

REMARKS
ON
LIEUT.-COLONEL OUTRAM'S WORK,

ENTITLED
"THE CONQUEST OF SINDE, A COMMENTARY."


" In seeking tales, and informations,
Against this man (whose honesty, the devil
And his disciples only envy at,)
Ye blew the fire that burns ye : now have at ye."
SHAKSPEARE.

" You shall stife in your own report,
And smell of calumny."
Do.

BY RICHARD NAPIER.

LONDON:
JAMES RIDGWAY, PICCADILLY.
1847.





PREFACE.

THE following pages are not addressed to the public as an exposition of Sir Charles Napier's conduct in Sinde, in 1842 and 1843, or a defence against the accusations Lieutenant-colonel Outram has made, in his work, entitled, "The Conquest of Sinde, a Commentary."

Sir Charles Napier has never seen these remarks; nor is he, up to this moment, in the slightest degree aware of my intention to publish these or any other observations upon this subject. I believe, I am the only person of his immediate family, that has read a page of Colonel Outram's work. That officer's rank and position, and the reference sometimes made to his opinions and assertions, as conclusive authority against Sir Charles Napier, induced me to examine it. As I have elsewhere* noticed, it quickly became apparent, that merely to *read* the work, would give no person a just notion of the depths and intricacies of Colonel Outram's controversy.

It is not easy to describe these in general terms, without using language too closely resembling Colonel Outram's, to possess that union of propriety and force which is due to good taste and sound judgment.

The vexing spirit of anger against General William Napier, prevails in his mind even above that of enmity to Sir Charles Napier; and much of his book is, therefore, employed in abusive criticism of the "Conquest of Sinde." General William Napier is in this country; and, if he had any reason to suppose a reply necessary, he can adequately perform that office himself. The notice, taken by me of certain passages directed against his work, it will be seen, is merely to give examples (as they arose in following the pages of the "Commentary") of Colonel Outram's methods of controversy. The charges in those passages were so prominent as to attract attention; and no great

* Appendix.

research was necessary, to find proofs that would expose their motives, and overturn their conclusions.

My object is, to shew that Colonel Outram is not deserving of confidence as a public accuser, or a controversialist. I hope to do this, by laying before the reader a series of cases, taken in the order of his pages, and not extending beyond the first half of his volume, by which it will appear that the original documents—the only authentic evidence before the public—have been suppressed where they should have been produced, that their nature and substance have been mis-stated, their fair meaning perverted, and the integrity of their text corrupted; that, so far from bearing out many of the declarations and opinions in his book, they are inconsistent with, and even in direct contradiction to them; that, although the want of circumspection that belongs to passion may account for, without excusing, several of his errors, yet, in others, the characters of deliberation and device are too plain to admit of question.

Colonel Outram advances facts upon his own alleged knowledge, and refers to papers not produced before the public. It was not in my power to investigate these, as I have done other parts of his work, which could be collated with the Blue Book. Even this authority is imperfect (at least for the purpose of examining his charges), as several letters, referred to, are not printed, and of others, only extracts are given. It is, however, the only authentic evidence to which I can refer my readers; and I hope this will appear to have been done with care and integrity. If mistakes or false judgments have been made, the constant references to the original will enable any person speedily to correct them. Such errors there may be:—for much labour and time were required to trace out the inconsistencies, to disentangle the complexities, and to simplify the confusion of his work; to rectify the false grouping, by restoring facts to their true positions and dates; and, while feeling vaguely that many statements were at variance with matter contained in the original documents, to be forced to spend hours in searching out that matter, before those statements could be conscientiously admitted or denied.

To have given the results of this revolting task in an intelligible and simplified form, is the most I can hope to have done. They, who are sufficiently patient and considerate to examine the whole carefully, will probably be few; nor can I wonder at this, or complain of those who turn from the whole subject with distaste. Some may be surprised at me for entering upon such repulsive investigations; and I can only appeal to their own feelings, on the plea, that

“Entire affection hateth nicer hands.”

The cases are stated in separate sections, so that any one of them may be examined independently of the rest; though, as they all relate to the same general subject, it will be found (by those who read the whole) that the facts and arguments in some sections, will occasionally give greater clearness and force to those in others.

It remains only to give some examples of the temper and language of Colonel Outram's work, that, these being taken in connexion with the actual matter examined in the following pages, the reader may be satisfied, there is enough of passionate enmity to lead to misrepresentation, where the circumstances are made known only through his assertions and on his authority, and too many instances of infidelity of statement, to leave a doubt of his disingenuity. The following are specimens of the terms, and forms of expression Colonel Outram thinks proper to adopt:—

“The *natural blunders* of a man suddenly invested with unlimited powers.” “*Intemperate and unmannerly* as were the personalities indulged in by General William Napier;” “the *inordinate vanity* of the brothers;” “the lamentable diplomatic *blunders* of Sir C. Napier.” “I was employed *amicably* to control, not to *subvert* the Ameers; and did so for three years. Sir C. Napier had *ostensibly* the same duty to perform for his Government; in less than as many months, he *picked a quarrel* with them, and *commenced hostilities*; *drove* them from their habitations; *hunted* them until *compelled* to resist; *hurled* them from their thrones; *sacked* their capital; and *seized their country*!”—p. 27, Com-

mentary. "The gross ignorance of my assailant" (General William Napier). "In these qualifications "Sir Charles Napier was *singularly deficient*," viz. "firmness tempered with forbearance, that delicacy which shrinks from giving offence, and that magnanimity which avoids taking it, a disposition ever ready to put the most favourable construction on ambiguities, and, where punishment is not necessary, to pass lightly over misconduct." "Rude and domineering in his demeanour, prejudiced by anticipation against the Indian character, suspicious and distrustful, even where there was no reason to doubt the good faith of the native princes; and, probably, from this very feeling of his own incompetency to separate truth from falsehood, or discriminate between candour and imposture, &c." (p. 59.) "A quick perception of danger and hostility in Sind, Sir Charles Napier undoubtedly evinced." "General William Napier's topographical ignorance." "Yet Sir Charles presumes authoritatively, and in a style the most offensive." "This was the first act of spoliation." "Sir Charles Napier's arrogant letter." "The principle according to which Sir Charles Napier avowed his intention of acting towards the Ameers, was equally opposed to the dictates of justice, to the stipulations of treaties, and to the intentions of the Governor-General." (p. 80.) "A General exercising a military dictatorship, and spurning every conventional amenity of manners." Sir Charles Napier had, "from first to last, treated them with rudeness and insolent bravado." "Ignorance of oriental character, rather than any clear-sighted view, either of the actual position of affairs, or their probable result, lay at the bottom of his policy. Prejudiced against those with whom he was sent to treat, he mistook violence for vigour, obstinacy for firmness; and, by an insolent demeanour towards a 'barbarous' ally, conceived that he was best upholding the national dignity of a civilized country."—(p. 101.) "His violent and menacing conduct." "The violent and suspicious man (Sir Charles Napier), who was rendering his (Roostum's) life miserable." "Although, in one of his letters, he went through the farce of endeavouring,

"*in appearance*, to dissuade Ali from accepting the
 "Turban, the General longed to confer it on him."
 "This *deliberate* proposal to violate that *just policy*,
 "&c."

Such are some of the phrases and invectives he employs freely, sometimes in a general way, sometimes as introductions to his charges, that the reader may be prepared to accept slight proof, against a man already branded as criminal; at other times, as brief summaries of the cases before presented, so that, if the proofs and arguments be weak or sophistical, the emphatic words, at least, may rest in the reader's mind, as legitimate conclusions.

Many of the imputations, contained in the above expressions, are examined in the following pages; and as they will, I trust, be proved to be baseless, the terms themselves may take their vain flight, and will then, like certain other winged words, probably return "home to roost." It may perplex his readers, to reconcile these descriptions of Sir Charles Napier, with the following words, addressed to him, by Colonel Outram, *at the time* all these evil doings were in progress,—all these odious qualities working out their flagitious ends: "I am too glad of the honour of
 "serving under you, and proud of your friendship
 "and confidence, to require or wish for further advantage, so long as I continue with you." And *of* whom he wrote, *after* these crimes had been perpetrated, that he considered him "the dearest personal
 "friend he had, and would mourn his loss almost as
 "much as any member of his family."—(See App. p. 137).

But, in skilful hands, such inconsistencies vanish. A method of solving similar difficulties was, long ago, described in the following scene:—

"*Harpagon*.—Et cette cassette comment est-elle faite? Je verrai bien si c'est la mienne.

Maitre Jacques.—Comment elle est faite?

Harpagon.—Oui.

Jacques.—Elle est faite. . . . Elle est faite comme une cassette.

Le Commissaire.—Cela s'entend. Mais dépeignez là un peu pour voir.

Jacques.—C'est une *grande* cassette.

Harpagon.—Celle qu'on m'a volée est *petite*.

Jacques.—He oui, elle est *petite*, si on le veut prendre par-là; mais je l'appelle *grande* pour ce qu'elle contient.

Le Commissaire.—Et de quelle couleur est elle ?

Jacques.—De quelle couleur ?

Le Commissaire.—Oui.

Jacques.—Elle est de couleur. . . . Là, d'une certaine couleur.
 . . . Ne sauriez-vous m'aider à dire ?

Harpagon.—He ?

Jacques.—N'est-elle pas rouge ?

Harpagon.—Non, grise.

Jacques.—Hé, oui, GRIS-ROUGE ; C'EST CE QUE JE VOULOIS DIRE.

L'AVARE, Acte V. Scene 2.

The race of "Maitre Jacques" is not yet wholly extinct.

The following are the names of the principal persons mentioned in the following pages :—

Meer Roostum, Chief,	} Upper Sinde, or Khyrpore Ameers.
Meer Mahomed Hoossein, his Son,	
Meer Nusseer, his Nephew,	
Meer Mahomed, ditto,	
Meer Ali Moorad, Roostum's Brother,	
Futteh Mahomed Ghoree, Roostum's Chief Minister.	

Meer Nusseer,	} Lower Sinde, or Hyderabad Ameers.
Meer Meer Mahomed,	
Meer Sobdar,	
Meer Shadad,	
Meer Hoossein Ali,	
{ Sons of Meer Noor Mahomed, who died on 5th December 1840.	

Meer Shere Mahomed, Ameer of Meerpore, who fought the battle of Hyderabad, on 24th March, 1843.

Shere Singh, the Maharajah of the Sikhs.
 Sawun Mull, the Sikh Chief of Multan, or Mooltan.
 Bhawul Khan, the Chief of Bhawulpore.
 Beebruck Boogtie, a Chief of the Boogtie tribe.

REMARKS, &c.

§ 1.

EARLY in his work Colonel Outram writes thus :—
“ A lengthened residence in Sinde, as British Political
“ Agent had enabled me—if I may venture to rely on
“ the expressed opinion of those well qualified to
“ judge—to acquire a practical and accurate know-
“ ledge of the characters and feelings of its princes
“ and its people, qualifications for which Sir Charles
“ Napier has never disguised his contempt.”—(p. 3,
Colonel Outram’s Commentary.)—Having laid this
basis for prejudice against Sir Charles Napier in the
reader’s mind, he leaves it without any kind of proof.
Proofs to the contrary shall however be given, and
the very first, from the *same page* in Colonel Outram’s
book, where he says :—“ The *results of my experience*
“ I communicated to Sir Charles when, in October
“ 1842, on my summary removal from Sinde, I finally
“ resigned into his hands the supreme authority in
“ that province. To the value of the information
“ supplied, he *then* bore very handsome testimony, and
“ did me the honour publicly to express the high
“ sense he entertained of my military and diplomatic
“ talents. We parted from each other with expres-
“ sions of mutual esteem and regard.”—(p. 3.)

Sir Charles Napier arrived at Sukkur on the 5th
October, 1842. Colonel Outram closed his Sinde
agency on 15th November, 1842. Thus they had
been acting together for six weeks, at the end of
which time, Sir Charles Napier’s “ contempt for
“ practical and accurate knowledge” was shewn in the
above manner, as described by Colonel Outram him-
self. On 17th October Sir Charles wrote a long
letter to Lord Ellenborough upon the general policy
required in Sinde. In paragraph 16 he says,—“ I
“ shall keep this memorandum till the arrival of
“ Major Outram, and will request of him to peruse
“ it, that he may give his opinion upon the view
“ which I have taken ; an opinion which his *expe-*

“*rience* of these countries, his abilities, and the high situation in which he has been placed by the Governor-General, all render *very important*. If Major Outram concurs in the opinions which I have ventured to express, they will be *strengthened*; if not, the Governor-General will be made *acquainted with the objections of one possessing great local knowledge*.”—(par. 17.)—“I have drawn up this memorandum entirely on my own consideration of the subject; but since Major Outram’s arrival, which took place when I finished the last paragraph, he has given me every possible assistance. He concurs in all I have said in the foregoing paragraphs, but at the same time he *has added much to my local knowledge*, and in justice to the Ameers, I must, *with this increase of information*, enlarge upon what I have stated.”—(p. 364, Blue Book.)*

On 17th November Sir Charles Napier writes thus to Lord Ellenborough :—“With regard to appointing a commissioner, I should say that Major Outram is the most fit person. He has *more local knowledge than any man here*, and has the most unwearied zeal for the public service.”—(p. 454, Blue Book.) On the 15th January, 1843, in his instructions to Colonel Outram (then proceeding by his direction to arrange the details of the new Draft Treaty), Sir Charles says,—“Should any arrangements strike you, by which all, or any of the parties concerned may be benefited, and which your great experience in Upper and more especially in Lower Sind, renders very probable, you are requested to propose such arrangement to me, that I may, if necessary, submit the same to the Governor-General for his Lordship’s decision, &c.”—(p. 497, Blue Book.)

On 23rd January, 1843, in a letter to Colonel Outram, and with reference to the new Draft Treaty, he writes,—“I have no instructions to give you beyond what my letter contains. I am of your opinion I believe, on every point of a general nature, and the

* “Correspondence relative to Sind.” Presented to Parliament, 1843.

“ details are in your hands. I have sent Brown to you for the following reasons :—if the negotiations are spun out beyond the time you can remain, or if you should be ill, I must have some one *trained by you*, and up to the affair, to carry on the work. I can only have such a successor in one acting *under your instructions* ; and in this serious affair, I do not know any man but him, that I would confide this matter to.”—(p. 17, Supplemental Blue Book.)

§. 2.

In p. 5 of his Commentary, Colonel Outram says, —“ They (the Ameers) had urged much, very much in their own behalf, through myself their only medium of communication with Sir Charles Napier. Their spoliation and imprisonment had been justified solely on the grounds of a treacherous attack made on myself ; not only did *I know them*, with the exception of Meer Shadad, *to be entirely guiltless of all participation, direct or indirect*, in that attack, but I knew further, that to their protection I owed my life.” — Let me here appeal to the reader’s common sense, and ask if Colonel Outram, or *any man* in his position (that of an enemy at the time of the attack on the Residency), is entitled to declare in this unqualified manner, that none but Shadad took any part, “ *direct or indirect*,” in that attack ? How could he know this ? Would the denial of the accused parties themselves be conclusive in the judgment of any reasonable man ?

Let us next see what opportunities he had for examining into this matter.

The attack was made on the morning of 15th February 1843. From that day till 18th war was actually going on. Upon 18th the Ameers surrendered their swords to Sir Charles Napier (all of which, by the way, he returned to them immediately.) On 21st February, Colonel Outram left Sir Charles Napier (see his book, p. 6.) He had thus but three

days for investigating their conduct, "direct or indirect." He neither avers that he did this, nor does he give any proof whatever of the correctness of his unqualified assertion. If he relies on the evidence of the Beloochees (though he states none), is similar evidence to be rejected when in direct contradiction of his assertions?

The following evidence was given on 22nd of October, 1843, by "Peer Budroodeen Moosahib, or "confidential servant of the ex-Ameer Sobdar Khan "of Hyderabad." "On the evening of 14th February, Meer Nusseer Khan moved out and joined this "force" (collected, as he says, on 6th February, near the town.) "Question.—Do you know what strength "the force was?

"Answer.—I did not count them, but it was well "known that it amounted to 30,000 strong.

"Question.—This was on 14th February. What "did this force do the next day?

"Answer.—In the morning an order was issued to "plunder Major Outram's dwelling.

"Question.—Who gave this order?

"Answer.—I know not.

"Question.—What number of men went to the "Agency for that purpose?

"Answer.—Nine or ten thousand men.

"Question.—Who commanded this party, and what "chiefs accompanied it?

"Answer.—Meer Shadad commanded the party, "and by him was given the order to plunder the "Agency; and Meer Nusseer Khan, of Khyrpore, "Meer Jehan Mahomed, Meer Khan Mahomed, "Gholam Mahomed Komriewalla, a Nizamancee "chief whose name I forget, Ahmed Khan Lugharee, "Meerza Bakur, and other inferior chiefs, accompanied him."—(p. 136, Supplemental Blue Book.) Of the above, Meer Shadad, and Nusseer of Khyrpore, were principal Ameer. I do not know whether the other Ameer, Jehan and Mahomed, were of the Ameer's family.

The next evidence is from the memorandum of a

conversation between Meer Gholam Shah, Meer Fuzzil Ali, Meer Bijjur and Lieutenant Rathbone, on 22nd October, 1843.—(p. 139, Supplemental Blue Book.) “The Meers Gholam Shah and Fuzzil Ali, “are nephews of the ex-Ameer Meer Mahomed, “their mother having been his sister: and Meer “Bijjur is brother-in-law of the ex-Ameer Meer “Shadad, his sister being Meer Shadad’s wife.

“*Myself*.—Meer Bijjur, you joined in the attack on “the Residency: by whose order, or at whose instigation, did you do this?

“*Meer Bijjur*.—I joined that attack by order of “Meer Shadad.

“*Myself*.—Have you any objection to stating how “that business commenced, and what part Meer “Shadad acted in it?

“*Meer Bijjur*.—I will tell you willingly. The “way of it was this; but first I must explain how we “three Meers, now conversing with you, stood. I “was in the service of Meer Shadad, Meer Gholam “Shah was in the service of Meer Sobdar, and Meer “Fuzzil Ali was in the service of Meer Mahomed. “Well, as you know, for some days before the attack “on the Residency, there had been a great deal of “unpleasant discussion between the Ameers and “Major Outram; but at last, on the evening before “the attack, Meer Nusseer Khan moved out with his “forces to Meer Futteh Ali’s garden, on the road to “Meeanee. He moved in the evening, the other “Ameers remaining in the fort. The night he moved “out, a large assemblage of Belooch Sirdars took “place at his Durbar, but what was done I do not “know, as I was not there. The next morning, as I “was going, as usual, to make my salaam to Meer “Shadad, I saw great crowds of Beloochees, and “heard they were going to attack the Residency. I “went on to Meer Shadad’s. On going into the “Durbar, Mutakum Moonshee also came in, and said, “the Beloochees were ready to start and attack the “Residency, when Meer Shadad, who was all prepared for battle, jumped up, and said he would go “forthwith and head them. He desired me to go “with him. I had my sword with me as usual, but

“no shield or matchlock, and was quite unprepared for fighting, but of course I obeyed. I then learned that Ahmed Khan Lugharee *had been detached with seven or eight thousand men to attack the Residency, by orders given him the night before, by Meer Nusseer Khan.*

“*Myself.*—What! by order of Meer Nusseer Khan?

“*Meer Bijjur.*—I understood it was by his order given over-night at the garden; but I cannot speak positively, as I was not there. However there were the men ready to start.”.

“*Meer Gholam Shah.*—Meer Bijjur has given a true statement of the transaction.

“*Meer Fuzzil Ali.*—Yes, that is all true.

“*Meer Gholam Shah.*—May I ask why these inquiries are now made? Meer Bijjur has made his salaam, and we hope the past, as then promised, is forgiven.

“*Myself.*—I can have no difficulty in telling you. Meer Bijjur has made his salaam, and has been forgiven; and there is not the slightest intention of molesting him for what is past. The cause of my questioning him is this—Meer Shadad now states that he never headed the party that attacked the Residency at all; that it was the Belooch Sirdars who insisted on attacking it; and that the purpose for which he went was to remonstrate with them, and save the garrison.

“*Meer Bijjur.*—Why this is notoriously untrue; every one who was with the party knows it to be so. What influence the boasting of the Beloochees may have had in first procuring the order for the attack, I know not; I dare say it may have had a good deal, for they talked loudly of what they could do; but Meer Shadad headed the party as I have said, voluntarily, against the remonstrances and the orders of Meer Mahomed; attended throughout the fight, and, after driving out the English, rode with us over to Meeanee, went up to Meer Nusseer Khan, and saluting him said, ‘good fortune attend you, I have gained the day.’

“*Myself.*—What! said this to Meer Nusseer Khan?

“*Meer Gholam Shah.*—Meer Bijjur speaks truth.”

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“Meer Gholam Shah on the morning of the attack, also waited on Meer Sobdar, who *desired him to join in the attack also.** Meer Gholam Shah replied that he was not going to put himself under the orders of an inexperienced child like Shadad, especially as he thought the business a bad one; but, if Meer Sobdar chose to go himself, he would, as in duty bound, accompany him : *Meer Sobdar then laughed, and said that would never do.*†

“This morning Meer Gholam Shah and Fuzzil Ali called upon me, and I took the opportunity of reading over to them the above conversation, taken down on the 22nd inst., which they said was quite correct; on this occasion the *Moonshee* was not present, and on both his aid was not required.

“A. B. RATHBONE,

“*Collector and Magistrate, Hyderabad.*”

Only those parts are extracted which contradict Colonel Outram's assertion, of which he offers no proofs: if he had any, they must have been taken from the declarations of some of the enemy, in no respect more trustworthy than the above persons.

§. 3.

“In spite of the assurances I had given them, the Ameers not present at the battle of Meeanee, were despoiled, imprisoned, and transported. A ward of my own, the youthful Ameer Hoossein Ali—entrusted to me by a dying father, and that father a *staunch* friend of the British nation, for whom I had solicited and obtained the General's pardon, was, without a pretence, condemned to the same fate.”—(p 5, Col. Outram's Commentary).

Colonel Outram does not tell us what these assurances were, nor whether he had authority to give any; but the following are some of the assurances recorded by himself, though not exactly such as he seems to refer to. On 8th February, in a conference with Col. Outram, the Ameers say, “If the army

* *Italics in orig.*

† Do.

“advances, our Beloochees will not be restrained, and we shall be blamed for the consequences.

“*Commissioner.*—(Col. Outram). Do not suppose that the army will be delayed one moment by any assembly of your Beloochees, who, if they appear before it, will certainly be attacked, *and the excuse that you could not restrain them, will be of no avail. As customary in all nations, the Government will be held responsible for the acts of its people.*” (p. 503, B. B.)

Deputies from the Ameers having, on 13th February, said, that they had lost all control over their people, and could not be answerable for what they did, Colonel Outram replied, “that whatever the Ameers said as to the Beloochees being disobedient would avail their Highnesses nothing; that they inevitably would be made to answer for whatever their subjects did in the shape of hostility to the British or plundering the country; that if their Highnesses could not control their people, it would be considered that they were unfit to rule them: and, therefore, it will be at the Ameers’ own peril if their Belooch followers are not immediately dismissed; for that the General would certainly march on Hyderabad with his army the moment he learned that the *Beloochees had assembled in arms; which I had written to inform him of*, on receipt of the message sent by the Durbar, through Mahdajee Moonshiee, this morning.”—(p. 506). “At last, the Deputies said, ‘If you will not promise restoration of the lands Ali Moorad has taken, the Khyrpore Ameers must fight for their bread; why should we be answerable?’ ‘You will not be answerable,’ I observed, ‘for what they do, provided you do not allow them to commit hostilities within the Hyderabad bounds, and afford no aid; if the Khyrpore Ameers are determined to court destruction, let them go out of the Hyderabad territory, and let no assistance be given to them by the Hyderabad Ameers and subjects, in which case, I will pledge myself, that the army will not come to Hyderabad, and that no harm shall befall the Hyderabad Ameers.’”—(p. 507). In a formal answer to the Ameers on this subject, he repeats his warning, that *“if injury is sustained by any subject of the British*

“ *Government to the extent of a single cowrie, your Highnesses will have to answer personally for the same, and it will be of no avail to make the excuse, that your Beloochees would not obey you.*”—(p. 43, Suppl. B. B.)

Also, in another formal notice to the Hyderabad Ameers (p. 44, Suppl. B. B.), he pledges himself, that no injury will befall them if they shew no hostility to the British troops; but that, if their subjects aided the Khyrpore Ameers, he was sure the army would advance to the capital. Special messages were also sent to Sobdar and Shadad, that they would *each be held answerable for the hostile conduct of their people.*—(p. 45, B. B.) It might be supposed that such warnings would be sufficient to shew them their danger, and guard them against incurring it. Nevertheless, all the Ameers were in the battle, except Sobdar and Meer Mahomed Khan; but both of them sent their troops. This is stated in the evidence of Peer Budroodeen, the confidential servant of Sobdar.—(p. 137, Suppl. B. B.) Sobdar sent a message to Sir Charles Napier, offering to betray the other Ameers in the battle, and turn his men against them. This shews he could control them, or thought he could. His offer was rejected with scorn by Sir Charles.—(p. 25 and 91, Suppl. B. B.) Meer Mahomed's letter to Hyat Michin and other Murree chiefs, desiring them, to “collect all their forces of every description, and every disposable person, and meet him (Mahomed) at the station of “Meeanee,” was found on Hyat Michin's person, on 12th February, when he and twenty-four other Murrees, most of them chiefs, were made prisoners, in attempting to ride through Captain Jacob's camp.—(p. 508, B. B., and p. 35, Suppl. do.) This confirms Peer Budroodeen's statement, that “every soul he (Mahomed) could collect” was in the battle.

Colonel Outram gave them “repeated assurances”

that they would be held answerable for even the lesser offence of inability to restrain their troops from hostility. They committed the greater offence of sending them directly to battle. Their treatment was in conformity with their acts, and with the "assurances" Colonel Outram had given them, according to his own statement in the "Blue Book." Did he give them, or any of them, other "assurances" at variance with, or in contradiction of the above? If he did, what right had he to do so? In plain words, would it not be double-dealing, either with the Ameers or Sir Charles Napier? Why does he refer in general terms to some vague "assurances" (of security?) which, he says, he gave, and keep back those of a directly opposite nature, which he has himself officially recorded that he did give?

Though Colonel Outram insinuates that their being "despoiled, imprisoned, and transported," was the mere arbitrary act of Sir Charles Napier, he well knows that the final decision in these matters must have been that of the Government. Colonel Outram says his ward, Hoossein, was entrusted to him by a dying father, and that father the staunch friend of the British nation. This father was the Ameer Noor Mahomed of Hyderabad. For a full exposition of statements by Sir H. Pottinger, in direct opposition to this assertion, the reader is referred to the extract from a letter, given in the appendix—(see Appendix). Colonel Outram professes, in a letter written at the time of Noor's death, to regard him as the friend of the British, but founds it partly on the probability that his last words were sincere, when declaring that friendship, and partly because "whatever that chief's *secret feelings* towards the British may have been, certainly his acts latterly "were all most friendly." And again, "In fact, I am "satisfied that Meer Noor Mahomed Khan *at last per-*

“ceived that it was wiser to cultivate our friendship than *hopelessly to intrigue against our power.*”—(p. 269).

It is to be observed that Colonel Outram succeeded Sir Henry Pottinger, on 25th February, 1840—(see p. 233, B. B.); that on 5th March, 1840, he says, Noor’s constitution “is supposed to be so entirely undermined, that he holds life on a most precarious tenure,” &c.—(p. 236.) Noor died on the 5th December, the same year.—(p. 268, B. B.) Thus his intercourse with him was only during nine months of dangerous and finally mortal disease, while Sir H. Pottinger’s extended over at least twenty months of his previous, more active life. Granting to Col. Outram the right to form, and maintain his own opinion as better than Sir H. Pottinger’s, he has however no right to bring forward, as an admitted fact, what he knew was directly opposed to Sir H. Pottinger’s constant assertions, while at the same time he avoids the slightest allusion to those repeated and emphatic condemnations of Noor.

§. 4.

In p. 17 of the Commentary, he states the “deliberately expressed, written opinion” of Sir Charles Napier, who had “officially acknowledged ‘the high sense he entertained of my zeal and *abilities** in the public service, and of the obligations he personally felt towards me, for the great assistance I had so kindly and diligently afforded to him; thereby diminishing in every way the difficulties he had to encounter, as my successor in the political department of Sind.’” This, by the way, is another proof of the unfounded nature of the disparaging charge that Sir Charles Napier “never disguised his contempt for practical and accurate knowledge” of the Princes and people of Sind. This was early in

* Colonel Outram’s *italics*.

November, just before Colonel Outram left Sind, he having then been in official and personal communication with Sir Charles Napier for about two months. He next gives an extract from Sir Charles's letter to him, on 25th January, 1843, having rejoined him on the 4th January. This extract expresses the writer's sense of the deference and consideration due to Colonel Outram's arguments, and to every thing he might say. These facts being kept in mind, there will be little difficulty in giving its true value to the insinuation that immediately follows the statement of them. "It is a singular coincidence that the discovery of my inferior ability should only have been made *after* Sir Charles Napier was aware that I had found it necessary, in the discharge of an imperative duty, to advocate the cause of the Ameers, and in so doing to condemn the policy he had adopted."—(p. 18.)

