

# CHRISTIANS *and* JEWS *in the* TWELFTH-CENTURY RENAISSANCE

Anna Sapir Abulafia

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*For David:*

*'This is my beloved, and this is my friend,*
*O daughters of Jerusalem.'*
*(Song of Songs 5:16)*

# CONTENTS

# PREFACE

This book reflects years of thinking about the effect of the development of ideas in the twelfth-century renaissance on Christian attitudes towards Jews. Christian attitudes towards Jews lie at the centre of my study, not Jewish attitudes towards Christians. This is the aspect of the Christian-Jewish debate that has interested me most, and I believe that it is in this area that fresh assessment is much needed. Over the past fifteen years I have published a number of articles on the eleventh-and twelfth-century authors who feature in this book. No attempt has been made to repeat the detailed arguments which can be found in those papers. On the contrary, the purpose of writing this book has been to bring together in a much wider framework all the thoughts that I have been developing on this topic over so many years. Readers who wish to find details concerning textual particulars and details concerning authorship, dates and provenance will find the references they need in the notes.

Research for this book has been conducted over a long period of time and there are many people and institutions to whom I owe a debt of thanks. My parents, Berti and Boris Sapir, have always shown a keen interest in my work. Their love and support have been of the utmost importance to me all my life. It is a particular regret to me that my father did not live to see this book in print. In my Alma Mater, the University of Amsterdam, two people were especially influential for the direction of my later research. Drs Hans van Rij introduced me to the Hebrew chronicles of the First Crusade. It was my interest in the invectives in these chronicles that prompted me to study the polemical material of the eleventh and twelfth centuries. Drs Bert Demyttenaere aroused my interest in the history of ideas by engaging me in many fascinating conversations about sources and their interpretation. It was a great honour and pleasure to become their colleague in 1979.

Of the people who helped me when I moved to Cambridge after my marriage two must be named: Dr Marjorie Chibnall and Professor Christopher Brooke. I shall always be grateful for the kindnesses they showed me in those difficult years when I had to rebuild the career I had left behind in Amsterdam. I am deeply grateful to the President and Fellows of Clare Hall who elected me to a non-stipendiary Research Fellowship in 1981. The fellowship gave me the academic home I needed in Cambridge. My greatest debt must be to the President and Fellows of Lucy Cavendish College who elected me to the Laura Ashley Research Fellowship in 1987. The fellowship made it possible for me to continue my teaching and research after the birth of my second child. I thank the Laura Ashley Foundation for financing the post. Finally, I warmly thank Lucy Cavendish for showing their confidence in me by electing me into the Cassel College Lectureship in History in 1990. I am grateful to the Sir Ernest Cassel Educational Trust for their help in financing the lectureship.

My biggest vote of thanks must go to my husband, David Abulafia. His encouragement as a fellow medievalist has been invaluable in all the years we have been together. He was the first to read this book and I am very grateful for his useful suggestions. His enthusiastic role as a father to Bianca and Rosa has made it possible for the Abulafia household to cope with two busy historians. It has been the task of Bianca and Rosie to keep their mother firmly in touch with reality. Their love has been an inspiration throughout.

Anna Sapir Abulafia
June 1994

# INTRODUCTION

This book concerns the Christian-Jewish debate and the twelfth-century renaissance within the context of the many changes that took place in late eleventh- and twelfth-century northwestern European society. One of the great innovations of the period was the increased interest in available classical material and the unbridled urge to find more. The epithet 'renaissance', which is used to describe the intellectual activity of the late eleventh and the first half of the twelfth centuries, captures the excitement scholars felt as they glimpsed inside a world of uncharted treasures. But their excitement was tempered by a considerable amount of trepidation. For they were forced to come to terms with the fact that there existed outside Christianity an impressive body of knowledge. And because their view of truth was exclusive they had no choice but to absorb classical authorities into Christian thought. Paradoxically this was happening just when, for the first time in many centuries, European Christianity was not physically threatened by outside invaders. In the south the Saracens, in the north the Vikings and in the east the Hungarians had successfully been held back. Indeed it was Christian Europe that in its turn was pushing its boundaries outwards. With the threat of outside invasion removed, ecclesiastical institutions could begin to concentrate their efforts on more thoroughly Christianizing the areas under their influence. On the one hand much was done to extirpate any remaining vestiges of paganism. On the other the need was felt to revivify the experience of Christianity for those who were, at least nominally, of that faith.

Over and above the spirit of Christian renewal which seems to have captured the imagination of a wide cross-section of the Church, forces within the institutional Church increasingly strove, from the second half of the eleventh century onwards, to centralize the

structure of the Church. The attempt at centralization went hand in hand with developing ideas about the universal power of the Pope and views about the intrusive role the personnel of the Church, that is the priesthood, were required to play within a properly Christian society. A number of further paradoxes arose from this. At the very same time that efforts were under way to strengthen the position of the Pope both within and outside the Church, temporal governments were increasingly making their own political structures more sophisticated. Whilst the notion that these temporal structures were themselves Christian entities was not in doubt, it was far from a foregone conclusion that it was the responsibility of a centralized clergy to regulate all religious aspects of that Christian organism.

A second paradox arose from the fact that these ecclesiastical developments were accompanied by economic expansion. In northwestern Europe economic growth was not only extensive; it was sudden. This growth not merely substantially changed the social map of the period in so far as rapid urbanization took place. It meant that what had largely been a gift economy rapidly turned into a money economy. The question that arose was whether a society which was supposed to be striving to achieve a greater content of Christianity could at the same time focus its energy on getting rich. Were money and morals compatible? Could apostolic poverty remain a valid goal in a society that was beginning to experience the fruits of economic expansion?

A third paradox concerns the institutional Church itself. Attempts at centralization occurred during a period of spiritual renewal. This begged the question whether the proposed format of the Church actually best met the aims which many of its members were developing concerning the content of its teaching. In short, did an increase in the power of the Pope and his ministers serve the interests of those who strove for greater Christian spirituality? The negative answer which many gave to this question goes some way to explaining the rise in heresy from 1100 onwards.

R.I.Moore has labelled the twelfth century as the period in which European society began to brand its deviants as outcasts. His central thesis is that the changes which took place in the twelfth century generated the creation of in- and out-groups. He asserted that the literati, the new administrators who owed their position of power to their education, initiated persecution in order to consolidate their own social standing.[1]

Moore is absolutely right that in this changing society the administrators, who shaped its various facets, were extremely influential in determining who belonged to the evolving social configurations and who did not. But their actions should not be interpreted too much in terms of power politics. In order to understand better what lay behind the choices those administrators made it is essential to examine the existing ideological tensions within the developing structures of twelfth-century Christian society. After all, the literati were as much part of society as the persons on whom they passed judgement. And as such they were compelled to find the right balance between the contrasting extremes with which they and everyone else were challenged: increasing wealth against the ideal of apostolic poverty; ecclesiastical centralization and bureaucratization against the quest of a large number of individuals to express their own feelings about God; increased emphasis on Christian ritual against the growing awareness of the existence of non-Christian beliefs and practices; growing interest in the scope of reason against the traditional medium of faith through revelation; and developing ideas about the normative functions of temporal government against ecclesiastical ideas about the necessary role of the priesthood within society. The ways people went about solving these paradoxes provide a key to the ideological climate of that society. For solutions were sought in order to create social structures that would, at least in theory, approximate to a Christian ideal. But these solutions could only work if strict boundaries were put in place that excluded all elements which seemed to challenge the feasibility of ever creating such an ideal.

This book concerns the attitudes of Christians towards Jews in northwestern Europe between about 1050 and 1150. According to Moore's interpretation the literati turned on the Jews because they considered Jewish administrative skills to be a threat to their own positions. That is why they twisted the truth and denigrated Jews as irrational and inferior creatures. Moore readily admits that there is not much proof that Jews actually held high administrative offices at the courts of northwestern Europe. But he is nonetheless confident that they had much influence on account of their superior education and their closeness to the court.[2] If, however, one turns aside from administrative power politics and directs one's attention more specifically to the current tensions within northwestern European society, one can discover a great many other, possibly more convincing, reasons for the worsening of northwestern European attitudes towards Jews. This book will concentrate on the theological and

intellectual marginalizaton of Jews within the context of all the socio-economic and ecclesiastical changes enumerated above.

Two books appeared in 1990 which have substantially enhanced our insights into medieval religious attitudes towards Jews: Gavin Langmuir's *History, Religion and Antisemitism* and *Toward a Definition of Antisemitism*.[3] The second book is a collection of essays which Langmuir published over the last couple of decades. The first is a penetrating study of the phenomenon of religion. Langmuir posits that it is not possible properly to discuss Christian religious attitudes towards Jews without first determining what religion is. Borrowing heavily from sociology, anthropology and psychology, Langmuir defines the terms which he considers indispensable for the purposes of writing the history of anti-Judaism and/or antisemitism: religion, religiosity, rational empirical thought, nonrational thought, irrational thinking, nonrational doubt and rational empirical doubt. Anxious to consider religion not by its content but as a social force, he defines it as 'those elements of religiosity that are explicitly prescribed by people exercising authority over other people'.[4] By religiosity he means 'the dominant pattern or structuring of nonrational thinking—and the conduct correlated with it—which the individual trusts to establish, extend, and preserve consciousness of his or her identity'.[5] Rational empirical thinking is taken 'to denote the kind of thinking…that has enabled human beings to develop tools and demonstrate their efficacy by results in principle observable and repeatable by anyone else'.[6] Nonrational thinking 'fluidly indicates and establishes for us a universe of relations between symbolized aspects of experience that could not be expressed if the symbols were employed unambiguously. It is our understanding of what we cannot express as knowledge.'[7] Nonrational doubt is 'uncertainty about beliefs, values, or a cosmology that is inspired, not by any conflicting rational empirical knowledge, but by the appeal of other beliefs'.[8] Rational doubt, on the other hand, appears as 'the result of consciousness of a conflict between nonrational beliefs and rational empirical knowledge'.[9] Finally, irrational thought emerges when individuals preserve belief 'by the suppression or compartmentalization of their capacity to think rationally and empirically about segments of reality and the projection on those realities of associations created by their nonrational thinking'.[10]

The purpose of formulating these terms and defining them in the way he does is for Langmuir to develop a vocabulary with which he can discuss the Christian religion in such a way that he can distinguish

between the official teachings of the European medieval Church, and what those who called themselves Christians actually believed. With this in place Langmuir sets out to pinpoint when and why Christian anti-Jewish feelings became antisemitic. For Langmuir the crucial moment came in the middle of the twelfth century when some Christians developed rational doubts about doctrines like the Eucharist. Simply put, these people had trouble believing what they were taught, namely that the physical objects of bread and wine really did become (and not just symbolize) the body and blood of Jesus Christ. Nor were they at ease with their religion's teachings about the divinity of Jesus once they began to concentrate their thoughts more carefully on his life as a human being. According to Langmuir irrationality set in when many of these Christians suppressed their rational empirical knowledge about the nature of objects and human beings in order to continue to subscribe to what they wished to believe. Their irrationality became social irrationality when other Christians accepted irrational thinking on their authority. This irrationality was turned against the Jews because they embodied the denial of precisely those beliefs about which so many doubts existed. The hostility already felt against Jews facilitated this process. For Langmuir antisemitism became established when irrational accusations like ritual murder, blood libel and host desecration were levied against Jews. For empirical knowledge of Jews began to be suppressed in order to create fantasies about Jews, which in turn buttressed Christian beliefs.[11]

The salient points of Langmuir's thesis are two. On the one hand he emphasizes the existence of tension between organized religion and those who subscribe, at least nominally, to its ordinances. On the other, he stresses the prevalence of doubt amongst Christians, confronted with rational empirical thought, which in due course caused widespread irrational thinking about Jews. The first point is obviously valid. Without using Langmuir's definitions I have attempted to make clear where I am discussing the workings of the institutional Church and where I am looking more closely at an individual scholar's perception of truth. I have also tried to show how closely the two are related. Within an authoritarian body like the medieval Western Church no Christian scholar could ignore completely what the official doctrine of the moment was.

The second point is more problematic, not because I would wish to dispute that chimerical ideas about Jews began to surface by 1150, nor because I would argue against labelling chimerical hostility against Jews antisemitism rather than anti-Judaism. What I shall attempt to

argue in this book is that the fanciful claims that Jews committed inhuman crimes did not just stem from irrationality caused by suppressed doubts about the congruity between visible reality and the beliefs of twelfth-century Christians. The novelty of twelfth-century thinking should not be sought almost exclusively in the period's renewed interest in empirical knowledge.[12] Twelfth-century thinkers were equally enthusiastically absorbing a great amount of Stoic thought about reason and natural law. This reason was not of the rational empirical sort which functions as Langmuir's yardstick. To them reason was an innate human capacity to perceive truth, and as such it would probably have to be placed for much of the time in Langmuir's category of nonrational thought. But to do so would be to obscure a major feature of twelfth-century thought, as the protagonists of that thinking saw it, for the sake of Langmuir's perception of what kind of thinking is universally acceptable to historians today. Contrary to Langmuir, I would argue that it is essential not to obscure this feature precisely because twelfth-century perceptions of what was reasonable and what was not had a lasting influence on European perceptions of what it was to be properly human.

I too believe that many thinkers of the twelfth-century renaissance and beyond experienced doubts as they struggled to face the challenge posed to them by classical thought. But I also think that many of them overcame their doubts, and not just by suppressing empirical evidence. Many of these thinkers were inspired by a genuine confidence that the proper use of reason (which they did not restrict to rational empirical thought) would necessarily lead not only to understanding but also to concurrence with Christian doctrine. But since they also thought that reason was the hallmark of human beings, separating humans from animals, they were led to conclude that those who could not accept their rational conclusions about Christianity were not really human. My book will argue that what developed was a universalistic construct of humanity based on reason which was deemed to coincide with universal Christendom. The inherent inclusiveness of this construct (everyone has reason, so everyone can be a Christian and the Church is open to all true believers) was, in fact, decidedly exclusive to anyone or any group who could not conform to the agreed philosophical and religious formulae. Thus a sideline of the intellectual endeavours of the twelfth-century renaissance was the marginalization of Jews. I will attempt to show that this form of marginalization interlocked with the exclusion of

Jews in many other areas. In this way twelfth-century ideas contributed to the concept that Jews were less than human, falling as they did outside what was deemed to be the pale of humanity.

Returning to Langmuir's terminology, I would argue that developments in what he would probably call nonrational thought conjured up chimeras of Jews as much as irrational thought did. The growing perception of the twelfth century that the separation between Jews and Christians was not just dictated by their difference in belief but by their supposed different capacity for reason was, I think, as much a seed-bed for fantasies about inhuman Jewish behaviour as the projection of suppressed doubt. The combination of the two was fatal for the continued existence of Jews in most parts of Western Europe in the later Middle Ages. From the end of the thirteenth century Jews were faced with one mass expulsion after another. Where they were allowed to continue to live they were segregated from Christians into ghettos. My interpretation is not a refutation of Langmuir's; it is, rather, an extension of his analysis. The importance which I attach to twelfth-century perceptions of reason for understanding the subsequent dehumanization of Jews dictates that I cannot employ Langmuir's terminology. In the appropriate chapters I shall point to the most interesting instances where our views diverge and where they are mutually reinforcing.

Because of my emphasis on twelfth-century thought, I have devoted the first section of this book to a discussion of the twelfth-century renaissance. In three chapters I attempt to give an overview of the development of thought in the period and to offer my interpretation of how Christian scholars stood up to the challenge put to them by classical philosophy. Part II concerns the wider background against which ideas about Jews took shape. In one chapter I discuss the many tensions within late eleventh- and twelfth-century northwestern European society. In another I turn to the challenge posed to this period's Christians by Judaism and Jews. The final section of the book specifically concerns the Jewish-Christian debate. Using the available anti-Jewish polemics of the period I illustrate how scholars, interacting with evolving ideas about Christian universality, developed ideas that seemed to push Jews to the edge of humanity. The epilogue attempts to show how essential an understanding of these twelfth-century developments is in order to assess correctly not only the thirteenth-century Talmud debate but also the legal and administrative measures put in place against Jews during the remainder of the medieval period.

The aim of the book is to give an accessible account of a very difficult and highly emotive topic in the history of the Middle Ages. Further, it is hoped that specialists in twelfth-century intellectual history will find it illuminating for the insights it offers concerning the development of Christian ideas about Jews. To those primarily interested in Jewish history this book aims to offer a useful account of the Christian background without which it is impossible to understand any facet of medieval Christian-Jewish relations. Finally, my approach, highlighting as it does the implications of constructing exclusive universalities, is intended to contribute something to the general understanding of some of the processes which can lead to the marginalization of minorities in any society.

# Part I

# THE TWELFTH-CENTURY RENAISSANCE

# 1

# THE SCHOOLS

The thinkers who will feature in the pages of this book did not operate in a vacuum. They were brought up and educated in the rapidly changing world of the end of the eleventh century and the initial decades of the twelfth century. Their attitudes to Judaism and the Jews were closely associated with their reception of the new sources of knowledge on offer to them. Equally what they thought about Jews was also linked to their appraisal of the socio-economic, political and ecclesiastical changes of their day. It is essential to remember that for all these people Jews were only one subject out of many upon which they pondered. To understand the implications of what they wrote about Jews it is necessary first to know something about the milieux in which they were educated and what they chose to do with the opportunities now open to them.

Gilbert Crispin (*c.*1045–1117) and Rupert of Deutz (*c.*1075–1129) were products of a custom that would decline in the course of the twelfth century.[1] They both entered monastic life as oblates: Gilbert was given by his parents, Norman aristocrats, to the newly founded monastery of Le Bec near Brionne; Rupert was given by much more modest parents to the monastery of St Lawrence in Liège which was dedicated in 1034, the same year Herluin founded Bec. Gilbert became abbot of Westminster in 1085; Rupert abbot of Deutz in Cologne at the end of 1120 or the early days of 1121.[2] Peter the Venerable (*c.*1094–1156) was an oblate too. He hailed from an Auvergne family that was intimately connected to Cluniac monasticism. He took his monastic vows in Vézelay, where he was put in charge of education. He was prior at Vézelay and Domène before being elected abbot of Cluny in 1122.[3]

Guibert of Nogent (1055?–*c.*1125) had been dedicated to God by his noble parents as a baby. He entered St Germer de Fly after a short period on his own after he had been released from the clutches of

his pious mother and punitive tutor. In Fly he continued his education and soon became a monk. He also received instruction from Anselm, who often visited Fly in his capacity first as prior and then as abbot of Bec (1063–93).[4] Guibert would later record how much that incidental teaching had meant to him.[5] Guibert became abbot of Nogent in 1104.[6]

Anselm (b. 1033) himself had come under the spell of Lanfranc, whom he found teaching in the school of Bec in 1059. Anselm had left his home in Aosta in 1056 after quarrelling with his high-born father whose economic position was insecure. Soon he was helping Lanfranc run the monastic school. In 1060 he joined Bec as a monk. He took over the school from Lanfranc when the latter left Bec to become abbot of Caen in 1063.[7]

The other scholars whose works will guide us in our understanding of the nature of the development of twelfth-century thinking about Jews were trained in and taught at the cathedral—and not the monastic —schools of Flanders and northern France. Odo of Cambrai (*c.*1050–1113) had enjoyed a successful teaching career at the cathedral school of Tournai since 1089 when he chose to retire to an austere form of monasticism in 1092. In his monastery of St Martin in Tournai he set in motion the creation of an impressive library. In 1105 he was chosen bishop of Cambrai in opposition to the imperial incumbent of that see.[8] Hildebert of Lavardin (1056–1133) became head of the cathedral school of Le Mans before becoming archdeacon (1091) and bishop (1096) of that town. His parents were not only poor but unfree.[9]

Peter Abelard (1079–1142) gave up what was his due as a noble first-born son in Brittany to study dialectic in Paris. He taught intermittently at Melun and Corbeil and set up a school on Mont Sainte Geneviève just outside Paris where he taught at various intervals in his life. Before his fateful affair with Heloïse he had achieved his ambition of teaching at the cathedral school of Notre Dame (*c.*1114–18). Prior to that he had spent a short period of time in 1113 in Laon where Anselm of Laon (d. 1117) was teaching what Abelard branded as outmoded. After becoming a monk in Saint Denis (1119) Abelard continued to teach (and to be censored) in different places, returning to Mont Sainte Geneviève in 1136. After his condemnation at the Synod of Sens in 1140, he was befriended by Peter the Venerable who looked after him until he died in 1142 at Saint-Marcel-lès-Chalon.[10]

The mysterious Odo, who composed a theological compendium in England in the 1140s, had evidently attended Parisian schools. His work betrays the imprint of two rival schools: the school of Abelard

and the School of St Victor, founded by one of Abelard's major antagonists, William of Champeaux in 1108.[11] William himself had been taught by Anselm of Laon; he was archdeacon of Notre Dame when Abelard was drawn to Paris to hear his lectures.[12]

Peter Alfonsi (*c.*1060–*c.*1140) is the odd man out. Not only was he born a Jew; he was born in territory that was being incorporated into the kingdom of Aragon. There he had at his fingertips a wealth of culture which his counterparts in northern Europe were only beginning to glimpse. Indeed, it was Alfonsi, who travelled to England and France after his conversion (in 1106), who introduced scholars of these kingdoms to elements of Greek, Muslim and Jewish thought.[13]

In the brief outlines of the careers of the scholars who will concern us in this study the term 'school' has cropped up time and again. But what do we actually mean when we use the word 'school'? How did schools function in monasteries and in cathedrals and what was their purpose? How did cathedral schools differ from those in a monastic setting? Did other forms of instruction exist? Who went to school and why? And finally, who did the teaching?

To begin at the beginning: the word 'school' or 'schools' can be used in a number of ways. First it can simply mean the physical setting where instruction took place. But it can also denote a group of masters each teaching in his own school. Finally it can signify the spirit or the method of the teaching of a particular master or group of masters.

The disintegration of public administration in the early Middle Ages meant that with the exception of Italy public schools ceased to exist. To find a school of any sort in this period one would have to go to a religious house or church where unlettered recruits found some form of instruction. Impressed by the quality of teaching he discovered in Anglo-Saxon monasteries, Charlemagne decided to harness this type of teaching in his programme for the revitalization of learning. Thus he stipulated in a capitulary which he sent at the close of the eighth century to the archbishops of his empire, that all bishoprics and monasteries provide an education to those who were capable of learning. This formalized and encouraged the development of monastic schools and schools attached to cathedrals.[14]

The establishment of schools in monasteries and cathedrals did not mean that tutors were no longer in demand. Throughout the period between the ninth and twelfth centuries tutors were employed by the upper echelons of society to give their children, who were not destined for the Church, some basic education. But tutors were also

used to give children a rudimentary education before they went to school. Some tutors would accompany their charges to one of the available cathedral schools.[15]

Guibert of Nogent's private tutor was employed when Guibert turned six. It is indeed not without interest to dwell on what Guibert wrote in his autobiography about the appointment of this tutor. He writes that there were few available teachers in the cities and even fewer in settlements surrounding castles. The tutors who were available were much less learned than the 'moderni temporis clericulis vagantibus', the wandering young clerks of the modern age, that is to say of *c.*1115, the time of writing of his book. The man Guibert's mother finally got hold of taught his charge on his own in a room in the castle near Catenoy in the region of Clermont-en-Beauvais where Guibert's family lived.[16] There is no doubt that had Guibert been born some fifty years later, his mother would have had much less trouble finding him a teacher among the many clerks looking to put to use what they had learned in the schools.

Monasteries which had to cope with a steady influx of completely uneducated oblates and novices would always need to provide at least some schooling for those destined to become monks in their midst. Following Charlemagne's instruction many monasteries opened these schools to the sons of local notables. For obvious reasons this did not always prove to be a successful formula. After all, the priorities of monks-to-be were substantially different from those of the offspring of the local gentry. Almost immediately a synod of abbots at Aachen in 817 decided to forbid the practice. Consequently some monasteries ran two schools, an internal one for oblates and an external one for outsiders.[17]

A perennial problem in monasteries, which ultimately affected the existence of not only their external but also their internal schools, was the vexing question concerning the proper place of study and teaching in the lives of people who had dedicated themselves to God. Part of the question had to do with ideas concerning the role monks could or should play in pastoral work. Rivalry between the secular diocesan clergy and the monks did nothing to simplify the issue. But on a more fundamental level there were worries about finding the right mean between studying for the sake of enhancing knowledge and studying as part of a monk's devotional exercises. As the amount of scholarly material expanded in leaps and bounds in the late eleventh and twelfth centuries it was generally felt more and more strongly that cathedral schools and not monastic schools were the proper places

for what we might call academic endeavours. The fervour of the new religious orders of the Reform Movement, stressing as it did the importance of individual devotion leading to individual spirituality, encouraged this view. In the course of the twelfth century many monasteries closed their external schools; some employed a clerk to stand at its head.[18]

Two other factors contributed to the decline of monastic schools. With the decline in the numbers of oblates within the traditional Benedictine houses and their total absence in most of the new monastic orders, providing a basic education became less of an obviously necessary task. With so many flourishing cathedral schools available, those who came to the monasteries as novices did not need to depend on their chosen monastery for their education. What happened to unlettered novices depended on the religious house in question. The Cistercians accepted such men as lay brothers who served their monastery as manual labourers; they did not take it upon themselves to educate them.[19] The other important factor to consider is that monastic schools *sui generis* lacked one of the prerequisite conditions for maintaining an exciting place of learning over a substantial period of time. Monastic schools could not provide the fluctuating population of students and masters that did so much to enrich the curriculum and the ambiance of some of the cathedral schools. It is not for nothing that clerks tended to look down on those who had not sat at the feet of the famous masters. Rupert of Deutz smarted under the contempt that the products of the cathedral schools had for the learning that he had received in the school of Saint Lawrence.[20]

All these factors meant that in the course of the twelfth century the great monastic schools of the Continent like St Gall, Fleury and Fulda lost their lustre. This is not to say that where schools were absent twelfth-century monks stopped using their minds. Contemplating and meditating on the Scriptures, the so-called *lectio divina,* could never cease to be an essential component of a monk's spiritual life. But the studying this involved did not necessitate the existence of a classroom. When Guibert entered Fly towards the last quarter of the eleventh century, he completed his education by making good use of the excellent library he found at his disposal. He does not speak of attending a school in his monastery. Nor does he describe the monastery as a particular place of collective scholarship. On the contrary he complains with his characteristic bitterness about the jealousy shown by the brethren for his learning.[21] But his near

contemporary, Gilbert Crispin, was lucky enough to have been educated in one of the best schools of the day: the monastic School of Bec.

The School of Bec, with which so many of our scholars were connected in one way or another, is an excellent illustration of the possible range of educational activities within a monastic institution. Eight years after Herluin founded Bec, in 1034 Lanfranc arrived at the monastery. At the time of his arrival he had already made his name as an expert dialectician in the schools of northern Italy. When in 1045 he was made prior of Bec he took over the school for oblates which was providing a run of the mill education in elementary Latin and the monastic office. He proceeded to develop the school into a place offering a new curriculum in which the trivium was harnessed to expound the Psalms and the Pauline Epistles, Lanfranc's set texts.[22] Before long Abbot Herluin allowed Lanfranc to open an external school to augment the finances of the monastery. To this school were attracted pupils from Normandy, France and Germany. Both Popes Nicholas II and Alexander II sent clerks to sit at Lanfranc's feet. It was Lanfranc's fame that attracted the wandering Anselm to Bec in 1059. Soon he was teaching alongside his mentor. But for all its success the external school at Bec was not an integral part of the monastery. In many ways—not least in charging for lessons—it was actually atypical of its genre. When Lanfranc left to take up the abbacy at Caen, the school was probably shut down again. The fact that even after this Bec did not immediately lose renown as a place of learning, with Orderic Vitalis referring to the monks of Bec as 'seeming to be philosophers', was entirely due to Anselm's inspired presence and teaching. But the future of Bec did not depend on its teaching facilities.[23] That became the business of the institutions of learning which had potentially more scope for long-term development: the cathedral schools.

The liturgical training of the choir stood at the centre of any cathedral school. Next to the choir school there could exist any number of classes to teach the diocesan clergy what they needed to know as administrators and pastors. Indeed an effective functioning of these classes had been made mandatory by Gregory VII's decree of 1078, in which he stipulated that the clergy be taught their letters.[24] It is plain that Gregory's vision of a hierarchic Church, structured with the Pope at its apex governing through papal legates in conjunction with the leaders of well administered local dioceses, could ill afford ignorant pastors.

It was indeed the urge for renewal, which was generated by the Gregorian Reform, that prompted masters and students to ponder in a professional way the pastoral questions arising from the social and economic changes of the period. The pastoral thinking that emerged concerned itself with the human condition, i.e. freewill, sin, redemption, marriage, money and so on. It also looked to the underlying meaning of Christian doctrine which led scholars to thinking about God and his creation. This prompted some masters, like Peter Abélard, to move on to a more speculative plane and contemplate matters like the nature of God.[25] For all these studies the Bible remained a textbook, offering on the one hand material to expound and on the other prooftexts to substantiate Christian doctrines of faith and precepts of behaviour. The natural companions of the Bible were the writings of the Fathers. But in the schools this was not considered sufficient material to cope adequately with the questions of the day. More and more attention was given to the study of the liberal arts, and in the hands of many a master it was the liberal arts, not pastoral exigencies, that became the prime focus of attention.

It is thus not difficult to appreciate that within a cathedral school the school attending to the diocesan clergy might find it difficult to keep in sight its sense of priorities. The situation would be exacerbated if the master in question was of such renown that he attracted vast numbers of students, who had little or nothing to do with the diocese. The continuing success of such a cathedral school depended on whether or not there was room in its structure for more than one master to cater for the disparate needs of the diocese and scholarship as a whole. The room that was needed was not only a measure of broadmindedness on the part of the relevant chancellor. Room in a physical sense had to be provided for students to attend classes. In addition students needed to be housed and fed. Could the town in question cater for an expanding student body? The long-range development of any cathedral school into a real place of learning hinged on an affirmative answer to this simple question.[26]

By the first quarter of the twelfth century the most flourishing cathedral schools in France were those situated to the north of the Loire: Angers, Le Mans, where Hildebert had been such a success in his day, Tours, Orléans, Chartres and especially Paris, which was becoming the real capital of the domain of King Louis VI.[27] Laon for its part could not maintain its reputation as one of the greatest schools after the death of its most famous master, Anselm.

Anselm of Laon had been taught by Anselm of Canterbury at Bec before he became master at the cathedral School of Laon. It is here that he wrote the glosses on the Bible that would become part of the *glossa ordinaria*. It is here that he together with his brother Ralph (d. 1131/33) expounded the Bible and the Fathers in order to answer questions of pastoral concern. It was Anselm's predilection for scriptural proofs rather than arguments based on the new learning of the trivium that earned him Abelard's derision. It was his reaction to Abelard that indicated what the future of the School of Laon would be. Abelard was thrown out on his ear when he had the temerity to set up rival classes to those of Anselm's. In Laon there was no room for a diversity of approach to learning.[28]

Abelard was probably far too severe in his censure of the teaching methods of Anselm. Although Anselm used the liberal arts much more cautiously than his one-time mentor, the other Anselm, he did much to professionalize the study of the Bible, and he and his pupils addressed a full range of theological questions arising from it. They were interested in knowing more about God's relationship to man and they pondered questions of practical morality. Anselm seems to have tackled such issues by dividing them into manageable questions. After the questions had been discussed in the classroom he presented their solution by formulating an answer that often judiciously weighed a number of arguments in favour of a given position and a number of arguments against it. These answers were called *sententiae* (sentences). But Anselm's sentences could also be a gloss on a scriptural text, with the gloss being used to shed light on a specific situation. His sentences and those of other masters were later assembled in sentence collections.[29]

Many sentence collections of the early and mid-twelfth century are ordered to deal with creation and salvation; the topics covered usually start with questions concerning the attributes of God and move on to his works of creation. Man's fall and its consequences, and the available remedies offered by Natural Law and the Law of Moses, often come next. This then tends to be followed by subjects like redemption, the sacraments, human morals, and so on. As will be shown later, some of these topics could involve a direct or an indirect discussion of Judaism and Jews. There is disagreement amongst scholars whether this order of topics, which was roughly adhered to, reflects the actual order in which Anselm himself taught at Laon. If this were so then Anselm's teaching could be said to have helped determine the structure of later sentence collections and even the

*summae* of the thirteenth century. Much more likely is that the compilers of the school texts of Laon organized the sentences they found in a way that suited them. They chose the ones they liked and added to their collection sentences from other masters. The difficulty in authenticating the contents of sentence collections is of course proverbial. The order of material that evolved has probably more to do with the subject matter being organized to facilitate ease of reference than with anything else. One must remember that these sentence collections served as handbooks not only for the secular clergy but also for the monks who insisted in keeping their hand in pastoral affairs. It was left to Peter Lombard (d. 1160) to put together the first fully and coherently organized sentence collection, which appeared after 1150. It is not surprising that its success was immediate.[30]

The contribution of Laon lay especially in the thoughtful way some contemporary issues were being handled. Abelard's objections notwithstanding, the biblical and patristic approach to these questions had enough freshness to attract and hold on to vast numbers of students. William of Champeaux, who was renowned as an expert in the liberal arts, sat at Anselm's feet. The sentences he later composed on theological topics so much show the imprint of Laon that one speaks of the joint school of Anselm of Laon and William of Champeaux. If distinguishing marks between his work and his teacher's are to be found, they would be a greater penchant for speculation and a greater emphasis on the trivium on William's part.[31]

After about 1100 Paris began to show itself more and more as the place of the future. By 1150 there can be no doubt that Paris could offer more masters and schools than its rivals like Reims or Chartres. It is precisely the diversity of the available instruction that allowed the schools of Paris to rise above the inherent limitations of a cathedral school primarily geared to the practical training of its clergy. Everything that was needed for expansion seems to have been at hand in Paris. The city was growing as a commercial centre; it could absorb a large number of students. The Capetian kings were making Paris their administrative and financial capital. They welcomed the growth of the schools as a contributing factor to the enhancement of their own political position. The jurisdiction of the chancellor of Notre Dame extended only to the instruction given at the cathedral school on Ile de la Cité. He could not prevent masters from establishing their own schools on the left bank of the Seine. Abelard set up a school at Mont Sainte Geneviève; Adam of Balsham

established his school on the Petit Pont in the early 1130s. In addition to these schools there was the school at St Victor and an important school at the abbey of canons of Sainte Geneviève. Rather than threaten the cathedral school, the very existence of these other schools assured prospective students that whatever the vicissitudes of Notre Dame, they were sure to find a master to their liking in Paris. What happened in Paris was not tied up with the reputation of one school or even one particular master. Its continuity as a place of learning was guaranteed by the number of different components it comprised.[32]

It does not lie in the scope of our study to examine the development of the Parisian schools beyond 1150 and the emergence of the university of Paris by 1215. Others have preformed that task most successfully.[33] What we do need to do is to say a few words about the school at St Victor before we draw together some important points.

St Victor was not established as a house of monks; William of Champeaux and his followers became canons regular adopting the Augustinian rule. They could be described as living a religious life that lay somewhere in between the monastic life and the existence of the secular clergy. Thus, notwithstanding opposition from some quarters —not least from Abelard—William set up a school at St Victor that was open to students who were not novices of the foundation. Hildebert of Lavardin encouraged him to maintain the school. As in monastic teaching there was a lively discussion whether or not canons regular should run schools accessible to outsiders. The reformers urged them to behave as monks in this respect; but the canons regular felt that their form of religious life was compatible with teaching. Indeed many of them had become canons regular precisely because they wanted to carry on their teaching at a comfortable remove from the hurly-burly of the cathedral schools.

William of Champeaux's house became an abbey with royal benefaction the year after he left St Victor to become bishop of Châlons-sur-Marne in 1113. Before long the abbey had over forty daughter houses. The school at St Victor was an important one, combining theological studies with a liberal arts education. Hugh of St Victor taught there between 1124 and 1141. His manual, the *Didascalion,* sought to outline what an education was really about: the attempt to enter into the world of learning, which comprises elements that fit together to make up one unified whole. The Victorines made an especially important contribution to biblical exegesis. Andrew of St Victor consulted rabbis on the meaning of the original Hebrew in order to compose the commentaries on the literal sense of the Bible

which he completed by 1147. It seems that until the middle of the twelfth century the school at St Victor remained open to outsiders. By 1175 the school had become an internal one, and St Victor lost the scholarly vitality it once had.[34]

When an effort was made at the end of the ninth century to institutionalize the provision of education, the surviving remnants of organized teaching were naturally enough seized upon. And because that teaching was ecclesiastical in nature the schools that emerged were ecclesiastical too, that is to say the monastic and cathedral schools and the schools managed by the canons regular which we have discussed.

It was from the person in charge of education in the relevant ecclesiastical institution that permission had to be gained to teach as a master in the area under the jurisdiction of that establishment. In a series of decretals Pope Alexander III (1159–81) regulated the granting of these teaching licences, emphasizing again and again the basic principle that licences should be given free of charge to suitable candidates.[35] Although no precise rules were ever put in place to prohibit laymen from teaching, in practice only monks and clerks had enough education to do so. Clerks were not laymen, but that does not mean that they were in holy orders. They enjoyed clerical status, having undergone the rite of tonsure, which in itself did not mean more than that they could (but did not have to) proceed to any one of the grades of Christian ministry.[36]

In practice those who attended the schools were monks or clerks or those who were destined to become either. At least until the second half of the twelfth century it is true to say that laymen, who did attend monastic or cathedral schools, would usually do so for only a short while in order to get a rudimentary education. Generally speaking, being educated was tantamount to being a clerk, at least if one were a Christian male. As we shall see later, literacy was much more widespread among Jews than Christians. Nuns would be able to get an education in their convents; noble ladies were sometimes admitted to these schools. Others, like Heloïse, would have to rely on private tutors.[37]

The ecclesiastical nature of education outside Italy gave rise to much of the existing tension about the value of teaching and studying the liberal arts. We have seen how in monasteries there were worries about the place of learning in a monk's duty to devote himself to God. Even in cathedral schools there were bound to be doubts about teaching such material as subjects for their own sake rather than as

tools for learning how to function better as pastors. On the other hand, as the twelfth century progressed, more and more students flocked to the Parisian schools; these students' aim in studying seemed to be solely to find a good job afterwards in a secular or an ecclesiastical administration. They had little patience for an extensive curriculum in which they saw scant relevance for their future careers. Their critics had grave doubts about the propriety of going to school for the sake of private gain rather than knowledge and the public good. They rued the growth of specialization and professionalism which they discerned in the schools after about 1150.[38]

What we have here are fundamental questions about the content and role of knowledge in human beings' spiritual and material development. The answers that our thinkers found to these questions were a constituent part of their view of the Church and Christian society. But they also affected their thinking about those who lay outside those structures: the Jews and other non-Christians. Before we can examine their conception of the role of the liberal arts in their Christian lives, we must first know much more precisely what these people were taught and how that could impinge on their thinking about themselves and the society they lived in.

# 2

# THE TOOLS OF REASON AND CHRISTIAN HUMANISM

When twelfth-century renaissance schoolmen put their minds to the political, socio-economic, moral and ecclesiastical issues of their day they had at their disposal a growing variety of tools within shifting patterns of thought. First and foremost their considerations were influenced by the ideology of the faith they were part of. Thus the prayer-books they used together with the Latin Bible, patristic and other sacred writings determined much of their thinking. However, that thinking was not nearly as homogeneous as one might be tempted to suppose. In the first place many Fathers of the Church had in their own day drawn heavily on ancient Greek and Latin thought, so their output never ceased to provide a glimpse of a non-Christian past that was waiting to be consulted at first hand once again. Secondly, as the eleventh century drew to a close and as the twelfth century progressed, more and more classical texts began to be (re)examined by scholars in northwestern Europe. Nor was the perspective of faith static. Traditional religious material was constantly being re-examined and reinterpreted in the light of new knowledge and experience. And fresh works, which had picked up a medley of classical pagan ideas, were being added to the canon.

Fundamental to any study of the shifts in thinking in the twelfth-century renaissance is an appreciation of what was actually meant by 'reason' and 'rational thought' in this period. *Ratio* in its most technical sense was supposed to be the intuitive quality which human beings possess and with which they are able to perceive truth. Despite what were obviously and persistently Platonic elements contained within this approach to 'reason', much of eleventh- and twelfth-century thinking on the subject was, in fact, permeated with Stoic ideas.[1] The

Stoics, whom Cicero had much admired, had taught that the entire universe was governed by godlike Reason. The gift of reason to man implanted in man an element of the divine. Reason not only linked man to what was divine; it united all men on account of their common possession of reason. Cicero writes in the *De Legibus,* a text that was widely disseminated in the twelfth century:

> that animal which we call man, endowed with foresight and quick intelligence, complex, keen, possessing memory, full of reason and prudence, has been given a certain distinguished status by the supreme God who created him; for he is the only one among so many different kinds and varieties of living beings who has a share in reason and thought, while all the rest are deprived of it. But what is more divine, I will not say in man only, but in all heaven and earth, than reason? And reason, when it is full grown and perfected, is rightly called wisdom. Therefore, since there is nothing better than reason, and since it exists both in man and God, the first common possession of man and God is reason.[2]

He goes on to say:

> Therefore among all the varieties of living beings, there is no creature except man which has any knowledge of God, and among men themselves there is no race either so highly civilized or so savage as not to know that it must believe in a god, even if it does not know in what sort of god it ought to believe. Thus it is clear that man recognizes God because, in a way, he remembers and recognizes the source from which he sprang.[3]

In the *De Officiis,* which was equally well known in the twelfth century, Cicero writes:

> But it seems we must trace back to their ultimate sources the principles of fellowship and society that Nature has established among men. The first principle is that which is found in the connection subsisting between all members of the human race; and that bond of connection is reason and speech, which by the processes of teaching and learning, of communicating, discussing, and reasoning associate men together and unite them in a sort of natural fraternity.[4]

One only needs to browse through the *De Legibus* and the *De Officiis* to know how often tmhese sentiments are voiced by Cicero. God (or

the gods) is the supreme embodiment of reason. Human beings are special; the reason given to them by the deity demarcates them from animals. The formation of groups is a natural human activity. Reason is the common and binding factor of humanity. It is also that which governs the order of the universe and the laws of nature. Taken as such, it is hardly surprising that the scholars of our period used reason to discover more about themselves and their fellow men. They turned to reason to understand better the function of language and the intrinsic meaning of words. Reason was also called upon to explicate the course of nature and the movements of the heavenly bodies. But because reason was understood to originate with God and come to man through God and thanks to God, reason was also used by late eleventh- and twelfth-century thinkers to understand more about God. And this explains why, for all their enchantment with classical thought, so many of the philosophical works of this period remained unswervingly preoccupied with God. For the thinkers of this period reason did not represent anything secular in the modern atheistic sense of the word. It opened their eyes to an alternative route to the divine than the tried and tested route of faith. The urgent question which they could not escape was to what extent the paths of faith and reason had overlapping termini.

In a much more precise sense the terms 'reason' or 'rational arguments' were used to denote the opinions and conclusions of classical philosophers, such as Plato, Cicero, Seneca and, increasingly, Aristotle. These were placed alongside biblical and patristic authorities, and detailed comparisons were made between them. In a very much looser sense the words 'reason' or 'rational arguments' were used in this period to describe a methodical use of data, whether or not the provenance of that data was Christian or pagan. But it should be obvious that more often than not the different meanings of reason overlapped considerably. Indeed, one of the most difficult tasks for any person studying texts of this period is to discover how reason is being defined and used at any one moment.

Before we can consider the different ways that our scholars felt their way along the roads of faith and reason, we must have a picture of the content of their schooling and we must make a start at gauging how the texts they were exposed to could affect their thinking about God, man and society.

