Mohan Lal, munshi.

LIFE

OF THE

AMIR DOST MOHAMMED KHAN,

OF

KABUL:

WITH HIS POLITICAL PROCEEDINGS TOWARDS THE

ENGLISH, RUSSIAN, AND PERSIAN GOVERNMENTS,

INCLUDING THE

VICTORY AND DISASTERS OF THE BRITISH ARMY

IN

AFGHANISTAN.

BY MOHAN LAL, ESQ.,

KNIGHT OF THE PERSIAN ORDER OF THE LION AND SUN; LATELY ATTACHED TO THE MISSION IN KABUL.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

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NOTICE.

The extracts which have unavoidably been briefly quoted in this Work, especially in the latter part of it, are meant neither in disrespect to the opinions of any authority whatever, nor to contradict or disprove the assertions of certain writers in Indian journals. That is the province of men of higher talents and abilities; nor are they meant as self-boasting by the Author. Far from it. They illustrate the pages merely as evidence to his statement, which otherwise might have been considered partial.

The Author.

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CHAPTER XIV.

Affairs of Sindh—Geography—Political position—Mission to the Mirs — Difficulties attending its reception — It arrives at Tattah — Stay at that city—Negotiations — Departure —Captain Christie and Sir Henry Pottinger proceed in disguise through Sindh—Dr. James Burnes invited to Sindh—His testimony—Extracts from Sir John Malcolm—Mission of Sir Alexander Burnes—Various treaties—Further negotiations with the Mirs—Their harsh treatment by the British Government—Sir Charles Napier sent to Sindh—Continued oppression exercised towards the Mirs—the Bilochis revolt—Battle of Miani—The Mir of Mirpur is defeated—Capture of Omercote—Battle of Pir Assee—Victory gained by Col. Jacob—Conclusion of the history of Sindh.

THE country of Sindh is irrigated by the river Indus or Sindh, from which it takes its common appellation. On the north it is bounded by Kach Gandava,

the Panjab, and the Daudpotra districts; and on the south side by the ocean. It has Rajvara on the east and Bilochistan on the west, making the area of the country about 100,000 square miles.* The revenue derived by the ex-Mirs of Sindh was from 3,500,000 rupees (35,000*l.*) to 4,000,000 rupees (40,000*l.*); and the expense in maintaining possession of that country is 8,000,000 rupees (80,000*l.*).†

When the successful career of Bonaparte had subverted the independence of many kingdoms in Europe, his thirst for the conquest of India, and the arrival of his mission on a large scale under General Gardanne at Tehran, excited great alarm in British India, and the Supreme Government deputed various missions in various directions to frustrate the designs of Napoleon. The Honourable Mountstuart Elphinstone, as already mentioned, went to the Durrani Court, Sir John Malcolm to the capital of Persia, and Nicholas Hankey Smith, Esq., of the Bombay Civil Service, was appointed as an envoy by the Governor-General of India to negotiate for and to secure the alliance of the Mirs of Sindh. Both the

* Visit to the Court of Sindh, by Dr. Burnes, K.H.

† Also in 1845 the expense has much exceeded the income. See Captain Postans's Observations on Sindh.

former kingdoms still retain their independence, but the latter dominion has fallen into our possession; and its rulers, who once possessed independence, and were soothed and courted by English ambassadors, and feared, flattered, and adored by European travellers, who explored their country in disguise, are now the prisoners of our Indian government!

In the number of the European gentlemen who composed the mission of Mr. Smith to the court of Sindh, I will only mention the name of Sir Henry Pottinger (then Lieut.), whose knowledge of that country became a guide to the ambition of others, and whose talents and judgment in all his diplomatic career, whether in Kach, in Sindh, or in China, have merited an extraordinary and yet just degree of estimation, and which are rewarded with the unanimous applause of all parties of the English nation at large. The departure of this officer brought the misfortune and sealed the fate of the Mirs of Sindh; and knowing as I do his just and noble principles, no one feels so bitterly distressed at the fall of the Mirs as he feels.

On the 27th of April, 1809, the mission, consisting of Mr. Smith and Sir Henry Pottinger, the former being the chief, embarked on board their ships to

sail from Bombay, and on the 9th of May, at noon, they approached the harbour of Karachi, the Governor of which place was requested to supply pilots. Here I shall quote the Right Honourable Baronet himself,* and, in short, follow his steps until the valuable publication of "Napier's Conquest of Sindh."

"The Governor made some demur regarding the admission of the ships into the harbour, but his objections were overruled. About an hour after they had anchored, the Governor came on board to visit Mr. Smith, attended by several matchlockmen, and brought some sheep and vegetables as a present. The two succeeding days were lost in discussions respecting the disembarkation of the mission, which the Governor was anxious to delay until he should receive instructions from the Mirs. On the 12th he visited Mr. Smith a second time, when the latter took occasion to reprehend some improper assumptions in the correspondence that had taken place relative to the titles and rank of the Governor-General and the Mirs: at which he professed his regret, and said it arose from his ignorance of the

* Pottinger's Bilochistan. Mission to Sindh, p. 332.

Persian language; but that he was willing either to put the person who had written them to death, or to blind him, as the envoy chose. He was of course requested not to proceed to such violent measures, but to give orders for greater circumspection in future. The Governor seemed under great alarm throughout this visit, and, after his boat was alongside, hesitated whether he would come on board or not. On the 13th and 14th of May the tents and public stores of the mission were landed, and the former pitched on a spot pointed out by the Governor. Several of the gentlemen had gone on shore and learned that great consternation had been excited by our arrival; that orders had been issued not to let any of our people enter the fort of Karachi, and that a large body of troops, under one of their most distinguished Sardars, had encamped within eight miles of the place, with the evident intention of watching our motions; indeed, the whole of the Governor's conduct had evinced a medley of terror and dissimulation, and a jealousy of our acquiring the slightest information which could not have been exceeded had we come with declared hostile intentions. On the 16th of May the Envoy disembarked under salutes of fifteen guns from the two ships, and

was received on the beach by the escort and gentlemen of the mission, amidst the acclamations of a vast concourse of natives, to whom money was distributed according to the Oriental custom. In the afternoon the Navab sent a man to intimate his intention of paying his respects to the Envoy; but as the order for debarring our servants from ingress to the fort was still in force, he was informed he would not be received. Mr. Ellis went to the Governor to explain the cause of this refusal, and had an interview with him at a house outside the walls. The Navab wished us to believe that a similar prohibition extended to all strangers: he said that he was very sorry it should give such offence; but whether Mr. Smith saw him or not, he would daily attend at his encampment; that he had his orders from the Mirs, his masters, and must obey them; and that when a Mihmandar* was sent from Haidarabad to conduct the mission to court, we should be convinced of the necessity of his non-compliance. A few days after a letter was received from the Mirs, acquainting the Envoy with their determination to depute two offi-

* Mihmandar, from Mihman, a guest and dar-a-keeper. He is a person appointed to conduct envoys, and see that they are supplied with the productions of the country. Usually his powers are very much abused, by making them a cloak for extortion.

cers of Government to treat with him at Karachi, and that he was to accept all they said as strictly official; but as the style of their language was in that strain of arrogance and superiority which it was so much the object of the mission* to check in its infancy, the letter was returned, accompanied by a light communication, acquainting the Mirs that, as it contained not merely an unwarrantable assumption of rank on their behalf, but a want of due acknowledgment of that of the exalted government of which the Envoy was the representative, it was impossible its contents could be attended to in any form. Reports of various natures now daily reached us. At one hour it was confidently affirmed that the mission was to advance to the capital, escorted by a large body of Sindhian horse, and to be treated with every mark of attention; at another, that the Envoy would be called upon to negotiate with officers that were to be dispatched to him for that purpose; and, at a

* An envoy on the part of the Government of Bombay had been deputed to Sindh the preceding year, and treated in a manner that was not deemed at all warranted by the relative rank of the two nations. The envoy from the Governor-General had therefore the most pointed instructions to repress every attempt at a similar impropriety, and to be scrupulously exact in resenting any omission of that respect due to the British power in India, as well as any superiority claimed by the rulers of Sindh.

third, that we were to be forced by a body of troops, then reported to be on its march to Karachi, to re-embark on board the ships and sail for India. All of them corresponded in one great feature, which was, that the Mirs entertained the utmost apprehensions of our designs on their territories; and, in fact, the hourly arrival of reinforcements for the garrison and defence of Karachi would have afforded sufficient evidence of this dread.

"Some days subsequent to the transmission of the letter to the Mirs, a friendly note reached the Envoy from Akhund Mohammed Baqa Khan, who had been at Bombay a few months before as an agent on behalf of the Sindhian government, announcing his being deputed to Mr. Smith, and his intention of making all possible haste to join him. The same messenger who brought this letter confirmed intelligence that we had obtained some time before of an army of three thousand men having been collected in the neighbourhood of the city of Tattah, and the probability of its moving towards us, in order, as we presumed, to enforce the Akhund's terms, which officer arrived at Karachi on the 23rd of May; and the following morning came to the British encampment, where he had a very long con-

ference with the Envoy. He dwelt much on the fears that had been engendered in the minds of the Mirs by the presence of two armed ships in the harbour of Karachi; and concluded by avowing that their being dispatched to Bombay, or at least out of the Sindhian dominions, was a *sine quâ non* previous to the mission being allowed to move towards Haidarabad.

"Other subjects were also discussed of a political nature, and the consultation ended by a positive declaration of the envoy, that in preference to proceeding to the capital under the most trifling stipulation, he would go on board; and however great the risk might be of venturing to sea at that advanced season of the year,* sail for Calcutta, to lay the business before the Governor-General; that with regard to that part of the communication made by the Akhund, which relates to his powers to treat with the envoy, it was entirely out of the question, as the latter could only do so with the rulers of Sindh, to whom he was accredited. On the 26th May, the Governor sent a verbal message to the envoy, desiring he would issue orders for the ships

* The south-west monsoon had set in with great violence, and it was then blowing a tremendous gale.

to quit the harbour immediately; but he, as well as the Akhund, evaded, in the most artful manner, giving any written document to this effect. At length the former proposed to show any gentleman of the mission the official instructions he had received from the Mirs to enforce this demand; however, when Mr. Ellis and Captain Christie proceeded to the usual place of meeting, he declined to fulfil his proposal, on the grounds of not being authorised to do so by his masters. Under these perplexing circumstances, Mr. Smith came to the determination not to have any further official intercourse either with the Navab or the Akhund, but to write a letter to the Mirs, and to regulate his future measures in conformity with their answer. At the same time he announced his resolution to those officers, and requested that the latter of them would attend at the British encampment, in order that he might hear the proposed letter read, ere it was sent off to Haidarabad. He accordingly came, and, while it was preparing, a very long conversation took place, in which he laboured to convince the envoy that the mission had been received in the most friendly way; that the simple act of its being permitted to land, and to hoist the British flag, was decisive evidence

of this assertion; 'for,' added he, 'if you had attempted to enter the port without leave, the guns of the fort would have sunk your vessels.' To this bravado it was replied, that had affairs come to that crisis it would have been seen whether English or Sindhian guns were best, and that the result was very obvious.

"The Akhund next adverted to the expressions which were complained of in the Mirs' correspondence, and endeavoured to prove that they were according to the idiom of the Persian language, as used in Sindh; he swore repeatedly that 'Mulazimat' (services) meant a friendly meeting; that 'Mavddat' (friendship) was highly disrespectful as used in the envoy's letters; and that 'Huzur' (the royal presence) had been the title of the Mirs for twenty years, and could not be altered without putting every man in Sindh to death. Mr. Smith reminded him that it was absurd to expect that he should be acquainted with the peculiar idiom of Sindh, or adopt it, even admitting he were so; that he used the two first words pointed out, and all other, agreeably to their general acceptation; that 'Huzur' was only applicable to an independent

sovereign, and not to a tributary government like that of Sindh. The Akhund here interrupted the envoy by saying that the tribute was of late years only nominal, and that he might attribute his not receiving answers to his former letters to the diction used in them. The letter about to be dispatched to the Mirs was then read aloud by one of the Munshis or Persian writers, and the Akhund made the same ridiculous objections to the use of various words inserted in it, after which he took leave.

"All the Sindhians who had entered the public service were this forenoon expelled, with their families, from their houses in the fort of Karachi, and one of them, who was bringing some provisions for the use of the envoy's table, was seized and tied to a post in the centre of the Sindhian camp which now nearly encompassed our tents; but as we had Qanats* all round our encampment it did not inconvenience us. A remonstrance was instantly sent out by the Navab, who ordered the man to be released, and expressed his dissatisfaction at the act; but a few hours after his own people committed one of much

* Qanats are tent walls, made for the purpose of keeping tents private.

greater insolence, by beating the Lascars who were filling water for the consumption of the two ships' crews, and spilling all that was ready to be sent on board.

"In the evening the Akhund came to our encampment, accompanied by a person whom he introduced by the name of Musa Khan, informing the envoy that he was empowered to communicate the Mirs' desire that the ships should quit the harbour, and that the mission might afterwards advance to Haidarabad, with every honour and attention.

"We had been so narrowly watched since our arrival here, that it was quite unpleasant to venture beyond our camp limits; and matters began to assume so hostile an appearance from the increasing arrogance of the Navab, and the real or affected imbecility of Akhund Baqa Khan, that it was judged advisable to re-ship all the valuable part of the public property. Boats were consequently requested of the Governor, who avowed his positive determination not to permit a single article to be sent on board; and he effectually prevented any such precaution by denouncing the displeasure of the Mirs against whatever boatmen might dare to serve us. We

were in reality now nothing better than prisoners at large, for the only communication we could have with the ships was by means of their boats, and every time that one of them came to the landing-place three or four armed men were placed near her to prevent things being put on board. We now also discovered that a guard was stationed at each corner of our encampment every night; which was so unequivocally meant to observe our proceedings, and consequently so undisguised an insult, that one of the Chobdars* was sent with a message to direct that they might not again come there under any circumstances: and this was attended with the proposed effect. The Hindus and other inhabitants of the town, who had been, at first, in the habit of occasionally visiting our encampment, had of late ceased to do so; and the Sindhians, who had been entertained in different capacities, were threatened with harsh treatment, unless they quitted our service.

"About a week after the transmission of the envoy's letter to the Mirs their reply was received, in which they entered into a prolix view of the

* Chobdar, a native mace-bearer; from *chob*, a mace, and *dar*, a bearer.

behaviour they had adopted towards the mission from the Bombay Government the antecedent year, contrasting it with the increased attention and respect which, as they wished to impress on Mr. Smith, had been observed with regard to the present one. The style of the letter was, however, highly domineering and imperious; and, among others, it contained an observation, that they knew not how to write to a person who had returned the Parvanah Huzur (royal mandate). They, however, revoked their orders respecting the dispatch of the ships, — a matter which they endeavoured to treat in the lightest manner, by inquiring of what importance it could be to them, though there were twenty British ships-of-war in the Karachi harbour?

"Political considerations induced the envoy to overlook, or at least to view in a secondary light, the exceptionable style of this communication, which was instantly returned; and as the question of any compromise of the dignity of the British Government was laid at rest by the rulers of Sindh having waved their stipulation on the subject of the vessels, he announced his determination to set out for Haidarabad in a few days."

On the 10th of June the mission quitted Karachi;

and after five marches arrived in the old and famous city of Tattah,* once the splendid capital of Sindh. A few days' stay in this place afforded a favourable opportunity for Sir Henry Pottinger to collect commercial and geographical information concerning this district; and the circumstances which took place during the space of his delay there will be better described in his own extracts.†

"Our stay at Tattah afforded us ample leisure to see every corner of it, and the surrounding district offered to the sportsmen of the party abundance of shooting at hares and partridges. We were not, however, exclusively indebted to these recreations for means to pass our time, as some acts of the officers of the Sindhian Government again called for all the firmness and address of the envoy to combat them, and had nearly led to the mission abruptly leaving the country. Shortly after we had taken up our residence at Tattah, a nobleman of high rank and station, of the name of Vali Mohammed Khan, came to that city on official business; and the very next morning sent a body of his troops, who made

* The Honourable East India Company had here a commercial Residency in Sindh for many years.

† Pottinger's Bilochistan, pp. 348-9.

prisoners of all the Sindhians that were employed by the mission.

"A second letter was received by the envoy from the Mirs while we were on the road, acquainting him that one of their jamptis, or state-boats, was about to be dispatched for the conveyance of himself and suite by water to Haidarabad; and that he might expect her in a few days. It had been previously decided that some plausible excuse should be fabricated to enable the gentlemen of the mission to separate here, in order to proceed to court by two routes, and thereby acquire the utmost geographical knowledge of the country possible under so jealous a government; and, therefore, so exactly the reverse was their proposal from being vexatious, that our plan was perfected by it, as the boat was found too small even to contain one half the mission; and Mr. Ellis, Captain Maxfield, and myself, were eventually accommodated on board of her, with some difficulty, while the envoy and the remainder of the officers proceeded by the land route.

"Mr. Ellis immediately waited on him by the envoy's directions, and reprobated in strong terms this unfriendly and unjustifiable measure. A very

long conference ensued, in warm language, in the course of which the Khan asked who we (the English) were? and whether we fancied ourselves the lords of the land? He added that he would do as he chose with the subjects of Sindh; that he would flog them, cut their ears off, and put them to death; nay, that he would burn Tattah if he thought proper.

"The morning after the envoy reached Haidarabad the Mirs each sent a formal deputation out to our encampment, which was pitched on the bank of the Fuleli river, about one mile south-east of the fortress, to congratulate him on that event, and to inquire after his health; but as it was ascertained that none of the persons who brought these complimentary messages, and who were also charged with the delivery of many large trays of sweetmeats, were of higher rank than Khidmatgars,* it was not deemed

* Khidmatgars are personal servants, and we usually apply the term to every description of attendants at table. In Sindh the word appears to be more confined in its acceptation, and to signify inferior divans or stewards. They, however, wait on their masters, and perform several offices in the household. The Peish Khidmats of Persia are of the same class, and seemed to be employed on similar errands and duties.

consonant with the situation of affairs that Mr. Smith should receive them in person, and Mr. Ellis accordingly did so; at which arrangement they appeared considerably disappointed, though, when they found that they had a present notwithstanding, this feeling ceased, and they returned in perfect good humour. The Mirs did not, however, allow this alleged disrespect towards themselves to pass without a long expostulation, which was delivered by one of their divans, or managers, called Mushtaq Ram, who particularly enlarged on the policy of the envoy courting the favourable opinion of the Mirs by acts of pointed external respect, on which subject, he added, they were very tenacious. He likewise adverted, most opportunely, to its having been omitted by the envoy to make a return of complimentary inquiries for the Mirs, and was informed that that had not been neglected; but that the Munshi who was dispatched for that purpose had in vain endeavoured to gain entrance into the fort, and was actually obliged to wait outside until he sent a person back to Mr. Smith to ask what steps he should take towards delivering his messages; and that that gentleman had even waved ceremony so

far as to direct he would do so to any of the officers of Government he should happen to meet with, in order that they might be conveyed to the Mirs through that channel.

"The divan was further reminded, that previous to the arrival of the envoy at the capital, Mr. Ellis found occasion, more than once, to have intercourse with the Mirs on official topics, and that the Munshi who was employed on those errands was invariably refused admission into the fort, and obliged to remain in the bazaar outside, until an answer was brought to him. It was therefore evident, if any unfriendly omission had occurred, that it originated on the side of the Sindhian Government; and it was equally obvious that the Mirs had no cause to feel any sort of chagrin at their Khidmatgars not being seen by any envoy, when they had declined to admit a Munshi, who was a person of much higher station and respectability, into their presence, even when charged with important verbal communications.

"A serious quarrel had nearly occurred between our people and the Sindhians, one of whom attempted to rush past a sentinel, and, on being prevented, struck him, and knocked off his cap. Exertions

were made to seize the offender, but he effected his escape in the crowd; and the envoy's anxiety to obviate any similar occurrence, which might have led to the most fatal consequences, only for the forbearance displayed by the Sipahi, suggested the expedient of the sentries being posted inside the Qnats, which was accordingly resorted to.

"The second day after the envoy had got to Haidarabad, the ceremonials of his first audience at court were brought forward; when, as we had foreseen, the proposals made by the Mirs, through various people, induced a negotiation that delayed the final arrangements for nearly a week; and had once or twice led us to anticipate quitting Sindh without a personal interview of the rulers.

"It had been understood that the 'masnad,' or throne, was considerably elevated from the ground,* and the envoy therefore deemed it proper that he should have a chair to sit upon, and also that the three Mirs should rise on the entrance of the

* This mistake was immediately rectified, and the stipulation regarding the chair withdrawn, as it was ascertained that the Mirs sat upon a farsh, or quilted mattress, that did not raise them above two inches from the ground.

mission; while they, on the other hand, not only declined showing any outward mark of respect by standing up, but actually proposed that we should all be disarmed previous to coming into the hall of audience, grounding this unwarrantable proposition on a plea that proved it a still greater insult, of an attempt having once been made by two 'vakils' of the Jaipur Rajah to assassinate one of the Mirs at a public levee.

"The evening after the forms of our reception had been agreed upon we were introduced to the Mirs by Akhund Mohammed Baqa Khan, who came to the British encampment for the purpose of conducting us to court, and he severally announced the rank and station of the envoy and of the gentlemen of his suite.

"At last we got to the place where we were to dismount, and were there received by Vali Mohammed Khan and by several other officers of the highest rank, who preceded us to a large open platform, at the further end of which sat the three Mirs. The platform was spread with the richest Persian carpets, so that we here put off our shoes; and the moment the envoy made the first step to

advance towards the princes, they all rose and stood upright until he reached his allotted place, which was distinguished from that of the remainder of the party by having an embroidered cloth laid over it.

"As soon as we had sat down a scene of confusion ensued, which it is difficult to describe, and could only be attributed to a distrust of our real designs; for the mass of attendants, matchlockmen, and swordsmen crowded into the place, and nearly overwhelmed us by their pressure. The foremost of them even placed their feet on the scabbards of our swords and on the skirts of our coats, which, from the manner in which we were sitting, lay along the carpet; but whether this was a preconcerted plan or the effect of chance it was impossible to guess. Subsequent interviews, however, incline me to lean to the former idea. The princes individually made polite inquiries for all our health. Indeed, nothing but compliments and expressions of politeness took place, as it was a mere audience of ceremony; and after we had been in the Darbar about half an hour, the eldest verbally signified their wish that we should retire, a hint that is given at all Indian

levees by the introduction of 'pan supari'* and 'atr,' or oil of roses; but in Sindh they have no such custom, nor even the Persian one of Qalliyans and coffee.

"At this levee the Mirs were dressed still more superbly than when we first saw them; however, there was nothing so remarkable in the change of any part of their costume as to merit description. The eldest brother had some very long strings of beautiful pearls round his neck, and one in his hand, which he used as a rosary, the size of which I should have before regarded as perfectly incredible. One of the younger princes had a dagger in his sash, from the hilt of which was suspended a perfect emerald,—considerably larger than a pigeon's egg.

"Towards the close of this audience, the envoy retired with the Mirs, and had a private conference, when he explained to those princes the nature of the negotiations he was intrusted with by the Governor-General, and intimated his desire that they should nominate such officers of the government as they deemed qualified to conduct, on their behalf, the consideration of the various topics connected with his

* Pan is the leaf of the piper betel. The Supari is the fruit of the areca tree.

mission. To this proposal they gave their ready assent, and promised that their ministers should attend daily at the British encampment until all matters were finally arranged.

"The ministers fixed upon by the Mirs were Vali Mohammed Khan, Akhund Baqa Khan, and a Hindu called Mushtaq Ram,—all persons of acknowledged abilities, and high in the confidence of their masters; but it would be equally uninteresting and unprofitable here to enter into a prolix narrative of the progress of the negotiations which almost wholly engaged the attentions of the envoy during our further stay at Haidarabad. The very nature of them, although extremely delicate and perplexing, rendered the whole peculiarly devoid of interest; and as the rulers of Sindh had desisted from assuming the tone of imperious superiority that had guided their counsels on our first arrival in the country, the discussions thenceforward were purely of a political nature. It therefore is sufficient for me to add, that the result of them was in the highest degree satisfactory to the supreme British authority in India, and that the envoy received the merited approbation and thanks of his superiors for the firm-

ness, dignity, and sound judgment he had evinced in fulfilling the orders with which he had been furnished. An envoy to the Governor-General was likewise appointed, to return with the mission, in order to receive the ratification of the treaty that was made then and there."

While the interviews and the negotiations between the Princes of Sindh and the English envoy were going on, Sir Henry Pottinger was engaged in collecting information as to what was necessary to be known. The objects of the mission were thus satisfactorily completed; and the British envoy, after appointing among them an Indian agent on the part of his government, quitted the court of Sindh on his way back to Bombay.

"Having had an audience of leave, we embarked on board three jamptis, or state barges, provided by the Mirs, on the morning of the 25th of August, the baggage being shipped into boats hired for the purpose, and dropped down the Fuleli, from Haidarabad, in a south-south-east direction, till we entered the mouth of the Guni."

At the time Sir John Malcolm was re-appointed on a mission to Persia, the government of India felt more

anxiety than ever to make itself perfectly acquainted with the territory and resources bordering on Sindh, or the countries on the west of it. The information which was already gained, during the mission of Mr. Smith, appeared imperfect,—or in true words excited more curiosity than had existed before in the mind of the government. On this occasion Sir Henry Pottinger volunteered his services, together with Captain Charles Christie. This enterprising functionary, in order to facilitate the success of his mission, and the progress of his journey, did not only disguise himself, but also made himself known as the accredited agent of a rich Hindu,—a horse-dealer. On the 2nd of January, 1810, Sir Henry Pottinger and Captain Christie quitted Bombay; and on the 16th of that month they anchored at the harbour of Sonmiani. Here they thought proper to land in the darkness of night, so as to prevent the disclosure of their disguise; and on being introduced to the contractor of the Custom-house, Sir Henry Pottinger allowed them to say that he was in the service of Sundarji, the horse-dealer. Also at Bela, on the 26th of January, the Jam, or chief of the place, sent for one of the companions of Sir Henry

Pottinger, and pretended that he was anxious to show him civility and kindness, if the real character was known to him of that officer. It was, however, considered that the confession of his real character would be productive of serious trouble;—whereas the preservation of the disguise would facilitate the means of gaining information, and therefore the name of the horse-dealer was to be adopted as the safe passport for this bold traveller.

"Subsequent events, to dwell upon which would be entirely irrelevant to the subject of this narrative, induced the supreme government to recal Sir John Malcolm, and to postpone his mission until the latter end of the year 1809, when he arrived a second time at Bombay, on his way to the Persian capital. Captain Charles Christie, of the 5th regiment of Bombay Native Infantry, and I were then just returned from Sindh, whither we had accompanied the envoy on the part of the Governor-General, and on being made acquainted with the proposed plan, of exploring the regions between India and Persia, we volunteered to attempt the tour which is detailed in the following pages.*

* See Pottinger's Travels in Bilochistan.

"Our services having been accepted, and the authority of the government of Bombay obtained for their being thus appropriated, I was directed by General Malcolm to place myself under the orders of Captain Christie, who received his instructions from the General, and these instructions were of that indefinite tenor which the very nature of the service we were about to proceed upon demanded. They called our attention to such leading points as were most likely to merit the notice of government, and to meet the intentions of that enlightened policy that had sanctioned the original measure;—but at the same time they fully authorized us to select, with respect to our progress,—mode of travelling,—ultimate destination,—and, in fact, all minor points,—such a line of conduct as the circumstances we were placed in might render advisable, and were only peremptory in reminding us, that we were to regard our personal safety beyond every other consideration.

"It had been generally remarked that a very principal obstacle to the accomplishment of similar undertakings to that on which Captain Christie and myself were bent had originated at the very commencement of them, owing to the great difficulty attendant upon

an advance from the sea-coast, where most Asiatics are known to be more suspicious of, and uncivil to European strangers, than at some distance inland; an arrangement, therefore, to effect our first outset from the port at which we might land, was considered of the last importance to us, and we were fortunate enough to succeed in making one, to which no possible objection could be discovered.

"A Hindu merchant of great respectability and wealth, called Sundarji Sevaji, who had been, for many years preceding, the contractor for supplying the government of Madras and of Bombay with horses, to mount the cavalry of those two Presidencies, offered (on being consulted as to the best mode for us to proceed) to furnish us with letters and bills,—accredited as his agents, and dispatched by him to Kelat, the capital of Bilochistan, to purchase horses, from which city he observed that we could follow such route as local knowledge might point out to us; and that even in the extreme case of being forced to fly, we could take a different road towards the sea-coast, from that which we travelled in going, and thereby secure, almost beyond a doubt, seeing a great portion of the country.

"The bills and letters for us were, therefore, prepared; and a Hindu Gumashtah, or agent of Sundarji named Pitambardas, was appointed to accompany us as far as Kelat for the purpose of giving a greater air of plausibility to our avowed characters. Captain Christie and myself also selected two Hindustani men, who were bound to secrecy by promises of large presents, and whose fidelity and honesty, in the result, proved most exemplary. We were also, each, furnished with a considerable sum of money in gold Venetians, intended to use as a dernier resort, in case of the utmost necessity. These we carried in belts, tied round our waists, underneath our clothes; and, in addition to this supply, Captain Christie was empowered to draw bills on the government of Bombay, in favour of Sundarji Sevaji, to any amount he might find necessary; so that nothing was omitted in our equipment which could enable us to surmount opposition, and extricate ourselves from difficulties or dangers. The month of December, 1810, elapsed in these preparations,—and I commenced my narrative from the day we quitted the Presidency of Bombay.

"Late in the evening of the 2nd of January, 1811,

Captain Christie and myself embarked on board a small native boat, in Bombay harbour, that had been hired for the purpose of conveying us to the port of Sonmiani, and we instantly got under way. At daylight, next morning, we found that our party, exclusive of the boatmen, consisted of two Hindustani servants, and a Gumashtah or agent of Sundarji, and his attendant, — besides several Afghan horse-dealers, on their return to their own country, to whom we had granted a passage, thinking such acquaintances might be useful on landing. We were introduced to them as Europeans in the service of Sundarji.

"In the forenoon of the 26th of January the Jam sent for our Hindu Tulsia, and after some desultory conversation, said to him, 'I am now going to speak to you on a subject which I have not hitherto hinted at, nor ever shall mention to any other person, not even to my own son. I do not think that the two Englishmen here are merchants:—it is neither my wish nor aim to inquire into their plans; but if they are officers, I ought, when they visited me, to have considered them as my equals, and to have treated them accordingly, I therefore request

you will now inform me who they really are:—you may depend on the strictest secrecy, and if they belong to the British government it will give me additional pleasure to serve them.' The Hindu saw immediately into the drift of the Jam's curiosity, which he did not satisfy, but adhered to our original tale of being Sundarji's servants. The Jam next inquired what wages we had, and whether it would be possible to get, through our interest, two small guns or wall-pieces from Bombay. Tulsia replied he would mention the chief's wishes to us, and he then came away. We directed him to say that we could not venture to make any promises, but that on our return to India we would endeavour to have them sent."

On the 14th of July this brave and talented explorer of the regions quite unknown to the government of India in that period, came to Kashan, in Persia. The difficulties which he encountered, and the dangers he dared during his journey through Sindh and Bilochistan, bore a promising testimony to his worth, and gave hope of the career in which, at present, he has so successfully maintained his fame and honour. At Maraghah, south-west from

Tabriz, Sir Henry Pottinger joined Sir John Malcolm, after traversing a distance of two thousand four hundred and twelve miles, during the space of seven months;—and on the 6th of January, 1811, he landed in Bombay after an absence of thirteen months.*

It would not much interest the readers to know the negotiations and correspondence which continued between our government and the Mirs of Sindh; let it therefore suffice to say, that on the 23rd of October, 1828, Dr. James Burnes, K.H., the surgeon to the Resident at Kach, was invited by the rulers of Sindh for medical advice. His reception was friendly, and his opinions on the political view of our government towards Sindh are remarkable. He was treated with the greatest kindness and respect on every stage, and in the places of note he was met by a nobleman deputed to him by the Mirs, till he was at length mounted on a horse and pompously conducted into the city. His reception by the rulers was gratifying, and expressive of the feelings of amity which they entertained towards the British government, and of their desire of cultivating its friendship, as well as of their sense of the dignified cha-

* See Pottinger's Travels in Bilochistan, pp. 245-6.

racter and high position which they enjoyed. He added that their names were worthy of their rank, and showed that good breeding which he seldom saw in an European character. The Mirs, after making inquiries after the health of the English King, and of the Governor of India, said that the present meeting will further strengthen the bonds of friendship between them and the British government. Here he also speaks of the value of the alliance which might be formed with that country.* "Ever since the final occupation of Kach by the British troops in 1819, our government has been brought into close connexion with Sindh, and attempts have been made on our part to cultivate an amicable intercourse with the Mirs. But these haughty and jealous chieftains, who, from the first, had perceived the extension of our empire in this direction with distrust and apprehension, uniformly maintained a cold and unfriendly attitude towards us. Treaties had been entered into, but without any feeling of cordiality on their part; no European officer was allowed to cross the frontier of Kach; and even an envoy, who had

* Visit to the Court of Sindh, by Dr. Burnes, K.H., pp. 1-3, 20-32, 33, 36-39.

proceeded from Bombay to Sindh, in 1820, on the invitation of their own minister, was coldly received at their court, and abused after he left it.

"It had been an object of policy to avoid a war with the Mirs; but the British government had, nevertheless, been forced on two occasions,—one so late as 1825,—to assemble large bodies of troops in Kach, to awe them into the maintenance of treaties, and to prevent them taking advantage of our being engaged in the Bhartpur and Barmis operations, in order to invade our territories, or those of our allies. It is scarcely to be doubted that the Court of Haidarabad gave protection and support to the Mianah plunderers who infested and devastated Kach in 1825; and, indeed, everything led to the impression, that it was the terror of our power alone which had prevented the Mirs from openly declaring war against us, and that they had no wish whatever to keep up friendly relations with us. Their distrust and jealousy were understood to extend equally to the government and to its European servants; and nothing appeared more improbable than that a British officer should be invited, on any pretence whatever, to visit Sindh.

"In this state of affairs considerable surprise was excited, when, on the 23rd October, 1828, a letter of the most friendly nature was received from the Mirs by the Resident in Kach, requesting that I should be permitted to proceed without delay to Haidarabad, on account of the alleged sickness of Mir Murad Ali Khan, one of the principal chiefs. As private reports did not represent the disease of His Highness as dangerous, it was now our turn to be suspicious; but many and various were the surmises formed as to the real object of the request. Some maintained that as peace had been restored in India by the fall of Bhartpur, and the termination of the Barmis war, and as the Russians had entered Persia, the Mirs had taken this mode of prudently making friendly advances to our government. Few gave them credit for sincerity in the reason assigned; and several of my friends were strongly of opinion that I ought not to venture into Sindh without some specific assurance of protection.

"For my own part I had ever felt a feverish anxiety to cross the forbidden frontier, and particularly to view the classic river Indus. Nothing could, therefore, be more satisfactory to me than the

invitation; and, without considering whether the undertaking involved danger or not, I prepared to enter upon it with the best possible spirits, and without a moment's delay. My arrangements were soon completed; and, on the evening of the 25th, I commenced my march, accompanied by the Sindhian 'vakil' or agent at Bhuj, whom the Mirs had ordered to attend me, together with an escort composed of a small detachment of the 21st regiment of Native Infantry, a few troopers of the Punah auxiliary horse, and about a dozen horsemen in the service of His Highness the Rav of Kach.

"I waited with the greatest impatience till the morning of the 3rd of November, when the expected letter from the Mirs arrived. It was couched in the most friendly terms; begging me to come with all convenient speed to Haidarabad, and informing me that two noblemen, high in their favour, had been dispatched to meet me, and conduct me to their court.

"As I approached nearer Haidarabad (within thirty miles) I was met by Mohammed Khan Tora, a nobleman related to the family of the Mirs, who, together with another officer of rank, named Musa

Khan, had been sent to compliment me, and who brought with him a number of attendants.

"At the nearest stage to the capital I was received by the Navab Vali Mohammed Khan Laghari, the Prime Minister of Sindh, whom, as a mark of great respect, the Mirs had sent to congratulate me on my arrival.

"Within a mile of the city I was mounted on a large black horse, handsomely caparisoned, which had been brought out by Vali Mohammed Khan, and led slowly forwards.

"Viewing the family generally, I could not but admire their manners and deportment, and acknowledge that, in appearance at least, they seemed worthy of the elevation they had gained. The younger Princes, indeed, had an air of dignity and good breeding seldom to be met with, either in the European or native character.

"Several inquiries then followed regarding Mr. Elphinstone and Sir John Malcolm, Sir Evan Nepean, the Governor-General, and his Majesty King George the Fourth, for all of whom the Mirs professed the greatest respect and esteem. The resident in Kach, they observed, had acted the part of

a friend in permitting me to visit Sindh; and by the grace of God, the friendship between themselves and the British government would now be greater than it had ever been at any former period."

Two years had not completely passed away from the time of the invitation to, and the return of Dr. Burnes from, the Court of Sindh; and the interest which his information created, both in England and in India, was clearly manifested in a general and strong desire to form a closer alliance with its rulers. This was evidently shown in sending another mission through that country in the course of such a short time.

In the year 1830, William the Fourth, King of Great Britain, sent a present of five horses to the Maharajah Ranjit Singh; and they arrived in Bombay while Sir John Malcolm was the Governor of that Presidency. There was also a letter from the Earl of Ellenborough, then President of the Board of Control, to the address of that chieftain, explaining the friendship which the British Government felt towards him. The Governor of Bombay selected and recommended Sir Alexander Burnes; upon which the Supreme Government of India nominated

him to take charge of those presents, and to proceed to the capital of the Panjab. This produced a favourable opportunity to acquire a more familiar and accurate knowledge of the navigable state of the Indus, and of the country extending from its banks; and with this view it was resolved that the horses must be sent up by that river. It was at the same time considered advisable that a carriage should be purchased for the Maharajah, and sent with the horses. If the Mirs of Sindh, however, should happen to object to this measure, and should say that they will permit the horses to pass by land, Sir Alexander Burnes was to reply that the carriage, by a long journey on an uneven and irregular road, will be worn out and reduced to pieces; and that therefore he must go by water. I shall not fatigue the reader by adding observations on this subject, which fully shows that the suspicion and alarm of the chiefs of Sindh at the appearance of any British officer in their country, so evidently come to obtain information concerning it, were not groundless, since they have been deprived of it all at last. The intention which the English Government had towards that in-

dependent dominion, and the jealousy of the Mirs, which appears now to have been right and just, will be read with much interest from the following quotations from Sir Alexander Burnes.*

"Sir John Malcolm thus minuted in the records of the Government in August, 1830:—

"'The navigation of the Indus is important in every point of view; yet we have no information that can be depended upon on this subject, except of about seventy miles from Tattah to Haidarabad. Of the present state of the Delta we have native accounts, and the only facts which can be deduced are, that the different streams of the river below Tattah often change their channels, and that the sands of all are constantly shifting; but notwithstanding these difficulties, boats of a small draft of water can always go up the principal of them. With regard to the Indus above Haidarabad, there can be no doubt of its being, as it has been for more than two thousand years, navigable far up.'

"In addition therefore to the complimentary mission on which I was to be employed, I had my attention most specially directed to the acquisition of full and complete information regarding the Indus.

* Burnes's Travels into Bokhara, vol. iii. p. 2.

This was a matter of no easy accomplishment, as the Mirs or rulers of Sindh had ever evinced the utmost jealousy of Europeans; and none of the missions which visited the country had been permitted to proceed beyond their capital of Haidarabad. The river Indus, likewise, in its course to the ocean, traverses the territories of many lawless and barbarous tribes, from whom both opposition and insult might be dreaded. On these matters much valuable advice was derived from Lieutenant Colonel Sir Henry Pottinger, political resident in Kach, and well known to the world for his adventurous travels in Bilochistan. He suggested that it might allay the fears of the Sindh Government if a large carriage were sent with horses, since the size and bulk of it would render it obvious that the mission could then only proceed by water. This judicious proposal was immediately adopted by Government; nor was it in this case alone that the experience of Colonel Pottinger availed me, as it will be seen that he evinced the most unwearied zeal throughout the difficulties which presented themselves, and contributed in a great degree to the ultimate success of the undertaking.

"That a better colour might also be given to my deputation by a route so unfrequented, I was made the bearer of presents to the Mirs of Sindh; and at the same time charged with communications of a political nature to them. These referred to some excesses committed by their subjects on the British frontier; but I was informed that neither that nor any other negotiation was to detain me on my way to Lahaur. The authorities in England had desired that a suitable escort might accompany the party; but though the design was not free from some degree of danger, it was evident that no party of any moderate detail could afford the necessary protection. I preferred, therefore, the absence of any of our troops, and resolved to trust to the people of the country; believing that, through their means, I might form a link of communication with the inhabitants. Sir John Malcolm observed, in his letter to the Governor-General, that 'the guard will be the people of the country he visits, and those familiar with it, and Sir Alexander Burnes prefers such, on the justest grounds, to any others, finding they facilitate his progress, while they disarm that jealousy which the appearance of any of our troops excites.' Nor were

my sentiments erroneous, since a guard of wild Bilochis protected us in Sindh, and allayed suspicion.

"When these preliminary arrangements had been completed, I received my final instructions in a secret letter from the chief secretary at Bombay. I was informed that the depth of water in the Indus, the directions and breadth of the stream, its facilities for steam navigation, the supply of fuel on its banks, and the condition of the princes and people who possess the country bordering on it, are all points of the highest interest to government, but your own knowledge and reflections will suggest to you various other particulars in which full information is highly desirable; and the slow progress of the boats up the Indus will, it is hoped, give you every opportunity to pursue your researches. I was supplied with all the requisites for surveying, as instruments, &c., and desired to draw bills on honour for my expenses."

With this view and with these directions the mission was formed, and Sir Alexander Burnes sailed from Mandvi in Kach on the 21st of January, 1831, and on the 24th he anchored near the mouth of Kori, which divides the country of Sindh from that of

Kach. He was turned out once by the Sindhians, but by communicating with the Mirs he sailed again for Sindh; and his letter to the agent at Daraji will not fail to point out how desirous we were to enter that country and to seek the friendship of the chiefs, notwithstanding their fearful hatred. Sir Alexander Burnes speaks thus of the circumstances and of himself.

"The jealousy of the Sindh government had been often experienced, and it was therefore suggested that we should sail for the Indus without giving any previous information. Immediately on anchoring, I dispatched a communication to the agent of the Mirs at Daraji signifying my plans.

"A day passed in anxious suspense, but on the following morning a body of armed men crowded round our boats, and the whole neighbourhood was in a state of the greatest excitement. The party stated themselves to be the soldiers of the Mir, sent to number our party and see the contents of all the boats, as well as every box that they contained. I gave a ready and immediate assent, and we were instantly boarded by about fifty armed men, who

* Burnes's Travels to Bokhara, vol. iii. p. 16.

wrenched open everything, and prosecuted the most rigorous search for cannon and gunpowder. Mr. Leckie and myself stood by in amazement till it was at length demanded that the box containing the large carriage should be opened, for they pretended to view it as the Greeks had looked on the wooden horse, and believed that it would carry destruction into Sindh. A sight of it disappointed their hopes, and we must be conjurors, it was asserted, to have come without arms and ammunition.

"When the search had been completed I entered into conversation with the head man of the party, and had hoped to establish, by his means, a friendly connexion with the authorities, but after a short pause this personage, who was a Rais of Lower Sindh, intimated that a report of the day's transactions would be forthwith transmitted to Haidarabad, and that in the meanwhile it was incumbent on us to await the decision of the Mir, at the mouth of the river. The request appeared reasonable, and the more so, since the party agreed to furnish us with every supply so situated. We therefore weighed anchor, and dropped down the river, but here our civilities ended. By the way we were met by several dingies full of

armed men, and at night were hailed by one of them, to know how many troops we had on board. We replied, that we had not even a musket. 'The evil is done,' rejoined a rude Bilochi soldier; 'you have seen our country; but we have four thousand men ready for action.' To this vain-glorious observation succeeded torrents of abuse, and when we reached the mouth of the river the party fired their matchlocks over us; but I dropped anchor, and resolved, if possible, to repel these insults by personal remonstrance. It was useless; we were surrounded by ignorant barbarians, who shouted out in reply to all that I said, that they had been ordered to turn us out of the country. I protested against their conduct in the most forcible language, reminding them that I was the representative, however humble, of a great government, charged with presents from royalty, and added, that without a written document from their master, I should decline quitting Sindh. An hour's delay served to convince me that personal violence would ensue if I persisted in such a resolution, and as it was not my object to risk the success of the enterprise by such collision, I sailed for the most eastern mouth of the Indus, from which I

addressed the authorities in Sindh, as well as Colonel Pottinger, the Resident in Kach.

"I was willing to believe that the soldiers had exceeded the authority which had been granted them, and was speedily put in possession of a letter from the Mir, couched in friendly terms, but narrating, at great length, the difficulty and impossibility of navigating the Indus.

" 'The boats are so small,' said his Highness, 'that only four or five men can embark in one of them; their progress is likewise slow; they have neither masts nor sails, and the depth of water in the Indus is likewise so variable as not to reach, in some places, the knee or waist of a man.' But this formidable enumeration of physical obstacles was coupled with no refusal from the ruler himself, and it seemed expedient, therefore, to make a second attempt after replying to his Highness's letter.

"On the 10th of February we again set sail for Sindh. We now anchored in the Pikteani mouth of the Indus, and I forthwith dispatched the following document by a trustworthy messenger to the agent at Daraji.

" 1st. Let it be known to the government agent at

Daraji that this is the memorandum of Mr. Burnes (sealed with his seal, and written in the Persian language in his own handwriting), the representative (vakil) of the English to the Mir of Sindh, and likewise the bearer of presents to Maharajah Ranjit Singh from the King of England.

"2nd. I came to the Indus a few days ago, and you searched my baggage, that you might report the contents thereof to your master. I have now returned, and await an answer.

"3rd. You may send any number of armed men that you please; my life is in your power; but remember that the Mir will hold every one responsible who molests me. Remember, too, that I am a British officer, and have come without a musket or a soldier (as you well know), placing implicit reliance on the protection of the ruler of Sindh, to whose care my government have committed me.

"4th. I send this memorandum by two of my own servants, and look to you for their being protected."

"This remonstrance drew no reply from the agent at Daraji; for the individual who had held the situation on our first visit to Sindh had been dismissed for permitting us to ascend the river; and our servants brought us notice that we should not be permitted to land, nor to receive either food or water. We observed, therefore, the greatest possible economy in the distribution of our provisions, and

placed padlocks on the tanks, in the hope of reason yet guiding the councils of the Mir. When our supply of water failed I despatched a small boat up the river to procure some; but it was seized, and the party detained; which now rendered us hopeless of success, and only anxious to quit the inhospitable shores of Sindh.

"On the 22nd of February we weighed our anchor, at daylight, and sailed for Katch, and anchored in Mandivi Roads after a surprising run of thirty-three hours.

"It could not now be concealed that the conduct of the Mir of Sindh was most unfriendly, but he yet betrayed no such feeling in his letters. He magnified the difficulties of navigating the Indus, and arrayed its rocks, quicksands, whirlpools, and shallows, in every communication, asserting that the voyage to Lahaur had never been performed in the memory of man. It was evident that he viewed the expedition with the utmost distrust and alarm; and the native agent, who resides at Haidarabad on the part of the British Government, described, not without some degree of humour, the fear and dread of this jealous potentate. In his estimation we were

the precursors of an army, and did he now desire to grant us a passage through Sindh, he was at a loss to escape from the falsehood and contradictions which he had already stated in his epistles. One letter went on to say, that 'the Mir of Sindh avoids giving any reply, lest he should be involved in perplexity; and he has stopped his ears with the cotton of absurdity, and taken some silly notions into his head, that if Captain Burnes should now come, he will see thousands of boats on the Indus, and report the same to his government, who will conclude that it is the custom of the Mir of Sindh to deceive on all subjects, and that he has no sort of friendship.' At length, after a remonstrance from Colonel Pottinger, both he and myself received letters from Haidarabad, offering a road through Sindh by land. As this might be fairly deemed the first opening which had presented itself during the whole negotiation, with the advice of Colonel Pottinger I set out a third time for the Indus. That officer, in the meanwhile, intimated my departure to the Mir, and pointed out the impossibility of my proceeding by land to Lahaur. He also intimated, in no measured language, that the vacillating and un-

friendly conduct of the Mir of Sindh would not pass unnoticed, the more particularly since it concerned the passage of gifts which had been sent by His Most Gracious Majesty the King of Great Britain.

"On the 10th of March we once more set sail for the Indus; and reached the Hasamri, one of the central mouths of the river, after a prosperous voyage of seven days. We could hire no pilot to conduct us across the bar, and took the wrong and shallow mouth of the river, ploughing up the mud as we tacked in its narrow channel. We were now met by an officer of the Sindh government, one of the favourite descendants of the Prophet, whose enormous corpulence bespoke his condition. This personage came to the mouth of the river, for we were yet refused all admittance to the fresh water. He produced a letter from the Mir, and repeated the same refuted arguments of his master, which he seemed to think should receive credit from his high rank. It would be tiresome to follow the Sindhians through the course of chicanery which they adopted, even in this stage of proceedings. An embargo was

laid on all the vessels in the Indus; and we ourselves were confined to our boats, on a dangerous shore, and even denied fresh water. The officers urged the propriety of our taking a route by land; and as a last resource, I offered to accompany him to the capital, and converse with the Mir in person. Having previously landed the horses, I made known this arrangement by a courier which I despatched to the Court; and on the following morning quitted the boats, along with Sayad Jindal Shah, who had been appointed our Mihmandar. No sooner had we reached Tatta, than the required sanction for the boats to ascend by the Indus was received, provided we ourselves took the land route; but I immediately declined to advance another step without my charge; and ultimately effected, by a week's negotiation at Tatta, the desired end. At the expense of being somewhat tedious, I will give an abstract of these proceedings, as a specimen of Sindhian policy and reasoning.

"A few hours after reaching Tatta, Sayad Zulfqar Shah, a man of rank, and engaging manners, waited on us on the part of the Mir. He was accom-

panied by our Mihmandar, and met us very politely. He said that he had been sent by his Highness to escort us to Haidarabad; to which I laconically replied, that nothing would now induce me to go, since the Mir had conceded the request which I had made of him. The Sayad here marshalled all his eloquence; asked me if I wished to ruin the Mihmandar, by making him out a liar, after I had promised to accompany him to the Court, and he had written so to the Mir? if I had no regard for a promise? that the capital was close at hand, and I could reach it in two marches; that, if I did not now go, it could only be inferred that I had been practising delusion, from a desire to see Tatta; for I had even been allowed to choose the route by that city, contrary to orders; and that I was not, perhaps, aware of the high character of the Sayad, who was a descendant of the holy Prophet, and honourable in this land; whose dignity the Christians, who preserved even the relic of Jesus Christ's nail, could well understand; and that it was not the part of a wise man to cavil like a mullah, since the Mir had sanctioned the advance of the

mission by water if we embarked at Haidarabad, and would be answerable for the safety of the horses to that place; and finally, that if I persisted in taking the route by water, he was desired to say that it was a violation of the treaty between the States.

"I heard with attention the arguments of Zulfqar Shah; nor did I forget that the praises and respects which he claimed for his friend, as a descendant of the Prophet, likewise included himself; I replied, that there had existed a long-standing friendship between Sindh and the British Government; that I had been despatched by a well-frequented route, to deliver the presents of our gracious Sovereign to Ranjit Singh at Lahaur; that on reaching Sindh I had been insulted, abused, starved, and twice turned out of the country by low persons, whom I named; that my Government, which was ever considerate, had attributed this unheard-of insolence, not to their friends the Mirs of Sindh, but to the ignorance of mean individuals, and had despatched me a third time to Sindh; when I reached it, I found Sayad Jindal Shah ready to receive me, but although thoroughly satisfied that

the presents of which I was in charge could never be forwarded by land, he offered me that route, and detained me on board ship for eleven days, till necessity had driven me to make a proposal of repairing in person to the presence of the Mir, in hopes of persuading that personage.

"The case was now altered; the water route had been granted, which rendered my visit to Haidarabad necessary; and I could only view the present procedure in the light of jealousy, which it was unbecoming in a government to entertain. I continued, that I had chosen the route by Tatta because my bills were payable at that city; and the sooner the Sayad got his master to meet my wishes the better, for the floods of the Indus were at hand, the hot season approached, and delay would increase the hazard; while no arguments but force would now induce me to visit the Court, or permit the horses to be moved without my presence. In fine, if it were not the intention of the Mir to act a friendly part, he had only to say so, and I would forthwith quit the country when I received a letter to that effect; and finally, that he had formed a very erroneous opinion of the British character, if he considered that I had been

sent here in breach of a treaty, for I had come to strengthen the bonds of union; and, what was further, that the promise of an officer was sacred.

"An interview in the following morning brought a repetition of the whole arguments; and as we could not convince each other, we both agreed to address his Highness. After the style of Asiatic diplomacy, I informed the Mir that he had acted the part of a friend in first pointing out the difficulties of navigating the Indus, and now assisting me through them by giving his sanction to the water route; but since I was so thoroughly acquainted, through his Highness's kindness, with the dangers of the river, I dared not trust such royal rarities as the gifts of the King of Great Britain to the care of any servant. In three days I received a full and unqualified sanction to advance by water from the mouth of the Indus.

"On the morning of the 18th we moored opposite Haidarabad.

"Immediately on our arrival four different deputations waited on us to convey the congratulations of Mir Morad Ali Khan and his family at our having reached the capital of Sindh, and at the same time to tender the strongest professions of friendship

and respect for the British government, to all of which I returned suitable answers.

"Tents were pitched, and provisions of every description sent to us; and it would, indeed, have been difficult to discover that we were the individuals who had so long lingered about the shores of Sindh, now the honoured guests of its jealous master. Great and small were in attendance on us: khans and Sayads, servants and chobdars, brought messages and inquiries.

"In the evening we were presented to the Mir of Sindh by his son Nasir Khan, who had previously received us in his own apartments to inform us of his attachment to the British government, and the state secret of his having been the means of procuring for us a passage through Sindh.

"We found the Mir seated in the middle of a room, begged that I would forget the difficulties and dangers encountered, and consider him as the ally of the British government and my own friend.

"Elephants and palanqueens were at our disposal if we would accept them; and he would vie in exertion with ourselves to forward in safety the presents of His Most Gracious Majesty the King of Great

Britain, and had nominated the son of his Vazir to accompany us to the limits of his territories.

"On the morning of the 23rd of April we embarked in the state barge of the Mir. On the day after quitting Sevan we were met by Mohammed Gauhar, a Bilochi chief, and a party, the confidential agents of Mir Rustam Khan, the Mir of Khairpur, who had been sent to the frontier, a distance of eighty miles, to congratulate us on our arrival and declare their master's devotion to the British government. We hardly expected such a mark of attention in Sindh, and were therefore gratified. The deputation brought an abundant supply of sheep, flour, fruit, spices, sugar, butter, ghee, tobacco, opium, &c. &c., on which our people feasted.

"In return for Mir Rustam Khan's kindness, I addressed to him a Persian letter in the following terms, which will serve as a specimen of the epistolary style used by the people of this country, which I imitated as closely as possible.

(After compliments.)

"I HASTEN to inform your Highness that I have reached the frontiers of your country in com-

pany with the respectable Sayad Taqi Shah, who has accompanied me on the part of Mir Morad Ali Khan from Haidarabad. As I have long since heard of your Highness from those who pass between Katch and Sindh, it forms a source of congratulation to me that I have arrived in your dominions, and brought along with me in safety the presents which have been graciously bestowed on Maharajah Ranjit Singh, by his Majesty the King of England,—mighty in rank; terrible as the planet Mars; a monarch great and magnificent; of the rank of Jamshaid; of the dignity of Alexander; unequalled by Darius; just as Naushervan; great as Faredun; admired as Cyrus; famed as the sun; the destroyer of tyranny and oppression; upright and generous; pious and devout; favoured from above, &c., &c. May his dominion endure for ever!

"It is well known that when a friend comes to the country of a friend it is a source of much happiness, and I have therefore written these few lines; but when I have the pleasure of seeing you, my joy will be increased.

"I had written thus far when the respectable Mohammed Gauhar, one of those enjoying your Highness's confidence, arrived at this place to acquaint me with your professions of respect and friendship for the British Government, bringing along with him many thanks of your hospitality. Need I say I am rejoiced? Such civilities mark the great."

"With the better orders of society we had frequent intercourse and conversation.

"Some of them felt interested about the objects of our mission to Lahaur. They did not give us much credit for sincerity in sending it by a route which they believed never to have been passed since the time of Noah.

"On the morning of the 14th we disembarked near the small village of Alipur, and were met by the Vazir of Mir Rustam Khan, who had come from Khairpur to receive us.

"Our reception was cordial and kind; the Vazir assured us of the high satisfaction with which his master had heard of our arrival, for he had long desired to draw closer to the British government, and had never yet had the good fortune to meet any of its agents. He said that Mir Rustam Khan did not presume to put himself on an equality with so potent and great a nation, but hoped that he might be classed among its well wishers, and as one ready to afford his services on all occasions.

"I thanked his Highness for the uniform attention and hospitality which we had received. He made a long address to me regarding his respect for the British government, and said that I had of course learned his sentiments from his Vazir.

"I must mention that the hospitality which he so modestly named consisted of eight or ten sheep, with all sorts of provisions for one hundred and fifty people daily; and that while at Khairpur he sent for our use, twice a day, a meal of seventy-two dishes."

The preceding contents which I have quoted will show how we were desirous to enter in Sindh to obtain political, geographical, and commercial information, and how the Mirs were flattered, civil, and hospitable, and what extraordinary forbearance was exhibited by our authorities to allay their suspicions, which appear now to be just. I shall preserve my saying on this subject of great moment, as I have said before, but will lead the readers to the trodden path of those high political characters whose remarks will themselves point out the object fully and clearly, which, if I were able to describe, would not be considered justifiable. So let the English public read the observations of their own countrymen and enterprising explorers.

On the 19th of May Sir Alexander Burnes took leave of Mir Rustam Khan of Khairpur, and his minister Fatah Mohammed Khan Ghori delivered to

him the secret message with which he was entrusted by his master the good Mir.

"On the banks of the Indus we had a curious interview in the evening after our arrival with the Vazir from Khairpur, who had been sent by Mir Rustam Khan to escort us thus far, and see that we were furnished with boats.

"After requesting to be received privately, he renewed the subject of our first conversation, and said that he had been instructed by his master to propose a solemn treaty of friendship with the British Government on any terms that might be named. He then ran over the list of neighbouring states which owed their existence to an alliance,—the chief of the Daudpotras, the Raval of Jaisalmer, and the Rajah of Bikaner, &c. &c.,—and then concluded with a peroration full of gravity, that it was foretold by astronomers, and recorded in his books, that the English would in time possess all India, a prediction which both Mir Rustam and himself felt satisfied would come to pass, when the British would ask why the chiefs of Khairpur had not come forward with an offer of allegiance. I tried to remove, but without effect, the sad prognos-

tication of the minister, and declared my incompetency to enter on such weighty matters as a treaty between the states, without authority, and before receiving a written statement under the Mir's seal. I said that I would make known the wishes that had been expressed to my government, which would be gratified to hear that they had such friends, which seemed to please the diplomatist. He begged that I would bear in mind what had passed, and exacted a promise that I would write to him when gone, and so water the tree of friendship that the object might be ultimately effected—'for the stars and heaven proclaimed the fortune of the English!' "

It has been already stated that though the Honourable East India Company had the commercial intercourse with the ruler of Sindh for a long standing period, there were no treaties of alliance contracted till 1809. Previous to the treaties of 1839, in which I was employed, it would make the matter more clearly to be understood that I should quote those which were successively framed during the space of those distant periods. Most of them, through the extraordinary tact and negotiations of Sir Henry Pottinger, produced a wonderful

result, and success of the commercial measures at the time, and, above all, paved a peaceable path for our armies in their country, where, according to the first and second conditions of the third article of the treaty of the 20th April, 1832, it was engaged that no arms and military stores of any description shall be brought in their country.

Treaty with the Mirs of Sindh, of August 22, 1809.

"ART. 1. THERE shall be eternal friendship between the British Government and that of Sindh, namely, Mir Gholam Ali, Mir Karam Ali, and Mir Morad Ali.

"Art. 2. Enmity shall never appear between the two states.

"Art. 3. The mutual despatch of the vakils of both governments, namely, the British Government and Sindhian Government, shall ever continue.

"Art. 4. The Government of Sindh will not allow the establishment of the tribe of the French in Sindh.

"Written on the 10th of the month of Rajab-ul-Morajab, in the year of Hijri 1224, corresponding with the 21st August, 1809."

Treaty between the East India Company on the one hand, and the Mirs of Sindh on the other, of November 9, 1820.

"THE British Government and the Government of Sindh having in view to guard against the occurrence of frontier

disputes, and to strengthen the friendship already subsisting between the two states, Mir Ismail Shah was invested with full power to treat with the Honourable the Governor of Bombay, and the following Articles were agreed on between the two parties :—

"Art. 1. There shall be perpetual friendship between the British Government on the one hand, and Mir Karam Ali and Mir Morad Ali on the other.

"Art. 2. Mutual intercourse by means of vakils shall always continue between the two governments.

"Art. 3. The Mirs of Sindh engage not to permit any European or American to settle in their dominions. If any of the subjects of either of the two states should establish their residence in the dominions of the other, and should conduct themselves in an orderly and peaceable manner in the territory to which they may emigrate, they will be allowed to remain in that situation; but if such fugitives shall be guilty of any disturbance or commotion, it will be incumbent on the local authority to take the offenders into custody, and punish or compel them to quit the country.

"Art. 4. The Mirs of Sindh engage to restrain the depredations of the Khosas and all other tribes and individuals within their limits, and to prevent the occurrence of any inroad into the British dominions.

Bombay, 9th November, 1820.

"*Note.*—The foregoing treaty was approved of by the Supreme Government on the 10th February, 1821."

