hand) to SC, Leer, 26 September/6 October 1637. Similarly, Calvin also wrote: "It is the duty of believers to present their 'bodies a living sacrifice, holy and acceptable unto God, which is their reasonable service' (Rom. 12: 1)." John Calvin, *Institutes of the Christian Religion*, trans. Henry Beveridge (Edinburgh, 1845), bk. 3, 7:1–2. Since the original publication of this chapter in 2003, Simone Buckreus has expanded on the various ways the landgravine justified her regency and political power. Simone Buckreus, *Die Körper einer Regentin: Amelia Elisabeth von Hessen-Kassel (1602–1651)* (Göttingen, 2008).

17. For her belief in the need for allies see, for example, HStAM 4d Nr. 51, fols. 4–5, AE (minute) to Vultejus, Groningen, 1/11 October 1637.

18. Riksarkivet Salvius Samling, vol. 8, Instructions for Sten Bielke and Johan Adler Salvius, Stockholm, 23 March/2 April 1637, pub. in *Acta Pacis Westphalicae* ser. 1, vol. 1, 210–217, copy in Riksregistratur 1637, fols. 194ff. For Wilhelm's failure to renew the Swedish alliance, see BN MS Baluze 167, fols. 108–110, D'Avaux (own hand minute) to Chavigny, 29 September 1637. For later Swedish annoyance over the conflicts with Wilhelm in 1637, see Riksarkivet Germanica 1369, Wolff (copy) Considerations on the Alliance with Amalia Elisabeth, Köpingen, 5/15 October 1639?. Wolff was born in Marburg and had served the Hessian court before joining Swedish service soon after Wilhelm's alliance with Gustavus Adolphus. Although he remained Swedish resident at Cassel until his death in 1645, he was also the Swedish commissary for the entire Westphalian Circle. Daniel Höffker, "Axel Oxenstierna und Hermann Wolff," in *Gemeinsame Bekannte: Schweden und Deutschland in der Frühen Neuzeit*, ed. Ivo Asmus, Heiko Droste, and Jens E. Olesen (Münster, 2003), 145–164; Bechert, "Aussenpolitik," 217–219.

19. The report of Wolff's departure and the secret council's confusion is in HStAM 4d Nr. 39, fols. 17–18, SC (letter sent) to AE, Cassel, 2/12 October 1637, minute in HStAM 4h Nr. 1448, fol. 6. Her departure for Delfzijl on 12/22 October is in HStAM 4h Nr. 1448, fols. 19–20, AE (letter sent) to Statthalter and SC, Leer, 11/21 October 1637, minute in HStAM 4d Nr. 39, fol. 15. Her discussion of Wolff's departure is in HStAM 4h Nr. 1448, fols. 21–22, AE (letter sent) to SC, Delfzijl, 14/24 October 1637, doublet in HStAM 4h Nr. 1448, fols. 37–38, minute in HStAM 4d Nr. 39, fols. 19–20.

20. HStAM 4h Nr. 1448, fols. 23–24, AE (letter sent) to Wolff, Delfzijl, 14/24 October 1637, copy in HStAM 4h Nr. 1448, fols. 39–41; HStAM 4h Nr. 1448, fols. 21–22, AE (letter sent) to SC, Delfzijl, 14/24 October 1637, doublet in HStAM 4h Nr. 1448, fols. 37–38, minute in HStAM 4d Nr. 39, fols. 19–20. The praise of Günderoode is in AAACP Allemagne 14, fols. 368–371, Tercy (letter sent) to Richelieu, Leer, 10/20 October 1637. Cross quote in Riksarkivet, AE (copy) credentials for Wolff, 21/31 October 1637, pub. in Axel Oxenstierna, *Rikskansleren Axel Oxenstiernas Skrifter och Brefväxling* (Stockholm, 1895), ser. 2, vol. 7, 663–664. See also Riksarkivet, AE (letter sent) to Oxenstierna, 21/31 October 1637, pub. in Oxenstierna, *Skrifter*, 2:7, 664–666.

21. AAACP Hambourg 1, fols. 329–350, St. Chamond Relation, 1635–1637. For French fears about the progress of the war, see AAACP Allemagne 14, fols. 396–411, Memoire (Chavigny secretary's hand minute) to D'Avaux, 19/29 October 1637, letter sent in BN MS Baluze 167, fols. 127ff. For a comparison of Mantua, Savoy, and Hesse-Cassel, see Sven Externbrink, "Kleinstaaten im Bündnissystem Richelieus: Hessen-Kassel und Mantua 1635–1642. Ein Vergleich," in Klaus Malettke, ed., *Frankreich und Hessen-Kassel zur Zeit des Dreißigjährigen Krieges und des Westfälischen Friedens* (Marburg, 1999), 135–157.

22. Tercy's report to Richelieu is in AAACP Allemagne 14, fols. 368–371, Tercy (letter sent) to Richelieu, Leer, 10/20 October 1637. Excerpts also appear in Richelieu's *Mémoires*, 128–130.

23. AAACP Hesse 1, fols. 179–182bis, Louis XIII (minute) to La Boderie, 19/29 October 1637; AAACP Allemagne 14, fols. 396–411, Memoire (Chavigny secretary's hand minute) to D'Avaux, 19/29 October 1637, letter sent in BN MS Baluze 167, fols. 127ff.

24. *Ibid.* The king also attempted to wiggle out of paying for mortars and cannons that Wilhelm V had previously demanded.

25. D’Avaux’s carefully reworked minute is in BN MS Baluze 167, fol. 123, D’Avaux (own hand minute) to AE, 13/23 October 1637. For instructions for la Boderie to lie about the subsidies, see AAACP Hesse 1, fols. 183–184, Louis XIII (minute) to La Boderie, 19/29? October 1637.

26. AAACP Hesse 1, fols. 179–182bis, Louis XIII (minute) to La Boderie, 19/29 October 1637. For Melander’s attitude toward the French see Geisthardt, “Peter Melander.” Melander was to receive a pension half the size of young Wilhelm VI’s—18,000 livres. AAACP Allemagne 14, fols. 396–411, Memoire (Chavigny secretary’s hand minute) to D’Avaux, 19/29 October 1637, letter sent in BN MS Baluze 167, fols. 127ff. According to Richelieu, they doubled Melander’s salary. Richelieu, *Mémoires*, 128–130. The information that Dalwigk was receiving 3,000 Reichsthalers and Günderoode 2,000 is in AAACP Hesse 1, fols. 193–194, Summary of a La Boderie letter, 27 March 1638. For information on Geysso and St. Andrew’s pension, see AAACP Hesse 1, fols. 187–188, Summary of a La Boderie Letter, 28 November/8 December 1637.

27. For the French attempt to get Melander to stay loyal to her, see AAACP Hesse 1, fols. 179–182bis, Louis XIII (minute) to La Boderie, 19/29 October 1637; AAACP Allemagne 14, fols. 396–411, Memoire (Chavigny secretary’s hand minute) to D’Avaux, 19/29 October 1637, letter sent in BN MS Baluze 167, fols. 127ff. For d’Avaux’s statement that Melander was greedy and peace-loving—bad character traits in a general, see AAACP Hesse 1, fols. 183–184, Louis XIII (minute) to La Boderie, 19/29? October 1637. For Melander’s tendency toward peace, see also BN MS Baluze 167, fols. 167–175, D’Avaux (minute) to Chavigny, 1 December 1637. Geisthardt also argues that Wilhelm himself had begun to mistrust Melander shortly before his death. Geisthardt, “Peter Melander.”

28. HStAM 4d Nr. 51, fols. 4–5, AE (minute) to Vultejus, Groningen, 1/11 October 1637; HStAM 4h Nr. 1448, fols. 23–24, AE (letter sent) to Wolff, Delfzijl, 14/24 October 1637, copy in HStAM 4h Nr. 1448, fols. 39–41. See also Riksarkivet, AE (copy) credentials for Wolff, 21/31 October 1637, pub. in Oxenstierna, *Skrifter*, 2:7, 663–664; HStAM 4h Nr. 1448, fols. 21–22, AE (letter sent) to SC, Delfzijl, 14/24 October 1637, doublet in HStAM 4h Nr. 1448, fols. 37–38, minute in HStAM 4d Nr. 39, fols. 19–20; AAACP Allemagne 14, fols. 368–371, Tercy (letter sent) to Richelieu, Leer, 10/20 October 1637.

29. AAACP Allemagne 14, fols. 368–371, Tercy (letter sent) to Richelieu, Leer, 10/20 October 1637. Her elucidation to Oxenstierna of her weakened condition and her not-so-veiled threat are in Riksarkivet, AE (letter sent) to Oxenstierna, 21/31 October 1637, pub. in Oxenstierna, *Skrifter*, 2:7, 664–666.

30. HStAM 4d Nr. 39, fol. 31, SC (Jacobi hand letter sent) to Wilhelm VI, Cassel, 11/21 October 1637, minute in HStAM 4h Nr. 1448, fols. 7–8.

3. *The Imperial Mandate*

1. Hessische Staatsarchiv Marburg [HStAM] 4d Nr. 39, fols. 26–28, Jacobi (letter sent) to Amalia Elisabeth [AE], Cassel, 25 October/4 November 1637; HStAM 4d Nr. 39, fols. 49–50, SC (copy) to AE, Cassel, 2/12 November 1637, minute in HStAM 4h Nr. 1448, fols. 27–32. Discounting of Götz’s moves in HStAM 4h Nr. 1448, fols. 23–24, AE (letter sent) to Wolff, Delfzijl, 14/24 October 1637, copy in HStAM 4h Nr. 1448, fols. 39–41.

2. The report of the imperial patent, for example, was sent out 11/21 October, but the reply came on 14/24 November. HStAM 4d Nr. 39, fols. 26–28, Jacobi (letter

sent) to AE, Cassel, 25 October/4 November 1637; HStAM 4d Nr. 39, fols. 31, Cassel Secret Council [SC] (Jacobi hand letter sent) to Wilhelm VI, Cassel, 11/21 October 1637, minute in HStAM 4h Nr. 1448, fols. 7–8; HStAM 4d Nr. 39, fols. 59–62, 65, SC (letter sent) to AE, Cassel, 11/21 November 1637, minute in HStAM 4h Nr. 1448, fols. 46–51. D’Avaux’s complaint in Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris, [BN] MS Baluze 167, fols. 167–175, D’Avaux (minute) to Chavigny, 1 December 1637. The exchange between the council and Götz is in Dietrich Christoph von Rommel, *Geschichte von Hessen*, vol. 8 (Cassel, 1843), 489–490.

3. HStAM 4h Nr. 1448, fols. 11–12, Wilhelm VI (letter sent) to SC, Delfzijl, 24 October/3 November 1637.

4. HStAM 4d Nr. 39, fols. 29, 35, AE (copy) to SC, Delfzijl, 26 October/5 November 1637, copy in HStAM 4d Nr. 39, fols. 30, 32, minute in HStAM 4d Nr. 39, fols. 33–34, letter sent in HStAM 4h Nr. 1448, fols. 52–53, 54–55.

5. *Ibid.*

6. Amalia Elisabeth’s attitude toward time is in HStAM 4d Nr. 50, fols. 6–8, AE (own hand letter sent) to Vultejus, early September 1638. See also Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Paris, Correspondance Politique, [AAECP] Allemagne 14, fols. 396–411, Memoire (Chavigny secretary’s hand minute) to D’Avaux, 19/29 October 1637, letter sent in BN MS Baluze 167, fols. 127ff. For her interest in the Hanau situation, see HStAM 4h Nr. 1448, fols. 13–14, AE (letter sent) to SC, Leer, 11/21 October 1637, minute in HStAM 4d Nr. 39, 13–14, doublet in HStAM 4h Nr. 1448, 42–43; HStAM 4h Nr. 1448, fols. 17–18, AE (letter sent) to Statthalter Erckebrecht, Leer, 11/21 October 1637, letter sent in HStAM 4h Nr. 1448, fols. 15–16. Wilhelm’s Hanau strategy is mentioned in HStAM 4d Nr. 39, fols. 12, SC (minute) to Albrecht Otto of Solms Laubach, Cassel, 13/23 September 1637. The French were also very interested in using Amalia Elisabeth to block this accord. AAECF Hesse 1, fols. 183–184, Louis XIII (minute) to la Boderie, 19/29? October 1637.

7. HStAM 4h Nr. 1448, fols. 21–22, AE (letter sent) to SC, Delfzijl, 14/24 October 1637, doublet in HStAM 4h Nr. 1448, fols. 37–38, minute in HStAM 4d Nr. 39, fols. 19–20; HStAM 4d Nr. 39, fols. 29, 35, AE (copy) to SC, Delfzijl, 26 October/5 November 1637, copy in HStAM 4d Nr. 39, fols. 30, 32, Vultejus hand minute in HStAM 4d Nr. 39, fols. 33–34, letter sent in HStAM 4h Nr. 1448, fols. 52–53, 54–55; John Calvin, *Institutes of the Christian Religion*, trans. Henry Beveridge (Edinburgh, 1845), bk. 3, 7:8.

8. AAECF Hesse 1, fols. 183–184, Louis XIII (minute) to La Boderie, 19/29? October 1637. For the opinion at the Hessian court of Hermann, see AAECF Allemagne 14, fols. 368–371, Tercy (letter sent) to Richelieu, Leer, 10/20 October 1637.

9. HStAM 4d Nr. 39, fols. 93–94, Johann Georg (copy) to the Estates of Hesse-Cassel, Dresden, 23 October/2 November 1637; HStAM 4h Nr. 1448, fols. 27–32, SC (minute) to AE, Cassel, 2/12 November 1637; HStAM 4d Nr. 39, fols. 49–50, SC (copy) to AE, Cassel, 2/12 November 1637, minute in HStAM 4h Nr. 1448, fols. 27–32; HStAM 4d Nr. 39, fols. 109–110, 119, 124, Vice Statthalter [VS], Vice Chancellor [VC], and SC (letter sent) to AE, Cassel, 23 December 1637/2 January 1638, duplicata in HStAM 4d Nr. 39, fols. 120–122, minute in HStAM 4h Nr. 1448, fols. 79–85. A copy of Georg’s appeal is in HStAM 4h Nr. 2137, fols. 663–674, 10/20 November 1637. For the emperor’s declaration releasing Hessians from their duty, see HStAM 4d Nr. 39, fols. 112–116, Ferdinand III (copy) to the Council, Knights, and Estates of Hesse-Cassel, Vienna, 17/27 November 1637. For Ferdinand’s belief in the loyalty of

the Hessian estates, see HHStA Kleinere Reichsstände Hessen-Kassel 1636–1648 [KRHK] 155, fols. 85–88, Ferdinand II (minute) to Ferdinand III, Regensburg, 12 September 1636. Richelieu's description of the imperial attempts to sway her subjects to revolt is in Richelieu, *Mémoires du Cardinal de Richelieu, sur le Règne de Louis XIII*, vol. 9 (Paris, 1838), 319–320.

10. HStAM 4d Nr. 39, fol. 31, SC (Jacobi hand letter sent) to Wilhelm VI, Cassel, 11/21 October 1637, minute in HStAM 4h Nr. 1448, fols. 7–8; HStAM 4d Nr. 39, fols. 26–28, Jacobi (letter sent) to AE, Cassel, 25 October/4 November 1637.

11. HStAM 4d Nr. 39, fols. 49–50, SC (copy) to AE, Cassel, 2/12 November 1637, minute in HStAM 4h Nr. 1448, fols. 27–32. Georg's claim that his illness delayed the presentation of the mandate is in Rommel, *Geschichte von Hessen*, vol. 8, 489. The refusal of the estates to go to Alsfeld is in HStAM 4d Nr. 39, fols. 49–50, SC (copy) to AE, Cassel, 2/12 November 1637, minute in HStAM 4h Nr. 1448, fols. 27–32.

12. HStAM 4d Nr. 39, fols. 29, 35, AE (copy) to SC, Delfzijl, 26 October/5 November 1637, copy in HStAM 4d Nr. 39, fols. 30, 32, Vultejus hand minute in HStAM 4d Nr. 39, fols. 33–34, letter sent in HStAM 4h Nr. 1448, fols. 52–53, 54–55. The States General actually had two agents there, who had arrived before Wilhelm's death to mediate his agreement with the East Frisian estates. Louise van Tongerlo, "Beziehungen zwischen Hessen-Kassel und den Vereinigten Niederlanden während des Dreissigjährigen Krieges," *Hessisches Jahrbuch für Landesgeschichte [HJL]* 14 (1964), 234–237.

13. HStAM 4d Nr. 39, fol. 36, Sixtinus (own hand minute) to VC, Delfzijl, 6/16 November 1637; HStAM 4h Nr. 1448, fol. 26, AE (copy) to Heussener, Delfzijl, 30 October/9 November 1637; HStAM 4d Nr. 39, fols. 48, 51, SC (letter sent) to AE, Cassel, 3/13 November 1637, minute in HStAM 4h Nr. 1448, fols. 35–36. She also described her discussion with Heussener in HStAM 4d Nr. 39, fols. 39–42, AE (copy) to SC, Delfzijl, 15/25 November 1637, Sixtinus hand minute in HStAM 4d Nr. 39, fols. 43–44, letter sent in HStAM 4h Nr. 1448, fols. 57–8.

14. HStAM 4d Nr. 39, fols. 49–50, SC (copy) to AE, Cassel, 2/12 November 1637, minute in HStAM 4h Nr. 1448, fols. 27–32; HStAM 4d Nr. 39, fols. 26–28, Jacobi (letter sent) to AE, Cassel, 25 October/4 November 1637; HStAM 4d Nr. 39, fols. 59–62, 65, SC (letter sent) to AE, Cassel, 11/21 November 1637, minute in HStAM 4h Nr. 1448, fols. 46–51; HStAM 4d Nr. 39, fols. 46–47, VS, VC, and SC (letter sent) to AE, Cassel, 3/13 November 1637, minute in HStAM 4h Nr. 1448, fol. 33. The secret council's opposition to her Hanau plan is in HStAM 4d Nr. 39, fols. 48, 51, SC (letter sent) to AE, Cassel, 3/13 November 1637, minute in HStAM 4h Nr. 1448, fols. 35–36. Money shortages are also mentioned in HStAM 4d Nr. 39, fols. 63–64, SC (letter sent, doublet) to AE, Cassel, 10/20 November 1637, letter sent in HStAM 4d Nr. 39, fols. 52, 57–8, minute in HStAM 4h Nr. 1448, fols. 44–45. For the secret council's happiness at Georg's decision to negotiate at all, see HStAM 4d Nr. 93, fols. 26–30, VS, VC, and SC (copy) to Breithaupt, Cassel, 23 November/3 December 1637.

15. Rumors mentioned in HStAM 4d Nr. 39, fol. 36, Sixtinus (own hand minute) to VC, Delfzijl, 6/16 November 1637. For her comments and information on Hanau, plus Sixtinus's nervousness at being the landgravine's only councilor at Delfzijl at this time, see HStAM 4h Nr. 1448, fols. 67–70, AE (letter sent) to SC, Delfzijl, 6/16 November 1637, minute in HStAM 4d Nr. 39, fols. 37–38.

16. HStAM 4d Nr. 39, fols. 39–42, AE (copy) to SC, Delfzijl, 15/25 November 1637, Sixtinus hand minute in HStAM 4d Nr. 39, fols. 43–44, letter sent in HStAM 4h Nr. 1448, fols. 57–58.

17. For her ideas about peace, see HStAM 4d Nr. 51, fols. 4–5, AE (minute) to Vultejus, Groningen, 1/11 October 1637. See also HStAM 4h Nr. 1448, fols. 23–24, AE (letter sent) to Wolff, Delfzijl, 14/24 October 1637, copy in HStAM 4h Nr. 1448, fols. 39–41; HStAM 4d Nr. 39, fol. 36, Sixtinus (own hand minute) to VC, Delfzijl, 6/16 November 1637; Riksarkivet, AE (letter sent) to Oxenstierna, 21/31 October 1637, pub. in Oxenstierna, *Axel Oxenstiernas Skrifter och Brefvexling* (Stockholm, 1895), 2:7, 664–666; HStAM 4d Nr. 39, fols. 29, 35, AE (copy) to SC, Delfzijl, 26 October/5 November 1637, copy in HStAM 4d Nr. 39, fols. 30, 32, Vultejus hand minute in HStAM 4d Nr. 39, fols. 33–34, letter sent in HStAM 4h Nr. 1448, fols. 52–53, 54–55; HStAM 4d Nr. 39, fols. 49–50, SC (copy) to AE, Cassel, 2/12 November 1637, minute in HStAM 4h Nr. 1448, fols. 27–32; HStAM 4h Nr. 1448, fols. 67–70, AE (letter sent) to SC, Delfzijl, 6/16 November 1637, minute in HStAM 4d Nr. 39, fols. 37–38. For her discussions with Tercy, see AAACP Allemagne 14, fols. 368–371, Tercy (letter sent) to Richelieu, Leer, 10/20 October 1637. Her tactics for excusing the negotiations with Georg to the Dutch are in HStAM 4f Niederlande Nr. 498, fols. 65–68, Sixtinus (own hand minute) to Sengel, Delfzijl, 24 November/4 December 1637.

18. HStAM 4f Niederlande Nr. 498, fol. 5, AE (minute) Powers for Sengel, Delfzijl, 21/31 October 1637; HStAM 4f Niederlande Nr. 498, fols. 56–59, AE (Sixtinus hand minute) to Sengel, Delfzijl, 17/27 November 1637; Tongerlo, “Beziehungen,” 235–236.

19. BN MS Baluze 167, fols. 167–175, D’Avaux (minute) to Chavigny, 1 December 1637.

20. For payments to Amalia Elisabeth’s officers, see AAACP Hesse 1, fols. 187–188, Summary of La Boderie Letter, 28 November/8 December 1637; BN MS Baluze 167, fols. 167–175, D’Avaux (minute) to Chavigny, 1 December 1637; BN MS Baluze 167, fols. 108–110, D’Avaux (own hand minute) to Chavigny, 29 September 1637.

21. HStAM 4d Nr. 39, fols. 82–85, VS, VC, and SC (letter sent) to AE, Cassel, 22 November/2 December 1637, minute in HStAM 4h Nr. 1448, fols. 59–62, copies in HStAM 4d Nr. 39, fols. 91–92 and fols. 98–101. The letter of the duke of Brunswick-Lüneburg to Melander is mentioned in HStAM 4h Nr. 1448, fols. 86–87, AE (letter sent) to SC, Delfzijl, 1/11 December 1637, minute in HStAM 4d Nr. 39, fols. 54–55, copy in HStAM 4d Nr. 39, fols. 53, 56. For the estates beginning to waver, see HStAM 4h Nr. 1448, fols. 63–66, SC (minute) to AE, Cassel, 24 November/4 December 1637, letter sent in HStAM 4h Nr. 1448, fols. 90, 95–96. The secret council’s outreach to the empire also in HStAM 4d Nr. 39, fols. 49–50, SC (copy) to AE, Cassel, 2/12 November 1637, minute in HStAM 4h Nr. 1448, fols. 27–32. For the elector of Saxony’s belief in the efficacy of an appeal to the estates in forcing a peace, see HStAM 4d Nr. 90, Extract of a Letter from Dresden, Dresden, 18 December 1637. HStAM 4d Nr. 93, fols. 26–30, VS, VC, and SC (copy) to Breithaupt, Cassel, 23 November/3 December 1637.

22. HStAM 4h Nr. 1448, fols. 86–87, AE (letter sent) to SC, Delfzijl, 1/11 December 1637, minute in HStAM 4d Nr. 39, fols. 54–55, copy in HStAM 4d Nr. 39, fols. 53, 56.

23. *Ibid.*

24. HStAM 4h Nr. 1448, fols. 88–89, AE (letter sent) to SC, Delfzijl, 2/12 December 1637, Sixtinus hand minute in HStAM 4d Nr. 39, fols. 75–6, copy in HStAM 4d Nr. 39, fols. 74, 77; HStAM 4d Nr. 39, fols. 70–72, AE (copy) to VC and VS, Delfzijl, 2/12 December 1637; HStAM 4d Nr. 39, fols. 78–79, AE (copy) to the Prelates, Knights, and Estates, Delfzijl, 3/13 December 1637.

25. HStAM 4d Nr. 39, fols. 103–105, VC, VS, and SC (letter sent) to AE, Cassel, 7/17 December 1637; HStAM 4d Nr. 39, fols. 97, 102, VS, VC, and SC (letter sent) to AE, Cassel, 1/11 December 1637, minute in HStAM 4h Nr. 1448, fols. 71–72; HStAM 4d Nr. 39, fols. 23–24, Extract of a Letter, Cassel, 4/14 December 1637 (misdated as 4/14 October 1637).

26. *Ibid.* The council's decision to send Commissary Horn to explain the details to Amalia Elisabeth is in HStAM 4d Nr. 39, fols. 109–110, 119, 124, VS, VC, and SC (letter sent) to AE, Cassel, 23 December 1637/2 January 1638, duplicata in HStAM 4d Nr. 39, fols. 120–122, minute in HStAM 4h Nr. 1448, fols. 79–85. See also HStAM 4d Nr. 90, Duke of Neuburg (copy) to VS, VC, and SC, Düsseldorf, 8/18 January 1638.

27. AAACP Allemagne 14, fols. 368–371, Tercy (letter sent) to Richelieu, Leer, 10/20 October 1637; HStAM 4d Nr. 39, fols. 23–24, Extract of a Letter, Cassel, 4/14 December 1637. For more on Melander's desire for titles, see Fritz Geisthardt, "Peter Melander Graf zu Holzappel 1589–1648," in *Nassauische Lebensbilder*, ed. Karl Wolf (Wiesbaden, 1950), 36–53. See also Hessische Staatsarchiv Darmstadt [HStAD] E8A 120/1, Ferdinand III (letter sent) to Georg of Hesse-Darmstadt, Pressburg, 10/20 December 1637; HStAD E8A 120/1, Ferdinand III (letter sent) to Georg of Hesse-Darmstadt, Pressburg, 19/29 December 1637. The emperor's suspicions are in HStAD E8A 120/1, Ferdinand III (letter sent) to Georg of Hesse-Darmstadt, Pressburg, 19/29 January 1638.

28. HStAM 4d Nr. 90, Georg of Brunswick-Lüneburg (copy) to Elector of Saxony, Hildesheim, 9 November 1637; HStAM 4d Nr. 90, Christian of Brandenburg (copy) to Georg of Hesse-Darmstadt, Plessenburg, 11/21 December 1637; HStAM 4d Nr. 90, Christian of Brandenburg (copy) to VS, VC, and SC, Plessenburg, 11/21 December 1637.

29. HStAM 4d Nr. 90, Elector of Saxony (copy) to Johan Ernst of Saxe-Eisenach, Dresden, 16 December 1637; HStAM 4d Nr. 90, Extract of a Letter, Dresden, 18 December 1637. Johan Ernst's response is in HStAM 4d Nr. 90, Johan Ernst of Saxe-Eisenach (copy) to VS, VC, and SC, Eisenach, 29 December 1637. The secret council had also reiterated its argument that young Wilhelm was innocent in a letter to Johann Georg of 15/25 December, though this was considerably delayed, reaching the elector only in mid-February. HStAM 4d Nr. 90, Johann Georg of Saxony (copy) to the Estates of Hesse-Cassel, Dresden, 12/22 January 1638.

30. HStAM 4a Nr. 47,26, Hermann (letter sent) to AE, Cassel, 15/25 December 1637.

31. HStAM 4d Nr. 39, fols. 23–24, Extract of a Letter, Cassel, 4/14 December 1637; HStAM 4d Nr. 39, fols. 111, 118, Georg of Hesse-Darmstadt (copy) to VS, VC, and SC of Hesse-Cassel, Giessen, 14/24 December 1637; HStAM 4d Nr. 39, fols. 109–110, 119, 124, VS, VC, and SC (letter sent) to AE, Cassel, 23 December 1637/2 January 1638, duplicata in HStAM 4d Nr. 39, fols. 120–122, minute in HStAM 4h Nr. 1448, fols. 79–85; HStAM 4d Nr. 93, fols. 31–32, VS, VC, and SC (copy) to Breithaupt, Cassel, 23 December 1637/2 January 1638. For the secret council's continuing hope that the poverty of the countryside would cause the enemies to retreat, see HStAM 4h Nr. 1448, fols. 143–151, VC and SC (minute) to AE, Cassel, 19/29 March 1638, letter sent in HStAM 4d Nr. 93, fols. 51–55.

4. Deeper into the Labyrinth

1. Hessische Staatsarchiv Marburg [HStAM] 4d Nr. 39, fols. 97, 102, Vice Statthalter [VS], Vice Chancellor [VC], and Cassel Secret Council [SC] (letter sent) to Amalia Elisabeth [AE], Cassel, 1/11 December 1637, minute in HStAM 4h Nr. 1448, fols. 71–72; HStAM 4d Nr. 39, fols. 23–24, Extract of a Letter, Cassel, 4/14 December 1637; HStAM 4d Nr. 39, fols. 87–89, AE (Sixtinus hand minute) to SC, Groningen, 24 December 1637/3 January 1638, copy in HStAM 4d Nr. 39, fol. 86, letter sent in HStAM 4h Nr. 1448, fols. 105–106; HStAM 4h Nr. 1448, fols. 117–118, AE (letter sent) to SC, Groningen, 4/14 January 1638, copy and minute in HStAM 4d Nr. 90. Heinrich Casimir, the statthalter of Friesland, gave her his official residence at Groningen. Louise van Tongerloo, “Beziehungen zwischen Hessen-Kassel und den Vereinigten Niederlanden während des Dreissigjährigen Krieges,” *Hessisches Jahrbuch für Landesgeschichte* [HJL] 14 (1964), 236.

