




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FANTASTIC**



The Muslim World *after* 9/11

ANGEL M. RABASA

CHERYL BENARD | PETER CHALK

C. CHRISTINE FAIR | THEODORE KARASIK

ROLLIE LAL | IAN LESSER | DAVID THALER



PROJECT AIR FORCE

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Preface

The tectonic events of the past three years—September 11 and Operation Enduring Freedom, the global war on terrorism, and the war in Iraq and its aftermath—have dramatically affected the Muslim world and attitudes toward the United States. However, some of the dynamics that are influencing the environment in Muslim countries are also the product of trends that have been at work for many decades. The continuation of these trends will make management of the security environment in the Muslim world more difficult in years to come and could increase the demands on U.S. political and military resources. Consequently, it is important to develop a shaping strategy toward the Muslim world that will help to ameliorate the conditions that produce religious and political extremism and anti-U.S. attitudes.

This RAND Corporation study has several purposes: (1) to develop a typology of ideological tendencies in the different regions of the Muslim world, in order to identify the sectors with which the United States can find common ground to promote democracy and stability and counter the influence of extremist and violent groups; (2) to identify the factors that produce religious extremism and violence; (3) to identify the key cleavages and fault lines among sectarian, ethnic, regional, and national lines and to assess how these cleavages generate challenges and opportunities for the United States; and (4) to identify possible strategies and sets of political and military options to help the United States meet challenges and exploit opportunities presented by changed conditions in the Muslim world. Research on this project was completed in the fall of 2003. To the extent possible, the text has been updated to reflect many of the developments that have occurred since that time.

This study builds on previous RAND Project AIR FORCE work on counterterrorism:

- Nora Bensahel, *The Counterterror Coalitions: Cooperation with Europe, NATO, and the European Union* (MR-1746-AF, 2003)
- Kim Cragin and Sara Daly, *The Dynamic Terrorist Threat: An Assessment of Group Motivations and Capabilities in a Changing World* (MR-1782-AF, 2003)

- David A. Ochmanek, *Military Operations Against Terrorist Groups Abroad: Implications for the United States Air Force* (MR-1738-AF, 2003).

It also builds on other RAND Corporation regional security studies:

- Cheryl Benard, *Civil Democratic Islam* (MR-1716-CMEPP, 2003)
- Nora Bensahel and Daniel Byman, eds., *The Future Security Environment in the Middle East: Conflict, Stability, and Political Change* (MR-1640-AF, 2004)
- Angel Rabasa and Peter Chalk, *Indonesia's Transformation and the Stability of Southeast Asia* (MR-1344-AF, 2001).

This research was conducted in the Strategy and Doctrine Program of RAND Project AIR FORCE under the sponsorship of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Air and Space Operations, U.S. Air Force (AF/XO). This report should be of value to the national security community and interested members of the general public, especially those with an interest in U.S. relations with the countries of the Muslim world and in developments in those countries. Research for this project was completed in September 2003. Comments are welcome and should be sent to the project leader, Dr. Angel Rabasa, or the acting RAND Project AIR FORCE Program Director for Strategy and Doctrine, Dr. Alan Vick.

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Summary

Events since September 11, 2001 have dramatically altered the political environment in the Muslim world, a vast and diverse region comprising the band of countries with significant Muslim populations that stretches from West Africa to the southern Philippines, as well as Muslim communities and diasporas scattered throughout the world. In the Muslim world, as in others, religion, politics, and culture are intertwined in complicated ways. The purpose of this study is to examine the dynamics that are driving changes in the religio-political landscape of the Muslim world. Our goal is to provide policymakers and the broader academic and policy community with a general overview of events and trends in the Muslim world that are most likely to affect U.S. interests and security.

First, we develop a typology of ideological tendencies or orientations in the various regions of the Muslim world. The world's Muslims differ substantially not only in their religious views but also in their political and social orientation, including their conceptions of government, law, and human rights; their social agenda (in particular, women's rights and the content of education); and their propensity for violence. The defining characteristics of the main tendencies in Islam are summarized in a typology that we apply on a region-by-region basis. This methodology allows for a more precise classification of groups and for comparisons across regions and allows us to identify in a systematic way the sectors with which the United States and its allies can find common ground to promote democracy and stability and counter the influence of extremist and violent groups.

Having begun to lay the foundations for what could be called a "religio-political map," we explore the main cleavages in the Muslim world, primarily those between the Sunni and Shi'a branches of Islam and between the Arab and the non-Arab Muslim worlds and those deriving from membership in subnational communities, tribes, and clans.

The majority of the world's Muslims are Sunni, but a significant minority, about 15 percent of the global Muslim population, are Shi'ites. Shi'ites are the dominant group in Iran, and they form a politically excluded majority in Iraq (until

the fall of Saddam), Bahrain, and possibly also in the eastern province of Saudi Arabia, where the dominant Wahhabi ideology stigmatizes them as “polytheists.”

The expectations of Iraqi Shi’ites for a greater say in the governance of their country presents an opportunity for the United States to align its policy with Shi’ite aspirations for greater freedom of religious and political expression, in Iraq and elsewhere. If this alignment can be brought about, it could be a powerful barrier to radical Iranian influence and a foundation for a stable U.S. position in the region. Of course, this alignment would not come about easily. A reversal of the U.S. commitment to de-Ba’athification in Iraq or a U.S. policy that is perceived as pro-Sunni would erode trust in the U.S. commitment to democracy and drive otherwise moderate Shi’ites into the arms of Iran.

The second major cleavage is between the Arab and the non-Arab worlds. Arabs constitute only about 20 percent of the world’s Muslims, yet interpretations of Islam, political and otherwise, are often filtered through an Arab lens. A great deal of the discourse on Muslim issues and grievances is actually discourse on Arab issues and grievances. For reasons that have more to do with historical and cultural development than religion, the Arab world exhibits a higher incidence of economic, social, and political disorders than other regions of the so-called developing world.

By contrast, the non-Arab parts of the Muslim world are politically more inclusive, boast the majority of the democratic or partially democratic governments, and are more secular in outlook. Although the Arab Middle East has long been regarded (and certainly views itself) as the core of the Muslim world, the most innovative and sophisticated contemporary work in Islam is being done on the “periphery”—in countries such as Indonesia and in Muslim communities in the West, leading some scholars to ask whether Islam’s center of gravity is now shifting to more dynamic regions of the Muslim world.

Ethnic communities, tribes, and clans often constitute the principal basis of individual and group identity and the primary engine of political behavior. The failure to fully understand tribal politics was one of the underlying causes of the catastrophic U.S. involvement in the Somali conflict in the early 1990s. Ten years later, the U.S. government still knows little about tribal dynamics in areas where U.S. forces are or may be operating. As the United States pursues an activist policy in disturbed areas of the world, it will be critical to understand and to learn to manage subnational and tribal issues.

The third goal of this study is to examine the sources of Islamic radicalism. We break these sources into three classes: conditions, processes, and catalytic events. Conditions are factors that have a permanent, or quasi-permanent, character. They are the result of processes, which are developments that occur over an extended period of time and have a particular outcome. Catalytic events are major developments—wars or revolutions—that changed the political dynamics in a region or

country in a fundamental way. Table S.1 gives examples of conditions, processes, and catalytic events relevant to our study.

The condition that perhaps more than any other has shaped the political environment of the Muslim world, and the Arab world in particular, is the widespread failure of the postindependence political and economic models. Arguably, many of the ills and pathologies that afflict many countries in this part of the world and that generate much of the extremism we are concerned about derive from—and contribute to—economic and political failure. This situation leads to the concept of structural anti-Westernism (or anti-Americanism). This concept holds that that Muslim anger has deep roots in the political and social structures of some Muslim countries and that opposition to certain U.S. policies merely provides the content and opportunity for the expression of this anger. It differs fundamentally from the type of anti-Americanism that may result from objections to specific U.S. policies in that it is not amenable to amelioration through policy or public diplomacy means. The third condition discussed is the decentralization of religious authority in Sunni Islam, which makes it vulnerable to manipulation by extremists with scant religious credentials.

Processes include the Islamic resurgence experienced by much of the Muslim world over the past three decades. Outside the Arab Middle East, Islamization has involved the importation of Arab-origin ideology and religious and social practices—a phenomenon that we refer to as *Arabization*. This process has had a polarizing effect outside the Middle East, creating greater distance between Muslims who have chosen to adopt elements of the Arab religious culture as a way of manifesting greater piety and those Muslims who continue to adhere to local customs and religious practices.

Table S.1
Sources of Islamic Radicalism

Conditions	Failed political and economic models Structural anti-Westernism Decentralization of religious authority in Sunni Islam
Processes	The Islamic resurgence Arabization of the non-Arab Muslim world External funding of religious fundamentalism and extremism The convergence of Islamism and tribalism Growth of radical Islamic networks Emergence of the mass media The Palestinian-Israeli and Kashmir conflicts
Catalytic events	The Iranian revolution The Afghan war The Gulf War of 1991 September 11 and the global war on terrorism The Iraq war

Much has been written about Saudi funding and the export of its fundamentalist version of Islam as a factor in the spread of radical and violent movements. The funds that finance the propagation of Wahhabi ideology throughout the world come from public and private sources and are channeled through a variety of foundations and middlemen to recipients around the world. Until recently, efforts to establish accountability have been weak or nonexistent, either because it has had low priority for donors or because the mechanisms to monitor the disposition and use of the money are lacking.

Although the literature on the relationship between tribalism and radicalism is not yet well developed, interviews in the region and anecdotal evidence suggest that extremist tendencies seem to find fertile ground in areas with segmentary lineal tribal societies. Tribal conservatism—a cultural and not a religious feature—and religious extremism can be mutually reinforcing. In the absence of countervailing forces—for instance, a strong central authority—they produce a mix that, in the words of a Kuwaiti interlocutor, “leads to bin Laden.”

We cannot overemphasize the importance of the development of networks in the growth of Islamic extremist and terrorist movements, and we devote a chapter of this study to analyzing their structure and influence. These networks may be explicitly Muslim in nature or simply collections of individuals who share a common religious background. They can be diasporic (that is, related to Muslim communities outside the Muslim world), humanitarian, or financial. As we now know, support networks have been key nodes in the funding and operations of extremist and terrorist groups.

Another important process is the emergence of the satellite regional media, whose most visible manifestation is the well-known Qatar-based network Al-Jazeera, whose political line reflects that of the Qatari Muslim Brotherhood. These new media reinforce existing stereotypes and narratives of Arab victimization that play into the radicals’ agendas.

Beyond those factors, the specific modalities that radical political Islam has taken are the product of a number of critical or catalytic events that have altered the political environment in the Muslim world in fundamental ways. Catalytic events include the Iranian revolution, the Afghan war, the Gulf War of 1991, the global war on terrorism that followed the September 11 terrorist attacks, and the Iraq war of 2003. The Palestinian-Israeli conflict and the Kashmir conflict are not catalytic events per se but rather chronic conditions that have shaped political discourse in the Middle East and South Asia for over half a century. Arguably, they have retarded the political maturation of the Arab world and Pakistan by diverting scarce material, political, and psychic resources from pressing internal problems.

The aftermath of September 11, particularly Operation Enduring Freedom and expanded U.S. counterterrorism operations across the Muslim world, brought about a strategic realignment, as a number of countries in the Muslim world sided openly

with the United States in the global war on terrorism or quietly expanded their counterterrorism cooperation. The most dramatic change was in Pakistan, where President Musharraf presented himself as a bulwark against Islamic extremism. After Afghanistan, Southeast Asia was regarded as the “second front” in the war on terrorism, and the United States stepped up counterterrorist cooperation with regional governments. In Central Asia, the de facto alliance with the United States removed the Taliban threat to the Central Asian republics and brought money, opportunities, stature, and unprecedented international attention to the region. It is in the context of this geopolitical realignment that the war in Iraq brought U.S. power into the heart of the Middle East.

The war in Iraq and its aftermath can be regarded as the most potentially significant event in the U.S. relationship with the countries of the Greater Middle East in the past half-century. For the first time since the withdrawal of the European colonial powers from the Middle East, a Western-led coalition assumed responsibility for the governance and political reconstruction of a Muslim country, pending the establishment of a permanent constitution and government. In the short run, the major threat to Iraq’s stability is posed by the increasingly organized Sunni-based insurgency. The long-term threat, however, is not popular support for the extremists but the strengthening of Islamic fundamentalist forces, both Sunni and Shi’a, and the manipulation of Shi’ite movements by Iran.

Over the medium to long term, the impact of Iraq on the political evolution of the Greater Middle East will depend on whether the new Iraq emerges as a pluralistic and reasonably democratic and stable state or whether it reverts to authoritarianism or fragments into ethnic enclaves. The first outcome would challenge current negative perceptions of the United States’ role in the region, demonstrate that some form of democracy—what we call “democracy with Iraqi characteristics”—is possible in the Middle East, and undermine extremists and autocrats alike. However, any of the unfavorable outcomes would further destabilize the Middle East, diminish U.S. credibility and influence, discredit democracy-based policies, and open opportunities for encroachment by U.S. adversaries in a vital region of the world.

The impact of the war in Iraq and the removal of the Saddam regime was more attenuated in the geographically and culturally distant regions of the Muslim world. The war in Iraq did not strongly resonate in Central Asia. For the Central Asian republics, the key event of the post–September 11 period was the regional governments’ partnership with the United States and the overthrow of the Taliban government in Afghanistan. For the most part, mainstream Muslim sectors in South and Southeast Asia opposed the war in Iraq, but the war does not appear to have had lasting effects on the evolution of political Islam or on U.S. relations with South and Southeast Asian states. This is not to say that the war in Iraq did not introduce a new and complicating factor into the war on terrorism in those regions or that it did not have an adverse effect on perceptions of the United States.

Thus, while outside the Middle East the war and subsequent developments have not altered trend lines or the fundamentals of the U.S. relationship with countries in those regions, it can and is being used by radicals to gain influence. Nevertheless, a liberal minority shares the U.S. expectation that the removal of Saddam opens the prospect of democratic evolution in Iraq and in the Muslim world at large.

Radical and dogmatic interpretations of Islam have gained ground in many Muslim societies, for reasons that we explore in this volume. The outcome of the “war of ideas” under way throughout the Muslim world is likely to have great consequences for U.S. interests in the region, but it is also the most difficult for the United States to influence. How can the United States respond to the challenges and opportunities that current conditions in the Muslim world pose to U.S. interests? We suggest a number of social, political, and military options (see pages 60–67).

Promote Moderate Network Creation

The radicals are a minority, but in many areas they hold the advantage because they have developed extensive networks spanning the Muslim world and sometimes reaching beyond it. Liberal and moderate Muslims, although a majority in almost all countries, have not created similar networks. Their voices are often fractured or silenced. The battle for Islam will require the creation of liberal groups to retrieve Islam from the hijackers of the religion. Creation of an international network is critical because such a network would provide a platform to amplify the message of moderates and also to provide them some protection. However, moderates do not have the resources to create this network themselves. The initial impulse may require an external catalyst.

Disrupt Radical Networks

Most of the networks described in this study perform socially useful functions. A key question is how the United States can identify hostile use of these networks. There are several approaches to consider. One is to examine the profiles of communities that sustain violent Islamic networks and the nodal and communicative characteristics of these networks. Once the characteristics of these networks are known and their recruitment patterns and weaknesses identified, a strategy of nodal disruption could be implemented to break up these networks and to empower Muslim moderates to take over the transmission belts that sustain the networks.

Foster Madrassa and Mosque Reform

Radical madrassas (Islamic boarding schools) from Pakistan to Southeast Asia have been one of the main sources of personnel for radical movements and terrorist groups. Despite the importance of madrassa reform, few concrete plans have emerged to design and implement specific changes in these schools, and little consideration has been given to how they fit within the broader reform of public education systems, which can help produce more desirable economic, political, and social outcomes. There is an urgent need for the United States and other concerned countries and international institutions to support the reform of Islamic schools, to ensure that these schools are able to provide a broad modern education and marketable skills. This reform is key to breaking the cycle of radicalized madrassas producing cannon fodder for radical and terrorist groups. In some countries, the United States could help to establish or strengthen higher education accreditation boards that monitor and review curricula in both state and private schools.

Although the United States may be reluctant to involve itself in ostensibly religious affairs, it should find ways to support the efforts of governments and moderate Muslim organizations to ensure that mosques, and the social services affiliated with them, serve their communities and do not serve as platforms for the spread of radical ideologies.

Expand Economic Opportunities

“Youth bulges” and high rates of population growth in many Muslim countries will create educational, economic, and social needs that are being met in many places only by radical Islamist organizations. Lack of economic growth and employment opportunities could push still more individuals and communities to support radical organizations and initiatives and could ultimately pose a threat to U.S. security interests.

Provision of alternative social services in many places might help to indirectly undercut the appeal of radical organizations. In particular, the United States should be most concerned with initiatives that would improve the economic prospects of the young. Assistance from U.S. and international sources needs to be channeled in ways that are appropriate to local circumstances and, to the extent possible, rely on non-governmental organizations (NGOs) with existing relationships in the recipient countries. Funding for education and cultural programs run by secular or moderate Muslim organizations should be a priority to counter the influence of radical groups.

Assistance programs in the Muslim world that promote economic expansion and self-sufficiency can help reduce the perception that the United States has only military interests in the region, a perception that likely contributes to opposition to all U.S. interests there. Improving economic, political, and social conditions will not

guarantee an end to terrorism or extremism, but it could reduce the potential for popular support of extremist movements. To succeed, these programs would have to be accountable and transparent—otherwise they simply foster corruption among administrators. And they need to be linked to economic and fiscal policies on the part of the recipient countries that promote economic rationality, productivity, and growth.

Support “Civil Islam”

Support of or stronger links with “civil Islam”—Muslim civil society groups that advocate moderation and modernity—is an essential component of an effective U.S. policy toward the Muslim world. Moderate political Islam in a democratic context could offset the appeal of theocratic movements or of those favoring exclusively Islamic states. Funding of educational and cultural activities by secular or moderate Muslim organizations should be a priority. The United States may also have to assist in the development of democratic and civil society institutions where they do not currently exist. Ensuring that these institutions are transparent and protective of minority rights—including, of course, the rights of Muslims where they are a minority—can have long-term benefits for perceptions of the United States in the Muslim world.

Deny Resources to Extremists

A complementary element of the strategy of supporting secular or moderate Muslim organizations is to deny resources to extremists. This effort needs to be undertaken at both ends of the funding cycle. The point of origin of the funding is Saudi Arabia and other countries in the Gulf. The Saudis have begun to take steps to monitor their funding activities more closely and to close down the branches of some suspect charities, but it is unclear that there are adequate safeguards to ensure that funds are not diverted to extremist or terrorist organizations. The technical capabilities of the recipient countries also need to be strengthened to give them the capability to monitor and, when necessary, to interdict suspect financial flows.

Balance the Requirements of the War on Terrorism and of Stability and Democracy in Moderate Muslim Countries

Radicals will continue to present U.S. actions as a war against Islam and will attempt to use them to destabilize moderate governments. The United States, therefore, should calibrate carefully its next steps in the war on terrorism with a view to avoid-

ing destabilizing effects. This is not to say that the United States should soft-pedal antiterrorist actions or condone inaction by these governments. However, it is also important for the United States to demonstrate that its efforts are meant not to strengthen authoritarian or repressive regimes but to promote democratic change in the Muslim world.

Seek to Engage Islamists in Normal Politics

A difficult issue in the development of Muslim democracy is whether or how Islamist groups that may not have fully credible democratic credentials—for instance, the Muslim Brotherhood—may be engaged in the democratic process. While there is always a danger that an Islamist party, once in power, may move against democratic freedoms, the inclusion of such groups within existing, open democratic institutions may have the effect over time of taming the threat they pose to the system. This is particularly the case in parts of the Muslim world that have stronger democratic traditions in which public opinion can be expressed through the ballot box and whose governments have ties to broad international alliances. An unequivocal commitment to nonviolence and democratic processes should be a prerequisite for inclusion. For its part, the United States should register its opposition to electoral machinations designed to marginalize legitimate opposition parties.

Engage Muslim Diasporas

Engagement of diaspora Muslim communities can also help the United States advance its interests in the Muslim world. The U.S. Muslim communities are a unique source of cultural information that can be harnessed to the promotion of democracy and pluralism in the Muslim world. One possibility is working with Muslim NGOs in responding to humanitarian crises in the Muslim world. Needless to say, any effort to incorporate transnational Islamic organizations in development should be undertaken cautiously. At the same time, the U.S. military has proven itself adept at meeting ad hoc needs of Islamist groups, as, for example, its civil affairs officers did in assisting those in need of short-term care during massive international pilgrimages to Shi'ite shrines in Iraq after the fall of Saddam.

Rebuild Close Military-to-Military Relations with Key Countries

The military will continue to be an influential political actor across the Muslim world. In some countries—Pakistan, for instance—the military will likely control the state for the policy-relevant future. More often than not, the military is on the fore-

front of the war on terrorism. In Turkey and Indonesia, the military establishments are also pillars of their respective countries' secular political institutions. Therefore, military-to-military relations will be of particular importance to any U.S. shaping strategy in the Muslim world.

U.S. legislative restrictions on military-to-military relations—for instance, the Pressler amendment and its sequelae in Pakistan and the Leahy amendments in Indonesia—precipitated a serious disconnect between the United States and the military establishments in two of the most important countries in the Muslim world, a breach that will take years to repair. Rebuilding a core of U.S.-trained officers in key Muslim countries is therefore a critical need. Programs such as International Military Education and Training (IMET) not only ensure that future military leaders are exposed to American military values and practices but can also translate into increased U.S. influence and access.

Build Appropriate Military Capabilities

Militarily, the United States faces a need to reduce the more obvious aspects of its presence while working to increase different types of presence, e.g., intelligence, psychological operations, civil affairs. In some places in the Muslim world, this will mean continuing to reduce a heavy (and politically sensitive) forward presence and instead seeking to support operations from consolidated regional locations. Islamists, particularly in the Middle East, have often used the U.S. military presence as a reason for violence. A lower U.S. military profile may reduce targets for such violence. In Iraq, it would certainly be desirable for U.S. forces to lower their presence in populated areas as soon as operationally feasible, reducing U.S. visibility as an “occupying power” and promoting rapid development of Iraqi military and security forces.

Likewise, establishing main operating airbases in Iraq is not politically desirable in the foreseeable future. However, the United States should not foreclose the option of access to Iraqi military facilities, if welcomed by a sovereign Iraqi government, which could be necessary to respond to future military contingencies in the Gulf.

Civil affairs are a promising area for military cooperation in countering the influence of radical Islamic networks. The interaction of U.S. and other countries' militaries in the area of military medicine could be an excellent model for engagement in responding to the effects of conflict and natural disasters.

Ungoverned areas throughout the Muslim world, from isolated portions of Indonesia and the Philippines to large tracks of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Yemen, can become havens for extremist and terrorist groups. Political and economic stabilization in such areas will reduce opportunities for extremism and terrorism to take root. Not only can greater government presence, supported as necessary by the United

States, help reduce the immediate threat of Islamist terrorism, it can also foster a greater sense of national integration, thus helping to increase long-term security.

Better cultural intelligence is needed. While the relative lack of Arab specialists in military and intelligence positions is well known, the need for specialists in, among other matters, Persian and African regions and languages is less well known but nearly as urgent. Some U.S. intelligence and diplomatic capabilities in parts of the Muslim world have atrophied in the past two years as a result of redeployment to other areas of this region. A transnational approach will also be needed to address what are often transnational rather than isolated national phenomena. This may include working with regional alliances to root out militant Islamist organizations that operate across international boundaries.

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Abbreviations

ABIM	Islamic Youth Movement of Malaysia
AFMIC	Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center
AHDI	Alternative Human Development Index
AIMMM	All India Muslim Majlis-e-Mushawarat
AIMPLB	All India Muslim Personal Law Board
AKP	Justice and Development Party (Turkey)
ANAP	Motherland Party (Turkey)
AOR	Area of Responsibility
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AUMA	Association of Algerian Muslim Ulama
BIF	Benevolence International Foundation
BIN	National Intelligence Agency (Indonesia)
BJP	Bharatiya Janata Party (India)
CARs	Central Asian republics
CDLR	Committee for the Defense of Legitimate Rights
CENTCOM	U.S. Central Command
CHP	Republican Peoples Party (Turkey)
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency (U.S.)
CIDES	Centre for Information and Development Studies (Indonesia)
CIRF	Council on International Religious Freedom (U.S.)
DDII	Indonesian Islamic Propagation Council
DPR	House of Representatives (Indonesia)
DUMK	Muslim Spiritual Administration of Kazakhstan
DYP	True Path Party (Turkey)
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States

ESB	Election Supervisory Board (Iran)
EUCOM	U.S. European Command
FATA	Federally Administered Tribal Areas (Pakistan)
FPI	Islam Defenders Front (Indonesia)
FSU	Former Soviet Union
FYR	Former Yugoslav Republic
GAM	Free Aceh Movement (Indonesia)
GEM	Gender Empowerment Measure
GIA	Armed Islamic Group (Algeria)
GICM	Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group
GSPC	Group for Salafist Preaching and Combat
HAMAS	Islamic Resistance Movement (Palestinian Territories)
HAYAT	Turkish Humanitarian Organization
HM	Hizbul Mujahadeen (Pakistan)
HuA	Harkat-ul-Ansar (Pakistan)
HUMINT	human intelligence
HuT	Hizb ut-Tahir (International)
ICG	International Crisis Group
I.SHAD.	Solidarity Association for Business Life (Turkey)
IAF	Islamic Action Front
IB	Intelligence Bureau (Pakistan)
IBDA/C	Great East Islamic Raiders Front
ICG	International Crisis Group
ICMI	Indonesian Association of Islamic Intellectuals
IHS	Islamic Health Society
IIFSO	International Islamic Federation of Student Organizations
IIRO	International Islamic Relief Organization
ILP	Islamic Liberation Party
IMET	International Military Education and Training
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IMIK	Islamic Movement of Iraqi Kurdistan
IMN	Islamic Movement of Nigeria
IMU	Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan

INC	Indian National Congress
IRGC	Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (Iran)
IRP	Islamic Renaissance Party (Tajikistan)
ISI	Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (Pakistan)
ITP	Islami Tehreek Pakistan
IUML	Indian Union Muslim League
JAH	Jamiat Ahle Hadith (Pakistan)
JI	Jama'at-i-Islami (Pakistan)
JI	Jemaah Islamiyah (Southeast Asia)
JKLF	Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (Kashmir)
JM	Jaish-e-Mohammed (Pakistan)
JUI	Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Islam (Pakistan)
JUI-F	Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam, Fezalur Rehman Faction (Pakistan)
JUP	Jama'at al Ulema-e-Pakistan (Pakistan)
KAMMI	Indonesian Muslim Student Action Union
KISDI	Committee of Solidarity with the Muslim World (Indonesia)
KMM	Malaysian Militant Organization
KPPSI	Komite Persiapan Penerimaan Syariat Islam (Indonesia)
LeT	Lashkar-e-Taiba (Pakistan)
MI	Military Intelligence (Pakistan)
MIA	Armed Islamic Movement (Algeria)
MILF	Moro Islamic Liberation Front (Philippines)
MIRA	Movement for Islamic Reform in Arabia
MMA	Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (Pakistan)
MMI	Indonesian Mujahidin Council
MNLF	Moro National Liberation Front (Philippines)
MPR	People's Consultative Assembly (Indonesia)
MSA	Muslim Student Association of North America and Canada
MSF	Medecins Sans Frontieres
MUSIAD	Independent Association of Industrialists and Businessmen (Turkey)
MUSIAD	Independent Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association (Turkey)
NAB	National Accountability Bureau (Pakistan)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NDP	National Democratic Party (Egypt)
NCERT	National Council of Educational Research and Training (India)
NGO	nongovernmental organization
NNPC	National Nigerian Petroleum Company
NSP	National Salvation Party (Turkey)
NU	Nahdlatul Ulama (Indonesia)
NWFP	Northwest Frontier Provinces (Pakistan)
OPEC	Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
PACOM	U.S. Pacific Command
PADC	Pakistan-Afghan Defence Council
PAN	National Mandate Party (Indonesia)
PAS	Pan-Malay Islamic Party (Malaysia)
PBB	Crescent and Star Party (Indonesia)
PDI-P	Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle
PDS	Prosperous Peace Party
PFLP	Palestinian Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
PIJ	Palestinian Islamic Jihad
PJD	Party of Justice and Development (Morocco)
PKB	Political Awakening Party (Indonesia)
PKK	Kurdistan Workers Party (Turkey)
PKS	Prosperous Justice Party (Indonesia)
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
PML-N	Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz
PML-Q	Pakistan Muslim League-Qaid
PPIM	Center for the Study of Islam and Society (Indonesia)
PPP	Pakistan People's Party
PPP	United Development Party (Indonesia)
PSI	Pan Sahelian Initiative
PUK	Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (Iraq)
PULO	Patani United Liberation Organization (Thailand)
QLI	Quranic Literacy Institute
RFE/RL	Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
RSS	Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (India)

SCIRI	Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution of Iraq
SIMI	Students Islamic Movement of India
SIO	Students Islamic Organization of India
SMP	Sipha-e-Mohammad Pakistan
SSP	Sipha-e-Sahaba Pakistan
TJP	Tehrik-e-Jafria Pakistan
TNFJ	Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Fiqha-e-Jafria (Pakistan)
TNI	Indonesian National Military
TUSIAD	Turkish Businessmen's and Industrialists' Association
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UIC	Union of Islamic Communities
UMNO	United Malays National Organization (Malaysia)
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
U.P.	Uttar Pradesh (India)
UTO	United Tajik Opposition (Tajikistan)
VHP	Vishva Hindu Parisha (India)
WAMY	World Assembly of Muslim Youth
WML	World Muslim League
WTO	World Trade Organization

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Glossary

<i>abangan</i>	nonpracticing Muslims (Indonesia)
<i>abaya</i>	garment worn by Muslim women (see “chador”)
<i>al-salaf al-salih; salafiyyah</i>	righteous ancestors
<i>asabiyyah</i>	sectarianism
<i>bazaari</i>	trader
<i>bid'a</i>	an innovation prohibited by Islam
<i>bonyad</i> (Iran)	foundation
<i>bumiputra</i>	Malays and other indigenous peoples (Malaysia)
<i>chador</i>	woman’s large black sheet-like garment
<i>da'iyah</i>	popular preachers
<i>da'wa</i> , (Indonesia, <i>dakwah</i>)	preaching and spreading the word of Islam
<i>dar-ul-harb</i>	land of war (non-Muslim parts of the world)
<i>datus; datos</i>	Muslim nobility (Southeast Asia)
<i>dhimmi</i>	protected non-Muslims living in Muslim areas
<i>fatwa</i>	ruling on Islamic law issued by a religious scholar
<i>fiqh</i>	Islamic jurisprudence
<i>fuqaha</i> (Iran)	clerical elites
<i>gama'a; jemmah; jaamat</i>	community
<i>hadith</i>	Record of the Prophet Muhammad’s sayings and actions
<i>hajj</i>	pilgrimage to Mecca
<i>haram</i>	forbidden
<i>hawala</i>	informal system of money transfer

<i>hejira</i>	flight; the departure of the Prophet Muhammad from Mecca to Medina in 622
<i>hijab</i> (Persian. <i>hejab</i>)	veil or Muslim woman's head covering
<i>hudna</i>	ceasefire
<i>hudud</i>	criminal law component of shari'a
<i>ijara</i>	leasing
<i>ijtihad</i>	independent reasoning (lit. "effort in the cause of truth")
<i>ikhwan</i>	brethren
<i>jahiliyyah</i>	the ignorance that prevailed before Muhammad's revelation
<i>jihad</i>	struggle, either a virtuous inner struggle or a military struggle to defend or expand Islam (see below)
<i>jihad al-musallah</i>	holy war; armed jihad
<i>jizya</i>	poll tax paid by non-Muslims in lieu of military service
<i>kafir</i>	unbeliever
<i>madrassa</i>	religious boarding school
<i>majlis</i> (Persian, <i>majles</i>)	council
<i>manteau</i> (Iran)	woman's long coat
<i>mawlid</i>	festival commemorating the birth of the prophet Muhammad or an event related to the life of a saint
<i>mazhab</i>	school of Islamic jurisprudence
<i>murabah</i>	trade financing
<i>musharakah</i>	partnership
<i>mushrikin</i>	idolators
<i>pesantren</i>	Indonesian religious boarding schools
<i>riba</i>	interest on money
<i>rusari</i> (Persian)	headscarf
<i>shari'a</i>	Islamic law
<i>shura</i>	consultation
<i>sunna</i>	The moral example set by the prophet Muhammad as recorded in the <i>hadiths</i>

<i>ta'wil</i>	a method of interpretation used by Sufis and Shi'ites
<i>takfir</i>	excommunication of other Muslims as infidels
<i>talaq</i>	divorce
<i>tariqa</i> (Turkish, <i>tarikat</i>)	brotherhood; usually Sufi
<i>tawhid</i>	the oneness of God
<i>ulama/ulema</i>	religious scholars
<i>umma</i>	The worldwide Muslim community
<i>velayat-e faqih</i> (Iran)	guardianship of the jurist; the Ayatollah Khomeini's theory of supreme religious authority
<i>zakat</i>	almsgiving, one of the five obligations of Islam
<i>zawiya</i>	Sufi brotherhoods

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Overview

Angel M. Rabasa

Introduction

Events since September 11, 2001 have dramatically altered the political environment in the Muslim world, a vast and diverse region comprising the band of countries with significant Muslim populations that stretches from western Africa to the southern Philippines, as well as Muslim communities and diasporas scattered throughout the world.¹ The United States—through its response to the September 2001 terrorist attacks, the subsequent war on terrorism, and the removal from power of the Taliban in Afghanistan and of Saddam Hussein and his regime in Iraq—has become deeply involved in the affairs of the Muslim world, where religion, politics, and culture are intertwined in complicated ways and intersect with the geopolitical interests of major powers.

This book examines the dynamics leading to religious and political changes in the Muslim world, particularly its “religio-politics” in which relations with God provide shape and meaning to political action and orientations (Green, 1985), and the implications of these developments for U.S. and Western interests. We review previous research on the aspects of the Muslim world most important to current U.S. interests and also report insights gathered from interviews with scholars and other leading figures across various regions of the Muslim world. Our goals are (1) to give policymakers and the broader academic and policy community a general overview of events and trends in the Muslim world that are most likely to affect U.S. interests and security and (2) to provide detailed analyses in subsequent chapters for those with a specific interest in individual countries or regions.

This study examines the dynamics that are driving changes in the religio-political landscape of the Muslim world in order to develop, on the basis of that analysis, a strategy, or the elements of a strategy, that will help to ameliorate the con-

¹ Azyumardi Azra, the rector of Indonesia’s State Islamic University, distinguishes the following cultural zones within the Muslim world, each with distinct religio-political characteristics: Arab, Persian, Turkic, Indian Subcontinent, Sudanese-African, Malay-Indonesian, Sino-Islamic, and Western Hemisphere. Discussion with Azyumardi Azra, Jakarta, June 2003.

ditions that produce religious and political extremism and anti-U.S. attitudes. Our methodology is the following:

First, we develop a typology of ideological orientations in the different regions of the Muslim world, based on the overall position of their adherents on seven major marker issues or areas. This methodology allows for a more precise classification of groups and for comparisons across regions and allows us to identify in a systematic way the sectors with which the United States and its allies can find common ground to promote democracy and stability and counter the influence of extremist and violent groups.

Second, we identify the key cleavages and fault lines among sectarian, ethnic, regional, and national lines and to assess how these cleavages generate challenges and opportunities for the United States.

Third, we examine the factors that produce religious extremism and violence. The analysis focuses on conditions, processes, and catalytic events that have given rise to Islamic radicalism. In subsequent chapters, we examine in detail the operation of these factors and their effects on the growth of extremist and violent movements in different regions of the Muslim world.

Fourth, we derive strategies and sets of political and military options for the United States to meet challenges and exploit opportunities presented by changed conditions in the Muslim world.

This overview provides a tour d'horizon of the book. It offers an introduction to the contemporary Muslim world; outlines the analytical framework of the study; summarizes the main points of the individual chapters; and pulls together the key themes, findings, and recommendations. The chapters that constitute the body of the report apply this framework to the regions of the Muslim world: the Arab Middle East, the Maghreb, Turkey, Iran, South Asia, Central Asia, Southeast Asia, West Africa, and Muslim diasporas and networks scattered throughout the world.

The regional structure of the report recognizes that while events since September 11 have affected U.S. relations with all parts of the Muslim world, they have done so in different ways in different regions. Given the size and diversity of Muslim populations, no general discussion will be able to fully capture the complexity of the Muslim landscape. Accordingly, we consider this work as only the beginning of an effort that will improve with continued critique and analysis.

Threats and Challenges

We are concerned with three types of threats and challenges to U.S. interests:

- Direct physical threats against U.S. citizens and installations

- Destabilization of friendly states
- Growth of anti-U.S., anti-Western, and antidemocratic ideologies.

Preventing direct threats against the United States is the goal of the current war on terrorism, with the eradication of Al Qaeda and related terror networks the highest U.S. security priority. Cooperation in combating terrorism is therefore a critical component of U.S. relations with Muslim countries, but it is not the only one. Beyond the problem of terrorism lies the issue of the future shape of the Muslim world and whether that world will be hospitable to U.S. interests and values.

Balancing Democracy and Stability

Destabilization of friendly but authoritarian states poses a complex set of challenges. Statesmen of the realist school, which historically has guided U.S. policies toward the Muslim world, valued regime stability nearly above all else. At the end of the 1991 Gulf War, fear of the consequences of the destabilization of Iraq informed the U.S. administration's decision to stop short of overthrowing Saddam Hussein and to allow him to crush the Kurdish and Shi'ite rebellions. For the following decade, the United States had to live with the consequences of that decision. Because of that experience, some policymakers now hold that U.S. interests are sometimes better served by regime change in antithetical authoritarian states. In some cases, support for regime change is clearly the superior option. There is little question, for instance, that most alternatives to the current Iranian theocracy would produce a government more respectful of the Iranian people's political and human rights, less likely to proceed with the development of nuclear weapons or to support terrorist groups, and more favorably disposed toward cooperation with the United States and other democratic states. The policy questions relate to the cost-benefit calculus implicit in any set of U.S. actions designed to promote democratic change.

Differentiating between transitions that can be expected to lead to more pluralistic and democratic political systems and those that might lead to more repressive and regressive regimes is more difficult in the case of friendly authoritarian states. This requires some fine-grained analysis of the relative strengths and long-term goals of the political forces at play.

The best-case scenario in the democratization of friendly authoritarian states assumes that a transition from authoritarianism, although initially disruptive, will produce a more democratic and benign environment over the long term. In this view, a democratic or democratizing Muslim world would reduce or remove some of the structural causes of extremism and anti-Americanism.

However, promoting political change in friendly authoritarian states could be enormously destabilizing in the short term, particularly in the absence of democratic political alternatives and strong civil society institutions. The overthrow of the Shah

of Iran is a cautionary case in point. Algeria is a tale of democratic transition that produced an Islamist electoral majority, but instead of moving the country toward more inclusive politics, it precipitated a military crackdown and a radical Islamist insurgency of unprecedented violence. In Egypt, the keystone of U.S.-supported international order in the Arab world, the Mubarak government's authoritarian methods have driven the political opposition into underground, largely extremist channels, leaving little room for a democratic alternative to emerge. In Saudi Arabia, the most serious threat to the regime's stability comes from religious radicals espousing a more extreme version of the official ideology itself. In Pakistan, a key partner in the U.S. counterterrorist strategy, a weakening of the Musharraf government could produce a further deterioration of that country's fragile political environment. Political turmoil in Pakistan would be extraordinarily dangerous because of Pakistan's possession of nuclear weapons and the possibility that these weapons could fall into the hands of terrorists or a radical regime.

The War of Ideas

The difficulty in predicting the consequences of regime change may stem from a failure to understand the growth of ideologies opposed to U.S. interests, values, and policies. Radical and dogmatic interpretations of Islam have gained ground in many Muslim societies, for reasons that will be explored in this volume. Radical Islamists employ accusations of apostasy against liberal Muslims. They wage their battles in the mass media and in the political arena. Sometimes they go to court to sue their opponents for violating Islamic law and find conservative judges who declare their targets guilty and subject to the prescribed penalties.² Sometimes, as has happened in Egypt, Iran, and Sudan, liberal Muslim intellectuals are imprisoned, murdered, or forced to flee overseas.

The outcome of the "war of ideas" under way throughout the Muslim world is likely to have great consequences for U.S. interests in the region, but it is also the most difficult for the United States to influence. Even friendly governments wishing to cooperate with the United States on regional security issues may be constrained by domestic perceptions. It is fundamentally difficult for non-Muslims to influence the perceptions of Muslims about their own religion. Only Muslims themselves have the credibility to challenge the misuse of Islam by radicals. As we shall see later, however, Muslim moderates are constrained in this effort by a variety of political and psychological factors.

² Hasan Hanafi, "Alternative Conceptions of Civil Society: A Reflective Islamic Approach," in Hashmi, ed. (2002).

Muslims and “Islamic” Movements

The terms *Muslim* and *Islamic* are often used interchangeably in discussions of Islam. In social and political analyses, however, there are important differences (Denoeux, 2002). *Muslim* refers to a religious and cultural reality; *Islamic* denotes political intent. For example, a Muslim country is one in which the majority of the population is Muslim, whereas an Islamic state is one that bases its legitimacy on Islam.

Islamic fundamentalism implies a return to the foundations of the faith, and therefore it could be seen as a variant of fundamentalism also found in other religions.³ Nevertheless, because adherents of any religion can, in a sense, be seen as “fundamentalists” in their quest to follow the fundamental tenets of their faith, and because “fundamentalist” radicals claiming to return to the original meaning of the religion are in fact mobilizing modern discontent, some scholars prefer other terms, such as “Islamic revivalists,” for those commonly referred to as Islamic fundamentalists.

Moreover, “Islamic revivalists” and “Islamic fundamentalists” encompass a broad range of religious adherence and interpretation, both in the religious sphere and in the intersection of religion and politics, which is a focus of our study. Some fundamentalists have a highly politicized vision of Islam; others claim not to have a political program at all. For some Muslim scholars, as well as for the purpose of our work, the critical distinction is between those with political goals—also referred to as Islamists—who use Islam to advance their quest for political power, and those whose emphasis is on religious observance and personal devotion.

The Diversity of Religious Interpretation in the Muslim World

Since Islam is the common denominator of our study, we begin with a discussion of the religio-political landscape of the Muslim world. Islam is the world’s second-largest religion, with an estimated 1.2 billion members or one-fifth of the world’s population (Table O.1). Most Muslims live in a belt of countries from West Africa to the Southern Philippines, most of which, but not all, have Muslim majorities. However, the second-largest concentration of Muslims in the world is in India, where Muslims constitute a minority in a Hindu-dominated state. There are also Muslim communities scattered throughout the world, particularly in Western Europe and North and South America (the so-called Muslim diaspora), that play a key role in the development of Muslim networks and movements.

³ Riesebrodt (1993), for example, examines fundamentalism as a religiously inspired protest movement, which includes a defense of supposed tradition and may culminate in a radical patriarchy, by urbanites facing modern upheaval.

Table O.1
Estimated Religious Adherents Worldwide (in millions)

Religion	1997	2002	% increase, 1997–2002	% of total, 2002
Muslims	1,147	1,226	6.9	19.8
Hindus	747	828	10.9	13.3
Other non-Christian	1,118	1,185	6.1	19.1
Catholic	1,040	1,077	3.5	17.4
Other Christian	890	962	8.1	15.5
Nonreligious	907	925	2.0	14.9

SOURCE: *Encyclopedia Britannica*, 2003.

The world's Muslims are far from homogeneous, and they differ substantially not only in their religious views but also in their political and social orientation. This includes their conceptions of government and human rights, their social agenda (in particular, women's rights and the content of education), their linkages to international terrorist groups, and propensity for violence. The defining characteristics of the main tendencies in Islam are summarized in Table O.2.⁴

The same tendencies are placed on spectrums of democracy to nondemocracy (Figure O.1) and non-violence to violence (Figure O.2). The criteria for violence include two elements: a willingness on the part of the groups (1) to engage in terrorism or other forms of violence against persons or property or (2) to justify or condone such violence. Our definition of democracy includes not only the formal processes of electing a government through democratic means but also freedom of expression, association, and religion and an independent judiciary—in short, the infrastructure of democratic political processes.

Groups and movements are placed on Figures O.1 and O.2 based on the orientations of their leadership and the critical mass of their followers. For each of the groups mentioned, however, there is a minority who belong on a different end of the spectrum. For example, the vast majority of the followers of the worldwide Jama'at al-Tabligh movement are nonviolent, although a small fringe of the movement has been associated with Taliban-esque militancy and is believed to be a channel for recruitment into terrorist groups.

As expected, the tendencies associated with religious moderation have a greater affinity for democracy and are also the ones with lesser propensity for violence. Conversely, radical fundamentalists tend to be both antidemocratic and violent. The main difference between the two spectra is that some fundamentalist groups, while ideologically radical, might nevertheless be nonviolent in their methods. Therefore,

⁴ This typology is partially adapted from work by Cheryl Benard at RAND.

Table O.2
Characteristics of Major Tendencies or Orientations in the Muslim World

Radical Fundamentalists	Scriptural Fundamentalists	Traditionalists	Modernists	Liberal Secularists	Authoritarian Secularists
(e.g., Saudi Salafi-jihadist groups)	(e.g., Jama'a al-Tabligh)	(e.g., mainstream Shi'ites [Iraqi An-Najaf Hawza])	(e.g., Muhammadiyah [Indonesia])	(e.g., secular parties in Turkey, Indonesia)	(e.g., Ba'ath Party)
Agenda					
Primarily political; mobilize Islam to achieve political goals	Primarily religious	Can be politically active, but primary agenda is religious, social, and cultural	Can be politically active, but agenda is religious, social, and educational	Focus on democratic politics and civil society	Power-oriented
Ideology					
Literal interpretation of Islamic scriptures, but with some political innovations and emphasis on obligation of jihad	Literal interpretation of Islamic scriptures	Fuse Islamic beliefs with local traditions	Return to core values of Islam, viewed as consistent with modern world	Liberal democratic or social democratic values form core of "civil religion"	Leader cult dressed in nationalist, socialist, or, in Arab world, pan-Arab ideologies
Political-Legal					
Revolutionary and anti-status quo; seeks establishment of strict shari'a-based state	Politically conservative; asserts supremacy of religious law strictly interpreted in all aspects of life	Politically moderate; focus is on social and cultural aspects of Islam rather than politics. Flexible on application of religious law	Politically moderate; support rule of law. Believe religious law should be adapted to modern conditions	Support secular law and institutions within the context of a democratic society and political system	Rely on authoritarian structures and repression of civil society, Islamic or otherwise

Table O.2—continued

Radical Fundamentalists	Scriptural Fundamentalists	Traditionalists	Modernists	Liberal Secularists	Authoritarian Secularists
(e.g., Saudi Salafi-jihadist groups)	(e.g., Jama'a al-Tabligh)	(e.g., mainstream Shi'ites [Iraqi An-Najaf Hawza])	(e.g., Muhammadiyah [Indonesia])	(e.g., secular parties in Turkey, Indonesia)	(e.g., Ba'ath Party)
Government					
Democracy is an "infidel religion." Political legitimacy derives from God. Government should be by religious experts accountable only to God. Two models: the Iranian and the Sunni. Some groups seek to establish a pan-Islamic caliphate	Political legitimacy derives from God, but there may be some democratic elements. Accept rule by political leaders in consultation with religious scholars (<i>ulama</i>), but ruler must enforce Islamic law	Political legitimacy derives from both religious and non-religious factors (e.g., the will of the people). Leaders need not enforce all aspects of Islamic law, but must respect Islamic values	Political legitimacy derives from the will of the people through free elections	Political legitimacy derives from the will of the people through free elections	Political legitimacy derives from the state ideology. Rule of law subordinated to state or party interests
Human Rights					
Reject Western concept of human rights and individual liberties. Believe that the full imposition of Islamic law (<i>shari'a</i>) creates a just society. Deny rights to religious minorities and to Muslims who do not share their views	Largely the same, but allow protected status (<i>Ahl al-dhimma</i>) for certain non-Muslim communities	Properly interpreted, Islam guarantees human rights and liberties. Tolerant of non-Muslims; some believe all citizens are equal before the law	Islam contains the basic concepts of human rights and individual freedoms. Tolerant of non-Muslims; some believe all citizens are equal before the law	Primacy of individual political and human rights over state and group interests. Believe all citizens are equal before the law	Primacy of party and state and collective interests over individual rights

Table O.2—continued

Radical Fundamentalists	Scriptural Fundamentalists	Traditionalists	Modernists	Liberal Secularists	Authoritarian Secularists
(e.g., Saudi Salafi-jihadist groups)	(e.g., Jama'a al-Tabligh)	(e.g., Mainstream Shi'ites [Iraqi An-Najaf Hawza])	(e.g., Muhammadiyah [Indonesia])	(e.g., secular parties in Turkey, Indonesia)	(e.g., Ba'ath Party)
Social Agenda					
Generally reactionary. Willing to use coercion and violence to enforce their conception of Islamic dress and behavior. However, some neo-fundamentalist sectors allow some leadership roles for women	Reactionary, particularly with regard to dress and behavior codes for women. Men must conform too, but have fewer restrictions	Conservative, but many value nonreligious subjects in education. Women should dress modestly, but the definition depends on local custom. Most oppose use of coercion to enforce behavior and dress codes	Generally progressive. Value nonreligious subjects in education. Do not believe Islam requires women to wear any particular form of dress. Support education and advancement of women	Progressive in education and women's rights. No restrictions on dress or behavior unless contrary to law	Inconsistent. In some cases, authoritarian secularists support education and the emancipation of women, but suppress the development of civil society
Links to Terrorism					
Direct. Most Islamic terrorist groups fall in this category	Generally indirect; but there are links between fundamentalist groups and extremists at many levels	Usually none. Most oppose terrorism and violence	Usually none. Most oppose terrorism and violence	Usually none. Oppose terrorism and violence	Terrorism can be an instrument of state policy. Some groups are prone to opportunistic alliances with Islamic terrorists
Propensity for Violence					
High	Situation-contingent	Low	Low	Low	High

Figure O.1
Muslim Tendencies on a Spectrum of Democracy to Nondemocracy




Figure O.1—continued




Figure O.2
Muslim Tendencies on a Spectrum of Nonviolence to Violence





Figure O.2—continued



the two spectra together capture more fully the overall orientation of the tendencies and the level of threat they pose from both a political and a security perspective.

The two spectra range from radical fundamentalists to secularists, with moderate Muslim tendencies in between. Strictly speaking, the secularist category does not fall within a religio-political continuum, since secularist political philosophy does not have a religious content. Nevertheless, secularists represent an important tendency in many Muslim-majority countries, and including them enables us to represent fully the broad range of political opinion in the Muslim world.

It should be noted that some Islamic movements cannot be easily labeled as radical or moderate and may exhibit characteristics of both. This is because radical and moderate wings can coexist within the same movement, or the movement's ideology or leadership can shift over time. Extremist movements can evolve into moderate ones, and moderate movements can become radicalized. The Muslim Brotherhood (*Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*), for instance, had a record of militancy, conspiracies, and assassinations in its early incarnation; in the West Bank and Gaza it spawned Hamas. On the other hand, the Brotherhood has evolved into a largely nonviolent (but still politically radical) movement in a number of Arab countries. In its latest evolution, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood supported a Christian (Coptic) candidate for the Egyptian parliament, a hitherto unthinkable step for a Muslim fundamentalist organization. The Egyptian al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya is in a process of transition from terrorist organization to political action group, as appears to be the case with a faction of the Jemaah Islamiyah in Southeast Asia. The possible evolution of radical Islamist groups raises the important and interesting issue of how these groups can or should be accommodated in a process of democratic institution-building.

The Diversity of Fundamentalists

Fundamentalists, as noted, base their interpretation of Islam exclusively on the authoritative Muslim scriptures, the *Quran* and the *sunna* (the moral example set by the prophet Muhammad as recorded in the *hadiths*, the record of his sayings and actions). Shi'ites add to the Quran and the sunna the traditions of their imams. Fundamentalists generally support the strict implementation of Islamic law (*shari'a*), although interpretation of the law can vary depending on the controlling legal tradition.

Islamic fundamentalists seek to strengthen the *umma* or worldwide Islamic community rather than any individual state. Nationalism is regarded as *asabiyya* (sectarianism), contaminated by Western secularism and involving loyalties superseding those to God. Such a concept of the unity of the faithful is not unique to Islam. In Western Europe the concept of Christendom, the *Res Publica Christiana* of medieval Christian thinkers, was the overarching conception in European political theory before the unity of the Western Church was broken by the Reformation and the rise of national states in the sixteenth century. The practical difference is that no one of po-

litical significance in the West has spoken seriously about the unity of Christendom for some centuries, whereas the idea of the *umma* continues to have deep resonance in the Muslim world.⁵

In practice, fundamentalists, like most other Muslims, have had little difficulty in adjusting to the configuration of nation-states that constitute the current Muslim world, although they may have varying attitudes toward political power. Radical fundamentalists tend to be political as well as religious militants and tend to be very critical of the vast majority of the *ulama* (religious scholars), seeing them as having sold out to those in power. Scriptural fundamentalists tend to be more interested in theology and issues of morality and personal behavior than in politics and may avoid involvement in politics or the wider society.⁶ In many countries, fundamentalists have found their niche in state-supported religious institutions and are reluctant to challenge the political establishment that provides them with status and income. Many of these movements are quite adaptable. Some reflect widespread patterns of Islamic apoliticism compatible with democratic and liberal traditions (Metcalf, 2000).

Salafis and Wahhabis. The Salafi movements (from *al-salaf al-salih*, Arabic for righteous ancestors, referring to the two first generations of Islam), which emerged at the end of the nineteenth century, sought to respond to the political, cultural, and military challenge of the West. The Salafis seek the “purification” of Islam by returning to the uncorrupted form that they believed was practiced in the time of the prophet Muhammad and his companions. Salafi movements are found throughout the Muslim world. Some have a strictly religious, nonpolitical agenda. Others have evolved into or influenced the modernist tendency in Islam. Yet others have become radicalized and given sustenance to violent and terrorist groups.

Salafis are characterized by extreme conservatism and pronounced emphases on outward manifestations of piety, such as beards, “Islamic” garb, and strict segregation of the sexes. Salafis seek to create a more Islamic society, but not necessarily through conventional politics. Among the most extreme manifestation of Salafism is Takfir wal-Hijra, whose adherents tried to kill Osama bin Laden because they saw him as too lax.⁷ Also in this class are the Wahhabis (although Wahhabism as such preceded modern Salafi movements by some 150 years). Wahhabism derives its name from its

⁵ However, only a very few of the world’s Muslims want to turn the concept of the *umma* into a political program, i.e., the reestablishment of the Caliphate.

⁶ The Darul Arqam movement in Southeast Asia, for example, eschewed politics and tried to promote a “totally Islamic way of life” in exclusive communities that it established (Azyumardi Azra, “Indonesian Islam in a World Context,” *Kultur*, Vol. 2, No. 1, 2002). The Tablighi Jama’at, a movement for internal religious renewal without an explicitly political program, focuses on teaching and encouraging individuals to follow Islamic practices in matters of ritual, dress, and personal behavior while eschewing conflict and violence in its efforts to reshape individual lives through participation in a moral community (Metcalf, 2000).

⁷ Daniel Byman’s review, March 2004.

founder, Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, an eighteenth-century religious reformer from the Najd, the central region of present-day Saudi Arabia. Wahhabis actually consider the term pejorative and prefer to call themselves *al-Muwahhidun* or *Ahl al-Tawhid*, “those who uphold the unity of God.” By these terms Wahhabis presume an exclusive claim on *tawhid*, the oneness of God, the fundamental principle of Islam (Algar, 2002). Wahhabi teachings incorporate the concepts of *hejira* (flight from non-Wahhabi traditions), *takfir* (excommunication of other Muslims as infidels), and armed *jihad* as not only permissible but obligatory against unbelievers and non-Wahhabi Muslims, who are stigmatized as *mushrikin* or idolators.⁸

Wahhabism owes its influence to a personal and political alliance that Ibn Abd al-Wahhab forged with Muhammad ibn Saud, the ruler of Diriyya, in Najd. Ibn Saud pledged his support to Al-Wahhab in waging jihad against all those who deviated from Wahhabi doctrines in return for religious sanction for his military campaigns. Nevertheless, Wahhabism remained a marginal and heterodox tendency within Islam until Abd al-Azziz ibn Saud expelled the Hashemites from the Hejaz, the region containing the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, and established the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1932. The modern Saudi state exists in a state of tension between its ideology, which has not renounced its extreme doctrines, and the state’s security and economic requirements, which fostered a 50-year alliance of convenience with the United States. Since September 11, the dissonance between Saudi theory and practice and in U.S.-Saudi relations has become harder and harder to ignore.

Modern Radical Fundamentalism. Wahhabism is a fundamentalism of tribal origins. Other fundamentalist movements have engaged broader political movements. The “neo-fundamentalism” that emerged in Egypt in the early twentieth century combined fundamentalist religious beliefs with some of the characteristics of fascist movements, including contempt for “Western decadence,” anti-Semitism,⁹ desire for idealized “pure” ethnic or religious communities, strict discipline, the central role of a charismatic leader, and a revolutionary political program. Neo-fundamentalists have their roots in the modern societies that produced them rather than in conservative and traditional villages and rural areas. They appeal to those who have been detached from traditional moorings and have been transposed to unfamiliar and impersonal surroundings, such as the teeming cities of the Muslim world or the West.

⁸ Author’s conversation with Indonesian Muslim scholar Nurcholish Madjid, Jakarta, June 2002. See also Gibb and Kramers (2001), pp. 236–241.

⁹ Semitic is a linguistic term that refers to the family of languages to which both Hebrew and Arabic belong. Here, however, we use anti-Semitism in its generally understood meaning of prejudice against and hostility toward Jews.

They can appeal as well to highly educated persons, including graduates of engineering and technological institutes.¹⁰

The original neo-fundamentalist organization, the Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan al-Muslimun), was founded in Egypt by Hassan al-Banna in 1928, four years after Kemal Atatürk's abolition of the Caliphate, under which the political and religious life of the Muslim community had been nominally unified. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, which served as the prototype for similar organizations in other countries, developed a sophisticated organizational structure, with sections in charge of different social sectors (students, workers, professionals) and functions (propaganda, liaison with the Islamic world, finances, and legal affairs). Like the European fascist movements, the Brotherhood also featured a paramilitary wing modeled on Mussolini's Blackshirts and a clandestine armed group called "the secret apparatus" (*al-jihaz al-sirri*). The Brothers assassinated Egyptian Prime Minister Nuqrashi Pasha in December 1948, prompting Egyptian government agents to assassinate al-Banna in retaliation just two months later.

Today the Muslim Brotherhood has branches throughout the Arab world, as well as in some non-Arab Muslim countries. In a legal or underground form it is the strongest Islamist organization in several countries, including Egypt, Jordan, and Kuwait. The tactics and strategy of the group shifted significantly as it expanded. Some Muslim Brotherhood branches are still associated with violent activities; in other countries—for instance, Jordan—they have become a relatively normalized part of the political process. Nevertheless, their ultimate goal remains the implementation of their vision of the Islamic state in their respective countries.¹¹

After al-Banna, the most significant figure in the development of neo-fundamentalism or radical fundamentalism was the Egyptian ideologue Sayyid Qutb. While in prison, Qutb, later executed by President Nasser's government, wrote the influential book, *Milestones on the Path (Ma'alim fi al-Tariq)*, a manifesto drawn from his vast, multivolume commentary on the Quran, *In the Shade of the Quran (Fi Dhilal al-Qur'an)*. Qutb argues that the Muslim world was in a state of *jahiliyya*, the ignorance that prevailed before Muhammad's revelation.¹² Contrary to al-Banna's gradualist approach to the establishment of an Islamic state in Egypt, Qutb advocated the seizure of power by a revolutionary vanguard, which would then impose Islamization from above. Rulers, Muslim or otherwise, who stood in the way could

¹⁰ For instance, disproportionate number of leading Indonesian Islamists in Indonesia were graduates of the Bandung Institute of Technology, the country's foremost technological institute.

¹¹ One of the key variables in the attitudes of modern fundamentalist movements toward violence is the policies of the state. For instance, the Muslim Brotherhood was repressed in Syria, allowed to participate in politics in Jordan, and partially repressed in Egypt. Not surprisingly, as Daniel Byman pointed out, it was very violent in Syria, largely peaceful in Jordan, and intermittently violent in Egypt. Daniel Byman's review, March 2004.

¹² The concept was used exclusively to describe the pre-Islamic era until applied to the modern world by Pakistani ideologue Abu al-Al'a Mawdudi.

justifiably be removed by any means. After Qutb's death, his writings became part of the canon of radical political Islam and were translated into Farsi by Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khomeini (Erikson, 2002). From Qutb there is a line of development to Al Qaeda through Ayman al-Zawahiri, a student of Qutb's teachings and the leader of the al-Jihad organization that merged with Al Qaeda in 1998.

In his analysis of the rejection of Western culture and ideas by Egyptian Islamists, Giles Kepel refers to four rejected categories: Jews, Crusaders, Communists, and secularists (Kepel, 1985).¹³ The term "Crusader" referred originally to Egyptian Copts, but in recent years the term has been used most commonly by radical Islamists to demonize the Western presence in the Muslim world. Communists are considered enemies of God. Secularists who were born Muslim are deemed to be guilty of apostasy, for which the punishment is death. There is no room for any of these groups in the radical Islamists' conception of the universe. Radicals also tend to disregard the traditional Muslim tolerance for the "protected" categories of non-Muslims living in Muslim areas (*dhimmi*)¹⁴ as demonstrated by the horrific attacks on Copts in Egypt and on Christians in Pakistan and in reports of forced conversions in areas of conflict in Indonesia.

Radical fundamentalists reject democracy as an ideology of outsiders—an "infidel religion." Voting in elections is *bid'a*, an innovation prohibited by Islam, which in their view offers its own unique form of governance, the Islamic caliphate and its institutions.

Some groups, such as the worldwide Hizb ut-Tahrir (HuT), call for the reestablishment of the Caliphate. The regional strategies of these groups differ in some important ways. The Hizb ut-Tahrir claims that it favors a peaceful jihad—that is, spreading Islam through persuasion and conversion rather than violence—but those who conclude that it poses a threat point to two indicators: the cadre structure of the organization, which is characteristic of extremist movements, and the increasing virulence of its rhetoric. Various governments have come to different assessments on this matter, but many have decided to outlaw HuT. The organization is banned throughout Central Asia, as well as in Egypt, where distributing HuT literature is punishable by prison sentences. Perhaps most significant, Germany banned the organization in 2003 after having kept it under close observation for several years. German Interior Minister Otto Schily explained that in the judgment of the German

¹³ See also Farhad Kazemi, "Perspectives on Islam and Civil Society," in Hashmi (2002).

¹⁴ In classical Islamic theory, *dhimmi* were given the same level of protection from external and internal enemies as Muslims were and a degree of communal autonomy. They were required to pay a poll tax known as the *jizya* in lieu of military service.

courts, “this organization promotes the use of violence to achieve political goals and wants to provoke violence.”¹⁵

Radical Recruitment. Much of the success of radical and terrorist groups lies in their sophisticated recruitment techniques. The targets are separate potential pools of recruits, each requiring different nodes for recruitment and different vetting measures. The key nodes for recruitment are mosques and cultural centers; schools, universities, and youth organizations; health and welfare organizations, including charities; and other social clusters. Recruitment methodologies vary: In universities, for instance, they are different from those used in economically and socially marginalized districts. Recruits from the latter areas, such as the Algerian *hittiste*,¹⁶ might be willing to join the extremist group out of sheer frustration with their condition in life.

According to a Kuwaiti source, some Muslim Brotherhood or Salafi groups begin by picking up young boys twelve or thirteen years old. An older teenage member will befriend them and involve them in sports and other youth activities. He will ask them to join in group prayers at a mosque after classes. He will then begin to teach them the radicals’ version of Islam and tell them terrifying tales of life after death and the day of judgment. When the children enter puberty, they learn that it is forbidden (*haram*) to shave. In a few years many of the youth are fully committed and ready to commit violence in the service of the cause. Some even decide that their Muslim Brotherhood or Salafi mentors are not Islamic enough and join more violent or terrorist groups. Another observer noted that kinship is used as a means of recruitment. A third observer delineated a number of stages for adult recruitment, including encouraging people to engage in collective prayers, using *gama’a* techniques (pooling money to meet individual needs) as a way of enticing people to join, providing social services, and convincing people to become active members of the group. Note that these techniques have little to do with politics. They involve peer pressure, economic incentives, or relief from boredom among a large, socially disengaged and often unemployed youth population.¹⁷

Fundamentalism and Violence. Polling and other data, such as election results in countries where meaningful elections have been held, show that only a minority of Muslim fundamentalists supports terrorist or violent groups. A disproportionate number of terrorists and violent extremists have emerged from the neo-fundamentalist/radical fundamentalist milieu. Why is this? The identification of violence with radical fundamentalism may stem from the elevation of the armed jihad (*jihad al-musallah*) by some of these groups to nearly equal status with the five ca-

¹⁵ See “Hizb-ut-Tahrir—Islam meets Communism?” in Chapter Seven of this book and Peter Mandaville, “Salafis and Sufis: The Political Discourse of Transnational Islam,” in Hefner, ed. (2004).

¹⁶ From *hit* (wall), a reference to unemployed young men leaning against a wall. The *hittiste* constituted the shock troops of the radical wing of the Algerian Islamic Salvation Front (Kepel, 2002).

¹⁷ See the section in Chapter One, “Factors Influencing the Rise of Radical Islam.”

nonical pillars of the religion (profession of faith, formal prayer five times daily, *zakat* or almsgiving, fasting during Ramadan, and *hajj* or pilgrimage to Mecca). Muhammad Faraj, al-Jihad's ideologue, wrote a book called *Holy War: The Neglected Obligation*, which emphasized the individual duty of jihad and rejected interpretations of the jihad other than violent confrontations with the enemy.

The term *jihad* is never used to mean warfare in the Quran, where it is used to refer to a person's inner struggle. The doctrine of jihad as military struggle was developed in the first century of Islam to legitimize the expansion of the Muslim state. While force could never be justified as a first resort, it could be justified under certain conditions. The jurists of the early Abbasid period (late eighth and early ninth centuries A.D.) elaborated two conceptions of the armed jihad: wars for self-defense and for the propagation of the Islamic faith. The latter form of jihad was a collective undertaking by the *umma* as a body under the authority of the legitimate ruler—the Caliph in the Sunni tradition. Since there is no longer a Caliph or recognized head of the *umma*, this form of jihad is no longer possible. This endows the second form, the defensive jihad, with greater importance in modern Islamic discourse.¹⁸

In theory, the defensive jihad must be a war to protect Muslims against aggressors and respects the normative limits to be observed in fighting, such as using the minimum force required, respecting the lives of noncombatants, and avoiding ambushes and assassinations. Contemporary radical interpretations, however, have taken the defensive jihad well beyond its traditional conception to an expression of Islamic world revolution. This new conception of jihad is premised on the sense of victimhood that prevails in the Muslim world in its relationship with the West. The radical interpretation also erases all limits on warfare, so Bin Laden's February 1998 fatwa instructed Muslims "to kill Americans and their allies—civilian and military."¹⁹

By giving the concept of the armed jihad a central place in their belief system, radical Islamists have preserved a theological nexus that went out of fashion in Europe after the seventeenth-century wars of religion. Thus, while many scholars have noted that nothing in the core beliefs of Islam predisposes the religion to greater bellicosity than any other religion, the duty of religious war espoused by radicals is undoubtedly a key driver of the violence.

It is important to note that this interpretation of jihad is challenged by mainstream Muslims, who believe that the "greater jihad" is a personal struggle for self-improvement, while the armed jihad of the battlefield is the "lesser jihad." The Sunni religious establishment as reflected in the scholarship of Al-Azhar University, the oldest and most prestigious of Islamic academic institutions, rejects the notion that war is a proper instrument to fulfill the obligation to propagate Islam. With a few excep-

¹⁸ James Turner Johnson, "Jihad and Just War," *First Things*, 124 (June/July 2002), pp. 12–14; Patricia Martinez, "Deconstructing Jihad," in Ramakrishna and Tan, *Beyond Bali* (2003), pp. 59–79.

¹⁹ "Osama bin Laden's 1998 Fatwa" at <http://www.mideastweb.org/osamabinladen2.htm>.

tions, Al-Azhar does not treat the armed jihad as an obligation for Muslims in the modern era. It downgrades the status of armed struggle (*qital*), while emphasizing the nonmilitary duty of jihad against evils such as ignorance, poverty, and disease.²⁰

Other Interpretations of Islam

Other Muslims admit the validity of other sources of religious knowledge than the Quran and the sunna. They differ even more widely in the interpretation and practice of their faith.

Traditionalism. Traditionalists probably constitute the majority of Muslims. The largest Muslim social organization in the world, Indonesia's Nahdlatul Ulama (Awakening of the Ulama), with a membership of about 35 million, represents the traditionalist outlook. Traditionalists are generally conservative Muslims who uphold beliefs and traditions received and adapted through the centuries. These traditions often derive from local beliefs and practices that are not always based on orthodox Islamic doctrine but over time have come to be regarded as an intrinsic part of the religion. Traditionalism incorporates the veneration and prayers offered at the tombs of saints, belief in spirits and miracles, and the use of amulets—in short, a set of beliefs quite removed from Wahhabi severity and intolerance.²¹ Many traditionalists incorporate aspects of Sufi beliefs and practices described below.

Politically, many traditionalists share an instinct for toleration and do not condone violence and terrorism. Professor R. William Liddle, a scholar of Indonesian Islam, suggests that one way of looking at traditionalism in Indonesia lies in the long tradition of political quietism in Islam. Traditionalists like to cite the hadith of the Prophet Muhammad against overthrowing even unjust rulers. This helps to explain why there is little tendency (actually, none) toward fundamentalism or militancy among traditionalists in Indonesia.²² By and large, this is also true of traditionalists elsewhere, although Indonesian traditionalism stands out for its moderation and inclusiveness. To a greater extent than other Muslims, traditionalists tend not to identify non-Muslims as the source of Muslims' problems and are hospitable to interfaith dialogue and cooperation. Although traditionalists are as engaged politically as other Muslims, their primary area of activity is often the social and cultural spheres, with the goal of promoting Islamic education and preserving traditional values and norms.

²⁰ See Bassam Tibi, "War and Peace in Islam," and Sohail Hashmi, "Interpreting the Islamic Ethics of War and Peace," in Hashmi, ed. (2002). That said, as Bernard Lewis and Benjamin and Simon point out, the distinction between the greater and lesser jihads is not historically grounded, so unfortunately the radicals may have a defensible case in this controversy.

²¹ It is common for Wahhabis or related groups, when gaining control of a traditionalist community, to desecrate the tomb of the local saint, a practice that generates great resentment among the population but that they nevertheless, may be unable to resist.

²² Professor R. William Liddle, review of Chapter Eight.

They see no inconsistency between their religious beliefs and allegiance to secular states and their laws.

Sufism. Sufism, the tradition of Islamic mysticism, is the inner-worldly variant of Islam that stresses emotive and personal experiences of the divine. Often regarded as “popular Islam,” it has a large following and through Sufi orders or brotherhoods (*tariqas*) provides an important base of social structure. Charismatic leadership is often a central component in Sufi practice, and sheikhs of various brotherhoods often establish footholds within the political sector. Sufism is a strong tradition in Central Asia, Turkey, North and West Africa, and South and Southeast Asia, where to this day Sufi orders play an important political as well as religious role.²³

Traditionalist and Sufi beliefs kept their hold on the world of popular Islam throughout the convulsions of the twentieth century, but they waned within some Muslim elites under the influence of secularism, modernism, and neo-fundamentalism. Salafis and Wahhabis are relentless enemies of Sufism, which they consider a deviant corruption of Islam. Rejection of Sufism among radical Sunni fundamentalists goes back to the writings of Ibn Taymiyya in the thirteenth century, echoed by the modern exponents of radical Islamism. A long bill of particulars against Sufis published by the Saudi-based al-Haramain Foundation accuses Sufis of holding the view that all religions are valid and spreading pacifist views. The Sufis, according to al-Haramain, have made Muslims believe “that work and family is the greatest Jihad, rather than establishing Allah’s religion on Earth through the use of the sword.”²⁴ Wherever radical Islamic movements have gained power, they have sought to suppress Sufi practices. Upon taking Kabul in 1996, the Taliban arrested some of the most prominent Sufi leaders and sought to eradicate Sufi rituals known as *zikr*, which involve chanting, singing, and swaying as a way to achieve an ecstatic state thought to bring adherents closer to God.²⁵

²³ Among the oldest of the Sufi orders are the Naqshbandi, established in Istanbul from an early period, from where it spread widely in the eastern Sunni Muslim world. The Naqshbandi order now commands a global following, from the United States and Europe to South Asia and the Malay world. Under the Ottomans, the Khalwati brotherhood spread from Anatolia throughout the empire and gave rise to branches in Syria, Egypt, and elsewhere. The Shadhili were influential in the Maghreb. The Senussi order was established in Cyrenaica in the 1840s. In the nineteenth and early twentieth century, Sufi orders were important channels for reformist and revivalist ideas throughout the Muslim world and spearheaded the resistance to European colonial expansion. The Qadari and Rahmani orders provided the base for Abd al-Qadir’s revolts against the French in Algeria. The heads of the Senussi order led the opposition to Italian colonization of Libya. Muhammad Ahmad, the Madhi of Khartoum fame, who claimed to have been sent to restore justice on earth and establish universal Islamic rule, drew his inspiration from Sufi teaching (Hourani, 1991).

²⁴ “Sufism: its origins,” in <http://www.alharamain.org/alharamain/eng/inner.asp?order=3&num=4&number=197>. The al-Haramain Web site is not currently accessible, but the same article can be found in <http://www.ahya.org/amm/modules.php?name=Sections&op=viewarticle&artid=145>.

²⁵ Anthony Shadid, “Reconstruction: For the Sufis, Taliban’s Fall Means a Revival,” *The Boston Globe*, January 23, 2002.

Their victimization by Salafis and Wahhabis makes Sufis and traditionalists natural allies of the West in the struggle with radicals to define the place of Islam in the modern world.²⁶ In Lebanon, a Sufi movement, the Jam'iyyat al-Mashari' al-Khayriyya al-Islamiyya Ahbash or Society of Islamic Philanthropic Projects, has taken the ideological offensive against radical Islamic ideologues, beginning with Ibn Taymiyya and his contemporary disciples, Sayyid Qutb, Mawdudi, and Fathi Yakan of Lebanon's al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya. The Ahbash ideology emphasizes moderation and toleration, along with opposition to political activism and the use of violence.²⁷ In Pakistan, radical political Islam is being challenged by a reinvigorated Sufi movement.²⁸ Although antagonism and sometimes confrontation is the dominant theme in the relationship between Sufis and radical Islamists, in some cases Sufis have supported radicals; for instance, some militant strains of political Islam are said to have become established in some branches of the Naqshband brotherhood in Central Asia and Iraq.²⁹

Modernism. Muslim modernists are part of a movement that began a century ago to banish "superstition," including some of the practices associated with traditional Islam, particularly devotions at the tombs of saints, and, at the same time, to bring the core elements of Islam into harmony with the modern world. Modernism has Salafi roots, but evolved beyond the narrow theological confines of Salafism. Modernists hold that Islam, if properly interpreted, can be fully compatible with modernity and articulated and defended by reason. Islamic modernism is heavily indebted to nineteenth-century thinkers such as the Egyptian educational reformer Muhammad Abduh and the Persian political activist Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, both of whom called for Muslim unity and reform as a bulwark against Western power. Abduh referred to his movement as *salafiyya*, but he urged his contemporaries to draw the lessons that their contacts with the European nations might have taught them. Al-Afghani pointed out the anachronism and futility of Islamic scholasticism in the era of modern science and technology (Choueri, 1990). Their ideas helped crystallize modernist thought as advocated by such early twentieth-century organizations as Muhammadiyah in Indonesia and the Association of Algerian Ulema.

Some modernists support the enforcement of Islamic law but believe it is a human construct that needs to be adjusted to modern conditions. Modernists stress the

²⁶ This argument has been made by Stephen Schwarz (2002), a convert to Sufism.

²⁷ A. Nizar Hamzeh and R. Hrair Dekmejian, "A Sufi Response to Political Islamism: Al-Ahbash of Lebanon," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 28 (1996), pp. 217–229, at <http://ddc.aub.edu.lb/projects/pspa/al-ahbash.html>.

²⁸ Mumtaz Ahmad, "The Militant Movement," in Pakistan's Future and U.S. Policy Options, Working Group Meeting on Islam and the Militants," Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Washington, D.C., May 1, 2002, at <http://www.csis.org/saprog/>.

²⁹ Syed Saleem Shahzad, "Saddam's Northern Trap," *Asia Times Online*, February 19, 2003, at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/EB19Ak06.html.

principle of independent reasoning (*ijtihad*)³⁰ and, like some Protestant Christians in the West, the primacy of individual conscience over blind obedience to the authority of the *ulama*. The Abduhist tradition was bifurcated in the twentieth century into liberal and Islamist wings.³¹ Liberal modernists seek to reconcile Islam with the values of Western liberal democracy. Their emphasis on the rule of law and rationalism makes them receptive to Western concepts of democracy, pluralism, and human rights. Liberal modernists maintain that some elements of early Islam, including, for example, the concept of *shura*, or consultation, anticipated modern democracy. They also distinguish between shari'a rules on worship, which they note are quite precise, and those on social relations, which they say are less precise. Consequently, they are able to reconcile shari'a with secular law and modern practices (Mondal, 2002). Liberal modernists include Muhammadiyah Chairman Ahmad Syafii Maarif, and scholars and human rights activists Chandra Muzaffar of Malaysia and Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im of Sudan.

Modernists of an Islamist bent are closer to fundamentalists in advocating government based on shari'a. There is, in fact, considerable overlap in the rhetoric of Islamist modernists and fundamentalists, although the modernists generally do not manifest the militant intolerance and propensity for violence that characterize some of the radical fundamentalist groups. The Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS), the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) of Indonesia, a sector of Indonesia's Muhammadiyah movement, and Hassan al-Turabi in Sudan are representative of Islamist modernism.

Secularism. A large number of Muslims, including possible majorities in some Muslim nations, are secularists. They are religious in their private life but support the separation of religion and state and the primacy of secular over religious law. Secularism, of course, has a long history in the West, and its supporters have a very broad range of opinions. In the Muslim world, as in premodern Europe, there has long been a tension between the pragmatic requirements of rulers and the demands of religion (Mondal, 2002). Under the Seljuks and early Ottomans, the political leadership of the Turkish people and the religious leadership were separate, with the Sultan exercising political authority and the Caliph performing solely religious functions. This formal separation came to an end with the unification of the offices of the Sultanate and the Caliphate by Selim I in 1517. In Shi'a Islam, the separation between religion and state has been particularly sharp, with Iraqi Shi'ite scholars of the Ottoman period avoiding involvement in secular affairs and denying the state any religious authority (Cole, 2002). The Turkish Republic is the most thoroughgoing experiment in secularization in the Muslim world. Like the anticlericalists of the Third French Republic, the founders of the Turkish Republic sought to restrict the activi-

³⁰ *Ijtihad* shares the same root as jihad and means "effort in the cause of truth" (Mondal, 2002).

³¹ Professor R. William Liddle, review of Chapter Eight. An authoritative treatment of this bifurcation can be found in Brown (2001).

ties of religious institutions and the public display of religious symbols. Whether the Turkish model remains tenable for the Muslim world in an age of Islamic resurgence is an open question, one we explore in this study.

Secularists can be divided between liberal secularists, who are natural allies of the democratic world and whose political values and orientation are compatible with those of liberal Muslims, and authoritarian or antidemocratic secularists, such as Marxists, “Arab Socialists,” and extreme nationalists of various stripes. Some authoritarian secularist movements and regimes are capable of evolution toward liberal democracies, as is occurring in post-Suharto Indonesia. Others, such as the Ba’ath parties in Syria and Iraq, decayed into nothing more than opportunistic factions supporting despots, with little or no prospects of democratic evolution. Although theoretically secular, authoritarian regimes sometimes find it expedient to assume Islamic symbols and rhetoric or to make alliances of convenience with Islamic extremists and terrorists, as in the reported link between the Saddam Hussein regime and the Ansar al-Islam, a terrorist group in Iraq connected to Al Qaeda.³²

Religion, Politics, and the State

Radical fundamentalists believe the teachings of Islam are so comprehensive that they encompass all aspects of human affairs, as the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hassan al-Banna, stated in his oft-quoted definition of Islam as a “creed and state, book and sword, and a way of life.” With religion and politics so deeply intertwined, all problems are ultimately religious and all political conflict becomes absolute. Wahhabis and some extreme Salafis, therefore, do not hesitate to stigmatize other Muslims who dissent from their creed as “infidels.”

For nonfundamentalist Muslims, religion plays a role in politics, but does not subsume or obliterate it. Moderates believe in the compatibility of Islam and democracy. To the extent that political pluralism takes root in the Muslim world, moderate Muslims may occupy a position along the spectrum of Islamic political activism resembling that of European Christian Democrats, as religiously oriented participants in a secular political process but not as divinely informed arbiters of human affairs.³³

Of course, the critical question is whether we are confident that such “moderate political Islam” exists—or can exist—within the contemporary Muslim world. The real difference between European and Islamic religious politics is the context. In the West, the political evolution of the past two centuries has tamed religion as a political force and has allowed the modern Western state to sustain a secular political process

³² In his presentation to the U.N. Security Council on February 5, 2003, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell stated that the Iraqi regime had “an agent in the most senior levels” of Ansar.

³³ Contribution of RAND analyst David Shlapak, 2003.

that religiously based parties can influence but not dominate. An analogous process of political development has not taken place in large parts of the Muslim world. Whether the state in this part of the world can successfully accommodate the raw political power of religion and not be destabilized in the process remains to be seen.³⁴

The Islamic State

The appropriate relationship between the state and religion remains one of the key unresolved questions in the political development of modern Muslim states and a defining issue separating the different strands of Islamic political thought. Radical Islamists seek to establish an Islamic social, economic, and political order, although there is in fact a great deal of disagreement among the radical groups themselves as to the exact nature of an Islamic state. The concept itself is actually a twentieth-century innovation. The most authoritative Islamic scriptures, the Quran and the sunna, provide general principles of governance but no specific blueprint.³⁵

If we consider modern states that define themselves as Islamic, we find that there are significant differences among them—for instance, between the political model of Iran, where the principle of clerical supremacy over the political authorities is well established, and that of Saudi Arabia or Sudan, which follow the Sunni tradition of rulers governing in consultation with, but not subordinated to, the clerical establishment. In the Taliban model, the clerics and the political authorities were one and the same, whereas in Pakistan, which considers itself an Islamic state, the government is controlled by the military with Western-style constitutional trappings.³⁶

Whatever its modalities might be, the hallmark of the Islamic state is the premise that sovereignty derives not from the people, but from God, and that shari'a must be the highest legal authority in the land. This raises the fundamental question as to whether this conception of Islam is compatible with modern concepts of democracy. None of the self-defined Islamic states (with the possible exception of Malaysia, which considers itself an "Islamic country" but is actually organized on the basis of Western political principles) can be considered democratic, but is this a function of the Islamic character of their constitutions, or of other sociopolitical factors? The ex-

³⁴ The Justice and Development Party of Turkey (AKP) provides a hopeful example of a party with a religious basis operating according to the norms of pluralism and accountability. However, the AKP has only been in power since 2002, and it is too soon to evaluate the success of the current Turkish experiment with a government by a party with Islamic roots.

³⁵ Exponents of the theory of the Islamic state cite the Constitution of Medina (622) and Caliph Ali's instructions to Malik Ashtar, governor of Egypt (795), the most detailed exposition of the precepts of Islamic governance from the period of the early caliphs.

³⁶ Some countries that do not consider themselves Islamic have special dispensations for certain areas within the country—for instance, the province of Aceh in Indonesia and certain northern states of Nigeria—to govern themselves in accordance with Islamic law, to the extent that it does not contradict the national constitution.

perience of the Islamic Republic of Iran presents an interesting case study. The Islamic Republic's bifurcated constitutional arrangements have permitted the development of a limited form of democracy, but the issue is not yet settled on whether further progress is possible under the current system of clerical supremacy or whether the religio-political superstructure would have to be swept away to permit the development of a genuinely democratic state.

Islamic Law

A contentious part of the debate on Islam and democracy revolves around the issue of shari'a. The full imposition of shari'a, including its criminal law component (*budud*) with its characteristic physical punishments, e.g., stoning of adulterers, amputations, etc., and its panoply of restrictions on women's rights, is a central part of the fundamentalists' political program. Outside certain Islamic circles, these practices are generally regarded as inconsistent with customary practice, not to speak of contemporary human rights standards. In almost every Muslim country, with the exception of Saudi Arabia and Iran, implementation of the shari'a is relegated to the sphere of inheritance and family law.

Some of the most controversial issues at the intersection of religion and politics have been rulings by Islamic courts in Pakistan and Nigeria condemning to death by stoning women who had given birth to children outside wedlock—prima facie evidence of adultery, in the courts' view. (The women alleged that they had been raped.) In 2001 Indonesia experienced the first, albeit illegal, stoning in its history, in the area in Ambon controlled by the radical Laskar Jihad militia. The extension of Islamic criminal punishments to areas where they had not been applied in recent times can be considered a strong indicator of the growing influence of radical political Islam.

Movement need not be in one direction only. The possibility of modernizing Islamic law is recognized by Muslim scholars. Unlike the Quran and the sunna, shari'a is regarded by Muslims as man-made and therefore subject to interpretation. Several legal schools in Islam—the Hanafi, Shafi'i, Maliki, and Hanbali schools in Sunni Islam and the Jafari school in Shi'ism—differ on the definition and relative weight of certain legal principles, particularly the methods and limits of *ijtihad* (independent reasoning) (Hourani, 1991). At various times in the development of the Islamic legal tradition, disagreements among jurists was not only permitted but encouraged. In this respect, it should be noted that some of the most oppressive social practices associated with some Muslim societies, particularly relating to the treatment of women, have less to do with Islam or Islamic law than with tribal norms or customs.³⁷

³⁷ For instance, there is nothing in Islamic scriptures that prescribes the wearing of the *abaya* or *chador*-type garments or any particular "Islamic" garb. The Koran simply admonishes to dress modestly. Yet, as some scholars

The Sunni-Shi'a Divide

The majority of the world's Muslims are Sunni; however, a significant minority belong to the Shi'a branch of Islam. The various sects of Shi'ism—of which the most important is the “Twelver”—account for about 15 percent of the global Muslim population. The two other main branches are the Ismailis and the Zaydis, both of which are regarded as moderate in their practice of Islam. Shi'ites constitute a majority in Iran, Iraq, Bahrain, and Azerbaijan. They are now considered to be the largest community in Lebanon, and they are substantial minorities in Pakistan, Turkey, Yemen, and among Indian Muslims, as shown in Figure O.3.


The split between Sunni and Shi'ite Muslims goes back to a dispute over the succession to the Prophet Muhammad. The Shi'ites rejected the first three caliphs, Abubakar, Omar, and Othman, and venerated Mohammed's son-in-law Ali and his son Hussein as his legitimate successors. Ali, who became the fourth caliph, was assassinated in 656 (as were his two predecessors, Omar and Othman). Hussein was killed in battle near Karbala, in what today is Iraq, by forces loyal to the caliph Yezid, whom the Shi'ites regard as a tyrant and usurper. The death of Hussein is commemorated on the day of Ashura, the holiest and saddest in the Shi'ite calendar.

Shi'ites developed a highly emotional religious tradition around the martyrdom of Ali and Hussein and the veneration of the tombs of their successors, the Imams. A millenarian tradition in Twelver Shi'ism holds that one day the “Twelfth Imam,” who disappeared from view in the ninth century, will return from occultation as the Mahdi (the “guided one”) and inaugurate a reign of universal justice. Because of their sense of the injustice and corruption of the world, many Shi'ites throughout history have chosen to eschew involvement in politics as an inappropriate if not impious undertaking.

Shi'a Islam is the official religion of Iran, professed by over 90 percent of the population. Sunnis are about 5 to 8 percent of the Iranian population (Iranian Sunnis are predominantly ethnic Kurds in Iranian Kurdistan), with smaller numbers of Armenian and Assyrian Christians, a dwindling number of Jews, and persecuted Baha'is and Zoroastrians. It is not fully appreciated that the idea of clerical government in Iran is a Khomeinist innovation. Khomeini and his supporters could only take power after fundamentally distorting the historic Twelver Shi'ite doctrine that worldly authority was to be opposed by believers until the return of the Twelfth Imam. Most senior members of the Iranian Shi'a hierarchy rejected the religious premises of Khomeini's revolution, but Khomeini and his supporters were able to silence their critics through their control of religious and state institutions.

have noted, the issue of dress is intensely political and highly symbolic. See Kees van Dijk, “The Indonesian Archipelago from 1913 to 2013: Celebrations and Dress Codes,” in Meuleman, ed. (2001).

Figure O.3—Sunni and Shi’a Populations in the Greater Middle East



SOURCE: Central Intelligence Agency, *The World Factbook 2002*; Library of Congress Country Studies Azerbaijan (1994) and Iraq (1988).

RAND MG246 0.3

Shi'ites also constitute a majority in Iraq, a country that is particularly important to them from a religious standpoint. Two of the most important shrines of Shi'a Islam—Karbala, the site of the martyrdom of Ali and his son Hussein, and Najaf—are located in Iraq and have long been centers of Shi'ite religious devotion. Yet, until the removal of Saddam's government, the Iraqi political elite came from the Arab Sunni community, which comprises approximately 16 percent of the population (another 19 percent are Kurds, almost all Sunni).³⁸ The Iraqi monarchy overthrown in 1958 was Sunni, but Sunni domination intensified after the 1968

³⁸ Library of Congress, *Iraq, A Country Study*, at <http://memory.loc.gov/frd/cs/iqtoc.html>.

Ba'athist takeover. It is likely that the particularly violent and absolutist character of Iraqi politics since the overthrow of the monarchy is related to a political structure that permitted a narrow, largely Sunni oligarchy to sit on top of an alienated and disenfranchised Shi'ite majority.³⁹

Shi'ites are now considered to be the largest religious community in Lebanon, but exactly how large is not known because Lebanon has not conducted a census since 1970. Shi'ites constitute a significant minority in Pakistan, where they are often at odds with the Sunni majority and have been the target of recurrent terrorist attacks. There are also islands of predominantly Shi'ite populations in the Pakistani Punjab; in India, around Avadh (Oudh) north of the Ganges and around Hyderabad in the central Deccan; and in Kashmir.

Shi'ites constitute approximately one-third (some say a majority) of the population in the eastern province of Saudi Arabia,⁴⁰ where the dominant Wahhabi ideology stigmatizes them as "polytheists." For the last two decades, Shi'ite activists in the province drew support and inspiration from the Islamic Republic of Iran. However, with the moves toward rapprochement between Tehran and Riyadh, there are reports that Saudi Arabia's Shi'ites are now turning from Iran and placing their hopes on the United States. Their expectation is that any move toward democracy in Iraq would give the Shi'ite majority a greater say in the politics of that country and increase their ability to help their brethren in Saudi Arabia.⁴¹ Such expectations could present an opportunity for the United States to align its policy with Shi'ite aspirations for greater freedom of religious and political expression and a say in their own affairs in countries controlled by others. If this alignment can be brought about, it could be a powerful barrier to radical Iranian influence and a foundation for a stable U.S. position in the region. Of course, this alignment would not come about easily. A reversal of the U.S. commitment to de-Ba'athification in Iraq or a U.S. policy that is perceived as pro-Sunni would erode trust in the U.S. commitment to democracy and drive otherwise moderate Shi'ites into the arms of Iran.

The downside of such a policy is that it would enrage the Saudis and many other Sunnis, especially in the Iraqi context. It would not necessarily be welcomed by all Shi'ites—certainly not by the Iranian hard-liners or Lebanese Hezbollah. More important, an alignment with the Shi'ites, who are minorities in most Arab countries, would not by itself be a sufficiently robust base to support the whole range of

³⁹ Most Arab and many Muslim polities are autocracies or oligarchies, but the divide between rulers and ruled and the alienation of the ruled is greater in countries such as Saddam's Iraq and Asad's Syria, where the rulers and the ruled belong to different and historically antagonistic branches of Islam.

⁴⁰ Shi'ite activists maintain that Shi'ites are at least half of the population in the eastern province, if not a majority. There are said to be a substantial numbers of "hidden Shi'as" who hide their status because of official persecution and discrimination.

⁴¹ "Saudi Shiites See Gains from a U.S. Invasion of Iraq," *The Wall Street Journal*, February 3, 2003.

U.S. interests in the Middle East. On the other hand, the cost-benefit ratio of this alignment could be improved if it were a component, or by-product, of a democratization policy that empowered historically oppressed groups throughout the region.

The Arab and the Non-Arab Muslim Worlds

The Middle East, a predominantly Arab region that includes all the states of the Arabian Peninsula and those northward to Syria and Iraq and westward to Egypt and Sudan, forms the cradle of the Muslim world. This is the region in which the Prophet Muhammad preached and from which his teachings spread to other lands. The holiest sites of Islam, including Mecca and Medina, are here, as are the oldest institutions of Islamic learning. Although Arabs constitute only about 20 percent of the world's Muslims, interpretations of Islam, political and otherwise, are often filtered through an Arab lens. A great deal of the discourse on Islamic issues and grievances is actually discourse on Arab issues and grievances. A case in point: The Organization of the Islamic Conference at its 1981 summit decided to declare a jihad for the liberation of Jerusalem and Palestine but declined to do the same for Afghanistan (Kepel, 2002). Many Muslims from non-Arab regions resent this Arab-centric worldview. Referring to this tendency to conflate Arab interests and sensitivities with Islam, former Indonesian President Abdurrahman Wahid observed that "the Saudis don't understand the difference between Islam and their own culture."⁴²

The Arab world is by no means monolithic. Egyptian sensibilities, rooted in the traditions of one of the world's oldest civilizations, are very different from those forged in the austerity of the Arabian desert. The Arab conquest of the eighth century did not obliterate the ancient cultures of the Middle East. There is a significant Berber population in North Africa with its own language and culture. Remnants of pre-Muslim Christian communities have survived throughout the region. The Coptic Christians constitute 8 to 15 percent of Egypt's population. Lebanon's Maronite community was politically dominant until the country's collapse into anarchy in the 1980s. Non-Arab Kurds and Turkomans are a majority in the northern third of Iraq; and in Syria, a predominantly Sunni country, the Asad regime is dominated by members of the small Alawite sect, considered heretical by most Sunnis.


Nevertheless, the countries in this region, from Morocco to Iraq, share a language, traditions, and elements of a common history and culture that give the region a distinct identity and distinguish it from other parts of the Muslim world. The key unifying factor is the Arabic language, which is the language of the Quran and has unmatched religious prestige and authority. A common language and cultural con-

⁴² Cited by Mark Woodward, United States–Indonesia Society (USINDO) and The Asia Society, "Islam in Modern Indonesia," proceedings of conference held in Washington, D.C., February 7, 2002.

text facilitate the transmission of values and ideas and the emergence of a regional media. Problems in one part of the Arab world—most notably the Palestinian issue—resonate strongly even in areas far removed from the epicenter of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. A second unifying factor is the self-identification of individuals and nations as “Arab.”


The purpose of making this distinction between Arab and non-Arab Muslim worlds is to explore whether there are factors producing Islamic extremism that are peculiar to the Arab sociopolitical environment rather than to the Muslim world at large. It is noteworthy that the Arab world exhibits a higher incidence of political disorders than other parts of the so-called developing world. The United Nations Development Program’s *Arab Human Development Report 2002*, a remarkable document written by a team of Arab scholars, acknowledges that the predominant characteristic of the current Arab reality is the existence of deeply rooted shortcomings in Arab institutional structures. The report documents critical deficits in freedom, empowerment of women, and knowledge. Out of seven world regions, the Arab world had the lowest freedom score (Figure O.4). These finds were confirmed by a set of indicators of “voice and responsibility” derived from a different database (Figure O.5).

Figure O.4—Average Value of Freedom Scores, World Regions



SOURCE: UNDP (2002).

RAND MG246-0.4

Figure O.5—Average Value of Voice and Accountability Indicators, World Regions

SOURCE: UNDP (2002).

RAND MG246-0.5

With a few exceptions, the Arab political landscape has been dominated by authoritarian political systems. Whereas Latin America, Asia, Eastern Europe, and even parts of sub-Saharan Africa experienced a strong democratic trend in the 1980s and 1990s, the Arab countries by and large remained mired in dictatorship and in the politics of violence and exclusion. This context naturally generates extremist political movements with a message often articulated in the language of political Islam. However, the Arab Middle East is not the only source of Islamic radicalism. Some elements of South Asian Islam have been as extreme as any emanating from the Middle East. The nineteenth-century Deobandi movement in India propagated Wahhabi fundamentalism and imitation of Arab cultural behavior; its ideological successors in Pakistan launched the Taliban in Afghanistan (Upadhyay, 2003).⁴³

By contrast, the non-Arab parts of the Muslim world are politically more inclusive, boast the majority of the democratic or partially democratic governments, and are more secular in outlook. As Chapter Three points out, the question of political Islam in Turkey is arguably a Western rather than a Middle Eastern case study. Turkey is imbedded in the West—institutionally, economically, strategically, and to a growing extent culturally. It is a member of NATO and a candidate for European Union (EU) membership. Over the past two decades, in particular, Turkey has con-

⁴³ Farhad Kazemi attributes the persistence of authoritarianism in this part of the world to the role of the state. Broadly speaking, in Kazemi's view, the region's states have dominated the economy, manipulated sociocultural diversity to fragment the opposition, used repression to stifle dissent, and promoted different ideological formulas to rationalize non-democratic rule. Kazemi, *op. cit.*, pp. 42–43.

verged significantly with European norms in terms of prosperity, democracy, and day-to-day preferences. Thus, Islamic politics in Turkey unfolds in a more transparent setting and is affected to a greater extent by the normative international context than in the rest of the Middle East. Although in this Turkey is distinct from most countries in the Arab world and perhaps in Asia, this convergence with the norms of the modern world has also been taking place in Southeast Asia.

In this regard, Dr. Azyumardi Azra, the rector of Indonesia's State Islamic University, that country's most venerable institution of Islamic studies, noted that the most democratizing Muslim countries, as listed by Freedom House, were also the "least Arabicized."⁴⁴ Although the Middle East has long been regarded (and certainly views itself) as the core of the Muslim world, the most innovative and sophisticated contemporary work in Islam is being done on the periphery, that is, in countries such as Indonesia and in Muslim communities in the West, leading some scholars to ask whether Islam's center of gravity is now shifting to more dynamic regions.⁴⁵ In the regional chapters that constitute the core of this book, we explore in more detail the factors that give Islam and its political expression their specific characteristics in the different regions of the Muslim world.

Nation-States, Tribes, and Clans

Every country in the Muslim world is riven by multiple cleavages among ethnic communities, tribes, and clans, which often constitute the principal basis of an individual's identity and the primary engine of political behavior. Some attribute much of the state dysfunction in the Middle East to the fact that the bureaucratic and institutional trappings of the modern state have been superimposed on social orders that maintain strong tribal and clan components.⁴⁶

In Iraq, for instance, there are about 150 family-based clans, some with memberships into the tens of thousands. The Saddam regime was largely staffed at senior levels by Saddam's relatives and members of a group of tribes—referred to as the *al-Takarita* (Tikritis), of which Saddam's own Albu Nasir tribe is one. Beyond the Tikriti tribes, many of Iraq's other Sunni tribes enjoyed considerable perquisites under Saddam that ensured some degree of loyalty to the regime. Tribal leaders were given land, money, weapons, and authority over their tribes. Young men from friendly tribes were encouraged to join the military and security services and enjoyed

⁴⁴ United States–Indonesia Society (USINDO) and The Asia Society, "Islam in Modern Indonesia," proceedings of conference held in Washington, D.C., February 7, 2002.

⁴⁵ See Nurcholish Madjid, "Islam in Indonesia: A Move from the Periphery to the Center," *Kultur*, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2000.

⁴⁶ Comment by Professor Peter Mandaville, October 2003.

rapid promotion.⁴⁷ Not surprisingly, politics in post-Saddam Iraq continue to be deeply influenced by tribe and clan dynamics. The Sunni tribal federation of the Dulaym, which collaborated closely with the Saddam regime, predominates in Fal-lujah, the epicenter of attacks on coalition forces. Sometimes fear of provoking tribal retaliation has inhibited the new Iraqi authorities from enforcing law and order.

Tribalism is also pervasive in the Arabian peninsula. According to a 1996 study, members of Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh's Sanhan tribe occupied 48 percent of the top political posts and 70 percent of the public administrative posts in Yemen (Kostiner, 1996). In the Pashtun areas of Afghanistan and the Northwest Frontier Province of Pakistan, all politics is tribal. Political leadership was traditionally exercised by the tribal leaders or *maliks*. The British institutionalized the malik system by providing the maliks with official patronage and entitlements as a way of controlling the tribes—a system that continues to this day in Pakistan's tribal areas. The anti-Soviet jihad in the 1980s fundamentally altered the internal political balance in the Pashtun region by empowering the religious leaders, or *mullahs*, who gained access to arms and money supplied by international patrons to the Afghan *mujahidin* (fighters for jihad). Over the past two decades, the mullahs have come a long way from their role of poor village prayer leaders and now vie for political leadership with the traditional tribal maliks.

The strength of these subnational loyalties tends to be inversely proportional to the strength of national institutions. The influence of the tribes derives not simply from tradition but from the reality that they provide services to citizens that the state fails to deliver. Consequently, they attract the loyalty of those citizens. It becomes difficult for the state to enforce its writ, other than by coercion, in areas where the population does not derive tangible benefits from membership in the national community.⁴⁸

In failed states, such as Somalia, clan loyalties are everything, whereas in strong states such as Turkey, the national identity is strong enough to sustain a political system that has successfully submerged ethnic and religiously based politics for over 70 years. In Jordan and some of the Gulf states, tribes are the mainstay of conservative monarchies; in other countries, however, the convergence of tribalism, radical politi-

⁴⁷ The most privileged tribes were those neighboring Tikrit: the Jubbur in Sharqat, the Ubayd in al-Alam and Tarmiya, the Mushahadah in Tarmiya, the Luhayb in Sharqat, and the al-Azza in Balad, the Harb in ad-Dur, the Tayy in Mosul, the Khazraj south of Mosul, and the Maghamis from Khalis. The regime's favor also extended to some Shi'ite and even Kurdish tribes, who undertook in return to monitor the border with Iran and prevent their own tribesmen from joining anti-Saddam insurgents. See Amatzia Baram, "The Iraqi Tribes and the Post-Saddam System," The Brookings Institution, *Iraq Memo* No. 18, July 8, 2003. Baram notes that Saddam's tribal power base was not monolithic. There were periodic fallings out between Saddam and key members of his tribe (usually with lethal consequences for the latter) and resulting alienation and hostility of many individuals and tribe members.

⁴⁸ Omar Daair, "Authoritarian Rule in a Plural Society: the Republic of Yemen," MSc Dissertation, School of Oriental and African Studies, London, September 2001, at <http://www.al-bab.com/yemen/pol/daair1.htm>.

cal Islam, and weak state authority has produced the most virulent kinds of Islamic extremism and terrorism. An effective U.S. policy toward individual countries in the Muslim world—or elsewhere—must take into account the need to manage subnational loyalties and power relationships. In Iraq, until a representative national government is consolidated, authorities in Baghdad will have to work with the tribal leadership. However, handing over too much power to local sheikhs could turn some of them into warlords whom the central government will find difficult to control. There could also be a risk of tribal revolt or an attempt by tribes to expand their autonomy at the expense of the central government.

The failure to fully understand tribal politics was one of the underlying causes of the catastrophic U.S. involvement in the Somali conflict in the early 1990s. Ten years later, the U.S. government still knows little about tribal dynamics in areas where U.S. forces are or may be operating. As the United States pursues an activist policy in disturbed areas of the world, it will be critical to understand and to learn to manage subnational and tribal issues.

Sources of Islamic Radicalism

Within the broad universe of political Islam, radicals are a distinct minority, but they are disproportionately influential. The factors that account for the upsurge of radical political Islam can be broken down into three broad categories: conditions, processes, and catalytic events.

Conditions are just what the term means: factors that have a permanent or quasi-permanent character. The key condition in the countries under study is that, because they are all Muslim-majority countries, Islam—or the prevailing interpretations of Islam—defines their religious and to some extent their political culture. For the most part, they are also the product of colonialism and the process of decolonization. After independence, most of these countries experimented with political and economic models that failed to deliver sustained economic growth or stable and representative political institutions. The failure of alternative models was a major driver of the rise of the Islamist model—the concept that “Islam is the answer.” Other conditions that facilitated the rise of Islamic extremism are what we call “structural anti-Westernism,” the tendency for people to externalize their frustrations with unappealing economic, political, and social conditions that they feel powerless to change, and certain characteristics in the structure of Sunni Islam that facilitate exploitation by clerics with radical agendas.

Processes are developments that occur over an extended period of time and that can have a particular outcome or equilibrium state. Processes occur within the framework of a region’s conditions and may be propelled by catalytic events. The Palestinian-Israeli and Kashmir conflicts are processes.

Catalytic events are major developments—wars or revolutions—that changed the political dynamics in a region or country in a fundamental way. Examples of conditions, processes, and catalytic events relevant to our study are shown in Table O.3.

Table O.3
Sources of Islamic Radicalism

Conditions	Failed political and economic models Structural anti-Westernism Decentralization of religious authority in Sunni Islam
Processes	The Islamic resurgence Arabization of the non-Arab Muslim world External funding of religious fundamentalism and extremism The convergence of Islamism and tribalism Growth of radical Islamic networks Emergence of the mass media The Palestinian-Israeli and Kashmir conflicts
Catalytic events	The Iranian revolution The Afghan war The Gulf War of 1991 September 11 and the global war on terrorism The Iraq war

Conditions

Failed Political and Economic Models. The condition that perhaps more than any other has shaped the political environment of the Muslim world and the Arab world in particular is the widespread failure of the postindependence political and economic models. Arguably, many of the ills and pathologies that afflict countries in this part of the world and that generate much of the extremism we are concerned about derive from—and contribute to—economic and political failure.

From the earliest days of Western dominance, there were political movements that challenged Western values and political influence. Although some of these movements were Islam-based, in the immediate postcolonial period the most influential opponents of the Western presence in the Muslim world were secular movements espousing some form of socialist ideology, such as Nasser's Arab socialism, the Ba'ath Party, Mossadegh and the Tudeh Party in Iran, Al Fatah and various smaller Marxist-oriented Palestinian groups, the Algerian National Liberation Front, and Sukarno's brand of Indonesian nationalism. These regimes and ideologies were notoriously unsuccessful in fulfilling their promises of economic growth, social justice, and international strength.

The residue of the failed political experiments of the postcolonial era is a set of repressive, corrupt, and unrepresentative regimes incapable of providing a modicum of democracy, economic well-being, or social justice. The already cited 2002 United

Nations Development Program's *Arab Human Development Report 2002* is an unusually frank indictment of what it calls the deeply rooted shortcomings in the Arab institutional structure.

It should be noted, however, that economic and political failure is not universal throughout the Muslim world. Jordan, Morocco, and some of the Gulf states have developed more or less functioning representative institutions. Egypt and Iraq had functioning, if imperfect, parliamentary systems before the overthrow of their respective monarchies. It is noteworthy in this respect that Muslim monarchies have generally provided greater political pluralism, economic rationality, and the possibility of democratic evolution than the "republics" that in some cases replaced them. Turkey took a different path early on with the establishment of an avowedly secular republic in 1923 and has had half a century of experience in parliamentary democracy, albeit with periodic military intervention. The main trend of political development in the major Muslim-majority states in Southeast Asia is also in a democratic direction. Malaysia has had a parliamentary system since its independence, and Indonesia is holding its second free election since the end of the Suharto era.

Structural Anti-Westernism. Radical political Islam has taken by and large an anti-Western and specifically anti-American cast. Explanations for Muslim anger at the United States and the West fall on two sides of an analytical and ideological divide.

On one side is the view that the reason for this anger is U.S. policies, specifically U.S. support for Israel and for authoritarian regimes, and the U.S. military presence in Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, and now Iraq. The enforcement of economic sanctions and no-flight zones on Iraq after the Gulf War of 1991 has also been given as a reason for Muslim anger. However, there does not appear to be a relationship between fluctuations in U.S. policies that at various points were aligned with Muslim interests (e.g., U.S. support for the mujahidin during the Afghan War, U.S. interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo on the side of Muslims, the liberation of Kuwait) and the level of anti-U.S. sentiments. In other words, U.S. support for oppressed Muslims does not seem to have affected Muslim attitudes, *except in the countries where U.S. intervention was effective*—for instance, Kuwait and Bosnia.⁴⁹

An alternative view is that Muslim anger has deeper roots in the political and social structures of some Muslim countries and that opposition to certain U.S. policies merely provides the content and opportunity for the expression of this anger. This is not to say that many Muslims do not object to U.S. policies. They do, but the sources of the anger are deeper. This is what we refer to as structural anti-Westernism

⁴⁹ For instance, attitudes toward the U.S. decision to go to war against Saddam were dramatically different in Kuwait than in other Arab countries. Two of the authors of this book met with a leading Kuwaiti Salafi who supported the war in Iraq. This apparent anomaly can be explained by the fact that Kuwaitis had experienced aggression from fellow Arabs. Discussion with Halil Sultan al-Aisa, Kuwait City, June 11, 2003.

or anti-Americanism. It differs fundamentally from the type of anti-Americanism that may result from objections to specific U.S. policies in that it is not amenable to amelioration through policy or public diplomacy means.

According to this view, the source of the anger is the trauma of the Muslim world's encounter with modernity, the economic and social dislocations caused by failed modernization, and the lack of established channels to express political dissent. The anger is directed at the West and at the United States in particular because, as the chief agent of global change, the United States represents the forces that, in the view of some Muslims, have placed their countries in a position of inferiority vis-à-vis the West and threaten the integrity of Muslim societies and values.

Structural anti-Westernism also comes about in a more deliberate way when government and political elites in countries with failing political systems (some of them aligned with the United States) seek to divert the discontent of their populations by fomenting or exploiting anti-American and anti-Jewish propaganda. The Egyptian media is particularly notorious in this regard. A case in point, which generated great outrage in the West, was the Egyptian television production *Horseman Without a Horse*, which featured the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, a Czarist anti-Semitic fabrication. The production was serialized on some 20 Arab television channels and networks during Ramadan in 2002.

The Decentralization of Religious Authority in Sunni Islam. One of the factors that make Sunni Islam vulnerable to manipulation is the lack of institutional mechanisms within the religious infrastructure to control extremists. Unlike Shi'a Islam, which developed an elaborate clerical hierarchy in the nineteenth century, Sunni Islam religious authority is decentralized. Generally, religious interpretation is exercised by the ulama, who carry out their duties with varying degrees of autonomy from the political authorities, depending on the country.

Religious scholars routinely issue *fatwas*, rulings on Islamic law. Individuals without formal training or recognized religious authority are not authorized to issue fatwas, but the diffused nature of authority in Sunni Islam provides a great deal of scope for religious entrepreneurs to advance their political and personal goals in the name of religion. Osama bin Laden is an example of someone without religious training or authority who nevertheless hijacked religious symbols and rhetoric for his own extremist interpretation of Islam.

The Silence of the Moderates. Extremists are also able to exercise undue influence because moderates are often unwilling to confront radicals. One reason given for this reluctance is ideological paralysis brought about by shared values and beliefs. A scholar of Islam put it this way: "When one focuses on their fundamental convictions, their most cherished values, and the kind of society and political order they aspire to create, moderates have far more in common with radicals than they do with Western-style democrats" (Denoeux, 2002).

There is also a fear of the consequences of taking on the radicals. In many parts of the Muslim world, the radicals have been generally successful in justifying terrorism as part of the struggle between Islam and the West. Concern about being portrayed as proxies for Western interests inhibits some moderate Muslims from openly opposing the radicals. An aversion to confrontation may also play a role. Some moderates, although they may disagree with the teachings and methods of the radicals, regard them as fellow Muslims whom one should engage in dialogue and seek to persuade rather than confront.⁵⁰

Processes

The Islamic Resurgence. Beginning in the 1970s, much of the Muslim world experienced a trend known as Islamization or the Islamic resurgence. This phenomenon is characterized by greater religiosity, greater insistence on such outward manifestations of piety as the wearing of Islamic garb, greater social distance between the sexes, overt concern with Islamic dietary restrictions, intolerance of such un-Islamic public behavior as consumption of alcohol at public accommodations, and exclusive, identity-driven politics.⁵¹ Moderate Muslims stress the healthy aspects of Islamization, which encourages greater attention to the ethical teachings of the religion, a more intensive discourse, and an internal critique of the condition of Islam. However, the process has had pernicious aspects, such as greater intolerance, political extremism, and a propensity for violence among some sectors of Islam.

The wearing of “Islamic” garb in societies where it was not generally worn is a visible indicator of the extent to which Islamization has progressed in areas such as sub-Saharan Africa, Southeast Asia, and even Turkey. In some secular societies as different as Singapore and France, the wearing of such garb in public schools has generated major political battles between observant Muslims demanding the right of religious expression and state authorities seeking to enforce their vision of secular education and social cohesion.

Arabization of the Non-Muslim World. In countries outside the Arab Middle East, the Islamic resurgence has involved the importation of Arab-origin ideology and religious practices, greetings, terminology, and even mosque architecture—a process that we refer to as *Arabization*. This process has had a polarizing effect outside the Middle East, creating greater distance between Muslims who have chosen to adopt elements of the Arab religious culture as a way of manifesting greater piety and non-Muslims and Muslims who continue to adhere to local customs and religious practices.

⁵⁰ Discussion with Muhammadiyah Chairman Ahmad Syafii Maarif, Jakarta, Indonesia, June 2002.

⁵¹ For a discussion of the manifestations of Islamization in Malaysia, see the important study by Chandra Muzaffar (1987), pp. 3–6.

The extent to which Arabization has taken root in the countries and regions where the process operates depends on a number of external and internal factors. Gulf money is an important engine of this process. Other factors are the level of cultural and political resistance and the affinity (or lack thereof) of the local populations for Arab religious and political culture. Pakistan has been particularly susceptible. In the early 1970s, Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's government actively promoted Arabic language and education as part of a policy of establishing a "Middle Eastern" identity for Pakistan. This policy accelerated under his successor, General Zia ul-Haq. As the International Crisis Group noted in a report on Pakistan, the influx of Arab financial, cultural, and political capital would "assume mammoth proportions during the Afghan jihad."⁵² By contrast, in Central Asia the most significant extra-regional influences have been not Arab but Turkish.⁵³ In Southeast Asia, Arab influences have been associated with political militancy. There is a Hadrami (Yemeni) connection to radical Islam across the region. Many Indonesians point out that Islamic extremism in their country has been associated with clerics of Arab origin—for instance, Laskar Jihad leader Ja'afar Umar Thalib, Jemaah Islamiyah founders Abu Bakar Ba'asyir and Abdullah Sungkar (deceased), and Islamic Defenders Front head Muhammad Habib Rizieq.⁵⁴

"Riyaldiplomatik": The Funding and Propagation of Fundamentalism and Extremism. Saudi funding and export of the Wahhabi version of Islam over the past three decades has had the effect, whether intended or not, of promoting the growth of religious extremism throughout the Muslim world. Although the Wahhabi variant has been the official interpretation of Islam in Saudi Arabia since the establishment of the Saudi monarchy, the large-scale funding of religious outreach activities overseas became a central feature of Saudi policy in the 1960s. In 1962, the World Muslim League (WML) (Rabitat al-'Alam al-Islami) was established, with the chief mufti of Saudi Arabia, Muhammad bin Ibrahim Aal al-Shaykh, a descendant of Ibn abd al-Wahhab, as its president. The WML was intended to project the Saudi version of Islam on an international scale. It also brought about a closer association between Wahhabis and non-Wahhabi Salafis. The organization's constituent council included several leading Salafi personalities, such as Sa'id Ramadan, son-in-law of Hassan al-Banna, founder of the Muslim Brotherhood; Maulana Abu A'la Mawdudi, founder of the Jama'at-i Islami of Pakistan; and Maulana Abul-Hasan Nadvi of India (Algar, 2002).

Another link in the Wahhabi international network, the Muslim Student Association of North America and Canada (MSA), was established in 1963, one year after

⁵² International Crisis Group (ICG Asia Report No. 36 (2002), p. 8. See also Chapter Five.

⁵³ See "Fethullah Gulen and the Turkish Nurculuk Movement," in Chapter Seven.

⁵⁴ Rabasa (2003).

the WML and with close ties to it. Collaboration between the MSA and analogous organizations in other countries led to the foundation in 1966 of the International Islamic Federation of Student Organizations (IIFSO), an organization described as having close relations with the Muslim World League and with the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY) with headquarters in Riyadh. In 1973, when the oil embargo ushered in an era of steeply higher oil prices and released a flood of petrodollars to the Persian Gulf states, the structure was in place for aggressive funding of international fundamentalist tendencies. (See Chapter Ten.)

The Saudis have deftly used aid to communities devastated by war to spread Wahhabism. Saudi aid agencies provide medicine and food and build mosques, schools, and shelters. But this aid can come with a price. In the aftermaths of the Balkan conflicts in the 1990s, Saudi aid agencies—in addition to building schools, clinics, and shelters—razed or defaced numerous Ottoman-period mosques, libraries, cemeteries, and other Islamic structures that had survived the violence in Bosnia and Kosovo.

In ways quite unanticipated by the Saudis, however, the oil wealth also worked to the advantage of Islamic extremists, who capitalized on the social dislocations and the corruption generated by the oil economy to gain support for their more radical views. Two events in 1979 profoundly threatened Saudi security: the Iranian revolution and the takeover of the Grand Mosque in Mecca, the *Haram al-Shereif*, the holiest site in Islam, by Saudi dissidents. The Iranian revolution, among other effects, set off a fierce competition between Tehran and Riyadh for influence among the world's Muslims. The Saudis had the advantage in money as well as the Custodianship of the Two Holy Places, but the Khomenists countered with revolutionary fervor and an appeal to the “oppressed” (*mustazaffin*) that transcended the Iranian revolution's Shi'a foundations.

The takeover of the Grand Mosque by Saudi extremists occurred in the context of this ideological competition. The takeover shook the monarchy to its foundations. The Saudi government executed the leaders of the dissidents, but in effect adopted some of their agenda. The Saudis tightened religious observances at home and, of greater consequence, stepped up funding of mosques, *madrassas* (religious schools), and Islamic social welfare organizations that, in countries such as Pakistan, filled the void left by ineffectual or nonexistent state institutions.

Of course, there is no single mechanism for raising and distributing what is known as “Saudi money.” The funds come from public and private sources and are channeled through a variety of foundations and middlemen to recipients around the world. In some cases, the recipients are what they seem to be, but sometimes they camouflage themselves in ways that make them more attractive to the donors.

It is difficult to ascertain to what extent the donors are aware of the ultimate disposition of the funds after they are transferred, but there is substantial evidence that some of the funds make their way to extremist and terrorist groups. Efforts to

establish accountability have been weak or nonexistent, either because they have low priority for the donors or because mechanisms to monitor the disposition and use of the money are lacking.

Recently, there appears to be a more aggressive effort by the Saudi authorities to curb the funding of terrorist groups. The al-Haramain Foundation, accused of funneling funds to Al Qaeda, was instructed by Saudi authorities to drastically reduce its presence abroad and to concentrate on funding activities within Saudi Arabia. In May 2003, the foundation announced the closure of offices in Albania, Bosnia, Croatia, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Kenya, Kosovo, Pakistan, and Tanzania. According to media reports, the directive for the closure of the offices was relayed by the Saudi Islamic Affairs Minister Saleh Al Sheik, who also oversaw the appointment of a new administrative board for the foundation.⁵⁵ In June 2004, Saudi and U.S. officials announced at a press conference in Washington, D.C., that the al-Haramain Foundation and other private charitable organizations would be dissolved or come under the supervision of the National Commission for Charitable Work Abroad, a new body that will have exclusive authority over all Saudi charity and welfare activities overseas.⁵⁶

The Convergence of Radical Islamism and Tribalism. Tribal culture and affiliation can play a substantial role in the extent to which radical, violent forms of Islamism prosper in some regions of the Middle East and South Asia. Although the literature on the relationship between tribalism and radicalism is not yet well developed, interviews in the region and anecdotal evidence suggest that extremist tendencies seem to find fertile ground in segmentary lineal tribal societies.⁵⁷ Wahhabism was and continues to be a tribal phenomenon with limited appeal in urban areas or settled agricultural communities. Areas considered Al Qaeda strongholds are also strongly tribal: the Saudi-Yemeni border area, southeastern Afghanistan, Baluchistan, and the federally administered tribal areas of Pakistan. The majority of the September 11 hijackers, as well as Bin Laden himself, came from families originating in the southern province of Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the mastermind of the September 11 attacks, and his nephew Ramzi Yousef, who planned the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and the 1995 plot to

⁵⁵ "Saudis shut down charity after pressure from U.S.," World Tribune.com, May 16, 2003; "Saudi Official Says Saudi Arabia Is 'Mobilized' to Fight Terrorism," The Washington File Europe, U.S. Department of State, International Information Programs, June 12, 2003, at <http://lists.state.gov>. The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (CIRF) has recommended that Congress fund a study to determine whether, how, and the extent to which the Saudi government, members of the royal family, or Saudi individuals or institutions are funding and propagating a religious ideology that explicitly promotes hate and violence toward members of other religious groups. The CIRF-proposed study would also examine the curricula and teaching materials used in Saudi-supported institutions. Discussion with CIRF staff, Washington, D.C., April 2004.

⁵⁶ "Riyadh Creates Body to Supervise Charity," IslamOnline, in <http://www.islamonline.net/English/News/2004-02/29/article08.shtml>.

⁵⁷ Steven Simon, a reviewer of this chapter, does not believe that there is a sufficient analytical basis for the causal correlation implied between tribalism and Islamic extremism.

blow up 12 U.S. passenger airlines en route from Asia to the United States, are Pakistani Baluchis. Three other Baluchis related to Yousef have been identified as major Al Qaeda figures.⁵⁸ Tribal connections sustain the Taliban and Al Qaeda remnants on the Pakistani-Afghan border area and probably also the current Iraqi insurgency.

The phenomenon whereby new converts to radical Islam emerge from the tribal areas is referred to by Kuwaiti political scientist Shamlan al-Essa as the “tribalization of radical Islam.” According to al-Essa, the Islamist parties that emerged in the 1950s and 1960s as urban movements are overlapping more and more with the tribes. One hypothesis is that tribes’ leanings toward a rigid interpretation of Islam are inherent in their lifestyle and history. To illustrate this point, one observer notes that many prominent features of radical Islam find their roots in tribal customs that predate Islam.⁵⁹ Tribal conservatism—a cultural and not a religious feature—and religious extremism can be mutually reinforcing. In the absence of countervailing forces—for instance, a strong central authority—they produce a mix that, in the words of a prominent Kuwaiti editor, “leads to bin Laden.”⁶⁰

At the same time, it is worth noting that many Islamic extremist movements are not tribal—for instance, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, the Algerian terrorist groups Armed Islamic Group (GIA) and Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), and Southeast Asia’s Jemaah Islamiyah. Also, in countries where the tribes are integrated into a strong political structure, such as Jordan, the more extreme forms of Islamism and terrorism have not taken root.

The Development of Muslim Networks

International networks have played an important role in the Islamic resurgence of recent years and, within this context, in the growth of religious extremism and terrorism. These networks may be explicitly Muslim in nature or simply collections of individuals who share a common religious background. Networks can be diasporic (related to Muslim communities outside the Muslim world), humanitarian, or financial. Numerous cross-cutting issues link these networks, including ethnic affinity, class, tribe, and family links, as well as perceptions of injustice that inhibit acculturation and sometimes drive individuals toward violent paths.

As we now know, support networks in Muslim diasporas, especially in Europe, have been key nodes in the funding and operations of extremist and terrorist groups. Ironically, the activities of these groups have been facilitated by the reluctance of

⁵⁸ Laurie Mylroie, “The Baluch Connection,” *The Wall Street Journal*, March 18, 2003. In Mylroie’s view, some of these terrorists could have been elements of Saddam Hussein’s Baluchi network and might have been given false identities during the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait.

⁵⁹ Mohammed El-Kuwaiz, “Radical Islam Has Nomadic Origins,” Letters to the Editor, *Financial Times*, February 4, 2003.

⁶⁰ Discussion with Mohammed Al-Jassem, editor-in-chief, *Al Watan*, Kuwait City, June 2003.

Western security and law enforcement agencies to monitor the activities of allegedly religious groups. As the investigations following the events of September 11, 2001 have run their course, it has become apparent that Muslim diasporas in countries such as Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Spain, Belgium, and Switzerland have been implicated as important hubs of Al Qaeda operations and recruitment.⁶¹

Al Qaeda is not the only organization to use Muslim diasporas and networks for support and operations. Islamic humanitarian and health organizations have been key building blocs of many radical groups. Hezbollah and Hamas have used the provision of social services to strengthen their political bases. Hezbollah has set up an impressive network of health and welfare facilities throughout eastern and southern Lebanon and has extended its reach to the Lebanese Shi'a diaspora that stretches from Lebanon to West Africa and South America. The "tri-border region" of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay has been identified by the U.S. Department of State as "a focal point for Islamic extremism in Latin America" and a major hemispheric threat to the U.S. security.⁶²

Health services delivered by al-Haramain and other Saudi foundations in Chechnya, the Balkans, Somalia, Indonesia, and other areas of conflict have been linked to radical political organizations in these countries. Insurgents use humanitarian assistance to provide medical treatment to their cadres and to gain influence among the population in impoverished and neglected areas. European and North American groups generate funds for these activities. The Chechen guerrillas, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, the United Tajik Opposition, and Hizb-ut Tahrir have tapped into this system to gain support in the Caucasus and Central Asia.

Economic networks comprise front companies that launder money and fund the activities of extremist and terrorist groups.⁶³ Their methods include the use of free trade zones for the transfer of goods and support services, the informal *hawala* system of untraceable currency transfers, and other methods of cash transfers, including diamonds and gold. Investigations into Al Qaeda sleeper cells in Europe in the wake of the September 11 attacks revealed widespread use of legitimate business and employment by Al Qaeda operatives to derive income to support themselves and their activities. Al Qaeda itself has had extensive financial concerns in Sudan, worldwide investments, and small businesses in operationally important places around the globe.

⁶¹ See, for instance, the report of the Spanish investigation of the Al Qaeda cell in Spain, Juzgado Central de Instrucción No. 005 Madrid, Sumario (Proc. Ordinario) 0000035/2001E, September 17, 2003, at <http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/terrorism/espbinltn91703cmp.pdf>. See also "Beyond the European Union: Al Qaeda," in Chapter Ten.

⁶² U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, "Patterns of Global Terrorism 2000," *Latin American Overview*, Washington, D.C., April 2000.

⁶³ For instance, in his study of terrorism in Southeast Asia, Zachary Abuza lists four front companies established in Malaysia to channel Al Qaeda funds. Abuza (2002), p. 59.

Criminal enterprises also service violent Islamist activities. Al Qaeda and Hezbollah have raised millions of dollars in drug money. Hezbollah profits from the Bekaa Valley poppy production and traffics in narcotics in North America to fund activities in the Middle East. Hezbollah and according to some reports Al Qaeda also capitalize on the black market for African gold and diamonds. Muslim extremists routinely resort to smuggling, kidnapping, and extortion to raise funds and achieve political ends. In South America, Hezbollah operatives engage in a wide range of criminal activities, including shakedowns of local Arab communities and sophisticated import-export scams.⁶⁴

The Emergence of the New Mass Media. Islamic radicalism is exacerbated by the emergence of increasingly bold and often irresponsible satellite regional media whose most visible manifestation is the well-known Qatar-based network Al-Jazeera, which reflects the political line of the Muslim Brotherhood. The new media have changed the patterns of news dissemination in the Middle East by breaking the information monopoly of the state-controlled media. (Previously, news reports in the Middle East consisted of videos of officials shaking hands with visitors. In 1990, for instance, the Saudi media did not tell their audience that Iraq had invaded Kuwait until several days after the invasion, giving the government time to put the official line together.) This is not to say that the new media have done much to promote a culture of tolerance. These media propagate stories with an anti-American, anti-Western, and anti-Semitic content, broadcast Al Qaeda propaganda, and occasionally attack the Saudi and Jordanian monarchies (although Al-Jazeera's taste for controversial political coverage does not extend to Qatari politics). The media both exploit and endorse existing popular anger and real and imagined grievances.

Over the long term, this opening of the regional media could work in two ways. In the best case, it could contribute to a democratization process by providing an alternative source of information to the state-controlled media. The development of these media has the potential to foster greater self-examination, internal debate, and exposure to new ideas.⁶⁵ Unfortunately, there is little evidence of these potential positive effects; instead, the new media reinforce existing stereotypes and narratives of Arab victimization that play into the radicals' agendas.

Catalytic Events

Beyond those factors, the specific modalities that radical political Islam has taken are the product of a number of critical or catalytic events that have altered the political

⁶⁴ For a more detailed treatment of this subject, see "When Muslims Finance Islamic Violence: Criminal Activities" in Chapter Ten.

⁶⁵ In some Gulf state programs, there is viewer call-in and audience participation, and citizens are able to ask questions of government officials.

environment in the Muslim world in fundamental ways. We discuss these catalytic events below.

The Iranian Revolution. The Iranian revolution demonstrated that religious fundamentalists could overthrow an apparently strong secular government—importantly, one supported by the United States—and establish in its place a state with an exclusive Islamic identity. In the Arab Middle East, the influence of the Iranian revolution found expression in the Islamization of the Palestinian and Lebanese conflicts. Before 1979, radical political Islam did not figure prominently in these conflicts. Afterwards, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (*Pasdaran*) established a military presence in Lebanon, where the large Shi’ite community provided the social basis for the emergence of Hezbollah as a proxy for Iranian policy. The Iranian mullahs also developed ties with indigenous fundamentalist groups in the Persian Gulf states, North Africa, and Southeast Asia.

The Afghan War. The war against the Soviets in Afghanistan attracted militants from all over the Muslim world. Whereas the Afghan fighters were generally devout Muslims themselves, they saw their struggle primarily as a war of national liberation. At the beginning, radical fundamentalists did not dominate the Afghan mujahidin movement. However, massive Saudi subsidies were disproportionately channeled through the Pakistani Inter-Service Intelligence organization to such radical fundamentalist groups as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hizb-e-Islami. Recruitment was carried out in the Pakistani madrassas, whose graduates later constituted the backbone of the Taliban and the Kashmiri terrorist organizations.

For the foreign mujahidin, the Afghan war was a jihad pure and simple, logically coextensive with other battlefields—Kashmir, Chechnya, Bosnia, or Mindanao. Osama bin Laden, together with the radical Palestinian preacher Abdallah Azzam, founded the *Maktab al-Khidamat* (Office of Services), through which they recruited and controlled foreign mujahidin volunteers. Azzam, the emir or leader of the organization, was killed with two of his sons in a bomb explosion in Peshawar in November 1989 after parting company with Bin Laden. Reportedly, Azzam wanted to take the jihad from Afghanistan to the aid of oppressed Muslims worldwide, especially in Kashmir and Chechnya, whereas Bin Laden wanted to concentrate on attacks on the United States and the destruction of pro-Western Arab regimes.⁶⁶

The list of “Afghanis,” or veterans of the Afghan war, who played key roles in terrorist and armed radical Islamic movements throughout the Muslim world is extensive. Many of the returning “Afghan Arabs” played a key role in the Algerian Islamist insurgency, in the Islamist terrorist campaign in Egypt in the early 1990s, and

⁶⁶ Rohan Gunaratna notes that Azzam’s opposition to indiscriminate terrorism was a key point of discord with Bin Laden. Gunaratna (2002), pp. 22–23. Anonymous, in contrast, plays down the disagreement between Azzam and Bin Laden and does not seem to give credence to the theory that Bin Laden arranged Azzam’s assassination. Anonymous (2002), p. 101.

in Bosnia, Chechnya, Kashmir, and Southeast Asia. The Afghan war, therefore, not only served as the training ground for today's Islamic terrorists and radicals, but it provided the context for the creation of the transnational networks that served as the conduit for Al Qaeda operations.

The Gulf War of 1991. The Gulf War widened the breach between the Saudis and their allies in the Muslim world, including the ulama that they had assiduously cultivated, on the one hand, and more extreme Islamist sectors, on the other. In the eyes of the radicals, the Saudis had compromised their religious legitimacy by allowing infidels into the kingdom. The Saudi alignment with the West in a war against a Muslim state (notwithstanding the secular character of the Iraqi regime and its record of repression of any independent expression of Islam) gave rise to an alternative Islamist project directed against the Saudi royal family (Kepel, 2002). The neo-Wahhabis, as they are referred to by a Saudi dissident and political analyst Ali al-Ahmed,⁶⁷ had been exposed to the Muslim Brotherhood and Arab expatriates and adopted their ideology. They spoke out against the presence of U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia and questioned the credibility of the traditional religious establishment, which backed the Saudi government's position that the presence of U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia to liberate Kuwait was permissible. One of the neo-Wahhabi tendencies examined the fatwas of former Wahhabi clerics concerning the conditions that would permit rebellion against a Muslim ruler and concluded that the Saudi government was an "infidel government" and that the clerics of the official religious establishment were apostates.⁶⁸

Region-Specific Catalytic Events. Some events have been catalytic with respect to one region of the Muslim world but not others. For example, in the Arab world the Six-Day War of 1967 greatly discredited secular governments and boosted Islamic fundamentalist movements that, along with the continuing conflict between Palestinians and Israelis, vex the United States today. In South Asia, home to one in three Muslims in the world, the communal polarization that occurred under the British and the subsequent partition of the continent gave rise to radical Islamic movements, whereas other catalytic moments, such as the breakup of Pakistan in 1971 and the destruction of the Ayodha mosque in 1992 by Hindu nationalists, have fueled extremist religion-based politics. In Southeast Asia, the economic crisis of the late 1990s, the collapse of the Suharto regime in Indonesia, the disaffection of Muslim minorities in the Philippines and Thailand, and political dynamics in Malaysia have led some to see religious politics as a means to power. In Central Asia, after a long period of quiescence under the Soviets, religious movements have become more salient in some Central Asian republics as these states struggle to define their post-

⁶⁷ Discussion with Ali al-Ahmed, Washington, D.C., April 3, 2003.

⁶⁸ See Mansur al-Nuqaydan, "The Islamist Map in Saudi Arabia and the Question of Repudiation," *Al Wasat* (Manama), February 28, 2003.

Soviet identities and to define new relationships with Russia and others seeking influence in the region.

Effects of the Palestinian and Kashmir Conflicts

The Palestinian-Israeli conflict is not a catalytic event but a chronic condition that has shaped political discourse in the Middle East for over half a century. Arguably, it has retarded the political maturation of the Arab world by diverting scarce material, political, and psychic resources from pressing internal problems. Successive Arab defeats in armed conflicts with the Israelis have contributed to the discredit of Arab regimes and to the rise of Islamic extremism in the Arab world.

There is no question that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a neuralgic issue for many Muslims. However, the implications of the Palestinian issue for policy depend on the extent to which anti-Western anger and resentment is a function of external factors, and particularly of U.S. policy toward the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. If this were the case, resolution or mitigation of the conflict would defuse much of the anger directed at the United States. Of course, this begs the question of how the conflict is to be solved, or whether it can be solved at all under present conditions, since there is little to suggest that the political will exists for the parties to find common ground. (A key precondition is the ability of the two parties to enforce the terms of a settlement. Since the Palestinian authority does not currently have a monopoly on force in the Palestinian territories, this condition does not seem to be present on the Palestinian side.) In any event, as Yezid Sayigh points out, violent and disintegrative trajectories in the Israeli-Palestinian relationship have greatly complicated the task of resuming the peace process within the foreseeable future.⁶⁹

Nevertheless, no matter how bleak the prospect, if the problem is policy-driven there is at least some hope that at some future point reconciliation may be achieved. If, on the other hand, the sources of Arab anger and resentment are *not* policy-driven, then even a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict would not bring about long-term stability in the Arab world. That said, if the Palestinian problem is viewed as a lightning rod for anger that may derive from other causes, resolution or mitigation of the problem could bring about a short-term reduction in tensions by removing one of the major outlets for such anger.

To the extent that the Palestinian issue has served as a mechanism in some Arab countries to externalize discontent with domestic conditions, Kashmir can be said to serve as analogous function with regard to Pakistan. It is, aside from Islam, the central unifying factor in Pakistan. Successive Pakistani governments have pursued a proxy war in Kashmir, to which they have subordinated the other purposes of the Pakistani state to a large extent. This dynamic has dramatically changed the fabric of

⁶⁹ Yezid Sayigh, "Palestine Confounded," *Survival*, Vol. 44, No. 4, Winter 2002–03, pp. 7–21.

Pakistan's domestic politics by empowering extremist movements and their sponsors in the Pakistani security services.

Effect of September 11 and the War on Terrorism

The September 11 terrorist attacks were clearly catalytic with regard to the United States' perception of its own security and its relations with the Muslim world. Threat perceptions in the United States changed. Issues that before September 11 loomed large in the U.S. bilateral relationship with countries in the Muslim arc from Morocco to Mindanao receded in importance, and cooperation in the global war on terrorism became a preeminent U.S. interest.

But did September 11 bring about a quantum change in Muslim attitudes? A common view among our interlocutors is that September 11 opened a new era in the United States and Europe, but not in the Muslim world. As an Egyptian interlocutor told us, September 11 was an American event whose consequences America has visited upon Muslims. Most Muslims were horrified by the death and destruction wreaked by the September 11 attacks, but many—particularly in the Arab world—found some satisfaction in the idea that America's nose had been bloodied and that the United States had felt some of the pain that they believed had been inflicted on Muslims.⁷⁰ So condemnation of the attacks was common but conditional. The public Arab reaction to the attacks usually included some combination of the following:

- Satisfaction that the United States tasted what it had allegedly dished out to the Arab world (and the poorer countries globally) for years.
- Condemnation of the attacks as criminal and anti-Islamic but a natural result of U.S. foreign policy, which was primarily to blame for the attacks.
- Spreading of conspiracy theories that asserted the attacks were the work of American domestic extremists, the U.S. government, or Israel's Mossad intelligence service.
- Rejection of claims that the perpetrators were Arab or Muslim, based on the argument that Muslims would not commit mass murder or that the terrorist operation was too complex to have been carried out by some of their own.

Nevertheless, although September 11 may not have been seen as a catalytic event in the Muslim world, the war on terrorism that flowed from the September 11 attacks certainly has been. The aftermath of September 11, particularly Operation Enduring Freedom and expanded global U.S. counterterrorism operations, has brought about a strategic realignment, as a number of countries in the Muslim world

⁷⁰ See the discussion in Chapter One.

sided openly with the United States in the global war on terrorism or quietly expanded their own counterterrorism cooperation. The most dramatic change was in Pakistan, where President Musharraf presented himself as a bulwark against Islamic extremism, and the nation's Inter-Service Intelligence directorate shifted from working with extremists to opposing them. The United States forged close military links with Uzbekistan and other Central Asian states, an unthinkable development before September 11. In Southeast Asia, referred to by some as the "second front in the war on terrorism," the United States lifted some restrictions on military assistance to Indonesia and reengaged with the Philippines, greatly expanding military assistance and deploying U.S. troops to train Philippine forces in counterterrorist operations.

The global war on terrorism also had an impact on the domestic politics of a number of Muslim countries, sharpening the divide between moderate and radical Muslims and producing new political risks and opportunities for governments and political actors alike. Some governments, as noted above, saw the global war on terrorism as an opportunity to discredit the Islamist opposition. In Malaysia, the government suggested that there were ties between members of a terrorist group uncovered in 2001 and the main Islamic opposition party, the Pan-Malay Islamic Party (PAS).⁷¹ A danger noted by some political and human rights advocates is that some governments have sought to blur the line between violent and nonviolent groups to delegitimize peaceful opposition groups and justify human rights violations.⁷²

The global war on terrorism also radicalized some Muslim sectors, or activated Islamic militants. In Saudi Arabia, a number of the ulama were incensed by the support given by Riyadh to U.S. military operations in Afghanistan. Sheikhs Hamud al-Shu'aybi and Abdullah bin Jibrin issued fatwas in which they not only justified the attack on the World Trade Center, but condemned as apostates Muslims collaborating with America, a category that included the Saudi royal family (Algar, 2002). In Indonesia, the mainstream Muslim organizations condemned the September 11 terrorist attacks but came out against U.S. operations in Afghanistan. Muslim opponents of Indonesia's secular president Megawati Sukarnoputri attempted to take advantage of her initial public support of the United States and the global war on terrorism by portraying her as supporting what they alleged was a war against Islam.

A key issue that has emerged out of the experience of the war on terrorism is how to reconcile the goals of eradicating Islamic terrorism and strengthening friendly governments and moderate forces in the Muslim world. Moderate Muslims are the

⁷¹ See Chapter Eight.

⁷² Such allegations were made by officials of PAS with reference to the policy of the Malaysian government in a discussion in Kuala Lumpur, May 2002. An Egyptian critic of the Mubarak government argues that the regime uses the fundamentalist challenge to justify its authoritarianism and could not survive without it. Beijing has attempted to use the war on terrorism to gain U.S. support for its efforts to suppress the proindependence movement among the Uighur majority in Xinjiang.

most effective potential allies of the United States and U.S. values of democracy and pluralism against the challenge of radical Islam. The question, therefore, is how the United States can forge partnerships with moderate Muslims to advance democratic and pluralistic values and reduce the political vulnerability of moderate governments.

Implications of the War in Iraq

The war in Iraq, along with the occupation of that country by coalition forces pending the establishment of an Iraqi government, is the most significant event in the U.S. relationship with the countries of the Greater Middle East in the past half-century. For the first time since the withdrawal of the European colonial powers from the Middle East, a Western country has assumed responsibility for the governance of a Muslim country. The stakes, therefore, are very high.

