MUSLIM PHILOSOPHY SCIENCE AND MYSTICISM



HAMID NASEEM

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Hamid Naseem

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Introduction

Philosophy literally means "love of Wisdom". Muslims have been provided by Allah a complete code of conduct in the form of the holy Quran. In Quran there are two types of verses i.e, allegorial (Muta Shabiat) and categorical (Muhkamat). The Mutashabiat verses of Quran are mostly pertaining to the Essence of Allah and his attributes, predestination, soul and life hereafter death etc. etc. Since these verses are outside the purview of human reasoning, much hair splitting and question begging has not been encouraged in this regard. Yet many of the Muslim thinkers and philosophers have ventured to enter into detailed discussions in these matters. The introduction of Ilmul-Kalam is Islam owes its origin to the problems like divine Essence and attributes, Freedom of the will, beatific vision etc etc. The transalations of the Greek books into Arabic in the early Umayd and Abbasid period also provoked many Muslim thinkers to indulge in discussions pertaining to the relationship of Allah and he Universe. Theory of emanation, problem of prophecy, being, soul, intellect intelligence, causations, eaternity, time and space, matter and form, nature of knowledge, sources of knowledge, revelation and reason etc.

Almost all these problems are discussed by the Muslim philosophers in the right of peripatetic philosophy. Plato, Aristotle and Plotinus are presented by Al-Kindi, AI-Farabi, Ibn Sina and Ibn Rushd etc in a new Islamic framework and terminology. The Muslim philosophers remained loyal to the spirit of Greek philosophy. But there can be no denial to the fact that the Muslim philosophers have revised, modified and enriched Greek thought in several matters. In this case Muslims were not only commentators of Greek philosophy, but also made valuable and original contributions to it. For example, in Aristotelian philosophy, there was no explanation of the internal relation or nexus between cause and effect. Muslim philosophers brought ten intelligences to bridge the gulf and fill the place of the mediator agencies in the process of causation.

In the same way Greek philosophers were not insisting on the necessity of cause of all causes, and seem mostly engaged in giving rational explanation of causation. But this addition was made by Muslims and then adopted by Christian school men and philosophers in medieval ages. Muslims developed inductive logic, based on Quranic verses instead of the Greek Logical apparatus. Muslims developed the concept of God which was devoid of form, in the Aristotellian sense, and employed the emanation theory of plotinus for this purpose.

This is an invalid allegation that the translations by Arabs and Muslims of Greek books were not authentic, instead the translations, which were made were being prepared in a professional manner and there were several revisions which came up with the passage of time and all precautionary measures were taken to assure their authenticity. The Western scholars do not acknowledge to contribution of

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Muslims to science and philosophy and they stop at the most of making some passing references to the medieval Muslim philosophy and theology, which is sheer injustice to this great edifice of knowledge. In the same way when philosophy development from Greek onwards is shown, it is started from Descartes and there is no detailed mention of the long interval between the Greek and modern philosophy, as if philosophy has abruptly taken flight from ancient Greece to modern Europe. But after a close scrutiny we find that the Greek philosophy was developed by Muslim philosophers to the extent where it could become a totally different enterprise, Ghazzali, about five hundred years before Descartes, propounded a systematic method of doubt, which is no respect is less radical than that of the Descartes. Bu there is no mention is history of philosophy about method. M M Sharif, in his famous booked, "The souce and Achievements of Muslim Thought" has gone to the extent of saying that Ghazzali was the first philosopher who could accommodate sense-perception, rational discourse, and intuition in his philosophy in a comprehensive way, whereas from Descartes onwards, there were several attempts to do justice only to one of the different sources of knowledge. We can safely say that the fact remains that European philosophy shows a great impact if Arab and Muslim thought on it, especially from the philosophers like Ibn Sina, Ghazzali and Ibn Rushd. How several attempts to do justice only to one of the different souces of knowledge. We can safely say that the fact remains that European philosophy shows a great impact of Arab and Muslim thought on it, especially from the philosophers like Ibn Sina, Ghazzali and Ibn Rushd. However, since Muslim philosophers could not evade the heretical or blasphemous influences of Greek philosophy, there was an Islamic reaction to this effect. We find Al-Ghazzali attacking these heretical aspects of Al-Farabi and Ibn Sina in his classical "Tahafut-ul-Falasifah", were he condemns the philosophers on Twenty points, three of which according to him amount to blasphemy i.e, their belief in the eternity of the world II resurrection of souls not of bodies: III Gods knowledge of universals on the expense of His knowledge of the particulars. Ibn Taimiyah followed with a strong rejection of (Al-Radd-Alal-Al-Mantaqeen) logicians and found faults with them for diluting the Islamic doctrines by their ratiocination and argumentation without keeping themselves strictly adherent to the Islamic teachings. He attacks even Ghazzali on his being a "later Kalam Theologian" and a man responsible for the introduction of philosophical discussion among theologians and Sufic. Ibn Rushd Strives in a convincing manner to make an accord of philosophy with religion in his "Faslul-al-Maqal". He also supports a scientific and rationalistic interpretation of realigion vis-a-vis philosophy. He recommends philosophical discourse to people of demonstrative power (Ahl-al-Burhan) only and makes four categories of people That is, people are of four natures, I, Ahl-al-Burhan (people inclined to demonstration) II, people inclined to dialectics (Ah-al-Jadal), III, people inclined to rhetorics (Ahl-al-Tasdeeqh) IV. People inclined to sophistry (Ahl-Safsatah). Philosophy should be prescribed to people inclined to demonstration only and not to common masses.

Althoug, we don't and find any consistent development in philosophy in the Islamic world after Ibn Rushd and Ibn Taimiyah, yet there were individual thinkers with a philosophical bent of mind who tried to continue philosophical discussions in their own way.

In the East, and particularly in Iran, post-Ibn Rushd philosophy adopted a different line of development in which rationalism of al-Farabi and Ibn-sina was synthesised with the mystical doctrine of al-Suhrawardi and Ibn-al-Arabi. This development shows that Al-Ghazzali's influence continued to lurk in some corner of the philosophers mind. Philosophy in Islam has never been independent of the faith, but the later phase of its development reveals a closer affinity between philosophy and religion. Beginning from Khwajah Nasir al-Din al- Tusi up to Mula Hadi Sabzawari, the Shariah, alongwith a

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keen interest in the Quran and its Tafsir, seems to play a much more vital role in shaping and moulding philosophical ideas. Following is a tentative list of the philosophers who contributed to philosophy in post-Ibn Rushd Islamic philosophy in Iranian context:-

1. Khwaja Nasir Al-Din-al-Tusi (1201-1274)
2. Najm Al-Din a-Kalibi al-Qazwini (675/1276)
3. Najam Al Din al-Nakhjawani (650-1252)
4. Adb al-Hamid Khusrowshahi (1184-1254)
5. Abdal al-Din al-Khunji (1194-1248)
6. Afdal al-Dink Kashani (650/1252)
7. Qutab al-Din-al-Shirazi
8. Al-Allamah al-Hilli (1205-1277)
9. Nasir al-Din al-Kashani (755/1354)
10. Qutb al-Din al-Razi (1293-1374)
11. Ala al-Din al-Qushji (879/1474)
12. Jalal al-Din al Dawwani (1401/1502)
13. Ghiyath al-Din al-Shirazi (948/ 1541)
14. Kamal al-Din al-Ardabili (950/1543)
15. Shams al-Din al-Khafri (960/1558)
16. Mir Damad (1041/631)
17. Al-Shaykh al-Bahai (1546/1621)
18. Mulla Sadra (1050/1640).

In the Indian context we find that there were great Muslim logicians, who contributed to Greek logic. From Iran philosophy came to India during the period of Mughal king Humayan. During the rule of Lodi dynasty, there was a considerable portion of rational science included in the syallabus. Mullah Yazdi (a great logician came from Iran, and from India, students from Tulbilli went to Iran to learn rational sciences. There were such great scholars of philosophy as Ameer Fathuallah Shirazi. I Punjab there was Mullah Abdul Hamid Siyalkoti. In the era of shah Jahan, Greek Sciences were common place, Mullah Mohammed Jonepuri has written a thesis on the problem of Time. However, it should be mentioned here that no separate books were written on philosophy proper, books were usually prepared to meet the teaching needs, it is said that the king Sikandar Lodi used to attend the lectures of Mullah Abdullah Tulbuli.

In Gujrat Mullah Ziauddin and Mullah Jeavan were prominent teachers of logic. Among the disciples of Naseer-ud-din Tusi were scholars like Mirza Janana, Mullah Sadra and Mir Qutbuddin Razi. It is said that some of his disciples came to Ibn Taimiyah India from Iran. This trend of rationalism was taken ahead by Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, Muhsinul Mulk Ubadi and Chiragh Ali etc. Iqbal was unique figure in the modern Islamic world, who gave a different direction to philosophy. He can be categorised with the Muslim thinkers who tried for Islamisation of philosophy trend started from Al-

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Ghazzali and was taken to a logical conclusion by Ibn Taimiyah. Iqbal contributed towards a systematic and comprehensive Islamic philosophy.

We can divide Muslim philosophy into six broad stages: 1. Imul-kalam and intellectual discussions; 2. Translation of Greek Books into Arabic; 3. Commentary and revisions of the translated books; 4. Modification of the Greek philosophy; 5. Criticism of Greek philosophy and its Muslim interpretation; and 6. Islamisation of philosophy.

In the first stage we find that the Muslims are engaged in explanation and elaboration of various Islamic doctrines in the light of Quran. Mutazilites, Asharites, Maturidians, Qadarites and Jabarites etc are the representatives of this period. In the second stage Muslim scholars (in some cases Jewes and Christians as well) started translating the transmiting Greek philosophy into Arabic Ishaq Ibn Hunayn, Hunayn Ibn Ishaq, Al-Kindi and many others were engaged in this process.

In the fifth stage we observe that a critical appraisal of the Greek thought started. AI-Ghazzali criticised Greek philosophy and its Muslim adherents. In the sixth stage we observe that a revolt took place against all sorts of philosophy. Ibn Taimiyah criticised Muslim philosophers including Ghazzali for their indulgence in Greek thought. He highlighted the religious aspects of Islam to the extent, where logic or philosophy cannot work. Iqbal in a sense continued the same trend but with a specialized manner and compared Muslim philosophy to the Greek and Western philosophy.

Dr. Hamid ulllah Marazi
(Alias Dr. Hamid Naseem Rafiabadi)
Reader, Shah-i-Hamdan Institute of Islamic Studies
University of Kashmir, Hazratbal, Srinagar

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Intellectual Discussions in the Early Days of Islam

There are various interpretations about the emergence of intellectual discussions among the Muslims during the Umayyad and Abbasid periods after the Greek philosophical books were translated into Arabic. Moreover, the very translation enterprise in itself has been interpreted by various people in different ways. Some people say that the basic sources of inspiration for it were Islamic ones and the Greek philosophy. Indian thought, Persian ideas and Egyptian concepts worked as secondary sources. The indigenous trends among the early Muslims, the advocates of which later on came to be known as the Qadarites and the Jabarites are also cited by some people as an evidence that the intellectual discussions has started long before the Greek and the foreign sciences were translated into Arabic lanaguage. The Mutazilites and Asharites however, show a considerable influence of the foreign ideas as is conspicuous in case of the Muslim and adherents of Greek thought. In the following pases we will discuss these all points before providing a detailed survey of the representative Muslim philosophers who were instrumental in popularizing Greek philosophy among Muslims before Ghazzali. Afterwards we will see the important philosophical credentials of al-Ghazzali, i.e. his basic books an philosophy, his views on philosophy, logic, reason and other branckes of philosophical sciences before presenting views of some important writers and researchers on his philosophical status.

The pre-Islamic Arabs had no arguments on their beliefs and practices. They were following their ancestral practices on the basis of oral authority. As the Quran has indicated at various places.[1]

The Quran has declared the Arabs as the "ignorant" (Umieen). No doubt the Arabs were at home in poetry, eloquence, wisdom and intelligence, but had not developed any civilization of their own as was the case with the Persian, Indian or Greek nations. Even they had not invented the rules of eloquence (Balagah) or semantics (Maani) or rhetorics (Badih). The theories about these sciences were invented by the Islamic scholars after the advent of Islam in Arabian peninsula.[2] Arabs always gave edge to sword on pen.[3]

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In a hadith also it has been indicated that Arabs were illiterate, who could neither write nor count.[4] Arabs had home wise people among them as they had erudite poets, but no philosophers like Indians and Greeks were found among Arabs. They did not inherit philosophy or wisdom from their ancestors. Three sciences, of course, were there among the Arabs during their age of Ignorance, i.e.

1. Genealogical accounts: Historical and religious records.
2. Interpretation of dreams and (3) astrological assumptions.[5]

Their religious condition indicated that some of them were inclined towards Judaism, others to Christianity and still others to Sabanite ways of religion, who believed in the astrological hypothesis of the astrologists.[6]

The wise people among the Arabs were very little in number and most of their wisdom was based on the figment of their imagination or mental gymnastics.[7]

Arabs worshiped the inanimate objects like idols, stars and trees during their period of ignorance. They were not exposed to any logic, reason or aesthetic sciences. Their social, moral, religious, political and economic life depicts utter chaos and disturbances. Moreover their internal wars had ruined their system, thousands of people were becoming victims of these civil brutal conflicts.[8]

All the progress made by the Arabs was made possible by the revelation of Quran. All aspects of the Arab life, political, economic, civilizational were influenced by the Quranic inspirations. It gave birth to Arab thought and Islamic philosophy. Because though the Quran was not a book of philosophy in its technical sense, but it solved philosophical problems, prescribed a rational vision, rejected the opponents with sound rational arguments, these all aspects led to the emergence of Islamic philosophy and the Arabic thought.[9]

Dr. Marhabah asys:—

"The Quran was not a philosophical book. It did not intend to address basically to the themes of philosophy. But it, freed human mind and thought and lifted all the fetters and chains in front of it. Which had been afflicting it since centuries together and had deprived human conscience from its feelings. The Quran addresses reason and invites it to think and ponder, as it addresses heart conscience and intuition and arouses feelings and awakens understanding and warns it agaisnt lethargy and stagnation, raises its status and invites it to ponder over the creations of the heavens, and earth and to the belief in the all powerful, single. Diving Being, by way of an analogy from the cause to the effect, from the design, system and order to the Great Designer."[10]

There is no doubt that the people who read the Quran, memorized it, or taught it came across numerous verses which invited people to knowledge, research, consideration, contemplation and elevated the status of knowing people over those who do not know. It was for the same reason that a sizable number of the Arabs were led to indulge in acquisition of knowledge and perusal of invention.[11]

There are many Quranic verses which invite people to thinking, observation and deep contemplations. For example few of these verses are as follows:

"Nor did we send before thee (As Messengers) any but men, whom we did inspire- (Men) from the peoples of the towns."

"Do they not travel through the earth, and see what was the end of those before them ?"

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"But the home of the Hereafter is best, for those who do right. Will ye not then understand".[12]

"Do they not travel through the land, so that their hearts (and minds) may thus learn wisdom".

"And their ears may thus learn to hear ? Truly it is not the eyes that are blind, but the hearts which are in their breasts."[13]

And

"Do they see nothing in the kingdom of the heavens and the earth and all that Allah hath created ? (Do they not see) that their term is nigh drawing to an end."[14]

And

"Do they not look at the sky above them ? How we have made it.

"And adorned it, and there are no flaws in it ?

An the earth—we have spread it out, and set there on mountains standing firm, and produced there in every kind of beautiful growth (in pairs).

For an insight and Reminder to every servant. Turning (to Allah).

"And we send down from the sky rain, charged with blessing, and we produce there with Gardens and Grain for harvests: And tall (and stately) palm trees, with shoots of fruit-stalks, piled one over another. As sustenance for (Allah's) servants. And we give (new) life therewith to land that is dead: thus will be The Resurection".[15]

These all verses are indicative that the Quran invites considerably to knowledge and understanding, and insists on investigation and research about the creations of God and to travel in the land for discovering God's signs and acquire as much information as possible about the mysteries of existence. These verses invite all and sundry, who have reason and penchant for discovery, investigation, and deeper insights about the matters beyond reality. In this way the Quran has provided a complete "metaphysical account about the universe."

"The Quran was not a book of sermons on ethics or records of past historical events, but rather a book an metaphysics, anthropology, ethics, practice, which established principal rules for the whole Universe, in this way it is a Book of the universe from its inception to end...which incites the believers to acquire guidelines from its commandments for all affairs of their lives and strive in this direction to their utmost levels."[16]

We see that among the Muslims a good number of luminaries emerged as the torch bearers of human thought, these people were not confined to the sphere of religions only but were led by those injections to become social reformers, of their societies. They remained triumphant by dint of their knowledge. They searched for knowledge wherever they found it, they faced many difficulties and traversed may distances from one country to another, from one sub-continent to another searching for knowledge, or ascertaining or scrutinizing informations they had received or whatever the beneficial knowledge they already had, imparting that and explaining the knowledge they had acquired, to implicit those people who were interested to enrich their knowledge. These people were eager to acquire and learn every new thing.

These leaders and torch bearers of knowledge were sometimes called "Hukamah," some times philosophers. They had different schools of thought, either secretly learning a member of their group

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from others by joining their company. Therefore, their knowledge remained confined to limited number of individuals, or openly so that people may get acquaintance with their knowledge and sciences, therefore free discussins may ensue upon and rejoinders may come up from the people or their books may become beneficial for the readers.[17]

According to Jameel Saleeba when Islam united the Arabs and established them in the earth and transformed their tribal mode of life into a community, and humanistic mode of life. Afterwards Islamic influence appeared in shape of New Intellectual renaissance in the fields of exegesis, Fiqh, principles of Jurisprudence, emergence of schools of Jurisprudence and religious sects who adopted "qiyas" (analogy) and rational insight in the interpretations of Shariah commandments. In Islam there is the scope for advancing man physically and spiritually as there is insistence on freedom of human research and spirit, enjoining good and forbidding evil, belief in equality counseling (Shurah) cooperation and accountability. If the Quran was not revealed and the traditions of the Prophet not taught, which encourage thinking and knowledge, we would have never seen group of the people who would invite towards reliance on the dictates of reason in the human affairs of life as the Mutazilites did, who preached Tawhid and Justice, reward and punishment, and regarded that reason is the light of the heart which identifies truth from falsehood, good from evil, right from wrong. Or the scholars of kalam would have not come to the fore who first insisted on correcting the beliefs of a believer in the light of shariah, then were led to establish these on rational arguments. It will be sufficient to remind the student about the fact that the Muslims regard the Quran as the trust of human spirit and a complete code of conduct which has been sent by God for the proper guidance of humanity of enable it to get salvation and a believer also knows that the greatest adventures which are being faced by the thinkers are tantamount to understanding real meaning of this divine books.[18]

The Quran solved many philosophical problems like Divinity and power, God's being above and aloof from all other creations, God's being free from progeny, the creation of the world, the Divine knowledge, Resurrection, prophecy, Freedom of will and determinism etc. in this way the Quran opened the vistas before the eyes of Muslims to study the universe as a religious obligation. It was under the impact of such Quranic injections that the Muslims considered the philosophy and religion aim at the discovery of truth, therefore, both are the two sides of the same coin, and philosophy is nothing but just a systematic rational thinking about the universe, hence they proved that religion and philosophy have the same objective i.e. the discovery of truth. As al-Farabi says:—

"A real philosopher is that a person who acquires the total knowledge and displays the competence of utilize it."[19]

Philosopher is that a person who acquires theoretical virtues first and then practical virtues by cultivating a certain vision. We see that the religion also aims at the same objective. Therefore, according to al-Farabi both religion and philosophy are identical in their aims and objections. Religion and as well as philosophy are searching for truth and truth can never contradict truth. Religion and philosophy interpret the same reality from two different angles, as the difference is that the philosophy employs those methods for realizing its objectives which are not used by religion.

Ibn Sina has also expressed similar views in this respect.[20]

Because Ibn Sina does not regard basis of theoretical philosophy in contradiction with religion.

In this way the Quran is considered by the old and new Muslims as the source of inspiration of

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their thinking and the first treasure of their religous and rational knowledge. The Quran has provided rational knowledge. The Quran has provided the background for the flourishing of philosophical and rational sciences in the Islamic world prior to all other factors which led to this activity. Therefore, the Quran has been considered the criterion and paradigm for acceptance or rejection of any though system or philosophy by the Muslims. Apart from the Muslim thinkers several western scholars have also endorsed this fact as Russler and others have done.[21]

In this way the western scholars have alluded as the Muslims have done throughout the annals of the history that the source of their philosophy and thought had been the Quran, from which the streams of knowledge, philosophy sciences and literatures have gushed forth and all the prestige, honour and Islamic thought is rooted in this sublime source. Ibn Rushd has also mentioned similar views which we will discuss in the forth coming discussions pertaining to Ibn Rushd's response to Ghazzali's philosophy.[22]

Ibn Rushd regards that the study of the world and the creation is included in philosophy. This study scrutiny is obligatory from shariah point of view as he maintained that it entails rational analogy, which is possible by studying the books of the predecessor philosophers, and the study of their philosophy is obligatory as it is a prerequisite for the fulfillment of this obligation.

Similar are the views of al-Kindi and he considers a person who prevents people from looking into the books of philosophers and denies its utility, the opponent of religion, as the knowledge of philosophy according to him is consisting of the knowledge about the existence of God, His Unicity and all virtues. Al-kindi says:—

"A person who disliked objects the study of philosophy is devoid of religion and calls its study as blasphemous. There is the knowledge of divinity, unicity and virtues in the science of reality of things (i.e. philosophy), to whole knowledge which is beneficial and a road to it and a way to rescue (people) from all harmful things by way of pre-caution"....[23]

In this way we see that almost all Islamic philosophers have agreed on the point that all the competent people who can observe the Universe, it is obligatory on them to do the same, as many Quranic verses invite people to hve observation of the Universe. This all also indicate that the source of Muslim and Arab thought and philosophy is the Quran, therefore the first factor to cause emergence of Islamic thought is Muslims is the Quran.[24]

However, here it should be kept in mind that the Quran manifests two worlds (alam) that are subject to human knowledge: the unseen world ('a lam al ghayb) and the visible world (a lam al shahadah). That this distinction is made by the Quran is evident from the oft repeated verse alim al ghayb wa al shaha dah (knower of the Unseen and the visible).[25]

A number of the Quranic verses[26] make it clear that man can not know the unseen world (ghayb). It is clearly stated that the unseen world can not be known by human beings. But it is nowhere implied in these verses that we cannot know the visible world. On the contrary, humanity is encouraged to inquire and reflect upon the visible universe.

"In the creation of the heavens and the earth, and the alteration of night and day there are indeed signs for men of understanding."[27]

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And

"There is no lack of proportion in the creation of God. So turn your eyes (and look around). Do you see any defect ? Again, turn your sight (and examine) a second time. But your eyes will come back to you dull and frustrated in a state worn out."[28]

These and other verses of the Quran make it clear that the visible world can be known by human beings through reflective thinking. But the unseen world can not be known in the same manner, but can be made understandable or intelligible to humanity by revelation. In fact, the Quran's purpose is to teach human being out the unseen world. The Quran says-" God alone knows the unseen world, and He does not disclose it to any one except a messenger whom He has chosen".[29] and "These are the tidings of the unseen world which we have revealed unto you. Before this neither you nor your people knew them."[30]

This unseen world is known to God alone.

"None except God knows the unseen world in the heavens and on earth, nor can they perceive when they shall be resurrected. Still less can their knowledge comprehend the Hereafter".[31]

And

"This is the Book, wherein is no doubt, a guidance to those who fear God, and believe in the unseen world, there awaits them forgiveness and a great reward". (2:97)

The conclusion one can draw from these verses is that the unseen world includes such concepts as God, the Hereafter and revelation. If so, then we already know that these concepts are subjected to the study of metaphysics in philosophy. Since the Quran states that these cannot be known by the human mind, as the mind can only comprehend them after they are taught by Quran, we can infer that the rationalist concept of philosophy, which claims that metaphysical subjects can be discovered and conceived by unaided reason and, more specifically, unaided by revelation, is unacceptable to the Quranic perseptive.[33]

But the Muslim adherents of the Greek philosophy did not keep this division between unseen and visible world in view, therefore they indulged in such metaphysical theorerization, which was not acceptable to Ghazzali and Ibn Taimiyah for the same reason that they considered it in contrast with the Quranic spirit. Al Farabi for instance, classified sciences in his famous work 'Ihsa-al ulum'[34], and included there in a classification of such philosophical disciplines as logic, metaphysics and ethics. Ghazzali however, opposed this classification and did not admit metaphysics as a science (ilm) as such in the Islamic science. He nevertheless contended that metaphysics was a philosophical discipline. What Ghazzali was positing was that the human mind tried to reach the sort of certitude in metaphysical subjects that it reached in such formal studies as logic and mathematics. However, the nature of metaphysical problem is such that they evade mathematical exactitude, as metaphysics has never succeeded in reaching conclusion upon which all philosophers agree.[35]

Ghazzali, however, thought about logic to be an essential branch of philosophy and indispensable for all people, including theologians. But according to Ibn Taimiyah almost all principles of Greek logic are erroneous, therefore, unwarranted for any Islamic science. Ibn Taimiyah considers Greek logic as "an invention of human brain, and is not required by people for understanding religion, social relations or commercial dealings." Logic, according to Ibn Taimiyah, does not fulfill the requirements of self-sufficiency.[36] However, Ibn Taimiyah praised Ghazzali for his viewpoint that the Greek methods

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are corrupt and criticised these methods s he did in case of Mutakallimeen.[37]

In this way we have observed that the Quran was the first source of inspiration of Islamic thought and philosophy. And the digressions made by individual philosophers were corrected by the subsequent thinkers in the light of the Quran.[38] Before the translation of the Greek books into Arabic, the issue of predestination (Jabr) and free will (Ikhtiyar), and that of Divine justice, became current among Muslims during the first half of the second century of Hijrah. Perhaps the first formal center of such discussions was the circle of Hassan al-Basri (d. 110/728-29). Among the Muslim personalities of the latter half of the first century, the names of Ma bad al Juhani (d. 801/699) and Ghaylan ibn Muslim al Dimasshqi (d. 105/723) have been mentioned, who adamantly defended the ideas of free will (Ikhtiyar) and man's freedom. There were others who opposed them and supported predestination (jabr). The believers in free will were called "Qadariyyah" and their opponents were known as "Jabriyyah".

Ma bad al-Juhani lived in the early days of the Umayyads. These were very cruel times: there were relentless persecutions and ruthless blood sheding in the Muslim world for the Unmmayad hegemony. The freedom loving Arabs could not easily brooks all this, they would demand answers from the state officials of queries such as the following:

"Why do you practise such barbarites ? Is not all this against the spirit of Islam ? Are you not Muslims ? The officials would reply : We are not responsible for what we do. It is God who does everything. His is the power for good and evil".

It is reported that Ma bad al-Juhani with "Ata, Ibn Yassar, one of his companions, came one day to Hassan al Basri and said "O Abu said, these rulers shed blood of the Muslims and do grievous things and say that their works are by decree of Allah."

To this Hassan replied: The enemies of God, they are liars.[39]

According to Shibli the emergence of the issues of freedom of will and predestination owes its origin to politics, as in the Umayyad period especially during the governorship of Hajjaj bin Yousuf, the people were coerced to declare. We believe that good and evil (is from God).[41]

In this way the first conflict which raised its head in the Muslims community was that of freedom of will or Ikhtiyar and Ma'bad al-Jahani was the first person who talked about it.

The free will position was generally anti-Umayyad on the political level and resulted in an attitude that viewed opposition to that regime as not only warranted but desirable. The upholders of free will came to be known as "Qadarites", from the Arabic word, qadar, meaning "determination" or "measuring out" and including the sense of the capacity to determine events. The closely related term qudra, meaning "power" "capability" is what the free Willers claimed for themselves and for all humans. It seems probable that the free will-position was developed and held for moral and religious reasons. That is, what is religion without responsibility, and how is responsibility to be conceived without a real capacity to act ?[42]

According to DeBoer[43]

....there are also detached notices which indicate that some of the earliest Muslims, who taught the Freedom of the will, had Christen teachers." He says further.

".....the forerunners of the Mutazilites, who were called Qadarites, taught the Freedom of the human will".[44]

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Ma'bad all-juhani preached freedom of will publicly and was done to death by Hajjaj in 80/699 under orders of Caliph Abdul Malik.

After Ma'bad al-Juhani it was a copt named Ghaylan al-Dimashqui who promulgated similar views. He further added that it was incumbent on every Muslim to urge people to do right actions and to check them from doing wrong. This addition by Ghaylan overtly interfered with and threatened the maintenance of the Ummayad rule. As a consequence he met his death at the hands of Hisham ibn Malik soon after his ascendancy to the caliphal seat in 105/723.[45]

The deaths of Ma'bad and Ghaylan put life into the cause of the Mutazilites. Their teachings gained currency and exerted an overgrowing influence. Thousands of people came to subscribe to the Mutazilite views and out look.

Before emergence of these sects in Islam, we know that during the prophets own lifetime Islam consisted of simple and broad principles. This simplicity of the creed continued for sometime after him. The prophet's death was closely followed by wars with the Romans and the Persians. These wars completely absorbed the mental and physical energies of the Arabs. Further, the Muslims in the beginning were so much occupied with the propagation of their faith that they had little time to indulge in abstract discussions about its dogmas. Even then there was a group of companions who did not have much to do with military campaigns, and thus had leisure enough to be busy with theological studies and other academic pursuits: reference here is to those of the companions in particular who were known as "The people of the Bench. (Ashabi-al-Shufa). Though this group generally did not allow reason free traffic into matters of religion, yet, where needed, they did try to work out the practical ramifications of religious doctrines in the light of reason. It may not be out of place to mention the names of 'Ali' Ibn Masud, Aishah, Muadh ibn Jabal alongwith them. According to Shibli these were the people who prepared the ground for the school of Mutazilism. According to Shibli Nomani the differences which go back to the times of the companions are the following:—

1. Most of the companions believed in the bodily Ascension (Miraj) of the prophet (SAW). But Aishah opposed this view and believed visa-versa.
2. Abdullah ibn Abbas believed that the prophet (SAW) saw God, but Aishah opposed this view.
3. Abdullah ibn Omar maintained that the deal can listen the voices of people but there were the companions, who did not accept this view point.
4. Abu Hurarah believed that a deal body is grived and put to trouble by the mournings of the kiths and kins, but Aishah opposed this belief.[46]

Shibli says:—

"All these differences in the view points and practices did not lead to any disintegration or sectarianism in Islam. All the people were identifies as Muslims. Prayers were offered behind any Muslim by his counterparts".[47]

But before we discuss the basic doctrines of the Mutazillites and the Asharites, it is very necessary to discuss the process of translation work, which was also responsible for creating the sectarian and doctrinal differences among the Muslims. The Mutakallimeen were also influenced by the foreign thought system. Since the Greek sciences and philosophy infiltrated every where, no sciences could remain aloof from this all encompassing influence. It was not possible that Ilmul-Kalam could remain unaffected from this enterprise. Rather this influence reached to the extent that set an agenda

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before the Mutakallimeen.[48]

Dr. Sami Nashar has shown that there was great impact of Neoplatonism on the Hadith.[49]

However, this view has been refuted by Shibli that Ilmul-al-kalam emerged under the influence of the Greek philosophy wholly and solely. He, nevertheless, confesses that there were the mutakallimeen, who had erroneous understanding of the Greek thought. These people could not understand the Arabic translations of the Greek philosophy or to reach to real conclusions from these books.[50]

According to Murtada Mutahhari, there were many reasons which led to the unprecedented realization of the necessity for the study of the fundamentals of the Islamic faith amongst Muslims and the task of defending them, a realization which led to the emergence of prominent Mutakallimeen during the second third and fourth centuries. There were: embracing of Islam by various nations who brought with them a series of (alien) ideas and notions; mixing a coexistence of the Muslims with people of various religions, such as, the Jews, the Christians, the Magians, and the Sabaeans, and the ensuing religious debates and disputes between the Muslims and those peoples, the emergence of the Zindiqah in the Islamic world—who were totally against religion—as a result of the general freedom during the rule of the 'Abbasid Caliphs; the birth of philosophy in the Muslim world—which by itself gave birth to doubts and sceptical attitudes.[51] It also indicates that the Mutakallimeen have gone through the books of the Greek philosophers, therefore, the influence on them seems very evident for their vast erudition in Greek sciences. Not only this but the formation of opposite camps in the debates of Kalam, later acquired a great scope, and extended to many philosophical problem, such as, substance and accident, nature of indivisible particles, which constitute physical bodies, the problem of space etc. This has because, in the view of the Mutakallimeen, discussion of such issues was considered a prelude to the debate about theological matters, particularly those related with mabda (primeval origin) and maad (resurrection). In this way many problems of philosophy entered 'Ilm al-kalam, and now there are many problems common to both.

If one were to study the books on Kalam, specially those written after the 7th/13th century, one would see that most of them deal with the same problems as those discussed by philosophers-specially, Muslim philosophers-in their books.

Islam, philosophy and kalam have greatly influenced each other. One of the results was the kalam raised new problems for philosophy, and philosophy helped in widening the scope of kalam, in the sense that dealing with many philosophical problems came to be considered necessary in Kalam.[52]

Shibli has included various philosophical figures of Islam among the Mutakallimeen as well. He divided the history of Ilmul-al-kalam into three broader periods.

1. Ist period started from the reign of Abasids of fifth century Hijrah. The period in which the doctrines of the Mutazilites and the Asharites were prevalent.

2. Second period, starting from the golden age of Asharite doctrines, encompassing the famous personalities like Imam Ghazzali, Mohammad bin Abdul Karim Shristani (D-548) Imam Mohammad Ibn Umar Fakkrud din Razi (d. 606 A.H) Allama Abdul Hassan Ali Saifud din 'Aamdi (d. 631 A.H) and Maulana Jalal-ud-din Mohammad Roomi, who through thought provoking discussions took Ilm al-kalam to the height of its development. Shibli includes also the belief systems of the atheists, the batiniyyah and the philosophers in this stage.

The third stage starts from 6th century A.H. to 12th century A.H. in which the thought systems

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of Ibn Rushd Andulsi (d. 595), Imam Ahmad ibn Taimiyah Harrani (d. 728) and Shah Walliullah Dehlivi (d. 1124) flourished, contributing to the emergence of new trends, problems, interpretations, and explanations at the same time.[53]

However, the nature of the activities of the philosophers and the Mutakallimeen was also different. No doubt, the Mutakallimeen were also influenced by the Greek philosophers, yet their basic objective was to defend religion by the help of rational arguments. Their basic purpose was to reply the questions raised by the atheists and misguided people. Ilml al-Kalam did a great favour to the Muslims by freeing them from themental slavery of the Greeks. Because when the Greek thought got vogue in the Muslim world, it was received by the Muslims whole heartedly and its tenants were given the status of the revealed truths. Muslims too, accepted it as such and regarded Plato and Aristotle as the idols of knowledge. It is said that al-Farabi was once asked : What is your relation with Aristotle ? He said : "had I lived during the times of Aristotle, I would have preferred to be one of his obedient students". Ibn Sina goes a step forward and declares in his "Kitab al-Shifah" that after the passage of the Golden period of Greek thought, nothing worth mentioning would be added to thediscoveries of Aristotle. The adherence and following to Greek thought remained in tack, until the scholars of Ilmul-al-kalam subjected philosophy to criticism.[54]

Before discussing Ilmul-kalam any further, a little survey of the translation works of the Greek books will be proper. There are different interpretations about the enterprise of this activity of the translation. But the most relevant and pertinent interpretation, which seems justified has been provided by Ziauddin Sardar in my view. He discusses this issue in the context of the unique character of the epistemology of Islam. According to this interpretation, it provides a middle path for the pursuit of knowledge answering that no individual form of knowledge or method of knowing becomes the sole criteria of truth or is pursued to the exclusion of all others. It is for this reason that a predilection for systematic classification of knowledge is so noticeable in Muslim civilization. The classification of knowledge into its various branches was the prime occupation of many Muslim scholars of classical age.[55]

It provided a method indispensable to genuine scholarship and proved extremely fertile in the history of Muslim intellectual endeavour. Moreover, the insistence of Islamic epistemology on giving equal status to all forms of knowledge with in a single matrix of values meant that Muslim scholars were able to accept and synthesize the existing sciences of various civilizations which they inherited. Once it became part of the framework of eternal Islamic values, it was transformed into a new substance. However, while Islamic science, like Greek and Chinese science before it, had its own unique identity, unlike them, it was truly international because of the geographical spread and the cosmopolitan nature of Muslim civilization.[56]

It was the concern of Muslim scholars with the classification of knowledge that enabled them, first, to appreciate the intellectual output of other civilizations and then the sysnthesize it with the world-view of Islam.[57]

This international and synthetic character of Islamic thought did not only availed the Greek treasures of knowledge, but all the Sciences of the ancient civilizations of India, China, Persia and Egypt as well.

These all civilizations were not similar in their influences which they exerted on Muslim civilization. But two important civilizations, which exerted the utmost influence on the latter, was

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remarkable, which is evident till today. But since Indian civilization could not retain its originality because of its conflict with other nations and, therefore, could not extend its impact any further. But so far as the Greek civilization is concerned it expounded for an wide and included in its fold great learning centers like Alexandria, Rome, Syria for about fifteen centuries. During this period Islam could make its inroads into the central areas of the Greek thought and interacted with the communities which were fascinated by Greek culture. Therefore, as a natural consequence, the Muslim thought mingled with the Greek philosophy and Greek thought became identical with Islamic thought. 'Till the beginning of 10th century there were not only two great centers and fountain heads of thought in the world. i.e. the Islamic world and India.[58]

Van Den Bergh Says:—

"It may be said that Santa Maria sopra Minerva is a symbol of our European culture, it should not be forgotten that the mosque also was built on the Greek temple. Whereas in Christian western theology there was a gradual and indirect infiltration of Greek, and especially Aristotelian ideas,...the impact of Islam was sudden, violent, and short".[59]

This statement of Simon Van Den Bergh clearly shows that the Muslims translated the Greek books and changed the orientation of this thought to the extent that it became a new enterprise. There is no doubt that the infiltration of the Greek ideas was "sudden" violent and short" because the translation work took place suddenly and after the translated books became available to the Muslims, extensive discussions and debates became rampant throughout the Muslim world. But with the passage of time the niceties, subtleties and implications of this thought started becoming clear, therefore, a strong reaction was seen and a Systematic process started to purgate Islamic thought from the impact of this "alien Thought".

Many reasons have been assigned to this translation work by the Arabs in the medieval age. The first reason according to many writers was the encouragement which the Quran has shown towards acquisition of knowledge, observation, insight, contemplation, research and investigation.

The impact of the Quranic injections was that when the Muslims were able to stabilize their rule during the Abasid period, Muslims in general and the rulers in particular were inclined towards Greek sciences and philosophy.

There are other people, who think that the Muslims were attracted to those sciences because of their weakening of religious beliefs and Islamic consciousness.

But this view seems wrong because we see that when the philosophical sciences were getting prevalence among the Muslims, at the same time, religious sciences like Islamic Jurisprudence was also flourishing substantially. Moreover, the same people who were giving patronage to the philosophical sciences were also the patrons of Islamic religious sciences. If the reason of their inclination towards philosophy was a Sign of weakness in their belief, the flourishing of religion science would have been never possible.[60]

Since during the period of Abasid rule, the Persian, Indian Greek, and Arab civilizations had chance to make representation in one way or the other there in Islamic world, it was but natural that advancement of sciences and philosophy should take place.[61]

The vast expansion of Islam brought it into contact with Greek philosophy in those conquered territories where Greek sciences had flourished such as Syria, Iraq and Egypt. However, the philosophy

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had to wait for a century or so following the conquest to thse territories before it could make its inroads into the intellectual lives of the Muslims. They were pre-occupied with consolidating their military and political might and pulling their new more complex society in order.[62]

Hellenism, however, later made its way into the Muslim milieu through the process of translation into Arabic from Greek and Syriac. During the last phase of the Umayyad dynasty, practical considerations prompted the translation of some works in the pragmatic and semi pragmatic disciplines of Greek science e.g., medicine, alchemy and astrology, into Arabic on a limited level.[63]

These great conquests by the Arabs took place in the seventh century when the Arabs first came into contact with the Hellenistic world. At that time Hellenistic culture, was still alive, Alexandria in Egypt, certain towns in Syria-Edessa for instance—were centers of Hellenistic learning and in the cloisters of Syria and Mesopotamia not only theology was studied but science and philosophy also were cultivated. In philosophy Aristotle was still, the master of those who know; and especially his logical works as interpreted by the Neoplatonic and Neo-Pythogorean writings were still known, and also, very probably, some of the old stoic concepts and problems were still alive and discussed.[64]

The scientific and intellectual activities kept pace with the material splendor of Baghda. Translations into Arabic of the Greek heritage in science and philosophy stirred up new interests and presented new problems. The Syrians had, before the coming of Islam, assimilated and preserved in Syria a great deal of the Greek culture. In the cloisters of Syria, in the school of Jundishapur in Persia manned by Nestorians, and in pagan Harran in North Syria, Greek works on science, philosophy and medicine were translated and commented upon and made the bases of education when the Muslims first appeared on the political scene of the Fertile Grescent and as early as the end of the seventh century, several efforts were made to translate works on medicine and alchemy into Arabic, but the movement of translation did not experience its most brilliant florescence until the coming of the intellectually disposed Al-Ma'mun.[65]

However, there is no doubt that the Arabs were acquainted with the Greek thought before translation work even, but that was by way of interaction with the foreigners. This acquaintance was deepened with coming of the period of translation. This translation work started during. Abu Jaffar Mansur's period in a big way. This acquaintance gradually increased until it reached to its zenith in al-Ma' mun's period, as it took the form of an incorporate institute.

Abu Jaffar Mansur, despite his fascination with wealth, proved to be very much successful to amass wealth from all sources, he could trace out. He, however, spent lavishly on translation work.[66]

Even this translation work goes back to Khalid bin Yazid, but since a systematic translation work took place during Abu Jaffar Mansur's reign, therefore it is mentioned as the starting point of this enterprise.

Jahiz mentioned in his book, "Kitabul al-Bayyan wal Tabbien" that khalid bin yazid bin Mawiyah was a poet, and a fluent orator, well versed in literary field, he was the first person to translate the books on astronomy, Medicine and Al-chemy.[67]

However, though the translation work before Abu Jaffar al-Mansur had started to some extent, yet it was carried on individually by various people. During the period of Abu jaffar Mansur, it become an institutionalized enterprise.[68]

It is perhaps for the same reason that the historians regarded times of Mansur as the beginning

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of translation work.

De Boer says:—

"Even the Ommayad prince, Khalid Ibn yazid (died 704) who occupied himself with Alchemy under the guidance of a Christian monk, is said to have provided for translations of works on Alchemy from Greek into Arabic proverbs, maxims, letters, wills and in short whatever bore on the history of philosophy, were at a very early time collected and translated. But it was not till the reign of Mansur that a commencement was made with the translation into Arabic-partly from Pahlawi versions of those writings of the Greeks which deal with Natural science, Medicine and logic."[69]

But till the times of Mansur, the translation work was carried on individually as mentioned earlier. George N. Atiyeh says—that "...the movement of translation did not experience its most brilliant flourishing until the coming of the intellectually disposed al-Ma'mun".[70]

Abu Jaffar Mansur was well versed in Islamic jurisprudence, philosophy, astronomy.[71]

Before this translation work started, Syrians had taken Greek culture from Alexandria and Antioch, spreading it eastward and propagating it in the schools of Edessa and Nisibis, Harran and Gondeshapur.[72]

The Mesopotamian city of Harran, in the neighbourhood of Edessa, started flourishing again after the Arab conquest. The Harranaeans or Sabaens, as they were called in the 9th and 10th centuries also played an important role in this process, when a few of them became active as translators and learned authors. Moreover, many Harranaens "Kept up a brisk scientific intercourse with Persian and Arab Scholars from the 18th to the10th century".[73]

Moreover, in Persia, at Gondeshapur an Institution for philosophical and medical studies was established by Khosrau Anosharwan (521-579). The Christian Syrians (Principally Nestorian Christians) from this place were held in special honour as medical men by the caliphs.[74]

Greek theology, ethics, metayphysics, logica, mathematics, physics and medicine were the subjects rendered into syriac language by the Syrians, particularly Sergius of Rasain. Though to the Syrians produced nothing original, yet their activity as translators was of advantage to Arab-Persian science. It was Syrians almost without exception,who from the 8th century to the 10th, rendered Greek works into Arabic, either from the older Syriac versions or from those which had been in part improved by them, and in part rearranged.[75]

The Syrians translated the original Greek books. In Syria and Mesopotamia, books of Aristotle, Galen., Hypocrites and others we found in translation in Syriac languages. Most of these books were translated, latter on, into Arabic from Syriac language.[76]

This process of translation soon became serious and was expanded to cover philosophy and sciences other than medicine, alchemy and physics, during the 'Abbasid period, particularly during the reign of the 'Abbasid caliph al-Mansur (137-159/754-775) who represented himself as a great admirer of knowledge.[77]

But the enthusiasm for Greek sciences did not long survive al-Mansur. Neither of his two successors, Harun al-Rashid and al-Amin showed much interest in patronizing literary and scientific pursuits in the empire with the same vigour as did al-Mansur. Therefore, the translation activities, especially in philosophy slowed down in this period.[78]

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The city of Baghbad was established in 762 and in 786 Harun Rashid became its ruler. Baghbad became a centre of such a vibrating movement, which ws started for transforing the Greek sciences in Arabic language. From the establishment of Baghbad city till the reign of Harun al-Rashid, the 24 years period provided the atmosphere for emergence of such a vital movement. With in the 75 years after the establishment of Baghbad city, wherever Arabic language was spoken, Aristotle's philsophical books, commentaries on Neoplatonism, Medical books of Galen had been transformed into Arabic language, including books in Sanskrit and Persian as well.[79]

In this way though the translation work had started in the Umayyad period, but the fourth century Hijrah is regarded the golden age of Translation.[80]

It was during the reign of al-Ma'mun (198-217/813-833) that Greek philosophy made its main thrust into the cultural centers of Islam. Himself a scholar and an author, al-Ma'mun added his outstandingly profound intellectual dedication to the glamour of the caliphate.[81]

He was the greatest patron of philosophy and sciences in the whole checkered history of Islam.[82]

It is said that al-Ma'mun had a dream, in which he saw a man sitting on a chair in a magnificent manner. Al-Ma'mun was very much impressed by the presence of this gracedul man. After inquiry al-Ma'mum came to know that: this old man is Aristotle: Al-Ma'mun asked few questions to Aristotle and started by posing a question about the definition of good. Aristotle replied that good is that which is regarded good by human reason. He asked again what is next to it. Aristotle replied the good is that which is considered good by the people. Al-Ma'mun asked, what is the next ? Aristotle replied: "nothing" ? It is said that this dream became the greatest inspiration for this great translation work of Greek books.[83]

Al-Ma'mun founded an official institute called "Bayt-al-Hikmah" (House of Wisdom), where books were translated and copied by panel of celebrated scholars, while another part of it served as a library for these books. He commissioned emissaries to Byzantine to search for books on Greek philosphy and sciences and purchase them for him. He then had them translated by the scholars of this academy.[84] This centre of learning and translation is famous in Arab history as the "House of wisdom" (Bayat al-Hikmah).[85] But there are other writers who call it as Khazanatal-al-Hikmah (Treasure of wisdom). Ibn Nadim and Qifti call it Bayt al-Hikmah, but Yaqut Hammavi called it Khazanatul al-Hikmah.[86]

However, no specific date has been suggested by the historians to establish its exact time of establishment.[87] According to Ibn Nabattah "Bayat ul-Hikmah" was consisting on several treasures of books and each collection of books was known as "Khazzana". Sahl Ibn Haroon was incharge of the "Book Treasure" which was established in 336 A.H. in Constentiniple. The number of books in this treasure was around one lac. Some of the books of this treasure were burnt under religious fervour. It seems that the books which were acquired by Harun were kept separate from those acquired by Ma'mun, as Ibn Nadim mentions these treasures some times as "Khazanatul al-Rashid" and "Khazanatul al-Ma'mun" at others.[88]

It is said about al-Ma'mun that he repaid for each book, translated from a foreign language into Arabic, its weight in gold.[89]

He enlisted the services of the most illustrious translators at that time such as, Yahya B.

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Masawayh, al-Hajjaj B. Matar, Yahya b. al-Bitriq and the famous Hunayn B. Ishaq and his disciples.[90]

Ibn al-Moqaffa, a leading part is this task, from whom later workers must have marked themselves off by their terminology. The earliest specimen of this work of translation which we possess dates from the 9th century, the time of al-Ma'mun and his successors.

Moreover, the translators of the 9th century were, for the most part, medical men, and Hypocrites and Galen were among the first to be translated after Ptolomy and Euclid. In philosophy, proper a translation of the Timaus of plato is said to have come from Yuhanna or Yakhya ibn Bitriqu in the beginning of the 9th century, as well as Aristotle's Meteorology, the 'Book of Animals,' and epitome of the psychology, and the tract, 'On the world' To Abdal Masik Ibn Abdullah Nima al-Himsi (Circa 835) is to be ascribed a rendering of the 'Sophistics' of Aristotle, in addition the commentary of John Philospnus upon the 'physics,' as well as the so-called 'Theology of Aristotle'—a paraphrased epitome of the Enneads of Plotinus. Qosta Ibn Luqa al-Balabakki (Circa 835) is said to have translated the commentaries of Alexander of Aphrodisias and John philoponus upon the 'physics of Aristotle' and in part, Alexander's commentary on the 'Degeneration et corruption', as well as the Placita philosophorum, of the pseudo-Plutarch, and other works.[91]

The most productive translators were Abu Zaid Honayn Ibn Ishaq (809-873), his son, Ishaq Ibn Honayn (910 or 911), and nephew Hobaish Ibn al-Hassan. They worked together, therefore, there is a good deal which is ascribed to each or all of these. Not a little material must have been prepared, under their over sight, by disciples and subordinates. Their activity extended over the whole range of the science of that day. Existing translations were improved, and new one added. The father preferred to work at versions of medical authors, but the son turned more to the rendering of phiosophical material.[92]

The work of the Translations was still proceeding in the 10th century. Among those who especially distinguished themselves were Abu Bishr Matta Ibn Yunus al-Qannai (940), Abu Zakarya yakhya Ibn Adi al-Mantiqi (974), Abu Ali Isa Ibn Ishaq, Ibn Zura (1008) and finally Abul-l-Khair al-Hassan Ibn al-Ammar (born 1942), a pupil of Yakhya Ibn Adis, of whose writings besides translations, commentaries, and so forth, a tract is mentioned, on the Harmony between philosophy and Christianity.

From the time of Honayn Ibn Ishaq the activity of the translators was almost wholly confined to Aristotelian and Pseudo-Aristotelian writings, and to epitomes of them, to paraphrase of their contents and to commentaries upon them.[93] The translation work, which took place in the Abbasid period can be divided into three periods.

The first period starts from Abu Jaffar Mansur to the dealth of Harun Rashid i.e. from 136 to 193 A.H. In this period translators like yakhya Ibn Bitriq, Gorgeous Ibn Djebril (148 A.H), Abdullah Ibn Moqaffa (143 A.H>) who translated some books of Aristotle on logic, Yohana Ibn Masawayh (who translated most books on medicine), Sabeel-ul-al-Mattran.

The second period starts from 168 and ends in 300 A.H. During this period the translators like Yohana Ibn Bitriq, Hajjaj Ibn Matar (214) Qosta Ibn Luqa al-Balabakki (220), Abdul Masikh Ibn Abadallah Naima al-Himsi (220) Honaya Ibn Ishaq (260 or 262), Ishaq Ibn Honayn (298), Thabit Ibn Qurah (288), Hobaish Ibn al-Hassan (300), flourished. These people translated mostly books of the Hypocrites, Galen, Aristotle and to some extent plato. Plato's books the Timaus, Siyasatul-al-Madinah, kitabul al-Nawamis Most of the Aristotle's books were translated by Honaya Ibn Ishaq.

Third period starts from 300 A.H. and ends in the second part of 4th century Hijrah. Abu Bishr

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Matta Ibn Yunus (who remained in Baghbad from 320 to 330) Sanamm Ibn Thabit Ibn Qurah (360), Yakya Ibn Adi (364), Abu Ali Zura (331-398), Hilal Ibn Abi Hilal Hamsi, Isa Ibn Sahar Bakht are included in the group of translators. These people translated mostly Aristotle's books on physics and logic.[94]

There were three great treasures of books, which were procured by the Caliphs in this golden period. The first such treasure was found in Baghdad and belonged to the Abbasids, in which there were numerous books. This treasure was intact till the sack of Baghbad by the Mangols. Most of the books were destroyed and no trace of these books could be found after wards.

The second treasure was owned by the Fatimids of Egypt, which remained intact upto the period of 'Aazid'. But when Salahuddin became ruler of Egypt, Qazi Fazil purchased most of the books of this treasure and donated these books to Madrasatul al-Fazilah of Egypt. Those books remained there but with the passage of time, most of the books were destroyed.

Their Treasure belonged to the Banu Umayyads of Spain, which remained intact for a long time, but afterwards all its books were destroyed.[95]

It was also during the reign of al-Ma'mun that the first Muslim philosopher, Abu Yusuf Yaqab b. Ishaq al-Kindi (800-870) emerged to enjoy al-Ma'mun's patronage.[96]

In this way the great period of translation of Greek into Arabic, mostly through the intermediacy of Christian Syrians, was between the years 750 and 850, but already before that time there was an impact of Greek ideas on the Muslim Theology.[97]

According to O'leary the books of Aristotle were received by the Muslims as revelation. The Quran and Aristotle was read side by side as the latter was considered like on appendix on the former.[98]

Some positive and negative influences of this great translation process were deeply felt by the Muslim community. As a result of the translations, and of the interest of the Caliphs in science and philosophy, Greek science, medicine and philosophy rose to unprecedented heights in the Near East except the Alexandrian period. It was during al-Ma'mun's Caliphate that al-Khwarazmi wrote his famous book in Al-gebra. Even Geodesy, the science of the calculation of the height of mountains and width of valleys, received due attention. Some of the treatises of al-Kindi on this subject must have played, along with others of the kind, a great part in the designing and construction of aqueducts, bridges, engines of war and balances.

The Greek inspired sciences took their Arab-Muslim form in this period. The intellectual activities of Islam took two different ways, which crossed each other only occasionally. The orthodox way, inspired mostly by the Muslims, led to rise and development of sciences such as philosphy, history and jurisprudence. The latter and less orthodox way, influenced by Greek, Syrian, and Persian cultures, led to the rise and development of disciplines such as philosophy, mathematics, astronomy, astrology, physical sciences and geography, which were later called the Sciences of the Ancients.[99]

Secondly, al-Kindi, who pioneered the philosophical movement in Islam, was succeeded by a number of philosophers in the 9th, 10th and 11th centuries, such as the physician-philosopher al-Razi (d. 926) a series of minor but important philosophers in the 10th century and above all al-Farabi (d. 950) and Ibn Sina (d. 1037). The last two in particular, were extremely influential. Their system derives partly from Aristotle and partly from Plotinus. Their political philosophy, on the other hand, was influenced by plato.