2. HStAM 4d Nr. 90, VS, VC, and SC (letter sent) to AE, Cassel, 4/14 January 1638, copies in HStAM 4d Nr. 90, minute in HStAM 4h Nr. 1448, fols. 100–103; HStAM 4h Nr. 1448, fols. 90–91, Instructions for von der Malsburg, Cassel, 2/12 January 1638; HStAM 4d Nr. 39, fols. 23–24, Extract of a Letter, Cassel, 4/14 December 1637. Amalia Elisabeth’s dislike of von der Malsburg, including her opinion that he was engaged in embezzlement, made him an unfortunate choice of delegate. HStAM 4d Nr. 90, AE (minute, Sixtinus hand corrections) to VS and VC, Groningen, 5/15 January 1638. Geoffrey Parker’s discussion of the development of the contribution system is in Parker, ed., *The Thirty Years’ War*, 2nd ed. (London, 1997), 183. For a more extensive discussion of this system, see Fritz Redlich, “Contributions in the Thirty Years’ War,” *Economic History Review* 12, no. 2, new ser. (1959), 247–254. See also David Parrott, *Richelieu’s Army: War, Government and Society in France, 1624–1642* (Cambridge, England, 2001), 281–282; Geoffrey Parker, *The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road, 1567–1659* (Cambridge, England, 1972), 142–143; Geoffrey Parker, *The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500–1800* (Cambridge, England, 1988).

3. Amalia Elisabeth also sent agents to her allies’ courts to repeat the same arguments as Vultejus. HStAM 4d Nr. 51, fols. 1–3, Instructions for Vultejus, Groningen, 12/22 January 1638.

4. HStAM 4d Nr. 90, Duke of Neuburg (copy) to VS, VC, and SC, Düsseldorf, 8/18 January 1638; HStAM 4d Nr. 90, Duke of Neuburg (copy) to Bishop of Bamberg and Würzburg, Düsseldorf, 8/18 January 1638; HStAM 4d Nr. 90, Duke of Neuburg (copy) to Georg of Hesse-Darmstadt, Düsseldorf, 8/18 January 1638; HStAM 4d Nr. 90, VS, VC, and SC (copy) to Duke of Saxe-Eisenach, Cassel, 11/21 January 1638; HStAM 4d Nr. 90, VS, VC, and SC (copy) to Christian of Brandenburg, Cassel, 11/21 January 1638; HStAM 4d Nr. 90, VC and SC (copy) to Georg of Brunswick-Lüneburg, Cassel, 15/25 January 1638; HStAM 4d Nr. 90, VC and SC (copy) to Duke of Neuburg, Cassel, 15/25 January 1638; HStAM 4d Nr. 90, Bishop of Bamberg and Würzburg (copy) to VS, VC, and SC, Würzburg, 11/21 January 1638; HStAM 4d Nr. 93, fols. 33–34, Breithaupt (copy) to VS, VC, and SC, Vienna, 3/13 January 1638. The intercession of the bishop of Würzburg on behalf of Hesse-Cassel is in HStAM 4d Nr. 90, Bishop of Bamberg and Würzburg (copy) to Georg of Hesse-Darmstadt, Würzburg, 11/21 January 1638. The council’s report to Amalia Elisabeth on its outreach program is in HStAM 4d Nr. 90, VC and SC (letter sent) to AE, Cassel, 15/25 January 1638,

postscript dated 18/28 January 1638, minute in HStAM 4h Nr. 1448, fols. 108–109, duplicata in HStAM 4d Nr. 90.

5. HStAM 4d Nr. 90, Johann Georg of Saxony (copy) to Estates of Hesse-Cassel, Dresden, 12/22 January 1638.

6. HStAM 4d Nr. 90, Delegates to Marburg (copy) to VS, VC, and SC, Marburg, 13/23 January 1638; HStAM 4d Nr. 90, Project in *Publica* (copy), Marburg, 13/23 January 1638, copy in Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv, Vienna [HHStA], Kleinere Reichsstände Hessen-Kassel 1636–1648 [KRHK] 155, fols. 265–291; HStAM 4d Nr. 90, *Protocollum undt Relation*, Marburg, 13/23 January 1638.

7. For the death of Dalwigk and the secret council's displeasure over the draft *publica*, see HStAM 4d Nr. 90, VC and SC (letter sent) to AE, Cassel, 15/25 January 1638, minute in HStAM 4h Nr. 1448, fols. 108–109, duplicata in HStAM 4d Nr. 90. Dalwigk's earlier illness is also mentioned in HStAM 4d Nr. 90, VS, VC, and SC (letter sent) to AE, Cassel, 4/14 January 1638, copies in HStAM 4d Nr. 90, minute in HStAM 4h Nr. 1448, fols. 100–103. The death of Louise is in HStAM 4d Nr. 90, VS, VC, and SC (copy) to AE, Cassel, 7/17 January 1638, copies in HStAM 4d Nr. 90. See also HStAM 4a Nr. 49.10, Emilie to Wilhelm and Philipp, 15/25 January 1638, pub. in Erwin Bettenhäuser, ed., *Familienbriefe der Landgräfin Amalie Elisabeth von Hessen-Kassel und ihrer Kinder* (Marburg, 1994), 15–16; HStAM 4a Nr. 49.10, Charlotte to Wilhelm and Philipp, 15/25 January 1638, pub. in Bettenhäuser, *Familienbriefe*, 16. For the secret council's belief that the delegates had been acting in good faith, see HStAM 4d Nr. 90, VC and SC (letter sent) to AE, Cassel, 18/28 February 1638, extract in HStAM 4d Nr. 90. See also HStAM 4d Nr. 38, Local Ministry of Hesse-Cassel and Superintendent of Allendorf Memoire (copy) to SC, Cassel, 22 January/1 February 1638.

8. For the secret council's insistence on handing over the army only after it had been first discharged, and Westerhold's role in trying to change their minds, see HStAM 4d Nr. 90, Delegates to Marburg (copy) to VS, VC, and SC, Marburg, 16/26 January 1638. See also Hessische Staatsarchiv Darmstadt [HStAD] E8A 120/1, Ferdinand III (letter sent) to Georg of Hesse-Darmstadt, Pressburg, 19/29 January 1638. The keen interest at court in the progress of the negotiations is in HStAM 4d Nr. 93, fols. 41–42, Breithaupt (copy) to VS, VC, and SC, Vienna, 23 [sic] January/3 February 1638. For the presence of Todenwarth in Vienna and the view that he was “up to something,” see HStAM 4d Nr. 93, fols. 35–36, Breithaupt (copy) to VS, VC, and SC, Vienna, 17/27 January 1638.

9. HStAD E8A 120/1, Ferdinand III (letter sent) to Georg of Hesse-Darmstadt, Pressburg, 19/29 January 1638. For Melander's concerns, see HStAM 4h Nr. 1448, fol. 112, Melander (copy) to General Commissary Heussener, Dorsten, 17/27 January 1638.

10. Rabenhaupt was later famous for liberating Groningen, an event still celebrated in that city. His story is mentioned in HStAM 4d Nr. 90, Delegates to Marburg (copy) to VC and SC, Marburg, 21/31 January 1638. See also HStAM 4d Nr. 90, Delegates to Marburg (copy) to VC and SC, Marburg, 30 January/9 February 1638.

11. *Ibid.* The Darmstadt delegates' games with the *privata* are also in HStAM 4d Nr. 90, SC (coded letter sent) to AE, Cassel, 1/11 February 1638, coded doublet and copy in HStAM 4d Nr. 90, minute of postscript in HStAM 4h Nr. 1448, fol. 116; HStAM 4d Nr. 90, VC and SC (letter sent) to AE, Cassel, 29 January/8 February 1638, duplicata in HStAM 4d Nr. 90, copy in HStAM 4h Nr. 1448, fol. 115. The draft

of the letter supposedly from Amalia Elisabeth is in HHStA, KRHK 155, fols. 146–148, AE (copy of proposed letter) to Emperor, [11/21 February 1638].

12. HStAM 4h Nr. 1448, fol. 121, SC (minute) to AE, Cassel, 13/23 February 1638, letter sent in HStAM 4d Nr. 90, rec. Groningen 4/14 March 1638. For the number of enemy regiments in the countryside, see HStAM 4d Nr. 90, W. B. Sixtinus (letter sent) to AE, Hildesheim, 23 February/5 March 1638. Financial problems in Hesse are also in HStAM 4d Nr. 90, SC (coded letter sent) to AE, Cassel, 1/11 February 1638, coded doublet and copy in 4d Nr. 90, minute of postscript in HStAM 4h Nr. 1448, fol. 116; HStAM 4d Nr. 90, *Verzeichnuß Waß uff die Allhier im Landt Liegende Soldatesca itzo Eine Lehnung gehet*, Cassel, 1/11 February 1638; HStAM 4d Nr. 90, VC and SC (letter sent) to AE, Cassel, 15/25 January 1638, postscript dated 18/28 January 1638, minute in HStAM 4h Nr. 1448, fols. 108–109, duplicata in HStAM 4d Nr. 90. A later document stated that a month's cost came to 5,450 Reichsthalers. HStAM 4d Nr. 93, fols. 56, 62, VC and SC (letter sent) to AE, Cassel, 26 March/5 April 1638, duplicata in HStAM 4h Nr. 1448, fols. 152–153. For the complaints from the field, see HStAM 4d Nr. 90, Obrist Justin Ungefug (copy, extract) to SC, Ziegenhain, 19/29 January 1638, copy in HStAM 4d Nr. 90; HStAM 4d Nr. 90, Captain Zerhsky (copy) to SC, Spangenberg, 24 January/3 February 1638; HStAM 4d Nr. 90, Cavalry Captain Wenderoth, Lieutenant Hengst, Colonel Scheiber (copy) to Colonel Geysso, Weichaus, 28 January/7 February 1638, copy in HStAM 4d Nr. 90; HStAM 4d Nr. 90, Captains and Officers of the Garrison of Cassel (copy) to SC, Cassel, 30 January/9 February 1638, copy in HStAM 4d Nr. 90. For the Schmalhausen story, see HStAM 4d Nr. 90, Charges against Ludwig Schmalhausen, [16/26 February 1638]. This and further complaints from the secret council are also in HStAM 4d Nr. 90, VC and SC (letter sent) to AE, Cassel, 22 February/4 March 1638. This trial, and the extreme interest of the government in the case, suggests that despite recent scholarly focus on what may be called “bottom-up” confessionalization, in Hesse-Cassel, at least, we see a clear case of “top-down” confessionalization—that is, a continuing effort by the landgraves to enforce religious and political discipline from above.

13. HStAM 4d Nr. 90, AE (Sixtinus hand minute) to SC, Groningen, 1/11 February 1638, copy in HStAM 4h Nr. 1448, fols. 126–127, rec. Cassel, 22 February/4 March 1638; HStAM 4h Nr. 1448, fols. 128–130, AE (letter sent) to SC, Groningen, 10/20 February 1638, minute in HStAM 4d Nr. 90; Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris, [BN] MS Baluze 168, fol. 36, D'Avaux to AE, Hamburg, 10/20 February 1638; BN MS Baluze 168, fols. 37–38, Memorandum of AE (copy), Groningen, 20/30 February 1638; HStAM 4d Nr. 93, fol. 44, Breithaupt (copy) to VC, VS, and SC, Vienna, 14/24 February 1638.

14. HStAM 4d Nr. 90, Georg of Hesse-Darmstadt (copy) to Prelates, Knights, and Estates of Hesse-Cassel, Giessen, 15/25 February 1638; HStAD E1 M34/4, Georg of Hesse-Darmstadt (letter sent) to Prelates, Knights, and Estates of Hesse-Cassel, Giessen, 18/28 February 1638; HStAD E1 M34/4, Georg of Hesse-Darmstadt (copy) to Georg of Brunswick-Lüneburg, Giessen, 16/26 February 1638, postscript 18/28 February 1638.

15. HStAM 4h Nr. 1448, fols. 128–130, AE (letter sent) to SC, Groningen, 10/20 February 1638, minute in HStAM 4d Nr. 90; HStAM 4d Nr. 90, W. B. Sixtinus (copy) to VC and SC, Hildesheim, 17/27 February 1638, postscript 18/28 February 1638; HStAD E1 M34/4, Georg of Hesse-Darmstadt (copy) to Götz, Giessen, 17/27 February 1638; HStAD E1 M34/4, Georg of Hesse-Darmstadt (letter sent) to Heinrich

von Langen, Giessen, 18/28 February 1638. For a minibiography of Sinold, see Johann Gottfried von Meiern, *Universal-Register über die Westphälischen Friedens- und Nürnberghischen Executions-Handlungen und Geschichte* (Göttingen, 1740) 70.

16. HStAM 4d Nr. 90, VC and SC (letter sent) to AE, Cassel, 18/28 February 1638, extract in HStAM 4d Nr. 90. For the secret council's despair, see also HStAM 4d Nr. 90, VC and SC (copy) to W. B. Sixtinus, Cassel, 22 February/4 March 1638; HStAM 4d Nr. 90, Hessian Estates (letter sent) to VC and SC, Ziegenhain, 22 February/4 March 1638. The estates' warning is also reported in Archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Paris, Correspondance Politique [AAECP] Hesse 1, fols. 190–192, Günderode (memoire sent) to Louis XIII, Gentilly, 19/29 April 1638.

17. HStAM 4d Nr. 90, AE (copy) to SC, Groningen, 21 February/3 March 1638, Sixtinus hand minute in HStAM 4d Nr. 90. A summary of this letter is also in HStAM 4h Nr. 1448, fols. 143–151, VC and SC (minute) to AE, Cassel, 19/29 March 1638, postscript dated 20/30 March 1638, letter sent in HStAM 4d Nr. 93, fols. 51–55. See also HStAM 4d Nr. 93, fols. 10–11, Georg of Hesse-Darmstadt (copy) to VC and SC of Hesse-Cassel, Giessen, 3/13 March 1638.

18. HStAM 4d Nr. 93, fol. 45, Georg of Hesse-Darmstadt (copy) to VC and SC of Cassel, Giessen, 22 February/4 March 1638; HStAM 4d Nr. 93, fols. 7–9, Georg of Hesse-Darmstadt (copy) to SC of Hesse-Cassel, Giessen, 28 February/10 March 1638; HStAD E1 M34/4, Georg of Hesse Darmstadt (letter sent) to Langen and Schützen, Giessen, 1/11 March 1638.

19. Her complaints against the *publica* and Georg's response are in HStAM 4d Nr. 93, fols. 10–11, Georg of Hesse-Darmstadt (copy) to VC and SC of Hesse-Cassel, Giessen, 3/13 March 1638. For the emperor's attempts to buy the Hessian troops, see HStAD E8A 120/1, Ferdinand III (letter sent) to Georg of Hesse-Darmsadt, Pressburg, 19/29 December 1637; HStAD E8A 120/1, Ferdinand III (letter sent) to Georg of Hesse-Darmstadt, Pressburg, 19/29 January 1638. Westerhold's public boast that he could buy up all the Hessian troops had made this strategy pretty obvious to everyone concerned. HStAM 4d Nr. 90, Delegates to Marburg (copy) to VC and SC, Marburg, 21/31 January 1638.

5. An Amazing Consequence

1. Hessische Staatsarchiv Marburg [HStAM] 4d Nr. 93, fol. 17, Extract of a Letter, Frankfurt, 1/11 March 1638; HStAM 4d Nr. 93, fol. 16, Extracts of Letters About the War, 1/11 March 1638, 2/12 March 1638; HStAM 4d Nr. 93, fol. 20, Johan Macks (extract) to Johan Schreiber, Tradesman at Cassel, Frankfurt, 2/12 March 1638; HStAM 4d Nr. 93, fol. 15, Extract of a Letter, Strassburg, 23 February/5 March 1638; Archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Paris, Correspondance Politique [AAECP] Allemagne 15, fols. 24–26, D'Avaux (secretary's hand letter sent) to Riche-lieu, Hamburg, 15 March 1638; AAACP Hambourg 1, fol. 362, D'Avaux (secretary's hand letter sent) to D'Auvagour, Hamburg, 14/24 March 1638; AAACP Hambourg 1, fol. 360, D'Avaux (secretary's hand letter sent) to D'Auvagour, Hamburg, 28 February/10 March 1638.

2. HStAM 4d Nr. 93, fol. 46, Cassel Secret Council [SC] of Hesse-Cassel (copy) to Georg of Hesse-Darmstadt, Cassel, 6/16 March 1638. The council's quotes are from HStAM 4d Nr. 93, fols. 12–14, Vice Chancellor [VC] and SC (copy) to Georg of Hesse-Darmstadt, Cassel, 7/17 March 1638; HStAM 4d Nr. 93, fols. 6, 46, VC and SC

(letter sent) to Amalia Elisabeth [AE], Cassel, 8/18 March 1638, minute in HStAM 4h Nr. 1448, fol. 133.

3. For the council's determination to use Rheinfelden to cement the Marburg treaty, see HStAM 4d Nr. 93, fols. 49–50, VC and SC (letter sent) to AE, Cassel, 13/23 March 1638, minute in HStAM 4h Nr. 1448, fol. 135. Its report that the imperialists were withdrawing from Hesse-Cassel is in HStAM 4d Nr. 93, fols. 6, 46, VC and SC (letter sent) to AE, Cassel, 8/18 March 1638, minute in HStAM 4h Nr. 1448, fol. 133; HStAM 4h Nr. 1448, fol. 141, AE (letter sent) to SC, Groningen, 9/19 March 1638, Sixtinus hand minute in HStAM 4d Nr. 93, fol. 1. The establishment of the cease-fire is in HStAM 4h Nr. 1469. The deputies of the estates were Professor Johannes Crocius, Jost Trott, Reinhardt von Boyneburg, and Mayor Henrich Wagehalsen. HStAM 4h Nr. 1448, fol. 140, AE (copy) to the Estates, Groningen, 10/20 March 1638, Sixtinus hand minute, dated 13/23 March, in HStAM 4d Nr. 93, fol. 63.

4. HStAM 4d Nr. 93, fol. 59, Elector of Mainz (copy) to Georg of Hesse-Darmstadt, Mainz, 10/20 March 1638; HStAM 4d Nr. 93, fols. 58, 60, Georg of Hesse-Darmstadt (copy) to VC and SC of Hesse-Cassel, Giessen, 16/26 March 1638. For complaints about Hessian troops, see also HStAM 4d Nr. 93, fol. 45, Georg of Hesse-Darmstadt (copy) to VC and SC of Cassel, Giessen, 22 February/4 March 1638. For the council's defense of its military actions see HStAM 4d Nr. 93, fol. 46, SC of Hesse-Cassel (copy) to Georg of Hesse-Darmstadt, Cassel, 6/16 March 1638. The emperor's veto of the point of Hersfeld occurred just as foreseen. For this and other news from Vienna, see HStAM 4d Nr. 93, fol. 43, Breithaupt (copy) to VC, VS, and SC, Vienna, 7/17 February 1638; HStAM 4d Nr. 93, fol. 44, Breithaupt (copy) to VC, VS, and SC, Vienna, 14/24 February 1638; HStAM 4d Nr. 93, fols. 80–82, Breithaupt (copy) to Christina, Duchess of Saxe-Eisenach, Pressburg, 13/23 March 1638; HStAM 4d Nr. 93, fol. 79, Breithaupt (copy) to Justenium, Pressburg, 13/23 March 1638.

5. HStAM 4h Nr. 1448, fols. 95–96, Otto von der Malsburg Relation, Groningen, 14/24 March 1638; HStAM 4d Nr. 93, fol. 2, AE (Sixtinus hand minute) to VC and SC, Groningen, 16/26 March 1638, letter sent in HStAM 4h Nr. 1448, fols. 154–155, dated 17/27 March 1638, received Cassel, 30 March/9 April 1638; HStAM 4h Nr. 1448, fols. 138–139, Melander (copy) to the Estates of Hesse-Cassel, Groningen, 17/27 March 1638.

6. Günderoede's propositions to the king of France are in AAACP Hesse 1, fols. 190–192, Günderoede (memoire sent) to Louis XIII, Gentilly, 19/29 April 1638. The request for military support from Sweden can be inferred from Amalia Elisabeth's letter, written at the same time, to Oxenstierna. Riksarkivet, AE (copy) to Oxenstierna, 13/23 March 1638, pub. in Oxenstierna, *Axel Oxenstiernas Skrifter och Brefvexling* (Stockholm, 1895), 2:7, 666–669.

7. AAACP Hesse 1, fols. 193–194, Summary of a La Boderie Letter, 17/27 March 1638.

8. "Single yoke" quote is in HStAM 4d Nr. 90, VC and SC (letter sent) to AE, Cassel, 18/28 February 1638, extract in HStAM 4d Nr. 90. For her distrust of her council, see HStAM 4d Nr. 93, fol. 102, AE (copy) to VC Deinhardt, Groningen, 22 April/2 May 1638; HStAM 4d Nr. 93, fol. 57, Georg of Hesse-Darmstadt (copy) to VC and SC of Hesse-Cassel, Giessen, 5/15 March 1638; HStAM 4d Nr. 93, fol. 61, VC and SC of Hesse-Cassel (copy) to Georg of Hesse-Darmstadt, Cassel, 18/28 March 1638. For the council's hope that rumors of negotiations were false, see HStAM 4d Nr. 93, fols. 56,

62, VC and SC (letter sent) to AE, Cassel, 26 March/5 April 1638, duplicata in HStAM 4h Nr. 1448, fols. 152–153. The secret council's fury at the landgravine is in HStAM 4h Nr. 1448, fols. 143–151, VC and SC (minute) to AE, Cassel, 19/29 March 1638, postscript dated 20/30 March 1638, letter sent in HStAM 4d Nr. 93, fols. 51–55.

9. Her use of the lack of a regency council to declare the Marburg treaty invalid is also in HStAM 4h Nr. 1448, fols. 95–96, Otto von der Malsburg Relation, Groningen, 14/24 March 1638. See also HStAM 4d Nr. 93, fol. 2, AE (Sixtinus hand minute) to VC and SC, Groningen, 16/26 March 1638, letter sent in HStAM 4h Nr. 1448, fols. 154–155, dated 17/27 March 1638, rec. Cassel, 30 March/9 April 1638; HStAM 4d Nr. 93, fols. 4–6, AE (Sixtinus hand minute) to VC and SC, Groningen, 17/27 March 1638.

10. For her later assessment that Mainz had been appointed because of the complaints of the princes, see HStAM 4d Nr. 93, fols. 193–194, Vultejus (own hand minute) to SC, Groningen, c. 24 June/4 July 1638. For the news of the imperial commission for Mainz and instructions to compromise, see HStAM 4d Nr. 93, fol. 75, Delegates of Hesse-Darmstadt to the Imperial Court (extract) to Georg of Hesse-Darmstadt, Vienna, 22 March/1 April 1638; HStAM 4d Nr. 93, fol. 109, Ferdinand III (copy) to Georg of Hesse-Darmstadt, Vienna, 28 March/7 April 1638.

11. HStAM 4d Nr. 93, fols. 74–76, Georg of Hesse-Darmstadt (copy) to VC and SC of Hesse-Cassel, Giessen, 31 March/10 April 1638, copy in HStAM 4d Nr. 93, fols. 92–94; HStAM 4d Nr. 93, fols. 87–89, Georg of Hesse-Darmstadt (letter sent, duplicata) to AE, Giessen, 2/12 April 1638. For Georg's comment that the quartering caused the Cassel secret council to mistrust the negotiations, see HStAM 4d Nr. 93, fol. 110, Georg of Hesse-Darmstadt (copy) to Vinthus, Giessen, 8/18 April 1638. See also HStAM 4d Nr. 93, fols. 108, 112, Georg of Hesse-Darmstadt (copy) to SC of Hesse-Cassel, Giessen, 9/19 April 1638. For the council's thanks for Georg's efforts to end the quartering in Cassel, see HStAM 4d Nr. 93, fol. 119, VC and SC of Hesse-Cassel (copy) to Georg of Hesse-Darmstadt, Cassel, 13/23 April 1638.

12. HStAM 4d Nr. 93, fols. 56, 62, VC and SC (letter sent) to AE, Cassel, 26 March/5 April 1638, duplicata in HStAM 4h Nr. 1448, fols. 152–153. For the elector of Mainz's appointment as mediator "about, and account of" Amalia Elisabeth's continuing problems with the treaty, see HStAM 4d Nr. 93, fols. 66–70, 89, VC and SC (letter sent) to AE, Cassel, 2/12 April 1638. For the secret council's frustration at the landgravine, see HStAM 4d Nr. 93, fols. 71, 83, VC and SC (letter sent) to AE, Cassel, 5/15 April 1638, doublet sent in HStAM 4d Nr. 93, fols. 90, 97; HStAM 4d Nr. 93, fols. 85, 98, VC and SC (letter sent) to AE, Cassel, 9/19 April 1638. See also HStAM 4d Nr. 93, fol. 73, VC and SC (copy) to Elector of Mainz, Cassel, 4/14 April 1638, copy in HStAM 4d Nr. 93, fol. 95; HStAM 4d Nr. 93, fol. 72, Elector of Mainz (copy) to VS, VC, and SC of Hesse-Cassel, Mainz, 31 March/10 April 1638. For the secret council's announcement to Georg that Mainz was soon sending delegates to Cassel, see HStAM 4d Nr. 93, fols. 77–78, VC and SC of Hesse-Cassel (copy) to Georg of Hesse-Darmstadt, Cassel, 4/14 April 1638, copy in HStAM 4d Nr. 93, fols. 96–97; HStAM 4d Nr. 93, fols. 64–65, AE (Sixtinus hand minute) to SC, Groningen, 6/16 April 1638; Hessische Staatsarchiv Darmstadt [HStAD] E1 M34/4, Scheffer (extract) to Velen, Groningen, 10/20 April 1638. For Melander's concerns about continuing the cease-fire, see HStAD E1 M34/4, Melander (copy) to Velen, Groningen, 10/20 April 1638. See also HStAM 4d Nr. 93, fols. 114–115, Summary of Scheffer's Appeal to Velen, Early April 1638; HStAM 4d Nr. 93, fol. 116, Velen (extract) to Georg of

Hesse-Darmstadt, c. early April 1638. For Amalia Elisabeth's hope for the allies, see HStAM 4d Nr. 93, fols. 64–65, AE (Sixtinus hand minute) to SC, Groningen, 6/16 April 1638. For the further delay of Melander and Scheffer, see HStAM 4d Nr. 93, fol. 84, AE (minute) to SC, Groningen, 18/28 April 1638.

13. For Georg's "good intent," see HStAM 4d Nr. 93, fol. 113, Georg of Hesse-Darmstadt (copy) to VC and SC of Hesse-Cassel, Giessen, 11/21 April. For the secret council's apology to Georg for its lack of powers, see HStAM 4d Nr. 93, fol. 120, VC and SC of Hesse-Cassel (copy) to Georg of Hesse-Darmstadt, Cassel, 14/24 April 1638. For the secret council's apologies to Mainz for the delay, see HStAM 4d Nr. 93, fols. 117–118, VC and SC (copy) to Elector of Mainz, Cassel, 13/23 April 1638; HStAM 4d Nr. 93, fols. 128–129, VC and SC of Hesse-Cassel (copy) to Elector of Mainz, Cassel, 21 April/1 May 1638. For Mainz's concern about delays, see HStAM 4d Nr. 93, fol. 83, AE (minute) to SC, Groningen, 14/24 April 1638; HStAM 4d Nr. 93, fols. 126–127, Elector of Mainz (copy) to Vice Statthalter [VS], VC, and SC of Hesse-Cassel, St. Martinsburg, 17/27 April 1638; HStAM 4d Nr. 93, fols. 134–135, Elector of Mainz (copy) to VC and SC of Hesse-Cassel, St. Martinsburg, 20/30 April 1638; HStAM 4d Nr. 93, fols. 150–151, Elector of Mainz (copy) to VC and SC of Hesse-Cassel, St. Martinsberg, 26 April/6 May 1638. For the secret council's panic, see HStAM 4d Nr. 93, fols. 122–124, SC (letter sent) to AE, Cassel, 19/29 April 1638. See also HStAM 4d Nr. 93, fols. 141–142, Georg of Hesse-Darmstadt (copy) to VC and SC of Hesse-Cassel, Giessen, 24 April/4 May 1638. For the secret council's pleas for sending Melander and the others, see HStAM 4d Nr. 93, fols. 125, 130, VC and SC (letter sent) to AE, Cassel, 23 April/3 May 1638, duplicata in HStAM 4d Nr. 93, fol. 124; HStAM 4d Nr. 93, fols. 131–132, VC and SC (letter sent) to AE, Cassel, 28 April/8 May 1638.

14. For her satisfaction with the functioning of Providence, see HStAM 4d Nr. 93, fols. 99–100, AE (minute, Sixtinus hand corrections and postscript) to SC, Groningen, 22 April/2 May 1638; HStAM 4d Nr. 93, fol. 102, AE (copy) to VC Helffrich Deinhardt, Groningen, 22 April/2 May 1638. HStAM 4d Nr. 93, fol. 103, AE (Sixtinus hand minute) to SC, Groningen, 29 April/9 May 1638; HStAM 4d Nr. 93, fol. 104, AE (Sixtinus hand minute) to SC, Groningen, 30 April/10 May 1638; HStAM 4d Nr. 93, fol. 139, AE (Vultejus hand minute) to VC and SC, Groningen, 7/17 May 1638. Scheffer and Sixtinus's instructions are missing, but they are summarized in a later minute of Vultejus. HStAM 4d Nr. 93, fols. 193–194, Vultejus (own hand minute) to SC, Groningen, c. 24 June/4 July 1638. For the attempt by Riedesel to gain a larger number of nobles on the regency council, see HStAM 4d Nr. 93, fols. 190–191, AE (minute) to VC and SC, Groningen, 19/29 June 1638.