The impact of the war in Iraq can be assessed at three levels:

- Effects on Iraq's future development
- Effects on the Greater Middle East
- Effects on the Muslim world.

The Future of Iraq

Within Iraq, the emergence of large-scale armed resistance to the coalition forces and the Iraqi provisional government and the coalition response have resulted in significant civilian casualties, destruction of infrastructure, and delays in reconstruction and restoration of basic services. These results have generated anti-Americanism and rendered the achievement of U.S. long-term objectives more problematic.

However, if we follow the logic of the analysis of ideological orientations in this report, we are led to the conclusion that the spectacular violence in Iraq has obscured some key factors.

One factor is that the majority of the population appears to be politically moderate. According to a survey of opinion in four Iraqi cities conducted in August 2003, only 33 percent of the respondents wanted an Islamic government, whereas 60 percent were opposed. Shi'ites opposed the idea of an Islamic government by 27 to 66 percent. The possibility of a Ba'athist revival is even less popular. Seventy-four percent of the respondents believed that Ba'ath leaders who had committed crimes in the past should be punished.⁷³ Moderate attitudes among the Shi'ite majority were

⁷³ "Summary and Analysis of the First Iraqi Poll," The American Enterprise Online, http://www.taemag.com/issues/articleID.17697/article_detail.asp. Some have questioned the validity of the poll because it involved only one major Shi'ite-majority city (Basra) and three Sunni-majority cities (Mosul, Kirkuk, and Ramadi). Nevertheless, it is unlikely that Shi'ites in Basra would have radically different views from Shi'ites in other cities in the

also manifested in the lack of mass support for Moqtada al-Sadr's rebellion. The most authoritative Shi'ite religious leaders have given qualified support to the process of political devolution orchestrated by the coalition and the United Nations. The leading Shi'ite cleric, Ayatollah Sistani, has denounced the terrorists, as have Sunni religious leaders.

Therefore, the problem is not popular support for the extremists, but rather that radical fringe elements might move in to fill a power vacuum produced by the weakness of state and civil society institutions. At present, the only meaningful organizations are ethnic (primarily Kurdish), mosque-based (but not necessarily radical), or those with links to external actors, such as Iran or Lebanese Hezbollah. Radical attempts to fill this power vacuum could be overt, as in the case of al-Sadr's uprising, or covert, by local groups with the support of external intelligence services.

In the short run the major threat, of course, is the increasingly organized series of attacks mounted by at least three sectors: Saddam loyalists; nationalists who object to the country's occupation by foreign forces; and Islamists, including foreign fighters and terrorists. Although the most spectacular acts of terror have been committed by foreign jihadists, particularly those of the al-Zarkawi network, Ba'athists remain the center of gravity of the resistance. The party as an institution and its former leadership are beyond political redemption, but there is a possibility that the rank and file could reinvent themselves as normal participants in the political process. This would be the best-case scenario, but as of this writing it does not seem to be happening. It could also be that mainstream Sunnis are too alienated or too frightened to cooperate in the construction of the new Iraq.

Given the configuration of interest groups and the distribution of political power in Iraq at the time of the transfer of power from the coalition authorities to the Iraqi provision government, the most likely outcome over the medium term—that is, the next five years—is a power-sharing arrangement among the major ethnic and religious groups. In this time frame, no group is likely to be strong or unified enough to dominate the others. The one scenario that is not realistic is the restoration of authoritarian Sunni rule. The lasting legacy of the war in Iraq and the removal of Saddam's government is the destruction of the Sunni-based power structure that had been in place in Iraq since the time of the Ottomans.

This leaves four likely scenarios:

1. *Democracy with Iraqi characteristics.* A democratic model would require competing political parties and regular and reasonably free elections, although it can be expected that the political processes that emerge will be rooted in personal, clan, and ethnic loyalties—as they are, for instance, in the Kurdish areas of northern

Shi'ite heartland. It is also interesting and significant that opposition to an Islamic state is greater among the Shi'ites than among non-Shi'ites in the survey.

Iraq. This model of democracy can be deemed to be successful if it allows for governance that is broadly representative and for the emergence of elements of civil society that are the building blocs of genuine democracy. Despite Iraq's inexperience with democracy, this outcome can be said to be "realistic" in that democratic processes could serve as the mechanism to aggregate and adjudicate the interests of Iraq's disparate communities. The interim Iraqi constitution, signed on March 8, 2004, and designed as a basic law that would provide a bridge to an elected government, was a positive example of the ability of disparate Iraqi ethnic and religious groups to forge the compromises necessary to a working democracy.

2. *Pre-Civil War Lebanon.* This was not so much a democratic or representative government as a formula for sharing political power and benefits among the various communal groups. The problem with this system is its lack of flexibility. In the case of Lebanon, the system was successful in securing communal peace and delivering political stability and economic growth as long as the demographic underpinnings of the system were not out of balance. In Lebanon, the imbalance between the distribution of political power and demographic factors and an unfavorable international environment led to the collapse of the system and the Lebanese civil war.
3. *Post-Civil War Lebanon.* The communities are violently separated within the formal but empty framework of a single state. This scenario almost inevitably involves foreign meddling in the disintegrating state, both as the result of a "push" factor—foreign players seeking to expand their influence within the country—and a "pull" factor—local factions seeking to improve their power position by securing foreign support. In a Lebanized Iraq, Iran would likely seek to play a hegemonic role in the Shi'ite South, Syria in the West, and Turkey and Iran will seek to protect their interests in the Kurdish North.
4. *Fragmentation.* A community, most likely the Kurds, seeks its own independent state. This outcome would produce great violence over control of resources in mixed areas. Kurds, Arabs, and Turkomans would contend over Kirkuk and its oil fields. Fragmentation would produce at least three weak, possibly unviable states with contested borders and would invite or even compel intervention by Iraq's neighbors.

The most likely outcome is one of the two more favorable scenarios, because the conditions in Iraq do not allow for the attainment of maximalist goals. Therefore, it is in the interests of Iraqi communities to find a *modus vivendi* within a unified Iraq. This assessment is also supported by our analysis of trends in the far-from-unified Shi'ite majority and by the political maturity shown so far by Shi'ites and Kurds, despite differences over some aspects of the Iraqi constitution with regard to the powers to be given to provinces.

Either of the last two, more negative scenarios could come about if any of the major groups overplayed its hand: for instance, in the unlikely event of an attempt by Shi'ites to import the theocratic model of Iran or to dominate the other communities, or a refusal by the Sunnis to concede that they have lost their historically dominant role in the polity or an attempt by the Kurds to leave Iraq.

Aside from the risk of fragmentation noted above, the major political risks in Iraq are the strengthening of Islamic fundamentalist forces, both Sunni and Shi'a, and the manipulation of Shi'ite movements by Iran. Iran has the ability to use proxies in a number of ways that provide plausible deniability. When military operations began in Iraq, Iran infiltrated scores of agents and thousands of pro-Iranian Iraqi cadres into Iraq.⁷⁴ Iran also has a media apparatus that has been effective in reaching audiences in Iraq. That the south of Iraq has remained relatively calm compared to the north "Sunni Triangle" may suggest that Iran has not felt sufficiently threatened to activate its resources within Iraq.

In addition, there is evidence of Saudi efforts to promote Wahhabism among Sunnis in the north. Saudi involvement in reconstruction efforts in Sunni areas could, as elsewhere, serve as a vehicle for Wahhabi radicalization. Wahhabism had existed underground during Saddam's rule, and mosques that had secretly adhered to this sect began to show their true colors after the war.⁷⁵

What role can the United States and the international community play to help to bring about one of the more favorable outcomes? Despite the overwhelming U.S. and coalition military presence in Iraq, these outcomes are likely to be determined by internal factors that can only be influenced by outsiders at the margins. The most important contributions that the United States can make to the establishment of a stable and representative Iraqi government are (1) to avoid actions that delegitimize the Iraqi government, such as interference in decisions that fall within the province of the Iraqi authorities, for instance, economic, fiscal, administrative, and judicial matters; (2) to avoid the appearance of supporting the restoration of Sunni power structures or of anti-Shi'a bias in its policy toward the new Iraqi government, and (3) to prevent interference by external forces with hostile designs on Iraqi democracy, such as Iran, Syria, Hezbollah, and foreign Sunni jihadists.

Effects on the Greater Middle East

The act of wresting Iraq from Saddam's grip seems to constitute a "catalytic event" that could have a major and perhaps decisive impact in shaping the future of the

⁷⁴ See Federation of Atomic Scientists Intelligence Resource Program, Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), available at <http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/sciri.htm>.

⁷⁵ See "Saddam's Unholy Allies," *Newsweek*, Vol. 121, No. 24; and Peyman Pejman, "Saudi Hand Makes US Uneasy," *Asia Times Online*, July 15, 2003, at http://atimes01.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/EG15Ak02.html.

Greater Middle East and the relationship between the United States and the Muslim world. Many in the Arab world likened the Iraq war to the Arab defeat in 1967 in terms of the effect on the Arab psyche. At least one Arab analyst termed it an “earthquake” and a “shock” to the region.⁷⁶ Although there was broad opposition in the Arab and Muslim worlds to the war in Iraq, many liberal Muslims saw the post-Saddam trends as positive. The drive for reform of authoritarian regimes, they thought, strengthened their ranks, and Islamic extremism was seen as losing ground with the public as a result of the terrorist attacks in Bali, Casablanca, Riyadh, and Jakarta. Not surprisingly, a favorable view of the U.S.-led overthrow of the Saddam regime, and positive expectations of democratization in Iraq, were strongest in Kuwait, which had been a victim of Saddam’s aggression. Even in Egypt we found the view among some liberal Muslim academics that political liberalization in Iraq could open up areas concerning the role of the state and religion, democracy, and human rights that had been hitherto closed to discussion in the Arab world.⁷⁷

Unfortunately, much of the initial momentum for democratic change in the Greater Middle East dissipated as violent resistance to the coalition authority in the Sunni areas of Iraq developed and intensified into an insurgency. In the short term, the negative reaction throughout the Arab and Muslim world to the images of violent conflict and the inevitable civilian casualties presented in the Arab satellite stations, such as Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya, and the well-publicized abuse of prisoners at the Abu Ghraib prison have made the U.S. democratization agenda in the Greater Middle East much more difficult to pursue. Over the medium to long term, the impact of Iraq on the political evolution of the Greater Middle East will depend on which Iraqi scenario materializes. On the one hand, the emergence of a pluralistic and reasonably democratic and stable Iraq would challenge negative perceptions of the U.S. role in the region and undermine extremists and autocrats alike. At a minimum, it would demonstrate that some form of democracy—what could be called democracy with Iraqi characteristics—is possible in the Arab world. On the other hand, an unfavorable outcome would further destabilize the region, diminish U.S. credibility and influence, discredit democracy-based policies, and open opportunities for encroachment by U.S. adversaries in a vital region of the world.

U.S.-led operations in Afghanistan and Iran removed two of Iran’s nemeses, the Taliban and the Saddam Hussein regime. Although Tehran may have been pleased to see those two threats disappear, it is discomfited that the United States has now become a *de facto* neighbor on two borders and has gained unprecedented access to

⁷⁶ Dr. Shafeeq Ghabra, president, American University of Kuwait, “War Reconstruction, and the Arab World,” seminar at the Middle East Institute, Washington, D.C., May 21, 2003.

⁷⁷ This assessment is based on interviews with Muslim moderates in Indonesia, Kuwait, Egypt, and Jordan in the summer of 2003. Our interlocutors were not unanimous in these views, but a surprising number concurred in the assessment.

the Central Asian republics. As noted in the discussion of Iraq's future, unstable conditions in Iraq could allow the Iranian regime to exercise influence through its proxies and allies in Iraq. But the evolution of a democratic Iraqi state in which Shi'ites exercise significant and perhaps predominant political influence also holds risks for the Iranian theocracy. As a model of a democratic Shi'ite-majority state, Iraq could be seen by many as a more palatable alternative to the Iranian model. And the reemergence of the Iraqi Shi'ite shrine cities of Najaf and Karbala as centers of moderate Shi'a Islam could represent a challenge to the Iranian mullahs' religious authority.

The changes in Iran's security environment have taken place at a time when the Iranian regime is facing numerous domestic challenges, most importantly the active opposition of increasing numbers of students and young people. These changes have given the United States a wider, if very uncertain, array of options for dealing with Iran than it has had since the Iranian revolution. This study identifies three options. The first option is to actively engage Tehran, bearing in mind that coercion and engagement are not mutually exclusive. The objective of an engagement policy would be to ensure that Iran participates constructively in the reconstruction of Afghanistan and Iraq (or more realistically, that it refrains from actively undermining those processes). The second option would be for the United States to continue to isolate Tehran until there is a change of Iranian behavior concerning support for terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, human rights, and democratization. Third, the United States could seek to catalyze regime change. Whatever policy course is chosen, it will have to be conducted under conditions of great uncertainty. Iran is a difficult country to read under ordinary circumstances. With the cascade of events that have taken place since the terrorist attacks of 2001, reading Tehran's equities and intentions and understanding the power balances within that country have become even more difficult.

Shi'ite empowerment in Iraq also has profound implications for the future of Saudi Arabia. As noted earlier, Shi'ites constitute a substantial minority or perhaps even the majority in the kingdom's oil-producing eastern province. Shortly after the onset of the Iraq war, Saudi Shi'ite leaders presented a petition to Crown Prince Abdullah seeking equal political and religious rights. The chief mufti of the kingdom, Sheikh Abdul Aziz bin Abdullah al-Sheikh, declared that accusing other Muslims of disbelief—a common Wahhabi accusation against Shi'ites—was not permitted under Islam. However, it is not clear that a tolerant approach enjoys wide support in the Saudi religious establishment. In a broader geopolitical context, some Sunnis in Saudi Arabia expressed a fear that U.S. policy in Iraq and the Gulf would turn “pro-Shi'a,” leading to U.S. support of Shi'ite aspirations in Sunni-dominated states.⁷⁸

⁷⁸ Comments by Dr. Gregory Gause III, associate professor of political science, University of Vermont.

There also appears to be a growing internal debate in Saudi Arabia over whether the intolerance and fanaticism fostered by Wahhabism has been a factor in the radicalization of some sectors of society. In this regard, the escalation of terrorist attacks in Saudi Arabia that began with the May 12, 2003, attacks in Riyadh is potentially a catalytic event for Saudi Arabia. Saudis, who had come to believe that “these things happen to others” and were foreign-inspired, began to refer to the Riyadh attack as “our September 11.” One Saudi columnist even stated flatly that the Wahhabism spread in the kingdom through school curricula, mosque sermons, and state television is the root cause of Islamic militancy.⁷⁹

The ouster of Saddam Hussein and continued U.S. military presence in Iraq changed Syria’s neighborhood overnight. The Syrian Ba’ath Party remains firmly entrenched, but there are signs of change. Soon after the Iraq war, the Damascus government took several steps in the direction of reform, including demilitarizing primary and secondary schools, licensing three private banks, approving two private universities and four radio stations, and possibly eliminating the requirement that all students join Ba’ath-affiliated youth groups.⁸⁰ In addition, 287 Syrian intellectuals and activists presented Asad with a petition calling for the release of political prisoners, cancellation of martial law, and freedom of expression and political activism. The initial paragraphs of the petition argued that Syria’s strategic realities had changed, U.S. “lawlessness” could not be reined in, Arab regimes were “impotent or collapsing,” and Syria would not be prepared for the “looming danger” without “sweeping national reforms.”⁸¹

The war in Iraq strained U.S.-Turkish relations, but the fissures created in the relationship at the onset of the war have been largely repaired. The inability of the United States to secure Turkish agreement to the deployment of U.S. forces and the use of the Incirlik Air Base for operations during the war in Iraq reflected the changed political environment in Turkey. Turkish foreign and security policy has been traditionally driven by a limited set of actors, including the Turkish General Staff, senior bureaucrats, and a small number of strategic thinkers. Since the early 1990s, however, the rise of Islamic politics and the retreat of the secular state from many areas of Turkish life have opened new areas of influence for alternative elites who are less secular, more conservative, and more provincial in outlook. The advent to power of a political party with Islamic roots, the AKP, has accelerated these trends.

⁷⁹ See Neil MacFarquhar, “Saudis Reexamine and Islamic Doctrine Cited by Militants,” *The New York Times*, May 25, 2003, at <http://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/25/international/middleeast/25SAUD.html>; and “Saudi Media Trends: In the Wake of the Riyadh Bombings (2),” *MEMRI*, Special Dispatch Series No. 514, June 1, 2003, at <http://www.memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=sd&ID=SP51403>, accessed August 9, 2004.

⁸⁰ Alan Sipress, “Syrian Reforms Gain Momentum in Wake of Iraq War,” *The Washington Post*, May 12, 2003, p. A1.

⁸¹ “Syrian Citizens Urge President Assad to Implement Sweeping Reforms,” *MEMRI*, Special Dispatch Series No. 523, June 16, 2003, at <http://www.memri.org>.

Our analysis suggests that Islamic extremism does not constitute a threat to stability in Turkey. Since taking power in 2002, the AKP has enjoyed closer relations with secular elites than have previous Islamist parties. Rather than advocating religion in politics, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan stressed a view of “politics as a safeguard of religious expression.”⁸² The “red lines”—maintenance of a unitary and secular state—are unlikely to be crossed. On the foreign and security policy front, the outlook is for continuity in Turkish behavior, the product of fundamental conservatism in the Turkish approach. In any setting, the Turkish commitment to counterterrorism cooperation is likely to remain strong.

Turkey’s experiment in accommodating greater religiosity in politics while maintaining a secular state and pro-Western orientation has interesting implications for the future of political Islam. If successful, it would expand the scope of liberal Islam. At the same time, as Ian Lesser warns in Chapter Three, Turkey’s future is by no means settled along these lines. Moreover, the key variable in the Turkish model, Turkey’s integration into Europe and the West, is absent from most other cases where political Islam contends for power.

Effects in the Muslim World

The impact of the war in Iraq and the removal of the Saddam regime was more attenuated in the regions of the Muslim world geographically and culturally distant from the Middle East. The war in Iraq did not strongly resonate in Central Asia. For the Central Asian republics, the key event of the post–September 11 period was the regional governments’ partnership with the United States and the overthrow of the Taliban regime. The overthrow of the Taliban removed a threat and a headache for Central Asian governments that were right next door. Aside from a small minority of militants, Muslims in Central Asia did not approve of the Taliban version of Islam.

For the most part, mainstream Muslim sectors in South and Southeast Asia opposed the war in Iraq, but the war does not appear to have had lasting effects on the evolution of political Islam or on U.S. relations with states in those regions. The Malaysian government, as chair of the Non-Aligned Movement, orchestrated opposition to the war without U.N. sanction, and the Malaysian Parliament unanimously passed a motion condemning unilateral military action in Iraq.⁸³ There were large anti-Iraq war demonstrations in Indonesia, home to the majority of the region’s Muslims, in the days leading to the beginning of hostilities and through the first two weeks of the war, but the number and size of the demonstrations declined markedly after coalition forces entered Baghdad.

⁸² Interview by Ian Lesser, author of Chapter Three, with Recep Tayyip Erdogan, May 2001.

⁸³ Joseph Liow, “Malaysia’s Opposition to the Iraq War: A Matter of Principle or Expediency?” Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies Commentaries, May 2003.

This relatively moderate reaction can be attributed to several factors. First, governments and moderate Muslim leaders either organized and controlled the protests, as in the case of Malaysia, or took proactive steps to ensure that the war in Iraq was not presented as directed against Islam, as the radicals had done with some degree of success in the case of Afghanistan. Second, in Indonesia, the changed political climate after the Bali terrorist bombings on October 12, 2002, rendered mass actions by radicals less acceptable. Third, there was little sympathy for Saddam among Southeast Asian Muslims. Even opponents of the war conceded that Saddam was a tyrant and, from the perspective of some Muslims, an un-Islamic leader unworthy of Muslim support. Fourth, for the public at large domestic issues trumped international issues.

This is not to say that the war in Iraq did not introduce a new and complicating factor into the war on terrorism or that it did not have an adverse effect on perceptions of the United States. These perceptions worsened as the terrorism and violence escalated in Iraq and the attempts by coalition forces to bring the situation under control were presented by hostile media as a campaign against Muslims. There is anecdotal evidence, for instance, that Iraq might have been a mobilizing factor in recent violence by Islamic extremists in southern Thailand. International and local grievances conflated in the minds of extremists.⁸⁴ Thus, while the war itself and subsequent developments have not altered political trend lines outside the Middle East or the fundamentals of the U.S. relationship with regional states, it can and is being used by radicals to gain influence. However, a liberal minority shares the U.S. expectation that the removal of Saddam opens the prospect of democratic evolution in Iraq and in the Muslim world at large.

Conclusions and Recommendations

How can the United States respond to the challenges and opportunities in the Muslim world? The extremists cannot be fought with military means alone. They need to be fought culturally and socially. Below, we suggest a number of social, political, and military options.

Promote Moderate Network Creation

The struggle under way throughout much the Muslim world is not a clash of civilizations but a struggle within the Muslim world between tendencies associated with liberal Islam and secularism, on the one hand, and radical and violent interpretations, on the other. The radicals are a minority, but in many areas they hold the advantage because they have developed extensive networks spanning the Muslim world and

⁸⁴ Author's discussions with security experts in Bangkok, June 2004.

sometimes reaching beyond it. Liberal and moderate Muslims, although a majority in almost all countries, have not created similar networks. For the most part, Muslim moderates feel exposed and isolated. Their voices are often fractured or silenced. What we heard in several Middle Eastern countries is that the battle for Islam will require the creation of liberal groups to retrieve Islam from the hijackers of the religion. Creation of an international network of moderates is critical because such a network would provide a platform to amplify their message and to provide them some protection. However, moderates do not have the resources to create this network themselves. The initial impulse may require an external catalyst.

Disrupt Radical Networks

Most of the networks described earlier in this overview perform socially useful functions. A key question is how the United States can identify hostile use of these networks. There are several approaches to consider. One is to examine the profiles of communities that sustain violent Islamic networks and the nodal and communicative characteristics of these networks. Methods of indoctrination, influence, communications, and rituals need to be better understood. Once the characteristics of these networks are known and their recruitment patterns and weaknesses identified, a strategy of nodal disruption could be implemented.

Disrupting transmission belts does not necessarily mean shutting down the relevant institutions (health and welfare organizations, mosques and cultural centers, student unions, youth organizations). Rather, it means breaking down the trust relationships upon which militants depend and empowering Muslim moderates to gain control of these institutions. Carefully targeting psychological operations is more important than freezing financial assets. Within the United States, policymakers need to be attentive to radical recruitment in prisons and within the U.S. military and to the role of Muslim prison clergy and military chaplains in spreading radical interpretations of Islam.

Education: A Critical Battlefield

Education has been one of the main battlefields between secularists and advocates of a religiously based state and society. The Muslim world—the Arab world in particular—faces a massive education problem, as the UNDP *Arab Human Development Report* documents in painful detail.⁸⁵ A critical issue in most Muslim countries is how to bridge the cultural and intellectual gap between those educated in institutions of Islamic learning and those educated in the Western secular tradition. In Pakistan, a system of exclusively religious education—the madrassas (schools of religion)—coexists with private English-language schools and government Urdu-language

⁸⁵ UNDP (2002), Chapter 4, “Building Human Capabilities: Education/The Status of Education,” pp. 51–54.

schools.⁸⁶ The religious schools, many of which adhere to radical interpretations of Islam, are driving the process of religious radicalization in Pakistan. In Malaysia, the government is concerned that Islamic schools have become a breeding ground for militant Islam. Consequently, the authorities are seeking to relocate religious education within the national school system to afterschool classes purged of political content and to enforce close supervision of private Islamic schools (Rabasa, 2003). In contrast, many of the Indonesian religious boarding schools, or *pesantren*, stand out as models of integration of religious education and modern Western subjects.

Many moderate Muslim scholars and political activists believe that the future of political Islam will be decided in the schools. An education system that is relevant to the modern world and that produces graduates who can find productive jobs in the globalized economy can promote religious moderation and political stability. But religious schools that produce graduates indoctrinated in a narrow interpretation of the Islamic scriptures and without marketable skills will continue to produce recruits to reinforce the ranks of extremist and violent organizations.

Foster Madrassa Reform

Promoting educational reform is therefore an important component of a shaping strategy in the Muslim world. Despite the importance of madrassa reform, there have been few concrete plans to design and implement specific changes in these schools, or much consideration of how these schools fit within the broader reform of public education systems that can help produce more desirable economic, political, and social outcomes. There is an urgent need for the United States and other concerned countries and international institutions to support the reform of religious schools to ensure that these schools are able to provide a broad modern education. This reform is key to breaking the cycle of radicalized madrassas producing cannon fodder for radical and terrorist groups. In some countries, governments lack the capability to monitor the activities that are being conducted in the madrassas. The United States could provide assistance to governments to establish or strengthen higher education accreditation boards that monitor and review curricula in both state and private schools.

Promote Mosque Reform

In addition to madrassa reform, in many places mosque reform may also be needed. In some places, mullahs or imams may be poorly educated and have little or no accountability to the community served by their mosque. They may be affiliated with extremist groups or espouse alienating versions of Islam. Although the United States may be reluctant to involve itself in ostensibly religious affairs, it should find ways to

⁸⁶ See Muhammad Khalil Masud, "Religious Identity and Mass Education," in Meuleman (2001), pp. 238–241.

support the efforts of governments and moderate Muslim organizations to ensure that mosques and the social services affiliated with them serve their communities and do not serve as platforms for the spread of radical ideologies. As with madrasa reform, U.S. efforts to promote mosque reform must be indirect and low-profile because overt U.S. involvement may risk discrediting those whom the United States wishes to help.

Expand Economic Opportunities

Most nations of the Muslim world will see their populations increase by 30 percent or more by the year 2025, in part because in nearly all countries at least 40 percent of the population is less than 25 years old. Such continuing population growth will create educational, economic, and social needs that are being met in many places only by radical Islamist organizations. The ability of some radical organizations to address entrenched social and economic problems has created a growing base of support for their politics. Lack of economic growth and employment opportunities could push still more individuals and communities to support radical organizations and initiatives and could ultimately pose a threat to U.S. security interests.

Provision of alternative social services in many places might help to indirectly undercut the appeal of radical organizations. In particular, the United States should be most concerned with initiatives that would improve the economic prospects of the young. Assistance from U.S. and international sources needs to be channeled in ways that are appropriate to local circumstances and, to the extent possible, rely on NGOs with existing relationships in the recipient countries. Funding for education and cultural programs run by secular or moderate Muslim organizations should be a priority to counter the influence of radical groups.

In pursuing broader initiatives to improve social and economic conditions, the United States will not necessarily alter the determination of the radical minority to strike at the perceived enemies of Islam, but it can reduce the opportunities for radicals to exploit economic hardship to expand their movements. Assistance programs in the Muslim world that promote economic expansion and self-sufficiency can help reduce perceptions that the United States has only military interests in the region, perceptions that likely contribute to opposition to all U.S. interests there. Improving economic, political, or social conditions will not guarantee an end to terrorism or extremism, but it could reduce the potential for popular support of extremist movements.

To succeed, these programs would have to be accountable and transparent—otherwise they simply foster corruption among administrators. And they need to be linked to economic and fiscal policies in the recipient countries that promote economic rationality, productivity, and equitable growth. Poorly managed economic growth can actually serve as the catalyst for political instability and violence.

Support “Civil Islam”

Support of or stronger links with “civil Islam”—Muslim civil society groups that advocate moderation and modernity—is an essential component of an effective U.S. policy toward the Muslim world. Moderate political Islam in a democratic context could offset the appeal of theocratic movements or of those favoring exclusively Islamic states. Funding of educational and cultural activities by secular or moderate Muslim organizations should be a priority. The United States may also have to assist in the development of democratic and civil society institutions where they do not currently exist. Ensuring that these institutions are transparent and protective of minority rights—including, of course, the rights of Muslims where they are a minority—can have long-term benefits for perceptions of the United States in the Muslim world.

Deny Resources to Extremists

A complementary element of the strategy of supporting secular or moderate Muslim organizations is to deny resources to extremists. This will be difficult because of the poor regulation of banking systems in most countries in the Muslim world and because of the widespread use of the unregulated *hawala* system of informal money transfers. Nevertheless, it is clear that interdiction of funding to extremist and terrorist groups is a critical requirement. This effort needs to be undertaken at both ends of the funding cycle. The point of origin of the funding is in Saudi Arabia and other countries in the Gulf. The United States is already pursuing terrorist funding as part of an overall counterterrorist strategy. The Saudis have begun to take steps to monitor their funding activities more closely and to close down the branches of some suspect charities, but it is unclear whether there are adequate safeguards to ensure that funds are not diverted to extremist or terrorist organizations. The technical capabilities of the recipient countries also need to be strengthened to give them the capability to monitor and when necessary interdict suspect financial flows.

Balance the Requirements of the War on Terrorism and of Stability and Democracy in Moderate Muslim Countries

The war on terrorism will continue to have an effect on the Muslim world. Radicals will continue to present U.S. actions as a war against Islam and attempt to use them to destabilize moderate governments. The United States, therefore, should calibrate carefully its next steps on the war on terrorism with a view to avoiding destabilizing effects on friendly governments. Yet the United States should not always take protestations of political weakness at face value. Sometimes governments in the Muslim world are reluctant to take firm action against extremist or violent groups even though in the long term it is in their best interest to do so. They also make seek to take advantage of the war on terrorism to suppress legitimate opposition. It is there-

fore important for the United States to demonstrate that its efforts are not meant to strengthen authoritarian or repressive regimes but to promote democratic change.

Seek to Engage Islamists in Normal Politics

A difficult issue in the development of Muslim democracy is whether or how Islamist groups that may not have fully credible democratic credentials—for instance, the Muslim Brotherhood—may be engaged in the democratic process. While there is always a danger that an Islamist party, once in power, may move against democratic freedoms, the inclusion of such groups within existing, open democratic institutions may have the effect over time of taming the threat they pose to the system. This is particularly the case in parts of the Muslim world that have stronger democratic traditions in which public opinion can be expressed through the ballot box and whose governments have ties to broad international alliances. In such cases, e.g., Turkey, Islamists in power can and should be treated as normal political actors and expected to behave as such. In other parts of the Muslim world, continued democratization could encourage Islamist parties to pursue their agenda through elections rather than violence. The downside of engaging Islamists in normal politics is that, in the short term at least, they are likely to promote anti-U.S. policies if they are allowed to gain any real influence. An unequivocal commitment to nonviolence and democratic processes should be a prerequisite for inclusion. For its part, the United States should register its opposition to electoral machinations designed to marginalize legitimate opposition parties.

Engage Muslim Diasporas

Engagement of diaspora Muslim communities can also help the United States advance its interests in the Muslim world. American Muslim communities can be an important source of sociocultural information about Muslim societies and have the potential to play an important role in U.S. outreach to Muslims elsewhere. Such efforts may require care and flexibility. At the same time, the U.S. military has proven itself adept at meeting ad hoc needs of Islamist groups, as, for example, its civil affairs officers did in assisting those in need of short-term care during a massive international pilgrimage to a Shi'ite shrine in Iraq after Saddam's downfall.

Rebuild Close Military-to-Military Relations with Key Countries

The military will continue to be an influential political actor across the Muslim world. In some countries—Pakistan, for instance—the military will likely control the state for the policy-relevant future. More often than not, the military is on the forefront of the war on terrorism. Therefore, military-to-military relations will be of particular importance to any U.S. shaping strategy in the Muslim world. U.S. legislative restrictions on military engagement—for instance, the Pressler amendment and its sequelae in Pakistan and the Leahy amendments in Indonesia—precipitated a serious

disconnect between the United States and the military establishments in two of the most important countries in the Muslim world. A generation of military officers in both countries has advanced to senior positions without meaningful contacts with or knowledge of the United States and the U.S. military. They are also more insular and less open to U.S. concepts of democratic civilian control of the military. Rebuilding a core of U.S.-trained officers in key countries such as Indonesia and Pakistan is therefore a critical need. Programs such as International Military Education and Training (IMET) not only ensure that future military leaders are exposed to American military values and practices but can also translate into increased U.S. influence and access. The enhanced person-to-person relationships between American officers and their foreign classmates have been repeatedly cited as being of great value in future years when those classmates have risen to senior positions in their respective military and government establishments. Shared experiences and friendship can provide a more meaningful opportunity to discuss and perhaps influence issues of importance to their respective countries.⁸⁷

Build Appropriate Military Capabilities

Militarily, the United States faces a need to reduce the more obvious aspects of its presence while working to increase different types of presence, e.g., intelligence, psychological operations, civil affairs. In some parts of the Muslim world, this will mean continuing to reduce a heavy (and politically sensitive) forward presence and instead seeking to support operations from consolidated regional locations. Islamists, particularly in the Middle East, have often used the U.S. military presence as a reason for violence. A lower U.S. military profile may reduce targets for such violence. In Iraq, this means it would certainly be desirable for U.S. forces to lower their presence in populated areas as soon as operationally feasible, reducing U.S. visibility as an “occupying power” and promoting rapid development of Iraqi military and security forces.

Likewise, establishing main operating airbases in Iraq is not politically desirable in the foreseeable future. However, in view of the Turkish refusal to allow the U.S. use of Incirlik Air Base for Operation Iraqi Freedom, the United States should not foreclose the option of access to Iraqi military facilities, which could be necessary to respond to future military contingencies in the Gulf.

Civil affairs are a promising area for military cooperation in countering the influence of radical Islamic networks. The interaction of the U.S. and other countries’ militaries in the area of military medicine could be an excellent model for engagement in responding to the effects of conflict and natural disasters. Any attempt to incorporate Islamic NGOs into civil military cooperative arrangements should be

⁸⁷ See “Measuring the Effects of Engagement” in Rabasa and Haseman (2002), pp. 118–120.

undertaken with the greatest of care. The United States should insist that Islamic NGOs operate in accordance with the International Federation of the Red Cross NGO Code of Conduct that calls for NGOs to remain apolitical in emergencies and conflicts.

Ungoverned areas throughout the Muslim world, from isolated portions of Indonesia and the Philippines to large tracks of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Yemen, can become havens for extremist and terrorist groups. Political and economic stabilization in such areas will reduce opportunities for extremists and terrorists to take root. Greater government presence, supported as necessary by the United States, cannot only help reduce the immediate threat of Islamist terrorism, but also foster a greater sense of national integration helping increase long-term security.

Better cultural intelligence is needed. While the relative lack of Arab specialists in military and intelligence positions is well known, less well known, but nearly as urgent, is the need for specialists in, among other matters, Persian and African regional and languages. Some U.S. intelligence and diplomatic capabilities in some parts of the Muslim world have atrophied in the past two years as a result of redeployment to other areas of this region. A transnational approach will also be needed to address what are often transnational rather than isolated national phenomena. This may include working with regional alliances to root out militant Islamist organizations that operate across international boundaries.

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The Middle East: The Cradle of the Muslim World

David Thaler

Introduction

This chapter assesses the mosaic of Islam in the Middle East. The goals of the chapter are (1) to portray in detail the diversity of Islam in the region, (2) to describe recent trends as they pertain to the development of religious and political Islam and to assess the effect of September 11 on these trends, and (3) to identify challenges and opportunities for U.S. policy, especially in the aftermath of the 2003 Iraq war.

In the context of this study, the Middle East refers to the predominantly Arab belt of states and territories that extends from Egypt and Sudan in the west to the states of the Arabian Peninsula in the east and Syria and Iraq in the north (see Figure O.3 in the Overview). It contains 15 countries or entities, including the West Bank and Gaza but excluding Turkey and Iran.¹ The people of the region—although largely Arab and Muslim—represent very diverse religious, social, and ethnic backgrounds who have manifested themselves in a variety of ways in modern times, particularly in attitudes toward political Islam.

As the chapter title suggests, the Middle East is Islam's historic heartland, the region in which the Prophet Muhammad preached and from which his teachings spread to distant lands. Islam's holiest sites are found there. The shrines in the cities of Mecca and Medina, located in the Hejaz region of western Arabia, are the most venerated. It is Mecca toward which all Muslims face in prayer, and it is to Mecca that the pious Muslim hopes to conduct the *hajj* (pilgrimage) at least once in his lifetime. Jerusalem, a city holy to Jews and Christians as well as Muslims, is believed to be the site of Muhammad's ascension to heaven. Other sites in the Middle East are venerated as well; for example, the Iraqi cities of Najaf and Karbala hold great importance in Shi'a theology and tradition.

¹ Turkey and Iran are covered in separate chapters.

The dominant language of the Middle East is Arabic. Arabic unifies disparate populations and helps them transcend national borders. It is also the language of the Quran. Arabic is thus more than just a mode of conversational, political, and mercantile discourse like English or French. It contains deeply historic and religious symbolism and has been used very effectively by modern-day religious radicals who seek to influence Arabic-speaking Muslims. Moreover, it has been used as a vehicle for the export of Islamism and Arab culture to non-Arab parts of the Islamic world.

The Middle East is rich in Arab and Muslim tradition. Following the early years of Islam's establishment and rapid expansion in the seventh and eighth centuries, the Middle East became the world's center of science, law, mathematics, and philosophy. This period of relative openness and tolerance occurred under Arab caliphates in Damascus and Baghdad and extended to Muslim-ruled territories as far away as Spain. The period is seen as a golden age in Arab culture, in stark contrast to the stagnation and lack of freedom many average people in the Arab world face in modern times. Arab civilization began a long decline beginning in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries as the people of the region came under the rule of a long line of non-Arab powers. The more recent experience with European colonialism—and the subsequent line of authoritarian Arab regimes after the British and French withdrew from the area—left a deep impression on the Arab psyche. The average Arab citizen in the Middle East has not controlled his or her own destiny for centuries. It is this lack of control, and the feeling of humiliation that has accompanied it, upon which extremist religious elements have fed. In this view, whose best-known proponent is Bernard Lewis, the rise of fundamentalism and extremist political tendencies in Islam can be seen in the context of colonialism and the failure of postindependence Arab regimes to regain the perceived glory of Arab and Muslim civilization.

Along with this historical context, a number of factors have served to help make political Islam—*Islamism*—a dominant force in the Middle East in the latter half of the twentieth century. These factors, which we discuss below, have been amplified by a series of catalytic events. Although our focus is on developments after September 11, 2001 and the 2003 Iraq war, it is important to identify and analyze the consequences of critical turning points for the Middle East during the second half of the twentieth century. The catalytic events that shaped the political dynamics in the Middle East before September 11 are

- the 1967 Six-Day War
- burgeoning oil wealth in the Gulf in the 1970s and 1980s
- the 1979 Iranian revolution
- the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and subsequent withdrawal
- the 1991 Gulf War.

These events have served to bring underlying conditions and processes to the forefront and in many cases have facilitated the spread of extremism and even violence. The Arab defeat by Israel in 1967 marked the eclipse of Nasserism and pan-Arab socialism and the beginning of a surge in current forms of Islamic extremism. With the rise in oil prices in the 1970s following the Arab-Israeli Yom Kippur War in 1973, Saudi Arabia was able to fund the spread of its own form of fundamentalism far and wide, while the Iranian revolution and the Soviet presence in Afghanistan accelerated the process of radicalization. The 1991 Gulf War widened the differences between the Saudi establishment and religious extremists and dissidents, largely as a consequence of the establishment of a significant U.S. military presence in the kingdom.

Finally, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, while not a catalytic event in our definition of the term, has cast a long shadow over political discourse in the Arab world and U.S. relations with countries in the region. Its intensity has ebbed and flowed over decades, with periods of low-level conflict separating relatively severe clashes. The seeming intractability of the conflict has been a source of frustration for all who desire to see a solution that allows Palestinians and Israelis to live in peace, security, and prosperity. And it has served in the larger Arab world as a catalyst for radicalism—both Islamic and secular—even before the founding of the State of Israel in 1948.

Although the swift Israeli defeat of the Arab armies in June 1967 deflated the causes of Nasserism and pan-Arabism, the subsequent Israeli presence in previously Arab-held lands—especially East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and Gaza—gave impetus to an invigorated Palestinian cause and served as a rallying cry for Arab public opinion. For the Palestinians themselves, the conflict has played a substantive, even existential, role in their daily lives. In the rest of the Arab world, however, the Palestinians' plight has taken on a very different hue. Shibley Telhami has likened the Arab affinity for Palestine to the intense emotional ties Jews have to the State of Israel.² As such, many Arabs have visceral reactions to scenes of Palestinian suffering filling their television screens every day. Numerous scholars have noted that Palestine is used as a powerful symbol by states as well as subnational and transnational groups to promote their own agendas, with rhetorical support for the Palestinian people usually more forthcoming than tangible support.

Before discussing the evolution of political Islam and the sources of Islamic radicalism in the Middle East, we first provide some background on the diverse religious, ethnic, and cultural environment of the Middle East. Then we describe the region's Islamic landscape and introduce the factors that have influenced the rise of radical Islamism. Next, we analyze those factors and their effect on the Islamic

² Shibley Telhami, "Understanding the Challenge," *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 56, No. 1, Winter 2002, p. 14.

landscape, including post–September 11, in four key areas: Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, the Palestinian territories, and the “Ba’ath belt” (Iraq and Syria, with some reference to Syrian-influenced Lebanon). This is followed by a general overview of Arab responses to the September 11 attacks. Finally, we conclude with an assessment of the potential effects of the 2003 Iraq War on Islamism in the Middle East, and what this means for U.S. policy.

Background

Ethnic Arabs constitute the largest segment of the region’s population of about 220 million. But one also finds many non-Arab ethnic groups. The Kurds and Turkomans in northern Iraq and eastern Syria; Ashkenazi, Mizrahi, and Ethiopian Jews in Israel; and Berbers in Egypt all bring vastly different experiences to the area’s landscape. Ethnic Arabs are a minority in Sudan. In addition, millions of laborers from South and Southeast Asia live in the Gulf states and work in the oil and gas industries and in service-related sectors. Over five million Pakistanis, Indonesians, Filipinos, and others reside in Saudi Arabia alone, making up over 20 percent of the population. Non-nationals also constitute 35 percent of the population in Bahrain, 55 percent in Kuwait, and around 80 percent in Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

Despite their common language and heritage, the Arabs of the region are by no means a homogenous group. One can differentiate the Arab people of the area according to religious belief, social status, family or tribal affiliation, and, of course, nationality. These differentiations are critical to understanding the language in which public discourse is couched and the motivations for the policies of governments and agendas of Islamic groups. Table 1.1 depicts the countries of the Middle East along ethnic and religious lines. Religious sects that appear in boldface italics are minorities that rule their respective countries.

The Muslims of the region can be divided into a variety of sects and belief systems. The major schism is between Sunni and Shi’a Muslims, and their most profound disagreement centers on the successors to the Prophet Muhammad, whom the Shi’ites believe should have been Muhammad’s son-in-law Ali (the fourth caliph), Ali’s son Husayn, and his descendants.³ Sunni Muslims are a majority across the area, although the Shi’ites form a majority in several states (Iraq, Bahrain) and regions (Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province, Southern Lebanon). Moreover, smaller offshoots of Sunni and Shi’a Islam thrive in various locales, including Alawis in Syria; Druze in Syria, Lebanon, and Israel; Ismailis in parts of Yemen and Saudi Arabia; and Ibadhis (a majority) in Oman.

³ The term *Shi’a* comes from *shi’at ‘Ali*, or partisans of ‘Ali.

Table 1.1
Ethnic and Religious Groups in the Middle East

State	Largest Ethnic Group	Other Key Ethnic Groups	Largest Sect/Religion	Other Key Sects/Religions
Bahrain	Arab	Asian, Iranian	Shi'a	<i>Sunni</i>
Egypt	Arab	Berber	Sunni	Copt Christian
Iraq	Arab	Kurd, Turkoman	Shi'a	<i>Sunni</i> (pre-Iraq War)
Israel	European/ North African	Arab	Jewish	<i>Sunni</i> , Druze, Christian
Jordan	Arab	Circassian	Sunni	Christian
Kuwait	Arab	Asian, Iranian	Sunni	Shi'a
Lebanon	Arab	Armenian	Shi'a	Sunni, Maronite Christian, Druze
Oman	Arab	Asian, African	Ibadhi Muslim	Sunni, Shi'a
Qatar	Arab	South Asian, Iranian	Sunni	
Saudi Arabia	Arab	Asian, African	Sunni	Shi'a
Sudan	African	Arab	Sunni	Animist, Christian
Syria	Arab	Armenian, Kurd	Sunni	<i>Alawi</i> , Shi'a, Druze, Christian
United Arab Emirates	Arab	South Asian, Iranian	Sunni	Shi'a
West Bank and Gaza	Arab	European/ North African	Sunni	Jewish (settlers)
Yemen	Arab		Sunni	Shi'a

Christians make up a sizable minority (30 percent) in Lebanon, where they share power by agreement with representatives of the Sunni and Shi'ite communities; Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Israel, and the Palestinian territories also have Christian minorities. In Sudan, where Christians have engaged in armed conflict with the northern Muslims for years, animists constitute 25 percent of the population and Christians, 5 percent.

Social status and geographic distribution can play an important part in the discourse across the region. This is especially the case among Palestinians. One can observe tensions between refugees and nonrefugees, between Palestinians in the territories and those in the diaspora, and even between residents of the West Bank and residents of Gaza.

The importance of clans and tribal affiliations cannot be overestimated; familial ties, in fact, are a key determinant of social status in many locales. They far precede the advent of Islamic fundamentalism and, in many ways, run deeper in the fabric of the Arab world. Clan-based monarchies control government and politics on the Ara-

bian Peninsula. The Al-Saud family rules Saudi Arabia, and members of the royal family occupy key positions in the government and business sectors. Other examples of ruling families can be found in Kuwait (the Al-Sabah clan), Bahrain (Al-Khalifa), Oman (Al-Said), Qatar (Al-Thani), and the UAE (rulers of the seven emirates). Jordan has been ruled by the Hashemite dynasty since 1921, five years before that family's ouster from the Hejaz region (where Mecca and Medina are located) during the Al-Saud ascendancy to power in Arabia.

As was discussed at greater length in the Overview, familial and tribal ties are important in other political frameworks as well. In Iraq, for example, Saddam Hussein and his most loyal followers hailed from tribes centered in the town of Tikrit, some 90 miles northwest of Baghdad. Families constitute a key ingredient in Palestinian politics. And Bedouins in Jordan have a special status as longtime loyalists and protectors of the Hashemite dynasty; they play a disproportionately large role in elite Jordanian fighting units and in the officer corps.⁴

We now describe the landscape of the Middle East in more detail. We begin with a discussion of Islamic tendencies in the region and move on to a general overview of the prevailing conditions and processes that drive more radical tendencies.

The Islamic Landscape in the Middle East

The schism between Sunnis and Shi'ites constitutes the primary cleavage within Islam in the Middle East. Within Sunnism and Shi'ism, there are multiple schools of thought. Sunni schools were introduced in the Overview. The largest group of Shi'ites in the region are known as the Imamis or Ithna Asharis ("Twelvers"), who trace a line of twelve imams beginning with Ali, whom they consider the first. They dominate the Shi'ite populations in Bahrain, southern Iraq, Kuwait, the eastern province of Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. Branches can also be found among the Shi'ites in Syria and southern Lebanon, where they are called Matawila. A second Shi'ite sect is the Zaydi, who constitute the vast majority of Shi'ites in Yemen. The Ismailis represent a third sect whose adherents live in small numbers in central Syria, western Yemen, and the southern Saudi region of Asir. The differences among these three sects are based on how they trace lines of succession from Ali.

Three other Muslim sects of consequence are the Alawis, the Ibadhis, and the Druze. An offshoot of the Twelvers, the Alawis, who rule Syria, are concentrated along that country's western coast in Latakia province. Besides devotion to Shi'ite precepts and the family of Imam Ali, they practice certain rituals of Christian and Zoroastrian origin. The Ibadhis, found today almost exclusively in Oman, originate from the Khawarij sect, a group whose schism with mainstream Islam predates the

⁴ See Moaddel (2002), pp. 30–33.

Sunni-Shi'a break. Historically, the Druze religion is related to Shi'a Islam. The Druze belief system, however, has evolved to the point where the Druze are considered somewhat distinct from Islam. They are known to emphasize moral and social principles and loyalty to the states in which they reside. The largest Druze communities are in Lebanon, Syria, and Israel.

Major Islamic Groupings in the Middle East

In the Middle East, one can find examples of all the major categories of Islamic belief. Traditionalists, modernists, mainstream fundamentalists, and radical fundamentalists are represented in some form in all the countries of the region, as well as the West Bank and Gaza. In addition, liberal and authoritarian secularists have a long and varied history in the states of the region, particularly since independence. Table 1.2 depicts examples and characteristics of these tendencies.

According to our definition of traditionalism (see Overview), a large part of the Sunni and Shi'a populations of the Middle East could be considered traditionalist. One of the main criteria is overt acceptance of sources of law and custom that are not limited to Salafi interpretations, such as the religious adoption of local customs and the veneration of saints. For example, many Sunnis in the formerly Ottoman-ruled areas who practice Hanafi-based forms of Islam are more likely to be traditionalists. Twelver Shi'ites who worship at the tombs of saints would be included in this group, as would Shi'ite offshoots like the Ismailis.

A second criterion is a focus on the personal, family, and communal manifestations of Islam rather than the political. Unlike the other categories of believers, traditionalists are not by nature given to forming identifiable political organizations with Islam as the foundation. This does not mean that traditionalists would only vote for non-Islamist candidates or parties when given the chance. Traditionalists could cast votes for Islamist candidates out of frustration with the ruling regime or because of the Islamists' stances on corruption and accountability and their support for social programs. But what drives traditionalists politically is not Islam, except inasmuch as their personal morals as Muslims enter into their decisions to support one candidate or program over another.

A type of traditional Islam well known in the West is Sufism. Sufis incorporate mysticism into their Islamic belief structures. There are numerous Sufi orders around the Middle East, especially in Egypt, Sudan, and Iraq. Some Sufis practice secretly in Saudi Arabia, where their observances are banned. The largest orders are the Naqshbandi and the Qadiri, which are especially prominent among Iraq's Kurds.⁵

⁵ See Sami Shourush, "The Religious Composition of the Kurdish Society: Sufi Orders, Sects and Religions," in Abdul-Jabar ed. (2002), pp. 114–139.

Table 1.2
Characteristics of Major Tendencies in the Muslim Middle East

Radical Fundamentalists	Mainstream Fundamentalists	Traditionalist/Sufis	Modernists	Liberal Secularists	Authoritarian Secularists
Examples					
Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya (Egypt)	Muslim Brotherhood (Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Iraq)	Shi'i Hawza (Iraq)	Al-Wasat (Egypt)	Individuals (Saad Eddin Ibrahim, Tarek Heggy in Egypt)	Nasserists (Egypt, Syria)
Salafi-jihadists (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait)	Hezbollah (Lebanon)	Naqshbandi order	Wahhabi reformers (Saudi Arabia, Qatar)		Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (West Bank/ Gaza)
Hamas (West Bank/Gaza)	Establishment Wahhabis (Saudi Arabia, Qatar)	Large portions of Sunni and Shi'a believers throughout the Middle East		Kuwait National Democratic Movement (Kuwait)	Some governments (Egypt, Syria)
	Kuwaiti Salafi movement				
Agenda					
Primarily political. Mobilize Islam to achieve political goals	Can be both political and religious	Can be politically active, but politics not necessarily driven by Islam. Organized movements emphasize religious, social and cultural agendas	Agenda can be political as well as religious, social and educational	Focus on democratic politics and civil society	Power-oriented
Ideology					
Literal interpretation of Islamic scriptures, but with some political innovations and emphasis on obligation of jihad	Literal interpretation of Islamic scriptures	Fuse Islamic beliefs with local traditions	Return to core values of Islam, viewed as consistent with modern world	Liberal democratic or social democratic values form core of "civil religion"	Leader cult dressed in nationalist, socialist, or pan-Arab ideologies

Table 1.2—continued

Radical Fundamentalists	Mainstream Fundamentalists	Traditionalist/Sufis	Modernists	Liberal Secularists	Authoritarian Secularists
Political-Legal					
Revolutionary and anti-status quo; seeks establishment of strict shari'a-based state	Politically conservative; asserts supremacy of religious law strictly interpreted in all aspects of life	Politically moderate; focus is on social and cultural aspects of Islam rather than politics. Flexible on application of religious law	Politically moderate; support rule of law. Believe religious law should be adapted to modern conditions	Support secular law and institutions within the context of a democratic society and political system	Rely on authoritarian structures and repression of civil society, Islamic or otherwise
Government					
Political legitimacy derives from God. Government should be by religious experts accountable only to God. Some groups seek to establish a pan-Islamic caliphate	Political legitimacy derives from God, but there may be some democratic elements. Accept rule by political leaders in consultation with religious scholars (ulama), but ruler must enforce Islamic law	Political legitimacy derives from both religious and nonreligious factors (e.g., the will of the people). Leaders need not enforce all aspects of Islamic law, but must respect Islamic values. Religious leaders may play advisory role	Political legitimacy derives from the will of the people through free elections	Political legitimacy derives from the will of the people through free elections	Political legitimacy derives from the state ideology. Rule of law subordinated to state or party interests
Human Rights					
Reject Western concept of human rights and individual liberties. Believe that the full imposition of Islamic law (shari'a) creates a	Largely the same as radical fundamentalists, but allow protected status for certain non-Muslim communities	Properly interpreted, Islam guarantees human rights and liberties. Tolerant of non-Muslims. Some	Islam contains the basic concepts of human rights and individual freedoms. Tolerant of non-Muslims. Some believe all citizens	Primacy of individual political and human rights over state and group interests. Believe all citizens are equal before the law	Primacy of party and state and collective interests over individual rights

Table 1.2—continued

Radical Fundamentalists	Mainstream Fundamentalists	Traditionalist/Sufis	Modernists	Liberal Secularists	Authoritarian Secularists
just society. Deny rights to religious minorities and to Muslims who do not share their views		believe all citizens are equal before the law	are equal before the law		
Social Agenda					
Generally reactionary. Willing to use coercion and violence to enforce their conception of Islamic dress and behavior	Many are reactionary, particularly with regard to dress and behavior codes for women. Men must conform too, but have fewer restrictions (some may dress in Western clothes)	Conservative, but many value nonreligious subjects in education. Women should dress modestly, but the definition depends on local custom. Most oppose use of coercion to enforce behavior and dress codes	Generally progressive. Value nonreligious subjects in education. Do not believe Islam requires women to wear any particular form of dress. Support education and advancement of women	Progressive in education and women's rights. No restrictions on dress or behavior unless contrary to law	Inconsistent. In some cases, authoritarian secularists support education and the emancipation of women, but suppress the development of civil society. May officially sanction Islamic institutions and use them to benefit the state
Links to Terrorism					
Direct. Most if not all Islamic terrorist groups in the Middle East fall in this category	Generally indirect; but there are links between fundamentalist groups and extremists at many levels. Some radical groups are offshoots of mainstream groups	Usually none. Many oppose terrorism and violence	Usually none. Most oppose terrorism and violence	Usually none. Oppose terrorism and violence	Terrorism can be an instrument of state policy. Some groups are prone to opportunistic alliances with Islamic terrorists
Propensity for Violence					
High	Situation-contingent	Low	Low	Low	High

Sufism is a pluralistic belief system that “embodies certain basic elements: the principle of divine love; the search for spiritual union in contemplation of the divine; and the social mission of studying and absorbing other, earlier esoteric beliefs.”⁶

One mark of traditionalism in Middle Eastern countries is the *mawlid* celebration, a practice that is scorned by many fundamentalists, especially Wahhabis who consider it *bid'a* (unacceptable innovation). A *mawlid* is a festival commemorating the birth of the prophet Muhammad or an event related to the life of a saint. Such festivals are national holidays in many Arab states and usually follow the Islamic calendar. The celebrations may involve a fair, meditations and Quranic readings at the sanctuary of a saint, processions, communal meals, and charity work.⁷

Liberal democrats, socialists, nationalists, communists, Nasserites, Ba'athists, and many others constitute the secularists in the Middle East. Because secularists espouse political platforms that contain little or no religious content, they do not fit neatly on the spectrum of political or religious Islam. A clear separation of mosque and state underpins the worldview of some secularists; others take the position that a secular government should control the mosque and other religious institutions. Secularists may share some tendencies of Islamist groups. In particular, the pedigree of a number of leftist groups derives from the fascist movements of the first half of the twentieth century, and they can be vehemently anti-West and anti-Semitic. The Ba'ath parties that rule Syria and—until its dissolution—Iraq exhibit such tendencies, as do the Nasserist parties in Egypt and Yemen. Some leftist groups, such as the Palestinian Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), are also violent.

At the opposite end of the secular spectrum are groups of liberal intellectuals who propose the establishment of Western style democracy. These intellectuals can be portrayed as “voices in the wilderness.” They are individuals who have little or no grassroots organization, suffer government harassment, and are sometimes fearful that their lives are at risk from radical elements in their societies. In many places, they find themselves swimming upstream against the traditional conservatism of their societies, which bear deeply held inhibitions toward many liberal ideas. Liberal secularists carefully push the envelope of free speech under regimes that mostly deny that right. Notable among the liberals is Dr. Saad Eddin Ibrahim, who recently was detained for seven months in Egypt—in part for calling the regime of Hosni Mubarak a *gomho-malikiyya* (royal republic) on Al-Jazeera, in reference to Hosni's grooming of his son, Gamal, for power.

Secularists who deny the place of Islam in public life can certainly be devout Muslims in their private lives. There is no contradiction in supporting the secular

⁶ Schwartz (2002), p. 46.

⁷ “Mawlid: Typology of the Mawlid and Its Diffusion Through the Islamic World,” in *Encyclopaedia of Islam* (1999).

state as a political aspiration and practicing traditionalist forms of Islam in the family sphere. It is therefore difficult to separate secularists from traditionalists.

We next turn to groups that hold that Islam has a place in politics and governance. Liberal Islamists or “modernists”—those who advocate the compatibility of Islam on one hand and pluralism, women’s rights, and other democratic values on the other—seem to have little mass support in the Middle East and in this respect can be likened to the liberal secularists. One can point to a number of individual intellectuals and their followers as well as a handful of groups. These include Gamal al-Banna (brother of Hasan al-Banna, founder of the Muslim Brotherhood) in Egypt, Sheikh Abd Al-Hamid Al-Ansari in Qatar, and Egypt’s al-Wasat organization.

The two largest and most influential Sunni fundamentalist movements in the Middle East are the Muslim Brotherhood (Al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn), which originated in Egypt, and Wahhabism, born in the Najd area of the Arabian Peninsula, which is now part of Saudi Arabia. These two movements represent “mainstream” political Islam in the Middle East today, but they also have provided breeding grounds for the radical jihadist strains of Islamist activism. The Muslim Brotherhood, established by Hasan al-Banna in Egypt in 1928, has spread to numerous locales in the region, with movements sprouting in Syria, Jordan, the West Bank and Gaza, the Gulf, and even Israel, but the Egyptian branch can be seen as a first among equals. The Muslim Brotherhood now draws many of its members from the more affluent middle class in the major urban areas. Doctors, lawyers, engineers, and other professionals fill its ranks; often, the Brotherhood dominates professional syndicates and has won elections for leadership of these organizations. The Brothers also carry elections to student unions at many universities in the Middle East. A number of violent groups trace their lineage to the Brotherhood, yet the Muslim Brotherhood itself often takes an evolutionary approach to the politics in its home countries, pursuing its goals within the prevailing political system. This has involved gaining parliamentary membership and ministerial positions, while practicing *da’wa* (preaching and spreading the word of Islam) and doing charitable and social work at the grass-roots level. At times, however, the Brotherhood’s evolutionary approach has given way to armed uprisings. When its violent actions have been crushed by the regime, members of the Brotherhood have returned to biding their time and rebuilding with *da’wa*.

Founded in the eighteenth century by Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab in the Najd region of the central Arabian Peninsula, Wahhabism predates the Muslim Brotherhood by nearly two centuries. Wahhabism has been the fastest growing school of Islamic thought since the 1970s and, like the Muslim Brotherhood, has formed the basis for a number of radical fundamentalist movements—including, for example, Osama bin Laden’s Al Qaeda. It continues to make inroads, even among

Muslims in the United States itself.⁸ It is the officially sanctioned religious movement in Saudi Arabia, and its doctrine permeates public life there. Saudi Arabia has actively promoted the spread of Wahhabism across the Islamic world through a myriad of organizations funded by oil wealth. A more open form of Wahhabism is practiced in Qatar.

In addition, there are Salafi movements in a number of countries, including Egypt and the smaller Gulf states. *Salafism* is the belief in and emulation of the “pure” example of the Prophet Muhammad, his disciples, and the earliest caliphs. Salafists tend to be strict Sunnis who abhor mysticism and the veneration of saints practiced by many Muslims and who oppose other sects as heretical. They also tend to eschew modernization. Some Salafi movements identify with Saudi Wahhabism, but some do not.⁹

Some Shi’ite groups in the Middle East share a number of proclivities of Sunni fundamentalists. Hezbollah (Party of God) in Lebanon has combined political participation in Lebanon with armed resistance and terrorism. Shi’ite Islamist groups are also becoming prominent in southern Iraq and Baghdad in the aftermath of the fall of Saddam Hussein’s Ba’athist regime. These include the Iran-based Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) and the followers of Moqtada al-Sadr, son of the revered Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr, murdered by the Ba’athist regime in 1999. The SCIRI became part of the Iraqi Governing Council, while al-Sadr’s group was omitted and has rejected cooperation with the coalition in Iraq—and finally turned to violence in April 2004.

Although some, perhaps most, fundamentalist movements do not exhibit violent tendencies, they have spawned numerous small, often violent splinter groups. The writings of Egyptian Muslim Brother Sayyid Qutb—particularly his seminal works, *Milestones on the Path (Ma’alim fi al-Tariq)* and the 15-volume *In the Shade of the Quran (Fi Dhilal al-Qur’an)*—radicalized al-Banna’s teachings in the 1960s and helped spawn a new generation of revolutionary, violent Islamist groups and ideologies whose influence can be felt to the present day. Two of the best-known of these groups are from Egypt, al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya and Al-Jihad—the latter being the organization of Ayman al-Zawahiri, Osama bin Laden’s top lieutenant. The Palestinian groups Hamas and Islamic Jihad can also be included in this category.

Factors Influencing the Rise of Radical Islamism

The rise of conservative and radical fundamentalist tendencies in the Middle East was influenced and driven by a number of factors. The importance of these factors varies

⁸ See Schwartz (2002), pp. 226–255.

⁹ Interview with Sheikh Khalid al-Sultan, Spokesman, Kuwaiti Salafi Movement, Kuwait City, June 2003.

widely by country and even subregion, and interrelationships among them abound. Among these factors are the following:

- The eclipse of Nasserism/pan-Arabism
- Economic stagnation and demographic turbulence (and failure of governments to provide services)
- Insufficient accountability, pervasive corruption, and the absence of political and civil freedoms
- Educational systems that fail to stress tolerance and critical thinking from an early age
- Structural anti-Westernism and anti-Americanism, fed by a sense of historical loss and helplessness
- The emergence of the mass media
- Tribalism and regionalism
- Radical recruitment techniques.

The Israeli defeat of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria in the 1967 Six-Day War marked the beginning of the end of the pan-Arab socialism of Gamal Abdel Nasser as a major force in the Middle East. Psychologically, the defeat dealt a critical blow to nationalism and to the Arab self-image. The Arab pride that Nasser instilled provided members of all strata of Arab society an anchor for their identity and purpose. Suddenly, the anchor was gone, and Arab society was left adrift. The defeat was an absolute shock to the Arab psyche. Nasser had connected with the common person and had been venerated as a folk hero who would rid the region of Israel and gain true economic and political independence from the West. The loss to Israel was deeply disturbing and created a conundrum for the Arabs, as captured by Fouad Ajami:

People read into the world what they are inclined to. There is in great events, defeats, and revolutions something for nearly everyone. No sooner had the Six Day War ended than a war of a different sort erupted: a conflict over the defeat. Who was responsible for it? What did the defeat say about the basis of Arab society, the quality of the Arab as an individual? How should the Arab world be organized to cope with the defeat and its consequences?¹⁰

A vacuum was created that forced a reexamination of fundamental questions of identity and purpose. In these circumstances, many were drawn to Islam as an answer to these questions. Islamists argued that the primary cause for the defeat was that the Arabs had lost their bearings and their faith and that Israel was able to easily take advantage of this. In fact, the defeat fit in very well with the worldview of the fundamentalists.

¹⁰ Ajami (1981), p. 24.

Stagnating economies, demographic transition, and the absence of basic freedoms have combined to fuel extreme despair, frustration, and anger in many parts of the Arab world. There is little personal freedom. People are not secure in their livelihoods and many feel they have little honor in their lives. Lack of dignity, and the desire to attain it as individuals and peoples, is a major theme. These conditions have helped sow the seeds of radicalism in Islamic form.

Oil dominates the economies of most of the Arab states in the Middle East—either because these states earn revenue from selling oil (like Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf States) or because remittances from expatriates working in the oil states drive their economies (Egypt, Yemen). Rather than relying on domestic taxation for revenue, their wealth is based on collection of international rents; these states therefore are categorized as rentier states. Societies that do not generate their own revenues also do not tend to be involved in political processes—hence the predominance of authoritarian forms of government in the Middle East. The state makes a de facto “contract” with its citizens that guarantees the provision of basic needs in return for political acquiescence in the status quo. However, oil prices have remained relatively constant and have at times declined, creating economies that stagnate because there are few alternatives for revenue generation. The state can no longer afford to provide for the welfare of its population and uphold its end of the contract.

The pressure from demographic change is quite acute. Half the population of the Middle East is under the age of twenty (compared to about one-quarter in developed countries). The number of young working-age citizens in the Middle East, especially in the Gulf, is about to explode. A recent RAND Corporation report argues that the age structure of a nation’s population can be a key determinant in the extent of economic growth attained in developing countries.¹¹ In particular, the Middle East is beginning to experience a demographic transition from high to low rates of mortality and fertility, just as East Asia and Latin America did before it. The transition produces “a ‘boom’ generation—a generation that is larger than those immediately before and after it—that [gradually works] its way through nations’ age structures.”¹² A proportionally large working-age generation can fuel economic growth because a relatively smaller percentage of a country’s capital (though potentially higher absolute expenditures) is devoted to supporting the health and education needs of the youth and the health and income needs of the elderly. For growth to occur, however, this demographic transition must be accompanied by forward-thinking government policies in the areas of public health, education, and family planning, as well as economic policies that promote free commerce and savings.¹³

¹¹ See Bloom et al. (2003).

¹² Bloom et al. (2003), p. xii.

¹³ Bloom et al. (2003), pp. 69–80.

This is where the sluggishness of some governments in the Middle East in liberalizing their economic policies hampers their ability to exploit the changing labor force. Economic stagnation seems even more intractable when one considers the severe inequality in the education and rights of women, which automatically deprives the region of half its potential workforce. With increasing unemployment, these states have the potential for becoming rife with unrest.

In sum, with the state unable to uphold its contract with society, society may no longer feel bound to maintain the political status quo. Islamists are well positioned to exploit this development. Absent institutional vehicles for political expression in many countries, mosques have become the only alternative public space for dissent. In recent times, conservative and radical fundamentalists—some with revolutionary political agendas—have controlled much of this limited public space.

A number of key studies and surveys have emerged over the past two years that provide insights into the conditions in the Arab world and the outlook of the people of the region toward their predicament. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) in 2002 released the *Arab Human Development Report* in concert with the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development.¹⁴ This report presented an honest, critical, comprehensive assessment of the status of political freedoms, economic development, education, women's empowerment, and research and development in Arab countries. The study team and advisory group were made up of eminent Arab scientists and scholars, a fact that lent credibility and boldness to the report's findings.

The study begins with the premise that "human development can be simply defined as a process of enlarging choices."¹⁵ The "alternative human development index" (AHDI) that the report proposes employs a series of six indicators to capture the multiple dimensions of development. These indicators are life expectancy at birth, educational attainment, freedom score, gender empowerment, Internet hosts per capita, and carbon dioxide emissions per capita.¹⁶ The report ranked 111 countries on the basis of their AHDI scores, eight of them in the Middle East. Among these eight, Jordan ranked the highest at 68, followed by Kuwait (70), Lebanon (73), UAE (74), and Egypt (92). Syria (103), Sudan (105), and Iraq (110) rounded out the Middle East states among the ten lowest-ranked countries.

¹⁴ UNDP (2002).

¹⁵ UNDP (2002), p. 15.

¹⁶ According to the report, the significance of each indicator is as follows: Life expectancy indicates longevity and overall health; educational attainment provides a sense of the emphasis placed on useful knowledge acquisition; the freedom score expresses both civil liberties and democratic participation; gender empowerment reflects women's access to power in society; Internet hosts per capita portrays the ability to benefit from globalization; and carbon dioxide emissions depicts environmental damage and is used as a penalty. See UNDP (2002), Box 1.6, p. 21.

The report reinforced the results of the AHDI by emphasizing three critical deficits that stunt the Arab world's ability to grow and prosper: the "freedom deficit," the "women's empowerment deficit," and the "human capabilities/knowledge deficit." Figure 1.1 shows the freedom scores and gender empowerment measurements for the eight countries and compares them with indicators for the United States, Argentina, and Thailand; the indices range from 0 (lowest score) to 1.0 (highest score). The number in parentheses next to the name of each state signifies its AHDI ranking. The Arab countries are noteworthy in their low freedom and gender empowerment scores, leading the authors to conclude that "the wave of democracy that transformed governance in most of Latin America and East Asia in the 1980s and Eastern Europe and much of Central Asia in the late 1980s and early 1990s has barely reached the Arab states."¹⁷ As a group, Arab countries ranked last out of seven world regions, with an average freedom score of about 0.18; the next highest score was sub-Saharan Africa, with an average score of almost 0.40.¹⁸

Reinforcing its conclusions, the report provided more detailed indicators of the relative conditions of Arab government institutions, including the level of accountability, regulatory burden, government effectiveness, and the prevalence of graft. Figure 1.2 gives scores for all Middle East countries except Israel and the West Bank and Gaza.¹⁹ The scores reflect a normal distribution in which the mean is zero; the lower the score, the worse the conditions. These 13 states had average scores of -0.77 for voice and accountability, -0.26 for government effectiveness, -0.26 for regulatory burden, and -0.22 for graft. This means that as a group, the Arab states of the Middle East fall well below the mean in terms of institutional well-being.

All in all, the UNDP report is a scathing commentary on the condition of the Arab world.²⁰ Many Islamist groups use the despair that this causes to further their own political aims and to broaden their constituencies. Certainly, their clarion call that "Islam is the solution" sits well with some segments of the population who cherish Islam as a comforting counterweight to modernization and globalization. However, Islamist groups—including extremist elements—have gained popularity by emphasizing pervasive corruption and lack of accountability in government bureaucracies. In addition, these groups have developed sophisticated social welfare


¹⁷ UNDP (2002), p. 2.

¹⁸ UNDP (2002), Fig. 2–4, p. 27. The other regions, in ascending order of freedom score, are South and East Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, Europe, Oceania, and North America. It should be noted that since these measurements were made, some states in the Middle East have made progress toward improving their deficits, while others have remained steady or even deteriorated. Some of these developments are addressed below in the sub-regional sections.

¹⁹ UNDP (2002), Table 35 of the Statistical Annex, p. 165.

²⁰ The UNDP released a second report on Arab development in 2003 after the war in Iraq. Its main focus was on building a "knowledge society" in the Arab world. The report concluded that the region remained well behind the rest of the world in terms of freedom, gender empowerment, and knowledge. See UNDP (2003).

Figure 1.1
Freedom and Gender Empowerment Scores for Selected Arab and Other States




SOURCE: UNDP (2002).
 RAND MG246-1.1

networks in regions where governments have failed to provide adequate services. This has been especially true in Upper Egypt, Lebanon, Sudan, Yemen, southern Jordan, and the West Bank and Gaza. It has also been an emphasis of Islamist groups in Iraq, where the restoration of basic services after the war has been a difficult and ongoing challenge for U.S. administrators.

The educational systems of much of the Arab Middle East serve to distort views of the outside world and to create willing receptacles for both the fundamentalist message and the propaganda of ruling regimes. They emphasize rote learning and memorization and discourage the development of critical thinking. Generally, the “top students” are those who can best recite lessons by rote, not those who can analyze a problem. This plays into the hands of the fundamentalists, who have a simple and powerful message, and the regimes, which are inclined to produce graduates less likely to question their legitimacy. It also dampens tendencies toward self-criticism, feeds conspiracy theories, and prevents people from processing information in an analytical—rather than reactionary—manner. This is particularly the case when it comes to critically analyzing stories from the mass media such as Al-Jazeera, information from the Internet—or the claims of Osama bin Laden.

Figure 1.2
Freedom and Institutional Constituents of Well-Being, Standardized Indicators, 1997–1998



SOURCE: UNDP (2002).

RAND MG246-1.2

There is what one observer has called a “historical residue” of frustration and despair arising from what many see as a series of defeats of the Arab and Muslim worlds.²¹ It began with the demise of the Ottoman Empire and has continued in the form of colonialism in Arab lands and the establishment and continued existence of the State of Israel. The sense of loss of control and loss of dignity is profound, and it is the prism through which many in the Arab world see events unfolding even today. The rapid U.S. victory over the Ba’athist regime in Iraq, for example, is seen as yet another defeat, with the West occupying a center of Islamic civilization and the “jewel of the Arab world”—Baghdad.

²¹ Interview with Professor Asher Susser, director of the Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel, June 20, 2003.

U.S. policies in the Middle East are viewed through this historical prism as well, and they help stoke the flames of anti-Americanism in the region. There are two deeply held frustrations about U.S. policy. First, the United States is seen as providing support for Israeli policies and goals at the expense of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. Effects on the Palestinians of the 2000 *intifada*—Palestinian casualties, civilians held at army checkpoints, homes bulldozed—are splashed across newspapers, televisions, and Internet sites all over the region. Israeli victims of terrorism are shown little or no sympathy. As a result, the average Arab citizen sees, at best, U.S. indifference to Israeli actions and, at worst, active collaboration. These perceptions foster great anger among Arab populations, especially because they lack exposure to legitimate Israeli concerns.

Second, the average citizen sees the United States paying lip service to democratization while at the same time supporting repressive regimes in the name of ensuring “stability.” This encourages a view that the United States holds Arabs to be inferior and not deserving of democratic reform. American values are seen to be diametrically opposed to American interests, at least where the Arab world is concerned. As a result, U.S. positions on the Palestinian problem and support for despotic Arab regimes drives a perception among many Arabs that the United States pursues a double standard in its relations with the region.

Recent public opinion surveys in the Arab world reveal widespread disapproval of the United States. A survey of 3,020 people in several Arab countries by the University of Maryland indicates that a majority of citizens of Lebanon, Egypt, the UAE, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia have an unfavorable view of the United States.²² This survey was administered between February and March 2003, near the height of the debate in the Security Council regarding the use of military force against Iraq. Saudis were the most critical, with 95 percent viewing the United States in an “unfavorable” light—68 percent in a “very unfavorable” light.

Certainly, the rapid development of the mass media has exacerbated anti-Americanism and enabled Islamist groups to spread their message quickly and effectively. Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and the Palestinian Authority severely restrict press freedoms and use their media as mouthpieces for government policies and worldviews. Governments in the Middle East also employ media to “externalize” profound problems in their own societies, especially by focusing on the plight of the Palestinians and Israel’s “brutality.” One Arab observer commented that there is something profoundly wrong with someone who worries more about an external problem than

²² Shibley Telhami, *Arab Public Opinion Survey*, Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and Development at the University of Maryland, February 19–March 11, 2003, at <http://www.bsos.umd.edu/sadat/mesurvey.htm>. The survey was done in cooperation with Zogby International. It should be noted that surveys were administered in the one or two major cities of each country.

the problems of his community and country.²³ The media—feeding on the lack of critical thinking in the Arab world—have also helped perpetuate virulently anti-American, anti-Israel, and anti-Semitic conspiracy theories.

Despite their negative views about modernity, extremist groups have effectively used modern means of communication. They have employed audio and video technology very effectively as vehicles for spreading their ideologies. Even Salafist groups that ostensibly eschew tools of modernity have found these media essential for propaganda and recruitment, especially in more restrictive environments like Saudi Arabia. More recently, their use of the Internet has grown exponentially, and it is used as a means for issuing fatwas and, in some cases, for directing terrorist operations. There are numerous chat rooms that propagate extremist ideologies and Web-sites from which one can download source materials.

The Arab world is beginning to experience an expansion in relatively independent television media. The best known of these, the Qatar-based Al-Jazeera network, was alone in this capacity since 1996. In 2002 and 2003, new outlets began springing up, such as Abu Dhabi TV, Al-Arabiya, and others. They have been given more or less free reign by their host governments (except when it comes to criticizing those governments) and are attempting to compete with Al-Jazeera for the ever-increasing Arab appetite for unfettered, sometimes sensational reporting. These developments are a two-edged sword, however. While a free press could theoretically support democratic development in the area, in practice it can have a radicalizing effect by amplifying the voices of militants.

Tribal culture and affiliation can play a substantial role in the extent to which radical, violent forms of Islamism prosper in some regions of the Middle East. Radical interpretations of Islam sometimes have come from tribal areas where people are disaffected for one reason or another. Although the literature on the relationship between tribalism and radicalism is not well developed, interviews in the region and anecdotal evidence suggest that extremist tendencies seem to find fertile ground among these clans for three reasons. First, there seems to be a nexus between the rigid, conservative tribal values that allowed these peoples to survive their harsh environments on the one hand, and the purist, exclusionary doctrines of Salafism and Wahhabism on the other.²⁴ Second, the “outcast” tribal and nomadic groups in southern Saudi Arabia and northeast Yemen often have not benefited from oil revenues and liberalizing economic policies in the same way that other groups have. Many of the September 11 hijackers are thought to have come from this region. And

²³ Interview with Egyptian liberal intellectual Tarek Heggy, Cairo, June 2003.

²⁴ Recent attacks on Americans in Kuwait have been attributed to the spread of Salafism among Bedouin clans there. A member of the Matran tribe confessed to killing U.S. businessman Michael Rene Pouliot and wounding another in a January 2003 shooting near a U.S. military base in Kuwait. See “Tribesmen Desert Royal Families for Radical Islam,” *Financial Times*, February 1, 2003.

third, in some cases, there may even be tribal “grudges” against despised rulers that go back many decades. Elements of such a grudge can be found in the 1979 takeover of the Grand Mosque in Mecca. The role of tribal culture in increased extremism is an area that is ripe for in-depth study, especially where the Arabian Peninsula is concerned.

Regionalism, a phenomenon closely related to tribalism, can also be a source of radicalization. Extremism can be an outgrowth of feelings of severe disenfranchisement because of unequal access to government services and a strong perception that the state treats the population of a region as inferior.

Finally, a degree of the success of fundamentalist groups in the Arab Middle East lies in their recruitment systems. According to one Arab observer, the groups begin by picking up young boys 12 to 13 years old.²⁵ An older teenage member will befriend them and involve them in sports and other activities. He will ask them to join him for group prayers at a mosque after classes and will tell them “fire and brimstone” stories to keep them engaged. The parents are satisfied because their children are pursuing mosque prayers and other activities perceived as wholesome. Strict religious observance is also encouraged. When the children enter puberty, they learn that it is forbidden (*haram*) to shave. By age 18 or 20, some decide that their Muslim Brotherhood or Salafi mentors are not Islamic enough and join more extreme or terrorist organizations. Another observer noted that kinship is used as a means of recruitment, as well as proselytizing in mosques among regular worshippers.²⁶ A third observer has delineated a number of stages for drawing adult recruits: (1) encouraging people to engage in collective prayers; (2) using *gama'a* techniques (pooling money to meet individual needs) as a way to entice people to join; (3) providing social services; and (4) convincing people to become active members, which involves a willingness to sacrifice time and money for the cause.²⁷ Note that these recruitment techniques have little to do with politics. They involve peer pressure, economics, and in some cases boredom among a large, socially disengaged (and often unemployed) youth population.

In the following four sections, we explore the rise of political Islam in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and the Palestinian milieu, and Iraq and Syria. At the end of each section, we analyze the effect of September 11 on Islamism in those areas. In some key countries, Egypt in particular, Islamists remain the only viable opposition and represent the only organizations capable of mobilizing large numbers of constituents. A succession of authoritarian Egyptian governments has alternated between co-optive and coercive techniques against the Islamists. In extreme cases, those govern-

²⁵ Interview with Mohammed al-Jassem, editor-in-chief of Kuwait’s *Al-Watan* daily newspaper, June 2003.

²⁶ Interview with Dr. Saad Eddin Ibrahim, Cairo, June 2003.

²⁷ Interview with prominent Arab analyst, Cairo, June 2003.

ments have conducted violent campaigns to eradicate the most radical Islamist elements from the country.

Egypt: Political Islam Under Authoritarianism

Modern Islamism as a political ideology and source of political activism was founded in Egypt in 1928 when Hasan al-Banna established the Muslim Brotherhood. The founding of the Brotherhood was a response to imperialism generally and British colonial rule over Egypt in particular. Al-Banna viewed imperialism and the Western traditions that accompanied it as anathema to Egypt's Islamic heritage and considered it the source of the social, economic, and political deprivation of Egypt's people. Moreover, Muslim regimes had allowed and even encouraged Western encroachment and, in al-Banna's view, those regimes were equally to blame for the ills that befell the Egyptian people and Muslims in general.

The Brothers' answer to colonialism and to "impious" Muslim authorities was a mass return to Islam as practiced by the Prophet and his disciples and the full application of shari'a to replace Western law. A key ingredient of the Brothers' doctrine was the universality of Islam in both the public and private spheres and the denial of any separation between the two. They sought to build an Islamic society in an evolutionary way through institutional change. Jihad in the Brothers' vocabulary under al-Banna referred to "speaking the truth" and struggling personally rather than wielding the sword. Their ranks grew quickly in Egypt to between one and two million by the late 1940s, drawing mainly from the urban working class as well as lower middle-class white-collar workers.²⁸

Egypt's opposition to the birth of the State of Israel under United Nations auspices led to its invasion of the new state along with other Arab armies in May 1948. King Farouk, who had ruled Egypt since 1936, led the charge to "throw the Jews into the sea." Volunteer brigades from the Muslim Brotherhood accompanied Egyptian army regulars.²⁹ Israel's defeat of the more numerous Arab forces arrayed against it shocked Egyptians and helped drive a wedge between the king and Egyptian army officers, who believed that Egypt's loss was a direct result of being poorly trained and equipped. The Muslim Brotherhood also fell afoul of the king, leading to the banning of the organization in 1948. Al-Banna was killed in 1949 by government agents in retaliation for the Brotherhood's assassination of Prime Minister Mahmud Fahmi al-Nuqrashi.

²⁸ Sullivan and Abed-Kotob (1999), pp. 41–42.

²⁹ Yasir Arafat, longtime chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization and president of the Palestinian Authority, was a member of the volunteer brigade that thrust toward Jerusalem.

The Brotherhood's reinstatement as a legal organization in 1951 enabled it to provide assistance to the "Free Officers" movement of the Egyptian army, led by Gamal Abdel Nasser and Muhammad Naguib, who in 1952 overthrew the king. Nasser alone took the reins of power in 1954 and developed programs under the guise of "Arab socialism," which represented a new social contract between government and governed. The basic outlines of this contract were the provisions of public health, education, land reform, and government jobs in return for acquiescence to authoritarian government. It was under Nasserist programs that many young rural Arabs ventured out of their villages to take advantage of education and job opportunities in the cities. Other Arab states instituted versions of this Arab socialist contract in fact, if not in name.³⁰ Nasser also became an icon of Arab nationalism and opposition to Israel and to imperialism. "Nasserism" was born.

Despite the Brothers' expectations that the new regime would share their goals of establishing shari'a, Nasser rejected their demands and, after an assassination attempt against him, banned the organization and arrested and tortured many of its leadership cadre. Many members who escaped went into exile in the Gulf region, especially Saudi Arabia. However, Nasser's break with the Muslim Brotherhood did not signal a break with Islam. On the contrary, he used the language of Islam in numerous speeches to the masses because he clearly sensed that this was the language they would understand. Cairo's Al-Azhar, long a venerated center of Islamic higher education and scholarship, became an instrument of Nasser's propaganda at home and in the Arab world. Additionally, in the mid- to late 1950s, Nasser enlisted Sufi orders as a counterbalance to fundamentalists like the Muslim Brotherhood (a tactic also used by his successors). Nasser's patronage stimulated the revival of Sufi orders, which had diminished in membership in the face of the secularization of Egyptian society. This expanded both their numbers and membership.

Among the Muslim Brothers whom Nasser imprisoned in 1954 was Sayyid Qutb. While in prison, Qutb introduced the concept that modern society existed in a state of *jahiliyya*, or pre-Islamic paganism and moral ignorance. Qutb's ideas were informed by his own personal experience with the Egyptian government. How, he asked, could a regime that arrests and tortures its own citizens be Muslim? Muslims and their leaders who did not uphold the tenets of Islam in such a society were therefore *kafir*, or unbelievers, a crime that could be punishable by *takfir* (excommunication) and death. He argued that bringing society out of *jahiliyya* and into a state consonant with Islamic practice and law required revolution—jihad by armed struggle. Contending that only Allah could be sovereign, he rejected as *jahiliyya* secular nationalist ideologies and the regimes founded upon them. Qutb's goal was the estab-

³⁰ For example, the oil states in the Gulf used their substantial revenues to guarantee free health care, state education, and government jobs to their citizens as a way of distributing the wealth. However, they were loathe to call it Arab socialism in light of their opposition to Nasser.

lishment of an Islamic state, after which a new generation of pious Muslims would arise, a generation that he likened to the first community of believers during the time of the Prophet.³¹

Over the longer term, the mainstream Muslim Brotherhood rejected the more militant doctrine that Qutb (who was hanged by Nasser's government in 1966) espoused.³² Al-Banna's successor as the Brotherhood's general guide, Hasan al-Hudaybi, published *Du'ah la Qudah (Missionaries, Not Judges)* in 1969 in which he rejected the concept of *takfir* and said that the people merely needed to be taught the proper Islamic way. As such, he also rejected Qutb's requirement for armed revolution.³³ Thus, the Muslim Brotherhood continued its work, but within Egypt's institutional framework rather than as a revolutionary movement—even though it was officially banned. As a disciple of that movement, however, Qutb provided the link between the Muslim Brotherhood and the most radical, violent Islamic movements that were to prosper in the last third of the twentieth century.

The Arab-Israeli war of 1967 marked a key turning point for the Arab world and for political Islam. The depth to which the Arab defeat penetrated the Arab psyche is a critical factor to this day. Still perceived as a serious humiliation, the war marked the eclipse of Arab nationalism and Nasserism and the rise of Islamism as the solution to the Arabs' woes.³⁴ In practical terms, Nasser's economic and development policies were also victims. After Nasser's death in 1970, his programs were slowly dismantled. President Anwar Sadat's "de-Nasserization" program angered many people in poverty-stricken areas. With the social contract broken, a sense of disenfranchisement arose that radical Islamists could exploit.

In fact, Sadat enlisted the help of Islamists in his efforts to isolate Nasserists and leftists who opposed his courtship of the West and his liberalizing economic policies. He portrayed himself as a devout Muslim and adopted the moniker *al-Ra'is al-Mu'min* ("the believing president") in an attempt to contrast himself with Nasser.³⁵ Sadat encouraged a return of Al-Azhar to conservatism and used it to mobilize public opinion to support his domestic and foreign policies—notably his historic trip to Jerusalem in 1977 to pursue peace with Israel. As with Nasser, Sadat supported Sufi orders, and in the 1970s the Law on the Sufi Orders was adopted, along with a

³¹ Kepel (2002), pp. 24–26. Qutb's novelty was his applications of Ibn Taymiyya's concepts of Muslim rule to modern Nasserist government. Ibn Taymiyya wrote that Muslims owe allegiance to a government as long as it ruled according to Islam. If the rule was deemed un-Islamic, Muslims had a duty to overthrow that government. According to Ibn Taymiyya, the ulama were the ultimate deciders of the standards for Islamic rule.

³² However, the Brotherhood was blamed for attempting to assassinate Nasser in 1965.

³³ Kepel (2002), p. 63.

³⁴ The defeat was so humiliating that Arabs reject references to the 1967 conflict as the "Six-Day War," a term which merely serves to pound home the speed of the Arab collapse.

³⁵ Sullivan and Abed-Kotob (1999), p. 21.

number of supporting regulations that provided a legal framework for mysticism in Egypt and were aimed at bringing the orders under state control. Some 300 *mawlid* celebrations were officially condoned.³⁶ Most importantly, Sadat heralded a rapprochement with the Muslim Brotherhood that allowed it to rebuild the organizational infrastructure Nasser had destroyed.

The relatively permissive political environment and a number of other factors made Egypt conducive to the growth of Islamist movements during the 1970s. The combination of the October War of 1973—which Sadat had conceived in part as a way of retrieving Arab dignity—and Sadat's de-Nasserization program had unintended consequences. With economic hardship at home and skyrocketing oil prices, newfound Saudi wealth beckoned Egyptians to the Gulf for lucrative jobs. They returned with their earnings and, in some cases, a more conservative notion of Islam based on the Wahhabism they encountered in Saudi Arabia. Some helped the Wahhabi form of intolerant fundamentalism take root in Egypt through support of public works in poor areas, building of mosques, and teaching in primary and secondary schools.

Influenced by the revolutionary writings of Qutb and dissatisfied with the mainstream Muslim Brotherhood, students at Asyut University founded the Upper Egypt movement in the early 1970s. The students were mainly from lower-middle-class and working-class families, and their focus was the perceived corruption of the government and the socioeconomic inequities brought about by economic liberalization. Throughout the last three decades of the twentieth century, groups of the Upper Egypt movement acted there to enforce segregation of the sexes, prevent the sale of alcohol, and harass the Coptic Christian community. They also perpetrated acts of violence against government ministers, secularist intellectuals, security forces, and foreigners. Of the 280 people implicated in Sadat's assassination in 1981, 183 were Upper Egyptians, and another 73 were from Cairo neighborhoods that contained many recent transplants from rural areas.³⁷

In sum, these more radical Islamist groups, rather than seeking to work within existing institutional frameworks, espoused the overthrow of the prevailing system. The largest of these groups, al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya, had its roots among students with recently rural backgrounds; a number of the early leaders were graduates in engineering, medicine, and law. Its ideology was contained in a 1984 monograph written under the supervision of Omar Abdel Rahman while the group's leadership was

³⁶ As of 1997, the state had recognized 70 Sufi orders. See "Sufism: In 19th and 20th-Century Egypt" and "Mawlid: Typology of the Mawlid and Its Diffusion Through the Islamic World," in *Encyclopaedia of Islam* (1999).

³⁷ Jeffrey A. Nedoroscik, "Extremist Groups in Egypt," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 14, No. 2, Summer 2002, p. 64. See also pp. 63–65, 71. At the height of terrorism in Egypt during the mid-1990s, the government seemed to tip its hat to the role of poverty and exclusion in the violence by introducing in 1996 an Upper Egypt development campaign designed to create jobs in agriculture and industry.

in an Egyptian jail. The *Charter of Islamic Action (Mithaq al-'Amal al-Islami)* set forth the goals, strategies, and beliefs of the organization. The leaders professed adherence to the tenets of Islam through emulation of the deeds of the Prophet Muhammad and his companions. They stated that their goal was “to establish Islam as a totality in each soul, and over each handbreadth of land, in each house, in each organization, and in each society.” This would be accomplished by reestablishing the caliphate through jihad and replacing Western laws with shari’a. The group also opposed foreign investment in Egypt and declared war on tourism, arguing that tourist destinations like the Pyramids were pagan shrines and that income from tourism supports an infidel state.³⁸

Members of a smaller extremist group with roots in Cairo, the Gama’a al-Jihad, assassinated Sadat in 1981; Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman was the group’s spiritual leader before becoming the mufti of al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya.³⁹ Al-Jihad merged with al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya for a few short years in the early 1980s and with Al Qaeda in 1998 when Al-Jihad’s leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, became Osama bin Laden’s top lieutenant.⁴⁰ Al-Jihad’s ideologue was Muhammad Faraj, who penned *Al-Jihad: Al-Farida al-Gha’iba (Holy War: The Neglected Obligation)*. In it, Faraj set forth two main goals: to replace secular law with shari’a, even if it meant killing Muslims who resist, and to kill the leaders of governments that adopt the secular ways of imperialists (including Christians or “Crusaders,” Communists, and Zionists). He rejected interpretations of the concept of jihad other than those of direct, violent confrontation with the state. And he emphasized the obligation to confront the “near enemy” (i.e., the Egyptian government) before the “distant enemies” like Israel, arguing that supporting an infidel state in a struggle against an external enemy merely would strengthen that state.⁴¹ Later, al-Zawahiri abandoned the fight against the near enemy in favor of confronting the distant enemy when the Egyptian government’s forcible dismantling of his organization in Egypt made it impossible to support this part of Faraj’s argument.⁴²

Sadat’s vice president and successor, Hosni Mubarak, proclaimed a state of emergency after Sadat’s assassination, which has remained in force until the present. He brutally suppressed militant Islamists in the wake of the assassination and uprisings in Upper Egypt. However, he has at the same time allowed a modicum of participation by the Muslim Brotherhood in politics, professional syndicates, and uni-

³⁸ Sullivan and Abed-Kotob (1999), pp. 84–85. The authors draw this quote from the *Mithaq*, p. 55.

³⁹ The sheikh received a life sentence in the United States after being implicated in the February 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center in New York.

⁴⁰ Nedoroscik, op. cit., pp. 60–62.

⁴¹ Sullivan and Abed-Kotob (1999), p. 80.

⁴² Al-Sayyid 2003, p. 20.

versities. Despite a ban on religion-based political parties, the Muslim Brotherhood has fielded candidates as independents or on the slates of legal political parties, and they have acquitted themselves quite well despite government campaigns to discourage them through legal obstacles and harassment. President Hosni Mubarak's ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) dominates both houses of the legislature, with nearly 90 percent of the 454-seat People's Assembly and almost 100 percent of the 264-seat Advisory Council. In the 1984 elections for the People's Assembly, Brotherhood members allied with the New Wafd Party gained one-third (12) of the seats that party won.⁴³ As candidates on the slates of the Socialist Labor Party and Socialist Liberal Party in 1987, Brotherhood members won 35 seats, equaling New Wafd's totals for that year. After boycotting the 1990 and 1995 elections (along with other opposition parties), Brothers won 17 seats as independents in 2000, approximately equaling the gains of all other opposition parties combined.⁴⁴

The invasion and subsequent occupation of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union in 1979 was a turning point in the radicalization of Islamism in the Middle East and across the Muslim world, and its aftermath heralded nearly a decade of extremist violence in Egypt. Afghanistan became the first real theater of operations for Salafijihadists propelled by the combination of the writings of Ibn Taymiyya and Qutb, Wahhabi doctrine, and Saudi (and in some cases, U.S.) funding. Egypt and other Arab states found Afghanistan a convenient means of ridding their populations of radical elements that threatened the status quo, and they encouraged their extremists to join the ranks of the mujahidin. But in a decade these extremists would be back in their countries of origin as well-trained, battle-hardened fighters. The withdrawal of the Soviet Union in defeat in 1989 became a bellwether for jihadist groups, who believed they could apply the victory they had achieved in Afghanistan to jihad against other "infidels," such as pro-Western Muslim regimes, Russia (i.e., in Chechnya), and the West itself.

In 1989, thousands of "Arab Afghans"—Arab mujahidin who had fought in Afghanistan—began returning to Egypt, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and other states. They helped fill the ranks of al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya, which undertook attacks on government institutions, Copts, and tourists, sometimes in coordination with like-minded groups such as al-Jihad. Al-Gama'a was heavily involved in the convulsion of violence in Egypt between 1992 and 1997 that killed over 1,200 people. It carried out the infamous massacre at Luxor in November 1997, when gunmen burst into the courtyard at the 3,400-year-old Hatshepsut Temple and mowed down 66 people, 57 of

⁴³ The New Wafd, established under Sadat in the late 1970s, was a reincarnation of the nationalist Wafd party that had dominated Egyptian opposition to British presence from the 1920s until Nasser's ascendancy in 1952, when the Wafd was banned.

⁴⁴ Al-Sayyid (2003), pp. 8–12.

them foreign tourists.⁴⁵ But this was the last major attack carried out by Islamic militants in Egypt. The violence led to a heavy government crackdown that seriously degraded the extremists' infrastructure, killed scores of militants, and resulted in the jailing of many leaders. In addition, the extremist groups lost large segments of their popular support. The intensity and brutality of their violence alienated many Egyptians, not least because it severely curtailed tourism, a major source of national and personal income. Moreover, there was popular fatigue at the militants' heavy-handed interference with Egyptian traditions they interpreted as *bid'a*—including wedding ceremonies, funeral customs, and dancing.⁴⁶

The 1990s saw two other phenomena in Egypt that are of interest. In the mid-1990s, several Muslim Brothers broke with the Brotherhood over the authoritarian nature of its leadership and a political platform that excluded women and non-Muslims. This younger generation of intellectuals formed al-Wasat ("The Center"), which derived its worldview from centrist Egyptian thinkers of the 1980s. Al-Wasat's leadership cadre included women and Coptic Christians, and they leaned toward a more liberal view of political Islam. However, their attempts to attain legal recognition as a political party from the Egyptian government failed. They continued as a small movement dedicated to marrying Islamism with human rights, pluralism, and democratic freedoms.

A second phenomenon was the rise of popular preachers (*da'iya*) in Egypt as well as Yemen. Their teachings seem to be relatively conservative, and it is unclear whether they are moderates in the sense of adapting Islamic law to incorporate modern norms. Somewhat akin to a cross between televangelists and rock stars in the United States, *da'iya* such as Amr Khaled and Khaled al-Guindi in Egypt and El-Habib Ali in Yemen wear Western-style dress and speak of Islam in terms that seem to appeal to an expanding audience of middle- and upper-class youth whose families have benefited from economic liberalization. They are hugely popular among young people—especially women—who feel caught between the moral exclusivity and utopian ideal of *umma* espoused by the fundamentalists and radical fundamentalists on one hand and the orthodoxy of traditionalists on the other. The *da'iya* focus on personal piety as a way of finding meaning in life, but they teach their lessons in modern terms that matter to their constituencies, such as dating, nightlife, beach vacations, and parental pressure.⁴⁷

⁴⁵ Sullivan and Abed-Kotob, (1999), pp. 82–86; and Mohamed El-Dakhakhny, "At Least 66 Dead in Egypt Attack," *The Associated Press*, November 17, 1997.

⁴⁶ Interview with a prominent Egyptian scholar, June 2003. It is common, for example, for Egyptians to make use of funeral customs that originated in Pharaonic times, including grieving for forty days and building houses for the dead.

⁴⁷ "Kinder, Gentler Islam," *The Economist*, June 27, 2002, from <http://www.economist.com>.

For all intents and purposes, Egypt is an autocratic state with a veneer of democratic processes, an entrenched, bloated bureaucracy, an absence of basic freedoms, and a stunted civil society. Hosni Mubarak is president for life, and many observers believe he is grooming his son Gamal to take his place (the elder Mubarak adamantly denies this). There are elections to parliament, but they are routinely manipulated by the government to ensure the dominance of the ruling NDP. Opposition parties are weak by design. Those who speak out against the government can be arrested and tried in court or can have their lives made miserable in other ways.

The government can be said to have a symbiotic relationship with the opposition mainstream Islamist movements, particularly with the Muslim Brotherhood. The regime is loath to let the movement get too strong or threaten the government's control. It limits the Brotherhood's political influence through various means, including both legal manipulation and internment of the movement's leaders. However, the Muslim Brotherhood—though nominally banned since Nasser's rule in 1954—has fielded political candidates in parliamentary elections. Moreover, the government has permitted peaceful demonstrations by supporters of the Brotherhood. For example, the organization mobilized an estimated 100,000 supporters in early 2003 in a public display of reverence to mark the death of its 81-year-old leader Mustafa Mashour despite the failure of state media to mention his death.⁴⁸ In these ways, the Mubarak regime can show the United States and the West that Egypt has democracy on the one hand, but that its control is necessary to prevent a “worse” alternative—the Islamists—from taking power in Egypt on the other.⁴⁹

The Landscape in Egypt Since September 11

Since Al Qaeda's attacks of September 11, the Egyptian regime has continued its control tactics against the Islamist movements. Egypt has used the war on terrorism and the imminent war on Iraq to stifle dissent by arresting opposition figures. A large number of rank-and-file supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood were arrested in Alexandria during runoff legislative elections in September 2002, allegedly for rioting, illegal gathering, and attempting to hinder public balloting, among other things. They claim they were obstructed from going to the polls to vote.⁵⁰ A more recent example of such government practice was its preemptive arrest in early 2003 of scores of leaders in the weeks leading up to the anticipated attack on Iraq in an effort to weaken or control protests against U.S. military action in Iraq.⁵¹

⁴⁸ Anthony Shadid, “Restrictive Arab Nations Feel Pressure from Within,” *The Washington Post*, February 27, 2003, p. A20.

⁴⁹ Interviews with various Middle Eastern scholars and intellectuals, June 2003.

⁵⁰ Iason Athanasiadis, “101 Saad Eddins?” *Cairo Times*, November 9, 2002.

⁵¹ Omayma Abdel-Latif, “Preemptive Containment,” *Al-Ahram Weekly Online*, Issue No. 620, January 9–15, 2003, at <http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2003/620/eg7.htm>.

The regime has continued to crack down on liberal intellectuals as well. The most celebrated of these cases is Dr. Saad Eddin Ibrahim, a noted sociologist and advocate of democracy and director of the Ibn Khaldun Center for Developmental Studies in Cairo. Arrested in June 2000 for telling a European organization that the Egyptian elections were rigged, he was tried in military court and sentenced to seven years in prison. The Ibn Khaldun center was closed. Intense U.S. pressure on the Egyptian government helped lead to his acquittal by a civilian Court of Cassation, and he was released in May 2003. The Ibn Khaldun Center was also reopened in June, but it had been ransacked after his March acquittal and was under guard by Egyptian authorities. Despite the release of Dr. Ibrahim, his detention has had a deterrent effect on other liberal intellectuals, some of whom believe that U.S. pressure on Ibrahim's behalf derived from his possession of a U.S. passport.

In terms of political Islam within Egypt, the most notable development since September 11 has been Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya's renunciation of violence and *takfir*, the act of accusing the government of apostasy. It was on this basis that the Gama'a had justified its devastating attacks in the 1990s. This event illustrates a case of an important radical fundamentalist group coming full circle to express doubt about the revolutionary strategy for establishing an Islamic state. Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya's renunciation was based on a careful, exhaustive review of Islamic law and seems to be an authentic revision of its ideology.⁵² Its emphasis has shifted to *da'wa*, which some observers have characterized as an attempt to stay relevant and to rebuild its infrastructure. It is quite possible that the success of the Muslim Brotherhood as a viable organization despite a repressive government has convinced the leadership of the Gama'a that operating within the existing institutional framework is a more effective way of achieving its long-term goals.

Saudi Arabia: A Marriage of Religion and State

The states of the Arabian peninsula abutting the Persian Gulf represent a contrast to Egypt in terms of their relationship with Islamism. In the small nations of Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman, several Islamist movements are allowed to operate relatively openly. In the case of the largest state, Saudi Arabia, only one variant of Islam—fundamentalist Wahhabism—is sanctioned by the government. The two-and-a-half-century symbiosis between proponents of Wahhabism and the ruling Al-Saud clan is a key factor both in the Islamic landscape of the Middle East and elsewhere in the Islamic world. Throughout Saudi Arabia's recent history, however, radical fundamentalists have challenged the government, sometimes violently. The Saudi response has often included repression of these elements—

⁵² See al-Sayyid (2003).

usually with the use of the religious establishment to bolster the legitimacy of the government's actions—combined with adoption of some of the radical agenda.

Wahhabi doctrine is based on the Hanbali school of Islamic jurisprudence and is characterized by acceptance only of original texts of the Quran, the hadith, and the sunna. The teachings of Hanbali disciple Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328) were a major influence on Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab and continue to be a source of inspiration for fundamentalist and radical fundamentalist ideologies. Ibn Taymiyya espoused a literal interpretation of the Quran and sunna, rejected all forms of innovation or *bid'a* (such as cults of saints and pilgrimages to tombs), and developed Quranically based justifications for rebelling against corrupt rulers. Religion and state were inextricably linked; without religion, the state would become tyrannical, and without the state, the religion would have no protector and would be in danger. The state's most important mission was to prepare for a society wholly devoted to the service of God.⁵³

Wahhabism is quite intolerant of sects that are considered to have introduced *bid'a* into Islamic practices, including the Shi'ites and their offshoots, Sufis, the Khawarij-based Ibadhis of Oman, and even other Sunni theologies. Wahhabi doctrine preaches strict monotheism (*tawhid*) and forbids any religious supplication to and veneration of human beings.⁵⁴ Abd al-Wahhab also denounced a number of Bedouin practices originating during the *jahiliyya*, the pre-Islamic times. (See panel, "The Wahhabi Creed.") Intolerance of others has created tensions in a Saudi society dominated by conservative Wahhabi doctrine. Apart from the Shi'a minority, there are still adherents to the other Sunni schools of jurisprudence in Saudi Arabia. But only Wahhabi/Hanbali interpretations of law are applied in the kingdom.

Abd al-Wahhab forged an alliance with the Al-Saud clan in the Najd of Arabia in the 1740s. This symbiotic relationship helped ensure the spread and entrenchment of Wahhabi teachings throughout the Arabian Peninsula and the expansion and legitimization of the Saudi conquest of what would become Saudi Arabia. To support Saudi consolidation of power on the Arabian Peninsula (especially into the Hejaz), and as part of the Saudi-Wahhabi alliance, modern Saudi Arabia's first king, Abd al-Aziz ibn Saud, settled Bedouin tribes in agriculturally based military cantonments beginning in 1912 and established the warrior *Ikhwan* (the Brethren, not to be confused with Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun, the Muslim Brotherhood). The *Ikhwan* were fiercely loyal and zealous, and constituted a major part of Al-Saud forces. The strength of tribal ties, the religious fervor that in many ways dampened intertribal divisiveness, the clamor to spread Wahhabi Islam by jihad, and the readiness to die as

⁵³ See Ayubi (1991), p. 66; Gibb and Kramers (2001), p. 152; and "Ibn Taymiyya," in *Encyclopaedia of Islam* (1999).

⁵⁴ Followers of Wahhabism call themselves *muwabbidun* (unitarians) since the Wahhabi doctrine rejects even the veneration of Abd al-Wahhab himself.

martyrs made the *Ikhwan* a formidable power. The conquest of the peninsula cost thousands of lives, and Ibn Saud's appointed governors executed or conducted amputations on thousands more.⁵⁵ In 1929, however, Ibn Saud fought and defeated some of the tribes of the *Ikhwan* in a dispute over a Saudi agreement with Great Britain. Some members of these tribes have continued to harbor animosity toward the Saudis and were central to the Grand Mosque takeover in Mecca in 1979 in a revival of the *Ikhwan* creed (see below).⁵⁶ After the establishment of Saudi Arabia in 1932, Wahhabism served as a foundation for the legitimacy of the Al-Saud clan as protectors of the holy places and rulers of the state.

It should be noted that the centrality of the Najd as the origin of Wahhabism creates tension in Saudi society. Contrary to popular belief in Western circles, regionalism in Saudi Arabia is as important—if not more important—a distinction as religious beliefs. Each major region of the Kingdom—the Eastern Province, the Najd, the Hejaz, and the south (Najran and Asir)—has distinctive speech, food, dress, and culture. Najdis dominate the religious establishment and the government, and even nonreligious Najdis will defend Wahhabism merely because of pride in its Najdi origins. This domination alienates other regions, especially when it is accompanied by a failure to fairly distribute resources. This regional alienation may have

The Wahhabi Creed

All objects of worship other than God are false, and those who worship such objects deserve death.

Most of mankind is polytheist, since many practice visitation of tombs of saints.

It is polytheism to include in prayers the names of prophets, saints, or angels.

It is polytheism to seek intercession from or make vows to any other but God.

It is heresy to deny divine decree in all acts.

It is heresy to interpret the Quran based on *ta'wil* (a method of interpretation used by Sufis and Shi'ites).

Attendance at public prayer is mandatory.

Smoking of tobacco is forbidden, and shaving the beard may be forbidden.

Source: Gibb and Kramers (2001), p. 618.

⁵⁵ Hamid Algar, known for an anti-Al-Saud, anti-Wahhabi bent, has written that 400,000 people died, with 40,000 executions and 350,000 amputations conducted by the governors. This is likely an exaggeration, but nonetheless illustrates the magnitude of destruction seen in the formation of the Saudi state. See Algar (2002), p. 42.

⁵⁶ See "al-Ikhwan," in *Encyclopaedia of Islam* (1999); Ayubi (1991), pp. 99–100; and Clements (2001), p. 109.

played a part in motivating the extremism of the September 11 hijackers, many of whom were from the poorly developed southern region.⁵⁷

Nasser's meteoric rise as self-appointed leader of the Arab world and his antagonism toward the Saudi regime (he called it "reactionary" and questioned its custodianship of the Holy Places) propelled Saudi Arabia to compete with Egypt and later with other regional powers. Nasser enlisted Syria and Iraq in his pan-Arab vision and fought a proxy war with Saudi Arabia in Yemen from 1962 to 1967.

The Egyptian Muslim Brothers had found refuge from Nasser in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states in the 1950s and 1960s. Gulf governments had employed the Brothers as imams in mosques, as teachers, and as officials in the ministry of education where they designed textbooks and syllabi. By the time the Muslim Brothers arrived in Saudi Arabia, Wahhabism had become the "state ideology" of Saudi Arabia and was thus politically quietist, focusing on societal and religious morals. In a number of ways, Wahhabism and the Brotherhood were kindred spirits in that they both called for a return to the fundamentals of Islam. The presence of the Muslim Brotherhood in Saudi Arabia had a profound effect on the Wahhabi movement and seems to have helped light a political spark among Wahhabi fundamentalists.⁵⁸ Wahhabi puritanism, the formidable organizational skills of the Muslim Brotherhood, and Saudi oil wealth combined to set the stage for an expansion of Salafism in the 1970s. The mix of traditional tribalism and political activism based on Islam has had a radicalizing effect, not only in Saudi Arabia but also in Kuwait. Later events, such as the Iranian Revolution and the Afghan jihad, reinforced and extended this effect. The Nasser–Al-Saud competition and Saudi Arabia's experience with the Muslim Brotherhood set the stage for the Saudi export of Wahhabism to the far reaches of the Muslim world and beyond.

The structure for the spread of Wahhabism outside Saudi borders originated in 1962, when the Saudis established the Muslim World League to compete with the nationalist/socialist ideology of President Nasser of Egypt. Supported by the Egyptian Muslim Brothers, the league sought to establish support networks for Wahhabi-inspired Islamic associations and mosques throughout the Muslim world. As a result

⁵⁷ In the Eastern Province and the Hejaz, the cosmopolitanism that developed out of exposure to "others" through sea-based trade stands in stark contrast to the harsh Bedouin tribal structures of the isolated Najd region. In the south, the regions of Najran and Asir adopted Wahhabism relatively recently, only about 30 years ago. Many Sunnis there are adamant Wahhabis because of Saudi education, yet as a region they have been left behind the rest of the kingdom. There have been no government ministers from the south. There are only seven southern members of the Shura Council. Infrastructure, health care, and education are much less developed in the south. In 2000, 300 people in Jazan near the Yemeni border died of "Rift Valley fever," a treatable disease, but the government did not respond and no facilities existed to deal with it. The majority of deaths from car accidents are in the south because of inadequate roads. Najdis derogatorily refer to southerners as "07's," signifying theirs as the lowest of the seven Saudi area codes (01 to 07). Interview with Ali al-Ahmed, director, the Saudi Institute, April 3, 2003.

⁵⁸ See Eric Rouleau, "Trouble in the Kingdom," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 81, No. 4, July/August 2002, p. 79.

of the vast oil wealth the Saudis amassed from 1973 onward, the league greatly expanded its activities, opening offices in many Muslim-populated areas of the world including Europe, Asia, and Africa.⁵⁹ Export of money became a key ingredient in spreading Wahhabism in an effort to consolidate Saudi control over Islam. Royal family members would give huge sums of money to the establishment ulama (or to their own religious advisors) for their own purposes or to give to charitable organizations. Money would be funneled through organizations such as World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY), which had offices in 65 countries, and the World Muslim League, whose staffs often exhibited extremist tendencies. A Saudi government agency, the Supreme Council of Charity and Relief, made policy and coordinated the activities of all the charitable Saudi organizations.⁶⁰

The Six-Day War created a vacuum in political thought in the Arab world, and the explosion in Saudi oil revenues in 1973 and 1979 greatly accelerated the process by which fundamentalism and Islamism could fill that vacuum. To protest U.S. support of Israel during and after the Yom Kippur War of October 1973, most Arab members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), with Saudi Arabia in the lead, initiated an oil embargo of the West. The resulting drop in

⁵⁹ Sayyid Abul-Ala Mawdudi, the Pakistani Muslim scholar whose revolutionary ideology, along with Qutb's, formed the basis for radical fundamentalism, was one of the League's leading figures. See Kepel (2002), p. 72; and Schwartz (2002), pp. 131–132.

⁶⁰ The Saudis have deftly used aid to communities devastated by war to spread Wahhabism. Saudi aid agencies provide medicine and food and build mosques, schools, and shelters. But this aid can come with a price. In the aftermaths of the Balkan conflicts in the 1990s, Saudi aid agencies—in addition to building schools, clinics, and shelters—razed or defaced numerous sixteenth-, seventeenth-, and eighteenth-century mosques, libraries, cemeteries, and other Islamic structures that had survived the violence in Bosnia and Kosovo. For example, a Saudi agency that had taken charge of the “restoration” of the Gazi Husrev Beg mosque in Sarajevo ordered the ornate Ottoman tilework and painted wall decorations stripped off and discarded. The interior and exterior were redone “in gleaming hospital white.” Such destruction of archeologically and religiously significant architecture was repeated throughout Muslim communities of the Balkans. See Jolyon Naegele, “Yugoslavia: Saudi Wahhabi Aid Workers Bulldoze Balkan Monuments,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, August 4, 2000, at <http://www.rferl.org/specials/yugoslavia/monuments/>.

There is precedent for Wahhabi-inspired iconoclasm even within Saudi Arabia itself. Wahhabi religious architecture is noted for its simplicity and absence of decoration. The Saudis and other groups beholden to Wahhabi teachings have demolished architecture, including archeologically important sites, deemed contrary to its doctrine. The purpose of such destruction is twofold. First, it removes any hints of sectarianism in Islam in favor of the one “true” Islam represented by Wahhabi doctrine. Second, it destroys sites that could become objects of adoration, thereby supporting the Quranic injunction against worshipping images or beings other than God. In an affront to its Shi'ite minority, they have destroyed tombs of venerated saints. Several early Islamic mosques in Medina were demolished, and the nearby site of a historically significant Islamic battle was turned into a parking lot. Not even antiquities of the Prophet Muhammad himself have been spared; the Wahhabi Ikhwan appear to have destroyed Muhammad's reputed birthplace upon taking over Mecca in 1924, along with 500–600 mausoleums and other revered structures of Muhammad's time, to prevent them from drawing worshippers. More recently, the Saudi government in early 2002 demolished the eighteenth-century Ottoman al-Ajrad fortress overlooking Mecca. The Saudi Islamic Affairs Minister called the destruction “an act of preservation” that was done “in the interest of pilgrims” to Mecca. See “Makka: The Modern City,” in *Encyclopaedia of Islam* (1999), Jolyon Naegele, “Middle East: Saudi Arabia Rejects Criticism over Citadel Demolition,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, January 11, 2002, at <http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/2002/01/11012002095823.asp>.

supplies of crude on the world market nearly doubled oil prices. Once the embargo was lifted, prices remained at about \$20 per barrel in 1996 dollars. The new price equilibrium filled the coffers of oil exporters with unprecedented cash reserves. In 1979, prices skyrocketed again. As a result of their newfound wealth, the Saudis went on a spending spree during the 1970s and 1980s. Much of the revenue went for massive efforts at city-building and associated infrastructure development and the procurement of modern military equipment. But substantial amounts were also sent outside the country to spread Wahhabism and to counter the effects of the Iranian revolution.

It was also during the 1970s that Saudi Arabia's third king, Faysal bin Abd al-Aziz, set the stage for a formal relationship between state and society in Saudi Arabia. At the center of "Faysal's Order" of 1971 was an attempt to harmonize modernization with the conservative tendencies of Saudi society. It included the use of oil wealth to expand technological innovation, attract investment in infrastructure, and strengthen the military, often with foreign (especially Western) assistance. It also established a social contract with Saudi citizens that provided free education, employment opportunities, and lifelong welfare for all—in return for acquiescence to a non-participatory political system.

However, Faysal's Order was to become a source of tension between the Saudi regime (and, by extension, the state ulama) and conservative clerics who were appalled at the modernization of Saudi society and what they perceived as growing corruption and "un-Islamic practices" on the part of the royal family. One might term these antigovernment sheikhs and their followers "radical fundamentalists" or, more specifically, "neo-Wahhabis." Encouraged by the Iranian revolution some six months before (despite its Shi'ite nature), the movement burst onto the world stage in November 1979 when several hundred followers of two opposition sheikhs, Juhayman bin Muhammad al-Utaybi and Muhammad bin Abdallah al-Qahtani, forcibly took control of the Grand Mosque (the Haram) in Mecca.

Both sheikhs had been products of education under the establishment ulama at the Islamic University in Medina, and al-Utaybi had been a member of the Saudi Arabian National Guard, which had absorbed the warrior *Ikhwan*. Al-Utaybi severely criticized the regime for alliance with "Christians" and demanded the expulsion of foreign military and civilian experts from the country (a demand that would again figure prominently among radicals during the 1991 Gulf War and in Osama bin Laden's statements). Moreover, he condemned the establishment ulama for backing such a morally bankrupt regime. Al-Utaybi and al-Qahtani were executed along with many followers after the government wrested control of the Haram by force, sup-

ported (some say reluctantly) by the establishment ulama, who issued a fatwa allowing the attackers to be hunted down and, if necessary, killed.⁶¹

It is important to note that, despite its position as the birthplace of the Wahhabi–Al-Saud alliance, Najd has also been a center of incitement against the royal family and formulation of neo-Wahhabi ideologies. A number of Najdi tribes, including the Utayba, Matir, and Yam, had fought against the Saudis in previous generations and were not enamored of the latter’s domination of Arabia. Though these tribes later benefited from Saudi rule, it was a member of the Utayba, Juhayman, who led the assault on the Haram.⁶² Juhayman’s philosophy was based on returning to “pure” Wahhabism from which, he argued, the Saudis (and the establishment ulama) had strayed. A key part of his criticism centered around the royal family’s corruption, lack of accountability, and perceived injustices and inequitable distribution of oil wealth. Many tribal areas in the Najd and elsewhere had been passed over in favor of the fast-developing urban areas. Many of Juhaiman’s disciples were young, newly urbanized university students; over two-thirds of the Saudi citizens whom the government executed after its assault to recover the Haram hailed from the Najd.⁶³

The regime’s response to Juhaiman and his followers was to adopt some of their demands in an effort to co-opt conservative elements in the kingdom. After the government killed the extremists involved in the 1979 Mecca incident,

it then essentially adopted their ideology. . . . Saudi authorities began imposing crushingly strict and pointless rules. Women were banned from appearing on television. Music was not allowed to be played in the Saudi media. Stores and malls closed during the five daily prayers. Members of the religious police were granted more power to intervene in people’s personal lives. The Saudi government did all of this to please the Islamists, perhaps fearing further extremist threats.⁶⁴

This government reaction would be repeated at other points when indigenous radical fundamentalists would question or threaten the regime—especially following the 1991 Gulf War.

The Iranian revolution of 1979 was important on two other fronts as well. First, it empowered members of the Shi’ite community in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia to raise their voices against the discrimination they faced in a state whose religious establishment (and, by inference, many Sunnis whose schooling the

⁶¹ Teitelbaum (2000), pp. 19–22.

⁶² Juhaiman’s grandfather, a member of the *Ikhwan*, was killed by Ibn Saud’s army in 1929 during the government suppression of the militias.

⁶³ Ayubi (1991), pp. 100–103.

⁶⁴ Sulaiman Al-Hattlan, “In Saudi Arabia, an Extreme Problem,” *The Washington Post*, May 8, 2002, p. A21. The author is a columnist for the Saudi daily *Al Watan*.

establishment influenced) viewed them as polytheists (*mushrikin*), a great crime in Wahhabi doctrine. The revolution radicalized the Shi'a Reform Movement in Saudi Arabia, founded in 1975.⁶⁵ The movement spearheaded a Shi'ite uprising in the Eastern Province that was put down by the Saudi government. Beginning in the late 1980s, however, the movement began to soften its positions, toning down its Iranian-style revolutionary rhetoric and emphasizing democratic reform, human rights, and equality.⁶⁶

Second, Ayatollah Khomeini replaced Gamal Abdel Nasser as the supreme threat to the kingdom's preeminence in Arab and Muslim affairs. Khomeini's revolutionary fervor and his criticism of Saudi stewardship of the Holy Places called into question the legitimacy of the Saudi regime. In response, the Saudis sought to play up the Shi'ite nature of the revolution (hoping to alienate majority Sunnis) and to portray it as an instrument of Persian nationalism. The regime also redoubled its efforts to export Wahhabism through its already extensive network of Islamic organizations.⁶⁷

One group that became a major recipient of Saudi largesse was the mujahidin fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan came on the heels of both the Grand Mosque takeover and the sacking of the U.S. embassy in Tehran and the taking of its staff as hostages. This confluence of events led to joint U.S.-Saudi support of radical Sunni forces in Afghanistan who would later form the Salafi-jihadist movements of the 1990s and turn against their erstwhile patrons. In the context of Cold War containment, as Kepel writes, the United States

turned on massive aid to the Afghan resistance. . . . Saudi Arabia and the wealthy conservative monarchies of the Gulf also contributed freely to the Afghan jihad. All were glad to join the United States in an effort to keep the Soviet Union out of their backyard, while providing an outlet as radical as that of the Iranian revolution, though distinct from it, for all the Sunni Islamist militants who dreamed of striking a blow at the impious, as Khomeini had done.⁶⁸

The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the demise of the Soviet Union soon thereafter convinced the militants that, armed with fanatical religious devotion and a readiness to use violence, they could bring down governments, even superpowers.

The Gulf War in 1991 heralded nearly a decade of Islamist gains in participatory political systems, increased dissent by Islamic movements, and rising violence by

⁶⁵ Fandy (1999), pp. 198–204.

⁶⁶ Fandy (1999), p. 199.

⁶⁷ Kepel (2002), p. 120.

⁶⁸ Kepel (2002), p. 137.

radical Islamic organizations in a number of countries. In Saudi Arabia, the war led to challenges to the regime by indigenous radical clerics. Conservatives were incensed at the presence of U.S. forces in the kingdom, which was taken as an indication that the Saudi government had failed in one major part of its social contract: to protect the kingdom and the Holy Places. The establishment ulama had issued a fatwa allowing the presence of non-Muslim troops, and conservatives saw this as contrary to shari'a. To add fuel to the fire, after the war a group of some 45 women protested their prohibition from operating automobiles by driving cars in Riyadh. Reportedly, some removed their veils and stepped on them. Conservatives believed the women were encouraged by the presence of U.S. troops. Appalled, some 400 conservatives, led by the "Awakening Sheikhs," Salman bin Fahd al-Awda and Safar bin Abd al-Rahman al-Hawali, circulated in May 1991 a "Letter of Demands," a petition that called for what amounted to separating the ulama from the royal family and increasing the ulama's involvement in political decisions. The petition called for many other changes, including establishment of an independent consultative council, repeal of all laws and regulations not conforming with shari'a, and the strengthening of Islamic religious institutions.⁶⁹ A more strident "Memorandum of Advice" followed the Letter of Demands in 1992.

As in the aftermath of the Haram takeover in 1979, the Saudi government's response to the petition and memorandum was to repress this radical movement while adopting, at least superficially, a number of its demands. First, the king established a basic law that codified existing functions of government and the preeminence of shari'a. Second, a nonlegislative Majlis Al-Shura (Consultative Council) was inaugurated in 1993 with 60 members appointed by the king (this number was increased to 90 in 1997). The Majlis Al-Shura was seen variously as an initial opening to parliamentary democracy and as a sham designed to give only a veneer of participatory governance, and it certainly did not meet the radicals' desire of a council that they could dominate. Political parties, whether religiously based or not, remained proscribed, and civil society continued to be severely restricted. And, in what was possibly a bow to radical Wahhabis, the government took several repressive measures against the kingdom's Shi'ites, including imprisonment and execution as well as the razing of four Shi'a mosques in 1992.⁷⁰

In response to the regime's repression of the neo-Wahhabis, a group of conservatives, led by Muhammad al-Mas'ari, formed the Committee for the Defense of Legitimate Rights (CDLR) in May 1993. This group was unique in that it portrayed itself as a human rights organization and actively courted Western media outlets and embassies in Riyadh with interviews and faxes. Al-Mas'ari was "comfortable in the

⁶⁹ See Teitelbaum (2000), p. 32; and Fandy (1999), pp. 50–60.

⁷⁰ Algar (2002), p. 62. A mere two years later, however, the government forged a compromise with Saudi Shi'a activists that led to the return of key Shi'ite opposition leaders from abroad. See Fandy (1999), pp. 199–200.

Western idiom, and unlike the Awakening Sheikhs, he ‘repackaged’ the radical fundamentalist message for a Western audience.”⁷¹ Soon after its founding, the Saudis arrested CDLR activists; after his release in November 1993, al-Mas’ari moved the CDLR’s operations to London and used faxes (and later the Internet) to continue his attacks on the regime by questioning its Islamic legitimacy and exposing corruption in the royal family. An internal disagreement split the organization in 1996, and a new exile group, the Movement for Islamic Reform in Arabia (MIRA), was founded under the leadership of Sa’d al-Faqih.

Several groups of Saudi Salafi-jihadists emphasize the repudiation of others who do not hold to their own strict, puritanical interpretations of Islam, contending that “a religion without repudiation of others does not deserve the name.”⁷² Their focus has been on the conditions under which other Muslims can be accused of apostasy, thereby opening these Muslims up to excommunication and even death. In the political sphere, their doctrine would be applied by establishing the circumstances for popular uprisings of Muslim citizens against Muslim rulers who are deemed infidels. In fact, the only Muslim government that never incurred the label “apostate” was that of the Taliban in Afghanistan.⁷³ Salafi-jihadist movements in Saudi Arabia are difficult to identify because of their diffuse nature and informal structure; it might be more appropriate to term them “tendencies” rather than organized movements.

In the 1990s, radical Islamists conducted two major attacks that were unprecedented in Saudi history. The first was the bombing in November 1995 by Sunni radicals of a Saudi National Guard building in central Riyadh that housed U.S. military advisors. Five Americans and two Indians were killed and 60 were injured. The perpetrators were later caught and beheaded; a number of them were said to be “Afghan Arabs” who had been trained in Afghanistan and had fought the Soviets. The second incident was the Khobar Towers bombing in Dhahran in 1996, which killed 19 U.S. servicemen and injured some 500 other people. Despite improved relations between the government and the Shi’ite population from the mid-1990s on, a violent Shi’ite organization called Saudi Hezbollah was suspected, as was Iranian complicity.⁷⁴

Numerous articles and books have been written about Osama bin Laden and his Al Qaeda organization, especially after September 11. The organization had its beginnings in Afghanistan, but bin Laden also founded the Advice and Reform Committee as an umbrella group for “Afghan Arabs” in Saudi Arabia. A key demand of

⁷¹ Teitelbaum (2000), p. 50.

⁷² Mansur al-Nuqaydan, “The Islamist Map in Saudi Arabia and the Question of Repudiation,” *Al-Wasat*, February 28, 2003. Al-Nuqaydan claims to have been a former member of the extremist salafi groups in Saudi Arabia.

⁷³ Al-Nuqaydan, *op. cit.*

⁷⁴ Al-Nuqaydan, *op. cit.*, pp. 73–94.

that group was the removal of U.S. forces from Saudi soil. Al Qaeda would later conduct bombings in the kingdom following the 2003 Iraq War, a point to which we return below.

The Landscape in Saudi Arabia Since September 11

The attacks of September 11 brought Saudi Arabia under a great deal of scrutiny. Because 15 of the 19 hijackers had been Saudi nationals, many in the West hoped that the Saudi government would initiate a major effort to root out internal extremism and to clamp down on the funding of terrorist groups from Saudi sources. Saudi cooperation in the war on terror was very slow to materialize and was accompanied by denials that Saudi Arabia or its export of Wahhabism were key factors in fomenting jihadist groups like Al Qaeda.

In fact, the Saudis responded quite defensively to charges of complicity in the development and nurturing of Islamic extremism and violence perpetrated in the name of Islam. A common response to these charges was that the violence was directed by external sources and that the West in general, and the Western media in particular, were engaged in a campaign to tarnish the image of Islam. Crown Prince Abdullah was quoted as proclaiming that “we are all targeted . . . not only Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Sudan, and others . . . but the main target is Islam.”⁷⁵ Saudi officials also vigorously defended the network of charities and financial institutions that the United States and other Western governments indicated were funding terrorist groups and their activities. Riyadh’s governor and King Fahd’s brother, Prince Salman, summed up the Saudi position by commenting that charitable funds “are used in good deeds, and it is not the responsibility of the kingdom if there were people who turn those good deeds into evil ones.”⁷⁶

At the same time, Saudi officials began advising government clerics to temper provocative, anti-Western rhetoric and to present Islam as a moderate religion. In a move whose only precedent was King Abdel Aziz’s preparation to put down a revolt by religious conservatives in the 1920s, Abdullah called a meeting of Saudi Islamic scholars to tell them that

it is your duty to be careful. Scholars serve their religion and country and look for reasonable words that serve Islam. I advise you not to get emotional or provoked by anyone. Let there be no extremism in religion.⁷⁷

⁷⁵ “Shun Provocative Actions, Abdullah Urges Muslims,” *Arab News*, November 3, 2002. Abdullah was speaking to an international conference of the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY) in Riyadh.

⁷⁶ “Saudi Tycoon Defends Muslim Charity,” *Associated Press*, November 3, 2002. Quote taken from remarks published by Arabic-language daily *Okaz*, November 2, 2002.

⁷⁷ Howard Schneider, “Saudi Arabia Wrestles with 2 Views of Islam,” *The Washington Post*, December 15, 2001, p. A1.

This admonition to the recognized scholars in Saudi Arabia was generally repeated to the state-affiliated ulama. In addition, the government has sponsored a concerted initiative to discredit Osama bin Laden's worldview. For example, in early 2002 the World Muslim League adopted a statement limiting jihad to very specific—and heretofore unrealized—circumstances and forbidding the killing of innocents. Moreover, the Saudis enlisted the support of conservative dissidents formerly critical of the government, including Sheikh al-Awda and Sheikh al-Qarni, who expressed their disdain for bin Laden's "deviant application of legitimate teachings."⁷⁸

But nonaffiliated sheikhs did not feel obligated to heed this call for moderation. They continued advocating the pursuit of jihad against the United States and supported the attacks as a legitimate part of this war. One such advocate was Sheikh Hamoud Abdullah al-Okla al-Shuaibi, who issued a fatwa at the start of U.S. operations in Afghanistan stating that whosoever aids an infidel is an infidel.⁷⁹ Such viewpoints helped convince the Saudis to limit and mask U.S. air operations from the kingdom during Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. In addition, according to Saudi analyst and former Salafi movement member Mansur al-Nuqaidan, jihadist ideology became more prominent in Saudi Arabia. Extremists branded the Saudi regime (and all others in the Islamic world except the Taliban in Afghanistan) as infidels and issued a fatwa allowing armed attacks on security forces. They also branded Muslims in the United States as hostile combatants because they pay taxes to an infidel government.⁸⁰

As in Egypt, the Saudi regime has continued to retain tight control over its citizens. It allows little freedom of expression or religion, and civil society is virtually nonexistent. On the other side of the coin, there have been stirrings of a debate about reform in the kingdom since September 11 in light of perceived excesses in the name of Islam. The most notorious of these excesses was the behavior of the *mutawwa'in*, or religious police of the Commission for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice. Known for enforcing strict dress codes, shepherding men to prayer, and demanding the closure of businesses during prayer times, the *mutawwa'in* have reportedly broken into private homes on suspicion of illegal alcohol consumption or sexual relations. In March 2002, 15 schoolgirls died in a school fire in Mecca when the *mutawwa'in* prevented male rescuers from entering the school because the girls were not veiled. This drew an unprecedented rebuke from Prince Nayef bin Abdul

⁷⁸ F. Gregory Gause III, "Saudi-U.S. Relations and the War on Terrorism," address to the Foreign Policy Association, October 17, 2002, at http://www.fpa.org/topics_info2414/topics_info_show.htm?doc_id=126331.

⁷⁹ See Schneider, *op. cit.*

⁸⁰ Al-Nuqaidan, *op. cit.*

Aziz, the Saudi interior minister, who stated that the religious police should show leniency and a respect for privacy and personal freedoms.⁸¹

A “National Reform Document” was presented to (and received by) Crown Prince Abdullah in January 2003 that proposed a directly elected Majlis Al-Shura, an independent judiciary, freedom of expression and assembly, and the establishment of a civil society. It also called for improving accountability, developing sources of income not based on petroleum, encouraging a greater role for women, and ensuring civil rights for political prisoners and reformers.⁸² More than 100 Saudi liberals and conservatives signed the document, and its tone was decidedly respectful of the royal family. In addition, the Saudis have established a professional journalists’ association, the first of its kind in Saudi Arabia. The government has allowed somewhat more public discussion of the role of women in society and of corruption among members of the royal family.⁸³ Finally, Saudi Arabia presented an “Arab Charter” to the Arab League urging “internal reform and enhanced political participation” and “an environment conducive to private initiatives and investments” in Arab countries.⁸⁴

There was also growing debate about education in Saudi Arabia. The Wahhabi religious establishment continues to heavily influence Saudi Arabia’s educational system. Some 30–40 percent of the curriculum focuses on religious instruction. Successful students are those who memorize their lessons and can repeat them back to the teacher. According to a Saudi-born American who spent his primary and secondary educations in Wahhabi schools in the kingdom, the curriculum formerly included 2–3 hours per week of memorization of the Quran, several more hours of relating *hadith* to the memorized passages, and a substantial amount of time on the history of Islam. This history often included positive portrayals of relationships with “others,” such as Christians and Jews. Since this person’s schooling in the 1970s and 1980s, that element of Islamic history has been removed from the curriculum, especially because it showed “others” in a good light. This perpetuates the lack of tolerance for non-Wahhabis. Indeed, Abd al-Hamid al-Ansari, dean of the faculty of Islamic Law at the University of Qatar, has argued that “this culture [of terrorism] is rooted in the minds of those who suffered from a closed education that leaves no room for pluralism.”⁸⁵

⁸¹ “Saudi Minister Rebukes Religious Police,” *British Broadcasting Corporation*, aired November 4, 2002.

⁸² The text of the National Reform Document was translated by the Saudi Institute, Washington, D.C. Full text at <http://www.al-bab.com/arab/docs/saudi/reform2003.htm>.

⁸³ Jean-Francois Seznec, “The Impact of the Iraq War on Politics in the Islamic World,” comments on Saudi Arabia to symposium of the Carnegie Endowment of International Peace, April 29, 2003.

⁸⁴ “A Pact for Reforming the Arab Condition,” *Arab News*, January 15, 2003.

⁸⁵ Abd al-Hamid al-Ansari, “The Fight Against Terrorism Must Begin with Curricular, Educational, and Media Reform in the Middle East,” *Al-Hayat* (London), November 29, 2001, translated by The Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI), Special Dispatch Series, No. 307, December 4, 2001, at <http://www.memri.org/bin/opener.cgi?Page=archives&ID=SP30701>.

An impassioned letter to the editor of the London Arabic-language daily *Al-Sharq al-Awsat* from a Saudi woman confirms this sentiment:

The mentality of each one of us was programmed upon entering school as a child, [to believe] that [Islam] is everything. Instilled in our small heads was the [notion that the Muslim] has a right—whatever the cause—and that he will triumph—even if he is armed with a stick of wood against a tank—because he [represents] the truth and others represent falsehood. Instilled in our small heads was the [notion] that we have a monopoly on good values. . . . They have taught us that anyone who is not a Muslim is our enemy, and that the West means enfeeblement, licentiousness, lack of values, and even *jabiliyya* itself. Anyone who escapes this programming in school encounters it at the mosque, or through the media or from the preachers lurking in every corner. . . . This is the culture that has made each of us able to determine the fate of the universe.⁸⁶

Thus, although Saudi Arabia after September 11 remained a state tightly controlled by the monarchy and a society largely beholden to the religious and moral direction of the establishment ulama, there were signs—albeit small—of positive change. The extent of this change will depend largely on the outcome of the future succession to the Saudi throne and the impact of the Riyadh bombings on Saudi soil after the Iraq War. We return to those issues below.

The West Bank and Gaza and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan: Palestinian Society and Jordanian “Soft Autocracy”

Islamism in Jordan and in Palestinian society dates from the establishment of branches of the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1940s. The Society of the Muslim Brothers in Palestine was formed in Jerusalem in the middle of the decade, and branches were opened in other towns on both sides of the Jordan River soon thereafter. The Hashemite monarchy in Jordan has, for the most part, nurtured a cooperative relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood, especially when compared with other Arab countries. Although there have been tensions and arrests and the government has closely monitored the movement’s activities, the dynasty’s descent from the House of the Prophet Muhammad, its possession of the Sharifate of Mecca (until the Saudi conquest of the Hejaz), and its conservatism made the monarchy and the Brotherhood natural allies. The Jordanian government has joined with the Brotherhood at various times against Jordan’s opponents, especially Hafez al-Asad’s Syria and Yasir Arafat’s Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Leaders of Syria’s Mus-

⁸⁶ Dr. Sahr Muhammad Hatem, “The Fault Lies in Our Education, Not in American Society,” Letter to the Editor, *Al-Sharq al-Awsat*, December 21, 2001, translated by MEMRI, Special Dispatch Series, No. 331, January 14, 2002, at <http://www.memri.org/bin/opener.cgi?Page=archives&ID=SP33102>.

lim Brotherhood branch found refuge in Jordan after Asad's severe crackdown in the early 1980s. The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan has fielded candidates in all parliamentary elections and can quite accurately be termed a "loyal opposition."⁸⁷

The Muslim Brotherhood in the West Bank and Gaza has prospered or suffered according to the nature of the authority in those areas. Before the 1967 war, Nasser's authority repressed the Muslim Brothers in Gaza in the same manner as their Egyptian colleagues, whereas in the West Bank Jordan's authority was relatively benign. The 1967 war had a major effect on Jordan and the Palestinians. The establishment of Israeli rule in both the West Bank and Gaza changed the dynamics, beginning with Israeli openness toward the Brotherhood (even support against the secularist Palestine Liberation Organization), turning more restrictive, and finally ending with armed hostility against violent offshoots like Hamas. Unlike Islamists in other regions, it is a challenge to distinguish "mainstream" from "radical" Islamists in Palestinian society because the major Islamist groups use violence as a primary means of achieving their aims. There are, of course, independent Palestinian Islamists who disapprove of violence as an instrument. Moreover, nationalism plays a more dominant role as a driver of Palestinian Islamist positions than among other Islamist movements.

The establishment of the State of Israel in 1948 created an influx of refugees into Jordan, many of whom settled in camps that exist to this day. In 1950, the Jordanian government annexed the West Bank and, unlike other Arab regimes that accepted refugees, granted full Jordanian citizenship to the Palestinians. Palestinians became prominent in government, including as members of the cabinet. Between 1950 and the 1967 war, the Muslim Brotherhood was active and tolerated in both the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and Jordan proper. Muslim Brothers also took positions in Jordan's government and attained influence in a number of ministries, notably the ministries of justice and education.⁸⁸

More militant Islamist groups formed in Jordan and in the West Bank and Gaza during the 1950s to compete with the Muslim Brotherhood. Palestinian lawyer Takiy al-Din al-Nabhani founded the Islamic Liberation Party (ILP)—Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami—in Jerusalem in 1953. An avowedly political organization, the ILP's stated aim was to establish a unified caliphate for all Muslims in the world. The group was considered jihadist and believed that all countries, even those populated largely by Muslims, were *dar kufr*—a household of infidelity—because they did not implement Islamic principles and shari'a. Al-Nabhani's ideology was said to have influenced Sayyid Qutb and extremist groups in Egypt, Iraq, and Tunisia, and the group had many adherents among Central Asian Muslims. The ILP attempted to

⁸⁷ Mohammed Shadid, "The Muslim Brotherhood Movement in the West Bank and Gaza," *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 10, No. 2, April 1988, p. 662.

⁸⁸ Ayubi (1991), p. 95.

overthrow the Jordanian government in 1968 and a few years thereafter and has been involved in disturbances on university campuses and in price riots in Jordanian towns.⁸⁹ The ILP has been far more active of late outside the Middle East, most notably in the United Kingdom, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia. Operational control still rests, however, with a Middle East headquarters in Lebanon.⁹⁰

The formation of the PLO in 1964 and the responses to the war in 1967 served, at least initially, to weaken the Islamist movements in the West Bank and Gaza. The PLO's nationalist platform and active resistance to Israeli rule drew the support of a wide cross-section of Palestinian society. In contrast, the Muslim Brotherhood leadership's decision to avoid confrontation with the Israeli authorities and to concentrate on *da'wa* and social services weakened the group's political power. But the Islamist movement strengthened as the fortunes of the PLO waned. The PLO's expulsion from Jordan in 1970–1971 and from Lebanon in 1982 weakened the nationalist movement in the territories. In the mid-1970s, the branches in Gaza, the West Bank, and Jordan combined to form the Muslim Brotherhood Society in Jordan and Palestine.⁹¹ And the Brothers' mosque-building and recruiting activities began to pay off by the end of the 1970s as their influence grew substantially, especially in Palestinian universities.