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In the western part of the Muslim world after the collapse of the Umayyad dynasty in 750, the only surviving Umayyad prince, Abd al-Rahman al-Dakhil managed to escape to al-Andalus where he was able to establish a state that soon almost rivaled the 'Abbasids in the East politically and culturally".

Majid Fakhry Says:—

"From the ninth century on, scholars traveled from one end of the empire to another carrying books and ideas and thereby insuring what one might call the cultural unity of the Islamic world".[100] Thus, about the same time it had its main thrust into the East. Philosophy emerged in the West by importation from the East. However, it was on few occasions, philosophy, did not gain the favour of the rulers of al-Andalus and its scholars who belong predominantly to the Malikite School of legal thought. They resisted the philosophical approach, considering it an alternative approach to the already established approach of the religious scripture.[101]

Nevertheless, philosophy maintained quiet survival in this antagonistic atmosphere and even produced, during this period, the first three notable philosophers in al-Andalus, namely Ibn Masarra, Ibn Bajjah and Ibn Tufayl.[102]

With the Almohad's assumption of power in the Twelfth century, philosphy found its place in the courts of the rulers. Ibn Tumart, the founder of the Almohad dynasty allowed theological schools of thought other than the Malikite, i.e. the Mutazilite and the Asharite schools, and even philosophy itself to spread in the state.[103]

His successor Abu Yaqub Yusuf not only tolerated philosophy but also patronized the study of it. It was under his auspices that Ibn Rushd wrote most of his philosophical works.

In this way both in the Eastern part of the Muslim world and the western part of it, Greek philosophy flourished and had its impact on almost all aspects of the Lives of Muslim community.

But it was not very long after the advent of philosophy in Islam that tension between it and theology surfaced. Disagreement on major and minor issues between the Muslim philosophers and the theologians was inevitable because, even though both parties were discussing the same issues; physics and metaphysics, their source of authoritative knowledge and their educational background were divergent in essence and nature. Islamic law and theology were almost fully developed and thus philosphy appeared as something additional to the theology of one, Ommiscient, omnipotent, Absolute and Supreme God who interacts directly with His Universe. He is the only Creator and everything else is created directly or indirectly by Him.

On the other hand, the philosopher's source of knowledge is the direct observation of the nature of things, and careful reasoning about them in the light of the principles laid down by their ancient Greek masters. Whom they also regard as authoritative sources of truth. Philosophy, however grew up in a remote age and in a polytheistic environment and was later on influenced by Christianity and its doctrine of the trinity, phenomenon incompatible with Islam.

Moreover, besides the majority of those who were interested in philosophy and science were Christians. Manicheans, Sabians, Jews and the Muslims who followed the esoteric sect of the Batiniyyah.[104]

It is perhaps for the same reason that O'leary syas that the inevitable result of these translation works and spread of Greek philosophy among Muslims, was that it started eroding Islamic beliefs and

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doctrines in a dangerous way.[105]

During the Abbasid period the people of al hues were given the fullest freedom to indulge in intellectual and polemical discussions. In this process Islam faced a great challenge. Persians, Christians, Jews and Zanadiqah raised their heads from all sides and tried to avenge their defeat in the battle field by raising suspicions about Islamic beliefs. The Islamic beliefs and doctrines were subjected to a devastating criticism, and as a result the feeble, minded Muslim masses were exposed to a great danger regarding heir religious beliefs.[106]

As a matter of fact, religion is based on the Divine Relevation i.e. a divine language and food for hearts, source of commandments and prohibitions. Therefore, how religion could be reconciled with philosophy, as the latter is the creation of human reason, which is subject to modifications and corrections. One is based on certitude, the other on scepticism ?

Philosophical reason sometimes casts doubt on the validity of reason itself. But since the Muslims were facing a great problems in those days. Various nations were embracing Islam and they were coming with their different cultural and religious back grounds. At that point of time, the Muslims could not see the dilemma and the far reaching implications of this philosophy. In this way the philosophy was given the free traffic into Islamic countries. The Muslims could not discern at that time the issues like duality of causes responsible for the creation of the world i.e. Matter and Form (Hyle and Surah) as was held by plato. Aristotelian philosophy also influenced Muslims in a negative way. The Jewish, Roman and Christian philosophies had also very dangerous impact on Muslims.

The pivotal point of these philosophies was either their dependence on senses in attainment of knowledge as was held by Aristotle, or in the archetypal idea as held by Plato, or in abstract feeling consigned with other elements (al Rataq wal-Talfeeqh) as was held Plotinus. There was no possibility of agreement between philosophy based on speculations and religion based on the faith embedded in the nature and Universe. The philosophy could only be reconciled with religion when it would have accepted the Quranic guidelines though it was based on reason or sense-perception. This new philosophy could not meet the demands of Islamic teachings. Islam is a monotheistic religion, and Platonism is based on dualism. Moreover, The dualism of Plato's disciples as Aristotle and then the amalgamation of various pagan, Jewish and Christian philosophies into Neo-platonism. These and all other factors, negate any possibility of creation and invention from the Great creator. For these people a maternal thing is the most dark and the source of all evils. Therefore, these philosophers have made several and many spiritual mediatory agencies i.e. Intelligences and Celestial spheres, between God and His creations, responsible for emanation process. God has, rather been converted into the first cause for the creation of all natural things. In this respect plato's theory of ideas and Intelligences in Plotinus can be cited as an example of this trend. We know that Neo-platonism regards universal intellect as the creator and the first in the process of emanation, and tried to combine the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle. The First intelligence creates the world soul and the world soul creates the souls of the heavens and in the end the souls of heavens created the natural world or physical world to which God does not like to be attributed to Him and His being Exalted in His completeness is beyond the purview of God's creation process. In the old Neo-platonism, God remains like idea of Absolute Good, which has no other business than to be busy with His contemplation and has left the process of creation to these intermediary agencies, regrding the particulars of the world as figments of imagination, photo copies or shadows which have no real existence of their own.

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In the philosophy of Aristotle, God remains only as the First Mover, who moves hyle and Form at first instance only, then leaves these two free to determine the course of the changes, movements, creation, invention by way of combining form with hyle.

In this way in the Neo-platonism, God remains complete in Himself and away from all creations or being concerned with His creations. These three schools of thought, i.e. Platonism, Aristotelianism and Neo-platonism either believe in duality of the creators or multiple creating agencies and causes. This whole discussion shows that the Greek thought was cutting the Islamic beliefs at the roots by its polytheistic or pantheistic theories, because Islam believes in monotheism and declares Unicity of God as the first tenet of its faith. We can say that the Muslim philosphers have drawn largely from these Greek sources which run vertically against Islamic doctrines of Tawhid and Creationism. Therefore, it could be declared easily that in real sense of the word, this philosphy which came up with the introduction of Greek philosophy in the Muslim world, was posing a great challenge to the Islamic creedal structure. There was only one exception to this general trend, Imam Ghazzali as his philosophy was Islamic in nature to a great extent.[107]

We can say that the materials with which this philosophical system was constructed were either Greek or deduced from Greek ideas; in its material or content aspect, therefore, it was Hellentistic Throughtout. But the actual construction, the system itself, has an indubitably Islamic stamp; all along its metaphysical frontiers it reckons with the corresponding religious metaphysics of Islam and consciously tries to create points not only of contact but of coincidence with the latter. But this it does only in so far as the rational Greek character of the material would allow.

Over against the Islamic doctrine of creation, it upheld the doctrine of the eternity of the world. But in order to do justice to religious conscience it affirmed that the world was an eternal effect of God vis-a-vis whom it had a unilateral relationship of absolute dependence.

In the making of this doctrine, it sought the help of the monistic Neoplatonic doctrine of emanation and discarded the Aristotelian theory of the dualism between God and Matter. Matter, thereofre, instead of being an existent per se independently of God, ws derived ultimately from God at the end of an emanation process. It further sought to draw a fundamental distinction between God and the world, to soften even the regorous of emanation, with the categories of necessity and contingence. God is the Necessary Being, this world is contingent.[108]

On the basis of the plotinian idea of the ultimae ground of Reality, the one of plotinus, as interpreted by his followers and endowed with a mind that contained the essences of all things, the philosophers re-interpreted and elaborated the Mutazilite doctrine of the Unity of God. According to the new doctrine, God was represented as pure Being without essence or attributes. His only attribute being necessary existence. The attributes of the deity were declared to be negations or purely external relations, not affecting His Being and reducible to His necessary existence. God's knowledge was thus defined as 'non-absence of knowledge things from Him; His will as' impossibility of constraint upon His being. "His creative activity as emanation of things from Him" etc. In the frame work of the Greek theories of Aristotle and plotinus, it was impossible that God should know particulars: He could cognize only universals since a cognition of the particular would introduce change in the Divine Mind both in the sense of temporal succession and a change of different objects. But this theory could hardly be accepted by religion for which a direct relationship between the individual and the Deity forms the core of interest. Accordingly, Ibn Sina devised a clear theory which would do justice both to the demands of religion and the requisites of his philosophy. God according to this theory, knew all the particulars.

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Since He, being the ultimate cause of all things, necessarily knew the whole casual process. Thus, God knew from eternity that, for example, as solar eclipse would occur with all its particular characteristics, at a particular point of the causal process. This type of knowledge would require no change in the Divine knowledge since it removes the necessity of perceptual knowledge which occurs at a definite time and place.[109]

Latter on Ghazzali responded to this and other theories of Ibn Sina with a devastating criticims in his Tahaful-ul-Falasifah. We will discuss this issue in detail latter on. From Greek epistemological and metaphysical theories, the Muslim philosophers acquired the idea of a radical dualism between body and mind, which under Greek Christian influences had also developed into an out-and-out ethical dualism between the material and spiritual. This affected the Muslim philosophers eschatological teaching very fundamentally. The philosopher al-Farabi held that only the soul survived in an individual and, further, that only the souls of thinkers survived, 'undeveloped, minds being unressurcetible, although he allowed that souls, after being separated from their bodies, especially those that are 'undeveloped' but morally virtuous, felt a kind of physical, pleasure since they were incapably of experiences purely mental states. But in general he taught that the resurrection of the body was an imaginative myth with which the minds of the prophets were inspired in order to influence the moral character of the unthinking masses. Ibn Rushd, the Spanish Arab philosopher came nearer to orthodox Islam with his doctrine that althought the same body could not be identically resurrected, a numerically different but qualitatively identical body, a simulacrum, would be supplied.

In this way the entire philosophical metaphysics seemed to correspond to theological beliefs of religion but never exactly tallied with the latter. Now the Muslim philosopher faced the problem to reconcile to reconcile religious truth with rational truth. They held that religious truth is but rational truth, but instead of being expressed in nakedly rational formulas, manifested itself in imaginative symbols—a fact which was responsible for its wide spread acceptance by, and effectiveness among, the masses. Thus, according to this view, religion is but philosophy of the masses, having as its primary function their moral education and purification.

In order to make this view possible, an intricate and brilliant theory of prophetic Revelation was constructed to do justice to the Islamic phenomenon as the philosopher saw it. Basically, nothing new was imposed on the Greek system of thought: the materials were those of late Hellenism, but these were pressed into a new direction so that a novel, original pattern emerged from them. Greek theory and psychology of cognition were internally manipulated to yield the idea of a unique type of human intellect which intuitively apprehended the Reality in a total sweep and then clothed this truth, through an inner impulsion, into figurative symbols to make them accessible to the common man.

In this way the situation created by these theories was in the words of Fazlur Rahman:—

"For its individual doctrines—the eternity of the world, the nature of eschatology, the nature of God etc. could be controverted or modified by criticism, but the status that it assigned to religion and to the shariat could not fail to be rejected if religion was not to be reduced to a kind of spiritual mockery."[110]

Ibn Rushd went to the extent of reconciliation of philosophy with religion that he regards the study of philosophy the same kind of study and reflection ordained by God. It then follows that he who wants to know God and all the beings demonstratively shoud acquire the knowledge of philosophy which is the most perfect kind of reasoning. It is in the same case as a jurist who must acquire

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knowledge of the various kinds of juridical analogies before he deduces legal pronouncements from the texts. For this category of people, the study of philosophy is therefore, obligator.

There are many errors in this assertion of Ibn Rushd, the most important of which is that, from the Islamic theological and juridical point of view, the first believers could not have been philosophers in any sense. The mildest conclusion one can therefore draw from this point of view of Ibn Rushd, is that the first believers were incapable of acquiring the best method of knowing God and his creatures: the demonstrative method. Or if they were capable, they were grave sinners because, with such capability, they neglected one of the most important obligatory duties (wajibat) of Islam: the study of philosophy, for in his opinion, the neglect of allegorical interpretation of those who are capable of it is an act of disbelief. If however, he means that it is obligatory only for those who come after the first believers, this is absurd. Either of these impact assumptions about a group of people whom the Muslims generally regard as the best of the Muslim is perhaps at least one of the reasons why his coreligionist scholars are very critical of Ibn Rushd III. There were some more dangerous implications of Ibn Rushd's Hellinized thought which we will discuss in the forth coming discussion on Al-Ghazzali and Ibn Rushd.

Not only this, Ibn Rushd denies resurrection altogether in his Talkhis, although he has not expressed his belief in explicit terms, as it seems that he is torn between his fear of public outrage and possible subsequent persecution. On the one hand, combined with his at least out ward commitment to Islam as a faith which emphasizes bodily resurrenction in no ambiguous terms in the other and his commitment to philosophy which considers corporeal resurrection inconceivable.

In this way the philosophers 'source of knowledge' is the direct observation of the nature of things, and careful reasoning about then, in the light of the principles laid down by their Greek masters, Whom they also regard as authorative sources of truth. Moreover, philosophy grew up, as we have seen above, in a remote age and was later on influenced by Christianity and its doctrine of the trinity, dualism of the Zoroastrianism, innovations of the Jews, phenomena incompatible with Islam. The natural theology of the philosophers, then, posed a potent threat to the revealed content of Islam. Ghazzali formulated a systematic refulation of the philosophers in his classic work Tahafut al-Falasifah (The Incoherence of the philosophers) for the same reasons.

There were thus various factors responsible for the translation project of Greek books into Arabic, as we have enumerated in the foregoing pages, political, religious, and intellectual considerations were also very important in this respect.

The translation work during the Umayyad reign started with the individual initiative latter on became collective and institutionalized affair during the Abasid rule, especially by the efforts of al-Ma'mun.

Most of the translators were Christians and major portion of the translations were made from the syriac Translations of the Greek books.

Muslims in general and the philosophers in particular were influenced by this newly introduced science and various sects and schools of thought came to fore. Most important of all the early developments in Muslim society was that of the Mutazilites.

Now coming back to kalam or Ilmul-al-Kalam, we can say that it is a science in which religious beliefs, practices and moral values are proved and established on the basis of arguments and demonstration. Moreover, the allegations leveled against religion and suspicions raised are dispelled on

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sound rational and authoritative (Aqli, wa, Naqli,) grounds. In this way, Ilmul-al-Kalam is a branch of the theology (Diniyat), The word: "theology" however, does not exist in Islam as an idiomatic or natural term. It can be expressed in Arabic, of course, in which it is known as, Ilm al-lahut. "The science of divinity" or al-Lahutiya, which is close in meaning to "divinity" in the sense of a field of study.[112]

In the past, Ilmul al-kalam was also-called "Asool-al-Din," or "Ilm al-Tawhid wa al-Sifat." The technical term that is the closest parallel to theology is kalam meaning "words, discussion, discourse" Ilm al-Kalam is the science of discourse" on divine themes.

Ilm al-kalam discussion the fundamental Islamic beliefs and doctrines which are necessary for a Muslim to believe in. It explains them, argues about them, and defends them. It deals with doctrines or 'aqa id' of Islam, which constitute the issues which must be understood and believed in, such, as the unity of God, the Divine Attributes, Universal and restricted prophethood, Beatific Vision, Reward and punishment, sources of knowledge; place of revelation in Islam; Freedom of will and Determinism etc.

Now the question is why this science was called Ilm al-Kalam and why this name has been given to it. Some Scholars have said that it was called "kalam" because it gives an added power of speech and argument to one who is well versed in it. Some say that the reason lies in the habit of the experts of this science who "has began the Lkada". Others explain that it was called "Kalam" because it discusses the issues regarding which the Ahlal-Hadith preferred to maintain complete silence. Yet according to Others this name came to be in vogue when the issue whether the Holy Quran, called "Kalam al Allah", the divine utterance is created (Makhluq) or not, because a matter for hot debate amongst the Muslims, a controversy which led between the two opposite camps and bloodshed of many. This is, since most of the debates about the doctrines of the faith revolved around the huduth (createdness), temporality, or the qidm (pre-eternity) of the utterance "or Kalam" of God, this discipline which discussed the principal doctrines of the faith came to be called "ilm al-kalam" (lit. The science of the Utterance). These are the various opinions that have been expressed about the reason why 'Ilm al-kalam was given this name.[113]

Speculative theoogians in Islam are called Mutazilites (from abut A.D 723). According to Von Den Bergh the general name for speculative theologians is Mutakallimeen, dialecticians, a name often given in later Greek philosophy to the Stoics. Although they form rather a heterogeneous group of thinkers whose theories are syncretistic, that is taken from different Greek sources with a preponderance of stoic ideas, they have certain points in common, principally their theory, taken from the stoics, of the rationality of religion, which for them is identical with Islam, of a Lumen naturale which burns in the heart of every men. The foundation of the science of Kalam was laid down apparently in the beginning of third century Hijrah during the reign of Haroon Rashid and Ma'mun al-Rashid, when rationalism was at its peak.

In real sense of the word a group of the Mutazilites have started "Ilm al-Kalam". The members of this group discussed, elaborated and explained the basic doctrines of this school, until it became like a full-fledged philosophy, with different branches and ramifications, under the title of Ilmul-al-Kalam. In this way the first speculative theologians in Islam were the Mutazilites (from about A.D. 723). The general name for speculative theologians, according to Von Den Bergh is Mutakallimeen, dialecticians, a name often given in later Greek philosophy to the Stoics. This was 'a heterogeneous group of thinkers whose theories are syncretistic, that is taken from different Greek sources with.

A preponderance of Stoic ideas, they have certain points in common principally their theory,

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taken from the Stoics, of the rationality of religion, which for them identical with Islam. The uphold the optimistic view of a rational God who has created the best of all possible for the greatest good of man who occupies the central place in the universe.[114]

However, it must be taken care of that though the Mutazilites were influenced by Greek thought, they were basically trying to defend Islam against the attacks of heretical groups and atheists. According to Sami Nashar, the Mutakallimeen were in real sense of the word, representatives of exact Islamic philosophy.[115]

The recent historical research has revealed that the Mutazilites were a group of Muslim intellectuals who, in an arena of great ideological conflict in the middle East in the early centuries of Islam, had successfully defended Islam against Gnosticism, Christianity, Zoroastrianism and Buddhism. They were no mere intellectual idlers. One of the weapons with which they had defended Islam was the doctrines of human free will and responsibility. This doctrine they had undoubtedly derived from the Quran and had then sought to formulate it in term of the current stock of philosophical ideas of Greek origin.[116]

It means that the Mutazilites were though influenced by the Greek thought, yet they were trying to defend Islam with help of their rational argumentation. Secondly, Mutazilism was not a philosophy in real sense of the word, as the Mutazilah rationalism can hardly be described as purely philosophical for in its main scope it was confined to theological problems. They were keenly interested in the problem of free-will but the center of gravity of their thought was not this problem philosophically or absolutely speaking but largely in so far as it affected the concept of God i.e. whether free will was or was not compatible with the idea of a just God.[117] Favoured by al-Ma'mun, al-Mu'tasim and al-Wathiq, Mutazilism became the official creed but it suffered a great decline and persecution with the coming of al-Mutawakkil who favoured the orthodox attitude.[118]

Thousands of people came to subscribe to the Mutazilite views and out look after Ma'bad and Ghaylan put life into their cause. At this time two great personages born in 80/699 appeared like two stars on the horizon of Mutazilism. These two were the pupils of Hassan al-Basri who used to give his lectures in the great mosquo of Basra. One day when Hassan was busy discussing some problems with his pupils, famous among them were people like Wasil Ibn 'Atja and Amr Ibn' Ubayd. Once the teacher objected to the religious condition of the Kharijites and was discussing their status in religion, i.e. whether they are Muslims or infidels. All of a sudden one of his students, either wasil or 'Amr broke out with the assertion of a middle position (Manzilan bayna al-Manzilatayn).[119]

Whereas the position of Hassan Basri was that they are Muslims. Hassan took it ill and said: "Laqad I Tazala anna Wasil"[120] (i.e. Wasil seceded from us). So Wasil and 'Amr' left the circle of the master, went to the another corner of the mosque and began teaching their own views. Those who gathered around them came to be known as the Mutazilites.

Al-Masudi (d. 346/957) makes it clear that the Mutazilites were named so essentially because of their doctrine of 'Manzilan Bayna al Manzilatayn'; i.e. estate intermediate between belief and unbelief, according to which they separated themselves from the standpoints of the Murji'ties and Waidites with regard to the position of a Muslim perpetrator of a grave Sin.[121] Hassan Basri, However, wanted to bring affinity between the Kharijites and the rest of Muslim community and the rest of Muslim community. He refrained from declaring any person among various sects of the Muslim community, as infidel. He used to say:—"In a Murtakibul-al-Kabiratu, Mu'min-Aasim". "The person committing a

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grave is a believer-sinner"[122]

Most of the progress and advancement of Mutazsilism goes to the credit of Wasil ibn 'Ata' and Amr ibn 'Ubayd' who carried an impressive aura of scholarship and learning around them. Besides the doctrines of qudar and 'add' they added many other important and subtle formulations in the creed. The first rejection of atheists was made by him. He was the first man, who suggested that there are four sources of Jurisprudence i.e. the Quran, the Hadith, Ijmah and Qiyas. He used the term of "Khas" and "Aam" (particular and general) for the first time. He declared that the abrogation is valid only in commandments (Ahkam), and not in information and narrations.[123]

The prestige of the school was raised and it gained strength and attracted the attention of the court. Yazid Ibn Walid publicly supported Mutazilism and during his reign this group gained ascendancy over all other schools of thought. After the fall of the Umayyad Caliphate in 132/749, Mutazilism received quite hospitable treatment at the hands of the Abbasids. The second Abbasid Caliph Mansur and Amr Ibn Ubayad were friends from early childhood and had been school fellows. Mansur appreciated the piety, devoutness and scholarship of 'Amr ibn Ubayd. He wrote an elegy on his dealth, which is probably the only instance in Islamic history of a royal elegy composed on the dealth of a great scholar.[124]

During his reign Mutazilism was realized from all barriers to its free development.

Wasil Ibn 'Ata' sent a number of missionaries to propagate the creed of Mutazilism in various parts of the country. Abdullah Ibn Harith was sent to Egypt, Hafs Ibn Salim to Khurasan, Ayub to Jazirah, Hassan Ibn Zakwan to Kufa and Uthman Tawil to Armenia. Mutazilism received cordial welcome wherever it went.[125]

Meanwhile, other important developments took place which gave Mutazilism supremacy and a significant position in the Islamic world. His empire well established and secure, Mansur now applied himself to the propagation of arts and sciences. Whatever books on philosophy and science were available in Persian, Syriac, Greek, and Sanskrit, he had them translated into Arabic. These translations made under royal patronage, greatly encouraged the study of philosphy and science. The Jews, the Christians, the Zoroastrians, Maniwides, Masanids Marqunides, Dahriyah or naturalists, Samnides had treasures of knowledge with them even they had embraced Islam. Moreover their religious beliefs were based on the philosophical and logical foundations. Although these people accepted Islam, yet their temperaments could not get reconciled with the simple and clear doctrines of Islam. They were, of course, impressed by the political power of Islam, but mentally they were not ready to follow Islam in all its aspects.[126] Their Islamic way of life remained a little different from the rest of Arab Muslims. As a result, they started interpreting the Quranic verses according to their religious beliefs and idioms. Even the Zoroastrian belief in the God of Good and God of evil made its inroads into Islamic World and was garbed under the title of problem of "Qadar". Shamlah said in the court of the Abbasid Caliph Mehdi, While addressing him about the Qadarites:—

"When a Qadarite is led to an exxageration, he claims two powers to govern the universe, i.e. the creator of the good and the creator of the evil."[127] It is therefore, rightly said that after the political differences in the Muslim community, the first problem which created sectarian division in Islamic community was the problem of "Qadar".[128]

These groups gave particular attention to raising philosophical issues with regard to religious

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dogmas and even took the liberty of criticizing Islam. Mansur was too tolerant and liberal to permit the suppression of these incursions of Islam with sword. He gave complete freedom of argument and discussion. Orthodox theologians and traditions came forward to have intellectual bouts with non-Muslims, but the weapons of dogma were ineffective in these contests, and they had to retreat honourably. At this critical juncture the Mutazilites came to the rescue of Islam. Fully equipped with the weapons of reason and dialectics, they smashed the arguments of their opponents non-Muslims and silenced them. This added to the prestige of the Mutazilites and some of the most distinguished scholars came to subscribe to their views.

Later, the Mutazilites received great honours at the court of al-Ma'mun. The two great Mutazilites, namely, Abu al-Hudyal Allaf and al-Nazzam, were al Ma'mun's own teachers, and he held them in high esteem. With regard to Abu al-Hudayl, al-Ma'mun used to say: "He spreads over the art of dialectics as a cloud spreads over the people."[129] Azala Abu Hudayl "Ala al-kalam ka-Izlal al-Ghaommam Alal-al-Anam". Al-Ma'mun was very found of listening to the debates between people beclonging to different religions, and he used to allow them complete liberty of thought and speech. In all such debates and religious polemical contests, it were the Mutazilites who would come out victorious; they thus proved themselves to be the protectors of Islam.

The two Abbasids after al-Ma'mun namely, al-Mu tasim and al-Wathiq, lent their whole hearted support to the Mutazitites. A great personality, Qadi, Ahmad Ibn Dawud, who was an enthusiastic champion of the school of Mutazilism, was all in all in the courts of al-Mutasim and al-wathiq Mutazili held unprecedented ways under the patronage of this great man. Qadi Ahmad Ibn Dawud was the chief Justice during the reign of al-Mutasim and al-wathiq.[130]

It was during this period that a tyrannical attitude was adopted by the rulers towards Ah-al-Hadith and they were tortured regarding their belief in the problem of Khalq-al-Quran. It was during the reign of al-Ma'mun al-Rashid who issued a degree in 218 A.H in favour of Khalq al-Quran and preference of Ali (RA) (Tafzil al-Ali) Ahmad ibn Hanbal combated the Mutazilites on the problem of Khalq al-Quran with great courage and determination. It was perhaps for the same reason that when Mutawail became the ruler after Watiqh, he disliked the Mutazilites.[131]

The historians say that the Mutazilites remained triumphant in all walks of life for complete two centuries.[132]

Up to forth century A.H. the Mutazilites reigned supreme and this movement produced great exegetical personalitics, Literary figures and scholastic scholars, whose works are still considered as authority on their respective subjects.[133]

The last name to be mentioned is that of Abu Ali al-Jubbai (d. 303), who presented an epilogue to the splendid drama of the movement of rationalism in medicval Islam.[134]

Sir Syed Ahmad Khan provides details of some important sects of the Mutazilites.[135]

Moreover, Allama, Shibli has given an account of the main centers of the Mutazilite thought as were found in 4th century A.H. in the Islamic world.[136]

Abu Hudafah Wasil Ibn Ata (an Iranian by race, 80 A. H/131 A.H) laid down the basic doctrines of the Mutazilism, prescribed its boundaries, framed its theories in an epistemological and philosophical garb.[137] In the opinion of abu al-Husayn al-Khayyat, a great Mutazilite authority, there are five fundamental principles of Mutazilism which one claiming to be a Mutazilite must subscribe to these

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in their entirely.[138]

These five principles of Mutazilism are very important in relation to the creator and His qualities. His relation with His creations and actions of the servants, the Reward and or punishment ensuing from it. These were the central, pivotal points on which the Mutazilites were different from their opponents. In other words, these fundamental principles can be described as.

(1) Divine unity (al-Tawhid).

(2) Divine justice (ai'adl)

(3) The promise of reward and the threat of punishment (al-wa'd, wa'l-waid)

(4) The state between states of belief and unbelief (al-Manzilan bayna al-manzilatayn)

(5) To enjoin doing of good and to prohibit the doing of wrong (amr bil Maruf wa'l An nahy al-Munkar).

The first two doctrines may be said to be more central than the rest of them for the Mutazilites verily called themselves, the people of unity and justice "ah-l al-adl wa'l Tawhid"[139]

"Tawhid" means an abstract unity of the Essence (Dhat), without Attributes, God is one, without doubt Eternal and non-Accidental (Muhadith), bereft of all directions. He is without any Qualities and devoid of all shades of plurality in His Essence. He is the creator of the body, but not a body Himself. "Wa Huwa-al-Khaliq-al-Jism, Wa Laisa Huwa Bi-Jism".[140] He is the creator of objects, but himself nothing like His creations. He is away from all the accidental qualities.

The Attributes are there by His Essence and if the Attributes are separated from Essence, these will be tantamount to substances existing from all eternity.[141]

The Mutazilites explained the divine attributes such as the knowing, the powerful, is living, and so on and so forth, as to His being and not that He possesses the qualities of knowledge, power, life etc., apart from His essence.

Al-Nazzam emphasized that qualities are not in the essence of God but are His essence. Thus God is omnipotent by His omnipotence, and it is His essence and not in His essence. He is omniscient by omniscience and it is His essence and not in His essence.

Some of the Mutazilites maintained that these qualities must be considered in a negative way, nothing positive could be asserted of God for that would jeopardize His absolute unity. This would mean that there is in God the complexity of subject and predicate, whereas God is a unity in the purest and most absolute sense.[142]

The purposely negative way in which the Mutazilites discussed the whole issue of divine attributes is seen in the following brief excerpt from al-Ashari's (d. 935) famous discussion of their views in his book on Muslim heresies. He says:—

"The Mutzilah agree that God is one; these is nothing like him. Hearing, seeing, he is not a body, not a form, not flesh and blood, not an individual, not substance nor attribute; he has no colour, taste, smell, no heat, cold, moisture, nor dryness, no length, breadth, not depth, no joining together nor separation, no movement, rest or division...no place comprehends him, no time passes over him...not begetting nor begotten...he is not comparable with men and does not resemble creatures in any respect...he is unlike whatever occurs to the mind or is pictured in the imagination—he is ceaselessly knowing,

powerful, living, and will not cease to be so, eyes do not see Him, sight does not, attention, imagination does not comprehend Him; He is not heard by hearing, (He is) a thing not as the things, knowing, powerful, living, not as (men are) knowing, powerful, living, He is eternal alone, and there is no eternal except him, no deity apart from Him, He has no partner in His rule, no vizier (sharing) in his authority, no assistant in producing what he produced and creating what He created-He may not experience benefit or harm, joy or gladness, hurt or pain...He may not cease to exist nor become weak or lacking, He is too holy to be touched by women or to have consort or children".[143]

The Muslims in general are believers and follow Tawhid (monotheism) and this thought of oneness is the glowing point in their belief system. The Mutazilites specifically have mentioned that the Essence of God is abstract from all attributes. They tried to safeguard Islam from being declared as a religion believing in many gods or its getting resemblance with the atheists or Zanadiqh. According to them the nature of Tawhid i.e. thought is simpler. About the verses in the Quran which indicate that God has Hand, Throne, Face etc., the Mutazilites advocated the view that such term must be interpreted in a way to become reconciled with the unity of God.[144]

According to the Mutazilites, when we deny body and direction (al-Jismiah, wal-Jahat) from God's essence, the beatific vision also is rendered impossible.[145]

His unity demands that He should have no extra qualities apart from His essence. Whatever the positive qualities of God are found in religious scriptures for example, knowledge and power (al-Ilm wal Qudrah), have no meaning apart from indicating modes of His essence. God is knowing and powerful by His Essence. ('Alim wa Qadir Bi-Dhati).[146]

The traditionalists and the Attributionists (Ahlul al-Athar wal Safaties) have opposed the Mutazilies in all these doctrines, as these people believed all those verses of the Scripture in which mention of God's having body and space have been made and accepted those as such (Billa kaifa wa la Tashbih). They said that God, of course, has Hand, but not like other hands, a Throne, but not like other thrones. Morevoer, they claimed that the beatific vision is quite possible in the life hereafter substantiating their view with various arguments. They maintained that God's are attributes different from Essence, though dependent on Essence as Knowledge, life, hearing, seeing and willing. In this regard the Divine attribute of speech (kalam) had special importance in this conflict, which led all Ma'mun and its followers to persecute the Ulama for not upholding this doctrine.

In short the Mutazilites interpreted the Quranic verses in order to make these reconciled with their doctrine of Tawhid in contrast with the Salafides and ah-al-Sunah, who preferred the literal meaning of the Quranic verses and traditions.[147]

Divine justice (Nazriat ul-Adal). The doctine of justice with the doctrine of Tawhid were the two doctrines which became hall mark of the Mutazilities as they were known as the people of justice and unity. Justice is such an attribute of God, which negates all possibility of oppression or the injustice on the part of God. It indicates also that whatever God dies is replete with purpose and wisdom. Al-Nazzam in particular, taught in an absolute manner that God can do nothing to a creature either in this world or in the next that wouldn't be for the creature's own good and in accordance with strict justice. It is not that God would not do this but that He does not have the power to do this.[148]

The Mutazilah believe that some acts are essentially, 'Just' and some intrinsically 'unjust' for instance, rewarding the obedient and punishing the Sinners is justice; and that God is just, i.e. He rewards the obedient and punishes the sinners, and it is impossible for Him to act otherwise. Rewarding

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the sinners and punishing the obedient is essentially and intrinsically unjust, and it is impossible for God to do such a thing. Similarly, compelling His creatures to commit Sin or creating them without any power of free will, then creating the sinful acts and their hand, and then punishing them on account of those sins-this is in justice, an ugly thing for God to do, it is unjustifiable and un-Godly.[149]

God will not will but good or create evil in the world. Whatever He does is for the good of the people.

According to the Mutazilites it is quite evident that the good demands only good. As long as God is the Absolute Good, (khair al Mutlaq), there is to possibility of any evil emanating from Him in any case and the commandments of Shariah and its prohibitions are in accordance with human reason. God being absolutely just will like that which is liked by reason, and dislike that which is disliked by reason.[150] Under the doctine of justice, the Mutazilites advance a general doctrine, which is more comprehensive, that is the principle that "beauty" (husn) and "ugliness" (qubh), (good and evil), are inherent properties of acts. For instance, truth-fullness, trustworthiness, chastity and God-fearing are intrinsically good qualities, and false hood, treachery, indecency, neglectfulness, etc. are intrinsically evil. Therefore, deeds in essence, before God may judge them, possess inherent goodness or evil (husn or qubh).

Here upon, they arrive at another conclusion about reason. Human reason can independently judge or perceive good or evil in things. It means that the good or evil ofsome deeds can be judged by human reason independently of the commands of the Shariah.

In the same way the Mutazilah believe that evil is impossible to originate from God, because justice according to them is that which is demanded by reason, on the basis of wisdom, and that is the performance of an action on the basis of goodness and beneficiality.[151]

This is also demand of reason that there must be reward and punishment in accordance with human actions. This is the demand of justice that we are accountable only for those actions with which we are intentionally and practically involved. In the other words, the actions of servants of God are their own creations and a result of their choices. If this is not the case then the meaning of accountability (al-takleef) will be rendered redundant, and there will be no scope for praise or opposition, appreciation or abuse or for that matter no need of a guide for guidance or sending of the prophets (Irsal an Nabi).[152]

It is evident that the Mutazilites were attracted by explaining this view to reject the Jabarite theory, which deprives man from all initiatives and powers. But the "old fathers" (salf) have not accepted this view point of the Mutazilites that ctions are "good and the best in themselves and that God can prescribe only those actions which are good and the Best" "Al-Salah wal-Aslah alal-Allah"[153] This implies that it is incumbent on God to always do "good and the best". But on the contrary the "old fathers" did not accept the view that good and bad is determined by reason as was held by the Mutazilites or their view that man is the originator of his actions and his being completely responsible for his actions. Because the Mutazilites believe that good and right is that which is considered as such by reason and vise versa, which implies that reason not the shariah is the criterion of determination of good or bad.[154] Some of the Mutazilities argued that infants in no case would be condemned to the punishments of hell because, having never exercised free will, no responsibility devolves upon them.[155]

Since the Mutazilites were followers of the Qadarites, they were strong upholders of the doctrine of human freedom, Man's freedom and God's justice both must go together. Man should be considered responsible for his actions, otherwise God would not be justified in punishing the sinners in

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life after death.

God, they held, always wills what is good for his creatures. It is only humans who instigate evil in the world and, thus depending on their own acts freely chosen, determine their destinies as inhabitants of heaven or hell.[156] Doctrine of Al-wad wa al-waid (Retribution, or reward and punishment).

By this doctrine is meant that God is true in His promises and admonitions and He does not break His own promises, as stated by the Quranic verse regarding Divine promise.

"....indeed God does not break the promise".[157]

Accordingly the Mutazilites say that all threats addressed to the sinners and the wicked, such as the punishments declared for an oppressor, a liar or a wine imbiber, will all be carried out without fail, except when the sinner repents before death. Therefore, pardon without repentance is not possible. From the view point of the Mutazilites, pardon without repentance implies failure to carry out the threats (wa'd) and such an act, like breaking of promise (Khulf al Wa'd) is, "qabih", and so impossible. Thus the Mutazilite beliefs regarding Divine retribution and Divine forgiveness are interrelated and both arise from their belief in inherent good and evil of deeds determinable by reason.[158]

This doctrine of retribution is intimately related to that of divine justice. Since God is just, He should punish the sinners and reward the virtuous in life after death. But the Asharites don't find any difficulty in declaring that the rewards of God (Sawab-al-Allah) is the mercy or grace (Fazl) from God, and His punishment (Aqab) is His justice (Adl) in which He will not be lenient.[159] He can reward whom He wills and punish whom He wills. It is certain, however, that He will favour the righteous and punish the wicked as He has promised to do so but no consideration can bind His discretion and compel Him to do this or that.[160] Doctrine of Manzilan Bayan al Manzilatayn (The intermediate position between the states of Belief and Unbelief).

This is the first principle to which the Mutazilites were inclined and the implication of it is that when a man commits a capital sin, he remains neither a believer nor a non-believer. He, rather remains in an intermediate position between the two. The basis of this doctrine is that in their view the faith remains embedded in heart and actions are its branches (Itiqad Bil-al Qulb wa Aml bil-al-Jawarih).

The Kharijites went so far as to execute the grave sinner, where as the Murjites continued to include such a person in the full community. "The intermediate position" was the attempt to avoid the two extremes of the kharijites and the Murjities.[161]

Doctrine of Al amr bi al Maruf wa al Nahy al-Munkar

("enjoining the right and prohibiting the wrong").

The principle of enjoining good and prohibiting the wrong, so that the Muslims may fulfill the demands of their "Trust" ("al-Ammanat") nd spread their dawah, is obligatory. They are commanded to establish the divine order on earth, though they may have to resort to sword for this case, against all the forces who oppose it, without any exception, whether from the non believers or wrong doers among the Muslims themselves.[162] In this the Mutazilities held that the Muslims are obligated to enjoin right and prohibit the wrong "to the extent that opportunity and ability allowed with the" tongue "hand, and sword," as al-Ashari put it.[163] This doctrine is also admitted by the orthodox, but the Mutazilites considered this incumbent upon every Muslim a "Fard-al-Ayn" i.e. the duty of perfect obligation. According to the orthodox, on the other hand, it is only al Kifayah i.e. it would suffice if some one carried out this injunction on behalf of the group.[164] Having initiated this process of duty of enjoying

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good and forbidding the wrong, they created great strife in the Muslim world and became a great source of threat and warning against the Zanadiqah and the innovators. Many people became dazzled by their arguments and embraced Islam, delighted by their demonstration and logic.[165]

Because of this doctrine the Mutazilites deemed it necessary to spread their creed not only by word of mouth but also by force of state authority. Under the glorious patronage of al-Ma'mun, this doctrine of the Mutazilites led to the institution of inquisition or mihnah agaisnt all those who did not subscribe to their religious views particularly that of the createdness of the Quran.[166]

The Mutazilites attempted to interpret the Allegorical verses (Mutashabihat), as in the Quran there are two types of verses i.e. Muhkamat and Mutashabihat. 'Mahkam' (Categorical, is that verse of the Quran which reveals and discusses a very apparent and clear matter, which does not warrant any interpretation of relating it to its real meaning after bifurcating it from the symbolic one or from its symbolic meaning to real one. The Mutazilities interpreted those verses of the Quran which resembled in their turn to a place, space or time or may pertain to the qualities of the creatures. They interpreted such verses from the reality point of view on the basis of their words, which indicated to the symbolic or figurative meanings they might have possessed earlier, such as, "Hand of God," "Face of God" etc. etc. i.e. "God's Hand is over their hand."[167]

Since God is far from having hands as we have, therefore, the Mutazilites interpreted 'Hand' in metaphorical way and synonymous to power (al-Qudrah) or God's being all-pervading (al-Ahatah). In the same way the Quranic verse "Al-Rehman alal-Arsh Istawa" "God sat on the Trone"[168] The Mutazilites interpreted al-Istawa with al-Qudrah (power) on all the things, regarded al-Arsh as the major portion of things, rather than accepting "al Istawa" in the sense of assembly as it would have resembled to the servants in that case.[169]

This approach was different from the approach of the traditionalists who are also known as Externalists (Zahirites), who were of the view that the Quran must be interpreted according to the requirements of literal rules of the verses, hence don't support any metaphorical interpretation.

Secondly, the Mutazilites did not accept traditions as arguments as there was much dispute pertaining to these, which is not the case with the Quran.

If all the views, theories and theses of the Mutazilites are considered in totality, we will realize that these are based finally on the Aristotelian ligic, which they received from the Greeks and exaggerated the commanding position of reason in the matters of Shariah, though shariah itself is rooted in revelation.

The Externalists take these verses of the Allegorical nature as they are in themselves and refrain from all interpretations or commentaries about these:

The Mutazilites made reason an absolute judge in the Shariah commandments.[170] While as, on the other hand, the people who take the Quranic verses in their external aspects, apply the propositions of the relevation to the problems of rational commandments. That is other words, implies that they give reason a subservient point in comparison to relevation, without any qualification, and in this scheme the reason has only one function that is to support the tenants of revelation, though on the basis of Taqlid.[171]

On the other hand, the Mutazilites try to abstract the Divine Reality from all qualities and attributes, considering that these are such entities without essences existing on their own.

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As a matter of fact, the qualities are the abstract peculiarities of the Divine Essence, not separate from it. Though dependent on it at the same time.[172]

The Mutazilites exaggerated in this case and were led to deny the speech (kalam) of God and called the Quran as created, and claimed on the basis of their obsession with "abstraction" that the speech of Allah can't be read or listened as claimed by the Asharites, who were the middle paddlers among these two groups i.e. Externalists and the Mutazilites.

As was said earlier until the end of 3rd/9th century and the beginning of the 4th/10th century, there existed no rival school of kalam that could challenge the Mutazilites. All opposition occurred under the claim that the views of the Mutazilites were against the externals of the hadith and the sunnah. The leaders of the Ahl-al Hadith such as Malik ibn Anas and Ahmad ibn Hanbal, basically considered any debate, inquiry or argument connected with the matters of faith as unlawful (harram).[173]

About the late 3rd/9th century and early 4th/10th century, a new phenomenon took place. That was the appearance of a distinguished thinker who had received instruction in Mutazilite teachings under Qudi 'Abd al Jabar, and had mastered them. He rejected Mutazilite tenets and inclined towards the doctrines of the Ahl-al-Sunnah. Since, on the one hand, he was a man of genius, and on the another was equipped with the tools used by the Mutazilities, he established all the doctrines of the Shariah on a rational basis, and gave them the form of a relatively closely Knit intellectual system. That distinguished person was Abu al Hassan al Ashari (d. circa 330/941-92). Al Ashari as against the view of his predecessors among Ahl al-Hadith, like Ahmad Ibn Hanbal-considered debate and argument, and use of the tools of logic in the matter of the doctrines of the faith as permissible, citing evidence from the Quran and the Sunnah to support his claim. He wrote a treatise entitled "Risalah fi Istihsan al Khawd fi Ilm al Kalam" ("A treatise on Appropriateness of Inquiry in Ilm al kalam".[174]

But the beginnings of Asharism are still shrouded in obscurity. At first, it was only a gradual and scarcely conscious shifting of attitude, but with 'al-Ashari' this movement suddenly leaped into self-consciouness.[175]

A story is related in order to trace the beginning of this movement by the historians. It is siad that al-Ashari was discussing with his teacher Mohammad Ibn Abdul al-Wahab al-Jubbai (235-303 A.H.). They began discussing a hypothetical case of three brothers, two adults and one boy. One adult was good, and so when he died he went to heaven, having been obedient and thus meriting his reward, according to Mutazilite principles. The second adult brother was bad and so was consigned to hell for eternity. He got what was coming to him. The boy died and was sent to heaven, although he had never reached the age of accountability. When asked why this happened, Ashari's teacher is reported to have replied that God knew that the boy would have grown up to be bad and so took him at an early age and through his mercy sent him to heaven. The older brother in hell then cried to God asking why he had not done the same for him before he had grown up and too late became enmeshed in a life of sinfulness and disobedience. But al-Jubbai could not give an answer to this, and there could of course be none according to strict Mutazilite principles. In the story, God had been unjust, which is priori impossible.

The story obviously does not provide any reliable information about God: rather it exposes a fatal weakness in Mutazilite thought about the divine justice, which simply can not be granted by human reason. Convinced of this mysterious fact, Ashari is said to have left his teacher for good and the Mutazilite movement as well. Now, the boy in the story could have been sent to hell in the first place, but this would have been unjust, too. This story seems unlikely to be a true account of al Ashari's

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conversion from Mutazilism, but it is a powerful parable and has been retold in theological circles since at least the time of Ghazzali. He considered it to be valid refutation of Mutzilite views (although he never connected it with al Ashari, whose school he himself followed in most cases).[176]

Moreover, al Ashari had several polemical discussions with al Jubai and their relations got affected because of these discussions. Al Ashari remained associated with the Mutazilite thought for complete forty years and supported the Mutazilite views with sharps arguments. But it was in 304 A.H. that al Ashari revolted against this school of thought and denounced this philosophy for ever. He went to Baghbad and studies the prophetic traditions and Islamic jurisprudence. He wrote several books in rejection of the Mutazilites. He used the Mutazilite tools against the way of the Mutazilites. He demolished the edifice of the Mutazilites. He was a respectful scholar of the Shafi school of thought.[177]

The books of al Ashari spread far and wide in the Islamic world.[178]

Al-Ashari's mission was to reconcile antagonistic views, and to set up a doctrinal system which was acknowledged first in the East, and, later, throughout the whole of Islamic World. According to DeBoer al-Ashari "understood how to render to God the things that are God's, and to man the things that are man's. He rejected the rude anthropomorphism of the Anti Mutazilite dialecticians, and set God high above all that is bodily and human, while he left to the Deity his omnipotence, and his universal agency".[179]

It was in this background that the contradictions between the Mutazilites and the externalists gave birth to a third group, commonly known as Asharites. In the detailed statement of his doctrines Ashari showed his mastery over religion and argumentation and arranged and condensed the material given him, a proceeding which could not be carried out without discrepancies. The main thing, however, was tht his cosmology, Anthropology and Eschatology did not depend too far from the text of the Tradition for the edification of pious souls, and that his theology, in consequence of a some what spiritualized conception of God was not altogether unsatisfactory even to man of higher culture.[180]

The Asharite attempted to reconcile those contradictory views with each other and tried to adopt a balanced approach, some times fascinated by the excitement of the Mutazilites, at others led to the extent of exaggeration special to the externalist Salfides. The common people were attracted by this middle course and gave it currency as well.[181]

It is perhaps for the same reason that al Mannufi called al-Ashari as a sufi, because of his reliance on divine Being in all matters.[182]

Al-Ashari did not accept the plea of the externalists that reason has no rule in the matters divine, but he did not even like the excesses of the Mutazilites who extolled reason and made it a paradigm of good and evil. It was during the reign of al-Mutawakil and his follower caliphs that the Asharism spread. The problems of the creation of the Quran was a pivotal point in the debate between the Asharite and the Mutazilites.

After al-Ashari established the doctrines of the Asharism in a systematic manner, he was followed by many luminaries. These people like al-Baqalani (1013 A.D) and Imam-al-Harmayn (1085 A.D) were such Asharites after Abul Hassan Ashari, who explained his views, supported his theories, revised his themes and improved his doctrines. Those people constructed Asharism on a new dialectical methodology. After wards appeared al-Ghazzali and Sharistani in around 1150 A/D. These two persons supported and helped Asharism in a substantial manner and stool strongly against all those who opposed

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it from among the Shia. Mutazilites and philosophers and we are in a position to say that it was from sixth century onwards that the Asharite school of theological thought flourished in almost all Islamic places. For specific reasons, it was favoured by all the people and they relied on it in their religious matters. The people had such to quote Abul Hassan Ashari or any one among his followers as an authority for Justifying their positions vis-a-vis various doctrinal issues.

The Asharites responded to almost all problems raised by the Mutazilites earlier, as the unity of the creator His qualities and justice, His grace and Mercy towards His creatures and provided also decisive judgements about the capability of the creatures, their choices, obediences, disobediences, reality of matter, elements of its creation, etc. were the topics which they discussed thoroughly. The Asharites were influenced in these and other issued by the views of the Salfides and the Mutazilites both. These people were sometimes inclined towards the Mutazilites and inmost of the case they took sides with the salafides they and the externalists. While as they tread a middle path, trying to remain neutral in the controversial issues between the Mutazilites and Salfides.[183]

The Asharite school underwent gradual changes, and particularly in hands of al Ghazzali Kalam somewhat lost its characteristic colour and took on the hue of sufism. Imam al-Razi brought it close to philosophy. According to Murtada Mutahjari, after Khawajah Nasir al Din al Tusi wrote his book Tajrid al Itiqad, more than ninety per cent of kalam assumed the colour of philosophy. After the publication of the Tajrid, all Mutakallimeen-including the Mutazilah and the Ashariah followed the same road which was trodden by that this great philosophy.[184]

For instance, the later works of kalam such as al Mawaqif and Maqabid and the commentaries written upon them all took on the colour of the Tajrid. It may be said that in fact, the more time has elapsed since Abu al Hassan al Ashari, the more leading Asharites have moved away from him bringing his doctines closer to the views of the mutazilah or those of the philosophers.[185]

Al-Ghazzali, too gave a philosophical colour to Ilm-al-kalam as we will see in the subsequent chapters.

Now we shall list the main doctrines of al Ashari, which are aimed at defending the basic principles of the Ahl al Sunnah, or attempting a rational justification of their beliefs.

1. Attributes of God and their relation with His essence.
2. Createdness or uncreatedenss of the holy Quran.
3. Possibility of beatific vision.
4. Gods seating Himself on the throne.
5. Freedom of will.

It was perhaps the problem of Quralities, which in a special case involved the Ashariah and the Mutazilah in discussion. In several matters al Ashari Stood and displayed a role of a master mind. Al-Ashari accepted the Divine qualities which have been already accepted by the salafides. However, al-Ashari gave to this problem a meaningful interpretation to bring it close to that of the Mutazilite interpretation. He accepted that God has essence, power existential attributes as knowledge (al Ilm), power (Qudrah) and will (al-Iradah) as these have eternal meanings of being dependent on their essence. But he could not deny like the Mutazilites that God has a throne, and a face and Hand etc. about which several verses are found in the Quran and the Sunnah, whose external or literal meaning

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was rejected by the Mutazilites. The Asharites accepted these Qualities, which are resembling body and space, but without the qualifications of 'Mukhalafah lil hawadith' and 'Bila kayafa walia Tashbihah' i.e. the qualities and the attributes ascribed to God must be understood to be in a applicable to human beings and so we should not ask how and draw comparisons. Terms used for human beings must have quite different meaning when applied to God. Gods attributes do not differ from those of making in degree only, as He is wiser and more powerful than human beings. They differ in their whole nature. Expressions or ideas regarding God should be deviated of all human element, according to the Asharite principle of 'Tanzih' (S. Sheikh p-120-21).

The doctrine of God is expressed in carefully chosen language by the Asharites. A few lines of which will give an idea of delicacy and precision in talking about God.

"Allah the exalted is one, not in the sense of number, but in the sense that He has no partner, He begetteh not and He is not begotten and there is none like unto Him. He resembles none of the created things nor do any created things reasonable Him. He has been from eternity and will be to eternity with His names and qualities, those which belong to His essence as well as those which belong to His action. Those which be long to His action. Those which belong to His essence are: life, power, knowledge, speech, hearing, sight and will. Those which belong to His action are : creating, sustaining, producing, renewing, making and so on.

(A.J. Wensinck, The Muslim creed, Its Genesis and Historical Development) London : Franc-ess, 1965 (p.188).

After speaking about the eternal quality of God's qualities and names, the creed lamches into a discussion of the Quran, which is...the speech of Allah, written in the copies, preserved in the memories, recited by the tongues, revealed to the prophet Our pronouncing, writing and reciting the Quran is created, whereas the "Quran itself is uncreated".

(Ibid p.139)

The speech of Gid is a unique phenomenon, not like the speech of humans. Although God spoke to Moses, and moses himself spoke, to, their speeches were deferent: God spoke before he created things, for speech is one of his eternal qualities, but it is not to be compared with human speech, even if it is uttered in history. (Mathew S. An Introduction to Islam, London p. 1985 (p. 210). Although the Asharism has clearly been influenced by the Mutazilite concern for preserving God from anthropomor-phism, but not enough to denude God of all attributes, as the "rationalists" did, Aj,ad Ibn Hanbal developed a means of avoiding speculation about Just how God could have hands, face, and soul. He insisted that because the Quran speaks of these, they must be accepted, as said earlier, bila kayfa, "without asking How". Al Ashari also held his position. In order to avoid reducing the more concrete divine attributes to mere metaphor the Asharites held:—

"It must not be said that His hand is His power or His bounty, for this would lead to the annihilation of the quality (that is, "handiness"). This is the view of the Qadarites and the Mutazilites. No, His hand is His quality, Without how (bila kayfa). Likewise His wrath and His good pleasure are two of His qualities, without how."

The Asharites neither anthropomorphized (tashbih) God nor stripped him bare (ta til) but took a middle course, Known as Tanzih "keeping pure" in the sense of refraining from speaking of God in human terms (Mathew s p. 211).