15. For Velen's pressure on Georg to come to peace to hinder the Prince Palatine's levying, see HStAD E1 M34/4, Velen (copy) to Georg of Hesse-Darmstadt, Warendorff, 29 April/9 May 1638. See also HStAM 4d Nr. 93, fols. 145–146, VC and SC (copy) to Georg of Hesse-Darmstadt, Cassel, 30 April/10 May 1638; HStAM 4d Nr. 93, fol. 153, Georg of Hesse-Darmstadt (copy) to VC and SC, Giessen, 5/15 May 1638; HStAD E1 M34/4, Georg of Hesse-Darmstadt (copy) to Melander, Giessen, 5/15 May 1638; HStAD E1 M34/4, Georg of Hesse-Darmstadt (letter sent) to AE, Giessen, 5/15 May 1638. For Georg's repeated denials that he was working for his own advantage see HStAD E1 M34/4, Georg of Hesse-Darmstadt (letter sent) to AE, Giessen, 6/16 May 1638. Georg's confusion at Amalia Elisabeth's dependence on luck is in HStAM 4d Nr. 93, fols. 143–144, Georg of Hesse-Darmstadt (copy) to VC and SC of Hesse-Cassel, Giessen, 27 April/7 May 1638. See also HStAD E1 M34/4, Instructions for

Langen and Schütz for Negotiations at Cassel, Giessen, 5/15 May 1638. There does not seem to be any evidence that the plan to attack Georg ever went farther than talk, or that it existed in the first place—though it would indeed become a reality in future years. Georg’s frantic attempt to block any attack against him and his appeals to Brunswick-Lüneburg, the elector of Saxony, the dukes of Eisenach, Altenburg, and Weimar, the Palatine field marshal Ferensi, the States, and the kings of England, Denmark, and France, are in HStAD E1 M34/4, Instructions for Langen and Schütz for Discussions with Georg of Brunswick-Lüneburg, Giessen, 5/15 May 1638.

16. HStAM 4d Nr. 93, fols. 154–161, SC (copy) Report to AE on the Negotiations with Langen and Schütz, Cassel, 9/19 May 1638; HStAM 4d Nr. 93, fols. 164–165, VC Deinhardt (letter sent) to AE, Cassel, 10/20 May 1638. For the council’s complaints about the state of the country, see HStAM 4d Nr. 93, fols. 149, 162–163, SC (letter sent) to AE, Cassel, 9/19 May 1638. The departure of Langen and Schütz to Hildesheim is in HStAM 4d Nr. 93, fols. 179, 180, 184, VC and SC (letter sent) to AE, Cassel, 31 May/10 June 1638. For Langen and Schütz’s appeal to Melander, see HStAD E1 M34/4, Langen and Schütz (minute) to Melander, Hildesheim, 16/26 May 1638.

17. HStAM 4d Nr. 93, fols. 177–178, VC and SC (letter sent) to AE, Cassel, 17/27 May 1638; HStAM 4d Nr. 93, fols. 181–183, Casseler Accord, Cassel, 30 May/9 June 1638, copy in HStAM 4h Nr. 1487, fols. 6–7; HStAM 4d Nr. 93, fol. 185, AE (minute) to SC, Groningen, 11/21 June 1638; HStAM 4d Nr. 93, fols. 179, 180, 184, VC and SC (letter sent) to AE, Cassel, 31 May/10 June 1638; HStAM 4d Nr. 93, fols. 186–187, VC and SC (letter sent) to AE, Cassel, 2/12 June 1638. Amalia Elisabeth ratified the accord on 24 June/4 July, Georg on 22 June/2 July. HStAM 4d Nr. 93, fol. 192, AE (minute) to VC and SC, Groningen, 24 June/4 July 1638. See also HStAM 4d Nr. 38, Georg of Brunswick-Lüneburg (copy) to VC and SC of Hesse-Cassel, Hildesheim, 8/18 July 1638; HStAM 4h Nr. 1487, fols. 9–10, Georg of Hesse-Darmstadt (copy) Ratification of the Cassel Accord, Giessen, 22 June/2 July 1638. Juliane’s claims against both Hesse-Cassel and Hesse-Darmstadt complicated the agreement and were not entirely settled by it. HStAM 4d Nr. 38, W. B. Sixtinus (copy) to VC and SC, Hildesheim, 21/31 July 1638; HStAM 4h Nr. 1448, fols. 157–159, Estates of Hesse-Darmstadt (copy) to the Estates of Hesse-Cassel, Giessen, 22 June/2 July 1638; HStAM 4d Nr. 38, AE (minute) to VC and SC, Groningen, 2/12 August 1638.

18. For the report of another victory by Bernhard in a surprise attack after Götz’s munitions were struck by lightning, see HStAM 4d Nr. 93, fols. 186–187, VC and SC (letter sent) to AE, Cassel, 2/12 June 1638. Vultejus’s important letter is in HStAM 4d Nr. 93, fols. 193–194, Vultejus (own hand minute) to SC, Groningen, c. 24 June/4 July 1638. The French report that the Dutch had merely “made some protestations of affection, without promising anything,” is in AAACP Hesse 1, fols. 193–194, Summary of a La Boderie Letter, 17/27 March 1638.

19. The different proposed venues included Marburg, Frankfurt, Friedtburg, and Cassel. HStAM 4d Nr. 93, fols. 117–118, VC and SC (copy) to Elector of Mainz, Cassel, 13/23 April 1638; HStAM 4d Nr. 93, fols. 106–107, Elector of Mainz (copy) to VC, VS, and SC of Hesse-Cassel, St. Martinsburg, 7/17 April 1638; HStAM 4d Nr. 93, fols. 126–127, Elector of Mainz (copy) to VS, VC, and SC of Hesse-Cassel, St. Martinsburg, 17/27 April 1638; HStAM 4d Nr. 93, fols. 167–169, VC and SC of Hesse-Cassel (copy) to Count Albrecht Otto of Solms-Laubach, Cassel, 28 April/8 May 1638. For her happiness that the Mainz negotiations were finally under way, see HStAM 4d Nr. 38, AE (minute) to SC, Groningen, 9/19 July 1638. See also HStAM

4d Nr. 38, Horn and Solms-Laubach (copy) to SC, Mainz, 7/17 July 1638; HStAM 4d Nr. 38, Horn and Solms-Laubach (copy) Report on the Mainz Negotiations, Mainz, 7/17 July 1638; HStAM 4d Nr. 38, VC and SC (copy) to W. B. Sixtinus, Cassel, 13/23 July 1638; HStAM 4d Nr. 38, VC and SC (letter sent) to AE, Cassel, 16/26 July 1638. Dickmann argues this was the first attempt to demand the legal inclusion of Calvinists under the rubric of “adherents of the Augsburg Confession.” Fritz Dickmann, *Der Westfälische Frieden*, 7th ed. (Münster, 1998), 367. Here see also S. Keller, “Die staatsrechtliche Anerkennung der reformierten Kirche auf dem westfälischen Friedenskongreß: Zugleich ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der deutschen Diplomatie im XVII. Jahrhundert,” in *Festgabe der Bonner Juristischen Fakultät für Paul Krüger* (Berlin, 1911), 473–510, here 476f. For Mainz’s concern that her demands were diplomatic games, see Mathias Koch, *Geschichte des deutschen Reichs under der Regierung Ferdinands III*, vol. 1 (Vienna, 1865), 133.

20. The treaty at Sababurg, at which the elector of Cologne made this agreement, is mentioned in HStAM 4h Nr. 2116, fols. 65–74, *Das herrn Vice Cantzlers bedencken*, n.d. For the council’s argument that the elector of Cologne would be better off if he paid the 50,000, since her armies extract over 200,000 in contributions, see HStAM 4d Nr. 38, SC of Hesse-Cassel (copy) to Bishop of Bamberg and Würzburg, Cassel, 14/24 July 1638.

21. AAACP Allemagne 15, fols. 98–102, Louis XIII (minute) to D’Avaux, Abbeville, 8 August 1638; AAACP Allemagne 15, fols. 94–95, Louis XIII (Chavigny secretary’s hand minute) to La Boderie, Abbeville, 8 August 1638; AAACP Hollande 20, fols. 387–390, Memoir to Mr. d’Estampes (Chavigny’s secretary’s hand), 18 August 1638. For Sixtinus’s report of 4/14 August on the imminent completion of the treaty, see HStAM 4d Nr. 38, AE (minute) to VC and SC, Groningen, 16/26 August 1638. For the intercession of Brunswick-Lüneburg, see HStAM 4d Nr. 38, AE (Vultejus hand minute) to VC and SC, Groningen, 2/12 August 1638.

22. For the completion of the treaty, see HStAM 4d Nr. 38, VC and SC (letter sent) to AE, Cassel, 16/26 August 1638. Arrival of Horn and departure of Scheffer and Sixtinus is in HStAM 4d Nr. 38, VC and SC to Elector of Mainz, Cassel, 23 August/2 September 1638.

23. HStAM 4d Nr. 38, SC Memoire, Cassel, 23 August/2 September 1638. Her displeasure at von Scholley is in HStAM, 4d Nr. 50, fols. 6–8, AE (own hand letter sent) to Vultejus, n.d. (c. 3/13 September 1638).

24. The knights who refused to join were Ludwig von Dörnberg, Christian von der Malsburg, Jost Trott, and Hans Diede. Henrich Muldener of Eschwege also reported sick, but was the only nonknight not to show. HStAM 4d Nr. 38, SC Memoire, Cassel, 23 August/2 September 1638. For her displeasure at the knights, see HStAM 4d Nr. 93, fols. 190–191, AE (minute) to VC and SC, Groningen, 19/29 June 1638. Her instructions not to fill any vacant positions until she returned is in HStAM 4d Nr. 38, AE to VC and SC, Groningen, 2/12 August 1638. Her quote is in HStAM, 4d Nr. 50, fols. 6–8, AE (own hand letter sent) to Vultejus, n.d. (ca. 3/13 September 1638). HStAM 4d Nr. 50, fol. 1, Vultejus (own hand minute, AE response) to AE, Groningen, early September 1638. Despite her decision to wait on establishing the regency government until her return, she begins at this point to refer to the coregents as the “governing council.” See, for example, HStAM 4d Nr. 38, Secret, Governing, and War Council (letter sent) to AE, Cassel, 28 August/7 September 1638, rec. 10/20 September 1638.

25. HStAM 4d Nr. 38, VC and SC (letter sent) to AE, Cassel, 20/30 August 1638; HStAM 4d Nr. 38, SC (letter sent) to AE, Cassel, 22 August/1 September 1638, rec. Groningen, 2/12 September; HStAM 4d Nr. 38, VC and SC (copy) to Elector of Mainz, Cassel, 23 August/2 September. The plight of the Hessian people is also a theme of numerous other letters forwarded by the council throughout HStAM 4d Nr. 38.

6. *To the Lord God Nothing Is Impossible*

1. Hessische Staatsarchiv Marburg [HStAM] 4d Nr. 38, Amalia Elisabeth [AE] (minute, Vultejus hand corrections) to Vice Chancellor [VC], Groningen, 17/27 August 1638. Concern over the dissolution of Hesse–Cassel if Wilhelm should die is also in a letter from her brother-in-law: HStAM 4d Nr. 38, Solms-Laubach (copy) to Commissary Horn, Laubach, 5/15 September 1638.

2. HStAM 4d Nr. 38, AE (Sixtinus hand minute) to Cassel Secret Council [SC], Groningen 29 August/8 September 1638, rec. 8/18 September 1638. The deadline for her ratification was 2/12 September. Her annoyance at Melander is in HStAM 4d Nr. 50, fols. 6–8, AE (own hand letter sent) to Vultejus, n.d. [c. 3/13 September 1638]. Ransom for Scheffer is in HStAM 4d Nr. 38, VC and SC (copy) to Elector of Mainz, Cassel, 5/15 September 1638.

3. For her great frustration, almost paralysis, in the face of Vultejus's illness, see for example, HStAM, 4d Nr. 50, fol. 4, AE (own hand letter sent) to Vultejus, n.d. [c. 12/22 August 1638]; HStAM, 4d Nr. 50, fol. 9, AE (own hand letter sent) to Vultejus, n.d. [c. late August 1638], which also contains the efforts of the East Frisians. Squabbling generals are, among other places, in HStAM 4d Nr. 38, AE (Vultejus hand minute) to VC and SC, Groningen, 2/12 August 1638. Her response to the complaints from Hersfeld can be seen at HStAM 4d Nr. 38, AE (minute) to SC, Groningen, 3/13 September 1638. Letters concerning appointments and pensions include, among others, HStAM 4d Nr. 38, AE (Sixtinus hand minute) to SC, Groningen, 4/14 September 1638; HStAM 4d Nr. 38, AE (Sixtinus hand minute) to VC and SC, Groningen, 25 September/5 October 1638. For more on many of these issues see also HStAM 4d Nr. 50, fol. 1, Vultejus (own hand) questions and AE (own hand) responses [early, c. 3/4 September 1638]. For her dream state, see HStAM 4d Nr. 50, fol. 2, AE (own hand letter sent) to Vultejus, Groningen, 26 August/5 September 1638.

4. Her quotes are in HStAM, 4d Nr. 50, fols. 6–8, AE (own hand letter sent) to Vultejus, n.d. [c. 3/13 September 1638]. News about the general peace is in HStAM 4d Nr. 50, fol. 14, AE (own hand letter sent) to Vultejus, Groningen, 6/16 September 1638. Her concern about depending on these negotiations is in HStAM 4d Nr. 50, fols. 15–16, AE (own hand letter sent) to Vultejus, Groningen, 6/16 September 1638. French–Swedish jostling in Hamburg over possible territorial gains in Lorraine and Pomerania (respectively) are in Archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Paris, Correspondance Politique, [AAECP] Allemagne 15, fols. 120–121, Memoire (minute) to d'Avaux, 21 September 1638.

5. HStAM 4d Nr. 50, fols. 18–19, AE (own hand letter sent) to Vultejus, Groningen, 18/28 September 1638; HStAM 4d Nr. 38, AE (Sixtinus hand minute) to VC and SC, Groningen, 25 September/5 October 1638.

6. Migraines and martyr quote in HStAM 4d Nr. 50, fol. 13, AE (own hand letter sent) to Vultejus, Groningen, 3/13 September 1638. Headaches are also hinted at elsewhere, such as: HStAM 4d Nr. 50, fol. 5, AE (own hand letter sent) to Vultejus, n.d.

For her complaints about the weather, see HStAM, 4d Nr. 50, fols. 6–8, AE (own hand letter sent) to Vultejus, n.d. [c. 3/13 September 1638]. Further cross imagery and a complaint about memory problems are in HStAM 4d Nr. 50, fols. 15–16, AE (own hand letter sent) to Vultejus, Groningen, 6/16 September 1638. For more on her distrust of Melander and depression, see HStAM 4d Nr. 50, fols. 18–19, AE (own hand letter sent) to Vultejus, Groningen, 25 September/5 October 1638. Report of events in Giessen is in HStAM 4d Nr. 38, Solms-Laubach (copy) to Commissary Horn, Laubach, 5/15 September 1638.

7. HStAM 4d Nr. 38, the Elector of Mainz (coded copy) to VC and SC, Johannesburg Castle, 18/28 September 1638, rec. Cassel, 25 September/5 October 1638. Urgent appeals from the council can be seen, for example, in HStAM 4d Nr. 38, VC and SC (Jacobi hand coded letter sent) to AE, Cassel, 28 September/8 October 1638; HStAM 4d Nr. 38, VC and SC (letter sent) to AE, Cassel, 6/16 October. See also HStAM 4d Nr. 38, Elector of Mainz (copy) to SC, Mainz, 1/10 September 1638; HStAM 4d Nr. 38, VC and SC (letter sent) to AE, Cassel, 8/18 September 1638; HStAM 4d Nr. 38, VC and SC (letter sent) to AE, Cassel, 11/21 September 1638. The council's warning that the treaty might be entirely repudiated is in HStAM 4d Nr. 38, VC and SC (coded letter sent) to AE, Cassel, 25 September/5 October 1638; and also in HStAM 4d Nr. 38, VC and SC (letter sent) to AE, Cassel, 9/19 October 1638, rec. Groningen, 21/31 October. This is confirmed by the reports from the count of Solms. For example, see: HStAM 4d Nr. 38, Count of Solms (copy) to Commissary Horn, Laubach, 16/26 October, rec. 20/30 October 1638. The anger of the elector is also in HStAM 4d Nr. 38, Anselm Casimir (copy) to SC, St. Martinsburg [Mainz], 4/14 October 1638. Anger over Winther is in HStAM 4d Nr. 38, SC (letter sent) to AE, Cassel, 20/30 September 1638, rec. Groningen, 2/12 October 1638.

8. Report of Scheffer's freedom is in HStAM 4d Nr. 38, Elector of Mainz (Jacobi hand coded copy) to VC and SC, St. Johannesburg, 18/28 September 1638, rec. Cassel, 25 September/5 October. Based on this letter, the council also seemed to think that Scheffer was now most likely with AE. HStAM 4d Nr. 38, VC and SC (Jacobi hand coded letter sent) to AE, Cassel, 25 September/5 October 1638. Anger at the unnecessary delay is, among other places, in HStAM 4d Nr. 38, Elector of Mainz (copy) to SC, St. Martinsburg [Mainz], 4/14 October 1638.

9. Her continued hope for the Marburg inheritance can be seen in HStAM 4e Nr. 1411, Instructions for the Hesse–Cassel delegates to the Regensburg Diet, Cassel, 10/20 November 1640. See also Kerstin Weiland, *Hessen-Kassel und die Reichsverfassung: Ziele und Prioritäten landgräflicher Politik im Dreißigjährigen Krieg* (Marburg, 2009), 82–83; HStAM 4d Nr. 38, AE (Sixtinus hand minute) to VC and SC, Groningen 25 September/5 October 1638; HStAM 4h Nr. 1451, fols. 1–2, Georg Müller (letter sent) to AE, Hamburg, 7/17 September 1638, rec. Groningen 23 September/3 October 1638. Sixtinus's lies to du Maurier appear in AAACP Hollande 20, fol. 402, *Discours fait par Madame La Landgrave de Hesse*, 13 September 1638. For French efforts to gain her army see AAACP Hollande 20, fols. 421–424, Memoir to Mr. d'Estampes (Chavigny's secretary's hand), 10 October 1638. Later, d'Avaux reported that at this time Vultejus was also claiming the Mainz negotiations were only to satisfy the peace-hungry Hessian estates. Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris, [BN] MS Baluze 170, fols. 25–26, d'Avaux (minute) to Chavigny, 14/24 January 1640.

10. Her letter to Vultejus and quote about the Lord (paraphrasing Proverbs 21:1) is in HStAM 4d Nr. 50, AE (own hand letter sent) to Vultejus, Groningen, 26 October/5 November 1638, rec. Dorsten, 8/18 November 1638.

11. Her fears that the emperor would reject the terms of the treaty in HStAM 4d Nr. 38, AE (Sixtinus hand minute) to VC and SC, Groningen, 25 September/5 October 1638. That she was not alone in these fears can be seen in correspondence from Solms, who had earlier tried (and failed) to get some hint from Mainz about the nature of the emperor's ratification. Count of Solms (copy) to Horn, Laubach, 16/26 October, rec. 20/30 October 1638.

12. HStAM 4d Nr. 38, *Extract wie der punctus religionis . . . abgefasset*, n.d. [c. 21/31 December 1638]; HStAM 4d Nr. 38, Imperial Ratification of the Mainz Treaty (copy), Prague, 2 September 1638; HStAM 4d Nr. 38, Imperial Ratification of the Side Agreement of the Mainz Treaty, Prague, 2 September 1638. The council's descriptions of the errors of the emperor's ratifications are in VC and SC (letter sent) to AE, Cassel, 14/24 November 1638; HStAM 4d Nr. 38, Copy of the Imperial Safe Conduct for Amalia Elisabeth and her Court, Prague, 2 September 1638; HStAM 4d Nr. 38, Copy of Imperial Pass for the Body of Wilhelm, 1638. Her appreciation that, as originally written, the point of religion applied not just to her, but to all Calvinists in the empire, is in HStAM 4d Nr. 50, AE (own hand letter sent) to Vultejus, Groningen, 26 October/5 November 1638, rec. Dorsten, 8/18 November 1638. For the opposition at the imperial court to her religious demands, and the emperor's efforts to get around them, see Mathias Koch, *Geschichte des deutschen Reichs under der Regierung Ferdinands III*, vol. 1 (Vienna, 1865), 133–136.

13. HStAM 4d Nr. 38, VC and SC (letter sent) to AE, Cassel, 20/30 November 1638, rec. Groningen, 9/19 December. An emergency meeting of the Hessian estates, called at the council's request for 17/27 and 18/28 December, would then echo the opinion of the theological faculty. The knights, in particular, were angry at the ongoing war taxes and the war's impact on trade and the currency. HStAM 4d Nr. 38, Hessian Knights' *Gravamina*, Cassel, 18/28 December 1638; HStAM 4d Nr. 38, VC and SC (letter sent) to AE, Cassel, 21/31 December 1638. See also HStAM 4d Nr. 38, Collected Theological Faculty memoire, Cassel, 19/29 November 1638. The Hessian ministers had also noted this dangerous phrasing. HStAM 4d Nr. 38, Collected Ministry memoire, Cassel, 18/28 November 1638.

14. Arrival and accomodations in Dorsten in HStAM 4d Nr. 38, AE (minute) to VC and Council, Dorsten, 19/29 December 1638; HStAM 4d Nr. 50, fols. 30–31, AE (own hand letter sent) to Vultejus, Dorsten, 21/31 December 1638, rec. Hamburg, 23 January 1639. Melander's return to Cassel in HStAM 4d Nr. 50, fols. 37–38, Sixtinus (own hand letter sent) to Vultejus, Dorsten, 28 January/7 February 1639. For the return of the bodies, see Franz Carl Theodor Piderit, *Geschichte der Haupt- und Residenzstadt Kassel* (Cassel, 1844), 214.

15. HStAM 4d Nr. 38, AE (minute, Sixtinus hand corrections) to VC and SC, Dorsten 26 December 1638/5 January 1639; HStAM 4d Nr. 50, fols. 32–33, AE (letter sent) to Vultejus, Dorsten, 7/17 January 1639, rec. Hamburg, 19/29 January 1639; HStAM 4d Nr. 38, AE (Sixtinus hand minute) to Elector of Mainz, Dorsten, 28 December 1638/7 January 1639; HStAM 4d Nr. 95, fols. 7, 22, VC and SC (letter sent) to AE, Cassel, 26 December 1638/5 January 1639, rec. Dorsten, 9/19 January 1639. The elector of Mainz's assurances on the point of religion are in HStAM 4d Nr. 95, fols. 9–11, Elector of Mainz (copy) to VC and SC, Mainz, 6/16 December 1638. Her hopes after the fall of Breisach in HStAM 4d Nr. 50, fols. 30–31, AE (own hand letter sent) to Vultejus, Dorsten, 21/31 December 1638, rec. Hamburg, 23 January 1639.

16. HStAM 4d Nr. 50, fols. 32–34, AE (letter sent) to Vultejus, Dorsten, 7/17 January 1639, rec. Hamburg, 19/29 January 1639. Her annoyance at d'Estampes is in HStAM 4d Nr. 50, fols. 30–31, AE (own hand letter sent) to Vultejus, Dorsten, 21/31 December 1638, rec. Hamburg, 23 January 1639. D'Estampe's orders to arrange a secret meeting with Melander and buy him and/or the Hessian army is in AAECF Hollande 20, fols. 387–390, Memoir to Mr. d'Estampes (Chavigny's secretary's hand), 18 August 1638. The French were so desperate to gain the Hessian army that they were even prepared to offer Melander East Frisia! Their continuing attempts to dissuade her from a separate treaty and their emphasis on the importance of Breisach are in HStAM 4f Frankreich, Nr. 1312, La Boderie (letter sent) to AE, January 23, 1639.

17. For Georg's frustration, see HStAM 4d Nr. 95, fols. 13–15, Georg of Hesse-Darmstadt (copy) to VC and SC, Marburg, 14/24 December 1638. See also HStAM 4d Nr. 95, fols. 25–27, VC and SC (copy) to Elector of Mainz, Cassel, 29 December/8 January 1639. For the elector's doubts about the emperor's flexibility, see HStAM 4d Nr. 95, fols. 46–47, Elector of Mainz (copy) to VC and SC, Mainz, 18/28 January 1639.

18. HStAM 4d Nr. 50, fols. 35–36, AE (letter sent) to Vultejus, Dorsten, 18/28 January 1639, rec. Hamburg, 30 January 1639. Her source on the flexibility of Cologne and the emperor was Mr. Wippermann of Münster. The involvement of the elector of Saxony in hindering the religious article is suggested in HStAM 4d Nr. 50, fols. 37–38, Sixtinus (own hand letter sent) to Vultejus, Dorsten, 28 January/7 February 1639, rec. Hamburg. Her insistence on full legalization for Calvinists, and refusal to allow Horn to accept merely religious liberty for her own territories are in HStAM 4d Nr. 95, fols. 60, 63, AE (letter sent) to VC and Council, Dorsten, 9/19 February 1639 (minute of the same letter is dated 8/18 February). The council's same argument is in HStAM 4d Nr. 95, fols. 74–75, VC and SC (copy) to Elector of Mainz, Cassel, 15/25 February 1639. Discussions at Vienna over the Hessian religious article are in Koch, *Geschichte des deutschen Reichs*, vol. 1, 136–138.

19. HStAM 4d Nr. 95, fols. 30–31, VC and SC (copy) to Melander, Cassel, 29 December/8 January 1639; HStAM 4d Nr. 95, fols. 24, 31, VC and SC (letter sent) to AE, Cassel, 31 December 1638/10 January 1639, rec. Dorsten, 9/19 January 1639. Her interest in Corvey and the sending of Melander et al. to Cassel is in HStAM 4d Nr. 95, fol. 53, AE (minute) to VC and SC, Dorsten, 7/17 February 1639. For the census, see Himar Milbradt, ed., *Das hessische Mannschaftsregister von 1639* (Frankfurt am Main, 1959), esp. 130–131. See also John C. Theibault, *German Villages in Crisis: Rural Life in Hesse-Kassel and the Thirty Years' War, 1580–1720* (Atlantic Highlands, N.J., 1995), for the costs of war for the Hessian countryside.

20. Octavio Piccolomini would become a member of the Fruitbearing Society in 1641. Klaus Manger, *Die Fruchtbringer: Eine Teutschhertzige Gesellschaft* (Heidelberg, 2001). A study of German patriotism in this period is Alexander Schmidt, *Vaterlandsliebe und Religionskonflikt: Politische Diskurse im Alten Reich (1555–1648)* (Leiden, 2007). For the argument that the empire in this period developed a national identity, see Joachim Whaley, *Germany and the Holy Roman Empire*, vol. 1, *Maximilian I to the Peace of Westphalia, 1493–1648* (Oxford, 2011).

21. For more on Wicquefort, who would be elevated to the post of resident ambassador to the Dutch in 1645, see Louise van Tongerloo, "Beziehungen zwischen Hessen-Kassel und den Vereinigten Niederlanden während des Dreissigjährigen Krieges," *Hessisches Jahrbuch für Landesgeschichte [HJL]* 14 (1964), 204–209. Coordination of the

Lüneburgers and Hessians can be seen, among other places, in BN MS Baluze 170, fols. 118–120, d’Avaux (minute) to Chavigny, 5/15 May 1640.

22. Vultejus’s report appears in AAACP Hesse 1, fol. 199, Richelieu (letter sent) to AE, 2 April 1639. See also AAACP Hesse 1, fol. 202, Richelieu (letter sent) to AE, 2 May 1639; BN MS Baluze 169, fols. 64–66, d’Avaux (own hand minute) to Claude Bouthillier, 14 June 1639. Pressure from the French and the landgravine’s response are in M. Merian, *Theatrum Europaeum, oder Warhafftige Beschreibung aller denckwürdigen Geschichten*, 6 vols. (Frankfurt am Main, 1643–1652), vol. 4, 78.

23. The minutes of the meeting, including a nice doodle of a horse by Jacobi, are in HStAM 4d Nr. 46, fols. 1–10, *Protocoll über die Berathung zwischen den landgräfflich Hessen-Casselischen Rätthe*, Dorsten, 26 July/5 August 1639. The Swedish advance toward Laubach and Ziegenhain is in HStAM 4d Nr. 95, fol. 249, Secret and War Councils (letter sent) to AE, Cassel, 8/18 July 1639, rec. Dorsten, 13/23 July. See also attachments, fols. 250–255.

24. For a plan to try to extort money from the Jews of Hesse–Cassel, see HStAM 4d Nr. 95, fols. 178–179, VC and Council (letter sent) to AE, Cassel, 6/16 May 1639, rec. Dorsten, 15/25 May. For her concern over creditors and debts see: HStAM 4d Nr. 95, fols. 178–179, AE (minute) to VC and Council, Dorsten, 16/26 May 1639. Complaints from Hermann and others over increased contributions are in HStAM 4d Nr. 95, as well as in HStAM 4h Nr. 1520. Hessian troop numbers as of the beginning of 1639 are listed by Rehm as 14,420 infantry and 4,220 cavalry and dragoons. Friedrich Rehm, *Handbuch der Geschichte Beider Hessen*, vol. 1 (Marburg, 1842), 410. For more on the increased contributions from East Frisia—raised now by an additional 4,000 Reichsthalers monthly, to a total of 19,000, see Onno Klopp, *Geschichte Ostfrieslands von 1570–1751* (Hannover, 1856), 319.

25. AAACP Hesse 1, fol. 205, AE to Damontot?, 29 June/9 July 1639; AAACP Hesse 1, fol. 204, AE to Damontot?, 10/20 July 1639; HStAM 4d Nr. 50, fols. 56–57, AE (letter sent) to Vultejus, 9/19 April 1639. Discussion of the French court’s preferred terms for the new treaty appear in AAACP Allemagne 15, fols. 261–263, Louis XIII (minute) to d’Avaux, 25 May 1639. See also BN MS Baluze 169, fols. 32–35, 11–12, d’Avaux (own hand minute) to Claude Bouthillier, 30 May 1639. See also AAACP Hesse 1, fols. 208–212, 217, 223–224, Treaty of Dorsten, 12/22 August 1639, copy in Jean Dumont, ed., *Corps Universel Diplomatique du Droit des Gens* (Amsterdam, 1728), vol. 6:1, 178–180.

26. Although one recent work argues that she, unlike her husband, was not focused on imperial legal reforms, but was instead almost completely concerned with the particular interests of Hesse, her rejection of the Mainz accord suggests that this is not entirely the case. See Weiland, *Hessen-Kassel*, 79–167.