It was out of disagreement over confrontation with Israel that younger, more militant Brothers formed the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) in 1980. Its leaders, Fathi Shiqaqi and Abd al-Aziz Awda, had been influenced by extremist ideologies while attending university in Egypt during the 1970s and saw the 1967 defeat as a failure of mainstream Islamism to declare jihad and enter into armed conflict against Israel. The founders had also been impressed by the success of the Iranian revolution in 1979, and Iran became a major supporter through Syria and Hezbollah in Lebanon—to which the group was exposed during the Israeli-imposed exile of over 400 Palestinian Islamists in Lebanon from December 1992 to December 1993. Islamic Jihad was the first homegrown Islamist Palestinian movement to place jihad against Israel at the center of its ideology. As with other jihadist groups, it argued that armed struggle and revolution is the path to creating an Islamic state and Islamizing society. The group began conducting strikes against Israeli soldiers in the mid-1980s, the most noteworthy of which was the Gate of Moors hand-grenade attack on an army graduating ceremony near the Western Wall in 1986.⁹²

⁸⁹ Ayubi (1991), pp. 97–98.

⁹⁰ Comments by Dr. Peter Mandaville, professor, Department of Public and International Affairs, George Mason University.

⁹¹ Abu-Amr (1994), pp. 10–14.

⁹² Abu-Amr (1994), pp. 93–96.

In the mid-1980s, the leadership of the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood made a strategic decision to join the resistance through military action. It was in this context that the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas, the acronym for Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya) burst onto the scene at the beginning of the first Palestinian *intifada* in 1987. Hamas was led by Sheikh Ahmed Yassin (formerly head of the Brotherhood's Political Bureau in Gaza) and other leaders of the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood.⁹³ Its military wing, Izz al-Din Qassim Brigades, was named after a leader of the 1936–1939 Arab revolt in Palestine. Its ultimate goal was to establish an Islamic state in all of Palestine (Israel as well as the West Bank and Gaza). Hamas has opposed the leadership of Yasir Arafat and the Palestine Liberation Organization, but has worked with them when deemed tactically beneficial. After the signing of the 1993 Oslo Accords, which established a Palestinian authority in the territories, there was great hope that the conflict was nearing a permanent resolution. That hope reached a grassroots level as Israelis and Palestinians initiated personal and business relationships and thousands of Palestinian workers crossed into Israel daily to work. Frustration began to mount on both sides toward the end of the decade, however, as the parties failed to meet agreed-upon deadlines and in light of terrorism by PIJ, Hamas, and radical nationalist groups as well as Israeli retaliation.

With the failure of a last-ditch summit at Camp David in August 2000, the Palestinians' frustration burst into widespread violence in September with what became known as the Al-Aqsa Intifada. The Al-Aqsa Mosque is a structure located across from the Dome of the Rock, revered as the third holiest site in Islam and the place where the Prophet Muhammad is believed to have ascended to heaven. Ariel Sharon's visit to the site on September 21, 2000, enraged the Palestinians. The visit is given as the reason or pretext, depending on one's views, for the outbreak of years of violence that has left over 850 Israelis and 2,400 Palestinians dead.⁹⁴ Many of those killed on both sides were civilians.

Among Palestinians in the territories and in Jordan and Lebanon, the intifada and the lack of any peace prospects have expanded the popularity of radical Islamic movements like Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Much of the popular support is based not on widespread Palestinian sympathy for the establishment of an Islamic state, but rather on the fact that Hamas—in addition to its militant activities—operates an efficient network of basic social services that rivals and often outperforms the Palestinian Authority. Moreover, while not the first to employ the tactic, Palestinian Islamist groups have popularized the notion of suicide attacks as a form of martyrdom. “Martyrdom-inclined” imams like Sheikh Yussuf al-Qaradawi, who claims a global following (based in part on his otherwise relatively moderate views), has issued fatwas

⁹³ Abu-Amr (1994), pp. 1–22; and Hroub (2000), pp. 29–36.

⁹⁴ Detailed statistics on fatalities can be found on the Web site of the Israeli human rights organization B'Tselem, at <http://www.btselem.org>. Numbers as of March 10, 2004.

supporting such operations from a theological standpoint and criticized a ruling by the Mufti of Saudi Arabia stating that the operations were suicide and strictly forbidden.⁹⁵

Israeli Arabs established a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood (called the Islamic Movement) in 1980 after the Iranian Revolution, which served as a model of activism for them. However, the experience of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria in 1982—when Syrian President Hafez al-Asad killed thousands in Hama during a Brotherhood-inspired uprising—served as a model for patience and restraint. The Israeli Islamic Movement thus began with *da'wa* and worked to methodically build its infrastructure. In the 1990s, however, it began supporting Hamas with money-laundering and anti-Israel incitement. It has also taken a more active role in terrorist activities since the start of the Al-Aqsa Intifada by providing operational support within Israel.⁹⁶

In Jordan, Islamist parties have always been part of the establishment and have done relatively well. The Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood competed in parliamentary elections in the 1950s and 1960s; when parliament was reinstated in 1989, the Brotherhood attained 30 percent of the seats, in addition to independent Islamists who won 10 seats. This was the highest percentage of seats ever gained by Islamists in Jordan or anywhere else in the region. In the presence of pluralism, limited as it may be, the Brotherhood has been challenged to develop organizations and practical programs that allow it to compete against multiple alternative party platforms.⁹⁷

Jordan's system can be termed a "soft autocracy" in that the government allows relative freedom of expression (except where the government, especially the Hashemite monarchy, is concerned), but the government does manipulate elections to encourage a parliament that will support its policies. The government can also be heavy-handed in dealing with dissent. After assuming their parliamentary seats in 1989, opposition groups began looking into reports of corruption in the Jordanian government—only in the cabinet, carefully avoiding implicating the king. An Islamist from the southern city of Ma'an, Leith Shubeilat, led the initiative. As an independent, however, Shubeilat became an easy target for the government, which arrested him and tried him in a military court on charges of planning to topple the government. The opposition's anticorruption efforts were crushed, although King Hussein later pardoned Shubeilat.⁹⁸

⁹⁵ Interestingly, many of these fatwas appear as justifications after the fact. For example, al-Qaradawi issued his fatwa allowing female suicide bombers after Wafa Idris blew herself up in Jerusalem on January 27, 2002. Later, he focused on how women could dress conservatively while carrying out suicide missions.

⁹⁶ Interview with former Israeli government official, Tel Aviv, June 2003.

⁹⁷ See Moaddel (2002), pp. 95–97.

⁹⁸ Interview with Dr. Fares Braizat, coordinator, Opinion Polling Unit, Center for Strategic Studies, University of Jordan, Amman, June 2003.

When political parties were legalized in 1992, the Brotherhood formed the Islamic Action Front (IAF) as a political front organization. Government changes in electoral laws served to undermine IAF power, however, and in the 1993 elections the IAF won fewer seats than in 1989. The purpose of this change in law was to garner a parliament that would be more pliable and open to the looming peace agreement with Israel in 1994. King Hussein's death in 1999 and Abdullah II's ascent to the throne brought a period of relative withdrawal from democratic reforms in the kingdom. In early 2001, the king dissolved the parliament, and elections that were to be held in November were postponed twice until June 2003.

Southern Jordan has been a continuing area of concern regarding radical Islamism. Ma'an and other towns in the region were important bases of support for the Hashemites in the early days of the state. Traditionally, the region has been a center of trade and smuggling with northern tribes in Saudi Arabia. More recently, economic reforms recommended by the International Monetary fund have led to widespread, sometimes violent protests.

The Landscape Along the Jordan River Since September 11

Palestinians responded to the September 11 attacks in a manner similar to that of their fellow Arabs. There seemed to be some satisfaction among Palestinians that the United States had been bloodied—as there was throughout the Arab world. However, the increasing exploitation of Palestinians' suffering by bin Laden and other transnational jihadists has caused some resentment. According to one Palestinian analyst, many Palestinians believe that bin Laden has no right to use their cause in his quest to “hijack” Islam. “Not in our name,” they say.⁹⁹

However, September 11 was a much lesser factor for Islamism among the Palestinians than were events closer to home. Unlike Islamists in other parts of the Arab world, Hamas and the PIJ offer an Islamic perspective on a struggle that is, at its core, a nationalist struggle. These organizations have tended to compromise on their stated aims to remain relevant to their constituencies; they have shown themselves to be nationalist organizations with Islamic ideology. Their prominence in the forefront of spectacular terrorist attacks has, however, gained these groups greater influence in Palestinian society.

At the same time, there has been a measure of Islamization of the Al-Aqsa Intifada; the name of the conflict is itself indicative of this. Secularist Fatah, the main component of the Palestine Liberation Organization, established the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade as its military arm in the intifada and, borrowing from the Islamist groups, employed suicide bombers. Secular nationalists began quoting from the Quran and used Islamic language in their communication with the Palestinian public. Despite

⁹⁹ Interview with Dr. Mahdi Abdel Hadi, director, Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs (PASSIA), Jerusalem, June 2003.

this—and despite the increased religious conservatism in Palestinian society, which mirrors the rest of the Arab world—there are no signs at this point that Wahhabi-based radicalism has played a role in this Islamic upsurge.¹⁰⁰

In late 2002, Jordanian security forces and opposition groups in Ma'an clashed, leaving at least six dead and scores arrested. Some were members of independent Islamist groups. The most extreme (and one of the smallest) of these was made up of followers of Sheikh Muhammad Shalabi, also known as Abu Sayyaf, said to be connected to the radical, Egyptian-rooted Al-Takfir wa al-Hijra.¹⁰¹

Notably, there has been an increase in subversive activity by Islamists in Israel since the beginning of the Al-Aqsa Intifada. Radicals have smuggled arms from Hezbollah in Lebanon and have conducted surveillance within Israel for both Hezbollah and the Palestinian groups. These Israeli-Arab Islamists have also assisted in hiding and transporting terrorists on suicide missions from the West Bank, and a few have even carried out attacks themselves. The number of terror cells discovered annually by Israeli authorities has gone from about four to six just before the intifada to about 30 in 2003, and the number of members in each cell has doubled to 10–12.¹⁰² It is possible that the Islamic movement in Israel has reached a decision-point similar to that of the Palestinian Muslim Brothers in the 1980s, when the latter decided to embark on a strategy of violent resistance. In recognition of this possibility, Israeli authorities arrested sixteen leaders of the Islamic Movement in May 2003 and charged them with conspiracy and money laundering, among other charges.¹⁰³

The “Ba’ath Belt”: Islamism Under Dictatorship in Iraq and Syria

Of the four regions discussed in this chapter, the “Ba’ath Belt” has presented the harshest climate for indigenous Islamist movements. While Iraqi and Syrian governments have provided substantial support to nonindigenous Islamist groups as a means of undermining foreign adversaries, they have harshly repressed their home-grown Islamists. Many of these indigenous groups were forced to operate underground or take up residence in more hospitable countries.

¹⁰⁰ Interview with Israeli government officials, Tel Aviv, June 2003.

¹⁰¹ Jillian Schwedler, “Occupied Maan, Jordan’s Closed Military Zone,” Middle East Report Online at <http://www.merip.org/mero/mero120302.html>, accessed August 19, 2004.

¹⁰² Interview with former Israeli government expert, Tel Aviv, June 2003.

¹⁰³ David Rudge, “Islamic Movement Leaders Remanded Again,” *The Jerusalem Post*, July 18, 2003. According to the article, the charges included conspiracy to commit a crime, contact with a foreign agent, performing a service for an illegal organization, membership in a terrorist organization, money laundering, grand larceny, and conspiracy to deliver information to the enemy.

Syria and Iraq have been linchpins in the history of the Arab and Muslim worlds. They were the homes of great Muslim dynasties after the Arab-Muslim conquest in the seventh century. The Abbasids in Baghdad created a major center of Islamic thought, which represents one of the great eras in Muslim history. This is important to understand when considering the prism through which many Arab Muslims view Iraq: as a pillar of the Arab and Muslim world.

Both Iraq and Syria experienced European colonialism after the allies defeated the Ottomans in World War I. The French gained a mandate in Syria and Lebanon; the British mandate included Iraq as well as Palestine and Jordan. In 1920, Kurds and Arabs, Muslims and Jews, Shi'ites and Sunnis joined together in an Iraqi revolt against British rule that lasted from June to October. The uprising helped to cement nationalism as a unifying theme for Iraqis of all religious and ethnic backgrounds.¹⁰⁴ From the 1920s to the 1950s, Iraqi civil society and culture blossomed under the British-installed Hashemite monarchy with the development of professional syndicates, political parties, and even new innovations in modern Arab poetry. This continued under a military regime that overthrew the Hashemites in 1958, but the rise to power of the Ba'ath in 1963 and 1968 and Saddam Hussein's ascent to the presidency in 1979 ended Iraqi civil society. Ba'athists also gained control in Syria in 1963, and a series of weak governments followed until Hafez al-Asad's palace coup in 1970, which brought him three decades of power.

Ba'athist ideology is based on a mixture of Marxist-socialist policies, pan-Arabism, and revolutionary foreign policy. Michel Aflaq, a Damascus schoolteacher, founded the movement with Salah Bitar in 1943 under the banner of Arab unity, freedom, and socialism. As applied in Iraq and Syria, Ba'athism is essentially "an amalgam of anti-imperialistic xenophobia, nostalgia for the ancient glory of the Arab empires, and a commitment to redistribution of wealth to benefit the poorer classes."¹⁰⁵ Ba'athism emphasizes secularism; the ideology acknowledges the centrality of Islam in Arab identity, but more as a part of the idealized Arab past than as a contemporary social or political notion.

In both countries, Ba'athist socioeconomic policies favoring the rural, lower-middle class (some recently urbanized) quickly antagonized the merchant and artisan classes. Syrian and Iraqi Islamist movements grew quickly in the 1960s in part because of their opposition to these policies. And, as elsewhere, they were well placed to exploit the perceived failures of their secular Arab regimes in the 1967 war.

The Syrian branch of the Brotherhood began to emerge in the 1930s and 1940s, and just as it had in other Arab countries, it participated heavily in politics and social works. Syria served as a temporary haven for Muslim Brothers from Egypt

¹⁰⁴ The 1920 revolt has also been used by Iraqi insurgents as a rallying cry against the American occupation following Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003.

¹⁰⁵ David E. Long and John A. Hearty, "Republic of Iraq," in Long and Reich, eds. (1986), p. 108.

fleeing Nasser in the mid-1950s, but the short-lived merger with Egypt from 1958 to 1961 brought Cairo's repression of the organization to Damascus. With the rise of the Ba'ath regime in 1963, the antagonistic relationship between the government and the Islamist movement was sealed. One of the key contributors to this relationship was the Syrian Brothers' strong reliance on the teachings of the Hanbali jurist Ibn Taymiyya on the one hand, and Asad's status as a minority Alawi on the other. The writings of Ibn Taymiyya, himself a Syrian, contained vicious attacks on "Nusairis" (Alawis), whom he described as "more infidel than Jews and Christians, indeed more infidel than many polytheists."¹⁰⁶

The Brotherhood seriously challenged the Syrian establishment in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. The Syrian Brothers defined their platform by playing to the disgruntlement of landowner merchants and artisans under Ba'ath socialist policies as well as the disproportionately Alawi orientation of the regime. Despite a decidedly "Islamic socialist" economic platform during the era of parliamentary politics in the 1950s, the Brotherhood deemphasized leftist vocabulary in the 1960s to woo the "newly dispossessed" merchant class and by 1980 was openly criticizing socialist policies. The merchants joined with the Brothers in disturbances and uprisings in the major Syrian cities. The Syrian Brothers emphasized the minority position of the ruling Alawis and offered themselves as the majority Sunni alternative.¹⁰⁷

Thus, despite early participation in parliamentary politics, the movement turned to revolutionary violence during the 1960s and 1970s after a split in the group. The violence culminated in a series of assassinations of secularist leaders and bloody attacks on military barracks and headquarters in Aleppo and Hama in the early 1980s. Fearing a severe threat to his authority, Asad unleashed the army in 1982 against an uprising in the city of Hama and, in an assault that involved tanks and artillery, the army massacred some 20,000 people. Subsequently, the government successfully co-opted and isolated Islamists, rendering them relatively ineffectual. Initiatives to develop "official Islam" included mosque construction campaigns, development of shari'a centers and Asad Institutes for the recitation of the Quran, and the president's well-publicized attendance at Friday prayers. The Asad regime was also able to vilify the Islamists because of their association with the Iraqi and Jordanian governments—Asad opponents that had provided safe haven and other support to Syrian Islamists at various times.¹⁰⁸

Damascus has served as a center of organizational and operational activities for a number of extremist Islamist and secular groups that work against Syria's foes, especially Israel. Both Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad maintained operational head-

¹⁰⁶ Ayubi (1991), p. 88.

¹⁰⁷ Ghada Hashem Talhami, "Syria: Islam, Arab Nationalism, and the Military," *Middle East Policy*, Vol. VIII, No. 4, December 2001, pp. 110–127; and Moaddel (2002), pp. 88–89.

¹⁰⁸ Talhami, op. cit., p. 125.

quarters in Damascus beginning as early as 1988. Syria's occupation of neighboring Lebanon and cooperation with the Islamic Republic of Iran has afforded it influence over proxy groups in Lebanon, particularly Hezbollah. Syria has nurtured cooperation among all these groups; Iran's financial and material support for Hezbollah in Lebanon and the PIJ in the West Bank and Gaza has flowed through Damascus.¹⁰⁹

The Shi'ite fundamentalist group Hezbollah was established in Lebanon (with Syrian and Iranian encouragement) in 1982 during the Israeli incursion into southern Lebanon; its prime focus was resistance to the Israeli occupation. It has very close ties with, and receives direction from, the revolutionary government in Iran. Syria also supports Hezbollah through Syria's military occupation of the central and eastern parts of the country. Hezbollah's refusal to cooperate with Lebanon's Christians, Israel, or the United States attracted young radicals from the Shi'ite poor who had belonged to Amal, a more secular political group in the Lebanese Shi'ite community. The organization made its presence on the international scene known when it abducted Western hostages and blew up a U.S. barracks in Lebanon in 1983, killing 241 U.S. Marines. Its nearly two decades of armed attacks is credited with driving Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000, and it continues to harass Israel, especially in the Sheba'a Farms area.¹¹⁰

Hezbollah presents a unique combination of peaceful participation in Lebanese parliamentary politics, administration of social welfare programs at the grassroots level, and violent confrontation with internal and external powers, especially Israel. It is tolerant of different beliefs and is willing to work with other sects within the Lebanese milieu. In Lebanese parliamentary elections, however, Hezbollah has won fewer than half the seats allotted to the Shi'ite community.¹¹¹

The death of Syria's Hafez al-Asad and the rise of his son Bashar in July 2000 did not appreciably change Syrian support for radical Islamist movements in Lebanon and among the Palestinians, nor did it provide much of an opening for indigenous opposition Islamist groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood. A "Damascus Spring" followed Bashar's ascension to the presidency, during which a movement to develop a civil society took root with the expectation that the young Asad would initiate a series of liberalizing political reforms. Some Syrian Muslim Brothers living in exile were invited to return. However, Bashar suppressed the civil society movement and arrested its leaders after six months. It is possible that the "old guard" in the Syrian power structure—officials and advisors who were beholden to Hafez

¹⁰⁹ See Matthew A. Levitt, "Sponsoring Terrorism: Syria and Islamic Jihad," *Middle East Intelligence Bulletin*, Vol. 4, No. 11–12, November–December 2002, at http://www.meib.org/articles/0211_s1.htm.

¹¹⁰ Israeli troops remain on this small strip of land on the Israeli-Lebanese border. Hezbollah claims it is Lebanese territory (and thus Israel has not fully withdrawn), while the United Nations certifies that Sheba'a is Syrian territory and that Israel has fully withdrawn from Lebanese territory.

¹¹¹ Vickie Langohr, "An Exit from Arab Autocracy," *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 13, No. 3, July 2002, p. 119.

al-Asad—had made it difficult for Bashar to institute reforms even if, as many believed, he wanted to do so.

In Iraq, a number of Sunni and Shi'ite Islamist movements sprouted before and during the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein. There were several major obstacles to the spread of these movements, including harsh government repression, strong nationalist and secularist tendencies, and the popularity of moderate Islam and less politically oriented forms of Sunnism (Sufi orders) and Shi'ism (the Hawza clerics of Najaf). However, all these movements showed signs of revival after Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003. Among the most important developments was the Hawza clerics' adoption of strong political positions on Iraqi elections and the future government—a topic to which we return below.

Among Sunnis, the most notable Islamist movement was the Muslim Brotherhood. The Muslim Brotherhood arose in Iraq in the mid- to late 1940s when the Egyptian Brothers flooded Iraq with literature and sent activists to spread the word; a Society of the Muslim Brothers was founded in 1951. As the society became stronger, government harassment grew, until the society was banned in 1954. After the 1958 revolution, the Brotherhood was able to establish a political party (the Islamic Party) dedicated to establishing an Islamic state in Iraq, but political activity was severely inhibited after the Ba'ath takeover in 1963. The Brotherhood then focused on organization and recruitment and on influencing the professional and labor unions. But a new Ba'athist coup in 1968 led to severe persecution and mass exile of Islamist activists. To ensure that activists remaining in Iraq did not use mosques as platforms for fundamentalism, the Ba'athist regime ordered mosques to remain closed except for one hour before and after prayers. Following the 1991 Gulf War, exiles in London revived the Islamic Party.¹¹²

It was often reported in the Western press that Hussein relied on people from the predominantly Sunni areas to the north and west of Baghdad to populate his regime. This gave the incorrect impression that people in these areas were predisposed to the regime because they were Sunni. It should be remembered that the regime was secular. The large representation of Sunnis in the regime was more a function of tribal and family ties than of religion. For example, Saddam Hussein and Hasan al-Bakr (the general who preceded Saddam as Ba'athist president) both came from Tikrit. Two other towns in Sunni-populated areas, nearby Saara' and Anah near the Syrian border, also provided a disproportionate number of members of the Ba'athist leadership structure.¹¹³ The fact that these men and women were Sunni is relatively inconsequential. One could also point out that Iraq's Kurds were predominantly Sunni as well; their conflict with the regime was ethnic in nature, not religious.

¹¹² See Basim al-Azami, "The Muslim Brotherhood: Genesis and Development," in Abdul-Jabar (2002), pp. 162–176; and Syed Saleem Shahzad, "The Saddam Branch of Islam," *Asia Times*, www.atimes.com.

¹¹³ Long and Hearty, *op. cit.*, p. 108.

Though they are mainly secular or Sunni traditionalist (including Sufi), Iraqi Kurds have formed several small Islamist movements. The Kurdistan Islamic Union professes nonviolence and supports social services through the Islamic Kurdish League. Several conservative and extremist groups of Wahhabis/Salafis took root in northeastern Iraq during the late 1980s and early 1990s. These included the Islamic Movement of Iraqi Kurdistan (IMIK) and the more radical Kurdish Hamas and Tawhid. After the 1991 Gulf War and the establishment of a Kurdish safe haven in the north (protected by the U.S.-patrolled northern “no-fly zone”), an agreement with the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) allowed the IMIK to establish a tiny enclave near the Iranian border in the town of Halabja.¹¹⁴ Later, the IMIK joined the PUK in the Kurdish regional government and took control of the Ministry of Endowment and Religious Affairs and the Ministry of Justice. In the local elections of spring 2001, the IMIK garnered 20 percent of the vote in areas controlled by Kurdish secularists, and 50 percent in the Halabja area.

Kurdish Hamas and Tawhid, conversely, have fought battles in their declared jihad against the PUK and other secular forces and have been aided by Afghan Arabs who came to the area, especially since the October 2001 U.S. attack on the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. Hamas and Tawhid merged to form Jund al-Islam (Soldiers of Islam) in September 2001 and later renamed themselves Ansar al-Islam (Partisans of Islam). Their control of Halabja and the surrounding area was characterized by enforcement of a strict, Taliban-like Islamic code on its residents and harassment or expulsion of Sufis and other “heretical” sects. Moreover, Saudi-financed mosques preaching Wahhabism were built in Halabja and elsewhere in Iraqi Kurdistan, including a large multistory mosque in Irbil that could be seen from miles away.¹¹⁵

Among Iraqi Islamist groups, Shi’ite movements have been the most vociferous in their antagonism toward the Ba’athist regime. An early player in antiregime activities was Hizb al-Da’wa al-Islamiyya, or Islamic Call Party, which was established at the end of the 1950s. Al-Da’wa’s ideology foresaw establishment of a state based on Islamic law, but the clergy’s role in that state would not include governance; rather, it would be limited to ensuring the conformity of legislation to shari’a. This left open the possibility of cooperation with non-Shi’ite parties, and the organization did indeed have some Sunni members. The inclusive ideology also entailed a certain amount of factionalism within the group. There were three branches: one in Tehran (the most pro-Iranian and sympathetic to clerical governance), one in Great Britain

¹¹⁴ Halabja was the site of the infamous 1988 gas attack against the Kurds by the Saddam regime that killed approximately 5,000 civilians.

¹¹⁵ See Michael Rubin, “The Islamist Threat in Iraqi Kurdistan,” *Middle East Intelligence Bulletin*, Vol. 3, No. 12, December 2001, at http://www.meib.org/articles/0112_ir1.htm; and “Radical Islam in Iraqi Kurdistan: The Mouse That Roared?” International Crisis Group, ICG Middle East Briefing, February 7, 2003, <http://www.crisisweb.org>.

(the most pragmatic and open to contacts with secularists and the West), and a secretive one in Iraq itself.¹¹⁶

Despite some involvement in arms smuggling, assassinations of low-ranking Ba'athists, and sabotage in the mid-1970s, the movement did not embrace a truly violent strategy until the Iranian Revolution in 1979. Following this event, al-Da'wa embarked on a rash of assassinations and bombings in Iraq and against Iraqi and Western interests outside Iraq. Its operatives attempted to assassinate Saddam several times, and nearly succeeded in killing his son Uday in 1996. Its attack on the Iraqi embassy in Beirut in 1981, which killed 27 people, was said to have been the first major suicide bombing in modern times. In addition, al-Da'wa appeared to have received encouragement and material support from Iranian intelligence and, in the context of Western support of Iraq during its destructive eight-year conflict with Iran, bombed the U.S. and French embassies in Kuwait in 1983 and attempted to assassinate the Emir of Kuwait in 1985.¹¹⁷

A leading member of al-Da'wa, Ayatollah Mohammed Baqir al-Hakim, founded the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) in Tehran in 1982. Unlike al-Da'wa, SCIRI endorsed the concept of clerical control of government and openly aligned itself with Iran's clerical establishment. Despite some tensions between SCIRI and al-Da'wa, the organizations had similar roots and often cooperated in the political and military spheres.¹¹⁸ Iran supported SCIRI heavily with safe haven, funding, and military equipment. In Iran, SCIRI formed a 10,000-man "Badr Brigade" and fought with the Iranians against Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War of 1980–1988. Recruits were largely Iraqi Shi'ite refugees who had been part of Saddam's mass deportation of tens of thousands of Shi'ites to Iran in 1980.

In contrast, many Iraqi Shi'ites fought with Saddam Hussein during this war. The majority of conscripts in the Iraqi army were Shi'ites, yet Hussein retained the loyalty of the army in his war against predominantly Shi'ite Iran. Nationalism was a unifying factor. Despite this apparent "rallying around the flag," the continued government repression of the Shi'ites in the south promoted a seething hatred of the regime that erupted into an intifada after Iraq's defeat in the 1991 Gulf War. The Iraqi army eventually put down the uprising, which resulted in the deaths of thousands of Shi'ites as well as hundreds of Ba'athists in the south. In an effort to replace Ba'athist leaders, Saddam revived tribalism whereby allied tribal sheikhs became the executors of government policy and control in rural areas.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁶ Mahan Abedin, "Dossier: Hezb al-Daawa al-Islamiyya," *Middle East Intelligence Bulletin*, Vol. 5, No. 6, June 2003, at http://www.meib.org/articles/0306_iraqd.htm.

¹¹⁷ Abedin, op. cit.

¹¹⁸ Abedin, op. cit.

¹¹⁹ Eric Davis, "Taking Democracy Seriously in Iraq," Foreign Policy Research Institute E-Notes, March 27, 2003.

After the 1991 Gulf War and the growing international isolation of Iraq, Hussein's statements and domestic activities increasingly adopted an Islamic tone as a means of propping up his regime. He began a mosque-building campaign and established an Islamic center of higher learning at Saddam University, where the curriculum focused on Sunni theology (although he prohibited any reference to works of the Muslim Brotherhood). Hussein closed dance clubs, bars, and casinos and banned prostitution. The ubiquitous portraits of the Iraqi leader began to include those of him praying.¹²⁰

The Landscape of the "Ba'ath Belt" Since September 11

Very little changed in terms of political Islam in the Ba'ath Belt between the September 11 attacks and the 2003 Iraq war.

Saddam Hussein accelerated his Islamic rhetoric to garner support among Iraqis as well as Muslims outside Iraq when the United States increased pressure on Iraq to declare its weapons of mass destruction in mid- to late 2002. In the months before Operation Iraqi Freedom, he attempted to frame the U.S. pressure against Iraq in terms of an assault on Islam. Hoping to block Arab support of U.S. actions against Iraq, the regime gathered a group of 600 imams in Kirkuk in December 2002 to issue a fatwa calling on all Muslims to join in a jihad against the United States if it invaded. Calling President Bush the "pharaoh of this age," the attendees also confirmed Saddam Hussein as an Islamic leader. One government imam in Baghdad even commented that "the Ba'ath Party has become an Islamic party."¹²¹ But it was Saddam's defiance of the United States, not his belated piety, that earned him statements of Arab support in the lead-up to the U.S.-British invasion of Iraq in March 2003.

September 11: A Catalytic Event in the Arab Middle East?

The attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, certainly had a profound effect on the government and people of the United States. However, its impact on the regimes and peoples of the Middle East seemed somewhat less significant, especially in comparison with the potential impact of the 2003 Iraq war, a topic we explore below.

When the World Trade Center and the north face of the Pentagon collapsed on televisions across the Arab world, the outward reaction on "the Arab street" seemed

¹²⁰ See Syed Saleem Shahzad, "The Saddam Branch of Islam," and "A 'Third Force' Awaits US in Iraq," *Asia Times*, www.atimes.com.

¹²¹ Sheikh Mustafa Abbas Zaidi, quoted in Anthony Shadid, "Iraq's Rising Forces of Faith Create Fears for Future," *The Washington Post*, March 15, 2003, p. A14. See also Peter Baker, "Iraqi Preachers Press Holy War," *The Washington Post*, December 24, 2002, p. A10.

to be one of satisfaction, even glee. Americans naturally had a visceral reaction to scenes of celebration, especially in ostensibly friendly Arab states, over an event that tore at the very soul of the nation. Despite condemnations by most Arab governments, the American public was horrified to see expressions of support for Osama bin Laden from average citizens in the capitals of these same countries. Angered by such sentiments and cognizant of the fact that the perpetrators had carried out the attack in the name of Islam, many people in the United States looked for some kind of mea culpa from Muslim religious leaders. For most Americans, Islam was a topic of interest for the first time, and they took the claims of the terrorists at face value. They were hard-pressed to discriminate between the ideologues who claimed to speak in the name of Islam and the vast majority of more moderate Muslims.

On the one hand, many Arabs found some satisfaction in the idea that America's nose had been bloodied and that the United States had finally felt some of the pain they perceived to be so pervasive in the Middle East. On the other hand, most Arabs, Islamist and otherwise, were horrified by the sheer destruction, the killing of so many innocents, and the sadism of the perpetrators. So condemnation of the attacks was common, but it was conditional. The public Arab reaction to the attacks usually included some combination of the following:

- Satisfaction that the United States tasted what it allegedly had dished out to the Arab world (and the Third World countries generally) for years
- Condemnation of the attacks as criminal and anti-Islamic, but a natural result of U.S. foreign policy, which was primarily to blame for the attacks
- Spreading of conspiracy theories that asserted the attacks were the work of American domestic extremists, the U.S. government, or Israel's Mossad intelligence service
- Rejection of claims that the perpetrators were Arab or Muslim, based on the argument that Muslims would not commit mass murder or that the terrorist operation was too complex to have been carried out by some of their own.

These arguments were carried prominently in government statements, newspaper editorials, television news analyses, and "man-in-the-street" interviews throughout the Middle East. Conspiracy theories remained in vogue well after the attacks. In November 2002, more than a year later, Saudi Interior Minister Prince Nayef bin Abdul Aziz claimed in an interview that "the Zionists" were behind the September 11 attacks, and that the terrorist organizations have relationships with Israeli intelligence.¹²²

¹²² Interview with Kuwait's *Al-Siyasa* newspaper, reprinted in "In Comprehensive Interviews on the Current Issues: Prince Naif Ibn Abdul Aziz," *Ain al-Yaqeen* (Saudi weekly online news magazine), November 29, 2002, at <http://www.ain-al-yaqeen.com/issues/20021129/feat6en.htm>.

The general Arab response to September 11 emphasized external sources of the Arab world's woes and focused on a perception that Islam was under pressure, even under attack. Whether or not this perception is correct, it fed what could be called a "defensive crouch." As one Arab observer stated simply, "The basic instinct of the people is to protect their religion."¹²³ In this context, statements emanating from the United States, such as President Bush's comment that the West was on a "crusade"—a word loaded with negative historical connotations in the Arab world—against terrorism, were blown out of proportion. Evangelist Jerry Falwell's comment soon after the attacks that the Prophet Muhammad was a "terrorist," as well as other anti-Islamic statements from leaders of the Christian right, stoked a great deal of anger in the Arab world. In response, Arab leaders undertook initiatives to portray the "right" Islam to the West.

It is far from clear what effect the terrorist attacks of September 11 had on the membership of radical fundamentalist groups. We know that the United States and its allies rather severely disrupted Al Qaeda's operations and that its leadership was constantly on the run after the ouster of the Taliban from Afghanistan. As a practical matter, the group should have been facing difficulties absorbing new recruits. If Egypt's experience served as a model, the destructiveness of the attacks could have had the opposite effect than the one intended by the perpetrators—that of diminishing the utility of revolutionary Islamist violence as a solution to the region's ills. This is not to say that the pool of potential recruits to extremist Islamist ideologies has dried up, or that the desire to do violence to U.S. interests has disappeared. Hundreds of Arabs from Egypt, Yemen, Syria, Lebanon, and the Palestinian territories were said to have mobilized to fight coalition forces in Iraq.

The terrorist attacks of September 11 did not have an appreciable effect on processes of democratization or liberalization in the Arab Middle East. Some movement occurred, but not always in the right direction. Since the measurements used in the UNDP report were made, some states in the Middle East have made progress toward improving their deficits, whereas others have remained steady or even deteriorated. For example, Qatar abolished its Ministry of Information, allowed women to vote and drive, and held elections for the first time. Jordan twice postponed elections (finally held in June 2003) and restricted the press and professional syndicates dominated by Islamists. Islamists in many countries remained the best-organized, largest opposition groups.

¹²³ Interview with Dr. Ahmed Bishara, Secretary-General, Kuwait National Democratic Movement, June 2003.

Islamism in the Middle East After Operation Iraqi Freedom

In contrast with the attacks of September 11, the act of wresting Iraq from Hussein's grip seemed likely to constitute a "catalytic event" that would influence the course of political Islam in the Middle East. Many likened the Iraq war to the Arab defeat in 1967 in terms of the effect on the Arab psyche; at least one Arab analyst termed it an "earthquake" and a "shock" to the region.¹²⁴ However, it is unclear whether efforts to rebuild and restructure Iraq will bring about positive change (especially if the Iraq effort succeeds) or create in Arab minds yet another Arab defeat upon which fundamentalist and radical Islamist groups can strengthen their political influence and recruiting activities. Even if failure in Iraq did nothing more than buttress the status quo in the Middle East, one could argue that the long-term prospects for the political, economic, and social development of the region would remain dismal and would feed further radicalization.

We have now examined the conditions, processes, and catalytic events influencing political Islam in the Middle East and in four states or subregions. We have also provided an assessment of the effects of the terrorist attacks of September 11 in those areas. Our remaining task is to outline the potential ramifications of Operation Iraqi Freedom on the region and to provide recommendations for U.S. policy.

Islamism Blossoms in Post-Saddam Iraq

A critically important observation about Iraqi society is that it has essentially secular leanings and is characterized by diversity and a strong sense of nationalism. Even many among the majority Shi'a are secular, despite the impression one might have from the torrent of Western media reports about the postwar outpouring of religiosity and the political aspirations of some vocal Shi'ite organizations. In addition, it is important to note again that civil society in Iraq has not existed since the 1960s. Efforts to build an alternative, pluralistic political system must therefore start from scratch.

The majority Shi'ite community in Iraq certainly was the first to spread its wings after the war. Following the liberation of southern Iraq where most Iraqi Shi'ites live, thousands of Shi'ites participated in a traditional pilgrimage to Karbala to mark the end of 40 days of mourning for the Prophet Muhammad's grandson Hussein some 1,300 years ago. This pilgrimage had been prohibited under Saddam Hussein's regime. The long processions from cities as far away as Baghdad and Basra constituted an expression of religious freedom unrealized for decades.

Shi'ite clerics also began flexing their political muscles as many Shi'ites saw an opportunity in post-Saddam Iraq to dominate Iraqi politics as the majority bloc. The

¹²⁴ Dr. Shafeeq Ghabra, president, American University of Kuwait, "War Reconstruction, and the Arab World," seminar at the Middle East Institute, Washington, D.C., May 21, 2003.

growing influence of the clerics was based not on the strength of their doctrinal message but on their organizational prowess and the speed with which they took over security in neighborhoods, acted to restore basic services, and served as a de facto authority where none existed. However, these clerics and their followers did not present a unified front. Four main Shi'ite groups were prevalent after the war, all of which had originated earlier. Arguably the most influential of these in Iraqi society were the clerics of the Hawza, a group that constituted the supreme religious authority for Iraqi Shi'ites. The most senior of these leaders, the reclusive Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, had issued statements soon after the war opposing involvement of clerics in politics. This apolitical stance seemed to change in dramatic fashion when he began to express defiance of U.S. plans to arrange an interim Iraqi government. Because of his influence as the preeminent spiritual guide of Iraq's Shi'ites, this defiance effectively derailed U.S. plans for political transition and brought about more active UN participation in developing a transitional and electoral framework.

The young Moqtada al-Sadr, son of the revered Grand Ayatollah Mohammed Sadr (executed by Saddam in 1999), may be the most militantly anti-U.S. cleric among the Shi'ites. Having limited his supporters to largely peaceful protests for nearly a year, his Mahdi Army (a militia numbering from 3,000 to 10,000 men) began battling U.S. troops for control of parts of Baghdad and cities in the Shi'ite south in April 2004 after his *Al-Hawza* newspaper was closed for incitement. The fighting coincided with extensive violence in Sunni-populated Fallujah west of Baghdad, and expressions of moral and material support for the combatants from both Sunni and Shi'ite communities raised the specter of Iraqi nationalism turning anti-American. How this would play out was not yet clear at the time of writing.

The two remaining Shi'ite groups are SCIRI and al-Da'wa. Both SCIRI's Abdel Aziz al-Hakim (brother of SCIRI leader Mohammed Bakir al-Hakim, who was assassinated in a massive car bomb explosion in Najaf in late August 2003) and al-Da'wa's Ibrahim Jafari joined the Iraqi Governing Council, the U.S.-appointed body established in July 2003, and participated in the nine-member, rotating presidency.

One outcome of newfound freedom in the south was the potential for Najaf to rival or even replace the Iranian holy city of Qom as the center of Shi'ite learning and scholarship. As the location of the tomb of Ali, the Prophet Muhammad's son-in-law and patriarch of Shi'ism, Najaf is one of the most revered sites in Shi'a Islam. Iran's Ayatollah Khomeini spent considerable time there in the 1960s, during which it was the leading center of Shi'ite political activity in the region. Saddam Hussein put an end to this activity and severely isolated and repressed Najaf's clerics. With the establishment of the Islamic Republic in Iran, Qom became the spiritual center of Shi'ism and for 30 years pressed Iranian interpretations, including political leadership of the clerics. The reestablishment of Najaf as a Shi'ite center could offer a more moderate interpretation of the faith, especially with regard to the relationship of clergy and state and the support of militant groups like Hezbollah. According to

Grand Ayatollah Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah, the preeminent Shi'ite religious authority in Lebanon, "If there is freedom in Iraq, many would go to Najaf. Qom would be lessened as a place of scholarship."¹²⁵ This could have positive implications for U.S. interests in the region.

Among Sunnis, there have been signs of awakening Islamism as well. After the war, the Iraqi Islamic Party was reestablished after being banned under Saddam. A political organ of the Muslim Brotherhood, its platform called for the establishment of Islamic law through peaceful means and it seemed open to democracy.¹²⁶ Its secretary-general, Mohsen Abdul-Hamid, also participated in the Governing Council. It is unclear how much grassroots support the Muslim Brotherhood has in Iraq.¹²⁷

Clearly, Iran and Saudi Arabia are expected to jockey for influence among Islamists in Iraq in order to safeguard or advance their own interests. Using the Karbala pilgrimage as cover, Iran is said to have infiltrated scores of agents into the south after the war to support pro-Iranian Shi'ite factions.¹²⁸ In addition, there has been evidence of Saudi efforts to promote Wahhabism among Sunnis in the north. Saudi involvement in reconstruction efforts in Sunni areas could, as elsewhere, serve as a vehicle for Wahhabi radicalization. Wahhabism existed underground during Saddam's rule, and mosques that had secretly adhered to this form of Sunnism began to show their true colors after the war.¹²⁹

Despite the vocal opposition from some Iraqi Islamists to the U.S. presence in Iraq and calls for establishing an "Islamic state," there are positive signs that mainstream Islamist movements are amenable to pluralism and democratic government. Major Shi'ite and Sunni groups were prominently represented on the Governing Council (eight of the 25 members are Islamists). They have worked together under U.S. auspices to create a government and to prepare the ground for a new constitution. Noah Feldman, formerly a senior advisor on constitutional law to the U.S. authority in Baghdad, contends that the leaders of these movements should be considered "Islamic democrats" because they have agreed in principle to some form of democracy by virtue of their participation in and leadership of the Governing Council. Even the Iranian-backed SCIRI seems not to be advocating shari'a as the only

¹²⁵ Azadeh Moaveni, "Fall of Hussein Could Lead to a Shift in Center, Focus of Shiite Muslims," *Los Angeles Times*, April 17, 2003.

¹²⁶ David Rohde, "Free of Hussein's Rule, Sunnis in North Flaunt a Long-Hidden Piety," *The New York Times*, nytimes.com, April 23, 2003, <http://www.nytimes.com/2003/04/23/international/worldspecial/23RELI.html>.

¹²⁷ David Smock, "Religious Politics in Iraq," United States Institute of Peace Newsbyte, May 27, 2003.

¹²⁸ Douglas Jehl, "Iran Is Said to Send Agents into Southern Iraq," *The New York Times*, nytimes.com, April 23, 2003, <http://www.nytimes.com/2003/04/23/international/worldspecial/23IRAN.html>.

¹²⁹ See "Saddam's Unholy Allies," *Newsweek*, Vol. 121, No. 24; and Mohamad Bazzi, "Anti-Western Beliefs Find Following in Postwar Iraq," *Concord Monitor Online*, July 12, 2003, at http://www.cmonitor.com/stories/community/news2003/wahhabi071203_2003.shtml, last accessed August 2003.

source of law and is playing down its emphasis on clerical rule.¹³⁰ The interim constitution, signed on March 8, 2004, and designed as a “basic law” that could provide a bridge to an elected government, is a positive example of the ability of disparate Iraqi ethnic and religious groups to forge the compromises necessary to a working democracy. Most important, the positions of prominent Shi’ite groups—notably those of Sistani—seem to accommodate the notions of pluralism and of religious authorities taking an advisory role in government. Their model of an “Islamic state” is definitely *not* inspired by Khomeini’s Iranian-style theocracy, where the religious authority have final say on legislative issues.

Islamism in the Region After Operation Iraqi Freedom

In the weeks leading up to the commencement of hostilities in Iraq, anti-American protests reached a fever pitch in the Arab world. As expected, radical Islamists already tending toward criticism of U.S. policies and the modernity that Western culture represents decried the looming attack on Iraq as an attack on all Muslims. In contrast, more moderate Islamists, as well as establishment ulama in several countries (often under pressure from their governments), cautioned against viewing the U.S. policy on Iraq as a “clash of civilizations” between Christianity and Islam. Moderates feared a backlash among the younger generation that would swell the ranks of radical and terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda. These moderates, and even some nominally pro-American intellectuals in the region, expressed a fear that, although the United States had been relatively immune from charges of colonialism because of its lack of a colonialist history in the Middle East, it was about to create a colonialist portfolio for itself in Iraq. Many Arabs were convinced that the primary impetus for the U.S. attack in Iraq was oil and that the United States hoped to exploit Iraqi resources for its own hegemonic ends.

The coverage of the Iraq war by Al-Jazeera, Abu Dhabi TV, and other Arab news organizations reflected prevailing sentiment in the region but also fostered that sentiment. The coverage in the Arab world was quite different in emphasis from that of Western news outlets. As CNN, by means of reporters imbedded with frontline forces, focused on the progress of U.S. and British forces, the Arab media aired extensive footage of injured or dead Iraqi civilians—often women and children—with horrific wounds. A second focus of Arab media was Iraq’s “heroic resistance” and then its sudden collapse, accompanied by scenes of blindfolded, handcuffed Iraqi soldiers. These scenes evoked the deepest of emotions—the continued suffering and helplessness of Arabs in the face of a Western onslaught.

In the short-to-medium term, and as long as American forces occupy Iraq, it will be very difficult to convince Arabs that the United States is not interested in

¹³⁰ Noah Feldman, “Constitutional Democracy and Islam? A Blueprint,” speech at Brownbag Public Policy Forum on Democracy in the Middle East, The New America Foundation, July 22, 2003.

colonizing the country for its own interests. Islamists in the Arab world continue to use this sentiment to maintain political influence and to gain recruits. However, in the longer term, as one Arab analyst commented, the whole debate “will be settled by Iraqi public opinion.”¹³¹

The general Arab reaction in the war’s aftermath differed fundamentally from the post–September 11 response. Whereas the response to September 11 was to emphasize perceived external threats, the rapid defeat of Saddam’s regime has turned many in the Arab world inward. There are signs of a profound debate about what is wrong in Arab societies, and Islamists naturally are joining this debate.

In terms of the effect on the Arab world, one of the most important developments in Iraq could be the process of writing a permanent Iraqi constitution. All eyes will be on the ensuing debate in Iraqi society over the relationship between religion and state (and the role of Islamic law), the protection of minorities, women’s rights, and how to enshrine basic freedoms.¹³² The debate could be just as important as the outcome itself. As the debate unfolds, citizens in other Arab countries will undoubtedly be questioning and making comparisons with their own political systems.

If the United States succeeds in helping Iraqis create the conditions for pluralistic democracy, Iraq could become a center of political thought unrivaled in the Arab world and even a center of religious learning and scholarship for both Sunni and Shi’a. With freedom of expression guaranteed, Baghdad could turn into a premier destination for Arab liberals, modernists, and even fundamentalists who could engage in fruitful exchanges of ideas. Moreover, a free environment in Iraq would encourage its development as a center of free media that would eclipse others. A central tenet that would differentiate Iraqi media from other Arab mass media would be the ability to criticize its own government.

In his speech on a broad Middle East democracy initiative in November 2003, President Bush called upon Egypt to lead Arab nations toward greater freedoms, proclaiming that “the great and proud nation of Egypt has shown the way toward peace in the Middle East, and now should show the way toward democracy in the Middle East.” But apart from minimal reforms designed to placate the United States, Egypt’s Mubarak government seemed unlikely to initiate serious efforts to democratize or liberalize on its own. There has been some minor relaxation of government controls on speech, and a state-sanctioned human rights commission has been formed. But state emergency laws remain in effect, and the regime continues to deal harshly with its critics. Bureaucracy and corruption remain entrenched, and the tendency for self-preservation is strong. On the other hand, many observers have asked: Might Mubarak—from a position of internal strength and with the support of the United

¹³¹ Interview with Dr. Mustafa Hamarneh, director, Center for Strategic Studies, University of Jordan, June 2003.

¹³² Interview with Dr. Mohamed Kamal, professor of Political Science, Cairo University, June 2003.

States—begin the process of serious liberalization and democratization? And might his son Gamal—seen by many as more reform-minded than his father—continue this process to its desired conclusion? Such a process would take many years. At the time of writing, however, it is unclear whether Mubarak aspires to be an Egyptian Gorbachev and whether Gamal, should he succeed his father, would find support among Egypt's elites to move reforms forward.¹³³

In this environment, fundamentalists in the Muslim Brotherhood would continue to suffer harassment and arrest, but their perseverance, organizational skills, and flexibility would allow them to increase their membership. More radical fundamentalists like al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya have foresworn violence precisely because they see that the Muslim Brotherhood recipe works. The losers of the status quo would be the liberals and moderate Islamists, who are squeezed between the government's control of public speech and the fundamentalists' ability to exploit the mosque.

The empowerment of Iraq's majority Shi'ite community could have significant effects upon sister communities in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and other Gulf countries. Soon after the liberation of southern Iraq, Saudi Shi'ite leaders offered a petition to Crown Prince Abdullah seeking equal political and religious rights in a country where the Wahhabi-inspired educational curriculum calls Shi'ites "infidels." There are signals that the Saudis would be open to naming the first Shi'ite to the cabinet in coming months. And the leading imam in the kingdom, Sheikh Abdul Aziz bin Abdullah al-Sheikh, has declared that accusing other Muslims of disbelief is not permitted under Islam. These could be positive signs for the kingdom, where religious freedom—even for Sunnis—has been stifled in favor of strict Wahhabism. But it is not clear that such sentiment would be supported widely in the Saudi religious establishment. In a broader geopolitical context, some Sunnis in Saudi Arabia express a fear that U.S. policy in Iraq and the Gulf would turn "pro-Shi'a," leading to U.S. support of Shi'ite aspirations in Sunni-dominated states.¹³⁴

Saudi Arabia has been affected in a number of other ways since Operation Iraqi Freedom. First, there seems to be a growing internal debate over whether the intolerance and fanatical devotion encouraged by Wahhabism has been a factor in the radicalization of some sectors of society. In this regard, the terrorist attacks on May 12, 2003, in Riyadh that killed seven Saudis along with 18 others, including Americans, were potentially a defining event for Saudi Arabia. Saudis, who had come to believe that "these things happen to others" and that such acts were foreign-inspired, have begun to refer to the attack as "our September 11." One Saudi columnist even stated flatly that the Wahhabism spread in the kingdom through school curricula, mosque sermons, and state television is the root cause of Islamic militancy. Notably—and

¹³³ The experience of Bashar Asad in Syria following the death of his father does not bode well for Gamal.

¹³⁴ Comments by Dr. Gregory Gause III, associate professor of political science, University of Vermont.

unlike post–September 11 commentary—there have been few if any media references to “Zionist” or CIA complicity in the Riyadh attacks.¹³⁵

Second, U.S. military forces were withdrawn from Saudi territory, a move made possible by the removal of the southern no-fly zone over Iraq and the emergence of alternative bases in Qatar, the UAE, and Oman. Thus, “infidel forces” would no longer “desecrate” the land of Islam’s holiest shrines. It was hoped that this would render moot a key criticism that neo-Wahhabis and radical groups like Al Qaeda have used against the Saudi royal family and that it would give Crown Prince Abdullah a freer hand to liberalize. However, the redeployment of U.S. forces has not removed the radical challenge to the monarchy. Shootouts between Saudi security forces and radicals are reported frequently. A second major suicide attack on November 9, 2003, in a Riyadh suburb killed 18 people—all Arabs, mostly Egyptian and Lebanese professionals. There have been signs that this attack, along with the one in May, are driving erstwhile supporters away from “the banner of jihad.” It is possible that the effect on Saudis will mirror the reaction of Egyptians to internal Islamist violence in the 1990s—that of growing disgust with the cause.¹³⁶

Finally, some reforms have been initiated in the kingdom. The Saudi government has promised to hold municipal elections by October 2004, and the monarchy has granted approval for establishment of a human rights organization. In addition, the government has initiated changes in educational curricula and religious institutions to promote tolerance of non-Wahhabi “others” and reduce support of terrorist groups. Like Egypt, however, the government continues to deal harshly with reformist critics who it says “do not serve national unity or the cohesion of society based on Islamic shari’a.”¹³⁷

Critical challenges lie ahead for Saudi Arabia. When King Fahd dies, a succession struggle may ensue that will pit conservative members of the royal family against those who would like to see liberalizing reforms in Saudi society. Crown Prince Abdullah is seen as a careful proponent of the latter group, but it is not clear whether the 80-year-old Abdullah will emerge as the next king or for how long he would remain king. Regardless of the outcome, there will continue to be neo-Wahhabis watching carefully from the wings. Moreover, any new government will face a burdened economy and momentous demographic changes. The reliance on oil revenue to prop up a welfare state will become less tenable as the population of young

¹³⁵ See Neil MacFarquhar, “Saudis Reexamine an Islamic Doctrine Cited By Militants,” *The New York Times*, May 25, 2003, at <http://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/25/international/middleeast/25SAUD.html>; and “Saudi Media Trends: In the Wake of the Riyadh Bombings (2),” *MEMRI*, Special Dispatch Series No. 514, June 1, 2003, at <http://www.memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=sd&ID=SP51403>.

¹³⁶ See Neil MacFarquhar, “Deadly Bombing of Saudi Homes Sours Al-Qaeda Sympathizers,” *The New York Times*, November 11, 2003, at <http://www.nytimes.com/2003/11/11/international/middleeast/11SAUD.html>.

¹³⁷ “Saudi Arabia Detains Reformers,” *The Washington Post*, March 17, 2004, p. A17.

working-age adults increases and the pool of available jobs remains flat. Foreigners now make up over half of the workforce, leading one Saudi academic to remark that Saudi Arabia is “the only country in the world that imports the unemployed from other countries in order to swell the ranks of the unemployed among its own people.”¹³⁸ Unemployment will become a greater problem without liberalizing economic policies to encourage private investment and entrepreneurship. Radical fundamentalists will feed on the resulting discontent, in particular by calling attention to the wealth and alleged corruption of the royal family.

In the smaller Gulf states, some reforms have continued apace. Since 2001, parliamentary elections have been held in Bahrain and Kuwait, and a new constitution has been drawn up and approved by referendum in Qatar. However, there is still a long way to go before one could consider these political systems true democracies in the Western sense. They remain monarchies whose ruling elites retain ultimate control and power over most political life in their countries. The success of liberalizing efforts has been mixed. In Kuwait, political parties are still illegal, and efforts to attain women’s rights—the right to vote, for example—have failed in the past several years. In Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman, on the other hand, women are able to participate in the political process; Qatar appointed a woman as education minister in 2003. At the same time, Islamists have made gains in elections in Kuwait as a result of government support and tribal endorsement, whereas liberals have lost heavily. Liberal hopes for women’s suffrage in Kuwait were dashed when the July 2003 elections resulted in a net gain for Islamists, who held 21 of the parliament’s 50 seats. Meanwhile, liberals lost 11 of the 14 seats they held in the outgoing assembly, with their losses picked up by independents and royalists.¹³⁹

Jordan’s parliamentary elections in June 2003 were notable for giving a loss to the Islamic Action Front and other Islamist candidates. One Jordanian analyst suggested that Islamist influence had declined vis-à-vis tribal interests and that “big external issues no longer carry the day.” Jordanians were more concerned about domestic issues such as the economy and corruption than issues prominent in Islamist platforms such as Iraq or the Arab-Israeli conflict. Moreover, according to a poll by the Center for Strategic Studies in Amman, Jordanians voted for candidates based on personal competence, clan affiliation, and political experience rather than on religious affiliation; in fact, more Muslims voted for Christian candidates than ever before. Jordan seemed to be at a crossroads of political maturity whereby King Abdullah could choose to institute democratic reforms more rapidly.¹⁴⁰ However, radical

¹³⁸ Dr. Askar Enazy, quoted in Eric Rouleau, *op. cit.*, pp. 83–84.

¹³⁹ See “Liberals Lose Seats in Kuwaiti Election,” *The Washington Post*, July 7, 2003, p. A14.

¹⁴⁰ Interviews with Dr. Mustafa Hamarneh and Dr. Fares Braizat, June 2003.

forms of Islamism remain a threat in the southern parts of the kingdom around Ma'an and among Palestinians in refugee camps.

Undoubtedly, the primary events affecting Islamism among Palestinians are closer to home than the prospects for democracy in Iraq. After the demise of the Oslo Accords of 1993, the 2000 intifada provided new life to Hamas and Islamic Jihad and injected Islamic language into the mainstream of the conflict. By the end of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the intifada had exhausted both Israelis and Palestinians, with the latter beginning to question whether violence against Israel in general, and suicide bombings against civilians in particular, had harmed the Palestinian cause. Despite the fatigue on both sides, renewed efforts to bring them back to the negotiating table (i.e., via the "road map") strained under the weight of continued violence. The *hudna* (cease-fire) to which Palestinian militant groups had agreed in mid-2003 collapsed after several weeks of relative quiet. Based on the modus operandi of these and other Islamist groups, it is likely that they would use any lulls in fighting to regroup, rebuild infrastructure damaged in Israeli assaults, and continue to recruit new members. Israel assassinated the founder and leader of Hamas, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, in March 2004, a move that would further radicalize Hamas. This and other developments viewed as detrimental to the Palestinians, such as Israel's efforts to build a fence around and through the West Bank and President Bush's indication in April 2004 of a shift in U.S. policy on Israeli settlements, could lead to accelerated cooperation among radical Palestinian Islamist and secular groups—and potentially to operations against Israeli and Western interests beyond the borders of Israel and the territories.

The Palestinian problem, whether in and of itself or as a proxy for other resentments, has continued to have a strong hold on the Arab psyche. There is no doubt that the United States must continue to take a strong and sustained lead in seeking to move the conflict toward a resolution that will necessarily involve compromises on both sides. However, it is important to note the limitations of outside actors in helping resolve this conflict, at the core of which are existential issues for Palestinians and Israelis alike. Solving this conflict would by no means be a panacea for the ills of the Arab world or the attractiveness of radical Islamic ideologies. It would certainly remove a source of protest and a sore point in Arab views of the United States, but the other factors would remain. "Arab political discourse has been sandbagged" by the obsession with the Palestinian problem, according to one observer.¹⁴¹ Even the UNDP report, before entering into a comprehensive and well-documented examination of the political, economic, educational, and social ills of

¹⁴¹ Noah Feldman, *op. cit.*

the region, states flatly, and without following up or offering evidence, that “[Israeli] occupation freezes growth, prosperity, and freedom in the Arab world.”¹⁴²

Despite U.S. efforts to pressure Bashar Asad to reduce Syria’s support for radical Palestinian and Lebanese Islamist groups, there are few signs that the pressure is working. Soon after the end of major combat in Iraq, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell delivered a message to Asad that he must close the Damascus offices of Islamic Jihad and Hamas and cut off support for Hezbollah. Despite Asad’s public assurances that the Damascus headquarters of the Palestinian groups has been closed, Syria has not actually prohibited their activities in practical terms.¹⁴³ Hezbollah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad are among the few levers Syria had against Israel, and it is unlikely they would be jettisoned without progress on retrieving the Golan Heights from Israel.

Still, the U.S. ouster of Saddam Hussein and the continued U.S. military presence in Iraq changed Syria’s neighborhood overnight. There are signs that this new status quo is being used to weaken the antireform “old guard.” Soon after the war, the government took several steps in the direction of reform, including demilitarizing primary and secondary schools, licensing three private banks, approving two private universities and four radio stations, and possibly eliminating the requirement that all students join Ba’ath-affiliated youth groups.¹⁴⁴ In addition, 287 Syrian intellectuals and activists presented Asad with a petition calling for the release of political prisoners, cancellation of martial law, and freedom of expression and political activism. The initial paragraphs of the petition argued that Syria’s strategic realities had changed, U.S. “lawlessness” could not be reined in, Arab regimes were “impotent or collapsing,” and Syria would not be prepared for the “looming danger” without “sweeping national reforms.”¹⁴⁵ If Asad decided to confront the old guard by wielding the “stick” of the U.S. military presence next door, the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria would stand to gain because of superior organizational skills and ability to appeal to the sentiments of the Sunni majority, but it would have an uphill battle against Syrian secularism and nationalism.

Radical Islamists are not about to drastically change the status quo in the Middle East. None are poised to topple existing governments or even to threaten government control over political processes. They could, however, threaten civil order in ways that would damage the image these governments seek to portray to the outside

¹⁴² UNDP (2002), p. 2.

¹⁴³ One representative of the Israeli government, who asked not to be identified, quipped that the leadership and staff in these offices were simply told to “take the day off.”

¹⁴⁴ Alan Sipress, “Syrian Reforms Gain Momentum in Wake of Iraq War,” *The Washington Post*, May 12, 2003, p. A1.

¹⁴⁵ “Syrian Citizens Urge President Assad to Implement Sweeping Reforms,” *MEMRI*, Special Dispatch Series No. 523, June 16, 2003, at <http://www.memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=sd&ID=SP52303>.

world, inhibit official policies for economic growth, and expand the attraction of radicalism among disenfranchised youth. Because of their excellent organizational skills and willingness to work within the prevailing system, mainstream Islamists are better positioned to participate in and take advantage of reforms. In Iraq, for example, Islamist groups (particularly Shi'ite organizations) may have a prominent—possibly even dominant—role in a future Iraqi government. However, as Kepel has indicated, “in the final analysis, any ideology’s attractions, and the limits of those attractions, depend on how it adapts to the perceived needs of a society.” Therefore, Islamism is not “a necessary outcome for the Muslim world.”¹⁴⁶

A key issue is whether Islamist groups can and should participate in democracy-building, and if so, how. Such groups already are involved in setting a new paradigm in Iraq. Much has been made of the fear that, if Islamists gain power in democratic elections, they will act to curtail freedoms and enact laws that promote intolerance. It is this fear of “one person, one vote, one time” that autocratic regimes use in their arguments against democratization and liberalization. However, it is not completely clear that Islamist parties would make huge gains, much less win the power to form governments, if democracy were to take hold in the Middle East. On the one hand, in states where few parties are allowed and where non-Islamist candidates must run as independents lacking party-organized mobilization capabilities, the power of the opposition is dissipated. On the other hand, Islamists have the platform of the mosque to spread the message of their candidacy despite repression by autocratic governments. Were free elections and unfettered party politics allowed to level the playing field, non-Islamist parties potentially could make major gains.¹⁴⁷ Jordan’s experience is instructive. In Jordan’s pluralistic—though “soft” authoritarian—context, where “diverse contenders compete for consumers of ideas,” moderation has been strengthened and the Muslim Brothers “have shifted their discourse to more directly address issues related to Jordan’s national interests.”¹⁴⁸ Iraq will be another test case for the power of the Islamist message in a multiparty political process.

How would Islamists react to participation in an open system? One possibility is that factions that previously found it useful to submerge disagreements in favor of facing authoritarian governments with a united front will become more independent. For example, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt seems to have several factions within its tent—a group of core activists along with the aging leadership, a more moderate cadre in their forties and fifties, and a somewhat radicalized wing made up of the younger generation. The establishment of far-reaching democratic reforms in Egypt potentially could emphasize the cleavages among those factions, which could split the

¹⁴⁶ Kepel (2002), p. 30.

¹⁴⁷ See Langohr, *op. cit.*, p. 120.

¹⁴⁸ Moaddel (2002), p. 146.

organization apart.¹⁴⁹ Some parts of the organization could present themselves as modernists (as al-Wasat did in the mid-1990s) and willingly vie for democratic participation.

Radical fundamentalist groups will continue to pose a security challenge to governments and Western interests in the Middle East. In Iraq and the Persian Gulf states, this challenge will likely continue for some time and will be marked by occasional terrorist attacks, some of them potentially sensational. They will continue to take advantage of undergoverned areas to recruit, train, and prepare attacks. However, although extremist groups do remain, Egypt seems to have weathered its convulsion of attacks by radical fundamentalists who have decided, at least for now, to renounce violence. Governments must aggressively confront these groups, but they must also strike a balance between containing the threat from violent jihadists and maintaining progress toward political and economic reform.

Implications for U.S. National Security Strategy in the Middle East

The most important debate over the future of the Middle East does not derive from a “clash of civilizations” between the West and Islam, as Huntington argued a decade ago, but rather from a “clash of ideas” internal to the region. More succinctly, a “battle for Islam” is pitting those who espouse a fundamentalist, radical view of Islam’s role in society against those who emphasize the moderation in Islam and its compatibility with democracy.¹⁵⁰ The battle is based on the idea that an intolerant form of Islam has “hijacked” the religion from the tolerant form of Islam practiced by the majority of Muslims.¹⁵¹ But the moderate majority is at a distinct disadvantage: They fear for their own lives and livelihoods because of a combination of extremists who would do them violence on one hand, and governments that fail to protect them or that take actions to stifle them on the other. There is simply very little “public space” for open discourse on the nature of Islam, the role it should have in politics and society, and the true causes of the current Arab condition.

The United States has been embroiled in this clash of ideas for years because of its position as leader of the West, but the terrorist attacks of September 11 served to greatly sharpen U.S. awareness of this debate. Michael Doran has noted that

¹⁴⁹ Interview with prominent Egyptian analyst, June 2003.

¹⁵⁰ “Battle for Islam” is a term used by Dr. Ahmed Bishara, Secretary-General, Kuwait National Democratic Movement, during an interview in Kuwait City, June 2003.

¹⁵¹ Egyptian intellectual Tarek Heggy, among others, has written extensively on this clash between these two forms of Islam. See his Web site at <http://www.heggy.org>. See also Tarek Heggy, “Tolerant and Intolerant Islam,” July 20, 2003, http://www.heggy.org/recent_articles.htm.

Bin Laden is a participant in a profoundly serious civil war over Arab and Muslim identity in the modern world. The United States is also a participant in that war, because whether it realizes it or not, its policies affect the fortunes of the various belligerents. But Washington is not a primary actor, because it is an outsider in cultural affairs and has only a limited ability to define for believers the role of Islam in public life.¹⁵²

However, as Doran also notes, “U.S. policies can influence the balance of power among the protagonists in these struggles, sometimes to a considerable degree.” A key consideration is whether the influence is positive or negative. Iraq is supremely important precisely because that is where U.S. policy is most directly applied.

The United States can do several things to influence the outcome of this internal debate without injecting its own positions, which could in fact be detrimental to liberals and moderates. It can support moderates by helping them gain international recognition, thus helping them gain stature internally. The United States can also press governments to open public space and to initiate reforms that are beneficial to Islamists and secularists alike. The opening of public space in closed Arab systems would force Islamists to compete with other parties for popular support based on practical platforms to solve the community’s problems.

U.S. efforts to promote democracy in the Middle East should emphasize the careful construction of processes and institutions and the systematic acclimatization of Arab societies and organizations to a democratic environment. The ballot box should be utilized toward the end of these reform efforts, not the beginning.¹⁵³ Initiatives must take account of differences in societies. Reform will thus take different forms, and the pace of the reforms will be based on societal imperatives.

In the postwar period, the United States is challenged to act swiftly and powerfully in Iraq against violence directed toward the coalition forces and the nascent Iraqi government. It hardly needs mentioning that democratization—not to speak of basic reconstruction—requires a secure environment, and gaining and maintaining such an environment is a critical responsibility of coalition forces in Iraq. At the same time, the United States and its allies must encourage development of a system that will protect basic freedoms and promote the creation of a vibrant civil society. A second critical responsibility of the United States is therefore to help open up the public space in Iraq to allow the free flow of ideas and the development of democratic institutions and to enshrine that freedom in a widely accepted constitution. In such an environment, competing parties would be required to develop practical platforms detailing visions for the country’s political, economic, social, and ideological future. Islamist parties would have to go beyond the rhetoric of “Islam is the solution” to put

¹⁵² Michael Scott Doran, “Somebody Else’s Civil War,” *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 2002, p. 40.

¹⁵³ See Tarek Heggy, “The Institutions of Democracy Are More Important Than Democracy,” *Al-Ahram*, Cairo, June 5, 2003.

forth practical programs for governing Iraq. Otherwise, they would fail to gain much support. It is by no means clear that Islamist platforms would be any more attractive to the average Iraqi citizen than those of other parties. But the vast organizational superiority held by Iraqi Islamists puts their more secular opponents at a distinct disadvantage (except in Kurdish areas), at least until these other parties can generate the political machinery and grassroots support required to compete in elections.

The United States must seek to support moderate Islamism in Iraq in addition to liberal secularists. Such groups certainly include the movements affiliated with the Hawza clerics among the Shi'ites. Among the Sunnis, the Muslim Brotherhood may actually serve as a moderating Islamist tendency against radical Wahhabis and jihadists. All these tendencies (even radical ones) must be encouraged to participate peacefully in civil society and in elections and then to work together in participatory government. Ultimately, the United States should be prepared to accept the possibilities that (1) the Shi'ites will gain majority rule through elections and (2) Iraq will be an "Islamic democracy" in which clerics provide advice to the government (but cannot overrule it as in Iran) but that protects basic freedoms and the rights of minorities and women.

The writing of Iraq's permanent constitution—in addition to the advent of a freely elected Iraqi government—promises to provide the United States and advocates of democracy a crucial, perhaps once-in-a-generation opportunity to encourage reform in the Arab world. If Operation Iraqi Freedom could help establish the environment for democratic reforms in Iraq and the Middle East, the debate over Iraq's future constitution would give those reforms a tangible structure and may even accelerate them. However, without focused efforts to include the people of Iraq and the surrounding countries, the debate will have only minimal effect on the societies at large.

The United States can take important steps to ensure maximum transparency and participation, recognizing that the process of debate could be as important as the outcome of that process. First, the United States must encourage the widest possible representation of Iraq's disparate ethnic, religious, and tribal groups in the constitutional debate. The subject matter must be at once wide-ranging and profound. Participants should tackle such issues as the relationship between religion and state, the protection of minorities, women's rights, and the enshrinement of basic freedoms. Second, the United States should work to ensure that the people of Iraq and the rest of the Arab world participate "virtually" in the proceedings. All interested Arab news organizations should be invited to arrange extensive coverage and news analysis of the debate. If necessary, the United States and its allies should be prepared to offer incentives to these organizations, including satellite bandwidth. There could also be arrangements for ordinary citizens in Iraq and in the region to call in or email suggestions and reactions, some of which the news agencies could highlight on the air; the Internet would also be useful in this regard. Moreover, governments and nongov-

ernmental organizations, especially those from the Arab world, should be encouraged to send on-site observers. The United States may not be completely comfortable with all positions and outcomes. However, it is critical that the United States accept less than palatable outcomes as products of democratic processes.

The United States and its partners must continue to keep a close eye on Iranian and Saudi activities in Iraq. The Saudi penchant for combining Wahhabi *da'wa* with charitable works deserves special attention. An appropriate strategy would be to “follow the money”—to track sources of funds for construction of mosques, youth centers, etc.—as part of an effort to head off the growth of extremism in Sunni (both Arab and Kurdish) areas of Iraq. In addition, the coalition must ensure that basic government services and opportunities reach all corners of Iraq. Ungoverned areas have become havens for radical fundamentalists, some of whom are jihadists. Iraq already was serving as a magnet for Islamist militants, including a seemingly resurgent Ansar al-Islam, whose redoubt in northeast Iraq was destroyed during the war. There were even reports that Hezbollah and Hamas had established a presence there. Preventing conditions associated with failed states would help counter exploitation by well-funded antidemocratic forces in the region.

At the time of writing, it is not clear whether U.S. efforts to encourage a democratic Iraq will succeed—especially without improvement in the security situation. Not only would continuing violence hinder the development of civil society, it could also ensure the dominance of well-organized Islamist groups or secular and religious extremists to the detriment of moderate groups. Iraq could still devolve into ethnic and interreligious conflict, and conditions could be ripe for the rise of another authoritarian regime, or even a radical Islamist one. If Iraq “goes bad,” it certainly could have dire consequences for U.S. interests in the Middle East. Iraq has become a linchpin of U.S. reform efforts in the region, and success there has been viewed as breeding more success at reform throughout the area.

It is clear that continuation of the status quo in the wider Middle East would be quite detrimental to U.S. interests in the long term. The suppression of civil society, lack of women’s rights, repressive political environments, economic stagnation and demographic change, and moribund educational systems provide fertile ground for radical fundamentalist movements. Autocratic governments are unlikely to initiate the necessary fundamental changes on their own. Regardless of protestations of “meddling” that are likely to emerge from these governments, the United States must press them to initiate reforms. To borrow from a perennial Arab complaint about U.S. policy, U.S. democratic values are converging with its interests in the Middle East.

Thus, it is equally clear that even if efforts in Iraq fail, reform in the wider Middle East will remain a long-term strategic goal of the United States. It may therefore be necessary to reduce the central role of Iraq as the linchpin of regional democratiza-

tion. The U.S. government should be prepared with policy options for continuing to push for reform even in the context of “failure” in Iraq.

The United States faces a dilemma with regard to friendly authoritarian governments in the region—how to promote democratic reform in the long term without creating instability in the short term that could lead to anti-American, fundamentalist regimes. In Iraq, the United States is able to help ensure stability because it is the preeminent military power there. In other countries of the Middle East where currently the apparent choice is between the two alternatives of continued autocracy or radical theocracy, the way ahead seems less obvious. U.S. policymakers must expect resistance from these governments, and a range of policy options will have to be developed and adapted to specific countries and actors. Moreover, the pressure on both friendly and adversarial governments must be balanced against the potential effect on the war on terrorism, for which these same governments provide critical intelligence and other support. The United States must also create strategies for minimizing and managing the short-term instabilities that inevitably will arise. These instabilities could originate from potential violence by militant Islamist groups and even coup attempts. Nevertheless, it is important for U.S. long-term interests to stay the course in these endeavors.

The United States could improve its knowledge of the region and prospects for influencing developments there if it began to openly engage more moderate Islamist groups in dialogue. This dialogue could include fundamentalist groups that have sought to gain political influence through existing institutions. The goal could be both to better understand the goals of these organizations and their concepts of Islamic government and to expose them to Western concepts of democracy and civil society. If these groups are to take part in pluralistic systems in the future, they will need to learn how to behave as responsible, active members of these systems. It would be better to start this dialogue as a way of lessening the potential for misunderstandings and instabilities during transition periods. At the same time, U.S. pursuit of dialogue with mainstream Islamist groups could run afoul of some local governments that may view U.S. overtures to indigenous groups as threatening. Therefore, this dialogue would have to be part of an overall strategy of reform that emphasizes the willing participation of the local government and other interest groups.

As noted earlier, the populations in the Arab Middle East are proportionally quite young. A 2002 Zogby International poll administered in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Lebanon, Kuwait, and the UAE found significant differences in attitudes toward American culture and technology based on age group and Internet access. Respondents in the youngest age group (ages 18–29) and those with Internet access held the most positive attitudes toward the United States. This may offer an opportunity for U.S. policymakers to affect the image of the United States in the Middle East, because it is this age group whose numbers are about to explode in the region. But it is

also the age group that is a prime recruitment target of groups like Al Qaeda. The “clash of ideas” is in some ways a battle for the hearts and minds of Muslim youth.

Implications for the U.S. Military

September 11 and Operation Iraqi Freedom have important implications for the U.S. military posture in the Middle East. The war on terrorism provided a new focus for military operations in unexpected areas. It also called into question more starkly the reliance on Saudi bases for U.S. command and control, combat, and support forces. The United States accelerated plans for alternative basing in the Gulf region, and found Qatar, the UAE, and Oman to be willing partners (in addition to the already heavy U.S. military involvement in Kuwait and Bahrain). Operation Iraqi Freedom altered the dynamics even more profoundly. Since the 1991 Gulf War, Iraq had been the object of one of two major theater scenarios that drove the shape and size of U.S. military force structure and had constituted a central focus of force planning. U.S. aircraft enforced no-fly zones in much of Iraqi airspace during Operations Northern and Southern Watch. Operation Iraqi Freedom suddenly shifted the focus of force planning in the region toward Iran and stability or “nation assistance” operations. And it hastened the nearly complete withdrawal of U.S. forces from Saudi territory.

In light of these events and the implications for national security strategy described above, the U.S. military and the U.S. Air Force should posture themselves to support the following objectives in the Middle East:

- Counter terrorism
- Deter potential adversaries to U.S. interests in the region
- Reassure regional friends
- Minimize and counteract transitional instabilities.

U.S. military forces will play a key role in helping locate, track, and destroy violent groups in the Middle East. Countering terrorism, an objective that became a top priority after September 11, requires military forces to provide surveillance of large areas and to strike quickly and surgically when called upon. One key operational concern in the Middle East, as in other regions, is to track potential terrorist activities in areas where the state has failed to provide adequate governance. Such unruly areas should not be allowed to develop in Iraq. Parts of Lebanon, Jordan, Yemen, Egypt, Sudan, and the West Bank and Gaza remain areas of concern. The U.S. military will be required to maintain dedicated intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets in the region—and analysts to assess the data those assets collect—to help local governments pursue radical jihadists in areas where the reach of those governments is weak. At times, U.S. firepower will be called upon to strike fleeting targets quickly, precisely, and with minimal collateral damage.

With Saddam gone, the requirement to deter potential adversaries has lessened but by no means disappeared. Iran remains a threat to U.S. allies and interests in the Gulf, as does Syria. In the case of both states, their development of weapons of mass destruction and their potential to threaten U.S. interests in Iraq remain worrisome. Reassuring regional friends of U.S. determination to help them maintain their security against external aggression requires that the U.S. military remain engaged with the militaries of friendly governments.

The final objective, minimizing or counteracting transitional instability, is relatively unorthodox in comparison with the others. New thinking will be needed to assess if and how U.S. military forces can aid in strengthening reform initiatives in Arab countries and dampening any negative side effects. The U.S. military and the Air Force can make important contributions in the context of military-to-military contacts, including training, where instilling democratic values would be paramount. Military organizations will need to be brought along as reforms are instituted. Iraq, where the military must be reorganized from top to bottom, presents an important opportunity to develop educational programs that might be applied, with adaptations, to other countries. In addition, U.S. military forces might be called upon to assist transitioning governments and international organizations in delivering supplies and services to remote locations. This would constitute a key element of initiatives to promote democracy and counter inroads by militant Islamist groups.

Meeting these four objectives will require U.S. military forces to maintain a substantial forward posture. Deployed service members will interact with local populations more frequently in the future. Area knowledge thus will become a vastly more important skill. The armed forces should consider the development of a new breed of airman, sailor, and soldier who has substantial familiarity with local customs, language, and history as a “core competency” along with traditional warfighting prowess.

As the U.S. basing structure changes in the Middle East, flexibility should be among the criteria for future postures. In some cases, a low (but strategically and operationally sound) military profile will be called for. Transitions that upset entrenched political structures may require more frequent changes in operating locations. At times, however, a higher profile may be needed to help deter adversaries and reassure allies. Planners will need to constantly evaluate the balance between high and low profiles and between in-country presence and over-the-horizon support and response capability. Additionally, fundamentalists have used the U.S. military presence in the Middle East—particularly in Saudi Arabia, and now Iraq—as a club with which to bludgeon governments and moderates and as a rallying cry for supporters. For many of these militants, any U.S. presence or influence in the region is a reason for violence, and there is little the United States can do to change their outlook. However, the lower the U.S. military profile, the less these radicals will be able to use that presence as a pretext for violent action.

In this vein, the longer-term military presence in Iraq needs to be considered carefully. It would certainly be desirable for U.S. forces to lower their presence in populated areas as soon as operationally feasible. This would reduce U.S. visibility as an “occupying power” and promote the reality of Iraqi self-governance to Iraqis and to the Arab world. The question of whether to establish main operating air bases in Iraq would have to be addressed in the context of evolving regional threats and, more fundamentally, the relationship a representative Iraqi government would desire to have with the United States. The existence of such bases in a newly democratic Iraq could become a lightning rod for criticism and anti-Americanism from Islamists as well as nationalists. However, such a military presence—combined with serious political and economic initiatives to promote democracy, conflict resolution, and prosperity—could underscore the “generational commitment” of the United States to the Middle East and could serve to promote stability and strengthen moderate forces throughout the region.

The Maghreb

Rollie Lal

Introduction

The North African countries of the Maghreb encompass a wide spectrum of beliefs in Islam. Since their independence, governments in these countries have not permitted political Islam to expand; instead, they have sought to contain and control Islam in their societies and polities. Nonetheless, in recent years, the growth of Islamic fundamentalism has proved to be a threat to the stability of each of these countries. This chapter addresses the Islamic landscape of the Maghreb, provides an analysis of shifts in religious and political trends since September 11, and identifies challenges and possibilities for U.S. policy in the region.

The Maghreb consists of Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia. More than 95 percent of the population of the region is Sunni Muslim, although there are wide variations in belief and practice. Sufi traditions and saints are a prominent feature of the Maghreb, as are syncretic and mystical interpretations of Islam. Culturally, the countries of North Africa are distinguished by their significant Berber populations, and this heritage exerts a strong influence upon their linguistic traditions and political organization. Berbers form approximately 40 percent of the population in Morocco, 25 percent in Algeria, and more than 5 percent in Tunisia. Morocco also has a small Jewish community. Despite the strong Berber heritage, a large proportion of the Maghreb's population now identifies itself as Arab and is increasingly drawn to Arab culture.

Linguistically, the region is extremely diverse. Although French and Arabic are the dominant languages of the region, regional languages such as Berber, or Amazigh, and other dialects reveal the strength of local cultures and traditions in the Maghreb. The diversity of cultures and languages is reflected in the political milieu, in which Francophiles, Arab nationalists, Berbers, and others all vie for a voice and representation. A recurrent challenge for both Morocco and Algeria has been the necessity of incorporating these diverse ethnic and linguistic groups into a unified nation.

The countries of the Maghreb share a common colonial past. All were integrated politically with France to varying degrees in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Algeria remained a part of France as three departments of the French Republic for a particularly long period of its modern history—132 years—until 1962. During that time, France dismantled what institutions had existed in Algeria, replacing them with an imposed structure. After independence, Algeria was thus the least equipped with the institutions necessary to embark upon the challenges faced by a new state. Morocco and Tunisia, in contrast, remained under foreign rule for relatively short periods, and the extent of French intervention in state institutions also remained limited. Upon gaining independence from France, the countries of the Maghreb were headed by the political organizations that had been successful in leading the independence struggle. This led to the dominance of three main political models in the Maghreb: a constitutional monarchy in Morocco, civilian authoritarian secularism in Tunisia, and military authoritarian secularism in Algeria.

In all three countries, explicitly Islamist parties have not been allowed to operate; in fact, the political systems have been used primarily to limit the influence of Islamist movements. Each country's distinct approach has led to differing levels of effectiveness in attaining this goal. Of the three nations, Morocco has allowed the greatest role for Islam in politics, with the development of a religious monarchy that works in conjunction with the parliament. Tunisia's system limited the influence of Islam in civic life while banning the use of Islam in politics. The Tunisian Islamist movement was forced to move abroad to retain its freedom of operation. Algeria's experience has been the most mixed. After years of single-party rule, Islamist parties, organized as the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), were allowed to take part in elections and, in fact, won a majority. The subsequent disqualification of election results and the banning of the Islamist party led to a protracted civil war. In 2004 Algeria completed a peaceful presidential election, but questions about political freedoms remain.

A Moroccan expert on Islamic movements explained that two contradictory interpretations of how Islam and the state should interact are at play in the Islamic world. The first is official Islam, in which the authorities have Islam work in favor of the state, as reflected by Morocco's monarchy. The second is political Islam, in which the state must serve Islam. The struggle in Islamic nations concerns how to implement Islam and in favor of what goal. The countries of the Maghreb exemplify both the successes and consequences of that struggle.

The Islamic Landscape

Islam entered the Maghreb in the late seventh century, facing fierce resistance from the nomadic Berber population. The Arab conqueror Uqba Ibn Nafi established an encampment at present-day Kairouan, in Tunisia, and expanded throughout North

Africa from there. His forces drove the Byzantines from their hold on Carthage and established an Islamic community under the Umayyad dynasty in their place. Uqba Ibn Nafi is believed to have spread Islam to Morocco by making a 5,000-kilometer march around the country in 681. Moulay Idriss (788–793), a Shi'ite refugee who traced his lineage to the son-in-law of the prophet, later established the existing Alawite monarchy in Morocco.¹ Over the centuries, Islam in the region absorbed traditional local beliefs as well as Islamic trends from abroad, such as Sufism. Islamic beliefs in the Maghreb today span Sufi and syncretic traditions, traditional Sunni doctrine, and more fundamentalist Salafi thought, as well as many other variations in philosophy and practice. Most Berbers belong to the Maliki school of Islamic jurisprudence, with Sufi orders and interpretations remaining extremely influential. The Maliki school emphasizes the authority of the traditions of the prophet and the Medina Muslim community, but it has been adapted by local communities. In Morocco, the Maliki interpretation of Islamic law has tended to incorporate local traditions, so that traditional Islam and legal interpretation may differ from Maliki communities elsewhere.

For centuries, traditional practices have been dominant in the society of the Maghreb. The most influential Islamic practice in the region remains Sufism, which emphasizes mysticism and the attainment of the highest ideals of the faith. Maliki Sufism is dominant in Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia. The Sufis are historically organized in *zawiyas*, or brotherhoods. These brotherhoods served various societal purposes across the Maghreb, giving religious lectures, preaching, and providing protection for individuals seeking refuge. The *zawiya* provided these benefits to three main segments of society: (1) the general public; (2) urban intellectuals, scholars, and high society; and (3) both the intellectuals and the superstitious in the countryside. Modern *zawiyas* differ in influence according to the historical context of the country. The *zawiya* remains a central feature of traditional Islamic practice in Tunisia to the extent that the fundamentalist leader Rashid Ghannouchi targeted this aspect of Tunisian culture as a major barrier to the growth of fundamentalism.² In Algeria, accusations that the *zawiyas* collaborated with colonial France diminished their influence among the population, whereas their influence has remained strong in Morocco. Thus, Moroccan Sufism and the *zawiya* there provide the most comprehensive example of Sufism in the Maghreb.

Much of Moroccan Sufi practice derives from the thought and writings of at-Tadili, a thirteenth century Moroccan jurist.³ His focus was on the observable aspects of Sufism rather than mysticism, as exemplified by regional pious Muslim leaders.

¹ Not to be confused with the Alawite sect in Syria.

² Burgat (2003), p. 66.

³ Cornell (1998), p. 4.

These Sufis were known and venerated for their virtue and adherence to the sunna. A central group of those who were known as “tradition bearers of Sufism” for their exceptional adherence to the sunna could then receive *baraka*, or special powers from God, confirming their place of prominence in Islam.⁴ The tradition bearers would be endowed with the ability to perform miracles as a sign of their exalted position. At-Tadili’s ideas reflect influences from both the Maliki school of Islamic jurisprudence and Iranian and other eastern Islamic ideals. In at-Tadili’s works, religious leadership was not connected with descent from the Prophet Muhammad. Later, the earlier idea of the virtuous individual who is capable of performing miracles became popularly associated with the *sharif*, a descendant of the Prophet.⁵ Geertz describes the story of a famous seventeenth-century Moroccan Sufi saint, Sidi Lahsen Lyusi, that illuminates at-Tadili’s ideas about the *marabout*, the living saint, who has supernatural powers.⁶ In another story, Lyusi is able to use miraculous powers to force a sultan to do his will. Upon gaining the advantage, the saint demands that the sultan decree Lyusi as a *sharif*.⁷ The stories surrounding Lyusi reveal that over time, sharifian descent has gained importance in Morocco to the extent that a saint embodying virtuosity and the supernatural powers known as *baraka* nonetheless requests acknowledgment of exalted lineage to confirm his religious legitimacy.

The marabout has historically performed a critical religio-political role in Moroccan society, acting as an interlocutor for tribes and between the people and the imam. The marabout thus became attached to a local Sufi order and held responsibility for maintaining justice in the locality through his superior knowledge and understanding.

Sufism and the veneration of marabouts are central aspects of traditional Islamic observance throughout the Maghreb, and Sufi saints are widely venerated after their death. Some Sufi brotherhoods have become popular internationally. The Boutshishiya Tariqa, for example, which began in Morocco, has a widespread global following. Although Sufi brotherhoods are popular and organized throughout the Maghreb, traditionalists are not generally unified as a political force.

Islamic traditionalism remains strong in Morocco, not only socially but also politically. The king is called “The Commander of the Faithful”; the basis for the monarchy’s political legitimacy lies in the king’s descent from Muhammad and the inher-

⁴ Cornell (1998), p. 5.

⁵ Cornell (1998), p. 48.

⁶ Lyusi is described as arriving at an oasis at which his teacher has fallen gravely ill. None of the students of the sheikh dare to come near him or assist in washing his filthy shirt. Lyusi immediately offers to wash the sheikh’s shirt, and then proceeds to drink the dirty water wrung from it. Rather than falling ill, however, Lyusi “returned to the sheikh, his eyes aflame, not with illness, for he did not fall sick, but as though he had drunk a powerful wine.” This miraculous event proved that Lyusi was in fact a marabout. Geertz (1971), 32.

⁷ Geertz (1971), p. 35.

ent religious authority embedded in that relationship. Morocco presents a unique situation in which the state is secular for most practical purposes but the leadership has its foundation in traditional religious belief. According to Francois Burgat, this combination of political and religious authority allows the leadership to control the religious arena to the state's advantage. "The monarchies of Morocco, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, whose legitimacy is naturally founded on traditional ground, are more widely thought of as guardians of religious values than the republican leaders of North Africa, Egypt, Iraq, and Sudan . . ." ⁸ The combination of religious legitimacy and political authority in Morocco found in the institution of the monarchy has had the advantage of immunizing the Moroccan leadership from much religious attack. As a traditional institution promoting fundamental Islamic values in Moroccan society and government, the monarchy has left fundamentalist groups with little room to maneuver. The king has allowed Islamic schools to exist and has created an avenue for religious authority under the auspices of the state in the form of the High Council of Ulemas and the Ministry of Religion.

Although the Maghreb is predominantly Muslim and religious, strong support for secularism exists in Tunisia and Algeria, and the governments of those countries view Islamic groups as the major threat to state stability. Both states have engaged in efforts to co-opt and control religious institutions and leaders in order to weaken their influence in the public and political arena. Tunisia's first president took the country on a modernist path, decrying Muslim traditions that obstructed national modernization. His techniques were radical in their approach, and they created substantial resentment in the largely traditional population. ⁹ His successor allowed religion to enter the public sphere, but only briefly. Upon realizing the strength of the Islamic opposition, he proceeded to arrest Islamists and ban the religious parties from political participation, disallowing any party with a religious term in its name. These severe techniques led many Islamist leaders, including Rashid Ghannoushi, the founder of the fundamentalist Ennahda (Renaissance) movement, to seek refuge in other countries. Secularist elites in Tunisia agree with the government in viewing the fundamentalist movement of Ennahda as a threat. Despite the group's claims to engage in the democratic system, secularists in Tunisia remain skeptical that the fundamentalists would stay true to this agenda once in power. The secularists' repudiation of the goals of the fundamentalist movement, including the instatement of *shari'a* and a *shura*, lends support to the drastic and authoritarian measures taken by the government against the Islamists.

Groups interested in promoting aspects of Islam that are not secular but are compatible with modernity have become a powerful force in Tunisia. In the late

⁸ Burgat (2003), p. 51.

⁹ Burgat and Dowell (1997), p. 141.

1970s, the Tunisian Ahmida Enneifer led a movement toward Islamic reform through *ijtihad*. His exposure to Egyptian fundamentalist ideas had turned him away from their prescriptions and had convinced him that fundamentalism was obsolete and not applicable to the problems of modern Tunisia. The progressive movement led by Enneifer, known as the Islamic Group, avoided the political sphere and was heavily influenced by the ideas of the Egyptian Hassan Hanafi. Hanafi argued that competing with the political authorities would lead nowhere. Instead, the movement should be flexible with regard to what political structures are in place and should allow modernity in society while preserving Islamic culture. Enneifer supported Hanafi's ideas and criticized the literalist interpretations of the Quran by Ennahda and the fundamentalists. Enneifer's movement has presented itself as the alternative to secularism and fundamentalism, a path focusing upon Islam among civil society rather than in government.

The Growth of Islamic Fundamentalism in the Maghreb

Radical Islamic fundamentalism has grown in acceptance throughout the Maghreb since the 1970s. In contrast to the vast majority of traditionalists across the region, fundamentalists are extremely well organized. The groups maintain distinct organizations in each country, but they are not coordinated across national borders and in fact differ substantively in their goals and ideology. Radical fundamentalist groups in the region have pursued the most violent approach through permitting various Salafist individuals and groups to apply at will *takfir*, the ability to declare others apostates of Islam. Salafist groups in the Maghreb have used this authority to label various governments, supporters of the government, and often innocent civilians as *kafirs* (unbelievers) for opposing, resisting, or not supporting the Salafist movement.

The primary proponents of Sunni fundamentalist thought in the Maghreb are the Salafist groups in Algeria, Ennahda in Tunisia, and Al Adl Wal Ihsane in Morocco. All these movements were influenced by earlier fundamentalist movements and thinkers, such as the Muslim Brotherhood's Hassan al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb, and Maulana Abu al-A'la Mawdudi. However, their religious development and their relationship with the governing institutions of the state differ. The fundamentalist groups in Algeria largely reject traditional practices in the region, decrying them as superstitious, whereas the largest Moroccan fundamentalist movement has its roots in Sufi traditions. The Algerian Salafist groups are the most extreme in belief and practice: Since their failure to take over via the ballot, various factions support violent attacks upon the military or civilians to gain power. The Tunisian movement Ennahda explicitly accepts democracy even if it results in victory for an un-Islamic party. Various observers doubt the sincerity of Ennahda's commitment to democratic practice, however. The largest Moroccan fundamentalist movement, led by Al Adl Wal

Ihsane, accepts some traditional belief and practice but rejects electoral democracy. However, smaller, more violent groups have also become more active in Morocco recently.

Algeria

The independence movement in Algeria started as a violent struggle and was integrally connected to the religious reform movement. These linkages laid the foundation for a tradition of religiously based war in the country. Algerian reformism was influenced by the thought of Muhammad Abduh, the Egyptian thinker who stressed the need to purify Islam from the corrupt ideas and superstitions that had weakened it by returning to the Quran and the sunna. Abduh had visited Algeria in 1903, spreading modernist ideals and inspiring Abdelhamid Ben Badis, later to be a leading reformist in Algeria's movement.¹⁰ In 1931, Ben Badis organized a group of Islamic reformists called the Association of Algerian Muslim Ulama (AUMA). Ben Badis and the AUMA focused on cleansing society of alcoholism, gambling, and other vices and also established educational establishments to spread their teachings. A primary goal of the organization was the elimination of popular forms of Islamic practice, such as the Sufi traditions of mysticism and veneration of the marabout. It was also involved in lobbying for equal status of Algerians with the French and for the recognition of Arabic as an official language, and it sought to work cooperatively with the French authorities.¹¹ However, AUMA's actions resulted in French attempts to control its activities and arrest its members, and relations between the AUMA and the French authorities became increasingly hostile.

In 1954, a new independence movement under the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) began attacks on the French administration in Algeria and found support for its activities among the leaders of the AUMA. With this critical support, the FLN absorbed the AUMA in 1957, giving the nationalist fight for independence an aura of religious legitimacy. Using terrorist methods in order to gain independence from France, the rebels of the FLN took on the title of *mujahidin* and stated as a goal, "the restoration of the sovereign, democratic and social Algerian state within the framework of Islamic principles."¹² Despite the deep influence of Islam upon the independence struggle, socialism quickly became the dominant philosophy in the FLN during the war. The primary proponent of socialist thought was Ahmed Ben Bella, a senior FLN leader. Stating that socialism and Islam are compatible, Ben Bella became the first president of Algeria and attempted to follow a socialist path despite great support for a more Islamic form of governance. The Algerian army under Colonel

¹⁰ Willis (1996), p. 9.

¹¹ Willis (1996), p. 18.

¹² Willis (1996), p. 23.

Houari Boumedienne took control in a coup in 1965, thus beginning decades of military rule with a very limited role for Islam in politics. After Boumedienne's death in 1978, the Islamist movement gained in strength and popularity, defining itself against the growing Berber nationalist and Algerian women's movements and receiving inspiration from such international events as the Islamic revolution in Iran.¹³ In 1989, Abbasi Madani and Ali Belhadj established an Islamist party named the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS).

Egyptian thought deeply influenced the development of Islamic fundamentalism in Algeria. Sheikh Mohammad al-Ghazzali, an Egyptian, was brought to Algeria in the 1980s as part of the state's attempts to show its support for Islam. Al-Ghazzali was formerly a member of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and a proponent of Islam as a religion of "humanism and progress."¹⁴ The Algerian government of President Chadli Benjedid (1979–1992) fostered al-Ghazzali's influence through extensive media coverage in order to counteract more radical interpretations of Islam. Al-Ghazzali developed a conservative interpretation of the Quran, and his teachings spread these interpretations through his broad exposure to the public in Algeria, providing the philosophical base for a wider fundamentalist movement. The most organized group reflecting the ideas of Ghazzali and the Muslim Brotherhood was the Islamic Salvation Front. FIS was created as a political vehicle for promoting Islamic values and Islamic law in Algeria. For years after independence, the FIS was not allowed to participate in elections in opposition to the ruling National Liberation Front. As the party of independence, the FLN maintained complete control and authority in Algerian politics. However, the inability of the FLN to deliver economic development and good governance became increasingly evident, and opposition movements slowly gained ground.

The failings of the FLN rapidly translated into opportunities for the FIS, which promised to fulfill its political objectives using Islamic methods. Under the leadership of Abbasi Madani and Ali Belhadj, the group became increasingly powerful. The FLN, sensing the increasing authority of the Algerian Islamist movement, decided to provide a valve for dissent through open elections. Finally allowed to participate and contest in national politics, in 1991 the FIS swept local elections and proceeded to win the first round of the subsequent national elections as well. The results of the first round indicated that FIS would likely win a clear majority of seats after the second round and might possibly even attain the two-thirds majority needed to implement changes to the constitution.¹⁵ This unexpected result led to a rapid reversal by the Algerian military. The military deposed President Benjedid just days before the

¹³ Willis (1996), p. 104.

¹⁴ Willis (1996), p. 77.

¹⁵ Willis (1996), p. 232.

second round of elections.¹⁶ The Islamic party was banned, and its leaders imprisoned for the next decade. Outrage at the nullification of election results led to a prolonged and vicious cycle of violence and civil war between government forces and militant factions of the opposition Islamic group.

One of the most critical debates regarding the banning of the FIS was between those who believe that the FIS would have supported democratic governance and those who argue that a victory for FIS would have led to a permanent authoritarian Islamic state. Part of this ambivalence was due to the division within the FIS leadership. Abbasi Madani was viewed as favoring democracy and a more moderate method of promoting Islam in Algerian society. His leadership was greatly revered and possibly formed the basis for the widespread popularity of FIS. However, his partner Ali Belhadj was in favor of a far more extreme form of Islamic governance. On many occasions, Belhadj indicated that, if the Islamist movement were in power, it could not morally and would not in fact allow the democratic process to continue. Belhadj's perspective reflected the belief that only those who understand the rules of *ijtihad* are qualified to determine laws for the people.¹⁷ In any case, the banning of FIS before historical events could provide a resolution to the debate led to the rise of several militant groups demanding the reinstatement of FIS and Islamic governance.

After the FIS was banned in 1992, Islamic groups took up arms in the face of a closed political system to reclaim what they considered their rightful role as the political leaders of the nation. These violent radical fundamentalist groups were made up of individuals who had rejected the feasibility of democratic means to establish an Islamic state. The Armed Islamic Group (GIA) and the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) were at the forefront of a campaign of terrorism, leading to the death of approximately 100,000 in the decade after the banning of the FIS. Some of the Islamists in the GIA and GSPC had originally supported the FIS electoral attempt but saw the cancellation of elections as a sign to move forward with a militant strategy.¹⁸ The GIA in particular has been notable in its use of indiscriminate violence against both military and civilian targets, including villagers, the media, schools, and foreign nationals. Its approach has been to label all those who do not rise in its support as *kafir*, thereby legitimizing the killing of such individuals. The GSPC, alternatively, arose as a more moderate jihadist movement, decrying the use of such indiscriminate violence against civilian populations. This group has adopted a far more limited definition of *kafir*. It permits violence against the regime and military but does not promote attacks against civilians. However, other splinter move-

¹⁶ Willis (1996), p. 250.

¹⁷ Burgat and Dowell (1997), p. 125.

¹⁸ Willis (1996), p. 279.

ments reflect this divide in their interpretation of *takfir* and have generated further violence by labeling each other as *kafir* and engaging in intra-Salafist jihad.

The GSPC has been involved in the past few years in various attacks on security forces inside Algeria and has been linked with Al Qaeda as well.¹⁹ Algerian individuals connected to the GSPC have been held for being involved in the ricin poison plot in London, raising funds for Al Qaeda, producing forged documents and weaponry for terrorist purposes, and kidnapping. These individuals have been apprehended in Britain, France, Spain, and other European countries. Terrorists connected to the GSPC carried out a highly publicized kidnapping of 32 Europeans in Algeria in February 2003.

Michael Willis, an expert on the Islamist movement in Algeria and critic of the Algerian government, has stated that the Algerian regime has allowed radical groups such as the GIA to continue operating for political purposes. He argues that militant activity by the GIA permits the government to engage in internal repression and to justify high levels of defense spending and stops criticism from the international community. In his view, the Algerian government benefited from the war on terrorism, "Now they say, we have terrorism, and you have terrorism. We are all fighting the same enemy, so give us more weapons and don't bother us about human rights and democracy."²⁰

However, in 2004, Algeria was able to conduct a remarkably free and peaceful presidential election. An amnesty for armed Islamists may have reduced the level of conflict, convincing many of the battle-hardened to lay down their arms.²¹ More than a decade after the electoral debacle of 1991, Algeria's political environment has become considerably more stable, with a variety of individuals and parties contending for leadership of the country. Incumbent President Abdelaziz Bouteflika of the FLN swept the election with 83 percent of the vote, but not before a heated contest between several viable candidates.²² He faced competition from the Secretary-General of the FLN, former Prime Minister Ali Benflis, a competition that created a division in the FLN. In addition, another prominent figure who opposed Bouteflika for the presidency was Abdallah Djaballah, the leader of the moderate Muslim party El Islah.²³ Djaballah's party supported the free press and the Algerian constitution, and in 2002, El Islah came in third in local elections. The participation of Djaballah and other moderate Islamic parties in Algerian elections reflects the considerable pro-

¹⁹ Jonathan Schanzer, "Algeria's GSPC and America's 'War on Terror,'" *Policywatch*, No. 666, October 2, 2002, available at <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/watch/>, last accessed August 4, 2004.

²⁰ Interview with the author in Ifrane, Morocco, May 2003.

²¹ "Freer and More Peaceful: An Election in Algeria," *The Economist*, April 17, 2004.

²² Julia K. Voelker, "Outside View: New Voices in Algeria," *United Press International*, May 10, 2004.

²³ "Freer and More Peaceful," op. cit.

gress Algeria has made toward building democratic institutions and parties in the past decade. The peaceful conclusion of the 2004 elections and the decreased involvement of radical Islamic groups in the political process indicate that democracy is indeed possible in Algeria.

Tunisia

Habib Bourguiba spearheaded the independence movement in Tunisia in 1934 with the establishment of the Neo-Destour Party (New Constitution Party). The independence struggle continued in Tunisia for 20 years until France granted the country independence in 1956. Tunisia then rejected both monarchy and democracy and adopted an authoritarian secular government as a path to modernity. With President Bourguiba at the helm, Tunisia developed rapidly, making significant progress in education for both men and women. However, democratic norms were not established; from 1963 to 1981, Bourguiba's party remained the only recognized party, and in 1975 he was named president for life. In 1987, Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali, then Prime Minister of Tunisia, deposed Bourguiba and became president. President Ben Ali continued the authoritarian political system established by Bourguiba, allowing the dominance of a single party in Tunisian politics. Ben Ali also continued the tradition of secular politics in Tunisia, allowing little maneuvering room for Islamist politics in the country. However, the harsh measures used by Bourguiba and Ben Ali prompted Islamists to seek refuge and regroup abroad. Since September 11, several Tunisian émigrés have been arrested in Italy and France for connection to Islamic terrorist groups and activities.

The Tunisian government is secular and has limited the role of Islam in the state since independence. Under President Ben Ali, the country has focused its efforts on co-opting Islam and Islamic ideology by overseeing mosques and religious education in the country. People are dissuaded from wearing Islamic dress or beards. Nonetheless, Tunisia has had to struggle with Islamic fundamentalism, because of both the organized Ennahda movement and the growth of more radical organizations willing to use violence to attain their goals. Tunisia's most recent brush with radical Islamic groups was in 2002, when a Tunisian suicide bomber, Nizar Nawar, assisted by relatives, orchestrated a dramatic attack on a historic synagogue on April 11 in Djerba that killed 21 people, mainly German tourists. A group called the "Islamic Army to Liberate the Holy Places" claimed responsibility in a statement after the attack. They claimed that Nawar's purpose had been to avenge Israeli crimes against the Palestinians.²⁴ A more troubling trend is the involvement of Tunisians living in Europe in recent terrorist attacks outside Tunisia. A Tunisian national, Sarhane Ben Abdelmajid Fakhel, was suspected to be the leader of the terrorist group that con-

²⁴ "Tunisia Now Says Explosion Was Terrorism," *United Press International*, April 22, 2002.

ducted the Madrid train bombing in March 2004 (Fakhet was among four suspects who blew themselves up on April 3, 2004 as police raided their Madrid apartment).²⁵ Another Tunisian, known as Ihsan G., was arrested for planning multiple bombings in Germany. He is suspected of receiving training in Afghanistan in early 2003 and then attempting to recruit others in Germany to form a terrorist group.²⁶ The involvement of these key individuals in terrorist activities outside Tunisia is an area of concern that is easily overlooked as a result of the relative calm inside Tunisia.

The Tunisian government's larger battle until now has been in the domestic arena with the fundamentalist group Ennahda. Ennahda became the largest Islamic organization in Tunisia after independence. Rashid Ghannoushi formed the movement in opposition to President Bourguiba's programs for Tunisia. Resentment was rising against Bourguiba because he was widely perceived as hostile to Islam and unable to address the economic and social problems plaguing Tunisia. His controversial policies included the use of French as the official language, the banning of polygamy, a ban on wearing the veil, and encouraging the public to ignore the fast of Ramadan. In response, Ghannoushi and his colleagues Ahmida Enneifer and Abdelfattah Mourou promoted the use of Arabic and the adoption of Islamic values in society. The founders of the movement were greatly influenced by literature of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, as well as the Tabligh movement from India.

The Ennahda movement grew increasingly political in the late 1970s under the name of Jamaah al-Islamiya, and it undertook a more active program of social and political change with the ultimate goal of establishing an Islamic state. Ghannoushi particularly emphasized the necessity of promoting practical social objectives through Islam rather than abstruse philosophical debates. According to Tunisian Minister of Education Moncer Rouissi, there were three main reasons for the rise of Ennahda's popularity during these years: Bourguiba's harsh methods toward Islam, Ennahda's social activism, and its work in education.²⁷ Bourguiba's public statements and aggressive pursuit of a secular society were exploited by his Islamist opponents, who portrayed him as an enemy of Islam. Like other Islamist groups, Ennahda was able to gain widespread support among teachers and academics. Through this support group, Ennahda was able to promote Islamization and Arabization of the curriculum, changing lessons and textbooks to conform to its ideological vision.

The goals of Ennahda for Tunisia included a government with an elected president and elected parliament, in which the authority of the constitution and laws were vested in shari'a. In this system, Islam would be the state religion. Ghannoushi stated

²⁵ "Madrid 'Ringleader' Blew Self Up," CBSNews.com, April 4, 2004, at <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/04/05/world/main610192.shtml>.

²⁶ "Witness Incriminates Al-Qa'idah Suspect at German Terror Trial," *BBC Monitoring International Reports*, May 11, 2004.

²⁷ Interview with Moncer Rouissi, Minister of Education, Government of Tunisia, Tunis, Tunisia, May 2003.

that Quran was the ultimate law for the rulers and the people and was above laws reached through *ijtihad* (critical reasoning). However, he envisioned two major methods by which the people could be represented in the legislative decisionmaking process. The community (*umma*) would be able to create laws through direct *shura*, or referenda, on vital issues facing the state. In addition, an elected group could act as a *shura* council and create laws that conform to shari'a.²⁸ This group and the president were to be subject to the qualification that they be good Muslims, narrowing the possibilities for candidates considerably. Ghannoushi also provided that the candidate for presidency be nominated by the shura council. His model for an Islamic democratic state did not allow for equality for non-Muslims. Ghannoushi later focused the aims of the movement on bringing Islam into the state and society in coordination with the democratic system and criticized the Tunisian authorities for their lack of democracy.²⁹ As Ennahda gathered strength, Bourguiba moved to subjugate the organization, arresting Ghannoushi and others in 1981. Ghannoushi's party persistently pushed for the ability to compete politically in Tunisia. In 1984, after his release from prison, Ghannoushi stated Ennahda's willingness to participate in a democratic system, even if communists were to be the victors of the process.³⁰

In a crackdown in 1991, the Tunisian government moved against the fundamentalists, arresting many, including the leaders of Ennahda. In August 1992, Ghannoushi fled to London. Many Tunisian commentators view Ghannoushi's statements after his exile skeptically, saying that Ghannoushi simply changed the message to fit his more liberal audience in the West after seeking refuge abroad. After the dismantlement of Ennahda, no other fundamentalist group has been able to effectively organize in Tunisia. The Islamic Jihad has most effectively spearheaded the neo-fundamentalist movement, using violence to further its fundamentalist goals. This small group was responsible for bombing four hotels in Tunisia in 1987 in response to the hanging of one of its members by the government. Subsequent arrests weakened the Islamic Jihad further, and its strength is currently unclear.

Fundamentalists also have found no room to maneuver within the current political system. Tunisian officials say that incorporating fundamentalists into the political process would be inviting danger. Government restrictions banning wearing the *hijab* (veil or Muslim head scarf) in school and large group meetings are meant to discourage the citizenry from gravitating toward fundamentalist groups or practices. Regulation of mosques, religious education, and the appointment of imams by the government ensure that religious authorities do not stray into the fundamentalist camp. The educational system has incorporated religious education into the official

²⁸ Hamdi (1998), p. 110.

²⁹ Burgat and Dowell (1997), p. 127.

³⁰ Burgat and Dowell (1997), p. 195.

curriculum, infusing a liberal interpretation of Islam and Islamic law into the classroom and textbooks and ensuring that fundamentalists cannot recruit using these methods.³¹ The government also monitors sermons in the mosques.

This level of regulation, however, has created tensions. Some Tunisians state that Tunisia is not a Muslim country because the mosques are controlled by the government. They argue that regulation and inhibition of religious activity causes frustration, making religious Islamic activity even more attractive, and that opening the religious atmosphere in Tunisia would allow the public to practice their beliefs responsibly. A prominent Tunisian scholar says that the Tunisian people dislike Ben Ali because he is a dictator and a friend of the United States. "The Islamists could not win an election if it were democratic, but if Bush's policies continue, and if Ben Ali continues to be dictatorial, this will favor the fundamentalists."³²

Tunisians admit that there are indications of a societal shift toward religiosity, though not necessarily fundamentalism. As in Morocco, young women are increasingly wearing the hijab, a move with far more serious implications in Tunisia. In this secularized state, repeatedly wearing the hijab to school against the regulations can lead to expulsion. Observers note that there is also a renaissance of religion as a form of political protest among the younger generation. Some Tunisians believe this protest is one that is aimed both at the authoritarian Tunisian government of Ben Ali and at the United States for its perceived unjust foreign policies. According to one disgruntled Tunisian, "Americans come and speak highly of Ben Ali and his system. The west is not ready or serious about exporting democracy because dictators serve the interests of the west better than democracies. They only want democracy within their own borders." Many Tunisians frankly admit their fear and anger of the United States and its policies toward the Palestinians and Iraq. They state that until these issues are resolved fairly, the hostility toward the government and the trend toward fundamentalism will continue to rise.

Morocco

Morocco was the sole country of the Maghreb to attempt a constitutional monarchy after independence, under Mohammed V of the Alawite dynasty. The independence movement in Morocco was rooted in various concurrent movements arising in opposition to French influence upon Moroccan society, including a religious traditional movement and the nationalist movement. The central role of traditional Islam during independence established its legitimacy as a political force in Morocco. A secret organization called the *Zawiya* (religious brotherhood) was established in 1930, led by a mix of men with a modern education and those with a more traditional Islamic

³¹ Moncer Rouissi in an interview with the author, Tunis, Tunisia, May 2003.

³² Tunisian scholar in an interview with the author, Tunis, Tunisia, May 2003.

education. The Zawiya focused on establishing an independent and democratic Morocco. A major activity of the Zawiya was the establishment of Free Schools, a movement initiated by Salafis in the 1920s to provide modern and Islamic education in Arabic. Several subsequent leaders of the nationalist movement, such as Allal Fassi, Mohamed Ghazi, and Mohamed bel-Arabi al-Alaoui, began their careers as teachers in these Free Schools.³³ Various others focused on establishing publications to spread nationalist ideas.

The nationalist movement in Morocco coalesced in the 1930s around Sidi Mohammed as its symbol and leader. He took the title of king rather than sultan, a move that indicated an acceptance of modernity while retaining the traditional basis of authority in the Moroccan monarchy. In 1944, the nationalists, including former members of the Zawiya, established the Istiqlal Party, or the Party of Independence. The new party demanded a democratic and independent Morocco under Sidi Mohammed. The king continued pressing for democracy and independence, until he was deposed and exiled to Madagascar by the French in 1953. The arrest and exile of Sidi Mohammed cemented his position as head of the nation and leader of the independence movement. Two years later he was allowed to return, and formal independence from France was achieved in 1956.

King Mohammed V was accepted in Morocco as the Commander of the Faithful, the religious and political leader of the country. After his sudden death in 1961, his son Hassan II became king. However, King Hassan II's rule was well known for its repression of political opponents, and he faced two high-profile assassination attempts from within the government. His successor, the youthful King Mohammed VI, has transformed and expanded the political system to incorporate democratic practices in parliamentary elections. This political opening has revealed the growing influence of Islamic parties and actors in Morocco as well.

In Morocco, traditional Islam remains a dominant force, particularly in the countryside. The belief and practice affiliated with traditionalism in Morocco are reinforced by the presence of King Mohammed VI and his base of religio-political authority. The monarch has played a central role in unifying the ethnically diverse country and has gained substantial respect from the citizenry for doing so. However, radical and fundamentalist groups that can challenge the authority of the monarchy have become increasingly powerful. The May 2003 bombing of multiple locations in Casablanca, which killed 42 people, is a reflection of newly aggressive violent Salafist groups working in Morocco. The more nonviolent, yet antimonarchical fundamentalist groups, such as Al Adl Wal Ihsane, have found unprecedented popularity among the general public. Last, the rise in popularity of the moderate Islamic Party of Justice and Development (PJD) in recent elections shows that there is popular

³³ Pennell (2000), p. 186.

support for some fundamentalist ideas among the population. Young women in Morocco also indicate the trend through their increasingly popular and voluntary use of the hijab in the past few years.

The Casablanca bombings by radical Salafists sent a message to the monarchy that its religious and political authority was by no means unquestioned. The bombings by radicals were carried out against a Spanish restaurant, a Jewish cultural association, a Jewish-owned Italian restaurant, an international hotel, and a Jewish cemetery. The ultra-radical groups Salafia Jihadia and Assirat Al-Mustaqim, which are believed to be behind the bombing, derive their followers from the uneducated and unemployed in Morocco.³⁴ Some reports indicate that recruits are even taken from the ranks of the city's alcohol-drinking population, who are indoctrinated before being sent out to perform duties for the groups.³⁵ The Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM) has also been connected with the Casablanca bombings.³⁶ This group comprises Moroccans who were recruited to train and fight in Afghanistan. The ultimate goal of the GICM is the establishment of an Islamic state in Morocco, but they are also believed to support the objectives of Al Qaeda.³⁷ These terrorist groups support a radical and marginal Salafist ideology that was not well known in Morocco until recently.

The March 2003 train bombings in Madrid that killed 191 people indicate that Moroccan terrorist groups are active in Europe as well. A group of predominantly Moroccan radicals was suspected in connection with the bombings, possibly under the direction of Al Qaeda.³⁸ The Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group was again implicated in the attacks.³⁹ In the aftermath of the bombings in Spain, Moroccan radical groups have drawn considerable international attention. Although several members of these radical groups were either killed in suicide attacks or intercepted, a number of sleeper cells are believed to still be active in various countries of Europe.

The Salafist movement in Morocco began among the Quranic and traditional schools of Tangiers. According to a Moroccan scholar of political Islam, the 1980s saw a flow of Saudi funds into Morocco for religious education.⁴⁰ The first Quranic houses were established in Marrakesh, Tangiers, and other urban centers. These schools maintained connections to schools in Saudi Arabia. The authorities did not

³⁴ Nizar Al-Aly, "Morocco: Poverty Blamed for Terrorist Attack," May 19, 2003, *Inter Press Service*; "Moroccan Paper Views Recruitment Methods of Islamist Extremist Groups," *Casablanca Assabah*, in Arabic, July 4, 2003.

³⁵ "Moroccan Paper Views Recruitment Methods," *op. cit.*

³⁶ Sebastian Rotella, "Spain Hunts Fugitive Tied to Al Qaeda," *Los Angeles Times*, April 14, 2004.

³⁷ Nicolas Marmie, "Moroccan Authorities Send Experts to Help with Madrid Bombing, Identify Detainees," *The Associated Press*, March 13, 2004.

³⁸ Rotella, *op. cit.*

³⁹ Jon Henley, "Afghan Moroccans' Held in Casablanca Blasts Inquiry," *The Guardian (London)*, April 6, 2004.

⁴⁰ Mohamed Tozy, in an interview with the author, Casablanca, Morocco, May 2003.

pay sufficient attention to these groups and trends because the groups were not political and were therefore not viewed as a threat. In addition to the religious schooling, the media was used effectively by Islamist groups. The Arabic-language media and television stations have focused on religious and Islamic issues and have benefited from generous Saudi financing. According to this scholar, the use of the media to relay religious values has the added effect of resolving the contradiction between modernity and Islam. As satellite television becomes increasingly popular, Moroccans are viewing a standardized, global Islam that is practiced by Muslim communities everywhere. The media have helped to popularize non-Moroccan Islamic traditions such as the hijab and chador.

Despite the high profile of the more violent Islamist groups, the most influential Islamic fundamentalist organization in Morocco is Al Adl wal Ihsane (Justice and Charity). This group does not participate in politics and pointedly boycotted the elections of September 2002. The group was formed by Sheikh Abdelsalem Yassine in the early 1970s. Yassine questioned the authority of the monarchy in Morocco, as well as its claim to religious legitimacy. He sent a letter to King Hassan II, titled "Islam or the deluge," stating his views and was imprisoned for the next six years. The government also banned his organization and arrested many of its other leaders. Yassine's philosophy, nonetheless, has been able to draw substantial support from the population. Separate from fundamentalist movements in Algeria or Tunisia, Yassine retains a connection to his Sufi roots and the charismatic authority that he wields through his historical connection to the *tariqa* (Sufi orders). This difference is substantial, in that the fundamentalist opposition in Morocco clearly is built upon local traditionalism whereas fundamentalist movements elsewhere reflect Arab or pan-Muslim trends. Yassine also carefully expanded the applicability of his ideology by incorporating the arguments of the left. Emphasizing social justice and utilizing the organizational finesse of leftist groups, he has been able to control much of the political discourse in opposition to the monarchy. Yassine's indigenous fundamentalist movement has thus consolidated its support base; in the face of opposition from the monarchy, the group has continued to grow in popularity. Its membership is estimated to be from 50,000 to a few hundred thousand.

The similarity between the Moroccan and other fundamentalist movements is in their ideological and political goals for the state. According to a representative of Al Adl Wal Ihsane interviewed in Casablanca in 2003, "The global goal is to bring back the caliphate, following the Prophet's words." Along the path to that goal, Morocco has encountered different types of kingdoms, particularly the kingdom of "biting," in which the government implements the shari'a, and the kingdom of "obliging," in which the government has inherited shari'a but does not implement it. In bringing back the caliphate, he says, Morocco will undergo a cyclical historical process that passes through both these types of kingdoms. "In the hadith, there was a caliphate, then there was a kingdom of biting, then of obliging, that is today, then it

goes back to the caliphate.” He also noted that the kingdom of “obliging” is also to be found in the Ba’ath Party of Syria, Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, and Libya.

With regard to the monarchy, Al Adl Wal Ihsane argues although the monarchy relies on Islam as the basis for legitimacy, it does not follow the rules of Islam. They criticize the monarchy’s monopoly of the religious, political and military spheres simultaneously. In particular, Al Adl Wal Ihsane disputes the King’s authority as Commander of the Faithful (religious leader of all Moroccans) and maintains that the political leadership should be elected. The process for election, however, is complex. According to the group, rules would be instituted to ensure suitable candidates within the framework of an Islamic state. The leader and other political representatives would need to have all the requirements of a good Muslim before being elected. A shura would be responsible for electing the caliph. The group says that currently there is a separation between state and religion that precludes the establishment of a shura. Eventually, the conditions for the shura will emerge, the representative says. “After we reach government, there will be some political parties there, they can be communist, or some other party. Are we going to eliminate them? They are going to die by themselves, because the people will not like them, not follow them, and they will disappear.” The process for instituting the caliphate is long and established by the Quran. Al Adl Wal Ihsane states that fifteen years would be needed to educate the people, a reference to the fact that the Prophet took fifteen years to educate the people of Medina to understand Islam. The movement accords its success in Morocco to the power of religion, arguing that people are attracted to their group not because of economic duress but because they seek a more Islamic lifestyle and society.

In response to the rise in influence of Al Adl Wal Ihsane, the government of Morocco allowed the establishment of a moderate Islamic party, the Party of Justice and Development (PJD) with the intent of drawing away the support base of Yassine. The PJD supports Islamic ideals in governance but is careful not to challenge the authority of the monarchy. Although the PJD has a fundamentalist political ideology, it believes in working within the existing system. By permitting a party with ideals that overlap Yassine’s, the monarchy believed that it could weaken the Islamic opposition movement and control its direction. In its first five years, the PJD was a peripheral force, unable to muster more than a few seats in parliament. In the 2002 parliamentary elections, however, the organization moved beyond the expectations of most observers, becoming the third-largest political force in Morocco after the nationalist Istiqlal Party and the socialists. Support for Al Adl Wal Ihsane compared with PJD is difficult to assess, however, because some members of the PJD are known to be members of the banned Al Adl Wal Ihsane as well.

The PJD’s strength lies in its reputation for being close to the people and in its ability to court supporters legally. The candidates fielded by the party are selected on the basis of being known as good religious citizens who are also well respected in their communities. The PJD political agenda aims to refocus the legal, political, and

economic goals to consolidate Morocco's Muslim heritage. In particular, the PJD criticizes the French colonial legacy in the Moroccan educational and legal system. According to a leading PJD parliamentarian, "The French tried to create a different mentality through more Western schools, and also Western laws. It was like cultural colonization. They marginalized traditional education and culture."⁴¹ He also emphasized that this change was most apparent in the cities, so that the cities became progressively Westernized whereas the rural areas remained traditional. The result is that Morocco "is not a society that lives under one roof." However, the party does not have an explicit policy platform reflective of Islamic values. Politically, the PJD states that it would like to work within the constitutional monarchy. The PJD views the monarchy as a unifying force for the country and stresses that it wants to work with the king to resolve the problems of Moroccan society. On economic issues, the PJD mentions a vague formula emphasizing the importance of justice, equity, and closeness to society.

A representative of the PJD described three main reasons for increased public support in the recent elections: (1) People trust the PJD because of the party's clean record. (2) People have tried other parties and are disappointed with their performance. (3) People are attracted by the religious aspect of the PJD. The image of the party is that of a clean organization that, unlike the mainstream Istiqlal and USFP parties, has not been co-opted by the system. Members of the PJD believe that Moroccans voted for the party because, as a religious party, the PJD is accepted as more trustworthy and serious. The PJD prides itself in being able to respond to the problems of the community because of its proximity to the people it represents. It is well known that in the aftermath of elections, both in 1997 and 2002, the PJD revisited areas it had contested to thank the electorate, whether or not its candidates had won. Unsurprisingly, this strategy won them further support.

An observer from the Social Democratic Party (SDP) put forth another reason for the PJD's success, saying that the rise of Islam as a factor in Moroccan politics is mainly the result of manipulation by the Moroccan government. He said that in the 1970s, the authoritarian government of Morocco depended on the Islamic movements to counteract the leftists. Now, the Islamists have become more independent and are no longer willing to take instructions from the government; they have their own social and popular base with the people. Nonetheless, even this opposition politician conceded that the PJD has an extensive network throughout society, including development associations, literacy programs, and microcredit lending.⁴²

Both *Al Adl wal Ihsane* and the PJD draw significant support from the poorer regions of the country and disadvantaged segments of society, although they have an

⁴¹ Author's interview with Mohamed Yatim, PJD member of Parliament, Rabat, Morocco, May 2003.

⁴² Author's interview with Social Democratic Party politician, Rabat, Morocco, May 2003.

intellectual following as well. A Moroccan professor explained that the rise of Islamism in Morocco has resulted from the failure of the democratization process. He noted that the movements are essentially political rather than religious, and Islam is increasingly becoming the refuge for people who do not find institutional means at their disposal to confront the regime.⁴³ The Islamic movements in Morocco have moved to fill in the gaps in social services left by the government, increasing their popularity in the process. Both Al Adl wal Ihsane and the PJD distribute medicine and other goods to the needy. Al Adl wal Ihsane's strength also lies in its ability to present itself as the true opposition—outside the system and therefore uncorrupted by the monarchy. Because it does not participate in elections, it is free to espouse an ideology that is opposed to the Moroccan political system and the monarchy. The group's ideology is radical and revolutionary. Its representatives emphasize the importance of Islamizing society from the inside, individual by individual. After this is accomplished, Morocco can become a caliphate with a constitution and society based on Islamic law.

Cross-Cutting Trends and Developments in the Maghreb

The inability of secular governments in the region to provide sufficient economic progress and equitable distribution of income has given Islamic groups a way to gather public support. As modernization reaches across the Maghreb, the population is finding that adjustment entails changing traditional modes of thought and ways of working. The result of this challenge has often been a return to the core values in society and religion that have served well over the centuries. Attempts by the governments of Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco to modernize society and increase national wealth have most often led to increasing disparities in income distribution between urban and rural areas and within communities. Inefficient allocation of national wealth—with little regard for development of infrastructure, education, and employment—leaves much room for improvement. In the Maghreb, particularly Morocco and Tunisia, fundamentalist groups have taken advantage of such lapses by the central government. These groups have expanded their outreach into disadvantaged and poor communities, providing social welfare benefits and education in local madrassas.

The absence of representative governing institutions is yet another critical factor creating support for Islamic fundamentalism in the region. The countries of the Maghreb have not established democratic norms, and authoritarian governments have moved to limit the political space to their advantage. In Tunisia, President Ben Ali was elected with over 99 percent of the vote, whereas in Algeria, President

⁴³ Interview with Moroccan professor, Rabat, Morocco, May 2003.

Bouteflika has maintained tight control over the political process. Neither country allows Islamic parties to participate in national elections. In Tunisia, both Bourguiba and Ben Ali pursued harsh policies meant to suppress the Islamist movement. Banning the popular Ennahda from electoral politics encouraged a movement that could be free of legal restraints on its activities. By arresting thousands and using torture and the death penalty, Tunisia may have also created further discontent. Algeria's repressive actions following the election results of 1991 led to a vicious cycle of violence between the radical fundamentalists and the military. FIS supporters believed the banning of the party and nullification of the election results to be sufficient grounds for violent action. The subsequent arrests and murders by military and police gave them a further rationale for violent methods. Morocco presents a unique case in which the monarchy remains above politics, and moderate Islamic and opposition parties are allowed to participate effectively in parliamentary elections. Nonetheless, the most extreme, and possibly most popular, Islamic opposition movement remains outside Moroccan electoral politics. The various opposition movements have found in Morocco's stifling political atmosphere an argument for more radical methods to implement Islamic political ideals. Absent meaningful methods for political discourse, these groups see violence as an increasingly viable political tool. The Casablanca bombings reflect a new aggressive methodology for radical Islamic groups in Morocco.

Internationalization and the spread of communication between both the west and Islam and within the Arab world accelerated the transfer of ideas and their influence into the Maghreb. In universities across the Maghreb, students were exposed to leftist ideas and their modes of dissemination. This ideological mobilization led to an upsurge in organization and political activism by Islamist students. Travel and study in countries further east had the added effect of inculcating knowledge of Islamist ideology in the students of the Maghreb. Particularly in Algeria, teachers and others trained in Egypt were greatly influential and spread their ideologies to the next generation. Ghannoushi studied in Syria, learning Islamic trends there and transferring the knowledge to the Tunisian fundamentalist movement. A noted Tunisian scholar also notes that the contradiction between religious schooling in the Muslim world and the actions of the state are creating problems. "In the U.S. and France, the lessons of the school are reflective of the morals of the state. In the Muslim world it is different. There is a fundamental contradiction where the teacher says that it is correct to cut off the hands as punishment, but the state does not do so." He criticizes this lack of adaptability in the Islamic educational systems, saying that the Tunisian system is alone in acting progressively on this issue.

Opposition by the women's movement and Berber nationalism has further mobilized the Islamists. In Algeria, marches planned by women's groups in opposition to the family code were met by many thousands of women and men rallying in sup-

port of the Islamist agenda. Similarly, the Berbers who were agitating against the Arabization of Algerian society found themselves up against Islamist opposition.⁴⁴

Various historical events have also had a significant impact on the development of fundamentalist movements in the Maghreb. The Arab defeat in the 1967 war led to a widespread sense of disillusionment with Arab nationalism. Many individuals in the Maghreb turned to Islamism in the aftermath of the war, seeking an ideology that could be more effective in challenging the West and its values. This event, combined with the Islamic tone of the independence movements of the Maghreb, set the stage for the rise of Islamist movements in these countries. However, it was the Iranian revolution of 1979 that made the deepest impression on fundamentalists and nationalists of the region. The overthrow of the Shah of Iran by Khomeini in 1979 provided a clear example of the strength of revolutionary Islam.

The Iranian revolution gave fundamentalist groups hope that the West could be defeated by popular support for an Islamic state. Fundamentalists in Tunisia celebrated the Iranian revolution and viewed Khomeini as a leader against oppression, the United States, and global capitalism. Slogans and terminology of the Iranian revolution were adopted, and membership in Tunisian fundamentalist organization grew rapidly.⁴⁵ Influential among teachers in elementary and secondary schools, the movement was able to increase its members even further through its extensive network. In Algeria, several leaders of the Armed Islamic Movement (MIA) traveled to Iran to spend time in its training camps, and other Algerian fundamentalist groups also appear to have cooperated with Iran.⁴⁶ The governments of the region saw the events differently, finding the implications for their own regimes disturbing. The overthrow of a monarchy could not be supported by Morocco. Tunisia found the effect on its own fundamentalist movement to be destabilizing and condemned the shift toward fundamentalism and away from modernity.

The Afghan war against the Soviets created another focal point for Islamists in search of revolution. The war brought together jihadists for an internationalized conflict, a war that was broader than national boundaries. Hundreds of volunteers from Algeria traveled to Afghanistan to assist the mujahidin, and Islamist organizations collected funds to assist the effort.⁴⁷ Returnees brought back Afghan traditional dress and customs and a militant ideology for use in the Algerian context. The Afghan war had a significant effect on the development of radical groups in the region and polarized the political discourse. Hardened by battle, the “Afghanis,” as the Algerian returnees were called, spearheaded the military movement against the ruling FLN.

⁴⁴ Willis (1996), p. 104.

⁴⁵ Hamdi (1998), p. 34.

⁴⁶ Willis (1996), p. 92.

⁴⁷ Willis (1996), p. 93.

The imported radical Salafist strain of Islam prevalent among fighters in Afghanistan promoted violent jihad in order to impose an Islamic state. Moroccans, however, did not participate in the Afghan war to the same extent as Algerians. Some analysts argue that because Moroccan fundamentalists were not persecuted and therefore had little reason to flee their country, Moroccan society was less affected by both the war and the secondary effect of war-hardened Islamist returnees.

The 1991 Iraq War followed shortly after the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan. Although the governments of the Maghreb were supportive of U.S. and international action to force Saddam's withdrawal from Kuwait, the popular reaction was different. Tunisian fundamentalists supported Saddam Hussein and Iraq against the "kafir army" of the United States and the anti-Saddam coalition. Ghannoushi firmly believed that Arabs must stand together, despite the fact that Saddam's authoritarian and cruel methods were well known. This position was inconsistent with the democratic ideals he had set forth for Ennahda and instead was meant to provoke Muslim sentiments and unify the fundamentalist movement against the West. The Gulf War thus served as a catalyst for politicizing the fundamentalists and called into question the ultimate motives of Ghannoushi and Ennahda within Tunisia. In Morocco, people felt that Muslims in general were being attacked.⁴⁸ A respected Moroccan sociologist, Fatema Mernissi, wrote that even the use of "God Bless America" by President Bush created fear of a religious war in the region. "It seemed to be a religious war, a global conspiracy to destroy Islam and win victory for another religion, the religion of arrogant, capitalist America, even though Mr. Bush from time to time used the word 'freedom' alongside the word 'God.'"⁴⁹

Across the Maghreb, political leaders have attempted to contain the threat of Islamic fundamentalism through both authoritarian and more liberal policies. In Algeria, the government has firmly barred the Islamists from taking power at the center, retaining ultimate authority in the hands of the military. The secular government of Tunisia has similarly, albeit more peacefully, limited the role of Islamic parties in politics. However, substantial numbers of Tunisian fundamentalists have resorted to working from abroad. In Morocco, the government has faced a dilemma as it attempts to liberalize the political process and incorporate moderate Islamic parties. Although the government allows a legal political avenue for disaffected segments of the population through the PJD, a significant number of Moroccans nevertheless remain attracted to Al Adl Wal Ihsane and radical Salafist groups. Morocco's success in navigating this situation may provide critical insights for other countries in the Middle East and the Maghreb considering political liberalization and democratization in the future.

⁴⁸ Interviews with various scholars and leaders, Rabat, Morocco, 2003.

⁴⁹ Mernissi (1992), p. 102.

What Has Changed Since September 11?

After September 11, the countries of the Maghreb all condemned the attacks and offered their support to the United States. President Bouteflika also noted that Algeria has faced the problem of radical Islam for years and added that it is most important to address the problems and poverty that serve to recruit radicals.⁵⁰ Tunisia's President Ben Ali emphasized the effectiveness of Tunisia's secular system in combating the fundamentalist threat there. He noted that Tunisia's solid economic growth and secularized education system had contributed to limiting the influence of radical Islam.⁵¹ In Morocco, the king denounced the attacks and called upon Muslims to remain religiously tolerant and moderate. He stressed that Morocco's progress in liberalizing and democratizing the political system had played a critical role in moderating extremist groups and ideologies.⁵² Leaders from all three countries stated the necessity of working through the United Nations in combating the terrorist threat and appealed to the United States to avoid civilian casualties in Afghanistan.

Nonetheless, since September 11, Islamic extremist groups from North Africa have been active in launching attacks against the governments of Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria, as well as against Western interests. Their activities reflect a looser network with less central authority and structure than before September 11. Algerian radicals connected with the GSPC have been active both inside and outside Algeria. Six Algerians were arrested in London for making the poison ricin, and another person apprehended in the same ricin case stabbed a British police officer to death. This high-profile case in January 2003 drew international attention to the issue of radical Algerians working from Britain. Two Algerians were also jailed in April 2003 for recruiting Al Qaeda members in Britain. These individuals were found guilty of raising thousands of pounds for the organization through credit-card fraud, in addition to making military equipment and forged documents for the terrorist group.⁵³ In addition, various Algerian and Tunisian nationals have been apprehended in France and Pakistan and are being questioned regarding their links to Al Qaeda. The GSPC, believed to have connections to Al Qaeda, is responsible for multiple deadly attacks inside Algeria since 9/11. Also, in February and March of 2003, 32 European tourists were kidnapped by the GSPC in six different groups. These tourists were held for ransom during the next few months, with 17 being freed in a raid by the Algerian army in May 2003. This group, including Austrians, Germans, and a Swede, stated that the kidnapers had pointedly said that they wanted to establish an Islamic state,

⁵⁰ "Algeria's Bouteflika Meets with Bush," *Agence France Presse*, November 6, 2001.

⁵¹ "Tunisia: President Condemns Attacks against U.S.," *Africa News*, September 21, 2001.

⁵² "Perversions of Terrorism and Extremism' Unacceptable: Morocco," *Agence France Presse*, November 7, 2001.

⁵³ "Britain Jails Two Algerians for Recruiting for Al Qaeda," *Agence France Presse*, April 1, 2003,

and this possibility had been taken from the GSPC in the 1992 Algerian elections.⁵⁴ The Algerian authorities have concluded that the September 11 attacks and subsequent terrorist activities by Algerian groups and individuals require a coordinated and severe response.

Major terrorist attacks have also occurred in Tunisia and Morocco since September 11. In Tunisia, the bombing of the Ghriba synagogue in April 2002 showed that President Ben Ali's attempts to obliterate Islamic terrorism had not been successful. In May 2002, three Saudi Al Qaeda suspects were apprehended in Morocco for planning terrorist attacks on U.S. and British ships in the Strait of Gibraltar. The subsequent May 2003 bombings in Casablanca show that Morocco has not been able to eliminate the terrorist threat or the radical fundamentalist thread that runs through its society. The major attack on the train in Madrid involved both Tunisian and Moroccan nationals working together with others as a terrorist group. These major incidents, all occurring after September 11, indicate the persistence and possible growth of terrorist groups in the region.

Effect of the Iraq War

Moroccans, Tunisians, and Algerians all reacted with consternation and anger to the war in Iraq. The Moroccan government issued a statement that it was "deeply disappointed" by the use of force in Iraq and stated its solidarity with the people of Iraq.⁵⁵ An estimated hundred thousand people took to the streets of Rabat to protest the war.⁵⁶ In Tunisia, President Ben Ali criticized the use of force and stressed the need to deal with the causes of terrorism, including poverty and the Palestinian conflict.⁵⁷ Algerians also took to the streets to march against the war, except in Algiers, where the government limited public protests. President Bouteflika condemned the use of force in Iraq, stressing the absence of U.N. authorization. He noted that the military action "might lead to catastrophes and is full of dangers for the whole region," and expressed Algeria's solidarity with the Iraqi people.⁵⁸ Other political parties in Algeria stated their opposition and outrage, with the secular Republican National Alliance

⁵⁴ Tony Paterson, "Hostages Seized in the Sahara are Freed after Fatal Shootout," *The Independent*, May 15, 2003.

⁵⁵ "Morocco 'Deeply Disappointed' Force Used to Resolve Iraq Crisis," *Agence France Presse*, March 20, 2003.

⁵⁶ "Morocco: Mass Solidarity Marches in Rabat in Support of Iraq," *BBC Monitoring International Reports*, March 30, 2003.

⁵⁷ "Tunisia: President Draws Attention to Humanitarian Situation in Iraq," *Africa News*, May 15, 2003; "Tunisia: President Ben Ali Discusses 'Terrorism,' Iraq with German Minister," *BBC Monitoring International Reports*, April 8, 2003.

⁵⁸ "Algeria Condemns Resort to Force against Iraq, Expresses Solidarity with People," *BBC Monitoring International Reports*, March 20, 2003.

calling the military actions a “colonial invasion.”⁵⁹ The National Reform Movement, an Islamist party, went further in calling for jihad to defend Iraq.⁶⁰

Among those interviewed, most considered the war unnecessary at best. More often, they commented that it would create even more believers in radical Islam. One Moroccan scholar noted, “It is in instances like Iraq, Afghanistan, or Palestine when Islamism is reinforced. The United States thinks that it is combating extremism but on the contrary this has the opposite effect on Muslims. Muslims feel that their religion is threatened, and that they are victims, and so they should combat these external attacks.”⁶¹ In Tunisia, the reaction was no different. Scholars, citizens, and politicians alike criticized U.S. policies. According to a Tunisian scholar, “If Bush continues to occupy Iraq and help Israel, then the Islamists will be advantaged. Bush wants to combat terrorism, but his policies reinforce terrorism.” Some Moroccans expressed concern regarding the stated purpose of the U.S. intervention in Iraq. They were skeptical that despite the fact that weapons of mass destruction were not found in Iraq, the U.S. pursued military action. A popular parliamentarian from the PJD intimated that a violent reaction to the war was likely sometime in the future. “The fall of the twin towers was related to the first Gulf War. I don’t know what this war will bring, so we have to wait ten years.”⁶² The Casablanca bombings, which took place only days after this statement, were viewed as a reaction to the second U.S. war on Iraq. Michael Willis noted that whereas the hostility of the Islamist movement in the Maghreb has historically been toward France, that has changed now. After the war in Iraq, the Islamist discourse is anti-American rather than anti-French.

Policy Implications for the United States

Efforts by the governments in the Maghreb to control or vanquish Islamic fundamentalism have had uneven success. Algeria’s harsh treatment of radical Islamists has not eradicated the Islamist movement. Radical fundamentalists have mounted terrorist attacks inside Algeria and have demonstrated the capability to organize effectively in Europe as well. Tunisia has had relatively more success domestically, but the expatriate fundamentalist population from Tunisia has only been displaced, not reduced. In Morocco, the government’s ability to open political space for the Islamic parties has had a positive effect on curbing the rise of radical Islam. However, the

⁵⁹ “Algeria: Secular Party Leader Says War in Iraq Is ‘Colonial Invasion,’” *BBC Monitoring International Reports*, April 4, 2003.

⁶⁰ “Algeria: Islamist Party Calls for Jihad in Defense of Iraq,” *BBC Monitoring International Reports*, March 27, 2003.

⁶¹ Author’s interview with Mohammed El Ayadi, Morocco.

⁶² Author’s interview with Mohamed Yatim, Rabat, Morocco.

bombings in Casablanca and Madrid reveal that the problem of violent radical Islamism may be just under the surface and growing.