Treaty of Peace between the East India Company and the State of Khairpur, April 4, 1832.

"ART. 1. THERE shall be eternal friendship between the two states.

"Art. 2. The two contracting powers mutually bind themselves from generation to generation never to look with the eye of covetousness on the possessions of each other.

"Art. 3. The British Government having requested the use of the river Indus and the roads of Sindh for the merchants of Hindustan, &c., the Government of Khairpur agrees to grant the same within its own boundaries on whatever terms may be settled with the Government of Haidarabad, namely, Mir Morad Ali Khan Talpur.

"Art. 4. The Government of Khairpur agrees to furnish a written statement of just and reasonable duties to be levied on all goods passing under this treaty, and further promises that traders shall suffer no loss or hindrance in transacting their business.

"Dated the 2nd of Ziqad, 1247 Hijri, corresponding with the 4th day of April, A.D. 1832."

Treaty concluded between the East India Company and Mir Morad Ali Khan, Ruler of Haidarabad, in Sindh, April 20, 1832.

"ART. 1. THAT the friendship provided for in former treaties between the British Government and that of Sindh

remain unimpaired and binding; and that this stipulation has received additional efficacy through the medium of Lieut.-Colonel Pottinger, Envoy, &c.; so that the firm connexion and close alliance now formed between the said states shall descend to the children and successors of Mir Morad Ali Khan, principal after principal, from generation to generation.

"Art. 2. That the two contracting powers bind themselves never to look with an eye of covetousness on the possessions of each other.

"Art. 3. That the British Government has requested a passage for the merchants and traders of Hindustan by the river and roads of Sindh, by which they may transport their goods and merchandise from one country to another; and the said Government of Haidarabad hereby acquiesces in the same request, on the three following conditions:—

"I. That no person shall bring any description of military stores by the above river or roads.

"II. That no armed vessels or boats shall come by the said river.

"III. That no English merchants shall be allowed to settle in Sindh, but shall come as occasion requires, and, having stopped to transact their business, shall return to India.

"Art. 4. When merchants shall determine on visiting Sindh, they shall obtain a passport to do so from the British Government; and due information of the granting of such passports shall be made to the said Government of Haidar-

abad by the said Resident in Kach, or other officer of the said British Government.

"Art. 5. That the Government of Haidarabad, having fixed on certain proper and moderate duties to be levied on merchandise and goods proceeding by the aforesaid routes, shall adhere to that scale, and not arbitrarily and despotically either increase or lessen the same, so that the affairs of merchants and traders may be carried on without stop or interruption; and the custom-house officers and farmers of revenue of the Sindh Government are to be specially directed to see that they do not delay the said merchants on pretence of awaiting for fresh orders from the Government, or in the collection of the duties; and the said Government is to promulgate a tariff, or table of duties leviable on each kind of goods, as the case may be.

"Art. 6. That whatever portions of former treaties entered into between the two states have not been altered and modified by the present one remain firm and unaltered, as well as those stipulations now concluded; and, by the blessing of God, no deviation from them shall ever take place.

"Art. 7. That the friendly intercourse between the two states shall be kept up by the despatch of vakils, whenever the transactions of business or the increase of the relations of friendship may render it desirable.

"Written on the 18th Ziqad, 1247 Hijri, corresponding with the 20th of April, 1832."

Supplementary Treaty between the East India Company and the Government of Haidarabad in Sindh, which is to be considered as virtually annulled on the fulfilment of its Stipulations, April 22, 1832.

"ART. 1. IT is inserted in the fifth article of the perpetual treaty, that the Government of Haidarabad will furnish the British Government with a statement of duties, &c.; and after that the officers of the British Government, who are versed in affairs of traffic, will examine the said statement. Should the statement seem to them to be fair and equitable, and agreeable to custom, it will be brought into operation, and will be confirmed; but should it appear too high, his Highness Mir Morad Ali Khan, on hearing from the British Government to this effect, through Colonel Pottinger, will reduce the said duties.

"Art. 2. It is as clear as noon day that the punishment and suppression of the plunderers of Parkar, the Thale, &c., is not to be effected by any one Government; and as this measure is incumbent on and becoming the states, as tending to secure the welfare and happiness of their respective subjects and countries, it is hereby stipulated, on the commencement of the ensuing rainy season, and of which Mir Morad Ali Khan shall give due notice, the British, Sindh, and Jodpur Governments shall direct their joint and simultaneous efforts on the above subjects.

"Art. 3. The Governments of the Right Honourable East India Company and of Khairpur, namely, Mir Rustam,

have provided, in a treaty concluded between the states, that whatever may be settled regarding the opening of the Indus at Haidarabad shall be binding on the said contracting powers: it is therefore necessary that copies of the treaty should be sent by the British and Haidarabad Governments to Mir Rustam Khan, for his satisfaction and guidance.

"Written on the 20th of Ziqad, 1247 Hijri, corresponding with the 22d April, 1832."

Commercial Treaty between the East India Company and the Government of Haidarabad, in Sindh; published by Proclamation, on the 23d of December, 1834, *by order of the Governor-General in Council.*

"WHEREAS in the first article of the supplementary treaty concluded between the Honourable East India Company and the Government of Haidarabad, on the 22d day of April, 1832, corresponding with the 20th of Ziqad, 1247 Hijri, it was stipulated that the Government of Haidarabad was to furnish the British Government with a statement of duties, &c., and, 'After that, the officers of the British Government, who are versed in affairs of traffic, shall have examined the same statement, should the statement seem to them to be fair and equitable, and agreeable to custom, it will be brought into operation, and will be confirmed; but should it appear too high, his Highness Mir Morad Ali Khan, on hearing from the British Government to this

effect, through Colonel Pottinger, will reduce the said duties.' Now, according to the terms of the above stipulation, the contracting States, having made due inquiry, hereby enter into the following agreement:—

"Article 1. In lieu of a duty on goods proceeding up and down the River Indus, in virtue of the fifth Article of the perpetual Treaty of Haidarabad, there shall be levied on the rivers, between the sea and Ropar, a toll on each boat of nineteen Tatta rupees, per Tatta kharah, of which amount eight rupees shall be receivable by the Government of Haidarabad and Khairpur, and eleven rupees by the other States possessing dominions on the banks of the rivers, namely:—His Highness Bahaval Khan, Maharajah Ranjit Singh, and the Honourable East India Company.

"Art. 2. To obviate any cause whatever of trouble or inconvenience to traders and merchants during their progress, and also to prevent disputes and doubts, and consequent altercations and delay, touching the size of boats, the toll is fixed at thirty Tatta kharahs. Be a boat large or small, she will pay toll according to this; and whether she measures five kharahs, or one hundred kharahs, she will be reckoned as one of thirty.

"Art. 3. The portion of the toll above described, appertaining to Sindh, and amounting to two hundred and forty Tatta rupees on each boat, shall be levied at the bandar or port at the mouth of the river, where the cargoes are transferred from the river to the sea-boats, and *vice*

versâ, and divided as the Governments of Haidarabad and Khairpur may think best.

"Art. 4. For the purpose of assisting in the realization of the toll due to Sindh; also in the speedy and satisfactory adjustment of disputes, which may happen to occur amongst the merchants, boatmen, and others, on the question of hire, &c., as well as with a view to the preservation and augmentation of the amicable relations which happily subsist between the States—it is settled that a British agent (who shall not be an European gentleman), under the authority of Lieutenant-Colonel Pottinger, agent to the Governor-General of India, for the affairs of Sindh, shall reside at the bandar, or port, at the mouth of the river, where cargoes are transferred from one description of boats to another; and the British Government binds itself that the said agent shall neither engage in trade, nor interfere in any way with the fiscal or any other affairs of the Sindh Government. It is further settled, that when occasions connected with this Treaty may render it advisable, the Governor-General's agent for the affairs of Sindh shall have the power of deputing one of his assistants to the above described bandar, or port, to settle any discussion that may have arisen, after doing which he is to return to Bhuj.

"Art. 5. For the more perfect fulfilment of this treaty, it is hereby distinctly stipulated, that should any portion, however small or great, or of whatever description, of the merchandise or goods on board any boat passing up or

down the river be landed for sale by a merchant or merchants, such portion of merchandise or goods, whatever may be its quantity or quality, shall instantly become subject to the existing local duties, as levied by the respective governments within their own territories; the purpose of the toll agreed to by this treaty being not to supersede or set aside the established dues of the different states, but to repay the expense to which the Government will necessarily be subjected in affording the customary protection to the trade in transit on the river. It will be perfectly understood, from this fifth Article, that the Governments have no claim to duties on merchandise merely passing up and down the river, and that the toll is all that is to be demanded; but should any portion, however small or large, of goods be landed and sold, then the usual duties will be levied."

Treaty between the East India Company and the Mirs of Sindh, concluded by Colonel Pottinger, Agent to the Governor-General for Sindh on one part, and their Highnesses Mir Nur Mohammed Khan, and Mir Nasir Khan on the other, April 20, 1838.

"Art. 1. In consideration of the long friendship which has subsisted between the British Government and the Mirs of Sindh, the Governor-General in Council engages to use his good offices to adjust the present differences which are understood to subsist between the Mirs of Sindh

and the Maharajah Ranjit Singh, so that peace and friendship may be established between the two states.

"Art. 2. In order to secure and improve the relations of amity and peace which have so long subsisted between the Sindh state and British Government, it is agreed that an accredited British minister shall reside at the Court of Haidarabad, and that the Mirs of Sindh shall also be at liberty to send a vakil to reside at the Court of the British Government; and that the British minister shall be empowered to change his ordinary place of residence as may from time to time seem expedient, and be attended by such an escort as may be deemed suitable by his Government.

"Ratified by the Governor-General at Simla, this 20th day of April, 1838."

Let us now relate the proceedings of Sir Henry Pottinger at the court of the Mirs at Haidarabad, and the negotiations of Sir Alexander Burnes in that of the Mirs at Khairpur, as well as the progress of the army of the Indus towards Sindh. The latter officer remained for a considerable time with the Mir Rustam Khan, and exerted himself very much to have the proposed treaty agreed to, and signed by him; but the Mir Mobarak evidently, and the arch intriguer the Mir Ali Morad secretly,

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put many obstacles in the way of the Mir Rustam Khan, to prevent him from coming to an immediate conclusion with the English envoy. The former had naturally a disregard for, and a hatred against the English; and the latter, full of ambition and treachery, wished himself to prosper at the sacrifice of his brothers. Upon one hand his agents frequently visited Sir Alexander Burnes by night, and gave letters and messages from their master, presenting his profession of attachment to the British government, and saying that if he were to enjoy the confidence and friendship of that officer, he will at once beg his brother, the Mir Rustam, to sign the treaty, and will perform any other valuable services, which will cause the Mirs of Haidarabad to accede to the terms of Sir Henry Pottinger without further delay. On the other hand he prevented the Mir Rustam Khan from accepting our proposals, till there was first a treaty concluded in the lower Sindh; and said that if Sir Alexander were to insist upon the immediate settlement, he was to reply that the Mir Ali Morad, and Fatah Mohammed Khan Ghori, have full power to enter into any engagements for the alliance. Sir Alexander Burnes, from his know-

ledge and intercourse of ten or twelve years with the Sindh rulers, knew well the treacherous game which the Mir Ali Morad wished to play, and therefore he firmly refused to enter into any political conversation or convention with the junior members of the family, while the Mir Rustam Khan was alive. Ali Morad was now greatly disappointed; finding also that his brother seemed ready to consent to what the envoy had put on the paper, and sent to him for ratification: and he therefore contrived, through his Khas Khaili, to gain possession of the seal of the Mir Rustam, whom he frightened by saying that if he were to contradict him in what he says to Sir Alexander Burnes for the good of the family, he himself, the Mir Mobarak, and other members of the family, will make a separate division to receive the friendship and alliance of the British, who then, finding nearly the whole of the family on one side, and the Mir Rustam Khan alone on the other, will throw him off as nothing. While this crafty chief was thus causing the procrastination of the adjustment of affairs, he did not lose time to report the circumstances to Sir Alexander Burnes in a different garb. He stated that his

brother, the Mir Rustam, had delivered to him the seal of his own free-will, and that he would at once agree to any terms he may propose; and in return he expects that, even while the Mir Rustam was alive, the British government would use its influence to aid him in taking an equal share in the revenues of the country with his brother; and that after his brother's death the English authorities would acknowledge him as the rightful successor. Sir Alexander Burnes gave a decided refusal to all these proposals of the Mir Ali Morad; finding that the Mir Rustam, the old and faithful friend of the government, was himself willing to seal the treaty, but that his brothers were preventing him, against his own wish, and will not come to any satisfactory terms before the flag of our approaching army floats on the boundary of Sindh. He therefore left Khairpur, without gaining the object of his mission, and came to Shikarpur, leaving at the Khairpur Court a sufficient intimation of his displeasure.

On his departure the friendly ties and cordial feelings he had shown among them made the Mir Rustam Khan feel uncomfortable, and the Ali Morad; so that when a few days had rolled on, the

latter proceeded to his fort, Diji. Sensible as we were of the fidelity of that most excellent man the Mir Rustam Khan, I volunteered to go and undertake to settle the matter with him, if Sir Alexander Burnes would invite Fatah Mohammed Ghori to his camp, and permit me to confer and treat personally with the Mir Rustam Khan. Sir Alexander Burnes considered the plan proper, and while Fatah Mohammed Ghori was on his way to Shikarpur, I arrived at Khairpur by a different route, avoiding the chance of falling in with him.

I was very kindly received by the Mir Rustam Khan, who at once agreed to every article of the treaty, and stated that he will sign and seal it as soon as Sir Alexander Burnes comes to him. I did not approve of this plan, thinking that his coming will bring Fatah Mohammed Khan Ghori with him from Shikarpur, and will afford a fresh opportunity to the Mir, at the advice of the other persons, to alter certain words or conditions in the proposed treaty; while on being asked myself to do so, the answer was easy enough that I had not such power. With this view I wrote to Sir Alexander Burnes by express that he was to reply to the

Mir's request of visiting him, merely in one word, namely this: that when I return with the accepted treaty from the Mir's capital, he will visit him personally and congratulate him on the happy termination of such protracted negotiations, which have strengthened the bonds of amity between the two governments. Sir Alexander Burnes's letter came just at the time when the "Abdar" of Mir Ali Morad arrived from Diji, informing the Mir of his joining him to-morrow, and requesting him not to see me till he arrives. This I heard at a very late hour at night; and that night I passed in great anxiety, looking for the dawn of the morning.

It was still very early when I went to the private door of the residence of the Mir Rustam Khan, and sent in word to his Highness that I had received despatches, and was very desirous to see him on business of great moment. The good Mir came out in his night-dress, and placing me by his side, wished to know the object of my very anxious and early visit. I laid before him the treaty; and as I had taken with me the pen and ink, anticipating that the delay of asking for them might defer the accomplishment of my object, I begged the Mir to sign and

read it at once. Some of his attendants said to him in the Bilochi language, that it would be better to wait the arrival of Ali Morad; but giving the pen into his hand, I desired him either to sign it without hesitation, or to say that he does not want the alliance of the British government. I of course said a few words in addition, which were delivered in a different tone of voice and meaning, while every respect and propriety of rank was strictly observed. On this the good-natured Mir was just at the point of putting his seal under his own hand-writing in word and name, when suddenly the Mir Ali Morad arrived and interrupted him in the act of sealing it. I again told the Mir that, though Ali Morad was his brother, yet certainly he was not his well wisher; and that when the British troops arrive at Sabzalkot, every one will feel, for his own safety, inclined to agree to all the terms we now do and might then propose; but that it will not reflect any light of credit or friendship on the Mir Rustam Khan to have delayed so long. He now, holding my hand, said in a most affectionate manner that he knew that I was not an Englishman, and that I had a real regard for the welfare of Sindh, and therefore I must

tell him candidly whether the acceptance of the proposed treaty by him will really increase the friendship and satisfaction of the Governor-General and of the Sovereign in England, or that, after the present object was gained, he shall be put aside as useless. I assured the Mir, pledging my word and honour, as well as that of Sir Alexander Burnes on the part of the government (as he had told me), that every article of the treaty shall strictly be adhered to, and that the Mir and his descendants will from generation to generation enjoy the peaceable and independent authority of their possessions, without fearing any internal or external commotions: on which he affixed his seal, notwithstanding the open and repeated remonstrances of the Mir Ali Morad, whom the Mir Rustam Khan silenced by saying that he will get a separate agreement from Sir Alexander Burnes, stating that his (Ali Morad's) privileges will neither be interfered with nor coveted by the British Government; and at the Mir Rustam's repeated solicitation, that officer omitted the mention of the intrigues of Ali Morad in his despatch to the Governor-General.

Treaty between the Honourable the East India Company and the Khairpur State, or Mir Rustam Khan, on the 25th of December, 1838.

This Article requires no comment, being in the Treaty with Bhaval Khan, sent for my guidance.

"Article 1st.—There shall be perpetual friendship, alliance, and unity of interests between the Honourable the East India Company and the Mir Rustam Khan Talpoor, and his heirs and successors, from generation to generation, and the friends and enemies of one party shall be the friends and enemies of both.

As in Bhaval Khan's.

"Article 2nd.—The British Government engages to protect the principality and territory of Khairpur.

As in Bhaval Khan's.

"Article 3rd.—The Mir Rustam Khan, and his heirs and successors, will act in subordinate co-operation with the British Government, and acknowledge its supremacy, and not have any connexion with any other Chiefs and States.

As in Bhaval Khan's.

"Article 4th.—The Mir, and his heirs and successors, will not enter into negotiation with any Chief or State without the knowledge and sanction of the British Government; but the usual amicable correspondence with friends and relatives shall continue.

As in Bhaval Khan's.

"Article 5th.—The Mir, and his heirs and successors, will not commit aggressions on any one. If by accident any dispute arises with any one, the settlement of it shall be submitted to the arbitration and award of the British Government.

This Article differs materially from the others, and binds the Mir to all we wish, but in general terms.

"Article 6th.—The Mir will furnish troops according to his means, at the requisition of the British Government, and render it all and every necessary aid and assistance throughout his territory during the continuance of war, and approve of all the defensive preparations which it may make, while the peace and security of the countries on the other side of the Indus may be threatened; but the British Government will not covet a dam or drain of the territories enjoyed by his Highness and his heirs, nor the fortresses on this bank or that bank of the river Indus.

The mention of not coveting a dam or drain is merely a repetition of what is already written in the Haidarabad Treaty, which the Governor General, *mutatis mutandis*, agreed to give to Khairpur.

The Persian words, left to explain this last clause, are their own, and not mine.

This is the same as in Bhaval Khan's treaty, excepting the mention of our not listening to the complaints of the Mir's subjects, which is clearly implied in that treaty; for, without this mentioning of it, Rustam Khan declared he could not manage his country; and he is right, as appears to me.

"Article 7th.—The Mir and his heirs and successors shall be absolute rulers of their country, and the British jurisdiction shall not be introduced into that principality; nor will any of the Bilochis, servants, dependents, relatives, or subjects of the Mir be listened to, should they complain against the said Mir.

In this Article I have fulfilled his Lordship's instructions

"Article 8th.—In order to improve by every means possible the grow-

to the letter, and I might have easily abolished the toll for ever; but this would be a hazardous step till we substitute our own influence in Sindh. The toll binds the Mir to protect property; the release from it would remove this duty from his shoulders.

A mere copy of the Article in the Haidarabad Treaty.

As in Bhawul Khan's.

N. B.—The separate Article on surrendering Bakkar is not added, as it required no comment.

ing intercourse by the River Indus, the Mir Rustam Khan promises all co-operation with the other Powers in any measures which may be hereafter thought necessary for extending and facilitating the commerce and navigation of the Indus.

"Article 9th.—In order to still further secure the relations of amity and peace, which have so long subsisted between the Khairpur State and the British Government, it is agreed that an accredited British minister shall reside at the court of Khairpur, and that the Mir shall also be at liberty to depute an agent to reside at the court of the British Government; and the British minister shall be empowered to change his ordinary place of residence, as may from time to time seem expedient, and be attended by such an escort as may be deemed suitable by his Government.

"Article 10th.—This Treaty of nine Articles having been concluded, and signed and sealed by Lieutenant-Colonel Sir A. Burnes, Knight, Envoy on the part of the Right Honourable George Lord Auckland, G.C.B., Governor-General of India, and the Mir Rustam Khan, on the part of himself, Chief of Khairpur, the ratification by the Right Honourable

the Governor-General shall be exchanged within forty-five days from the present date.

"Done at Khairpur, this 24th day of December, 1838, corresponding with the 6th day of Shaval, A. H. 1254."

After the Treaty was sealed by the Mir Rustam Khan, I put into his hand the separate article for the cession of the fort of Bakkar. It was intended that it should not be presented to the chief till the offensive and defensive Treaty was signed. On reading the article the Mir Rustam Khan referred to the fourth article of the Treaty, in which it is stated that the English Government will not covet a dam or drain of the territories enjoyed by his Highness and his heirs, nor any fortress on this bank or that bank of the river Indus. I replied to the Mir that the English Government will adhere to every word of the article in which it has engaged, and I shall be the last person to commit any unjust trespass or oversight of the conditions which might reflect any stigma or disgrace on the Government, and on his friend Sir Alexander Burnes, who has deputed me to perform such important transactions: adding that in the fourth article my Government has indeed bound itself not to covet any land or fortress on this

or that bank of the Indus, but that the separate article strictly stands by that condition of the Treaty while it demands the possession of the fort Bakkar, which is situated in the island between the banks, and which is thus quite free of the argument now used by the Mir. Here, again, the Mir Ali Morad, shaking his head, and holding his own beard, said to the Mir Rustam, that the day is not far distant when his folly in attaching credit to us and in throwing himself entirely on the rumoured justice of the English, and on the sweet words and promises of Sir Alexander Burnes, and of myself on the part of the Governor-General, will bring a calamity over the whole family; and that we by some art, pointing out some day a new meaning of some other word in the Treaty, will desire him to deliver up his capital, as we have now done with regard to the fort of Bakkar. The good Mir's answer was, that his beard has been silvered by age, during which space no one has deceived him and betrayed his confidence. That he has now thoroughly attached himself to the British, and in the hope of good fortune he has "thrown himself into the ocean of the justice and generosity of that nation, and whether he comes out safe, and with

his hands full of pearls or of shells only, remains to be seen hereafter, and that the result will be a lesson for other princes who may seek the alliance of the English." He added, moreover, that as he has entered into the Treaty of ten articles, he must accept the separate one too, on which he sealed it and returned it to me. I must here as well say that it was promised by Sir Alexander Burnes and by myself to the Mir Rustam Khan, that the article which he has now sealed shall be given to him after it is ratified by the Governor-General; and the fort, which is only required by necessity "in time of war as a depôt for treasure, and munition," shall be restored when such war is over.

"Separate Article. Since the British Government has taken upon itself the responsibility of protecting the state of Khairpur from all enemies now and hereafter, and has neither coveted any portion of its possessions nor fortresses on this side or that side of the Indus, it is hereby agreed upon by the Mir Rustam Khan, his heirs and successors, that if the Governor-General in time of war should seek to occupy the fortress of Bakkar as a depôt for treasure and munitions, the Mir shall not object to it.

"This separate Article having been concluded, signed, and sealed by Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Alexander Burnes,

Knight, Envoy on the part of the Right Honourable George Lord Auckland, G.C.B., Governor-General of India, and the Mir Rustam Khan, on the part of himself as chief of Khairpur, the ratification by the Right Honourable the Governor-General shall be exchanged within forty days of the present date.

"Done at Khairpur, this 24th day of December, 1838, corresponding with the 6th day of Shaval, A.H. 1254.

"A. BURNES,

"*Envoy at Khairpur.*"

After having thus obtained the object of the mission, I returned with the accepted and sealed Treaties from the Mir Rustam Khan to Sir Alexander Burnes, at Shikarpur, and he despatched them to the Earl of Auckland. He also officially wrote to me, acknowledging my zeal, and the share I had in these successful negotiations with the Khairpur state, but unfortunately that document was plundered, with my other property and papers, in the outbreak of Kabul. I shall, however, quote one extract from Sir Alexander Burnes' official Report, in which my name appears to be mentioned:—*

"I had the honour this morning to convey to you, for

* Sindh Blue Book.

the information of the Governor-General of India, the successful termination of my negotiations with the Khairpur state, ending in the cession of Bakkar, on his Lordship's own terms, and in Northern Sindh being henceforward dependant on the British nation.

"I now do myself the honour to enclose the Treaty for his Lordship's ratification, and to state in detail, though as briefly as possible, the discussions which terminated in the instrument now enclosed. To one copy I have appended notes, as a clearer method of showing the motives that have actuated this chief and myself.

"I therefore drafted the treaty as it now stands, making a separate article regarding the cession of Bakkar, but binding the chief to approve of all our defensive preparations. I did this in order to give to the Mir Rustam Khan an opportunity of concealing our requests, if he feared his relatives, till we could support him in his resolution to give us Bakkar, supposing he so intended it.

"I sent Mohan Lal with the treaty, signed and sealed, to Khairpur, on the 11th inst., first directing him to give the document to the minister, and then to wait on the chief, if invited. After a delay of four days it appeared that all would end well; but the minister was then directed to wait upon me at Shikarpur, and he came full of grief and dismay at the demands made, and even stated that he had not shown the separate article to the Mir Rustam Khan from downright shame.

"Supposing such a statement to have been true, which I

do not believe, it was evident that the Mir must be made acquainted forthwith with our terms; and I demanded of Mohan Lal, at Khairpur, to deliver the treaty face to face; to tell his Highness that the treaty and the separate article were one, and that the separation entirely arose from an anxiety on my part to place it out of men's power to vex him, and that the cession of Bakkar was for his good as well as ours.

"The consternation caused by this public declaration was very great: the Mir first offered another fort in its stead; next to find security that our treasure and munitions were protected; but Mohan Lal, as instructed, replied to all, that nothing but the unqualified cession of the fortress of Bakkar, during the war, would satisfy me. He said it was the heart of his country; his honour was centred in keeping it; his family and children could have no confidence if it were given up; and that if I came to Khairpur he could speak in person to me many things. To this I had instructed Mohan Lal to say, that this was impossible till he signed the treaty, as I asked a plain question and wanted a plain answer.

"Yesterday morning the Mir sent for Mohan Lal, and told him that I had been the best and first friend of the Khairpur state; that I had made an unexpected demand upon him; that his name was irrecoverably gone if Lord Auckland did not seize upon Karachi or some other place from the Haidarabad family, who, as our enemies, now triumphed, while he, as our dearest friend, was thus de-

pressed. If they were let off, his only resource was to commit suicide. With this, and saying, 'Bismillah' (in the name of God), he sealed the treaty and the separate article, before Ali Morad Khan, Mir Zungi, Sulaiman Abdar, and about twenty other people."

On the 24th of January, 1839, the Bengal column of the army of the Indus reached and joined Sir Henry Fane, the Commander-in-Chief, at Rori. It had been formerly agreed on by us that the army will cross it about six miles above Rori, but the able chief engineer, Major Thomson, after mature deliberation and experiments, found that it was impossible to throw a bridge anywhere on the Indus but under the very walls of the fort of Bakkar. On this another discussion arose between us and the Khairpur state, in which again the Mir Ali Morad took a prominent part. Major Leech was deputed, and I was ordered to follow him, to the court of the Mir Rustam Khan, with instructions to persuade that chief not to distrust us by following the evil counsels of his brothers. The Mir gave permission for the bridge, and that part of the army crossed the Indus.

Now we demanded the cession of the fortress of Bakkar, in accordance with the separate agreement,

on which the Mir Rustam Khan, with his brothers Mirs Ali Morad, Mobarak, and Sangi, and his minister, Fatah Mohammed Ghori, justly remarked that we have not yet settled our differences, nor made any treaty of alliance with the Mir of Haidarabad in Lower Sindh; and having taken advantage of their sincere attachment to our government, we wish to make use of them as the first chiefs in Sindh who gave up their fort while the rest of the family held their independence. This, they said, will throw an everlasting stigma on the character of their descendants. We lent no ears to their reasonable and friendly remonstrance on this point; and I was ordered again to wait upon the chief, and to state to him, in the presence of all the members of the family, that if the fort was not instantly delivered, the troops shall be employed to possess it by force. Now a most overwhelming altercation commenced among them; in which the Mir Rustam Khan, in spite of all the frivolous, but mischievous excuses of his brothers, gave me the key of the fort, with one of his attendants to tell to the governor to quit it immediately. When I arrived at the gate of the fort, a swarm of Bilochis, about one hundred altogether

came on the top of it, and said to the attendant sent with me by the Mir Rustam Khan, that they are servants of the whole family, and will therefore obey the united orders of the brothers. However, after a protracted discussion between him and the garrison, the gate was opened, where Lieut. Wood of the Indian navy followed me with the flag, and gave a sign for the movement of our forces. I gave up the key to Sir Willoughby Cotton, who, with the Commander-in-Chief and Sir Alexander Burnes, entered the fort, and the British flag was hoisted up and floated in the breeze, throwing a beautiful reflection in the waters of the Indus.

On the 26th of January, 1839, it was arranged that Mir of Khairpur, with his brothers, should wait upon Sir Henry Fane; and he was received by his Excellency with that respect and civility of which his friendship to the British government was deserving. With the view of giving stronger proofs of the British appreciation of the friendship of the Mir towards our government, the treaty ratified by the Governor-General was given to the Mir Rustam Khan by the Commander-in-Chief himself, with assurances of perpetual cordiality and amity. This was accom-

panied by a letter from the Earl of Auckland himself to the Mir, the copy of which, in the proper place, will much characterise the change of our policy in behalf of so well-deserving an ally as the Mir Rustam Khan.

The cession of the fort of Bakkar, and the march of the Bengal army towards Haidarabad, brought the judicious measures of Sir Henry Pottinger in that court to a favourable issue. Before the Commander-in-Chief moved with the forces, the Mirs of Khairpur objected to our march by the right bank of the Indus, and especially by the route leading to their capital. Colonel Gordon, the Quartermaster, did not receive any civility from the Bilochis, who had pitched in a considerable number between Rori and Khairpur, under the Mir Rustam Khan, and the Mir Ali Morad. Alarms of a night attack on our army at Rori were caused in the camp; and I was directed in that late hour to go to the Bilochi camp, escorted by ten of the cavalry. On my arrival in the Bilochi camp, I went straight to the tent of the Mir Rustam Khan; but the Mir Ali Morad, having received an intimation of my proceeding from Rori, had given orders that I was not to be announced to

the Mir before the information was given to him. I did not dismount from my horse; and a reckless set of the Bilochis surrounded my party with drawn swords, and began to insult us by ill language and threats. I waited with patience the reply of the Mir Ali Morad; which having arrived, I immediately proceeded to his tent. I said to him that the object of my mission was to state to the Mir Rustam Khan that the British Government and the Khairpur Mirs had been united by an offensive and defensive treaty, and that it was not a friendly act of the Mirs to prevent the allied army from passing by their capital. The Mir Ali Morad said that the bridge was ready, and we could easily march our forces by the left bank. He added, in the strongest language possible, that if we will determine to proceed by the right bank great bloodshed will occur, and the Bilochis will not permit us to pass by Khairpur, where their wives and families reside; and that it will bring a stain on their national character to permit us to pass by their abode, and thus to expose them to a foreign army. I replied, that nothing could frighten the British-Indian army; and as to the threats of bloodshed of which the Mir

speaks, our soldiers, who are led by brave officers, treat them as nothing. I stated that I had come to have a conference with the Mir Rustam Khan, who was the head chief; and that his suggestions on the points of my mission would provide my superiors with the opportunity of coming to a final decision. The Mir Ali Morad replied, that the Mir Rustam Khan had gone to bed, and had vested in him full powers to confer with us, and that he will therefore not allow me to go to his tent. I said no more, but left him. Finding, however, that his servant had not followed me, I stepped into the tent of the Mir Rustam Khan without permission; and he was sitting there, and was surprised to see me. I told him the Mir Ali Morad is causing ruin for him, in order to promote his own views; and that if the Mir were to follow his advice, which from the commencement had been injurious to him (Rustam), he will forfeit the kind feelings of our Government. He immediately broke up the camp, and gave orders that his tent and followers should follow him to the capital, and that no one belonging to him was to remain with the Mir Ali Morad. He stated "that he has planted the tree of friendship with the

British, and will never cease to water it, with the hope that he may enjoy the fruits hereafter." I returned to the camp of Sir Henry Fane, and reported the result of my mission to him. The army moved next morning; and I was directed, from the Political department, to proceed with Sir Willoughby Cotton as an agent, while Sir Alexander Burnes remained with the Commander-in-Chief one march in the rear. I was accompanied by the brother of the Khairpur minister; and during the march every thing necessary, as supplies or information, were gained to the satisfaction of Sir Willoughby Cotton: so that Major Havelock, C.B., writes in this manner:—

"The brother of Mir Rustam Khan's Vazir, with a considerable 'Savari' accompanied our advance; and we had the assistance, as an agent for the relief of our wants, and an interpreter, able in both capacities, of the celebrated Mirza Mohan Lal, who speaks English with a good accent and with much idiomatic propriety. This intelligent and amiable man accompanied Sir Alexander Burnes through his wanderings in Central Asia, displaying everywhere a rare union of zeal, tact, and fidelity. The educated people in Sindh all converse in Persian with fluency, with which 'lingua Franca,' as it may be justly esteemed, from the

Indus to the Caspian, the good Mirza was equally familiar."

The advance of the Bombay army under Lord Keane, and the co-operation of that sincere ally the Mir Rustam Khan of Khairpur, to facilitate the progress of our views, as well as the march of Sir Willoughby Cotton's force, induced the Mirs of Haidarabad to receive Captain Eastwick, and to accept the Treaty sent by Sir Henry Pottinger.

Draft of Treaty to be proposed to the Mirs of Haidarabad.

"WHEREAS treaties of friendship and amity have, from time to time, been entered into between the British and Haidarabad Governments; and whereas circumstances have lately occurred which render it expedient and necessary to revise those treaties; with a view to which this draft has been prepared, agreeably to instructions addressed by the Right Honourable George Lord Auckland, Governor-General of India, &c. &c. &c., to Colonel Henry Pottinger, Resident in Sindh.

"1st. That there shall be lasting friendship, alliance, and amity between the Honourable the East India Company and the Haidarabad Government; and the provisions of all former treaties, not modified or annulled by the present one, are hereby confirmed.

"2nd. The Governor-General of India has commanded

that a British force shall be kept in Sindh, and stationed at the city of Tattah, where a cantonment will be formed. The strength of this force is to depend on the pleasure of the Governor-General of India.

"3rd. Mir Nur Mohammed Khan, Mir Nasir Mohammed Khan, and Mir Mohammed Khan bind themselves to pay annually the sum of
in part of the expense of the force, from the presence of which their respective territories will derive such vast advantages.

"4th. The chiefs of Bilochi tribes, and all others holding grants (jaedads), pensions (vazifas), jagirs (tesols), &c., from the different Mirs, are to continue to enjoy them as they now do, the Mirs being answerable for their peaceful conduct towards the British Government and its subjects.

"5th. The British Government pledges itself neither to interfere, in any degree, great or small, in the internal management or affairs of the several possessions of the Mirs, nor to think of introducing, in any shape, its regulations or adalats.

"6th. The British Government pledges itself on no pretence to listen to the complaints of the Bilochi chiefs, or any other subjects, whether Musalmans or Hindus, or other castes, against their highnesses.

"7th. The British Government agrees to protect Sindh from all foreign possession.

"8th. The Company's rupee being exactly of the same value as that called the bakru or timure, it is to be con-

sidered current in the British cantonment and in this country at the same rate; but in every case, when the British Government may have to coin any of the rupees now in circulation in Sindh, the seignorage or dues of the Sindh Government shall be paid, agreeable to the custom of the country.

"9th. Should any Mir attack or injure the possessions of another Mir, or those of his dependants, the Resident of Sindh will, on receiving the sanction of the Governor-General of India, act as mediator between them; but it is to be distinctly understood that he (the Resident) is not to intermeddle with trifling points.

"10th. Should any Bilochi, or other chief, rebel against the authority of the Mir to whom he appertains, or attack the lands or other possessions of any other Mir or chief, and the Mir to whom he appertains shall declare his inability to coerce such chief, the Governor-General will take his case into consideration, on its being submitted to his Lordship by the Resident, and will, should his Lordship see sufficient reason, order such assistance to be given as may be requisite to punish the offender.

"11th. Their highnesses the Mirs agree to form no new treaties, or enter into any engagements with foreign states, without the knowledge and concurrence of the British Government; but their highnesses will, of course, carry on friendly correspondence, as usual, with all their neighbours.

"12th. The British Government agrees, on its part, not to form any treaty or enter into any engagement that can

possibly affect the interest of Sindh, without the concurrence and knowledge of their highnesses the Mirs.

"13th. During the months of the year that vessels cannot enter the mouths of the Indus, the communication between Bombay and Sindh by sea is to be carried on by Karachi Bandar; and should it any time be requisite to send public stores to that place, every facility is to be afforded by the Sindh authorities to their being landed and forwarded under a guard, which will be sent from Tattah, to receive and watch them.

"14th. The Mirs agree to either build, or allow the British Government to build, an enclosure and storehouse at Karachi as a depôt for stores, their highnesses incurring no sort of expense on this account, and being repaid (should they build the enclosure, &c.) for any outlay they may incur.

"15th. Should any British merchants, or others, bring goods by way of Karachi Bandar, the duties of the Sindh Government (both import and transit) will be paid on them, agreeable to the custom of the country, and no exemption of such duties shall be claimed.

"16th. Amongst the great objects of the Governor-General in fixing a British force in Sindh, is that of perfecting the arrangements which have been in progress for several years for the opening of the Indus to traders; and as the thoroughfare (amad-o-raft) will now be increased an hundredfold, the contracting governments agree to abolish all tolls on the river from the sea to Firozpur.

"17th. To protect the interests of the different governments from any loss that might arise from the unrestrained intercourse provided for in the preceding article, it is hereby agreed, that all goods landed and sold (except those that are sold in the British camp or cantonment) shall be subject to duties agreeable to the usage of Sindh and the other states on that point, and no exception shall be made to this stipulation.

"18th. Goods of all kinds may be brought, by merchants and others, to the mouth of the Indus (Gorabi) at the proper season, and kept there, at the pleasure of the owners, till the best period of the year for sending them up the river; but should any merchant land and sell any part of his merchandise, either at Gorabari or any where else (except at the British cantonment or camp), such merchant shall pay the duties on them.

"19th. Should the British Government at any time require and apply for the aid of the army of Sindh, their Highnesses the Mirs agree to furnish it according to their means; and in any such case the Governor-General of India will take into consideration the expense the Mirs may incur, with a view to the diminution of the sum mentioned in the 3rd Article of this treaty.

"20th. The terms of this treaty are to be considered applicable to Mir Sobdar Khan, of Haidarabad.

"21st. A separate treaty has been made between the British Government and Mir Rustam Khan, of Khairpur.

"22d. Should Mir Shere Mohammed of Mirpur wish

it, a treaty, on the basis of this one, will be made with him.

"23rd. The British Government undertakes to guarantee to the different Mirs, their heirs and successors, on their acquiescing in the terms of this treaty, the perpetual enjoyment of their respective possessions; and the friends and enemies of one party shall be friends and enemies of the other.

"This treaty of Twenty-three Articles having been concluded, and signed and sealed, its ratification by the Right Honourable the Governor-General shall be exchanged within forty days from this date.

"Done at Haidarabad, on the day of , 1839, A.D., corresponding with the day of Hejri."

The objects of the Governor-General, both in Haidarabad and in Khairpur, were thus completed to the satisfaction of his Lordship, and in a manner becoming the dignity and honour of Britain, and which at the same time preserved the good feeling and the rights of the Mirs of Sindh. Before I proceed to my narrative of the progress of the army of the Indus on quitting the frontiers of Sindh *en route* to Afghanistan, it would be a matter of serious interest to read the fate of such faithful and independent allies as the Mir Rustam Khan, &c., who,

both in the time of forming the expedition and during the disasters of Afghanistan, proved himself to be a sincere and cordial coadjutor in advancing our interests. But there are such grave subjects connected with the decline of the independence of Sindh, and the dethronement of our allies, that my observations on them will not be considered just and palatable. I shall therefore quote some impartial remarks on this subject from a most valuable work just published:—*

"The Resident had deferred making to the Mirs a definite communication of the views of the British Government as to their future position till this period; and as a diplomatist he acted rightly. The Mirs were intensely averse to even the passage of troops through their territories; the notion of a British force permanently occupying any part of those territories had never entered their minds.† The

* 'History of British India,' by Thornton, vol. vi. pp. 408–466.

† "This appears from the communications of Colonel Pottinger to his Government:—'I now beg to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 19th ultimo; and after most attentively studying the instructions conveyed by it, I am obliged

time at length arrived for suggesting it; and the draft of a Treaty was submitted to them, the second article of which declared that the Governor-General of India had commanded that a British force should be kept in Sindh, to be stationed at Tattah, where a cantonment was to be formed; and that the strength of this force was to depend on the pleasure of the said Governor-General. Thus in the outset it was assumed that the rulers of Sindh were dependent upon the Government of British India; for the stationing of a military force at Tattah, and the determining the amount of the force, were not made subjects of mutual contracts; the first point was rested on the Governor-General's command, and

candidly to confess that I feel myself placed in a situation in which I can indulge no hope of carrying the Governor-General's commands into effect on the principle prescribed. My despatches, subsequent to that of the 2nd of November, will have shown the abject state to which Nur Mohammed Khan has been reduced by my refusal to treat with him relative to the money payment to Shah Shujah-ul-Mulk; but even when labouring under his worst apprehensions, it will be observed that no such idea has apparently ever crossed his mind as that our ultimate plan was to station even a company of sepoys in Sindh; and the moment that intention is announced, I think it will be the signal for a cordial coalition to oppose our arrangements.'"—*Letter, December* 15*th*, 1838, *Sindh Papers*, p. 133.

the second was left to his pleasure. By the next succeeding article it was provided that the Mirs should pay a sum (left open in the draft) in part of the expense of the force, 'from the presence of which they will derive such vast advantages.' Such was the language employed; the chief advantage, as far as can be discerned, being the exchange of sovereignty for dependence.

"The draft treaty was laid before the Mirs, and Lieutenant Eastwick, with some other British officers, were admitted to an audience for the purpose of discussing and explaining this extraordinary document. On this occasion Nur Mohammed took from a box all the treaties that had formerly been entered into with the British Government, and significantly asked, 'What is to become of all these?' The question was not an inappropriate one, and it was followed by some observations not unfaithfully describing the progress of the intercourse between Sindh and the British Government. The Mir said, 'Here is another annoyance. Since the day that Sindh has been connected with the English there has always been something new; your Government is never satisfied; we are anxious for your friendship, but we

cannot be continually persecuted. We have given a road to your troops through our territories, and now you wish to remain.'

"It would be useless to pursue the history of this period minutely. The Mirs of Haidarabad were well disposed to resist, and the Bilochi population not less ready to support their resistance. The British mission returned from the capital to the British camp, danger being apprehended from a continued stay at the former place. But difficulties, discouragements, and circumstances of embarrassment congregated thick and fast round the Mirs. The army of Sir John Keane was marching onward to Haidarabad; the reserve was in possession of Karachi; Sir Alexander Burnes had concluded a treaty with the Mirs of Khairpur, by which possession of Bakkar had been obtained; and Sir Willoughby Cotton, with the force under his command, was approaching from that quarter. In this situation the Mirs had no choice, but, in their own language, to become our humblest slaves: and the offensive treaty was accepted; the sum to be paid for the subsidiary force being fixed at three lakhs. But this treaty was not entirely approved by the

government of British India. Three of the articles which related to the use of Karachi as a port during the months when other modes of communicating between Bombay and Sindh were not available, were struck out, inasmuch as the English were in possession of that place, and their Government meant to keep it. In the second article, as accepted by the Mirs, the exercise of the pleasure of the Governor-General, as to the force to be maintained in Sindh, had been restricted to the employment of five thousand men. This was qualified so as to declare no more than that it was not intended that the force should exceed five thousand fighting men, thus virtually restoring the article to its original state. By another modification the power of the British Government was almost indefinitely extended as to the choice of the locality in which this force should be stationed. Instead of being fixed absolutely at Tattah, it was to be either there or at such other place westward of the river Indus as the Governor-General might select. There were other alterations, the most important of which was the omission of an article restraining the British Government from forming any treaty or engagement which could possibly affect

the interests of Sindh, without the knowledge and concurrence of the Mirs. The remainder it will not be requisite to notice. The result of the changes may readily be anticipated; the Mirs objected, implored, and finally gave way, by affixing their seals to the revised documents.

"Thus, in a very brief period, was Sindh reduced from a state of perfect independence to that of a feudatory of the British government. The modern history of India affords many instances of similar changes; but few, if indeed any, in which the incorporation has been effected so entirely without fair pretence. The Mirs of Sindh wished no alliance or connexion with us; they owed us nothing, and they had inflicted on us no injury; but it suited our policy to reduce them to vassalage, and they were thus reduced. If it be argued that we could not have prosecuted our views in Afghanistan without securing the dominion of Sindh, it must be answered, that if such were the case, they ought to have been abandoned. We had an object, and a legitimate one, to accomplish in Afghanistan; and as far as the rulers of that country, and those who claimed to rule it, were concerned, the prosecution of our policy did not

violate the laws of justice; but if it could not be pursued without invading the rights of others, there ought to have been an end to all attempts for carrying it out. It might be, and without doubt it was, very convenient to pass through Sindh: but we might have confined the passage of our army to Upper Sindh, where the reluctance to grant the favour seems to have been less strong; or we might have entered Afghanistan without passing through Sindh at all. With Ranjit Singh we had a long-established alliance. Why should so old a friend distrust us? If he did, how could we expect to find greater favour from those who had always looked coldly upon us? And, finally, if both authorities refused us that which we wanted, upon what principle did we select Sindh for coercion? The principle was this:—we could not safely quarrel with Ranjit Singh, but we entertained little apprehension of danger from the Mirs of Sindh.

"When Lord Auckland retired from the government of British India, the subsidiary treaty was that which regulated the relations of that government with Sindh. Little of importance had occurred since its ratification, except the death of Nur Mo-

hammed, the chief of the college of Mirs at Haidarabad, and some negotiations for transferring to the British the management of Shikarpur, which were never concluded. It was alleged that the Mirs had been engaged with various parties in correspondence of a dangerous tendency to British interests. The charge is not improbable, and may have been true; but it is remarkable that the terrible reverses which our army sustained in Afghanistan, and the consequent diminution of our military reputation, did not tempt the Mirs, writhing as they were under a deep sense of wrong, into any overt act of hostility. Indeed, the man likely to be best informed on the subject, Colonel Outram, political agent in Sindh, declared that nothing very definite had been resolved on, and expressed an opinion that such changeable, puerile, and divided chieftains were not ever likely to enter into deep, and consequently dangerous, conspiracy; nor did he consider that anything of the sort would be persevered in so long as no further disasters befel our arms in Afghanistan."

"This was written on the last day of May, 1842, when our prospects in Afghanistan were brightening.

"Early in the year 1842, Lord Ellenborough, as already mentioned, arrived in India as the successor of Lord Auckland. In May, from what especial cause does not appear, his Lordship transmitted to Colonel Outram letters addressed to the three divisions of the Mirs, threatening them with the confiscation of their dominions in the event of their proving faithless to the British government. The agent was allowed a discretion as to the delivery of these letters, and in the exercise of that discretion he withheld them.

"The Governor-General was prepared to dispossess the Mirs of their territories; but on the supposition that no sufficient, or ostensibly sufficient cause might be afforded for this step, he meditated an important change in their situation in regard to the British government. This was the commutation of the tribute payable by the Mirs to that government by the transfer of territory; and the localities where cessions of territory were to be derived were specified. Colonel Outram submitted to the Governor-General the sketch of a supplemental treaty embodying these views; but for some reason not explained, his Lord-

ship deemed it not advisable to press negotiations on the Mirs precipitately, and determined to leave their minds for the present in tranquillity.*

"The tranquillity conceded was not of long duration. In the month following that in which expression has been given to the wish that the Mirs should enjoy this inestimable boon of tranquillity, Major-General Sir Charles Napier was ordered to proceed to Sindh to assume the chief military command there. This was not all; he was also to exercise the chief political and civil authority. Such an arrangement, under particular circumstances, may be sometimes beneficial. The present instance is pronounced by a writer, hostile to Lord Auckland, and generally favourable to Lord Ellenborough, to have been 'a step, at such a crisis, of very questionable policy.' †

"Sir Charles Napier, in accordance with the instructions of the Governor-General, proceeded to Sindh, and on the 5th of October reported that the

* "Letter to Political Agent in Sindh, 10th April, 1842.—*Sindh Papers*, p. 380."

† "'A Great Country's Little Wars,' by Henry Lushington, p. 221."

Mirs levied tolls on the river, contrary to the treaty. Without waiting for the result of the remonstrance which the British representative made on the subject, that functionary was, by instructions forwarded in answer to his communication, directed to intimate to the Mirs that he was authorised to treat for a revision of the treaty. The agent to whom these instructions were addressed was nothing loth to follow them; and, in a paper of extraordinary length, he recorded his conviction that the existing state of political relations between Sindh and the British Government could not last; that the more powerful government would at no very distant period swallow up the weaker; and that it would be better to come to the results at once, if it could be done with honesty. The difficulty of doing it with honesty was great; but Sir Charles Napier was not a man to despair. An array of charges against the Mirs, extending over a considerable period, was transmitted to the Governor-General; and was answered by the draft of a treaty to be presented for the acceptance of the alleged offenders. By this document, required to carry into effect the project of obtaining territory in place of tribute, certain places were pointed out

as centres, to which a convenient arrondissement of country was to be assigned at the pleasure of the British general and political representative of his government. Another portion of territory was to be taken to reward the fidelity of the Khan of Bhavalpur as a British ally. The Mirs were to provide fuel for the steamers navigating the Indus; and if they failed, the servants of the British government were to be entitled to fell wood within a hundred yards of the banks of the river, within the territories of the Mirs. This was an offensive privilege, but not the most offensive that was claimed.

"By a series of articles in the treaty, which would seem to have been framed purposely with a view to insult, the Mirs were to cease to exercise the privilege of coining,—one of the chief characteristics of sovereignty. The British government were to coin for them; and, to aggravate the indignity offered to these wretched princes, the coin was to bear on one side the effigy of the sovereign of England. Thus, every transaction at every bazar throughout Sindh was to be made the means of publicly proclaiming that the Mirs had ceased to rule,—that they had become dependants of a foreign potentate, and held so

much of authority as was allowed to remain with them only by the sufferance of a superior, or of the servants of that superior. Separate treaties were to be tendered to the government of Haidarabad and to those of Khairpur; but they were framed upon the same principles and directed to the same ends.

"The justice of imposing such severe terms was rested upon the authenticity of the letters said to have been written respectively by Mir Nasir Khan of Haidarabad and Mir Rustam Khan of Khairpur, and on the escape of an insurgent leader from the British authorities, through the agency of a servant of the latter prince. As to the letters, every one acquainted with Oriental affairs knows that correspondence is constantly fabricated to aid any purpose that may be in hand.

"It is not meant that any Englishman was connected with the fabrication in this case, supposing the process to have been resorted to, or had any acquaintance with the matter. The supposition is unnecessary; native adventurers have great tact in guessing what will be useful or acceptable to those above them, and a rare facility in counterfeiting both signatures and seals. The authenticity of the letters

was denied by the alleged writers. The denial is certainly not to be received as conclusive against belief in their authenticity; but such belief is not warranted by any sufficient evidence. The seal attached to the latter, professed to be from Mir Nasir Khan, differed from the ordinary seal of that prince, but was said to correspond with another seal which he was represented to possess. The authenticity of the letter, however, was doubted by at least one very competent judge. The letter of Mir Rustam Khan, according to the admission of those who brought it forward in accusation against him, could not be traced to his cognizance; it was believed to have been written by his minister, but whether with or without his knowledge was not shown. And the escape of the prisoner from British custody was in like manner traceable no further than to the agent by whom it was effected. Certainly the rights of princes were never assailed on such slender ground as these charges afforded. But it was enough, for reasons not then disclosed; it was resolved to go forward with the process which had been commenced under a different administration, to tighten the grasp of the British government upon Sindh, and thus to

accelerate the progress of the movement which was to convert that country into a British province in name as well as in fact.

"The treaties were presented for the acceptance of the Mirs both of Upper and Lower Sindh on the 6th of December; they were accompanied by letters from Sir Charles Napier, intimating his intention to take immediate possession of the districts which it was proposed to assign to the Khan of Bhavalpur. The letters were dated the 1st of the month, and on the 18th publicity was given to the intention by the issue of a proclamation signed by the British general; which, after reciting the orders under which he acted, and the purpose which he had in view, declared that if the Mirs should, after the commencement of the ensuing year, collect any revenue in advance, or impose any new tax within the districts which they were destined to lose, they should be punished by amercement. At this time the new treaties were matters for discussion—they had not been ratified—they were mere proposals from one party which the opposite parties might reject; subject, of course, to the penalty attached to rejection. But it cannot fail to be observed, that Sindh

is dealt with by Sir Charles Napier as though the right of the Governor-General of British India to parcel it out at his pleasure were unquestioned and unquestionable; and moreover as if it were desired to exercise. The direct tendency of the proclamation was to render the Mirs contemptible in the eyes of those whom they were yet, perhaps for a time, to be permitted to regard as subjects. Such a course could not facilitate the acceptance of the proffered treaties; it was directly calculated to influence hostile feelings already believed to prevail in their minds; and had it been determined to hurry on an appeal to the sword, no more likely means could have been devised than the issue of this most injudicious and insulting proclamation.

"The extraordinary constitution of the Sindh government has already been adverted to. An incident arising from this cause has now to be noticed. Mir Rustam was the chief of the Mirs of Khairpur. He was above eighty years of age, and consequently no long tenure of life and power (such power as he was likely to retain) could be anticipated for him. According to the constitution of the Sindh state (if constitution it had), Ali Morad, brother of Mir Rustam,

was the legitimate successor of the prince in the chieftainship. Mir Rustam, it was alleged, wished to divert the succession in favour of his own son; and Ali Morad applied to Sir Charles Napier for support against any such attempt, should it be made. It was promised on condition of the fidelity of Ali Morad to the British cause. But something further was wished. The unmanageableness of a government constituted like that of Sindh was obvious enough; and it occurred to Sir Charles Napier that the age of Mir Rustam, and a presumed indisposition on his part to be longer burthened with the toils and vexations of government, might afford means for effecting some modification favourable to British influence. The following statement rests upon the authority of Sir Charles Napier; but it is proper to observe in the outset that it is not in all points uncontroverted. Mir Rustam sent a secret communication to Sir Charles Napier, to the effect that he could do nothing, and would make his escape to the British General's camp. This step was not desired; it was regarded as inconvenient: and by a very adroit, if not a very straightforward, piece of diplomacy, the General was relieved alike from the embarrassment

which would have resulted from entertaining Mir Rustam in his camp, and from that which would have followed his refusing him his refuge. As the transaction was in many points extraordinary, it will be best to relate it, as far as possible, in the words of the chief actor, Sir Charles Napier himself.

"It appeared then to him, that the only desirable system to follow in Sindh was that of making the chief powerful, and holding him under the power of the government—the British government being meant. 'This,' writes Sir Charles Napier, addressing the Governor-General, 'made me promise Ali Morad, your Lordship's support in having the turban,* which your Lordship has approved of. The next step was to secure him the exercise of its power now, even during his brother's life. This I was so fortunate to succeed in, by persuading Mir Rustam to place himself in Ali Morad's hands.'† Mir Rustam accordingly, instead of proceeding to the British camp, threw himself upon his brother, and surrendered to him the

* "The word turban, it will be perceived, is here used in the same sense as the word crown is frequently employed — to indicate the sovereignty."

† "Letter to Governor-General, 27th December, 1842.—*Sindh Papers*, p. 515."

chief authority. He seems, however, soon to have repented of the steps which he had taken, for in a very few days he escaped from the care of the person to whom he had been commended by the British General.*

"The flight of Mir Rustam — his first flight, namely, that which was followed by the surrender of his power to Ali Morad—excited great consternation among his family and followers. They forthwith fled; but not to the British camp, nor to Ali Morad. Their choice was the desert; and the greater portion were reported to have sought safety in a fort

* "That the intrigues of Oriental princes should be inexplicable is nothing new. Unfortunately, in this instance, the conduct of the British general is inexplicable also, and his statements irreconcileable until he shall furnish some further explanation. An account given by him has been closely followed in the narrative which will be found in the text, but it ought not to be concealed that the letters of the gallant general, written at different periods, contained discrepancies amounting to positive contradictions. The account followed above was written only eight days after the transactions recorded, and coincides with another more brief, which bears date on the day after Mir Rustam sought shelter with his brother. Any reader disposed to exercise his ingenuity in unravelling the perplexities and reconciling the discordance of this strange affair, all resting on the authority of Sir Charles Napier, will find abundant opportunity in the papers on the subject. Some notice of them will be found hereafter."

called Imam Ghar. Thither Sir Charles Napier resolved to follow them; and commenced his march without delay. No certain intelligence as to a supply of water being attainable, it was deemed prudent to take forward only a very small force. It consisted of three hundred and fifty men of the Queen's 22nd, mounted on camels (two on each animal), two hundred Sindhian horse, and two 24-pounder howitzers. The want of forage rendered it necessary to send back a hundred and fifty of the horse. The remainder of the force encountered the difficulties of the desert march, which were great, and reached Imam Ghar, which place was occupied without difficulty, and destroyed. The fort was stated to belong to Ali Morad, who consented to its destruction. The march of the British general, and the capture and destruction of a fortress belonging to some or other of the authorities of Sindh, took place at a time when we were professedly in a state of peace with all. It is greatly, therefore, to be desired, for the credit of the British name, that the statement above noticed should be correct. It has, however, been disputed, and with some appearance of truth. The fall of Imam Ghar took place early in the month of January, 1843.

"The event was not without effect, but the Mirs were yet naturally anxious to put off the evil day, which was to divest them of almost the very semblance of sovereignty. Major Outram, whose powers had been withdrawn, and who had consequently retired to Bombay, it was thought, might by his personal influence be able to effect something in the way of diminishing the reluctance of the princes to sign the sentence of their own virtual deposition. He returned, held various conferences with the Mirs, and finally prevailed on them personally to affix their seals to the treaties.* But there were other parties who claimed the privilege of judging beside the Mirs. The Bilochi tribes—bold, fierce, and intractable—were greatly excited againt the European intruders, who, by no slow advances, were establishing their own authority supreme in Sindh. As the British commissioner and his attendants departed from the final conference, they were assailed with execrations from an assembled crowd, who were restrained from more dangerous expression of their

* "With the exception of one of the Mirs of Khairpur, who alleged that his seal was in the possession of his brother, and promised to ratify the treaty at a future time."

feelings only by the presence of a strong escort of horse sent by the Mirs, under the command of some of their most influential chiefs.

"One great point on which the Mirs had dwelt in their conferences with Major Outram was the wrong which the British authorities had caused, and continued to uphold, in the transfer of authority from Mir Rustam to Ali Morad. It was stated that the surrender of power by the latter had been the effect of compulsion; and seeing that the aged chieftain was altogether in the hands of his brother, it is very probable such was the fact. The political move, which the British general thought a masterstroke of diplomacy, thus became a chief cause of embarrassing the negotiation; while it placed a chief, venerable for his years at least, in the position of an oppressed and injured man, and left on the shoulders of the highest British authority in Sindh the charge of being the principal author of the chieftain's degradation.*

* "The embarrassing situation in which Sir Charles Napier placed himself by his proceedings in regard to Mir Rustam and Ali Morad was obviously felt by him very deeply, as may be seen by a collation of his statement on the subject in the Sindh Papers and the supplementary collection. "The

"It was constantly represented by the Mirs that the continued advance of Sir Charles Napier would

"The first notice of the affair to be found in the printed papers occurs in a letter from Sir Charles Napier to the Governor-General, dated Sukkar, December 20th, 1842, which commences thus:—

"'I had a secret message from Mir Rustam. The bearer had an open letter in the usual unmeaning style of the Darbar; but the messenger privately informed Lieutenant Brown that Rustam could do nothing, and would escape to my camp. I did not like this, as it would have embarrassed me very much how to act; but the idea struck me at once that he might go to Ali Morad, who might induce him (as a family arrangement) to resign the turban to him (Ali Morad), especially as Rustam has long been desirous of getting rid of this charge of the Talpurs. I therefore secretly wrote to Rustam and Ali Morad; and about one o'clock this morning I had an express from Ali Morad to say that his brother is safe with him, and that he requested me not to move upon Khairpur before twelve o'clock to-day, to give time for his women to get away in safety. This I promised; and the more readily, as I could not (from other circumstances) move before to-morrow. Ali Morad is now virtually chief; for if Mir Rustam does not bestow the turban upon him, he will, at all events, be guided by Ali, into whose hands he has voluntarily thrown himself. Ali Morad was more powerful than any of the Talpurs, even when Mir Rustam's name and power were against him; now he is irresistible, and in alliance with us besides.' After a few further observations, Sir Charles Napier briefly sums up the results of the course which he had followed, and at the head of the summary stand the three points following:—First, that Ali Morad, the most powerful of the Talpur family, is secured to our interest by the promise of

exasperate the Bilochis, and cause them to resort to arms in defence of the independence of their country.

the turban. Second, that the chief of the Talpurs, frightened at the violence of his family, and at our steady operations to coerce them, has thrown himself into his brother's power by my advice; otherwise I should believe some trick was intended. Third, that we having complete power over the brother, have power over all without any chief making, or any apparent interference or any disturbance of the natural order of succession.