The curriculum that most of our scholars experienced in one way or another was that of the liberal arts. Classical in origin, it had already been revived in the ninth-century Carolingian reorganization of

education. The liberal arts were seven, with grammar, rhetoric and dialectic (or logic) forming the trivium and arithmetic, astronomy, music and geometry the quadrivium. The trivium was at the same time the foundation of the whole liberal arts course and its focal point, growing in content and scope as more and more texts became available. Over and above the trivium and quadrivium four main specialisms developed in the course of the twelfth century: theology, law, philosophy and medicine. By the mid-twelfth century resentment was already being voiced by students about the time they were being asked to devote to the trivium.[5]

Grammar was the subject that trained students in the structure of language. Students learned about the relationships between words and the rules how to construct sentences. The two main textbooks which were used were the *Ars Maior* of Donatus, which dated to the fourth century, and especially the sixth-century *Institutiones* by Priscian. Priscian's diffuse work covered not only grammar but Latin literature in that it contained a very large number of quotations from the classics. Here students found many a passage from Ovid, Horace, Lucan, Juvenal, Cicero, and other writers. They could often find additional passages in the classical *florilegia* or anthologies which had been compiled in the Carolingian period, if they could not or did not want to consult the original texts. But all the quotations contained in Priscian's grammar made it a very difficult text to study. To help students find their way through it a number of eleventh-century masters added their commentaries to the text. The compilation of their glosses, the so-called *Glosule,* was used as a handbook to Priscian between 1050 and 1150.[6]

That it is possible for grammar to stimulate anyone's thoughts about God can be illustrated by the well-known example of Berengar of Tours (*c.*1000–1088), one of the best grammarians of his day. One of the reasons that Berengar could not be persuaded that the bread of the Eucharist could be changed in substance into the body of Christ was his knowledge of the grammatical rule that a proposition loses its meaning if its subject is destroyed by its predicate. According to Berengar this would be the case if Jesus Christ's words at the Last Supper, *'hoc est corpus meum'* ('this is my body') and the priest's repetition of those words at the moment of consecration of the host brought about the change of bread into the body of Christ. For that would mean that the predicate of the sentence *'est corpus meum'* ('is my body') had destroyed its subject, which is *'hoc'* ('this'), by taking away its intrinsic nature of being bread.[7]

Rhetoric traditionally taught students how to express themselves to their best advantage so that they could be at their most persuasive in any situation. Much emphasis was placed on the art of writing letters.[8] Cicero's *De Inventione* was a main text here, as was what was believed to be his *Rhetorica ad Herennium.* The commentaries on *De Inventione* of Marius Victorinus, a contemporary of Augustine who eventually converted to Christianity, were popular too. One of these shows well how the study of rhetoric could also impinge on Christian belief. At a certain point in his *De Inventione* Cicero gives an explanation of what constitutes a necessary argument: 'Those things are proved irrefutably which cannot happen or be proved otherwise than as stated, for example, "If she has borne a child, she has lain with a man".'[9] Victorinus' astute comment on this was that for Christians this could hardly be a necessary argument.[10] It is not for nothing that Peter Damian worried about the effect the study of the trivium might have on belief in the doctrine of the Virgin Birth.[11]

In the twelfth-century renaissance dialectic took pride of place within the trivium. Unlike grammar and rhetoric, it could boast numerous Aristotelian texts; and it was not until the latter part of the twelfth century and the thirteenth century that Aristotle's works on natural philosophy, metaphysics, ethics and politics started competing for the attention of scholars.[12]

The tools of dialectic in the West were part of a logical tradition, going back to Aristotle and transmitted through his own works, as these passed through the hands of Greek and Latin (pagan and Christian) commentators and translators. What was known of the Aristotelian corpus of logic (the so-called *Organon* ['tool']) before the first quarter of the twelfth century has been dubbed the *Logica Vetus* (Old Logic). The *Logica Vetus* comprised Boethius' (*c.*480–524) translation of Porphyry's (233–*c.*304) Neoplatonic introduction to Aristotle's logic, the *Isagoge.* It also contained Boethius' translations of two of Aristotle's logical works: his *Categoriae (Categories)* and his *De Interpretatione (On Meaning).* Boethius' commentaries on the *Isagoge,* the *Categories* and two commentaries on *De Interpretatione* were available at this point too.[13] In addition students of dialectic could consult Cicero's *Topics* and Boethius' commentaries on it. In his *Topics* Cicero presented a systematic treatment of different types of argumentation. He claimed the work to be a reworking of Aristotle's work of the same name, but notwithstanding the fact that there is an overlap between the subject matter of the two texts, it is hardly that.[14] Finally, dialecticians had

at their disposal Boethius' tract, *De Topicis differentiis (On Different Topics)* and his two treatises on syllogisms.[15]

The *Logica Nova* (New Logic) denotes the remaining four texts of Aristotle's *Organon,* which surfaced in this part of Europe in the twelfth century. These are his *Topics* and *De Sophisticis Elenchis (On Sophistical Refutation),* which came to light about 1130, and the *Prior* and *Posterior Analytics,* which started circulating in Latin translations around the middle of the century.[16]

The works of both the Old and the New Logic drew the attention of students of dialectic to questions concerning the intrinsic meaning of thoughts and the status of the words used to express them. To put it more plainly, they wondered about the relationship between the thoughts in their minds, the terms they used to transfer those thoughts into language and the objects or concepts being thought and talked about: much of the work done in this period under the mantle of dialectic was in fact concerned with the philosophy of language. Scholars used the available texts to this effect not only because they were predisposed to do so on account of their understanding of reason; they were pointed in this direction by the texts themselves. For in the *Isagoge* Porphyry posed some knotty questions about universals (i.e. notions applicable to more than one particular, for example common nouns). Are universals realities of some sort or are they nothing but conceptions of the mind? If they are realities are they corporal realities or incorporal ones? And if realities, are they separate realities which exist on their own or realities that exist in material objects? It was with these questions that Porphyry brought out clearly the difference between Plato's belief in forms and Aristotle's criticism of it.[17] Broadly speaking, scholars who operated in some kind of Platonic mould believed that universals were indeed realities and not just conceptions of the mind. It is because they assigned realness to concepts like common nouns that they are called realists. Those scholars who flatly rejected the reality— metaphysical or otherwise— of universals, claiming that they were names *(nomina)* only, signifying the resemblance of individuals, are called nominalists.[18] The preference scholars showed for either position or, as was often the case, various nuanced combinations of the two was not just a matter of their outlook on the status of the components of language. It impinged directly on essential issues of faith, raising as it did fundamental questions about the extent to which Aristotle's more material view of reality could be incorporated into the existing system of Christian faith.

The potential pitfalls dialecticians faced can be inferred from the trouble that Roscelin of Compiègne (*c.*1050-after 1120) encountered when he dared to apply to his thinking about God what he had concluded from his study of dialectic. Roscelin was a nominalist; at least that is what his detractors made him out to be. He did not believe that universals were real, believing instead that they were nothing more than the puff of air caused when they were uttered.[19] Thus he asserted that it was not possible for more than one particular thing to have any one real thing in common.[20] To give our own example of what this means: the women in a lecture room are all women, but they are separate female beings and therefore they do not possess a *real* thing in common which is 'woman'.

To his detractors, like Anselm of Canterbury, Roscelin's nominalist standpoint could but lead him into the error of tritheism. The problem was that Roscelin questioned whether it was possible for the second person of the Trinity to have acted in a distinct way without the Trinity devolving into triplicity. For if, according to Roscelin, one asserted that the Son, and not the Father or the Holy Spirit, became incarnate, then one would be admitting the existence of a set of particulars among the persons of the Trinity that applied to one of the persons and not to the other two. Because Roscelin did not accept that particular things could share a real common thing, he could not grant that the three persons of the Trinity could share one real common thing—that is to say 'God' —if those persons were distinct from one another. Thus he seemed to argue that for God to be triune both the Father and the Holy Spirit would have had to become incarnate together with the Son. Insistence on the Incarnation of the Son only had to imply that the persons of God were more separate than Christian tradition would care to claim.

The importance of Roscelin's case for the purposes of this study is that it shows so well what implications Aristotelian logic could have for the most crucial elements of Christian doctrine. This particular episode was dealt with by Roscelin being compelled to renounce his views in 1092 at Soissons and by Anselm's categorical refutation of his opinions. Anselm, who firmly believed that universals did signify realities without exploring as extensively as he might have how different particulars could share in a real common thing,[21] wrote his *De Incarnatione Verbi (On the Incarnation of the Word)* to prove that Roscelin was wrong in everything he said and that it was necessary that only the Son became incarnate. One of the points he made was that if the Father or the Holy Spirit had become flesh too then there would be more than one

son in the Trinity. This could not be the case because this would be absurd.[22] But this hardly removed the inherent threat that Aristotelian thought continued to pose to Christian doctrine.

In Abelard we have a thinker who tried to steer an even course between the poles of extreme realism and stark nominalism. Like Roscelin, he wrestled with the implications that his work in dialectic had for the proper understanding of the Trinity. Like Roscelin he ended up condemned by the institutional Church for his application of dialectic to theology.

Abelard's solution for the vexing question of whether universals were intrinsically real or not was to look more closely at what constitutes reality. He concluded that universals were not real in themselves, but maintained that this did not mean that they were not at all real. They are real because they are names of material realities and as such they do exist in the world of things. At first it would seem that Abelard was, as it were, trying to reconcile the irreconcilable, but it would be more constructive to glean in his efforts an attempt to come to terms with Aristotelian logic and the desire to be more precise about the nature of abstract thinking.

Abelard argued that it was important to distinguish between physical things and the images we have of them in our minds. These images are not things in themselves; they are the vehicles used by our minds to think of something: an object or a nature or a property. Thus nouns signify the images in the mind of the person using the expressions. But they also, and more importantly, signify the actual things which are being mirrored in the mind. If the noun being used is a proper noun or a name, it simply names a specific thing. If, however, it is a common noun or universal, it names the particulars which that common noun covers, while at the same time it denotes the nature that those particulars have in common.[23] To return to the example we gave above to explain Roscelin's position: the proper noun 'Anna' would name all the women in a lecture room who had that name. The common noun 'woman' would name all the women in that room while at the same time it would signify what all these women have in common, i.e. their nature of being a woman. In other words, when uttered, the word 'woman' invokes in a flash all the physical and non-physical attributes the mind ascribes to women in general. Abelard would say that 'woman' is, therefore, not a thing in itself. But it is a condition of similarity which the human mind abstracts from what the human senses experience and as such it does exist. For individual beings and things do share in something and the words

used to signify what they share are more than Roscelin's breath of air. Depending as they do on the existence of actual individuals, they exist in the world of things *(in re)* even if in themselves they are not a thing *(res)*.[24] When Abelard applied these ideas to the Trinity, he concluded that there existed in the Trinity three relational properties: Fathership, Sonship and Spiritship. These properties exist, for without them there would be no question of a Trinity. But these properties are not entities in themselves, for that would negate the unity of God.[25] That this constitutes a satisfactory analysis of the triune nature of the God of Christianity would be stating too much. However, it does show a powerful mind trying to integrate extraneous concepts into his Christian vision of the divine.

With scholars constantly applying what they found in classical pagan texts to their faith's conception of God, why is it that the work of the period has been dubbed humanistic? Can the term 'humanism' in fact have any meaning at all for the thinking of the twelfth-century renaissance? And if it can, is it a useful term to employ? The answers to these questions must lie in one's definition of humanism.[26] If one assumes that humanism can exist only when human beings are studied as human beings in the here and now without reference to anything spiritual, which might lie beyond them and which might affect them, then the intellectual endeavours of 1050–1150 are poor candidates for any humanistic label. If, on the other hand, it is the emphasis on humanity that one is seeking, whether or not that humanity is seen to function within a particular spiritual framework, then these years do have much to offer that can usefully be called humanistic. The nature of that emphasis on humanity must, of course, be considered within the framework of the period under consideration.

Compared to the preceding centuries the late eleventh century heralded a period in European civilization which showed great concern for human beings. Whereas in the previous centuries thinkers were on the whole content strongly to emphasize the gross sinfulness of humankind and the relative insignificance of this world, thinkers now slowly began to be less negative about man and the role he had to play on earth. A new and more nuanced balance, as it were, was being sought between what this world and the next had to offer. Scholars began to think more deeply and positively about the purpose of this world and the reason for man's sojourn in it. In none of this did thinkers exclude God. But this does not in any way contradict the fact that their perspective was becoming more man-orientated or even 'man-friendly'. For twelfth-century renaissance discussions about God

had much to do with thinkers trying to make what was indescribable describable and what was inaccessible more accessible. Finding the right words to penetrate the mysteries of God's nature, working out what those words meant and what their status was in the realm of being—all this would enable human beings to come closer to God and to understand better what their relationship to God might be. Far from denigrating human beings as puppets operated from on high, this on the contrary elevated human beings to sharing in God's work and in a sense becoming his partners in governing this world.

The God that preoccupied the thought of Christian scholars was, of course, the triune God they knew from their faith. So it is understandable that the aspect of that God that fascinated them most was the second person of the Trinity, who, as they believed, assumed flesh and became man. The act of God becoming man and living among human beings, whom he had made his brothers, overwhelmed twelfth-century thinkers who pondered *Cur Deus Homo*? (why God became man).[27] They groped to understand what implications the Incarnation, which for them was nothing less than a historical fact, had for individual human beings, the brotherhood of man and society at large. The answers they found had much to do with the circumstances of their everyday lives and also with the stimuli they were receiving from a pagan past with which they were fast becoming familiar. Their answers would in turn influence their attitudes towards those who, like the Jews, did not believe Jesus Christ to have been man and God.

The renewed interest of the thinkers of this period in the material world inspired them to think more cogently about the laws of nature and the structure of social intercourse. Here too the discovery of classical texts, including Plato's book on cosmology, the *Timaeus,* had a profound effect. The twelfth century marks the first real steps into the realms of science taken by medieval scholars. Thinkers like William of Conches (*c.*1085-after 1154) and Thierry of Chartres (d. after 1156) were fascinated by problems of causation, seeking as they did to understand why things happened as they did.[28] In the sphere of social relations works by Cicero and Seneca together with Roman law texts prompted twelfth-century scholars to think more carefully about the intrinsic value of human societies. Thinkers contemplated the fabric of society and tried to think how best its common good could be served. On a more personal level, the importance of the bonds of friendship was explored. The role of individuals in all sorts of activities came under scrutiny.[29] Finally, although the study of the classics at

this time could hardly match the literary appreciation lavished on them by men of the Italian Renaissance from Petrarch and Boccaccio onwards, the scholars of this period did hold the writers of the classical past in great esteem.[30] Moreover their acquaintance with the classical Latin past stimulated a great improvement in their own style of writing Latin. Much of the output of the twelfth-century renaissance is of a substantially higher literary and linguistic quality than the Latin writings that preceded it.

The twelfth-century renaissance can be described as a humanistic epoch if one accepts that it is possible to study humankind in a spiritual framework. It is, however, vital to remember that the spiritual framework in which twelfth-century renaissance scholars operated was a Christian one. The humanism that emerged from their hands was, therefore, a form of Christian humanism and it is best given that name to make this absolutely plain. The point of using the two terms together is to signify that the emphasis on humanity, however Christian it may have been, was a new one. For all its religious overtones it did give people more scope to think for themselves and to take some lead in the course of their lives. What enabled them to do this was the study of classical texts and their growing interest in the powers of reason. The word 'Christian' keeps us aware of the fact that the framework of all this thinking about humanity remained a Christian one. As we have seen, reason did, after all, contain for them a spiritual dimension. How scholars tried to define the roles of faith and reason within their Christian humanism is the subject of the next chapter. The effects of that humanism, as it took shape in this period, on Christian attitudes to Jews is what much of this book is about.

# 3

# THE CHRISTIANIZATION OF REASON

The spiritual dimension which twelfth-century thinkers discerned in the concept of reason both simplified and complicated matters for them. On the one hand the idea that reason came from God and that it therefore linked man's intellectual faculties to God both reinforced and safeguarded their faith's expectation that all truth was ultimately divine. On the other hand the fact that they were absorbing profound truths from sources lying outside Christian revelation begged the question whether the Catholic canon was the only vehicle God used to reveal truth. To make matters worse, some of the pagan lessons they were learning did not seem to concur with their understanding of God and creation; and as such they appeared to do nothing less than threaten the whole edifice of Christian faith. Thinkers had to work out what they hoped to gain from employing the tools of reason. Did they hope to discover new and different truths to the ones they knew already? Were there indeed any truths to be discovered outside of Christianity as they knew it? Or did they seek to corroborate what they already believed on the strength of faith? But what sort of corroboration, if any, did faith need? Was it acceptable to subject articles of faith to rational scrutiny? What happened when rational thought contradicted the teachings of the Church? Who in the end defined the content of faith and to what extent was that content permanently fixed? Were there sides to human affairs for which the tools of reason could prove to be more useful than the tools of faith?

The answers to these questions did not just depend on the considered deliberations of individual scholars. These people did not function in isolation. The thinkers we are concerned with held positions of influence within the institutional Church, functioning as abbots, archbishops or bishops, playing active roles as students and teachers within schools which were ecclesiastical foundations.

As audible members of a religion organized on an authoritarian base, there had to be an interplay between their thoughts and pronouncements and the developing structures and policies of the Church in which they worked. The institutional repercussions of the scholarly debate of this period must be faced if we are to begin to understand what the impact of that debate was on Christian society and on the Jews in its midst. What was at stake were not simply the niceties of faith and practice; what was at stake was the viability of a developing institution, which ultimately based its power on its success in impressing on its members what they were supposed to believe and how they were supposed to behave.

Many of these institutional aspects are plainly visible in the first major debate concerning the relationship between faith and reason which arose over the question of the nature of the Eucharistic change. Did the host and the consecrated wine truly and materially become the body and blood of Christ? We have seen the objections of Berengar to this proposition. But there was more to Berengar's position than a grammatical quibble.

Berengar (b. *c.*1000) hailed from an old family of canons of St Martin's in Tours. He was educated at the school of Chartres, where Fulbert held sway as master. He returned to Tours after Fulbert's death in 1029 to take charge of education there. But around 1040 he entered the service of the counts of Anjou, working first for Fulk Nerra and then for his successor, Geoffrey Martel. Apart from maintaining his renown as a gifted teacher of the liberal arts, he established himself as an important adviser to Count Geoffrey in this period of the expansion of Angevin power. In due course he was promoted to archdeacon and treasurer of Angers cathedral. The Count's support was valuable for Berengar as long as it lasted. But Geoffrey's position weakened in the decade before his death in 1060.[1] At the Easter council assembled by Pope Nicholas II in Rome in 1059 Berengar's work was burnt, and he was compelled to recant his views on the Eucharist. Nonetheless he continued to proclaim those views, and the controversy gained fresh momentum when Lanfranc took up his pen to refute them. Eventually Berengar returned to Tours after accepting the Eucharistic formula coined by Gregory VII at the pre-Lenten synod at Rome in 1079. He died near Tours at St-Côme in 1088.[2]

The heated debate about the Eucharist possessed traits which would become characteristic of so many of the theological debates of the twelfth-century renaissance. What was under fire was not so much the veracity of a basic tenet of faith as the validity of the

developing consensus on the correct explanation of that doctrine. To be more precise: what caused furious disagreement was the exact way in which concepts learned from the study of the liberal arts should and could be used to describe and analyse what was believed to be true. Thus everyone who engaged in the debate, including Berengar himself, believed that at the moment of consecration the host became the body and blood of Christ.[3] What separated Berengar from an increasing number of his colleagues was his position that this change was not a change of substance.[4] And in so doing he allied himself with the views on the Eucharistic change which Ratramnus had put forward in the ninth century.[5]

Ratramnus had postulated the very Platonic view that at the celebration of the Eucharist the bread and wine become the images of the body and blood of Christ. As such, they spiritually feed the faithful because their invisible status is that of body and blood of Christ. So, although Ratramnus stated that the bread and wine did not undergo physical change at the moment of consecration, he did chart a very real change. For through consecration these physical objects reflected a spiritual reality that could not be seen by the naked eye.[6]

Ratramnus had formulated his views in opposition to those of Paschasius Radbertus, who like himself was a monk of Corbie. Paschasius had been asked to furnish missionaries, operating from Corvey, a daughter-house of Corbie in Saxony, with a manual that could explain to converts there what a priest was enacting at the altar during Mass. These missionaries had the task of making the mystery of the Eucharist intelligible to people who were imbued with generations of pagan magic, and they needed more than patristic literature could offer them on the subject. The Fathers had not really considered the technicalities of the Eucharistic change. For Ambrose (d. 397) it had sufficed to point out that if God could create from nothing then there could be no doubt that he possessed the power to change something into something else. It is within this context that Paschasius wrote his tract *De Corpore et Sanguine Christi (On the Body and Blood of Christ)* in which he claimed that even though the bread and wine still looked the same after consecration, they actually had changed materially to become the body and blood of Christ. For all the disagreement between the two monks of Corbie, no great Eucharistic battle ensued. In that period there seemed to be sufficient room for more than one interpretation of this element of Christian belief.[7]

This latitude vanished as scholars began to take cognizance of the *Logica Vetus* (see p. 27). All of a sudden it did seem to matter how

exactly what one believed fitted together. This in turn could lead to questions about the inherent plausibility of some details of belief. With Aristotle's discussions at hand about substances and accidents the vague, predominantly Platonic, terms of the existing Eucharist debate seemed unsatisfactory.[8] Scholars began to ask themselves what constituted the host: its physical components of bread, wine, water and oil; or what it became, i.e. the body and blood of Christ? They pondered whether the efficacy of the Eucharist could be said to be any less great if the act of consecration caused spiritual rather than physical change. They wondered whether things could change into something else without appearing to do so.[9]

Scholars began to apply the terms Aristotle had taught them to the Eucharistic ideas they had inherited. And perhaps because they were eager to prove that Aristotle's more material approach to reality did not negate their faith, they tentatively began to express the Eucharistic change in words that seemed to approach the sentiments of Paschasius rather than Ratramnus. Fulbert of Chartres already spoke of 'earthly material…chang[ing] into the substance of Christ'.[10] It was left to his pupils to work out what this could possibly mean.[11]

The answers his pupils came up with were not just answers to a particular problem; they revealed these pupils' attitudes to the newly available non-Christian material and its relationship to what was emerging as the accepted official position. Berengar for one claimed that it was not possible to use Aristotle to defend a physical Eucharistic change taking place. This meant for him that a material change did not take place, and he was willing to defy conciliar decisions that claimed it did. Most of his fellow scholars were more circumspect. They sought to mould newly founded knowledge so that it would fit the teachings of their faith without challenging ecclesiastical pronouncements on that faith. In the fluctuating circumstances of the Church of the second half of the eleventh century it was not always clear where the side of authority lay. But the predilection for following authority rather than one's personal assessment of Christian truth divided men like Lanfranc, Anselm and Bernard from those like Berengar, Roscelin and Abelard.

Berengar wrote to Lanfranc in his *De Sacra Coena (On the Eucharist)*:

> It is abundantly clear that concerning all matters one must resort to dialectic, because to turn to dialectic is to turn to reason. Wherefore he who does not resort to reason relinquishes God's honour because man was made according to reason in the image of God, nor can he be renewed day by day in God's image.[12]

Such a statement could carry the implication that it is possible for reason to deliver results that might be at odds with decisions taken by authoritative bodies within the institutional Church. And indeed Berengar was not averse to suggesting that an official pronouncement of the Church was wrong. This independent and in many ways anti-establishment attitude was seen to be dangerous by Berengar's opponents. By the time Lanfranc had properly entered the fray Berengar had turned his back on more than one synodal decision. This and above all the fact that Berengar had repudiated the authority of Nicholas II's 1059 Council horrified Lanfranc more than anything else. In Lanfranc's mind this constituted a threat to the universal Church.[13] As far as dialectic was concerned, Lanfranc saw it as no more than a tool to help faith. He wrote

> Even when the matter in dispute is such that it could most clearly be dealt with by the rules of dialectic, I prefer, so far as possible…[to hide] my art lest I should seem to depend more on art than on truth and authority of the holy Fathers.[14]

And this is exactly what he did. His book on the question *De Corpore et Sanguine Domini* is full of biblical and patristic authorities. It is true that Lanfranc also deftly used the tools of reason of which he was an experienced master. But he did so with great caution and with the aim of defending the authority of the Church against what he saw as Berengar's opposition to it. And so Lanfranc cleverly adapted Aristotle's view that all material objects have a basic nature as distinct from their qualities which are perceptible by the senses. He declared that at the moment of consecration the essence of the bread and wine are changed into the body and blood of Christ. The outward appearance of the bread and wine remain, obscuring from the eyes of the faithful the holy body to spare them distress. But 'what we receive is the very body which was born of the Virgin, and yet it is not. It *is,* in respect of its being and the characteristics and power of its true nature; it *is not,* if you look at the outward appearance of the bread and wine.' Exactly how the Eucharistic change takes place Lanfranc considered to be beyond human comprehension.[15]

The Eucharistic formula which Gregory VII would put in place in 1079 betrayed a further use of Aristotle's terminology: 'the bread and the wine on the altar are changed in their substance into the true… flesh and blood of Jesus Christ'.[16] Later theologians, with greater philosophical expertise, worked out more fully the doctrine

of transubstantiation which Innocent III pronounced at the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215.[17] But Lanfranc's contribution was to show that the fruits of new learning need not, and above all must not, challenge the authority of the institutional Church, and it is this conviction that he passed on to his pupil Anselm.

Around the time that Lanfranc was attending Pope Nicholas' 1059 Council in Rome Anselm arrived at Bec.[18] As Sir Richard Southern has pointed out with much sensitivity, Lanfranc's business in Rome and his involvement in the ensuing Eucharistic debate had both immediate and long-term advantages for Anselm. Lanfranc's part in the negotiations concerning the legitimization of Duke William's marriage put him and his school at Bec in the political and intellectual limelight. The price William had to pay for the Pope's consent to his marriage, which he gained in Rome in 1059, was the foundation of two monasteries. The one he founded for men at Caen would receive Lanfranc as its abbot in 1063. Thus Anselm had the tremendous benefit of having Lanfranc as an inspired teacher and mentor as he made his first steps into the monastic world and the world of thought. Lanfranc's need for him to share in the burden of teaching at Bec made it imperative that he learn quickly. When he arrived at Bec, Bec was at the centre of current affairs. On the other hand Lanfranc's many absences and his destiny in Caen and eventually Canterbury meant that in the long run Anselm's own intellectual development would not be stifled by this role model, who did not always see eye to eye with his star pupil.[19]

Anselm's monastic conversion was an intense experience, and he spent many years purifying his spirit before he dared to embark on what mattered most to him: a better understanding of God. In 1075–6 he was ready to compose his *Monologion,* a meditation on the nature of God. In it he made extensive use of the tools of reason, alluding to patristic authority only once, and even then only in the work's preface. All the same his conclusion was that of necessity God possessed all the qualities which Christian tradition had apportioned to him.[20] Dutiful as he was, he sent a copy to Lanfranc, who by then was archbishop of Canterbury. Lanfranc was not impressed. His letter to Anselm on the subject is no longer extant, but we know from Anselm's reply to it that Lanfranc had chided his former pupil for not explicitly referring to Augustine throughout the work. There was far too much undisguised reason in the *Monologion* for the taste of Lanfranc, who had been so cautious in his altercations with Berengar. Anselm's respectful, but nevertheless pained, reply to Lanfranc's

criticism revealed much of the younger man's approach to the trivium. His defence was that, notwithstanding the fact that he did not quote Augustine openly, nothing in his study contradicted the bishop of Hippo. There is no evidence that Anselm made any subsequent changes to the text.[21]

Anselm's next work, the *Proslogion,* contains his ontological proof of the existence of God. In it Anselm proved to his own satisfaction that the existence of God, who is 'something-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought', cannot be denied. If the fool of the Proslogion 'who says in his heart there is no God' (Psalm 13 [14]:1; 52 [53]:1)[22] had understood the meaning of his words, they would not have entered his mind.[23] The first chapter gives us a clear idea how Anselm hoped and believed he could use reason to discover God. In a beautifully rhythmic exhortation he extolled both the powers and the limits of reason. Anselm writes:

> Come now, insignificant man, leave behind for a time your preoccupations…Attend for a while to God and rest for a time in Him. Enter the inner chamber of your mind; shut out all else except God and whatever is of aid to you in seeking Him; after closing the chamber door, think upon your God…You are my God and my Lord; yet never have I seen you. You have created me and created me anew, and have bestowed upon me whatever goods I have; but not yet do I know You. Indeed, I was made for seeing You; but not yet have I done that for which I was made…Permit me, at least from afar or from the deep, to look upwards toward Your light. Teach me to seek You, and reveal Yourself to me as I seek; for unless You instruct me I cannot seek You, and unless You reveal Yourself I cannot find You… O Lord, I acknowledge and give thanks that You created in me Your image so that I may remember, contemplate, and love You. But this image has been so effaced by the abrasion of transgressions…that unless You renew…it, it cannot do what it was created to do. Lord, I do not attempt to comprehend Your sublimity, because my intellect is not equal to such a task. But I yearn to understand some measure of Your truth, which my heart believes and loves. For I do not seek to understand in order to believe but I believe in order to understand. For I believe even this: that I shall not understand unless I believe.[24]

We see Anselm groping here for understanding of what he already believes. As he puts it himself in the preface to the *Proslogion,* his faith

is seeking understanding *fides querens intellectum).*[25] He is in no way questioning what the Church teaches. He is seeking fuller understanding of the God whom the Church has taught him to worship and whom he believes he serves as a monk; and he is using the tools of reason in his quest. There seems to be no doubt in his mind that reason will lead him to where faith has already taken him. It is by reason and not by scriptural authority that Anselm sets out to outwit the fool. As a man wholeheartedly dedicated to the stern discipline of monastic obedience, he did not at this moment in his intellectual development guess that what he was permitting himself to do might be dangerous in the hands of others. His rational quest was intensely personal but never self-centred in the sense that self-fulfilment could ever take precedence over finding God. Human aggrandizement did not lie for Anselm anywhere other than in God. And this God was unchangeably the God of his monastic vocation. In his own hands this use of reason was quite safe. Anselm did not reason in order to arrive at new truths. His reasoning was like unravelling the paths of a maze of which he knew the centre. That is why Southern has reached the verdict that Anselm cannot be called a humanist.[26] Yet Anselm can be said to fit the term with which we have chosen to describe the intellectual endeavours of the period: Christian humanism. It is certainly true that Anselm's self-effacement was at odds with the tenor of many of the ideas of the thinkers of the twelfth-century renaissance. It cannot be denied that he set precious little store by human achievement for its own sake. However, his trust in the scope of human reason—whatever the preconditions he set for its proper working—does, I think, make it possible and even correct to put him forward as one of the first Christian humanists of the period.

It is those preconditions that take us to the point when Anselm realized just how dangerous the tools of reason could be in the hands of anyone who lacked his discipline of faith and obedience. In the *Proslogion* he had dealt with the mindlessness of a fool *(insipiens)* who suggests that the existence of God can be denied. In Anselm's vocabulary *insipientes* are those who think or behave in a mindless way and so doing place themselves outside the *communitas Christi.* So it is very likely that when Anselm rebutted the words of the fool, he was not just commenting on a well-known biblical text. His letters and numerous passages of his *oeuvre* attest to the fact that throughout his career he encountered people who did not comply with his firm dictates on how Christians should think and behave. Anselm was

always prepared to sternly admonish them to return to the fold.[27] But the fool of the *Proslogion* was not using the tools of reason to challenge the teaching of the Church. Roscelin was doing just that, and to make matters worse he was invoking Anselm's (and the late Lanfranc's too) authority to do so. It is at this point that Anselm started to document in detail how reason may be used in religious enquiry. It was as if Roscelin's challenge compelled Anselm to be less intuitive about the use of reason and to map out exactly where the boundaries of rational investigation lay.[28]

Upon hearing the claims of Roscelin, his first step was to write to Fulk, the bishop of Beauvais, in 1089 protesting his own orthodoxy. In it he wrote that Christians can be required to stay firm to the pledge given at baptism.

> For a Christian must proceed to understanding through faith, and not come to faith through understanding, nor must he leave faith behind if he cannot understand. If he can reach understanding he rejoices; if he cannot, he venerates what he cannot grasp.[29]

In the second recension of his *De Incarnatione Verbi* he not only expands on the requirements of faith, he has something to say about Roscelin's use of dialectic as well. As far as Anselm is concerned, Roscelin should not be discussing spiritual issues if he is incapable of thinking beyond what is concrete. In other words, Anselm thinks that Roscelin's nominalism precludes him from engaging in discussions about God.[30] He also claims that:

> No Christian may debate how what the Catholic Church believes in her heart and bears witness to by her mouth could not be; but as long as he always holds the same Faith without doubt, loves it and lives humbly according to its precepts, he may seek the reason why it is, to the extent he is capable. If he can understand, he thanks God; if he cannot, he does not grab a horn to vent it about: he bows his head in awe.[31]

These strictures are even more closely defined in the *Cur Deus Homo (Why God Became Man)* (1095–8). This work is constructed as a dialogue between Anselm and his friend and pupil Boso, with Boso serving as the mouthpiece of the so-called *infideles*. Who are these unbelievers? Anselm defines them first in the preface of his work

as those 'who do not accept the Christian faith because they think it repugnant to reason'.[32] We learn more about these unbelievers in Chapter 3 of the *Cur Deus Homo* where Boso explains that he is putting forward the questions asked by those who do not wish to come to faith without reason. They seek reason because they do not believe.[33] Boso himself closely follows the rules Anselm set down for religious enquiry in the *De Incarnatione Verbi.* He declares straight away that he not only believes in the profundities of the Christian faith; he asserts that he would not be deterred from believing something even if he were not to understand it.[34] What is it that the *infideles* ask? They ask by what reason and necessity God had to become man and give life back to the world by his death, when he could have done this through another person or by his will alone.[35] The *infideles* claim that the Christian faith dishonours God in believing that God took on the indignities of the human condition, including death by crucifixion.[36]

Anselm goes on to employ reason in his attempt to explain the possibility and the necessity of the Incarnation. The fundamental difference between the believers and unbelievers in his audience is that the first group believes, and whilst believing searches for an understanding of what it believes. The second group has allowed itself to suspend belief until it understands. Both groups are Christians, or at least nominal ones. Indeed, the basic premise of the whole exercise is the Fall and humanity's consequent need of redemption. Although scriptural arguments are not used, the historicity of the Incarnation is not placed in any real doubt.

Van der Plaas and a number of scholars after him, most recently Professor Southern, have claimed that the *infideles* of the *Cur Deus Homo* should be identified wholly, or at least partly, with Jews and possibly even Muslims.[37] Some point to the fact that the objections of Anselm's unbelievers are very similar to those voiced by Jews against the concept of God becoming man.[38] Others refer to the closing remarks of the *Cur Deus Homo* where Anselm has Boso say:

> For you prove that God became man out of necessity in such a way that, even if the few things which you have taken from our books were removed (such as what you said about the three persons of God and about Adam) you could satisfy not only the **Jews** but also the **pagans** with reason alone. And because the same God-man himself establishes the New Testament and confirms the Old, thus just as it is necessary to acknowledge

> that he himself is true, so no one can deny that there is nothing in the Scriptures that is not true.[39]

*Pagani* (or *paiens* in the French vernacular) was the term which in the twelfth century could be used to denote Muslims, and René Roques and Julia Gauss have argued especially hard that Anselm's pagans are Muslims too.[40] They see the *Cur Deus Homo* not only as an anti-Jewish but also as an anti-Muslim polemic.

I would argue that although Anselm's work on the *Cur Deus Homo* was probably stimulated by his pupil Gilbert Crispin's interest in the Jewish-Christian debate, he himself was not using the term *infideles* to cover Jews. Nor was he referring to Muslims. Anselm's work, including his large number of letters, betrays very little interest in any real non-Christians: Jews, Muslims or pagans, in the sense of as yet unconverted Danes or Vikings. He is, as Richard Southern has so brilliantly shown, a man firmly ensconced in his own monastic world. What concerns him most is to show Christians the way to the life of perfect belief and practice, which he thought could be found most truly in the monastery. The disbelief he combated was the disbelief of those who were at least nominal Christians. In his whole work there is only one unambiguous reference to Muslims. In the early 1100s Anselm wrote to Bishop Diego of Santiago de Compostela that he unfortunately could not give him military aid against the *Saraceni*.[41] Jews he mentions a number of times but these references reveal no great interest in contemporary Jews or the Jewish-Christian debate.[42] Some scholars have read much into the fact that in the *Cur Deus Homo* Anselm wrote that the murderers of Christ could be forgiven their sin because no one knowingly kills God.[43] They claim this means that Anselm distanced himself from assigning Jews collective guilt for the crucifixion.[44] But the context of the passage does not even make it completely clear that Anselm was referring here exclusively to the Jews rather than the Roman soldiers, who nailed Jesus to the cross. The point of the passage is to close a possible gap in Anselm's argument about the necessary efficacy of the Incarnation for the salvation of mankind. If the killers of Christ, who had to die to save man, were *a priori* excluded from redemption, then God's scheme of salvation would be less efficacious than Anselm claimed it was.[45]

An examination of the words that Anselm used for non-Christians shows that he used the word *pagani* twice apart from the passage we have just cited from the *Cur Deus Homo*. Each time he used the word he used it in conjunction with Jews as opposed to Christians, and I

think he did so in order to refer to all non-Christians who were not Jews.[46] At the end of the *Cur Deus Homo* he is so satisfied with his argument for the necessity and possibility of the Incarnation that he claims that, if a few Christian references are removed, the text would satisfy the rational disclaimers not only of nominal Christians but of everyone else too. This does not mean that he has been addressing those other people all along. Nor does it mean that he thought rational arguments could convert Jews or pagans. For them too, understanding could never yield faith. In the event Anselm was wrong to suppose that the *Cur Deus Homo* could answer Jewish rational enquiry. For the *Cur Deus Homo* loses all its force if one removes Anselm's Christian presupposition that man fell in the garden of Eden and therefore needed redemption. Original sin is not a doctrine that Jews (or Muslims for that matter) have ever accepted. In addition it is important to realize that the Jews Anselm would have known about from his friend Gilbert Crispin and from his own experience in Normandy were not in fact engaged in Anselm's kind of rational enquiry. The Jews of northern France and the Rhineland of this period were primarily concerned with the exegesis of the Bible and the Talmud.[47]

This does not mean that the Jewish-Christian debate had no impact at all on the genesis of the *Cur Deus Homo.* It must have had some, as it is almost certain that Anselm and Gilbert Crispin were together at Westminster while Gilbert was writing up his *Di.putatio Iudei et Christiani (Di.putation between a Christian and a Jew.)* and Anselm was collecting his thoughts for his own masterpiece.[48] But the real importance of the *Cur Deus Homo* for that debate is not that Anselm wrote against Jews. It is that it shows so clearly the overlap between Jewish objections to the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation and the internal Christian questions coming from Christians studying the trivium. It is this overlap that would encourage Anselm's protégés to use rational arguments when they themselves did enter the arena of the debate against Jews.

From what has been said so far, it is clear that for Anselm the correct use of reason was positive. With it he hoped and indeed expected to gain an understanding of what he believed. This in turn would serve to intensify even more his faith and the faith of others, as long as they stood firm in their belief. The destination of his journey was always clear; what he did was to elucidate the landmarks along the route. Used in this way, reason could only serve faith. But the strictures Anselm laid upon himself were very much his own and they were very much part of the monastic setting to which he

belonged. And even in that setting they were too personal to be widely accepted. Before long, thinkers who shared Anselm's confidence in the powers of reason were prepared to take reason into a polemical arena where Anselmian rules were simply not applicable. In a later chapter we shall see scholars like Odo of Cambrai and the anonymous author who recast the *Cur Deus Homo* into a disputation between a Christian and a Gentile at work in this way. But we shall also take into account the use of *ratio* by others who did not fully share Anselm's love of reason, like Gilbert Crispin and the author of a Jewish-Christian disputation of the first half of the twelfth century that seems to be connected to the School of Laon.[49] Indeed Weisweiler has argued that the Laon bias towards biblical and patristic material was in part a reaction against Anselm of Canterbury's rational methods.[50] As we know, Peter Abelard did not appreciate the conservative approach he encountered in Anselm of Laon's lectures, and it is important to see what he had to say about the relationship between reason and faith.

It is customary to contrast the quiet faith of the monk Anselm of Canterbury with the turbulent inquisitiveness of Abelard the schoolman. But although there is more than a grain of truth in such an assessment, it does perhaps take too much account of the opinions of Abelard's detractors like Bernard of Clairvaux.[51] When Abelard applied reason to the study of God, he no less than Anselm was seeking truth, which he too expected to find residing in the triune God of his Christian faith. The difference between the two men lies especially in their attitude to the status of their personal pursuit of knowledge *vis-à-vis* the authority of the institutional Church. Anselm, as we have seen, worked within the strict discipline of monastic belief. He used reason to tease out the explications of what the Church taught. Abelard's approach was far less tied down by the rules of institutional discipline. There can be no doubt that he had great confidence in his own abilities to discover what was true. And he remained undaunted if what he discovered was not quite the same as what ecclesiastical consensus taught. As far as he was concerned that did not necessarily disqualify his findings. Thus we find that Abelard was scathing about logicians who to his mind were using the tools of reason for their own sake rather than the sake of God. But reason for him had a more independent standing than for Anselm. Abelard not only thought, like Anselm, that reason led to God; he was convinced that God had revealed himself to true philosophers like Plato through reason. Abelard put forward the concept of double

revelation, with one route of God's revelation going through Old Testament prophecy and another through the works of the non-Christian philosophers he was absorbing. Just as one needed to read the Old Testament allegorically in order to identify its inherent Christology, so too an allegorical reading of Plato's *Timaeus* would reveal the triunity of God. The true philosophers, that is to say the true lovers of *sophia, sapientia,* wisdom, had identified the *logos, verbum,* the Word of God, who is Christ, even if they had not always been fully aware of their accomplishment.[52] Their perfect adherence to Natural Law, the unwritten law which God gave to humanity before he gave the Law of Moses and later the new Law of Jesus Christ, instructed them in the proper love of God. This brought them to Christ, in the same manner that the saints of the Old Testament are said to have known Christ through their faith before the Incarnation even took place.[53] We shall investigate some of these views more closely when we examine Abelard's thinking on the Jews.

Not all scholars of the twelfth-century renaissance were lovers of reason, but one can still say that the philosophical legacy of that period was the confidence that if non-Christian material were used correctly it would corroborate or even prove the teachings of faith.[54] The effect of this was that amongst those employing reason, philosophy became a Christian tool. The Christian guise of philosophy was in part fashioned to counter any possible doubts there could be about the reasonableness of Christianity. As a Christian tool the use of reason fell within the ambit of the institutional authority of the Church. It could be wielded against Christians who ran foul of that authority; it could be used equally well against non-Christians. So a whole corpus of material which objectively speaking had nothing to do with Christianity at all was added to all those other elements of the period which were at work to make twelfth-century society more Christian. It is time we turned to those elements in order to see how they, together with Christianized reason, affected Christian attitudes towards Jews.

# Part II

# CHRISTIANS AND JEWS IN THE TWELFTH-CENTURY RENAISSANCE

# 4

# A CHANGING SOCIETY

The twelfth-century renaissance was more than a period of intellectual renewal. By the close of the tenth century Europe had managed to beat back those intent on breaching its external security. In the north and east Vikings and Hungarians were less of a threat; in the south the initiative was passing from the Muslims to the Latins. Within the heartland of Christian Europe most pagans were at least nominally Christianized. The only significant and enduring non-Christian element of society was the presence of Jews. As Christians captured more and more territory from the Muslims in Spain and Siciliy, Muslims joined the ranks of non-Christians under Christian rule. By the middle of the eleventh century Europe began a period of economic expansion. In northwestern Europe economic growth was particularly sudden. It in turn stimulated many social changes which joined the significant ecclesiastical and religious developments of the period. Expansion and flux are the hallmarks of the second half of the eleventh century and the twelfth, and they form the backdrop to the educational and intellectual developments we have already discussed. They are vital features in understanding the evolution of Christian feelings about those within their frontiers who resided outside the *communitas Christi* ('the community of Christ').[1]

The year 1059 not only marks the year when Lanfranc was heavily engaged in Norman and papal affairs, it marks also the moment when Pope Nicholas II set out a number of decrees that would be of momentous importance to the future structure of the Church and to the construct which people began to make of that institution in their minds. The council of 1059 made three decisions that were supposed to counter lay interference in ecclesiastical settings. The first was the decree that in the future the Pope was to be elected by the College of Cardinals. The purpose of this was to exclude the German emperor

and the lay aristocracy of Rome from the process of papal elections. The second decree instructed that members of the laity were no longer allowed to possess tithes and churches. The third decree, of special concern here, determined that clerics of the rank of deacon or more were no longer allowed to be married.[2]

These three decrees signal crucial themes in the formation of ideas concerning the proper position of the Church in society. As the Gregorian Reform movement gained ground, the basic agenda of the papal programme became plain: an attempt to ensure the *libertas ecclesiae* ('freedom of the Church'), the concerted effort to improve the quality of the clergy by eradicating simony and promoting celibacy, and the desire to put into place *iustitia* ('justice'). These themes were closely related. The reason why it was so important for the Church to be free was because it was thought that only a Church that was untrammelled by lay concerns could perform its function well. But the Church could hardly be considered free if its priests continued to buy their offices rather than being appointed on the basis of merit. Only a properly elected clergy, living a properly regulated life, would have the necessary spiritual resources to transform the Church into a body capable of instilling society with justice.

Reformers like Gregory VII envisaged a Church with a strict hierarchical structure with the Pope at its head. The *Dictatus Papae,* which was compiled in 1075 at the start of Gregory's reign, contains headings for what was probably meant to become a collection of canons supported by arguments deriving from biblical and patristic authority.[3] Many of these headings indicate what Gregory had in mind: a universal Church under the firm and unquestioned leadership of the Pope, ruling not only holy Church but universal society as well. Thus heading two reads that 'the Roman Pontiff alone is rightly to be called universal'; nine says that the 'Pope is the only one whose feet are to be kissed by all princes'; twelve states that the 'Pope may depose emperors'; and twenty-seven reads 'the Pope may absolve subjects of unjust men from their fealty'.[4] In all of these propositions we see Gregory and his supporters putting forward an ideal of an all-encompassing Church unified under the Pope. This ideal would seem not just to include the Western Church but also the Greek Church in Constantinople. After all, at the time of writing there was no emperor in the West, only in Byzantium: Henry was crowned emperor by Antipope Clement III (his own choice) in 1084. The ideal of a universal Church had not shattered, notwithstanding the souring of relations between the Eastern and Western Churches after the failure

of Pope Leo IX to impress his authority on Constantinople in 1054. But the Church is seen to be universal not only in a narrow institutional sense. The concept 'Church' encompasses society at large: Church is society and society is Church. The modern reasonably self-evident distinction between State and Church is not in play here. The acrimonious discussions of the protagonists of the investiture struggle and its aftermath did not concern the question of whether or not Latin and Greek society was Christian; the debate centred on the problem of who within a Christian society should regulate temporal affairs and who should regulate sacerdotal ones. The *Dictatus Papae* clearly favours a position that awards the Pope great control in both areas. This fits in with Gregory's firm view that it is for the Church to fashion society in such a way that it would be worthy to be headed by Christ.[5] His vision of the Pope's position both within the Church and in society at large is made clear by a number of other headings of the *Dictatus Papae.* Heading three reads that the Pope 'alone can depose or reinstate bishops'; item thirteen allows him to 'transfer bishops, if necessary, from one see to another'; item seven even permits the Pope to 'divide a rich bishopric and unite the poor ones'.[6] This was, of course, a direct challenge to the effective government of temporal rulers like Henry, in whose administration archbishops and bishops held key positions of influence and power. Other headings emphasize the seniority of papal legates over local (arch)bishops (heading four) and specify that the more important cases of every church must be referred to the papal see (twenty-one). The importance of institutional obedience is highlighted in two headings. Item six instructs that 'we also ought not to stay in the same house with those excommunicated by [the Pope]'; item twenty-six lays down that 'he should not be considered as Catholic who is not in conformity with the Roman Church'.[7]

I have quoted from the *Dictatus Papae* at length because it shows so clearly an ideal of Christian unity. This unity did not exist and Gregory's methods of obtaining unity were challenged and rejected by many both within and without the institutional Church. But this does not alter the fact that Christian universality and Christian wholeness were recognized ideals. Archbishop Wibert of Ravenna, who later became Antipope Clement III, opposed Gregory's assumption of untrammelled authority within the Church. He chose Henry's side in the investiture struggle but that does not mean he discounted the concepts of Christian wholeness and universality. On the contrary, he was active against simony and advocated priestly

celibacy. He also worked for union with the Russian Church and tried to mend ecclesiastical relations with Byzantium.[8]

It is furthermore important to keep in mind that the whole discussion about the relationship between temporal power and priestly power presupposed that these two powers were operating within the framework of religious homogeneity. That this is true is obvious in the case of thinkers who tended towards a hierocratic stance; but it is also true for thinkers with a dualist approach. When Hugh of St Victor wrote that spiritual power not only establishes temporal power but also judges it, he was assuming the existence of one unified Christian social corporation. St Bernard's view that both the temporal and the spiritual sword belonged to the Church and that temporal force was wielded at the bidding of the priest assumed the same.[9] Indeed one has to remind oneself that these men were living in a society that contained non-Christians, i.e. Jews. That is not to say that they were unaware of Jews; we know for a fact they were aware of them. Jews contributed to the biblical studies which were conducted at St Victor in Hugh's lifetime.[10] At the time of the Second Crusade St Bernard was instrumental in saving Jews from the wrath of one of the popular preachers of that crusade: the monk Radulf.[11] It means that non-Christians like Jews simply did not fit easily into the theoretical paradigms these thinkers and others like them set up concerning the nature of society and its aims. In respect of these paradigms Jews could only be outsiders.