Though this passage is intended to charge Sir Charles Napier with being moved to this opinion by spleen and mortification, yet it seems not altogether unreasonable that he should think less highly of the ability of a person, who condemned the policy which, in a most critical and arduous state of public affairs, he had deliberately adopted. In his desire to impute personal and unworthy motives to Sir Charles Napier, Colonel Outram has fallen into a dilemma. Let us suppose his charge true, then, inasmuch as early in November, and again on the 25th January following, Sir Charles Napier still thought highly of his abilities, it follows *that up to that period* Colonel Outram did not "find it necessary, in the discharge of an imperative duty, to advocate the cause of the Ameers, and in so doing to condemn the policy he (Sir Charles) had adopted." If, on the other hand, he did so condemn this policy, Sir Charles Napier's high opinion of him, up to the 25th January, shews his total freedom from the base motives of personal spleen attributed to

him, since he endured all the opposition, and still praised and honoured the man who made it. The difficulty cannot be evaded by saying Colonel Outram refers to statements made to the Indian and Home Governments, because he says, that he had told Sir Charles he would state his objection *to them*. His words are, "In making the revelations which I did to the Home Authorities, I only gave effect to intentions of which I had long before apprized Sir Charles Napier."—(p. 6, Commentary.)

Thus, while in *Sinde* he opposed and condemned Sir Charles Napier's policy, and upon leaving that country said he would follow up this course in England; yet up to the 25th January, hardly a month before Colonel Outram finally left the country, Sir Charles had shewn neither anger nor disrespect towards him, as his letter proves; and when they finally parted on the 21st February, they did so, as Colonel Outram tell us, "with assurances of mutual regard. He expressed himself of me both orally and in writing in the warmest and strongest language."—(p. 6.)*

§. 5.

"So far from Sir Charles Napier's political responsibility, when he took charge of my office, exceeding that which I had laid down, it was then reduced to the political control of *Sinde alone*,† whereas I had had to maintain, in *addition*† to that charge, a strict control over the kingdom of Kelat, the state of Luss, and the independent Murree, Boogtie, Jukrahee, and other mountain tribes; and had also to conduct the direct revenue management of the provinces of Cutchee and Shahl besides."—(p. 25. Comm.) These terms "to maintain a strict control" over distant states and independent tribes, do not convey any very accurate notion of the extent or

* See more in the Appendix on this point.

† Italics in original.

labour of such offices. If they mean only, that he was to watch and maintain diplomatic relations with them, Sir Charles Napier could hardly be exempt from similar duties. I do not, however, pretend to judge of the relative importance of their several functions; but I do not find, in either of the Blue Books, despatches or documents shewing that any extensive or very laborious transactions with any of these states were carried on. Colonel Outram became political agent for *Lower Sinde only*, in February, 1840, on the retirement of Sir H. Pottinger. On the death of Mr. Ross Bell, Colonel Outram was appointed, in August, 1841, to be "Political Agent in Sinde and Beloo-chistan," "and the political charge at Quetta was "made subordinate to him."—(p. 305, B.B.) Sir Charles Napier arrived in Sinde early in September, 1842, and superseded Colonel Outram at once. Thus the whole career of the latter, as Political Agent, extended over but two years and seven months, during which time he was for one year and a half Political Agent in *Lower Sinde only*, and Political Agent over the *whole* only for thirteen months. He writes, on the 26th June, 1842, one year after his appointment over the whole, "however of this I am not certain, having "had *little personal experience in Upper Sinde*." In this book he says I was employed *amicably* to control, not to *subvert*, the Ameers, and did so for *three years*. (p. 27.)

He states that Sir Charles Napier's authority was reduced to the political control of *Sinde alone*.*

The Governor-General's letter to Sir Charles Napier says, "You will now proceed, as soon as you can do so, to that Port (Kurrachee), and assume the "command of all the troops in *Sinde and Beloochistan*. "Within the limits of your military command, you

* The Italics are Colonel Outram's.

“ will exercise *entire authority* over all political and “ civil officers.”—(p. 352, B.B.) The whole matter is of no great moment, but is given as one of the many instances I shall bring forward to shew the loose and inaccurate statements Colonel Outram makes, though not only the authentic documents in the Blue Book were before him, but that he must also, from his own official position and career, and independently of the Blue Book, have known such statements to be incorrect.

§. 6.

In reply to General Wm. Napier's remark, that the new treaty proposed by Colonel Outram, in June, 1841, (about two months before Sir Charles Napier had been ordered to Sind), was of an “ aggressive” character, he states the general grounds upon which he thought such new treaty necessary—the just and fair principles upon which he framed it, and his confidence, that the consent of the Ameers to it could be easily obtained. He says, “ The aggressive spirit of my “ views will be best appreciated by placing them in contrast with the forbearance of his brother,” (*i.e.* Sir Charles Napier.)—p. 23. Com. I shall therefore give his views as described by himself in his *present work*, and as described by himself in his despatches *at the time*, and perhaps this comparison may prove, as useful to the reader's judgment as the contrast *he* proposed.

After stating the nature of the prior treaties, and certain general objections he entertained to some of their provisions, he proceeds thus—“ During my incumbency (as Political Agent in Sind), I observed “ that the treaties then in force, were far from satisfactory, both as less explicit and less favourable to “ both parties than they might be rendered. The “ defects I pointed out, and the required remedies I “ suggested. The existence of the former was re-

“cognized by those in power, and the latter were
“acknowledged to be alike suitable and adequate.”—
(p. 30, Com.)

He then enumerates various events which had occurred, and matters of general policy, which might cause the defects in the treaty to ripen into mischief. “Ambiguities which formerly were productive of
“inconvenience might, under our altered circumstances, lead to more serious evils, and on every view
“of the case, it became advisable to remodel our
“treaties with the Ameers of Sinde, as well for our
“own immediate benefit, as to enable us to exert a
“beneficial control over that country. To strengthen
“our military position by obtaining territorial possession of Kurrachee and Sukkur Bukkur—the sites of
“our two camps: totally and beyond cavil to abrogate
“the river tolls, thereby unfettering commerce, and
“removing a prolific source of misunderstanding
“between the Ameers and ourselves: and to procure
“for the steamers composing the Indus flotilla, an
“ample supply of fuel, which by the restrictions then
“existing was inadequate, and likely soon to be
“exhausted, were the principal objects sought to be
“attained in the new treaty. The basis on which
“I sought to frame it, was an equitable one—a fair
“purchase of the privileges sued for—by relinquishing
“the three lakhs and 50,000 rupees, (£35,000) of
“tribute hitherto furnished, and arrears due of considerable amount.”

“Deeming it advisable, with reference to the
“security of our position in Sinde, that we should
“acquire Shikarpoor, and its dependencies, as well as
“Sukkur Bukkur, I tendered this, as an alternative
“suggestion, adding, that were it adopted, Kurrachee
“and our river relations must be left as they were.
“Either arrangement I considered just; to exact more
“than the *one* or the *other* in consideration of the
“pecuniary value tendered, would be, I considered,
“*unjust*. Yet this is the proposition which the
“General (Wm. Napier) characterises in the quotation already given from p. 99, as ‘quite in the
“‘aggressive spirit of Lord Auckland’s policy.’”
—p. 31, &c.

I believe this statement, in Colonel Outram's own words, is sufficient to convey a clear general idea of the principles of his treaty, as he *now* describes them; and of its feasibility;—to obtain concessions essential to our own security, and favourable to “the amelioration of the people of Sind;”—to obtain these, not by force but, by just and equitable agreements with the Ameers;—and lastly, that this proposed revision of the treaty might be easily carried into effect. The political prudence, of the proposed measures, forms no part of the inquiry towards which these remarks are directed; but as their equity and the ease with which they could be effected, imply the free assent of the Ameers to them, I shall shew how far the documents written at the time, and some passages even in Colonel Outram's present work, establish that presumption.

In his letter, 20th June, 1842, (when suggesting the settlement of a disputed interpretation of an article in Lord Auckland's treaty, respecting tolls on the Indus) he thinks the remission of all tolls might be easily attained by the remission of tribute due *to* us, and the payment, in certain cases, of money *by* us, and proceeds thus: “what amount of compensation would be fair, I am not able to say, but whatever portion of the tribute the Governor-General may please so to bestow on them, will be greedily accepted, and the deed readily subscribed by the Ameers who now pay tribute; but there are others, Meer Sobdar Khan of Hyderabad, and Meer Roostum Khan and Ali Morad of Khyrpore, who pay no tribute; consequently a money payment to them would be required, equal to the amount of tribute remitted to others; *unless in the mean time they have become amenable to punishment by conviction of intrigues against our power, which would authorize the dictation of our own terms; but although Meer Roostum probably will be convicted, together with Meer Nusseer Khan of Khyrpore, and Meer Nusseer Khan of Hyderabad*

“*of treasonable practices*, I do not think Meers Ali Morad and Sobdar Khan, will be so.”—(p. 339, B. B.)

These anticipations appear strange when proceeding from a man about to propose a treaty, whose “basis” he *now* tells us was “an equitable one,” a *fair purchase* of the *privilege sued for* (p. 32,) “an *equitable purchase*.” (p. 45.)

It can hardly be supposed that I should find in Colonel Outram’s letters or treaty, direct admissions that the latter was not just or equitable; but if I can shew that this treaty was by no means satisfactory to the Ameers, or likely to obtain their assent, except under the pressure of fear and hostile movements, the justice and equity of it, as *now* described, become doubtful. Colonel Outram says, he “considered it just” to possess ourselves, under the new arrangement, of *either* Shikarpore or Kurrachee; “to exact more than the *one* or “the *other*, in consideration of the pecuniary value tendered, would be, I considered, unjust.”—(p. 32, Commentary). Subsequently, he writes—“*In addition to the terms proposed by my Draft Treaty*, Lord Ellenborough desired that those Ameers, against whom the evidence of inimical designs were strongest, should be punished by depriving them of a *small portion of their territory*, and that this should be added to the dominions of Bhawul Khan, an ally whose conduct was deemed deserving of reward. The *justice* of this could not be disputed, and in conformity with instructions received to that effect, I submitted, on 26th June, 1842, an arrangement by which Subzulcote, which had recently been wrested from Bhawul Khan, should be restored to him. This transference was at the expense of Meer Nusseer Khan of Hyderabad, and the Ameer of the same name of Khyrpore, the chiefs who had rendered themselves most amenable to punishment. To this his Lordship afterwards added Bhoong Barra, of which Bhawul Khan had also been despoiled, and which was in the possession of Meer Roostum Khan. This also *I considered reasonable*, as the forfeited property bore but a fair proportion to the fine imposed on Nusseer Khan”—(p. 42).

Thus, to his "*just and equitable purchase*," two new conditions for the cession of territory by the Ameers were added, on the express grounds of *punishment for inimical designs*, and both are approved of as *just and reasonable* by Colonel Outram. If the first terms he proposed were really such, then these additions were *unjust*. It is quite possible that punishment may be just, though very unpalatable to the criminal; but the person, who claims credit for proposing only an *equitable purchase*, seems to have forgotten himself, when he says it is just and reasonable to introduce two penal clauses into a free contract. Further, he says that the possession of Kurrachee and Sukkur, and undisputed freedom of the river, "would be *cheaply purchased* at the cost" of the various remissions of tribute he advised, (p. 340) but, nevertheless, he thinks that two penal clauses for the cession of territory in favour of ourselves, might be added, without impairing the justice or reasonableness, of this originally *cheap purchase*.

While reading the various extracts from Colonel Outram's despatches, written at the time and containing his own views, and his reasons for those views, the reader is requested to direct his attention to the three following considerations: viz.

1st. The nature and strength of the Ameers' objections to several of the conditions of this proposed treaty,—this "*equitable purchase*."

2nd. The grounds (namely, the inimical conduct of some of the Ameers) upon which he assumed the right, to a certain extent, to dictate such of those conditions as were disagreeable.

3rd. The means by which he proposed to effectuate this "*equitable purchase*."

These three considerations are so mingled together

in the passages cited, that it is necessary thus previously to point out their distinct nature, that they may not be overlooked, and because they disclose the real character and aspect of the treaty, at the time.

“ With respect to the first arrangement, (the farming of Shikarpoor), the principal difficulty is the objections now raised by the Hyderabad Ameers to the transfer of Shikarpoor, and that, were their share transferred, three-sevenths still would belong to the Ameers of Khyrpore. I doubt not, however, that Meer Nusseer Khan of Hyderabad, the principal party concerned, *would be too glad to fulfil his previous engagement, when he sees our armies returning in full strength from Affghanistan*, and conscious, as he is, that he has rendered himself *amenable to punishment by his late treacherous proceedings*; and in that case the others would follow his example, especially if Meers Roostum Khan and Nusseer Khan of Khyrpore are also implicated. The obstacles to the second are, the extreme jealousy with which all the Ameers of Hyderabad will view our desire to obtain *the cession of Kurrachee, which I question whether they ever could be brought willingly to consent to, unless under the circumstances just noticed*; one of the Ameers, Meer Sobdar Khan, who owns a fourth share of Kurrachee and pays no tribute, would require pecuniary compensation, equal in value to the remission in tribute to the others.”—(p. 340, B.B.) The “circumstances just noticed” are clearly, the consciousness of guilt, and “*our armies returning in full strength from Affghanistan.*”

It will be seen by subsequent quotation, that this is not a forced interpretation; and that Colonel Outram did then look to the army, as the principal means of persuading the Ameers to assent to his “equitable purchase.”

In the 9th paragraph of his despatch (same page) will be found the passage already alluded to, viz.: that the possession of Kurrachee and Sukkur, and undisputed freedom of the river “certainly would be cheaply

“purchased at the cost” of the remission of tribute proposed : “at this price I should hope there will be little difficulty in effecting the arrangement, or, on the other hand, acquiring Shikarpore and its dependencies, together with Sukkur, but leaving Kurra-chee and our river relations as at present ; *more*, however, than either the one arrangement or the other, *could not, I believe, be accomplished at the price.* “*I am calculating, moreover, on our having acquired the right to dictate to some of the principal Ameers to facilitate the arrangement.*”

Here I must refer to Colonel Outram’s work. (p. 33) He says, “and while I think I have sufficiently vindicated the suggestion made by me, against the charge of being aggressive or unjust, I trust I may also plead, that I must also have had strong grounds for believing it to be safe and practicable.”* He afterwards proceeds, “Nor is there the least reason to doubt that these terms if then proposed, would have been readily assented to. On 20th June, 1842, I officially reported as follows :—‘if I am allowed to communicate with the Ameers on the above grounds, I anticipate little difficulty in satisfactorily concluding the arrangements desired by his Lordship, before the army returning from Affghanistan passes through Sinde.’” And here he ends the quotation, mentioning the return of the army rather as marking a period of time, than as bearing on the negotiation. Now, instead of a full stop at the word ‘Sinde,’ in the B. B. there is a semicolon, and the remaining member of the sentence is as follows : “*otherwise it may be impracticable to induce the Ameers to concede what is required on the mere ground of mutual advantage, for scarcely any return would induce them to waive their prejudices against making over Kurrachee, and allowing any infringement on their Shikargahs.* With respect to the article in the proposed treaty, which relates to the Shikargahs (hunting preserves), I have to explain that the Ameers are so *extremely tenacious*

* He had been informed that he was to be Envoy to the States of the Indus, and therefore the responsibility of maintaining our power and commerce would devolve upon himself.

"of them, that nothing that could be required of their Highnesses, would be more grating to their feelings than the encroachment thereon, which the stipulation, in the 5th article of the proposed treaty involves; but in order to keep up steam communication, the supply of fuel which it secures, is absolutely indispensable," &c.—(p. 341, B. B.) After stating various reasons to shew the propriety of this measure, and suggesting regulations to render it less obnoxious, he proceeds thus:—"This article will be more unpalatable to the Ameers personally, than any of the others, but not to their subjects, whose river traffic would be so greatly facilitated, besides being rendered safer; and I would submit, that their Highnesses' selfish feelings on this subject ought not to obstruct a measure of such general public benefit, and vitally necessary for the continuance of steam navigation on the Indus, which measure, *this may be the only opportunity* for effecting, that may occur for years to come."—(p. 342, B. B.) The reader will keep in mind, that the return of our armies "in full strength from Affghanistan" created this opportunity.*

Colonel Outram, in his book, represents the intrigues of the Ameers as "puerile"—that with one exception, "they were of a petty character, such as ever abound at Oriental Courts;" and says, that, "strictly just and favourable to the Ameers, as were the proposed terms," he was still "well aware, that unless good ground was shewn for interfering with the previous treaties of 1839, those chiefs would not consent to any alteration thereof, &c."—(p. 35, Comment.) He then explains the use he proposed to make of those intrigues. "I accordingly, in my despatch 21st of June, thus expressed myself. 'I respectfully premise, that I think it would be necessary to shew, as a ground for requiring new arrangements, that we have of late been exposed to the

* In April, 1842, when proposing some other "stringent measures," he states the prudence of waiting for a favorable opportunity "probably when our troops are about to return from above the Passes."—(p. 428, B. B.)

“ ‘inimical intrigues of some of the Ameers, that, “ ‘therefore, we are called upon to demand such “ ‘arrangement as will ensure security for the future, “ ‘to our power, and to commerce, which, as at present “ ‘situated, is liable to be interrupted.’ It was therefore, merely with a view to facilitate negotiations, “ ‘for what I deemed *really* necessary, and *no more than just,** that I availed myself of the intrigues “ ‘in which some of the Ameers had become involved, “ ‘but which otherwise would have been unworthy of “ ‘notice.’”—p. 36.

Accepting this statement for the sake of argument, it involves these points,—that Colonel Outram reported to the Governor-General intrigues which, at the time, he considered to be “ ‘puerile,” “ ‘of a petty character,” and in themselves unworthy of notice ; surely this was neither fair nor just ?

Next, that he was willing, for the purpose of aiding his negotiations with the Ameers, to urge frivolous charges against them, as if they were substantive offences.

And lastly, that a treaty, requiring such diplomatic management in his negotiation, could not be exactly the “ ‘*just and fair—the equitable purchase,*” he now describes it to be.

In further proof of the propriety and discretion with which his diplomacy was conducted, he says : “ ‘On 21st June, I therefore expressed myself as “ ‘follows ; and I request attention to the subjoined “ ‘extract, as confirming what I have stated as to “ ‘the extent to which I thought it either advisable “ ‘or justifiable, to avail ourselves of those charges of “ ‘intrigue or double-dealing, with which some of the “ ‘Ameers appeared to be chargeable.’”—(p. 37, Comm.)

The evident design of this part of his present work, is to impress generally on the reader’s mind, that the intrigues charged against the Ameers, were of a light

* These Italics are Colonel Outram’s.

and unimportant character, and not causing alarm, except "when our disasters in Affghanistan took place;" that at all other periods they might be easily frustrated, and though available as matter for reproof, were not otherwise deserving of notice. I, also, request the reader's attention to the extracts I have given from the Blue Book, and his consideration, whether this view of the case can be established, consistently with those extracts, which shew that he held the intrigues to be such as to justify the imposition of hard conditions, and even forfeiture of territory: and especial attention is requested to the following extract, as given by him, to shew the mode in which Colonel Outram uses the documentary evidence, to support his present views.

COLONEL OUTRAM'S EXTRACT.

"The evidence which I have already submitted to Government, even if deficient in legal proof, gives, I consider, sufficient data for suspecting that intrigues were in progress,* [and for]† taking the precautions necessary for self-preservation."‡

"These considerations would, I should suppose, justify the dictation of our own terms to the Ameers, *although generously, at the same time, relinquishing for ever, as an equivalent for what we justly assumed the right to demand, all pecuniary claims we possess on them, and even making up to such chiefs as we have no claims against, what we estimate they may sacrifice pecuniarily by the arrangement.*"§ (p. 38, Comm.)

Words in the Blue Book omitted by Colonel Outram.

* "To overthrow our power, and to authorize consequently our now, &c."

† The words "and for" are not in the B. B. but are inserted to make the passage grammatical, after the suppression of the above part of the sentence.

‡ The following words are omitted after the words "self-preservation," viz. "and it cannot be denied, that, as at present situated in Sindh, our military positions are insecure, and our communications liable to be cut off." Then comes the passage, "These considerations," &c. (p. 341, B. B.)

I now leave it to the reader's consideration whether the words omitted do not express both the *hostility* of the Ameers, and the *actually impending danger of our*

§ Italics are Colonel Outram's.

position, much more pointedly than the extract Colonel Outram has given ; and whether the omission of those words does not betray his consciousness, that it would not be safe, (without suppressing them) now to treat lightly, intrigues, which his own words had *formerly* described as involving so much hostility and danger ; and, lastly, whether the insertion of the words, “ and “ for,” to make the sentence correct, does not mark the deliberate character of this proceeding? If the words were immaterial, their omission can hardly be justified on the ground of brevity, for they are but thirty-five in all ; if material (as I contend), is such omission to be excused on any honest ground?

§. 7.

“ At no time, however, were the intrigues referred
 “ to universal ; and the parties implicated were so in
 “ very different degrees, many of the Ameers being en-
 “ tirely innocent. Meer Nusseer Khan of Hyderabad,
 “ is represented, throughout the Blue Book, as having
 “ been one of the most active in intrigues from first to
 “ last ; and therefore justly amenable to a greater de-
 “ gree of punishment than the others, should punitive
 “ measures be had recourse to. In the treaty which
 “ I drew up, no penal clause was actually introduced ;
 “ but I should not have been unwilling, at the time,
 “ to inflict some punishment on this chief. Believing
 “ that sufficient proof was at hand to substantiate all
 “ the charges brought against him, I wrote (324, 1st
 “ B. B.): ‘ I should not be sorry to afford Govern-
 “ ‘ ment grounds for making an example of Nusseer
 “ ‘ Khan ;’ adding, ‘ One such example would effec-
 “ ‘ tually *deter the other chiefs of this country from*
 “ ‘ *plotting in future.*’* Yet General Napier, quoting
 “ a *portion of my words*, describes me, at p. 103, as
 “ exhibiting the warmth of a partisan, and ‘ diligently
 “ ‘ collecting proofs, &c.,’ leading the reader to infer
 “ that I included the other Ameers in my penal recom-
 “ mendations, and neglecting to add, that *my treaty*

* Colonel Outram’s italics.

“ did not seek to punish even Meer Nusseer. Meers
 “ Roostum Khan and Nusseer Khan of Khyrpore,
 “ were suspected to be concerned in hostile intrigues,
 “ but to a less extent. Roostum, although not per-
 “ sonally culpable, was politically answerable for the
 “ conduct of his minister, Futteh Mahomed Ghoree ;
 “ but his former acts of friendship towards us, gave
 “ him strong and unquestionable claims on the for-
 “ bearance of the British Government.* Meers Ma-
 “ homed Khan and Shadad of Hyderabad, were very
 “ slightly, if at all, implicated ; and, of the remaining
 “ Ameers, Meer Mahomed of Khyrpore (whose
 “ fort of Emaum Ghur we destroyed), Hoossein Ali,
 “ and Sobdar Khan of Hyderabad, *not one had been*
 “ *even accused of a single hostile or unfriendly act.*†
 “ The latter, on the contrary, had proved himself the
 “ fast friend of the British from our first entry into
 “ Sinde.”—(P. 38-9, Commentary.)

Before citing the passages in the Blue Book respect-
 ing these Ameers, which will place their hostility in a
 stronger light than Colonel Outram now thinks fit to
 allow in his book, I must observe, that his own quota-
 tion, from p. 324, B. B., is given as if, after the words,
 “ Nusseer Khan,” the sentence went on thus, “ one
 “ such example,” &c. ; but he, in fact, suppresses
 words which occur between, viz. “ whose *restless, in-*
 “ *triguing disposition*, and whose hatred of the Ferin-

* Colonel Outram here puts a note, viz. “ That chief’s hitherto
 “ uniform friendship to the British Government, may fairly entitle
 “ him to more lenient treatment for his recent infidelity, than is due
 “ either to Meer Nusseer Khan of Hyderabad, whose intrigues, &c.,
 “ or to his namesake of Khyrpore.” (See Despatch, 26th June,
 1842, p. 346, B. B.)

He gives this quotation with an &c., instead of the words in the
 Blue Book, viz. “ against the British Government have been *unre-*
 “ *mitting from first to last.*” It then goes on, after the words,
 “ or to his namesake of Khyrpore,” “ whose late father’s hostility
 “ deprived his family of the claim to pecuniary remission and
 “ exemption from tribute, granted to Meers Roostum and Ali Moo-
 “ rad, and whose *own concern in the late intrigues entitle him to*
 “ *no consideration.*” These words do not accord well with the
 tone of his book, when speaking of the Ameer’s intrigues, as
 “ *puerile,*” and *unworthy of notice*, except as convenient make-
 weights in the negotiation for a new treaty.

† Italics are Colonel Outram’s.

"ghees, render him *ever eager to join in any scheme which promises a hope of injury to us.*" The case against Nusseer is so strong in the Blue Book, that Colonel Outram is compelled to condemn him, in general terms, in his book ; but still his desire to extenuate Nusseer's offences betrays itself in this, (as in many other instances), by suppressing the severe and unequivocal language of his own despatches at the time, respecting this Ameer.

Colonel Outram says, "At no time were the intrigues referred to universal." The answer to this is in his despatches of 23rd and 24th of May, 1842, when objecting to the immediate presentation to the Ameers of Lord Ellenborough's letter of warning, he says, "for I fear so stringent a letter, as the enclosure thereto, (the Government despatch) might drive these weak Ameers to their wit's end from fear: *all of them being conscious that they were already guilty*, would very probably be driven by their fears of the consequences, so explicitly proclaimed to them, to commit themselves further."—(p. 319, B.B.) Again: "consequently (*i. e.* on the delivery of Lord Ellenborough's letter) if, *as I have reason to believe, almost every individual chief throughout these countries has been more or less concerned, directly or indirectly, in treasonable plottings*, all would consider themselves compromised, &c."—(p. 320, B.B.)

The reader will observe, that I offer no remarks upon the propriety or discretion of withholding Lord Ellenborough's letter of warning, my object being here, as elsewhere, only to contrast the opinions in Colonel Outram's book, written three years after the events, with the statements in his despatches written at the time ; upon which despatches, Sir C. Napier was, in a great degree, dependant for information, and upon which, his policy and that of the Government must necessarily have been moulded. I shall illustrate the exculpatory tone, now adopted, respecting

these individual Ameers, by some extracts from the Blue Book,—chiefly from Colonel Outram's own letters; but all, from the letters and "intelligence" supplied by his subordinate political officers, and transmitted to Government by himself.

Colonel Outram admits, that the cabals of the Ameers were a source of alarm at the period of our disasters in Affghanistan, and the measures, he proposed at the time, afford proof of the depth of that alarm. He thus writes to Lieut. Postans, 10th Jan. 1842: "Sir,—The Lahore Vakeel's* candour is not " to be too implicitly relied on; of course he will " shew you his letters, but it does not follow that he " will shew you all. He has established a correspon- " dence with the Ameers of Hyderabad also—all in " the most open way—the Ameers asking Leckie if " they should receive his letters, &c. But *I find it " would not be amiss if you could manage to intercept " any of his packets after a while, if it could be done " without suspicion of their having fallen into your " hands. We are fortunately becoming stronger at " Sukkur and Shikarpore daily, or there is no know- " ing how far the Ameers might be excited by the dis- " astrous accounts from Cabool, when the truth can no " longer be disguised. Do not relax in the canals " and other public works; we must shew that nothing " can discompose us down here."*†—(p. 307, B.B.)

He wrote to the Private Secretary of Lord Ellenborough, on Feb. 22nd, 1842: "I shall have intrigues " of some of the more restless Ameers to expose " hereafter, Meer Nusseer Khan of Hyderabad, par- " ticularly, who has been especially active of late."

Same date, to the Governor of Bombay. "I think " we ought to preserve our positions in Sind as strong " as circumstances will admit, during the season when " our communication is cut off, for Nusseer Khan's

* i. e. The agent of the Sikh Government, whose powerful army was then in the flank and rear of our troops in Affghanistan.

† In consequence of this direction, a letter of a secret and suspicious nature from Nusseer Khan to Sawun Mull of Mooltan, was intercepted by Lieut. Postans. (No. 315, p. 308, B.B.)

“(of Hyderabad) *intrigues have been so extensive of late*, that he must see he has committed himself beyond hope of concealment, which may make him eager to embroil others with us, while our troops are occupied at a distance.” (p. 314, B.B.) In each letter, he adds his confident belief that he could nevertheless prevent disturbance.

On 8th May, he says: “I shall have it in my power shortly, I believe, to *expose the hostile intrigues of the Ameers*, to such an extent as may be deemed by his Lordship *sufficient to authorize the dictation of his own terms to the chiefs of Sind*, and to call for such measures as he deems necessary to place British power on a secure footing in these countries.”—(p. 316.) I am not trying to depreciate Colonel Outram’s merits, but only to shew that extensive and dangerous intrigues were going on at the time of our disasters in Affghanistan,—that his own statements aver this,—that such acts as intercepting the letters of sovereigns in alliance with us, and proposing to strengthen our position, shew his belief in the danger he describes. Yet in his Commentary, speaking of this period, he says: “At that fearful crisis no organization was required, less than a deep conspiracy would have sufficed to work results the most disastrous to us. Even their negative hostility, evinced by withholding supplies, would have placed us in a position which it is fearful even to contemplate. But I knew the people with whom I had to deal, and they in turn knew me.”—(p. 37, Commentary.)