27. A copy of the Mainz agreement as of 25 July appears in Dumont, *Corps Universel*, vol. 6:1, 175–178. For the quotes from the emperor and court theologians, see Koch, *Geschichte des deutschen Reichs*, vol. 1, 137–141. Koch is only the most vehement in his excoriation of the landgravine for her rejection of this major concession. See also S. Keller, “Die staatsrechtliche Anerkennung der reformierten Kirche auf dem westfälischen Friedenskongreß: Zugleich ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der deutschen Diplomatie im XVII. Jahrhundert,” in *Festgabe der Bonner Juristischen Fakultät für Paul Krüger* (Berlin, 1911), 477–478. The quote from Gans and more on this topic are in Robert Bireley, *The Jesuits and the Thirty Years War* (Cambridge, England, 2003), 213–214.

28. Koch, *Geschichte des deutschen Reichs*, vol. 1, 140–141; HStAM 4d Nr. 56, *Gutachten des Geheimen Rats Vultejus betr. Unterstellung unter den Schutz Frankreichs*, 24

November/4 December 1639. For the Treaty of Münden, see Dumont, *Corps Universel*, vol. 6:1, 187–188.

29. Banér (letter sent) to Oxenstierna, Saaz, 21 December 1639, pub. in Oxenstierna, *Axel Oxenstiernas Skrifter och Brefvexling*, ser. 2, vol. 6 [2:6] (Stockholm, 1898), 688–702.

30. For Wolff's assurance to the landgravine and return to Sweden, see AAACP Hesse 1, fols. 271–272, AE (copy) to Charnase, Dorsten, 16/26 September 1639. See following folios for the French disbelief that the Swedes would give her what she wanted (Reply of Charnase, Berg op Zoom, 8 October 1639). For Wolff's expression of frustration to the Swedish court, see Riksarkivet Germanica 1369, Wolff Opinions on the Hesse-Cassel Alliance, Köpingen, 4 October 1639; Riksarkivet Germanica 1369, Wolff (copy) on the Hesse-Cassel Alliance, Köpingen, [5 October 1639?]. For more on Wolff's influence at this time, see Daniel Höffker, "Axel Oxenstierna and Hermann Wolff," in *Gemeinsame Bekannte: Schweden und Deutschland in der Frühen Neuzeit*, ed. Ivo Asmus, Heiko Droste, and Jens E. Olesen (Münster, 2003), 160–163. For Swedish complaints, see Riksarkivet Germanica 1369, Swedish Councilors in Germany (copy) to the Swedish Regents, Köpingen, 20 November 1639.

31. Swedish demands are in Dietrich Christoph von Rommel, *Geschichte von Hessen*, vol. 8 (Cassel, 1843), 576. See also Fritz Dickmann, *Der Westfälische Frieden*, 7th ed. (Münster, 1998), 152–153. The religious issue in the Swedish-Hessian alliance and d'Avaux's dissatisfaction with the landgravine appear in BN MS Baluze 170, fols. 25–26, d'Avaux (minute) to Chavigny, 14/24 January 1640; BN MS Baluze 170, fols. 31–32, d'Avaux (minute) to Chavigny, 21/31 January 1640. D'Avaux's complaints about Paderborn are in HStAM 4f Frankreich Nr. 1313, D'Avaux (letter sent) to Amalia Elisabeth, 10 October 1639. Marienmünster problems are in HStAM 4h Nr. 1577. Brasset's comment that "she is gaining time so as to do nothing, except by necessity" is in AAACP Hollande 21, fols. 233–235, Brasset (letter sent) to Chavigny, The Hague, 21 November 1639. See also Riksarkivet Germanica 1369, AE (letter sent) to Wolff, Lippstadt, 10/20 January 1640, rec. Köpingen, 30 January 1640.

32. Her concerns with the Treaty of Dorsten are in BN MS Baluze 170, fols. 27–28, Copy of a Memoire Concerning AE, Wetter, 16/26 January 1640. Her complaints to the Swedes about the French failure to pay is in BN MS Baluze 170, fols. 31–32, d'Avaux (minute) to Chavigny, 21/31 January 1640. See also AAACP Allemagne 16, fols. 12–14, Instruction for d'Avaux, 23 February 1640. For a Swedish view of this, see Grotius to Oxenstierna, 9 January 1640, letter 4462 in P. C. Molhuysen et al., eds., *The Correspondence of Hugo Grotius*, digital 1st ed. (October 2009), <http://grotius.huygens.knaw.nl>.

33. Riksarkivet Germanica 1369, Wolff Opinions on the Hesse-Cassel Alliance, Köpingen, 4 October 1639; Riksarkivet Germanica 1369, Wolff (copy) on the Hesse-Cassel Alliance, Köpingen, [5 October 1639?]. French concessions and her conjunction with Longueville are in AAACP Hesse 1, fols. 231–232, Richelieu (own hand) to Chavigny, [February 1640]; AAACP Hesse 1, fols. 213–214, 215–216, 226–227, drafts for Instruction for d'Estrades [February 1640]; AAACP Hesse 1, fols. 300–306, *Memoire au Sr. d'Estrades*, 6 February 1640; AAACP Hesse 1, fol. 293, Treaty of Lippstadt, 22 January/1 February 1640. See also AAACP Hollande 21, fols. 307–308, d'Amontot (extracts), 5 and 10 December 1639, for French frustration with her financial demands and negotiations with Krosigk at The Hague. Her comments on The Hague

agreement of 11 March that put into effect the Treaty of Dorsten are in HStAM 4f Frankreich Nr. 1316.

34. Her receipt of the imperial announcement of the Diet is in HStAM 4e Nr. 1411, AE (minute), Cassel, 13/23 July 1640. For information on the electoral Diet see Kathrin Bierther, *Der Regensburger Reichstag von 1640/1641* (Kallmünz OPF, 1971), 25–43.

35. Copy of a Letter to the Most Praiseworthy Electoral College from her Princely Grace, Lady Amalia Elisabeth, Landgravine of Hesse, etc., Cassel, 14/24 March 1640, copy in Universitätsbibliothek Augsburg, 02/IV.13.4.185angeb.08. See also Peter H. Wilson, *The Thirty Years War: Europe's Tragedy* (Cambridge, Mass., 2009), 624–625.

7. *The Long Struggle*

1. The burial of the landgrave and her children is in M. Merian, *Theatrum Europaeum, oder Warhafft Beschreibung aller denckwürdigen Geschichten*, 6 vols. (Frankfurt am Main, 1643–1652), vol. 4, 240–241. The prince of Anhalt mentioned may also be Friedrich von Anhalt-Bernburg-Harzgerode, who had served as a major general in the Hessian army since 1636.

2. There is a great deal of work on the role of representation, ceremony, and public ritual in premodern governing. See, for example, Edward Muir, *Ritual In Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge, England, 2005), 253–293; John Adamson, ed., *The Princely Courts of Europe: Ritual, Politics and Culture under the Ancien Régime, 1500–1750* (London, 1999); Ronald G. Asch and Adolf M. Birke, eds., *Princes, Patronage and the Nobility: The Court at the Beginning of the Modern Age, c. 1450–1650* (Oxford, 1991). Also of interest here is Ulinka Rublach, “Frühneuzeitliche Staatlichkeit und lokale Herrschaftspraxis in Württemberg,” *Zeitschrift für historische Forschung* 2 (1997), 1–30. See also Justus Lipsius, *Politicorum libri sex*, lib. 2, cap. 3, §§3ff., 527, cited in Pauline Puppel, *Die Regentin: Vormundschafiliche Herrschaft in Hessen 1500–1700* (Frankfurt, 2004), 14; William Jones, *Six Bookes of Politickes or Civil Doctrine, written in Latine by Justus Lipsius* (London, 1594); Carole Levin, *The Heart and Stomach of a King: Elizabeth I and the Politics of Sex and Power* (Philadelphia, 1994); Sharon L. Jansen, *The Monstrous Regiment of Women: Female Rulers in Early Modern Europe* (New York, 2002); Sharon L. Jansen, *Debating Women, Politics, and Power in Early Modern Europe* (New York, 2008); William Monter, *The Rise of Female Kings in Europe, 1300–1800* (New Haven, 2012); Katherine Crawford, *Perilous Performances: Gender and Regency in Early Modern France* (Cambridge, Mass., 2004); Amanda Shepard, *Gender and Authority in Sixteenth-Century England: The Knox Debate* (Keele, Staffordshire, 1994); John Knox, *The First Blast of the Trumpet Against the Monstrous Regiment of Women [1558]* (London, 1878). Lynn Abrams and Elizabeth Harvey, *Gender Relations in German History* (Durham, N.C., 1996); John Carmi Parsons, ed., *Medieval Queenship* (New York, 1998); Barbara Garlick et al., eds., *Stereotypes of Women in Power: Historical Perspectives and Revisionist Views* (New York, 1992); Louisa Olga Fradenburg, ed., *Women and Sovereignty* (Edinburgh, 1992); Margaret R. Sommerville, *Sex and Subjection: Attitudes to Women in Early-Modern Society* (London, 1995); Merry E. Wiesner, *Women and Gender in Early Modern Europe*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, England, 2000).

3. See here especially Jansen, *Monstrous Regiment*. For the strategies of Elizabeth, see Levin, *Heart*. For those of three French queen-regents, see Crawford, *Perilous Performances*. For regency as a tool, see Puppel, *Regentin*, 17.

4. For Günderode's depiction of her warmaking as defensive, not voluntary, see Hessische Staatsarchiv Marburg [HStAM] 4h. Nr. 1565, *Kurzer bericht v. Günderode über den hess. Defensionskrieg Ldgf. Wilhelms V. und der Ldgfin. Amalie Elisabeth*, c. 1640. Trial of Georg Samuel von Dalwigk is in HStAM 4d Nr. 97, Vice Chancellor [VC] and Council (letter sent) to Amalia Elisabeth [AE], Cassel, 8/18 February 1640. See also the attached trial documents: "Deacons, Doctors, and Professors of the Legal Faculty at Cassel to the VC and Council of Cassel," received 30 December 1639. The landgravine's censorship appears in a letter of hers of 1/11 February 1640, cited in Friedrich Rehm, *Handbuch der Geschichte Beider Hessen*, vol. 1 (Marburg, 1842), 410. See following folios for further information on her reception in Cassel. Censorship and the Lutheran publication are also mentioned in Theodor Piderit, *Geschichte der Haupt- und Residenzstadt Kassel* (Cassel, 1844), 216–217.

5. HStAM 4a 46.11, fol. 51, Testament of Wilhelm V. For the inventory of books in her estate after her death, see HStAM, 4a 47.17, fols. 190–198r. For more on the landgravine's personal piety, see Simone Buckreus, *Die Körper einer Regentin: Amelia Elisabeth von Hessen-Kassel (1602–1651)* (Göttingen, 2008), 45–50, 70–71. After Neuburger, who had begun as court preacher for Wilhelm V, the landgravine had B. Matthaeus and J. H. Stöckenius.

6. The report of the 24 April/4 May–1/11 May meeting of the estates of Hesse-Cassel is in HStAM 73, Nr. 299, Resolution of the Cassel Estates, Cassel, 1/11 May 1640, pub. in Günter Hollenberg, ed., *Hessische Landtagsabschiede 1605–1647* (Marburg, 2007), 365–373. See also her arguments to the estates in HStAM 4d Nr. 97, AE (draft) to the Estates, Cassel, 24 April/4 May 1640. For the regency council, the knights included Lieutenant Colonel Franz Elgar von Dalwigk, Melchior von Lehrbach, and Jost Trott. The professors included Dr. Johann Antrecht, Dr. Justus Jungmann, Dr. Stückerodt, and Dr. Wigand. The representatives of the city included the Hersfeld Mayor Faber, Eschwege Mayor Müldner, Cassel Mayor Ungefug, Homberg Mayor Wagenhals, Allendorf Mayor Wagner, and Grebenstein Mayor Wetzell.

7. Hollenberg, *Hessische Landtagsabschiede*, 365–373; HStAM 4d Nr. 97, AE (minute) to the Estates, Cassel, 24 April/4 May 1640. For more on Jews in the Thirty Years War, see J. I. Israel, "Central European Jewry during the Thirty Years War," *Central European History* 16 (1983), 3–30.

8. Eberstein's and other Hessian military reports of the conjunction with Banér are in HStAM 4h. 1572. See also Ilsa Bechert, "Die Aussenpolitik der Landgräfin Amelia Elisabeth von Hessen-Kassel: Oktober 1637 bis März 1642" (diss., Philipps-Universität zu Marburg, 1946), 11. Hessian military strength of 14,420 infantry, 3,750 cavalry, and 870 dragooneers is in Merian, *Theatrum Europaeum*, vol. 4, 240. Troop strengths are hard to determine exactly, however. In March 1640 the French court estimated the landgravine's effective army (not fixed in garrisons) at around eight thousand. Archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Mémoires et documents [AAEMD] France 835, fols. 102–103, Summary of a La Boderie letter, 9 March 1640. Klopp estimates 29 companies of infantry and 2 of cavalry (total of around 4500 men) in East Frisian quarters in 1640. Onno Klopp, *Geschichte Ostfrieslands von 1570–1751* (Hannover, 1856), 320.

9. Especially useful for understanding the functioning of military financing in this period are Hubert Salm, *Armeefinanzierung im Dreissigjährigen Krieg: Der Niederrheinisch-Westfälische Reichskreis 1635–1650* (Münster, 1990); Cordula Kapser, *Die bayerische Kriegsorganisation in der zweiten Hälfte des Dreißigjährigen Krieges 1635–1648/49*

(Münster, 1997). For Dutch logistical and financing methods in this period, see Michiel de Jong, *Staat van Oorlog: Wapenbedrijf en militaire hervorming in de Republic der Verenigde Nederlanden, 1585–1621* (Hilversum, 2005); James D. Tracy, *The Founding of the Dutch Republic: War, Finance, and Politics in Holland, 1572–1588* (Oxford, 2008). See also Dieter Albrecht, “Zur Finanzierung des Dreissigjährigen Krieges,” *Zeitschrift für bayerische Landesgeschichte* 19 (Munich, 1956), 534–567; Ronald G. Asch, *The Thirty Years War: The Holy Roman Empire and Europe, 1618–48* (New York, 1997), 150–176; Redlich, “Contributions”; Fritz Redlich, *The German Military Enterpriser and His Workforce: A Study in European Economic and Social History*, 2 vols. (Wiesbaden, 1964–1965); Derek Croxton, *Peacemaking in Early Modern Europe: Cardinal Mazarin and the Congress of Westphalia, 1643–1648* (London, 1999), 56–94. For an analysis of sixteenth-century military financing and the role of local estates in exploiting a ruler’s need for money see James D. Tracy, *Emperor Charles V, Impresario of War: Campaign Strategy, International Finance, and Domestic Politics* (Cambridge, England, 2002).

10. French troop strength and movements, plus Melander’s complaints and talks with Neuburg, are in AAEMD France 835, fols. 102–103, Summary of la Boderie Letter, 9 March 1640. A similar estimate of allied troop numbers (16,000 for the French and around the same for Banér) appears in Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris, [BN] MS Baluze 170, fols. 126–127, d’Avaux (minute) to Chavigny, 13/23 May 1640. The Swedish appeal to Melander to cooperate is in Landeshauptarchiv Koblenz [LHA Koblenz] 47, no. 15966, fols. 478–479, Christina and Swedish Council to Melander, Nyköping, 30 April [o.s.?] 1640. See also HHStA Kleinere Reichsstände Hessen-Kassel 1636–1648 155, fols. 296–297, AE (copy of intercepted letter) to Karl Ludwig, Cassel, 27 May/6 June 1640. Her discussion with Melander and Banér’s move to Erfurt are in LHA Koblenz 47, no. 15966, fols. 503–505, AE to Melander, Cassel, 1/11 April 1640. Her hopes for the 1640 campaign season are in LHA Koblenz 47, no. 15966, fols. 567–569, AE to Melander, Cassel, 30 May/10 June 1640. For Melander’s reluctance see also Wilhelm Hofmann, *Peter Melander, reichsgraf zu Holzappel: Ein charakterbild aus der zeit des dreissigjährigen krieges* (Munich, 1882), 117–122. French discussions of bringing Brunswick into the alliance are in Archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Paris, Correspondance Politique [AAECP] Allemagne 16, fols. 67–70, Louis XIII (Chavigny’s secretary’s minute) to d’Avaux, 3 December 1639?

11. Swedish demands for the union of Brunswick and Hessian troops under Banér are in Friedrich von der Decken, *Herzog Georg von Braunschweig und Lüneburg*, vol. 3 (Hannover, 1834), 183–185, 328–330. Banér’s complaints about the allies are in Johan Banér to Christina, Eschwege, 14/24 July 1640, pub. in Oxenstierna, *Axel Oxenstiernas Skrifter och Brefvexling* (Stockholm, 1898), 2:6, 758–765. Similar French anger at Hessian neutrality in Westphalia is in BN MS Baluze 170, fols. 142–143, d’Avaux (minute) to Chavigny, 2/12 June 1640. Progress of the military conjunction is in AAEMD France 835, fol. 120, De L’isle (copy) report, 15 May 1640. Her letter to the Elector Palatine about this conjunction is in HHStA Kleinere Reichsstände Hessen-Kassel 1636–1648 [KRHK] 155, fols. 296–297, AE (copy of intercepted letter) to Karl Ludwig, Cassel, 27 May/6 June 1640. Her arguments to Melander against ending the conjunction are in LHA Koblenz 47, no. 15966, fols. 567–569, AE to Melander, Cassel, 30 May/10 June 1640. Wahl’s movements toward Hessian territory are in AAEMD France 835, fol. 224, la Boderie (extract), 24 June 1640. Her appeal to the Berhardine directors’ sense of German patriotism and request to move the burden of war from allied territories is in LHA Koblenz 47, no. 15966, fols. 583–4, copy on fols. 581–582,

AE to the Directors of the Weimar Army, Cassel, 23 May/3 June 1640. Arguments among the allied generals is also in Merian, *Theatrum Europaeum*, vol. 4, 231.

12. Her concern about the military situation and anger at Melander are in LHA Koblenz 47, no. 15966, fols. 478–9, AE to Melander, Cassel, 19/29 June 1640. Attacks on Hesse-Cassel by the imperialists are in Merian, *Theatrum Europaeum*, vol. 4, 241. Melander's complaints about Banér and quote are in Hofmann, *Peter Melander*, 121–125. French distrust of Melander is in AAEMD France 835, fols. 102–103, Summary of la Boderie letter, 9 March 1640.

13. Melander's departure and Malsburg's letter are in Hofmann, *Peter Melander*, 123–131, and in Merian, *Theatrum Europaeum*, vol. 4, 219. Grotius was also unhappy with the loss of Melander, as he "highly esteemed his qualities." Grotius to N. van Reigersberch, Paris, 11 August 1640, letter no. 4780. Melander's leaving also mentioned in HSAM 4f Frankreich, Nr. 1311, La Boderie (letter sent) to AE, 9/19 December 1640. Her subsequent refusal to have anything to do with Melander is in AAACP Hollande 23, fols. 126–127, La Thuillerie (copy) to Chavigny, 15 April 1641. Banér's scorn is in Oxenstierna, *Axel Oxenstiernas Skrifter och Brefvexling* (Stockholm, 1898), 2:6, 758–765. Ban on dueling is in Piderit, *Geschichte*, 215.

14. Eberstein as a bandit is in Matthias Koch, *Geschichte des Deutschen Reiches unter der Regierung Ferdinands III*, vol. 2 (Vienna, 1866), 8. Quote is in Christian Lehmann, *Die Kriegschronik: Sachsen mit Erzgebirge*, 3rd ed., ed. Hendrick Heidler (Norderstedt, 2011), 107–108.

15. Neuburg's relationship to Melander—such that Melander even purged Neuburg's councilors of his opponents—is in AAACP Hollande 22, fol. 121, La Thuillerie (copy) to Chavigny, 25 March 1641. Her unhappiness with Melander and Melander's embassy to the French are in AAACP Hollande 22, fols. 139–142, La Thuillerie (copy) to Chavigny, April 22, 1641. French disgust with Neuburg's double-dealing (done through Melander) is in AAACP Hollande 22, fols. 195v–197, Chavigny (copy) to la Thuillerie, 11 June 1641. For financial records relating to Melander's efforts on Neuburg's behalf, see LHA Koblenz 47, no. 4416, *Rechnungen (mit Belegen) über Ausgaben Peter Melanders von seiner Reise nach Wien für Pfalzgraf Wolfgang Wilhelm von Pfalz-Neuburg vom 7. Oktober 1641 bis 26. März 1642*. For E. A. von Eberstein, see Karlheinz Blaschke, "Eberstein, Ernst Albrecht von," in *Neue Deutsche Biographie* 4 (1959), 252. See also Hofmann, *Peter Melander*, 131–140, who follows the *Theatrum Europaeum* in arguing that Melander recommended Eberstein as his successor. Note that the Prince Palatine's efforts to retake his patrimony were damaged further by the outbreak of revolution in Ireland in October 1641, followed soon afterward by civil war in England, which greatly distracted the Stuarts from any interest in the Palatine cause.

16. Her trip to Groningen is in Merian, *Theatrum Europaeum*, vol. 4, 242. The promise from the Prince of Orange for assistance for Kalkar is in AAACP Hollande 21, fols. 307–308, d'Amontot (extracts) 5 and 10 December 1639. Krosigk and Wicquefort's efforts at The Hague, mostly for the preservation of Kalkar, are in AAACP Hollande 22, fol. 19, Chavigny (copy) to la Thuillerie, 29 October 1640; AAACP Hollande 22, fols. 19v–20, Chavigny (copy) to La Thuillerie, 3 November 1640; AAACP Hollande 22, fol. 25, La Thuillerie (copy) to AE, 23 November 1640; AAACP Hollande 22, fols. 25v–27, Chavigny (copy) to La Thuillerie, 17 November 1640. Strengthening of the fortifications of Kalkar mentioned in AAACP Hollande 22, fols. 27–30, La Thuillerie (copy) to Chavigny, 26 November 1640. Her complaint that

Neuburg was not supplying sufficient contributions for her troops is in AAACP Hollande 22, fols. 137v–138, AE (copy) to La Thuillerie, 6 April 1641. More on the Hessian use of Neuburg's lands to draw contributions for Kalkar is in AAACP Hollande 22, fols. 170v–172, La Thuillerie (copy) to Chavigny, 20 May 1641. See also Günther Engelbert, *Der Hessenkrieg am Niederrhein* pt. 1, in *Annalen des Historischen Vereins für den Niederrhein*, vol. 161 (Köln, 1959), 69–77.

17. Kathrin Bierther, *Der Regensburger Reichstag von 1640/1641* (Kallmünz OPF, 1971), 37–47, 63–4. French joy over the weakness of the Spanish can be seen, among other places, in AAACP Hollande 22, fols. 19v–20, Chavigny (copy) to la Thuillerie, 3 November 1640.

18. Bierther, *Regensburger Reichstag*, 87.

19. HStAM 4e Nr. 1411, AE (copy) to the Evangelical Electors and Estates at the Regensburg Diet of 1640–1641, Cassel, 10/20 August 1640. Her inclusion occurred despite the emperor's production of an intercepted letter from her to the Prince Palatine discussing further offensive action in the empire. HStAM 4e Nr. 1411, Regensburg Diet (copy) to AE, Regensburg, 6 October 1640.

20. See also Bierther, *Regensburger Reichstag*, 37–47, 63–64, 87, 135–145; HStAM 4e Nr. 1411, Instructions for the Hesse–Cassel delegates to the Regensburg Diet, Cassel, 10/20 November, 1640; HStAM 4e Nr. 1411, Instructions for the Brunswick–Lüneburg delegates to the Regensburg Diet (copy), n.d. For a brief biography of Lampadius, see Johann Gottfried von Meiern, *Universal-Register über die Westphälischen Friedens- und Nürnbergischen Executions-Handlungen und Geschichte* (Göttingen, 1740) [Meiern], 61–64. Dieter Albrecht and others have argued that the landgravine's insistence here, and subsequently, on the inclusion of all imperial estates in peacemaking was the “ultimate and principal contribution of the landgravine to the Westphalian Peace.” Albrecht, “Zur Finanzierung des Dreissigjährigen Krieges,” 248–249. See also Kerstin Weiland, *Hessen-Kassel und die Reichsverfassung: Ziele und Prioritäten landgräflicher Politik im Dreißigjährigen Krieg* (Marburg, 2009), 90–91, for a contrary argument.

21. For the quote from the estates see HStAM 17 I Nr. 1763, fols. 26–27, cited in Hollenberg, *Hessische Landtagsabschiede*, 378–379. For the Schaumburg agreement, see HStAM 4d. Nr. 95, fol. 286, VC Deinhardt (letter sent) to AE, Cassel, 24 July/3 August 1639, rec. Dorsten, 30 July/9 August. See also Friedrich Rehm, *Handbuch der Geschichte beider Hessen*, vol. 2 (Marburg, 1846), 441–442; Dietrich Christoph von Rommel, *Geschichte von Hessen*, vol. 8 (Cassel, 1843), 645–646. The exact division of the Schaumburg inheritance was contested between Hesse–Cassel and Brunswick–Lüneburg until 1647, when the two came to an agreement. Principal Agreement and Side Agreement among Duke Christian Ludwig of Brunswick–Lüneburg, Amalia Elisabeth of Hesse–Cassel, and Philip of Schaumburg, Lauenau, 1/10 October 1647, pub. in Johann Gottfried von Meiern, *Acta Pacis Westphalicae publica, oder westphälische Friedenshandlungen und Geschichte in einem mit richtigen Urkunden bestärkten historischen Zusammenhang verfassers un beschrieben*, 6 vols. (Hannover, 1734–6), vol. 5, 636–642.

22. Bierther, *Regensburger Reichstag*, 197–211. See also HStAM 4d Nr. 49, Ludwig to Vultejus, 4/14 January 1641.

23. For Brandenburg at the Regensburg Diet, see Bierther, *Regensburger Reichstag*, 96–109, 195–197. See also Ernst Opgenoorth, *Friedrich Wilhelm, Der Große Kurfürst von Brandenburg*, pt. 1, 1620–1660 (Frankfurt, 1971), 95–99.

24. See Heinz Duchhardt, “Friedrich Wilhelm, der Große Kurfürst (1640–1688),” in Frank-Lothar Kroll, ed., *Preußens Herrscher: Von den ersten Hohenzollern bis Wilhelm*

II (Munich, 2000), 95–112. See also Bierther, *Regensburger Reichstag*, 96–109, 195–197; Opgenoorth, *Friedrich Wilhelm*, 99–102; Hippolitho à Lapide [B. P. von Chemnitz], *Dissertatio de ratione status in Imperio nostro Romano-Germanico* (1640).

25. Swedish–French negotiations over renewing their alliance and news that the French had offered large monetary enticements is in HStAM 4e Nr. 1411, Sixtinus to the Hessian Delegates at Regensburg, Cassel, 26 December 1640/5 January 1641.

26. Bierther, *Regensburger Reichstag*, 202–211; Riksarkivet, Stockholm, *Germanica* 23, Ferdinand III (copy) to Archduke Leopold Wilhelm, Regensburg, 2/12 October 1641. Vultejus's objections to von Klitzing's negotiations with the imperialists, which he described as an attempt to “debauch” the allied armies, are in HStAM 4d Nr. 78, Vultejus (duplicat) to Sixtinus, Hildesheim 4/14 November 1641, rec. Cassel, 8/18 November 1641.

27. French concern over the siege of Dorsten, and efforts to get help from the prince of Orange, are in AAACP Hollande 22, fols. 230v–235, La Thuillierie (copy) to Chavigny, 7 August 1641. French fears over the fall of Dorsten are in AAACP Hollande 22, fols. 270v–273, La Thuillierie (copy) to Chavigny, 29 September 1641. For more on Hesse's military activities in this period, see Engelbert, *Hessenkrieg am Niederrhein*, pt. 1, 78–80. See also Rommel, *Geschichte von Hessen*, vol. 8, 621–625.

28. Duchhardt, “Friedrich Wilhelm,” 95–112. For the role of Brunswick-Lüneburg in shaping discussions on the general peace, see Bierther, *Regensburger Reichstag*, 231–243.

29. For French uncertainty about Eberstein's ability to keep the imperialists out of Münster, see AAACP Hollande 23, fol. 259, La Thuillierie (copy) to Chavigny, October 28, 1641. For Hessian torment and trouble in Germany, see AAACP Hollande 23, fol. 264, La Thuillierie (letter sent) to Richelieu, 4 November 1641. For her despair, see Engelbert, *Hessenkrieg am Niederrhein*, pt. 1, 80. Hessian interest in Goslar is in HStAM 4h. 1644–1650. Vultejus's concern that Hessian involvement in negotiations would make the foreign crowns suspicious is in HStAM 4d Nr. 78, Vultejus (heavily coded duplicat) to Sixtinus, Hildesheim 4/14 October 1641. Krosigk, like many of the landgravine's other councilors, came from a family of politicians. His father had been a councilor to the prince of Anhalt-Dessau, and his three brothers would also become princely councilors. Krosigk named his only daughter Amalia—a possible sign of his fondness for the landgravine. Meiern, *Universal-Register*, 67–68.

8. *A Manly Resolve*

1. Hessische Staatsarchiv Marburg [HStAM] 4h Nr. 2116, fols. 19–40, Instructions for Scheffer, Krosigk, Antrecht, and Vultejus to the Westphalian negotiations (minute), Cassel, 25 May/4 June 1644. See also Fritz Dickmann, *Der Westfälische Frieden*, 7th ed. (Münster, 1998), 104; Erwin Bettenhäuser, “Die Landgrafschaft Hessen-Kassel auf dem Westfälischen Friedenskongress 1644–1648” (diss., Johannes-Gutenberg-Universität zu Mainz, 1983), 34.

2. Criticism of Hessian forced recruiting is in Günther Engelbert, *Der Hessenkrieg am Niederrhein*, pt. 1, in *Annalen des Historischen Vereins für den Niederrhein*, vol. 161 (Koln, 1959), 73.