A good example of this is John of Salisbury's *Policraticus*. In his book for statesmen John gives a fascinating vision of an organically united human state. This state is worthwhile in itself, following as it does the law of nature. Indeed we clearly see in this work the importance twelfth-century thinkers attached to unravelling the complexities which govern the organization of human affairs. The prince, as the head of the state, rules the body-state. But because the state is likened to a body each of its constituent members is vital to the well-functioning of the whole. Interaction is the key theme. The power of the prince is definitely limited by the necessity of cooperation between the bodily components. But it is limited by a further consideration. For the soul of this body is the priesthood. And a just prince will willingly consult priests in spiritual matters and act on their behalf, at least if they are just too. In this sense he is the *sacerdotii minister* ('minister of the priesthood').[12] A good working relationship between prince and priests, with both parties concentrating on what concerns them, will ensure the good health

of the body politic.[13] Once again it is impossible to imagine any part of this state not being Christian.

The concept of Christian wholeness was also present in positions which emphasized more strongly the dual nature of authority in society. For in this period the linchpin of the dualist argument was that God, i.e. Christ, had instituted two powers, the temporal and the spiritual. In theory, then, subjects owed allegiance to a prince who exercised divinely instituted power. Again this begged the question about the relationship between the prince and those of his subjects who did not share his view of the God who is considered to be the source of his power."[14] Here too Jews must be exceptions to the rule.[15]

But the wholeness of society was not just a political or an administrative question. The period of Reform of the second half of the eleventh century went hand in hand with an atmosphere of spiritual renewal. It is hardly a coincidence that we have no record of heresy for the years between *c.*1051 and *c.*1100. What contemporary sources attack as heresy was simony. To give just one example from one of our thinkers, Gilbert Crispin composed a treatise attacking simony at the very beginning of the twelfth century. In it he writes that no simoniac must approach the altar, for simoniacs contaminate God's sanctuary because they are unclean and heretics, infected as they are by the stain of leprosy.[16] For a brief period at least the Church's membership and leadership seemed in one mind about the desirability of introducing the apostolic life to all levels of spiritual existence. It was when members' aspirations began to outstrip what their institution managed to offer that the phenomenon of heresy returned and quickly spread.[17]

The spirituality of the late eleventh and early twelfth century expressed itself in many disparate ways. One form was the effort on the part of the Church to improve the education of the secular clergy so that it was better suited to its pastoral task. Many reformers were determined that the secular clergy, rather than monks, should perform these tasks among the laity.

As for monks, by the end of the eleventh century more and more emphasis was placed on their individual quest for God. New orders, such as the Cistercians (1098) and the Carthusians (1084), were less interested in the traditional Cluniac version of monasticism which laid so much emphasis on elaborate forms of corporate worship. They felt they were reinstating the original Benedictine rule when they insisted that monks should labour with their own hands and live a life of strict poverty, not only individually but in a corporate sense

too. In this new monastic setting there was little room for oblates; monastic recruits were expected to be adults who had made up their own minds about living a life of apostolic poverty. These new orders were adamant in their conviction that monks should completely distance themselves from the inherent temptations of the secular world. The Premonstratensians, however, decided to stay within the world. They were canons regular who adopted the Augustinian rule in 1125. Their aim was to combine their own observance of the apostolic life with preaching it to others. Others still sought the apostolic life by adopting the life of a hermit. A hermit's reputation, however, usually meant that his solitude was soon shared by a large number of followers. The three orders we have mentioned all had their roots in eremitical movements. But throughout our period different kinds of hermits were to be found.[18]

Remission of sin was a vital quest both for those who sought out the religious life and for those who elected to stay in the world. In the greater part of the eleventh century members of the laity (especially the upper echelons of society) looked towards monasteries to help them find this remission. Gradual changes in perceptions of how and when a penitent was reconciled to the Church had meant that Christian sinners increasingly felt the need to offer some form of satisfaction to counter the temporal punishments they feared in this life and the next. In return for the prayers, which monks would ceaselessly invoke on their behalf, they would support monastic foundations by granting them land and income. Some ended their lives by joining the house they were supporting. Cluny owed its vast expansion in this century to the fact that it was seen to be able to help people find the remission of sin they sought.[19] But by the end of the eleventh century changes in attitudes towards this idea of the remission of sin become visible. With a growing interest in the make-up of man and society, people began to wonder whether even more might be required of them to achieve forgiveness. They began to look for a more personal experience of penance. That experience was often sought through joining one of the new orders, which stressed the monk's individual seeking for God. But some members of the laity wanted to find that experience without being obliged to give up the world for good. A traditional act of penance they could resort to was to go on a pilgrimage. But by the end of the eleventh century there was something new on offer: crusade.

Already in 1074 Gregory VII had summoned the knightly classes to become the soldiers of St Peter and fight on behalf of the Pope to

aid Byzantium against the Turks and thereby to promote the re-unification of the Churches of East and West. His call was not successful; for all his dynamism, the aristocracy was clearly not convinced that fighting Gregory's battles was the same as fighting Christ's. But his summons and the ideology that lay behind it had a profound impact. For Gregory was shifting the scene of action of the *milites Christi* ('the soldiers of Christ') away from the spiritual battleground of the monastery to the tangible battlefields of the world. The message was that knights could serve God even if they did not retire to a monastic foundation; they could serve him by staying in this world and doing what they did best, i.e. fighting, as long as they fought for him. It was Urban II who capitalized on these novel ideas, when with a stroke of genius he preached the First Crusade at Clermont in 1095. Whatever his exact words were, it is clear that he summoned the knightly classes to embark on an armed pilgrimage that would serve Christ. His audience understood this to mean that the purpose of this armed pilgrimage was to free Jerusalem, the place of Jesus Christ's earthly dwelling, from the Infidel. The call to pilgrimage assured them that this project would win them remission from the temporal punishment they feared so much;[20] the armed quality of the expedition fitted in beautifully with their daily occupation. As Guibert of Nogent put it: 'Knights and the common people…no longer need…entirely to abandon the world by entering a monastery or by some like commitment. They can obtain God's grace in their accustomed manner and dress, and by their accustomed way of life.'[21] Urban's call to crusade was therefore a resounding success. Indeed, persons of all statures of life and far more people than Urban had expected responded. The invitation to become a soldier of Christ and in so doing win remission of sin was clearly irresistible to most.[22]

The enthusiasm for crusade interacted with people's growing interest in the second person of the Trinity. We have already noted how fascinated thinkers of the late eleventh and twelfth centuries were in examining the mechanics of God becoming man and in studying what the implications of the Incarnation were for the fellowship of man. Interest in Jesus combined with interest in and devotion to his mother. The number of churches and monastic foundations which were dedicated to the Virgin Mary in this period was vast. It is enough to recall that all Cistercian churches had her as their patron saint. St Bernard was devoted to her, as were most of the thinkers who feature in these pages. The work of Anselm and the work of his followers like his

biographer Eadmer, Odo of Cambrai and Guibert of Nogent, sang the praises of Mary's holiness and purity. Eadmer went so far as to state explicitly that Mary herself was born without sin.[23] Devotion to Christ and the Virgin Mary was not a prerogative of the educated. On a much more basic level we see in the expressions of popular religion of this period the same sentiments. It was at the beginning of the twelfth century in England that miracle stories about the Virgin began to circulate. From the early twelfth century she is pictured as the queen of heaven, crowned by her son.[24] As for Jesus himself, it is in the twelfth century that the worship of Christ's presence in the consecrated host began. Although at this time the laity communicated but seldom, they did attend masses in their local church. And they did want to see what they were taught to believe was the body and blood of Christ. Elevation of the host and chalice and the ringing of bells at the moment of consecration date from this time. For the faithful the thought that Christ was actually present in their midst was awe inspiring, and feelings about the host could be ambivalent. On the one hand there was pious wonder, on the other there could be genuine dread at being so near to God. Theologians would continue to study the intricacies of the doctrine of Eucharistic change and the effect it was supposed to have on those who partook in it. As the twelfth century progressed the laity could seek whatever reassurance it needed from the many Eucharistic miracle tales which began to be collected. Peter the Venerable, for example, included eleven such stories in his work on miracles, the *De Miraculis* (1135–44).[25]

All this spirituality with its concentration on apostolic poverty, devotion to Mary and serving of Christ obviously automatically excluded Jews. But it did more than that. Jews not only rejected all that Christianity taught about the Incarnation and the Virgin Birth; they were quite vociferous in expressing their rejection of both.[26] Moreover, concentration on redeeming Jerusalem from the Muslims and concentration on the salvation Christians believed Christ delivered to man through his suffering on the cross fixed Christian minds upon those whom they held responsible for his death. It is from this period that over and above the accusation of killing Christ, Jews were increasingly accused of murdering Christ deliberately and not out of ignorance.[27] Thus we see that an important component of the fervour of the First Crusade was the urge on the part of Christians to revenge themselves on those who were considered to have killed the Lord in whose service they had entered. This was the message the so-called popular crusaders brought with them to the cities of the Rhineland

which contained flourishing Jewish communities.[28] Their attack marked the first major incidence of violence against Jews in the heartland of Europe. The onslaught on these communities was not a watershed in Jewish history,[29] but it did mark something of great significance. It underlined in a particularly bloody way that Jews were not only outsiders in relationship to one of the most important movements of the day; they were seen as inherent foes to what that movement stood for.

The urge for the poverty of the apostolic life does presuppose an economy that has some scope for wealth. One of the striking paradoxes of our period is the concurrence of economic growth with an atmosphere of aroused spirituality. The clash between the two was another factor that in the long run would work against the Jews.

The eleventh century witnessed a number of significant advances in agricultural techniques. New and more effective ploughs were introduced, crop rotation was practised more systematically and horses became greater assets to farmers now that horse collars and horseshoes made them easier to manoeuvre. All this contributed to a marked increase in productivity and this in turn not only encouraged an increase in population, it provided regional surpluses of goods. We see in the course of the eleventh and twelfth centuries a number of interrelated developments. New villages were created where waste land was claimed for agriculture. These villages drew in and indeed were formed by some of the people who could no longer be absorbed in the existing villages. Markets and fairs developed to facilitate the exchange of surplus goods. All kinds of traders visited these markets. The more successful these markets were, the more lucrative they became as places for traders to settle. As local and long-distance trade continued to grow these places attracted people who specialized in providing what those engaged in trade needed: basic daily commodities such as food, drink, clothes and housing; some kind of banking and legal facilities to provide necessary capital and adjudication; and also education and pastoral care. Existing towns increased in size and importance as new locations grew into urban centres. Broadly speaking, one section of the inhabitants of these cities would have been involved in the production of food, working in city gardens and vineyards. (It is important to remember how 'rural' cities in this period still were.) Another section would have been engaged as labourers and artisans in local industry. The highest stratum would have comprised the tertiary sector consisting of entrepreneurs and professionals.

In northwestern Europe the growth of the economy and the concomitant growth in urbanization was more sudden than in the south, in Italy and southern France and Spain. This meant that rather rapid adjustments had to be made to absorb new social and economic realities. One of the most important new factors people had to come to terms with was money. In the first place money rather than barter was becoming the basis of the new economy. This meant that an impersonal standard of value was introduced to a society more accustomed to personal exchange of goods and services. Availability of money encouraged capital venture: those who were successful could maintain their social position or move up the social ladder; the unsuccessful would move down. So market forces which were beyond people's immediate control became an important factor in determining their social standing. Good birth and/or the possession of land on its own could no longer guarantee this. And this begged the question of whether it was right for a Christian society to seek profit in the first place and to let monetary wealth function as a determining factor of the fabric of society.

In the second place, those who were making money were doing so without performing what seemed to be any real work. Some were engaged in professions which did not require any physical labour; others were earning money by investing spare capital they had accrued from other commercial transactions. This raised the question whether it was right for money to engender money. Was it permissible to charge interest on lent capital?[30]

It is fascinating that those who had to find answers to these issues were for the most part the ecclesiastics of the Reformed Church. Never before had the institutional Church been faced with a booming economy, whilst functioning as a controlling force in society. And the society it felt beholden to Christianize was one which was increasingly involved in a profit economy. Moreover the Church itself, as a vital institution of that society, was caught up in that selfsame developing economy. It is not surprising that from the latter part of the eleventh century the leaders of the institutional Church were negative about money and its acquisition. Condemnation of avarice became more common. The battle of the Reformers against simony increasingly elicited harsh words against the avaricious money transactions simoniacs were supposed to have been engaged in. As we have seen, the new monastic orders were intent on following a life of poverty. Combating the sin of avarice became a top priority and communal poverty was regarded as the best way to go about this.[31]

Ivo of Chartres (d. 1116) defined usury as anything taken beyond the principle. He regarded usurious gain as stolen goods and insisted that it might not be used for charity. By this time Anselm of Lucca (1035–87) had already likened usury to theft; he had demanded that what had been taken in usury must be restored.[32] In his collection of sentences Peter Lombard ranked usury alongside the crimes of fraud, rapine and theft.[33] Gratian collected texts condemning usury in his *Decretum* of 1140. In 1179 the Third Lateran Council ruled that open usurers must be excommunicated and that they should be refused Christian burial. They were also forbidden to make offerings.[34] These examples illustrate that condemnation of usury intensified from the second half of the eleventh century and that, whereas traditionally usury had been censored simply as shameful gain *(turpe lucrum),* it now began to be regarded as theft as well.[35] One of the reasons why the concept of theft entered into the equation was that usurers were judged to sell something that was not theirs to sell: time. For the longer their loans were outstanding, the greater their profits would be when the loans were finally repaid. But time did not belong to them; it belonged to God. Thus Peter the Chanter, writing at the end of the twelfth century, claimed that 'a usurer sold time'.[36] Guibert of Nogent, writing in the first quarter of the twelfth century, described usurers (both Christian and Jewish) as thieves weighing down the necks of the needy poor.[37]

Censorship of usury went back to the text in Deuteronomy 23: 19–20: 'Thou shalt not lend to thy brother money to usury, nor corn, nor any other thing: But to the stranger. To thy brother thou shalt lend that which he wanteth, without usury: that the Lord thy God may bless thee in all thy works in the land, which thou shalt go in to possess.' According to Jerome (340–420) the prohibition against charging interest to brothers was universalized by the Prophets of the Old Testament and by the New Testament. According to this interpretation usury was not permitted between any parties or peoples. Ambrose (340–397) had a different view. He considered usury acceptable between enemies: 'where there is the right of war, there also is the right of usury'.[38] In our period this interpretation would allow unfettered usury between Christians and Muslims and would also give Jews the licence to engage in usury within Christendom. Gradually, and in conjunction with the sharpened sensitivity of Christian moralists to the problem of avarice, most Christian thinkers tended to choose the path of Jerome. The existence of any kind of usury was seen to breach the ideal of Christian universality. Those

who engaged in it were condemned for threatening the wholeness of Christian society. And particularly in the midst of the Crusades, it seemed perverse to sanction the supply of money to the Muslim enemy. Bruno of Asti (d. 1123), for example, gave a spiritual meaning to the Deuteronomy text. The interest allowed there stood for the spiritual gain which Christians would receive over and above the literal meaning of the words of the Old Testament.[39] In turn, according to the *Glossa Ordinaria,* which was compiled in the first half of the twelfth century, Christians could charge aliens, i.e. unbelievers and criminals, spiritual interest by requiring from them repentance of sins, faith and good works in exchange for having the Gospel preached to them.[40]

The fact that it was by and large considered wrong to engage in usury did not of course stop people from becoming usurers. Throughout our period there were many usurers, Christians and Jews alike. Not only did the growing economy need capital investment; individuals needed practical solutions when cash flow problems arose. In the more developed and uninterrupted economies of southern France and Italy usurers were thus not always seen as a threat by their clients.[41] But as far as the institutional Church was concerned, usury was a sin, all the more so if it took place between Christians. In many ways it seemed preferable, as far as churchmen were concerned, to have Jews engaged in it rather than Christians. After all, they were deemed to be damned. In one of the letters which Bernard of Clairvaux wrote to prevent persecution of Jews in the wake of the Second Crusade, he stated that where Jews were lacking Christian usurers unfortunately took their place. He mused whether these Christians should not be called baptized Jews rather than Christians.[42] The use of the word 'judaizing' as a synonym for lending money points to the fact that, for all the existing Christian participation in money-lending, Jews did play an important and visible role in this area of the economy by the mid-twelfth century. This is especially true of northwestern Europe. We shall see below that as money-lenders they attracted much of the opprobrium which was generated there by contemporary ambivalence about the role of money in society. And as money-lending gradually became one of the few occupations open to them, they became more and more isolated in precisely the activity that was perceived by many as destroying the brotherhood of man, which in this period seemed so often to be equated with Christian universality. Let us now turn our attention to the position of the Jews and Judaism within the increasingly Christian society of the twelfth-century renaissance.

# 5

# THE JEWISH CHALLENGE

Before we can take a detailed look at the developing attitudes of Christians towards Jews and Judaism in northwestern Europe in the period of our concern, it is important to put into place the backdrop against which the interaction between Christians and Jews took place. What was it about Judaism that animated so much thought and emotion within Christendom? What were the major points of difference between Judaism and Christianity in their Western medieval guises? How real a challenge did Jews pose to Christians?

Any consideration about relations between Judaism and Christianity must begin with an obvious point. Christianity is a daughter religion of Judaism and as such it draws much of its validity from the very sources that Jews have always claimed as their own.[1] It is the sharing of what Jews call the Hebrew Bible and Christians name the Old Testament that has lain at the root of much of the tortured relationship between the two faiths. The Old Testament for medieval Christians contained the prophecies concerning the birth, suffering, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ. They considered themselves the spiritual heirs of the Jews of the Old Testament because they recognized Jesus as the prophesied Messiah and Son of God. In their eyes, it was on account of this recognition that God had made a new covenant that superseded the old one, which had pertained only to Jews. Because recognition of Christ was the *sine qua non* of the new covenant, that covenant included not just Jews, but Gentiles as well.

The approach by Christians to the Hebrew Bible affected the way they read it. Because they looked for the prophecies concerning their Messiah, they were obliged to read that text, at least on one level, in a non-literal, Christological way. This applied not only to the Prophets and the Psalms; it had bearing on the Pentateuch as well. Once the Pauline outreach to the Gentiles had been adopted by the early Church,

the rules and regulations of the Five Books of Moses could no longer be taken at face value. Gentiles could hardly be expected to conform to Jewish practices. A different and new meaning was found for these ritual stipulations by asserting that Christ had revealed their real purport. Thus, to give but one example from our own period, the true meaning of the prohibition against eating the flesh of a pig was considered to be the admonition not to imitate porcine behaviour.[2] Insisting that pork must not be consumed, in this line of thinking, could be seen as a denial of Christ's contribution to understanding the meaning of the text.[3]

Obviously, Jews experienced the words of the Hebrew Bible in an entirely different way. They saw themselves as the physical continuation of the Israelites of the Bible. To their mind there was one major covenant, and that covenant was between God and the Jews, his Chosen People. Christians formed part of the Noachite covenant together with all the other peoples that abode by a number of rules of basic civilized behaviour, but they had no part in the special bond that existed between God and Israel. The rituals concerning daily life and worship, which were included in the Law of Moses, were seen by Jews as an essential factor in the relationship between God and the Jewish people. Observance of these rules linked Jews to their ancestors and also bound them to each other, and in their eyes it made them and their children worthy of God's special favour. This is not to say that medieval Jews slavishly followed the literal meaning of the text of the Pentateuch. For one thing they had to compensate for the reality that after the destruction of the Temple in AD 70 and the resulting Dispersion, there were many rituals they could no longer observe. Over and above that, Jews at all times injected the words of the Bible with spiritual meaning. The reason why their spiritual interpretations seemed unsatisfactory to their Christian counterparts was that Jews by and large insisted that spiritual interpretations could not replace literal exegesis: spiritual and literal meanings were meant to exist side by side and mutually reinforce each other. Linked to this was the fact that Jewish spiritual exegesis naturally lacked any Christological connotation.[4] This above all else prompted Christians to disregard Jewish allegory and to censor Jews for being blind to anything that went beyond the literal meaning of the Old Testament.

As is apparent from the foregoing discussion, the difference of approach by Jews and Christians to the message of the Hebrew Bible was intricately connected to their basic disagreemant about the nature

of God and the identity of the Chosen People. Jews rejected the Christian concept of a triune God and they refused to accept Jesus Christ as the Son of God. This refusal involved Jewish rejection of fundamental Christian doctrines like the Incarnation and the Virgin Birth. Christians claimed that they were the true Israel *(Verus Israel)* precisely because they bore witness to Jesus' sonship and Messiahship. Jews were hotly defensive of their status as the Chosen People on account of their perception of their continued allegiance to the God of Israel. These topics together with a discussion of scriptural hermeneutics feature in many different guises in the extant samples of the Jewish-Christian debate of the twelfth-century renaissance. In due course we shall fully explore the manner in which they were discussed and the implications this had for Christian-Jewish relations.

It is important to appreciate the genuine concern that the continued existence of Jews engendered in the minds of Christian theologians. For if the Old Testament prophesied the coming of Christ as clearly as they said it did, why did Jews, who had seen Jesus with their own eyes, and Jews, who after Jesus' death had direct access to the words of the Prophets, not recognize him as their saviour? From a very early stage in the development of Christianity Christian thinkers answered these questions by claiming that the negative circumstances in which Jews lived after the Dispersion served to indicate how God punished those who refused to recognize his son. Jewish loss of territorial dominion was seen as particularly indicative of God's displeasure with the role Jews were supposed to have played in the crucifixion. It was left to Augustine of Hippo (d. 423) to add an additional and ingenious explanation for the continued existence of Jews.

Augustine argued that Jews were useful to Christians in that they bore witness to the truth of Christianity *(testimonium veritatis)*. Jews did this because they had in their possession the holy books in which Christians found the prophecies concerning Christ. Without the continued presence of Jews, pagans could easily argue that Christians had made up the prophetic texts themselves. With Jews at hand Christians could prove that this was not so. Thus Augustine wrote that Jews existed so that they could carry the books of Christians to their own confusion. He claimed that by the evidence of their own Scriptures Jews bore witness for Christians that Christians had not fabricated the prophecies about Christ. Just as slaves carried the books of their masters, so Jews carried their books for the benefit of Christians.[5] Because Jews performed this useful function, they should not be persecuted or compelled to convert to Christianity. At the end

of the world (which Augustine did not think was far off) they would all convert of their own accord.[6]

By and large the concept of *testimonium veritatis* ensured Jews a certain amount of basic toleration, at least at an official level. For it gave Christian institutions a straightforward reason to leave Jews alone, despite the problematic doctrinal differences between Judaism and Christianity. This type of toleration was expressed by Pope Gregory I (590–604) in his well-known bull *Sicut Iudeis* concerning Jews: 'Just as it should not be permitted the Jews to presume to do in their synagogues anything other than what is permitted them by law, so with regard to those things which have been conceded them, they ought to suffer no injury.'[7] This maxim was repeated in papal bulls throughout the Middle Ages. It is, however, important to appreciate that there was a decidedly negative aspect to the *testimonium veritatis* theorem. For Jews were tolerated not for their own sake; they were tolerated for the sake of Christians and Christianity. Intrinsically linked to *testimonium veritatis* is therefore the concept that Jews must serve Christians: *servitus Iudeorum* ('Jewish servitude'). From a very early period this idea was translated into legislation forbidding Jews to have any position of authority over Christians.[8] The importance of the theoretical concept of Jewish servitude within the framework of *testimonium veritatis* is that the viability of a Jewish presence within a Christian society ultimately relied on the amount of service Jews were thought to be able to give Christians. Where their contribution to Christian society was considered to be negligible or, worse, negative, *testimonium veritatis* was unlikely to guarantee their safety. Before the eleventh century this happened seldom; Visigothic Spain forms an exception to the relatively peaceful Christian-Jewish relations of the early Middle Ages.[9] It is when northwestern European society entered its phase of Christianization in the second half of the eleventh century that *testimonium veritatis* gradually seemed to lose a great deal of its force.[10]

We have seen in the last two chapters how ecclesiastical, spiritual, social and economic developments joined the intellectual momentum of the twelfth-century renaissance to make northwestern Europe more conscious of its Christian identity.[11] These developments went hand in hand with an increasing lack of diversification in the socio-economic position of Jews in this part of Europe.

In contrast to the large and ancient Jewish communities of Spain and what is now southern France, the Jewish communities of northwestern Europe were relatively small and new. Indeed the growth

and spread of Jewish communities from the eleventh century onwards had much to do with the commercial revolution we have discussed. On the one hand Jews who were engaged in commercial activities participated in and contributed to the growth of urban centres like Rouen, Paris, London and the cities of the Rhineland. On the other hand, as in the course of the eleventh and twelfth centuries fewer and fewer Jews continued to possess land, more and more Jews depended on cities for their livelihood. But within these cities there were further limitations on their choice of occupation. The evolving guilds of the towns that regulated crafts and many facets of industry closed their doors to Jews because of the religious nature of their associations. Increasingly northwestern Jews were confined to aspects of the money trade, which could range from modest pawnbroking to more lucrative money-lending. One of the results of the concentration in cities of Jews, who lacked the social status which substantial and successful landholding could offer, was that they became increasingly dependent on the protection of those in political authority, that is to say the king or his official representatives or, where the king did not have that kind of authority, the lord who had dominion over the region where they lived.[12] The close connection between Jews and their princes set in motion something that would only find full expression in the thirteenth century: chamber serfdom. The vexed issue of chamber serfdom lies far beyond the scope of this book. Here it is enough to say that in the course of the thirteenth century the Jews of England, northern France and Germany had become so reliant on their king/emperor that jurists at times seized upon the vocabulary of service to describe their relationship. Just as serfs were completely dependent on their masters, the circumstances of Jewish existence were, to a large extent, determined by how much their services were valued by their royal protectors.[13] The concentration of Jewish economic endeavour in the money trade made Jews seem even more different from their Christian neighbours than they already were as non-Christians. Their special reliance on royal favour hampered relations between Jewish and Christian inhabitants of towns and contributed further to their marginalization. All these factors played an important role in the evolution of Christian attitudes towards Jews in the course of the twelfth-century renaissance.

It would be a mistake to suppose that Jews accepted without demur the roles thrust upon them. The morality of money-lending was just as much a topic of discussion within the Jewish community as without. By and large, lending to non-Jews and borrowing from them at interest

was not considered an infringement of the biblical prohibition of usury. For some scholars, like the Tosaphist Rabbenu Tam (*c.*1100–1171), the grandson of Rashi (Rabbi Solomon ben Isaac [d. 1105], the most important Jewish exegete of the Bible and Talmud of the period, who studied in the Rhineland before returning to Troyes to teach there), the stark reality of Jewish existence made it necessary to allow this form of money trade. He ruled that: 'Today, people usually lend money on interest to [non-Jews]…because we have to pay taxes to the kings and princes, and everything serves to sustain ourselves. We live among [non-Jews], and it is impossible for us to earn a living unless we deal with them. It is, therefore, no more forbidden to lend at interest because "one might learn from their deeds" than it is to engage in any other business.'[14] Indeed his concern for the everyday needs of his co-religionists prompted him to show marked flexibility in his rulings about the use of non-Jewish middlemen in borrowing transactions between Jews. These middlemen or strawmen were employed to create the fiction that Jews were not engaged in usurious transactions amongst themselves. After all Jews, like Christians in this period, needed capital and wanted to borrow money from whoever had it to lend. Rashi had permitted the practice. But his other grandson, Rashbam (Samuel ben Meir [*c.*1085-after 1158]), was flatly opposed to all such dealings and forbade them. Another problem scholars of Jewish law had to face was the function of the *Jewish* middleman, who operated as the financial agent of a non-Jew and would approach Jews on behalf of his master to borrow or lend money. Was this permissible? Rashi had his doubts, but did not actually forbid it out of deference for his Rhenish teachers, who permitted it. Rashbam characteristically forbade it. It is not surprising that in France Rabbenu Tam's rulings won greater popularity than his brother's. This was the case in England too and reflects the close ties between the two Jewish communities. In Germany, however, a more stringent atmosphere was brewing. Notwithstanding the increased dependence of Jews on all types of money-lending, German scholars like R.Isaac ben Asher (d. before 1133) began to forbid the use of non-Jewish middlemen in loans transactions between Jews.[15] The tendency towards stringency in Germany will become even more apparent when we come to discuss the reaction of German Jews to the Crusades.

The scholarly debate about usury points clearly to vibrant Jewish communities attempting to define rules of behaviour within the framework of their existence as a minority in a Christian society. The burden on those organizing Jewish communal life was heavy. Among

their tasks was achievement of smooth contact between the community and those in political power. Co-operation between different Jewish communities to this effect was important too. Communal leaders also had to preserve order within their communities so as to prevent outside, Christian, interference in internal Jewish affairs. And they had to make sure that individual Jewish communities were economically viable. It is to this purpose that French Jewish communities limited the number of Jews who were allowed to settle in any one place. This in turn encouraged the spread of numerous small communities throughout the eleventh and twelfth centuries in northern France. The leaders of the community were also in charge of regulating the religious and social life of the community. Charity had to be organized for the poor, the demand for education had to be met and provision had to be made to meet religious needs.[16]

As far as rudimentary education was concerned, the requirements of Jewish law meant that every effort was made to teach boys to read from an early age.[17] As a result, the degree of literacy (at least in Hebrew) of Jewish males was very much higher than that of their Christian counterparts.[18] In the case of higher studies, French Jews and the Jews of the Rhineland were more interested in studying the Bible and the Talmud than engaging in philosophical discussions. Centres of learning in our period included Paris, Troyes, the Rhenish cities,[19] and, if Norman Golb is right, Rouen.[20] Running commentaries on the Bible were composed which aimed at unfolding to Jews the plain meaning of the words and the grammatical constructions of separate passages within the context of the narrative of the whole Bible and its message to the Jewish people. The Talmud was approached in a similar way. Scholars needed to find in their sacred books practical answers to the religious quandaries in which they were placed by their existence in a non-Jewish society. They were no less keen to make sense of their increasingly difficult position and to reinforce their own hopes and those of their community for future redemption. They also used their commentaries as a medium for refuting the Christological interpretations of the passages of the Bible which they shared with Christians. As far as polemics were concerned, the *peshat* (literal) interpretation of the text was deemed especially useful. But it would not be correct to believe that the *peshat* totally opposed the more traditional midrashic (homiletic) interpretation of the text or even replaced it. Both methods are still to be found in Rashi's commentaries on the Pentateuch, although Joseph ben Simeon Kara (b. 1060/70) and Rashbam favoured the *peshat* method. In the

commentaries of all three scholars many examples of refutations of Christian exegesis can be found.[21] Christian commentators like the Victorines, who were interested in the historical signification of the Old Testament as the prerequisite stepping-stone to deeper layers of scriptural meaning, were attracted to this aspect of the exegetical work of their Jewish counterparts.[22]

The polemical elements of twelfth-century Jewish exegesis did not stand on their own. A fascinating aspect of medieval Hebrew is the great number of anti-Christian invectives it contained. These were pejorative expressions that covered every aspect of Christianity to which Jews might have to allude, and were so much part of Hebrew vocabulary that the invectives completely replaced the notions they were originally meant to criticize. Thus churches were simply known as 'houses of idolatry'; baptism as '[Christian] stench'; Jesus Christ as the 'hanged one' or 'the son of whoredom' or 'trampled corpse' or 'son of a menstruating woman'; Christians as 'the unclean uncircumcised' or 'errant ones'.[23] The origin of these invectives, especially those concerning Jesus, goes back to the very beginning of the Jewish-Christian debate. By the fourth or fifth century Jews had put into writing an alternative version of the Gospels, the parody called the *Toledoth Yeshu* ('Generations of Yeshu'). This parody put on its head the New Testament account of Christ's birth, life as a preacher and performer of miracles, death and resurrection. All that was holy and intensely meaningful to Christians was turned inside out and ridi-culed. Yeshu's birth was perfectly natural: the absence of a father was explained by the claim that his mother was taken advantage of by someone other than her husband during her monthly period of uncleanliness. Yeshu's extraordinary powers were due to the fact that he managed to learn how to pronounce the ineffable name of God. When he died he remained lifeless; his trampled corpse witnessed against anyone who tried to claim that he had risen from the dead.

These invectives served the Jewish community as an arsenal in so far as they put into pithy and emotive language the essence of Jewish objection to the aspects of Christianity with which they were bound to be in daily contact.[24] For no Jew could go many steps in his or her town without being confronted by some kind of representation of Christianity, in the form either of Christ on the cross, or a wayside shrine, or a church, or a Christian religious procession. Rupert of Deutz implies as much when he declares in his anti-Jewish disputation that Jews see the crucifix adored wherever they live.[25] It was against

this constant intrusion that a Jewish minority had to gird itself if it wanted to preserve its own distinct identity. It could not afford, for even a moment, to forget that Jews did not believe in Jesus Christ as the Son of God who rose from the dead, and it needed to recall at all times that Jews regarded Christian usage of symbols as idolatry; in short it needed to withstand the inevitable attraction that an assertive majority culture exercised upon the minority living in its midst.

The self-assertiveness of Jews in northwestern Europe in the face of the developing assertion of their Christianizing host society found extraordinary expression in the reaction of Rhenish Jews to the onslaught of the popular Crusade in the spring months of 1096. The so-called popular crusaders of 1096 left for the Holy Land several months before the official princely forces did so. On their overland route they passed through the cities of the Rhineland declaring their frustration at setting off to fight the Muslims in a distant land when there were Jews at home, who were left unpunished for the crucifixion of Christ. The events that befell the Jewish inhabitants of these cities are well documented by three Hebrew chronicles that seem to have been composed between the First and Second Crusades. These narratives give a vivid account of what their authors believed to have happened and reveal much about the authors' perception of the pogroms that occurred. In broad outline the extant Latin sources back up the Jewish version of events.[26]

It seems that the popular crusaders were intent on murdering any Jew who refused to be baptized. Vengeance on the Jews for the crucifixion was the battle cry of the attackers.[27] The Jews of Speyer, Worms, Mainz and Cologne did what they could to protect themselves. Where appropriate they sought help from their Christian neighbours and the episcopal authorities, who did not support this type of anti-Jewish violence. They took up weapons and fought to save their lives. But when they realized how vastly outnumbered they were and when it became evident to them that their Christian protectors had done all they could and were willing to do to help them, they took the drastic step of committing mass suicide. The purpose of their sacrifice was to sanctify God's name *(Kiddush ha-Shem)* and at the same time to keep themselves and their children from falling into the hands of the crusaders alive. The procedure they followed was very similar to the sacrificial slaughter of animals in the days when the Temple stood in Jerusalem. This has prompted Ivan Marcus to postulate that the Jews who performed *Kiddush ha-Shem* were intent on recreating the scene of Jerusalem in their Diaspora abodes in order to unnerve, in the

only way they could, the crusaders' boast that they would soon make Jerusalem their own.[28]

The accounts of the manner in which family after family killed their children and then themselves are heart-rending and they had a profound effect on the generations of Jews who were exhorted by these texts to emulate the example of the Rhenish martyrs. The intense spiritual fervour that marked the behaviour of the martyrs and the style of those who later sang their praises may well have been connected to the heightened spirituality of the Christian society in which it all took place.[29] For our purposes the salient points are two. In the first place the sacrifice of the German Jews and the way it was recounted make us even more aware of the vibrancy of the Jewish minority in this period. However insignificant Jews were in a strictly political sense, they presented a visible and audible challenge to their Christian neighbours. The mid-twelfth century, in fact, witnessed the beginnings of the so-called Pietist movement in Germany. Rabbi Judah the Pietist (d. 1217) played an especially vital role for the movement by composing the *Sefer Hasidim (Book of the Pietists)*. Just as the First Crusade martyrs had sacrificed their lives to take control of their own and their community's Jewish destiny, the Pietists were intent on finding spiritual fulfilment in their lives as Jews. They aimed to assert the superiority of Judaism over Christianity. At the same time they tried to establish the superiority of their special and extraordinarily strict practice of Judaism over all other forms of Judaism. For themselves they were completely focused on finding personal salvation through their total commitment to God.[30] The violence of the pogroms should, I think, be seen as the first significant sign that elements were stirring in the consciousness of some Christians which seemed to indicate that at times the presence of Jews was not welcome. It was at such moments that concepts like *testimonium veritatis* became rather hollow. Work by John Gilchrist very much confirms that it is not too early to assign this role to the First Crusade. He has demonstrated that highly influential collections of canons like Burchard of Worms' *Decretum* (1012) heavily stressed the necessity of keeping Jews and Christians separate whilst insisting that Jews play a subservient role *vis-à-vis* Christians. The Leitmotif of these canons, superior Christians versus 'wrong' Jews, may well have contributed to the possibility of violence in the heady spring months of 1096.[31]

The purpose of this study is to illustrate in detail how the intellectual developments of the twelfth-century renaissance impinged on the Christian-Jewish debate so as to further stimulate the view that there

was little if any room for Jews in Christian society. We shall trace the development of Christian thinking about Jews by examining Latin material of the Christian-Jewish debate of the period. These sources, when studied within the full context of all the socio-economic and spiritual changes sketched in the previous chapters, are invaluable for what they can contribute to our knowledge of the evolution of Christian attitudes towards Jews. Most of these sources are disputations and the greater part of these debates are fictitious. A fictitious disputation does not record an actual exchange of ideas between real Christians and Jews; it represents what a particular Christian scholar wrote about the Christian-Jewish debate in the form of a dialogue between a Christian and a Jew. Far from invalidating it as a useful source of information, its fictitiousness grants us an insight into how the thinker in question believed Jews felt about their own religion and Christianity. It is precisely this that would have informed his own views about Jews, and it is these views that he is putting across in his contribution to the debate. Obviously, his experience of Christianity formed the undercurrent of this whole process.

Amos Funkenstein has provided us with a useful fourfold division of the evolution of the different types of arguments used in Christian-Jewish disputations. The first stage he identifies is the phase in which the debate is based on a standard selection of testimonies from the Scriptures. In the second phase reason is used in a number of disparate ways, rather than Scripture. The Talmud entered the debate in the next two stages. At first it was used against Jews; by the end of the twelfth century Christian protaganists, like Alan of Lille (d. 1202), had already started to use sections of it to try to prove to Jews the truth of Christianity.[32] In reality these categories often overlapped. At all stages biblical authority remained vital; it is important to remember that repetition alone of scriptural prooftexts does not mean that those texts contained no real or fresh meaning for those who continued to use them. It is essential at all times to assess the changing context in which these biblical arguments were employed. Reason in all the different guises, which we discussed in Chapter 2, continued to play a role even as evidence from the Talmud was introduced.

The authors of the material we shall be using have already been introduced in Chapter 1. Gilbert Crispin's *Disputatio Iudei et Christiani* (1092/3) is an excellent example of a disputation conceived primarily within a scriptural mould. His *Disputatio Christiani cum Gentili,* which was written as a companion piece to the *Disputation with a Jew,* was an attempt to enter into the world of reason.[33] The *Dialogus inter*

*Christianum et Iudeum de fide Catholica* (1123–48), which has been wrongly ascribed to William of Champeaux, incorporated reason but still leant heavily towards Scripture.[34] Guibert of Nogent concocted an interesting mix of reason and authority in his *Tractatus de Incarnatione contra Iudeos (Treatise on the Incarnation against the Jews)* (*c.*1111).[35] Odo of Cambrai followed Anselm's rational arguments of the *Cur Deus Homo* closely in his *Disputatio contra Judeum Leonem nomine de adventu Christi (Disputation against the Jew Leo about the Coming of Christ)* (1106–13).[36] This happened also in an anonymous recasting of the *Cur Deus Homo* of the first half of the twelfth century: *Dialogus inter Gentilem et Christianum*.[37] Hildebert of Lavardin used reason in quite a different way in some of his sermons, as did Peter Abelard in his *Dialogue of a Philosopher with a Jew and a Christian*.[38] Peter Alfonsi and Peter the Venerable used reason in yet another way, but also introduced arguments from the Talmud to combat Jews. Alfonsi wrote his *Dialogi* as a discussion between his new Christian identity and his old Jewish self between 1108 and 1110.[39] The abbot of Cluny finished his *Adversus Iudeorum inveteratam duritiem (Against the Inveterate Hardness of the Jews)* by 1147.[40]

The unknown Odo, who composed the *Ysagoge in Theologiam (Compendium of Theology)* in the 1140s had much of interest to say about the Hebrew text of the Bible.[41] Rupert of Deutz used the Bible extensively in his *Anulus sive Dialogus inter Christianum et Iudeum (Ring or Dialogue between a Christian and a Jew)* (1126). Finally, the Jew Herman, who became a Christian and who claimed to have been engaged with Rupert in a religious discussion, had quite remarkable things to say in his autobiography (*c.*1150) about the usefulness of debates in convincing Jews to approach the font.[42]

We shall now examine these categories and some others in our attempt to shine a brighter light on the changing attitudes of Christians to Jews in the twelfth-century renaissance.

# Part III

# THE JEWISH-CHRISTIAN DEBATE

# 6

# CHRISTIANIZED REASON AT WORK

The scholarly debate of the twelfth-century renaissance about questions of faith was not limited to the internal issues facing a Christian community of scholars confronted with classical philosophy. In northwestern Europe most of these scholars were very much aware of the presence of Jews who utterly rejected precisely those doctrines which Christians were in the process of trying to understand better by using the fresh skills and insights they had gained from their study of the liberal arts. What made Jewish opposition to Christian tenets of faith seem particularly relevant, if not positively threatening, was the fact that it seemed to impinge on the questions Christian scholars were asking themselves about doctrines, for example the Incarnation. We see some Jewish-Christian debates of the period devoting a considerable amount of space to discussions of *Cur Deus Homo,* which would have interested Christians far more than Jews. In others the Jewish-Christian discussion is placed within the framework of a compendium of Christian theology. In addition, a number of these dialogues feature a fictitious non-Christian protagonist instead of the usual Jew. This non-Christian can be a figure personifying classical philosophy or a questioning Christian or even a strange mixture of both, while at the same time expounding the points usually put in the mouths of Jews in Jewish-Christian disputations.

We have already seen how closely the *in fideles* (or unbelievers) of Anselm's *Cur Deus Homo* could be regarded as echoing Jewish perplexity on the subject of the doctrine of the Incarnation. Although Anselm himself was not in the business of polemicizing against Jews, the contact between him and Gilbert Crispin probably had some bearing on how that work eventually took shape. The perceived concurrence between Christian queries about the feasibility of God becoming man and Jewish outrage at the thought of God in a human

shape is especially clear in Crispin's own work. In the *Disputatio Iudei et Christiani* he introduced some obvious Anselmian notes in the portion he devoted to the Incarnation. The Jew is made to probe not only the possibility of the Incarnation but also its necessity. How could anyone imagine that there could have been any need for God, 'in comparison with whom nothing greater or more sufficient can be thought' to have assumed flesh? And in a disputation that is far more marked by intelligent use of scriptural authorities than by use of reason, a few short concentrated bursts of rational argument follow in an attempt to prove that it was not only possible but necessary for God to become man.[1] Crispin goes on in the same vein in his *Disputatio Christiani cum Gentili,* where at one point the *Gentilis* is made to express his distaste for the idea that God suffered hunger and thirst, was beaten and mocked, and finally crucified.[2] An essential aspect of all these statements was the difficulty Christians were experiencing in using reason to rhyme their conception of God as a king with the image of the suffering Christ which was demanding so much of their interest.[3] Indeed Pseudo-Anselm's dialogue, which is also a debate between a Christian and a so-called *Gentilis,* begins with the Pagan saying words precisely to that effect: 'I should like to ascertain why divine majesty degraded himself to the pains of mortal nature even to the disgrace of the crucifixion.'[4]

Gilbert Crispin's *Gentilis* is a multi-faceted figure. At the beginning of the disputation Gilbert maps out the common ground between the fictitious protagonists of this debate: a Gentile philosopher and a Christian one. Both Christian and Pagan assert their belief in one God. Both agree that man can and must use his reason to find out more about that to which he owes his existence, that is to say God. Thus knowledge of God surpasses all other knowledge.[5] What separates them is their perception of what exactly constitutes the oneness of God and also their ideas about what does and does not concur with the immutability of God which both accept as a divine prerequisite.