What may have been the nature and efficacy of this reciprocal knowledge, thus somewhat oracularly described, I know not; but the above passage surely leads the reader to suppose, that there was not any great hostility or any dangerous cabals against us—that there was no organization—no deep conspiracy—not even negative hostility. What, then, was the great value of this reciprocal knowledge, and where:

was Colonel Outram's merit in keeping peace where war was never designed? If there really were such little enmity, then his statements made at the time were over-charged, and the measures he proposed (intercepting letters, and strengthening our positions,) unjustifiable, or needless; and there was little trouble or merit, in preventing what was never impending. If, as I believe, his statements at the time were well founded, and his own measures judiciously taken, then, evidently, he has now toned down the real case to suit the exigencies of his present deep enmity to Sir Charles Napier.

I now proceed with the quotations. "I await the reply to (of?) Mr. Clerk to a reference, I made to that gentleman, regarding certain *treasonable* letters, one addressed by Meer Nusseer Khan of Hyderabad, to Sawun Mull of Mooltan, intercepted by Lieutenant Postans, upwards of three months ago; and another addressed by Meer Roostum Khan of Khyrpore, to Maharajah Shere Sing of Lahore, obtained by me about twenty days ago, on reporting the extent to which intrigues against the British Government had been engaged in by the Ameeris of Sind and Chiefs of Beloochistan; and the ultimate result will be, I believe, *the conviction beyond a doubt* of one or more of the parties, on which I shall solicit the orders of his Lordship, as to my consequent proceedings."—(p. 319, Blue Book.)

He refers to his own correspondence in January, 1841, relating to the *previous treasonable* correspondence of Meer Nusseer Khan of Hyderabad, the leniency displayed on which occasion renders his resumption of such practices now the more inexcusable."—(p. 321, Blue Book.)

There is next a long memorandum by Lieutenant Postans on 5th May, 1842, to which any of my readers disposed to examine the subject carefully are requested to refer, as disclosing the extent of the conspiracy against the British Government at that time. I give

various extracts from it, but the whole is too long for insertion. It begins thus:—"The following heads of information on certain recent secret understandings between parties in Sinde and Beloochistan, inimical to the interests of the British Government in those countries, *elicited from various sources, and at various times*, are herewith submitted."—"The progress of our measures in re-establishing our supremacy in Affghanistan has been narrowly watched by our enemies in Sinde and Beloochistan; and there can be no doubt, from general report and distinct evidence, that a very general revolt against our influence and authority, would have resulted from any serious reverse or disaster above the Passes."—(p. 322.)

Detailed statements are then given of the tribes and names of chiefs concerned in this "organized system of rebellion" extending beyond Sinde, and who were carrying on secret communications with Shere Mahomed of Meerpore, Nusseer of Hyderabad, and Roostum of Khyrpore, the latter being ruled by his Minister, Futteh Mahomed. A sketch of their plan of rising is given, and "such, as far as the writer has had the means of ascertaining it, is the digest of Brahojee proceedings, bearing of course on our measures, and only kept, I believe, from being demonstrated by the timely passage of our troops to Jellalabad, and other successes of our arms at Candahar, and in its vicinity."—(p. 323, Blue Book.)

The writer then states his reasons for believing that a secret correspondence, hostile to us, was going on between the Ameers of Khyrpore and Hyderabad, and gives the following character of Roostum's Minister; "Of the whole of the Khyrpore Durbar, the most bitter of our enemies, and the most dangerous, because the most influential and able, is Meer Futteh Mahomed Ghoree. This man is allowed by all to be *unceasing in his intrigues*; he is represented as *constantly in communication with the*

“ *Murrees, and other Beloochees, and the Punjaub ;*
 “ as Meer Roostum, in his letters, is made to style
 “ him ‘ his faithful friend, the possessor of his secrets,
 “ and master of all his actions,’ he is, of course, the
 “ organ of all correspondence, using the Meer’s
 “ seal to his own purposes ; *his treachery is no less*
 “ *notorious than capable of proof*, and in the late
 “ scheme he is allowed to have been a prime mover.”
 —(p. 324, B.B.)

A copy of the letter from Roostum to Shere Sing is given in p. 326. B.B., and extracts relating to the communications between Nusseer of Hyderabad and Sawun Mull of Mooltan ; also a letter from Colonel Outram to Lieutenant Leckie, 29th April, 1842, enclosing a letter from Meer Nusseer, shewing Nusseer’s hostility to Meer Sobdar, and his desire to injure the latter with the British Government.—(p. 327.) Colonel Outram proposes to shew this letter to some person not named, “ who, seeing the mean shifts Nusseer Khan is having recourse to, may turn the tables *by betraying Nusseer’s intrigues*, and assisting you to *get hold* of some of his treasonable letters. I do not, however, think the writing genuine,* for it is not in Chotram’s (Meer Nusseer Khan’s confidential scribe) writing, (apparently that of Sadik Shah, son of Syud Ali Shah), however it may answer your purpose with all the same, by pretending a confidence in him, in thus shewing him what he would see no reason to suppose you thought a forgery ; neither would it strike him that it was so, probably, from the casual reading which only you would allow him. I wish you would worm through him the real object of Jan Khan’s visit to Khyrpore, the real ditto of Tukkee Shah’s location at Larkhana, &c. &c. ; also what correspondence has of late passed between Nusseer and the Sikhs.” He then gives a passage from the intercepted letter from Roostum to Shere Sing of Lahore, though he has some doubt of its

* It was genuine, however, and was owned by Nusseer himself, when shewn to him.—(p. 330, B.B.)

being genuine, "as it was procured through a channel "inimical to Roostum." He next proposes to intercept a Cossid about to be despatched, (according to Roostum's letter,) from Nusseer to Shere Sing. Colonel Outram then ends his letter thus: "After effecting "your object with you may then give the "accompanying letter to Nusseer Khan, in reply to "his, saying, that I am convinced it is a forgery, and "have, therefore, sent it for his inspection; but there "is no necessity for any hurry in doing so, and I "should wish you to keep this back until you have "established a raw on under the smart of "which he may disclose what we want."—(p. 327-8, B.B.)

Here again I may observe, that such modes of acting can be accounted for, only by Colonel Outram's entertaining a very strong belief of dangerous intrigues being carried on, by some of the Ameers, with foreign powers. In a letter from "Lieutenant Robertson, superintendant of the Sinde Survey," to Colonel Outram, after mentioning that certain men of consequence had gone to Hyderabad, as "a most unusual circumstance," because some of them "had never been "accustomed to make their salaam to the Hyderabad "Ameers," he adds, "The reason given out is, that "the Ameers wish the assistance of such force as these "petty chiefs can collect, as they are apprehensive of "the Affghans. *I have no doubt but that this is a "blind, and that in a short time that hostility to us "which unquestionably exists throughout the country, "down to the very sea coast, will be openly manifested."**

To this letter Colonel Outram himself, adds a note to say, that Captain Gordon had also given him information of inimical proceedings in the Beila quarter, which is beyond Sinde to the west, (p. 331, B. B.) In pp. 332—337, B.B.) there is a mass of intelligence

* As this letter is dated Sukkur, the hostility would extend throughout Sinde, from north to south.

sent by Lieutenant Leckie, and others, during April and May, giving detailed statements of the extent and nature of the hostile intrigues then going on, of the plans of action proposed, of the names of chiefs and princes out of Sinde, that were in communication with, or influenced by the Ameers, all more or less hostile, and prepared on the first opportunity to act against the British. These statements are too long for citation; but it is to be hoped, those, who mean really to examine this question, will take the trouble to refer to them, before implicit credit is given to Colonel Outram's present views of those comparatively "puerile" and insignificant intrigues. I by no means intend to say, that such information may not abound in falsehood. Colonel Outram now speaks contemptuously of intelligence procured through native agents; but if, at the time, he thought it of no value, why did he employ his subordinate officers to collect it; and why did he transmit it to the Governor-General? A few passages will shew the character of this intelligence. "—— asked me, (Lieutenant Leckie) do you think that the English have a friend in Sinde? I replied, it would appear not, from what he said; he added, rely upon it, you have not, and I do not hesitate in telling you so—*trust no man*.* I put the question about the Ameers (with delicacy) in their intrigues secretly against us. He positively denied that they were.† As I have before written to you, and as you mentioned in your letter of the 23d ult., rely upon it, *they are*." Kumber Khan, a messenger from the Jam of Beila, told Nusseer that the Brahooees had been ready to rise for the last six months. "Preedy writes that the Jam of Beila is most unwilling to act against us, as we have been kind to him, but he has received *orders to have his tribe ready, and must act against us, or be ruined!*"—(p. 334, B. B.) In the preamble to Colonel Outram's proposed treaty, he charges certain of

* Italics in the original.

† So in the original.

the Ameers with “*treasonable correspondence* with the “enemies of the British Government, with a view to “the expulsion of the British troops from Sind and “closing the river Indus,” (p. 342, B. B.) and he charges General Napier with trying to mislead his readers into the idea that he designed to punish the Ameers, whereas he says, “my treaty did not seek to “punish even Meer Nusseer.” If the reader keeps in mind the strong statements made by Colonel Outram as to the reluctance of the Ameers to cede Kurrachee, and to admit of any encroachments on their shikargahs, the right he assumed, on the ground of their intrigues, to dictate to them the terms of his treaty, and the way in which he calculated on “our armies “returning in full strength from Affghanistan,” as the chief means to the same end, he will hardly admit that the treaty did *not* contain penal conditions, or something quite as unpleasant. The preamble charges them “with treasonable correspondence.” He puts forward their intrigues as giving a right to dictate conditions, which are, by his own letters, declared to be so obnoxious that fear and force only are likely to compel assent to them; and yet he regards his treaty as in no degree penal. But further, five days after the date of it he thus writes, in answer to Lord Ellenborough’s wish to have Subzulcote restored to Bhawul Khan, “as it happens that Meer Nusseer Khan of Hyderabad will, I believe, prove deserving of *greater punishment* than “any of the other Ameers, and as, on relinquishing “our views on Shikarpore, there is *no possession of his* “*which we could avail ourselves of*, beyond his share of “Kurrachee, in which he has only the same stake as “the other Ameers of Hyderabad, I consider making over Subzulcote* to the Khan of Bhawulpore a

* This *cession*, and a *further one* of Bhoong Barra, I have before noticed as *additions* to his treaty, or, as he calls it, his “*equitable purchase*,” and yet he thinks them both *just* and *reasonable* additions to a purchase, that had already secured for us all we could fairly demand for the price we were to pay.—(See *ante*, p. 27-8.)

“most desirable arrangement in every respect, as depriving Nusseer Khan of one of his richest districts, his right to rule over which he does not support by just government; as depriving him of a position bordering on the Punjaub, from whence his agents have every facility for carrying on their intrigues with the Sikhs; as placing him more on a par with the other Ameers, consequently *not displeasing to them*, and as *punishing* an unfaithful to the benefit of a faithful ally, &c. &c.”

Again—“Should it be necessary to recompense Meer Sobdar Khan for his share of Kurrachee, *probably one of Meer Nusseer Khan’s shikargahs would content him*; and I consider that thus *depriving the latter of what he so much values, i. e., his superiority over the other Ameers of Lower Sinde in extent of territory and hunting grounds, and at the same time a considerable source of wealth*, would be a sufficient *punishment* for his infidelity on this occasion, &c.” Again, “If, however, his Lordship should determine *on making a more signal example of this chief, by depriving him of his possessions altogether, &c. &c.*”

Of Meer Nusseer Khan of Khyrpore, he says, that he is the sole possessor of Sukkur, “which produces so trifling a revenue, that deprivation of this would be *a trifling punishment*, for his concern in the late intrigues.”—(p. 345-6, B.B.)

All the above extracts were written by Colonel Outram, as aforesaid, only *five* days after the date of the draft of “the substance of what he would recommend.” Colonel Outram has no right to cling to the *mere words* of this instrument. It must be taken in conjunction with his explanatory letters at the time, and from the whole, must be collected the real motives, opinions and principles by which the negotiation was to be conducted. All the conditions proposed or adopted by Colonel Outram may have been wise and justifiable. But now, to assert in his book that *his* treaty was *not penal*, and to accuse General Napier of misrepresentation on this subject, seems neither;—not wise, in leaving himself open to such exposure, and not

justifiable, in now giving a character to his policy which, the above extracts prove, belonged to it neither in spirit nor in letter. The consciousness, that the new conditions, upon which he proposed to negotiate with the Ameers, were of a severe and vindictive nature, is betrayed by Colonel Outram a few pages later, where he mentions the additions (the cessions of Subzulcote and Bhoong Barra) proposed by Lord Ellenborough, as just and reasonable, on the very grounds of the intrigues and hostility of the Ameers against whom the evidence was strongest. On those grounds, Lord Ellenborough required these cessions, and on those grounds Colonel Outram justified these new demands. I hope I shall not be thought to have overstrained these discrepancies. My object is to shew that Colonel Outram had ample evidence of the faithless, intriguing and hostile conduct of the Ameers ; that, *at the time*, he regarded their conduct in that light, and so strongly, as to justify the intercepting of their letters, the imposition of galling and penal conditions, even to the extent of depriving some of them of part of their territories, and the employment of fear or force to compel submission to his terms ; but that *now*, he endeavours to shew there was little or no danger, and that their offences were of a venial and insignificant nature. I think the general contrast is plain and strong, and the motive equally obvious. If the reader's sympathy can be gained in favour of the *erring* and *foolish*, rather than guilty Ameers, Sir C. Napier's dealings with them afterwards (especially as described by Colonel Outram) become more heinous.

Let it be remembered, that when Sir C. Napier went to Sind, he was dependent upon these very documents, and others of the same tenor, for information as to the conduct and character of the Ameers.

Tedious as this exposition has been, I must add a passage from Colonel Outram's letter to Sir C. Napier on 24th of October, 1842, respecting Meer Mahomed Khan of Hyderabad,* whom he had, in June, recommended should be raised to the Chieftainship of Lower Sinde: viz. "but that Chief (Mahomed) has "been so *deeply implicated* in the *unfriendly acts* of Meer "Nusseer Khan, that I could no longer uphold his "claim to the distinction."—(p. 397, B.B.)

Although against some of the Ameers Colonel Outram names, no conclusive evidence was adduced, yet the intelligence supplied to him at the time shews there were grounds for suspicion, that *all* the Ameers were more or less implicated in the intrigues against us—for example: "Shere Mahomed Khan of Meer-
"pore is ingratiating himself as much as possible with
"the Sikhs." "Shere Mahomed and Ahmed Yar
"keep up a correspondence with Sawun Mull of
"Mooltan, and disaffected people in their districts."—
(p. 332, B.B.) In p. 335 do. Meer Roostum having
at first hesitated about joining Nusseer in a treaty
hostile to the British, afterwards "sent a message in
"reply to Nusseer Khan, that he was willing to join
"them in *anything*." After stating that a secret
meeting was held between Meer Roostum, Meer Jan
Khan, Meer Nusseer of Khyrpore, and Futteh Ma-
homed, at which the joint plan of attack on the British
by the Ameers of Khyrpore, Hyderabad, and Shere
Mahomed of Meerpore was discussed, the intelligence
says, "Meer Roostum guaranteed himself to get all
"the Upper Sinde Ameers to join him." "Meer
"Jan Khan said, Meer Nusseer Khan and Meer
"Shadad (of Hyderabad) had authorised him to enter
"into these engagements with him on their parts, and
"after doing so, that he was to return to Hyderabad,
"and get Meer Mahomed, Sobdar Khan, Shere Ma-
"homed, and Hoossein Ali, to sign the treaty." This

* He describes this Ameer in p. 39 of his work, as "very *slightly*,
"if at all, *implicated*."

treaty was, that the Ameers should agree to join their armies against the British. Colonel Outram slights evidence of this nature, and perhaps justly, but then the question returns, Why did he collect it, and transmit it to the Governor General? In the present case, the person who transmits this evidence to Colonel Outram, and appears to be Lieutenant Leckie, adds a note, to state his confidence in the testimony of his informant, both on account of his opportunities of access to the Ameers, and that much of what he stated "was confirmed through various channels disconnected with each other."

The above remarks relate only to the *intrigues* and *hostile correspondence* of the Ameers. The charges against them of *other breaches* of the existing treaty, are a distinct consideration, and shall be noticed hereafter.

§. 8.

In page 40 of his Commentary, Colonel Outram says, "Nor can *I at all admit* that even in those cases "where *I officially preferred or forwarded charges* "against some of the Ameers, they were so forwarded "on the footing that *I myself considered them as war-* "*ranting a conviction.*" This sounds like strange language from a person who was to inform the judgment of another, upon charges seriously affecting the guilt or innocence of third parties. But to proceed with the passage, "My orders (imperative) were to lay "before Sir Charles Napier 'the several acts whereby " 'the Ameers or Chiefs may have *seemed* to have de- " 'parted from the terms or spirit of their engagements, " 'and to have evinced hostility, or unfriendliness " 'towards the Government of India.' In obedience to "these orders, I preferred charges against some of "the Upper Sinde Ameers, and forwarded the mass of "charges, *most of them very frivolous*, which had been "furnished by my assistant at Hyderabad, against cer- "tain of those of Lower Sinde."

Colonel Outram in citing the above passage, after the words, "to lay before Sir Charles Napier," ought to have commenced the extract with the following words in the original, but which he omits "*with judicial accuracy*," &c.—(p. 353, B. B.) Is this mere inadvertency or design? If these words had been quoted, would it have read well to say, that in charges "officially preferred" with "judicial accuracy," he did not himself consider that they warranted a conviction? Did he also suppose that Lord Ellenborough desired to have "*very frivolous charges*" preferred with "judicial accuracy?" The omission of these words by Colonel Outram, makes his duty seem merely ministerial, whereas *they shew* it was intended to be also judicial. He was, clearly, to prefer such charges as, in the exercise of a sound judgment, he believed to be substantial, not frivolous. But further, besides omitting these important words, he omits also to refer to his own remarks on the charges, at the time he framed and placed them before Sir Charles Napier; and whatever his opinion of them may have been, he does not (except in one case) treat them as of little moment, nor, though he enters into detailed explanations respecting some of them, does he say anything to make Sir Charles Napier regard them as invalid.—(p. 369, B. B.) The letter is too long to insert here, but the reader is requested to refer to it, that he may see my account of it is not unfair. His remarks on Captain Mylne's charges begin thus, "I have the honour to hand up "Captain Mylne's memorandum and summary of "charges against the Ameers of Lower Sinde, *which appear to be fairly stated*, and I agree generally in "the sentiments expressed by that officer."—(p. 397, B. B.) Did he really mean by these words to signify a fair statement of charges, "most of them very frivolous?"

§. 9.

In p. 46, Colonel Outram has a long argument to prove that early in May, 1842, he acted prudently in not delivering to some of the Ameers certain warning letters from Lord Ellenborough. He gives extracts from those letters, and the accompanying instructions, to shew that they were “not merely a *warning for the future*, but an intelligible denunciation of *vengeance for the past*, whenever proofs should be obtained of hostile designs; and such proofs the Governor-General believed to be already in my hands, or in course of preparation. Threats like these, affording no *locus penitentiae*, but on the contrary, shutting the door of hope, not only on those who had directly committed themselves, but on all who had indirectly been cognizant of their intrigues, could have had no other tendency than to drive them to desperation.”*

Even the extracts which he gives, by no means bear out this representation. The reader is requested to refer both to those extracts in Colonel Outram’s “Commentary” and to the original letters in p. 315, B. B., and he will see that their tone and language is plainly that of warning for the future only, and not a denunciation for the past. The words are used in a future sense, viz. “to punish, cost what it may, the first Chief who *may* prove faithless, by the confiscation, &c.” “No consideration shall induce me to permit you to exercise any longer a power you *will have* abused.” These two forms of expression are given in Colonel Outram’s quotations, but (as so often occurs) he suppresses the words that follow, for they are not sufficiently in accordance with the representation he makes of the character of these letters. The letter of instruction, after the word “confiscation,” proceeds thus — “of his dominions; but there must be clear proof — of such faithlessness, and it must not be provoked

* Italics in the original.

“by the conduct of British Agents, producing apprehensions in the mind of any Chief, that the British Government entertains designs inconsistent with his interest and honour.” In the letter to the Ameers, Colonel Outram’s quotation ends with the words, “a power you will have abused,” but the original goes on thus, “On the day on which you *shall be faithless* to the British Government sovereignty *will have* passed from you ; your dominions will be given to others, &c.”—(p. 315, B. B.)

In Lord Ellenborough’s letter to the Secret Committee—(p. 316, B. B.) he repeats his intention “to punish, cost what it might, the first Chief who *might prove faithless*.” In the present part of his work, Colonel Outram gives a character of harsh and indiscriminate threatening to the letters, and leaves out most of the qualifying words at variance with that character. But in p. 81 of his work, where the object is to represent Sir Charles Napier as acting upon a principle towards the Ameers “equally opposed to the *dictates of justice, the stipulations of treaties, and to the intentions of the Governor-General*,” he cites against him, the very passage he had suppressed here, as above shewn, and which contains, he tells us, “*sound diplomatic morality*.” Why then suppress it, or its substance in this part of his Commentary, when describing the letters ?

I will take the liberty of answering that question. In exposing what he calls General W. Napier’s “gross ignorance,” and exhibiting his own knowledge and better judgment, the argument requires that Lord Ellenborough’s letters should appear threatening, vindictive, and unjustly indiscriminate in their denunciations. But after giving them, (untruly) this character, it would not suit well to admit a passage from one of them, containing “*sound diplomatic morality* ;” that passage is therefore

omitted in *this* part of his work. But when Sir Charles Napier is to be condemned for injustice and disobedience of instructions, then Lord Ellenborough's "sound diplomatic morality" comes well forward in contrast; his alleged severe and unjust threatening is kept back, though the same letter is referred to in each case. If Colonel Outram, in supporting his arguments, cited passages from any single document, which might nevertheless be modified or contradicted by *other* passages in other documents, it would be but fair to regard this as the inadvertency, to which the most honest controversialist may be occasionally liable. But when he cites passages at variance with other (but suppressed) passages in the *same* document, or directly contrary to its fair tenor and context, this is not, and cannot be, error, but is most unworthy practice.

It must be further noticed, that these *very letters*, *at the time* when Colonel Outram was requesting leave to defer their presentation, were described by him as "the well deserved and very necessary (ultimately) denunciation."—(p. 319. B. B.)

§. 10.

Colonel Outram states, as a gross instance of General Napier's ignorance, the opinion of that officer, that it would have been better policy to have delivered the warning letters, mentioned in the last section, at the time they were sent to him. He cites a long extract from p. 109 of General Napier's work, and says, "The drift of this passage, which seems expressed with studied obscurity, is to convey the impression, that all danger from the effect of the letters to the Ameers would have been counteracted by the effect of Nott and Pollock's operations, then in full activity, and the advance of England's column. Now, the letters, destined for the Ameers, were intended

“to reach them *upwards of two months* before ‘the
 “ ‘operations of Nott and Pollock were in full acti-
 “ ‘vity,’ AND WHILE THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL WAS
 “ REITERATING HIS ORDER FOR RETREAT. So far
 “ from England’s columns being in Sinde or its neigh-
 “ bourhood, ‘to check any farther disposition to hos-
 “ ‘tility’ on the part of the Ameers, that officer was
 “ shut up in Candahar, and *entirely dependent on their*
 “ *friendly aid to enable him to escape from Affghan-*
 “ *istan.*”—(p. 49, Commentary).*

Now, this blunder or mis-statement of General Napier, so triumphantly exposed, as Colonel Outram thinks, will, on examination, prove to be a blunder, or something less excusable, on his own part. The passage from General Napier’s book does not refer, except incidentally, either to the time or the fact of the delivery of the letters. It refers to *another time*, and *another fact*, when “the operations of Nott and Pollock” were in full activity. It refers to *Lord Ellenborough’s answer, rejecting Colonel Outram’s proposed treaty*. This will be seen, by comparing his words with those used by General Napier:—

Lord Ellenborough’s despatch says, “With reference to your
 “ letter of 21st ult. (June), and
 “ the inclosed sketch of a treaty
 “ with the Ameers, his Lordship
 “ does not see any necessity for
 “ *pressing a negotiation upon*
 “ *them precipitately*; and, on the
 “ contrary, would rather desire
 “ *to leave their minds for the*
 “ *present in tranquillity.*”
 “ The Governor-General would
 “ not deem it expedient to make
 “ any reference, in the preamble
 “ to the treaty, to the treachery
 “ attributed to the Ameers,”
 &c.—(p. 348-9, B. B.)

In his letter to the Secret Committee, written a month later than the letter to Colonel Outram, he

General Napier writes thus,
 “ Lord Ellenborough rejected
 “ Major Outram’s counsel and
 “ treaty, and condemned the
 “ *offensive tone of the pream-*
 “ *ble.*” “He desired that the
 “ *Ameers’ minds should be left*
 “ *tranquil*, and disclaimed any
 “ intention of making *hasty*
 “ *changes in his political rela-*
 “ *tions with them.*”—(p. 108-9,
 Conquest of Sinde.)

The matter of General Napier’s passage, given in nearly Lord Ellenborough’s words, marks the fact to which he refers, namely, the proposed treaty. The dates are as follows: The warning letters of Lord Ellenborough are dated 6th May,

* Italics and Capitals in the original.

says, he had no intention to press on the Ameers "any *hasty change* "in our *present relations with* "them."—(p. 350, B. B.)

1842—(p. 315) ; Colonel Outram's letter and treaty, 21st June—(p. 342) ; and Lord Ellenborough's letter to Colonel Outram, just cited, and that to which General Napier clearly refers, is dated 10th July ; Lord Ellenborough's to the Secret Committee, the 17th August.

Now, by wrongfully referring General Napier's remarks to the warning letters of *May*, instead of truly to Lord Ellenborough's letter of *July*, Colonel Outram gets hold of the "*two months*" error, that is to make General Napier ridiculous. In May, the letters were to reach the Ameers ; "*two months*" *after* that time, Colonel Outram's own words admit that "the operations of Nott and Pollock were in full activity," that is, in July ; and I have shewn, that the very period General Napier refers to, is July, thus proving that he is quite correct, and that the whole imputation rests upon a misrepresentation of his meaning by Colonel Outram.

§. 11.

In the third section of Colonel Outram's work, he begins by describing Sir Charles Napier as "*singularly deficient*" in the "intellectual accomplishments" and "moral qualifications indispensable to the beneficial exercise of political authority in native states" —"rude and domineering in his demeanour, prejudiced by anticipation against the Indian character, suspicious and distrustful even where there was no reason to doubt the good faith of the native princes ; and, probably, from this very feeling of his own incompetency to separate truth from falsehood, or discriminate between candour and imposture, naturally, though it may be unconsciously, or even unwillingly, led to precipitate an appeal to that weapon of which he felt himself to be a greater master—the power of force, and the terror of the British arms."

—(p. 59). With much other matter of the same taste, he follows up his usual course of asserting broadly and absolutely Sir Charles Napier's various defects, and gross misconduct towards the Ameers, that the careless reader's mind may be well prepared to accept as conclusive, the feeble and often unfair evidence he afterwards produces. These general accusations I notice, not because I regard them as formidable, but, as evidence of the character of Colonel Outram's own temper and judgment. I therefore refer my reader to the opening of his third section, *and then* to his letter to me in the appendix, written on his return to this country, after the battles, that they may judge of the qualities (as now given) which render a man "noble" and fit to be Colonel Outram's "dearest personal friend."

Among these qualities, "a quick perception of danger and hostility in Sinde" was one: not merely of public, but of *personal* danger. After assuring us that Sinde was quite quiet and safe for travellers, he says that Sir Charles Napier "spoke of" travelling up the Indus with a guard of fifty men, "as a feat of daring approaching to folly, and only to be justified by necessity," and then gives in a note the following extract from a letter of Sir Charles's to General William Napier.—"I have now to travel 200 miles up the Indus, with a guard of fifty men, through a hostile country. This appears foolish, but I must do it." (p. 61—2, Commentary.) Less sagacious readers might suppose, that when Sir Charles wrote thus, he *believed* the country was hostile; and if it really were not so, that he had been simply misinformed on his arrival, for the letter was written at that time; but Colonel Outram penetrated deeper into his weakness, and in (p. 89) gives further proof of his want of courage. "The fate of

“Sir William M’Naughten seems ever to have haunted him ;”—“On that occasion (the meeting of the chiefs at Hyderabad in 1844), not only did he cause them to appear before him with their followers *unarmed*, contrary to the custom of the country, and their own ideas of dignity and propriety, but his *excessive carefulness led, under the pretext of doing honour to his guests*, to the exposure to a fierce sun, of two companies of the 86th Regiment, several of whom died in consequence from *coup de soleil*. Alas ! that one so brave when open danger is to be met, should be oppressed with *such timidity where danger does not exist, or, if it did exist, where it is a duty to encounter it*, under reasonable precautions.”

It seems odd, that Colonel Outram did not mention that this alarmed man put himself in the Ameers’ power, while on his journey up the Indus, by visiting them in Hyderabad, where his guard of fifty men could have been of small avail. But inward fear, we know, can sometimes assume outward bravery. To establish the *truth* of his story, he quotes the *Bombay Times* ! ; and to complete the picture, he adds a note, describing his own fearless habits of intercourse with the Brahoos and Beloochees.

§. 12.

Colonel Outram’s first proof of the “dictatorial and offensive tone which pervaded all his negotiations” is Sir Charles Napier’s letter to the Ameers, when he visited them *at Hyderabad*. Here, it would seem, the timid man begins to bluster.