Continued lack of economic and political development could push more individuals and communities to support fundamentalist groups and their initiatives and poses a real threat to U.S. security. The less advantaged communities of Morocco and Algeria have proven to be recruiting grounds for religious militants. If the basic economic needs of these communities are not met, resentment toward their government will rise. Hostility to the United States is integrally connected with this issue as well. U.S. support of repressive or ineffectual regimes creates the belief among the public that the United States should be held accountable for the regimes' mistakes. U.S. policy in the Maghreb will need to address the issue of poor governance that plagues these countries in order to attract the support of the public for moderate solutions.

The governments of the region clearly support the U.S. aim of reducing the influence of radical fundamentalist Islam in their countries. This implies that the United States should emphasize political and economic reforms to reduce support for radical Islam in the populations of the Maghreb. However, the United States faces difficult decisions in determining how to support democratic reforms in the region without destabilizing friendly governments. True democratic reforms will not necessarily lead to electoral victory for an undemocratic Islamist party. Attention to the construction of constitutions and election laws that regulate the use of religion in politics can help to minimize this risk. Creating a secular democratic basis for the institutions of governance while allowing a free popular vote is key in this process. Economic and educational reforms for the population are also necessary for the long-term success of those institutions.

Morocco has introduced and expanded upon democratic methods slowly and successfully. Nonetheless, great social and economic inequality in Morocco has provided the basis for growing radical Islamist movements in urban areas. Animosity in Tunisia toward the United States for its support of President Ben Ali's government suggests that the United States should carefully evaluate its policy goals there. As tensions build, activity from Tunisian radical groups abroad and simmering discontent within Tunisian society may increasingly be focused on the United States and its interests. In Tunisia, the state does not need to be authoritarian in order to remain secular. In Algeria, the opening of the political system in the past few years has led to a decrease in tensions. The Algerian leadership will need to be careful in continuing the transition to a peaceful and inclusive democracy and will need to reject tendencies toward authoritarianism. The absence of a positive secular model that is democratic in practice has, over time, caused the populations of the Maghreb to identify "democracy" and "secularism" with authoritarian rule. Islamic fundamentalism and its model of governance could become increasingly attractive as a result.

Negative perceptions of U.S. policies in the region only exacerbate this problem. Public opinion in the Maghreb opposed the war on Iraq, and many believe that it was a war against Muslims. Furthermore, some believe that their own country is a likely prospect for U.S. attack in the future. Similarly, there is much criticism of U.S. support for Israel in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. To mitigate these effects, U.S. military assistance for counterterrorism efforts, as in Algeria, should be accompanied by social initiatives to demonstrate U.S. interest in having a positive influence in the development of the countries of the Maghreb. Policy objectives in the region should also be evaluated against the risk of further inflaming fundamentalist and radical sentiment. U.S. policy will need to facilitate the propagation of democratic norms, economic development, and educational opportunities to stem the rise of radical Islam.

Turkey: “Recessed” Islamic Politics and Convergence with the West

Ian O. Lesser

Introduction

Contemporary Turkey is a key test case for the role of Islam in politics and its influence on external policy. It is also a distinctive, possibly unique, case in several respects. The Justice and Development Party (AKP), led by Recep Tayyip Erdogan, rules a solid majority government, having trounced all rivals in Turkey’s November 2002 elections and further reinforced its position with strong results in 2004 local elections. Thus, unlike most of its recent predecessors, AKP is able to govern outside the shadow of unstable coalition politics and impending elections. This is a novelty in contemporary Turkey, and it casts AKP’s policies and preferences in a sharper light. At the same time, Turkey is experiencing a burst of reform legislation aimed at bringing the country in line with European democratic norms. Turkey’s moderate Islamists, together with a coterie of secular reformers, are leading advocates for these legal changes.

Yet there continues to be an active debate over the real nature of AKP’s and Erdogan’s agenda, as well as close scrutiny of its credentials as a secular party. Erdogan professes to lead a movement of “Muslim democrats”—rather like Christian democrats in Western Europe—in which religion is a cultural backdrop rather than an active part of the political agenda. To what extent is this approach a genuine expression of a new synthesis in Turkish politics, and to what extent is it a tactic to hold Turkey’s entrenched secularists, including the military (and constitutional strictures against religious politics) at bay? These are open questions and the topic of daily debate in Turkey.

If Turkey’s current “recessed” Islamic politics is one source of Turkish distinctiveness, Turkish history is another. As a non-Arab society and a former imperial power, Turkey has had a distinctive experience with Islam, including the place of re-

ligion in politics. The tradition of Muslim sects is deeply rooted and persists despite being driven underground in modern, secular Turkey. The Ottoman Empire was the seat of the Caliphate and thus the center of Muslim political power and presence in international relations into the early years of the twentieth century. Atatürk's secular revolution modernized and Westernized Turkey in key respects. But even after 80 years, the results of this experiment are contested. Turkey remains a place of sharp regional, class, and cultural differences. These unresolved tensions are part of the contemporary political equation. Indeed, AKP's success can be explained in large measure by the way in which the movement has captured a sense of Turkish popular dissatisfaction with established political elites and the lockstep secularism of the modern republic.

The question of political Islam in Turkey is arguably a Western rather than a Middle Eastern one. It is not an "oriental" question, as Edward Said might have put it or as some European politicians might prefer. Regardless of Turkey's prospects for becoming a full member of the European Union—and these are increasingly realistic—the country is imbedded in the West, institutionally, economically, strategically, and to a growing extent culturally. It is a member of NATO and a candidate for EU membership. The thrust of modern Turkey's internal evolution and external policy has been overwhelmingly Western. Over the past two decades, in particular, Turkey has converged significantly with European norms in terms of prosperity, democracy, and day-to-day preferences. Important gaps remain, but the trends are fairly clear. The implication is that Islamic politics in Turkey, both "recessed" and overt, unfolds in a more transparent setting and is affected to a greater extent by the international context than is generally the case elsewhere. In this sense, Turkey is distinct from most cases in the Arab world and perhaps in Asia.

All these considerations would appear to argue for a moderate trajectory for religious politics in a democratic and increasingly globalized Turkey. Indeed, this is the most likely outcome. But there are other, less positive dimensions to the Turkish case, and they are worth considering in terms of their meaning for Turkey and for U.S. interests. Turkey *does* have more overt forms of religious politics outside the AKP milieu, some much more extreme and even violent in the desire to reorder society along Islamic lines and to reorient the country's external policies. Multiple terrorist bombings in Istanbul in November 2003 dramatically underscored the presence of radical Islamists inside Turkey, however marginal they might be in political terms. The bombings also made clear the existence of effective links between extremists inside the country and a wider terrorist network affiliated with Al Qaeda. It remains an open question whether the November 2003 attacks are part of an emerging strategic effort on the part of Al Qaeda and its fellow travelers to destabilize Turkey or whether Turkey simply offers a symbolic, readily accessible target for new strikes.

Within Turkey, the prolonged economic crisis has introduced social strains that could yet fuel more extreme religious politics. Nationalism, a powerful force across

the political spectrum in Turkey, could also interact with political Islam in new and unpredictable ways, particularly in the event of a rebuff from the EU. Finally, Turks residing abroad, including over three million in Europe, are a wild card. Notwithstanding the recent Istanbul bombings, the most extreme Turkish Islamist movements in recent years have operated with considerably more freedom and support in Europe than in Turkey. Their evolution will be another factor to watch.

These distinctive elements suggest that current developments surrounding AKP and other Islamist currents in Turkey are a critical test for Turkey. They may be less relevant for the evolution of political Islam elsewhere. From the perspective of American strategic interests, the unfolding of the "Turkish model" is important because of what it means for Turkey as a pivotal regional actor and a key security partner whose relations with the United States remain in flux. The application of this model elsewhere is of only moderate interest to Turks, and perhaps even less to states elsewhere in the Middle East and Asia.

This chapter explores the evolution of, and current dynamics in, Turkey's Islamic politics and the implications for American strategy and policy. The second section discusses Turkey's religious landscape, including the origins and distinctive features of political Islam in Turkey. The third section addresses religious politics and domestic change in light of recent developments. The fourth section explores the external dimension—the foreign and security policy context for political Islam in Turkey and the possible influence of religious politics in Turkey on the country's international policy, including relations with Washington. Finally, the fifth section offers overall observations and conclusions, with implications for U.S. and U.S. Air Force policy toward Turkey.

The Religious Landscape

Turkey has a complex and extraordinarily rich religious tradition, ranging from pre-Islamic survivals to mainstream Sunni Islam, from small minority groups of Jews and Orthodox Christians to a range of important Shi'a and other sects. Turkey is, of course, an overwhelmingly Muslim society, but 80 years of a rigorously secular republic have placed religion in the realm of private practice for most Turks. The emergence of a more visible religiosity on the Turkish scene, especially over the past decade, is a product of many influences: the waning of the Ataturkist legacy, a rediscovery of traditional practices, an expanding network of religious schools (some, reportedly, with Saudi and other foreign funding) and the rise of a more active but socially constrained middle class. It is also the visible product of large-scale migration from the countryside to the cities in recent decades, with a consequent movement of more traditional, more outwardly religious people to Turkey's modern, urbanized west. Is today's Turkey more religious? Or does it simply appear that way to the

secular elites and Western observers based in Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir? The answer is almost certainly both: Religion has found freer expression in public life including, within limits, politics.

Enduring Elements of the Religious Tradition

This analysis does not aim to explore in detail the historical roots of Turkish Islam.¹ Yet some specific features are worth noting because they have a bearing on current religious politics.

First, the role of Islam in Turkish political leadership was a contested issue even in the pre-Ottoman and Ottoman periods. Thus, the more direct confrontation between Islam and secularism in republican Turkey has historical roots.² At least one scholar has suggested that, in the Seljuk period, leadership of the Turkish “nation” and the religious leadership, the Islamic *ummet* (religious community), were separate, with the caliph performing solely religious functions. Political authority was exercised by the sultans, not the caliphs. This formal separation came to an end with the unification of the offices of the sultanate and the caliphate by Selim I in 1517. But the desire to maintain an essential separation of religion and the state continued even in the Ottoman period, when the caliphate served as an instrument of political unification and direction throughout the empire. From the late seventeenth century onward, with the erosion of the power of the sultan, the religious leadership, the *ulema*, became steadily more influential, and high-ranking mufti became central actors in Ottoman politics and foreign affairs.³

The balance of political and religious authority shifted again in the later years of the Ottoman Empire, as restive Arab populations outside Anatolia came to see the caliphate as part of an increasingly abrasive Turkish colonial presence and as the Ottoman regime and liberal reformers pushed the country toward modernization, Western practices, and de facto secularization.⁴ Ataturk’s abolition of the caliphate in 1924 and the enactment of a series of sweeping secularization measures greatly reinforced a trend toward secularization that had earlier roots but that remained—and still remains—a contested issue in Turkish society. Analysts of political Islam in Turkey often cite the general subordination of religious to political authority in Ottoman and post-Ottoman Turkey as an argument against the potential for a religious state

¹ For a comprehensive discussion of Islamic practice in Turkey, see Ozdemir and Frank (2000).

² See Lewis (1975) and Kinross (1977).

³ Ergil (1995), pp. 4–5. Others have suggested that the effective embodiment of the religious establishment’s role in the state was the office of Shaykh al-Islam, or chief mufti. See Toprak (1981), pp. 30–43.

⁴ Ergil (1995), p. 5.

in modern Turkey.⁵ In this view, the notion of an Islamic state is alien to Turkish political culture.

Second, Turkey's religious tradition, while overwhelmingly orthodox and Sunni, has always had a strong Shi'a and Sufi presence, with diverse underground sects. These minority tendencies remain important factors in contemporary society and politics and constitute a base of political Islam apart from the political party structure. Sufi orders, such as the Bektasi and the Safavi, at one time competed with the Ottomans for political control of eastern Anatolia, and Bektasi Sufism eventually became the official order of the Janissaries. Although incorporated into the Sunni mainstream in Turkey, the sect maintained key elements of heterodox Shi'a belief. Sufi orders or brotherhoods (*tarikats*) have survived as important religious and social networks in modern Turkey, despite being outlawed and driven underground in the period of the secular republic. Two prominent *tarikats*, the Naksibendi and the Kadiri, date to the fourteenth century. They remain an active part of the Islamic scene, and their lodges often intersect with other business and political networks.

From the 1950s onward, the *tarikats* have enjoyed a resurgence, including the formation of new orders. Some of them have taken an active, if indirect, role in politics, and some have been openly critical of Turkey's secular order. Members of the Mevlevi brotherhood (known for their ecstatic dancing) are followers of the precepts of the Mevlana (Jalal ad Din Rumi) and are probably Turkey's best known Sufi sect.⁶ They are a visible presence on the cultural scene, both in Turkey and abroad, and have remained an above-ground presence. Their devotees are careful to categorize their activity as cultural, rather than religious or political in nature. The Naksibendi have been more visible, with political figures from Ozal to Erdogan reportedly linked to the movement.

The Alevi, Turkey's leading Shi'a minority, are a significant factor in Turkey's social and political climate. There is considerable confusion about the numbers of Alevi in Turkey, in part because Turks often refer to all Shi'ites as Alevi. The Alevi are the largest of four Shi'a sects common in Turkey and probably account for some 70 percent of the Shi'a minority of roughly 15 million. Most Alevi in Turkey are ethnic Turks, but the sect also includes most of Turkey's Arabs and perhaps a quarter of Turkey's Kurds. Turkey's Alevi remain something of a group apart in contemporary Turkish society, and poor Alevi neighborhoods have often been the scene of violent confrontations with police, especially in Istanbul. Alevi intellectuals, and Alevi in the private sector, are often demonstrably secular in their behavior. They have had an uncomfortable relationship with Turkey's conservative secular establishment,

⁵ See comments by Soner Cagaptay and others, cited in Jean-Christophe Peuch, "Turkey: What Remains of Political Islam?" Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, www.Rferl.org/nca/features/2003/01/10012003163109.asp, last accessed August 4, 2004.

⁶ *Turkey, A Country Study* (Washington: Library of Congress, updated 1995), pp. 2–3.

including the military and the religious and nationalist right, many of whom tend to associate Alevis with leftist politics. Alevis have also been a frequent target of Turkey's small fringe of Sunni extremists.⁷

Third, religiosity and politics in Turkey are influenced by the country's ethnic and demographic situation. Throughout the Ottoman period, until as late as the 1920s, the Turkish empire was a diverse patchwork of ethnic and religious communities. This was obviously the case in areas such as the Balkans, but was also true to a lesser extent in Anatolia proper. By this measure, modern republican Turkey is actually more homogenous and less cosmopolitan than its imperial predecessor. Orthodox Christians, Jews, and other religious groups are more obviously minorities in today's Turkey than in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, when large non-Muslim communities were spread across Turkey. That said, the secular nature of the republic offers the remnants of these once-large communities a relatively stable, if sometimes uneasy, environment. It is an environment that is likely to improve as Turkey's legal regime concerning minorities is progressively liberalized.⁸ For example, under the AKP government Turkey's Syrian Orthodox community has seen both an improvement in its once difficult relations with national and regional officials and the emergence of a more tolerant atmosphere.⁹

Turkey remains an ethnically diverse society. Kurds represent perhaps 25 percent of the population, and the issue of Kurdish integration remains the leading internal social—and security—issue facing the country. Kurds are concentrated in southeast Anatolia, with large neighboring communities in northern Iraq, Iran, and Syria. Yet most Kurds live elsewhere in Turkey, with large-scale migration to urbanized western Turkey in recent decades. This pattern of demographic change has affected Turkey as a whole but has been reinforced in the Kurdish case by the strains of a 15-year insurgency and counterinsurgency in the Kurdish areas of the southeast. Beyond ethnic identification, many Turks can and do trace their origins to areas outside Anatolia, whether in the Caucasus, the Balkans, Central Asia, or elsewhere in the Levant. These “biographical” affiliations have come to play a more prominent role in

⁷ Alevis have also been the target of significant, if sporadic, violence. In 1978, scores were killed in rioting in southern Turkey. In 1993, Sunni extremists set fire to a hotel in Sivas where Alevi and pro-Alevi intellectuals had gathered. The police were criticized for inaction during this incident in which 35 people were killed. See Kinzer (2001), p. 64.

⁸ Greeks, Jews, and Armenians are the three minorities recognized in the Turkish constitution. The core of Turkey's Jewish community dates to the fifteenth-century expulsion from Spain. The large-scale Greek presence in Anatolia ended with the mass exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey in the 1920s. A small community remains in Istanbul and a few other parts of western Turkey, although Istanbul remains the seat of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate. The relationship between the Patriarchate and the Turkish government has often been uneasy, although much improved in recent years. The tragic experience of the Armenian community remains the basis for heated disagreement between Ankara and outside observers, including allies in Europe and the United States.

⁹ See Amberin Zaman, “Christians Return to Native Turkey,” *Los Angeles Times*, August 10, 2003, p. A3.

Turkish politics and foreign policy in recent decades and have become the basis for lobbies on Chechnya, Bosnia, Turkish-Azeri relations, and the status of the Turkmen in Iraq. The Atatürkist ideology, apart from being vigorously secular, left little room for these ethnic identifications. For Atatürk, Turkish identity was a question of location rather than ethnicity: Turks were those living within Turkey who called themselves Turks. But in popular perception, at least, being a Turk has also been synonymous with being a Muslim. The line between Turkish nationalism and Islamic identity has never been sharply drawn, even in the Atatürkist conception.

Ethnic and Regional Dimensions

Ethnicity, regionalism, and religious politics interact in several ways in contemporary Turkey. More traditional and visible Islamic practices are common in rural and poorer areas of the country, above all in the heavily Kurdish southeast.¹⁰ The steady pace of migration from the countryside to the cities has made urban, western Turkey appear poorer, more heavily Kurdish, and more religious. This was certainly a factor in the electoral success of the Islamist Refah (Welfare) Party, as well as its successors Fazilet (Virtue) and, more recently, AKP. (Both Refah and Fazilet were legally dissolved.) Religious parties have done well in the southeast, often out-competing Kurdish nationalist parties. The more radical currents in Islamic politics (e.g., Turkish Hizbullah) are also more visible in the urban areas of southeastern and eastern Anatolia, where it has often been alleged that such groups were supported by Ankara as part of the counterinsurgency strategy against the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) in the 1990s. The PKK (now re-formed as KADEK) and other Kurdish separatist movements have, in general, been oriented toward the secular left rather than the Islamic right. Religious extremism among Turkey's Kurds has never been a comfortable fit with Kurdish nationalism, most of whose advocates are avowedly secular.¹¹ At another level, however, the perception of disenfranchisement and alienation among many Kurds, especially in the southeast and among recent arrivals to urban Turkey, has probably driven substantial numbers toward religious movements as a political alternative. Kurds predominate among those apprehended in connection to the Istanbul bombings of November 2003. Apart from the southeast, certain areas of Turkey have a reputation for religious conservatism. Konya, a traditional center of Sufi activism, is a leading example.

¹⁰ For an analysis of the urban-rural dimension in the resurgence of Turkish religiosity, see Nur Vergin, "De-Ruralization in Turkey and the Quest for Islamic Recognition," *Private View* (Istanbul), Winter 1996.

¹¹ Clashes between PKK and Hezbollah elements in the early 1990s resulted in hundreds of deaths, largely in the southeast. See Haber Analiz (FORSNET), "Terror Organizations in Turkey," www.teror.gen.tr/english/, last accessed August 4, 2004.

Turks in Europe

The large-scale migration of Turks to Western Europe, especially Germany, is in many ways a natural extension of the migration from rural to urban Turkey. As a result, the Turkish population in Germany (around three million persons) is relatively conservative, traditional, and religious. Kurds also make up a relatively large part of the Turkish community in Europe. In Germany, perhaps a third of the community is Kurdish. It is a significant feature of Turkish political Islam that many of the more extreme movements are to be found in Europe rather than in Turkey itself. The explanation for this fact resides in part with the more religious and conservative nature of Turkish migrants to Europe. It also reflects the relative ease with which extremist groups—both Islamic and Kurdish—could organize and operate outside the reach of Turkish courts and security agencies.¹² Only in the post-September 11 climate of increased scrutiny and more frequent prosecutions has this situation begun to change, with radical groups outside Turkey under increasing pressure from terrorism-conscious European governments.

Quite apart from the issue of Islamic radicalism among Turks abroad, there is the larger question of why many second- and even third-generation Turks in Germany and elsewhere have been attracted to Islamist cultural and political movements. For some analysts, the answer is not simply the more traditional social outlook brought from provincial Turkey. Younger émigré Turks may be turning to Islam as a reaction to perceived discrimination and alienation in their own, Western surroundings. In short, the more cosmopolitan the setting, the greater the appeal of traditional, religious, and ethnic movements—a more pronounced version of the phenomenon seen among Turks migrating from the countryside to major cities in Turkey.¹³ Many supporters of Milli Gorus (National View), the European offshoot of Necmettin Erbakan's Refah Party, have been drawn from this group, as well as those associated with the much more radical movement founded by Metin Kaplan.¹⁴ Given the size of the Turkish community in Germany and the ability of Turks abroad to participate financially in Turkish elections, it is not surprising that most of the leading tendencies in contemporary Turkish political Islam are represented by

¹² The leading example of Turkish expatriate Islamic extremism is the Union of Islamic Communities (UIC), which remains active in Germany. The movement was founded by Cemalettin Kaplan, who sought to establish a "caliphate state" based in Turkey. After Cemalettin's death in 1994, his son, Metin Kaplan, took over leadership of the movement. Metin Kaplan was arrested by the German authorities in 1999 and remains in prison on terrorism charges. Turkish authorities have mounted numerous operations against UIC cells in Istanbul and provincial Turkish cities but have been unsuccessful in extraditing Kaplan from Germany. It is estimated that UIC has 200–300 members in Turkey and perhaps 1,300 members in Germany. See FORSNET, "Terror Organizations in Turkey,"

¹³ For a good analysis along these lines, see Werner Schiffauer, "Islamism in the Diaspora: The Fascination of Political Islam Among Second Generation German Turks," unpublished paper, Europa-Universitat Viadrina (Frankfurt/Oder), 1999.

¹⁴ See Schiffauer, *op. cit.*, pp. 5–6.

sister organizations in Germany. This has also been true of various Kurdish movements, both violent and nonviolent, whose financing has relied heavily on émigré sources.

Religion, Politics, and Domestic Change

Political Islam in contemporary Turkey can be assessed in terms of two very different questions. The first concerns the success of mainstream Islamist movements at the polls in recent years and the outlook for the future. The second concerns the status of and prospects for more radical Islamist movements, including Muslim terrorist groups, operating in Turkey or with Turkish roots.

Turkey's secular constitution has encouraged what might be termed "recessed" Islamic politics, in which religion is an implicit rather than an explicit part of political discourse. Successive Islamist movements have grappled with the dilemmas posed by these constitutional constraints, and several have come to grief by stepping over the accepted line between recessed and overt Islamism. AKP is the latest such movement to press the boundaries of religion in Turkish politics. Thus far, it has benefited from a loosening of the traditional control exercised by Turkey's secular elite, above all the military, and greater scrutiny of Turkey's democratic practices from the European Union and the United States. It has also been able to attract a following beyond its religious base, and it appeals to populist and reformist sentiments that are not necessarily tied to religion. In short, AKP did not need Islam to succeed at the polls. A key question is whether AKP will maintain its arm's-length approach to Islam or whether growing confidence—or pressures from less moderate elements—will lead it to embrace a more overtly religious agenda, with implications for Turkish foreign policy.

A History of Failed Movements

Islamist politics is hardly a new phenomenon in Turkey, despite the legal and practical constraints on religion in politics. Over the past 30 years, Turkey has seen numerous religiously oriented parties—more accurately termed "movements." Virtually all have been marginalized, closed for antiseccular or seditious behavior, or driven to carry on their campaigns abroad. In the 1970s, Milli Selamet (National Salvation Party, or NSP) espoused an Islamist agenda, alongside economic populism and Turkish nationalism. The party enjoyed substantial popularity among those *tarikats* members and others on the right opposed to the secular state. With political violence rife in the late 1970s and early 1980s, some Turkey secular elites were attracted to the notion of a Turkish-Islamic synthesis that could offer an ideological alternative to leftist politics. NSP was closed by the military in 1980, at a time when many parties on the right and the left came under government pressure.

The Refah Party, led by Necmettin Erbakan, emerged from the wreckage of NSP and acquired mass popularity in the early 1990s. As with many such movements, Refah built on a base of popularity and electoral success at the local level and emerged as the leading party in the 1995 general elections, garnering 21.5 percent of the vote.¹⁵ The party led a coalition government in partnership with Tansu Ciller's center-right True Path Party, until the coalition government was ushered out of power in a "soft coup" with strong pressure from the Turkish military and secular elites. Refah and its top leadership were subsequently banned from politics, leading to the formation of a successor party, Fazilet. It, too, was eventually banned, and its adherents splintered into several competing movements.

Erbakan remains the grand old man of Islamist politics in Turkey. He weathered successive legal campaigns, removals from office, and bans on political leadership. He is also a fixture of traditional machine politics in Turkey and very much part of the established political class. His inclinations are traditional and religious, mixed with a populist approach to economics and a healthy dose of Turkish nationalism. Refah was especially adept at articulating the nationalist message against a background of crises in Bosnia, Chechnya, and Azerbaijan that appeared to public opinion as Western indifference to Muslim and Turkish interests. Refah's domestic political agenda was not heavily oriented toward religious issues, although under Refah, Turkey's staunchly secular state bureaucracies began to hire increasing numbers of graduates from religious schools. The proliferation of these schools (Imam-Hatip) predated the Refah-led government and got under way in earnest during the Ozal years. Imam-Hatip are high-school-level *lycees* with a religious orientation. These schools, many allegedly established with Saudi funding, became a cause celebre for Islamists and secularists alike until the issue appeared settled by the end of the Refah government and the introduction of legislation limiting their role. But the issue of the Imam-Hatip schools remains highly controversial. The current AKP government's spring 2004 decision to introduce legislation aimed at giving the schools' graduates wider access to university and professional opportunities spurred concern in secular circles and even destabilized Turkey's financial markets.

On the foreign policy front, Refah was constrained by the leading role of the rigidly secular foreign ministry and the military on external and security matters. Erbakan might have been inclined to end Turkey's burgeoning relationship with Israel or to move closer to the Muslim world. But as a practical matter, Turkish external policy exhibited little change. Shortly after assuming office as prime minister, Erbakan embarked on a widely publicized tour of the Muslim world, from Iran to Indonesia. Notably, the tour did not take in a single Arab state. The Erbakan govern-

¹⁵ On the grassroots dimension of support for Islamist politics in Turkey and the neighborhood-level sociology of Muslim movements, see White (2002).

ment's most distinctive contribution to Turkish foreign policy was probably the establishment of the "D-8" (Developing Eight) bloc, now moribund.

With the demise of Refah and Fazilet, their leading lights established competing political movements, including a conservative wing, the Saadet Party, inspired by Erbakan himself. The highly popular and charismatic former Mayor of Istanbul, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, emerged as the leader of the only such movement with a critical mass of support. Erdogan had been sentenced to a brief jail term in 1988 for "inciting religious hatred," a prosecution stemming from his recital of an ambiguously worded poem at a political rally some years earlier. Although dogged by successive legal challenges and bans on his own political activity, Erdogan founded the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in 2001 and has served as its chairman and, after a flurry of legal and political maneuvering, as prime minister in the AKP-led majority government.

AKP achieved a sweeping success in the general election of November 2002, capturing 34 percent of the popular vote—very high for Turkey's traditionally fragmented politics—and winning 363 of the 550 seats in the Turkish Grand National Assembly. By comparison, the old-guard Islamists of the Felicity Party (an outgrowth of the now-banned Fazilet Party) won only 2.5 percent of the vote, far from the 10 percent hurdle for representation in parliament. The election result was hailed as the collapse of the old political establishment. Even the National Action Party on the secular right, a strong presence in the years leading up to the 2002 election, failed to make a significant showing. The discredited parties of the center virtually evaporated.

As of late August 2003, and as a result of some shifts in affiliation among members, AKP held 368 seats in parliament.¹⁶ This exceeds the two-thirds majority required to pass constitutional amendments. It is quite likely that AKP will acquire several more seats over the coming months, putting the party in a strong position to initiate changes to the Turkish constitution. Some Turkish observers view this as a key test of AKP's moderation. To date, AKP has certainly been a leading force behind seven successive legislative "packages" aimed at bringing Turkey into line with EU norms. But it has not acted directly on issues related to the role of religion, and it has compromised as needed with the Turkish General Staff to push ahead reforms to the powerful National Security Council. It remains an open question whether AKP will be emboldened to behave more aggressively with a solid two-thirds majority.¹⁷

The reasons for AKP's success and its prospects for the future, are discussed below. It is worth noting, however, that despite the Atatürkist state's formal secularism and secular ideology, Islamists were a substantial presence in Turkish parliamentary politics before AKP and the elections of 2002. The dominant center-right parties of

¹⁶ The Republican Peoples Party (CHP) holds 175, True path (DYP) 3, with four seats held by independents.

¹⁷ Soner Cagaptay, "EU Reforms Diminish the Role of the Turkish Military: Ankara Knocking on Brussels' Door," *Policywatch*, No. 781, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, August 12, 2003, p. 2.

the 1980s and early 1990s, the True Path and Motherland (ANAP) parties, had always contained significant socially conservative Islamist wings. Many have simply transferred their allegiance to AKP as a coherent, moderate party with an Islamic point of reference (although the current AKP members in the assembly itself are, by and large, new to parliamentary politics).

A Background of Waning Secularism?

AKP has emerged as a leading force in Turkish politics against a background of substantial Islamic activism, most of a very moderate sort, in various quarters of society, politics, and the economy. Although Atatürk's reforms secularized Turkey in a legal and ideological sense, it is fashionable among Turkish analysts to explain the apparent resurgence of religiosity since the 1980s as the result of an incomplete secularization of Turkish society.¹⁸ Atatürk's reforms did indeed have a sweeping influence on the pattern of life in Istanbul, Ankara, and the cities in Turkey's west. Their effect was much less dramatic in the provinces and the countryside, where traditional outlooks and behavior continued to prevail.

In a sense, the secular reforms were really about the extension of the Turkish state's control over many aspects of political, economic, and social life, including education and religion (analysts have likened Atatürk's revolution to the statist ideologies holding sway elsewhere in Europe and, above all, in the Soviet Union, at the time of the formation of the Turkish republic in 1922). The reforms of the 1920s and after did not eliminate religion from public life, they simply placed religion firmly under government control (the Turkish Muslim clergy continue to be appointed and paid by the state; their sermons are—at least in theory—prepared by religious bureaucrats in Ankara). Courses on religion are part of the state curriculum in Turkish schools. In political terms, religion was firmly banished to the private sphere, and the clerical establishment, seen as a regressive social force by the leadership in Ankara, subjected to state control. Central institutions such as the military saw, and continue to see, the preservation of the secular state as a central mission alongside the preservation of national unity.

The resurgence of Islam as a visible practice in Turkish society and the success of religiously inspired political movements—from Erbakan's Refah Party to the more recent electoral triumph of AKP—can be interpreted as “the failure of trickle-down secularism.”¹⁹ In short, the formal secularization of Turkish society in the early years of the republic and after affected primarily middle-class, urban Turks who were already increasingly secular in their outlook. It was carried forward by key institutions, above all the military, which until very recently played a unique role as a vehicle for

¹⁸ For a full discussion of secularization measures adopted in the 1920s and 1930s, see Ergil, pp. 57–62.

¹⁹ I am grateful to Dr. Heath Lowry of Princeton University for this formulation.

upward mobility and education and as a shaper of norms. Outside the urban middle classes and the military, in the provincial towns and the countryside, religion continued to play a more overt role in daily life, if not in politics. With the widespread movement of Turks to major urban areas in recent decades, this more traditional society has become more visible in Istanbul, Ankara, and other previously "secular" cities (Istanbul itself has grown roughly tenfold since the 1920s, to a city of roughly 13 million inhabitants). Given these changes, it is not surprising that head scarves and mosque construction are more evident today than twenty years ago. To a great extent, this is a class phenomenon. It is not uncommon for longtime, upper- and upper-middle-class residents of the city to say "this is no longer my Istanbul." In a demographic sense, at least, they are right.

Another explanation for the revival of religious practices, including the new activism of the *tarikats* and the rise of political movements with a more overt religious base, has been the slow, stubborn retreat of the Turkish state with its vigorously secular ideology and the means and inclination to enforce it.²⁰ The erosion of the "strong state" is a key aspect of the current political landscape in Turkey, with strong implications for the role of political Islam.²¹ If the military's influence over Turkish politics is diluted (this is already evident in legislation aimed at civilianizing the leadership of the National Security Council) under EU pressure and as a result of changing attitudes inside Turkey, the traditional "red lines" with regard to religion in politics may also disappear or become blurred. The process of political reform in Turkey is likely to leave more rather than less space for religious politics in the years ahead.

Interpreting Turkey's Islamist Movement

AKP's leadership does not disavow its religious roots, but Erdogan and other leading figures in the party leadership, such as former Prime Minister and now Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Abdullah Gul, assert that Islam is simply a cultural backdrop for an essentially secular political agenda. Even prior to the elections, Erdogan spoke explicitly of his desire to lead a movement of "Muslim democrats," on the pattern of Christian democratic movements in Western Europe. On other occasions, Erdogan has spoken of himself as a "conservative democrat."²²

AKP is a new movement, recent in terms of its establishment (August 2001) as well as the fashioning of its political philosophy and agenda. Leading AKP cadres,

²⁰ On Islamist and other opposition to authoritarian modernization, see Nilufer Gole, "The Freedom of Seduction," *New Perspectives Quarterly*, Winter 2002, pp. 71–73.

²¹ See Henri Barkey, "The Struggles of a Strong State," *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 54, No. 1, Fall 2000, pp. 87–106.

²² For a provocative profile of Erdogan, see Deborah Sontag, "The Erdogan Experiment," *The New York Times Magazine*, May 11, 2003, pp. 42–47.

including Erdogan and Gul, have their roots in the more assertively Islamist and traditional environment of the now-disbanded Refah Party. The current movement arose out of a split in the Fazilet ranks in early 2000, with Erdogan maintaining leadership over a “traditionalist” wing, determined to confront the secular order, and Erdogan leading the “reformist” wing. The latter apparently drew different conclusions from the experience of the soft coup of 1997 and resolved, whether tactically or as a matter of principle, to avoid a frontal challenge to the secular state.²³ Indeed, in its published program, the AKP leadership made clear its respect for the principles of the secular state and the catalog of reforms from Turkey’s republican history: “Our party perceives Ataturk’s principles and reforms as the most important medium of bringing Turkey to the highest levels of contemporary civilization and as an element of domestic peace . . .”²⁴ In an AKP document of February 2002, the party defined itself as a movement centered above all “on man and not on religion.”²⁵ Statements of this kind would have been, and remain, incompatible with the visions articulated by Turkey’s traditional Islamist movements. They have much more in common with the populist, reformist orientation championed by some of Turkey’s cosmopolitan, secular elites.

On the thorny question of whether Erdogan still favors the creation of an Islamic state, Erdogan and his leading advisors have been proactive in reassuring Western interlocutors that the AKP leadership, even those with roots in earlier and more assertive religious politics, have abandoned this objective. In conversations in 2001, Erdogan asserted that “we think of religion not in politics, but rather politics as a safeguard of religious expression,” noting that this was actually a very American view (and obviously what an American analyst would want to hear!).²⁶ In a recent interview, Erdogan spoke of the need, in principle, to separate religion from politics.²⁷

Secular Fellow Travelers

Quite apart from its less adversarial approach to established institutions and practices, AKP also differs markedly from its political predecessors in its relationship to secular elites and established interest groups. In the past, Turkey’s Ataturkist elite has tended

²³ Duygu Bazoglu Sezer, “The Electoral Victory of Reformist Islamists in Secular Turkey,” *The International Spectator*, No. 4, October–December 2002, pp. 10–11.

²⁴ Quoted in Sezer, op. cit., p. 11.

²⁵ *AKP Genel Merkezi, AKP Kimligi* (the AKP Identity), Ankara, February 21, 2002. Quoted in Sezer, op. cit., p. 11.

²⁶ Author’s interview, May 2001.

²⁷ In this same interview, he also noted that the poem—“the mosques are our barracks . . .”—he had once recited, which led to his arrest on charges of religious incitement, was actually written by a pan-Turkist (i.e., secular) writer: “I did recite that poem in a different situation, in a different time. Now, for a limited period of time, I am on leave, so to speak. Maybe later I will recite it again.” Interview with Nathan Gardels, “Global Viewpoint,” *Los Angeles Times*, January 27, 2003.

to view religious and populist politics with considerable distaste. As a general rule, this observation still holds, especially for Ankara's highly secular civil service mandarins. In Istanbul and in business circles elsewhere, however, there has been a considerable shift. Prior to the 2002 elections, the evidence for changing elite attitudes was largely anecdotal. Today, it is also evident from public pronouncements by leading civic and private-sector organizations.²⁸ Turkey's dramatic and sequential economic crises, from which the country is just now beginning to recover, together with the prize of closer relations with the EU, have spurred reform-minded secular elites to adopt a more open stance toward Erdogan and the AKP. In short, there is a widespread sense that the government should be given a chance—alongside a more traditional interest in "hedging one's bets" when it comes to the relationship between business and government in Turkey, where the state remains a leading source of largesse for the private sector.

The coterie of leading secular businessmen close to AKP, some with strong personal connections to Erdogan himself, is unprecedented in recent Turkish experience where, as noted earlier, religious and secular forces have traditionally held each other in disdain. Even prior to his emergence from a legal ban on political activity, Erdogan had attracted the interest and support of an unlikely set of secular figures. Some may have wished to hedge their bets; others may have sought to moderate the views of a rising political force. Others, probably the majority, may simply have found Erdogan's reformist, pro-EU agenda worth supporting. Top figures from the board of TUSIAD, the Turkish Businessmen's and Industrialists' Organization, the leading body representing big business, found aspects of the Erdogan agenda attractive.²⁹ The government's performance, especially on the economy and foreign policy, has been widely praised both inside and outside the country.

Ultimately, the majority of Turkey's secular elite are unlikely to find Erdogan's formulation of "Muslim democracy" attractive. But to the extent that the current Turkish government's Islamic politics remain recessed, many members of this group will likely continue to give AKP the benefit of the doubt, as long as reforms go forward and Turkey progresses in its bid for EU membership. The fact that prominent secular figures are willing to engage, advise, and assist AKP is noteworthy. This tendency not only distinguishes AKP strongly from Refah and Fazilet. The tolerance and support of secular forces arguably mediate between a movement whose secular credentials many Turks still distrust and hard-liners in the military and elsewhere who might wish to challenge the government's right to govern. Erbakan did not enjoy this advantage in 1997. By comparison, Erdogan and AKP are relatively insulated from the threat of military intervention, which, as in 1997, would probably require

²⁸ The Koc family, leading Turkish industrialists, are among those who have been open about their willingness to give Erdogan a chance. See "The Retiring Mr. Koc," *The Economist*, April 19, 2003, p. 58.

²⁹ Author's interview with Tayyip Erdogan, May 2001.

backing from a much larger circle of concerned civilian elements. In intellectual circles, there is also some interest in the AKP experience as evidence of an emerging religious-secular synthesis in Turkish politics, something which many view as healthy, especially if set in the context of an ever closer relationship with Europe.³⁰ Secular circles remain wary, as the renewed controversy over the Iman-Hatip schools underscores. But overall, there is continued confidence in Erdogan's moderate, pragmatic approach.

The Rise of an Alternative Elite?

The AKP movement has benefited from the acceptance and, often, support of Turkey's traditional secular elites. But the success of the party at the polls, and the significance of its success for the future, probably has more to do with other forces. At the popular level, and against a background of enormous economic insecurity affecting the prosperity and confidence of almost all Turks, support for AKP has meant support for an alternative to a corrupt and politically backward system that had "let Turkey down." AKP represented a new approach, with a charismatic leader drawn from a modest background. Like Refah and Fazilet, AKP is modern and well organized at the local level, and it could build on a pattern of perceived success in the management of leading municipalities. Activism in AKP, like activism in its less moderate predecessors, is regarded as a vehicle for social advancement and involvement among both working-class Turks and the large urban middle class that has felt increasingly isolated from the cosmopolitan world of Istanbul's upper-middle-class professionals and businesspeople. Amid a mood of popular anger at corruption, cronyism, and ossified politics, it is hardly surprising that AKP's populist message proved attractive.

Even in the 1990s, Turkey's economic growth—and growing income disparities—fueled class and regional resentments. The financial collapse of 2000–2002, along with continuing economic strains, reinforced these frictions. AKP's success is part of this equation, and the current environment can be interpreted as the "moment of the outsiders" in Turkish politics, economy, and society. To the extent that the AKP phenomenon proves durable, it is likely to signal the rising influence of groups with a less secular, more conservative, and more provincial worldview; less cosmopolitan and with less experience of the West, but with a keen interest in Turkish integration in Europe and a moderate international role.

Observers of the Turkish scene have long explained the appeal of political Islam among Turkey's middle class as a response to a perceived (and quite real) social "glass

³⁰ This might be contrasted to the more common discussion about a Turkish-Islamic (religious-nationalist) synthesis. On this and many other aspects of political Islam in Turkey, see Pope (1997), especially pp. 316–339. See also an interview with novelist Orhan Pamuk, "Soft Islam Takes Over in Turkey," *New Perspectives Quarterly*, Winter 2003.

ceiling" blocking otherwise successful individuals. The vigorous consumerism and spread of national and international media across much of Turkish society in recent years has heightened this sense of frustration and has fueled the search for alternative outlets. Some of the fashionable retreat to Muslim traditionalism, expressed in the proliferation of head scarves among middle-class women at Turkish universities, can be traced to this discomfort with globalized modernity.³¹ The economic crisis has been seen by Turkey's religious-minded counterelites, many hailing from provincial towns in Anatolia, as confirming their critique of the Turkish system as it has been championed by Westernized, Kemalist elites. There is a general perception that traditional elites in the private sector, together with the fallen political class in Ankara, had enriched themselves at the expense of the country.

These alternative elites in the private sector (often referred to as "Anatolian tigers") have seen the crisis, and the resulting political transformation, as an opportunity for more traditional and authentic elements—religious and provincial—to put their case forward, and to reassert themselves as the power of the Kemalist state and its leading institutions (including the military) wanes. These views are typical of the Muslim-oriented counterpart to TUSIAD, MUSIAD (Independent Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association), established in 1990 by a group of younger entrepreneurs as an industrial and commercial advocacy group.³² The group's first president was Erol Yarar. Its second president, Ali Bayramoglu, and many of its top leaders have close ties to Erdogan and Abdullah Gul, as well as to more conservative Islamist politicians within and outside the AKP orbit.

Conservative, Muslim-oriented businessmen, together with substantial numbers of middle-class products of the Imam-Hatip schools now in the bureaucracy, constitute an alternative "elite in waiting." These groups harbor a barely concealed resentment toward the established secular leadership. Many view Turkey's economic shake-up and the rise of AKP to a position of majority government as their moment, a turning point in Turkish society and politics. The Muslim-oriented private sector takes a particularly dim view of the traditional role of the Turkish state. In the wake of the 1997 ouster of the Erbakan government, and under pressure from the military, Ankara pursued a policy of excluding so-called green capital firms from public tenders and finance (as an unintended consequence, many such firms have weathered the economic crisis fairly well because they were essentially self-financed and lacked hard-currency debt). The religious and socially conservative counterelites are now

³¹ See Ustun Reinart, "Freedom Under Wraps: Islamic Garb on Turkish Campuses," *Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA)*, Vol. 2, No. 3, September 1998.

³² MUSIAD describes its aim as encouraging the economic and technical development of Turkey, "but without sacrificing national and moral values; where labor is not exploited and capital accumulation is not degraded," and "with high ethical and moral standards in politics," *MUSIAD and Its Objectives* (Istanbul: MUSIAD).

well placed to benefit from a strong AKP government, and their attitude toward the state may well change as a result.

Alongside business and the bureaucracy, Turkey also has an alternative, Muslim-oriented media, both print and electronic. These have flourished over the last decade, despite numerous constraints and subtle restrictions. In some cases, they have also gained a following among secular intellectuals and others who see newspapers such as *Yeni Safak* as more objective and open than their secular counterparts. Kanal 7, a socially conservative television station with a mildly religious flavor (it is owned by Yimpas Holding, a “green capital” firm), is another example. Popular and formally nonpartisan, it is nevertheless seen as broadly supportive of Erdogan and AKP. Despite their conservative approach, the Muslim media are, like Turkey’s large media sector as a whole, a vigorous promoter of modern, consumer lifestyles on a national basis.³³

A Wary Tolerance

Taken together, the economic and political upheavals of 2000–2003 have changed the Turkish domestic environment in significant and probably lasting ways. The old political class has departed. A series of new aspiring actors or alternative elites have entered the scene, informed by a more populist, conservative, and Muslim-oriented worldview but with a modern, outward-looking approach. The guiding mood is reformist, and this goes some distance to explain the acceptance and even support that Erdogan has received from secular quarters. Many secularists remain deeply suspicious of Erdogan’s conversion to secular politics, and many others worry about the implications of AKP’s populist politics. The military, apparently in retreat on matters such as the reform of the National Security Council, remains vigilant on the question of the secular state. It continues to scrutinize its officer corps for signs of Islamist leanings and regularly dismisses officers accused of involvement in religious politics. The military, including the Turkish General Staff, is reportedly far from monolithic in its view of the extent and implications of a drift toward “recessed Islam” in Turkish politics.

To be sure, the military and the secular elites retain some “red lines.” But unlike in 1996–1997, these are almost certainly of a very straightforward, minimalist kind: adherence to the provisions of the Turkish constitution regarding the secular state, the democratic process, and critically, in the wake of the November 2003 Istanbul bombings, support for antiterrorism measures aimed at religious extremism. As discussed below, the tolerance for change in Turkey, including change that could alter the balance of Islamic and secular forces, is strongly influenced by the close relationship between reform and Turkey’s EU membership candidacy. The result has been a

³³ See Levent Balbturk, “Consumer Culture and Religiosity in Turkey,” *Anadolu*, Vol. 6, No. 1, Spring 1996.

process—and a prize—that recessed Islamists and secularists both value, with a moderating effect on political behavior—at least to date.

The Fringe: Islamic Extremist Movements and the Istanbul Bombings

Despite some high-profile incidents over the last decade, until the Istanbul bombings of November 2003, Turkey did not suffer from a substantial amount of Islamic political violence. That relative peace was shattered by two multiple suicide bombing attacks in Istanbul within one week during Ramadan. The first incident, twin car bombings outside Istanbul synagogues on November 15, killed 23 people in addition to the two suicide bombers. The second incident on November 20, involved near-simultaneous bombings of the British consulate in the Taksim district and the British-based Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC) building in the city's commercial center. These attacks left an additional 27 dead (including the British consul general) and over 450 wounded. Al Qaeda and the Turkish group Great East Islamic Raiders Front (IBDA/C) claimed responsibility for the attacks. Turkish authorities subsequently determined that the ten-person cell directly implicated in planning for the attacks had been in training in Afghanistan in September 2001 and that five had fought in Chechnya.³⁴

The Istanbul bombings have provoked a strong response from the Turkish government and the military, reflected in the rapid apprehension of suspects in Istanbul and elsewhere, especially across the southeast of the country. More significantly, the attacks have raised the specter of a new Turkish front in the global war on terrorism. Muslim extremists based in Turkey, or elsewhere, could have varied rationales for a terror campaign inside the country: the destabilization of a "secular" Muslim state and NATO ally; the disruption of cooperation among Turkey, Israel, and the United States; sabotaging Turkey's EU prospects; and polarizing the debate over religion and politics within Turkey. Beyond these strategic aims, Turkey may simply appear as a convenient, accessible theater for operations against symbolic targets in the "near West" and a logical extension of Al Qaeda's practice of outsourcing terrorist operations to local affiliates.

The group allegedly involved in the Istanbul bombings, the Great East Islamic Raiders Front (IBDA/C), has been led by Salih Izzet Erdis ("Salih Mirzabeyoglu"). The organization is characterized by a highly idiosyncratic ideology ("Great East") favoring a return to Ottoman federalism. With its distinctive ideology and highly networked style of organization and action, revolving around a series of autonomous fronts, the group was thought to have few ties to foreign sponsors or international Islamist groups—an assumption called into clear question by recent events. IBDA/C has also been known to pursue tactical alliances with secular terrorist organizations

³⁴ "Purported Structure of Turkish Islamist Terrorist Group Described," *Milliyet*, December 4, 2003, cited in FBIS GMP20031204000181.

acting against the Turkish state, most notably the PKK. Targets of IBDA/C attacks, usually firebombings, have included mainstream mosques, religious minorities, media and communications infrastructure, symbols of the Atatürkist state, secular banks, restaurants, and bars and clubs serving alcohol. Like other organizations of this kind in Turkey, IBDA/C has specialized in intimidating local businesses with the aim of extortion.

Beyond IBDA/C, Turkey has a number of small, relatively fragmented fundamentalist movements, some of which have been involved in terrorism. A few of these groups remain active and pose a challenge to Turkish security. Their strongly anti-U.S. agenda makes them a continuing concern for force protection at Incirlik airbase and elsewhere, and they pose a standing, if limited, threat to Americans and American assets in Turkey. Some of Turkey's Muslim extremists also have a strong presence in heavily Kurdish southeastern Anatolia and are part of the security equation in northern Iraq.³⁵ Indeed, it is notable that many of the extremists implicated in the November 2003 Istanbul bombings are Kurds from the less developed, unstable areas of the southeast.

Prior to the Istanbul bombings, the best-known and most-active radical Islamic group in Turkey was Hizbullah (unrelated to the Iranian-backed Lebanese group Hezbollah), or the "party of God." The group, led by Huseyin Velioglu, emerged from Diyarbakir in the early 1990s and adopted a stance of armed resistance against the secular regime with the aim of establishing an Islamic state in Turkey. In addition to actions against the state, a series of assassinations and attempted assassinations of secular businessmen, and attacks against Jewish targets in Turkey, Hizbullah came to play an active role in the violence prevalent across the southeast in the 1990s. On the whole, this Hizbullah violence was directed against secular Kurdish nationalists, including PKK (now KADEK) sympathizers. The extent of its engagement in this sphere led many Kurds and others to allege ties between Hizbullah and the security services operating in the southeast.

During the height of the Kurdish insurgency, other groups, some with the apparent backing of the PKK, appeared to extend the ideological reach of the Kurdish movement to the conservative and religious right. Groups of this kind, far less active than Hizbullah, include the Union of Kurdistan Religious People, the Union of Kurdistan Imams, and the Kurdistan Islamic movement. Velioglu died in a shootout with the Turkish police in Istanbul in January 2000, and other leading members of the organization were rounded up within days. At its height, Turkish Hizbullah probably had fewer than 1,000 members and could never have been considered a serious threat to the Turkish state. The group's trajectory of abrupt rise and equally

³⁵ Apart from armed terrorist groups with a religious orientation, Turkey also has a shifting constellation of more-or-less radical political networks operating on the fringes of the mainstream conservative Muslim movements, including the Malatya Group, Tehvid, Akabe, and, somewhat better known, the Aczi-Mendi group.

abrupt decline lends some credence to the widely held suspicion that Hizbullah emerged with the tacit support of the state and became the target of the security services as the PKK insurgency wound down and as the group came to be seen as a threat to security outside the southeast, in Istanbul and elsewhere.³⁶

Other extremist groups—all with a history of terrorism, but now largely contained—include Vassat, led by Sahmerdan Sari until his arrest in 1999, which was most active in Gaziantep, Malatya, and Ankara; the Islamic Movement Organization, which engaged in an assassination campaign between 1993 and 1996, when most of its members were arrested; and Ceysullah (Army of Allah), founded in Istanbul in 1995. The latter group is jihadist in orientation. Some of its small cadre of members are reported to have received training in Afghanistan.³⁷

The United States has been a rhetorical target of all these organizations, and some, such as IBDA/C, have been implicated in plots against American military targets in Turkey. Prior to the bombing attacks in Istanbul, and with the possible exception of Hizbullah in its heyday, none of these organizations appeared to have the critical mass of resources, militants, and staying power to engage in a sustained campaign against U.S. or other Western targets. That said, the recent bombings point to the existence of a significant if limited constituency of Turks with extremist leanings, capable of undertaking individual acts of terrorism against Americans and American assets in Turkey. It is widely assumed that the terrorists who attacked the British consulate in Istanbul might well have chosen to attack the American consulate, once located in the same neighborhood, but recently moved for security reasons.

In the mid-1990s, there was considerable concern that tactical cooperation between IBDA/C and the PKK would lead the latter, far more capable organization, into attacks on U.S. targets at Incirlik or elsewhere—something the PKK had tended to avoid. Today, with the PKK (KADEK) in decline, it is more likely that anti-American terrorism in Turkey would arise from the infiltration of Muslim extremists based in northern Iraq, or via non-Turkish networks choosing to organize operations in Turkey. In light of recent events and the greatly heightened activism of the Turkish intelligence and security forces, Muslim extremist groups of all kinds will now confront a far more difficult operating environment inside Turkey.

The External Dimension

As this discussion suggests, Turkey has a distinctive environment regarding political Islam and its relationship to the secular state. Substantial social, political, and eco-

³⁶ FORSNET, "Terror Organizations in Turkey."

³⁷ FORSNET, "Terror Organizations in Turkey."

conomic changes inside Turkey are the leading factor in this equation. But external influences matter, and they continue to play an important role in shaping the country's "recessed" Islamic politics. Moreover, the evolution of religious politics in Turkey can have significant implications for Ankara's foreign and security policies, including relations with the United States. Four key aspects of this interaction are worth noting: the role of Turkey's EU candidacy in Islamist politics; the emergence of a wider debate on foreign policy matters in which public opinion, including religious opinion, counts; the lessons and implications of the AKP approach to Iraq and the U.S. intervention; and the consequences for Turkish cooperation in the struggle against terrorism.

Turkey's EU Candidacy as a Reference Point

Support for Turkey's EU candidacy has been a striking feature of the AKP agenda and has been characteristic of the approach by Turkey's "conservative (Muslim) democrats." Interest in European integration as a formula for Turkish prosperity and security has also extended to a supportive approach to NATO. In terms of respect for and interest in Turkey's key Western memberships, the current approach of Erdogan, Gul, and others is reminiscent of Turkey's traditional Western-oriented elites. Abdullah Gul, in particular, has been active in engaging Western observers and policymakers on this topic.

Erdogan himself has not always held this mainstream approach to Western institutions and European integration. In the Refah period and earlier, Erdogan was critical of the EU project and skeptical about the value of NATO in defending Muslim and Turkish interests.³⁸ This was certainly the position of Erbakan and other Islamist politicians in the 1980s and into the mid-1990s. The conversion of Turkey's mainstream Islamists to a pro-Europe, pro-Western approach took place in the context of the split in religious politics that occurred with the closure of Refah and Fazilet. Several factors were and are at work here. Erdogan and the moderates concluded that the key challenge facing any Muslim-oriented political movement in Turkey was to carve out enough legal space to operate as a normal political party without judicial and extra-judicial constraints. Achieving this would require reform and transparency, both of which could be furthered by European integration and ever closer European and U.S. scrutiny of Turkey's human rights performance. In short, a movement like AKP could operate far more easily in a European-style system than under the constraints of an unreformed Kemalist state, despite Turkey's formal and functioning democracy.

³⁸ See Sezer, *op. cit.*

Beyond their obvious stake in reform, support for EU candidacy and close relations with the West became a leading vehicle for Erdogan and AKP to promote their moderate, secular credentials and to demonstrate their normal, status-quo approach to foreign policy. This is both a product of, and an essential component in, AKP's ability to attract a wider circle of secular fellow travelers. It is also a key marker for Turkey's military establishment in its tolerance of the AKP government. To the extent that Turkey progresses in its bid for EU membership—and this remains an open question despite the remarkable progress made on the legislative reform agenda in 2002–2003—AKP stands to benefit and will remain supportive. If Turkey's EU candidacy stalls or appears to be "hollow," moderate Islamists, like others across the political spectrum and even the Turkish military, are likely to adopt a tougher, more nationalistic and sovereignty-conscious stance. In this respect, AKP is very much in the Turkish mainstream.

A Changing Foreign and Security Policy Debate

Turkish foreign and security policymaking has traditionally been driven by a limited set of actors, including the Turkish General Staff, the professional foreign service, and a very small circle of strategic thinkers, most drawn from military and foreign ministry circles. To some extent, this remains the case, but it is a reality that is changing rapidly. Public opinion now counts in Turkish external policy, and this has greatly increased the constraints on policymaking and has bolstered the value of political leadership on foreign policy questions. This change began to make itself felt in the early 1990s with the widespread popular reaction to the perceived costs of the first Iraq war to Turkish prosperity and security. It was reinforced by the public interest in events in Bosnia, Chechnya, and Kosovo. It has reached a new high-water mark with the visible and vigorous public opposition to the U.S. intervention in Iraq (various polls taken in the run-up to the war showed roughly 90 percent of the Turkish public opposed to military action in Iraq, putting Turkey solidly in the European mainstream). Months after the Iraq war, a remarkable number of Turks express concern that U.S. behavior can be a threat to Turkey.³⁹ There is widespread anecdotal evidence that these perceptions have been reinforced by the terrorist bombings in Istanbul—events that many Turks view as spillovers from U.S. and British policy in the Middle East. For AKP, as an avowedly populist party, public opinion is a factor that cannot be ignored. But public opinion can also be led, and that is indeed what Erdogan, Gul, and others tried to do in the months prior to the intervention in Iraq and continue to do in the wake of the Istanbul bombings.

³⁹ According to a 2003 Pew Research Center poll, 71 percent of Turks polled are "very or somewhat" worried that the United States could become a threat to Turkey. Christopher Marquis, "World's View of U.S. Sours After Iraq War, Poll Finds," *The New York Times*, June 4, 2003, p. 19.

The growing role of public opinion has some special implications in relation to political Islamism in Turkey. Turks in general display a marked conservatism on foreign policy matters, with little inclination for change, especially in areas such as relations with Washington, which touch directly on Turkish security interests. Nonetheless, there is some indication that religious sentiment does play a role in foreign policy perceptions, as seen in the popular reaction to events in Bosnia and continued sympathy for the Palestinian cause despite Turkey's close official relationship with Israel—a relationship under increasing pressure. It also appears that religiosity affects perceptions of the United States and plays a role in anti-Americanism.⁴⁰ AKP, and perhaps any successor government, must now deal with a more complex foreign and security policymaking environment in which public opinion and lobbies (including ethnic and business lobbies) count.⁴¹ With its populist orientation, AKP will also undoubtedly reflect the interests of a more conservative and provincial constituency, most of whom, like Erdogan himself, are more heavily focused on domestic than external policy.⁴²

For the foreseeable future, however, despite the steady erosion of the military's role in public policy generally, the Turkish General Staff is likely to retain a substantial say in regional security policy, defense cooperation, and counterterrorism in its internal and external dimensions. For example, the acquiescence of the military certainly facilitated the Erdogan government's pursuit of a more conciliatory policy on Cyprus, a traditional cause célèbre for Turkish nationalists. The sustained role of the military in strategic matters is significant to the extent that it insulates such issues as defense cooperation with Israel from pressures that could emanate from public opinion or the religious right.

Lessons of the Iraq Crisis

Perhaps the most notable feature of the recent friction with Ankara over Iraq is not the failure to secure Turkish cooperation but rather how close this cooperation came to formal approval on the Turkish side. In the run-up to the parliamentary votes in March 2003, Erdogan and key members of the AKP leadership placed their political reputations on the line in an attempt to secure passage of legislation permitting the deployment of American forces through Turkey and the use of Incirlik Air Base for strategic operations in Iraq. This in itself was notable for a populist, Muslim-oriented party newly arrived to government—especially with public opinion running strongly against participation in military intervention.

⁴⁰ According to data collected by Kemal Kirisci, Bogazici University, draft results conveyed to the author.

⁴¹ See discussion in Larrabee and Lesser (2003), pp. 30–36.

⁴² The priority given to domestic reform over foreign policy emerged clearly from the author's conversations with Erdogan in 2001.

On the Turkish side, the failure to secure passage of the required legislation can be ascribed to several factors, some tactical, others more strategic. Tactically, AKP's relative inexperience probably contributed to mismanagement of the parliamentary politics surrounding the issue. More significantly, key constituencies—religious and secular, civilian and military—were ambivalent at best regarding cooperation. The foreign ministry was reportedly very uncomfortable with the bilateral negotiations. More religious and activist cadres within AKP, although no supporters of Iraq, were opposed to intervention in a fellow Muslim state. Sovereignty-conscious members of AKP, the nationalist left, the military, and even the private sector were uncomfortable with the implications of a large U.S. military deployment through Turkey (although many private-sector elites saw the virtues of cooperation at a time when Turkey needed Washington's financial assistance and pressure on the IMF). The military and strategic analysts worried that despite American assurances, Turkish interests vis-à-vis the Kurdish issue and northern Iraq were not being taken seriously in Washington. With all this as background, Erdogan still pressed to secure Turkish cooperation and narrowly missed achieving it in parliament. Notably, the vote was taken in secret. An open vote would probably have resulted in approval, leading some to speculate that the AKP leadership itself was having second thoughts about the plan. Overall, it was an episode in which Islamic sentiment played little discernible role. The obstacles were essentially secular and strategic.

On the American side, too, the failure to secure agreement cannot be ascribed in any significant way to having a Muslim-oriented party in power in Ankara. In the end, wary of its post-1991 experience, Turkey was too distrustful, too sovereignty-conscious, and too cautious to readily accept a highly visible role in the coalition (to be sure, Turkish decisionmakers and public opinion would have found it easier to accept cooperation under a U.N. or NATO rubric). Earlier and more intensive policy planning with Ankara, starting years ago, might also have made a difference, and there is every reason to assume that an AKP government would still welcome this. Above all, American strategic interaction with Turkey needs to take account of the profound changes that have occurred on the Turkish scene in recent years. The Turkish General Staff remains a critical interlocutor on security matters, but public opinion now counts heavily in Turkish behavior. That, along with the ambivalence of secular elites, probably shaped the outcome in spring 2003.

Counterterrorism Cooperation

In broad terms, the advent of a new Turkish government with a religious base should make little difference to the outlook for cooperation on counterterrorism. Turkey, having suffered from terrorism from both the right and the left, as well as separatist violence, is highly attuned to the challenge of terrorism and primed to cooperate with the United States and Western partners. The Istanbul bombings of November 2003 strongly reinforced this orientation. Turkey is in a good position to play an active

role in counterterrorism strategy. With its borders in the Middle East, the Balkans, and the Caucasus, Turkey sits astride the lines of communication for transnational movements of all kinds. Iranian and Saudi exile networks have a long history of presence in Turkey. The Turkish intelligence services are highly professional and heavily focused on internal security and terrorist risks. In the area of nuclear smuggling, in particular, Turkey has been a leading venue for intercepted commerce. Despite a history of friction on many day-to-day matters, Ankara has generally been very cooperative in managing the force protection problem at Incirlik Air Base and elsewhere. Turkey has also been at the forefront in pressing for greater attention to counterterrorism missions within NATO.

Would a greater role for political Islam in Turkey imply a more complicated relationship on counterterrorism? Barring a sudden shift to a more overtly Islamist stance, this is most unlikely. Even Turkey's conservative Islamists have an ambivalent and often critical attitude toward the rest of the Muslim world, especially Turkey's Arab neighbors. Turks, whether religious or secular in orientation, can be expected to have little tolerance for state-sponsored terrorism, and they are keenly aware of their own exposure to instability and chaos in adjacent regions. With active weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs in Syria and Iran, along with the problem of nuclear control in Russia and Central Asia, Ankara is particularly keen to contain the spread of unconventional weapons, including those that could be deployed by terrorists.

In the area of counterterrorism cooperation, as in other spheres, the unifying element spanning both secular and religious politics in Turkey will continue to be Turkish nationalism and sovereignty concerns. Turkish governments of virtually any stripe will be eager to cooperate in the global struggle against terrorism, provided that Turkish security interests do not appear to be subsumed and there is no apparent interference in Turkey's internal affairs. In this context, the Istanbul bombings have had a mixed effect. In practical terms, the attacks resulted in a strongly reinforced program of internal surveillance, action by the police and security forces, and intelligence sharing. In a wider sense, the bombings produced expressions of solidarity with Western partners in the struggle against terrorism. But many Turks also view the attacks as a spillover of U.S. and British policy in Iraq and in the Middle East as a whole. Under these conditions, Ankara is likely to be even more insistent on American action against PKK/KADEK units in northern Iraq, as well as European action on Turkish Islamists based abroad, as part of a comprehensive approach to counterterrorism.

Conclusions

The advent of a majority Turkish government with Muslim roots is the product of profound social changes combined with the stimulus of a deep and continuing economic crisis. It also reflects long-standing dissatisfaction with Turkey's established political class and its perceived mismanagement, corruption, and lack of connection to the concerns of ordinary Turks.

This analysis suggests that violence by Islamic extremists does not constitute a substantial long-term threat to stability in Turkey, although small-scale extremist groups do exist and such groups are capable of lethal and highly disruptive attacks. The more relevant question in the Turkish context is whether mainstream Muslim-oriented politics of the kind advanced by AKP are as moderate and durable as they appear or whether Prime Minister Erdogan and his followers harbor undemocratic and antisecular sentiments. These questions are a matter of debate in Turkey, with most observers adopting a wait-and-see attitude. A measured assessment, based on the experience of AKP government to date, suggests that a shift to more pronounced Islamic politics is unlikely. Even if AKP's commitment to secularism is tactical, it is a tactic that is likely to persist and become imbedded. Even with the waning of Ataturk's strictly secular, statist ideology, Turkish political culture remains strongly secular. That said, many of the constraints on visible Islam in Turkey are likely to weaken, a process that actually began in the 1980s. In ten years, for example, it is doubtful that the wearing of head scarves will continue to be prohibited in official settings. Graduates of religious schools may find wider acceptance in higher education and professional circles. But the notion of secular government will almost certainly endure.

The existence of strong constitutional strictures against religious parties, and a widely shared commitment to preservation of the secular state, means that all but fringe groups operate in an atmosphere of "recessed" Islamic politics. Even with the electoral success of AKP, Turkish nationalism and economic populism arguably remain the most potent forces on the Turkish political scene. AKP, while conservative and religious in tone, has also played heavily on these forces—and they played a key part in political rhetoric following the November 2003 terrorist attacks in Istanbul.

The rise of "recessed" Islamic politics in Turkey has brought about an opening for alternative elites that are less secular, socially conservative, and more provincial in outlook than the cosmopolitan Western-oriented elites that have dominated Turkish domestic and external policymaking since the formation of the republic. The traditional Ataturkist establishment in the military, the upper reaches of the bureaucracy and the private sector remains broadly influential, but their presence is now accompanied by other voices and perspectives. In short, the Turkish scene is now far more diverse—socially, politically, and economically. This trend is likely to continue over the next decade.

The AKP phenomenon is also about systemic reform, and AKP's appeal as a reformist movement has allowed it to acquire a substantial following among secularists interested in promoting change in Turkey or has simply convinced them that AKP, as the political force of the moment, needs to be accommodated. To these factors must be added Erdogan's undoubted charismatic appeal and political skill. Overall, the AKP success is emblematic of changes and pressures that are likely to shape the Turkish scene for some time to come.

The policy orientation of these new elites and of AKP is primarily internal and has to do, above all, with moderating the heavy role of the Turkish state. It is also focused on reforms aimed at preparing Turkey for accession talks with the EU. Turkey's recessed Islamists have a strong stake in this process, and they have emerged as surprisingly vigorous advocates of integration with Europe and continued attachment to the West—objectives widely seen as good for public policy at all levels. For Erdogan and others, the equation is simple: Greater democratization and transparency in Turkish politics, on the European pattern, will create a larger and more secure environment for movements outside the secular mainstream. For AKP, the “opponent” is not the West but rather the Kemalist hard-liners in the Turkish military and among the old elites. AKP moderates are also wary of the threat from more radical elements within and outside their own movement. It is a difficult balancing act, in which the ability to deliver an ever-closer relationship with Europe is a key prize.

Whether Europe is, ultimately, prepared to respond in the manner envisioned at the Helsinki and Copenhagen summits remains an open question.⁴³ The failure of Turkey's European strategy could push Turkey's moderate Islamists and others toward a more radical, anti-EU stance. But, in this case, nationalists and populists are the more likely beneficiaries. The failure of Turkey's recent and fairly sweeping reforms to elicit a favorable judgment from the European Commission on the opening of accession negotiations (a decision regarding a “date” is expected in December 2004) could alter the calculus that has allowed diverse sectors of Turkish society to support reform and, again, could drive Turkish politics in less moderate directions and spur a more inward-looking, nationalistic approach. Yet, when viewed in the context of Turkey's evolution in recent decades, the trend in social, political, and economic terms has been one of more-or-less steady convergence with European norms. It would take a great deal to derail this process over the longer term.

In the near term, however, economic recovery is another key variable. Turkey has been in deep economic trouble since 2000 and has only recently moved toward a tentative recovery. A return to conditions of overt crisis could encourage more ex-

⁴³ For a full discussion of this question, see Larrabee and Lesser (2003); see also “Reforming for Europe,” *CSIS Turkey Update*, August 4, 2003; Kramer (2000); Mario Zucconi, “Turkey's New Politics and the European Union,” *Ethno-Barometer Working Paper*, April 2003; and Ziya Onis, “Domestic Politics, International Norms and Challenges to the State: Turkey-EU Relations in the Post-Helsinki Era,” *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 4, No. 1, Spring 2003, pp. 9–31.

trreme politics, including explicit forms of political Islam—an unlikely but possible scenario.

The risk of a military intervention in Turkish politics is now minimal. Turkey’s military establishment, along with elements of the secular elite, is certainly wary of Erdogan and AKP. But the “red lines”—maintenance of a secular and unitary state and a tough stance toward terrorism—are clear and unlikely to be crossed under current conditions. The norms, both internal and external, regarding the role of the military have changed, and it would be difficult to imagine a return to behavior tolerated during the Cold War, or even as late as 1997. Moreover, the Turkish military is part of a larger, secular social milieu in which tolerance for moderate expressions of religiosity, even in politics, is gaining ground. If leaders of the civilian elite are willing to tolerate “recessed Islam,” the military leadership is unlikely to act, even if the recent drift of Turkish politics is uncomfortable for them.

On the foreign and security policy front, the outlook is for essential continuity in Turkish behavior. This is the product of fundamental conservatism in the Turkish approach, the fact that traditional elites remain influential in the policy process, and, not least, the fact that Erdogan and AKP are at pains to demonstrate their solid, pro-Western credentials. This does not mean, however, that relations between Turkey and the West will always be easy. Turks across the political spectrum remain remarkably wary of U.S. and European intentions, especially toward the Kurds and northern Iraq. Ankara is also very exposed to tensions in transatlantic relations that would force Turkey to choose between U.S. and European approaches to key issues. These are choices that Ankara would prefer not to make. As a result, AKP—or any other Turkish government—will continue to opt for multilateral, NATO-centric approaches to security matters wherever possible. In any setting, regardless of the complexion of the government in Ankara, the Turkish commitment to counterterrorism cooperation is likely to remain strong based on Turkey’s own internal security concerns.

Implications for Policy and Strategy

This analysis points to a number of implications for U.S. policy and strategy.

Treat the Erdogan government as a normal, secular actor. The advent of a Turkish government with a religious background is not a transitory phenomenon. AKP has a strong interest in working with Washington, and we should continue to engage and treat AKP as a “normal” actor across the full spectrum of diplomatic and security issues.

Recognize the strength of Turkish nationalism and sovereignty concerns. Even the most pro-Western Turkish foreign and security policy elites are wary of policy overtures, including requests for access and overflight, that appear to take Turkish cooperation for granted or give short shrift to Turkish interests. This has been a leading characteristic of the Turkish approach since the formation of the republic

and has been demonstrated on numerous occasions since 1990. The Erdogan government shares in this tradition and will be more inclined to support cooperation imbedded in a Western rather than a bilateral frame.

Recognize that public opinion counts in contemporary Turkey. As an avowedly populist movement, AKP is particularly sensitive to public opinion in its foreign policy decisionmaking. In this respect, Turkey has moved solidly into the European mainstream. This argues for greater attention to public diplomacy and the engagement of a wider range of new civilian elites within Turkey.

Adjust to the changing role of the Turkish military. The erosion of the Turkish military's structural role in policymaking, along with greater transparency even in defense matters, reinforces the need to engage a broader range of influential Turks. Doing so will pay dividends in terms of a more predictable defense relationship with Ankara.

Anticipate changes on the internal security scene. The terrorism and force protection environment in Turkey is in flux. With the waning of the active Kurdish insurgency in southeastern Anatolia and with the occupation of Iraq, new cross-border networks with new political agendas may emerge. There is some potential for Turkey's own Muslim extremists (including groups based in Germany) to focus more intensively on American targets against a background of generally heightened anti-Americanism, on the pattern of the November 2003 attacks against British institutions. Indeed, there is evidence that Turkish terrorist groups in the Al Qaeda orbit have targeted American facilities in Turkey but have been prevented from launching successful attacks.

Changing conditions will place a premium on continued close cooperation with Turkish security agencies on intelligence sharing and force protection beyond the perimeter at Incirlik. A reduction of the American presence at Incirlik would reduce but hardly eliminate American exposure to terrorism in Turkey. In general, the effectiveness of counterterrorism cooperation with Ankara is likely to turn critically on the overall health of the bilateral relationship and on Turkey's perception that its own terrorism concerns (including PKK/KADEK remnants in Northern Iraq) are being taken seriously.

Recognize the limits of the Turkish model. If by a "Turkish model" we mean the ability to accommodate greater religiosity in politics while maintaining a secular state and a pro-Western orientation, it may have some utility in thinking through our relations with the current government in Ankara. But U.S. policy should recognize that Turkey's political future is by no means settled along these lines. Turks themselves often chafe at the notion of such a model, in part because they may prefer a different outcome, in part because the "model" is meant to be applied in the Middle East or Central Asia. These are places that most Turks view as far removed from their society, however near they may be in geographic terms. Arguably, the key variable in this regard has been the degree of Turkey's integration with Europe and

the West, a condition absent in most (perhaps all) other cases where political Islam vies for power. For deep historical reasons, the Turkish model will have little attraction—in the Arab Middle East in particular. In policy terms, the notion of a Turkish model should be treated with caution and used sparingly.

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Iran: What Future for the Islamic State?

C. Christine Fair

Introduction

Iran is a country of both regional and international strategic significance. Its population is estimated to be nearly 70 million, and it sits astride the intersection of Central, Southwest, and South Asia, as well as the Persian Gulf. In addition to these geographical and human resources, Iran is also endowed with the world's second-largest gas reserve (it has 15 percent of the total world gas reserves) and the third-largest reserve of oil (9 percent of the global oil reserve). Despite these natural resources, getting them to market is difficult because Iran is not near the consumer markets and faces stiff competition from Russia, Turkmenistan, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia.¹

Iran is a focus of attention for the United States principally because the two countries have been very much at odds since the Iranian Revolution of 1979, the seizure of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, and the resulting 444-day hostage crisis. Neither the United States nor Iran seems able to overcome these past antagonisms and forge new means of viewing the other. For Iran's part, the United States retains the moniker "Great Satan" among the conservative elite. In recent years, Iran's geopolitical outlook has shifted because of changes in the regional threat environment. One source of threat resulted from Pakistan's detonation of an atomic device in 1998, one in a series of events that have contributed to the deterioration of Iran-Pakistan relations.² Pakistani support for the Taliban also worried Tehran. Iran blamed Pakistan for the deaths of Iranian diplomats (or possibly intelligence operatives) in Mazar-e-

¹ British Petroleum Company: *BP Statistical Review of World Energy*, London, 1998, pp. 4, 20. Cited by International Crisis Group (ICG), "Iran: The Struggle for the Revolution's Soul," ICG Middle East Report, No. 5, Amman/Brussels, August 5, 2002.

² The nuclear cooperation between India and Pakistan occurred in the 1980s, well before the chill in their bilateral relationship following Islamabad's far-reaching support of the Taliban.

Sharif in August 1998.³ With the overthrow of the Taliban, the presence of the United States in Afghanistan has presented another source of concern to Iran. For Washington's part, Iran has been included in the "axis of evil," is accused of sheltering elements of Al Qaeda and of pursuing a nuclear weapons program, and is criticized for its long-standing opposition to a Middle East peace process as well for its repressive and totalitarian domestic policies.

Since the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, a number of significant changes have occurred in Iran's "backyard." The military operations in Afghanistan brought down the Taliban regime—a common antagonist of the United States, Iran, and the Central Asian republics. Second, U.S.-led military operations in Iraq have also decimated the mutual nemesis of Tehran and Washington, Saddam Hussein's regime. Although Iran may be pleased to see these two strategic threats disappear, it is less pleased that the threats were removed by the United States and that these military operations have given the United States access that it has not enjoyed in recent years (e.g., to Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Uzbekistan).

President Bush's labeling of Iran as part of an "axis of evil" during his 2001 State of the Union address emphasized the threat represented by regimes that are pursuing weapons of mass destruction as well as those governments that aid and abet terrorist groups and disregard international standards of human rights. This speech did more to shake up political and security affairs in the Gulf than any other event since the fall of the Shah. Since that presidential address, the United States has been involved in an intense reexamination of its objectives toward Iran.

Over the long term, Iran has proven to be less assertive than it was initially after the 1979 Islamic revolution. At that time, Iran repeatedly issued threats against the Gulf states, with one Iranian leader claiming that Bahrain was rightfully part of Iran. Iran seized the islands of Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs, which are claimed by the UAE. In recent years however, Iran has conducted a "charm offensive" to boost its interests and form alliances in the region. Nonetheless, there have been other episodes of Iranian assertiveness. In 1987 and 1988, Iran targeted the shipping—and, in a few instances, the territory—of U.S. partners to punish them for supporting Iraq in its war with Iran. Moreover, long-standing concerns remain about Tehran's support for Shi'ite radicals against the Gulf regimes and about Iranian-backed subversion or terrorism—particularly through Lebanese Hezbollah.

Notably, this changed regional environment poses both opportunities and challenges to Iran—and these threats and challenges are viewed somewhat differently by the various centers of power in Tehran as well as by differing factions of the pol-

³ See Byman et al. (2001a). The allegation that the Iranians killed in Mazar-e-Sharif were intelligence operatives comes from a well-informed Afghan source.

ity. This chapter seeks to illuminate the differences in these perceptions across the different stakeholders within Iran.

In addition to changes in its external environment, Iran is also facing numerous domestic challenges. Like many states in the region, Iran is challenged by a large youth bulge: Seventy percent of Iran's population and 50 percent of its electorate is under thirty.⁴ Despite the superficial manifestations of Islamic dominance—e.g., sex-segregated buses, wearing of *rusari* and *manteau* (the head scarf and long cloak) or the *chador* (the large black “sheet”)—Iran's youth are largely desacralized.⁵ In this context, *desacralized* suggests a trend in which Muslims retain their Muslim identity in a deeply personal or social sense but the rituals and outward markings of Islam are less important.⁶

Iran's youth must countenance the repressive features of the regime and its abysmal employment prospects. While Iran officially places its unemployment rate at 13.7 percent, other estimates have placed it at 20 or even 30 percent. Iran needs to create anywhere between 800,000 to 1.2 million new jobs annually. In 2000, a so-called good year, it produced 400,000.⁷ A poll conducted in 2002 found that 84 percent of the polled students from Iran's universities were opposed to the direction pursued by the clerical state.⁸ Concomitantly, the more influential contemporary movements are the new student organizations (e.g., the Organization for the Strengthening of Unity) that call for a referendum to adjudicate Iran's future and its political structure.⁹

Politically, Iran has a unique structure. Iran has the formal features and practices of a democratic state. However, recognition of these features is not tantamount to asserting that the sum of these practices constitutes a democracy. Iranians go to the polls nearly every year for some sort of election. Iran has a lively political debate and vibrant press, with varying degrees of episodic freedom. However, while Iran's popularly elected president and parliament have in the recent past enjoyed widespread support among the Iranian populace, these institutions have little power.¹⁰

⁴ R. Jahanbegloo, “Pressures from Below,” *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 14, No. 1, January 2003, p. 128; Abdo and Lyons (2003), pp. 196–230.

⁵ Jahanbegloo, op. cit., p. 129, and conversations with Ali M. Ansari in July 2003.

⁶ During an interview for this chapter, Ali Ansari used the term *desacralized* in a deliberate contrast to *secularized* because youth are disavowing not their religious identity but only the ritual observance of their religious identity.

⁷ Borzou Daragahi, “Iran Captivated by Prophet of Fiscal Doom,” *The Christian Science Monitor*, March 12, 2002. Available at <http://www.csmonitor.com/2002/0312/p06s01-wome.html>, last accessed July 18, 2003.

⁸ *Iran Times*, August 2, 2002, cited by Ray Takeyh, “Iran at a Crossroads,” *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 57, No. 1, Winter 2003, p. 48.

⁹ Jahanbegloo, op. cit., p. 129, and conversations with Ali M. Ansari in July 2003.

¹⁰ As this chapter will explain in subsequent sections, the inability of reformists to deliver since Khatami's first rise to power in 1997 has produced widespread disaffection among Iran's voting public. This has resulted in

Conversely, the regime embodied in the Supreme Leader, the Revolutionary Guards, Council of Guardians, and so forth are not elected and have few constituents in Iran, but they hold the reins of power and monopolize the use of force. Thus Iran watchers are curious to see how the mounting domestic pressure for reform and democracy will be negotiated by the conservative regime. This chapter also explores these questions in greater detail.

The chapter's immediate interest is to articulate the ways in which the events in Afghanistan and Iraq have altered how Iran perceives its regional security and how the much-altered environment will impinge on Iran's strategic behavior. It also seeks to explicate the various ways in which this changed environment will encroach on Iran's domestic political situation. As a part of this exercise, this chapter will also identify key past events and developments that are salient for understanding the present. Therefore, the chapter is organized around key events and developments beginning with Iran's Islamic revolution:

- The 1979 revolution
- The Iran-Iraq War
- The death of Khomeini and the birth of the Reformist movement
- The Second of Khordad movement and the ascendancy of President Khatami
- The post-September 11 environment: domestic and external impacts on Iran
- The removal of the Saddam regime in Iraq.

Where possible, we draw out the ways in which Islam was instrumental in each event, the specific entrepreneurs engaging in the manipulation of Islam, and a description of their means and ends.

Our research is based on interviews with representatives of Iran to the United Nations, academic and think-tank analysts, and individuals within the U.S. government. Because of the circumstances prevailing in the region, we were unable to conduct additional research in Iran.

The following section presents an overview of Iran's people, governance, parties and politics. The next several sections detail the various catalytic events noted above. The final section concludes the chapter with a number of considerations for U.S. policy.

diminished voter turnout as Iranians register their dissatisfaction with the system and the candidates that it permits to stand for elections.

An Overview of Iran's Population and Political Structure

Population

In comparison to its neighbors, Iran seems to be relatively homogeneous with respect to religious and sectarian composition: Nearly 89 percent of Iranians are Shi'a Muslims. The remaining population is nearly 10 percent Sunni Muslims. Collectively, Hindus, Jews, Zoroastrians, and Christian constitute a mere 1 percent. (See Table 4.1.)

However, this simple observation belies the country's rich social and cultural diversity. Iran's populace comprises several ethnic groups. Notably, Persians constitute a slight majority of 51 percent. The next largest fraction of Iran's population is made up of Azeris, whose homeland is centered on Tabriz in the north. The remaining population is split across numerous ethnic and tribal groups (see Table 4.2). Some of

Table 4.1
Religious and Sectarian Background

Religion and/or Sect	Percent
Shi'a Muslim	89
Sunni Muslim	10
Zoroastrian, Jewish, Christian, and Baha'i	1

Source: *CIA World Factbook 2002*, available at <http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ir.html#People>, last accessed July 16, 2003.

Table 4.2
Ethnic Groups in Iran

Ethnicity	Percent
Persian	51
Azeri	24
Gilaki and Mazandarani	8
Kurd	7
Arab	3
Lur	2
Baluch	2
Turkmen	2
Other	1

Source: *CIA World Factbook 2002*, available at <http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ir.html#People>, last accessed July 16, 2003.

these key ethnic groups are the Kurds, whose origins are in the areas adjacent to Iraq and Turkey; the Arabs, who are mostly in Khuzestan; and the Baluch, from Baluchistan, which cuts across Pakistan and Afghanistan. Similarly, among the languages spoken in Iran, 58 percent of the population of Iran speaks some variant of Persian. The second most widely spoken language group is the Turkic languages, spoken by 26 percent of the population (See Table 4.3). Notably, the adult literacy rate for Iran is 77 percent, which compares favorably with the overall adult literacy rate for the Arab countries of 61 percent.¹¹

Table 4.3
Languages Spoken in Iran

Language	Percent
Persian and Persian dialects	58
Turkic dialects	26
Kurdish	9
Luri	2
Baluchi	1
Arabic	1
Turkish	1
Other	2

Source: CIA World Factbook 2002, available at <http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ir.html#People>, last accessed July 16, 2003.

Key Political and Security Institutions¹²

The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran was promulgated after the 1979 revolution and went into effect on December 3, 1979.¹³ It was drafted by a body dominated by clerics sympathetic to Khomeini, the Assembly of Experts (*majles-e-khobregan*), and endorsed through a popular referendum in November 1979. To orient the reader, this subsection provides an overview of the six main bodies of power authorized under this constitution: namely, (1) the Supreme Leader (*velayat-e faqih*); (2) the President; and (3) four constitutional assemblies (the Parliament, Council of

¹¹ See *UNDP Human Development Report 2003 Indicators*, available at http://www.undp.org/hdr2003/indicator/indic_2_1_1.html, last accessed July 19, 2003. Note that adult literacy is defined as the percentage of the population above the age of 15 who are literate. Note also that “literacy” is not defined.

¹² This section draws heavily from the lucid and concise description of the Iranian government found in the International Crisis Group, “Iran: The Struggle for the Revolution’s Soul,” ICG Middle East Report No. 5 (2002). Where appropriate, we have added additional references or commentary. See also Ansari (2000).

¹³ The text of the constitution is available at http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/ir00000_.html, last accessed August 3, 2004.

Guardians, Assembly of Experts, and the Expediency Council). Iran also has a number of forces devoted to internal security duties, such as the various law enforcement instruments, the Basiij militia, the revolutionary guards, the Ministry of Intelligence and Security, and the Special Clerical Court. In addition, the revolutionary foundations (*bonyads*) play a key role in managing the internal security environment. Each of these institutions is briefly described below.

The Supreme Leader and the Supreme Leader of the Revolution. The concept of “rule of the Islamic jurist” animates the notion of the *velayat-e faqih* and endowed the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, with vast powers. While this concept, promulgated by Khomeini himself, had little basis in Shi’a political thinking, Khomeini argued that rather than waiting for the prophesied arrival of the “hidden Imam,” other qualified clerics could serve as interim stewards of government.¹⁴ The public has little effect on the selection of the Supreme Leader because this power is given to the clerical elites (*fuqaha*).¹⁵ The parliament and other consultative bodies were to be tasked with implementing divine law.

Despite vociferous protests from more liberal elements, the clerics endowed the office of Supreme Leader with unprecedented political and religious authority and created a system that was intrinsically tied to the charismatic figure of Khomeini. Under the constitution, the Supreme Leader alone controls the instruments of state coercion. He is the commander-in-chief of all armed forces and has the sole authority to mobilize troops and declare war. He alone can dismiss and appoint the heads of the judiciary, head of state radio and television, and the supreme commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (also known as the Revolutionary Guards).¹⁶

Khomeini’s successor, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, lacks the charismatic personality of Khomeini as well as his clerical legitimacy and is therefore less effective in silencing rivals within the clerical ranks. Therefore, even though he has not evinced particularly hard-line views, his lack of political efficacy has resulted in his aligning himself with such hard-liners as the chairman of the Council of Guardians, Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, and the chairman of the Assembly of Experts, Ayatollah Ali Meshkini. (Both of these individuals work closely with the intelligence services.)¹⁷

In 1989, after the death of Khomeini, the constitution was revised and substantive changes within the power structure were instituted. Despite these modifications, the Supreme Leader retains solid control of the most important elements of state. One of the major changes created by the constitutional revision is the authority of

¹⁴ This is clearly a gross simplification of a much more complicated line of reasoning. For a more nuanced explanation, see Brumberg (2001).

¹⁵ See Martin (2000).

¹⁶ ICG Middle East Report No. 5 (2002). Note that during the Iran-Iraq war, the Revolutionary Guards was a voluntary force. It is now a conscripted force.

¹⁷ ICG Middle East Report No. 5 (2002). See also Schirazi (1998).

the Assembly of Experts to dismiss the Supreme Leader should they judge that he is not executing his duties.

The President. In 1979 the presidency was a ceremonial role, and the actual executive power was vested in the prime minister. For a variety of reasons, the office of the prime minister was abolished in the 1989 revision of the constitution and the duties of that office went to the newly reconstituted president. The president became the nominal head of government with the authority to dismiss and appoint ministers, who also must be confirmed by parliament. Because the president controls the Planning and Budget Organization, he has considerable influence over economic policy. The president also appoints the head of the Central Bank and is chair of the National Security Council. The president and his ministers can be removed if there is a two-thirds majority no-confidence vote in the parliament. However, Article 110 of the constitution also empowers the parliament to declare him “politically incompetent.” Upon being informed of this judgment, the Supreme Leader is permitted to remove him.

While in principle the president is the second most powerful person within the state, in practice, he wields only “soft power.” His portfolio is composed of social, cultural, and economic matters. Curiously, although he chairs the National Security Council, his responsibilities do not include foreign policy, and he cannot command the armed forces because these powers are within the bailiwick of the Supreme Leader. Moreover, the executive branch is subordinate to the religious authorities.

Constitutional Assemblies. As noted above, there are several such assemblies; in many instances, there are no comparable organizations elsewhere in the world. The Council of Guardians, the Assembly of Experts, and the Expediency Council are unique.

The Council of Guardians. This group (currently headed by Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati) comprises 12 jurists whose job is to determine whether or not legislation passed by the parliament is consonant with Islamic law (*shari'a*). Legislation that does not conform is then sent back to parliament for revision. Notably, the Council of Guardians is a bastion of conservatives within the power structure of Iran.

The Assembly of Experts. Based in Qom, this is a council of 86 clerics who are popularly elected for eight-year terms. (As with all electoral proceedings, candidates are preapproved by the Council of Guardians.) Their primary task is to appoint the Supreme Leader and remove the Supreme Leader should they find that he is unable or unwilling to execute his duties or if he is deemed to be unqualified to hold the office.

The Expediency Council. Founded by Ayatollah Khomeini in 1988, this group has two responsibilities: (1) resolving conflicts between the Parliament and the Council of Guardians and (2) advising the Supreme Leader. This body has had episodic periods of great significance, for example, during the 1988–1989 period (at the end of the Iran-Iraq war) when significant domestic changes were required (e.g., a

peacetime economy, a number of emergency laws). It again became prominent in 1997 when Ayatollah Khamenei appointed President Rafsanjani to head this body. In this capacity, Rafsanjani effectively occupies the number three position within the Iranian government. While Rafsanjani was a critical factor in securing Mr. Khatami's election in 1997, he has mobilized his position as head of this council to check Khatami's reformist initiatives and has established parallel committees on culture, judiciary, economics, and trade to vitiate some of Khatami's own efforts in these areas.

The Parliament (Majles). Elections for parliament have been held on schedule every four years since 1980. The parliament engages in vibrant and controversial debates and is responsible for drafting legislation, approving states of emergency, ratifying treaties, approving loans and annual budget, and dismissing the president and his ministers. However, in both practice and principle, the actual authority of this institution is heavily circumscribed by nonelected centers of power.

Internal Security Institutions. Several formal bodies are charged with some form of internal security. These groups are briefly described below.

The Basij Militia. Created by Khomeini in 1979 and commanded by the Revolutionary Guards, the Basij recruits its volunteers among the ranks of the young (aged 11 to 17) from either rural environs or impoverished areas of the cities. Basijis (members of the Basij) tend to be ideologically motivated, deeply religious, and poorly educated; they are estimated to number some 90,000. They can be deployed with special units of the Revolutionary Guard when extreme force is needed to put down dissent or unrest. There were indications during 2001 that the Basij was receiving additional training and equipment especially among students in the universities. It was also learned that Basij forces were deployed along the sensitive frontiers with Afghanistan and Pakistan—possibly with a view to bolstering border security following the Operation Enduring Freedom against the Taliban in Afghanistan. Basij forces, which include women, have been holding major military exercises to improve their ability to react swiftly in emergencies.¹⁸

The Revolutionary Guards.¹⁹ Created by Khomeini in 1979 to protect the revolution and its accomplishments and to provide a counterweight to the monarchist-dominated armed forces, this organization has several security and intelligence apparatuses and is closely associated with hard-line elements of the conserva-

¹⁸ On August 5, 2001, Iranian military forces launched a three-day military exercise, "Shahmat-80" ("Courage-80") in the northern Persian Gulf port city of Bushehr. Admiral Ali Razmjou said "Shahmat-80" was aimed at "coordinating the different units of the volunteer Islamic Basij forces within the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps," adding that "it also aims to raise the combat readiness of the forces involved in the exercise to defend the nation." See "Iran: Army Organisation," *Jane's World Armies*, April 2004, at <http://www4.janes.com/K2/doc.jsp?t=A&K2DocKey=/content1/janesdata/binder/jwar/jwar1517.htm>, last accessed August 2004.

¹⁹ As noted elsewhere in this chapter, the Revolutionary Guards are now a conscripted force and are reported to have voted disproportionately for President Khatami. Now that they are no longer a volunteer militia, it has been suggested by Ali M. Ansari that they may no longer be as significant a military force as is conventionally thought (conversation with Ali Ansari, July 23, 2003).

tive factions of the government. Currently, this force numbers some 120,000—a substantial drop from its end-strength of 300,000 during the Iran-Iraq war.

The Ministry of Intelligence and Security. Since its creation in 1984, this ministry is the largest intelligence agency in Iran and is one of the most influential and independently operating power centers in Iran. By law, it is headed by a cleric and its top clerical officials are drawn from the *Madrassa-ye-Haqqani* (a very conservative theological school in Qom). It is well known for its repressive and coercive tactics.

The Special Clerical Court. This important internal security institution has ten branches in Iran's major cities and is the Supreme Leader's most effective weapon to combat sources of dissent. It has no legal basis whatsoever in the constitution and is accountable only to the Supreme Leader. Its rulings cannot be appealed or rescinded by any court. Its main function is to handle alleged clerical crimes (e.g., conspiracy against or defamation of the Supreme Leader).

The Bonyads. While they are not a state organization per se, Iran's numerous *bonyads* (often translated somewhat benignly as "foundations") comprise a key parastatal institution with far-reaching effects on internal security. The power of the bonyads is due in part to their collective resources and in part to their loose network. They are tax-exempt organizations that answer only to the Supreme Leader and engage in a host of activities (e.g., trade, commerce, manufacturing, religious and political propaganda, social services, and the arts).

The bonyads became important after the revolution when they were bequeathed the properties and business assets seized from the Shah's family and associates. Bonyads are an important ally of the regime because they give it several levers for exerting social control when needed (e.g., mobilizing protests, providing patronage, indoctrinating the polity, and repressing dissent). Notably, 58 percent of the national budget is allocated to the bonyads, which are generally headed by influential clerics or other prominent figures. The bonyads' existence as an institution predates the revolution. In fact, the postrevolutionary bonyads essentially appropriated the extant Bonyad-Pahlavi institutions to ease the transition from dynastic rule to clerical rule.

Fundamental Political Questions

Various strata of the Iranian polity have wrestled with the fundamental Islamic political structure that developed after the Islamic revolution of 1979. Iran is perhaps the only country that has tried to combine a strict Islamic regime with democratic processes within the limits of an Islamic framework. The constitution of Iran maps out a complex structure with some democratic elements. For instance, the people directly elect the president, the Assembly of Experts (whose sole duty is to elect the Supreme Leader), the *Majles*, and local councils. As a consequence, Iranians go to the

voting booth nearly every year.²⁰ There is also a referendum mechanism through which changes in the constitution or parliamentary legislation are popularly solicited. Iran generally enjoys high voter turnout rates: During the 1997 presidential election, a turnout rate was 70.7 percent (29,076,844 of the 36,466,487 eligible persons). In 2001, the turnout rate declined to 66.0 percent (28,086,507 out of 42,170,231 eligible persons voted).²¹

However, as Baktiari and Vaziri note, even with these democratic elements, it is far from obvious whether the constitution places more emphasis on “Islamic” or “Republic.”²² Article 56 (The Divine Right of Sovereignty) attests to this ambiguity when it states:

Absolute sovereignty over the world and man belongs to God, and it is He Who has made man master of his own social destiny. No one can deprive man of this divine right, nor subordinate it to the vested interests of a particular individual or group . . .²³

This vagueness in practice also resonates in the actual conduct of elections, which is far less democratic than the previous description indicates. For example, the Council of Guardians is empowered to supervise the elections to the Majles (Article 3 of the Elections Law). This means that the Council of Guardians claims (and exercises) the right to determine fitness for candidacy, prescreen candidates, and certify the final election results. Thus, in principle and in practice, the Council of Guardians has tremendous ability to shape the conduct and outcome of an election.²⁴

The extent to which Iran’s electoral politics are constricted by the Council of Guardians was made painfully obvious during the February 2004 parliamentary elections. The Council of Guardians disqualified more than 3,000 candidates from competing. Astonishingly, among these thousands were 80 individuals who were at the time of disqualification members of the parliament. These candidates were primarily liberal-minded individuals, which was the ostensible precipitant for the Council of Guardians acting to sideline them. This election therefore signals a reversal of fortune for the Council of Guardians and some of the setbacks that it has experienced in recent years—however minor in the first instance.

²⁰ See Bahman Baktiari, “The Impact of Elections in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. XXV, No. 2, Winter 2002, p. 53; ICG Middle East Report No. 5 (2002).

²¹ Samad Kalantari, “Iranian Voting Behavior in the 7th and 8th Presidential Elections,” *Discourse* (quarterly), Winter 2002, Vol. 3, No. 3, pp. 243–251. Available at <http://www.netiran.com/Htdocs/Clippings/DPolitics/020229XXDP02.html>, last accessed July 19, 2003.

²² Bahman Baktiari and Haleh Vaziri, “Iran’s Liberal Revolution,” *Current History*, January 2002, p. 53.

²³ See Article 56 of the constitution, available at http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/ir00000_.html, last accessed August 3, 2004.

²⁴ Baktiari, *op. cit.*, 2002, p. 54.

The actual extent to which the Council of Guardians has been able to “super-*vis*e” elections has been episodically debated, and ways have been found to mitigate the council’s influence in the recent past (although the 2004 parliamentary elections epitomize its resurgence.) For example, Ayatollah Hussein Ali Montazeri, the president of the First Assembly of Experts, which drafted the 1979 Constitution, claims that it was the responsibility of the Ministry of Interior to supervise elections—not the Council of Guardians. In his view, the Council of Guardians was empowered to oversee elections (under Article 99 of the constitution) to ensure that irregularities such as vote rigging would not occur. However, Montazeri averred that Article 99 “does not . . . empower the Guardians Council to constitute a process of vetting of its own.” Nonetheless, Montazeri did seek legislation that is compatible with shari’a.²⁵

Montazeri further said that, under the system that permits the Council of Guardians extensive power of electoral interference, “. . . the general public will have no choice but to elect their representatives from those candidates who have already been screened by the Guardians Council. This is clearly in contravention to the spirit and the wording of Article 99. Experts who drafted and approved the Constitution at the first Assembly of Experts never intended Article 99 to convey such a meaning.”²⁶ While the populace has the ability to vote for these four elected bodies, its choices are far from unconstrained—as the February 2004 election demonstrates. Moreover, while these institutions enjoy considerable support of the populace, they in fact have very little power.

A Multifissured Polity: The Politics of Conservatism and Reform

It is important to understand that while “reformist” and “conservative” are most often used to describe various political groupings within Iran, this overly simplistic dichotomy is inadequate to capture the rich mosaic of Iranian politics. In Iran, political camps encompass individuals, papers, magazines, and interest groups, as well as parties. Notably, the differences *between* the two broad camps (conservative or reform) are matched only by the differences *within* each particular faction.²⁷

Understanding the fissures in Iranian politics is somewhat complicated because political groupings tend to fractionate on specific issues—such as the limits of the state’s role in managing the economy, the degree to which Islamic modes of behavior should be imposed, whether there should be dialogue or engagement with the United

²⁵ Geneive Abdo, “Re-thinking the Islamic Republic: A ‘Conversation’ with Ayatollah Hossein ‘Ali Montazeri,” *The Middle East Journal*, Vol. 55, No. 1, Winter 2001, pp. 9–24; *Aban*, June 12, 1999, cited by Baktiari (2002), p. 54. According to Baktiari, several reformist newspapers covered parts of this interview and subsequently were required to appear in court.

²⁶ *Aban*, June 12, 1999. Cited by Baktiari, op. cit., p. 54.

²⁷ A. A. Saeidi, “Dislocation of the State and the Emergence of Factional Politics in the Post-Revolutionary Iran,” *Political Geography*, 21, 2002; Ashraf (1994).

States, the contemporary relevance of “exporting the revolution,” and the role and sovereignty of the Supreme Leader.²⁸ In recent years, a number of controversial constitutional issues have emerged. In summer 2003, there were two bills in the parliament: one that would enhance the president’s powers and another that would limit the Council of Guardians’ manipulation of elections.²⁹ In both instances, the Council of Guardians prevailed. In one sense, these particular issues serve as a prism through which the spectrum of political positions becomes apparent.

The Reformers. Khatami is the ostensible leader of the reform movement. Despite initial enthusiasm and hope for his reform program, there is growing disillusionment with Khatami’s inability to deliver on significant reforms since his election in 1997. Ultimately, Khatami believes in the revolution and is interested in maintaining its sanctity. In this regard, many Iranians deride Khatami as being an *akhund*,³⁰ who is “cut from the same cloth as the other Ayatollahs.”³¹ Khatami believes that a truly Islamic republic requires a functioning “republic” within which individuals can *choose* to be Muslim. Islam cannot be coerced. That said, Khatami does believe in the superiority of Islam and that if tutored in Islam, one will naturally gravitate to it. It is this belief that animates his repeatedly demonstrated commitment to a free press. Rather than subverting debate, he seeks to encourage it. As Khatami is a part of the clerical establishment; he seeks to moderate the pace of reforming the republic. Thus Khatami is not the most radical of reformers.³²

The “reform faction,” as it is currently constituted, is an umbrella term that captures several types of coalitions and convergences of interests.³³ One such collec-

²⁸ Saeidi, *op. cit.*; Ashraf (1994).

²⁹ Khatami and others argue that these “twin bills,” are critical to ensuring the “freedom of expression” of the polity. At present, the Guardian Council avers that while the constitution empowers it to “supervise” elections, it also has the authority to confirm the eligibility of the candidates. Reformists argue that this is the responsibility of the Interior Ministry. See “Reformist MPs deliver written report to Iran president on twin bills,” July 20, 2003, available at <http://www.payvand.com/news/03/jul/1137.html>, last accessed July 26, 2003; see “Khatami hints at compromise, rejects arbitration over twin bills,” IRNA, June 1, 2003. Available at <http://www.president.ir/cronicnews/1382/8203/820311/820311.htm>. Last accessed July 26, 2003; Bijan Khajepour, “Protest and Regime Resilience in Iran,” *Middle East Report on Line*, December 11, 2002. Available at <http://www.merip.org/mero/mero121102.html>, last accessed July 26, 2003.

³⁰ *Akhund* is a common word that means “clerics” in the vernacular. It has a distinctly pejorative overtone.

³¹ Author’s fieldwork in Iran, May and June 2001.

³² See ICG, *op. cit.* (2002); for Khatami’s writings, see Mohamad Khatami, “The Active Nihilism of Terror,” *New Perspectives Quarterly*, Vol. 19, No. 1, Winter 2002, pp. 18-21. “Khatami Addresses Young People in ‘Letter for Tomorrow,’” IRNA, May 3, 2004 as cited in FBIS IAP20040504000115.

³³ In the years following the revolution, the left was made up of different elements than the current configuration. In the early years, there was a radical left comprised of young intelligentsia. One such group was the Mojahedin-e-Khalq. Another group comprised Marxist-Leninist organizations, and a third group developed within the Islamic regime. These three had much in common: mobilizing the masses, egalitarian outlook on economic development, and shared antagonism toward the world capitalist system. (See Saeidi, 2002; and Ashraf, 1989.)

tive of groups can be described as the “Islamic left.” Here, *left wing* does not refer to a preference for state-run economies (although the Khatami reformists tend to be more statist in their outlook than Rafsanjani supporters, possibly because of lingering socialist influences).³⁴ Rather it refers to a desire for a faster pace of reform and challenging the authority of the Supreme Leader. The left wing argues that the development of Iran is principally impeded by the state’s failure to expand freedom and access to political participation. This is, in their view, an important bottleneck in the Iranian political structure. They contend that a minority, which is unaccountable to the people, monopolizes power and fails to deliver opportunities for the Iranian people.³⁵ The Islamic Left is made up of several groups, such as the Combatant Clerics Society,³⁶ headed by Mehdi Karubi; the Organization of Mojahedin of the Islamic Revolution,³⁷ headed by Pehzad Nabavi; and the Islamic Participation Front of Iran,³⁸ headed by Mohammad Reza Khatami. In general, these groups work well together and share many goals and objectives.

- The *Combatant Clerics Society* is made up only of clerics and houses a surprising array of diverse individuals and worldviews—for example clerics who support the “exporting of the revolution,” as well as persons such as Khatami who are amenable to reforming domestic and cultural policy.
- The *Organization of Mojahedin of the Islamic Revolution* claims a membership nearly exclusively of religious laypersons, many of whom have technical training.
- The *Islamic Participation Front* was formed in 1998 as a broad coalition of clerics, religious laypersons, Islamic-oriented workers, and women activists and supporters of Khatami and his agenda. This group has become the backbone of the reform movement and is led by Khatami’s brother—who is a much more outspoken supporter for reform than the president.³⁹

³⁴ See, for example, Abdo and Lyons (2003). See also Saeed Rahnama and Haideh Moghissi, “Clerical Oligarchy and the Question of Democracy in Iran,” *Monthly Review: An Independent Socialist Magazine*, Vol. 52, No. 110, 2001.

³⁵ Bulent Aras, “Transformation of the Iranian Political System: Towards a New Model?” *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 5, No. 3, September 2001. Available at <http://www.biu.ac.il/SOC/besa/meria/journal/2001/issue3/jv5n3a2.html>. Last accessed July 23, 2003.

³⁶ In Persian, *Mejme-e Ruhaniyon Mobarez* could also be translated as “Community of Struggling Mullahs.” Aras (2001) uses this translation.

³⁷ In Persian, *Sazman-e Mojahedin Engelab Eslami Iran*. It can also be translated as Society of Combatants of the Islamic Revolution.

³⁸ In Persian, *Jebhe-ye Mosharekat-e Iran-e Eslami*.

³⁹ ICG Middle East Report No. 5 (2002).

Other analysts, such as Aras (2001), would add to this list of organizations on the Islamic left the Islamic Solidarity Party (Hembestegi-e Iran-e Eslami) and the (non-Marxist) Islamic Labor Party of Iran (Kar-e Eslami Iran).⁴⁰ In addition, one could include the various student organizations and leadership among the Islamic left.⁴¹ Another element that has been important in the reform movement is the so-called Coalition of the Technocrat-Islamic Left. Khatami is considered to be the undisputed leader of this faction. This collective came into being in the wake of the 1992 electoral defeat of the Islamic left. It currently tends to support liberalization within the framework of an Islamic state under the authority of the Supreme Leader. However, there is disagreement over the pace of political and economic reform. Despite discordance on these areas, this faction remains largely cohesive.

A third group that has contributed to the reform element is variously referred to as the “modernist right,” “moderate reformists,” or “technocrats.” This group draws from upper-level bureaucrats, industrialists, and managers. It should be noted that this group in the past has been less a party and more a personality cult surrounding Rafsanjani. The technocrats first emerged as a visible group in 1996 right before the 1997 presidential elections when 16 ministers and leading state officials coalesced as the Executive Construction Party (Kargozaran-e Sazandegi).⁴² Another key group in this faction is the Moderation and Development Party (Etedal va Towseh).

The Executive Construction Party and Rafsanjani are realists, and they position themselves in ways that will maximize their personal utility by forming coalitions in whatever way is necessary to preserve their equities. As could be expected, the party focuses on public welfare and overcoming impediments to economic development and tends not to weigh in on issues of political liberalization. While it seeks to modernize Iran, it does not challenge the Islamic-ness of the republic. However, it sees the long-term success of the Islamic revolution as deriving from successful economic development, industrialization, and modernization of defense rather than being based on religious grounds. This group likely prefers a reform trajectory that would commence only after Iran has achieved and sustained periods of development and economic growth.⁴³ It should be noted that Rafsanjani is considered the pragmatic “camel that will sleep at anyone’s door” because he has played an important role in both the conservative and the reform camps.⁴⁴

⁴⁰ Aras, *op. cit.*

⁴¹ While the ICG report excludes this important group, we include it here because there is wide concurrence among analysts interviewed for this chapter that it is an important element of the Islamic left.

⁴² See Aras (2001); Saeidi, *op. cit.*; ICG Middle East Report No. 5 (2002).

⁴³ This discussion is derived from extensive interviews with Iran analysts. See also ICG Middle East Report No. 5 (2002).

⁴⁴ The ICG groups Rafsanjani with the reform element. However, other analysts consider him and his following to be conservatives or even a third grouping altogether.

The Conservatives. The conservative faction is solidly rooted in the traditional bourgeoisie—e.g., *bazaaris* (traders), high-ranking ulema, and well-educated jurists in Qom and Mashad.⁴⁵ Despite this robust anchoring of particular elements of the conservative factions, they, like the reform camp, comprise numerous individuals, organizations, networks, and alliances. The right tends to be more suspicious of formal political parties, and they tend not to mobilize in that way.⁴⁶

The conservatives, like the reformists, can be parsed by policy or issue areas. For example, conservative rhetoric suggests support for private property. Many within this camp are not particularly disturbed by the disparity in earnings or wealth accumulation and tend to rationalize it as part of the “divine order.” They maintain that poverty and class distinction can be overcome through religious solidarity alone. Since the mid-1990s, however, they have tended to support elements of a welfare state or rentier economy, in part because such a state diminishes the contractual obligation between the state and the citizen and ensures a cycle of dependency of the ruled upon the rulers.⁴⁷

There are several parties or groups in the conservative camp, but it is important to see them as a whole—encompassing many individuals, newspapers, magazines and small parties. One important group is the Mutalafeh-e-Islami, which is the oldest and most influential of the conservative groups. There are other groups consisting mainly of engineers, students, and the like. Influential executives within the government are also included among the conservatives.⁴⁸

In general, the conservatives assert the right of religious leaders to govern the state in accordance with shari’a.⁴⁹ They accept the notion of the Supreme Leader and have generally taken public positions in opposition to democracy and the construction of a liberal civil society. However, one must bear in mind that within the conservative camp there is considerable divergence of opinion, depending on the particular issue under consideration. It is also important to note that conservatives have relented somewhat on social issues in order to more easily preserve the current order.

The conservatives have access to an extensive network of religious organizations and societies, such as the Coalition of Islamic Societies, headed by Habibollah Asgar-Ouladi. Ouladi is a critical link between the conservative clerics in power and the *bazaaris*. Among the conservative organizations, perhaps the most important institu-

⁴⁵ Saeidi, op. cit.

⁴⁶ As one Iranian delegate to the United Nations explained in an interview, “Conservatives traditionally are suspicious of political parties and of framing themselves within political parties. . . . The reformists are more modern and are inclined to being organized. . . . Therefore, [organizing around political parties is] more widespread among reformists.” Interview with Iranian representatives to the United Nations in July 2003.

⁴⁷ ICG Middle East Report No. 5 (2002).

⁴⁸ Conversation with officials of the Iranian delegation to the United Nations, July 26, 2003.

⁴⁹ See ICG Middle East Report No. 5 (2002); Aras, op. cit.

tion is the Militant Clergy Association (Jame'eh-ye Ruhaniyat-e Mobarez). This group claims the Supreme Leader Khamenei as its preeminent member. It also nominally claims Rafsanjani, who has tended to drift back toward the conservative side after the 2000 parliamentary elections.

Among the conservatives are the so-called hard-liners, who resist any dialogue with the United States, are opposed to any form of liberalization, and are the most wedded to the current system because they have the most to lose in the event of actual reform. These individuals can be found within the Guardian Council, the Basij, and the judiciary.⁵⁰ Because they have the most at stake, they have demonstrated a steady reliance on violence to maintain their equities. For example, the ultraconservative head of the Guardian Council, Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, makes wide use of vigilante groups such as the Ansar-e-Hezbollah to assault reform leaders, intellectuals, and journalists.⁵¹

There is also an element of so-called moderate right or “pragmatic conservatives” who are socially conservative but practical and realistic about the likely end-state of Iran’s domestic trajectory. Rafsanjani has been associated with this strain of conservatism as well. Others who may be included in this camp include Ali Larijani, who heads the Islamic Republic of Iran’s broadcasting organization and Hashemi Taba, the publisher of the paper *Entekhab*.⁵²

These individuals see dialogue with the United States as critical, in part because of the downstream economic rewards that can be had through such engagement and fostering of investment. Individuals who have come out in favor of rapprochement with the United States include Mohammed-Javad Larijani, the former head of the Parliament’s foreign affairs committee.⁵³ Taba has argued that reform is necessary to safeguard the system’s survival and satisfy the demands of the polity. Particularly in the post-Saddam era, the elements of the moderate right may be keen to engage the United States because they understand that if they surrender this area to the reformists, they will lose out in the event that there is a significant change in Iran-U.S. relations.⁵⁴

As should be clear from the descriptions of the regime, the constraints on the electoral process, and the lack of compunction to use force, the groups described herein are obviously only those groups whose behavior can be observed. Many of the

⁵⁰ Rahnema and Moghissi (2001), pp. 28–40.

⁵¹ ICG Middle East Report No. 5 (2002); conversations with former U.S. government Iran analysts, July 2003.

⁵² Based on interviews with former U.S. government Iran analysts, July 2003; ICG Middle East Report No. 5 (2002); Saeidi, *op. cit.*


⁵³ ICG Middle East Report No. 5; conversations with former U.S. government Iran analysts, July 2003.

⁵⁴ This view was espoused by a senior Iran analyst who recently left the U.S. government. Conversation in July 2003.

liberal reformers have been subjected to considerable abuse by the regime, including incarceration, harassment, death threats, and in some cases execution by vigilantes.

Figure 4.1 depicts an overview of the observed political structure, indexing the groups on two axes: democracy versus theocracy and reform versus conservative inclinations. The right-most position on the horizontal axis is “Islamic Democracy.” The left-most position is “Islamic Theocracy,” which to a great extent is the status quo. Groups are depicted from left to right, depending on their relative positioning on this axis. Groups that tend more to reform are toward the bottom of the vertical axis; conservatives are toward the top. Therefore, the liberals would be in the lower-right portion of the figure, while the hard-line conservatives would be in the upper-left portion of the figure.

Figure 4.1
Observed Political Groupings in Iran



Catalytic Events

This section lays out some of the key features in Iran's development in recent decades—particularly those developments that cast light on how Iran has responded to its changed security environment in the post–September 11 world. In explicating these significant events, we focus on the ways in which Islam has been politicized, mobilized, and instrumentalized by key actors.

The 1979 Revolution

On February 23, 1979, the Iranian Revolution ushered in a new phase in Iran's political and cultural history. Iran's revolution was the world's first televised revolution, and its passion and brutality was brought into people's living rooms in "living color." It transformed Iran and impinged upon the lives of Muslims everywhere by influencing the policies of Muslim states throughout the region and beyond (including countries not typically considered Muslim, such as India). Yet, while the revolution was truly a popular revolution, its impact and legacy remains contested and contentious.⁵⁵

Ayatollah Khomeini's success in overthrowing the Pahlavi regime derived fundamentally from his acceptance among the important *ulema* and intelligentsia as well as from the various strata of Iranian society. With the victory of the revolution, some 43,000 Americans (many of whom had been working in Iran in defense-related jobs) left the country. The hostage crisis and the ensuing severing of diplomatic ties between the two countries ushered in a long-standing hostility that persists to this day. Moreover, all economic activities between the two countries came to a halt.⁵⁶

One of the problems confronted by Khomeini and his followers emerged within the very government he assembled. The essential question, as explained by Saedi, was how Khomeini, a charismatic leader, could delegate and entrust elements of political power to his appointees. In the wake of the revolution, the liberal elements of the revolutionary coalition (e.g., Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan's Liberation Movement and the veterans of Mosaddeq's National Front) held the majority of upper- and middle-echelon positions within the state bureaucracy. Bazargan's government tended to represent the interests of the Westernized middle class and aimed to restore Iran's stature within the international business community. The hostage crisis pre-

⁵⁵ For an interesting personal narrative account of the ongoing debate over the Iranian Revolution and its impacts, see Nafisi (2003). See also Ansari (2000), particularly Chapter 3, "Revolution, Republic and War"; John Foran, "The Iranian Revolution of 1977–1979: A Challenge for Social Theory," in Foran, ed., (1994), pp. 160–189; Theda Skocpol, "Rentier State and Shi'a Islam in the Iranian Revolution," in Skocpol (1994), pp. 240–258; Parsa (1989); Moaddel (1992); and Abrahamian (1993), pp.13–38. Also, for an interesting approach to whether the 1953 regime change influenced the 1979 revolution, see Barry Rubin, "Regime Change," *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 26, No. 3, Summer 2003.

⁵⁶ See Saeidi, op. cit.; See also Jahangir Amuzegar, "Iran's Crumbling Revolution," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 82, No. 1, January/February 2003, pp. 44–57.

precipitated a conflict between the Supreme Leader and his prime minister when the Supreme Leader backed the students who seized the U.S. Embassy. Bazargan's resignation in November 1979 allowed Khomeini to consolidate his power by cutting out the liberal faction of the revolutionary coalition.

A second confrontation occurred in 1980 between Iran's first president, Bani-Sadr (who was appointed by Khomeini), and Prime Minister Raja'i. Khomeini had initially sought to balance the two as both endeavored to reinforce the authority of the Supreme Leader during the Bazargan days. However, Bani-Sadr revealed his hostility toward consolidating the decisionmaking powers under the absolute authority of the Supreme Leader in the Constitutional Law of 1981. He further targeted Khomeini's authority when he facilitated a loose coalition of the Mojahedin-e-Khalq. Khomeini intervened to sideline Bani-Sadr, which precipitated his resignation and further abetted Khomeini's concentration of state power in his hands.⁵⁷

The Iran-Iraq War

The Iran-Iraq War became a critical tool in consolidating the gains of the revolution because it allowed Khomeini to unify and mobilize the polity under the guidance of his charismatic leadership. The war fostered a culture of authoritarianism and interrupted a process by which some of the contradictions in the nascent political structure might perhaps have been resolved in the absence of the conflict.⁵⁸ The war was a respite from the internal disputes among the various vociferous factions, and it gave the new republic the opportunity to mobilize against the enemy and concentrate along nationalist lines. In this way, Khomeini himself called the war a "blessing" and depicted it as one that was being waged on behalf of "Islam, the Quran and the Prophet of God."⁵⁹ Khomeini invited devoted Muslims to take part in the struggle to overthrow the blasphemous regime of Saddam Hussein. Khomeini was thus able to unify the polity against the threat posed by a foreign power and further entrench his personal power.⁶⁰

The Iran-Iraq war facilitated the ascendancy of radical elements throughout the state apparatus. Khomeini and his followers adopted a populist rhetoric that deemed adherents of "private property" and the like to be "agents of capitalism." This rhetoric enabled the regime to give a fillip to the young volunteers who were being recruited for what became "martyrdom" operations against Iraq. Khomeini mobilized a number of paramilitary organizations (e.g., the Basij and the Revolutionary Guards)

⁵⁷ Saeidi, op. cit.

⁵⁸ Ansari (2000).

⁵⁹ Khomeini, cited by Saeidi, op. cit., p. 531. See also Ansari (2000).

⁶⁰ See Saeidi, op. cit., Ansari (2000), and Saeed Rahnema, Haideh Moghissi, "Clerical Oligarchy and the Question of 'Democracy' in Iran," *Monthly Review* (New York, New York), Vol. 52, No. 10, March 2001, pp. 28–40.

to ensure adequate manpower with which to confront Iraq over the war's eight-year duration.⁶¹

In addition to helping Khomeini consolidate his political authority, the war also degraded the former Shah's imperial armed forces. As noted above, these forces were not trusted to be loyal to the revolutionary government. Consequently, the war permitted a shift from the modern imperial armed forces to Islamized armed forces, such as the Basij and the Revolutionary Guards.⁶²

The war altered Iranian society in ways that continue to the present. First, Khomeini encouraged large families to provide "manpower" for the war. The high fertility encouraged in this period has culminated in the much noted "youth bubble" in Iran.⁶³ Second, the casualties of the eight-year war were massive—ranging anywhere from 750,000 to one million, with the highest loss of life among the young male population (ages 18–30). Consequently, an entire generation of potentially productive citizens was cut by 15 to 20 percent. Moreover, the survivors of the conflict have suffered untold psychic damage as well physical harm in many cases. The massive casualties also impeded Iran's postwar reconstruction efforts because of manpower shortages. The loss of investment and Iran's international isolation exacerbated the embattled country's woes.⁶⁴

In 1989, Khomeini established two institutions to mitigate the effects of the war. One organization provided welfare and services to veterans and survivors. Another provided for orphans of the war.⁶⁵ As casualties continued to mount, these efforts became increasingly costly to maintain. The war also produced a "cult of martyrs." Murals of local martyrs adorn the buildings throughout Iranian public space. The children of martyrs receive preferential treatment in a number of situations such as government jobs and in seats in the universities. War widows also continue to receive subsidies and housing in "widows' hostels." These subsidies terminate if a widow remarries, thereby posing distinct disincentives to remarriage.⁶⁶ Officials at the Iranian mission to the United Nations acknowledge that these martyr and widow subsidies are costly but note that the subsidies have a natural lifetime and, over time, will gradually disappear.⁶⁷

⁶¹ Saeidi, op. cit.

⁶² Saeidi, op. cit.

⁶³ Akbar Aghajanian and Amir H. Mehryar, "Fertility Transition in the Islamic Republic of Iran: 1976–1996," *Asia Pacific Journal*, Vol. 14, No. 1 (1999), pp. 21–42.

⁶⁴ *Iran: A Country Study*, particularly the section on "Armed Forces and Society-Impact of Casualties on Society." This is available online at the Library of Congress: <http://memory.loc.gov/frd/cs/irtoc.html>, last accessed July 26, 2003.

⁶⁵ *Iran: A Country Study*, op. cit.

⁶⁶ Based on author's fieldwork in Iran in May and June 2001.

⁶⁷ Conversations with Iranian representatives to the United Nations in July 2003.

The Death of Khomeini and the Birth of the Reform Movement

During the first decade of the revolution, many of its contradictions went unchallenged at least in part because of Ayatollah Khomeini's personal charisma and authority as well as the mobilizing effects of the Iran-Iraq war. However, by the end of the 1980s, two significant events occurred that significantly altered Iran's internal dynamics. First, the war ended in 1988. The humiliating ceasefire had deep implications for Iran, given its massive costs invested in the war effort. Second, within one year, Ayatollah Khomeini was dead. The death of the Supreme Leader eroded the tenuous political consensus and left the clerical establishment without a leader of his stature. The twin challenges of growing public discontent and a revisionist movement within the clerical ranks gave rise to a new political movement in Iran: the reform movement.⁶⁸

The reform movement began to take shape in universities, seminaries, literary groups, and professional organizations. The reformers took as given that the very survival of the Islamic Republic would be jeopardized if it failed to accommodate the basic rights and freedoms of the polity.⁶⁹ Open discussion in intellectual and political activist circles began addressing the ways in which political representation could be expanded *within the context of an Islamic government*. One of the individuals within the avant-garde of the reform movement was Abdol Karim Soroush, a professor at the University of Tehran who had received training in Islamic jurisprudence. Soroush established himself through his writings and lectures as one of the more reformist thinkers in the clergy.⁷⁰ Soroush rejected the assertion that democracy is the exclusive domain of the West and stressed that "Islam and democracy are not only compatible. But their association is inevitable. One without the other is not perfect."⁷¹ (There are, of course, numerous other reformist thinkers among the clergy who have published their writings. Among them are Moshen Khadivar and Ayatollah Feizollah Arabsorkhi.)

Soroush maintained that an entire generation of Iranians had become alienated from Islam and from the regime as a consequence of the regime's rigidity and intolerance. His proposed remedy to this situation was the reinterpretation of sacred texts along progressive lines. He argued that this was not forbidden because religious interpretation is not "sacred and therefore can be criticized, modified, refined and redefined."⁷² Soroush believed that Islam and participatory democracy are fundamentally

⁶⁸ Ray Takeyh "Iran's Emerging National Compact," *World Policy Journal*, Vol. 19, No. 3, Fall 2002, p. 43–50. See also Saeed Rahnema, Haideh Moghissi, "Clerical Oligarchy and the Question of "democracy" in Iran," *Monthly Review*, New York, New York), Vol. 52, No. 10, March 2001, pp. 28–40.

⁶⁹ Ray Takeyh, "Iran at a Cross Roads," *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 57, No. 1, Winter 2003, p. 42–56.

⁷⁰ Takeyh, op. cit., 2002, pp. 43–50.

⁷¹ Wright (2002), p. 40, cited by Takeyh, op. cit., p. 44.

⁷² Takeyh, op. cit., 2002, p. 45.

consonant and that Islamic jurisprudence and textual sources may be instruments through which responsive and accountable government could be established. In this vein, he wrote, “To be a religious man . . . necessitates being a democratic man as well. An ideal religious society cannot have anything but a democratic government.”⁷³

Challenges to clerical authority and hegemony came within the clerical establishment itself, as Iran’s seminaries spawned a cadre of clerics who were leery of the revolution’s trajectory and apprehensive about the expanding disenchantment of the populace with the religious establishment.⁷⁴ Many younger clerics—some of whom had ties to Khomeini’s disinherited heir apparent Ayatollah Ali Montazeri—sought to interpret Islam so as to accommodate the dual principles of popular sovereignty and democratic representation.⁷⁵ Hojjat-ol-islam Mohsen Kadavar, a representative of this strain of thought, explained these efforts in the following way: “I believe democracy and Islam are compatible. But a religious state is possible only when it is elected and governed by the people. And the governing of the country should not be necessarily in the hands of the clergy.”⁷⁶

Takeyh summarizes this period of Iranian political history by describing this collaboration between the clerics and intellectuals as “fus[ing] disparate interests within a broad-based movement articulating democratic demands in the language of a familiar faith,” which Takeyh asserts bears a great deal of similarity to the mobilization that led up to the 1979 revolution. The result of this convergence of interest was the growing insistence that the public should be the ultimate ballast of governance and that the public will is the only source of regime legitimacy.⁷⁷ It was from this political arena that Mohammad Khatami, a midlevel cleric with unimpeachable revolutionary credentials, emerged.

The Second of Khordad Movement: The Ascendancy of Khatami

On May 23, 1997, Mohammad Khatami became president, thus changing the terms of the struggle among Iran’s various political factions. His election was made possible by a number of factors, not the least of which was President Rafsanjani’s inability to run for a third term under the constitution. Perhaps the most significant reason for Khatami’s victory was his ability to form working alliances between groups that had

⁷³ Takeyh, op. cit., 2002, p. 45.

⁷⁴ Takeyh, op. cit., 2002, pp. 42–56.

⁷⁵ Takeyh, op. cit., 2002, p. 45, and (2003), pp. 42–56.

⁷⁶ Elaine Sciolino, “Cleric Uses Weapons of Religion Against Iran’s Rulers,” *The New York Times*, September 18, 2000, cited in Takeyh, op. cit., 2002, p. 45.

⁷⁷ Takeyh, op. cit., 2002, p. 45.

previously been in opposition.⁷⁸ The technocrats (led by Rafsanjani) feared that the conservative candidate, Speaker of the House Ali Akbar Nateq-Nuri, would win as expected. To avoid such a scenario, the technocrats formed a tactical alliance with their previous enemies, the Islamic liberals, and threw their support to Khatami, who had a particularly strong appeal to women and youth.⁷⁹ Khatami also successfully wooed the Sunni minorities who had been increasingly marginalized within the regime since the revolution. (The Sunnis are mostly Kurds and Baluch and comprise 10 to 15 percent of the population.)⁸⁰

Backed by this coalition, Khatami won a landslide victory (60 percent of the vote). The coalition adopted as a unifying theme opposition to the unlimited authority and supremacy of clerical rule and its resistance to political liberalization. This alliance became known as the “Second of Khordad Movement,” after the date of Khatami’s victory according to the Persian calendar.⁸¹

However, there has been deep disappointment in Khatami’s ability to deliver on meaningful reforms. During his first term in office, he made good on only a few of his widely applauded campaign pledges. Perhaps the most significant of his accomplishments has been the extensive liberalization of the press, which in recent years has been significantly retarded by conservatives who have shut down reformist media outlets and imprisoned journalists and activists.⁸² His critics contend he has failed to fulfill his commitment to strengthen democracy, the rule of law, and political liberalization. Rather, he stood by helplessly while many of his supporters were jailed. Further, the judiciary has exploited various loopholes to ensure that political and press defendants do not receive a trial in an open court with a jury.⁸³

Others have been vexed that Khatami has not fully exploited his massive public to trounce the conservatives by calling his supporters into the street. (In fact, while the author was doing fieldwork in Iran, she often encountered this sentiment among the educated youth and the middle class.) To the contrary, Khatami warned those who were impatient that violence would not expedite reform and argued that reform needs to be slow and deliberate.⁸⁴ Khatami does not believe that another violent revolution would benefit Iran, and he has advocated evolutionary change of the re-

⁷⁸ ICG Middle East Report No. 5.

⁷⁹ Geneive Abdo, “Iran’s Generation of Outsiders,” *The Washington Quarterly*, Autumn 2001, pp. 163–171.

⁸⁰ ICG Middle East Report No. 5.

⁸¹ ICG Middle East Report No. 5.

⁸² For an excellent and extensive account, see Adam Tarock, “The Muzzling of the Liberal Press in Iran,” *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 22, No. 4, pp. 585–602, 2001.

⁸³ See also Christopher de Bellaigue, “Iran’s Last Chance for Reform?” *The Washington Quarterly*, Autumn 2001, pp. 71–80.

⁸⁴ Baktiari and Vaziri, *op. cit.*

gime from within. Clearly, this approach has not satisfied all his constituents who are eager for change.

Despite this pervasive disappointment, Khatami won again in 2001 with a wide mandate.⁸⁵ However, there were notable differences in voters' enthusiasm: In the 2001 elections, 33 percent of the electorate protested their lack of options by not voting—compared to 18 percent in 1997; in 2001 Khatami took only 61 percent of the votes compared to 69 percent in 1997.⁸⁶

Even though Khatami did not deliver the sweeping changes that many inside and outside Iran expected, Iran's political fabric has been significantly changed nonetheless. Khatami has promoted an "epistemic revolution," to instill within the polity the lexicon of civil liberties, rule of law, freedom of expression, and political liberalization. Iranians are using this new vocabulary to articulate their political demands: rights, civil society, and democracy. He has also fostered an expansive public discourse on politics, religion, and society and has no interest in controlling the dynamics of this debate. Iranians now feel free to discuss politics in a variety of forums and are no longer tolerant of institutionalized intrusion into their private lives.⁸⁷

While many of Khatami's efforts to liberalize the press have been thwarted, to varying extents "the genie is out of the bottle." The clerics' ongoing battle with liberal media outlets and their content producers attests to the increasing willingness of reformers to push the envelope of the permissible. Second, as Khatami has directed the police to cease harassing and arresting women for infringements on *hejab* (failure to wear the prescribed veil or Muslim head scarf), women are taking increasing liberties in "minimizing" their adherence to Islamic dress. The *manteau* (a coat of varying thickness, length, and colors) in combination with the *rusari* (head scarf of varying modesty) is displacing the expansive black *chador*. On occasion, while doing fieldwork in Tehran, the author saw women who dared to go into the street *without* the *manteau*. Similarly, women are increasingly showing coifed hair, makeup, and other fashion accoutrements that were not imaginable prior to 1997. Third, Khatami was responsible for the conduct of the 1999 municipal elections, which were an important victory for the reformists.⁸⁸

⁸⁵ Baktiari and Vaziri, op. cit.; Bahman Baktiari and Haleh Vaziri, "Iran: Doubting Reform," *Current History*, January 2003.

⁸⁶ See Mohsen M. Milani, "Iran's Reform Movement and Khatami's Domestic Political Agenda," *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. XXV, No. 1, Fall 2001, pp.13–21. See also Christopher de Bellaigue, "Iran's Last Chance for Reform?" *The Washington Quarterly*, Autumn 2001, pp. 71–80.

⁸⁷ De Bellaigue, op. cit.; Jahanbegloo, op. cit.; Said Amir, Arjomand, "Civil Society and the Rule of Law in the Constitutional Politics of Iran under Khatami," *Social Research*, Vol. 67, No. 2, Summer 2000; Jahangir Amuzegar, "Iran's Crumbling Revolution," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 82, No. 1, January/February 2003; Takeyh, op. cit., 2002. See also Milani (2001); Baktiari, op. cit., 2002.

⁸⁸ Baktiari, op. cit., 2002.

In 1999, some 200,000 councilmen and councilwomen were elected in thousands of districts throughout the country. In turn, the councilors are responsible for appointing some 720 mayors (who had previously been appointed by the interior ministry) and supervising their activities. The conduct of these elections was a milestone for Khatami, who had pledged to decentralize government and enhance public participation in political affairs. What is also notable about this election is that the candidates were overseen by a less-intrusive body than the Council of Guardians: the *Majles*-appointed Election Supervisory Board (ESB). The use and direction of the ESB to supervise elections was also a victory of sorts for Khatami and his cadre. The reformist interior ministry ensured that the conservatives on the ESB did not use their power to disqualify candidates simply because they were reformist. As a consequence, there were fewer rejections than expected, and the contests were open to more people of more diverse backgrounds. The faction that supported Khatami won 75 percent on 112 city councils, while Khatami's Islam Iran Participation Front alone took 50 percent of the city council seats.⁸⁹

The 1999 landslide victory of the reformists bolstered their belief that change could occur through legal channels and that this perhaps was the best means to achieve change within the regime. They were confident that they could also take the parliament. In contrast to such elections in the past, in this contest the reformist Ministry of Interior challenged the Council of Guardians throughout the entire election. To lay the groundwork for the 2000 elections, also a victory for the Khatami faction, the ministry began drafting a bill that would amend the election laws to circumscribe the Guardian Council's ability to manipulate the electoral outcomes.⁹⁰

To counter these initiatives, the Fifth *Majles*, which was still under conservative control, circulated several bills to *increase* the powers of the Council of Guardians. The outcome of this battle was mixed. The Guardian Council won absolute power by a slim margin. But a concession was made to Khatami: The reasons for candidacy rejection had to be given in writing, a condition that the council refused to accept. To break the impasse, the Expediency Council was forced to intervene and ruled that the council in fact had to provide written reasons for rejection.⁹¹

The reformist press also played an important role in forcing the Council of Guardians to defend its positions in public—perhaps in an effort to foment a public backlash. The effect of these efforts was formidable. For example, Baktiari cites an editorial in one daily: “Now, we must admit that Iran does not have a democratic system. For years, the Council of Guardians, which is fully in charge of the screening

⁸⁹ Baktiari, *op. cit.*, 2002.

⁹⁰ Baktiari, *op. cit.*, 2002.

⁹¹ Baktiari, *op. cit.*, 2002.

procedure in various elections, for one reason or another, has deprived a large section of the society from holding office.”⁹²

Nonetheless, while some may appreciate Khatami’s structural and philosophical accomplishments despite his lack of control over the hard assets of the state, reform constituents have become tired of his measured pace and his vision of gradual evolution from within. Such reformists are impatient with the institutional gridlock wherein the organs of state that have no legitimacy in terms of public support wield the hard power, whereas those with a popular mandate have failed to take advantage of their primary assets—the people and the streets.⁹³ Baktiari and Vaziri summarize this impatience: Iranian citizens no longer ask “why reform” or “what sort of reform.” Rather they now ask, with urgency, how and when?⁹⁴

While Khatami has not been able to deliver as much and as fast as some have hoped, others have been rising on the reform scene. These new reformers are seeking change from the outside. They see the only legitimacy of the regime as coming, oddly enough, from reform. To denude the regime of its patina of legitimacy, many reform parliamentarians have threatened to disengage from the political system, compelling the public to countenance the fact that the conservatives, despite their lack of public mandate, still control the power of the state. These tactics would deprive the regime of its only source of legitimacy, which could very well trigger extreme unrest.⁹⁵

The recent report on Iran by an independent task force sponsored by the Council of Foreign Relations drew several conclusions from the February 2004 parliamentary elections, in which the reformists experienced a decisive setback.⁹⁶ First, the widespread disqualification of reform-minded candidates, a significant constituency in the formulation of Iran’s domestic and international policies, reflects the fact that they were unable to mount an effective movement for change. Second, the report opines that these reformist leaders largely demonstrated a lack of willingness to challenge and thereby discredit the fundamental structure of politics in Iran and the real options this structure affords. Third, the principal strategy of the reform movement (e.g., gradual reform from within the extant structure) has consequently proven to be a remarkable failure. Fourth, this has motivated wide swathes of Iran’s citizenry to dismiss this approach as a viable route to reforming the current system. At least for now, the conservatives appear victorious in their efforts to retard any meaningful movement for political change through their efforts to eliminate viable potential

⁹² Baktiari, op. cit., 2002, p. 63.

⁹³ For a discussion of the gridlock that has obtained, see Takeyh (2003).

⁹⁴ Baktiari and Vaziri, op. cit.

⁹⁵ See Takeyh, op. cit., 2003.

⁹⁶ See *Iran: Time for a New Approach*, Report of an Independent Task Force sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations, available at http://www.cfr.org/pub7194/zbigniew_brzezinski_robert_m_gates_suzanne_maloney/iran_time_for_a_new_approach.php, last accessed August 2004.

opposition leaders and through their labors to quash any public debate on Iran's political structure and its future.

The Post–September 11 Environment: Domestic and External Impact on Iran

Since the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States, a number of events have occurred both regionally and globally that have seriously altered Iran's security perceptions. Operation Enduring Freedom removed one of Iran's arch-nemeses, the Taliban. The United States engaged Iran quietly through the British channel and appeared to recognize that Iran has a significant stake in the way events in Afghanistan materialize. Iranian diplomats played a productive role in the Bonn conference that addressed modalities for forming a new Afghan government. Despite some assertions in the popular press to the contrary, Iran also made it clear that any calls for "Muslim solidarity" made by Al Qaeda would have no currency in Iran.⁹⁷

In some ways, the issue of terrorism has been another area of potential overlap of strategic interest between Tehran and Washington. It is worth noting that India, Washington's strategic ally in the war on terror, has a counterterrorism joint working group with Tehran. However, there are substantive differences in worldviews on the issue of terrorism and its definitions. After September 11, 2001, few countries have been willing to entertain any meaningful distinctions between insurgency, freedom struggles, and terrorism. Iran continues to insist on a distinction between terrorism and the legitimate use of force to repel invasion or vanquish oppressors (Hezbollah in Lebanon and armed resistance within the Palestinian territories and Israel).⁹⁸ The United States, of course, considers the attacks on civilians in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza to be acts of terrorism. The United States has also accused Iran of sheltering Al Qaeda operatives. Clearly, then, there are limits to the perceptions of this issue the two countries share.

The United States continues to have good working relations with another country that advocates the distinction between "freedom fighters" and "terrorists": Pakistan. The key difference is that the U.S.-Pakistani relationship reflects at least a tactical and possibly a strategic decision to forge a security partnership. From the U.S. perspective, however, Iran is part of the "axis of evil." Nevertheless, the American relationship with Pakistan does demonstrate ways of focusing more intently on shared areas of interests than on areas of divergence.

⁹⁷ Fred Halliday, "Peril and Opportunity," *The World Today*, Vol. 58, No. 3, March 2002, pp. 11–13.

⁹⁸ Halliday, *op. cit.*

Iran, along with India and Russia, had been countering the Taliban well before the United States targeted the Taliban in earnest. Iran's contempt for the Taliban regime was, in some measure, religious. Iran considers itself to be the protector of the world's Shi'a population, and the Taliban was merciless in its persecution of the Shi'a Hazaras (who are believed to comprise some 19 percent of Afghanistan's population). Moreover, given the ongoing sectarian violence in Pakistan against the Shi'a community there (also estimated to comprise perhaps 20 percent of Pakistan's population) and Islamabad's support for the Taliban regime, Iran and other states launched a program of supporting the Northern Alliance.⁹⁹

While religious and sectarian conviction was an important motivation to counter the Taliban, so was Iran's geostrategic calculus. Iran has always tried to preempt a strategic encircling by a Sunni alliance of Afghanistan and Pakistan. It has been greatly afflicted by the flow of narcotics from Afghanistan and Pakistan. Finally, Iran has been beset by some two million Afghan refugees, who have imposed a substantial burden on Tehran.¹⁰⁰

Despite the convergence of U.S. and Iranian interests in Afghanistan after September 11 and early signs of some sort of tactical rapprochement, this trend did not develop. One of the first impediments to the potential for greater cooperation over Afghanistan was the Israeli seizure in January 2002 of the *Karine A.*, a ship with some 50 tons of arms provided by Iran for use by Palestinian militants. Another area of discord was the U.S. concern about nuclear proliferation in Iran that emerged with the October 4, 2002, agreement between Tehran and Moscow for the Bushehr nuclear power plant.¹⁰¹ While there are some U.S. advocates for a policy of engagement, Iran's support for Hezbollah, rejection of the Middle East peace process, and pursuit of nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles, as well as Tehran's domestic policies, render arguments for engagement implausible.