As we have seen, the Pagan expresses grave doubts about the concept of the Incarnation. But he begins his offensive with a different point altogether. He questions the validity of Christian abrogation of the Law of Moses in favour of the Gospel of Christ. To his mind Christians proclaim through their attitude that God changed his mind about the laws he wished human beings to obey. Thus they would seem to question God's immutability. The Pagan's concern with the lasting validity of Mosaic Law is one of the leitmotifs of the

disputation, and it has a markedly Jewish flavour to it. Indeed, many of the points which had been brought up by the Jew in the *Disputatio Iudei* are aired here for a second time. The difference between the two disputations is that in the *Disputatio cum Gentili* reason—and emphatically not authority—is supposed to prove the Christian case. Gilbert's Pagan is not just a figure he dreamt up on the basis of his knowledge of classical material. He is a figure that also includes Jewish elements which reflect Gilbert's experience with debating Jews. But intertwined in the fabric of the Gentile's enquiry are also the numerous questions Christians were posing on account of their growing expertise in reason. Thus the Pagan is made to question, for example, the rationale of the doctrine of the Fall of man. Why could God not have prevented man from sinning in the first place?[6]

The task Gilbert set himself in the *Disputation with a Gentile* was to settle by reason alone a number of the most controversial issues of the Jewish-Christian debate: the Trinity, the Incarnation and the Christological interpretation of the Hebrew Bible. As such it functioned as a companion-piece to his *Disputation with a Jew,* where he had been unhampered in his use of authority. For all their differences in their approach to the Old Testament, Jews and Christians, unlike pagans, did after all recognize in principle the authority of Scripture. It seems very likely that it was Anselm who suggested to Gilbert that he try his hand at a purely rational disputation. After all it had probably been Anselm who put his rational mark on the section of the *Disputatio Iudei* concerning the Incarnation.[7] But there were problems. In the first place Anselm did not, and indeed could not, provide his followers with a model showing them how they might employ reason to conquer disbelief. As we saw earlier, it was axiomatic for Anselm that understanding could not yield faith. It was precisely for that reason that Anselm himself never constructed a dialogue between a Christian and an unbeliever, be he real or fictitious. His attack on Roscelin was couched in the form of a letter; in the *Cur Deus Homo* the *infideles* were not granted a voice of their own. Their mouthpiece was Boso, whose firm belief was confirmed again and again.

In the second place Gilbert himself did not seem to have as much confidence in the scope of reason as his mentor. This comes out clearly in the passages of both disputations which concern the Trinity. Unlike Anselm, Gilbert was quite happy to compose dialogues between Christians and non-Christians and to put all kinds of issues on the agenda. But he made an exception for the Trinity. In the

*Di.putatio Iudei* Crispin declared that it was too risky to discuss this subject with unbelievers.[8] In the *Di.putatio cum Gentili* Gilbert reiterated that the Trinity should only be debated between Christians.[9] The Pagan had described the Trinity as a dogma that tripped people up. He had pressed his Christian counterpart to clarify how God could be one and three at the same time before they went on to examine anything else.[10] But the Christian had refused to take the bait. When Gilbert finally did buckle down to examining the Trinity he used the New Testament (and not the Old) and the authority of the institutional Church in his discussion. And he did so only after he had dismissed the Gentile from the scene and put a Christian student in his place. Nor was reason considered an especially useful tool in this matter.[11] The same pattern emerges in Gilbert's other works.

In his treatise on the Holy Spirit, which was composed subsequently to his work on the Jewish-Christian debate, Gilbert returned to the question of the Trinity. The treatise takes the form of a dialogue between a pupil and a master. The pupil is quite confident that reason compels him to believe that God is one; but belief in the Trinity was another matter: 'what necessity of reason compels us to believe that God is triune and that without this belief it is impossible to please God?'[12] In this work too Gilbert emphasized the limited power of reason in making the doctrine of the Trinity accessible to human understanding. The dialogue's *magister* has little to offer his student beyond stressing faith as the only satisfactory way forward.[13] Gilbert displayed the same attitude towards reason and faith in his piece on the Eucharist. Here he stressed that what enabled one to be sure that the bread and the wine on the altar became the blood and body of Christ was the authority of the institutional Church rather than reason.[14] It is worth noting that although this dialogue was composed as an interplay of questions and answers, the rubricator of the sole surviving twelfth-century manuscript added *Iudeus* and *Christianus* to some of Gilbert's *Interrogatio* and *Responsio* headings or replaced them with the new nomenclature.[15] This is another clear indication of how closely the Jewish-Christian debate was associated with internal Christian discussions of faith.

Like his other teacher Lanfranc, Gilbert Crispin was in many ways a transitional figure of the twelfth-century renaissance. He was well educated; his works display his familiarity with the liberal arts.[16] But for all his admiration for Anselm, he was at his best when he could refer endlessly to the authority of Scripture. Even in his *Disputation with a Gentile,* where it was misplaced to make recourse to the Bible,

he could not help quoting one biblical verse after the other. It is not surprising therefore that this work was a failure: it survives in only one manuscript.[17] In contrast, more than thirty times as many manuscripts exist of the *Disputatio Iudei et Christiani,* many of which date from the twelfth century.[18]

Gilbert did not stand alone in his doubts about the efficacy of reason. The School of Laon was far more conservative in its use of rational arguments than Anselm of Canterbury. A Jewish-Christian disputation that seems to be linked to the school is the *Dialogus inter Christianum et Iudeum de fide Catholica* (1123–48), which has been incorrectly ascribed to William of Champeaux. The disputation borrows heavily from both Gilbert Crispin and Anselm, and much use is made of scriptural authority.[19] But there are important differences between it and Gilbert's Jewish-Christian disputations. The tone of the debate is aggressive. This marks the cut and thrust atmosphere of the schools which differed so sharply from the quiet method of unravelling problems that Crispin had inherited from Anselm. The harshness of school polemics injected a hostile tone into the Jewish-Christian debates it engendered. This is especially clear in the way that the Jew of Pseudo-William's debate is argued into a corner with nothing left to oppose the plethora of evidence from nature and authority with which he has been confronted. After having discussed the status of the Law of Moses, original sin, the Virgin Birth and the Trinity (which Pseudo-William has no compunction about discussing), the Jew agrees to open his heart to what the Christian has to say so that he is able to accept the rational arguments the Christian will offer him on *Cur Deus Homo.* In this way the second half of the disputation becomes less of a Jewish-Christian debate than an exposition of the necessity of the Incarnation together with a full discussion of free will and the fall of Satan and man.[20]

The most interesting use of reason in this debate is the way evidence taken from nature is put to polemical use against Jews. Here, as in Guibert of Nogent's *Treatise against the Jews on the Incarnation* (*c.*1111) and Hildebert of Lavardin's (d. 1133) *Sermon against the Jews on the Incarnation,* an attempt is made to convince Jews of the possibility of the Virgin Birth by citing natural phenomena which are visible to Jew and Christian alike. Neither Pseudo-William nor Guibert nor Hildebert would claim that natural phenomena on their own could actually explain the mechanics of the dogma; rather they seem to be saying that some easily verifiable natural occurrences make it seem perfectly plausible that miracles like the Virgin Birth could have happened.

Thus Pseudo-William's Jew is made to ask his Christian counterpart how the mother of the author of nature could have given birth in a way that ran contrary to nature. For conceiving without the seed of a man is plainly unnatural. To begin with, Pseudo-William's Christian retorts that the divine author of nature can, in fact, do things which go against nature. He proceeds by citing a number of Old Testament miracles, like the burning bush and the budding of the rod of Aaron in which Jews believe.[21] But then he goes on to say that the Virgin Birth is very similar to something that can be experienced daily. Mary remained a virgin in the same way that a glass does not break when a sun's ray shines through it: 'Christ, the Sun of justice, passed through the Virgin by the power of his divinity; taking the flesh of his mother he passed through her while she remained intact.'[22] Hildebert too insisted that miracles were something Jews should be well acquainted with. He stressed the precedence of grace rather than nature in miraculous occurrences. But then he too went on to make an analogy between the Virgin Birth and something everyone could see for themselves: a purely white crystal glistening in the sunlight, emitting light without suffering any blemish in the process.[23]

The allusion to unscathed glass or crystal being permeated by the light of the sun had been used as a primarily anti-Manichaean argument in a number of early medieval Pseudo-Augustinian sermons. Peter Damian (d. 1072) used it in his sermon *De fide Catholica.* Anselm of Canterbury himself used it to make the concept of the Virgin Birth seem more understandable to his monks.[24] But neither Peter nor Anselm mentioned Jews. Pseudo-William's and Hildebert's introduction of the glass/crystal analogy to the Jewish-Christian debate is quite significant: it reveals that scholars like them were interested in the workings of nature and that they sought support for their beliefs in their practical observations of it. Langmuir would seem to argue that when twelfth-century thinkers were faced with apparent incongruities between nature and faith, they stilled any doubts this might cause by suppressing empirical evidence.[25] But this is not what people like Pseudo-William and Hildebert were doing. They were not in the business of scientifically deconstructing all miracles. What they seemed to feel quite genuinely was that some natural processes were really very similar to some of the central doctrines of the Church. This clearly encouraged them so much that they decided it was worth their while to include this kind of apparently neutral evidence in their attempt to convince Jews to drop their reservations about Christianity.[26] That scholars were aided in this kind

of approach by the severe limitations of their scientific knowledge will be obvious from what Guibert of Nogent comes up with in his diatribe against the Jews.

Guibert is outraged that Jews are repelled by the thought of God being incarnate. In the second chapter of the second book of his *Treatise on the Incarnation* he is determined to show Jews that just because the Virgin Birth opposed the regular course of propagation that does not mean it was in any way impossible. In the first place he questions the right of Jews to question the naturalness of the Virgin Birth. For how natural was the creation of Adam or, for that matter, Eve? Yet Jews do believe in Adam and Eve's creation even though they did not see it or see anything like it now. He then proceeds to chide Jews, who by now he has dubbed insane and enemies of Mary, for insisting that the passing of seed was a *sine qua non* of the process of birth. Were Jews not aware of the fact that cats were engendered out of catnip and she-goats out of foliage and that vultures were conceived and brought forth without coition? Furthermore, bees reproduce without coition, while tiny flies fertilize themselves. Guibert concludes that Jewish denial of the Virgin Birth implies that God could not do for himself what he had made possible in others.[27]

As for the Incarnation itself, Guibert produces a number of natural arguments in his attempt to prove that God would not have attracted any impurity from the womb of the Virgin and that in Christ humanity and divinity could have coexisted without one interfering with the other. Guibert starts with the sun, which he imagines everyone regards as the purest element of nature. He points to the fact that the rays of the sun daily pass through heaps of dung without accumulating any filth. Furthermore a person is perfectly capable of pondering the open ulcers of a leper or the vermin pouring out of a mangled corpse or bits of excrement without having his mind sullied. And oil or balsam does not mix with the water it is poured on. Nor is the nature of gold diminished when it is covered by black earth. The thrust of the argument is plainly that Jews should have no trouble finding a myriad natural phenomena that should convince them that the mechanics of the Incarnation were far less improbable than they were wont to claim.[28]

Odo of Cambrai too alluded to the sun's rays when he argued his case about the Virgin Birth in the second part of his *Disputation against the Jew Leo about the Coming of Christ* (1106–13). His Jew had said nothing less than that Jews laugh at Christians and call them insane because they assert 'that God was enclosed in the obscene prison of the

disgusting belly of his mother for nine months only to come out from her shameful exit'. Odo's immediate reply is that God, who is everywhere, is not sullied by the uncleanliness of what he fills in the same way that sunlight is not dirtied by the filth upon which it shines.[29] But Odo was much more of a dialectician than Guibert was and he was not content to argue his case simply by alluding to analogies between nature and Christian beliefs. Both men had been strongly influenced by Anselm of Canterbury but in different ways. Guibert had adopted from Anselm the conviction that it was reason that kept human beings from giving in to their appetites,[30] but he had not adopted Anselm's confidence in the powers of reason to understand faith.[31] Odo not only shared Anselm's love of reason, he expected the rational arguments which seemed so satisfactory to himself to impress Jews. Thus he reproduced Anselm's careful reasoning on the *Cur Deus Homo* in his anti-Jewish polemic. The prologue to his disputation and its closing words makes it plain how closely interconnected internal discussion of the Incarnation and Jewish opposition to it were in Odo's mind. He states that he was asked by Acardus of Fesmy for the text of the exposé he had given on the subject of *Cur Deus Homo* in the chapter of the monastery at Christmas. The monks apparently desired to see in writing the closely argued case they had heard. Odo writes that he is glad to provide them with what they have asked and explains that he has cast his answer in a dialogue with a Jew because he had successfully discussed the Incarnation with a Jew called Leo in Senlis where he was passing on his way to a council in Poitiers. At the close of his work he states that he was forced to make his arguments even more subtle by the Christians who were present at the discussion.[32] It is impossible to say with any degree of certainty whether Odo's Jew is real or not. All that one can say is that behind every word that Leo speaks lies the person who put him on stage: Odo.[33]

For all Odo's apparent confidence in the quality of his real or imagined discussion with the Jew, the fact of the matter is that he did not pretend that Leo was converted. In Odo's eyes this did not indicate that there was anything lacking in his argumentation. The fault lay entirely with Leo. Odo had hoped that he would become a Christian if he managed to make available to him a reasonable explanation of the Incarnation. However, although the Jew admitted that he had no rational objections to bring in against the rational arguments Odo had offered him, he still refused to become a Christian. The reason he gave is that he was not prepared to give up his own holy law.[34] In

effect, then, Odo claimed that it was this law (which of course included the non-Christological reading of the Hebrew Bible) that prevented the Jew from employing his reason. If he did employ his reason he would recognize the truth of Christian reasoning. This point is brought home all the more forcefully in the second part of the disputation concerning the Virgin Birth. Realist as Odo was, he strongly believed that reason was necessary to see beyond the external details of childbirth in order to discover the inner spiritual truth of the Virgin Birth. This reason is the quality all human beings share and it is this quality that separates them from animals. The fact that Jews did not concur with his vision of the role of reason in comprehending why it was eminently suitable for God to assume flesh in Mary's womb led him to question the humanity of Jews.[35]

Pseudo-Anselm's *Disputation between a Pagan and a Christian* offers an interesting mix of some of the features we have seen so far. Much of this is a recasting of Anselm's *Cur Deus Homo,* but in this work a serious attempt is made to deal with disbelief. For the *Gentilis* is not Boso who represented *infideles,* he is one of those unbelievers himself, and Pseudo-Anselm is speaking to him directly. This is not to say that Pseudo-Anselm had thrown all of Anselm's ideas on the use of reason to the wind. Again and again he urged his opponent to yield to faith so that he could be illuminated by truth.[36] These admonitions indicate that like Anselm he did judge faith to be a prerequisite for understanding. But unlike Anselm he did not leave it at that. When he realized that pure ratiocination could not deliver the results he desired, he adjusted his tactics by appealing to the *Gentilis* to take into consideration what was clearly visible.[37] By this time the Pagan had made explicit that what was preventing him from accepting his counterpart's arguments had nothing to do with their rational cogency. He goes so far as to state that 'what you say could seem fictitious, to a believer it is, however, very close to reason' and 'someone who holds for certain that that man [Jesus] is God must not only not contradict you but because you announce his salvation so rationally, he must show you unending gratitude'.[38] What we seem to have here is the unwillingness on the part of the Pagan to accept that Jesus Christ was God. This would seem to indicate that Pseudo-Anselm's *Gentilis* represented a type of disbelief that went beyond the lack of belief of Anselm's unbelievers, who—as we have argued—were nominal Christians who refused to believe what they could not understand.[39] The Pagan's apparent problem is not whether it was possible or necessary for God to become God-man; he has after all

accepted the rationale of his opponent's arguments on these fronts. The problem at this stage of the dialogue is his lack of belief in the existence of this God-man in the first place. And it was to break down the barrier of his Pagan's disbelief in Jesus that Pseudo-Anselm proceeded to bring into play what he considered to be the visible effects of Christ's passion. He asserts that Jesus must have been God because why else would the cross, which had been a despised symbol, have become an object of veneration to all peoples? Who but God could have uprooted the idolatrous cults of all nations? Who but God could have converted so many peoples to his laws in the face of so much persecution? He then distinguished between believers and unbelievers by stating that believers would know that Christ was God from the fact that otherwise vast numbers of poor monks and hermits would be wasting their time in devoting their lives to Jesus.[40] But even Christ's enemies were aware of all the miracles performed in Christ's name which could only have happened through God's power. All this is so manifestly obvious that whether unbelievers wish to or not they cannot not see what it means. Thus, although unbelievers deny that Christ is God, in their hearts they are forced to admit he is God, at least if they are rational.[41]

It is true that Jews are not mentioned here by Pseudo-Anselm. Yet, just as his *Gentilis* seems to end up representing more than only doubting Christians asking difficult questions, the unbelievers *(infideles)* he referred to here would seem to encompass the whole range of the non-Christian experience. And Pseudo-Anselm's message is clear enough: in light of the evidence available to them unbelievers can believe if they wish to. As he puts it to the Pagan: 'if you would not persist as an unbeliever, it would be possible to satisfy your request [to have answers to queries about the divinity of Jesus Christ]. But because you cannot not see the effect of this [the Passion], whether you want to or not, from now on you are to blame if you remain an unbeliever.'[42] In other words, non-Christians have become culpable for their disbelief in Christianity. It is significant that as soon as the *Gentilis* of the dialogue has been converted and has taken on the guise of a dutiful pupil, he unashamedly assumes that no one could remain an unbeliever once they had heard about the efficacy of the sacraments.[43]

We have seen that Pseudo-Anselm claimed that unbelievers (who must include Jews) could not in good conscience deny that Christ was God.[44] The author of the *Ysagoge in Theologiam,* the theological compendium written in the 1140s in England, was much more relaxed on this question. Following the *Summa Sententiarum* he in fact opined

that a Jew would be lying if he said the Son of God was God and man. Why? Because, although what he was saying was true, he did not believe it in his soul.[45] It will come as no surprise that Guibert of Nogent had a much dimmer view on the possible sincerity of Jewish rejection of Christ. As a postscript to his *Treatise on the Incarnation* he reported an incident which to his mind spoke louder than what he had said so far. He wrote that he knew of a Jew who had refused to convert even though a clerk, with whom he had been arguing, had carried a piece of burning wood unscathed by invoking the name of Jesus.[46] The incident reinforced Guibert's conviction that Jews were steeped in deceit. How else could a Jew deny Christ in the face of what Guibert regarded as clear-cut proof of the truth of Christianity?

Guibert's message in the final section of his anti-Jewish composition and Pseudo-Anselm's message concerning the evidence of the triumph of the cross and Christian miracles were not so very far removed from the way others, like Pseudo-William of Champeaux and Hildebert of Lavardin—and indeed Guibert of Nogent himself— used natural phenomena to compel unbelievers to belief. These thinkers were convinced that data existed which was universally visible and which supported or indeed proved the veracity of Christianity. And they felt that these data should carry weight with anyone who claimed to be endowed with the faculty of reason to assimilate evidence.

Peter the Venerable believed strongly in the didactic value of recounting miracles for the purpose of edifying the faithful and overcoming the disbelief of unbelievers.[47] It is therefore not surprising that within the context of the Jewish-Christian debate he assigned an important role to miracles. In doing this he too was bringing into play evidence which he thought was universally verifiable. And, as we shall see, he too considered this to lie within the bounds of rational thought. He was not, as Gavin Langmuir would seem to have it, suppressing empirical data, in order to still the doubts he was experiencing on account of his growing awareness of the number of unbelievers who denied what he himself held to be true.[48]

By Book Four of his *Against the Inveterate Stubbornness of the Jews* (finished by 1147)[49] Peter had left his audience in no doubt whatsoever that in his eyes Jews did not use their reason. If they did they would find in the Hebrew Bible ample proof that Jesus Christ was both God and man.[50] At this point in his composition Peter decided to move away from his assessment of the Bible and to move into the realm of reason. And the reason he immediately resorted to was the data produced by miracles:

> 'You have heard, Jew, by what authority…a Christian must believe and understand that all those things, which were promised [in the Bible], were said about none other than Christ; hear now by what reason, to which a Jew, whether he wishes to or not, must be forced to agree. And by what greater reason can you be persuaded than by those immense and infinite miracles which I have already noted? For who possessing human intellect cannot see that so many and such great miracles, which Christ and Christians performed, could nowise have occurred without the power of God.'[51]

Somewhat later in the text Peter explains in what sense he had identified miracles with reason. It is in their power (i.e. effect) that they are similar. For just as reason exerts force on a rational mind to believe something, so miracles compel belief in what they mean to prove. As far as their properties are concerned they are of course different. Reason is rational understanding which takes place either silently in the mind or is expressed in words; miracles are the extraordinary power of wondrous works.[52] The manner in which Peter discusses miracles makes plain that according to him miracles derive their power to convince from the fact that they plainly serve the spiritual and material needs of human beings.[53] Moreover, their effects are universally observable. This means that anyone with reason must recognize them for what they are and believe the message they bring. Thus Jews must accept the implication of the fact that miracles converted the world to Christianity. Just as Pseudo-Anselm did, Peter laid great store by the fact that the cross, which had started out as a sign of infamy, was now universally adored.[54] But to Peter's mind the greatest miracle of all, against which no doubts could possibly be raised, was the Easter miracle of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem. Peter firmly believed that it was at that time each year that Christ illuminated his tomb with heavenly light. According to him it was not just Christians who bore witness to this; all sorts of unbelievers including Muslims did as well.[55] This indicated yet again that 'the evident reason of miracles' proved that Christ was God and man.[56] The refusal of Jews to recognize this and the evidence from Scripture confirmed once again that they did not use their reason.[57]

Certainly not everyone was prepared to assign a role to the visible effects of signs or miracles in their efforts to convert Jews. The tenor of Herman the Jew's autobiography, *Hermannus quondam Judaeus opusculum de conversione sua* (*c.*1150),[58] was that signs and visions were

for the converted rather than the unconverted. The work describes Herman's painful road from Judaism to Christianity. As long as Herman looked to miracles to point him in the right direction he was disappointed. It was only when he had been converted to Christ through the intermediary prayers of two holy female recluses that he was granted the vision for which he had yearned so long.

It has been argued that Herman never existed and that the *Opusculum* is nothing but a fake.[59] I have argued elsewhere that there seems no reason to doubt the core facts of the composition. What should be obvious, however, is that Herman was far more interested in making a statement about the process of conversion in general than in giving a historically accurate account of his own.[60] What interests us here is his explicit denial of the importance of signs for winning converts. That he is nothing less than opposed to using any such data is clear from a chapter at the beginning of his autobiography. Herman relates there that a member of the household of Bishop Egbert of Münster (1127–32) made him an offer he was happy to accept. Herman would consent to be baptized if his friend would not be burnt by the red-hot iron he was willing to hold. As soon as Bishop Egbert hears of the plan he forbids it. Faith should come from within through God's grace and not from visible signs.[61] Whether what Herman has written here really happened or not, his opinion on the desirability of seeking out signs in the quest for faith is clear enough. The contrast with the view expressed by Guibert of Nogent at the end of his treatise is startling.

Another person who had no time for the effects of signs was Peter Abelard, and it is with him that we turn to a fascinating application of the concept of reason as the innate human quality to perceive truth.[62] Abelard had a dim view of the capacity and indeed the willingness of most to seriously examine their beliefs rationally. He was well aware that most people's religion was determined by birth rather than reason. He even went so far as to write to his son, Astralabe, that everyone valued the tradition they were born into and that no one who wanted to live at peace with himself dared to consult reason in matters of faith.[63] Nonetheless, he did regard reason as an essential element in coming closer to God. Abelard believed that God had revealed himself to man through the parallel routes of prophecy and philosophy. Thus reason opened the way to true knowledge, which to Abelard was equivalent to Jesus Christ, the personification of God's wisdom. In this way reason unlocked the channel of reciprocal love that needed to flow between God and man through Christ.[64] On a different level Abelard was convinced that the tools of reason were

necessary to find one's way amongst the existing myriad conflicting authorities.[65]

His *Dialogue of a Philosopher with a Jew and a Christian* has a great deal to say about the relationship between Natural Law and the Laws of Moses and the New Testament. Indeed it is the Pagan Philosopher's role to promote Natural Law in the discussions which he holds first with the Jew and then the Christian.[66] Natural Law was the first (unwritten) law which instructed human beings in what was moral and taught them love of God and their neighbours.[67] The New Testament, according to Abelard, reinforced these teachings and made them easier to comprehend and emulate by providing Jesus Christ as the model of perfect human behaviour.[68] The laws of the Old Testament were instituted to curb evil through fear of punishment and to separate the Jews from the rest of mankind. This separation was necessary because in due course, as had been prophesied, Jesus had to stem from the Jewish people.[69]

It is through reason that human beings had been able to perceive the moral lessons of Natural Law. Indeed through this process righteous pagans had been capable of finding God more easily in Natural Law than Jews via the Law of Moses. According to Abelard Jews were hampered by all the minutiae of ritual law, which distracted them from what really mattered: genuine love of God. To his mind Mosaic Law emphasized external rather than internal justice.[70] By this Abelard did not mean to imply that Jews were insincere in their form of worship of God. A lengthy passage of his *Dialogue* speaks sympathetically of the trials willingly shouldered by the Jews in their efforts to remain Jews and to fulfil the dictates of their religion.

> Sleep itself, which brings the greatest rest and renews nature, disquiets us with such great worry that even while sleeping we can think of nothing but the danger that looms over our throats. No pathway except the path to heaven appears safe for us whose very dwelling place is dangerous…Confined and constricted in this way as if the whole world had conspired against us alone, it is a wonder that we are allowed to live. We are allowed to possess neither fields nor vineyards nor landed estates because there is no one who can protect them for us…Consequently, the principal gain that is left for us is that we sustain our miserable lives here by lending money at interest to strangers; but this makes us most hateful to them who think they are being oppressed by it…our very situation is enough to speak more

> eloquently to all of the supreme misery of our lives and of the dangers in which we ceaselessly labor. The amount of difficulty which the precepts of the Law involve is not unknown to anyone who considers it, so that we are afflicted as intolerably by the yoke of the Law as by the oppression of men.[71]

Abelard was convinced that Jews did their best to please God.[72] But at the same time he was equally convinced that they did not in fact know how to please God. For that they were too tied down by the external elements of the ritual precepts of their law. The remainder of the *Dialogue* makes that plain enough.[73]

Langmuir saw in Abelard a twelfth-century thinker who was not consumed by doubt. He therefore argued that Abelard was not prone to the type of irrational thought which led to anti-Jewish hostility.[74] From what has been said here it should be clear that Abelard's understanding of reason was so Christianized that it could not but exclude Jews, for whom the equation of Jesus Christ with God's wisdom had no meaning. This exclusion meant that in Abelard's eyes Jews were not actually serving God as human beings really ought to. We shall return to Abelard's position at length in Chapter 9.

It is hardly surprising that we find the most sophisticated use of scientific data in the *Dialogi* of Peter Alfonsi, the Spanish Jew who converted to Christianity in 1106. Peter wrote his disputation (1108–10) as an exchange between his former Jewish self (Moses) and his present Christian state (Peter), and a major purpose of his writing was to justify his own conversion. Peter was determined to prove that he understood the Jewish Scriptures better than the rabbis. The way he went about this was to select a certain type of rabbinic exegesis from the Talmud and scrutinize it in order to determine to what extent it concurred with what reason teaches us about God and the relationship between Creator and creation.

Alfonsi postulated that according to reason the world, which is a composite, had to be created by a creator, who himself was uncreated, eternal, simple, incorporeal and unchanging.[75] Anyone with any understanding of the nature of creation would know that it was absurd to ascribe to God any type of corporality.[76] Yet this is exactly what Peter accused the rabbis of having done. To demonstrate this he quoted at length from a number of aggadic (narrative) sections of the Talmud which speak about God in anthropomorphic language. Because Peter asserted that these passages were to be read literally, he insisted that Jews actually ascribed to God a human body and human

qualities like anger and grief. In one piece, for example, God is said to have wept over the captivity of the Jews.[77] Much of Peter's discussion reflects the tensions that existed amongst Sephardi (Spanish) Jews about how to talk about God.[78] Whatever the role these internal Jewish arguments played in Alfonsi's own conversion, the fact that he introduced northwestern Christendom to this material would have considerable effect on the Jewish-Christian debate.[79]

In the same way that aggadic texts were supposed by Peter Alfonsi to say indecent and irrational things about God, literal interpretations of biblical verses which referred to God's body (e.g. Exodus 33:23: 'Thou shall see my back parts: but my face thou canst not see')[80] were considered to be fallacious and at odds with reason. For Peter claimed that when authority clashed with reason it was necessary to move away from the letter of the text and turn to allegory.[81] This is what Christians have done. They have understood that these passages refer to the human nature of Jesus Christ, who was God and man. And although, unlike Anselm, Peter opined that the necessity of the Incarnation could not be explained by reason alone, he was convinced that no reason militated against it. Like others before and after him, he demonstrated the likelihood of the Incarnation by looking to natural phenomena which seemed to provide analogies with its mechanics. Thus when Peter was asked by Moses why the Incarnation did not destroy the concept of the unity of the Trinity, he answered by stating that this aspect of the Incarnation could be compared to the workings of fire. Integral components of fire are light and heat, but at times we perceive light without heat and heat without light.[82] Indeed, Peter spelled out that there were three ways of knowing something [rationally]: (1) through sense perception; (2) by necessary reason; and (3) by similitude.[83] We have seen already how other thinkers moved between similar categories when they alternatively drew on ratiocination, on analogies with natural phenomena and the effects of miracles or historical events, which were taken to be universally visible and verifiable, to argue their case.

The plain message of Alfonsi's *Dialogi* was that Christianity was more rational than Judaism and that Jews were stupid to believe their rabbis when they told them things that ran contrary to nature. This is not to say that scriptural authority was not important for Alfonsi; it was to a very considerable extent. So although he believed that reason could prove the existence of the Creator and also the Trinity, he nonetheless was eager to support reason with innumerable quotes from Scripture.[84] Moreover, he needed scriptural evidence in his

attempt to prove that the Incarnation actually occurred.[85] Beyond that we have seen how closely connected his criticism of the supposed lack of reason in Judaism was to the question of hermeneutics. At the same time we have seen again and again that for all the diverse ways that our different thinkers used reason in their anti-Jewish polemic, scriptural authority was never very far off in the background. The time is ripe to look at what their works have to say specifically on the testimony of Scripture.

# 7

# THE TESTIMONY OF THE HEBREW BIBLE

Alongside all the other paradoxes of the twelfth century there was what one might call an ambivalent approach to the Hebrew Bible. On the one hand scholars were encouraged by their studies in the trivium to examine ever more closely the exact meaning and sentence structure of the words which they believed were the words of God. This meant that there was marked concern for the historical or literal signification of the text. Because Christian scholars of course knew that the original language of what they were reading was Hebrew, there was a revived interest in that language.[1] Interest developed too in the way Jews read the same texts Christians were studying. We see scholars like Andrew of St Victor (d. 1175) actively seeking the advice of rabbis and incorporating rabbinic commentaries in their exegesis.[2] But as far as these scholars were concerned, the Hebrew Bible was the Old Testament and for them God's Word was Jesus Christ. So for all their genuine fascination with the Hebrew Bible, Hebrew and even rabbinics, their ultimate aim was to intensify their own and their community's Christian understanding of the text.[3] And because this understanding was Christological it could not but be incompatible with the Jewish reading of the Bible. It is in the arena of Jewish-Christian polemics that this incompatibility was expressed especially clearly and increasingly sharply. As such it became an additional element that separated Christian from Jew.

For our purposes the *Ysagoge in Theologiam* sets the scene well.[4] In the prologue of the second book of this mid-twelfth-century compendium of theology its author, the elusive Odo,[5] spells out that as long as Christians do not know Hebrew they will be at a severe disadvantage in any discussion with the 'Jewish Goliath'. Jews will be able to trick them into believing that the Old Testament does not contain references to Christ. He pleads with Christians to put as much

effort into learning Hebrew as into their study of the liberal arts. By this Odo is not taking a stance against reason. He himself uses many rational arguments in his discussion of the person of Jesus Christ. What he is saying is that Christians have as yet left untapped the full possibilities of using Hebrew in their effort to convert Jews. According to Odo it is in Hebrew rather than Latin or Greek that the Trinity and the Incarnation are expressed most clearly.[6] In Books Two and Three of his compendium he sets out to prove this.

One of the most interesting aspects of the *Ysagoge* text and its sole extant complete manuscript, Cambridge, Trinity College, MS B.14.33 (*c.*1150) is the systematic way in which Odo presents his Hebrew evidence. To begin with Odo explains to his non-Jewish audience that Hebrew is written from right to left. This proves, according to Odo, that Judaism was superseded by Christianity, with its Greek and Latin alphabets running from left to right. He then announces that in order to help (and to educate) readers lacking Hebrew he will not only cite the relevant Old Testament texts in the original, he will provide transcriptions of what he quotes in Latin characters as well. He also explains which characters he intends to use for various Hebrew letters.[7] In the event the Trinity manuscript includes only one of these transliterations. The layout of the manuscript, however, makes it very likely that it was the scribes (the manuscript is written in more than one hand) and not Odo himself who had shirked the labour involved. In each case the manuscript allows ample space for a transliteration.[8]

Many of the texts which Odo quotes in Hebrew and Latin are the traditional Christological ones of the Jewish-Christian debate like Isaiah 7:14–15 ('Therefore the Lord himself shall give you a sign. Behold a virgin shall conceive, and bear a son, and his name shall be called Emmanuel'); Isaiah 9:6 ('For a child is born to us, and a son is given to us'); Isaiah 11:1 ('And there shall come forth a rod out of the root of Jesse') and Ezechiel 44:2–3 ('This gate shall be shut, it shall not be opened, and no man shall pass through it: because the Lord, the God of Israel hath entered in by it, and it shall be shut').[9] Odo's purpose is crystal clear. His aim is to prove that the Christological interpretation of the Hebrew Bible was not superimposed by Christian exegetes; it is locked up in the original text itself. Thus Isaiah's '*alma* must mean 'virgin', otherwise there would be no question of a sign being given; Ezechiel's gate must signify the Virgin.[10] It is interesting to note that even the form in which the Hebrew is presented betrayed Odo's Christian bias. Often Odo does not seem to be quoting from a Hebrew Bible. His Hebrew citations regularly reveal Latin traces and

they are often translations from the Vulgate or *Vetus Latina* back into Hebrew.[11] Saltman has even discovered that some of the quotations are translations of Old Testament passages as they occur in the New Testament, for example Deuteronomy 18:15 in the version of Acts 3:22 and 7:37.[12]

Odo's interest in Hebrew made him more aware of the differences between the Jewish and the Christian canon than other polemicists. Unlike, for example, Gilbert Crispin he accepted that Jews could quite truthfully profess no knowledge of the book of Baruch.[13] He asserted that this book together with the books of Judith, Tobias, the Maccabees, and Wisdom had been destroyed by Nebuchadnezzar. So when he quotes Baruch 3:36–8 'This is our God, and there shall no other be accounted of in comparison of him. He found out all the way of knowledge, and gave it to Jacob his servant, and to Israel his beloved. Afterwards he was seen upon earth and conversed with them', he does *not* provide a Hebrew citation. None of this means that Odo himself doubted the canonicity of the book of Baruch. Citing Jeremiah 36:32, he asserts that authority proves that Baruch was Jeremiah's scribe and had recorded his words faithfully. He simply recognized that there was a problem in using the Baruch passage in discussions with Jews.[14]

But his use of Hebrew becomes much more radical when in Book Three of the *Ysagoge* he turns his attention to the Hebrew orthographies of 'Adonai', the Lord. One of these is the Tetragrammaton, which is read as 'Adonai'. According to Odo, a second way to write 'Adonai' is by putting down *three* yods (Hebrew 'i'), and this is the way he often writes it in his own Hebrew citations. The third way is to use the Hebrew characters which spell out the word 'Adonai'. To Odo's mind the use of the Tetragrammaton and the 'yods' illustrate that God is ineffable. For in both methods the letters used do not actually spell the word one reads. The second orthography strikes him as the ultimate proof that the Hebrew language bears witness to the triune God. For what else can the use of three identical letters signify than the unity of the Trinity?[15] In actual fact only two 'yods' would normally have been used by Jews for 'Adonai', but it is not impossible that Odo had seen it spelt with three.[16] Moreover, he could have interpreted the diacritical sign that sometimes accompanies these 'yods' (to indicate that a word is being signified rather than spelt out) as another 'yod'. It is equally possible that he used a spelling he found useful for his argument. For our purposes what matters is his conviction that the Hebrew spelling of

the word for 'Lord' was as Christological as the meaning of the Hebrew words of the Bible themselves.

Another scholar who used Hebrew spelling and syntax in his attempt to prove the veracity of the Trinity was Peter Alfonsi. In the first place he emphasized that the Hebrew for 'God', 'Elohim' and 'Adonai', were plural noun forms which could appear with singular or plural verbs. This must mean that God is one in more persons.[17] In order to prove that this plurality of persons could only be three in number and no other, he turned to the fact that one of the letters of the Tetragrammaton, the 'heh' (Hebrew 'h') is used twice. This means that although four characters are used, only three different letters occur. This means that God is both one and three: i.e. in substance he is one; in persons three. Alfonsi then illustrates this by describing a geometrical figure with three interlinking elements within one big one. The first element contains the first two letters of the Tetragrammaton, the 'yod' and the 'heh'; the second element the second and third letters, the 'heh' and the 'vav' (Hebrew 'v' or 'w'); the third the final two letters the 'vav' and the 'heh'. The outer element contains all four letters. The inner elements are supposed to represent the persons of the Trinity; the large outer one the oneness of God. In many manuscripts of Peter's *Dialogi* a diagram of triangles follows.[18]

On the level of hermeneutics authors of anti-Jewish polemics used the skills they had learned through the liberal arts to urge Jews to recognize that their reading of the Hebrew Bible was incorrect. Many did this by attempting to demonstrate that a literal interpretation of the text did not make sense. Peter Alfonsi even asserted that Jewish exegesis clashed with the laws of nature. The underlying assumption in all these discussions seems to have been that Jews were unwilling and incapable of reading the Bible (and rabbinic texts) allegorically. Peter the Venerable put this into very plain words when he claimed that Jews rejected metaphors and allegories and any other modes of speech in favour of the killing letter.[19]

As a pupil of Lanfranc, who had written an effective commentary on Paul's Epistles,[20] Gilbert Crispin knew well how to harness the tools of dialectic to an analysis of the words of Scripture. Gilbert put this expertise to work in his *Disputatio Iudei* in a number of ways. Focusing on many of the standard biblical texts of the Jewish-Christian debate, he set about furnishing the full exposition of some like, for example, Isaiah's suffering servant passage (53:1–10). He closely examined the precise words of the Vulgate and he elucidated passages by comparing them to parallel passages found elsewhere in both the Old and the

New Testament.[21] Here as well as in the rest of his composition he also deliberately sought out or even created conflicting literal interpretations. The purpose of this was to prove that figurative explanations were essential to a proper understanding of the Bible. Two examples should be sufficient to illustrate his method.

Gilbert opened the *Di.putation* by putting into the mouth of the Jew the statement that those who do not observe the Law in its entirety will be cursed (Deuteronomy 27:26 [quoted in the version of Galatians 3:10]). The Jew is made to ask how Christians then can blame Jews for observing the Law, while they themselves only adhere to the bits and pieces which happen to strike their fancy.[22] This meant that Gilbert was obliged to prove two interrelated things: (1) Christians and not Jews obeyed the whole Law; and (2) the whole Law could only be obeyed if it was not observed literally. In order to prove the second point Crispin juxtaposed a number of texts which would seem to contradict each other. How could God pronounce the whole of his creation very good (Genesis 1:31) when some animals were later categorized as unclean (e.g. Leviticus 11:2–8)? How could God tell man that he was to rule over all animals (Genesis 1:26) and then prevent him from ploughing with an ox together with an ass (Deuteronomy 22:10)? Not surprisingly, Gilbert found the solution he required by a figurative reading of the passages which seemed contradictory. The parts of the Law which contain no mystery and which promote love, he said, must be taken literally for all times. The sections where the letter had functioned as a veil, covering hidden truths, should be interpreted figuratively, once all existing veils had been removed by Jesus Christ. In order to illustrate this traditional position in Christian hermeneutics he referred to the use of tenses in everyday speech. One does not use the future in the present. Thus after the veiled truths had been exposed, it would be superfluous to continue to adhere to the letter.[23] So when the Bible designates animals like pigs as unclean it does not mean their flesh may never be consumed. It means that human beings must abstain from moral uncleanliness.[24] Similarly the ox stands for a proper rector of souls and an ass for an immoral idiot. The two should not be joined together for the purpose of preaching the word of God. That is what the biblical prohibition against ploughing with an ox and an ass in fact meant.[25] The upshot is that Christians, and by implication not Jews, observe the Law in its entirety because they know how to solve all the paradoxes it contains. The curse of Deuteronomy, therefore, does not apply to them.

There is nothing particularly startling in the content of most of Gilbert's samples of exegesis. Anti-Jewish polemicists like Isidore of Seville had made many of these points long before he had. What is new is his logical approach, which incorporated his generation's interest in the meaning and usage of words. This is also clear from the way he tackles Ezechiel 44:2–3:

> And the Lord said to me: This gate shall be shut, it shall not be opened, and no man shall pass through it: because the Lord the God of Israel hath entered in by it, and it shall be shut for the prince. The prince himself shall sit in it, to eat bread before the Lord: he shall enter in by the way of the porch of the gate, and shall go out by the same way.

In his attempt to prove that no sense of this passage can be made if it is read literally Gilbert addressed five short questions to the letter of the text: (1) If God is everywhere, whence did he enter the gate and to where did he exit from it? (2) If God is undefined, how could he sit in the gate? (3) How can the gate be closed for the prince if the prince himself, the Lord God of Israel, is sitting in it to eat bread before the Lord? (4) What kind of bread is this? (5) Who is this other lord in the presence of whom the Lord God of Israel is eating?[26] These questions are insoluble as long as the text is read literally. Yet the passage must make sense, otherwise it would not be in the Bible. That is why Gilbert insisted, in the face of his Jewish opponent's objections, that 'gate' must signify the womb of the Virgin Mary. The moment one accepts that this is what Ezechiel's gate really means, then all five queries can easily be resolved.[27]

Gilbert Crispin clearly presented the case that it was rational for Christian exegetes to engage in figurative and allegorical interpretations. How else could they resolve the numerous internal contradictions of the text taken in its literal sense? However, he did not press his case by launching an offensive against the Jewish method of interpreting the Bible. In the *Disputation with a Jew* he fielded questions about the desirability of combining literal with spiritual observance by stressing that literal observance was no longer necessary after Christ's coming.[28] In his *Disputatio cum Gentili* he was more precise. There he asserted that to deem any aspect of literal observance necessary would be to deny that human beings were justified by faith. Apart from anything else this would generate great dissension among the faithful.[29] The discussion on hermeneutics in both his disputations

constituted more a defence of the Christian position than an explicit attack on the Jewish one. At the end of the *Disputatio Iudei* he did not do much more than urge his Jewish opponent to reread the Bible in order to ascertain that all he had been told was indeed there, either in word or meaning.[30] Other anti-Jewish polemicists, however, brought a considerably more aggressive and personalized approach to the subject of Old Testament exegesis.

Writing less than twenty years after Crispin, Peter Alfonsi was much more forthcoming in his criticism of what he regarded as the Jewish way of reading the Bible. The fact that he himself had abandoned Judaism for Christianity and was writing his *Dialogi* to justify his conversion must have influenced his approach to the question. After all, he was out to prove that he understood Jewish authoritative texts better than generations of rabbis had ever done. In the section where he expounded what reason taught about the nature of God and creation and where he demonstrated how, according to him, the Talmud conflicted with reason on these points, he asserted that Jewish biblical literalism too opposed what reason taught us about the natural world. What concerned him at this point was the proper understanding of Old Testament passages which contained anthropomorphic metaphors about God. Alfonsi wrote:

> The words of the Prophets are obscure, nor sufficiently plain to all. Therefore, when we find things in the Prophets and when we would stray from the path of reason if we took them literally, we interpret them allegorically so that we can return them to the path of rightness. It is necessity which forces us to act thus, otherwise the reason of the letter cannot stand. But your doctors did not know God as it is fitting. Thus they transgressed against him when they expounded the words of the prophets according to the surface alone. Because of this and many similar instances I have said above that I understand the words of the Prophets as right meaning dictates.[31]

Later on in his disputation he attacked what he called the silly belief of Jews that their dead would be resurrected and inhabit the Holy Land. Alfonsi makes plain that what he is referring to is the belief that once the Messiah has come all the dead shall be resurrected and return to the Holy Land to celebrate there the full rites of the Temple. After a thousand years all will be carried into the Kingdom of perpetual bliss and immortality.[32] Alfonsi argued that no support for

this belief could actually be found in the words of the Prophets, for example Isaiah 26: 19: 'Thy dead men shall live, my slain shall rise again.' He stated: 'what deviates both from nature *and* imposes contrariety on the Prophet himself must not be expounded…in a sense contrary to nature'.[33] For in Isaiah 26:14 it says 'Let not the dead live, let not the giants rise again.' It is worth noting that what Alfonsi seemed to find so unnatural and irrational in Jewish millennial teaching was not so much the concept of resurrection itself as the idea of the resurrected dead renewing their lives on earth as part of a Messianic kingdom. He did not deny that in the Bible people had been raised from the dead. He asserted that unusual and miraculous things could be believed if they were properly confirmed by the Prophets. As a Christian, he affirmed his belief in the resurrection by God on the Day of Judgment. But he did not believe that the dead would return to any kind of earthly Jerusalem.[34] According to him, there was no scriptural evidence for this belief; the rabbis had dreamt it up after the coming of Christ in order to make Jews persist in their disbelief.[35] Alfonsi also claimed that this belief was profoundly irrational. How could all those resurrected bodies fit into the Holy Land? How could the land feed so many people? Would they function as ordinary human beings? Who would be their king? The Messiah, or Moses of whom the Bible says 'there arose no more a prophet in Israel like unto Moses'?[36] As in his examination of the anthropomorphic passages of the Talmud, much of Alfonsi's criticism here reflected longstanding discussions about the matter within the Jewish community.[37]

In the section of the *Dialogi* concerning the Virgin Birth Alfonsi accused his former Jewish self of knowing the workings neither of the Hebrew language nor of nature. It was incorrect to claim that if Isaiah had wanted to say that a virgin would conceive and bear a child (7:14), he would have used the word 'bethula', the Hebrew for 'virgin' and that the word he did use, '*alma,* simply meant 'young girl'. For a woman was called a virgin whether she was young or old, as long as she remained intact. If she was not intact, she was called 'naara'. According to Alphonsi, '*alma* was used specifically to denote a woman who was both young and intact.[38]

Peter Alfonsi was of course a special case in that he was a convert and came from Spain with wide-ranging knowledge of both Christianity and Judaism (and for that matter Islam) and philosophy. But other polemicists with less exotic backgrounds displayed increasing hostility not just towards Jewish rejection of Christian

exegesis but towards Jewish exegesis itself, or at least their understanding of it. Someone like Guibert of Nogent did not just insist that the Christological interpretation of the Prophets was correct. He examined many biblical passages which he claimed Jews regarded as Messianic and asserted that the Messiah the Prophets referred to had to be none other than Jesus Christ. Isaiah's words in 53:5 'he was wounded for our iniquities,…by his bruises we are healed' could not, according to Guibert, apply to the human Messiah Jews were expecting.[39] The same applied to Isaiah 11.[40] It was not for nothing that Jewish exegetes grew more and more cautious in offering Messianic interpretations in the course of the twelfth century.[41] The layout of Peter the Venerable's anti-Jewish treatise was determined by his desire to prove to Jews that the Messiah who both they and Christians believe was announced by the Prophets was (1) the Son of God; (2) was God; (3) would be an earthly king; and (4) had already come.[42] These items correspond with the first four books of his composition.