"In another letter to the Governor-General, dated 27th of December, Sir Charles Napier, after adverting to the duplicity of the Mirs, says, 'This conviction opened upon me a system which appears the only one to follow—making the chief powerful, and holding him under the power of the Government. This made me venture to promise Ali Morad your Lordship's support in having the turban, which your Lordship has approved of. The next step was to secure him the exercise of its power now even during his brother's life. This I was so fortunate to succeed in by persuading Mir Rustam to place himself in Ali Morad's hands. This burst upon his family and followers like a bomb-shell.' In a letter of a still later date (29th December), also addressed to the Governor-General, Sir Charles Napier, who had then become acquainted with Mir Rustam's flight from his brother, thus writes—'Mir Rustam had resigned the turban to his brother Ali in the most formal manner, writing his resignation in the Qoran before all the religious men collected to witness the resignation at Diji. Ali sent the Qoran to me to see it: I said that these family arrangements were their own, but that your Lordship would support the head of their family, whoever it might be, according to the spirit of the treaty. That I personally thought it better for Rustam to keep the turban, and let Ali Morad act for him; but that he was free to do as he

That officer, however, continued to advance, and on the 15th of February the long-threatened outbreak took

pleased; it was a family arrangement with which your Lordship would not interfere.'

"This much is to be gathered from the first published collection of papers relating to Sindh, and the amount may be stated as follows:—That Mir Rustam proposed to escape to the British camp; that Sir Charles Napier was desirous of averting such a movement, and suggested that the old chief should take refuge with his brother Ali Morad; that in making this suggestion he was actuated by a wish to place Ali Morad, at all events, in possession of the actual power attached to what is called the turban itself. He abstained from suggesting the transfer, but thought it might be effected by a family arrangement. Mir Rustam acted on the British general's advice; proceeded to join his brother, and by his own free consent, or as the result of compulsion, made the surrender of the turban as Sir Charles Napier had desired.

"The supplementary collection of papers contain the following letter from Sir Charles Napier to Mir Rustam, which it is to be presumed is the letter written in answer to the alleged communication from the chief to the British general—offering to come to his camp. 'My own belief is that, personally, you have ever been the friend of the English. But you are helpless among your ill-judging family. I send this by your brother his Highness Ali Morad. Listen to his advice, trust yourself to his care: you are too old for war; and, if battle begin, how can I protect you? If you go with your brother, you may either remain with him or I will send an escort for you to bring you to my camp, where you will be safe.

"'Follow my advice, it is that of a friend. Why should I be your enemy? If I was, why should I take this trouble to save

place, the first object of attack being the residence of the British commissioner, Colonel Outram. A dense

you? I think you will believe me; but do as you please.' This letter, it will be observed, does indeed give the person to whom it is addressed the option of coming to the British camp after he had surrendered himself to his brother and successor Ali Morad, not at once and immediately; and Sir Charles Napier, in his correspondence with the Governor-General, declared that the presence of the Mir in his camp would embarrass him.

"In a paper drawn up by Sir Charles Napier, at a later period, and which will be found in the supplementary collection, pp. 112-115, as an enclosure in a letter to the Governor-General, dated 10th of August, 1843, numbered 155, the writer, after adverting to some conversations with Ali Morad, thus continues. 'Soon after, a message arriving from Mir Rustam, claiming my protection against the intrigues of his own family, offered an opportunity of having one man to deal with instead of a faction with whom it was impossible for a civilized government to deal, and into whose intrigues I considered it undignified for a powerful government to enter; and from the first I determined not to enter into them. I was determined that when there was a breach of treaty, whether great or small, I would hold all the Mirs responsible, and would not be played off like a shuttlecock, and told this was done by one Mir, and that by another, and have a week's inquiry to find out whom I was to hold responsible for aggression, for I at once saw, on arriving in Sindh, that this hide-and-seek shifting responsibility was the game which the Mirs had been playing. The proposal of Mir Rustam to come into my camp offered me an easy remedy for this evil, and having adopted the high opinion which Major Outram entertained of Ali Morad, I had no hesitation in recommending his brother to seek his protection, and be advised

body of cavalry and infantry took post in a manner to command three sides of the inclosure in which the

by him. But I beg the reader to bear in mind—for it is a matter of first-rate importance, and one upon which the whole gist of the matter depends—that while advising Mir Rustam to be guided by his brother, yet having suspicions in despite of the high character given to me by Major Outram of that brother, that some intrigue must be going on, I gave Mir Rustam the option and invitation of coming to my camp, and putting himself under my protection. I repeat the word must, because it is utterly impossible for me to believe that any Eastern divan can act without intrigue. By my advice to Mir Rustam, which, let the reader observe, was not given till it was asked, I secured to Mir Rustam the honourable and powerful protection of the British government. This he did not choose to accept; he went to his brother, and then he fled from that brother with his usual vacillating imbecility.'

"All this is reconcilable with what has been already quoted; but there is a colouring given to the transactions described, which in strict truth they will not bear. Mir Rustam denied that he had ever sent the message upon which Sir Charles Napier's interference with his movements was based; and the fact of his having sent it rests solely on the assertion of the Munshi by whom the message, real or pretended, was delivered. But presuming the message to be genuine (and upon this presumption Sir Charles Napier, throughout the papers, grounds his right to advise), it follows that Mir Rustam desired to place himself in the hands of the British general, but the latter did not wish to have him. He advised the aged chieftain to go to his brother; and with reference to his advice, and the manner in which it was given, it is not a fair statement to say that Mir Rustam did not choose to accept the protection of the British government.

residence was situated, the fourth being defended by a British steamer, which happily lay in the river at no

He did choose to accept it (supposing the message to have been sent), for he had applied for it; but he was recommended to take another course which suited Sir Charles Napier better. Let Sir Charles Napier speak for himself. In a letter to Mir Rustam, dated January 2nd, 1843 (in Supplementary Collection, p. 7, No. 17), he says:—'You know that you offered to come to my camp, and that I advised you to go to your brother's fortress instead of coming to my camp.'

"But a more extraordinary passage occurs in a later part of the paper, No. 155, in the Supplementary Collection: it follows. 'Another thing I have to observe—it is, that when I heard that he had resigned the turban to Ali Morad I disapproved of it, and Mr. Brown will recollect my sending Ali Morad's vakil back to him with this message. I even recommended him to return the turban, and merely act as his brother's lieutenant. His answer was, that the deed had been executed in due form before all the mullahs or priests, and that it was impossible to alter it. I, of course, had nothing to say; I had no business to interfere with the private arrangements of the Mirs.' And in a letter to the Governor-General in council, dated the 12th of August, 1843 (Supplementary Collection, No. 157), Sir Charles Napier says: 'I assuredly did not press the abdication of the turban by Mir Rustam, nor did I even advise it; on the contrary, my letters will show that I recommended that he should not.' In these two passages Sir Charles Napier asserts that he did not press the resignation of the turban; that he did not even advise it; that he recommended that it should not take place; and that on hearing that it had been effected he disapproved of the act, and suggested its avoidance. It may be granted that he did not openly advise the transfer of the turban, and consequently

great distance. A hot fire was commenced and kept up for four hours by the assailants; but their attempts to

that he did not press it; but from his own declaration it is clear that he wished it:—The idea struck me at once that he (Mir Rustam) might go to Ali Morad, who might induce him, as a family arrangement, to resign the turban to him (Ali Morad).' — Letter (above quoted), December 20th. In the hope of effecting this object, he advised Mir Rustam to place himself in his brother's hands, as appears from Sir Charles Napier's own declaration in his letter of December 27th, to the Governor-General above quoted, from the letter to Mir Rustam in answer to the message which has also been quoted above, where Sir Charles Napier says, 'You know that you offered to come to my camp, and that I advised you to go to your brother's fortress instead of coming to my camp.' Further, he recommended Mir Rustam not only to go to his brother, but to listen to his advice; and he knew full well what were Ali Morad's views. Sir Charles Napier laid the train, expecting and desiring that it should be fired by another—it was fired, and his language in explaining his own share in the transaction partakes more of the character of special pleading than might be looked for in a man bred, not in chambers, but in camps. In a note upon a statement made by Major Outram, p. 29, of the Supplementary Collection, Sir Charles Napier says, 'It (the transfer of the turban) was the positive act of Mir Rustam, without my connivance, or even knowledge, till it was done.' It was without the British general's knowledge; but, after reading his own account of his views in sending Mir Rustam to Ali Morad, can any one say that it was without his connivance?

"But, besides denying that he pressed or advised the abdication, Sir Charles Napier says that he recommended that it should not be made, and that his letters will show this. The only letter

effect an entrance were defeated by the judicious efforts of Captain Conway, the officer in command, ably and

found in the Collections which tends to bear out this assertion, is one addressed to Mir Ali Morad, under date of the 23rd of December, 1843 (Supplementary Collection, p. 6, No. 14), which commences thus :—'I think your Highness will do well not to assume the turban for the following reasons. People will say that the English put it on your head against the will of Mir Rustam. But do as you please; I only give you my advice as a friend, who wishes to see you great and powerful in Sindh. This is the wish of my government. The Governor-General has approved of all that I have said to you. If to be the chieftain gives you power, I would say, assume the turban. But it gives you none. You are strong without it. No one in Sindh can oppose you; no one out of Sindh can oppose you. The British government will secure you against all enemies.' Now, herein, Sir Charles Napier certainly does express an opinion unfavourable to the assumption of the turban by Ali Morad; but the force of that opinion is altogether neutralized by the words, 'Do as you please.' When a man has within his grasp the object of his highest ambition, and receives from a person of whose opinion he stands in awe, a mild dissuasive from possessing himself of it, qualified however by the gracious concession, 'Do as you please,' there can be no doubt as to the result—he will please to take that which he covets. Thus acted Ali Morad, and thus did Sir Charles Napier contend that he should act, notwithstanding the affectation of gently dissuading him from a step which the general had placed Mir Rustam in his hands for the very purpose of forwarding.

"The tortuous course of Sir Charles Napier in regard to the transfer of the turban is further illustrated by a proclamation which he issued from his camp at Khairpur on the 1st of Ja-

zealously supported by his subalterns, Lieut. Harding and Ensign Pennefather of her Majesty's 22nd; and

nuary, 1843, and which appears in the Supplementary Collection, No. 15, on p. 6. In this document he says: 'His Highness the Mir Rustam Khan sent a secret messenger to me to say that he was in the hands of his family, and could not act as his feelings of friendship for the English nation prompted him to do; and that if I could receive him he would escape and come to my camp. I answered his Highness that I would certainly receive him; but that my advice was, for him to consult with his brother the Mir Ali Morad Khan. He took my advice. He went to the fort of Diji to his brother. When I heard of this I was glad, for I thought that Sindh would be tranquil, that his Highness would spend his last days in honour and in peace. I moved with my troops towards Khairpur to force his violent family to disperse the wild bands that they had collected; I sent his Highness word that I should visit him; I wanted to ask his advice as to the arrangements for the new treaty; I thought that he had again become the friend of the government that I serve.

" 'That night I heard that he had solemnly conferred upon his brother, the Mir Ali Morad, the turban of command over the Talpur family, which brother is the heir to that honour. I thought this a very wise proceeding, and it added to my desire to meet his Highness, that I might hear from his own lips all about these things, and report the same to the Governor-General, being assured that these acts of his Highness would recover for him the good opinion and friendship of the Governor-General of India. My feelings towards his Highness were those of friendship, honour, and peace; I even advised his Highness's brother, Mir Ali Morad, not to accept the turban, and to assist his brother, the chief, in the care of government.'

" The above passage is not of great length; but, notwithstand-

by two volunteers, Captain Green of the 21st Native infantry, and Captain Wells of the 15th. Captain

ing, the writer seems to have found it impossible to preserve anything like consistency through it. He declares that he thought the surrender of the turban a very wise proceeding, and that he wished to report it as one among various acts (what were the others does not appear) which would recover for Mir Rustam the good opinion and friendship of the Governor-General; and yet he goes on to boast that he had advised Ali Morad not to accept the turban, not to concur in an act which was wise, and which, moreover, in the opinion of Sir Charles Napier, would be gratifying to the heads of the government which he served. It is proper to state that a version of Sir Charles Napier's proclamation, differing in some respects from that just quoted, appears in the Supplementary Collection; but the variations do not clear up the British general's character for consistency or plain dealing. In the second version the more important part of the passage extracted stands thus:—'That same evening I had intelligence that his Highness had conferred the turban of the Talpur family on his brother, Mir Ali Morad, because he was the rightful possessor of it. I considered that this was well, and desired more earnestly to meet his Highness, in order that I might hear from himself what he had done, and also, that I might be able to state the same to his Lordship the Governor-General; and I thought that, by his observing such a line of conduct, he would have re-established himself in the favour of the British government; my wish was, that friendship and honour should continue with Mir Rustam, and I gave his brother, Mir Ali Morad, advice that he should not take the turban, but that he should assist his Highness in the arrangements for his country.' The reader will see that this leaves the matter in question as it stood. The variations between the two

Brown, Bengal Engineers, was despatched to the steamer, and there rendered valuable assistance in

versions of the proclamation are greater than could have been expected; but they do not affect the views of Sir Charles Napier as to the transfer of the turban, nor the character of his proceedings in respect of that transfer.

"Sir Charles Napier alleges that he not only abstained from advising the transfer of the turban,—that he not only advised the direct contrary,—but that, after he heard of the transfer, he disapproved of it, sent a message recommending the rescission of the act, and acquiesced in giving it effect only on being assured that it was both regularly executed and irrevocable. Now, it is to be feared that the word 'disapproved' is here used in a manner which, if not altogether unwarrantable, is at least obscure and equivocal. How could Sir Charles Napier disapprove of that which he had taken pains to bring about, and which he invariably affirmed to be desirable for the British government? It is to be presumed, therefore, that in saying he disapproved, he means, not that he felt disapprobation, but that he expressed it. His communication to Mir Ali Morad must have been a deliberate piece of double dealing, or his avowal, several weeks before, of a desire that Mir Rustam should give the turban to Mir Ali Morad, must have been insincere. There is no reason for embracing the latter branch of the alternative, and, consequently, there is no choice but to accept the former.

"Mir Rustam, after going to his brother, Ali Morad, as advised by Sir Charles Napier, and surrendering to that brother the turban, as wished, though not advised, by Sir Charles Napier, subsequently fled from his brother, declared that the surrender of the turban was extorted from him (as most probably it was), and alleged that Sir Charles Napier had recommended him to go to his brother, and be governed by his advice, which

directing her fire. The number of men under Captain Conway was entirely inadequate to any pro-

recommendation he had followed. On this Sir Charles Napier remarked, in a letter to Major Outram, February 11th, 1843, Supplementary Collection, p. 32, No. 57:—'Rustam's plea of being sent to Ali Morad by me is a shallow affair, because, in the first place, he sent a secret message (by Moyadin, I believe Brown told me) to say he was, to all intents, a prisoner in Khairpur, and that he had tried to send away his family, and was obliged to bring them back after they were on their road, and that he would escape and come to my camp. Brown knows all this matter. The messenger said he (Rustam) would do whatever I advised. My answer was, Take your brother's advice; go to him, and either stay with him, or I will escort you to my camp. His flying from his brother's camp proves that he was not a prisoner; his not flying to mine proves either his duplicity or his imbecility, I believe the latter; but imbecility is not a legitimate excuse for rulers; I have only to deal with his acts. He played you the same trick; he even now stands out; he cannot say Ali Morad still influences him; I believe he did at first, but does not now, and I am half inclined now to doubt the fact, though I did not do so at first; but, as I said, the intrigues of these people are nothing to me, only I will not let his cunning attempt to cast his conduct upon my advice pass. He went contrary to my advice, and now wants to make out that he acted by it: I send you a copy of my letter.' A more extraordinary and painful specimen of floundering than is afforded by this passage is rarely to be found. Rustam's plea of being sent to Ali Morad by Sir Charles Napier was not a shallow affair; he was so sent, and no sophistry can explain the fact away. Indeed, a few lines after the above, Sir Charles Napier admits the fact. 'My answer was, Take your brother's advice; go to him, and

tracted defence, and the stock of ammunition was scanty. A reinforcement of men and a supply of

either stay with him, or I will escort you to my camp.' The reckless mode of arguing adopted by Sir Charles Napier in regard to Mir Rustam's flight from his brother is not less remarkable than the rest of the passage—'His flying from his brother's camp proves that he was not a prisoner.' Did Sir Charles Napier never know of a prisoner making his escape? 'His not flying to mine proves either his duplicity or his imbecility.' It proves neither one nor the other, though possibly the old chief might be under the influence of both; but, at all events, he had little cause for confidence in one who had recommended him to trust himself to the advice and keeping of a rival, by whose threats or cajolery his dignity had been subverted. The conclusion of the above extracts is worthy of all that precedes it. 'I will not let his cunning attempt to cast his conduct on my advice pass. He went contrary to my advice, and now wants to make out that he acted by it. I send you a copy of my letter.' On first reading this it is impossible not to suppose that the words 'he went contrary to my advice' must apply to the flight of Mir Rustam from his brother, not to his going to him; but the accuracy of this construction seems doubtful, because the letter, a copy of which is referred to, is that to Mir Rustam, in answer to his secret communication, and which is quoted above (p. 427). If it be meant that Mir Rustam went to his brother contrary to Sir Charles Napier's advice, the assertion is one of the boldest experiments upon the extent of human credulity ever hazarded. After the most careful consideration of this passage, no one can feel satisfied that he is in possession of its meaning, and the impression left on the mind is, that the writer felt that he was struggling with difficulties which could not be overcome, that he was conscious of the bad-plausible case in his favour. No

ammunition were expected by another steamer; but she arrived without either; and it became obvious that there was nothing to be done but to effect a retreat with as little loss as possible. An attempt was made to remove the property within the residence; but the camp followers became alarmed, and after reaching the steamer with their first loads, could not be brought to return; while the fighting men had employment more important, as well as more stirring, than looking after baggage. The greater portion of the property was therefore abandoned, and the British party evacuated their quarters in a body, covered by a few skirmishers. The movement was effected with perfect order; and the British commander, with his

degree of ingenuity can give to the conduct pursued towards Mir Rustam the colour of straightforwardness and honesty.

"Throughout this inquiry the conduct of Sir Charles Napier has been tried solely upon his own testimony. Much might be added, if the statements made on the other side were admitted; but it is better that the case should be rested upon evidence to which even the friends and defenders of the British General cannot object. Upon such evidence it is clear that, though not in appearance, Sir Charles Napier was in substance the party chiefly instrumental in transferring the power and station of Mir Rustam to Mir Ali Morad, and that, subsequently finding that the act was regarded as odious, he vainly struggled to relieve himself from responsibility in respect to it."

brave escort, arrived in safety at the camp of Sir Charles Napier.

"There was now no mode of deciding the existing difference but by the sword. Sir Charles Napier accordingly advanced to a place called Miani, about six miles from Haidarabad, which he reached on the 17th of February, where he found the Mirs posted in great force. Their position was strong, their flank being protected by two woods, which were connected by the dry bed of the river Fulaili, having a high bank, behind which and in the woods were the enemy posted. In front of the extreme right, and on the edge of the wood protecting it, was a village. Having made his observations, the British general prepared for attack, posting his artillery on the right of the line, and sending forward skirmishers to drive out the enemy's force. The advance then took place from the right in echelon of battalions, the left being declined to escape the fire of the village. The artillery and her Majesty's 22nd formed the leading echelon, the 25th Native Infantry the second, the 12th Native Infantry the third, and the 1st Grenadier Native Infantry the fourth.

"About a hundred yards from the bank the

British opened the fire of their musketry in answer to that of the enemy. Thenceforward the official details of the battle are neither very full nor very clear. Thus much is certain,—that the conflict was obstinate and sanguinary, and that for a time the event was doubtful. The British, however, continued to press determinedly on their opponents, and a charge from the 9th Bengal light cavalry (which formed the reserve), aided by some Sindh horse, completed the discomfiture of the enemy, who slowly retired. The victory cost the British a loss of sixty-two killed and one hundred and ninety-five wounded. Among the number was a large proportion of officers;* the loss of the enemy was

* "The following is a list of the officers who suffered:—

"9th regiment light cavalry:—Lieut. Brevet Capt. Adjt. Cookson, killed; Capt. A. Tucker, Lieut. Brevet Capt. S. Smith, Lieut. H. G. C. Plowden, Ensign J. H. Firth, wounded.

"Her Majesty's 22nd regiment:—Capt. W. W. Tew, killed; Lieut.-Col. J. L. Pennefather, Ensign H. Bowden, wounded.

"12th regiment native infantry:—Capt. and Brevet Major Jackson, Lieut. and Brevet Capt. Meade, Lieut. Wood, killed; Ensign Holbrow, wounded.

"25th regiment native infantry:—Major Teesdale, killed; Lieut. Qr.-Mr. Phayre, Lieut. Bourdillon, wounded.

"Staff:—Major Wyllie, Assist. Adjt. Gen. S. and B., wounded.

estimated at five thousand, but this amount seems incredible.*

"Immediately after the battle six of the Mirs (three of Khairpur and three of Haidarabad) surrendered themselves prisoners; and on the 20th of February Sir Charles Napier entered the capital of Lower Sindh. But the contest was not yet at an end. Shere Mohammed, Mir of Mirpur, remained in arms; and on the 24th of March the British

* "One of the most pleasing duties of a general is to render just praise to those who have distinguished themselves under his command. It is scarcely a less gratifying duty to those whose humbler province it is to record the results of the soldier's efforts; but the list of officers favourably noticed by Sir Charles Napier is so long, that to introduce their names into the text would have the effect of converting a considerable portion of it into a mere catalogue. It is, however, not fitting that such names should be passed over, and they are consequently here presented. The officers named in the general's despatches are Major Teesdale (killed), Major Jackson (killed), Capts. Meade, Tew, and Cookson (all killed), Lieut. Wood (killed), Lieut.-Col. Pennefather (wounded), Major Wyllie (wounded), Capts. Tucker and Conway (both wounded), Lieuts. Harding and Phayre (both wounded), Lieut.-Col. Pattle, Major Story, Capt. Jacob, Major Lloyd, Capts. Whitlie and Hutt, Major Waddington, Major Reid, Major Poole, Capt. Jackson, Lieut. M'Murdo, Major M'Pherson, Lieut. Pelly, Lieut. Thompson, Lieut. Younghusband, Capt. Henderson, Lieut. Boileau, Lieut. Outlaw, Capt. Taite, Lieuts. Leeson and Brennan."

commander marched out of Haidarabad to attack him.

* * * * *

"Sir Charles Napier concluded his despatch to the Governor-General announcing the occupation of Umarkot with the words—'Thus, my lord, I think I may venture to say Sindh is now subdued; but the subjugation of a country inhabited, for the most part, by a wild and warlike population, is a thing easy to talk of, but not easy to accomplish.' The governor of Sindh (for to this office Sir Charles Napier had been appointed by his Lordship) for many months after uttering this declaration, found that he had something more to do than merely to make the requisite arrangements for carrying on the civil administration of the country which he represented as subdued. The Mir Shah Mohammed continued to break the tranquillity upon which Sir Charles Napier had calculated.

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"Since this period Sindh has been more tranquil, but it will probably be long ere the irruptions of the wild Bilochi tribes shall cease to afford ground for alarm.

"The proceedings of the British government with regard to Sindh were never popular in England; and even the splendour of victory failed of securing public approbation to a course of policy believed to be based in injustice. The Governor-General, in a despatch to the Secret Committee, dated in June, entered into an elaborate defence of that policy, obviously under the impression that such a step was not unnecessary. As this document was the official vindication of a series of acts regarded by a great majority of observers as of very questionable character, some examination of its contents seems to be called for.*

* "With a view to fairness, the vindication itself, as given in the Parliamentary Collection, follows:—

"On the withdrawal of the British armies from Kabul to the Satlaj, I had to decide what course I should pursue with respect to the Lower Indus. I had to decide whether the Lower Indus should be altogether evacuated, and our armies everywhere resume the positions they occupied before the Afghan war, or whether, while the old positions were re-occupied upon the Satlaj, certain points should still be held upon the Lower Indus, which would insure the strict performance of commercial treaties, and give us the military command of that river.

"The withdrawal to the Satlaj, and the withdrawal from the Lower Indus, appeared to me to be very different questions. The withdrawal to the Satlaj was dictated by the clearest views

"The defence commences by a reference to the state of affairs at the time of the withdrawal of the

of military and political prudence. I shall not recapitulate the reasons for that measure, as they have been placed on record in what has been called my Proclamation of the 1st of October, 1842.

"I have adopted every measure which could have the effect of giving the appearance of triumph to the return of the armies from Kabul; but still it was a retirement from an advanced position, and it was the first retirement ever rendered necessary to a British army.

"I was deeply sensible of the impression which the reverses at Kabul had produced upon the minds of native princes, of the native population, and of our own troops. I knew that all that had taken place since, and all I had said and done, although it must have much diminished, could not have obliterated that impression, and restored to our government and to our army the place they had before held in the opinion of India.

"To have added to retirement to the Satlaj, retirement from the Lower Indus; to have abandoned every part of the advanced position we had taken up in 1839; to have withdrawn from Karachi and from Sakkar amidst the insults, and exposed, as we should have been, to the attacks of the Bilochis upon our rear-guard; to have practically abandoned, as we should thereby have done, all the benefits which we might expect ultimately to derive from the commercial treaties concluded in 1839 (for it was idle to imagine, after what had passed, that without the presence of force those treaties would be observed); to have abandoned also all the great prospective advantages which may be expected to be derived from substituting the Indus for the Ganges as the line of military communication between England and the north-west provinces, and to have left open to the am-

British army to the Satlaj; and it is urged that the question of withdrawing from the Lower Indus

bition of the Sikhs or of an European power that route of which we had demonstrated the practicability and the importance;—to have done all these things without positive instructions from you, or without some overpowering necessity, would have been, in my opinion, contrary to my duty, because inconsistent with our national interest and the national honour.

"Such a measure would have confirmed the most exaggerated accounts which had been circulated of our disaster,—it would have been humiliating to the army.

"There was no overpowering necessity for retirement. There is no difficulty in holding the positions of Karachi and Sakkar. The first is, during the largest portion of the year, accessible in a few days from Bombay; the latter is, during the whole year, accessible in less than three weeks from Firozpur. We can, besides, command the river by our steam-vessels, if we have a sufficient number of them well adapted to the navigation.

"The misinterpretations placed upon some provisions of the commercial treaty, and the various violations of its letters and its spirit, even while our armies were in force in Sindh, satisfied me that, unless some penalty were imposed upon the Mirs for such infractions of their engagements, there could be no security whatever for their future observance. I saw troops collected by the Mirs, contrary to their usage, and without legitimate cause; but such collections of troops in the presence of a British army is, in itself, an offence and an indication of hostility not to be misunderstood or overlooked.

"With respect to the authenticity of certain letters of hostile character, ascribed to the Mirs or to their agents, you will have observed how strongly I impressed upon Sir Charles Napier the necessity of caution in coming to a decision on that point. I

rested on very different grounds. The reasons assigned for the difference are that such a course

had, however, the fullest reliance upon his sense of justice; and with this reliance I felt that he, on the spot, with every opportunity of personal communication with those conversant with such matters, was infinitely more competent to form a correct conclusion than I could be, at Simla. To him, therefore, I confidently remitted the question.

"I am satisfied with the grounds upon which he decided that the letters were authentic.

"Major Outram's doubt as to the authenticity of the letter of Mir Rustam Khan to the Maharajah Sher Singh appears to have rested upon the circumstance of the party whose information led to the seizure of the letter being inimical to Mir Rustam Khan; but assuredly, information tending to criminate Mir Rustam could not be expected from one of his friends.

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"Much care appears to have been taken to investigate all the circumstances attending the escape of Mohammed Sharif. It seems impossible to doubt the participations of Mir Rustam's minister, in that escape of an enemy to the British government, proceeding to act hostilely against us.

"I cannot admit the convenient doctrine, that a chief is not to be responsible for the act of his minister. That minister, known to be so hostile to the British government, remained with Mir Rustam to the last.

"I have endeavoured to judge my own conduct as I could that of another; and I cannot think, on reviewing it, that in the circumstances in which I stood, I was unjustified in requiring from the Mirs the specific modification of their engagements, which I instructed Sir Charles Napier to propose to them.

"These modifications of the existing treaty involved on our

would have been humiliating; that there was no overpowering necessity for it; that our advanced position

part the abandonment of a considerable revenue, payable to us every year by the Mirs, under the name of tribute. They involved, undoubtedly, the sacrifice, on their part, of lands of more than equivalent value; but the penalty imposed did not seem disproportioned to the offence I had reason to believe they had committed.

"You have been long in possession of the reason which induced me to think that the abolition of tribute was in itself a good. You have also long been aware of the grounds on which I deemed it polite to make a gift to the Navab of Bhavalpur, of territory which formerly belonged to his state. Had you disapproved of the general principles upon which the new treaty proposed to the Mirs was founded; still more, had you disapproved of the intention I had announced, of holding military possession of certain points upon the Lower Indus, after the evacuation of Afghanistan; I presume that you would have acquainted me with that opinion. In the absence of any intimation to that effect, I had reason to suppose that a new treaty, based upon these principles, if legitimately obtainable, would not be unacceptable to you.

"Had the Mirs seen fit to reject the treaty proposed to them, and to support that rejection openly by arms, they would have pursued a legitimate course; and their defeat in fair fight would have admitted of subsequent arrangements on the basis of their retaining a portion of their territory, and the exercise of sovereign authority: but, from the first, while they of course denied the correctness of the charges made against them, they professed their willingness to submit to the penalty imposed, still they collected more troops. At last, having drawn the British general into the vicinity of Haidarabad, having then actually signed

was maintainable without difficulty; and that it was not desirable to abandon the Indus to the Sikhs, or

the draft of the treaty, they with a portion of their troops made a treacherous attack upon the residence of the British commissioner, and, with all their forces united, they opposed the further advance of our army at Miani.

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"The example of the Afghans at Kabul was to be followed by the Bilochis at Haidarabad; but the spirit in which they were met was different from that which at Kabul led to the destruction of a British army.

"It was my duty to mark such conduct by an extent of punishment which should be a warning to every chief and people in India, which should give future security to the persons of British ministers, and protect British troops from treacherous aggression.

"The battle of Miani entirely changed the position in which the British government stood with respect to the Mirs of Sindh.

"To have placed confidence in them thereafter would have been impossible.

"To have only exacted from them large cessions of territory would have been to give them what remained as the means of levying war for the purpose of regaining what was ceded.

"Foreigners in Sindh, they had only held their power by the sword, and by the sword they have lost it.

"Their position was widely different from that of a native prince succeeding a long line of ancestors, the object of the hereditary affection and obedience of his subjects.

"They had no claim to consideration on the ground of ancient possession or of national prejudice. Certainly they had none arising out of the goodness of their government. To take advantage of the crime they had committed to overthrow their

to a European power; that the Mirs had committed violations of the commercial treaty, and that the im-

power was a duty to the people they had so long misgoverned.

"It was essential to the settlement of the country that I should take at once a decided course with respect to the Mirs; and having no doubt that I was justified in dethroning them, I determined on at once adopting and announcing that decision.

"Their removal from the country with which they were no longer to be connected as sovereigns was a measure of obvious expediency. It has apparently had the beneficial effect I anticipated from it. The willing acquiescence of the people in our rule, and the adhesion of many of the chiefs to our government, are already the just rewards of an unhesitating and decisive policy which, in taking away every hope from the Mirs, has given confidence to their late oppressed subjects.

"Some resistance on the part of the Mirs I regarded as not an impossible event; and I considered that having once felt our strength, they might thereafter be more strict observers of their engagements. Treachery, such as that we experienced, had not come within my calculations. A victory, decisive as that at Miani, and gained under such circumstances, was to me a wholly unexpected event. As I have said, it entirely changed our position, and I was compelled at once to decide what policy should be adopted in the new state of things. I could not for the reasons I have given reinstate the Mirs. Any other arrangement than I have made would have imposed upon us all the burthen of protecting a government without affording us the means of benefiting the people or ourselves. Any half measure would have failed. Adopting the decisive measure of taking the province into our hands, I determined to adapt the means to the end, and

position of some penalty upon them was, therefore, expedient; that the Mirs were collecting troops; that they were charged with writing letters of hostile character which Sir Charles Napier determined to be genuine; that two of the Mirs entered into an agreement binding themselves to act together in every

not to omit any step by which security could be given to the new possession.

"The Mirs were removed beyond sea. All arrears of revenue due to them on the day of the battle of Miani were remitted, the transit duties were abolished, the neighbouring states of Jodpur and Jaisalmer were, as well as Bhavalpur, interested in the overthrow of the Bilochis, by the intimation that their ancient possessions would be restored. The inhabitants of Sindh were assured by proclamation that the property of all who laid down their arms would be respected.

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"The vast tracts which the Mirs have converted into Shikargahs will also be surveyed. Such of the woods as it may be necessary to retain will be carefully preserved, and extensive portions of land, having the richest soil, lately reserved for hunting-grounds by the Mirs, will be restored to cultivation.

"Some of these measures have originated with myself; in others, I have been anticipated by the Governor of Sindh. In all I know I shall have his most cordial co-operation.

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"You may be assured that no exertion of mine shall be wanting to make the conquest of Sindh by the British arms no less the source of happiness to the inhabitants of that country than of advantage to our own."

affair, whether for good or evil, peace or war; that the servants of some of the Mirs acted hostilely; and that their masters were accountable for their actions. These are the grounds from which the conclusion is deduced that it was just to demand the substitution in place of the existing treaty of one more favourable to the British government, which demand may be regarded as the first important step in the dealings of the Governor-General with Sindh.

"The withdrawing from the Lower Indus was in one view a very different measure from the withdrawal to the Satlaj. When it became a question whether or not the British should retain their positions on the Lower Indus, the impression produced by the disasters in Afghanistan had been in a great degree effaced by the triumphant march to Kabul. It will be recollected that before this march the British generals beyond the Satlaj had been urged to return with all speed. This would undoubtedly have been humiliating, and the effect might perhaps have been fatal. Happily, the officers commanding, both in Upper and Lower Afghanistan, were men not open to the influence of panic. They returned, but not till after they had vindicated their country's

honour. Surely it could not be so humiliating, or so disastrous, to quit Sindh at a moment of triumph, as it would have been to quit Afghanistan under the disgrace of defeat. Yet the Governor-General, who was prepared for the latter step, shrank from the former. It was, at least, as safe to retire from Sindh victorious, as to retire from Afghanistan beaten, and the difference which exists between the two cases, as far as national military character is concerned, tells alike against the course urged upon the generals commanding in Afghanistan in the one case, and the opposite course voluntarily taken by the Governor-General in the other.

"To the argument that there was no overpowering necessity for retiring from Sindh, it is unnecessary to say anything further than that its adoption will justify a government in keeping any thing which it is strong enough to hold. And if a government may thus argue, why may not an individual? The British were in Sindh, and it was believed that they had the power to remain. The question of how they came there appears not to have been thought of. It is true, that the Governor-General was not accountable for the original wrong inflicted on the rulers of Sindh;

but he did not hesitate to add to that wrong, and thus to identify himself with an evil policy. Further —in the doctrine that nothing should be yielded except to an overwhelming necessity, we find a severe condemnation of the Governor-General's proposed policy in regard to Afghanistan—that of quitting the country without an effort to vindicate the national honour. There was no overwhelming necessity for this; yet he would have done it.

"But it was not to be expected that the Governor-General should sever the British connexion with Sindh before his arrival in India. The rights of the Mirs as independent rulers had been violated, by forcing upon them a treaty containing provisions which they regarded with great, and, as the event showed, with very just apprehensions. It would be too much to maintain that the Governor-General was bound to set aside this treaty, and to restore the state of affairs existing previously to its being made. Such things have occurred in India as for a Governor-General summarily to annul engagements solemnly concluded by his predecessor, even when one of the contracting parties was thereby exposed to ruin, and was most anxious to receive the protection of the great Euro-

pean power which now gives law to the Eastern world: but the Governor-General might justly hesitate at the adoption of such a course; and assuredly, had he adopted it in the case of Sindh, he would have been met in certain quarters by clamorous accusations of neglect of duty, in having abandoned the Indus, that great line of communication with Upper Asia, to which our merchants and manufacturers had been taught to look, as affording the means of deluging with British goods countries known only by name. The Governor-General could not reasonably be blamed, had he only endeavoured to maintain things as he found them; but with this he was not content. He was resolved to have a new treaty more humiliating and more hateful to the Mirs than that which preceded it; and in endeavouring to accomplish this object, he precipitated his government into a new and dangerous war,—ending indeed successfully, and thus saving the military reputation of the British from blot, but leaving on their character for honour and good faith a deep and enduring stain.

"The provisions of the commercial treaty, it was said, had not been strictly adhered to by the Mirs;

and the charge was probably true. But if every trifling breach of treaty committed by a native prince or by his servants were to furnish occasion for war, the British government of India would never be at peace for a single year with any of the states with whom it is in alliance. The alleged aggressions were all very slight; they afforded proper ground for remonstrance, but not for forcing on the Mirs at the point of the sword an entire change in their situation in regard to the British government. The Governor-General was for prompt and decisive measures: he deemed it necessary to inflict some penalty, because without it there would, in his judgment, be no security for the future observance by the Mirs of their engagements. What security was gained by the course which he took? He deposed the Mirs and took possession of their country, thus putting their future adherence to treaties quite out of the question. But this was but the clumsy expedient of an unskilful surgeon, who cuts off the limb which he is unable to restore to healthy action. Looking merely to the relations subsisting between the Mirs and the British, it is impossible to deny that the former were in the wrong; but if the means by which those relations

were brought about be remembered, some degree of excuse will be suggested for men who had been coerced, by those whom they had never injured, into a position which they wished to avoid. The same remark will apply to the charge founded on the hostile letters (the authenticity of which is, to say the least, very doubtful) and to the other acts of an unfriendly character which the Mirs were charged with doing or tolerating. They had received gross provocations, and they might not unreasonably expect that remonstrance would be followed by some further period of probation before they were sentenced to descend still lower in the scale of dependency. But this was not granted. The charges were some of them trivial and some unproved, but they were sufficient to support a demand upon the Mirs for the execution of a new treaty, inflicting a penalty,—for that is the word employed by the Governor-General. It was not enough that the British government should be safe: it was deemed requisite that the Mirs should be punished. These princes had been subjected to much injustice: they were naturally dissatisfied; and it was therefore fitting that they should suffer more, especially as there was an opportunity for inflicting

further injustice without much risk. If the Mirs gave cause for suspicion, it was right to watch their conduct narrowly; it was justifiable to require them to conform to the treaty which they had subscribed; it was lawful even to propose alterations in the treaty; but if they were declined, it was neither lawful nor honourable to treat an ally as a conquered enemy, and require submission to any terms which it might be the pleasure of the stronger power to dictate.

"The Mirs were blamed for not peremptorily rejecting the treaty and supporting the rejection by arms. This would certainly have been the more honourable course; but why should honour be expected to find a place in a native government when it had departed from that which had hitherto rested its claim to power in Asia upon its character for good faith? What measure of openness and fair dealing had the Mirs met with at the hands of the power which, within eleven years from the period when it obtained a reluctantly-granted permission to use the roads and rivers of Sindh for commercial purposes, and for these only, had by steps following each other in rapid succession advanced its claim even to the right of disposing of the territory of the Mirs at its

pleasure? This is not an exaggerated representation. Sir Charles Napier assumed the right of transferring a portion of the territory of the Mirs of Sindh to the Navab of Bhavalpur, under orders from the Governor-General, and with reference to the provisions of a treaty which the Mirs had never executed. The General's proclamation announcing the transfer bears date the 18th of December. The Mirs did not subscribe the treaty till the 12th of February following. By threats or cajolery, by force or finesse, one sacrifice after another had been extorted from the Mirs.

"At length, at the end of the year 1842, the British Government being disembarrassed of all other difficulties, was able to deal very decidedly with the one which remained. It was thought no longer necessary to go through the forms of diplomacy, or to wear even a decent mask of friendship. It sufficed to declare that the British Government wanted certain portions of territory for their own objects, and forthwith to take them without reference to the treaty of 1839, though that was the only document which defined the relations of the Mirs and the British Government; and slight infractions of that treaty by the Mirs were represented by the other party as

sufficient to stamp on those princes the character of the most faithless of men. If a few breaches of commercial regulations, some of which were doubtful, demanded the infliction of a penalty; what punishment was due to the seizure of a province in violation of treaty? The rulers of Sindh were guilty of the former offence, and lost a kingdom; the British Government committed the latter, and gained one. Affairs had indeed been for some time approaching a point where it was inevitable that disguise on both sides should be abandoned; it was maintained by one party as long as was practicable, by the other as long as was necessary. The British in the earlier of their proceedings had employed both cunning and force. They were now in a condition to rely solely on force, and accordingly they dispensed with the less dignified means by the use of which they had won their first steps. The situation of the Mirs was different. They could not afford to discard the use of temporizing, and accordingly they clung fast to it. There is this apology for them,—they were acting in self defence. This at no time could be said of their opponents; they were throughout acting aggressively. The contest on their part was an unrighteous one,

and their triumph is felt by their countrymen to be almost as great a source of shame as would have been their defeat.

"The case properly rests on the grounds which have already been adverted to; but in the laboured defence of the Governor-General there are passages of wider and less special application, which claim some remark. They are those in which the situation of the Mirs in regard to their subjects, the character of their government, and the moral and social consequences of their dethronement, are referred to. 'Foreigners in Sindh,' writes his lordship, 'they had only held their power by the sword, and by the sword they have lost it. Their position was widely different from that of a native prince succeeding a long line of ancestors, the object of the hereditary affection and obedience of his subjects. They had no claim to consideration on the ground of ancient possession or of national prejudice.' The argument intended to be included in the word foreigner, obviously bears just as much against those who displaced the Mirs, as against the princes themselves, if not more strongly; and, though it be true that they held their power only by the sword, the British,

according to the statement under examination, have no better tenure. They struck the sword out of the hand of the Mirs, and took it themselves. Another party, if strong enough, may wrest it from them; and thus the question is reduced to one of mere force.

"The position of the Mirs, it is said, 'was widely different from that of a prince succeeding a long line of ancestors, the object of the hereditary affection and obedience of his subjects. They had no claim to consideration on the grounds of ancient possession or national prejudice.' The length of the possession of their family was about sixty years. Our own standing in India is not so much more as to warrant us in despising a sixty years' possession. As to the case of a prince supposed not only to be derived from a long line of ancestors, but to be the object of the hereditary affection and obedience of his subjects, it may confidently be asked, Where within the wide expanse of India and the adjacent countries is such a prince to be found? For the most part the obedience rendered to native princes is very imperfect; but the Eastern potentate enjoying the affection of his subjects has still to be sought for. This imaginary case of a prince of ancient descent, and of

such a character as shall command not only obedience but affection, is introduced merely for the purpose of a contrast with the Mirs, who, it is immediately added, had no claim to commendation arising out of the goodness of their government. This may readily be admitted. It may be at once allowed that the Mirs were not above the ordinary run of native princes—that they were very bad specimens of a very bad class; but why, it may yet be asked, were they selected for punishment by confiscation and imprisonment, while other royal profligates are permitted without restraint to cover with desolation some of the fairest portions of Asia? To take advantage of the crime they had committed to overthrow their power, it is said, was a duty to the people they had so long misgoverned; but how came it that the claims of the people of Sindh pressed so much more strongly upon the British government than those of other countries, with whom that government had been much longer connected? There was an opportunity, it seems—the Mirs had committed a crime. That crime consisted in a desire to keep to themselves the country from whose roads and river they had, down to the year 1832, excluded strangers at their plea-

sure; the country in which, down to the year 1839, they had exercised sovereign rule; the country in which they still retained the name and many of the functions of sovereignty, some of which, together with a large portion of territory, they were about to be deprived of. This was the crime of the Mirs; it was the crime of a man who resists an unlawful attempt to despoil him of his property. In all our disputes with these princes we had been the aggressors —we had dealt with their country as though it had been our own, and to suppose that they should regard us with friendly feelings was impossible. All that has been said of the bad government of the Mirs, and of the benefit likely to result from its transfer, is the result of after-thought. If a regard for the people of Sindh were the motive of our proceedings, why was it not avowed from the first? It was surely a more honourable one than some which could not fail to be imputed. Did we or did we not invade Sindh for the deliverance of its people from tyranny? If we did, why did we so long decline the honour attached to our chivalric movement? If we did not, how can we now pretend to any merit on such grounds? The government of the Mirs was bad; so is that of every other native

state. The people will be more prosperous and more safe under British rule than under that of their native governors: so would the people of every other state of India. Are we, therefore, prepared to take possession of every state subject to native rule? The case, in truth, stands thus: the British were anxious for the possession of Sindh; they were strong enough to take it; and the people, it may be admitted, will be benefited by the change. But the motive which led to that change was ambition, not philanthropy—cupidity, not benevolence; and it is sheer hypocrisy to declaim on the vices of the Mirs and the wrongs of their people, while, if our own interest had not furnished a spur to interference, the rulers might, for us, have revelled in their vices, and the people bent under their wrongs, until the end of time.

"Thus, too, of the vapouring display which has been made of the advantages of opening the Indus. It need not be denied that some degree of benefit to commerce may follow; but how has it been secured? By a series of political crimes; and if the actors in them are to be justified by the results, then may we do evil that good may come. Men have ceased, in a great degree, from attempting to propagate religious

truth by violence, and there are now few who will not admit the wickedness of such attempts. But it seems that it is quite lawful to open up new sources of trade by such means; and that when there may appear any chance of extending commercial operations, the sword may properly be employed to clear the way. Thus the errors and crimes of one age disappear in the next, but too often only to be replaced by others equally great and equally dangerous.

"And with such vindication of the policy of a British Governor-General, in dealing with an ally, as the letter of the Governor-General affords, closes, for the present, the history of Sindh, henceforth a British province."

Although I have swelled this chapter with the quotations and extracts of the best authorities and an impartial historian, I feel confident that the remarks of Captain William Eastwick, who, as a political agent in Sindh, was beloved by all, and possessed a most accurate knowledge of the politics of that country and the feelings of its inhabitants, will not be read without interest. He observes in his speech before the Court of Proprietors, that if such absurd rumours were listened to, no native prince would be

then safe. He also states that if the Earl of Auckland had planned to subdue Sindh without any just reason, it was not necessary that the same error should be followed after his departure.

"Sir, before I conclude, I would advert to two points which catch the eye at the first glance; and with superficial observers, divert the attention from the glaring injustice of the previous proceedings. On the 5th March, 1843, the Governor-General issued a proclamation to the following effect:—'The Governor-General cannot forgive a treacherous attack upon a representative of the Government, nor can he forgive hostile aggression prepared by those who were in the act of signing a treaty.'

"Now, Sir, both these assertions distort the facts. The treaty was signed on the 12th, incorrectly stated by the Governor-General the 14th. The attack on Major Outram took place on the 15th. In the intermediate days Major Outram was distinctly warned, that the Mirs could not control the Bilochis. They had already saved his life once, and the lives of his escort, on their return from their conference.

"In 1839 I was placed in exactly the same position. Aware of the weakness of the internal government of Sindh, and the inability of the Mirs to protect me, I thought it my duty to withdraw in order to avoid collision. If I had been attacked after having been warned, could I have called the attack treacherous? Certainly not. Does Major Outram designate it as a treacherous act? He does not. Let him

be summoned to the bar of the House of Commons, and answer for himself.

"Sir, the Mirs had not the power to prevent this attack. We have no right to judge them according to our European notions of a government. They were simply the heads of one of the principal tribes, the Talpurs, and the recognized channel of communication with foreign powers; but they had not even the jurisdiction of life and death amongst some of the other powerful tribes—the Lagharis for instance—they ruled through the Bilochi chiefs. They could influence and persuade, but they could not restrain nor enforce obedience when opposed to Bilochi prejudices. Captain Postans states, and I can confirm the statement, that the meanest Bilochi will, at times, unhesitatingly beard the Mirs in public Durbar.

"Sir, I feel convinced that the Mirs were not only not favourable to this attack, but exerted all their influence to prevent it, otherwise Major Outram must have been crushed. Will any man assert that the same troops who maintained such a desperate struggle at Miani against Sir Charles Napier's whole army, could not have destroyed a detachment of one hundred men?

"And now, Sir, let us turn to the charge of hostile aggressions prepared by those who were in the act of signing a treaty. Sir, the whole conduct of the Mirs show that their preparations were strictly defensive—that they had not the least notion of aggressive measures. The Governor-General himself writes on the 14th of November, 'The

design of the Mirs would seem, by the intelligence transmitted, to be of a defensive character only.' We must recollect, Sir, that this is written after the assembly of a preponderating force at Sakkar, after the Mirs were aware of the provisions of the new treaty, and after it had been officially reported that the Mirs had been informed that the English meditated treachery.

"Sir, none but the most obstinately prejudiced or the wilfully blind could accuse these unhappy princes of a desire of hostile aggression. It is against all the evidence,—it is against all probability. Is it to be believed that the Mirs would have stood our staunch friends in the day of defeat and adversity to break with us at the moment when our armies were returning flushed with victory? Is it credible that, with the experience of our recent successes in Afghanistan, they would rush headlong into so unequal a contest? I would refer the Court to a most admirable letter of Sir Henry Pottinger, dated 20th June, 1839. It is too long to quote, but bears remarkably on this point.

"Sir, the Mirs knew their inability to cope with us in the field; they depended upon our sense of justice. What does Mir Nasir Khan write? 'I know that the Kings of England never sanction injustice.' In all their letters, in every conversation, they refer to the treaty of 1839. Mir Nasir calls it a wall, or bund. On signing the new treaty, they express their determination to petition the Governor-General.

"Let us read Mir Rustam's letter to Sir Charles Napier;

a more affecting document it never fell to my lot to peruse. He writes, 'God knows we have no intention of opposing the British, nor a thought of war or fighting; we have not the power. Ever since my possessions were guaranteed to me and my posterity by the British government under a formal treaty, I have considered myself a dependant of theirs, and have thought myself secure. I have always attended to the least wish of the British officers, and now that my territory is being taken from me, I am at a loss to find out the reason of so harsh a measure. I have committed no faults. If any is alleged against me, let me hear what it is, and I shall be prepared with an answer. I feel strong in the possession of that treaty, and I trust to the consideration of the British still. If, without any fault of mine, you choose to seize my territory by force, I shall not oppose you, but I shall consent to and observe the provisions of the new treaty. However, I am now, and shall continue to be, a suitor for justice and kindly consideration at your hands.' Sir, my very blood boils with indignation when I contemplate the wrongs of this old and venerable chieftain. When political agent in Upper Sindh, he treated me as a father does a son. I have sat with him in his inmost apartments, and heard him express his satisfaction that he had secured the friendship of the British government; there was nothing that he would not have done to show his devotion and good feeling; he proved it in a thousand instances; and what is his reward? He is hurled from his throne, torn from his wife and family, and sent to

die in a prison in a foreign land. Sir, I am one of those who believe that retribution awaits the guilty even in this world, and it is my solemn conviction that some great calamity will overtake this country if such monstrous acts of injustice are sanctioned and upheld.

"But, Sir, I have shown what Mir Rustam writes. What does he do? He offers to throw himself into the hands of the British representative. Is it possible to show more plainly his submission and his reliance on the British government, his confidence in British faith, and strict observance of treaties; that confidence which has done more to raise up our wonderful empire in the East than all the exploits of British valour?

"Sir, notwithstanding Sir Charles Napier's repeated acts of hostility, notwithstanding his threatening and aggressive march on Haidarabad, all those who know Sindh must be aware that the Mirs could have no intention of proceeding to extremities. Sir, if they had meditated hostilities, they would have sent away their wives and families, they would have concealed their treasures, they would have called in all their levies, especially Mir Sher Mohammed, who was considered the bravest of their warriors, and who, on the prospect of hostilities with Lord Keane's army in 1839, brought his coffin and shroud to Haidarabad. And, Sir, if conscious of guilt, they never would have surrendered themselves immediately after the battle of Miani. Sir, I repeat, it is only those determined to convict against all evidence; it is only those prepared to trample upon all

obligations, that will pronounce judgment against the unfortunate Mirs of Sindh.

"Sir, on the 4th of last April, I happened to be in the House of Commons, when a Noble Lord, an honour to his country, gave utterance to the following sentiments (I quote from memory, but the words made a deep impression upon me at the time, and found a responsive echo in my breast): 'England (he said), with one arm resting on the East, and the other on the West, is in too many instances trampling under foot all moral and religious obligations. If such is to be the course of our future policy; if our superiority in arts, in arms, in science, and in strength, is to be turned to the injury, and not to the advantage of mankind, I would much prefer that we should shrink within the proportions of our public virtue, and descend to the limits of a third-rate power.' While these words rang in my ears I cast a rapid glance at the events, which, within a brief space of time, have thrown such a fearful interest over our Eastern empire.

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"Sir, it is painful to reflect on the gallant lives thus uselessly sacrificed or the misery caused to hundreds of English families; and if we have suffered misery, we have inflicted a hundred times greater. That may be a consolation to some; but to me it only conveys deeper shame and sorrow. War at all times is a great evil, but an unnecessary and unjust war it is fearful to contemplate, and fearful the responsibility of those who throw their sanction over a crime of such magnitude.

"Sir, no wonder then that my mind turned with some sort of satisfaction to the reflection that these execrable wars were at an end; that a new era was dawning on Hindostan; and that, profiting by experience, we should direct all our energies to the maintenance of peace, and to the moral and physical advancement of the millions over whom we are permitted by a gracious Providence to preside. Little did I imagine that the very next mail would bring accounts of an act of aggression to which our Indian annals, unhappily so fertile in such acts, can afford no parallel. Little did I imagine that the very man who had denounced the Afghan expedition as a crime, who had gone out of his way to mark his total dissent from the policy of his predecessor, who had so recently put forth to the world that memorable declaration, that, 'content with the limits that nature appears to have assigned to its empire, the government of India will devote all its efforts to the establishment and maintenance of general peace;' little did I think that the author of this declaration, without even the plea of an imaginary or real danger to the State, with all the aggravations of ingratitude for services rendered during a season of unwonted trial, would have grasped at frivolous and flimsy pretexts to goad a barbarous but brave people to desperation, and again to let loose all the horrors and calamities of war.

"Sir, it is my conscientious opinion that if the thinking part of this great Christian nation; that if the independent portion of the public press could once be roused to the con-

sideration of this question, such a storm of indignation would burst forth, that no ministry would be hardy enough to refuse a full and searching inquiry. Sir, the time is past, at all events in this free country, when the follies and passions of an individual can plunge the nation into all the calamities of war. Is it then to be permitted that the servants of the East India Company shall wantonly have recourse to such an extreme arbitrament? Is there to be no end of these wars of aggression? and no voice raised in their condemnation? If the Ministry of this country, oppressed with business, are unable or unwilling to grapple with Indian questions; if the great council of the kingdom have neither leisure nor inclination to enter upon an inquiry involving the rights of justice and humanity, involving the good name and good faith of the British nation, it is easy to predict that these acts of tyranny and aggression will continue, that one iniquity will only lead to another, and, to use the emphatic words of the unfortunate Mirs of Sindh, applied to their own case, 'There will be no justice for the natives of India until the Almighty sits on the judgment-seat.'

"Sir, I repeat this is no party movement; it is a step beyond the petty squabbles of political intrigue; it is an appeal to those loftier principles which alone ought to guide the councils of a great and enlightened Christian government. Every Englishman shares the responsibility of these acts, and we especially, as the intermediate body between the British public and the natives of India, bound as we are to that country by so many ties of friendship and gratitude.

Sir, are we also to remain silent, and to make no effort to awaken public attention to questions of such overwhelming national importance? Sir, I for one could not reconcile silence to my conscience. I believe it to be the duty of every member of this Court to record his opinion against a line of policy that reflects so much discredit on the British name, and entails so much misery upon our fellow-creatures. In this belief I second the motion, and call upon every independent man now present to support it."

I close this unavoidably lengthened chapter by adding one letter from the Earl of Auckland to the address of the Mir Rustam Khan* when he was in prosperity, and eagerly acknowledged and sought as a friend; and the petition of the latter to the Governor of Bombay† when dethroned by us.

The Governor-General to Mir Rustam Khan of Khairpur.

Camp, Bhagasar, Jan. 10, 1839.

"THE judicious mediation of your friend Sir A. Burnes, the highly esteemed and able agent of my Government now with you, has, by the blessing of God, brought about the establishing of our mutual good understanding by treaty on firm and lasting basis.

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* As alluded to in page 96. See Sindh Blue Book, p. 117.

† Supplement to the Sindh Papers, page 76.

"The support afforded to you by the guarantee of the British Government will, I am well assured, prove a source of future strength, and, if it be God's will, of continued prosperity to your country; and I am glad to acknowledge the advantages which I hope to derive from your alliance and support in the warlike operations which I am about to undertake.

"Having entered into a treaty with your Highness in all honesty and good faith, I shall be very sorry to find any part of the written agreement between us so worded as to leave either your successors or mine under the supposition that we concluded our contract in a spirit, on the one side or the other, of anything like jealousy or distrust.

"The mention, however, of a previous written agreement in every instance, as to the temporary character of the occasional occupation of Sindh by the English, is calculated to convey this unpleasant idea.

"I have, therefore, struck it out; and, in place of inserting a sentence which casts a doubt on the sincerity of our intentions, I address you this friendly letter as a lasting assurance of the plain meaning and purpose of the words of the separate article, namely, that the British shall avail themselves of the fort of Bakkar, the citadel of their ally the Mir of Khairpur, only during actual and periods of preparing for war, like the present.*

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* Not only kept the fort for ever, but the whole dominion afterwards conquered and the Mir banished!!

"I trust that this mode of reassuring your Highness will have the double effect of setting your mind at ease and of putting you in possession of a written testimony to my intentions, such as may remain among your records in pledge of the sincerity of the British Government.

"I have, &c.

"(Signed) AUCKLAND."

Mir Rustam Khan, inhabitant of Khairpur, in Sakkar, Bakkar, in Sindh, town called Rori, to the Governor of Bombay in Council.

May 17th, 1843.

"Most respectfully sheweth,

"THAT your humble petitioner begs to lay this case before your Honour: that the General* and Mr. Outram told me from Rori town till Sabzal town to give to the Company. So I did, and made no row with him; and I gave to him, with my own wishes to the Company, and accepted of the town; and I gave him a writing for the same, that I have nothing to do with that town, and also he has given me one; and afterwards Mr. Outram told me to come with him to Haidarabad, and he will settle there, that I may receive ten annas from one rupee; and the rest six annas Company will take it. So I agree to that point, and when I reached Haidarabad I stopped in the house of Nasir Khan, and after a few days a row commenced with the Company, and the Nasir Khan was seized with the Mirs

* Sir Charles Napier.

of that country, and my son Mohammed Husain came with twelve thousand people to fight with the Company. I told him, you go back to your own country, that I have settled with the Company, so he went away; and afterwards a quarrel took place with the Haidarabad people, and in that row seized me, my young son, and my brother's son, with the Mirs, and brought to Bombay without any fault; and now I beg to lay this case before your Honour, that myself and my son, and my brother's son, and thirteen servants, are placed in a miserable condition to maintain upon, and heard that your Honourable Board wants to send me and my people to Poonah. I have no wrong to the Company, and beg that your Honourable Board will let me stop in Bombay, or else send me to my native country, that I may stop there, and receive whatever is in the agreement which has been made between me and Mr. Outram, and this charity will never be forgotten.*

"And your petitioner, as in duty bound, will ever pray.

"The ⋈ mark of Mir Rustam Khan, inhabitant of Khairpur, in Sakkar, Bakkar, in Sindh, town of Rori."

The contents of the former documents afford a fearful lesson to every human being, and inculcate

* Is not this petition of the most heart-rending nature when the writer was a faithful and veteran ally, whom at one time we flattered and begged to give us footing in his country for commerce, and now oppressed and reduced him to such begging state.

that if men in power are at one time flattered, respected, and assured of perpetual friendship, they ought neither rely upon those assurances, nor be forgetful of the adversity of their fortunes which is to follow them. The deplorable case of the Mir Rustam Khan, notwithstanding the open intrigues of his brother Mir Ali Morad, as reported by Colonel Outram* to Sir Charles Napier, punishing him

* *Colonel Outram to Sir C. Napier.*

January 22nd, 1843.

"My misgivings as to Mir Rustam have proved well founded. He has fallen into the snare Ali Morad laid for him, and, instead of marching to join me here, has gone off, I am informed, to consult with the other fugitive Mirs, who are somewhere near Kohera, between Dingi and Haidarabad, or thereabouts. Should this prove correct, there can be little expectation that he and they will meet me here; so I beg your orders in that case. I almost despair of saving these misguided chiefs from destruction now; but so far from feeling any irritation towards them for baulking all my earnest endeavours to avert their fate, I only experience deep regret that they should thus be sacrificed to the acts of their unprincipled relation.

"Should you, however, consider that enough has been done to prevent these people breaking their own heads, perhaps you will deem it but fair to make some attempt to save the Mirs of Haidarabad from a similar fate, if it can be done by fair means; and as I am confident I can prevent the latter committing themselves, by my personal appearance among them before they are too far pledged to the runaways, I deem it my duty to offer to go down to Haidarabad for that purpose; and, should I do so

(Rustam) merely on the assertion of his enemy, the arch intriguer Ali Morad,* is an extraordinary but sad proof on this point.

without much delay, and by the river, so as to enable me to shake off the creatures of Ali Morad, by whom I am beleaguered, I have no doubt that not only shall I prevent the Lower Sindh chiefs from giving aid or refuge to the fugitives of Upper Sindh, but, possibly, through the means of the Haidarabad Mirs (with the exception of the traitor Nasir Khan), may cause their submission or capture.—J. OUTRAM."—*Supplement to the Sindh Papers, No.* 13, *page* 16.

* "Woe attend those who conspire against the powerful arms of the Company. Behold the fate of Tipu Sultan, and the Peshva, and the Emperor of China. You know, for I had it from your own lips, that the Mirs of Upper and Lower Sindh were in league against us—all, except his Highness Mir Sabdar and yourself—therefore have they suffered."—*C. Napier to Mir Ali Morad. Supplement to the Sindh Papers, 23rd December,* 1843, *No.* 14, *p.* 6.

CHAPTER XV.