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Al-Ashari is reported to have rebutted Abu al-Hudhayl Allaf's, identification of God's attributes with His essence in the following manner. Abu al Hudhayl Allaf says that God's knowledge is God, and so he makes God knowledge. He must be asked to invoke Knowledge instead of God, both being identical and say in his prayers. "O knowledge, forgive me". This was not sheer witticism on the part of al Ashari, probably, he made these remarks in all sriousness (Saed Sheikh, p. 21).

According to Al Ashari the Quality of speech is understood in two ways. In its first sense it is dependent on the Essence, but in the second it is composed of voices, words or letters which convey meaning. The speech of God is eternal in the first sense, and in the second sense created or accidental. The Asharites as regarded the Quran pre-eternal (qadim), however, this is true of al-Kalam al nafisihi (meaning of the Quran) not al Kalam al lafzi-the spoken word.

Possibility of Beatific vision

Al-Ashari contended that had the vision of God been impossible of realization, Moses would not have aksed for it. Moses was an apostle of God and thus free from sin or gross error. How could he ask for an absurd and impossible thing ?

Al-Ashari alleged that those who denied the beatific vision of God reduced God to a mere philosophical abstraction and even to a non entity (S.S.P. 24).

God's seating Himself upon the Throne al-Ashari provided evidences from the Quran and the Hadith for Gods seating. Himself upon the throne. Al Ashari advanced rational arguments in this regard, which are typical of his dialectical temperament. If God is at all places as the Mutazilites have maintained, this would compel one to admit tht God is under the depths and the created things are below Him. If this is true, He must be under that above which He is and above that under which He is. Since this is a complete absurdity, one can not say that God is at all places.

Al-Ashari attacked the Mutazilites and others who made use of allegorical interpretations and asserted that God is at all places, by saying that if this interpretation was true then it might be logically concluded that God is also in the wombs of Mary, in the Latrines and in the waste (which is absurd) (S.S p. 25).

Freedom of will or the Khalqul al Afaal

Abu Hassan intended to given a balanced solution to this problem, as he did in other cases, although the balanced solutions don't succeed always. The Mutazilites claimed that the actions of the people are the result of their choices and created by men themselves. This was the procession taken by the qudarites also. While as the salafides attributed all actions to God, (therefore, they are close to Jabiriyyah position,) Al-Ashari however, took a middle course between these two groups. They maintained that a man has power and choice, over his actions, of a particular category, with an argument that there are some actions, on which man don't have control like trembling or getting jolts which may be differentiated from the intentional actions. In this argument the main thrust is on the point that God's sunnah is the all things are created in a way that He first creates the power in the performer of the action before its occurrence. Doctrine of acquisition in this way is that man does not 'create' his own acts; rather he acquires or 'earns' them Kasb/Iktisab become the most difficult question for kalam. The Asharites wanted to preserve genuine human responsibility, for else how could there be true religion ? But they continued to view God as the overwhelming originator and disposer of all acts. From the view point of human reason, the individual "acquires" her or his acts simply because God has willed it, not

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because here is any real freedom involved. Later mutakallimeen, as the Muslim theologians are called, sought to reserve for humans some degree of genuine responsibility. Al-Asharis less well known but influential contemporary in central Asia, Al-Maturidi (d. 944) went further than his more famous fellow theologian upholding human free will. Later, the greatest of all Islamic religious, theological, and philosophical thinkers, Abu Hamid al-Ghazzali, contained to assert free will and responsibility. Al-Ashari uses two terms for his doctrine of acquisition. Kasb and Iktisab, both of which occur in averse of the Quran: Allah does not impose on a soul responsibility beyond its capacity. It has that which it has acquired (makasabat) (and it owes what it has acquired (maktasabat) (ii. 286). The commentators have sometimes made a distinction between the two terms by saying that while kasb refers to good actions both for ones own self and for others, Iktisab refers to bad actions and to actions which pertain to ones own self only.

(Hammouda Ghoraba, "Al-Asharis doctine of acquisition (al kasb): Islamic Quarterly vol. II. 1955, pp. 3-8).

The question of human free will continued to be debated, but the parties generally tended to accept the divine ordination of all things, including human acts al-Ashari developed a puzzling view on the issue, that God intended to preserve human responsibility while asserting his divine omnipotence. It is known as the doctine of Kasb or Iktisab, a common Quranic root meaning "to seek, attain, earn" and so forth and come to mean "acquisition" namely of ones acts as ones own. The Asharites maintain.

"Allah did not compel any of His creatures to be infidels or un-faithful. And He did not create them either as faithful or infidels, but He created them as individuals, and faith and unbelief are the acts of man. Allah knoweth the man who turneth to belief as an infidel in the state of his unbelief, and if he turneth to belief after wards. Allah knoweth him as faithful, in the state of his belief; and He loveth, him without change in His knowledge or His quality. All the acts of man his moving as well as his resting are truly his won acquisition (kasb), but Allah creates them and they are caused by His will, His knowledge, His decision, and His decree (Muslim creed, p. 191).

In this way we can say according to al Ashari man can not create a thing; God is the only creator, nor does man's power produce any effect on his actions at all. Gods creates in His creatures power (qudrah) and choice (Ikhtiyar). The he creates in him his actions corresponding to the power and choice thus created. According to al-Ashari, though to it's initiative and as to its production, yet it is acquired by the creature. Acquisition (kasb) corresponds to the creatures power and choice previously created in him, he as only the locus (mahall) or subject of his action. In this way al-Ashari is supposed to have accounted for free will and made man responsible for his action. For, example, he says, a man writes with a pen on a piece of paper. God creates in his mind the will to write and at the same time He grants him the power to writ, thus bringing about the apparent motion of the hand and the pen and the appearnance of the words on the paper. The whole theory of acquisition, as father and upon al Ashari amounts to saying that the significance of mans freedom lies in his consciousness of freedom in himself. Man gives assent to the works which are accomplished in him by God and claims these as his own. (See saed sheikh, studies in Muslim Philosophy, (pp. 26-27).

To conclude the following are the main doctrines of al-Ashari:—

(i) The divine attributes are not identical with the Divine Essence.

(ii) The Divine will is all-embracing. The Divine providence and predestination encompass all events.

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(iii) All evil, like good, is from God. This is rather a logical corollary of his views about the Divine will.

(iv) Man is not free in his acts, which are created by God, This belief, necessarily follows from the doctrine of all embracing nature of the Divine will.

(v) Acts are not intrinsically good or evil, i.e. husn or qubh of deeds is not intrinsic, but determined by the Shariah not by reason as was held by the Mutazilites.

(vii) Man's power over his actions does not precede them. There is no istila ah qabl al-fil, but is commensurate and concurrent with the acts themselves.

(viii) Absolute dean-thropomorphism (Tanzih-al Mutlaq) or absolute absence of similarity between God and others, does not hold.

(ix) Doctrine of acquisition : Man does not create his own acts, rather he acquires or earns them.

(x) Possibility of the beatific vision, God shall be visible to the eyes on the Day of Resurrection.

(xi) The fasiq is a believer (mumin). This view is contrary to the view of the Khawarij, who consider him kafir, and contrary to the Mutazilite doctrine of Manzilan bayna al manzilatyan).

(xii) There is nothing wrong abut Gods pardoning some one without reprentance. Similarly, nothing is wrong about Gods subjecting believer to chastisement.

(xiii) Intercession (Shafah) is justifiable.

(xiv) To tell a lie or break a promise is not possible for God.

(xv) The world is created in time, therefore it is hadith (created, not eternal (Qadim).

(xvi) The quran is pre eternal (qadim); however, this is true of meaning of the Quran, not the spoken word.

(xvii) The divine acts do not necessarily follow any purpose or aim. Because human reason is not capable always to understand that purpose or aim, which is therefore, determined solely by the revelation.

(xviii) It is possible that God may saddle a person with a duty beyond his power (Takhleef ma la Utaq) (See Murtada Mutahari pp. 75-76).

It was against this background that Al Ghazzali to a great extent established and strengthened the Asharite doctrines on a different foundation. Through al-Ghazzali's kalam was brought closer to philosophy and sufism.

It is clear that Ghazzali's theology or kalam did not remain unaffected by Philosophical speculation. He appropriated a good deal from philosophy, whether consciously or unconsciously.

In this way he was seen that Ghazzali's role as as a mutakallim is well known, but his role as a scholastic philosopher is not that well known. In the following pages we will deal with Ghazzali philosophical credentials. His view on philosophy and its various branches will also be discussed. Moreover, the views of some prominent scholars Ghazzali's philosophical status will too be presented.

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2

Philosophy of Al-Kindi

In this section we will discuss first of all some important aspects of al-Kindi life and his works. Moreover, we will deal with Kindi's views on philosophy apart from showing his philosophical status. His theory of knowledge Metaphysics, especially his views on God, soul and intellect apart from giving a brief account of his logical views.

The full name of al-Kindi was: Abu Yousuf Yaqub ibn Ishaq ibn al-Sabbath Ibn Imran Ibn Ismail ibn al-Ashath ibn Qais-al-kindi.[1]

About the genealogy of al-Kindi Ibn Usaibah says:

"Yaqub bin Ishq al-Kindi, an Arab philosopher and one of the descendants of Arab kings...His full name was Abu Yousuf yaqub bin Ishaq bin al-Sabah Ibn Imran bin Ismail bin Mohammad bin al Ashiath bin Qais bin Maadikarb bin Maiyah bin Jublatah bin Adi bin Rabiat bin Mayah al Akhbar bin al-Aarsul al-Ashgar bin Maqiyah bin al Haras al Akbar bin Maiyah bin Taur bin Murtah bin kindat bin Afear bin Addi bin al Haras bin Maratah bin Aud bin Zaid bin Usyub bin Ureeb bin Zaid bin Kahlan bin Sabah bin Yusuf bin Yarab bin A-Qahtan.[2]

His father, Ishaq bin Sabah was governor of Kufahin the reign of Mehdi and Rashid while as Ashath Ibn Qais was among the companions of the prophet (SAW) who was king of the whole Kindah area before that, while as al-Kindi grand father Qais Ibn Maadikarb was also ruler of whole kindah region, a famous ruler with a remarkable grandeur, for the same reason he was praised by a famous poet Aishia bin Qais bin Thailabah in his four lengthy poems".

Al-kindi was descended from the famous south Arabian tribe of Kindah, immortalized by the poet Imru al Qays, who sings of a trip to far off Byzantium long before the coming of Islam. The great grand father of al-Kindi was a companion of the Prophet V.G. Ilygel, basing his work on Uyun al-Anba fi Tabaqat al-Atibba, by Ibn Abi Usa ubiah,[3] traces the genealogy of al-Kindi to his sixth ancestor inn his fathers side, who come from a line of kinghtly warriors of the royal family that ruled over kindah before the coming of Islam.

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Ibn Julyal (d. Ca. 384/994) Tabaqat al-Atibba; wal-Hakam; maintains that al-Kindi was a Basrite and that he owned a village in that region. He also mentions that he left al Basrah for Baghda.[4]

AI-Kindi was a descendent of the kindah tribe, who had several no tables through the ages. Kindah tribe was a branch from Bani-Kahlah, whose native place was Yamen, Kindah had a rule in Hijrah and Yamen.

The south-Arabian tribe of Kindi was in any case further advanced in outward civilization the another tribes. Many Kindite families settlers in Iraq (Babylonia); and there in the tom of Kufah, of which his father was governor, our philosopher was born, probably in the beginning of tenth century.[5] But according to George Atiyah, "although the exact date of his birth is not known, we can safely assume that he was born towards the end of the eight century A.C.[6] Most probably al-Kindi was born in the year 185/801, a decade before the death of al-Rashid. [7] Saed sheikh gives a little different version about his date of birth and death i.e. Birth 188-C.260/873)[8].

Dr.Ahmad Faud al-Ehwany says:-

"(Al-Kindi) was born in 185 A.H/801, and he was seventy years of age when he died...this is also the opinion of Yohunna Qameer when he says:-

"He was born in 185 A.H./801. although he says tha he lived only for sixty five years.

Flugal thinks that he died in 861. A roman scholar Najilatini says that Kindi died in 258 A.H./ 873 A.D. His life was about 70 years at his death.

Henry Carbin says, al-Kindi was born in kufah in the year 185 A.H..796 and died in Baghdad in around in the year 260 A.H./ 873 A.D, in the same year when al Ashari was born, on the same day when the disappearance of the second tenth minor Imam of the Shias is believed to have taken place.

Sheikh Mustafa Abdul Raziq says:- "Al-Kindi's date of birth is just determined in the basis of guess-work. But what we have already alluded to that his birth took place during the period when his father was still alive", who died in the reign of Rashid and Rashid died in 193 A.H./608.

According to Abdul Munim Hammudah the strong evidence about his birth and death is that he was born in the beginning ninth century in about 185 A.H./801, as was preferred by DeBoer as well.[9]

Al-Kindi passed his early boyhood in Kufah. He learnt the Quran by heart, the Arabic grammar, literature, and elementary arithmetic.[10]

AI-Kindi's versatility and vast interest in all branches of knowledge point to an early liking for learning. It must have been this desire that actuated him to move to al-Basrah in search for more knowledge.[11]

He then studied Fiqh and the new-born discipline called kalam. But it seems that he was more interested in sciences and philosophy, to which he unsecrated the rest of his life, especially after he went to Baghada.[12] It seems that al-Kindi learnt Greek, but certainly he mastered the syriac language from which he translated several works.[13] He had mastery over the sciences of geometry, astronomy, theory of music, physics optics, meteorology, geography, medicine, pharmacy, politics etc. He was well acquainted with the philosophical views of Socrates, Plato, Aristotle and his commentaries, particularly Alexander of Aphrodisiacs. He was also a student of comparative religion. In philosophy, he had learnings towards Neoplatonism and Neopthagoreanism, and in muslim theology towards the then flourishing school of Mutazilism. He wrote an all subjects; the number of his treatises amounts to 265,

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though, unfortunately, very few f them are extant now.[14]

Kindi was a man of extraordinary erudition, he had absorbed the whole learning and culture of his time. He was a creative genius. His acquaintance with various systems of religion impelled him to compare them together, and he found as a common element in them all the belief that the world was the work of a first cause, One and Eternal, for whom our knowledge furnishes us with no more precise designation.[15] Moreover, al-Kindi's knowledge of Greek, Persian and Indian literature earned him unique respect and fame throughout his stay in Baghdad.[16]

Al-Ma'mun (813-833 A.C) invited him to joint the circle of scholars who were busy collecting the Greek scientific and philosophical works and rendering them into Arbic. Al-Kindi enjoyed the generous patronage of al-Ma'mun and his brother al-Mu Tasim. He held important positions as a royal teacher and probably as a physician. But al-Mutawaki could not look favourably upon his Mutazilite inclinations. Besides it is said that the sons of Musa Ibn Shakir, the well known brother scientist in the service of al-Mutawakil, plotted aganist him so successfully that al Kindi lost favour with al-Mutawakil and was dismissed from service. The sons of Musa had a reputation for scheming against all those who surpassed them in knowledge or were in the confidence of the caliph. The envied al kindi's library called al-kindiyah for the sizable number of good books it contained, and succeeded in persuading the caliph to confiscate it and give it to them as he had already done with the library of Hunayn ibn ishaq. But after a while al-Kindiyah was restored to its original owner.[17] However, al-Kindi could never regain his lost privileges at the court:[18]

Al-Kindi's notoreity for avarice was equal his fame for knowledge. This bad reputation was due to al-jahiz caricature of him in his kitab al-Bukhata. However, al-Kindi lived a luxurious life in a house, in the garden of which he bred many curious animals. It seems that he lived aloof from society, even from his neighbours. An interesting story related by al-Qifti shows that al-Kindi lived in the neighbourhood of a wealthy merchants on was attacked by sudden paralysis and no physician in Baghdad was able to cure him. Some one told the merchant that he lived in the neighbourhood of the most brilliant philosopher, who was very clever in curing that particular illness. Al-Kindi cured the paralyzed boy by music".[19]As has been already said Al-Kindi wrote more than 265 books, but most of his numerous works are lost,[20] *on the first Philosophy* is important source on al-Kindi's philosophy. This book deals with the meaning and uses philosophy, being and its categories, the first cause and the efficient cause, oneness in reality and metaphor. In the second chapter the nature and scope of physics and metaphysics is established. In the same chapter a discussion on the finite and the infinite is followed. The third chapter deals with the necessity of a first cause, and the impossibility its being material. The last chapter is devoted to a discussion of the problem of unity.

There are other important books which were written by al-Kindi on philosophy and related subjects. For example, "on the purposes of Aristotle in his categories".[21]

"On the Nature of science and its classification" (k. Fi Ma iyyat al Iim wa Asqamihly

"The classification of the Human sciences"(K.Aqsam al-ilm al-Unsi) etc. etc.

Ibn al-Nadim and following him al-Qifti classified his writings, most of which are short treatises, into seven teen groups:[22]

1. Philosophical 2. Logical 3. Arithmetical, 4. Globular 5. Musical, 6. Astronomical, 7. Geometrical, 8. Spherical, 9. Medical, 10. Astrological, 11. Dialectical, 12. Psychological, 13. Political, 14.

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Casual, (meterorological) 15. Dimensional 16. On first things. 17. On the species of some metals; Chemicals etc. According to Ibn Nadim the number of his books was about 230. [23]

This account shows to what extent al-Kindi's knowledge was encyclopedic some of his scientific works were translated by Gerad of Cremona into Latin and influenced very much the thought of medieval Europe. Cardano considered him to be one of the twelve greatest minds."[24]

Al-Kindi explained his views pertaining to great religion philosophical problems, as existence of God, His attributes, life after death, prophethood, theory of knowledge and ethics.[25]

Al-Kindi was a systematic thinker and consistent philosopher, followed Aristotle less than people like al-farabi, Ibn sina and Ibn Rushd. There are points of deferences between Al-Kindi and Aristotle so far as the issues relating to eternity of the world and other problems are concerned. Al-Kindi was not fascinated by the views of Aristotle to the extent, other Muslim philosphers were. He died not write foots notes on the philosophy of Aristotle. He rather contradicated Aristotle on various important themse.[26]

According to Dr. fawad Ehwany:-

"Al-Kindi is considered the first writer, who wrote on various scholarly subjects among the Arabs. He divided knowledge into two sections, i.e. religious and philosophical subjects. Later on all the Muslim philosophers and thinkers ranging from al-Farabi to Ibn Khaldun followed him in this classification. He added that Islam brought with it such sciences which are indispensable for all, for example, prophency, principles of religion, and the allied subjects like Fiqh, Hadith and Tafsire etc. etc.

Moreover, al-Kindi wrote as such subjects which we very noval as arithmetic, mathematics astronomy and music. He was knowns, for the same reason as one among the eight great in Europe into Latin language and he become very famous by dint of these books. Several of his books are still extent.

In this way al-kindi was not only an independent thinkers in his own right, but rather influenced almost all the subsequent thinkers who come after like farabi, Ibn sina and Ghazzali.[27]

However, there was a great controversy about al-Kindi's being and philosopher of Islam or the Arabs? There are several people like A.F. Ehwany and others who regard Al-Kindi as the philosopher of the Arabs. But sheikh Mustafa Abdual Raziq and Ibn Hajr regard him as philosopher of Islam. They think that when people call him philosopher of the Arabs in the fashion of missionaries they just want to show that there is no relation possible between Islam and philosophy.[28]

Mustafa Abdul Raziq says:-

"al-Kindi is philosopher of the Arabs as said by the author of "Akhbar al-Umum" it is said that no one among the followers of Islam was renowned in philosophical sciences to the extent to be called as philosopher before yaqub (al-Kindi) In the kitabul al fahrist he is named as *Falasuf al Arab* Ibn Nabattah says for the same reason:-

"al-Kindi as Yaqub bin Sabah, known in his life time as philosopher of Islam after Mustafa Abdul Raziq concludes that:-

"Al-Kindi was really entitled to this title because he was the first Arab Muslim who made the flourishing of philosophy possible among the Arabs under Islamic shadow."[29]

But the safte course out of this controversy is that al-Kindi was the first Muslim Arab who mastered philosophical sciences during his life span,"[30]

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Ibn Hajar in his Lisanual al Mizan has called al-Kindi the philosopher of Arab at a place and at another as philosopher of Islam and according to Dr. F.Ahwany it is contradictions in terms. But the fact remains that according to Ibn Hajr, there was no deference between the two terms.[31]After dealing with al-kindi's life, works and status as the philosopher of Islam. Let us se what he says about philosophy. Tobegin with it was due to al-Kindi that philosophy come to be acknowledged as a part of Islamic culture. He borrowed his ideas from Neo-platonic Aristotelianism etc., but it is also true that he put those ideas in a new context. By conciliating Hellenistic heritage with Islam he laid the foundations of a new philosophy. He made philosophy a most comprehensive study embracing all sciences by specializing in all the sciences known at his time. Ibn Nadim for the same reason placed him among the 'Natural philosopher," because of his prominence in science".[32]

Al-Kindi brought science and philosophy close together by strongly emphasizing after the pythagoreans and plato, that no body could be a philosopher without being thoroughly disciplined in mathematics. This was confirmed by his own mathematical applications of quantitative methods in the fields of medicince, optics, music, etc. Roger Bacon praised him for his application of mathematical methods in physiological optics. It is for the same reason that people like Witelo and others in the thirteenth century were influenced by him.[33]

Al-Kindi further applied mathematics to the theory of music which gave al-Kindi a prominent place in the history of arabic music. H.G. farmer thinks that al-Kindi s treatises on music had a fairly considerable influence on later writers for two centuries.[34]

No less a musician himself, the great al-Farabi was also indebted to him. [35]Kindi's actual philosophy, consists especially, of Mathematics and Natural philosophy, in which Neo-platonism and Neo-pythagoreians merge into one another. According to him no one can be a philosopher without studying mathematics." Fanciful play upon letters and numbers in frequently met with in his writings.[36] According to George Atiyah "In my opinion, his greatest contribution has been the opening of the doors of philosophy to muslim scientists".[37]

Philosophy is the knowledge of truth Muslim philosopher, like the Greek, believed that truth in something over and above experience, that it lies immutable and eternal in a supernatural world. The definition of philosophy in al-Kindi's treatise on "first philosophy" runs like this" philosophy is the knowledge of the reality of things within man's possibility, because the philosophers, end in his theoretical knowledge is to gain truth and in his practical knowledge behave in accordance with truth." At the end of the treatise, God is qualified by the term "truth" which is the object of philosophy" The true one (al-wahid al-Haq) is then the first the creator, the sustainer, of all that he has created.[38]

First, philosophy is considered the most exalted science, it is the science of the first cause, the first divine reality which is the cause of all other realities, that is why it is given the first place in other of learning. Contrary to Aristotle and Ibn Sina, Al-Kindi does not consider first philosophy the study of being qua being, nor does he always consider philosopher knowledge the most certain.[39]

In his treatise on the Definitions of things and their descriptions, Al-Kindi records six definitions which were representative of the scholars of this time. Here are they:

1. Philosophy is composed of two words, Philo, friend nad sophia or wisdom. Philosophy is the love of wisdom This definition is based on the Greek entomology of the word.
2. Philosophy is the human emulation of divine excellence as far as such emulation is possible.

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This is a functional definition.

3. Philosophy is the practice of death. Death means the separation of the soul from the body. Moreover, death involves the suppression of material concerns, which are inimical to the virtuous life or what is its practical equipvalent, the activity of the intellect. Another functional definition.
4. Philosophy is the science of sciences and the wisdom of wisdoms.
5. Philosophy is man's knowledge of himself.
6. Philosophy's proper subject matter is defined as the science of the haeccеity, the essence and causes of things of the limit of human power.[40]

From this list of definitions, al-Kindi seems to have chosen the last one and added to it the idea of philosophy as a practice of virtue. The philosopher, according to him, is he who seeks after truth and lives up to it, that is, who lives justly. Perfect philosophy s not merely the knowledge of the truth, it is, besides, the realization of truth in action. The truly wise combines the seeking after wisdom and its exercise.[41]

The final end of philosophy lies in its relation to morality. The philosophers aim in philosophy is both to know and to become wise or to act justly knowledge and virtue are regarded as equal and as important activities of reasons.

Al-Kindi tried at reconcilation between philosophy and religion. His approach wa a ballooned one. He opposed to various Aristotelian opinions an eternity of the world, God, knowledge of the particulars, resurrection of the bodies etc. He did not accept Aristotelian views in tot nor rejected him altogether. He rather made philosophy as an urgent matters from religious angle. He did not take an extreme view about philosophy or religion, rather brought affinity between religion and philosophy. He did not follow Aristotle in all his views was not followed by al-kindi as was done by al-Farabi, Ibn sina and Ibn Rushd. Moreover, he did not even approaching Aristotle with the scathing criticism as was done by al-Ghazzali and Ibn Taimiyah. He rather accepted those ideas of his predecessors which were based on reason. He rather remained thankful to his predecessors for having benefited from their views and philosophy. He says:-

"We must remain thankful for even getting a scintilla about reality from others" Al-Kindi praises Aristole: when he says:-

"We must thank these fathers who brought a portion of truth to us, as they became instrumental for discovering truth to us.[42]

According to al-Kindi the whole truth cannot be discovered by a single man, though he strives his whole life to reach to it. Only a portion of truth can be discovered by a person and thought it is a little portion of truth, still it is a valuable thing for us and leads us to an eternal blessedness, which is better than transitory, fleeting and timely benefits. But al-Kindi did not claim like Ibn Rushed that the philosophy of the predecessors was the absoulte Truth, (as Ibn Rushed said about Aristotle). He did not even declared the predecessor philosophy as misguided as was done by subsequent people. His approach towards Greek philosophy was that of a balanced: philospher, devoid of extreme verdicts and extremistic dubbings which was a common feature of Ibn Rushd or the other Muslim thinkers. Though he calls Aristotle as the Great philosopher among the Greeks.[43]

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But he does not call his thought as a absolution truth or that he has attained or reached to the total truth.[44]

al-kindi adopted this very balanced approach to philosophy, which clearly indicates that he was not a only the translator of Greek philosophy or a commentator for that matter. Rather he semed to believe that the human philosophy and knowledge as always accumulative process shared by various groups of people and is not based on individual efforts in isolation, or is acquired in one span of time. Hence, the availing of the knowledge acquired by the predecessors becomes indispensable.

The muslim philosophers after al-Kindi adopted some what similar approach towards Greek philosophy. Muslim philosophers in this sense were original thinkers not merely transmitters of the Greek thought as such, as some western writers allege.

Even Ibn Sina had no hesitation to oppose Aristotle and peripatetics in his attempt to establish right from wrong, thought he ahd lot of respect for Aristotels erudition and scholarship and pay s tributes to him for his being reached to the culmination of truth in his though and philosophy.

Al-Kindi flourished in this turmoil and turbulence and it was natural that al-Kindi wanted to defend Islam with the weapons of philosophical argumentation and proved that Greek philosophy was not a strange science for the Muslims.

If the Greeks, who are not Muslims, discovered the truth, there is no reason why one should not accept it from them. Furthermore the discovery of the truth is a collective enterprise of all nations. He had at times, however, to appeal to the tribal instinct of his audience by telling them that Yunan (Greece personalized) is the brother of Qahtan, the alleged ancestor of the Arabs. Greeks and Arabs are cousins why can not they seek the truth together. Although each one of them follows his own way.[45]

Philosophy is classifed into two main divisions: theoretical studies, which are physics, mathematics, and metaphysics, and practical studies which are ethics, economics and politics. A latter writer, quoting al-Kindi, gives the classification as follows:

Theory and practice are the beginning of the virtues. Each one of the two is divided into the physical, mathematics, and theological parts. Practice is divided into the guidance of one's self, that ones house, and that on ones city.[46] Ibn Nabata while quoting also al-Kindi mentions only the theoretical divisions. "The philosophical sciences are of three kinds: the first in teaching (talim) is mathematics which is intermediate in nature, the second is physics, which is the last in nature: the third is theology which is the highest in nature".[47]

As there are three types of sciences there are three types of information as well. The knowledge of Hyle is possible through senses. As far as the knowledge of Hyle is concerned, these are sensory aspects of knowledge, and this is the science of physics, but there are such other sciences as well which are not related to hyle, these are individual sciences as mathematics, consisting on numbers, figures, divisions, additions. The science which is not related to hyle, that is science of thelogy.[48]

Man had to get educated and acquire the profitable and beneficial science for development of himself and the society in which he lives. So that he may become fully conversant with tall these sciences. In the view of al-Kindi the way to such knowledge is either sensory perception or rational discourse or both at a time. According to al-Kindi four things are compulosry for a seeker of philosophical knowledge i.e. quest, search, Instrument, and time. The quest (al Talb) is to try to reach to ones purpose, search means discovering the secret aspects of a problems, and knowledge is the fruit of search

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and investigation and search is fruit of quest. The instruments of search are mathematics and Logic and time is included and involved in all human efforts, contrary to the Divine knowledge which is received without any effort, quest or search on the part of the receiver of that knowledge. It does not need even any method of mathematics, logic or history.[49] Most of the philosophers have confined theory of knowledge to these two sources of knowledge i.e. sense-perception, which in the view of al-kindi cannot lead us to the knowledge of essences of things, and the rational discourse, which is only the way to knowledge of class and genders. For the same reason, like many other Illuminationist philosophers, al-Kindi identities a third source of knowledge, that is inspiration, which is the highest of all sources according to al-Kindi and by which God chooses and selects prophets for prophet hood.[50]

In this way the philosophy of al-Kindi is aimed at establishing two objectives. The first objective is to establish the existence of the True one (al-wahid-al-Haqq) i.e. God, the most exalted. Since Islam is also trying to prove the existence of the unity of God, and according to it God is the one, inventor of the Universe from nothingness, therefore philosphy in real sense of its subject matter, is trying to provide and establish the knowledge of God, the true one, therefore no conflict is possible between religion and philosophy or between philosophy and Shariah. Nor is indulgence in philosophy warranting a blame of blasphemy against those who study it, as we don't find any such teaching in it, which may demand its prohibition or condemnation.

The second objective was to bring an accord between Plato and Aristotle, although before al-Kindi many others tried to bring this accord, as Alexander of Aphrodisias, Plotinus and others did. In all these efforts, however, the substance of Aristotelian philosophy was alwasy present and also and oppostion to the essence of plotinus, who believed in emanations of the creations from the one by way of over flow. Al-Kindi could not solve this problem fully, though he mixed philosophy of existence and philosophy of Unity into a new frame of concord.[51]

No doubt before al-Kindi, there were people who tried to bring an accord between religion and philosophy for, example the Christian thinkers considered that the philosophers, directly or indirectly, took inspiration from Torah about the existence of God (especially from the book of Genesis) as the Epicureans availed the teachings of Moses about their general attitudes, in this way, whatever has been said by the philosophers, poets about eternity of soul, or the reward which a man gets at his death etc. are basically inspired from the remnants of the prophetic teachings in this or that way.[52]

Even the Mutazilites had already tried to bring an accord between religion and philosophy, but Al-Kindi was, of course, the first Muslim philosopher who provided systematic and clear cut arguments to effect this accord. He for the first time said that philosophy is not only knowledge of reality of things, including science of theology as well and science of unity and Grace, but consists of all such sciences which are beneficial indicates avoidance from all vicious and harmful activities. According to al-Kindi the prophets came with the message for acquisition of all such beneficial sciences from God. He say:-

"The prophets (PBUT) come to people with confession of belief in God and His unity, and insisted on virtues which are approved by God, and rejected vices disliked by God, as these are dangerous in their essences and consequences. Therefore, adherence to this psychological acquisition from the prophets is obligatory in the view of people of truth and we must also attempt to our utmost to possess it,"[53] In this way al-Kindi paved the way for the study of philosophy and explained that like religion the objective of philosophy is to give us knowledge about profitable and harmful things, virtues and vices, so that we may cultivate virtues and shun vices, because both religion and philosophy has

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made these things desirable for us so, that man may receive the salvation in this world and hereafter. After wards al-Kindi replies the queries raised by the opponents who oppose study of philosophy. Becase al-Kindi was obliged to defend himself against the accusation of relgious sopkesman that "the acquisition of the knowledge of the reality of things (i.e. philosophy) is atheism (kufr)."[54]

In his turn al-Kindi accused those religious spokesman for being irreligious and traders with religion. He says:

"They disputed with good men in defense of the untrue position. Which they had founded and occupied without any merit only to gain power and to trade with religion."[55]

furthermore, the prophets have ordained the pursuit of truth and practice of virtue. "The totality of every useful science and the way to attain it, the getting away from any anything harmful and taking care against it—the acquisition of all this is what the true prophets have proclaimed in the name of God....The prophets have proclaimed the unique divinity of God, the practice of the virtue accepted by Him, and the avoidance of the vices which are contrary to virtues in themselves.

Against the attacks of the religious fanatics who were opposed to any kind of philosophical activities, he maintains that philosophy is a necessity and not a luxury. He tells the fanatics that they must declare philosophising either necessary or unnecessary. If they say it is necessary, they must be willing to go in search of it. On the other hand, If they declare that it is unncessary, they must give reasons and arguments to prove their contention. Now, to give reasons and arguments implies a act of philosophizing and hence philosophy is necessary in either case.[56]

This defence proposed by al-kindi assumes great importance not only because it was made in the face of religious opposition but also because it reveals to us that al-Kindi did not mean to undermine revelation by it; on the contrary, him main purpose seems to be to place religous concepts on what he considered stronger and sounder foundations, the use of demonstrative proffs.[57]

The main arguments, al-Kindi produces to defend philosophy is an assumption that both philosophy and religion have identical aims, namely, the knowledge of the unity of God and the pursuit of virtue. He substantiates this by maintaining that philosophy counts "Theology, the science of the unity of God, ethics and every useful science that leads, men to practice good and shun evil" among its branches.[58]

Religions, he claims does the same thing: the substance of all true prophetic messages is simply to affirm the unique divinity of God, and to enjoin upon us the selection and pursuits of those virtues most pleasing in the eyes of God." [59] In other wards, al-Kindi sees that on a theoretical level both religion and philosophy deal with a similar problem, the unity of God. Also on a practical level they have identical aims, to urge man to achieve a higher moral life. On both levels, therefore, Al-Kindi thinking makes it, appear that is no essential differences between religion and philosophy since they both aim at the same things.[60]

But as a matter of fact, al-Kindi approaches this problem in different ways. In one place he maintains the equal certainty of both rational and prophetic knowledge, in his psychological writings, he includes the prophetic in the rational: and in a third place he declares that human knowledge is inferior to the prophetic.

In his treatise on "The Number of the works of Aristotle," al-Kindi makes a sharp distinction between religion and philosophy. The fact that he discussed this point in this particular treatise proves

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that he was comparing the religion of Islam with Aristotle's philosophy. The divine Science, which he distinguished from philosophy, is Islam as revealed to the prophet and recorded in the Quran. Contrary to his general view that theology is a part of philosophy, here we find(1) that theology occupies a rank higher than philosophy (2) that religion is a divince science and philosophy is a human one, (3) that they way of religion is faith and that of philosophy is reason, (4) that the knowledge of the prophet is immediate and through inspiration and that of the philosopher is by way of logic and demonstration. We quote in full this interesting and very important passage.

" If then, a person does not obtain the knowledge of quantity and quality, he will lack knowledge of the primary and secondary substances, so that one can not expect him to have any knowledge of the human sciences which are acquired by man through research, effort and industry. These sciences fall short in rank of the divine science (al-Ilam al-Ilahi) which is obtained without research, effort, and industry, and in no time. This latter knowledge is like the knowledge of the prophets, a knowledge bestowed by God, unlike mathematics and logic, it is received without research, effort, study and industry, and requires no period of time. It is distinct in being obtained by the will of God, through the purification and illumination of souls, so that they turn towards truth, through God's support, assistance, inspiration and His messages. This knowledge is not a prerogative of all men, but only of the prophets. This is one of their miracles, peculiarities, the distinctive sign which differentiates them from other human beings. Men who are not prophets have no way of attaining knowledge of the secondary substances and their accidents without research and industry through logic and mathematics, and without any period of time.

"Hence, men of intelligence draw the evident conclusion that since this (knowledge) exists, it comes from God; whereas (ordinary) men are unable by their very nature to attain to a similar knowledge, because it is above and beyond their nature and the devices they use. Thus, they submit themselves in obedience and docility to it and faithfully belive in the truth of the message of the prophets."[61] In al-Kindi's view, the Quranic arguments, being divine, are more sure, certain, and convincing than the philosophical arguments which are human. The Quran gives solutions of some very important problems, such as the creation of the world from nothing, and resurrection. Al-Kindi holds that the Quranic arguments are "beliefs, clear and comprehensive," Thus they lead to certainty and conviction. Hence, they are superior to the philosophers arguments. An example of such sure arguments is to be found in the answer to the infidels who asked." who will be able to give life to bones when they have been reduced to dust? "The answer is: "He who produced them originally will give life to them".[62]

The attitude of al-Kindi towards the rational as certain ability of Mohammad's, message is substantiated further by al-Kindi's reduction of the conflict between reason and revelation to a problem of allegorical interpreation (Tawil). He attributes any contradiction between the word of the Quran and philosophy to our misunderstanding of the real meaning of the Quran.

The first illustration is take from his treatise on the Bowing of the outer most sphere and its obeisance to God. Al-Kindi's disciple, Ahmad the son of al-Mutasim, asked his tutor to explain the meaning of the verse." And the stars (al-najm) and the trees (prostrate) themselves." [63] This verse has been interpreted by reference to the different meanings of the word "Sajdah" It means: (1) prostration in praying, (2) obedience (3) change from imperfection to perfection (4) following by will the order of a person. It is this last meaning that applies to the worship of the stars. The heavenly sphere is animated and is the case of life in the world of generation and corruption. The movement of the premium unmobile is called worship (Sajud) in the sense that it obeys God.[64]

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To sum up, Al-Kindi was the first philosopher is Islam to effect an accord between religion and philosophy. Two quite different views are given by him. The first follows the way of the logicians and reduces religion to philosophy. The second considering religion divine science, raises it above philosophy. This divine science can be known by a prophetic faculty. However, through philosophic interpretation religion becomes conciliated with philosophy.

After dealing with al-Kindi's views on philosophy and accord between reason and revelation in a Mutazilite fashion, we will deal with his views on logic. Since said al-Andalusi has made al-Kindi's logical status susceptible to various confusions, it is necessary to see his actual views on the subject. Said says:— "al-Kindi wrote on logic many books which never became popular, and which people never read or used in the sciences, because these books missed the art of analysis, which is the only way to distinguish between right and wrong in every study. By the art of synthesis, which is what Yaqub meant by his writings, no one can profit unless he has a sure premises for which he makes synthesis."

But before we deal with logic of al-Kindi, it will be most suitable to say something about his Mutazilism. The Mutazilah, with whose tenants Al-Kindi's thinking was closely associated, considered that man can arrive at the knowledge of God and of right and wrong by reason, and accordingly the philosophy should not be confined only to theoretical speculation but should also be extended to the practical aspects of life.[65]

The allegorical method which was used by al-Kindi was earlier used by the Mutazilites and not by the philosophers.[66] About the problem of attributes of God too, al-Kindi has shown an amicable disposition towards the Mutazilites and formulated his thesis regarding God's attributes along the same lines of thought as those pursued by the "Liberal thinkers" of Islam. In the same way he wrote a book on that the Actions of the creator are all just which is presumed must have contained ideas along the theory that God can do only what is best (al aslah).

Al-Kindi was inclined towards Mutazilism for its reationalistic tendencies, a broad outlook and tolerance of Greek ideas. Some times al-Kindi approaches his subject like a Hellenistic mathematician and at other times like a dialectician who uses Mutazilite methods and argumentation and resorts to the Quran to prove a point as he does in the case of his explanations of various verses.[67]

About the aforementioned "al-aslah", for example, Al-Kindi says:— "This is the design of the all-powerful, bountiful, all knowing God, that He invented this universe. This design is the extreme form of perfection as He is the cause of commanding the best only, as we have already made clear.," [68] In this way al-Kindi applies "al amar al Aslah" to the whole universe, but the Mutazilite confine it only to God's having commanding the best for His servants compulsory, as it is well known to them. Moreover, the influence of the Mutazilitie thought can easily be discerned in al-Kindi regarding his interpretation. (Tawil) of the Quranic verses in a philosophical manner in form of rational propositions, it resembles to the interpretations of Jahiz and Nazzam and Hudial etc. especially among the renowned Mutazilite thinkers.[69]

It is also became of this Mutazilite influence and Neo-platonic impact on al-Kindi that there is much emphasis on the abstract aspect of the Divine Being and attributing Him with negative qualities.[70]

However, al-Kindi has attributed God with positive qualities also. For example he says: this is from the design from the knowing wise, who is powerful, benevolent Lord, who has created every thing with a complete design.[71]

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But there is no doubt that al-Kindi lays much emphasis on the Abstraction and negation about the qualities of God in the fashion of Mutazilities and we find a type of exaggeration in this aspect too. We find that the Mutazilite Abu Hudail has explained the negative aspects of the Divine Being. He says for example," that if you say that Allah is knowing, knowledge is proved for Him, He is Allah, and you have thus, negated ignorance from Him, and when you say that God is powerful, you negate from God incompetence and the power is established for God and that quality (of power) itself is (identical with) God. It means, that God is knowledgeable by His knowledge, which is (identical with) Him. He is powerful by His power (which is identical with) Him. He is Alive with life (which is identical with) Him. Similarly we find the cases of the other Divine qualities."[72]

Whatever has been said by Abu Hudail is also the general thinking of the Mutazilites as Nazzam, Jahiz etc. have held. Abu Ridah, Mohammad Abdual Hadi says:,

"Al-Kindi's thought was developed under the impact of the great Mutazilite trend which was prevalent during his period. Although it can safely by said that the impact of his strong philosophical and distinguished personality with its peculiarity is found always present throughout his thinking."[73]

In this way al-Kindi emerged as a Mutazilite Mutakallim and afterwards inclined towards philosophy, explained its tenets and elaborated on its complexities, attempted to bring an affinity between religion and philosophy, wrote several books on various subjects and in almost every branch of knowledge which were prevalent during his times.[74]

Though al-Kindi had a very close relation with the Mutazilite thought before the rule of Mutawakil. But he was not one among various members of this group. He rather proceeded ahead with his nowel ideas and left the Mutakallimeen far behind to him. He was the man, who is his books defended the accord between philosophical quest and the prophetic revelation.[75]

According to DeBoer "His theological views bear a Mutazilite stamp."[76]

As has been said earlier, first philosophy or metaphysics is the knowledge of the first cause because, all the rest of philosophy is included in this knowledge.[77] The method followed in the study of first philosophy is the logic of demonstration. From now on, Logic will be instrument of the philosophers in their quest for truth.

According to al-Kindi, logic is necessary for the preparation of a philosopher, but is not so necessary as mathematics. According to al-Qifit, al-Kindi wrote commentaries on Aristole's books.[78] Ibn al Nadim, furthermore, mentions several works on logic written by Al-Kindi himself. Among the latter were several introductions (Eisagoge), the titles of which indicate that some of them were detailed works, whereas others were short and concise. He wrote, moreover, a treatise on the Ten Categories and another on the Five categories. Al-Kindi's other writings on logic include a commentary of On sophistical Refutations entitled. How to Guard Against Sophistical Crafts, and different treatises on demonstration (Opodexis- al Burhan). This makes al-Kindi the first logician in Arabic.[79]

The methods of teaching and investigation used by the philosophers, al-Kindi maintains, are four in number: division, analysis, definition and demonstration. Demonstrative reasoning (qiyas) is considered the most important method since the knowledge one acquires by it is the comprehensive and is used by all kinds of people. People who use demonstrative reasoning are of different types: there are the chiidren whose reasoning is egocentric: the adults whose reasoning is base on analogy and who, profiting from their experience, deduce the unknown from the known, the scholars who are versed in

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dialectical reasoning and whose premises can be either ture, false, or absurd, and last, there are the initiates in geometrical proofs and logic who use syllogistic resoning in order to arrive at the knowledge of those things which cannot be known by the sense or by induction. This knowledge of the initiates is called epodictic, that is demonstrative. The rest of the treatise deals with wrong conclusions or logical errors in all their aspects and necessity of mathematics for the study of philosophy. The author then proceeds to give examples of demonstrative reasoning by providing such theories as the following: that there is no void, the outside the universe there is neither void no plenum: and that the world was created in time. The finale is a mystical conclusion that the aim of logic is identical with that of ethics.

It seems that al-Kindi discarded the Aristotelian forms of demonstration in favour of the hypothetical and his disjunctive syllogisms preferred by the Stoics and Neoplatonists.

Al-Kindi knew Aristotelian logic well. He favoured also a different approach because he was assuming that mathematical knowledge leads to the first intelligibles and that it is more certain than syllogistic reasoning. Al-Kindi considered that universals do not have concrete existence; they are only objects of thought comprehended by the intellect after having passed from potentiality into actuality. Equally, the essence of a thing is known by the intellect, whereas its concrete existence is known by the senses. Knowledge as well as being are hiearchical. Therefore in order to know the secondary substances, that is, the intelligibles, one has first to know the primary substances. Mathematics, al-Kindi maintains, is the only way that leads us to the knowledge of the primary substances, hence to the knowledge of the things in their true realities. According to him nobody should aspire to know the first principles of things, without having mastered the sciences of mathematics.[80] On the whole, we can conclude that al-Kindi must have known both the Aristotelian and Stoic logics, that he must have dealt with the problem of the cateogries of beings, the problem of essence and accident, as well as with terms, propositions, syllogisms, opinions adn error[81] and that he must not have considered Aristotelian logic as the only means that leads to philosophical certainty. Mathematical reasoning was for him more fundamental than logic, and we know that he wrote a book that philosophy can not be attained except by the science of Mathematics, the title of which points unequivocally towards his attitude to logic.[82]

After dealing with al-Kindi's views on philosophy, religion and logic, let us have a look into his theory of knowledge, as logic is closely related to theory of knowledge on the one hand and to ontology or metaphysics on the other.

To start with as for the classification of the sciences is concerned, al-Kindi followed more or less the Aristolelian division. However, it is interesting to note that in his treatise on the Number of Aristotle's Books....he arranges the sciences in order of their decreasing relation to matter. Al-Kindi, however, does not seem to have been very much involved in this issue of classification. He simply follows Aristotle in dividing philosophy into theoretical and practical. Just as man's existence, according to him, is two fold, intellectual and sensible, so philosophy should be divided into an intellectual science and a practical science ("Wujud hissi wa wujud aqli").[83]

The intellectual science corresponds to the Aristotelian theoretical, and is divided by a dual classification into the science of divine things and the science of "artificial" things, that is, created things. From another point of view, intellectual science may be divided into three brances, each corresponding to a different class of being. First there are those objects which are not separable from matter, in fact, they are nothing but matter, and they include what al-kindi denominates as the "corporeals" (al-jismaniyat). The second class included the objects associated with matter but which are not matter in

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themselves, such as soul. Third there is that class of beings which include only those objects which are divine and absolutely separable from matter.[84]

It will be noted that this third class is equivalent to the "divine things" of the formal dual classification and that the first and second classes of "corporeals" and of "objects associated with matter" fall neatly into place as subdivisions of the "artificial" things of the dual classification.

Ibn Nabattah, while describing Al-Kindi's "philosophy" i.e. the theoretical aspect only, also gives a double and a tripartite classification. He says:

"The science of philosophy are three: first there are the mathematical sciences which come in the middle by nature. Secondly, there is the science of physics, which is lowest by nature. Thirdly, there is theology, which is highest by nature. The sciences are three in number because the knowables are three. We have a science of immaterial objects. The last is divided into the science of those objects which are absolutely separable form matter, and those that are associated with matter. The material objects are investigated by physics. Those objects that are spearable by themselves but are associated with matter like the science of numbers, geometry, astrology, and musicology which are investigated by mathematics. The immaterial objects which are absolutely separable from matter are investigated by theology." [85]There is a slight difference between the classification of al-Kindi as reported in his Rasail and that reported by Ibn Nabattah concerning the second class of beings. Whereas Rasail 11, 10, gives the soul an example of the science of those objects which are immaterial but assoicated with matter, Ibn Nubatah gives mathematics.[86] Although al-Kindi dismisses practical philosophy without any discussion of its classification.[87] But according to Atiyah, we may surmise that he would have followed the lines laid down by Aristotle. Thus he would have included ethics and politics under practical philosophy.[88]

Al-Kindi divides philosophy into the study of divine things and "artificial" things. The divine things are identical with the Aristotelian immovables and the "artifical" with the movables. The use of the world "artificial" is to make clear that he does not share Aristotle's opinion concerning the eternity of matter.[89] In this, way al-Kindi maintains that there are two kinds of forms, the material and immaterial. The first is the sensuous, because the sensibles are composed of matter and form. When the soul acquires the material form, it becomes one with it, i.e. material form and the soul becomes one and same. Similarly, when the soul acquires the rational forms which are immaterial, they are united with the soul. In this way, the soul becomes actually rational. Before it was rational in potentiality, what we call the intellect in nothing other than the genera and species of things.[90] This intellectual operation is again illustrated in Al-Kindi's treatise on "first philosophy" He says:-

"When the genera and species are united with the soul, they become intelligibles. The soul becomes actually rational after its unity with the species. Before this unity the soul was potentially rationa. Now, everything which exists in potentiality does not pass to actuality save by something which brings it from potentiality to actuality. It is the genera and species of things, i.e. the universals...which make the soul which is potentially rational to be actually rational, I mean, which get united with it."[91]

Al-Kindi does not deny the sensory knowledge as Paramindes has done. Moreover, he does not make senses as the only source of knowledge as was done by Heraclitus. So that to deny the Absolute Reality, as they did, neither he denies rational knowledge in order to make room for the supposed experiences of the gnostics, al-Kindi rather combines between the sensory, rational discernment as done by plato, and in the same manner makes the sensory knowledge less important in degree than the rational knowledge, as he also elevated that observational aspect of knowledge in above rational

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knowledge. Though the philosopher of the Arabs; al-Kindi accepts and agrees with plato in these matters to a great extent, yet he does not deny the possibility of agreement with him that knowledge amounts to reminder or remembrance (al-Tazkirah) as this belief is rooted in the assumption that the soul is acquainted with each and every thing. According to this belief, when soul descends to this world and is attached to matter, it forgets what it was already acquanited with and it is reminded abou these things, which are similar to the ideas which he already has. In this way al-Kindi does not contradict this theory. Moreover, he has even give a title to one of his books, which supports this view.

But al-Kindi's agreement on this matter with plato never warrants that he believes in the eternity of the souls, as to him it is possible that the souls may be accidental and created in the Rational world, and then might have decided to this sensible world, as the origin of the createdness demands the same in the view of al-kindi.[92]

Al-Kindi, however, does not believe as Ibn Sina and al- farabi did that knowledge is the result of overflow in the Active Intellect, as he does not seem anywhere believing in the existence of al-Aql al-faal (Active Intellect) which brings the soul from its potentiality to its actuality. It is impossible that al-Kindi might means by the first intellect, the creator or Inventor (al-Barri), as It is the Absoulate first, or in Second condition he might mean by it that Intellect which has emanated from the creator directly without any mediatory agency, as it happens to be first in the chain of creations.[93]

When we are able to discern that al-Kindi agrees with various views of Plato and rejects several others, for example, in case of createdness of the souls, it indicates that he had an original thought of his own.

Mind is defined by al-Kindi as a "Simple essence cognizant of things in their true realities".[94] According to al-Kindi, there are four intellects, the first of which is separate and seems to be construed in the image of Aristotle's active Intellect. But Shah Walliullah Abdur Rehman categorically denies that al-Kindi believes in any such intellect as may be called Active Intellect.[95] The first intellect exists outside the human soul, it is divine and always in actuality. And although al-Kindi, like al-Farabi and Ibn Sina, believed that the celestial spheres possess intellects, there seems to be no indication that our philosopher ever thought of the first intellect as the intellect of the moon, better known as the "Giver of forms" as called by al-Farabi and Ibn Sina.[96]

DeBoer prefers rather the spirit to word intellect for 'aql and says that the first spirit is ever real—the cause and the Essence of all that is spiritual in the world, which indicates that God or the first spirit produced, second spirit as the Reasoning capacity or potentiality of the human soul, third, as the Habit or actual possession of the soul.[97]

Al-kindi divided the intellect in habitue into two intellects, one is the possession of knowledge without practising it and the other is the practising of knowledge. The first is similar to a writer who has learnt handwriting and is in possession of this art, the other is similar to the person who practices writing in actuality. Al-Kindi says"(The opinion of Aristotle concerning the intellect is that it is of four kinds:-

1. The first is the intellect which is always in action.
2. The second is the intellect which is potentially in the soul.
3. The third is the intellect which has passed in the soul from potentiality to actuality.
4. The fourth is the intellect which we call the second.[98]

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What he means by the "second" is the second degree of actuality as shown above in the distinction between mere possession of knowledge and practising it.[99]

The secondary intellects, refer to human intellect, and are similar in more than one respect, to the passive intellect of Aristotle. They are not separated from the soul as the first intellect is: The second intellect is called "intellect in potentiality (Latent or potential intellect: aql hayyulain), is the state of pure potentiality in the soul. It is the mere disposition to receive sense, impression as well as intelligent forms.[100] We all have the latent capacity to acquire the eternal truths subsisting in the realm of active intellect, but very few of us actually come to acquire them.

Active intellect is the over-mind of the universe, the same as the Nous of plotinus, the logos of Philo or the world of the universals of plato. It is the source of fundamental laws of thought, mathematical axioms, eternal truths and spiritual verities. From thense comes it is believed, the mystics illumination, the prophet's revelation, the poet's inspiration and also that of the scientists and the philosophers.[101]

The third intellect is the Acquired intellect (aql mustafad and in the Latin translation of John Intellectus adepts). It is the human mind after having passed from potentiality into actuality, that is, after having united with the intelligible forms and being one with them. Most probably, al-Kindi uses the word "acquired" to indicate the fact that intellect is acquired by the soul from outside i.e. from the First intellect which causes the intellect in potentiality to pass into actuality by uniting with the intelligibles. However, there seems to be a less probable meaning of the term "acquired," namely that the intellect is an acquisition (qunyah) already gotten and can be used at will. The intellect does not come into actuality until after it comes into possession of the universals which make it what it is.[102]

After showing the important role played by intellect or spirit or mind in the process of knowledge, we will turn to Al-Kindi's views on the sources of knowledge. Al-Kindi thinks that knowledge is a "fading opinion".[103] "Al Marifatil - Rayun Zayit". Moreover, he opines that knowledge is a well-known sign in the soul of the knower in a united form, because if it will not be in a form of ? united form, the soul of the knower will separate it or bifurcate between its parts and the signs of the known things, therefore, no knowledge is possible.[104]

According to al-Kindi the knowledge varies for the reasons of its source and its contents and by implication from the quality, permanence and sources point of view. Al-Kindi talks about three kinds of knowledge.