“And dared he then,
“To heard the Lion in his den,
“The Douglas in his hall ?”

As I profess not to undertake a defence of Sir Charles Napier against Colonel Outram’s accusations, but only to give specimens of the latter’s inconsistent and perverted statements, I cannot go into his comments on

the various points of this letter, "so rudely and dictatorially put forth;" but here, as everywhere else, I hope the reader will refer to Colonel Outram's work, and the Blue Book, to test the accuracy of my statements.

Sir Charles Napier's first offence is, that "without any complimentary preamble, deemed essential in letters to Eastern princes, without a single word of friendly introduction, he thus abruptly commences, etc."—(p. 62, Commentary.) I am told, I know not how correctly, these "complimentary preambles" are mere *forms*, that are always left to be filled up by the translators, as a matter of course. In the letters to the Ameers, from Sir Henry Pottinger, Sir A. Burnes, and Colonel Outram himself, in the Blue Book, these forms are not given; and it will be answer enough to this charge to refer to their letters generally, for the tone of many of them, equally, if not more, "harsh" and "dictatorial" than Sir Charles's, as *given by Colonel Outram*; who again omits such parts of the letter, as make against his disparaging character of it.

The objectionable acts of the Ameers were justified by them under the 5th Article of the treaty, which states, that the Ameers were to be "absolute rulers in their respective principalities," that "the jurisdiction of the British Government shall not be introduced into their territories," and that "the officers of the British Government will not listen to, or encourage complaints against the Ameers from their subjects."—(p. 174, B. B.)—Having enumerated the improper acts of the Ameers, Sir Charles says, "Upon the above four points, General Napier does in the most explicit manner state, First, That the Governor-General of India will not suffer the slightest infraction of the treaty. Second, That Article 5th of the treaty does not and cannot guarantee to the Ameers the power to break any other article of the treaty, still less the

"spirit of the treaty throughout. No complaints
 "made by the subjects of the Ameers against their
 "Princes have been listened to by the British autho-
 "rities. The complaint is made by the British
 "themselves, that the Ameers have broken the treaty
 "regarding tolls ; that they have insidiously endea-
 "voured to cut off the supply of provisions from the
 "cantonments, and to interfere with the regulations
 "made within those cantonments. General Napier
 "therefore informs the Ameers, &c." (See his letter,
 p. 358, B. B. and Colonel Outram's Commentary,
 p. 62-3.) The whole passage in Sir Charles Napier's
 letter beginning with the words "no complaints," and
 ending "within those cantonments," which contains
 the just grounds and nature of his complaint is *omitted*
 by Colonel Outram. The two last paragraphs of his
 letter are also omitted, one of which shews Sir Charles'
 attention to those very fiscal rights of the Ameers
 which he is accused of violating—viz : "Instructions
 "shall be given to the Bazaar Master, that he may
 "render every assistance in his power, to the revenue
 "officer of their Highnesses, in order to prevent
 "smuggling from the cantonments into the town
 "of Kurrachee : and every person detected in such
 "an offence, shall be delivered over to the Ameers."
 The other shews that what Colonel Outram speaks
 of as "rude," "dictatorial" "offensive," "interdicting the
 "Ameers from levying customs at their own wharfs at
 "Kurrachee," as "an act of spoliation," amounted to
 no more than a *declaration*, that if they would not give
 orders to stop what he believed to be breaches of the
 treaty, he would,—"*report the same to the Governor-*
 "*General.*" The words are "If the Ameers decline
 "to give these two orders, General Napier will report
 "the same to the Governor-General, whose severe
 "displeasure it is hoped, that their Highnesses will
 "not be willing to incur, by an infringement of the
 "treaty, and thereby break the friendship existing
 "between their Highnesses and the British Go-
 "vernment."

Any person reading the whole letter will see, that Sir Charles Napier wanted to prevent the levying of tolls *on the river*, which Colonel Outram admits he was "perfectly justified in doing,"—(p. 67. Commentary), to exempt from taxes all provisions and stores for the British cantonments—and to check all hindrances to the supply of the cantonments, or interference with their internal regulations. But Colonel Outram represents him as having forbidden them to levy *any customs at all at Kurrachee*; such customs constituting "the principal revenue of that place," thus presuming "authoritatively, and in a style the most offensive to set aside an arrangement ratified by Government."—(p. 65).

The stores landed at Kurrachee for the cantonments were specially exempted from duties. The constant proviso in the treaty, respecting such exemption, in spirit refers to all our cantonments, though Colonel Outram employs some special pleading to prove that the exemption only applied to goods, landed *from boats going up or down the Indus*, and *Kurrachee is not upon the Indus*.*

His argument goes to prove, that the British Government expressly designed to leave its cantonment at *Kurrachee liable to duties*, while it exempted all the other cantonments. The whole argument is obscurely and ambiguously stated; but it can establish only one of these points—either, first, that Sir Charles Napier violated the treaty by prohibiting the Ameers from

* Colonel Outram here indulges in a sneer at General William Napier's "topographical ignorance" of the situation of Kurrachee, which he assures him is not on the river, but "is a seaport town," p. 64. It would be hardly worth while to answer this, were not the answer very short.

In p. 159 of his work, General Napier describes correctly the situation of Kurrachee, and at the end of the work, he gives a map of Sind, with Kurrachee upon the sea coast, and not on the river. Had Colonel Outram neither read the book, nor seen the map, when he indulged in this species of sarcasm?

collecting any customs whatever at Kurrachee,—which he did not; or, secondly, that he prohibited their collecting customs from goods landed there for the use of the cantonment,—which it was his duty to do; for, (in despite of Colonel Outram's special pleading,) this is plain, not only from the spirit of the treaty and Sir Charles Napier's letter, but there is also a distinct statement that the cantonment was exempted from duties.—(p. 229, B.B.) Sir H. Pottinger, on 25th November, 1839, eight months after the treaty, requests the Bombay Government to notify in the Gazette, “that duties “will be levied on all goods save *bona fide* Government stores and supplies landed at Kurrachee.” Sir Charles complained that duties were levied on “every thing landed.” Meer Sobdar allowed the justice of his demand, complied with it, and received Sir C. Napier's thanks for his compliance.—(p. 359, B.B.)

Colonel Outram next examines the complaint that the Ameers “had forbidden the inhabitants of Kurrachee to settle in the Bazaar,” and tries to prove that to interfere with their right to do this, was a violation of the treaty by Sir Charles Napier. He says the Ameers “neither could prevent, nor had they “sought to prevent, their subjects taking refuge, if “they so desired, in the British camp, nor could they “have *driven* one of them out of our Bazaar; but “they had a right to expect, that in return for their “liberality,” (exempting from all tax supplies for the camp at Kurrachee), “we would discourage the “Kurrachee merchants from defrauding the revenue, “by transferring their shops from the town, where “certain taxes were, and always had been imposed, to “our cantonments, which their friendly disposition “had exempted from impost.” He says, they thus suffered loss of revenue, and had claims also, against those who migrated to our camp. To prevent this migration, “by confiscating the property of those “who did so, was their undoubted right; as inde-

“feasible as any exercise of sovereign power, and
 “no more tyrannical than the rules enforced on
 “wards in Chancery,” &c. “It was a duty the
 “Ameers owed themselves, to prevent their revenues
 “being injured by a fraudulent abuse of the privileges
 “accorded to us; and it was a duty we owed the
 “Ameers to second their efforts. To encourage such
 “evasions, betokened anything but a friendly disposi-
 “tion on the part of the British General: it was a
 “direct invasion of the treaty, which provided for
 “‘unity of interest between the Ameers and the
 “‘British Government.’”—(p. 66-7, Comm.)

That the Ameers neither could prevent, nor had
 “they sought to prevent, their subjects taking refuge,”
 &c. as above, is thus answered: An order from Nusseer
 Khan of Hyderabad, to his Officers, Kardars, &c. in
 August, 1842, begins thus: “It has been made known
 “to me, that a great many merchants belonging to the
 “town of Kurrachee have erected their shops in the
 “Sudder Bazaar, and I by no means approve of the
 “arrangement that any people belonging to the town
 “of Kurrachee, or other inhabitants of Sinde, should
 “locate themselves in the English camp for the
 “purposes of trade.” He then states that the English
 were not by treaty to protect the Sindians, or listen to
 their complaints, and proceeds thus: “It therefore
 “behoves you to confiscate the grounds of any mer-
 “chants, inhabitants of the town of Kurrachee, or of
 “Sinde, who have built houses or shops in the camp
 “Bazaar of Kurrachee, or any persons who may have
 “brought goods for sale within the precincts of the
 “English camp.”—(p. 351, B.B.)

In another order from Meers Nusseer and Mahomed,
 to their officers at Kurrachee, are these words, “We
 “have heard that the Banyans of Kurrachee, by their
 “own villany, have established godowns in the camp
 “of Kurrachee, and desire that whatever goods arrive
 “this season, may be stored in the camp, and by this
 “we have understood your folly and neglect.” . . . “On
 “the receipt of this perwannah, you are to prohibit
 “the establishment of shops; if they do not obey

“ your orders, punish them severely, remove their stores,” &c.—(p. 407, B.B.)

Another order from Meer Nusseer to the Killadar of Kurrachee, and other officers of that place, says, “ I will never allow the Banyans of Kurrachee, or the Ryots of any other parts of Sinde, which God has given us, or artificers, to settle in the camp Bazaar,” &c. “ I therefore write to you, that no Banyan of Kurrachee, or inhabitant of Sinde, shall establish a godown, or shop, in the camp Bazaar, or shall employ himself in artificer’s work, or merchandise; if he does, you shall plunder his house, confiscate his property to government, and put himself in the stocks, in order that he may be an example to others,” &c. &c.—(do.)

Another order from Meer Mahomed says, he has sent an officer to Kurrachee, “ to dig up the new godown within the camp which the people of the Bunder of Kurrachee have made there.”—(p. 410, B.B.)

The above extracts hardly agree with Colonel Outram’s assertion, that the Ameers neither could prevent nor had they *sought to prevent*, &c.

As to these proceedings not being “ a hostile measure,” as General William Napier had called them, a minute by Sir George Arthur, Governor of Bombay, concurred in by Mr. Anderson, dated 2nd September 1842, contains these words: “ It appears, one of the principal Ameers, (Nusseer Khan), has already committed *an overt act of hostility*, by prohibiting under the severest penalties (imprisonment and entire confiscation of property) any subjects of Sinde from establishing shops, or even trading with the military Bazaar at Kurrachee.”—(p. 353, B.B.)

If General William Napier is wrong, he has, at least, been misled by high authority.*

* This minute is also another proof of the extent of native hostility, and the alarm it caused at the time (in August) at Bombay, immediately before Sir Charles Napier’s departure from that place for Sinde. It can hardly be supposed Sir Charles Napier was not informed of all this. The reader is requested to refer to that minute.

Sir Charles is charged with want of a "friendly disposition;" with "a direct invasion of the treaty" in opposing these efforts of the Ameers to prevent their subjects settling in the camp Bazaar. In his letter to Lord Ellenborough, of 17th October, unfolding his own views of the state of our relations with the Ameers, he expressly notices the effect of our camps, if permanent, becoming places of refuge and settlement to the Ameers' subjects—that the camps will become towns, and the trade along the Indus fall into the hands of those within them, to the exclusion of the Ameers' subjects without, among whom "misery and poverty will sojourn."—(p. 363, B. B.)

He requested Colonel Outram's opinion on his views in that letter: this was given, and he, who *now* condemns Sir Charles Napier on this point, *then* wrote thus: "Our camps will afford a refuge to the trading classes of Sind, as would the district of Shikarpore (if a British possession) to the agricultural. And it appears to me, that the only method by which we can compel the Ameers to good government, without the direct interference, which is so much to be deprecated, is by the example of our own better government over the spots we secure in the heart of their country, and which, as giving refuge to Sind subjects who are driven by tyranny to seek it, would oblige the Ameers to rule better, in order to pre-serve their people."—(p. 368, B. B.)

So early as April 1842, Colonel Outram, in a despatch, refers to the propriety of possessing "as British property, the ground occupied by this cantonment, and the adjoining site of ancient Sukkur, that we may be rendered independent of Shikarpore altogether, and enabled to afford a refuge to the Hindoo and mercantile classes, who, in such case, would, to a man, desert Shikarpore for British protection at Sukkur."—(p. 427-8, B. B.)

Thus, it seems that a policy to draw off the inha-

nitants, and their trade, agricultural and commercial, from the Ameers' towns and territories to our own cantonments, was wise, innocent and humane, when advocated by Colonel Outram, both before, and at the time of its operation. He points out its *advantages*, in answer to Sir Charles Napier's anticipations of the evil that this policy would bring upon the Ameers' subjects. Three years after, when Colonel Outram thinks fit to attack and vilify Sir Charles Napier, this very policy is spoken of, as if it were a fraudulent abuse, by him, of privileges generously granted to us by the Ameers—as an abandonment of the duty he owed to the Ameers, namely, to second their efforts in prohibiting such migration to our cantonments,—as exhibiting anything but “a friendly disposition,” and as even a direct breach of treaty.

Colonel Outram could not but have known what his own opinions on this subject formerly were. They are recorded in the Blue Book before him, from which he is continually making extracts; yet he scruples not to pass them over, as if they never had been his own; as if no record of them existed; as if the chance of casting obloquy on Sir Charles Napier justified any changes, from his former opinions, however extreme, and sanctified any suppression of those former opinions, however absolute. Colonel Outram cannot end his comments on this letter of Sir Charles, without a parting blow at him. He admits that he was “perfectly justified” in checking the exaction of river-tolls; but adds, “whether he was justified in neglecting the express order of the Governor-General to clothe this necessary act of authority with the veil of courtesy and regard, is another question.”—(p. 67-8, Commentary). I find Sir Charles Napier's justification in the following words of the Governor-

General: "I am directed, by the Governor-General, "to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of 5th inst. (October), and its several inclosures, and to acquaint you, that the Governor-General *entirely* approves of your letter to their Highnesses, the Ameers of Hyderabad, dated 25th of September." —(p. 359, B. B.) This is the very letter described by Colonel Outram as "dictatorial," "offensive," "rudely and dictatorially put forth," "abrupt," and in which he neglected the express orders of the Governor-General, to act with "courtesy and regard." The reader may here test the value of Colonel Outram's strong epithets, by the weight of the evidence which, I cannot say he brings, but suppresses. The letter is fully given in the Blue Book. It is injuriously mutilated in Colonel Outram's book. It is entirely approved of by the Governor-General. It is grossly censured by Colonel Outram. The Governor-General's entire approval of it is suppressed by Colonel Outram, and its direct disobedience of the Governor-General's orders is asserted by Colonel Outram.

§. 13.

In p. 68-9 of his work, Colonel Outram, according to his custom of understating or palliating the offences of the Ameers, that he may give, by implication or broad assertion, a criminal aspect to Sir Charles Napier's conduct, tries to shew that Roostum, in levying tolls from his own subjects on the Indus, conceived he was not committing a breach of treaty, but exercising a just right.

The summary of the argument is this,—that, by treaty, Roostum was bound only to "co-operation with "the other powers in any measure that may hereafter "be thought necessary for extending and facilitating "the navigation of the Indus;" that he understood by the other powers, the Sikh and Bhawalpore autho-

rities, who *retained the right to levy tolls*, and not the Ameers of Hyderabad, who had been *prohibited* from levying them, and therefore, that only by “a very forced interpretation,” could the terms be made to include the latter; that, “there certainly existed *“no documentary evidence of any kind* to shew that “he had ever relinquished the right in this matter “enjoyed by his neighbours;” that, nevertheless, the question was decided against him by the Supreme Government, and, by submitting to a demand for restitution of tolls, he conceded the point. Then comes the conclusion, “By doing so, he surely merited indemnity for the past.” This is vague enough in its expression, as it states neither the kind of indemnity, nor whether for all, or for what offences; but it implies that Sir Charles Napier was merciless, as usual.

The true story is this. Lord Auckland desired to have the navigation of the Indus free for commerce. Sir A. Burnes, then Political Agent at Roostum’s court, got the treaty executed 24th December, 1838. The 8th article is in these words:—“*In order to improve, by every means possible, the growing intercourse by the river Indus*, Meer Roostum Khan “promises all co-operation with the other powers, in “any measures which may be hereafter thought “necessary for extending and facilitating the commerce and navigation of the Indus.” Colonel Outram omits the words in italics, though plainly essential, as shewing that *trade*, and not simply the navigation of the Indus, was the object desired. Sir Alexander Burnes, in a note on this article, says,—“I might “have easily abolished the toll for ever, but this “would be a *hazardous step*, till we substitute our “own influence in Sind. The toll binds the Ameer “to protect property, the release from it would remove it from his shoulders.”—(p. 108 and 118, Blue Book.) Prudence therefore, not moderation,

prevented the abolition of the tolls at that time. Colonel Outram's argument is this:—Bhawul Khan, of Bhawulpore, retained the right to levy tolls. The Hyderabad Ameers were deprived of it. Roostum agreed by the 8th article to co-operate with "the other powers." The terms in the 8th article could only by a "*very forced interpretation*" mean the Hyderabad Ameers; Roostum, therefore, naturally understood them to refer to Bhawul Khan, and thus, very innocently, thought he had a right to levy tolls also.

To shew the hollowness of this defence, it is necessary to state the order of the treaties. That, with Bhawul Khan, was the first: that, with Roostum, was the next, having been executed on 24th December, 1838: and that with the Hyderabad Ameers, the last, having been executed by Lord Auckland, on 11th March, 1839, and by the Ameers, not before the *middle* of July. No such doubt, as Colonel Outram suggests on behalf of Roostum, could have been in his mind, (namely, that only "a very forced interpretation" could bring him within the conditions of the Hyderabad treaty,) for this simple reason, that it *was not in existence* at the time Roostum is supposed to have been influenced by its terms. Next, the words of the 8th article are, "promises *all* co-operation with the other powers, in *any* measures which may be *hereafter* thought necessary," &c. "Hereafter" could not refer to the conditions of Bhawul Khan's treaty, because they were existing and known at the time. The words "*all* co-operation" and "*any* measures," by their plain sense, bound Roostum to an indefinite obligation to submit to *whatever* measures might be hereafter required from *any* other powers, and to their full extent. Further, I believe that Roostum at the time

knew that the words, "other powers," were *not* intended to refer to Bhawul Khan. My reasons are, that Lord Auckland, through his secretary, desired Sir A. Burnes to frame the treaty with Roostum, in the terms of that with Bhawul Khan, but expressly added other and further stipulations; and *this of co-operation with the other powers, is one of the stipulations.*—p. 61, Blue Book. I may fairly assume, that Sir A. Burnes in the course of the negotiation explained this instruction of Lord Auckland to Roostum. Thus Lord Auckland's original intention, Sir A. Burnes's understanding of it, the presumption that he explained it to Roostum, the very grammar and sense of the words of the 8th article, all conspire to shew, that Roostum could not have made the mistake Colonel Outram suggests on his behalf. His defence really amounts to this, that the words "*any measures which may be hereafter thought necessary,*" meant only, *such measures as have been thought necessary heretofore.**

But to proceed with further facts bearing on this subject. In January, 1839, Sir A. Burnes writes to the secretary of the Governor-General thus:—"I have the satisfaction to report for the information of the Governor-General of India, that the chief of Khyrpore (Roostum) has consented, for ever to renounce all right to toll on the river Indus, throughout his territories. I had avoided discussing this point while the treaty was pending, as questions might have arisen, as to the protection of the merchant being in the hands of the paramount power (the British), but nothing has been said on it, and of course the chief of Khyrpore must still be now held responsible for the merchant's safety,

* As Burnes in his notes on Roostum's treaty refers to the "Hyderabad treaty," the reader should know that the reference is not to the one mentioned in the text, but to a former treaty in 1838.—p. 5, Blue Book.

“as heretofore.”—(p. 126, B. B.) The Governor-General’s reply, on 7th February, 1839, to the above, states that this result is “a matter of much importance to the growing traffic on the Indus, and a source of sincere gratification to the Governor-General.”—(p. 144, B. B.)

On 9th July, 1840, Mr. Ross Bell (agent in Upper Sinde), in answer to the Governor-General’s inquiry, states that “no duty is levied by the Ameers of Khyrpore on merchandize while in transit on the river Indus, whether it be the property of their own subjects, or of foreign traders.”—(p. 394, B. B.)

In the year 1840, Colonel Outram, by some expressions of Mr. Ross Bell, was led into the erroneous belief that the tolls had not been relinquished; but this error was fully removed in *that year*, and he knew, on the joint authority of Sir A. Burnes, the Governor-General, and Mr. Ross Bell, that the right to tolls was relinquished. He knew this for *two years* before Sir Charles Napier entered Sinde; he himself prepared this charge of exacting tolls, and though he makes a note on the subject, and produces the correspondence of 1840, he does not venture to deny that the tolls were given up; for that would be to deny Sir A. Burnes’s assertion that such agreement was made, Mr. Bell’s statement of the practice, and Lord Auckland’s decision.

If, after the Governor-General’s decision in 1840, Colonel Outram, on succeeding Mr. Ross Bell, permitted the exaction of tolls, he neglected to *obey* that decision. If he *prevented* their exaction during those two years, it clearly shewed he considered the right as relinquished, from that time at least. Yet in his book written in 1846, he treats the question as if it had been open to doubt, till the time when Sir Charles Napier demanded restitution of the tolls improperly taken,—as if Roostum by acquiescence in that de-

mand, had *conceded the right for the first time*, and therefore, “surely merited indemnity for the past.”* His merit was, that having taken another person’s property, he gave up the stolen goods when detected.†

§. 14.

Following up his system of extenuating the offences of the Ameers, as a preliminary to his censures of Sir Charles Napier, he says, “The 4th charge was against “the Minister of Meer Roostum for aiding the escape “of Mahomed Shureef. Of the act there was no “doubt; but there were no grounds for suspecting “Meer Roostum of having been privy to it. To have “demanded his Minister’s expulsion from Sinde, we “were perfectly entitled, and this I recommended. It “was however, determined by Sir Charles Napier to “make the Sovereign answerable for his Minister, and “on this principle he acted.”—(p. 70, Commentary.)

The words of the charge are, “Compassing the “flight of a state prisoner, Syud Mahomed Shureef, “employing the same to raise insurrection against the “British Government at Beloochistan.”—(p. 370, B. B.)

It is made against the “confidential Minister of Roostum Khan of Khyrpore.” The words are Colonel Outram’s own, and in his letter to Sir Charles Napier, sent with the charges and remarking on them, he thus writes —“The case, No. 2, (erroneously called the 4th “in his book) although only brought home to Futteh “Mahomed Ghoree, may be *reasonably attributed to* “*the Khyrpore state*, of which he is the responsible

* As Colonel Outram’s remarks on this subject to Sir Charles Napier, in October, 1842, are somewhat ambiguously worded, I hope the reader will refer to them that he may correct my view of the matter, if it should seem overstrained.—(See p. 369, *fifth paragraph*, and *Correspondence marked A*, p. 384, &c. B. B.)

† The young London thief, who took toll of some bottles of soda water, also gave them up on detection, but far from thinking he thereby “merited indemnity for the past,” he candidly and truly stated his case in this distich, written on the wall of his cell—

“im as prigs wot is’nt his’n,
Ven he’s cotch, will go to pris’n.”

“ Minister ; and it is only one of many underhand efforts to incite insurrection against the British Government, which, although no distinct proof has been obtained, there is not the *slightest doubt*, have been repeatedly exerted by several of the Ameers of Upper and Lower Sindé, for some months past.”—(p. 369, B. B.)

The fact of exciting insurrection, and that Shureef was a state prisoner, is omitted in his book, as if of no importance. To Mr. Clerk he writes, (on 1st May 1842) proposing a plot for the detection of Roostum's treasonable correspondence, which might enable him “ to convict his intriguing Minister, Futteh Mahomed Ghoree (for *the good old Meer is in his dotage, and a mere tool in the hands of Futteh Mahomed*), so far as to warrant our demanding his and his son's expulsion from Sindé at least, (should the Ameer's connexion be overlooked,) for, so long as his family remains in influence here we shall never be free from “ intrigue.”—(p. 324, B. B.)

I can find no other passage to recommend Futteh Mahomed's expulsion from Sindé ; and this passage was written near two months *before* the escape of Shureef, and therefore cannot possibly have been given in *consequence* of that event. In none of the letters, or remarks on the charges, does this recommendation appear to have been addressed to Sir Charles Napier, though the words of Colonel Outram's book imply, that it was pointed out to him as the appropriate punishment. Lastly, Sir Charles is made to appear, as if he had rejected this advice, and made “ the sovereign answerable for his Minister.” In fact, he simply transmitted, on 17th October, the charges with their documentary proofs and Colonel Outram's remarks upon them, to Lord Ellenborough, and did not himself, in his despatch, say a single word, good, bad or indifferent, upon this particular case.—(See p. 362, &c. B. B.)

On receiving all these documents, Lord Ellenborough, on 4th November, writes—"I am of opinion that the conduct of Futteh Mahomed Ghoree, *confidential Minister* of Meer Roostum Khan, in compassing the escape of Syud Mahomed Shureef, was, under the circumstances, *an act of hostility* to the British Government, for which *Meer Roostum Khan is responsible*."—(p. 436, B. B.) Colonel Outram says not a word of this decision, but attributes the substance of it to Sir Charles Napier. "On this principle he acted." No doubt: after Lord Ellenborough had so decided;—it was his duty to act so.

§. 15.

The following case is hardly worth observing upon, except as shewing what continual misrepresentations Colonel Outram makes. The charge he examines is, "for placing in the stocks and otherwise maltreating the servant of a British officer, and no punishment inflicted on the offender."—(p. 70, Commentary.)

He says, the man was in "the *temporary* service of a British officer."—He was in the service of Major Clibborn and his regiment for "two years past," (p. 377, B. B.); next, that "he was a *Sinde* subject." Lieutenant Brown, the Political Agent says, he was a *British* subject. (p. do.) Colonel Outram himself, in his remarks at the time, says he was a British subject, (p. 369, B. B.) He calls him "a spy,"* and the cause of having had the liquor-shops shut up in Sukkur, by his representations to the English.

Lieutenant Brown, in his letter to the Ameer, says, the wrong was done to this man "on false accusations got up for the occasion," (p. 379, B. B.) The

* In the Blue Book the words are, "acting as an *informant* to Major Clibborn," (p. 377, B. B.)—Possibly.—He was Major Clibborn's servant, and that officer was employed, under Colonel Outram, to collect weekly intelligence.

Ameer's own answer to Lieutenant Brown, does not pretend that the man had done any wrong: on the contrary, excuses his officer's conduct, on the ground of, "an ignorant fellow having seized him," (p. 379.) Colonel Outram says, the Ameer tendered "a very adequate apology," and expressed himself certain, "that nothing of the kind will again occur."

Lieutenant Brown says, "by the reply I received, you will perceive how little his Highness has done to prevent the recurrence of such an outrage," (p. 377, B. B.) Colonel Outram's *own* remark at the time to Sir Charles Napier is, (after stating the Ameer's expression of regret,) "but no punishment has been inflicted on the offending party, as called for by the Assistant Political Agent: on the contrary, the Syud continues to hold his position."—(p. 369, B. B.)

§. 16.

"Similar to these, and *even still more frivolous*, were the mass of charges preferred against the Ameer of Lower Sind."—(p. 71, Commentary.)

I before pointed out Colonel Outram's strange propensity to stultify his own conduct respecting these charges. The return of complaints, furnished by himself, he at the time describes "as a memorandum of the several acts whereby the Ameer of Upper Sind *appear to me* to have departed from the spirit of their engagements to the British Government, shewing four cases of *breach of treaty, of late occurrence*, with documents in proof, appended, and numbered from 1 to 4."—(p. 369, B. B.) What he *now* calls the "still more frivolous charges" against the Ameer of Lower Sind, sent in by his assistant, Lieutenant Mylne, he told Sir Charles Napier *at the time*, as already mentioned, were "*fairly stated*."—Did he mean to inform or to mislead Sir Charles? Did he mean to place before him with "judicial accuracy," frivolous or valid charges? If his cha-

racter of these charges *now*, be his genuine opinion, did he suppose that Sir Charles Napier and Lord Ellenborough desired to have "frivolous charges" preferred, and did he, in that case, make himself the tool of such unworthy policy? If he believed they desired to have only just and valid charges, why did he prefer very frivolous ones? was it to prejudice their minds and delude their judgments?

Though somewhat beyond the task I have undertaken, (that of unfolding Colonel Outram's method of controversy, and testing the value of his authority and the consistency of his opinions,) I must here mention shortly the number and nature of these charges. There were in the "two returns," five charges against the Ameers of Upper Sind, and twenty-five against those of Lower Sind: and five days after Sir Charles Napier had sent the returns, and all documents to sustain them, to Lord Ellenborough, a *further* charge of hostile correspondence, carried on at this very time, between Roostum and Nusseer of Hyderabad, was made by Colonel Outram on 30th October. Of these charges, thirty-one in all, there were,

Four charges of hostile correspondence.

One, of aiding the escape of a State prisoner, and employing him to excite insurrection.

Two, of arresting British subjects, &c.

Two, of summoning, without reference to the political authorities, a British subject to appear before themselves.

Two, of failure in payment, of sums they were bound to pay, by treaty.

One, of coining secretly debased money, to defraud the British Government in the payment of those sums.