Affairs of Afghanistan—The British army crosses the Indus—Sir Alexander Burnes and Mohan Lal remain in the rear—They rejoin the army—Passage of the Bolan pass—Sir Alexander and his suite arrive at Kalat—Conduct of the Khan and his ministers—Treaty with him—His intrigues and bad faith—Progress of the Shah Shuja—Part of the Bombay army, under Major-Gen. Wilshire, sent against Mir Mehrab Khan—Storming of Kalat and death of the Khan—Shah Navaz Khan installed—Captain Loveday appointed resident—His conduct in that capacity—Unjust remarks of Mr. Masson.

I SHALL now resume again my narrative of the army of the Indus. On the 6th of February, 1839, the troops on the road to Haidarabad, under the Commander-in-Chief and Sir Willoughby Cotton, were ordered to return, and by the 18th the whole baggage and the ordnance had crossed the Indus. In Shikarpur we every day received numerous letters from the various chiefs of Bilochistan and of Afghanistan, all professing their joy at our approach, and all entertaining hopes of the reward that might be

promised for co-operating with us in furtherance of the object of the expedition. Sir Alexander Burnes, feeling not inclined to enter Afghanistan subordinate to another political head, the envoy and minister, Sir William Macnaghten, suggested the propriety of his remaining at Shikarpur, in the rear of the army; and this was agreed to by his superior. It was evident, and a topic of conversation in the camp, that the two rival politicians do not wish to act jointly in one field of honour and fame. At the same time Sir Alexander Burnes requested the envoy to leave me with him for the purpose of settling the Commissariat and the Shikarpuri bankers' accounts, which, as I was desirous to proceed with the army to Kabul, gave me much disappointment. However, this arrangement was of a very short duration. Major Leech omitted no exertions in procuring supplies, digging wells for water, and inviting the petty chiefs to facilitate the advance of our army; but there were some of them who would communicate with none but Sir Alexander Burnes, and his accurate knowledge of the state of things in Afghanistan pressed upon the Commander-in-Chief the necessity of having that officer with the army. Sir William

Macnaghten in the mean time had appointed him Envoy to the Court of Mir Mehrab Khan of Kalat i Nasir: on which Sir Alexander Burnes stated that if he was to go as far as the Bilochi capital, he would proceed from thence to Kabul, and not return to Shikarpur; and to this the Envoy agreed.

Sir Alexander Burnes and myself quitted Shikarpur, and by a long march in the night, we reached the camp of Sir Willoughby Cotton. We were in great want of water and forage in the desert, which the troops traversed during the night. It was the month of February; yet the heat was intolerable, and the scarcity of water added to the inconvenience felt from the long marches of the army. Sayad Mohammed Sharif, Governor of Gandava, was sent by the Mir Mehrab Khan to wait upon Sir Alexander Burnes, who, leaving me with Sir Willoughby Cotton, went on before to Dadar to see that the supplies were got ready for the arrival of the forces.

On our arrival at Bhag, the brother of the Kalat chief was introduced by me to Sir Willoughby Cotton, who returned his visit on the following day. My servant, Mohammed Tahar, whom I had appointed as news-writer at Qandhar, was very active in in-

ducing the various "Khavanins" (noblemen) to attach themselves to our interest, and to discourage the Barakzai chiefs of that city from offering us any opposition. He was also successful in conveying intelligence of the passing events in Afghanistan, and in securing the good offices of Mulla Nasu, the Prime Minister of the Sardar Kohandil Khan of Qandhar. This person, being a very rich merchant, had gained ascendency in the Court of that chieftain, and stood high in his favour as well as in his confidence. He undertook that he was to advise his master the Sardar either to surrender himself to us or to fly; and that he will continue to use such persuasions until he succeeds, even although the Sardar had really prepared to fight with us. In return for this service I sent him a letter from the Envoy and Minister, promising a pension for life and the preservation of his estate and property during the government of the Sadozais or Shah Shuja-ul-Mulk. In the mean time His Majesty the King was receiving assurances of submission from the Durrani nobles; and each march in advance was bringing several chiefs to the royal standard.

At Dadar Mohammed Hasan Khan, the minister

of the Mir Mehrab Khan, referred to the expectation which was afforded by our government to give two lakhs of rupees annually to the Mir for the purpose of binding him to keep the rear and route of our army clear from the predatory Bilochis, and added that he himself was in the hope of some substantial reward from the British. In this place Sir Willoughby Cotton halted, and Sir Alexander Burnes, with Colonel Curton and myself, penetrated the Bolan pass, and the engineers preceded us. We met no molestation from the robbers in the pass, who were reported afterwards to have caused great losses between Shikarpur and Dadar in regard to the followers of our army, our baggage, and camels.

In Shal or Koetta, Major Leech, by his usual indefatigable exertions, collected a great quantity of supplies, and remained with the British General; while Sir Alexander Burnes, with Captains Pattison of the 16th lancers, Simpson of the commissariat, and myself, bent his course towards Kalat; the former being directed to enter into alliance with the Mir Mehrab Khan, and the latter officer to purchase and send provisions to Shal for the army. After a march of two whole days we arrived at the capital of

the Birohi chief, whose son, mounted on a noble charger, came out to receive the British envoy, Sir Alexander Burnes. The mission was accommodated outside of the town in a house which was considered to be one of the best buildings among the wild Bilochis. The civilities shown by the Mir or Khan to the mission, his frequent change in the colour of his face, and continued unsteadiness in his manners when conversing with us, caused suspicions of his perfidious and unfriendly intentions towards our government; but whether those feelings were disturbing the peace of his mind through the imaginary fear of our evil intentions towards himself, or through his own ill-will towards us, cannot easily be ascertained. Although Nayab Mulla Mohammed Hasan his minister, and Sayad Mohammed Sharif, were the medium of the negotiations between us and the Khan, yet neither of them possessed the entire confidence of his lord, nor stood so high in favour as the cunning Daroghah Gul Mohammed; and in justice to one observation of Mr. Masson, with regard to our proceedings in the Birohi Court, I should not pass this unnoticed. It is true that the Nayab, as well as the Sayad, threw many obstacles in our way, and

delayed the termination of the friendly settlement between us and the Khan; but this they did neither with the intention to sacrifice the interest of their master, nor to impede the advance of our army towards Qandhar. Their object was to make a display of their talent in convincing us of their influence with the Khan, and thus to secure for themselves a handsome reward from us. They were, however, neither bought by Sir William Macnaghten, nor were any hopes of compensation held out to them for betraying their master. All they expected was that their services, like those of the other chiefs and people beyond the Indus, shall be duly appreciated. On the other hand, Daroghah Gul Mohammed, who was known as a celebrated man for intrigues and cruelties in the court of the Khan, was trying to become an important personage as the chief medium of our negotiations, to the end that he might thus profit himself as his rival courtiers had anticipated by our liberality. The drafts of the treaty were framed, and I conveyed them to the court for the approbation and seal of the Khan. Various topics of discussion at the ratification of it were raised and took place between myself and the Khan, who always, or I

may say after every word he spoke, boasted of his superiority in command over the numberless warriors of the Bilochi tribes, and added that not only his animosity, but merely his neutrality during our advance upon Qandhar, would make it impossible for the British troops to pass unmolested through the Bolan Pass, and would encourage the Barakzai chiefs and the Ackzai Afghans to shut the Kojak or Khovajak pass upon our face, and annihilate every person of our army in the valley of Peshing or Faushinj. I of course having spoken freely but respectfully long before in the pompous, civilized, and haughty court of Persia, in intercourse with Abbas Mirza, could not bear the boasting and vain language of the Khan, which reflected a shadow of inferiority on the government which I served in the presence of the wild Bilochis. I therefore took away the treaty from the hands of the Khan with every respect, and begged to state a few words in reply to his most unwise speech. I said to him that the object of the British government was to treat the Khan as a friend and see him permanently established in his authority without any interference in the administration thereof; and that if he, undervaluing our good offices,

cherished an idea that the English will not be powerful enough to advance unless the cordial aid of the Khan be obtained, I am sorry to find that he is so ill advised. This, I must be permitted to say, is an idea perfectly destitute of any sense, and those who have represented it to him are either men of the most childish intellect, or they are seeking for the destruction of the Khan. I added that if he was inclined to hope for any advantage in following the evil counsels of his disguised enemies and to be guided by such boasting sentiments, I would be the last person to ask him to accept the treaty which I held in my hand, and the first to recommend to him the undertaking of an immediate step to bring his own views into effect. This, I said, will at once decide the question whether or not the Khan's neutrality or animosity would check the progress of the army of the Indus, or whether the British soldiers will penetrate Afghanistan without sustaining any serious loss, and will soon plant the English flag on the tower of the Miri or palace of His Highness in the Kalat itself. On this the Bilochi chiefs around him appeared to be very extravagant in the words of their bravery while speaking to the

Khan, which I, of course, could not perfectly understand. But in justice to him I may say, that the Mir Mehrab Khan showed no apparent exasperation at my answer; but, taking the treaty again from my hand, he said that "I was a 'Sakhtgo,' or hard speaker—that the British have soldiers to frighten with their arms, and agents to cause alarm by their tongues, but that he will sign and seal the treaty free from those fears, and with the view only to secure our satisfaction." When Sir Alexander Burnes visited the Mir Mehrab Khan afterwards, he told that officer in my presence that I used hard words in treating with him, whereupon he inquired of the Khan whether they were bad words. On the contrary, replied Mehrab Khan, every one of them was good for the benefit of my government; and at the same time he said he had no reason to be dissatisfied with me. This is the real state of the thing, which any one present on the occasion of my conferring with the Khan might have alluded to afterwards in the presence of Mr. Masson, and he, altering the suggestion and remark from its real meaning, garbles it so as to suit his own purpose, with his undoubted and apt genius, so skilled in casting ground-

less accusations against nearly all who came into contact with this talented author.

The articles of the treaty, as far as I can remember, were that Mehrab Khan was to rule his own dominions as before, acknowledging the authority of Kabul; that Shah Navaz Khan his rival, the pretender from the elder branch of the family, was not to be recognised by the British and the Shah; that the Khan was to receive two hundred thousand rupees annually, and two thousand rupees cash at present; and that in return for this the Mir Mehrab Khan promised to keep the Bolan pass safe and open for our communications in the rear; that he was to wait upon the Shah and the British envoy at Koetta, and that he will exert himself as an ally in procuring, or rather facilitating the means of obtaining, provisions for our army.

The agreed sum in cash was paid to him by me in order to complete his equipage for the purpose of marching towards our camp; but yet several days passed away in fruitless preparations, and he did not start. Sir Alexander, finding that the Khan was neither sincere in his agreement nor in his deeds, quitted Kalat, leaving me with the Khan, and thus

still continuing to entertain and cherish his hope of securing the co-operation of Mehrab Khan, and thus also, by preserving the articles of the treaty unviolated, to benefit the Brohi chief by the British alliance for ever. There were sufficient reasons to believe that a party of wild Bilochis had arrived in the town, whether by the direct advice of the Khan or through the agency of others, with the intention to massacre the mission by night; but the sudden and unexpected departure of Sir Alexander Burnes frustrated the foul design, whether that of the chief or of the Brohis. However this might be, the Khan sent for me, and said that the rumour of our bringing a line of camels loaded with treasure for the purchase of the grain had induced some of the distant robbers to commit the offence of stealing; but that it had pleased God that Sir Alexander Burnes had gone, and he will place a strong guard to protect me in the house where I live. It was all in vain to persuade the Khan to hasten his agreed departure to wait upon the Shah and the envoy. He gave orders one day to have the tents ready; next day to take them out of the fort; and the third day to pitch them. After this a discussion took place how to

find and fix some lucky day that the Khan should leave his palace and go into the tent, which was pitched about a mile from the city. When he went there, some days were spent in patching the old "yakhdans," or leather baskets for the use of the kitchen of the Khan; and his object, I discovered, was to turn into ridicule the British authorities by showing off his marching preparations, while delaying it purposely with the frivolous excuse of getting ready, until the Shah and our army, being deficient in supplies, should be obliged to leave Shal for Qandhar; and in this view the Khan succeeded. Shah Shuja-ul-mulk, Sir William Macnaghten, and Lord Keane—the Commander-in-Chief, found at length that they could not stay and wait longer for Mehrab Khan; and Sir Alexander Burnes proceeded with the camp, directing me by express to quit Kalat immediately. This was all that Mehrab Khan wanted, by procrastinating his departure; and on my obtaining leave he told me to say to the envoy that the Khan was getting ready, and had pitched his tent to wait upon him; but that the intelligence of the Shah's quitting Shal prevented him from setting off. I replied that I shall be very happy to

convey to the Envoy any message of which he wishes to make me the bearer; but as a well-wisher of the Khan, I must say that the excuse he makes for his not marching now was long previously fabricated along with the deliberate delay: and that if the Khan was sincerely desirous to show his attachment to the British he has an opportunity of proving it now in the most unqualified manner, by following and overtaking the camp in the valley of Peshing. He made no reply to this; but appointed Daroghah Gul Mohammed apparently to escort me to Shal, but secretly instructed him to stay in that place, and daily communicate to the Khan the news of our advance upon Qandhar.

The Mir Mehrab Khan did thus not only fail with deliberate intention in the agreement of his waiting upon the Shah and the Envoys, notwithstanding that a sum of money for the expenses of the march had been paid to him; but in reality he also failed to execute and fulfil the articles of the agreement by which he had bound himself to supply us with provisions, and to keep the roads open and safe in our rear. If he had no rule over the subjects of his dominions, why had he pledged himself to do what

he was not able to do, and demanded annual payment to enable himself to maintain the tranquillity of the roads? Moreover, his not attending upon the Shah and the British envoy gave a sufficient proof to the Bilochis and to his neighbours the Kakars to persevere in their continued and augmented predatory habits, plundering our daks (or posts), stealing our camels, and cutting off our supplies. The treaty, signed and sealed by the Khan, and given by himself into the charge of the Sayad Mohammed Sharif,* for the purpose of giving to the envoy, was now taken by Darogh Gul Mohammed, who kept it, with the advice of his master, by himself, with the view of practising the deliberate treachery as to the end, that if the chiefs of Qandhar had defeated us, the production of that document would fairly show that he had not exchanged it, but had kept it, as he had no wish to form any connexion with us; and, on the other hand, if the British were victorious, it will be made to follow us to Qandhar, and the Khan thought that he will easily satisfy the Envoy by throwing the blame upon his agent for detaining it so long on the road. In April, 1839, when Haji Khan Kakar

* Not by Sir Alexander Burnes, as Mr. Masson says.

deserted the chiefs of Qandhar, and they fled towards their capital, now the agents of the Mir Mehrab Khan, agreeably to the previous arrangement, waited upon the envoy and Sir Alexander Burnes at Dandi Gulai, and delivered the treaty, saying, that the Khan will come and pay his respects in Qandhar. The conduct of the Khan * had been found to be from the beginning of an unfriendly nature, and therefore the treaty was given back to the agents, with this answer to the message of the Khan, which promised that he will wait upon the Shah at Qandhar, to the effect that the alliance shall be renewed then and there.

On the entering of the Shah into the city of Qandhar, and the flight of its chiefs towards Persia, it was expected that the chief of Kalat, according to

* "To judge rightly of the conduct of Mehrab Khan, who said to Sir Alexander Burnes—'You have brought an army into the country, but how do you propose to take it out again?' it is necessary to state that it was afterwards ascertained that the night before the departure of Sir Alexander Burnes a plan had been formed to murder the whole party, which was defeated by their unexpected departure. I was told so by Lieutenant Simpson, S. A. C. and G., one of the party. The Khan said, 'Your army will be starved, and the water of the country will kill your people.'"—*Major Hough's Campaign in Afghanistan*, pp. 73-74.

his recorded agreement at Dandi Gulai, will come personally, or at any rate will send congratulatory letters for our triumph; and it became known to us only by rumour that the Nayab Mohammed Hasan, in charge of the presents and dispatches from the Khan, was on his way to Qandhar, where he never made his appearance. Whether he missed his way by his own will, or by the directions of the Mir Mehrab Khan, who might have told him to stay in Shal, and wait to see how the affairs may go on in Ghazni and Kabul, thinking that the Amir of that place, with whom he was in correspondence, might gain the victory, and he might then be free to play the same game with him which he had hoped to play with the chief of Qandhar against our measures. Alas! in this, too, he was disappointed.

In the mean time our posts both east and west of the Bolan, as well as in the pass itself, were plundered, and the runners killed. The Governor of the Mir Mehrab Khan in Shal, instead of protecting our camels when grazing, employed men to carry them off to Sistan, where they were sold; for the Khan did not wish him to send them for sale in his

capital of Kalat, as this would cast an open rebuke upon his character.

In process of time part of the Bombay army, after Shah Shuja-ul-Mulk was placed on the throne, quitted Kabul under Major-General Sir Thomas Wilshire. On the 25th of August the brave and just politician, Colonel Outram, was ordered to proceed with it, and received instructions from Sir William Macnaghten to the following effect, viz., to arrest the refractory Ghilzai chiefs, Mehtar Musa, Mama Khodai Nazar Khan, Abdulrahman Khan, and Gul Mohammed Khan, the plunderers of the Hindostan caravan at Maruf, to reduce the forts of Haji Khan, and to punish the perpetrators of the atrocious murder of Colonel Herring. He performed these duties to the satisfaction of his superiors, and introduced peace and homage in that part of the Ghilzai country.

On the 31st of October Sir Thomas Wilshire reached Koetta; and Captain Bean, the political agent, in answer to his communications for adjusting matters with the Mir Mehrab Khan, chief of Kalat, for the purpose of securing future tranquillity and the good offices of the Brohi chief, received threats

of resistance, which obliged the British general to hasten his march towards his capital. On the 12th of November he encamped at Jiryani, a village within eight miles from Kalat. Next day the skirmishes commenced, and continued till the English force came in sight of Kalat. Now Sir Thomas Wilshire made the disposition of his forces, and planned to storm the town and citadel. The storming party was led in the most heroic and skilful manner by Brigadier Bomgardt, now commander of the 2nd Royal or Queen's regiment at Winchester.* The resistance made by the Mir Mehrab Khan in person was very brave, and he was killed fighting hard and with sword in hand. Such was the end of the Kalat chief, by whose instigation or imbecility hundreds of the followers of the British camp were slain in the Bolan Pass. The treachery and faults of the Khan in some cases in the time of the advance of the Army of the Indus were without any doubt; but I must say that the punishment, which ended his life, exceeded the crime. Shah Navaz Khan, the

* The services of this veteran officer were not rewarded as they ought to have been.

rival relation of the deceased chief, was installed, and Captain Loveday appointed as resident in his court. The charges made by Mr. Masson against this worthy and amiable officer, whom I had personally seen in Mastang, and of whom I heard the people talking in the most affectionate terms for his civil disposition, appear to me altogether incorrect. After he was most cruelly slaughtered, and the son of the late Mir Mehrab Khan was gained by the most skilful and wise measures of Brigadier Stacy, many influential men from Kalat came to Kabul. The British authorities of that day, as well as the chiefs of that place, made inquiries concerning the past but sad events of Kalat, and the proceedings of the much regretted Captain Loveday in that critical time. All of them unanimously, even those who had nothing to do with the good or bad manners and conduct of that officer, alleged that he was liked by every one for his civil and kind disposition, and he was disliked only by his political adversaries, namely, Darogh Gul Mohammed, with his party, to whose cruel passions he fell a victim at last. The truth stands thus: that the Earl of Auckland, with his

secretaries Messrs. Maddock and Colvin, Sir William Macnaghten, Sir Alexander Burnes, Captain Bean, and Lieut. Loveday, were of course all men of eminent talents,—and they did not appoint Mr. Masson a political agent in Kalat, as he had requested; and moreover they suspected the usefulness of his travels in the Bilochistan country, which were followed by outbreaks. These were, I think, the reasons which excited Mr. Masson to throw abuse on the tombs of those lamented officers who sacrificed their lives in the service of their country, and to attack the reputation of those who are still alive. His own words will show that he was refused the situation he wanted, and was also suspected.* "As one of the principal points for which I was then contending was employment, from which my exertions might deserve and obtain credit, I could not forbear asking him if I might be allowed to go to Kalat and put everything to rights; but Sir Alexander hung down his head, and made no reply."

* Pp. 81-226.—Narrative of a Journey to Kabul by Charles Masson, Esq.

"The mystery of Mr. Masson's appearance at Kalat at the period of the present outbreak, combined with his clandestine residence at that place, has given rise to suspicions, in my mind, of that individual, which I have not failed to communicate to Government."

CHAPTER XVI.

Haji Khan joins the British—Other chiefs join the British force, and tender allegiance to Shah Shuja-ul-Mulk—The Qandhari chiefs consequently fly to Persia—Qandhar occupied by the British—Installation of Shah Shuja-ul-Mulk—The fugitive chiefs refuse the offers of the British—The Haji Dost Mohammed Khan—Violations of engagements—The army arrives at Kalat-i-Ghilzai—Joined by Abdulrashid Khan—Capture of Ghazni—Proposals of Dost Mohammed refused—Execution of Afghan prisoners—Flight of the Amir—Shah Shuja-ul-Mulk established in Kabul—Progress of the Shah Zadah Taimur—Movements of Akbar Khan—Gholam Khan Popalzai—The Amir at Bokhara.

THE judicious negotiations and secret correspondence of Major Leech were successful, and induced Haji Khan Kakar, whose name has been prominently mentioned in the first volume, to desert the chiefs of Qandhar at a very critical period, while the Sardar Kohandil Khan, the head chief, was at the head of three thousand or four thousand well-mounted cavalry, had quitted his capital to oppose our advance, as already noticed, and had pitched at Dandi Gulai. The enemy diverted the stream of water from the side of our camp into

another direction; and had carried off the two elephants, with their drivers, when they went in search of forage. The chiefs then planned for a night attack on our troops; but Lord Keane removed the Shah's camp and that of the Mission, and thus made an open field to meet the reported and expected attack of the Qandharis. The Sardar Kohandil Khan was told by Haji Khan Kakar, that it was not wise to attack our camp without first gaining proper information of our strength, and reconnoitring the position of our forces, and where the chance of any success might be anticipated. He added that, if permitted, he will go and bring back all this information in full to him. The Sardar, blind with regard to the intrigues of the Haji, permitted him to do this duty; but he came to our camp, whence he never went back to him.

It was the 20th of April, 1839, and about 10 A.M., when Haji Khan's messenger arrived in my tent with a letter to Sir Alexander Burnes, announcing that he had come over to us, but did not like to approach our picquets until some one was sent to meet him. The Envoy, on receiving this intelligence, desired me to go and conduct him to his tent, telling me at

the same time not to go beyond the sight of the picquets, in case there might be a snare laid by the Afghan chief to get hold of one of us. However, I saw Haji Khan not far from our guards; and, after welcoming him, I conducted the famous Kakar to the Envoy. The desertion of Haji Khan, whose character and early life is well described in the valuable work of Mr. Masson, was a severe and fatal blow to the Barakzai chiefs of Qandhar, who fell back immediately on that city. They were now suspicious even of their own nearest dependents; and the safest course they were advised by Mulla Nasu now to pursue was to fly towards Persia, with the view to benefit themselves by the Russian security, which Count Simonich, the ambassador of the Emperor, and Mohammed Shah, the King of Persia, had given them, stipulating that if they (the Barakzai chiefs) are deprived of their country by the English, the ambassador and the Shah were to provide them (the chiefs) with maintenance equal to their loss, and sufficient to keep up their rank. When the news of Haji Khan's coming over to us was conveyed to the Amir Dost Mohammed Khan at Kabul, he was heard to say that the greatest mistake he

committed in his life was that he did not put an end to the existence of the Haji when in Kabul.

The Haji Khan's coming to us was an example to others; and he was followed by other chiefs of considerable influence, as Abdulmajid Khan, the son of Shah Pasand Khan, governor of Lash, and Gholam Akhund Zadah, a priest, who was one of those that were most violent in exciting the religious hatred of the population against our march. While we were approaching Qandhar, all the men of consequence then in existence in that neighbourhood were joining our camp, tendering submission to His Majesty Shah Shuja-ul-Mulk, and expressing their joy at coming to closer acquaintance with the British. Whatever we might boast of our diplomatic successes during the campaign of Afghanistan, we were certainly very wrong in not keeping up our adherence, even for a short time, to those engagements and promises which we had so solemnly and faithfully made to the various chiefs, in return for their taking up our cause and abandoning their long-known and established masters. Our letters, pledging our honour and Government to reward and appreciate their services for our good, were in their hands; and as soon as

we found that the chiefs of Qandhar were fled, and that there was no necessity for wearing longer the airy garb of political civilities and promises, we commenced to fail in fulfilling them. There are, in fact, such numerous instances of violating our engagements and deceiving the people in our political proceedings, within what I am acquainted with, that it would be hard to assemble them in one series. I shall, however, mention them in their proper places, and the time in which they were made, in order to show how soon they were forgotten through our vain pride of power and of our tact shown in the temporary and speedy gaining of the people.

The chiefs, on their return to Qandhar, after the Haji Khan came over to us, thought to secure themselves within the fortifications of the city; to sally out to have skirmishes with us, till our provisions are exhausted, our posts stripped in the rear, and the Mahomedans rise against us, either for the sake of religion, or through avarice of plunder and of theft. Mulla Nasu renewed his counsels, and succeeded at last in inducing the chiefs to quit the city, which was at the time of their departure suffering deeply through extortion and unjust outrages.

On the 25th of April the Shah Shuja-ul-Mulk and the British Envoy and Minister reached the city of Qandhar, the gates of which were already open to receive them. Lord Keane, with the English army, followed the Shah next day, and encamped in the neighbourhood. On a deliberate view of various points it was considered that His Majesty Shah Shuja-ul-Mulk should ascend the throne in a formal manner, and that the ceremony of installation should be publicly solemnized. Of course there was no proper throne that any one, after seeing even in a decayed state one of the poor descendants of the great Emperors of Dehli, might have supposed to be really a throne. However, a proper platform was erected in place of a throne, over which a canopy appeared to throw an ordinary light of pomp and show. It was placed out of the town in an open and extensive place, and the British army, amounting to 7500 men, was drawn up in a line. The Shah, mounted on a very superior horse, was accompanied by Lord Keane and Sir William Macnaghten: and his departure from the city was announced by the guns in the palace; and on his passing near the British lines a royal salute of

HIS LATE MAJESTY SHAH SHUJAH UL MULK.

twenty-one guns was fired. Afterwards there was a general salute; the colours were lowered; and on his ascending the throne a salvo was discharged from the whole of the artillery, 101 pieces, brought thither for the occasion.

Now the British Commander-in-Chief and the Envoy offered presents to the Shah on behalf of the English Government. Then the army of the Indus moved round in front of the Shah; and this grand ceremony was not only imposing for form's sake, but was caused with the view to awe the Afghans and the Ghilzais, through whose country we had yet to pass on our way to Kabul.

As to the fugitive chiefs of Qandhar. I introduced Mulla Nasu to the Envoy and Minister, and he once more tried, by negotiations, to induce the Sardars Kohandil, Rahamdil, and Mehardil Khan to accept our terms and proposals of returning to India. They had, however, already begun to know the value of our political promises, and had good reasons to believe that we shall never adhere to them. They therefore refused our offers; on which a detachment of troops was ordered to march and to overtake them at Girishk. In this enterprise we failed, just

as we had begun knowingly and intentionally to fail in our dealings and promises.

From this time to the end of June the army halted at Qandhar to receive supplies and to restore confidence in the people. Proclamations and letters were circulated in the country, inviting the chiefs of the various tribes to tender homage, and promising rewards,—of course without an idea that they shall ever be fulfilled. Grain was very scarce in the mean time, and only through the most extraordinary exertions of Colonel Parsons and of Captain Watt it was brought by the Afghans from a distant part of the country.

It appeared very desirable that Haji Dost Mohammed Khan, a Durrani of high rank and of an influential family, should be invited, or rather induced, to wait upon the Shah and the British Envoy, with the view that his doing so might add much and favourable weight to our influence, and facilitate our progress through the Ghilzai, who would be thunderstruck, as well as the adherents of the Amir Dost Mohammed Khan, to think that the only remaining nobleman of consequence amongst the Durranis was also with us. Various communications passed be-

tween this chieftain, Sir William Macnaghten, and the Shah, but the result did not appear successful. In all the Oriental countries and courts correspondence in writing is not considered the proper channel for gaining any object; but on this point verbal conference and assurances in speech are more effectual.

My old friend of Hirat, Abdul Vahab Khan Mustaufi, was solicited by me, and assured of being replaced in his hereditary situation of Mustaufi, paymaster under the king, if he succeeded in bringing the Haji Dost Mohammed Khan. He received the paper sealed by the Shah; and the Envoy assured him of appreciation and reward. He was then employed as the bearer of similar kind letters to the Haji, whom, after a protracted space of time, he succeeded to bring with himself to Qandhar. He was received by us with consideration, but the great mistake committed in disturbing the ease of his mind was in requesting him to accompany the Shah to Kabul. This chief, like the other Durranis, brought up amidst intrigues and rapacity, suspected our good intentions towards him. Upon one hand he considered that the Shah and we would make him a prisoner and send him to Calcutta; and on

the other hand he thought, like others, that after being thirty years on amicable terms with the Amir of Kabul, it would be painful to proceed with our camp and drawn sword upon a chief of so long standing. He therefore pretended to be unwell; but still we insisted upon his accompanying the Shah with our camp. Haji Khan Kakar was now elevated to the first situation under the King, and entitled Nasir ul-Doulah. He, as well as the Haji Dost Mohammed Khan, with other petty chiefs, hung back by slow marches to avoid their appearance in our camp, and to wait the result of our advance upon Ghazni. This we considered a treacherous design on their part, and we wished then to ensnare them, but did not warn them of their treachery at the time. Such were our political views and fair dealings.

After the Shah of Persia had raised the siege of Hirat, Colonel Stoddart was left with Prince Kam Ran and the Vazir Yar Mohammed Khan, to form a closer familiarity between the British Government and those personages. Sir William Macnaghten, who was desirous to act and be alone with the Shah, planned that Sir Alexander Burnes should be sent

on a mission to the Prince of Hirat; while the latter officer, anxious to gain political fame and ascendancy, refused to undertake this mission, and persevered to remain with the Envoy, with the view of succeeding him. He even refused to be a Resident in Qandhar, which was long afterwards offered to him on a larger salary, by the Earl of Auckland. However, Major Todd was appointed, and sent on a mission to the Prince Kam Ran, with instructions to strengthen the fortifications of that city and form a treaty with him. His proceedings in the court of Hirat I shall notice at the time of the failure of our objects in that quarter.

The arrangements for the advance of the army of the Indus from Qandhar were completed on the 2d of June;* and one of the sons of Shah Shuja-ul-Mulk was appointed as Governor of this part of Afghanistan, and Major Leech was nominated as Political Agent. Since it became evident that we had nothing to contend with at Qandhar, Shah Shuja-ul-Mulk upon one hand, and the British on the other, commenced to throw off the mask of adhering to their engage-

* This day the Maharajah Ranjit Singh of the Panjab breathed his last.

ments with the people who had been recently detached from the enemy. The Shah, in conjunction with our chief men as advisers, made arrangements for the administration of the country; and various persons of much experience were entrusted with the different offices of the Government. The mint was farmed by Mulla Jalal, an Ackzai merchant of ordinary wealth, who offered the Shah to give double the sum which was paid by his predecessor to the ex-chiefs of Qandhar; and this was settled through our intervention. As soon as large sums of English money were circulated in the country, it became obvious that there would be a considerable increase in the revenues of the mint, for changing the Company's coin into that of the Shah Shuja-ul-Mulk. A different party, aware of the profit, offered more to the Shah than was agreed on by Mulla Jalal; and consequently avarice overpowered His Majesty, who expressed his wish to break off the agreement which had been contracted between him and the Mulla on our guarantee. Such was the state of things and of affairs in which the sovereign just now elevated to the throne began to disregard his own engagements, careless of all loss of reputation.

But now let us mention our own conduct. The co-operation of Mulla Nasu, the chief adviser of the ex-chiefs, was gained by us on giving a written agreement bestowing a pension upon him. In return, he was desired to dissuade the chiefs from opposing our army, which will cause a fruitless bloodshed on their part. He succeeded in his advice, and the chiefs fled to Persia. As we wished not to stand by our engagement, we pretended to find faults, and said that the chiefs had quitted Qandhar in order to fight with us, but that, seeing the strength of our forces, and the coming over of Haji Khan to us, this compelled them to fly, which was not brought about by the advice of Mulla Nasu, who therefore is not entitled to the agreed pension.

Abdul Vahab Khan was the second Durrani who suffered also by the violation of our engagements. This individual was deputed to Mir Mehrab Khan of Kalat from the chiefs of Qandhar, while Sir Alexander and myself were with him; and was accompanied by another Qazilbash of distinction, who had in his charge many valuable documents concerning the negotiations between the Sardars of Qandhar, the Russian agent, and the various chiefs of Bilo-

chistan. He was a Durrani of the Popalzai clan, attached to the Sadozai, and thus hostile to the ascendancy of the Barakzai. Nevertheless, his father, as well as himself, were in the service of the usurpers. He offered his services to us in undertaking to deprive his companions of the alleged documents, for which we promised him a handsome reward from the British Government, and his nomination to the rank of the Mustaufi. In order to complete his promise, he set out from Kalat with his companion the Qazilbash, on his way back to Qandhar; but on the road, like a real Afghan, he broke off the bonds of long-standing amity with him, and respect to his employer the Sardar Kohandil Khan. He seized his comrade, and then let him off as a fugitive, and brought all the papers in his possession to us in Kalat. The next duty which was entrusted to him on our arrival at Qandhar was to induce Haji Dost Mohammed Khan of Garm Saial to come and wait upon the Shah and the British Envoy; and of his success in this affair I have made mention in the preceding pages. How we adhered to the engagements on our part is worthy of notice. We acknowledged his services by tongue as well as by pen; but, in order to

avoid doing so by reward, we merely gave him a note to the Secretary of the Shah, saying that he was a well-wisher of His Majesty; who, as usual, said in reply to Abdul Vahab Khan, "Amar khavahad shud;" meaning, "the commands shall be issued." But this phrase of the Shah was still more an extraordinary piece of deception than our own political promises, for such commands were meant never to be issued. In this state of anxiety and hope, Abdul Vahab Khan spent all he had, and sold his horses to maintain himself; and at length we pretended to forget what we had first agreed to do, and the Shah's "Amar" never came to pass. Were such proceedings of the Shah Shuja-ul-Mulk, and our political conduct towards the people at Qandhar, prudent? Were Gul Mohammed (Guru) Abdurrahman and Sultan Mohammed Khans, the chiefs of the Hotak and Tokhi Ghilzais, amongst whom we had yet to pass on the road to Ghazni, to believe our sincerity in any engagement hereafter? However, we marched from Qandhar, and sent deputations and letters to the Ghilzai, promising the reward of rank and high pay, as we had done in the cases of Mulla Nasu, Abdul Vahab Khan, and the Haji Dost Mohammed

Khan. We were at once infringing the engagements behind our army, and making new ones a-head. But the Ghilzais were not such fools as we might have supposed from their being uncivilised; nor did they fear to vie with us in arms, though undisciplined. Having already heard of the insincerity of our promises towards Mulla Nasu, &c., the Ghilzais laughed at our proposals; and instead of joining us, and facilitating our march towards Ghazni, they moved their families with their valuables into the interior, and continued annoying and plundering us all the way on our flanks. We had undoubtedly planted in their hearts the dread of our arms, but certainly we failed in restoring confidence of our faith. They would neither believe our promises, nor even our written engagements. On our gaining the possession of Kabul, the Ghilzai chiefs considered their safety consisted in leaving Afghanistan; and they took refuge in the Sikh territory, whence we secured their persons through negotiations from our ally the ruler of the Panjab.

The head-quarters of the army and of the Shah arrived at Kalat-i-Ghilzai, on the 4th of July; and we halted for the 5th, to nominate rivals of Guru, &c.

to the chiefship of the Tokhis; and Mir Alam Khan, a man of weak mind, but of high family, was appointed. Some of the Shah's troops were to occupy the fort, for the purpose of keeping the communication in our rear uninterrupted. Sir William Macnaghten thought it advisable that I should be left as a political agent, to try to restore confidence amongst the Ghilzais; but, on mature deliberation, he considered that my services would be more useful in Ghazni and Kabul than they could be by keeping me in the rear of the army, and he therefore countermanded his orders on this point. Before our arrival at Mokar, we received intelligence at one time of opposition to be met at Ghazni, and at another time the Amir of Kabul had desired his son to leave that fort on our approach, and to join him with his force, in order to give us battle jointly in one place. However, we knew of the disaffected members of the family now within Ghazni; and I wrote a note to Abdulrashid Khan, the first nephew of Dost Mohammed, to quit the camp of Haidar Khan and join me instantly. I was on very intimate terms with this person from a long time before, and he fortunately attended to my advice. The bearer of my

letter, a man from Istalif, was seized by Haidar Khan, just after he had delivered his charge to Abdulrashid. Here the sharpness of the Afghans in craft and planning of intrigues will not be deemed uninteresting. The seizure of my messenger, which was followed by putting him to death, deprived my friend of the opportunity to communicate with us, while he felt greatly anxious of necessity to do so. He taught one of his horsemen to counterfeit himself immediately as a fanatic and mad person, for the obtaining the martyrdom either by killing an infidel, or being himself killed by one of us. He shaved his beard, and clothed himself in green. He bore a drawn sword in hand, and, uttering the holy names of God and the Prophet, he proceeded in the direction of our camp, threatening to destroy any one who would dare to impede his progress. Besides the verbal messages and information from Abdulrashid Khan, he had contrived amazingly to conceal and bring a letter from him to us, which mode of hiding conveyance I had never dreamt of. Such was the successful contrivance of the nephew of the Amir, and thus the pretended thirst of martyrdom of the messenger was extinguished.

Abdulrashid Khan soon after stole his escape from Ghazni and joined our camp. I introduced him to the Envoy, who placed this same Abdulrashid Khan under the immediate disposal of Lord Keane. The information which he gave to Major Thomson, the chief Engineer, relative to the fortifications of Ghazni, was so valuable and necessary, that my friend Abdulrashid Khan was requested to attend upon him in all his reconnoitring expeditions. He told us that the Sardar Mohammed Afzal Khan, the eldest son of the Amir of Kabul, was, with a large troop of cavalry, outside the fort; and that the younger one, namely, Sardar Gholam Haidar Khan, was inside with a strong body of men, ready to defend himself to the last. On the 21st July, we came in front of Ghazni, and the fire of cannons from the ramparts bid us to form the disposition of the army. A council of war was held, and Lord Keane deemed it judicious that, instead of encamping opposite to the Qandhar gate of Ghazni, he had better move towards that of Kabul, and thus stop the reinforcement, if there was any sent, from the Amir Dost Mohammed Khan to the Governor of Ghazni. It became dark before we reached our ground; and the confusion and the irre-

gularity in our movement was so great, that if the cavalry of Mohammed Afzal, under the cover of the guns of Ghazni, had fallen upon us in that hour, the consequences would have been fatal to us; but, fortunately for us, they misunderstood our movement. When the Sardar Haidar Khan surrendered himself to us, he told us that he and his brothers thought that we were advancing upon Kabul, and intended to leave Ghazni to submit on the occupation of the capital. He added that they both considered it right to allow us to move undisturbed till we were in the valley of Shekhabad, and then to annoy us in the rear, while their father the Amir would fall upon us in front, and therefore we escaped without molestation. We heard successive reports that the Amir had left Kabul, in order to reinforce Ghazni, and command there personally; and that the Sardar Mohammed Afzal Khan was joined by all the disaffected Ghilzai chiefs, and threatened an attack on our camp. These were considered to be about three thousand well-mounted fighting men; and the strength of the garrison was equally numerous and formidable.

The position of our camp had perfectly cut off the direct communication of the Amir Dost Mohammed

Khan with his sons at Ghazni; and skirmishing parties were every day sent out to divert the attention of the enemy. The Sardar Mohammed Afzal Khan discovered his weakness by remaining outside of the fort; and he sent a message to his step-brother the Sardar Haidar Khan, asking him to allow him and his followers to enter the fort, and promising that he will sally out to destroy our foraging parties. The younger brother, however, jealous and distrustful as he was of his brother Mohammed Afzal, like other Afghans, refused to admit him. He considered, moreover, the stronghold of Ghazni was never to be subdued by force of arms, and that when we were reduced in our supplies, and unable to maintain ourselves amidst the wrathful fanatics, the victory will result in favour of the garrison, and yet the credit of it will be shared, if not wholly claimed, by his brother. He also feared that the Sardar Mohammed Afzal Khan, by intriguing personally with his dependents in the garrison, might make him a prisoner and take possession of the fort. These were the suspicions of Gholam Haidar Khan in the garrison: and they wounded the brotherly feelings of Mohammed Afzal Khan, who was outside, by his being refused leave to

enter the fort in such a critical time. He therefore moved far from Ghazni, abandoned the design of skirmishing with our forces, and left the garrison to its own fate.

Abdulrashid Khan gave such minute and correct information of the strength of the fortifications and of the chances of storming it, that all succeeded, and under the skilful and heroic superintendence of Major Thomson, the chief engineer, bags of leather filled with loose powder were attached to the Kabul gate. It was wonderful, indeed, how quietly and wisely the arrangements were made; but by 3 A.M. of the 23rd July, all the detachments ordered for the services were in their respective posts. Lord Keane, with his staff, as well as Sir Alexander Burnes and myself, stood upon the steep hill, which was frequently fired upon from the garrison, and Colonel Parsons was slightly wounded by a "Jozayar" ball, which fortunately had just missed me. The Commander-in-Chief had formed the disposition of the storming party so judiciously that it did not require his personal attendance at the time when the skilful and brave officers, Major Thomson and Captain Peat, blew up the gate. Immediately after

the gallant Colonel Dennie led the storming party,—rushed in, and dislodged the enemy from the gateway. He was followed by the supporting or advance column, under Sir Robert Sale, and thus miraculously the capture of the strong fortress of Ghazni was accomplished in three quarters of an hour, while the Commander-in-Chief had anticipated the impossibility of gaining possession of it until long after breakfast, which he had therefore taken with himself to the hill, with the view of not returning to his tent till late in the evening. While a false alarm was given on the other side, the heroic rush-in of the storming party, just after the powder-bags exploded and burst the gates open, threw the Afghans into astonishment and consternation, and soon after this we heard the British soldiers under Sir Willoughby Cotton cheering on the Balahisar, or citadel of Ghazni. We then sighed often for the dawn, and when it came at length, discovered that all was in our possession, and the firing had ceased. The Shah Shuja-ul-Mulk, accompanied by Sir William Macnaghten, was conducted by Lord Keane into the fortress, and his Excellency gave immediate orders that no outrages and insults should be committed on

the women of the garrison, and that every protection should be afforded to them. We entered the palace of the Sardar Gholam Haidar Khan, and there I saw his wife, the daughter of the late Sardar Mohammed Azim Kham, whom I had seen in 1832, when she was unmarried and about fourteen years of age, complaining of sore eyes, and asking the advice of the late Dr. Gerard. I gave her every assurance of protection on the part of my superiors, and of my endeavours to make her comfortable. She was accompanied by about thirty other females, relations and servants; and Captain John Conolly conducted them, with every mark of deference, to a house in the town, where it fell to my lot to provide them with every thing necessary which they wanted: and that responsible charge of them I had for a long time, and executed it to the satisfaction of the ladies, till they were sent to India. In the mean time the Governor of Ghazni, the Sardar, was not to be found, and the greatest doubts of his escape were entertained. After the Commander-in-Chief had returned to the camp, Major Macgregor found him concealed with an armed party, in the tower, waiting for the night, and intending then to effect their escape

towards Kabul. His adherents would not surrender until the assurance of their personal safety was given, —and then the Sardar, mounted on a small horse, and accompanied by a few of his companions, was conducted by Major Macgregor to the tent of the Commander-in-Chief. Sir Alexander Burnes and myself were sent for, and as soon as the Sardar saw him he felt a little easy in his mind; and discovering me with him, the expression of his countenance was at once changed, and he asked me for a glass of water. Lord Keane allowed him to remain in my tent, under the charge of Sir A. Burnes. I clothed him with my own clothes every day, and he partook of my meals. All the time he continued with me, he repeated on every occasion his gratification and ease of mind, and his gratitude to the Commander-in-Chief and to the Envoy, for their placing him under my care, while the officer also of the Bombay Presidency,* at the head of the personal guard of our state prisoner, added to the satisfaction of the Sardar, by his strict adherence to the respect and civility which were due to him. He at first declined to wait upon the Shah Shuja-ul-Mulk; but the Commander-in-

* I unfortunately forget the name of that amiable officer.

Chief assuring him that there was no necessity for any kind of alarm, and that every respect should be shown to him, and that his Excellency would personally conduct him and bring him back from the presence of the king, he went; and the king received him of course, as was advised by us, with something like outward kindness.

A little before evening it was reported that a certain chief, a friend of our state-prisoner, at the head of about one hundred well-armed men, was still occupying his possessions, and resisting our forces in the town, and firing upon them from the top of his house, and would not listen to any proposals made to him by the officers of the garrison, unless Sir Alexander Burnes or myself were to speak to him. I was ordered to go and confer with the chief, taking with me the seals of the Envoy and of Sir Alexander Burnes, thus showing that I was empowered by them both to treat with him. The doors of his house were blockaded inside, and many of our soldiers and sepoys who had dared to attempt to break them open, were lying dead under the walls of the house, while the whole regiment and officers were standing round the building, under the cover of the different ruins.

They would have soon destroyed the house by cannonading, and would have killed and seized every one of the men who were killing our people after quarter had been granted;—but it contained many ladies of his family, and it was therefore considered proper to induce the chief to surrender by overtures, otherwise it would have involved the poor ladies also in the fatal consequences. In truth I must confess that I was not quite fearless on approaching the house; but the chief called me by my name, and swearing that there was no trap laid for my destruction, and that he only wished that I should take charge of his ladies, and place them with those of the Sardar Gholam Haidar Khan, pledging myself that no insult should be offered to them by our people, I agreed to all he had said, the doors were opened, and the ladies taken into my charge. The chief and his attendants now gave up their arms to the officers who were then around his residence; and from the most dark cellars he let loose a great number of his horses into the street, as they had been shut up for a long time, with the view that the fort would be besieged, and would hold out for a considerable time. Amongst these animals there was a most beautiful

and valuable charger, of a grey colour, which he selected, and told me to accept from him, adding that he would be of great use to me if I were ever in danger, and wished to fly. The Commander-in-Chief kindly allowed me to keep that animal, and did not include him in the prize list of Ghazni.

The Sardar Mohammed Afzal Khan, who had encamped with his cavalry far from Ghazni, soon after the capture discovered that the British flag was waving on the citadel of that fortress. He thereupon broke up his camp and hastened on his way back to Kabul, whither he conveyed the melancholy news to his father of our brilliant victory at Ghazni. Lord Keane and Major Thomson recommended to the Envoy to confer a pension for the information which my friend Abdul Rashid had given them previous to the storming of the fortress. He was clothed by me in a dress of honour, and received a pension of five hundred rupees *per mensem* for his life, which unhappily did not last long.

On this the Navab Jabbar Khan, celebrated as a staunch friend of all Europeans, and especially of the English at that time, came on a deputation to us from the Amir Dost Mohammed Khan. Being

from a considerable period endeavouring to establish the British influence against his brother in Kabul, and aware of the hospitalities, the kind, civil, and liberal protection with which he received the English officers frequently, and that at the same time conscious of his being in secret communication and correspondence with our government, in addition to the numerous claims which he had established by rendering valuable services to our state; he therefore, like other Afghans, or I may say naturally, felt confident that from the risk he ran in furthering the views of the English and the dethronement of his brother the Amir, he will, on the weight of the abovementioned claims, succeed in the object of his mission to us, and thus will show brotherly affection to the Amir in time of need. I went to receive him about five miles from our camp, and on arriving at the picquets he was met by Sir Alexander Burnes. He was accommodated in a tent next to the Envoy, but far from my place, with the view not to allow him to be near to our state-prisoner. He stated that his brother, the Amir Dost Mohammed Khan, was desirous to surrender on the condition that he be made the Minister (Vazir) of the Shah, which situation, by

hereditary claim, he had a right to secure. Yet this was refused by us, and very properly. The mention of sending the Amir to India was not palatable to the Navab, who said that his brother the Amir will never agree to it. He then demanded the deliverance of his niece, the wife of Haidar Khan, which was also denied. This refusal I do not think was prudent. It was thus made evident how much the British were indebted to the Navab, and an Afghan cares very little for his wife or child in the hands of the enemy, when he has an opportunity to frustrate that enemy's designs. On the first ground it was incumbent upon us to oblige the Navab, and to give up his niece to him; for another reason, if the Afghans had means to resist our arms, and unforeseen circumstances should have thrown one of our officers into the hands of the Barakzai chiefs, the detention of the wife of Haidar Khan by us would have never induced them to save the life of our officer, when he became their prisoner, if they had thought it advisable to terminate his existence. With these views it was quite unnecessary to offend such a valuable friend as the Navab in this critical time, who justly and candidly said to us that "All Mahomedans

know that I am the friend of the English, and that I am only the cause of my brother's ruin; and if I fail in gaining the appointment for him under the King, I shall still return proud amongst my equals if the wife of Gholam Haidar Khan was liberated and given back to him." As he was on the point of starting, he expressed his last wish to see his nephew Haidar Khan, who was in my tent, under the surveillance of Sir Alexander Burnes. It was promised that he should be permitted to see him, but on this point a little delay took place in obtaining the permission of the various political and military functionaries; and this delay gave the Navab reason to suppose that we were deceiving him. He was not only disappointed on this trifling matter, but he really lost confidence and hope in us. In the conversation which he had with us, the topic turned so as to speak of the Shah Shuja-ul-Mulk, whose name we of course mentioned with great deference; on which the Navab smiled, and said to the Envoy, "If Shah Shuja is really a king, and come to the kingdom of his ancestors, what is the use of your army and name? You have brought him by your money and arms into Afghanistan, and you have behaved toward him in a

friendly and liberal manner in every way. Leave him now with us Afghans, and let him rule us if he can." Such plain language was not palatable to us; and he was requested to wait upon the Shah, who feigned to be civil to him, as His Majesty was advised by the Envoy to receive the Navab with kindness. The good Navab, sunk in disappointment and distress of mind by our unfriendly manner towards him, left our camp about noon of the 29th July. When the Shah and the Envoy offered him the situation of minister under His Majesty, he said he will share the fate of his brother the Amir, and not be flattered by such prospects and sweet promises. I was told to escort the Navab beyond our picquets; and on the road between the camp of the Envoy and the Commander-in-Chief we heard shrieks of some woman captured from the fortress of Ghazni. The Navab turned his face towards me, and nodding his head with an expression of inward abuse, said that we had boasted before him yesterday of our being fortunate in that no woman was ill treated by the captors. I assured the Navab that the person from whose tents the shrieks were heard must have brought her from some village in the vicinity; that

every respect has been paid to the women in the fortress; but I immediately went in his own presence to the tent and got the poor female released, who was at that time captured by a waterman of the Sergeant of the Mission, who was afterwards discharged from the service. The tone of the language of the Navab, on his return to Kabul, was not friendly to the English. Disappointed as he was in regard to the success of his mission to our camp, and having expected little good from us, he unwisely, though justly, talked like others, saying that we political people show the prospect of a good harvest in distant promises, but that in the time of reaping we turn it into nothing but a "Darakht i hanzal," which looks green and beautiful, but bears no fruit. As he had been truly suspected for several years of intriguing with us to ruin his brother the Amir, therefore, to wipe away that stain from his name, he supported the Amir in encouraging the people to rise and oppose us, saying that otherwise we shall ill treat them and their females, and banish them from the country. I shall notice this latter part of the discourse of the Navab in its proper place hereafter, and go back to my narrative of the advance of the army.

The victory of Ghazni was undoubtedly brilliant and glorious; but the execution of numerous persons in the vicinity of the British camp threw a very unpleasant light on those triumphs. I do not mean that it took place either by our advice or without any offence; but surely no one in any country will admit and approve of the butchery of fifty men in the most cruel and barbarous way for the offence of one individual. It is true that such a massacre was perpetrated by an Afghan against the Afghans in Afghanistan; but every child in that country, as well as those well versed in the affairs of the Trans-Indus, will admit and say that the Shah would have never thought of beheading such a number of men in cold blood, who were fighting for their country, unless he was guarded by the British arms. If we had said in our proclamation that the Shah entertains the idea of murdering the persons who may fall his prisoners under the exertions of the English officers, we would have done the duty of just and humane beings in warning the population. The remarks of an English authority,* who was with

* Campaign of the Army of the Indus in Sindh and Kabul, by Dr. Kennedy, vol. ii. pp. 38-43 and 56-59.

the army at that time, will not fail to interest the reader :—

"The following day, the 22d July, was a day of no ordinary interest. Before us was the fort, firing its five-minute guns, apparently relying upon the noise to frighten us off, as crows are scared from a corn-field: they did not appear to fire at anything; the fire seemed for firing's sake; but the hill on our flank and rear presented a most formidable array of the enemy's rabble, covering the heights and clustering on the summits. It was not, I believe, considered desirable to employ the army generally against these people: had it been so, a fearful slaughter might have been made, for they put themselves most unaccountably forward, and showed the only spark of courage we had yet seen among them. Colonel Outram attacked them at the head of a part of the Shah's levies, and defeated them with a very trifling loss on our side, and not much on theirs; as they did not stand for any close-quarter work, and the force acting was too small for any flank movement to intercept their retreat.

"It was on this occasion that so many prisoners were beheaded by Shah Shuja's order. On being

brought in, the King seems to have thought it would be agreeable to look at them, and have a little conversation with them; and they were consequently paraded in the royal presence! His Majesty upbraided them roundly as rebels, &c.; whereon one more heroic than the rest, or more probably intoxicated with opium, reviled the Lord's anointed, as an infidel at heart, and a friend and slave of infidels, and wounded one of the King's servants (a Pesh kidmat) with his dagger, on the menial, in the terror of horrified loyal sycophancy, attempting to stop his mouth, and the torrent of his abuse. The King, it is said, forthwith ordered the whole party, upwards of sixty in number, to be put to death.

"Captain Outram's narrative slurs over this affair in a manner that I hope silently shows his opinion of it; and his position may explain his motives for keeping such an opinion to himself. He describes the number of prisoners at about fifty; and says that one of them, 'on being brought into the King's presence, stabbed one of the principal officers of state in the open durbar,—an offence for which the whole are said to have atoned with their lives.'

"I heard that the person wounded was a Pesh

kidmat, and such a man may be a principal officer of state in an Asiatic darbar, where the scale of intellect and education betwixt the prince and his chief butler, and the baker and the prime minister, is not widely different; but why write that they were 'said to have atoned with their lives,' when every body knew that a great many prisoners, in reality upwards of sixty, had been put to death?

"A British officer of the Bombay column was said to have accidentally witnessed the destruction of these miserable creatures; and his statement, as it reached me, was, that they were huddled together pinioned, some sitting, some lying on the ground, some standing, and four or five executioners, armed with heavy Afghan knives—a something betwixt a sword and a dagger, the shape of a carving knife, two feet long in the blade, broad and heavy—were very coolly, and in no sort of hurry, hacking and hewing at their necks, one after the other, till all were beheaded.

"The Bengal papers have attempted to charge the responsibility of this on Lord Keane. I would hope that, when he heard of it, he may have given an English opinion in condemnation of it; but it is not likely that he could have had any intimation of

it before it was all over. The Shah's camp was two miles from his tent; and it was a mere political question, which would not be referred to him by Sir W. Macnaghten.

"The first folly of having brought such people at such a moment into the King's presence, and so occasioning the outrage, should have palliated its atrocity, and mitigated its punishment, as the wounded man did not die. But allowing that one life was justly forfeited, and that the audacious criminal who struck the King's servant in the King's presence was beyond mercy, the remaining sixty-four were prisoners of war; and to call Dost Mohammed and his sons rebels, and to talk of sparing their lives on the one hand, or of executing them on the other, can be justified by no law, and upheld by no reasoning under heaven.

"It is little creditable to British honour to know that this could never have occurred but under the protection of the British artillery, and within the lines of the British camp. Even the Ghazni dispatch exhibits the British Commander-in-Chief soliciting the fulfilment of the Shah's promise to spare the life of his prisoner Haidar Khan, as if the bare possibility to the contrary could have been contemplated. But

Sir W. Macnaghten's letter to Colonel Outram, published by the latter as the twenty-fifth chapter of his Narrative, is enough, without further commentary, to show the courtier tone that was generally adopted. India was not won after this fashion: may God in his mercy grant that it be not lost thus!

"'On the 25th July,' says Outram, 'the leader of the party which continued firing upon our soldiers on the 23d inst., after the town had surrendered, and who twice renewed hostilities after having actually sued for quarter, was this day shot by order of the Commander-in-Chief.'

"On the 16th of July, it is said, 'a native was shot by the sentence of a drum-head court-martial, for wounding and robbing some of the camp followers.' It might have been better had a drum-head court-martial preceded the business of the 25th. How any man, having the power to order a court to sit to try and condemn a person undoubtedly guilty, should prefer ordering the putting to death in the exercise of authority only, when the delay involves no risk of evil, seems inexplicable; nor should such a power be permitted to do this by the laws of any country, much less of a 'trial-by-jury' country.

"The power to put to death a prisoner in cold blood, without any public investigation or trial, supposes the power to destroy any other life whatsoever; and if we take into account the possibilities of insanity on the one hand, and blind obedience on the other, the hazards of the abuse of power are most fearful, and it is high time that such a law should be amended.

"The circumstances connected with the capture of the unhappy man who suffered, and whose name was Vali Mohammed, are most probably correctly stated by Colonel Outram. The manner of his death was very affecting. The Commander-in-Chief, having heard some such charge as Colonel Outram has related, probably the same verbatim, sent his Persian interpreter, Major Powell, on the evening of the 24th—that is to say, twenty-six hours after the capture—to single out the culprit from among the other prisoners. Major Powell called out, in a court-yard where the prisoners were, that he required Vali Mohammed; and he, little dreaming of what was intended for him, sprang up with alacrity, and at once presented himself to Major Powell, as one who probably fancied that he was 'a man whom the King

might delight to honour.' He was led forth to the camp; and the next morning marched to the rear of the staff lines, and shot by a party of the Bengal 35th regiment of Native infantry.

"Much public discussion has been excited by this tragical occurrence. As to the guilt of the sufferer, I should hope it was so established, that, in a civilised country, and among educated men, the sentence of death would follow of strict necessity. But among such people as those with whom we were in collision, the turpitude and heinousness of guilt are to be weighed by other shades of criminality than those which operate in European warfare; and a high-toned generosity and clemency would have been the most honourable assumption of national and religious superiority."

One day after the capture of Ghazni, Haji Khan Kakar, along with Haji Dost Mohammed Khan and the other Durrani chiefs, who had designedly hung back from our camp on a former occasion, began now a new course of conduct. We knew of course the reason of this duplicity of their conduct, as I have noticed previously; but now they opened their tongue for flattery, showering the flowers of praise on our

soldiers, which, indeed, they really deserved; and said that no one had ever thought in Afghanistan of our capturing the stronghold of Ghazni in such a short time, and that therefore they did not hurry themselves to join our camp, fearing to fatigue men and horses, and thus make them unfit for the active service which they expected we should want. On the 30th of July, the army of the Indus resumed its march in the direction of Kabul; and the Shah, with the Bombay brigade, preceded us to Shekhabad. About 3 A.M., on the 3d of August, a Persian friend of mine arrived in my tent, with the intelligence of the flight of the Amir Dost Mohammed Khan towards Bamian, leaving his artillery and ammunition at Maidan. I immediately conducted my friend to Sir Alexander Burnes; and though this news was satisfactory to the political functionaries, resulting as it did from their judicious negotiations in inducing the chiefs to abandon the cause of the Amir, yet it certainly disappointed the military authorities sadly, as I had seen many officers the previous evening sharpening their swords, rejoicing at the prospect of showing their true heroism. The brave Colonel Outram, with Captains Lawrence, Troup, Taylor,

Christie, Hogg, &c., volunteered immediately for special service, and started off at once to overtake the fugitive Amir of Kabul on his way to Bamian. Haji Khan Kakar or Nasir-ul-daulah accompanied the party, which amounted to about eight hundred foot and horse. I shall here leave the subject of the pursuit of the Amir at present, and resume it on the occasion of throwing Haji Khan into custody, and our administration in Kabul.

In Shekhabad my friend Khan Shirin Khan, the Persian chief, with a large retinue, and different other chiefs in it, joined ourcamp, after the Amir Dost Mohammed Khan had entered the valley of Sirchishmah. The Shah and the Envoy received him very kindly, and he was acknowledged as the first leader of the Persian tribe in Afghanistan. We moved on to Maidan, where the artillery and ammunition, with the other heavy baggage, had been left by the Amir, and which now became the property of the Shah Shuja-ul-Mulk. This day many Durrani chiefs came to meet the Shah, and were drawn up in lines on both sides of the road along which we passed, complimented and welcomed by them. The nearer we approached the city of Kabul, the more people of

all ranks came in throngs to our camp. The fruits and the luxuries of ice, &c., as well as the picturesque view upon Kohdaman, Chardehi, &c., with the emerald-like gardens in the vicinity of the capital, intersected and washed as they are by the brooks of crystal-like water, though not foreign to me, yet induced me to partake of the astonishment and pleasure which suddenly but joyfully surrounded our army, particularly the natives of Bengal, of Madras, and of Bombay. It was the 7th of August, 1839, that the exiled king, Shah Shuja-ul-Mulk, after the lapse of thirty years, was reseated in the capital of his kingdom by the British army.

The Amir Dost Mohammed Khan would have certainly given us one or two battles before his flight to Bamian, had he had to oppose us only on one side. We, however, threatened him at once in three different directions, besides that we had to a considerable degree caused him to mistrust the chiefs and people around his own person. From the South, the army of the Indus, after obtaining possession of Qandhar, and taking the fortress of Ghazni, had reached within a few marches of his capital; and on the north, or in Kohdaman, at only about twenty

SIR CLAUDE WADE KT CB

miles from the city, we had succeeded in inducing his own subjects, the Kohistanis, to stand up against him; and from the east side we had sent the Shah Zadah Taimur, the eldest son of the king, with about 10,000 foot and horse, through the Panjab, to divert the attention of the Amir towards Jelalabad and Khaibar; and we thus prevented his son the Sardar Mohammed Khan from joining his father in Kabul.