Sensory knowledge: This knowledge comes from senses when they come into contact with the sensa, but this kind of knowledge is less in degree and permanence, because the instrument by which the knowledge is acquired is affected by the force or weakness from external or internal factors[105] and is subject to change with the alternation of its content and the senses, get changed with the sensed things, as the sensory or senisble objects are not permanent or stable on one condition ad state, as these change at every moment and time, in the same way, the knowledge acquired through these is not permanent. The senses are employed by the soul to receive the sensible forms (sense impressions) emitted by the various individuals of external objects. On being received by the soul, they are not received as a vase receives water, or a piece of wax an impression: the sense perceived and the soul became one and the same thing.[106]

The senes apprehend the particular or the material form. In other word, the material kinds of forms, are sensuous, because the sensibles are composed of matter and form when the soul acquires the material form, it becomes one with it, i.e. the material form and the soul become one the same.[107]

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Since when we observe things through senses without the mediation of time, as it is non-permanent because of various condition which apply on sensory knowledge. This knowledge gets affected by quantity of being less or more, equal or unequal, or changing its quality of similitude or non similitude, intensity and weakness, it is a transitory and fleeting temporal perception, which undergoes changes.[108] After wards al-Kindi explains the process of acquiring knowledge through senses.[109]

There is one faculty of soul, which is known as imaginative faculty, which leads us to see the forms of the individual things with out matters, which independent of the process involved in the activity of our senses. This faculty was called by the Greeks faculty of "gnosis". The difference between these faculties i.e. faculty of sensory knowledge and faculty of imaginative knowledge is that the former enables us to see the sensible forms in the content of their matter, while as in the latter, we are made able to perceive individual forms in abstract form without matter or its ingredients in all its quantities and quality.[110] According to al-Kindi this force or power from the powers of soul is in between the two contradictory powers, that is, senses and reason, and these powers are present in all human beings.[111]

Al-Kindi explains the difference between senses and the forms of providing the following details.

The sensory faculty is able to perceive the forms of particulars, which are contained or borne by its material and dispositional conditions, but the imaginative or formal faculty perceives it in abstract form devoid of its material contents.

Secondly: The sensory faculty can perceive the forms of things during the waking condition only, but the imaginative faculty can perceive these in both states of awakening and sleep, but the perception during the state of sleep will be more pure and subtle than in its former state.

Thirdly, the imaginative faculty can perceive the pictures or forms without any help of secondary mediatories or instruments. But the sensory faculty perceives these with the help of these instruments which are exposed to destruction or corruption. For these reasons and differences between these two faculties, we say that the senory faculty is replete confusion, obscurity and clarity, but the imaginative faculty is more subtle and pure, especially during the state of sleep.[112]

Al-Kindi explains that senses perceive forms of sensibles in their material forms, but every matter can accept every form, but it will accept only that form, which is close and suitable for it which is susceptible to its acceptance. If is for the same reason that sensory experience is not a complete and independent experience for perception of a total subject, it is because of the acquired defect in the form from the material side of it.

Contrary to it the Imaginative Faculty perceives the form in abstract form, i.e. devoid of matter, for that reason its perceptions are finer and clearer from the sensory ones, secondly because it comprehends and conceives the essence or quidity of a thing in a complete perception which is not possible in the case of sense- perception.

Al-Kindi then proceeds to show that last peculiarity of the imaginative faculty, that is, when it perceives the forms in their abstraction from the matter, it is able to make a change in it from the angle of its composition, as it likes, therefore, can design and visualize various forms out of it, because to it the form is devoid of matter, and the matter remains unable to be visualized in this his manner for its inherent corporeality. In this way the Imaginative faculty can visualise a man who has two horn, and jaws, or it can attach seven lingual organs to it. But the senses cannot lead us to the quality or essence of

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a thing, nor leave any scope for any such thing whose perception could be made by the Imaginative faculty. For example, they eye cannot find a man endowed with two horns or with feathers etc., which usually does not belong to human species. It can't see also an animal who is dumb, to be imagined as a speaking species.[113]

The al-kindi explains that the senses can only perceive the specific particulars by help of the other subjective Organs which are meant for perception, as eye, ear, tongue etc. etc. But the Imaginative faculty can conceive forms and relate these to the soul without any external organ or support and means, and is not exposed to corruption or destruction except from a subjective mind which is regarded present in all the psychological faculties in which senses are found. But the senses are always exposed to destruction and corruption from other organs, as these have strong relation with these organs, as these have relation with brain as well.

Therefore, the senses are amenable to corruption from two aspects, but the imaginative and all other psychological faculties from only one, as the acts of the imaginative faculty and its comprehensions are more authentic, strong, explicit, and clear than the comprehensions of the senses. Because it is always less safe from the danger of corruption, as it from two sides, therefore, its comprehensions are less strong and explicit than those of comprehensions of imaginative faculty.[114] In this way the second stage is the imaginative which al-Kindi calls phantasy, and whose function consisting in preserving the forms separated from atter whether they come from the phenomenal or the intellectual world. Now, when the forms are received and are "ready" i.e. abstracted from matter, the soul gets in touch with the first intellect and is acted upon. The intelligible forms which are potential in it, are then converted into actuality.[115]

In the second chapter of his Treastise on First philosophy, he speaks of "being" as either sensible by nature and subject to sensible knowledge. or intellectual by nature and subject to intellectual knowledge. The first kind of being is transient, changeable and mutable in respect to position, quantity and quality. In terms of knowledge, its form is represented in the Imaginative Faculty and not in the intellect.[116]

According to al-Kindi when Imaginative Faculty is less prepared for reception, the soul represents future events in symbolic forms. The soul uses the imaginative Faculty to impress and to store the realities it sees in the invisible world.[117] But the Imaginative faculty is not of same strength in all men; some have stronger and purer faculties. The strong ones receive and register the intelligible forms as they come in their original purity, whereas the poor ones, either because they are weaker by nature or because they are not so pure, distort these forms into symbols which was must interpret in order to understand them. For example, a man may dream that he is flying, yet the true meaning of such a dream can be a journey he will undertake, when one dreams of the suddent death of a friend, the friend may live longer than expected.[118]

In al-Kindi's conception of visions there are, therefore three categories: the direct visions of the very pure souls and strong Imaginative faculties which are received always corresponding to the truth and not needing interpreations; the two other categores are what we may call symbolic vision The first of the two is the vision nearer to the truth and symbolized by events similar but not corresponding to the truth. The other is the farther away from the truth and symbolized by events opposite to the truth. These two categories of visions i.e., symbolic visions, are compared by al-Kindi to pinions (zann). An opinion is not always false neither it is always true. It corresponds to the truth, whenever it leans towards

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something truthful or it corresponds to a falsehood whenver it leans towards something unture. When a symbolic vision falls nearer to the truth it must be interpreted allegorically, but when it falls away from the truth, we have to look for its opposition in order to find out what it means. There is no explanation, however, as how to distinguish between a symbolic vision that is leaning towards the truth and the one that is not. Nonetheless, both visions indicate the coming of an event, or a fact and the difference between the two lies in the manner the event, or the fact, is represented in our dreams.

One gather from al-kindi's views on Imaginative Faculty that it is one the border line between sense and intellect, that it makes us perceive the individual forms after the object which first excited, it has withdrawn, that it stores these forms in the retentive faculty and can compose out of them new images; that; although its perception of the forms is purer than that of the senses, it cannot grasp the intelligibles in themselves; it can represent them, however, with a sensible image, and finally that it is used by the soul in connection with visions and dreams.

About the question of prophency, the "elite" could include the prophet as well as the philosopher according to al-Kindi. Both are i.e. the prophet and the philospher are distinguished from the others by a strong Imaginative facult, which enables them to froesee things in their true realities. The principle used by al-Kindi is that the Imaginative faulty represents in a sensible image the universal truths grasped by the philsopher or the prophet. This type of knowledge is rather intellectual and depends on the purity of the soul. Hence, there is no difference between the philosopher and the prophet in this respect, for bothy can, through the use of their Imaginative Faculties, come to know the same truths with the same certainty.

Al-Kindi, however, makes a clear distinction between the way by which the philosopher comes to know and the way by which the prophet comes to know. The philosopher seeks knowledge by deliving into mathematics and logic, he has to work hard to reach certainty, whereas the prophet is inspired by God.

"God inspires him (the prophet) enlightens his soul with resorting to the use of any first principles. "But apart from this, the prophet expresses himself much more concisely and clearly. His knowledge, being direct is the clearest and most dependable. It is true that the prophet and the philosopher may know the same truth but the pronouncements of the prophets are more dependable because of their divine inspiration. According to Professor M.M. sharif,[119] al-Kindi held long before Kant did so, imagination to be a mediating faculty between sense-perception and reason, the senses give knowledge of the particular and reason of the universal and imagination of the universal- particular.[120]

Here some explanations warrant our attention. Al-kindi delcares at the very beginning of his Treatise on First philosophy that the intellectual power of man to know the ultimate is limited. Again when he compares human knowledge with prophetic knowledge he states clearly that human knowledge is inferior to the prophetic.

He compares both types of knowledge as follows:

"...Like the knowledge of the Apostle which God has given a high position, a knowledge which is not the outcome of a desire (for its acquisition), of research and pain and trouble as well as study and exercise and dialectics and which does not require and time. It is the outcome of the will of God through the purification and Illumination of their souls for the (sake of) the truth by God's grace (and) His guidance, His inspiration and His messages. This knowledge is the prergative of the Apostles over the rest of the human beings, and it is one of their unusal trances (Khawalij) i.e. their prodigious signs

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which distinguish them from the rest of the ordinary men. Human beings who are not prophets have no way of attaining to the higher knowledge of the secondary true substances, or to the primary sensible substances and their accident without research or the help of logic and mathematics, as we have said; and for this a period of time is required. But the prophets attain to this knowledge without recurring to nothing of the kind but through the will of His who sent them, needing any time in reaching what they are after or anything else. The minds gain the conviction that knowledge is from God, because He is existent, when ordinary human beings fail by their very nature to do the same, as it is beyond their nature and temperanment. Thus, they submit themselves and let themselves be guided. Their sound understanding is directed towards the belief in the truth of the messages of the prophets.[121]

One may contend that the difference between philosophical and prophetic knowledge is simply one of clarity and methodology and that both come to know the same truth by taking different ways. But al-Kindi insists that there is more to it, there is a difference in comprehensiveness (ihatah) besides the difference in clarity and methodology:

"If one sets out to consider the answers which the prophets have given to questions about hidden and essential things, he will find out this: should a philospher intend to give an answer to these questions employing all the effort which has provided him with knowledge through his prolonged study and application of a rigorous discipline, we should not find that he could produce a similar answer as succinct and clear and simple and comprehensive as the prophet gave to the infidels who refused to believe in the resurrection of the body; one of them, a Meccan, had brought a dry bone to Mohammad and asked him whether Allah could restore it to life. He asked,' who will revive the dry bones when they are decayed? Then God, the One, the true sent him the following revelation. Say: he will revive them who originated them the first time....Is He, who has created the heavens and the earth, not able to create their like.[122] Implied in this answer are the theories of creation out of nothing and the omnipotency of God which the prophet arrived at instantly and expressed in a successful, clear and comprehensive form".

Human knowledge, on the other hand, being derivative, depends upon syllogistic reasoning which in turn depends on the senses and cannot be so comprehensively or so forcefully clear as the divine knowledge which embodies explicit and implicit aspects of truth bestowed by God upon his prophets. However, we would be making too much of the comprehensiveness of prophetic knowledge yet the general trend of what al-Kindi has said about prophetic knowledge points towards its superiority.[123]

In this way al-Kindi considered human sciences in the categories fo acquired sciences by the efforts of man. Their status in lower than those of the prophetic sciences.[124]

Al-Kindi regards the prophethood and revelation such subjects which are not acquired by way of spiritual exercises or logical arguments, neither are these the result of the Imaginative Faculty of man, which itself is the result of grace of the Active intellect, as was held by al-Farabi. It is rather a gift of God which He bestows on those people whom he wants to bestow among His servants and He knows where to put His prophethood. The prophetic sciences don't require any exercises, or use of Logic on the part of individuals for acquiring knowledge and by implication does not depen on time or period as it is non-acquired and the prophets and the messengers don't have any role or share in receiving prophethood or divine messages or related sciences. Allah alone choose whosoever he likes or wishes from his servants to make a prophet, without consideration of having a special talent or a specific temperament.

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Al-Kindi observes:

"No doubt the prophethood is not repeated all times, but its non-repetition does not amount to the negation of a special temperament or a fixed talent in a man as said Ibn Sina".[125]

But the choice of appointing any one as his prophet depends soley on the will of Allah, If he wills he can repeat it as he is not determined by a specific temperament for a prophet hood or creation of a specific talent with it. If God wills to appoint any person as a prophet, his sould will be enlightened and illuminated for truth with his support and settlement for placing revelation and message. Al-Kindi observes that the prophethood is the divine gift and grace from God which solely depends on his choice and pleasure and can't be acquired by any human effort. He differentiates between sciences of the prophets and the messengers and sciences of philosophers and saints, as he observes that the sciences of the prophets are the specific to the prophets and other people than the prophets can't have access to it. He says:

"This knowledge is specific to the prophets, contrary to other human beings, as the prophets have specific signs which differentiate them from other human being, as these people don't have any access to this knowledge about the ultimate Realities and the first sensible substances. Prophets don't require any research, or help from logic or exercises....as the prophets receive these teachings without any consideration for time or search."[126]

Human knowledge is that knowledge which is quite opposite to divine knowledge, which can't be acquired and is knowledge of realities.[127] From these details it has become evident for us that according to al-Kindi the intellect in his sight is incompetent from perception of these things which a prophet perceives or gets through revelation and intuition, for that reason he considers their sciences lofty and exalted in status from other sciences of the philosopher and sufis. He also differentiates between the philosophical sciences and prophetic science from the angle of their objectives, origins and peculiarities. Afterwards whatever has been brought by the prophets from the Divine sciences can't be understood by the intellect as the intellect can't perceive these sciences except under the guidance of the prophets. Though revelation can't be comprehended by the intellect, yet it is not opposite to the dictates of the common sense.[128]

In this way according to al-Kindi our knowledge is either knowledge conveyed by the senses, or knowledge acquired by the reason that which lies between; the Fancy or Imagination,-is called a mediating faculty. The senses, then, apprehend the particular or the material Form, but the reason conceives the universal,—species and genera or the spiritual Form. And just as that which is perceived is one with sense perception, so too that which is conceived by the reason is one with Reason itself.[129]

Moreover, we have seen thus that the sense-perception is exposed to corruption from various angles as said already, but the imaginative faculty and other psychological faculties are free from such dangers. Therefore, the activities of imaginative Faculty and its perceptions will be more strong and clearer than the sensory perceptions.[130]

As mentioned already the reason in another source of knowledge accroding to al-Kindi, as it enables us to have the perception of the Universals and the forms as the senses perceive the personalized particulars. According to al-Kindi the meanning of sensed in a person, while as rationalized thing meanning various kinds and whatever is over and above it from various varieties of Universals and Al-Kindi maintains that the sense perception is common between man and all other animals, which can comprehend forms of various persons, which have qualities of the colours, shapes, taste, vocies, smells,

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and touch or all other things which are related to material forms. But on the other hand, reason or intellect is particular to human beings, while as the animals are devoid of these, as man perceives universals of the classes and varieties and sections.[131]

At an other place al-Kindi says:

"The things are either universal or particular, i.e. the universal classes of the elements, and the various of different people, and of mean by particular the kinds of particulars. The particular individuals and hyllani and are under the purview of senses. So far kinds of elements are concerned these are not under the purview of senses, and have no sensible existence, but are rather under the faculty among the faculties of Absolute, Soul, i.e. humanity, which is known as Human intellect"[132]

In this way since the Universals are not sensibles in the opinion of al-Kindi, therefore, they fall under the purview of reason or intellect. He observes that the universal meanings for all varieties and kinds don't resemble soul, because whatever resembles to soul, must have a sensuous existence with a material and mundane taints. The meaning of the universals from various kinds are not like that, therefore the universals are not analogous to the forms material particulars which are present in the imaginative faculty, which are sensible existence, but these are rather clear, evident transparent realities or facts and abstract non material forms i.e. mental essences from the first principles; as can be understood by the following statement:

"Two opposite things can't combine in one form nor can disappear altogether. Therefore, its understanding or knowledge does not need any mediatory form or analogy and by implication is devoid of all forms and analogies or parables, as these things are found only along with sensible things".[133]

The Arab philosopher, while explaining the way of perception of a non-material structure in a rational manner of taking help from analogy in soul, remains in dark about the abstract rationalized object, though the matter may be from the transparent and clear first principles. It is for the same reason that combining sensory and rational methods of comprehension has surprised many people about the problems relating to metaphysical issues, when they endeavour to bring analogies by help of forms in a casual way.[134]

Al-Kindi explains that for everything there is no argument, as this would indicate as this would entail an impossible continuity, and would ultimately lead to an impossibility of required perception. He says:-

"This is indicated that all the required things may be perceived i.e. the Demonstrative Existence, because it is not necessary that every rational required thing may also be Demonstrative Being, as this may lead us 'o ad infinitum because every thing can't be supported by demonstration. There is demonstration for several things, but for demonstration there is no demonstration. Since this process of searching for demonstration in everything can't be taken to adinfinitum, which by implication will render comprehension of each and every thing impossible. If for example, we assume that man's knowledge is the knowledge of a speaking mortal, we will not be able to know what is the meaning of alive, and what is the meaning of speaking animal, and what is the meaning of mortal. In this way we will not be able to understand the reality of man even."[135]

Somethings are evident, explicit while as others are theoretical. The themes are made clear by the help of evidences, and an unknown thing is known by way of known things which is necessary in such cases; and is possible by theoretical enterprise. If all things were only theoretical in nature, the

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discussions would have continued. For each science there is a special method and for a theoretician. It is incumbent on him to use every method specific with the particular sciences or to use a method of one science in case of other sciences at least. Otherwise the theoretician will fall in a mistake and will be led to the direction of misguidance from the truth, therefore will not be led to reach to his destiny. Al-Kindi say: "It is very necessary for (us) that whatever the obligatory things require must be provided. We should not observe in the mathematics restriction or brevity, neither in the science of theology a sense-experience or an analogy, nor in the beginning of physical science hypothetical and theoretical jargons. There is no need of demonstration in eloquence, nor a demonstration at the beginning of demonstration itself. If we observe these precautions it will be easier for us to reach to our objectives, and the vice versa."[136]

Al-Kindi strictly followed these rules in order to reach a truth in the manner of the modern philosophical subtleties.[137] Al-Kindi regards intellect as one of the faculties of al-Nafs al Natiqah, as was also done by Aristotle, farabi and Ibn Sina before him.[138]

We have already dealt with further details about intellect and its various kinds while discussing al-Kindi's views on knowledge. Here we should note that al-Kindi does not think that there are only two sources of knowledge, that is, sensory knowledge and rational knowledge. He insists that third category of knowledge, knowledge as "al-Maarifat al Ishraqiyah", which according to al-Kindi regards as superior, clearer and sound than other two categories of knowledge. This knowledge comes from intuition and revelation. This type of knowledge is associated with only those people, who are chosen by God for receiving Divine Revelations. We have already dealt with the nature of the prophetic knowledge while discussing the relation between philosophy and Religion.

To conclude our discussion on al-Kindi's views on Aql or reason we see that 'Aql (reason) according to al-Kindi is a perceptual force (Al-Quwat-al-Mudhrikah) for the cogniton of universal or general concepts pertaining to classes or kinds of various phenomena. The 'aql is either in the state of potentiality for the perception (al-Mustad lil idhrak) or in the state of actuality (Bil al Fa'I), which according to al-Kindi is the basis of recollection (al-Istazhar) and is acquired by the repetitive processes of information. In other case, it may be "Musta fadd" which becomes evident when it starts coming into action, and this is the stage when it becomes ripended to appear, and this is also the stage of perpetual representation. Al-Kindi explains also how this change in the 'aql takes place from the state of potentiality to the state of actuality and claims that there is necessarily an agent of this change and that is "al-Aqu-al Awwal". However Al-Kindi could not explain fully the mode of this change from potential intellect to actual intellect. Therefore, though his theory of intellect is well-defined, still it remains incomplete in this respect.[139]

Al-Kindi's views on soul are very much interrelated with his theory of intellect. What does al-Kindi mean by soul and what are the basic faculties of soul are the subject of our further discussion.

Al-Kindi was confused by the doctrines of plato, Aristotle, and plotinus concerning the soul, especially because he revised the parts translated from plotinu's Enneads, a book which was wrongly ascribed to Aristotle. He borrowed from plotinus the doctrine of the soul, and followed the model of Aristotle in his theory of the intellect. In a short treatise "On the Soul", he summarizes, as he says, the view of' Aristotle, plato and other philosophers". In fact, the idea expounded is borrowed from the Enneads.[140]

Al-Kindi tried to reconcile plato and Aristotle in his other short treatise. A Discourse on the

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Soul, but in spite of this effort the tone of his whole writings on the nature of the soul is platonic.[141]

As to the nature of the soul, al-Kindi apposes any materialistic conceptions. The Muslim philosophers have not opposed Aristotle's definition of common soul, Animal soul and vegetable soul, but these people are inclined towards Plato in the absoluteness of Nafs al Natiqah. Al-Kindi regards man as a soul and body is its instrument, and the soul is substance not the body, and the substances don't depend on bodies.[142]

The sould is a simple entity and its substance emanates from the creator just as the rays emanate from the Sun. It is spiritual and of divine substance and is separate and distinct from the body. When it is separated from the body, it obtains the knowledge of very things in the world and has vision of the supernatural. After its separation from the body, it goes to the world of the intellect, returns to the light of the creator, and sees Him.[143]

In this way al-Kindi proves that the Nafs al-Natiqah is not body, and not the other two powers i.e. the passionate (al-ghadubiyah) and the concupiscent (al-Shah Waniyah) and thus soul, according to al-Kindi is the ruler and guide of both these faculties, which leads man to rightness through them, and preserves them from falling into a mistake. It is for the same reason, perhaps that plato, al-Kindi and Ghazzali etc. say that soul is like a king in all the bodily organs. Because like al-Kindi, Ibn Sina, and al-Ghazzali differentiate al-Nafs, al-Natiqah from the body in to totality, and rejected the Statements of the Scholastics (Mutakallimeen), who negate any difference between the soul and body.[144]

Like plato in the Phaedrus, he compares the intellectual part to a charioteer and the other two to the two horses that draw the chariot. The two latter parts, he maintains, can not be one with the intellect. In accordance with the law of contradiction, that which drives cannot be the same as that which is driven. The division of the soul into three parts is not meant to be an exhaustive classification of all the soul's functions. Al-Kindi mentions three types of faculties: Sensation (al-hiss), the middle faculties, which include retention (al-hifz), passion and irascibility, nutrition and growth, as well as the Imaginative faculty, and the intellectual faculty, which is the most important of all.[145]

In the highly speculative scheme of 'emanationalism' the human souls are supposed to have originated from the world soul. In its actual operations human soul is no doubt bound up with its body, yet in its spiritual essence it is independent of the body and belongs to the Supersensible sphere of the world-soul. Al-kindi finds no difficulty in explaining the immortality of the human soul. Having descended from the world-soul, and being independent of body, it is an umcompounded, simple, imperishable substance.[146]

According to al-Kindi, the soul is "simple, and of a perfect and noble nature. It's essence dervies from the essence of the creator, just as Sunshine is derived from the sun. It has been explained that the soul is separate from the body and different from it, and that its essence is divine and spiritual in view of the excellence of its nature and its aversion to the passion and irascibility that blight the body."[147]

The salvation of the human soul is explained by Al-Kindi in more or less in the manner of plato. Like plato, he believes that a man's soul continuously suffers from the reminiscences or recollection of the conditions of its earlier existence in the Supersensibles realm. The human sould does not fell at home in this world, nor does its true happiness consist in the gratification of bodily desires. Bodily desires are myriad and endless; their gratifiaction is followed by an awareness of those which have not

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yet been gratified. Further, the human soul cannot be satisfied with that which is ever changing. It always longs and yearns for the eternal and the permanent, but the eternal and the permanent is to be found only in the realm of reason and spirit. The real happiness and salvation of the human soul, therefore, lies in the life of reason in and the spiritual life, that is, in philosophical and scientific pursuits and religious and moral activities.[148]

If the soul is of a divine nature this implies that man can reach a state of excellence, nobility and bliss in this world as well as in the other by purifying his soul from all material contaminations. Just as a "polished" mirror reflects the shapes of all things, similary a"polished" (Saqi Iah) soul, that is, a purified soul, is capable of reflecting the hidden mysteries of the universe. According to plato, by abandoning the body and returning into its own world, the world of divinity, it acquires a capacity for knowledge and divination, similar to that of the Almighty. The future for it an open book, and it loses all senses of time:

"When the sould contains the utmost degree of purity, it beholds in dreams a world of marvels, and it will be able to converse with those souls that have already separated from their bodies. It gains God's light and mercy, and it will partake of an eternal bliss superior to all other kinds of pleasures dervied from food, drink, cohabitation, hearing, sight, smell and touch. There are sensual and defiled pleasures that end in pain, but its pleasures are divine, spiritual and heavenly that lead to the utmost nobility.[149] The soul never sleeps; only while the body is asleep, it does not use the senses. And, if purified, the soul can see wonderful dreams in sleep and and speak to the other souls which have been separated from their bodies. The same idea is expounded in al-Kindi's treatise "On sleep and Dreams." which was translated into Latin. To sleep is to give up the use of the senses. when the soul gives up the use of the senses and uses only reason, it dreams.[150]

The sould is simple and when separated from the body is sleep, is able to fore know. Soul is always vigilant, never asleep, and it is immortal. During sleep, it only relaxes its control over the senses but does not lose consciousness. As to it's immortality, its presence in this world is of a transitory nature. This earth is only a bridge to the nobler heavenly world where the souls make their permanent abode in proximity to their Creator, and where they see him intellectually but not sensibly.[151]

As the the relation of the soul to the body, al-Kindi maintains that it is accidental. He emphasizes the soul's separateness from the body and its substantiality, but introduces a novel idea in the sense that the action of the soul on the body constitutes the form of the body.[152] In his treatise, On the definition of Things, al-Kindi gives three different definitions of the soul, two Aristotelian and one Pythagorean, but does not voice any personal opinions. Meanwhile, in his short treatise entitled "A Discourse on the Soul", he tries to reconcile Plato and Aristotle in a manner which anticipates the method of the Arab Muslim philosophers. Still more important is his anticipation of Ibn Sina in the theory that the soul is the intelligible form of a living species.

The union between soul and body is not to be understood as similar to the union that occurs between elements in transmutation and transformation, rather it is a union of action and passion. The soul acts on the body and it is the form of living human being in the sense that it acts on the body in its particularizing capacity but not as one with it in substantiality. It inhabits the body, but always striving to free itself from all material ties and from the rigid limits of his obscure world which keep it away from the light of the intelligible world. It is immortal (Latad thur) and does not die with the body.

As to how the soul act on the body, it must be pointed out that al-Kindi equates the soul to the

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intellectual faculty in man, or to his reason. And he affirms that the human mind is a denizen of two worlds. The soul as a separate substance belings to the intelligible world but its field of action while in this world is the human body. In his treatise, A discourse on the soul, al-Kindi says:

"Both (Plato and Aristotle) prove some where in their writings that the soul performs its actions on the bodies that suffer generation and corruption through the agency of (bi-tawassut min al falak) the heavenly bodies."[153]

And he hastens to explain that this means that the action of the soul on the body is not like the action of one corporal body on another, but like the actions of the planets on a corporeal body. According to al-Kindi, Aristotle maintains that the soul" is a simple substance manifesting its actions in the bodies" while plato maintains that the soul is "united to a body" he interprets the expression united to a body to mean a celestial body (Jism) by means of which the actions of the human soul are manifested in the corporeal body (jism). But al-kindi does not explain to us the exact relationship between the celestial body, which could be the Active intellect, and the soul.[154]

The three faculties of the soul are the rational, the Trascible, and the appetitive. He who gets away from the pleasures of the body and lives most of his life in contemplation to attain to the reality of things, is the good man, who is very similar to the Creator.[155]

The interpreations about soul are common between philosopher and the Muslim sufis. For them the soul, heart, intellect and spirit (Nafs, qalf, Aql, and Ruh) each have double meanings, i.e. (physical and non-physical).

Moreover, Al-Kindi and Ghazzali while agree with plato and plotinus on abstractness of soul and its permanence, but don't accept their views on eternity of the soul., as these people blieve only in the eternity of the Only One God, about whom, plotinus is of the opinion that soul was in an exalted place from very begining, but for its mistake it had to forsake that world and escended this material world.[156]

Plato and Neoplatonists maintain that the soul is prisoned in the body and the relation, therefore is of a prison and the cave as showed by other Greek philosophers also. Who regarded body as a type of rust on the soul. Therefore, these people consider release of the soul from the body equivalent of its getting freed from a fetter. Plato considered rather man's fall to this world tantamount to his becoming nude and when man will get his dress back, he will once again return to his earlier abode. His descent in this way was a penalty for his sins.[157]

This view point of plato and the Neo-platonists has not been accepted by al-Kindi and Ghazzali. Al-Kindi believes only in the eternity of One Creator, and does not consider union of body with soul as a punishment or a stain as was held by plato and others. Al-Kindi rather believes in the resurrection of the bodies as well.[158]

This is very clear that al-Kindi believed in the descent of soul, but his saying does not amount to denial of its status as accidental, as it may be accidental and descendent at one and the same time, as observed by al-Kindi.[159]

In my view the most important problem in this chain of problems discussed by al-Kindi is of God. Soul resembles to God when purified from its impurities according to al-Kindi. Now we will see briefly what are views of al-Kindi regarding God.

In al-Kindi's opinion, the world is a work of God, but God's influence in its descent is

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transmitted through many intermediate agencies. All higher existence affects the lower, but that which is caused has no influence upon its cause, standing as this does above it in the scale of Being. In all the events of the world there is a parading causality, which makes it possible for us, from our knowledge of the cause, to foretell the future, for example, of the positions of the heavenly bodies. Further, in any single existing thing, if it is thoroughly known, we possess a mirror, in which we may behold the entire scheme of things.[160]

It is to the spirit or Mind that the higher reality and all activity belong, and matter has to dispose itself in conformity with the desire of the spirit. Midway, between the Spirit of God and the material and bodily world stands the soul, and it is the soul which first called into being the world of the spheres. From this soul of the world Human Soul is an emanation. In its nature, that is, in its operations, it is bound to the body with which it is united, but in its spiritual essence it is independent of the body, and thus the influence of the stars, which are limited to physical occurrences, do not affect it. Al-Kindi goes on to say that our soul is an uncompounded, imperishable substance, descended from the world of reason into that of the senses, but endowed with a recollection of its ealier conditions. It does not feel at home here, for it has many needs, the satisfaction of which is denied to it, and which consequently are attended with painful emotions. Verily there is nothing constant in this world of creation and corruption, in which we may be deprived at any moment of what we love. Only in the world of reason is stability to be found. If then we desire to see our wishes fulfilled, and would not be deprived of what is dear to us, we must turn to the eternal blessings of reason, to the fear of God, to science, and to good works. But if we follow merely after material possensions in the belief that we can retain them, we are pursuing an object which does not really exist.[161]

Al-Kindi accepted the Neoplatonic doctrine of emanation ascribing it to Aristotle for so it was given in the "Theology of Aristotle." after showing the relation between God and human soul. According to the Neoplatonic theory. God didi not create the world through an act of volition, for creation thus understood implies consciousness and will, both of which are limitations with regard to the Absolute. Knowing implies an object which confronts the knower as alien to him. God being infinite and absolute has nothing outside his being, hence nothing can confront Him as something other than he. willing implies some desire or want which has not been fulfilled or some purpose which is yet to be realized. But God is above all such deficiencies: hence willing cannot be ascribed to him either.

The Universe, al-Kindi believes, is an emanation from God, an inevitable over flow of His infinite being or a necessary result of His creativity. The world emanates from God as light emanates from the sun or the properties of a triangle from a traingle.

The world, however, does not emanate from God directly but through intermediary spiritual agencies which, consider from point of view of theology, may be conceived as angles. These intermediary agencies are of various grades: the lower agency emantes from the agency of a higher order and from it emanates another of a lower order. Between the last item of this graded series of spiritual agencies and the material world stands the world soul as the final connecting link.[162] Al-Kindi conceives of God, whose being is beyond our descriptive capacity and to whom the definition of substance as self-subsistent does not apply. Al-Kindi's concept of God is closer to that of Aristotle whose unmoved Mover occupies a separate category, than that of plato who assigns to God the highest place among His likes the ideas. Al-Kindi differed from other Muslim philosophers by drawing upon Aristotle rather than plotinus for his approach to the fundamental problems of metaphysics in general and the problem of God in particular. Al-Kindi was acquainted with the Metaphysics of Aristotle which was translated.[163]

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There is no doubt the Plato and Aristotle's God is eternal a parte ante, but he shares eternity with matter. Al-Kindi believes that some created beings such as the soul, are indestructible, but the soul's eternity is a parte poste. Al-Kindi's God is the only being who possesses aboulute eternity. Al-Kindi believes that some created beings such as the soul, are indestructible, but the soul's eternity is a parte poste, and it is by the will of God that is so.[164] " It is ture", however, that the first two important philosophers of medieval Islam, al-kindi, Abu Bakra Razi did not adopt Aristotle's theory of the world's eternity. Al-kindi, in particular, argues at great length in an attempt to prove that the world could only have been created in time and out of nothing. The case of Al-Kindi, however, is instructive. The length and detail of his arguments to prove the world's creation ex nihilo in itself attests to the importance of this question for Islamic thought in the ninth century".[165]

A part from maintaining the eternity of the universe, matter, time, and motion, Aristotle upheld the idea that this universe is finite in respect to the magnitued of its body. The universe as a magnitude is a body because like all bodies it it bounded by a surface, and form this he concluded that there can not be an infinite body in actuality[166] contrary to Aristotle, al-Kindi consistently upheld the theory of creation out of nothing (creation ex nihilo). God is the one, the creator out of nothing (al-mubdi).[167] He uses the word."Ibda" unlike later philosophers to denote creation in time out of nothing.[168]

After having proved that the universe is created in time (Muhadath), al-Kindi proceeds to demonstrate that it has a creator (Muhdity). He advances five proofs, four of which are variations of the cosmological argument based upon the idea of novitate mundi (dail al-Huduth), the not directly upon the argument from cauality. The last proof is teleological.

The first proof is based upon the premise that the universe was created in time. It has been shown that the universe is finite in respect to body, time and motion, which means that it must have been created. According to the law of causality everything created in time must have a creator. God, therefore, is its creator and he is consequently existent. al-Kindi also invokes the principle there is a necessary relation between cause and effect, or between creator and created. If it has been proved that the universe is created, what is created, must necessarily have a creator.[169]

The second proof is basically cosmological. Al-Kindi explains the equivocal meaning of the term "one." This is attributed to the "single" objects of the world of creation and also it is attributed to the One the Creators. Oneness is referred to simplicity cant be attributed to any being except God. All "single" beings are component parts. Only God is indivisible, he is one in essence as well in number, Oneness is essential in God, but "single" objects it is accidental. In the case of God, oneness is absolute unity; in the case of all other beings, it is relative and dependent on God.

The third proof is advanced and is based upon the principle that a thing can not be the cause of itself for in order to be so, it would have to exist before itself. He means by a "thing" of course, created one and not God.

The fourth proof is analogical. The analogy is between the macrocosm and the microcosm. Just as the orderly and smooth running of the human body points towards an invisible intelligent administrator, which is the soul, so do the orderly and harmonious workings of the universe point towards an invisible and all intelligent administrator, which is God. But if someone asks how we come to know this administrator, al-Kindi answers that just as we know that the soul exists by the effect we observe in the body, so we should be able to know that God exists by the effects of his wise administration manifest in the visible world.[170]

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The fifth and last proof is based upon the telecological argument (dalil al-inayah), which is alluded to on several occasions in al-Kindi's writings. Al-Kindi points out that the orderly and wonderful direction and a providential administer, "an agent of agents, a generator of generators, a first of firsts and a cause of cause."[171]

In another place Al-Kindi says:

"The majestic structure of this universe, its regularity, the harmonious interaction of its parts, the admirable way some parts submit themselves to the guidance of other parts, the perfect arrangement so that the best is always preserved and the worst is always destroyed, is the best indication of the existence of a most intelligent administrator and consequently of a most intelligent administrator."[172]

Al-Kindi says:

"For God, great in his praise, is the reason and agent of this motion, being eternal (qadim), He cannot be seen and does not move, but in fact causes motion without moving himself. This is His description for those who understand Him in plain words: He is simple in that He cannot be dissolved into something simpler, and He is indivisiblle because He is not composed and composition has no hold on His, but in fact He is separate from the visible bodies, since He....is the reason of the motion of the visible bodies.[173]

Simplicity, individuality, invisibility, and causality of motion are the divine attributes stated by Theon.

The basic Islamic notions concerning God are His unity; His act of creation from nothing, and the dependence of all creatures on him. Al-Kindi qualifies God in new terms. God is the true one. He is transcendent and can be qualified mostly by negative attributes. Al-Kindi says:

"He has no matter, no form, no quantity, no quality, no relation, nor is He qualified by any of the remaining categories (al-maqalat,). He has no genius, no differentia, no species, no proprium, no accident. He is immutable. He is, therefore, absolute oneness, nothing but oneness (wahdah). Every things else is multiple."[174]

Al-Kindi devotes a whole chapter of his on first philosophy to a thorough defence of the essential identity of God and His attributes. For example he makes a distinction between absolute unity and metaphorical unity. The former applies only to God, whereas the latter describes sensible objects, which always possess certain qualities and attributes and hence multiplicity. In the case of God, one cannot refer to a number, because this is a quantitative concept and quantities have attributes inseparably attached to them. To say that God is one is this sense would imply that the one has an equal one and also that He is unequal to some other similar one. In any case one as a number refers to a material, divisible quantity, and this God is not.[175]

Al-Kindi followed the Mutazilites in their denial of the attributes. But his approach to the solution of the problem is quite different. First, it is not the essence of 'God and His attributes with which he is concerned; it is rather the predictability of the categories—to the substance of God. Secondly, all things can be denied, hence known, by giving their genera and differentia, except God who has neither genus nor differential. In other terms, Al-Kindi follows in his quest the way of the logicians.

Al-Kindi maintains that God is the efficient cause of the universe. There are two kinds of efficient; the first is the frue efficient cause and its action is creation from nothing (ib'da). All the other efficient causes are intermediates i.e. they are produced by other causes, and are themselves the causes

of other effects. They are called so by analogy; infact, they are not true causes at all. Only God is the true efficient cause. He acts and is never acted upon.[176]

In this way al-Kindi has given a detailed account of the metaphysical problems ranging from soul to God in a very consistent manner. While availing the views of his predecessors, he never tried to present un-orthodox views on these crucial delicate matters. His approach, to a great extent, is similar to that of Ghazzali, despite his inclination towards the Mutazilite theories. He regards philosophy a sublime discipline as it deals with the theme of Absolute truth i.e. God. In the hierarchy of beings God is the supreme beings, on whom all other beings depend in way of the emanationlism. The intellect, the soul, the world, the celestial spheres are all dependent on God for their existence.

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3

Philosophy of Al-Farabi

Al-Farabi, the first Turkish philosopher, continued the harmonisation of Greek philosphy with Islam the process starting from al-Kindi, the Arab philosopher (188- (260/803-73), preparing the way for Ibn Sina the Persian philosopher (370-428,980-1037). It was by the study of al-Farabi's writings and the imitation of his philosophical systematisation that Ibn Sina attained such eminence in philosophy as he did. It must, however, be added that Ibn Sina clarified and simplified what was pithy and abstrue inal-Farabi. Ibn Sina's contemporary Ibn Miskawayh (334-422.945-1030) in his small work *al-fayz al Asghar* (The smaller salvation) more or less repeated the arguments of al-Farabi, particularly those pertaining to the existence and the attributes of God.

In the following pages we will deal with some important subjects such as al-Farabi's theory of prophency, his views on God and the world; his theories of knowledge, soul and intelligence and logic etc. with a brief introduction about his life and imporant books on philosophy. Since Farabi was instrumental in introducing Greek philosophy into Muslim world in a systematic way, he needs special attention.

According to Dr. Abdul Haleem Mehmood the history is completely silent about the early life of al-Farabi, even the date of his birth has not been recorded. It is on the authority of Ibn Khallikan that al-Farabi is believed to have died in 339 A.H. and his age was around 80 years at his death. This fixation of his life span is based on approximate estimation and guess work. And if we accept Ibn Khallikan's version, al Farabi was born around in 259 A.H.[1]

There are other and different opinions about the date of birth of al-Farabi as well. [2] Abu Nasr al-Farabi was born in about 258 or 259 A.H., 870 and he died in 339/950.[3] He died at Damascus, while on a journey in December, 950... we are told that he was eighty years of age, and it is otherwise probable that he was a very old man. His contemporary, and partner in study, Abu Bishr Matta died ten years before him, and his pupil Abu Zakiriya Ibn Adi in the year 971, at the age of eighty-one.[4]

The full name of al-Farabi, was Al-Pharabins of Latin scholastics, Mohammad Ibn Mohammad Ibn Tarkhan Ibn Uzlagh Abu Nasral al-Farabi.[5]

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According to the historians the name of the philosopher, i.e. al-Farabi was Mohammad, and his title was Abu Nasr. There is difference of opinion about the names of the ancestors of al-Farabi. In Ibn Usaibah's book *Ayun al-Anbah* his full name is recorded as "Abu Nasr Mohammad bin Mohammad Ibn Uzlagh bin Tarkhan", Ibn Khallikan says that his name was Abu Nasr Mohammad bin Tarakhan ibn uzlagh. Qifti and Baihaqi has dropped one of the names of his ancestors i.e. Uzlagh and says that he was "Abu Nasr Mohammad bin Tarakhan", while as Ibn Nadim in his book *al fahrist* added name of one of his forefathers and dropped another and said that his full name was: Abu Nasr Mohammadbin Mohammadbin Mohammad bin Tarakhan. While as there are the controversial statements of Saad in his *Tabaqat* as he sometimes says that he was Abu Nasr Mohammad bin Nasr and at others says: He was Abu Nasr Mohammad bin Nasr".

These were some of the different opinions of the old historians about the names of the ancestors of Al-Farabi and their genealogical chain. But as for as the opinions of modern writers are concerned they are also varied in their statements. For example, Dr. Marhaba says:

"He is Abu Nasr Mohammad Tarakhan ibn Uzlagh al-Farabi, Dr. Ahwany says that his names is: Abu Nasr Mohammadbin Mohammadbin Tarakhan, Uzlagh al-Farabi. According to Lutfi Jamhu is abu Nasr Mohammad Ibn Mohammad bin Uzlagh bin Tarakhan. Qazi Saad wrote "Uzluq" instead of 'Uzlagh'. Yuhuna Qameer says: he is Abu Nasr Mohammadbin Mohammad bin uzlagh bin Tarakhan al-Farabi. Abdual al-Huluw in his book *al-farabi* says:

"He was Mohammad bin Tarakhan bin Uzlaqh Abu Nasr al-Farabi, the second teacher i.e. the Aristotle of Arabs and the Muslims."[6]

According to Mohammad Ghallab he was: Abu Nasr Mohammad bin Mohammad bin Uzlaqh bin Tarakhan al-Farabi....

Dr. Jameel Saleeba says that his name was Abu Nasr Mohammad bin Mohammad bin Tarakhan bin Uzlaq, commonly known as al-Farabi. Sayed Zayid does not add in his book "al-Farabi" more than what has been said by other historians. These historians differed in the genealogical background of al-Farabi, then he said:

"...all the historians are one on the nisbah of al-Farabi, though they have differed in his family background and about names of his father, while they are agreed on his name Mohammad."[7]

He was born at Wasiji, a village near Transoxiana.[8] He was Turkish by birth, his father, was a general and that he himself worked as a judge for some time.[9] The basis of his early education was religious and linguistic: He studied jurisprudence, Hadith and the exegesis of the Quran. He learnt Arabic as well as Turkish and Persian. He flourished as a sufi, chiefly at Aleppo in the brilliant court of Sayfal-Dawlah al-Hamdani (rule 333-57/ 944-67). He was the first Turkish philosopher to make name.

MacDonal rightly maintains that al-Farabi was the very base of the pyra lid of Muslim philosophy.[10] According to Ibn Khallikan, no Muslim thinker ever reached the same position as al-Farabi in philosophical knowledge.[11]

He left a considerable amount of literature, according to al-Qifti and Ibn abi Usaibah, the number of his writings is seventy. Al-Farabi's works may be divided into two equal parts, one dealing with logic and the other with other sciences. The logical works are concerned with the different parts of Aristotle's *Organon,* either in the form of commentary or paraphrase. The second category of his works deals with the other brances of philosophy, physics, mathematics, metaphysics, ethics and politics.

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Al-Farabi's books can be in other words divided into two varieties. The books writteh with a personal touch. Important among such books are:

Ihsa al-ulum, in this book Farabi classified sciences in a natural way. He started with the sciences related to language and logic. Then he discussed the theoretical sciences, and practical sciences.

His other imporant books are: *Ahlul al-Madinatual al-Fazilah, Ayun al-Masail, Assiyasi-tul-al Madinah Al- Tanbihala Sabeel il al Saddat. Fasus al-Hikm, Jamah Bay nal al Hakeemain, Tahseel al Saddar. Maqalah Fi Masil al aql.* etc. etc.

The other type of books are consisting on commentaries as *al Burhan, al-Ibarah, Al-Khitabah, al-jidal, al-Mugalatah, al-Qays,* etc. etc.

Now coming to al-Farabi's philosophy, we will start our discussion with his views pertaining to prophethood. According to al-Farabi prophethood or 'Bubuwat' resembles human soul. In the sense that as the organs of human body obey the will of the soul, in the same way the prophethood is the soul of this universe, and carries extra ordinary influence onit contrary to norm and habit. The mirror of the prophethood never gets rusted or obscured, and can easily read and discern what is in the preserved Tablet from the Book, and can have the vision of the angles.[12]

About reality of prophecy the philosophers say that it is a name of a trait or technique shaped throught the power of imagination, from which the prophet depicts the impressions of the Absolute Imagination which emanates from al-Aql-al-Fa' al. According to Farabi, the chief must be stout, intelligent, lover of knowledge, and supporter of justice, and he must also rise to the level of the agent intelligence through which he gets revelation and inspiration.[13] It is within the power of imagination to create mental images after the pattern of the spiritual world. The sleeper may, thus, behold the Heaven and its inhabitants, and may feel its enjoyments and pleasures. Imagination may also rise to the celestial world and commune with the agent intelligence which it can receive the heavenly judgements relating to particular cases and individual, and dreams often so represent the fulfillment of a desire or the avoidance of fear that the sleeper may move in his bed responding to a certain emotion or leave his bed and to a certain emotion, or leave his bed and beat a person unknown to him, or run after him.[14]

These attributes remind us of the attributes of the philosopher-king of plato's *Republic,* but al-Farabi adds to them the ability of communion with Celestial World as if the city is inhabited by saints and governed by a prophet. Communion with the agent intelligence is possible through two ways: contemplation and inspiration. As the soul rises through study and quest to the level of the acquired intellect when it becomes recipent of the divine light. This level can be attained only by the sacred spirits of the philosophers and sages, those who can penetrate through the unseen and perceive the "world of light"[15]

Al-Farabi says:

"The sacred soul, preoccupied with what is above, gives no heed to what is below: and it's external sensation never overwhelms its internal sensation: and its influence may go beyond its own body affecting other bodies and everything in this world. It receives knowledge direct from the High spirit and angles without any human instruction"[16]

Thus, through continuous speculative studies the sage gets into communion with the agent intelligence.

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According to al-Farabi's view, everything prophetic-in dream, vision, revelation and so on-belongs to the sphere of the Imagination or Representation, and thus takes an intermediate position between sense perception and pure rational knowledge.[17]

According to Farabi this communion is also possible through imagination, as happens to the prophets, for all their inspiration or revelation is caused by imagination. Imagination in al-Farabi's psychology is closely connected with inclinations and sentiments, and is involved in rational operations and volitional movements. It creates the mental images which are not imitations of sensibles and are the source of dreams and visions. The prophetic inspirations take the form either of true dreams in sleep or of revelation in waking. The difference between these two forms is relative: they are distinct as regards their degree. In fact, a true dream is but one aspect of prophecy:

Farabi explains the process of working of imagination and says that when imagination gets rid of conscious activities as in sleep, it is wholly occupied with some of the psychological phenomena. Influenced by some bodily sensations and feelings, or by some emotions and conceptions: it creates new images or composes, from rational mental images, their new forms. Thus, we dream of water or swimming, when our temperament is humid, happenings.[18]

Farabi regards that through this communion by day or at night, prophecy can be explained, since it is the source of true dreams and revelation. According to al-Farabi.

"If the faculty of imagination is so powerful and perfected in a certain person, and is not completely overwhelmed by externl sensations, it gets into communion with the agent intelligence from which images of the utmost beauty and perfection are reflected. He who sees those images would testify to the sublime and wonderful majesty of God...Once the imaginative faculty in main is completely perfected, he may receive, when awake, from the agent intelligence the pre-vision of the present and future events and thus he would, through what he has received, prophency, divine matters. This is the highest level to which imagination may be raised, and which man can attain through this faculty".[19]

Thus, the chief characteristic of a prophet is to have a vivid imagination through which he can commune with the agent intelligence during waking time and in sleep, and can attain to vision and inspiration. And revelation is but an emanation from God through the agent intelligence. Some persons, although in a lower degree than the prophets, have a powerful imagination through which inferior kind of vision and inspiration can be achieved. In this way al-Farabi places the saints in a degree lower than the prophets. The imagination of the populace and the masses is so weak that it does not admit of rising to union with the agent intelligence, neither at night nor by day.[20]

Farabi asserts that man through imagination can commune with the agent intelligence, but this is available only to the privileged and the chosen. The agent intelligence is the source of divine laws and inspirations. It is, in al-Farabi's view, almost similar to the Angel charged with revelation, as in the tenets of Islam. It is within the capacity of the prophet or the philosopher to commune with the agent intelligence, the former through imagination and the latter by way of speculation and contemplation. This is understandable for the two draw together upon the same source and get their knowledge from high above. In fact, religous truth and philosophic truth are both the radiation of divine illumination through imagination or contemplation.[21]

Ibn Sina adhered faithfully to Farabi's theory of prophecy, Ibn Rushd admitted its validity. A Jewish philosopher Maimonides subscribed to it and showed much interest in it. Spinoza expounded a similar theory which he most probably borrowed from Maimonides.[22]

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It continued to be echoed by some of the modern philosophers in Islam, such as Jamal al-Dinal-Afghani and Imam Mohammad Abduh.[23]

But according to Ghazzali and someother scholars whatever al-Farabi has related about reality of the prophecy and revelation is not supported by argument, at the most it may be based on the common sense speculations, but it goes against the tenets of the Quran and Sunnah of the prophet (SAW). Whatever Farabi says in this connection, is tantamount ot superstitions rather than logic and ratiocination. This is a mistake and blunder made by Farabi and other philosophers who agree with him, who in turn provied to the orientalists the materials to oppose Islam.[24] However. Ibn Rushd while admitting the validity of prophecy, as perceived by al-Farabi, was much astonished at Ghazzali's criticism of it: for it corroborates the religious tenets and affirms that the spiritual perfection can be attained only through man's communion with God.[25]

The most ultimate and universal concept is that being or existence for al-Farabi and other Muslim philosopher. Being can not be defined for it preceds all other concepts and is the simplest of them all. To define a concept is to analyse its content, but being, having the least content, resists all efforts to resove it into simpler thought elements. To try to define it by words serves only to make our mind attentive and directed towards it and does not explain the concept which is clearer than words by which it may be defined.

According to Muslim philosophers God is simple and Extended Entity, devoid of any complexity, as the complexity is a sign of need, and therefore sign of possibility. They regard that the Divine qualities are Essence of His Existence.

Al-Farabi says, for example:

"He is benevolent, and His existence is in His substance, from whom the existents get their arrangements, and all the existents gets its portion of existence according to its grade, as He is just and His justice is in His substance, and that is Not any external thing outside His substance."[26]

At an other place al-Farabi says about God that, He has no differentia, nor species, not a denfinition nor established on an argument, but He is argument on all things. His Being is by His existence, eternal and everlasting, without and taint of nothingness.[27]

In this way Farabi explains that the Being of Godevades all definitions as His reality is all pervading and His being devoid of all species, mental or external and His being a unique absolute Being. We can't provide even arguments to prove Him, as the arguments are based on theories, but He is a transparent first principle.[28] He is the first when there was nothing in the universe, and He is the source of the universe and His being the highest of all beings, al It has not been preceded by any cause or limitation, He has no form as He is not related to matter. In this way God is complete and self-sufficient and the Unique completeness. He has nothing to resemble Him or an associate, He being one in Hish nature is Unique in Being as well. He is one. He is absolute light. But our eyes are not able to have His vision because the blazing emanating light from Him, He is the pure Reason or Intellect, about whom our finite intellects are unable to have the perception of His universal substance. We are immersed in the material aspects of the Universe, But His intelligence is present in our souls, We are incapable of comprehending His Absolute Nature and ultimate Reality as it is outside human competence. When we avoid indulgence in mundance affairs and sensous activities, we come closer to the Intelligences, and at the time our perception of God, the most Exalted, is clear and explicit. Our gnosis of God is only complete at our complete withdrawal from the physical world.

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Since His being is the most complete Being, and source of all existence it amounts to His being the only Reality, as His being is complete and His reality is essence of His existence contrary to all other existents. He is Alive, His life is not an attribute superfluous to His Existence. But life is His substance and Nature, He knows that He knows His essence with an eternal knowledge. He is also known to Himself always because there is no difference between His knowledge and substance.

He is Excellent, as He knows His Essence, and contemplates on His Essence. He is Eternal, without any limit or boundaries. His excellence like His completeness and self-sufficiency is eternal and full fledged.[29]

Farabi discussed the problem of God from two angles i.e. possible and Necessary Being. Possible being needs an eternal cause for its existence, as it cant exist by itself, While Necessary Being is self-caused, and does not need any external cause for its existence. He proceeds to explain the Necessary Being and says:

"He is Necessary by itself, i.e. God the Exalted, He is Real, Necessary Being, an Eternal Existent, to whom all other existences belong.

"Possible by itself and necessary by other is another being, which means that it is by an external cause after it was in naive state of possibility" According to Farabi all the things found in the Natural or physical world are of this kind.