3. Arrival of Guébriant and Hessian troop numbers are in Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Paris, Correspondance Politique [AAECP] Hollande 23, fols. 293–294, la Thuillierie (letter sent) to Noyers, The Hague, 31 December 1641. Slightly different troops numbers of four thousand men for Eberstein (half cavalry),

and fifty-five hundred men for Guébriant (thirty-five hundred cavalry), appear in Peter H. Wilson, *The Thirty Years War: Europe's Tragedy* (Cambridge, Mass., 2009), 633.

4. For Franco-Hessian movements, accumulation of troops, and the battle of Kempen see Engelbert, who estimates the Hessians at thirty companies of cavalry and infantry, and a whopping twenty thousand Bernhardines. Engelbert, *Hessenkrieg am Niederrhein*, pt. 1, 85–101.

5. The discussion of the terms demanded by the imperialists is in HStAM 4d Nr. 78, Vultejus (duplicat) to Sixtinus, Hildesheim, 4/14 November 1641, rec. Cassel, 8/18 November 1641. See also other undated letters from Vultejus to Sixtinus in HStAM 4d Nr. 78. For her demands at Goslar, see Hans Heinrich Weber, *Der Hessenkrieg* (Giessen, 1935), 31.

6. Problems with her finance ministers is in Christian Tacke, “Das Eindringen Hessen-Kassels in die westfälischen Stifter,” in *Frankreich und Hessen-Kassel zur Zeit des Dreißigjährigen Krieges und des Westfälischen Friedens*, ed. Klaus Malettke (Marburg, 1999), 175–187. For negotiations between the imperialists and Hesse-Cassel in this period, see HStAM 4h Nr. 1696, *Diplomatische Korrespondenz mit Deinhard und Scheffer betr. das Goslarische Friedenstraktat, 1642–1643*. See also HStAM 4h Nr. 1646, *Frieden-shandlung zu Goslar und Mainz, 1642*. Günderrode's letter in HStAM 4h Nr. 1696, fol. 136, cited in Erwin Bettenhäuser, ed., *Familienbriefe der Landgräfin Amalie Elisabeth von Hessen-Kassel und ihrer Kinder* (Marburg, 1994), n. 4.

7. For French reaction, see AAACP Hollande 23, fols. 462–463, La Thuillerie (letter sent) to Noyers, 23 May 1642; Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris, [BN] MS Baluze 172, fol. 54, d'Avaux (minute) to Chavigny, 27 May 1642; BN MS Baluze 172, fols. 60–62, memoire (minute), Cassel, 4 May 1642. For more on efforts along the Lower Rhine at this point, see Engelbert, *Hessenkrieg am Niederrhein*, pt. 1, 108–113; G. Engelbert, *Der Hessenkrieg am Niederrhein, pt. 2*, in *Annalen des Historischen Vereins für den Niederrhein* 162 (1960), 35–58. See also Dietrich Christoph von Rommel, *Geschichte von Hessen*, vol. 8 (Cassel, 1843), 627–628.

8. Wilson indicates Eberstein sent only one thousand men with Guébriant, but the landgravine claims the larger number. Wilson, *Thirty Years War*, 634–639; Riksarkivet Germanica 1373, Amalia Elisabeth [AE] (copy) to Christina, Cassel, 17/27 December 1642. For the correspondence between Amalia Elisabeth and Torstenson, see Rommel, *Geschichte von Hessen*, vol. 8, 629.

9. Wolff's conversation is in Riksarkivet Germanica 1373, AE (copy) to Christina, Cassel, 17/27 December 1642. See also Wilson, *Thirty Years War*, 639–640, for the tendency in this period toward neutrality and disengagement in the war.

10. BN MS Baluze 172, fol. 69, d'Avaux (minute) to Chavigny, 9 September 1642; AAACP Hollande 23, fols. 603–604, la Thuillerie (extract, Chavigny's secretary's hand) to Chavigny, The Hague, 23 December 1642. Krosigk was delayed in his trip to Paris, arriving in February 1643. Mention of the French-Hessian agreement concerning Kempen, which she gained in May in return for a further one thousand troops for Guébriant, can be seen in AAACP Hollande 24, fols. 36–39, Destrade to Chavigny, 9 March 1643. See also Engelbert, *Hessenkrieg am Niederrhein*, pt. 2, 58–78.

11. For her letter to Sweden see Riksarkivet Germanica 1373, AE (copy) to Christina, Cassel, 17/27 December 1642.

12. AAACP Hollande 24, fols. 125–128, Brasset (letter sent) to [Chavigny], The Hague, 18 May 1643. See also Klopp, *Geschichte Ostfrieslands von 1570–1751*, 323–324.

13. Death of Juliane is in M. Merian, *Theatrum Europaeum, oder Warhafftige Beschreibung aller denckwürdigen Geschichten*, 6 vols. (Frankfurt am Main, 1643–1652), vol. 5, 38–39. See also Rommel, *Geschichte von Hessen*, vol. 8, 640–641. For the meeting of the Estates of 1643, see HStAM 73 Nr. 300, Resolution of the Hessian Estates, Cassel, 27 March/6 April 1643; HStAM 17 I Nr. 1762, pub. in Günter Hollenberg, ed., *Hessische Landtagsabschiede 1605–1647* (Marburg, 2007), 391–396. Fritz’s loyal service as commander of a Hessian contingent in the Swedish army can be seen in his friendly correspondence to the landgravine. See, for example, HStAM 4a 47:27, fols. 5, 11, Friedrich to AE, Altenburg, 29 March 1641, rec. Cassel, 7/17 April 1641.

14. Hesse-Darmstadt’s appeals to the allies and her reiterated war aims are in HStAM 4h Nr. 2116, fols. 6–11, Instructions for negotiations with the Swedes, Cassel, 25 October/4 November 1643.

15. Mazarin’s great optimism at the military situation and desire to push the advantage is in Bibliothèque Mazarine, Paris [BMaz] Ms. 2214, fols. 71r–72r, Mazarin (copyist hand) to AE, [Paris], 10 July 1643, pub. in A. Chéruef and G. d’Avenel, eds., *Lettres du cardinal Mazarin pendant son ministère*, vol. 1, *Décembre 1642–Juin 1644* [LM] (Paris, 1872), 243–245. See also Paul Sonnino, “From D’Avaux to *Devot*: Politics and Religion in the Thirty Years War,” *History* 87, no. 286 (2002), 31–36.

16. Frankfurt Deputations Diet to AE, 23 May 1643, pub. in Michael Caspar Londorp, *Der Römischen Kayserlichen Majestät und deß Heiligen Römischen Reichs geist- und weltliche Stände, Chur- und Fürsten . . .*, vol. 5 (Frankfurt am Main, 1668), 830. Her response appears on the following page. See also Dickmann, *Westfälische Frieden*, 113–117, 164–165. For more on early demands by the Elector Palatine for parity in the Reichskammergericht, see Wilson, *Thirty Years War*, 216–223.

17. See Rommel, *Geschichte von Hessen*, vol. 8, 642–644. Mention of this agreement, made on 5 August and also signed by the electors of Saxony and Brandenburg, appears in the landgravine’s later peace conditions at Westphalia. See, for example, HStAM 4h Nr. 2137, 3/13 July 1647, fols. 126–127.

18. Hessische Staatsarchiv Darmstadt [HStAD] E2 Nr. 2/3, fols. 13–18, Resolution of the Hesse-Darmstadt Estates, Giessen, 29 August/8 September 1642, pub. in Hollenberg, *Hessische Landtagsabschiede*, 380–385; HStAD E2 Nr. 2/3, fols. 88–89, Report of the Darmstadt Estates, 17/27 November 1643, pub. in Hollenberg, *Hessische Landtagsabschiede*, 406–411. See also Weber, *Hessenkrieg*, 34–39; Rommel, *Geschichte von Hessen*, vol. 8, 650–652.

19. HStAM 4d Nr. 142, n.d. [1643]; Rommel, *Geschichte von Hessen*, vol. 8, 654–662; Weber, *Hessenkrieg*, 41–42.

20. Fritz’s fiancée, Eleonore, was later involved in a scandalous affair with a French lute player, and became pregnant with his child. For Salvius’s quote and the information about Landgrave Fritz see Rommel, *Geschichte von Hessen*, vol. 8, 653–662.

21. BMaz Ms. 2214, fol. 116v., Mazarin (copyist hand) to Count von Eberstein, [Paris], 24 September 1643, pub. in LM, 385–386. Krosigk’s comments to Mazarin and his description of Amalia Elisabeth’s feelings on this matter are in AAACP Hollande 24, fols. 236–237, Krosigk (secretary’s hand letter sent) to Mazarin, The Hague, 19 October 1643. Her mention of contributions as “les nerfs principaux de sa guerre” is in HStAM 4f Frankreich Nr. 1343, Louis XIV (letter sent) Response to Memoire of AE, Paris, 9 September 1643. French interest in Amalia Elisabeth’s imposition of contributions and complaints of the East Frisians are in AAACP Hollande 24, fols. 248–249, La Thuillierie (secretary’s hand letter sent) to Mazarin, The Hague, 9 November

1643. Her argument that preserving her territories was in the common good is in HStAM 4h Nr. 2116, fols. 6–11, Instructions for negotiations with the Swedes, Cassel, 25 October/4 November 1643. For Lynn's argument, which is similar to AE's, see John A. Lynn, "How War Fed War: The Tax of Violence and Contributions during the Grand Siecle," *Journal of Modern History* 65, no. 2 (June 1993), 286–310 (esp. 296–297). See also Hubert Salm, *Armeefinanzierung im Dreissigjährigen Krieg: Der Niederrheinisch-Westfälische Reichskreis 1635–1650* (Münster, 1990), 22, 30–31.

22. HStAM 4h Nr. 2116, fols. 6–11, Instructions for von Hoff, Cassel, 25 October/4 November 1643; partial copy in HStAM 4h Nr. 2116, fols. 17–18. Kerstin Weiand, *Hessen-Kassel und die Reichsverfassung: Ziele und Prioritäten landgräflicher Politik im Dreißigjährigen Krieg* (Marburg, 2009), 103–105, downplays Amalia Elisabeth's role here, noting that Sweden took the initiative in April 1643 to invite Protestant princes to the Congress. This is overly simplistic, as inviting the princes was one thing, agreeing not to negotiate without them is another.

23. Ibid. For her appeal to the princes of the empire see Londorp, *Römischen Kayserlichen Majestät*, vol. 5, 834; Dickmann, *Westfälische Frieden*, 165; Bettenhäuser, *Landgrafschaft*, 34.

24. For d'Avaux's analysis of the causes of the Swedish invasion of Denmark see AAACP Hollande 30, fols. 11–14, D'Avaux (D'Avaux secretary's hand letter sent) to Mazarin, The Hague, 4 January 1644. For more on the Swedish–Danish war, see R. I. Frost, *The Northern Wars: War, State and Society in Northeastern Europe, 1558–1721* (Longman, 2000), 133–155; P. D. Lockhart, *Denmark in the Thirty Years War, 1618–1648* (Selinsgrove, England, 1996), 227–256.

25. Mazarin's concern over her discouragement is in BMaz Ms. 2214, fols. 141v–142r., Mazarin (copyist hand) to Krosigk, [Paris], 3 December 1643, pub. in *LM* 1, 482. A plan to reinforce the Hessians is in AAACP Hollande 24, fols. 298–309, Plenipotentiaries (secretary's hand duplicata sent) to Anne, The Hague, 23 December 1643, letter sent in AAACP Allemagne 21, fols. 141–149; AAACP Hollande 24, fols. 312–321, D'Avaux and Servien (letter sent) to Mazarin, The Hague, 25 December 1643. Her quotes are in HStAM 4h Nr. 2116, fols. 6–11, Cassel, 25 October/4 November 1643. For more on the Marburg invasion plans, see Weber, *Hessenkrieg*, 39–40.

9. Westphalian Maneuverings

1. Hessische Staatsarchiv Marburg [HStAM], 4h Nr. 2116, fols. 13–16, Amalia Elisabeth [AE] memoir for Krosigk, Cassel, 27 December 1643/6 January 1644; HStAM 4h Nr. 2116, fols. 77–83, *Punctus Admissionis*, n.d. Weiand provides a good analysis of the landgravine's constitutional program, but misses the tie between *ius territoriali* and *ius reformandi* for her. Kerstin Weiand, *Hessen-Kassel und die Reichsverfassung: Ziele und Prioritäten landgräflicher Politik im Dreißigjährigen Krieg* (Marburg, 2009), 107–110; for the arguments of the Hessian estates, see HStAM 17 I Nr. 1763, fols. 26–27; HStAM 304 Nr. 495, pub. in Günter Hollenberg, ed., *Hessische Landtagsabschiede 1605–1647* (Marburg, 2007), 378–379.

2. Archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Paris, Correspondance Politique [AAACP] Hollande 30, fols. 106–107, Wicquefort (own hand letter sent) to Bailleur, The Hague, 25 January 1644; AAACP Hollande 30, fols. 108–109, Krosigk (secretary's hand letter sent) to Mazarin, The Hague, 25 January 1644. Note also Krosigk's careful refutation of rumors that the landgravine and Eberstein were skim-

ming funds. See also AAACP Hollande 24, fols. 298–309, Plenipotentiaries (secretary's hand *duplicata* sent) to Anne, The Hague, 23 December 1643, letter sent in AAACP Allemagne 21, fols. 141–149; AAACP Hollande 24, fols. 312–321, D'Avaux and Servien (letter sent) to Mazarin, The Hague, 25 December 1643. For Hatzfeldt's strategy see Hubert Salm, *Armeefinanzierung im Dreissigjährigen Krieg: Der Niederrheinisch-Westfälische Reichskreis 1635–1650* (Münster, 1990), 33–34. See also Cordula Kapser, *Die bayerische Kriegsorganisation in der zweiten Hälfte des Dreißigjährigen Krieges 1635–1648/49* (Münster, 1997), 186–187.

3. Bibliothèque Mazarine, Paris [BMaz] Ms. 2214, fol. 157v., Mazarin (copyist hand) to AE, [Paris], 5 February 1644, pub. in *Lettres du cardinal Mazarin pendant son ministère*, vol. 1, *Décembre 1642–Juin 1644* [LM], p. 568; BMaz Ms. 2214, fol. 158r., Mazarin (copyist hand) to AE, [Paris], 6 February 1644, pub. in *LM* 1, p. 572–3; BMaz Ms. 2214, fol. 158v., Mazarin (copyist hand) to Krosigk, [Paris], 6 February 1644, pub. in *LM* 1, p. 573–5. For Krosigk's "upside-down" quote, see AAACP Hollande 30, fols. 214–216, Krosigk (secretary's hand letter sent) to Mazarin, The Hague, 15 February 1644; For his "finish us off" quote, see AAACP Hollande 30, fols. 246–247, Krosigk (secretary's hand letter sent) to Mazarin, The Hague, 22 February 1644. For d'Avaux quotes and fears of the plenipotentiaries see AAACP Hollande 30, fols. 248–251, D'Avaux (secretary's hand letter sent) to Mazarin, The Hague, 22 February 1644; AAACP Hollande 27, fols. 287–290, D'Avaux, Servien, and La Thuillerie (Servien own hand minute) to Brienne, The Hague, 22 February 1644, Servien secretary's hand (Servien own hand corrections) copy in AAACP Hollande 27, fols. 291–295, *duplicata* dated February 23 sent to Mazarin in AAACP Hollande 30, fols. 258–263. For more on the plans for Marsin's levy, see T. Helfferich, "A Levy in Liège for Mazarin's Army: Practical and Strategic Difficulties in Raising and Supporting Troops in the Thirty Years War," *Journal of Early Modern History* 11, no. 6 (November 2007), 475–500.

4. Reports of Swedish movements appears in AAACP Hollande 30, fols. 106–107, Wicquefort (own hand letter sent) to Bailleul, The Hague, 25 January 1644; AAACP Hollande 30, fols. 196–197, Wicquefort (own hand letter sent) to Bailleul, The Hague, 9 February 1644. Further criticism of the Dutch duplicitousness and reports on the Swedes are in AAACP Hollande 30, fols. 252–253, Wicquefort (own hand letter sent) to Bailleul, The Hague, 23 February 1644.

5. Complaints of the Darmstadt estates over her early 1644 occupation appear in Hessische Staatsarchiv Darmstadt [HStAD] E2 Nr. 2/3, fols. 108–109, Resolution of the Darmstadt Estates, Giessen, 2/12 February 1644, pub. in Hollenberg, *Hessische Landtagsabschiede*, 412–414, Mazarin's quote is in AAACP Hollande 30, fols. 271–273, Mazarin (Lionne hand minute) to the Plenipotentiaries, 5 March 1644. Krosigk's mention of the 20,000 Reichstalers, which he found lacking, is in AAACP Hollande 30, fols. 438–439, Krosigk (secretary's hand letter sent) to Mazarin, The Hague, 14 March 1644.

6. HStAM 4a 47:27, fol. 17, AE to Friedrich, Cassel, 25 March/4 April 1644. Description of Geyso's cavalry and the threat from Hatzfeldt, who took the fortress of Meiningen in January 1644 and frightened the Hessians out of their quarters in Fulda, is in AAACP Hollande 30, fols. 252–253, Wicquefort (own hand letter sent) to Bailleul, The Hague, 23 February 1644; see also Wicquefort. AAACP Hollande 30, fols. 442–444, Wicquefort (own hand letter sent) to Bailleul, The Hague, 15 March 1644; AAACP Hollande 30, fols. 556–557, Wicquefort (own hand letter sent) to Bailleul,

The Hague, 25 April 1644 for the occupation of areas of Fulda by Hatzfeldt. For more information, see Hans Heinrich Weber, *Der Hessenkrieg* (Giessen, 1935), 41–43, and especially Dietrich Christoph von Rommel, *Geschichte von Hessen*, vol. 8 (Cassel, 1843), 668, who gives the details of the Hessian–Swedish conjunction.

7. AAACP Hollande 30, fols. 442–444, Wicquefort (own hand letter sent) to Bailleul, The Hague, 15 March 1644 gives troop numbers. The loss at Merode by Rabenhaupt is in AAACP Hollande 30, fols. 539–541, Wicquefort (own hand letter sent) to Bailleul, The Hague, 18 April 1644. Wicquefort mentions the presence of Ernst, but not Wilhelm, whose presence and injury is recounted in Friedrich Rehm, *Handbuch der Geschichte Beider Hessen*, vol. 1 (Marburg, 1842), 456. See also M. Merian, *Theatrum Europaeum, oder Warhafftige Beschreibung aller denckwürdigen Geschichten*, 6 vols. (Frankfurt am Main, 1643–1652), vol. 5, 367; AAACP Hollande 30, fol. 558, Relation of Count von Eberstein (Wicquefort hand), 25 April 1644. The account of Hessian atrocities is in Johannes Wilmius, *Chronicon rerum Kempensium*, ed. Jakob Hermes (Krefeld, 1985), 145. For more Hessian requests for French aid after this defeat, see AAACP Hollande 30, fols. 556–557, Wicquefort (own hand letter sent) to Bailleul, The Hague, 25 April 1644.

8. AAACP Hollande 30, fols. 271–273, Mazarin (Lionne hand minute) to the Plenipotentiaries, 5 March 1644. The French invitation is in AAACP Allemagne 26, fols. 341–343, 345–349, pub. in Michael Caspar Londorp, *Der Römischen Kayserlichen Majestät und deß Heiligen Römischen Reichs geist- und weltliche Stände, Chur- und Fürsten . . .*, vol. 5 (Frankfurt am Main, 1668), 903–905; see 907 for a warning from the emperor against accepting foreign invitation to the congress. For matters at Frankfurt, see AAACP Hollande 30, fols. 252–253, Wicquefort (own hand letter sent) to Bailleul, The Hague, 23 February 1644. For her appeal to the Frankfurt delegates, see HStAM 4h Nr. 2127, fols. 37ff., AE to the Delegates at Frankfurt, 23 April/3 May 1644; See also Kurt Beck, *Der Hessische Bruderzwist zwischen Hessen-Kassel und Hessen-Darmstadt in den Verhandlungen zum Westfälischen Frieden von 1644–1648* (Frankfurt a.M., 1978), 17–18; Rommel, *Geschichte von Hessen*, vol. 8, 662; Fritz Dickmann, *Der Westfälische Frieden*, 7th ed. (Münster, 1998), 165–167, 176, 189–215, 541.

9. HStAM 4h Nr. 2116, fols. 19–40, Instructions for Scheffer, Krosigk, Antrecht, and Vultejus to the Westphalian negotiations (minute), Cassel, 25 May/4 June 1644. See also Erwin Bettenhäuser, “Die Landgrafschaft Hessen-Kassel auf dem Westfälischen Friedenskongress 1644–1648” (diss., Johannes-Gutenberg-Universität zu Mainz, 1983), 27–30; Rommel, *Geschichte von Hessen*, vol. 8, 749. Scheffer was not particularly good at attending sessions, however. See *Acta Pacis Westphalicae*, ser. 3A, vol. 3/1, 81–82.

10. Ibid. See also Klaus Malettke, “Scheffers Gesandtschaft in Osnabrück: ‘Stände seyn nicht nur Rätthe, die man hören, sondern deren Rätthen man auch folgen müsse,’” in *Der Westfälische Friede: Diplomatie, politische Zäsur, kulturelles Umfeld, Rezeptionsgeschichte*, ed. Heinz Duchhardt (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1998), 506–508, 513–514. For a counterargument that the Cassel delegates were not especially radical, see Weiland, 94–121.

11. Ibid. See also Dickmann, *Westfälische Frieden*, 367–369.

12. The landgravine’s argument against Georg for the Swedes is in HStAM 4h Nr. 2116, fols. 99–109, *Extract aus der Schwedischen Instruction*, n.d.; Karsten Ruppert, *Die kaiserliche Politik auf dem Westfälischen Friedenskongress. 1643–1648* (Münster, 1979), 391–392; Antje Oschmann, *Der Nürnberger Exekutionstag 1649–1650: Das Ende des Dreißigjährigen Krieges in Deutschland* (Münster, 1991), 79, 517–518, 521–522.

13. HStAM 4h Nr. 2117, fols. 93–96, Krosigk and Vultejus (letter sent) to AE, Münster, 12/22 June 1644; HStAM 4h Nr. 2117, fols. 109–110, Krosigk and Vultejus (letter sent) to AE, Münster, 18/28 June 1644; Johann Gottfried von Meiern, *Acta Pacis Westphalicae publica, oder westphälische Friedenshandlungen und Geschichte in einem mit richtigen Urkunden bestärkten historischen Zusammenhang verfassers un beschrieben*, 6 vols. (Hannover, 1734–6), vol. 1, 223–228; Dickmann, *Westfälische Frieden*, 167–169; Bettenhäuser, *Landgrafschaft*, 36.

14. For the Hessians' lodgings see Bettenhäuser, *Landgrafschaft*, 29–30. See also AAACP Allemagne 20, fols. 310–314, *Instruction pour Mr de Montigny*, July 11, 1644. Difficulties in East Frisia are in HStAM 4f Niederlande Nr. 502, AE (minute) to Wicquefort, Cassel, 10/20 June 1644; HStAM 4f Niederlande Nr. 502, AE (minute) to Wicquefort, Cassel, 13/23 June 1644; HStAM 4f Niederlande Nr. 502, AE (minute) to Wicquefort, Cassel, 27 June/7 July 1644; AAACP Allemagne 32, fols. 27–29, Brasset (letter sent) to Mazarin, The Hague, 13 June 1644. For Dutch internal dissension over the East Frisian rearmament and Brasset's quote, see AAACP Allemagne 31, fol 171–175, Brasset (letter sent) to Mazarin, The Hague, 15 July 1644. See also Onno Klopp, *Geschichte Ostfrieslands von 1570–1751* (Hannover, 1856), 325–327.

15. Rommel, *Geschichte von Hessen*, vol. 8, 666; Louis Ferdinand Eberstein, Freiherr von, *Beschreibung der kriegthaten des generalfeldmarschalls Ernst Albrecht von Eberstein* (Berlin, 1890), 24–25.

16. HStAM 4f Niederlande Nr. 502, AE (minute) to Wicquefort, Cassel, 15/25 July 1644; HStAM 4f Niederlande Nr. 502, AE (minute) to Wicquefort, Cassel, 23 September/3 October 1644; HStAM 4f Niederlande Nr. 502, AE (minute) to Wicquefort, Cassel, 10/20 October 1644; HStAM 4f Niederlande Nr. 502, AE (minute) to Wicquefort, Cassel, 14/24 November 1644. For the negotiations by Rorté and Krosigk in East Frisia, see AAACP Hollande 31, fols. 410–412, Brasset (copy) to d'Avaux and Servien, The Hague, 7 October 1644. For her sending of Geysso, see AAACP Hollande 31, fols. 423–424, Brasset (copy) to d'Avaux and Servien, The Hague, 14 October 1644. See also Klopp, *Geschichte Ostfrieslands von 1570–1751*, 327–328. Her discussion of the conjunction of Geysso with Torstenson is in HStAM 4h Nr. 2116, fols. 45–47, AE to Scheffer, Cassel, 24 October/3 November 1644; copy in HStAM 4h Nr. 2115, fols. 77–80. Geysso's diversion from East Frisia to join Königsmarck, and estimate of Hessian troops at thirty-two hundred, is in Rommel, *Geschichte von Hessen*, vol. 8, 664–665.

17. French appeals to include the estates are in HStAM 4h Nr. 2117, fols. 378–381, Scheffer (letter sent) to AE, Münster, 10/20 December 1644. AE quote in Rommel, *Geschichte von Hessen*, vol. 8, 747. For her delegates' frustration at the failure of many other estates to appear, see HStAM 4h Nr. 2117, fols. 389–390, Scheffer to AE, Osnabrück, 24 January/3 February 1645. A copy of the French invitation of September is in AAACP Allemagne 33, fols. 375–378, 4 September 1644. For the French proposal to the emperor of 24 January see AAACP Allemagne 54, fols. 12–15, 90–92. See also Dickmann, *Westfälische Frieden*, 173–175; Bettenhäuser, *Landgrafschaft*, 36.

18. HStAM 4h Nr. 2116, fols. 59–64, Instructions for the negotiations at Münster and Osnabrück, Cassel, 20/30 January 1645; HStAM 4h Nr. 2116, fols. 55–58r, Vice Chancellor Deinhardt memoire, Cassel, 21/31 January 1645; additional drafts in HStAM 4h Nr. 1694, fols. 31–33, 34, 36. Earlier emphasis on coordinating with Brandenburg and Brunswick is in 4h Nr. 2116, fols. 93–96, Vultejus memoire with AE responses, Cassel, 16/16 and 21/31 July 1645.

19. HStAM 4h Nr. 2117, fols. 418–419, Scheffer to AE, 12/22 March 1645; HStAM 4h Nr. 2117, fols. 420–421, Demands in *publica*, n.d.; HStAM 4h Nr. 1694, 1, fols. 21–23, Krosigk (minute) to Vultejus and Scheffer, Cassel, 22 April/2 May 1645. For the French and Swedish April proposals, see AAACP Allemagne 43, fols. 432–436. Her disappointment in the French is in HStAM 4h Nr. 2117, fol. 472, AE (minute) to Scheffer, Cassel, 3 June 1645. The 11 June 1645 proposals are in AAACP Allemagne 44, fols. 47–51 (French proposals), and fols. 78–84 (Swedish proposals), pub. in Meiern, *Acta Pacis Westphalicae publica*, vol. 1, 439–448. See also HStAM 4h Nr. 2117, fols. 473–474, Scheffer (letter sent) to AE, Cassel, 2/12 June 1645 (with Swedish propositions following); Paul Sonnino, “From D’Avaux to *Devot*: Politics and Religion in the Thirty Years War,” *History* 87, no. 286 (2002), 55–56; Bettenhäuser, *Landgrafschaft*, 38–41. For their concerns about support for their private demands, see HStAM 4h Nr. 2116, fols. 93–96, Vultejus memoire (with responses) for AE, Cassel, 16/26 July 1645 (21/31 July for AE’s responses). Swedish concerns over the moral validity of supporting the legalization of Calvinism can be seen in Riksarkivet Germanica 23, *Questio*, n.d. Her delegates’ complaints about the quarrels between Servien and d’Avaux emerge from the beginning. See HStAM 4h Nr. 2117, fols. 378–381, Scheffer (letter sent) to AE, Münster, 10/20 December 1644.

20. Detlev von Ahlefeldt, *Geheimrat Detlev v. Ahlefeldts Memoiren aus den Jahren 1617–1659: Nach der Originalhandschrift im Haseldorfer Archiv*, ed. Louis Bobé (Copenhagen, 1896), 55–57; HStAM 4a Nr. 49:10, Emilie to Wilhelm, Cassel, 28 July/7 August 1645, pub. in Erwin Bettenhäuser, ed., *Familienbriefe der Landgräfin Amalie Elisabeth von Hessen-Kassel und ihrer Kinder* (Marburg, 1994), 47–48. See other letters 43–46.

21. HStAM 4h Nr. 2117, fols. 463, AE (minute) to Scheffer, Cassel, May 1645; HStAM 4h Nr. 2117, fols. 481–482, AE (minute) to Scheffer, Cassel, 12/22 June 1645; Weber, *Hessenkrieg*, 43–71; HStAD 1, 25, fols. 113/117, Georg to J. A. Oxenstierna, cited in Beck, *Bruderzwist*, 31.

22. Earlier Bavarian attempts to gain neutrality are in HStAM 4h Nr. 1694, 1, fols. 21–23, Krosigk (minute) to Vultejus and Scheffer, Cassel, 22 April/2 May 1645. For details of the military activities in this period, see Peter H. Wilson, *The Thirty Years War: Europe’s Tragedy* (Cambridge, Mass., 2009), 698–705.