I have followed the "Army of the Indus" to its final destination, in its arrival at Kabul; and I shall now take a brief view of the proceedings of the Shah Zadah Taimur, and of the Khaibaris under the Sardar Mohammed Akbar Khan, before I touch upon the subject of raising a rebellion against the Amir in Kohistan.

In accordance with the Tripartite treaty, the Shah Zadah Taimur left Lodianah on his way to Peshavar through the Panjab, and Sir Claude Wade, having been invested with both the military and political powers, was appointed to accompany the Shah Zadah. They crossed the Satlaj on the 15th of February, 1839, and in the Panjab the whole of the troops under them, including the Sikh contingent, amounted

to about 10,000 of all descriptions. A very interesting account of the daily progress of this part of the force advancing upon Kabul is well set forth in an amusing volume published by Lieut. W. Barr, one of the officers under Sir Claude Wade.*

Previous to the departure of the Shah Zadah Taimur from Lodianah, Mr. Lord was appointed as a political agent, and sent ahead to Peshavar to spread reports of the restoration of the Shah Shuja ul-Mulk to his kingdom of Afghanistan; to communicate with the various chiefs of the surrounding tribes, and to gain adherents for the purpose of advancing the views of the British Government; and he was authorised to spend the sum of one lakh of rupees, in order to effect this object. He had successfully negotiated with the Khataks, Bajauris, and Panjtaris, and had sent emissaries by a circuitous route to Qunduz and Khulam, inviting the co-operation of those chiefs against the Amir of Kabul. The instructions which were furnished to this officer from Sir Alexander Burnes, in addition to those given by

* Shahamat Ali, the Persian secretary to Sir Claude Wade, has written an able account of the advance of the Shah Zadah, which I hope he will amuse the public some day by publishing.

Sir Claude Wade, though abruptly and briefly stated, will not fail to show the outline of his guidance in those important transactions:—

"Be kind to the Divan of Sadat Khan Momand.

"Sadud Din has great influence with the tribes of the south of Peshavar; he is likely to be a useful man.

"Be careful how you deal with the Baujaur chiefs and the Shah of Kunar; do it secretly.

"Sadud Din will open the door to the Khataks.

"Do not carry on too much communication with Fatah Khan and Payandah Khan, or it may vex the Sikhs.

"Do not be open in your communications with Sadat Khan, or Mohammed Akbar Khan may injure him from Jalalabad.

"Mohammed Beg Qaflah Bashi is particularly to be well treated. Present him with one hundred rupees from me for bringing Gholam Khan's letter. Through him you can safely communicate with the Navab and with Gholam Khan; but beware of what you write, or these men will lose their lives.

"Employ the Qazis near, if you can, Qutab-alam. He is a shrewd, clever fellow; and his father being with the Shah gives to him an interest in doing good. He is, however, very thick with Avitabile. This has its advantages and its disadvantages."

The nearer to the Peshavar territory the Shah Zadah and Sir Claude Wade arrived, the more

number of the Afghans joined their standard, and valuable advices reached them from Kabul. In Peshavar, on the 29th of March, 1839, that officer thought it advisable that the Shah Zadah should hold a public Darbar (levee), to receive the chiefs and bestow the dresses of honour on them. To excite the cupidity of the Afghans by such show, and to gain the services of the Khaibaris, it was necessary that the greatest splendour should be displayed on the occasion. A salute was fired. The French generals in the service of Ranjit Singh, Prince Hashim, the principal Arbabs, and the other Afghan chiefs, were introduced. The entrance of the Darbar tent was tastefully decorated by the Kashmir shawls. All the newly-raised officers exhibited the picture of the old system of the Sadozai state, and they stood all in an array before the Prince. Among them Akhund Mulla Shakur occupied a dignified post. To describe the series of the negotiations and the communication which took place between Sir Claude Wade and the chiefs of the Trans-Indus for the purpose of dethroning the Amir Dost Mohammed Khan, and the sound judgment, with able and unceased exertion which he showed in effecting

this course, will be of great interest. I shall therefore quote his official reports to the Government of India.

To H. Torrens, Esq., Officiating Secretary to the Government of India with the Right Honourable the Governor-General.

"SIR,

"I HAVE the honour to transmit abstracts of letters received by me, by direct messengers from different parties across the Indus.

"2nd. Bad-rud-din is the son of a Sayad who was recommended to me by the late Mr. Moorcroft, and to whom some years ago I had an opportunity of showing such attentions as were in my power at Lodianah, which his son also visited for the purpose of interesting me in the settlement of some disputes or claim which he had in Peshavar; but as he possessed neither the influence nor ability of his father, and the request involved an improper interference, on my part, with the jurisdiction of the Sikhs, who had at that time established their authority in the place, I was able only to offer him my advice to conciliate that people.

"3rd. To the letter of Rahmut Khan Khaibari I have replied that I have been highly gratified by his assurances of attachment to the cause of Shah Shuja; that I had seen his agent, and heard what he had to state; that I felt

fully assured of the good disposition of the writer, the praise of whose character was familiar to my ears; that I relied, with confidence, on the proofs of his devotion to the Prince, and that his agent, whom I had dismissed, would satisfy him of the nature of my friendly sentiments towards him.

"4th. By the agent himself I sent a verbal message to Rahmat Khan, to the effect that he might confidently rely on every attention being paid to his application for pecuniary assistance on the arrival of the Shah Zadah on the frontier; that it would not consist, in my opinion, with the interests of either side to make these open demonstrations now; but when the time came, the Shah Zadah would not be found wanting in the inclination to reward him and all those who might, like himself, profess their readiness to serve the cause of his father.

"In my letter to Shah Zadah Hashim I have deemed it right, from the intimacy which is supposed to exist between the Sikhs and himself, to inform him of the wish of my Government to see the Sadozai dynasty restored to the kingdom of Kabul; and while I have expressed my belief that as a member of that family Shah Zadah will contribute his means to the accomplishment of that object.

"To Amin Khan I have sent no reply, not being able to trace the channel by which his letter came.

"It is my intention to confine my replies at present to all communications of a tenor similar to those now reported to an intimation of the preparations in which I have been en-

gaged, and that I have a firm reliance on the loyalty and devotion of the writers, when the time for the exhibition of these qualities may arrive. The Shah Zadah himself has replied to the letters received by him in the same manner, and he will continue to write in the same strain, as it is the best course which he can, I think, pursue until he is on the spot, and quite prepared to receive the allegiance, as well as to demand the services of his countrymen.

"I have, &c.,

(Signed) "C. M. WADE,

"*Political Agent.*"

To H. Torrens, Esq., Officiating Secretary to the Government of India with the Governor-General.

"SIR,

"MIR Baza Qasid, who was sent to Kabul about two months and a half ago, by Shah Shuja, with a letter for Dost Mohammed Khan of a conciliatory tenor, has just returned, and I collect the following information from him: that in consequence of the advice of Navab Jabbar Khan and Gholam Mohammed Khan Popalzai, who told him that he would lose his life if he attempted to deliver the Shah's letter openly, the Qasid had given it to a Faqir to deliver; that on opening and reading the letter, and finding from whom it came, he had thrown it into the fire, and said that he would never yield to the Shah; that he looked to Russia and Persia to rescue him from the threatened invasion.

"2nd. Strict orders were given to find out the bearer of the letter; but the Qasid managed to conceal himself, and only left Kabul fifteen days ago, the latest date to which my information, either direct or through Mr. Lord, extends. Mir Baz has been directed by the Shah Zadah to return to his father. He says that the Amir is apparently wrapt in utter carelessness as to his fate, making no visible preparations whatever of defences; that his son at Jelalabad has not above two thousand men with him; that the force sent to Qunduz is winter-bound in that country; that the people of Kabul are waiting with impatience for the appearance of the Shah and his son, and say that the present is the moment for their advance; that if we do not advance before the Nauroz the communication will then be open, and enable Dost Mohammed to receive succour both in men and money from Russia, who has promised aid in both.

"3rd. We may believe such portions of these reports as may seem probable. As I have said before, I shall be able to judge of the intentions of the Amir, the disposition of the people, and the best mode of meeting both.

"4th. Nearly the whole of Sultan Mohammed Khan's followers have now joined the Shah Zadah; and the report is that Ranjit Singh either has taken or intends to take the Jaghirs of the Peshavar chiefs from them, and give some land in the territory between the Bias and Satlaj. It is certain that Sultan Mohammed does not appear to retain any political influence now at Lahaur, a result which, proceeding as it does from the suggestions of the Maharajah's

own mind, is better than if it had been effected by any pointed direction on our part, when such a course would have argued a groundless fear of the ex-chief's power to do us mischief, and a supercession of the just responsibility which attaches to Ranjit Singh for his conduct.

* * * * *

"With the command of Peshavar, the authority of the three brothers of Jammu would extend, almost without exception, to the whole country between the Jelum and Indus, south-west of Kashmir. Every day may be said to be adding weight to the power and importance of these great feudatories, and nothing but the personal character of Rajah Dhian Singh, whose moderation, when compared with his influence at the Court, redounds highly to his credit, restrains the ambitious projects of his brother, Gulab Singh.* Their object at present seems to be to consolidate their authority on the Afghan frontier; and I shall not be surprised to hear that ere long they succeed in forcing Peshavar and its dependencies from their master.

"When about to leave Lahaur, Faqir Azizuddin waited on me with the following questions, viz., that Qazi Mulla Hasan, in the service of Shah Shuja, had written to the Maharajah, requesting, on the part of the Shah, his Highness's assistance in procuring the immediate dispatch of

* His ambition has at last been successful; all that intermediate country has been added to his already overgrown possessions by the British government during the late war of the Panjab.

fifteen thousand rupees of shawls to His Majesty, and that the Maharajah wished to know what reply he should send.

"2nd. Whether I had any information to give regarding the receipt of the fifteen lakhs which the Maharajah is to receive from Sindh.

"3rd. That his Highness would be glad to learn when payment of the ten lakhs which he is to receive from the Government of Kabul is to commence.

"To the first question I replied that the Maharajah was the best judge of the reply to be sent to the Shah's request; to the second, that the contribution from the Mirs of Sindh had not yet been received, nor could it well be expected before the settlement of the existing affairs. With regard to the third question, I referred the Maharajah to the terms of the tripartite treaty, by which each party was bound to abide; the Faqir remarked that the words of the treaty were as 'ibtadar mamurr fany.'—I assent to this citation, adding, however, that the payment of the money could evidently not precede the establishment of the Shah on the throne for which the armies of the two states were preparing to invade the country. The Faqir did not again make any allusion to these subjects.

"I have, &c.,

(Signed) "C. M. WADE."

To the Officiating Secretary to the Government of India.

"SIR,

"I HAVE the honour to transmit a copy of a letter to my address from Mr. Lord, (the original sent to Mr. Torrens

with private letter, and a copy with this letter,) dated the 31st ultimo.

"With regard to the attempt of Dost Mohammed Khan to exert the influence of religion in his favour with the people of Kabul, I may notice the arrival in my camp since the receipt of Mr. Lord's report, of a person from that city, who states that he has been deputed by Hafizji to assure the Shah Zadah and myself that though the force of circumstances has induced him and others to give a paper to the effect mentioned by Mr. Lord, their intentions towards the Shah are the same as before.

"As the man produced no letter authorising him, I rather distrusted the truth of his mission, but he said that his employer had desired him to inform me that he was afraid to write in consequence of the discovery of some letters that had been addressed by Shah Shuja to Hafizji, as well as others of his party in Kabul, from the effects of which on the mind of the Barakzai chief he had not been able to escape, by stating that he could not prevent the Shah addressing him, and by exclaiming against the injustice of suspecting him, until the Amir could prove that he had been writing to his Majesty.

"In the course of further conversation, I learned from the messenger, who is a respectable looking man, that after giving the Fatva, one of the Mullas expostulated with those who had put their seals to it, on the selfish violence of the deed which had been extracted from them, that Dost Mohammed Khan had not now the power of resisting the

enterprise of Shah Shuja; that, therefore, by pronouncing an anathema against his Majesty, they were, in fact, sealing their own ruin, as it was not to be supposed that the Shah would forgive them for denouncing him whom they had hitherto regarded as their rightful sovereign, and on whose protection and favour their hopes of future peace and contentment rested.

"Though the story appeared to be a very plausible one, yet I saw an objection to my giving credence to it; and I accordingly told the person to go back to Kabul and inform Hafizji and the other friends of the Shah there of the danger that they would inevitably incur if they sided with the enemies of his Majesty; that I was disposed to place every confidence in their loyalty and devotion to his cause, but that the Shah would look for proofs of these sentiments; and as the time drew near when the Shah Zadah would arrive, I expected that they would prove their attachment, and avert the possible consequences of procrastination, by sending not a messenger known only to themselves, but one of their own body, which would give assurance of their fidelity, and establish their claim on the generosity of the Shah. The man is still, however, in the camp, and appears to be considered by the Shah Zadah's people as an authentic messenger; but I recommend that he should be allowed to return.

"I have written to Mr. Lord to encourage the overture which he has received from Sher Ali Khan Javansher, by offering a suitable provision for the present to himself and

followers on their arrival in the Shah Zadah's camp, and that in the event of his compliance, a recommendation will be made to the Shah to receive him on the same terms as were conceded to his father. At the same time I have requested Mr. Lord to authorize Sher Ali Khan to draw to the extent of one thousand rupees on him, if he should be in want of money to extricate himself from his present situation. His father enjoyed much consideration with Shah Shuja during the monarchy among the leaders of the Gholam Khana, and is of the party of which Khan Shirin Khan is considered the head.

"Pir Mohammed Khan, as well as the other Barakzai chiefs subject to the Maharajah's authority, have, I understand, become alarmed at the suspicion with which they are at present viewed by the British and Sikhs. Impelled by his fears, it is said that Pir Mohammed Khan has, within the last few days, left Peshavar suddenly with his own family as well as that of his brothers, and retired to his estate with a view to secure a retreat if his liberty should be threatened.

"With respect to Sultan Mohammed Khan and Sayad Mohammed Khan, they are at present living in the city of Lahaur, where his Highness has allowed a spacious residence for them, and though they have repeatedly applied to return to Peshavar, they have as often been refused.

* * * * *

"While I was at Peshavar, Sultan Mohammed had made a representation both to the Maharajah and myself as to the

conduct of the Afghans in leaving him, and that the arms, &c. which they had carried away with them were his property. He requested that I would order them to return; but I replied that they had come, neither on my invitation nor that of the Shah Zadah, and that it would be contrary to the usages of his own country as to that of any other, to force them back to his service; that I had heard that their complaint was that they had not been paid by him, but that into that subject I had no right to inquire; that they were free to remain wherever they pleased; that I did not desire to take any part in the affair; that if they had illegal possession of anything belonging to the Sardar he should apply to the Shah Zadah, who I doubted not would be ready to do impartial justice to both parties.

"Disappointed in my reply, I found that he interested Rajah Dhian Singh, who sent me a polite message to the effect of the complaint that Sultan Mohammed Khan had been making to me, while he told the Sardar himself, I learned, that people seek service where they were likely to be well paid. I replied to the Rajah by reporting the observations which I had used to Sultan Mohammed Khan, adding, however, that I thought, under the circumstances, that we should both consult our interests best by taking no part in the matter one way or the other; but a few days afterwards I heard that the Rajah had brought the complaints to the notice of Ranjit Singh, who took no notice of it. In consequence of his failure in these attempts, I presume the Sardar resolved, whether with or without the

knowledge or instigation of any of the Sikh officers I cannot state, on pursuing a system of retaliation on the Afghans; having, therefore, waited some days for a confirmation of the report, and satisfied myself of its accuracy, I determined to address a notice on the subject to the Maharajah through the only direct channel of communication which I have of my own at present with the court, viz., the deputy news-writer at Lahaur; and I am happy to state that his Highness has noticed the conduct of his Barakzai dependant, and ordered the property and families to be released.

"The ground on which I have deemed it advisable to object to the part which Sultan Mohammed Khan has chosen to act is, that supposing the Afghans who have joined the Shah Zadah were possessed of any property belonging to the Sardar, he had no right to make his political duty to the Maharajah subservient to the gratification of a personal claim, or, in other words, to bring into jeopardy the obligation of the treaty which Ranjit Singh had contracted with our government.

"It will have been seen that his Highness has not returned any reply to the recommendation offered by me that some effectual means should be adopted to prevent the Barakzai chiefs owing allegiance to him from intriguing with impunity with the enemies of the Shah. These chiefs can evidently have no doubt of the jealousy and distance with which they are regarded, that in fact there is no way left to them of gaining the confidence of the British government;

and I am accordingly of opinion that I should hold the Maharajah responsible for their conduct in a more formal manner than he appears to consider himself at present required to do; I therefore intend to revert immediately to the necessity of his Highness taking such a pledge from them as I suggested.

"The Right Honourable the Governor-General is aware that, during the negotiations which led to the late treaty with the ruler of Lahaur, his Highness inquired what should be done with Sultan Mohammed during the contemplated operations. He was informed in reply that if agreeable to his Highness the Sardar might proceed with him. And on reference to the peculiar position of Sultan Mohammed Khan, it is I think greatly to be regretted that the mode in which it was arranged that he should be disposed of, during the actual progress of operations, was carried into effect. If it had been considered difficult to restrain him from engaging in intrigues to obstruct the success of our measures, the Shah's conformity with the disposal of him in the manner proposed would not have been more irksome to his Majesty than his acquiescence in other important objects of our contract with him. Though I am not prepared to say that he would have proved a faithful friend to the cause, whether placed with the Shah or with the troops of Ranjit Singh, yet his means of doing injury with the former would obviously have been neutralized by the presence of the overwhelming force with which his Majesty was moving, while by allowing him to remain where he is we have in-

creased not alone his facilities, but those of the Sikhs, of intriguing against the Shah; and by declaring our suspicions of him, may be said to have converted a possibly useful partisan into an open enemy, and thus rendered the operations on the side of Peshavar more intricate and involved than they would otherwise have been.

"It is not improbable that the Maharajah may excuse himself for the acts of his Barakzai feudatory, by referring the rejection of the proposal which was made to remove him from a scene where his Highness no doubt saw that he could intrigue more readily than if he had been permitted to accompany the Shah, an event as matters now stand, and since his Lordship has not thought it a necessary precaution to insist on the course which was proposed, and Ranjit Singh does not seem inclined to adopt, or rather has not distinctly said that he would, the suggestion which I offered for guarding as effectually as I could against the intrigues of his vassal. I would beg to solicit the support of the Governor-General to the application which I am about to write to his Highness for the production of some real security for the future good conduct of Sultan Mohammed Khan. With a view to the same, I would also request that his Lordship would be pleased to send a duplicate of his letter to the Maharajah through the Agent at present with Mr. Clerk, while the original can be forwarded for transmission to me.

"Regarding the property claimed from the Afghans by Sultan Mohammed, although I have ascertained that they

have brought nothing but their clothes and arms along with them, in lieu of long arrears of pay due to them when they left the Sardar's service, I intend to observe that he may bring a civil suit against them either through myself or through M. Avitabile, before the court at Peshavar, for the recovery of any property to which he may be found to have a just claim.

* * * * *

"The Shah Zadah has been joined by several other Afghans of note sent chiefly by Mr. Lord, who is ably and zealously engaged in securing the services of the tribes in favour of the Shah Zadah. I had informed the Prince on leaving Lahaur that I expected those who might join him on the road would be entertained out of the fixed sum for his monthly expenses; but as the seceders from Sultan Mohammed Khan had now regularly attached themselves to the service of the Shah Zadah, and the time appeared to me to have arrived when both his Highness and myself should adopt some plan by which, while treating his countrymen, who were the first to flock to his standard, with his princely liberality, he should possess something more substantial than their mere verbal assurances of devotion to him, and that I should satisfy myself that the public money of which I had the disposal was not heedlessly squandered away, I deemed it advisable to suggest to Shah Zadah Taimur that he should explain to the Afghans with him, that before they could be finally enrolled in his service they should give him their written pledge of fidelity, and more-

over that they should not hold any correspondence or communication whatever with the enemies of his house without his previous knowledge and consent.

"The Prince approved entirely of my proposition, and I am happy to say that the parties who have been required to conform to it have at once admitted the reasonableness and justice of the measure, and cheerfully signed, sealed, and delivered to the Shah Zadah a paper to the effect desired.

"I have pointed out the necessity of pursuing the same plan with others who may arrive, being decidedly of opinion that it is better to incur all the risk of foregoing the services of men who may refuse to sign such a declaration, than expend the money of Government in entertaining them without any security between them and the Shah Zadah.

"I have, &c.,

(Signed) "C. M. WADE."

On the 20th of July, the Shah Zadah came to Jam Road; and by the 22d his force marched to enter the Khaibar Pass. Sir Claude Wade, Major Mackison, Captains Cunningham, Ferris, &c., ascended the heights of the pass by the different routes. There were many Afghans who had espoused the cause of the Prince, some by love of loyalty, others by cupidity; but there were still many of them in the Khaibar who did not tender their homage

to the Shah Zadah, and intended to resist. The Sardar Mohammed Akbar Khan had encamped at the western extremity of the pass, near Dakka. He did not like to enter the pass to impede the progress of the Shah Zadah; for he thought that if he was routed by the united force of the Sikhs and the Prince, he will be plundered by the very Khaibaris, who will stand by him for a time, and most probably caught and delivered to Sir Claude Wade. However, he did not fail in spreading false reports of the arrival of the Persian army in Ghuryan for the aid of the Barakzais, and thus encouraged the Khaibaris to oppose us.

Substance of a Letter addressed by Mohammed Akbar Khan to the Khaibaris, received on the 22nd of May.

"ACCOMPANIED by all my troops and the peasantry of the country around, I have to-day left Jalalabad with a view to commence a religious war against the detested infidels, and to sacrifice my life in the way of God, and have halted at Ali Boghan. The next stage will be Chahardehi, and from thence to Basaul and Dakka, where I shall arrive soon.

"About five thousand Jazayarchis and an equal number of people from Kohistan have been dispatched from Kabul by my father, to assist me. Please God they will join me

at Basaul, after which I will proceed forthwith to Khaibar. By the favour of the Almighty and his prophet, the bravery of his faithful servants, the devotion of experienced warriors, and the assistance of my troops and artillery, you will witness the proofs of courage that will be displayed on the field of battle in defending the honour of my nation.

"Correct intelligence has been received from Ahmad Shahi to the effect that the Persians and Russians had arrived with a large army at Ghuryan, that they would soon be able to assist the chiefs of Qandhar, and contend with the British army and Shah Shuja-ul-Mulk, who by the blessing of God will be disgraced, and that on the receipt of this news had recalled his 'Pesh Khana' (tent), which he had sent in advance to the fort of Azam Khan on the way to Kabul, and that he was preparing for a siege at Qandhar."

Before the Shah Zadah's forces reached Ali Masjid, Major Mackison came into contact with the Khaibaris; and because the Sikh Najibs showed cowardice on the occasion, he was compelled to erect a breastwork; and with extraordinary bravery and presence of mind he continued the unequal contest with the enemy, till assistance, with ammunition, was dispatched to him from Sir Claude Wade. The Khaibaris were, however, successful in carrying off some of the camels laden with the baggage; and after a succession of petty attacks, they escaped, leaving

the impregnable fort of Ali Masjid quite empty; and it was soon discovered and occupied by one of the Afghan officers under Captain Ferris; and on the 27th of July the British flag and that of the Shah Zadah were displayed on the top of that fort. After leaving a garrison there, the Prince and Sir Claude Wade arrived on the 6th of August, 1839, at Dakka, which had been abandoned by the Sardar Mohammed Akbar Khan, when he was recalled by his father on the fall of Ghazni.

The chief of Dakka, Sadat Khan Momand, who resided in the opposite fort of Lalpurah, was always considered to be in favour with the Shah Shuja-ul-Mulk; but when the Shah Zadah Taimur and Sir Claude Wade arrived in Peshavar, the Momand lord behaved in a manner which gave cause of suspicion in the mind of that British officer. However, he invited him again to wait upon the Shah Zadah, but received no satisfactory reply. Next day it was reported that he with his Momand followers had decamped, either with a deliberate intention of rebelling, or in consequence of the alarm which was created by the precautionary measures of Sir

Claude Wade, as it is described by Lieut. Barr.* The British officers crossed the river and took possession of the fort of the fugitive chief; and Turrah Baz Khan was made head of the Momand tribe under the government of the Shah Shuja-ul-Mulk. The policy of Sir Claude Wade, in dispossessing Sadat Khan Momand, and substituting Turrah Baz Khan in his place, was palatable neither to the Shah nor to the political head of Afghanistan. However, the conduct of Sadat Khan was really suspicious; and if Sir William Macnaghten and the Shah were

* "Our camp was pitched on the banks of the Kabul river, which flowed silently and swiftly by, and opposite to the village of Lalpurah, the principal residence of Sadat Khan, who has erected a small fort close to it. Intimation has been received from that chief, avowing his willingness to come to terms; but the unceasing enmity that he had evinced towards the Shah Zadah, since our arrival in Peshavar, rendered it necessary to be prepared to act on the offensive, in case he should change his mind. Accordingly some troops were ordered on this service, and cannon were planted opposite to his stronghold; but no further acts of hostility ensued, and on the following morning the colonel was informed that the Momand lord, with his followers, had decamped during the night, and gone off in the direction of Bajaur. Sir C. Wade, on this, crossed the river and took possession of Lalpurah and the fort, the government of which he conferred on Furrah Bâz Khan, a chief who had proved a most faithful ally to us."—'Kabul and the Panjab,' by Lieut. W. Barr, pp. 353-4.

on the spot, they would have done the same, I believe, that Sir Claude Wade was obliged to do. This change undoubtedly kept our troops employed against many tribes, who were sometimes conducted personally by Sadat Khan, and sometimes only instigated by him, to resist us for a long period. But the measure and the choice of Sir Claude Wade, in dethroning one chief of suspicious character and elevating another, appeared most judicious in the time of the disasters of 1841-2; for it was Turrah Baz Khan who stood by the British when all the Afghan chiefs had deserted them. It was the new chief of Lalpurah who became the medium of our communication between our heroic garrison of Jelalabad and the Peshavar authorities; and above all it was he who escorted the supplies of ammunition, grain, and money to them, when they were in great need. The Shah Zadah Taimur and Sir Claude Wade, after adjusting matters in Lalpurah and Dakka, reached Kabul without any further annoyance. On the 3d of September, the entry of the Shah Zadah into the capital of his father was solemnised with the display of much military splendour. Lord Keane ordered some of the regiments

to be arranged for the occasion, making a street to the city; and the Prince passed along this through the concourse of the population and of our camp. The Shah Shuja-ul-Mulk did not like this mode of our showing respect to the Prince, as his jealousy and pride neither permitted him to witness nor hear of the honour or consideration paid to others.

Now I will briefly take a view of the circumstances which had alarmed the Amir Dost Mohammed near his capital in Kohistan, and principally caused him to abandon his design of proceeding to the assistance of any of his sons, either to the south or to the east, and at last compelled him to precipitate his flight towards Bamian. The readers of this book should bring back into their mind the name of Gholam Khan Popalzai, a liberal friend of the Amir in the days of his poverty. When the Dost became Amir, and had the supreme power in Kabul, he made no good return to his early friend for his kindness in supporting him in distress, and in taking his part against his rival and wealthy brothers. Being disgusted with this ingratitude in the Amir, Gholam Khan turned his mind to pursue the usual line of conduct of his family, who always were the well-

wishers of the Sadozai, or royal family. Gholam Khan was now evidently sighing, praying, and exerting himself for the restoration of the monarchy instead of anarchy. He knew that the Shah Shuja-ul-Mulk had taken asylum in the British territories, which Gholam visited in search of a medical adviser. The late William Fraser, Resident at Dehli, and Sir Claude Wade, treated him with great consideration in consequence of his high birth, and as the son of Nasaqchibashi, who was of some service to the Hon. Mountstuart Elphinstone. The civilities shown to him in India made a deep impression upon the mind of this noble man; and when I returned from Mashad to Peshavar, on my way to Calcutta,* he made his acquaintance with me, and invited me to dinner, and at last became my correspondent in Afghanistan. On the arrival of the mission of Sir Alexander Burnes, I introduced my Durrani friend to him, who felt gratified by making the acquaintance of one whose name he had so often heard previously. The first words poured out from the lips of this visitor were that we were quite mistaken in the idea of the success of our mission to the

* Page 357 of Mohan Lal's Travels in the Panjab and Afghanistan.

Amir of Kabul, whose treacherous and faithless disposition cannot sufficiently be fathomed by any human being. He afterwards was my constant visitor; and the information and opinions he gave appeared to be authentic and sound. The mission failed, as he had foretold; and on our departure towards India, he said that we must rest assured that the Shah Shuja, if he is ever brought by the English, will enter Afghanistan without meeting any opposition from the ruling chieftains, who will be most fortunate persons to be deserted, if not killed or plundered, by their own adherents. It is a most extraordinary coincidence that all his forebodings on the politics of that day, as well as on the course and extent of our disasters, came to pass without the slightest difference. In the meantime the Mission left Kabul, and the army of the Indus, with the Shah Shuja-ul-Mulk, obtained possession of Qandhar; and during this space of time Gholam Khan was exerting himself, in the face of every personal risk, to gain friends for the British, to create disturbance against the Barakzai, and, above all, to transmit the most valuable intelligence to Sir Claude Wade in Peshavar, and to us in Sindh and Qandhar. From

the latter place, under the direction of my superiors, I sent him a note of credit for forty thousand rupees, which was wonderfully procured at such a crisis by Pokhar, a Shikarpuri broker in Kabul. Gholam Khan, whom we instructed to raise disturbances against the Amir, gained the great priest of Kabul, "Hafiz Ji," the son of the late Mir Vaiz, the most turbulent heretic and hypocrite in the kingdom. He also gained in the same manner the Khavajah Khanji of Ashqan-i-Arifan, with many other petty chiefs or ringleaders, both Durranis, and the Qizal-bashes. He then disguised himself as a woman, and covering himself with the veil or Burqah from head to foot, he mounted a donkey at sunrise and went out to a distance from Kabul. Thus he cunningly succeeded in avoiding the seizure of his person by the people of the Amir, who had lately appointed some men to get hold of him.

Gholam Khan afterwards rode on horseback and hastened his departure to Tagav, the ruler of which place, Milak Shahdad Khan, commonly called "Ba-chai Mazu," gave him refuge, raised his own tribe to espouse our cause, and went with him to Kohistan, where all the chiefs, as Mir Misjadi, Mir Darvesh,

Mir Khoja, Khalifah Ibrahim, Mir Sikandar Shah, Saif-ul-Din, Milak Esa Khan, and other chiefs of Nijrav, Panjsher, Ghorbard, Kohistan, and Kohdeman, rose in arms to further the views of Gholam Khan. He thus distributed the money we had sent him from Qandhar amongst his followers, and threatened an attack upon the Amir in Kabul. Hafiz Ji, in the mean time, made a pretence of suppressing the Kohistanis (who worshipped him as their religious guide), and joining the Amir against the English; yet he received secretly a present of 8,000 rupees from our friend, and instead of bringing his followers the Kohistanis to the assistance of the Amir against us, he co-operated with Gholam Khan in our favour. At this time one of the descendants of the "Sadozai," or Royal Family, had joined the insurgents in Kohistan, and was proclaimed as Prince, under the Shah Shuja-ul-Mulk. The Amir seized upon Pokhur, and confined and tortured him for lending the money to Gholam Khan, whose property also he confiscated, and razed his house to the ground. Hafiz Ji's junction with Gholam Khan was a plain cause and evidence that none of the Sunnis of Kabul would exert themselves in his favour; while the Qizal-

bashes fortunately embraced a favourable opportunity by this change of the Sunnis, and stated to the Amir that if they were to go with him either to oppose the English towards Ghazni, or to oppose Sir Claude Wade in the direction of Khaibar, the Kohistanis, who were ready to pour down upon Kabul with Gholam Khan, and Hafiz Ji, will join the Sunnis of the city, will massacre their families, and reduce the Chandoul, or the Persian quarters, to ashes, not under the prompt encouragement of their leaders, but under the influence of their religious prejudices. The citizens said to the Amir, that his silence, and his holding consultations every day, and not taking any step to quell the progress of the Kohistanis, is causing them very much loss in their bargains, and keeping up danger amongst their neighbours. They added, that he ought not to leave the town unprotected; and, in short, they insisted upon him to take clearly, decidedly, and at once, any of the measures, whether to decide for war with us, or to flee into Turkistan. The Amir called an assembly in the garden which surrounds the tomb of Taimur Shah, and made a speech, petitioning his subjects to support him in maintaining his power, and in driving off the

infidels (us) from the Mahomedan country. Many people who were present, stated to me that the words of the Amir were most touching and moving, but they gained no friends. The Amir also frightened the ignorant people by fabricating and telling them monstrous falsehoods, such as that we have continued, during our march from Sindh to Ghazni, in the practice of seizing and abusing the women, and perpetrating the most barbarous deed of boiling the little infants for our meals. The Navab Jabbar Khan confirmed the assertion of the Amir, with the view that the people will thus be induced to rise in his cause, but all this was in vain. In the mean time Gholam Khan with the Kohistanis began to descend from their native valley with the intention to annoy and fright the Kabulis if they will allow the Amir to remain any longer in their city. To the end that I may show the importance of the services of this individual, which he rendered to the British government at the risk of his life and to the loss of his estate, I shall not let the readers pass away from this subject, without quoting parts of his voluminous communications to our government, which will give a clear view of his proceedings.

Translation of the Extracts of a Letter from Gholam Khan Papalzai.

"THE chief of Kabul is exceedingly distracted in mind. He lately sent for some of his courtiers one night in secresy, and observed that as information was constantly arriving of the advance of Shah Shuja-ul-Mulk against him, with the British troops on one hand and the Sikhs on the other, he requested they would give him their opinions as to the course which his interest required him to adopt. They replied that he was wise and should follow the dictates of his own judgment, while their duty was to serve him. Dost Mohammed Khan repeated his request, and desired every one of those in attendance to express his sentiments; but they all maintained a perfect silence. The Sardar became dejected and retired to his harem. On the retreat of Dost Mohammed Khan, some of the members of the meeting, such as Navab Jabbar Khan, Amir Akhundzadah, and Abdullah Khan, that the time for consultation was when Sir A. Burnes had visited Kabul; that he should then have formed some connexion with the British government,—but that at that period being led away by the representations of the Russian agents, the Persians, and the Amir of Bokhara, he did not listen to their advice. These courtiers also retired afterwards to their homes, saying that they would now see how the Russians, the Persians, and the Amir of Bokhara would assist the Amir, of which they talked so much of doing; that at present there was no remedy but fighting.

"God knows what may come to pass; but it is certain Dost Mohammed Khan is alarmed and distressed.

"The reason of Dost Mohammed Khan's sending Akram Khan along with Mirza Abdul Sami towards Bamean was that the Persians should not raise the siege of Hirat, and with the same view he continued to supply Mohammed Shah and the Russian Ambassador with fabricated news regarding the English and the Sikhs. The substance of the letter written by the Amir to the Ambassador of Russia after the retreat of the Persians from Hirat, is as follows:

"'In persuasion of your letter, sent by the hand of Captain Vikovich, and the delusive overtures made by him, I sacrificed my alliance with the British Government, and consequently dismissed Sir A. Burnes. The Persians and the Russians, notwithstanding their united efforts, have not been able to capture Hirat, defended by four thousand men, who were like the dead in their tombs, and had retired to Persia. How is it reconcileable with your ideas of conquering India to Calcutta? Hirat was neither assisted by Bokhara, nor by Afghanistan; nor had you sustained any defeat which should have occasioned your retreat. If you had shame you would not have caused the enmity which has taken place between me and the British Government; for your sake the foundation of my house has been destroyed, though my nation never attempted to save Hirat, yet it has been liberated by the hostile exertions of two important powers.'

"On the arrival of the news of the Persian retreat at

Kabul, the Qizalbashes seemed much dejected and vexed, while the Sunnis expressed exceeding joy on the occasion. For instance, a party of poor merchants who trade between Qandhar and Kabul having collected about one hundred rupees by subscription, held a party in a temple outside the city, and illuminated the place. Dost Mohammed, on being informed of the fact, sent for the ringleaders, severely rebuked and disgraced them for their merriment. They answered that God had aided in defeating the arms of the infidels, and had thus defended the faith and reputation of the whole Afghan nation; that in consequence they had held a party of pleasure, and that they not alone, but the whole nation, were delighted at the event. The very Akhundzada, who is the minister, and is called Naib, was heard in the Darbar to offer thanksgiving to God for the retreat of the Persians. It offended the Amir very much; and he observed that the retribution of the Qajars was his own, when the Naib, who was one of the favourites of the Amir, was so actuated, what would be the sentiments of the Kabulis, Durranis, and Ghilzais; the fact is, the Sunnis are all discontented with Dost Mohammed, and so are the Qizalbash, since the Persian retreat, and every one now looks towards the English. The chiefs and people will rebel, and the country will fall into your hands without fighting.

"A letter had been received from the Qandhar chiefs confirming the news of the Persian retreat, and announcing the return of Captain Vikovich to them; that he had already

reached Farah, had brought ten thousand ducats for them, with a message that they were to make every necessary preparation of defence, and that after the Nauroz the Persians would return. It is rumoured that the Russian ambassador has also remitted about twenty thousand ducats for the Amir, who on account of delay in the operations on your part and the arrival of the ducats, is pleased and reassured. He is now employed in repairing the Bala Hisar, and Mohammed Akbar Khan has been sent to Jalalabad, where he is engaged in building a fort.

"The Dastkhats sent by his Majesty for different people have been distributed to them; assurances had been held out by the writer to the Arabs of Balahisar, &c. He states that he had done his best to awaken them from their lethargy; but it should be recollected that he could manage the affair merely by empty words. When the Shah reaches Shikarpur, if he would remit him money, the writer would raise the people. Those who are sincerely affected towards his Majesty, from their forefathers, are now in great distress for want of subsistence. The writer observes that he had tried to induce Hafizji to proceed to the Kohistan to collect the people; and his reply was that without means his journey there would be useless, and would be like erecting a wall without a foundation. Those who appear in the least disaffected towards the Amir, I send them Dastkhat of his Majesty.

"Lately I forwarded a Dastkhat to Mir Morad Beg, and one to Abdulakhan Achakzai, who is displeased with

the Qandharis. The people of Mavarulnahar are discontented with the Amir of Bokhara because he did not receive the son of Shah Zadah Kamran with proper distinction, and refused to give him assistance against the infidels. They call the Amir also an infidel. Morad Beg and others are all waiting for his Majesty's advance to throw off the mask. If his Majesty is determined to proceed to this quarter, he should remit a sufficient sum of money by the hand of a confidential person, so that the people be secured by him, and they may have some assurance of the Shah's intentions.

"On the 31st of October, Captain Vikovich reached Qandhar with ten thousand ducats, and has held out to them assurances that Mohammed Shah would return after Nauroz; that if in the mean time the English should attack them and reduce them to extremity, they were to apply for assistance to the troops that were left at Ghuryan, and that Afghanistan had now become the country of the Russians. The said officer has also written to Dost Mohammed Khan that in a day or two the Amir would receive six lakhs rupees, with which he was desired to defend himself until the return of the Persians, when the whole country, including Hirat, should belong to him. The Amir is highly delighted by the receipt of this intelligence. He is now preparing to dismiss Abdul Vahab, who brought him a Khilat on the part of the Russian Emperor. Favour me with an immediate reply."

I have now shown the method of our operations against the Amir of Kabul by the three different

directions, which distracted his mind so painfully that he at once resolved to fly, but yet implored the Qizalbashes to prevent the people from plunder, and to escort him safely to Sar Chishmah. Thus he was compelled to relinquish all thoughts of opposition, and, leaving his elephants and warlike stores in "Arghandi," where his son the Sardar Mohammed Akbar Khan joined as an invalid, he made the best of his escape towards Bamian, as previously noticed.

Gholam Khan Popalzai entered the city of Kabul with his Kohistan auxiliaries, one day before the arrival of the Shah and the British, and proclaimed the authority of his Majesty. He was of great assistance to our authorities as well as to those of the Shah, in the administration of the country, and more particularly at the appearance of the Amir in Kohistan against us, and during the unfortunate disasters of 1841-2. Throughout the account of those events his name will frequently be read with interest; but here I shall add only the final termination of his history, with the end of his life. In return for his services we had engaged ourselves, both in writing and in words, to replace him in his hereditary rank, and to honour him with permanent rewards, both

from our government and from the Shah; but yet none of those promises were ever fulfilled in any degree. We on our part continued to make one promise after another, without doing more than merely to promise; and Gholam Khan, still relying upon the virtue of our words, did not cease to devote himself to our interest on his part, until we were compelled to leave Afghanistan. He then followed us with his family to Lodianah, as his stay in Afghanistan would endanger the safety of his life in our absence. He thus lost his estate, his house, and his relations in attaching himself to us in spite of his countrymen, and he became an exile in our territory. How we fulfilled our promises and appreciated his services is not unworthy to be mentioned here. We gave him a dress of honour in Kabul; and yet we allowed the Shah and his ministers, Mulla Shikur and Nizam-ul-Daulah, to treat him slightingly even there and then, and to levy taxes on his very small private property, which was free in the time of the Amir. This threw him into such poverty, that at Lodianah he dismissed his adherents, sold all his horses and every article he had, and afterwards he was starved, having fallen sick: he expired,

leaving a family in the most distressed and impoverished state!!

Having recorded in detail the circumstances which occurred from the commencement of the expedition, I shall now pursue the course of the Amir Dost Mohammed Khan to Bokhara.

When Colonel Outram, in company with several English officers, and the Afghans under Haji Khan Kakar, as mentioned before, started from Shekhabad in pursuit of the Amir Dost Mohammed Khan, the fugitive, with Nayab Zulfqar and the Navab Jabbar Khan, as well as his immediate adherents, was three marches beyond Maidan. On the 21st of August the brave Colonel was informed that the object of his pursuit was at Urt, only one march a-head; but it appears from the official report of Colonel Outram, that the escape of the Amir Dost Mohammed Khan was in consequence of the treachery of Haji Khan, or the new Nasir-ul-Daulah. I do neither doubt the authenticity of the assertion of that impartial officer, nor do I seek to excuse or to deny the treacherous intention of the Khan; but there was no communication of the kind between the traitor and the fugitive. When the ministers and a good many followers

of the Amir returned from Turkistan, they told us that he, the Amir, instead of having the slightest hope or thought of the good offices of Haji Khan in delaying the march of the English, did not only throw loads of abuse on his head, whenever his name was mentioned, but concluded that he will do all to facilitate the means of his being overtaken. He therefore became more alarmed, and precipitated his advance from Hunai to Gardan Divar, bearing the diseased Mohammed Akbar Khan in a litter, and leaving his family with the Navab to follow him. At night the Hazarahs stole about twenty horses of the Amir, which reduced the number of his confidential attendants considerably. The party of Colonel Outram arrived at last in Bamian, while the Amir Dost Mohammed Khan had succeeded to get into Aqrabad long before the arrival of his pursuers. He then went to Saighan, and next morning to Qilai Sar-i-Sang, which was still in the possession of the people of the ex-Amir; and now at length he found himself out of the reach of the British officers and Haji Khan, whom I shall leave here for the present.

In Qilai Sar-i-Sang, Mohammed Ali Beg, the Uzbeg chief, waited upon the Amir Dost Mo-

hammed Khan, and presenting him with a beautiful horse, he gave his son as hostage to the Amir. In return, he requested the Amir to give him the charge of the abovementioned fort, and promised to deliver it to the Vali of Khulam if he and the Amir did ever ask for it. The Amir accepted his terms; and while the son of Mohammed Beg, who was left as hostage, was marching with him towards Khulam, Farhad Beg, the rival of his father, shot him dead on horseback. The Amir was met on the road by all the Uzbeg chiefs, Sufi Beg, Qalich Ali Beg, and Mir Baba Beg, who paid him every consideration; and meanwhile he arrived in Khulam. Here the Mir Vali allotted the best apartments for the residence of the Afghan guests; and soon after they all assembled in the tent of the Sardar Mohammed Akbar Khan, to consult about what course should be most advantageously adopted for the future good of the Amir and of his family. The Sardar stated that the best thing for them would be to go to Persia; on which the Vali promised to escort them all safely to Shibarghan and Hazarahjat.

In the meantime the Amir Dost Mohammed Khan dispatched his own peshkhidmat, named Mohammed

Azim, towards Maimanah, to bring him the intelligence of that road to Persia; and deputed Mirza Sami Khan to the Amir or King of Bokhara, to request the favour of his Majesty to allow him to remain in Balkh; and himself, with the Mir Vali, set out for Qunduz, to co-operate with the Mir Mohammed Morad Beg in suppressing the tumultuous Uzbegs, as requested by that chieftain. The Amir settled the affairs of the Qunduz chief, who of course paid him a sum of money to defray the expenses of his journey, and consequently the Amir returned to Khulam. Mirza Sami Khan, with the agent of the King, returned from Bokhara, and communicated to the Amir that his Majesty thinks it impossible that the chiefs of Qunduz, Khulam, or the revenues of Balkh, should be able to maintain the followers of the Amir; and that if he comes personally to Bokhara, he will not only be treated with distinction, but will receive military assistance to enable him to recover his country. However pleasing this intelligence was to the Amir, yet nothing was resolved; for one day he thought it better to accept the offer of the King, but various fears gave him reason to put it off; while on another

day, when the thoughts of better fortune entered his mind, he fancied going over to Persia. During these speculations grain began to be scarce in Khulam; and the Amir again called Mohammed Akbar Khan, the Navab, Mirza Sami Khan, and the Vali, and asked their opinion for his guidance. The former persevered in his advice of going to Persia, while the latter suggested the propriety of waiting upon the King of Bokhara. Mirza Sami Khan stated that although he did not hear any thing unsatisfactory from the lips of the Uzbeg monarch, yet his minister Nur Mohammed Bi mentioned to him that the sovereignty of Kabul has been restored to its hereditary royal master, and that the Amir Dost Mohammed Khan ruled only as an usurper. He would advise, therefore, that he should wait in patience till affairs appear to take a favourable turn. Nayab Abdul Samad, added the Mirza, mentioned that the King of Bokhara will not have reliance on the fidelity of the Afghans, unless the Amir comes into Bokhara with his family. The Navab Jabbar Khan, in junction with the Vali, and the Peshkhidmat Mohammed Azim, suggested the almost insurmountable difficulties of the road to Persia, which was already impassable

on account of the snow; and allowing the chance of the fears which were afforded by the reports of the Mirza, he advised the Amir to go to the Uzbeg king. At last, however, the Amir Dost Mohammed Khan determined upon going to Bokhara. And now the question of the expenses of the road demanded and occupied the Amir's attention; on which the Sardar Mohammed Akbar Khan gave him about fourteen thousand rupees, and the Vali six thousand on mortgage of the jewels. He thereupon left his family in Khulam, and set out with all his sons and the Navab towards the Oxus. In Balkh, the Governor received the ex-chief of Kabul with honour, and gave him five hundred out of one thousand tilas.* The Navab had remained behind in Mazar, and did not join the Amir for three days, when he plainly refused to accompany him. The Amir left Balkh; and all the way to and in Qarshi, Nur Mohammed Bi provided him with all the necessaries of life. At Qaraval, the principal officers of the Bokhara court came to receive the Amir, and requested him, on the part of the King, to proceed at once with his mounted retinue into the presence of his Majesty.

* Gold coin of Bokhara, fifteen shillings each.

The Afghan guest agreed to this; and after paying his respects to the King, returned with his sons and followers to the quarters assigned for his residence. During five days' dinner all the luxuries of the court were sent to the Afghans from the royal kitchen; and on the sixth his Majesty sent a person named Mirza Khan to the Amir, and inquired by him what were his wishes, saying that, if possible, they shall be gained for him. Dost Mohammed Khan sent reply that he does not expect anything from the King, but the royal aid to regain his authority, which has been snatched away from him by the enemies of their mutual religion (namely, by the English). In return to this, the Amir was told that he should recover first from his fatigue; and as the winter was fast approaching, he would do well to keep about two hundred men only with himself, and the rest of his followers should be divided into small numbers, so as to reside in the villages, where, in this manner, they will be all lodged; and that in the summer his case shall be taken into the royal consideration. The Amir was also requested to send for his family from Khulam. On this all the members of the Afghan party assembled, and the Amir stated to

them the message of the King, with his own opinion that its adoption would be a hazardous step. All of them replied, that as they were now in a foreign country, and in the hands of the foreigners, it would be better to act on their guidance. While the Amir was about to inform the King of the result of his decision, Qazi Badruddin stepped into his presence, and on hearing the circumstances of the assembly, he dissuaded the Amir from taking any advice of the kind from the King, adding, that if once his family was in the power of the Uzbegs, and his followers divided into separate and small parties, the Afghans will be reduced into worse slavery than the Qizalbashes. The Amir, finding trust in the soundness of the Qazi's sentiment, sent word to his Majesty that he had come to Bokhara in the hope of better fortune; that if the King was desirous to show his liberality to the Afghans, he begs to have some land on the other side of the river towards Balkh, to maintain himself with his family; and that otherwise he wants permission to proceed on his pilgrimage.

The King of Bokhara replied to the Amir Dost Mohammed Khan, that since he had come into his court, he would do better to act as he is advised;

and that if he insists on being dismissed, he is at liberty to go wherever he likes. The Afghans prepared to start for Mecca; and the Court appointed some of the Uzbegs to see them soon out of the city. The night was passed in tents outside of the gates; and in the morning another party of the Uzbegs was sent with the message that they are to break up from the ground immediately, and take the route of Khiva, and not of Charju. This perplexed the Afghans, who sent a petition through Mohammed Afzal Khan and Abdul Ghani, stating that none of them will pass alive through the waterless deserts of Khiva; and therefore they hope that the King will pardon them for the offence which they give him by refusing to act on his advice. His Majesty allowed them again to return to Bokhara, but ceased from showing them the former hospitality. The meal of food from the royal kitchen was now stopped; and a very trifling sum in cash was paid to the Amir for maintaining himself.

In the meantime the Amir Dost Mohammed Khan selected two of his best horses, with about ten fine swords and a few daggers, and sent them through his son Mohammed Amin Khan for the acceptance of the

Amir-ul-momnin, as the king was called. In return five dresses of honour were sent by his Majesty, with the message, that Mohammed Afzal Khan was forthwith to fetch the Amir's family from Khulam. Mohammed Akbar Khan did not approve of the going of his elder brother, on which the "Badshah" of Bokhara desired them to send any of the confidential Afghans. This concerned very much the whole party; and the Sardar Mohammed Akbar Khan, after consulting with his brothers, resolved to steal their way towards Shahar-i-Sabz. The Amir being informed of the flight of his sons, immediately informed the King of the circumstance, and requested him to effect their return. Orders were accordingly issued in all parts of the kingdom; and the sons of the Amir, unfortunately losing the road, came near Qarshi, where they found two shepherds, one of whom undertook to lead them in the right way, and the other went and reported the affair to Nur Mohammed Bi, the governor of Qarshi. He started immediately with the ruler of Chiraghchi, and about 3000 horsemen, and overtook the Afghans very near to the boundary of Shahar-i-Sabz. He sent them a message that their leaving Bokhara

without the permission of the Badshah was an insult to his authority, and degrading to the character of their father, who was still in the city; and he would therefore advise them to return. The Sardar Mohammed Akbar Khan and his brothers promised to go with him if he will allow them to rest and to halt for the night. This was agreed to by Nur Mohammed Bi, who provided them with all the necessaries of life. At night the Afghans held a council of war; and in the morning, after arming and mounting themselves, they rushed into the lines of their pursuers the Uzbegs, and there ensued then a hard fight, in which many of the Uzbegs were killed. At the close of the contest the Afghans became exhausted, and destitute of ammunition, on which the Uzbegs attacked and killed about fifteen of them, with Samandar Khan, and made the rest, with Akbar, prisoners. All their property and horses were plundered; and the Governor of Qarshi, agreeably to his commands from the throne, sent all of them to Bokhara, where his Majesty ordered them to live with their father the Amir. Not long time had passed after this, when the Badshah again requested the Amir either to leave his

kingdom, or to send for his family. The answer returned was this,—"The Navab Jabbar Khan has the charge of the whole family, and I do not think that the Navab will pay attention to even my request, with regard to sending them to Bokhara." The Badshah said, if the Amir consents to write a letter and to send a confidential servant with it, he will not blame him if the Navab Jabbar Khan does not act upon his command. Husain Khan Shah Samand was entrusted with the letters to Khulam, to whom the Amir secretly said, that he was to tell the Navab that he should not lose time in taking off his family anywhere out of the reach of the Uzbegs. The King of Bokhara, by the same opportunity, wrote letters to the Vali of Khulam, and to the Mir of Qanduz, to facilitate the departure of the family of the Amir Dost Mohammed Khan from their territory. Ghanichah, the agent of the King of Bokhara, accompanied Husain Khan Shah Samand to Khulam, where he was rebuked by the Navab and the rulers for the ill behaviour of his employer towards the Amir. He returned therefore without obtaining the object of his mission, and the Badshah, incensed at this, ordered the Amir

Dost Mohammed Khan to quit Bokhara with his retinue, and issued commands to provide him with every thing necessary on the road to Charju. Here the "Mahram" * of the king desired the Amir and his sons and relatives to occupy one boat to cross the Oxus, while his servants were said to be about to follow him afterwards. To this plan, however, he did not agree, and while the matter was in discussion, one of the boatmen desired the Mahram, in the Turkish language, to quit the boat,—which the Amir Dost Mohammed Khan understood, and instantly jumped out of the vessel, and rode his horse back to Bokhara. He was thus saved from being drowned in the river, which the king had faithlessly contrived and had wished to be his fate. On his arrival in the city, he informed the king of the reason of his return, and he, after some delay, ordered him to occupy his former apartments, stating that he plainly saw that an Afghan chief was afraid to travel in Turkistan. No food nor servants, as usual, were sent for three days to the Amir Dost Mohammed Khan, who at last applied to his Majesty for his daily expenses. The Badshah sent a message to say that there was

* Confidential, or literally, familiar attendant.

no necessity for maintaining two hundred followers, and that the Amir had better keep only thirty of them. In the meantime Nayab Abdul Samad secretly informed the Amir that he had spoiled all his prospects by his own conduct, which made him the more perplexed in his mind. He then proposed his desire to marry his daughter with the king, who accepted it, and Abdul Ghani and Mohammed Azim Khan were ordered to go to Khulam and bring the daughter of the Amir for marriage. Mohammed Amin, Sharif, Azim, and Sherjan Khan, the four younger sons of the Amir, also got permission to join their mother at Khulam; and Mirza Imam Vardi made himself appear to be insane, and thus secured his release, and Mustaufi Abdul Razzaq also obtained leave and followed him.

Now the Amir Dost Mohammed Khan was removed to another house, and during a few days he was well treated. In the meantime the manners of the Uzbegs now waiting upon him excited some suspicion of the evil intention of the king, in the mind of the Amir. When the Mirza Sami Khan was brought from a separate residence to live with the Amir, and the Mustaufi ordered back from the way to Khulam, it

increased the apprehension of the Afghan chiefs, who thought that they were collected for the purpose of being massacred. They were only permitted to make their prayers in the mosque; and one day some of the people who were engaged in the prayers made their heads bare and prayed for the good fortune of the Amir, which was reported to the king. His Majesty was incensed as well as alarmed by the partiality of the people towards the Amir, and therefore gave orders that they are to discharge their religious functions inside of the house, and never should go out of the doors. Now the Amir Dost Mohammed Khan, with his sons Mohammed Akbar, Afzal Khan, and his minister, was a regular prisoner.

CHAPTER XVII.

Occurrences at Kabul—Disaffection—Expedition against Pusht—Extracts from various correspondence—Dost Mohammed Khan escapes from Bokhara—Takes up arms—Is defeated by Col. Dennie—Movements of Sir R. Sale—The ex-Amir is again defeated—He surrenders himself to Sir W. Macnaghten—Increasing discontent.

HAVING pursued the course of the ex-chief till his confinement by the barbarous King of Bokhara, it would not be improper to mention the occurrences which took place in Kabul during the period of his imprisonment, till he surrendered himself to Sir William Macnaghten.

On the return of Colonel Outram from Bamian, Haji Khan was accused of his deliberate treachery in causing the escape of the Amir Dost Mohammed Khan. I have said that I do not doubt the grounds which Colonel Outram had for suspecting his fidelity, but I say it was not then the proper time for punishing the treacherous. In the first place, it was utterly far from policy to expect good service from Haji Khan

on such a critical point as the pursuit of the Amir Dost Mohammed Khan, after every one of us had expressed our conviction of his duplicity in remaining behind till the fortress of Ghazni was stormed and taken. In the second place, I cannot see how wisdom could dictate to place confidence in one whom we had induced to betray his former master of twenty years.

Whatever the faults of Haji Khan Kakar were, it was very impolitic to punish him. He was three months ago nominated Nasir-ul-daulah, with a considerable salary; and now we made him a prisoner, and banished him to India. We gained no good by all this, but rather we shook the confidence of many other chiefs. Immediately when his fate was known in the capital of Afghanistan, Aziz Khan, the principal chief of the eastern Ghilzais, fled from Kabul, fearing that he might be forced to share the fate of Haji Khan; and Yar Mohammed Khan, the Vazir of Hirat (as it will be observed by the official extracts), called us the "faithless dogs" in the presence of Major Todd, the British Envoy, alluding to the case of Haji Khan. Sir Claude Wade was in the meantime directed to conciliate the Aziz Khan Ghilzai

chief, and endeavour to restore confidence enough to induce him to wait upon the Shah and the Envoy. He had great difficulty to efface from his mind the suspicion and fear which had been already implanted in his heart by the example of our treatment of Haji Khan, yet at length he succeeded in persuading him to meet the expectations of the Kabul Government. He gave him letters of recommendation, pledging his word for honourable treatment, in addition to the reward he was promised; but very little attention was paid by us to his stipulation.

I have particularly stated the just and sound reasons which led the Earl of Auckland to place an allied sovereign on the throne of Kabul, and the judicious measures which dictated his policy in that crisis, and which ended in the successful termination of his enterprise. If mistakes or wrongs, whether arising from the pride of power, or from the misunderstandings or the jealousies of the parties invested with chief authority, were committed on the acquisition of the objects of the Governor-General, this cannot with impartiality be attached to the originator of that enterprise. The object of the Governor-General was to annihilate the Russian and Persian

influence and intrigues in Afghanistan, both at that time and for all time to come, unless they adopt open measures; and this object he fortunately and completely attained in a manner worthy of the British name, and laudable to himself as a statesman. If he had not taken these open measures, disasters and outbreaks would have soon appeared in the very heart of India. The only mistakes which his lordship committed during the whole Afghanistan affair were on these two points of the gravest importance,—one, in appointing two such talented men as Sir William Macnaghten and Sir Alexander Burnes to act at the same time in one field of honour; and the second was that, on hearing of the outbreak at Kabul, he delayed in insisting upon the Commander-in-Chief to order an immediate dispatch of the troops towards Peshavar, as was judiciously advised by Mr. Clerk. Though this outbreak had nothing to do with the line of policy which the Governor-General had adopted in the origin, and was caused by the most extraordinary circumstances of quite a contrary nature, which I shall hereafter describe; yet, he being the superior head of the Government, he ought not to allow hesitation to ap-

proach and to embarrass his sound judgment at the crisis when immediate and energetic attention was required. But the motive for not doing so was that his lordship had already made every arrangement to retire from the Indian government, and therefore did not wish to prolong the time for his departure by embarking in other and new operations. I shall therefore leave this matter here, and proceed to tell the causes of our triumph, without opposition from the people or chiefs of Afghanistan, men who in customs and in religion were perfectly different from us.

Firstly. The inhabitants of Afghanistan, whether the Durranis, Tajaks, or partly the Persians, are by nature habituated to and fond of the vicissitudes of times; and thus, in consequence of the tranquillity established by the iron rod, not the popularity of their ruler, and the destruction of the ringleaders of every description caused by the Amir Dost Mohammed Khan, they became tired of his government.

Secondly. The Amir had confiscated the estates of all the Durranis; and the authority of the districts and towns was entrusted to his personal adherents; and those who suffered thereby were always desirous to see his government overthrown.

Thirdly. His force, which in a great proportion consisted of cavalry, was discontented in consequence of their small pay, and the long journeys which they were sometimes obliged to make under great personal fatigue and expense.

Fourthly. The Amir had deprived the Navab Mohammed Zaman Khan, his uncle, of the Jalalabad country, and had given it in charge to the Sardar Mohammed Akbar Khan, his own son. He had behaved in the same manner with his nephew, the Sardar Shamshuddin Khan, the ruler of Ghazni, and appointed his second son, the Sardar Gholam Haidar Khan, as ruler in this stronghold of Afghanistan.

Fifthly. The Navab Jabbar Khan, the elder brother (but step-brother) of the Amir, was deprived by him of the government of the Ghilzai country, which had compelled the Navab to pursue a hostile course towards him, and to become a willing friend of the English.

Sixthly. The Amir had killed and had caused the murder of many rebellious chiefs of Kohistan; and therefore their survivors were always anxious to co-operate with those who may seek for his ruin.

Seventhly. The poor as well as the men of busi-

ness were harassed by being employed without pay, or with very little wages from the Amir Dost Mohammed Khan.

Eighthly. The merchants of all descriptions on various occasions, and especially in the time of any internal or external demand for military aid, were forced to lend large sums of money, which were scarcely repaid by the Amir.

Ninthly. The Amir was also disliked for fixing several unjust demands for revenues upon the land, in addition to what his servants, when abroad on duty, gained as food from the cultivators by the use of force, and paid no value for it.

Tenthly. The allowances of the Mullas, the Sayads, and the priests of all denominations, which were granted by the late sovereigns of Afghanistan, were in some instances forfeited, and in others reduced.