"Possible by itself potentially is such a being, which is container of existence, a being which has not so far appeared in the sensible world. This indicates that the continuity of emanations from God and His perpetual over flowing is possible for all eternity."[30]

It means in other words that necessary being is that Which exists in itself or that which cannot but exist, non-existence of it is unthinkable e.g. God. Contingent being is that which receives its existence from another and the non-existence of which is thinkable or possible e.g. this world of ours.

Potentiality is the capability to exist. Every created being, before it actually comes into existence, had only a possibility to exist, i.e. it was in potentiality. Actuality is that which exists in fact. According to al-Farabi, that which is in actuality is perfect and that which is in potentiality is imperfect. Nature as such is both in actuality and potentiality and thus being in becoming God alone is pure actuality or act.

Substance is that which exists itself and not in another. Accident is that which needs a substance in which and by which it may exist.

Essence is the reason why a thing is and what it is, existence is the actuality of essence. Thus existence is one thing and essence quite another. There is one Being alone whose essence is His very existence and that is God.[31]

On the question: can God be known, Al-Farabi could not make his mind and hesitated to give a definite answer. God is knowable and unknowable, evident and 'hidden' and the best knowledge of Him is to know that He is something that mind cannot thoroughly know.[32]

It is difficult to know what God is, because of the limitations of our intellect light is the principle by which colours become visible. It would seem logical to conclude that perfect light produces perfect vision instead, the very opposite is the case. The perfect light dazzles the vision. The same is true og God. God is infinitely perfect and His infinite perfection bewilders our mind. How can the

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infinitely perfect be comprehended by one who is finite and imperfect?

In spite of his hesitancy with regard to the knowability of God, al-Farabi insisted that knowledge of God, is the object of all philosophy and that it is the duty of man to rise so far as it is human by possible to the likeness of God.

Al-Farabi brought forth the arguments to prove that there is God. He provides proof from motion and says that in this world there are things which move, every object which is moved receives its motion from a mover. As motion is to be presupposed in the mover itself before it comes to move others, there must be another mover to move it and beyond that still another and so on and so forth. It is impossible to go back infinitely in the series of movers and the things moved. Therefore, there must be an immovable and that is God.

In the same way in the series of efficient causes it is impossible to conceive an infinite regress of causes. What is not conceivable is not possible; therefore, outside the series of efficient causes, there must be an uncaused efficient cause and this is God. Al-Farabi provides another proof from contingency and says that a necessary being is that which exists in itself or that which an not but exist, non-existence of it is unthinkable, contingent being is that which receives its being from another and whose non-existence is possible. It is, for instance, possible that this world may not have existed or may come not to exist. But as a matter of actuality the world does exist, its existence, therefor, must be due to another being, and can't be due to its won self. That other being which may be the cause of the existence of this world either is or is not itself contingent. If it is contingent, then it presupposes another being as the cause of its existence. This other cause again may in turn be contingent. Now a series of contingent beings which would produce one another cannot proceed to infinity. Therefore, the series of causes and effects must end in a cause that owes its existence to itself. Thus, finally, we come to the necessary being, the non-existence of which is unthinkable and the existence of which is necessarily implied in its very idea. This is God, the self-existent.

These arguments are various statements of the same argument, i.e. cosomological argument, the last argument as mentioned above is suggestive of being also an ontological one. We can have, according to al-Farabi, knowledge of God by means of the process of 'exclusion, by which we remove from the ideal of God, whatever implies defect or limitation, and by the process of pre-eminence' by which we attribute to God in an infinite degree all such perfections as we can possibly think of. By this argumentation, al-Farabi proceeds in a purely logical way to prove that God is one, Simple, infinite immutable, intelligent, living etc. etc.

God, according to al-Farabi is simple becase he is free from every kind of composition, physical or metaphysical. Physical composition may be either substantial or accidental. It is substantial if the composite substance consists of two bodies. Now an infinite being can not be a substantial composite because this would mean that God the infinite results from the Union of finite parts: further that these parts would exist before Him in time and thus be the cause of His being. Nor can an accidental composition be attributed to the infinite because this would imply a capacity for an increase in perfection which the every which the very notion of the infinite excludes. Therefore, there can not be, and is no physical composition in God.

Metaphysical composition results from the union of two different concepts. So referred to the same real thing that neither one by itself signifies the whole reality as meant by their union. Thus every contingent being is a metaphysical composite of essence and existence cannot be applied to the self-

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existent or infinite being in whom essence and existence are one. Therefore, there is no composition of essence and existence in God. Nor can the composition of genus under which it should be possible to subsume Him, He is above all such distinctions and is the ultimate source and ground of all things.

God is only one. If there were two gods they would have to be partly alike and partly different in which case the simplicity of each would logically impossible. God is one because He is free from all quantitative divisions. One, in the case of God, means the indivisible, that which is indivisible in substance is one in essence. Hence there is only one God.

The uncaused being i.e. God is infinite, for it it were not so it would be limited and therefore caused, since the cause of a thing is its limit. But God is uncasued, hence it follows that God is unlimited i.e. is infinite. God is the first cause such as in pure actually without the admixture of potentiality. God is pure actuality. In God there is no potentiality, for he is pure actuality. Hence, there is no change in God. So God is immutable.

That God exists is an established truth; that the world exists in a factual truth. Through principle of emanation. Farabi like, al-kindi tried to show the process of creation. World emanates from God not directly but through a number of iatermediary agencies. Between God and the world al-Farabi places the intellects and the souls of the heavely spheres of the various planets as enunciated in the ptolemaic system.[33] The argument from possible and necessary beings to prove the existence of God, was a new argument on the Existence of God. This argument was later on adopted by Ibn Sina. A Jewish philosopher Mainmonides borrowed this argument from Ibn Sina, from Maimonides St. Aquinas adopted it and it is for the same reason that this argument remained present in the philosophical discourses in the Europe upto the times of Kant.[34]

As we have already seen every things in fact the exists, is in Farabi's view, either a necessary or a possible thing, there is no third kind of Being. Now since all which is possible presupposes for its realization a cause, while yet the chain of causes cannot be traced back without end. We see ourselves compelled that there is a being, existing of necessity, uncaused, possessing the highest degree of perfection and an eternal plenitude of reality, self-sufficing, without and change, who as absolute mind pure goodness and thinking,—being the thinking and the thought in one nature, loves the all-transcending goodness and beauty of that nature, which is his own. This Being cannot be proved to exist, because He Himself is the proof and first cause of all things in whom truth and reality coincide. And it, is involved in the very idea of such a Being, that he should be one, and one only, for if there were two first and absoulte Beings, they would have to be partly alike and partly different,-in which case, however, the simplicity of each would be destroyed. A Being who is the most perfect of all must be one alone.

We are able to see God better in the regular gradation of Beings which proceed from him that in himself. From him, the one alone, comes the All, his knowledge is the highest power. In his cognizance of himself the world comes into being. The cause of all things is not the will of an almighty Creator, but the knowledge of the Necessary. From eternity the Forms or Types of things are in God, and from him eternally proceeds also his own image, termed the second All, or the first created spirit which moves the outermost Clestial sphers. In succession to this spirit, come, one out of the other, the eight spirits of the spheres, all of which are unique in their several Kinds and perfect, and these are the creators of the celestial bodies. These nine spirits, called, Celestial Angle', together form the second grade of Being. In the third grade stands the Reason, active in Humanity, which is also termed the Holy spirit and which unites heaven and earth. The soul is in the fourth grade. These two, the reason and the

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soul, do not remain by themselves in their strict original oneness, but multiply in accordance with the great number of human beings. Lastly appear form and Matter, as Beings of the fifth and sixth order; and with them the series of spiritual existence is closed. The first three grades, God, the spirits of the spheres, and the Active Reason, remain spirit per se; but the three which follow-soul, form and Matter, although incorporeal, yet enter into relation with Body. The corporeal, which is held to originate in the imagination of the spirit, has also its six grades: celestial Bodies, Human Bodies, Bodies of lower Animals, Bodies of plants, Minerals, and Elementary Bodies.[35]

Farabi's philosophy is an amalgamation of Aristotelian's concept of motion. Neoplatonic theory of emanation, Platonic, eternal ideas and Epicurean views on rational soul and their relation of Human bodies. In the beginning all the things are latent in the knowledge of God and this is the cause of their existence. Since God contemplates and thinks, therefore, the first Intelligence emanates from Him and gives intelligences, moves the second celestial sphere. After this process, comes and intelligences of the other celestial spheres one by one till we reach to the Tenth Intelligence, which is believed to be a link between the higher existents and lower ones...Then Farabi defines and discusses various intellects, i.e. human intellect as "Haywalani" (Aql ul al Gharazih Ahsas), in which man and an animal are same. Then he defines "al-Aql bil-al Malkah" which is the intellect resposnible for providing information, which we receive from sense experiments and materiall-oriented sciences. "Aql-Bil al-Fal" is the Abstract universal Intellelct, which is a gift from the Active Intellect (al-Aql-al-Faal) or Divine intellect, or the permanent examination from the first being or from God. Man reaches to this stage of intellect by full preparations and patient, ceaseless efforts to arrive at the highest degrees of knowledge from physics, mathematics to theology. And some times intellect reaches to this stage by revelation and intuition as the prophets and the saints do. In this way prophecy and philosophy are the two ways to God, one by instruction and teaching and the second by revelation or inspiration (Ilham).[36]

Farabi classifies the intellect into practical which deduces what should be done, and theoretical intellect which helps the soul to attain its perfection. The latter is again classified into material, habitual, and acquired as mentioned earlier.[37]

The material intellect, or the potential intellect is the soul, or is a part of the soul, or a faculty having the power of abstracting and apprehending the quiddity of beings. It is, like a material on which the forms of being are imprinted, just like wax which becomes one with the inscriptions carved on it. These inscriptions are nothing but perceptions and intelligibles. Thus, the intelligible exists in potentiality in sensible things, and when it is abstracted from the senses, it exists in the mind in actuality.[38] The intellect in act, or the habitual intellect as it is sometimes called, is one of the levesl of a number of intelligibles; it is intellect in action with regard to what it perceives, and intellect in potency with regard what it has not yet perceived. The intelligibles themselves exist in potency in the sensible. Once they are striped of them, they become intelligibles in action. And once man has attained to this level of the intellect in action, he can comprehend himself. This kind of comprehension has no relation with the external world; it is a mental. abstract comprehension.[39]

Once the Intellect becomes capable of comprehending abstractions, it is rasied again to a higher level, that of acquired intellect, or the level where human intellect becomes disposed to conceive abstract forms which have no connection with matter.[40]

The difference between this rational conception and sense-perception is that the former is a kind of intuition and inspiration; or in other worlds, it is a kind of immediate apprehension. This is the

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noblest level of human apprehension, and it is reached only by the few and the select who attain to the level of acquired intellect, where the hiddent is unveiled, and come in direct communion with the world of the separate intelligence.[41]

Thus, the intellect is capable of rising gradually from intellect in potency to intellect in action and finally to acquired intellect. The intellect in potency is just a receiver of sensible forms, intellect in action retains the intelligibles and comprehends the concepts. The acquired intellect rises to the level of communion, ecstasy and inspiration. Concepts of different levels: Originally, the are intelligibles in potency existing in matter once abstracted from matter, they become intelligibles in action. Still higher are the abstract forms which can never exist in matter.

The therory of the intellect and the soul of the spheres such as taught by al-Farabi and some other muslim philosophers seems very much like a myth to a modern student of philosophy.

Even Ghazzali considers this theory of the intellects and the souls of the spheres to be a mere conjecture and wild guess-work, when he says:

"All you have said here is arbitrary reasoning. To be more exact, it is darkness piled upon darkness. If some one says that he saw things of this kind in a dream, it will be inferred that he was suffering from some disease. Or if such things are introduced in this discussion of the problems of Fiqh-the only place where conjecture is the ultimate end—it will be said that these things are wild guess—work which does not raise even a presumption as to its validity."[42]

It was the initial stage of interaction between Greek philosophy and Muslim thought which led people like al-Farabi to attempt an accord between religion and philosophy. But as a matter of act, there was non possibility of accord between Islamic monotheism and the duality in the Greek philosophy. It seems likely that there was some impact of Judaism, Christinaity, Neo-Platonism on these philosophers, which led them to this accord.

But the theory of ten Intelligences, Farabi tries to show the relation between one and many i.e. God and the Universe. Here Farabi employed a kind of emanation to explain this problem. He holds that from the Necessary one flows or emanates only one either by virtue of its self-knowledge and goodness. This eminent is the first intelligence. Thus knowledge equals creation, for it is enough for a thing to be conceived in order to exist. The first intelligence is possible by itself, necessary by an other, and it thinks the one as well as itself. It is one in itself, and many by virture of these considerations. From this point al-Farabi starts the first step towards multiplicity. From thinking by first intelligence of the one flows another intelligence. By virture of its thinking of itself as possible in itself flow the matter and form of the "first heaven" because every sphere has its specific form which is its soul. In this way, the chain of emanations goes on so as to complete the ten intelligences, and nine shpheres and their nine souls. The tenth and last intelligence, or agent intelligence, is that which governs the sublunary world. From this intelligence flow the human souls and the four elements.[43]

These intelligences and souls are hierarchical. The first intelligence in this hierarchy is the most transcendent, and the follow the souls of the spheres and then the spheres themselves. The last in order is the earth and the world of matter; which falls in the fourth rank.[44]

The number of intelligences is ten consisting of the first intelligence and the nine intelligences of the plants and spheres, becase al-farabi adopts the same theories as held by the Greek astronomers and others especially by Ptolomy according to whom the cosmos is constituted of nine encircling spheres

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all of which move eternally and circularly around the earth. Intelligences and souls are the originators of this movement.

Every sphere has its own intelligence and soul. The tenth intelligence manages the affairs of the terrestrial world. The soul is the immediate mover of sphere. However, it acquires it s power from the intelligence, it moves through its desire for the intelligence, and pursuit of perfection moves its sphere. Thus, its desire is the source of its movement, Intelligence in its turn is in a state of perpetual desire. The lower desires the higher and all desire the one which is considered the prime Mover although it is immovable.[45]

From the tenth intelligence flows the prime matter, or hyle, which is the origin of the four elements, and from the same intelligence flow the different forms which unite with the hyle of produce bodies. The terrestrial world is only a series of different kinds of forms united with-matter, or separated from it. Generation is the result of the unity of form and matter, and corruption is the result of their separation. The movement of the Sun produces hotness and coldness necessary for change. All the separate intelligence provide the movements appropriate to the terrestrail world. In this way physics is fused with cosmology and the terrestrail world is subjected to the heavenly world.[46]

Al-Farabi solves the problem of movement and change through the doctrine of the ten intelligences. He has made use of the same theory in this attempt at solving the problem of the one and the many, and in his reconciliation of the traditional Aristotelian theory of matter and the Islamic doctrine of creation. A matter is as old as the ten intelligence, but it is created because it has emanated from the agent intelligence. To vindicate the unity of God, al-Farabi has resorted to the mediacy of these ten intelligences between God and the terrestrial world.[47]

Some of the elements of the theory of the Ten Intelligences can be traced to the different sources they have been derived from. Its astronomical aspect is closely indentical with Aristotle's interpretation of the movement of the spheres. The theory of Emanation has been borrowed from Plotinus and the school of Alexandria. But in its entirety, it is a Farabian theory, dictated and formulated by his desire for showing the unity of truth and his method of grouping and synthesis. He reconciles Plato and Aristotle and religion and philsophy. This theory met with some success among the philosophers of the East and those of the west in the Middle Ages. Yet reconciliation necessitates, from one side or the other, some concessions; and if it pleases some, others are sure to resent it. Hence, this theory has been fervently embraced by Ibn Sina who has given it a concise and elaborate exposition, while Ghazzali is loud in denouncing it. Among the Jewish scholars, Ibn Gabriol does not give it even the slightest notice, while Maimonides enthusiastically subscribed to it. And in spite of the objections of Christian scholars to this theory, it has always elicited their respect and esteem.[48]

While talking about Farabi's views on Intelligences, one has to deal with his views on human soul as well. According to al-Farabi man is composed of two principles; body and soul. Body is composed of parts, is limited by space and is measurable and divisible, while soul is beyond such bodily qualities. The former is a product of the create world, while the latter belongs to the last separate intellect of the supersensible world. The spirituality of the soul is demonstrated by its specific functions which are intellection and volition (moral). The operation of a being is according to the nature of the being. Now, intellect and will at the higher levels feel at home only in the abstract and the spiritual, therefore, the soul itself must also be spiritual and independent of matter.[49]

The souls is that which gives completeness (Entelehia) to the existence of the body; but which

gives completeness to the existence of the soul is the mind, or the spirit (aql). The spirit only is the real man.[50]

From Greek epistemological and metaphysical theories, again, the Muslim philosophers acquired the ideal of a radical dualism between body and mind, which under Greco Christian influences and also developed into an out and out ethical dualism between the material and the spiritual. This effected the Muslim philosopher's eschatological teaching very fundamentally. The philosopher al Farabi held that only the soul survived in an individual and, further, that only the souls of thinkers survived, undeveloped, minds being destroyed at death.[51]

But according to Saed Sheikh, al-Farabi's views with regard to the immortality of the human soul are rather doubtful. In his works we find passages both for and against immorality. At one place he says:

"The only thing that survives the dissolution of the body is the active intellect". Now active intellect with al Farabi is something altogether different from the human soul, it is merely an impersonal principle. Hence at best this statement vouchsafes only the possibility of corporate immortality and leaves no scope for personal immortality". This stand point is confirmed by another passage which reads as follows:

"Man's supreme good in this life is to attain knowledge. But to say that man after death becomes a separate form is an old wive's tale: for what ever is born and dies is incapable of becoming immortal".

There is a curious passage in which al-Farabi speaks of this in the next world. This passage occurs in his famous work *al-Fazilah,* where he explains that the final aim of the state on earth is to make souls happy in the next world. The soul of the citizens belonging to the ideal city would assemble generation after generation in the next world and their happiness would increase according to increase in their number:[52]

It is intersting to note that al-Farabi has no doctrine of the torture (shaqa) in life after death but only that of the bliss (sa'adah).[53]

The passage assumes that the each soul would be endowed with individual feelings in the life hereafter. The assumption is reiterated in other similar passages such as: After death the human soul will be unhappy according to its merits or demerits.[54] But the fact remains that although al-Farabi fully admits the eternal bliss or the painful suffering of the hereafter, yet he reduces them to spiritual matters having no relationship with the body and natural properties, because the spirit, not the body, is that which enjoys or suffers, is happy or unhappy.[55]

This interpretation conforms to the Farabian tendency towards spiritualism.[56]

The soul is governed by one of the intelligences, i.e. agent intelligence.

At a place al-Farabi seems to believe in the createdness of soul when he says:

"The soul has a perceptive power, in one substance, and it is human no doubt. It has various branches and organs spread out, it has been given by the giver of the forms, which it gets existence at its opportune time: from the body or something like body".[57]

At other place Farabi says, the existence of soul is not possible before body, as was said by Plato, nor is transfer of souls possible from one body to other body as was believed by the upholders of

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transmigration of soul theory.[58]

In this way Muslim philosopher denied the doctrine of eternity of souls and opposed Plato in this respect, though they believed in its resurrection and permanence. Ibn Tufay blames that al-Farabi was confused about eternity of soul, and he says that al-Farabi seems to be inclined towards its annihilation, and he says that if this doctrine gets hold of minds of common masses, people will not find any difference between vices and virtues. Good and bad, which will lead to fatal consequences and disaster.[59]

Logic is one of the important subject in which we find that al-Farabi have developed a very comprehensive system. Farabi denominated purity of soul the condition and fruit of all philosophizing, and the demanded love of truth even though it should oppose Aristotle. According to Farabi the judgment is to be trained by means of Geometry and logic for the study of physical and mental science. According to DeBoer, Farabi pays little heed to the separate branches of study, his powers are concertrated on logic, metaphysics, and the principles of physics.[60]

The logic of Farabi is not a mere analysis of scientific thinking: it contains in addition many remarks on grammar, and discussion on the theory of knowledge. While grammar is limited to the Language of one people, logic, on the other hand, has to regulate the expression in language of the aggregate intelligence of manking. From the simplest elements of speech it must advance to the most complex, from the word to be sentence, and on to discourse.[61]

Farabi showed special interest towards logic, he studied it first under Abi Bashr Matta Ibn Yunus, in Baghdad and latter on studied a portion of it from Yohuna bin Hailan in Harran. These teachers taught him logic to the extent that he became well conversant with it. He got fully acquanited with Aristotelian logic and mastered it al-Farabi surpassed all his predecessors and scholastics in the field of logic. It is for that reason that Qazi Saad says that He stole a march on all other philosophers in logical science and mastered this science to a full extent. He explained its complexities and revealed its secrets and made access to it easier. He explained the necessary aspects and pre-requisites of logic in a very lucid and beautifully alluded expressions.[62]

Dr. Marhaba says:

"There is no doubt that al-Farabi understood Aristotelian logic in a most comprehensive manner. He took lead in this sphere on all the schoars and thinkers of Islam and displayed excellence in his research on logic. He made the implicit of the Greek logic explicit, revealed its secrets, made its comprehensions easier and it is on this basis that he was given the title of second teacher, Aristotle being the first".[63]

There are various reasons which indicate Farabi's excellence in the field of logic. He did not confine his attention to the analysis of thought only, but extended its relation to grammar. He said that Grammar can't entail the fuller understanding of Arabic Language. On the other hand Logical grammar corrects all the Languages and saves these from mistakes. It is on this basis that Farabi is led to deal with logic in a gradual manner. He starts from word, then compound sentences. then conditional statements, and this method is among the innovations of al-Farabi.

Logic falls into two divisions, according as its subjects stand related to actuality: the first of these comprising the doctrine of Ideas and Definitons (Tasawwur), and the second of the proofs (Tasdiq). Ideas- with which were classed definitions, though in a mere Loose, outward juxtaposition,—have in

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themselves no relation to actuality. that is to say, they are neither true nor false. Among ideas, Farabi recognizes here the simplest psychological forms. that is, both the representations of individual objects arising from sense- perception, and those ideas which has been stamped upon the mind from the first, such as the Necessary. the Actual, the possible. Such representations and ideas are immediately Certain. A man's mind may be directed to these, and his soul made observatn of them, but they cannot be demonstrated to him, nor can they be explained by deriving them from what is know, seeing that they are already clear in themselves, and that too with the highest degree of certitude.[64] But combining representations or ideas, judgments result, and these may be either true or false. To obtain a foundation for these judgments we have to go back through the processes of Inference and of proof to certain propositions originally conveyed to the understanding, immediately obvious, and admitting of farther confirmation. Such propositions—the fundamental propositions or Axioms of all science, there must be for Mathematics. Metaphysics and Ethics.[65]

Al-Farabi's study of logic was not merely for the sake of study without a purpose. He rather devoted special attention to its real purport. He defines the real purpose of logic in his book *Ihsaul al Ulum*. When he says:

"If we ignore the real purpose of logic, we will not be able to separate truth from falsehood, as we will be not certain about its certitude and its being an authentic argument amounting to real opinion, nor can we be certain about the nature, and falsity of a false argument. This is the real criterion for remaining established in one's beliefs and opinion against the dictates of probability".[66]

Farabi has many books and commentary which deal with logic, but most of these are lost. Only few books are still extant and most important among all these books it al-Farabi's commentaries on *Kitabul al Ibarah* of Aristotle. There are some other chapter and portions scattered in various of Farabi's books, such as *Ayun-al al Hikmah* and *Tahselil at Saadat* etc. etc.[67]

There are various sayings of al-Farabi which indicate the aims and objectives of logic.

Al-Farabi holds that "the art of logic gives, in general, the rules which, if followed, can correct the mind and direct man to the right way to truth away from the pitfalls of error."[68]

According to al-Farabi, in the intelligiblets there are such items which can never be disproved by reason as these are found by human nature very true and certain in their own right. For example, the total is more than a part, all the three numbers are individual numbers. In order to reach to certainty a man has to depend on the principles of logic.[69]

With Aristole, Logic is primarily a method to arrive at the truth but with al-Farabi it is method as well as the truth itself. Al-Farabi presupposes inseparability between logic and ontology. What is true of thought is true of reality. Thus, unlike Aristotle. Al-Farabi is a thorough going idealist.[70]

Toal-Farabi, Logic stands in the same relation to intelligibles as grammar to words and prosody to verse.[71] The practical and applied aspects of Logic, have been laid much emphasis by al-Farabi. He advocated that the intelligibles should be tested by its rules, as dimensions, volumes, and masses are by measurement.[72]

Logic helps is distinguishing truth from error and attaining the right way of thinking or in guiding other people along this way, it also indicates where to start our thought and how to conduct them necessarily to their final conclusion.[73]

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According to al-Farabi, practice of rhetoric, and dialectical discourses, in geometry and arithmetic, can never be a substitute for logic, in the same way as learning a considerable number of poems and speeches is of no avail to a man ignorant of grammar.[74] The art of logic is not an unnecessary ornament, because it can never be replaced by natural aptitude.[75]

Al-Farabi makes a difference between grammar and logic, as grammar is concerned with words only, while as logic deals with meanings and is related to words in so far as they are the embodiments of meanings. Morover, grammar is concerned with the laws of language, and languages are as diverse as people and races; but logic deals with the human mind which is always the same anywhere and every where.[76]

The doctrine of proof, by which, starting from what is known and well-established we arrive at a knowledge of something formerly unknown, is, according to Farabi, logic, properly so called.[77]

The subject matter of logic is its which the laws of intelligible are studied. They are classified under eight heads. (1) Categories (Leading to concepts) (2) Interpeation.[78] First Analytics (Inference). According to DeBoer, Acquaintance with these three topics. i.e. the categories, and with their synthesis in Judgment (Hermeneutics) and in inference(first Analytics) furnished only the introduction thereto. And in the proof-doctrine the chief point is to ascertain the norms or principles of a univerallly valid and necessary science, which philosophy has to be. Here the law of contradiction is looked upon as the highest of these principles, by which law the truth or necessity of a proposition, and the contrary, become known in one single cognitive act. From this point of view the platonic dichotomy is to be preferred, as a scientific method, to the Aristotelian Polytomy. And Farabi is not content with the formal side of the doctrine of proof. That doctrine has to be more than a methodology which points out the right way to the truth. It must itself point out the truth, it must generate science. It not only deals with judgments as material for the syllogism, but it enquires also into the truth which they contain, with reference to the particular sciences concerned. It is not a mere implement, it is rather a constituent part of philosophy.[79] (3) Second Analytics, (4) Topics (5) Sophistics (6) Rhetorics, and (7) Poetics.[80]

As we have seen, the theory of proof terminates in necessary knowledge, corresponding to necessary existence. But besides this there is the great province of the possible, from which we can gain only a probable knowledge. The different degrees then of probability, or the modes in which we attain to a knowledge of the possible, are discussed in the *Topics* and with them are associated Sophistic, Rhetoric and Poetics. In other connections these last three subjects are mainly concerned with practical aims, but in Farabi's hands they are combined with the Topics into a dialectice of the seeming. He proceeds to say that true science can be built up only on the necessary propositions of the second *Analytics,* but that probability shades off into the mere phantom of truth, from the topical or dialetical judgments down to the poetical. Thus poetry stands at the very bottom of the scale, being in Farabi's opinion a lying and immoral absurdity.[81]

It is obvious that al-Farabi follows in the foos steps of Aristotle, although he considers rhetorics and poetics as brances of logic.

Al-Farabi laid down the basis for the division of reasoning. The reasoning is demonstrative if it leads to certainty; it is dialectical if it leads to a semblance of certitude through good intention; it is sophistical if it leads to a semblance of certitude through bad intentions and falsity, it is rhetorical if it leads to a probable opinion, and it is poetical if it leads to imagery giving pleasure or pain to the soul.[82] These different kinds are used according to the situation and the standard of the audience. Philosophers

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and scholars make use of demonstrative reasoning theologians resort only to dialectical syllogism, and politicians take refuge in rhetorical syllogisms. It is obvious that they way of addressing any group of people should be adapted to the standard of their understanding, and thus, to use demonstrative syllogisms when addressing the populace and the masses is absurd.[83]

Conclusion

If we take a general survey of Farabi's system, it exhibits itself as a fairly consistent spiritualism, or to be more precise,—Intellectualism. The corporeal,—that which appeals to the sense,—as it originates in the imagination of the spirit, might be designated" a confused presentation" The only true existence is spirit, although it assumes various degrees. God alone is entirely unmixed and pure spirit, while those spirits, which eternally proceed from Him, already have in them the element of plurality.

Farabi speaks of prophecy as if it represented the highest stage of human knowledge and action, but that cannot be his real view, as it is not the logical consequence of his theoretical philosophy. According to it everything prophetic—in dream, vision, revelation and so on belongs to the spheres of the Imagination or representation, and thus, Farabi takes an intermediate position between sense perception and pure Rational knowledge. Although in his *Ethcis* and politics, he attaches a high educational importance to religion, it is always regarded inferior in absolute worth to knowledge acquired through pure reason.

According to al-Farabi from the one, the first cause, ten intelligences proceed from which the two worlds of heaven and earth have flowed. His spheres are moved by the managing intelligences, and nature with its generation and corruption is subjected to these. The soul is governed by one of these intelligences which is the agent intelligence. Politics and ethics are not exception, for happiness pursued be men is but the communion with the celestial world. His "Model city" only aims at this end.

Al-Farabi so fully believers in causality and determinism that he refers to causes even from those effects which have no apparent causes.

It was in response with his views on causation and other issues that he invoked a devastating criticism from Ghazzali.

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4

Philosophy of IBN Sina

Abu Ali al-Hosain Ibn Abdallah Ibn Sina, Avicenna[1] was born at Asphan in the neighbourhood of Bokhara[2] in the year 980, of a family connected with the public service. His father ruled a city known as Kaharamaitan.[3] He received his early education at home. He studied philosophy and medicine in Bokhara. He was seventeen years old when he had the god fortune to cure the prince, Nukh ibn Mansur, and to obtain the privilege of access to his library.[4] He ventured his fortunes in the political working of the smaller state. He wandered on from court to court, at one time employed in State Administration, at another as a teacher and author until he became Vizier of Shams Addaula in Aspahan. And at last, having returned to Hamadan, which Ala Addaula had conquered he died there in 1037 at the age of 57.[5]

According to George Sarton, he is the most famous scientist and philosopher of Islam and one of the greatest of all races, places and times.[6]

There is no doubt that the impact of Ibn Sina was very deep on the philosophers especially on European philosophers as the commentator of Aristotle's works. But Ibn Sina was not only a commentator, but also a free thinker, who denied to remain confined to the blind following of Aristotelianism. He rather harnessed in his system all the positive aspects of other thought systems as well, and combined Greek sciences with oriental wisdom in a very selective and qualified manner.

It is for the same reason that in several problems he seems to be very close to Plato than to Aristotle, for which he was accused by St. Aquinas to be inclined towards the philosophy of Academy. But there is no doubt that although Ibn Sina constructed his philosophical system on platonic grounds, still the pillars of the system were originally peripatetic. The though of Ibn Sina Plato though rooted in the same source, yet their systems flourished in different directions.[7]

In this way Ibn Sina was, perhaps, the most important Islamic Philosopher. Besides being a prolific writer on philosophy and religion, he was a court scholar and physician, an active politician, a civil administrator, and the writer of medical texts which were standard works in Europe up to the seventeenth century. Of his approximately one hundred works the two most important are the philosophic encyclopedia, *Kitab al-Shifa* (The book of Healing), the bulk of which was known to late

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medieval thinkers, and an abridgement of it, *Kitab al Janat* (The book of Salvation).[8]

Before we can discuss Ibn Sina's philosophy of mind and his epistemology etc, it will be necessary to outline the system within which it is elaborated. Ibn Sina regarded himself as an Arsitotelian, but his Aristotelianism, as was said earlier like that of both his predecessors and successors, was influenced by the pressure of religious considerations and by the fact that the Aristotle transmitted to him had become coloured by Stoic and Neoplatonic elements. The modifications in Aristotle are evident in Ibn Sina's notion of God, his doctine of creation, and his cosmology. He describes God not only as an eternal, unchanging, immaterial Unmoved Mover, but also as a being whose existence is necessary because his esence is identical with his being, as the One who is indivisible, as True Perfection, as Pure Benevolence, and as a continuously active agent intellect who, by emanation, creates the cosmos and all that is in it. Since intellect and will are identical in a pure intelligence, God can create simply by thinking. When he contemplates himself he automatically generates the first created being which is, because it stems from him, a pure intelligence.

The first created intelligence, too, can create by contemplation, but since it is finite intelligence it can contemplate and create in different ways. In contemplating God, it creates the second Intelligence in contemplating its own essence and in knowing that it is a contingent being characterized by potentiality, it creates the body of the first celestial sphere, and contemplating itself and in knowing its existence as necessary in that it flows necessarily from God, it generates the soul of the first celestial sphere. Since the celestial sphere is attached to a body, it's soul is not a pure intelligence and therefore does not create, but it does seek to emulate the perfection of its creator, the First Intelligence. It does so by contemplating the intelligence and by perfecting its own body. Since the only change simple celestial matter can undergo, a change of position, the soul perfects celestial matter by circular motion. Hence, the First Intelligence is the final cause of both the existence and motion of the first sphere. The Second Intelligence, by contemplating the first Intelligence and by contemplating itself in the two fold manner, produces the Third Intelligence and the body and sould of the second celestial sphere, that containing the stars. In a similar manner, further intelligences and spheres are produced as the creative process works down through the spheres of Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, the Sun, Venus, Mercury and the Moon. The Tenth Intelligence does not produce a sphere but it does produce sublunar things by providing souls and forms and by uniting them with suitably disposed complexes of sublunar matter. These complexes of matter come about as the four Aristotelian elements combine and recombine under the influence of the celestial spheres. The Tenth Intelligence is the Agent Intellect or Giver of Forms which looms so large in Ibn Sin's psychology and which provides a linkage between Aristotle's active intellect and the Active Intellect of the Scholastics.

Ibn Sina agrees with Aristotle and disagrees with the theologians in claiming that this creative process is not a temporal process and that it is not creation ex nihilo (out of nothing). Creation is not a temporal event since time is the measure of change and thus presupposs the existence of matter, and it is not a temporal process because a cause must be contemporaneous with its effect. Furthermore, creation is not ex nihilo since form can only be printed on matter that is already available. Consequently, God, matter, the cosmos and creation itself are eternal. Things exist because God exists, because he contemplates Himself necessarily and because their existence flows directly or indirectly from this contemplation. In so far as it explains why things exist, the theory of emanation suggests a non temporal sequence of active, efficient cause grounded in the supreme efficient cause, but it also suggests a hierarchy of essences following from one another in sequence. When God contemplates, His own essence He sees

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the network of implications that flow from it and unlike Aristotle's God, knows the cosmos in detail.[9]

Aristotle, Proclus, Abu Nasr Farabi, Abu Ali Sina etc. were such philosophers who believed that the Universe has a creator, who is Wajib-ul Wajud by His very Essence and the World, on the other hand is possible existence by itself. The former is necessary but its Essence, not accidental preceded by non-existence (Adm). They meant by its createdness, that the origin of the world is God, and the world emanated from Him, and remains always dependent on Him. In this way God is eternal and the world quasi eternal.

According to Ibn Sina "Ibdah" means that a thing has an existence which is related to other without any material form, means or temporal relations. In this Sense "Ibdah" is the highest stage of creation and existence.[10]

In this sense, Ibn Sina employs two terms to explain his position. According to Ibn Sina what is preceded by nothingness is preceded in time as well, as there is a necessary relation between precedence in nothingness and precedence in time. For example Tawsi explains the same point in the commentary on Ibn Sina.[11]

After al-Kindi the Muslim philosophers among the followers of Aristotle gave two meanings to "Huduth" (createdness) and "Qudmm" eternity, by declaring the former as temporal and the latter non-temporal and said that the "Ahadath-i-Zamani" (creation in time) is to create a thing from nothingness or creatio ex nihilo, but the 'Ahadath-i-Ghari Zamani" (creation without time) is related to the bestowal of a thing of its existence without being in time.[12]

A thing according to this definition is created in its essence, eternal from temporal angle. These philosophers assign double meaning to 'Qidm' (eternity) too i.e. first is relative, its time being earlier than the second one, which is known as "Al-Qadeem-Bil-Qiyas", the second is the absolute Eternal Existent.[13]

Ibn Sina and others among the Peripatetics believed that Allah is the creator of the world in the sense of being bestowal of His Existence not in themeaning of creation of a thing from nothingness or non-entity as al-Kindi, Mutakallimeen and other Muslim thinkers believed. He called it "Ifadah-tul-Wajud."

Ibn Sina gives altogether different meaning to the terms like invention (Ibdah) creation (al-Khalq) etc. For Example he says 'khalq' is common noun and is used in their sense of existence as such and also in the sense that how existence took its shape and form latter on.

Ibn Sina's views influenced much subsequent philosophy. Many, if not all of the later Christian philosophers appreciated the proof of God's existence from the existence of contingent things, the notion of God as agent, the step in the direction of a suitable creation theory, the doctrine of intelligences as a foundation for a study of angles. God's knowledge of the world, and the identity of essence and existence in God but their sharp separation from other things. They objected to the eternity of the world, the denial of ex nihilo, the piecemeal emanation of the created world, the determinism and the doctrine of the agent intellect.

Ibn Sina's reliance on Aristotle, and in particular on the De anima, is evidenced from the beginning of his psychology, when he classifies souls as vegetable, animal and human. The vegetable is characterized by the faculties of growth, reproduction and nutrition, the animal has in addition those of motion and perception and, the human being is completed by the faculty of reason. There are really two

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faculties of motion in the animal soul i.e. a psychic one characterized by desire and anger which is inside motion towards objects which are away from them and the physical one that actually moves the body by contracting and relaxing the muscles. There are five external senses, each operative when the form of the senses object is impressed on the physical sense organ. For instance when light falls on an object it transmits an image through the transparent medium and this image is impressed on the vitreous humour of the eye where it is apprehended by the psychic faculty of sight.

Ibn Sina's analysis of the internal sense goes considerably beyond that of Aristotle, who did not distinguish explicity between internal and external senses, and it anticipates in considerable detail that of the Scholastics. There are five internal senses. Fantasy or common sense, representation imagination, the estimative sense and the recollective or retentive sense. These are unique faculties, each being associated with the different part of the brain, the common sense receives images transmitted to it by the five external senses, enabling us both to know that they differ from one another and to collate the data received from them. The function of representation or sense memory is to preserve the data received by the common sense. An external sense, such as vision, abstracts the form of a particular object from its manner, but it can do so only in the presence of the object seeing the form with all the determinations imposed upon it by that matter ands seeing it as being in matter. The form in representative faculty is still particular but it is not seen as being present in or presented by matter. The further abstraction makes memory possible. Imagination is the faculty that enables us to separate and combine the images preserved by representation.

The estimative faculty detects the intentions of animate things and the effects of inanimate ones, thus enables us to discover their significance for our welfare. On the first occurrence of such an insight as the sheep's recognition that the skulking wolf means it no good, the response is an instinctive one in which the estimative sense operates on the images of common sense or representation to abstract the intention. Later it also seems to work by association, for after sense memory has past correlations of certain sort of visual data, say, with subsequent pain, the occurrence of such a visual data will trigger the associated image of pain in the imagination and the sense will then note the evil of that object.

Ibn Sina and the Scholastics note that intentions are not the objects of any other five external senses, yet they insist, without explaining how it is possible that intentions can be grasped only by attending to the image of common sense or representation. The intentions are particulars but since they are sensible, our apprehending them marks a yet higher degree of abstractions for here we are abstracting an immaterial thing from a material thing in which it exists accidently. Ibn Sina also points out that non-cognitive judgement is involved here and that this is the supreme judging faculty in the animal, further more, it is the function of this faculty to guide the two motive faculties, the function of the recollective or retentive faculty is to retain the judgments or insights of the estimative faculty just as the representative retains the images of sensible things.[14]

The apprehensions of particulars occurs only through bodily organs, for a spatial thing can be present only to another spatial thing. This is so even in the case of faculty of imagination, representation, estimation, despite the fact that they operate in the physical absence of the object. This point may be shown thus imagine two squares of exactly the same size but separated from each other, and then ask yourself how it is possible for there to be too separate squares. Since the difference cannot be accounted for as a difference of form, it must be the consequence of the same form, being manifested in two different places. That is there must be two images impressed on the different areas of the middle ventricle of the brain, which is the physical seat of the psychic faculty of imagination. The point is a

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general one that determinate features of our imaginary can be accounted for only if form perceived by the faculty is at the same time from manifested in matter. This line of reasoning, which does not appear in Aristotle, influenced the Scholastics and reappears quite explicitly in Descartes.[15]

Reason is divided into practical and theoratic faculties, with the help of the theoratic faculy, the practical faculty elaborates basic moral principles such as 'tyranny is wrong', "Lying is wrong". It considers purposes, deliberates, initiates behaviour and produces in the faculty of appetite such responses as shame and laughter.[16]

The theoretic faculty can occur in various degrees. It may be dormant; it may develope to the point where it possesses the primary principles of thought, such as "The whole is greater than its part" and "Things equal to a third are equal to one another", or it may perfect its potentiality by grasping the secondary principles as well, and thus be in a position to think without the further acquisition of any other principles. These are the various degrees of the Potential Intellect. Finally, the intellect may actually think exercising the capacities it has perfected at the prior stage. It is then called the Actual or Acquired Intellect. As we shall see later, this last state is not attained unless the Potential intellect is activated by the Agent Intellect, the Tenth Intellignece.

In order to achieve its end of contemplating pure forms, theoretic reason must complete the process of abstracting forms from matter, a process already initiated by the external and internal senses. That is it must turn to the imagination, to the images of particular objects, and , through the agency of the Agent Intellect, grasp the forms appearing there free of all the materially imposed determinations they still exhibit. This process of abstraction can be by-passed only by highly gifted individuals, such as the prophets, whose intellects are illuminated directly by the Agent Intellect the Giver of Forms. Reason recognizes that these pure forms could be manifested in many particular cases, so it regards them as universals; but it also sees that these forms need not have been manifested at all, and therefore that they are, themselves, neither particular nor universal.

Though he departs from Aristotle in holding that a form is not restricted to its occurrence in matter, Abu Ali Sina is not quitea Platonic realist, for he does not admit that a form can exist or subsist by itself. He introduces the famous doctrine of ante rem, in rebus, and post rem, a doctrine accepted later by Aquinas and others as the solution to the problem of universals. The essences are ante rem in so far as they are the exemplars in the Giver of Forms, in rebus in sofar as they are manifested in sensible objects, and post rem in sofar as they are grasped free of material considerations by the human intellect.

Knowledge involves the discovery of necessary relations between universals, relations noted directly by intuition, which is a kind of illumination, or established indirectly by syliogistic reasoning. While his model seems to be that of a body of knowledge derived by reason along from universals and self evident truths, Ibn Sina thus points out that much of our knowledge about the world, though certain, is based partly on experience. Having noted the constant conjunction between things such as man and rationality, and day and being light, and constant disjunctions such as its not being both day and night we cannot avoid concluding that the need constancy reveals a necessary conjunction or disjunction. Thus, we are forced to acknowledge necessary truths about the world, trusths such as "Man is rational" "If it is a day then it is light", and "Either it is day or it is night". But apart from this sort of assistance and the assistance of the internal senses as provides of data, the intellect does not need the assistance of the body. It does not operate through a physical organ, for it can know itself and sight is disrupted by a dazzling light. Furthermore, as is required by a faculty that apprehends pure forms, it is an immaterial

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faculty.[17]

In defending his view that the soul is an immaterial substance, Ibn Sina invokes his famous "man is the void" argument. Suppose, he says, that a man is created in a void and suppose that his feet, hands and other physical parts are separated from his in such a way that he has no sensation of an external world and no experience of his body; nevertheless, he would still be conscious of himself. Consequently the self he is conscious of must be an immaterial thing. Furthermore, since he can think of himself without thinking that he has a body, having a body is not essential to being a self and therefore is exclused from the nature of the self. That is to say, the immaterial self exists in its own right independently of other things and is therefore a substance. If it is associated with a body, the association is accidental. The soul is and is an entelechy because it govern and guides the body, but it is no more the form of the body than the pilot is the form of the ship.

The soul did not exist prior to the existence of its body for if there were a number of pre-existing souls, they would have to differ from one another. To do so it is impossible since they would not differ in form nor would they be individuated by matter. If these were one pre-existing soul it would have to be shared by all men-an absurd idea. Therefore the individual soul is created when there is body suitable for it. By binding itself closely to its body the soul is influenced permanently by the peculiar nature of the body and the particular events that be fall it. Since the soul is simple substance it survives the dealth of the body, carrying over into the hereafter the individuality it has acquired.

In these various respects, Ibn Sina departed from the Aristotelian view of the soul in order to satisfy the requirements of theology. Thus the later Jewish and Christian philosophers welcomed his guidance when they encountered Aristotle. There is also a remarkable coincidence between Ibn Sina's position and arguments and those of Descartes. The influence of the "man in the void" argument is particularly evident.[18]

To complete the survey of Ibn Sina's psychology, one must consider the relationship between the human intellect and the active intellect. The human intellect does not achieve its highest status, that of apprehending universals and the relations between them, unless it is activated by the tenth Intelligence, which is Active Intellect or Giver of Forms. Ibn Sina describes the Active Intellect as radiating a power which illuminates as the potentially intelligible but actually sensible forms of imagination, thereby making them intelligible and thus present to a suitably prepared mind. In this way our potential intellect becomes an actual or acquired intellect in this process, images are important for two reasons. First, we must abstract the form from an image of the object if we are to grasp the form as the form of an object, and second, we must compare where the divine illumination is able to enlighten it. It is to be noted that the Active Intellect, not the human intellect, abstracts the intelligible form from the image in the imagination. The giver of Forms is evinced further by the fact that since we have not intellectual memory we must re-establish contact with it every time we think. Later, Thomas Aquinas and others referred to Ibn Sina's Active Intellect and insisted on fragmenting it into individual active intellects occurring as faculties of individual human souls, thus making man himself responsible for the activating of his potential intellect. They also feared, though Ibn Sina himself did not, that as long as well all shared the same active Intellect, personal immortality was jeopardized. Also, they introduced intellectual memory and insisted that when intellection occurs the known and the known become one.

Since the human intellect is able to contact the Giver of Forms more easily on subsequent occasions, it is able to perfect itself appraoching the ideal of constant contemplation of the forms. By

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thus emulating the Giver of forms, which contains all intelligible forms, the soul prepares itself to enjoy a higher, a more worthy status when it leaves the body. Insofar as it is the emulated intelligence, the Giver of Forms is a final and formal cause as well as an agent, and insofar as it functions in these ways it brings the human soul into the sequence of efficient, formal and final causes that stem from and culminate in God.

Besides influencing later Jewish and Christian philosophers in the various ways already indicated, Ibn Sina had a great influence on the work of Ibn Rushd, the other great Islamic philosopher. Anyone interested in a critical but sympathetic evaluation of Ibn Sina should turn to Ibn Rushd.[20]

Thus, according to Ibn Sina, God is the eternal, unmoved First Mover, who exists necessarily by His own nature and who eternally generates the first created being, a pure intelligence, by a creative act of thought.

The First Intelligence creates the Second Intelligence and also the first celestial sphere and its soul, the second intelligence produces the third intelligence and the second celestical sphere, the process continues to the Tenth Intelligence, the giver of forms.

According to Ibn Sina, Souls are vegetable, animal and human; the human soul is characterized by the faculties of growth reproduction, nutrition, motion, perception and reason. Moreover, There are five external senses and five interna senses; the internal senses are common sense, representation, imagination, estimation and recollection.

Furthermore, reason has two faculties, the practical and the theoretic; the theoretic faculty may develope to the stage of actual intellect as activated by Tenth Intelligence, knowledge then consists of discovering the necessary relations between universals.

The above discussion about the psychology of Ibn Sina includes some rudimentary details of Ibn Sina's metaphysics and epistemology as well. Therefore let us see in some more detail his views on being, God's knowledge of particulars and his concept of the eternity of the world. Moreover this discussion is very important because, Ghazzali has mainly objected to these views of Ibn Sina in his rebuttal against philosophers.

The metaphysics, or the first philosophy concerned with the study of being (Wajud). Ibn Sina regards the doctrine of being as the basic doctrine in his metaphysics. It is the doctrine which illustrates the doctrine of the creator (the principle of existence) and the creation (the existents). In this regard, he says:

"And the required knowledge of this kind is 'the First philosophy' for it is the knowledge which it is mainly concerned with 'being'. It is the First case and the first subject in general. And it is the being and the one. And it is also the wisdom which is superior to other knowledge. It is superior and certain. And by its superiority it is the knowledge about God and causes after Him. And it is the wisdom of the remote sense of the universe".[22] 'Ibn Sina is famous for his Doctrine of Being'. He is characterized as 'The philosopher of Being'. The study of Being, being the most fundamental subject in metaphysics according to Ibn Sina, is underling in his important books. For example He says:

"It will become clear to you through an intimation that we have a way for providing the First principle, not by way of inference from sensible things but through Universal rational premises that makes it necessary that there must be for existence a principle that is necessary in its existence, that make it possible for (this principle) to be in any respect multiple, and that make it necessary it must be

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the principle of the whole (of existence) and that the whole proceeds from Him according to the order possessed by the whole"[23]

The doctrine of being is aimed at demonstration; the process of eternal existence of the Universe from the First Being, which Ibn Sina termed as emanation. In order to illustrate this process, Ibn Sina develops the distinction of being. He divided beings into three categories. 'The Necessary Being' (Wajib al Wajud); "The possible Being (mumkinal-Wujud); and "The impossible Being' (mumtani al-wajud). Regarding the first two categories, he explains:

"We say: Things which are included in existence can be divided in the mind into two (kinds). One of these is that which, it is considered in itself, does not have its existence by necessity. And it is clear that its existence is also not impossible, for if its existence were possible, it would not be included in existence. This thing is in the domain of possibility. The other of these is that which, when it is considered in itself, has its existence by necessity"[24]

In *Uyum-al-Hikmah*[25] Ibn Sina explains that the Necessary Being is an existence when considered in itself, does not have its existence by ncessity. It is obvious that, one of the aspects which makes a being necessary and possible in Ibn Sina's sense is the state of its coming into existence. If its coming into existence is in the possible state, then it is called 'The possible Being.' On the other hand, a being whose existence is of necessity cannot be conceived as having the possibility of non-existence; for it, the state of non-existence or even the hypothetical supposition of non-existence is impossible (muhal). Therefore, the existence of 'the Necessary Being is' Necessary '(daruri), as in the above position or' continuous (da'imi).

If the existence of a being is made possible by a cause, it is a possible Being in its essence (mumkin al-wajud bi dhatihi); but if the existence of a being is not the result of any cause, it is a Necessary Being in its essence (wajib al-wajud bi dhatihi). Regarding these two categories of necessary being in terms of 'cause', Ibn Sina mentions:

"We say that whose existence is necessary being by its essence does not have a cause, while that whose existence is possible by its essence does have a cause. Further, that whose existence is necessary by its essence is necessary in respects to existence in all of its aspects. Again, it is not possible that the existence of that whose existence is necessary is co-equal with another existence so that each of them is equal with the another in respect to the necessity of existence and (so that) both necessarily accompany each other."[26]

It appears that Necessary Being by its essence or the first, according to Ibn Sina, does not have the cause for its existence either external or internal. The denial of external cause it obvious since Necessary by its essence is the First cause of all existents and there is no cause superior and prior to it. His denial of internal cause is derived from his conception of the Necessary Being by its essence itself.

The First or the Necessary Being, according to Ibn Sina, is neither a body nor in body, it is not an accident, neither form nor matter. Furthermore, its nature is unchangeable, its essence and existence are inseparable. The First is a simple (basit), as well as a pure Being. It is one (wahid). In this respect, Ibn Sina states that :

"We have made clear before, that the Necessary Being by its essence (The First) is one, and it is not body and not in body and not composed in any respect. And, therefore all other existents exist from it. It is not possible for it to have a principle for its existence in any repect."[27]

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For Ibn Sina, his non-accidental concept of the First is stated as follows:

"And it is clear that it (The First) is not an accident, for an accident exists in substratum, and the substratum is prior to it. And it is not possible for it to exist without a substratum. And we have mentioned that the Necessary Being (The First) has no cause for its existence."[28]

According to Ibn Sina the 'Necessary Being' is unchangeable. He says:

"And it is also clear, from the negation of the susceptible cause, that it is impossible for the Necessary Being to be changeable, for change means the removal of an attribute and its replacement by another. (This implies that) it would then be in a state of potentiality either to be removed or to be replaced. This is impossible."[29]

Furthermore, the First is not divisible into elements like genus, species and difference. All other existents are subject to such divisions. Ibn Sina says:

"Necessary Being has nothing in common with the quiddity of anything, because every quiddity belonging to what is not itself, postulates the possibility of being. Therefore, Necessary Being does not share a generic or a specific idea with any other Being. Hence, it does not need to be distinguished by an idea of a difference, specific or accident."[30]

According to Ibn Sina the Universal knowledge pertains to the Existence of the Absolute Being and leads us to the grounds wherefrom whole knowledge stems about the particulars. Therefore his system seems based on deduction than on induction.

Ibn Sina has explained the stages, grades of the being and existence, apart from showing its original roots and their inter-relationships. Wajib-ul-al-wujud is a necessary Existence, while as possible Existence (Mumkin-ul-al-wujud) is not necessary.[31]

'Wajib-ul al-Wujud' has two meanings, first is necessary from the essence point of view, and second, when existence is conditioned by some other thing possible, existence is that which is accepted as determined by its essence. Ibn Sina regards it as a necessary by other not by itself.

The necessary being is that in which there is not possibility of the possible meaning, i.e. Allah.

The possible in itself is that in which there is no possibility of necessity. It is a potential existence. The necessary by other is possible in itself, the existence in cause has a cause outside from it, and these are the existences of the realms of earth and heavens.[32]

Ibn Sina's whole philosophy stands on the difference he made between Necessary and possible existences. He took this starting point of his philosophy from al-Farabi and made it an important aspect of his own philosophy. Ibn Sina, while explaining the meaning of Necessary and possible says that Wajib-ul-al Wujud is essentially necessary in itself while as possible is not i.e. it is not necessary in its existence or non existence.[33]

Imam Razi says that philosophers believed that the world is eternal, most of them deny divine knowledge, clearly the resurrection of the bodies. Most important among all these philosophers was Ibn Sina, who was in the period of Mehmood bin Subuktageen.[34]

Though Sadruddin Shirazi claims that Aristotle was not believer in the doctrine of the eternity of the world, yet *Metaphysis* of Aristotle indicates clearly that he was the upholder of the Theory of eternality of the world. Though Shirazi claimed that he knows the real purport of these books of Aristotle, but this claim seems to be doubtful after studying the actual books of Aristotle on factual

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grounds. May be that the several books which have been attributed to Aristotle indicate such beliefs.[35]

At an other place Sadruddin Shirazi says that this problem of eternity and createdness has be witched the most intelligent people to the extent of stumbling. He thinks, however, that the problem can be under stood by the pure hearted people, only.[36]

However, Shirazi, like Ghazzali believes that the belief in eternality of the world is tantamount to the denial of Islamic Shariah and the teachings of the prophets, as the religious tenets expressly support doctrine of createdness of the world in unequivocal terms. The people, who uphold this belief in eternity, can't reconcile it with religious teachings, says Shirazi. He accused al-Farabi that he could not understand the statements of his predecessors, therefore he regarded Plato's views and interpreted them in the context of "Huduth-al-Dhati."[37] (Essential Creative process).