Four, of a miscellaneous character, viz. levying troops to attack other Ameers; their disputes being referred at

the time to British arbitration ; accusing the British Political agent of a breach of the treaty ; trying to annul an engagement made with the British Government for the transfer of Shikarpore.

Two, of preventing the free supply of the British cantonment's Bazaar, which Sir G. Arthur regarded as an act of " overt hostility ;"—and lastly,

Thirteen cases of stopping the free transit of the Indus, and levying tolls on their own subjects and those of foreign powers, and even firing into the boats on the river. Two of these cases were, however, immediately rectified by the Ameer Hoossein Ali, who promised to punish his officers, if they should in future levy tolls. —(pp. 370—400, B.B.)

This inquiry, into the conduct of the Ameers, was carried back only to the beginning of the year 1841, at which time Colonel Outram pardoned all previous offences they had committed, (levying tolls, and treasonable correspondence), so that the renewal of such acts was the less excusable. If the mass of these charges was " very frivolous," or the evidence to support them inconclusive, let the reader keep in mind that they were collected, sanctioned, and placed before Sir C. Napier, by Colonel Outram himself, in obedience to Lord Ellenborough's orders, who plainly desired that officer should exercise a sound, honest discretion, in framing his accusation. If this, by his own confession, be the manner in which he acts the part of public accuser, perhaps it is no wild hope, to expect that three years hence, he may write thus : " Nor can I at all " admit," that in making these charges against Sir Charles Napier, this was done " on the footing that I " myself considered them as warranting a conviction," " The mass of them were very frivolous."

§. 17.

Colonel Outram says, that as he considered the charge of hostile negotiation not capable of proof, he “strongly recommended him (Sir C. Napier) to “ground the new treaty, since some reason must be “assigned, on the admitted exaction of imposts, which, “however regarded by the Ameers, *had been definitely “pronounced an infraction of the treaty.** Such, I “pointed out, would be the more manly course, and “one not liable to misconstruction. It might be considered severe, but could not be cavilled at as dishonest. He did not see fit to follow my advice ; and “on 17th November, 1842, he thus wrote to the Governor-General :—‘ The whole proceedings towards “the Ameers now depend, as I construe your decision, upon three things :

“ ‘ 1st. Is the letter of Meer Nusseer Khan of Hyderabad to Beebruck Boogtie, an authentic letter, “ ‘ or a forgery ?

“ ‘ 2nd. Is the letter of Meer Roostum Khan of Khyrpore to the Maharajah Shere Singh, an authentic letter or a forgery ?

“ ‘ 3rd. Did Futteh Mahomed Ghoree, confidential “ ‘ agent of Meer Roostum Khan of Khyrpore, assist at “ ‘ the escape of Mahomed Shareef ? ’ —(p. 72, Commentary.)

In the last section, I mentioned that there were *thirteen* cases, of breach of treaty by levying tolls, or “exaction of imposts.” Even by Colonel Outram, can these cases be thought “very frivolous,” since he proposed to ground the new treaty upon them ?

There is not one word, in his communications at the time, to shew that any such advice was given to, or rejected by Sir Charles Napier. I can find no allusion whatever to it, much less any statement of it, either in Sir Charles Napier’s letters, or Colonel Outram’s, or in those of Lord Ellenborough. There is no trace of it in Sir Charles Napier’s letter to Lord Ellenborough, of 17th October, written while the charges were under

* Colonel Outram’s italics.

his consideration, though he asked for Colonel Outram's opinion upon that very letter, and, in consequence of that opinion, added new matter to it. He did not enter into any detailed examination of the charges, but transmitted the whole—charges and proofs—to Lord Ellenborough.

The extract from Sir Charles Napier's letter, of *17th November*, is given as proof that he rejected Colonel Outram's advice, to take "the more manly course;" that which "might be considered as severe," but not "dishonest." If it be not used as such proof, there is no sense in making the extract. To shew its value as *evidence*, the following facts must be known. It was not written while the charges were under Sir Charles Napier and Colonel Outram's joint consideration; *that* period was between the 14th October, the day when Colonel Outram first laid the charges before him, and the 25th of the same month, when they were all sent off to Lord Ellenborough. It was written a month after Sir Charles had considered the charges; it did not express, or pretend to express his own opinion on the charges. It was a *reply* to Lord Ellenborough's *letters of 3d and 4th November*; and the very passage quoted is, (as, indeed, to any attentive reader it must appear to be) a *mere recapitulation of Lord Ellenborough's views* (after the charges had been considered by his Lordship), "as to the course "which should be pursued." By the way in which Colonel Outram uses it as evidence, he tries to make his readers believe that Sir Charles Napier not only rejected his advice, but selected, as the strongest grounds upon which to rest the treaty, the very charges that he knew to be the weakest grounds. Colonel Outram knew, and could not but know, that this was a false impression; he knew Sir Charles had *not* selected these grounds, but was merely repeating

the substance of Lord Ellenborough's decisions; that he was *not* stating his own views, but Lord Ellenborough's views. The very important letters of Lord Ellenborough, on the 3rd and 4th of November (p. 436, B. B.), and Sir Charles Napier's, of 17th November, (p. 453) contain this knowledge so clearly, that no man, honestly seeking, could fail to find it. But Colonel Outram gives neither the words nor the substance of Lord Ellenborough's letters; he does not even allude to them: he gives but a few lines from Sir Charles Napier's letter, presenting them to his readers under a false character, and he suppresses all the remainder, words and substance alike.

I have no doubt, Sir Charles Napier fully assented to the proposed grounds, for a revision of the treaty, as being perfectly just; but they did not originate with him. They were supplied by Colonel Outram, and determined upon by Lord Ellenborough,—the only person who had a right to determine upon them.

That Roostum was responsible for the conduct of his confidential minister; that his correspondence with Shere Singh, and that of Nusseer with Beebruck Boogtie, were offences amounting to "constructive hostility;" that the "infractions of specific treaty," by the Hyderabad Ameers, "so pertinaciously persisted in were of a "serious nature," are all laid down in Lord Ellenborough's letter of 3d November. They were not considered by him "very frivolous," but as a justifiable reason for treating, and even rendering it "necessary," to treat those who committed these acts "as enemies," and to inflict upon them "punishment and penalties;"—the terms are several times repeated. At the same time, he framed and sent the draft of his treaty, grounded on these views. He requires, of course, that the offences of hostile cor-

respondence should be proved. — (p. 436-7, 440, B. B.)

While Lord Ellenborough was writing his despatch, of 3d and 4th November at Simla, in which he gives these decisions, Sir Charles Napier was (on 5th November) writing, at Sukkur, to say he awaited Lord Ellenborough's answer to his letter of 25th October, (which conveyed the charges, &c.), "to draw out a fresh treaty, entering minutely into details of exchanging tribute for territory; and, if your Lordship approves of this, I would submit it to the Ameers, at the same time sparing no pains to convince them that neither injury nor injustice is meditated."—(p. 444, B. B.) He received Lord Ellenborough's answer on 12th November; and *then*, on 17th, writes in reply, the letter quoted by Colonel Outram. The passage cited from that letter, as proof that "he did not see fit to follow my advice," has been already shewn to be no proof, being merely the recapitulation of Lord Ellenborough's views on the most essential points, as Sir Charles Napier understood them. The remainder of the letter is, in substance, a request to have Lord Ellenborough's decision; "because, in so grave a matter, I should feel that it would be extremely presumptuous in me to act upon my own judgment, when, in a few days, your Lordship's can be obtained." After giving an explanation of what he had done, and was then doing, to procure proofs of the truth or falsehood of the three particular charges mentioned therein, he states his own opinion as to the degree in which the evidence sustains them; expresses his inability to give an opinion on one point, from want of documents; and, after having given such proofs, as he possessed, of the acts having been really committed, he says, "If I have your Lordship's answer, saying, that you consider the above sufficient to act upon, I shall lose no time in proposing your

“draft of the new treaty to the Ameers.”—(p. 454, B. B.) The letter ends by requesting to have Colonel Outram named as Commissioner, to carry the draft into effect.

§. 18.

Colonel Outram concludes his third section thus :
 “The *authenticity of the letters and seals*, he (Sir Charles Napier) *had set his mind on demonstrating* :
 “it is for the reader to judge with what success he
 “accomplished it.” (p. 79, Commentary.)

The grossness of this imputation may receive such acceptance in the mind of the reader, as it is worthy of,—my business is with Colonel Outram’s facts and logic.

There were in all, four cases of hostile letters.

1st. A letter from Nusseer of Hyderabad, to Beebruck Boogtie, without date, but supposed by Lieutenant Mylne to have been written about 20th September, 1842.

2nd. Ditto, from ditto to Sawun Mull of Moultan, intercepted about February, 1842.

3rd. From Roostum to Shere Singh the Maharajah of the Sikhs, in April 1842.

4th. A letter, and a treaty written in a Koran ; both, with Roostum’s seal and addressed to Nusseer of Hyderabad, intercepted on 29th October, 1842. These last were obtained, five days *after* the general charges (containing Nos. 1, 2, 3,) had been sent off to Lord Ellenborough.

As, in his endeavours to shew that there was not proof of these letters being authentic, Colonel Outram has made some confusion among them ; it is fit to notice that No. 2, does not appear to have been followed up by any further investigation, nor is it alluded to, in Sir Charles Napier’s letter, Lord

Ellenborough having said, "it was a matter of little moment," if the letter to Beebruck Boogtie (No. 1,) were authentic : (p. 440, B. B.) No. 4, in like manner is not alluded to in Sir Charles Napier's letter of 17th November.

Nos. 1 and 3, are therefore, the only letters to which Colonel Outram's argument can be correctly applied.

He says that, "No *legal proof* of the authenticity of "the document (No. 1) was obtained ;" that seals are "never held *alone* to constitute legal proof," and that General William Napier's "assertion, that 'none " 'cognizant of the Ameer's signet doubted the authenticity of the intercepted seal,' is entirely at variance "with the truth." (p. 73, Com.) Whether the seal ought or ought not to be received, as proof of the genuineness of the letter, is not within the scope of my remarks, but it will hardly be denied that, where positive evidence is not to be had, the authenticity of a Sovereign's signet, is a valuable fact in presumptive evidence. Colonel Outram will hardly venture to allege, that a *genuine* seal of this nature being affixed to a written instrument, is perfectly immaterial. If it be at all material, then it becomes also material, to examine carefully into the fact of its genuineness.

This Sir Charles Napier did, and Colonel Outram treats the matter as an absurdity. The simple fact was, that Sir Charles compared the seal, on the intercepted letter, with a known authentic seal of the Ameer's. He found, by measuring with a pair of compasses, that they did not exactly coincide in the size and the distance between the letters ; but he was told, this circumstance was explained, by the Ameer having two seals,—one for ordinary use, the other for secret communications ; and that these differences were purposely introduced, to discredit the authenticity of the secret seal, if produced against them. Sir Charles

Napier then desired the persons, that intercepted the letter, to procure for him an authentic secret seal, justly reasoning, that if the letter and seal were a forgery by these persons, they could easily repeat the forgery of the seal, and so carry on the fraud. But up to the 17th November, from the 25th October, (when he sent the charges against the Ameers to Lord Ellenborough,) these persons could not procure an impression of the secret seal, thereby affording a strong presumption that the seal, attached to the intercepted letter, was *not a forgery*. On 18th Nov. he did obtain an impression similar to that on Nusseer's treasonable letter, "and on the cover of the letter, to which it was attached, was writing, known to be that of Chotram the Ameer's confidential Moonshee;" both were sent to Lord Ellenborough.—(p. 455, B. B.)

This mode of verifying or falsifying the circumstantial evidence is treated by Colonel Outram with contempt.

"No legal proof of the authenticity of the document was obtained; the rigid process by which it was sought to be acquired, was merely so much time thrown away"—(p. 73, Commentary). "The rigid process of measuring by compasses, only proved two things,—the industry of the General, and that if the seal were a forgery, it was well executed. It left the question of its authenticity where it found it."—(p. 74, Com.)

His habitual inaccuracy appears in the latter passage. "The rigid process" proved exactly the contrary of what he avers, for "if the seal were a forgery," it was *ill* executed, since it differed visibly from what it was intended to copy. The process and the result were favourable to the Ameer, as casting a doubt upon the genuineness of the document; and, had there been nothing to rebut this evidence, the presumption of innocence would have been strong. The next step was also in favour of the Ameer, for its tendency was to

test the truth of those who had intercepted the letter. If they had immediately produced another impression of the seal, a suspicion would have been created that there was fraud, since it could hardly be supposed that they had such ready access to the real secret signet, as to be able to give an impression of it at once. When another secret seal was at last procured, and found, not only to coincide with the first, but, to carry with it an evidence of its authority, namely, the Moonshee's known hand-writing, Sir Charles Napier very naturally abandoned his suspicions of forgery. But he did not rest upon the mere evidence of the seal; and though Colonel Outram, in one of his unscrupulous affirmations says, as above, that General William Napier's assertion is "entirely at variance with the truth," yet he gives no proof of his own assertion, and suppresses the proofs of General William Napier's, though contained in the very letter he is citing, viz. "Major Outram, "Major Clibborn, Lieutenant Browne, and the confidential Moonshee hitherto employed in the Political agency, all assert that the seal is that of Nusseer Khan of Hyderabad." (p. 454).—General William Napier's assertion is taken from this passage, and it is certainly as good evidence, being written by Sir Charles Napier at the time he was anxiously seeking for proof of the authenticity or otherwise of the letter, as Colonel Outram's utterly unsupported assertion now. He does not venture to say explicitly that Major Clibborn, Lieutenant Browne, or the confidential Moonshee did not assert what is attributed to them. He does not deny this, even on his own behalf, for in the very same page of his Commentary he says: "one of them (the letters) that, purporting to be from Meer Nusseer Khan to Beebruck Boogtie, might, I thought, be authentic, but actual proof was required, before punitive measures could justly be had recourse to."—(p. 74, Commentary). Now this very letter to Bee-

bruck Boogtie, and *this only*, was that respecting which General William Napier had asserted that "none of the persons, English or native, cognizant of the Ameer's signet, doubted the authenticity of the intercepted seal." I presume that if Colonel Outram thought the letter itself might be "authentic," he thought the same of the *seal*. General William Napier adds in his work the following words: "But their confident assertions on this head, the General would not accept as proof, and thus delayed his decision."—(p. 135-6, *Conquest of Sind*.) Colonel Outram suppresses these words; but they stated the simple truth, as is proved by Sir Charles Napier's letter, which says: "In short, no one here has a doubt of the authenticity of the letter. But I shall *nevertheless endeavour to get a proof seal*."—(p. 454, B.B.) And in the beginning of the letter he says: "I have delayed replying thereto (Lord Ellenborough's letters of 3rd and 4th November), in the hopes of procuring a seal of Meer Nusseer Khan; however, I can no longer wait, lest your Lordship should think me idle."—(p. 453, B.B.)

But to cite such passages would not accord well with the assertion, that "Sir Charles Napier had set his mind on demonstrating the authenticity of the letters and seals." Sir Charles Napier's mind was set on finding out *the truth*.

Colonel Outram says, "the authenticity" of the letters to Shere Singh from Roostum "was very doubtful." The reader will keep in mind, that there was but *one* letter which was the subject of inquiry, namely, that marked No. 3, and intercepted in April, 1842, Sir Charles Napier, whose mind "was set on demonstrating the authenticity of the letters and seals," examined those persons with him most competent to judge of their authenticity; stated Colonel Outram's doubts, whether Roostum was privy to the letter or not; stated, that there was, however, no doubt of its

having his (Roostum's) seal, and being written by his confidential minister, Futteh Mahomed Ghoree (p. 454, B. B.), and ends thus: "However, without the original document, which is in the possession of Mr. Clerk, I can form no opinion."

Further, Colonel Outram admits that Lieutenant Postans deemed the letters genuine. The decisive opinion Lieutenant Postans gives will be found in p. 325, B. B.; but he thinks it the work of the minister, and that it was possible Roostum might be innocent of the matter. On receiving the letter back from Mr. Clerk, Lieutenant Brown had not the "slightest doubt" of its authenticity.—(p. 457, B. B.) But Colonel Outram slights Lieutenant Browne's authority, averring, that he could neither *speak* nor *write* Persian at the time. The question, however, would rather seem to be, whether he could *read* it, and were not, therefore, competent to form a correct opinion, by comparing the letter and seal, with those of Roostum in the Political Agency Office.

Colonel Outram then opposes to this opinion, Mr. Clerk's testimony; but, according to his usual practice in this controversy, gives only so much of Mr. Clerk's letter as serves his own argument, the other parts being adverse to it. He says, "That gentleman professed himself unable to determine the question, at the same time declaring that he shared my doubts."—(p. 75, Com.) And he cites Mr. Clerk again, as saying, on the 12th November, in a letter to Lord Ellenborough, "the authenticity of these letters is still a matter of some doubt to me, as it was to Major Outram, in sending them. My expressing an opinion, therefore, can serve no practical end."—(p. 76, Com.) The reader is thus led to think that his doubts proceeded from his having considered the question; and Colonel Outram follows up this, by

suggesting, that “ it is very improbable that Mr. Clerk
 “ would have transmitted them (the originals, to Sir
 “ Charles Napier) without expressing similar doubts
 “ of their authenticity to those contained in his letter
 “ of the same date, (12th November,) to his Lordship.
 “ Mr. Clerk’s qualifications for deciding on the mat-
 “ ter, his high official character, his well-known abi-
 “ lities, his perfect acquaintance with the language in
 “ which the documents were written, and his intimate
 “ connexion with those to whom they were addressed,
 “ appear to have been *lightly esteemed* by Sir Charles
 “ Napier.”—(p. 76, Com.) All these qualifications,
 Colonel Outram would have us believe were brought
 to bear on the inquiry, and resulted in the doubts
 expressed by Mr. Clerk.

The reasons for this assumption of Sir Charles
 Napier’s disregard of Mr. Clerk’s opinion are, that he
 knew nothing of Persian ; that Colonel Outram’s assist-
 ants, who did know it, had left the country ; that Sir
 Charles adopted at once Lieutenant Browne’s opinion ;
 that Lieutenant Browne had formerly, in May, been
 unable to decide the question ; that he had obtained
 no further light to clear up the doubt ; and that he
 could neither speak nor write Persian.*

All this, of course, places Sir Charles in the usual
 light of a presumptuous ignorant man, scorning the
 sound opinion of a competent and accomplished judge,
 and hastily adopting that of a man nearly as ignorant
 as himself, because the former militated against what
 he had “ set his mind upon demonstrating,” and the
 latter favoured it. It becomes necessary here to give
 a long extract from Colonel Outram’s letter to Mr.
 Clerk, on 1st of May, respecting this letter of Roos-
 tum to Shere Singh, both to shew how he considered it
 at the time, and to explain Mr. Clerk’s letter to Lord

* The reader is requested to refer to Colonel Outram’s work for
 his own words ; of which, to avoid long extracts, I have given only
 the substance.

Ellenborough, on 12th of November, which, it will then be seen, is virtually an answer to Colonel Outram's. It will supply also some other points, that it is desirable to compare with the statements now given in his Commentary. "Sukkur, May 1st, 1842. "The enclosed is a letter I intercepted the other day, "purporting to be from Meer Roostum Khan of "Khyrpore to Shere Singh. However, as the party "through whom I obtained the information, which led "to the seizure, is inimical to Meer Roostum Khan; "I was doubtful as to the authenticity of the letter, "and sent it to Lieutenant Postans, who has seen much "of the Meer's correspondence, for his opinion as to "the seal, and for comparison with the writings in his "office from the Khyrpore Durbar.* I enclose a "copy of his reply, which pronounces the document "genuine, and if so, probably you might make some "use of it, if by any means it could be enclosed with "a fac-simile copy of the seal and direction, it might "be so conveyed to the Maharajah, as to elicit a reply, "which would let us more clearly into the nature of "the compact alluded to by Meer Roostum, and thus "enable me to convict his intriguing minister, Futteh Mahomed Ghoree, (for the good old Meer is in his dotage, and a mere tool in the hands of Futteh Mahomed) so far as to warrant our demanding his, and his son's expulsion from Sind at least, (should the Ameer's connection be overlooked) for so long as his family remains in influence here, we shall never be free from intrigue. Shere Singh has, by your able management, been brought so thoroughly to identify himself with our cause, and has been driven to do such good service to the British Government,

* In p. 75, of his Commentary, Colonel Outram says,—“My suspicions of Ali Moorad were recorded so early as 1st of May, 1842,” and he refers to this very letter. The above passage is the only one in the letter alluding to hostility to Roostum, but it has *not one word* to shew that he meant thereby Ali Moorad. Nor does Ali's name appear in any part of the letter. Yet he now, not only alleges that he put this opinion of Ali on record, but states it as if he had drawn Sir Charles Napier's attention to it then, and subsequently. It is also worthy of note, that Colonel Outram, at this time, thought the authenticity of the seal a matter of importance, though he affects to ridicule such inquiry, when made by Sir Charles Napier.

“ that now he will feel that he may rely on our
 “ support hereafter, and consequently, he may from
 “ late events (and since this intrigue commenced) have
 “ been converted from a suspicious friend, preparing
 “ to turn against us when opportunity offered, to a
 “ sincere ally confident of our support, and fully de-
 “ cided on relying on it for the future. In that case,
 “ would there be no possibility of inducing him to seal
 “ his sincerity, by shewing the previous correspon-
 “ dence with the Khyrpore, Meerpore, and Hyderabad
 “ Ameers, on your confidentially informing him of the
 “ exposure, or to aid us in their conviction by answer-
 “ ing this letter, in such manner, as must elicit a more
 “ explicit reply, which reply I would intercept ; and
 “ I should be glad, at the same, to obtain the replies
 “ of Meer Nusseer Khan of Hyderabad, and Meer
 “ Shere Mahomed of Meerpore, who are the only
 “ parties I suspect to have been in direct correspon-
 “ dence with Lahore of late ; for I must confess, I
 “ should not be sorry to afford government grounds
 “ for making an example of the former, whose restless
 “ intriguing disposition, and whose hatred of the Fer-
 “ inghees, render him ever eager to join in any scheme
 “ which promises a hope of injury to us. One such
 “ example, would effectually deter the other chiefs of
 “ this country from plotting in future.

“ The Cossids from whom the letter was taken,
 “ carried another, intended for inspection if stopped,
 “ and which was tied up in their clothes in the usual
 “ manner ; (this also I send marked *) but the secret
 “ letter was concealed within the binding of an old
 “ Sanscrit book (grinth), into which it was neatly
 “ pasted in such a manner as to defy detection, were
 “ concealment not suspected through other clues.”—
 (p. 324-5, B. B.)

The remainder of the letter is not extracted, as it is merely a detail of the mode in which the letter had been intercepted ; and, though it is an instance of Colonel Outram's dexterity in such arrangements, it does not bear upon the point under examination.

The above extract, stating Lieut. Postans' opinion as to the genuineness of the letter, Colonel Outram's

opinion of Futteh Mahomed Ghoree's character, and Roostum's blind submission, together with the very decisive steps he proposed Mr. Clerk should take, are scarcely to be explained, if *he at that time* held the opinion he *now* advances,—that the authenticity of the letter from Roostum to Shere Singh, was *very doubtful*. The real value of Mr. Clerk's doubts (which are put forward as confirmatory of Colonel Outram's own, and invidiously against Sir Charles Napier,) will be best shewn by giving some of that gentleman's own words, which have been suppressed by Colonel Outram. His letter is dated "Simla, 12th November, 1842," and is, in substance, an answer to the letter from which the above extracts are made.

"I also annex an extract of a letter from Major Outram to me, which accompanied these letters,* and beg to state that, thinking it probable I might be returning to Lahore soon after these documents reached me, I considered that the information regarding this, or previous correspondence of the kind, which it was Major Outram's wish that I should elicit from the Maharajah, could best be obtained in a personal conference, I have continued to think so, and thus, have *not attempted by other means, or through other persons*, to elucidate the doubts to which these intercepted papers give rise. I failed in my endeavours to trace the Cossids to their homes, as directed by Major Outram. The authenticity of these letters is yet matter of some doubt to me, as it was to Major Outram when sending them. My expressing an opinion, therefore, can serve no practical end, nor do I think that the question *can at any time be well judged of here.*"—(p. 446, B. B.)

This letter shews, that Mr. Clerk was not fully satisfied of the authenticity of the intercepted letter,

* Viz :—The letter in question, that from Nusseer Khan to Sawun Mull, and another of no moment.

that he could not examine into the matter effectually except at Lahore, to which place he had not then returned ; that consequently he had taken no steps in the inquiry ; that having been unable to form an opinion it was needless to express one, and lastly, that he " did not think the question could at any time be well "judged of here," i.e., Simla, where he then was. Why are the last words of Mr. Clerk's letter suppressed ? What is there in the language, or honest purport of that letter, to justify Colonel Outram in bringing forward Mr. Clerk's doubts and his authority, as if conclusive against Sir Charles Napier ? Had every word of it been written to Sir Charles Napier, and whether kept back from Lord Ellenborough, or forwarded to him, what possible evil could arise, since the whole amounted only to a simple disclaimer from Mr. Clerk of having formed an opinion, or of having the means to form one ?

Colonel Outram's course is, by suppressing some essential words, and also the plain purport of Mr. Clerk's letter, to give to that gentleman's opinions a meaning never intended by himself, and then to suggest broadly, that such (*misrepresented*) opinions were also sent to Sir Charles Napier, and contemptuously disregarded by him.

The authenticity of this letter from *Roostum to Shere Singh* occupies three pages, 75-6-7 of Colonel Outram's Commentary, but by some strange confusion, he refers, in the course of his argument, to Sir Charles Napier's letter of 18th November, respecting the authenticity of *Meer Nusseer Khan's letter to Beebruck Boogtie*.

The writers are distinct, namely, Roostum of Khyrpore, and Nusseer of Hyderabad. The persons to whom they are addressed are distinct, viz. : the

Maharajah of the Sikhs, and a Chief of the Boogties. The times when they were intercepted are distinct, one being on 28th April, 1842, the other about September, 1842. And the persons who sent them in, as charges against the Ameers, are also distinct; for Colonel Outram himself supplied the one, and Lieutenant Mylne the other. If Colonel Outram brings forward the extract from Sir Charles Napier's letter of 18th November, as bearing upon the question of Roostum's letter, it is confusion of fact, for it has no relation to it whatever; if, as a separate instance of Sir Charles Napier's pre-determination to believe the letter to Beebruck authentic, it is confusion of argument, for Colonel Outram in p. 74, admits that he himself thought "it might be authentic," yet he just before ridiculed Sir Charles Napier's measures for testing more closely that authenticity; and now he blames him as having precipitately and even criminally assumed it. The reader will observe too, that all the proofs which (up to the 12th November, when Colonel Outram left Sind) induced *him* to think the "letter might be authentic" were equally before Sir Charles Napier, who had also such further evidence, as a comparison of the Seals afforded, when the Secret Seal with Chotram's hand-writing was obtained on 18th November,—evidence which Colonel Outram never saw.

There is one more point to be noticed in this part of the Commentary. He says: "My suspicions of Ali Moorad were recorded as early as May 1st, 1842, and on transmitting the intercepted letter ascribed to Meer Roostum on 30th October, I reiterated them as a reason for viewing with distrust, evidence proceeding from such a quarter."—(p. 75.) I have already shewn,* that his letter of 1st May does not

* See note, p. 78 *ante*.

name Ali Moorad. The letter of 30th October does not refer to Roostum's letter to Shere Singh, of April, 1842, but to a letter, and a treaty written in a Koran, and sent to Nusseer of Hyderabad in the end of October. He does, as he states, express in the beginning of his letter, suspicion of evidence coming through a person "interested in Meer Ali Moorad's favour," but he also, in the *end* of his letter, makes an essential statement, which is suppressed in his Commentary, viz., "*To all appearance the Documents are genuine, and the accompanying intelligence marked B, received through a totally different channel, which is not likely to have any collusion with Meer Ali Moorad's agent, confirms the fact of an interchange of Korans between Meers Roostum and Nusseer Khan; and the circumstance of the Seals of the other Ameers, mentioned by this informant, not being attached, as he represented, tends to prove that there is no collusion, and that Major Clibborn's informant had obtained correct information of the receipt and despatch of the Korans, but had had no access to them, which indeed it is not likely he could have obtained.*"— (p. 430, B. B.)

Thus, he tries to impress on his reader's mind, that the evidence (the letters and treaty) was to be distrusted, and that he took care to make Sir Charles Napier fully aware of that fact. Such is the statement in the present Commentary. His original letter tells Sir Charles Napier, that some suspicion may attach to the evidence under one aspect; but that the reasons for believing it *authentic, are stronger*. Such is the statement in the Blue Book, and *not* in the Commentary.

§. 19.

Colonel Outram opens his fourth section by calling attention to "one essential point:" "The previous

“ policy of the British Government, as fixed and guaranteed by the treaty of the 11th March, 1839, had been to recognise each Ameer as independent, and irresponsible for the acts of others. Sir Charles adopted a different resolution: ‘ I was resolved, when there was a breach of treaty, whether great or small, I would hold ALL the Ameer’s responsible, and would not be played off like a shuttlecock, and told this was done by one Ameer, that by another, and so have a week’s inquiry to find out who was responsible for the aggression.’ ”* Then follows a charge against Sir Charles Napier of having thus laid down a principle, equally opposed to the dictates of justice, to the stipulations of treaties, and to the intentions of the Governor General.”—(p. 80, Com.)