10. Pressing the Attack

1. Imperial Response to the Crowns, 15/17 September 1645, pub. in Johann Gottfried von Meiern, *Acta Pacis Westphalicae publica, oder westphälische Friedenshandlungen und Geschichte in einem mit richtigen Urkunden bestärkten historischen Zusammenhang verfassener un beschrieben*, 6 vols. (Hannover, 1734–6), vol. 1, 617–632. See also Fritz Dickmann, *Der Westfälische Frieden*, 7th ed. (Münster, 1998), 174–176, 186–189, 241–243; Erwin Bettenhäuser, “Die Landgrafschaft Hessen-Kassel auf dem Westfälischen Friedenskongress 1644–1648” (diss., Johannes-Gutenberg-Universität zu Mainz, 1983), 37; Dieter Albrecht, “Die Kriegs- und Friedensziele der deutschen Reichsstände,” in Konrad Repgen, ed., *Krieg und Politik 1618–1648. Europäische Probleme und Perspektiven* (Munich, 1988), 249. For her earlier concerns about the seating of princes at the congress, see Hessische Staatsarchiv Marburg [HStAM] 4h Nr. 2116, fols. 93–96, Vultejus memoire (with responses) for Amalia Elisabeth [AE], Cassel, 16/26 July 1645 (21/31 July for AE’s responses).

2. *Acta Pacis Westphalicae*, [APW] ser. 3A, vol. 4/1, 25–26; Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv, Vienna [HStA], Staatskanzlei Friedensakten Kart. 1, fols. 210–217, Ferdi-

nand III (own hand) Instructions for Trauttmansdorff, 16 October 1645, pub. in *Acta Pacis Westphalicae* ser. 1, vol. 1, 440–452. See also Dickmann, *Westfälische Frieden*, 174–176, 187–189; Bettenhäuser, *Landgrafschaft*, 37. Compare also Kerstin Weiand, *Hessen-Kassel und die Reichsverfassung: Ziele und Prioritäten landgräflicher Politik im Dreißigjährigen Krieg* (Marburg, 2009), 107. For the landgravine's earlier assessment, see HStAM 4h Nr. 2116, fols. 19–40 [here fol. 24r.], Instructions for Scheffer, Krosigk, Antrecht, and Vultejus to the Westphalian negotiations (minute), Cassel, 25 May/4 June 1644.

3. HStAM 4h Nr. 2118, fols. 649–652, Vultejus (letter sent with attachments) to AE, Münster, 30 October/10 November 1645; HStAM 4h Nr. 2118, fols. 699–702, *Extract Protocolli*, Münster, 10/20 November 1645; HStAM 4h Nr. 2118, fols. 697–698, Vultejus and Scheffer to AE, Münster, 12/22 November 1645; Georg of Hesse-Darmstadt to AE, 27 September 1645, pub. in Meiern, *Acta Pacis Westphalicae Publica*, vol. 2, 154–155; Georg of Hesse-Darmstadt to Ernst of Saxe-Gothe, 1 and 27 October 1645, pub. in Meiern, *Acta Pacis Westphalicae Publica*, vol. 2, 142–149; AE to Georg of Hesse-Darmstadt, 7 October 1645; AE to the Estates of Upper Hesse, 27 October 1645, pub. in Meiern, *Acta Pacis Westphalicae Publica*, vol. 2, 155–156; AE to Princess of Butzbach, 4 November 1645, pub. in Meiern, *Acta Pacis Westphalicae Publica*, vol. 2, 154; *Accord Zwischen Geysso und Willich*, 1/11 November 1645, pub. in Hans Heinrich Weber, *Der Hessenkrieg* (Giessen, 1935), 175–176; Georg of Hesse-Darmstadt to Ernst of Saxe-Gothe, 12 November 1645, pub. in Meiern, *Acta Pacis Westphalicae Publica*, vol. 2, 149–153; See also Kurt Beck, *Der Hessische Bruderzwist zwischen Hessen-Kassel und Hessen-Darmstadt in den Verhandlungen zum Westfälischen Frieden von 1644–1648* (Frankfurt a.M., 1978), 31–32.

4. HStAM 4h Nr. 2118, fols. 697–698, Vultejus and Scheffer to AE, Münster, 12/22 November 1645; HStAM 4h Nr. 2118, fols. 724–727, *Extract Protocolli*, Münster, 3/13 December 1645; Darmstadt December requests for intercession and Protestant princes' appeal to AE are pub. in Meiern, *Acta Pacis Westphalicae Publica*, vol. 2, 159–161. See also Beck, *Bruderzwist*, 19–35.

5. Strassburg and Franconian quotes in *Ausschußsitzung*, Osnabrück, 6/16 October 1645, pub. in APW, ser. 3A, vol. 3/1, 383–385. See also Dickmann, *Westfälische Frieden*, 369–370. Darmstadt quote of 22 December 1645/1 January 1646 pub. in APW ser. 3A, vol. 3/2, 408. The preconditions for the inclusion of the Calvinists delivered by Thumshirn to Scheffer (which denied them the *ius reformandi* against Lutherans) are pub. in Meiern, *Acta Pacis Westphalicae Publica*, vol. 2, 9–11. Earlier efforts with the Dutch in the point of religion are in HStAM 4h Nr. 2116, fol. 97, Krosigk memoire and AE responses, Cassel, 22 December 1645/1 January 1646.

6. The *Ausschußsitzung*, Osnabrück, 6/16 October 1645, pub. in APW ser. 3A, vol. 3/1, 383–385, indicates that Scheffer first suggested a mutual revocation of the Protestant *ius reformandi* the previous day. See also meetings of 9/19–11/21 November 1645, pub. in APW ser. 3A, vol. 3/2, 150–169; Meiern, *Acta Pacis Westphalicae Publica*, vol. 2, 231; Meiern, *Acta Pacis Westphalicae Publica*, vol. 6, 242–243. See Bernd-Christian Schneider, *Ius Reformandi: Die Entwicklung eines Staatskirchenrechts von seinen Anfängen bis zum Ende des Alten Reiches* (Tübingen, 2001), 218–228, 275–280, for the problems of the Ecclesiastical Reservation. See also HStAM 4h Nr. 2117, fol. 625, Scheffer (letter sent) to AE, Osnabrück, 1/11 November 1644; HStAM 4h Nr. 2117, fols. 629–631, Scheffer (letter sent) to AE, Osnabrück, 12/22 November 1645; HStAM 4h Nr. 2117, fol. 663, AE (minute) to Scheffer, Cassel, 24 November/4 December 1645; HStAM 4h Nr. 2117, fols. 666–667, Scheffer (letter sent) to AE, Osnabrück,

10/20 December 1645; HStAM 4h Nr. 2117, fols. 672–673, AE (minute) to Scheffer, Cassel, 18/28 December 1645. For Hesse–Cassel’s limited participation in the *Corpus Evangelicorum*, see session 16, APW ser. 3A, vol. 3/1, 404ff. The landgravine’s assessment that nothing would be gained through the Lutherans is in HStAM 4h Nr. 2116, fol. 97, Krosigk memoire and AE responses, Cassel, 22 December 1645/10 January 1646. The discussion of 22 December at which the Lutherans again rejected Calvinist demands for a full *ius reformandi* and pushed them to talk with the Swedes instead is in Meiern, *Acta Pacis Westphalicae Publica*, vol. 2, 140–141. See also Dickmann, *Westfälische Frieden*, 371–373; Fritz Wolff, *Corpus Evangelicorum und Corpus Catholicorum auf dem Westfälischen Friedenskongreß* (Münster, 1966).

7. Hessian demands in HStAM 4h Nr. 1694, fol. 37, n.d. [18/28 December 1645], pub. in Meiern, *Acta Pacis Westphalicae publica*, vol. 2, 161–163. See also HStAM 4h Nr. 1694, fols. 57–68, 63–65. These demands were repeated, in a slightly different text of 7 February, for the Venetian mediator, who then forwarded them to the imperialists. HStAM 4h Nr. 2137, fols. 21–22, *Daß fürstlichen haußes Heßen Cassel absonderliche gravamina, undt postulata*, Münster 27 January/6 February 1646, French version in HStAM 4h Nr. 2137, fols. 23–24v. See also Bettenhäuser, *Landgrafschaft*, 46–47. Her approval of standing firm initially for territorial satisfaction is in HStAM 4h Nr. 2116, fol. 97, Krosigk memoire and AE responses, Cassel, 22 December 1645/1 January 1646. See also HStAM 4h Nr. 1694, fol. 523, AE to her Delegates, 22 December 1645/1 January 1646. The French reply of 7 January is in Archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Paris, Correspondance Politique [AAECP] Allemagne 59, fols. 41–45, 7 January 1646, pub. in Meiern, II, 200–203. The Swedish demands are in Reichskanzlei [RK] Friedensakten 50b, fols. 22–37 and 54–74, pub. in Meiern, *Acta Pacis Westphalicae publica*, vol. 2, 183–190. See also Paul Sonnino, “From D’Avaux to Devot: Politics and Religion in the Thirty Years War,” *History* 87, no. 286 (2002), 66–67, 207–208.

8. A copy of the January surrender by Willich is in Beck, *Bruderzwist*, 178–179; see also 111; Weber, *Hessenkrieg*, 76–85, 172–179. A description of the seizure of Marburg also appears in the *Theatrum Europaeum*, vol. 5, 792.

9. For her explanation of the treatment of the Marburg professors, see AE to the Evangelical Princes, Cassel, 12/21 June 1646, pres. Osnabrück, 23 June 1646, pub. in Meiern, *Acta Pacis Westphalicae publica*, vol. 3, 592–593. Copies of Georg’s February letters to various groups in Hesse–Marburg demanding loyalty are pub. in Meiern, *Acta Pacis Westphalicae publica*, vol. 3, 594–602. See also Weber, *Hessenkrieg*, 90–95. Torstenson quote is from p. 94–95. Sending of delegation to Stockholm is in AE to Christina, Cassel, 10/20 February 1646, pub. in Axel Oxenstierna, *Rikskansleren Axel Oxenstiernas Skrifter och Brefvexling*. Ser. 2, vol. 7 (Stockholm, 1895), 675. See also HStAM 4h Nr. 2124, fols. 12ff, *Acta . . . wegen Einrückung der Reformierten Religion*, 1646, cited in Bettenhäuser, *Landgrafschaft*, 53.

10. The meeting of the Darmstadt estates is in Hessische Staatsarchiv Darmstadt [HStAD] E2 Nr. 2/3, fols. 114–117, Resolution of the Darmstadt Estates, Giessen, 19/29 January 1646, pub. in Günter Hollenberg, ed., *Hessische Landtagsabschiede 1605–1647* (Marburg, 2007), 414–418. See also Weber, *Hessenkrieg*, 96–104; Bibliothèque de l’Assemblée Nationale, Paris Paris [AssNat], Ms. 275, fols. 163–164, AE memoire (with Plenipotentiaries’ letter), 17 March 1646, rec. 28 March. She had already received another 40,000 the same month. AAECP Allemagne 59, fols. 390–392, Mazarin (minute) to Plenipotentiaries, Paris, 17 March 1646.

11. French concern, plus the possible involvement of Saxony, are in AAACP Allemagne 75, fols. 90–98, Servien (minute) to Lionne, Münster, 7 April 1646. See also Weber, *Hessenkrieg*, 96–104.

12. The Catholic determination in March to leave the matter of the Reformed to the Protestants is in Meiern, *Acta Pacis Westphalicae publica*, vol. 2, 583. Brandenburg's demand for the non-exclusion of princes solely by their own proclamation as adherents of the Augsburg Confession is in Meiern, *Acta Pacis Westphalicae publica*, vol. 2, 936–938. Scheffer and Wesenbeck's June 1646 appeal to the imperialists is pub. in Meiern, *Acta Pacis Westphalicae publica*, vol. 3, 144–145. see also Wesenbeck, Scheffer, and Milagius to the Swedish deputies, Osnabrück, 1 May 1646, pub. in Meiern, *Acta Pacis Westphalicae publica*, vol. 3, 145–149; Dickmann, *Westfälische Frieden*, 372.

13. Session XX of the Princely College, Osnabrück, 4/14 March 1646, pub. in APW ser. 3A, vol. 3/3, 311–335, and in Meiern, *Acta Pacis Westphalicae publica*, vol. 2, 471–475; session XXIII of the Princely College, Osnabrück, 7 April 1646, pub. in Meiern, *Acta Pacis Westphalicae publica*, vol. 2, 896–897; Session XXIV of the Princely College, Osnabrück, 9 April 1646, pub. in Meiern, *Acta Pacis Westphalicae publica*, vol. 2, 911. See also Meiern, *Acta Pacis Westphalicae publica*, vol. 2, 960. Hessian territorial demands as given to the Venetian ambassador appear in HStAM 4h Nr. 2137, fols. 25–26, 15/25 April 1646. A Hessian explanation for their territorial demands appears in HStAM 4h Nr. 2137, fol. 19. See also HStAM 4h Nr. 2137, fol. 27, Krosigk and Vultejus to Contarini, Osnabrück, 14/24 April 1646; HStAM 4h Nr. 2121, fols. 7–12, AE (copy) to Scheffer, Krosigk, and Vultejus, Cassel, 11 May 1646. Trauttmansdorff's assessment is in Meiern, *Acta Pacis Westphalicae publica*, vol. 3, 95–96, and further imperial opposition to Hesse's land demands are in the imperialists' 29 May response to France, pub. in Meiern, *Acta Pacis Westphalicae publica*, vol. 3, 31–35. Her support for Catholics is in Tacke, 182–183. French suggestion of compensation in lieu of Church lands is in AssNat Ms. 275, fols. 416–421, French reply to mediators, Osnabrück, 30 May 1646. Hessian response is in HStAM 4h Nr. 2137, fols. 15–16, Remonstrations to the French Plenipotentiaries, Münster, June 1646. See also Bettenhäuser, *Landgrafenschaft*, 46–47, 60–64.

14. Peter H. Wilson, *The Thirty Years War: Europe's Tragedy* (Cambridge, Mass., 2009), 712, has the estimate of forty thousand troops for the combined imperial-Bavarian army at this point. See also Weber, *Hessenkrieg*, 102–106, who estimates only thirty thousand.

15. For the negotiations between Georg and the Spanish, see APW, ser. 2C, vol. 1, 483; ser. 2C, vol. 2, 394, 465. See also Weber, *Hessenkrieg*, 106–107; HStAD *Verträge mit ausländischen Staaten, Accord, und Punkten*, pub. in Weber, *Hessenkrieg*, 189–192. The Darmstadt search for interposition at Osnabrück appears in HStAM 4h Nr. 2137, fol. 28, *Ex relatione plenipotentiarum Casario für Osnabrug*, 21 August 1646.

16. Her demand is in HStAM 304, Nr. 501 and HStAM 17 1 Nr. 1719, 27 April/7 May 1646, cited in Hollenberg, *Hessische Landtagsabschiede*, 420. For the knights' arguments, see HStAM 304, Nr. 501, Resolution of the Knights, Oberkaufungen, 10/20 December 1646, pub. in Hollenberg, *Hessische Landtagsabschiede*, 418–424. See also Robert von Friedeburg, "Why Did Seventeenth-Century Estates Address the Jurisdictions of Their Princes as Fatherlands? War, Territorial Absolutism and Duties to the Fatherland in Seventeenth-Century German Political Discourse," in *Orthodoxies and Heterodoxies in Early Modern German Culture: Order and Creativity 1550–1750*, ed. R. C. Head and D. Christensen (Leiden, 2007), 169–194.

17. Weber, *Hessenkrieg*, 108–114; Dietrich Christoph von Rommel, *Geschichte von Hessen*, vol. 8 (Cassel, 1843), 704; *Theatrum Europaeum*, vol. 5, 929.

18. Rommel, *Geschichte von Hessen*, vol. 8, 704; Simone Buckreus, *Die Körper einer Regentin: Amelia Elisabeth von Hessen-Kassel (1602–1651)* (Göttingen, 2008), 76–77.

19. Weber, *Hessenkrieg*, 114–126; HStAM 4h Nr. 2121, fols. 506–511, *Extract Protocolli*, Münster, 7/17–9/19 November 1646.

20. French support for the separation of the Swedish and Hessian satisfaction is in HStAM 4h Nr. 2121, fols. 375–379, Vultejus (letter sent) to AE, Münster, 4/14 September 1646, rec. Cassel, 8/18 September 1646. See also HStAM 4h Nr. 1694, fols. 878–880, Hessian plenipotentiaries (copy) protocol for AE, 25 September/5 October 1646, copy in HStAM 4h Nr. 2121, fols. 403–406; HStAM 4h Nr. 2121, fol. 412, AE (minute) to Vultejus, Krosigk, and Müldener, Cassel, 5/15 October 1646. The continued resistance of the French to attaching their demands to the Hessians' is in HStAM 4h Nr. 2137, fols. 17–18, *Raisons pourquoy les Plenipots. de France ne doivent bailler leur Insemmement avant que l'affaire de Hesse sois regle*, 1647. Hessian demands of 7/17 November appear in HStAM 4h Nr. 2137, fols. 29–30, *Praetensio Satisfactionis Serenissimae Domus Hasso-Cassellanae*, 7/17 November 1646, copy in HStAM 4h Nr. 2137, fols. 201–202, pub. in Meiern, *Acta Pacis Westphalicae publica*, vol. 3, 755–756, Meiern, *Acta Pacis Westphalicae publica*, vol. 4, 419–421. Krosigk's quote and the mention of one million is in HStAM 4h Nr. 1694, fol. 899, Krosigk (extract), Münster, 16/26 November 1646.

21. HStAM 4h Nr. 1694, fols. 841–845, Kleinschmidt (letter sent) to Badenhausen, Cassel, 19/29 October 1646, rec. Stockholm 5 Nov. 1646. HStAM 4a Nr. 49:01, AE instructions to Wilhelm VI, 29 October/8 November 1646, pub. in Erwin Bettenhäuser, ed., *Familienbriefe der Landgräfin Amalie Elisabeth von Hessen-Kassel und ihrer Kinder* (Marburg, 1994), 48–52. For details of Wilhelm's experiences in France see also Hans Phillipi, "Eine hessische Gesandtschaft in Paris im 17. Jahrhundert: Die Mission des Johann Caspar von Dörnberg 1646–1651," in *Hessisches Jahrbuch für Landesgeschichte [HJL]* 30 (1980), 241ff. Fritz's wedding is in Rommel, *Geschichte von Hessen*, vol. 8, 707. Christina's donation of Eichsfeld is in C. Hallendorff, ed., *Sveriges traktater med främmande makter*, 6:1 (Stockholm, 1915), 117–119. The dissatisfaction of the Hessian estates and attempt to meet at Allendorf appears in HStAM 255 Nr. H 139, cited in Hollenberg, *Hessische Landtagsabschiede*, 425.

22. The Swedish–Brandenburg deal over Pomerania is in Hallendorff, *Sveriges traktater*, 6:1, 149–152. See also HStAM 4h Nr. 2121, fols. 469–472, *Extract Protocolli*, 23 October/3 November 1646; HStAM 4h Nr. 2123, fols. 8–11, Vultejus (letter sent) to AE, Münster, 30 December 1646/9 January 1647, rec. Cassel, 2/12 January 1647. Additional information and Hessian hopes that a deal between Sweden and Brandenburg would speed the peace is in HStAM 4h Nr. 2123, fol. 28, Vultejus to Krosigk (at The Hague), Münster, 10 January 1647. See also Wilson, *Thirty Years War*, 716–718.

23. Longueville's earlier helpfulness is in HStAM 4h Nr. 2121, fols. 506–511, *Extract Protocolli*, Münster, 7/17–9/19 November 1646; HStAM 4h Nr. 2123, fol. 28, Vultejus to Krosigk, Münster, 10/20 January 1647. Longueville's speech is in Meiern, *Acta Pacis Westphalicae publica*, vol. 4, 419. See also HStAM 4h Nr. 2123, fol. 43, AE to her Delegates at Westphalia, 7/17 January 1647.

24. HStAM 4h Nr. 2121, fols. 370–373, Vultejus (letter sent) to AE, Münster, 1/11 September 1646, rec. Cassel, 6/16 September 1646; HStAM 4h Nr. 2121, fol. 374, AE (minute) to Vultejus, Cassel, 7/17 September 1646; HHStA, RK Friedensakten 51a, fols. 75, 88–89, Lamberg and Krane to Ferdinand III, Osnabrück, 27 September 1646.

pub. in APW, ser. 2A, vol. 5, 50–52; HStAM 4h Nr. 2121, fols. 469–472, *Extract Protocolli*, 23 October/3 November 1646; HStAM 4f Niederlande Nr. 505, AE (minute) to Wicquefort, Cassel, 29 October/8 November 1646; HStAM 4h Nr. 2123, fols. 8–11, Vultejus (letter sent) to AE, Münster, 30 December 1646/9 January 1647, rec. Cassel, 2/12 January 1647. Earlier efforts with the Dutch in the point of religion are in HStAM 4h Nr. 2116, fol. 97, Krosigk memoire and AE responses, Cassel, 22 December 1645/1 January 1646. See also Dutch Plenipotentiaries to the Evangelical Estates, Münster, 10 January 1647, pub. in Meiern, *Acta Pacis Westphalicae publica*, vol. 4, 210–211; discussions of the Reformed are in Meiern, *Acta Pacis Westphalicae publica*, vol. 4, 245–249. HStAM 4h Nr. 2123, fol. 19, AE to Vultejus, Cassel, 4/14 January 1647; HStAM 4h Nr. 2123, fol. 20, AE to Krosigk and Vultejus, Cassel, 4/14 January 1647; HStAM 4h Nr. 2123, fol. 43, AE memoire, 7/17 January 1647; Dickmann, *Westfälische Frieden*, 372–373. Königsmark's attack on Kirchhain is in Weber, *Hessenkrieg*, 131, 142. See also Bettenhäuser, *Landgrafschaft*, 53.

11. Satisfaction

1. Hessische Staatsarchiv Marburg [HStAM] 4h Nr. 1964, fols. 38–39, First Imperial Reply to Hesse-Cassel demands, 10 February 1647, pub. in Johann Gottfried von Meiern, *Acta Pacis Westphalicae publica, oder westphälische Friedenshandlungen und Geschichte in einem mit richtigen Urkunden bestärkten historischen Zusammenhang verfassert und beschrieben*, 6 vols. (Hannover, 1734–6), vol. 4, 422–3 [dated 8/18 Feb.]. See also HStAM 4h. Nr. 2137, fols. 33–34; HStAM 4h Nr. 1964, fols. 40–41, 16/26 February 1647, 2nd Imperial Resolution [misdated at top as 15 February 1647], pub. in Meiern, *Acta Pacis Westphalicae publica*, vol. 4, 424–425, copies in Archives Nationales, Paris [AN], K 1335 no. 100, Archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Paris, Mémoires et documents, [AAEMD] Allemagne 9, fols. 21–22. Contarini quote is in Archivio di stato di Venezia, Venice [ASVen], Münster 6, Contarini (copy to Senate) to Nani, 26 February 1647; HStAM 4h Nr. 2123, fol. 59, Amalia Elisabeth [AE] (draft) to Krosigk, Cassel, 18/28 February 1647; HStAM 4h Nr. 1964, fols. 53–54, Response of Hesse-Cassel to the first imperial response (second draft), 21 February/3 March 1647, copy in AN K 1335 no. 99bis dated *apres 26 Feb*, first draft in HStAM 4h Nr. 2137, fols. 44–46 (without insert beginning *Quamis autem*), pub. in Meiern, *Acta Pacis Westphalicae publica*, vol. 4, 426–427 w/o insert; HStAM 4h Nr. 2137, fol. 41, Response of Hesse-Cassel to the second imperial response, 21 February/3 March 1647, copies in AN K 1335 no. 102, HStAM 4h Nr. 1964, fols. 53–54 and 55–56, pub. in Meiern, *Acta Pacis Westphalicae publica*, vol. 4, 427–429.

2. The Truce of Ulm and ratifications are in C. Hallendorff, ed., *Sveriges traktater med främmande makter*, 6:1 (Stockholm, 1915), 58–97. See also Dietrich Christoph von Rommel, *Geschichte von Hessen*, vol. 8 (Cassel, 1843), 707–708, for Hesse's part in the Truce of Ulm. The landgravine was represented by her lieutenant colonel von Mai.

3. HStAM 4h Nr. 2137, fols. 55–58, Hesse-Cassel Demands, 28 March/7 April 1647; HStAM 4h Nr. 2135, fols. 10–13, Protocol (draft extract) to AE, 28–31 March/7–10 April 1647; HStAM 4h Nr. 2123, fol. 72, AE to Longueville, Cassel, 15/25 April 1647. Further discussion of the situation at Neuss appears in HStAM 4h Nr. 2123, fol. 77, AE to Longueville and d'Avaux, Cassel, 13/23 May 1647. See also Hans Heinrich Weber, *Der Hessenkrieg* (Giessen, 1935), 138. The quote from Trauttmansdorff is in Meiern, *Acta Pacis Westphalicae publica*, vol. 4, 422. The warning by the

papal nuncio is mentioned in *Acta Pacis Westphalicae* [APW], ser. 3C, vol. 3/2, 798. For the Darmstadt–Cassel talks see HStAM 4h Nr. 2137, fol. 61, Darmstadt Concessions, n.d. [before 19/29 March 1647], rec. Osnabrück, 6/16 April 1647, pub. in Meiern, *Acta Pacis Westphalicae publica*, vol. 4, 436–438, copy sent to the Cassel deputies is in HStAM 4h Nr. 2137, fols. 59–60; HStAM 4h Nr. 2137, fols. 55–58, *Wie die Hessische postulata dem instrumentum pacis einzurücken seÿ*, 28 March/7 April 1647, pub. in Meiern, *Acta Pacis Westphalicae publica*, vol. 4, 430–438. See Weber, *Hessenkrieg*, 138, for more on Georg's proposals.

4. Archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Paris, Correspondance Politique [AAECP] Allemagne 88, fols. 144–147, D'Avaux (own hand minute) to the Court, Osnabrück, 22 April 1647. See also Weber, *Hessenkrieg*, 138. For the earlier (February) official imperial offer to divide the contested quarter into three parts, with two-thirds for Georg, one-third for Amalia Elisabeth, see Meiern, *Acta Pacis Westphalicae publica*, vol. 4, 452–455.

5. HStAM 4h Nr. 2137, fols. 69–70, 14/24 April 1647, copy in AAECP Allemagne 80, fol. 132. See also Allemagne 83, fols. 59–62, *Petitionis Hasso-Castelane pro sua satisfactione pretense*, 25 April 1647, copies in ASVat Paci 23, fol. 361 (with an addition but without the list of towns), AAECP Hesse–Cassel 3, fols. 30–32, pub. in French in Jean Dumont, ed., *Corps Universel Diplomatique du Droit des Gens*, vol. 6:1 (Amsterdam, 1728), 394. Another Hessian response to imperial proposals is in HStAM 4h Nr. 2137, fols. 35–37, [13] April 1647. See also AAEMD Allemagne 9, fol. 19, for a similar 4/14 April 1647 response. Her presentation against Georg is in *Hessen-Casselische Gegen-Vorstellung*, Münster, 17/27 April 1647, pub. in Meiern, *Acta Pacis Westphalicae publica*, vol. 4, 438–445. For the discussions at Westphalia see Session 38 of the Princely Colledge, 23 April 1647, pub. in APW ser. 3A, vol. 3/4, 202–216, and Meiern, *Acta Pacis Westphalicae publica*, vol. 4, 445–451. Her concern about religious objections by the crowns to her satisfaction are in HStAM 4a Nr. 47:29, AE to Wilhelm, Cassel, 19/29 March 1647, pub. in Erwin Bettenhäuser, ed., *Familienbriefe der Landgräfin Amalie Elisabeth von Hessen-Kassel und ihrer Kinder* (Marburg, 1994), 145–146. Her letter to her son is in HStAM 4a Nr. 47:29 AE to Wilhelm, Cassel, 22 April/1 May 1647, pub. in Bettenhäuser, *Familienbriefe*, 159–160. Here see also Fritz Dickmann, *Der Westfälische Frieden*, 7th ed. (Münster, 1998), 465–466.

6. May demands are in HStAM 4h Nr. 2137, fols. 104–5, *Postulata Haßo Castellana*, May 1637. See also AN K 1335 Nr. 103, *De Successione Marpurgensi Et Satisfactione Castellana*, 19 May 1647; HStAM 4h Nr. 2123, fols. 78–82, Krosigk (letter sent) to AE, Münster, 13/23 May 1647, received Cassel, 16/26 May; HStAM 4h Nr. 2123, fols. 83–84, Vultejus and Krosigk (letter sent) to AE, Münster, 14/24 May 1647, received Cassel, 19/29 May 1647.

7. Weber, *Hessenkrieg*, 132–135; Rommel, *Geschichte von Hessen*, vol. 8, 709. Her appeals to the French to assist her against Georg, for the general good, are in AAECP Hesse–Cassel 3, fols. 25–26, AE Memoire, 10 April 1647.

8. Rommel, *Geschichte von Hessen*, vol. 8, 712–714; Weber, *Hessenkrieg*, 144–148.

9. AN K 1335 no. 104, 20 June 1647, copies in Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv, Vienna [HHStA], Reichskanzlei [RK] Friedensakten 94 III, no. 410, Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris, [BN], Ms. Dupuis 737, fols. 147–150, partial copy in AN K 1335, no. 105, 24 June 1647. French support for her demand for one million is in Bibliothèque de l'Assemblée Nationale, Paris [AssNat] Ms. 278, fols. 95–101, Longueville and d'Avaux to Louis XIV, 24 June 1647, copy in AAECP Allemagne 84, fol. 105–110. Overwhelm-

ing desire for peace from all but the French can be seen in AssNat Ms. 278, fols. 114–120, Longueville and d’Avaux memoire, 31 June [1 July] 1647; AssNat Ms. 278, fols. 130–134, Longueville and d’Avaux memoire, 8 July 1647. French use of the Hessian matter to delay peace is ASVen Münster 6, Contarini (copy) to Nani, 9 July 1647. The Hessian matter as a barrier to peace is in the protocols of the Münster Princely College of 23 June and 30 June 1647, and deliberations of 23, 25, and 30 June and 1 July by the Brandenburg-Culmbach deputy, pub. in Meiern, *Acta Pacis Westphalicae publica*, vol. 4, 625–637; Mainz quote on 637. Hesse-Cassel’s July demands are in HStAM 4h Nr. 2137, fols. 126–127, 3/13 July 1647, copy also on fols. 124–125. French provided similar demands in the printed *Projectum Instrumenti Pacis*, and see AAACP Allemagne 88, fols. 569–582, 9 July 1647. The March 1648 Hessian demands delivered by the Swedes to the imperialists, pub. in Meiern, *Acta Pacis Westphalicae publica*, vol. 5, 613–615, are the same, indicating no shift in her positions over those months. A 4 July proposition by Trauttmansdorff to resolve to the Marburg matter by dividing the inheritance in sixteen parts (ten to Georg), and her refusal, is in Meiern, *Acta Pacis Westphalicae publica*, vol. 4, 461–463. Swedish dissatisfaction with French support for the Hessian matter delaying peace is in Riksarkivet *Germanica* 23, *Etlche Motiven, so den FriedensSchluß noch zur zeit aufhalten*, August 1647. Appeal to the French is in AssNat Ms. 278, fols. 149–159, Longueville and d’Avaux memoire, 15 July 1647, and in Meiern, *Acta Pacis Westphalicae publica*, vol. 4, 644. See also the Elector of Mainz’s relation of discussions between Hesse-Cassel and Hesse-Darmstadt, 5–6 July 1647, pub. in Meiern, *Acta Pacis Westphalicae publica*, vol. 4, 639–641. Trauttmansdorff’s concern that her demands are one of only two remaining major issues in the empire, and report that her delegates are willing to go lower than 600,000 is in AssNat Ms. 278, fols. 165–170, Longueville and d’Avaux memoire, 19 July 1647. Her concession to 800,000 is in AssNat Ms. 278, fols. 181–190, Longueville and d’Avaux memoire, 22 July 1647.