Eleventhly. The friendly correspondence and amicable intercourse which continued between the Amir Dost Mohammed Khan and Mohammed Shah of Persia, as well as the siege of Hirat by that monarch, stimulated the religious enthusiasm and hatred of the majority of the Afghans against his

conduct and policy, because his countrymen, being Sunnis by sect, were fatal and deadly enemies to the Shias of Persia.

Previous to my taking a view of the various points of policy and the line of conduct which we pursued after taking Kabul, a glance on the reasons of our popularity and esteem in Afghanistan would not be destitute of interest, because those manifold reasons, added to the discontented feelings of the Afghans against the Amír, formed a favourable instrument and occasion for our triumph.

Firstly. The golden days of the liberality of the mission of the Honourable Mountstuart Elphinstone were always in fresh remembrance with the inhabitants of Afghanistan; and as they are by nature the most avaricious of mankind, they entertained very high hopes of deriving emoluments from his countrymen, and thus they wished our influence established for some time in that country, for their own advantage.

Secondly. The city of Kabul in particular has always been involved in the mutual contest of the two parties, the Sunnis and Shias, and these two sects maintain religious animosity between themselves at all times, and the bloodshed of the one party is

considered a virtue by the other. The English, on the contrary, were none of them; and being free from their religious prejudices, were inclined to act only as impartial mediators, endeavouring to annihilate this evil. The Shias, being themselves foreigners in Afghanistan, liked the foreigners (the English) more than the Sunnis, and they always stood high as men of the sword amongst the latter.

Thirdly. The chiefs of the country entertained an opinion that if they were to render service to the British, their descendants from generation to generation will derive benefit from this service; and thus we had gained their good opinion very effectually.

Fourthly. The merchants and the people of the lower class, such as the cultivators of the land, &c., were desirous to see our authority established in Afghanistan; because the former suffered much under the Amir Dost Mohammed Khan, through the heavy duties which he imposed; and the latter suffered also in extortions of every kind.

Fifthly. There were also a few men of rank in the country, who, being moved by vanity, and proud of the well-known superiority of their blood, were jealous of the usurpers (the Amir, &c.), and zealous

to serve us under the name of their long-exiled but legal monarch; and therefore thus they caused disunion against the Barakzai chiefs on our approach to Afghanistan.

Under the above-mentioned circumstances, which had made the populace of Afghanistan the desperate foes of the Barakzais upon one hand, and had made the English more popular on the other hand, there appeared no evident sign of discontent, nor of such resistance or commotions as would require an immediate recourse to arms. Undoubtedly we alone held possession of Kabul, but in the meantime its ruler was not in our hands, and there was therefore sufficient reason for apprehension that as long as he, or any of his sons, was at liberty, and a fugitive on our northern frontiers, there would be no difficulty for the people of Kabul to invite him whenever we give them any annoyance by our conduct. Notwithstanding all these points of grave concern, we sent a large portion of the army back with Lord Keane to India, and yet we interfered in the administration of the country, and introduced such reforms amongst the obstinate Afghans just on our arrival, as even in India, the quietest part of the

world, Lords Clive and Wellesley had hesitated to do but slowly, and to extend them over many years.

Captains Taylor and Trevor, with some other officers, were appointed nominally to act under the Shah, and to enlist Afghan forces; and all the chiefs were desired to give "San," that is, to pass with their mounted followers for inspection, under the eyes of the above-mentioned officers, who discarded the unfit, and enlisted the fit ones as servants of the Durrani states. All those who were gained by Sir Claude Wade on his advance upon Kabul with the Shah Zadah, and all those chiefs whom we had secured to our interest during our progress to, and residence in, Kabul, had of course the strong testimonials from us, and were therefore entered into the service. Here we committed another fatal error, knowingly, I may say, in that we did not till then at once reduce the number of their followers, but allowed them to be enrolled on that occasion, and after a few months began to show them signs of our further intentions in dismissing them, which they reasonably attributed to our deliberate treachery.

All the principal towns on the frontiers of Afghanistan were now placed under the administration of

the officers of the Shah, while our political assistants to the Envoy were everywhere watching their conduct, and interfering in the jurisdiction of the country; and yet as this interference was not open, it did no good to the people, while it caused a disregard for the local authorities of the kingdom.

The more we found the people quiet, the more steps we took in shaking off their confidence. We neither took the reins of government in our own hands, nor did we give them in full powers into the hands of the Shah Shuja-ul-Mulk. Inwardly or secretly we interfered in all transactions, contrary to the terms of our own engagement with the Shah; and outwardly we wore the mask of neutrality. In this manner we gave annoyance to the king upon the one hand, and disappointment to the people upon the other.

The Shah Shuja-ul-Mulk began to become jealous of our power, and of the influence which he thought we were daily gaining for our own benefit, contrary to treaty, and to suspect that all the people looked upon us as the sovereigns of the land. We did indeed give a kind reception to some of the heads of the tribes, but this was merely temporary, to ensure

the stability of the Shah's kingdom, and to provide for ourselves some means of cure or of safety against any internal commotions in future. It is sad to state, however, that all our liberalities were showered upon intriguing men of low birth, and not upon the chiefs of high estimation, who would have stood by us in time of need.

Akhund Mulla Shakur, an old sharer of the misfortunes of the Shah, was the head manager of the affairs of government, commonly called Vazir, but neither we nor the Shah ever allowed him to assume that title. Having passed all the former part of his life in exile with the king at Lodianah, where he had only to distribute about 4000 rupees *per mensem* amongst the dependents of his Majesty, little good might have been expected from such a manager in the administration of the kingdom. He had no relation to claim his aid and attention; and whatever money he gained by public or private means he added to the coffers of the Shah, and he was therefore in great favour and confidence with the king. Mulla Shakur was however very old, and totally unfit to occupy this high post. He had lost his memory to such an extent that he could not recog-

nise a person whom he had well known before, if he had not seen him even for a day; but he had perfectly understood the real meaning of our treaty with the king, and by it he knew that we had no right in the administration of the country, and therefore our position was not favourably looked on by him nor by the Shah. Mulla Shakur appointed Sher Mohammed and Daya Ram as his deputies,—men too well known for tyranny and unjust principles. Sir Alexander Burnes introduced a system for the reduction of duties on all articles of commerce, which undoubtedly grew thence more prosperous; but the men of Mulla Shakur treated those alterations slightingly, and took from the merchants more than was fixed by us. Every day complaints were made to us, and we permitted ourselves to interfere by giving notes to the complainants, requesting the Mulla to settle their cases; but this did no good, for instead of having redress to their grievances they were beaten, and sometimes confined, for coming and complaining to us against the Shah's authority. All the chiefs or heads of tribes received their allowances from certain villages, by obtaining an order from Mulla Shakur. If there was any man among

them known to us, and whom we would wish to favour, the Mulla took care to annoy and vex him by giving him an order to a distant village for such sums, which he would likely spend during his journey, or else to poor villages, where there was very little chance of gaining anything. Gholam Khan Popalzai, whose services and melancholy death I have already mentioned, was appointed, by our advice, to settle some disputes in Charkar. Mulla Shakur, whether by himself or with the consent of the Shah, sent criers to notify in the streets that Gholam Khan, being a protégé of the infidel English, was (himself) an infidel, and acting for the ruin of the Shah, and of the faithful of the country. In a very short time, it became manifest that the Mulla was not acting to our satisfaction;—whether he acted to the satisfaction of his own master or not is another question. He was now trying to form a party in favour of the king separately from us, with the view to make his Majesty entirely independent of our support. Instead of acting wisely on such a critical subject, he made use of such foolish sentiments as afforded a good opportunity for the chiefs and intriguers to play their own

cards. Instead of telling the people that the Shah was an independent sovereign, and, being an ally of the British, was protected by the British troops, which will retire on the settlement of the country, he said to the people that the Shah looks upon us as the violators of the treaty by keeping the force in the country; interfering with the business thereof, and inducing the people to go to us for favour. He added that, as soon as the family of the Shah had arrived in Kabul from Lodianah, His Majesty will be quite fearless of our injury, and then, by the assistance of his faithful subjects, the followers of "Islam," he will take the reins of government into his own hands, will reward his friends and punish his enemies. Such expressions of Mulla Shakur gave an excuse to the bigoted malcontents to look upon us and the Shah as disunited, and, in fact, they considered him to be our slave by necessity. The priests, therefore, omitted the performance of the usual ceremony of reciting the "Khutbah" with the name of king, after the prayers in the mosque. We had indeed heard this privately, and now Mulla Shakur waited upon us and informed us of the circumstance, in the show and manner as if he had no

concern with the affair, nor any knowledge of the reason of it. He added that the priests, according to the Mahomedan faith, cannot recite the Khutbah for any one but an independent sovereign, while the Shah under our arms cannot be recognised in that position. Mulla Shakur, by such ruinous absurdity, did not really exert himself to put a stop to such insolence of the priests, because he had two objects in view.

In the first place, he wished to excite the religious hatred of the Musalmans against us, and by allowing such thoughts to pass quietly, he meant to show the natives of the country that though the omission of the oration or Khutbah was an insult to the king, yet being faithful himself, he would not urge the Mullas to read it, since it was contrary to their law to do so during our occupation of the country.

In the second place, he thought that our interference in such matters would involve us in great difficulties and even in religious warfare; and that if we were to bear such disrespect of the people with toleration, we shall of course be looked at as more weak than it is politic for us to appear.

Soon after this, another occasion of disorder and

confusion was caused in the city by our disagreeing with Mulla Shakur on the subject of grain. In this affair, I may say, he was right, and we were wrong; and the wrong we then did hastened our ruin in that country. The purchase made by our Commissariat officers of grain from the various parts of the country raised the price too high and placed it utterly beyond the means of the population in general. The landlords, knowing the advantage of the sale at such a price, keeping only as much as would meet their own immediate demand, used to send all their produce to our camp, without selling the smallest quantity to the poor in the country or in the towns. Grass for cattle, meat and vegetables, and in short all the necessaries of life, rose to a considerable price, and the cry of starvation was universal, and there were very many hardly able to procure a piece of bread even by begging in the streets, while every thing would have been in abundance but for our purchase. Mulla Shakur in the first instance gave orders, by beating the drum, that if any one shall either sell articles necessary for subsistence higher than the fixed price, or store up the grain more than is necessary for the consumption of

his family, shall suffer a severe penalty. To this notification of the Government of the Shah, there was no attention paid at all. The necessaries of life continued to rise higher in value, and the poor to suffer more than before, and Sir Alexander Burnes was obliged to order the distribution of about one thousand loaves of bread amongst the poor, who assembled in throngs around his house. Mulla Shakur was now compelled to adopt such measures as are usual in Afghanistan, by seizing the shopkeepers and forcing them to sell the grain at a moderate price. All of them were well aware that we will interfere in this determination of the Mulla, and will prevent him from forcing the sellers to conform to orders; and thus, therefore, shut up their shops and ceasing to dispose of anything for sale, they came in throngs to complain to us. I was ordered to wait upon Mulla Shakur, and to request him to release the traders, who, in fact, had taken the advantage of our interference, with the deliberate intention of starving the people in general, and of filling up their own pockets, while they sold the grain very dear. The result of our stopping the Mulla from executing his plans in cheapening the grain was

that there appeared a universal cry throughout the whole kingdom that we are killing the people by starvation. As a natural consequence of this, all of them became tired of our presence in the country; and at length they joined and swelled the number of the rebellious. After the outbreak of Kabul, when I was concealed in the Persian quarters, I heard both the men and the women saying that the English enriched the grain and the grass sellers, &c., while they reduced the chiefs to poverty, and killed the poor by starvation.

Whenever any article rose high in price in the time of the Amir Dost Mohammed Khan, he used to make it cheap by forcing the traders to sell cheaper, as Mulla Shakur attempted to do on this occasion, but we unwisely objected to his proceedings. The full force of power in a despotic country and among a reckless people is a law suited to the taste and habits of its inhabitants, and simple justice produces there most bitter fruits. We adhered to this mode of lenity in Afghanistan, and allowed the traders to sell provisions at their own price; but we thereby raised the indignation of the population while supporting the wicked principles of

a few, and in return we were turned out of the country. What Navab Jabbar Khan did on such occasions is not unworthy of mentioning here. During the disasters of 1842, when Mohammed Akbar Khan had gained the supreme power, and the rumour was spread that the British army was advancing upon Kabul, the grain began then to rise high in price. The traders ceased to sell anything to the people at low prices, having the prospect of much gain from us. The Navab sent for one man belonging to each of the different trades, as one butcher, one grass and grain seller, &c., and persuaded them to sell cheap, so as not to produce famine. They made an excuse, that their supply or store of grain is not in the vicinity, and that to bring it into the market requires a longer notice. The Navab gave no heed to such excuses, but ordered his men to pierce an iron nail through the corner of the trader's ear; and then in the case of the butcher, to fasten the point of it in the block of wood over which he used to hang the killed sheep in his shop. Thus he was forced to stand there for a whole day, passing a stream of blood from his ear; and the meat was next morning so cheap as to be within the reach

of all classes. Such was the example put upon all traders, and the effect was satisfactory. I confess, such punishment in a civilized country must be considered to exceed the crime, and barbarous; but in Afghanistan it annoyed only a few persons, and it did good to very many, for it gained both provisions for all, and the good-will of the people at large.

Another discussion ensued between us and Mulla Shakur, with respect to the wages of certain people in the employ of the Shah. Our engineer officers in building the cantonments employed the workmen at a much higher price than was usual, so that hundreds of the people of the country, leaving the plough in the field, ran to seek work in our cantonment. Mulla Shakur had orders to repair the gardens of the king, and could not get one man but on wages higher than we had promised to pay. The treasury of the Kabul government could not afford such payments; and the Mulla was therefore obliged to force the people to work in the garden of the Shah, and accept the regular wages of the country. This produced a clamour, and they came complaining to us. The Mulla was informed that if he does not satisfy the

people by payment, we shall open our treasury and pay them for the Shah.

However, our differences on all subjects with Mulla Shakur grew every day more and more. We submitted all his proceedings to the Shah Shuja-ul-Mulk, and requested him to dismiss the Mulla; but as he was adding to the private treasury of the Shah, and foolishly intriguing against us, His Majesty paid little attention to our warnings, and thought that we are desirous to lower his dignity by causing the dismissal of his minister, the old Mulla Shakur, while he himself was aware that if we put anything in order one day, the Mulla spoiled it again next day, even from spite.

The jealousy of the Shah Shuja-ul-Mulk grew stronger. He complained to Sir William Macnaghten against Colonel Dennie, who had taken up his quarters at the palace-yard in the absence of the Shah. He said that it was showing disrespect to his royal dignity by that officer's occupying that part of the palace. Such was the Afghan gratitude which the Shah felt for one of the bravest officers who had taken a prominent part in storming and subduing the fortress of Ghazni for him. A

king, moreover, who had lived for thirty years on the bounty of his countrymen, who freely shed their blood and spent their money in placing him on the throne; that he should consider his dignity lowered by the occupation of a room where formerly the sweepers lived!!* When the communication on this subject was made to Colonel Dennie, he most resolutely but justly replied, "that he declares before God that it shall be the Governor-General alone who shall turn him out." His Majesty also suggested the impropriety of our keeping ammunition and provisions in the Bala hisar, while the country was not perfectly tranquillized, and the Russian army was moving towards Khiva. He stated that it will reduce him to be the neighbour of the commissariat and ordnance officers. In this department no one showed a determined disposition like Colonel Dennie, and so the cellars were evacuated.

How unwisely we paid attention to such absurd ideas of the king! Had our commissariat stores

* What Sir Willoughby Cotton said on this occasion was this:—"In Persia, in Egypt, in Masqat, the greatest sovereigns allow the officers to occupy palaces; and Shah Shuja declares he will resign his throne if he be so insulted by the contamination of those men who bled for him, and placed him where he is!"

remained in the Bala hisar, where Captain Watt had judiciously placed them on the arrival of the army, how different would have been the circumstances during the insurrection, when our troops were starving in the cantonment! The Shah did not stop here, but pursued a jealous and unprincely course on all occasions. I shall notice one case here, though perfectly foreign to the subject of the book. During the mission of Sir Alexander Burnes to the Amir Dost Mohammed Khan, Qadirju, a Kashmirian musician, with his band, entered my service; and when our army advanced upon Kabul he reoccupied his situation under me. His musical instruments were always in my house; and, according to the custom of the country, no one asked his attendance without my permission. The Shah Shuja-ul-Mulk, having heard of their excellence in music, ordered them to wait upon His Majesty; but Qadirju remonstrated that he was in my service, and that his instruments were in my house. The king stated to the Envoy that I had kept the musical instrument by force in my house, although they belonged to His Majesty. The Envoy, on investigating the case, found that the musician was never in

the service of the king, and that the musical instruments were purposely made by my orders. He informed the Shah of the result of his investigation, saying that he could not force me to give them up to the king, even if I were his own private servant. However, after some time, when his minister called upon me, I made over the charge of the musician to him, for the satisfaction of the Shah; but this fairly shows how destitute his suggestion was of truth, and how easily accessible he was to jealousy. Another complaint he made of me to the Envoy was in consequence of my building a house, of which he became jealous, and thought that no one should have a good thing but himself. He made an excuse, and said that I had built such a high and large house, which overlooked all the neighbours; and that they have privately complained to him on account of their inconvenience. On this my neighbours made a petition, sealed and signed by all, stating that I had built the house with their permission, and that they look upon me as one of themselves, and had never thought of any inconvenience from my erecting the house. Here, again he was disappointed, or rather ashamed, through telling such stories which he could never prove.

There was now one general impression amongst us that the country was all quiet; but this idea soon began to be effaced. Colonel Herring, escorting the treasury from Qandhar, was murdered near Ghazni. Sayad Hashim rebelled, and disturbed the authority of the Shah Shuja-ul-Mulk, in the direction of Kunar. Major MacGregor, C. B., whose diplomatic talents and military skill will demand a prominent place in the account of the victorious garrison of Jelalabad, was appointed political agent in that place, and accompanied the expedition. All the troops of the Shah marched against the fort of Pushut, the residence of the refractory chief Sayad Hashim, excepting the brigadier; which exception was amusing enough, since a report stated that the said brigadier withdrew from mess because an officer spoke slightly of the Envoy in his presence, and refused to apologise to him when asked to do so. Colonel Orchard was appointed to lead the expedition, and the fort of the enemy did not fall in our hands so easily as was anticipated. These are the words of Sir William Macnaghten:—

"I have just heard from Major MacGregor. The forts are stronger than we were led to expect. The account is not

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so favourable as I could wish. The gate of Pushut resisted our powder-bags, and all our ammunition being expended, we were obliged to retire with a loss of forty or fifty killed and wounded. Collinson severely, and Hicks of the European regiment slightly wounded. Hashim has, I grieve to say, escaped, and taken with him eighty thousand rupees. The rain was sadly against us. The garrison evacuated during the night, and are gone God knows where."

While such disorder was prevailing at home, we were not altogether free from receiving the stirring news of the movements of Russia towards Khiva, and we aimed at political fame by recommending the military occupation of Balkh, and of the eastern banks of the Oxus, and thus establishing our influence in the kingdoms of Bokhara and Khavarazm to counteract the advance of Russia. Mr. Lord was appointed political agent on the north-west frontier of Afghanistan, and resided in Bamian, where he was negotiating with the Navab Jabbar Khan to deliver the family of the Amir Dost Mohammed Khan to us, and from whence he was the direct channel of communication with the chiefs of Turkistan. Sir Alexander Burnes coincided in these opinions; but the Earl of Auckland placed not much importance

on the movements of Russia, and considered it a most hazardous work to employ any force on the other side of Bamian. After a great deal of correspondence had passed between the Kabul authorities some time in favour and some time against the movement of our troops towards Turkistan, and the repeated intelligence of the Russian army, despatched by our news-writers in Bokhara and in Khiva, as well as the reports of Mohammed Husain Kashi (who was deputed to the King of Bokhara); Lord Auckland thought it advisable that a messenger should be sent to Khiva to examine the real state of affairs, and to find out the real object of the Russian expedition. We knew that the Amir Dost Mohammed Khan was nearer to Persia and Russia, though a prisoner, and we were aware that the Shah of Persia, under the advice of the Russian ambassador, had written to the King of Bokhara to release the Amir of Kabul; and that Major Todd, the envoy at Hirat, had discovered at last the duplicity of Yar Mohammed Khan Vazir. The latter had abused our government for faithlessness, called our officers "dogs," and had offered to tender Hirat to the Persian government, after we

had employed our engineers, spent thirty-six lakhs from our treasury, and exerted our skill in repairing and strengthening the fortifications, and in encouraging agriculture and commerce of the country. In short, Major Todd's mission to Hirat failed, and he also advised the military operations against Kam Ran, in which we all coincided, as well as the home authorities; but the Governor-General did not think it prudent to enter into an undertaking of such great magnitude; and at the same time he strictly observed the engagements of the tripartite treaty. Colonel Arthur Conolly, whose sad fate will be noticed together with the melancholy end of Colonel Stoddart, was the officer selected by Sir William Macnaghten to go to Khiva instead of a messenger. No better officer could be found to conduct political duties of such a nature than Colonel Arthur Conolly, who succeeded in forming a treaty with the Khan of Khiva.* Before his arrival in that country,

* The relation of the King of Bokhara had also come to the Envoy at Hirat, demanding the British aid against His Majesty; and if we had made a declaration on the part of Shah Shuja-ul-Mulk, without compromising the English government, there was a prospect of success in the release of Colonel Stoddart from the dungeon of that savage king. However, the policy of the time was not favourable to effect this step, which I must confess was a very dangerous one.

Lieutenant Shakespear (afterwards Sir Richmond Shakespear) was deputed by the Envoy at Hirat to the Khan of Khiva, and had wonderfully succeeded in obtaining the release of the Russian slaves. Yet the expedition of Russia, under General Petrowik, had created so much political discussion in our quarters, that Sir Alexander Burnes, who had once expressed that "no move of any kind, political or military, may take place beyond the passes," had now volunteered to proceed to the general's camp if he were invested with full powers. But again the Governor-General hesitated in sanctioning such measures, which he wisely considered would lend our political influence far from our support, and at the same time make us a close neighbour with Russia. It would be highly interesting if I were to quote the extracts of some correspondence which took place between the authorities of that day.

From Mr. Lord.

"I have received Sir William Macnaghten's official, and your private reply to my propositions of sending in the troops to Khulam.

"Meanwhile, that I am not to have the advantage which would arise from the immediate execution of it, both in getting me into the country and Dost Mohammed out of it."

From Sir Alexander Burnes.

"I have just received your very interesting letter of the 13th, with its enclosure, an extract from the Governor-General's letter regarding the designs of Russia. I now feel somewhat at ease since his Lordship has become cognizant of the real state of affairs on our frontier, as we shall no longer be acting on a blind reliance that the expedition to Khiva was small, and would be unsuccessful, when it is an army composed of the *élite* of their empire, and has made good its lodgment in the Delta of the Oxus. After the Punic faith which Russia has exhibited, I confess I was astonished to see Lord Clanricarde put trust in what Count Nesselrode told him on the strength of the Russian force, and you may rely on it that we are better judges of what Russia is doing in Turkistan, than our ambassador at Saint Petersburg; and I hope the correctness of all our information from first to last will now lead to implicit reliance being hereafter placed upon it. One correspondent may exaggerate and distort; but it is not in the nature of falsehood to be consistent: and of inconsistency we have none, the cry being that Russia has entered Turkistan with the design of setting up her influence there, and that (whether her ruler or ministers admit it or not) her object is to disturb us in Afghanistan. European intelligence confirms all this; and with a policy peculiarly her own, Russia has for the present left the Turkish question to be settled by England and France, and even in her generosity agreed to open the Black Sea.

"Firmly impressed with these views they torture all my thoughts and opinions; and, in consequence, lead me to hope that our every nerve will be strained to consolidate Afghanistan, and that no move of any kind, political or military, may take place beyond the passes. Had we force sufficient the occupation of Balkh might not be a bad military move, and one which would, in truth, show an imposing attitude. * * * The attitude of the Sikhs towards us is that of undisguised hostility, and on both our front and rear we have cause for deep reflection—I will not say alarm, for I do not admit it; we have only to play the good game we have begun, and exhibit Shah Shuja as the real King, to triumph over our difficulties. * * *

"I regarded * * * deputation to Khiva as the most unhappy step taken during the campaign: * * * it places us in a position far more equivocal than Russia was placed in by Vikovich being here. We had no ground of complaint against Dost Mohammed (till he joined our enemies), and two great European powers merely wished for his friendship; * * * * * * but release her slaves and have done with her. Does he remember that Russia has extensive trade passing through Khiva, and that the proclamation of war declares that the object of the expedition is to protect the merchants? Is England to become security for barbarous hordes, some thousands of miles from her frontier? If not, * * * * such promises or speeches must compromise us.

"I observe you proceed on the supposition that Russia

wants only her slaves released; but this is one of her demands only; and instead of our language, therefore, being permanent on that head that we insist on her relief, it means nothing, for Captain Abbott tells us that the Khan had offered to release them all; and I know that the King of Bokhara has made a treaty to that effect, and acts, too, upon it, for Captain Abbott likewise confirms the information frequently reported. * * * We have, in consequence, I think, no business in Khiva, and, however much we may wish it, none in Bokhara. The remaining state is Kokan; and we shall now state the probable good of a connexion with it.

"In my letter to Colonel A. Conolly, I enclosed some 'observations on sending the mission to Khiva:' but I did not then discuss the policy of the thing; I merely, in reply to Colonel Conolly's request for hints, pointed out the difficulties of the road and communication when there.

* * * * *

For the chances are that Russia will at once march on Balkh to assert her just position, as she calls it, in Central Asia; and then, indeed, the Governor-General's surmises will be proved; it will give measures to all surrounding states, and add difficulty to the game which we have to play. But one very serious obstacle to all interference with Turkistan has apparently been overlooked. Russia is not engaged alone in the enterprise; she has her ally of Persia in too, and ambassadors who seek the release of the Persian slaves. Are we prepared to insist on this, and reconstruct

the whole fabric of society by marching back some two or three hundred thousand slaves? If not, our proceedings are neither consonant with humility nor the rights of nations. * * *

"I have been thus earnest on these very momentous questions, from the anxiety which I have to see our cause flourish, and our good name preserved. It is not the question of Mr. Lord or Colonel Conolly going; that is a mere trifle, which does not call for a moment's consideration.

* * * * *

Let us crown the passes; let an engineer forthwith be sent to map them; and let grain (as you have just proposed) be stored behind them at Bamian. Let alarm be allayed by our not appearing to stir over, for Kabul is the place for the coup de main, and not Bamian, which should be its outwork, and as such, strengthened. * * * We have our agent detained in Bokhara; for Colonel Stoddart's captivity reflects seriously upon our character and damages it here: while in Kokan I see possibly good likely to flourish, even from the most splendid success attending the agent, and on the contrary, much chance of evil.

"I sent off your letter to Mr. Lord, and yours to Major Todd is now being despatched. I shall keep Nicolson fully informed of the proceedings of the Ghilzais.

"I am in constant correspondence with Sir James Carnac himself, and your views are almost on all points my own. The Governor-General and his private secretary are, it seems, resolved on giving no credence to the Russian attack

on Khiva, in spite of all your and my letters. This short-sightedness is distressing.

"I have just got your long official, and the private letter accompanying. The latter, stripped of the two last sheets, has gone on with the official. You ask me what I think of the latter. I can say in truth that it is a very clear and convincing document; but you will not move the Envoy or his Lordship at all. Lord Auckland must see that it is his duty to counteract Russia either from this or Europe; and he leaves the ministers at home to work. I must confess that I should like to see Balkh and the country south of the Oxus restored to Shah Shuja; but when Russia is in the field, if we are not able to render them to his dominions by force, the less we do in that quarter the better; and to this conclusion you seem to have come, from the papers which I have now received. Lord Auckland took a step in sending an army into this country contrary to his own judgment. * * * All the dispatches plainly prove this. * * * The Envoy sees that Russia is coming on; that Hirat is not what it ought to have been—ours; and his dawning experience tells him, that, if not for us, it is against us. What says Lord Auckland?—'I do not agree with you; Yar Mohammed is to be conciliated. Russia is friendly to England, and I do not credit her advance on us, though she may have an expedition against Khiva. I wonder,' adds his Lordship to the Envoy, 'that you should countenance attack on Hirat, contrary to treaty; that you should seek for more troops in Afghan-

istan; it is your duty to rid Afghanistan of troops;' all very fine. * * *

"I find my yesterday's letter did not go on account of snow. I have just had long letters from Sir W. Macnaghten, with three sheets from the Governor-General.

" His Lordship mentions yourself, and I quote the passage through, 'not authorised to prevent you saying more. Mr. Lord's letters are a little mild, and he appears to me to be too restless. It was clearly out of the question that any of the regular troops at Kabul should be sent to him. You will restrain him from pushing too rashly forward. Upon this point however I much rely upon your judgment, for I am far from able to decide where occupation should end and the exercise of peaceful influence begin.' This latter sentiment will please you much, and show you what might be done to meet your wishes, if the Envoy wish. But at present I am even a conservative as to movements beyond Bamian, *i. e.* we will not set our house right at Hirat, and with Russia in the field and Dost Mohammed not dissolved. What we should do requires great caution. I am, however, of your opinion that Russia should have one side of the Oxus and we the other; but I would not be in too great a hurry, but to Balkh I would ultimately go."

While these signs of discontent were attracting our attention in Afghanistan, we were suddenly informed of the escape of the Amir Dost Mohammed Khan from Bokhara. This was effected in the most

extraordinary mode, and for such tact the early life of the Amir has always been signalized. The king of Persia rebuked the Bokhara ambassador for the harsh conduct of his master to the Amir of Kabul, on which the king took him out from the prison and lodged him in the house of the daughter of Shah Zaman, and fixed five hundred tankas * for him as monthly expenses. He was allowed to take exercise in riding, and to make his prayers in the mosque, without any personal guard, but was entrusted to the care of one of the priests or Sahabzadahs from Sarhind. In the mean time, his eldest son, the Sardar Mohammed Afzal, became an invalid; and after the king had given him permission to join his family, he was stopped on his way for some days, and then allowed again to start at the earnest request of his father. After this, the Amir lost no time in contriving his own escape. After discharging the evening prayers in the mosque, he assembled Mohammed Akbar Khan, Sultan Jan, and Alahvardi, and consulted with them on schemes of escape. He said, to flee in one body and together would be an unwise thing, while it would be better that

* Twenty-two tankas make fourteen or fifteen shillings.

Mohammed Akbar, with Sultan Jan and a guide, should take the Andkho road, and he himself with Alah Vardi and one guide should flee towards Shahar Sabz; and in this manner, if one party is overtaken by the pursuers, the other one is sure of success in the enterprise. The Amir set out accordingly, but unfortunately, by traversing a long, circuitous, and wrong road, he tired and killed his horse. Yet then he luckily met a caravan on the road, and was provided with a camel, bearing baskets on both sides; and in these baskets the Amir and his companion placed themselves, under the pretence of indisposition. In Chiraghchi, the servants of the Bokhara government, being previously informed of the escape of the Amir from the city, suspected his being in the caravan. They examined every camel basket, but could not discover him, since he had cunningly coloured his silver beard with ink, which he found by himself on the occasion, and the informer was punished by the officers for bringing them into ridicule with his false report. Mohammed Akbar Khan and Sultan Jan were still in Bokhara, and the Amir, by a providential escape, arrived at Takyah, in the suburbs of the Shahar Sabz. Here

he sent for Kabir Khan, a merchant, who provided him with clothes, on which the Amir sent information of his arrival to the Mir of that place. The latter, accompanied with about a thousand horsemen, came to receive the Amir Dost Mohammed Khan, and conducted him with all possible honour to his princely apartments; and now he was free from the fear of the Bokhara tyrant. The ruler of Shahar Sabz however soon received a letter from the king of Bokhara, desiring him not to allow the Amir to go towards Khulam, at least if he will not send him back to the Badshah; but he replied that his custom was to pay every attention and respect to a guest, while those of his Majesty are contrary, and that he shall therefore do what will be suitable to the Amir Dost Mohammed Khan.

After resting there a few days, the Amir Dost Mohammed Khan quitted the Shahar Sabz, escorted by a large body of horse, and the ruler presented him with a beautiful charger, with a sword, and with money for the expenses of the road. Passing by the town of Hisar, he safely crossed the Oxus, where Yahabeg the boatman brought dinner for the Amir. The Vali of Khulam came to receive him, and was

delighted to see him again in his country. In Khulam, both of these chiefs, in conjunction with many other adherents, held councils as to the future proceedings of the Amir. He proposed to disturb our tranquillity, and try to recover his lost government in Kabul; and the Vali was promised to be his vazir. The latter chief had not succeeded in having his affairs settled with us to his satisfaction before, and he now thought that his co-operation with the Amir at this time will induce our policy to meet his wishes; and he therefore collected money, horses, and auxiliary forces from the chiefs of Mazar and Qunduz and marched towards Bamian; and the Mir Baba beg, the chief of Haibak, being our friend against his brother the Vali of Khulam, was dispossessed of his place by the united force of the Amir and the Vali. It is well to state here, that the family of the Amir Dost Mohammed Khan, with the Navab Jabbar Khan, was in our hands, and the son of Mir Vali was in attendance upon the Shah and the Envoy. Yet these ties had no power either on the Uzbeg or Afghan mind; for they knew that the British rules will neither permit us nor the Shah to ill-treat their relations for their advancing against us. At this

time affairs were indeed of a more seriously alarming nature than ever was known before in Afghanistan. The chiefs and the people of the country, being disappointed by our fruitless promises, were desirous to see us involved in difficulties;—disturbances were brisk in Kohistan, and no favourable tidings sent from Hirat, Kalat, and Bajaur. Yet the well known activity and prudence of Major MacGregor, the Political Agent, had in the meantime settled everything favourably in the latter direction.

The affairs in Kohistan demanded the immediate attention of our authorities; and we began now to suspect almost every one for intriguing with the Amir Dost Mohammed Khan, and for being ready to join the Kohistanis in their attack on the city. There were, indeed, many people innocent of any such intention; yet our own fault making our conscience uneasy gave us a strong reason to fear and doubt every one. Haji Dost Mohammed Khan of Garm Sail, Agha Husain, Mulla Rashid, Nayab Amir, Mahmoud Khan Bayat, with many other chiefs, were now placed in custody, and Hafizji was sent as a prisoner to India, and thence to Mecca. These our measures in some respects put a check upon intrigues in

certain quarters; but on the other hand many individuals of consequence lost their confidence in us. The people in Kohistan were the warmest and stoutest friends of the Shah and of the English in July, 1839; and they were now reckoned our enemies, in consequence of the judicious measures of Gholam Khan Popalzai, who had purchased them with money and with promises of reward; for in both of these they were disappointed by us on gaining the possession of Kabul. In this district, as I said before, the poor people were discontented, because of oppression; while those of rank were intriguing in consequence of our neglecting their privileges.

On the 30th of August the Sardar Mohammed Afzal Khan, eldest son of the Amir Dost Mohammed Khan, came with five hundred horsemen to attack our post at Bajgah, and was driven off. Information reached us the same evening that the Amir was in great force on this side of Haibak; on which Captain Rattray, with the Janbazes, fell back upon Saighan. All our outposts were now left to the Amir; and even Saighan was evacuated, leaving a good deal of private property for the use of the enemy. All our troops were now in Bamian, from

whence one company* of the Afghan regiment, raised by Captain Hopkins, went over to the Amir, and the rest were disarmed and ordered to go back to Kabul.† On the 7th of September the brave Colonel Dennie left Kabul to reinforce Bamian; and on the 18th the Amir attacked a fort dependent upon Kabul. It was now ascertained that the allied forces of the Amir and of the Vali were more in number than had been stated previously; and Colonel Dennie did not think it prudent to wait for aid from Kabul nor yet to retire: and so he at once charged and drove the enemy from their position. The cavalry, consisting of Captain Anderson's horse Janbazes, and of Mr. Lord's and Captain Conolly's escort, spread in every direction, and cut off great numbers of the fugitive Uzbegs; and no mercy was shown to the deserters of Captain Hopkins's regiment. The Amir Dost Mohammed Khan, with his son and the Vali, had a very narrow escape, after losing about six hundred men in the field of battle, and leaving all

* Headed by Salah Mohammed, who in 1842 changed sides and gave up the British prisoners.

† Amir Khan, brother of our pensioner Abdulrashid, also followed their example.

their tents and stores behind for our possession. Colonel Dennie moved on to Saighan, but the fugitives were so precipitate in their flight that it was considered not prudent to pursue them any further.

On the 28th the Vali of Khulam sent an agent to our political agent, Mr. Lord, and accepted the proposed offers. The Amir was refused any further assistance by the Uzbeg chiefs, and Mohammed Afzal Khan, having fortunately met the men of a caravan of Bokhara, levied the customary duties, and thus obtained about a thousand rupees to provide his routed father with a few necessary things. In the meantime the spirit of rebellion and of insurrection in Kohistan grew daily more and more restless. Shah Zadah Taimur, with a few hundreds of the Afghans, was sent towards that district; and Captain Edward Conolly was attached to his Highness. The royal person, without the British troops, was not considered to throw any weight on the people of Kohistan, nor to ensure their respect; and therefore Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, together with two native regiments under Sir Robert Sale, was ordered to follow the Shah Zadah, and Sir Alexander Burnes and myself accom-

panied it as political agent to negotiate with the rebels.

Sultan Mohammed Khan, a steadfast adherent of the Amir Dost Mohammed Khan, was at this crisis in Nijrav, and was exhorting the Kohistanis to espouse his cause; and did not lose a moment to dispatch a paper, signed and sealed by a good many chiefs of that district, inviting the Amir into that quarter. The Amir, after being routed by Colonel Dennie, had no hopes whatever from the Uzbegs, and therefore was glad to take advantage of this invitation, as well as of our unfavourable state of things; and he was also informed of our forces moving to Kohistan, and meeting opposition in every direction. After a few long and most tiresome marches he arrived in the valley of Ghorband, through Qilai Surkh, but was deserted by Sultan Hazarah, at the head of about seven hundred foot, although the Amir had only one day before presented him with a handsome horse, ornamented with silver trappings.

On the 29th of September Sir Robert Sale surrounded the forts of Ali Khan, who was in special or close communication with the Amir Dost Mohammed

Khan, and was an active person in exciting the rebellion. He had taken a very strong position in the fort, and on the heights which commanded it, as well as the suburbs, and resisted our troops with vigour for a short time. At length, however, the fort was deserted by Ali Khan, and destroyed by our troops. In this warfare of Tutamdrah we suffered a severe loss by the death of Captain Edward Conolly. Notwithstanding his political duty, and merely to see the fun, as he called it, he wished to be in the battle, and thus had volunteered himself to be the aide-de-camp of the general; and while he was galloping his horse on the advance of the troops towards the fort was shot through the heart, and he was then brought in a litter, and placed by me under the tree. This was indeed a heart-rending sight to me, since I was on terms of most intimate familiarity with him, and with his brothers, all men of noble character and benevolent disposition.

The Shah Shuja-ul-Mulk had sent Munsur Khan Chaus Bashi, an officer of the court, to co-operate with us in gaining the notice and favour of the people, as well as all necessary information. The Shah had also asked the Envoy to supply him with

cash wherewith to corrupt the adherents of the rebels: but it was stated at that time, that his Majesty added much out of that sum to the stores in his own treasury; and it is certain that the Chaus Bashi did us harm rather than good. He advised the rebels to resist us a little, in order to show Afghan bravery, and then to go straight seeking the pardon and reward from the Shah. Sir Alexander Burnes objected to such measures, and pointed out to the Envoy the injury that must arise from employing various channels of intercourse in gaining over the enemies.

Gholam Khan Popalzai, zealous as usual, had considerately rendered us the most valuable services during this crisis. He brought over and persuaded many influential chiefs, as Khojah Khanje and Khojah Abdul Khaliq, to tender their submission to us; and settled that Mir Misjadi Khan was to go the next day to Kabul, and to take refuge in the mausoleum of Taimur Shah, and thence to proceed to wait upon the Shah and the Envoy, as he was afraid to come to our camp. Sir Alexander Burnes agreed to this plan; yet at night, contrary to the previous arrangements, and without the knowledge of Gholam

Khan, the Afghan chiefs, with the Shah Zadah, were excited by us to go and invest the stronghold of Julgah, the residence of Mir Misjadi Khan; and on the 3rd of October, early in the morning, we marched, regardless of the entreaties of Gholam Khan, and besieged Julgah. He suggested and urged the impropriety of the measure, which will never restore confidence in the Mir Misjadi Khan; but we lent no ear to his solicitations, and thus we made the Mir our enemy for ever. The walls of the Julgah were exceedingly strong, and our guns made no practicable breach.

The storming party, consisting of five companies of Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, as well as detachments of Indian infantry, under their respective officers, was commanded by Lieut.-Colonel Tronson, who led it up to the walls with the most determined bravery. The conduct of the troops, under the heavy and close fire of the enemy, was conspicuous; but the breach being not practicable to ascend, the troops were compelled to retire. At night Mir Misjadi Khan, who was severely wounded, opened the gate of the fort, and stole his escape, to our bitter disappointment, towards the valley of

Nijrav. If we had taken due caution to prevent the chance of his flight, and had placed proper guards around the fort, he never would have succeeded in getting away so quietly. The fort of Julgah was then destroyed, and we remained there for a few days to receive the submission of the other chiefs; and we gave the charge of Julgah to Khojah Padshah, the rival of Mir Misjadi Khan.

On the 8th of October the troops marched to Chakar, anticipating to meet the Amir Dost Mohammed Khan in his coming out from the valley of Ghorband near Tutamdrah. In the meantime information was received of the departure of the Amir to Nijrav, and the rumours were in circulation that he still keeps himself with his followers (who had now surrounded his standard to a considerable number) along the skirt of the mountains, and purposes to join the rebels of Kahdrah and of Baba Qushqar, and then to fall upon the city of Kabul. Desertion now commenced to show itself among the native troops, and on the 14th a whole company of Lieutenant Moul's Kohistanis went over to the Amir Dost Mohammed Khan; yet under all these circumstances, we moved and pitched our camp near Qarabagh on the 15th of

October. In the neighbourhood the fort of Boaba Qushqar, which was considered a very strong one, was in possession of another rebel chief, the Mir Darvesh Khan, who, in consequence of the earnest supplications of the mother of Madad Khan, one of the sisters of the Amir Dost Mohammed Khan, had espoused the cause of the latter. This lady was equally conspicuous in intrigues as her brother the Amir was. I was informed by her own adherents, that since the attack of her brother upon Bamian, and his defeat there, she has been day and night paying visits to the chiefs in Kohistan, producing the Holy Qoran before them, tying knot at their garment,* and thus securing their co-operations in behalf of her brother. Knowing this, I addressed a letter to the Mir Darvesh, on the ground of my former acquaintance with him, advising him to put away all rebellious thoughts from his mind, and to acknowledge the authority of the Shah. His reply was, that he was not a rebel, but that he feared to wait upon us or the Shah, as his enemies had im-

* This is a great token of humiliation in imploring mercy and support amongst the Afghans, which by the national rule cannot be refused.

planted evil suspicions of his conduct in our mind. He added, that if we will use our force against him, he will shut himself up in the fort, which is much stronger than that of Julga, which we could not take after a whole day's battering; and therefore that he will there fight to the last, and not be so mean as to stoop before the enemies of his religion. On this the forces moved with the intention to fight; but it was soon discovered by the reconnoitring party under Colonel Sanders, that the Mir Darvesh Khan had fled, and thus the fort of Baba Qushqar fell into our possession, and we blew it up immediately.

There was another rebel in Kahdrah who had been exceedingly insolent in his language towards us and the Shah, writing in letters that he was stimulated by the sweet thirst for martyrdom, to do all he can to kill us the infidels, or to fall in battle by our foul hands. All negotiations failed on this occasion, and recourse to arms was considered necessary. It was a very dark night when the Kahdrah chief Milak Saifuddin Khan attacked the front and rear of our camp with about five hundred men, but caused no injury of consequence; and on the 21st, our troops advanced in three divisions, and got possession of that

place reckoned by him impregnable. Saifuddin Khan, with his family and adherents, escaped to the mountains, and we destroyed the town of Kahdrah with flames of fire.

On the 22nd, the troops under Sir Robert Sale encamped at aq-Sara-i, commanding the road to Kabul, and thus impeded the progress of the Amir Dost Mohammed Khan, if he was attempting a surprise in that quarter.

Leaving Nijrav, the Amir arrived at Durnamah on the 28th, and on the next day the Shah Zadah Taimur, with our camp, moved in the direction to meet him, and halted at Bagh-i-alam. He was now at the head of about five thousand, but as he was gradually and cautiously descending the hills and approaching the capital, he was securing the assistance of other chiefs, by whose forts he passed, taking hostages and provisions during his march, till he reached the valley of Parvan. Sir Alexander Burnes and myself were actively engaged in detaching from him as much as we could the number of adherents. We sent our servants, natives of Kabul, with money into the different forts and villages; and by paying the people in small sums of money, we

deprived the Amir of gaining any additional number to his standard, which he had exhibited, under the pretence of maintaining a religious war. The rumour of our distributing money amongst the people in order to prevent their junction with the Amir, had circulated amongst his followers, and he appeared distrustful of their fidelity, and feared that they might seize or destroy his power in the hope of receiving a reward from us. However, on the morning of the 2nd of November,* we came in sight of the Amir Dost Mohammed Khan. The information was received of his endeavouring to retreat, on which Colonel Salter detached two squadrons of the 2nd cavalry, and resolved to intercept the fugitives; but it was said that these troops followed slowly, and paid no attention to the orders of that officer, who repeatedly, but in vain, cried out "Charge! charge!" The Amir took advantage of this disorderly state on our side, and drawing the sword, he with his followers fell upon our force and routed our cavalry.

* The very same day in the following year, *i. e.* 2nd of November, 1841, the insurrection took place in Kabul; Sir Alexander Burnes was murdered, and Mohammed Akbar headed the rebels at last.

Majors Ponsonby and Fraser were severely wounded, and Mr. Lord, the political agent, and Lieutenant Broadfoot and Adjutant Crispin, were killed. The two former of the killed officers had also volunteered to accompany the advance; and if they had not gone out, but had adhered to the rules of their own duty, they would not have been killed. The Amir Dost Mohammed Khan was seen on a charger, with a white turban, and a blue flag by his side, haranguing and cheering his men to attack us. Notwithstanding this confusion on our side, the Amir felt himself still overwhelmed by numerous difficulties, and in personal danger. The people employed by us were diminishing the number of his followers by the distribution of money among them, and the Amir knew that the Kohistanis around his person will not hesitate to shoot him if they were sure of the Shah's approbation and reward for that deed. He therefore was obliged to leave the field of battle without the knowledge of any of his followers, or even of his son, Mohammed Afzal Khan. About half an hour after his escape, the intelligence was brought to me by a person who had seen him passing through a village only four miles distant; but no

credence was placed on this report. In this case, we pitched our camp on the battle-field, and the insurgents crowned the tops of the hills. All night there was heard here and there the sound of firing; and the fall of our officers and the flight of the cavalry had produced a bad impression in the minds of the Afghans of the Shah Zadah. His Highness was so afraid that he sent for me at about ten o'clock at night, and represented the dangerous position he was in, and said that if he sees any signs of mutiny amongst the soldiers of his camp, or any of the chiefs going over to the Amir, he will come quietly to my tent. We also now felt the delicacy of our position, for all the forts in the rear were rebellious, and the mountains in front covered with the enemies. Sir Alexander Burnes prepared an official letter at three o'clock in the morning for Sir Robert Sale, advising him to march back upon Charkar, stating that we had withstood the Amir with bravery, notwithstanding our own disorders, and had pitched our camp on the ground lately occupied by the enemy; suggesting, however, that by remaining long here, we shall induce the countless swarms of people to pour down upon us from

all the different valleys opposite to us, while by taking the central position at Charkar, we will closely watch the movement of the Amir along the hills, on both sides, leading to Kabul. The general moved his force agreeably to the advice of Sir Alexander Burnes, and came to Charkar.

Repeated information of the movements of the Amir reached us, but they all differed from each other; and on the 4th of November, early in the morning, a letter from Sir William Macnaghten arrived, conveying the happy tidings of the surrender of the Amir Dost Mohammed Khan; and then all the authorities agreed that my information of the escape of the Amir just after the battle of Parvan was correct and authentic. The Amir, as I said previously, thought it safer not to trust himself any more to the Kohistanis; and therefore passing through Nijrav he came straight to Kabul with his friend the Sultan Mohammed Khan. It was in the evening of the 3rd of November, when Sir William Macnaghten was riding with two officers and deliberating on the sad contents of the report of the battle of Parvan, and on the uncertainty of the movements of the Amir, that one horseman galloped up and said

to him, "Are you Lord Sahab?"* "Yes," replied the Envoy. "Then," rejoined the Afghan, "I come to tell you that the Amir is arrived." "What Amir? Where is he?" "Dost Mohammed Khan," was the answer. After a minute the Amir appeared, and dismounted from his horse, and claimed the protection of the British Envoy. The Envoy took his arm, and conducted him with all respect to his own residence, where the Amir one year before held his court, swayed his country, and now surrendered his sword as a state-prisoner! Such are the decrees of fate!! However the Envoy, by the nobleness of his mind, begged the Amir to keep it; and Lady Macnaghten kindly sent for one of his wives, the daughter of Nazir Khair-ullah, who was still in Kabul, and, supplying her with everything necessary, conducted her to the presence of her long separated Lord—the Amir. The reception and the generosity of the Envoy delighted the Amir Dost Mohammed Khan beyond all limits, and he wrote letters to his sons, as Mohammed Afzal Khan, &c., to come to us, as he had surrendered and met every

* The Envoy by the natives of the country was addressed as Lat Sahab or Lord for respect.

kind consideration. After a few days, the necessary arrangements having been made, the Amir started for India, and all his family were escorted from Ghazni to join him at Peshavar.

Our position in the month of October, 1840, before the surrender of the Amir Dost Mohammed Khan, was a hundred times more dangerous than it was in October, or even on the 2nd of November, 1841. The whole of Kohistan was in rebellion, the people and chiefs being equally discontented by our not adhering to the engagements and promises we had made with them. Above all, the Amir Dost Mohammed Khan was personally encouraging and regulating the insurrection. What was then the reason that we encountered the surrounding difficulties with success on all sides? What was it that kept in order Abdullah Khan Achakzai, and the Amin Ullah Khan, and the tumultuous people, or Sunnis, of Kabul, even though we had imprisoned their priest Hafiz Ji? What was it then that procured success and maintained an honourable name for the British when our negotiations had failed at such a crisis? It was only the determined heroism and perfect skill of Sir Willoughby Cotton which

annihilated all the impending dangers that were ready to fall on our heads. His eyes, his ears, and his mind were directed on all sides, and attentive to what was going on in all places; and wherever the presence of his troops was considered to produce good, he was ready and active to effect such good most successfully. But alas! neither he nor any officer like Sir H. Smith or General Littler was in Kabul to preserve the British name from the stigma which the disasters of November, 1841, have stamped on the English character in Central Asia, and I may safely add, in India too.

As soon as we became free from anxiety and elated at the time on seizing and banishing the Amir Dost Mohammed Khan, we thought that we had nobody to disturb the peace of our mind any more for ever; but such peace was imaginary only, and perfectly at variance with the results which our own proceedings were sure to create. On the surrender of Dost Mohammed Khan a bag full of letters was found in the field of the Parvan battle, and among them were the letters generally from Sultan Mohammed Khan of Nijrav, and Saifuddim of Kahdrah, signed also and sealed by a hundred

persons more, inviting the Amir to protract the contest; promising to join his standard, and stating merely the names of some men of rank in the city who would also espouse his cause: and I received orders to translate these letters, the contents of which were undoubtedly offensive. On my part, however, I would have treated them as nothing, and even would never have confessed to having them in our possession after the Amir was in our hands; while the disclosure of them made the writers and the other parties concerned with them always fearful of our suspicions of them, and thus caused the loss of mutual confidence. To mention them at all served also to open a field for the vagabonds of Kabul; for it was universally known that we were in search of such letters as might show the intrigues of certain people. There were many such characters as would be ready to fabricate and to write such letters, in order to become our familiar associates for having produced them.

I forgot to mention in its proper place, that just at the time of the attack of the Amir Dost Mohammed Khan on Bamian, all of us had discovered a most singular proof of the existence of certain people who

had made it their profession to forge letters, in order to gain our bread and intimacy.

There was a very respectable person of Kohat, by the name of Sayad Ahmad Khan, in the service of Captain Edward Conolly; and this person reported to that officer an account of his seizing a messenger bearing a communication from the Sardar Sultan Mohammed Khan, or from the Sikhs to the address of the Navah Jabbar Khan, then residing in Kabul. He thought this a discovery of some great treasury, or of a plot against the English; and so the messenger was placed clandestinely in a house, and his letters submitted to the Envoy. They were translated: and they acknowledged the receipt of the letter from the Navab, and, coinciding with his opinion, requested him to raise disturbances in Kabul, while the Sardar Sultan Mohammed Khan, with the pecuniary aid from the Sikhs, would disturb the peace of Jellalabad, from the Bajaur side, and the Amir Dost Mohammed Khan was to threaten us at Bamian. Such letters were truly in plain meaning and understanding sufficient grounds to accuse and banish the Navab from the kingdom of Afghanistan, and such

appeared the intention of the authorities. Sir Alexander Burnes was consulted, and he desired the original letters to be produced. If I am not mistaken, there was Captain Johnson, paymaster of the Shah's force, with him; and I suggested to Sir Alexander Burnes that it would be desirable to send for the man who had charge of the letters. He came, and on my asking him the date of his arrival in Kabul, he mentioned a day which I pretended to say was not right; and to find out the truth, I added that I had a man in my room who had seen him two days before in Kabul, riding on horseback, in a fine dress; and that he was neither a messenger, nor could make a trip in such a short time to Peshavar and back here on the day he describes. This puzzled the man, and we offered him a reward of fifty rupees if he were to make the whole truth known to us. He at once said that if we promised a pardon to him, he would disclose the whole secret. We accordingly complied with his request; on which he stated that he was not a messenger, but the horseman of Sayad Mohammed, who wrote the letters, and gave them into his hands, and told him to appear as a messenger before Captain Conolly!!

This was reported to the Envoy, who, of course, ordered the forger to leave the Mission Compound; but no punishment was inflicted upon such a culprit, which might have served to stop all such ruinous intrigues hereafter. We all indeed allowed such things to go on smoothly, and this encouraged the writers continually.

Here were three more persons of the same character as Sayad Mohammed Khan, all of them known as an abandoned set of men. One, with the name of Shah Ji, became an agent of the Envoy; and another, named Mir Hasan, gained the favour of Sir Alexander Burnes for having acted in the same capacity; while a third, named Ahmad Khan, obtained our patronage by forging letters on the part of Nazir Khan Ullah and other men at Bokhara, and filling them with fabricated accounts concerning the movements of Russia and Colonel Stoddart, who was a prisoner at Bokhara.

Meanwhile Mulla Shakur was dismissed by the Shah at our repeated solicitations; and our recommendation for nominating Mohammed Usman Khan or Nizam-ul-daulah as a minister was forced upon the Shah in a great measure. This showed the

people in the country that the King had no power, and the new minister truly looked upon us as his patrons rather than upon His Majesty. Every evening he came to report to us what he had done during the day, and he executed our orders with more celerity and attention than those of the Shah Shuja-ul-mulk, whose minister he was appointed to be. Our choice fell upon him merely because he was a Sadozai; but certainly he possessed no abilities for administering a kingdom, having passed all his previous life as a subordinate servant of the Barakzais. Our selection of Mohammed Usman increased the jealousy of the Shah upon one hand, and the hatred of the chiefs of the country upon the other. His late father, Vafadar Khan, had been equally obnoxious to dislike in the employment of his capacities as his son was now; and the son was inclined to seek revenge against those noblemen who had taken part in the murder of his father, in the reign of Shah Zaman, and always to insult those who stood higher than himself, rather than to restore confidence for the public good. Mirza Imam Vardi, a great hypocrite, became his deputy, or under secretary, and his career in the service of the Barakzai chiefs

has always been stained with deeds proceeding from principles highly injurious to the welfare of the Government. He, along with Abdul Razzaq Khan, Mustaufi, and Sayad Husain Daftri, took advantage of the ignorance and inexperience of the new minister in the affairs of the realm, and thus enriched themselves by the unjust exercise of their influence. At the same time they were old servants of the Barakzai chiefs; and being the relations and friends of Mirza Sami Khan, the minister of the Amir Dost Mohammed Khan, they were endeavouring to excite confusion in the country in order to act against the new Sovereign. While Mohammed Usman Khan was proud of our protection, he did not care for the good or bad opinion of the people, nor for the satisfaction of the Shah, and the following is a remarkable instance of this fact. A Sayad, the spiritual guide of the Shah, was deprived of his land, which was attached by the minister to that of his own servant. He complained to the Shah, whose repeated injunctions could not induce the minister to restore to the Sayad what was his by right. He waited again upon the Shah, and on representing the result of his interview with the minister, the Shah told him

the truth in reply—that he had no power over his Vazir, and therefore that the Sayad should curse him, and not trouble the Shah any more, because he is no more a King, but a slave.

While the dissatisfaction of the Shah and the discontent of the chiefs and people became stronger, Nizam-ul-daulah, the minister, took care to bribe Shah Ji and Mir Hasan, the news-writers of the Envoy and of Sir Alexander Burnes; and they received a monthly sum for engaging to praise his administration and popularity.* In this manner the envoy was kept unacquainted with the proceedings of the Nizam-ul-daulah. Sir Alexander Burnes was also informed by me, by Nayab Sharif, and by many other persons of rank and trust, that such was the state of things; but he felt himself in an awkward position, and considered it impossible to cause the dismissal of one whose nomination he had with great pains so recently recommended, together with

* The circumstance which led us to know of the bribe received by our news-writers was curious. While the Shah, the Envoy, and the Minister were passing the winter in Jellalabad, Sir Alexander Burnes, being the resident in Kabul, received orders from the Governor General to examine the custom duties; and while reading over the items of expenditure, a sum appeared to be paid monthly to the Shah Ji.

causing the discharge of Mulla Shakur, the favourite of the King.

I cannot omit to express here my agreement in opinion with Sir James Hogg, M.P., now the Chairman of the East India Company, when he spoke in the House of Commons, alluding to the deplorable case of the Rajah of Satarah, "that paid agents are a curse to their employers and to the country." So Ahmed Khan Mandival or Biranjfrosh, Mir Hasan, and Shah Ji, have proved to be amid our ruin. Their names will appear on several occasions hereafter; but a glance at their history will not be entirely uninteresting here. I must say that they never gave me any reason whatever for private offence, and so I do not entertain the private resentment against them which persons unacquainted with the state of things might fancy.

Shah Ji was formerly in the service of the Barakzai chiefs in Peshavar, and having committed an offence, was obliged to take refuge and service under the government of the Amir of Kabul. Here he did some other mischief, and to avoid punishment he escaped to Peshavar, where the sons of the Qazi Mulla Hasan took him under their protection, and

put him in the employ of the Sardar Sayad Mohammed Khan. He continued in the mean time to furnish intelligence secretly to our news-writers in Kabul till the British army arrived in that country, and he then got an appointment under us, and became a corrupted supporter of the minister.

Mir Hassan, a Sayad by birth and Mufti by rank, was a person of a most bitter and degraded character. Every boy in Kabul knew that he was matchless in forging letters, seals, and lies. He was several times put in prison, and was once saved of his ears and beard through the applications of the good Navab Mohammed Zaman Khan, when the vigilant Dost Mohammed Khan found him guilty, and wished to deprive him of them.

Ahmad Khan Mandival, or Biranjfrosh (one of the rice-merchants, or sellers in the market), assumed a respectable surname, and wished to be called Mulla Ahmad Khan. He pretended to set himself up for a rich merchant, and as connected with the mercantile people of Bokhara. He was notorious in Kabul for lies and intrigues; yet he gained the favour of Sir Alexander Burnes by fabricating news, and enriched himself by the charges he made for ob-

taining information from Bokhara, and by the wages of the messengers.

Such were the characters of the individuals who stood high in our estimation, while the chiefs and persons of respectability were refused access into our presence.

Sir Alexander Burnes proposed a valuable paper regarding the administration of the government of Kabul, in which he recommended the introduction of reform in the military department. All the chiefs who were enlisted about a year ago with a certain reduced number of their followers, were now informed that they were to re-pass under the eyes of Captain Trevour, who will keep and discharge such of them as he shall think proper, and that they are hereafter to bear the name of "Hazarbashes," to live in tents and to be ready to start at a moment's notice. To this all the Durrani and the Persian chiefs objected; stating that they were not brought up to bear such reform, and that if we were determined to diminish the number of their retinue, they would bring with them only such a number for the inspection of Captain Trevour as we were inclined to allow each of them to maintain, as this would prevent dis-

grace to their character; for that otherwise our interference was sure to lower them in the eyes of their dependants. We, however, refused to them even this means of pacifying their feelings. All the chiefs, with much unwillingness, went with their followers for inspection to Captain Trevour, who regulated their number, and retained, and dismissed them as he liked. Each of the nobles, gnawing his beard and hanging his head with fury, left the residence of that officer, who, irritating the chiefs, employed any one without distinction, whether he was a vegetable seller or a soldier. Some of them, who still bore patiently this violent insult to their pride and feelings, were on several occasions reduced to suffer the harsh treatment and ill words which we sometimes use in our intercourse with the low class of people in India. Under all these just causes of offence and of indignation there were no bounds to the fury of the chiefs, and of the descendants of the old soldiers of the country. Abdullah Khan Achakzai, Mulla Momin took a prominent part in showing discontent against our reforms and against that officer, by whom they appeared to be introduced. Khan Shirin Khan repeatedly said to us that our reforms in the military

class of Afghanistan would involve us in fatal difficulties—that every one of the "Hazarbashes" would think himself independent of the chiefs, and in time of need would act according to his own plans, disobeying them without fear—and that thus the English officers, not acquainted with the custom of the country, would not know how to manage them; at least these officers would either be trifled with or be killed by them. This was too truly and really the case at the insurrection of Kabul and of Qandhar.