We have seen that Pseudo-William's *Dialogue* (1123–48) owed a great deal to Crispin's *Disputatio Iudei* and *Disputatio cum Gentili,* but Pseudo-William too was much more critical of Jews than the abbot of Westminster had been. The discussion here about the observance of the Law opens with the Christian asserting that his Jewish opponent not only does not observe the Law correctly, he destroys it. Choosing his words carefully, the Christian accuses him of being uncircumcised by being circumcised. He goes on to say that the carnal Law was given carnally to a carnal people. It remained imperfect until 'the Perfect one perfected it perfectly'. Mosaic Law offered the metaphor of what was later to be established by Jesus Christ. The rite of circumcision prefigured the sacrament of baptism. Continued carnal observance of the letter of the old Law thus destroys its proper, spiritual, observance.[43]

Rupert of Deutz, writing in 1126, went so far as to declare that maintaining circumcision was tantamount to negating Christ.[44] For Christians to observe the Sabbath would be to incur God's hatred: the Jews had stained that day with the blood of Christ. What must be observed is Sunday, the day of Christ's resurrection.[45] According to Rupert, Jews had put the Law before faith for so long that they had forgotten faith had ever existed.[46] Inexorably linked to these views was the conviction that Jewish religious observance was completely superfluous and indeed that Mosaic Law was limited and unspiritual even in its own right.

Pseudo-William put the concept of superfluity across by skilfully adapting Gregory the Great's well known metaphor about nuts.[47] By asking the Jew a series of brisk questions about how he goes about shelling a nut in order to get at the toothsome kernel and how he goes about discarding the useless broken shell, the Christian makes his point that Mosaic Law should now be put to one side. Its purpose had been to lock up safely inside it the New Law. Now that Jesus Christ had shattered the outward coating of the Old Law, it could not and should not be observed alongside the new one. Jesus Christ died for the Jews, and it was high time that Jews showed fitting gratitude for this great gift.[48]

Peter Alfonsi not only thought Jewish observance of Mosaic Law superfluous,[49] he was convinced that in any case Jews only observed a small part of the Law and that even that observance did not please God. For since their exile Jews did not acquit themselves of the prescribed Temple sacrifices, nor did they observe the laws of impurity. If God had taken pleasure in the observance of these laws, he would not have allowed the Temple to have been destroyed. Relying on the copious admonitions which can be found in the Prophets, Alfonsi argued that God had destroyed both Temples and exiled the Jews twice because they did not obey the lessons which were intended by sacrificial ritual: right belief in and love of God and the upholding of his precepts with the correct care and purity. The destruction of the second Temple marked even greater sinfulness of the Jews. For by this time Jesus Christ had unfolded for them the true purport of the Law and still they clung to their old ways. Alfonsi concluded this section of the *Dialogi* by firmly asserting that according to the Law of Moses all Jews were unclean because they no longer had priests to give judgements concerning menstrual uncleanliness. For all their religious observance, all Jews were born of pollution; their food too was unclean, their prayers unheard by God and their works displeasing.[50]

Guibert of Nogent expressed similar sentiments in his fulmination against the Jews. He wondered why Jews were so concerned with the minutiae of some laws when the focal point of their Law, that is to say the Temple with its sacrifices and the priesthood, was no more. In any case why should Jews blame Christians for eating pork when they themselves did not even keep the precepts they could observe like attaching a *blue* tassle on the four corners of their garments? He accused Jews of wallowing in trifles instead of 'loving God with all your heart and loving your neighbour as yourself'.[51] Peter the Venerable followed the same train of thought when he accused his imaginary Jewish

opponent of gnawing the shell, while he, Peter, ate the kernel of the Law. Moses' curse of Deuteronomy 27:26 affected Jews, not Christians. For Jews did not cling to the Law like Christians in a spirit of freedom. Over and above that, they did not fulfil the works of the Law as the first Jews had done in their present servile and carnal condition.[52]

The whole discussion about the unsatisfactory nature of Jewish observance and the limited character of the Law was tied up with the standard Christian conviction that once Adam had sinned the gates of heaven were closed until Jesus Christ had reopened them. The author of the *Ysagoge* used his knowledge of Hebrew in his attempt to prove that the original text of the Bible stated unequivocally that Jacob, Job, David and Ezechias expected to go to and, indeed, went to hell.[53] Pseudo-William relied on some of these texts and others, as had Gilbert Crispin, to prove the same. He explained to his Jewish opponent that the righteous Jews of the Old Testament (those who had been justified by faith in Christ) had gone to the upper regions of hell where they had suffered nothing more than shadows.[54] Rupert of Deutz offered a graphic description of the redemption of the saints of the Old Testament by the salvific blood which had dripped from the side of Christ on the cross.[55]

All this prompted scholars to insist with ever more force that Mosaic Law in itself did not offer salvation; what it offered was material goods only. Guibert of Nogent hammered this point home relentlessly throughout his tractate.[56] The same is true for Peter the Venerable.[57] Abelard too clearly stated that the only reward which was promised for observance of the Law was earthly prosperity, not beatitude. In the event, those earthly benefits would not be delivered because Jews could not fulfil their ritual obligations after the loss of their land.[58]

Pseudo-William of Champeaux used medical terms to explain to his Jewish opponent that this assessment of the Old Testament did not cast aspersions on God who had given the Jews their Law. Just as a particular potion might not cure a sick man but prevent him from getting worse, so the Law gave its observers the chance to avoid worse sin. But it could not lead them to paradise.[59] Pseudo-William is following the traditional view here that the Law of Moses was a harsh and punitive law aimed at curbing human propensity for evil after human beings had abandoned the unwritten code of Natural Law.[60] Using an Anselmian concept, Odo of Cambrai was careful to point out to the Jew of his dialogue that although the Law offered recompense for sin, it did not offer the necessary satisfaction for man to obtain beatitude.[61]

In a manner reminiscent of the schools, Pseudo-Anselm closed his dialogue with a lengthy discussion of the sacraments and their relationship to the sacrifices of Mosaic Law. By this time in the dialogue the Pagan had been converted into a faithful pupil, hanging on to the lips of his teacher in order to find out more about Christian redemption. The *magister* instructs him that God had instituted animal sacrifices in order to give men a way in which they could symbolize their wish to mortify their animal-like flesh. But as the time of redemption [in Christ] drew nearer God required something harder of man. Circumcision was instituted so that man could cut away something of his own as a token of all the excesses which had to be excised. Mercifully, God only required this to be done in one member. And the most fitting member was chosen in that it was the part of the body in which man seemed to be most damned. Moreover, in a bestial way it tended to move against man's will. Pseudo-Anselm concluded this item by asserting that like all the other legal regulations in Mosaic Law, circumcision preshadowed future truths. And before long he turned to the subject of baptism.[62] Abelard expressed similar views about the fitness of circumcising the male organ.[63] As for animal sacrifices, Rupert of Deutz was convinced that God had prescribed them to the Jews because that was the only way to lure a carnal people from idolatry.[64]

None of the scholars we have studied offered any particular solution for Jewish disbelief. Rather they studied and reworked, according to their own appreciation of the problem, existing views on Jews and Judaism. As we shall see in the next two chapters, the points they emphasized and developed were intricately connected to the way in which they themselves partook in the religious, intellectual, social and economic changes of the late eleventh and first half of the twelfth centuries. It was from the vantage-point of their own position in the developments of the twelfth-century renaissance that they pronounced on both the causes and the effects of Jewish unwillingness to convert to the enriched Christianity of this period.

Gilbert Crispin seemed quite content simply to request Jews to reread the Bible. Guibert of Nogent, however, who was deeply concerned about the economic and social changes of his era, was enraged that Jews seemed immune to the plethora of rational and biblical proofs they were constantly given of the truths of Christianity. The tenor of his anti-Jewish polemic is that Jews were caught up in self-perpetuating damnation. They followed a law that offered them only material gain; because they aspired only to what was material, they could not rise to the plane of accepting the spiritual truths of

Christianity.[65] Odo of Cambrai decided that Jews would listen to reason only if they were willing to give up Mosaic Law.[66]

Herman the Jew, who wrote an account of his traumatic road to baptism, perpetuated the fiction that Jews were impervious to all forms of allegory. He reported that his (Jewish) family was even incapable of assessing correctly his adolescent dream of being fêted by the German emperor.[67] As a Christian, he later understood that this dream meant that he was destined to sit at Christ's table by way of celebrating the Eucharist.[68] As far as the Hebrew Bible was concerned, he had listened with great pleasure to Christian clerics expounding it. In his desperate quest for spiritual peace he sought to dispute religious matters with knowledgeable men of the Church. According to his autobiography he even initiated a discussion with Rupert of Deutz.[69] But although he did appreciate the beauty of the Christological explanations he was exposed to, he simply could not believe them as long as he was a Jew.[70]

Rupert himself, who was actively engaged in one aspect of the spiritual renewal of the Reform movement, claimed that Jewish eyes were repelled by the light of Christian truth.[71] According to him, they hated allegories and would rather embrace dung than break the bread of Scripture.[72] Peter Abelard, who was so interested in the inner forces that propelled human beings, seemed to believe that all the legal minutiae of Jewish Law made it virtually impossible for Jews to see the forest for the trees.[73] Peter Alfonsi, who had turned his back on rabbinic authority, blamed the rabbis (of the Talmud) for misinforming Jews about God and the meaning of the Bible.[74] Peter the Venerable insisted again and again in his anti-Jewish polemic that Jews could not read the Bible properly because they lacked reason. In the fifth and final book of his tractate against the Jews he maintained that the Talmud was responsible for crippling Jewish reason to the extent that it had become completely stifled.[75]

It is in fact virtually impossible to disengage cause from effect in what our scholars had to say about the determination of Jews to remain Jews. It is time to move on to a new discussion in which we shall explore this matter by examining two integral themes of the Jewish-Christian debate: bodies and money.

# 8

# BODIES AND MONEY

So far we have traced the development of significant strands of thinking affecting Christian perceptions of Jews. As we have seen, twelfth-century renaissance scholars utilized a concept of reason which was imbued with all kinds of Platonic and Stoic connotations. This meant that a great deal of weight was attached to what was believed to be the innate ability of the mind to grasp truth. The mind was thus ever more emphatically raised above the body, as was the spirit over the properties and appetites of the flesh. We have also seen that the truth, which the mind or spirit was thought capable of perceiving, was essentially Christian. Jews, who continued to refute that 'truth', were, therefore, increasingly associated with what lay opposite to reason: the senses or appetites of the body. This trend interlocked with the way in which the Hebrew Bible was viewed within the context of Christian salvific history. With the Fall of Adam and the injection of original sin into humanity, salvation was considered unattainable until the coming of Christ. So the rewards which were promised in the letter of the Old Testament could only be material ones; spiritual rewards were reserved for the New Testament. As with the bifurcation between reason and appetite, Jews became steadily more associated with the material gain which their Scriptures were thought to offer them. Spiritual gain remained the domain of Christians, who benefited not only from the message of the New Testament but also from their Christological reading of the Old. This broad classification of Jews and Christians mixed together with the conflicting ideas which began to be voiced about the period's rapid growth in economic prosperity.

Alongside all these ideas about the spirit and the flesh in general, there was a great deal of concern about two very specific and highly significant bodies: the body of Jesus Christ and that of the Virgin

Mary. We have discussed at some length how this period was marked by widespread fascination with the human nature of Jesus Christ and the womb from which he was supposed to have assumed flesh.[1] Concurrent interest in the twelfth-century renaissance in the workings of nature made it all the more imperative for Christian thinkers to feel able to explain how God could become incarnate by means of a virgin mother. We have already recorded how scholars like Pseudo-William of Champeaux, Guibert of Nogent, Odo of Cambrai, Hildebert of Lavardin and Peter Alfonsi summoned up examples from the processes of nature to make the Virgin Birth and the coexistence of a human and a divine nature in the person of Jesus Christ seem more plausible.[2] At this point it is worth our while to look more closely at

Odo's efforts: his approach is a prime example of the process by which reason was used to explain what the senses could not observe in such a way that in the end Christians seemed rational whilst Jews did not. Odo sets his scene carefully by making his Jew, Leo, question the Virgin Birth in words vividly reflecting sensuous observation. Mary's womb is dubbed 'obscene' and 'disgusting'; her vagina as a 'shameful exit, which cannot be looked upon without horror'.[3] How then could this be a suitable place for God to be for nine whole months? The Jew claims he finds it shameful even to bring it up. Jews have every reason to mock Christians and call them insane.

Odo proceeds by carefully delineating the realms of reason and the senses. According to Odo a person's senses reach conclusions on the basis of what they are used to. They are governed by lust and cupidity and their opposites. Reason operates on a much sounder level because it gazes into the true nature of things. Reason, therefore, displays a preference for what lives over what does not; reason cares more about what pertains to heaven than what belongs to this world. To illustrate his point Odo puts forward the argument that a peasant who is given the choice between a stone and a frightening snake, couched in one of its cavities, would invariably choose the stone, which can serve him as a building block for his wall. That is because the peasant is ruled by his senses. If reason had been his lead, he would have opted for the snake because it is animate unlike a stone, however precious it might be. Nor would reason have been distracted by the horrible sight of the snake from assessing the *real* value of the creature in comparison with the *supposed* worth of an attractive object like a useful stone. Likewise the senses would prefer to fell a fruitbearing tree rather than burn down the house it was threatening. Many a modern conservationist would

applaud Odo's verdict that reason would choose the living tree over the inanimate house. A sensuous peasant would also not hesitate to let any number of wild animals perish rather than lose a halfpenny from his purse. Nor would he be willing to sacrifice even one of his shrubs for the sake of many stars.[4] In all of this Odo's realist stance is more than obvious. For him reality lay beyond the particulars of any material object.[5] That he not only was a realist but also an ascetic reforming monk is reflected by his disdain for money and goods. His own disregard for material comfort almost brought starvation to the monks under his charge at St Martin in Tournai in the harsh winter of 1095. His monks reacted by appointing a prior less prone to rejecting all their monastery's material assets.[6]

In the same way human senses find privy parts, guts and excrement revolting and assume these things must be unclean. Reason, however, knows that the only thing that is unclean *sui generis* is sin itself. For God's creation on its own is good. Indeed this is proved by Christ himself, who stated that what enters the mouth and the belly and is cast into the privy does not defile man. What defiles man are things which come from the heart like theft, murder and adultery.[7] It is at this point that Odo cleverly reintroduces Jewish hermeneutics in order to contrast its conclusions unfavourably to what he has just quoted from the Gospels. It is useful to recall that at the end of the first part of Odo's disputation Leo had admitted that it was his adherence to Mosaic Law that prevented him from accepting his adversary's rational explanation of the Incarnation.[8] Here Odo approaches the subject by way of St Paul. He goes out of his way to stress that Paul had started out as a Jew and that he was educated in Jewish Law, but that he had subsequently turned against the Jews because of their use of the Law to designate certain foods as unclean. Thus Paul asserted that 'every creature of God is good and nothing [should] be rejected that is received in thanksgiving'.[9] It is plain to Odo that the Law (that is to say the Law in its non-Christological sense) passes the verdict of uncleanliness on a sensual basis, whereas the Gospel of Christ and the teaching of his apostles judiciously apply reason. Reason, he reiterates, is greatly preferable to the senses. Because the senses cannot reach the cognitive level of reason, they often consider its judgement to be stupid and insane. With this in place Odo is ready to differentiate clearly between what he sees as Jewish sense perception and Christian rational understanding.

Concentrating on the intrinsic spiritual value of human beings in terms of their future eternal destiny, Odo asserts that Christians value

the human body beyond the sun and the stars. In contrast, Jews have eyes and noses only for the unsightly and smelly aspects of the human condition. If the bodies of ordinary, sinful humans are so valuable, how much more precious must then be the sinless body of the Virgin? Odo finishes by blasting the sensuousness of worrying about the propriety of the Virgin's reproductive organs. He concludes by demanding that Leo admit to the stupidity of following his senses, asking him whether he is sensual along with the animals, lacking reason among men.[10] The equation is complete: just as the senses compare to reason, the Law of Moses compares to the New Testament. In the same way Jews compare to Christians as animals compare to human beings. And as before, although professing interest in Odo's use of reason, Leo refuses to believe, unwilling as he is to submit his own Jewish truth to Christian reasoning.[11]

Odo concludes his disputation in praise of the Virgin Mary; his love of the Virgin was characteristic of many in Anselm of Canterbury's circle, including Guibert of Nogent.[12] Much of the venom that exudes from Guibert's *Treatise on the Incarnation* stems from his distress at the thought that anyone might not share his deep love and profound respect for the Virgin mother. In Guibert's thoughts on Mary's body and the body of her Son we can once again ascertain a subtle interplay of reason and hermeneutics. The blend we see is, however, not quite the same as what we have just picked up from Odo's work.

For Guibert the overriding role of reason seems to have been to control appetite, and here, I think, we see the lasting influence of St Anselm who counselled Guibert while he was an adolescent boy. It must be clear to anyone who has read Guibert's autobiography how transfixed the man was by the full spectrum of human depravity. Again and again he accused his contemporaries of the most lurid acts of misconduct. One monk is accused of denying his faith and tasting the semen he has offered to the Devil. A Jew is supposed to have acted as the facilitator in this pact with Satan. Using the sorcery he acquired through his bargain with the Devil, the monk turns a nun, who has been his mistress for some time, into a large dog so that she can leave his cell undetected.[13] Heretics are reported to fornicate freely at their ritual meetings and sacramentally eat the ashes of the children they have engendered.[14] A dying usurer is reported to have swallowed the coin he had extorted from a poor woman as if it were the consecrated wafer of the last rites.[15] It was as if no one, save Guibert himself and a select few, like Anselm of Canterbury and

Anselm of Laon, cared about following the straight and narrow path of righteousness. As far as his own person was concerned, he seemed to have been permanently on guard against anything that might tempt him to do what his reason told him not to.[16] This, arguably, is the background against which Guibert considered Jewish disbelief in the Virgin Birth and in the Incarnation.

St Anselm had taught him at the impressionable age of fourteen that a proper spiritual life could not be had unless reason curbed the appetites of the flesh. Anselm also taught him that one could only comprehend the operations of the human mind if one subdivided the mind into four parts: desire, will, reason and intellect. According to Anselm, will had to be aligned with reason for a person to achieve spiritual understanding. If it were not and desire was allowed to rule, man was doomed to carnal things.[17] In terms of studying Scripture, without reason no one could hope to understand the spiritual meaning of the Bible. To achieve the most profound level of spiritual meaning, that is to say the anagogical or mystical one, the purest category of the mind was called upon: intellect.[18] It would seem that Guibert combined all these Anselmian lessons on good conduct, the mind and hermeneutics when he came to his own analysis of people's opposition to the teachings of the Church concerning Jesus and Mary.

Guibert starts off his *Treatise on the Incarnation against the Jews* by insisting that purity of mind and heart are essential in order to understand and to champion the Incarnation, which in itself is so pure. For all the clichés with which he introduced his composition, Guibert may well have been genuinely concerned about the degree of his own suitability to defend the Incarnation against those who refuted it.[19] Guibert fashioned his treatise as a two-pronged attack against the Jews and Count John of Soissons, whom Guibert accused of encouraging the Jews. Not much is known about this figure. Guibert continued to vent his hatred against John and his family in his autobiography.[20] It is not unlikely that Count John had Jewish financial agents. We know that there were Jews in Soissons in this period.[21]

In Guibert's opinion it is part and parcel of the Jewish race *(gens)* to speak against the virginal conception of the Son of God. He goes on to say that 'those who boil the meat of the lamb in water' consider Christ's birth in the same way as all other births; they lack a sense of mystery. The phrase *hi agni carnes coquunt aqua* is somewhat enigmatic. I would suggest that it refers to the contradiction between Exodus 12:9 where it is stated that the Paschal offering must not be boiled in water *(nec coctum aqua)* and Deuteronomy 16:7 where it might be

inferred that it should be *(coques et comedes).*[22] If this interpretation is correct, we can say that already at this stage Guibert has forged a link between Jewish observance of Passover with Jews being unprepared to appreciate what he regards as the wonders of the Incarnation.[23] The allusion is of course particularly poignant on account of the Christian identification of the Paschal lamb with Christ. Guibert proceeds by airing most graphically the concerns he thinks there might be about God assuming flesh by way of the Virgin's womb. He is very agitated indeed that anyone might draw the wrong conclusions from the fact that as a human Jesus covered his privy parts and needed to urinate and defecate just like any other man. The message he drives home is similar to Odo's. The only thing that is unclean is sin itself. For all its smelly effluences, the human condition, even in its female form, is not disgusting in itself.[24] Guibert's verdict is that the filth which Jews (and John of Soissons and his ilk) have the temerity to associate with Jesus Christ and his mother is, in fact, embodied in themselves. To use the Abbot of Nogent's own words, 'the enemies of the divine birth throw out stinking words from their filthy gaping jaws… But those members, which served that birth, were more worthy than their foul mouths which they daily stuff with fraud and excess and disparaging remarks about the living sacrament.'[25] In other words, not only are Jews filthy because they operate on a material level, they are wicked on account of their reprehensible behaviour on that plane. And it is unsurprising that this is so because appetite needs to be curbed by reason. But this does not happen in Jews. Their predilection for the literal meaning of Mosaic Law determines their inclination towards carnality. In short, Jews wallow in a self-perpetuating state of carnality.

Whereas the usurers of the *De Vita sua,* including the one whose dying act was to swallow a coin rather than the viaticum,[26] are Christians, usurers in Guibert's *Treatise on the Incarnation* are Jews. Incapable as they are of profiting from Mosaic Law by understanding its non-material message concerning love of God and one's neighbours, Jews are drawn to theft, lies and deceit.[27] In Guibert's mind usury was clearly tantamount to stealing, for Jews are portrayed as thieves as they supposedly amass interest off the backs of the poor.[28] According to Guibert, Jewish lives are filled by thefts and usury; they lack the desire for holy simplicity.[29] In any case with hearts full of theft and usury there can simply be no question of Jews gaining any perception of God's mysteries.[30]

Guibert's fulmination against Jewish usury in the *Tractate on the Incarnation* and his condemnation of Christian usury in his autobiography seem to reveal his keen mistrust of the social and economic changes he was witnessing.[31] His profound unease with the developments of his own age mingled with the complex views he held on human nature. All this coloured the way in which Guibert would interpret the fact that Jews did not share his understanding of the Bible or accept doctrines like the Virgin Birth or the Incarnation. In Guibert's mind Jewish rejection of the Christological interpretation of the Hebrew Bible and Christian doctrine were intimately connected and the implication of that rejection was that Jews were filthy and carnal in a material sense. In turn, their beastly filthiness made it impossible for them to stop rejecting what they needed to accept in order to become clean. In short, there is precious little hope for Jewish redemption in Guibert's writings. Guibert is not really seeking to convert Jews. His concern seems to be to ferret out the reason why Jews will not become Christians notwithstanding all the information they are offered about that faith. The conversion he describes at length in his autobiography is one of force not conviction. It is the conversion of the Jewish boy who was saved from death at the hands of the (popular) crusaders who attacked the Jewish community of Rouen in 1096. The boy consented to baptism out of fear for his life. Guibert was, in fact, surprised he turned out so well, overcoming what Guibert dubbed 'his evil nature'. The boy became a monk at Fly, Guibert's monastery, before Guibert became abbot of Nogent.[32]

The themes of Jewish obduracy and Christian spirituality emerge in yet a different guise in the autobiography of the convert *Hermannus*.[33] Here there is no question of venom. Instead, we are privy to a former Jew's judgement on the material and spiritual aspirations of his erstwhile community. The context of this verdict is that Herman was writing not in order to pass on accurate and objective information about Jews, but to impress upon his Christian readership what it was that made Jews like himself convert.[34] The fact that Herman entered the newly founded Premonstratensian order upon becoming a Christian obviously coloured his mature reflections on his conversion.[35]

Long before his conversion we see Herman distancing himself from the business practices of his family when he lent a large sum of money to Egbert of Münster (1127–32) without demanding the customary pledge worth twice as much as the loan. Herman was more than satisfied with the bishop's word of honour; his *parentes* and friends

were not. They sent him to Münster to stay with Egbert until the loan had been repaid.[36] So from the start Herman subtly put across his sense of Jewish concern with material things. Part of this picture is the information he gives about his family's reaction to the enigmatic dream he had as a boy about being entertained by the emperor. They are only capable of giving it a purely literal and worldly meaning.[37] Once in place, Jewish materialism and Jewish literalism can be juxtaposed with Christian spirituality.

During his stay in Münster Herman was much impressed by the charity shown to him by a pious member of the bishop's household. The man, who was called Richmar, was content to live off bread and water and he handed on to Herman a handsome pike given to him by Egbert. What struck Herman so forcefully was the fact that Richmar should show such kindness to a Jew; to someone he would rate as his enemy.[38] To Herman's later Christian frame of mind this proved the superiority of the Gospels over Mosaic Law: the New Testament lesson concerning love for one's enemies seemed to surpass the love of one's neighbour taught by the Old Testament.[39] As we saw earlier, Bishop Egbert did not allow Richmar to undergo an ordeal in a desperate attempt to convert Herman, insisting as he did that faith, and not a sign of any kind, was the *sine qua non* of conversion. Herman is full of praise for Egbert's good sense but he leaves his reader in no doubt about his regard for Richmar. He stresses emphatically the importance of Christians showing exemplary piety to Jews, 'from whom Christians take the author of their eternal salvation… and through whom eternal good came'. According to Herman, this and the fervent prayers of Christians could play a vital role in the long road to Jewish conversion.[40]

Exactly how this might work is shown when Herman is exposed to the simple and pious lifestyle of the Premonstratensians Cappenberg, which he visited with Bishop Egbert. He is deeply moved by the sight of so much spirituality. Indeed, the experience caused him great anxiety. If Christianity was a false creed, did that mean that the Cappenberg brethren were living a life of deprivation in vain? But how could such service to God go unrewarded? Did this not mean that Christianity and not Judaism was the true religion? Woven into his account and his subsequent musing is the contrast he explicitly draws between the Christian path of *vita apostolica* and the Jewish path of ritual observance. In addition Herman goes out of his way to indicate that it was on account of their carnal reading of the Bible that Jews like himself could not understand that it was in houses

such as Cappenberg that Isaiah's Messianic message of peace was being fulfilled. Christians, however, understood that the coexistence of the wise and the simple, the strong and the weak, the noble and the abject under the guidance of a spiritual father, representing Christ, epitomized the prophecy that 'the wolf shall dwell with the lamb…and a little child shall lead them'. The visit to Cappenberg left real doubt in Herman's mind about the validity of Judaism.[41] He returned to his home town of Cologne a troubled man.

Herman's spiritual turmoil steadily increased as he vainly sought for signs to show him the road to truth and as he attempted to find answers to his questions by engaging learned churchmen, like Rupert of Deutz, in discussions about Christianity.[42] The only illusory respite he found in his misery was during the first heady months of his marriage when sheer carnal delight temporarily pushed all gnawing doubts out of his mind. Herman's fellow Jews had insisted that their troublesome confrère settle down with a wife.[43] When marital bliss wore off, he began to despise the affairs of the world in which he was engaged, and his anxiety returned in full measure.[44] Just before he was driven to despair he was finally brought to the Christian faith through his own prayers and especially by way of the intercessory prayers of two pious female recluses. His sense of deliverance was intense.[45] As soon as he was baptized he returned to Cappenberg to become a brother there. Five years later he was studying for the priesthood and he understood that the emperor of his adolescent dream had been none other than Christ, bearing him spiritual gifts.[46]

The contrast drawn here is not just between the power of prayer and signs; it is also between the efficacy of the prayers of those genuinely living the *vita apostolica* as opposed to the uselessness of disputations with those who lack faith. According to Herman, Jews were prevented from converting by a veil of blindness which covered their hearts. The veil precluded them from accepting any rational explanations of the meaning of the Bible or Christian doctrine.[47] God's grace was needed for the removal of this veil and that grace had to be sought by fervent prayer of the person involved and of those who interceded on his behalf. Exemplary Christian piety could nudge Jews on to a path of prayer. Thus Christian spirituality was put forward by Herman as the only effective cure for Jewish blindness; and that vibrant spirituality by which Herman set so much store is contrasted firmly with Jewish attachment to what held them back from the truth: material things and their non-Christological reading of the Old Testament.

No subtlety is needed to gauge Peter the Venerable's feelings about Jewish aspirations. He was convinced that Jews loved money. In his letter to Louis VII on the eve of the Second Crusade Peter is scathing about Jewish usury, claiming that they made money out of stolen church vessels. He therefore suggested to the king that the Jews be made to finance the Crusade.[48] But it is the connection he drew between what he saw as Jewish carnality and Jewish disbelief that is more instructive for us here.

Peter's *Adversus Iudeos* is a blast against supposed Jewish lack of reason. In the course of his fulmination Peter ends up by dehumanizing Jews. He likens Jews to animals because they refuse to accept a Christological reading of the Old Testament, however often and however clearly it is explained to them. Nor will they employ their reason to accept the universally visible proof which he felt miracles provided for the divine and human nature of Jesus Christ.[49] Again and again Peter wonders aloud whether he is confronting a human opponent or an animal. 'I do not know whether I am speaking to a man… I know not whether a Jew is a man because he does not cede to human reason, nor does he acquiesce to the divine authorities which are his own.'[50] 'I dare not say you are a man lest perhaps I lie, because I know that reason is extinguished in you, yea buried, reason that separates man from other animals and puts him in charge of them.'[51] To Peter's mind these animal desires render Jews immune to spiritual aspirations. Their love for earthly things, for example, makes them interpret innumerable biblical passages as if they applied to the promised land. This results in nothing less than Jews throwing away all the heavenly and eternal goods which have been given to all peoples but them. 'Others daily plunder the kingdom of heaven, while you, who have always been instructed to love only carnal impurities, await in vain a kingdom on earth.'[52] To Peter there was no hope for Jews as long as they persisted in their carnal outlook on life, which, he was sure, was intrinsically bound up with their literal reading of the Bible.

But Peter was not content simply to signal Jewish carnality and to condemn it. He wanted to discover why it is that Jews should show so much more propensity to act like animals rather than humans. He, of course, knew full well that they are human and that in principle they had been endowed with reason just like all other human beings. He was at pains to point out that the Jewish murderers of Christ were men and not really dogs, even though they acted like dogs. For like dogs they thirsted after Christ's blood, rabidly licking their chops.[53]

What was it then that had extinguished Jewish reason? To Peter's mind the answer to this lay in the Talmud.

About forty years before Peter the Venerable wrote his treatise against the Jews, Peter Alfonsi had used anthropomorphic passages of some of the narrative portions of the Talmud to demonstrate that the rabbis taught Jews things about God that were contrary to nature. God, the eternal, simple, incorporeal and unchanging Creator, could never display the features the Talmud ascribed to him like weeping or showing anger or having a head, arms and legs and being capable of being measured. The absurdity of these passages proved to Alfonsi that Judaism lacked reason.[54] Peter the Venerable used many of the same passages and others to castigate the Talmud as an evil bestial book which blasphemed against God and which was responsible for smothering Jewish reason.[55]

Peter's tract against the Jews hinged on the conviction that Jews lacked the ability to read the Bible spiritually. That is why they were immured in their rejection of Christ as the Son of God and the Messiah whose coming was foretold by the Prophets. Like Alfonsi before him, Peter also assumed that Jews read the allegorical language of the Talmud literally. Without the benefit of metaphor the relevant sections of the Talmud seemed to take away from God his omnipotence and glory. Peter's own additions to and adaptations of the Talmudic passages he quoted made them seem even more offensive. In Peter's hands, for example, rabbinic material, which portrayed God as being proud of the ability of his children to outwit him, was made to sound like a Jewish attack on God with rabbis calling their God a fool and a liar.[56] In the same way Peter was appalled that the Talmud seemed to dare to imply that God wept over the captivity of the Jewish people and expressed his grief by roaring like a lion and stamping his feet. Peter was convinced that it was no exaggeration to compare those who said such disgraceful things about God to impudent dogs and filthy pigs.[57] In short, Peter's verdict on the Talmud was unequivocal. Blaspheming as it did against God, it held Jewish hearts in its grip and incapacitated their use of reason.

Something very interesting seems to have happened in the course of both Peter Alfonsi's and Peter the Venerable's appraisal of the Talmud. Both men used the Talmud to prove that Jews were irrational because they ascribed to God a body and human attributes. In other words, the two Peters used Jewish sources (or at least their understanding of those sources) to accuse Jews of the same thing Jews blamed on Christians: demeaning God by claiming that he was

a man. In so doing they introduced a new twist to the perennial discussion of how and why God became man. For Jews now stood accused not only of disparaging God incarnate; they were blamed for attacking God himself.[58]

Essential to the arguments raging between Christians and Jews about the Incarnation was the completely opposite view both parties took of Christ's passion on the cross. To Jews the idea of a mangled body on a cross was totally and utterly incompatible with their views about God. Indeed in their eyes the fact that Christians admitted that Jesus died proved that they had to be wrong about him being God. It is not for nothing that the Hebrew invectives concerning Jesus dwell on his corpse so much.[59] Worshipping a cross with a suffering Christ depicted on it was not only distasteful to Jews; it was idolatrous. Christians naturally saw things from a different perspective. For them the crucified body of Christ had deep spiritual meaning, which grew even more intense as interest in the human nature of Jesus increased in the course of the twelfth-century renaissance. To them it represented the salvation offered by Christ; to them it was the reminder of what Jesus had been willing to suffer for the sake of humanity. These sentiments come out clearly when we compare the feelings of Herman about the cross before his conversion with those of Rupert of Deutz, one of the churchmen with whom Herman was supposed to have had a discussion.

Herman writes that when during his stay in Münster he walked into the cathedral, he was horrified to see 'one and the same man humiliated and exalted, despised and promoted, shameful and glorious, below miserably hanging on a cross and above in a deceptive picture sitting most beautifully as a god'. Herman, who at that stage was still a Jew, was clearly stupefied by the sight of what to him had then to be an idol.[60] Later, when he engaged Rupert on the subject, the abbot of Deutz tried to explain what the crucifix meant to Christians.[61] According to Herman, Rupert pointed out that the cross or the image on it were not worshipped as idols. What was adored was Christ's passion:

> through which in pious devotion we may represent how, while we externally picture to ourselves his death by means of the image of the cross, we ourselves inwardly must also be kindled to love of him. And we, who reflect unceasingly that he, who was immune to any sin, took on such a shameful death for us, must always remember piously how much we, who are enveloped by many great sins, should suffer out of love for him.[62]

The cross with Christ's bleeding body was absolutely central to Rupert's own devotion and to his view of a healthy Christian society. He was an avid reformer and in his eyes Christ's salvific body and blood were the agents through which Christendom was to be brought back to unity and to the proper worship of God under the guidance of monk-priests like himself. These points come out very clearly in his vast exegetical work and in his anti-Jewish polemic, the *Anulus sive dialogus inter Christianum et Iudeum* (1126).[63] In the *Anulus* he seemed not to have been at any great pains to emphasize that the image on the cross was not in itself an object of Christian worship. In this work, written against an imaginary Jew, he stressed the appropriateness of the likeness on account of the fact that Jesus Christ 'was seen on earth and conversed with men' (Baruch 3:38). 'So I make his likeness and I worship it.'[64] His words throughout the disputation make it quite plain how intensely Rupert identified with Jesus' suffering and how deeply he adored the humility of the figure hanging on the cross.[65] Moreover, according to Rupert, Christ had instituted the Eucharist through his suffering and death on the cross, rather than at the Last Supper. In the past it had been Christ's blood that saved those who had piously awaited redemption in the bosom of Abraham. Now the single road to salvation was through participation in the Eucharist, which to Rupert really meant physically consuming Christ's body and blood.[66] It goes without saying that there was not much hope for Jews in this kind of outlook. Indeed to Rupert's way of thinking Jews (and all others who did not partake of the Eucharist faithfully) were covered in Christ's blood.[67]

The image of Jewish hands covered in blood brings us to the way in which the participation of Jews in the crucifixion was viewed by the thinkers we have taken under scrutiny. Jeremy Cohen has noted that it was in the course of the twelfth century that more emphasis began to be placed on what was imagined to have been the deliberate element in the actions of Christ's persecutors. The evidence Cohen cites comes from twelfth-century glosses on the pertinent New Testament texts. The tenor of some of these glosses like, for example, Anselm of Laon's gloss on Matthew 21:33–9 (the parable of the vineyard) and the commentaries of the *Glossa ordinaria* on the same parable and on 1 Corinthians 2:8 ('Which none of the princes of the world knew; for if they had known it, they would never have crucified the Lord of glory') is that unlike the uneducated Jewish *minores,* the learned Jewish elders did know that Jesus was the promised Messiah. Their actions could not, therefore, be explained as stemming from

their ignorance of the true identity of Jesus Christ. They acted out of greed, not ignorance.[68] Especially in the electric atmosphere of the Crusades these ideas added a new and harsh dimension to the concept of Jewish guilt for the crucifixion.

Such sentiments are signalled in the work of Rupert of Deutz and Peter Alfonsi. In a strange way one could even say that Peter Abelard's ideas about the crucifixion might be taken to tend in that direction too. Others like Gilbert Crispin, Pseudo-Anselm or Pseudo-William of Champeaux did not belabour the question of Jewish motivation for their crime. The role of the Romans in the crucifixion was still very much in Gilbert Crispin's mind: 'We say the Jews crucified the Lord and yet it was not Jewish soldiers who crucified the Lord but Gentile soldiers. The Jews crucified the Lord by their judgement, the Gentile soldiers by matching their decisions.'[69] Pseudo-Anselm and Pseudo-William of Champeaux seemed as keen to stress the role of the Devil in Jesus' death as the role of the Jews.[70] Abelard's concern was to work out whether or not the Jews had sinned (in the technical sense of the word) when they crucified Christ. Because Abelard defined sin as 'consent to evil', he had to conclude that the Jews had not sinned. For they *intended* to do God's will in putting Jesus to death. They had no intention of showing contempt to God, which is what constitutes sin. In the event, Abelard was quite sure that their good intention was, in fact, false. The bearing this has on our discussion is that although Abelard argued that the Jews acted as they did through lack of knowledge of Christ, that is to say ignorance, he did assume in his discussion that the Jews did what they did intentionally. He even said that 'they would have sinned more gravely in fault if they spared them [Christ or his disciples] against their conscience'.[71] It was for others to argue that those intentions were *deliberate'y* wicked.

Peter Alfonsi for his part spelled out that the leaders of the Jews made the whole Jewish people accomplices in their crime of killing Christ. The elders led the others astray by claiming that Jesus was a magician and a prostitute's son.[72] These doctors and scribes were wise and learned and they were *not* ignorant of Jesus' real identity. According to Alfonsi, they knew that Jesus was not a magician. They were fully aware that he was God's friend and that he performed miracles through God's will and power. It would have been clear to them that he was God's Son. The reason they crucified Jesus was that they were envious of him; they feared that he would cause them to lose dignity and fame.[73]

Rupert of Deutz freely aired his views about Jewish greed and envy. At one point in the *Anulus* he says that it was on account of their insatiable greed that Jews had killed Jesus Christ.[74] But to Rupert Jewish deliberate denial of Christ was and continued to be even worse than the act of putting Jesus to death. According to Rupert, Jews denied Christ because they were blind to his message. And the efficient cause of that blindness was the envy Jews had always borne towards non-Jews. In their eagerness to keep what they believed to be God's salvation for themselves they were intentionally unwilling to accept the idea that Jesus Christ had come to save the whole of mankind.[75] The possible ramifications of the idea that Jews actually hated Christians and that this hatred had something to do with their deliberate refusal to acknowledge Christ falls under the heading of our final chapter.

The present chapter will close with yet another expression of the imagined bifurcation between unreasonable, carnal Jews and rational, spiritual Christians. Our attention is directed to Hildebert of Lavardin's thoughts on the rejection by Jews of the Incarnation. Hildebert (d. 1133) was a true man of the twelfth-century renaissance. The great esteem he had for the classical past is exemplified in his well known verses singing the praises of the pagan artifacts of Rome. Imbued with Stoic ideas, Hildebert was a great admirer of nature: he firmly believed that in order to live well human beings should live according to nature.[76] Within this framework man's rebirth in Christ was essential because it was the new nature provided by Christ that Hildebert so valued. Hildebert's two sermons on the Incarnation give a graphic illustration of his views about the gaping void between those who had been healed by Christ and those, like the Jews, who had not.[77]

The first of these sermons rejoices in man's redemption by Christ. Hildebert is clearly anxious to illustrate as effectively as possible the contrast between unredeemed and redeemed nature. He does this by producing a similitude. Unredeemed man is pictured as a horribly diseased servant, rotting away from an inherited illness on his bed. His master comes to comfort him, cheerfully putting up with the putrid filth with which the sickbed is covered. He is undaunted by the fact that his servant does not even recognize him and laughs at his efforts. But the incommodities of the bed are too much for the master. He dies, curing his servant by breathing out his last breath over him. The cure is so effective that the servant will not transmit the dreaded illness to his children. In his explanation of the simile Hildebert stressed that the rejection he pictured was a metaphor for

the rejection of Christ by Israel, i.e. the Pharisees and high priests, who were blinded by malice. They considered valueless what was, in fact, worth the whole world.[78]

In the second of these sermons Hildebert attempted to refute Jewish objections to the Incarnation. We have already seen how he used the natural phenomenon of light being emitted from an unscathed crystal to try to convince Jews of the feasibility of the Virgin Birth.[79] His sermon also argued that the Incarnation advanced the status of human nature, and as in his other sermon he dwelt on what he castigated as the unreasonableness of the Jewish denial of Christ. Their denial meant that they preferred to dwell in darkness, choosing poverty over riches and hunger over food.[80]

What Hildebert has done is to picture to his Christian audience the tremendous gift of the Incarnation and to contrast vividly the essential difference between the unsaved state of the 'homo vetus' (old man) and the saved state of the 'homo novus' (new man). What interests us here is how in so doing he has also made a stark distinction between Christians and Jews, which correlates with the kinds of distinction we have studied throughout this chapter. Hildebert has illustrated Christians as those who are saved and who, therefore, can live up to their human potential according to their renewed nature. Like Odo of Cambrai and Guibert of Nogent, Hildebert clearly thought that the state of redeemed man was higher than the state man had before the Fall.[81] Indeed his praise of renewed nature was so fulsome that one cannot help wondering how much room he gave to sin after the Incarnation.[82] What is plain is that Jews are not saved through their own fault. Their path is not the road for renewed nature. As with the simile's servant, they remain doomed to die a painful, lingering death surrounded by the filth of iniquity. Our remaining task is to analyse closely the implications of all these distinctions for Christian ideas about the place of Jews within human society.

# 9

# INCLUSIVENESS AND EXCLUSION

Accusations of carnal or unreasonable behaviour were limited neither to Jews nor to the twelfth century. Christians would happily employ similar terms of abuse against those with whom they disagreed on all kinds of issues. Invective was very much a commonplace in the disputations of the eleventh and twelfth centuries.[1] Jews, themselves, had been accused of these things and others for many years. What is important in our period is the interlocking of the different areas where Jews, as a distinct group, were perceived as falling outside the norms of Christian society. We have seen how in a political, social, economic and spiritual sense Jews were increasingly understood to be different from their Christian neighbours and have discovered how philosophical concepts concerning reason were so Christianized that they could be used to strengthen and further define Christian doctrine. Gradually hackneyed terms of abuse actually seemed to reflect specific circumstances governing the relations between Christians and Jews. More and more, Jews were seen as not fitting into the ideals of the Christianizing society of late eleventh- and twelfth-century northwestern Europe. Jews had this in common with other groups like heretics. Both groups were faced with an institutional Church that thought of itself as being universal and Christian at the same time. The underlying ideology of the Church was one of enthusiastic inclusiveness, for by definition it was open to all members of the human race. All humans were considered brothers through their common possession of reason and through their share in the gift of salvation bestowed on humankind by Jesus Christ. This inclusiveness, however, went hand in hand with mechanisms of exclusion. The institutional Church was becoming increasingly hierarchical. Greater definition of doctrine and ritual, greater efforts to enable the clergy to tighten their grip on pastoral affairs, greater care for legal and

administrative concerns—all these efforts begged for mechanisms of control determining what was truly Christian and what was not.[2] Those who did not accept the guidance of the institutional Church on these matters were excluded from this universal construct. Because of the Christianization of reason in this period, this meant that they were not only thought to be excluded from salvation in a religious sense; they were seen to be falling outside the parameters of humanity as well. As these exclusive ideas increasingly interacted with concrete political and socio-economic realities, they were gradually absorbed by society at large.[3] In this chapter we shall trace the initial steps in this process by examining the implications of different expressions of Jewish exclusion in the works we have been studying.