Operation Iraqi Freedom and the Removal of Saddam's Government

According to Halliday, in the post-September 11 environment, Iran indicated that with respect to Saddam Hussein, Tehran would not be averse to regime change in Iraq.¹⁰² Moreover, Iran indicated that with suitable understandings, it could even contribute to efforts against the Ba'athist regime in Iraq. When the United States went into Iraq with other members of a coalition of the willing, some efforts were made to gain Iran's passive cooperation with respect to troops inadvertently crossing the border or munitions accidentally landing in Iran. Nevertheless, the United States

⁹⁹ Brumberg (2002).

¹⁰⁰ Brumberg (2002).

¹⁰¹ Brumberg (2002).

¹⁰² Halliday, *op. cit.*

remained concerned that Iran would seek to use its Iraqi proxies to gain influence within Iraq, promote Islamist ideology, and sabotage the construction of a liberal democracy in Iraq.

As a number of interlocutors explained during interviews in July 2003, from Tehran's perspective the dominant U.S. role in Iraq has dangerous implications. Although the United States has little influence on either the pace or direction of Iran's domestic developments, it can do much to influence Iran's external environment.¹⁰³ For its part, Iran has a number of means at its disposal to seriously influence the developments within Iraq (the use of media, proxies, and diplomatic means, etc.).

To understand how Iran may react to this new strategic environment, it is useful to dissect the various factions within Iran to assess what their preferences may be vis-à-vis Iraq and the instruments that they may have at their disposal to achieve their preferred ends. To cast light on these important questions, the author conducted numerous interviews with analysts within the U.S. government, retired U.S. government analysts, think-tank and academic analysts, and Iranian representatives to the United Nations. Below is a summary of the findings. It is important to appreciate that this is a dynamic and fluid situation.

Iran's Preferred Outcomes in Iraq and Instruments to Ensure Outcomes

The hard-line conservative segment of the regime is facing a number of tradeoffs. This segment would certainly prefer a weak and militarily nonthreatening Iraq. The hard-liners also likely seek some sort of theocratic state that would take its cues from Iran. While this may be the preferred outcome among this segment, it could give rise to serious complications. First, Najaf has always been a more important center for Shi'a learning than Qom, which came into its own as a result of Saddam Hussein's persecution of the Iraqi Shi'ites and because of its association with the Iranian revolution. On the other hand, some analysts contend that the Najaf-Qom controversy has been exaggerated. They point out that many of the clergy in Iran and Iraq are linked through marriage and other family connections.¹⁰⁴ Second, it is hard to imagine how a theocratic state could be established in Iraq within a federal structure, given the large non-Shi'a minorities. A highly fissiparous and unstable Iraq would not really be in Iran's long-term interest.

A visit to Iraq in the summer of 2003 by Ayatollah Khomeini's nonconformist grandson, Hossein Khomeini, highlighted the potential significance of Najaf and Karbala. During this visit, Hossein Khomeini made a number of statements that more or less invited the United States to bring about regime change in Iran. He remarked that the Iranian regime is "the worst dictatorship in the world," reminiscent

¹⁰³ Conversations with analysts from the Committee on Foreign Relations, think-tank analysts, former diplomats and former and current U.S. government analysts, July 2003.

¹⁰⁴ This view was conveyed to the author by the reviewer of an earlier version of this chapter.

of the “church during the Dark Ages in Europe,” and also called for a separation of religion and state as an expedient to the state’s current predicament. He also denounced the current clerical regime as exploiting the name of his grandfather for the cynical purposes of propagating their own “unfair rule.”¹⁰⁵ Despite Hossein Khomeini’s maverick reputation, these remarks were hard to dismiss casually among the Iranian hard-liners in Tehran who already fear that Najaf and Karbala, with the support and promotion of the United States, will rise up as competing sources of political and religious authority. (Of course, over the course of 2004, this fear has probably subsided—given the widespread violence that has broken out under U.S. occupation.)

While some of Tehran’s tradeoffs and cost-benefit calculus regarding the future of Iraq are complex and hard to understand, it is clear that the hard-line conservatives in Iran’s power base do not want the United States in the region, nor do they want a government in Baghdad that is overly friendly to the United States. These hard-line elements may be tempted to use proxies or find some other means to complicate the U.S. efforts to build a liberal democracy in Iraq.

The pragmatic conservatives such as Rafsanjani are likely to seek a weak Iraqi state with a form of representation that would enhance Shi’ite political influence. This is not only to ensure that Iran’s strategic relevance among the Shi’a community is unchallenged but also to ensure a politically stable Iraq that is open to trade with Iran. Of course, Iran hopes for a weak Iraq that is easily subject to Iran’s political maneuvers. As 2004 has progressed, a consensus seems to be developing within Iran that democracy in Iraq may best serve Iran’s interests. This is so, it is thought, because with a democratic structure, Iraq’s various domestic factions will have ample opportunity to challenge each other, resulting in a fairly weak state that can pose little challenge to Tehran.

However, while most interlocutors believe that the pragmatic conservatives seek some sort of representative government for Iraq, the Iranian public is already expressing concern that this same faction seeking a form of democratic Shi’ite majority rule in Iraq does not advocate the same form of democracy for Iran. With respect to the U.S. presence and the degree of accord between Washington and Baghdad, this element of the regime is far more practical. It realizes that for the policy-relevant future, it is likely that the United States will have a significant presence in Iraq and that the Iraqi government will, to varying extents, be inclined toward Washington by design. This segment of the regime also favors some form of engagement with Washington—albeit on Iran’s terms.

Arguably, almost all reformist factions seek a centrally weak Iraq with a federal structure and a democratic form of governance with appropriate Shi’ite representa-

¹⁰⁵ Anton La Guardia, “Khomeini Grandson Attacks ‘Religious Dictators,’” *Daily Telegraph*, London, August 5, 2003.

tion. This has utility both because it likely to be the best way to achieve a sane and functioning Iraq and because it also bolsters their own democratizing efforts at home.

All three camps very likely concur on the fate of Iraqi oil. Iran is economically wobbly and would prefer to see high oil prices. An influx of oil from Iraq could drive down the price of oil, which is clearly not in Iran's interests. Iran is probably not keen on Iraq's quickly becoming a large supplier of oil to the world market and could even employ proxies to sabotage efforts to get the oil out of the ground and into the markets.

Iran has a number of means to project power into Iraq and for this reason alone should be taken into consideration. First, Iran has the ability to use proxies in ways that provide plausible deniability. When military operations began in Iraq, for instance, Iran exfiltrated out of Iran and into Iraq thousands of cadres from the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), a group represented in the former Iraqi Governing Council.¹⁰⁶ Undoubtedly, Iran also sent in some Iranian nationals as well. That the south of Iraq has remained relatively calm compared to the "Sunni Triangle" may suggest that Iran has not felt sufficiently threatened to mobilize these resources.

Iran also has a media apparatus that has been demonstrated in the current operation to be effective in reaching audiences in Iraq. While Iran's media are not as sophisticated as those of the United States, Iran has the "cultural intelligence" needed to be effective. It also has adequate linguistic resources to get its message out.¹⁰⁷

Iran could also cause problems elsewhere. For example, Ali M. Ansari has suggested that there was evidence that Brigadier General Mohammad Baqer Zolqadr, the deputy chief of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC), had exfiltrated Al Qaeda fugitives from Pakistan into Iran with the likely help of Pakistan's intelligence directorate without President Khatami's knowledge. If true, this attests to the ability of parts of the regime to operate independently of others. This is not surprising because the conservatives control the instruments of state power.

Conclusions: Options and Their Implications for the United States

As the foregoing discussion suggests, the United States' history of alternating between engagement with and isolation of Iran has had an ambiguous outcome at best. At the highest level, there are essentially three options for Washington vis-à-vis Tehran in

¹⁰⁶ See Federation of Atomic Scientists Intelligence Resource Program, Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), available at <http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/sciri.htm>, last accessed July 27, 2003.

¹⁰⁷ Although one could argue that there is a difference between Iranian media approaches with regard to Persian versus Arab issues, the fact that Tehran has an active media campaign aimed at Iraq cannot be ignored. See "Up for Grabs," *The Jerusalem Post*, May 19, 2003, p. 32; "Rumsfeld Accuses Iran of Using Airwaves to Spark Opposition in Iraq," *Deutsche Presse-Agentur*, May 30, 2003.

the post–September 11 and post–Operation Iraqi Freedom environment. The first option is to actively engage Tehran, bearing in mind that coercion and engagement are not mutually exclusive (e.g., the carrot-and-stick method). The second, which appears to be the status quo, is to isolate the regime until there is satisfactory change on several key issues. These issues include Tehran’s support for terrorism, proliferation of WMD (and their delivery vehicles), human rights, and democratization. The third option is to engage in activities that may catalyze regime change. This chapter concludes with some of the tradeoffs inherent in these three options.

Option 1: Engagement

Most interlocutors interviewed for this research were advocates of finding ways of quietly engaging Iran on the reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan. The principal aim would be to ensure that Iran participates constructively or at least does not sabotage these efforts and to help formulate useful policies that further U.S. aims and assist international organizations with their work. However, the payoffs are far from certain. There are political risks that will accrue through offering some sort of olive branch to Tehran absent a more forthcoming Iranian position on key issues such as nonproliferation. It should be noted, however, that some observers believe Iran’s changed strategic environment following 9/11 has created constituencies of differing views. Some have come to accept the fact that, given the U.S. proximity to Iran on nearly all borders, Iran has few choices but to avoid confrontation on the issue of nuclearization. But Tehran has done little to bolster Washington’s confidence that this route would be worth the political capital required.

Advocates of engagement recognize the considerable risks of such a strategy, particularly if Iran rebuffs the United States (and such a rebuff could be expected) or remains recalcitrant on key issues. Therefore, proponents of this option argue that any effort should be very low key and would be best vetted and operated through other channels, such as the United Kingdom or possibly even India.¹⁰⁸ Those who favor engagement also believe that the U.S. encirclement of Iran has created a bastion of realists who appreciate that Iran has few meaningful options other than to fine some *modus vivendi* with the United States.

Takeyh, who supports a modified engagement strategy, believes that the prospect of economic engagement with the United States is enticing to some segments of Iran’s leadership and that this incentive will deter Iran from engaging in unhelpful external behavior and may even encourage Iran to be helpful. Moreover, he suggests that the most effective means of binding the clerical elite to the existing world order would be to forgo official diplomatic relations while integrating Iran into a number of economic and security arrangements. For example, the United States could aban-

¹⁰⁸ See C. Christine Fair, “Indo-Iranian Relations: Prospects for Bilateral Cooperation Post-9-11,” in Hathaway (2004).

don its opposition to Iran's membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO). Membership in the WTO would force Tehran to make a number of changes that could have acute domestic effects, such as market adjustments and fundamental economic restructuring, and would promote constructive engagement with many Western economies. Takeyh also suggests that another—albeit politically more difficult—means would be to lift the U.S. presidential ban on direct investment in Iran, allowing American “soft power” to permeate Iran. To bolster this assertion, he cites the influential role of American businessmen, academics, tourists, and cultural figures in precipitating change in Eastern Europe.

Takeyh contends that “managing tensions” may be a more sensible way in the long term to deal with the Iranian government and the behaviors that it evinces. To manage tensions he suggests embarking on a dialogue with Iran on important regional security issues through multilateral fora. The multilateral characteristic is important because it would not have the vitiating impact on Iran's reformists, who come under conservative attack whenever the United States makes overtures toward a segment of Iran's polity. Issues that would be addressed in these fora could include, among others, reconstruction of Afghanistan and the political and economic development of postwar Iraq.

In addition to these areas, Pakistan and counterterrorism issues could be included in this dialogue. Iran and the United States share many concerns about Pakistan's internal security and behavior in the region. Iran also shares U.S. apprehensions about Pakistan's nuclear capability, at least according to analysts interviewed for this chapter.¹⁰⁹ Also, Iran shares with both the United States and India concerns about the security of sea-lanes adjacent to Pakistan and Iran. Indeed, the U.S. and Iranian navies quietly shared information and cooperated on enforcing the Saddam-era embargo on Iraq.¹¹⁰

Nevertheless, there are a number of impediments to the modified engagement strategy. In the aftermath of the attacks of September 11 and the onset of military operations in Afghanistan, the United States made overtures to Iran. Iran responded by playing a constructive role at the Bonn conference on Afghanistan including a pledge of \$500 million in aid to Afghan reconstruction, by far the largest sum from any neighboring state or developing nation.¹¹¹ However, in the eyes of many in Washington, Tehran did not follow through appropriately on these contributions. Washington believes that Iran has sheltered numerous fugitive Taliban and Al Qaeda ele-

¹⁰⁹ The nuclear cooperation that existed between Pakistan and Iran occurred during the 1980s under Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. Her mother was Iranian. During this time, Iran and Pakistan enjoyed fairly robust relations. This relationship began to chill with Pakistan's involvement in Afghanistan, its support of the Taliban, and its willingness to export Sunni extremism.

¹¹⁰ *The Washington Post*, February 12, 2002, cited by Takeyh, op. cit., 2002.

¹¹¹ Jim Dobbins, “Time to Deal With Iran,” *The Washington Post*, May 6, 2004.

ments, and the fact that Iran has recently announced that it in fact has Al Qaeda personnel in its jails provides scant reassurance. Iran has also sought to establish a buffer zone between Iran and Afghanistan by supporting the warlord Ismail Khan—which troubles Washington because Ismail Khan's fiefdom in Herat poses a direct challenge to the Karzai government. This is quite apart from Tehran's continued policies of domestic repression.

The most critical roadblock, and a possible source of escalation to a confrontation between the United States and Iran, is Tehran's apparent pursuit of a nuclear weapons program and their means of delivery. (The compromise brokered by the European Union at the end of 2003 broke down in June 2004, when Tehran announced that it would resume building equipment essential for a nuclear weapons program.)¹¹²

Option 2: Isolate the Regime

This option is essentially the status quo. This position argues that, because the United States has initiated engagement episodically through back-channel means and Tehran has not followed through with satisfactory and expected reciprocity, there is little benefit to engaging Iran. It should be acknowledged, however, that Tehran does not see the failure to follow through as solely its own doing. Conversations with the Iranian mission to the United Nations, for example, underscore Iran's position that its "just reward" for being cooperative and supportive of U.S. efforts in the war on terrorism was to be painted as an international pariah state in the "axis of evil" speech. Iran has its own chronology whereby it suggests that Washington also failed to follow through in ways that Tehran had anticipated.

Nonetheless, one of the essential problems with attempting to engage Iran, from Washington's vantage point, is the uncertainty over which power center can be engaged and on what issues. Moreover, U.S. analysts often opine that it is unclear who serves as an appropriate interlocutor for the regime's interest and who can credibly engage the United States on critical issues and ultimately deliver.¹¹³ However, the recent report of an independent task force on Iran has a different view. The authors of that report contend that the conservatives and hard-liners remain firmly in control of Iran's instruments of state power. As such, they are the *only* "locus of power and the only authoritative interlocutors for any diplomatic interface."¹¹⁴

¹¹² "Iran Says It Will Renew Nuclear Efforts," *The Washington Post*, June 25, 2004.

¹¹³ On this issue, one interpretation of parts of President Khatami's 1998 "Dialogue of Civilizations" interview on CNN is that he was suggesting that the world must engage Iran the country—not Khatami the individual and president. The text of Khatami's interview with CNN's journalist, Christiane Amanpour, can be found at <http://www.sfcg.org/locdetail.cfm?locus=Iran&programid=128>, last accessed August 23, 2003.

¹¹⁴ See Council on Foreign Relations, *op. cit.*

Given that Iran has numerous power centers with which to negotiate, has no reliable track record of reciprocity toward Washington, and pursues domestic and foreign policies that are inimical to U.S. interests, this option has some appeal—however limited. Moreover, it can be argued that Iran indicates a willingness to cooperate with the United States only when the United States is most indifferent toward Iran. For example, Iran has only recently conceded the presence of Al Qaeda personnel in its prisons after Washington’s consistent demonstration of disinterest in Iran’s equities in the region.

While this option may insulate Washington from the vicissitudes of engaging Iran, there are also risks in adopting such a strategy. Washington’s narrative of events notwithstanding, an Iranian official suggested that Iran has pursued its equities in Afghanistan only after it was effectively shut out of significant involvement in multilateral diplomacy. This same individual also warned that Iran could do the same in Iraq should the international community fail to countenance that ultimately Iran must find a *modus vivendi* with Iraq and Afghanistan.

Option 3: Catalyze Regime Change

Some Iran observers believe that neither isolation nor engagement has deflected Tehran from policies inimical to U.S. interests. In their view, only regime change will bring about a permanent change in Iranian behavior. In principle, regime change could be precipitated through a number of instruments. These instruments include most forms of U.S. national power.

There are two prominent options for exerting internal pressure. The United States, particularly if given access to Iran’s immediate neighbors, could use a number of proxy means to operate internally to destabilize the regime. This would be a “proxy war” or “low intensity conflict strategy.” The United States could also provide enhanced support to those elements within Iran that seek regime change.

The United States could also use external pressure. For example, Iran has a large dissident expatriate community throughout the world. This Iranian diaspora has used its material assets to develop a variety of media messages that are broadcast within Iran. Another option is the softer side of such external pressure. The United States could facilitate the exchange of students, faculty, artists, athletes, and so forth. At the “harder” end of the external means spectrum are economic pressures and even the use of covert operations or overt military instruments.

However, there are limits to each of these initiatives. If the past is any predictor, using proxy elements to prosecute objectives can have unanticipated consequences. At some level, the use of proxies devolves into a “principal-agent” problem whereby there are few means to ensure the proxies continue executing the policies preferred by the United States. There are also few guarantees that such proxies cannot be co-opted by powers inimical to the United States or that they might not develop their own agenda.

Over the course of the past year, the United States has sought episodically to give activist elements in the reform movement a fillip, particularly after the June 2003 student riots over tuition increases. For example, the United States has indicated that it would support elements rising up against the regime. This reflects the recognition that change in Iran would have to come from within. Unfortunately, some reformers are now even more hesitant than in the recent past to engage in critical activities, out of fear that the judiciary might take action against them as agents of an enemy state. This has corroded the already limited ability of reformist elements to pursue their political agenda.¹¹⁵

The utility of the Iranian diaspora is also highly circumscribed by the vast gulf in political sensibilities between expatriate Iranians and those in Iran. While popular culture (e.g., music and entertainment) from the Iranian diaspora is very popular, the news programming that is piped in from abroad does not resonate with wide swaths of the Iranian populace. Many expatriate dissidents espouse political sentiments that are inconsonant with Iran's internal political dialogue. For example, many expatriates are monarchists. Others adhere to the defunct Tudeh party. Iranians in the homeland view with considerable cynicism the efforts of the diaspora to press its political agenda on a country that they no longer know or understand.

Needless to say, the more coercive instruments of power are even more complicated. The results of previous attempts to use coercion have been at best mixed. Given that the United States has no diplomatic representation in Iran and movement between the peoples of the United States and Iran is highly limited, there is some question as to how well the complexity of Iran's social and political fabric is understood abroad. In the absence of credible and sophisticated knowledge of Iran, we have little hope of understanding how likely such an effort is to be successful and what the consequences would be of attempting regime change and failing. The highly restricted case for coercive instruments, however, would become more compelling if Iran approached a critical threshold in the development of a nuclear weapons program.

Implications for U.S. Policy and the U.S. Armed Forces

Unlike with other countries examined in this book, military-to-military cooperation with Iran is not currently an option and is unlikely to become an option in the near future. However, the United States has a number of instruments it could leverage in the region. For example, the United States could use the cultural knowledge of its friends and allies more effectively. India is emerging as a key partner of the United States and the U.S. military. Indian personnel have had a long and robust relation-

¹¹⁵ L. Bruce Laingen, "National Change Must Come from Within," *Los Angeles Times*, June 22, 2003.

ship with Iran and other countries of the Gulf. The Indo-Iranian relationship continues to gather momentum, and both states are trying to find a means to deepen their defense relationship. The Indo-Iranian relationship may present the United States with opportunities to gain insights into Iran.¹¹⁶

Arguably, one of the keys to assessing the relative costs and benefits of any of the three options described above is credible human intelligence (HUMINT) and enhanced knowledge of the country and its people. Human intelligence is critical because it animates and informs intelligence gathered by other means. U.S. intelligence and diplomatic agencies, as well as the military, can do much to enhance HUMINT. For example, there are relatively few Persian speakers in the U.S. government and the military in particular.¹¹⁷ Enhancing Persian-language capabilities may be an important strategy and may have utility in other countries in the region as well. Other mechanisms include utilizing consulates of countries where Iranians seek U.S. visas (India and Turkey) to collect and develop information during the visa interview process. Defense attachés may also engage their in-country counterparts in countries where military cooperation with Iran are ongoing to gain insights into Iran.

A more general option exploits the large U.S. presence in the Gulf, where many Iranians have business interests. These individuals may be more effectively leveraged. In addition, the United States could also be more proactive in seeking out U.S. citizens who have traveled and/or studied in Iran. This may be an important segment to target for intelligence as they often have language skills, interact with persons of a variety of social strata, and have an interest in Iran's social and political conditions.

Apart from these softer assets, the presence of the United States in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Uzbekistan provides new opportunities to enhance intelligence collection and military access in the event of a contingency requiring more coercive instruments of power.

The expanded presence of the United States may also be a means to exert leverage over states that continue to support Iran's pursuit of WMD and delivery vehicles. Two key countries in this regard are Russia and China. Iran currently enjoys relatively robust relations with these two states whereas the U.S. bilateral relationship with both has come under some strain since the onset of military action in Iraq. Securing the cooperation of Russia and China on key issues vis-à-vis Iran should be an important U.S. objective.

¹¹⁶ See Dinesh Kumar, "The Limits of the India-Iran Rapprochement," June 1, 2001, available at <http://www.westerndefense.org/bulletins/June1-01.htm>, last accessed August 23, 2003. See also Shah Alam, "The Changing Paradigm of Iranian Foreign Policy Under Khatami," *IDSIA Journal*, December 4, 2000, available at <http://www.idsia-india.org/an-dec-00-4.html>, last accessed August 23, 2003.

¹¹⁷ See Bureau for International Language Coordination: 2002 Conference National Report—USA. Available at http://www.dlielc.org/bilc/Rep_Presnt/NATLRPT/USNatRpt2002.doc, last accessed August 23, 2003.

The post–September 11 world offers challenges and opportunities and concomitant costs and benefits for any U.S. strategy toward Iran. It is not the objective of this chapter to advocate a particular strategy for handling Iran. Rather, the chapter has aimed to identify the various options and analyze the payoffs that may be expected from each. Under conditions of strategic equilibrium, Iran is a very difficult country to understand. With the terrorist attacks of 2001 and the cascade of events that have occurred within Iran’s neighborhood, reading Iran’s equities and intentions has only become more challenging. Unfortunately, policymakers do not have the luxury of waiting for equilibrium to return. The U.S. government will have to continue to weigh its options under conditions of considerable uncertainty.

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Islam and Politics in Pakistan

C. Christine Fair

Introduction

This chapter explores recent developments in political Islam in Pakistan. To fully understand the effects of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and their sequelae, it is necessary to place the current trends in Pakistan in a historical context. Consequently, it is important to examine key catalytic events and other important historical developments within both the brief history of Pakistan and the deeper history of South Asia, particularly toward the end of the colonial period.

Because the shape and direction of political Islam in Pakistan are also due to specific political agents who have sought to mobilize aspects of Islam during critical phases in Pakistan's independent history, this chapter will also explore the role of these political entrepreneurs and organizations. Some of the most important political agents are the Pakistan military (particularly the army and its affiliated institutions such as the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate), civilian leadership, a variety of nonstate actors (e.g., Islamic groups and militant organizations), as well as several key extrastate actors (e.g., Iran, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and the United States).

Although specific catalytic events and the conditions that they precipitated or enabled provide the framework for this analysis, it is also important to explain the roles of specific political entrepreneurs. This method will permit the analyst to observe organizational change and continuity throughout Pakistan's political development. In addition, such an approach makes it possible to examine cleavages within the Pakistani polity as well as within the various Islamic organizations.

Because this is not an exercise in rehashing the well-known history of Pakistan, we generally restrict ourselves to the postindependence period in an effort to explain the developments within Pakistan since September 11, 2001. However, we need to identify salient catalytic events in the decades prior to independence in 1947 because these events put the countries and communities of South Asia on particular political trajectories, the vestiges of which are still apparent.

These key catalytic events include the following:

- The rise of ethno-nationalist movements, forged in the crucible of colonial policies that preceded the partition of the subcontinent into India and Pakistan
- The partition of the subcontinent in 1947
- The 1971 Indo-Pakistan war and the birth of Bangladesh
- The 1979 Iranian revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
- The events pursuant to September 11 (Operation Enduring Freedom, U.S. intervention in Pakistan, the 2003 Iraq war).

Notably, the intractable Kashmir dispute—while important—is not a catalytic event *per se*. Rather, from 1947 onward, the disputed disposition of Kashmir has resulted in numerous “crisis slides”¹ that have profoundly affected the political strategies and courses of action adopted by Pakistan’s leadership—civilian and military—and by the numerous nonstate and extrastate actors that claim equities in the dispute. Our approach is to view the dispute over Kashmir through the lens of nearly every catalytic event noted above, expanding on the interaction between the event and the ongoing competition over Kashmir. This approach is justified because the dispute over Kashmir recurs in nearly every catalytic event during and after the partition in 1947 and each event in turn has been shaped by the Kashmir dispute.

Because of the centrality of the Kashmir dispute to Pakistan’s domestic political environment and its foreign policy *vis-à-vis* India and the region, some discussion is warranted as to why Kashmir is so important for Pakistani political actors and citizens. As we describe later in this chapter, India and Pakistan see the partition of the subcontinent and the resultant disposition of Kashmir in mutually exclusive terms. From Pakistan’s vantage point, partition was necessary to permit Muslims to pursue their lives as Muslims without interference from or dominance by the numerically superior Hindu community. However, partition was not a complete process in the case of Kashmir, which—as the only Muslim-majority state in federal India—should logically have gone to Pakistan.² The failure to acquire Kashmir has been consistently represented to the Pakistani populace as an enduring hindrance to the consummation of the Pakistani state and by extension its national ethos. Pakistanis have been fed a steady diet of “regaining Kashmir,” when in truth, it was never Pakistan’s to regain in the first instance.

From India’s point of view, partition was undesirable and eminently unnecessary. However, conditioned on its having occurred, the process of partition is fundamentally complete. India sees the accession of Kashmir as legal and binding and

¹ Tellis (1997).

² It is not the intent to reproduce these well-trod historical arguments here. For an insightful version of the Pakistan narrative, see Wirsing (1994) and Malik (2002). Also see Wirsing (2003).

therefore not the subject of Pakistani concern. Further, because Kashmir is the only Muslim majority state, retention of Kashmir is fundamental to India's national narrative as a secular, multiethnic, multireligious state.³

At the most fundamental level, the dispute over Kashmir is not about land or even strategic concerns. Rather, it is an argument over symbols and narratives of national self-representation. As such, it is particularly recalcitrant to efforts to resolve the dispute—in part because there is little common ground from which India and Pakistan can move forward. India is very much a status-quo state that seeks to engage Pakistan to ratify the current situation. Pakistan, for its part, is a revisionist state that is only interested in engaging India to the extent that there can be movement on the singular issue about which it cares intensely: Kashmir.

As a consequence of these fundamentally different motives for engagement and metrics of success, virtually every *détente* effort between the two has broken down. Pakistan has nearly always concluded that without movement on Kashmir, there is no point to engagement and instead returns to militancy. India, for its part, sees no meaningful end in sight to militarism and concludes that there is no point in engaging Pakistan. India, having come to such a position, decides to continue killing militants and seeking to deal directly with the Kashmiris. This cycle has been pernicious and enduring. Clearly, a solution that is not mutually satisfying to all three parties will not be durable. Yet given the well-worn positions of both states and the degree to which both are entrenched in their positions, moving forward in a meaningful way seems unlikely in the policy-relevant future. For these reasons, the question of Kashmir animates virtually every aspect of Pakistan's external and security policies and dominates its foreign policy in India and beyond.

Organization of This Chapter

We first provide a summary of how Pakistan came to be independent and a general overview of its ethnic, tribal, linguistic, and cultural diversity. In addition, we detail the religious and sectarian diversity that characterizes Pakistan's populace. Where possible, this section integrates the varying concepts of Islam and ethnicity around which Pakistani politics are organized. The second section describes the development of political Islam and the roles of specific actors (groups, individuals, Pakistani state-based institutions, extra-Pakistani actors, etc.) using the framework of the aforementioned catalytic events. The third section posits several possible futures for political Islam in Pakistan and some of the precipitants of these scenarios. Finally, we conclude with some thoughts about the implications for the U.S. government and its varied agencies. Where possible, we describe some of the tradeoffs inherent in current

³ For treatments articulating the Indian perspective, see Bose (2003) and Ganguly (2001).

policies and suggest potential interventions that may have a salubrious effect on the course of Pakistan's development.

Background

Both Pakistan and India came into being in 1947, when the British departed South Asia, cleaving the former British Raj in two through a violent and bloody partition. While the movement for an independent Pakistan, which was rooted to the contention that Hindus and Muslims were two distinct nations, ultimately prevailed, the subcontinent's Muslim population was deeply divided by the issue. As independence drew near, the Muslim ulema (clergy) and the intellectual elite struggled with the role of nationalism within Islam.

To many ulema and elites alike, nationalism was anathema to the notion of the *umma* (the global community of Muslims). Debates ensued among the varied Muslim leaders and members of the intelligentsia weighing the tradeoffs between supporting the Congress Party, which championed an independent but united India, and prioritizing the well-being and political destiny of South Asia's Muslim communities. Anxiety over these competing priorities was exacerbated by the mounting prevalence of communal violence, which tended to communalize the independence movement itself. Over time, Mohammad Ali Jinnah and the other Muslim League leaders were increasingly persuaded that, within a unified India, the minority Muslim community would be subordinated, marginalized, and perhaps even harmed by the dominant political will and aspirations of the Hindu majority.⁴

The ensuing partition of the subcontinent precipitated a movement of some ten million people and the death of perhaps one million during the largest mass migration of people in modern history. The Punjab, in particular, bore the brunt of this tragedy. The massive transfer of populations mostly occurred within this province and was marked by extensive and bloody incidents of communal violence. The motivating logic for partition (the two-nation theory) and the way in which it unfolded has had enduring implications for Indo-Pakistan bilateral relations as well as the ways in which Hindus and Muslims have come to construct their own identities.

The nascent state of Pakistan had to confront serious geographical, regional, and cultural challenges. Pakistan was divided into two wings, East and West Pakistan. East Pakistan (which is now Bangladesh) was separated from West Pakistan by the expanse of India. Moreover, while Pakistan was ostensibly created with Islam as a unifying factor, this mythology immediately came under attack. The predominantly Bengali East Pakistan was more populous than the Punjab-dominated West Pakistan.

⁴ For various accounts of the Pakistan movement, see Mehta and Shaffer (2002); Mahmood (2000); Ziring (1997); Ahmed (1997); and Wolpert (1993).

From the outset, West Pakistan maneuvered to marginalize the Bengalis of East Pakistan, which eventually culminated in a civil war in which India intervened and from which an independent Bangladesh emerged. This was a significant event because the dissolution of Pakistan demonstrated that Islam was insufficient to overcome extreme differences in ethnicity, regionalism, language, and culture. However, this lesson was not learned uniformly if at all among the power brokers of East Pakistan.

As we describe below, the events of 1971 gave a new sense of urgency to what had been an underlying effort of the political actors shaping Pakistan's destiny. The response to the loss of East Pakistan and the formation of Bangladesh, as well as several other internal ethnic conflicts within post-1971 Pakistan, was an increased effort to forge a national identity around Islam. To quell the internal threats arising from ethno-nationalist aspirations, Pakistani leaders have systematically turned to Islam to find some cohesiveness for the state. This desire has prompted civilian leaders, military leaders, religious parties, and militant elements to form alliances of mutual convenience—to the overall detriment of Pakistan's political, social, and economic development.

The fate of Kashmir persists as the greatest source of security competition between India and Pakistan. While the functional nature of the Kashmir dispute is rooted in the way in which the British disengaged from the subcontinent, the ideological nature of the problem derives from the fundamentally divergent notions of statehood held by India and Pakistan. For India, absorption of Kashmir was and remains critical to its self-narrative of a secular, multiethnic state. Pakistan's claim to Kashmir arises from its contention that the absorption of the Muslim-majority state is fundamental to its identity as the homeland for South Asia's Muslim population.⁵

Although Islam was ostensibly the fundament of Pakistan's creation and was intended to be the unifying logic of the state, events and developments within the subcontinent have seriously challenged this notion. First, India's Muslim population exceeds that of modern-day Pakistan. Second, the loss of Bangladesh—in large part due to Bengali nationalism—challenged the ability of Islam to be a unifying force. Third, given the importance of securing Kashmir to fulfill Pakistan's destiny as the homeland for South Asia's Muslims, Pakistan has continued to see partition as “incomplete.” All these events continue to have salience for the way in which Islam in Pakistan has been politicized and practiced.

The Mosaic of Pakistan: Ethnic, Linguistic, and Religious Diversity

Pakistan has four major provinces: the Punjab, Sindh, Baluchistan, and the North-west Frontier Provinces (NWFP). In addition, there are the territories of Azad

⁵ See, for instance, Tellis (1997); and Ganguly (1997).

Kashmir and the heavily Shi'a Northern Areas as well as the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). To provide an overview of the distribution of the present composition of Pakistan, Table 5.1 presents data from the 1998 census. According to these data, the total population of Pakistan is slightly more than 132 million. (Because of the nominally "autonomous" status of Azad Kashmir and the Northern Areas, census data are not available for these two areas.) While residents of the Punjab comprise the largest percentage of the population, the Punjab constitutes only about one-quarter of the area of Pakistan. Conversely, Baluchistan is the largest province but is home to less than 5 percent of Pakistan's overall population.

Pakistan's census does not currently ask about ethnicity; however, in the 1984 census it did ask census respondents about their mother tongue. These data, while seriously dated, provide some insight into the ethnic distribution of the various provinces. While "mother tongue" is not a perfect substitute for "ethnicity," it is a very close approximation. In 1984, Punjabi speakers were nearly one-half the population. If one accepts the claim advanced by many linguists (as well as by many Punjabi nationalists) that Saraiki is a dialect of Punjabi, then Punjabi speakers clearly constitute more than half the state. Pashto and Sindhi speakers represent the second- and third-largest linguistic groups at 13 percent and 12 percent, respectively. While Urdu is the state language, fewer than 8 percent claimed it as their mother tongue in 1984, and those respondents disproportionately resided in Sindh. (See Table 5.2.)

Scholars and analysts have estimated the breakdown of Pakistan's population by ethnicity more recently. For example, Ahmed (1997) offers the ethno-linguistic breakdown for 1996 shown in Table 5.3.

In general, there are significant linguistic, tribal, and cultural differences among the various provinces. In Punjab, people tend to speak Punjabi; in Sindh, Sindhi is spoken, and so forth. It should be kept in mind, however, that to some extent this is

Table 5.1
Population of Pakistan by Area

Province	Population	Percent of Population	Area (sq. km)	Percent of Area
NWFP	17,743,645	13.41	74,521	9
FATA	3,176,331	2.40	27,220	3
Punjab	73,621,290	55.63	205,345	26
Sindh	30,439,893	23.00	140,914	18
Baluchistan	6,565,885	4.96	347,190	44
Islamabad	805,235	0.61	906	0
Total	132,352,279	100.00	796,096	100

Source: 1998 Census. Available at the Population Census Organization of Pakistan, http://www.statpak.gov.pk/depts/pco/statistics/area_pop/area_pop.html, last accessed August 6, 2004.

Table 5.2
Linguistic Groups in Pakistan, by Region, 1984 (%)

Language/ Province	Punjabi	Pashto	Sindhi	Saraiki	Urdu	Baluch	Other
Punjab	78.7	0.8	0.1	14.9	4.3	0.6	0.6
Sindh	7.7	3.1	52.4	2.3	22.6	4.5	7.4
NWFP	1.1	68.3	0.1	4.0	0.8	0.1	25.6
Baluchistan	2.2	25.1	8.3	3.1	1.4	36.3	23.6
Total	48.2	13.1	11.8	9.8	7.6	3.0	6.5

SOURCE: Government of Pakistan, Statistical Pocket Book of Pakistan, 1984, Islamabad: Federal Bureau of Statistics, 1984, p. 61, cited in Jaffrelot (2002), p. 48.

Table 5.3
Estimated Ethno-Linguistic Breakdown by Percent of Population, 1997

	Punjabis	Sindhis	Pathans	Mohajir	Baluch	Other
Percent of population (131.5 million)	56	17	16	6	3	2

SOURCE: Ahmed (1997), cited by Jaffrelot (2002), p. 48.

an oversimplification. Within each major language group (Punjabi, Pashto, Baluchi, Sindhi, etc.), there are significant dialects. It is notable that while Urdu is the state language, there is no province that claims it as a mother tongue. Moreover, there has been considerable migration within Pakistan for many reasons (toward urban areas for work, migration for education and marriage, etc.). As a consequence, Punjabis live in large numbers in all provinces. Ethnic Pathans (who mostly think of the NWFP as home) have also migrated throughout Pakistan and have been joined by coethnic migrants—many of whom are refugees—from Afghanistan. Mohajirs (those Urdu speakers who migrated from Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, which are now in India) tend to live in Karachi but are also distributed across the country consonant with their early role in state-building.

The Twin Challenges to State-Building in Pakistan: Islam and Ethnicity

As the foregoing discussion suggests, Pakistan's polity is riddled with ethnic, linguistic, and, as we will describe, severe sectarian differences. This complex social mosaic has posed persistent challenges to the state and its fundamental national identity. Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Pakistan's founding father, sought to overcome these innate impediments and forge a robust nation-state under the principles of "one nation, one culture, one language."⁶

⁶ Quoted by Jaffrelot (2002), p. 9.

Virtually every head of state (civilian or military) since Jinnah has sought to mobilize both Islam and Urdu for these ends. For instance, the first constitution of 1956 stated unequivocally that Pakistan's citizens "should organize their lives both as individuals and collectively in accord with the demands and the principles of Islam as laid down in the Quran and in the sunna."⁷ General Ayub Khan (who came to power in 1958) also included within the constitution of 1962 a clause stating that the laws of the state should not be discordant with the shari'a.

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto laid the foundations of a true Islamization policy. He enshrined Islamization within the framework of the 1973 constitution, which clearly stated that Pakistan was an Islamic state. This differs substantially from what is widely believed to have been Jinnah's understanding of Pakistan as a state for South Asia's Muslims. In addition, the 1973 document stipulated that Urdu was the country's national language and that it would replace English as the official language of state within 15 years of the constitution's promulgation.

The military leader, General Zia, expanded and deepened these Islamization efforts and further developed Urdu as the language of the state by making it a compulsory subject from the earliest years. Even Nawaz Sharif, the last civilian leader, committed himself to a policy of Islamization in 1998 when he introduced the fifteenth amendment that required the state to apply shari'a law.⁸

With perhaps the exception of Zia (who by all accounts seems to have engaged in Islamization out of religious conviction), these men did not mobilize Islam because of their own personal religious fealties. Rather, they did so to find some means of forging a "Muslim nation" that could transcend the ethnic, linguistic, and even sectarian differences that pervade Pakistan's political body. If Islam was the substitute for national ethnicity, Urdu followed as the logical language of the reconstituted national polity.

To the person unacquainted with Pakistan, the natural question arises as to why Urdu was fundamental to this state-building effort given that it has no true "indigenous" constituency. The centrality of Urdu in many ways stems from the role of the migrants from India following partition. These migrants refer to themselves as "Mohajirs" (literally, migrants) and are also referred to in this manner by others. The term tends to apply only to those who migrated from the Urdu-speaking communities of Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, and Gujarat rather than the Punjabi-speaking migrants from East Punjab or the Hindi and Bengali-speaking migrants who moved to East Pakistan. According to the 1951 census, there were some seven million Mohajirs in the country—one-fifth of Pakistan's total population.⁹

⁷ See "Islamic Identity and Ethnic Tensions," in Jaffrelot (2002), pp. 9–38.

⁸ Quoted in Jaffrelot (2002), p. 9.

⁹ See Jaffrelot (2002), p. 17.

However, the access to power and privilege enjoyed by the Mohajir community was greater than their numbers would suggest. Mohajirs played a decisive role in the formation of Pakistan and were quick to remind others that they were the ones who gave up everything to settle in the dreamland of Pakistan. (Punjabis who migrated from East Punjab find this argument vexing because they too gave up everything and braved the bloody partition—a test of fire that the Mohajirs were generally spared.) Mohajirs dominated the state apparatus (e.g., the civil service and the liberal professions) as well as the major political parties. Both Jinnah the first prime minister and Liaquat Ali Khan were Mohajirs.

It was under pressure from the powerful Urdu-speaking Mohajir community that this language was promoted to the rank of official language—despite the fact that English was the language of the elite and consequently of the apparatus of state. The selection of Urdu over Punjabi as the language of the state is also interesting given that Punjabi is the mother tongue of the largest fraction of Pakistanis and Urdu speakers have no territorial roots in Pakistan. While recognizing that English had to be maintained in the interim to assure a modicum of smooth governance, the state promoted Urdu aggressively.

The Organization for the Advancement of Urdu (*Anjuman-i-Taraqi-i-Urdu*) was established in 1948 and experienced massive growth in its budget. The courts and regional assemblies were vigorously encouraged to use Urdu rather than English or the provincial language (Punjabi, Sindhi, Baluch, Pashto). In the 1950s, the Committee for the Official Language was established and became active in promulgating various Urdu neologisms to replace English terms then in use.

Clearly, the active participation of Punjabis in disavowing their own mother tongue in favor of Urdu was necessary to permit Urdu to become the state language. This would have been difficult to achieve had the Punjabis actively resisted, owing to their numerical superiority and the fact that the Punjab is the ideological heartland of Pakistan. Jaffrelot maintains that not only was the cooperation of the Punjabis necessary, but they were in fact critical actors and moved swiftly to appropriate the new ideology to gain better access to the various apparatuses of the new state.¹⁰ Of course, over time, the Punjabis rose up and displaced the influence of the Mohajirs in many spheres. The Punjabis are now considered the redoubtable hegemon of the Pakistani state—even if the price of this accomplishment was sacrificing the advancement of their mother tongue, Punjabi.

¹⁰ However, it should be noted that today provincial languages are spoken in the provincial assemblies with the one notable exception of the Punjab—where Urdu is used. Similarly, provincial languages are taught in all provinces except the Punjab.

All Muslims Are Not Equal: Sectarian Rivalries

Even though Pakistan is 97 percent Muslim, there is considerable sectarian diversity. For example, it is estimated that 77 percent of the population is Sunni and 20 percent is Shi'a. (The estimates of the Shi'a population vary, ranging from 15 to 25 percent).¹¹ Estimating the Shi'ite population size is made more problematic by the fact that few data are collected among the residents of the Northern Area—many of whom are Shi'ites. In addition, 3 percent of the population is made up of Christians, Parsis (Zoroastrians), Sikhs, Buddhists, Hindus, and Ahmedis. While the Ahmedis consider themselves to be Muslim, they have been declared non-Muslim by the state. Table 5.4 summarizes the religious and sectarian diversity in Pakistan.

A majority of Sunni Pakistanis are associated with the Hanafi school of jurisprudence and follow either the Deobandi or Barelvi traditions. The Barelvi tradition, with its Sufi and syncretic folk traditions, is particularly popular. Another group—albeit less popular—is Ahl-e-Hadith. Ahl-e-Hadith is heavily influenced by Wahhabism, and its adherents do not accept interpretive traditions of the Hanafi sects. Mehta and Shaffer (2002) rightly caution against insisting on such taxonomy too strictly:

. . . there are many shades of difference in belief, strategy and politics within each category, and many Pakistanis who might fall into these categories would

Table 5.4
Religious and Sectarian Differences in Pakistan

Religion	Estimated Percentage of Population
Muslim	
Sunni (Barelvi, Deobandi, Wahhabi/Ahle-e-Hadith)	77
Shi'a (Twelvers, Ismaili, Ahl-e-Tash)	20
Non-Muslim	
Christian, Hindu, Parsi, Sikh, Buddhist, Ahmedi	3

Source: CIA *World Factbook* and The United States Commercial Service, *Pakistan Country Commercial Guide FY-2002*, available at <http://www.usatrade.gov/Website/CCG.nsf/CCGurl/CCG-PAKISTAN2002-CH-10:-0049A7A0>, last accessed April 3, 2002.

¹¹ See United States Commercial Service, *Pakistan Country Commercial Guide FY-2002*, available at <http://www.usatrade.gov/Website/CCG.nsf/CCGurl/CCG-PAKISTAN2002-CH-10:-0049A7A0>, last accessed April 3, 2002. Part of the problem with estimating the size of the Shi'a population is that the Northern Areas are not included in the census, and this area is heavily populated by Shi'a.

not identify themselves as such unless they belong to particular groups or organizations that stress these categories.¹²

In addition to these sectarian Sunni traditions, there are also suprasectarian organizations such as the Jama'at-i-Islami (JI), which we discuss in depth below.

The Shi'a communities in Pakistan are also quite varied and include Bohra, Ismaili, and Ithna Ashariyya ("Twelver") communities. Of these, the Ithna Ashariyya community is the largest.¹³

Major Political and Religious Organizations

Mainstream Political Parties. Pakistan has two putative mainstream political organizations: the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) and the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N). Both have been hollowed out and crippled since Pervez Musharraf took over the state in a bloodless coup in 1999. The PPP's leader-in-exile is Benazir Bhutto. She is the subject of various inquiries and prosecutorial efforts in Pakistan, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Her husband is currently imprisoned on corruption charges. The PPP is a left-of-center party. The second mainstream party is the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N). The PML-N's leader-in-exile is Nawaz Sharif, who is currently residing in Saudi Arabia. Nawaz Sharif and his family face extensive charges under the National Accountability Bureau. The PML-N is a right-of-center party. The Musharraf regime argues that the Pakistan Muslim League-Qaed-i-Azam (PML-Q) is the new heir of the PML support base. However, stalwart PML-N supporters would discount such assertions.

While the "mainstream" parties do not espouse a particularly Islamist agenda, neither party disavows Islam per se. Both parties have made tactical and strategic alliances with religious parties to expand their political base. Both parties have made serious concessions to the Islamists to co-opt their agenda and secure their political position. Nawaz Sharif even attempted to introduce shari'a formally into Pakistan's constitutional structure. In this sense, it is difficult to argue that these parties are truly secular in their political posture.

In the October 2002 election, the Musharraf regime went to great lengths to squelch the political base of the two mainstream parties. Using various instruments of coercion and co-optation, the regime cobbled together the PML-Q—a party that has been described as the "King's Party." The PML-Q is a coalition of willing individuals from PML-N and the PPP, among others. We discuss this election in greater detail below.

Religious Organizations. The various Islamic organizations can be described by their sectarian affiliations and their functional objectives. Both viewpoints provide

¹² Mehta and Shaffer (2002), p. 9.

¹³ Mehta and Shaffer (2002).

valuable insights. Sectarian affiliation, in particular, is a salient dimension because there are relatively few suprasectarian organizations in Pakistan, Jama'at-i-Islami (JI) being one notable example. Both the major Sunni and Shi'a traditions are represented by a number of organizations and schools of thought, of which the major ones are detailed herein.

The JI merits further discussion because of its uniqueness.¹⁴ While the JI is suprasectarian, it does contest elections and has been the most popular of the Islamic parties. In fact, it was JI founder Maulana Abu al-A'la Mawdudi's vision that elections should be the principal means of obtaining the support of the populace. Thus JI, on principle, works through the electoral system. In this regard, it encourages female participation both because women are nearly half the electorate and because their support is required to establish an Islamic society.

On the issue of women's rights, JI supports education for women and some room for political activity. While JI encourages women to take seats in the national and provincial assemblies, it is not apparent whether it would support a female prime minister. JI also holds that *hejab* (woman's head covering) is compulsory, although they admit that various forms of hejab are permissible. When asked about legal enforcement of hejab, JI's Naib Amir (vice chairman) explained that JI does not believe that the law should impose it because hejab is only meaningful when it is chosen.¹⁵ However, as a cautionary tale, women in Iran also said that Khomeini promised that hejab would not be legally required. Yet, this is one of the first things that was imposed on women after the revolution.

The JI has even vocally discouraged sectarian violence. As a group, JI tends to advocate establishment of shari'a—although it has never been very specific about what this means given the diversity of its constituents. Theoretically, JI would follow the teachings of Mawdudi. Conversations in January and August 2003 with the Naib Amir on key issues of shari'a suggest that JI's vision of Islam is one in which Islam can and must be able to incorporate and accommodate modernity. The example the Naib Amir gave was blood transfusions. While the Quran is silent on this issue, it is JI's conviction that there is no reason to disallow blood transfusions. JI, unlike other established Islamist groups in Pakistan, believes that *ijtihad* is ongoing, and this is the vehicle for accommodating modernity within their vision of Islam.

While JI is concerned about the domestic religio-political developments within Pakistan, it also has an active international religio-political agenda. (For example, it has published a two-volume set detailing its national and international political agenda.¹⁶) It has been deeply involved in Pakistan's foreign policy and has projected

¹⁴ For the most comprehensive treatments of JI, see Nasr (2000) and (1994).

¹⁵ Interview with the Naib Amir of JI in August 2003.

¹⁶ See Rahman, Sahibzada, and Ahmed (1999).

its ostensible equities into the theaters of Afghanistan and Indian-held Kashmir. While JI itself is a political organization, it is believed to act through militant organizations operating in those theaters. For example, JI works with and through Hizbul Mujahadeen (HM) and with Al-Badar to prosecute its foreign policy objectives.

Although JI often draws attention in international forums because it is an Islamist party, JI has always acted in ways consistent with a political party. In other words, it has been responsive to its electorate and their expectations. Thus, when JI is in power it has tended to focus less on the “Islamist” agenda because its primary power base is made up of Punjabis, who have historically been less willing to entertain such an agenda than the residents of the Northwest Frontier Province. Much of JI’s power base overlaps the constituency of the PML-N. Many Pakistan observers have expressed the view that, had the PML-N been able to take part in the elections, JI would have had more difficulty in the elections than it in fact had.

The distinction by functional objectives is also important because most Islamist organizations in Pakistan have objectives that are religio-political in nature, with few exceptions. The Tablighi Jama’at, for instance, pursues a religious agenda only and has no interest in domestic policy and political affairs. Its focus is entirely on spiritual regeneration, and as such, it does not participate in the electorate process.

Tablighi Jama’at has captured the attention of the global community and has been associated with being a “portal” for recruitment for extreme or even militant Islamist organizations.¹⁷ However, while Tablighi Jama’at does hold a massive gathering of the world’s Muslims in Raiwind every year, it does not permit groups to set up recruitment booths. However, the Raiwind gathering is often a means to get into Pakistan, and once individuals are in, they are fairly free to associate with whomever they desire. Moreover, Raiwind is an obvious networking opportunity for groups and individuals of all types. Although extremist and militant groups may send individuals to Raiwind, so do the Pakistani intelligence agencies. Raiwind is heavily monitored by a variety of intelligence organizations such as Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI), Military Intelligence (MI), and the special branch.¹⁸

Sunni Interpretative Schools and Organizations. As noted above, the Barelvis are one interpretative tradition within the Hanafi school of thought. The majority of Pakistanis are, at least to some degree, adherents of this tradition, which originated in the town of Bareilly (in what is today India) in the nineteenth century. The Barelvi tradition is heavily influenced by the rich South Asian Sufi tradition and other syncretic religious practices. Some of these syncretic practices include devotion to particular burial grounds of renowned religious figures (*pirs*). This strand of belief is pervasive among Pakistan’s rural population where *pir-worship* is common. Worship of

¹⁷ See Chapter 10, “Muslim Diasporas and Networks.”

¹⁸ Conversations with a political scientist and analyst on Pakistan’s internal security in Lahore, August 2003.

pirs' birth dates, death anniversaries, and burial sites is considered anathema in more orthodox interpretations of Islam. Barelvi beliefs and practices are also common among Pakistan's urban communities. According to Mehta and Shaffer, while most Barelvi interpretations are tolerant of pluralism in the practice of Islam, some groups that have become politicized and sectarian in nature. Organizations affiliated with Barelvi interpretative schools run some 25 percent of the madrassas in Pakistan.¹⁹

The primary organization that represents Barelvi political aspirations is the Jamiat al Ulema-e-Pakistan (JUP). The JUP is led by Shah Ahmed Noorani and is influenced by the Sufi tendencies of the Barelvi school. It was founded in 1949 as a rival to the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI) (see below). Its following has traditionally been strongest among the Mohajir community (those who migrated to Pakistan from India following independence). Although it once was strong in Sindh (where Mohajirs have been historically concentrated), it has been weakened by the secular, antistatist Mohajir Quami Movement and the centrist mainstream party, the PPP. Today it lacks the organizational strength and geographical base enjoyed by JUI.²⁰ Over time, the JUP has splintered into five different groups, some of which have become militarized. The Karachi-based Sunni Tehreek is the largest and has become involved in sectarian violence. Other offshoots of JUP include the Dawaat-e-Islami and the Punjabi Sunni Tehreek.²¹

Functionally, the JUP tends to focus on domestic affairs of Pakistan (establishment of some version of shari'a, Islamic banking institutions, etc.). It has not been involved with militancy and has not tended to open madrassas. According to Mahmood, it has had a strong social agenda supporting equal rights for all, provision of basic needs for the landless, shelter for the homeless, an independent judiciary, maintaining a nonaligned foreign policy, and unity with the Muslim world.²² JUP has participated in the electoral process and is currently part of the coalition of Islamic parties, the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA).

The other popular Hanafi tradition is the Deobandi school. Deobandism dates back to the late nineteenth century and originated in the town of Deoband in what is now India. Deobandism called for purification of Islam and can be logically seen in the same context of the numerous other reform movements that overtook colonial South Asia. Barbara Metcalf argues that Deobandis

¹⁹ See Mehta and Shaffer (2002) and Metcalf (2001).

²⁰ Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment—South Asia, "Internal Affairs," July 30, 2003. Available at www.janes.com, last accessed August 24, 2003.

²¹ See Mehta and Shaffer (2002) and Metcalf (2001).

²² Mahmood, (2000), pp. 159–160; Rodney W. Jones, "The Prospects for State Failure in Pakistan: Ethnic, Regional, and Sectarian Fissures. Summary for Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory," May 1, 2001. Session on the Future of Pakistan: Prospects of State Failure. Available at [http://216.239.53.104/search?q=cache:VE90owAsp84J:www.policyarchitects.org/pdf/Pak_statefailure_ExSumm.pdf+Jamiat+al+Ulema-e-Pakistan+\(JUP\).+&hl=en&ie=UTF-8](http://216.239.53.104/search?q=cache:VE90owAsp84J:www.policyarchitects.org/pdf/Pak_statefailure_ExSumm.pdf+Jamiat+al+Ulema-e-Pakistan+(JUP).+&hl=en&ie=UTF-8), last accessed August 24, 2003

were “reformists” in a way that, with broad strokes, was shared across a whole range of Muslim, Sikh and Hindu movements in the colonial period. Characteristic across the board were movements that assessed worldly powerlessness and looked to earlier periods or pristine texts as a source of cultural pride and a possible roadmap to resurgence. Armed with their studies of *hadith*, the Deobandis, for example, deplored a range of customary celebrations and practices, including what they regarded as excesses at saints’ tombs, elaborate life cycle celebrations, and practices attributed to the influence of the Shi’a.²³

Most of these religious reform movements were formed in response to the efforts of Christian missionaries in South Asia. Indeed, several of the organizational features of Christian missionary work (e.g., tractarianism, the establishment of schools, publication of religious materials in regional dialects) were appropriated by a wide array of religious reform movements, which represented varied religious traditions of South Asia. They also appropriated and adapted the tools of demarcating communities from each other. For example, religious groups began promulgating, through tractarian and other movements, specific life-cycle events (marking birth, marriage, and death) to substantiate their claims to a unique religious status.²⁴

While adherents of the Deobandi interpretative tradition are relatively few, Deobandis operate the largest fraction of madrassas. Khaled Ahmed estimates that they run some 64 percent of the madrassas in Pakistan.²⁵ The Taliban leadership emerged from these Deobandi schools. Not surprisingly, the Taliban were able to exploit Deobandi adherents for political as well as military support.²⁶

Although the ulema of the Deoband in India persisted in their preindependence pattern of abstaining from political activities, the ulema in Pakistan have become politically involved. The single most important Deobandi political organization in Pakistan is the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI). The JUI, founded in 1941, tends at a functional level to pursue a domestic religio-political agenda. For example, it has pressured the state to make a number of reforms, including the canonization within the legal code of the Hanafi interpretation of the shari’a.²⁷ JUI also has taken part in elections over time and has formed alliances with mainstream parties, such as Benazir Bhutto’s PPP. Currently, the JUI is one of the two major parties in the MMA.

While adherents to the Deobandi school remained a small minority through the 1970s, General Zia ul-Haq cultivated the Deobandi mullahs both to gain a degree of religio-political authority and to legitimize his dictatorship. Since the late 1970s, the

²³ Metcalf (2001).

²⁴ See Harjot S. Oberoi, “Ritual to Counter Ritual: Rethinking the Hindu-Sikh Question, 1884–1915,” in Joseph T. O’Connell, et al. (1988); and Oberoi (1994).

²⁵ Khaled Ahmed, cited by Mehta and Shaffer (2002).

²⁶ Singer (2001).

²⁷ Metcalf (2001); Mehta and Shaffer (2002).

Deobandi influence has grown substantially, and Deobandis are now thought to represent some 15 percent of the Pakistani populace.²⁸

Several Deobandi madrassas have been intimately involved with sectarian groups and the violence they perpetrate. Both Sipha-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) and the Lashkar-e-Jhangi (LeJ) are essentially offshoots of JUI.²⁹ Moreover, the Kashmir-focused militant group Harkat-ul-Mujahadeen (HuM) has cozy relations with JUI. (This was one of the first groups to be declared a terrorist organization by the U.S. government.)³⁰

HuM further split when its main ideologue, Maulana Masood Azhar, was released from incarceration in India for his role in the hijacking of the Indian Airlines flights to Kandahar. Upon release, Azhar founded the fiercely violence organization Jaish-e-Mohammed (JM), which is believed to have perpetrated a number of high-profile attacks, perhaps in concert with the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) (e.g., the December 2001 attack on the Indian Lok Sabha). At present, this group is listed as a terrorist organization by the United States and is—at least nominally—proscribed within Pakistan.³¹

Another important grouping of Sunni Islam in Pakistan is the Ahl-e-Hadith, a conservative Indian Muslim reform movement that originated in the colonial period (nineteenth century). This school takes its lead from the ulema of Saudi Arabia, rejects the Hanafi *fiqa* (legal tradition), and is the most rigid interpretative school in Pakistan. It staunchly rejects the Sufi practices and syncretic traditions that are prevalent within Pakistan and calls for Muslims to revert to the pristine Islam of the Prophet's generation and the two ensuing generations (the "pious forefathers").³²

To enable the reader to identify some of the key features of and differences among these major Sunni and suprasectarian groups, we provide a summary overview of JI, JUP, and JUI in Table 5.5.

Shi'a Organizations. The largest Shi'a community is the "Twelver" sect. Twelvers are well represented in Karachi, Lahore, and the southern Punjab; within their community are powerful landowning families, which have traditionally been a source of power and authority. As we discuss below, urbanization has brought the

²⁸ Metcalf (2001); Mehta and Shaffer (2002); Stern (2000).

²⁹ Rizvan Zeb documents linkages between the SSP, LeJ and the JUI in "War Against Terror: Lessons for Pakistan," *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. XXV, No. 3, Spring 2002.

³⁰ Mehta and Shaffer (2002).

³¹ Mr. Azhar is also notorious for the fact that his close associate, Ahmed Omar Saeed Sheikh, has been found guilty in the kidnapping and murder of Daniel Pearl. See Mehta and Shaffer (2002).

³² Mehta and Shaffer (2002).

Table 5.5
Summary of Key Features of Islamic Groups in Pakistan

Jama'at-i-Islami (JI) ^a	Jamiat al Ulema-e-Pakistan (JUP) (Barelvi) ^b	Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI) ^c
Agenda		
Primarily political. Mobilizing Islam to achieve political goals	Favors establishment of Islamic governance, progressive domestic agenda	Establishment of Islamic state, adaptation of Hanafi interpretation for Pakistan's legal code
Ideology		
Nonsectarian, believes that <i>ijtihad</i> allows compatibility between Islam and modernity. Seeks to establish shari'a through political process	Barelvi; reflects Sufi influence	Deobandi, very antagonistic toward Western and non-Islamic culture and values
Political-Legal		
Seeks to establish Islamic society through grassroots and electoral level. Participates in elections and advocates acting within the framework of the Pakistan constitution	Favors establishment of shari'a, but not clear as to what its version of shari'a entails. Has formed alliances with other political and Islamist groups. Participates in elections	Has participated in elections, is currently part of the MMA. Seeks to establish its version of Shari'a. Has already done so in the NWFP in 2003
Government		
Within Pakistan, seeks an Islamic state through the political process. Supports the institutions created through the constitution	No comprehensive information on this issue	While it takes part in elections, elections are an instrument to establish an Islamic state. It is unclear what will happen to "democracy" should JUI succeed
Human Rights		
Islam provides notions of universal fundamental rights that are to be observed in all circumstances. JI does support U.N. human rights positions in general, but because they are not "God given mandates," they are not as permanent and binding as are the human rights laid out by Allah	Position on human rights is not clear, however JUP has run on platforms asserting equal rights for all citizens and other socially progressive issues	Presumably, its notion of human rights turns to Islam as the source of such rights. JUI has been hostile to non-Islamic NGOs operating in Pakistan
Social Agenda		
Conservative, but many value nonreligious subjects in education. Women should dress modestly, but the definition depends on local custom. Most oppose use of coercion to enforce behavior codes	Socially progressive agenda	Generally reactionary. Willing to use coercion to enforce its conception of Islamic dress and behavior Has been a stronghold of support for the Taliban

Table 5.5—continued

Jama'at-i-Islami (JI) ^a	Jamiat al Ulema-e-Pakistan (JUP) (Barelvi) ^b	Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI) ^c
Links to Militancy		
Not a militant group, but does have direct command and control of Hizbul Mujahadeen and Al Badr	None	Has links to the anti-Shi'a militant groups (SSP and LeJ). HuM has had cozy relations with them but command and control is less clear in Kashmir
Propensity for Violence		
Low—but uses militant groups to prosecute its Kashmir agenda	Very low	Operates as a political group. But there are links with and overlapping membership in and among SSP, LeJ, and HuM

^a Information obtained from interviews with JI and from information on JI's Web site: <http://www.jamaat.org> (sections on Women and Human Rights).

^b Based on Mahmood (2000), pp. 159–160; Jones (2001); Mehta and Shaffer (2002); Metcalf (2001); and Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment—South Asia, "Internal Affairs," July 30, 2003, available at www.Janes.com, last accessed August 24, 2003.

^c Based on Mahmood (2000), pp. 156–159; Jones, 2001; Mehta and Shaffer (2002); Metcalf, 2001; Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment—South Asia, op. cit. (2003).

nascent Sunni middle class into conflict with these Shi'a landowning families by mobilizing sectarian identities. This has resulted in significant sectarian violence, which we explore more thoroughly later in the chapter.³³

The Bohras and Ismailis comprise the smaller Shi'a faith communities. The Bohras tend to be concentrated in Karachi. The Ismailis, who are followers of the Agha Khan, tend to be concentrated in Pakistan's Northern Areas, such as Gilgit, as well as major urban centers. The Ismailis tend to be better educated and more affluent and generally avoid politics altogether.³⁴

There are a number of Shi'a militant organizations. One is the Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Fiqha-e-Jafria (TNFJ), which was formed in 1979 to counter Zia's Islamization campaign, which sought to transform state institutions, laws, and policymaking in accord with a narrow Sunni interpretation that favored the Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadith organizations and worldviews. Shi'ites understood this as an overt attempt to interfere with the conduct of their religious activities and sociopolitical interests. Thus, the TNFJ was organized to articulate the concerns of the Shi'ites and to give voice to a community that was becoming increasingly marginalized and indeed vic-

³³ Mehta and Shaffer (2002).

³⁴ Mehta and Shaffer (2002).

timized by anti-Shi'a militant organizations.³⁵ The TNFJ became radicalized only upon the formation of the Sunni SSP, which targeted the TNFJ in deadly encounters. The TNFJ later changed its name to Tehrik-e-Jafria Pakistan (TJP) and the Imamia Students Organization. There is also a third prominent Shi'a militant group, the Sipa-e-Mohammad Pakistan (SMP).³⁶

Religious and Sectarian Violence. As noted above, sectarian violence between Sunnis and Shi'ites has become pervasive and is a major and recurring theme in the catalytic events described below. Pakistan's other minorities have also been victimized. The small Sikh and Hindu communities have been targeted episodically. Hindus and the few remaining Hindu shrines in Pakistan have become particularly vulnerable in the wake of the 1992 destruction of the Babri Masjid in Ayodha, India. Mobs of enraged Pakistanis retaliated for the destruction of this mosque by destroying Hindu and Jain edifices in Pakistan and by targeting vulnerable communities. Sikhs and their religious buildings have been a less frequent target because of their association with the separatist movement for Khalistan, an independent Sikh state, with which many Pakistanis are sympathetic.

Christians have also been targeted in recent years, particularly in the aftermath of September 11 and Pakistan's decision to join the coalition against Al Qaeda and the Taliban. However, the Christian community has been under threat for several decades. The blasphemy law, passed by General Zia in 1984, has been used with particular effectiveness to coerce land and other concessions from Christians.

The blasphemy law carries a mandatory penalty of death for any action or comment (acted out, spoken, or written) that indicates disrespect for Islam or the Prophet. This law has been used to marginalize and terrorize the small Christian community and other minorities as well. The Ahmedis are particularly vulnerable. While they consider themselves to be Muslims, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto declared them non-Muslims in the eyes of the state in 1974. This was done to curry favor and co-opt the religious forces that were mobilizing against him. As a consequence of this law and the Ahmedis' own belief that they are Muslim, the very practice of their faith is argued to be blasphemous. The logic of this claim revolves around the fact that in their rituals Ahmedis use prayers and forms of worship that are claimed by "authentic" Muslims.³⁷

³⁵ Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, "International Politics, Domestic Imperatives, and Identity Mobilization," *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 30, No. 2, January 2000a; Muhammad Qasim Zaman, "Sectarianism in Pakistan: The Radicalization of Shi'i and Sunni Identities," *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 32, No. 3, 1998; Charles Kennedy, "Islamization and Legal Reform in Pakistan, 1979–1980," *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 63, Spring 1990.

³⁶ Mehta and Shaffer (2002).

³⁷ Mehta and Shaffer (2002).

Catalytic Events

In this section, we explore several of the salient developments and consequences of the catalytic events identified earlier. As will become apparent in virtually every narrative, Islam has been utilized by multiple nonstate and state actors—with long-range effects that are still imprinted on the social and political landscape of Pakistan.

The Independence Movement and the Rise of Religio-Nationalist Movements

Although Pakistan was nominally formed along the lines of the Muslim identity of the vast majority of its inhabitants, mobilization of the Islamic identity preceded the creation of the state by many years. Perhaps one of the formative prepartition events was the mutiny of 1857, which had wide-ranging effects on both the British colonizers and the Indian subjects.

The mutiny began in May 1857, when Indian soldiers of the British Indian Army mutinied at the Meerut cantonment near Delhi. One of the significant features of this event was that the rebelling soldiers were overwhelmingly drawn from the Muslim units of Bengal. The uprising precipitated an insurrection against British East Indian Company forces that took nearly a year to put down. The participants proceeded to march from Meerut to Delhi, where they offered their services to the Mughal emperor. The mutiny had extensive implications and shaped many of the enduring political features of the subcontinent. At one level, the revolt was a response of the Indian populace to rapid changes in the social order that had been engineered and imposed by the British. But it also represented an attempt to revive a defunct Muslim political order. As the British perceived the uprising specifically as a “Sepoy mutiny” targeting the demise of British authority, the British were ruthless in their efforts to put down the mutiny and to ensure that Muslims were deprived of the political, military, or economic capacity to mount another such challenge to British authority.³⁸

When the insurgent units surrendered a year later, the British exiled the Mughal emperor Bahadur Shah to Burma. His exile was the official end of the Mughal empire. However, as a result of the mutiny, the British East India Company also met its demise, and the British crown assumed direct rule of India. This meant that the administration of India was transformed from a mere commercial enterprise to one of geopolitical and strategic importance. This change in administration marked the official beginning of the British Raj.

The British response to the mutiny had a lasting effect on the communal identities of South Asia. The new rulers were deeply suspicious of Muslims and their ability to foment unrest. In 1871, one British observer remarked “the Mussalmans of India are, and have been for many years, a source of chronic danger to the British Power in

³⁸ See Ziring (1998); and Mahmood (2000).

India.”³⁹ After the mutiny, the British did not keep any all-Muslim army units. This is significant because the British Indian Army was organized along regimental lines and the Muslims were the only community not to have its own units.⁴⁰ The British did not recruit Muslims into government service, both to punish the Muslims for their role in the mutiny and to minimize exposure to such risk in the future. This selective discrimination resulted in deprivations of Muslims in educational and economic opportunities and promoted friction between religious communities because the Hindus were the direct beneficiaries of these policies.

British policies in South Asia in many ways encouraged the fostering of distinct religio-political organizations. As a result, a wide array of communal organizations—Hindu, Muslim, and Sikh—were formed and had antagonistic and sometimes violent relations with one another. The Indian National Congress (INC) was founded in the 1880s. While the INC claimed to represent all Indians, an anti-Muslim bias was apparent in its initial agenda. Another important event was a meeting convened by leading Muslims in Dhaka in 1906. This meeting called for separate electorates for Hindus and Muslims to ensure that Muslim interests would be protected in the face of the dominant Hindus. These deliberations resulted in the All-India Muslim League. To allay concerns that it had militant intentions, the Muslim League stressed that its interests were solidly rooted to a desire to live in peace with all communities; the organization was, above all, to be a political party solely devoted to constitutionalism and rule of law.

The Muslim League’s pursuit of a separate electorate coincided with the 1905 partition of Bengal along communal lines into East and West Bengal. While the division of Bengal was meant to improve the ease of administration, Hindu zealots violently reacted to the partition and attempted to coerce the British into reversing the decision. They wreaked such havoc on the commercial activities that the British eventually capitulated. Upon abrogation of the partition scheme, the Muslim League moved its headquarters to New Delhi. Mohammed Ali Jinnah, also a member of the INC, joined the Muslim League in 1913.

Although the Muslim League had its roots in Dhaka, the violence perpetrated by Hindus against Muslims began to transform the organization’s scope. The events in Bengal animated and validated rising Muslim concerns that both Muslims and Islam were at risk. Eventually the organization assumed the role of speaking for South Asia’s Muslims. While the roots of the “two-nation theory” were in the bloody events of Bengal, the notion expanded throughout the subcontinent. The Muslim League in many ways marked an important stage in the organized development of

³⁹ W. W. Hunter, *The Indian Mussalmans* (Calcutta: Comrade Publishers, 1945, p. 3), cited in Mahmood (2000), p. 2.

⁴⁰ Cohen (1984); Kukreja (2003).

Muslim religious nationalism in India and eventually became the primary voice of Muslim demands and interests.

In the years leading up to World War I, Jinnah and Gandhi engaged in a power struggle for the control of the INC. Jinnah, with his staid and institutional approach, deeply despised Gandhi's populist approach and his appeal to Hindu symbols. Jinnah believed that Gandhi's tactics would only exacerbate the growing fissure between Hindus and Muslim. However, Gandhi easily seized control of the INC. Jinnah, demoralized and frustrated, left for England to reformulate a more effective future strategy.⁴¹

The Khilafat Movement

World War I brought the defeat of the Ottoman Empire, imperiling the Islamic caliphate, which had been occupied by the Turkish sultan since 1517. The treatment of Turkey at the hands of the victorious Allies engendered deep anger among Indian Muslims, who held the Turkish caliphate in great esteem and launched the Khilafat Movement to demonstrate concern for this institution and to prevent its demise.⁴² The Khilafat Movement in India ended with the dissolution of the Ottoman empire,⁴³ the abolishment of the caliphate in 1924, and the subsequent creation of the modern Turkish Republic. However, the impact of the Khilafat Movement on the Muslim community and Muslim ideologues was profound. In many ways, the Khilafat Movement was the genesis of the political culture of India's Muslims in that it was the first mass movement against the British by Indian Muslims organized explicitly around religious lines. Launched during discussions of what an independent India might look like, the Khilafat Movement demonstrated to Muslim elites that their identity as Muslims could be effectively mobilized in pursuit of a separate entity for South Asia's Muslims.⁴⁴

The Khilafat Movement deeply affected influential individuals like Mawdudi, the founder of Jama'at-i-Islami. Mawdudi believed that the caliphate was not only a symbol of Muslim unity but also a ". . . sacrosanct institution that would preserve that unit and give shape to a transnational *umma* whose borders would encompass all Muslim territories."⁴⁵ For Mawdudi, the Khilafat Movement was both a struggle against Western imperialism—the principal impediment to Muslim unity—and an

⁴¹ The above narration is based on Ziring (1998) and Mahmood (2000).

⁴² See Ziring (1998), pp. 11–15; and Mahmood (2000), pp. 11–12.

⁴³ The Ottoman Empire was dissolved in 1920 with the Treaty of Sévres.

⁴⁴ Ziring (1998).

⁴⁵ Nasr, *op. cit.*, 2000, p. 7.

affirmation of the centrality of the *umma* as both an idealistic and a realistic model for Muslim life.⁴⁶

Partition

Jinnah returned to British India in 1934 and reestablished the Muslim League as the voice of India's Muslims. The Muslim League adopted a separatist agenda, which argued for a separate state to protect South Asia's Muslims. After much compromise and violence, the vision of a separate "Pakistan" materialized. Despite months of British efforts to leave South Asia with a united India intact, the Mountbatten Plan of June 3, 1947, was implemented. This plan both delineated the borders of the two emergent Muslim provinces (Punjab in the northwest and Bengal in the northeast) and articulated the procedures for the transfer of power. By August 15, 1947, Lord Mountbatten was gone, and the peoples of the subcontinent awoke to find themselves in one of the two new states.

Partition bequeathed an uneasy legacy to the two nascent states. Partition involved the largest ever transfer of population, numbering some ten million people. It is believed that one million people were killed in the course of the mass migration—in addition to unknowable instances of rape and other forms of violence perpetrated by all groups against each other. The divided province of the Punjab bore the brunt of this violence. East Pakistan, in contrast, was largely unaffected by such pogroms. The distrust and communal discord stemming from this horrific historic event still resonates today through the peoples of Pakistan and North India. The social, political, and economic consequences of the subcontinent's partition bequeathed to Pakistan a persisting adversarial perception vis-à-vis India.

The Pakistan that emerged from this process was challenged by a number of factors. This nascent state inherited comparatively fewer administration apparatuses and had to develop governmental institutions de novo. Pakistan had to create institutions of state to govern provinces that had previously been ruled from Delhi. In addition, the state was divided into two wings: East and West Pakistan, which were separated by the territory of the emergent Indian state.⁴⁷

When the Royal Indian Army was divided, some 80 percent of the officer corps went to India. Many of the units with substantial Muslim representation were in those areas that were allotted to India, but not all Muslims in the British Indian Army elected to go to Pakistan. Many officers and *jawans* (enlisted men) chose to stay within the Indian army. Pakistan, as the smaller of the two states, also received a smaller portion of the fixed and transferable resources. Most of the defense production base and military stores were also in areas that went to India: Pakistan received

⁴⁶ Nasr, op. cit. 2000, p. 7.

⁴⁷ For various versions of partition, see Ziring (1998); Mahmood (2000); and Wolpert (1993).

the obsolete defense infrastructure in the Northwest Frontier. The inequitable division of assets formed one of the first bones of contention between the two militaries. This issue persists within the culture of the Pakistani army, which is perhaps the single most influential entity in Pakistan.⁴⁸

In addition to the disputed allocation of military forces and assets, severe disputes also emerged over water sharing, distribution of government assets from the disassembled Raj, and territorial disputes over Kashmir. Consequently, the security competition between India and Pakistan has existed since the inception of the two states. Simultaneously, Afghanistan's irredentist claims on Pakistan's territory further exacerbated Pakistan's security concerns.⁴⁹

The first Kashmir war (1947–1948) occurred in the initial months of independence at a time when Pakistan was not only struggling to develop its armed forces but also endeavoring to establish a central governmental authority. The war thrust the Pakistani army into the center of decisionmaking.⁵⁰ However, this was not to be a transitory role for the army. Pakistan came into being as an “insecure state” because of the nature of partition and the preponderance of force and assets that India held (and continues to hold) over Pakistan. As a consequence of the chronic and enduring security competition with India and the persisting conviction that India seeks to destroy Pakistan, the army is seen as the only institution that can sustain the nation's survival. Thus, over time, the Pakistani army assumed all strategic and structural decisionmaking authority. Subsequent attempts to reduce the army's role have largely met with failure.⁵¹

The issue of Kashmir has had remarkable tenacity and has persisted as the single most salient source of security competition between India and Pakistan. It was the flashpoint of the first Indo-Pakistani conflict of 1947–1948 and precipitated conflict again in 1965. Pakistan, obsessed with attaining Kashmir, has pursued a proxy war there since 1989 and made a limited-aims incursion into the Kargil Dras sector in 1999. The status of Kashmir has seized the attention and imagination of the Pakistani public since independence as well as the attention and policy focus of Pakistan's civilian and military leadership.

The 1971 War and the Birth of Bangladesh

Whereas Pakistan was born out of the logic that the Muslims of South Asia should be protected within the confines of their own nation-state, the cohesive capacity of Is-

⁴⁸ Cohen (1984); Cloughley (2000).

⁴⁹ Cohen (1984); Khan (1963); Kukreja (2003); Cloughley (2000).

⁵⁰ See Hasan-Askari Rizvi, “Civil-Military Relations in Contemporary Pakistan,” *Survival*, Vol. 40, No. 2, Summer 1998, for a more thorough discussion of civil and military relations and their evolution.

⁵¹ Kukreja (2003).

lam to bind the two parts of the Pakistani state began to diminish in the face of severe cultural and linguistic differences. According to the 1951 census, West Pakistan had 33.7 million inhabitants and East Pakistan 41.9 million. This demographic fact motivated the Bengalis of East Pakistan to seek a democratic regime based on the “one man, one vote” principle, which would have essentially given them the right to govern the country.⁵²

The Punjabi-dominant establishment of West Pakistan considered the numerically superior Bengalis of East Pakistan to be less than their equals. These Punjabis were unwilling to permit such an electoral regime to develop. West Pakistan promoted policies, such as an Urdu-only language policy and differential armed forces recruitment that favored Punjabis and Pathans and heavily discriminated against the Bengalis of East Pakistan. Moreover, West Pakistan exploited East Pakistan economically to fund the development of the West while depriving East Pakistan of equal political representation. The result of this chronic mismanagement was a separatist movement wherein East Pakistan sought independence, precipitating civil war. Eventually, the deteriorating security environment (resulting, for instance, in Bengali refugees streaming into India) prompted India to take a “defensive offense,” precipitating the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war. When the war was over, Pakistan had been cleaved into two states. West Pakistan became what is today known as Pakistan, and East Pakistan became Bangladesh.⁵³

The independence of Bangladesh shook the foundations of the Pakistani state because the Bangladeshi independence movement revolved around Bengali nationalism. The success of this ethno-nationalist movement challenged the notion that Islam and allegiance to it could overcome the competing loci of identity formation such as ethnicity, language, and regionalism. Whereas in India, observers hailed the dissolution of Pakistan as proof that the two-nation theory was eminently flawed, in Pakistan the experience gave new life to the old debate about Islamic identity and the type of state Pakistan should be in the future.

The collapse of Pakistan also catalyzed a series of fundamental changes in the relations between the state and the religious organizations. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the estranged protégé of Ayub Khan, came to power in 1972 when the nation was still struggling with its new form and the devastating defeat by India. Although many attribute the sweeping changes in the Islamic nature of the Pakistani state to General Zia, it was Bhutto, in fact, who launched this process.

In his effort to resurrect his nation’s dignity, Bhutto sought to foster a new national identity and ethos tethered to anti-Indian and pan-Islamic themes. Rather than reject the two-nation theory, Bhutto and others explained the secession of

⁵² Jaffrelot (2002).

⁵³ Wirsing (1998); Mahmood (2000); Ziring (1997).

Bangladesh in terms of a failure to sustain an Islamic ethos. Thus it was the failure to create an authentic pan-Islamism that enabled Bengali nationalism to triumph. Bhutto pursued a rhetorical and political strategy that emphasized Pakistan's Islamic identity and embraced Pakistan's posited Middle Eastern identity.

As religious parties began protesting his movement toward the left, Bhutto attempted to co-opt them to undermine any destabilizing effect they might have on his government. As a consequence, the religious parties, which had failed to achieve electoral gains in the 1970 elections, were given a voice in establishing the 1973 constitution. This constitution declared Islam to be the state religion (Article 2) and established the Council of Islamic Ideology, which was charged with Islamizing Pakistan.⁵⁴

Under the Islamization efforts led by Bhutto, madrassas began to proliferate at hitherto unseen rates. From 1960 to 1971, the number of madrassas increased by 482. In contrast, between 1971 and 1979, 852 new madrassas were established. The number has been increasing ever since.⁵⁵ While Bhutto undertook ostensible efforts to nationalize the education sector, he left the madrassas autonomous. Thus, it was under Bhutto that the first real period of significant madrasa growth occurred.

Bhutto also attempted to co-opt the madrassas and their leadership by offering to render madrasa certificates equivalent to public-sector certificates and diplomas. The madrassas spurned the offer. (However, this status was later conferred under Zia's leadership.) Nevertheless, Bhutto persisted in his efforts to win them over. For example, during the nationalization of the public schools, the newly promulgated curricula comprised more religious content than had been the case previously. Further, in his efforts to establish a national identity rooted in Pakistan's Middle Eastern identity, Bhutto made Arabic a compulsory subject at middle and secondary school levels. This also was a major gain for the Islamists because madrasa graduates were employed in teaching Arabic. This had the consequence of furthering the institutionalization of the madrassas in the national educational infrastructure. It was during this time of expanded institutionalization that the madrasa clerics began establishing funding sources external to Pakistan.⁵⁶

To further the "Middle Easternizing" of Pakistan, Bhutto's PPP party negotiated several agreements with Saudi Arabia to promote the teaching of Arabic lan-

⁵⁴ The above discussion is based on International Crisis Group, "Pakistan: Madrasas, Extremism and the Military," ICG Asia Report No. 36, Islamabad/Brussels: July 29, 2002; Khan (2001).

⁵⁵ ICG Asia Report No. 36 (2002); Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Religious Affairs, *Report of the National Committee for Deeni Madaris, 1979*. Malik (1996) estimates that at independence in 1947, there were only 137 madrassas in Pakistan. According to a 1956 survey, there were 244 madrassas in all of West Pakistan. Official estimates assess that the number of madrassas has doubled every year since the mid-1950s. However, official estimates are always problematic because it is unknown how many madrassas actually bother to register with the state.

⁵⁶ ICG Asia Report No. 36 (2002); Waseem (1994).

guage and literature. According to fieldwork conducted by the International Crisis Group, madrassas were established in areas that were frequented by members of that Arab monarchy, such as the Punjab. As we will discuss below, the influx of Arab financial, cultural, and political capital would “assume mammoth proportions during the Afghan jihad.”⁵⁷ Indeed, the linkage between Saudi Arabian patrons and Pakistan’s madrassas (particularly the Ahl-e-Hadith/Salafi madrassas) persist to date—even if they have been attenuated by the post–September 11 global environment and international attention to the Saudi Arabia–madrassa nexus.

It is important to note that some of the features of Pakistani domestic and foreign policy began to take root in the period after the 1971 war. The institutional linkages between madrassas, militancy, and the army can be dated to Bhutto’s government. Afghan Islamist dissidents sought and received sanctuary in Pakistan (e.g., Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Burhannudin Rabbani, and Ahmad Shah Massoud) following the 1973 coup in which the Afghan King Zahir Shah was dethroned. During Bhutto’s rule, army officers such as Lieutenant General Naseerullah Babar cultivated Afghan dissidents. It is notable that Babar would later become Benazir Bhutto’s interior minister, from which position he became one of the most important patrons of the Taliban.⁵⁸ Bhutto also attempted to placate the religious forces by consenting to declare the Ahmedis “non-Muslims.”

Rather than being co-opted by Bhutto’s efforts, the swelling religious forces in Pakistan understood his “political sops” as victories of sorts. This emboldened the religious clergy to form alliances with each other and with the military in an effort to remove Bhutto from power. Notably, this coalition contained both traditional clergy members as well as the more modernist Jama’at-i-Islami. In 1977, Bhutto was deposed. The military, under Zia, brought the religious parties to the forefront of Pakistan’s foreign policy and became a major instrument, cultivated by the United States and Arab states, to repel the Soviets from Afghanistan.

1979: The Iranian Revolution and the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan

The year 1979 marked the Iranian Revolution and the Soviet incursion into Afghanistan. The Iran-Iraq war, which began shortly after the Iranian revolution, introduced into Pakistan new equities and players, all of whom sought to mobilize and instrumentalize Islam for their own narrow ends. Given the significance of these events for the political history of Pakistan and for political Islam in Pakistan, we now explore this concatenation of events in some detail.

We will concentrate our attention on the specific actors involved—individuals, nonstate actors, Pakistani official agencies, and a host of other states in the region

⁵⁷ ICG Asia Report No. 36, p. 8.

⁵⁸ Rashid (2000); Matinuddin (1999); Roy (2001, 2003); ICG Asia Report, No. 36 (2002).

and beyond. We will also identify the processes that were set into play and the ways in which the events of 1979 were mobilized by those actors. Some of these processes include the “madrassa boom,” the militarization of Pakistani society, the rise of ethnic and sectarian violence, and a major shift in Pakistani foreign policy in the theaters of Afghanistan and Kashmir. Pakistan, as it is currently constituted, continues to bear the imprint of this period in ways that may not be reversible.

These events provided Zia and the military the opportunity to continue a process that had already commenced with the deposing of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. In 1977, Zia suspended the 1973 constitution and reneged on holding elections that were scheduled for 1978. With a popularly elected—and indeed popular—prime minister ousted and no elections in sight, the domestic opposition to Zia’s regime mounted. To marginalize such opposition, Zia sought to consolidate his authority by rooting it in appeals to Islamization. These Zia-led military efforts to consolidate power were bolstered both by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and by the Iranian Revolution.⁵⁹

The Iranian revolution for its part gave newfound direction to the Shi’a communities in Pakistan and elsewhere and animated their political aspirations. This impact derived both indirectly from philosophical and political momentum of the Iranian (read Shi’a) revolution and directly through the infusing of Iranian funds into Pakistan to establish and maintain Shi’a political organizations. With the onset of the Iran-Iraq war of 1980, both Iran and Iraq sought to fight for influence in Pakistan and each funded Shi’a and Sunni sectarian organizations respectively.⁶⁰ Iran was particularly interested in organizing Pakistan’s Shi’ites (the efforts of which culminated in the establishment of the TJP and its offshoots) because of the revolutionary government’s vexation with General Zia. This irritation with Zia is attributed both to his 1977–1978 visit to Iran to shore up the Shah’s regime and because of the tight relations with the United States pursued by Zia after 1980.⁶¹

When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, Pakistan became a “front line” state. Zia adeptly exploited U.S. willingness to invest in Pakistan’s military and intelligence infrastructure to render it an effective weapon against the Soviet presence. Moreover, the United States, along with Gulf States such as Saudi Arabia, was keen to invest in the madrassa infrastructure to churn out mujahidin to fight in Afghanistan. Zia’s efforts to consolidate his power base by “Islamizing” Pakistan domestically and through promoting jihad in Afghanistan fundamentally transformed Pakistan and the madrassa system. For example, the regime promulgated Islamic rules and regulations for virtually every institution, which created employment opportunities

⁵⁹ See ICG Asia Report No. 36 (2002).

⁶⁰ ICG Asia Report No. 36 (2002).

⁶¹ Nasr, *op. cit.*, 2000a.

for madrassa graduates. Moreover, even though in theory many madrassas were often openly hostile to one another, they all flourished to varying extents under his regime. However, because each sect within Pakistan competed for support, patronage, and visibility, the sectarian divisions along which madrassas were organized became militarized. Countries like Iran and the Gulf States eagerly bankrolled the sectarian madrassas of their choice.⁶²

The Madrassa Culture in Pakistan Forever Changed. During the first six years of the Zia period (1979–1982), growth in the madrassas was modest with the founding of 151 new seminaries. During the subsequent six years as the U.S.-backed mujahidin effort in Afghanistan continued to gather momentum, 1,000 new madrassas were established. According to an official 1988 Pakistani government estimate, of the 2,891 registered madrassas (and many more were likely to have been unregistered), the largest share (1,869) were Deobandi in orientation. The second largest share (717) were Bareilvi. Notably, there were only half as many Bareilvi-affiliated madrassas as Deobandi. Another 47 were registered under Shi'a affiliation. The Salafi Ahle Hadith accounted for 161 institutions. Jama'at-i-Islami and other independent madrassas together accounted for only 97.⁶³

There are unofficial estimates as well. For example, according to Malik (1996) Shi'a madrassas increased from about 70 in 1979 to 116 in 1983–1994, demonstrating the influence of Iran's efforts in this period. Malik also notes that the Ahle Hadith madrassas—the closest to Saudi Wahhabism—experienced similar expansion. While they were an insignificant minority prior to the 1970s, hundreds of Ahle Hadith madrassas were established in important commercial areas of the Punjab during the late 1970s and early 1980s. Because the Ahle Hadith, along with the Deobandis, harbor deep animosity toward Shi'ites, the Sunni-Shi'a sectarian conflict took on new dimensions as a consequence of this madrassa expansion and the deepening of sectarian identities.⁶⁴

While the institution of the madrassas has gained much notoriety since September 11, 2001, because of the often-positing ties between Pakistani madrassas and terrorism, this popular perception is not altogether accurate. The problems of civilian militancy (often dubbed jihad) are largely independent of the madrassas; in fact, most civilian militants (mujahidin) do not come from these schools. It is widely believed and indeed asserted by jihadis that the first Pakistani “martyr” in Afghanistan

⁶² ICG Asia Report No. 36 (2002).

⁶³ Government of Pakistan figures cited in ICG Asia Report No. 36. Also see Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, “International Relations of an Islamist Movement: The Case of Jamaat-i-Islami of Pakistan,” Council on Foreign Relations, 2000b.

⁶⁴ S. Jamal Malik, “Islamization in Pakistan: 1977–1885: The Ulama and Their Places of Learning,” *Islamic Studies*, 28, Spring 1998.

was not a madrassa graduate at all. Rather, he was a graduate of a government college in Karachi where he had been attracted to the student wing of the JI.⁶⁵

It is also not appreciated that for much of the Afghan conflict, the JI that was “the face of the Afghan jihad” in Pakistan. Unlike the JUI factions, which are ethnically biased and rooted in the NWFP, JI is nonsectarian, even suprasectarian. JI claims a predominantly urban constituency and draws from among the intelligentsia, particularly through its student wings. However, it would be equally wrong to deny that a small number of madrassas do maintain close associations with radical or even violent organizations. Thus, they certainly have contributed to the terrorist problem within Pakistan, in South Asia, and beyond. Further underscoring the indirect relations between militancy and madrassas, the militant madrassas play essentially a supporting role: They provide a fertile pool of manpower susceptible to recruitment by militant organizations.

The madrassas served (and continue to serve) as an important recruitment institution by encouraging students to join the mujahidin efforts in Afghanistan, Kashmir, and elsewhere. One such string of schools, the Haqqaniya madrassas, along with the Fazlur Rahman–led JUI faction, has been notable for its successful efforts to promote such recruitment networks throughout Pakistan’s major cities.⁶⁶

While many analysts focus on the sheer number of madrassas and their proliferation, numbers are only part of the story. To a great extent, the boom in madrassas has resulted both from the incentives to establish them (as noted) and from a desire on the part of many of the clergy to provide a semblance of education in the face of the unwillingness of the Pakistani government to invest in the public educational sector. A number of analysts have noted that the most important factor drawing the Pakistani populace to the madrassas is the dearth of public educational opportunities as a result of state neglect. Even where schools are available, many families cannot afford the small fees that are charged, much less textbooks, uniforms, and other materials. Madrassas provide not only free education to the families but also free materials and room and board. In some cases, they even give the family a stipend to compensate for the loss of the child’s labor.⁶⁷

However, this does not mean that the system is not deeply problematic. While most madrassas do not have ties with radical militant organizations, a number of in-

⁶⁵ ICG Asia Report No. 36 (2002); Looney (2002).

⁶⁶ See Christine Fair, “Militant Recruitment in Pakistan: Implications for Al-Qa’ida and Other Organizations,” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Vol. 27, No. 6, November/December 2004; Malik (1996); ICG Asia Report No. 36; Singer (2001); Matinuddin, (1999); Rashid (2000); Robert Looney, “Strategic Insight—A U.S. Strategy for Achieving Stability in Pakistan: Expanding Educational Opportunities,” September 2, 2002, at <http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/sept02/southAsia.asp>, last accessed August 9, 2004.

⁶⁷ See Looney (2002); Singer (2001); Stern (2000).

direct effects warrant attention. Apart from creating students who may be more amenable to participating in militant actions, most madrassas do not equip their students with skills that have any value in the labor market. Because they do not contribute to the intellectual human capital of a large number of Pakistan's youth and do not open economic opportunities for these youth, the reliance on the madrassa system to educate Pakistani children poses enormous challenges to Pakistan's economic, political, and social development. Moreover, this situation may itself contribute to a favorable environment for recruitment by radical or militant organizations.

During the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, there were two types of madrassas that participated in the U.S.- and Saudi-backed jihad. One group of madrassas had been specifically established to produce jihad literature, mobilize popular sentiment, and provide a platform from which to recruit and train mujahidin. An example of such madrassas is the Jama'at-i-Islami's Rabita madrassas. The JI has never been a madrassa-based party. The madrassas that it did establish are predominantly a product of the jihad in Afghanistan during the Soviet occupation.⁶⁸

The second group comprises various independent associations of madrassas, such as those affiliated with Jamiat-e-Ulema Islam. As an institution, JUI was politically opposed to Zia (who tended to prefer and patronize JI and its institutions) but was nonetheless a partner in the Afghan jihad. Interviews in Pakistan by the author reveal that JUI was hostile to Zia because it felt that it contributed more to the jihad in Afghanistan than JI, yet was denied the institutional support that JI received.⁶⁹

Not only did the institution of the madrassa change as a result of the events in Afghanistan and Iran, but the mix of students who joined the madrassas also changed. Madrassas with militant orientation attracted Afghan and Arab volunteers and proliferated to Karachi (where many Arabs had previously pursued their education before the Gulf oil boom) and later into the Punjab. Indeed, Muslim males from Central Asia, North Africa, and the Caucasus arrived to participate in the Afghan effort. Madrassas such as those of Haqqaniya at Akora Khattak particularly benefited from Middle Eastern funding because these madrassas had long-established ties with the University of Medina. Moreover, Saudi Arabia had a deep stake in promoting the jihad effort in Afghanistan.⁷⁰

The message that was disseminated at the various madrassas was originally intended to be anti-Communist. The intention was to encourage a supply of recruits to the Afghan conflict. Madrassas and makeshift schools were established within the proliferating refugee camps in Pakistan. Notably, it is these camps and schools that

⁶⁸ Malik (1998) and ICG Asia Report No. 36 (2002). See also Singer (2001).

⁶⁹ Interviews conducted in Lahore and Islamabad in December 2000 and in January 2002.

⁷⁰ ICG Asia Report No. 36 (2002); high-level diplomats at the Embassy of Pakistan in Washington, D.C. in April and July 2002.

became the cradle of the Taliban.⁷¹ International patrons (the United States, Saudi Arabia, and others) supplied the camps and affiliated schools with arms and textbooks.⁷²

At present, it is unknown how many madrassas exist. Despite episodic attempts to require registration of madrassas and efforts to provide incentives for them to register, it is believed that most have not. Official Pakistani data suggest that there were 3,906 madrassas in 1995 and 7,000 in 2000. Dr. Mahmood Ghazi, Pakistan's minister for religious affairs, has estimated that Pakistan currently has at least 10,000 madrassas, with as many as 1.7 million students attending classes at least intermittently.⁷³

Sectarian Violence: An Enduring Legacy. An important consequence of Zia's policies and the active intervention of other state actors has been the violent sectarian conflict between Sunni and Shi'a, which persists to date. Generally speaking, Sunni groups have been patronized in particular by Saudi Arabia and were popularized by the Afghanistan jihad, which drew recruits and funds. Pakistani Shi'ite groups have been supported by Tehran financially and ideologically inspired by Khomeini and the 1979 revolution. Iraq, too, vied for influence in Pakistan during the Iran-Iraq war as it sought to prop up Sunni groups to counter the growth of Iran-inspired Shi'a strength. Consequently, Pakistan became the venue for a proxy war between Iran and the Arab Gulf states. A testament to this ignominious legacy is that *all* the sectarian parties outlawed by Musharraf after September 11 (e.g., SSP, JM, LeJ, LeT, TNSM [Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi], and SM [Sipah-e-Mohammad]) either originated as militant madrassas *or* developed their own militant madrassas to support their efforts.⁷⁴

While this general description has some merit, much more is at play. Nasr observes that the rise of sectarianism within Pakistan suggests that “. . . states with limited capabilities are more prone to manipulating cleavages of identity.”⁷⁵ While the current sectarian quagmire can surely be traced back to the Iranian revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, at another level it can be attributed to the utter inability of the Pakistani state to control the political forces it unleashed (with the help of many other states) and ensure that these forces would not exert corrosive effects on Pakistan's domestic politics.⁷⁶

⁷¹ See Rashid (2000); and Matinuddin (1999).

⁷² Joe Stephens and David B. Ottaway, “The ABC's of Jihad in Afghanistan,” *The Washington Post*, March 23, 2002.

⁷³ ICG Asia Report No. 36 (2002); Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Finance, *Economic Survey 2001-02*, Malik (1996).

⁷⁴ ICG Asia Report No. 36 (2002).

⁷⁵ Nasr, *op. cit.*, 2000b, p. 174.

⁷⁶ Nasr, *op. cit.*, 2000a.

As noted, the Shi'a community in Pakistan, backed diplomatically and financially by Iran, organized in response to General Zia's Islamization regime. In turn, Zia's regime attempted to contain Shi'a assertiveness by promoting Sunni institutions, particularly the seminaries. Recall that these organizations were also financed by a number of other actors as well.⁷⁷ Consequently, the Pakistani military and the ISI financed and promoted Sunni seminaries in the Punjab as well as in the NWFP and Baluchistan. The latter two provinces were important because they border Iran. Thus Pakistan's efforts to build up Sunni religious institutions could be seen as building a barrier to block Iran. The ISI was also mobilized to restrict Shi'a activities in those areas where they were perceived to be most threatening (such as Gilgit in the Northern Area). For example, in 1988 the central government allowed violent mobs of Sunni activists to raid Gilgit, resulting in the murder of 150 Shi'ites and the destruction of their homes and shops. The government then built an imposing Sunni masjid (mosque) in the Shi'a majority area. The Zia government was not alone in its efforts to circumscribe Shi'a mobilization. Both Saudi Arabia and Iraq contributed to the effort to curb what was seen as Iran's regional influence.⁷⁸

Class, feudal structure, and urbanization have also had an important effect on sectarianism. (Zaman [1998] has even boldly claimed that sectarianism *is* an urban phenomenon.) For example, the Punjab underwent considerable urbanization in the 1970s and 1980s. This resulted from the population pressure and families who could not sustain themselves from their agricultural activities. Moreover, as a result of the Gulf oil boom and expatriate labor and corresponding remittances, families migrated to Punjab's urban centers and new conurbations developed on the edge of agricultural lands.⁷⁹

This process of urbanization transformed sectarian relations in part because it changed traditional patterns of authority. These urban settlements tended to be dominated by the Sunni middle class who, while tied tentatively to the agricultural economy, were not part of the rural feudal power structure. The emergent Sunni middle class sought to establish greater influence in local politics consonant with its demographic strength. This demand for political influence challenged the political control of the landed elite, who in many areas of the Punjab (e.g., Jhang, Kabirwala) were Shi'a landlords. Aspiring Sunni political entrepreneurs were able to mobilize growing sectarian trends to emphasize the Sunni identity of the middle class and weaken the power of the Shi'a landed elite. As a consequence, in urban areas such as Jhang, Shi'a landlords and the Sunni middle class have competed for the allegiance of Sunni peasants since the mid-1980s. Moreover, these same areas have also been the

⁷⁷ Malik, op. cit.; Nasr, 2000a.

⁷⁸ Nasr, op. cit., 2000a.

⁷⁹ Nasr, op. cit., 2000a; Zaman (1998).

loci of newly established militant seminaries, which have transformed these localities into sectarian battlefields.⁸⁰

Similar demographic shifts in Karachi have furthered sectarian identity. In recent years, Pathan migration to Karachi (mostly from the NWFP) has rendered Karachi a “Pathan” city. Given the ties of the Pathans to more orthodox and militant Sunni organizations, they have benefited tremendously from Pakistan’s various Afghan policies. The ascendancy of the Pathans in Karachi, a city claimed by the Mohajirs, brought these two groups into conflict. Since this conflict began in the mid-1980s, Pathan interests have been served by the rise in sectarianism and the financial networks that have been developed to support sectarianism. The Pathans made the Mohajir-Pathan conflict a sectarian issue because the Mohajir leadership (whose major party is the Mohajir Quami Movement) is Shi’ite. As Nasr writes, “By redefining the axis of conflict in Karachi as sectarian, rather than ethnic, Pathans hope to reduce resistance to their growing political and economic presence.”⁸¹

The Ascendancy of the Pakistan Army and the ISI

During this period, the Pakistani military expanded its influence. Zia was able to cement a robust military relationship with the United States, which lasted until 1989 when the Soviets departed Afghanistan. During this time, the United States downplayed evidence of Pakistan’s progress on its nuclear program (which would have triggered the Pressler Amendment sanctions).⁸² As a consequence, the Pakistani military became a critical instrument of state power—in both foreign and domestic policy. Moreover, the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate developed into an effective intelligence agency with the ability to project power into Afghanistan and beyond.⁸³ The ISI was the primary conduit through which American and Arab monies were funneled into the Afghan war effort and was largely responsible for training the militants at a variety of camps in Afghanistan and Pakistan’s tribal area.⁸⁴

Although the ISI became an important tool of foreign policy, it also became an important source of influence on the political process domestically—a role that it still plays. The military, particularly during the Zia period, also cultivated Military Intelligence (MI) and the Intelligence Bureau (IB) for variety of domestic manipulations. While the ISI is semimilitary, owing to the fact that officers rotate in and out of the ISI on two- to three-year terms, the MI is a completely military institution and IB is

⁸⁰ Nasr, *op. cit.*, 2000a; Zaman (1998).

⁸¹ Nasr, *op. cit.*, 2000a; pp. 183–184.

⁸² See Kux (2001); Rizvi, *op. cit.*; Congressional Research Service, Pakistan-US Relations, Issue Brief for Congress, Updated April 4, 2003, at <http://www.fas.org/man/crs/IB94041.pdf>.

⁸³ Rizvi, *op. cit.*

⁸⁴ Malik, *op. cit.*, and ICG Asia Report No. 36 (2002). See also Singer (2001).

an entirely civilian organization. During the Zia years, the MI became involved in domestic political activity and took on roles that would otherwise have been delegated to the ISI. In one sense, the MI was used to countercheck the findings and activities of the ISI and other agencies.⁸⁵

However, after 1989, the ISI and the MI became more active within Pakistani domestic politics. They have been active in behind-the-scenes manipulations of political grouping as well as managing electoral turnouts. Information collected by the various intelligence agencies has been used by the chief of army staff to “. . . take up internal and external security issues in Troika meetings and in his individual meetings with the President and the Prime Minister.”⁸⁶ The president has also used their intelligence to arrange for government dismissals. The MI, for example, was used to arrange for the dismissal of two governments (in August 1990 and November 1996). Not only has intelligence gathering become a tool at the highest echelons of leadership (military and civilian), but it has also become an important activity to inform the efforts of senior commanders “. . . pursuing behind-the-scenes political intervention.”⁸⁷

When the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, the United States departed Pakistan rather unceremoniously. As Pakistan's strategic importance diminished, the United States chose to focus more closely on evidence that Pakistan had crossed the nuclear threshold. In 1989, then-President Bush declared that he could no longer certify that Pakistan had not developed nuclear capabilities, which precipitated a slew of sanctions under the Pressler Amendment. The effect was far-reaching. All military ties with Islamabad, including IMET, were cut. Most damaging was the refusal to deliver several F-16s for which Pakistan had already paid in full. Because Pakistan relied heavily on U.S. weapon systems, the inability to obtain spare parts to maintain these systems posed a number of conventional security concerns for Pakistan that were only exacerbated after the round of nuclear tests conducted by India and followed by Pakistan in May of 1998.⁸⁸

The departure of the Cold War from Pakistan's doorstep also afforded Pakistan newfound opportunity on its eastern front. In December 1989, the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Force (JKLF), a proindependence group, launched an armed campaign against Indian rule in Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistan by this time had acquired several new and improved assets in its pursuit of Kashmir. With the departure of the Soviets, Pakistan had a surplus of trained and battle-hardened militants to deploy to the Kashmir theater. Moreover, in the course of the Soviet engagement the ISI had

⁸⁵ Rizvi, *op. cit.*

⁸⁶ Rizvi, *op. cit.*, p. 101.

⁸⁷ Rizvi, *op. cit.*, p. 101.

⁸⁸ Congressional Research Service (2003); Kux (2001).

developed into a robust and effective external intelligence agency with deep links to the religious right—the madrassas as well as the militant organizations. As Pakistan began injecting these elements into the Kashmir insurgency, the JKLF became quickly marginalized by pro-Pakistan groups like the ISI-backed Hizbul Mujahadeen (HM). By the mid-1990s, other groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba and the Harkat-ul-Ansar (HuA) had entered the fray. Over the course of the 1990s the militancy in Kashmir was fundamentally transformed as these Pakistani and Afghani “guest militants” took over the conduct of operations.⁸⁹

September 11 and the War in Iraq

Within Pakistan, the war in Iraq is generally seen as a progression or an extension of U.S. policy since September 11. Therefore this section treats September 11, Operation Enduring Freedom, the U.S. presence in Pakistan since September 11, and the war in Iraq as a cluster of events that have generally compounded each other’s effects on Pakistan’s domestic politics and on the recent development of political Islam in Pakistan.

Political Context

While these events have had a profound influence on Pakistan’s domestic politics and on the growing trend of anti-Americanism across broad swaths of public opinion, it is necessary to place them in the context of that which happened well before September 11. On the tail of Pakistan’s disastrous misadventure in the Kargil crisis of spring 1999 (a shallow, limited-aims Pakistani incursion into Indian-administered Kashmir followed by a bloody artillery duel between the Indian and Pakistan armies that included the use of Indian air power), then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif attempted to dispose of the chief of army staff, General Pervez Musharraf. Nawaz Sharif had ordered that landing be denied to the civilian aircraft transporting Musharraf from meetings in Sri Lanka, which was tantamount to death to all passengers on the aircraft because of perilously low fuel levels. The army stepped in to protect its chief, and Pakistan entered yet another phase of military rule.

Well before the tragic events of September 11, 2001, Musharraf tried to eviscerate the political support base of the two mainstream political parties, the PML-N and the PPP. This was accomplished by jailing political figures, banning public rallies, and mobilizing the military to take over a vast array of public and private institutions. Thus, by the time of the terrorist strikes of 2001, a dangerous political vacuum

⁸⁹ See, for instance, Alexander Evans, “The Kashmir Insurgency: As Bad as It Gets,” *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, Vol. 11, No. 1, Spring 2000; Shofield (1996); Wirsing (1998); Ganguly (1997); Puri (1993); Bose (1997).

had already been established in Pakistan through the forcible silencing of the two moderate mainstream parties.⁹⁰

One of the tools mobilized by Musharraf to marginalize the PPP and the PML-N was the National Accountability Bureau (NAB). Although NAB purports to counter greed and corruption within Pakistan's political leadership and governmental institutions, in practice it has been a tool of intimidation and extortion to produce political compliance. NAB has been used to “. . . settle political scores and win defectors from the ranks of the PPP and the PML-N. The goal is to win the regime more maneuvering room and a playing field tilted in its favor well in advance of the parliamentary balloting set for October 2002.”⁹¹ Presciently, during an interview in December 2000 with this author, a prominent newspaper editor warned that, although the Islamist parties had never done well historically, they were well situated to take advantage of the power vacuum that had been created by Musharraf. Indeed, this is exactly what happened. However, the process was hastened and catalyzed by the events of September 11 and subsequent policy measures pursued by the United States in Pakistan and the region.

Operation Enduring Freedom and its Sequelae

While Musharraf has been widely and publicly praised by the United States for his U-turn in Afghanistan, it is clear that he had little choice. U.S. government officials interviewed by the author claim that Musharraf was forced to either abandon the Taliban or be prepared to be treated like the Taliban. The protests that ensued after Musharraf's historic decision were smaller than predicted by Pakistan watchers.

This is in part because Pakistan watchers were so focused on the street power of the Islamists that they did not pay adequate attention to the wide popular support within Pakistan for a change in Afghan policy. Many interlocutors claim that Islamabad was growing exhausted with Taliban recalcitrance, which included harboring perpetrators of sectarian violence and criminals fleeing Pakistan. Despite Pakistan's numerous requests to extradite such individuals, the Taliban refused. Pakistanis had also grown weary of the extensive Afghan refugee presence in Pakistan and were anxious to see them returned to Afghanistan. Moreover, Pakistanis had become increasingly alarmed about the drug problem that had developed as well as the “Kalashnikov culture” that had been nurtured by the Taliban-Afghanistan-Kashmir nexus. Thus initially, according to numerous persons interviewed in Pakistan, there was great hope that Musharraf could leverage the tragic events of September 11 to

⁹⁰ Shah (2002).

⁹¹ Shah (2002), p. 72.

enact a serious cleanup of Pakistan's domestic situation including madrasa reform, which had repeatedly failed.⁹²

Even though polls conducted in 2001 demonstrate widespread support for curbing militancy, banning militant groups, and reforming madrassas, anti-American sentiment was growing and deepening at the same time.⁹³ In fact, as Operation Enduring Freedom was being executed, many Pakistanis began to resent the presence of Americans in the region and in Pakistan in particular. The effect of Operation Enduring Freedom was most strongly experienced in Baluchistan and in NWFP, whose populations share family, linguistic, tribal, social, and cultural ties with those across the border. Similarly, debates over hot pursuit and joint FBI–Pakistani security forces raids stung most deeply in these areas. Moreover, the *carte blanche* granting of air access, logistical support, and access to several air bases fueled concerns about the integrity of Pakistan's sovereignty.⁹⁴

Curiously, even though Musharraf's policy of cleaning up Pakistan's domestic situation was initially supported, there was growing concern across broad swaths of Pakistan's polity that Musharraf was responding too quickly to the demands of the United States. Thus, even while the Pakistani public by all accounts still supports abandoning the reckless pursuit of militarism in favor of political, social, and economic reform, the view still persists that Pakistan has forgone its sovereignty.⁹⁵

Pakistanis also fear the degradation of their sovereignty from within. They have become increasingly disenchanted with Musharraf. He has failed to deliver a penitent India or to persuade the United States to weigh in on the Kashmir dispute (something that most Pakistanis believe was implicit in the decision to join the coalition in the war on terror). Many Pakistanis also feel that the United States has not fully delivered on its promises (despite evidence to the contrary). Cynicism surrounding Musharraf deepened in the aftermath of the October 2002 elections, which installed his "king's party" with a narrow margin of victory and extended his term by another five years. However, as we discuss below, the election also demonstrated an impressive showing by the coalition of Islamist parties.⁹⁶

U.S. support of Musharraf and the Pakistani armed forces has had an adverse effect on Pakistani perceptions of the United States. First, a common concern is that U.S. policy is centered on Musharraf rather than Pakistan. As a consequence, many Pakistani elites have observed that the institution that benefits most from the current

⁹² See for example, Fair and Vaidyanathan (2003). This view was commonly expressed during interviews in Pakistan in January 2003 and during a number of meetings held with high-level Pakistani diplomats during the course of 2001 and 2002.

⁹³ Poll data provided in personal communication from the United States Department of State (2003).

⁹⁴ This issue has been covered extensively in Fair (2003a, 2003b).

⁹⁵ This was the broad view obtained from interlocutors interviewed in Pakistan during January 2003.

⁹⁶ Interviews in Pakistan, January 2003.

engagement is the military—not Pakistan and its civil institutions. Second, most interlocutors interviewed see U.S. support for Musharraf as a repeat of the U.S. position during Zia’s tenure. That is, democracy per se is disposable and dependent upon the vicissitudes of the perceived security requirements of the United States. Third, Pakistani interlocutors stress that the United States must engage more than the military if Pakistan is to be effectively rehabilitated.

The public disaffection with Musharraf and the rising anti-American sentiment have been aggravated by various aspects of Operation Enduring Freedom, such as FBI activities within Pakistan and the ongoing debate over “hot pursuit.” Another concern stressed to the author by a variety of Pakistani interlocutors is that there is deep dissatisfaction with the current government in Afghanistan. Many interlocutors are concerned about the inappropriately low representation of Pashtuns in the Afghanistani government. Such observers caution that it was dissatisfaction with the regime in Kabul that prompted Pakistan’s involvement in Afghanistan and note that, in the long term, Pakistan needs a government in Kabul that it can live with. Pakistanis are disappointed that the United States has not appeared to provide Pashtuns adequate political voice and express further concern that the current regime in Kabul favors those who have sought to marginalize Pashtun aspirations (through politics and/or violence).

The trends toward anti-Musharraf sentiment and anti-Americanism have been exacerbated by other recent events, such as the war in Iraq and the requirement that Pakistanis in the United States register with the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). Pakistanis object to being labeled a “terrorist threat” after contributing so much to the war on terrorism. Some of the initial domestic repercussions over Iraq were likely attenuated by the U.S. and British decision not to pursue a second resolution in the U.N. Security Council. Had the United States pushed this issue, Pakistan would have been in the awkward position of having to cast a vote. As the issue became increasingly moot, Musharraf felt increasingly able to state his opposition to the conflict. This probably reflects the thin line that Musharraf has had to tread between his domestic political demands for sovereignty and strategic independence from Washington and the reality that he needs Washington for financial and economic reasons.

As the U.S. efforts in Iraq extend beyond toppling the Saddam regime, Pakistanis increasingly consider the occupation unjust. These sentiments have intensified and hardened in the wake of the abuse perpetrated by U.S. soldiers against Iraqi detainees in the Abu Ghraib prison. Individuals at the Pakistan embassy in Washington, D.C., have expressed concern that these revelations further compromise Musharraf’s position within Pakistan, given the perception that he is marching in step to Washington’s drumbeat.

Musharraf’s earlier statements that he would consider sending Pakistani troops to Iraq under the auspices of the United Nations and would consider normalizing

relations with Israel were not received well. Further, these and other actions undertaken or proposed by Musharraf occasioned a call to Pakistanis by Ayman al-Zawahri to overthrow Musharraf.⁹⁷ According to a *Herald-Gallup* poll whose results were published in August 2003, the vast majority of respondents indicated that they feel “pain” (47 percent) and “anger” (38 percent) about the war in Iraq. Moreover, when asked how they would describe their reaction to U.S. strikes on Iraq, 69 percent said that they would “hurt America where possible,” compared to 39 percent who said that they would engage in “quiet protest.” Only 4 percent said that they would remain inactive. No respondent indicated support for the United States. Similarly, the respondents showed a high level of support for Saddam Hussein, with 85 percent indicating that he should continue the fight. Only 11 percent indicated that he should concede defeat. This support for Saddam is striking given that Saddam never supported Pakistan on key international issues such as Kashmir and has always been more closely aligned with India.⁹⁸

Given the intense disgruntlement over U.S. operations in Iraq, protests surrounding the war in Iraq, with few notable exceptions, were not as large as had been expected. Arguably, one of the strongest reasons why Iraq has not provoked more anti-U.S. sentiment in Pakistan is that in one sense anti-U.S. sentiment is already saturated. According to a national survey executed by the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press in 1999–2000, 23 percent of Pakistani respondents had a favorable view of the United States. In 2002, that figure had slipped to 10 percent.⁹⁹

The Rise of the MMA

Most Pakistan observers have expressed considerable concern over the showing of the alliance of religious parties, the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), in the October 2002 elections. In fact, the MMA took the provincial assembly of the NWFP and is sharing power with the PML-Q in Baluchistan. It also is essentially the voice of the opposition within the general assembly. Many have speculated that its performance bodes ill for Pakistan’s social, political, and economic development. While many are quick to point out that that its showing was “unprecedented,” others have pointed out that under Zia they also scored seats in the double digits. However, the religious parties have not fared as well since Zia’s tenure.

In the months after their sweep, some suggested that the MMA differs from previous Islamist coalitions because the MMA may enjoy greater independence than its predecessors from the army and the ruling regime. In the years that have elapsed,

⁹⁷ See “New ‘al-Qaeda tape’ aired,” BBC News World Edition, September 28, 2003. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3147338.stm, last accessed May 16, 2004.

⁹⁸ “America Vs. the World,” *The Herald*, April 2003, pp. 36–41.

⁹⁹ The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, “What the World Thinks in 2002,” 2002, available at <http://people-press.org/reports/pdf/165.pdf>.

this view has been heard less often, as many in the MMA have come to believe that they are Musharraf's "B Team" and are subject to his manipulation. There are valid reasons for this belief.

What is perhaps novel about the MMA is that it comprises six parties, most of which in the past have been unable to overcome their various antagonisms to sustain an effective coalition:

- Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam Fezalur Rehman Faction (JUI-F)
- Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI): Sami Ul Haq Faction
- Jamaat-i-Islami (JI): headed by Qazi Hussain Ahmed; a tightly knit community mostly made up of urban and educated professionals
- Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan (JUP): headed by Shah Ahmed Noorani
- Jamiat Ahle Hadith (JAH): headed by Sajid Mir; a political organ of the numerically weak Wahhabi-influenced sect. JAH pursues a notion of shari'a modeled on the Saudi shari'a system
- Islami Tehreek Pakistan, (ITP): a Shi'a organization led by Syed Sajjad Naqvi.¹⁰⁰

All these parties, except for JI, have deep networks among their ulema. Their leadership as well as their group membership consists either of religious scholars or men who have received religious training in the specific tradition espoused by the group. The joint membership of hard-line Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadith groups with Shi'a ITP is surprising given that hard-line Sunni groups hold Shi'a to be infidels. SSP, which has been supported by the JUI, has even demanded an amendment to this effect.¹⁰¹

The diverse composition of the MMA poses a number of unique constraints and, oddly, opportunities. First, they are most cohesive at the center—at the leadership level. The individual parties tend to pursue their own interests within their own strongholds.¹⁰² This does *not* mean that the MMA is not a robust coalition. The MMA has shown considerable tenacity in maintaining this improbable alliance. However, this cohesion probably draws from the deep anti-American sentiment and vexation with Musharraf's inability to assert his independence from Washington and to stand up to New Delhi. Moreover, the MMA also derives much of its staying party because the two largest parties, the JUI(F) and the JI, have made a political truce to share positions and power. Should this axis crumble, the life expectancy of

¹⁰⁰ See ICG, "Pakistan: The Mullahs and the Military," Asia Report No. 49, March 20, 2003.

¹⁰¹ Stern (2000).

¹⁰² ICG Asia Report No. 49 (2002).

the MMA is questionable. But for now, both groups see the advantage of downplaying past antagonism as the cost of enhancing political clout.

Second, although the MMA espouses a desire to “Islamize” Pakistan and enforce shari’a, there is considerable disagreement as to what form of shari’a will be enforced. While many would agree on an implementation of shari’a in principle, in practice the notion has been riddled by sectarian interpretations. As one observer has written, “Official adherence to vague notions of a religious system has led to unresolved ‘political, cultural and ideological confusion.’” The writer further notes that the ulema in Pakistan even haggle over basic issues such as who is a Muslim.¹⁰³

In the months following the elections, some writers suggested that the MMA’s electoral showing could produce a number of short-term advantages. They suggested that the MMA’s diverse sectarian representation may mitigate Shi’a-Sunni violence. Had this turned out to be a valid assessment, it would have had a salubrious effect upon restoring sanity to Pakistan’s commercial hub, Karachi, which has been crippled by the violence. Unfortunately, the predicted mitigation of sectarian violence never materialized. In fact, May 2004 was the bloodiest month for Karachi since Musharraf seized power in 1999. Some analysts also argued that as the Islamic parties become vested in the current political status quo, they act like any other assembly of rational political entrepreneurs. Third, many pointed out that the regime would limit their activities because of both domestic and international compulsions. For instance, had the MMA pursued policies in NWFP that were excessively unpalatable to the national government, the provincial assembly could have been dismissed. Some even thought it was possible that as Islamic parties become politically vested, they would exert whatever influence they have over associated militant groups. Thus, some suggested that in the short-term the threat to Musharraf might diminish.¹⁰⁴

Of course, in retrospect, very little of this “silver lining” has materialized. The past year has seen a number of deeply disturbing acts—mass murder of Shi’a worshipers as well as attacks on Christians. Irrespective of the MMA’s political vestedness, Musharraf has experienced several attempts on his life. The MMA has become an effective opposition to Musharraf on constitutional issues and is insisting that he step down as chief of army staff if he wishes to remain president. Increasingly, however, people in Pakistan believe that the fight between Musharraf and the Islamists is “fixed.” Our analysis concurs that this cynicism is warranted because Musharraf could let the PML-N and PPP regain their political standing and eviscerate the MMA. However, the longer the mainline political parties are left to languish, the more MMA will continue to develop into a credible voice of the polity’s aspirations and sentiments. This outcome would not be desirable because such a popular man-

¹⁰³ Mehdi (1994); cited by the ICG Asia Report No. 49 (2002).

¹⁰⁴ For a review of the various positions articulated about the MMA’s winnings, see Farooq Tanwir, “Religious Parties and Politics in Pakistan.”

date could enable the MMA to win irrevocable concessions on its Islamization agenda.

To understand the success of the MMA in October 2002, one needs to understand its organizational origins and the various sources of its legitimacy. According to interviews with JI conducted in January 2003 in Lahore, the MMA's roots are in the Pakistan-Afghan Defense Council (PADC), which was established in October 2001. The PADC was a larger aggregation of parties (perhaps as many as 26 religious parties and several smaller groups that spanned the sectarian spectrum). The immediate objective of the PADC was the mounting of opposition to the U.S.-led Operation Enduring Freedom and Pakistan's partnership in that effort. The salience of the PADC seemed to diminish after the Taliban fell. However, the PADC provided the platform for the six remaining parties to maneuver and form the MMA in preparation for the October 2002 elections.

It is notable that the MMA concentrated its efforts where it had the most influence: those areas most affected by Operation Enduring Freedom and related U.S. policies. Consequently, it exerted much effort in NWFP and Baluchistan, which border on Afghanistan. It also fielded candidates in urban areas in Punjab and Sindh. It made serious efforts to field candidates in the rural areas of these provinces because it was unlikely to move support away from the PML-N in Punjab and the PPP in Sindh. A broad range of interlocutors, including the governor of NWFP, expressed the view that the MMA did so well in these areas because it was able to mobilize growing anti-American sentiment.

The MMA has been the direct beneficiary of anti-Americanism in part because since October 2001 it has been the most vocal champions of so-called sovereignty issues. But one must keep in mind that the MMA has filled the political vacuum created by Musharraf. While many speculate whether the MMA has enjoyed this benefit by accident or fiat, there is no mistake that it has capitalized on a number of initiatives promulgated by Musharraf. For example, although most political discourse was silenced, religious parties always had access to Friday sermons delivered at mosques. Second, Musharraf made a bachelor's degree a requirement for candidates to run in elections. As the madrasa degrees were recognized as B.A. equivalents, the MMA had an easier time fielding candidates. Third, the NAB was effectively used to coerce and intimidate PPP and PML-N candidates, thus removing or co-opting mainstream candidates. Fourth, Musharraf lowered the voting age and expanded access to voting stations. This enabled the MMA to mobilize madrasa youth as a voting bloc. Fifth, the central government let the MMA use as its electoral symbol "the Book," which would be universally equated with the Quran. (In Pakistan, owing to illiteracy, election ballots feature the symbol of the party in question.) Finally, Musharraf's mobilization of the ISI and other military intelligence sources to manipulate electoral results and to ensure that the PPP and PML-N would fare poorly benefited the MMA.

Most believe that Musharraf's regime was so intent on discrediting the PML-N and PPP that it did not accurately gauge the electoral potential of the MMA.¹⁰⁵

Another important feature of the MMA has been its vocal position on, oddly enough, constitutional issues. The MMA has adamantly insisted on the restoration of the 1973 constitution. Indeed, its opposition to Musharraf and some of his policies has been framed in constitutional terms. For example, the MMA disagreed with the banning of Islamic militant groups because it argued that the procedure used to do so was illegal. The MMA couches its opposition to Musharraf within the precepts of the 1973 constitution, according to which the president cannot concurrently hold a government position for which he is compensated. Thus, the MMA maintains that if Musharraf wishes to remain president, he must step down as chief of the army staff. Thus, as one scotch-loving atheist remarked to the author in Islamabad in January 2003, "Whenever the MMA opens its mouth, it makes sense."

Future Directions of Political Islam in Pakistan: Possible Scenarios

It is far too early to divine the direction that Pakistan will take with respect to further political institutionalization of Islamic principles—however they are defined. So far, the MMA has derived its legitimacy by promoting sovereignty and constitutional issues. With respect to its religious agenda, it has mostly made absurd or cosmetic changes in the NWFP. For example, it has outlawed gambling and alcohol saloons—which have long been outlawed since the days of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. They have also removed CDs, videos, and audio materials they consider "bawdy" as well as the colorful, if not racy, Pashto movie ads from the urban billboards. They have also argued for separate transportation facilities for men and women. They have been much slower to act on more controversial issues such as coeducation.

The future of the MMA is far from certain. To be reelected, they will have to provide for their constituencies. This may be easier said than done. Second, as noted, they have an incentive not to be too aggressive in their religious agenda to retain their piece of the power. Moreover, the Musharraf regime has shown that it does have tools at its disposal to limit the MMA without allowing the PPP and the PML-N back into politics. For instance, it has used the judiciary to strip an MMA parliamentarian of his national assembly seat through an interpretation of his educational qualifications. Certainly, many other obstreperous parliamentarians could be similarly dispatched if Musharraf so desired.

However, concern is still warranted. The history of Pakistan shows us that once religious parties gain concessions, it is impossible to take them back. It has been impossible to repeal or amend the much-loathed Hudud Ordinance, the blasphemy

¹⁰⁵ See Fair and Vaidyanathan (2003). Also see ICG Asia Report No. 49 (2002).

law, or the ban on alcohol. Moreover, it has been impossible to rein in the militant groups claiming to operate in Kashmir. In fact, many Pakistani officials lament the fact that they are helpless to act against organizations that are clearly criminal or sectarian *if* they claim to be operating in Kashmir. Thus, any gains that the MMA or its constituents make are likely to be permanent.

The religious parties have always been expediently allied with the military. Even though the military has largely been a secular institution (this army, in particular, is perhaps the most secular army since Zia's tenure), their interests have generally overlapped in the past. While religious leaders interviewed by the author in January 2003 indicate their vexation with the center and its policy of placing restrictions on militant groups, it remains to be seen how the relationship with the military will shape up in the future.

The Kashmir problem is not likely to be resolved any time soon— notwithstanding this most recent round of talks in spring 2004.¹⁰⁶ Exacerbating Pakistan's anxiety over Kashmir is the fear that as India continues its ascendant path, the Kashmir situation is not likely to be resolved with any acknowledgment of Islamabad's ostensible equities. Pakistan's desperation to retain salience in the Kashmir dispute has over the years compelled Islamabad to take increasingly ill-calculated risks. The MMA and its constituent parties will have influence over groups acting in Kashmir. This necessitates a working relationship with the army and the ISI in particular. Therefore, even though the ISI may have been mobilized to minimize electoral gains of the MMA (and it is not clear that this was the case) and thus has caused short-term tension between the intelligence agency and the religious groups, the tension is likely to be temporary. Moreover, should Afghanistan prove in the long term to be a poor neighbor for Islamabad, the old military-mullah alliance may be renewed in that theater as well.

Conclusions: Implications for the United States

As this chapter shows, the United States—far from being unable to influence events on the subcontinent—has shown a significant capacity to impact domestic developments, for better or worse. This section draws on the previous U.S. engagements in the region and the various opinions offered during numerous high-level interviews in Pakistan to suggest implications for U.S. policy.

¹⁰⁶ For a critical assessment of what may be expected from this round of Indo-Pakistan dialogue, see *India and Pakistan: Is Peace Real This Time? A Conversation Between Hussain Haqqani and Ashley J. Tellis*, Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2004.

Identifying and Evaluating Tradeoffs

First, there are tradeoffs to be made between investing in the Pakistani armed forces and in other parts of the Pakistani state and society. Pakistani elites have expressed concern that investment in the military bolsters the army and strengthens Musharraf's hand. Musharraf-centric policies do little to create a viable political space wherein Pakistanis can pursue their political aspirations. Thus, there is a clear need to make investment in Pakistan—not simply in Musharraf or the army—a priority.¹⁰⁷

This involves continuing and expanding the investments that the United States is making in education and economic and political reform. In fact, investment needs to be made across all dimensions of Pakistan's human capital infrastructure, including health and human services. The United States has devoted relatively few resources to electoral reform; this should be expanded. Elections must be institutionalized in Pakistan if robust democratic culture is to take root and flourish. Moreover, the United States has made law enforcement and counterterrorism a priority. The internal security apparatus would be bolstered if Pakistan can counter the terrorist threat to its own interests as well as the threat to international security. While the United States and Pakistan have twice convened the Law Enforcement and Counter Terrorism Working Group, the financing for these programs is insufficient. Of greater concern than the actual amount of aid given is accountability. So far, there have been few if any efforts to ensure that aid given has been used appropriately or even that the aid itself (e.g., technology transfer) has been appropriate.¹⁰⁸

Pakistani interlocutors have identified mosque and madrasa reform specifically. (Analysts such as Singer and Looney have offered similar suggestions.) These observers note that while not all villages have a school, all have a mosque. Therefore, much of the madrasa structure can be improved by ensuring quality teachers, acceptable curriculum, and funding. However, this utilization of the madrassas should only be considered a short-term expedient. In the long run, Pakistan's public schools must be revamped to provide its youth with the human capital endowments needed for the future economy that Pakistan hopes to develop.

One of the problems with madrassas as well as mosques seems to turn on the mullahs (or *maulvis*) in charge of the institution. In Pakistan, maulvis generally depend on the landlord (*chowdhury*) and therefore little status is associated with the position. Pakistani interlocutors have complained that in most cases, the maulvis have no association with the mosque they lead. The maulvis are “foreigners,” and therefore

¹⁰⁷ For similar views about U.S. investment priorities in Pakistan, see Teresita C. Schaffer, *Pakistan's Future and U.S. Policy Options*, Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 2004. See also Marshall Bouton, Mahnaz Ispahani, Dennis Kux, Nicholas Platt, and Frank G. Wisner, Jr., *New Priorities in South Asia: U.S. Policy Towards India, Pakistan and Afghanistan*, Independent Task Force Report—Council on Foreign Relations, October 2003.

¹⁰⁸ See C. Christine Fair and Peter Chalk, “Pakistan's Internal Security: Key to U.S. Success in Global War on Terrorism,” *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs*, Summer/Winter 2004.

are not accountable to the community served by that mosque. Moreover, the maulvis tend to be illiterate, espouse versions of Islam that do not resonate with the residents, and pursue policies that are alienating. In some cases, the maulvis are even criminals seeking refuge in their positions.

Observers of this problem have provocatively suggested that the maulvis as a class should be professionalized. Rather than depending on the chowdhury, they should receive a respectable stipend from the state. Moreover, maulvis should come from the community in which they work to ensure that they share the ethnic, linguistic, tribal, and cultural values of their congregants. One observer even went so far as to say that maulvis should be elected to ensure their accountability. Professionalization would also affect the madrassa system because the schools are typically connected to a mosque. If an illiterate (possibly criminal) maulvi with extreme views runs the mosque, he will also be in charge of overseeing educational functions. Interlocutors suggest that this area is critical to reforming the educational structure.

While there is no doubt that investing in civilian institutions is necessary both to ensure a normalized relationship with the Pakistani populace and a resuscitation of the state of Pakistan, there needs to be some recognition of the impact of U.S. policies on the United States' relationship with Pakistan and Pakistanis. For example, the INS registration policy and the Abu Ghairb prison abuse scandal will likely have long-term repercussions. Similarly, according to a number of informants both at the Pakistani embassy in the United States and within Pakistan, the United States is no longer seen as a desirable place to work or to pursue an education. Not only does this pose economic opportunity costs to the United States, it also threatens over time to diminish elite contacts.

The Military Will Continue to Dominate Policy in Pakistan

Although these considerations are surely important, one cannot lose track of the fact that the military will control the state in the policy-relevant future. Therefore, military engagement is particularly important. The Pressler Amendment and its sequelae (such as the cutoff of IMET) precipitated a serious disconnect between the U.S. and Pakistani militaries. A generation of Pakistani military officers advanced to senior positions without contacts with the United States. As a consequence, these officers are more insular. Moreover, these officers and soldiers labored with U.S. weapons systems that were unusable because of the inability to obtain spare parts. This further exacerbated their security concerns vis-à-vis India. As a consequence of the estrangement between U.S. and Pakistani armed forces, many in Pakistan have argued that the current army, though the most secular, is also the most anti-American.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁹ See Fair and Chalk, *op. cit.*

Programs such as IMET not only ensure that the United States has good bilateral access to the countries' training through IMET and similar programs—but they also enable officers of other countries to interact. Lieutenant General Mahmud Ali Durrani (retired) has argued that one of the most valuable experiences he had as an IMET student was interacting with his Indian counterpart. Durrani considered this formative experience to be the motivation for his subsequent extensive dedication to track-two efforts to bring about a normalization of relations with New Delhi.¹¹⁰

Operation Enduring Freedom demonstrated that Pakistan has many resources that are useful to the U.S. military and to the U.S. Air Force in particular. Pakistani pilots speak English and have (for better or for worse) relied on U.S. weapon systems. The Pakistani air force provided excellent logistical and basing support. The Pakistani navy also provided basing access and support. In addition to these resources, Pakistan has what is likely to be the best source of human intelligence on a number of terrorist threats operating in the region (in part because the Pakistanis nurtured these threats). Pakistani security personnel have also proven to be effective in neutralizing Taliban and Al Qaeda fugitives. However, they could probably be much more effective if given proper incentives.

Kashmir Is the Key to Stability

It should also be noted that the Indo-Pakistan conflict has taken on dimensions that implicitly assume the intervention of the United States. Since the United States was able to compel then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to “respect the sanctity of the Line of Control” during the Kargil Crisis, India has come to see the value of the United States in restraining its archenemy.¹¹¹ In the military buildup of December 2001 that stretched through May 2002, both India and Pakistan assumed that, should hostilities emerge, the United States would step in immediately to end them. New Delhi implicitly made this assumption when flirting with its doctrine of limited war. Pakistan for its part assumed that India would not invade Pakistan with U.S. assets sitting at major Pakistani airfields. Both states believe that the United States would quickly act to limit conflict to prevent nuclear escalation.

The Indo-Pakistan security calculus, the United States, and the course of political Islam are inherently related. The religious parties in Pakistan derive much of their legitimacy from the Kashmir issue. Moreover, militant organizations operating in Kashmir have openly expressed the view that they will no longer restrict their activities to Indian-held Kashmir (note the December 2000 attack on the Red Fort in New Delhi and the December 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament). Should India continue to pursue a resolution of the Kashmir conflict without acknowledging Paki-

¹¹⁰ Duranni (2001).

¹¹¹ See Tellis, Fair, and Medby (2001).

stani equities, these groups will be motivated to perpetrate more daring and bloody acts of violence. India for its part is pursuing a limited war doctrine to free it from the strategic paralysis resulting from Pakistan's nuclear assets and delivery means. Moreover, India faces increasing domestic pressure to wage a war for peace. Should another outrageous attack such as that perpetrated against the Indian Parliament take place successfully, India is very likely to act beyond the scope of mere "coercive diplomacy."

As long as the Kashmir dispute remains unresolved to the satisfaction of India, Pakistan, and the various Kashmiri constituencies, and as long as militant production and training infrastructure persist in Pakistan, security on the subcontinent will be a distant dream. Analysts should recall that only a few years ago, Afghanistan watchers were ambivalent about the threat posed by Al Qaeda and its Taliban hosts. In a similar vein, one should recall that once a militant is trained, it makes little difference whether his training was intended for Kashmir. With the right training and logistics, the same militant can operate virtually anywhere. Therefore, it is not only in the interest of Pakistanis to resolve this issue and to rehabilitate Pakistan—it is in the interest of all.

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Islam in India

Rollie Lal

India is home to the second largest Muslim population in the world. Muslims constitute the largest minority in India, comprising 12 percent of the population, or 140 million. Of this group, approximately 20–30 million are Shi'a, but the overwhelming majority are Sunni. Kashmir is the only state where Muslims form a majority. The conflict in Kashmir has been the focus of considerable media attention and analysis, and thus observers often assume that Kashmir is the primary issue of interest regarding Indian Muslims. However, Kashmir has a population of approximately eight million and is only part of a vast and diverse Indian Muslim community that extends across all the states of India. This chapter addresses the Indian Muslim population as a whole and looks at Kashmir in that context.

Both Sunni and Shi'a communities exist throughout India, and each community has a unique history based on how it was converted to Islam. Indian Muslims have played an important role in shaping Indian culture, music, architecture, poetry, and literature. They have also held prominent scientific, governmental, and cultural positions throughout Indian history. They have been chief justices, vice presidents, and presidents of the Republic of India.¹ Indian Muslim organizations favor both the democratic Indian political system and Indian foreign policy in general. Islamic groups in India have been proponents of a secular state, have not been historically identified with larger international Islamic movements, and have been remarkably apolitical. In most Muslim countries, the primary political debate regarding the role of Islam in social and political life has revolved around whether shari'a should be in the constitution or whether it should be the basis for legal interpretation. In India, however, the debate has focused on whether shari'a should be the civil code for Muslims, or if there should be a uniform civil code for all citizens. In India, "nonsecular politics" has meant Hindu dominance and the possibility of infringement upon Muslim law by Hindu traditions. Support for minority rights has thus become an important political issue for Muslims, and secularism in India has become the protec-

¹ Rasheeduddin Khan, "Muslims in Modern India," *India Perspectives*, August 1997, available at <http://www.webspawner.com/users/indiaislam/>, last accessed May 29, 2003.

tor of Muslim communities. In the decades following independence, the Congress Party remained the party of most Muslims. It was the party of independence, of Hindu-Muslim unity, and of secularism. Many Muslims in India vote for the Communist Party in India for the same reasons.

In addition to occupying the center-left of the Indian political spectrum, Muslims in India have largely not identified with the global fundamentalist Islamic movement. Whereas, in Southeast Asia, Jemaah Islamiah intends to unite Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and parts of the Philippines into a single caliphate, a similar trend has not arisen in India. According to Indian Muslim organizations, Indian Muslims maintain allegiance to the Indian state, to the extent that most Indian Muslims outside Kashmir support the Indian stand on Kashmir.²

There has been no successful national Muslim political party in India since independence. After partition, Muslims did not want to associate with Muslim parties for fear of being viewed as antinationalist or separatist. Some Indian Muslim leaders note that this hesitation to form Muslim parties persists because of the anticipated reaction.³ In addition, Muslims do not form a majority in most areas and cannot generate sufficient support for a national party. Gerrymandering has also been a problem for political mobilization because districts are often redrawn so that Muslim majorities cannot be attained. Last, Muslim groups in India have been notorious for factionalism and infighting. This divisiveness within the community has hampered its ability to be more forceful politically. Mainly, Muslim groups have encouraged voters to vote for certain candidates or parties that appeared to be positive forces for the community. However, a few Muslim parties have had local success in the north-east and in the southern states of Kerala and Tamil Nadu.

Background

Islam entered India early in the eighth century, and Islamic culture and practice became deeply embedded in Indian society over the following centuries.⁴ Islam eventually spread throughout all of India, although a greater proportion of Muslims remained in the northern areas. During the colonial period under British rule, Muslims and Hindus coexisted with relative tranquility, despite the occurrence of occasional riots and disturbances. However, as the Indian independence movement moved forward, contending ideas regarding the nature of the new Indian state emerged. Although the Muslims in the early twentieth century comprised approximately one-

² Adil Mehdi, "Radicalism Among Indian Muslims in the Aftermath of September 11 Attack and the War in Afghanistan," in Grare, ed. (2002), p. 27.

³ Interviews with Indian Muslim community leaders, summer 2003.

⁴ Aziz Ahmad (1964).

third of the population of India, at independence they formed a distinct minority, with important implications for Muslim power in a democratic polity. Apprehensive that a democratic, Hindu majority India would consistently override the needs of its Muslim minority, Mohammad Ali Jinnah and the Muslim League lobbied for an independent Muslim state. Arguing that Indian Muslims formed a nation distinct from Indian Hindus, Muslim leaders put forth the two-nation theory to support the creation of a separate Muslim state.

However, many Indian Muslims regarded India as their permanent home and supported the concept of a secular, unified state that would include both Hindus and Muslims. After centuries of joint history and coexistence, these Muslims firmly believed that India was fundamentally a multireligious entity and that Muslims were an integral part of the state. Furthermore, cleaving India into independent Muslim and Hindu states would be geographically inconvenient for millions of Muslims. Those living in the middle and southern regions of India could not conveniently move to the new Muslim state because it required travel over long distances and considerable financial resources. In particular, many lower-class Muslims opposed partition because they felt that a Muslim state would benefit only upper-class Muslims.⁵ At independence, the division of India into the Muslim state of Pakistan and the secular state of India caused a massive migration of millions of Muslims into Pakistan and Hindus into India, along with the death of over one million people in the consequent riots and chaos. The millions of Muslims who remained in India by choice or providence became a smaller and more interspersed minority in a secular and democratic state.