The eternal possibility of the existence in indisputable, for it could never have been possible after it had been impossible. That would be absurd, because it would limit the power of God and ential a determinant for the beginning of that particular power. This in turn would lead to another absurdity: the denial or at least the restriction of the freedom of the eternal will. Therefore, since what can possibly exist eternally ought to do so actually and the eternal existence of the world is possible, therefore, the world, is actually eternal.[38]

Ghazzali actually agrees with the first premise of the philosopher's argument: that the existence of the world is eternally possible but refutes the second: that the world is therefore eternal. Creation of the world, he holds, is always possible from all eternality and, for that matter, there is not a time when the creation of the would could have been impossible. Its creation had been determined from all eternality but was actually realized in time. Hence, the eternal possibility or creation does not entail its concomitance with creation; per se,[39]

"For reality does not conform to possibility but differs from it."[40]

For the Islamic Philosophers, the world emanates from God necessarily as part of a chain of necessitated and necessitating existents since, according to them, it is the immutability and eternality of the prime necessitating principle—God—that in the final analysis secures the incessant regularity of the natural order.[41]

The concept of a necessitating God is not acceptable to Ghazzali because it is fundamentally opposed to the doctrines of the Asharite theologians, or even according to Ghazzali, the teachings of Islam.[42] Al-Razi, on the other hand, upholds the theory that the would was created in time, but not out of nothing. In this he was greatly influenced by Plato's *Timaeus.*[43] Otherwise, this position of his might have been derived from the Quranic verse 4 : 11, that states that the heaven was created out of something, namely smoke.[44]

Ibn Sina's theory that God knows the particulars in a universal way has been interpreted by medieval commentators and critics in two different ways. The first is to interpret "universal knowledge" as meaning that it is eternal and changeless, and which is conceptual in the sense that it is not knowledge apprehended by the senses. According to this interpretation God, by this type of knowledge, knows all particulars in both the celestial and the terrestrial worlds.[45] The second interpretation, expressed by Ibn Sina's Asharite critics, like Ghazzali, Al-Sharistani' Abdul-Karim,[46] and Fakhru-al-Din al-Razi[47], also maintains that God's knowledge, according to Ibn Sina, is universal in the sense of being eternal, changeless and conceptual, but that His knowledge of particulars in this manner is confined to

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the entities and happenings in the celestial realm. The wording in this second interpretation as given by these several critics differs, but the essential point they make is that according to Ibn Sina's principles, God does not know the particulars in the world of generation and corruption, whether these are entities or events, as particulars. He knows only the universal characteristics of these particulars. Thus, he does not know the individual human being nor his individual acts.[48] and Leaman Oliver[49] gives comprehensive evidence that the second of these interpretations is the one that in fact accords with Ibn Sina's philosophy. Again, although the wording of the statement by Ibn Sina may differ from the interpretations of Ghazzali or Fakhru-al-Din al-Razi, there is agreement in substance among them all.[50]

For a proper understanding of Ibn Sina's Theory, one must take account of two features peculiar to his scheme of emanation. The first is the principle that from the one only one proceeds; the second, an outcome of the first, is that in Ibn Sina's celestial realm, each of the beings that proceed from God, whether these are intelligences souls, or bodies, constitute the only number of their respective species. Ibn Sina's emanative scheme is generally considered to represent a consequence of divine knowledge and consists of a series of Triads in the celestial realm. The process can be summed up as follows:

"God, the only being whose existence is necessary in itself, necessitates the existence of all other beings through His eternal act of self-knowledge. God's self-knowledge, according to Ibn Sina, results in the direct necessary emanation from Him of one being, a first inttelligence. That this first being directly emanating from His is one is in accordance with the principle that from the one only one proceeds. Now this intelligence, though necessitated by God, is in itself possible. It thus becomes aware of three circumstances of existence: God's existence as necessary in itself; its own existence as necessitated; and is own existence as in itself only possible. In undegoes three acts of knowing in relation to these the circumstances. Since from the one act only one proceeds, its three acts result in the existence of three other beings, a second intelligence, a soul and a body, the outermost body of the universe that contains no stars. The second intelligence undergoes a similar triadic cognitive activity, resulting in the emanation from it of three other beings: a third intelligence, a second soul and a body—the body of the fixed stars.[51]

This process is then repeated by the third and successive intelligence thus:

"God will thus apprehend singular things in as much as they are universal. I mean, in as much as they have qualities. If the qualities become specified individually in the singulars, this occurs in relation to a particular time or circumastance (hal). If this circumstance is also (simply) apprehended with its qualities, it will be in the same position as the singulars. But in as much as it is attributed to principles where the species of each is confined in its one individual (instance), it is attributed to individual things.

"We have said that it is through such an attribution (innad) that singulars can be given a description (rasm) or characterization restricted to (each) of them. If the individual to which the singular is attributed is for the intellect an individual, then the intellect will have some means for apprehending the singular discribed (al-marsum). That (forma) is the individual which is the only member of its species and has no similar; for example, the sphere of the Sun or Jupiter. If, on the other hand, the species has many individual instances, then the intellect will have no way for arriving at the singulars, description unless one points to it directly to begin with, as you have (already) gathered (from our discourse)."[52]

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One gathers from the above passage that God cannot know the particular events and entities in the world of generation and corruption. Conclusive as this inference may be in the case of events and entities in the world of generation and corruption, similar inference cannot be drawn with regard to the non-corporals i.e. rational human souls and particular human acts. These are immaterial and the consideratin of some of Ibn Sina's other theories might render God's knowledge of them possible.

Therefore, both of these entities too can be apprehended by God conceptually. This is the very point that Ibn Sina elaborates at the beginning of his discussion of God's knowledge of the particulars in the *Isharat:*—

"Particular things can be conceived just as universals are conceived when these particulars are necessitated by their causes and are related to principles where the species is confined to its one individual instance. An example of this is the particular eclipse. For its occurrence can be conceived when its particular causes are sufficient and when the intellect known all these causes, conceiving them as it would universals."[53]

Hence, Ibn Sina's choice of the eclipse of the moon as an example is meant to restrict God's knowledge of the particulars to celestical events, and as such this knowledge cannot be extended to the events in the "world of generation and corruption." Because the second kind of events here is ascribed to individuals that are not the only members of their species as stipulated by Ibn Sina for God's knowledge of them. According to Ibn Sina therefore, God does not know the events (human acts included) in the world of generation and corruption.[54] Contradictory as it is to Ibn Sina's own definition of conceptual knowledge, the interpretation of Ibn Sina's as rendered by his defenders, Nasiru-al-Din and al-Dawani, to mean that God knows each and every particular through an eternal conceptual knowledge, does not satisfy Ghazzali because the issue is not merely God's knowledge of the particulars but the quality of that knowledge, conceptual knowledge of an individual being as such denotes two things.

"Apprehension of its abstract qualities and knowledge of the fact that these qualities belong to the individual in question. This is too abstract. The theologain in his opposition to the theory is defending his concept of an omnipotent God, personally and intimately acquained with our innermost thoughts and acts, For the theologians, it is in this sense that not even the weight of an atom escapes his knowledge."[55]

In Sum then, Ghazzali's interpretation of Ibn Sina's concept of God's, knowledge of the particular is accurate and runs thus: God's knowledge, Ibn Sina holds, can only be conceptual because He is pure intellect. It cannot be sensory because sensation requires a particular organ of apprehension which cannot be attributed to God. Furthermore, sensory knowledge of a particular incident individually is only attainable through its ascription to a particular entity known by God as an individual. That entity should also be the only member of its specie. The eclipse in this case is ascribed to the moon, which is an individual and that the only member of its species. The moon's eclipse on the other hand involves such elements as sun; the earth and their respective movements involved here now are two other entities, i.e. the sun and the earth (each of which is the only member of its species) and their movements,[56] of the occurrence of an individual eclipse and the strictly conceptual awareness of certain characteristics of an eclipse which might take place at a particular period of time. The former kind of apprehension involves change in the knower, but the latter does not. It is with this latter kind of knowledge that God, according to Ibn Sina, knows every particular eclipse.[57] However, according to Ibn Sina, knowledge implies

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change in the knower, and God is eternal and changeless. God knows conceptually only the particulars in the celestial realm. He does not know the particulars in the world of generation and corruption either conceptually or sensationally.[58]

Ghazzali attributed the doctrine of eternity of the world to all philosophers, though with an exception. According to Dawani, this exception in this regard was that of Plato.

Even Ibn Miskawyah says that the agnostics were the people who believed in the eternality of the world. He held that every thing according to these people presupposes some other matter for its existence. Therefore, world should exist from very beginning and all eternity.

In this way the statements of the philosophers are confused about the themes of the latter thinkers and philosophers, but there is no doubt that Aristotle believed in the eternity of the world, this is the belief and doctrine of Al-Farabi, Ibn Sina and Ibn Rushd and others from among the followers of Aristotle, and as for as the views of Plato are concerned he believed in the createdness of the world not in its form, (shakl), but in its hyle. (Ha'it). According to Saddurudin Shirazi the problematic of eternity and createdness of the world is that complicated a subject, that even the great minds were unable to understand its reality. It is for the same reason that people like Ghazzali were led to tax al-Farabi and Ibn Sina, the Aristotelian Muslim philosophers, with infidelity. Ghazzali leveled philosophers with infidelity despite the fact that Ghazzali advocated restraint from declaring "Ali-i-al-Qiblah" as "infidels."

There was strong opposition against Ibn Sina from Ulama for his unorthodox views pertaining to eternity of the world, God's knowledge of universals on the expense of His knowledge of particulars and resurrection of souls rather than body. For example Ibn Salah said about Ibn Sina:

"He (Ibn Sina) was not one among the Islamic Ulama, but a devil among the devils of the man kind."[59]

But such type of allegations speak of the bias and prejudice of the theologians and nothing else. Reason cant accept such extreme slanderous statements to be passed against the great philosophers like Ibn Sina.

In the same way Ibn Taimiyah, Ibn Salah, Tajuddin Subki and Jalal-ud-Din Sayuti have subjected Ibn Sina to severe criticism, sometimes without any sound basis.

However, Ghazzali's criticism on Ibn Sina meets almost all demands of fair play and justification, as it was critique of a philosopher against another philosopher, which has been always, the very essence of philosophical line of thinking. It is in a way very similar to the saying of Artistotle i.e. dear is Plato, but dearer is truth.

Iysa A Bello says, for example Ghazzali's interpretation of Ibn Sina's concept of God's knowledge of the particulars is accurate and runs thus; God's knowledge, Ibn Sina holds, can only be conceptual because He is pure intellect. It cannot be sensory because sensation requires a particular organ of apprehension which cannot be attributed to God. Furthermore, sensory knowledge implies change in the, knower, and God is eternal and changeless. God knows conceptually only the particulars in the celestical realm. He does not know the particulars in the world of generation and corruption either conceptually or sensationally.

Ghazzali declares this doctrine tantamount to disbelief because it denies God the knowledge of the particulars in the world of generation and corruption, especially human acts upon which the reward

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in the hereafter as one of the principles of Islam are based. It contradicts outright the categorical pronouncement of the Holy Quran (34:3), that "not even the weight of an atom escapes God's knowledge."

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1. Saed Sheikh, *Studies in Muslim Philosophy,* Adam Publishers and Distributors, Delhi, 1994, p. 89) says:
   "Avicenna, is a Latin distortion from Hebrew, Avensina," and the Islamic creed came to fruition in the comprehensive system of Ibn Sina (370-428/980-137) generally known to the west under the Latinized name of Avicenna" See Fazlur Rahman, *Islam,* Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1994, p. 89).
2. Bokhara is a city in the democratic Uzbikstan and an old township of Turkistan. It was once the centre of great Islamic learning and culture. Moreover, this city is famous for its silk carpet and perfume industries. It was ruled by Uzbik rulers for sometime, who opposed Russian intervention in 1868, their rule however ended in 1920. This city has produced great Islamic luminaries as Ismail Bokhari, a famous authority on Hadith literature. Bokhara was the capital of the Samanids (Iysa A Bello., *The Medieval Islamic Controversy Between. Philosophy and Orthodoxy,* E.J. Brill, New York, 1989). See also Abdul Munim Hamudah, *Min Rawwad-al-Fal-Safatul-al-Islamiah,* Maktaba, Al-Ajnilual-Misriyah 1983, p. 86.
3. Leo. F. Miller, *History of Philosophy,* Discovery Publishing House, New Delhi, 1983, p. 127 and see (Abdul Minim Hamudah, op. cit, p. 188) who says that:
   "The writers write this name of the city differently. Mohammad Lufti Jamuhu writes it as "Kahrmatian". Dr. Abdul Halim Mehmood and Dr. Jameel Saleeba as "Kahramaitan" as has been done by Dr. Ahmad F Ehwany, But Abbas Mehmood 'Aqad' writes it as "Kahrmateen".
4. T.J. DeBoer. *The History of philosophy in Islam* (Tr. Edward R. Jones) Cosmo publications, Delhi, 1983, p. 132.
5. Ibid, p. 132.
6. George Sarton, *Introduction of the History of Science,* Baltimore, 1927. vol-1, p. 709.
7. Abdul Munim Hamudah, op. cit, p. 211.
8. *Kitaban-Najat,* Cairo, 1938/1357, Tr. by Fazlur-Rahman, *Avicenna' s psychology,* Oxford 1952 and *Kitab-ash-Shifa,* ("Avicenna's '*De Anima*') ed./ Fazlur-Rahman, London, 1959. See also Fazlur Rahman, *Islam,* London, 1966) when he says "Thus philosophical system, constructed was a magnificent creation of the Islamic civilization; is" p. 120.
9. Magil Frank (Edited), *Masterpieces of World-Philosophy,* New York 1961, p. 28c. The Asharite theologians and the majority of the Mutazilites, basing themselves on their doctrine of the creation of the world exnihilo, held that "non-existence" or "a non-existent" mean absolutely nothing; yet some of the Mutazilites, held that it is something, thereby maintaining that the world was created our of an anti mundance matter. Their views vary about the definition of this anti mundane matter but eventually, they all affirm that, even though created, the world is some how eternal *(al Farq Bayn—al-Firaq wal Beyan Firquh al-Najjiyah min hum.* Beirt 1993, p. 163-5).
10. In the 7th/12th century itself there arose a number of eminent philosophical writers and critics

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who, while defending philosophy in general, nevertheless accepted orthodox positions on the most critical and positive points of the dogma. For example, Nasiral-Din-al-Tawsi (d 672/ 1273), an acute and clear thinker rejects the doctrine of the eternity of the world and defends Islam on this point (see Fazlur Raham, *Islam,* London, 1966, p. 122).

11. Ibn Sina Sharh-il-Isharat vol. I, p. 2321.
12. *Sharh-al-Isharat,* vol. I, p. 134.
13. Rasail Ibn Sinap, p. 69.
14. Ibid, p. 169.
15. Ibid, p. 49.
    Ibn Sina gives different meanings of creation as well. The first two important philosophers of medieval Islam, al-kindi (d. 246/860) and the physician philosopher Abi Bakr al-Razi (d 313/ 925) did not adopt Aristotle's theory of the world's eternality. Al-Kindi argues at great length to prove that the world could only have been created in time out of nothing (Al-Kindi, *Rasail al-Kindi al-Falsafiyah,* edited by M. Abu Ridah cairo, 1950, pp. 197-8).
16. The fourth and the most important internal faculty is called Wahm, which passed into the west as vis estimativa, it perceives immaterial motion like usefulness and harmfulness, love and hate in material objects, and is, in fact, the basis of our character, whether influenced or uninfluenced by reason. The doctrine of Wahm is the most original element in Ibn Sina's psychological teaching and comes very close to what some modern psychologiests have described as the "nervous response" of the subject to a given object. In Aristotle this function is performed by imagination or perception itself, but Ibn Sina contends that perception and imagination tell us only about the perceptual, qualities of a thing, its size, colour, shape, etc. They tell us nothing about its character or "meaning" for us, which must be read or discerned by an internal faculty of the organism. Ibn Sina's doctrone of Wahm is primarily a purely psychological doctrine, explaining our instinctive and emotional response to the environment. For further details refer to M.M. Sharif (edit) *A History of Muslim philosophy,* vol. I, Otto Harrassowitz Wies-baden, 1963, pp. 493-495.
17. At the apex of the in-tellectual powers of the soul stands the Reason. There is a practical Reason (which reminds us of Kant) also, but in its action we have been only multiplying ourselves mediately.
    On the other hand, in self-consciousness, or the pure recognition of our essential nature, the unity of our Reason is directly exhibited. But instead of keeping down the lower powers of the soul, the Reason lifts them up, refining sense-perception, and generalizing presentation. Reason, which at first is a mere capacity for though, because elaborated gradually, in that material which is conveyed to it by the external and internal senses, into a finished readiness in thought. See T.J. DeBoer, *The History of philosophy in Islam,* Cosmo Publications, New Delhi, 1983, pp. 141-144.
18. Dr. Abdur Rahman Marhaba, *Min-al-al-Falsafatul-al-Yunania Ila-al-Falsafa-tul-al-Islamiyah,* Manshurat Aweeda, Beirut 1970, pp. 486-87.
19. According to some scholars Ibn Sina is more than any other philosopher concerned with the problematic of soul (Al-Nafas). He wrote on the knowledge of soul, its various conditions, faculties, its relation with body, its substance, and eternity in various treatises, especially in *Kitabus-as-Shifa* and *kitabun-an-Najat, Kitab-ul-al-Isharat* and his discussions are elaborate ones. He extended on Aristotle's views pertaining to soul, new dimensions and rendered the

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subject althoghter a different enterprise, by relying on physical, psychological, and philosophical analysis of the same.
(See Dr. Jameel Saleeba, *Tarikh-u-al-Falksafatul-al Arabiyah,* Darul al-Kitabal-Lubnani, Beirut 1970, p. 239).

20. Magill Frank, *Masterpieces of World philosophy,* op. cit pp. 283-84.
21. Isya A. Bello, *The Medieval Islamic controversy Between philosophy and Orthodoxy* E. J. Brill, New York, 1989, pp. 124-125.
'*Kitab al-Najat'* consists on topics like logic, mathematics, physics and theology. Ibn Sina did not write about mathematics himself, but it was written by his disciple Abu Ubeed al Janzani. This book resembles the chapterisation and structure of the *Kitabus-as-shifah,* but is more comprehensive, meaningful, and has an edge of *Shifa* from the stylistic point of view and eloquence. *Al-shifa* consists of few type of subjects : i.e. Logic, Mathematics, physics and Theology.
See Dr. Jameel Saleeba, *Tarikh-ul-Falsafatul-al-Islamiate,* Darul-Kitab Lubnani, Beirut 1970, p. 215.
22. Ibn Sina, *al-Shifa (all-Ilahiyyat)*, vol. 1, Cairo: 1960, pp. 14-15, Translated by Mohammad Yousoff Hussian in 'The Doctrine of Being in Ibn Sina's Metaphysics", *Islam and Modern Age,* New Delhi, August, 1992, p. 177.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibn Sina, vol. I, p. 37, Translated by A, Hyman in *philosophy in the Middle Ages,* edited by A. Hyman and J.J. Walgh (Indianapolis: Hacketl publishing Co. 1988), p. 240.
25. Edited by Abdul Rehman Badawi, Cairo: 1954.
26. Ibn Sina, *al-Shifa (al-Ilahiyyat),* vol. 1. (Cairo 1960), ptranslated by A. Hyman, p. 240.
27. Ibn Sina, *al-Shifa (al-Ilahiyyat*, vol. II, p. 402.
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5

Ghazzali's Philosophy

In Muslim history a specific movement of philosophy emerged in medieval times from 8th to 15th century. It developed its own traditions and characteristics of thought.

Ghazzali refuted the extremist trend of Greek philosophy which was influencing the whole Muslim society, Ghazzali developed his own methods and traditions in philosophy. This method of Ghazzali was moderate between the philosophical and theological extremism. Its other specific dimensions were scepticism and mysticism and a consistent and systematic approach towards reason, Logic and theology.

In the following pages we will explain various philosophical credentials of Ghazzali's philosophy, for example, his important philosophical treatises, i.e. *Maqasia-al Falasifah* (The Aims of philosophy), *Tahafut al Falasifah* (Incoherence of the philosophers) and *Munqidh min Dalal* (Deliverance from Error) etc. Then we will see how Ghazzali has dealt with various philosophical science as logic, mathematics, physics, metaphysics and ethics etc.

Moreover we will discuss the novel, innovative and remarkable dimensions Ghazzali, which are inherent in hs treatment of various philosophical subjects like Reason, Scepticism and causation. These are the philosophical subjects which have been undertaken by Ghazzali in a very systematic and comprehesive manner, and, therefore, Ghazzali has been compared to philosophers like Kant, Rene Descartes and David Hume on the basis of the remarkable similarities found in his ideas and those of these philosophers, respectively.

Finally we will try to bring a very interesting but generally unknown aspect of Ghazzali's holistic philosophy to fore, which pertains to psychology. In this way Ghazzali's philosophical position can be established in a very convinving manner.

To start with Ghazzali was not a rational philosopher as were al-Farabi and Ibn Sina, but was rather a critic of philosophy, who tried to demolish the edifice of philosophy constructed by the Muslim philosophers on the foundation of the Greek thought. In this way usually, Ghazzali's position in the history of philosophy is known for its negative implications rather than positive in the history of

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philosophy is known for its negative implications rather than positive ones. But in most cases a critic of philosophy himself assumes a status of a philosopher especially when he might have employed the various ways and methods for strengthening his soudn thought. There is no doubt that a critic of philosophy is condemned to adopt a specific attitude or approach towards the philosophical problems which confront him, and in this way he reaches himself to endorsement of several truths or themes of that philosophy.[1]

Ghazzali's philosophy can be called as "Spiritual Critique" in modern terminology. Ghazzali started his philosophical experience or expedition by doubting inherited beliefs and sensory and rational principles, and then arrived at certitude after passing through the phase of scepticism by a light which dawned in his heart and this light according to him is the prelude to most of the knowledge processes. The difference between the doubt of Ghazzali and Descartes is that the former arrived at the certitude by the divine light which was thrown in his heart by God, but Descartes remained in the amenable to doubt. which is well-known by Descarte's, Cogito Ergo Sum, i.e. I think, therefore I exist But even to Descartes, these first principles themselves needed a divine guarantee for their authenticity, because he himself was not sure about his own existence unless he became convinced that God is truthful and does not speak a lie to mislead him. He thought that had there been a deceiving devil, who would play tricks with his reason and show the truth as flasehood, he would never have arrived at certitude.

It is, however, not easy for a person who doubts the dictates of reason to reach to certitude or certainty by relying only on reason, unless he receives some external help in this process, and this external help is the divine light which is cast in the human heart by God which enables reason to understand itself, and perceive abou the truth of its findings. In this way we have observed that the certainty to which both Ghazzali and Descarted reached about the authenticity of the findings of reason was made possible by the divine favour only.

Ghazzali considers the dictates of reason to be valid in the science of Logic, mathematics and physics and in all those matters which are related to experience. But so far as the matters relating to the divine world are concerned, the reason cannot pass andy judgment about these with authority. Therefore, the statements of philosophers about Mathematics are demonstrative and about the theology probable, therefore, they were condemed by Ghazzali as they could not meet all the requirements of Logical demonstration in the matters of theology. The reason requires the external support in at lelast two conditions in view of Ghazzali, first is to give him freedom from the scepticism when it had assumed very dangerous proportions, and secondly to lead a man and makr him to realize that in the matters of religion and theology, there is no possibility of knowledge except through revelation and inspiration (al-wahy wal I Ilham). Except in these two conditions, the reason is the true scale, rather safe and sound instrument for acquiring knowledge and information about all other matters, whose basis are the first rational principles and its way is vision apart from its ability to elaborate and explain things.

Ghazzali didn't require rational argumentation to reach to divine knowledge, as he knew God through heart before, knowing Him by way of reason. In this way his knowledge of God was the result of this internal or subjective experience, which is a mystery of hearts not the fruits of reason. A person who is not well versed with this knowledge by 'taste' (Dhawq), he will not be able to know the matters relating to God except at the level of expressions. Ghazzali said in his book *al-Munqidh min al-Dalal,* that the methods of the philosophers are futile, which don't leadus to certainty. Ghazzali rejected philosophers more than he opposed the scholastics. However, Ghazzali himself has mentioned and

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included in some of his books such meanings which are contrary to religious belief.[2] One of his disciples exclaimed when he came to know about his views:-

"We ask God's rescue from the hypotheses of a philosopher and the imagination of a sufi"

Some of the Fuqaha (jurists) opposed Ghazzali for this view that the knowledge of the prophets is possible without the agency of the prophethood and becase of his saying that when a man become sick, realities are dawned on him, and this statement is taken by him from the philosopher's principles.[3] It is said perhaps for the same reason that:- "Abu Hamid was diseased by (Ibn Sina's) "Kitab-as-Shifa". When Ghazzali's books reached Spain, men were surprised by listening strange and uncommon things which they had never listened before. They labelled all the allegations against him as they did in case of other philosophers. They said that if there is blasphemy and Zandiqah in the world, that is found in the books of Ghazzali. People in one voice opposed him and complained aganist him to the ruler and in this way prepared the ruler to get his books burnt. As a result the ruler issued a circular in which he ordered all the people to burn his books, which they did accordingly. The rulers disliked these books and punished and person who possessed any copy of them. It was for the same reason that every one became apprehensive against being charged with reading a book of Ghazzali or possessing a copy of it.[4]

But after the coming of al-Imam Mehdi to power, people were attracted to read Ghazzali's works and were fascinated with the contents of his books. Perhaps, there was not a single person in Spain, who remained without a taint of influence from Ghazzali. Even for the blind and ardent followers, the study of Ghazzali's books assumed the status of religious and Shariah duty after the first phase of its being considered an act of atheism or blasphemy. [5] Ghazzali was treated by people as they did in case of other philosophers, He was condemned as infidel by the people as were the philosophies. But with the passage of time, the rulers and people supported Ghazzali, his books had good impact on the whole community later on. Despite the attacks of Ibn Rushd against Ghazzali in his *Tahafut-al-'Tahafut* and Ibn TufayI's allegations that Ghazzali, in some of his books is loose and tight in other, Ghazzali's influence was remarkable. We feel that the soul of Ghazzali is identical with us till date. He was, no doubt, a very fascinating personality of the history of Islamic thought. He comprehended religious issues deeply and then attempted to reach at the greater understanding of God more than as was reached by the various schols of rational philosophy. In most cases the way of arriving at reality by heart was in no case less significant than arriving at it through reason.[6]

Ghazzali defended the main tenets of Asharite thought and criticized the main aspects of philosophers, yet his critique "does not replicate the familiar refutations common among the theologians. His arguments are generally philosophical in nature and display great respect for logic and clear analytical thought."[7] According to Van Den Bergh, Ghazzali is evident throughout his philosophical thought, though there are some influences of Aristotelian or Neo-Platonic philosophy. We can appreciate clearly the philosophical training which Ghazzali underwent, as he valued the study of philosophy very crucial as times demanded. In fifth century Hijrah, the study of philsophy was not confined to only a particular section of people, but was spread among all sects. On one side there were "Rafizees" and Hanabilities, Shia and Ahlal Sunnah, Mutazilites and Asharites, philosophers and Ulama. There were people in this century, like Abu Abdullah al-Baghdadi al-Shafi (43 H) Qadi Adual Jabbar al-Mutazili (415 A.H.), Abu Ali Ibn Sina, Sheikh-al-Falasifah (428 H.), Ibn Hathim al-Riyazi wal-Tabiyi (430 H.) Ibnal-Hazamal-Andulsi (444 A.H.), Al-Asfarain (418 H.) Al-Jawani (478 H.) Who was among the stalwarts of Asharite thought, Hassan Ibn Sabah(485 H.), who was leader of the Batiniyyah sect. The preachers of the doctrines of Batiniyyah and Ismiliya were spread through out the Muslim cities in west

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and east ward. They all used to organize meetings and Conferences to elaborate and explain the teachings of their particular sects and at the same time refute the arguemts of their opponents. In which all problems concerning religion, politics and philosophy came into discussion. It was not possible for a person, who was living in Khurasan or Iraq to remain aloof from philosophy., at least to defend oneself demanded study of philosophy in those times. This was the situation in which Ghazzali was brought up.[8] Ghazzali mentioned, himself about his study of philosophy in Munqidh as follows:-

"After I had done with Theology, I started on philosophy. I was convinced that a man cannot grasp what is defective in any of the science unless he has so complete a grasp of the science in question that he equals its most learned exponents in the appreciation of its fundamental principles, and even goes beyond and surpass them, probing into some of the tangles and profundities which the very professors of the science have neglected. Then and only then is it possible that what he has to assert about its defects is ture."[9]

Ghazzali earnestly set out to acquire a knowledge of philosophy from books, by private study without the help of an instructor. Ghazzali completed the study of philosophy in two years. Afterwards he reflected assiduously for nearly a year on what he had assimilated probing its tangled depths. It was on the basis of this vast erudition in philosophy that Ghazzali could classify philosophers in three groups. First the Materialists (Dhriyun), second the Naturalists (Tabiyun) and the third, Theists (Ilahiyun).

The first group of philosophers deny altogether the existence of Creator, and the Disposer of the world and think that the world in everlasting. The second group is of the Naturalists who are of the opinion that since there is the design in the Universe, therefore, there must be a Designer. This group does not however, death. The third group is of the theists, such as socrates, plato, Aristotle and their Muslim followers. This group attacked the former two groups. Ibn Sina and al- Farabi were concerned with the subsequent development of philosophy of this group. Ghazzali says:-

"Aristotle, moreover, attacked his prodecessors among the theistic philosophers, especially Plato and Socrates, and went so far in his criticisms that he separated himself from the all. Yet he retained a residue of their unbelief and heresy from which he did not manage to free himself. We must therefore reckon as unbelievers both these philosophers themselves and their followers among the Islamic philosophers, such as Ibn Sina, al Farabi and other".[10]

This shows how much knowledge Ghazzali and about Greek philosophers. But Ghazzali's influence on the subsequent philosophy was also very deeps, as Watt rightly points out. He says:

"If it is thus impossible to say how much al-Ghazzali's attacks contributed to the decline of philosophy, there is no doubt about the success of the positive aspects of his work, namely, the incorporation of parts of philosophy with Islamic theology. From this time onwards the theologians..made use of syllogistic Logic and various Greek metaphysical conceptions. Some of the later Hanbalites even felt themselves constrainted to study syllogistic logic in order to refute it."[11]

It was the result of Ghazzali's concern with philosophy and logic that after Ghazzali theological treatises came to have large introductory sections on logic and metaphysics. More interesting books on Logic came to be written by theologians and not philosophers. In view of Watt, "in all this al-Ghazzali was the pionner, Ghazzali alone made that combined study of philosophy and theology that was necessary if the tension was to be resolved."[12]

Dia' ecollinson and Robertson wilkinson say rightly that:-

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"Al-Ghazalli was a philosopher of great orginiality and critical acumen. He was deeply religious, a mystics as well as a penetrating analytical thinkers, a Sceptic as well as a man of faith".

They continue and say: "His Scepticism has been likened to that of the eighteenth century Scotish philosopher David Hume, and of the logical positivists of Twentieth century European philosophy."[13]

Ghazzali has given a complete detail of the divisions of the philosophic science in a very lucid manner.

He says:-

"For our present purpose the philosophical sciences are six in number. i.e.

"Mathematics, logic, natural science (physics), theology or metaphysics, politics, ethics or moral philosophy."

Mathematics comprises the knowledge of arithmetic or calculation, geometry and cosmography or solid geometry. They are matters of demonstration which it is impossible to deny once they have been understood and apprehended. Logic is the study of the methods of demonstration and of forming syllogisms, of the conditions for sound definition and the manner of ordering it. For knowledge consists of conceptions, (Tasawwur), which spring from a definition, and the assertion or judgment (Tasdiq), which is apprehended by Proof. There is nothing here which requires to be denied. matters of this kind are actually mentioned by the theologians and speculative thinkers in connection with the topic of demonstrations. The philosophers differ from these only in the expressions and technical terms they employed in their greater elaboration of the explanations and classifications. An example of this is their proposition,. If it is true that all A is B, then it follows that som B is A', that is, ' If it is true that all men are animals, then it follows that some animals are men.' They express this by saying that the universal affirmative proposition has as its converse a particular affirmative proposition.

Natural Science or physics. This is the investigation of the sphere of the heavens together with the heavenly bodies, and of what is beneath the heavens, both simple bodies like water, air, earth fire, and composite bodies like animals, plants, minerals, and also of the causes of their changes, transformations and combinations.

Theology or Metaphysics:- This is the fruitful breeding ground of the errors of philosophers. Here they can no longer satisfy the laws of rigorous argumentation such as logic demands, and this is what explains the disputes which arise between them in the study of metaphysics. The views of Aristotle, as expounded by al-Farabi and Ibn Sina, are close to those of the Islamic writers. All their errors are comprised under twenty heads, on three of which of their views on these twenty points that Ghazzali composed "The Incoherence of the philosophers",[14]

Poltics or Political Science:- All their discussion of this is based on considerations of wordly and governmental advantage. These they borrow from the Divine scriptures revealed through the prophets and from the maxims handed down from the saints of old.[15]

Ethics:- Their whole discussion of ethics consists in defining the characteristics and moral constitution of the soul and enumerating the various types of soul and the method of moderating and controlling them. This they borrow from the teaching of the mystics, those men of piety whose chief occupation is to dedicate upon God, to oppose the passions, and to walk in the way leading to God by withdrawing from worldly pleasure.[16] Ghazzali has discussed these subjects by judging their status from

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religious and rational point of view. He has shown the dangers lurking in the unqualified adherence to these philosophical science. Ghazzali while fully endoreses the authenticity of the Mathematical science, and does not see anything contrary to the religious teachings in it as such, as its basis are found in demostrative proofs, but he warns at the same time that the altheists who are well-versed in this subject may be taken as a Criterion of truth by the credulent people and their views may also be accepted true as the mathematical ones. In the same way Ghazzali sees a danger in the "absolutist approach" to logic, that it may lead to the following conclusions:-

"Frequently, too, the student who admires logic and sees it's clarity, imagines that the infidel doctrines attributed to the philosophers are supported by similar demonstrations, and hastens into unbelief before reaching the theological or metaphysical, sciences. Thus this drawback too leads to unbelief."[17]

Secondly, Ghazzali does not regard logic the prerogative of philosophers only, but thinks that the theologians also adopt logical methods for demonstrating divine matters.

Moreover, while al-Farabi classified sciences in his famous work *Ihsa' al-Ulum* and included there in a classification of such philosophical disciplines as logic, metaphysics, and ethics, Ghazzali opposed this classification and did not admit metaphysics as a science ('ilm) as such in the Islamic sense. He nevertheless contended that metaphysics was philosophical discipline. What Ghazzali was positing was that human mind tried to reach the sort of certitude in metaphysical subjects that it reached in such formal studies as logic and mathematics. However, the nature of metaphysical problems are such that they evade mathematical exactitude. This fact is observed clearly in the agreement of philosophers upon the solution of a certain mathematical problems. But metaphysics has never succeeded in reaching a conclusion upon which all philosophers agree.[18]

In the same way, Ghazzali thinks that ethics and politics has included a vast portion of the teachings of the prophets and the suis. Therefore, it is very difficult to identify the original teachings from the embellishment added to it by the philosophers. Ghazzali says:-

"The philosopher have taken over this teaching and mingled it with their own disquistions, furitively using this embellishments to sell their rubbishy wares more readily."[19]

In Maqasid-ul-al-Falasifah (The Aims of the philosophers) Ghazzali has mentioned three classifications of the theoretical sciences. First is called theology and first philosophy. Second is known as Mathematics and Education, the intermediate science, the third is called as physics or natural science, the lower science.[20]

Ghazzali has displayed analytical insight in his dissuasions about the classification of philosophical sciences. He accepts the positive elements found in each science, explains its scope and validity, however, at the same time, elaborates the inherent contradictions, lurking implications and negative dimensions of each science.

Ghazzali's classification is not naive or netural, but always governed by the methodology which he employs every where in his books and theories.

Ghazzali's classifications of philosophiclal sciences is unique and systematics. His approach is holistic and criticism preparative. He displays an originality of thought and creativity in this respect also.

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The impression about Ghazzali that he was opposed to philosophy as such is utterly fallacious. Because not only in Ghazzali's works on philosophy proper, but in books like *Ihya* he has clearly displayed that the science of philosophy as such, not in all its aspects is blame worth. I think a brief exposition of Ghazzali's views on this subject will remove these commonly held confusions.

To begin with Ghazzali regards philosophy not as a single branch of science, but comprising four: the first includes geometry and arithmetic, both of which, according to Ghazzali are permissible, and no one in barred from them except the person who might be led by their study to blame worthy sciences. The second according to Ghazzali in this line is logic, which is a study of the nature of evidence and its conditions as well as the nature of a definitions and its conditions. Both of these, according to Ghazzali are allowed by theology.

The third is divinity which is the science of the being and attributes of God. This according to Ghazzali is also included under theology. Here Ghazzali makes an important classification and says that "the philosophers have not in their philosophy, developed another type of science, but have branched out into several schools, of which some are systems of unbelief and others of innovation. Thus just as Mutazilites system does not, in itself, represent a branch of science, but its protagonists, as a group of theologians and specialists in the art of philosophical disputation, have been distinguished by their erroneous views, so are the philosophers".[21]

The fourth, according to Ghazzali is physics of which some (parts) contradict the law and the true religion, and are, therefore, futile. These are the sciences that may be classified under sciences. Others are a study of the qualities of the different substances, Their properties, transmutation and change. This part resembles the researches of physicians, except that the physician studies the human body, particularly the cause of its diseases and cures. Whiel as the physicists study all substances from the stand point of change and motion.[22]

Ghazzali is very famous in this history of Islamic thoughts as one of the greatest leaders an erudite scholar and a lodestar in almost all subjects of science.

He was a jurist and scholar of the principles of jurisprudence. He wrote a very important book *al-Mustasfa Fi UsuI-i-Fiqh* which is regarded an authority in this field.

He was a fmous MutakaIlim among the scholars of IIm al-kalam. He authored in this field many books, most important of all is *al-Iqtisad Fi'I' 'Itiqad* which comprises on all its principles, doctrines and details. This is in addition to his another writings in which he opposed to the Mutakallimum and led common people to right belief as *Faysl al-Tafruqa* etc. He says about IIm al-kalam:-

"The second is the arguments against the unbelievers and their rejection. from this science, stem IIm-al-kalam, which aims at combating misguidance, innovation and dispelling doubts, the Mutakallimun deal with this science. We have already explained this science in two type of treastise, in the first category, are included my book *al-Risalah al-Qudsiyyah* and in the second category a little category a little higher than the former consists of book *Iqtisad fil-al-Itiqad,* the belief of common masses from the distrubances and chaos created by the innovators. This science cannot bear the discussions about the revelation of realities, on the science of which we have already written a book *Tahafut al-Falasifah* or the book in which we have rejected the Batiniyyah in *al-mustazhair* and in *Hujjat al-Haqq* and *Quasim al-Batiniyyah,* and *Mufassil-al-khalaf* which is on the principles of theology. This science is a tool or an instrument by which we come to know about the methods of real demonstration and polemics. Moreover, we have already explained this (science of kalam) in *Mahak-al-Nazzar* and

Miyar-al-Ilam on a pattern that jurists and scholastic people cannot venture to write on such subjects. A person who is not well-versed with the science of argumentation and analogy can not comprehend this science".[23]

Ghazzali was a philosopher, who authored books like *Maqasid-al-Falasifah* in which he wrote about the aims and objectives of the various schools of philosophers and their views on Logic, physics and theology or metaphysics as was done by Ibn Sina before him in his book al-Najat. Afterwards, Ghazzli attacked the philosophers in his famous book *Tahafut al-Falasifah* in which he made a decree of blasphemy against philosophers on three issues i.e. eternity of the world, Denial of God's knowledge of particulars, and their denial of resurrection of bodies. Though Ghazzali condermned the philosophers, but in fact, *Tahafut al Falasifa* makes Ghaazali to be included among the great philosophers, not less in status than Descartes, who employed a method of doubt before reaching finally to certainty or from Hume who denied the origin of Causation.[24]

He was a Logician, as he wrote books such as *Miyar al-Ilm Mahak al-Nazzar al-Qistas al-Mustaqim* a part from his several discussions on Logic in his other books. He was a moralist or an ethical writer, as he wrote a book on this science entitled *Mizanuala al-Amal* as well as he wrote several chapters on this subject in *Al-Ihya.*

He was also a sufi, this way he adopted in the part of his life after scrutinizing all the schools of thought as he maintained in his biography, *Munqidh Min al-Dalal* and in *Ihya* there are details about the principles, status and stages of sufism.

but so far as Ghazzali's psychology is concerned, it is not that well-known as no significant study or research has been made on this aspect of Ghazzali's thought.

While as Ghazzali has discussed his psychological conditions, apprehensions, states, fluctuations trials and tribulations in his *Munqidh min al-Dalal* in a most authentic and honest manner. He has narrated the story by the method of subjective experience, which is a very famous method in the science of psychology.

In *Ihya* however, Ghazzali employed a second method, i.e. objective methodolgoy, that is an external method. This is a new method in this science.

Ghazzali's method in psychology:-Ghazzali associated psychological science with ethics and theology and considered the theoretical aspect of this science as a way to purify soul, or a guide towards moral purification, to lead a believer to the parth of salvation i.e. pleasure of God or success by attaining the permanent place of Grace.

Since this whole success and salvation is dependent on knowledge of one's self or cognizance of the demerits or vices from which a man should refrain for treading the straight path. Therefore, a man must necessarily know his own self in its reality.

So far as the theoretical method is concerned, we confine in it only on the external aspect or on that aspect which is specific with man in his external behaviour. The understanding of man in this respect remains dependent on his knowledge of its states and behaviour.

Ghazzali laid emphasis on the external and internal aspects of man in the study of his psychology. He provided four principles for psychological study. Which are indicative of an external study of the soul not merely subjective ones. These are:

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1. A man should sit before his spirit preceptor and inform him about his shortcomings.
2. Man should search an honest companion, who will help him in guarding his carnal self.
3. He should avail from the opinions of his enemies for knowing the weaknesses of his own self.
4. He should mix up with the people, and whatever he finds undesirable in them, he should refrain from that.

In the first instance, Ghazzali talks about a Sheikh (in modern terminology, a psychologist) Ghazzali says about him: "He should be well-conversant with the shortcomings of people, and should also know the secret dimensions of evils."

Secondly, man should have an honest companion, with a religious mind and discerning eye, who can help a person to know himself. He should warn him about the undesirable aspects of his morals and actions.

Thirdly, man should know his mistakes by listening to his enemies.

Fourthly, man should mix up with all kinds of people for knowing their good and bad conditions, states and circumstances as different people are not equal in following their desires.

The second method in the Science of psychology is the subjective introspection, sometimes this method is different from the objective or natural methods. Because a person who ponders or makes an introspection is not a devoid of desires and it is very hard for him to get away from the consideration of the self.

Ghazzali deserves to be considered among the great scholars of psychology and a person who is very competent in the matters of subjective introspection. *Al-Munqidh min al-Dalal,* is a masterpiece, indicative of Ghazzali's mental dimensions and intuitive tribulations in this regard. Ghazzali discusses the condition, which followed after the disruption of the teaching, research and writing, starting in Rajab 448. A.H, Ghazzali says about the same:

"Thus I remained, torn-asunder by the opposite forces of earthly passions and religious aspirations, for about six months from the Rajab of the year A.D. 1096. At the close of them my will yielded and I gave myself upto destiny. God caused an impediment to chain my tongue and prevented me from lecturing. Vainly I desired, in the interest of my pupils, to go on with my teaching, but my mouth became dumb.

The silence to which I was condemned cast me into a violent despair, my stomach became weak, I lost all appetite; I could neither swallow a morsel of bread nor drink a drop of water.

"The enfeeblement of my physical powers was such that the doctors despairing of saving me, said:

"The mischief is in the heart, and had communicated itself to the organism; there is no hope unless the cause of his grievous sadness be arrested".[25]

In this passage we can see easily that how Ghazzali has related his psychological condition after discussing all the aspects of his fear, its causes and reasons, and its bodily manifestations. We can understand also that Ghazzali's methodology was one, whether he had to discuss a objective or subjective matter. Ghazzali could explain all the aspects of problem in a very subtle way. In modern times, the psychology has been separated from philosophy and has assumed status of separate science. In modern

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times there are different schools of psychology, important schools of psychology are Behaviourism, Empiricism and psycho-Analysis.

A famous psycho-Analytical school of psychology is attributed to S. Fredu, which advocates that the human behaviour is determined be sexual instinct, while as Freud's disciple Adler maintained that it is determined by man's instinct for supremacy or ascendancy.

Ghazzali, contrary to it, advocates a theory that human behaviour is determined by four basic factors, which are as follows: Greed for food, sexual passion, Passion for wealth, and Greed for show and supremacy.

On the top of all these desires according to Ghazzali, is the greed for food and when it is fulfilled, the other desires i.e. sexual desire, desire to accumulate wealth and desire to acquire power stem from it, Ghazzali calls it as the lust of the stomach (Shahwat ul-Batan) and he says about the same:

"Greed for food is a destructive evil... In fact, belly is the container of greed and the breeding ground of diseases and disasters. In case of satisfaction of belly, sexual passion rises high and it encourages companionship with women. Desire for name and fame grows from greed. Then come the evil attributes of hatred, clash of interests, pride, self conceit etc. These can be removed by hunger" [26] The crux of Ghazzali's statement is that the basic source and pivotal point in the psychological life of a man is his greed for food (Shahwatual al-Ta'm), which determines all other patterns of human behaviour, whether primary or secondary. The three primary patterns of behaviour are greed for sex, greed for wealth and greed for honour and show, and the secondary patterns which are the ramifications of these primary patterns are hatred, caprice, clash of interests, pride, ostentation, impiety.

Ghazzali, in this way, gave to the science of psychology an Islamic dimension in real sense of the word. Ghazzali has alluded extensively to the Quranic verses and the prophetic traditions in support of his views about various aspects of the psychological phenomena under discussion.

Ghazzali's impressive treatment of the science of psychology for the support of religion can be profoundly discerned, when he claims that the basic purpose of human sexual desire is to get two advantages i.e. the first is enjoyment and the second is continuation of human progeny. Moreover, the enjoyment is not meant in itself, or for the continuation of human race, but for a more lofty and sublime purpose that is man's comprehension of the luxuries and enjoyment which are reserved for him in the life hereafter on the analogy of the sexual enjoyment, he had in the world.

There are extremes in the sexual activity of man also in the opinion of Ghazzali. One extreme is that the sexual desire may make human reason subservient to it and lead him to indulgence in sexual relations with ladies and concubines, thereby deprive man from following the path of life hereafter, or subdue his religious conscience to the extent that man may openly commit obscene acts. The other extreme is to weaken one's sexual capability and instinct, which too is objectionable. The praise worthy behaviour in this regard is a balanced one which is supported both by reason and Shariat. Ghazzali suggested three methods for controlling the greed for sex. i.e. hunger, restraining from having looks at woman, and indulgence in some such assignment which involves ones heart.

Ghazzali says about all these matters as follows:

I."There are two benefits of sexual passion (i) Satisfaction of intercourse and (2) preservation of mainkind. The pleasure that is felt in sexual intercouse between a man and his wife is a little sign of

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the next worldly pleasure. If it were lasting, pleasure would have been strong as physical pain inflicted by force is great. The fear of Hell fire and the greed for pleasure and happiness of paradise lead a man towards guidance. If a man would not have the taste of pleasure or pain, it would not have been possible (2) second benefits is preservation of mankind. But there is this damage in it that if it is not kept under control and exceeds limit, his next world and this world are both destroyed."[27]

II. "There are three stages of sexual passion, excessive, little and middle. In case of excessive sexual passion, a man loses his sense of right and wrong and enjoys any women and thus destroys his religion and world. Such a man often takes recourse to medicine to increase his sexual passion. That is all the more dangerous. Such a man takes recourse to love-making of which the object is the satisfaction of sexual passion. The medicine for this is to control eyes and thoughts. The prophet prescribed marriage for them and said:

"O youngmen, take recourse to marriage. He who is unable to do it, let him fast, as fast for him is constration."[28] In the second case Ghazzali quotes several Quranic verses and the prophetic traditions to show the importance of control on one's eyes. For example, he quotes the Quranic verse.

"Tell the believers to control their eyes sight"

He quotes a prophetic tradition in this regard.

The prophet said:

"Eye sight is a poisonous arrow out of the arrows of the devil. God gives to a man who gives it up for fear of God such faith which gives satisfaction to his heart."[29]

In third place, Ghazzali while showing the rewards of opposing passions, and insists that man should remember God and indulge in the recitation of the Quran, offer prayers, i.e. the way to hereafter.[30]

In this way we have drawn an outline of Ghazzali's psychological views. We have also seen how Ghazzali has discussed various conditions, patterns of behaviour and the dimensions of psychological states of man. Ghazzali has also indicated the solution to come out of these psychological problems, for example, knowledge of God, and leading a life in accordance with the teachings of the Quran and the Sunnah.

In *Ihya*, the discussions pertaining to fear, hope, caprice, hatred, pride, fascination, anger, animosity etc. are found in the third and fourth volumes of this book. In these discussions Ghazzali has indicated various psychological conditions of man, which show an originality of thought, broad vision, and following of a scholarly scientific methodology, which in no respects is less important and subtle than the methods of the proponents of psycho-analytical methodology in psychology.[31]

Dr. Ahmad faud Ehwany has rightly called Ghazzali the founder of science of Islamic pscyhology.

After discussing the main philosophical credentials of Ghazzali, we will explain some very important and novel aspects of his philosophy.

Al-Farabi and Ibn Sina were considered two main figures of philosophy at the time, when Ghazzali started study of philosophy. He studied under 'Imam-al-Haramayn' for several years. Who was the leader of the Asarites in his own times, who had succeeded the Mutazilites in Kalam philosophical studies. Al-Ashari was the originator of the firstever, philosophy of religion. Ghazzali studied

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not only Muslim philosophers but also non-Muslim philosophers. He got full hold of Greek philosophy, Oriental philosopher's views of the school of Alexandaria as well as he became well versed in the philosophy of Peripatetic. In this way he got full command on the philosophy of Aristotle, Al-Farabi and Ibn Sina. In the first half of his life he studied philosophy in Nishapur, and after arriving Baghdad, new vistas of philosophy were opened before his eyes. So he began to engage himself once again in the study of philosophy. He spent at least three years this time in this study, pondering and meditating philosophical problems. In this way he became quite well versed and fully acquainted with new and old philosophies.[32]

The outcome of this vast erudition appeared in the form of some important works. He wrote on logic some important books; as *Miyar-al-IIm, Mahak al-Nazzar, Muqadimah al-Mustasfa.* He wrote on philosophy proper three books: The first was on the branches of philosophy known as *Maqasid-ul-Falasifah.* This is originally a compendium of the views of the philosophers. i.e. Al-Farabi, and Ibn-Sina, which is consisted on three portions. First portion deals with logic, second portion, which is very detailed, deals with theology or metaphysics; and the third portion deals with physics. In this book we can discern explicityly Ghazzali's approach towards different branches of philosophy. He includes Arithmatics in the sciences of mathematics; and claims that there is nothing in it, which is contradictory to religion. He deals with logic and claims that it is only the knowledge of the methods of argumentation in which all possibilities are included. But in case of physics, Ghazzali, says that truth and falsehood are equally included in it. Metaphysics is full of beliefs of philosophers, which go contradictory to the truth as accuracy in this branch of philosophy is very rare.[33]

The second philosophical treatise of Ghazzali is *Tahafatual-al Falasifah* which is very famous among all his books. This book is without doubt, one of the remarkable books of medieval period also. Ghazzali wrote this book, before his migration from Baghdad. In this book, we find clarity, and comprehensiveness, encompassing all aspects of philosophical enterprise. Here we find a very sound material and strong argumentation, and a deep concern towards the solutions of almost all problems concerning the philosophy of religion; no matter Islamic or Christian. Ghazzali condensed the philosohical of arguments in twenty points, then proceeds a head with arguments against each other dealing in detail with the pros and cons of the problems in logical manner. This method, which Ghazzali adopts is, no doubt, a new methodology in writing and presentation of subtle philosophical and speculative thought. Because Ghazzali gives full details of the arguments of the philosophers, and then shows his understanding of the problems they were discussing, afterwards makes selection of the arguments in order to assess them. The force and vigour of this book in known through those characteristics, which leave a reader perplexed. It is for the same reason that this book is world famous.

It was Ibn Rushd, who after about hundred years of Ghazzali's remarkable book had appeared, felt need to defend philosophy against Ghazzali's attacks. "But there is no doubt that Ghazzali was more original, clear, explicit and free in his *Tahafut* than, Ibn Rushd",[34] According to MacDonald Ibn Rushd seems a "beggarly compiler" when compared with Ghazzali in this respect. Though, we can not underestimate the philosophical and the scientific acumen of Ibn Rushd, Yet he really is, in no case that profound in his arguments against Ghazzali as Ghazzali himself is in his critique against the philosophers.