Abelard was convinced that the many ritual precepts of Mosaic Law prevented Jews from knowing how to love God in the right way. Within the framework of his thinking this conviction must have had more than religious implications. Abelard did not just think that Judaism was inferior to Christianity in a religious sense. His *Dialogue of a Philosopher with a Jew and a Christian* and other works show that Abelard was sure that it was so in a philosophical sense too. For not loving God rightly—however good one's intentions—had to mean that one could not be a partner in that reciprocal loving relationship that provided the essential channel of communication between God and man. To Abelard's mind reason played a vital role in establishing this route to God. For Natural Law instructed the discerning person about loving God and his neighbour. The failure of Jews to comprehend the lessons of Natural Law and their incomprehension of the 'real' message encoded in their own Law must mean that he thought they were precluded from participating fully in the potential of human endeavour.[4] The points Abelard makes about circumcision reinforce this impression.

In his *Dialogue* he belabours the point that circumcision was never meant to be universally binding on mankind; nor did it ever promise salvation. From the beginning it applied only to Abraham and his progeny. Men like Enoch, Noah and Job living before and after the inception of the commandment were justified without it. Circumcision served only to demarcate the sons of Abraham. It marked nothing more than ethnic descent. The lack of universality of circumcision and its lack of scope in salvific terms cause the Philosopher of the dialogue to reject it out of hand. He has equally little time for the other ritual precepts of the Old Testament, which he sees as burdensome and serving only to increase a person's opportunity to transgress.[5]

Abelard was very careful to insist that circumcision and all these other rules did have a purpose in the divine scheme of things. Indeed their purpose was the very *opposite* of universality. They served to separate the Jews from the rest of mankind. The abhorrence Gentiles would feel for Jewish customs like circumcision would guarantee that no intermarriage occurred between Jews and non-Jews. In addition Jewish dietary laws prevented communal feasting.[6] In his *Sermon on Circumcision* and his *Commentaries on Romans* Abelard enlarged on this theme and asserted that this separation had been dictated by the necessity of Jesus Christ being born of the Jewish people.[7] But however useful circumcision had been in separating Jew from (unrighteous) Gentile in the interlude between the giving of Natural Law and the inauguration of the Gospels, it was now no longer necessary; nor did it serve any purpose. 'With the cessation of the Law and the succession of the more perfect Gospels, circumcision has been overtaken by the sacrament of baptism which sanctifies men and women alike.'[8] Baptism, which was universal, offered salvation; circumcision and the rest of Jewish ritual continued to be outward manifestations which added nothing to the lessons of Natural Law. On the contrary, they made it virtually impossible for Jews to see those very lessons for themselves.

Most of our scholars dealt with the question of circumcision, asking themselves why it was instituted in the first place and what its role could be once the sacrament of baptism had been introduced. As we shall see, these discussions had at their core the tortuous topic of *Verus Israel.* But scholarly searchings did not just cover the traditional ground of asking who, Christians or Jews, now constituted 'true Israel'. They examined closely what the concept of being chosen actually meant. In so doing they brought into sharp relief their ideas about the universal inclusiveness of Christianity as opposed to their perception of Jewish particularism.

Guibert of Nogent concentrated on the fact that circumcision by definition excluded women. To his mind this meant that its remit was too narrow to have the salvific efficacy of faith; it would be absurd to claim that women were damned because they could not be circumcised.[9] In its section on the sacraments the *Ysagoge in Theologiam,* for its part, states that Jesus exchanged circumcision for baptism because he wanted a sacrament that would pertain to both sexes and one that would cause no abhorrence in anyone.[10] Peter Alfonsi discussed circumcision at length with his alter ego, Moses. After exploring the problems of Jewish women and righteous Old

Testament figures like Methuselah and Job, who were uncircumcised, and after debating whether the sons of Ishmael could be considered saved on account of circumcision, Peter firmly asserts that circumcision was instituted in order to distinguish Jew from Gentile, thus ensuring that Jesus Christ would be of the seed of Abraham. Its purpose was not to offer salvation; its purpose was to ensure that Jewish baby boys could not be mixed up with Gentile ones. Thus the Jews did not need to be circumcised during their forty years of wandering in the desert because there had been no risk of mixing then. Joshua had everyone circumcised before they entered the land of Canaan because it was at that point that confusion might again occur. Now that Jesus Christ had come the need for distinction between Jew and Gentile had disappeared: for all were one in Christ. In other words, there was now no longer room for drawing boundaries around Jews in order to demarcate them from non-Jews.[11] As Peter puts it in the context of his discussion on dietary laws: 'Before the coming of Jesus Christ the boundaries of Israel were narrow, because they did not even have the whole land which God promised them through Moses. After the coming of Christ the Lord enlarged the boundaries of Israel as the apostles preached the law throughout the whole world.'[12]

Rupert of Deutz's words on this theme reflect his passionate concern for one unified Church under the aegis of reforming figures like himself. In his *Anulus sive dialogus inter Christianum et Iudeum* and elsewhere he constantly juxtaposed what he saw as the narrow and particularistic attitude of Judaism with the universal outlook of Christianity. He was at great pains to emphasize that whereas circumcision was limited to Judaea, the blessing promised by way of the seed of Abraham, that is to say Christ, was not. That blessing was universal in the sense that everyone who believed would be saved, regardless of sex, legal status or ethnic origin. Whereas Jews had kept their prophecies to themselves in their own tongue, the apostles had gone outside the confines of physical Israel to preach penance and remission of sins in the name of Christ in *all* languages to *all* peoples.[13] Rupert went so far as to claim that Jews were jealous of non-Jews and begrudged them the salvation Christ had brought them. In contrast he continued to invite Jews to partake of the salvation which had been offered to Jew and Gentile alike. He urged them to become part of that one great people promised by God to Abraham instead of continuing to be a small people which was captured and dispersed. Drawing on the imagery of the prodigal son, he encouraged

his fictitious Jewish counterpart to bury his anger about the fact that their divine Father had opened his arms to non-Jews. He invited him to no avail to be equally feasted with himself.[14] The image of Jews which emerges is quite clear. Jews did not welcome non-Jews to share in their privileged position of *Verus Israel.* Now that that position had shifted away from them to the *communitas Christi,* they refused to accept the invitation extended to them to enter. In other words, Jews rejected the inclusive universality which constituted the very hallmark of Christianity.

Herman stressed how the Christians he met in Münster pressed him to join the unity of Christendom, promising him that Jesus was most merciful and would not turn away anyone who sought him.[15] In the discussion he is reported to have had with Rupert of Deutz he had some very interesting things to say about Christian views on Jewish particularism.[16] He (at this point in his autobiography he was still a Jew) asserted that Christians were very prejudiced against Jews because they were jealous that God chose the Jews to be his special nation. It is because Christians were blinded by envy on account of God's preference that they deemed Jews to be the most hateful of men. Herman went on to accuse Christians of pride because they had the temerity to pick and choose which bits of Mosaic Law they cared to observe. His particular complaint against Christians at this time was that they were guilty of the sin of idolatry.[17]

In the last chapter we discussed Rupert's defence of Christians' veneration of the crucifix. Here it is interesting to record his assertion that the cross served Christians as a testimony that through Christ's suffering on it they might rejoice in the surety that they belonged to the society of saints and the eternal heritage of celestial Jerusalem.[18] The implication is that Christians had no reason to envy Jews at all. Indeed, in a commentary on the Gospel of St John Rupert averred that after the coming of Christ Christians had become the real Jews: 'they are rightly called Jews who are confessors of truth'. And it was the Catholic faith of Christian confessors that witnessed Christ in Hebrew, Greek and Latin throughout the whole world. Those who call themselves Jews for their part did nothing but malign Christ, whose blood they had shed, in their synagogues.[19] In the *Anulus* Rupert spelled out that it was faith and not the Law of Moses that constituted the true liberty and nobility of the human race.[20] There can be no doubt how fervently Rupert believed that Christians were now the *Verus Israel.* In this line of thinking it is really very hard to find any space for Jews at all.

Herman was not writing a straightforward treatise on Christian-Jewish relations. He was the author of an intensely personal account of his own conversion in which he highlighted, and no doubt embellished, those aspects which he thought would make inspiring reading for his Christian audience.[21] Thus he described the raging battle in his own soul between the distinctive demands of Judaism and the general appeal of Christianity. Just before he finally converted he desperately tried to break through what he termed 'his veil of Jewish blindness'. He thought that if he repeatedly signed himself with the cross he would be helped. It was then, according to Herman, that the Devil reminded him of the precept that Jews should remain distinct and not imitate the customs of non-Jews. The result of this was that Herman drew back from committing himself to Christianity. Instead he ended up torn between feeling guilty about being a bad Jew, whilst at the same time being relentlessly drawn to the teachings of Christianity.[22] As we know, it was at this point that he finally found the solace he was seeking through the intercessory prayers of two holy women.

Peter the Venerable expressed views about Jews which are not too dissimilar from what we have seen so far. In his *Adversus Iudeorum inveteratam duritiem* he claimed that Jews repelled Christians and all non-Jews as much as they could. In his eyes Jews averred that God spoke only to them and that the Messianic kingdom of salvation was solely the concern of Jews. To Peter's mind it was bestial for Jews to imagine that the Creator of the whole world would only care about their salvation. He wondered how anyone could imagine that God would confine his mercy to such narrow limits. How could God be thought to save one tiny ungrateful people, while damning the rest of humanity? Peter concluded by saying that what in fact had happened was that it was the Jews who were rejected, while the 'plenitude of the peoples' was saved.[23] He strongly advised Jews to stop bragging about the singularity of their Law and to put aside their pride in their special position.[24] Peter was of course well aware of the fact that in reality Christendom was far from universal. To his mind the existence of non-Christians, like Muslims, did not, however, detract from the intrinsic universality of the *communitas Christi*. He found proof of that universality in the 'fact' that there was no part of the world where Christianity was not represented. According to him, the Christian faith had conquered the whole world: 'although pagans or Saracens exercise dominion over some parts and although Jews skulk amongst Christians and pagans, there is not any part, or a significant part, of land, not of the remotest

island of the Mediterranean or the ocean itself' where there are no Christians.[25] We must remember that the universality of Christendom was an ideal for thinkers like Peter. The fact that unbelievers existed would not, as Langmuir has argued, necessarily cause them to doubt the validity of their dreams of Christian unity. On the contrary, one could argue that the presence of non-Christians served to strengthen the purpose of those generating ideas within the Church to develop concepts and mechanisms that would make the construct of universal Christendom a reality.[26]

Christian scholars of the twelfth-century renaissance spent a great deal of energy explaining the doctrines of their faith in terms of reason. We have discussed at length how their Christianized view of reason made them conclude that Jews lacked that quality which they believed separated man from beast. In this way Jews began to be discussed as if they were less than human. Within the framework of the discussions by twelfth-century thinkers on *Verus Israel* the question of universality featured prominently. Just as Jews were perceived as standing outside the realm of human reason, they were seen in this context as deliberately distancing themselves from the rest of mankind. The distinctive features of Judaism were thus interpreted as constituting an affront to everything the vibrant, reforming Church of the late eleventh and twelfth centuries seemed to stand for: renewed and intensified experience of the universal bond of brotherhood in Christ. The fact that Jews could play no truly independent part in the spiritual and intellectual aspirations of this period's majority society could not but influence the way Christian thinkers seemed to find less and less room for Jews in their conception of the world.[27] These theoretical patterns of exclusion of Jews interlocked with the increasingly visible differentiation between Jews and Christians of northwestern Europe in the course of the twelfth century.

In this period Jews were not only seen as playing a particular role in the developing money economy and they were not only regarded as standing in a peculiar relationship to temporal authority. They were noticeably different from Christians in other ways too. Inevitably they fell outside the collective ritual enactments of Christian oneness, which took place whenever the sacraments were celebrated and whenever Christ's body was venerated either on the cross or in the Eucharist. Earlier we saw how in the discussions on circumcision Christian scholars contrasted the selectivity of the Jewish ritual with the ubiquity of baptism. Central to their thinking on this matter was of course the Christian doctrine of original sin, a doctrine which Jews did not

share. The manner in which Hildebert of Lavardin put his views into words about the need for man's fallen nature to be repaired by Christ is striking. In his work the difference between the old nature of fallen man and the new nature of saved man comes across as the difference between repugnant morbidity and vibrant health.[28] Pseudo-William expressed the need for universal salvation by explaining to his fictitious Jewish counterpart that all men sinned together with Adam because the whole of humanity was locked up in Adam's body. This did not only mean that the whole of mankind was tainted by original sin, it meant that every single member of humanity was damned unless he or she was saved.[29] Jesus Christ's willingness to save humanity through his own suffering on the cross was thought to express vividly his feelings of fellowship for humanity. Pseudo-Anselm put it clearly: 'as a man, to whom could he better give his repayment [due to him from God on account of his suffering] than to miserable men, his brothers?'[30] Conversely, the commemoration of his passion was supposed to intensify the sense of fellowship between all those who believed in Christ. Peter Alfonsi explained that Christians made copies of the true cross so that the sight of a crucifix would make them remember to what extent they were his sons.[31] Gilbert Crispin and Pseudo-William stressed the unlimited gratitude all men must bear towards Christ for saving them.[32] The celebration of the Eucharist was a continuous communual re-enactment of Christ's gift of salvation. As Odo of Cambrai put it: 'he feeds us with his blood and body so that we unite in one body with him and so that we are him and he is one with us'.[33] Rupert of Deutz believed that Abraham and the other Old Testament saints were baptized by the blood and water which gushed out of Jesus' side when a soldier pierced it with his spear. Their gift of eternal glory was due to them on account of their faith in Christ. After the institution of the Eucharist, salvation for the faithful, who now constituted the Church, which had been reborn out of that bleeding body, lay in consumption of that very same body and blood.[34]

The fact that Jews could not participate in any aspect of the celebration of the sacraments of Baptism or the Eucharist, either on a theoretical or on a practical level, increased their isolation not just from Christians enacting Christian rituals, but from Christians who saw their rituals as essential vehicles of grace for the whole of humanity. Interesting ideas about the isolation of Jews from the rest of human society can be found in the work of Peter the Venerable. Peter talks of Jews as if they are the stupidest of all peoples. They are

idiots in comparison to the ancient Romans and Greeks. For these pagans did not really believe the mythological details of their repertoire of amusing fables. Greeks and Romans were indeed unfamiliar with the true worship of God because it had not as yet been introduced to the world, but notwithstanding that, they had been wise. To Peter's mind, Jews lacked comparable wisdom. They had no idea how to read any text figuratively. That is why they took all the anthropomorphic nonsense they found in their Talmud to be literally true. They were a wretched people, who made a mockery of themselves in the eyes of all men because they claimed that God's nature had human, even animal-like characteristics.[35] At one point in his treatise Peter averred that there was no rational animal, not only in heaven, not only on earth, but not even in hell, who did not spit out, deride and damn what Jews read in the Talmud.[36]

It is as if Peter cannot censure Jews often enough for not accepting Jesus Christ as the Messiah and the Son of God. Again and again he angrily asserted that all peoples worshipped him except the Jews. This meant that Jews were excluded from the blessing God had bestowed on all men through Christ. Indeed, Jews did not deserve to magnify Christ together with all the peoples. Peter wondered how it was possible for Jews to continue to negate Christ when besides their own prophecies, pagan prophecies like the Sybilline ones witnessed to Christ. If even demons had been forced by divine power to acknowledge him and Jews still did not, Jews must be worse than demons.[37] Jews were so deaf and so blind that they could not see what everyone else saw; they were incapable of hearing what was universally audible.[38] It is high time they ceased to be the enemies of God.[39] But Peter comforted himself with the thought that although the Jews had rejected Christ, they were very few in number. The infinity of the whole world venerated Christ.[40] We have suggested above how the presence of Muslims (and for that matter heretics) did not shake Peter's vision of Christian universality. In his letter to Louis VII Peter accused Jews of being even worse than Muslims. They were the worst enemies of Christ and Christendom because they railed against Christ and all the Christian sacraments. Muslims at least shared some beliefs with Christians about Jesus Christ and the Virgin Mary. The only reason not to kill Jews was that God wanted them to be saved so that they could live a life worse than death. That is why Peter suggested to the king that the Jews should be stripped of their wealth in order to pay for the Crusade.[41] In his treatise against the Jews he told the Jews that they had been trampled under the feet of Christians, whom they hated above all, for the past 1100 years. But

they have been a laughing-stock among the Saracens and other peoples and demons as well. Jews were cursed on account of the fact that they shed the blood of Christ who was their brother and their Lord. Roaming the world as they did, their fate was worse than death. For in this life they were looked down upon by all peoples; in the next life they would be an eternal plaything for the demons of hell. And this was as it should be. They richly deserved this punishment because they not only vomited curses over men, they poured out unspeakable things about God.[42]

Peter the Venerable's scathing remarks make it plain that in his eyes Jews were not just separated from the rest of Christian society. He was convinced Jews actively hated Christians and did all they could to deride what Christians held to be holy. On a very practical level he accused Jews of desecrating the church vessels left in their care as pawns.[43] It was Rupert of Deutz who was especially vociferous in accusing Jews of hating Christians and their Saviour. According to him the Messiah Jews were awaiting was none other than Antichrist, who would unfurl untold horrors over mankind.[44] Jews bore contempt towards non-Jews, priding themselves on being the noblest of all peoples.[45] It was on account of their jealousy of the other peoples that Jews did not want Christ's message of universal salvation to be heard. Their greed and envy caused them to deny Christ and to murder him;[46] their hands continued to drip with Jesus' blood. Everything Jews now touched was besmirched with blood. The Jewish people, who were once God's people, were now called an evil wild beast, or hyena, on account of what they did to Jesus.[47] Although it should be obvious to them that they lost their land because they shed Christ's blood, they still refused to acknowledge him together with everyone else; instead they hated him.[48] Rupert did not doubt that just as Jews were plotting to retain their land at the time of Jesus, they continued to plot, full of anger at their disinheritance.[49] And they blamed Christ for their dispersion.[50] Rupert's views on Jews are far-reaching. In his eyes Jews have not only denied and killed Jesus Christ, nor are they only guilty of the heinous crime of continuing to deny him.[51] They deliberately set themselves apart from the rest of humanity, doing everything in their power to prevent universal salvation from ever being achieved.

In Rupert's and in Peter the Venerable's conception of Christian universality there was simply no room for non-believers. Among 'unbelievers' Jews were an especially problematic category. The reason for this was not only the traditional tortuous relationship between Christianity and Judaism. In Jews they were faced by a minority which

was fully conscious of its own destiny and which did not hesitate to voice its wholehearted rejection of Christian doctrine.[52] The solution Peter and Rupert sought for this problem was not to give up their vision of Christian wholeness. Instead, they chose to talk about Jews in such a way that Jews as a group seemed to fall outside the norms of human (i.e. Christian) experience. And the reason they could discuss Jews in such exclusive language is that so many interlinking aspects of twelfth-century society were contributing to the marginalization of Jews.

This book has concentrated on an analysis of the intellectual marginalization of Jews. We have examined the anti-Jewish disputational material from the end of the eleventh and the first half of the twelfth centuries within the contexts of twelfth-century Christian humanism. Our examination has yielded intertwining patterns of exclusion from the vantage-point of reason, exegesis and socio-economic conditions. We have seen how the Christianization of reason made it possible for Christian scholars to equate the rejection of Christian doctrine with the rejection of reason. Anyone using their God-given reason and using their eyes to see the self-evident instruction of nature would know that it was contrary to reason to deny Christ. To be human was in effect to be a Christian.

The Hebrew Bible was so Christianized that the very spelling of Hebrew was deemed to be Christological. In the hands of some it was almost as if Hebrew became the unifying language of the Church. In the *Ysagoge in Theologiam,* for example, Odo argued that a proper understanding of the meaning of Hebrew would draw Jews into the Church and end the existing acrimony between Christianity and Judaism. A common language was what gave human beings a proper sense of community.[53] The renewed interest in the meaning and the different usages of words in this period made Christian scholars more keen than ever to comprehend exactly what the Old Testament said. Their increasingly sophisticated Christological reading of the text ultimately served to increase the gulf between Christian and Jewish exegesis. Christological reading was deemed to be spiritual; Jews were increasingly stereotyped as inherently unspiritual because their reading of the Bible, however spiritual in a Jewish context, did not and could not reflect Christ. Mosaic Law was not only pictured as superfluous; it was seen to be flawed in its own right. It offered only material rewards and lacked universal appeal. In this period these views interacted with the conviction that Jews lacked reason, which human

beings needed in order to look beyond the mundane world of sense perception. They also interlocked with developing ideas reflecting the rapidly changing economy in northwestern Europe. The alleged carnality of Jewish exegesis was linked to supposed Jewish greed for money and material goods, and this could be linked suggestively to the belief that Jews lacked the necessary reason to curb their appetites. At the same time and in a period of tremendous interest in the humanity of Jesus Christ and increased veneration for his suffering on behalf of mankind, Jews were accused of being deliberate Christ-killers. Moreover, they were accused of uttering blasphemies against his mother. In short it was as if on every front Jews could not participate in their own right in what mattered very deeply to large sections of Christian society. Not only could they not participate, in many ways they were thought to threaten the vision which that society was in the process of creating for itself.

Against the backdrop of the universal ideals engendered by the Gregorian Reform it began slowly to seem that there was little room left for Jews in human society. It is this, I would argue, that gradually began to hollow out the traditional Augustinian formula of *testimonium veritatis*. For it was not really all that self-evident any more that Christians needed Jews very much to witness to their truth. To be sure, the formula retained its validity. Rupert of Deutz, for example, referred to it.[54] The dispersed condition of the Jews could still usefully be employed to extol the fate of those who denied Jesus Christ. But once the challenge of a pagan presence within the heartland of Europe had ceased to exist and once not only the Hebrew Bible but the concept of reason had been Christianized it does seem as if the Jews were considered to be more superfluous than ever.[55]

The patterns of exclusion we have highlighted did not change attitudes towards Jews overnight. It was not until well into the thirteenth century that a considerable amount of anti-Jewish ecclesiastical and temporal legislation began to be generated. But concrete signs of Jewish marginalization did begin to emerge in our period. We have already argued that the pogroms of the popular crusade of 1096 should be interpreted as an early indication that in times of intense social and religious feeling Jews could be seen as a threat to common Christian endeavour. Another important sign of growing Jewish marginalization was the ritual murder accusation which developed in Norwich at the hand of Thomas of Monmouth in 1150, when Thomas accused the Jews of Norwich of having crucified the boy William in 1144 in mockery of the Passion.

According to William's *Vita* the Jews of Narbonne decided each year where a Christian child would be crucified. The Jews of the designated country then cast lots to determine which Jewish community would perform the act. In 1144 the appointed town had allegedly been Norwich. After the Norwich accusation, ritual murder accusations occurred in Blois (1171) and in many other places. By the first half of the thirteenth century the accusation often took the form of a blood libel. Here Jews were not only accused of ritually killing Christian children; they were accused of using their blood for any number of nefarious purposes. The first instance of the blood libel accusation was in Fulda in 1235.[56] Gavin Langmuir has labelled as irrational these accusations and the charge that Jews tortured the consecrated host in order to make Jesus suffer once again at their hands. For him anti-Judaism becomes antisemitism when Jews were accused of such purely fanciful things.[57] It should now be clear why I would hesitate to use the word 'irrational' here. We have seen how important the role of reason was in the development of the idea that Jews were less than human. Once the idea that they were non-human began to take hold, they could be charged with any kind of inhuman behaviour. To call these charges irrational hides what was an essential aspect in the unfolding process of Jewish alienation from the very beginning of the twelfth century.

This book has also attempted to demonstrate that the marginalization of Jews in the course of the twelfth century should not primarily be seen as an aspect of the struggle for power among the newly educated literati of twelfth-century Europe. Bob Moore has argued that these literati denegrated Jews because so many Jews had comparable administrative skills to their own, if not better.[58] The issues which contributed to the exclusion of Jews went far beyond any administrative challenge Jews may or may not have posed to those in authority;[59] these issues touched the very nerve of the developing intellectual and spiritual life of the period. The basic challenge Jews presented the literati was the fact that many of their criticisms of Christianity were uncomfortably similar to the growing number of questions which began to be asked by enquiring minds within the Church. One of the major irritants was that, as far as Jews were concerned, the answers, however sophisticated they might be, were deemed unsatisfactory. The increase in questions within the Church was due to the excitement caused by the introduction of so much new learning. One of the reasons why the acceptance of official

solutions was so important was that in the midst of all this intellectual and spiritual excitement it seemed essential to the leaders of the institutional Church to delineate carefully who would fit in with their Christian ideals of Church and society and who would not. As a growing number of areas within society became steadily more Christianized, it appeared as if Jews, at least in theory, did not fit. It was for later centuries to develop these ideas more fully and gradually to put theory into practice.

# EPILOGUE

This book has highlighted one specific aspect of the history of Christian attitudes towards Jews: the intellectual and spiritual alienation of Jews within the context of the great number of changes that took place in northwestern Europe during the late eleventh and the first half of the twelfth centuries. The purpose has been to deepen existing insights into the reasons why from the middle of the twelfth century onwards Jews of England, France and Germany were accused of unspeakable acts against their Christian neighbours and why from the end of the twelfth century onwards legislation came into existence restricting Jewish activities. In short I have attempted to provide the means to understand better the intellectual and spiritual dimensions of, for example, the expulsions of the Jews from medieval Europe, which started in 1182 with Philip Augustus of France expelling, for a time at least, the Jews of the royal domain and the ruling of the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215, which called for Jews to wear distinguishing badges, The book is meant as a supplement to what has already been written about these issues and others from different vantage-points.

Many scholars writing on the exclusion of Jews from Christian society have tended to take the thirteenth century as their effective starting point. A good example is the work of Jeremy Cohen. In *The Friars and the Jews* Cohen concentrates on the attacks made against the Talmud by the friars.[1] According to him the friars abolished the concept of *testimonium veritatis* because they argued that the Jews no longer carried with them the books of the Old Testament. Instead they bore the Talmud. Thus they were not really the Jews Augustine had referred to at all. In effect they were heretics within their own ambit. Christians had no need of people who relied on the Talmud, so they rid themselves of the Jews in their midst through conversion, persecution and expulsion in the course of the thirteenth and

fourteenth centuries and beyond. Although it is obvious how important the attack on the Talmud was for Christian-Jewish relations, it is important to take account of the twelfth-century background to Christian reactions to it. Jeremy Cohen puts much emphasis on the fact that it was only in the thirteenth century that Christians began substantially to increase their first-hand knowledge of Jewish contemporary customs and practices. This means that in his eyes Christian attacks on the Talmud only became truly threatening for Jews when Christians could read the Talmud for themselves. I have tried to demonstrate that the fact that many of the scholars whom we have scrutinized did not know all that much about contemporary Judaism, and the fact that the disputations which they wrote did not take place as real-life debates with contemporary Jews, does not mean that the ideas these men developed about Jews were insignificant. The attitudes they formed concerning the place of Jews within human society fed into the way Jews were regarded by later and better informed generations of thinkers. The vilification of the Talmud by the friars was anticipated in the way it was vilified by Peter Alfonsi (whose *Dialogi* were widely disseminated)[2] and Peter the Venerable. Both Peters' verdict on the Talmud was governed by their understanding of reason. On the other hand the manner in which Christian polemicists also used sections of the Talmud in their attempt to prove to Jews the legitimacy of Christian teaching reveals links to developments which had taken place by the first half of the twelfth century. The process of the Christianization of the Talmud was very similar to the way both reason and the Hebrew Bible had been Christianized in the twelfth century. The fact that *testimonium veritatis* proved to be less and less of a guarantee for the safekeeping of Jewish communities as a minority within Christendom should not be regarded as primarily the consequence of increased knowledge of the Talmud. The process of practical exclusion, which accelerated in the course of the thirteenth century and in which attacks on the Talmud played such an important role, should rather be seen as an extension of the theoretical hollowing out of the Augustinian concept, which was already firmly under way by the middle of the twelfth century.

The same holds true for the introduction of legislation aimed at isolating Jews. To be sure there were many complex political and fiscal explanations why one Christian prince after another felt that his body politic could, or should, no longer contain Jews. Scholars like Jordan, Stow and Kriegel have written extensively on the suject.[3] Yet here too an insight into the intellectual development of twelfth-

century anti-Jewish attitudes is important: it helps us understand why the wholeness of Christian society could seem to be so threatened by a Jewish presence. Even though the concept of reason changed in the course of the thirteenth century, with considerably less optimism being voiced about its capacity fully to comprehend Christian articles of faith, the stereotype that Jews were less than human did not lose its hold. The insights we have gained are, furthermore, not just important for understanding the exclusion of Jews. From the thirteenth century onwards many so-called deviants were isolated from the rest of society. Heretics and Muslims under Latin rule spring immediately to mind.[4] A fuller understanding of twelfth-century intellectual alienation of Jews can also contribute to a better understanding of the history of medieval outcasts in general.

This is not to say that all anti-Jewish feeling as it developed from the twelfth century onwards was purely intellectual. Much of the hatred towards Jews stemmed from totally uneducated people and many of their views about Jews were irrational by anyone's definition of the word. However, this book has portrayed the intellectual developments during the twelfth century as a broad framework which seemed to invite and justify all kinds of accusations against Jews. The history of the precise interaction between the work of the scholars we have studied and popular attitudes demands a book in its own right. Preaching and miracle collections were obvious ways of bringing the wider public into contact with what intellectuals were thinking. Increasing popular devotion to the Virgin Mary and Jesus Christ would seem to have made many receptive to the idea that Jews were not a useful part of human society. Bill Jordan has, for example, convincingly linked popular Marian devotion to the Paris Talmud trial of 1240.[5] The fact that Jews played an increasingly distinct economic role whilst falling outside the parameters of central Christian communal celebrations must have made the idea seem even more persuasive. But it is also important to remember how slow the process was. In Norwich, for example, there were no anti-Jewish protests in response to Thomas of Monmouth's ramblings. At the time Christian townsfolk did not really think their Jewish neighbours were a threat to their children. Although intellectual developments, ecclesiastical and governmental legislation, and popular attitudes were interconnected and although they ultimately did move in the same direction, they did not do so at the same speed.

We have concentrated on northwestern Europe because it was in this region that much greater scope at first existed for different facets

of anti-Jewish feeling to interlock. The reason for this must lie in the fact that it was in this part of Europe that such rapid economic and social change took place. The Jewish communities of northwestern Europe were for the most part newer and smaller than those of Spain, Sicily and southern France. However, as Muslim Europe was steadily Christianized and as the new Christian princes of southern Europe took over more and more non-Christian areas, many of the ideas and attitudes which had been fermenting in the north since the beginning of the twelfth century seemed increasingly relevant to the south. So from about the middle of the thirteenth century we begin to see in southern Europe the spread of a greater number of anti-Jewish activities. One example is the Barcelona disputation of 1263 in which the spokesman of the Jewish community, Rabbi Moses ben Nahman (Nachmanides), was forced to participate. The Dominicans, who initiated the disputation, used it to argue that the Talmud proved that Jesus Christ was the Messiah Jews had been waiting for. Robert Chazan has written at length about the place of the disputation within the Dominican missionary activities of the second part of the thirteenth century.[6] Another example is the establishment of the Jewish 'Call' (reserved area) in 1286 by Alfonso III of Aragon in what is now Palma de Mallorca. Although there were positive sides to rulings concerning the 'Call', the negative side of the restrictions soon began to outweigh any benefits there might have been for the Jews to have an area of the city for themselves. By 1371 and, even more violently, in 1391 the Christians of Majorca had turned on the Jews. Jews were forced to convert or were killed.[7] In-depth knowledge of the twelfth-century marginalization of Jews is useful for a fuller comprehension of the dynamics of Christian attitudes towards Jews in southern Europe too.

The wider interest of this study might be what the consequences can be for a minority when it is perceived by the majority to be different on all possible levels. The situation of the minority in question becomes especially perilous when the majority supposes that it constitutes a universal construct to which it decides everyone must ideally belong. It was the growing perception in medieval Europe that Jews could not play a meaningful part in their Christian host societies that eventually led to one country after another divesting itself of its Jewish population. The roots of this perception, I have argued, lay in the intellectual and spiritual developments of the twelfth-century renaissance.

## ABBREVIATIONS

CCCM Corpus Christianorum Continuatio Mediaevalis
CCSL Corpus Christianorum Series Latina
PL J.P.Migne, *Patrologiae Cursus Completus Series Latina*

Biblical references are to the Vulgate; quotations generally come from the Douay Rheims Version.

# NOTES

## INTRODUCTION

1 R.I.Moore, *The Formation of a Persecuting Society. Power and Deviance in Western Europe, 950–1250,* Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1987; Moore, 'Anti-semitism and the birth of Europe', in D.Wood (ed.), *Christianity and Judaism,* Studies in Church History, vol. 29, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1992, pp.33–57.
2 Moore, 'Anti-semitism', pp.51–6.
3 G.I.Langmuir, *History, Religion and Antisemitism,* Berkeley and Los Angeles, California University Press, 1990; Langmuir, *Toward a Definition of Antisemitism,* Berkeley and Los Angeles, California University Press, 1990.
4 Langmuir, *History,* p. 136.
5 ibid., p.162.
6 ibid., p.46.
7 ibid., pp.154–5.
8 ibid., p.240.
9 ibid., p.245.
10 ibid., p.157.
11 ibid., pp.275–305; Langmuir, 'Doubt in Christendom', in *Toward a Definition,* pp.100–33.
12 Cf. Langmuir, 'Doubt in Christendom', in *Toward a Definition,* p.119ff.

## 1 THE SCHOOLS

1 C.H.Lawrence, *Medieval Monasticism. Forms of Religious Life in Western Europe in the Middle Ages,* 2nd edn, London and New York, Longman, 1989, p.125. The new orders usually did not take oblates. The Benedictines continued to do so but the system became more and more unpopular. See below, p.56.
2 A.Sapir Abulafia and G.R.Evans (eds), *The Works of Gilbert Crispin.* Auctores Britannici Medii Aevi, 8, London, Oxford University Press for the British Academy, 1986, pp.xxi–xxv. J.H.van Engen, *Rupert of*

*Deutz,* Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1983, pp.11– 22, 229.

3 J.Hourlier, 'Pierre le Vénérable', *Dictionnaire de spiritualité, ascétique et mystique, doctrine et histoire,* vol. 12.2, Paris, Beauchesne, 1986, col. 1669.

4 J.F.Benton (ed.), *Self and Society in Medieval France. The Memoirs of Abbot Guibert of Nogent,* New York, Harper & Row, 1970, pp.11–19; E.-R.Labande (ed. and trans.), *Guibert de Nogent, autobiographie.* Les Classiques de l'histoire de France au moyen âge, 34, Paris, Les Belles Lettres, 1981, pp.ix–x. Benton places Guibert's birth in 1064; Labande in 1055.

5 Benton, op.cit., p.89; Labande, op.cit., pp.138–41.

6 Benton, op.cit., p.19.

7 R.W.Southern, *Saint Anselm. A Portrait in a Landscape,* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990, p.xxvii, p.3ff.

8 G.Michiels, 'Odon de Cambrai', *Dictionnaire de spiritualité, ascétique et mystique, doctrine et histoire,* vol. 11, Paris, Beauchesne, 1982, cols 614–16; F.Labis, 'Le bienheureux Odon, évêque de Cambrai. Son école à Tournay, à la fin du xi[e] siècle—son réalisme et l'application qu'il en fait au dogme du peché originel', Recueil Catholique, recueil religieux, philosophique, scientifique, historique et littéraire, 1856, vol.14, pp.445–9. Labis claims a distinguished background for Odo but in fact little is known for sure about the social status of his parents. See C.Dereine, 'Odon de Tournai et la crise de cénobitisme au xi[e] siècle', *Revue du moyen âge Latin,* 1948, vol. 4, p.140.

9 P.von Moos, *Hildebert von Lavardin 1056–1133. Humanitas an der Schwelle des höfischen Zeitalters, Pariser Historische Studien, 3, Stutigart, 1965, p.6.*

10 R.-H.Bautier, 'Paris au temps d'Abélard', in *Abélard en son temps. Actes du colloque international organisé à l'occasion de 9e centenaire de la naissance du Pierre Abélard (14–19 Mai 1979),* Paris, Les Belles Lettres, 1981, pp.53–8; S.C.Ferruolo, *The Origins of the University. The Schools of Paris and their Critics 1100–1215,* Stanford, California, Stanford University Press, 1985, pp.18–21.

11 D.E.Luscombe, 'The authorship of the *Ysagoge in Theologiam*', *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge,* 1968, vol. 43, pp.7–8.

12 Bautier, op.cit., pp.53–4.

13 On Alfonsi see J.Tolan, *Petrus Alfonsi and his Medieval Readers,* Gainesville, University of Florida Press, 1993.

14 P.Delhaye, 'L'Organisation scolaire au xii[e] siècle', *Traditio,* 1947, vol.5, pp.211–13, 225; also E.Lesne, *Les Ecoles de la fin du viie siècle à la fin du xiie,* Lille, Economat, 1940, p.15.

15 Lesne, op.cit., pp.453–8.

16 Benton, op.cit., pp.12, 44–5; Labande, op.cit., pp.26–9.

17 Delhaye, op.cit., p.225.

18 ibid., pp.213–17, 225–9.

19 ibid., pp.230–4.

20 Van Engen, op.cit., pp.44–5; Delhaye, op.cit., p.238.

21 Delhaye, op.cit., pp.234–6; Benton, op.cit., pp.77–9, 83–4, 87–92; Labande, op.cit., pp.xi–xix, 109–13, 125–7, 135–45.

22 For the trivium see next chapter.

23 M.Gibson, *Lanfranc of Bec,* Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1978, pp.34–44; P.Zobel, 'Bec', *Lexikon des Mittelalters,* vol.1, Munich and Zurich, 1977–80, cols 1768–9; Southern, op.cit., pp.29–30; P.Riché, 'Vie scolaire et pédagogie au Bec', in R.Foreville (ed.), *Les Mutations socio-culturelles au tournant des xi^e–xii^e siècles. Etudes Anselmiennes (IVe session),* Paris, Editions du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1984, pp.213– 25; M.Chibnall (ed. and trans.), *The Ecclesiastical History of Orderic Vitalis,* vol. 2. Oxford Medieval Texts, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1969, pp. 296–7.

24 R.W.Southern, 'The schools of Paris and the school of Chartres', in R. L.Benson and G.Constable with C.D.Lantham (eds), *Renaissance and Renewal in the Twelfth Century,* Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1982, p.117.

25 V.I.J.Flint, 'The "school of Laon": a reconsideration', *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale,* 1976, vol. 43, pp.97–110; J.Leclercq, 'The renewal of theology', in Benson *et al.,* op.cit., p.79.

26 Southern, 'The schools of Paris', op.cit., pp.114–18.

27 P.Riché, 'Jean et le monde scolaire du XII^e siècle', in M.Wilks (ed.), *The World of John of Salisbury,* Studies in Church History, Subsidia, 3, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, published for the Ecclesiastical History Society, 1984, pp.40–1.

28 Ferruolo, op.cit., p.20.

29 H.Weisweiler, *Das Schrifttum der Schule Anselms von Laon und Wilhelms von Champeaux in Deutschen Bibliotheken. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Verbreitung der ältesten scholastischen Schule in Deutschen Landen.* Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters. Texte und Untersuchungen, vol. 33 part 1/2, Münster i. W., Verlag der Aschendorffschen Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1936, pp.2–3, 247; E.Bertola, 'Le Critiche di Abelardo ad Anselmo di Laon ed a Guglielmo di Champeaux', *Revista di Filosofia Neo-scolastica,* 1960, vol. 52, pp.503–11; J.Châtillon, 'Abélard et les Ecoles', *Abélard en son temps,* pp.146–52; M.Colish, 'An other look at the School of Laon', *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge,* 1986, vol. 53, pp.7–22.

30 For a discussion on the relationship between the early sentence collections and the school of Anselm of Laon see O.Lottin, *Psychologie et morale aux xiie et xiiie siècles,* vol. 5: *Problèmes d'histoire littéraire. L'Ecole d'Anselme de Laon et de Guillaume de Champeaux.* Louvain, J.Duculot, 1959, pp.7–10, 178–83, 229–30, 444–7; Colish, op.cit., pp.8–11; Colish, 'Systematic theology and theological renewal in the twelfth century', *Journal of Medieval and Renaissance Studies,* 1988, vol. 18, pp.135–56; Flint, op.cit., pp.89–110. For the dating of Peter Lombard's *Sentences* see D.E.Luscombe, *The School of Peter Abelard,* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1970, p.262.

31 Weisweiler, op.cit., pp.3–4; Bertola, op.cit., pp.512–22; Colish, 'An other look', pp.21–2.

32 Ferruolo, op.cit., pp.12–26.

33 ibid, *passim.*

34 ibid., pp.29–44; Delhaye, op.cit., pp.241–3; B.Smalley, *The Study of the Bible in the Middle Ages,* 3rd edn, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1983, pp.83–195.

35 Delhaye, op.cit., pp.253, 258–60; Lesne, op.cit., pp.425–30.
36 Lesne, op.cit., pp.464–5.
37 ibid., pp.514–19.
38 Ferruolo, op.cit., pp.131–3.

## 2 THE TOOLS OF REASON AND CHRISTIAN HUMANISM

1 The idea that metaphysical reality exists and that reason can perceive it is Platonic.
2 Cicero, *De Legibus,* I, vii, 22–3; trans. C.W.Keyes. Loeb Classical Library, London, Heinemann, 1977, pp.320–1.
3 ibid., I, viii, 24–5; pp. 324–5. Cicero is speaking here about the divine gift of the soul. But the context makes it clear that soul here has very much to do with reason, which he has just called the 'first common possession of man and God'.
4 Cicero, *De Officiis,* I, xvi, 50; trans. W.Miller. Loeb Classical Library, London, Heinemann, 1975, pp.52–5. On Cicero's Stoicism see M.L. Colish, *The Stoic Tradition from Antiquity to the Early Middle Ages. 1. Stoicism in Classical Latin Literature,* Leiden, E.J.Brill, 1985, pp.61–158. On the twelfth-century dissemination of Cicero's works see M.Lapidge, 'The Stoic inheritance', in P.Dronke (ed.), *A History of Twelfth-century Western Philosophy,* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988, pp.92–3.
5 John of Salisbury defends the trivium, and especially the study of logic, against its detractors: see K.Jacobi, 'Logic (ii): the later twelfth century', in: Dronke, op.cit., pp.227–31.
6 M.Gibson, *Lanfranc of Bec,* Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1978, pp. 46–7; C.H.Haskins, *The Renaissance of the Twelfth Century,* Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1927, p.113.
7 R.W.Southern, 'Lanfranc of Bec and Berengar of Tours', in R.W.Hunt, W.A.Pantin and R.W.Southern (eds), *Studies in Medieval History Presented to Frederick Maurice Powicke,* Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1948, pp.44–6. Southern emphasizes here how opaque the boundary line between grammar and dialectic could be.
8 G.R.Evans, *Old Arts and New Theology,* Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1980.
9 Cicero, *De Inventione,* I, xxix, 44; trans. H.M.Hubbell. Loeb Classical Library, London, Heinemann, 1968, p.83.
10 Victorinus, *Explanationes in Ciceronis Rhetoricam,* I, xxix, ed. C.Halm. *Rhetores Latini minores,* Leipzig, Teubner, 1863, pp.232–3.
11 J.de Ghellinck, *Le Mouvement théologique du XII^e siècle.* 2nd enlarged edn, Bruges, Editions 'De Tempel', 1948, pp.289–91.
12 B.B.Price, *Medieval Thought. An Introduction,* Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1992, pp.80–4.
13 His second commentary was not widely used before Abelard: M.M. Tweedale, 'Logic (i): from the late eleventh century to the time of Abelard', in Dronke, op.cit., p. 197.
14 It also overlaps with Aristotle's work on rhetoric *(De Rhetorica):* Cicero, *Topica,* ed. and trans. H.M.Hubbell. Loeb Classical Library, London,

Heinemann, 1968, p.377 and 382ff. See also on the relationship between Cicero's *Topics* and Aristotle's *Topics:* J.Kaimio, *Cicero's Topica: the Preface and Sources.* Opera ex Instituto Philologiae Classicae Universitatis Turkuensis edita, vol. 5, Turku, Yurun Yliopisto, 1976. Obviously the boundary line between dialectic and rhetoric is hazy.

15 J.Marenbon, *Later Medieval Philosophy (1150–1350),* London, Routledge, 1987, pp.35–6; Tweedale, op.cit., pp.196–7.

16 Marenbon, op.cit., p.36: the terms 'Old' and 'New' Logic stem from the later Middle Ages; Price, op.cit., p.80.

17 J.Jolivet, 'Non-réalisme et platonisme chez Abélard. Essai d'interprétation', in *Abélard et son temps,* Paris, Les Belles Lettres, 1981, pp.175–6.

18 Price, op.cit., p.125.

19 This is what Anselm claims he said: *De Incarnatione Verbi* (2), I, in F.S. Schmitt (ed.), *S.Anselmi...opera omnia* [henceforth *S*], vol. 2, Edinburgh, Thomas Nelson, 1946, p.9.

20 Tweedale, op.cit., p.205.

21 See ibid., pp.205–10 for a discussion of Anselm's views on universals. Tweedale calls Anselm's realism naive.

22 On the controversy between Anselm and Roscelin see R.W.Southern, *Saint Anselm. Portrait in a Landscape,* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990, pp.174–81. For a new interpretation of the conflict and Roscelin's thinking, however, see C.Mews, 'Nominalism and theology before Abaelard: new light on Roscelin of Compiègne', *Vivarium,* 1992, vol. 30, pp.4–33.

23 Tweedale, op.cit., pp.216–21.

24 D.E.Luscombe, 'Peter Abelard', in Dronke, op.cit., p.292, see also pp.290–1.

25 Tweedale, op.cit., p.221.

26 As Richard Southern pointed out in his seminal article 'Medieval humanism', in *Medieval Humanism and Other Studies,* Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1970, pp.29–60.