While we were making the nobles of the country our enemies by introducing these reforms, Mir Hasan, our news-writer, forged another letter on the part of the Sikh government to the address of the Amir Dost Mohammed Khan, and produced it to Sir Alexander Burnes, who received it of course as a matter of caution, and according to the existing custom of the time considered it to be a genuine document. Translations and copies were sent to the Government, and thus we were anxiously seeking for a rupture with the Lahaur government, but as we had not secured safety for ourselves in Kabul, we did not think it prudent to kindle a fire immediately in our rear. However the reward which Mir Hasan received

for this discovery of his own fabrication gave him ample encouragement to establish fresh claims upon our thirst for news of every kind.

After a few days he went to a Khatri merchant at Moradkhani, in the city, and demanded of him a sum of money, threatening to have him seized by us if he refused. When disappointed in regard to the money, he came with great pride, under the pretence of discovering a plot, and desired us to seize the merchant immediately, while in his shop. His plan was, that then he would go to the merchant's wife, pretending to be his friend, and would request her to deliver to him a bag of papers for her husband, and thus he would have all the papers before us. We had placed so much confidence in him, notwithstanding the unanimous reprobation of the public, that we desired the apprehension of the poor trader; on which Mir Hasan, with a bag full of forged letters in his pocket, entered the room of his house, where his wife saw him taking out the bag from his own pocket. Now Mir Hasan, himself a forger, discoverer, and our protegé, astonished the trader's wife by saying that her husband was an intriguer, and was therefore imprisoned by us. All the merchants came forward

as witnesses for the innocence of the victim of Mir Hasan, but we lent a deaf ear to them. In the bag were found numerous letters of the various chiefs conspiring against us, and some bearing the seal of Shah Shuja-ul-Mulk. Under the pretence of protecting the chiefs who were thus exposed, he managed, by his artifice, to snatch money from several of them, and thus also he kept them always fearful of our suspicion. The letters of the Shah were addressed to the various chiefs in the Kohistan, desiring them to rise up against us; but neither the style nor the handwriting gave reason to believe that they were authentic. On examination it appeared that the words which had formerly been in the paper were washed out and fresh ones had been replaced; but as we knew that neither the Shah was satisfied with our interference nor the chiefs with the failure of our promises, it became a matter of grave discussion whether they were really sent by His Majesty or were the production of the intrigues of Mir Hasan. However, they were shown to the king, who, either justly or unjustly, denied being ever concerned in them in any way. We gained no good by this exposure; we did not punish the doer of the evil, but

on the contrary we implanted distrust in the mind of the Shah; and the Khatri merchant was punished by being placed on the back of a donkey and proclaimed as an offender of the state.

In the mean time the Shah Shuja-ul-Mulk despatched Mansur Khan Chaus Bashi to Qandhar, stating to us that the Governor of that city, Mohammed Taqi Khan, had been negligent in his duties, and the Chaus Bashi was ordered to regulate his conduct. On his arrival at Qandhar he desired the governor to assemble the Durrani chiefs privately, because he had a Royal message to deliver to them. They appeared all in the assembly, on which the Chaus Bashi requested them to join in his plan, and to show signs of disturbance in the country, which would compel us to act agreeably to the wishes of the Shah, and suitably to the dignity of the chiefs. The governor, Mohammed Taqi Khan, considered himself our protegé, and having informed Major Rawlinson, the political agent, of the object of the mission of the Chaus Bashi, requested him to allow one of his confidential men to be concealed behind the screen in the house of the said governor, where he would call another assembly of the nobles to have the

repetition of the Shah's message from Mansur Khan. This was all managed wonderfully, and the whole proceedings were reported and laid before the king, who, like other Afghans, at once threw the whole blame, justly or unjustly, upon the Chaus Bashi, and denied having anything to do in the matter.

The Chaus Bashi, Mansur Khan, was ordered back to Kabul, where, at our urgent request, as well as to show his neutrality, the Shah Shuja-ul-Mulk blackened the face of his officer, mounted him on an ass, and ordered him to be conducted through all the streets. The cries of the criminal were—"He who will serve the Shah Shuja-ul-Mulk in confidence will suffer such penalty," meaning that whatever service he had performed was in pursuance of His Majesty's secret orders.

To give the substance of the discovered or forged letters of Mir Hasan would fill up the pages of these volumes; but the translation of the document supposed to be sent by the Lahaur government to the Amir Dost Mohammed Khan, when attacking Bamian, will at once show the fabrication of the whole proceedings by our protegés, Mir Hassan, Shah Ji, and Ahmed Khan.

Letter from the Lahaur Government to the Amir Dost Mohammed, intercepted or forged by Mir Hasan.

To Dost Mohammed, Mohammed Afzal, and Akbar Khan, Nau Nehal Singh, Sultan Mohammed Khan, and Sayad Mohammed Khan, from Lahaur, send their salam.

"YOUR letter mentioning your release from Bokhara and arrival at Khulam reached. They are much pleased thereat. The Sarkar has ordered me to write and say that he is your friend; rest satisfied. The Sarkar desires that you should send by Qasids all the intelligence you may wish; that he is on your side. The Sarkar has sent these things to you: 10,000 rs. hundi, 60 abrahs, 60 shawls, which Jewahire Singh will cause to be delivered to you secretly. The Sirkar says that you will be seized if you go to Kabul; you had better come to him. If you can get troops where you are, the Sarkar will send you (ferèman) lots of money by the Kohistan route. Any papers you may wish to send have them written by Raghu Shikarpuri, and send by Sultan Khan and Salem Khan. Have no fears for your family, we will send for them. Nau Nehal Singh says if you come towards Peshavar he will send Ayob's son to meet you. Bajaur and Runar have tendered their allegiance; everybody is with you. The Biloches of Kalat, the Talpurs and Kakars have all sent papers. The Sarkar is very kind to us. The Farangis have not more than five to seven thousand men altogether, and have disgusted all the country, which is with us.

Write constantly, for we day and night look for your letters. Now is the time for exertion. Be bold. Write us all the Turkistan news. Do not be alarmed about the Qajars; they too have sent letters. I will send you money through Kunar. Ata Mohammed does you great service here—be satisfied.

"13th Savan, 1897, Sammat, corresponding with
7th August, 1840.

"The Sarkar did not do anything for you when you went to Bokhara, though your letters reached; such shall not now be the case.*

(True translation. ALEX. BURNES.)"

To Lallu Mal, Javahare Singh's salam.

"I HAVE sent you 10,000 rs. and 60 shawls for Dost Mohammed Khan by a Qafila; get a receipt and send it to me. Be careful that no one discovers this. Send me intelligence of what force collects that I may send you money. Do not send by the Bamian but the Hindu Kush road and Charkar. Whatever the expense is, that is the road to be used.

"Savan Badi, 8th (22nd) August, 1897.

(True translation. ALEX. BURNES.)"

While in every direction we had unquestionable

* Every word and style of this is a plain fabrication of Mir Hasan, and never used in Panjab.

proofs of discord and malcontent, we now commenced to hasten the calamities by causing the adoption of economy in the kingdom of Afghanistan. Upon one hand we were sending the British troops back to India, and, on the other, raising low and petty persons into the corps of "Hazarbashes," namely, Kohistanis and Khaibaris; and neither would the British Government pay these new levies, nor could the revenues of the country, unless the allowances of the chiefs should be reduced: wherefore our policy and the advice of our appointed minister, Nizam-ul-daulah, dictated the adoption of the latter plan. The sum of two lakhs of rupees was considered necessary to be deducted from the allowances of the Ghilzais, the Mullas, the Durranis, and the other chiefs; and all the Afghans who were employed by Prince Taimur at Peshavar, on the guarantee of Sir Claude Wade, were turned out of the service; and this proposition caused a general disorder in the circle of the nobles. On this Nizam-ul-daulah advised us to force the discontented chiefs to subscribe a document to the King, binding themselves to perpetual fidelity, and never to enter into any intrigues, but to agree to the terms of the new system in the

Government, otherwise to leave the dominions of the Shah. To this the chiefs replied that they were servants of the state; and that it was not the custom of kings to mistrust their servants, and to demand a paper bond of this nature from them. On this we requested the Shah not to allow them to attend the court, and to send them orders to quit the country. They knew that the Shah was not willing to give them such disgraceful annoyance, and that it was Nizam-ul-daulah who, with the use of our influence, was at the bottom of such administration.

Under these circumstances the chiefs saw no remedy for their evils, and therefore they prepared and signed a paper as we had desired. After this the minister advised us to tell the noblemen that it was necessary to seek his satisfaction and approbation on every occasion, and this was another bitter stroke to their pride. The minister thus, instead of gaining their good will for the interest of the Government, was really actuated by old family differences to treat them with contempt. Amin Ullah Khan Logri was requested either to give up the chiefship of that district, or to increase the sum of the revenue paid by him. He then appointed his own son the go-

vernor of Jelalabad; and intending to nominate Mirza Imam Vardi under him, and to extend his influence by attaching the Ghilzai districts to Jelalabad, he presented a series of complaints, some just, and some partial and unjust, against Hamzah Khan, and at length succeeded in persuading us to cause the dismissal of that governor; and this also was perfectly against the wish of the Shah. Now, therefore, Hamzah Khan had also good reason to join those who had already been plotting against us.

These rumours of the disaffection of the chiefs under the Durrani regime were not slow in reaching the ears of Yar Mohammed Khan, the cunning vazir of Hirat. He wisely thought that the result of our proceedings in Kabul will be a general tumult, and he took the first step to show want of respect to our envoy, Major Todd, who was thus compelled to quit Hirat and come to Kabul; and this gave fresh encouragement to the designs of the malcontented personages of the capital.

Besides all these alarming occurrences in our administration, the state of the government in the city wore a fearful aspect. Whenever the chiefs or the poor had any complaint to make to the Shah,

even if access were obtained, the Shah, having no power to decide, referred the case to the minister; while the latter, by his natural vanity and selfish motives, was adding to their distresses. It was then represented to Sir Alexander Burnes, who was to tell them to wait upon his superior the Envoy, who having formed a good opinion of the Nizam-ul-daulah from the perusal of the news written by the corrupted Shah Ji, only disappointed their expectations by ordering them to seek justice from that minister. He, on the other hand, would not give them any relief, unless his avidity, jealousy, and old animosity against them were satisfied; and thus by disappointing them under the influence of these reasons, he was sure to tell them that he acts as advised by the Shah and by the British authorities, and thus people were lost in uncertainty about where to go and seek redress for their grievances.

One day, however, the noblemen waited upon the King in the Bala Hisar, and submitted their deplorable state to his Majesty, adding, that they are quite at a loss as to what would be the best course for them to adopt in order to secure their own good. The Shah, in the hope that some unpleasant dis-

turbance will induce us to seek his consultation and dependance upon the one hand, and show the chiefs that his Majesty was inclined to promote their interest on the other, replied that he was a King only by title and not by power, and that they cannot do any thing; meaning that they are cowardly, and cannot persevere so as to mount to the national honours of the Durrani kingdom ("Az roe shuma hech nameshavad, kenam qaum koned"). These were indeed sad and severe words of the Shah; and, in my opinion, though guilty of such unwise utterance of them, he had never anticipated that they will stimulate the chiefs to open rebellion, and that they will go so high as to be beyond his power to suppress. His object in speaking these imprudent words was to convince us of the unpopular character of the Nizam-ul-daulah, and of the bad policy of our reforms, and of our other measures; and that thus we shall be forced to give up all the affairs of state into the entire management of the Shah himself.

After the interview with the King the chiefs assembled at the end of September, 1841, and sealed an engagement written on the holy leaves of the Qoran, binding each other to rebel against the ex-

isting government, and thus to annihilate our influence in the country. One of the parties concerned in the plot called "Bacha-i Pahalvan," a neighbour of Nayab Mohammed Sharif Khan, came and informed me of the circumstances, adding, that if we wish he will go and seize the Qoran from the bearer who has it now to take it to certain chiefs in the country. I reported the whole circumstance to Sir Alexander Burnes, and Nayab Sharif persisted in giving him leave to gain this object; but he did not place any value on this discovery, which could at once show who were the chiefs inimical or friendly to us.

The eastern Ghilzais stopped our communications and disturbed the peace of the road between the city of Kabul and Jelalabad. They plundered the merchants near Tezin, and refused to acknowledge our orders to restore their property to them. On this a brigade, under Sir Robert Sale, was sent to punish them, and bravely succeeded in clearing off the pass of the Khurd Kabul. In consequence of Major Macgregor's absence with the Zurmat expedition I was ordered to go with Sir Robert Sale from the political department, and I executed the duties

entrusted to me till the return of that officer. On my return to Kabul the state of things and the spirit of the inhabitants seemed to threaten our stability, and gave ample reasons for alarm. It has been stated in many papers, and by many authorities, that neither Sir William Macnaghten nor Sir Alexander Burnes had information of the existing discontent and conspiracy of the chiefs; yet, on the contrary, the following quotations will fairly show that they were both well informed several months before; but that the pride of power, and the disunion of opinion caused by two able men acting in one field of notoriety, always prevented them from taking the necessary measures to meet the reverse. Sir Alexander Burnes's opinion about stirring, and being alert was, that this will show our alarm, and make things much worse; while on the other hand, being silent and treating these reports as nothing will show our unshaken intrepidity, and will be likely to produce favourable results. But this was not the time to speculate.

"My dear Burnes,

"I heard a report yesterday which I cannot believe, to the effect that Khan Shirin Khan is intriguing

with certain parties; yet it is certain that he is disaffected, as are many of the great men of these parts; and with Akbar Khan on the frontier, and determined, as I hear, not to come in, it might be just as well to watch the proceedings of these gentry; not that they could do much harm, but a row would be unpleasant. So pray keep the Sayad (Mir Hasan) on the alert.

"Yours sincerely,

17th July. "W. H. MACNAGHTEN."

From Sir Alexander Burnes.

"I WAS again called by the King in the afternoon. I see a deep-rooted jealousy against the Vazir (minister). Though he must and ought to be supported, I still think the King should be made more conversant with the passing affairs than he is.

"The King gave me at greater length his feeling and his sufferings. He said he had not a trustworthy man in his country;—that all were engaged in setting him against us, and us against him—that his enemies were allowed to continue in power—that the portion of his revenue set aside for him was not collected and paid—that his adherents were discontented—that he was kept under by us in all things, yet that they had not gone right;—that a pilgrimage to Mecca was his only alternative, and that at Lodianah he had had much power as compared with this part of his reign.

"More fighting still! when will this country be pacified?"

Another symptom of discord among the Shah's people was known during the night attack of the Ghilzais on Colonel Monteith's camp in the Khurd Kabul Pass. Mohammed Ali Khan, who had gone to co-operate with that officer on the part of the Shah, neither fired on the enemy before nor after the assailants were defeated, and forced back through his camp. The Khan was in consequence of this seized under our advice to the King.

After the victory of Khurd Kabul Sir Robert Sale was opposed by a larger body of the Ghilzais at Tezin, but the very brave bearing and wise negotiations of Major Macgregor made a peace for a short time, though there was still some annoyance experienced by our troops near Jagdalak. These little temporary patches of peace with the Ghilzais made us to hope for the cessation of further disturbances, especially as they were assured upon our granting them again the rank and allowances which they had formerly enjoyed, besides some reward from the British Government.

In the meantime a circular letter was secretly sent round to all the Durrani and Persian chiefs in the city and suburbs, falsely intimating to them an idea of our designs to seize and send them all to India with Sir William Macnaghten, who was about to proceed as governor to Bombay in the course of three days. The authors of this atrocious letter were afterwards proved to be Mirza Iman Vardi, Mulla Ahmad Khan, and Mir Hasan. The object of every one of these was to signalise himself as our friend during the outbreak, if we were able to maintain our part. The Mulla was also reported to have stated verbally the contents of this letter to Mirza Sayad Husain, Mohammed Husain (the son of the Dost's minister), Mirza Abdul Razaq Mustaufi, Mirza Ali Akbar, Mohammed Mirza Khan, Javan Sher, and Hasham Kah Frosh. These persons, in the habit of deriving advantage from the revolutions in the previous reigns, wrote the contents of the report of the Mulla; and these they distributed amid all the petty chiefs through their own confidential men, who without showing themselves to the chiefs, gave them into the hands of their servants at the door when the night was quite dark,

without waiting for a minute for the fear of being recognised and seized by any of the chiefs who might feel still favourably disposed towards us.

As the chiefs of all denominations were extremely distressed by the decrease of their allowances, and also vexed by the injurious conduct of the Nizam-ul-daulah, they were thunderstruck by the perusal of such vouchers, and with the idea of being banished from their native land. Under these painful thoughts, Abdullah Khan Achakzai, with his relatives, went to Amin Ullah Khan Logri, and, holding the Qoran in his hands, implored him to be their comrade in exciting a sedition in the city. When he had agreed to this, some other discontented chiefs, as Sikandar Khan, Abdul Salam Khan, Mir Afzal, Mir Ahmad Khan, Samad Khan, and Mohammed Husain Khan Arzbegi of Chandaul, Haji Ali and Hazar Khan Kotval, Mir Junaid, Mahmud Khan Bayat, Mohammed Azim Peshkhidmat, Nazir Ali Mohammed, Mir Aftab, Mirza Mir, Abdulrahim Mohtsib, Mir Mahbub, Mir Haji, Mir Said Khan, Mir Gholam Qadir, Agha Husain, Tabchibashi, relations of the Dost, sons of Mir Dad Khan Hotak, and Vali Mir Akhor, Akbar Khan Khabgahi, Abdulraihman

Usmanlu, were sent for into the house of the Ackzai chief. The whole of the party now solemnly entered into an engagement with each other, and determined to stand up against us. Some of them suggested that it would be a better plan to murder the Envoy on the road to visit the Shah; and others proposed that they should secretly set fire to our magazine in the cantonment; but Amin Ullah, in conjunction with Abdullah Khan Achakzai, considered this whole talk childish, and proposed that first of all they should attack the houses of Sir Alexander Burnes, of other officers, and myself, residents of the city; and this plan was admired and chosen by the rest of the party.

Before I commence the narrative of the insurrection, I feel compelled to touch on a subject which has so often been talked of, and believed in the circles of the high authorities both in Europe and in India. This is a most unjust and misrepresented accusation against Sir Alexander Burnes, for intriguing with the ladies of Abdullah Khan, the Achakzai chief. I know well that the exposure of the truth on this subject will cause the animosity of many persons towards me; but I feel assured that

the vindication of the character of that deceased officer in a just cause and that the performance of this duty will not cause that feeling in the impartial and pure mind. However, I shall not mention the names of the persons, and shall not hesitate to say how far Sir Alexander Burnes was to be blamed in this matter, which sadly terminated in the loss of his life on the fatal morning of the 2nd of November.

Abdullah Khan Ackzai could not bear the treatment we gave to the chiefs when they visited Sir Alexander Burnes. They were kept waiting for hours near the door-keeper, and then referred to me, as he did not like to see them, for fear of being supposed desirous of interfering with the business of the Envoy, as he notes himself in these words:—"I am hardly to be blamed, for I have no responsibility, and why should I work?" In the meantime our old friend Phokar Shikarpuri, a broker in Kabul, had some claim for debt against Abdullah Khan; and to show his own influence, he asked Sir Alexander Burnes to give him two of his attending servants (peons) to go with the message to the chief that he must pay immediately his debt. The Achakzai chief justly replied that his allowances and

followers are diminished, and that he cannot pay his creditor in one sum. Again the peons went with the broker with fresh orders that he must sell his horses to pay his debt, and not think to show himself a great man. They spoke to him with some sharp words and in an insolent tone, and of course no Afghan chief would bear insults, even though his head was placed in danger. Neither did Abdullah Khan forget the disgraceful conduct of the bearers and the tone of their message; nor did Sir Alexander Burnes drop from his memory that the Achakzai chief never waited upon him, nor acted as ordered; and hence it came that their misunderstanding grew daily stronger.

After a few days one of the favourite concubines of Abdullah Khan left his house, and took shelter in the house of a "Sahab Log"* residing between his house and the Chandaul. He could not get her back through polite applications to that officer, and he therefore sent his nephew to complain to Sir Alexander Burnes. He did not wish to write, but ordered one of his peons to go with the complainant, and restore the lady to him if she is there.

* All the English were addressed after this name.

On his approaching the house, she was concealed, and the gentleman of the house turned furious, and accused the Ackzai of a false complaint, notwithstanding they saw her running into the back room. They returned to Sir Alexander Burnes, who, instead of giving soft words to the sufferer, said angrily that he was making false accusations against "Sahab Log," and then turned him out of the presence.

Another case was similarly brought to the notice of our authorities. A gentleman who had taken up his quarters at the house of the Navab Jabbar Khan, won the heart of the favourite lady of his neighbour Nazir Ali Mohammed, and she, crossing the wall by the roof, came to him. The Nazir waited upon me, and I reported the circumstance to Sir Alexander Burnes while the defendant was breakfasting with him. He of course denied having ever seen the lady, on which the Nazir was dismissed, and I myself was always disliked from that day by that gentleman for reporting that fact. The Nazir then complained to the minister of the King, and he sent us a note demanding the restoration of the fair one. The constable saw her in the house, and gave his testimony to this as a witness; but Sir

Alexander Burnes took the part of his countryman, and gave no justice. One night the very same gentleman was coming from the Bala Hisar, and abused the constable for challenging him, and next day stated to Sir Alexander Burnes that he was very ill used, on which Sir Alexander Burnes got the man dismissed by the King. The lady was openly sheltered at the house of the same gentleman after some time, and came to India under the protection of his relatives. Nazir Ali Mohammed and the constable (Hazar Khan Kotval) never forgot these acts of injustice of Sir Alexander Burnes, and thus they were stimulated to join with Abdullah Khan Ackakzai, and to strike the first blow in revenging themselves on that officer.

A rich merchant of Nanchi, near the city, had two years previously fallen in love with a lady at Hirat, and after great pains and exorbitant expense he married her, and placed her under the protection of his relations while he went on to Bokhara to transact his commercial business. In the absence of the husband a European subordinate to the staff officer contrived her escape to his residence in the cantonment. The wretched man on hearing this

catastrophe left all his merchandise unsold, and hastened back to Kabul; and there were no bounds to his tears and melancholy. He complained to all the authorities, and offered a very large sum to the King to have his fair wife restored to him; but she was not given up. He at last sat at the door of Sir William Macnaghten, and declared that he had resolved to put an end to his own life by starvation. When that authority appeared partly determined to order the lady to be given to her lawful husband, she was secretly removed to a house in the city. Hereupon the Envoy appointed two of his orderly men to enter the house, and to give her into the charge of the plaintiff; but now the very officer who had offended Nazir Ali Mohammed and Hazar Khan Kotval came to Sir Alexander and begged him to pacify the Envoy, which he agreed to do. On this a sum of four hundred or five hundred rupees was offered to the husband if he will give up his claim to his wife; and Sir Alexander Burnes employed Nayab Sharif and Hayat Qaflahbashi to persuade the poor husband of the lady to accept these terms, stating that otherwise he will incur the displeasure of that authority. The poor man had no

remedy but to fly to Turkishtan, without taking the above mentioned sum. When her paramour was killed during the retreat of our forces from Kabul, she was also murdered by the Ghazis, with the remnant of our soldiers who had succeeded in making their way forcibly as far as Gandumakh.

Two other gentlemen lived opposite to the house of the Navab Mohammed Zaman Khan, and Quddos Khan, and wrought a change upon the affections of their respective favourites. When all endeavours failed to get them back, the good Navab wrote a civil note to the possessor of his fair one, saying that he himself had no need for her, and that he (the Englishman) had better keep her for ever. That gentleman having now been joined by his own wife has at length left her, I think, in an unprovided and destitute condition. But the other one, belonging to Quddos Khan, is well and respectably treated by her paramour, who has made a will to say that she was to claim his property in case of his death, in preference to any of his own relatives.

Mir Ahmad Khan, brother of Abdullah Khan Achakzai, was returning from Qandhar to marry a lady with whom he was engaged a long time before

in Kabul. On his arrival near Ghazni he heard from his friends that she had left the roof of her parents, and taken shelter in the house of a "Sahab Log." He was incensed beyond all description, but could not show his face in Kabul; wherefore he turned back from the road and afterwards joined his brother in the insurrection in order to gain his revenge upon us; and the woman is now, I think, left unprovided at Lodianah.

These instances of gallantry in the gentlemen, with numerous cases of the same nature, were disgraceful and abhorrent to the habits and to the pride of the people whom we ruled; and it was the partiality of Sir Alexander Burnes to his friends in these circumstances which made him obnoxious to dislike, and wounded the feelings of the chiefs, who formerly looked upon him as their old friend and guardian. It was not he who committed himself in any sort of intrigue; but yet it was his duty to restore the ladies to their relations, and not to sacrifice his public name and duty through any private regard to his friends,—who, in return, never contradicted the accusations which were attached to him personally instead of to them. All of those friends knew well

that Major Leach, Sir Alexander Burnes, his brother, and those who were subordinate to him, had Kashmerian females in their service, ever since he proceeded on a mission to Kabul, and no just man will deny this, and allow that they were persons to intrigue with the ladies in Kabul. Sir Alexander Burnes, indeed, bitterly suffered, or I may say lost his life, for the faults of others, as far as he appears concerned at all in such intrigues.

Exasperated and disgraced as the chiefs felt by the whole line of our conduct, they resolved first to attack the house of Sir Alexander Burnes; and they determined not to delay in perpetrating their deed to the fullest extent, lest, in the meantime, the plot might be discovered. Nayab Mohammed Sharif, and Taj Mohammed Khan, informed Sir Alexander Burnes of the conspiracy, and Mohammed Mirza Khan Javan Sher, one of the conspirators, called upon me the same evening in the house of that officer; and on my telling him that the Ghilzais were pacified by Major Macgregor, and that the force under Sir Robert Sale was victoriously proceeding towards Jelalabad, he seemed to laugh at my expression about pacifying the Ghilzais,

and said seriously that to-morrow morning the very door I was sitting at will be in flames of fire, and yet still we pride ourselves in saying that we are safe. I told all this to Sir Alexander Burnes, whose reply was, that we must not let the people suppose that we are frightened, and that he will see what he can do in the cantonment; whither he started immediately. While I was talking with Sir Alexander Burnes an anonymous note reached him in Persian, confirming what he had already heard from me and from other sources, on which he said, "The time is arrived that we must leave this country."

CHAPTER XVIII.

The 2nd of November, 1841—Sir Alexander Burnes's house fired—His hard fate—How he might have been saved—The Shah's regiment defeated—Insurgents increase—Stores plundered—Hard fighting on the 13th—Promised reward to Akbar Khan—Sir William Macnaghten shot by Akbar Khan—Unaccountable conduct of the troops—On the 6th of January the troops commenced their march—Lieutenant Eyre's account — Jelalabad maintained — Akbar Khan defeated—Government notification—The Shah fired upon and killed—Amin Ullah Khan defeated—Akbar gains Bala Hisar—Mohan Lal communicates with Sir George Pollock—Mohan Lal's services denied—Authorities quoted—The Amir restored.

THE sad dawn of the 2nd of November, 1841,—a Tuesday,—appeared awful to our wearied eyes, and an outbreak in the city immediately followed. It was about seven o'clock in the morning when the maid-servant knocked loudly at the door of my bedroom, and cried, "Agha * shuma khab hasted va shahar chappa shudah," meaning, you are asleep and the city is upset. I came out into my garden, and saw the people moving their goods to some secure place from my neighbourhood. The merchants were

* Masters are always addressed by servants in that name.

taking off their commodities from their shops, and the whole city appeared in commotion. Mirza Khodadad, secretary to the Sultan Jan, came to my house, and being my old acquaintance, warned me of the danger in which I was then standing, by remaining in my house, and not sending away my property. Nayab Mohammed Sharif also sent his father-in-law Mohammed Kamal, to fetch me to the Persian quarters, with all my valuable things. But I refused to attend to all their kind advice, fearing that my stirring from the house might increase the apprehension of the impending danger, and I sent my servant Abdullah Kashmiri, with a note to Sir Alexander Burnes* conveying to him the messages I had received, and desiring his advice for my guidance. His reply was, that I must remain in my house, and that he has sent for the troops, and that they will soon be in town. Half an hour after this, my servant informed me that the Nizam-ul-Daulah was advising that officer to quit his house and to proceed with him to the Bala Hisar, as there was very great

* His residence was separated by a few buildings from my house, on the right, and that of Captain Trevor was by my garden, on the left.

risk and danger to his personal safety. He then ordered his horse to be saddled, but his "Jamadar Nathu" from Bhuj reminded him of his sending a note to Sir William Macnaghten, and of the propriety of waiting for his answer. This changed the mind of Sir Alexander Burnes, who, from that time, repeatedly said to the Nizam-ul-Daulah, that he will not leave his place. On this the Minister proceeded towards the Bala Hisar, and was fired on from the top of the houses in the street, but unfortunately he did not part some of his guard, which was composed of sixty of the best Jazayarchis, but said that he will bring the Shah's own regiment for his protection. The principal rebels, as Abdullah Khan Achakzai, Amin Ullah, Sikandar, and Abdul Salam Khan, mounted their horses and came to the garden, very near to the residence of Sir Alexander Burnes. He sent a Sayad in his employ, with another horseman named Hamid, with a message to them, inquiring the reason of their thus suddenly appearing in open rebellion, and assuring them of his wish to restore their privileges to them. Before an answer was made to the Sayad, Sikandar Khan, one of the party, stood up and cut off his head with one stroke of his

sword, without regarding the respect which was due to the blood of the poor Sayad, the descendant of his Holy Prophet. This caused the other servant of Sir Alexander Burnes to make his way back as fast as possible, and gave an ample proof to the lower class of the citizens of the determined resolution of the above-mentioned chiefs to overthrow our influence. On this, they ordered their handful of men to ascend the tops of the houses of the Tabchi bashi, and of the Agha husain, and to penetrate the garden attached to the Presidency, by the direction of Mirdad Khan's lodgings, and to open a fire on Sir Alexander Burnes. The door was ordered to be shut, and the guards of Sepoys were still prevented from using their muskets. Now about two hundred people assembled on all sides, and Sir Alexander Burnes, from the window of his upper room, demanded the insurgents to pacify themselves, and promised a handsome reward to all. While he was thus haranguing the mob, Captain Broadfoot received a ball just below his breast, and was brought down by Sir A. Burnes, and Charles Burnes, and placed in the room down stairs, and the guard being now under a sharp fire from the rebels, was compelled to oppose the advance. Some of the

servants of Sir Alexander Burnes desired him to permit himself to be concealed and wrapped up in a tent, which they will carry off on their shoulders, like as others are carrying off plunder, but he said that he can neither leave his own brother nor his wounded friend Captain Broadfoot. Now Hazar Khan Kotval, whose bosom was full of revenge against Sir Alexander, came with Haji Ali, Hashim Kah Farosh, Kaka Husain, Abdul Rahim, Mohammed Husain Khan Arezbegi, and they set fire to the very door which Mohammed Mirza Khan Javan sher had mentioned to me the previous evening. The flames extended to the room where Sir Alexander and his brother were standing, looking at the multitude and begging for quarter, and Captain Broadfoot was consumed in it. Lieutenant Charles Burnes then came out into the garden and killed about six persons before he was cut to pieces. The people now became a large mob, and the balls passing the house of Sir Alexander Burnes were breaking the glass windows of my house, from the top of which I was witnessing this unhappy progress of the enemy. Some of them now came towards my house, and I ordered the door to be shut, and I went out through

a hole in the neighbouring wall belonging to the Nazir Zafar, with the intention to bring Khan Shirin Khan, the Persian chief, to the assistance of Sir Alexander, and some of his men, to save my house from plunder. In the street I was seized by Nazir Ali Mohammed, and by several other "Khabgahis," who proposed to murder me on the very spot, and Shuja-ul-Daulah * gave hints to perpetrate the deed, while he was arming himself to join Abdullah Khan in attacking Sir Alexander Burnes. Providentially his father, the famous, kind-hearted Navab Mohammed Zaman Khan, came out of his house and upbraided those who had seized me, and snatching me from their hands, took me away and placed me among his ladies, who having received some assistance from me some time before, brought a sumptuous dish of "Pulav" for my breakfast. To enjoy this hospitality from the hands of the Afghan fair on other occasions would have been an unexpected and highly valued nourishment, but at the present disastrous moment every grain of the rice seemed to choak me in my throat, and I refused to touch the dish. I was now locked up in a dark room, and the

* He afterwards murdered the Shah Shuja-ul-mulk.

good Navab desired me to take off the rings from my fingers, and to conceal them somewhere, so that the avarice of his son might not tempt him to cut off my fingers with them! All my house was in the meantime plundered, and Khan Shirin Khan having heard on the road that Sir Alexander Burnes, to whose aid he was proceeding, was murdered by the rebels, went to protect Captain Trevor and his family.

The Shah's own regiment, under Mr. Campbell, came to support Sir Alexander Burnes, and had a hard conflict with the rebels, and as they received no succour, they were at last obliged to give way, nearly all of them being cut to pieces, and their guns captured.

Shah Zadah Fatah Jang was ordered by the king to pass into the city and to restore tranquillity, but this prince, whether with or without the permission of the Shah, or in consequence of the danger of his position amidst the rebellious mob, instead of adjusting matters, encouraged them to persevere in their tumult, adding "Prove yourselves to be the champions of the faith, and destroy the infidels (English)." My guardian the Navab became very apprehensive

on hearing the name of the king connected with the rebels, who under such authority might attack his house, in order to get hold of my person. He therefore filled his house with armed men to protect me, and desired me to write to Sir William Macnaghten, on his part, that the Navab will remain in person in the cantonment, and will render service under his guidance to pacify all the insurgents, who, if the Shah is not their instigator, will not dare to stand up against him or his advice; and Navab sent this letter by his own men to the envoy, but no answer was returned.

I was now very anxious to be let out of the room, and to look from the top of the Navab Mohammed Zaman Khan's house (which commanded the residence of Sir Alexander Burnes), to find if possible what has befallen to that officer. The Navab took me up, and we saw that it was all in flames, and that the people were plundering his property, and even the wood of the house. The servants or guards of the Navab, who were on the top of the house watching the proceedings of the rebels, stated that after Charles Burnes was killed, and the fire had consumed the whole of the room, Sir Alexander Burnes was obliged to come to the door opening to his garden. Here

he implored the multitude to save his life, but receiving a torrent of abuse from Nazar Ali Mohammed, Hazar Khan Kotval and the nephew of the Achkzai chief, and many others, whom he had unjustly offended by taking the part of his countrymen, he abandoned all hopes of safety. On this he opened up his black neckcloth and tied it on his eyes, that he should not see from what direction the blow of death strikes him. Having done this, he stepped out of the door, and in one minute he was cut to pieces by the furious mob. The treasury and house of Captain Johnson was also plundered and levelled with the ground, and a poor female was burnt in it.

While affairs were wearing such a sad and unfavourable aspect, and even Lieutenant Sturt was attacked and wounded in the presence of the Shah Shuja-ul-Mulk at the Bala Hisar, and Captain Lawrance at great personal risk made his way towards the cantonment, no defensive measures were taken on our part. Brigadier Shelton came and kept himself with his troops within the walls of the Bala Hisar, whereas, had he entered the city by any side, the life of Sir Alexander Burnes would have

been saved, and that movement would have not only preserved the lives of thousands, but even would have suppressed the insurrection at the moment, for the rebels had secured the means of escape for themselves, and would have fled on the appearance of our troops; moreover, if Brigadier Shelton had arrived in the Bala Hisar while Sir Alexander Burnes was still alive in his own house in the city, order would have been restored.

In the evening, the Navab Mohammed Zaman Khan kindly offered to escort me either to the cantonment or into the Persian quarters, and he even accompanied me himself to the latter. The whole town was now in great alarm, and every minute they were expecting the arrival of our troops to blow up the town in order to revenge the murder of Sir Alexander Burnes, but none of the troops were ordered to move. On my arrival in the house of our kind host of Kabul, Nayab Mohammed Sharif Khan, the Persian chief, Khan Shirar Khan, an old and intimate friend of mine, thought it advisable that I should remain in his house, which will be a safer place than the house of the Nayab. I was now in great and painful anxiety and in a very disturbed state

CAPTN COLIN MACKENZIE.

of mind at one time, thinking of my own safety, and at another time thinking of the melancholy loss I had suffered in the untimely end and most cruel murder of Sir Alexander Burnes, who had gained my attachment and respect by his continued desire to treat me as a friend. Khan Shirin Khan told me that, as soon as the outbreak took place in the city, he sent his officer Shah Ghasi to the envoy, requesting him to command his services, and that the answer was not so favourable as the chief had anticipated. The envoy sent him a message, that he will look upon him as an enemy if he will not seize Abdullah Khan. Nevertheless being unable to do this, Khan Shirin Khan remained, and saved Captain Trevor with his family for two days, and at last conducted them safely to the cantonment.

In the meantime Captain Colin Mackenzie still held possession of the fort "Qilai Nishan Khan," although no reinforcement was sent to him: but at length he and his party felt themselves in a state of great danger, and boldly made their way through the enemy to the cantonment, yet he was wounded on the road. In fact, all the brave commanders of our troops were paralyzed at this outbreak; and without

using any of those energies which have always been displayed in the power and skill of the British arms, they let such awful deeds grow and prevail. While Captain Mackenzie held out the fort in the city against the rebels, he hoped that reinforcements will arrive and enable him to keep its possession. But when he had spent all his ammunition, and had lost every hope of receiving aid, he was compelled at length to leave it. The number of the insurgents from the country now increased, and the Navab Jabbar Khan, who had always until then proved himself hospitable and friendly to the British, entered the town accompanied by a large number of the villagers, beating a drum and haranguing the faithful to stand up against us: and the people from Kahdrah, Logar, and Vardak came in swarms to swell the number of our enemies in the city. In the former place also, Lieutenants Maul and Wheeler were barbarously murdered by the people of their own Kohistani regiment. On the 4th of November the rebels, having stationed themselves in the King's garden and the fort of Mohammed Sharif, destroyed the communication between our cantonment and the commissariat fort which stood outside of it. They then attacked

the fort, and plundered all our commissariat stores, while no exertions were made to preserve such necessaries on which the life of the warriors depended: and thus the enemy was daily gaining spirit while it was sadly sinking amongst our troops. General Elphinstone was said to be in a weak state of bodily health, and Brigadier Shelton was desired to come to the cantonment from the Bala Hisar. He appeared from the commencement of the outbreak to despair of success, which produced a baneful effect in every fighting man. In short, he recommended to evacuate Kabul and to retreat to Jelalabad. Sir William Macnaghten, however, was averse to this plan, and taking the whole responsibility upon himself, he urgently desired the General to storm the fort of Rikabashi. While such uncertainty prevailed, I was negotiating with the Ghilzai chiefs through Nayab Mohammed Sharif, and my protector Khan Shirin Khan was promising every aid, and preparing to take our side, yet was still fearful to declare for us. In the mean time Sir William Macnaghten wrote to me as follows: "I am very glad to find that you are doing excellent service. Enclosed are two letters for Khan Shirar Khan and

Mohammed Hamzah.* You may assure them both, that, if they perform the service they have undertaken, the former shall receive one lakh and the latter fifty thousand rupees, and everything else they require. I hope you will encourage Mohammed Yar Khan, the rival of the Amin Ullah, and assure him that he shall have the chiefship. You may give promises in my name to the extent of five lakhs, and I fully approve your having raised thirty thousand rupees for distribution amongst those disposed to assist our cause, but I would not advance more than fifty thousand rupees before some service is actually rendered." We had not only sheltered our enemies under our own wings in the city, but had neglected the overtures made to us by the stern and hostile person on the frontier. In the city, the Navabs Jabbar Khan, Mohammed Zaman Khan, and Usman Khan, all Barakzais, were allowed to remain, after the Amir Dost Mohammed Khan was sent to India, and our conduct was daily adding to their

* He was deprived of the governorship of the Ghilzais, and confined by Nazam-ul-daulah; and on the appearance of the insurrection he obtained his liberation, and took a leading part with the rebels against us.

discontent. On the frontier Mohammed Akbar appeared, and requested us to fix a separate allowance for him from that of his father, promising that then he will surrender himself to us. But the Envoy most likely was right to refuse such a proposal, and he wrote in this manner in reply, "That Mohammed Akbar's arrival at Bamian is likely enough. There can be little use, I fear, in offering him a separate remittance if the rebels have made overtures to him already."

On the 13th a hard day of fighting continued between our troops and the rebels till the evening, but our success of this day was destined to be the last one; and from this time misfortunes and blunders of every description surrounded the British arms and honour. Major Pottinger, with Lieutenant Haughton, were the only surviving officers of the unfortunate Gorkha regiment of Charkar, and they made their way, under great risk and fatigue, to the cantonment, while suffering from wounds. In Charkar, on the 3rd of November, when Major Pottinger was conferring with the Kohistan chiefs in the garden, and his assistant, Lieutenant Rattery, at a little distance, was negotiating with the other petty chiefs, the

latter was suddenly shot, and the former obliged to secure himself within the fort; and all the negotiations failed. The cantonment, which was most unwisely situated far from water, could not be preserved under thirst, hunger, and the attack of the enemy, and it was therefore abandoned. The regiment, having fallen into confusion, was cut off by the rebels in all directions, and their females, with many other surviving Gorkhas, were distributed and sold as slaves. Sir William Macnaghten, on the arrival of Major Pottinger, wrote to me as follows:—"The Charkar regiment behaved ill, and has been for the most part destroyed; but Major Pottinger is safe in the cantonment."

Quandhar, Kelat-i-Ghilzai, Ghazni, and Jelalabad, were soon after surrounded by the swarms of rebels. The whole of Afghanistan was in a state of rebellion, and the Hazarbash cavalry had mutinied, and murdered their English officers. The Navab Mohammed Zaman Khan was elevated as a king, and the other rebel chiefs, though acting on their own judgment, did in some measure acknowledge his superiority. Mohammed Akbar Khan, taking the advantage of

such a disastrous state of things, hastened to reach Kabul from Bamian. He wisely agreed to act under the Navab, but yet he was carrying on negotiations with the Envoy upon one hand, and making a separate party for himself on the other. The Ghilzais took his part, and did all to promote his interest, while they were not forgetful to desire money from us by promising their services to us, to the Shah, the Navab, and his coadjutors. Nayab Mohammed Sharif, under great personal risk, did all he could to buy over the Ghilzais in our favour. Sir William Macnaghten at first hesitated to advance the stipulated sum without having any security for the fulfilment of their agreement; but to this they objected on many groundless excuses, and the circumstances were so unfavourable, that we were compelled to accede to their demands. They wrote an agreement on the leaf of the Qoran, pledging themselves to wait upon the Shah, to open communication between us and Jelalabad, to supply us with provisions, and to espouse our cause openly. Upon this some of the Ghilzais came to the Envoy in the cantonment, and he advanced them money. They continued promising everything, and yet putting off the fulfil-

ment from day to day. In the mean time the Envoy had lost every hope of aid from the troops, and was distressed to find that, if he fails in his negotiations, he cannot use force to make the Ghilzais or other chiefs adhere to their agreements. Thrown into such a dilemma, the Envoy and all his subordinates, like myself, had no other means but still to persevere in treating with the rebels, hoping perhaps we might yet succeed, though we had failed before. As our troops were daily losing their soldier-like spirits under the discouraging talk of retreat by their commander, Brigadier Shelton, this sad intelligence, being circulated in the cantonment, was thence unfortunately conveyed to the rebels by their countrymen who were in the service of our several officers. This made them perfectly careless about the claim of our power, and aware that we will neither sally out, nor keep our ground much longer without provisions. It was through the most active and extraordinary exertions of Captain Boyd, and especially of Captain Johnson,* that now and then a

* No one is better acquainted than myself of the influence he had on certain grain-sellers. His efforts in getting the supplies were miraculous, and successful in that crisis.

quantity of grain was brought for sale secretly into the cantonment.

However, this mode of obtaining supplies was not of long duration: and the military authorities, as they were always anxious about this affair, insisted upon the Envoy's negotiating with the chiefs for a retreat, whilst he entreated them either to keep their ground, or to go into the Bala Hisar, and thus to keep up the name and honour of the English government. In reply, a great many obstacles and dangers were thrown on the idea of the safety of the troops and camp-followers in passing between our cantonment and the Bala Hisar, a distance of nearly two miles and a half; while to travel for eight or ten days to go to Jelalabad through the frozen passes of the Khurd Kabul, Tezin, and Jagdallak, which were occupied by the ferocious and plundering Ghilzais, was considered by our military superiors far from dangerous!! Thus Sir William Macnaghten was forced to open the negotiation with the Barakzais; and the principal article of his agreement with Mohammed Akbar Khan and the other Barakzai chiefs was to evacuate Afghanistan, if all classes were desirous of our doing so. This

article, however, retained for us the privilege of still remaining in Afghanistan, if a portion of the people or chiefs wished us to remain. Sir William Macnaghten had secured a good deal of grain through the Ghilzais; but as the military people were so obstinately desirous of a retreat, he feared to offend the Barakzais by having the grain thrown in, and therefore with much reluctance he wrote to me on the evening of the 22nd December, "Pray forbid the Ghilzais to bring up grain to-night. The sending grain to us just now would do more harm than good to our cause." The same night Mohammed Saddiq, accompanied by Captain Skinner and the treacherous Sarvar Khan Lohani, waited upon the Envoy, and offered, on the part of the Sardar Mohammed Akbar Khan, that if the Envoy was to promise a certain sum of money, the Sardar will seize Amin Ullah Khan, on receiving such a promise in the form of a written document. The offer was not received by the Envoy altogether without suspicion; but as he had no hope of military aid, and considered the idea of retreat disgraceful to the British name, he was just like a drowning man catching at straws, and sensibly running the risk of all sorts of evils,

with the view of reserving any chance of success. On this he wrote the paper required, saying that if Mohammed Akbar Khan performs the service he has undertaken, he will be rewarded. Mohammed Saddiq and Sarvar Khan Lohani assured the Envoy of the sincerity of Mohammed Akbar Khan, who, in consequence of his parents and family being in the power of the British general, will faithfully promote the objects of the Envoy; and they requested the Envoy to keep this secret from every one, lest it might reach the ears of Amin Ullah Khan.

Mirza Khodadad, the Secretary to the Sultan Jan, and Mohammed Saddiq Khan, who was present in the room with them when Mohammed Akbar Khan consulted with Mohammed Shah Khan, for perpetrating this deed of blood, informed me secretly of the plot. He stated that Akbar has laid a deep scheme to entrap the Envoy, and that if he succeeds in bringing him alive into the city, he will force him to give up to him all the ammunition, the treasury, &c., and will then cause his death by poison, and that otherwise he will shoot him with the very pistols the Envoy presented to him the other night. This was said to me by the Mirza about 10 A.M., on the 23rd

of December, 1841, and I sent Qurban Ali* to the Envoy with a note and the message which Mirza Khodadad had related. The Envoy was just then conversing with the Mustaufi, on the deputation of Akbar, and just preparing to start for the fatal conference with him, when my messenger delivered to him the note, and told him in the ear what a conspiracy had been formed against him. Sir William Macnaghten changed the colour of his countenance as if he were either annoyed with the information or alarmed at the intelligence. He had now no other remedy, however, but to run personal risks in order to preserve the honour of his country and of the government, for even the troops left him alone at the time when his life was in danger. He entreated the military authorities to have two regiments ready outside the cantonment, with the view that, if Mohammed Akbar Khan was sincere, he might employ them for offensive acts against Amin Ullah Khan,

* This person stood in great confidence and esteem with Sir Alexander Burnes for taking despatches to Hirat and the Persian camp; and the Envoy wrote to me once in his behalf as follows: "I should be glad if you would send with the Ghilzais this evening the messenger you were formerly in the habit of sending, as he is well acquainted with this place."

THE LATE SIR WILLIAM HAY MACNAGHTEN BT

and if he was not sincere, they would take a defensive part and protect his person. Alas! all his extraordinary exertions to keep the honour of Great Britain from disgrace at such a crisis, which would have melted an iron framed body by care and alarm, were useless, and produced not the slightest shadow of energy in the bosom of the officers and soldiers of his country. Captains Lawrance, Mackenzie, and perhaps Trevor, warned him of the danger; to which he replied, "Dangerous it is, but, if it succeeds, it is worth all risks; the rebels have not fulfilled one article of the treaty, and I have no confidence in them, and if by it we can only save our honour, all will be well; at any rate, I would rather suffer a hundred deaths than live the last six weeks over again."

"A plot! let me alone for that,—trust me for that!"

In short Sir William Macnaghten went out of the cantonment to meet Mohammed Akbar, and looked back and saw that no troops were ordered according to his suggestion, and knew even that the military authorities made an excuse to employ them on such an occasion. While conferring with the treacherous

Akbar, the Envoy was suddenly caught by him and Sultan Jan, and when he refused to mount on horseback, he was dragged down from the cliff, shot by Mohammed Akbar Khan with the very same pistols, and wonderful to add, loaded and then presented by the Envoy himself.* Mohammed Shah Khan Ghilzie, and his brother Dost Mohammed Khan, saved Captains Lawrance and Mackenzie,† and brought them on their own horses into the fort of Mahmud Khan Bayat, and Captain Trevor fell a victim to the revenge of Mulla Momin, whom, with many other chiefs, he had most imprudently offended by discharging a great number of his followers, when introducing the fatal reform in the military class, which deprived them of their livelihood, and which was also wrong in principle.

* In him I lost the best and noblest friend in the world. I knew him from 1834, and he was the best judge of his placing confidence in me, being a constant medium of my communications with the Supreme Government. Some misinformed person, if not malicious, put in the Indian papers that I had cast some slanders on the character of that dignified and lamented authority. It is utterly false. No one regrets his loss so bitterly as I do, and no one more gratefully feels pride in speaking of his high talents and character than I do.

† Read their letters on the murder of their political chief, Sir William Macnaghten.—*Eyre's Diary.*

On the fall of Sir William Macnaghten, Mohammed Akbar Khan put the first stroke of his sword on his throat, and then his head was severed from his body, and brought into the house of the Navab Mohammed Zaman Khan. His body was dragged away and was hung up in the Bazar for the public view, while the assassin, Mohammed Akbar Khan, triumphed by, bearing the drawn and bloody sword in his hand when returning to the city, and receiving with pride the congratulations of the Ghazis. There has been a good deal of difference of opinion whether Mohammed Akbar Khan shot the Envoy, or if the deed was perpetrated by the Ghazis. He formerly repeatedly expressed with pride, that he was the assassin of the Envoy, in the presence of many noblemen and of myself.* The difference of opinion and the doubt on the subject have not unjustly been raised by those who, while dining and conversing with the assassin during their imprisonment, flattered him most imprudently by giving him the views of all the parliamentary speeches, and by assuring him that England will not keep possession of Afghanistan, but

* He confessed in a letter to his murdering the Envoy, which was intercepted by the illustrious garrison of Jelalabad.

that it disapproved of the policy of the Indian Government, and has ordered the evacuation of that country. Why such information and speeches were translated by some of us to please Akbar Khan is a matter for others to determine, and is not one of my suggesting. The body of the Envoy, after hanging for three days in the public street, was thrown into a ditch, behind the treasury of Captain Johnson, and his head was sent to the Vali of Khulam, and this statement was confirmed by several servants of Colonels Stoddart and Conolly, who had seen it in returning from Bokhara. They affirm that they saw it with their own eyes conveyed in the nose-bag of the horse.* Such was the deplorable end of Sir William Macnaghten, who, unassisted by troops, preferred the loss of his life to that of the honour of his country and government, by evacuating Kabul while himself was alive; and very extraordinary indeed was the heroism of the British officers and troops, to see their chief murdered within the distance of musket-shot, in the face of the English camp, and

* Never was his real head found. It was merely to deceive and take money from Major Leech when a man came from Kabul, and presented an account of his finding it, and bringing it at great risk to India.

yet not to fire a gun on the perpetrators of the murder, nor on the draggers of his body which lay for some time in the plain! I repeat it here again, that if the pride of power had not wrought upon the minds of political chiefs, they were sufficiently aware of the impending danger, and fully able to destroy it before it broke open on our heads; and the insurrection would not have grown so fatally strong, and continued from the 2nd of November to the 22nd of December, if four companies of soldiers from the cantonment had been sent to save Sir Alexander Burnes in the commencement of the outbreak. And if the two regiments, as ordered by Sir William Macnaghten, had been sent out when he proceeded to treat with Mohammed Akbar Khan, the Envoy in all probability would not have been murdered. With his sad loss came the loss of spirits to every one in the cantonments; the loss of the British honour in Central Asia, and an open field was left for certain military men, who were insisting upon him to negotiate for retreat.

Major Pottinger took the political charge after the death of Sir William Macnaghten,* and he found all

* If the Envoy had not been murdered, he would have re-

the demands of the rebels increased, and that in spite of all his own judgment, as well as that of others of his department, he also was urged to quit the capital; a negotiation which commenced with the chiefs, and ended at the evacuation of the cantonment. No regard was shown to the articles of the tripartite treaty, and the Shah Shuja-ul-Mulk was left at the mercy of his enemies, to whom we had given shelter during his government of the last two years. Had it not been for us, he, acting as an independent sovereign, and on the usual customs of the country, would have destroyed all the Barakzais, and have thus freed us and himself from these fatal consequences; herein, however, we interfered, and allowed Jabbar Khan, Zaman Khan, Usman Khan, and other Barakzais, to remain and now intrigue

mained in Kabul, or at least in the Bala Hisar, till the spring would have brought reinforcements from India, and there was plenty of provisions and wood. All his letters in my possession show his disgust at the word of retreat; and up to the 22nd of December he was trying to gain his object, and was expressing his opinions thus to me: "If the people quarrel amongst themselves, and we are allowed to remain, it would be very agreeable to stop here for a few months, instead of having to travel through the snow. I will spend any sum to effect that purpose; but no time is to be lost."

with the malcontents against us. By the new agreements the chiefs became possessed of the magazine fort, the guns, and bills of money to be drawn on India, and in return they were to escort our troops safely to Jelalabad. This was not indeed their intention, for their object was to see us once out of the cantonment, and then to plunder and imprison us. Khan Shirin Khan, the Persian chief, informed me of this fact, and desired me to dissuade our authorities from marching towards Butkhak, and said that we had better enter the Bala Hisar. I accordingly wrote what the Khan stated to my political chief in the cantonment, and the secretary replied thus:—"Thanks for your kind letter, and the hints it contains. The chiefs you name have signed the treaty, and the most of them accompany us. As for others attacking us on the road, we are in the hands of God, and in him we trust. We hope to be off tomorrow."

On the 6th of January, the British army, consisting of 4500 fighting men and nine guns, commenced the march from the cantonment. The Persian chief Khan Shirin Khan forced me to go back with him to Kabul; and our forces, as soon as they were out of

the cantonment, were in confusion and disorder. The enemy were soon busy plundering and burning the cantonment, and soon after commenced firing upon us. The guns were then left, and the sepoys as well as their European brothers in arms were exhausted by hunger and fatigue, and equally paralysed with the havoc caused by the Ghazis. When Mohammed Akbar Khan joined with the avowed intention to annihilate our army, and to make the English ladies and gentlemen his prisoners, the Afghans were more ferocious in their attacks. He spoke to them in Persian, seemingly to prevent them from committing offence, and then in Turkish, engaging them to plunder and seize us, as some of the officers could not understand that language. Many officers, soldiers, and sepoys, with numerous followers, were shot, wounded, and left on the ground to perish by cold; and thousands being unable to move, sank down in despair. Soon afterwards they were seen perished and frozen to death, exhibiting a fearful group of snow-burnt bodies, which covered the face of the road, and particularly of the pass. The treacherous Mohammed Akbar was also gradually getting possession of several officers as hostages, so

that by these means the strength of the force was totally weakened, and by the 13th of January all the officers became prisoners to the assassin of the Envoy, and the whole army was thus annihilated. No better account is given of these disasters than that of Lieutenant Eyre, who, as a Christian and an upright person, has spoken the truth freely; and I can promise all persons interested in those sad affairs that they will not be disappointed if they throw a glance over his most interesting 'Diary.'

On the 18th of January, the Sardar Mohammed Akbar Khan, with Sultan Jan, Mohammed Shah Khan, and the other Ghilzai chiefs, proceeded on an expedition to reduce Jelalabad, and left all the British prisoners, or rather the survivors of the retreating force of General Elphinstone, in Badiabad. When Sir R. Sale and Major Macgregor refused to evacuate Jelalabad, as ordered by General Elphinstone and by Major Pottinger, Mohammed Akbar Khan could not be convinced of the reasonableness of the rule that a *prisoner*, however exalted in rank, is not obeyed by any subordinate, however inferior he may be. He assembled a considerably large force of

Ghazis in the mean time, and gradually approached to and besieged Jelalabad. He was every day attacking our foraging parties, planning the storm of the place, and endeavouring to mine it, and he was at the same time laying a trap by negotiations for Major Macgregor, who was however too wise to be deceived by him. Mohammed Akbar Khan used his influence more powerfully in Kabul, and made the Shah Shuja-ul-Mulk to write to Major Macgregor to leave Jelalabad, and to say that His Majesty will escort the garrison safely to Peshavar. The fortress of Ghazni was also surrendered to the enemy, and the Kelat-i-Ghilzai abandoned. Sir William Nott was surrounded by the rebels, headed by Prince Safdar Jang, and, though always victorious, he could not move towards Kabul before the harvest was ripe. Sir George Pollock's army was detained in Peshavar longer than was anticipated, and Colonel Moseley's retreat from Ali Makjid gave further signs that no reinforcement can immediately be expected. The supply of provisions, of ammunition, and of money fell short, and the communication was entirely cut off from Peshavar with the brave garrison of Jelalabad. It was only through the able and extraordinary exer-

tions of Major Mackison that now and then small sums of money, &c. were conveyed by Turrah Baz Khan to Major Macgregor. In the mean time, Mohammed Akbar Khan was accidentally wounded in the arm by the musket of his servant being fired off by chance when helping him to mount his horse. This created a strong impression in the mind of Akbar, who burnt alive the innocent man, and being incensed by the false idea that he had been induced to shoot him either by the Shah or by Major Macgregor, he furiously determined to gain possession of Jelalabad, and of the persons of its gallant officers, whether by force of arms or by the means of negotiation. Mohammed Akbar Khan wrote to the rebel chiefs in Kabul, and I read the letter myself (whether what it told was true or false), stating that the "Kafir" (infidel) Macgregor will not negotiate in any way with him, and that he has been informed from an authentic source that he (Macgregor), Colonel Dennie, Major Broadfoot, and Captain Abbot have taken a prominent part in persevering to maintain the possession of Jelalabad, which they declare they will not quit while they bear heads on their shoulders. The ramparts of the town were made defensible by

the extraordinary abilities of Major Broadfoot, and Major Macgregor never placed any reliance on the negotiations of Mohammed Akbar Khan, and always insisted on preserving the British honour by a firm stand at Jelalabad.

In writing to Major Mackison, the Political Agent at Peshavar, he appears still persevering in the same sound opinion, even up to the 23rd of March, two weeks before the signal defeat of Mohammed Akbar. "Pray, tell the General (Sir George Pollock) that no good can possibly arrive from entering into a negotiation with this young Hotspur Akbar."

On the 5th and 6th of April, 1842, the heroic garrison of Jelalabad heard rumours of the reverses of Sir George Pollock's army in the Khaibar Pass, and resolved at once to strike a blow on the enemy's camp, and thus to relieve itself from further vexation in being starved and invested by the merciless Afghans. It was the ever-memorable morning of the 7th, which gloriously dawned on this brave garrison, who, having been formed into three columns, attacked and surprised the camp of Mohammed Akbar. The centre was led by the heroic and deeply-lamented officer Colonel Dennie, who was

shot just after securing the honour of the British name and arms in the face of an inveterate enemy. Mohammed Akbar Khan fled with precipitate haste towards Lamghan; and Mohammed Husain Khan Arzbegi, with numerous other chiefs, followers of Akbar, were so much alarmed by an idea of being pursued and overtaken by Sir Robert Sale, that they hurried their flight and arrived the next morning in Kabul, some without shoes, some without clothes on their person, and others riding the unsaddled horses. This glorious victory, gained by such a small garrison, has for ever established the martial name of the English army, with fear and praise. The Government of India acknowledged the services of Major Macgregor, on the 19th May, in the most flattering manner:—"I am directed by the Governor-General [Lord Ellenborough] to offer you his Lordship's acknowledgments for the indefatigable zeal and assiduity, and the unbending spirit with which you executed your duty in Jelalabad, from the entrance of Major-General Sir Robert Sale into that place, to the period of its ultimate relief by the advance of the army under Major-General Sir George Pollock; and his Lordship will be happy should any suitable

opportunity offer itself of evincing his sense of your merit."

Let me return to the state of things in Kabul. After the departure of General Elphinstone's force from the cantonment, and its annihilation on the road to Jelalabad, Amin Ullah Khan Logri, the Durrani chiefs, and Khan Shirin Khan, declared themselves openly, and waited upon the Shah Shuja-ul-Mulk. It was indeed necessary that the Navab, Mohammed Zaman, who was a few weeks ago acknowledged as a sovereign, and called Shah Zaman, should give up that title—should tender his homage to the Shah Shuja—should assume the station of Vazir (minister) under him—and that the Amin Ullah himself, the agent of the latter, should submit in like manner. Confidence could neither be procured by the Navab Mohammed Zaman Khan, by the Barakzais, nor by the Shah Shuja-ul-Mulk, the Sadozais. The former hesitated to wait upon the Shah for fear of being apprehended; and the latter was afraid that, by opening the gates of the Bala Hisar, and allowing the Barakzais to be inside of it, he might lose the place altogether. Oaths after oaths were exchanged; and the Amin Ullah, with the

Persian chief, assured the Shah of the fidelity of all classes of the people. His Majesty, finding his situation very delicate and not safe, pretended to harangue the "faithful" to destroy and discard us from Jelalabad; and he distributed dresses of honour and sums of money to divert their attention. The King had his trust entirely in the Logri chief; and Mohammed Zaman Khan, with his Barakzai clansmen, was watching for a favourable opportunity to upset the influence of the Amin Ullah, and to extricate the Sadozais from Kabul. All the Barakzais could not bear the overgrown power of a commoner of Logar, who was always in their employ. Letter after letter was received from Akbar Khan, urging the necessity for a reinforcement from Kabul; but the family jealousy between the Barakzais, and their joint hatred of Amin Ullah Khan, upon one hand, and the old rivalry of the Durranis of all classes with the Barakzais; the daily growing dependence of the Shah on the Logar chief, and a desperate thirst of all in general for snatching money from the King, upon the other, became a chief topic of the concerns of the day, and thus no attention was paid to the affairs of Jelalabad.