The Muslim Landscape

Muslims in India cover a wide expanse of philosophical, cultural, linguistic, and economic diversity reflecting the Indian mosaic. Sufi (primarily Barelvi), Deobandi, Shi'a, and other belief systems coexist but are the basis for deep divisions within the community. The Hanafi school of thought informs much of Sunni tradition in India, although various communities reference Maliki thought and other Islamic teachings. The differences among Indian Muslims create a set of cross-cutting cleavages that have hindered the formation of any single national religious or political organization capable of representing the Indian Muslim community. As a result, the Indian Muslim community can most effectively be described by an overview of their religious beliefs, community organizations, political representatives, and political issues.

⁵ Zafar Ahmad (2003), p. 119.

Muslim Tendencies

Sufism in India is a major aspect of traditional Muslim belief and practice. Belief in a mystical and philosophical path to God is of central importance to Indian Sufis, and syncretic rituals are common in their religious practice. One who attains the highest level of spirituality becomes a *pir*, or living saint; the martyrs who spread Islam are also sometimes included as *pirs*. The *pir* can accept disciples, and his descendants are also often considered holy. The tombs, or *dargah*, of the *pir* become holy sites for Sufis, and religious rituals and ceremonies may take place there. Pilgrims in India visit the shrines and tombs of these saints in the hopes of being cured of illness and suffering, or in hope of having a child.⁶ The renowned nineteenth-century Sunni scholar Ahmad Riza Khan Bareilwi founded one of the most influential Sufi movements in India. The Barelvis maintain the tradition of revering the saints and their shrines and practicing various syncretic Sufi rituals. Bareilvi tradition, by offering a personal and familiar approach to Islamic practice, has remained popular in India.

However, the existence of these syncretic practices caused consternation among Islamic reformers in nineteenth-century India. The reformers preached that these traditions were creating the decline of the Islamic community and promoted a return to a stricter adherence to the teachings of the Quran. The main proponent of orthodox Sunni Islamic practice inside India is the Deobandi movement, which rejects syncretic and Sufi tradition. Inside India, the heart of the Deobandi movement is at Darul Uloom, in Uttar Pradesh (U.P.), one of the largest madrassas in the world. Despite the wide influence of the Indian Deobandi movement internationally, Deobandis remain a small minority of the Muslim Indian community. Although the Deobandi school is the progenitor of the Taliban, Indian Deobandis continue to believe in the secular Indian state and are peaceful. However, they believe in strict adherence to Islamic practice as revealed in the Quran. The Deobandi movement, despite its conservatism, does not view India as *dar-ul-harb* (land of war), a land where the lack of Islamic law fosters anarchy and immorality.⁷ Because Muslims are able to use shari'a in their personal lives, the Deobandi community in India considers India's governing system acceptable. Notably, the Indian Deobandi movement did not support the Taliban or the Deobandi movement in Pakistan.

Divisions also exist between Sunnis and Shi'ites in India. Shi'ites remain a minority and conduct much of their religious and social activities separate from Sunnis. Relations between the Hindu population and Shi'ites remain congenial. The Shi'ite community consists of Ithna Ashri (Twelver Shi'ites), Ismailis, and Dawoodi Bohras. The Ismailis are followers of Aga Khan and have large communities in the Bombay area. The spiritual leader of the Dawoodi Bohra community is Mohammed Burha-

⁶ Kerrin Graefin V. Schwerin, "Saint Worship in Indian Islam: The Legend of the Martyr Salar Masud Ghazi," in Imtiaz Ahmad, ed. (1981), p. 143.

⁷ Zafar Ahmad (2003), p. 128.

nuddin, who represents the twenty-first imam. Although Shi'ites are a small population, the Shi'a commemoration of Muharram (the first month of the Muslim year) is widely observed by Muslims across the country.

Imtiaz Ahmed has identified three distinct levels of belief and practice for Muslims in India that accurately reflect the Islamic system of thought as practiced by Muslim communities. The first of these levels includes beliefs and practices that are considered part of formal or scriptural Islam that are ideals held by all Muslims. The second level includes beliefs that are conditioned by religious behavior that may or may not be in accordance with the scriptural texts. Various life-cycle rituals and the popular celebration of Muharram fit into this category. The third level consists of religious beliefs and behavior that are pragmatic in nature—popular beliefs of the causes of disease, veneration of Muslim saints and Hindu Gods, and the belief in spirit possession, the evil eye, and so forth. These three levels coexist and are “relevant for presumably different purposes, yet at the same time remaining very much an integral part of Islam in India.”⁸ Ahmed's analysis appropriately depicts Indian Islam as a complex set of beliefs and practices that are not necessarily internally or philosophically consistent but that encompass India's diverse cultural milieu.

Muslim Organizations

Indian Muslims have formed a multitude of organizations to disseminate religious knowledge. The most influential of these, the Tablighi Jama'at, is spiritually focused and apolitical. The Tablighi Jama'at was founded in India in 1927 by Maulana Muhammad Ilyas, later spreading internationally to become one of the largest Muslim organizations in the world. Ilyas firmly believed that Muslims were suffering from weakness that could be addressed through “religious cleansing, moral uplift and spiritual regeneration,” duties that the Tabligh would undertake.⁹ The Tablighi Jama'at continues to exist in India as a peaceful, apolitical, reformist movement that aims to teach Islamic practice among Muslims and to encourage the growth of Islam. The movement inculcates humility in its members and encourages them to transcend social and economic differences. It also emphasizes the necessity to follow strict codes of Islamic conduct, including proper clothing and religious practices.¹⁰ A central aspect of the Tablighi Jama'at is the emphasis on proselytization, conducted by traveling groups of men. Despite the spiritual and religious focus of the Tablighi, after September 11 various members of the organization were found to be connected to

⁸ Imtiaz Ahmad, ed. (1981), pp. 12–13.

⁹ Hasan (1997), p. 197.

¹⁰ Zafar Ahmad (2003), p. 114.

international terrorist organizations. Some individuals were recruited from within the Tablighi by militant organizations leveraging the broad reach of the organization for networking purposes. However, Tablighi members denounce the goals and actions of radical Islamists.

The most influential organization inside India is the Jamaat-e-Islami Hind. Maulana Abu al-A'la Mawdudi, the founder of the original Jamaat-e-Islami in pre-partition India, provided the basis for fundamentalist thought on the subcontinent. He emphasized the importance of forming a Muslim community and identity separate from traditional Muslim identity and secular nationalism. This community would develop as a Muslim nation built on the ideals of the Islamic faith. Mawdudi's goal was to purify the religion while consolidating Muslim political strength. According to Nasr, "He put forth a view of Islam with an invigorated, pristine, and uncompromising outlook that would galvanize Muslims into an ideologically uniform, and hence politically indivisible, community, one that would assert its demands and remain unyielding before the overtures of Hindus."¹¹

After independence, the vast majority of Mawdudi's followers moved to Pakistan where the establishment of an Islamic state would be possible. Upon his departure for Pakistan, the organization in India became known as Jamaat-e-Islami Hind. At partition, the organization divided along both national and ideological lines. Jamaat-e-Islami in Pakistan became a political party supportive of a religious shari'a state, whereas Jamaat-e-Islami Hind members remained in India as supporters of a secular state.¹² This group has remained largely apolitical since independence and has focused on maintaining Islamic traditions and organizing religious interfaith meetings and other initiatives to encourage smooth communal relations. The Jamaat is essentially a conservative organization, however. Indian Muslims criticize it for maintaining an "inflexible interpretation of Islamic doctrines and stout resistance to the eclectic Sufi and syncretic trends in Indian Islam."¹³

Despite its apolitical role, the Jamaat is extremely influential in determining legal issues for the Muslim community, and it informs Muslim opinion regarding political issues and elections. The decisions of the Jamaat tend toward conservatism and orthodoxy with regard to Islamic issues of importance to the community, particularly in family law, whereas its stance on political issues is liberal, emphasizing the preservation of Muslim minority rights and liberties. Islamic women's groups in India consider the Jamaat a fundamentalist organization, particularly for its stance on *talaq*

¹¹ Nasr (1996), p. 5.

¹² Hasan (1997), p. 206.

¹³ Hasan (1997), p. 210.

(divorce) and maintenance payments in case of divorce.¹⁴ In 2003, the Jamaat made a decisive move to increase its political influence without becoming a political party. During a meeting of its Majlis-e-Shura (central advisory council), it concluded that it would take a more aggressive stance in supporting political parties that advocate democratic and liberal norms, including constitutional rights for minorities. The leader of the Jamaat, Abdul Haq Ansari, noted that it could support the Congress Party, the Socialists, or the Communists, with the ultimate purpose of opposing parties supported by the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), a Hindu nationalist movement.¹⁵ The Jamaat also maintains links to a national students organization, the Students Islamic Organization of India (SIO), a moderate Muslim student organization. This group has been engaged in relief activities and encourages Muslim youth to avoid communal activity and sentiment in favor of peace, true Islam, and community.

Other national Islamic organizations with religious and political objectives include the All India Muslim Majlis-e-Mushawarat (AIMMM), Jamiat-al-Ulema-I Hind, Jamiat-e-Ulema Islami, the All India Milli Council, and many others. These organizations are not political parties but are influential in Indian politics as opinion leaders and politically conscious communities. The AIMMM is a politically active Islamic organization that acts as an interest group. It has put forth an agenda to the Indian government concerning issues of importance for Indian Muslims, such as the violence in Gujarat, Kashmir, and Palestine. In the aftermath of the Gujarat riots, AIMMM reprimanded the Gujarat government for police brutality and crimes and requested Indian army forces to be placed in troubled areas. With regard to the situation in Kashmir, it requested that the Indian government conduct a dialogue with the Hurriyat Conference, an alliance of organizations formed to further the cause of Kashmiri separatism. The AIMMM has also ventured into foreign policy, requesting that the Indian government sever ties with Israel. Groups such as the Jamiat-e-Ulema Islami and Jamaat-e-Islami Hind were integrally involved in post-Gujarat riot reconstruction and relief efforts. Other groups, such as the All India Milli Council, play a political role by backing certain pro-Muslim parties.

Although Muslim political parties exist in India, they are not powerful or well organized at the national level. They have found footholds only in areas where Muslims form local majorities. One of the more successful Muslim political parties is the Indian Union Muslim League (IUML), which has been able to gather significant votes primarily in the southern state of Kerala. Its platform is to gain leverage in national politics, include the Muslims in the “other backward class” (OBC) list, ban

¹⁴ Ranjit Devraj, “Fighting the Veil,” August 5, 2002, available at <http://www.indiatogether.org/women/articles/veil0802.htm>, last accessed August 20, 2003.

¹⁵ Mohammed Shafeeq, “Jamaat-e-Islami to Play Active Role in Election Campaign,” *Indo-Asian News Service*, June 14, 2003.

Hindu *yatras* (pilgrimages in Gujarat), and oppose the war on Iraq. Other Muslim parties include the prominent National Conference in Kashmir and the Majlis Iti-had-ul-Muslimin in Hyderabad. In addition, Muslim parliamentarians have been sharply criticized for not articulating the interests of their community. “Muslim legislators, though often elected from Muslim-populated constituencies and sponsored as minority representatives, have eschewed the more public forms of protest and rebuffed petitions for help on minority causes.”¹⁶ Thus the existing Muslim representation has provided a relatively weak political voice for the community.

In addition to the religious groups, community organizations, and political parties, various organizations promote certain issues of importance to the Muslim community. The All India Muslim Personal Law Board (AIMPLB) is the most powerful of these. It is an apolitical organization that engages political leaders and parties in legal issues of importance to the Muslim community. Established in 1972, the AIMPLB has been a principal proponent for retaining shari’a as personal law for Muslims in India.¹⁷ Muslim personal law, particularly as it pertains to family law, has been a central issue of debate in India. Whereas India has a secular civil code for resolving legal disputes for the country as a whole, the Muslim community has historically been able to use shari’a in personal and family matters. Both Muslim political parties and Muslim pressure groups such as the AIMPLB lobby for the preservation of a separate Muslim personal law based on shari’a for use by Muslims in India.

In recent decades, this situation has created inconsistencies and disputes within the Muslim community as well as between Muslims and Hindus. Muslim Indian women often appeal to the government to be treated under the civil code rather than under Muslim personal family law. In 1986, a highly publicized divorce case, the Shah Bano case, created a furor across India. After India’s supreme court awarded Shah Bano, the divorced wife, continued maintenance payments by her former husband, the AIMPLB and other fundamentalist groups in the Muslim community pressured the government to reverse the ruling. The AIMPLB argued that the supreme court had no right to attempt to interpret the Quran. Rajiv Gandhi’s government finally succumbed to the pressure and passed the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act of 1986, which restored the shari’a ruling and ultimately rescinded Shah Bano’s right to maintenance payments.¹⁸ On the issue of triple *talaq* (a man’s declaring three times consecutively that he wishes to divorce his wife), there has been debate within the Islamic community, with the AIMPLB supporting fundamentalist interpretations of law. The Bombay High Court ruled that the wife must be present for a man to divorce her, rather than his being able to complete a divorce

¹⁶ Hasan (2002), p. 382.

¹⁷ Zafarul-Islam Khan, “Indian Muslim Apex Body Gets New Chief,” *The Milli Gazette*, June 23, 2002.

¹⁸ Hasan (1997), p. 263.

by saying *talaq*—“I divorce you”—three times in her absence. The stance of the AIMPLB was that a wife does not need to be present for *talaq*, or divorce, to occur.

The AIMPLB has also been involved in demanding the rebuilding of destroyed mosques, including the sixteenth-century Babri Masjid mosque in Ayodha, U.P., that was destroyed in 1992 by Hindu nationalists who declared that a Hindu temple had preceded the mosque and should now be rebuilt in its place. The AIMPLB is involved in demanding that those accused in the Babri Masjid destruction case be brought to trial quickly. On the issue of madrassas, Hindu nationalist groups have been pressuring state governments to institute madrassa boards in order to oversee the curriculum and activities of the schools. In particular, the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP), a right-wing Hindu nationalist group, has alleged that madrassas are antinational and has indicated that all madrassas in India should be banned. In the southern state of Karnataka, the state government proposed creating a madrassa board that would include members drawn from the government as well as members selected from different madrassas. According to the proposed bill, the government would also decide the curriculum of the madrassas in the state. In response, the AIMPLB firmly opposed the establishment of a madrassa board in Karnataka and explicitly instructed madrassas not to register with the madrassa board.¹⁹

In addition to the wide variety of Muslim organizations and parties, Islamic religious leaders have exerted control over other Muslim organizations and leaders in the Indian political context. The leaders, such as the Shahi Imam of Jama Masjid, Maulana Sayed Ahmed Bukhari, often act to limit the political avenues and roles of other Muslim representatives. In 2003, Bukhari stated that other Muslim organizations were not authorized to negotiate the Babri Masjid issue with Hindu groups, as represented by the Shankaracharya of Kanchi.²⁰ He emphasized that the sensitive mosque issue is one that must be resolved in courts. Although the leader of the AIMPLB was willing to discuss possible resolutions with the Hindu religious representative, Bukhari vetoed his involvement. On the same issue, Bukhari has stated, “the community did not authorize any Muslim leader or organization including the Board [AIMPLB] for negotiations on the issue.”²¹ Bukhari’s role in blocking the AIMPLB’s role in the negotiations reflects the deep divisions within Muslim organizations and their inability to unite on even popularly agreed-upon issues.

Religious conversions and reservations for Muslims are related issues of debate for both Muslims and Hindus in India. Many low-caste Hindus opt for conversion to Islam to escape the discrimination they face. This phenomenon has created animosity among Hindus against the Muslim and Christian proselytizers. A factor that

¹⁹ “AIMPLB to Oppose Karnataka Bill on Madrasas,” *The Times of India*, September 24, 2002.

²⁰ “Shankaracharya-Bukhari: AIMPLB Will Not Be Allowed to ‘Bargain’ on Babri Mosque,” *Press Trust of India*, June 14, 2003.

²¹ “India: Ayodhya Mosque Cleric Rules Out Dialogue with Government,” *Press Trust of India*, June 30, 2002.

limits the number of conversions is the existence of numerous advantages for the lower castes, including reserved seats for employment and education. The reserved seats are only available to Hindus, however. Conversion to Islam by a member of a lower caste leads to ineligibility for the same benefits. However, as an underrepresented community in public employment and educational institutions, Muslims are increasingly demanding recognition as a “backward class” in order to have access to reserved seats in proportion to their population.²²

The multiplicity of Muslim religious and community organizations in India reflects a strong civil society and interest group structure. However, it also reveals the inability of Muslims in India to combine efforts to launch effective political initiatives. The small role played by Muslim political parties in particular may create frustrations among Muslims with the Indian political system as a whole.

Islam and Democracy in India

Islam and democracy have coexisted successfully in India since independence. The democratic and secular environment has allowed for an institutionalized process for articulating individual and community needs despite the absence of strong Muslim political parties. This may be the result of cross-cutting cleavages in India society, wherein poor Muslims have more in common with poor Hindus than with Muslim elites. Muslims and Hindus may also find that their interests coincide with their locality or state rather than falling along religious lines. As a result, Muslims do contribute to the democratic process, casting votes in elections alongside Hindus, Christians, Sikhs, and others, but more often voting for candidates representing their interests rather than particular parties. Muslims vote across the political spectrum, placing their support behind a diverse collection of parties in different states, including the Congress, Communist parties, regional parties, and the Hindu nationalist BJP. A strong and free civil society has provided the vehicle for Muslim community interests through a multiplicity of Muslim organizations. Above all, secularism as the basis for governance in India has been critical for the success of democracy. The ability of the Muslim community to use shari’a as basis for personal law has made coexistence with the Hindu majority in the democratic context acceptable to Muslim religious leaders. The support from the Indian Muslim community for a secular state that preserves the rights of minorities suggests that a democratic Muslim majority state with minority rights is possible in other regional contexts as well. Nonetheless, the success of a democratic and stable state in India relies on the preservation of these secular values and the strength of the rule of law in upholding constitutional rights. Were Hindu nationalists to alter the secular fabric of the state without regard for religious minorities, the result would be internal conflict on a vast scale and religious

²² Noorani (2003), p. 276.

radicalization of both the Muslim and Hindu communities. Similarly, rejection of modernizing and secular influences in India by the Muslim community would serve to isolate the community and increase religious tensions. According to Alam Khundmiri, a prominent Indian Islamic scholar and philosopher,

[t]he problem in India is the modernization of the majority of the Hindus who will ultimately determine whether India is going to be a modern state or a state governed by medieval Hindu values. Indian Muslims can accelerate the process of modernization if they accept the suggestion that the values of secular democracy are more in tune with a higher ethical ideal than futile attempts to recapture past politico-legal traditions which are neither in tune with modern times nor can be shared by their contemporaries belonging to different faiths.²³

It is clear that, to maintain stability in a multireligious India, preserving secular democracy as the basis for the state will be critical.

Growth of Islamic Fundamentalism

Historically, fundamentalist groups have not been highly influential in India and do not have large followings. Nonetheless, in recent years, small radical groups have become increasingly prominent for their involvement in violent activities inside India and for their growing connections to international Islamist movements. Pakistani groups operating in India have also expanded their attacks from Kashmir to major tourist or urban locations deep inside India. For instance, terrorist bombings in Bombay on August 25, 2003, killed 52 people and injured another 150. The group responsible for the attacks targeted the Gateway of India and Zaveri Bazaar, a marketplace.²⁴ The Indian government posited that Lashkar-e-Taiba in coordination with the Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) was responsible for the bombings, although no group claimed responsibility.²⁵ One of the accused, Arshad Shafique Ansari, stated that he had carried out the attacks in revenge for the Gujarat massacres of early 2002.²⁶ The attack followed five other bombings in Bombay since December 2002. The recent attack on Bombay shows that the situation may be deteriorating. Although similarly violent events have occurred in the past, the current international environment indicates that the terrorist attacks are part of a far more dangerous trend. After September 11, militant Islamic groups operating in India have

²³ Khundmiri (2001), p. 282.

²⁴ Jay Deshmukh, "Bombay Blast Suspect Says Attacks Were to Avenge Gujarat Riots," *Agence France Presse*, September 2, 2003.

²⁵ Rahul Bedi, "Police See Underworld Hand in Mumbai Blasts," *Inter Press Service*, August 31, 2003.

²⁶ Deshmukh, op. cit.

developed a perspective more integrated with that of international terrorist groups regarding philosophical objectives and terrorist targets. Whereas militant groups working in Kashmir in past years may have focused mainly on separating Kashmir from India, connections with international groups and ideologies appear to be moving their focus toward targets further inside India and against U.S. interests. Just three months after the September 11 attacks, militants from Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed bombed India's parliament building.

Prior to the Bombay attacks, at least two Indian Muslims had been arrested for conducting terrorist activities in coordination with Al Qaeda. Mohammed Afroz Abdul Razzak and his brother were arrested in October 2001 in Bombay for plotting to hijack a plane from Manchester, United Kingdom, and fly it into the parliament building in London on September 11, 2001. The Indians alleged that Afroz's brother was an Al Qaeda financier.²⁷

Terrorist groups operating in Kashmir have become increasingly visible in the past decade. These groups, such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed, are known to have connections to Al Qaeda, but are based in Pakistan rather than India. Jaish-e-Mohammed was responsible for the attack on the Kashmir parliament that killed 38 legislators in October 2001. A Kashmiri militant group claimed responsibility for the attack on the U.S. information center in Calcutta in January 2002, indicating that the United States is also a target of Islamic militancy in India. During the war in Afghanistan, many of these militants received assistance from the Pakistani intelligence services, the ISI, to fight against the Soviet Union. When the war was over, individuals returned and refocused to fight in Kashmir. Concurrently, in the late 1980s, poor governance on the part of India led to increasing Kashmiri discontent and a growing separatist movement. Rigged elections and police brutality created grassroots support for insurgency in the state. Pakistani and Pakistan-based militant groups took advantage of the popular resentment in Kashmir, sending militants and weaponry into Kashmir to fight against the Indian authorities.

The violent dynamic between Hindus and Muslims in India has likely accelerated the growth of radical Islamic groups in India in the past decade. The possible effect of Hindu nationalist actions on Indian Muslim militant activity was demonstrated earlier in terrorist attacks on the Bombay Stock Exchange, the Air India building, Shiv Sena headquarters, and other financial centers in Bombay in March 1993—an attack that killed over 257 people. Indian Muslim underworld figures such as Abu Salem and Dawood Ibrahim were implicated in the Bombay terrorist bombings, reflecting some of the connections between Indian organized crime and terrorist networks. The terrorist bombings were conducted in response to the Hindu nationalist destruction of the Babri Masjid mosque. Imam Ali, another Indian Muslim, was

²⁷ Dolan Cummings, "Afroz claims he has become a pawn in India's global power game," August 2, 2002, available at <http://www.spiked-online.com/Articles/00000006D9B2.htm>, last accessed June 18, 2003.

charged with bombing Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) headquarters in Chennai in August 1993 and had apparently planned to assassinate Deputy Prime Minister L.K. Advani and other senior Hindu nationalist figures. According to a Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) report, the bombing was in revenge for the destruction of Babri Masjid.²⁸ Imam Ali belongs to Al Umma, a militant Islamic organization based primarily in Tamil Nadu. Al Umma increased its activity and membership after the demolition of Babri Masjid in 1992, by conducting social work and opposing the RSS. The group was also charged with bombings in Tamil Nadu in 1998 that killed 68 people.²⁹ An example of new indigenous Islamic militant groups arising in India, Al Umma shows that a dangerous dynamic exists between radical Islamists and Hindu militants in India.

Student groups have increasingly become the center of fundamentalist thought in India. The Students Islamic Movement of India was started in association with Jamaat-e-Islami Hind in 1977. The government of India banned SIMI in September 2001, charging that the group had connections to Lashkar-e-Taiba in Pakistan, Jaish-e-Mohammed, or the Pakistan-based Jama'at-i-Islami. Deputy Prime Minister L. K. Advani also placed the blame for the Bombay, August 2003, terrorist attacks on SIMI and Lashkar-e-Taiba. Originally, SIMI was a student group that promoted Islamic ideals, but the organization became more militant in the late 1980s, demanding a shari'a state. The group has a popular following among students of Aligarh Muslim University.

In India, fundamentalist Islamic thought and radical Islamic groups, have extended their reach in recent years. Although Pakistani terrorist groups remain the primary source of Islamic militancy in Kashmir as well as in many attacks deep inside India, indigenous violent groups are increasingly active throughout the country. Communal violence has created opportunities for recruitment, and organized crime inside India and Pakistan offers avenues for expanding terrorist activities.

Factors Influencing the Rise of Radical Islam

A variety of factors are combining to contribute to the rise of radical Islam in India. Critical among these are long-term economic and political marginalization, the continuing and increasingly violent conflict in Kashmir, the rise of violent Hindu nationalism, and the increasing influence of radical international Islamic thought.

²⁸ M. Mazharul Haque, "Indian Muslims Forced to Extremism," *The Milli Gazette*, Vol. 3, No.21, November 11, 2002, available at www.milligazette.com/Archives/01112002/0111200282.htm, last accessed July 30, 2003.

²⁹ A. Ganesh Nadar, "Let Them Not Demolish the Mosques in Kashi and Mathura or the Country Will Face Another Partition," December 1, 1997, available at <http://www.rediff.com/news/dec/01al.htm>, accessed July 30, 2003; M. Mazharul Haque, "Indian Muslims Forced to Extremism."

Economic and Political Factors

Discrimination against Muslims since independence and partition has been endemic in India. Bias against Muslims has affected access to housing, jobs, and education. Muslims in India have a lower family income and lower levels of literacy than do Hindus, and they are underrepresented in both political and business organizations. According to data collected by the All India Milli Council, Muslims comprise only 2.98 percent of all Indian administrative service officers, 3.14 percent of police service officers, 2.64 percent of foreign service officers, and—in the central government—1.6 percent of class I officers and 3.9 percent of class II officers.³⁰ These figures reflect severe underrepresentation because Muslims make up 12 percent of the population. Muslims fare worse than their Hindu counterparts on educational and literacy measures as well. Whereas national literacy estimates in India for 1991 were 52 percent overall, for Indian Muslims the comparable statistic was only 47 percent.³¹

The popularity of traditional madrassas has had an unintended effect on Muslim mobility in India. Many Muslims send their children to madrassas rather than public secular schools, thus hindering their ability to adopt the knowledge necessary to integrate into modern Indian higher education and society. The result has been a gradual segregation of Muslims away from the mainstream and a sense of isolation and backwardness in the Muslim community. Disaffection created by these conditions has created support among disadvantaged youths for more extreme ideologies.

The sense that the political system does not serve the Muslim community as well as it serves the dominant Hindu community has also been a factor. For decades after independence, the Muslim community generally supported the Congress Party and its secular ideals in the belief that the Congress Party would protect minority interests and support Muslim causes. However, since the 1970s, this belief has slowly disintegrated. Indira Gandhi's 1975–1977 state of emergency brought forced sterilizations for both Muslims and Hindus and suspension of various civil liberties, which created resentment among Hindu and Muslim communities.³² The persistence of riots and violence against Muslims also reinforced the sense that the Congress Party was not working effectively to protect the community. Fundamentalist and radical Muslim groups, including the Tablighi Jama'at, Jama'at-e-Islami Hind, and Jamiat-al-Ulema I Hind, slowly began to fill the vacuum left by the Congress Party, though not as political parties. These groups have focused on mobilizing Muslims against a

³⁰ Abdul Haq, "Indian Muslims—An Oppressed Minority," available at www.imannet.com/articles/minority.asp, last accessed July 30, 2003.

³¹ Census of India data, 1991, available at www.censusindia.net.

³² Hasan (2002), p. 383.

uniform civil code, Islamic reformism, modern education, and syncretic forms of Islam.³³

In addition, the increasing influence of the conservative Hindu parties has exacerbated this trend. Militant statements against Muslims by the right-wing Hindu groups VHP and RSS, along with the strength in recent years of the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), has increased the Muslim community's sense of political isolation. Hindu nationalist groups have been active in attempting to create a historical argument for their ideology and in trying to destroy mosques in India. Under the BJP, they initiated changes in school textbooks and national historical research to support their ideology and convince Indians that Hinduism is the historical basis for India as a modern state. The National Council of Educational Research and Training (NCERT) was tasked with revising textbooks "to highlight Indian achievements and glorify Hindu tradition," an issue that alarmed many Indian Muslims.³⁴ The changes NCERT accomplished are fundamentally shifting public perceptions on the importance of protecting secularism, as more and more youths are taught that an aggressive approach toward minorities and foreigners is the most effective. A corollary to the policy of historical revisionism is the Hindu nationalist policy of reclaiming Muslim religious property for Hindus. In addition to Babri Masjid, Hindu nationalists have stated that they intend to destroy thousands of other mosques that were built over Hindu temples during Mughal rule, in order to rebuild temples on these locations. This policy initiative appears to be gaining public support and is likely to lead to violence if pursued.

The 2004 election of the United Progressive Alliance (Congress-led coalition of parties) to power has set back some of these Hindu nationalist objectives. The new Indian government has taken steps to discredit the NCERT texts and is pushing for a return to a traditional study of history. The Congress-led government of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh may also slow the progress of other Hindu nationalist agendas against the Muslim community.

Kashmir

Kashmir has experienced violence since independence and the partition of India, when the rulers of India's princely states were given the choice to join either Pakistan or India. Some qualifications were presented to the rulers of each state: The states would need to be geographically contiguous with the country to be joined, the states with a majority Hindu population would accede to India, and the states with a Muslim majority would join Pakistan. The state of Kashmir presented a particular problem because the population was predominantly Muslim whereas the monarch was

³³ Hasan (2002), p. 385.

³⁴ Adil Mehdi, "Radicalism Among Indian Muslims in the Aftermath of September 11 Attacks and the War in Afghanistan," in Grare, ed. (2002), p. 29.

Hindu. It also bordered both countries. The Maharaja of Kashmir, Hari Singh, stalled in deciding the issue; meanwhile Pakistani troops entered Kashmir with the purpose of taking Srinagar, the capital. Hari Singh appealed to the government of India for assistance against the invaders.³⁵ India agreed to come to his aid after he signed the instrument of accession to join India, although the document stated that the Kashmiri people would have to ratify the agreement. The war between India and Pakistan in 1947 over the territory led to the case being taken to the United Nations, and no comprehensive resolution has been reached since.

India and Pakistan fought another war over the region in 1965, and the 1971 war between the two countries over Bangladesh included attempts to change the status quo in Kashmir as well. Neither conflict served to resolve the dispute, and various other factors embedded in India and Pakistan's treatment of the state helped to exacerbate the instability. In the 1970s, Pakistan funded the growth of madrassas in Kashmir while training guerrilla forces to fight against the Indian government. This involvement increased the level of terrorist activity in Kashmir over that of previous years. Concurrently, the Indian government failed to adequately address the political demands of the Kashmiri people. Poor governance in the 1970s and 1980s, combined with rising unemployment, further destabilized the region. The Congress Party then interfered with the conduct and results of the 1987 elections in Kashmir, creating further resentment among Kashmiris. By 1989, the situation had become extremely volatile, and brutality by the Indian police in an attempt to quell the insurgency in Kashmir led to further terrorist attacks.³⁶

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan directly affected the conflict in Kashmir. During the long war, Pakistan aided mujahidin in the fight against the Soviets, providing funding and weaponry to the insurgents. After the war in Afghanistan, mujahidin from Afghanistan and Pakistan relocated to Kashmir to continue the fight. As the Taliban emerged victorious over other mujahidin forces, Pakistan retained close relations and support for the Taliban regime. Networks had developed between militant groups engaged in Afghanistan and groups based in Pakistan during the years of fighting for a common cause. As the necessity for fighters in Afghanistan decreased, many turned to Kashmir as the next struggle. With the assistance of Pakistan-based terrorist groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed, militants have been able to operate effectively in Kashmir since the 1990s. Although the Indian government accused the Pakistani government of colluding to send mujahidin into Kashmir, Pakistan insisted that the fighters were indigenous Kashmiri freedom fighters. The influx of fighters from Pakistan, as well as jihadis from Afghanistan, increased the level of fighting and the attacks on civilians in Kashmir. Over the past

³⁵ Ganguly (2001), pp. 15–17.

³⁶ Ganguly (1997).

decade, the continued violence and terrorism inside Kashmir between the military and police forces and the militants has increasingly polarized the citizenry of Kashmir, as well as Indians and Pakistanis on both sides of the border.

The Shah Bano Case

Before independence, customary law—unwritten practices and beliefs that are treated as if they were laws—was followed more often than shari'a. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the fact that women had fewer rights under Muslim customary law than under shari'a became evident, thereby making uniform acceptance of shari'a a way of improving the status and treatment of women. Prior to this change, women could not inherit property at all. Most Muslims observed the Hanafi legal tradition, which gave women no right to divorce. Rejecting Islam meant nullifying marriage, so many women did so in order to divorce. After 1932, Maliki, Shafi, or Hanbali law also became permissible, making divorce possible for women under certain circumstances. When the divorcée Shah Bano appealed to the supreme court in 1985 for maintenance payments from her former husband and the court ruled in her favor, Islamic groups, particularly the AIMPLB, were outraged and argued that the court could not interpret the Quran. The verdict was finally reversed, and the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act of 1986 was passed, restoring shari'a for Muslims and ultimately denying Shah Bano's right to maintenance payments.³⁷

The result was communal violence and increased hostility between the Muslim and Hindu communities. The debate also served to polarize Muslim views on the issue of personal law. Whereas many Muslim women had successfully petitioned for their rights under civil law in past divorce cases, the Shah Bano case drew the attention of the entire Muslim community, forcing individuals and groups to choose sides in the debate. Agreeing to the idea of adjudication under civil law appeared tantamount to siding with the Hindus. Ultimately, Muslims who may have quietly supported Shah Bano's right to maintenance payments stood behind the conservative AIMPLB decision to deny maintenance based on shari'a. In the end, traditional Muslims in India stated that the fundamentalist minority had succeeded in wrongly pressing their views on the application of shari'a to all Muslims across India.

Destruction of Babri Masjid

On December 6, 1992, Hindu nationalist groups and their followers destroyed the sixteenth-century Babri Masjid mosque. The Hindu activists claimed that the Mughal emperor Babur had built the mosque after destroying the existing temple at the site marking Rama's birthplace. Upon the dismembering of the mosque, the Hindu nationalists argued that a Hindu temple to Rama should rightly be rebuilt in

³⁷ Hasan (1997), p. 263.

Babri Masjid's place. Indian Muslims viewed the incident as an indication that Hindu nationalists aimed to deny their religious and community rights. The inability or unwillingness of the Indian government to protect the mosque from destruction proved to many Muslims that the government, including the Congress Party, had sold out their interests and no longer could serve effectively as their intermediary. Disillusion at the political process may have provided fuel for extralegal actions and violence, and revenge prompted the ensuing Bombay bombings of March 1993. In the months following the mosque destruction and Bombay bombings, communal tensions escalated, with more than a thousand killed in the ensuing riots. Muslims were killed disproportionately in this violence. The drama continued to unfold in the following years, with the site of Babri Masjid closed to the public by the courts in the face of petitions for access by both Hindu and Muslim groups. The Babri Masjid issue remains sensitive for both the Muslim and Hindu communities, and actions taken by either side of the debate regarding the site could again spark violence. Either an attempt by Hindu nationalists to replace the destroyed mosque with a temple or a rebuilding of the mosque could result in widespread riots. Statements from the Hindu nationalist groups arguing for the destruction of hundreds of other mosques have also created widespread fear among Muslims that the Indian constitutional protection for minorities may be worthless.³⁸ A solution that is acceptable to both communities must be constructed, and the responsibility for ameliorating this situation will lie with the Indian government.

Gujarat Riots

In March 2002, a group of Muslims in the state of Gujarat set fire to a train carrying Hindu nationalists, killing 58. The Hindu group was returning from a pilgrimage to the site of Babri Masjid when attacked. The carnage that followed was on a level unheard of for decades. Estimates of up to 2,000 Muslims were killed in northern India in revenge for the train massacre. The local Gujarat government did little to protect the local Muslims or to attempt to prosecute those responsible for the carnage. The delayed and insufficient response of both the Gujarat government and the central government to the situation further fanned the fears of Indian Muslims that neither government was interested in protecting its Muslim minority.

This type of religious violence is increasingly isolating the two communities from one another. A social activist in Gujarat noted recent changes in his community, "Muslims and Hindus used to mix with each other, live in the same localities. Now, if you walk five kilometers in either direction from here you will not meet a single Muslim."³⁹ Muslim groups are also now more active in pockets of Assam and

³⁸ Zafar Ahmed (2003), p. 135.

³⁹ Edward Luce, "Faith, Caste & Poverty," *The Financial Times*, July 5, 2003.

U.P. in response to Hindu nationalists' aggressive moves to confront the Muslim community. However, the Muslim political parties in India are few and divided, thus limiting their outlets for political expression. As a result, Muslim discontent in India is largely reflected in the sentiments of community leaders, academics, and activists. Thus a shift in the views of this representative group toward Hindu nationalist policies may indicate a larger trend.

Various press accounts further indicate that the Hindu nationalist government of Gujarat has not pursued the Hindus responsible for the deaths of the individuals in the Gujarat riots. Government officials dispute that claim and say they have arrested hundreds of individuals and filed thousands of police reports.⁴⁰ However, according to Ashutosh Varshney, in India perceptions are what matter, and Muslims who believe the state is ignoring their rights and is unwilling to protect them or address their grievances could fuel a trend toward increased militancy.⁴¹ Indeed, some reports indicate that police forces were involved in the killing of Muslims in Gujarat.⁴² A resident of Ahmedabad noted that the situation in India has noticeably worsened in recent years. "The Gujarati city [Ahmedabad] had seen communal rioting before but this time the hatred reached a new pitch of intensity."⁴³ In this atmosphere of increased Hindu-Muslim tensions, especially in states such as Gujarat, militant organizations may find a ripe recruiting ground. Muslims who see a need to protect themselves from future outbursts of violence may well be attracted to military training provided by a terrorist group. Whether their fears are based on reality or simply the perception of reality, Muslims who feel vulnerable and unprotected by the state are the most likely to join militant groups.

Since the Gujarat riots, numerous bombings have occurred in Bombay, and Islamic militant groups have vowed to take revenge. Suspects in the Bombay bombings of 2003 have admitted that the atrocities committed in Gujarat were the driving force behind their attacks. The individuals are part of a splinter group of Lashkar-e-Taiba who call themselves the "Gujarat Muslim Revenge Group." The members of this militant organization are Indian Muslims who apparently witnessed and were galvanized by the violent occurrences in Gujarat.⁴⁴ The existence of a cycle of violence between the two communities is now well established, and further persecution of the Muslim community is likely to foster more terrorist attacks.

⁴⁰ Thomas Kutty Abraham, "Gujarat Riot-Hit Muslims See Little Hope of Justice," *Reuters*, August 28, 2002.

⁴¹ Varshney (2002).

⁴² Luke Harding, "Police took part in slaughter," *The Observer*, March 3, 2002, http://www.geocities.com/IslamAwareness/Gujrat/hindu_massacre.html, accessed August 10, 2004.

⁴³ Luce, *op. cit.*

⁴⁴ Deshmukh, *op. cit.*

What Has Changed Since 9/11?

After September 11, Indian Muslims have increasingly begun to identify with their counterparts internationally. The response of the Muslim community directly following the attacks was largely one of sympathy for the U.S. victims, but Indian Muslims were firmly against the war in Afghanistan. The Imam of Fatehpuri Jama Masjid said, "Everyone is sad over whatever happened in America on September 11 and terrorism. Everyone is sad also because of the happenings in Afghanistan at present."⁴⁵ Some Indian Muslims also noted feeling a degree of satisfaction that the United States had finally felt retribution for its foreign policy wrongdoings. According to Adil Mehdi, "Even before the war began in Afghanistan the majority of people did consider America as a force antagonistic to Islam and did not regret the attack on WTC though they carefully refrained from speaking in public in support of it."⁴⁶

The fundamentalist Muslim leader Shahi Imam of Jama Masjid, Syed Ahmad Bukhari, went further in his remarks against the United States. He called the war against Afghanistan a war against Islam and stated his support for Osama bin Laden.⁴⁷ The Shahi Imam is well known for issuing inflammatory statements, however, and thus he does not necessarily represent the sentiments of the majority of Indian Muslims. Nonetheless, among Indian Muslims, support for the following global war on terrorism is clearly absent, and it has increased existing suspicion of the United States and U.S. intentions toward Muslims. "[T]he American campaign against the Taliban and Osama bin Laden has added to the accumulated anguish of Muslims and reinforced the already existing image of America as anti Islam in the Muslim mind."⁴⁸ The war on terrorism has also translated into increased suspicion by right-wing Hindus of Muslims and their activities in India, further increasing religious tensions in the country.

In addition, the focus of Islamic terrorism in India has widened since the September 11 attacks. Although modern India has continuously suffered religious violence and terrorist attacks, the militancy has gradually shifted in intent and style in recent years. The disputed territory of Kashmir had historically been the focus of Muslim terrorist attacks in India, and various other attacks were carried out in relation to locally instigated incidents. After the war against terrorism began, Indian analysts such as Ajai Sahni predicted that terrorist networks in India would expand in reaction to U.S. actions. "I think what we will see is a widening of the terrorist net-

⁴⁵ "Muslim Leaders Flay Killing of Civilians in Afghanistan," *The Press Trust of India*, October 31, 2001.

⁴⁶ Adil Mehdi, in Grare, ed. (2002), p. 15.

⁴⁷ Mehdi, p. 18.

⁴⁸ Mehdi, p. 3.

work across India particularly in metropolitan cities. This is the best time for the terrorist elements to consolidate behind Osama Bin Laden.”⁴⁹

In recent years, this trend has increasingly taken shape in India. Some terrorist groups are now shifting their focus from Kashmir to spectacular acts of mass murder in India’s urban centers, with the goal of intimidating and terrorizing the Indian public. In addition, these groups are increasingly targeting national assets such as the Gate of India and the Indian parliament. Increasingly, terrorists operating in Kashmir and in Indian cities are adopting the philosophical objectives and desired targets of other militant Islamic movements around the world. The radical groups operating in India, whether Pakistani or Indian Muslim, are showing greater similarities to international terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda.

The Iraq War

Indian Muslims opposed the war against Iraq and organized protests across India prior to the U.S. military intervention. Their view on the issue was not so different from the rest of the country. Hindus, Sikhs, and Christians also took to the streets in protest. Muslim leaders, however, publicly and vehemently stated the opinions of the community, giving pause to Indian politicians who might have considered supporting the U.S. effort. Religious leaders, such as the Shahi Imam of Jama Masjid and the Shahi Imam of Fatehpuri Masjid in March 2003, also condemned the U.S. attack on Iraq in public statements, “Muslims in India consider the U.S. attack on Iraq as an attack on Islam and humanity.”⁵⁰ The leaders also accused the United States of attempting to “control oil resources.” The reaction was even stronger at the highly regarded Darul Uloom religious school in Deoband. The leadership there issued a fatwa asking Indians in general and Indian Muslims in particular to boycott U.S. and British consumer goods to protest the war. Darul Uloom had issued a fatwa to the same purpose when the United States launched Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. The director of Darul Uloom, Maulana Margoobur Rehman, called the U.S. war on Iraq “terrorism against humanity” and accused Americans and Jews of attempting to destroy Muslims around the world.⁵¹ Other Muslim groups organized marches to protest the war. The Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Bangla, a Muslim group of clerics and intellectuals, organized 5,000 people to march on the American Center in Calcutta in April.⁵² In the months following the war, Indian Muslims were outspoken

⁴⁹ Palash Kumar, “India Fears Terrorist Backlash After U.S. Military Action,” *Agence France Presse*, October 8, 2001.

⁵⁰ “Indian Muslim Religious Leaders Condemn U.S. War on Iraq,” *Xinhua*, March 20, 2003.

⁵¹ “Darul Re-Issues Fatwa to Boycott U.S.-U.K. Products,” *Indian Express*, March 30, 2003.

⁵² “Indian Muslim Clerics Hold Anti-War March,” *Xinhua*, April 13, 2003.

against the deployment of Indian troops in Iraq to assist the coalition. Prominent Muslims noted that Iraqis were simply resisting an occupation force, and India should not assist an occupation army. Others were openly cynical of U.S. intentions. “The United States is inviting Indian and other troops to deal with the mess they have created . . . It will be our troops who will be sacrificed to clear the mess they have created.”⁵³ Muslim leaders stated that Indian Muslims are against deploying troops, adding that if the government were to send troops, they would protest.

Policy Implications for the United States

Increasing Muslim radicalism in India has important implications for U.S. security. India has already experienced serious terrorist attacks from a small number of domestic Muslim individuals and groups in the past decade. The spread of this trend could conceivably mean rising support from Indian Muslims for international radical groups.

A critical issue facing the Indian government is the need to address the poverty and discrimination faced by Indian Muslims. Muslims remain underrepresented in every arena of Indian government, including parliament and the civil service, and have lower literacy rates than the national average. In particular, the absence of schools that provide a solid secular education in Muslim communities forces communities to rely on the less-standardized madrasa system and leads to the separation and eventual polarization of religious communities. Unless Muslims have equal access to education in India, resentment of the democratic system will build and, with it, the incentive to turn to radical international groups claiming to represent the needs of the Muslim community.

Growing cooperation between terrorist factions in India and international militant and criminal groups also poses a serious threat. As they expand their networks, terrorist groups could share manpower, money, and munitions to launch bigger and more destructive operations against U.S. interests as well as on Indian government targets. Intervening to disrupt these networks and linkages will be crucial to limiting the growth of Islamic radicalism in India. The United States needs to recognize that the South Asian militant groups are still primarily based in Pakistan, and groups in India may be increasingly radicalized through exposure to international terrorist movements and ideologies. Reducing Pakistani support for terrorist activity on the Indian side of Kashmir is key to demobilizing the spread of militancy in India.

With the second-largest population of Muslims in the world, India remains an example of the compatibility of Islam and democracy. However, radicalization of the

⁵³ Elizabeth Roche, “Indian Muslims Come Out Against Deploying Troops in Iraq,” *Agence France Presse*, June 24, 2003.

Muslim and Hindu community could lead to internal violence on a large scale and the erosion of secular democratic norms in India. In the past, terrorist activity by Muslims in India has provoked a violent reaction by Hindu fundamentalists, leading to more violence and spiraling unrest. Protecting the civil rights of its Muslim population and preventing deadly waves of revenge killings, like the one in Gujarat, are critical if India wants to emerge victorious against religious extremism. This situation will need to be monitored closely, and the United States should encourage moderation on the part of the Indian government in dealing with the terrorist threat. A heavy-handed approach is more likely to win recruits for militant groups than to dissuade them, as seen by India's experience in Kashmir. Conversely, the continued success of the secular Indian state in peacefully incorporating its massive Muslim population into the political system is a testament to the compatibility of Islam and democracy.

India and the United States have been cooperating closely in counterterrorism efforts since September 11, 2001, and continuing attacks underline the need for expanding that cooperation. Interdicting terrorist groups operating in the nebulous territory between Pakistan and Afghanistan and in the disputed areas of Kashmir is one major goal in this counterterrorism effort. Defeating the vicious cycle of violence that creates terrorist groups inside India and Pakistan is the other.

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Central Asia: “Apocalypse Soon” or Eccentric Survival?

Cheryl Benard

Introduction

Regional experts offer sharply divergent prognoses for the stability of Central Asia and for its potential Islamic radicalization. The region indeed faces significant challenges. The risks already inherent in its geostrategic position are made more dangerous by problems of governance and serious economic and social difficulties. The possibility that radical Islam could gain adherents cannot be dismissed. On balance, however, if the challenges are properly managed, we do not believe that the Central Asian republics are inherently prone to Islamic extremism. Whether extremism becomes a significant vehicle for the expression of political disaffection will depend on the policies of domestic and international political actors; but at present it remains eminently preventable. Such prevention, however, presupposes the thoughtful, locally appropriate, and realistic management of Islam within these polities and societies.

A subsidiary danger is that an excessive focus on political Islam in the five countries of Central Asia will lead analysts and policymakers to overlook other—possibly more significant—fault lines.

To better understand current political trends in Central Asia, it is helpful to look at the area from four key perspectives: its overall history, which has created a distinctive political culture; recent catalytic events; current challenges; and its geopolitical placement. Together these factors shape the affiliations, identity, and governance of these states.

This chapter reviews the relationship between religion and politics in Central Asia, discusses the development and the prospects of political Islam in that region since September 11, 2001, and evaluates the implications of these developments for U.S. security interests.

The background section describes significant aspects of this region’s political culture as it has evolved historically and reviews the problems and challenges shared by the five republics.

Next, the chapter evaluates the development of Islam in these countries. This development has been shaped by “catalytic events” that deepened, transformed, or changed the context of prior dynamics between religion and politics.

In the concluding section, we review the assessments of experts concerning the level of threat facing the stability and development of Central Asia. We conclude with our own evaluation of the most likely trends and their significance to security.

To understand Central Asia and assess its likely political conduct, it is helpful to look at the area from three key perspectives: its overall history, which has created a distinctive political culture and which shapes its current affiliations; recent catalytic events that have driven the development of politics and Islam in the region; and the area’s current challenges and geopolitical situation, including issues of governance, economics, and diplomacy.

The region has many problems—from an absence of cohesive national identities to grave economic downturn, a well-developed drug trade, significant ecological challenges, and powerful outside actors with rival agendas. However, it also has a functioning, elaborate political culture deeply rooted in history and a long tradition of resilience.

Unlike some other parts of the world, Central Asia does not have a history of populist religious fanaticism. On balance, Islam has been an important but subsidiary part of people’s lives and identity and has coexisted well with nonbelievers and with members of other religions. As one expert notes:

Political Islam has little indigenous resonance in Central Asia. Central Asians traditionally adhered to versions of Islamic practice with certain syncretic peculiarities. This was true of the Uzbeks and Tajiks, where text-based Islam found greater resonance, and of the formerly nomadic Turkmen, Kazakh and Kyrgyz, for whom Islamic practice overlay shamanistic and animistic beliefs.¹

Today, however, there is significant disaffection, especially among young people, and Islam could conceivably become a vehicle for its expression in violent ways. Certainly, some forces are attempting to position radical Islam as a venue for oppositional politics. The events in Uzbekistan in 2004 signal that religion can function as a transmitter of frustration.

The third and possibly more disruptive fault line is the emerging division between those who lean toward Russia and those who are attracted by the opportunities flowing from an alliance with the West. Russia, determined to maintain its influence in this region, is undoubtedly stoking this conflict. For the West, bringing this issue to a head within Central Asia by pursuing either/or strategies is probably not a good

¹ Edward Schatz, “Islamism and Anti-Americanism in Central Asia,” *Current History*, October 2002, p. 337.

idea and may be more destabilizing than the activities of Muslim activists, although these currently garner more of the West's attention.

The need to democratize and implement economic reforms is clear, and there is broad local consensus on these goals—although on the part of some within the ruling elites, that consensus may consist more of lip service than genuine conviction. These reform processes need to be undertaken persistently but thoughtfully, not through the cookie cutter methods sometimes demanded by external critics.

History and Political Culture

Central Asia's history, recorded since the sixth century B.C., has shaped a distinctive and complex political culture. A common theme has been the ability to endure exceptional levels of turbulence and to evolve a culture that remains stable at its core despite dramatic and violent political change.

Central Asia's complex history allows for many different placements of emphasis, depending on the lens and interests of the viewer. Because radical Islam is currently a focal point of concern for the scholarly community and for policymakers, there is a danger that this may lead to analytic overemphasis and a loss of perspective. Central Asia has seen more than one major religion and ideology—as well as some of this planet's most famous conquerors—come and then go. It is important to keep a broader view.

The predominant themes of Central Asian history are endurance of multiple waves of conquest; periods of isolation from the global mainstream; and a high capacity to absorb new religions and ideologies, which the area has typically amalgamated but not succumbed to.

The most "homegrown" religion of this region is Zoroastrianism, which had its origins in Bactria/Sogdiana before spreading to Persia. This was followed by Buddhism and later Islam and Christianity. In terms of governance, the region has seen dramatic sequential changes, from its origin in a nomadic culture through Parthians, Sassanids, Huns, Turks, Umayyad Arabs, Samanids, Ghaznavids, Seljuks, Mongols, Timurids, Safavids, to the Soviets of the previous century. Regional experts often have their favorite theory concerning the relative significance and lasting impact of one or another of these eras; together they form a cultural reference base whose images, values, and ideas continue to shape Central Asian self-definition.

How significant will radical Islam become in Central Asia? The answer will in part be determined by the performance and nature of Central Asian governments. If they fail to manage the difficult balancing act between security and repression; if economic reform does not take place and economic opportunities do not expand; then popular opposition to the regimes will grow. This protest will be channeled, articulated, and exploited by those who have the ideological and organizational tools to

do so. They will include, but not be confined to, Islamic extremists. It is reasonable to argue that, in an Islamic context, grievances that are expressed in Islamic terms have a certain advantage. They may enjoy special resonance and may be more difficult for the regime to repress, since they will have a measure of popular sympathy and be shielded by the special care political leaders need to take when dealing with matters related to religion. However, it is important to avoid an isolated focus on just one of the challenges Central Asian societies face and on just one of the political means of expressing discontent. Radical Islam is not the only challenge. It is perhaps not even the most significant one. The rival interests of outside powers, the imprint and enduring influence of Russian and indeed of socialist thought, are important as well. And the success or failure of a more moderate experiment in Islamic statehood in neighboring Afghanistan will have an impact, as will the unfolding attempt to control extremist Islam in Pakistan and the ongoing violence of Chechen extremists.

Brought by expansionist Arab armies in the seventh century, Islam initially met with heavy resistance. In the ninth century, the Samanid Empire became the first native dynasty to arise in Central Asia after the Muslim Arab conquest with Bukhara (current day Uzbekistan) as its capital. During that period Bukhara—"the Pillar of Islam"—became Central Asia's religious and cultural heart. It was renowned for the impulse that it gave to national sentiment and learning through literature and culture. The Samanid emirs controlled the silver mines of Central Asia in Badakhshan and Ferghana, which made possible the development of coinage that circulated not only through the Muslim world but also in Russia, Scandinavia, the Baltics, and even the British Isles.² Significant conversion to Islam, however, did not occur until the tenth century. Transoxiana was affiliated religiously with the Sunni caliphate in Baghdad but remained on good terms with Persian Shi'a culture as well, one of many indicators showing that religion tends to be viewed moderately in the area and is kept in a broader context. A long period of dynastic wars and wars of succession then rocked the area, but the next major events by global reckoning were the successive arrivals of two Mongol invaders, Genghis Khan in the thirteenth century and Timur in the fourteenth. Although these names are synonymous with mass destruction, the two leaders pursued goals beyond what their military strategy of "shock and awe" suggests—Genghis Khan wanted to preside over a flourishing trade route and improved the infrastructure accordingly. Timur was interested in city-building and turned Samarkand into a flourishing center of culture.

The next turning point was economic: the decline of the Silk Road during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries as maritime trade became more important. The seventeenth and eighteenth century saw a Buddhist dynasty established in Kazakhstan and parts of Turkestan. Commerce started to pick up again in the eighteenth cen-

² See, for example, Lapidus (2002).

ture, this time with an orientation toward Russia. The already growing interest of a rising Russia in this region gained an entirely new weight during the following century with the onset of the struggle for dominance known as the "Great Game." Central Asia's colonial period, first under the Russian czars and later under the Soviet Union, would last until glasnost.³

The states known as the "Stans" were created starting in 1924:⁴

[This was the] most graphically visible effect of Soviet rule; it drew the lines on the map. Before the [Russian] revolution the peoples of Central Asia had no concept of a firm national border. They had plotted their identities by a tangle of criteria: religion, tribe, location, way of life, social status. The Soviets, however, believed that such a populace was fertile soil for Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism . . . [Previously] Central Asians usually identified themselves "ethnically" as nomad or settled, as Turk or Persian, as Muslim, or by their clan. Separate nationalities were "identified" by Soviet scholars on orders of Stalin. Central Asia's linguistic continuum was artificially teased apart into five standardized languages, with a host of in-between dialects lost in the process. Similarly, the ethnic blur was vivisected and its five most distinguishable parts bottled in separate republics. . . . Each of the republics was shaped to contain numerous pockets of different nationalities, each with long-standing claims to the land. Everyone had to admit that only a strong central government could keep order on such a map.⁵

Throughout this region's extraordinarily tangled and changeable history, some patterns can be discerned.

Subsequent to most of the conquests, an intermixing of the new and old elites generally took place. Whether on a practical level, with existing urban elites making themselves useful to their nomadic conquerors by becoming their administrators or through intermarriage, the previous elites often managed to affiliate themselves with the new elites. This had the result of not entirely eliminating old structures; instead, new ones were superimposed. This approach produced not only a hybrid culture but also a varied ethnic mix.

The region typically demonstrated a ready but "amalgamatory" willingness to adopt new religions as they came and went. Such an attitude has generally produced moderate practitioners rather than fanatical converts.

The nature of Central Asia as a trade route meant that invaders, even after an initial and frequently brutal campaign of destruction, often saw it in their best interest to safeguard and even improve the infrastructure.

³ Mehmet Saray, "The Roots of Islam in Central Asia: A Brief Primer," in Snyder (1995), p. 39

⁴ The designation, common in popular parlance and in academia, is somewhat arbitrary, since it excludes Afghanistan and Pakistan.

⁵ Mayhew, Plunkett, and Richmond (2000), pp. 34, 53.

The region has an extremely violent history. However, the bulk of that violence is attributable either to foreign invaders or to intra-elite succession struggles, not to recurrent conflicts among clearly defined local actors (religious groups, ethnicities, city-states, etc.)

Much has been made of the ethnic heterogeneity of the Central Asian republics (CARs) (see Table 7.1), and the fact that their national boundaries do not coincide with ethnic lines. Brzezinski sees the cultural, linguistic, religious, and ethnic pluralities of the CARs as a factor “promoting instability” and making them vulnerable to “internal and external conflicts.”⁶ Other interpretations are possible as well. Since none of these identities was clearly dominant over the others, and since they did not coincide with each other, one could argue that they add up, if not to integration, then at least to entanglement, which may be less destabilizing than a situation where there are clear-cut lines of division. One could also argue that a culture with a strong nomadic component is comfortable with a much higher degree of fluidity than a strictly sedentary society might be.

Table 7.1
Ethnic Distribution in the Central Asian Republics

Ethnic Group	Republic	Number
Kazaks	Kazakhstan	8,000,000
	Uzbekistan	900,000
	Turkmenistan	90,000
	Kyrgyzstan	50,000
Kyrgyz	Kyrgyzstan	3,000,000
	Uzbekistan	180,000
Tajiks	Tajikistan	4,400,000
	Uzbekistan	630,000
	Kazakhstan	100,000
Turkmen	Turkmenistan	3,600,000
Uzbeks	Uzbekistan	18,000,000
	Tajikistan	1,600,000
	Kyrgyzstan	690,000
	Turkmenistan	396,000
Uyghurs	Kyrgyzstan	50,000

⁶ Mayhew, Plunkett, and Richmond (2000), pp. 129–130.

The Region's Current Challenges

It is customary to refer to the Central Asian Republics en bloc, although they show significant dissimilarities in size, wealth, resources, ethnic composition, relative power, security strategy, and political system (see Table 7.2 for an overview). We examine these differences later in this chapter.

Their most important similarities, which justify their being perceived collectively, are their shared recent past at the hands of the Soviet empire, which marginalized them even as it engaged in massive interventions in their economy, culture, and political structure; a complex history that left behind a multilayered set of political identities, affiliations, and survival strategies; and similar (though not identical) economic and social problems.

A Difficult Economic Situation. Although some Central Asian republics are relatively better off than others, especially in terms of topography and natural resources, overall they suffer from depressed economies. Their economic systems and markets are poorly structured, with uneven reliance on a few sectors; some of those sectors, for example, the growing of cotton, are vulnerable to circumstances such as droughts.

The criminal sector is significant, with the drug trade representing up to a third of the GNP in some of the republics. All the republics have poor educational systems and rapidly growing populations living under rising levels of poverty and unemployment. Attempts to integrate and consolidate the region economically have made little headway.

Some experts blame Soviet planners for constructing what they see as a series of colonial economies in the Central Asian states, economies whose underlying logic was to provide maximum benefit to the Soviet center. Others take a more benign view and believe that Soviet planning was premised on Central Asia being one interlocked region, with each state maximizing what it did best on the assumption that there would be sharing and exchange. In this view, it is only now, when their economies have become separate, that the intended system of interdependence is causing them trouble:

Soviet planners looked on Central Asia as a single unit and, in a rational manner, accorded low priority to agriculture in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, where land is poor but water is plentiful. Instead, they encouraged agricultural development further downstream, where the reverse is true.⁷

⁷ Charles William Maynes, "America Discovers Central Asia," *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 2003, p. 125.

Table 7.2
Overview of the Five Central Asian Republics

Population and Geography	Economy	Politics/Religious Influences
Kyrgyzstan		
<p>Second-smallest CAR</p> <p>Population: Just under 5 million. Two minorities feel aggrieved: (1) Uzbeks (13 percent of population) feel their rights to cultural and political self-expression are stifled; (2) ethnic Russians, whose departure in large numbers has been felt economically because they were the country's technocrats and professionals</p>	<p>Few natural assets</p> <p>80–90 percent unemployment; shortages of water and arable land; corruption</p> <p>Effort made to implement IMF planning but trend has been reversed</p>	<p>Effort made to liberalize the political system; but trend reversed, apparently because the leadership thought it was not working. Reform of education system considered by observers to be noteworthy</p> <p>President Askar Akayev considered relatively responsive to economic and political problems; Kyrgyzstan considered a more open society than that of the other CARs</p> <p>Hizb ut-Tahrir maintains presence, membership estimated to be 3,000</p>
Tajikistan		
<p>Geographically smallest CAR</p> <p>Population: 7 million, about 80 percent living in poverty. Only CAR with non-Turkic language</p>	<p>No oil or gas. Under Soviets, was assigned the task of producing cotton, aluminum, and some minerals only</p> <p>One-third of country's GNP thought to be derived from drugs transiting from Afghanistan</p> <p>Major exodus of trained and educated Russians has caused a shortage of professionals</p>	<p>Currently allows political participation of a moderate, democratic Islam in the form of the Islamic Renaissance Party. Tajikistan is only CAR in which an Islamic party is legally permitted</p>
Turkmenistan		
<p>Population: 4.7 million</p>	<p>Significant gas reserves but economy is probably slipping</p>	<p>Highly centralized and authoritarian government; fairly good system of social benefits attempts to make the leadership more tolerable</p> <p>Experimented with liberalization and greater political expression during 1990s but apparently deemed it too risky and reverted to authoritarian rule</p> <p>Has declared political neutrality and has sought to "form ties with diverse foreign nations"; this has contributed to friction with Uzbekistan</p>

Table 7.2—continued

Population and Geography	Economy	Politics/Religious Influences
Uzbekistan		
Population: 25 million	<p>Relatively good agricultural base, minerals, and natural gas, and more foreign investment than the others. Unemployment high, estimated at around 40 percent</p> <p>Different outside agencies have made conflicting demands and given contradictory guidance, e.g., the IMF, the World Bank, and U.S. experts have differing views on the speed and advisable nature of privatization</p>	<p>President Islam Karimov has been the most forward-leaning of the Central Asian leaders concerning the new "strategic partnership" with the United States. This posture has enabled him to maximize the possible economic benefits of such an alliance, but it may be causing domestic difficulties</p> <p>Large numbers of students are permitted to study abroad; censorship has been lightened</p>
Kazakhstan		
<p>Population: about 17 million. Largest CAR—larger than Western Europe</p> <p>Only CAR with a direct border with Russia. Border is one of the longest in the world between two countries, stretching about 3,000 miles</p> <p>Population was the least settled, the most nomadic, of the CARs</p>	<p>Soviets left significant industry behind, as well as mining</p>	<p>President Nazarbayev has attempted to chart a course that satisfies Sunni Islam; Shi'a Islam; Sufism; the Slavic population that adheres mostly to the Eastern Orthodox church; the German, primarily Lutheran, minority; and a small number of Jews and Buddhists—while adhering to a firmly secularist definition of the state. President made pilgrimage to Mecca in 1994 but also a public visit to the Pope in Rome during the same trip</p>

Whichever explanation one finds more persuasive, the economic indicators are currently bad enough to inspire some experts to diagnose "hyperdepression" and to use terminology such as "collapsed economies."⁸

Demographic pressures and the Soviet legacy of mismanagement have exacerbated the continuing economic problems in Central Asia. Of the five Central Asian states, only Kazakhstan, which has the potential for significant oil exports, offers a commodity of significant interest to global markets; this country also benefits from a transparent and competitive banking sector and a stable monetary system. In contrast, while Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are gas producers, the need to transport the gas long distances and possibly over or under water to reach more profitable markets all but guarantee that it will instead be sold locally. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, the most resource-poor of the Central Asian states, also have the most limited pro-

⁸ International Crisis Group (ICG), "Incubators of Conflict, Central Asia's Localised Poverty and Social Unrest," Asia Report No. 16, June 8, 2001, p. 1.

pects for growth. All the states except Kazakhstan have a high debt-service-to-exports ratio. Legal and tax systems that penalize success further complicate the equation and limit foreign investment. In this context, both corruption and the underground economy become key safety valves, even as they create more problems in turn.⁹

Tenuous Governance and a Volatile Political Situation. Within each state, among the republics, and radiating outward in concentric circles from Central Asia (Russia, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Turkey, China, India, Iran, the Muslim world, Western Europe, the United States) there are numerous and multiple conflicting interests and agendas at play. Preventing their societies from breaking down and open conflict from erupting is an ongoing challenge faced by their governments, which meet the challenge through idiosyncratic combinations of delicate balancing and massively indelicate authoritarianism.

In each republic, the political culture represents a mix of personality cult and authoritarian rule, old networks of affiliation and organization, Soviet institutional and organizational structures, and some modern democratic forms.

Each of these systems is represented by advocates pressing for their own respective system: For example, Russia supports Soviet system components, tribal leaders support the old networks, and modern human rights organizations demand more progress on modern democratic processes. Meanwhile, outside actors seek to advance their respective agendas, related to economics, security, and diplomacy.

Aside from the similarities, there are quite a few objective indicators by which the Central Asian republics differ from each other significantly:

Although geographically intertwined and previously economically integrated to a great extent, the five “Stans” today display distinct differences: per capita income in Kazakhstan is about \$1,200, but only \$200–300 in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan have plenty of oil and gas resources, but need to develop their energy transport links to Western markets. Uzbekistan has some gas and a highly developed and specialized agricultural sector, but must depend heavily on the water resources of its upstream neighbors. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have abundant water and electricity resources, but very little else.¹⁰

Political and ethnic issues add to the combustible diversity. Uzbekistan is by many indicators the “alpha-Stan,” but the others do not always concede this gracefully. There is a Tajik minority in Uzbekistan and an Uzbek minority in Tajikistan, both with grievances concerning their treatment and right to be represented.¹¹

⁹ As cited in current RAND research by Olga Olikier and Theodore Karasik.

¹⁰ Robin Poulton, “Ethnic and Interstate Complexity in the Central Asian ‘Stans,’” *Asian Affairs*, Vol. 33, London, February 2002.

¹¹ For one of many downbeat versions of the region’s fracture lines, see Michael Denison, “Central Asian Politics After the Taliban: New Risks, New Opportunities,” *Asian Affairs*, Vol. 33, London, February 2002.

There are also territorial issues, such as the border dispute between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, which some feel have the potential to "spark broader political turmoil."¹²

Despite the artificiality of the borders between these five countries, which were drawn by Soviet officials in the 1930s with the express aim of limiting national and ethnic capacity to mobilize, the states of Central Asia have been left with a variety of claims on each other's territories. Specifically, Tajikistan has a historic and ethnic basis for claiming all of Bukhara, which lies in Uzbekistan; Turkmenistan could claim Khiva, in Uzbekistan; Kazakhstan can make a claim to Tashkent, the capital of Uzbekistan; and Uzbekistan, for its part, can assert the right to territory in all three of these countries, as well as Kyrgyzstan's Osh region. Moreover, all the Central Asian states have sizable Uzbek ethnic diasporas.¹³ The effect has been incursions into each other's territory in pursuit of "bandits" who are frequently innocent of any crime.

Catalytic Events

Central Asian history is marked by a great many dramatic events. Here we review only those of the modern era, emphasizing the ones that have played into the development of political Islam in the region:¹⁴

- The establishment of the Central Asian states by the Soviet Union
- The collapse of the Soviet Union
- The rise of fundamentalism and the reign of the Taliban in neighboring Afghanistan
- The post–September 11 alliance with the United States and the overthrow of the Taliban.

Each of these has represented a serious challenge or turning point for the political balance of the region. They also reveal four critical fault lines:

- The somewhat tenuous nature of its states, which are recent and were drawn on arbitrary lines
- The challenge of radical Islam

¹² ICG, "Kyrgyzstan at Ten, Trouble in the Island of Democracy," Asia Report No. 22, Osh/Brussels: August 28, 2001, p. 18.

¹³ As cited in current RAND research by Olga Olikier and Theodore Karasik.

¹⁴ Although the imperial Russian conquest of Central Asia could be considered a catalytic event, the scope of the chapter is the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries.

- The competing agendas of powerful outside actors and the strong ongoing “pull” of Russia
- Problematic governance (autocratic rulers, corruption, oppressive police, absence of political freedoms, poorly managed economies, etc.).

The establishment of the Central Asian states by the Soviet Union is of obvious significance, as is the fact that the process was fairly arbitrary. In line both with the Soviets’ broader attitude toward religion in general and their assessment of the possible negative impact of Islamic activism on the domestic, political, and international goals of the Soviet Union, Islam was seen as something requiring management and containment. To this purpose, the Soviets attempted different strategies involving varying levels of repression. The overall thrust of the policy was to create a registered, overseen, official, and minimal Islam.

Several strands of “underground Islam” survived these efforts and persisted: the folk Islam of older and traditional Central Asians; a stifled clerical Islam, sustaining itself in secret and often passed along within clerical families; and various incipient blendings of Islam with local nationalism on the part of intellectuals.

The Soviet army spent ten years in Afghanistan trying in vain to bolster a friendly Communist regime. It lost thousands of fighters but failed to gain control in what became, because of U.S. involvement, a proxy war. In the Soviet Union, opposition to the intervention grew, and Soviet troops finally retreated from Afghanistan in 1989, leaving behind their weapons and ammunition and almost one million dead Afghans, most of them civilians. The civil war that followed, and the rise of the Taliban regime, brought extremism and anarchy to the Stans’ immediate borders and gave a temporary boost to homegrown radicals, notably the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). The IMU drifted into Afghanistan, lured by the prospect of funding, training, and an alliance with like-minded partners. The decision caused IMU to suffer devastating damage when it was caught up in the overthrow of the Taliban—although there is disagreement over how great that damage has been and whether IMU can recover from it or perhaps has already regrouped to some extent.

Under the Soviet policy of Mikhail Gorbachev’s *glasnost* (openness), the repression of religious observance was loosened and grassroots Islamic revival movements began to take shape, notably in the Fergana Valley. The movement had no more than a few thousand members but it reflected a return of more overt religion. More new mosques were opened in 1989 than in the whole previous decade.¹⁵ Various Islamic groups that had opposed those that held power through the Soviet Spiritual

¹⁵ Shirin Akiner, “The Struggle for Identity,” in Snyder (1995), pp. 13–14.

Administration of the Muslims of Central Asia sought to take control of the network of mosques and schools.¹⁶

The collapse of the Soviet Union increased the freedom of mainstream Muslims to express their religious sentiments, but religious leaders, groups, and mosques remained on the radar screens of the newly independent governments, whose leadership bore the Soviet imprimatur and continued to be subject to suspicion and surveillance.

The post–September 11 alliance with the United States and the overthrow of the Taliban seem to be locally regarded with little ambivalence as a good development and a good opportunity for the Stans. The overthrow of the Taliban removed what had been a giant threat and a headache from right next door. Aside from a small minority of militants, Muslims in Central Asia did not approve of the Taliban version of Islam. The alliance with the United States has brought money, opportunities, stature, and unprecedented international attention to the region. However, there is some divergence among the countries concerning their assessment of their longer term options and best interests. Uzbekistan appears to be the most committed to the partnership with the United States and seems to regard it as a long-term development. The other states have benefited less, but they also seem less certain that the United States can be a reliable alternative to Russia in the longer term, or that it serves their national interest to affiliate more bindingly with the United States at the expense of detaching themselves from Russia. On the other hand, Uzbekistan has a number of vulnerabilities. Its leader, Islam Karimov, faces growing criticism of his autocratic manner and possible corruption. He has announced his intention to step down, but there is no clear vision for his succession. Instead of contributing to cooperative arrangements and regional cohesion, Uzbekistan is in many ways moving away from the other Stans.

The Islamic Landscape of the Central Asian Republics

Central Asia's non-Arab status, its cultural diversity, its geography, and its history have all contributed to a distinctive evolution of Islam. Central Asian Islam is accustomed to coexisting with other religions. It usually does not challenge the state but finds ways of coexisting with it. It can be eclectic and flexible. It has been remote from the Islamic mainstream repeatedly and for long periods of time. In terms of the bulk of the population, Central Asian Islam is moderate and tempered by many pre- and non-Islamic regional values and traditions. Many Central Asians do not practice

¹⁶ Evgeny Abdullaev, "The Central Asian Nexus: Islam and Politics," and Bakhtiar Babadzhanov, "Islam in Uzbekistan: From the Struggle for "Religious Purity" to Political Activism," in Rumer, ed. (2002), pp. 245–298 and pp. 299–330.

any religion at all. Of the practicing Muslims in the region, many are liberal Hanafi Sunnis, and their practices continue to incorporate various pre-Islamic practices, such as shrine pilgrimage (*ziyarat*) and the celebration of Zoroastrian holidays.¹⁷

The high point of Central Asia's Islamic identity was reached during the ninth and tenth centuries, when the region contributed intellectually and culturally to the development of Islamic civilization; the low point fell during the early part of Soviet rule, when a determined effort was made to eradicate Islam. During the early part of their rule, the Soviets made rigorous efforts to stamp out the influence of religion. This later gave way to a more modest policy of "managing Islam," allowing its limited practice but reducing its avenues of expression and subordinating the clergy to the state.

Throughout the former Soviet empire, the fall of the Soviet Union inspired the reemergence of religious observance from its former underground existence as one way of expressing and celebrating the new era of freedom. The enhanced religious self-expression of Central Asian Muslims during that period was generally comparable to the increased church attendance in Christian parts of the former Soviet Union, but with the added dimension that people in these arbitrarily created states were exploring Islam as a possible source of identity.

The propensity for various Islamic populations to become radicalized or re-Islamized has received a large share of recent analytic attention, and this question has certainly been raised for Central Asia. Particular concern has been given to three issues: whether the IMU was truly eradicated in the strikes against the Taliban or might be regrouping; to what extent the influence of Hizb ut-Tahrir (HuT) is growing in different locations in Central Asia and what the group's real political agenda is; and whether a socially conservative, backward-looking Islam is experiencing a revival, with all the attendant consequences of such a development for the education system, the legal system, the international alignments of these societies, the status of women, and the equilibrium between Muslims and non-Muslims and secularists in these societies.

To address these questions, it is important to first assess Islam realistically within each of these countries, neither neglecting nor overemphasizing its actual significance. The bulk of practicing Muslims in Central Asia adhere to what we can term "folk Islam," which contains elements of pre- and non-Islamic traditions and has a history of moderation and tolerance; the more urban and intellectual strata practice an Islam strongly shaped by Sufism. A strong segment could best be described as practicing a "lapsed" Islam, centered around occasional prayer and the observance of rituals connected with major holidays and life events that have a social as

¹⁷ See, for example, ICG, "Central Asia: Islam and the State," Asia Report No. 59, July 10, 2003; and David Tyson, "Shrine Pilgrimage in Turkmenistan as a Means to Understand Islam Among the Turkmen," *Central Asia Monitor*, No. 1, 1997.

much as a religious value. The landscape of Islam in Central Asia can be represented graphically in Figure 7.1 and 7.2, the first showing the most interesting tendencies on a spectrum of democracy to nondemocracy, and the second one on a spectrum of nonviolence violence.

Showing these tendencies on two separate figures is necessary because one of the most politically radical groups, the Hizb ut-Tahrir, also professes to be nonviolent in its methods. This is widely doubted by experts. However, until definitive evidence is available, judgment must remain suspended on this question.

To be relevant to peoples' lives, Islam must have something to offer. Over the past decades, Islam's main contribution in Central Asia has been to provide a general

Figure 7.1
Political and Religious Tendencies in Central Asia on a Spectrum of Democracy to Nondemocracy





Figure 7.2
Political and Religious Tendencies in Central Asia on a Spectrum of Nonviolence to Violence



RAND MG246-7.2

ethical framework, a belief system, and a structure for such fundamental life events as births, marriages, and deaths.

The Soviet system tried to contest the validity of Islam on the first and second matters and succeeded in part in reducing it to the third, more “ceremonial” function, often driving even that function underground. The Central Asian governments today generally share the same approach toward Islam: They want to manage it, keep it transparent, and prevent it from becoming an independent political force. That describes their attitude toward religion in general and is not exclusively focused on Islam. Where proselytizing Christianity makes an appearance, it is subjected to exactly the same lack of hospitality as is activist Islam.

Moderate Islam is nominally encouraged by Central Asian governments. This is reflected in the increase in the number of mosques. Turkmenistan had only four

mosques during the Soviet era; today it has 318.¹⁸ In Kyrgyzstan, the number of mosques increased from 33 to over 2,000.¹⁹ An exception is Uzbekistan. In 1998, the Uzbek government set up registration requirements for existing mosques and subsequently shut down thousands that did not meet the criteria. It is estimated that the number of mosques consequently decreased from over 5,000 to approximately 1,800.

Most observers agree that the number of mosques in Central Asia is not indicative of very much. They are not well attended, and overt religious practice, after an initial increase following independence, is again at low levels, exercised primarily by elderly men. People pray at home or not at all, and seldom with the frequency required by doctrine. In Turkmenistan, luxurious new mosques have mostly been erected by the government at the behest of President Saparmurad Niyazov; reportedly, his book *Rukhnama (Spiritual World)* is read in these mosques, besides being used as a textbook in the schools.

All the Central Asian states have institutionalized their control over religion by subsuming the religious authority under that of the state. In Turkmenistan, the Ministry of Justice is the lead agency for any religious activity in the country. There is also a size requirement for congregations; they must have a membership of at least 500 to be legally registered. The purpose is to prevent groups that may not have legitimate religious agendas from being able to take cover in a maze that the government will no longer be able to oversee. In addition to the Ministry of Justice, a special Council for Religious Affairs under the personal leadership of the president is also in charge of religious matters. Its leadership additionally consists of high-ranking Islamic clerics and representatives of the Russian Orthodox church in Turkmenistan. This body runs the Muslim Religious Board, which employs, selects, supervises, and can dismiss all clerics in the country, Christian as well as Muslim. Turkmenistan does not "discriminate" against Muslims—Baptists, Seventh Day Adventists, and Baha'is have all experienced surveillance and arrest. In fact, Christian sects are comparatively worse off than Muslims, because it is almost impossible for them to meet the 500-member limit required to establish a legal congregation.

In Kazakhstan, several government bodies supervise religious activities. As in Turkmenistan, the Ministry of Justice is in charge of the registration of mosques and other religious centers. There is also a Council on Religious Affairs and, of greater consequence for Muslims, the Muslim Spiritual Administration of Kazakhstan (DUMK). This organization appoints clerics and publishes the topics that are approved for the Friday sermon. Mosques offer courses on the Quran, but there are no known madrassas in Kazakhstan.

¹⁸ U.S. Department of State, "International Religious Freedom Report 2002: Turkmenistan."

¹⁹ ICG Asia Report No. 59 (2003), p. 23.

Kyrgyzstan maintains a State Commission of Religious Affairs. The prime goals of the government are to prevent foreign religiously based influences from gaining influence and power, to keep HuT and other radical groups repressed, and to maintain Islam at a moderate level. Clerics who seem to be expressing radical views find themselves replaced. This seems to be in accord with the wishes of the bulk of the population and the established imams. There are dozens of madrassas in Kyrgyzstan, as well as a theological faculty at Osh University funded by Turkey and a faculty of shari'a law at the Kuwaiti-funded Kyrgyz-Turkish Manas University in Bishkek.

The one exception to the general trends discussed above is Tajikistan. In that country, existing rifts in regard to regional and clan politics and the distribution of resources, exacerbated by radical spillover from Uzbekistan, found their expression in a civil war with Islamic overtones. Experts continue to be divided over the issue of how "Islamic" that bloody, five-year conflict really was,²⁰ but the predominant view is that it was a "fight for central government control by rival regional-political groupings."²¹ It centered on a coalition of those who opposed the government of President Rakhmonov, the United Tajik Opposition (UTO).²²

Tajikistan ultimately resolved this civil war with the help of a Russian-led, Iranian-supported negotiation in the foreground of ongoing U.N.-sponsored talks between the Tajik government and the Islamist opposition.²³ This accord reflected a strategy of co-opting Islamic political actors, with Tajikistan becoming the only one of the Central Asian states to allow a legal Islamic political party, the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP). One could argue that political Islam has most effectively shown its muscle in Tajikistan, where it was able to threaten the survival of the state and the viability of the society, and forced its way into the political system. However, even there, the state has been recapturing lost ground ever since, successively sidelining the IRP. In the face of strong government control and supervisory measures, including the arrest of two high party officials,²⁴ the IRP (which has 40,000 members nationwide) is choosing a conciliatory and cooperative stance vis-à-vis the central government, at least overtly.

Tajikistan's policy of accommodating political Islam has been combined with serious crackdowns on anything outside the Islamic mainstream. Clerics who seem too radical have been dismissed in significant numbers, and many mosques have been closed. Control is effected through the government's Committee on Religious Af-

²⁰ ICG Asia Report No. 59 (2003), p. 3.

²¹ Ben Partridge, "Tajikistan, Civil War Challenged Russian Policy," Radio Free Europe (RFE), London, January 28, 1999.

²² See especially Johnson (1999).

²³ Chatterjee (2002).

²⁴ RFE/RL Central Asia Report, "Islamic Party Walking Softly Under Tajik President's Big Stick," September 18, 2003.

airs, which has been systematically increasing its level of supervision over local religious bodies, the content of religious education, the vetting of clerics, etc. Tajikistan has 251 major mosques and 3,000 smaller mosques, all registered. An unknown number of unregistered mosques have so far eluded the attention of the authorities, though dozens have been closed down. The threshold for building a major mosque is high—it has to prove that it will serve a minimum of 15,000 worshippers who are not already yet served by an existing mosque. The 21 existing madrassas are under the control of the CRA through the Islamic Center, which is its affiliate. Interestingly, clerics are required to be apolitical; they may not be affiliated even with the IRP. Most clerics and citizens appear to be content with this system, with one exception. The closing of mosques has inspired public protest to the point of major demonstrations.

In Uzbekistan, a Committee on Religious Affairs regulates religious matters. The Islamic component is the Muslim Spiritual Board, which supervises the content of curricula and religious publications, the registration of mosques, the topics of Friday sermons, and the appointment of clerics. Local bureaucracies and neighborhood councils (*mahallas*) extend the supervision and control to the province level. Religious education is strictly controlled by the state. Some clerics chafe at this level of supervision and regulation. However, there is a long-standing system in place for those who wish a higher degree of religiosity. Under the Soviets, traditional religious figures gave semiclandestine instruction and religious counseling, and this continues on the part of imams and religiously knowledgeable women known as *otin-oyi*. Table 7.3 shows the range of religious practice in Central Asia.

For the significance of Islam to shift in Central Asia, one or more of the following developments would have to take place: Non-Muslims would have to convert

Table 7.3
Range of Central Asian Populations with Reference to Islam

Non-Muslim members of other religions
Energetic Christian and Islamic missionary activities are discouraged by the governments, but nonetheless produce some converts
Non-Muslims affiliated with no religion
Non-Muslim secularists
Muslim secularists and modernists
"Lapsed" Muslims
Some are reverting to the faith
"Occasional" Muslims
Along with pious traditional Muslims, constitute the mainstream of Islam in Central Asia
Pious traditional Muslims
Converts to Islam with predominantly personal/spiritual motivations
More likely to be "reverts" with Islamic family background
Converts and "reverts" with predominantly political motivations
Could be youths from secular families

to Islam in significant numbers; previously areligious people could convert to other religions, affecting the relative religious balance; lapsed and occasional Muslims could show regained interest in religion, either through increased conventional religious observance or through participation in more activist, even radical groups; secularists could assertively defend the separation of church and state in this region; or pious traditional Muslims could take a more active stance against extremists. In political terms, only the last three scenarios have potential significance. The others are lifestyle changes.

Out of this hypothetical list, the following appear to be actually occurring: various missionary efforts—Christian,²⁵ Islamic, and other—are making some headway; the principle of a secular state has many outspoken defenders; the message of political, radical Islam is finding an as-yet small audience; and mainstream public opinion is not sympathetic to radical Islam at this time.

The key group to watch in this regard is the young. A Tajik journalist describes their situation as follows:

Before the Soviet Union fell apart . . . youth in Tajikistan was educated in a spirit of atheism. Under the Soviet Constitution the religion was separated from the state, yet it was not totally uprooted. People were clinging to their religious values and traditional culture and customs; the clergy was highly respected. . . . During the years of independence there appeared three distinct groups among the young people. One of them became actively involved in the Islamic movement under the influence of the Islamic clergy and Islamic activists. Another is made up of young people who either preserved their faith in the communist ideology or turned to the West. They are convinced that Islam should be blamed for all conflicts in their republic because of its intolerance and warmongering. There are also young people who prefer new religious beliefs and sects (Bahais, Zoroastrians, Krishnaites, Satanists and others) that came to the republic in post-Soviet times.²⁶

Assessing the significance of Islamic adherence requires information that will allow us to form judgments on four questions: To what degree is Islam, though nominally “believed in,” actually practiced? Is this practice largely personal/social, or does it include acceptance of some of Islam’s more rigorous aspects, particularly shari’a law, *hudud* criminal punishments, and a politically interpreted notion of jihad? Are these aspects merely accepted in principle or are they actively pursued? Are there any indications that Islam is “metastasizing” into the broader arena of radical, extremist politics?

²⁵ Jehovah’s Witnesses are particularly active in the region and are reportedly gaining converts. Adam Albion, RFE/RL Central Asia Report, February 14, 2003, pp. 3, 7, 14.

²⁶ Kiemiddin Sattori, “Tajik Press About the Youth and Islam,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, <http://www.cac.org/journal/eng-03-2002/15.satprimen.shtml>, accessed August 31, 2004.

It is important to look closely and carefully at available indicators. For example, the Tajiks are often described as being more Islamic and even as more fundamentalist than other populations in Central Asia. This initially seems to be supported by surveys in which 97 percent of Tajiks identify themselves firmly as Muslims. However, more detailed questioning reveals that of these, 78 percent do not go to the mosque even for the Friday prayer, and 59 percent say that they never pray at all.²⁷

Kiemiddin Sattori's observations concerning Tajikistan—cited above—are probably valid for the other Central Asian republics as well.

Although the leaders at times make symbolic friendly gestures toward Islam, the Central Asian republics by and large have demonstrated their willingness to suppress and contain even nonpolitical, traditional Islam. In Tajikistan, unregistered mosques are subject to closure, even without any further evidence of political links to radical groups. In Turkmenistan, the Tashauz Theological Seminary was closed down, its students instead enrolled in a government-approved madrassa in the country's capital.²⁸ Dissident religious leaders have been arrested and mosques associated with their activities have been destroyed. As in Tajikistan, mosques require registration in Turkmenistan also.

The Kyrgyz Republic requires the registration of madrassas. According to official statistics, there are 45 registered madrassas in the republic. A theological (Islamic) faculty (170 students) and the Dayanet Vak fund (Turkish) have been functioning at Osh State University since 1993. A similar faculty has been opened at the Kyrgyz-Turkish Manas University in Bishkek, as has a faculty for religious studies at the Kyrgyz State National University and a faculty of world cultures and religions at the Kyrgyz Russian Slavonic University. The authorities keep tabs on Kyrgyz nationals studying at religious institutions abroad. As Table 7.4 shows, the majority of these attend Al-Azhar in Cairo, followed by institutions in Turkey, Pakistan, and Syria. However, there are reports that a number of Kyrgyz students, when traveling on tourist visas, enter religious educational institutions abroad in violation of existing rules. According to media information, more than 300 Kyrgyz students are studying illegally in madrassas in Pakistan.

The approach of keeping a close watch over religion and maintaining regulatory rights is a deliberate continuation of Soviet policy. In Turkmenistan, for example, separation of church and state is a matter of law. Proselytizing, distributing "unofficial" religious literature, and forming religious parties are all prohibited. In partnership with Uzbekistan, a government-run board oversees the training of clergy and religion teachers and can appoint and dismiss members of these two professions. The response to increased Islamic interest and activism is two-pronged: prohibition and

²⁷ Steven Wagner, "Public Opinion in Tajikistan," IFES, Washington D.C., 1996.

²⁸ Jean-Christophe Peuch, "Turkmenistan: Leader Tightens His Grip on Unofficial Islam," RFE, 28 June 28, 2001.

Table 7.4
Kyrgyz Students at Religious Educational Institutions Abroad

Country	Educational Institution	Number of Students
Egypt	Al-Azhar	139
Turkey	Dayanet Vak	73
Pakistan	Madrasatul Arabiya	26
Syria	Ins. Al Mukhadas	24
Kuwait	Religious Institute	5
Jordan	International University	3
Libya	Bani-Gazi University	1
Saudi Arabia	Islamic University	4
Korea	Buddhist Center	2
TOTAL		277

SOURCE: Report from Presidential Press Service: "Database of religious foundations, educational institutions, and students," Bishkek Presidential Press Service, November 27, 2002.

repression of anything that seems radical and close supervision and bureaucratization of mainstream religious actors and activities.

As stated earlier, Central Asian governments show wariness not only about the expansion of Islam, but also about the missionary activities of other religions and sects. For example, Jehovah's Witnesses missionaries have been jailed under the same charges of "inciting racial or religious hatred." Their movement is reported to be growing rapidly in Uzbekistan.²⁹

Tajikistan's approach to Islam departs from that of the other republics in one significant respect. This is a consequence of the 1992–1997 civil war. The approach seeks to manage political Islam by providing it with officially sanctioned channels of expression and political participation. The Islamic Revival Party of Tajikistan holds a unique position in being the only legally registered Muslim political movement in Central Asia and has gone to great pains not only to dissociate itself from Islamic radicalism but also to downplay the existence of such radical trends in Tajikistan altogether.³⁰

However, neither the region's historical bent toward moderation in religion nor the decades-long watchful surveillance and repression of Islam by Soviet officialdom were able to prevent the arrival of radical Islam in the region. Martha Brill Olcott and Bakhtiyar Babajanov describe the setting that fed this development:

²⁹ RFE/RL Central Asia Report, Vol. 3, No. 7, February 14, 2003.

³⁰ RFE/RL Central Asia Report, op. cit.

The late 1980's and early 1990's were difficult and confusing years for young people living in Central Asia. A seemingly invincible state had virtually disintegrated and was replaced by fragile new ones. Conditions were almost apocalyptic: The economy was in disarray, an expansive social safety net had shredded, and the powerful Red Army was in tatters, with those who served it selling off their weaponry to survive. Muslim activists who claimed that moral turpitude brought down the Soviet regime found it easy to muster arguments to bolster their cause, and they organized the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP). Although the Uzbek government refused to register the IRP, a number of charismatic clerics who preached rejection of the secular state continued to gain supporters, especially in the Ferghana Valley. And these men in turn developed armed supporters, who in the first months of Uzbekistan's independence briefly took control of key government buildings in the city of Namangan. Fearing the outbreak of civil war, Uzbek President Islam Karimov authorized a purge of the official Islamic establishment and the arrest or disappearance of prominent unlicensed clerics and leaders of "extremist" Islamic groups.³¹

Several prominent figures escaped the official dragnet, fleeing with followers into neighboring Tajikistan and the Tajik- and Uzbek-dominated parts of northern Afghanistan, long a host site for jihadi training camps. Thus was born the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), led by Soviet Army veteran Juma Namangani.³²

In the view of some analysts, the decision to affiliate overtly with transnational, radical Islam ultimately led to the downfall of the IMU. The group was prepared to use violence for its national goals; in February 1999, for example, it was linked to a series of bomb explosions in Tashkent that killed 16 people and wounded 100 and was said to have been aimed at assassinating Karimov, who escaped narrowly when he was late for a scheduled meeting. In order to access Al Qaeda funding and training and to obtain shelter in Afghanistan and possibly Iran, from which it broadcast calls for jihad, the IMU was obliged to embrace the far more global agenda of its sponsors. Uzbek academic Abdujabar Abduvakhitov believes that this step was beneficial to the IMU's funding and radical support base but served to alienate the group from the Uzbek population and distract it from its actual platform. Reportedly, the group agreed to set aside its Central Asia campaign and instead to assist the Taliban in defeating the Northern Alliance. This, of course, fatally exposed it to what was soon to become a massive and successful American air campaign.³³

This example illustrates the significance of three of our identified catalytic events. The downfall of the Soviet Union created a situation of massive instability

³¹ Martha Brill Olcott and Bakhtyar Babajanov, "The Terrorist Notebooks," *Pakistan Defence Journal*, April 2003.

³² Olcott and Babajanov, op. cit (2003).

³³ Quoted in C. J. Chivers, "Uzbek Militants' Decline Provides Clues to U.S.," *The New York Times*, October 8, 2002.

during which varied contenders for power could emerge and appeal to the unmoored masses. The rise of the Taliban in neighboring Afghanistan provided ideological fuel and economic and strategic opportunities to Islamic radicals in Central Asia. Conversely, September 11, combined with U.S. engagement, provided the muscle and the rationale to move forcefully against extremist groups in and around the Stans.

Did the fall of the Soviet Union open the doors to a broader-based, if perhaps not generally violent, movement toward politicized Islam? There is little evidence to support such a claim. The increased religious observance that followed the end of Soviet rule does not seem to have changed the characteristic regional observance of Islam, which continues to be personal and social rather than political, and which in fact appears in some ways to be consciously and deliberately nonpolitical.³⁴ In a study conducted in Kyrgyzstan, support for the idea of an Islamic state was extremely low among those who self-identified as active Muslims. At the same time, these respondents expressed support for the government's use of force against Islamic militants:

Our findings show that establishing Shari'a based political institutions clearly remains a minority preference even among Muslims in Kyrgyzstan. And to the extent that economic factors play a role in such things, those who are worse off are not more likely to favor an Islamic state. We also found there is clear support for a military response to the attempts to establish an Islamic state by force.³⁵

Central Asia has contained fundamentalist extremism before. This is an important point to keep in mind when assessing the disruptive potential of radical Islam in Central Asia. The region has already shown an ability to successfully contain, limit, and overcome such a threat. Three distinct instances stand out:

First, Taliban-style radicalism did not significantly affect Central Asia. This is particularly clear if we compare it with Pakistan. The Pakistani government has been unable to control the spread of madrassas, the infiltration of its own institutions by Taliban and Al Qaeda sympathizers, and the increase of mass-based populist Islam. Compare this with Central Asia, another Taliban neighbor. Governments there are well able to oversee, limit, and insist on the transparency of Islamic schools and institutions. Fundamentalist fervor has not spread, and even the Ferghana Valley, the closest thing Central Asia has to a Northwest Frontier Province, is moderate by comparison.

Second, Central Asia already experienced a "religious war" (in Tajikistan) and came out of it successfully.

³⁴ This is also the assessment of John Schoeberlein at a conference on "The Islamization of Central Asia: Politics, Economics and Society," Woodrow Wilson Center, June 11, 2003.

³⁵ Joseph F. Fletcher, "Islam and intolerance in Central Asia, The Case of Kyrgyzstan," *Europe-Asia Studies*, March 2002.

Third, even those parts of Central Asia where the population makeup might have led to religious strife have remained quiet. As one expert notes, "At the beginning of the 1990s, Kazakhstan seemed to be the country in Central Asia where 'clashes of civilization' were to be most likely. The dominance of Christian ethnic-Russians . . . led many political analysts and politicians to misperceptions of the conflict situation in Kazakhstan. Ten years after Kazakhstan's independence, one can state: no 'clashes of civilization' took place."³⁶

Hizb ut-Tahrir—Islam Meets Communism?

The mainstream of Central Asians appears to be primarily interested in economic growth, a continued opening to the West, social advancement and liberalization, and the prevention of extremism and instability. However, there is an audience for the overtly political Islamic message as well. The Central Asian version of radical political Islam differs in interesting ways from the message espoused by Islamic radicals elsewhere. In this regard, Hizb ut-Tahrir (HuT) offers an instructive case study.

Initially founded in 1953 by a Palestinian who split off from the Muslim Brotherhood over doctrinal issues, HuT drifted toward Central Asia and took root. The organization has been declared illegal almost everywhere, including Germany, and its main public operating base is now the United Kingdom. Since it is forced to operate underground in Central Asia, estimates of members are hard to acquire. Even if numbers were available, it would be difficult, given the many-layered structure of the organization, to distinguish core members with real knowledge of the group's agenda and activities from peripheral sympathizers whose activities are limited to circulating pamphlets and flyers. That having been said, the University of Leipzig believes that HuT has 80,000 members in Uzbekistan alone.³⁷

In Central Asia, HuT is generally regarded as the successor movement to the IMU. Like the IMU, HuT desires the establishment of an Islamic state, which it refers to as a caliphate or *khilafa*. It claims to differ from IMU in its chosen means and insists that it eschews violence and uses only legal political methods and persuasion. However, this claim is widely doubted by regional experts and by terrorism experts.³⁸ There have also been reports of activity by the IMU, which has been dormant for a

³⁶ Marie-Carin von Gumpenberg, *State and Nationbuilding in Kazakhstan*, Opladen, Germany: Leske and Budrich, 2002.

³⁷ Datenbank Islamischer Gruppen, University of Leipzig, <http://www.stura.uni-leipzig.de>. On its probable growth curve, see also Erkin Kurmanov, "Hizb-ut-Tahrir in Kyrgyzstan," *Central Asia and the Caucasus Journal*, Vol. 3, 2002.

³⁸ Kai Hirschmann, "Net Around German Islamic Fundamentalists Gets Tighter," *Deutsche Welle World*, January 17, 2003.

while. In May 2003, law-enforcement authorities in Kyrgyzstan detained two men whom they suggest have ties to the IMU in connection with a bombing in Osh.³⁹

Ariel Cohen concludes:

Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami is an emerging threat to American interests and the countries in which it operates. It has 5,000 to 10,000 hard-core members, and many more supporters in former Soviet Central Asia. . . . Over 10,000 members are active in Pakistan, Syria, Turkey, and Indonesia. . . . By breeding violent anti-American attitudes, attempting to overthrow existing regimes, and preparing cadres for more radical Islamist organizations, Hizb poses a threat to U.S. interests in Central Asia and elsewhere in the Islamic world where moderate regimes are found.⁴⁰

HuT has not thus far been directly implicated in specific violent terrorist activities. Those who conclude that it poses a corresponding threat point to two indicators: the cadre structure of the organization, which is characteristic of extremist movements, and the increasing virulence of its rhetoric. In regard to the latter, observers note that “recent pamphlets put out by the group are more strident and aggressively anti-American, voicing support for a possible jihad against the West.”⁴¹ And terrorism expert Kai Hirschmann describes HuT as a group that, at the very least, “shares the spirit of terrorism.”⁴²

Various governments have come to different assessments on this matter, but many have decided to outlaw HuT. The organization is banned throughout Central Asia. It is also illegal in Egypt, where distributing HuT literature is punishable by prison sentences. Perhaps most significantly, though, Germany banned the organization on January 15, 2003, after having kept it under close observation for several years. German Interior Minister Schily explained that in the judgment of the German courts, “this organization promotes the use of violence to achieve political goals and wants to provoke violence.”⁴³ In Great Britain, on the other hand, the group

³⁹ Alisher Khamidov, “Officials in Kyrgyzstan Suggest Islamic Militant Group Is Active Again,” *Eurasia Insight*, May 14, 2003, www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav051403.shtml, accessed August 13, 2004.

⁴⁰ Ariel Cohen, “Hizb-ut-Tahrir: An Emerging Threat to U.S. Interests in Central Asia,” Research Russia and Eurasia, The Heritage Foundation, May 30, 2003. <http://www.heritage.org/Research/RussiaandEurasia/BG1656.cfm>, accessed August 13, 2004. Also see Ahmad Rashid, “The Fires of Faith in Central Asia Islamic Movements in Central Asia,” *World Policy Journal*, Spring 2001 and Mikhail Falkov, “The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan,” *Nezavisimaya gazeta* (Internet Version), August 25, 2000.

⁴¹ “Evidence of Expanding Clandestine Islamist Activity in Tajikistan,” *RFE Central Asia Report*, pp. 3, 6, February 2003.

⁴² “Net Around German Islamic Fundamentalists Gets Tighter,” *Deutsche Welle World*, January 17, 2003.

⁴³ “Germany Bans Islamic Group; Recruitment of Youths Worried Officials,” Peter Finn, Washington Post Foreign Service, *The Washington Post*, January 16, 2003.

continues to operate freely, and many consider England to have become its de facto headquarters.

HuT has a number of interesting features. It clearly seems to be spreading, not only within Central Asia but within the broader region and also in the Central Asian diaspora communities. It appears to have access to substantial funding, but the source of this funding remains unclear. Its ideology, upon closer examination, is only tenuously connected with actual orthodox Islam. Instead, it is strongly and surprisingly derivative of Communism, to which it maintains an ambivalent posture, sometimes denouncing it as one of the manifestations of disbelief, at other times lauding it as having been the last effective bulwark against the expansion of heartless global capitalism.

A study of HuT literature leaves the reader with two strong impressions. The first is that the claim of nonviolence is not persuasive. HuT publications praise terrorism, describing it as a "form of prayer"; call directly for the killing of apostates; and have shown a clear increase in references to jihad.⁴⁴ One of HuT's publications tersely states:

There is no difference between salah [special prayer said five times daily] and jihad, between du-a [supplications to Allah] and frightening the enemy, terrorism. There is no difference between zakah [giving charity] and cutting the hand of the thief, nor is there a difference between helping the grieved and killing those who commit aggression against the sanctities of the Muslims. All of them are Shari'a rules.⁴⁵

In terms of its organizational structure, HuT is reminiscent of the Communist Party, with its system of recruitment into a pyramid of ever more secretive cells. As Alima Bissenova observes,

The party has been characterized by a high level of secrecy and conspiracy that is *ironically reminiscent of the Bolsheviks in Russia before the revolution*. Hizb ut Tahrir members are organized in small circles (da'ira) of five to seven people, headed by a mushrif. Each group member knows only the members of his/her circle and only the mushrif knows the next stage superior. The party manifests that all its work is political in nature . . .⁴⁶ [emphasis mine]

⁴⁴ "It Is Obligatory Upon Muslims to Unite in One State," in *From the Party Culture*, www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/english/culture/14.htm, directly states the need to kill anyone who tries to "divide the community."

⁴⁵ *Dangerous Concepts to Attack Islam and Consolidate the Western Culture*, London: Al-Khilafah Publications, 1997.

⁴⁶ Alima Bissenova, "Is Hizb ut Tahrir Going Public in Its Struggle?" *Central Asia Caucasus Analyst*, July 18, 2001.

A similarity more striking than the aspect of secretiveness is the role assigned by both ideologies to the party. Not only is the party considered an essential part of Islamic activism, it is in some ways placed in a position of supremacy over the religion.

In the first stage . . . the Party focuses its attention on building its body, increasing its membership and culturing the individuals in its circles by the concentrated Party culture until it has managed to form a party structure from people who are melted by Islam. . . . In the second stage . . . the Party develops its activities from only approaching individuals to also talking to the masses collectively . . . the collective culturing of the masses (of the ummah) . . . through lessons, lectures and talks in the mosques, centers and common gathering places, and through the press, books and leaflets.⁴⁷

Several formulations are noteworthy in this paragraph. There is the equation of the leftist term *masses* with the theological term *umma* (community of believers)—unconventional to say the least. There is the image of Islam as a “melting agent” that leads people to flow into the party. This suggests the instrumentalization of Islam as a means for recruiting and mobilizing members. It is also striking how often HuT literature refers to Islam as an “ideology” or as a “method”—not as a religion, a faith, or even an ethical system: “Hizb ut-Tahrir is a political party whose ideology is Islam, so politics is its work and Islam is its ideology.”⁴⁸

Texts borrow heavily from Soviet totalitarianism. As a HuT publication noted, “the Muslim is not free in his opinion. His opinion is the opinion of Islam, and it is not allowed for a Muslim to have an opinion other than that of Islam.”⁴⁹

In a subsequent formulation, we meet a new version of the “Soviet man,” the individual programmed to conform to the needs of a visualized ideal society: “The policy of education is to produce an Islamic mentality and emotions . . . the purpose of education is to produce the Islamic personality.”⁵⁰

There is no equivalent to this idea even in the strictly implemented traditional Islamic orders or in “classic” fundamentalism; it is more reminiscent of a sect. Even the Virtue and Vice Police of Saudi Arabia, the Taliban of Afghanistan, and the Revolutionary Guards of Iran “only” saw it as their responsibility to oversee conformity of behavior. What HuT proposes is much more ambitious, a conformity of thought and personality.

It is in economic theory, however, that HuT departs most dramatically from orthodox Islam and displays its closest affiliation with socialism and Communism. Is-

⁴⁷ Hizb ut-Tahrir, “Definition,” www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/english/definition/messages.htm, last accessed August 13, 2004.

⁴⁸ Hizb ut-Tahrir, *op. cit.*

⁴⁹ Hizb ut-Tahrir, *The American Campaign to Suppress Islam*, London: Al-Khilafa Publications, 1996, p. 28.

⁵⁰ “The Thought of Hizb ut-Tahrir,” <http://www.khilafah.com.pk>, last accessed August 13, 2004.

lam arose in a mercantile society and has no objections to private property or material success, merely enjoining charity and a religious tax. Muhammad himself was a businessman. For HuT, things present themselves in a very different light:

It is clear that freedom of ownership as such contradicts Islam and is therefore forbidden for the Muslims to accept. . . . As a result of adopting freedom of ownership, the Capitalist societies suffer from innumerable diseases. Immorality, organized crime, selfishness, and love of oneself at the expense of others have become established norms. . . . As a result of this kind of freedom, wealth is concentrated in the hands of a few, called Capitalists. . . . Muslims are not allowed to accept the free market policies that America, and the West in general advocate. These policies are an implementation of the concept of freedom of ownership in the Capitalist ideology, which contradicts Islam and its rules.⁵¹

This lays the foundation for critiques of Central Asian economic policies, which are phrased in classic Soviet agitprop language:

The income from the sale of mineral resources such as gas, oil, and gold, extracted in cooperation with America's and the West's multinational corporations, are in the most part taken by them. Furthermore, many goods produced by painstaking work of Uzbekistan Muslims, such as cotton, wheat and silk cocoon, end up in the hands of huge Russian and western corporations. . . . The criminal clique consists firstly of Karimov at the head, then his ministers, governors, mayors, parliamentarians and other government officials, who have become experts in plundering the peoples' wealth.⁵²

"Criminal clique," "plundering," "the peoples' wealth"—these are phrases from the leftist vocabulary of earlier decades and are certainly not from the Quran. Some of HuT's publications indeed give the impression of being recycled leftist pamphlets in which someone has replaced the word *socialist* with the word *Islamic*. What is perhaps most interesting and surprising are those passages in HuT literature in which political Islam is directly positioned to be the successor of socialism, an ideology that stood against capitalist exploitation but has now been defeated:

After the fall of the Soviet Union there remained in the world only the Western economic system, which was branded the free market system instead of its true name, Capitalism. It is the system that reminds us of its greed and ugliness.⁵³

⁵¹ "Globalisation," in *Dangerous Concepts*, op. cit. p. 39 ff.

⁵² "What is the real meaning of Karimov's attacks on traders," <http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/english/leaflets/july2202>, last accessed August 13, 2004.

⁵³ *The American Campaign to Suppress Islam*, pamphlet, London: Al-Khilafah Publications, 1996, p. 6. Also available on the Internet, <http://www.khilafah.com>, last accessed August 13, 2004.

Although HuT's ideological eclecticism and its overtly ambivalent attitude toward socialism seem striking and paradoxical, they, too, have a regional tradition. During the Bolshevik era, we find precedents for such a stance in "national Communism," whose most prominent representative was the Tatar intellectual Mir-Said Galiev. In the major features of his platform, we can see previews of HuT: a predominantly political Islam, a blending of Islamic elements with socialist thought, and a distinct platform for Muslims looking for their niche inside a broader agenda.⁵⁴

While the Soviet Union still existed, this text argues, "it was able to prevent the absolute domination of Capitalism internationally." Communism had long

. . . waged a fierce campaign worldwide in which it portrayed colonialism in its true ugly face, by making colonialism and Capitalism synonymous and expounding that the way for liberation from colonialism was only through Socialist revolution. This campaign succeeded greatly to the extent that many people started to incline towards Socialism. The states which gained independence and freed themselves from colonialism, by its old face, raised the slogan of Socialism. . . . However America realized that the old face of colonialism would be a danger to the Western international powers, and to Capitalism as an ideology. Therefore, it cunningly worked to contain the aspirations of the nations and the peoples towards Socialism. . . .⁵⁵

These are surprisingly kind words about the Soviet Union, what it represented, and the values that it stood for.

Whether HuT is even properly to be classified as an "Islamic" movement, or whether it is really more of a leftist movement in Muslim guise or a postmodern amalgamation of Islam with assorted other ideological components that happen to resonate with disaffected young people, is on some levels irrelevant—its capacity to resonate is what is key. However, it would then also follow that the movement is not about "Islam in Central Asia" but about certain social conditions of young people in Central Asia that put them in search of an ideological framework to give expression to their disaffection. Economic justice is the strongest theme in HuT literature, much stronger than the theme of moral purity, for example, that predominates in the literature of some other fundamentalists. Other observers, too, believe that a lack of purpose in life, work, or other ways to occupy one's time is a primary motivating factor for many of the young recruits.

On the basis of interviews with HuT members as well as surveys of court archives concerning individuals sentenced to prison for membership in HuT, the International Crisis Group concludes:

⁵⁴ Bennigsen and Wimbush (1979); Geyer (1994), p. 42. "National Communism," *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, <http://www.uanews.tv/archives/eou/natcom.htm>, accessed August 13, 2004.

⁵⁵ Geyer (1994), p. 8.

Most members of Hizb-ut-Tahrir come from the ranks of the young and unemployed. Given the lack of economic opportunity, many youths appear attracted to the Hizb-ut-Tahrir out of motivations as simple as boredom and dissatisfaction with their lot in life. . . . One member told ICG that "this party appeared just at the right time. We could have been led in any direction. If it hadn't been for Hizb-ut-Tahrir, we would have joined some other party."⁵⁶

The Neo-IMU Insurgency in Uzbekistan

In late March 2004, a series of suicide attack on Uzbekistan's police in Bukhara and Tashkent, plus other shootings and small bombings by females and males in both cities, illustrated a new, still evolving twist in Central Asia's Islamic tendencies.⁵⁷ Although versions of the event vary widely, it appears that some of the participants were recent converts linked up with splinters from HuT and IMU. Various sources mention the proliferation of underground *jamoats* (Uzbek for *jamaat*, societies or groups) with domestic and foreign members that are forming in the southern part of the country; Uzbek Prosecutor-General Rashid Qodirov has accused these groups of practicing indoctrination and calling for a violent overthrow of the government.⁵⁸

There are some worrying aspects to this latest round of terrorism. Observers are concerned about the profile of some of the attackers, which may point to a new recruitment strategy of the extremists and to the use of suicide bombers, new in this region. The involvement of such "better educated and better connected recruits" suggests that HuT and IMU may be "tailoring [their] recruiting efforts to match local dynamics in Tajikistan and Kazakhstan (as well as Uzbekistan), targeting individuals from the dominant ethnic group, with a higher education and ties to state institutions."⁵⁹ One of the female suicide bombers, for example, was a middle-class Uzbek college student with respectable grades who studied Arabic and only started taking an interest in Islam in 2002 at the Egyptian embassy's cultural center.⁶⁰

Of still greater concern, IMU is believed to have relocated to Pakistan's border provinces, where, in continuation of its former approach (i.e., before being damaged and driven out of Afghanistan), it can cooperate with a variety of like-minded ex-

⁵⁶ "The IMU and the Hizb-ut-Tahrir: Implications of the Afghanistan Campaign," ICG Asia Briefing Paper, No. 30, January 2002, <http://www.icg.org/home/index.cfm?id=1760&l=1>, last accessed August 13, 2004.

⁵⁷ Suicide attacks have been uncommon in Central Asia. This was the first suicide attack outside of the Russian Federation and still the within Former Soviet Union (FSU). Within the FSU, "political suicide" is a recent concept among Chechens and historically known among orthodox Russians through self-immolation rituals and during the period of revolution against the Tsarist officials (1890s–1914).

⁵⁸ Uzbek Radio Youth Channel, April 9, 2004 via internet; "Terror in Uzbekistan: The Aftermath and Other Views," RFE/RL Central Asia Report, pp. 4, 15, April 14, 2004.

⁵⁹ RFE/RL Central Asia Report, pp. 4,10, March 8, 2004.

⁶⁰ "Uzbekistan: Affluent Suicide Bombers," Institute for War and Peace Reporting, No. 278, April 20, 2004.

tremist groups that are also using this hard-to-control area as their base of operations.⁶¹

Fethullah Gulen and the Turkish Nurculuk Movement

An additional Islamic actor of possible significance in this region, who tends to be overlooked, is Fethullah Gulen.

Fethullah Gulen is associated with the Turkish Nurculuk movement. Although this movement, founded by Said Nursi in the 1920s, describes itself as moderate, the Turkish government judges it to be antiseccular. It has been the subject of numerous court proceedings and is repressed in Turkey, instead flourishing in the diaspora, especially Germany. Fethullah Gulen is a follower of the since-deceased Nursi, but he portrays himself as more modern and reform-minded, as a philosopher and poet as well as a religious scholar and leader. Having found Turkey to be inhospitable, he lives in the United States and operates from there in an extremely low-profile manner. This stands in contrast to the vast resources he controls, many of which go into educational and social programs.⁶²

In Central Asia alone, his network of schools is impressive. He is said to have 30 high schools and a university in Kazakhstan; 11 high schools and a university in Kyrgyzstan; 14 high schools and a university in Turkmenistan; and 18 high schools in Uzbekistan.⁶³

Concerning the ideology, the values, and the intentions of Gulen's movement and his impressive network of schools, the jury is still out. Some believe he is exactly what he purports to be: a moderate, liberal reformer and social benefactor. Others feel that some of the central features of his movement should inspire suspicion. First on the list is the cultlike nature of his organization. In its diffuse and secretive structure, it resembles other clandestine movements, having layers of membership and revealing only the most bland and superficial content to those on the margins. The expanding network of schools, largely staffed and certainly directed by members of the organization, is gaining powerful influence over the next generation of the educated elite in all its operating countries. In that connection, and given his purported modernism, it is noteworthy that Gulen establishes and supports boys' schools almost exclusively. Several other hints imply that there may be more to this movement than meets the eye. In one instance, he has been the subject of a lawsuit by parents who

⁶¹ On March 1, 2004, Deutsche Welle reported that IMU militants had relocated to Baluchistan and were also maintaining offices in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, and Tajikistan. RFE/RL Central Asia Report, Vol. 4, No. 10, March 8, 2004.

⁶² Bulent Aras and Omer Caha, "Fethullah Gulen and his Liberal 'Turkish Islam' Movement," Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA), Vol. 4, No. 4, Dec. 2000.

⁶³ "Central Asia: Fethullah Gulen's Missionary Schools," *ISIM Newsletter*, 9, 2002, www.religioscope.com/info/articles/007_fetullahci.htm, accessed August 13, 2004.

sued Gulen for allegedly indoctrinating their son with fundamentalist ideas.⁶⁴ In Turkey, the movement is distrusted by government agencies; its activities in Central Asia, however, are viewed with greater tolerance because there they are seen as spreading Turkish national influence. German Islam-expert Spuler-Stegemann concludes that while Gulen is considered to be a conservative in his Islamic values, but democratic, moderate, and willing to engage in dialogue, "his actual intentions are not known."⁶⁵

Central Asia's Future

In evaluating the future of this region and its potential stability or instability, there are primarily three things to watch:

- The evolution of political Islam
- The influence of the region's Soviet past and the ongoing "Russia connection"
- The political culture of the region.

These points are, of course, in addition to factors that pertain universally: economic and security issues and the conduct of outside actors. Although the topic of this study is Islam, in Central Asia these three points are strongly interactive, serving to reinforce or neutralize each other.

Underlying them is a multiplicity of interwoven memberships, affiliations, and identities. This is true in modern polities as well, but under normal circumstances in modern political systems, it does not have the same political and societal salience as it does in more traditional polities. This is in part a function of culture and history, but it is largely a practical matter. The primary difference lies in the relatively greater strength of the modern state, in terms of control, authority, and power, and in terms of its ability to provide services. Where the state is weaker, alternate affiliations are essential if people hope to survive and prosper.

In Central Asia, numerous identities and affiliations apply—religion, language group, clan, ethnicity, tribe, political party, ideology, guild, region, and class. Need and opportunity help determine the direction and depth of affiliations. In other words, if an important need is not being met by the modern state, alternative and older affiliations will continue to be significant.

It is important to understand the specifics and cultural intricacies of Central Asian society, but it is also important not to overstate them. There is a strong possi-

⁶⁴ Anadolu, October 17, 2000, <http://www.hri.org/news/turkey/anadolu/2000/00-10-17.anadolu.html>, accessed October 11, 2004.

⁶⁵ Spuler-Stegemann (2002), p. 136.

bility that outsiders may overestimate the importance of “anthropological” variables in this region. A number of experts warn against relying too much on stereotypes. They point, for example, to unexpectedly high levels of interethnic marriage, a surprising amount of positive sentiment toward Russia and Russians, and a not infrequent difficulty in getting respondents to express much sentiment about their ethnic membership.⁶⁶

In terms of Islam, the developments associated with the catalytic events cited earlier in this chapter have provided three main changes: They brought about a somewhat greater freedom for the expression of mainstream Islam; they caused a significant hardening against extremist Islam on the part of the authorities; and they inspired some increase in the attractiveness of radical Islam as an effective medium for the expression of discontent, as discussed in the case of HuT.

The Soviet Legacy

Central Asia may have been a peripheral part of the Soviet empire, the peoples of this region may have chafed under Soviet rule, and that rule may have been intrusive and oppressive in many ways. Nonetheless, the Soviet portion of it remains pivotal. It has left a deep mark on the culture, the mind-set, the administration, and the infrastructure of the republics. It also appears to have left in place a relationship with many positive, indeed surprisingly positive, elements.

As one expert points out, Central Asia’s experience with the Soviet Union may have been rocky, but under Soviet dominance, the region “witnessed startling development. Within two generations, Central Asia boasted university matriculation and literacy rates on a par with Europe, and a standard of living and social indicators that placed the region near the top of the developing world. In particular, residents of Central Asia enjoyed standards of living a world apart from their compatriots living in border areas of China, Afghanistan, and Iran.”⁶⁷

On several levels and for a variety of reasons, the Soviet legacy lives on in Central Asia:

- Soviet-educated, -trained, and -socialized bureaucrats and experts continue to hold important positions in the administration.
- Soviet-educated professionals are trusted and often preferred by Central Asians because they are considered to be better qualified and less corrupt.

⁶⁶ On this issue see Ronald Suny, “Provisional Stabilities: The Politics of Identity in Post-Soviet Eurasia,” *International Security*, Vol. 24, No. 3, Winter 2000.

⁶⁷ Eric Sievers, “Water, Conflict, and Regional Security in Central Asia,” *New York University Environmental Law Journal*, Vol. 356, 2002.

- Soviet administrative and organizational structures have become integrated into the regional political culture and operate in the manner of a clan or tribe, with a similar philosophy of hierarchical networks of mutual aid and obligation.
- Some aspects of the Soviet belief system continue to resonate among segments of the population. These include not only secularism but also principles of social justice and internationalism.

The impact of the Soviet phase of Central Asian history on the values and thinking of its society is so profound that it even reemerges in the writing of Islamic extremists, who augment Muslim terminology and concepts with notions of class war.⁶⁸ Sievers sees the "remarkable calm" manifested by Central Asia during perestroika and its failure to collapse into violence thereafter as further signs that the Soviet legacy in this region, while ambivalent, had many positive features.⁶⁹

According to some analysts, the more relevant division within some Central Asian governments is not over the issue of Islam or democratization but rather relates to a split between the pro-Soviet and the pro-U.S. lobbies. This is thought to be especially strong in Uzbekistan.

Conversely, the determination of Russia not to be displaced from Central Asia should also not be underestimated. Even as it has been tolerating significant U.S. incursions into its traditional sphere of interests and dominance, Russia has been engaged in a multitiered effort to invigorate its relationship with the Central Asian republics. Cooperation on the level of intelligence has been stepped up. Economic ties and military links have increased. For example, the Russian language has again been made compulsory in Tajikistan's public schools.⁷⁰

Good News or Bad News? The Experts Disagree

Political analysts tend to fall into two distinct camps when assessing Central Asia. One group—the larger one—is downbeat. Experts belonging to this school of thought expect this region to explode—sooner rather than later. They note that the Central Asian republics are artificially created states, differing significantly from each other, with no real bond to unite them. Interdependencies among them, constructed and maintained by the Soviets to suit their own interests rather than the needs or geographic logic of the region, have collapsed since independence and have not been replaced with anything more impressive than a few hollow treaties on paper. The governments are unpopular, headed by dictators who prop themselves up by repres-

⁶⁸ See preceding discussion of the philosophy of the Hizb ut-Tahrir.

⁶⁹ Sievers, *op. cit.* p. 5.

⁷⁰ "Russian Army Beckons Tajik Unemployed," RFE/RL Central Asia Report, Vol. 3, No. 19, May 29, 2003; Roger McDermott, "Looking for Trouble? Russia Steers Central Asian Antiterrorist Preparations," *Eurasia Insight*, October 30, 2002.

sive measures thinly covered by a few semidemocratic exercises. The area is riddled with divisions and subdivisions: Populations are identified by ethnic, linguistic, tribal, clan, and religious memberships that sometimes overlap and sometimes conflict. The individual countries are at odds with each other, both because they are so unequal in terms of power, resources, wealth, and population and because there are real and unresolved conflicts among them, such as competition over natural resources, especially water. Not to be forgotten, a host of outside powers are prepared to meddle in this geostrategically interesting region. Smugglers, drug lords, recruiters for clandestine radical movements, and possibly purveyors of chemical and biological weapons systems are afoot.

Further, they note, this region is condemned to geopolitical strife. The writings of these experts are replete with references to the "Great Game."⁷¹ Played first by Russia and colonial Britain, then by the Soviet Union and the capitalist West, they believe, this game is about to enter round three, this time with Islamic radicalism facing down Western modernity.

None of these observations are untrue, and they inspire both predictions of imminent collapse and of the region becoming a battleground in the current global war on terrorism.⁷² Two prominent representatives of this view are Ahmad Rashid, who conjures up a threatening vision of increased radicalization and "jihad," and Zbigniew Brzezinski, who designates Central Asia as the "Eurasian Balkans" and calls their situation "explosive."⁷³

The second, smaller group of experts reads the same facts differently. They point out that collapse, expected daily since the early 1990s, has not occurred and does not really seem more imminent now than it did ten years ago. In studying the pertinent cultural and political inclinations of the region, the ones they consider noteworthy are different from the ones highlighted by the first group. Central Asia, they think, is more resilient than it looks. With so little to substantiate its cohesion, it somehow succeeds nonetheless. The supposedly shaky leaders display impressive longevity under difficult circumstances that would long have toppled lesser despots. Tajikistan had a serious crisis, but it came out of it, apparently with some lessons learned. As President Rakhmonov correctly points out, despite numerous good reasons for doing so, "it's been eleven years and we haven't gone to war yet." Afghanistan imploded. The Balkans erupted into bloody violence. Czechoslovakia subdivided. In comparison, Central Asia has done better.

By conventional Western standards, the region has an eccentric political culture. It is important to consider its internal mechanisms and rules, however, before com-

⁷¹ See for example, Hopkirk (1992); Meyer and Brysac (2000).

⁷² The most dramatic vision of such an outcome is drawn by Rashid (2002).

⁷³ Brzezinski (1997), p. 133.

ing to a judgment about its ability to function. Failure to do so makes it difficult for outside actors to structure their policies effectively; it can also lead to erroneous assessments. In the case of Central Asia, it may inspire too bleak a view.

"After the collapse of the Soviet Union, scholars and analysts began to see Central Asia as an 'emerging zone of no control.'"⁷⁴ In descriptive terms, that prediction seemed quite convincing. Who would place much confidence, for example, in Kazakhstan, in the light of this overview:

A worsening economy, tense ethnic relations . . . these are, like dark clouds covering the sky of Kazakhstan, threats of political instability that may undermine the Republic's otherwise healthy development. . . . Since Kazakhstan's political future lies completely in the hands of two major nationalities—the Kazaks and the Russians—the slightest change in the present well-balanced national relations in this former Soviet Republic could be devastating.⁷⁵

The title of this article is "Kazakhstan Struggles for Survival"—yet almost ten years after it was written, Kazakhstan is still gamely struggling on.

Of course, no one would argue that these are not societies under massive strain, with serious problems. Clashes and collapses are certainly possible. However, in coming to an assessment, it is important to consider the baseline and the societal mechanics. A complicated ethnic mix is likely to be less of a problem in a society that has lived with such a circumstance for centuries, indeed millennia, than for one that was accustomed to homogeneity and has suddenly had that balance disrupted. Likewise, in assessing the quality of social and economic life, discontent relates not only to objective conditions, but also to expectations, to what is locally considered "normal," and to how far things may have come from their starting point, even if the achieved level is not objectively impressive. The International Monetary Fund, for example, was not happy with an Uzbek inflation rate of 77 percent in 1995. However, this represented a significant improvement over the inflation rate of 1994, which had been 1,300 percent.

In terms of understanding Central Asian political culture, the danger is that in dealing with this region, one can make the dual error of giving local cultural factors too much significance and at the same time neglecting to understand their practical functionality—that is, interpreting as "traditionalism" something that in fact is practical and pragmatic. Saulesh Esenova, for example, notes that:

There has been much talk (in both Soviet and Western schools of thought) of divisions within the Kazaks along "clan" lines, a "tribal-type" phenomenon which is

⁷⁴ Catherine Yusupov, "United States Foreign Policy in the States of Central Asia," The Brookings Institution, November 12, 2002, p. 1.

⁷⁵ Jiger Janabel, "Kazakhstan Struggles for Survival," *Central Asia Monitor*, No. 4, 1994.

recognized as still relevant to the modern Kazak society, and extremely exaggerated as a pervasive characteristic of the still “tribal” Kazak society.⁷⁶

Similarly, Dave Gullette observes that

every state is fraught with internal problems of varying degrees [the concept of] tribalism . . . does not illustrate the multitude and magnitude of political and economic forces that play a part of the daily existence of people today. My main concern is to take a look at why and how these political and economic forces should be looked at in greater depth, and how the term “tribalism” is unhelpful in our understanding of these processes.⁷⁷

Some of the “exotic” features of Central Asian society have political and social functionality. As Kathleen Collins notes,

Central Asia exhibits the lowest level of ethno-national/religious conflict in the region. Since 1991, conflict of an ethno-national or religious cause or nature has been absent—despite the existence of common preconditions and critical triggers of such conflict. Although scholars rarely attempt to explain absence of conflict, they do hypothesize that democratic institutions, ethnic power-sharing, inclusive language laws, and equal economic opportunity help prevent identity conflict. Yet, in very different political and economic institutional contexts—authoritarian, economically centralized Uzbekistan, semi-democratic, market-oriented Kyrgyzstan, and weakly authoritarian, centralized Tajikistan—we find ethno-national and religious stability. Greater political pluralism in Kyrgyzstan may be a partial explanation. Alternatively, one might argue that repression has suppressed conflict in Uzbekistan; however, repression helped generate conflict throughout the Caucasus and Eastern Europe. . . . Since social conditions appeared pregnant with ethno-national and religious elements of violence, social stability and the lack of ethno-national or religious conflict throughout most of Central Asia has been a surprising phenomenon.⁷⁸

The most overtly eccentric of the Central Asian republics is undoubtedly Turkmenistan. To varying degrees, the others also have cults of personality, but Turkmenistan’s President Saparmurad Niyazov, also known as “Saparmurad Turkmenbashi the Great,” takes it to a new level. From his 400-page book *Rukhnama*, which has been incorporated into the school curriculum at all levels from primary school through university, to mysterious assassination reports, to renaming calendar

⁷⁶ Saulesh Esenova, “‘Tribalism’ and Identity in Contemporary Circumstances: The Case of Kazakhstan,” *Central Asian Survey*, Vol. 17, No. 3, 1998.

⁷⁷ David Gullette, “Tribalism in Kyrgyzstan Examined,” *Central Asia and the Caucasus Journal of Social and Political Studies*, Vol. 2, No. 4, 2002.

⁷⁸ Kathleen Collins, “Clans as Informal Institutions, Explaining Stability and Conflict in Central Asia,” American Political Science Association Meeting, September 2001.

months after himself, the political style of president-for-life Niyazov provides rich material for foreign journalists and commentators.⁷⁹

The eccentric nature of Central Asian political culture presents difficulties for outside observers, who are often simply not sure what to make of it. Again, this is clearest in the case of Turkmenistan, where some experts excuse the oddities of Niyazov's rule as fulfilling a function in a society that otherwise lacks cohesion, whereas other experts think his style is at best an irrelevant distraction and at worst may border on psychopathology.

The International Crisis Group (ICG), for example, is not dazzled by his style in the least: "Too often the international community has simply not taken Niyazov seriously, treating him as a rather bizarre eccentric, who creates revolving statues, or renames months after himself. The reality is much more sinister and dangerous. Turkmenbashi's continued rule is not merely a somewhat comical despotism but a serious threat to stability in the whole region."⁸⁰

Assessments Vary

There is a distinct and striking gap in the approach taken to this region by the two most prolific sources of analyses, the regional experts and the civil liberties organizations. Regional experts tend to give enormous weight to highly specific anthropological and sociological characteristics of these polities. Civil liberties organizations, in contrast, tend to give these factors, along with most other country-specific conditions, almost no weight at all but instead tend to apply a uniform template.

Each of these approaches has problems that, besides obstructing a balanced understanding of the quality and prospects of the political order in these countries, also has the potential to affect the development of policy in a counterproductive way.

A consequence of the first approach is that the political standard applied can be too low and the goals and expectations set can be extremely modest, under the assumption that ordinary standards do not or do not yet apply to these archaically structured societies.

The second approach applies current standards but gives little regard to the possibility that achieving them might be a process, during which complex sets of realities have to be taken into consideration. This kind of attitude can produce some startling analysis. For example, the ICG recommendations for Turkmenistan, for instance,

⁷⁹ See for example Simon Ingram, "Turkmen Live By Leader's Book," BBC, May 29, 2002, www.news.bbc.co.uk; "Turkmenistan's President Announces Assassination Attempt," FBIS CEP20021125000352; Lowell Bezanis, "Some Revival, Much Subordination, More Superstition in Turkmenistan," *Transition*, December 29, 1995; "Whodunnit? Hunt for Culprits Following Assassination Attempt Becomes More and More Curious," RFE/RL, Central Asia Report, Vol. 2, No. 45, December 5, 2002; Ilan Greenberg, "When a Kleptocratic, Megalomaniacal Dictator Goes Bad," *The New York Times*, Jan. 5, 2003.

⁸⁰ ICG, "Cracks in the Marble: Turkmenistan's Failing Dictatorship," ICG Central Asia Report No. 44, January 17, 2003, <http://www.crisisweb.org/home/index.cfm?id=1896&l=1>, last accessed August 13, 2004.

reflect an alarming mix of armchair humanism and Machiavelli: “There is little likelihood that systemic change can be produced by positive engagement, but isolating Niyazov through sanctions or other external measures would only worsen the plight of the Turkmen people,” the organization’s report concludes. What does the ICG recommend instead? The outside world, the ICG proposes, should provide support to opposition groups in exile, with a view to “regime change.”⁸¹ This is a startling recommendation. Which opposition groups? What manner of support? Regime change through what means? Has the ICG really thought through all the possible attendant risks and consequences? The report remains blissfully vague on such details, though in situations where “regime change” is actually attempted, the ICG is quick with critical postmortems.⁸²

In reference to the first group of analyses, experts have noted and warned against excessive applications of cultural anthropology. Clan, tribal, and ethnic structures are deeply rooted in community, economic, and political life. Their weight is attributable to two factors: familiarity and practicality. On the first, Ernest Gellner notes that “in semi-modern societies, an informal and socially embedded identity, such as clan identity, is in fact stronger than its rivals—nationalist and religious identity.”⁸³

This can sometimes strike outsiders from modern industrial societies as an anthropological matter. But it is more than that. Ties rooted in history and sentiment are reinforced by the very pragmatic fact that this identity links the individual into a strong and efficacious network; the clan, tribal, ethnic, and regional affiliations are a way to “get things done.” The tribe, sect, ethnicity, or clan “delivers,” sometimes more reliably and more efficiently than the modern structures that coexist with it.

As Collins observes:

Clans are informal social organizations in which kinship or “fictive” kinship is the core, unifying bond between group members. . . . Clans are rationally rooted in a culture of kin-based norms and trust, reinforced by their shared identity’s common bond of kinship, in a semi-modern economy. That is, clans serve rational purposes. . . . Clans in fact serve as an alternative to the formal institutions of markets and state bureaucracies. Their particularistic ties and repeated interaction build rational trust and mutual exchange reciprocity, enabling contracting over time and the informal institutionalization of the norms of this relational behavior. Clans thus provide the normative and organizational basis for internally

⁸¹ ICG, Report No. 44, 2003.

⁸² See for example its dismissive reporting on the Bonn process and the *loya jirga* in neighboring Afghanistan.

⁸³ Gellner (1997).

cohesive networks. . . . Clan elites provide political, social, and economic opportunities to their network, and rely on its loyalty and respect to maintain the status quo.⁸⁴

Impact of the U.S. Presence

A U.S. presence in non-Western, semidemocratic states can often have two disjointed consequences:

The U.S. relationship with the leadership of the country, and its wish to maintain stability and order, can strengthen that leadership. Where this leadership is authoritarian and repressive, U.S. support can serve to bolster the autocracy.

The spotlight of American and Western European attention that focuses on the country or region in question, as a consequence of the enhanced U.S. presence, usually brings with it a greater critical scrutiny of the government on the part of Western media, experts, and human rights organizations. This can raise awareness of the dictatorial and other negative features of that government and society; which in turn leads to demands for pressure, conditions placed on aid, more rapid reform, and even regime change.

In other words, Western policy goals and Western political values typically travel together, but where Western realpolitik and Western ideals do not overlap, they do not always travel together comfortably.

This appears to be true in Central Asia. The heightened importance of Central Asia for U.S. strategic goals in Afghanistan is seen as strengthening the existing leaders, who gain in stature and resources from their new role as U.S. partners. At the same time, notions of a free press, free expression, and other democratic standards are applied to the area, and far more international attention is paid to how the Central Asian leaders and governments perform in terms of human rights and political freedoms.

To complicate matters even further, it is not a simple issue of U.S. policy being used in a callous attempt to prop up unpopular and undemocratic leaders while U.S. values—brought in by nongovernmental organizations, the free Western press, and human rights groups—seek to liberate the populace. Both sides of this coin have multiple and often conflicting effects.

Some aspects of even a purely pragmatic U.S. presence may enhance development—political as well as economic—and thus contribute to the expansion of liberties. A U.S. presence is usually associated with at least three benefits: money in the form of grants, loans, payments, and stimulation of the local economy; aid programs in the areas of education, civil society, and economic development; and a more direct

⁸⁴ Collins, op. cit.

link to the rest of the world, as a formerly peripheral country receives more international attention and the communication infrastructure is improved to meet the needs and interests of the Westerners now on location there.⁸⁵

Conversely, some of the well-intended actions of the purveyors of Western values can backfire, especially if a “global template” is applied without a prior effort to understand what holds the fabric of a particular society together and what its history, its rules, and its complexities are.

Human rights organizations have been vocal in their fear that the new U.S. security relationship with Central Asian states would strengthen a repressive leadership. This, they believe, could happen in at least three ways: “Antiterrorism” can serve as a convenient blanket excuse for these governments to act aggressively even against opponents who have little or nothing to do with terrorism; incoming resources can artificially extend the life of governments that had been close to failure; and the U.S. government, with troops on the ground and bases and other resources to protect, could oppose political change that could jeopardize its investment.

For these negative consequences to hold true, three things would have to occur. It is not sufficient to note that the leaders and political processes of the countries in question fail to meet objective external criteria for modern democracy. Rather, there would have to be an assessment of how U.S. policy or U.S. actions contribute to this situation by either omission or commission. This case has not been persuasively made for Central Asia. For example, Amnesty International’s strongest argument supporting the deleterious impact of closer U.S. ties with Central Asian governments is the increased crackdown in Uzbekistan against the IMU: “In Uzbekistan, the IMU had always been seen as a very big threat by President Karimov. And in fact, there had been a lot of steps taken previous to 11 September to actually clamp down on the IMU . . . so what 11 September provided was, really, people with an excuse to get away with gross human rights violations.”⁸⁶

This argument is not likely to be seen as persuasive by many. Given the well-established linkage between IMU and Al Qaeda and the fact that IMU was and is a terrorist organization with the explicit aim of violently overthrowing as many existing governments as possible, its elimination would not be widely lamented as a loss to democracy.

⁸⁵ This is colorfully described by Christian Caryl in his paragraph on Ganci Air Base near Bishkek: “Ganci Air Base offers a perfect if unintended lesson in the way modern military power also serves as an avatar of globalization. Right now, there are 3000 soldiers from eight nations holding up a 24/7 routine at the base. The obligatory base tour takes you from the giant gymnasium to the air-conditioned eight-man tents to the internet room, all flown in from halfway around the world. The PX is filled with Butterfingers, PlayStations and cans of Skoal. By the end of August, the base had pumped some \$34 million into the Kyrgyz economy. (The national budget of Kyrgyzstan is \$250 million.) “Collateral Victory,” *Washington Monthly*, November 8, 2002.

⁸⁶ Judith Arenas, cited in Bruce Pannier, “Central Asia: Six Months After: Human Rights Seen as Backtracking,” Radio Free Europe, www.rferl.org.

Some critics are concerned about possible negative effects of the U.S. role in Central Asia on civil liberties. Boris Rumer, for example, writes:

President George Bush's appeal to other nations to join the United States in the war on terrorism was quickly answered by the five states of Central Asia—Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. They . . . offered, variously, their land and air space for the United States to use in the anti-Taliban campaign. The war against radical Islamic movements waged by the United States in neighboring Afghanistan has benefited and strengthened these regimes, for whom militant Islam had been a real, deadly threat. U.S. military presence in the region and pledge of economic assistance arrived just in time to prop up the faltering regimes. Invitations to visit Washington for Uzbek President Islam Karimov and Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev served as a huge boost for unpopular autocrats.⁸⁷

Tucked away in this paragraph is a rather bold assumption, namely, that the region's governments are "faltering regimes." Terms such as "propped up" and "just in time" suggest that their collapse was imminent. The terminology is noteworthy because it pervades the literature on Central Asia. Its leaders are generally described as holding on by a thread. The region itself is described as being on the brink of breakdown or, alternatively, of violent upheaval.

The Washington Post, after referring to the region as "shaky Central Asia" in the article's title, went on to explain that Karimov had formerly been "held at arm's length by the United States . . . because of his authoritarian policies."⁸⁸ That is possible. It is equally plausible that the former distance between the United States and Karimov was due to the fact that the United States had no strong geopolitical or strategic reason to take more than a peripheral interest in a remote country that still remained loosely within the Russian sphere of influence.

Overall, it is not entirely correct to portray the leaders of the Central Asian republics as unenlightened dictators who must be educated about democracy and human rights and pressed hard to permit political and economic reforms. Their style of governance might incline one to such a view; these are not dedicated reformers. However, neither are they unenlightened dictators categorically opposed to liberalization. Since independence, Central Asian leaders have undertaken repeated and seemingly sincere efforts to liberalize and reform their countries' economies. They have also undertaken not insignificant attempts to open up their political systems. They backtracked when these efforts seemed too risky, met with too much resistance, or, in the case of economic reforms, did not work. Kyrgyzstan is a good example:

⁸⁷ Boris Rumer, "The Powers in Central Asia," *Survival*, Vol. 44, No. 3, Autumn 2002, p. 57.

⁸⁸ Robert Kaiser, "U.S. Plants Footprint in Shaky Central Asia," *The Washington Post*, August 27, 2002.

Although President Akayev began his regime with ideals of multiparty democracy, strong opposition stymied his reform programs and moved him gradually closer to the authoritarian positions of his four Central Asian colleagues.

Referendums extending presidential powers at the expense of parliament are not accepted global democratic practice. Akayev, who solidified his position with two such referendums in the mid-1990s, justified them by arguing that a more centralized executive branch was necessary to achieve economic, political, and legal reforms and to weaken the influence of often corrupt regional power centers. This case can indeed be made. During the first half of the 1990s, the country's parliament in fact was the major obstacle to a reform of the tax code and to the privatization being urgently called for by international economic experts.⁸⁹

To a lesser extent, the other Central Asian republics also took stabs at liberalizing their systems, granting more freedom to the press, and the like. These were in the nature of cautious explorations, not broad-sweeping reforms, and backtracking followed quickly when the results were not reassuring.