Now for the real facts. The treaty with the *Hyderabad* Ameer’s recognizes them as independent of each other. The policy at that time was to deprive Noor Mahomed of the chieftainship then existing, and this was done for our own interest, *not* that of the Ameer’s. (See pp. 121, 167, 173, 178, B.B.) Colonel Outram himself proposed in June, 1842, to annul this policy, and to give the turban to *one* of the Ameer’s, to render him, “ the executive administrator of the general government of the country,” and he gives reasons similar to those of Sir Charles Napier, namely, the difficulty of transacting business with them, and their system of shifting the responsibility upon one another. This interference with “ the stipulations of treaties ” was proposed three months before Sir Charles Napier went to Sind (p. 347, B.B.); and he again, on 22nd January, 1843, suggests to Sir Charles the expediency of electing a Rais, or Chief of Lower Sind, (p. 15, Sup. B.B.)

* The words ending the sentence are omitted by Colonel Outram, viz.: “ for I at once saw, on arriving in Sind, that this hide-and-seek shifting responsibility was the game which the Ameer’s had been playing.”—(p. 114, Sup. B.B.)

Next as to the Ameers of *Upper Sinde*. There was *no such policy*. The treaty is made with Roostum alone, as chief. Colonel Outram cites the 5th Article (p. 80), as if it expressed the policy of the British Government towards all the Ameers of Upper and Lower Sinde, whereas it is taken from the *Hyderabad Treaty*, and the 7th Article (corresponding to it) in the *Khyrpore Treaty*, refers to Roostum *alone*. (p. 118, B.B.) This shews that there were two systems of policy—one to divide and render independent of each other, the Ameers of Lower Sinde; the other, to recognize, and treat with, a single Chief (Roostum), as head of the Upper Sinde Ameers. Subsequently, separate agreements were made with the three other Ameers of Upper Sinde, securing to them their possessions, and the friendly alliance of the British Government, as in the treaty with Roostum, but not recognising their separate independence. Further, the 5th and 7th Articles really amount only to a declaration, that the British Government would not interfere with the internal Government of each Ameer, within his own possessions, but by no means exempted them from responsibility for breaches of treaty. Lastly, these words of Sir Charles Napier were written in August, 1843, six months after the conquest of the country, in a paper headed “*Recollections of Conversations and Circumstances,*” and they are specially applied to the Upper Sinde Ameers, who were *not* separately independent, but subordinate to Roostum, as chief. The object was, plainly, to baffle this system of evasion, and insure a disclosure of the guilty person, by the apprehension of common danger operating on men, who were acting in intimate relation with each other. *In fact*, however, Sir Charles Napier did not proceed on this principle, for his complaints of breach of treaty or

wrong, are always addressed to the individual he believed to have committed it.

In p. 81-2-3, Colonel Outram collects all the circumstances that he imagines must have caused alarm to the Ameers, (Sir Charles Napier's imputed violent conduct being, of course, most prominently stated), yet, he tells us, in noting the "daily intelligence," he considered "all their measures and preparations, however, are "merely defensive, and will lead to nothing offensive." He then avers, that, "a few words courteously and "kindly uttered would have sufficed" to remove this alarm. "Without compromising himself or the Government, he might in general terms have informed them, that some were to be visited with no penalty whatever; and that even those who had rendered themselves amenable to punishment, would be lightly dealt with, for he was aware that such were the arrangements contemplated up to that period."

This intelligence of the 6th November, (of which he gives only the introductory sentence, stating his own opinion), is full of hostile plans and arrangements of the Ameers. The reader is requested to refer to it, in p. 433, &c. B.B. I aver, that Sir Charles Napier could not, with any propriety, have done what, it is here alleged, he ought to have done, and also, that he was not "aware that such were the arrangements." All these hostile steps took place *before the 6th November*. The charges against the Ameers, upon which their treatment was to depend, were sent to Lord Ellenborough on the 25th of October. He did not consider and decide upon them till the 4th of November. That decision, and the treaty founded on it, did not reach Sir Charles Napier till the 12th of November; and it was six days later than that, before he was so fully convinced of the genuineness of the intercepted letters, as to act upon that belief; and even then, he asks for Lord Ellenborough's decision as to proposing the treaty.

To have stated before the 6th of November, conditions he did not know till the 12th, was scarcely practicable; and even if he had guessed their nature, to have opened it to the Ameers before his final instructions had arrived, would have been most imprudent. If his guess were wrong, or Lord Ellenborough's final decision had varied from his first intentions, that course might have compromised both himself and the Government very seriously.

§. 20.

In p. 85, Colonel Outram mentions that Roostum sought a meeting with the General, and the 14th of November was fixed for it, but Roostum "deferred his visit on the plea of sickness," (had he said, "broke the engagement on the *false* plea of sickness," it would have been the truth), that Sir Charles knew, through his "intelligence department," this was caused partly by Ali Moorad's advice, "and partly, as he (Roostum) expressed himself confidentially to Jeth Sing, his correspondent at the Agency, 'by desire of the other Chiefs, as in case of any misunderstanding in the course of the negotiation, he might be made a prisoner.' A more pungent comment on the offensive nature of Sir Charles Napier's demeanour, and of the distrust of his intentions which it had produced, could hardly be furnished than the existence of such an apprehension." That the plea of illness was false, appears in p. 448-9, B.B. The allegation, that the *Chiefs* advised Roostum not to go to the meeting, lest he might be made prisoner, (though so stated by Roostum), is not true, according to the intelligence. The meaning of the passage therein is, that the Chiefs feared their interests would be betrayed, if Roostum was guided by the advice of Futteh Mahomed Ghoree, in any consultation with the General; their appre-

hensions related to his influence. The words of the intelligence shew this; and it is further corroborated by the fact, that Futteh Mahomed Ghoree was expressly excluded from the council, in which this advice was given. No apprehension was expressed about Sir Charles Napier making Roostum a prisoner.* The fear of being made a prisoner, was, therefore, either a false pretence, or the offspring solely of Roostum's own mind. But that, or any other hollow foundation, can afford base enough for an imputation against Sir C. Napier. Colonel Outram omits to add, though the words *immediately* follow the part he cites, that the answer of Jeth Sing,—this very confidential agent,—was, “I cannot be security that such might not occur; but my *belief* is, that the English Sahib *has no idea of the kind*; and further, that, as the head of the Talpoorees, it would have been better if you had decided on meeting the head representative of the British Government.”—(p. 450, B.B.) To have given these words would have deprived the pungent comment of its sting, and Colonel Outram of his scoff.

§. 21.

Colonel Outram says, all the chiefs had “invested Meer Ali Morad, with full powers to treat with the British General. Sir Charles Napier's intelligence of the 13th November apprised him of this circum-

* Intelligence from Sukkur, November 12th, 1842.—“My report of yesterday mentioned the intention of Meer Roostum to leave Khyrpore for Roree in a day or two, for the purpose of having an interview with the General. At 8 p.m. of the evening of the 10th, the following Chiefs sat in council (at which Futteh Mahomed Ghoree was not allowed to be present), viz.: Meer Roostum, Meer Ali Moorad, Meer Nusseer Khan, Meer Ali Murdan, Meer Jan Khan, Meer Shere Mahomed. The Chiefs addressed themselves to Meer Roostum, saying, ‘You have, agreeably to the advice you have received from Futteh Mahomed Ghoree, expressed your intention of visiting Roree, and consulting with the General. It is our decided opinion, that if you attend to that man's (Futteh Mahomed) advice, we shall all be betrayed.’”—(p. 449, B.B.)

“ stance, as also of the true cause of Meer Roostum’s
 “ hesitation to meet him. The General was not *then**
 “ in possession of any information, which could have
 “ led him to doubt that Ali Moorad was acting as the
 “ friend, as well as the Envoy of his brethren,” (p. 86,
 Com.) The “ intelligence,” generally treated as so
 unworthy of trust, is here made good evidence, to shew
 that Sir Charles Napier knew, through it, what was
 passing in the councils of the Ameers ; lower down, it
 is treated as not only bringing these matters to his
 knowledge, but, as being equivalent to regular cre-
 dentials presented by Ali Moorad ; for there is no official,
 or other mention of such appointment, except in this
 intelligence. “ When Sir C. Napier had become
 “ aware of the *ambassadorial functions*, with which he
 “ (Ali) had been invested”—“ the interview with his
 “ *accredited agent* being thus declined.”—(p. do.)

The meeting was demanded by Ali, on the 12th, the
 words of the reply shew that Sir C. Napier considered
 the meeting with Roostum as still to take place.
 There is not a word to shew that Ali demanded a
 meeting as *Envoy from the Chiefs* ; and lastly, the
 statement that he was such, does not appear in the
 “ Intelligence” till the 13th, so that Sir Charles did
 not know of it, even through that indirect channel, till
 the *day after* Ali asked for an interview ; and it was
 not “ declined,” but the answer to his request was
 merely postponed, and a fair reason given for that
 postponement, (p. 448-9, B. B.) But we are told Sir
 C. Napier had not *then* (*i. e.* on 13th Nov.) any
 reason to doubt that Ali Moorad was the friend as well
 as Envoy of his brethren. In p. 75, Com. I find Col.
 Outram alleging that as early as the *first of May*, he
recorded his suspicions of Ali Moorad, and *reiterated*
them to Sir C. Napier on the 30th of October. Again,

* Col. Outram’s Italics.

in p. 110, he says, "Of all this Sir C. Napier was "aware; against Ali Moorad's intrigues he had *been* "warned; the interest the latter had in maligning "his brethren *had been fully pointed out to him*; and "he *knew* that his unprincipled visitor had sought the "interview, in the *sacred character of an Ambassador*, "deputed by his confiding brethren to attend to their "common interests." Thus, Sir C. Napier was referred to the May warning about Ali's treacherous motives; in October, was again told of them: on 13th November, had *no information to make him aware* of them: and is again asserted, to have known them perfectly, during the very time these transactions were taking place.

These contradictions are not to be explained as the mere errors of collation, or investigation into a mass of documentary matter, for they relate to one simple fact, wholly within Colonel Outram's own knowledge at the time—that is, had or had not Sir C. Napier any information to render him suspicious of Ali Moorad's good faith towards his brethren? If he had, why does Colonel Outram, (in p. 86,) say he had not? If he had not, why does he (in pp. 75 and 110, Com.) say he had?

§. 22.

In several places, Col. Outram indulges in fine composition, especially about Roostum, (p. 87); whether from the spirit of authorship, or to engage the sympathy of unwary readers against Sir Charles Napier, I do not determine; but if the latter, then it is hoped, that those who may read these remarks, will have their attention so far awakened as to refer to the dry, matter-of-fact statements in the "Intelligence" respecting Roostum and his brethren.

There is another eloquent passage, (p. 91,) about

Hoossein's advice, to wait "till an advance (on "Khyrpore) was really made, and then, when all hope "had fled, and not before, to cut the throats of their "wives,—a horrible procedure, but one, not uncommon y had recourse to in Asia, when chiefs of "distinction are driven to despair; for theirs is a "pride that deems death* far preferable to dishonour, "&c." and ending with an inquiry, whether "*had the deed been perpetrated,*" Sir C. Napier would not "have been *more guilty* than the Ameers." I have to add to this fine language and the charitable suggestion it introduces, merely three facts.

The Ameers of Lower Sinde talked in the same strain, when Sir John Keane's army threatened to attack them in 1838; and appear to have even made Sir Henry Pottinger believe they were in earnest, (p. 201, B.B.)—but they cut no throats. When Sir C. Napier *did* move in the direction of Khyrpore, they cut no throats. And when real danger came upon them, before and at Meeanee, they did not cut a single wife's throat. Thus, happily Sir Charles Napier escaped this guilt—and so, according to Burns' song, did Maggie, whose "menacing and repulsive treatment" drove poor Duncan Grey, ("for his was "a pride that deemed death far preferable" to ill-requited love) to such despair that he—" *spak o'louping o'er a linn.*"

§. 23.

In p. 92-3, Colonel Outram, while accusing General William Napier of confusing dates, and undertaking to correct him, does himself confuse dates and misreport facts, in a way, that it would take more tedious detail to unravel, than the points deserve. His aim is, to shew that Sir Charles Napier's disobedience of the Governor-General's orders, and his delay in

* That is, their wives' death.

presenting the treaty, were the causes of all the hostile measures in which the Ameers had engaged up to that time; measures which, he avers, were taken merely in self-defence, and rendered "*absolutely necessary*,"* by the General's conduct.

As to the nature and extent of the hostile preparations, the reader must be referred to the intelligence in the Blue Book, as it is much too extensive to be copied here. As to the presentation of the treaty having been delayed, the short history is this: On the 12th November, the draft of the treaty reached Sir Charles Napier, together with letters of instruction as to its basis and conditions. He was to satisfy himself that the breaches of former treaty had been committed, before he acted on the new draft-treaty. Many of these were undisputed, and, in Lord Ellenborough's opinion, rendered it "*absolutely necessary*" to "*impose penalties*" upon them.—(p. 437, B.B.) Some, (the treasonable letters) were yet in doubt; and those Sir Charles Napier was then investigating. On 18th November, he was satisfied that Nusseer's letter was authentic; and, on 23d November, that Roostum's also was authentic. In communicating this opinion immediately to Lord Ellenborough, he, at the same time, sent to him all the documents and other original proofs upon which it was founded; and he requested to have Lord Ellenborough's judgment upon these proofs, saying, if they were deemed sufficient to act upon, he would lose no time in proposing the draft of the new treaty to the Ameers. He added, that the time spent in the inquiry was not lost; "because one cannot be too cautious in securing firm moral ground, on which to have the defence of whatever events may arise;" and he gives also prudential

* Colonel Outram's italics.

military reasons for the same opinion. — (p. 455, B. B.)

On the 30th of November, he received Lord Ellenborough's answer, to say, that he thought "no delay" should take place in communicating to the Ameers "the ultimate decision of the British Government" with respect to the revision of our engagements "with them, which their conduct has compelled us" to demand." — (p. 457, B. B.) Sir Charles had then, (30th November) already prepared translations of the draft-treaty, and of Lord Ellenborough's letters to the Ameers, which were to be sent off the next day (1st December) — (p. 462, B. B.) On that day, he sent to inform the Ameers, that he had received the draft-treaty, and orders to present it to them; and requested them to appoint persons to meet the officers, who were to settle the minor arrangements thereof. On 3rd of December, he sent an officer to Roostum, to arrange a day and hour on which the treaty should be presented to him. — (p. 2, 3, Sup. B. B.) On the 4th of December, the treaty was presented to Roostum; and, on the 6th, to the Hyderabad Ameers. — (p. 463, 467, B. B.) The reader will now judge whether there was any needless or unjustifiable delay in presenting the treaty. Let this be contrasted with the conduct of the Ameers. Immediately on receiving the treaty, in the first week of December, they *said* they would accept it, but never *did sign* it till the 12th of February; and, in the intermediate time, collected troops, and arranged hostile plans.

As to Sir C. Napier's disobedience of Lord Ellenborough's orders, the general reply to that charge is to be found in these words of his despatch to the Secret Committee on 13th March, 1843. "Sir Charles" "Napier had my instructions more than three months" "before the battle of Meeanee. He was, during all

“that period, at the head of a preponderating force; but acting with extreme forbearance, in the true spirit of a generous soldier, he earnestly endeavoured to effect the objects of the Government without using the military means at his disposal. The firmness of the language he adopted, and the energy of his measures, were best calculated to control a barbarous Durbar; and had the Amgurs been entirely masters over their own troops, it seems to be doubtful, even now, whether he would not have effected his purpose and carried the treaty into execution, without actual hostilities. The events which have occurred give to Sir Charles Napier the peculiar glory which attends the most decisive success in war, obtained in the prosecution of measures, which had for their object the preservation of peace.”—(p. 516, B.B.)

This is not the language of a man who believed his authority had been abused, and his orders disobeyed.

§. 24.

In p. 94, Colonel Outram, when referring to General William Napier's book, says, “That Roostum's son ‘wrote to the Boordees and other tribes to be ready,’ is simply a fiction of the General's. With the exception of a report in the ‘Intelligence,’ of the 12th Nov., *two days previous to that fixed for the interview,** (with Sir Charles Napier,) that Mahomed Hoossein had sent for two Boordee Chiefs to confer with them, the first reference to that tribe occurs in the Intelligence, of the 1st December, a fortnight after the Khyrpore consultation.” The very exception he states shews that what was “simply a fiction,” had truly a foundation. The words in the Intelligence are, “Meer Mahomed Hoossein has *written* to call in the Boordee Chiefs, Shere Mahomed Boordee and Emaum Buksh Juttooe, to confer with them.” “Meer Mahomed Hoossein, now united with Meer Ali Moorad, remains at Mungulwalla, by advice, for the purpose of collecting the *Beloochees* in that quarter.”—(p. 449. B.B.)

* Italics by Colonel Outram.

This certainly was not *writing* to them, but seems enough to justify General William Napier's statement, (when taken in connexion with the previous fact, that Hoossein had *written* to the Boordee Chiefs,) that "Roostum's son wrote to the *Boordee* and *other* tribes, to be ready." Colonel Outram tries to shew the harmlessness of this proceeding, by saying it was "*two days previous to that fixed for the interview.*" These words he prints in italics, to lead the reader to suppose that, of course, no hostility on the part of the Ameers existed at that time; but he does not tell the reader, what the "Intelligence" states, namely, that the determination to break the engagement was taken by Roostum on the *evening of the 10th*, and that Hoossein's writing to the Boordee chiefs, is stated immediately after that information, and, apparently, as one of its results.

Lastly, as to this being the first mention of the Boordee tribe, see p. 436, B.B., where, intelligence of 5th Nov., signed by Colonel Outram, says, "Jan " Mahomed Toonia was sent this morning from Roree " by Futteh Mahomed to Shere Mahomed Boordee, " (one of the very chiefs named above) to keep them " ready for any thing that might be required of them." If the accuracy and validity of Colonel Outram's proofs, bore any proportion to the boldness of his accusations, the latter would indeed seem formidable.

§. 25.

Through several pages (95-6-7-8), Colonel Outram tries to shew that there were no serious armaments, or plans of a hostile nature, up to a certain date, not very clearly stated, but which seems to have been the middle of November; and that, after that time, their armaments were still insignificant, and only in self-defence. The intelligence in the Blue Book, on

this point, is much too full to be cited here ; but some of the leading facts, with their dates, shall be given. See the following pages of it. Page 430. Colonel Outram's letter, with the treaty between Roostum and Nusseer of Hyderabad, written in the Koran, and the hostile letter of Roostum. P. 432. On 26th October the intelligence, gives information, respecting a similar treaty (offensive and defensive) having been sent from Lower Sinde ; also, of preparations for putting all the fighting men in order for sudden service. P. 433. On 27th to raise the fighting men in the direction of Larkhana. On 28th. Pledges of support from Nusseer of Hyderabad to Roostum. 30th. Roostum's efforts to engage Ali Moorad in hostility to the English. P. 434. To ask Nusseer's advice as to calling the whole of the fighting men into Khyrpore. 1st Nov. Union among the Ameers supposed to be attained, and if territory should be demanded, immediately to prepare for hostilities. 2nd Nov. Preparations to remove their families to forts in the desert and other places. P. 435. Wullee Mahomed Chandia, commanding 5000 men of the Hyderabad force, but capable of being raised to 16,000, ordered to resist the entrance of any British force into the territory about Larkhana. 3rd Nov. Roostum makes Ali Moorad his commander-in-chief, the Ameers being now all reconciled. All the commanders were instructed to act immediately on the receipt of Roostum's orders. Resolution not to pay any more tribute, as the English had been driven out of Affghanistan. 5th Nov. English said to be prostrate with sickness, and but a handful compared with what the Ameers could bring into the field. Futteh Mahomed Ghoree proposed, that in case of hostilities, a religious war should be proclaimed, P. 436. Patans, who came down with General England's army, offered service under

Roostum, and numbers accepted it. Boordees, under Shere Mahomed Boordee, to be kept ready for service. All the above intelligence is supplied by Colonel Outram himself. The interview was not proposed to Sir C. Napier till the 9th, four days after the latest date of the above intelligence. It will be remembered, that Sir C. Napier agreed to hold the meeting on the 14th, and Roostum determined, on the evening of the 10th, to break the engagement, on the false plea of illness, but really, because he and the chiefs changed their plans. Meer Khan Jan, the confidential agent of Nusseer of Hyderabad, made a similar request for an interview, and when it was granted, in like manner broke his appointment, p. 448.—P. 449. Decision of the Ameers in Council, on the 10th of Nov. to put off Roostum's engagement to meet Sir C. Napier. Boordee chiefs written to by Meer Hoossein. The Beloochees to be collected at Mungulwalla. Nov. 13, Nusseer of Hyderabad writes to Roostum, that he was sending off to his assistance a force under his own son, and Meer Hoossein Ali. P. 450. Shere Mahomed made chief of the forces in the Hyderabad direction, and promises to supply 16,000 men, independent of the other Ameers. This Ameer afterwards fought the battle of Hyderabad in March, and brought above 20,000 men into the field. He had not had any demand made on him for territory, or for any new arrangement. On the 18th of Feb. (p. 47, Sup. B.B.) he was offered security and alliance, if he would disband his forces, after the battle at Meeanee, on 17th, which place he had not been able to reach in time for the action. Sir C. Napier, in compliance with Colonel Outram's advice, and assurance that Shere Mahomed would keep quiet, made the above offer to him, and abstained from noticing his misconduct. The battle of

Hyderabad was the result ; for, instead of disbanding his troops, he employed the next five weeks in collecting more, and after he was defeated, renewed his attempts, though repeatedly warned of his danger. (p. 92, Sup. B. B.) See also Nos. 82, 83, 89, 92, 98, 100. Do.

But to proceed with the intelligence of hostile plans : In p. 98, Com., as proof that, on the 13th of *November*, the Ameers of *Hyderabad* "entertained no hostile " designs," he cites Captain Mylne's report, *of that date*, stating, that he could not learn that messages were sent to any of the tribes, nor that the Ameers meditated the collection of troops. But this intelligence, sent by Captain Mylne, is *really only up to the 9th* ; that of the 13th, given in the same document, relates to the *Khyrpore* Ameers, and comes from Mr. Brown, whose name is signed to it. Further, Colonel Outram, who had arrived at Hyderabad, does *himself* give the intelligence from that place, from 10th *November to the 15th*. Thus, having misdated Captain Mylne's report, by affixing to it the date of Mr. Brown's report, he suppresses *his own* totally ; in which, on this very 13th of November, he writes, " The Jam of the Jockyas, who is at present at Hyderabad, has been, I am informed, enjoined to look " after the country between this and Kurrachee ; but, " with the exception of the Chandias, I cannot learn " that any of the Belooch tribes have been warned."—p. 448, 450. If there were no hostility, why was this injunction given to the Jam of the Jockyas ? and why was even the Chandia tribe warned ? and why does Colonel Outram suppress his own report ?—(P. 452). Revenue collected with much violence about Larkhana. In Colonel Outram's book (p. 97-8), an extract from the intelligence of the 15th of November is given, to prove that there was no serious collection of troops,

though the very extract itself shews that the fighting men of the villages and towns had been long warned to be ready for service. To have given further and fuller extracts from the intelligence of that date and the following days, would not accord with this alleged peaceful temper of the Ameers. I will, however, add the substance of some of these items of intelligence, viz. p. 452, B. B.—That Ahmed Khan and other chiefs were marching on Khypore with “several “thousand men;” that the Ameers had pressed Mahomed Saddeeg of Shawl, a chief beyond the Bolan Pass, to join them at Khypore, where he would be received with “honour and liberal service;” that “Patan “horsemen cross the river daily in small bodies, and “obtain immediate service with the Ameers;” 2500 troops with Roostum at Abad; November 16th, 700 more men joined Roostum; 18th, Nusseer of Hyderabad promises to send 15,000 men to Khypore. Chiefs of the Moomria and Jockya tribes summoned to Hyderabad, treated with great distinction, and certain districts confided to their care. Sawun Mull of Mooltan (the Sikh chief) enlisting troops daily, repairing his fort extensively, building a new one, and making preparations against a siege. 20th, the distant villages warned to send in their men to Khypore; Hoossein sends 400 men to his father Roostum; message to the Ameers of Hyderabad, “not to delay one “instant in sending their contingent, in order that it “may be ready;” “a strong garrison to be placed in “and around Bubberlow,—a large body of men to “delay any advance.” P. 461.—Nov. 24.—Meer Mahomed Hoossein came to his father with 1000 men and 2 guns. P. 462.—Nov. 26.—The fort of Mungree said to be strong, “having guns, ammunition, “and a garrison, ready for the English, if they approach Khypore. Bubberlow is also in a state of “defence.” P. 464.—Mahomed Hoossein, with 2 guns,

and about 2000 Beloochees, arrived in Khyrpore, on 30th November. The Kardar of Boordee arranged with Roostum, to raise the whole of the Hill Beloochees in the direction of the Boordee country. P. 465.—2d Dec.—Horsemen sent in various directions to assemble the Beloochees, and direct them to repair to Khyrpore. Dec. 2.—Chief with 100 horse, others with 200 horse, arrived in Khyrpore, where the force was daily augmented, no armed man or Belooch that arrived there being allowed to leave without taking service; “Meer Mahomed Hoosseïn was collecting a “very large force.” Ali Moorad discharged a number of Sikh and Patan horsemen, all of whom were immediately taken into the service of Hoosseïn and Nusseer. All this is reported to have taken place *prior* to the presentation of the treaty.

Between the 4th and the 20th of December, there are not less than twenty-four notices of the collection of troops, and of orders for their assembling from nearly all quarters. It is needless to cite further, even their substance: they will be found from p. 465 to 482, B. B. They supply a large mass of evidence, opposed to Colonel Outram’s assurances of the generally peaceful and submissive temper of the Ameers. He, ordinarily, treats all such intelligence lightly, setting it aside by a few vague or peremptory contradictions; or he omits all notice of it. The reader may, however, think it of some importance, if for no better reason than that Colonel Outram seems to have little scruple about citing it, whenever its statements appear to *bear out his present views*.

§. 26.

In p. 100, Colonel Outram, when contesting some remarks by General William Napier, referring to the

period of assembling the army of reserve on the Sutledge, says, "So far as Sindh was concerned, no deep conspiracy was ever hatched,—nothing resembling one. Petty intrigues might, and doubtless did occur, during our Affghan disasters; but the return of our armies in triumph was the signal for their cessation."

I believe, that the extracts already given from Colonel Outram's letters, and the references to the "intelligence" during April, May, June, and July, 1842, are sufficient answers to this broad assertion.* I have no means of meeting such absolute assurances, as he gives to his readers, except by a general reference to all the information collected at the time, from day to day; the means of collecting which, were organised by Colonel Outram; the information was for his use, and that of the Government, and the whole was transmitted to the Government by him. The facts of that intelligence would form a pamphlet, and to give even the substance shortly, would swell these remarks much beyond their present size,—already too large.

Further on he says, "Before Sir Charles Napier entered the country, all hostile machinations had been frustrated;—profound tranquillity prevailed. This is a fact notorious to all in India, of which the Indian Government at home are well aware, and of which the Governor of Sindh cannot be ignorant."—(p. 100.)

Sir Charles landed at Kurrachee on the 9th of September, with his staff-officers, and some troops as a reinforcement, sent in consequence of Sir George Arthur's Minute of 2nd September, (p. 352, B. B.) declaring that the hostile spirit of the Ameers, (and even, in one instance, an overt act of hostility) rendered such precautions necessary. Sir George Arthur cites the intelligence of August in proof of his opinion, and of the extent and serious nature of the designs against

* See Section 7, ante.

the British Government. It must be mentioned too, that this "intelligence," these "digests of the Sindh agencies," to which he refers, were made in August, but are not given in the B. B., so that Sir George Arthur had then, still more evidence of their hostility, than I am able to refer to now. As these "digests" were however made under Colonel Outram's authority, *he* cannot have been ignorant of the state of Sindh *immediately* before Sir Charles Napier entered it.

§. 27.

In his fifth section, Colonel Outram examines the events connected with Roostum's resignation of the Turban to Ali Moorad. One prominent design of the examination is to shew the deep-laid schemes, by which Ali Moorad made Sir Charles Napier his dupe, and Roostum his victim. He tells us that Ali's claim to the Turban (after his brother Roostum's death) was more in accordance with the custom of the country than the claim of Roostum's son; that, moreover, Ali was better qualified for the office, both as regarded our interest and that of the country; and, "as at that time, Meer Roostum and his family were believed to entertain no friendly feelings towards the British, I had no hesitation in recommending the recognition of the claims of the former, 'on the demise of 'Roostum.' This I did on the 21st of April, 1842." —(p. 104, Com.) His suspicion of Roostum rested, he says, "on the intercepted letters before referred to," and the more he examined the evidence of their authenticity, the more he was led to believe they were fabricated by Ali Moorad's agents, to prejudice the claim of Roostum's son to the Turban. He pointed out the suspicious channel through which the letter had been obtained, and recommended Sir Charles Napier to receive with distrust evidence against Roostum coming

from the same quarter.—(p. do.) I have already (in section 18) shewn the inaccuracy of this statement about the letters, but as he repeats it here, the answer shall be repeated. The letter which chiefly criminated Roostum was that to Shere Singh, Maharajah of the Sikhs, intercepted in April, 1842 (called No. 3 in p. 71 of these Remarks.) To the authenticity of this letter were directed Lord Ellenborough's, Mr. Clerk's, Sir C. Napier's, Colonel Outram's, Captain Postans', and Mr. Brown's investigations. In a former page (75), Colonel Outram tells us this letter was "obtained from a party in the interest of Ali Moorad," and that his suspicions of him were recorded so early as the 1st of May, 1842. I have shewn that, in that letter (to Mr. Clerk), there is not the least mention of any connexion between Ali Moorad and the party who obtained the letter, nor is Ali's name even once mentioned.—(p. 324, B. B.) The "party" is said to be inimical to Roostum, but is *not* said to be Ali Moorad or any one in connection with him. On the present occasion this failing evidence is not brought forward, but a quotation from his own letter of the 30th of October is given, to shew he then warned Sir Charles Napier as to the authenticity of the "intercepted letters;" this, to the Maharajah, being the most essential one, and being thus included in the terms, "intercepted letters." Now, Colonel Outram's letter, of the 30th October, has no reference whatever to his doubts of the authenticity of *that* letter (Roostum to the Maharajah): the warning is given to Sir Charles respecting *another*, a *totally different letter*, and a *treaty* between Roostum and Nusseer of Hyderabad. By always speaking of Roostum's "letters," in the plural and conjointly, he makes the evidence of his own doubts about the one, appears to be also evidence of

his doubts about the other, on which it has no bearing whatever. On both occasions too, (p. 75 and 105, Com.) when referring to the doubts and warning contained in his own letter of 30th October, he totally suppresses the end of that letter, in which he gives strong reasons for believing his own *doubts were wrong*, and the *intercepted letter* therein mentioned, *genuine*.
—(See p. 430, B. B.)