Meanwhile the intelligence of the movement of the British army towards Peshavar, and a copy of the notification issued by the Earl of Auckland, was brought by a merchant from Peshavar, and given to the Navab Mohammed Zaman Khan. He came to the Persian chief, Khan Shirin Khan, and asked him where was his (Navab's) "Rafiq," friend, meaning myself. I was sent for, and the Navab was very courteous, and told me before the whole assembly that I must rest assured that the British army will soon come to Kabul; and then, taking out of his pocket the copy* of the said noti-

* *Notification by the Government of India.*

"INTELLIGENCE having been received which leaves no room to doubt that, after the British force at Kabul had maintained its position against overpowering numbers of insurgents for more than six weeks, the officer commanding had judged it necessary, in consequence of a failure in provisions, to agree to a convention with the enemy, and to retire, in reliance on the faith of that convention, towards Jelalabad, when the troops, exposed to the worst rigours of cold and privation on the mountain defiles, and harassed by treacherous attacks, suffered extreme disasters,—the Governor-General (Earl of Auckland) in Council deems it proper to notify that the most active measures have been adopted, and will be stedfastly prosecuted, for expediting powerful reinforcements to the Afghan frontier, and for assisting such operations as may be required in that quarter for the maintenance of the honour and interest of the British Government.

"The ample military means at the disposal of the British

fication, he requested me to read. It was indeed a masterly resolution; but, as I said before, it was not put into execution immediately. This notification created so much alarm and consternation, that the wealthy persons removed their property to a distance, and did not return to town till long after the retreat of Sir George Pollock's army from Kabul.

However, the rebel chiefs insisted upon the Shah Shuja-ul-Mulk marching in person towards Jelalabad, and checking the progress of the British troops in the Khaibar. The Shah, having already suffered by his unwise speech with the Durranis previous to the

Government will be strenuously applied to these objects, so as at once to support external operations and to ensure efficient protection to its subjects and allies.

"A faithless enemy, stained by the foul crime of assassination, has, through a failure of supplies, followed by consummate treachery, been able to overcome a body of British troops, in a country removed, by distance and by the difficulties of the season, from the possibility of succour. But the Governor-General in Council, while he most deeply laments the loss of the brave officers and men, regards this partial reverse only as a new occasion for displaying the stability and vigour of the British power, and the admirable spirit and valour of the British Indian army.

"By order of the Right Honourable the Governor-General of India in Council.

"T. H. Maddock."

outbreak, was soon sensible of his error and the dilemma in which he was placed. He was consequently very unwilling to proceed; and therefore he put it off from day to day, hoping that the reinforcements from India might soon arrive, and that he might then co-operate with them to destroy the enemy. The rebels began to suspect him for being friendly disposed to the British; and Mir Haji, the fanatic priest of Kabul, pitched out his tent, and proclaimed his avowed intention of proceeding to Jelalabad, and inviting all the Musulmans to join him. The Navab Mohammed Zaman Khan was secretly intriguing with the Haji against the Amin Ullah, and at the same time desirous to become a powerful man in Kabul. All the nobles insisted upon the Shah marching with the Haji; and the Navab sent his wife at night to the King in the palace, with a written agreement in the Qoran that he was devotedly attached to his Majesty, and will faithfully promote the interest of his government. On this assurance of the Navab Mohammed Zaman Khan, the head of the Barakzais, being conveyed and communicated to his Majesty by a female of such distinction as his (the Navib's) wife, he fixed the day of his march for the

5th of April. Shuja-ul-Daulah, whether with the knowledge of his father the Navab or not, but certainly instigated by the Sardar Mohammed Usman Khan, and by the Navab Jabbar Khan, on the one hand, and incensed at the appointment of the son of the Amin Ullah Khan as governor of the city during the absence of the Shah and the chiefs, on the other, determined to revenge himself upon the Shah, and thus to gain a higher name than Mohammed Akbar Khan did in murdering Sir William Macnaghten. He consulted with some adventurers, as Shahghasi Dilavar and Nur Mohammed Khan-i-Reka, &c., in all about sixty well-armed persons; and he went early in the morning and placed himself on the road between the Bala Hisar and the royal camp. The Shah, attended by a few Hindostanis, came out of his palace in a litter (jampan), and was first fired upon by Shuja-ul-Daulah. In the hope of still being saved, he threw himself out of it, and ran towards the small ditch of an adjoining field, but was overtaken and again fired upon. His Majesty implored the mercy of the assassin, and cried out, "Az barai khoda Sardar Sarkar che gunah kardak?" ("For God's sake, save me!—what offence have I done?")

Shuja-ul-Daulah paid no attention to this; and then a volley of musketry was poured upon the Shah, who instantly fell lifeless. The assassin fled to his house, and the corpse of the Shah was left lying for several hours on the ground.* The report of the murder of the Shah was soon spread, to the surprise and in-

* It was the custom of the Shah Shuja-ul-Mulk to have all his precious diamonds and valuable stones in a bag always in his pocket, in the fear that he might meet some reverse unexpectedly, and that he should not lose them by keeping them in a box at his palace. When he was fired at, he took the bag out of his pocket and threw it in the field, in the hope of having it again if his life were saved. His assailants did not perceive it; but an Afghan, who was merely a spectator at a distance, saw the Shah throwing something aside, and came there afterwards at night, and picked up the bag full of diamonds. He was a real Afghan, a savage of the mountains, and thought the prize nothing but common stones of different colours. He showed it to a Khatri in Charsu, who, taking advantage of the ignorance of the Afghan, told him they were common stones, but he would give him ten pounds if he would part with them. They were valued at nearly a million, yet he gave up the stones for this trifling sum. A third person saw this, and after taking five pounds from the purchaser to keep the matter secret, he went to Shuja-ul-Daulah, and reported the circumstance. The purchaser was immediately summoned, tied to the mouth of a gun, and threatened to be blown up if he did not give up the whole of the diamonds. The poor man was thus compelled to deliver up his prize, and was not paid his expenses. Thus fell the property of the Shah into the hands of his assassin.

dignation of all the chiefs; and the Amin Ullah Khan, taking their side, became a powerful opponent of the Barakzais. Prince Fatah Jang was placed on the throne, and called on the chiefs to punish the murderers of his father.

Hence a deep-rooted misunderstanding took place between the Navab Mohammed Zaman Khan, who also proclaimed himself to be the king, in opposition to the Amin Ullah Khan and the Durrani chiefs. Now, there were thus two kings in one town. However, the Amin Ullah Khan, at the instigation of Ahmad Khan Biranj Farosh, desired Navab Mohammed Zamar Khan to deliver up the person of Captain John Conolly, and of other hostages, to remain in the charge of Mir Haji the priest. He succeeded in this; and that officer, with other of his companions, was now under a strict watch; and no one was allowed to see him, except Ahmad Khan, whose object was to procure bills in large sums for paying small amounts, and thus to keep the whole management of affairs in his own hands, without the slightest interference of any other person. He, of course, paid something now and then to the Amin Ullah Khan, whom he convinced that he was his

friend and an enemy to us; and at the same time he stated to Captain Conolly that he was doing service to him under great personal risk. Captain Conolly told me himself that this scoundrel, in conjunction with his own writer, Haji Mir, kept all his separate bills of different amounts, after taking one in total amount for them all.

In the mean time the Amin Ullah Khan, influenced by the money of Fatah Jang, and the association of the Durrani chiefs, proposed to fight with the Navab Mohammed Zaman Khan, and by persuading the Priest Mir Haji to speak in favour of the latter, he was attacked by every citizen on every side, defeated, and obliged to take refuge with the Prince Fatah Jang in the Bala Hisar. This was indeed a proper time and a favourable field open for the display of the tact and intrigues of the Sardar Mohammed Akbar Khan. He lost no time in making his appearance during these internal commotions, and gained universal applause by declaring with cunning hypocrisy that it was the time that all home quarrels and interests should be buried under ground, and that all should join together to put off the external enemy (English) of the religion and honour

of the "faithful." He accordingly opened negotiations with the Amin Ullah Khan, and addressed letters to him, calling him his father, and stating his attachment to the distinguished person of the Amin Ullah Khan, who had taken so prominent a part in protecting the "Islam" or Mohammedan faith. Meanwhile he was siding with the Navab Mohammed Zaman Khan against the Prince Fatah Jang and the Amin Ullah Khan, till after many skirmishes and much warfare the latter was obliged to confer with the Sardar Mohammed Akbar Khan, with whom he entered into treaty and begged His Royal Highness to go and meet him outside of the Bala Hisar. It is stated that he and Akbar had basely conspired to lay hold of the Prince, and therefore the Arabs of the citadel objected to the going out of Fatah Jang, and Mohammed Akbar could not trust himself to come in, and so the Amin Ullah left the royal family to join his new ally. Several days rolled on, and the Bala Hisar was closely invested and attacked by the united forces of the Navab Mohammed Zaman and of the Sardar Mohammed Akbar Khan. The Durranis stood by in a cowardly state of neutrality and there was only

the Prince Fatah Jang with the other royal descendants, the Hindostanis, and his secretary Merza Haidar Ali, repelling bravely the repeated assaults of the overpowering number of the Barakzais. Money was not spared, and every exertion was used to uphold the citadel, to preserve the honour of the royal family, and to act on the advice of Sir George Pollock. The Prince Fatah Jang, in time of need, himself headed the party to repel the enemy from the ramparts; but the ammunition was exhausted, and there was no other means to procure it for any sum but by a little now and a little then through my agency. The Sardar Mohammed Akbar Khan at last conducted a mine under the large tower of the Bala Hisar called Burj-i-Majanju, and the mine was blown, and the battering guns which had been left by us in the cantonment, and which were now in possession of the Barakzais, were opened on the same tower. On the 7th of June Mohammed Akbar Khan became master of the fortress, and of the guns, &c., through the treachery of Darvesh Mohammed Khan, the Arab chief, who allowed Amin Ullah with his party to enter it, and thus forced the Prince to surrender. The Sardar Mohammed

Akbar Khan was not forgetful of the designs of the Navab Mohammed Zaman Khan by taking a share in storming the Bala Hisar, knowing that it was done in order to establish his own influence as an equal if not a superior to Akbar; and he therefore took precaution whereby to avoid this, and he succeeded.

The Sardar Mohammed Akbar Khan did neither allow the Shuja-ul-Daulah, the son of the Navab Mohammed Zaman Khan, to go inside of the Bala Hisar, nor to station any of his men at the gate. This caused a fatal disappointment to the Navab, and Mohammed Akbar soon bought over to his own side the Sardar Mohammed Usman Khan, Mir Haji the priest, and other staunch adherents of his rival uncle. After this he waited upon the Prince Fatah Jang, and in order to deceive him, he did not sit down in his presence, but continued to show him the highest nominal respect till he got plenty of money from him; and after a hard fight of a whole day he deprived Mohammed Zaman Khan of his guns and of all the weapons of war. His followers were all dispersed or gained over, and himself made a secondary chief. Mohammed Akbar Khan was now

without the fear of an internal rival, and there was no hinderance for him to accomplish his objects with the Prince. He placed him on the throne and became himself his minister, and continued to show him some outward respect until he extorted all the money and a great part of the jewels and of the silver and gold utensils from that helpless king Prince Fatah Jang, and then confined him at last in a room out of the palace, whence he made his escape to the Persian quarters, and then was escorted by the brother of Amin Ullah Khan to the camp of Sir George Pollock. The Sardar Mohammed Akbar Khan had now gained possession of all things belonging to the royal household, and found himself in the zenith of glory.

I shall now invite the attention of the readers to the hardships and the anxiety under which the British prisoners laboured who were in the hands of Mohammed Akbar Khan, and were dragged about from one place to another. I shall also briefly touch upon the circumstances which occurred during our imprisonment, and which were connected with us and Akbar, as well as the duties which fell to my lot to perform. It must be recollected, that on the de-

parture of the forces of General Elphinstone, I was brought back from Siah Sang to the Persian quarters in Kabul, and remained under the protection of the Persian chief, Khan Shirin Khan, nearly to the end of June. I was treated by him with much consideration, and enjoyed within my allotted room all the blessings of freedom; but I was not allowed to go out of the room to see any one secretly from him. His son-in-law, my old friend Sultan Mohammed Khan, also slept in the room where I was living, and he amused me always with his conversation and anecdotes, as did also the Nayab Mohammed Sherif. He knew that I was corresponding with Sir George Pollock, but he had plainly told me, that if any of my letters was intercepted by our enemy, he should not then be able to protect me, and would be compelled to give me up; and I therefore took all the responsibility on my own shoulders. Various chiefs, while in power, demanded Khan Shirin Khan to deliver me to them, but he was ever ready to abuse them for the idea of disgracing his name by taking me off from his protection; and the divisions amongst the chiefs were so numerous, that no one could exactly use force against him without offending others. Though

I was not free from external danger, yet I did not fail to negotiate with the chiefs, to detach them from the enemy, to communicate with the Prince, to send ammunition into the Bala Hisar, for the use of his Royal Highness; and, above all, to send regularly the intelligence of the state of things and of parties in Kabul to the Government and to Sir George Pollock.

On the 22nd of June, Mohammed Akbar Khan, having gained superiority over all the chiefs, sent a party into the house of Khan Shirin Khan, which seized and conducted me into the house where Major Pottinger and Captain Mackenzie lived. From thence I was taken and placed in the house of Mohammed Mirza Khan, in charge of Sultan Jan, and thence delivered to Mulla Jalal Achkakzai, who tortured me and ill-treated me in other ways. It was only the tone of dissatisfaction which the letter from the Governor General showed, and the conversation of Sir George Pollock with Haji Bakht Yar Khan, that after some time produced a change in the steps of Mohammed Akbar, who stopped in his ill-treatment, and moved me from the house of that cruel Mulla Jalal on the 29th of July, and lodged

CAPTN JOHN CONOLLY.

me where Major Pottinger, and the Captains John Conolly, Drummond, Troup, Lawrence, and other hostages had been living ever since Mohammed Akbar Khan had possession of the Bala Hisar; and even here, while under the same guard as other officers were, I contrived to keep up my communication with Sir George Pollock, under great personal risk. A few extracts which I quote here will explain the nature of my duties, and the difficulties and dangers which I encountered in executing them. The regular messengers to carry out my letters could not be employed for fear of being intercepted on the road, which was on every inch watched by the people of Mohammed Akbar Khan. I therefore ran the risk of securing the aid of the very men of Akbar himself and of the other rebel chiefs, by money, and I fortunately succeeded. They accordingly took my letter, which was very closely written on the small thin paper, and concealed it under the lock of their musket, which they bore on their shoulder, and proceeded in this manner as if they were really going to harass the camp of Sir George Pollock.

While living with the hostages near the house of Mohammed Akbar Khan, I had frequent conver-

sations with Captain John Conolly, an officer of the most amiable and noble character. I was intimately acquainted with him, as well as with his two brothers, the one killed in Tutam Drah, as I mentioned already, and the other murdered by the savage king of Bokhara. Captain John Conolly spoke very firmly on my behalf to Mohammed Akbar Khan, when I was suffering in person from his cruel treatment, and also by the extortion of money; and on my joining the hostages, he was so good as to give up his bed and room to me. With him I was perfectly easy and happy; but unfortunately this enjoyment was not of long duration. He was suffering ever since the disasters mentioned above by a sad pain at the heart, caused through the public misfortunes; and he could not bear to think a moment of the disgrace and misfortunes which had stained the arms and honour of his country; and thus his mind was agitated so much that at length it produced disease. No one was so much liked by the people of the country as Captain John Conolly was. He was a universal favourite; and it was his amiable disposition and polite manners which induced the people to lend him large sums of money, wherewith to feed, to heal, and to clothe,

hundreds of the sick and wounded of our soldiers and camp-followers.

In addition to all the calamities of Kabul, he had the melancholy news to hear, that his brother, Captain Arthur Conolly, had been murdered by the King of Bokhara, which sad tidings hastened to increase his illness; and this advanced so fast, that in a very short time he breathed his last, on the 7th of August. His loss was sincerely lamented by us all, and, I may say, by every one in Kabul.

Captain Arthur Conolly was in England when the army of the Indus marched into Afghanistan, to place Shah Shuja on the throne of Kabul. He arrived there after six or nine months, and, as I stated before, he went on a mission to Khiva, where he completed the object of his embassy. He went thence to Kokan, and when there, a very worthy feeling of ambition induced him to think that his presence might aid to throw a light on the dark mind of the Uzbeg king, which he considered Colonel Stoddart was unable to do alone. While we were in power at Kabul, the King of Bokhara set the latter officer at liberty, and treated him with consideration; and there was an open communication kept up by

that officer with us, through Agha Hamza at Kabul, an intimate friend of Nayab Abdul Samad, with whom Colonel Stoddart was then living in Bokhara. The king gave him permission to return to Kabul, and, besides that, there were favourable opportunities on several occasions, which might have easily permitted the escape of that lamented officer. We also employed men to bring him to Kabul, but, after promising frequently to start, he put it off from day to day: and he wrote, and asked for rarities from us to present to the king, such as buffaloes, clocks, &c., which we sent him. The changed manner, and the attention of the king, gave reason to Colonel Stoddart to hope that he will at last succeed in bringing His Majesty to a favourable opinion towards the English Government, and that he himself will no doubt be made an ambassador to his court. He would have certainly gained his object, had the disasters of Kabul not occurred; and he, as well as his fellow-prisoner, Colonel Arthur Conolly, would not have been murdered by that cruel monarch had our army started immediately for Afghanistan, and re-occupied Kabul as soon as the winter was over. Herein the unfortunate delay occurred, and the King

of Bokhara put them both to death, merely to show forth and to satisfy his vanity, in being able to say he also had shed the blood of two "infidels," as the faithful of Kabul shed that of thousands. The report of their being thus murdered was repeatedly confirmed; wherefore altogether in vain were Captain Grove's friendly pains and anxiety to ascertain this, as also the incurring such expense by sending that enterprising missionary, Dr. Wolff, to ascertain the fate of those brave officers. What was done for this purpose was certainly extraordinary, and few friends would have done so much as Captain Grove did; and he would have received thanks from their relations, and from other authorities, if he had not published the "Victims of Bokhara," which could not be acceptable, however right he was in his opinions.

Sardar Mohammed Akbar Khan was on several occasions inviting me to dine and converse with him; and on the march of the army of Sir George Pollock towards Kabul, he often asked my advice (of course not sincerely), what course he should pursue. He said he knows well that he cannot stand our troops in the field, and that our money will, in its influence, pursue and oppose him wherever our arms

cannot reach; he asked if I thought there was any chance of his being safe if he were to throw himself upon the honour of the British Government, as his father did in time of need. I replied to him, that though my advice to him would appear a partial one, yet still I would not hesitate in saying that his life will be safe, and that he will likely be forgiven for the outrages he has committed against the English, if he wait upon Sir George Pollock. To this he answered that we may give him every assurance, but yet we will not act upon it. He had become so conversant with all the affairs of England by newspapers, and the old histories read to him, or related by some of us, the prisoners, that he perfectly made me silent by saying that Napoleon, who was not considered a murderer, as he fears himself to be of the English Envoy, relied upon the British justice, and in time of difficulty went on board an English ship; and that the English Government, instead of showing him the privilege of the liberty of their land, made him a prisoner, and sent him to a distant island, where he died. He added, also, that since the disasters took place in Afghanistan, and Lord Auckland departed for Europe, there has been

a universal outcry against his political measures, and that in almost every newspaper which we—the prisoners—receive, men do not accuse him so much for the offences he has committed as they accuse and find fault with their own countrymen and authorities; and he added, that seeing this, he cannot rely on any assurances he might receive for his waiting upon the General;—and in justice to him I must say that he was right. We had given numerous wretched grounds and causes for our words and assurances both to be suspected; and instead of endeavouring to wipe away the stain, and to preserve the English honour, by forgetting all party feelings, and by striking a severe blow at once on our offenders, we were accusing and abusing those who had planned and acted in the expedition. How different was the time, and how unjustly partial were the people of these days in comparison to those who had to deal with men who met similar reverses when wars were waging with Hulkars and other chiefs in India. The retreat of Colonel Monson was disastrous in that period, but how nobly did Lord Wellesley * sympathise with his

* "Grievous and disastrous as the events are, the extent of the calamity does not exceed my expectation. I fear my poor friend Monson is gone. Whatever may be his fate, or whatever

misfortunes when writing to Lord Lake. The disasters at Kabul were exaggerated by want of confidence and perseverance among us; and the brave and noble general, Sir William Nott, writing to the Governor General, stated that all the disasters which befell us in Kabul were extremely exaggerated. The delay in the movement of Sir George Pollock towards Kabul, and the general complaint now of the past and once-praised expedition, gave us, the prisoners of Mohammed Akbar Khan, a sad idea that the British Government will not like to incur another heavy expense and hazard by sending an army again into Kabul. While we were thus speculating and lamenting our fates, the overland mail brought us the intelligence of the views of the Government of England with regard to Afghanistan, and in a most welcome and long speech of Sir Robert Peel, we read an extract * which convinced us that we are

the result of his misfortune to my own fame, I will endeavour to shield his character from obloquy; nor will I attempt the mean purpose of sacrificing his reputation to save mine."—*Sir John Hobhouse's Speech.*

* "I trust that in any course that Her Majesty's Government may pursue, they will not forget to ensure that the honour of the British army shall be fully maintained; and that no instances of gross treachery and perjury shall pass altogether unpunished."

not forgotten, and that the Government was determined to frighten (if not chastise) the enemy; and in the meantime I received a communication from Sir George Pollock * which dispelled all doubts of his coming to Kabul.

I shall now briefly describe how the government of India and Sir George Pollock received intelligence of the events passing at Kabul, and what measures were taken for the rescue of our prisoners. Whatever humble share I fortunately took in these transactions when myself a prisoner, and ill-treated by Mohammed Akbar Khan, was long before, without my wish, published in the "Englishman" of Calcuttta, † and then in the Delhi Gazette, but no one then had appeared to contradict any part of my assertions. On my submitting a memorial to the Court of Di-

* "You ought not to despair of British troops advancing on Kabul; and you must not, on any account, sell the grain which has been collected for the use of the army."

† That letter, with the following remark of the editor, has received an honourable place in the Appendix of Lieut. Eyre's Diary: "Mohan Lal's brief and unassuming account of his own exertions, intrepidity, risks, and sufferings, is very little calculated to do him full justice; but his great merits are well known to, and will be amply appreciated and rewarded by, the Government of India."

rectors, some persons accused me most cruelly and unjustly. In writing out their accusations, some of them took the credit of knowing every thing of the political and secret department, because, indeed, he could prove this merely by signing himself a prisoner, or by being in Afghanistan! Undoubtedly I should have been guilty of a gross crime had I not established my claims by the original documents of the authorities under whom I served, and also I should have felt ashamed of doing so if any of the political authorities whose name I have mentioned, and who are now living,* could contradict any of my statements. I sincerely say that I am not one of those who would boast of great doings and snatch at the merits of others, or who would have ever felt inclined to disrespect and be ungrateful to the officers, both military and civil, who were in Afghanistan. I do not presume to say that none but myself took a share in transmitting intelligence and negotiating the release of the prisoners,—far from it. There might be many more persons besides Captain John Conolly

* Sir George Pollock, Sir Richmond Shakespear, Major Mackison, in India; Major Macgregor, Captains Lawrence and Mackenzie, in London.

and Majors Pottinger and Lawrance, but I fully trust that the same persons who were so good as to cast a stigma on my reputation, will, on the perusal of the quotations, feel to what extent I had the good fortune to be serviceable at that time, and how far this credit was allowed to me by very many, from the Governor General, Lord Ellenborough, down to the principal authorities in Afghanistan. I call upon any one who may doubt the authenticity of the letters I quote, to throw off the mask of anonymous writing, and like an honourable man, openly to demand the perusal of the original documents.*

Captain John Conolly sent always information while he was a hostage in the house of the Navab Mohammed Zaman Khan, but when he was placed

* Nothing gave me so much satisfaction as the calling of Mr. or Professor Houghton, the father of the gallant Lieutenant Houghton, of Charkar, upon me in London, and telling me in a straightforward and honourable manner that his son, being one of the prisoners, had never mentioned my name in taking any share in the release of the prisoners. He desired me to show him the original letters of Major Pottinger and Sir Richmond Shakespear, whom the people had considered to be the sole negotiators. On reading their documents, quoted hereafter, he most affectionately shook hands with me, adding that he was thankful to me on account of his son, and that those who denied my services were malicious and partial accusers.

in the charge of the head priest, Mir Haji, he had less opportunity, and when brought thence by Mohammed Akbar, he had it not at all. Major Pottinger also wrote, but only when Mohammed Akbar wished him to communicate his negotiations with Sir George Pollock. But while in the house of Khan Shirin Khan I had ample and uninterrupted opportunities of writing, but the danger of transmitting the letters to Jalalabad was just the same as I had when suffering under the cruelties of Mulla Jalal, and when afterwards placed under the guard of Mohammed Akbar Khan, and living with Major Pottinger, Captains Conolly, Drummond, Airy, and Welch, &c. I shall henceforth quote only the authorities, and shall not make any more remarks on my behalf.

Lord Ellenborough.

"THE subsequent information has confirmed the report of the Shah's murder, and the elevation to the throne of Prince Fatah-Jung, who has opened a communication with Sir George Pollock, and professes a strong inclination to co-operate with our Government. For particulars of the state of parties and affairs at Kabul, I beg to refer your Honourable Committee to the letters from Mohan Lal, enclosed in General Pollock's despatch of the 30th ultimo."

"In a letter from Mohan Lal, dated Kabul, 9th May, your Honourable Committee will observe that, notwithstanding the vigilance observed in strictly guarding Dost Mohammed Khan within our provinces, it is alleged that he had found means to communicate with his son, Mohammed Akbar."

"The intelligence which has been lately received by Sir George Pollock from Kabul, with great despatch and regularity, contains a clear and connected account, mostly* from the pen of Mohan Lal, of the progress of events at that capital."

"The letters from Prince Fatah-Jang and Mohan Lal, previous to the capture of the Bala Hisar, had repeatedly urged the expediency of the advance of the British army, even as far as Gundamuk, as a measure which would lead

* Can any higher testimony than this be shown of my being the regular and constant correspondent while a prisoner, and living in the same house, and under the same guard, where Major Pottinger, Captain Troup, &c. &c., prisoners, were living? I wish "Quorum Pars," the correspondent of the Delhi Gazette (December 13, 1845), to read this. If he does not know the difference between Baboo and other Orientals, how can he know what Major Pottinger and other political people were doing in behalf of the prisoners, which was all secret? He might be one of the Bamian captives, but he was not a political officer, who could only know what we were doing. If he has means to throw a glance on the pages of the Blue Book, he will there see whose name is most frequently mentioned by Lord Ellenborough. This I do not say by way of boasting, but to show how unjustly I have been accused by some worthy writers of the Indian papers, as himself.

almost certainly to the dispersion of the Barakzai party, and the probable flight of Mohammed Akbar Khan, and the liberation of the British prisoners."

"Mohammed Akbar has told Mohan Lal that, in the event of the British army advancing, he shall not meet it in the field, but defend the town of Kabul, upon which I immediately sent 400 more rockets to Sir George Pollock."

"I have continued to receive constant reports,* furnished by Mohan Lal, of the progress of events at Kabul. Your Honourable Committee will learn that Mohammed Akbar was installing himself in the office of Vizier to Prince Fatah-Jung, whom he has formally proclaimed King."

Sir George Pollock.

"MOHAN LAL has proved himself to be a very intelligent and useful public servant. He was of essential service in sending me information from Kabul, until I reached that capital with the army under my command."

"I have already had occasion to bring to the notice of the Right Honourable the Governor-General the valuable services performed by Mohan Lal, in keeping me informed, at considerable personal risk,† of the state of affairs at Kabul."

* This will further show from whom Lord Ellenborough received much and regular information.

† It will separately show Mr. "Quorum Pars" and others what risks I encountered in sending the communications to the army.

Sir R. Shakespear.

"IT is, indeed, very cruel to keep Mohan Lal in any doubt. His services to the state were of great value; and if any of his letters had fallen into the hands of the enemy, his life would have been forfeited." *

"Mohan Lal has performed very valuable service to the British Government during the campaign of 1842.

"While at Jalalabad we were entirely† dependent on him for intelligence of the state of affairs and of parties at Kabul. His letters in general reached us twice a-week; and I do not remember a single instance of the information which he gave being incorrect; and his arrangements were so good, that not a single letter sent by any of his messengers fell into the hands of the enemy."

Major Macgregor, Political Agent.

"I HAVE known and have served with Mohan Lal in Afghanistan for several years. At the risk * of his life he did serve his Government faithfully, and his services are too well known to render it necessary that I should here detail them. A more intelligent person I have never met with, and I trust that his meritorious services will be duly rewarded by a lucrative appointment. His qualifications and judgment render him equal to a difficult enterprise."

* See preceding Note.

† Does not this say that the entire dependence was on my information?

Sir Richmond Shakespear, Secretary, to Mohan Lal.

"YOUR very interesting letters, of date the 6th June, reached me this morning at 9 A.M. They have been shown to the General, and copies forwarded to Government."

"We are very anxious to hear from you again.

"I trust you continue to give intelligence of the state of affairs at Kabul, as all your letters are forwarded to Government."

"SIR,

"THE General is very sorry that you have been seized by Mohammed Akbar Khan, but hopes that you will still be able to write us intelligence occasionally of the state of affairs.* The General has to-day written to the Governor-General, pointing out the zeal and perseverance which you have displayed in sending such regular and correct information."

Sir George Pollock to the Governor-General (Lord Ellenborough).

Political Department.

"I REGRET to have to report the seizure of Mohan Lal by Mohammed Akbar Khan. I venture to take this oppor-

* These letters will further show the brave "Quorum Pars" and others in what personal danger I performed my duty, and what was expected and spoken of me by the first authorities of India, if not by the good "Quorum Pars" and his worthy companions.

tunity of bringing to the notice of the Right Honourable the Governor-General the zeal and perseverance of Mohan Lal, who, under very difficult circumstances, and at very great personal risk,* has contrived to send me regular and correct information of the state of the different parties at Kabul.

"The Cossid brought the scrap of paper, a copy of which I have now the honour to enclose."

Governor-General (Lord Ellenborough).

"I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 132, dated 26th June, reporting the seizure of Mohan Lal by Mohammed Akbar Khan.

"In reply I am directed to inform you that the Governor-General duly appreciated the zeal and intelligence displayed by Mohan Lal* during late events at Kabul, and regrets that the state is likely to be deprived for a time of that officer's services."†

Sir Richmond Shakespear, Secretary, to Mohan Lal.

"SIR,

"I AM very sorry to hear that you have been so ill-

* See preceding Note.

† Lord Ellenborough and the quoted authorities will show how ill I was treated when a prisoner, and that the Government expects and appreciates the services of Asiatics as well as those of Englishmen, which Mr. "Quorum Pars" takes all to himself.

treated, and trust that such disgraceful conduct will not be repeated.*

"I have received your letters of the 17th and 19th, and am much distressed to hear of your sufferings. The General will have it explained (to Akbar) that there can be no possible faith in negotiations while any of our prisoners are ill treated.

"Mohammed Akbar has been told that we have heard of his ill-treatment of you, and reminded that *our* prisoners are well treated.*

"I trust that you will not be ill-treated again, as it has been explained to Mohammed Akbar that the treatment of the Afghans in our possession will depend on his treatment of our prisoners."*

Governor-General to Sir George Pollock.

"I am directed by the Governor-General (Lord Ellenborough) to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 3rd instant, and to communicate to you his Lordship's entire approval of the measures adopted of extending to Mohan Lal the protection of the British Government.

"It is his Lordship's intention to remove Mohammed Akbar Khan's family from Lodianah; and it is under his Lordship's consideration whether Mohammed Akbar Khan's wife and children should not be immediately sent to Calcutta, and eventually to England.

"Mohammed Akbar Khan must be aware that the Go-

* See preceding Note.

vernment in England cannot afford to any one education in the Mohammedan faith, and there are no means of obtaining it there."*

Sir George Pollock to Mohan Lal.

"We are glad of your being released from your sufferings, and allowed to join Major Pottinger."

In reading the preceding extract of a letter from the Earl of Ellenborough, and also the forthcoming ones, it will be observed how deeply concerned and anxious his Lordship was, as were also Sir George Pollock and Sir Richmond Shakespear, about obtaining the liberty of the prisoners. In order to effect this object, the exchange of the Afghan prisoners, and also large sums of money, were offered to Mohammed Akbar. There were also in the mean time numerous negotiations in existence through highly esteemed and able officers, such as Major Pottinger, and Captains Lawrance, Troup, Drummond, Johnson, and I may also say every prisoner! but the treachery of Mohammed Akbar Khan was always an obstacle to our success. Proclamations

* This letter from Lord Ellenborough, and a closer confinement of the Amir and his family by Mr. Clerk, made a favourable change in the condition of the prisoners then in the hands of Mohammed Akbar Khan.

desiring the citizens to interfere in rescuing us, with promises of rewards and threats of punishment, were issued and caused by us to be thrown unknown into the houses of the various rebels. Several promised to render us service, and openly to declare for our release; but the dread of the cruel disposition of Mohammed Akbar was always a hinderance in the way to our objects. Sir George Pollock, with Sir Richmond Shakespear and Major Macgregor, had from the beginning entertained a good wish towards me, and therefore in order to bring me kindly forward they always encouraged me to exert myself in every way and degree to have us released, and the same was the aim and endeavour of every officer who had an opportunity of being acquainted with the influential men. The time however came when I was the first to say to Major Pottinger, in the presence of Captain Drummond, that we were ordered to go to Turkistan. Mohammed Akbar had often expressed his intention to fulfil his threats of distributing us, and of selling us as slaves in Turkistan; and nothing could have prevented this gratification of his cruelty and vanity if we were once on the other side of Bamian. Colonel Palmer, who was

disgracefully ill-treated and tortured by Shamshuddin Khan, at Ghazni, was now, with other officers, brought and placed with the rest of the prisoners by Mohammed Akbar. This was managed through our friend Khan Shirin Khan, who excited the suspicion of Mohammed Akbar by saying that Shamshuddin Khan was negotiating with us separately from him, and thus would get the upper hand of him through our influence. All of us were ordered to be ready to start in the dusk of the evening of the 25th of August, as Mohammed Akbar was a little afraid of the rising of the people to force our liberation. I waited upon him, and reminded him of his swearing on the Qoran, and promising to release me after I had given him the sum of eighteen thousand rupees. I added that he had failed in this, and still kept me a prisoner, and that he was now going to send me off to Turkistan. His sister, the wife of Sultan Jan, to whom I had shown every attention in my power while she was the only member of the Amir Dost Mohammed Khan's immediate family that was allowed to remain at my request in Kabul, interposed on my behalf, and begged her brother to keep me under the same

guard and in the same house where I was living with the other prisoners, and then take me with himself to the camp when he went to fight with Sir George Pollock, instead of sending me to Bamian. He agreed to this, but next day he got into a great passion with me on hearing that I was intriguing with the chiefs, and he ordered the door of my room to be locked, and gave orders that I must not be permitted to step out under any circumstances.

On this I again begged him to relax his hard treatment, and I gave a handsome present to Yaqub Khan, the commandant of our guard, and begged him to allow to come to me Sayad Murtza Shah, a Kashmirian draper, pretending that I wished to buy some clothes for myself. He came, and was good enough to undertake the hazardous mission to Salah Mohammed Khan, then in charge of the prisoners in Bamian. As Sir George Pollock had approved of my proposal, I wrote letters, and made Sayad Mustza Shah the bearer of them, and he succeeded in inducing Salah Mohammed to accept my proposals of a pension for life, and that of twenty thousand rupees in cash, as well as of a pardon for his past offences. On the successful termination of these

negotiations by Sayad Murtza Shah, Major Pottinger wrote to me immediately a letter (1),* which I forwarded immediately to Sir George Pollock, and he submitted the information to the Governor-General (2, 3). Before Akbar Khan started to oppose Sir George Pollock, I made my escape from his custody, and went with Nayab Mohammed Sherif Khan to the Afshar fort, where my friend Khan Shirin Khan, the Persian chief, joined me with all his followers. Captain Troup, with Captain Anderson and his family, were left by Mohammed Akbar Khan in the fort of Shevki, and it became now important to secure their safety; and Khan Shirin Khan, on my paying a small sum,† despatched a strong body of horse, which was accompanied by Sayad Mohammed Khan (Janfishan) Ali Jan, the son-in-law of our stedfast friend Nayab Mohammed Sherif Khan, and I was soon delighted to hear from Captain Troup (4) that all of them were safe. He came next day to see me in the fort, and

* Every mark from Number 1 will regularly guide to the quotations inserted pp. 473—483.

† It was distributed amongst the horsemen by Nayab Sharif, and I also gave two gold makeers to Janfishan, as his expenses.

as I had resolved to send a Persian party to meet our prisoners (5), he readily offered to accompany them if there was any necessity for the appearancce of an European officer with them. In the mean time another letter from Major Pottinger came to my address (6), on which Sir Richmond Shakespear boldly accompanied the Persian party, and his person gave great weight to the measures. By the quotations (7) it will be observed that I was in communication with Salah Mohammed before I had received the orders of any of my superiors, and had also secured the highly valuable services of Agha Hamza, which we should have used if Salah Mohammed had declined to meet my wishes. It will be seen in an extract from Major Pottinger's report (8), the authenticity of which a recent misunderstanding between several officers obliged Captain Lawrence (9) to confirm, that before the arrival of my friend Sayad Murtza Shah, Salah Mohammed had distinctly refused the offers of other officers, and it will at the same time show how far their share is allowed in the report of Major Pottinger. On the successful and happy release of the prisoners, and the signal victory gained by Sir

George Pollock over Mohammed Akbar Khan, that just and impartial General writes to the Governor-General (10); and Sir Richmond Shakespear afterwards, on receiving the thanks of the prisoners for his gallant exertions in order to meet them while with the Persian party, writes (11) in my behalf, and so does Colonel Outram, the late Resident in Sindh, in a letter to the Viscount Jocelyn (12). Major Macgregor, the political agent, who had also negotiated (13) with Mohammed Shah Khan Ghilzai, offering him two lakhs of rupees to have the prisoners released, finding that the sum I promised to pay to Salah Mohammed (twenty thousand rupees) and to Sayad Murtza Shah (five thousand rupees), as well as their pension, was much less than what Mohammed Shah Khan was offered, kindly and justly stated (14) these particulars of my economy on behalf of the Government.

It is my pleasing duty now to mention that Lord Hardinge has shown much liberality to my friend Sayad Murtza Shah, and has fixed a pension of five hundred rupees *per mensem* for him instead of one hundred only, which Lord Ellenborough had granted to him in accordance to my promise.

(1)

Major Pottinger, C.B., Political Agent, with the Prisoners, to Mohan Lal.

"SIR,

"YOUR agent Sayad Murtza Shah has arrived and concluded the arrangements; Salah Mohammed Khan agrees to it. The agent wants money, and says that it and aid of troops should be sent; if the troops follow quickly, the country will aid them, and the Minister may be taken. Let General Pollock or General Nott know.

"Yours obediently,

"ELDRED POTTINGER."

(2)

Sir George Pollock to the Governor-General of India.

"SIR,

"I HAVE the honour to forward, to be laid before the Governor-General, the accompanying report forwarded to me by Major Pottinger. The return in safety of the prisoners may be attributed, in a great measure, to the negotiations of Mohan Lal, and the active co-operations of the Kizulbash chiefs.

"GEORGE POLLOCK."

(3)

The Governor-General of India to the Secret Committee.

"HONOURABLE SIRS,

"I RECEIVED last night a letter from Major-General Pollock, dated the 21st ult., of which I enclose

an extract, by which you will perceive that all the European prisoners, except Captain Bygrave, are in our hands, and that Sir Robert Sale, at the head of a light force, was bringing them into Kabul, where they were expected to arrive on the 22nd.

"I have, &c.,

"ELLENBOROUGH."

(4)

Letter of the Shevki Prisoners to the Address of Mohan Lal.

"MOHAN LAL,

"SIR,

"JAN Fishan Khan, Mehar Ali Khan, Sher Ali Khan, Ali Mirza Khan, Abbas Khan Shahghasi, have just reached us, with a note from you for Sir R. Shakespear. I beg you will offer our best thanks to Khan Shirin Khan, Gholam Mohammed Khan, Nezamul Daula, Gholam Hasan Khan, Naib Sharif, Mehar Ali Khan, and all the other chiefs, for their great kindness to us. I mention the names of the gentlemen here in order that you may make the chiefs acquainted with them—Captain Anderson, with his wife and children; Mrs. Trevor and her children; Captain Troup, Dr. Campbell.

"Your obedient servants,

"EDWARD CAMPBELL,

"W. ANDERSON,

"C. TROUP."

(5)

Sir George Pollock, C.B., to the Commander-in-Chief.

"SIR, 21*st Sept.* 1842.

"I HAVE the honour to report, for the information of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, that having received intimation from Bamian, * * * * * * * * I, at the suggestion of Mohan Lal, with the concurrence of Khan Shirin Khan, chief of the Qizalbashes, sanctioned the speedy departure of seven hundred of his horse on the 15th inst., the day of our arrival here, to meet the party. Some difficulty occurring on the score of money, I advanced ten thousand rupees (1000*l.*), which were delivered by Sir R. Shakespear, who accompanied the Qizalbashes.

"I cannot conclude without recording my opinion, that to Khan Sheereen Khan and Mohan Lal may be attributed the safety of the prisoners, and I have reason to believe the chief of the Qizalbashes to be a stedfast adherent to the British Government.*

"I have, &c.,

"GEORGE POLLOCK, *Major-General,*

"*Commanding in Afghanistan.*"

* This letter is quoted in Stocqueler's (formerly Editor of the 'Englishman,' Calcutta, and now of the 'English Gentleman' in London,) 'Memorials in Afghanistan,' and also printed in the Parliamentary Blue Book.

(6)

Major Pottinger, C.B., Political Agent, with the Prisoners, to Mohan Lal.

"SIR, *Bamian, 16th September*, 1842.

"Your good agent Sayad Murtza Shah Kashmiri arrived a few days ago, and has succeeded in getting Salah Mohammed Khan to change sides, and in consequence of the letters from the Qizalbash, most of the Hazarah chiefs have come in. Give my best thanks to the Qizalbash chiefs engaged in the business, and tell them that neither my fellow prisoners nor myself shall ever forget their kindness. I trust we may be strong enough to move into the Afghan country in a few days; but lest we should not, I have written to General Nott to send some troops if he possibly can.

"Your obedient servant,

"ELDRED POTTINGER,

"*Political Agent, T. F.*

"I enclose a letter for General Pollock, C.B."

(7)

Sir R. Shakespear, Secretary, to Sir George Pollock, to the Address of Mohan Lal.

"I need hardly tell you that if you can obtain the release of the prisoners, and particularly of the ladies, you will perform a most valuable service to Government.

"You may consider this as security for the payment of

any sum of money thus expended, when the service has been performed.

"It is impossible to come to terms with Mohammed Akbar; and Mohammed Shah Khan has been written to, but has not replied.

"There is now an opportunity of doing good service by detaining our prisoners and getting grain and supplies for our troops, and we trust to you to make every exertion to effect them both. * * *

"If Salah Mohammed secures the prisoners, as his expenses to the amount as mentioned shall be paid, he may be quite sure that he will be forgiven, and well rewarded if we get the prisoners.

"Agha Hamza's conduct is very gratifying, as we are most anxious to get all the prisoners. Agha Hamza has offered to raise a corps to cut off the retreat, and states that it would cost 10,000 rupees (1000*l.*). The General would willingly pay that, or even two or three thousand more."

(8)

Extracts from Major Pottinger, C.B., Political Agent, to the Address of Sir George Pollock, G.C.B.

"I HAVE omitted to state that on the 29th and 30th of August the prisoners having agreed among themselves that they would raise a subscription for their release, and the party having selected Captain Lawrance, Captain Johnson, and myself as their agents, we opened a negotiation with Salah Mohammed Khan, by Captain Johnson and Captain

Lawrence severally offering to engage themselves for the payment of a lakh of rupees to Salah Mohammed Khan, if he would agree to aid in our release; and Captain Johnson explained to him that, if he (Salah Mohammed) would delay our march, when Major-General Nott's army reached Maidan, we might, by a forced march, join his camp. To both these proposals Salah Mohammed Khan returned distinct refusals, and afterwards treated us with considerable harshness, giving orders that no one should go beyond the line of sentinels round our tents, threatening to kill us if any escaped, and in other ways showing himself displeased with our propositions."

Editorial remark of the Delhi Gazette.

"The following letter, relating to a correspondence which appeared in our columns some time since, bearing on the part which Colonels Shelton and Palmer were said *not* to have taken in the liberation of the prisoners at Bamian, ought to have reached us by the April mail, but in consequence of being sent to a distant station, was not placed in our hands till Monday last. Any of our readers anxious to connect the present with the former correspondence will find the same by referring to the 'Gazettes' of the 30th December, 1843, of the 6th January, 1844, and of the 17th of the same month.—Ed."

(9)

To the Editor of the Delhi Gazette.

"Sir,

"Your overland summary of January 21st reached me

by the last mail, and with reference to the correspondence in it between Captain H. Johnson, 26th N. I. and a 'Quondam Captive,' in justice to the late Major Pottinger I deem it incumbent on me thus publicly to state that the Major's account of our negotiations with Salah Mohammed in the matter of our release, as contained in his official letter to Major-General Sir George Pollock, K.C.B., of the 21st September, 1842, No. 512 of the Afghanistan Blue Book, is perfectly correct, and further that Captain Johnson not only saw but read the said letter previously to its despatch! I myself having taken it to him!! the only remark he made on it was that Pottinger had taken to himself all the credit!!! hardly naming us, which remark led me to get Pottinger to add the concluding paragraph, commencing 'I have omitted to state,' &c.!!!! In a letter to a near relative, of 27th September, 1842, which is now lying before me, is the following paragraph—'On the 11th Salah Mohammed asked to speak to Pottinger, Johnson, and myself; immediately Pottinger told me, I said it must be about our release, and so it proved. We three, with Mackenzie (Shelton and Palmer refusing, *being afraid of compromising themselves with Mohammed Akbar*), signed a paper giving Salah Mohammed," &c. &c.*

"Captain Johnson should have known that this was the

* It is very strong evidence of the authenticity of my statement. Had I done otherwise, it would have been contradicted by Captains Lawrance, Mackenzie, and Major Macgregor, who were in London on submitting my Memorial.

paper alluded to by Pottinger; when he reported to Government that Shelton and Palmer declined affixing their signatures to it. Shelton in particular said he would have nothing to do with it; that we were premature, and would compromise ourselves; that it was a trap, &c. &c. The paper which the Captain parades as bearing the Brigadier's signature at the top, was one subsequently prepared, and was merely, as it sets forth, to bind the subscribing parties to abide by what the Committee should apportion to each in the event of Government not sanctioning our engagements with Salah Mohammed.

"Captain Johnson says 'that Pottinger, Lawrance, and self never thought of asking Shelton or any other officer to attach his signature to the bond drawn up by Suyud Mustza Shah,' he seems altogether to forget what passed at the meeting when Colonels Shelton and Palmer positively refused to have anything to do with it. Does he forget what Salah Mohammed said to Shelton at the time? if he does, I do not. Had not we broken up the meeting, leaving Shelton and Palmer in the room, and taken Salah Mohammed into Lady Sale's, and then signed the bond, my firm opinion is that not one of us would now be alive to tell the tale.*

"I am, Sir, yours, obediently,

(Signed) "G. St. P. Lawrence,

"Captain 11th Cavalry."

"*Bath, 5th April*, 1844."

* If such difference of opinion or disunion is in existence amongst such distinguished officers, how can an Asiatic, as my-

(10)

Sir George Pollock, G.C.B., to the Governor-General.

"I HAVE already had occasion to bring to the notice of the Right Hon. the Governor-General the valuable service performed by Mohan Lal in taking a prominent part in the arrangements which so happily terminated in the release of the prisoners from Bamian * * * * *; and he was also greatly instrumental in effecting the escape of the prisoners from Bamian.

"GEORGE POLLOCK."

(11)

"Above all, Mohan Lal deserves the credit of having been the first to open the negotiation with Saleh Mohammed, which so happily terminated the release of our prisoners. * * * * *

"R. SHAKESPEAR."

(12)

"Mohan Lal, of Indian celebrity, of whom you have read and heard as the travelling companion of Burnes, and the

* * * * *

man who, amongst all the British prisoners at Kabul, did

* * * * *

most to uphold our honour and rescue our countrymen: I am sure I need say no more to interest your Lordship; but I may add, that you will find him most intelligent on all

self, dare to claim any share, unless the quoted authorities—Sir George Pollock, Sir R. Shakespear, &c.—should speak for me?

Indian subjects, and particularly conversant with all relating to the Sikhs and our north-western frontier.

"J. OUTRAM."

(13)

Mohammed Shah Khan to Major Macgregor.

"YOUR letter has been received and has afforded me much pleasure; I have been much pleased with what you say regarding the release of the English gentlemen who are under my protection, and the friendship which you express for my relations, and the message which you sent by the bearer of the letter desiring me to send, or cause to be sent, the gentlemen to Major-General Pollock, as the English Government would reward such service. My friend, ingratitude is not permitted in your religion, nor in mine."

(14)

"I FEEL assured that, so long as he (Mohan Lal) is employed by the Government, he will not only serve it with the utmost fidelity, but also with advantage to the State.

"G. H. MACGREGOR,

"*Political Agent.*"

On the successful arrival of Sir George Pollock's army in Butkhak, I had received instructions to bring all the chiefs to meet Prince Fatah Jang, who was to enter the city along with him, and other high officers of the British army. In the morning of the 16th of

September I proceeded with the chiefs, and met Sir George Pollock with the Prince, and came back with them to the Bala Hisar. The Prince, accompanied by all who attend of use and wont on such an occasion, entered the court and sat on the throne of his father, while Sir George Pollock and Sir Robert Sale sate by his side, each on a chair, and Majors Macgregor, Lawrence, and myself, with some other staff officers, stood by his Highness, I may say by his Majesty. All the Afghan and Persian chiefs stood in a row to offer their submission and their congratulations upon his restoration to the throne of his father; and a salute was also fired, but whether for his installation, or for honouring the British flag, which was then on the top of the citadel, is a matter beyond my discovery.

A brigade under Sir — MacCaskill was now sent to punish the rebellious chiefs in Kohistan, and after destroying all their fortifications and the places where they had committed their atrocities, we returned to Kabul; but yet Fatah Jang, whom the British generals had accompanied, and caused to ascend the throne, refused to stay there after the return of our army. All the Musalmans of the city had gone off

with all their moveable property, and there were only the Khatris and Shikarpuris now left living in the town. They remained on assurances of protectection, and they deserved it; for after the force of General Elphinstone was destroyed in the retreat, that class of the inhabitants of Kabul had behaved most liberally towards our half-dead, lame, and handless sepoys and camp-followers. They indeed clothed, fed, and warmed them during the winter, and continued their generosity till the arrival of Sir George Pollock. They therefore deserved, and were sure of protection; but unhappily, when a small part of the Kabul Bazar was blown up (where the bodies of Sir William Macnaghten and Captain Trevor had been hung up by Akbar Khan), these poor people in that time of confusion suffered by being plundered; and all their families, which had once given our people shelter, were pillaged of all their property, and driven from their houses.

Mohammed Akbar Khan had in the meantime fled towards Ghorband, and thence to the frontier of Bamian; and had not Sir George Pollock been repeatedly ordered to march back from Kabul, many of the rebel chiefs, as well as Mohammed Akbar

Khan, the assassin of the British Envoy, would have been easily seized. To have punished our enemies by the stay of our army for six months at least in Jalalabad, if not in Kabul, would have shown the people of Central and of all Asia, that we possessed an abundance of means, both defensive and offensive, not only to disperse our enemies, but also to occupy their fields and their cities.

In the mean time we might have buried the bodies of thousands of our brave soldiers and of our poor camp-followers, which were lying scattered about in every direction, calling us to avenge them on their destroyers. Moreover, if we had found during our stay there that the Sadozais, whom we are bound by treaties to support, were unfit to rule the country, and that to maintain a military post there would cost us much money and blood, we might have then honoured our name by releasing and placing the Amir Dost Mohammed on the throne, and afterwards withdrawn wholly our armies. If we had thus completed these chivalrous objects, then we would be both right and proud to say that "our victorious armies, after retrieving the loss of our honour, have been withdrawn." We have now, on the contrary, left an impression for

ever in Central Asia that we are so rare of high honour that we could not punish those who had offended us, and that we were afraid to stop among them, and too weak to sway the haughty and bold Afghans.* This is the opinion now of all the chiefs and natives of India and of Central Asia, and this was the notion which emboldened the Sikhs to oppose our arms, though at last this proved ruinous to themselves.

I said before that the Prince Fatah Jang would not endanger his personal safety by attempting to keep the sovereignty at Kabul without our arms; and so he, with all the royal family, followed our camp to India. In the moment of departure, I cannot understand whether political considerations or the supplications of certain chiefs induced our authorities to think that the Prince Shahpur should

* "They were taught that England is powerful to punish as well as to protect; but not one benefit, either political or military, has England acquired by the war. Indeed, our evacuation of the country resembled almost as much the retreat of an army defeated as the march of a body of conquerors, seeing that to the last our flanks and rears were attacked, and that such baggage as we saved was by dint of hard fighting."—P. 128, *Sale's Brigade in Afghanistan*, by the Rev. G. R. GLEIG, M.A.; published by JOHN MURRAY, 1846.

be seated on the throne in the presence of some of us, but so it was done, and the poor boy was left at the mercy of his powerful enemies, and had to incur much personal danger, with the loss of property, when obliged to run away from Kabul on the approach of Mohammed Akbar Khan from Bamian. By such a precipitate withdrawal from Afghanistan we did not show an honourable sentiment of courage, but we disgracefully placed many friendly chiefs in a serious dilemma. There were certain chiefs whom we detached from Akbar Khan, pledging our honour and word to reward and protect them; and I could hardly show my face to them at the time of our departure, when they all came full of tears, saying that "we deceived and punished our friends, causing them to stand against their own countrymen, and then leaving them in the mouths of lions." As soon as Mohammed Akbar occupied Kabul, he tortured, imprisoned, extorted money from, and disgraced all those who had taken our side. I shall consider it indeed a great miracle and a divine favour if hereafter any trust ever be placed in the word and promise of the authorities of the British governments throughout Afghanistan and Turkistan.

We thus left the country where the bravest officers and soldiers of our army had been treacherously destroyed, supplying our enemies at the same time with money and the weapons of war! Yet such was called the retrieving of the lost reputation of the British arms!!!

Mohammed Akbar Khan, on hearing that Salah Mohammed had given up all the prisoners, and that there was only one of them, Captain Bygrave, remaining with him, felt that he had no remedy, but was forced to show pretended feelings of generosity by sending that officer also to our camp. His release indeed was without any negotiation on our part, and he therefore owes it to himself and to Akbar.

The victorious force at Qandhar, under Sir William Nott, whose name will never die, had, by the orders of the Governor-General, gained possession of the celebrated Sandal-wood gates which had been long before carried away by the bigoted Sultan Mahamud of Ghazni from the temple of Somnath * in India, about eight hundred years ago, if

* Baron, or Captain Von Orlich, the celebrated Prussian traveller, has lately published an account of his travels in India

tradition speaks the truth. This was indeed a masterly stroke, and never to be forgotten by the religious class of Afghanistan; but Mohammed Akbar Khan and the others who had offended us, did not care for them, whether we bore them away as our trophy to India, or might have burnt them to warm ourselves in the chilling breeze of the Khurd Kabul pass. On their entering Peshavar, their fortune, after eight hundred years, became brighter, for, passing through the Panjab and Sarhand, they were glorified by the attendance of the British officers, such as my friend Major Leech, &c., and were carried with much pomp. The notification of the Governor-General,* and the respect we paid to the old gates, undoubtedly gained the attachment of those to whom it was addressed; but some even of the followers of Somnath said that we ought to have glorified, and shown the superiority of our arms and power by bringing Mohammed Akbar Khan, the murderer of the British Envoy, instead of the holy

and Lahaur, replete with valuable information and amusing anecdotes. That work is illustrated with a drawing of those gates.

* The reader will find this notification in the Blue Book of Parliament, and also in Stocqueler's Memorials of Afghanistan, p. 302, published in Calcutta.

gates. The learned Musalmans contented themselves by saying, that as those gates were foul in reality, and taken from the foul temple of Somnath, they could no longer continue to be gates of the pure and holy tomb of Mahmud, since Mohammed, the prophet, has foretold that "Kulle shayan yarjo ala aslahi;" meaning all things go back to their origin.

No honour can be more sufficiently shown than was paid by Lord Ellenborough to the well-deserving garrison of Jalalabad. At Qasur, on the other side of the Satlaj, medals were received that had been transmitted thither for the brave officers and soldiers of Sir Robert Sale. On the ferry of Firozpur also a beautifully decorated bridge of boats was thrown across the river, to carry over that illustrious garrison; and triumphal arches were erected, where the Governor-General was himself seen courteously showing his feelings of pride and of gratification in the heroic conduct of the lions of Jalalabad, and where the whole of the army of reserve formed a street, and presented arms to their victorious brother officers and soldiers. Here was the termination of all the campaigns of Afghanistan!!

Let me return now to the hero of my tale, the Amir Dost Mohammed Khan. After his surrender and departure to India, he expressed his wish to wait upon the Earl of Auckland, the Governor-General of India. His family was accommodated in the house where his unfortunate successor, the Shah Shuja-ul-Mulk, had lived, at Lodianah, and the Amir himself was sent to Calcutta. His son, Haidar Khan of Ghazni, was despatched from Bombay to join his father. Every attention and respect were shown to him by the Governor-General; and this not only delighted the Amir, but astonished him with an idea of wonder to see and to feel with what deference and generosity state-prisoners are treated by the British. His Lordship fixed a sum of three lakhs per annum for the expenses of his household; and the Amir, in seeing all the curiosities of Calcutta, and the improvements introduced by the British in all the imaginable and useful departments, together with the command and management of the military and naval stores, was astonished beyond all measure. He was heard to say, that if he had known of all these warlike means, and of the extraordinary power of the English before, he would never have thought to oppose our

views. The dinners and balls in the Government-house gave him also a grand idea of British splendour and hospitality. During his sojourn in Calcutta he became indisposed in health, and was so much alarmed about the probable consequences to his health from his staying any longer in that metropolis, that he repeatedly begged the Governor-General to send him to Lodianah to join his family, often and earnestly saying to Mr. Colvin, the private secretary to his Lordship, "Sahab mara zud nazdik ayal i ma bifresed vagarnah inja bimari mara me kusbad va nam argrez dar tamam alam badnam kavahad shud;" meaning, "Send me, Sir, quick to join my family, else the illness will kill me here, and the English will get a bad name—it will be said he was poisoned." The Amir was accordingly sent into the upper provinces, and afterwards to the hills, where he enjoyed the climate and the cold in some degree of his own country. During the insurrection of Kabul he had managed wonderfully to communicate with his son Mohammed Akbar Khan, advising him to do all in his power to destroy us; yet when I met and dined with him at Lodianah, on his being released, and on his way to Lahaur, in order

to proceed to Afghanistan, he said, to please me, that the conduct of Akbar was obnoxious to much blame, and that he believes there is some fault in his birth, and that he does not think him his own son.

On crossing the river Satlaj he was accompanied by Captain Nicolson to the court of the Maharajah Sher Singh,* with whom he entered into a secret treaty of alliance. With regard to the proclamation, which was published by the Earl of Ellenborough, no man of impartial feeling can deny the nobleness and generosity of his Lordship in treating the Amir honourably, and in releasing a prisoner in so dignified a manner. The release of the Amir, said some chiefs of the Panjab, was in variance with the tripartite treaty, while Shahpur and Safdar Jang, the sons of the Shah Shujah-ul-Mulk, were in Afghanistan, and contrary to our then existing alliance with the Lahaur court. However, it was a noble act, and universally admired.

From Lahaur the Amir Dost Mohammed Khan was escorted to the Khaibar Pass by the Sikh authorities, where he was received by his son the Sardar

* He was shot dead by Ajit Singh; and since that the Panjab has been suffering by anarchy, murders, and bloodshed.

THE LATE MAHARAJAH SHER SINGH

Mohammed Akbar Khan and the other chiefs of Afghanistan. There was no limit to the rejoicings of this chieftain at the circumstances which induced our Government to release and restore him to his kingdom. In Kabul, after a few months, he adopted all his old tyrannical system of extortion; and he grew unpopular so suddenly that he was once fired upon, but escaped. He wished to add another to the number of his wives, and fixed his eyes on the daughter of a Morad Khani chief. The intended bride being young, refused to marry the old Amir, but he instantly coloured dark his silvered beard and told her that he was now young, and he must have her. She was forced by her parents to consent to his proposal.

The Amir is now enjoying the authority in Kabul, and the superiority of his family. He is now fearless of an invasion from the West as well as from the East, and he has given himself up again to drinking and to dancing parties, which habits he had forsaken on assuming the title of "Amir-ul-momni." It is said he believes that while he was an enemy to wine he was always involved in difficulties, and that since

he drinks he is prosperous, and has gained his liberty after being in "Qaid i Frang," meaning in an English prison!

THE END.

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