The last book in the realm of philosophy was Ghazzali's *Al-Munqidh min al-Dala.* In this book Ghazzali criticized Mutakallimeen, refuted philosophers and Batiniyyah. He categorized these all groups under one category, as the despite of their minor differences, believe that the source of knowledge of

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reality and truth is reason or intelligence. While as Ghazzali believes that knowledge is attainted throught 'Dhawq' or sufi experiences; because to him only that belief is true, which emanates from heart and is embedded in a soul; leading to the spiritual solace. Though we find in *Munqidh* a doubt reminiscent of Rene Descartes, in order to attain certainty, but this doubt does not extend to three beliefs i.e. the existence of Allah, the prophethood of Mohammad (SAW); and the Day of Judgment. The spiritual knowledge according to Ghazzali emerges from heart, which is absolute light and the highest stage of certainty.[35]

The *Al-Munqidh min al-Dala...* in its intellectual subtly bears a certain resemblance to New man's *Grammar of Assent,* and in its almost puritanical sense of the terrors of the world to come, it is akin to Bunyan's *Grace Abounding.* It is also interesting as being one of the very few specimens of genuine Eastern autobiography.[36]

It was after Ghazzali's defence of Islam against "Batiniyyah" by his book *Al-Mustazhari* and *Hujjat al-Haqq,* that he was given the title of 'Hujja at al-Islam', where from a new period started in his life, which consisted in defence of Islam not as a Mutakallim, or 'Fiqih' but as a figure in philosophy, equal to any other. He apprehended the contradictions between Islamic teachings especially its version propounded by the Asharites, Abul Maali al Juwaini and the theories of philosophers like Ibn Sina and al-Farabi etc. So he set for himself the mission to show the contradictions in the philosophies of different thinkers and by applying these contradictions to each other, he rendered the edifice of philosophy groundless. This great adventure was undertaken by Ghazzali in his book *Tahafat al-Falasifah,* which he wrote in around 488 AD.[37]

It seems apparently that Ghazzali gave farewell to philosophy in the last stage of his life, which started in 488., as he declined to take interest in philosophy and refuted philosophers. But according to Abdur Rahman Badawi, Ghazzali remained under its influences all his life despite his efforts to relieve himself from them. Ghazzali's purpose was never to divert attention of people from philosophy, but rather he strived to attract them towards it by popularizing it among the Sunni religious sects. He in this way, made philosophy very much popular among them.[38]

The same point has been elaborated in a more clear manner by Ibn Taimiyah, when he discussed the contradictions in Ghazzalian approach to philosophy. He says that Ghazzali is comparing some times the views of philosophers with the views of "Qaramities", sometimes with the views of "Asharites", sometimes with the views of "Mutazilites", sometimes with the views of them with those of "Waqufiyah". In this manner it is clear that Ghazzali did not intend to invalidate the arguments of the philosophers as he did not also intend to attach himself to their approach fully. What he did, according to Ibn Taimiyah was only to strive in order to bring an affinity in the approaches of Mutakallimeen and Falasifah. It is for the same reason that he did not rely on a singular approach in their refutation. He never directed the arguments of mutakallimeen against those of the philosophers, but rather directed these against each other. Even in the stage when Ghazzali adopted sufi ways as the means to approach reality, he was still under influence of philsophy. However, there was no difference in this influence, i.e. during the early period of sufis, Ghazzali was under the influence of neo-platonic philosophy, while as he was under the sway of Aristotelian peripartetic and Muslim philosophy from 484 A.H. to 487 H.H, equally. He never renounced philosophy, rather he shifted from one aspect of philosophy to other. He of course, renounced the philosophy of Aristotle and his Greek followers and its Muslim adherents, to adopt the philosophy of Plato and neo-Platonism in general, to which he remained loyal upto his death[39]

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According to Abu Bakr Ibn Arabi:

"Our Sheikh Ghazzali went in the depth of philosophy, then strived to come out, but did not succeed." This statement shows clearly the real cause of the vassitude, perplexity and crisis of Ghazzali for which he was subjected to criticism by Ibn al-Tufayl in his *Hai Bin Yaqzan,* Ibn Rushd in *Faslul al-Maqal. Tahafat* and also by Ibn Taimiyah in different books as *Muafiqat al-Shihal-Manqool Naqiz-ial-Mantiqh.*[40]

However, this is not true the Ghazzali's views are confused and fluctuating regarding philosophy. He rather had various approaches to address different kinds of people.

But Dr. Omar farukh holds that Ghazzali did not took study of philosophy merely for the sake of love of philosophy. But rather made it the method to argue for the relevance of religious beliefs.[41]

This may also be one of the interpretation of Ghazzali's flexible views in philosophy. But it does not affect his philosophical stature.

After dealing with Ghazzali's philosophical credentials in detail, we will turn now to his views on scepticism and also will show the Impact of it on him. Ghazzali's scepticism was followed after his study of philosophy, as Watt says:

"It seems unlikely that the period of scepticism occurred at an early stage in his theological studies. It seems certain that the fit of scepticism as he describes it must have been preceded by some study of philosophy".[42] After dealing with his scepticism we will discuss Ghazzali's views on Logic, reason, as logic and reason are subsisting somewhere in all processes of doubt.

Ansiyah Hayyam al-Neuelati holds. "Paramendis observed that the Universe is one static phenomenon. He rejected change altogether. And Heraclitus saw change everywhere in the Universe. He was the founder of the scepticism in the philosophy of Greece. This trend of scepticism was continued by the sophists, Pythagorus viewed that man is measure of all things. From there the process of scepticism in the categores of epistemology i.e. sense-perception and reason started. The outcome of all these endeavors was the formation of a sceptical schools, which altogether denied the possibility of human knowledge, and even doubted the very process of man's rational discourse."[43]

Ghazzali, in the same manner doubted the validity of rational knowledge, after he had doubted sense perception. He remained in the state of this scepticism at least for about two months in the manner of sophists actually, though not in his speach.[44]

But here we should not that despite a state of scepticism, a sceptic has to depend always on reason. In Ghazzali's case, we find that he always abides by the dictates of reason even in case of scepticism.[45] At this point we are reminded about Rene Descarte's statement, "Cogito Ergo Sum", I doubt, therefore I think, therefore I exist."

According to Yousuf al-Sharoni, Ghazzali's doubt was also only as a method to arrive at certainty, as he writes in the prelude of his book *Meezan-ul-al-Amal.* that:-

"Doubts have an important role to play in realizing the value of inherited beliefs. Because a person who does not doubt, does not have vision, and can never become enlightened, and a person, who does not get enlightened remains in darkness and blindness forever."[46] However, this extract has led many scholars to a very wrong conclusion that Ghazzalian Scepticism was methodological in nature.

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After showing the features of Greek scepticism about the competence of human reason that it cannot reveal the nature of the things, (which afterwards, extends to the human affairs in social life where good and bad cannot be determined, some people try to race out the basis of Ghazzali's scepticism from Greek sources. Ghazzali displays very little reliance in sense perception, reason and on the different ways of attaining knowledge, which were adopted by the Talimiyah. (Batiniyyah) Shia. who believed in the infallibility of the Imams in religious knowledge. He was not even satisfied with the methods of Mutakallimum and the philsophers. He seems vacillating in the search of the reality pertaining to these matters. Ghazzali believed that the souce of the true knowledge in Allah, but despite his faith, he seems very much confused and vacillating in his solutions to the propositions concerning it. Ghazzali, in this sense was not a sceptic in the Greek sense of the term. But the strange scepticism which is displayed by Ghazzali is unique in this history of philosophy.[47]

Ghazzali adopted the method of doubt only as a means to reach certainty, and the certainty according to Ghazzali is that which does not leave any room for doubt.[48]

That Ghazzali's scepticism had a philosophical background is shown by the fact that he links it up with a consideration of the nature of knowledge and certainty. To be fair Ghazzali's scepticism should not be observed only from its chronological side, because in fact it was during his studentship at the Nizamiyah Academy of Nishapur that he became impatient of dogmatic teaching and developed the urge to free himself from the bonds of authority (Taqlid), and even showed the signs of scepticism. This view is supported by *al-Munqidh min al-Dalal.* The period of scepticism through which Ghazzali passed was natural, because the Islamic world at that time was influenced by the spell of philosophy prevalent those days.[49]

So far as the nature of doubt is concerned, Ghazzali passed throught a phase of utter existential scepticism, which resulted in his migration or "flight" from his native land to "solitary" pilgrimage to Syria, Egypt, Mecca and Medina, so it was a real doubt. Ghazzali says:

"Thereupon, I investigated the various kinds of knowledge. I had, and found myself destitute of all knowledge with this characteristic infallibility except in case of sense perception and necessary truth. So I said: Now that despair has come over me, there is no point in studying any problems except on the basis of what is self-evident, namely necessary truths and the affirmations of the senses. I must first bring these to be judged in order that I may be certain on this matter. Is my reliance on sense-perception and my trust in the soundness of necessary truths of the same kind, my previous trust in the beliefs I had merely taken over from others and as the trust most men have in the results of thinking? Or is it a justified trust that is in no danger of being betrayed or destroyed."[50]

"Consequently as I drew near the age of adolescence the bonds of mere authority (Taqlid) ceased to hold me and inherited beliefs lost their grip upon me, for I saw that Christian youth always grew up to be Christian, Jewish, youth to be Jews and the Muslim youths to be Muslims."[51]

Ghazzali, as this remark shows, was from his early age a victim of this scepticism and it culminated when he was at Baghdad and remained at its peak for two months. His scepticism about reason in its theological use extended to philosophical use also. "Thus" says, Montgomery watt, "whatever the relative datings; his scepticism was virtually turned against philosophy as well as theology".[52]

The most important of all the parallels and one which is most remarkable of them all is that between al-Ghazzali and Descrates (1005-61) (1596-1650) pertaining to scepticism, and it deals not

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only with this or that view or theory of our author but with his very method of doubt. In particular there is a remarkable similarly between Ghazzali's method of doubt as given in his *al-Munqidh* and the one expounded by Descartes in his *Discourse de al method* which appeared in 1047/1636. In what follows we shall bring out a close parallel between these two works.[53]

It was really with reference to Ghazzali's *Munqidh* rather than to his *Ihya* that G.H. Lewis (1817-78) was led to exclaim that, "had any translation of it existed in the day of Descartes, everybody would have cried against the plagiarism."[54]

The internal evidence however; in the two works is so strong that it leaves no doubt as to Ghazzali's influence on Descartes. But the external evidence is not altogether missing. Descartes himself acknowledges the indebtedness of the general plan of his work to the example of many fine intelllects by name but certainly no one among his predecessors had followed exactly the same plan as Ghazzali in his *Munqidh*. Whether or not there existed a tranlsation of *Munqidh* in Latin, the lanaguage in which Descartes himself wrote two of his most important works. It is for the Latin scholars to tell. It would, however, be very strange, if it did not, if we know that Raymond Martin was already very well acquainted with his work and that its influence on the Pansees sural region of Blaise Pascal is quite palpable.[55]

In the case of Descates himself the influence of Ghazzali's method can be traced as for back as 1138/1628, i.e. when the completed his *Rules for the Guidance of Mind*, for some of the rules laid down there is are just those rules, which he later expounded in the Ghazzalian manner in the *Discourse*. There is no doubt about the extensive and almost revolutionary influence that Descarte's method wrought on the modern European thought. But, then, it may be claimed, in the light of what has been said above, that where ever it went it took the influence of Ghazzali along with it.[56]

Where as Kant was "aroused from his dogmatic slumber by the scepticism of Hume." Ghazzali was aroused by his own scepticism. His *Tahafut-al-falasifah* in spirit at least, is comparable to Kant's, *Critique of Pure Reason*. Like the *Critique*, it is destructive of all rational philosophy by a pointed emphasis on the limitations of human reason.[57]

Alone Reason, according to Ghazzali cannot demonstrate "all matters of religious belief". Reason cannot also pronounce on the morality of truths. "Hence there is a clear moral necessity for Kalam (since revelation suffices for salvation)" Ghazzali would point out that there are two classes fo men, the simple believers and the 'intellectuals, and that for these latter there is not sufficient conviction in revelation alone.[58]

Nowhere does Ghazzali appear as a feudist. Though he protects the convictions of the 'Simple beliver, and recognizes it's advantages, he realizes equally well that it, is not always enough. What he wishes to do is to re-establish the hierarchy of knowledge. All truth is from one high; the simple adherence to it on human authority is a position open to doubts and hesitations; it is not dangerous, but it is weak. On the other hand, the rational search for truth falls short of a complete realization of its goal; it is dangerous in that it leads a man to think that he is sufficient unto himself.[59]

In his search for assurance and reality, Ghazzali, thus, passed through a brief period of deepest gloom and uncertainty in which he began to doubt the evidence of his own senses and the possibility of attaining such certain knowledge as he sought.[60]

Ghazzali has dealt with logical problems in *Maqasidal-Falasifah, Miyar-ul-al-IIm*, etc. In

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these books Ghazzali subjects Greek logic as propounded by Ibn Sina to severe criticism also, with some examples from jurisprudence. At the same time Ghazzali did not neglect Greek logic altogether, but harnessed it with his argumentation and utilized it sometimes in the process of analysis, which he provides about various subjects. He wrote books like *Mahak-al-Nazzar Al-Qista-al-Mustaqeem, Al-Mustasfa,* etc. In these books, Ghazzali applied the Greek logic on Islamic views and also used the terminology of the logicians.[61]

Ghazzali provided in *Qistas* a unique type of logic from Quranic verses thereby based it on them as arguments.[62]

Ghazzali did not only confine the inclusion of logic as a method for studying the principles, but also made it the introduction for the study of all sciences, as we find this indication in his *Muqaddimah al-Mustasfa.* He said:

"This is not only the introduction or prelude to only to some particular branch of knowledge, but to all the sciences. And the sciences which are studied without its help, are not authentically presented."

When Ghazzali feared the criticism of extremist Ulama for his introduction of rational sciences in the argumentation of legal issues which was not usually the way of Muslim scholars. He tried to bring analogy for his logic from Quranic verses.[63]

At the same time we can easily observe Ghazzli's complete consideration for religious teachings despite his inclusion of logic in the principles. He says:

"I am not inviting to some other guide, except the prophet (SAW) and to some other book, except Quran, as I have borrowed and gained all the secrets of knowledge from it.": In this way Quran and sunnah were the sources of Ghazzali's"Mizan" (measure) for logic.[64]

It is said that Ghazzali was the first person who included the Greek logic in IsIamic principles clearly. It was for the same reason that Ghazzali was severely criticised by people like Ibn Taimiyah. But according to Rafeeq al-Ajam:

"Ghazzali did not deviate from Islam by including this logic in Islamic sciences. Actually, he attempted intentionally to strengthen Islamic arguments and support them."[65]

Ghazzali based his views about Greek logic on the pattern of philosophy of Ibn Sina. He announced that Greek Logi should be separated from Greek philosophy when we assess its value. He said:

"The Logical sciences, are not related to the religious sciences positively or negatively. These provide only the method to assess and examine the methods and ways of argumentation and analogies." Though it is said that it is not possible to separate Aristotelian logic from his metaphysical discussions, because it is part and parcel of total philosophy. Yet this is also true that Ghazzali made very effort to separate Aristotelian logic from his metaphysics, while applying it on Islamic issues. Ghazzali's books on logic, though influenced by al-Farabi and Ibn Sina, are more clear indications of Islamic topics discussed by the help of Aristotelian logic, in that sense these books have become great support to Islamic argumentation and polemics. Ghazzali was the first 'mutakallim' to use Aristotelian logic to defend matters of dogma, a method which al-Juwaini had attempted without exhausting its potentials. This 'New' method is abundantly demonstrated in Ghazzali's *Tahafut al-Falasifah* and *al-Radd ala Batiniyyah.* It appears also in *Qawaidal-Adillah* and *al-Risalah al-Qudsiyyah* and in *Al-Iqtisad.*[66]

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In defending the use of logic to prove issues of a dogmatic nature, Ghazzali says."But logic is not a monopoly of theirs (i.e. the philosophers); rather it is the principle that of al-Farabi and Ibn Sina." We know that Ghazzali is not objecting to the concept itself he is objecting to the danger involved in the method employed to prove it, and have the eluding tone in the use of such terms as "ala aslihim" and "alamaslakihim"i.e. according to their premise and according to their method."[67]

The two fold conception of God's unity is stated by Ghazzali in the *Iqtisad* as follows:

God's unity means that "God is one which means the negation of any thing other than He and the affirmation of His essence." This echoes what he says in the *Tahafut,* viz that it is not permissible to suppose two Necessary Beings each of whom is without cause, secondly, the term 'one' he tells in the *iqtisad* means the denial of plurality.[68] *Iqtisad* is the book which we can call in the art of Kalam the 'Book of logical reasoning' (Kitab al Nazar). Accroding to Ghazzali the philosophers altered its expressions to sound impressive. We may also call it the 'Book of Dialectis' (Jadal) or intellectual perception. When a dialectician hears the term 'logic', he thinks it is mysterious art which the mutakallimeen do not know and only philosophers have access to it.[69]

Not only this, but numerous examples can be given to show Ghazzali's complete acceptance of logic as a sound method for acquiring truth. He says in *Maqasid al-Falasifah,* for example:

"...as for logical judgments, they are mostly correct and are rarely erroneous, but they (i.e. the philosophers) differ from the people of the truth concerning them only in terminology and applications but not meaning and conclusions."[70]

Although he argues that even prophets were not sent to prove the existence of God and the origination of the world, but were sent to each His Unity, we find elsewhere that he permits arguing for the existence of God when the arguments are drawn from and sustained by the Quran.[71]

In the *Qistas,* the verse (i.e. if there were gods other than Allah (i.e. in heavens and earth), they would be decaying is presented as a model of a condition conjunctive syllogism or 'mizan at-talazum'. All this of course is a way of showing that reason alone cannot reach to absoulte certainly, for reason can help only in taking positive decisions, vis-a-vis the revealed world of God. For Ghazzali, then reason must be used to reach a golden mean or middle course in belief, not absoulte certainty.[72]

The importance of *Iqtisad* lies in this extensiveness of syllogistic logic and the attention to objections from a neo-Platonic stand point, both of which can be seen in the proofs of the existence of God and the vision beautifica, which in Mantogomery Watt's judgment are in fact Ghazzali's greatest contribution to the latter development of Islamic theology and accentuate that fact that what Ghazzali did was to "effect a complete fusion of the Greek and Islamic intellectual traditions."[73]

Iqtisad is Ghazzali's most sophisticated major work in Kalam. Its complete title is *al-Iqtisad fil-'Itiqad'* and have been variously translated, but the most appropriate translation is the *Golden Mean in Belief.* Ghazzali himself holds *Iqtisad* in high esteem and, whenever the occasion calls for the proofs of the creed, he refers to it...In Ghazzali's own words:

"As for the proofs of the creed we have set them in *al-Risalah al-Qudsiyyah* in about twenty pages and it is a chapter of the *Kitab Qawa-idal-Adillah* of the *Ihya* and as for their proofs, with more thoroughness and sophistication in raising questions and objections, we have set them in the *Golden Mean in Belief,* in some hundred pages it is a book devoted entirely to the very essence of the science of the theologians, but it is more adequate in its proofs and more apt to knock at the doors of knowledge

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than the scholastic jargon which is normally met in the works of the thelogians.[74]

Discussing Kalam in the *Jawahir*, he says that the he was written two treastises on Kalam explaining the creed "on two calling the lower *al-Risalah al-Qudisiyyah*, and the higher level *al-Iqtisad fil-Itiqad*".[75]

After dealing with Ghazzali's views concerning logic, I think it will be very relevant to see his treatment of intelligence or reason in the acquisition of knowledge. Because people like Arbery and others view that Ghazzali has denied the reason any value in the aqquisition of knowledge.

While as Ghazzali regards reason as a balance for truth in all cases. He has gone to the extent of saying that sufis were not justified in their criticism of reason. He thinks, however, that the abhorrence which sufis feel towards reason is perhaps due to the fact that it is deemed to be related with the polemics and hair splitting. But according to Ghazzali we can know God through this hidden vision, the truth fullness of prophet can also justified through it. Ghazzali exclaims that how can we abuse reason, when God praised it. He says:

"When reason is abused, what else should be praised afterwards. How can reason be abused, when even Shariah is known by help of it. It seems that reason takes a form of belief in itself. (Aanu-al-Yaqeen) and light of belief (Noor-ul-Yaqeen). Because man is characterized by intellect and separated from the animals by dent of it. He gets at the hold of the essence of reality of things through it."[76] According to Ghazzali "the example of Quran is like the light of the sun and that of the reason is the light of eye."[77]

Ghazzali demanded from the philosophers a complete adherence to their logical arguments in religious matters also. But he feels as he has expressed in the *Munqidh* that they could not abide by these conditions, but have failed to observe these to a great extent. It is for the same reason that Ghazzali criticised them for their reliance on hearsay and compiling. Let us have look at Ghazzali's treatment to reason in some of his views of *Mishakta al-Anwar*. While comparing sense-perception with reason, he says:

"..they eye does not behold itself, but the intelligence does perceive itself as well as other, and it perceives itself as endowed with knowledge, power, etc., and perceives its own knowledge and perceives of its knowledge of its own knowledge, and so on infinitum."[78] He says further,"...to the intelligence near and far one is indifferent. In the twinkling of an eye it ascends to the highest heaven above, in another instant to the confines of earth beneath. Nay, when the facts are realized, intelligence is revealed as transceding the very idea of 'far' and 'near', which occur between material bodies." [79]The eye does not perceive what is behind the veil, but the intelligence moves freely about the throne, the saddle, and everything beyond the veil of the Heavens, and beyond the veil of the Heavens, and likewise about the Host supernal, and the Realm celestial, just as much as about its own world, and its prophiquate (that is its own) kingdom. The realities of things stand unveiled to the intelligence. It's only veil is one which it assumes of its own sake, which resembles the veil that the eye assumes of its own accord in the closing of its eye."[80]

Ghazzali says further:-"while intelligence breaks throught into the inwardness of things and into their secrets; apprehends the reality of things and their essential spirits; elicits their causes and laws—from what they had origin, how they were created, of how many ideal forms they are composed, what rank of Being they occupy."[81]

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He holds: "But the domain of intelligence is the entirety of existence, for it both apprehends the entities we have enumerated, and has recourse among all others beside (and they are the major part), passing upon them judgments that are both certain and true. To it, therefore, are the inward secrets of things mainfest, and the hidden forms of things become clear."[82]

"The Koran, then, is represented to us by the sun, and the intelligence by by the light of they eyes."[83]

Ghazzali says: "He who never faces to that world, but allows the limitations of life in this lower world of sense to settle upon him, is still a brute beast, on encommunicate from that which constitutes us man; gone astray is he more than any brute beasts, for the brute are not vouched the wings of flight."[84]

The knowledge is rational and supported by an argument without betraying the teachings of the Quran and the Traditions.

In this way Ghazzali has laid much emphasis on reason when it is purified from the embellishment of wrong opinions and false views. Dr. Mehmood Qasim says that:

"We say that Ghazzali has gone to the exaggerated extent by elevating the reason. It seems that Ghazzali thinks that hidden secrets look very evident by the help of reason. It is perhaps for the same reason that Ghazzali has approved taking to truths from all possible sources. Though it may be embedded in the books of philosophers, provided the limits of reason are known. The knowledge of Almighty is attained through the agency of prophecy, which opens the secrets for the intelligent and sufi people, about those matters which cannot be known through the analogies of intelligence or taste (Dhawq). Ghazzali says that. "The intelligent people themselves realize this thing that intelligence cannot lead us to the knowledge about the matters of life after death, nor can it guide us about the harm of sins, and benefit of obedience..., These all matters are only knowable through the agency of the prophets, which is such a source, which is above intelligence, which informs people about the known matters of the past and future. It is childish on the part of a person, who wants to know the wisdom behind the prayers in a rational way. Though we recognize that the importance of intelligence lies in acceptance of the prophethood and also in the declaration of its incompetency from knowing these matters except through the light of prophency."[85]

In Ghazzali's letter to His Majesty Sultan Sanjar Salijuqi, he says: "You should know that by now I am fifty years old. Forty years of my life have been spent in the various peaceful haunts of famous scholars and learned men under whom I studied, till I was raised to such a rank that people began to know me and understand the change in my ideas."[86]

After dealing with Ghazzali's philosophical credentials, his views on logic, reason, scepticism, psychology, mathematics and ethics etc.[87] We will present observations of some important scholars about dimensions of his philosophical thought.

Dr. Ibrahim Madhkur says that Ghazzali is one of the greatest symbols in the history of human thought. He can be placed with Socrates and Plato among the Greek philosopher, Saint Augustine and Saint Thomas Aquinas among the Latin Philosophers, and Rene Descartes and Pascal among the contemporary philosophers.[88]

Ghazzali considered that the purification of heart is the way in order to remove the veils of ignorance and for attaining knowledge.[89] Ghazzali was bound to philosophize in the deep sense of the

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word. Because in Ghazzali's times, as was mentioned, Philosophy was part and parcel of a civilized world. A study was deemed to be incomplete, which did not include some portion of philosophy.[90]

It is for the same reason that we find that a lot of books on philosophy were written by Muslims. They translated Greek books during second and third year of Hijrah, and began philosophizing themselves in fourth century Hijrah, as was mentioned earlier.

Renan, whose easy-going mind was the exact antithesis to the intense earnestness of Ghazzali, Calls him "the most original mind among Arabian philosophers."[91]

Yet it is doubtful whether it is a philosopher that he would have wished to be chiefly remerbered.[92]

Claud field rightly indicates:

"Philosopher and sceptic as he was by nature, Ghazzali's chief work was that of a theologian, moralist, and mystic, though his mysticism was strongly balanced by common sense. He had, as he tells us in his 'Confessions', experienced "conversion."[93]

At any rate, Ghazzali has been accepted as orthodox authority by the Muslims among whom his title is Hujjat-ul-Islam, "The proof of Islam", and it has been said ", if all the books of Islam were destroyed it would be but a slight loos if only the 'Ihya' of Ghazzali was preserved,"[94]

Dr. Mohammad Thabit Al-Fanadi says: "Ghazzali would have never become himself happy to be dubbed as a philosopher, but there is no doubt, that Ghazzali was a philosopher, a great philosopher despite of his disliking to be called as a philosopher."[95]

The most important aspect of Ghazzalis' work and influence seems to be, in his bringing philosophy and philosophical theology with in the grasp of the ordinary mind. By his intense personality and through his personal experiences, he attained so overpowering a sense of the divine realities that the force of his character swept all before it and Islam entered on a new era of its existence.[96]

Ghulam Saiyadian says: "Imam Ghazzali's life was a magnificent intellectual adventure. He did not sail passively into the faith, corrosion and "peace that passeth understanding" which he eventually achieved, but went through all the trials and tribulations which beset the adventurous and critical mind. He made a deep and penetrating study of different schools of thought in philosophy and of various religious sects as the Dalivis and Batinis, the Sufis and the men of Falsafa, the momins and the Zindiqs.[97]

It is this courageous adventure of the intellect which has been the glory and the inquisite torture of the mind of man, as it has struggled ceaselessly to arrive at the truth, undaunted by dogma and unfettered by the bonds of "Taqlid." It is important to note that he regards this quality of the mind 'as planted by Allah in his nature' and, therefore, it is not to be suppressed as a heresy but welcomed as a God given gift.

But the intellectual approach which Imam Ghazzali had adopted failed to satisfy him. His scepticism not only influenced his religious thinking but, like many other philosophers in the history of thought, he began to doubt whether it was at all possible to acquire certain knowledge throught the medium of the rational intellect.[98]

Dr. Abdul Ala Afifi says:

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"Ghazzali unmasked the real faces of philsophers indicating their false views and removed the crown of vanity from their heads. Ghazzali considers that since philosophy is one of a way of the thinking which is equally liable to criticism and refutation by other rational arguments. It is for the same reason that Ghazzali thinks philosophers are at fault, when they consider their metaphysical approach the sole way to approach reality, while according to him it is attained by the light of belief, which should take guidance from reason and revelation both".[99]

According to Badawi, Ghazzali could never break the shell of philosophy despite his concerted efforts to do so. He views that Ghazzali rejected the opinion of the philosophers on the eternity of the world, as he read the book of Yahya Nahvi which was known as *Hujjuj-Baraqalus-Fi-Qudm-i-al-Aalam*. In this book yahya had rejected views of Heracletus on eternity of the world. Ghazzali has produced the arguments as given by yahya Nahvi to reject the arguments of philosophers on the same issue. By these all claims Badawi wants to say that:

"Ghazzali used the arguments of one group of philosophers against the other group of philosophers in his book *Tahafut al-Falasifah.*"[100]

In Ghazzali's philosophical endeavours, there are some positive aspects also. He was the first person to reconcile Islamic beliefs with Neo-platonic philosophy, by interpreting Quranic verses, so as to make them serve this end. Secondly, he presented these Neo-Platonic views in an Islamic grab, indicating as these were originated from Quran and Sunnah without any influence from onn-Islamic thought. Third, Ghazzali provided his views especially in *Mishkat al-Anwar,* which is one of his important philosophical works, as he gave details and analysis in it and related them with Quran and Sunnah with strong concern. He drew the conclusions and thoughts which were implicit in Neo-Platonism. He gave full analysis of all these issues.[101]

As said ealier when Ghazzali took to philosophy he devoted full three years to it. He studied philosophy during first two years in pondering over these philosophical sciences. He gave the results and conclusions of this thorough study in his book, *Tahafat-ul-Falasifah.* In this renowned work he noted twenty points made by philosophers which were inconsistent with their own conclusions. He concentrated in this book only on demonstrating the inconsistencies in the approach of the philosophers and did not put forward any positive views of his own.[102]

Ghazzali gave his conclusions about philosophical science in his *Al-Munqidh min al-Dalal* (delieverance from error). According to Ghazzali's classification the philosophcial sciences were six in number i.e. mathematics, logic, natural-science, theology (or metaphysics), politics and ethics. In these books, according to watt, Ghazzali retains his philosophical and intellectual honesty. It is a critical book. Its contents cannot be summarised to represent Ghazzali's own teachings. He was so careful in his philosophical honesty that he reminds us that he is not going to affirm what he considers to be truth. In *Tahafat ul-Falasifah,* Ghazzali accepted the findings of mathematics, science and logic and employed the weapons of Aristotelianism against the Greek philosophy, mainly its version as propounded by Ibn Sina and Farabi. Ghazzali argued against the philsopher's, position with regard to religious doctrine point by point and revealed both its self contradictions and its insufficiency from the religious and philosophical point of view.

Some of the Western scholars, Henry Corbin for example, regard Ghazzali as one of the spiritual personalities of Islam, but he denies of Ghazzali and philosophical stauts, and prefers to call him "the most ardent critic of philosophy."[103]

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But Ghazzali's philosophical attainments show that apart from his "great rectitude" he embodied in his person and his doctrine "a synthesis between heartfelt religious piety and philosophical objectivity and an almost scientific precision in the manner he gave expression to it". It was not only Ghazzali who discussed philosophical points for the first time, but these were being discussed by philosophers in the Isamic world shortly before his time. Ghazzali's critique of knowledge is evidently as mentioned, an aspect of philosophy not merely of theology. We can see Ghanzzali's philosophical contribution from his book *Maqasid-al-Falasifah,* (the aims of the philosophers) in which he gave an 'objective statement of their doctrine without criticism.[104]

Ghazzali's study of philosophy affected all what he afterwards did. His attitude was far from being purely negative, on the one hand, indeed, he argued powerfully against Neo-platonism on the inconsistency of the philosophers and on the other hand he was carried away by admiration for Aristotelian syllogistic logic and wrote several books about it and thus introduced it to other theologians and jurists for whom the books of the philosophers were inaccessible or technically difficult. In this way Ghazzali used superior Neoplatonic (including) Aristotelian method and concepts which he had learnt from Ibn Sina and others. According to Ibn Khaldun, "Ghazzali was the first theologian to write according to the way of the moderns." It is for these reasons that Ghazzali is described as a "prophetic intellectual." He spoke to his fellows in terms of the highest thought of his time. He made in fact, the combined study of philsophy and theology in order to resolve the tension between the two.., his perspicacity and courage in this regard deserves the full credit.

Indeed, as he often been noted, it was Ghazzali's introduction of the methods and vocabulary of philosophy which made possible the further development of the Kalam in the works of Fakhru-al-Din al-Razi, al-Jili, al-Taftazani and others.[105]

Syied Hossein Nasr says: "Everyone is aware of Ghazzali's criticisms of peripatetic philosophy espeically that of Ibn Sina as seen in such well-known works of Ghazzali as *Tahafut al-Falasifah,* but not much study has been devoted to the philosophical dimensions of this opponent of philosophy."[106]

Nasr says further "In Ghazzali's writings there is much concern for the question of knowledge and gnosis and his writings in the field have wielded much influence upon later Islamic philosophers and theologians, such as Mulla Sadra and Shah Waliullah of Delhi, Likewise Ghazzali was concerned with the classification of the sciences."[107]

He continues: "Ghazzali's theology is also itself of a philosophical nature and he, more than his teacher Juwayni was the founder of philosophical Kalam in Islam,"[108] So far as the impact of Ghazzali on Mulla Sadra is concerned it extends to his theory of resurrection and causation as well. Mulla Sadra discusses the problem of resurrection in detail in his famous book, *al-Hikmat al-Arshiya.* He says:—"know that when the spirit has become separated from the elemental body, there still remains with it something having a weak being, in the prophetic tradition, this was called "the root of the tail" people have differed greatly concerning its meaning. Thus, it was said (by some it was the original part of the body. And it was said (by certain philosophers) that it was the material intellect or simply prime matter. Abu Hamidal-Ghazzali said that it was only the soul, and that the other world arose out of this."[109]

Ghazzali's view does not differ a great deal, at least in its outward expression, from Sadra's own conception here, though Sadra criticises Ghazzali for not regarding soul altogether a separate entity. In the same way Ghazzalis' influence on Sadra seems very evident in his views about causation.

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He says in the similar manner as Ghazzali would say that the Divine Being is not subject to the causal nexus. He says:—"But as far that second (notice) modality of being, there are only essential causes, (there are no secondary causes, that are) external to the essence of the thing and do not (actually) constitute its being".[110]

It means that for Sadra, the cosmic process of the unfolding self-manifestation of being which was revealed in the "greater Rising" constituted an "essential" (dhati) order of "existentiating" Causality, which is independent of the physical appearances to which the Traditional Aristotelian analysis could be applied.[111]

Nasr brings this important point to our notice that: Ghazzali defended reason and its role in acquiring knowledge although he pointed out the necessity of making reason subservient to both revelation and the intellect. He also not only defended logic but wrote several important works on it. In both of these attitudes he stands with the philosophers against certain theologians and jurists. Furthermore, Ghazzali's criticism of philosophy was itself of a philosophical character...The philosophic nature of Ghazzali's criticism can be seen especially in the discussion of the created or eternal nature of the world, a discussion to which Ibn Rushd was to return in detail in his *Tahafut al-Tahafut.* Ghazzali's philosophic concerns can be seen also in his polemical works against Ismailism.[112]

Hawa Lazarus says: "It would means that al-Ghazzali was indeed deeply affected by Neplatonic philosophy, but that he evaded systematically its heretical conclusions and accepted terminology; the stranger current Neoplatonic 'atmospher' in his authentic writings is therefore derived from the fact that he did borrow images, symbols, idioms and expressions from this philosophy but only those of secondary importance with no heretical meaning. These he implanted into his writings and elaborated on in a traditional sufi manner without accepting any Neoplantonic doctrine as such."[113]

Ghazzali objects only the claim of a class of people who believe in the superiority to others, because of their greater intelligence and insight as they deal with these natural sciences. Hawa says:

"Al-Ghazzali saw no contradiction between the rational and the traditional sciences, and he believed that they complemented each other. No man should content himself with the study of only one of them. The rational sciences are compared to food, while as the traditional ones are compared to medicine, (and the human body needs both)".[114]

M.N. Roy has paid tributes to Ghazzali by saying:"His place in the history of philosophy can be judged from the opinion of the famous French orientalist Renan, who thought that the father of modern scepticism, Hume, did not say anything more than what had been said by the Arab Philosopher, who preceded him by seven hundred years."[115]

While comparing Ghazzali with Hume and Kant, M.N. Roy further writes."The immensity of the historical significance of al-Ghazzali's views is appreciated still more clearly when we remember that it was scepticism of Hume which gave impetus to Kant's all shattering critical philosophy that laid occurrence at the rest of all speculative thought. But al-Ghazzali's views were a long ahead of his time. Experimental science as he visualized, was not yet possible. In the absence or infancy of technology, the nature of objects could not be so mathematically ascertained as the philosopher wished. Therefore, in his later years, al-Ghazzali, fell into mysticism, but his fall was not more strikingly inglorious than of Kant. Objective drawbacks clipped the intrepid wings of the soaring spirit of the Arab thinker, whereas subjective predilection of class interest overwhelmed the critical genious of Kant".[116]

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Ibn Taimiyah alleged Ghazzali as "he was particularly effected by the ideas of the philosophers." He includes Ghazzali among the "Later Kalam theologians."[117]

It is the criticism of Ghazzali, which some people take as negative point of his thought, but in fact Ghazzali's attack on philosophers was not, in all respects, destructive, but it also possessed constructive and positive elements as well, despite harsh tone and insufficiency of argumentation. Ghazzali highlighted the lofty aspects of philosophy as well as religion and marked the distinctions and particularities of both. He elaborated the objectives put forward by the philosophers in such a detailed manner that his analysis is a unique masterpiece.

In *Studies in al-Ghazzali* Hawa Hazarus says: "It should be remarked here that thought he deals mainly with philosophical terms concerned with metaphysics, that holds true also for other philosophical disciplines such as logic. It is a well-known fact that al-Ghazzali tried to propagate this science, as well as mathematics and other sciences, among the masses and fought the prejudice of the theologians against these sciences. He even considered this prejudice to be a sin that endangers and weakens religion unnecessarily."[118]

She says further: "Already in his introduction to the *Tahafut* he mentions that he will use in this book technical terminology only to address his philosophical opponents in order to impress them with his own mastery of an familiarity with, their subject."[119]

Allama Shibli Nomani has mentioned the philosophical aspect of al-Ghazzali's work as. "In Europe, all reputation attached to al-Ghazzali is due to his refutation of philosophical sciences. The European scholars say that Ghazzali destroyed philosophy in East ruthlessly, and if Ibn Rushd would have not appeared on the stage to save it in the West, the fate of philosophy would had been similar. In Ghazzali's *Rebuttal of philosophers,* we see that he is speaking to his philosophical opponents in a tone of scholar who is totally away from any symptom of embarrassment. He seems to be free from any sign of inferiority complex when he makes assault on them. He addressed Greek philosophers in a manner which is of an equal rival, and thinker who is not overawed from the argumentative jargons of them and their Muslim followers".[120]

Muslim philosophers have not only worked as an agency to transmit Greek philosophy to the West, but according to a renowned Indian scholar, M.N. Roy. "For a hundred years, it modestly learned from others, particularly the ancient Greeks. Thus equipped, it began to produce independent and original thought in every branch of learning." 121/M.N. Roy further says. He (Ghazzali) anticipated Descartes in reducing the standard of truth to self consciousness. He stands out as the connecting link between the antiquity and modern scepticism."[121]

He comments further: "The principle of acquiring exact knowledge, started nearly a thousand years ago by the Muslim Savant, still holds good as then: and the scientific outlook which makes such knowledge possible, is still comparatively rare among the Indians, who even in these days of the twentieth century allow themselves to be impressed feats of magic and "spiritual" Charlatanism, and credit-self-consciousness, he found the judge of the correctness of the perception of senses."[122]

It becomes quite evident a fact from these statements that to allege Ghazzali as the opponent of logic and science is figment of imagination of those scholars, who don't know the essence and substance of Ghazzali's works. It is convincingly put forward by Hawa Lazurs and M.N. Roy that Al-Ghazzali was in no manner anti reason or anti-science, rather he provided a strong argument in their favour.

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Moreover, Ghazzali, in his Kitab *Jawahir al-Quran* underlines the importance of contemporary Sciences in understanding the Quran. "The Quran becomes transparent only to those who have studied the sciences, which are extracted from it. For example, the meaning of Sura (26: 80)...who, when I am sick, gives the health could not be properly understood without the knowledge of medicince. Similarly, the real meaning of the solar and Lunar movements (55:5), the merging of the night into the day (35:13), and so forth, could be fully understood only by astronomers, thus affirming a complete harmony between may Quranic science and natural and positive sciences."[123]

The problems of epistemology are the most important problems of philosophy. Ghazzali solved the problem of knowledge and certitude by affirming a degree of comprehension that left no room for doubt, a comprehension that is the essential apprehension of things. Ghazzali was in search of such knowledge which would not leave any room for doubt.

He say: "I am looking for knowledge of what things really are, so I must undoubtedly try to find what knowledge is, that knowledge in which the object is disclosed in such a fashion that no doubt remains along with it."[124]

Late Dr. Noor-an-Nabi has aptly dealt with the philosophical status of al-Ghazzali. Dr. Nabi writes:

"It would be very interesting to note that the modern analysis adopting the techniques of the analytical approach, such as acceptance of common sense and appeal to the ordinary meanings of words (Moore), logical atomism (Russell) in the principle of verification (A.J.Ayer) and Linguistic Analysis (Wittgenstien) opposed, and most of them refuted metaphysics but, al-Ghazzali on the contrary, with the tools of acceptance of common sense, linguistic analysis and the principles of verfication confirmed metaphysics." [125] The Specific example of Ghazzali's concern with linguistic and semantic analysis can be discerned in Ghazzali's developing a significant Linguistic account of the expression. Light, veritably and literally applied to God as the source of lights. and to the existence of the universe as an emanative light, emerging from the light of lights.

According to Mehdi Hairi Yezdi, Ghazzali's achievement in the *Tahafut-al-Falasifah,* is for the most part semantic, for he is among "the first philosophers, at least in the history of Islamic speculative thought, who distinguished the problem of using a word in its meaning with reference to its meaning without reference to its applications".[126]

However, it is ture that al-Ghazzali was deadly opposite to the claims of the philosophers that it is reason which should determine right and wrong with out worrying about dictates and tenets of religion. Since, philosophy or rational discourse is not without shortcomings, its sphere should be limited to the issues which can come in its purview. It is perhaps for the same reason that in several senses. Ghazzali's mission seems very close to that of Kant, who tried to show the limitations of reason in his classical book. *The Critique of Pure Reason.* Iqbal for the same reason comments on the mission of Ghazzali as "Ghazzali's apostolic mission was, like that of Kant in Germany of the eighteenth century". Ghazzali's philosophical scepticism, say Iqbal, "which, however went a little too far, virtually did the same kind of work in the world of Islam in breaking the back of the proud but shallow rationalism which moved in the same direction as pre-Kantian rationalism in Germany."[127]

Al-Ghazzali's studies in philosophy led to the incorporation of certain aspects of philosophy, logic for example, into Islamic theology.

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It was under the influence of Ghazzali that theologians after him, came to devote much more time and space to the philosophical preliminaries than to the theology proper. Ghazzali used the forms of Greek dialectice to found a pragmatic system in his originality and distinction. He also brought philosophy into the open and dissipated was "simply thinking", and the philosophers and their systems could be understood by any intelligent man.[128]

Ghazzali was interested in logical questions, because as a scholar jurist, logical questions were of great conern for him. 'Abdul Kadir Sharief says:

"Al-Ghazzali's originality, incidenty and extent of knowledge in his lectures on jurisprudence. theology and the Quran attracted hundreds of students. Between his stimulating seminars. Al-Ghazzali produced a number of legal works, such as *Al-Basit, Al-Wajiza,* which are among the fundamental works on the shafi' in school of thought. *Al-Mustasfa,* is al-Ghazzali's outstanding contribution to the sources of Islamic law and continues to be regarded even after 900 years as the most important work on Usool al-Fiqh in Islam."[129]

Hanief Nadvi has rightly said that the importance of *Tahafatual-al-falasafah* does not lie only in the fact that Ghazzali attacked the Greek philosophers and smashed the undue vainty and arrogance of them, but is also presents Ghazzli's own philosophical views before us. This book is the living testimony of the critical power and inquisitive qualities of Al-Ghazzali. It shows Ghazzali's mastery and tactful ability to analyse the problems.[130]

Ahmad Mohammad Jili says: "Abu Hamid al-Imam Ghazzali wrote his book *Tahafut,* which had a marvelous impact to check the imbalances and absurdities of philosophers."[131]

As regards mathematical and other natural sciences which were included in philosophy, Ghazzali sees no scope for objection. In *Tahafut* Ghazzali says," As regards mathematics, there is no point in denying or oppposing it." About the things which are established by astronomical and mathematical evidence which leave no room for doubt, Ghazzali has no intention to dispute them. Contrary to this, Ghazzali regards it a great harm to religion that some people may criticize these things in an immethodical manner; for example as in the case of Lunar eclipse some people refute the beliefs of philosophers about his matterm although astronomical and mathematical evidence have established their beliefs. Here we should observe the care which Ghazzali takes in discussing issues pertaining to astronomy and mathematics, which depicts his overall approach to natural sciences. His views about these sciences are quite positive and progressive.

Dr. Ishaq Musa al-Hussaini says: "That the most important aspect about al-Ghazzalis is his love for truth or reality, his concern to reach it and his endeavour to discover it...Ghazzali has set and example of a unique nature of human experience which opens before a man a method and way of discussion, discovery, renunciation and innovations. In this way Ghazzali is not only the proof of Islam (Hujjat-al-Islam) but also a proof of a greater bravery and discovery of man."[132]

It is perhaps for the same reason that Ghazzli's influence was not only confined to Muslims, but it extended to Christians of the west, who found in Ghazzali's philosophy valuable points and benefited from it, as for example Saint Thomas Aquinas seems to show strong concern for it. Other western philsophers like Descartes, Hume and Kant seem also influenced by the comprehensive philosophy of Ghazzali. Descartes' method of Doubt, Hume's resemblance to the profound argumentation of Al-Ghazzali, implicity though not explicity.

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According to Thabit al-Arees; it is the abiding demand of the Arabic legacy that the efforts should be arranged to revive his memory i.e. Al-Ghazzali's a philosopher, who was the proof of Islam (Hujat al-Islm) in his own times, who was one of the blossoming flower of the garden of Arabic civilization, He elevated the status of thought and bestowed sincerity to the intellectual and spiritual realities as well."[133]

He says further: In this way Ghazzali opened the new vistas for the modern thought when most of the nations of the world were screaming under the reign of dark ages. He broke they way in front of epistemological Reason, he was forerunner of Descartes, about five hundred years before, and all those thinkers who laid down the rules and methods for epistemological discussions. In this way Ghazzali was not only one of the torch bearers of the enlightenment in the history of Arabic civilization, but also in the civilizational history of all human beings.[134]

Dr. Abdul Karim Alwan considers Ghazzali among the "leaders of human thought, who encompassed in their selves studies, analyses from various angles in a deep and original manner. A specific instance is found in the thinking of Al-Ghazzali."[135]

There are two view points about Ghazzali's approach to philosophy. First is that Ghazzali out rightly rejected and denounced all kinds of philosophical arguments, as held by people like Henry corbin, Bertrand Russell, Fazlur Rahman, P.K. Hitti, Arbery and others. Second approach to Ghazzali is as has been already mentioned, that Ghazzali accepted several conclusions arrived at by the philosophers, consciously or unconsciously as elaborated in the above pages. It is clear that he is heavily indebted to the philosophers. This he himself admits. His method is eclectic, and unshamedly so. Far he subscribes to the principle attributed to "Ali Ibn Abi Talib: "Do not know the truth by the men, but rather, know the truth, and then you will know who follows it.[136]

According to Ghazzali those who reject philosophy outrightly run the risk of ignoring useful and, indeed, self-evident truths, such as are provided by mathematics and astronomy. Moreover, such people bring religion itself into disrepute when such a well-intentioned but ignorant person rejects, for example, the philosopher's account of Lunar and solar eclipses, "Some one may hear, who knows these things through conclusive demonstration (bil-burhan-al-qati') and he does not doubt demonstration, but comes to view Islam as founded upon ignorance and the rejection of proof. Thus, his love for philosophy, increases, as does his hatred for Islam."[137]

Ghazzali enunciates the rule to be observed: "if the philosophical doctrine is "reasonable in itself and corroborated by proof, and is not in conflict with the Book, then why should we flee and renounce it".[138]

Moreover Ghazzali has attempted to defend the use of philosophy:

"Suppose that (these statements exist no where but in their writings) were we to open the gate and proceed to relinguish every truth to which the mind of an infidel had preceded us, we would be forced to forgo much of the truth".[139]

Ghazzali gives a concrete example: the reasonable man, does not loath honey even though if he finds it in the cupping-glass, for he knows that the cupping-glass does not change the intrinsic nature of the honey:[140]

Most people, Ghazzali says cannot grasp this:

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"For when you trace and ascribe a statement to a person of whom they think highly, they accept it, even if it be false, but if you ascribe it to one of whom they hold a low opinion, they reject it, even if it be true. And so, they everlastingly recognize the truth by means of men, rather than recognizing men by means of the truth, and this is the ultimate error."[141]

Acting on this principle, Ghazzali wishes to establish what is useful, and what is baneful, in the works of the philosophers. Certain subdivisions of philosophy, such as arithmetic and geometry, he points out, are indifferent with regard to revealed truth and may be deemed harmless. Logic, too, is in itself neutral, although it offers a potential danger. For, example, those whom its clarity impresses may come to believe that certain heretical doctrines which it supports are also true. [142] In any case, logic is not the private province of the philosophers. In former ages, theologians employed it too, although with different terminology. Furthermore, the name logic (mantiq) is itself used by philosophers solely in order to intimidate Jahwilan.[143]

While mathematics, astronomy, and even logic may be considered neutral, the metaphysical doctrines which Ghazzali seeks to expose and demolish in the Tahafut *al-Falasifah* are not. Indeed, in that work Ghazzali analyses and refutes twenty "heretical" doctrines held by the philosophers.

Even so, while philosophers from earliest times, upto and including al-Farabi and Ibn Sina, are to be considered heretics, their works are not utterly devoid of truth.[144] Truth and falsehood lie side by side within their works, and this is the essence of the problem.

In short, Ghazzali takes the truth where he finds it. And in the case at hand, he has clearly borrowed from his predecessors among the philosophers. Al-Ghazzali owes a distinct and undeniable debt to al-Farabi and to Ibn Sina, as well as to various works of Greek philosophy in Arabic translation, such as *Galen's Deusu partium* or the some authors compendium of Plato's *Timaeus*. In particular, Ghazzali has borrowed from these authors a notion of providence which he seeks to reconcile with traditional Islamic beliefs.[145]

Moreover, it cannot be denied that Ghazzali shows a penchant for philosophical terminology and method, but he also avails himself of certain key concepts even in their metaphysics, which he generally repudiates. The notion of providence, as elaborated earlier by al-Farabi and Ibn Sina, is one such instance. However, the role of necessity in that doctrine, which was attached to it by these philosophers, has been replaced in the Ghazzalian adaptation by the divine will itself. The necessity that obtains, results from the efficacy of that will in acting upon its objects.

Ormsby thinks that whatever sympathy Ghazzali may have with certain aspects of philosophy, and however much he appropriates its language and methodology, his attitude towards it remains "inimical." According to ormsby, Ghazzali finds himself allied wiht various other sectarians, their differences not withstanding. Ghazzali says. "I do not rise to defend any specific theological school. On the contrary, I consider all the sects united as one against then (fil-tas-sil), but these (philosophers) oppose the very foundations of religion. So let us join together against them, for in the face of calamities, personal_rancors vanish."[146]

Since in the opinion of Ghazzali there were several sections and varieties of philosophers, therefore, it must be understood that Ghazzali's attack was directed to only those philosophers, which were either "infidels" or heretics in his view. Therefore, Ormsby's above observations are not true in totality but partially. If we consider attacks against infidels or "heretics" as tantamount ot rejection or animosity of philosophy, then the same allegation can be squarely levelled against a prominent philoso-

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pher, Rene Descartes, who also attacked the infidels in order to restore religous belief in God and soul.

He says, for example,

"...for although to us, the faithful, it be sufficient to hold as matters of faith, that the human soul does not perish with the body, and that God exists, it yet assuredly seems impossible ever to persuade infidels of the reality of any religion, or almost even any moral virtue, unless, first of all, these two things be proved to them by natural reason.

"...and although it is quite true that the existence of God is to be believed since it is taught in the sacred scriptures, and that, on the other hand, the sacred scriptures are to be believed because they come from God....nevertheless, this cannot be submitted to infidels."[147]

Then Descartes undertakes responsibility of convincing of these infidels of the validity of faith in God and soul according to natural reason.

In this way it can safely be said that though Ghazzali was always open to new ideas and thoughts from all sides but not without qualifiacations, He has of course, accepted several views of the philosophers, which he rejected afterwards in some cases. He harnessed the same views in his own scheme of things, but has come out with different conclusions of his own, moreover, being overwhelmingly influenced with the sufistic tendencies, he synthesized Islamic views with those of philosophers and mystics. His approach to philosophy was balanced and eclectic.

If philosophy, does not lead to blasphemy or heresy, Ghazzali would not object to its acquiring, the sources or denominations not withstanding.

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6

Ghazzali's Impact on IBN Tufayl

Ibn Tufayl was one important Muslim Philosopher who seems very much influenced by the Philosophy, especially epistemology of Ghazzali. In spite of his pointing out certain contradictions in Ghazzali's works, Ibn Tufayl had on the whole great admiration for his teaching and the influence of it can be seen on his own greatly admired Philosophical romance, *Hayy Bin Yaqzan.*[1]

Ibn Tufayl recognizes the necessity of solitude for the improvement of the theoretical reason, because he feels ubhappy over Ibn Bajjah's one-sided emphasis on the role of reason in arriving at the ultimate truth. Somewhat sympathetically he complains of the "incompleteness" of Ibn Bajjah's *Tadbir at-Muta-Wahhid.* It is to the desire of removing this incompleteness that Ibn Tufayl's *Hayy Bin Yaqzan* owes itsorigin. The influence of Ghazzali made him supplement reason with ecstasy in its flight to the celestial world.[2]

From Philosophical point of view, the treatise is a brilliant exposition of Ibn Tufayl's theory of knowledge, which seeks to harmonize Aristotle with the Neoplatonism on the one hand and Ghazzali with Ibn Bajjah on the other. Here one of the explanation warrants our attention. Ghazzali was critical of Aristotelian rationalism[3]. Ibn Bajjah was Aristotelian through and through. Ibn Tufayl followed the middle course, and bridged the gulf between the two. As a rationalist he sides with Ibn Bajjah against Ibn Bajjah and qualifies rationalism with mysticism. Ecstasy is the highest form of knowledge, but the path leading to such knowledge is paved with the improvement of reason, followed by the purification of the Soul through ascetic practices. The methods of Ghazzali and Ibn Tufayl are both partially the same, but unlike the former, the latter's ecstasy is marked by a neo-Platonic strain. Ghazzali takes ecstasy as the means to see God, but to Ibn Tufayl, the beatific vision reveals the active intellect and the Neo-platonic chain of causes reaching down to the elements and back to itself.

But here we must be on our guard against the opinion of some people that Ghazzali's criticism and critique to reason amounted to his rejection of the reason. But as we know even in the stage when Ghazzali adopted sufi ways as the means to approach reality, he was still under the influence of Philosophy and rationalism. However, there was one difference in this influence; i.e. during the early

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period of sufism, Ghazzali was under the influence of Neo-platonic Philosophy, while as he was under the sway of Aristotelian, parapatetic and Islamic Philosophy from 484 H. to 487 A.H. equally. Ghazzali, however, remained loyal to the Philosophy of Plato and Neo-platonism upto his death.[4]

Here it should be noted that Ibn Tufayl uses the word 'intellect' in a very wide sense, almost in the sense of mystic vision. Moreover like Ghazzali, Ibn Tufayl points out that the notion of existence after non-existence is unintelligible with out supposing the priority of time over the world; but time itself is an inseparable accident of the world and so its being prior to the world is ruled out.[5]

Ibn Rushd has angrily observed of Ghazzali:

"From the books ascribed to him it is obvious that in metaphysics he relied on the school of the Falasifah; and of all his books this is most clearly illustrated and most unimpeachably proved by his *Mishkat al-Anwar*".