In contrast, when the experiments seemed to be working, they were expanded. In Uzbekistan, Karimov proceeded cautiously during the first half of the 1990s, implementing IMF recommendations but doing so far more slowly than that organization would have liked. When this seemed successful—bringing inflation down significantly, for instance—his regime “became noticeably less cautious in its approach to economic reform.”⁹⁰ To look at another example, Tajikistan also attempted economic reforms, embracing the concept of privatization and market reform in order to qualify for IMF and World Bank support. These transformations proved difficult; the elimination of price controls, for example, led to riots, when the prices for food items such as bread went up.

It is important to consider internal as well as external perceptions when making predictions about stability. One Western journalist, remarking on the fact that Tajikistan suffers from rampant corruption, widespread poverty, a lack of natural resources, and a nearly bankrupt government, yet seems moved by a spirit of optimism, wrote “Tajikistan today is full of reminders that ‘compared to what’ can be one of life’s most revealing questions.” And for many Tajiks, he believes, the current situation holds signs of “an improving economy, stable national politics and an easier atmosphere in the country.”⁹¹

⁸⁹ This is also the assessment reached in Glenn Curtis, ed., *Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan—Country Studies*, Library of Congress, Washington D.C., 1997, p. xlvi.

⁹⁰ Curtis, op. cit., p. lviii.

⁹¹ Robert Kaiser, “Tajiks Upbeat About Most Backward Republic,” *The Washington Post*, August 1, 2002.

Conclusions and Recommendations

U.S. assistance to the Central Asian states has increased significantly as a result of the U.S. military presence. Every effort should be made to target a significant share of this aid to the problems of Central Asian youth. The aid should concentrate both on measures that improve the economic prospects of young people and on those that provide intellectual stimulation and the productive use of leisure time. HuT has specifically denounced sports programs as diverting the energies of young people from the religious struggle. The greatest danger of radicalization in Central Asia is provided by young people who believe that there is no hope for a good personal future but who have a great deal of free time and no way to occupy themselves. HuT is often the only way to directly criticize the government and their economic woes and may be the most available way of expressing disaffection.

The region has a complex political culture. This political culture has many idiosyncrasies and imperfections and much room for reform and improvement, but it is a functioning and in many ways a resilient system. It should not be mistaken for chaos, breakdown, or anarchy. The Central Asian ship is navigating some extremely choppy waters, and programmatic formulas of change and reform cannot be imposed from the outside.

Central Asian governments need, with various degrees of urgency, to be reformed and liberalized. However, this has to be accomplished judiciously. A number of experts and some organizations, most notably the ICG, argue for a "lighter hand" in dealing with fundamentalism in Central Asia. The latter group in particular consistently argues in its reports that repression only gives more popularity and momentum to HuT in particular, that a harsh stance on the part of Central Asian governments will be ineffective, and that moving strongly against HuT will "drive it underground, and make it more secretive and conspiratorial." But it is not only the Central Asian semidictatorships who have taken this step. The German government did the same, after a lengthy period of reflection and investigation. Nor does HuT stand in danger of being "driven underground." It already is underground and has from its inception been a clandestine organization. Many experts believe that, after the defeat of the IMU, a number of IMU loyalists joined HuT, merging easily into the preexisting deeper, clandestine layers of that organization. Rather than blanket admonitions to become more open, Central Asian governments should be provided with analytic support in crafting a solid plan for reform and liberalization.

It is too early to pass judgment on the Central Asian governments' formula for dealing with radical Islam. But there are some indications that it may be effective. Tajikistan, focusing on the illegal, radical character of HuT, seems to be pushing that

group out of the mainstream. Even the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP) has distanced itself from HuT and described it as a “threat to Tajikistan’s security.”⁹²

Dividing radicals from the mainstream by raising the risks and costs associated with radicalism to the point where an average discontented young person will think twice about expressing his disaffection through membership in such an organization; keeping control over the religious establishment in order to avoid its becoming an autonomous, opaque societal zone where radicals can find concealment; permitting sufficient expression of religious sentiment that the average person can feel free to practice his religion; motivating and equipping mainstream religion to “self-police” against radicals; this is likely to be the most realistic and effective formula for Central Asia.

The “Russia factor” should not be underestimated, as this could pose a more serious risk to U.S. interests in the region than radical Islam. Russia has vital ties to this region, and Central Asians view the shared history with nostalgia as well as resentment.⁹³ Ongoing bonds to Russia, coupled with uncertainty about U.S. long-term intentions in a region remote from its core interests, make Central Asians reluctant to sever their ties to the big power next door. Forcing them to make a choice is of no real advantage to the United States, but it might inspire Russia to subtly or overtly undermine U.S. goals in the region to avoid being pushed out of one of its traditional spheres of influence.

The Central Asian republics provided critical military facilities to the United States during Operation Enduring Freedom. From the standpoint of the U.S. Air Force, access to air bases in Central Asia, particularly in Uzbekistan, continue to be relevant as a hedge against deterioration of security conditions in Afghanistan or other future requirements of the war on terrorism. Closer interaction with the U.S. military could also prove beneficial in the professional development of the Central Asian militaries. Cooperation in the area of training could also provide an opportunity to encourage values of anticorruption, respect for human rights, and the rule of law within those institutions.

⁹² Davron Vali, “Banned Islamic Movement,” *Eurasia Insight*, September 5, 2002. Some studies that explore policies toward radical, violent movements in a broader context have found that “repression can work.” See Cragin and Daly (2003). This study found that in the case of Egyptian Islamic Jihad and Shining Path, terrorist groups were effectively neutralized by government campaigns not dissimilar from those followed by the Central Asian republics vis-à-vis Islamic extremists.

⁹³ Charles William Maynes points out that there is some cause for the nostalgia: World Bank studies show that Central Asia is worse off now than it was under Communism, *op. cit.*, p. 122.

Southeast Asia: Moderate Tradition and Radical Challenge

Angel M. Rabasa

Introduction

This chapter explores the evolution of political Islam in Southeast Asia in recent years. As the title of the overall report suggests, this chapter assesses the impact of the September 11 terrorist attacks and the ensuing global war on terrorism, the Bali bombing of October 12, 2002, and the reverberations of the war in Iraq and the removal of Saddam's government.

As with other chapters, the framework of this chapter is structured around catalytic events and other political, economic, social, and cultural developments that have given Southeast Asian Islam its particular character and direction. The key developments specific to Southeast Asia that have shaped the region's religio-political landscape include the following:

- *The 1997–1998 regional economic crisis.* The deterioration of economic and social conditions after the crisis weakened governments and produced an environment favorable to the activities of political and religious extremists. These domestic factors interacted with broader external trends to produce greater Islamic militancy in the region.
- *The fall of President Suharto's New Order government in Indonesia.* Suharto's downfall, to a large extent a consequence of the economic crisis, sharpened competition among political sectors, some of which saw Islam as a path to political power. The political disorder also produced tactical alliances between some elite and military factions and Islamic extremists, which gave the extremists greater scope to expand their political influence and to engage in communal conflict in the Moluccas and Sulawesi.
- *The Islamization program in Malaysia,* in the context of the competition between the dominant political organization, the United Malay National Organization (UMNO) and the Islamic fundamentalist opposition party, the Pan-Malay Islamic Party (PAS) for the ethnic Malay vote.

- *The effects of the September 11 attacks*, in particular, Southeast Asia's emergence as the so-called second front in the war on terrorism and the reorganization of security policy on the part of many of the region's most important international actors on a counterterrorist agenda.
- *The terrorist bombings in Bali and Jakarta* and their impact on Indonesian attitudes toward terrorism and Islamic extremism.

This chapter also explores the role of political agents and institutions whose actions have influenced the relationship between state and religion in Southeast Asia in important ways. The institutions include the Indonesian military; Indonesian political parties and civil society organizations; Malaysia's two major Malay parties, UMNO and PAS; and Islamic militant organization throughout the region and their external associates and sponsors.

Before proceeding with a dynamic analysis of the trend lines in political Islam in Southeast Asia, it is necessary to provide an overview of the landscape of Southeast Asian Islam. Without a sense of the varieties of Islamic practices in Southeast Asia and of the history of interfaith and intercommunal relations in this extraordinarily diverse region, we could not place the religio-political trends in Southeast Asia in their proper perspective.

We will conclude the analysis with an assessment of the future of Southeast Asian Islam and with some of the implications for the U.S. government, the Department of Defense, and the U.S. Air Force. We will evaluate the condition of "civil Islam" in the most important Southeast Asian countries with significant Muslim populations and recommend policies to strengthen moderate sectors within Southeast Asian Muslim communities.

The Ethnic and Religious Landscape

Southeast Asia is divided into two major cultural zones. The first is maritime Southeast Asia—the Malaya peninsula and the islands and archipelagoes stretching from Sumatra to the Philippines. This is the area also referred to as the "Malay world." Most, but not all, of the populations in this area speak languages of the Malay linguistic family. For the most part, Malay speakers are Muslim, except in the Philippines, East Timor, and parts of the Moluccas, northern Sulawesi, and the Nusa Tenggara islands of Indonesia, where the people are largely Christian. Ethnic Chinese constitute 30 percent of the population of Malaysia. They are, of course, the majority ethnic group in Singapore. Hindus are the third-largest ethnic group in Malaysia and a majority in the Indonesian island of Bali. Indigenous peoples, called Lumads in Mindanao, are one of the three major ethno-religious groups on that island. Dayaks and Kadazan, mostly animist or Christian in religion, constitute the majority in the

eastern Malaysian states of Sarawak and Sabah and in parts of Kalimantan (Indonesian Borneo).

The second cultural zone in Southeast Asia is mainland Southeast Asia, the area comprising the former Indochina, Thailand, and Burma. The major cultural and political influences during the pre-European period in mainland Southeast Asia were from China and Hindustan. Theravada Buddhism is the dominant religion in mainland Southeast Asia, although there are significant Muslim minorities in Thailand, Burma, and Cambodia. Malay Muslims constitute approximately 80 percent of the population in the southern Thai provinces of Pattani, Yala, and Narithiwat, which were historically part of the former Kingdom of Patani (Pattani in Thai). Ethnic Malays also constitute a majority in the province of Satun, although in this province most people speak Thai and are better integrated into the mainstream Thai culture. In Cambodia, it is estimated that there are some 200,000 Muslims, mostly ethnic Malays or indigenous Cham, who trace their roots to the former kingdom of Champa, which once extended through south and central Vietnam. Burmese Muslims are estimated at 4 percent of the population and at a higher proportion by Muslim leaders.¹

This analysis focuses on maritime Southeast Asia, where the most significant Muslim populations are found, and particularly on Indonesia, the world's most populous Muslim-majority country and the largest Muslim-majority democracy. Moreover, Indonesia's geostrategic importance makes it the key to regional security. The Indonesian archipelago stretches across 3,000 miles from the Indian Ocean to the western half of New Guinea, straddling key sea-lanes and straits. A high proportion of the trade of Japan, the Republic of Korea, Taiwan, and Australia, including much of their oil imports, transits these straits and sea-lanes of communication.²

As has often been noted in studies of Southeast Asian Islam, what is most striking about Islam in Southeast Asia is its extraordinary internal diversity. This reflects several factors. One is the modality of Islam's introduction to Southeast Asia. Islam spread largely through the conversion of elites and therefore developed under different conditions from those in other regions of the Muslim world, where the religion was established through military conquest. The continuity of elites permitted the preservation of strong pre-Islamic elements in the religious culture of the region. The character of Southeast Asian Islam also reflects the cultural, ethnic, and linguistic diversity of the region; the absence of a common language and discourse (such as Arabic, which reinforces ideological and cultural trends in the Arab world); and the presence of substantial Christian, Hindu, and animist communities, which by and large

¹ For a more detailed discussion of the Muslim populations in mainland Southeast Asia, see Rabasa (2003), pp. 21–23.

² Shipping transiting the region must pass through one of three or four chokepoints: the straits of Malacca, Sunda, or Lombok, or possibly the straits east of East Timor. See Noer (1996).

have accustomed Muslims in Southeast Asia to coexist with other religious and cultural traditions (as is also the case in India).³

In Indonesia, degrees of Islamic observance range from orthodox forms of Islam practiced by the *santri* Muslims to the more diluted form known as *Kejawen* in parts of Java. A great many Indonesians are *abangan*, or nonpracticing Muslims. In East Java, the majority of Muslims belong to the tendency known in Indonesia as traditionalism, which incorporates strong elements of Sufi mysticism and Javanese traditions. Traditionalists adhere to the Syafi'i (Shafi'i in Arabic) *mazhab* (school of jurisprudence) within Sunni Islam. Adherents of this school continue to interpret the Islamic scriptures on the basis of the teachings of the ninth-century jurist Imam Syafi'i, rather than engaging in the unmediated reading of the Quran, as the modernists do. Traditionalists argue that the success of Islam in Indonesia from the fourteenth century onward had to do with the willingness to adapt to local customs, and they sometimes will admit that contemporary practices owe something to pre-Islamic traditions. (This syncretism opens traditionalists to attack by modernists and others for incorporating "non-Islamic" elements in their beliefs and practices.)⁴

Traditionalists are represented by the Nahdlatul Ulama (Awakening of the Ulama) (NU), the largest social welfare organization in the Muslim world, which claims a membership of over 40 million. The organization was founded in 1926 by a group of *kiai* (traditional Islamic teachers), who were alarmed by the inroads made by modernists, represented by Muhammadiyah, which was formed in 1912 to pursue a program of religious, social, and educational reform. After independence, the Nahdlatul Ulama leadership agreed that, in the interest of national unity, it was acceptable for Indonesia not to be organized as an Islamic state.⁵ The republic emerged not exactly as a secular state, but not as a religiously based state either (the national philosophy, *Pancasila*, or five principles, acknowledged belief in one God as a national principle but did not discriminate among the recognized religions—Islam, Catholic Christianity, Protestant Christianity, Hinduism, and Confucianism).

³ The development of maritime trade and the formation of Muslim states in maritime Southeast Asia in the thirteenth century were closely intertwined. The gravestone of Malik al-Salih, the first Muslim ruler of Samudra Pasai, on the southern coast of Sumatra, is dated 1297. Muslim merchants who visited Samudra Pasai became important agents of Islamization in the Indonesian archipelago. After the emergence of Malacca as an important Muslim state in the fifteenth century, many Muslim merchants, especially Persians, Arabs, and Bengalis, moved from Samudra Pasai to Malacca. Jajat Burhanudin, "The Making of Islamic Political Tradition in the Muslim World," *Studia Islamika*, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2001, pp. 8–15.

⁴ R. William Liddle, review of Chapter Eight. Professor Liddle notes that placing the doctrinal roots of Indonesian traditionalism in the Shafi'i school is important because it connects Indonesian traditionalists to the rest of the Muslim world, just as modernists are connected through the teachings of Muhammad Abduh and other modernist Muslim thinkers of the last two centuries.

⁵ In the 1950s, following the lead of the more ideological, modernist-led Masyumi Party, NU campaigned for the implementation of *syariat* (shari'a) by the state. In the 1980s, under the leadership of Abdurrahman Wahid, the organization formally rejected the Islamic state.

Although representing traditionalist Islam, the NU leadership has endeavored to adapt to modern conditions. Under the chairmanship of Abdurrahman Wahid (1984–1999), the curriculum in the NU *pesantren* (Islamic boarding schools) was reformed and secular subjects added to the traditional religious subjects. The leadership also worked through associated foundations and research institutes to promote a democratic civil society and reconcile Islam and nationalism. The Nahdlatul Ulama tends not to identify non-Muslims as the source of the problems of Muslims and is hospitable to interfaith dialogue and cooperation.⁶

The second important tendency within Indonesian Islam is modernism. Indonesian modernism is part of a movement that began at the turn of the twentieth century, influenced by the ideas of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and Muhammad Abduh, with the aim of purifying Islam from what were considered to be heterodox practices. Modernists are largely drawn from the urban population and professionals. Just as the Abduhist tradition was bifurcated in the rest of the Muslim world into a fundamentalist and a liberal or moderate wing, Indonesian modernism is heir to the same development. The former includes the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) and the latter most (but not all) of Muhammadiyah.⁷

The founders of Muhammadiyah, the institutional expression of the Indonesian modernist movement, wanted to banish “superstition,” e.g., some of the practices associated with traditionalist Indonesian Islam. They placed great emphasis on social services and education, with the aim of preparing Indonesian Muslims for independence. Their model of education was the Dutch school system, with the inclusion of religious subjects, and they stressed the primacy of critical reasoning (*ijtihad*) as opposed to blind obedience to the traditional *ulama* (*taqlid*).⁸

Indonesian modernists believe in adjusting *shari’a* (*syariat* in Bahasa Indonesia) to present conditions. In the view of Muhammadiyah Chairman Ahmad Syafii Maarif, Islamic law must be reformed because in many cases it is no longer relevant to modern conditions.⁹ Both Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama opposed the initiative of some Muslim parties in 2002 to introduce Islamic law into the Indonesian constitution. The respected religious scholar Nurcholish Madjid argues that those who want to put *shari’a* in the constitution do not have a proper understanding of it. *Shari’a*, he says, comes up only three times in the Quran. Originally, it was a

⁶ Douglas E. Ramage, “Social Organizations: Nahdlatul Ulama and Pembangunan,” in Baker et al., eds. (1999), provides an excellent overview of the Nahdlatul Ulama.

⁷ Professor R. William Liddle, review of Chapter Eight. Professor Liddle notes that Muhammadiyah was opposed not just to heterodox practices but to the *mazhab* tradition in Islam.

⁸ Discussion with Dr. Azyumardi Azra, Jakarta, June 2002. See also Muhammadiyah Chairman Ahmad Syafii Maarif’s statement of Muhammadiyah’s mission in the Incontro internazionale uomini e religioni, Comunità di Sant’Egidio, September 8, 2003, at http://www.santegidio.org/uer/2003/int_508_EN.htm.

⁹ “‘Ideology Is Dead’ in Politics,” *Jakarta Post*, May 29, 2002.

way of dealing with the consequences of the Muslim conquest, but now there is no agreement on what it is.¹⁰

Traditionalist and modernist Islam can no longer be considered pure categories, if they ever were. In recent years, Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah attitudes and religious practices have converged, at least on the elite level. Some NU members who studied at Middle Eastern universities have become more receptive to the principle of *ijtihad*, which is central to modernism. The new discourse on gender equality also has gained greater acceptance within NU and rejection of polygamy is now very strong among the younger generation.

In Muhammadiyah, the trend among the younger generation is toward greater openness to local cultural influences. In the past, Muhammadiyah opposed Sufi practices. Now, increasing numbers of Muhammadiyah members practice Sufism. Nevertheless, important differences remain: Muhammadiyah remains oriented toward promotion of religious renewal through education and social services whereas NU is more focused on traditional education and practices. Muhammadiyah resists involvement in partisan political activity whereas NU has a stronger political vocation. There is a close association between NU and the NU-based political party National Awakening Party (PKB), whereas Muhammadiyah has kept some distance from its political offshoot, the National Mandate Party (PAN).¹¹

This convergence of the two pillars of moderate progressive Islam in Indonesia is juxtaposed against a trend toward radicalism in other sectors of Indonesian Islam. More radical interpretations of Islam are prevalent in areas where NU and Muhammadiyah do not have a strong presence—for instance, in South Sulawesi and West Java—and in some universities, where the PKS has made significant inroads in recent years. These radical interpretations are associated with what moderate Islamic activist Ulil Abshar-Abdalla calls the “New Islamic Movement,” groups that emerged in the 1980s and 1990s as part of the worldwide wave of Islamization.¹² These groups include the Hizb ul-Tahrir and Jamaah Tarbiyah, which supports the establishment of a pan-Islamic caliphate, the Jamaah al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim Brotherhood), and other groups, some of them violent, that emerged in the immediate post-Suharto period. Table 8.1 summarizes the characteristics of major religious and political tendencies in Indonesia on a set of defining or “marker” issues. Figure 8.1 and 8.2 place these same tendencies on spectrums of democracy to nondemocracy and violence to nonviolence.

¹⁰ Discussion with Dr. Nurcholish Madjid, Jakarta, February 2002.

¹¹ This analysis is based on discussion with Dr. Azyumardi Azra and Ulil Abshar-Abdalla, Jakarta, June 2003.

¹² Discussion with Ulil Abshar-Abdalla, Jakarta, June 2003.

Table 8.1
Characteristics of Major Religious and Political Tendencies in Indonesia

Radical Fundamentalists	Scriptural Fundamentalists	Traditionalists	Modernists	Liberal Secularists	Authoritarian Secularists
Groups in This Category					
Jemaah Islamiyah	Tabligh	Nahdlatul Ulama	Muhammadiyah mainstream (liberal)	PDI-P (Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle)	Golkar (Suharto era)
Majlis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI)	Darul Arqam		PKS (Prosperous Justice Party) (Islamist)	Golkar (reformed)	
Islamic Propagation Council (DDII)					
See "Other groups" on Table 8.3					
Ideology					
Adhere to Islamist ideologies; seek to mobilize religion to attain political goals	Strict scripturalism but focus is on religion, not politics	Fuse Islamic beliefs with local traditions	Return to core values of Islam, viewed as consistent with modern world	Adhere to state philosophy of Pancasila. Key values are nationalism and democracy	Officially adhered to Pancasila, interpreted to support authoritarian political system
Political-Legal Views					
Anti-status quo; seek expanded political power for Muslims, establishment of shari'a as part of constitution	Politically conservative; support establishment of shari'a	Politically moderate; focus on social and cultural aspects of Islam rather than politics. Flexible on application of religious law	Politically moderate but with Islamist wing; support rule of law. Believe religious law should be adapted to modern conditions	Support secular law and institutions within the context of a democratic society and political system	Relied on authoritarian structures and control or repression of civil society. In practice rule of law subordinated to interests of ruling groups


Table 8.1—continued

Radical Fundamentalists	Scriptural Fundamentalists	Traditionalists	Modernists	Liberal Secularists	Authoritarian Secularists
Government					
Political legitimacy derives from God. Ultimate goal is establishment of Islamic state in Indonesia	Political legitimacy derives from God, but generally not involved in politics	Political legitimacy derives from the will of the people. Leaders need not enforce Islamic law, but must respect Islamic values	Political legitimacy derives from the will of the people through free elections. The Islamist wing believes the people can be educated to support an Islamic state	Political legitimacy derives from the will of the people through free elections.	Trappings of constitutional government and elections but in practice authoritarian control exercised through the ruling party, bureaucracy, and military
Human Rights					
In theory, reject Western concept of individual liberties, but make tactical use of human rights as a political tool. Believe the full imposition of shari'a creates a just society	Concepts of human rights must be based in the Quran and the sunna	Support human rights and individual liberties	The liberal wing supports human rights and individual liberties; the Islamist wing seeks to establish an Islamic state and Islamic law	Support human rights and individual liberties	Limits placed on human rights by internal security legislation. Rights subordinated in practice to the interests of the state and the ruling groups
Social Agenda					
Generally reactionary. Most groups willing to use coercion and violence to enforce their conception of Islamic behavior	Reactionary, particularly with regard to dress and behavior codes for women. Men must conform too, but have fewer restrictions	Conservative but value nonreligious subjects in education. Women should dress modestly, but the definition depends on local custom. Most oppose use of coercion to enforce behavior codes	Generally progressive; value nonreligious subjects in education. Do not believe Islam requires women to wear any particular form of dress. Support education and advancement of women	Progressive in education and women's rights. No restrictions on dress or behavior unless contrary to law	Inconsistent. Suharto government supported economic development, education and the emancipation of women, but suppressed the development of civil society

Table 8.1—continued

Radical Fundamentalists	Scriptural Fundamentalists	Traditionalists	Modernists	Liberal Secularists	Authoritarian Secularists
Links to Terrorism					
Most support goals of Islamic terrorists; some groups are believed to have links to terrorist organizations	No known links	None. Most oppose terrorism and violence	None. Most oppose terrorism and violence	None. Oppose terrorism and violence	None
Propensity for Political Violence					
Generally high. Some groups are violent; others are not but condone certain types of violence	Low	Low	Low	Low	State used violence to suppress opposition, both violent and non-violent


Figure 8.1
Major Indonesian and Malaysian Tendencies on a Spectrum of Democracy to Nondemocracy



RAND MG246-8.1

The trend toward religious radicalism has not been an entirely indigenous phenomenon. Moderate Indonesian Muslims often cite ideological influences and funding from the Middle East as a major factor in radicalization. In Indonesia, there is a substantial Hadrami (Yemeni) diaspora, which numbers about five million across Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia. Although the majority of Southeast Asians of Arab origin are not radicals (indeed, many Indonesians of Arab descent, such as former Foreign Ministers Ali Alatas and Alwi Shihab, have served with distinction in prominent positions), there is a striking Yemeni connection to radical Islam

Figure 8.2
Major Indonesian and Malaysian Tendencies on a Spectrum of Nonviolence to Violence



RAND MG246-8.2

across Southeast Asia. Many Indonesians point out that Islamic extremism in their country has been associated with clerics of Arab origin—for instance, Laskar Jihad leader Ja’afar Umar Thalib, Jemaah Islamiyah founders Abu Bakar Ba’asyir and the late Abdullah Sungkar, and Front Pembela Islam (Islam Defenders Front) head Muhammad Habib Rizieq, among others.¹³

¹³ Discussion with Dr. Azyumardi Azra, Jakarta, June 2002.

A related phenomenon is the influence of the relatively small number of Southeast Asian jihadist fighters who returned to the region after the Afghan war. According to a regional intelligence source, there are about 1,000 Afghan veterans in Indonesia. Not all of them are involved in militant Islamic causes, of course, but it is worth noting that practically all the leaders of the Jemaah Islamiyah and a good number of leaders of other radical groups are veterans of the Afghanistan war.

As in Indonesia, Islam in Malaysia was deeply influenced by pre-Islamic practices and beliefs derived from Hinduism and animism. From the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries on, returning scholars from the Arabian Peninsula and Egypt introduced a more shari'a-oriented or scriptural interpretation of Islam. In modern times, Islam in Malaysia has become more homogeneous and orthodox. The consolidation of Islam in Malaysia reflected the country's experience under British colonial rule and as an independent state, particularly the survival of the religio-political role of the sultans, the role of the government in defining religious orthodoxy, and the highly dichotomized character of Malaysian society.

The development of a centralized religious authority to oversee Islamic affairs in the Malay States began under the British administration. The shari'a and *adat* (custom) were codified and subordinated to the British legal code and the enactments of the colonial administration. Religious officials were engaged as government functionaries at the state level. After independence, the constitution empowered the country's nine sultans as the final arbiters in matters relating to religion.¹⁴ The result was enforced Sunni orthodoxy. Heterodox religious movements, largely tolerated in Indonesia, were suppressed in Malaysia as "cults."

The highly dichotomized character of Malaysian society is another factor in the religio-political development of the state. At the time of independence in 1957 the politically dominant group, the Malays,¹⁵ accounted for 50 percent of the population of peninsular Malaysia. Ethnic Chinese accounted for 37 percent; Indians 11 percent. By 2000, according to census figures, the proportion of *bumiputra* (Malays and other indigenous peoples) had increased to 65.1 percent, whereas that of ethnic Chinese had decreased to 26.0 percent and that of Indians to 7.7 percent. The Muslim proportion of the population increased from 58.6 percent in 1991 to 60.4 percent in 2000. Of the remaining population, 19.2 percent professed Buddhism; 9.1 percent Christianity; 6.3 percent Hinduism; and 2.6 percent Confucianism, Taoism, and traditional Chinese religion.¹⁶ However, although Muslims constitute an overall majority in Malaysia, according to a 1997 estimate they represent a minority in the

¹⁴ See Mutalib (1993), pp. 20–26.

¹⁵ Malays are defined in the Federal Constitution as those who profess the Muslim religion, speak the Malay language, and conform to Malay customs.

¹⁶ Department of Statistics, Malaysia, Population Distribution and Basic Demographic Characteristics Report, Population and Housing Census 2000, in <http://www.statistics.gov.my/English/pressdemo.htm>.

eastern Malaysian states of Sarawak (tribal religions 35 percent; Buddhists and Confucians 24 percent; Muslims 20 percent; Christians 16 percent; other 5 percent) and Sabah (Muslims 38 percent; Christians 17 percent; other 45 percent).¹⁷

The Malays' political insecurity produced a greater insistence on ethnic and religious solidarity, reinforced by the status of Islam as a pillar of the Malay identity, again in contrast to Indonesia, where the national identity is defined in nonreligious terms.¹⁸ Another factor that strongly influenced Malaysian Islam is the *dakwah* (Arabic *da'wa*) movement, which promotes Islamic education and the propagation of Islam and Islamic practices. Islamic education includes an informal network of madrassas at the elementary school level. There are allegations of Saudi funding for some of these madrassas, but the evidence is inconclusive. Many of the madrassas are staffed by members of the Partai Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS), Malaysia's Islamic opposition party. Although the level of militancy in the Malaysian Islamic education system has never approached that of Pakistan, it nevertheless has sustained fundamentalist religio-political.

Most Philippine Muslims, known as Moros or Bangsamoro (literally, the Moro nation) are Sunni of the Shafi'i *mazhab*, as are most of the Malay peoples of Southeast Asia. There are at least 13 distinct ethno-linguistic communities of Moros, the most important of which are the Maranao and the closely related Ilanun around Lake Lanao in Mindanao and the Maguindanao of Cotabato. In the Sulu archipelago, the most important groups are the Tausug on the island of Jolo (Sulu); the Yakan of Basilan; the Samal in Tawi-Tawi and adjacent islands; and the Jama Mapun of Cagayan de Sulu. Philippine Muslims constituted 50 percent of the population in Mindanao in 1918, but because of the migration of Catholic Filipinos from Luzon and the Visayas, the Muslim proportion of the population of Mindanao declined to 18 percent in 1970, where it has stabilized. At present, the Muslim population of the Philippines is estimated at 3.8 million, or 5 percent of the overall Filipino population of 76 million.¹⁹

The Muslim areas of the southern Philippines experienced an Islamic resurgence after the end of World War II. The term *Moro* was used to encompass all the Muslim communities and was attached to the separatist organizations that emerged later. The Islamic resurgence in the Philippines was influenced by the religious revival in neighboring Muslim countries and by the return of Philippine Muslim scholars from cen-

¹⁷ The breakdown of the population figures for Sarawak and Sabah is from the 1997 *CIA World Factbook*. Later editions do not provide separate data for eastern Malaysia. The Muslim proportion of the Sabah population may be significantly greater if illegal Muslim Filipino migrants are counted.

¹⁸ Malays are also identified with the *bumiputra*—literally, “sons of the soil”—to whom special privileges have been extended since the 1970s; all Malays are *bumiputra*, but not all *bumiputra* are Malay Muslim, especially in eastern Malaysia.

¹⁹ “The Diverse Culture of Mindanao,” http://www.seasite.niu.edu/Tagalog/Mindanao/Mindanao_Culture/mindanao_culture.htm. Last accessed August 18, 2004; *CIA World Factbook*, 1997.

ters of Islamic learning in the Middle East. With Saudi financial support, hundreds of mosques were built on the Middle Eastern model.²⁰ The Islamic resurgence brought changes in the dress code and in the status of women. The Muslim elites that in the period before the resurgence had favored Western-style clothes now embraced Islamic dress.²¹ These changes in outward appearance and personal behavior reflected a stronger sense of group identity and greater religio-political militancy. This religious revival was intertwined with ethnic nationalism and the socioeconomic grievances of Philippine Muslims. To Moro nationalists, Islam was the ideology that transcended ethnic and linguistic differences.

The most influential informal religious movement among the Moros is the international Tabligh movement. The goal of the Tabligh movement is to bring Muslims faith back to the practices of orthodox Islam. The Tabligh does not have an organized structure and does not take political positions. However, *ulama* involved in the Tabligh have organized two Muslim political parties, the Ompia (Reform) and Sabab. These two parties have taken part in local elections and elected several mayors and regional assembly members. Both groups are moderate; their differences are mostly over personalities. The government party, Lakas, also has a Muslim component that wields significant power at the local level. Traditional leaders constitute another power center, although they are now fading in influence. The *datus* (Muslim nobility) in central Mindanao have been able to translate social status into political power. Some have become warlords and some have joined the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), the largest Moro armed separatist organization. Since membership in the Tabligh is open to all Muslims, there is an overlap between the membership of the Tabligh and the MILF, but there are no organizational links between the two.²²

Catalytic Events

Impact of The Political Revolution in Indonesia

As noted above, a number of catalytic events specific to Southeast Asia interacted with broader trends at work in the Muslim world to give Southeast Asian Islam and its political manifestations their particular direction. A key event was the downfall of Indonesian President Suharto, which unleashed forces that had been suppressed or carefully controlled during Suharto's 32-year "New Order" regime. Under Suharto, the only political vehicle allowed for the representation of Muslim interests was the

²⁰ "Islamic resurgence as an international movement," in Spain, "Balky-Islam," at <http://www.magandamagazine.org/04/balkik1.html>, last accessed August 2004.

²¹ "Islamic resurgence as an international movement," *op. cit.*, p. 86.

²² Discussion with Senator Santa Nina Rahul, Washington, D.C., 2003.

officially recognized Islamic party, the United Development Party (PPP). Even this ostensibly Islamic party, however, was obliged to accept Pancasila and not Islam as its sole ideology.²³ For most of the New Order, political Islam was labeled as the “extreme right” by the government, ranking just below the communists, the “extreme left,” in the hierarchy of political threats.

In the later years of the New Order, Suharto sought to cultivate Muslims as a countervailing force. In June 1991 Suharto undertook a highly publicized *hajj*, or pilgrimage to Mecca. His government introduced and passed legislation establishing the equality of Islamic courts with other types of courts and returning to them jurisdiction over inheritance disputes.²⁴ Suharto also began to lay down the institutional foundations of the Islamic resurgence in Indonesia. He sponsored the Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals (Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Se-Indonesia, or ICMI), chaired by his trusted aide, Minister for Research and Technology and later President B. J. Habibie. ICMI played a key role in the establishment of new Islamic institutions, such as the Indonesian Islamic Bank, the *Republika* daily newspaper, and the Centre for Information and Development Studies (CIDES).²⁵ Suharto also courted the neofundamentalist Muslims represented by the Indonesian Islamic Propagation Council (Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia, DDII), an organization with a strict Salafi orientation that previously had been a strong critic of the regime.²⁶ Suharto’s son-in-law, then-Major General Prabowo Subianto, built a support base in KISDI (Committee of Solidarity with the Muslim World), a fundamentalist organization with modernist roots that sponsored activities and raised funds in support of Muslims in Bosnia, Chechnya, Kashmir, and elsewhere.²⁷ KISDI and the DDII later played an important role in the support network of the Laskar Jihad and other militant groups.

After Suharto’s resignation in May 1998, the tight controls on political activity were loosened. The new freewheeling political environment enabled Muslim extremists to launch what Michael Davis calls the “jihad project,” an attempt to take advantage of the weakening of state authority and to use opportunistic alliances with military and political factions associated with the Suharto regime to undermine the country’s nascent democratic institutions and bring about the establishment an Is-

²³ After the fall of Suharto and lifting of controls on political activity, the PPP has returned to an Islam-based ideology.

²⁴ Muhammad Hisyam, “The Interaction of Religion and State in Indonesia,” in Mailman (2001), pp. 308–312.

²⁵ Azra, “Globalization of Indonesian Muslim Discourse,” in Mailman (2001), p. 34. For an overview of Suharto’s tactical turn toward Islam in the 1990s, see Vatikiotis (1993), pp. 132–138.

²⁶ Azra, *op. cit.*, pp. 36–37.

²⁷ Suharto critic George Aditjondro has written at length on connections between pro-Suharto elements and Islamic extremists. See “Notes on the Jihad Forces in Maluku,” in Ambon Berdarah Online, July 2000, at www.geocities.com/ambon67/noframe/gja0410y2k.htm, last accessed August 2004.

lamic state. (The motivations of some of the factions aiding or abetting the Muslim extremists were different, of course. Some might have wanted to foment chaos to justify a return to authoritarian rule or simply to put pressure on the new civilian government to be more attentive to their interests).²⁸

The reform movement that led to the fall of Suharto and the removal of his successor, Habibie, had a multireligious backing, including students from the non-denominational, Protestant, and Catholic universities.²⁹ There was no shortage of radical Islamists seeking to fill the political vacuum. Nevertheless, the two major mainstream Muslim organizations, Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, resisted and continue to resist the radicals' efforts to redefine the state in Islamic terms. In a press interview in which he proclaimed the "death of ideology," Muhammadiyah Chairman Ahmad Syafii Maarif scorned the idea of an Islamic state.³⁰

The dividing line between Muslim moderates and radicals goes to the fundamental question at the root of Indonesia's foundation as a nation: whether it should be a secular or an Islamic state. The June 1999 parliamentary elections gave the secular and moderate Muslim parties a large majority in the Parliament—the two largest secular parties, PDI-P and Golkar, received a combined vote of 57 percent.³¹ These results reinforced the perception of political analysts and Indonesia scholars that the majority of Indonesians do not support the establishment of an Islamic state. This was confirmed by the failure of the Islamic parties to gain parliamentary approval in 2002 of a measure establishing Islamic law—the so-called Jakarta Charter. The measure was opposed not only by the secular parties but by the two major Muslim organizations, Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah.

The pattern set in the 1999 election was repeated in the 2004 election for the House of Representatives (DPR). The ruling PDI-P and Golkar together received 40.1 percent of the vote; together with the Democrat Party (a new party that backed the presidential candidacy of former Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono) and the Christian-based Prosperous Peace Party (PDS), the secular parties received 49.7 percent a vote. Five avowedly Islamic parties, including the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) and United Development Party (PPP), received about 20.55 percent of the vote, some 7 percent more than in 1999.³² The

²⁸ See Rabasa (2003), Chapter 2, "Indonesia: The Jihad Project;" and Michael Davis, "Laskar Jihad and the Political Position of Conservative Islam in Indonesia," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 24, No. 1, April 2002, p. 28.

²⁹ Johan Mailman, "South-East Asian Islam and the Globalization Process," in Mailman (2001), p. 28.

³⁰ "'Ideology Is Dead' in Politics," *Jakarta Post*, May 29, 2002.

³¹ United States-Indonesia Society (USINDO) (1999).

³² The Islam-based parties are the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), United Development Party (PPP), Crescent and Star Party (PBB), Reform Star Party (PBR—a splinter of the PPP), and the Indonesian Nahdlatul Community Party (PPNUI). 2004 figures are those announced by the election commission (KPU).

rest of the votes were garnered by the “inclusive” Muslim parties—the PKB and the PAN and other smaller groupings. Overall, the results did not reflect structural changes in voting patterns since 1999. Although the secular parties’ vote was down about 10 percent, this reflected dissatisfaction with the PDI-P’s performance in office (the PDI-P’s overall vote dropped from 34.7 percent in 1999 to 18.5 percent in 2004. Instead of rising support for an Islamic agenda, Golkar held steady).

Despite the evidence of continued electoral strength by the secular parties, Professor R. William Liddle’s analysis of surveys of Muslim public opinion taken by the Center for the Study of Islam and Society (Pusat Pengkajian Islam dan Masyarakat, or PPIM) of the State University for Islamic Studies in Jakarta shows that Indonesians may be more receptive to the appeals of Islamists than previously thought (see Table 8.2). The surveys show that a majority of those sampled agree that Indonesia should have an Islamic government based on the Quran and the sunna and that all Muslims should be required to abide by the shari’a. More than 40 percent believe that one should only vote for candidates who understand Islamic teachings and are prepared to fight for their implementation and, more disturbingly, that the struggle of violent organizations such as the Laskar Jihad and the Darul Islam to implement an Islamic state should be supported. Nevertheless, there is a fair amount of what could only be called cognitive dissonance in the results. Although a majority of the respondents support the establishment of an Islamic state and Islamic law, only a minority believes that one should vote only for an Islamic party, that the government should prohibit banks from charging or paying interest, or that the police should ensure that Muslims carry out their five daily prayers or fast during Ramadan.³³ The best-performing party in the 2004 parliamentary election was the Islamist modernist PKS, which increased its share of the vote to 7.34 percent from 1.01 percent in 1999. The PKS benefited from a campaign that portrayed its politicians as clean and uncorrupted and clearly resonated with the public. The PKS is a new phenomenon in Indonesian politics. It is urban and university based, and its leaders have been educated in Indonesian and Western universities. It considers itself a “cadre” and not a mass party. The party’s goal, according to its leaders, is not near-term electoral gain but propagating a correct interpretation of Islam as a way of life and politics. Despite its Islamist ideology, the party seeks to project a moderate public image.³⁴ Although the PKS made the most spectacular gains, the largest of the explicitly Muslim

³³ The surveys covered 16 provinces in 2001 and all provinces except Papua and Maluku in 2002. Professor Liddle notes that the PPIM survey results are the most reliable in Indonesia, but that more iterations are needed to construct an accurate picture of Muslim political attitudes. For Professor Liddle’s explanation and analysis of the surveys, see Liddle (2003).

³⁴ Discussion with leaders of the Justice Party, Jakarta, June 2002. There are those who believe that the party is controlled by a clandestine inner circle of more radical leaders, and that its real agenda is radical Islamization.

Table 8.2
Political Orientation Among Indonesian Muslims

	2001 (%)	2002 (%)
Agree that Islamic government, i.e., government based on the Quran and sunna under the leadership of Islamic authorities, such as ulama or kiai, is best for a country like Indonesia.	57.8	67.0
Agree that religion and the state should be separated.	36.4	N/A
Agree that the state should require all Muslim men and women to abide by the syariat.	61.4	70.8
Agree that the ideals and struggle of Islamic movements or organizations (like Islamic Defenders Front, Laskar Jihad, Darul Islam, and others) to implement the syariat in the government and society must be supported.	46.4	53.7
Agree that in the national election one should vote only for candidates who understand Islamic teachings and attempt to fight for their implementation in national politics.	46.7	46.1
Agree that in the national election one should vote only for Islamic parties.	22.6	21.1
Agree that the government should prohibit banks from charging or paying interest in all banks in Indonesia.	25.8	N/A
Agree that the law of cutting off the hand of a Muslim thief, as stated in the Quran, must be implemented by the government of Indonesia.	28.9	33.0
Agree that the law of stoning that is ordered in the Quran, i.e., throwing stones at a married Muslim adulteress, must be prohibited in Indonesia.	42.4	N/A
Agree that the police must ensure that Muslims carry out their five daily prayers.	9.9	N/A
Agree that the police must ensure that Muslims fast during Ramadan.	12.9	30.2
Agree that the inheritance of daughters should be half that of sons.	46.7	50.1
Agree that men may have more than one wife (polygamy).	NA	37.9

parties remains the PPP, the former official Islamic party under Suharto, at 8.15 percent of the vote. Other smaller religious parties, such as the Crescent and Star Party (PBB), are also based on Islam but reject violence.³⁵ Beyond these parties, there are groups on the radical fringe that could be characterized as inspired by Wahhabism, such as the Laskar Jihad and other militant groups that emerged under the interim presidency of Habibie. Some of these groups have links to terrorist organization. Table 8.3 lists and characterizes Indonesian extremist groups.

³⁵ USINDO (1999), pp. 10–16.

Table 8.3
Indonesian Radical Islamic Groups

Organization	Description
Political/Activist Groups	
Majlis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI)	Umbrella organization for Indonesian radical groups. Has links to the regional terrorist group Jemaah Islamiyah
Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia: Indonesian Islamic Propagation Council (DDII)	Activist organization with strong Salafi orientation. Nonviolent
Committee of Solidarity with the Muslim World (KISDI)	Established in 1987 to channel support to Islamic causes abroad (Palestinians, Bosnians, Muslims in Kashmir and Mindanao)
Komite Persiapan Pemberlakuan Syariat Islam (KPPSI)	Based in South Sulawesi; violent. Leader: Abdul Aziz Kahar Muzakkar
Islamic Youth Movement	Claimed to have sent fighters to fight with the Taliban in Afghanistan. No independent confirmation of this claim
Defenders of Islam Front (FPI)	Known for organizing attacks on bars and entertainment centers. Led by Muhammad Habib Rizieq
Ikhwan al-Muslimin Indonesia	Indonesian Muslim Brotherhood. Nonviolent
Hizb ul-Tahrir	University-based branch of movement of the same name. Wants to abolish the Indonesian state and replace it with an Islamic caliphate. Nonviolent
Militias	
Laskar Jihad	Paramilitary wing of the Forum Komunikasi Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jamaah (Sunni Communication Forum). Led by Umar Ja'afar Thalib
Laskar Mujahidin	Paramilitary organization under the Majlis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI)
Laskar Jundullah	Paramilitary wing of the KPPSI
Laskar Pembela Islam	Paramilitary wing of the FPI
Student Organizations	
Indonesian Muslim Student Action Union (KAMMI)	Ideologically tied to Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and politically linked to the Keadilan (Justice) Party of Indonesia

Source: RAND.

The period of most rapid growth of the militant groups was under the Habibie presidency (May 1998–October 1999). Habibie sought to mobilize Muslim support in his ultimately unsuccessful effort to retain power. At the president's behest, the military organized groups of thugs, referred to as *Pam Swakarsa* (Self-help Security Guards) to confront antigovernment students who were demanding the govern-

ment's resignation.³⁶ Some of these vigilantes were villagers trucked in from the countryside, unemployed workers, and members of the former progovernment youth organization, Pemuda Pancasila.³⁷ Others were militants mobilized by Muslim extremist groups. Of the groups on this last category, the best known is the Laskar Jihad, which operated from 1999 until it was disbanded in October 2002.

The Laskar Jihad, the militia of the Ahlul Sunnah Wal Jamaah Communication Forum, was founded by Ja'afar Umar Thalib, an Indonesian of Yemenite descent who pursued Islamic studies in the Mawdudi Institute in Pakistan and took part in the war in Afghanistan in the late 1980s. The organization adhered to the Wahhabi sect and recruited its members from among the poorer and less-educated segments of the populace, especially the young rootless urban poor. As with other jihadist organizations, the group claimed to pursue a mission of social work and Muslim education, but its primary business was the armed the jihad in eastern Indonesia.

Laskar Jihad found a rallying cause in the communal conflict that, beginning in 1999, pitted Christians against Muslims in the Moluccas (which, since 2001, split into the two provinces of Maluku and North Maluku) and later in Sulawesi. The causes of the conflict are complex, but at least at the beginning the conflict could not be ascribed solely to religious factors.³⁸ There were long-standing friendly and cooperative relations between the indigenous Christian and Muslim communities in the Moluccas, including institutionalized mutual help arrangements on some islands.³⁹ However, the arrival of migrants, mostly Muslims, from other regions of Indonesia upset established social and economic arrangements. Between 1945 and 2000, the Christian proportion of the population declined from approximately 68 percent overall to 50.20 percent in Maluku and 14.57 percent in North Maluku.⁴⁰ Adding to the mix were political rivalries between local elites that had been suppressed in the period of centralized rule from Jakarta and possible instigation of the violence by military elements associated with the Suharto regime.⁴¹

In spring 2000, Laskar Jihad dispatched hundreds of volunteers with their weapons to Ambon, unhindered by the authorities, despite President Abdurrahman

³⁶ As Harold Crouch notes, although the military was less than enthusiastic about Habibie's accession to the presidency and dismayed by the operation of civilian groups outside their control, the military's leaders had little choice but to defer to Habibie's authority. Harold Crouch, "Wiranto and Habibie: Military-Civilian Relations since May 1998," in Budiman, Hatley, and Kingsbury, eds. (1999), p. 133.

³⁷ David Bouchier, "Skeletons, Vigilantes, and the Armed Forces' Fall from Grace," in Budiman, Hatley, and Kingsbury, eds. (1999), p. 158.

³⁸ Rabasa and Chalk (2001), pp. 41–44.

³⁹ Presentation by Dr. Michael Taylor, "Turbulent Times Past and Present in the Moluccas," USINDO Open Forum, Washington, D.C. September 13, 2000.

⁴⁰ Suryadinata, Arifin, and Ananta (2003), p. 153.

⁴¹ Rabasa and Chalk (2001), pp. 41–44.

Wahid's orders to prevent them from leaving Java. In addition to the Laskar Jihad, other Muslim irregulars were operating in the Moluccas, such as the Laskar Mujahidin, a group associated with accused terrorist ringleader Abubakar Ba'asyir's Ngruki network.⁴² The authorities were not able to get a handle on the situation in the Moluccas until 2001, when a specialized battalion composed of personnel from elite units was dispatched to Ambon to restore order.⁴³ Poso, Central Sulawesi, a region evenly divided between Christians and Muslims (or with a slight Christian majority) has also been the scene of communal strife since April 2000. In August 2001, the Laskar Jihad dispatched hundreds of fighters to the district, where other extremist militias were already active. The situation stabilized at the end of 2001, when the national government sent reinforcements to the region and successfully mediated the peace agreements known as Malino I and II between Muslim and Christian leaders in Poso and Ambon. The two sides undertook to end the hostilities and to disarm their respective militias. Despite episodic outbreaks of violence since then, the truce has held and a degree of stability has been restored to the conflict areas.⁴⁴

As Michael Davis notes in his interesting piece on the Laskar Jihad, the group's tactics, such as targeting civilians, were part of a sustained effort to polarize the Muslim and Christian communities in order to increase tensions and religious polarization throughout Indonesia and thus promote the radicals' larger goals.⁴⁵ Laskar Jihad was believed to have links to Al Qaeda derived from ties to Afghanistan, common Salafist roots, and a propensity for violence—although the Laskar Jihad's did not share Al Qaeda's global agenda and pursued strictly local goals. After September 11, 2001, Ja'afar tried hard to distance his organization from bin Laden and his network. He criticized bin Laden's understanding of Islam and told the press that he had turned down an offer of money and training from bin Laden's representatives. Nevertheless, there were reports of Al Qaeda trainers with Laskar Jihad and of arms shipments to the group from the Philippine terrorist Abu Sayyaf Group.⁴⁶

Despite their limited grassroots support, the radicals, as a moderate Muslim political activist noted, are adept at using modern mass communications.⁴⁷ Laskar Jihad was largely successful in presenting itself as the defender of beleaguered Muslims in eastern Indonesia (as shown in the opinion survey in Table 8.2). This view was ac-

⁴² International Crisis Group (ICG), "Indonesia Background: How the Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network Operates," ICG Asia Report No. 43, Brussels/Jakarta, December 11, 2002, pp. 22–23.

⁴³ ICG, "Indonesia: The Search for Peace in Maluku," Brussels/Jakarta, February 8, 2002, pp. 13–14.

⁴⁴ Rabasa (2003), pp. 28–31.

⁴⁵ Michael Davis, "Laskar Jihad and the Political Position of Conservative Islam in Indonesia," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 24, No. 1, April 2002, p. 23.

⁴⁶ Derwin Pereira, "Is There an Al-Qaeda Connection in Indonesia?" *Sunday (Straits) Times*, January 20, 2002, p. 35.

⁴⁷ Interview with Ulil Abshar-Abdalla, Jakarta, June 2002.

cepted even by some moderate Indonesian Muslims who, while critical of Laskar Jihad's goals and tactics, noted that the group defended the Muslims in the Moluccas, a task that, in their view, the central government was unable or unwilling to perform.

Effect of the Islamization Program in Malaysia

In contrast to Indonesia, where the national identity since independence has been defined in nonreligious terms, Malaysia defines itself as an Islamic country. But also unlike Indonesia, in Malaysia religion is intimately bound up with the identity of the politically dominant group, the Malays. The political debate within the dominant Malay community is not whether Malaysia should be a secular or an Islamic state, but what kind of an Islamic state it should be. This question is the crux of the competition between the United Malays National Organization (UMNO), the dominant partner in the ruling Barisan Nasional (National Front), and the Islamic fundamentalist opposition party, the Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS).

PAS is one of the Muslim world's oldest Islamic political parties. It was founded in 1951 and has participated in every parliamentary election in Malaysia since 1955. In 1959 it came to power in the northeastern Malaysian states of Kelantan and Terengganu. Since then the party has been in continuous control of Kelantan, with the exception of 1978–1990. PAS lost control of Terengganu in 1961 and regained it in 1999. From the beginning, the party's goal was the establishment of an Islamic state in Malaysia, as defined by PAS, but during the first three decades of its existence the party's ideology also had a strong tinge of Malay nationalism.

After the 1978 parliamentary election, in which PAS suffered one of its worst defeats, the party began to take a decidedly more theocratic cast. This was the result of several factors. The ulama began to play a more important role in party affairs, particularly in Kelantan. There was also an infusion of cadres and ideology from the Islamic Youth Movement (Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia, or ABIM).

ABIM, a university-based nongovernmental organization headed by the future Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim from 1974 to 1982, played a key role in laying the ideological foundations of political Islam in Malaysia. ABIM served as a transmission line for fundamentalist political ideology. It organized training programs for its members and ran schools throughout the country. Its primary aim was to inculcate what it considered to be a proper understanding of Islam in Muslim youth in particular and in the Muslim population at large. The group criticized the government for promoting Malay nationalism, which, in the organization's view, subordinated the community's Islamic identity to a narrow ethnic concept. Like other Islamist movements, ABIM also criticized economic disparities, Western-

oriented economic development models and cultural influence, corruption, and abuses of internal security laws.⁴⁸

In 1982 a new generation of leaders, many with an ABIM background, took over the leadership of PAS.⁴⁹ The party came under the ideological influence of the Iranian revolution, accepting the Iranian concept of the supremacy of the religious hierarchy. PAS began to propose a vision of the Islamic state that included an elected parliament with limited legislative authority, subordinated to a religious body, the Council of Ulama, with shari'a as the exclusive source of law.⁵⁰ Although ABIM was providing much of PAS's new leadership, the leading ABIM personality, Anwar Ibrahim, and a number of his followers joined UMNO, which, under the new Prime Minister Mahathir bin Mohamad, had launched its own Islamization program.⁵¹ UMNO strategy since 1982 has been to accommodate Islam through pro-Islamic rhetoric and such initiatives as the establishment of the Dakwah Foundation to coordinate Islamic propagation activities throughout the country, the International Islamic University, compulsory "Islamic civilization" courses for Muslim university students, and Islamic banking and insurance schemes.⁵²

UMNO leaders sought to defuse PAS's attempts to turn Islam to its political advantage by claiming that Malaysia was already an Islamic country. The UMNO promoted its own Islamization program, which centered on the promotion of cultural Islam and such symbolic steps as offering of Muslim prayers at official functions, the construction of mosques by the state, the holding of Quran-reading competitions, and organizing of the *hajj* by state agencies. Nevertheless, the government's Islamization campaign has not changed the fundamental structure of the country's legal, political, and administrative system, which is based on the British model and to a large extent reflects the Western political tradition.

According to a well-known Malaysian academic,⁵³ UMNO staked its ground as an Islamic organization to respond to the demands of the Malay population for a larger role for Islam in society. Tactically, the UMNO strategy has been to undercut PAS's appeal by blurring the distinction between their agendas. This was a risky strategy, because it forced UMNO to confront PAS on PAS's own ground. Some Singaporean observers suggested that such a strategy opened more political space for

⁴⁸Muzaffar (1987), pp. 50–52.

⁴⁹ These included the recently deceased PAS president Fadzil Noor, Abdul Hadi Awang, Nakhaie Ahmad, and Syed Ibrahim Rahman.

⁵⁰ Farish A Noor, "Ustaz Haji Yusuf bin Abdullah al-Rawa: Architect of the 'New PAS' of the 1980s," at http://pasjt.tripod.com/a/saf/yusuf_rawa.htm.

⁵¹ This program is known as the *Penerapan Nilai-nilai Islam* (Application of Islamic Values).

⁵² Muzaffar (1987), pp. 78–82.

⁵³ Interview with Dato Mohamed Jawhar, Kuala Lumpur, May 2002.

the advance of radical political Islam.⁵⁴ That said, the UMNO-led government has not hesitated to act forcefully when confronted with what it considers security threats. In the Memali incident of November 1985, for instance, the police killed a local PAS leader named Ibrahim Mahmood (also known as Ibrahim Libya) and a number of others when Libya and his followers resisted arrest.⁵⁵

PAS was the beneficiary of the internal power struggle within UMNO that led to the dismissal of Mahathir's heir apparent, Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, in September 1998 and his arrest on charges of corruption and sodomy. After two contentious trials, Anwar was convicted and sentenced to a combined fifteen years in prison and disqualified from holding public office for five years after his release.

The Anwar affair eroded support for Mahathir and encouraged the opposition political parties to coalesce against the ruling coalition. In the November 1999 parliamentary election, PAS, in coalition with other opposition parties, made significant inroads into traditional UMNO strongholds. PAS increased its parliamentary representation from 7 to 27 seats and regained control of Terengganu state. The UMNO-led coalition retained its two-thirds majority in the parliament but suffered substantial losses in the Malay belt of northern states. For the first time, UMNO lost its majority among ethnic Malays.

The confluence of international factors, including broad trends in the Muslim world toward greater religiosity and more militant manifestations of political Islam, and the Malaysian government and Malay political parties' Islamization policies has given political Islam in Malaysia its particular character and direction. To some extent, these trends have also affected Singapore and its Malay Muslim minority. Therefore, a discussion of Islam in Singapore is warranted in the context of our discussion of Malaysian Islam.

While in Malaysia, Malays are a politically dominant majority in a multiethnic but officially "Islamic" state; in Singapore, Muslims, mostly Malays, are a minority (about 15 percent of the population) within an officially multiethnic state in which ethnic Chinese predominate. The approaches of the two governments to the management of ethno-religious relations could not be more different. In Malaysia, the UMNO-controlled governments have pursued an ethnically and religiously conscious policy. In Singapore, the authorities have sought to blur ethnic and religious distinctions and to encourage the development of a national identity independent of ethnicity and religion. There have also been efforts to elevate the level of education and standard of living of groups that have been traditionally disadvantaged. As a re-

⁵⁴ Discussions with political analysts in Singapore, January and May 2002.

⁵⁵ See Kamarulnizam Abdullah, "National Security and Malay Unity: The Issue of Radical Religious Elements in Malaysia," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 21, No. 2, August 1999, pp. 271–272.

sult, over the past two decades, Singaporean Malays have experienced significant improvements in their educational level, income, and standard of living.⁵⁶

The vast majority of Muslims in Singapore, as elsewhere, are politically moderate and are represented by the Muslim members of parliament and by officially recognized organizations, such as the *Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura* (Singapore Islamic Religious Council). The members of the council are nominated by Muslim societies and appointed by the president of Singapore. The council advises the president on all things relating to Muslim affairs. There is a *shari'a* court to hear civil cases where all parties are Muslim or in which the parties involved were married under Muslim law. The court has jurisdiction over cases related to marriage, divorce, payment of dowry, division of property after divorce, alimony (maintenance) payments, and related matters. The regular court system has jurisdiction over adoption, inheritance, and custody, even for those married under Muslim law.⁵⁷

Despite the efforts of the Singapore government to accommodate the concerns of Muslims in Singapore and Singaporean Muslims' relatively high standard of education and living (as compared to Malaysia, for instance), Singapore has not been immune from the upsurge of Islamic militancy that has swept across the Islamic world. The greater militancy among Muslims in Singapore was illustrated by the controversy over the wearing of the *tudong* (Muslim female headdress) in school in contravention of Singaporean school regulations. The Singaporean authorities saw the *tudong* controversy as an effort to embarrass the government and to manipulate Islam for political purposes. The discovery of terrorist cells in Singapore in 2001 and 2002 was an even more alarming manifestation of Singapore's vulnerability to Islamic extremism and terrorism.

Effect of September 11 and the War on Terrorism

September 11 transformed the regional security environment in important ways. From the Southeast Asian standpoint, it was not the terrorist attack itself that transformed the environment (although it was widely condemned), but the ensuing U.S.-led war on terrorism and the response of governments and political and religious actors to the exigencies of the war on terrorism. The September 11 attacks and the consequent global war on terrorism

- brought into focus the links between Al Qaeda and local radical groups

⁵⁶ See Tables 7.1 to 7.4 in Vasil (2000), pp. 222–223.

⁵⁷ Emory University Law School, Islamic Family Law Project, Legal Profiles: Singapore, <http://www.law.emory.edu/IFL/legal/singapore.htm>.

- recast Southeast Asia as a transit point/staging area and potential battlefield in the war on terrorism
- reshuffled the domestic political deck in Muslim-majority countries and regions.

Islamic Terrorism in Southeast Asia

International terrorist networks, largely but not exclusively of the Islamic variety, were active in Southeast Asia long before September 11, but the extent of the terrorist infrastructure was not apparent until the arrests in Malaysia and Singapore of members of terrorist cells in 2001.⁵⁸ Part of the network was uncovered in Malaysia in May and June 2001, when the Malaysian police arrested 25 suspected members of a hitherto unknown group, the *Kumpulan Militan Malaysia* (also referred to as *Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia* or KMM). Among the detainees was Nik Adli Nik Aziz, son of the PAS chief minister of the state of Kelantan. In December 2001, the Malaysian authorities arrested 13 members of a Malaysian cell of the Al Qaeda–linked Jemaah Islamiyah. U.S. and Malaysian investigations determined that members of Malaysian Jemaah Islamiyah structure provided assistance to two of the September 11 hijackers and to terrorist suspect Zacharias Moussaoui.⁵⁹ Thirteen alleged members of a Jemaah Islamiyah cell in Singapore were arrested in December 2001 before they could carry out plans for terrorist attacks on the American and Israeli embassies, the Australian and British High Commissions, and other U.S. and Singaporean targets. Of the thirteen, at least eight had gone to Afghanistan for training in Al Qaeda camps. The network’s Malaysia-based leadership had made covert arrangements for their travel to Al Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan, where they received military and specialized terrorist training.⁶⁰

Another 21 suspected terrorists were arrested in Singapore in September 2002. Nineteen were alleged members of the Jemaah Islamiyah, and two had links to the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). At least 14 of those arrested had undergone military training in camps in Malaysia, the Philippines, and Afghanistan. The militants hoped to stir up ethnic strife and make Muslims respond to calls for a jihad, which would in turn create the conditions to overthrow the Malaysian government and establish an Islamic state in Malaysia.⁶¹ Information gleaned from the investigation of the suspected terrorists revealed important details about the structure, goals, and operations of the Jemaah Islamiyah organization. The organization consists of three or four districts or territories called *mantiqi*. The first of these districts covers

⁵⁸ For a more detailed discussion of regional terrorist networks, see Rabasa (2003), Chapter 5, pp. 59–66.

⁵⁹ Abuza, op. cit., pp. 41–45.

⁶⁰ Government of Singapore, Press Release on ISA Arrests, December 2001; and “The Jemaah Islamiyah Arrests and the Threat of Terrorism,” January 2003, pp. 10–15 and Annexes A and C.

⁶¹ “Web of Terror: Jemaah Islamiyah Forged Links with Regional Groups,” and “Govt Reveals Plot to Spark Religious Violence Here,” *The Straits Times*, September 20, 2002.

peninsular Malaysia and Singapore; the second one Java; and the third the southern Philippines, the Malaysian state of Sabah on the island of Borneo, and the Indonesian island of Sulawesi.⁶² A fourth *mantiqi* was reportedly being organized by Indonesians in Australia and the province of Papua, but according to a regional intelligence service, the Australian branch (wakalah) has disbanded and its leader has returned to Indonesia.⁶³

The Malaysian organization was originally the largest and most capable of the Jemaah Islamiyah components, but after the arrests of militants in Malaysia and Singapore in 2001 and 2002, the center of gravity of the organization shifted to Indonesia. Political instability and an existing network of radical Islamic groups and militias provided a favorable environment for the implantation of terrorist cells. A jihadist training camp operated in the region of Poso, Central Sulawesi, from sometime in 2000 until around July 2001. Captured tapes of training in the camp suggest that the camp was operated by the Laskar Jundullah, one of the most violent Islamic militias in Indonesia.⁶⁴ According to Indonesian press reports, about 50 new recruits arrived at the camp every two or three months. Automatic weapons were available in the camp, but their storage and distribution was under the supervision of “men who spoke Arabic.”⁶⁵

The U.S. Response

For the United States, September 11 and the onset of the global war on terrorism brought about a restructuring of policy priorities. Cooperation in the war on terrorism became the preeminent U.S. objective in the region. In the period immediately after September 11, after the decision to launch Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, U.S. requirements were

- overflight and transit rights for counterterrorist operations in Afghanistan
- port service facilities
- intelligence on terrorist activities and surveillance of suspected groups
- cooperation against terrorist financing
- diplomatic and military support for U.S. counterterrorist and stability operations in Afghanistan.

⁶² The Jemaah Islamiyah structure is described in the Singapore government’s white paper, “The Jemaah Islamiyah Arrests and the Threat of Terrorism,” Singapore: Ministry of Home Affairs, January 7, 2003. See also Lesley Lopez, “Portrait of a Radical Network in Asia,” *The Wall Street Journal*, August 13, 2002.

⁶³ Information from a regional intelligence service. See Abuza (2003), pp. 121–161.

⁶⁴ Information from a regional intelligence service.

⁶⁵ “Looking for SE Asia’s Own Carlos the Jackal,” *Jakarta Post*, January 30, 2002.

Over the longer term, the war on terrorism in Southeast Asia created unprecedented opportunities for cooperation, but also new challenges for the United States. The war on terrorism created

- a framework for increased military assistance and cooperation
- expanded intelligence-sharing with and among regional states
- possibilities of expanded military access and support linked to counterterrorist cooperation.

The denomination of Southeast Asia as the second front in the war on terrorism was postulated about the time that the United States launched Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. The second front reflected the perceived high level of the terrorist threat in Southeast Asia: the presence of radical Islamic factions and armed militias and their base of support, the prevalence of porous borders and large swaths of “ungoverned areas” throughout the region, and other political and environmental conditions favorable to the operations of terrorist groups.

The concept of the “second front” came under criticism on the grounds that the terrorist threat in the region was perhaps not as great as the term “front” implies and that, in any event, a front is not an appropriate concept for discussing terrorism. Nevertheless, in view of unfolding information about the terrorist network in Southeast Asia, there is little doubt that the terrorist threat in the region is serious enough to justify the U.S. government focusing on it and that the designation of the region as a front in an international struggle against terrorism has helped to focus the needed attention of U.S. policymakers, the bureaucracy, and Congress on the region and provide coherence to the overall U.S. approach.

At the level of bilateral relations, some of the issues that loomed large in the U.S. relationship with Malaysia and Indonesia before September 11, 2001, have receded in the order of U.S. priorities. One indication of this realignment is the rapprochement between the United States and Malaysia, which had fallen into a deep chill after Vice President Gore’s criticism of Prime Minister Mahathir for his treatment of Anwar at the 1999 Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Kuala Lumpur. Mahathir’s successful visit to Washington in 2002 represented this new spirit in U.S.-Malaysian relations.

Another indicator was Philippine President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo’s successive visits to the United States in November 2001 and May 2003 and the high level of military assistance that the United States has extended to the Philippines. U.S. Foreign Military Financing (FMF) for the Philippines increased from \$2 million in fiscal year 2001 to \$19 million in fiscal year 2002. In addition, the United States allocated \$10 million in drawdown authority to the Philippines (i.e., authority to transfer defense equipment and services) to reequip, transport, and train the Philippine military and transferred significant amounts in excess military equipment. The

Philippines also became the third-largest recipient of U.S. International Military Education and Training (IMET) funding, with \$1.3 million in fiscal year 2002. Emblematic of the new relationship was the designation of the Philippines during Macapagal-Arroyo's 2003 visit as a "major non-NATO ally" of the United States.

A third indication of changed U.S. priorities was the Bush administration's decision to resume cooperation with the Indonesian military. The new policy was formally enunciated during the visit of President Megawati to Washington on September 19, 2001, barely a week after the September 11 attacks. The United States also agreed to a significant expansion of military relations, including a new security dialogue and an end to the embargo on the sale of nonlethal military items. The appropriations bill for fiscal year 2003, signed into law by the president, removed the restrictions on the IMET program for Indonesia that had been in effect, in one way or another, since 1993 but retained restrictions on FMF provision. The IMET funds were released by the U.S. Department of State in July 2003.

The Southeast Asian Response

The September 11 attacks and the war on terrorism changed the domestic political landscapes in Southeast Asia, opening or widening fault lines and prompting political realignments. In general terms, the response to Southeast Asian governments and other political actors to the challenges posed by the war on terrorism were shaped by a number of considerations.

Factors Favoring Cooperation. Closer alignment and sustained military connections; shared security interests and objectives; and hope for closer relations with the United States.

Factors Working Against Cooperation. Conflicting goals and interests; domestic public opinion; fear of reprisals.

The calculations of regional governments, of course, varied from country to country. Some governments, like those of Philippine President Macapagal-Arroyo and Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir, seized on the war on terrorism as an opportunity to forge closer cooperation with the United States and, in the case of Malaysia, to weaken the political opposition, PAS, by suggesting an association with terrorist groups. In the case of Indonesia, dealing with Islamic extremism presented a complex political challenge to the Megawati government.

Indonesia in the War on Terrorism

Until the Bali terrorist attack of October 12, 2002, the Jakarta government found it difficult to take meaningful action against extremists and suspected terrorists. Jakarta's hesitant approach to the problem of extremism and terrorism derived from a number of factors. Indonesia, unlike Malaysia and Singapore, had just emerged from authoritarian rule and lacked the equivalent of an Internal Security Act that would allow the authorities greater latitude in dealing with suspected terrorists. Therefore,

the authorities were inhibited from moving against suspects without evidence that would hold up in court and, just as important, in the court of Muslim public opinion.⁶⁶

These factors were magnified by the weakness of the Megawati government. As a secular political leader, Megawati had weak Islamic credentials. Moreover, her government was dependent for its parliamentary majority on the Muslim parties. These parties, although a minority, played a pivotal role in the parliament. In 1999 they coalesced to block her election as president and joined with other parties to elect Abdurrahman Wahid. Two years later, in July 2001, they turned against Wahid and helped to remove him from office. Megawati was elevated to the presidency with a Muslim politician, PPP leader Hamzah Haz, as vice president.⁶⁷

Megawati's tenuous control over her government was illustrated by the behavior of Megawati's vice president Hamzah Haz. Haz opposed U.S. operations in Afghanistan and told worshippers at a Jakarta mosque, only days after September 11, that the attacks would "cleanse the sins of the United States." In other controversial moves, Haz visited Ba'asyir at his *pesantren* in Ngruki and Laskar Jihad leader Ja'afar after the latter's arrest in May 2002 and expressed sympathy for his activities. In the view of some Indonesian political analysts, Haz's overtures to the radicals were simply opportunistic tactical moves to strengthen his position within his own party, the PPP, and with other Muslim political sectors. Nonetheless, although motivated by pandering, the solicitude of Haz and other Muslim politicians for the radicals represented the same dangerous dynamic that we have noted in Malaysia: moderate leaders competing for the support of radical elements and, in the process, legitimizing the radical agenda.

Nevertheless, even before the Bali bombing, the Megawati government was showing signs of greater resolve to combat terrorism and extremism. In May 2002, Laskar Jihad leader Ja'afar was arrested and charged with inciting religious violence and making public threats against the president. Ja'afar's arrest drew protests from representatives of some of the Muslim political parties and of radical Islamic organizations such as KISDI and the DDII and demonstrations by supporters in Jakarta.⁶⁸ These demonstrations, however, did not have much effect. By fall 2002, before the Bali bombing, the Laskar Jihad's influence was clearly in decline. One factor was the increased international pressure on the government to crack down on extremists. But more important, with changed political circumstances, some of the military and po-

⁶⁶ Discussions with senior Indonesian government and intelligence officials, Jakarta, February 2002.

⁶⁷ However, Megawati's position upon her assumption of the presidency was considerably stronger than Wahid's had been. Not only did Megawati command the largest parliamentary bloc, but she also enjoyed the support of the military. Moreover, even Megawati's political opponents acknowledged that the removal of another Indonesian president could seriously destabilize the political system.

⁶⁸ ICG, "Indonesia: The Search for Peace in Maluku," p. 16.

litical factions that helped the organization in its ascendancy came to see it as more of a liability than an asset.⁶⁹

Shortly after the Bali bombing, the Laskar Jihad announced that it had closed its headquarters and disbanded. The group was not linked to the Bali terrorist attack, and its leaders claimed that its decision to disband was voluntary and had been taken before the bombing, but no one doubted a linkage between the two events.

An important event in Indonesia's participation in the war on terrorism was the arrest and transfer to U.S. custody of Omar al-Faruq, identified at the time as the most senior Al Qaeda operatives in Southeast Asia, in the summer of 2002. Al-Faruq's reported confessions, which included allegations of two assassination plots against President Megawati, were widely reported in the international media. According to al-Faruq's reported confession, Al Qaeda encouraged the efforts of Abubakar Ba'asyir, the suspected ideological leader of the regional terrorist Jemaah Islamiyah organization, to spark a religious war in Indonesia and implement his vision of an Islamic state. Al-Faruq implicated Ba'asyir in the Christmas 2000 church bombings in Indonesia in which 18 persons were killed and over 100 injured.⁷⁰ Information from al-Faruq led to the arrest of other suspects, including Seyam Reda, a German national of Syrian descent believed to be the head of finances for Al Qaeda in Southeast Asia.⁷¹ The publicity over al-Faruq's arrest increased the pressure on the Jakarta government to take more effective action against suspected terrorists and extremists.⁷²

The Bali Bombing: Indonesia's Turning Point?

The Bali bombing of October 12, 2002 left 202 people dead, including 88 Australian tourists, and 209 injured. This was the first suicide bomb attack in modern Indonesian history and represented another step in the introduction of Middle Eastern terrorist techniques into Southeast Asia.⁷³ (The bombing of the Marriott Hotel in Jakarta in August 2003 also involved a suicide bomber.)

The Bali terrorist attack changed the political dynamics in Indonesia and stiffened the resolve of the Indonesian authorities to combat terrorism in a way that September 11 had not. Defense Minister Matori and other Indonesian officials who had hitherto questioned the presence of Al Qaeda cells in Indonesia now asserted that the

⁶⁹ Some analysts believe that some power groups sponsored the Laskar Jihad and other radical groups to undermine the Wahid government. One noted that the radical training camp in Poso was abandoned about the time that Wahid was removed from office.

⁷⁰ "Hand of Terror: Key Suspects Prepare to Face the Music," *The Straits Times*, Sept. 20, 2002.

⁷¹ Abuza, op. cit., p. 50.

⁷² "Government to investigate Abu Bakar Ba'asyir's alleged involvement in terrorist network," *Tempo Interactive*, September 20, 2002.

⁷³ "Suicide Bomber Blew Up Paddy's Club in Kuta," *Tempo Interactive*, November 22, 2002.

bombing had been carried out by Al Qaeda with the support of local collaborators. President Megawati signed two emergency antiterrorism decrees that empowered the authorities to arrest suspected terrorists based on intelligence information and to hold them for up to a week without charges, or longer if justified by the intelligence. The leaders of the two major Indonesian Muslim organizations, Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, endorsed the new antiterrorist measures.⁷⁴

An important indicator of the government's resolve was the decision to arrest Ba'asyir on charges of rebellion and forgery of immigration documents, although he was not named as a suspect in the Bali bombing.⁷⁵ The police also arrested Muhammad Habib Rizieq, the leader of the Islam Defenders' Front (FPI), an extortionist group in Islamic guise known for carrying out raids on bars and nightclubs in Jakarta. Ba'asyir's arrest was criticized by some Muslim leaders, who alleged that the government was bowing to foreign pressure, but the arrest was supported by such leading Muslim moderates as former President Wahid.⁷⁶ (Ba'asyir was set free in April 2004 after the Supreme Court reduced his sentence on the immigration charges and sustained a higher court decision to dismiss the rebellion charges, but he was re-arrested almost immediately on charges that he had violated antiterrorism statutes.)

Meanwhile, effective investigative work led to the arrest of several of the perpetrators of the October 12 attack, including the owner of the vehicle used in the bombing of the Sari Club, a motorcycle mechanic named Amrozi, which in turn led to the arrests of the attack's reputed organizer, Imam Samudra; Amrozi's brother Mukhlas, who had reportedly become the acting operational head of the Jemaah Islamiyah; and other suspects.⁷⁷ Amrozi, Samudra, and other accused terrorists, together with Ba'asyir, went to trial in Jakarta in June 2003. Amrozi, Samudra, and Mukhlas were sentenced to death, four other accomplices to life in prison, and 27 others to prison terms of varying lengths.

The issue of Ba'asyir's responsibility remains somewhat controversial. According to a December 2002 report by the International Crisis Group (ICG), a rift developed within the Jemaah Islamiyah between Ba'asyir and younger and more radical elements. Ba'asyir is said to have opposed the Bali bombing for tactical reasons, but the more radical faction went through with the attack. The ICG concludes that Ba'asyir is unlikely to have been the mastermind of the attack.⁷⁸ However, a regional intelligence source places Ba'asyir with the radical faction. According to this information,

⁷⁴ "Muslim Organizations Back Antiterrorist Regulations," *Jakarta Post*, October 21, 2002.

⁷⁵ Ba'asyir was also charged with violating the laws on possession of firearms and explosives and destruction of property.

⁷⁶ "Indonesian arrest of Muslim Cleric Raises Criticism," *The Wall Street Journal*, October 21, 2002.

⁷⁷ "National Police Arrests Imam Samudera AKA Kudama," *Tempo Interactive*, November 21, 2002.

⁷⁸ ICG Asia Report No. 43, p 5. The sources for the allegation of a split within the JI in which Ba'asyir is said to oppose the Bali bombing are interviews with an unspecified source or sources in Surabaya.

the split in the group took place *after* the Bali bombing. The dissidents were advocates of nonviolent approach to Islamic propagation and were opposed to Ba'asyir.⁷⁹ As of spring 2004, the JI appears to be in a stage of regrouping and rebuilding. Southeast Asia terrorism scholar Zachary Abuza believes that the JI leadership will place greater emphasis on political action and involvement in local jihads, for instance, in Poso, where sectarian violence flared up in 2004. These local jihads provide the next generation of JI militants with the "rite of passage" that is the functional equivalent of the experience the war in Afghanistan provided for the previous generation.⁸⁰ Some regional intelligence sources, however, believe that the JI is in fact pursuing simultaneously both a strategy of mass-casualty attacks and participation in local jihads.⁸¹

Malaysia in the War on Terrorism

The September 11 attacks and the global war on terrorism, together with the discovery of terrorist networks operating in Malaysia, broke the momentum that PAS had gained as the result of the Anwar affair. PAS responded to the onset of Operation Enduring Freedom and the Malaysian government's crackdown on domestic extremists by abandoning the posture of moderation that it had assumed for the 1999 elections and radicalizing its rhetoric. Perhaps PAS feared that a less aggressive stance could weaken its hold on its Malay base. The party tried to sharpen the differences between Malays and non-Malays and Muslims and non-Muslims. It declared a (symbolic) jihad against the United States and mounted large demonstrations in front of the U.S. embassy in Kuala Lumpur. PAS also attempted to exploit the Palestinian issue by sponsoring a forum with Hamas and Hezbollah militants.⁸² The downside of PAS's radicalized posture was that it frightened and alienated moderate Muslims, especially its non-Muslim political allies.

The Mahathir government took full advantage of PAS's missteps to isolate PAS and drive it into the defensive. In the aftermath of September 11, the authorities detained the son of Nik Abdul Aziz Nik Mat, the PAS spiritual leader and chief minister of Kelantan state, and other activists and suggested that PAS had been infiltrated by terrorists. The ethnic Chinese opposition party, the Democratic Action Party (DAP), could not abide PAS's relapse into Islamist militancy and broke off their alliance. The Keadilan Party, which represented Anwar Ibrahim's supporters, also lost credibility because of its association with the radicalized PAS. These trends mani-

⁷⁹ Discussion with a senior regional intelligence official, June 2003.

⁸⁰ Discussion with Zachary Abuza, Washington, D.C., May 2004.

⁸¹ Information from regional intelligence service, May 2004.

⁸² "Mid-East Groups Attend PAS Forum," *The Straits Times*, May 30, 2002.

fested themselves in the landslide victory of the UMNO-led National Front in the March 2004 parliamentary election

The discovery of a terrorist network with a Malaysian infrastructure throughout Southeast Asia and other manifestations of the proliferation of Islamic extremism convinced the Mahathir government of the dangers posed to social stability by the politicized Islamic educational system that had developed during the years of state-supported Islamization. The government now considered some of the madrassas in this system a breeding ground for Islamic extremism and determined to bring them under control. In the wake of his surprise announcement in July 2002 that he would be retiring the following year, Prime Minister Mahathir proposed a series of measures designed to break the hold of militant Islam on Malaysian education. Mahathir's plan includes relocating religious education within the national school system to after-school classes purged of political content, close government regulation of private Islamic schools, and the establishment of compulsory national service for young men in order to break down ethnic barriers and strengthen commitment to national unity.⁸³

It was also proposed to bring back English in the place of Malay as the language of instruction. To a large extent, this was due to the concern of government and business leaders that the emphasis on religious education and the use of Malay were making Malays less competitive in the global economy and widening the economic gap between Malays and non-Malays. The government's proposed refurbishing of Malaysian education served both political and economic needs: the reduction of the perceived threat of militant Islam and ethnic polarization and a return to meritocracy and economic rationality.⁸⁴

The Philippines in the War on Terrorism

The Philippines has had a persistent Moro separatist insurgency since the early 1970s. In its initial phase the insurgency was a series of isolated uprisings, but the insurgents were brought under the umbrella of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), chaired by Nur Misuari, an ethnic Tausug and a professor at the University of the Philippines. The MNLF ideology had nationalistic connotations. Its goal was the establishment of an independent Bangsamoro republic, but the MNLF was willing to settle for autonomous status within the Republic of the Philippines. In 1996 the MNLF signed a peace agreement with the government of President Fidel Ramos that established the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), a self-

⁸³ S. Jayasankaran, "A Plan to End Extremism," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, December 26, 2002–January 2, 2003.

⁸⁴ Badawi has a much more low-key style and deep religious roots. Badawi's grandfather was a mufti, and Badawi chose to study Islam as a student at the University of Malaya. "A Kampung Kid Takes Over," *Tempo Interactive*, November 4–10, 2003.

governing political entity comprising four provinces that opted to be included in the ARMM in a 1989 plebiscite.

The second of the main Moro separatist movements is the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), a Maguindanao-led religiously oriented organization that emerged as the result of a split within the MNLF in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The MILF was led until his death in July 2003 by Salamat Hashim, a former vice chairman of the MNLF Central Committee who had received extensive religious training at al-Azhar University in Cairo and later lived in Libya, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan.⁸⁵ The MILF rejected the MNLF's agreement with the Manila government and presented itself as the vanguard of the Islamic revolution in Mindanao. The MILF is currently the largest of the Moro separatist movements, with an armed strength of about 8,000 to 11,000. Other estimates place the number as high as 15,000.

On the radicalized fringe of the Moro separatist movement is *Al Harakatul al-Islamiya* or the Islamic Movement, commonly known as the Abu Sayyaf Group. The Abu Sayyaf was established with the support of the bin Laden organization through Osama bin Laden's brother-in-law Mohammed Jamal Khalifa. The group was headed by Abdurajak Janjalani, a veteran of the Afghan war, until his death in a clash with police on Basilan island in December 1998. The original goal of the Abu Sayyaf was to establish an independent theocratic state in the southern Philippines, but unlike the MNLF and the MILF, the group saw its national goal tied to a global effort aimed at asserting the global dominance of Islam through armed struggle.⁸⁶ With Abdurajak's death in 1998, the group lost much of its ideological impetus and became little better than a criminal enterprise, engaging mainly in large-scale kidnappings of Filipinos and foreigners.

President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo saw the war on terrorism as an opportunity to engage the United States in the government's military campaign against the Abu Sayyaf. Macapagal-Arroyo had criticized her predecessor, Joseph Estrada, for succumbing to "Malaysian and European pleas to hold the troops back" and for allowing Libya to arrange a ransom deal with the Abu Sayyaf.⁸⁷ The criminal activities of the Abu Sayyaf group, which had kidnapped two American citizens (and beheaded a third), and its links to Osama bin Laden's organization, provided a common target for the Philippine and U.S. governments. Manila allowed U.S. forces to overfly Philippine airspace and use airfields as transit points in support of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. The United States, in turn, provided antiterrorism

⁸⁵ See "Salamat Hashim Speaks: The Muslim Separatist Leader Wants 'The East Timor Formula,'" *Asiaweek*, Vol. 26, No. 12, March 31, 2000.

⁸⁶ See discussion of Abu Sayyaf in Rabasa and Chalk (2001), pp. 88–92.

⁸⁷ Cited in Daniel Joseph Ringuet, "The Continuation of Civil Unrest and Poverty in Mindanao," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 24, No. 1, April 2002, p. 44.

training and advice and deployed military personnel, including U.S. Army Special Forces, to Zamboanga, Mindanao, and Basilan to train the Philippine army in counterterrorism operations.⁸⁸

The campaign against Abu Sayyaf has seriously degraded the group's capabilities. From a high of 1,000 fighters in the mid-1990s, the group has dwindled to fewer than 200. There is evidence, however, that in 2004 the Abu Sayyaf leader, Abdurajak's brother Khaddafy Janjalani, was seeking to reconstitute the group on the island of Sulu and to return to its original Islamist agenda.

In addition to seeking to eradicate the Abu Sayyaf through military means, the Manila government is attempting to ameliorate the conditions of poverty and hopelessness that it believes allow terrorist groups to flourish. The last phase of the 2002 combined "Balikatan" exercise with the United States involved civic action, including the provision of medical services to the population, construction of waterworks, road upgrades, and rehabilitation of an airfield and a wharf in Basilan.⁸⁹

The relationship between the MILF and Al Qaeda and the Jemaah Islamiyah has been the subject of considerable controversy. The Philippine and U.S. concentration on the fight against the Abu Sayyaf Group as the focus of the war on terrorism in the Philippines has been questioned on the grounds that the MILF, not the much weakened and beleaguered Abu Sayyaf, has the strongest links to international terrorist groups. Some Philippine political players believe that the cooperation between the MILF and the Jemaah Islamiyah is purely tactical.⁹⁰ However, outside observers believe that the linkages between the MILF and Jemaah Islamiyah are more concrete than the Filipinos perceive them to be.⁹¹ The death from natural causes of longtime MILF leader Hashim Salamat in July 2003 and his succession by the MILF's military commander, Al-Haj Murad Ebrahim, has made the MILF less receptive to international terrorist ties. Salamat subscribed to a pan-Islamic agenda, whereas Ebrahim, unlike Salamat, is not a cleric and is considered more nationalist-oriented. Nevertheless, the MILF central leadership's control over the actions of local commanders is tenuous. Some MILF factions are sympathetic to Al Qaeda's pan-Islamic radical ideology and continue to provide shelter and support to foreign radicals.⁹² The military strength of the MILF and its support among a substantial part of the Muslim population in central Mindanao compel the Manila government to negotiate with it. Manila has conducted sporadic negotiations with the MILF since the signing of the

⁸⁸ U.S. forces were not to engage in operations, but the rules of engagement permitted them to fire in self-defense.

⁸⁹ Videoconference with Defense Secretary Angelo Reyes, RAND, Santa Monica, California, August 15, 2002.

⁹⁰ Discussion with Senator Santa Nina Rahul, Washington, D.C., 2003.

⁹¹ Taylor Phillip, conference, Washington D.C. See also Abuza, *op. cit.*; and Rabasa (2003), pp. 65–66.

⁹² Andrew Tan, "The Indigenous Roots of Conflict in Southeast Asia," in Ramakrishna and Tan, *op. cit.*, p. 107.

peace agreement with the MNLF. At the beginning of 2003, intense fighting broke out between government forces and the MILF in the province of North Cotabato. In mid-February, Philippine government troops overran an important MILF stronghold near the town of Pikit. The MILF denied responsibility for a terrorist attack on Davao airport on March 4, 2003, but it was widely suspected that the attack had been carried out by the MILF in retaliation for the government's offensive.

According to a well-informed Philippine source, the government believed that then-MILF leader Salamat had lost control of "rogue elements" in the MILF. The purpose of the government's offensive was reportedly to induce Salamat to rein in the rogue elements suspected of involvement in terrorist incidents. The strategy appears to have met with some degree of success: Just before his death, Salamat issued a statement renouncing terrorism, a key demand of the Philippine government for resuming negotiations, and underlined the MILF's commitment to achieving a peace settlement. The new MILF leadership, headed by Murad Ebrahim, confirmed that the MILF was committed to resuming peace talks with Manila.⁹³

Thailand in the War on Terrorism

The war on terrorism has not had the same impact in Thailand as in Muslim-majority Indonesia and Malaysia, or in the Philippines, where the major internal security challenge to the Manila government is the persistence of a large-scale Muslim insurgency. Two Muslim separatist organizations, the Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO) and New PULO, were active in southern Thailand through the 1990s but have since declined as the result of effective Thai government strategies and the cutoff of support from associates in Malaysia. In the 1990s, the Bangkok government took significant steps to address the underlying causes of Muslim discontent. The government implemented policies to improve social and economic conditions in the south. The city of Pattani has become a major economic and educational center. Opportunities for Muslims have opened up at all levels of public administration. Muslims have risen to the cabinet level in recent Thai governments, most notably among them the highly regarded statesman Surin Pitsuwan, who served as foreign minister from 1992 to 2001.⁹⁴ Nevertheless, southern Thailand remains underdeveloped relative to other parts of the country. Muslim participation in local businesses is low, and there remains a perception of linguistic and religious discrimination among many Thai Muslims. These factors continue to feed feelings of discontent and frustration and hinder the prospects of true national reconciliation.⁹⁵

⁹³ "Govt Urges MILF to Close Ranks in Peace Talks," *The Manila Times*, August 7, 2003; "Philippine Rebel Leader Dead," jaknews.com, <http://www.jaknews.com/2003/english/agust/06082003-1030jak09.htm>.

⁹⁴ Peter Searle, "Ethno-Religious Conflicts: Rise or Decline? Recent Developments in Southeast Asia," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 24, No. 1, April 2002, pp. 78.

⁹⁵ Chalk (1997), p. 62.

At the beginning of 2004, there was an unexpected resurgence of violence in southern Thailand that included two bombings, a raid on a military weapons depot in Narathiwat province in which four guards were killed, and the burning of 22 schools, possibly as a diversionary tactic. Thai intelligence officials attributed the attacks to Barisan Revolusi Nasional and the Gerakan Mujahidin Islam Pattani, two separatist groups.⁹⁶ In response to the violence, the Bangkok government imposed martial law and reinforced the army presence in the south. On April 28, 2004, Thai security forces, which had had advance warning of the attack, repulsed a coordinated assault on 15 police posts in three provinces, killing at least 107 rebels. Some 32 militants retreated to the 450-year-old Krue Se Mosque in Pattani and were all killed when the security forces stormed the building.⁹⁷

Although some Thai government officials blamed the attacks on local bandits, the attackers were undoubtedly Islamic militants. Some of the dead attackers wore Hamas-style headbands, checkered head scarves, and clothes emblazoned with Islamic slogans. The magnitude and complexity of the operation suggests that the attackers received guidance and support from regional extremist groups, possibly the Jemaah Islamiyah organization (JI). However, diplomatic and intelligence sources in Thailand say that there is no evidence of JI involvement in the violence in the south. One theory is that the attacks were conducted by shadowy new groups that have emerged out of the southern provinces' network of radical Islamic schools.⁹⁸

Thailand has long been a transit and staging point for the Jemaah Islamiyah. According to Singaporean analyst Eric Teo Chu Cheow, JI elements met twice in southern Thailand to plan the Bali bombing and possibly other bombing attacks in Indonesia.⁹⁹ In June 2003, the Thai police broke up a JI cell suspected of planning to bomb embassies and Thai tourist resorts. A Singapore citizen and three Thai Muslims were arrested based on information provided by Singapore. The authorities stated that JI operatives had provided funds for terrorist attacks against international targets in Thailand, in addition to the plot to bomb foreign embassies. The crack-down represented a change in the attitude of the Thai authorities, who until then denied that any terrorist groups operated in the country.¹⁰⁰

A more spectacular event was the arrest of Southeast Asia's most wanted terrorist, Riduan Isamuddin, alias Hambali, in the old Thai capital of Ayutthaya, in central Thailand. Hambali was the only non-Arab member of the Al Qaeda *shura* (council),

⁹⁶ Kazi Mahmood, "Violence Hits South Thailand Again," IslamOnline.net, January 6, 2004, at <http://www.islamonline.net/English/News/2004-01/06/article01.shtml>.

⁹⁷ "Thai Forces Were Ready for Attackers," *Washington Post*, April 29, 2004.

⁹⁸ Discussions with security analysts, Bangkok, June 2004.

⁹⁹ Eric Teo Chu Cheow, "Terrorists Regroup in Southern Thailand," Asia Times Online, August 19, 2003, at http://www.asiatimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/EH19Ae05.html, last accessed August 2004.

¹⁰⁰ "In Switch, Thais Crack Down on Alleged Terrorist," *The Wall Street Journal*, July 9, 2003.

as well as the Jemaah Islamiyah's operational chief. He is believed to have been behind most of the terrorist attacks in Southeast Asia, including the Bali bombing and the bombing of the Marriott Hotel in Jakarta. Although the terrorist organization had undoubtedly planned for the arrest or death of Hambali, the capture of its most senior strategist (together with some 300 alleged militants over the past two years) could be a key development in breaking the back of the international terrorist network in Southeast Asia.

Impact of the War in Iraq

For the most part, mainstream Muslim sectors in Southeast Asia opposed the war in Iraq, but the war does not appear to have had an important effect on the evolution of political Islam or on U.S. relations with Southeast Asian government and political actors. The majority of Muslim elite opinion in Indonesia opposed the war but in restrained terms. Ahmad Syafii Maarif, a well-known moderate, was outspoken in his condemnation of the coalition attack (while agreeing that Saddam was a very bad man indeed), but neither he nor other moderate Muslim opponents of the war characterized it as an attack on Islam. The Malaysian government, as chair of the Non-Aligned Movement, orchestrated opposition to the war without U.N. sanction, and the Malaysian parliament unanimously passed a motion condemning unilateral military action in Iraq. There were large anti-Iraq war demonstrations in Indonesia in the days leading to the beginning of hostilities and through the first two weeks of the war, but the number and size of the demonstrations declined markedly after coalition forces entered Baghdad.

This relatively moderate reaction could be attributed to several factors. First, governments and moderate Muslims leaders either organized and controlled the protests, as in the case of Malaysia, or took proactive steps to ensure that the war in Iraq was not presented as directed against Islam, as the radicals had done with some degree of success in the case of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. Second, the changed political climate in Indonesia after the Bali bombing rendered mass actions by radicals less acceptable. Third, there was little sympathy for Saddam in Southeast Asia. Even opponents of the war conceded that he was a tyrant and, from an Islamic perspective, an un-Islamic leader unworthy of Muslim support.

This is not to say that the war did not introduce a new and complicating factor into the war on terrorism or that it did not have an adverse impact on Southeast Asian perceptions of the United States. These perceptions worsened as the terrorism and violence escalated in Iraq and the attempts by coalition forces to bring the security situation under control were presented by hostile media as a campaign against Muslims. There is anecdotal evidence, for instance, that Iraq may have been a mobi-

lizing factor in recent violence by Islamic extremists in southern Thailand.¹⁰¹ A May 2003 Pew poll shows favorable views of the United States in Indonesia down to 15 percent from 61 percent in 2002, but the two sets of respondents are different, making comparisons questionable.¹⁰² U.S. sources outside Jakarta believe that there has been a deterioration of the U.S. image since the war in Iraq. To some extent, this is because ordinary Indonesians, particularly in the provinces, receive much of their information from information sources, such as Al-Jazeera, the vernacular press, or Islamic Web sites, that tend to feature negative information about the United States. Counterterrorist measures are sometimes presented as anti-Muslim. Conspiracy theories are rampant, as elsewhere in the Muslim world, with the most improbable theories receiving wide credence.

Critics of U.S. policy in Iraq attack the U.S. project to bring democracy to Iraq from two directions. First, they express skepticism that the United States is really interested in promoting democracy. In this regard, they note long-standing U.S. support for certain authoritarian Arab regimes and the alleged U.S. interest in Iraqi oil or in dominating the Middle East. Second, they question whether the conditions for democracy exist in Iraq. They argue that democracy cannot be enforced from the outside and that, therefore, the United States should withdraw and allow Iraqis to determine their own destiny.¹⁰³

A minority view shares the U.S. expectation that the removal of Saddam opens the prospect of democratic evolution in Iraq. In the view of one moderate, the situation in the Muslim world after Iraq is very positive. The drive for reform is getting stronger. One can be critical of American hegemonies, but the reality of the Muslim world is authoritarianism, poverty, poor education, and above all political repression. The bottom line on Iraq is that while the war itself and the U.S.-led occupation has not altered trend lines in Southeast Asia or the fundamentals of the U.S.-Southeast Asian relationship, it can and is being used by radicals to gain influence. The evidence of humiliating treatment, abuse, and arguably torture of Iraqi prisoners in the Abu Ghraib prison has done great damage to U.S. standing and credibility. Therefore, whether the United States delivers in helping to build a democratic political infrastructure in Iraq and in turning over control to a legitimate Iraqi government will have a decisive effect on perceptions of the United States in Indonesia and among Muslims in Southeast Asia at large. At the same time, both Muslim and non-Muslim Indonesians stress the importance of U.S. engagement in the effort to resolve the Palestinian question. Some thoughtful Indonesian observers acknowledge that the

¹⁰¹ Author's discussions with security experts in Bangkok, June 2004.

¹⁰² The 2003 poll reflected the views of respondents in a few urban areas whereas the 2002 poll was nationwide, so the results are not comparable.

¹⁰³ Discussion with Ahmad Syafii Maarif, Jakarta, June 2003.

United States might not be able to solve this problem but argue that the United States must be seen as actively involved in seeking to promote a solution.

Future Trends

The relationship between political Islam, the state, and society in Southeast Asia since September 11 has been strongly influenced by exogenous events: the September 11 attacks and the U.S. response, beginning with Operation Enduring Freedom, the regionalization of the war against terror in Southeast Asia, the war in Iraq and the removal of the Saddam regime. The Bali attack was carried out by Indonesians in Indonesia, but it was not a domestic event. The perpetrators were part of an international network that sought to attack Westerners for reasons unrelated to domestic Indonesian politics. However, it is likely that the next stage in the evolution of political Islam in the region's most important Muslim-majority countries, Indonesia and Malaysia, will be influenced by domestic events, namely the 2004 presidential elections in Indonesia and parliamentary elections in Malaysia. After Bali, President Megawati made the decision to crack down on Muslim extremists, but at her own pace and in the context of the Indonesian system, with public trials of the accused terrorists and their sponsors aimed at demonstrating the fairness of the justice system in the new democratic era and at educating the public as to the reality of the terrorist threat. The 2004 presidential election confirmed that there is little likelihood of any significant change in the country's religio-political landscape. The winner was the former Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs, General (retired) Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. His running mate was former Coordinating Minister for People's Welfare Yusuf Kalla, a member of Golkar and the architect of the Malino accords that sought to end the sectarian violence in Maluku and Poso (Kalla had been criticized for anti-Chinese comments during the campaign). Former President Megawati, who lost her bid for reelection, selected as her vice-presidential candidate Husayn Muzadi, the chairman of Nahdlatul Ulama. The composition and platform of both tickets demonstrated the continued ascendancy of secular nationalist-moderate religious combinations in Indonesian politics.

In Malaysia, the ruling UMNO-led National Front, under the leadership of Mahathir's successor Abdullah Badawi, won a landslide victory in the 2004 parliamentary election, winning 198 of 219 contested seats. The PAS dropped to seven seats from the 27 seats it had won in the 1999. The party kept control of the state of Kelantan but lost Terengganu, which it had gained in 1999. Anwar's wife, Wan Azizah Wan Ismail, was elected in Anwar's old district, but she was the only Justice Party candidate elected. The ethnic Chinese opposition Democratic Action Party gained 12 seats, up from 10, replacing PAS as the largest opposition party in parliament. As has been noted, the 2004 electoral results represent a return to the politics

of the early 1980s, with the ethnic Chinese opposition facing the Malay-dominated National Front.¹⁰⁴

Although PAS suffered a major defeat and lost ground even in its traditional strongholds in the Malay heartland, some analysts believe that its Malay base of support remains viable. If the long-term trend in the Malay community remains toward Islamization, UMNO will have to cater to it to remain competitive with PAS among the Malays. Nevertheless, other factors place an absolute ceiling on Islamization in Malaysia for the foreseeable future. These are (1) the 40 percent of the Malaysian population that is not Muslim and would object to Islamization beyond a certain point; (2) disagreements among the Malays themselves as to the type of Islamic polity they would like to see in Malaysia; (3) the lack of support for religiously based politics in the eastern Malaysian states of Sarawak and Sabah; and (4) the strength of Malaysia British-based political and judicial institutions.

The above analysis suggests that there is not likely to be a sharp break with the current power configuration, religious or otherwise, in the major Muslim-majority Southeast Asian countries. What might occur, depending on electoral developments, is a sharpening or attenuation of existing trend lines.

Conclusions and Recommendations

The preceding pages have laid out the problems of religious extremism and terrorism in Southeast Asia. It is clear that the challenges that they pose are too complex to be amenable to unitary solutions. The most practical approach to the formulation of an effective policy response is to disaggregate the problem into its components. The international terrorist networks focus on U.S. and international targets, while the domestic extremists are driven largely by internal factors and pursue domestic goals. The separatists are in a different category, although their methods and ideologies may resemble those of other extremists, with whom they have developed extensive links. Since many of these groups share the same ideological orientation and biases, it has been relatively easy for international terrorist groups to infiltrate and influence the domestic radical groups and, through these groups, mainstream Muslim organizations.

Address the Challenge of Radical Political Islam

In addressing the challenge of radical Islam, it is important to differentiate between the religious and political dimensions of the phenomenon. Only when radical groups try to tap into religion to pursue a radical political agenda, does political Islam become a security problem.

¹⁰⁴ S. Jayasankaran, "A Vote of Confidence," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, April 1, 2004.

The critical long-term issue in such Muslim-majority countries as Indonesia and Malaysia is whether a moderate or a militant version of political Islam will prevail. Radical Islamists, both violent and nonviolent, are a minority in Southeast Asian countries, as elsewhere in the Muslim world. Accordingly, the main obstacle to the inroads of radical political Islam comes from mainstream Muslim groups themselves. In fact, only moderate Muslims have the ability to counter the influence of the radicals, since non-Muslims or secular powers such as the United States do not have enough credibility with Muslims.

However, there are important political and psychological obstacles to effective moderate action against radicals. One major obstacle is that moderate Muslims, even when they disagree with the goals and methods of the extremists, are sometimes reluctant to be perceived as taking sides with non-Muslims against fellow Muslims. Some are afraid of retaliation by the radicals. In 2003, a moderate Indonesian Muslim activist, Ulil Abshar Abdalla, was the target of a *fatwa* issued against him by radical clerics in western Java for “defaming Islam.” Although the clerics in question were low-ranking clerics with no religious authority to issue such a fatwa, Ulil was forced to retain a bodyguard to ensure his safety.¹⁰⁵

In Indonesia, only after the Bali bombing did the country’s secular government and moderate Muslim leaders begin to mobilize in a serious way to regain control of the political and ideological agenda from extremists and terrorists. Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah leaders have appeared together to emphasize that Islam does not advocate violence and to warn against the misuse of religion. The major Muslim organizations also seek to improve educational opportunities for Muslims so that they can become part of the globalized economy.

It follows that a key challenge for U.S. and Western policy is to forge stronger links with what has been called “civil Islam,” Muslim civil society groups that advocate moderation and modernity.¹⁰⁶ Indonesia should be the focus of this effort. Moderate political Islam as a force in a democratic pluralistic Indonesia could be an antidote to the theocratic ideologies and the concepts of an intolerant and exclusionist Islamic state that emanate from other quarters in the Muslim world.

Funding for education and cultural programs run by secular or moderate Muslim organizations should be a priority, to counter the influence of radical Islamic religious schools and institutions. Assistance from international sources needs to be channeled in ways that are appropriate to local circumstances and, to the extent possible, should rely on nongovernmental organizations with existing relationships in the recipient countries to reduce the prospects that radicals might seek to use the assistance to discredit their opponents.

¹⁰⁵ Conversation with Ulil Abshar Abdalla, Jakarta, June 5, 2003.

¹⁰⁶ See Hefner (2000).

A complementary element of a strategy of supporting moderate Islamic sectors is to deny resources to the extremists. This will be difficult. The poor regulation of banking systems in Southeast Asia and the widespread use of informal money transferring methods severely hinder the authorities' ability to monitor suspicious financial flows. Notwithstanding the difficulties, it is critical to strengthen the technical capabilities of Southeast Asian finance ministries and intelligence agencies to monitor and control international financial flows. Given the difficulties in controlling the flows, however, it is imperative to exert pressure on the countries that are the sources of these flows to introduce accountability and ensure that the money goes to legitimate organizations in the recipient countries.

Modernize and Improve Muslim Education

There is broad agreement among Southeast Asia and Western scholars that the war of ideas between moderate and radical Islam will be won or lost on the educational battleground. In Malaysia, the federal government has announced educational reforms to reduce the profile of political Islam in Malaysian education. If the government is successful, the underlying strength of the impulse toward Islamization in Malay society might weaken over the long term. In the Muslim areas of the Philippines, there has been talk for decades of incorporating modern subjects into the madrassa curriculum, but very little has been accomplished. There is a critical need to revise the curriculum of madrassas in the Philippines to raise them to the level of the public education system and to get the religious schools accredited, so that a madrassa degree would have meaningful economic value.¹⁰⁷ In Indonesia, the situation of Muslim education is much more favorable. The majority of the *pesantren* associated with Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama, as well as a number of independent schools, already teach modern subjects. The challenge is to provide the resources that they need to deliver an effective modern education.

Reestablish State Authority and Reduce "Ungoverned Areas"

One of the conditions generating Islamic extremism in countries otherwise as different as Indonesia and Cambodia is the breakdown of state authority. Therefore, whether the central government succeeds in restoring order and stability and provides services to the population will be a critical factor in determining whether Islamic extremism will continue to grow or start to wane. If government is unable to restore a sense of security to the population, the scope of action for religious and other extremists will continue to expand. Conversely, political and economic stabilization will reduce opportunities for extremists to dominate the political discourse among Muslims and will allow moderate voices to reassert themselves.

¹⁰⁷ Discussion with Senator Santa Nina Rahul, Washington, D.C., 2003.

As the author of this chapter has discussed in another recent study,¹⁰⁸ the role of the Indonesian military, one of the few institutions that cuts across the many divides in Indonesian society, will be critical. Despite its shortcomings and the linkages of some military sectors with extremist groups, the military remains committed to Indonesia's secular constitution. However, the military is part of the society and is not immune to the forces that are transforming Indonesia. Over time, continued Islamization or the coming to power of an Islamic-oriented government could change the religio-political balance within the military itself.

Expand the Stake of Muslim National Minorities in Democratic Non-Muslim Majority States

In countries where Muslims are a minority, such as the Philippines and Thailand, the issue of Islam and politics is framed somewhat differently. The question of whether radical or moderate forms of Islam will prevail in the Muslim areas remains extremely important, of course, but the central issue is that of national reconciliation. The success of reconciliation efforts is likely to hinge on the ability of the central governments to address what are referred to as the “root causes” of the discontent, that is to say, opening up political, social, and economic opportunities for their minority populations. Addressing root causes, of course, does not guarantee an end to terrorism or extremism. However, improving political opportunities and socioeconomic conditions in potentially disaffected regions reduces the potential for popular support of extremist movements.

In the Philippines, the MILF retains a strong military presence in the Muslim areas of the south. A resolution of the conflict would require a multipronged approach involving (a) good-faith negotiations between the Philippine government and the MILF; (b) a real improvement in economic and social conditions in the Muslim areas; and (c) restoration of a climate of security for the population, which requires the suppression of politico-criminal groups such as the Abu Sayyaf. All these are elements of the Manila government's strategy.

Assist Economic Recovery Throughout the Region

The 1997–1998 economic crisis devastated the Southeast Asian economies, creating widespread hardship and social dislocations and widening divides among ethnic and religious groups. Improving socioeconomic conditions will not necessarily alter the radical minority's determination to strike at the perceived enemies of Islam, but it would reduce opportunities for radicals to exploit economic hardship to expand recruitment. Economic growth and security are inextricably linked, however. Development is unlikely to take place without peace and security.

¹⁰⁸ Rabasa and Haseman (2002).

In the War on Terrorism, Do Not Lose Sight of Long-Term Strategic Requirements

The key requirement of an effective long-term strategy for the West is to balance the needs of meeting both the threat of terrorism and the threat of destabilization of moderate Muslim countries. The U.S.-led global war on terrorism will continue to have a serious impact on the Muslim communities in Southeast Asia, but the impact need not be destabilizing. Much will depend on the efforts of the mainstream Muslim leadership to prevent radicals from hijacking the Muslim agenda and on the success of the United States and its allies to make clear to Muslims that the war on terrorism is not a war on Islam. It will be important, in the course of prosecuting this war, for the United States to demonstrate that its efforts are not directed against Muslims or at strengthening repressive and authoritarian regimes but rather are directed toward promoting democratic change in the Muslim world. The success of such a project in Southeast Asia could have profound implications for the future of Islam in the broader Muslim world and for the shape of the international order in the twenty-first century and beyond.

Islam in West Africa: The Case of Nigeria

Peter Chalk

Introduction

U.S. security interests in West Africa have been cast in a new light during the past two years, with policymakers in Washington expressing increased concern over the potential of the area to emerge as a new front for anti-Western extremists in the post–September 11 era. Sizable Islamic populations suffuse the hinterlands of a broad band of regional states, extending from Mauritania, through Cote D’Ivoire, to Cameroon. In many cases, these communities exhibit greater loyalty to the concept of a global Muslim *umma* and caliphate than to the relatively young nation-states of which they are a part.¹ Although some of this pan-frontier identity undoubtedly stems from historical cultural and linguistic ties to the Arab world, it also reflects the fundamentalist proselytizing of charities funded by Saudi and other Persian Gulf donors, as well as growing alienation brought about by autocratic governance, rampant corruption, and economic marginalization.² If the divisive politics of Pakistan, Indonesia, and Algeria are any gauge, such sentiments and frustrations are highly susceptible to the radical rhetoric of outside demagogues and can be easily co-opted for militant ideological purposes.³

Further accentuating American misgivings are several environmental facets that make West Africa ideally suited to the tactical designs of groups such as Al Qaeda. Not only is the region characterized by porous land and sea borders, it is also beset by general socioeconomic dysfunctionality that has become an increasingly endemic feature of the contemporary Nigerian landscape. Exacerbating the situation is the endemic culture of organized criminality that has developed in this part of the conti-

¹ “Faithful, but Not Fanatics,” *The Economist*, June 28, 2003.

² Stephen Morrison, “Africa and the Global War on Terrorism,” testimony given before the House International Relations Committee Subcommittee on Africa, November 15, 2001.

³ Peter Lewis, “Islam, Protest and Conflict in Nigeria,” *CSIS Africa Notes* No. 10, December 2002, p. 1.

ment, which currently involves everything from drug trafficking to document forgery. Such activities have already proven their logistical worth in Central, South, and Southeast Asia—both with respect to aiding movements of operational cells between attack venues and in terms of generating and “hiding” illicit proceeds—and could certainly be utilized for similar purposes in West Africa.⁴

Nigeria presents a natural focal point for these concerns, embodying as it does many of the characteristics and attendant problems that underscore the fragility of West African states. The republic is home to a large Muslim population that remains highly prone to radical and polarizing influences. Nigeria represents the most suitable sub-Saharan candidate for theocracy—at least according to Osama bin Laden. Just as problematic, the country suffers from chronic political instability, an entrenched climate of ethno-religious violence, prodigious corruption, and pervasive organized crime influences.⁵ Nigeria is also a “regional giant” whose internal religious politics could affect neighboring states in the West African region.

This chapter examines Muslim identity in Nigeria as a microcosm for the latent Islamic challenges presently confronting the wider West African region.⁶ It first discusses the general context of Muslim sentiment in the republic, delineating three broad streams: traditionalism, modernism, and fundamentalism. The analysis then looks at main Islamic trends in the country—particularly as they pertain to shifts toward increasing fundamentalism—assessing their import for national and international security considerations. The chapter concludes by examining principal policy options available to the United States to help stem a radical reorientation of Muslim identity in Nigeria and to facilitate the emergence of a more stable domestic socioeconomic and political environment.

The Broad Islamic Context in Nigeria

The Republic of Nigeria has a population of approximately 126 million people split among some 200 ethno-linguistic entities, principally including Hausa and Faluni (29 percent), Yoruba (21 percent), Igbo (18 percent), Ijaw (10 percent), Kanuri (4 percent), Ibibio (4 percent), and Tiv (2 percent). Half the country’s population is made up of Muslims, who have existed for decades in an uneasy equilibrium with Christians and tribal groups adhering to indigenous religious beliefs (see Figures 9.1


⁴ Comments made by Department of Defense officials during counterterrorism experts consultation meeting, Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS), Crystal City, Virginia, December 4, 2003.

⁵ Lewis, *op. cit.*, pp. 1–3; “Faithful, but Not Fanatics,” *op. cit.*

⁶ Time and budgetary constraints prevented a more thorough analysis of Islamic trends in West Africa. This study, therefore, does not address the special problems concerning the larger border of the Sahel for Mali, Niger, Chad and Mauritania; the Sahelian regions of the failed states of Sierra Leone and Liberia (and increasingly Cote D’Ivoire; and internal, intra-Islamic rivalries in Mauritania.


and 9.2).⁷ The main Islamic influence is concentrated in the republic's northern states, 12 of which have been operating under an institutionalized shari'a legal code

Figure 9.1
Ethnic Divisions in Nigeria



SOURCE: IISS, *Strategic Survey, 2001/2002*, p. xxi.
RAND MG246-9.1

Figure 9.2
Religious Beliefs in Nigeria



SOURCE: IISS, *Strategic Survey, 2001/2002*, p. xxi.
RAND MG246-9.2

⁷ International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) (2003), p. xx; Lewis, op. cit., p. 1; Morrison, op. cit.

since 2000.⁸ Although this extension of religious law has been associated with widespread human rights abuses, its consolidation has nevertheless met with considerable public support, particularly on the part of the youth and the middle classes who have vigorously embraced the integration of Muslim jurisprudence with political governance as a step toward order and moral legitimacy.⁹

Islam is not a uniform force in Nigeria. Indeed, throughout most of the Republic's postcolonial history, there has been a wide-ranging religious discourse, which in the Muslim-majority northern region has embraced a plethora of political organizations, social movements, and Muslim groupings representing a heterogeneous and eclectic array of interests and objectives.¹⁰ The country's current Islamic milieu draws on several tendencies, including the traditional emirate system, Sufi brotherhoods, and a growing stratum of Muslim conservatism. These various identifying influences can be subdivided into three broad streams: Islamic traditionalism, Islamic modernism, and Islamic fundamentalism.

Muslim Traditionalism

Islamic traditionalism in Nigeria revolves around the influence of the *ulama* as well as the religious benchmarks set by the sultans and emirs of states with a long and rich Muslim history, such as Sokoto¹¹ and Borno.¹² This segment of the country's Islamic

⁸ These states include Sokoto, Kebbi, Niger, Zamfara, Kaduna, Katsina, Kano, Jigawa, Bauchi, Yobe, Gombe, and Borno.

⁹ Lewis, *op. cit.*, pp. 10–13; “Nigerian City Where Beauty Leads to 100 Deaths,” *The Weekend Financial Times*, November 23–24, 2002; “The U.S. Can’t Allow 50 Million Muslims to Descend into Extremism,” *The Wall Street Journal*, November 27, 2002. It should be noted that the application of *shari’a* law has not been uniform in these states. Several provinces, though nominally operating under a Muslim religious system, continue to affirm *shari’a* as a voluntary code of civil jurisprudence, which has been the common arrangement for decades. Moreover, the enactment of the harshest forms of Islamic criminal justice, such as amputation and stoning, continues to be more the exception than the rule.

¹⁰ Lewis, *op. cit.*, pp. 5–6.

¹¹ Sokoto was founded in 1809 by Usman da Fodio (1754–1817), a Fulani leader who led a revolt against the region's Hausa overlords and subsequently established a large Muslim empire that included most of northern Nigeria. In 1817, the territory was divided between a new Emirate of Gwandu and the Sultanate of Sokoto, although the sultan remained overlord of the whole empire. In 1903, Sokoto fell to British forces under Frederick Lugard. It is presently ruled by Muhammadu Maccido (the nineteenth sultan), who has pledged unity among Nigeria's Muslim community. For useful background commentaries see “Sokoto,” available online at www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/Rotunda/2209/Sokoto.html; and Usman Bugaje, “The Jihad of Shaykh Usman Dan Fodio and Its Impact Beyond the Sokoto Caliphate—2,” available online at <http://www.webstar.co.uk/~ubugaje/beyond2.html>.

¹² The Borno empire/caliphate has its roots in the history of the westward expansion of the Kanern from Bahr-el Nur, an area east of the Lake of Chad. Due to its location, the empire performed an integrative role fostering trade links between the wider trans-Saharan region and the hajj movements of the Middle East, which brought it much prosperity. The modern Borno state was created in 1976 and initially comprised Borno and Yobe states; the latter was established as a separate political entity within the federal Nigerian system in 1991. For useful background information see “Borno State,” available online at www.onlinenigeria.com/links/LinksReadPrint.asp?blurb=218; and Bugaje, *op. cit.*

milieu is preoccupied with the broad ideological parameters of Muslim society, particularly as they pertain to the religious, educational, and legal domains. The traditionalists emphasize ancient Islamic learning, focusing on Arabic teaching and the memorizing of the Quran. They are heavily influenced by Sufi ritualism and mysticism, although have increasingly come to identify with modern civic associations that are able to effectively articulate, promote, and aggregate the religious and material interests of their members and leaders.

This association with the contemporary world has allowed Nigerian ulama to remain actively engaged in topical global debates relating to secularism, the division between politics and religion, human and ethnic rights, and democracy.¹³ All these issues are discussed in daily Islamic broadcasts put out by the Popular Federal Radio Corporation and international media houses such as the Voice of America, the British Broadcasting Corporation, and Deutsche Welle (Voice of Germany); they are also frequently raised in public forums, including street preaching and Friday mosque sermons.¹⁴ As Mohammad Umar observes:

By actively participating in [modern] discourses rather than confining themselves to arcane religious issues and ancient texts, Nigerian ulama show that their traditionalism is not an anachronism, but a changing orientation fully engaged with topical global issues.¹⁵

This modernist predisposition notwithstanding, an intrinsic tenet of traditionalist thinking stems from its vigorous opposition to capitalist development. The oil boom of the 1970s, in particular, is regarded by traditionalists as instrumental in driving the graft, cronyism, and social dysfunctionality that have been such an endemic feature of the contemporary Nigerian political scene. Indeed, from the perspective of the ulama, the practical effect of expanding and fostering the country's fast-developing petroleum sector has been merely to create vast opportunities for corruption while ensuring that the best way to amass great personal wealth is through the systematic capture of the state and its resources.

The sudden injection of oil wealth is generally regarded as central to the breakdown of the agrarian social infrastructure upon which traditionalism was historically founded. It is hardly surprising that such developments have bred little confidence or trust in economic capitalism or the governing institutions that manage and sustain

¹³ For instance, on numerous occasions when religious-inspired violence has broken out in Nigeria, influential scholars and leaders in states such as Sokoto and Borno have urged restraint and a cessation of conflict. See Lewis, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

¹⁴ Muhammad Umar, "Education and Islamic Trends in Northern Nigeria: 1970s–1990s," *Africa Today*, pp. 129–130. See also Ousmane Kane, "Izala: The Rise of Muslim Reformism in Northern Nigeria," in Marty and Appleby, eds. (1994); and Loimeier (1997).

¹⁵ Umar, *op. cit.*, p. 132.

this system. Several writers regard the rejection of capitalist development as integral in triggering the series of mass Islamic uprisings that erupted during the 1980s under the ostensible direction of the 'yan Tatsine (Maitatsine) millenarian movement. By 1985, these riots had claimed thousands of lives (4,177 according to official figures) and resulted in the destruction of property of a yet undetermined value.¹⁶

Modernism

Islamic modernism in Nigeria is ostensibly organized through the Jama'atu Izlat al-bah wa Iqma al-Sunna (hereafter referred to as Izala for short). Historically, this track of Muslim identity has stringently opposed the mysticism inherent in Sufism—advocating, by contrast, a legal positivism that is characterized by preference for the rules of modern democracy (so long as they are seen to be compatible with the textual wisdom of religious principles) over the personal authority and perceived divine guidance of the traditional ulama.

Three specific features are typically associated with modernism. First, adherents of Izala do not regard adherence to traditional Islamic values as necessarily incompatible with modernity. As Marshall Hodgson observes,

An unbiased devotee [can find much to admire in modernity] because the shari'a had posited an egalitarian justice and had presupposed a degree of social mobility, stressing individual responsibility and the nuclear family. More than any other great religious tradition, it had catered to bourgeois and mercantile values. It had struggled persistently against any merely customary authority and usage in the name of universal law and dignity of the individual.¹⁷

Second, the Izala movement was instituted along modern, progressive lines. In contrast to the traditional Sufi orders under the leadership of spiritually preselected ulamas, this track of Nigerian Muslim identity is predicated on an organizational structure that is formally registered as a legal entity characterized by both elected officials and a written constitution. Additionally, Izala places considerable emphasis on formulating and implementing specific decisions through bureaucratic administrative procedures as opposed to “superstitious customs and beliefs.”¹⁸

Third, and naturally following on from the first two features, Izala advocates a thoroughly modern, inclusive educational system, with a clearly defined syllabus,

¹⁶ Mark Shaw, “West African Criminal Networks in South and Southern Africa,” *Africa Affairs*, Vol. 101, 2002, p. 295; Umar, op. cit., pp. 130–131. For more on the 1980s uprisings, see Elizabeth Isichei, “The Maitatsine Uprisings in Nigeria 1980–1985: A Revolt of the Disinherited,” *Journal of Religion in Africa*, Vol. 17, 1987; Paul Lubeck, “Islamist Protest Under Semi-Industrial Capitalism: 'yan Taitatsine Explained,” *Africa*, Vol. 55, 1985; and Alan Christelow, “The 'yan Taitatsine Disturbances in Kano: A Search for Perspective,” *The Muslim World*, Vol. 75, 1985.

¹⁷ Hodgson (1974), p. 196.

¹⁸ Umar, op. cit., 134. See also Yandaki (1992).

graded classes, and fixed periods to graduate after satisfactory performance in written and oral examinations. Izala schools, which actively encourage the enrollment of women, use two main languages of instruction—English and Arabic—and prepare the bulk of their students for careers either in teaching or leadership in nongovernmental, religious, or judicial organizations. Core offerings in Islamic studies and Arabic culture and literature are integrated with more Western-oriented disciplines, such as mathematics, English, history, and general knowledge.¹⁹

Fundamentalism

Islamic fundamentalism in Nigeria focuses its attention on so-called antisystem movements that articulate vehement opposition to the existing political (secular) status quo, the federal government, established (and perceived ineffectual) religious elites, modern-oriented Muslim identity, and foreign—mainly Western—influences. Currently, these sentiments are enshrined mainly in the guise of the *Ikhwan* or Brotherhood (Islamic Movement of Nigeria/IMN), a Sunni organization (though strongly influenced by Iran)²⁰ led by Shaykh Ibrahim El-Zakzaki. Outside observers consider this group as the vanguard of a militant fundamentalist resurgence in Nigeria's northern states whose devotees remain committed to religious purity and counterdemocratic/capitalist objectives.²¹ Although the IMN has traditionally recruited from madrassas and other institutions of religious scholarship, it has increasingly taken on a mass popular basis, with El-Zakzaki claiming that his group is able to mobilize a million supporters in a moment's notice "on any issue."²² This being said, continuing connections to educational institutions still heavily influence the movement toward an intellectualist orientation, especially in the articulation of its defining doctrines.

At the center of the IMN's ideology is the idea that the modern Nigerian state, created in the crucible of colonial rule, is incompatible with Islamic precepts and merely represents a crude attempt by outside Western and Christian powers to corrupt the North's Muslim heritage for their own selfish material interests. More specifically, El-Zakzaki regards Nigeria's religious secularism as a fundamental "birth

¹⁹ Umar, op. cit., pp. 135–136. For good analyses of the emphasis Izala schools put on female enrollment and participation see Callaway (1987); Coles and Mack, eds. (1991); Fatima Lawson, "Islamic Fundamentalism and Continuing Education for Hausa Muslim Women in Northern Nigeria," doctoral dissertation submitted to the University of Minnesota, 1995; and Alaine Hutson, "The Development of Women's Authority in the Kano Tijaniyya, 1894–1963," *Africa Today*, Vol. 46, 1999, pp. 43–64.

²⁰ Iran's influence over the IMN has led a number of commentators incorrectly to portray both the IMN and El-Zakzaki as Shi'as. Both the group and its leader are Sunnis, as are the bulk of Nigerian Muslims.

²¹ Lewis, op. cit., pp. 4–5. Some attention has also recently focused on the Ja'amutu Tajidmul Islami (JTI, or the Movement for Islamic Revival), which is led by Abubakar Mujahid. However in terms of both numbers and geographic influence, the JTI is eclipsed by the IMN.

²² El-Zakzaki, cited in "Nigeria's Firebrand Leaders," *BBC On-Line News*, October 1, 2001.

defect” that, unless remedied through a vigorous and comprehensive process of Islamization, will consign the country to endless social, cultural, economic, and political maladies. According to Simeon Ilesanmi:

[Islamists] cite the dysfunctional conditions of the Nigerian state as a reason to employ religion to launch a moral challenge to past conventional legitimations of political life and to unleash different possibilities in the construction of a new one. Any concessions to secularism, they contend, would inflate the already bloated propensity of the state to absolutize its moral status, and this would only entangle the country in a vicious cycle, as the moral level of public life cannot be, and is not being, sustained by the secular state. Only religion is capable of generating civic responsibility and high levels of moral performance in everyday life . . . As Muslims see it, the push for the institutionalization of the Shari’a . . . is fundamentally an obedience to a divine benevolent call to save Nigeria from an impending doom. They seem genuinely convinced that “moral depravity, corruption, oppression, infidelity and syncretism” are the price that a society would pay when not “conducted and governed according to the rules and principles” of religion (Islam).²³

Fundamentalists emphasize the necessity to achieve this objective through suffering and struggle, including a willingness to actively embrace martyrdom, as ineluctable on the correct path prescribed by God and the only “honorable” way to effectively defeat pagan rites and rituals of the Satanic infidel.²⁴ It is in this context that El-Zakzaki has declared “religion cannot be established without bloodshed.”²⁵

IMN self-identity additionally reflects a strong resonance with outside Islamic influences. Of particular importance has been Iran, which appears to have provided both inspiration and guidance for the group’s religious symbolism.²⁶ Over the past decade, leading members have undertaken religious pilgrimages to Teheran, taken to wearing the garments of Iranian clerics, and increasingly moved to integrate and distribute Shi’a literature along with their own publications—including a monthly magazine known as *Hausa* that has specifically targeted a Northern Nigerian readership.²⁷

²³ Simeon Ilesanmi, “Constitutional Treatment of Religion and the Politics of Human Rights in Nigeria,” *African Affairs*, Vol. 100, 2001, pp. 542–543. See also Hiskett (1994), p. x.

²⁴ Umar, op. cit., pp. 140–141; Siddiqi (1981), p. 7. El-Zakzaki’s preoccupation with the political problems of the Nigerian polity is consistent with the general emphasis on fundamentalist state power. For more on this see also Marty and Appleby, eds. (1993); and Youssef Choueiri, “The Political Discourse of Contemporary Islamist Movements,” in Sidahmed and Etheshami, eds. (1996).

²⁵ El-Zakzaki, cited in Umar, op. cit., p. 141.

²⁶ It should be noted that the IMN denies it is unduly influenced by Iran, claiming that its identity with the Republic stems more from the 1979 revolution and the triumph of Islamic radicalism than any overt shift toward Iranian Shi’ism.

²⁷ Umar, op. cit., pp. 138, 143; Lewis, op. cit., p. 6.

In the wake of the September 11, 2001, attacks that were launched against the United States, the IMN has also begun to express a rhetorical affinity with the Taliban and Al Qaeda. While expressing regret at the death and destruction caused in New York and Washington, El-Zakzaki has nevertheless portrayed America's counterresponse as wholly unjustified, denigrating military action in Afghanistan (and, more recently Iraq) as nothing less than a thinly veiled crusade aimed at Islam itself.²⁸ The leader's opinions have particular relevance, not least because they suggest that, in the ongoing war against global terrorism, IMN rhetorical support (though not necessarily physical backing)²⁹ would be proffered not to America or its allies but to Osama bin Laden and Mullah Omar.³⁰

Figures 9.3 and 9.4 place the three Muslim traditions in Nigeria on spectrums of democracy to nondemocracy and nonviolence to violence.

Islamic Trends in Nigeria

Current Islamic trends in Nigeria appear to be moving in the direction of heightened fundamentalism and radicalism. In large part, this shift reflects the deepening socio-economic inequities and broad failure of governance that have become such notable features of the country's emerging geopolitical landscape over the past two to three decades. In 1999, Olusegun Obasanjo was elected president following the death of Sani Abacha, arguably one of Nigeria's most brutal and corrupt despots.³¹ The new leader, a devout born-again Christian who had a strong international reputation for commitment to democracy and human rights, pledged a new era for Nigeria that would be characterized by ethno-religious stability and accountable rule, buttressed by sustained fiscal growth.³²

²⁸ In the days leading up to the launch of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, El-Zakzaki was already affirming opposition to what he regarded as the absolute U.S. stance on global terrorism: "Soon after the event we were all shocked and dismayed, because it appears now as if the entire Muslim people are considered guilty, over one billion of them. This was a crime perpetrated by some individuals and justice demands that only those individuals that are responsible should be brought to book." El-Zakzaki, cited in "Nigeria's Firebrand Muslim Leaders," *BBC On-Line News*, October 1, 2001.


²⁹ To date, the IMN has offered no physical backing to international terrorist groups, nor have any attacks been carried out in the name of the Al Qaeda movement. This seems to reflect that, at least at present, the immediate focus of the IMN and its supporters is on internal Nigerian change rather than furthering the cause of the anti-Western international jihadist cause.

³⁰ See, for instance, Morrison, *op. cit.*, p. 5; "Nigeria's Firebrand Muslim Leaders," *op. cit.*; and "The U.S. Can't Allow 50 Million Muslims to Descend into Extremism," *op. cit.*

³¹ Obasanjo was elected to another seven-year presidential term in April 2003. However, his electoral success was marred by widespread allegations of polling misconduct that, in the words of his main rival, Muhammadu Buhari, was "on a scale that has never been witnessed in the history of criminality in Nigeria."

³² "The U.S. Can't Allow 50 Million Muslims to Descend into Extremism," *op. cit.*; "The People Disagree," *The Economist*, April 26, 2003.

Figure 9.3
Muslim Groups in Nigeria on a Spectrum of Democracy to Nondemocracy




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While Obasanjo has certainly managed to rein in the most glaring examples of graft and state corruption, cronyism and political bribery at virtually all levels of the administration continue to represent major problems, and there have been no high-profile convictions as yet. Moreover, the president's avowed Christian leanings have aggravated his relationship with Nigeria's Muslims and limited his ability to check the swing toward radicalism within this section of the populace. For instance, the initial introduction of shari'a in the northern states—heralded by Zamfara in 1999—was widely interpreted as a direct act of political protest against the new administration in Lagos.³³

Although Obsanjo's reelection in 2003 has given the president more influence over his party and opened the possibility for the introduction of meaningful domestic

³³ Zamfara introduced a bill for the institution of an Islamic Legal Code in September 1999, which was formalized at a public ceremony a month later. IISS, op. cit., p. xxi; Umar Danfulani and Sati Fwatshak, "Briefing: The September 2001 Events in Jos, Nigeria," *African Affairs*, Vol. 101, 2002, p. 243.

Figure 9.4
Muslim Groups in Nigeria on a Spectrum of Nonviolence to Violence



RAND MG246-9.4

reforms, he has yet to consolidate a solid democratic foundation for the country, nor has he been able to foster sustained relationships in the legislature to support ongoing economic and devolution initiatives.³⁴ Just as important, Obasanjo's support in the northern states has continued to fall, exacerbating the relative isolation of what was already a region at the fringe of central government control.

These political failings have come at a time when Nigeria is reeling from one of the worst economic declines in the world. Annual per capita income has declined from US \$750 in 1982 to less than US \$250 today. Overdependence on nationalized oil exports has also bred a rentier mentality, fostered official corruption, and led to the development of a lopsided economy that has discouraged investment in either the primary agricultural or secondary industrial sectors.³⁵

³⁴ See Lewis, *op. cit.*, p. 2; "The U.S. Can't Allow 50 Million Muslims to Descend into Extremism," *op. cit.*

³⁵ Although Nigeria retains considerable supplies of crude oil, the country's central fuel refining firm, the National Nigerian Petroleum Company, is too dilapidated to turn this base into enough petrol to meet public demand.

Moreover, despite being one of Africa's main oil producers, Nigeria continues to suffer from recurrent domestic fuel shortages, largely because the National Nigerian Petroleum Company (NNPC) is too dilapidated to refine sufficient gasoline to meet public demand. Added to this is a scarce public resource base that has been all but consumed by the profusion of highly inefficient state-run enterprises existing across the country, as well as foreign capital reserve holdings that have been effectively "swallowed" as a result of servicing an external debt currently standing at over US \$30 billion.³⁶

This combination of political and economic dislocation has provided an environment ripe for antisystem religious tendencies that both question and challenge the prevailing status quo. As Lewis notes:

Dissident Islamists are a significant force in countries such as Nigeria, where there is a ready social foundation [steeped in] inequities. Conditions that foster radicalism—poverty, unemployment, social dislocation, cultural polarization and a large pool of disaffected young men—are evident in abundance. Among Muslims, social grievances often find religious expression through fundamentalist appeals to piety, or through Islamist challenges to the political status quo. Both trends are evident in the country's political and religious landscape, and Islamist pressures may become a serious danger. There is no doubt that . . . the spread of fundamentalism pose major challenges to Nigeria's fledgling democracy.³⁷

Further driving the shift toward radical Islam has been the growing influence of non-Nigerian religious proselytism. Over the past decade, frustrated Muslim communities living under corrupt and malfunctioning governments have increasingly turned to outside nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), religious charities, and welfare agencies based in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states to provide education, health, social welfare, and security. Although the support of these groups has often helped to enhance the legitimacy of local Islamic activism, it has also provided the means to mobilize anti-Western sentiment and has created openings for the penetration of militant, Taliban-style ideologies that have explicitly denounced the secularism and capitalism of the Nigerian state as directly threatening to the religious identity and piety of the Muslim faith. Evangelical organizations in the United States that channel money to domestic Christian radio stations and President Obasanjo's explicit support of Washington's global war on terrorism have done nothing to amelio-

³⁶ IISS, op. cit., p. xx; "The U.S. Can't Allow 50 Million Muslims to Descend into Extremism," op. cit.; "The People Speak," *The Economist*, April 26, 2003. The government's greatest economic success to date has been to allow private firms to provide telephone services, which has both facilitated communications across the country and availed higher productivity among small businesses.

³⁷ Lewis, op. cit., p. 2.

rate these suspicions, providing a fertile and receptive ground for the fundamentalist rhetoric of outside Wahhabi and Salafi demagogues.³⁸

Finally, the moderating influence of Izala modernism has weakened, principally as a result of internal factionalism and doctrinal infighting. The movement has suffered from leadership struggles pertaining to Sufism and the theological debate over whether traditionalists can be considered, on any level, true Muslims. In addition, its membership has undergone important generational changes that have seen the growing influence of younger scholars who have studied at Saudi educational institutions and whose intellectual capital includes both greater fluency in spoken Arabic and wider exposure to different traditions of Islamic religious learning. Combined, these developments have degraded the erstwhile cohesiveness of progressive Nigerian Islam while simultaneously fostering an increased predisposition toward fundamentalism—even within established Izala ranks.³⁹

Radical Islam in Nigeria: National and International Considerations

The growth of radical Islam has significantly affected Nigerian national stability and continues to have serious implications for international security. Domestically, the trend toward fundamentalism has sparked widespread sectarian clashes between the forces of traditionalism and modernity, in addition to helping undermine the country's delicate internal Muslim-Christian balance.⁴⁰ Since May 1999, when Obasanjo first came to power, more than 10,000 people have died in communal clashes—the vast bulk of them variously connected to disputes over land and/or the politics of ethnic identity exacerbated by religion. Nearly every region has been affected, including most major metropolitan centers and several rural areas.⁴¹ This culture of endemic violence has directly torn at the social fabric of Nigeria, further polarizing what is already a deeply divided society.

The expansion of *shari'a* has been particularly divisive. As noted above, twelve of the country's northern provinces have been operating under a formalized Islamic criminal code since 2000. Reforms introduced in these areas—which have essentially

³⁸ Morrison, op. cit., pp. 2, 5; “The U.S. Can’t Allow 50 Million Muslims to Descend into Extremism,” op. cit.; “New ‘Taliban’ Clashes in Nigeria,” BBC Interactive News, January 7, 2004, available online at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3376979.stm>.

³⁹ Umar, op. cit., pp. 136–138.

⁴⁰ It should be noted that Christian evangelicalism has been just as problematic in this regard. It has been speculated, for instance, that when Mel Gibson's *Passion of the Christ* hits the country's cinemas the result will be explosive. This is especially problematic for the West, which defines (and prides) itself on religious freedom. In a state like Nigeria, however, it is akin to “crying fire in a crowded theater.”

⁴¹ Lewis, op. cit., p. 7; IISS, op. cit., p. xxi; “Beauty and the Beastliness,” *The Economist*, November 30, 2002.

extended Muslim legal prerogatives to prevailing penal and civil systems⁴²—have sharply exacerbated underlying ethnic divisions as well as dangerously heightened religious and land-tenure tensions. Between February 2000 and June 2001, shari'a-fueled riots erupted across Nigeria's northern and middle belt regions, producing shock waves that were felt as far south as Lagos. Clashes were particularly serious in Kano, Kaduna, and Jos.⁴³

In Jos, it is believed that some 3,000 people were killed and many more injured or displaced over the course of just six days. The scale of the tragedy has left an indelible scar on the city that will undoubtedly take many years to heal.⁴⁴ As Danfaluni and Fwatshak observe:

Since the events of 7–12 September 2001, there has been a great deal of suspicion, mistrust, fear and even open resentment between . . . Muslims and Christians in Jos town. The uncontrolled culture of fabricating and circulating dangerous and malicious rumors during the riots played an important role in sustaining the carnage. The trust and confidence that used to exist between Muslims and Christians during the peaceful times is no longer there, and it will certainly take some time for the wounds of ethnic hatred, religious arrogance and fundamentalism to heal.⁴⁵

Beyond national considerations, the spread of fundamentalism in Nigeria carries important implications for international security, particularly as it pertains to the post-September 11 era. Arguably of most concern in this regard is the possibility that elements connected with the Al Qaeda terror network will move to co-opt radical Islamists based in the north for logistical and tactical purposes. As previously noted, the IMN has already exhibited a growing affinity toward bin Laden and his former Taliban "hosts," declaring the U.S.-led global war on terrorism to be a unjustified onslaught against the Muslim faith and its most devoted adherents. Just as seriously, the group has linked the war on terrorism to the Nigerian internal context, charging that Obasanjo's support for the war on terrorism is nothing less than a thinly veiled Christian attempt to strip the northern Islamic states of their political, economic, and

⁴² It should be noted that ongoing trials and appeals of various death sentences under *shari'a* (at the time of writing, none had been carried out) demonstrate divergences within the country's Islamic community over exactly how far this code should be carried out.

⁴³ More recently in November 2002, the decision to hold a Miss World pageant in Kaduna sparked Christian-Muslim communal clashes that left more than 220 people dead, 1,000 injured, and 11,000 homeless. See, for instance, "Beauty and the Beastliness," *op. cit.*; and "Nigerian City Where Beauty Leads to 100 Deaths," *The Weekend Financial Times*, November 23–24, 2002.

⁴⁴ Danfaluni and Fwatshak, "Briefing: The September 2001 Events in Jos, Nigeria," p. 249; IISS, *op. cit.*, p. xxi; Lewis, *op. cit.*, p. 11; "Nigerian City Where Beauty Leads to 100 Deaths," *op. cit.* It should be noted that Jos was already primed for communal violence as a result of competition for land in the context of migration to the area by "new" ethnic groups.

⁴⁵ Danfaluni and Fwatshak, *op. cit.*, p. 254.

social influence.⁴⁶ These messages, which have found a receptive audience among growing numbers of Muslims increasingly disillusioned with a corrupt and malfunctioning Nigerian state, provide outside demagogues with an ideal conduit for rhetoric that Western analysts fear could be readily exploited to propagate their own visions of extremism and militancy.

The possibility of external Islamist extremists establishing a concerted foothold in Nigeria is troublesome for at least three interrelated reasons. First, it could allow transnational terrorists to establish a new operational fulcrum in the heart of West Africa—a primary source of U.S. non-Gulf oil imports.⁴⁷ This would certainly be of interest to networked groups such as Al Qaeda, which have repeatedly emphasized economics as the “soft underbelly” of the morally corrupt capitalist system they seek to destroy.⁴⁸

Second, a militant Islamic presence in Nigeria could quite easily radiate out and affect on surrounding states, including Mali, Chad, Mauritania, and Niger, conceivably causing the collapse of the wider Sahel belt into endemic lawlessness and fundamentalist violence. As the current situation in the Horn of Africa so vividly demonstrates, not only do settings of this sort make it remarkably difficult to plan for—much less institute—pragmatic social, civil, economic, and political drives, they also effectively consign constituent polities to the very lowest rung of the global development index, greatly exacerbating the potential for full-scale, or at least partial, state collapse.

Third, and as a direct result of the previous two considerations, West Africa has for some time provided a highly permissive environment in which terrorists and other illegal substate actors can operate—not least because of the porous borders, weak law enforcement structures, and pervasive corruption that characterize this part

⁴⁶ Morrison, op. cit., 4–5; “The US Can’t Allow 50 Million Muslims to Descend into Extremism,” op. cit.; “Nigeria’s Firebrand Muslim Leaders,” *BBC On-Line News*, October 1, 2001.