He proceeds to say, the recognition of Ali's claim "was in no way dependent on the authenticity of the intercepted letters; though, doubtless, the *suspicion of hostile views*, on the part of his rival, *might have afforded us grounds for congratulation*, that he was "the *more eligible candidate*."—(p. 105, Com.) Neither the positive assertion, nor the dainty phraseology of the above sentence, can overrule the following explicit words in Colonel Outram's letter of 30th October. "These documents, (the letter and treaty) "may be useful, should they prove genuine, to set "aside the claims of the latter (Roostum's sons) for "ever, which otherwise might embarrass you hereafter, if sufficient proof has not already been afforded, "of the inimical proceedings of late of Meer Roostum Khan and his family." These plain words shew, that the authenticity of the documents *was* a matter of consideration, as proving hostility; and that such hostility *was* a material element in the question of the rival claims, since, by setting aside the claims of Roostum's sons "*for ever*," not only would Ali Moorad's personal claims be established, but the hereditary succession fixed in his family. Though Colonel Outram, on 30th October thus not only suggests to Sir Charles Napier, the probable expediency of "setting aside the "claims of Roostum's sons for ever," but also sends him "documents which may be useful," as a justification of that step, yet he does not scruple, (in p. 116, Comment.) to condemn Sir Charles Napier for "*artfully*"

proposing the same thing in December,—for “*a deliberate proposal to violate a just policy.*” Even if he had done so, he had Colonel Outram’s authority and advice for so doing ; but, in fact, Sir Charles did *not* propose it “*artfully,*” or at all. He simply asked Lord Ellenborough what *answer* he was to give to Ali, if the latter should ask the question.*

§. 28.

Although these remarks are intended to be only such an exposition, of the frequent self-contradicting arguments, and mis-statements or perversions of facts in Colonel Outram’s Commentary, as may deprive that officer’s rancorous accusations of Sir Charles Napier, of the authority which his military rank and presumed knowledge of India might otherwise be thought to confer, yet it may not be amiss to relieve the reader from the weariness of that exposition by an extract from the Commentary, of a more amusing character. In it, Colonel Outram unfolds the secret designs and councils of Ali Moorad, far too closely hidden for his dupe, Sir Charles Napier, to discover, and only to be penetrated by such a piercing intellect as shall now describe them in his own words. “Ali Moorad, however, was not cognizant of the bearings under which we viewed the question” (that of the chieftainship). “He had *long been aware* of the pre-
“ference with which we regarded his pretension to
“the office of Rais, when vacant by his brother’s
“death, but he neither knew the reasons for that pre-
“ference, nor was he certain of its permanence.† He
“*had learned* that the new treaty was to contain penal

* See this point more fully treated in § 30.

† On 30th of October, Colonel Outram told Sir Charles Napier he “*had not yet* thought it expedient to make known to either “party” the Governor-General’s favourable disposition towards Ali Moorad’s claim.

" clauses,* and the confiscation of the turban as well
 " as of territory might, *he thought*, be effected through
 " the instrumentality of the British authorities, on his
 " producing strong proofs of hostility, on the part of
 " Roostum.† While, therefore, *he hoped*, by rendering
 " his brother's family odious to the British government,
 " to effect his nephew Hoossein's exclusion from the
 " turban, and thereby remove the only obstacle which
 " existed to the gratification of his own ambition, he
 " *did not despair* of finding means of supplanting his
 " brother while yet alive, and unhappily a combination
 " of unfortunate circumstances enabled him to succeed,
 " beyond what may be supposed to have been ori-
 " ginally his most sanguine expectations. Sir Charles
 " Napier had not long taken up his residence at Suk-
 " kur, ere Ali Moorad appears to have discovered,
 " through his *hirelings*, the *peculiarities of the man he*
 " *had to deal with*. He learned that he was ignorant
 " of oriental customs, feelings, and modes of thinking.
 " He *knew* that he was prejudiced against the Ameers,
 " and this prejudice, he *readily saw*, might be made
 " to operate in his own favour. The General, he had
 " been told, was credulous and suspicious, yet fiery
 " and self-opinionated; and these were failings to
 " which he well understood how to address himself, for
 " he was proud,—and, as the result shewed, with good
 " reason,—of his capabilities in intrigue. *All that he*
 " *required was a personal interview, to enable him to*
 " *master the details of the character*, with the outlines
 " of which he was thus familiar, and to establish his
 " first parallels of approach to the General's favour.‡
 " We have seen *how artfully he contrived, with this*

* How? The interview with Sir Charles Napier was on the 23rd
 of November, and the new treaty was not presented to the Ameers
 till the 4th December, being *eleven days*, at least, *after* Ali Moorad
 had, as Colonel Outram asserts, "learned" the nature of the con-
 ditions. Lord Ellenborough's final decision, that the treaty was to
 be presented immediately, did not reach Sir Charles Napier himself
 till the 30th of November, *seven days* after the interview with Ali
 Moorad.

† Here it would seem that he knew, *before* the interview, what
 would be ruinous to Roostum's rights. A little further on, this
 knowledge is said to have been gained only *at the interview*.

‡ All this was to be done at one interview, and through an inter-
 preter! and it *was* done, and "*accurately*," too, as will be seen.

“ *object*, to have himself elected as the deputy of his brethren to negotiate with Sir C. Napier, and how insidiously he not only prevented the proposed interview with Roostum, which might have frustrated his plans, but by suggesting that treachery was intended, laboured to preclude the possibility of any future intercourse between them.* On the 23rd of November, he succeeded in obtaining an interview. His object was now gained. *Accurately did he take the moral and intellectual dimension of the man* in whose hands reposed the destinies of himself and his brethren; *he formed his plans while yet in the General's presence; and by his agency, he was resolved* they should be carried out. Nor did he over-estimate his resources. I subjoin the report of this interview, made by Sir C. Napier to the Governor-General. ‘ Sukkur, 23rd November, 1842. — My Lord, I this day had an interview with Meer Ali Moorad Khan. His object was to know if we would secure to him the turban or chieftaincy. As I have read all the papers on this subject which are in this office, I was not taken by surprise; and, knowing your Lordship's general policy, I felt no difficulty in replying to him, that your Lordship's intentions were to punish your enemies, and to support your friends in all that was just; that you adhered to treaties; that the treaties with the Ameers obliged us to protect each Ameer in his right; that the Chieftaincy of the Talpoors was Meer Roostum's during that Ameer's life; and, unless he forfeited the protection of your Lordship, it would be preserved to him, and, at his death,

* Not a word is there to shew this *artfulness* or its “ object,” in the only account we have of this transaction, namely, the “ Intelligence” of the 12th November (p. 449, B.B.). The suggestion of treachery is to be found only in Roostum's letter to Jeth Sing, and it is there mentioned as proceeding from “ the other Chiefs,” not Ali in particular. (p. 450, B.B.) It is curious, too, that a man so anxious to *prevent* a meeting, should, on the 18th of December, have sent a false message, in Roostum's name, requesting leave for him to take refuge in Sir C. Napier's camp. In p. 130, Commentary, Colonel Outram declares that “ no such message was ever sent”—i. e. by Roostum, and if not by him, then by Ali, for there was no other person to send it, and there is no doubt, that a *message* to that effect was delivered to Sir C. Napier.

“ ‘ would be transferred to Ali Moorad, if he continued to act loyally towards the British Government, because such was the treaty. He answered that he wanted only to know if we would protect Meer Roostum against him in an intrigue to get the Chieftaincy away from him (Ali Moorad), by nominating his son, Meer Mahomed Hoossein, to be Chieftain during his (Roostum’s) life. My answer was,—that it would be against the treaty for any one Ameer to defraud another of his right; and therefore Meer Roostum would not be permitted by the Governor-General to invest his son with the dignity in question,’ &c.* If Sir Charles Napier had no difficulty in replying to the cunning inquiries of his guest, the latter had as little in gathering from his replies, ample encouragement to proceed in his villany. He coveted the turban; it was to be obtained during Roostum’s life, *by a forfeiture on the part of the latter of the Governor-General’s protection:—that forfeiture he was resolved to effect.*† Ali Moorad departed to carry his designs into execution, congratulating himself on the dazzling prospect which the General had held out to him, and confident of success; while Sir Charles Napier proceeded to his desk, to communicate to the Governor-General the happy augury he had formed of the future. ‘ I hope what I have said will meet with your Lordship’s approbation. It does three things which are desirable :—

“ ‘ 1st. It is just. Ali Moorad has the right to the Turban, for his own life, after the death of Meer Roostum; and it promises to protect him in this right.

“ ‘ 2nd. It detaches Ali Moorad from any league among the Ameers, and consequently diminishes the chance of bloodshed.

“ ‘ 3rd. It lays a train to arrive at a point which I think should be urged, viz. that we should treat with one Ameer instead of a number.’

“ Little did he know of Ali Moorad’s character, if

* A few more lines from Sir C. Napier’s letter are omitted, as not bearing on the present subject.

† Colonel Outram’s italics.

“ he believed that Prince would wait till his brother’s death, when he had himself shewn him how it might be earlier obtained. He flattered himself that, by detaching Ali Moorad from the other Ameers, he had diminished the chance of bloodshed ! Grievous and fatal delusion ! While he thus fancied, he was treading the highway of an honourable and peaceful diplomacy, he had been beguiled into the tortuous paths which ultimately led to the bloody fields of Meeanee and Dubba !”—(p. 106, &c. Com.) The objections to certain parts of the above extract have been placed in notes, that nothing might impair the effect, on the reader’s mind, of this bold sketch of an eastern Mephistopheles, and of the sagacious diplomatist, who alone pierced “ the gloomy recesses of a mind capacious of such things.” How Colonel Outram discovered the wishes, and fears, and thoughts, and springing hopes of Ali Moorad ; and whether in his single interview, and by the aid of an interpreter, Ali Moorad was able to search out, and then beguile the frailties of Sir Charles Napier, I am less able to determine, than Hudibras was, in the case of Eve,

“ Whether the devil tempted her
“ By a High Dutch interpreter.”

There is one truth to be learned from the above extract, taken in connexion with certain opinions Colonel Outram once held. In a single interview, Ali Moorad, through his interpreter, “ accurately took the moral “ and intellectual dimension” of Sir Charles Napier, but after more than three months’ private and official intimacy with him, Colonel Outram, skilled as he is in detecting men’s inmost designs, failed to discover the mingled character of weakness and wickedness, his present work attempts to hold up to public scorn and condemnation. No interview was denied to him. No interpreter was needed. On 27th of January, his

matured opinion of his General is thus expressed :
 “ I am too glad of the honour of serving under you,
 “ and proud of your friendship and confidence, to
 “ require or wish for further advantage, so long as I
 “ continue with you.”* To myself, he wrote in May,
 1843, more than two months after he finally left Sir
 Charles Napier, about my “ noble brother,” and as
 one whose loss he would “ mourn almost as much as
 “ any member of his family.”†

If these were the opinions he truly held at the time,
 how much inferior in discernment to Ali Moorad does
 he appear. If they were not, then, indeed, there is
 still need for an interpreter.

§. 29.

In p. 114, and other parts of his present section,
 Colonel Outram attempts to shew that Roostum feared
 treachery and oppression from Sir Charles Napier, and
 with some apparent reason, “ for to the unfortunate
 “ Roostum not a word of assurance or friendly promise
 “ had been spoken, and he had little reason to believe
 “ that the General, who *spurned his amicable overtures*,
 “ *and insulted his grey hairs*, would hesitate to deprive
 “ him of his dignities or possessions.”

Sir Charles Napier advised him to go to Ali
 Moorad, but, at the same time, offered to send an escort
 to bring him to his own camp.—(Suppl. B.B., No. 10.)

These questions naturally arise here. If Roostum
 feared treachery and oppression from Sir C. Napier,
 why follow his advice, and go to Ali Moorad? If he
 feared Ali Moorad, why did he not accept Sir Charles’s
 offers, and go to his camp? If he feared them both,
 why take the advice of the one, and trust himself in
 the power of the other?

* See App. to Col. Outram’s work, p. 305.

† See App. to these Remarks, p. 137.

§. 30.

In page 116, Com., Sir Charles Napier is charged with having "artfully proposed to his Lordship, "fixing the succession in Ali Moorad's family, to "the exclusion of Hoossein! 'How far your Lordship would think it *justifiable* to promise that Ali Moorad's son should succeed to him, I cannot say: "the rightful heir at Ali Moorad's death, is his nephew, the son of Meer Roostum: as *I have no doubt that Ali will ask me this question, I should like to know your Lordship's decision.*' ""*

"*This deliberate proposal to violate that just policy, the maintenance of which he had declared to be the unbending resolve of the Governor-General, it is unnecessary to say was rejected by Lord Ellenborough.* His Lordship replied, that however he regretted and should wish to see changed, 'the unreasonable course of descent obtaining amongst the 'Talpoors,' he 'could not recognize the eldest son of Meer Ali Moorad as his successor, *in contravention of the very principle†* on which his father's 'rights are founded.'" The charge of an 'artful' and 'deliberate' proposal to violate a just policy, is broad enough. The passage from Sir C. Napier's letter, intended to establish it, may, perhaps, appear to the reader rather to prove Colonel Outram's animosity, than Sir Charles Napier's offence. It states the question, declares that Ali Moorad's son is *not* the rightful heir, and then asks for instruction from Lord Ellenborough, that he might be prepared to give an answer to Ali Moorad. If there be any leaning in it towards either side, it is rather for, than against Roostum's son. This appears, even from the passage as it is given; but Colonel Outram knew, that only *five lines* further back, Sir Charles spoke of Roostum's having gone to Ali Moorad, as a satisfactory event, since it

* The above words are put in Italics by Col. Outram.

† Col. Outram's Italics.

gave us power over all, through the latter, who was in alliance with us, "without any chief making, or any apparent interference, or any *disturbance of the natural order of succession.*" Colonel Outram himself is not checked by the inconsistency of these words with his accusation;—and he conceals them from his readers.

To give his charge a deeper tinge of infamy, he cites Lord Ellenborough's answer, as if it contained not only a refusal, but a rebuke. Instead of a rebuke, Lord Ellenborough in his reply says, "I entirely approve of all you have done, and express your intention of doing."

I must give rather a long extract from this reply, that Lord Ellenborough's opinion on this matter may be expressed by himself, not by Colonel Outram.

"I can have no doubt that the establishment of hereditary succession, in the direct male line, to the Turban, would materially conduce to the domestic peace of the Ameers, and to the better government of their territories. You will see by the letter of Mr. Maddock to Major Outram, dated 10th May, that while I was willing, in compliance with the prevailing custom in the Khyrpore family, to recognize the succession of Ali Moorad to Meer Roostum, yet 'I could not but regret the existence in that state of a course of descent so unreasonable, and calculated to produce so much of conflict in the Khyrpore family.'

"I shall, therefore, gladly see established the right of primogeniture in the direct line, and this you may, if you should deem it advisable, communicate to Meer Ali Moorad; and I have little doubt, that once established in the possession of the Turban, with our support, he will be able, with the concurrence of a majority of the family, to establish the more natural and reasonable line of succession to the Turban, and clothe the measure with the forms of legality; but recognizing, as I do, Meer Ali Moorad as the successor to Meer Roostum, accord-

“ing to the present custom, whereby the eldest son of
 “Meer Roostum is superseded, I could not (*at once*),
 “recognize the eldest son of Meer Ali Moorad as his
 “successor, in contravention of the very principle upon
 “which his father’s rights are founded.”—P. 480, B.B.

It is quite needless to press upon the attention of any one, with common intelligence, how totally Lord Ellenborough’s opinions and instructions, as recorded by himself, are at variance with those attributed to him by Colonel Outram. I will shortly recapitulate this proceeding. He accuses Sir Charles Napier of a deliberately dishonest design. The words, from which he perversely attempts to draw this injurious inference, tend to prove the contrary. To add to the force of his own censure, he insinuates that Lord Ellenborough both rejected and reprobated the “artful proposal.” He knew that Lord Ellenborough did neither. He suppressed the fair and explicit expression of Lord Ellenborough’s opinion, because it was incompatible with his own misrepresentation. And lastly, when he felt it necessary to quote some of Lord Ellenborough’s words to establish his case, he *strikes out of the passage two most essential* words, because if given, they would directly overturn it. The words “at once” (in italics and between brackets) which are in Lord Ellenborough’s original letter, are struck out in Colonel Outram’s quotation from it.

§. 31.

In p. 117, he avers that a copy of Sir Charles Napier’s letter of 18th December, to Roostum, “was sent for his (Ali Moorad’s) perusal, and lest he should allow this golden opportunity to pass unimproved, he was urgently pressed to second Sir Charles Napier’s endeavours; ‘*try all you can to induce him*’ (Roostum) *to leave Khyrpore with his family.*’”*

* Colonel Outram’s italics.

He then gives a letter from Roostum to Sir Charles Napier.

My remarks shall be short.

He offers *no proof* that a copy was given to Ali Moorad. He offers *no proof* that Ali Moorad "was pressed" to second Sir Charles Napier's endeavours." The words he puts in italics *are not* in either B. B. He gives no reference or authority for them. The letter from Roostum is *not* in the B. B., nor does he give any reference or authority for it. Colonel Outram could have no personal knowledge of these transactions, for he was not in Sind at the time. I do not undertake to dispute the correctness of his allegations, as I have only the Blue Books to refer my readers to; and I can find neither proof nor disproof of them there. But I do hope, after having so often shewn in these pages, the boldness with which he makes assertions incapable of proof, his unscrupulous perversion, suppression, and mutilation of documentary evidence, that his assertions will never be accepted without proofs, nor his proofs admitted, without careful and severe examination.

§. 32.

In p. 123, in commenting on a proclamation of 1st January, 1843, if he does not broadly allege, he insinuates pointedly, that in it Sir Charles Napier staked his own and the nation's honour upon what was not true, viz. that when asked by Roostum to receive him in his camp, his answer was, "Certainly, I will receive you, but I advise you to consult your brother." Colonel Outram then enters upon an argument to prove that Sir Charles could not have made this offer, or, that he made it in such a manner as to be equivalent to a *positive refusal* to receive him.

As I have repeatedly intimated to the reader, I avoid entering on the matter of Sir Charles Napier's defence against Colonel Outram's accusations, except on occasions when the controversial arts of the latter are so mixed up with the matter at issue, that it is very difficult to expose the one without also discussing the other. Here, I merely undertake to shew, that the averment in the proclamation was strictly true.

Even in p. 117 of his own Commentary, he gives a copy of the answer to Roostum (No. 10, in the Supplement, B. B.), it is dated 18th December, the evening the message came from Roostum. These words are in it, "If you go with your brother, you may either remain with him, or *I will send an escort for you to bring you to my camp where you will be safe.*" Again, on 28th January, 1843, he wrote thus to Colonel Outram, "I wish *you would write to Roostum to say that I will receive him at any time, with every attention to his comfort, if he comes to my camp.*"—(p. 22, Sup. B.B.) In Sir C. Napier's letter of 11th February, to Colonel Outram, (p. 32, do.) referring to this matter, he says, "My answer was, Take your brother's advice—go to him, and either stay with him, or I will escort you to my camp." Thus, the very answer itself, produced by Colonel Outram and printed in his own book, contains the offer; and within two months after, he twice repeats it to Colonel Outram himself, yet the latter, (three years after) tries to make his readers believe, that in saying, in a proclamation, he had made this offer, Sir Charles told an untruth, and sacrificed his own and his country's honour.

§. 33.

In one of Colonel Outram's comments (p. 124), on the above proclamation, he writes thus: "On 20th

“(December, 1842,) the General received the extorted letter of abdication; on 27th, it was that he intimated his intention of visiting the Ameer; on 28th, the old man fled! and Sir Charles Napier, who had previously stated, that he had little doubts that Ali Moorad had first ‘*bullied his brother into making over to him the Turban and his estates,*’* and then driven him to fly, now expresses blank astonishment at the step! construes it into a new ground of accusation against Roostum, and engrafts on it a fresh series of insulting epistles and menacing proclamations.”

~ “Previously” to what? If the word mean anything, it means previously to 1st January 1843 (the date of the proclamation); and the imputation is, that Sir Charles Napier pretended to regard with “blank astonishment,” *as an offence committed* by Roostum, that which he knew, and, previously to his proclamation of 1st January, had “stated” to be an *oppression suffered* by Roostum.

The words, that “Ali Moorad had first bullied, &c.,” above given as Sir Charles Napier’s statement, previously to 1st January 1843, were written by him in August, in an explanatory statement to Lord Ellenborough, seven months after the date assigned to them by Colonel Outram. They are not given as a declaration of his belief, but as an *argumentative supposition*, accompanied, at the same time, by a denial that it was true.

The true words will be given further on, when shewing that he subsequently misquotes the *words*, with as little scruple as he has here misplaced their *date*. In p. 128, Commentary, these words will be found: “He (Sir C. Napier) admits that, at the time of the transfer, *he believed that ‘Ali Moorad bullied his brother into making over to him the Turban*

* Colonel Outram’s Italics.

“ ‘and his estate.’ ”* The reader will observe these are the same as above quoted. The true words, fully given, are, “ We will even suppose,—which I do not admit (though I *suspected* it at the time),—that Ali Moorad bullied his brother into making over to him the Turban and his estates; he, Ali Moorad, guaranteeing a due and dignified maintenance to Roos-tum.”—(p. 115, Suppl. B. B.) As before, he transposed dates; here, he alters sense and words.

What right has Colonel Outram to change the word “suspected” into “believed?” He puts the words, “HE BELIEVED,” in Roman capitals, to mark more emphatically Sir Charles Napier’s state of mind to be that of positive belief though the very passage was before him, with the words, “I *suspected*,” in it.

In an earlier part of the same paper, Sir Charles Napier says, “That this *flight* was caused by Ali Moorad, as Major Outram asserts, I do not now *believe*, though I did at the time.”

Did Colonel Outram carelessly confound these passages together, so as to suppose that, to have “*believed*” the *flight* was caused by Ali Moorad, is the same thing as to have “*suspected*” “that Ali Moorad bullied him *into the resignation of the Turban and his estates?*” Finding the word “believe” in one sentence of the letter, did he think that entitled him to prefix it to another sentence, instead of the original word, “suspected;” and to do this so pointedly, as to give his readers a false and injurious impression of Sir Charles Napier’s opinion? Did this spring from confusion or design? Having read half the volume, I am conscious of the perplexing nature of this question.

* All these words are printed in Roman capitals. If Colonel Outram had been as curious about the truth, as about the type of his accusations, both his text and my criticism would have been shorter.

§. 34.

Though the following point is of little moment in itself, it is stated as another of the many instance of the want of fidelity in Colonel Outram's quotations. In p. 132, where he tries to prove that the Moonshee was corrupt, he says, "And I had described him to the General, before the Hyderabad conference took place, as *one* of the bribed tools of Ali Moorad, who surround me."

He refers to p. 16, Suppl. B. B., in which the reader will find no allusion to the Moonshee, either by name or description; and he will find the words, "*one of*," are interpolated by Colonel Outram, the original words being, "Opposed although I am by the bribed tools of Ali Moorad, who surround me."

Colonel Outram, in his work, appeals to "every *honest* reader." Considering the liberty he so often permits himself to take with documentary evidence, it would have seemed more prudent to demur, than to appeal to such jurisdiction.

§. 35.

Before stating what I believe to have been Sir Charles Napier's views and general conduct, at the period when the private message was sent from Roostum, and the advice given to him to go to his brother, the following series of extracts from the "intelligence," in the Blue Book is given, as strong evidence that Roostum intended voluntarily to resign the Turban to his brother, *before* he sent the secret message to Sir Charles Napier, or received his answer advising him to go to Ali Moorad.

On the 14th December, Mr. Brown was sent with a letter from Sir Charles Napier to Roostum.—(p. 475, B. B.) That letter (No. 8, Sup. B. B.) says, "I

“ want to prevent blood being shed : listen to my
 “ words,—consult with your brother, his Highness Ali
 “ Moorad. Your own blood will not deceive you—
 “ your servants will.” Roostum’s answer is in p. 473,
 B. B., as appears by the reference in it to Sir Charles’
 letter, though no date is given. It says, “ You then
 “ recommend me to consult my brother Meer Ali
 “ Moorad Khan, &c.”—— and lower down, “ Ali
 “ Moorad Khan is indeed a brother, and as such,
 “ we shall of course consult him. *A messenger has been*
 “ *sent off* to him, and I expect him here in a day or
 “ two ; and then I shall have the honour of reporting
 “ to you the result of our conference. Mr. Brown has
 “ left without waiting for this event.” As Mr. Brown
 was sent to him on the 14th, this answer was probably
 returned the same day, and almost certainly, before the
 18th December, in the evening of which day the secret
 message reached Sir Charles Napier. On the 15th
 December, Major Clibborn reports thus, “ Another
 “ messenger, Kumaul Khan Jellabanee, was sent to
 “ Meer Ali Moorad, desiring his presence.”—(p. 476,
 B. B.) This item and the declaration in Roostum’s
 answer that he had sent such a messenger, shews the
 correspondence then passing. The probable object of
 it will be shewn by the following items of intelligence
 from Major Clibborn, dated 19th December, (p. 481.)
 “ Meer Roostum Khan sent a Dustkhut *the day before*
 “ *yesterday* (therefore on 17th December) to Meer Ali
 “ Moorad, at Dejee-ka-kote, saying, ‘ You have not
 “ ‘ acted well in separating yourself from us, the Kafirs
 “ ‘ are taking our country from us, and *it would be*
 “ ‘ *better if you took the Puggree at once, and keep the*
 “ ‘ *territory in your own possession ; we will make it over*
 “ ‘ *to you.*’ Meer Ali Moorad sent an answer, re-
 “ quiring Futteh Mahomed Ghoree (Roostum’s con-
 “ fidential minister) to be sent to him. Futteh Ma-
 “ homed went *early* yesterday (i. e. early on the 18th
 “ December) to Dejee.”—(Ali Moorad’s residence.)

At noon, on the 18th, Roostum sent his wife and

three daughters, with Korans to Ali Moorad, desiring hospitality for the ladies and children of the Ameers, and "imploing" Ali Moorad to join them. On the same day "Peer Ali Gohur recommended that Meer "Nusseer Khan and Mahomed Hoossein should immediately be sent to make their submission to Meer "Ali Moorad, in *their own*, and *Meer Roostum's name*, "and to declare their intention of abiding entirely by "his (Ali Moorad's) decision in extremity. The "above Ameers have in company with Peer Ali Gohur, "proceeded to *lay the Puggree before Meer Ali Moorad, at Dejee*. They mounted their horses for "this purpose yesterday, (i. e. 18th December) at two "P.M. Futteh Mahomed Ghoree was *still* in Dejee," (i. e. Roostum's minister was with Ali Moorad at nine A. M. 19th December, for that was the hour at which Major Clibborn's informant left Khyrpore.)

"The general feeling was, in Khyrpore, that Ali "Moorad would join the Ameers, if he was proclaimed "their head, and that he would manage to withdraw "himself from any closer alliance with the English. "Peer Ali Gohur was hourly expected in Khyrpore "from Dejee, when informant left at about nine A.M.; "and Meer Nusseer Khan, and Meer Mohamed Hoossein were still in Dejee at the time informant left."

Thus, on the morning of the 19th, Roostum's son and nephew were still with Ali Moorad at his fort, in prosecution of their joint intention, (adopted on the 18th) to make Ali Moorad chief of the Ameers. This was the *day after* the secret message had been sent to Sir Charles Napier, and strongly negatives Colonel Outram's assertion, that such message was a forgery by Ali Moorad; since it is incredible that, at the very time his family were offering the Turban to him, he should send a message in Roostum's name, to crave an asylum in Sir Charles Napier's camp. Everything might be lost, and nothing could be gained by that proceeding. Roostum might have acted on Sir Charles' reply, offer-

ing to receive him in his camp; their meeting would lead to a discovery of the negotiation for the Turban then pending, as the condition of Ali's separation from the English; while, on the other hand, this act of submission on Roostum's part, would have secured his possession of the Turban for the remainder of his life. If the above intelligence were true, it is not to be reconciled with the notion, that Ali Moorad had forged the secret message. The presumption in favour of its truth shall be noticed further on.