10. Dagger quote in HStAM 4h Nr. 2135, fols. 10–13, Protocol (draft extract) to AE, 28–31 March 1647. See also HStAM 4h Nr. 2123, AE (minute) to the Münster delegates, Cassel, 23 June/3 July 1647. Her quote is in HStAM 4a Nr. 47:29, AE to Wilhelm, 29 June/9 July 1647, pub. in Bettenhäuser, *Familienbriefe*, 199. For the Rheinifels siege and Georg’s quote see Weber, *Hessenkrieg*, 148–153. Arrival of Johann in Cassel is in HStAM 4a Nr. 47:11, Charlotte to Wilhelm, Cassel, 13/23 May 1647, pub. in Bettenhäuser, *Familienbriefe*, 174–175. Georg’s complaint over her demand for precedence is in Georg of Hesse-Darmstadt to the Congress, Giessen, 16/26 June 1647, rec. Münster, 8/18 July, pub. in Meiern, *Acta Pacis Westphalicae publica*, vol. 4, 464–468. His coded letter to the emperor of July was intercepted by the Swedes and handed over to the landgravine. Georg of Hesse-Darmstadt to the emperor, [July 1647], pub. in Meiern, *Acta Pacis Westphalicae publica*, vol. 4, 468–70.

11. Her quote is in HStAM 4a Nr. 47:29, AE to Wilhelm, Cassel, 9/19 Sept. 1647, pub. in Bettenhäuser, *Familienbriefe*, 246–247. See also Rommel, *Geschichte von Hessen*, vol. 8, 715–718.

12. HStAM 4a Nr. 47:10, Emilie to Wilhelm, Cassel, 5/15 Sept. 1647, pub. in Bettenhäuser, *Familienbriefe*, 245; HStAM 4a Nr. 47:29, AE to Wilhelm, Cassel, 30 Sept./10 October 1647, pub. in Bettenhäuser, *Familienbriefe*, 256–257.

13. HStAM 4e Nr. 1340, *Mandatium inhibitorium et casatorium*, 14/24 September 1647; HStAM 5 Nr. 19147, Remonstration of the Cassel Knights, 11/21 October 1647, cited in Günter Hollenberg, ed., *Hessische Landtagsabschiede 1605–1647* (Marburg, 2007), 425.

14. For a copy of the Cassel agreement of 9/19 October, see Meiern, *Acta Pacis Westphalicae publica*, vol. 4, 477–481. For Georg's opposition to the agreement and the landgravine's efforts to get him to ratify it, see AE to Georg of Hesse-Darmstadt, Cassel, 10/20 October 1647, pub. in Meiern, *Acta Pacis Westphalicae publica*, vol. 4, 473–474; Georg to AE, Giessen, 19/29 October 1647, pub. in Meiern, *Acta Pacis Westphalicae publica*, vol. 4, 474–475; AE to Georg of Hesse-Darmstadt, Cassel, 22 October/1 November 1647, pub. in Meiern, *Acta Pacis Westphalicae publica*, vol. 4, 476–477. See also Weber, *Hessenkrieg*, 151–54. Boyneburg's arrest is in Meiern *Acta Pacis Westphalicae publica*, vol. 4, 481. See also Georg of Hesse-Darmstadt to the Congress, Giessen, 26 November/6 December 1647, pub. in Meiern, *Acta Pacis Westphalicae publica*, vol. 4, 482–483.

15. The landgravine's report of the invasion of the imperial-Bavarian troops is in HStAM 4a Nr. 49:29, AE to Wilhelm, Cassel, 3/13 November 1647, pub. in Bettenhäuser, *Familienbriefe*, 270–271. See also Rommel, *Geschichte von Hessen*, vol. 8, 718–724, for full details of this invasion. A more sympathetic reading of Melander's actions can be found in Wilhelm Hofmann, *Peter Melander, reichsgraf zu Holzappel: Ein Charakterbild aus der zeit des dreissigjährigen krieges* (Munich, 1882), 274–299.

16. Rommel, *Geschichte von Hessen*, vol. 8, 718–724. Hofmann suggests that the letter from von der Malsburg was actually written later, to shield him from charges of treason. For this and Melander's letters to AE, see Hofmann, *Peter Melander*, 277–288. See also HStAM 4a Nr. 47:29, AE to Wilhelm, Cassel, 9/19 November 1647, and letters of 15/25 November and 21 November/1 December, all pub. in Bettenhäuser, *Familienbriefe*, 270–274.

17. Rommel, *Geschichte von Hessen*, vol. 8, 725–729; Hofmann, *Peter Melander*, 295–299.

18. HStAM 4a Nr. 49:10, Emilie to Wilhelm, Cassel, 10/20 February 1648; HStAM 4a Nr. 49:11, Charlotte to Wilhelm, Cassel, 10/20 February 1648, both pub. in Bettenhäuser, *Familienbriefe*, 312–314. For the Protestant gravamina signed on 24 March 1648 in Osnabrück, see Meiern, *Acta Pacis Westphalicae publica*, vol. 5, 562–576. For discussions over the inclusion of Calvinists and the push by the estates see Dickmann, *Der Westfälische Frieden*, 464–465, 471. See also Meiern, *Acta Pacis Westphalicae publica*, vol. 6, 239–286; S. Keller, “Die staatsrechtliche Anerkennung der reformierten Kirche auf dem westfälischen Friedenskongreß: Zugleich ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der deutschen Diplomatie im XVII. Jahrhundert,” in *Festgabe der Bonner Juristischen Fakultät für Paul Krüger* (Berlin, 1911), 473–510; Martin Heckel, *Reichsrecht und “Zweite Reformation”*: Theologisch-juristische Probleme der reformierten Konfessionalisierung (Gütersloh, 1986), 11ff. For Brandenburg concerns over a distinct category for Calvinists, which he saw as excluding them from the Augsburg Confession, see Meiern, *Acta Pacis Westphalicae publica*, vol. 4, 993–994. This, and the anger of some Swedes over the inclusion of Calvinists as “a third party,” is in Riksarkivet Germanica 23, *Contenta des Articulz, die Calvinische Religion betreffend*, Osnabrück, April 1648. Saxon opposition is in Elector of Saxony's Concept and Protest Against the Article Concerning the Reformed, Osnabrück, 14 June 1648, pub. in Meiern, *Acta Pacis Westphalicae publica*, vol. 6, 281–283; Reformed response ff.

19. *Declaratio Hasso-Cassellana in puncto Successionis Marpurgensis*, 27 March 1648, pub. in Meiern, *Acta Pacis Westphalicae publica*, vol. 5, 648–649; *Declaratio Legatorum Hasso-Darmstadinorum in Causa Successionis Marpurgensis*, 29 March 1648, pub. in Meiern, *Acta Pacis Westphalicae publica*, vol. 5, 655–656. Earlier in March the Swedes had

again presented her demands of July 1647 to the imperialists, stressing the need for their resolution before other matters, or at least simultaneously. The imperial response to this is pub. in Meiern, *Acta Pacis Westphalicae publica*, vol. 5, 616–617. French support for the landgravine's satisfaction can be seen in HStAM 4h Nr. 2137, fol. 192, Servien (copy) to the Mainz Plenipotentiaries, Osnabrück, 15 April 1648. For the Hessian matter delaying and complicating the resolution of the Palatine matter and of the *tandem omnes*, and for arguments over Hessian demands, see the Altenburg diary of 24 March 1648, and the negotiations at Osnabrück among the princely, imperial, Swedish, and French (in the person of de la Court) delegates of mid- to late March, pub. in Meiern, *Acta Pacis Westphalicae publica*, vol. 5, 577–582, 610–645. For the ultimatum and attached imperial declaration of the same date, see Meiern, *Acta Pacis Westphalicae publica*, vol. 5, 662. See also Congressional Delegates' Pronouncement to Hesse-Darmstadt and Hesse-Cassel, Osnabrück, 12 April 1648, pub. in Meiern, *Acta Pacis Westphalicae publica*, vol. 5, 675–676. Imperial frustration over the Marburg ultimatum is in APW ser. 2A, vol. 8, 217–226, 292–294.

20. Thumshirn quote in Meiern, *Acta Pacis Westphalicae publica*, vol. 5, 654–655. For the Hessian moderation to 600,000 and effort to make only the Catholics pay, see also Meiern, *Acta Pacis Westphalicae publica*, vol. 5, 624–625, 632–633, 642–647; APW ser. 2A, vol. 8, 222–226, 290–292. The counts of the Wetterau also hoped to be excused from future payments, as their poverty was notorious. For Cologne and Bavarian attitudes and the final discussions over Hessian satisfaction, see Meiern, *Acta Pacis Westphalicae publica*, vol. 5, 645–649, 652–668. See also HStAM 4h Nr. 1964, fols. 163–164, fols. 175–176, *Circa Causam Hasso Cassellanam conventum est ut sequitur*, Osnabrück, 29 March/8 April 1648, pub. in Hallendorff, *Sveriges Traktater*, 6:1, 209–211, copies also in Meiern, *Acta Pacis Westphalicae publica*, vol. 5, 663–665, Jean Le Clerc, ed., *Négociations secrets touchant la paix de Munster et d'Osnabrug*, vol. 4 (The Hague, 1725–1726), 504–507, with side agreement, dated 9/19 March; HStAM 4h Nr. 2138, fols. 318–319, Scheffer, Krosigk, and Vultejus (letter sent) to AE, Osnabrück, 3/13 April 1648. French approval of the Cassel talks is in AAACP Allemagne 117, fols. 12–13, De la Court (letter sent) to Lionne, Osnabrück, 10 April 1648. See also Rommel, *Geschichte von Hessen*, vol. 8, 730–731; Kurt Beck, *Der Hessische Bruderzwist zwischen Hessen-Kassel und Hessen-Darmstadt in den Verhandlungen zum Westfälischen Frieden von 1644–1648* (Frankfurt a.M., 1978), 73. See also the discussions over her demands from 19/29 March to 30 March/9 April pub. in Meiern, *Acta Pacis Westphalicae publica*, vol. 5, 665–668. Final quote is from Thumshirn, pub. in Meiern, *Acta Pacis Westphalicae publica*, vol. 5, 672.

21. The Congress's deadline began as of 9 April, so the agreement was one day late. See also Principal Agreement and Treaty between Hesse-Cassel and Hesse-Darmstadt, Cassel, 14/24 April 1648, pub. in Meiern, *Acta Pacis Westphalicae publica*, vol. 5, 677–687. See also HStAM 4h Nr. 2128, fol. 143, Vultejus to AE, Münster, 10/20 April 1648. For Swedish discussion of the Marburg resolution and another copy of the peace, see Hallendorff, *Sveriges traktater*, 6:1, 212–224, 298. See also AE (letter sent) to the Princes and Electors of the Empire, Cassel, 16/26 April 1648, pub. in Meiern, *Acta Pacis Westphalicae publica*, vol. 5, 690; Rommel, *Geschichte von Hessen*, vol. 8, 731–732; 764–769. The university division did not work well, and by 1650 each side would establish its own institution, one in Marburg, one in Giessen.

22. State of negotiations is in AAACP Allemagne 117, fols. 37–42, De la Court (letter sent) to Lionne, Osnabrück, 27 April 1648. For the Swedish push for their

satisfaction (and inclusion of Hesse–Cassel as a payee), see APW ser. 3A, vol. 3/5, 337–354; Hallendorff, *Sveriges traktater*, 6:1, 233–239; Memorial on the Satisfaction of the Army of Hesse–Cassel, Osnabrück, 25 May 1648, pub. in Meiern, *Acta Pacis Westphalicae publica*, vol. 5, 855–858. See also Erwin Bettenhäuser, “Die Landgrafschaft Hessen-Kassel auf dem Westfälischen Friedenskongress 1644–1648” (diss., Johannes-Gutenberg-Universität zu Mainz, 1983), 103–108; Fritz Dickmann, *Der Westfälische Frieden*, 7th ed. (Münster, 1998), 421–424. For negotiations over the normal year see Ralf-Peter Fuchs, *Ein ‘Medium zum Frieden’: Die Normaljahrsregel und die Beendigung des Dreißigjährigen Krieges* (Munich, 2010).

23. The repercussions of the Spanish–Dutch peace are in HStAM 4h Nr. 2123, fols. 161–162, Memoire, Münster, 16 May 1648. Victory against Lamboy is in HStAM 4a Nr. 47:29, AE to Wilhelm, Wildungen, 9/19 June 1648, pub. in Bettenhäuser, *Familienbriefe*, 323–324; AAACP Allemagne 117, fols. 296–300, De la Court (letter sent) to Lionne, Osnabrück, 29 June 1648. See also M. Merian, *Theatrum Europaeum, oder Warhafftige Beschreibung aller denckwürdigen Geschichten*, 6 vols. (Frankfurt am Main, 1643–1652), VI, 348, 353; Rommel, *Geschichte von Hessen*, vol. 8, 732–741. The landgravine’s pain and attempts at cures are in HStAM 4a Nr. 47:29, AE to Wilhelm, Wildungen, 2/12 June 1648, letter of 3/13 June, and letter of 5/15 June, all pub. in Bettenhäuser, *Familienbriefe*, 314–317, 321; HStAM 4a Nr. 47:29, AE to Wilhelm, Wildungen, 13/23 August 1648, pub. in Bettenhäuser, *Familienbriefe*, 337–338. Scheffer’s admonishment is in APW ser. 3C, vol. 3/2, 1158–1159; Meiern, *Acta Pacis Westphalicae publica*, vol. 6, 575.

24. HStAM 4h Nr. 2128, fols. 306–309, Scheffer and Krosigk (letter sent) to AE, Münster, 29 September/9 October 1648; HStAM 4h Nr. 2128, fols. 327–331, Scheffer and Krosigk (letter sent) to AE, Münster, 6/16 October 1648; HStAM 4h Nr. 2128, fols. 336–338, Scheffer and Krosigk (letter sent) to AE, Münster, 7/17 October 1648; HStAM 4h Nr. 2128, fols. 339, Memoire on the Hessian Military Satisfaction, n.d.; HStAM 4h Nr. 2128, fols. 314–315, Scheffer and Krosigk (copy) to [Mazarin?], Münster, 6/16 October 1648. For the almost universal condemnation of the landgravine as preferring war to peace, see the Altenburg diary for 7–26 October 1648, pub. in Meiern, *Acta Pacis Westphalicae publica*, vol. 6, 575–581, 606–608, 615–624. The Cassel delegates were so late to the signing ceremony that there was some talk of sending for them to ask if they were planning on signing. For the resolution on her 100,000 see Meiern, *Acta Pacis Westphalicae publica*, vol. 6, 582–585. See also Bettenhäuser, *Landgrafschaft*, 103–108; Hallendorff, *Sveriges traktater*, 6:1, 241–249, for the French satisfaction; 331–332 for the Swedish delegate’s agreement to insist on her other points before signing the peace. In the end, Hesse–Cassel was not exempted from paying Swedish satisfaction in the actual treaty (see art. XVI.10 IPO) but payment was instead waived by Queen Christina two months later. Rommel, *Geschichte von Hessen*, vol. 8, 775. Hesse’s portion of the peace is art. XV.1–15 Instrumentum Pacis Osnabrugensis (IPO)=§48–60 IPM. See art. VIII.3 IPO=§64 Instrumentum Pacis Monsteriensis (IPM) for the requirement of a Reichstag to resolve outstanding issues not covered in the final peace.

Conclusion

1. Art. VIII.2 Instrumentum Pacis Osnabrugensis (IPO). Proclamation of traditional *Landeshoheit* is in art. VIII.1 IPO. For a complete copy of the peace, see *Die*

Westfälischen Friedensverträge vom 24. Oktober 1648: Texte und Übersetzungen, Acta Pacis Westphalicae, Supplementa electronica, 1, www.pax-westphalica.de/ (2012); Johann Gottfried von Meiern, *Universal-Register über die Westphälischen Friedens- und Nürnberghischen Executions-Handlungen und Geschichte* (Göttingen, 1740), I–XCVI. For the argument that the peace altered conceptions of the hierarchy at the top of Christendom in general due to the incompatible claims of the three major universalist powers (France, Sweden, and the Habsburgs), see Johannes Burkhardt, “The Summitless Pyramid: War Aims and Peace Compromises among Europe’s Universalist Powers,” in 1648. *War and Peace in Europe*, eds. Klaus Bussmann and Heinz Schilling (Münster, 1998) [WPE], vol. 1, 51–60. For a discussion of the constitutional implications of art. VIII, and of the peace in general, see Georg Schmidt, “The Peace of Westphalia as the Fundamental Law of the Complementary Empire-State,” in WPE, vol. 1, 447–454; Georg Schmidt, *Geschichte des alten Reiches: Staat und nation in der frühen Neuzeit 1495–1806* (Munich, 1999), 177–193; Dirk Göschmann, “Das Ius Armorum: Ausformung und politische Bedeutung der reichsständischen Militärhoheit bis zu ihrer definitive Anerkennung im westfälischen Frieden,” *Blätter für Deutsche Landesgeschichte* 129 (1993), 257–276; Ronald G. Asch, “The *Ius Foederis* Re-examined: The Peace of Westphalia and the Constitution of the Holy Roman Empire,” in *Peace Treaties and International Law in European History: From the Late Middle Ages to World War One*, ed. Randall Lesaffer (Cambridge, England, 2004), 319–337; Heinhard Steiger, “Die Träger des *ius belli ac pacis* 1648–1806,” in *Staat und Krieg: vom Mittelalter bis zur Moderne*, ed. Werner Rösener (Göttingen, 2000), 15–135; Andreas Osiander, “Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth,” *International Organization* 55, no. 2 (2001), 251–287. For post-Westphalian discussions of the nature of the empire, see also Joachim Whaley, *Germany and the Holy Roman Empire*, vol. 2, *The Peace of Westphalia to the Dissolution of the Reich, 1648–1806* (Oxford, 2012).

2. The electorate was gained by Wilhelm IX, from then on Elector Wilhelm I (1743–1821).

3. For Brandenburg’s similar shift in political style, see Otto Hintze, “Calvinism and Raison d’Etat in Early Seventeenth Century Brandenburg,” in *The Historical Essays of Otto Hintze*, ed. Felix Gilbert (New York, 1975), 153. For ties between Calvinism and a more absolutist form of rule in another German state, see Bodo Nischan, “Calvinism, the Thirty Years’ War, and the Beginning of Absolutism in Brandenburg: The Political Thought of John Bergius,” *Central European History* 15, no. 3 (1982), 203–223. Also of interest in this regard is Michael Stolleis, *Staat und Staatsräson in der frühen Neuzeit—Studien zur Geschichte des öffentlichen Rechts* (Suhrkamp, 1990). See also Ludolf Pelizeaus, *Der Aufstiegs Württembergs und Hessens zur Kurwürde 1692–1803* (Bern, 2000); Sheilagh Ogilvie, “Germany and the Seventeenth-Century Crisis,” in *The General Crisis of the Seventeenth Century*, ed. Geoffrey Parker and Lesley M. Smith (London, 1997), 57–87.

4. Art. VIII.1 IPO; *ius reformandi* mentioned also in art. V.27 IPO=§47 Instrumentum Pacis Monsteriensis (IPM); art. V.30 IPO=§47 IPM; art. V.31 IPO=§47 IPM; art. V.42–44 IPO=§47 IPM. Calvinists are included in art. VII.1=§47 IPM.

5. Art. V.14 IPO=§64 IPM for normal year.

6. For more on Hesse in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, see Hans Philippi, *Die Landgrafschaft Hessen-Kassel 1648–1806* (Marburg, 2007); Charles Ingrao, *The Hessian Mercenary State: Ideas, Institutions, and Reform under Frederick II, 1760–1785* (Cambridge, England, 1987). For Friedrich’s conversion, see FWP von Ammon,

Galerie der denkwürdigsten personen, welche im XIV., XVII. Und XVIII. Jahrhunderte von der evangelischen zur katholischen Kirche übergetreten sind (Erlangen, 1833), 236–238.

7. Art. VIII.3 IPO=§64 IPM for the requirement of a Reichstag to resolve outstanding issues not covered in the final peace. Parity is required in art. V.1 IPO=§47 IPM. See also Klaus Schlaich, “*Maioritas—protestatio—itio in partes—corpus Evangelicorum*: Das Verfahren im Reichstag des Hl. Römischen Reichs Deutscher Nation nach der Reformation,” in *Gesammelte Aufsätze: Kirche und Staat von der Reformation bis zum Grundgesetz*, ed. Martin Heckel and Werner Heun (Tübingen, 1997), 68–134; Sigrid Jahns, “The Imperial Justice System as Mirror of the Imperial and Religious Constitution,” in *WPE*, vol. 1, 455–463. For more on the future of Calvinism, see Irena Backus and Philip Benedict, eds., *Calvin and His Influence, 1509–2009* (Oxford, 2011).

8. Art. XV.1 to art. XV.15 IPO=§48–60 IPM. Sweden’s similar financial compensation for its military is in art. X.1 IPO.

9. Amnesty is in arts. II, III IPO. Imperial hereditary lands are in art. IV.52–54 IPO. Palatine resolution in art. IV.2–22 IPO. Swedish satisfaction in art. X IPO. For the French satisfaction, see especially §73 and §87 IPM. For problems after the peace with the promised 100,000 advance, see Meiern, *Acta Pacis Westphalicae publica*, vol. 6, 640–651.

10. Hessische Staatsarchiv Marburg [HStAM] 4a Nr 47:29, Amalia Elisabeth [AE] to Wilhelm, Cassel, 20/30 November 1648, pub. in Bettenhäuser, *Familienbriefe*, 359–360; HStAM 4a Nr 47:29, AE to Wilhelm, Cassel, 28 November/8 December 1648, pub. in Bettenhäuser, *Familienbriefe*, 366; HStAM 4a Nr 47:10, Emilie to Wilhelm, Cassel, 23 November/3 December 1648, pub. in Bettenhäuser, *Familienbriefe*, 362–364.

11. HStAM 4a Nr 47:10, Emilie to Wilhelm, Cassel, 20/30 November 1648, pub. in Bettenhäuser, *Familienbriefe*, 361–362; HStAM 4a Nr 47:29, AE to Wilhelm, Ems, 27 April/7 May 1648, pub. in Bettenhäuser, *Familienbriefe*, 375–376. For her improvement and the visit of Trier, see HStAM 4a Nr 47:29, AE to Wilhelm, Ems, 7/17 May 1648, pub. in Bettenhäuser, *Familienbriefe*, 378–380. For her return home and Wilhelm’s departure, see HStAM 4a Nr 47:29, AE to Wilhelm, Ems, 29 May/8 June 1648, pub. in Bettenhäuser, *Familienbriefe*, 384. See also Dietrich Christoph von Rommel, *Geschichte von Hessen*, vol. 8 (Cassel, 1843), 779. The description of Hedwig Sophie is in Samuel Chappuzeau, *L’Allemagne Protestante, Ou Relation nouvelle d’un Voyage fait aux Cours Des Electeurs, et des Princes Protestans de l’Empire . . .* (Geneva, 1671), 177–178.

12. Wilhelm’s reaction to this news, which he first heard in June, appears in HStAM 4a Nr 47:29, Wilhelm to AE, 12/22 June 1648, pub. in Bettenhäuser, *Familienbriefe*, 401–402. See also HStAM 4a Nr. 47:10, fols. 4–7, Vice Chancellor [VC] and Council to the Estates, Cassel, 7/17 September 1650, rec. 9/19 September 1650, including printed proclamation of abdication dated Cassel, 24 August/3 September 1650, copy of the abdication on fol. 9.

13. HStAM 4a Nr. 47:10, fols. 12–15, Extract of a Protocol of the Hessian Estates.

14. Rommel, *Geschichte von Hessen*, vol. 8, 788. Numerous letters from the landgrave at Heidelberg to Wilhelm appear in HStAM 4a Nr. 47:29. For her quote, see HStAM 4a Nr. 47:29, AE to Wilhelm, Heidelberg, 11/21 April 1651, pub. in Bettenhäuser, *Familienbriefe*, 454. Mention of her testament in the following letter of 14/24 April. Her return to Cassel is in HStAM 4a Nr. 47:29, AE to Wilhelm, Heidelberg, 20/30 June 1651, pub. in Bettenhäuser, *Familienbriefe*, 455–456. For a description of the memorial tablet, see Theodor Piderit, *Geschichte der Haupt- und Residenzstadt Kassel* (Cassel, 1844), 220.

15. Her martyr quote is in HStAM 4d Nr. 50, fol. 13, AE (own hand letter sent) to Vultejus, Groningen, 3/13 September 1638. Cross imagery is in HStAM 4d Nr. 50, fols. 15–16, AE (own hand letter sent) to Vultejus, Groningen, 6/16 September 1638. HStAM 4d Nr. 49, Ludwig to Vultejus 4/14 January 1641; HStAM 4d Nr. 50, fols. 50–51, AE (own hand letter sent) to Vultejus, 7/17 March 1639.

16. HStAM 4d Nr. 39, fols. 39–42, AE (copy) to Cassel Secret Council [SC], Delfzijl, 15/25 November 1637, Sixtinus hand minute in HStAM 4d Nr. 39, fols. 43–44, letter sent in HStAM 4h Nr. 1448, fols. 57–58. The French pensions did concern the imperial plenipotentiary Issak Volmar, however. *Acta Pacis Westphalicae*, ser. 3C, vol. 3/1, 343–343.

17. Ramsay quote in Rommel, *Geschichte von Hessen*, vol. 8, 679–680; Karl Wilhelm Justi, *Amalie Elisabeth: Landgräfin Von Hessen: Versuch einer Darstellung ihres Lebens und Charakters* (Giessen, 1812), iii. My thanks to P. Puppel for indicating the perfection of this portrait. Pauline Puppel, *Die Regentin: Vormundschaftliche Herrschaft in Hessen 1500–1700* (Frankfurt, 2004), 190.