⁴⁷ Currently, some 15 percent of Washington’s non-Gulf oil imports are derived from the central/West African basin. This proportion is expected to rise to 25 percent over the next decade. Nigeria, itself, is the world’s sixth-largest petroleum producer. With extensive oil and gas claims in the abundant-rich Gulf of Guinea, Nigeria has the potential to significantly lessen America’s dependence on traditional Middle Eastern supplies (which has prompted many in Washington to press for the Gulf to be recognized as an area of vital strategic interest). See Morrison, op. cit., p. 7; Tamara Makarenko, “Terrorist Threat to Energy Infrastructure Increases,” *Jane’s Intelligence Review*, June 2003, pp. 8–13; and Clive Schofield, “Bakassi Dispute Could Derail West African Peace Process,” *Jane’s Intelligence Review*, March 2004, p. 48.

⁴⁸ Following the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon in 2001, bin Laden issued a call specifically exhorting Islamic militants to hit hard economic targets of strategic importance to the United States and its Western allies. The oil sector represents a logical focal point for such aggression, particularly in terms of its potential to trigger major energy instability. Attacks carried out against Royal-Dutch Shell and ChevronTexaco by Ijaw militants in September 2002 highlight the potential threat in Nigeria: The incidents disrupted the manufacture and export of 350,000 barrels of oil a day, roughly one-sixth of the country’s daily production. See Makarenko, op. cit., p. 13.

of Africa.⁴⁹ In addition, a culture of criminality suffuses much of the region. Most of the criminal activity is carried out by Nigerian syndicates; it centers on document forgery and trafficking in gems, people, drugs, and weapons.⁵⁰

Overlaying these geopolitical facets with an extra layer of destabilizing inter- and intrastate radical Islamic sentiment may well create a new jihadist territorial front that could become a primary platform for the planning and perpetration of major anti-Western attacks, as has occurred in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Indonesia. Indeed, Algerian Islamists linked to the Al Qaeda network are already suspected of using false passports and fake credit cards supplied by Nigerian groups for entry into France, Italy, and Britain.⁵¹ Just as seriously, bin Laden is alleged to have exploited the underground West African diamond trade to hide terrorist assets to the tune of US \$240 million, which the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) believes has been used to purchase a wide array of weaponry, including assault rifles, rocket-propelled grenades, and surface-to-air missiles.⁵²

Policy Implications

Nigeria remains both important and relevant to the security calculations of the United States. Geopolitically, it is the key state in West Africa, and it is the principal anchor of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), one of the main multilateral organizations on the continent. Lagos, in short, has the potential to play a primary role in regional stabilization and general conflict mitigation efforts, which fits in well with Washington's emphasis on cooperative burden-sharing. In this connection, it is salutary to recall the leading role Nigeria played in trying to stem the civil violence associated with the Revolutionary United Front insurgency in Sierra Leone during the 1990s, including its active participation in peacekeeping missions undertaken under the auspices of ECOWAS. More recently, the Republic participated in the multilateral intervention in Liberia (2003–2004), which successfully evicted Charles Taylor—a longtime renegade leader in West Africa and the principal

⁴⁹ Government delegations from Mali, Mauritania, Chad, and Niger have been quite frank in stating that they lack the resources to manage significant tracts of their territory and that there is currently little control of borders and the related smuggling of arms, drugs, human, and other illicit commodities that pass through their territories. RAND interviews, Bamako, Mali, February 2003. See also IISS, *op. cit.*, pp. 348–352.

⁵⁰ For an excellent overview of the scale and geographic scope of organized West African and Nigerian criminal syndicates, see Mark Shaw, "West African Criminal Networks in South and Southern Africa," *African Affairs*, Vol. 101, 2002.

⁵¹ Author interview, New Scotland Yard, June 2003.

⁵² "Report Says African Harbored Al Qaeda Terror Assets Hidden in Gem-Buying Spree," *The Washington Post*, December 29, 2002; and "DAYA: A Branch of Al-Qa'ida Movement Meets in Mali?" *Associated Federated Press* (AFP), December 27, 2002.

architect behind the war in Sierra Leone—from power. These endeavors demonstrate Nigeria’s willingness to assume the obligations and responsibilities required of the ranking power in the area.⁵³

By virtue of its size and regional influence, Nigeria also helps to reinforce and legitimate U.S. strategic engagement in West Africa. This consideration has taken on added salience over the past two years, reflecting heightened concerns that outbursts of extremist religious violence or Al Qaeda–associated terrorism could come to directly threaten proximate (and not insignificant) energy supplies and business interests. Being able to count on Lagos as a loyal and stable ally provides the United States with a valuable sounding board for securing vital American national interests in the region while simultaneously helping to enhance intelligence and diplomatic capabilities on the ground.

These facets necessarily mean that a central component of Washington’s overall West Africa policy should be to focus on encouraging the emergence of an internal religious context in Nigeria that is stable and inhospitable to radical outside influences and associated extremist or criminal designs. This effort should emphasize several critical areas.

First, there needs to be a major emphasis on promoting institutional state development and governance. Ideally, policies should center on the best means to curb official corruption, enhance ethno-religious tolerance, develop accountable and transparent power structures, and boost professionalism within the security forces, particularly in terms of respect for human rights.⁵⁴

The U.S. government will need to rebuild the capabilities needed to assess and influence developments in this part of the world. U.S. intelligence and diplomatic capabilities in West Africa have steadily atrophied since September 11 as a consequence of the redeployment of personnel and resources to alternative theaters in the war on terrorism, such as South and Southeast Asia. Several commentators believe that this development has resulted in a weakened grasp of evolving trends on the ground, creating acute vulnerabilities that can be quickly and decisively exploited.⁵⁵

Second, a broad poverty relief program needs to be instituted in Nigeria. On one level, this effort will require increased bilateral development assistance combined with flexible and workable debt restructuring arrangements enacted through multilateral organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. However, it will also require initiatives designed to promote economic self-sufficiency, through both the expansion of the country’s agricultural and industrial sectors and the consolidation of a viable and more equitable national energy strategy.

⁵³ See, for example, IISS, *op. cit.*, p. 352.

⁵⁴ Morrison, *op. cit.*; “The US Can’t Allow 50 Million Muslims to Descend into Extremism,” *op. cit.*

⁵⁵ See, for instance, Morrison, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

Important in this regard will be programs aimed at providing for increased transparency in the oil sectors and building greater management capacity within the NNPC (both of which Obsanjo has pledged to do), privatizing more state enterprises, and augmenting investments in the primary and secondary sectors of the economy.⁵⁶

Third, institutional and economic support needs to be accompanied by the provision of more explicitly defined security assistance, ideally by protecting and bringing to bear existing national plans and prerogatives. Following the September 11 attacks, Nigeria, along with several other North and West African countries, submitted reports to the United Nations Security Council outlining the steps it was taking to combat militant extremism within its borders. Highlighted measures included the enactment of specific legal instruments to freeze terrorist (and other criminal) assets, the augmentation of domestic intelligence structures and bodies; the establishment of more formalized passport, border control, and immigration procedures; and the development of streamlined information exchange and extradition protocols with friendly governments.⁵⁷ The United States could also usefully work to improve the professionalism of the Nigerian Armed Forces—especially with respect to human rights. If effectively consolidated, this would open the way for more directed and broad-ranging military assistance programs.

Finally, the United States should consider means of helping to produce greater religious and communal stability in Nigeria. One way of achieving this would be through public diplomacy programs that reach out to both Islamic and Christian populations and that are framed in such a way as to mitigate the propagation and support of dangerous proselytizing messages and influences.

Beyond the national level, the United States could also usefully leverage extant programs in the wider West African region. Four recent interstate initiatives are worthy of mention in this regard:

- The Wade Declaration, adopted following a high-level summit in Senegal mid-October 2001, which commits member states of the newly reconfigured African Union (AU) to evaluate implementation of the existing African Convention on the Combating and Suppression of Terrorism.⁵⁸
- The Pan Sahelian Initiative (PSI), a U.S.-funded program of military support, initially enacted with Mali, Niger, Mauritania, and Chad, which is now being

⁵⁶ Morrison, op. cit., pp. 6–7.

⁵⁷ “Nigeria: Country Report on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001) of 28 September 2001,” letter submitted to the Counter-Terrorism Committee of the United Nations Security Council, January 15, 2002.

⁵⁸ Office of the Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism, *Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002: Africa Overview* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, April 2002), available online at http://stockholm.usembassy.gov/terror/rpt2002/africa_overview.html; “African Anti-Terrorism Summit Starts in Senegal,” *People’s Daily Online*, available online at <http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/>.

used to evaluate the scope of more inclusive counterterrorist training in the general West African region.⁵⁹

- The funding, organization, and cohosting of a West African Counterterrorism Working Seminar in October 2003 that included participants from Niger, Mali, Chad, Mauritania, Senegal, Nigeria, Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco. The five-day meeting—the first of its kind to be held in this part of Africa—was primarily designed to complement the PSI at a strategic level by providing a broad-based forum of discussion for senior policymakers, law enforcement and intelligence officials, and academics with expertise and experience in counterterrorism and associated transnational threats.
- The subsequent institution (in January 2004) of a \$100 million program of U.S. counterterrorism assistance for West Africa. Designed and implemented under the auspices of the PSI, this initiative will involve American military advisors and defense contractors who will provide training, coaching, and equipment to help seal the region's borders from outside penetration by Al Qaeda and its affiliate groups.⁶⁰

Instituting a broad-ranging pragmatic agenda of this sort will necessitate innovative, forward-looking, and politically dynamic responses on the part of the United States. The trick will be to develop and balance short-term expediencies aimed at securing American trade, investment, energy, and security interests in West Africa with the more problematic and long-term challenge of pushing through the difficult internal reforms required of the current Nigerian state. In short, Washington's objectives need to be directed to, and framed within, the context of, sustained national resilience.

If managed aggressively yet carefully, a policy mix of this sort could help to realize real gains for both the United States and Nigeria, as well as for relevant neighboring countries in West Africa. Over the medium to long term, it could help

⁵⁹ Comments made by Department of Defense officials during counterterrorism experts consultation meeting, Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS), Crystal City, Virginia, December 4, 2003. See also U.S. Department of State, "Text: State Department Cites Acts of Terrorism in Africa," *US Department of State International Information Programs*, May 6, 2003, available online at <http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/af/security/a3050102.htm>.

⁶⁰ "U.S. Team Arrives to Quash Threat," *The San Francisco Chronicle*, January 13, 2004. Two developments in March 2004 greatly increased the perceived importance of institutionalizing counterterrorism assistance throughout the general Maghreb and Sahelian regions: (1) Reports that members of the Al Qaeda-affiliated Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (SGPC) had directly clashed with the Chadian military along the border with Niger; and (2) revelations that those implicated in the simultaneous train bombings in Madrid (which, with its 202 fatalities, is the worst act of international terrorism since 9/11) are North Africans with alleged links extending to the edges of the Sahara Desert. See "U.S. Seeks Military Access in North Africa," *Los Angeles Times*, March 27, 2004; "Chad Army Kills Several 'Terrorists,'" *Independent Online*, March 12, 2004, available online at http://www.iol.co.za/general/news/newsprint.php?art_id=qw1079069760595B231&sf.

consolidate mutually beneficial ties that would bolster national and regional governance, encourage democratic mechanisms of ethno-religious accommodation, and foster alternatives to fundamentalism and sectarian antagonisms.

Muslim Diasporas and Networks

Theodore Karasik and Cheryl Benard

This chapter examines the characteristics of several important types of Muslim networks (e.g., diaspora, humanitarian, and economic) that are likely to be salient in understanding the globalized phenomenon of political Islam. Notably, although some of these networks may be explicitly Muslim in nature, others may simply be collections of individuals—living in Muslim and non-Muslim-majority countries where political Islam is being debated and is undergoing evolution—who happen to share a common religio-cultural background.¹ Like many other multiethnic, transnational social groups, these networks of Muslims tend to cross ancestry and ethnic lines, clans, communities, and nationalities. Thus, a clear definition is needed to understand the nuances of “Islamic” versus “Muslim.”

The terms *Muslim* and *Islamic* are often used interchangeably in discussions of Islam. However, there are subtle, but important differences. *Muslim* refers to a religious and cultural reality whereas *Islamic* denotes political intent. For instance, a Muslim county is a country in which the majority of the population is Muslim, such as Indonesia or Turkey; an Islamic state is a state that bases its legitimacy on Islam. Muslim networks often are comprised of diasporic, humanitarian, or financial nodes that can be used by Islamic extremists to transmit materials, money, and manpower to achieve political aims. However, it is important to appreciate that these networks can be mobilized for legitimate personal and social purposes as well, which confounds clear-cut analysis and facile taxonomy of these networks. Peter Mandaville cuts to the crux of the problem when he notes that, “What makes transnational political Islam so simultaneously successful and elusive is the fact that it appropriates and inhabits the same nebulous channels of communication and transmission that

Our approach in this chapter is built upon Arquilla and Ronfeldt, eds., (2001) and John Arquilla and Theodore Karasik, “Chechnya: A Glimpse of Future Conflict,” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Vol. 22, No. 3, 1999, pp. 193–206. The authors thank Sara Daly and Brian Nichiporuk for their views. Chris Fair’s insights on diasporan politics contributed to this chapter’s opening discussion on Muslim society and Islamic culture. Harlinah Lopez put together the diaspora statistics.

¹ It is analytically important to at point out that increased transnationalism and global networking by Muslim groups has had a positive and even progressive impact. See Peter Mandaville, “Sufis and Salafis: The Political Discourse of Transnational Islam,” in Hefner, ed. (2004).

define contemporary globalization. The infrastructure of the global liberal economy is, in effect, the ‘transmission line that political Islam rides.’²

In many ways, these Muslim networks are not unique; rather, they are simply one case of a generalized phenomenon of individuals and associations employing the tools of technology and exploiting globalization to organize themselves on a global scale. There are Sikh, Jewish, Armenian, and Hindu transnational networks. In each case, specific social, historical, and economic events prompted previously disparate groups to imagine themselves part of an interconnected community dispersed globally. In some cases, a shared sense of collective injustice, threat of annihilation, or other perceived or real significant threat precipitates such a mobilization of identity. While these networks offer productive means for dispersed persons to engage their community, their host states, and their home states, as well as the international community, they can also be used for nefarious ends. In such cases, political entrepreneurs within specific networks can utilize universities, prisons, and slums to create a permissive environment for their political aims, recruit sympathizers and adherents, and even plan their operations.³

This chapter is divided into three sections that examine the basic fundamentals of several forms of Muslim and Islamic networks. The first section addresses networks and diasporas consisting of Muslim organizations and migrants/immigrants. The second section focuses on humanitarian networks. Parallel health care systems are particularly salient to how Islamic welfare services function in the wake of natural disasters (Turkey) and during conflict and postconflict situations (Lebanon). It also examines medical preparation for insurgency that relies on Muslim networks for material support and training. The third section looks at legal and illegal economic support networks within Muslim communities across continents and in local diaspora communities. The final section assesses the evolution of these networks and the implications for the United States.

Diasporas and Transnational Islamic Networks

The study of diasporas and networks has been developing over recent decades. Growth of the Muslim diaspora has been marked by the recent phenomenon of people fleeing lands in violent conflict that are being torn apart by internal strife and border disputes. This transnational movement is distinct from the merchant trading and indentured servitude that are the historical legacy of transnational Islam. Examples include the vast array of Indian Ocean trading networks in the thirteenth cen-

² Peter Mandaville, review of Chapter Ten, April 2004.

³ Correspondence with C. Christine Fair and Sara Daly, 2004.

ture and early reformist movements in the late colonial period, such as al-Aghani's Pan-Islam Muslim migration in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in which Bosnian Muslims migrated to Germany, Indian Muslims to Guyana, and Somalis to Finland.⁴ Table 10.1 shows more recent population figures regarding the Muslim diaspora to major non-Muslim countries. (See the appendix for a complete listing of diaspora countries.)

While ethnic and linguistic diversity in the Muslim diaspora can impede the formation of a common identity among Muslims of various nations, the recent increase in movement across borders has actually been aided by the previous existence of social and political networks within the diaspora. In fact, the Muslim diaspora serves to strengthen religious and political movements through the transferring of adherents, ideas, and financial and military resources to different countries. Through its religious and ideological bond, the Muslim diaspora possesses a unifying common belief system that citizenship itself does not guarantee. Islam did not originate within the boundaries of a nation; it constitutes a system of beliefs and values that traverse borders. The Muslim diaspora is flexible; it can effectively maintain cohesion beyond the limits of a nation-state's borders.

Recent improvements in information and communication technologies have enabled people to share ideas and cross borders much more quickly and affordably than ever before. Diasporic Muslim communities have used these modern channels of communication and travel to expand and foster a common Islamic identity, as well as to include voices in the Muslim diaspora that weren't previously heard (women, youth, etc.).

In the past few years, Muslim diaspora networks have encouraged the exchange of significant resources, specifically money, man power, political support, and cultural influence. Transnational and trans-state networks established by Muslim diasporas are instruments of globalization that foster a shared sense of community among dispersed peoples. These networks fundamentally depend on various forms of technology (e.g., audiovisual content, electronic and digital communication, human traffic, and electronic financial transactions) to penetrate state borders. The expansion of a globalized system of communication and transportation has made international travel affordable for more people and facilitated diaspora identity formation.⁵ Diasporas also help to make travel affordable for diverse communities of Muslims who want to perform the *hajj* and to participate in other multinational collective behavior (Raiwind in Pakistan). Because travel is no longer the exclusive purview of the,

⁴ See, for example, Marja Tiilikainen, "Somali Women and Daily Islam," *Social Compass*, Vol. 50, No. 1, March 2003, pp. 59–69.

⁵ One could argue that violent Islamists need transportation too. This aspect is important point to remember when considering nonstate actors' use of man-portable air defense systems against civilian and military aircraft.

Table 10.1
Muslim Diaspora in Major Western Countries

Estimated Number	Predominant Countries of Origin	Waves of Migration	Location of Settlement in Diaspora
France			
4–5 million	Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia Other Arab, Non-Arab, including Turks, Asians, including Pakistanis and Indonesians	Because of reduced workforce after World War II, France recruited immigrants to work as laborers from North African colonies.	Paris, Marseilles, other southern urban areas
Germany			
2.9 million	Turks, Bosnian Muslims, following civil war in FYR, are now second-largest immigrant group and have strong ties with Turkey	Because of reduced workforce after World War II, Germany entered recruitment agreements with Turkey in 1961, Morocco in 1963, and Tunisia in 1965. Second wave of Muslim immigrants began in mid-1970s	In late 1940s and early 1950s, a relatively large-scale migration of Iranian businessmen to Hamburg
Great Britain			
1.5 million	India, Pakistani, Bangladesh, Black Caribbean	From colonial period to present	Almost half the Muslim population in or near London; also in Bradford and Leicester
Italy			
1 million	Albania, Algeria, Bangladesh, Bosnia, Egypt Iran, Italian converts, Morocco, other Yugoslav, Pakistan, Senegal, Somalia, Tunisia , Turkey	First wave of immigration to Italy began in 1970s During 1980s and 1990s, immigrants began arriving from Maghreb, sub-Saharan African countries, Albania, other Middle Eastern countries, and Latin America. Eastern Europeans began arriving recently	Early mosques created by intellectual elite (not immigrant workers) from Syria and Jordan, many were Palestinian. Center still mainly in Rome

Table 10.1—continued

Estimated Number	Predominant Countries of Origin	Waves of Migration	Location of Settlement in Diaspora	
United States				
4.175 million	African Americans	First group to arrive to United States came from West Africa between 1530 and 1851	East Coast	32.3%
	Middle East (Arab)		South	25.3%
	South Asia	Second wave came during early 1900s, from Lebanon, Syria, and other Ottoman Empire countries	Central/Great Lakes Region	24.3%
	Other		West	18.2%
	Middle East (not Arab)	Third wave came after World War II, during 1960s and 1970s, from all over Islamic world		
	East Asia			

NOTE: FYR = Former Yugoslav Republic.

elites these gatherings now include class-based diversity as well as sectarian, ethnic, and national diversity.⁶ Both the kind of resources and the networks developed for their mobilization significantly shape the relationships between and among the Muslim diasporas.⁷

The European Union

Even if we accept the most conservative estimates, there are more than 10 million Muslims currently living in the EU states. This sizable group is having a complex effect on the host societies—political, social, and economic. Although many of the original immigrants were “imported” to meet an economic need, portions of this population now represent an economic burden, with high unemployment rates and a heavy demand on social services, housing, and other infrastructure. Their relatively more rapid growth could form a constructive counterpoint to Europe’s demographic decline, but only if a number of social and economic issues could first be resolved to make them fit better into their host societies.

Matters related to Islam are only one part—in objective terms, probably the smaller part—of the multiple issues causing strain between the Muslim minority and the dominant society, but since September 11, this aspect has obviously garnered the lion’s share of attention. National security agencies had previously known that extremist groups were accustomed to using European cities as bases for their meetings and as places to recruit new members and to plan their operations. The tracing of the September 11 terrorists back to Hamburg brought home the significance and peril of allowing a murky subculture of this kind to persist and showed that the threat had been tragically underestimated.

The extremists were able to make good use of several characteristics of the European Muslim diaspora. The autarchic isolation of its multiple small and large religious and national clubs, groups, and associations from the surrounding society served as camouflage; insufficiently scrutinized charitable monies helped finance terrorists and their operations; indiscriminately applied ideals of religious tolerance and the protection of minorities lent themselves to clever manipulation.

⁶ It is important to point out the distinction between permanent Muslim communities in the West and the presence of Muslims residing in Europe who see themselves there temporarily. See Rivka Yadlin, “The Muslim Diaspora in the West,” in Ma’oz and Sheffer, eds. (2002), pp. 219–230.

⁷ In positing the existence of a Muslim diaspora, Yadlin suggests a fundamentally different avenue of mobilization of a variety of Muslim groups that may have otherwise have been organized upon sectarian and ethno-national lines. Not only does she argue that a “Muslim diaspora,” as a social construct, is theoretically possible, she but further posits that there exists an accumulating body of evidence for such a diasporic identity. See Yadlin, op. cit. See also Gabriel Sheffer, “Ethno-National Diasporas and Security,” *Survival*, Vol. 36, No. 1, Spring 1994, p. 61.

After September 11, serious attempts were made to close some of these loopholes. Nevertheless, several of the Achilles heels in the modern industrial democracies of Western Europe remain. They offer radical fundamentalism a number of advantages:

Incomplete integration. The continued marginalization of Muslims from mainstream Western European culture creates a diffuse base of needs and services that exist outside the structures—and thus the awareness—of the dominant institutions. This in turn creates a lack of transparency, an opaque subculture in which not only legitimate alternative businesses and clubs and groups but also illegal and violent individuals and organizations can move about unnoticed. This is in part a product of the minority status of the subculture, but it is even more the result of the ongoing deliberate marginalization of the immigrants. One reflection is the absence of products and services geared to the demands of this minority, an illogical oversight from a purely commercial point of view. Although in terms of their sheer numbers they ought to have been perceived as a market segment, this did not happen. Meeting the preferences and needs of immigrant subgroups is almost exclusively left to entrepreneurs and service providers inside their communities. This provides opportunities not only for legitimate small businesses but also for the clandestine transfer of money. Another example is in the media. The failure of mainstream media to provide programs or at least subtitles for Germany's Turkish minority left a gap that was eventually filled by private stations, many of them heavily ideological. Secular television for the immigrant community could have been a valuable instrument of assimilation.

Exploitable loopholes in the prevailing democratic system. Islamic radicals in England, France, and Germany have proven adept at manipulating the legal systems in these countries with subversive, antidemocratic intent. Laws and protections intended to safeguard the diversity, freedom of religion, and the rights of minorities are being used to undermine the security and the social system of these Western democracies. As one expert notes, the Islamic radicals gained the important insight that Western democracies established safeguards for the rights of minorities but neglected to provide similar protection to the rights of majorities—an oversight that the radicals are determined to exploit. Through a series of demands and legal challenges, Muslim fundamentalists are attempting to undermine the principle of the secular state, the principle of equal protection under the law, the public school system, and other foundations of their host states. Their efforts range from ambitious attempts to introduce *shari'a* legislation through efforts to gain symbolic ground by forcing public institutions such as schools or swimming pools to officially accommodate fundamentalist notions of Islamic dress⁸ and sex segregation. In one German state, welfare

⁸ Marie Chaudey and Marie-Christine Jeannot, "Tempete sous on foularde," *La Vie*, May 15, 2003.

recipients even launched a campaign to pressure social services to pay not only for the circumcision of their sons but also for the genital mutilation of their daughters.⁹

Alienated youths. Second- and third-generation Muslim immigrants are often in an uncomfortable, ambivalent situation. The expectations and values of their families conflict with the surrounding culture, which to these young adults is attractive in some ways but frightening and inhospitable in others. This is compounded by objective problems—difficulties in school, problems with finding an apprenticeship or job in a narrowing economy.¹⁰ As elsewhere, fundamentalists in the diaspora are quick—often quicker than the state—to address these problems and offer programs and assistance. Afterschool care and tutoring, legal advice and counseling, sports programs, leisure programs, summer camps, computer classes, folk dancing events, scout groups, and scholarships are some of the programs developed by movements and Islamic political parties in the diaspora to attract and influence youth.

Naïve allies. When fundamentalists succeed in casting their goals in a nonpolitical light as a means merely of practicing their religion and guarding their culture and their norms, they often get support from Christian churches, which do not bother to take a more differentiated look at the groups they are embracing in the name of ecumenical brotherhood. Spuler-Stegemann cites the example of the opening of the Yavuz Sultan Selim mosque in Mannheim, where various dignitaries of the Christian churches sat in benign approval, oblivious to the fact that copies of *Mein Kampf* in Turkish were being distributed all around them.¹¹ This incident can be attributed to ignorance; not so the instances in which known radical fundamentalists, including officials of the Afghan Taliban government, were invited to speak in Christian churches and community centers.¹² Christian churches, operating on the premise that almost any kind of enhanced religiosity is a good thing, have been strong advocates of the increased teaching of Islam in German public schools, a position that ironically has put them at odds with the representatives of local immigrant communities, who generally oppose this measure because they know that radical fundamentalists are doing the teaching.¹³

Strange coalitions. This point is in some ways the most troubling. Fundamentalists are showing an ability to form not only pragmatic and tactical alliances but even, in some cases, ideologically based coalitions with other extremists, including some

⁹ Spuler-Stegemann (2002), p. 209.

¹⁰ Burgmer, ed. (1996).

¹¹ Burgmer, ed. (1996), p. 64.

¹² On January 27, 2001, Taliban Minister of Health was permitted to give an incendiary anti-Western speech from the pulpit of the Hamburg Kreuzkirche church. "Bayernmagazin," Bayerischer Rundfunk, February 10, 2001.

¹³ Marion Knobloch, "Religionsunterricht für Moslems an staatlichen Schulen?" *Oberhessische Presse*, May 5, 1999.

who “should” be their enemies. There are increasing signs of unlikely but disturbing alliances, such as partnerships with neo-Nazi and other extreme right-wing movements. Because of their racism and extreme nationalism, neo-Nazis might not be expected to cooperate with Muslim extremists. Indeed, in the past they have often been implicated in violent assaults on refugees, immigrants, and minorities. Now, however, there are signs of a rapprochement. There are similarities in the nature and platform of the groups, as well as in their inclination to violence. Another common bond is their shared hatred of Israel and/or the Jews. We have already mentioned the popularity of *Mein Kampf* with Turkish extremist readers.

The Deutsche Orient Institut also notes:

As of late, Arab Islamists are even being allowed to use right wing extremist publications as a platform for their writings. For instance, the neo-Nazi magazine “Sleipnir” published an article glorifying jihad.¹⁴

However, the diaspora also has a number of features that weaken the ability of Islamic radicals to act:

National, ethnic, and sectarian divisions. Even in countries such as Germany, where the immigrant population is relatively homogeneous in terms of its national origin (coming almost entirely from Turkey and former Yugoslavia), this population is divided in deep and significant ways. The Yugoslavs consist of those who came as migrant workers during the 1960s and 1970s, mostly Croats and Serbs, and the Bosnians, who came much later as refugees. Obviously, there are not only divisions, but also deep animosities among these groups. The Turks make up two-thirds of the Muslim population in Germany, but they are divided along lines of ethnicity, political affiliation, class, urban-rural origin, and degree of modernity and religiosity. Kurds and Turks, Sufis and non-Sufis, Kemalists and anti-Kemalists, villagers and city folk, secularists and pious Muslims, these subgroup have little in common with each other. This has greatly weakened the ability of politico-religious organizations to develop the political influence that they would like to have within German society. Because of these differences, no immigrant party can reach the 5-percent threshold necessary for party representation in the German parliament.

Lack of mass support. By a variety of indicators, the bulk of the diaspora community is primarily interested in living an economically viable, peaceful life in the host country, which to many—whether or not they formally acknowledge it through steps such as acquiring citizenship—is in fact their new and permanent home. They want to be accepted by the surrounding society, although they may wish to keep cer-

¹⁴ N. Feindt-Riggers, Islamische Organisationen, *Deutsches Orient Institut*, Hamburg 1997, p. 40.

tain elements of their culture and way of life intact. German studies estimate that at most a quarter of diaspora Muslims actively practice their religion.¹⁵

A crisis of identity. Muslims in Europe are a “voluntary minority,” i.e., in distinction from groups that became minorities in the wake of an occupation or invasion or other act of compulsion (for example, slavery in the case of African-Americans). Almost all of them are in Europe as a result of the deliberate choice to leave a place where they belonged to the majority in order to live as a minority in a country dominated by a different race, culture, and religion. For most, this choice was made by themselves, their parents, or at most their grandparents. For most (and this is also true of their hosts), their original intention was a temporary stay that, over time, developed into a de facto permanent immigration. Both sides still tend to experience considerable ambivalence about this change in the nature of their presence. For example, many immigrants find themselves emotionally unable to renounce their original citizenship, even though accepting the new citizenship would bring many practical advantages and would probably be a more accurate reflection of the new center of gravity of their family’s life and future.

Most Muslims in Western Europe originally came as migrant laborers or as refugees, i.e., because the economic opportunities were better than in their countries of origin or because they were fleeing political persecution or war. Of the latter group, many stayed even when the military or political situation changed and they could have gone back to their original homes. In other words, Europe offered an improvement in their situation, in terms of greater relative opportunities, prosperity and quality of life, safety, freedom and refuge.

At the same time, the situation of the Muslim minority is marked by a number of characteristic problems and grievances.

Education. Disproportionately, they are at the margins of the school system. For example, in Germany large numbers tend to end up in *Sonderschulen*, schools intended for mentally handicapped children, merely because language difficulties and behavioral problems attributable to unsuccessful assimilation make them unwelcome in the regular schools. This has been identified as a problem since the 1960s, but it remains essentially unchanged.

Economic vulnerability. Muslims are affected by unemployment more than the rest of the population. In Germany, Turks have the highest unemployment rate, 20 percent.

Social marginalization. Despite efforts on the part of some European governments to promote the concepts of diversity and multiculturalism as a new positive identity in place of an identity that tended to value homogeneity, Muslims continue to feel like outsiders and to be perceived and treated as such. Although there has been

¹⁵ Islam-Archiv Soest, in *Moslemische Revue*, 4, 1995.

significant spillover of immigrant culture into the mainstream (in the usual areas of influence such as music and food), there is also open and ongoing majority disapproval of things that are considered to be characteristic of “their” style of life, such as higher levels of noise and emotion, large families, etc. Religion is only one part (and by all indications not the dominant part) of this marginalization—racial, cultural and class differences appear to be more dominant.

Living in the diaspora causes significant fracture lines in immigrant communities and families. Generational and gender divisions play a prominent role. Differences in the values of the culture of origin and the new culture particularly affect the status of young people versus their elders and of women. The issues of authority in the family and community, of traditional and hierarchical structures versus those that allow for more equality and individual autonomy, lead to ongoing and deep conflicts not only within families, marriages, and neighborhoods but even within individuals, who feel torn and ambivalent. Young people in particular suffer from the schizophrenic push and pull of distinctly different normative sets and can feel caught in an unresolvable dilemma. Accepting the demands of their elders and conforming to tradition means giving up aspirations they may have developed on their own or through contact with the surrounding culture: to choose their own spouse, for example; to have a marriage based on common interests and equality; to live independently and spend their leisure time as they like; and to be free of the dense network of financial and social obligations that tradition imposes.

Although sacrifices for the sake of tradition may bring young people the reward of approbation and belonging, but the group to which they then belong is looked down upon by the surrounding society. Worse, the young people may no longer believe in the rightness of the things they are being asked to do. But the other choice, to reject the wishes of the elders, has a high price as well. The family and the community punish rebellion of this sort, sometimes very severely, especially in the case of girls, who can find themselves suddenly spirited back to Anatolia or North Africa, physically and psychologically abused, and even killed, if the family decides their conduct has dishonored them. Nor is the society of the host nation entirely welcoming. It expects assimilation but does not offer true integration in exchange.

Grievances, social disputes, and economic problems are inevitable components of societal life. The issue is how these conflicts are interpreted and managed. Therefore it is important what direction the identity formation of the Muslim minority in Europe will take. A number of possible directions can already be made out.

Some experts place particular emphasis on the division between the secular-minded and the religiously oriented individuals within the Muslim population:

For the secular-minded, their religion—if they give it any consideration at all—is just a part of their cultural identity. They are no different from the remainder of the population, except that they face more obstacles and have a harder time.

The young among them tend to be resentful and to be searching for a place in an inhospitable society. The religiously oriented gain a number of advantages from their Islamic identity. The fundamentalists provide them with moral guidelines . . . they keep them away from drugs and alcohol abuse, from street gangs and crime, and give them a sense of importance and value.¹⁶

This group of experts believes that strong social measures are necessary to avoid driving the Muslim minority, especially their young, into the arms of either the fundamentalists or of radical secular groups such as right-wing extremists.¹⁷

Other experts believe that the primary danger lies in the potential metamorphosis of Islam into a hybrid transnational and violent ideology. If the immigrants achieve authentic integration into the larger society, or if they develop a new identity that blends their national origin with their new domicile (becoming German Turks for example or Euro-Muslims), then the problems are manageable. If, however, they develop a “supranational Muslim identity that produces a virtual ghetto,” radicalization is likely.

Islam in Europe could assume several forms. One is integration, by which is meant the development of a distinct European, or French or British, “Muslim church.” Another is re-communalization along supranational lines. It is within this latter phenomenon that radicalism and violence become potentially serious issues.¹⁸

The phrase “Muslim church” is reminiscent of the French government’s approach, which has been to attempt to create a French Muslim central religious authority for official dealings. This strategy carries two important risks. One, it can artificially give more weight, importance, and voice to a strain within the diaspora that in fact represents only a small part of that community, inadvertently turning it into an official representative of a group that it does not represent at all. In Germany, experts believe that even the best organized and most vocal of the official religious representations speaks for 2 percent of German Muslims, at most.¹⁹ Upgrading such organizations into the official institutions of the minority is negative because it undermines the prospects of integration, which is the preferred and most stabilizing of possible outcomes. A central authority is particularly bad, however, if state efforts to create a national Muslim church go awry, and instead of the moderate church the state has in mind, it gets fundamentalist leadership. This second risk is not unlikely,

¹⁶ Wilhelm Heitmeyer, “Jugend auf dem Weg nach Rechts,” *Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte* 9, 1989, and Heitmeyer and Dollase, eds. (1996).

¹⁷ Heitmeyer, op. cit.

¹⁸ Olivier Roy, “EuroIslam: The Jihad Within?” *National Interest*, Spring 2003.

¹⁹ “Es Muss Einen Islam Deutscher Praegung Geben,” *Sueddeutsche Zeitung*, November 12, 2001.

precisely because of the constitution of the diaspora community: Most are only mildly religious and do not participate in organized Islamic affairs. This leaves the strongly religious, who in turn are either traditionalists or fundamentalists. In France, precisely this unwanted outcome appears to be taking shape, with fundamentalists gaining control of the government-induced official Islamic church.²⁰

Finally, it is important to note some additional points about Islam in Europe. A search for “universal Islam” characterizes much of the younger generation born and raised in Europe. This quest bifurcates into one route that leads to a moderate, liberal, and integrationist tendency and another that leads to Hizb ut-Tahrir or worse. The first is a universalism premised on a pluralistic search for the common good; the other a different idiom of the universal that emphasizes theological rigidity (“the one true Islam”). The varied experiences of Muslim communities in Europe have had an effect on how their politics play out. The rather ecumenical climate of Britain is quite different from, for example, the intense secularity that defines French laypeople. Clearly, our comprehensive portrait acknowledges that there is a battle of sorts going on within European Muslim communities between those who define Islamism in terms of civic engagement and mainstream politics (e.g., the Islamic Society of Britain) and those who define it in terms of separatism and global struggles (sometimes violent) in search of a revived caliphate (e.g., Hizb ut-Tahrir and al-Muhajiroun).

Beyond the European Union

Al Qaeda

Arguably the most compelling reason to focus on Muslim diasporas is that diasporas, by definition, forge and operate extensive trans-state networks.²¹ These networks pose the most compelling threat both to the states that host them and to their originating states—and any other states that fall into their sights.²² Once a diaspora (or political entrepreneurs within the diaspora) decides to pursue an interventionist or revisionist agenda, these massive trans-state networks are activated in pursuit of the group’s objectives. This behavior of diasporas and the structures at their disposal sug-

²⁰ Gunter Mulack, German foreign office, interview with Cheryl Benard, August 19, 2003.

²¹ While analysts are coming to appreciate the roles of diasporas within the context of globalized Islamist violence, it is important to note that the roles of diasporas have been identified in many other conflicts. For example, globally dispersed Tamils have long supported the efforts of the Tamil Tigers in pursuit of their insurgent objectives. Sikhs in the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, and elsewhere have supported militants fighting for an independent Khalistan to be carved out of India’s northern state of the Punjab. Irish Catholics in the United States and elsewhere have supported the Irish Republican Army.

²² See Karim H. Karim, “Diasporas and Their Communication Networks: Exploring the Broader Context of Transnational Narrowcasting (DRAFT),” in Nautilus Institute, *Virtual Diasporas and Global Problem Solving Project Papers*, available online at <http://www.nautilus.org/papers/information/>, posted April 23, 2002, last accessed June 6, 2003.

gest several potential conflicts. As time has progressed since the horrific events of September 11, it has become increasingly apparent that Muslim diasporas in such countries as the United Kingdom, France, Spain, Belgium, Germany, and Switzerland have all been implicated as important hubs for Al Qaeda operations and recruitment. Few individuals illuminate the important role of the diaspora more than Muhammad Atta, one of the key hijackers in the September 11 attacks.²³

By many accounts, Atta began to espouse a radicalized worldview while a student in Hamburg, where he became exposed to extremist Islamic politics. In Hamburg, Atta, along with Ramzi Binalshibh (a Yemeni national who is now in U.S. custody) and Said Bahaji (a German citizen of Moroccan descent who provided technical and logistical support to the teams), established an Al Qaeda cell. It is worth noting that Hamburg is home to some 2,500 Islamic radicals and a Muslim community of nearly 80,000 that originates from the greater Middle East.²⁴

Hezbollah's Reach

Al Qaeda is not the only organization to use the diaspora for support and operations. Before Al Qaeda's rise to the forefront of mass terrorist groups, Hezbollah used the Lebanese Shi'a diaspora to gather intelligence abroad, including information that has aided the group in conducting terrorist attacks on Israeli targets overseas.²⁵ Hezbollah's reach into the Lebanese Shi'a diaspora stretches from Lebanon to West Africa to Latin America.

The tri-border region of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay has been identified by the U.S. State Department as a focal point for Islamic extremism in Latin America and represents a major hemispheric threat to the United States. Hezbollah has maintained an active and growing presence in the region and is believed to be responsible for at least two terrorist attacks in Buenos Aires: the 1992 bombing of the Israeli embassy and the 1994 bombing of a Jewish community center. The Latin American center of Hezbollah's activity is the Paraguayan city of Ciudad del Este and is under the operational command of successful businessman Assad Ahmad Barakat. Barakat's chief aide, Sobhi Mahmoud Fayad, was arrested in 1998 for an alleged conspiracy to bomb the U.S. embassy in Paraguay and again in 2002 for alleged participation in a money-laundering ring. Ali Mohamed Mukhlis, a member of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad closely linked to Osama bin Laden's lieutenant Ayman al-Zawahiri, heralded

²³ Atta and others were picked up in the Abu-Al-Dahdah network. Uthman Tizghart, "New Security Dilemma Worries Anti-Terrorism Bodies Worldwide: Foreign Fighters Take Over al-Qa'ida's External Networks; al-Qa'ida, New Blue-Eyed Leaders," *al-Majallah* (London), August 3–9, 2003, pp. 10–14. See also Adrian Karatnycky, "Under Our Very Noses: The Terrorist Next Door," *National Review*, Volume LIII, No. 21, November 5, 2001; and Terry McDermott, "A Perfect Soldier," *The Los Angeles Times Online*, January 27, 2002.

²⁴ Karatnycky, op. cit.; and McDermott, op. cit.

²⁵ Byman, et al. (2001b), pp. 59–60.

the Al Qaeda presence in the tri-border region when he was apprehended by Uruguayan authorities in 1999 in connection with a plot to bomb the American embassies in Paraguay and Uruguay.²⁶

The Tablighi

Within the realm of pursuing Islamic teachings on a global scale, the Tablighi Jama'at ("group that propagates the faith") is an example of an outwardly benign Muslim network tied exclusively to religious values, unlike Al Qaeda.²⁷ This model features the use of gateways that send recruits into the broad linear organization. From diasporas (and converts) in those diasporas, violent anti-Western Islamic behavior is sometimes manifested by the Deobandi background and influences of a sector of the adherents.

Tablighi Jama'at describes itself as a nonpolitical, nonviolent, group interested in nothing more than proselytizing and bringing wayward Muslims back to Islam. In fact, the organization is a fraternity of traveling Muslim preachers that is well known in Pakistan and other Muslim countries. Founded in rural India 75 years ago, Tablighi Jama'at is one of the most widespread and conservative Islamic movements relying on networks of South Asian Muslims.²⁸ It is present in Central America and parts of the Caribbean, especially Trinidad, and in the northern cone of Latin America, specifically Guyana.²⁹ Tablighi Jama'at members visit mosques and college campuses in small missionary bands, preaching a return to pure Islamic values and recruiting other Muslim men, often young men searching for identity, to join them for

²⁶ See, for example, William W. Mendel, "Paraguay's Ciudad del Este and the New Centers of Gravity," *Military Review*, March–April 2002. See also "Egyptian Militant Arrested in Southern Brazil," *Reuters*, April 16, 2002.

²⁷ The most ethnographically detailed source on the Tablighi Jama'at is Masud (2000).

²⁸ The vast majority of Tablighis (and there are millions at this point) have no interest in militancy and terrorism. Most Tablighi practice, while conservative, is quietist and apolitical. There are, however, certain segments of the movement that have assimilated a more hard-line activist strain through the same Deobandi connections that spawned the Taliban. A turning point for the movement came in the 1990s with the emergence of the Taliban in Afghanistan, according to former members and intelligence officials. By way of illustration, Farad Esack, a South African Islamic scholar who says he spent 12 years with the group in Pakistan, recounted a favorite Tablighi Jama'at analogy that equates individual Muslims to the electricians who work to light up a village. Each person lays wire until one day, the mayor comes to switch on the lights. "For many people in Tablighi Jama'at," he said, "the Taliban represented God switching the lights on." Some people drawn to the Tablighi Jama'at were also drawn to the Taliban, Mr. Esack said. The Tablighi Jama'at, he said, "attracts angry people—people who need absolutes, who can't stand the grayness of life." In turn, that mentality "lends itself to being recruited by a Taliban-type project." See Susan Sachs, "A Muslim Missionary Group Draws New Scrutiny in U.S.," *New York Times Online*, July 14, 2003.

²⁹ For background, see "Muslims in the Americas and the Caribbean: Years Before Columbus," at <http://www.shf.ac.uk/~ics/whatis/articles/carib.htm>, last accessed July 16, 2003; "Indian Diaspora Supplement," *Trinidad Guardian*, May 30, 2000, pp. 4–6, online at http://www.nalis.gov.tt/Communities/communities_MuslimsinTT.htm, last accessed July 16, 2003; Richard Chickrie, "Muslims in Guyana," online at http://www.geocities.com/WestHollywood/Park/6443/Guyana/guyanese_muslim.html, last accessed July 16, 2003.

a few days or weeks on the road.³⁰ They preach a return to the teachings and trap-pings of Islam's seventh-century founders, including segregation of women and rejection of activities such as voting that they say distract Muslims from the worthier task of preparing for judgment day. Their goals are devotion to God and promoting change in each individual, not society.

However, since the attacks of September 11, Tablighi Jama'at has appeared on the margins of at least four high-profile terrorism cases. It has been cited in the case of John Walker Lindh, the American serving time for aiding the Taliban. Federal prosecutors have suggested that the Tablighi Jama'at was also seen as a springboard by at least one of the defendants in a Portland, Oregon, terrorism case, in which six men and one woman are accused of plotting to fight with the Taliban and Al Qaeda against American forces.³¹ Six Yemeni-American men from Lackawanna, a Buffalo suburb, apparently told family and friends a similar story—that they were going to Pakistan in the spring of 2001 for religious training with the Tablighi Jama'at. Once in Pakistan, however, they went on to take military training at an Al Qaeda camp in Afghanistan. The six have pleaded guilty to providing material support to Al Qaeda, or otherwise aiding a terrorist organization through their attendance at the camp.³²

Hizb ut-Tahrir

Hizb ut-Tahrir is another global Islamic organization that unites Muslim peoples in increasingly hateful ways through propaganda drives and recruitment strategies.³³ Although HuT is discussed in other chapters of this book (Central Asia, Southeast Asia, etc.), use of the diaspora to spread its ideological goals is a crucial basis of HuT's con-

³⁰ Generally, though, Tablighi missions are small—a few heavily bearded men, carrying sleeping bags and cooking stoves who show up at a mosque, give lectures, and go door to door calling Muslims to prayer. A central purpose of their visits is to ask other men to travel and preach with them for a time, which they say can benefit the preachers even more than their audiences. According to a *New York Times* article: "It's kind of a rite of passage for practicing young Muslims," said Mairaj Syed, a law student at UCLA who says he was briefly involved with the Tablighi Jama'at in high school in Arizona. "They emphasized identity, showing outwardly that you are a Muslim. Also, there was the element of going out, visiting cities, sleeping in mosques. I thought it was cool." But law enforcement officials and moderate Muslim scholars say that disengagement from society is what worries them most about the Tablighi Jama'at. "You teach people to exclude themselves, that they don't fit in, that the modern world is an aberration, an offense, some form of blasphemy," said Khaled Abou El Fadl, a professor of Islamic law at UCLA. "By preparing people in this fashion, you are preparing them to be in a state of warfare against this world." See *New York Times Online*, July 14, 2003.

³¹ The men tried to get to Afghanistan in the late fall of 2001, according to the indictment. Most came home after spending some time in China, but one defendant, Jeffrey Leon Battle, went on to Bangladesh. Prosecutors said Battle's trip there was aimed at finding Tablighi Jama'at members who might help him get military training and join the Taliban. See *New York Times Online*, op. cit.

³² See Suleman Dig, "U.S. Tiblighis Fear Crackdown," September 21, 2002, online at <http://www.rediff.com/us/2002/sep/21us.htm>, last accessed July 16, 2003.

³³ Roy, op. cit.

tinued growth and survival.³⁴ HuT's origins outside the traditional centers of Islamic learning are indicative of the diasporic roots of its increasingly confrontational political agenda. HuT members in non-Muslim states, particularly in Europe, are part of the diaspora from the greater Middle East including Turkey, Syria, Palestine, Jordan, and Egypt.³⁵ Hizb ut-Tahrir has said that its goal is to restore the "Islamic way of life" in the Muslim world and create a single Islamic "caliphate" from the western coast of Africa to China.³⁶

HuT's activities in Germany are illustrative of the diasporic influences within the group's Leninist-style ideological drive to win over converts. In January 2003, Germany's top law enforcement official outlawed HuT and accused the group of establishing contacts with the fringe German neo-Nazi National Democratic Party and spreading propaganda calling for the destruction of Israel and the killing of Jews.³⁷ Police in five states raided some 30 HuT locations. The fact that the officials did not make any arrests showed the lengths that the German government went to to avoid a debate on immigrants in Germany.³⁸

³⁴ Although some would argue that much of Hizb ut-Tahrir's (HuT's) most recent success has come about from defining itself in less hateful ways, the tenor of its anti-American sentiment is rising in Central Asia as Hizb ut-Tahrir portrays the U.S.-led counterterrorism actions as an assault on Islam and a transparent attempt to assert cultural hegemony. See "Notes on Wahhabism," "Wahhabis," and "Hizb ut-Tahrir," online at http://hrw.org/reports/2004/uzbekistan0304/4.htm#_ftnref126, last accessed August 23, 2004.

³⁵ Analyzing taped phone calls between suspected Al Qaeda " sleeper cells " in Germany and Abu Mussab al-Sarkawi, a Jordanian-born associate of Osama bin Laden, German intelligence officials have also concluded that hundreds of Al Qaeda fighters fled Afghanistan with forged passports provided by their supporters in Germany. "The code word for faked passports was dancers," said an intelligence official, "and a considerable number of fighters made their way to Western Europe, including Germany." See Eric Geiger, "Germany Bans Islamic Group," *San Francisco Chronicle*, January 16, 2003, p. A9.

³⁶ Hizb ut-Tahrir is quite open about its organizational and leadership structure. The best account to date is Farouki (1996). It is important to note that the movement does not officially disclose the location of its executive council, although it is widely believed to currently be in Lebanon. Public relations and fundraising are handled mainly out of the United Kingdom. See also Roy, op. cit.

³⁷ In October 2002, HuT staged a demonstration with the neo-Nazis at the Technical University of Berlin. See Richard Bernstein, "German Police Raid an Islamic Group," *The New York Times*, April 11, 2003. It is important to illuminate the linkage. First, there is historical precedent: Neo-Nazi groups linked up with Bosnians after World War II and former Nazi officers, etc., joined up with Egyptians in the 1950s and 1960s. Second, in North America and Europe, the extreme right shares three ideological affinities with some Islamic movements: (1) a hatred of Jews as seen in the traditional anti-Semitic caricature of running the world through secret conspiracies; (2) a hatred of the U.S. government, seen as not just a global bully but also as controlled by Jews to support Israel. U.S. Neo-Nazis sometimes refer the administration in Washington, D.C., as the Zionist Occupational Government—ZOG; and (3) a desire to overthrow existing governments and replace them with monocultural nation-states built around the idea of supremacist racial nationalism or supremacist religious nationalism or both mixed together. This ethno-nationalist philosophy is sometimes called the "Third Position," a shared ideology.

³⁸ In November 2002, police raided 27 apartments, including the Duisburg home of Shaker Assem, an Austrian of Egyptian origin who is one of the Islamic Liberation Party's top leaders and publisher of its German-language quarterly magazine, *Explizit*. The publication, which has a circulation of 5,000, has described 9/11 as an attack engineered by "Western intelligence services" and Israel as "a poisonous knife in the heart of the Islamic nation." Wads of the group's anti-U.S. and anti-Israel propaganda—in German, Turkish and Arabic—were seized in the November raids, along with large amounts of cash stashed in backpacks. See Geiger, op. cit.

In other parts of Europe,³⁹ HuT is extremely dynamic in both internal and external political Islam. In Sweden and Denmark, it has garnered support among second-generation Muslim immigrants and made inroads into active political life over the past 10 years. In the United Kingdom,⁴⁰ HuT is active in London and in towns with major Muslim populations such as Birmingham, Bradford, and Sheffield. HuT developed a controversial reputation in the early 1990s because of its leader, Omar Bakri Mohammed, a Syrian immigrant whose inflammatory rhetoric made him a hate-figure in the British press but a popular leader for some alienated and angry young Muslims.⁴¹ In Russia, HuT has done active fundraising for its operations in Central Asia, yet with a more potentially violent angle. Recently, Moscow police arrested the leader of the Moscow group, Kyrgyz national Alisher Musayev, and HuT activist and functionary Akram Dzhalolov, a Tajikistan citizen, plus 53 other members. For the first time, HuT members in the diaspora were found with explosives and weaponry (though not confirmed in other sources). According to Russian police, 100 grams of plastic explosive, three hand grenades of various types, and 15 Hizb ut-Tahrir leaflets were confiscated from Musayev; and 400 grams of TNT, two cord detonators, 38 leaflets, and two booklets were taken from Dzhalolov.⁴² Clearly, diasporas of the “disenchanted” help spread HuT support and ideology throughout the world.

Muslim Humanitarian Networks

Several issues need to be explained regarding Muslim humanitarian networks. First, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) run by Muslims to provide amenities to Muslim populations or communities are not necessarily Islamic, in the sense that Islam is their organizing principle. So if one says “Islamic organizations,” one must make the case that they target populations from an ideological perspective. This section attempts to show the distinction.

Many modern-day Muslim networks are involved in health and welfare activities. Humanitarian and medical NGOs from the United States, Europe, and the Middle East are increasingly involved in responding to urban disasters and conflict

³⁹ A reference to HuT activity in Poland is found in Marcella Andreoli, “Dirty Alliance in the Name of Usama,” *Panorama* (Milan), April 24, 2003, pp. 54–55.

⁴⁰ It is important to point out that HuT is not the most radical of the U.K.-based khilafist movements. Groups such as al-Muhajiroun (Omar Bakri Mohammed’s current crew), Supporters of Shari’ah (Abu Hamza al-Misri), and the people around Abu Qatada may have more active ties to global jihadist networks. See Mandaville, *op. cit.*

⁴¹ International Crisis Group (ICG), “Radical Islam in Central Asia: Responding to Hizb-ut-Tahrir,” No. 58 (2003), p. 11.

⁴² “Russia Arrests 55 Hizb ul-Tahrir al-Islami Members, Supporters,” *Agentstvo Voyennykh Novostey*, June 9, 2003, accessed via FBIS CEP20030609000220.

situations—a number of which happen to be situated in countries with a high or even predominant proportion of Muslims.

Insurgents use this humanitarian assistance to provide medical treatment to their cadres and their families—and to gain influence in impoverished or failing economies. This is true generally and it also applies to insurgents who are arguing political objectives consonant with their Muslim identity and to those who specifically mobilize the ideology of jihad for their guerrilla warfare activities. Insurgent organizations that mobilize the lexicon of jihad, espouse a worldview of “Islamic justice,” or deploy a narrative of oppression based on their Muslim religious identity often are able to provide their target communities with a moral and religious framework within which to understand their predicaments. Many of these militarized Islamic movements gain credibility as a result of corrupt governments, mismanagement of public facilities, and misallocation of public goods. Thus, the insurgents may provide a radical, motivating ideology to an increasingly marginalized and disaffected set of communities. The insurgent rhetoric of Islamic justice can be buttressed by the ability of these organizations to use humanitarian facilities to support their political and military objectives. Insurgents (both jihadist and Muslim ethno-nationalist) are using hospitals, schools, and mosques for deployment of personnel and supplies and have established clandestine clinics to treat fighters and their families, as well as members of the local community.

This approach is not new. Groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah have been using a similar model throughout the Levant and the Middle East for the past decade. Humanitarian organizations offer a channel through which nonstate actors (insurgents, violent Islamists, etc.) can transmit information, medical supplies, weapons, and contraband (e.g., drugs, foodstuffs) with impunity. Such medical NGOs are fully operational in many parts of the world, including India, Indonesia, China, and Latin America.

Muslim NGOs

Muslim NGOs have operated in global hot spots, providing funding for medical facilities and supplies. Before September 11, prominent Muslim NGOs active in crisis zones included the Benevolent International Foundation, the Red Crescent, Islamic International Relief Organization, Islamic Relief, Blessed Relief, the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY), the Turkish Humanitarian Organization (HAYAT), the Kuwait Joint Relief Committee, the Avicenna Medical and Pharmaceutical Network, al-Waafa (Saudi Arabia), and the Islamic Joint Relief Committee.⁴³ Muslim founda-

⁴³ The following organizations gave monies to Islamic Relief for their operations: Islamic Association (Bahrain), Sheikh Eid Bin Mohammed al-Thani Charity Association (Qatar), Human Support Aid, Ben Hammudah Group, WAMY, al-Eslah Charitable Society (Yemen), al-Eslah Society (Bahrain), and Muslim American Society and Muslim Aid (United States). See data at <http://www.irw.org/chechnyaConflict.htm> (Web site no longer available).

tions from Saudi Arabia such as al-Igasa, al-Ibragim, and Tayba provided financial support for refugees.⁴⁴ Often, combatants (including Islamic and jihadist rebels) make use of Muslim NGOs and their resources because these institutions provide access to areas next to or even within conflict zones. The humanitarian organizations provide mobile clinics and such essential supplies as food, water, blankets, and coal.⁴⁵ These groups rely on indigenous staffs for logistical support and intelligence. The logistical supply chain of these institutions can also be intercepted and diverted for nefarious ends. The established organizations themselves, in theory, could be co-opted and rendered fronts for the newer, more radical Islamic NGOs.

Some Islamic and Muslim NGOs are establishing a means or a system of medical care that insurgents and violent Islamists rely on for assistance. Such groups have no interest in coordinating or submitting to oversight by the U.N. High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR) or Western NGOs.⁴⁶ Muslim health and medical networks have not been adhering to the 1993 International Federation of the Red Cross NGO Code of Conduct, which calls for NGOs to remain apolitical in complex emergencies and conflict. Employees of these Muslim NGOs often work to systematically divert medical supplies from Western or established Muslim NGOs to insurgents. The Hezbollah system in the Levant and the Jama'at-i-Islami system in Pakistan are creating medical clinics and propaganda centers to provide traditional medicines, health benefits, insurance, schools, training centers, and health care for citizens—as well as for belligerents and their families.⁴⁷ The Chechens, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, the United Tajik Opposition (UTO), and Hizb ut-Tahrir have tapped this system to gain support from disenfranchised citizenry in poorer ar-

⁴⁴ For funding from the Beirut-Riyad Bank and the Dallah al-Baraka Group, see Mikhail Falkov, "On the Path to the Moscow Caliphate: The Foreign Sponsors of Homebred Radicals and Terrorists," *Nezavisimoye voennoye obozreniye*, May 11–17, 2001, p. 2, accessed from FBIS CEP20010515000255; and Mikhail Falkov, "The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan," *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, August 25, 2000, accessed via FBIS CEP20000825000201. Another group, SAAR, operates in the region and is tied to Indian Islamists. See Dmitrii Mikhailin, "Wahhabism: Not Just an Evil—A Deadly Evil," *Rossiiskaya gazeta*, September 28, 1999.

⁴⁵ For example, Islamic Relief purchased two 10-ton water carriers in addition to 30 water tanks with three-ton capacity each. Water carriers deliver 40–60 tons of water per day to between 15,000 and 20,000 refugees, a huge effort for one NGO. See "Conflict in Chechnya," October 4, 2000 online at <http://www.irw.org/chechnyaConflict.htm> (web site no longer available).

⁴⁶ It is an open question how many non-Muslim NGOs submit themselves to oversight, especially Christian organizations that behave in the same manner.

⁴⁷ See, for example, <http://www.Jama'atrelief.com>, last accessed August 2001; and "Dawoodi Bohra Jaamat," at <http://www.dawoodi-bohras.com/aboutus/udaipur/udai-Jama'at.htm>, last accessed August 23, 2004. See also how Al Qaeda manages these affairs in John J. Goldman, "Even Bin Laden Has to Deal with the Mundane," *Los Angeles Times*, February 11, 2001, p. A14; Robin Wright, "The Chilling Goal of Islam's New Warriors," *Los Angeles Times*, December 28, 2000, pp. A12–13; and James Pierpoint, "U.S. Charges Group Conspired to Aid Hizbollah," *Reuters*, March 28, 2001.

reas of the Caucasus and Central Asia.⁴⁸ Others, such as the Taliban and Hamas, are contributing to or adopting this pattern of support. There is evidence to suggest that all the groups share information on welfare matters.⁴⁹ Many employees of the newer Muslim welfare groups have been implicated in the diversion of medical supplies from Western or Muslim NGOs to insurgents. These groups include the Kuwait Joint Relief Committee, Rabitat ul-Islamiya, Dzhamagert ul-Islamiya, the World Islamic League, Daava Islamiya, and the World Islamic Organization of Salvation.⁵⁰

In a complex emergency or conflict, Muslim NGOs may espouse oppositional ideology and sentiment that in some cases demonstrate that they support extremist and violent ideologies and possibly are even sympathetic to terrorist groups. For example, in October 2001, NATO forces raided the Saudi High Commission for Aid to Bosnia, founded by Prince Salman bin Abd al-Aziz and supported by King Fahd. Among the items found at the Saudi charity were before-and-after photographs of the World Trade Center, U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, and the *U.S.S. Cole*; maps of government buildings in Washington; materials for forging U.S. State Department badges; files on the use of crop duster aircraft; and anti-Semitic and anti-American material geared toward children.⁵¹

In the Chicago offices of another Saudi-based charity, the Benevolence International Foundation (BIF), videos and literature glorifying martyrdom were found. According to the charity's newsletter, seven of its officers were killed in battle in Chechnya and Bosnia. In March 2002, Bosnian officials investigating foreign humanitarian organizations reported funds were missing from the Bosnian office of BIF.⁵² Also in March, Bosnian police raided the offices of a Muslim charity called Bosnian Ideal Future, the name under which BIF operated in Bosnia. Officials seized weapons, plans for making bombs, booby traps, and false passports.⁵³ This search also yielded an Al Qaeda organizational chart; notes on the formation of Al Qaeda by

⁴⁸ Hizb ut-Tahrir does not conduct paramilitary training but does provide instruction on Islamic rites and health care through the distribution of leaflets. See Vladimir Socor, "Hizb-e Tahrir Upstaging Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan," *Jamestown Monitor*, Vol. 7, Issue 103, May 29, 2001. See also ICG, No. 58 (2003).

⁴⁹ Ahmad Rashid, "The Fires of Faith in Central Asia: Islamic Movements in Central Asia," *World Policy Journal*, Spring 2001, via email from Turkistan-N, July 13, 2001. See also the training discussion for violent Islamists in bin Laden's camps in "Testimony Points to Bin Laden Plot," *Los Angeles Times*, July 4, 2001, p. 16.

⁵⁰ See, for instance, Oleg Fochkin, "Muslim Brotherhood Divvies Russia Up: Chekists Destroy Their Nest," *Moskovskii komsomolets*, October 19, 2000, p. 2, accessed via FBIS CEP20001019000131; and Oleg Petrovskii, "Who Is Issuing Wages to Khattab?" *Utro.ru*, March 26, 2001, accessed via FBIS CEP20010328000289.

⁵¹ Matthew Levitt, "Tackling the Financing of Terrorism in Saudi Arabia," The Washington Institute, Policy-Watch 609, March 11, 2002, online at <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/watch/policywatch/policywatch2002/609.htm>.

⁵² "Al-Qaida Terrorists Planned Bosnia Attack, Official Says," *Associated Press*, March 23, 2002.

⁵³ Alexandar S. Dragicevic, "U.S. Embassy in Bosnia Reopens," *Associated Press*, March 25, 2002.

bin Laden, Azzam, and others; and “a list of wealthy sponsors from Saudi Arabia,” including references to bin Laden.⁵⁴

A day later, the U.S. embassy in Bosnia was shut down for four days, from March 20 to March 24, after Bosnian officials informed the embassy of a possible threat. According to a Bosnian official, Al Qaeda terrorists reportedly met in Sofia, Bulgaria, where they decided that “in Sarajevo something will happen to Americans similar to New York last September.”⁵⁵ Two days before the embassy reopened, Bosnian police arrested Munib Zahiragic, the head of the local BIF office and a former officer in the Bosnian Muslim secret police. In January 2002, the bank accounts of BIF were blocked by the U.S. Treasury Department. Then, on April 30, 2002, the foundation’s executive director, Enaam M. Arnaout, was arrested on perjury charges for making false statements in a lawsuit against the U.S. government.

Although this charge was later dismissed on technical grounds, Arnaout was subsequently charged in October 2002 with conspiracy to provide material support to violent Islamists, among other charges.⁵⁶ Contrary to his statements and those of the foundation, documents and cooperating witnesses have indicated that Arnaout facilitated money and weapons transfers through the foundation.⁵⁷ Muhammad Bayazid, a bin Laden operative involved in efforts to obtain nuclear and chemical weapons for Al Qaeda, listed the foundation’s address as his residence in his application for a driver’s license.

Chechnya. Medical networks of all varieties help people in crisis. Many such networks perform admirable work to relieve suffering by supplying equipment, doctor-patient contact, and follow-up. However, insurgents and Muslim extremists are using Muslim aid and charity organizations to benefit their own agenda, sometimes forcing NGOs to be political. The behavior of Chechen rebels in the second Chechen war (1999–present) illustrates the extent that NGOs can aid insurgent health.

The wars in Chechnya provide a case study of how insurgents and violent Islamists in the Caucasus and Central Asia are acquiring medical treatment for themselves and making use of NGOs in the region to support political and military objectives. The Chechen rebels benefit from the presence of the Muslim NGOs, who provide desperately needed health care to civilians and rebels alike. This pattern is being repeated throughout Eurasia as global networks of Islamists are combining

⁵⁴ *United States of America v. Enaam M. Arnaout, a/k/a ‘Abu Mahmoud,’ a/k/a ‘Abu Mahmoud al Suri,’ a/k/a ‘Abu Mahmoud al Hamawi,’ a/k/a ‘Abdel Samia,’* case no. 02CR892, Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, October 2002.

⁵⁵ “Al-Qa’ida Terrorists Planned Bosnia Attack, Official Says,” *Associated Press*, March 23, 2002.

⁵⁶ “Judge Dismisses Islamic Charity Case,” *Associated Press*, September 14, 2002.

⁵⁷ *United States of America v. Enaam M. Arnaout*, 2002.

well-funded humanitarian assistance with military prowess to gain influence in impoverished or disrupted economies.

A particularly violent strain of Islam took root in Chechnya during the chaos of neglect, corruption, and open criminality after the first war (1994–1996).⁵⁸ Fundamentalist Wahhabi missionaries from Saudi Arabia arrived in Chechnya and used the flow of Saudi money to establish a network of charitable associations in the region. With the withdrawal of most international humanitarian relief organizations, this network effectively began to serve as Chechnya's social safety net. Perhaps most important, the Wahhabis provided a cohesive moral structure to a badly demoralized society. The hospitals and clinics destroyed in the Chechen wars were replaced by Muslim-supported clinics and aid packages. Francois Jean of *Médecins Sans Frontières* (MSF) (Doctors Without Borders) says that the Wahhabis consolidated their "influence by offering a framework for socialization to disoriented young people in a devastated country."⁵⁹

The Chechen rebels make use of a loosely organized network to provide supplies and financial support for health services. The Chechen diaspora is well organized to provide humanitarian and medical support to the military efforts. Prior to the outbreak of the war in 1999, Chechens in Russia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan purchased medicines and transported them to Chechnya.⁶⁰ The Chechen diaspora and their supporters have also collected money throughout Europe and North America to purchase medical supplies for shipment to Chechnya and Ingushetia.⁶¹ Up to 35 banks in the Russian Federation alone helped funnel money from abroad to Chechen rebels, with portions of those funds going to medical and humanitarian supplies.⁶² Charities are providing medical supplies to Chechen refugees—along with booklets on Islamic values.⁶³

In military terms, Chechen soldiers maintain their robust fighting forces through a combination of medical treatment and rest that relies on Muslim NGOs. They have established networks to help them recuperate after battle. Each combat

⁵⁸ For more on this phenomena, see Akhmadov et al. (2000); Iskandryan et al. (2002); Akhmadov et al. (2001).

⁵⁹ Quoted in John Clark, "Destination: Unknown," *American Outlook*, January–February 2001, p. 18.

⁶⁰ Dmitri Nikolayev, "The Troops Are Heading for the Mountains: The Operation's Success Depends on Reliable Logistics and the Pace of the Restoration of the Republic's Economy," *Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye*, February 17, 2000, FBIS CEP200000217000269.

⁶¹ In addition, reports of how other nonstate actors use donations from airports, cigarette sales, etc., to finance jihad are increasing. See Terry McDermott and Soraya Sarhaddi Nelson, "7 Accused of Raising Funds at Airports for Iran Terrorist Group," *Los Angeles Times*, March 1, 2001, pp. B1, B4. Groups can earn up to \$5,000–\$10,000 per day.

⁶² "Thirty-Five Banks Suspected of Financing Chechen Rebels," *RosBusiness Consulting*, February 8, 2001.

⁶³ The charity in question, IQRAA, claims to be headquartered in Chicago, Illinois. See Iliia Maksakov, "Islamic Missionary in Dagestan," *Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye*, No. 13, 2001, p. 2. The acronym IQRAA is not defined.

unit has a trained medic.⁶⁴ In northern Georgia, Azerbaijan, East Kazakhstan, and Turkey, rebels receive medical treatment from a network of apartments that serve as triage centers before visiting local clinics and hospitals.⁶⁵ Chechen fighters have been known to pose as refugees in order to receive aid from local health agencies. It is rumored that the Chechen system for rest and health treatment has been operating for “a long time” in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan.⁶⁶

Medical Training for Islamic Combatants. Islamic rebels adapt their medical training from U.S. Army Field Manuals available on the Internet and books written by ex-British soldiers.⁶⁷ They also learn wilderness training and preventive diets through programs that emphasize natural remedies or other traditional medicines. An example of one such document shows the emphasis on personal hygiene through cleansing rituals, which are important for keeping fighters healthy:

The majority of the time spent in Jihad is learning to cope with harsh, physical and mentally demanding living conditions. It is not about fighting glamorous battles for your pictures to appear on the Internet. Jihad is tough and difficult, which is why the rewards for it are so great.

Although survival training is taught at centers in some countries, it is expensive and, in many cases, nothing special that you cannot learn and practice yourself by reading books on the subject. The best way to learn these skills is to go camping into the outdoors with a small group of brothers. Avoid going to a camping site, since these are holiday areas where many facilities are available such as hot showers, gas, etc. The best training is to take some tents, food, and water and warm clothes in a rucksack and go on treks lasting two–three days at a time. If you do not have an experienced person with you, then start easy and build up gradually. Learn how to purify water, make wudu⁶⁸ and istinja⁶⁹ in cold water, attend to the

⁶⁴ Kaimov, *On Urban Warfare in Chechnya*, Working Draft, Marine Corps Intelligence Agency, 2000.

⁶⁵ For example, one fighter, Umar Ismail, was “deeply wounded in one battle and was forced to look for a cure outside.” See “Ameer of Jama’at Returns to Battlefield,” *Marsho News Agency*, January 8, 2001. See also Movsun Mamedov, “Chechen Gunmen Are Being Treated in Baku; Kommersant Correspondent Met with Them There,” *Kommersant*, February 23, 2000, p. 1, accessed via FBIS CEP20000224000058. The wounds reported were from shrapnel only. There are no reports of burns or crush wounds typical of urban warfare.

⁶⁶ Amberin Zaman, “Istanbul Hotel Siege Ends Peacefully with Release of Hostages,” *Los Angeles Times*, April 24, 2001, p. A5; “Four Alleged Chechen Fighters Arrested in East Kazakhstan,” *BBC Monitoring Service*, June 5, 2001; and Musa Alibekov, “Chechen Plan Summer Offensive,” *IWPR Caucasus Reporting Service*, June 13, 2001.

⁶⁷ “Physical Training,” Section 4.1, and “Military Training,” Section 4.6, in *How Can I Train Myself for Jihad*, online at <http://63.249.218.164/html/articles/jihadtrain.htm#43> (Web site no longer available).

⁶⁸ Cleanliness and good health are central to a fighter’s capabilities. *Wudu* is partial ablution. It is performed in order to be in a state of purity before praying or reading the Quran. The following actions nullify purity and require partial ablution: discharges from the body, the flow of blood or pus; vomiting; falling asleep; and becoming intoxicated. *Wudu* includes washing the hands up to the wrists, rinsing the mouth with water, cleansing the nostrils, washing the face with both hands, washing the right and left arms up to the elbow, wiping the head from the forehead to the back of the neck, wiping the inner sides of the ears with the forefingers and their outer sides with the thumbs, wiping the neck with wet hands, wiping the two feet up to the ankles beginning with the right foot.

call of nature in the outdoors, cook or heat food out in the open, making different types of knots with ropes, setting up tents and other similar activities. Learning how to start and maintain a fire in all conditions, wet or dry, with and without lighting instruments is one of the most important survival skills.

Learning how to walk long distances carrying loads up to one-third of your bodyweight, walking over difficult terrain at night without the use of torches and navigational skills using a compass/map or the stars are also useful skills. Many of these skills can be learned from books and then practiced out in the outdoors.⁷⁰

The effectiveness of the washing of hands and cleanliness in keeping fighters healthy in an unhealthy environment is illustrated by comparing the relatively low illness rates among Chechens with those of their Russian enemies.⁷¹

Parallel Health Care Systems

Although Muslim social welfare activities have a long history in the Middle East, recent decades have seen an unprecedented upsurge in Turkey, Algeria, Lebanon, and especially Egypt. For instance, when an earthquake hit Cairo in 1992, the Muslim Brotherhood rushed in to clear the rubble and treat the injured as the Egyptian government stood by. In many Muslim countries, Muslim organizations have become energetic in social reform, establishing much-needed schools, hospitals, clinics, legal societies, family assistance programs, Islamic banks, insurance companies, and publishing houses. These groups are primarily reinforced by like-minded Muslim humanitarians.⁷²

Muslim NGOs and Earthquakes: Turkey. The two devastating earthquakes that hit Turkey in 1999, causing over 17,000 deaths, provided the Turkish government the opportunity to engage hundreds of NGOs eager to assist. The past decade had witnessed the significant proliferation of registered Muslim associations and foundations in Turkey. By 1995, they accounted for 10.4 percent of the Istanbul associa-

Most of the above activity is done three times. See "How to Perform Wudu (Islamic Ablution)," available online at <http://www.geocities.com/Athens/Delphi/7974/wudu.html>.

⁶⁹ *Istinja* is the rigorous use of water to cleanse the lower extremities after going to the lavatory. See Chapter 4, "How to do Wudu and What Is Fard and Sunna in It—How to Clean Yourself After Going to the Lavatory with Water (Istinja) or with Stones and Other Things (Istijmar)," available online at <http://ourworld.compuserve.com/homepages/Abewley/Page22.html>, last accessed June 6, 2003.

⁷⁰ "Survival and Outdoors Training," Section 4.3, *How Can I Train Myself for Jihad*, Section 4.3 accessed from <http://63.249.218.164/html/articles/jihadtrain.htm#43> (Web site no longer available).

⁷¹ Hot and safe water sources for hundreds of Russian soldiers are unavailable as opposed to their Chechen opponents. See Vadim Udmantsev, "Proud to Serve: Military Medical Personnel Are Risking Their Career for an Open Discussion on Problems in Chechnya," *Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye*, December 1, 2000, accessed from "Warrant Officer Pressured to Retire Over Revelations of Serious Shortcomings in Medical Support to Troops in Chechnya," FBIS CEP200012050000299.

⁷² However, it is important to point out that parallel health care systems associated with Islamist movements play a huge role in building "passively supportive" constituencies—i.e., those who consume the groups' services do not necessarily share their political goals.

tions. In addition to the traditional associations engaged in building mosques and teaching the Quran, a new breed of Muslim associations were targeting poor urban areas. Holy Land Foundation and Islamic Relief were key participants. In 1999, Saudi Arabia sent medical aid via two Saudi cargo planes. The International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO), an affiliate of the Muslim World League, also sent medicine, foodstuffs, dates, and milk in cooperation with the Saudi and Turkish Red Crescent organizations⁷³

The 1999 quake shattered a cultural taboo in Turkey against accepting humanitarian help from outsiders. After Greek relief organizations entered the country, there was a popular recognition of the help that foreign humanitarian organizations could provide to Turkey. The 1999 quake not only raised the profile of Muslim relief organizations but also made the Turkish public more receptive to foreign foundations, charities, and relief organizations as well.⁷⁴

Following the earthquakes, Muslim associations formed special task forces and dispatched volunteers to the disaster area. Coordination centers were established to channel information about needs and distribute assistance to victims. In addition to handing out relief assistance, Muslim NGOs set up communal kitchens and child-care centers, established fixed and mobile medical units, and provided tents, some of which had originally been purchased for the Kosovo Albanians.⁷⁵

Turkey quickly learned to vet the organizations that preached more violent strains of Islam; the Turkish authorities understood how radical Islamist NGOs can penetrate organizations and affect disaster relief operations for nefarious purposes. Prominent associations of industrialists and businessmen, including MUSIAD and I.SHAD, which were major financial contributors to Muslim associations, faced strict government scrutiny.⁷⁶ MUSIAD complained of bureaucratic hurdles to delivering assistance. In this it was reiterating what other Turkish NGOs and international aid agencies were experiencing. The state's unease with criticism of its inefficiency and its discomfort with the portrayal of civil society as a better alternative led it to centralize all aid and relief operations in state organizations. Muslim associations in particular were targeted. The bank funds of I.HH and Mazlumder were confiscated, and those of Hakyol Vakfi were blocked and scrutinized.⁷⁷ In Golcuk, Muslim NGOs were

⁷³ Discussions with Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center (AFMIC) throughout 2001–2003.

⁷⁴ Kinzer (2001).

⁷⁵ Discussions with AFMIC throughout 2001–2003.

⁷⁶ MUSIAD is the Independent Association of Industrialists and Businessmen, with a membership of more than 3,000 individual companies. I.SHAD is the Solidarity Association for Business Life associated with Fethullah Gulen's Nurcu movement. It includes over 2,000 businessmen and merchants.

⁷⁷ I.HH stands for *Insan Hak ve Hurrhyetleri Insani Yardim Vakfi* (The Foundation for Human Rights and Humanitarian Relief); Mazlumder is *Insan Haklari ve Mazlumlar icin Dayanisma Dernegi* (Organization for Human Rights and Solidarity for Oppressed People); and Hakyol Vakfi is the Foundation of the Way of the One True Religion, Islam.

asked to cease their activities and to physically leave the area for handing out religious literature along with aid.⁷⁸

Muslim NGOs During and After Conflict: Hezbollah.⁷⁹ Hezbollah has been at the forefront of violent Islamic groups in creating and maintaining humanitarian and medical care in Lebanon's collapsed health care system in the wake of Israeli occupation.⁸⁰ In predominantly Shi'a areas such as parts of West Beirut and the southern suburbs of Beirut, Baalbek and Bekaa Valley in the east, and throughout southern Lebanon, Hezbollah has set up an impressive network of humanitarian facilities. In addition to providing general health care, the medical centers have delivery wings and care for newborns, laboratories, x-ray departments that specialize in care for women and children, a vaccination section that also provides general health advice, a blood bank, and dispensaries. Bakeries provide nutritious food. Funding for Hezbollah's health sector comes from Iran and the Lebanese diaspora including communities in West Africa, notably Nigeria. Other Iranian NGOs contributing to Hezbollah's health network include the Imam's Relief Committee, Foundation of Martyrs, Construction Crusade, Housing Foundation, and the Volunteer Women's Community Health Workers' Organization.⁸¹

Hezbollah is also developing a robust system for reconstruction after conflict.⁸² Hezbollah's entry into reconstruction occurred in the wake of the political and military upheaval in southern Lebanon, filling a void when public services collapsed after

⁷⁸ Interviews with AFMIC, 2001–2003.

⁷⁹ Although this subsection focuses on Hezbollah, Hamas has a very impressive social services network as well. See, for example, Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan (2003).

⁸⁰ In 2001, many of Lebanon's hospitals remained destroyed and doctors had left. Many remaining hospitals were private. At present, there are only four medical training faculties attached to hospitals in Beirut.

⁸¹ Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan (2003).

⁸² This section is based on a number of sources, including Abhinav Aima, *Hizbollah Beyond Khomeini: The Rolling Back of Iranian Extremism*, Middle East Studies Program, 1999, 2000, available online at <http://oak.cats.ohiou.edu/~aa342389/hizb2.html>, last accessed June 5, 2003; Stefano Chiarini, "Hizbollah, Welfare of God," *The Manifest* (Italy), June 15, 2000; Leslie Close, *Southern Lebanon: Politics and Children's Issues*, 2001, at <http://www.scripps.ohiou.edu/news/beirut/close.html>, last accessed August 23, 2004; John Daniszewski, "Hizbollah Riding High On Withdrawal of Israel," *Dawn*, May 13, 2000, at <http://www.dawn.com/2000/05/13/int6.htm>; JoMarie Fecci, "Despite End of Lebanon's Long Civil War, Low-Level Conflict Continues Around Israeli-Occupied Zone," *Washington Report on Middle East Affairs*, January/February 1999, pp. 20–22; JoMarie Fecci, "Southern Lebanon Getting Back to 'Normal' After 25 Years of War," *Washington Report on Middle East Affairs*, August–September 2000, pp. 20–21; Harik (1994); *Hizbollah: The Party of God: A Middle East Threat Analysis*, 2002, at <http://www.freelebanon.org/articles/a226.htm>, last accessed August 23, 2004; Jaber (1997); James Kitfield, "The Hizbollah Model," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 34, No. 20, 2002; *Lebanon Annual Report, 1996*, International Commission of the Red Cross (ICRC), June 1997, at <http://www.icrc.org>; Neil MacFarquhar, "To U.S., a Terrorist Group; to Lebanese, a Social Agency," *The New York Times*, December 28, 2001; *The Near East Lebanon ICRC Annual Report, 2000*, at <http://www.helpicr.org>; NORWAC: *Norwegian Aid Committee* at <http://www.norwac.no>; "On the Verge of Victory, Hizbollah's Future Uncertain," *Associated Press*, May 21, 2000, at <http://www.thehollandsentinel.net>; Michelle Ross Stanton, *Mobile Clinic Lebanon*, at <http://www.warchild.org>; Eyal Zisser, "Hizballah: New Course of Continued Warfare," *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 4, No. 3, Fall 2000. All Web sites last accessed in fall 2003.

the Israeli withdrawal. Hezbollah's Jihad al-Bina (literally "effort or exertion of reconstruction") serves as a main coordinating body with one committee out of eight providing social needs for the movement's members. Hezbollah's Majlis al-Shura has seven specialized committees, one of which is the social affairs committee, which oversees three similar committees in the three Shi'a areas.⁸³

The Jihad al-Bina helped Lebanese army units fortify border positions and build new roadways and has started to rebuild airfields and port facilities. Jihad al-Bina has also reportedly repaired filtration plants and sewage treatment plants. Electricity and maintaining electrical power is still a problem with many of the hospitals and clinics using generators. Jihad al-Bina's plan to provide regular crews to fix recurrent problems is expected to bring an end to blackouts and brownouts in the Bekaa Valley by 2004. Water and agriculture are also important areas of Hezbollah efforts. Hezbollah owns a fleet of water tankers. Stationary water tanks have been installed and are resupplied regularly by the tankers. Laboratory technicians test the water twice a day. Hezbollah workers have also sent in insecticide-spraying trucks to kill mosquitoes.

Hezbollah also has the ability to respond to disaster: During a snowstorm in the 1991–1992 winter, Hezbollah organized teams of relief workers to open roads and distribute food and other provisions to villages cut off in the storm. In fact, 1,000 houses were rebuilt, illustrating a capability to recover from repeated Israeli military operations.⁸⁴ When combined with the Jihad al-Bina authority, Hezbollah's ability to build facilities may become a force multiplier beneficial to itself as well as to other nonstate actors who may copy the model in other war-torn areas.

Hezbollah also has one of the most significant Muslim medical NGOs operating in the world today. Founded with Iranian aid, the Islamic Health Society (IHS)⁸⁵ established two major hospitals in Baalbek and in the southern suburbs of Beirut in 1986 and an array of medical centers and pharmacies throughout the various regions of Lebanon.⁸⁶ Hezbollah administers three hospitals and trains 500 nurses per year. These nurses go out to villages to carry out sanitary prevention. A taxi service in the Shi'a areas helps transport IHS personnel and supplies.⁸⁷

⁸³ Hezbollah's director of the Jihad al-Bina social wing is Mahmoud Mais. Hizbollah medical administrator is Hajj Mohammad Hijaz and is subservient to Jihad al-Bina's organizational structure.

⁸⁴ The Israeli operations were Litani (1978), Operation Peace for Galilee (1982), and Operation Accountability (1993). During the IDF's Operation Accountability in 1993 and Grapes of Wrath in 1996, Hizbollah launched a hearts and minds campaign.

⁸⁵ See <http://www.hayaa.org>.

⁸⁶ Danish and Norwegian NGOs helped establish these facilities.

⁸⁷ Medical administrator Hijazi operates the three hospitals and is the director of a Shi'a NGO, the al-Shahid (Martyrs) Association. The general manager of the Islamic Health Society is a surgeon, Abbas Habballah, who helps train the nurses.

The IHS has 46 centers in Lebanon, including the al-Janoub hospital in Nabatiyeh, and 13 dental clinics, and the group has an excellent reputation.⁸⁸ Staff have been trained over the world. The hospital director in Bint Jbeil, for instance, trained for 12 years in Florida.⁸⁹ In recent years, the IHS has concentrated on building hospitals, clinics, dispensaries, and first-response centers in areas closest to the current conflict zone. Although its aim is, first and foremost, to provide health care to the community in general, the clinics can also serve as modern aid stations for victims and combatants. IHS clinics and dispensaries also promote preventive care through education and outreach. This is particularly relevant in Lebanon, where the government reimbursement system, which pays for surgery but not for medical consultations, encourages people to wait until they are sick enough to need an operation.

Yet, Hezbollah also has an elaborate international network of sister organizations and secret cells around the world, including Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Pakistan, and other offshoots. As insurgents, they require human support for training, intelligence, inspiration, and organizational aid. The materials they require are safe haven and transit, financial resources, direct military support, and arms and material—including ammunition, food, and fuel. In terms of military strategy and operations, Hezbollah's presence in these areas is key in understanding Muslim welfare networks today.

The Muslim Finance Network

Islamic causes throughout the world are financed by an array of states, groups, fronts, individuals, businesses, banks, and criminal enterprises. Some are perfectly legitimate; others are not.⁹⁰ There is a salient distinction between legal and illegal financial and banking activities. The establishment of legitimate Islamic banking and financial corporate entities is a new development in the contemporary corporate world, criminal elements aside. This is noticeable not only in Muslim countries but also in non-

⁸⁸ A key question to ask is: "Would you want to be treated in an Egyptian hospital or a Hizbollah hospital?" The answer is likely to be the latter.

⁸⁹ Marek Hamzi of the Islamic Health Society came with his team to the hospital in Bint Jbel following the Israeli departure. Medical teams and mobile clinics were sent to cover 40 villages daily. The ER was treating about 250 cases per day (versus an average of 40 emergencies a day in Nabatiyeh). Other organizations affiliated with the Islamic Health Society involved in medical assistance are Islamic Resistance support Association (www.moqawama.org or www.moqawama.net) and the Injury Association (www.aljarha.org).

⁹⁰ A distinction should be made between Islamic banking and Western-style banking as seen in the dozens of financial institutions based in Lebanon. Banks in Lebanon mainly play the traditional role of society's financial go-between. They are playing this role in an open and liberal financial market that promotes competition. With 55 active commercial banks and eight specialized medium- and long-term credit banks, the Lebanese banking sector currently employs about 15,000 individuals in 790 branches conveniently spread throughout the country, and manages more than US \$49.4 billion in assets nationwide. See "The Association for Banks in Lebanon at <http://www.abl.lb/ABL/home.asp>, last accessed July 4, 2003.

Muslim majority countries as well. These institutions provide Islamic services on the basis of a unique and just profit-and-loss sharing principle involving *murabah* (trade financing) and *musharakah* (partnership).⁹¹ To date, there is little evidence to suggest that extremist politics is entering Islamic banking despite the fact that *shari'a* is used by banking officials for guidance in individual matters.

Another issue is that Islamic financing complies with *shari'a*, which prohibits receiving interest (*riba*) on money lent. Therefore, Islamic financing depends on the Islamic bank and its customers generating profits together. *Ijara* (leasing) requires an Islamic bank to purchase equipment and lease it to the customer for a specific period of time. At the end of that period, in most cases, the bank will transfer the title to the customer either by executing a sale agreement for a normal value or by way of donations.⁹²

As demonstrated by the diaspora statistics earlier in this chapter, London has become the largest international center for Islamic finance outside the Muslim World, largely as a result of the city's role as a center for Middle Eastern and Asian banking. Treasury management facilities are provided on behalf of Islamic banks in the Gulf, and Islamic fund management and promotion is becoming more significant. Possibilities for Islamic electronic financial services are opening up, and London is the major center for information gathering and dissemination on the Islamic banking industry.⁹³

Yet London's role in serving the British Muslim community has been disappointing. Despite almost two decades of experience with Islamic financing, there are few retail products available. The Muslim community in the United Kingdom num-

⁹¹ al-Harran (1993); al-Hawary (1981), pp. 25–28; Khurshid (1980), pp. 178–179; Meier (1976), pp. 563–565. All cited in <http://islamic-finance.net/islamic-microfinance/harran1.html>.

⁹² An important new aspect of Islamic financing is the ability to purchase a home through the process known as *manzil*. The original scheme, which was introduced in 1997, provides for *murabaha* financing through a trading mark-up contract in which the bank buys the home and sells it to the owner at the agreed-upon marked-up price. The Islamic Investment Banking Unit that runs the idea is a part of the United Bank of Kuwait, which was established in London in 1966 to serve Kuwaiti overseas financial and commercial interests. In August 2000 it was taken over by the al-Ahli Commercial Bank, which formed a new institution, the Ahli United Bank. This has been registered as an offshore banking unit in Bahrain with its shares listed on the stock exchange in Manama.

The *manzil ijara* plan was introduced in March 1999 and has proved much more popular than original *murabaha* house purchase plans. The property is registered in the bank's name, not just initially, but throughout the period of the lease, which may extend to 25 years. The tenant or lessee agrees at the outset to eventually purchase the entire property, but at the original price that the bank paid without any markup. The flexibility of the plan seems to appeal to clients, who can repay larger amounts when they can afford to do so to reduce their rental payments. The monthly payments by the client consist of three elements. The first represents the repayments of the funds that the bank has used to purchase the property. The second is the rent on the property, which is the source of the bank's profit. The rent is reassessed annually to ensure the bank is making a reasonable return and adjusted downward to reflect payments already made. The third element of the monthly payment, referred to as insurance rent, is to recover the cost of the insurance that the bank has to pay on the property. See Rodney Wilson, "Islamic Investment in the United Kingdom" at http://www.islamic-banking.com/aom/ibanking/rj_wilson.php.

⁹³ Wilson, *op. cit.*

bers more than 1.5 million British citizens and permanent residents, with up to another 500,000 temporary residents including students and visitors. However, the Muslim community is ethnically and linguistically diverse and geographically scattered, which makes marketing aimed at attracting the attention of the community a major challenge.⁹⁴

Although casual evidence suggests the British Muslim community has a greater propensity to use cash for transactions than the population in general, its demand for banking and financial products is not markedly different from the rest of the nation. Some devout Muslims avoid using conventional interest-based banks, and others donate their interest earnings to charity in an attempt to purify their income. The majority use conventional financing services, largely because they have little alternative and tend, like the rest of the population, to have greater trust in large retail financial institutions with established brand names.⁹⁵

Financing Islamic Violence

Although Iran and Syria continue to back international violent Islamism, Islamic groups increasingly finance their own activities through a network of charitable and humanitarian organizations, criminal enterprises, front companies, illicit and unregulated banking systems, and the personal wealth of individual militant Islamists, rather than Islamic financial instruments. This subsection highlights the network of substate actors who act on their own and in concert with state and other sponsors of violence.

Violent Islamic groups tend not to open bank accounts under their organization's name, especially in the West. Nonetheless, there are, in fact, cases, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, where groups operate openly and have accounts in their own or other known names. Other groups may boast of their links to such groups. The Islamic Action Front (IAF) in Jordan and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt openly state their support for Hamas, and the IAF called for Arabs and Muslims to donate funds to finance Hamas suicide operations.⁹⁶

A few wealthy individuals are able to sponsor violent Islamic groups. For example, Mustafa Ahmad al-Hasnawi, a Saudi national, sent the September 11 hijackers operational funds and received at least \$15,000 in unspent funds before leaving the

⁹⁴ Wilson, *op. cit.*

⁹⁵ Wilson, *op. cit.* Some banking institutions such as HSBC Holdings already have an Islamic finance unit and extensive experience through their global operations. HSBC Holdings has a significant presence in many Muslim countries, including Malaysia, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, and has become a major force in Middle Eastern banking since its acquisition of the British Bank of the Middle East. Its network includes six branches in Bahrain, six in Lebanon, 15 in the United Arab Emirates, nine in Egypt, and five in Oman. HSBC Holdings also owns a minority stake in the Saudi British Bank that has 80 branches in the Kingdom. These financial networks give the bank unparalleled business knowledge of different Muslim societies.

⁹⁶ See Matthew Levitt, "Diplomacy Run Amuck," *The Jerusalem Post*, October 8, 2002.

United Arab Emirates for Pakistan on September 11. U.S. officials say that Yasin Al-Qadi, a prominent Jiddah businessman and head of the Muwafaq Foundation, has supported a variety of violent Islamist groups from Al Qaeda to Hamas. According to U.S. court documents, in 1992 Al-Qadi provided \$27,000 to U.S.-based Hamas leader Muhammad Salah and lent \$820,000 to a Hamas front organization in Chicago, the Quranic Literacy Institute (QLI). Based on their connection to Hamas, the U.S. government has frozen the assets of both Salah and the QLI. Similarly, U.S. officials maintain that the Muwafaq Foundation is a front organization through which wealthy Saudis send millions of dollars to Al Qaeda.

Legitimate Business

Investigation into Al Qaeda sleeper cells in Europe in the wake of September 11 revealed the widespread use of legitimate businesses and employment by Al Qaeda operatives to derive income to support themselves and their activities. According to congressional testimony by a senior FBI official, a construction and plumbing company run by members of an Al Qaeda cell in Europe managed another business buying, fixing, and reselling used cars. In these and other cases, cell members deposited their legitimate salaries, government subsidies, and supplemental income from family members in Europe and abroad.⁹⁷ According to the Lebanese state prosecutor, members of an Al Qaeda cell broken up there had funded their activities by buying and selling cars in Germany and had discussed establishing other businesses to cover the cell's activities.⁹⁸

Al Qaeda itself has had extensive financial concerns in Sudan, worldwide investments, and small businesses in operationally important places around the globe, illustrating how terror groups can use legitimate business to cover their operations and recruitment. For instance, Al Qaeda owned several boats and a fishing business in Mombassa. Other enterprises in Sudan included Zirqani, Ladin International, Althamar al Mubarak, Quadrat Transportation, Quadrat Construction, and Bareba. Al Hijra Construction built the Thaadi Road from Khartoum to Port Sudan; International al-Ikhlas manufactured sweets and honey in Kameen; the Bank of Zoological Resources produced genes for making cattle hybrids; the Kasalla agriculture facility produced hybrids for commercial and other agricultural produce; the Happ tannery (Khartoum) produced leather; and Blessed Fruits exported fruits and vegetables. Al Qaeda farms included the Soba and Damazine farms that produced white corn, peanuts, sunflower seeds, and wheat. Al Qaeda factories crushed sesame and peanut seeds to make oil. Al Qaeda products for export included ostriches and sheep dogs (Kenya); wood (Turkey); lemons, olives, raisins, nuts, hazelnuts, and almonds

⁹⁷ <http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress02/lormel021202.htm>, accessed August 23, 2004.

⁹⁸ Youssef Diab, "Al-Qaeda Suspects 'Planned to Set up Local Cell,'" *Daily Star* (Beirut), October 11, 2002.

(Tajikistan); diamonds (Tanzania); lapis lazuli (Uganda); and camels (Sudan). Al Qaeda also owned a furniture company and a bakery in Sudan.⁹⁹

Legitimate employment offers violent Islamists cover, livelihood, and, sometimes, useful international contacts. Muhammad Haydar Zammar, the Syrian-born German national who recruited a number of the September 11 hijackers, worked at Tatex Trading. Tatex's director, Abd al-Matin Tatari, was reportedly a member of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood and one of its principal shareholders is Muhammad Majid Said, director of Syria's General Intelligence Directorate from 1987 to 1994.¹⁰⁰

Banking Systems

International and unofficial banking systems have also played a role in violent Islamist financing. The Arab Bank was a special favorite for funneling money used by Iran, Syria, and the Damascus headquarters of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) to transfer funds for attacks to operatives in the West Bank.¹⁰¹ For example, Thabet Mardawi and Ali Saffuri, two captured PIJ activists from Jenin, revealed that they opened several bank accounts, some in their names and others in the name of an elderly woman, and that PIJ leaders in Damascus transferred funds into these accounts via the Arab Bank.¹⁰² According to Palestinian documents seized by Israel in the West Bank, Saudi organizations transfer money for organizations linked to Hamas and the families of killed Palestinians—including suicide bombers—through branches of the Arab Bank in the West Bank.¹⁰³

The Arab Bank's links to violent Islamic financing extend beyond the Middle East. According to court documents filed in Spain, an Al Qaeda cell charged with helping prepare the September 11 attacks and serving as a logistics hub and recruitment center used the Arab Bank to wire money from Spain to associates in Pakistan and Yemen.¹⁰⁴ The cell included Imad Eddin al-Yarkas (Abu Dahdah), who discussed terrorist attacks on a telephone line tapped by Spanish intelligence.¹⁰⁵

⁹⁹ Jane's Information Group, "Al Qaeda's Business Empire" [Special Report: Al Qaeda], in *Jane's Intelligence Review*, August 2001, p. 44.

¹⁰⁰ "Intelligence Briefs: Syria-Syrian Intelligence Linked to al-Qaida Cell in Hamburg," *Middle East Intelligence Bulletin*, Vol. 4, No. 9, September 2002.

¹⁰¹ *Iran and Syria as Strategic Support for Palestinian Terrorism (Based on Interrogations of Arrested Palestinian Terrorists and Captured Palestinian Authority Documents)*, Document number TR6-548-02, Israel Defense Forces, Military Intelligence, September 2002, from Levitt (2002).

¹⁰² Levitt (2002).

¹⁰³ Levitt (2002).

¹⁰⁴ Brooke Nelson and Paul Tighe, "Spain-Based al-Qaeda Cell Wired Cash to Extremists, Judge Says," *Bloomberg News*, November 19, 2001. See also Carla Vitzthum, and Keith Johnson, "Spain Arrests Alleged Terror Financier—U.S. Officials Say Detection Will Help Unravel Finances Behind al Qaeda Network," *The Wall Street Journal*, April 25, 2002, pp. A14, A16; Sebastian Rotella, "Probe Links Syria, Terror Network—Italian Investiga-

During the 1970s and 1980s, Beirut became a haven for funds spirited away from neighboring countries as well as for not-so-clean profits repatriated by Lebanese merchants involved in the diamond and gold business in West Africa. The drug trade, in which Lebanon acts as a hub, has also helped banks in Beirut achieve sophisticated money-laundering capabilities in narcotics and other criminal activity. The BBC reported estimates that opium and cannabis from the Bekaa Valley generated more than \$500 million annually during the Lebanese civil war.¹⁰⁶

Beyond the official international banking system, unofficial banking systems and *hawala* are of particular concern. *Hawala* networks are a legitimate business that has served millions of people trading in Southeast Asia.¹⁰⁷ *Hawala* provides a fast, secure and cost-effective method for worldwide remittance of money or transfer of value. Experts estimate that more than \$200 billion per year flows through this industry. However, some observers have concerns about *hawala* and other alternative transfer systems, noting that a lack of transparency and accountability, as well as the absence of governmental supervision, presents the potential for abuse by criminal elements, including violent Islamists.¹⁰⁸

The U.S. Treasury Department froze the assets of 62 organizations and individuals associated with the al-Barakat and al-Taqwa financial networks in November 2001. Federal agents raided these groups' offices across the United States and subse-

tion Finds the Country Was a Hub for Shuttling Money and Recruits to Iraq," *Los Angeles Times*, April 16, 2003, pp. A1, A12.

¹⁰⁵ The Spanish scheme illustrated the high level of simplicity of violent Islamists' financing using donations through a web of legally established companies transferring money through Western-style banks, such as al-Rajhi Bank, National Commercial Bank, Faisal Islamic Bank, and Saudi American Bank. See Nelson, op. cit.

¹⁰⁶ John Sfakianakis, "Gray Money, Corruption and the Post-September 11 Middle East," *Middle East Report*, Vol. 222, Spring 2002, pp. 33–34.

¹⁰⁷ United Nations Security Council, "Second Report of the Monitoring Group established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1363 (2001) and extended by resolution 1390 (2002)," in *Letter dated 19 September 2002 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999) concerning Afghanistan addressed to the President of the Security Council*, S/2002/1050, September 20, 2002, pp. 14–15. See also Sfakianakis, op. cit., p. 36. According to Sfakianakis: "While the *hawala* system has ancient roots, much of the contemporary network grew out of gold smuggling operations in South Asia during the 1960s and 1970s, using Dubai as one of the most important transit routes. To get around import restrictions, smugglers shipped gold aboard boats from Dubai and Abu Dhabi to South Asia. After selling the gold, they needed to get the cash back home. The smugglers discovered a solution in the growing population of Indians and Pakistanis working in the Gulf states. These workers often send money home to their families, but banks charged prohibitive commissions and fees. By contrast, the *hawala* system set up in part by gold smugglers, whose enormous profits and low overhead allow them to offer very cheap rates, was attractive. South Asians give portions of their earnings to *hawala* offices in the Gulf. Usually by phone, the Gulf office contacts its counterpart in South Asia, which pays out an equal sum to the workers' relatives from its stash of gold profits. In this way, the gold profits are repatriated to the Gulf without being physically moved or leaving a paper trail. Dirty money sent via *hawwalas* cannot be taxed or traced. The system works as if the workers' remittances—entirely clean money—become the revenue from smuggled gold. The smugglers even make a small profit on the fees they charge the South Asian workers for their services."

¹⁰⁸ United Nations Security Council, op. cit., pp. 14–15.

quently in Europe and the Bahamas as well. President Bush stated that the two institutions provided fundraising, communications, weapons procurement, and financial and shipping services for Al Qaeda. A few months later, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Treasury Juan C. Zarate told Congress that in 1997 \$60 million collected for Hamas was moved to accounts with Bank Al-Taqwa.¹⁰⁹ Al-Taqwa shareholders reportedly include known Hamas members and individuals associated with a variety of organizations linked to Al Qaeda. A 1996 Italian intelligence report linked al-Taqwa to Palestinian groups, the Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA), and the Egyptian Gama'a al-Islamiyya.¹¹⁰

In August 2002, the United States and Italy, in cooperation with the Bahamas and Luxembourg, designated 25 individuals and institutions—including 14 businesses owned or controlled by Ahmed Idris Nasraddin or Yusif Nada and linked to Bank Al-Taqwa—as terrorist entities and blocked their assets.¹¹¹ The Treasury Department announced that Bank Al-Taqwa “was established in 1988 with significant backing from the Muslim Brotherhood” and financed groups such as Hamas, Algeria’s Islamic Salvation Front and Armed Islamic Group, Tunisia’s Ennahda, and the Al Qaeda organization.¹¹²

Criminal Activity

Criminal enterprises have also serviced the spread of violent Islamic financing. Ahmad Omar Sayid al-Shaykh, convicted of the abduction and murder of *Wall Street Journal* reporter Daniel Pearl, linked up with Aftab Ansari, a prominent figure in the Indian mafia, to provide Al Qaeda with recruits, false documents, safe houses, and proceeds from kidnappings, drug trafficking, prostitution, and other crimes.¹¹³ Authorities in Belgium issued an arrest warrant for Victor Bout, a notorious arms trafficker suspected of supplying weapons to the Taliban and Al Qaeda as well as warring factions throughout Africa in an elaborate guns-for-diamonds scheme.¹¹⁴

Al Qaeda and Hezbollah also raise millions of dollars in drug money to support their operations. By one account, Al Qaeda raised as much as 35 percent of its oper-

¹⁰⁹ Testimony of Juan C. Zarate, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Terrorism and Violent Crime, U.S. Department of the Treasury, House Financial Subcommittee Oversight and Investigations, February 12, 2002.

¹¹⁰ Lucy Komisar, “Shareholders in the Bank of Terror?” *Salon.com*, March 15, 2002; and Mark Hosenball, “Terror’s Cash Flow,” *Newsweek*, March 25, 2002.

¹¹¹ *The United States and Italy Designate Twenty-Five New Financiers of Terror*, Department of the Treasury Office of Public Affairs, PO-3380, August 29, 2002, at <http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/po3380.htm>.

¹¹² *The United States and Italy Designate Twenty-Five New Financiers of Terror*, op. cit., 2002.

¹¹³ Paul Watson and Sidhartha Barua, “Worlds of Extremism and Crime Collide in Indian Jail,” *Los Angeles Times*, February 8, 2002.

¹¹⁴ Donald G. McNeil Jr., “Belgium Seeks Arms Dealer with Suspected Qaeda Ties,” *The New York Times*, February 27, 2002.

ating funds from the drug trade.¹¹⁵ Hezbollah benefits from the drug business in Lebanon, much as Al Qaeda did from the drug business in Afghanistan. Hezbollah used the Bekaa Valley's poppy crop not only for funds, but also to buy support from Israeli Arabs ready to carry out operations.¹¹⁶

Hezbollah and other Muslim groups also traffic narcotics in North America to fund their activities back in the Middle East. A Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) investigation into a pseudoephedrine smuggling scam in the American Midwest led investigators as far as Jordan, Yemen, Lebanon, and other Middle Eastern countries, including bank accounts tied to Hezbollah and Hamas. There has also been evidence of Hezbollah linking up with Mexican drug cartels to cultivate and distribute marijuana in California, and for the first time, opium poppies have been found on federal lands.¹¹⁷

Groups like Al Qaeda and Hezbollah also capitalize on black-market gold and diamond markets. One official noted the "influx of hard-core Islamist extremists" in the Congo, including those from Hezbollah and other groups, involved in diamond smuggling.¹¹⁸ Other countries acting as hubs for these groups are Mozambique and South Africa.¹¹⁹

Radical Islamic groups also use smuggling, kidnapping, and extortion to achieve their political goals. For example, in June 2002, Muhammad and Chawki Hamud, two brothers involved in a Hezbollah support cell in Charlotte, North Carolina, were found guilty of a variety of charges, including funding Hezbollah activities from the proceeds of an interstate cigarette smuggling ring. Seven other defendants pled guilty to a variety of charges stemming from this case, including conspiracy to provide material support to terrorists, cigarette smuggling, money laundering, and immigration violations. In South America, Hezbollah operatives engage in a wide range of criminal enterprises to raise, transfer, and launder funds. These activities include small-scale businesses that engage in a few thousand dollars worth of business but transfer tens of thousands of dollars around the globe, mafia-style shakedowns of local Arab

¹¹⁵ Hugh Williamson, "Al-Qaeda 'May Turn to Organized Crime,'" *The Financial Times*, June 14, 2002.

¹¹⁶ Dina Kraft, "Seven Israeli Arabs Charged with Spying for Lebanese Guerrillas," *Associated Press Worldstream*, November 29, 2000; James Bennet, "Israeli Bedouin Colonel Is Formally Charged with Spying," *The New York Times*, October 25, 2002.

¹¹⁷ "Opium Poppies Seized in National Forest," *Los Angeles Times*, June 20, 2003.

¹¹⁸ Douglas Farah, "Digging Up Congo's Dirty Gems; Officials Say Diamond Trade Funds Radical Islamic Groups," *The Washington Post*, December 30, 2001.

¹¹⁹ "Al-Qaeda in West Africa," *The Washington Post*, December 29, 2002 p. A01; Robert Block, "Islamic Terrorists Have Found a New Home in South Africa," *The Wall Street Journal*, December 10, 2002, p. 1.

communities, and sophisticated import-export scams involving traders from India and Hong Kong.¹²⁰

In the United States, law enforcement officials are investigating a variety of criminal enterprises suspected of funding violent Islamic groups including the stealing and reselling of baby formula; food stamp fraud; and scams involving grocery coupons, welfare claims, credit cards, and even unlicensed T-shirts. U.S. officials believe that, of the many millions of dollars raised by violent Middle Eastern Islamic groups, “a substantial portion”— \$20 million to \$30 million annually—comes from these illicit industries.¹²¹

Implications for the United States

The networks described above—diasporic, humanitarian, and economic—feed into and are part of nodes that sometimes provide material and propaganda support to insurgents and violent Islamist sympathizers. There are both policy and military implications for the United States.

Policy Implications

The policy implications for Muslim networks should be to focus on the U.S. ability to differentiate terrorist groups, sympathizers, and everyday moderate proselytizers.¹²² The key questions are, How do we identify hostile use of these networks? And how do we strengthen moderates in the networks? Care must be taken to avoid unintended consequences, as with the French attempt to organize a Muslim council to

¹²⁰ Jeffrey Goldberg, “The Party of God: Hizbollah Sets Up Operations in South America and the United States,” *The New Yorker Magazine*, October 28, 2002.

¹²¹ John Mintz and Douglas Farah, “Small Scams Probed for Terror Ties; Muslim, Arab Stores Monitored as Part of Post-September 11 Inquiry,” *The Washington Post*, August 12, 2002.

¹²² What we see is a transformation of the national state and the rise of what the sociologist Manuel Castells has called “the Network Society.” Migrants try to avoid the state in building transnational networks. This is obviously true for large-scale illegal migration, but it is also true for legal migration. An important indication is the fact that money transfers of transnational migrants in 1995 were estimated to exceed \$70 billion, according to the International Monetary Fund. National governments try to control these transfers but are not capable of doing so. It is important to understand that this kind of large-scale monetary traffic enables transnational entrepreneurship. Integration into a nation-state is not the aim of these entrepreneurs, although they may well be citizens of the states of immigration. They want to be flexible, to be able to respond quickly to changes in political and financial circumstances. Violent Islamists in the greater network of Muslim activists constitute transnational networks with nodes in a number of nation-states. Terrorist attacks have suddenly made us much more aware of the negative effects of postcolonial globalization on the Western world. One can no longer assume that conflicts in the south, in which the north and especially the United States are involved, will be contained there. Moreover, with the rise of the networked society the ability of states to guarantee security within territorial borders has declined. See Peter Van Der Veer’s comments cited in “The Netherlands and Islam: Lecture of the Occasion of the Dr. Hendrik Mueller Award, online at <http://www2.fmg.uva.nl/gm/articles/pvdv01a.htm>.

oversee Islamic organizations in the country, which backfired when radical elements made an unexpectedly strong showing in the April 2003 council election.¹²³

It is important to recognize that Muslim networks are actually vehicles for mobilization and recruitment. Regimes throughout the Muslim world have attempted to emasculate the independence of formal religious institutions by controlling mosques, religious publications, sermons, and other Islamic spaces and practices. Religious interpretations that threaten state power are repressed or “managed” through government bureaucracy to weaken critical voices. In most countries of the Middle East, the Islamic opposition is banned from politics. The result is that many groups rely on informal social networks outside the region for sustained mobilization in the face of repression.¹²⁴ Islamic networks have also “transnationalized” through new technologies and globalization. The Internet, in particular, has become critical in sustaining and expanding movement to foster transnational linkages and solidarity across borders. The use of images and encrypted materials helps transmit messages and orders and win hearts and minds.¹²⁵

Nodal disruption appears to be the best way to mitigate the impact of Muslim networks with violent tendencies and to empower moderates to take over these transmission belts. There are several remedies to consider. Primarily, policymakers need to examine the generational dynamics of Muslim communities, their sectarian affiliation, and their place of origin. In addition, youth profiles, age/sex data, gender, geographic dispersion, urban/rural divides, and analyses of human capital and the resulting clusters can be revealing.¹²⁶

¹²³ The Union of Islamic Organizations of France, inspired by Egypt's banned fundamentalist Muslim Brotherhood, won 19 of the council's 58 seats. The moderate, Algerian-backed Mosque of Paris, which was considered a favorite, won just 15 seats. See Kim Housego, “France May Expel Islamic Extremists,” *Associated Press*, April 16, 2003.

¹²⁴ See Wiktorowicz (2001); Diane Singerman, “The Networked World of Islamist Social Movements,” in Wiktorowicz, ed. (2003).

¹²⁵ See Quintan Wiktorowicz, “The New Global Threat: Transnational Salafis and Jihad,” *Middle East Policy*, Vol. 8, No. 4, December 2001, pp. 18–38; Oliver Roy, “Qibla and the Government House: The Islamist Networks,” *SAIS Review* (Summer–Fall 2001).

¹²⁶ In many ways, the anarchist movements of the late nineteenth century and their nodal and communicative characteristics resembled violent Islamic networks today. Globalization also supported the growth of those anarchist networks. Open international boundaries permitted individuals to move freely, promoting the personal contacts necessary to sustain a network on the borderline of legality. The growth of transatlantic population movements offered a liberal refuge for those displaced by war. Both Britain and the United States offered a safe haven for those planning violent deeds elsewhere. With the decline of globalization after World War I, the anarchists' network model of organization suffered in competition with hierarchical (Leninist) organizations and nation-states intent on reasserting internal control. Interestingly, a final, technological change promoted the ideology of violence that developed in anarchist networks. Changes in the technology of destructive power made asymmetric attacks on important individuals and “bourgeois institutions” more potent. The repeat-action revolver, which was mass-produced after 1850, and dynamite, patented in 1867, allowed small groups of individuals to wield accurate, easily concealed, and effective destructive power against human beings and property. Anti-immigrant and antiforeign sentiments, reinforced by antiglobalization backlash, were mobilized.

Methods of recruitment and indoctrination, influence, communications, and rituals, along with their role in building and sustaining a violence-prone network, need to be better understood. The key nodes for Islamic terrorist recruitment are mosques and cultural centers, universities and youth organizations, health and welfare organizations, including charities, Internet cafés and professional schools, and diasporas. There is a serious need to document and understand these phenomena and how the United States can use counterterrorism tactics and techniques to shut down terrorist recruitment nodes.

Policymakers must remember that recruitment feeds networks. Recruitment is defined as a process in which individuals, groups, and populations are targeted by psychological operations designed to enlist their witting or unwitting participation in and exploitation by the recruiter's organization. Terrorist groups, cults, and insurgencies explicitly use a variety of recruitment techniques to gain everything from a zealous active cadre willing to kill and die, to active supporters who gather intelligence and money and passive supporters who prepare the psychological battlefield for subsequent action and exert third-party influence on other targets.

September 11 was a seminal event for violent Islamic networks that tap disenfranchised Muslims. Historically, major terrorist or insurgent "successes" have had a significant effect on networks in two ways: the positive effects of the action (measured in more recruits and approbation by sponsors) and the negative effects of the reaction (measured in arrests, compromise of intelligence assets, etc). In other words, when terrorist or insurgent movements experience a major development in their campaigns, there are almost always a number of important changes in their structure. Al Qaeda and its affiliates have had to adapt since September 11 because of the loss of its training base in Afghanistan and to incorporate new and more clandestine methods of recruitment.

For instance, Al Qaeda's recruitment features separate potential pools of recruits in a pyramid organizational structure: The bottom of the pyramid represents support, information, and communications; the middle of the pyramid illustrates foot soldiers, financiers, scientists, and tacticians; and the top leaders are at the point of the pyramid. Each layer of the pyramid requires different nodes for recruitment and, thus, different measures for vetting within Al Qaeda's structure. Various nodes, described below, feed from Muslim networks into transnational terror organizations. Clearly, there is the need for increased human intelligence and planting of personnel in and around these layers. Insofar as Al Qaeda and its ilk operate as "trust networks," the key to breaking the transmission belt must be to break these trust relationships. Clearly, psychological operations also have a role to play here.

To identify recruitment patterns and weaknesses within each of the three pyramid layers, policymakers need to examine the roles of key individuals within the organization who operate at these different levels and how they were recruited for different purposes (e.g., low-level operatives, financiers, bomb makers, and strategists).

This first step can be developed using both open-sourced and classified information. The second step would be to conduct interviews whenever possible with people both in the United States and overseas with whom these individuals have been in contact, such as professors and landlords. Moving beyond these known Al Qaeda operatives, recognizing recruitment nodes is critical for understanding how moderates can be placed in Muslim networks. As a result of this approach, policymakers can outline processes and weaknesses, as well as new routes that violent Islamists might pursue in response to U.S. moves in the global war on terrorism. Below are the key nodes that policymakers need to focus upon.¹²⁷

Diasporas and their linkages back to the Arab world are poorly understood and are a fertile ground for violent Islamic recruitment. Such diasporas exist in Western Europe, sub-Saharan Africa, Southeast Asia, and North and Latin America. It is generally acknowledged that Islamist extremists have already drawn on Middle Eastern diasporas for recruits to their cause. For example, Hezbollah has been active during the past decade in the Middle Eastern expatriate community of South America's tri-border region. There is little doubt that Al Qaeda has worked to garner recruits from the Arab diaspora in Western Europe, as the cases of Muhammad Atta and Zacarias Moussaoui demonstrate.

There are three methods of terrorist recruiting in diasporic communities. The first is to search for loners and social outcasts who have no social or family support network and may have already experimented with petty crime. These individuals have little stake in the societies in which they live and are searching for some structure in their lives. They can be used for extended strategic reconnaissance missions in distant countries or for high risk, "throwaway" operations in which there is little probability of success. Second, terror groups target certain specific immigrant districts that have been economically marginalized and where there is a sense of social alienation. Recruits from these areas might be willing to join an extremist group out of sheer frustration with their current lot in life. Finally, there is the likelihood that terrorist groups actively study the membership rolls of Islamic youth organizations and university student groups in diasporic communities for suitable recruits. Informal links may even be established with the leaders of these groups, who can assist in the vetting process.

In addition, policymakers need to determine whether Islamist terrorist groups have special initiatives to target Muslim youth from complex multinational or multi-ethnic backgrounds in the diasporas. These youth are often confused about their national identity and might find an easy way out of their identity crisis by embracing

¹²⁷ See also the Statement of R. Richard Newcomb, Director Office of Foreign Assets Control, U.S. Department of the Treasury Before the Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate Hearings on Terrorism Financing: Origination, Organization and Prevention, July 31, 2003 at <http://govt-aff.senate.gov/073103newcomb.htm>, last accessed August 23, 2004.

the pan-Islamic ideology espoused by a group like Al Qaeda. By embracing transnational pan-Islamism, these youths can avoid the task of having to resolve the complicated questions they would otherwise face about their own identity.

Health and welfare organizations, including charities, offer several characteristics conducive to recruitment. Many suspect Muslim NGOs are involved in education, and there are medical aid societies that provide outreach to those who cannot afford care services. As illustrated earlier in the chapter, Hezbollah is actively engaged with over 20 health agencies in Lebanon that provide medical attention and political advertising and recruitment opportunities. It is not so much the treatment of the individual but rather the interaction with the staff members of the NGO that leads to a recruitment possibility. These organizations also act as “postrecruitment nodes” for transport of recruits to training centers. For instance, before September 11 Spain appears to have been a transit point for recruits on their way to Afghanistan. Al Qaeda operatives were given malaria pills and other prophylaxis to prep them for Afghanistan’s rugged environment.

Hijacking Muslim and Western NGOs has been an important tool by terrorist recruiters. Al Qaeda infiltrated the Kuwait-based Mercy International in Kenya and Help Africa People by funding a malaria research project in Somalia. Al Qaeda also controlled branches of the International Islamic Relief Organization in the Philippines, Tanzania, and the Pankisi Gorge in Georgia. American charities are also a key terrorist goal for recruitment. The successful penetration or establishing of a U.S. 501(C)(3) charity provides Islamic terrorist organizations with a substantial support apparatus in the United States from which to recruit supporters.

Organizational alliances connect individuals and small groups with regional terrorist groups that are deemed capable and effective. These groups, in turn, network with globally oriented Islamist terror organizations such as Al Qaeda and, perhaps, Hezbollah. The tactic most often used by the Al Qaeda leadership has been to steadily build close personal relationships with the most charismatic senior leaders of a regionally oriented group. These targeted leaders are cultivated through the provision of funds, expertise, and weapons for certain important operations. Eventually they become dependent on the global resources of Al Qaeda and can be easily convinced to transform their rank-and-file members into men with a global jihadist outlook.

With the global war on terrorism, a new model of macro-level recruitment has risen that allows a global terror group to rapidly expand its membership rolls by cultivating just a handful of strategic relationships. A good example of this practice is the relationship between the Algerian Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat and Al Qaeda, which began in the mid-1990s. Bin Laden’s alliance with this group gave him a ready-made Islamist terrorist infrastructure in France and other Western European countries. Macro-level recruiting also allows global terror organizations to take control of proven grassroots recruiting practices that are used by these regional

groups. These types of organizations need to be understood by identifying who is moderate or radical. Then, their more violent tendencies can be mitigated.

Mosques and cultural centers are the purest recruitment vehicles because any dwelling can become a place of worship and discussion. For example, if an imam at a mosque fails to support extremist teachings, militant groups can launch afterschool classes for indoctrination. These facilities help terrorists broaden their ranks and distribute propaganda. Discussion and sharing of texts and stories also contribute to spreading terrorist rhetoric. Bookshops, online Web sites, and cyberstores allow mosques and cultural centers to circulate manuals for terrorism and other jihadist materials. Many publications are radical in content and virulent in tone. Inflammatory films and documentaries that depict violent conflicts abroad involving Muslims (e.g., Bosnia, Chechnya) are often used to nudge impressionable youth toward jihadism. Speeches given by radical Islamic clerics also can lead to recruitment. In addition, as spiritual centers, mosques enjoy relative immunity from overt surveillance in Western countries.

Universities are ideal sites to recruit and incubate potential terrorists. Colleges with a large percentage of foreign students are ideal for rallying demonstrations and identifying future potential midlevel administrators. Many Al Qaeda members prior to September 11 were radicalized at British, German, and French universities. They were students in urban studies, planning, computer sciences, and other technology-related departments. These departments are not the traditional center for political activity and recruitment. It should be noted that university Islamic student organizations are often the conduit for bringing potential recruits from technical departments into contact with hardened terrorist recruiters. This has been recognized as a problem in Britain, where the country's National Union of Students has already taken action to ban a number of highly radicalized Islamic student groups.

Youth organizations are also critical to the recruitment of young supporters and activists. Youth groups associated with mosques are frequently tied to insurgent groups and terrorist networks, a pattern repeated throughout the Middle East and Southeast Asia. Youth groups frequently mix religious content with physical activities to promote camaraderie. Sporting events are among the best means to entertain, educate, and attract Muslim youth. There is anecdotal evidence to suggest that sporting events sponsored by various Muslim youth organizations in Britain are actually mechanisms for determining which potential recruits have the physical strength required to become fighters for Islamist causes in Asia, the Middle East, and the former Soviet Union. Those who demonstrate physical skills and stamina in these youth outings are then sent to other locations for actual military training. WAMY, the Saudi-based World Assembly of Muslim Youth, has chapters featuring sleep-away camps. Al Qaeda successfully penetrated WAMY through two Islamic NGOs, the International Islamic Relief Organization and al-Haramain.

Internet cafés and technical training centers help indoctrinate computer-literate young people with skills ranging from data collection to hacktivism. In conflict zones, Islamic groups associated with known terrorist fronts have established computer centers not only for intelligence purposes but also to convert and indoctrinate potential future foot soldiers. Such centers were established in Dagestan in 1999 and 2000 and were used to distribute Wahhabist literature including Al Qaeda propaganda.

Prisons are a potentially fertile ground for radical recruitment.¹²⁸ They present four issues:

- *Survival.* Large groups of violent men and women are gathered in a small and not completely supervised or controlled environment. At a basic level, inmates are susceptible to radical group alignment because they want to survive their time in prison.
- *Status.* An inmate's status determines the level of relative privilege that the individual has.
- *Time.* The expected duration of incarceration the inmate is facing should be considered in conjunction with survival and status.
- *Ethnic background* often reduces or determines the choices of group alignment available to the prisoner.

Despite the tough and often violent personalities of inmates, most desire acceptance and community. This sense of acceptance or community can be found in a variety of ways, which allow the inmate to fulfill the four primary motivations for inmate actions described above. An Islamic ideology presented to a socially needy individual may provide an inmate with a desirable status and the increased likelihood of survival while in prison. Consequently—and most important—prisons can be a state-subsidized sanctuary to recruit and plan operations. Terrorist organizations can also recruit sympathetic individuals with a criminal background from outside the prison population. For example, the Algerian Armed Islamic Group worked extensively with ethnic Algerian and other Arab criminal networks in Canada in the early 1990s to gain expertise in criminal tactics and help subsidize their operations.

Military Implications

While the policymaker has to contend with ways to mitigate recruitment nodes, the U.S. military must contend with Islamic fighters. The way that violent Islamists use

¹²⁸ See, for example, the role of Palestinian Islamic Jihad in prison recruitment as discussed in Abu Amr (1994), p. 95. In the United States, the recruitment of inmates to radical Islamic positions in the Black Muslim Brotherhood is transferable to other radical positions as well. For instance, the Aryan Nations (a white only, seed-line Christian identity group) has been very successful in recruiting prisoners to its cause.

Muslim networks can directly affect a number of military missions. Obviously, the ability to tap recruiting nodes for various types of operations is possible around critical coalition airbases and seaports, particularly in the CENTCOM, EUCOM, and PACOM Areas of Responsibility (AORs). Slums are increasingly being seen as an important node from which to plan and launch attacks; in the third world, U.S. strategic interests frequently abut very poor and marginal areas.

For the most part, Muslim networks perform necessary social functions and should be encouraged—provided that they are not transmitters of radical Islamic ideologies and violence. However, Muslim networks that have been infiltrated by Islamic fundamentalists do not want to be under the supervision of Western aid agencies or the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Muslim health and medical networks have not been adhering to the 1993 International Federation of the Red Cross NGO Code of Conduct, which calls for NGOs to remain apolitical in complex emergencies and conflict. In the near term, the United States and its allies can expect to see more attempts by nonstate actors with a political Islamic agenda to take advantage of local conflicts and natural disasters. In conflict zones, U.S. foreign humanitarian assistance operations will likely be subject to penetration by Islamic insurgents, who will attempt to use sympathetic indigenous military and civilian personnel to access medical facilities to treat their own and influence local populations.

Islamic insurgents will be able to treat most of their own urban combat wounds, particularly when the level of violence is low. “Sector and seal” operations, in which small sectors of an urban area are sealed off one by one, are likely to result in treatable insurgent casualties. Moreover, Islamic insurgents can be expected to try to turn the use of precision weapons by their adversaries to their own advantage. By causing incapacitation but not death, such weapons allow insurgents to claim a higher “moral stature” for having survived and recovered from their injuries. At the same time, Islamic insurgents are likely to engage in psychological warfare, magnifying or making false claims of collateral damage to civilians. In fact, Islamists will use tactics of asymmetric warfare to enhance their medical capabilities during a deployment, whether during a complex emergency or conflict. Islamists will also try to gain influence and control over noncombatants by distributing food and providing medical support and other relief obtained from locations outside contested areas.

The interactions between Muslim humanitarian organizations and insurgencies and violent Islamists have important implications for U.S. and coalition military forces engaged in urban operations in regions where these organizations are operating. Any effort to incorporate Muslim NGOs into civil military cooperative arrangements should be undertaken with the greatest care. This was quite apparent during the Karbala pilgrimage immediately following the downfall of Saddam Hussein. Hawza al-Ilmiya, a center of Shi’ite learning in the holy city of Najaf, sent in thousands of volunteers to manage security and traffic for the Karbala pilgrimage during which an estimated one million Shi’ites marched to the holy shrine. American

troops were ready with food and water, but they were not needed. However, Major James M. Bozeman, a civil affairs officer attached to the 82nd Airborne Division, said U.S. Special Forces treated scores of pilgrims for sprains, cramps, and heat exhaustion. Water trucks were brought in for the pilgrims. Roving U.S. personnel sprayed worshippers with rose water, which cools and conveys a blessing.¹²⁹ Developing a working model in which the U.S. military works with Muslim networks during complex emergencies and conflict will make it easier to win the hearts and minds of civilians and political actors alike.

¹²⁹ "Iraqi Shiites Worship at Karbala Shrine," *Associated Press*, April 22, 2003.

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Muslim Diasporas by Country of Residence

The following table presents information on the number, countries of origin, and places of residence of diaspora Muslims.

Table A.1
Muslim Diasporas by Country of Residence

Percentage/Number of Muslims	Countries of Origin	Year of First Migration Wave	Location of Settlement in Diaspora
Australia			
Total:	200,885 ^a		
2000 arrivals:		FYR: 28,300 India: 16,400 ^b	
Austria			
2001 total:	134,210 60,000 – 80,000 30,000 5,000 – 6,000 7,000 – 8,000 ^c	Turkey Bosnia Kosovo Albanians Egypt Iran	
2000 total (Vienna):	1,123 376 533 220 1,241 925 545 ^d	Iraq Lebanon Libya Morocco Pakistan Tunisia Syria	
Belgium			
1990 total:	289,400 99,000 164,900 12,400 8,300 1,500 3,300 ^e	Turkey Morocco Algeria Tunisia Pakistan Other	More than 42% in Brussels and other French-speaking industrial cities in south. Substantial numbers of Turks have been coming to Antwerp, Ghent, and regions such as Limbourg

Table A.1—continued

Percentage/Number of Muslims	Countries of Origin	Year of First Migration Wave	Location of Settlement in Diaspora
Canada			
2001 total:	579,640		
Canadian-born:	137,835		
Foreign-born:	415,835		
Immigrated before 1991:	139,975		
Immigrated between 1991–2001:	275,860 ^f		
Caribbean			
English-speaking Caribbean:	172,250		Caribbean Islamic Secretariat established 1988.
Out of total population of	5,836,601		
French-speaking Caribbean:	2,600	West Africa,	Guadeloupe, Guyana Francaise,
Out of total population of	7,178,572	Senegal, Mali	Haiti, Martinique—has wealthy immigrant Palestinian community, some funding by Dar al-Ifta of Saudi Arabia
Spanish-speaking Caribbean:	3,500		Cuba (no number known);
Out of total population of	20,537,000		Puerto Rico: strong Palestinian community (2,000 members with two mosques)
Dutch-speaking Caribbean:	121,000	Arab and Indo-Pakistani (Arabs have a mosque; Indians are less organized)	Curacao (no figures known);
Out of total population of	635,415	Surinam: Javanese have been settled for more than 50 years; Indo-Pakistanis arrived as indentured laborers more than 100 years ago; also Afro-Surinamese community	St. Martin (no figures known); Surinam (28.23% of population) and Nethfral, Antilles

Table A.1—continued

Percentage/Number of Muslims	Countries of Origin	Year of First Migration Wave	Location of Settlement in Diaspora
Denmark			
Total (estimated):	122,200	First arrivals in 1950s; first mosque built in 1958	Majority of Muslims are concentrated in Copenhagen area along with Aarhus, Aalborg, Odense, and Roskilde
	26,000	Bosnia and FYR	
	4,000	Iran	
	11,000	Iraq	
	7,800	Lebanon and Levant	
	3,600	Morocco	
	7,100	Pakistan	
	8,700	Palestine	
	13,000	Somalia	
	38,000	Turkey	
	3,000	Others	
France			
Total:	4–5 million ⁹	From reduced workforce after WWII, France recruited immigrants to work as laborers from North African dependencies	
		Other Arab	First wave: 1914–1918 during World War I. Muslim immigration related to industrialization and mining. Most Muslims were Algerian and Moroccan recruited by French. In 1920 labor was needed for postwar reconstruction
		Non-Arab, including Turks	Until 1960 majority of Muslims immigrants were Algerian from Tizi Ousou, Setif, and Constantine regions. In 1970s, Turks began arriving in large numbers
		Asians, including Pakistanis and Indonesians	
		French converts	
		Others	After 1970 most immigrants were women and children instead of males

Table A.1—continued

Percentage/Number of Muslims	Countries of Origin	Year of First Migration Wave	Location of Settlement in Diaspora
Germany			
Total (estimated):	2.9 million	Turks predominate. Following the civil war in FYR, Bosnian Muslims now second-largest immigrant group and have strong ties with Turkish immigrants	Because of reduced workforce after World War II, Germany entered recruitment agreements with Turkey in 1961, Morocco in 1963, and Tunisia in 1965
Out of 3,000,000 total Muslim population:			Muslim community primarily in large urban centers
67.9% = 2,035,564	Turkey		In late 1940s and early 1950s, relatively large-scale migration of Iranian businessmen to Hamburg (Hunter, 2002, p. 30). Major migration from Bosnia-Herzegovina after beginning of Bosnian war
5.6% = 167,690	Bosnia		
3.9% = 116,446	Iran		
2.7% = 81,450	Morocco		
2.4% = 71,955	Afghanistan		
1.7% = 51,211	Iraq		
1.3% = 38,257	Pakistan		
1.0% = 54,063	Lebanon		
0.8% = 24,260	Tunisia		
0.6% = 17,186	Algeria		
0.3% = 12,107	Albania		
0.3% = 8,350	Somalia		
11.6% = 55,600	Other countries		
3.3%	German Muslims		

Table A.1—continued

Percentage/Number of Muslims	Countries of Origin	Year of First Migration Wave	Location of Settlement in Diaspora
Great Britain			
2001 total:	1,546,626		Total/percent of population:
Pakistani:	658,000		Tower Hamlets: 71,000 (36%)
Bangladeshi:	260,000		Newham: 59,000 (24%)
Indian:	160,000		Blackburn: 27,000 (19%)
Arab and African:	350,000		Bradford: 75,000 (16%)
			Waltham Forest: 33,000 (15%)
			Luton: 27,000 (15%)
			Birmingham: 140,000 (14%)
			Hackney: 28,000 (14%)
			Pendle: 12,000 (13%)
			Slough: 16,000 (13%)
			Brent: 32,000 (12%)
			Renbridge: 29,000 (12%)
			Westminster: 21,000 (12%)
			Camden: 23,000 (12%)
			Haringey: 24,000 (11%)
			Concentrated primarily in a few large cities
			Almost half of the Muslim population in or near London
			Nearly all Turkish Cypriots and half of Bangladeshis live in inner-city London
			Majority of Arabs and Iranians live in London

Table A.1—continued

Percentage/Number of Muslims		Countries of Origin	Year of First Migration Wave	Location of Settlement in Diaspora
Guyana				
Estimated at nearly 12% of total population ^h		Predominantly South Asian, but growing Afro-Guyanese Muslim community	Muslim presence only since mid-20th century with growth of Indo-Guyanese population	Networks: Caribbean Islamic Organization of Guyana Islamic Trust; Guyana Muslim Mission; Guyana Islamic Institute
		Afghan Pathan Muslims, via Afghanistan and India	Africans were first Muslim group in region. Islamic influence may have begun with West African Mandinka travelers. Slave trade brought millions of Muslims to Caribbean	
			South Asian Muslims arrived 1838–1916	
Italy				
2000 total (estimated):	1,000,000		First wave of immigration began in 1970s	In early 1970, Union of Muslim Students in Italy was established; first mosque was in Rome. Early mosques created by intellectual elite (not immigrant workers) from Middle East (Syria and Jordan); many were Palestinian
Population by origin: ⁱ	163,868	Albania	During 1980s and 1990s, immigrants began arriving from Maghreb, sub-Saharan African countries, Albania, and other Middle Eastern countries, as well as Latin America. Eastern Europeans began arriving more recently	
	12,991	Algeria		
	17,984	Bangladesh		
	14,058	Bosnia		
	37,674	Egypt		
	8,510	Iran		
	10,000 (est.)	Italian converts		
	194,617	Morocco		
	10,000 (est.)	Other Yugoslav		
	17,117	Pakistan		
	39,708	Senegal		
	12,056	Somalia		
	60,441	Tunisia		
	6,545	Turkey		
Jamaica				
3.75% / 5,000				

Table A.1—continued

Percentage/Number of Muslims	Countries of Origin	Year of First Migration Wave	Location of Settlement in Diaspora
Netherlands			
Total (estimated):	700,000	Country of origin: ^j	First wave: 1932, from Dutch colonies in Indonesian archipelago
	284,679	Turkey	Second wave: 1950s, Surinamese. After colony's independence, numbers rose to 188,000 by end of 1975. Surinamese, with ethnic roots in Indian subcontinent and Java, dominated migration wave in 1974–1975. Largest wave of Muslims immigration occurred in 1960s, consisting primarily of workers from Turkey and Morocco. First wave of group was single males, second wave of group was workers joined by families
	247,443	Morocco	
	35,638	Suriname	
	28,502	Iraq	
	26,050	Somalia	
	17,432	Iran	
	15,115	Pakistan	
	15,020	Afghanistan	
	12,272	Egypt	
	48,000	Other	
			Third wave: After 1979, consisted of political refugees fleeing revolutions and civil wars. Many members of opposition groups in Iran were granted asylum. Other refugees came from Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan, FYR, and Somalia. Dutch converts constitute about 5,000 of total 700,00 estimate
New Zealand			
Estimate:	14,000		First documented in 1874 census—migrants of Indian descent from Fiji and India

Table A.1—continued

Percentage/Number of Muslims	Countries of Origin	Year of First Migration Wave	Location of Settlement in Diaspora
Norway			
Total (estimated):	74,000		Majority live around Oslo and Akershus, as well as Bergen, Drammen, Stavanger, and Trondheim. Most Pakistanis live in Oslo; most Turks are spread out among other cities
	10,000	Bosnia	
	9,000	Iran	
	5,000	Iraq	
	6,000	Kosovo	
	3,000	Lebanon & Levant	
	4,500	Morocco	
	5,000	Pakistan	
	7,000	Somalia	
	21,000	Turkey	
	3,500	Others	
Russia			
Estimated 12% of population ^k			Largest cities of Central Russia, including Moscow
Spain			
Total (December 2001): ^l	234,937		
Legal residents from primarily Muslim countries/newly legalized immigrants: ^m			
	8,495 / 9,551	Algeria	
	9 / 12	Chad	
	9 / 0	Djibouti	
	972 / 465	Egypt	
	105 / 18	Ethiopia	
	8,524 / 1,411	Gambia	
	185 / 28	Libya	
	2,281 / 842	Mali	
	1,651 / 3,742	Mauritania	
	161,870 / 78,759	Morocco	

Table A.1—continued

Percentage/Number of Muslims	Countries of Origin	Year of First Migration Wave	Location of Settlement in Diaspora
Spain (continued)			
62 / 34	Niger		
4,214 / 4,277	Nigeria		
7,744 / 8,303	Senegal		
99 / 24	Somalia		
116 / 56	Sudan		
90 / 201	Tunisia		
22 / 14	Afghanistan		
3 / 1	Bahrain		
850 / 1,086	Bangladesh		
3 / 0	Brunei		
201 / 41	Indonesia		
1,959 / 245	Iran		
702 / 110	Iraq		
646 / 92	Jordan		
24 / 3	Kuwait		
1,093 / 137	Lebanon		
127 / 38	Malaysia		
2 / 4	Mongolia		
8 / 0	Oman		
5,126 / 7,698	Pakistan		
201 / 52	Palestine		
2 / 1	Qatar		
240 / 3	Saudi Arabia		
195 / 22	Sri Lanka		
1,010 / 264	Syria		
498 / 105	Turkey		
5 / 1	UAE		
14 / 3	Yemen		
204 / 60	Albania		
929 / 129	Bosnia		
28 / 41	Kazakhstan		
15 / 14	Uzbekistan		

Table A.1—continued

Percentage/Number of Muslims	Countries of Origin	Year of First Migration Wave	Location of Settlement in Diaspora
Suriname			
20% of 425,000 population	Javanese, from Indonesian archipelago; Indo-Pakistani; Afro-Surinamese Afghan Pathan Muslims via Afghanistan and India	Originally brought by Dutch as contract workers on plantations, began arriving in 1890s. Mostly Kejawen Muslims from Java	
Sweden			
Total (estimated):	250,800		Most Muslims are settled in Stockholm and suburbs
Breakdown by origin: ¹	3,100 Afghanistan 1,300 Algeria 1,500 Bangladesh 60,000 Bosnia 1,500 Egypt 5,000 Ethiopia 1,200 Gambia 48,000 Iran 37,000 Iraq 8,500 Kosovo/Albania 17,000 Lebanon 4,000 Morocco 2,700 Pakistan 12,000 Somalia 5,000 Syria 2,500 Tunisia 30,000 Turkey 1,500 Uganda 9,000 Others		Gothenburg and Malmo. Turks are evenly spread around cities; Malmo has most Muslims from FYR

Table A.1—continued

Percentage/Number of Muslims	Countries of Origin	Year of First Migration Wave	Location of Settlement in Diaspora
Trinidad			
Estimated 8.10% of population			International Islamic Federation of Student Organizations (IIFSO)
United States			
2000 total (estimated):	4,175,000	First group to arrive to United States came from West Africa because of slave trade, 1530–1851. Second sizable wave came during early 1900s, primarily from Lebanon, Syria, and other parts of the Ottoman Empire	East Coast: 32.3% South: 25.3% Central/Great Lakes: 24.3% West: 18.2%
77.6% immigrants; 22.4% U.S. born			
Breakdown by origin: ^o	23.8% African Americans 26.2% Middle East Arab 24.7% South Asia 11.6% Other 10.3% M.E. not Arab 6.4% East Asia	Third wave came post-World War II, during 1960s and 1970s, from all over the Muslim world including those who came to study	

NOTE: FYR = Former Yugoslav Republic

^a1996 figures; www.geocities.com (published by Australian Bureau of Statistics).

^b2000 figures; Australia Bureau of Statistics, 2002.

^cAustrian Statistical Office (in Hunter, 2002).

^dStatistical Service of the Municipality of Vienna (in Hunter, 2002).

^eFelice Dassetto, 1997 (in Hunter, 2002).

^f2001 Census, Statistics Canada, <http://www.statcan.ca/start.html>.

^gwww.csis.org/europe/frm990412.html; March 6, 1999.

^hChickrie, Raymond; March 2003; in: http://www.guyana.org/features/afghanguyanese_muslim.htm.

ⁱInstituto Nazionale di Statistica, <http://demo.istat.it/e/stra1/query.php>.

^jCentraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, <http://statline.cbs.nl>.

^k1997 data, www.intas.be/catalog/93-3241.htm.

^lInstituto Nacional de Estadística taken from Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, <http://www.ine.es>.

^m1999 figures, Immigration Office, Madrid (in Hunter, 2002).

ⁿHunter, 2002.

^oU.S. Department of State, International Information Programs, <http://usinfo.state.gov>.

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