27 See below, Chapters 4, 6–9.

28 On science in this period see T.Stiefel, *The Intellectual Revolution in Twelfth Century Europe,* London and Sydney, Croom Helm, 1985. The *Timaeus* was the only work of Plato that scholars of this period had available to them. The *Timaeus* they knew was an incomplete text which had been translated and commented on by Calcidius, a Neoplatonic Christian working *c.* 400 in Italy. On Calcidius see M.Wesche, 'Calcidius', in *Lexikon des Mittelalters,* vol. 2, Munich and Zurich, Artemis Verlag, 1983, cols 1391–2. On the use of Plato see T.Gregory, 'The Platonic inheritance', in Dronke, op.cit., pp.54–80.

29 See note 26 and D.E.Luscombe and G.R.Evans, 'The twelfth-century renaissance', in J.H.Burns (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Medieval Political Thought c.350–c.1450,* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988, pp.306–38.

30 R.W.Southern, 'Peter of Blois: a twelfth-century humanist?', in *Medieval humanism and other studies,* p.126.

## 3 THE CHRISTIANIZATION OF REASON

1 He was excommunicated at the Council of Reims (1049) for imprisoning the bishop of Le Mans: M.Gibson, *Lanfranc of Bec,* Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1978, p.64.
2 ibid., pp.64–5, 94; O.Capitani, 'Berengar von Tours', in *Lexikon des Mittelalters,* vol. 1, Munich and Zurich, Artemis Verlag, 1980, cols 1937–9.
3 R.W.Southern, *Saint Anselm. Portrait in a Landscape,* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990, p.44.
4 Gibson, op.cit., p.93.
5 Berengar mistook Ratramnus' work for that of his Carolingian contemporary, John Scotus Eriugena, and quoted it as such. This made his views even more unpopular than they might have been, for Eriugena was generally under a cloud of suspicion on account of his far-reaching use of Greek sources: Gibson, op.cit., p.79.
6 ibid., pp.75–6.
7 ibid., pp.71–6.
8 There was much Platonism in Paschasius' views too, such as the direction of his thought towards the spiritual reception by the faithful of Christ's body: ibid., pp.75–7.
9 ibid., pp.77–8.
10 ibid., p.77.
11 ibid.
12 R.W.Southern, 'Lanfranc of Bec and Berengar of Tours', in R.W.Hunt, W.A.Pantin and R.W.Southern (eds), *Studies in Medieval History presented to Frederick Maurice Powicke,* Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1948, pp.38–9; Berengarius Turonensis, *Rescriptum contra Lanfrancum,* vol.1; ed. R.B.C.Huygens. CCCM, 84, Turnhout, Brepols, 1988, p.85.
13 Gibson, op.cit., pp.69–71, 81–3, 97.
14 Southern, *Saint Anselm,* p.51 (I have quoted Southern's translation of the passage but the square brackets and the shortening of the text are mine).
15 Southern, op.cit., pp.47–50; Gibson, op.cit., pp.89–91. (The quotation is Gibson's translation.) On the debate between Berengar and Lanfranc see also H.Chadwick, 'Ego Berengarius', *Journal of Theological Studies,* N.S., 1989, vol. 40, pp.414–45.
16 Gibson, op.cit., p.95.
17 ibid., p.96.
18 Anselm arrived in Bec just before or just after Lanfranc's return to Bec: Southern, op.cit. p.29.
19 ibid., pp.24–32.
20 ibid., pp.116–18.
21 G.R.Evans, *Anselm and Talking about God,* Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1978, pp.15–17; Southern, op.cit., pp.60, 119–20; Anselm, *Epistola 72 and 77; ed. F.S.Schmitt, S.Anselmi...opera omnia* [henceforth *S*], vol. 3, Edinburgh, Thomas Nelson, 1946 pp.193–4 and 199–200; *The Letters of Saint Anselm of Canterbury,* vol.1, trans. W.Frölich, Kalamazoo, Michigan, Cistercian Publications, 1990, pp. 197–8; 205–7.

22 Bible citations refer to the Vulgate; where numbers in square brackets are given, they refer to the Hebrew Bible.
23 R.Campbell, 'Anselm's theological method', *Scottish Journal of Theology,* 1979, vol. 32, pp.541–6. Many scholars have written about this text and what Anselm was hoping to accomplish, most notably K.Barth, *Fides quaerens intellectum, Anselms Beweis der Existenz Gottes im Zusammentrag seines theologischen Programms,* 1931, repr. Zurich, Theologischer Verlag, 1981; M.J.Charlesworth (trans.), *St Anselm's 'Proslogion'; with A Reply on behalf of the Fool' by Gaunilo and 'The Author's to Gaunilo',* Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1965; J.Hopkins, *A Companion to the Study of St Anselm,* Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1972. Southern (op.cit., p.117) writes that Anselm tried to prove that 'justice, goodness, and truth are necessarily united in a single being, who by definition is God. And since justice, goodness, and truth exist, God cannot *not* exist.' See also pp. 127–34 of his book and G.R.Evans, *Anselm,* Outstanding Christian Thinkers Series, London, Geoffrey Chapman, 1989, pp. 50–2.
24 *Proslogion,* 1; *S,* vol. 1, pp.97–100; translation taken from J.Hopkins and H.W.Richardson (eds and trans.), *Anselm of Canterbury,* vol. 1: *Monologion, Proslogion, Debate with Gaunilo, and a Meditation on Human Redemption,* Toronto and New York, Edwin Mellen Press, 1974, pp.91–3.
25 *Proslogion, Prooemium; S,* vol. 1, p.94.
26 Southern, op.cit., pp.447–52.
27 A.Sapir Abulafia, 'St Anselm and those outside the Church', in D.Loades and K.Walsh (eds), *Faith and Unity: Christian Political Experience,* Studies in Church History, Subsidia, 6, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1990, pp.23–7, 35–7.
28 Sapir Abulafia, op.cit., pp.32–4; Southern, op.cit., pp.174–81.
29 Anselm, *Epistola* 136; *S,* vol. 3, pp.280–1; *Letters,* trans. Frölich, op.cit., pp.314–16. The translation I give is my own.
30 *De Incarnatione Verbi* (2), 1; *S,* vol. 2, p.9; Sapir Abulafia, op.cit., p.34. See above pp.28–30.
31 *De Incarnatione Verbi* (2), 1; *S,* vol. 2, pp.6–7.
32 *Cur Deus Homo [CDH],* Praefatio; *S,* vol. 2, p.42.
33 *CDH* I, 3; *S* vol.2, p.50.
34 *CDH* I,1; *S* vol.2, p.48. For Boso's own development as a firm believer see Sapir Abulafia, op.cit., p.29.
35 *CDH* I, 1; *S,* vol.2, p.47.
36 *CDH* I, 3; *S,* vol. 2, p.50: 'the *infideles* deride our simplicity and put it to us that we bring injury and shame to God when we assert that he descended into the womb of a woman, was born to a woman, grew up, nurtured by milk and human food…suffered weariness, hunger, thirst, lashes and the Cross between thieves and death'.
37 G.van der Plaas, 'Des hl. Anselm *Cur Deus Homo* auf dem Boden der jüdisch-christlichen Polemik des Mittelalters', *Divus Thomas,* 1929, vol. 7, pp.446–67; ibid., 1930, vol. 8, pp.18–32; Southern, op.cit., pp.198–202.
38 E.g. Southern, op.cit., pp.198–202.
39 *CDH* II, 22; *S,* vol. 2, p.113; I have amended my translation of the passage after consulting J.Hopkins and H.Richardson (eds and trans.), *Anselm of Canterbury,* vol. 3: *Why God became Man,* Toronto and New

York, Edwin Mellen Press, 1976, p.137. The reference to Adam does not concern the question of original sin; it concerns the question of whether or not Adam would be saved by Jesus Christ (II, 16; *S* vol. 2, p.119; see also Sapir Abulafia, op.cit., 20 n. 34).

40 R.Roques, *Pourquoi Dieu s'est fait homme.* Sources Chrétiennes, 91, Paris, Les Editions du CERF, 1963, pp.72–4; J.Gauss, 'Die Auseinandersetzung mit Judentum und Islam bei Anselm', *Analecta Anselmiana,* 1975, vol. 4:2, pp.101–9 and 'Anselmus von Canterbury zur Begegnung und Auseinandersetzung der Religionen', *Saeculum,* 1966, vol. 17, pp.277–363.

41 Epistola 263; *S,* vol. 4, p.178.

42 Sapir Abulafia, op.cit., pp.14–16.

43 *CDH* II, 15; *S,* vol. 2, p.115.

44 A.Funkenstein, 'Basic types of Christian anti-Jewish polemics', *Viator,* 1971, vol. 2, p.378; G.Dahan, 'Saint Anselme, les Juifs, le judaïsme', in R. Foreville (ed.), *Les Mutations socio-culturelles au tournant des XI^e–XII^e siècles,* Paris, Editions du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1984, p.522.

45 Sapir Abulafia, op.cit., pp.16–18.

46 ibid., pp.18–22.

47 Dahan makes this very valid point, op.cit., pp.30–1.

48 R.W.Southern, 'St Anselm and Gilbert Crispin, Abbot of Westminster', *Medieval and Renaissance Studies,* 1954, vol. 3, pp.78–115.

49 The *Dialogus inter Christianum et Iudeum* incorrectly ascribed to William of Champeaux, see below pp.73–4, 81.

50 H.Weisweiler, *Das Schrifttum der Schule Anselms von Laon und Wilhelms von Champeaux in Deutschen Bibliotheken. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Verbreitung der ältesten scholastischen Schule in Deutschen Landen,* Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters. Texte und Untersuchungen, vol. 33 part1/2, Münster i. W., Verlag der Aschendorffschen Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1936, pp.2–3, 247.

51 See an interesting discussion on this in A.Victor Murray, *Abelard and St Bernard. A Study in Twelfth-century 'Modernism',* Manchester, Manchester Unversity Press, 1967, p.139ff.

52 T.Gregory, 'Abélard et Platon', in E.M.Buytaert (ed.) *Peter Abelard. Proceedings of the International Conference Louvain May 10–12, 1971,* Mediaevalia Lovaniensia series I/studia II, Leuven and The Hague, 1974, pp.44–7; Gregory, 'Considérations sur ratio et natura chez Abélard', in J.Jolivet and J.Châtillon (eds), *Pierre Abélard—Pierre le Vénérable. Les courants philosophiques, littéraires et artistiques en Occident au milieu du XII^e siècle,* Colloques internationaux du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 546, Paris, CNRS 1975, pp.569–73; Gregory, 'The Platonic inheritance', in P.Dronke (ed.), *A History of Twelfth-century Western Philosophy,* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988, pp.57–60.

53 Gregory, 'Abélard et Platon', p.58; J.Jolivet, 'Eléments du concept de nature chez Abélard', in *La Filosofia della natura nel medioevo. Atti del terzo congresso internazionale di filosofia medioevale,* Milan, 1966, p.303; M.Lapidge, 'The Stoic inheritance', in Dronke, op.cit. p.99; R.Thomas, *Der philosophisch-theologische Erkenntnisweg Peter Abaelards im Dialogus inter*

*Philosophum, Judaeum et Christianum,* Bonn, 1966, pp.166, 203; G.Verbeke, 'Peter Abelard and the concept of subjectivity', in Buytaert, op.cit. pp.6–7; A.Sapir Abulafia, '*Intentio recta an erronea?* Peter Abelard's views on Judaism and the Jews', in B.Albert, Y.Friedman and S.Schwarzfuchs (eds), *Festschrift for Prof. A.Saltman,* forthcoming.

54 There was much more confidence in the twelfth century than there was in the thirteenth that reason could explain even the most mysterious of Christian doctrines like the Incarnation and the Virgin Birth.

## 4 A CHANGING SOCIETY

1 My thoughts along these lines have been especially stimulated by two books: R.I.Moore, *The Formation of a Persecuting Society,* Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1987 and L.K.Little, *Religious Poverty and the Profit Economy in Medieval Europe,* London, Paul Elek, 1978.

2 R.W.Southern, *Saint Anselm. A Portrait in a Landscape,* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990, pp.19–20, 25 emphasizes the importance of these three measures.

3 There is a great deal of discussion about the *Dictatus Papae.* I am following for the most part the views put forward by B.Tierney, *The Crisis of Church and State 1050–1300 with Selected Documents,* Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice-Hall, 1964, pp.45–6.

4 Tierney, op.cit., pp.49–50.

5 On this aspect of Gregory's programme see the introduction by H.E.J. Cowdrey (ed. and trans.) to *Epistolae Vagantes of Pope Gregory VII.* Oxford Medieval Texts, Oxford, 1972.

6 Tierney, op.cit., pp.49–59.

7 ibid.

8 T.Struve, 'Clemens III', in *Lexikon des Mittelalters,* vol. 2, Munich and Zurich, Artemis Verlag, 1983, cols 2139–40; J.Ziese, *Wibert von Ravenna. Der Gegenpapst Clemens III (1084–1100),* Päpste und Papsttum, 20, Anton Hiersemann, Stuttgart, 1982, p.50.

9 J.Watt, 'Spiritual and temporal powers', in J.H.Burns (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Medieval Political Thought c.350–c.1450,* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988, pp.368–73.

10 B.Smalley, *The Study of the Bible in the Middle Ages,* 3rd edn, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1983, pp.102–5.

11 H.Schreckenberg, *Die christlichen Adversus-Judaeos Texte (11.–13. Jh.). Mit einer Ikonographie des Judenthemas bis zum 4. Laterankonzil.* 2nd edn, Frankfurt am Main, Peter Lang, 1991, pp.169–76.

12 John of Salisbury, *Policraticus,* IV, 3; ed. C.C.J.Webb, vol. 1, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1909, p.239; trans. C.J.Nederman. Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990, p.32.

13 I am following the new interpretation of Cary Nederman here. See especially C.J.Nederman and C.Campbell, 'Priests, kings and tyrants: spiritual and temporal power in John of Salisbury's *Policraticus*', *Speculum,* 1991, vol.66; pp.572–90.

14 Even when Aristotelian ideas about the state entered these discussions in the latter part of the thirteenth century, the concept of authority coming to the prince from Christ continued to play a significant role.
15 See the next chapter on the political position of Jews in twelfth-century northwestern Europe.
16 Gilbert Crispin, *De Simoniacis,* 12, ed. G.R.Evans, in A.Sapir Abulafia and G.R.Evans (eds), *The Works of Gilbert Crispin Abbot of Westminster,* Auctores Britannici Medii Aevi, vol. 8, London, Oxford University Press, 1986, p.xxxviii and pp.144–5; for the connection between heresy and leprosy see Moore, op.cit., pp.45–65.
17 See Moore's analysis of these developments: op.cit., pp.11–27.
18 C.H.Lawrence, *Medieval Monasticism. Forms of Religious Life in Western Europe in the Middle Ages,* 2nd edn, London and New York, Longman, 1989, pp.149–205.
19 H.E.J.Cowdrey, *The Cluniacs and the Gregorian Reform,* Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1970, pp.121–8.
20 Those who went on crusade in a sincere frame of mind were promised that the journey would count as an act of all-embracing penance: Cowdrey, 'The genesis of the Crusades', in Cowdrey, *Popes, Monks and Crusaders,* London, Hambledon Press, 1984, XIII, p.23.
21 Guibert of Nogent, *Historia quae dicitur Gesta Dei per Francos,* I,1, in *Recueil des historiens des Croisades: historiens occidentaux,* vol. 4, Paris, Imprimerie nationale, 1879 (repr. Farnborough, 1967) p. 124 as quoted in Cowdrey, 'The genesis', p.23.
22 Cowdrey, 'The genesis', pp.9–32; J.Riley-Smith, *The First Crusade and the Idea of Crusading,* London, Athlone Press, 1986, pp.7–8, 13–30. It is interesting to note that Anselm of Canterbury was not caught up in this fever. He remained convinced that salvation should be sought within the monastery and that the Jerusalem that really mattered was the heavenly one. See J.A.Brundage, 'St Anselm, Ivo of Chartres and the ideology of the First Crusade', in R.Foreville (ed.), *Les Mutations socio-culturelles au tournant des XIe–XIIe siècles,* Paris, Editions du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1984, pp. 175–8.
23 The doctrine of the immaculate conception was not accepted by the Roman Catholic Church until 1854.
24 R. and C.Brooke, *Popular Religion in the Middle Ages: Western Europe 1000–1300,* London, Thames & Hudson, 1984, pp.31–3.
25 G.Macy, *The Theologies of the Eucharist in the early Scholastic Period. A Study of the Salvific Function of the Sacrament according to the Theologians, c.1080–c.1220,* Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1984, pp.86–93; Brooke and Brooke, op.cit., pp.115–17; M.Rubin, *Corpus Christi. The Eucharist in late Medieval Culture,* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991, p.108ff.
26 See Chapter 5.
27 J.Cohen, 'The Jews as the killers of Christ in the Latin tradition, from Augustine to the friars', *Traditio,* 1983, vol. 39, pp.1–27. See below pp.119–21.
28 Riley-Smith, op.cit., pp.49–57.
29 R.Chazan, *European Jewry and the First Crusade,* Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1987, pp.197–210.

30 Little, op.cit., pp.3–41.
31 L.K.Little, 'Pride goes before avarice: social change and the vices in Latin Christendom', in *American Historical Review,* 1971, vol. 76, pp.16–49. On avarice see also A.Murray, *Reason and Society in the Middle Ages,* Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1978, pp.59–80.
32 J.T.Noonan, *The Scholastic Analysis of Usury,* Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1957, pp.17–20.
33 B.Nelson, *The Idea of Usury. From Tribal Brotherhood to Universal Otherhood,* 2nd enlarged edn, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press, 1969, p.9; Peter Lombard, *Liber Sententiarum,* III, 37, 3; PL 192, col. 832.
34 J.Le Goff, 'The usurer and purgatory', in *The Dawn of Modern Banking.* Center for Medieval and Renaissance Studies, University of California, Los Angeles, New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1979, p.28.
35 Noonan, op.cit. pp.16–17.
36 J.W.Baldwin, *Master, Princes and Merchants. The Social Views of Peter the Chanter and his Circle,* vol. 2, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1970, p.191, n. 13.
37 *De Incarnatione Verbi,* III. 8; PL 156, col. 524 (Jews); *De Vita sua,* III, 19; ed. E.-R.Labande, Les Classiques de l'histoire de France au moyen âge, Paris, Société d'Edition 'Les Belles Lettres', 1981, pp.450–3; Guibert of Nogert, trans. J.F.Benton, *Self and Society in Medieval France. The Memoirs of Abbot Guibert of Nogent,* New York, Harper Torchbooks, 1970, pp.221–2 (Christians).
38 Ambrose, *De Tobia* 15:51; L.M.Zucker (ed. and trans.), Catholic University of America Patristic Studies, 35, Washington, 1933, pp.67–8.
39 Bruno of Asti, *Expositio in Deuteronomium;* PL 164, col. 528; Nelson, op.cit., pp.3–8.
40 *Glossa Ordinaria,* on Deut. 23:20, PL 113, col. 479; Nelson, op.cit., p.9. This particular gloss closely resembles the view of Rabanus Maurus in the ninth century; Nelson, op.cit., p.5. On the *Glossa Ordinaria* see Smalley, op.cit., pp. 116–66.
41 On perception of Jewish usurers in a later period in southern Europe see J.Shatzmiller, *Shylock Reconsidered. Jews, Moneylending, and Medieval Society,* Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1990.
42 Bernard, *Epistola* 363; J.Leclercq and H.Rochais (eds), *Sancti Bernardi opera,* vol. 8, Rome, Editiones Cistercienses, 1977, p.316.

## 5 THE JEWISH CHALLENGE

1 See the useful discussion in J.Katz, *Exclusiveness and Tolerance. Jewish-Gentile Relations in Medieval and Modern Times,* New York, Schocken Books, 1962, pp.3–4, 13–23.
2 Gilbert Crispin, *Disputatio Iudei et Christiani,* 47, in A.Sapir Abulafia and G.R.Evans (eds), *The Works of Gilbert Crispin,* Auctores Britannici Medii Aevi, 8, London, Oxford University Press, 1986, p.18.

3 For a full treatment of medieval Christian Bible exegesis see H.de Lubac, *Exégèse médiévale. Les quatres sens de l'Ecriture,* vols 1.1–2.2, Paris, 1959–64. See also Chapter 6, 'The exposition and exegesis of Scripture', in G.W.H.Lampe (ed.), *The Cambridge History of the Bible,* vol. 2: *The West from the Fathers to the Reformation,* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1969, pp.155–279.

4 This does not mean that Jewish exegesis could not be Messianic in character. The point is that for Jews Jesus Christ is not the Messiah. In the course of the twelfth century Jewish exegetes shied away from some of these Messianic interpretations in order to defend themselves against Christological readings of the texts. See G.Dahan, *Les Intellectuels Chrétiens et les Juifs au moyen âge,* Paris, CERF, 1990, p.482.

5 E.g. Augustine, *Enarrationes in Psalmos,* 56:9, in E.Dekkers and J. Fraipont (eds), CCSL, 39, Turnhout, Brepols, 1956, pp.699–700; *De Civitate Dei,* XVIII, 46, ed. B.Dombart and A.Kalb, CCSL, 14, part 2, 1955, p.644; trans. H.Bettenson, Penguin Books, 1984, p.827.

6 B.Blumenkranz, *Die Judenpredigt Augustins. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der jüdisch-christlichen Beziehungen in den ersten Jahrhunderten.* Etudes Augustiennes, Paris, 1946, repr. 1973, pp. 175–81.

7 *Sicut Iudeis* is the bull Gregory sent to Victor, bishop of Palermo, in June 598, in S.Simonsohn (ed.), *The Apostolic See and the Jews. Documents: 492–1404,* Toronto, Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1988, pp.15– 16.

8 G.I.Langmuir, 'Anti-Judaism as the necessary preparation for antisemitism', in G.I.Langmuir, *Toward a Definition of Antisemitism,* Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1990, pp.58–9.

9 G.I.Langmuir, 'The transformation of anti-Judaism', in Langmuir, *Toward a Definition,* pp.78–83.

10 Jeremy Cohen argues that *testimonium veritatis* broke down when Christians found out about the Jewish Talmud. According to him, Christians, especially the Mendicants, claimed that Jews had abandoned the Bible for the Talmud, and that they therefore could no longer be said to witness to the truth of Christianity: *The Friars and the Jews. The Evolution of Medieval Anti-Judaism,* Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1982. See also below, Chapter 9.

11 Langmuir assesses the Christianization of Europe by examining the different phases of Christian religiosities. He does this in 'The transformation of anti-Judaism', pp.63–99. By religiosity Langmuir means 'what individuals do in fact believe about themselves and their universe' (p.65). For yet another angle see Moore, 'Anti-Semitism and the birth of Europe', in D.Wood (ed.), *Christianity and Judaism.* Studies in Church History, 29, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1992, pp.33–57.

12 Moore, op.cit., *passim.*

13 See the excellent new appraisal of the problem by J.A.Watt 'The Jews, the law, and the Church: the concept of Jewish serfdom in thirteenth-century England', in D.Wood (ed.), *The Church and Sovereignty,* Studies in Church History, Subsidia series, 9, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1991, pp.153–72. See also Langmuir, '"Tanquam Servi": the change in Jewish

status in French law about 1200', in Langmuir, *Toward a Definition,* pp.167–94.

14 *Encyclopaedia Judaica,* vol. 12, Jerusalem, Keter Publishing House, 1971, p.248. The Tosaphists expounded and augmented Rashi's commentaries on the Talmud.

15 H.Soloveitchik, 'Pawnbroking: a study in *Ribbit* and of the Halakah in exile', *Proceedings of the American Academy for Jewish Research,* 1970–1, vols 38–9, pp.203–68.

16 R.Chazan, *Medieval Jewry in Northern France. A Political and Social History,* Baltimore and London, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973, pp.18–24, 58.

17 L.Rabinowitz, *The Social Life of the Jews of Northern France in the XII–XIV Centuries as Reflected in the Rabbinical Literature of the Period,* London, 1938, p.216.

18 Moore considers this most significant. He sees this as the reason why Christian administrators saw Jews as their rivals: op.cit., pp.51–7.

19 Chazan, op.cit., 52–3.

20 N.Golb, *Les Juifs de Rouen au moyen âge: portrait d'une culture oubliée,* Rouen, Publications de l'Université de Rouen, 1985.

21 See e.g. M.Awerbuch, *Christlich jüdische Begegnung im Zeitalter der Frühscholastik,* Munich, Kaiser, 1980, pp.101–53.

22 M.A.Signer, 'Exégèse et enseignement: les commentaires de Joseph ben Simeon Kara', *Archives Juives,* 1982, vol. 18:4, pp.60–3; Signer, 'The land of Israel in medieval Jewish exegetical and polemical literature', in L.A. Hoffman (ed.), *The Land of Israel: Jewish Perspectives,* Notre Dame, Indiana, University of Notre Dame Press, 1986, pp.211–12; Dahan, op.cit., pp.291, 483–5. See the useful references there to the seminal work on Jewish exegesis by many scholars in the particular field of Jewish exegesis.

23 These invectives come from the Hebrew chronicles of the First Crusade but they are not peculiar to those chronicles and cannot be written off simply as expressions of anger during a period of persecution. See my 'Invectives against Christianity in the Hebrew chronicles of the First Crusade', in P.Edbury (ed.), *Crusade and Settlement,* Cardiff, University College Cardiff Press, 1985, pp.66–8.

24 ibid., pp.66–72.

25 Rupert of Deutz, *Anulus sive dialogus inter Christianum et Iudeum,* III, ll. 531–43; ed. R.Haacke in M.L.Arduini, *Ruperto di Deutz e la controversia tra Christiani ed Ebrei nel secolo XII,* Rome, Istituto Storico Italiano per il Medio Evo, 1979, pp.238–9. The initial reaction of Herman, the Jewish convert to Christianity (see Chapter 8), to seeing a depiction of Christ on the cross in Münster cathedral was one of instinctive horror (*Hermannus quondam Judaeus opusculum de conversione sua,* ed. G. Niemeyer, Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Quellen zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters, vol. 4, Weimar, Hermann Bohlaus, 1963, p.75; trans. K.F.Morrison, *Conversion and Text. The Cases of Augustine of Hippo, Herman-Judah, and Constantine Tsatsos,* Charlottesville and London, University Press of Virginia, 1992, p. 80.

26 Two editions of the texts exist: *Hebräische Berichte über die Judenverfolgungen während der Kreuzzüge,* ed. A.Neubauer and H.Stern, trans. S.Baer, Berlin, Verlag von Leonhard Simion, 1892; *Sefer Gezerot Ashkenaz ve-Zarfat,* ed. A.M.Habermann, Jerusalem, Tarshish, 1945. Translations in English are: *The Jews and the Crusaders. The Hebrew Chronicles of the First and Second Crusade,* S.Eidelberg (trans. and ed.), Wisconsin, University of Wisconsin Press, 1977; R.Chazan, *European Jewry and the First Crusade,* Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1987, pp.225–97. See also A.Sapir Abulafia, 'The interrelationship between the Hebrew chronicles on the First Crusade', *Journal of Semitic Studies,* 1982, vol. 27, pp.221–39.

27 J.Riley-Smith, 'The First Crusade and the persecution of the Jews', in W. J.Sheils (ed.), *Persecution and Toleration,* Studies in Church History, 21, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1984, pp.51–72.

28 I.G.Marcus, 'From politics to martyrdom: shifting paradigms in the Hebrew narratives of the 1096 Crusade riots', in J.Cohen (ed.), *Essential Papers on Judaism and Christianity in Conflict. From late Antiquity to the Reformation,* New York and London, New York University Press, 1991, pp.469–83.

29 Chazan, *European Jewry,* pp.195–7.

30 I.G.Marcus, 'Hierarchies, religious boundaries and Jewish spirituality in medieval Germany', *Jewish History,* 1986, vol. 1, pp.7–26.

31 J.Gilchrist, 'The perception of Jews in the canon law in the period of the first two Crusades', *Jewish History,* 1988, vol. 3, pp.9–24.

32 A.Funkenstein, 'Changes in the pattern of Christian anti-Jewish polemics in the 12th century', *Zion,* 1968, vol. 33, pp.125–44 (in Hebrew); Funkenstein, 'Basic types of Christian anti-Jewish polemics', *Viator,* 1971, vol. 2, pp.373–82.

33 Edited and commented on in Sapir Abulafia and Evans (eds), *The Works of Gilbert Crispin,* pp.xxvii–xxxii, 1–87.

34 A.Sapir Abulafia, 'Jewish-Christian disputations and the twelfth-century renaissance', *Journal of Medieval History,* 1989, vol. 15, pp.105– 25; the dialogue is edited in PL 163, cols 1045–72.

35 Ed. PL 156, cols 489–528; see A.Sapir Abulafia, 'Theology and the commercial revolution: Guibert of Nogent, St Anselm and the Jews of northern France', in D.Abulafia *et al.* (eds), *Church and City, 1000–1500. Essays in Honour of Christopher Brooke,* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992, pp.23–40.

36 Ed. PL 160, cols 1103–12; A.Sapir Abulafia, 'Christian imagery of Jews in the twelfth century: a look at Odo of Cambrai and Guibert of Nogent', *Theoretische Geschiedenis,* 1989, vol. 16, pp.383–91.

37 A transcription of one of the MSS of this text is given by C.Mews in 'St. Anselm and Roscelin: some texts and their implications. I. the *De Incarnatione Verbi* and the *Disputatio inter Christianum et Gentilem*', *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge,* 1991, vol. 58, pp.86–98. See also A.Sapir Abulafia, 'Christians disputing disbelief: St. Anselm, Gilbert Crispin and Pseudo-Anselm', in B.Lewis and F. Niewöhner (eds), *Religionsgespräche im Mittelalter,* Wiesbaden, Harrassowitz, 1992, pp.131–48.

38 Hildebert of Lavardin, sermons 5 and 7, ed. PL 171, cols 806–11; also 811–14; see Chapter 8, note 77; see A.Sapir Abulafia, 'Twelfth-century humanism and the Jews', forthcoming. Abelard, *Dialogus inter Philosophum, Iudaeum et Christianum,* ed. R.Thomas, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt, 1970; trans. P.J.Payer, Toronto, Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1979. See also A.Sapir Abulafia, '*Intentio recta an erronea?* Peter Abelard's views on Judaism and the Jews', in a Festschrift for Prof. A.Saltman, ed. B.Albert *et al.,* forthcoming.

39 Ed. PL 157, cols 535–672.

40 Ed. Y.Friedman, CCCM, 58, Turnhout, Brepols, 1985. See also Chapter 6 note 49.

41 Ed. A.Landgraf, *Ecrits théologiques de l'Ecole d'Abelard, textes inédits.* Spicilegium Sacrum Lovaniense, 14, Louvain, 1934, pp.61–289. See also A.Sapir Abulafia, 'Jewish carnality in twelfth-century Renaissance thought', in Wood (ed.), *Christianity and Judaism,* pp.59–75.

42 For editions of these two texts see note 25 above. See A.Sapir Abulafia, 'The ideology of reform and changing ideas concerning Jews in the works of Rupert of Deutz and Hermannus quondam Iudeus', *Jewish History,* 1993, vol. 7, pp.3–23. On the genuineness of the text see Chapter 6.

**6 CHRISTIANIZED REASON AT WORK**

1 *Disputatio Iudei et Christiani [Disp. Iud.],* 80–1, 91–3, 100–3, in *The Works of Gilbert Crispin Abbot of Westminster,* ed. A.Sapir Abulafia and G.R.Evans [henceforth *WGC*], Auctores Britannici Medii Aevi, vol. 8, London, Oxford University Press, 1986, pp.27, 31, 34–5. The definition Gilbert gives of God is closely linked to Anselm's in the *Proslogion,* ii, ed. F.S.Schmitt, in *S.Anselmi...opera omnia* [henceforth *S*], vol. 1, Edinburgh, Thomas Nelson, 1946, p.101; R.W.Southern, 'St Anselm and Gilbert Crispin, abbot of Westminster', *Mediaeval and Renaissance Studies,* 1954, vol. 3, pp.87–94; A.Sapir Abulafia, 'The *Ars disputandi* of Gilbert Crispin, abbot of Westminster (1085–1117)', in C.C.M.Cappon *et al.* (eds), *Ad fontes. Opstellen aangeboden aan prof. dr. C.van de Kieft,* Amsterdam, Verloren, 1984, pp.145–7.

2 *Disputatio Christiani cum Gentili [Disp. Gen.],* 52; in *WGC,* p.74.

3 Anselm's *Meditation on Human Redemption* (*S,* vol. 3, pp.84–91; trans. B.Ward, *The Prayers and Meditations of St Anselm,* Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1973, pp.230–7) is a fine example of a piece where an attempt is made to thrash out this difficulty.

4 Pseudo-Anselm, *Dialogus beati Anselmi inter Gentilem et Christianum,* Berlin, Staatsbibliothek Preussischer Kulturbesitz, MS Theol. lat. fol. 276 [henceforth MS Berlin], f.48v; see also C.Mews, 'St Anselm and Roscelin: some texts and their implications. I. the *De Incarnatione Verbi* and the *Disputatio inter Christianum et Gentilem,' Archives d'histoire doctrinale et Littéraire du moyen âge,* 1991, vol. 58, p.86. (When referring to this disputation, which has not yet been edited, I shall refer to the above MS, which is the best of the five MSS I have collated of the text. Constant Mews has transcribed London, British Library, MS Royal 5 E xiv, ff. 70r–74r with corrections from Hereford, Cathedral Library MS O I xii, ff.82r–107r in his article, and I shall refer to his transcription too. His

transcription differs in places from my reading of the MSS. The disputation exists in at least eleven MSS: see Mews, op.cit., pp.78–9 and my 'Christians disputing disbelief: St Anselm, Gilbert Crispin and Pseudo-Anselm,' in B.Lewis and F.Niewöhner (eds), *Religionsgespräche im Mittelalter,* Wiesbaden, Harrassowitz, 1992, pp. 142–3. My former student, Colin Gale has identified an additional twelfth-century MS, Cambridge University Library MS Gg V 34.)

5 *Di.p. Gent.,* 5–7; *WGC,* pp.62–3.
6 *Di.p. Gent.,* 12, 76; *WGC,* pp.65, 79.
7 Southern, op.cit., pp.94–7; A.Sapir Abulafia, 'An attempt by Gilbert Crispin, abbot of Westminster, at rational argument in the Jewish-Christian debate', *Studia Monastica,* 1984, vol. 26, pp.56–8; *WGC,* pp.xxx–xxxii. See also note 1.
8 *Di.p. Iud. 117; WGC,* p.39.
9 *Di.p. Gent.,* 54; *WGC,* p.74.
10 *Di.p. Gent.,* 31–2; *WGC,* p.69.
11 *Di.p. Gent.,* 82–108; *WGC,* pp.83–7. Gilbert said in so many words that there was no example in the Old Testament that could convince Jews or Gentiles that God was triune (ibid., 90; *WGC,* p.82).
12 *De Spiritu Sancto,* 45; *WGC,* p.123.
13 *De Spiritu Sancto,* 51; *WGC,* p.124.
14 *De Altaris Sacramento; WGC,* pp.124–42. See also my 'Christians disputing disbelief', pp.135–42.
15 London British Library, MS Add. 8166 which contains a collection of Crispin's works, see *WGC,* pp.xiii, xxxi.
16 See the next chapter.
17 See note 15.
18 *WGC,* pp. 1–7.
19 On the relationship between the Disputation and Anselm and Crispin see A.Sapir Abulafia, 'Jewish-Christian disputations and the twelfth-century renaissance', *Journal of Medieval History,* 1989, vol. 15, pp.105–25.
20 PL 163, cols 1060–72; Sapir Abulafia, 'Jewish-Christian disputations', pp.108, 118–21.
21 Exodus 3:2; Numbers 17:23.
22 PL 163, cols 1054–5.
23 PL 171, cols 813–14; see also my 'Twelfth-century humanism and the Jews', in a volume edited by O.Limor, and G.G.Stroumsa, Tübingen, Mohr (Siebeck), 1995 forthcoming and below, Chapter 8.
24 For a discussion of these sermons and their interrelationship and of the way Peter and Anselm used the allusion see my 'Jewish-Christian disputations', pp.115–17.
25 G.I.Langmuir, *History, Religion, and Antisemitism,* Berkeley and Los Angeles, California University Press, 1990, pp.275–305; Langmuir, 'Doubt in Christendom', in *Toward a Definition of Antisemitism,* Berkeley and Los Angeles, California University Press, 1990, pp.100–33.
26 At the end of the twelfth century Alan of Lille included the analogy in his *Contra Hereticos;* on the Jewish side Jacob ben Reuben recorded it in his *Milhamot Ha-Shem* ('Wars of the Lord', written about 1170 in Provence). On this see note 24.

27 PL 156, cols 499–500; it goes beyond the framework of this study to examine the provenance of Guibert's 'scientific' ideas. It is perhaps worth mentioning that Albert the Great quotes Pliny as describing catnip as a particularly powerful herb. He calls the report that cats are impregnated by it a fable. See Albertus Magnus, *De Vegetalibus,* VI, trac. II, cap.xiii, section 397, ed. E.Meyer and C.Jessen, Berlin, George Reimer, 1867, pp.543–4.
28 PL 156, col. 498.
29 PL 160, col. 1110.
30 See Chapter 8.
31 See for example *Tactatus De Incarnatione [De Inc.],* I, 1; PL 156, col. 491 where he stresses the limitations of understanding.
32 PL 160, cols 1103, 1112.
33 See my 'Christian imagery of Jews in the twelfth century: a look at Odo of Cambrai and Guibert of Nogent', *Theoretische Geschiedenis,* 1989, vol. 16, p.385. Does the fact the the French for Leo, Leon, is the reverse of the French for Christmas, Noel, indicate that Odo dreamt up the Jew for his own purpose?
34 PL 160, col. 1109.
35 See Chapter 8 for a full discussion of Odo's argumentation on this question.
36 MS Berlin fol. 51r; Mews, op.cit., p.91. The Christian of the dialogue has been expressing these sentiments since fol. 50r (Mews, p.90).
37 Anselm himself had recognized that for some it was easier to understand why God had become incarnate by examining Christ's life than by ratiocination alone.
38 MS Berlin, fols 52r, 52v; Mews, op.cit., pp.93, 94.
39 See Chapter 3.
40 It is interesting to note that Herman the Jew claimed that one of the things that had influenced him on his tortuous path to becoming a Christian was the lifestyle he experienced at the newly founded Premonstratensian foundation at Cappenberg, *Hermannus quondam Judaeus opusculum de conversione sua [Opusculum],* ed. G.Niemeyer, Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Quellen zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters, vol. 4, Weimar, Hermann Böhlaus, 1963, pp.88–93; trans. K.F.Morrison, *Conversion and Text. The Cases of Augustine of Hippo, Herman-Judah, and Constantine Tsatsos,* Charlottesville and London, University Press of Virginia, 1992, pp.88–91. See Chapter 8.
41 MS Berlin, fols 52v–53r; Mews, op.cit., pp.94–5.
42 MS Berlin, fol. 52r; Mews, op.cit., p.93.
43 MS Berlin, fol. 54r; Mews, op.cit., p.96.
44 MS Berlin, fol. 53r; Mews, op.cit., p.95.
45 *Ysagoge,* II, ed. A.Landgraf, *Ecrits théologiques de l'Ecole d'Abelard, textes inédits.* Spicilegium Sacrum Lovaniense, 14, Louvain, 1934, p.138; *Summa Sententiarum,* PL 176, col. 123. The *Summa Sententiarum* can be regarded as the distillation of Victorine reaction against the School of Abelard: see D.L.Luscombe, *The School of Abelard,* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp.198–213.

46 *De Inc.,* III, 11; PL 156, col. 528. See also R.Bartlett, *Trial by Fire and Water,* Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1986, p.20 where a connection is made between trials of faith and attitudes towards judicial ordeals. Ordeals were, in fact, increasingly criticized from 1050 onwards; the Fourth Lateran Council legislated against the practice in 1215 (Bartlett, pp.34–102).
47 *De miraculis libri duo;* ed. D.Bouthillier, CCCM, vol. 83, Turnhout, Brepols, 1988, pp.3, 93–4; J.P.Valéry Patin and J.le Goff, 'A propos de la typologie des miracles dans le *Liber de Miraculis* de Pierre le Vénérable', in R.Louis, J.Jolivet and J.Châtillon (eds), *Pierre Abélard—Pierre le Vénérable. Les courants philosophiques, littéraires et artistiques en Occident au milieu du XII^e siècle.* Colloques Internationaux du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 546, Paris, CNRS, 1975, pp.181–7.
48 G.I.Langmuir, 'Peter the Venerable: defence against doubts', in *Toward a Definition of Antisemitism,* pp.197–208; Langmuir, 'Faith of Christians and hostility to Jews', in D.Wood (ed.), *Christianity and Judaism,* Studies in Church History, vol. 29, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1992, pp.77–92.
49 *Petri Venerabilis adversus Iudeorum inveteratam duritiem [Adversus Iud.],* IV, ed. Y.Friedman, CCCM, vol. 58, Turnhout, Brepols, 1985, pp.lxiii–lxx.
50 See Chapter 8.
51 *Adversus Iud.,* IV, p.106, ll. 1357–64.
52 ibid., p.110, ll. 1498–1512.
53 ibid., pp.118–20, ll. 1794–1868.
54 ibid., pp.107–8, ll. 1402–13.
55 ibid., pp.122–3, ll. 1955–91.
56 ibid., p.124, ll. 2002–9.
57 ibid., V, p.125, ll. 1–8.
58 See note 40.
59 A.Saltman, 'Hermann's *Opusculum de conversione sua:* truth or fiction?', *Revue des Etudes Juives,* 1988, vol. 147, pp.31–56.
60 See my 'The ideology of reform and changing ideas concerning Jews in the works of Rupert of Deutz and Hermannus quondam Iudeus', *Jewish History,* 1993, vol. 7, pp.3–23. See also Morrison, op.cit., pp.39–75 and A.Kleinberg, 'Hermannus Judaeus's opusculum: in defence of its authenticity', *Revue des Etudes Juives,* 1992, vol. 151, pp.337–53.
61 *Opusculum,* ed. Niemeyer, pp.83–7; trans. Morrison, pp.85–8. See note 46 above. Egbert's doubts would concur with contemporary scepticism about the desirability of ordeals.
62 See for example his scathing words on Jews seeking signs (1 Cor. 1:22) in *Dialogus inter Philosophum, Judaeum et Christianum [Dial.],* ed. R. Thomas, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstat, Friedrich Frommann Verlag, 1970, pp.90–1; trans. P.J.Payer, Toronto, Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1979, p.78; cf. Letter 13 in E.R.Smits (ed.), 'Peter Abelard. Letters IX–XIV. An edition with an introduction,' PhD, Rijksuniversiteit te Groningen, 1983, p.276.
63 J.M.A.Rubingh-Bosscher (ed.), *Peter Abelard, Carmen ad Astralabum. A critical edition,* Groningen, 1987, p.127.
64 See Chapter 3 on Abelard's concept of double revelation.

65 See for example, Abelard, *Dial.,* ed. Thomas, pp.97–8; trans. Payer, pp.86–7; A.Victor Murray, *Abelard and St Bernard. A Study in Twelfth-century 'Modernism',* Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1967, pp.139–58.
66 In my '*Intentio recta an erronea?* Peter Abelard's views on Judaism and the Jews' (in a Festschrift for Prof. A.Saltman, ed. B.Albert *et al.,* forthcoming) I take issue with those who have argued that the Philosopher is (also) a Muslim.
67 Abelard, *Dial.,* ed. Thomas, pp.44, 53; trans. Payer, pp.24, 36. In my '*Intentio recta an erronea?*' I explain why I follow the earlier dating of the Dialogue to the second half of the 1130s (Buytaert) or 1125–6 (Mews). See E.Buytaert, 'Abelard's Collationes', *Antonianum,* 1969, vol. 44, pp.33–9 and C.Mews, 'On dating the works of Peter Abelard', *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge,* 1985, vol. 52, pp.104–26.
68 Abelard, *Dial.,* ed. Thomas, pp.86, 92; trans. Payer, pp.75, 80.
69 Abelard, *Dial.,* ed. Thomas, pp.49, 62–4; trans. Payer, pp.30, 46–8; *Sermo in circumcisione Domini,* ed. V.Cousin, in *Petri Abaelardi opera,* vol. 1, Paris, Aug. Durand, 1849, pp.374–5. See Chapter 9.
70 Abelard, *Theologia Christiana,* II, 44, in E.Buytaert (ed.), *Petri Abaelardi opera theologica,* vol. 2. CCCM, vol. 12, Turnhout, Brepols, 1969, p.149 and also his *Sermo in circumcisione Domini,* ed. Cousin, vol. 1, p.371 and his *Problemata Heloissae* XIII, ibid., pp.257–8.
71 Abelard, *Dial.,* ed. Thomas, pp.49–52; trans. Payer pp.30–5; quotation from Payer, p.33–4.
72 Abelard, *Dial.,* ed. Thomas, pp.52–3; trans. Payer, p.35. The Philosopher with whom the Jew is speaking says as much.
73 See my '*Intentio recta an erronea?*'.
74 Langmuir, 'Faith of Christians', pp.86–8.
75 PL 157, cols 553–60; on the philosophical dimensions of Alfonsi's discussion see J.Tolan, *Petrus Alfonsi and his Medieval Readers,* Gainesville, Florida, University Press of Florida, 1993, pp.35–6. See also M.Kniewasser, 'Die antijüdische Polemik des Petrus Alphonsi (getauft 1106) und des Abtes Petrus Venerabilis von Cluny (+1156)', *Kairos,* 1980, vol. 22, pp.37–48.
76 PL 157, col. 543.
77 ibid., cols 541–50; Babylonian Talmud, Berachot 59a and 3a.
78 Kniewasser, op.cit., pp.47–9; N.Roth, 'Forgery and abrogation of the Torah: a theme in Muslim and Christian polemic in Spain', *Proceedings of the American Academy for Jewish Research,* 1987, vol. 54, pp.203–36; Tolan, op.cit., pp.22–4.
79 See below Chapter 8 where Peter the Venerable's use of the Talmud will also be examined.
80 PL 157, col. 541.
81 ibid., cols 552–3; see also Chapter 7.
82 ibid., cols 617–18; Tolan, op.cit., p.39.
83 ibid., col. 555; Tolan, op.cit., p.69 sees Saadia Gaon (d. 942) as Alfonsi's source here.
84 ibid., cols 606–7 where the Trinity is analysed as substance, wisdom and will; Tolan op.cit., pp.39–41 and note 75 above.