But to proceed with the extracts—"December 20th, *Yesterday*, in consequence of Meer Ali Moorad having told Meer Nusseer Khan and Meer Mahomed Hoossein, that he would consult with Meer Roostum in Khanpore, half-way from Dejee to Khyrpore; they returned to Khyrpore, having been assured of an asylum for their ladies and children in Dejee-ka-kote. On their arrival in Khyrpore, Meer Roostum instantly entered his maffah, or palanquin, and, with his confidential servant Ramzan, went to Khanpore, where he was met by Meer Ali Moorad, who told him that he would not waste his time by saying more to him then, than to beg he would come on with him to Dejee-ka-kote; Khyrpore was no place for him now; that he would send his son Meer Newaz round to Khyrpore to bring away Meer Roostum's wives and children, which was done yesterday evening."

All the above extracts and statements will be found in pp. 481-2, B. B. They shew a series of consecutive and connected acts, bearing in various degrees upon the same final purpose—the surrender of the Turban to Ali Moorad, in the hope of thereby tempting him to join the other Ameers in their league against the English.

Sir Charles Napier, on the 14th December, advises Roostum to consult his brother Ali Moorad; Roostum assents to that advice, and declares he has sent a messenger for that purpose to Ali Moorad. The "intelli-

gence" of the 15th confirms that fact. On the 17th, Roostum offers the Turban to Ali Moorad. Ali, in reply, desires to have Roostum's confidential minister sent to him, which is done early on the 18th. At noon, in the same day, Roostum sends his wife and daughter to Ali for protection. Later in the same day, a further offer of the Turban is made, personally, by two of the chief Ameers in their own name and Roostum's. They, and the confidential minister (Futteh Mahomed) remain all night at Ali Moorad's fort; this (the 18th) was the very night the secret message was sent from Roostum to Sir Charles Napier, and would seem to have been done during the absence of his son and nephew. The belief among the inhabitants of Khyrpore is, that the Turban had been offered to Ali Moorad, and that he would in consequence abandon the English alliance. The two Ameers return on the 19th, with a message from Ali to Roostum, desiring him to meet him at a place named. Roostum immediately proceeds to this place, and, at Ali's request, goes on with him to the fort of the latter. In the evening, Ali's son brings the other wives and children of Roostum, from Khyrpore to join him at Dejee.

Colonel Outram takes no notice whatever of this "intelligence," in the section he expressly devotes to the question of the Turban; nor, so far as I have read his book, (the first 145 pages), in any other part of it. If he thought it false, he should have said so, and brought his proofs. If he held it to be a fiction devised by Ali Moorad, he should have explained how such open and unequivocal acts, as these repeated movements of the principal people of Khyrpore, male and female, could have been imposed upon Major Clibborn as facts, if they had never taken place. If true, it shows that Roostum and his party were willing to confer the

Turban on Ali Moorad, before Sir Charles Napier had any secret communication from Roostum; and it also renders it probable, that the resignation was made in the formal manner alleged by Ali Moorad.

In p. 138, (Commentary), Colonel Outram ridicules Sir Charles Napier for having applied to Ali Moorad, for confirmation of the fact, that the treaty about the Turban had been written in the Koran, and he declares that "of this pretended cession of territory,—this spontaneous request on the part of Roostum, that Ali Moorad would accept, not merely the supreme command, but the actual sovereignty and territory of Roostum, there is *not only no evidence*, but every consideration leads to the inference that the whole is "an utter fiction, subsequently devised by Ali Moorad, "when endeavouring to support, by some appearance "of an antecedent cession, the forged treaty in the "Koran."—(p. 139, do.)

There certainly may be a lack of evidence, if it be sought for only in Colonel Outram's book. But a good deal more has now been supplied from the Blue Book; and even in Ali Moorad's answer, given by Colonel Outram, there is corroborative evidence of the truth of the "intelligence" above given; for Ali Moorad names Meer Mahomed Hoossein, Meer Nusseer Khan, Futteh Mahomed Ghoree, and Peer Ali Gohur as having come to offer the Turban to him. Now, these are the very persons named in the "*intelligence*" as having gone to him for that purpose. Does Colonel Outram suppose these names were supplied to Ali Moorad, by Sir Charles Napier, a year after, to give an air of truth to his statement? Does he think Ali saw the "*intelligence*," at the time it was collected by Major Clibborn? Can he get over the difficulties, inherent in the notion, that such public and visible events could have been invented by Ali, and passed upon Major Clibborn as realities?

• Lastly, does not the supposition that the "intelligence" was true, make Ali's account of it, a year after, perfectly simple and natural? But Colonel Outram does not allow his readers an opportunity of collating the "intelligence" with Ali's account of the transaction, for he not only does not allude to this evidence in the "intelligence," but assures his readers absolutely, that no evidence of such kind exists.

In the writings (avowed and anonymous), and in the speeches of those who have thought fit to calumniate and abuse Sir Charles Napier, I find, (so far as I have read them) no mention of, or reference to the above extracts. If false, it might have been expected that some proof of their falsehood would have been offered. If true, conscientious men would not have disregarded, and suppressed them.

§. 36.

Colonel Outram, and other assailants of Sir Charles Napier's character have continually addressed the public, as if he had few responsibilities to sustain, slight duties to fulfil, and scarcely any rights to exercise on behalf of himself, the army, or his country; as if he were sent to Sind, merely to command the troops, and to conduct a complimentary diplomacy with the Ameers; to carry out the policy of Government, and the interests of his country, only so far, and in such manner, as might be agreeable to those rulers.

He was to suffer them to commit repeated breaches of treaty,—to carry on intrigues and correspondence among themselves, and with foreign powers, for purposes of direct hostility to the English,—to temporize at their pleasure, neither giving nor withholding assent, when required to enter into new political relations with the British Government,—to collect and

retain troops, to provision and garrison forts ; while, on the other hand, he was to treat them with all the regard due to candid and faithful allies, though he knew them to be guilty of systematic falsehood,* of ceaseless intrigues, and, some at least, actuated by deep-rooted hostility. He was to " bide," not his, but " *their time* ;" to wait patiently and respectfully, till the crudeness of their plans might be corrected by maturer counsels, their internal resources strengthened by foreign alliances, their family quarrels reconciled, their personal jealousies allayed : and then, when their gathered resources, and ripening hopes, acting on the presumption of uninstructed minds and the fierce nature of their people, should have given them confidence in their ample means, and made their battle dangerous, Sir Charles Napier, who was to sleep while all these elements of danger were combining, was expected to subdue and scatter their war, or, in the pride of their power, to soothe them diplomatically into compliances, they had used every art to evade during their weakness. What prospect had he, of avoiding bloodshed, and conflict with them, in their strength, when enforcing

* Colonel Outram himself (p. 11, Sup. B. B.) tells Sir Charles Napier of " the *bare-faced lying* they have recourse to behind each " other's backs," (alluding to Roostum and Ali Moorad.) And again, " I am *positively sick*, and doubtless you are tired, of these petty " intrigues—*brother against brother*, and *son against father* ;—and " sorry that we should be in any way the instruments to be worked " upon by *such blackguards* ; for, in whatever way we act, we must " play into the hands of one party or the other, unless we take the " whole country to ourselves."—p. 14, Sup. B. B.

These terms may seem strange to those who have read only Colonel Outram's Commentary, full of pathetic epithets, and appeals to public sympathy. " The venerable," " the ill-used," " the unhappy Roostum," " the deposed and trembling Roostum, infirm in body, and crushed in spirit ;" " this venerable suppliant for mercy," &c. — See Commentary, *passim*. These contrasts in language however may serve to guard his innocent readers against Colonel Outram's touching pathos, which might otherwise delude them into feeling, that, like Shenstone's swain—

" They loved him the more, when they heard
" Such tenderness fall from his tongue."

revision of the treaties, (a necessity as incumbent upon him as upon them) if he found, that neither their unstable and conflicting counsels, nor the consciousness that their confederacy was incoherent, could make them submit to this necessity, or check their attempts to elude it by fraud, subterfuge, and procrastination?

Early in the year, an army had been driven from Affghanistan, in one long flight through those valleys, where the feeble and the brave sank alike in the silence of death, even while their cries of anguish and their shouts of battle were still echoing among the rocks above them. The triumphant return of those who had avenged our disasters, was looked upon, as a virtual defeat, by chiefs who could not comprehend the policy of resigning real conquests.

At this time Sir Charles Napier had under his care, probably between twenty and thirty thousand people, composing his army and its followers. He was to consider that there had been recent disasters; that even our successes wore a doubtful aspect in the eyes of the natives; that a powerful and warlike nation* was in arms near his frontier, watching us with suspicious and jealous feelings; while he knew intrigue and enmity were sown broadcast around him, and throughout the borders of the land he was holding. Any external movement or disaster, any symptoms of alarm or vacillation on his part, might involve him in hostilities; while a serious military error would, in all probability, have renewed the horrors of the Cabul retreat, and proved to be the first step towards even wider national calamity.

It can scarcely be supposed, that, after the Affghan war was finished, many thousand men were kept in Sinde, out of pure friendship to the Ameers. At the time of

* The Sikhs.

the treaty of 1839, we claimed to be the paramount power of India, and admitted the Ameers into our alliance, only as subordinate princes. It may reasonably be assumed, that the presence of our troops was considered essential to the preservation of that alliance. If infractions of the treaty were committed, and neither sufficient reparation made, nor adequate security for the future given, no course would remain but to abandon our former policy, or to enforce it.

To this condition, matters had come at the period when Sir Charles Napier took the command in Sind, but he had neither devised the policy, nor stationed the army there to sustain it.

A revision of the treaty was determined upon. This determination and the conditions of the treaty were communicated to the Ameers. If they thought fit, they undoubtedly had a right to reject it absolutely, and to prepare for war; but then, on the other hand, if we had any right, on the ground of past infractions of treaty and prospective danger to our just interests, to demand a revision of the treaty, we had also the right to enforce that demand. The Ameers, being doubtful of their internal union and resources for immediate war, promised assent to the treaty, but evaded affixing their signatures to the instrument. In the mean time (above two months) they endeavoured to collect and consolidate their means of future hostility. Only, however, for "defensive" purposes, says Colonel Outram. Let it be supposed so, and even further, that these rulers (feeling themselves too weak for immediate war) were justifiable in seeking to gain time, by pretended submission, till they could throw off the mask, and make open resistance with the hope of overthrowing our power, and expelling us from the country. But the other side of the argument then recurs; and

whatever it was allowable in them to do, on the plea of self-preservation, it was, on the same plea, allowable in Sir Charles Napier to counteract. He saw that they would neither reject the treaty and declare open war, nor accept it faithfully; that they professed submission and amity, while acting with covert hostility; that they assumed a defensive demeanour, under shelter of which the means were prepared for offensive action.

He felt, therefore, that he had not only a right, but was bound by duty, to bring the question to a speedy issue, to thwart this double policy, by dissolving their confederacy, and so effectuate the orders and the policy of his own Government without bloodshed; or, if that should prove to be unattainable, then to anticipate their intended hostility before it was ripe for action. If they were entitled to evade and procrastinate, he was equally entitled to anticipate their designs, and press forward the policy of his Government. Let it not be forgotten, that defeat would have brought destruction on more than twenty thousand people under him, followed perhaps by other wars that would have endangered the whole Indian Empire.

Under these circumstances, (to use his own words), was he "to place the army at their mercy, to spare or "destroy as they pleased?"

Sir Charles Napier saw the ostensible Chief of the Khyrpore Ameers, ruled by his son, his nephew, and his able minister Futteh Mahomed Ghoree—all hostile to the British Government. He knew that Ali Moorad was, both by inclination and interest, disposed to adhere to the English: that his secession from the confederacy against us would abate the confidence of its members, and so afford some security against the impulses of their passions, hurrying them on to attempt the execution of their rash machinations.

Observing that the necessary consequence of Roostum's imbecility was to throw the exercise of his authority into other hands, he wished it to be placed in those of one who was, not only the immediate heir to that power, but also friendly to the British; whose interest it was to avoid war with us; who was the most active and powerful of the Upper Sinde Ameers, and whose secession would in itself weaken their league, while the chief authority being exercised by him, would still further perplex their measures, and probably dissolve their union. Colonel Outram may say, "nevertheless this effect was not produced in fact," but it must also be remembered, that whether Ali Moorad were hostile or friendly, the *signature of the treaty* was to be *enforced*, and the *warlike preparations* of the Ameers were to be *suppressed*. The former treaty had been acquiesced in, only through the fear of Lord Keane's force; and the revision of it proposed by Colonel Outram himself, I have shewn in §. 6, pp. 20, 21, 22, he did not *then* hope to carry into effect, without the influence of our army returning in triumph from Affghanistan. Had Ali been alarmed and exasperated, would the continuance of the Ameers' union have been less probable, and would the addition of his troops to those of the lower Ameers, have rendered their warfare less formidable?

When, therefore, Roostum sent the message* to Sir

* Colonel Outram avers that no such message was ever sent, and proves his assertion by producing Roostum's denial that he sent it. He says it was a device of Ali Moorad, executed by a treacherous interpreter. But, as he before told us it was Ali's object to prevent Roostum and Sir Charles meeting, the device of sending a message to *request leave to take refuge in Sir Charles' camp*, was but a clumsy one. The head Moonshee and Mr. Brown corroborate the general accuracy of the message, as related by Moyadeen Moonshee, whom Colonel Outram calls a traitor. The discrepancies he points out are rather confirmatory of the general truth of this man's evidence, since they are not in themselves material, and had falsehood been practised, they could easily have been adapted to the

Charles Napier, requesting leave to come to his camp, the latter advised him to go to his brother Ali Moorad, and be guided by him; but at the same time offered to Roostum, his own camp as an asylum, and an escort to attend him to it.

Colonel Outram's strong assertions and weak arguments in p. 123-4, establish no inconsistency in Sir Charles Napier. He did wish Roostum to go to Ali Moorad, rather than come to his camp; he did wish Roostum to adopt, under the influence of his brother, measures favourable to peace, and the policy he was ordered to effect; he did feel that if Roostum were in his camp, such measures would probably be regarded by his family and subjects as adopted under coercion, and therefore less likely to be peaceably submitted to; and finally, he did, nevertheless, undertake to incur this "embarrassment," and did offer to receive Roostum in his camp. What is there inconsistent or contradictory in all this? But when arraigned before Colonel Outram's tribunal, Sir Charles Napier's guilt becomes as broad and prominent as that of Lord Say and Sele before another professed corrector of public abuses, and upholder of national honour. "It will
 " be proved to thy face that thou hast men about thee,
 " that usually talk of a noun and a verb, and such
 " abominable words as no Christian ear can endure to
 " hear. Thou hast appointed justices of peace, to

general story. They are evidently such defects of memory, as give credibility to the Moonshee's distinct and positive allegations. Lastly, instead of the contrast being between Roostum's "solemn assurance" and the Moonshee's "bare assertion," as Colonel Outram alleges, the Moonshee is examined *upon oath* before Mr. Brown and Mr. Stanley: the head Moonshee declares he "well remembers" that the message, as given by Moyadeen Moonshee, was brought by him from Roostum: and Mr. Brown declares that he also "remembers well" this message being brought.—(p. 118, Sup. B.B.) The denial of it rests solely on Roostum's *word*, and it may well be supposed, he was not willing to let his family know he had sent such a secret message.

“ call poor men before them, about matters they were
“ not able to answer.”

Let those who desire to form a fair and rational estimate, of the circumstances in which Sir Charles Napier was placed *at the time*, keep in mind these points : the difficulties he had to encounter as a negotiator with persons, the chief element of whose policy was passion, the methods, falsehood and intrigue ; the invidious, but imperative duties he had to execute, the subterfuges he had to trace out, and the intricacies he had to disentangle. He had to counteract their procrastination, before the season for defence or more vigorous action should have passed away. He had, all the multiplied and laborious military details of a large army, to superintend and administer. And lastly, there hung upon him the oppressive consciousness, that any error on his part might cause the destruction of thousands under him, and lead finally to irreparable calamity.

Those who candidly reflect upon each and all of these conditions, by tracing out the detail in their own minds, so far as they can do so, will probably come to the conclusion, that Sir Charles Napier was justified in prudence and in right, in desiring to avail himself of the opposing interests and divisions amongst the Ameers, to defeat their hostile councils, and to break their league, as the surest means of accomplishing, without bloodshed, the policy confided to him.

I shall here finish the irksome and ungrateful office I have undertaken. The first five sections of Colonel Outram's work, being scarcely half the volume, have been examined, not, (as has been repeatedly declared) with the view or intention of undertaking Sir Charles Napier's defence, against the charges of Colonel Outram. If any such defence be really required, Sir

Charles Napier alone is the person to make it; and the reader may here be reminded, how totally out of his power it is to do this, under the pressure, and just restrictions of his present military and civil duties.

It must be obvious to every person, that without local knowledge, limited to such evidence as the Blue Books and Colonel Outram's work afford (the first, in many respects, incomplete, the last, adverse), and not entitled to use the information contained in my private or family letters, my office was necessarily reduced to that of examining the evidence brought forward by the accuser, and so exposing its defects, that none, really desiring to learn the truth, should accept it as proof, without some higher sanction than Colonel Outram's authority, and some more faithful exposition and interpretation of the real evidence extant, than his pages supply. If I have succeeded, as I hope, in exposing above thirty cases of misrepresentation and perverse detraction in the first half of this volume, it is surely enough. To prolong such an inquiry would hardly be more repulsive to the public than to myself.

I may not have abstained sufficiently from using strong language, to describe the unworthy character of this book. Indignation at its injurious and unjust accusations, and my own inability, may have betrayed me into forms of expression that the reader's good taste will condemn, though his honest sympathy with the feelings which moved me, may pardon them. If for no better reason than to shun Colonel Outram's example, I desired to avoid pronouncing censures, till I had established solid grounds for them to rest upon. Feeling that the matters to be advanced were at once authentic and forcible, there would have been little use (even if I had the inclination,) in introducing them with declamatory prologues, and denunciations

larger than the proofs would warrant. If any of these remarks should appear to have been overstrained, the inferences unjust, the facts not borne out by the evidence adduced, or the proofs discoloured, I shall greatly regret having been so misled, even by just resentment at the foul calumnies against my brother's honour and humanity. I as earnestly desire, that my readers should correct such errors, if they appear, as that they should give due weight to what remains after such correction. It may be, that careful examination will prove those censures not to be erroneous or unjust, which may seem so, when first presented to the mind. It is therefore to the judgment, not merely of *candid*, but of *careful* readers also, of those accustomed to consider and to scrutinize evidence, and who do not shrink from the dry and minute character of such inquiries, that I appeal.

APPENDIX.

On the 3rd of November 1846, I addressed a letter to the Editor of the Sun newspaper, in consequence of some violent attacks made upon the character of Sir Charles Napier, by certain proprietors of East India Stock, at their previous Quarterly Meeting. In that letter, there were several observations upon Colonel Outram's work; some of which are embodied in the text of this pamphlet, and others are here reprinted. — viz :—

FIRST EXTRACT.

"I shall now make some observations on Colonel Outram's conduct towards Sir Charles Napier. He and his friends, above three years after the events passed, have compounded a work (literally a thing of shreds and patches) which, we are told, is to destroy Sir Charles Napier's character for military skill, policy, truth, humanity, integrity, and justice—even personal timidity is insinuated against him. Colonel Outram's opinion, Colonel Outram's statement, and Colonel Outram's book seem to be the great mine which supplies, in the shape of speeches, letters, journals, reviews, and pamphlets, much of the dross and refuse, with which his followers have encumbered the public. I do not know whether the whole work is yet published. I have seen only the first part; and though I have looked at various passages of it, I have hitherto been able to examine carefully only fifty pages. I say "carefully," for Colonel Outram's skill in the less creditable arts of controversy, soon convinced me that a very careful collation of his quotations with the original words, with the passages bearing on the question which he has omitted, or given only in his own language, and of his assertions with the facts, as disclosed in the Blue Book, was essentially necessary.

It is still less practicable here than in Mr. Sullivan's case, to enter upon the details of this three years' joint work of Colonel Outram and his friends. I will, however, draw out some of the rotten threads with which the web is woven, as it may induce those who are disposed to read, or review, or draw their facts from Colonel Outram's work, to sift it fairly and thoroughly before they take it as their text-book."

* * * * * The substance of what is here omitted, is contained in the previous pages of this pamphlet.

SECOND EXTRACT.

In the same page (5), Colonel Outram says, "a ward of my own, the youthful Ameer Houssein Ali, entrusted to me by a dying father, and that father a *staunch* friend of the British nation," &c. Here is another daring assertion, totally opposed to evidence in the Blue Book, *passim*. This father was Noor Mahomed; the chief Ameer in Sir Henry Pottinger's time, and described by him through-

out as our bitterest, most persevering, and unprincipled enemy. I give a few, and but a few, extracts from Sir Henry Pottinger's opinion of Noor. In p. 32, Blue Book, he says, "Noor Mahomed" has continued to evince the same suspicious, unfriendly, and despicable conduct." P. 35, "The great difficulty I have in arriving at any positive conclusion as to what Noor Mahomed Khan will do, springs from his utter and abandoned want of either truth or shame." P. 38, "It seems to me very evident that Noor Mahomed's object and hope were, to gain a declaration from me, that we would support him against his relations, and then to have turned them against us." P. 39, "His perverseness, no doubt, partly proceeds from his innate suspicious and treacherous disposition." "It is impossible to trust his word in the smallest degree." P. 43, "But it is impossible to believe a syllable he utters." "Not one hour passes without my obtaining additional proofs of his inimical feelings." P. 49, "In addition to these unequivocal proofs of Noor Mahomed's unabated enmity and treachery."—I will trouble you with but one more extract, and that is from Sir Henry Pottinger's letter, 25th January, 1840 (p. 232), to Colonel Outram himself, on Sir Henry's giving up the agency to him:—"Noor Mahomed is still that intriguing, faithless person he has ever been." Are these proofs of Noor Mahomed's staunch friendship for the British nation? There are many more in the Blue Book. Does not this prove that Colonel Outram's assertions and the facts disclosed in the Blue Book are by no means alike?

In p. 18 of his own book Colonel Outram writes, "It is a singular coincidence that the discovery of my inferior ability should only have been made after Sir Charles Napier was aware that I had found it necessary, in the discharge of an imperative duty, to advocate the cause of the Ameers, and in so doing, to condemn the policy he had adopted." The purport of this insinuation is clear enough, and I beg the reader's attention to the remarks I shall make upon it, that its true value may be ascertained. Colonel Outram in the same page cites a letter of the 25th January, 1843, to shew the high opinion Sir Charles Napier then entertained of his judgment. From this, one of two things is clear, either—1st, that up to the 25th of January, Colonel Outram had not advocated the cause of the Ameers, and had not condemned Sir Charles Napier's policy; or, 2dly, if previously to 25th January he did take that course of condemnation, then the letter shews that Sir Charles Napier had not been swayed by it to undervalue Colonel Outram's judgment and ability, and this peevish insinuation is shewn to be baseless. He cannot avoid the dilemma by saying he referred to his own statements to the authorities at home, because, in page 6, he says, "In making the revelations which I did to the home authorities, I only gave effect to intentions of which I had long before apprised Sir Charles Napier!" Now, I must presume that his opposition to, and remonstrances against, Sir C. Napier's policy continued through the period in which they acted together, since Colonel Outram must have desired practically to check that policy. I must presume, also, that Colonel Outram, in his home statements, said no more than he thought the facts would justify, and than he had previously said to Sir C. Napier himself. If, then, Colonel Outram had acted throughout against Sir C. Napier's policy—had

always condemned it to Sir Charles himself—had told him he would state his own views to Government, as he had before to him, and that he would seek “by every means in his power to enlist the sympathies of those in authority in behalf of the unfortunate Princes, who by a series of unjust acts of oppression, and by the rude violence of their followers, anxious only for the independence of their country, were forced to resistance and then punished for it, their possessions confiscated, and themselves sent into captivity and treated with indignity,” (p. 6.) would Sir Charles Napier (whom Colonel Outram insinuates to have been swayed by spleen and anger) have applauded him on the 25th January, parted from him with “assurances of regard,” and expressed himself respecting Colonel Outram, both “orally and in writing, in the warmest and “strongest language?” (p. 6.) But if all this be true, if Colonel Outram did so act and speak during his official services with Sir C. Napier, what truth is there in the above insinuation, and on which of them does it cast most discredit?

I have taken the matter for all the above remarks from the first eighteen pages of Colonel Outram's book, and venture to think, that they are sufficient to throw some light on the true value of his proofs and assertions, and the quality of his hostility.

Colonel Outram speaks of his own forbearance under the attacks made in Parliament and elsewhere on his public character, and of the duty to himself and his family to vindicate it. Were there not attacks in Parliament and the Court of Proprietors on Sir Charles Napier? Was he not, there, and in newspapers both here and in India, in pamphlets, reviews, and speeches, represented as little less than treacherous to those who employed him, as a guilty and wanton shedder of innocent blood, as ignorant, self-willed, tyrannical, a savage soldier, a sordid, ruthless plunderer? Where was the spring-head from which these waters of bitterness were first drawn? Was it not in “the revelations” which Colonel Outram's “conscience” impelled him to make known to those who had a right to interrogate him on the subject.” (p. 6.) Why did not his conscience impel him, long before, to renounce office under the guilty author and perpetrator of this wicked policy, “since, nearly a month before the battle of Meeanee, he not only clearly foresaw the sad events that were to follow, but declared to Sir Charles Napier his conviction, that every life which might hereafter be lost in consequence would be a murder.” (p. 4.) What public duty bound or could bind him, to continue an actor in any policy which he clearly foresaw must lead to such crimes? How could he part from this great criminal, even after the perpetration of his crimes, “with assurances of mutual regard?” (p. 6.) How could he on 27th January, 1843, only three weeks before the battle of Meeanee, write to Sir Charles Napier thus:—“I am too glad of the honour of serving under you, and proud of your friendship and confidence, to require or wish for further advantages so long as I continue with you. I shall defer sending this letter” (one disinterestedly refusing to accept any increase of salary), “however, till you dispense with my services, lest it should induce you to do so one day sooner than you otherwise intended,” (p. 305, appendix of his book.) What! glad of the honour of aiding a murderous policy—dreading to be released from his service in such a cause and under such a leader!

“What wilt thou do, renowned Falconbridge,
Second a villain and a murderer?”

Colonel Outram, by his violent hostility to my brother, by his endeavour to intercept the rewards of his services—to impair his fame—to stain his honour—to brand deeply the characters of infamy on him and shame on us, has forfeited all right to delicacy or forbearance towards himself, and I shall therefore produce proofs of his opinion of Sir Charles Napier, that I would otherwise have withheld.

At the time he arrived in England, a rumour also came that a second battle had been fought, and that Sir Charles Napier was killed. I tried to see Colonel Outram, who had brought letters from him to myself and several more of his family. By mere accident I did not see him then, or at all, but I wrote a note to ask if he could give any information respecting this painful rumour, and I addressed him as what I then supposed he was—the true and warm friend of my brother. I now copy his answer, which I then kept as the words of a friend. I can still draw some friendly services from them.

“E'en drops are welcome from a scanty spring.”

Let it be remembered that all the events had taken place when this letter was written. Colonel Outram and Sir Charles Napier had parted, and have never since met. The wicked policy and its deadly issues were known to him who foresaw its crimes, and denounced its iniquity, but had worked with the author of them, and who was now about to unfold this dark volume before the eyes of the Government, and not to keep it altogether closed from the public.

“Dear Sir,—I only received your note late last night on my return home, and regret much you should have been so long in suspense regarding your noble brother, who is, I confidently trust and believe, in good health, and doubtless victorious. The only information we received in Bombay up to our departure on the night of the 1st of April, was that brought by a native cossid to Corachie, alluded to in the *Times*. The addition of his death originated God knows where, but certainly not from the only source it could have arisen from, had it been true, for I saw the dispatches from the authorities at Corachie, containing all the information they had received, and, with the exception of the cossid alluded to, whose information they reported, no other communication had been obtained.

“However Sir Charles and I differ on Indian politics, he is, I consider, the dearest personal friend I have; and I should mourn his loss almost as much as any member of his family. But I have no fears on the score of the reports you allude to, although I certainly fear that the worry and exposure he will be subjected to, in the conduct of his most arduous task, in such a climate as Sind, must severely try his health.

“I am, my dear Sir, very faithfully yours,

(Signed)

“J. OUTRAM.”

“10, Maddox-street, Tuesday morning,”

How are such words to be reconciled with his conduct? Was Sir Charles Napier “his dearest personal friend?” Did Colonel Outram really think him my “noble brother?” and would he indeed “have mourned his loss almost as much as any member of his family?”

Or was he, as Colonel Outram's "revelations to the home authorities" (then made and now avowed and expanded in his work) would imply, the author and perpetrator of a policy wrought out by insult, fraud, and murder, to its unrighteous ends of conquest and spoliation? Do such words as "however Sir Charles and I differ on Indian politics," suggest that there was any such gulf between them as that which divides violence and fraud from humanity and truth—oppression and war from protection and peace? Did Talleyrand utter a jesting scoff or a bitter truth when he said that "language was given to us to conceal our thoughts?"

I am, Sir, &c.

RICHARD NAPIER.

Dolgelli, North Wales, Oct. 26.