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Index

- Allerheim, 196, 197, 198
Alsfeld, 68, 173, 178, 208, 209
Althusius, Johannes, 20, 156
Amöneburg, 35, 205, 218
Anhalt, 121, 188, 200
Anhalt-Dessau, John Casimir, Prince of, 141
Anne of Austria, Queen of France, 6, 10, 41, 46, 170, 174–175, 210
Antrecht, Johann, 70, 186, 189
Augsburg: Religious Peace of, 17, 21, 23, 24, 31, 109, 122, 187, 188, 193, 194, 200, 201, 215, 216, 226, 236–238; Confession of, 23, 31, 33, 121, 122, 156, 187, 188, 193, 200, 205, 215, 236. *See also* Calvinists and Calvinism; Lutherans and Lutheranism
Austria and Austrian(s), 10, 196, 234. *See also* Anne of Austria, Queen of France; Habsburgs; Vienna
Avaux, Claude de Mesmes, Count d', 56–57, 63, 65, 74–75, 85–86, 92, 98, 129–130, 135–136, 157, 167, 180, 181, 182, 185, 193–194, 217–218
Baden-Durlach, 20, 31, 152, 225
Badenhausen, Regner, 203, 211
Baden-Württemberg, 134, 195
Banér, Johan, General, 53, 125, 126, 132, 134, 147–149, 156, 157
Bavaria and Bavarian(s), 12, 147, 175, 177, 184, 195–196, 198, 204, 207, 208, 215, 218, 222, 223, 225, 230; Elector Maximilian of, 17, 103, 132, 138, 152, 153, 155, 159, 176, 196, 197, 203, 215, 222, 223, 226–228
Beauregard, French Resident at Cassel, 169, 193
Blankenstein, 208, 225
Bodin, Jean, 19, 24, 47, 156
Bohemia and Bohemian(s), 2, 18, 25, 36, 42, 132, 147, 192–195, 238; Elisabeth of, 141, 142
Brandenburg, 18, 39, 200, 205, 234; Elector Friedrich Wilhelm of, 14, 156–157, 159, 166, 188, 192, 211, 226, 227–228; Elector Georg Wilhelm of, 36, 121, 134, 156; Margrave Christian of, 80–81; Hedwig Sophie of, 192, 210, 240
Breisach, 125, 202
Breithaupt, Johan Friederich, 76, 83, 86, 100
Bremen, 182, 202, 211
Brunswick-Lüneburg, 13, 14, 22, 35, 125, 128, 129, 153, 155, 157–159, 163–167, 176, 189, 192, 201; Duke Georg of, 35, 38, 76, 80, 92, 93, 96, 108, 110, 125, 128–130, 134, 138, 147–148, 152–155, 157, 167; Duke Christian of, 42; Duke Christian Ludwig of, 203
Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel, August, Duke of, 35, 157–158, 162, 163. *See also* Wolfenbüttel

- Calvin, John, 7, 8, 11, 17, 52, 66, 142, 144
- Calvinists and Calvinism, 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 8–9, 16, 17, 23, 24, 27, 28, 31–33, 39, 71–72, 109–112, 121–124, 126, 128, 131–133, 143–144, 156, 165, 173, 186–188, 193, 200–201, 203, 205–206, 212, 215, 217, 226, 235, 236–239, 243; as a *confessio Augustana variata*, 8, 23, 31, 33, 109, 187–188, 122, 226, 236, 238; conflict with Lutherans, 23, 31–32, 122, 133, 135–136, 143, 169, 187, 193, 200–220, 205–206, 212–213, 226, 237–238. *See also* Catholics and Catholicism; Lutherans and Lutheranism
- Cassel, 7, 20, 21, 39, 40, 45–47, 49–50, 53, 62–63, 65, 66–67, 69, 70–71, 78, 80, 86, 88, 90–91, 95, 98, 100, 105–107, 108, 112–114, 118, 121, 123, 127, 129, 134, 140–141, 143, 144, 146–147, 149, 150, 151, 154, 169, 178, 194–195, 207, 210, 220, 222–224, 227–229, 230, 240–242. *See also* Hesse–Cassel
- Catholic League, 24, 25, 30, 52, 184, 221
- Catholics and Catholicism, 23, 25, 127, 128, 130, 131, 133, 144, 159, 161, 176, 186, 187, 194, 197, 201, 212, 216, 217, 226, 227, 236–239, 244; conflict with Protestants, 8, 13, 17, 21, 24, 28, 30–31, 52, 103, 110, 122, 136, 144, 150, 152, 153, 156, 165, 171–172, 193, 200, 204–206, 212, 216, 218. *See also* Catholic League
- Charlotte, Landgravine of Hesse–Cassel, 38–39, 140, 231, 239–241, 242
- Chemnitz, 132, 156
- Christina, Queen of Sweden, 6, 10, 46, 53, 167–168, 174–175, 210, 219
- Cleves, Duchy of, 151, 158, 163, 192
- Coesfeld, 228, 238
- Cologne: Ferdinand of Bavaria, Archbishop–Elector of, 12, 25, 79, 84, 86, 110, 112, 119, 123, 126, 128, 130, 134, 158, 163, 176, 180, 184, 188, 199, 203, 209, 215, 221, 227–228; city and electorate of, 18, 63, 112, 117, 120, 161, 163, 171, 174, 180, 188, 202, 209, 210, 228
- Contarini, Alvise, 185, 189, 202, 209, 214, 215, 217
- Contributions and Contribution System, 11, 29, 31, 39, 40, 43, 82, 85, 91, 95, 96–97, 100–101, 104, 107, 109, 119, 126, 131, 145–146, 154, 158, 164–169, 173, 175–176, 181, 189, 191, 199, 204, 208, 212, 215, 221, 225, 227, 228, 230, 235
- Corvey, 127, 167, 202
- Crocus, Johannes, 124, 144
- Dalwigk: Johan Berndt von, 47, 49, 57, 82, 88, 112; Franz Elgar von, 70; family of, 143
- Darmstadt, 20, 21, 23, 195, 219. *See also* Hesse–Darmstadt
- D’Avaux. *See* Avaux, Claude de Mesmes, Count d’
- Deinhardt, Helfrich, 47, 49, 75, 107, 112–113, 114, 116, 145, 192–193, 202
- Delfzijl, 53, 63, 64, 69, 72, 84
- Denmark and Danes, 2, 10, 20, 177–178, 180, 182, 190, 192, 197, 241; King Christian IV of, 77, 177, 193. *See also* Sweden and Swedes
- Dörnberg, Johann Caspar von, 186, 193
- Dorsten, 123, 125, 130, 134, 158, 168; Treaty of, 131, 136, 137, 146, 164, 188, 193
- Düsseldorf, 141, 150, 151, 176, 209
- Dutch Republic (United Provinces) and Dutch, 2, 16, 33, 34, 38, 44, 46, 69, 74, 77, 108, 110, 125, 129, 151, 158, 162, 165, 170, 180, 181, 183, 212, 219, 221, 226, 245; and Hessian occupation of East Frisia, 39, 74, 117, 168–169, 189–191, 227. *See also* Frederick Henry, Prince of Orange; Hague, The
- East Frisia and Frisians, 6, 11, 39, 40, 42, 45, 47, 55, 59, 63, 74, 76, 77, 85, 88, 117, 131, 146, 151, 168–169, 175, 188–191, 198, 210, 221, 226; Duke Ulrich II of, 39, 77, 168–169, 189–191, 227; military camp of Jemgum, 189, 191, 221. *See also* Dutch Republic (United Provinces) and Dutch
- Eberstein, Ernst Albrecht von, 173, 190, 203–204, 207–209, 218, 219, 223
- Eberstein, Kaspar, Count von, 150–151, 157, 158, 162–165, 173, 176, 182–184, 189–190, 191, 219
- Ecclesiastical Reservation, 200, 226, 237
- Edict of Restitution, 28, 32, 123, 137, 152, 187–188, 237
- Effectus suspensivus*, 159, 172
- Eleonore Katherine, Countess of Pfalz–Zweibrücken, 174, 210
- Elisabeth, Landgravine of Hesse–Cassel, 38–39, 140, 143, 194, 240, 242
- Emden, 189, 191
- Emilie, Landgravine of Hesse–Cassel, 38–39, 140, 194–195, 222, 230, 231, 239
- Enghien, Duke d’, 170, 177, 195, 196
- England and English, 2, 14, 72, 120, 141, 150. *See also* Bohemia and Bohemian(s): Elisabeth of

- Erfurt, 39, 147, 178
- Ernst, Landgrave of Hesse-Rheinfels, 169, 184, 219, 230
- Ferdinand II, Holy Roman Emperor, 1, 4, 17, 26–28, 29–39, 60, 235. *See also* Habsburgs
- Ferdinand III, Archduke, later Holy Roman Emperor, 4, 5, 8, 36–37, 39–40, 44, 50, 52, 53, 59–60, 65–75, 77, 79–82, 85–90, 93, 95–97, 99–101, 103–106, 108–112, 119–126, 128–139, 140, 150, 152, 153–154, 155–159, 161, 163–164, 166–167, 171–172, 175, 176, 178, 179–180, 182, 184–189, 192–194, 197–200, 203, 205–207, 210, 214–216, 220, 222–223, 226–227, 229–230, 232, 233, 235, 236, 238, 239; attempts to gain the Hessian army, 58, 80, 88–89, 96–97, 104, 110, 125, 129, 137; opposition to the rights of Calvinists, 72, 87–88, 109, 111–112, 121–126, 128, 132–133, 163. *See also* Habsburgs
- France and French, 2, 3, 5, 13, 14, 16, 20, 33–36, 39–40, 42, 44, 48, 54, 63, 74, 80, 89, 93, 98–100, 118, 129, 138, 147–148, 154–156, 159–161, 169–171, 173, 174, 177–178, 180, 185–186, 188–189, 191, 193, 195–196, 198, 205–206, 209, 215, 216, 218–219, 223, 231–232, 239; payment of subsidies by, 12, 35, 37, 38, 40, 43, 56, 75, 82, 86, 92, 98, 102, 130, 137, 146, 148, 164, 167, 175, 181, 183–185, 204, 230, 235; relations with Hesse-Cassel, 24, 30, 33–40, 42, 46, 52, 54–61, 67–69, 74–75, 85–86, 92, 99–103, 106, 110, 111, 120, 125, 129–134, 136–137, 140, 141, 143, 146–150, 152, 155, 162–171, 174–175, 179–183, 188–194, 199, 202, 204, 206, 209–212, 216–218, 220, 231–232; relations with Sweden, 33–35, 37, 74–75, 92, 98–99, 130, 136, 152, 157, 161, 166, 218, 226, 230; and Army of Germany, 137, 147, 162, 166, 177, 181–182. *See also* Anne of Austria, Queen of France; Dorsten: Treaty of; Louis XIII, King of France; Louis XIV, King of France; Mazarin, Jules, Cardinal; Paris; Richelieu, Armand du Plessis, Cardinal de; Saxe-Weimar, Bernhard of, and Bernhardines; Wesel: Treaty of
- Franconia and Franconian, 147, 165, 173, 175, 178, 184, 189, 200, 207, 215, 225
- Frankenberg, 173, 209, 225
- Frankfurt am Main, 31, 190, 206; Deputations Diet of, 159, 171, 174, 176, 186, 191
- Frederick Henry, Prince of Orange, 17, 39, 69, 72, 74, 150, 168, 189–190, 212
- Friedrich (Fritz), Landgrave of Hesse-Eschwege, 43, 49, 165, 169, 174, 184, 210, 231, 239
- Friedrich V, Prince Palatine, 31, 43, 152, 155, 238
- Fritzlar, 205, 218, 134, 173, 225
- Fulda, Abbey of, 22, 167, 172, 174, 178, 184, 188, 202, 205, 216, 217, 218, 223, 225, 227, 228
- Geleen, Gottfried Huyn, Baron von, 184, 196, 206, 207
- Georg II, Landgrave of Hesse-Darmstadt, 7, 27, 28, 29, 31, 37–39, 52, 59–60, 62–83, 84–93, 95–97, 99–101, 103–108, 111, 113, 119, 125–126, 132, 148, 168–170, 172, 189; attitude toward women of, 10, 96, 99; and negotiations at Westphalia, 198–199, 205, 209, 212–213, 214, 216–218, 220, 227. *See also* Hesse-Darmstadt
- German Liberties, 8–9, 20, 24, 28, 32, 55, 67, 128, 134, 138, 153, 179–180, 233–235
- Geyso, Johann von, 57, 63, 134, 158, 173, 178, 184, 191–192, 195–196, 198–199, 202, 204, 206–209, 219, 230–231
- Giessen, 20, 22, 173, 190, 198, 202, 204, 207, 208, 219
- Goslar, 158, 160, 163; Peace of, 163, 242
- Götz, Johann, Count von, 36, 38, 54, 62–63, 66–67, 71, 74, 80, 89, 93, 95, 99, 195
- Groningen, 84, 91, 100, 108, 112, 116, 119–120, 123, 125, 151
- Gronsfeld, Jost Maximilian, Count von, 223–225
- Guébriant, Comte de, 162–165, 171, 172, 177
- Günderode, Hans Heinrich von, 54, 57, 101–103, 158, 164, 184
- Gustavus Adolphus, King of Sweden, 1, 28, 47, 53, 135, 166, 167, 170, 202. *See also* Sweden and Swedes
- Habsburgs, 4, 13, 17, 24, 30, 33, 80, 134, 152, 170, 185, 212; hereditary territories of, 132, 165, 166, 198, 227, 229, 238. *See also* Anne of Austria, Queen of France; Austria and Austrian(s); Bohemia and Bohemian(s); Ferdinand II, Holy Roman Emperor; Ferdinand III, Archduke, later Holy Roman Emperor; Leopold Wilhelm, Archduke; Moravia and Moravian(s); Silesia; Spain and Spanish

- Hague, The, 118, 129, 137, 150, 151, 160, 164, 165, 172, 180, 185, 190, 212, 229
- Hamburg, 56, 65, 74, 85, 98, 118, 123, 125, 129, 136, 157, 161, 162, 169
- Hanau, 16, 20, 35, 37, 66, 70, 72, 99, 109, 121, 172, 201, 240
- Hanau-Münzenberg, 16–17, 20, 30, 66, 77, 142, 172, 173. *See also* Hanau
- Hatzfeldt, Melchior von, 120, 151, 158, 165–166, 173, 178, 180–182, 184, 206
- Hauptakkord, 26–28, 34, 71, 79, 95, 101, 107, 174, 187, 199, 201, 217, 222, 228, 229
- Heidelberg, 16, 222, 240, 242
- Hermann, Landgrave of Hesse-Rotenburg, 49–50, 56–57, 70, 82, 107, 141, 169
- Hersfeld, 49, 90, 96, 100, 110, 111, 113, 127, 163, 173, 205, 214, 223, 225, 238
- Hesse-Butzbach, 170, 199, 203–204
- Hesse-Cassel, 5, 7, 9–10, 12, 14, 20–22, 25–30, 33, 35, 38, 40, 42–43, 48, 54, 59, 62–63, 76, 85, 90–91, 100, 104, 107, 114, 119, 126–127, 148, 151, 167–169, 201, 207, 209, 217, 223–225, 229, 239; estates of, 11, 12, 18, 25–29, 34, 38, 43, 45, 48–49, 67–69, 74, 76, 78, 82, 84–85, 88, 92, 94, 96, 100, 101, 106, 111, 113–114, 120–121, 143–145, 154–155, 163–164, 169, 180, 207–208, 222, 224, 229, 235–236, 242. *See also* Cassel; Charlotte, Landgravine of Hesse-Cassel; Elisabeth, Landgravine of Hesse-Cassel; Emilie, Landgravine of Hesse-Cassel; Hesse-Darmstadt; Louise, Landgravine of Hesse-Cassel; Philipp, Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel; Wilhelm V, Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel; Wilhelm VI, Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel
- Hesse-Darmstadt, 13, 22, 23, 25–27, 37–38, 76, 90, 108, 172–173, 207–208, 198–200, 212, 216–219, 221–222, 223, 229; and the Hessian civil war, 172–174, 183, 190–191, 195, 199, 202–204, 206–209, 212–213, 218–223, 225, 227–229, 238. *See also* Darmstadt; Georg II, Landgrave of Hesse-Darmstadt
- Hesse-Marburg, 22, 24–27, 29, 32, 34, 61, 120, 148, 163, 169, 170, 173–174, 177, 183, 184, 198–210, 214, 216–220, 223, 226–229, 238–239. *See also* Marburg
- Hessian Mannschaftsregister, 127, 131
- Heussener de Wundersleben, Commissary General, 69–70, 73
- Hildesheim, 35, 93, 95, 108, 134, 163, 164; Treaty of, 129, 134, 163
- Hoff, Jakob von, 130, 176–177, 179, 203, 210, 212, 241
- Homburg, 113, 178, 206
- Horn, Commissary, 54, 63, 109, 112, 123–126
- Horn, Gustav, Field Marshal, 182
- Hungary, King of. *See* Ferdinand II, Holy Roman Emperor; Ferdinand III, Archduke, later Holy Roman Emperor
- Italy and Italian, 2, 33, 167, 174
- Ius reformandi*, 17, 23, 24, 133, 180, 187–188, 200–201, 212, 215, 236, 237
- Ius territoriali*, 24, 180, 236
- Jacobi, Friedrich, 53–54, 62–63, 66, 71
- Jankau, Battle of, 195, 197
- Johann Georg, Elector of Saxony, 4, 30–32, 36, 37, 67, 76, 80–82, 86, 126, 128, 132–133, 172, 176, 191, 195–196, 197, 215; hostility to Calvinists, 31–32, 126, 133, 201, 205, 212–213. *See also* Saxony and Saxon(s)
- Juliane, Landgravine of Nassau-Dillenburg, 27, 49, 107, 142, 169
- Jülich, 151, 163, 171, 185
- Kalkar, Fortress of, 151, 192
- Karl Ludwig, Prince Palatine, 31, 43, 50, 69, 129, 134, 150, 152, 154, 155, 159, 162, 222, 239–241
- Katharina Belgica, Countess of Nassau, 16, 30, 74, 142, 172, 229
- Katzenelnbogen, 20, 22, 27, 198, 205, 217–219, 223, 229
- Kempen, 163, 164, 167, 171, 185
- Kirchhain, 173, 178, 195, 204, 206–208, 213, 215, 223–225, 225, 229
- Königsmarck, Hans Christoph, Count von, 130, 134, 172, 173, 177, 182, 184, 190, 192, 195, 204, 213, 219, 221, 225, 230
- Krosigk, Adolf Wilhelm von, 57, 65, 130, 136–137, 151, 160, 164–165, 167, 174–175, 179–184, 186, 191, 194, 202, 210, 218, 227, 232, 243
- La Boderie, French Resident at Cassel, 38, 55–59, 69, 102–103, 110, 120
- Lamboy, Guillaume de, General, 98, 151, 163, 221, 223–225, 230–232
- Langen, Heinrich von, 93, 95–96, 106–108
- La Trémoille, Henri Charles de, prince of Tarent and Talmont, 222, 230
- Leer, 40, 49, 53
- Leipzig, 165–166; Alliance of, 128

- Leopold Wilhelm, Archduke, 88, 110, 132, 157–158, 160, 165, 203, 206–207, 215. *See also* Austria and Austrian(s); Habsburgs
- Leslie, Alexander, General, 35, 38, 69
- Leslie, Walter, Field Marshal, 135
- Lippe, 147, 155, 158, 167, 188
- Lippstadt, 77, 134, 184, 198, 230; Treaty of, 137, 146
- Longueville, Duke de, 137, 147–148, 211–212, 216
- Lorraine, Duke de, 184–185
- Louis XIII, King of France, 17, 41, 45, 55–59, 67, 75, 92, 102–103, 130, 131, 134, 136, 141, 167, 169–170. *See also* France and French
- Louis XIV, King of France, 175, 182, 210, 216, 241. *See also* France and French
- Louise, Landgravine of Hesse-Cassel, 38–39, 88, 91, 140–141
- Louise Juliana, Princess Palatine, 16, 30
- Lower Saxony and Lower Saxon Circle, 122, 128–130, 163
- Ludwig V, Landgrave of Hesse-Darmstadt, 23, 25, 27
- Ludwig VI, Landgrave of Hesse-Darmstadt, 222, 228–229
- Luther, Martin, 17, 21, 144
- Lutherans and Lutheranism, 8, 9, 13, 17, 19, 21–25, 27, 28, 30, 31, 91, 121, 122, 133, 135–136, 143–145, 161, 169–170, 173, 174, 187–189, 194, 200, 201, 203, 204, 206, 212, 214, 223, 226, 236–238. *See also* Calvinists and Calvinism; Catholics and Catholicism; Luther, Martin
- Mainz, Archbishopric and Archbishop-Elector of, 12, 18, 25, 33, 36, 79, 84, 86, 99–100, 104–112, 114, 116–122, 124–126, 129, 131–133, 155, 164, 172, 188, 198, 202, 203, 205, 215, 216, 218, 220, 226–228, 242
- Malsburg: Herman von der, 47; Christian von der, 70, 114; Otto von der, 85, 100, 107, 149, 224
- Marburg: city and fortress of, 19, 21–23, 27, 47, 170, 173, 199, 202–205, 208, 216, 217, 223, 225, 227, 229; peace negotiations at, 68, 70, 72–73, 76–77, 80, 82–83, 87, 89–97, 98–107, 114, 121. *See also* Hesse-Marburg
- Maximilian, Elector of Bavaria. *See* Bavaria and Bavarian(s)
- Mazarin, Jules, Cardinal, 1, 6, 46, 170–171, 174, 175, 180–183, 210
- Mecklenburg, 39, 125, 189
- Melander, Peter, Count von Holzappel, 11, 30, 32, 43–46, 48, 53–54, 57–58, 62, 63, 65, 69, 72, 74–76, 80, 89, 92, 93, 95, 99, 102, 105, 106, 110, 112–113, 117–118, 120, 123, 126–130, 132, 134, 135, 141, 146–151, 164, 203, 208–209, 215, 220, 223–226, 230
- Mercy, Franz von, Bavarian General, 177, 195–196, 197
- Mercy, Kaspar von, Commander, 208
- Minden, 211, 228; Treaty of, 36
- Moravia and Moravian(s), 165, 177, 186
- Moritz, Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel, 12, 22–27, 29, 30, 47, 49, 143, 236
- Mortaigne de Potelles, Kaspar Kornelius, Hessian Lieutenant General, 219–220
- Müldener, Nikolaus Christoph, 189, 218
- Müller, Georg, 120, 125
- Münster, city and bishopric of, 43, 47, 55, 126, 158, 159, 161, 167, 168, 177, 186, 188, 189, 191, 197, 202, 205, 210–212, 216, 218, 223, 226–228, 228, 232. *See also* Osnabrück; Westphalia(n)
- Naumburg, 173, 205, 218
- Neuburg, Wolfgang Wilhelm, Duke of, 79, 86, 128, 130, 135, 141, 150–151, 165, 166, 176, 188, 192, 227
- Neuss, 164, 165, 184, 185, 216, 228, 238
- Nördlingen, First and Second Battles of, 30, 196
- Osnabrück: negotiations at, 159, 161, 179, 186, 189, 197, 198, 200–202, 218, 226–227, 230; bishop and bishopric of, 167, 189, 211–212. *See also* Münster, city and bishopric of; Westphalia(n)
- Ottoman Turks, 65, 100, 162, 182, 188
- Oxenstierna, Axel, Chancellor, 6, 32–33, 46, 53, 54, 59, 120, 128, 134, 157, 167, 170, 177, 211
- Oxenstierna, Johann, 176, 185, 189, 200, 205
- Paderborn, 22, 43, 55, 134, 136, 154, 167, 188, 202, 205, 209, 216, 221, 227–228, 230, 231
- Palatinate of the Rhine, 4, 16, 18, 134, 188, 222. *See also* Friedrich V, Prince Palatine; Heidelberg; Karl Ludwig, Prince Palatine
- Papacy and papal nuncio, 2, 133, 165, 185, 216
- Paris, 101, 167, 169, 170, 174, 186, 193, 194, 210, 222
- Philipp, Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel, 38, 41, 116, 140–141

- Philipp I, Landgrave of Hesse, 21–22, 23, 30, 217
- Piccolomini, Octavio, Imperial Field Marshal, 147, 157, 165
- Polhelm, von, family members of, 167, 169, 174, 202
- Pomerania(n), 39, 53, 69, 92, 150, 156, 157, 177, 202, 211
- Prague, 21, 119, 230; Peace of, 3, 4, 31–33, 35–37, 60, 79, 81, 88, 109, 121, 123, 126, 132–133, 137–138, 152, 154, 155, 156, 163, 187–188, 234
- Rabenhaupt, Karl von, Major General, 90, 151, 158, 184–185, 209, 213, 219, 221, 226
- Ramsay, James, Swedish General, 35, 66, 99
- Rantzau, Josias, French General, 40, 57, 75, 177
- Reformed. *See* Calvinists and Calvinism
- Regensburg, 30; Diet of, 152–156, 159, 161, 172, 188, 192
- Reichshofrat, 13, 25, 171, 193
- Reichskammergericht, 13, 23, 25, 47, 171, 193, 208, 222
- Rheinfelden, Battle of, 98–99
- Rheinfels, 21, 22, 27, 190, 219, 220, 229
- Richelieu, Armand du Plessis, Cardinal de, 11, 33, 55, 56, 98, 129–130, 160, 170
- Riedesel, Erbmarschall, 106, 113, 207, 222, 242
- Rotenburg Quarter, 27, 49, 50, 82, 169, 210, 229. *See also* Ernst, Landgrave of Hesse-Rheinfels; Friedrich (Fritz), Landgrave of Hesse-Eschwege; Hermann, Landgrave of Hesse-Rotenburg; Juliane, Landgravine of Nassau-Dillenburg; Ziegenhain
- Salvius, Johan Adler, 86, 136, 171, 174–175, 176, 185, 200
- Saxe-Altenburg. *See* Thumshirn, Wolfgang Conrad von
- Saxe-Eisenach, Albrecht, Duke of, 79, 81
- Saxe-Gothe, Ernst, Duke of, 227, 229
- Saxe-Weimar, Bernhard of, and Bernhardsines, 1, 31, 42, 74–75, 92, 98–100, 125, 128–130, 132, 147
- Saxony and Saxon(s), 18, 132, 150, 165, 184, 198, 238; delegates at Westphalia, 231. *See also* Johann Georg, Elector of Saxony; Lower Saxony and Lower Saxon Circle
- Scheffer, Reinhardt, 47–48, 54, 57, 95, 99, 105–106, 108, 117–118, 120, 123, 130, 145, 153, 184, 186, 193, 200–201, 212, 218, 231–232, 243
- Schmalkalden, 25, 27, 134, 205, 214, 217, 223, 229, 238
- Servien, Abel, 180, 181, 185, 190, 193, 209, 232
- Silesia, 165, 202, 223
- Sinold, Justus (aka Schütz), 93, 95–96, 106–108, 199
- Sixtinus, Nicolaus, 47–48, 93, 106, 108, 112, 116, 120, 123, 127–130, 145, 194, 243
- Sixtinus, Wilhelm Burckhardt, 93, 96, 174
- Solms-Laubach, Albrecht Otto, Count zu, 109, 125
- Spain and Spanish, 2, 3, 4, 12, 17, 33, 55, 85, 117, 151, 152, 162, 165, 166, 167, 170, 177, 184, 185, 190, 212, 215, 226; king of, 175. *See also* Habsburgs; Spanish Netherlands
- Spanish Netherlands, 2, 117, 170
- St. André, Colonel, 57, 158
- St. Chamond, French Resident at Cassel, 32, 39–40
- Stadthagen, 155, 217, 228
- Stockholm, 54, 69, 101, 102, 169, 174, 203, 211, 212. *See also* Sweden and Swedes
- Sweden and Swedes, 2, 5, 13, 20, 33–35, 38, 75, 98–102, 156–159, 166, 188, 193, 210, 215, 232, 239; army and military actions of, 4, 28–29, 30, 32–33, 35, 37–40, 53, 69, 74, 80, 92, 93, 125, 126, 129, 130, 132, 147–148, 150, 152, 155–158, 165–166, 173, 196, 202, 204, 206–207, 209, 215, 219, 221–223, 226, 230; relations with Hesse-Cassel, 28–29, 32–35, 37–38, 42, 45–47, 52–55, 57–61, 68, 69, 80, 86, 98–102, 106, 111, 120, 125, 128–132, 134–137, 147–149, 152, 154, 155, 157–158, 166–170, 173–178, 179–181, 183, 184, 188–190, 192–194, 199–200, 202–207, 209, 211–213, 216–219, 226–227, 228, 232, 236; relations with Hesse-Darmstadt, 29, 169–170, 173–174, 189, 199, 203–204, 206–207, 209, 212–213, 216–219, 228; negotiations at Westphalia, 159, 161, 171, 176, 179–180, 185–186, 189, 192–194, 199–200, 202, 206, 209–213, 216, 226–232; war with Denmark, 176–178, 180, 182, 192, 197. *See also* Christina, Queen of Sweden; France and French; Gustavus Adolphus, King of Sweden; Müller, Georg; Wolff, Hermann
- Tercy, French diplomat, 10, 49, 55–56, 59
- Thumshirn, Wolfgang Conrad von, 201, 227
- Thuringia(n), 62, 127, 148, 196
- Tilly, Johann Tserclaes, Count von, 25–26, 28–29, 38, 127

- Todenwarth, Johann Jakob Wolff von, 88, 191, 199
- Torstenson, Lennart, Swedish General, 165–166, 177, 182, 184, 192, 195–196, 203
- Trier, Archbishop-Elector of, 18, 152, 162, 240
- Turenne, Henri de La Tour d’Auvergne, Vicomte de, 182–183, 195–196, 198, 206–207, 218–219, 225–226, 230
- Tuttlingen, Battle of, 177–178, 180
- Uerdingen, 163, 165
- Ulm, Truce of, 215–216, 221
- Umstadt, 217, 223, 229
- Venice and Venetians, 44, 185, 189, 202, 209
- Vienna, 83, 86, 88, 100, 104, 133, 150, 150, 165, 196. *See also* Austria and Austrian(s); Habsburgs
- Vultejus, Hermann, 19, 24, 47
- Vultejus, Johannes, 47, 58, 85–86, 108–109, 117–119, 121, 123, 125, 126, 129, 130, 134, 145, 153, 158, 160, 163, 186, 194, 199, 209, 211–212, 218, 241, 243
- Wahl, Count von, 146, 148, 158, 165, 166, 173
- Waldeck, 134, 151, 167, 173
- Welfs. *See* Brunswick-Lüneburg
- Werben, Treaty of, 28, 135
- Werra River, 148, 184, 223
- Werth, Jean de (also Jan von), Bavarian commander, 71, 74, 98, 165, 206
- Wesel, 125, 158; Treaty of, 36, 56, 92, 102, 110, 131
- Westerhold, Major General von, 89, 90, 107
- Westphalia(n), 11, 22, 29, 32–36, 38, 40, 42, 47, 55, 59, 77, 85, 88, 106, 126, 129, 130, 131, 134, 146, 148, 166, 168, 172, 176, 180, 184, 190, 195, 196, 198, 203, 204, 209, 221, 224, 230–231; Congress and Peace of, 2, 3, 4, 159, 161–162, 166, 169–171, 174, 176, 179–180, 185–189, 192, 193, 197–202, 204–206, 209–212, 214–220, 223, 226–232, 233–234, 236–239, 243, 245. *See also* Münster, city and bishopric of; Osnabrück
- Wetterau, The, 167, 206–207
- Wicquefort, Joachim de, 129, 151, 180–181, 183, 185, 190
- Wilhelm V, Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel, 5, 7, 11, 24, 26–40, 41–53, 55–56, 59–60, 64, 67–71, 78, 80–81, 87, 91, 99, 108, 123, 128, 135, 140–141, 150, 158, 167, 168, 170, 174, 224; testament of, 44, 46, 49–50, 60, 69, 78, 94, 101, 103, 106, 112–113, 143–144, 145. *See also* Hesse-Cassel
- Wilhelm VI, Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel, 38, 41, 49–52, 56, 59–60, 63–65, 69, 81–82, 87, 95, 141, 184–185, 195, 210, 223, 226, 237, 240, 241–242; illness of, 116; betrothal and marriage to Hedwig Sophie, 192, 210, 239, 240. *See also* Brandenburg; Hedwig Sophie of; Hesse-Cassel
- Wismar, 211; Treaty of, 35, 92
- Wolfenbüttel, 129, 157–158, 163. *See also* Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel, August, Duke of
- Wolff, Hermann, 53–54, 58, 69, 125, 135, 137, 157, 166, 203. *See also* Sweden and Swedes
- Wrangel, Karl Gustav, Swedish General, 157–158, 196, 204, 206–207, 218, 225, 230
- Ziegenhain, 20, 22, 49–50, 90–92, 94, 100, 207–209