85 ibid., col. 618 ff.; Tolan, op.cit., p.40.

## 7 THE TESTIMONY OF THE HEBREW BIBLE

1 On the study of Hebrew see G.Dahan, *Les Intellectuels Chrétiens et les Juifs au moyen âge,* Paris, CERF, 1990, pp.239–70. See also A.Grabois, 'The *Hebraica Veritas* and Jewish-Christian intellectual relations in the twelfth century', *Speculum,* 1975, vol. 50, pp.613–34; repr. in A.Grabois, *Civilisation et société dans l'occident médiévale,* London, Variorum, 1983.

2 On Andrew see B.Smalley, *The Study of the Bible in the Middle Ages,* 3rd edn, Oxford, 1983, pp.83–195 and more recently M.A.Signer's introduction to his edition of Andrew's *Expositionem in Ezechielem,* CCCM, vol. 53E, Turnhout, Brepols, 1991, pp.ix–xxxvii. Dahan, op.cit., *passim* gives many examples of Christian usage of rabbinical material.

3 H.de Lubac makes this point forcefully in opposition to Smalley's ideas about the especial interest of, for example, the Victorines in the letter of the Bible, *Exégèse médiévale. Les quatre sens de l'Ecriture,* Paris, vol. 1.1 and 1.2, 1959; vol. 2.1, 1961; vol. 2.2, 1964, *passim.*

4 *Ysagoge,* in A.Landgraf (ed.), *Ecrits théologiques de l'école d'Abélard, textes inédits.* Spicilegium Sacrum Lovaniense, 14, Louvain, 1934, pp.61–289; on question of authorship see D.E.Luscombe, 'The authorship of the *Ysagoge in Theologiam*', *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge,* 1968, vol. 35, p.7–16. See also M.Evans, 'The *Ysagoge in Theologiam* and the commentaries attributed to Bernard Silvestris', *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes,* 1991, vol. 54, pp.1–2 where a date between *c.* 1135 and 1139 is suggested for the *Ysagoge.*

5 Evans, op.cit., pp.40–2 identifies him as the author of commentaries on the *Aeneid,* the *Timaeus* and *De Nuptiis,* but as an historical figure he cannot be placed.

6 *Ysagoge,* II; ed. Landgraf, pp. 126–7; 162–7; he is clearly following Jerome here.

7 ibid., pp. 128–9. Dahan, op.cit., discusses Odo's method of transliteration on pp.252–3; A.Saltman does this in 'Odo's *Ysagoge*—a new method of anti-Jewish polemic', *Criticism and Interpretation,* 1979, vol. 13–14, p.273 [Hebrew].

8 See my 'Jewish carnality in twelfth-century Renaissance thought', in D. Wood (ed.), *Christianity and Judaism,* Studies in Church History, vol. 29, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1992, p.65; Saltman disagrees, op.cit., pp.272–3.

9 *Ysagoge,* II; ed. Landgraf, pp.140–2. All biblical references are to the Vulgate.

10 ibid.; for Odo's reliance on Gilbert Crispin see A.Saltman, 'Gilbert Crispin as a source of the anti-Jewish polemic of the *Ysagoge in Theologiam*', in P.Artzi (ed.), Bar-Ilan Studies in History, 2: *Confrontation and Coexistence,* Ramat-Gan, 1984, pp.89–99. On Crispin see below, p.99.

11 C.Peters, 'Aussermasoretische Überlieferung in den Zitaten des Scholastikers Odo?', *Muséon,* 1938, vol. 51, pp.137–49 *contra* J.Fischer, 'Die hebräischen Bibelzitate des Scholastikers Odo', *Biblica,* 1934, vol. 15, p.84ff.

12 *Ysagoge,* II; ed. Landgraf, p.140; Saltman, 'Gilbert Crispin', pp.94–5.
13 Gilbert Crispin, *Disputatio Iudei et Christiani [Disp. Iud.],* sections 85, 130 in A.Sapir Abulafia and G.R.Evans (eds), *The Works of Gilbert Crispin Abbot of Westminster* [henceforth *WGC*], Auctores Britannici Medii Aevi, vol. 8, London, Oxford University Press, 1986, pp.28–9, 43–4. Gilbert is aghast at Jewish rejection of the canonicity of the book of Baruch.
14 *Ysagoge,* II; ed. Landgraf, p. 143.
15 ibid., III, pp.281–2.
16 On evidence of three 'yods' being used for 'Adonai' see V.Apowitzer, *Das Schriftwort in der rabbinischen Literatur,* Vienna, 1906–15, repr. New York, 1970, p. 10.
17 Peter Alfonsi, *Dialogi;* PL 157, cols 608–10.
18 ibid., col 611; See J.Tolan, *Petrus Alfonsi and his Medieval Readers,* Gainesville, Florida, University of Florida Press, 1993, pp.37–8. Tolan refers to the mystical aspects of Alfonsi's treatment of the Tetragrammaton which bear resemblance to ideas which would later evolve within the Kabbalah.
19 *Petri Venerabilis adversus Iudeorum inveteratam duritiem [Adversus Iud.],* V, ed. Y.Friedman, CCCM, vol. 58, Turnhout, 1985, p.153, ll. 989–96. The context is the anthropomorphic language used in conjunction with God in the Bible. The killing letter refers to Paul's language in 2 Corinthians 3:6.
20 M.Gibson, *Lanfranc of Bec,* Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1978, pp.54–61; PL 150, cols 105–406.
21 *Disp. Iud.,* sections 138–48; *WGC,* pp.46–9.
22 ibid., sections 11–14; *WGC,* pp.10–11. The fact that Gilbert's Jew frequently quotes Old Testament passages in their New Testament form does not prove he is simply a figment of Crispin's imagination. There seems no reason to doubt that Gilbert had some kind of discussions with a Jew about their respective religions. The *Disputatio* is, however, clearly Gilbert's reworking of any talks he might have had. And he obviously reworked it to fit his own, Christian, purpose. See my 'The *ars disputandi* of Gilbert Crispin, abbot of Westminster (1085–1117)', in C.Cappon *et al.* (eds) *Ad Fontes. Opstellen aangeboden aan prof. dr. C.van de Kieft,* Amsterdam, Verloren, 1984, pp. 140–1.
23 *Disp. Iud.,* sections 16–31; *WGC,* pp.11–15. Isidore of Seville (d. 636), for example, had made very similar points about the letter covering hidden truths in his *De Fide Catholica,* II, xiv, 5; PL 83, cols 521ff.
24 *Disp. Iud.,* sections 47–50; *WGC,* pp.18–19; see also the *Disputatio cum Gentili,* sections 40–2; *WGC,* pp.71–2 where the non-ruminating, dirt-loving pig is made to symbolize a sinner wallowing in evil. Cf. Isidore, *De Fide Catholica,* II, xviii; PL 83, cols 527–8.
25 *Disp. Iud.,* sections 51–2; *WGC,* pp.19–20.
26 *Disp. Iud.,* section 109; *WGC,* pp.36–7. The text in the Vulgate differs from the Hebrew Bible. There it says '[the gate] will be shut. As for the prince, being a prince, he shall sit…'.
27 ibid., sections 86–7 and 110–13; *WGC,* pp.29, 37–8. See edition for references to Ambrose, Augustine and Isidore; see also my 'Gilbert Crispin's disputations: an exercise in hermeneutics', in *Etudes*

*Anselmiennes. Les mutations socio-culturelles au tournant des XI^e–XII^e siècles,* Paris, CNRS, 1984, pp.513–14.

28 *Di.p. Iud.,* section 47; *WGC,* p.18.
29 *Di.putatio cum Gentili,* section 62; *WGC,* pp.76–7.
30 *Di.p. Iud.,* section 162; *WGC,* p.53.
31 Peter Alfonsi, *Dialgi,* PL 157, col. 553; see also J.Cohen, 'The mentality of the medieval Jewish apostate: Peter Alfonsi, Hermann of Cologne, and Pablo Christiani', in T.M.Endelman (ed.), *Jewish Aposta.y in the Modern World,* New York, 1987, pp.24–6.
32 *Dialgi,* PL 157, cols 588–9, 592.
33 ibid., cols 582–3.
34 ibid., col. 582.
35 ibid.
36 ibid., cols 582–93; Deut. 34:10; see also Tolan, op.cit., pp.25–7 on the intricate discussion on different forms of resurrection and on different types of souls.
37 B.P.Hurwitz, '*Fidei causa et tui amore:* the role of Petrus Alphonsi's dialogues in the history of Jewish-Christian debate', PhD, Yale University, University Microfilms International, 1983, pp.82–3; 120–8. Hurwitz alludes to the many borrowings from Saadia Gaon. She points out that this is the first instance of a discussion on the resurrection of the dead in a Jewish-Christian debate.
38 PL 157, col. 615.
39 Guibert of Nogent, *Tractatus de Incarnatione,* III, 2; PL 156, col. 508.
40 ibid., II, 4; PL 156, cols 503–4.
41 On Jewish Messianic and non-Messianic interpretations of Isaiah 11 see D.Berger, *The Jewish-Christian Debate in the High Middle Ages. A critical Edition of the Nizzahon Vetus,* Philadelphia, Jewish Publication Society of America, 1979, pp.10–11, 108, 280.
42 Peter the Venerable, *Adversus Iud.,* Prologue; ed. Friedman, pp.2–3, ll. 69–78.
43 Pseudo-William of Champeaux, *Dialgus inter Christianum et Judaeum de fide Catholica [Dialgu.];* PL 163, cols 1045–6.
44 Rupert of Deutz, *Anulus sive dialgus inter Christianum et Iudeum,* I, ll. 236–55; ed. R.Haacke in M.L.Arduini, *Ruperto di Deutz e la controversia tra Christiani ed Ebrei nel secoloXII,* Rome, Istituto Storico Italiano per il Medio Evo, 1979, p. 191.
45 ibid., II, ll. 434–43; ed. Haacke, pp.216–17.
46 ibid., II. ll. 359–61; ed. Haacke, pp.214–15.
47 Gregory, *Moralia in Job* XX, IX, 20, ed. M.Adriaen. CCSL, vol. 143A, Turnhout, Brepols, 1979, p.1019.
48 Pseudo-William, *Dialgus;* PL, 163, cols 1047–50.
49 On e.g. Jewish observance of the Sabbath see Alfonsi, *Dialgi;* PL 157, col. 660.
50 ibid., cols 593–7.
51 Guibert of Nogent, *Tractatus de Incarnatione,* III, 7–8; PL 156, cols 522–4; cf. Numbers 15:38; L.I.Rabinowitz (*The Social Life of the Jews of Northern France in the xii–xiv Centuries as Reflected in the Rabbinical Literature of the Period,* London, Edward Goldston, 1938, p.177) claims that when

Jews of this period wore fringes (and apparently they often did not) the fringes were white.

52 Peter the Venerable, *Adversus Iud.,* IV, ll. 1101–42; ed. Friedman, pp. 99– 100.

53 *Ysagoge,* II; ed. Landgraf, pp. 160–1; cf. Genesis 44:29; Job 17:13; Psalm 15:10, 29:4, 48:16; Isaiah 38:10.

54 Pseudo-William, *Dialogus;* PL, 163 cols 1050–1; cf. Genesis 42:38; Job 17:13; Psalm 85:13; Crispin, *Disp.Iud.,* sections 97–9; *WGC,* p.33; Isaiah 38:10. See also my 'Jewish-Christian disputations and the twelfth-century Renaissance', *Journal of Medieval History,* 1989, vol. 15, pp. 112–13 on the discussions in the schools on the geography of the different regions in the afterlife.

55 Rupert, *Anulus,* III, ll. 175–87; ed. Haacke, p.229.

56 Guibert, *Tractatus de Incarnatione,* III, 6; PL 156, col. 519 and *passim.*

57 E.g. Peter the Venerable, *Adversus Iud.,* III, ll.744–78; ed. Friedman, pp.62–3.

58 Abelard, *Dialogus inter Philosophum, Judaeum et Christianum,* ed. R. Thomas, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstat, Friedrich Frommann Verlag, 1970, p.61; trans. P.J.Payer, Toronto, Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1979, p.45.

59 Pseudo-William, *Dialogus;* PL 163, col. 1051.

60 ibid.; Gilbert Crispin had done the same in the *Disputatio cum Gentili,* sections 35–7; 57–8; *WGC,* pp.70, 75–6.

61 Odo, *Disputatio contra Judaeum;* PL 160, cols 1103–4.

62 Pseudo-Anselm, *Dialogus inter Gentilem et Christianum,* Berlin, Staatsbibliothek Preussischer Kulturbesitz, MS Theol. lat. fol. 276, 54r–v; see also C.Mews 'St Anselm and Roscelin: some texts and their implications. I. the *De Incarnatione Verbi and the Disputatio inter Christianum et Gentilem*', *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge,* 1991 vol. 59, pp.97–8.

63 Abelard, *Dialogus,* ed. Thomas, p.66; trans. Payer, 50. Abelard seems to be speaking about sin in a less nuanced way than he would do later in his *Ethics,* ed. and trans. D.E.Luscombe, Oxford Medieval Texts, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1971, pp.4–5. This supports the early dating of the text: see Chapter 6, note 67.

64 Rupert, *Anulus,* II, ll. 222–7; ed. Haacke, p.211.

65 See Chapter 8 and my 'Theology and the commercial revolution: Guibert of Nogent, St Anselm and the Jews of northern France', in D.Abulafia *et al.* (eds), *Church and City, 1000–1500. Essays in Honour of Christopher Brooke,* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992, pp. 23–40.

66 See Chapter 6.

67 *Hermannus quondam Judaeus opusculum de conversione sua [Opusculum],* ed. G.Niemeyer, Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Quellen zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters, vol. 4, Weimar, Hermann Böhlaus, 1963, pp.70–2; trans. K.F.Morrison, *Conversion and Text. The Cases of Augustine of Hippo, Herman-Judah, and Constantine Tsatsos,* Charlottesville and London, University Press of Virginia, 1992, pp.77–8.

68 *Opusculum;* ed. Niemeyer, pp.122–7; trans. Morrison, pp.110–13.

69 See my 'The ideology of reform and changing ideas concerning Jews in the works of Rupert of Deutz and Hermannus quondam Iudeus', *Jewish History,* 1993, vol. 7, pp.52–3 where I argue that the location of this discussion should be sought in (or near) Cologne rather than in Münster.
70 *Opusculum;* ed. Niemeyer, pp.73–4, 76–83, 96–7, 103–6; trans. Morrison, pp.79, 80–5, 93–4, 98–100.
71 Rupert, *Anulus,* I, ll. 224–5; ed. Haacke, p.191.
72 ibid., II, ll. 70–3; p.207; Rupert of Deutz, *De S.Trinitate,* XXIX, *In Hieremiam,* 83, ed. R.Haacke, CCCM, vol. 23, Turnhout, Brepols, 1972, p.1635.
73 See Chapter 6.
74 E.g. Alfonsi, *Dialogi;* PL, 157, col. 637; see also Chapter 8.
75 See Chapter 8.

## 8 BODIES AND MONEY

1 See Chapters 2 and 3.
2 See Chapter 6.
3 'Dicitis enim Deum, in maternis visceribus obsceno carcere fetidi ventris clausum, novem mensibus pati, et tandem pudendo exitu (qui intuitum sine confusione non admittit)': *Disputatio contra Iudeum;* PL 160, col. 1110.
4 ibid., cols 1110–11.
5 On Odo's realism see F.Labis, 'Le bienheureux Odon, évêque de Cambrai. Son école à Tournay, à la fin du xi[e] siècle—son réalisme et l'application qu'il en fait au dogme du péché originel', *Recueil Catholique, recueil religieux, philosophique, scientifique, historique et littéraire,* 1856, vol. 14, pp.453–60.
6 C.Dereine, 'Odon de Tournai et la crise du cénobitisme au xi[e] siècle', *Revue du moyen âge Latin,* 1948, vol. 4, pp.137–54. It would probably be worthwhile to use this part of Odo's disputation to explore further the attitudes of people like Odo to peasants and indeed to women.
7 *Disputatio contra Iudeum;* PL 160, col. 1111; cf Matthew 15:11, 17–20. The reference to Matthew in the context of discussing the Jewish dietary laws is standard enough, cf. Gilbert Crispin, *Disputatio Iudei et Christiani, [Disp. Iud.]* 3 in A.Sapir Abulafia and G.R.Evans (eds), *The Works of Gilbert Crispin Abbot of Westminster,* [henceforth *WGC*], Auctores Britannici Medii Aevi, vol. 8, London, Oxford University Press, 1986, p.19. See also above, Chapter 7.
8 See above, Chapter 6.
9 1 Timothy 4:4. This admonition seems in fact to have been originally addressed to Gnostics, Manichaeans and others who spurned the eating of meat altogether (see relevant commentary in the Douay Rheims version of the Vulgate). By Odo's day there had already been some heretics who had been accused of preaching against the consumption of meat (see R.I.Moore, *The Origins of European Dissent,* London, Allen Lane, 1977, pp.30–45 on this element in the manifestations of heresy in the first half of the eleventh century; Guibert of Nogent accuses

heretics of refusing to eat meat: see below, note 14), and one wonders whether Odo might possibly have had them in mind as well as Jews who deem only some animals unfit for food.

10 *Disputatio contra Iudeum;* PL 160, cols 1111–12. The Migne text gives *Nunquid tunc* erat *sensualis cum animalibus, sine ratione cum hominibus?* Berlin, Staatsbibliothek Preussischer Kulturbesitz, MS Theol. lat. fol. 276, fol. 60 (xii) clearly gives *eras.* A new edition of the text would be welcome.

11 ibid., col. 1112.

12 See above, Chapter 4 and also J.Pelikan, 'A first generation Anselmian, Guibert of Nogent', in *Continuity and Discontinuity in Church History. Essays Presented to G.H.Williams,* ed. F.Forrester Church and T. George, Leiden, Brill, 1979, p.77ff.

13 Guibert, *De Vita sua,* I,26, ed. E.-R.Labande, Les Classiques de l'histoire de France au moyen âge, vol. 34, Paris, CNRS, 1981, pp.202–7; *Self and Society in Medieval France. The Memoirs of Abbot Guibert of Nogent,* trans. J.F.Benton, New York, Harper Torchbooks, 1970, pp.115–16.

14 Guibert, *De Vita sua,* III, 17, ed. Labande, pp.428–31; trans. Benton, pp.212–13. See notes by Labande and Benton on the traditional nature of these accusations. See also N.Cohn, *Europe's Inner Demons. The Demonization of Christians in Medieval Christendom,* 2nd revised edn, London, Pimlico, 1993, *passim.*

15 Guibert, *De Vita sua,* ed. Labande, pp.450–1; trans. Benton, p.221.

16 On Guibert's personality see J.Kantor, 'A psychological source: the memoirs of Abbot Guibert of Nogent', *Journal of Medieval History,* 1976, vol. 2, pp.281–304; M.D.Coupe, 'The personality of Guibert of Nogent reconsidered', *Journal of Medieval History,* 1983, vol. 9, pp.317– 29; R.I.Moore, 'Guibert of Nogent and his world', in H.Mayr-Harting and R.I.Moore, *Studies in Medieval History presented to R.H.C.Davis,* London, Hambledon, 1985, pp.107–17; A.Sapir Abulafia, 'Theology and the commercial revolution: Guibert of Nogent, St Anselm and the Jews of northern France', in D.Abulafia *et al.* (eds), *Church and City, 1000–1500. Essays in Honour of Christopher Brooke,* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992, pp.23–40.

17 Guibert, *De Vita sua,* I,17; ed. Labande, pp.138–41; trans. Benton, pp.89– 90; *Dicta Anselmi,* xvii; *Memorials of St Anselm,* ed. R.W.Southern and F.S.Schmitt, Auctores Britannici Medii Aevi, vol. 1, London, 1969, p.174. See my discussion in 'Theology and the commercial revolution', pp.30–4.

18 K.Guth, 'Zum Verhältnis von Exegese und Philosophie im Zeitalter der Frühscholastik (Anmerkungen zu Guibert von Nogent, *Vita* I, 17)', *Recherches de Théologie ancienne et médiévale,* 1971, vol., 38, pp.121–36 and Sapir Abulafia, op.cit., pp.32–3.

19 *Tractatus de Incarnatione [Tract de Inc.],* Introductory letter by Guibert to Bernard, deacon of Soissons, PL 156, cols 489–90.

20 *De Vita sua,* III, 16; ed. Labande, pp.422–9; trans. Benton, pp.209–12. Guibert wrote his autobiography about four years after his work on the Incarnation (Benton, p.233).

21 Sapir Abulafia, op.cit., pp.27–8.

22 The rabbis in fact interpreted Deuteronomy 16:7 as saying that the Paschal lamb should be broiled, not boiled, so that the passage would run parallel to the other passages in the Pentateuch concerning Passover; see *Encyclopaedia Judaica,* vol. 13, Jerusalem, Keter Publishing House, 1971, col. 170.
23 *Tract, de Inc.,* I,1; PL 156, cols 489–91. In II, 1; PL 156, 499 Guibert explicitly links Jewish literal reading of the Hebrew Bible with their unwillingness to understand the Incarnation; see also Sapir Abulafia, op.cit., p.30.
24 *Tract, de Inc.,* I. 2–5; PL 156, cols 489–97. Obviously here too there is material on medieval attitudes towards women; see note 6.
25 ibid., I,6; PL 156, col.497.
26 Both usurers are mentioned in *De Vita sua,* III.19; ed. Labande, pp.450–3; trans. Benton, pp.221–2.
27 *Tract, de Inc.,* III, 6; PL 156, col. 521.
28 ibid., III, 8; PL 156, col. 524; on usury being regarded as theft see above, Chapter 4.
29 *Tract, de Inc.,* III, 3; PL 156, col. 513.
30 ibid., II, 4; PL 156, col. 506.
31 Moore, 'Guibert of Nogent' and Sapir Abulafia, op.cit.
32 *De Vita sua,* II,5; ed. Labande pp.246–53; Benton, pp.134–7.
33 *Hermannus quondam Judaeus Opusculum de conversione sua [Opusculum],* ed. G.Niemeyer, Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Quellen zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters, vol. 4, Weimar, Hermann Böhlaus, 1963; trans. K.F.Morrison, *Conversion and Text. The Cases of Augustine of Hippo, Herman-Judah, and Constantine Tsatsos,* Charlottesville and London, University Press of Virginia, 1992, pp.39–113.
34 See Chapter 6 on the reliability of the source.
35 The *Opusculum* was written about 1150; on dating see Niemeyer, op.cit., pp.47–8 and my 'The ideology of reform and changing ideas concerning Jews in the works of Rupert of Deutz and Hermannus quondam Iudeus', *Jewish History,* 1993, vol. 7, p.56.
36 *Opusculum;* ed. Niemeyer, pp.72–3; Morrison, pp.78–9.
37 ibid.; ed. Niemeyer, pp.70–2; trans. Morrison, pp.77–8.
38 ibid.; ed. Niemeyer, pp.83–4; trans., Morrison, p.85.
39 Herman is following here Matthew 5:43.
40 *Opusculum;* ed. Niemeyer, p.87; trans. Morrison, pp.87–8.
41 ibid; ed. Niemeyer, pp.88–93; trans. Morrison, pp.88–91; Isaiah 11:6.Gilbert Crispin gives the same explanation of this text in his *Disp.Iud.,* 61, *WGC,* p.22. On the relationship between Herman's autobiography and Crispin see my 'The ideology of reform', note 83.
42 *Opusculum;* ed. Niemeyer, pp.94–7; trans. Morrison, pp.91–4. I have argued elsewhere that it is likely that Herman met Rupert in Cologne *after* his stay in Münster and not before. See my 'The ideology of reform', pp.52–3.
43 *Opusculum;* ed. Niemeyer, pp.98–103; trans. Morrison, pp.94–7.
44 ibid.; ed. Niemeyer, pp. 103–6; trans. Morrison, pp.97–100.
45 ibid.; ed. Niemeyer, pp. 106–9; trans. Morrison, pp.100–2.
46 ibid.; ed. Niemeyer, pp.121–7; trans. Morrison, pp.109–13.

47 ibid.; ed. Niemeyer, pp.104–6; trans. Morrison, pp.98–100. On pictorial images of Jewish blindness see M.Camille, *The Gothic Idol. Ideology and Image-making in Medieval Art,* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989, pp.187–9. Chapter 4 of Camille's book discusses many different images of Jews.
48 G.Constable (ed.), *The Letters of Peter the Venerable,* vol. 1, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1967, pp.327–30.
49 See Chapter 6.
50 *Petri Venerabilis Adversus Iudeorum inveteratam duritiem, [Adversus Iud.],* III, ed. Y.Friedman. CCCM, vol. 58, Turnhout, Brepols, 1985, pp.57–8, ll. 562–6.
51 ibid., V, p.125, ll. 6–8.
52 ibid, III, p.42, ll. 23–5.
53 ibid., p.57, ll. 534–52.
54 Peter Alfonsi, *Dialogi;* PL 157, cols 541–67; see above, Chapter 6.
55 It is likely that the abbot of Cluny knew Alfonsi's work, but he must have had other sources for the Talmud as well. On the relationship between the two Peters see *Adversus Iudeorum,* Friedman, pp.xiv–xx and M. Kniewasser, 'Die antijüdische Polemik des Petrus Alfonsi (getauft 1106) und des Abtes Petrus Venerabilis von Cluny (+1156)', 1980, *Kairos,* vol. 22, pp.34–76.
56 On the story about Rabbi Nehemiah (Neemias in Peter's text) see *Adversus Iud.,* V, ed. Friedman, pp. 131–43, ll. 236–685 and Friedman's comments on the nature of Peter's sources and the use he made of them in the introduction to her edition, pp.xviii–xx.
57 ibid., V, pp.150–1, ll. 917–44 and ff.
58 See my 'Bodies in the Jewish-Christian debate', in S.Kay and M.Rubin (eds), *Framing Medieval Bodies,* Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1994, pp. 126–9.
59 See Chapter 5; these invectives also served to refute the doctrine of Christ's resurrection.
60 *Opusculum;* ed. Niemeyer, p.75; trans. Morrison, p.80. Gilbert Crispin's Jew also expressed horror at the sight of a crucifix, *Disp.Iud.,* 153; *WGC,* pp.50–1. Morrison (p.63) suggests that what Herman saw was a double painting with a depiction of the crucifixion in the lower register and a painting of the court of heaven above in the top register.
61 See note 42 on my views on the timing and place of the debate between Herman and Rupert.
62 *Opusculum;* ed. Niemeyer, p.80; trans. Morrison, p.83.
63 See my 'The ideology of reform', pp.44–6; J.H.van Engen, *Rupert of Deutz,* Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1983, *passim.*
64 Rupert of Deutz, *Anulus sive dialogus inter Christianum et Iudeum,* III, ll. 386–96; ed. R.Haacke in M.L.Arduini, *Ruperto di Deutz e la controversia tra Christiani ed Ebrei nel secolo XII,* Rome, Istituto Storico Italiano per il Medio Evo, 1979, pp.234–5.
65 ibid, ll. 306–16, p.232

66 ibid., III, pp.224–6; 229; 232. See Van Engen, op.cit., pp. 148–9 on Rupert's unconventional views on the institution of the Eucharist. Rupert was an ultra-realist when it came to the real presence in the Eucharist. See G. Macy, *The Theologies of the Eucharist in the early Scholastic Period. A Study of the Salvific Function of the Sacrament according to the Theologians c.*1080–*c.*1220, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1984, pp.66–7.

67 E.g. Rupert of Deutz, *In Genesim* VIII, 26, ed. R.Haacke, *De Sancta Trinitate et operibus eius,* CCCM, vol. 21, Turnhout, Brepols, 1971, p.513; Van Engen, op.cit, p.141.

68 J.Cohen, 'The Jews as the killers of Christ in the Latin tradition, from Augustine to the Friars', *Traditio,* 1983, vol. 39, pp.1–16. Cohen points out that in the West before the twelfth century it was only Bede who had stressed that the leaders of the Jews had killed Jesus out of envy rather than ignorance as Augustine had suggested. See for texts *Biblia Latina cum glossa ordinaria. Facsimile Reprint of the Editio Princeps, Adolph Rusch of Strassburg, 1480–81,* introduction by K.Froelich and M.T. Gibson, vol. 4: *New Testament,* Turnhout, Brepols, 1992, p.68 on Matthew 21:38 (cf. PL 162, col. 1433 where a similar gloss is ascribed to Anselm of Laon) and p.309 for a gloss on 1 Corinthians 2:8.

69 Gilbert Crispin, *De altaris sacramento,* 15–16, in *WGC,* pp. 126–7.

70 Pseudo-Anselm, *Dialogus beati Anselmi inter Gentilem et Christianum,* Berlin, Staatsbibliothek Preussischer Kulturbesitz, MS Theol. lat. fol. 276, ff. 51r-v; see also C.Mews, 'St Anselm and Roscelin: some texts and their implications. I. the *De Incarnatione Verbi* and the *Disputatio inter Christianum et Gentilem*', *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge,* 1991, vol. 58, p.91; Pseudo-William of Champeaux, *Dialogus inter Christianum et Iudeum de fide catholica,* PL 163, col. 1071. See Chapter 3 for a discussion of Anselm of Canterbury's views on the ignorance of Christ's killers.

71 Peter Abelard, *Ethics,* ed. and trans. D.E.Luscombe, Oxford Medieval Texts, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1971, pp.54–7, 66–7.

72 Peter Alfonsi, *Dialogi;* PL 157, col. 573. The similarity between these words and the Jewish anti-Christian invectives concerning Christ is striking. See Chapter 5.

73 Peter, *Dialogi;* PL 157, cols 648–9. Cf. John 11:47–8. See also J.Tolan, *Peter Alfonsi and his Medieval Readers,* Gainesville, University of Florida Press, 1993, pp.19–22 where Tolan states that Alfonsi was the first Latin anti-Jewish polemicist to accuse Jews of deicide.

74 Rupert, *Anulus,* 2; ed. Haacke, p.199.

75 ibid., pp.201–4; *Comment. in XII Prophetas minores. In Osee Lib.* V; PL 168, col. 170; see also D.E.Timmer, 'Biblical exegesis and the Jewish-Christian controversy in the early twelfth century', *Church History,* 1989, vol. 58, p.316.

76 P.von Moos, 'Hildebert de Lavardin', in *Dictionnaire de Spiritualité,* vol. 7.1, Paris, Beauchesne, 1969, pp.502–3; W.von Steinen, 'Humanismus um 1100', *Archiv für Kulturgeschichte* 1964, vol. 46, pp.5–7, 11, 13. On Hildebert see also Von Moos' biography *Hildebert von Lavardin 1056–1133. Humanitas an der Schwelle des höfischen Zeitalters,* Pariser Historische Studien, Stuttgart, 1965.

77 Wilmart proved that only nine of the very many sermons attributed to Hildebert are genuine: A.Wilmart, 'Les Sermons d'Hildebert', *Revue Bénédictine,* 1935, vol. 47, pp.12–51. Our two sermons are 5 and 7 in Wilmart's numbering, corresponding to 100 in PL 171, cols 806–11 and 101 in PL 171, cols 811–14 (repeated as 142 in cols 951–4).
78 Sermon 5; PL 171, cols 806–11.
79 See Chapter 6.
80 Sermon 7; PL 171, cols 811–14.
81 Odo, *Disputatio,* PL 170, col. 1106; Guibert, *Tract. de Inc.,* I,6; PL 156, col. 497; see also Pelikan, op.cit., p.76.
82 Sermon 5; PL 171, col. 81. See my 'Twelfth-century humanism and the Jews', in a volume edited by O.Limor, and G.G.Stroumsa, Tübingen, Mohr (Siebeck), 1995.

## 9 INCLUSIVENESS AND EXCLUSION

1 See for instance A.Cantin, 'Sur quelques aspects des disputes publiques au XIe siècle latin', in *Mélanges offerts à E.-R.Labande,* Poitiers, Centre d'Etudes Supérieures de Civilisation Médiévale, 1975, pp.89–104; B. Stock, *The Implications of Literacy. Written Language and Models of Interpretation in the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries,* Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1983; J.-P.Torrell, 'Les Juifs dans l'oeuvre de Pierre le Vénérable', *Cahiers de Civilisation Médiévale X^e–XII^e siècles,* 1987, vol. 30, pp.337–8.
2 For R.I.Moore's views on these matters see his *The Formation of a Persecuting Society. Power and Deviance in Western Europe, 950–1250,* Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1987.
3 See Chapters 4 and 5.
4 See Chapter 6.
5 *Dialogus inter Philosophum, Judaeum et Christianum,* ed. R.Thomas, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstat, Friedrich Fromman Verlag, 1970, pp.53–62; trans. P.J.Payer, Toronto, Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1979, pp.36–45. Abelard is clearly quoting Romans 4:15, 5:20 and 7:7–10.
6 ibid., pp.62–3; trans. pp.45–7; Abelard has his Jew argue that circumcision is universal because the descendants of Ishmael are also circumcised. In the course of a clumsy argument he seems to imply that the Philosopher too is circumcised (*Dialogus,* pp.67–8; trans. pp.52–3). This is the reason why scholars like Roques and Jolivet have argued that the Philosopher is a Muslim: R.Roques, *Structures théologiques de la Gnose à Richard de Saint-Victor,* Bibliothèque de L'Ecole des Hautes Etudes, section des sciences religieuses, vol. 72, Paris, 1962, pp.261–4; J.Jolivet, 'Abélard et le philosophe (Occident et Islam au XII^e siècle)', *Revue de l'histoire de Religions,* 1963, vol. 164, pp.181–9). The Philosopher, however, reacts as if he is not circumcised at all (*Dialogus,* pp.76–7; trans. p.63). See my '*Intentio recta an erronea?* Peter Abelard's views on Judaism and the Jews', in a Festschrift for Prof. A.Saltman, ed. B.Albert *et al.,* forthcoming.

7 *Sermo in circumcisione Domini [Sermo in circ.]*, ed. V.Cousin, in *Petri Abaelardi opera,* vol. 1, Paris, Aug. Durand, 1849, pp.374–5; *Commentaria in Epistolam Pauli ad Romanos,* ed. E.M.Buytaert, in *Petri Abaelardi opera theologica* I. CCCM, vol. 11, Turnhout, Brepols, 1969, pp.87–90, 93–6, 135–6. On the interrelationship of these two works and the *Dialogue* see C.Mews, 'On dating the works of Peter Abelard', *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge,* 1985, vol. 52, pp.112–13.
8 *Sermo in circ.,* ed. Cousin, pp.375–6.
9 Guibert, *Tractatus de Incarnatione contra Iudaeos,* I,2; PL 156, col. 493.
10 *Ysagoge,* II, ed. A.Landgraf, in *Ecrits théologiques de l'Ecole d'Abélard, textes inédits.* Spicilegium Sacrum Lovaniense, 14, Louvain, 1934, p.182; cf. *Summa Sententiarum;* PL 176, col. 128.
11 Peter Alfonsi, *Dialogi; PL 157, cols 657–60.*
12 ibid., col. 668; cf. Deuteronomy 12:20.
13 Rupert of Deutz, *Anulus sive dialogus inter Christianum et Iudeum,* I, ll. 170–92; ed. R.Haacke in M.L.Arduini, *Ruperto di Deutz e la controversia tra Christiani ed Ebrei nel secolo XII,* Rome, Istituto Storico Italiano per il Medio Evo, 1979, pp. 189–90; cf. Galatians 3:28, Colossians 3:11.
14 ibid, I, ll. 294–310; 675–722; ed. Haacke, pp.203–4; Luke 15:11–32.
15 *Hermannus quondam Judaeus opusculum de conversione sua [Opusculum.],* ed. G.Niemeyer, Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Quellen zur Geschichte des Mittelalters, vol. 4, Weimar, Hermann Böhlaus, 1963, p.74; trans. K.F.Morrison, *Conversion and Text. The Cases of Augustine of Hippo, Herman-Judah, and Constantine Tsatsos,* Charlottesville and London, University Press of Virginia, 1992, pp.79–80.
16 See Chapter 8 on the probable timing of this debate.
17 *Opusculum,* ed. Niemeyer, pp.77–8; trans. Morrison, pp.81–2. There are some similarities between Herman's text and Gilbert Crispin's opening line of the *Disputatio Iudei et Christiani* (sections 11–14 in A.Sapir Abulafia and G.R.Evans, eds, *The Works of Gilbert Crispin Abbot of Westminster* [henceforth WGC], Auctores Britannici Medii Aevi, vol. 8, London, Oxford University Press, 1986, pp.10–11) but Herman expresses himself much more forcefully and to the point than Gilbert. Gilbert's argument concerns the correct observance of the Law; Herman's point concerns Christian attitudes to the selection of the Jews.
18 *Opusculum,* ed. Niemeyer, p.82; trans. Morrison, p.84.
19 *In Evangelium sancti Iohannis,* VII, ed. R.Haacke, CCCM, 9, Turnhout, Brepols, 1969, pp.390–1.
20 *Anulus,* II, ed. Haacke, p.207, ll.76–89.
21 See Chapter 6 on the reliability of the source.
22 *Opusculum,* ed. Niemeyer, p.105; trans. Morrison, pp.99–100.
23 *Petri Venerabilis adversus Iudeorum inveteratam duritiem,* III, ed. Y. Friedman, CCCM, vol. 58, Turnhout, Brepols, 1985, p.65, ll. 835–51.
24 ibid. IV, p.103, ll. 1245–7.
25 ibid, IV, p.109, ll. 1464–71. Muldoon describes well the shock of Christians when they discovered that there were no Christians in the Canaries: J.Muldoon, *Popes, Lawyers and Infidels,* Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 1979, pp.119–25, 132–5.

26 G.I.Langmuir, 'Peter the Venerable: defence against doubts', in *Towards a Definition of Antisemitism,* Berkeley, California University Press, pp.197–208; Langmuir, 'Faith of Christians and hostility to Jews', in D. Wood (ed.), *Christianity and Judaism,* Studies in Church History, vol. 29, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1992, pp.77–92. See also my 'Bodies in the Jewish-Christian debate', in S.Kay and M.Rubin (eds), *Framing Medieval Bodies,* Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1994, pp.132–3.
27 See Chapter 7 for my views on the role Jews played in helping Christians understand the Hebrew meaning of the Old Testament.
28 See Chapter 8.
29 Pseudo-William of Champeaux, *Dialogus inter Christianum et Iudaeum de fide Catholica;* PL 163, cols 1051–2. See my 'Jewish-Christian disputations and the twelfth-century renaissance', *Journal of Medieval History,* 1989, vol. 15, pp.113–14 on some twelfth-century discussion on original sin and its transmission.
30 Pseudo-Anselm, *Dialogus beati Anselmi inter Gentilem et Christianum,* Berlin, Staatsbibliothek Preussischer Kulturbesitz, MS Theol. lat. fol. 276, f. 52v; see also C.Mews, 'St Anselm and Roscelin: some texts and their implications. I. the *De Incarnatione Verbi* and the *Disputatio inter Christianum et Gentilem*', Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge, 1991, vol. 58, p.93; cf. Anselm, *Cur Deus Homo,* II,19; ed. F.S. Schmitt, *S.Anselmi...opera omnia,* vol. 2, Edinburgh, Thomas Nelson, 1946, p.130.
31 Peter Alfonsi, *Dialogi;* PL 157, col. 670.
32 Gilbert Crispin, *Disputatio Christiani cum Gentili,* section 78; *WGC,* p.80; Pseudo-William, *Dialogus;* PL 163, col. 1050.
33 Odo of Cambrai, *Disputatio contra Iudaeum Leonem nomine de adventu Christi filii Dei;* PL 160, col. 1108.
34 Rupert, *Anulus,* I, III; ed. Haacke, pp. 197–8, 232. See also Chapter 8 including notes 63–7.
35 Peter the Venerable, *Adversus Iud.,* V; ed. Friedman, pp.155–9, ll. 989–1200.
36 ibid., IV; ed. Friedman, p.150, ll. 914–16.
37 ibid., II; ed. Friedman, pp.39–41, ll. 823–75.
38 E.g. ibid., I; ed. Friedman, pp.7–10, ll. 90–230.
39 ibid., II; ed. Friedman, p.18, ll. 40–4.
40 ibid., II; ed. Friedman, p.25, ll. 301–5.
41 G.Constable (ed.), *The Letters of Peter the Venerable,* vol. 1, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1967, pp.327–30; cf. Psalm 58:12.
42 *Adversus Iud.,* V; ed. Friedman, p.141–2, ll. 595–620.
43 See note 41.
44 Rupert of Deutz, *De operibus Spiritus Sancti,* VIII, 16; ed. Haacke, CCCM, vol. 24, Turnhout, Brepols, 1972, pp. 2094–5. See also D.E. Timmer, 'Biblical exegesis and the Jewish-Christian controversy in the early twelfth century', *Church History,* 1989, vol. 58, pp.316, 320. The article is based on his doctoral dissertation, 'The religious significance of Judaism for twelfth-century monastic exegesis: a study in the thought of Rupert of Deutz, *c.* 1070–1129', University of Notre Dame, 1983.
45 *Anulus,* II; ed. Haacke, p.222.
46 ibid., II; ed. Haacke, pp.199 and 201–4.

47 E.g. *In Genesim* VIII, 26; ed. Haacke, *De Sancta Trinitate et operibus eius,* CCCM, vol. 21, Turnhout, Brepols, 1971, p.513.
48 *Comment. in XII Prophetas minores, in Amos Lib.* III; PL 168, col. 342.
49 *De Sancta Trinitate, In Librum Psalmorum* 5, ed. Haacke, CCCM, vol. 22, Turnhout, Brepols, 1972, p.1356.
50 *Anulus,* II, ed. Haacke, pp.215–16.
51 *Comment. in XII Prophetas minores. In Osee Lib. V;* PL 168, col. 170.
52 Kenneth Stow's new book deals at length with the history of the Jewish community in medieval Latin Europe: K.R.Stow, *Alienated Minority. The Jews of Medieval Latin Christendom,* Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1992. The book came to my attention after I had researched the whole of my book and written most of it. However, Stow is not especially concerned with the details of the intellectual marginalization of Jews.
53 *Ysagoge in Theologiam,* prologue to Book II; ed. A.Landgraf, pp.126–7; see also my 'Jewish carnality in twelfth-century Renaissance thought', in D.Wood (ed.), *Christianity and Judaism, Studies in Church History, vol. 29, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1992, pp.64, 75.*
54 *Comment. in XII Prophetas minores, in Amos Lib.* IV; PL 168, col. 369.
55 See below, pp.137–8, for Jeremy Cohen's views on the abrogation of *testimonium veritatis* in the thirteenth century.
56 Langmuir, 'Irrational fantasies', section 4 in *Toward a Definition of Antisemitism,* pp.209–98. For a highly controversial suggestion that a causal link should be sought between the ritual murder accusation and knowledge amongst Christians of the ritual slaughter by Jews of their own children during the pogroms of 1096 see I.J.Yuval, 'Vengeance and damnation, blood and defamation: from Jewish martyrdom to blood libel accusations', *Zion,* 1993, vol. 58, pp.33–90 [in Hebrew]. To my mind the case has not yet been proven.
57 Langmuir, *History, Religion and Antisemitism,* Berkeley and Los Angeles, California University Press, 1990, pp.275–305; Langmuir, 'Anti-Judaism as the necessary preparation for antisemitism', in *Toward a Definition of Antisemitism,* pp.57–62.
58 R.I.Moore, *The Formation of a Persecuting Society. Power and Deviance in Western Europe,* 950–1250, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1987, pp.146–52; Moore, 'Anti-semitism and the birth of Europe', in Wood (ed.), *Christianity and Judaism,* pp.33–57.
59 I am not convinced Jews posed such an administrative challenge to the literati; Moore himself admits that there is little evidence for Jews holding positions of authority in northwestern European courts ('Anti-Semitism', pp.51–2). Mark R.Cohen shares my reservations in his newly published *Under Crescent and Cross. The Jews in the Middle Ages,* Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1994, pp.255–6, n. 41. Cohen's book appeared while I was concluding my own.

## EPILOGUE

1 J.Cohen, *The Friars and the Jews. The Evolution of Medieval Anti-Judaism,* Ithaca and London, Cornell University Press, 1982.
2 See list of manuscripts of the text in J.Tolan, *Petrus Alfonsi and his Medieval Readers,* Gainesville, Florida, University of Florida Press, 1993, p.95 and appendix 2, pp.182–98.
3 See for example W.C.Jordan, *The French Monarchy and the Jews. From Philip Augustus to the Last Capetians,* Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1989; K.H.Stow, *Alienated Minority. The Jews of Medieval Latin Europe,* Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1992; M.Kriegel, 'Mobilisation politique et modernisation organique. Les expulsions de Juifs au Bas Moyen Âge', *Archives de sciences sociales des religions,* 1978, vol. 46, pp.5–20.
4 R.I.Moore (*The Formation of a Persecuting Society. Power and Deviance in Western Europe, 950–1250,* Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1987) and J. Richards (*Sex, Dissidence and Damnation. Minority Groups in the Middle Ages,* London and New York, Routledge, 1990) would include lepers in this list. I am not convinced that segregation of lepers in leper hospitals bore as much similarity to the exclusion of Jews and heretics as has been suggested.
5 W.C.Jordan, 'Marian devotion and the Talmud trial of 1240', in B.Lewis and F.Niewöhner (eds), *Religionsgespräche im Mittelalter,* Wiesbaden, Harrassowitz, 1992, pp.61–76.
6 R.Chazan, *Daggers of faith. Thirteenth-century Christian Missionizing and Jewish Response,* Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1989 and Chazan, *Barcelona and Beyond. The Disputation of 1263 and its Aftermath,* Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1992.
7 D.Abulafia, 'From privilege to persecution: crown, church and synagogue in the city of Majorca, 1229–1343', in D.Abulafia, M.Rubin and M.Franklin (eds), *Church and City, 1000–1500. Essays in Honour of Christopher Brooke,* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992, pp.111–26.

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# INDEX

Recurrent terms such as Jew(s), Jewish and Christian(s) have not been indexed separately. These items appear as subentries within relevant entries.