In the *Mishkat* Ghazzali seems to accept not only emanation, but also the notions of a secondary hypothesis, and even a "demiurge" That is identical with God. But according to Lenn Evan Goodman, "One should not however call Ghazzali's consistency into question too rashly. Creation in time and emanation were not mutally exclusive for Ghazzali, for in his view time was created with the universe. Thus it was not necessary for him to accept the world's eternity (which he equated with athesm in accepting emanation".[7]

As for the secondary beings are concerned, the relevant point to the medieval radical monotheist was not their existence but their subordination. The Philosophers may verge on d_alism even for upholding causal necessity; but Ghazzali does not uphold the independent existence of any finite being.

Ibn Tufayl strives to reconcile the views he finds in Ghazzali's works and wants to arrive at a correct conclusion. He departs in the process of this reconciliation; sometimes from "the teaching of the master" as he does from that of Ibn Sina, Ibn Bajjah and Farabi at other times.[8]

Ibn Tufayl says:—

"When his (Hayy Bin Yaqzan's) thinking had risen to this level and the sensory world had been left behind to some extent, just as he was mounting to height from which he could gaze out toward the approaches of the world of the sense, balked at the notion of unqualified body, a thing he could neither perceive nor possess, and fell back on the simplest objects he could see, the four he had already singled out".[9]

In this way like Ghazzali Hayy bin yaqzan is entangled with the metaphysical problems and starts pondering over these problems. However, his solutions to these problems are his own, inspite of it that he avails the arguments presented by Ghazzali on the problem. Ibn Tufayl holds that these problems included among other things the implications of "Creationism and eternalism" He says:

"For some years Hayy pondered over this problem, but the arguments always seemed to cancel each other. Neither position could outweight the other. Baffled and exhausted by this dilemma he began to wonder what each of the beliefs entitled perhaps the implications were the same".[10]

Thus Ibn Tufayl affirms that the implication of creationism and eternalism are the same. Hence he explicitly rejects one main contention of Ghazzali's *Tahafut-al-Falasifah* (Rebuttal of Philosophers) i.e. the only valid proof of God's existence is the argument from creation and that in affirming the eternity of the world the Philosophers of the Aristotelian tradition take a position which can't be

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distinguished from atheism. The dependence of the world on God, Ibn Tufayl insists may be envisioned through the notion of an act of creation in time but the real basis of the dependence is finite being itself. Thus, according to Ibn Tufayl, the Philosophers are not wrong in refusing to limit their conception of God's act to creation, in conceiving God not merely as creator but for more broadly, as "Author" of the universe. According to him, their deism is not tantamount to atheism, but is in fact the highest form of Theism.[11]

By the age of twenty-eight Hayy was able to rise to the awareness of the incorruptible world of stars and to recognize the necessity of a creator thereof.

As to the duration of the world as a whole, he was unable to arrive at a conclusion. But, as both Maimonides and St. Thomas Aquinas were to show later, he eventually understood that the problem of the eternity or non-eternity of the world was entirely irrelevant to the demonstration of the existence of its cause.[12]

Thus Ibn Tufayl defended Philosophers against Ghazzali and held that Ghazzali's allegation or levelling blasphemy against the Philosophers was not justified in any case. He goes to the extent of saying that the main problem of the eternity or noneternity of the world was totally irrelevant so far as demonstration of the existence of the cause of the universe is concerned. As to the world becoming co-eternal with God, he maintains in a mystic strain that the world is not something other than God. Interpreting the divine essence in terms of light, the essential nature of which is perpetual illumination as held by Ghazzali, he conceives of the world as the manifestation of God's own essence and the shadow of his own light that has no temporal beginning or end. It is not subject to annihilation as the belief in the day of the judgment tends to suggest. Its corruption consists in its transformation into another form rather than in its complete annihilation. The world must continue in one form or another, for its annihilation is inconsistent with the supreme mystic truth that the nature of divine essence is perpetual illumination and manifestation.

In this way like other sufi writers, Ibn Tufayl dwells on the ineffability of ultimate condition of utter annihilation. He does not refrain, however, from describing it in allegorical and oblique terms, although he held it to be clearly "for above reason".

Ibn Tufayl shows another marked resemblance with Ghazzali with regard to the Ishraqi or illuministic aspect of his Philosophy. Ghazzali makes frequent use of imagery derived from light to express his meaning. Inemphasizing the unity of God and in refuting the Christain doctrine that Christ was God, he puts forward the analogy of the mirror. One who looks in a mirror which reflects a coloured object, and supposes that reflection to be the form of themirror, is mistaken. To strengthen his analogy he quotes the following lines of the poet Ibn Abbad:

"Fine is the glass and the wine is fine they are commingled and seem to be one. As if there were only wine and no glass or as if there is only glass and no wine."[14]

Ibn Tufayl says:

"And because a supernal light streams down on it, it is the most perfectly adopted to accept the human form".[15]

Here we should understand that in the same manner Ghazzali thinks that "True light is God. The term is applied to all else only metaphorically" This opening sentence of the *Mishkat-al-Anwar* lays the foundation for Ghazzali's notion that all reality and all realization stems from God.[16]

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"It may be that you desire greatly to known the aspect (Wajh) whereby Allah's light is related to the heavens and the earth, or rather the aspect whereby he is in himself the light of heavens and earth____ Since light is an expression for that by which things are revealed; or, higher still, that by and for which they are revealed; yea, and higher still, that by, for, and from which they are revealed and now that you know, too that, of everything called light, only that by, for, and from which things are revealed is real____"[17]

In the same way awareness particularly must stem from God.

In *Al-Munqidh-Min-al-Dalal,* Ghazzali says:

"This [the balance and certitude] did not come about by systematic demonstration or marshalled argument, but by a light which God most high cost into my breast. That light is the key to the greater part of knowledge____from that light must be sought an intuitive understanding of things Divine".[18]

Ibn Tufayl accepts the notion and uses it to construct the imagined environment which will be most suited not only for the production of life, but also for the realization of a man's fullest potentials.[19]

Again, Ghazzali goes at to say:

"The term 'light' applied to any but Him is merely metaphorical, without real meaning. God is the highest and ultimate light" Ghazzali also makes use of the analogy of the light of sun falling on the room, then on the wall, and then on the floor. Then he concludes, "the term light therefore can worthily be applied only to ultimate light above where is no light and from whom light descends upon all else".[20]

The same is true of the primal light and its manifestation in the cosmos.[21]

In the field of epistemology, Ibn Tufayl has largely depended on the theories of Ghazzali. He has endorsed the fact in his book, *Hayy Bin Yaqzan* several times. Therefore in the following pages we will try to show Ghazzali's impact on the epistemology of Ibn Tufayl. Like Ghazzali, Ibn Tufayl has shown the limitations of human reason. He like Ghazzali relies on the intuitive knowledge. He talks of sensory knowledge, before reaching to the stage of rational discourse, he thinks that the knowledge gained through a person with sound disposition can never contradict the knowledge provided by the prophets. Therefore, his treatment of the problem is very similar to Ghazzali's views about human nature. Very important influence which Ghazzali seems to have exerted on Ibn Tufayl is about intuitive knowledge, which cannot be expressed in a categorical manner, but at the most allegorically. He believes in this analogical and allegorical way of knowledge by following Ghazzali in almost all respects.

Contrary to the views of Al-Kindi, Al-Farabi and Ibn Sina, he presents his views in metaphorical manner in his famous treatise *Hayy Bin Yazqan* and tries to show the relation between Philosophy and religion. In this romantic Philosophical book, he shows how Hayy could reach to the truth through the means of his senses, reason and intuition and when thse three sources of knowledge were judged in association with the information provided by the prophetic revelation. He did not find any contradiction between these channels of knowledge, because "Hayy" does not find any opposition in religious doctrines of divine world, Heaven and Hell, resurrection, of judgment. Accountability, balance, bridge with that which Hayy had experienced during his Philosophical voyage.[22]

Though the charge of inconsistency has been made by Ibn Tufayl against Ghazzali; He alleges that in the works of Ghazzali which are meant for general readers, he is "bound in one place and loose in another and has denied certain things and then declared them to be true". Moreover, he says about

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Ghazzali:—that he was a scholastic with the scholastics, a Philosopher among the philosophers and a Sufi among Sufis.[23]

Ibn Tufayl tries hard to resist the temptation, to which Ghazzali had succumbed of preaching to the crowd and the urge to lecture like an untempered rationalist at the cosmos. But if he speaks Softly he does not keep silent like a mystic. He addresses his own dear friend when he hopes he will become his disciple unlike a pure mystic, he believes he can convey what he knows; unlike a pure rationalist he does not think he can "Convince every one", not every one is capable of sound reasoning.[24]

Not to mention a beatific relation with God, he must find a disciple whom he can guide[25].

Ibn Tufayl explains himself why there is loosensess or compactness in Ghazzali's books. Although he enumerates various reasons to this effect, yet a critical evaluation of Ghazzali has been made by Ibn Tufayl at the same time.

He says that since the works of Ghazzali have been addressed to the masses of men, therefore he had to bind something in one place and to loosen it in another. He calls a thing heretical, in one place, but regards it as permissible in another. For instance, according to Ibn Tufayl, two of the opinions of the philosophers on account of which he has subjected them to takfir (or verdict of blasphemy) in the *Tahafut-al-Falasifah* are their denial of the resurrection of bodies and punishment (in the hereafter) to the Souls alone. He says further: "However in the beginning of his book called the *Mizanal-(al-Amal),* he tells us that these very opinions are held by the leading Sufis. And in his book called *al-Munqidh min al-Dalal, Wal Mufashi-hhal Ahwal* (means of Deliverance from Ignorance and the way of the Eloquent expression of the Mystical states) he says that his own beliefs are like those of the sufis, and he had arrived at that position as a result of prolonged investigations, so there are many things of this kind which can be perceived by such readers of his books as may study them closely and intently. Actually, he has tried to explain his practice (in this respect) in the latter part of his book *Mizanul-al-Amal.* For he says that opinions are of Three kinds. First, there are opinions which represent a man's attempt to go with the masses with regard to all they may believes. Secondly, there are those opinons that represent what one would say to persons who ask him questions and make enquiries with a view to being enlightened. Thirdly, there may be opinions which pass between a man and his own self, and which cannot be shared by any one else unless the two should be co-believers in it. Having given all these explanations. Ghazzali says:

"Even if these words contribute nothing but such as may throw your inherited beliefs in doubt, that would be not advantage to gain. For he who does not doubt does not think and he who does not think cannot see. And he who does not se remains in the state of blindness and bewilderment".

Finally, he quotes the following lines by way of illustration:—Take what you see, and give up what you may heard.

When the splendour of the sun is in sight, you have no need for the light of saturn.[26] According to Ibn Tufayl these are the teachings of Ghazzali, as most of them have been expressed in symbolic and indirect terms. Hence, they are quite uninstructive to his readers-unless they should enable them to bring their own insight to bear upon them, and should have heard them from their author, or should be prepared to understand them by means of their excellent natures which are responsive to the slight hint. In his Kitab *al-Jawahir,* Ghazzali tells us that he was written some books which ought to be withheld from unqualified persons, and which are devoted to the truth in the most explicit terms. Ibn Tufayl says:—

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"Here in Andalusia we have no knowledge of these books. There are some books which have been claimed by some persons to be the withheld books; but the claim is not true. One of these books is called *al-Maarif al-Aqliyah* (particulars of the rational knowledge). Another is called *Kitab al-Nafkh Wal Taswiyah.* In addition to these, there is also a collection of short treatises. Although these books contain some suggestive things, they do not add very must to what is already known about Ghazzali's teaching from the ideas interspersed in his well-known works. For instance, his al-maqsadal Asna contains thoughts which are profounder than the teachings of these books; and Ghazzali has indicated in explicit terms that the *Maqsad* is not one of the withheld books. It follows then, that the books in question (which have come to us) are not the 'withheld books.[27]

From these views as expressed by Ibn Tufayl, two points become very clear that the inconsistency which is apparently found in the books of Ghazzali owes its origin to the demands of the audience or times. Moreover, if Ghazzali has written various books for all readers, including masses, he has warned also against making several othr books accessible to masses or has declared several of his books prohibited for commonality of people.

Moreover almost all the books written by Ghazzali were available in Spain during Ibn Tufayl's times.

After dispelling this doubt about the inconsistency in Ghazzali; we will not try to show the impact of Ghazzali on Ibn Tufayl's epistemology.

The most important agreement between Ghazzali and Ibn Tufayl is found with regard to their theories of knowledge. Margaret Smith-sums up Ghazzali's Theory of knowledge by enumerating the following five faculties possessed by human Soul:

1. The sensory faculty.
2. The facylty of imagination.
3. The faculty of Intelligence.
4. The Reasoning power.
5. The Divine prophetic spirit or intuition.

In Ibn Tufayl we find that knowledge according to him does not fall outside these five sources. But for the sake of convenience he divides knowledge into three grades:

1. Knowledge of physical things
2. Knowledge of meta-physical things.
3. Knowledge of Saints.

These grades of knowledge virtually exhaust the kinds of knowledge enumerated by Ghazzali.[28]

Ibn Tufayl lays much stress on the sincerity and quest for the truth in the manner of Ghazzali in all his endeavours in the direction of epistemology. He says:

"We want to lead you through ways we have already traversed in the course of our wanderings (mystical experiences) and to swim with you across—so that all this experience may lead you wither so ever, it has led us. And then you will observe and realize, through your insight, that we have observed and realized_____and it is necessary that you should pursue it in complete freedom from distinction and through the concentration of all the enthusiasm you may devote to it. Should your resolve be

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genuine, and your intention to devote all your energy to this problem sound, then at the break of dawn your vigilant activity will find its gratification"_____[29]

Ghazzali in a similar manner elaborated the objective of his rearch and quest. He says:

"You have begged me to relate to you the difficulties I encountered in my attempt to extricate the truth from the confusion of contending sects and to distinguish the different ways and methods, and the venture I made in climbing from the plain of naive and second hand belief (Taqlid), to the peak of direct vision_____"

He says further:—

"_____I have ever bravely embarked on this open sea, throwing aside all craven caution; I have poked into every darkness, I have made an assaut on every problem, I have plunged into every abyass_____"[30]

This search for truth has led Ibn Tufayl to say in the out set of his principal treatise that:—

"Then you must know from the start that if you want the truth without flummery you must seek it and seek it diligently"[31]

Ghazzali didn't make any compromise with Taqlid or blind following. As he himself acknowledges in *al-Munqidh min al-Dalal.* To Ghazzali blind faith in authority, complacement acceptance of dogma and ignoring of the intellectual problems of religious (Taqlid) was the cardinal temptation facing the potentially aware. For the masses complacency is the natural state. For the man of ability it is a block which must be removed before stage of spiritual growth can be achieved. Ghazzali says:

"There is certainly no point in trying to return to the level of naive and derivative belief (taqlid) once it has been left, since a condition of being at such a level is that one should not know one is there; when a man comes to known that, the glass of his naive beliefs is broken".[32]

Ibn Tufayl following Ghazzali in like manner says:

"Nevertheless, if I tell you of the highest levels I reached

it would do you not more good than blind faith."[33]

After showing his disliking towards 'Taqlid' and interest for searching truth, Ghazzali has proceeded ahead to show the validity of various sources of knowledge before finally reaching to the state of ecstasy.

According to Ibn Tufayl, the Soul in its first state, is not a tabula rasa, or a blank slate. The image of God is implicit in it from the very beginning, but in order to make it explicit, we need to start with a clean mind, with neither bias, nor prejudice. Freedom from Social prejudices and prespossessions as a primary condition of all knowledge is precisely the idea behind Hayy's spontaneous birth in an uninhabited island. Sense experience is then first source of knowledge by which Hayy begins his Journey of knowledge about the world.

Experience is a process of knowing the environment through the senses. The sense-organs owe their respective functions to the animal Soul with its seat in the heart; from there the confused manifold of sense-data reaches the brain which spreads it all over the body through the nerve-paths. It is transmitted through the same paths to the brain, where it is organised into a perceptive whole.

Observation gives us knowledge about bodies which the inductive intellect, with its instruments

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of comparison and discrimination classifies into minerals, plants and animals. Each of these classes of bodies exhibits certain specific functions, which lead us to postulate specific forms or souls as the cause of the function peculiar to the bodies of different classes.[34]

Ghazzali in his own way too makes mention of it:

"You must know that all the sciences are imbedded in all the human selves, and all human beings are competent to attain or receive all sciences whatsoever. If a self or body is deprived of its share in these sciences, is because of the external causes or afflictions which take hold of it from outside."[35]

In *Munqidh,* Ghazzali says about sensory knowledge:

"I proceeded therefore with extreme earnestness to reflect on sense-perception and on necessary truths, to see whether I could make myself doubt them. The out come of this protracted effort to induce doubt was that I could no longer trust sense-perception either."[36]

Ibn Tufayl knows the limitations of his newly discovered method. Following Ghazzali, he sees no power in the cause which may necessarily produce the effect as it does. He sees the bond of causality in an act of synthesis which he ascribes to God. He cleared the clouds of scepticism by declaring with Ghazzali that the bond of causality is a synthetic act of God.[37]

Having gained sensory awareness of this eternally existing being whose existence is uncaused, but who is the cause of all existence, Hayy counted off his senses-hearing, sight, smell, taste and touch. None of these could grasp any thing but the physical or the attributes subsisting in it.[38]

Ghazzali set earnestly to examine the notes we derive from the evidence of the senses and from sight in order to see if they could be called in question. The result of a careful examination was that his confidence in them was shaken. He says:

"Our sight for instance, perhaps the best practised of all our senses, observes a shadow, and finding it apparently stationery pronounces it devoid of movement. Observation and experience, however, show subsequently that a shadow, moves not suddenly, it is true, but gradually and immediately, so that it is never really motionless."[39]

After showing the limitations and short-comings of sense perception, Ghazzali tried to rely only on intellectual notions based on fundamental principles. In Ibn Tufayl we find the similar developments about the theory of knowledge. All the world lies before Hayy, the stars, like limbs of some great dissected animal symmetrically displayed for his examination. This was the age of wonder. The Soul, seeks answer to higher questions and struggles with their meanings; the heart seeks a window for itself on the universe. Hayy's discovery forms the first experience of the intellectual, that is the truly spiritual world.[40]

According to Ibn Tufayl, there is in reason itself, a certain room for growth, room to seek beyond abstration and airtight proof in the tangles of whose impeccable logic all is solid, but conviction gives room for growth, reason might mature to wisdom.[41]

It is through the use of reason that Hayy, Ibn Tufayl's paradigm of mankind reaches his first knowledge of God's nature; he would remain ignorant even of God's existence were it not for reason.[42]

Z.A. Siddiqi views that while in discussing the influences on Ibn Tufayl's philosphy of Ghazzali cannot be ignored. But he adds apparently there are basic differences between them. Ghazzali holds

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reason and intellect in contempt while Ibn Tufayl believes that reason can give us knowledge of God but this knowledge is inferior to the knowledge of the Saints. In other matters two (e.g. causality, etc.) Al-Ghazzali is sceptic about the powers of reason, but Ibn Tufayl considers it a reliable guide sofar it goes.[43]

Here we want to say that prof. Siddiqi is not right when he alleges that Ghazzali holds "reason and intellect in contempt" and regards Ghazzali as sceptic about the powers of reason. These allegations can be easily refuted by citing Ghazzali's views petaining to reason and intellect. For example Ghazzali while showing the limitations of sense perception and enumerating the positive dimensions of reason, has explained his position in the following manner:

"Reason is the most suitable faculty to call it the light of the apparent eye for its great value as it is devoid of several defects.

I. Eye cannot see itself, but intellect conceives itself and its qualities as well when it conceives itself as a knowing and power full faculty, it also perceives the knowledge of its knowing and knows by means of its knowledge too to an infinitum.

II. The eye cannot see what is close or near to it or what is beyond itself but for intellect near and far are similar, it can rise on its direction to the heights of heavens and can also descend in a moment to the abysmal.

III. The eye can't perceive what is behind the evil, but the intellect moves freely about Throne, the Sedile, and everything beyond the veil of the heavens, and likewise about the Holy supernal, and the Realm celestial, Just as much as about its own world, and its propinquate, (that is its own). Kingdom, The realities of things stand unveiled to the intellignece. Its only veil is one which it assumes of its own accord, etc. and for its own sake, which resembles the veil that the eye assumes of its own sake, which resembles the view that the eye assums of its own accord in the closing of its eyelids etc, etc.[44]

By showing the defects of sense perception and feasibility of intellectual comprehension of things, Ghazzali hints in virtue of his intellect or aql, that man is "after the image of Allah" The aql, is "Allah's balance-scale upon earth".[45]

In its own sphere it is infallible from the aql, as from a firm taking off place, souls make their mystic Assension to the heavens.[46] It is because it is thus specifically human faculty that is a determinative element in the human sura.[47]

Ghazzali does not deny possibility of rational proofs for divine knowledge. As according to Ghazzali "all shariah sciences are rational ones to its scholar, and almost all rational sciences are shariah sciences according to a knowledgeable person."[48]

Ghazzali saw no contradiction between the rational and the traditional sciences, and he believed that they complemented each other. No man should content himself with the study of only one of them. The rational sciences are compared to food, while as the traditional ones are compared to mdeicine, (and the human body needs both).[49]

In this way, it is true that reason for Ghazzali is a humble search for truth and not a pround self-assertion, yet in the *Mishkat-al-Anwar,* a work of his last period, Ghazzali explicitly refers to the infinte possibilities immanent in reason through the dynamic self unfolding of which it has the capacity to transcend itself and capture the Absolute. Even in the *Tahafut-al-Falasifah,* he makes it clear that

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though the absolute will of God and His omnipotence is unconstrained by any external law or incumbency, yet it is confined with in the self-imposed reasons, law of contradiction.[50]

Even divine realities can be known by reason according to Ghazzali in a similar manner of Ibn Tufayl, Ghazzali says:

"When reason is abused, what else should be praised afterwards, how can reason be abused, when even shariah is known by held of it. It seems that reason takes a form of belief in itself (Aanul-al-Yaqeen) and light of belief (Noor ul-al-Yaqeen). Because man is characterised by intellect and separated from the animals by dent of it. He gets at the hold of the essence of reality of things through it".[51]

He says further that the example of the Quran is like the light of the sun and that of the reason is the light of eye.[52]

Goodman while talking about Ghazzali's rationalistic dimensions says:

"_____despite his opposition to some of the central doctrines of the mainstream of Islamized Greek Philosophy, it remains possible to say that for from writing the death warrant of Philosophy in Islam, Ghazzali, by questioning the dogmas of Philosophy and opening door to further fusion, gave Islamic Philosophy a new breath of life. If so, it is in this aspect of Ghazzali's achievement, the hope he gave to independence of mind, not only by what he practised, but also by what he preached, that Ibn Tufayl is his true heir".[53]

After discussing Ibn Tufayl's views, about sense-perception and reason, we will see how he reaches to the subjects of intuition and ecstasy etc. he says:

"When his thinking had rises to this level and the sensory world had been left behind to some extend, just as he was mounting to a height from which he could gaze out toward the approaches of the world of mind, Hayy felt alien and alone. He longed for the familiar would of the senses, balked at the notion of the unqualified body, a thing he could neither perceive nor possess, and fell back on the simplest objects he could see, the four he had already singled out.[54]

Ghazzali in the same manner caught by the fear of losing God, starts on his search for the foundation of religious faith. Ibn Tufayl, here follows the same pattern and like Ghazzali, Hayy wrings and advantage from his set back, finding firmer footing for his metaphysics in the elementary problems on which he is thrown back".[55]

It seems that Hayy passed from sceince to Philosophy and later from Philosophy to mysticism.[56]

Ghazzali at this stage said:

"After that I examined my motive in my work of teching, and realized that it was not a pure desire for the things of God, but that impulse moving me was the desire for an influential position and public recognition. I saw for certain that I was on the brink of a crumbling bank of sand and in imminent danger of hell-fire unless I set about to mend my ways".[57]

The feeling that Ghazzali was on the brink of a crumbling bank of sand and the danger of 'losing God' are found in Ibn Tufayl in the similar fashion. He says:

"This specious thinking might well have taken root in his Soul, had not God in His mercy caught hold of him and grounded him back to the truth". He then realized that he would never have fallen prey to such a delusion unless some shadows of the physical or taint of sensory things still lurked within him. For 'many' 'few' and 'one', 'Singularity' and 'Plurality'; union and discreteness "are all

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predicates applicable only to physical things".[58]

Through personal experience Ghazzali discovered that human reason, unaided by divine grace and mercy, will never free itself from doubt...He says:

"This did not come about by systematic demonstration or marshalled argument, buy by a light which God most high cast into my breast. That light is the key to the greater part of knowledge".[59]

In the same way, Ibn Tufayl points qut, without God's help Hayy Bin Yaqzan would have been unable to transcend the ordinary categories of human thought by which his confusion was generated. The special gratitude expressed by Ghazzali and obliquely by Ibn Tufayl, should not however, be taken for fideism. It must be borne in mind that for both thinkers, without God's generosity, reason itself would not exist.

All awareness and all perfections come from God.[60]

Moreover, following Ghazzali's kitab *Madnun as-Sagir,* Ibn Tufayl affirms that the meaning of God's creation of man is the joining of body and soul.

In this way after educating the senses and the intellect and noticing the limitations of both, Ibn Tufayl finally turns to the discipline of the spirituality, leading to ecstasy, being the highest source of knowledge. In this state, truth is no longer obtained through a process of deduction or induction, but is perceived directly and intuitively by the light within. The soul becomes conscious of itself and experiences "which the eye hath never seen, nor ear ever heard, nor the heart (mind) of any man ever conceived".

The state of ecstasy is ineffable and indescribable, for the scope of words is restricted to what can be seen heard, or conceived. Divine essence, being pure light, is perceived only by the light within which comes into its own through the proper education of the senses, intellect, and spirti. The knowledge of essence, therefore, is itself essence. Essence and its vision are identical.[62]

But this knowledge never comes without personal efforts, meditations and solitude works as its sources. Hayy declined to stay among common people and did not offend. Ibn Tufayl says:

"So say good bye to them [Hayy and Absal] the two left their Company and discretely sought passage back to their own Island".[63]

Ghazzali too had found it necessary quietly to withdraw from a harried and much scrutinized life. He discovered much against his will, that he was in grave danger of becoming a hypocrite and a time-server unless he removed himself from the stage of his students, demands and the arena of emulation with his colleagues long enough to examine himself and his life and thinking in solitude with his conscience and his God. He says:

"In due course I entered Damascus, and there I remained for nearly two years with no other occupation than the cultivation of retirement and solitude, together with religious and ascetic exercises, as I busied myself purifying my soul, improving my character and cleansing my heart for the constant recollection of God most high, as I had learnt from my study of mysticism. I used to go into retreat for a period in the mosque of Damascus, going up the minaret of the mosque for the whole day and shutting myself in so as the be alone."[64]

In search of solitude, Ghazzali wandered about many places. Apart from Syria, he went to Iraq, Mecca, Medina and Jerusalem.

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For Hayy the danger was perhaps less visible, but equally grave if he stays among men-even for the service of the illusory ideal of saving them, he will become one of them. He will be involved in human concerns, lose purity ofhis experience. Ultimately, he will become subject to doubt and delusion, like the rest. For ordinary men, all this may be necessary, but for Hayy Bin Yaqzan, a higher course has been marked out.[65]

After realizing this fact, Hayy decided to leave the Company of the people and understood:

"There is a man for every task and everyone belongs to the life for which he was created."[66]

Hayy now understood the human condition. He saw that most men are no better than unreasoning animals, and realized that all wisdom and guidance, all that could possibly help them was contained already in the words of the prophets and the religious traditions. None of this could be different. There was nothing to be added.[67]

Hayy's acceptance of this dogma must be viewed in light of his "Kitam" and Ibn Tufayl's enunciation of it must be qualified by Ghazzali's doctrine that for elite an allegorical interpretation is necessary, where literal one is impossible.

Moreover, Ghazzali points out, one man's medicine is another man's poison, when he says:—

"My purpose here, however, is to describe my own case, not to disparage those who sought a remedy thereby, for the healing drugs vary with the disease. How often a sick man's medicine proves to be another's poison."68

Hayy does not reject image of the truth conveyed by traditional religion, nor does he scorn the discipline by which traditional religion controls man's violent tendencies.[69]

In this way after showing limitations of reason and validity of mystic experience, Ibn Tufayl talks about the allegorical meanings of various themes.

Ibn Tufayl contrary to Al-Kindi, Al-Farabi and Ibn Sina was attracted like Ghazzali to the symbolic, metaphorical, analogical and allegorical style of expression to express his views through his philosophical romance *Hayy Bin Yaqzan.* As according to Ibn Tufayl, Hayy reached to knowledge of reality through ratiocination and mystic experience which does not contradict religious dogmas of divine world, belief in heaven and Hell, day of judgment and resurrection, Accountability, balance bridge. Ibn Tufayl divided people in different groups in the manner of Farabi and Ibn Sina.

He says that there is a group of people who can't comprehend the knowledge about reality. Therefore, people should confine their attention to abide by the dictates of Shariah, as long as these dictates are not expressed in analogical or metaphorical way. If these people are exposed to the knowledge of reality, they will be misled. There is however, a second group who have been endowed with very high rational capabilities, which separate them from the common people, these people can avail from intuitive and mystical knowledge about the real nature of things.

It is in conformity with these facts that Ibn Tufayl thinks that there is esoteric and exoteric aspects found in Shariah dictates and there are people who are capable of receiving either of the aspects of the same.[70]

Ibn Tufayl distinguishes between theoretical or metaphysical knowledge and the knowledge of the saints (Idrak-Ah-al-Nazar and Idrak-al-Wilayat). He criticises Ibn Bajjah for denying the latter and for confining himself to the former only. He has no sympathy with Philosophers like Ibn Bajjah and Al-

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Farabi on account of their intellectual approach and shows respect for men like Ghazzali and such other mystic Philosophers.[71]

Ibn Rushd thinks that through Sufi ways, some intuitional facts can be discovered, but he does not invest reliance on it.

While as Ibn Tufayl regards Sufism a paradigm of knowledge to differentiate between the human and Divine world. But Ibn Rushd does not regard this knowledge satisfactory, as this knowledge is not open to all, as he relies only on the reason and argumention for the discovery of truths and pursuit of reality. Ibn Tufayl too says that the realities which are exposed to the sufi defy all expressions and interpretations. In a mystic rapture (Wasl) the experiences which a sufi has are inexpressible in human terminology. Ghazzali has expressed similar views in *Munqidh.*[72]

Ibn Tufayl says:—

"A person who wants to disclose these things to people is like a person who is attempting to perform an impossible thing. He is like a man who wants to taste the colours as colours, or for instance things that blackness should assume a form of sweetness or bitterness". He says further "that a person in such condition listens a voice, which he discerns, and, if remains constantly in this rapturous state then he observes such things which cannot be seen by eyes, listened by ears, nor can be comprehended by any heart."[73]

According to Ibn Tufayl:

"You may be asking what is actually seen by those who under go the experience and reach intimacy. If so this is some thing which cannot be put into a book. Whenever any one tries to entrust it to words or to the written page its essence is distorted and it slips into that other, purely theoretical branch of discourse. For clothed in letters and sounds and brought into the perceptible world, it cannot remain, in any way, what it was".[74]

Ghazzali also talks about various methods of knowledge, and classifies people at least in three categories. He says:—

"The section of people who are to be invited to the way of Allah with wisdom (Hikmah) are separate from that section of people who are to be invited with good sermons, that too is different from the section of people who are to be invited to the way of Allah by way of polemical argumentation (MuJadalah). Because if the second category of people will be invited to the way of Allah with wisdom it will harm them as a baby which is being fed on milk will be provided with meat of birds as its food. In the same way if the polemical argumentation is applied to the people of wisdom it will make them abhorrent as a taste of a strong man will be abhorrent by milk of human being."

"If polemical discussion with the people who have tendency to polemics is not being carried on in a beautiful way as Quran teaches, it will be tantamount to feel a villager with a bread which is being used by city dwellers, as he is only accustomed to dates or to provide a city dweller with a date to which he is not used to."[75]

In the same way Ghazzali, like Ibn Tufayl holds that intuitive knowledge cannot be revealed to other people, he says:

"It is unwise to give a detailed account of gnosis, for the more one seeks words to express it (Ma rifat) the more one feels the impossibility of describing the thing by any of our usual image. A hint

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in this connection may be of some use to those who are interested. Gnosis or Ma'arifat is knowledge given in ecstasy peculiar to saints who behold God with their heart. The knowledge differs altogether from intellectual and traditional knowledge."[76]

In yet more clear words Ghazzali says about this mystic knowledge as follows:

"In general what they manage to achieve is nearness to God; Some, however, would conceive of this as 'inherence' (hulul), some 'as Union' (Ittihad), and some as 'connection.' (wusul). All that is erroneous._____; yet he who has attained the mystic 'state' need do not more than say:

"Of the things I do not remember, what was, was; Think it good; donot ask an account of it".[77] Ibn Tufayl says:

"A mystic may feel so exalted by the joy and wonder of his experience, that he may utter blesphemous ejaculations like Hallaj's famous ecstaticcry 'I am the Truth." Such exclamations, Ibn Tufayl believes, would be impossible given adequate training in intellectual pursuits.[78]

According to Ibn Tufayl, Ghazzali was protected from such lapses by the refinement of his mind through education.[79] Reason and the mystic experience seem to have found symbolic Union in Ibn Tufayl's thought. Reason is never discarded by him as never by Ghazzali.

Ibn Tufayl sees the essence of the world with its seventy thousand faces, each face with seventy thousand mouhts, and each mouth with seventy thousand tongues, all praising, glorifying and extolling God. Hayy sees himself as it were-among these faces, he achieves Union with the God head.[80]

Ibn Tufayl's placement of the beatific experience as denouncement and the reverent periphrasis with which that experience is described seem to leave no doubt as to how he answered the questions of religious philosophy clearly, he was a mystic plain and simple. It is for climactic Union with God that all the rest takes place.

The most peculiar feature of Ibn Tufayl's mysticism is his consistent refusal of reason to abdicate its role. Ghazzali's influence in both these cases seems very evident, as Ghazzali has also discussed the problem of beatific Vision in *Mishkat Anwar*. Moreover, he has never rejected reason even in matters of religious and mystical matters. Reason has its role though restricted in several senses.

According to Ghazzali:—

"Assuredly, then, the kindling source of those spirits Terrestrial is the divine spirits, Supernal, described by Ali and Ibn Abbas, when they said that "Allah hath an Angel with countenances seventy thousand, to each countenance seventy thousand mouths, in each mouth seventy thousand tongues where with he Laueth God most high".[81]

The above quoted passage seems to be a word to word depiction of Ghazzali's views. This is the attitude of Ibn Tufayl towards various mystical and divine matters. Ghazzali's influence on Ibn Tufayl is traced in his views on intuition, ecstasy and revelation.

About the intuitive experience Ibn Tufayl shows his indebtedness to Ghazzali and Ibn Sina. He confessed that what ever understanding of truth he had was because of their influence on him. He says:

"I myself would not have gained what truth I have attained, the culmination of my intellectual efforts, without pursuing the arguments of Ghazzali and Avicenna, checking the one against the other, and comparing the result with the views that have sprung up in our era, so fervently admired by self

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appointed philosophers, until finally I was able to see the truth for myself first by thought and theory and now in my first brief taste of the actual experience."[82] This actual experience and its taste which in other works can be called "Dhauq", was also Ghazzali's concern, as he says:—

"I thus comprehended their fundamental teachings on the intellectual side, and progressed, as far as is possible by study and oral istruction, in the knowledge of mysticism. It became clear to me, however, that what is most distinctive of mysticism is something which cannot be apprehended by study, but only by immediate experience (dhawq-literally 'tasting'). by ecstasy and by a moral change."[83]

Since the role of heart is very important in intuitive and mystic experience, the conceptual treatment of heart here is similar to that of Ghazzali. Ibn Tufayl regards heart not only the physical or spiritual organ in our body, but as a spirit which spreads "its powers throughout the human body." He further says:

"Now by 'heart' do I mean only the physical heart or the spirit it encloses. I mean also the form of that spirit which spreads its power throughout the human body. All three of these might be termed 'heart'; but there is no way of articulating this experience in any of them, and only what is articulated can be expressed. The ambition to put this into words is reaching for the impossible—like. wanting to taste colours, expecting black as such to taste-either sweet or sour."[84]

The "heart is not the seat of the emotions to Ghazzali, but rather the seat of his experiential apprehension of the world. It is a transcendent spiritual refinement or subtlety. Its connection with the physical heart has been the despair of the minds of men."[85]

About heart Ghazzali holds:

"And by the heart I do not mean the palpable matter of flesh but one of the mysteries (sing. sirr) of God which the bodily senses fail to perceive; a spiritual substance (Talafah) from God, sometimes indicated by the word spirit (ruh) and at times by the calm soul (al-nafs al-mutmainnah). In law it is referred to as the heart (al-qalb), because it is the primary vehicle for that mystery (Sirr), and through it the whole body becomes to be a vehicle and instrument for that spiritual substance."[86] While making difference between rational and mystical realities, Ibn Tufayl indicates in the manner of Ghazzali as follows:

"The difference is an increase in what is seen and in the fact that this is experienced through what I must, only figuratively, call a faculty."

Thus the difference between the rationalist and those who enjoy intimacy isi that while both are concerned with the self save things, the latter enjoy a cleaver view and far greater delight.[87]

Now coming to ecstasy or 'dhauq' Ibn Tufayl shares most of the views of Ghazzali when he says:

"This ecstasy, to the taste of which is one of a number of stages in the progress of the devotee".[88]

According to Goodman the "metaphorical faculty is now given its (metaphorical), name, dhawq, the taste, i.e. intuition, of God. The distinctive thing in mysticism, writes Ghazzali, "cannot be grasped by study, but only by immediate experience (dhawq)". Technically, dhawq is the first stage of enlightenment beyond the ordinary."[89]

Ibn Tufayl while tells us what is revealed in mystic experience, no matter what he sees, he will

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turn from it to the sacred presence, reminded of same aspect of the Divine, and again he will be overwhelmed. Thus he begins to see the truth in everything.

Ghazzali explains in *Ihyaulum ad-Din,* That the monotheism of the mystic is monism. He sees nothing in all being but God. The object of his Love, whom he calls the Truth. According to Ghazzali the self becomes a barrier between the mystic and his God and the task of the sufi is to strip away this last veil and lose himself in God.

The emotional and the "overwhelming" which the mystic undergoes is symptomatic of the initiation of the process in which the self is lost. The process would seen to be totally destructive. But for Ibn Tufayl, as far Ghazzali; the mind provides safeguards against total annihilation, loss of self is not loss of consciousness, but rather the highest form of consciousness. Thus the self remains beyond the dying into self is found the death of death; which to Ghazzali is the birth of life eternal.[90]

According to Ibn Tufayl when Hayy proceeded to inquire how he had attained this knowledge of a Supreme Being who was altogether immaterial, he concluded that it was not gained through a bodily organ or power but through the soul, which is entirely distinct from body and which constituted the very essence of his self hood. This discovery brought him to a full awareness of the nobility of his soul, its superiority over the whole material Universe, and its independence of the condition of generation and corruption which affect body alone, the ultimate happiness of this soul, he also realized, was bound up which the recognition of its Kinship to the necessary being and its diligence in contemplating this being, who is the supreme object of knowledge.[91]

The ultimate goal of the seeker after truth, then, was annihilation of self or its absorption in God (fana), which al-Junayd had set up as the culmination of the mystical life. To attain this goal, the seeker should dwell on the two aspects of God's nature: the positive and the negative, since the positive attributes of God are all reducible to His unity or the identity of attribute and essence in Him, the genuine Knowledge of God resolves itself to the knowledge is His absolute unity since the negative attributes are reducible to His transcendence and incorporeality. Knowledge rooted in these attributes is never adequate. The consciousness of the corporeal, as indeed of the seekers own identity, constitutes a bar to the pure or genuine knowledge of the Being who is fully other. Thus only once the finite self and the whole world of corporeal entities have been left completely behind and the seeker has risen to the realization that there is no other being except God, is it given him to "see what eye no has seen., no ear has heard, and has not occurred to any one at all." This final stage is kind of intoxication, which has led some to identify themselves with the object of this contemplation i.e. God. Hayy however, was guarded from this temptation by God's grace like other sufi writers Ibn. Tufayl dwells on the ineffability of this ultimate condition of "utter annihilation." He does not refrain; however, from describing it in allegorical and oblique terms, although he held it to be clearly "for above reason."[92]

The final vision of Hayy is thus described in graphic terms that represent a remarkable amalgam of Neo-platonic and sufi doctrine, similar in many ways to that of Ghazzali. Upon attaining the fina stage of utter annihilation, Hayy was even able to perceive the highest heaven and that immaterial entity ("dhat") which was neither the essence of the true one, the soul of that heaven, nor something else.[93] That entity may be compared to the reflection of the sun in a mirror, from which it is nevertheless distinct.

Ibn Tufayl before talking about prophetic revelation says that finally Hayy reaches to a state of tranquility:

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"Finally his efforts bring him to a stage where his moment of recognition turns to tranquil contemplation; his stolen glimpses, familiarity; his spark, a limpid flame. He has gained an understanding as unshakable as that of an old friendship."[94] He says futher:

"But to those who reach love, God grants what I purely metaphorically call another faculty. This corresponds to the restoration of sight. And sometime, rarely, there comes a man whose eyes, as it were, are always open, whose glance is always piercing, who does not need to search."[95]

Here it seems that Ib Tufayl thinks that men are born in a state of nature; and if they are well fomed, as is Hayy, their natural endowment or 'fitrah' will bring them to the highest level of understanding a human being can attain.[96]

Ghazzali had already said in clearer terms in this regard something which guided afterwards Ibn Tufayl to believe that a man can return to his original fitrah after a "purgatory process" and mystic experience. But that state of nature is to be discovered by man himself. He says for example:

"I heard, too, the tradition related of the prophet of God according to which he said: Everone who is born is born with a sound nature; it is his parents who make him a Jew or a Christian or a Magian; My in most being was moved to discover what this original nature really was and what the beliefs derived from the authority of parents and teachers really were."[97]

At another place Ghazzali says:

"The "Nafs-al-Natiqah" of a human being is capable to be enlightened by "Al-Nafs-al-Kuliyyah" and is also able to accept ideal pictures with force of their real purification and original purgation_____some (people) remain intact on their original health without any difficulty, as they remain receiving or perceiving these realities up to their time of death."[98]

About prophetic knowledge, Ibn Tufayl says that prophets too have the intuitions; their main source of knowledge is revelation from God. The knowledge of the prophet is direct and personal.

Ghazzali says about superiority of revelation on other sources of knowledge as follows:

"In general the man to whom He has granted no immediate experience at all, apprehends on more of what prophetic revelation really is than the name. The miraculous graces given to the saints are in truth the beginnings of the prophets".[99]

The knowledge of prophets is to tally inconceivable by human reason.[100]

The other features of prophetic revelation are apprehended only by immediate experience (dhawq) and from the practice of the mystic way._____[101]

Dr. Abdul Halim Mehmood denies such influence of Ghazzali on Ibn Tufayl and does not regard him as the follower of Ghazzali and rather thinks that is Ibn Tufayl following his own independent line of thought.[102]

In the same way proff...Saeed Sheikh thinks that the charge of inconsistency against Ghazzali has also been made by Ibn Tufayl.[103]

But both these points have been refuted fully by us, while showing influence, indebtedness impact of Ghazzali on Ibn Tufayl on almost all aspects of his thought. Not only in epistemology, Ibn Tufayl follows Ghazzali in a good deal but in matters of ontology and metaphysics, a glaring and conspicuous influence of Ghazzali can easily be discerned, as has been discussed above. The creationism

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or eternalism, Divine being, Reason and revelation, priority of time over the world, mystic experience, ecstasy, Neoplatonism, Illuminism etc. are such subjects on which Ibn Tufayl has written in the manner of Ghazzali. There is no substantial difference between the two Muslim philosphers about the treatment of these problems. Even the terms, cionage, metaphors, examples, similies, analogies and illustrations are common in these two. Goodman, Zaffar Ahmad Siddiqi and some other writers[104] have tried to highlight these points of similarity. But no systematic attempt has been made to show the tremendous impact of Ghazzali on Ibn Tufayl so far. Moreover, Ibn Tufayl was an Arabic Knowing Muslim with deep philosophical learnings. He made Ghazzali as his great "master" and followed him in his philosophical romance *Hayy Bin Yaqzan.* He has endorsed at various places in his treatise that he is following Ghazzali. In the same way, he has mentioned names of Ghazzali's books like *Tahafut-al-Falasifah; Mizanul-al-Amal; Al-Munqidh Min-al-Dalal; Jawahir-ul-al-Quran, Ihya Ulum al-Din, Mishkatul-al-anwar* etc. Moreover, Ibn Tufayl has, without mentioning the names of the books, even quoted various extracts from Ghazzali's writings, like *Ketab Madnun as Saghir, Al-Ilm Ludniya,* and *Iljamul-Al-Awam* etc. In this way we agree fully with Good man when he calls Ibn Tufayl as the "heir" of Ghazzali.

Regarding the second allegation that Ibn Tufayl has found faults or inconsistency in Ghazzali is also a superficial allegation. After going through deeply Ibn Tufayl's views, we only have to know that he merely shows Ghazzali's versatility and his ability to communicate with people according to their capacity, talent and temperament. Like Ghazzali Ibn Tufayl also believes in various interpretations of Reality. He believes in allegorical and metaphorical usage of language as well as very mystical mode of speech apart from classifying people into various categories according to their dispositions.

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5. M.M. Sharif, p. 532, op. cit.
6. Ibn Rushd, *Tahafut-al-Tahafut,* (ed-Bouyges), p. 117.
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89. Ibid, FF. p. 174.
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92. Ibid, pp. 267-68

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In the Mysteries of the Human Soul (being English Translation of Al-Ghazzali's, *Al-Madnun Bihi Ala Ghairi Ahlihi*) by Abdul Qayyum (Delhi 1992), p. 71.

Ghazzali says about beatific vision:

"People disagree among themselves on the real nature of seeing God literally, although removed from quantity and unlimited by directions and climes is nevertheless seen with eyes in our dreams, just as we see the prophet (Peace be upon him) in the same manner God's vision also is possible, just as it is possible to know Him without modality or form".

Ghazzali's influence on Ibn Tufayl is consipicuous about several problems and issues which have engaged him in his philosophical romance *Hayy Bin Yaqzan.* Both these philosophers consider the problem of existence and non-existence unintelligible without supposing priority of time over the world and don't accept priority of the time over the world. In the same way, both were not in favour of the eternity of world. While discussing various aspects of this problem, the issues of creationism and eternalism have emerged to the fore. Both have employed illuminationism to demonstrate their ontology. Ghazzali in *Mishkal ul-al-Anwar* has eloborated the philosophy of 'light' and vindicated the problematic of singularity and plurality of the Universe. Ibn Tufayl followed Ghazzali and has explained the problem in complete agreement with that of Ghazzali's views.

The most important influence of Ghazzali on Ibn Tufayl is in the field of epistemology. Reason, sense-perception and intuition as sources of knowledge have been eloborated by both the philosophers in a similar manner. The necessity of solitude for the improvement of Theoretical reason has been accepted by Ibn Tufayl as by Ghazzali earlier. Ecstasy is of reason in a most refined way and calls our attention as the problem has been dealt by Ghazzali himself.

93. *Hayy Ibn Yaqzan,* (Tr.), p. 79. op. cit:
94. Ibid, p. 96.
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96. Ibid, F.F. 177.
97. What are the reasons and causes which lead people to get deviated from the original condition of righteousness, have been expressed by Ghazzali thus:

"I have often seen groups of intelligent people deceived by the literal meanings (Zawahir) and at a loss to see differences and contradictions therein, and finally their basic beliefs collapse. As a result they go so far as to deny secretly the creeds of Eschatology, the Resurrection, paradise and hell, and the return to God after death. They express that in their hearts. The fear of God and piety no longer restrain them. They thrist after the dream of the wordly happoness, eat foridden foods, behave themselves in subordination to the wordly success. When they meet pious people, they look down upon them with pride and contempt_____. All this is due to the fact that they only see the external formal aspect of the things and do not attempt to look into the inner, real meaning. They consequently do not understand the relationship between the world of phenomena and the unseen world. When they, being ignorant of this relationship, are across the apparent contradictions they fall into error and lead others astray. Thus they cannot know the spiritual world through their own experience (Dhawq) like the religious virtuoso, nor do they believe naively in the unseen world like the common people. They are doomed to perdition because of their smartness. We do not think this cannot happen. We actually fell into

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depths of error for a while through our intercourse with the wicked friends. But God saved us there from and protected us from the danger" (52-53).

'Al Ghazzali's *Jawahir al-Quran* (Beirut: Dar-al al-Jadidah, 1393/1973), 35-37 as quoted by An approach to Ghazzali's conversion, Kojiro Nakamura, *Orient,* Vol: XXI, 1985, see also *Munqidh* (Tr.) p. 21. In *The Mysteries fo the human Soul* (Tr. Al. Ghazzali, *Al-Mudnun Bihi, Al Ghair, Ahlihi*) Delhi 1992, Tr. by Abdul Qayum, Ghazzali, says:

"The feeble minded with regard the literal and exoteric meaning sensible and will not go beyond it, but a wise man will comprehend the sceret it contains. There is a Divine Light which shines into the very depths of man's heart, provided he separtes himself from the followers of error and heresy and does good deeds".

"Renunciatian and contemplation give forth the true light, until the mind, eye of the mediator, perceives the vision of the beauty of the presence, which at one glance fills his mind to the exclusion of all other sights. The sensible world is a shadow and a sin a thick veil between man and God". p. 68, see also *Al-Risalah al-Ludniyah,* p. 119.

While discussing Divine and human knowledge, Ghazzali (In *The Mysteries of Soul*) Al-Ghazzali's *Al-Madnun Bihi 'Ala Ghairi Ahlihi'*, Translated by Abdul Qayyum Delhi, 1992, p. 38) says:

"The difference between God's knowledge and power and human knowledge and power is greater than the difference between any two things, for He is not composed of bodies within whose limits powers are diffused. His power and will and knowledge are one and the same as his essence. His life is not like our, which needs for its completion the two different powers which are manifested through our knowledge and action. On the contrary, His life is identitical with His essence".

99. *Al-Munqidh,* Tr, p. 61.
100. Ibid, p. 65.
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103. M. M. Sharif, Vol. I., p. 639.
104. "Ibn Tufayl's debt to Al-Ghazzali in his famous book *Hayy Bin Yaqzan* has been shown to be considerable" Massarat Hussain Zaberi, *Aristotle and Al-Ghazzali* Delhi, 1992, p. 140 while referring to Margaret Smith *Al-Ghazzali, the Mystic,* p. 203.

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7

Ghazzali and Ibn Rushd-Conflict and Concord

Ghazzali's impact on Ibn Tufayi, as already, discussed is very evident, especially on his epistemological ideas, while as this impact can be found on almost all aspects of Ibn Rushd's thought. Ibn Rushd's all three philosophical and theological treatises were mainly written in response to Ghazzali's books. No doubt, Ghazzali attacked philosophers in *Tahafut al Falasifah,* Ibn Rushd responded to that attack with a rebuttal in his *Tahafut al Tahafut,* but in the latter work full length quotations from the former are the greatest evidence of the concern of Ibn Rushd with Ghazzali's thought. In the same way in *kitab Fasl al Maqalwa Taqrir ma bainal Shariate wal Hikmati min al Ittisal,* he has dealt with the views of Ghazzali and refers to him at several places. In yet another treatise of Ibn Rushd entitled *Al-Kashf an Manhij al Adillah fi Aqid il millah, we tarif mawaqfiha bi hasb il tawil minshubhil Muzibah wa Bid ill Mudillah.* Ibn Rushd quotes full extracts from Ghazzali's book like *Fayi al Tafriqa bainal Islami wa zindiqah,* about various kinds of existence with approval.

Moreover, he quotes Ghazzali in his defence about interpretation and also about the problems of bodily and spiritual resurrection.

The second aspect of this influence is that nowhere does Ibn Rushd complain about the non-availability of Asharite books, including Ghazzli is Spain, Ibn Rushd complains, no doubt, about the non availability of the Mutazilite books, but never about Asharite books, As he says:

"As to the Mutazilites, their books have not reached us in sufficient number in this peninsula (Spain) that we may be able to form a fair estimate of the method which they have adopted in this matter. But it seems that their methods are like those of the Asharites".[1]

Moreover apart from mentioning the name of abul Maali the teacher of Ghazzali, Ibn Rushd has mentioned of Ghazzali's different books as *Almaqasid Tahafut al Falasifah Jawahir al Quran, al Maznun ala Ghairi Ahlihi, Mishkat al Anwar.*[2] *Munqidh min al Dalal, Kimiyai saadat, Al Tafriqa bain al Islami was Zindiqah.* Moreover, Ghazzali has commented on the contents and substance of each of these books. This is an extra evidence about his indebtedness to Ghazzali.

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Apart from Ibn Rushd's commentaries on Aristotle, almost all his philosophical and theological treatises were written in responses to Ghazzali's views. In this way Ghazzali awakened Ibn Rushd from his "dogmatic Slumber" by writing *Tahafut al Falasifah.* Ghazzali's *Tahafut* was a great challenge to all those Muslim thinkers who had accepted the intellectual leadership of Aristotle. One such thinker was Ibn Rushd (Averroes) who accordingly took up the challenge and examined the arguments of Imam Ghazzali in a work known as *Tahafut al Tahaful.*[3]

Ghazzali's criticism of philosophers in this way was a catalyst for the supporters of Greek philosophy. It was bliss in disguise for philosophy. Abul Hassan Ali Nadvi says:

"The courageous criticism and to an extent, the denigration of philosophy by al-Ghazzali began a new chapter in the history of Islamic scholasticism, which was later brought to a successful completion by Ibn Taimiyah".[4]

Tahafut al Falasifah, caused stir in the ranks of philosophers who had to suffer an irreparable loss on account of it. However, after al Ghazzali there arose no philosopher worthy of note for one hundred years. At last, Ibn Rushd, a great admirer of Aristotle and as a spirited defender of philosophy wrote *Tahafut al Tahafut* (Incoherence of Incoherence) by way of rejoinder to *Tahafut al falasifah* by the close of the sixth century. Many scholars are of the view that if Ibn Rushd had not put up the defence on behalf of philosophy, it would have been coupled by the hostile criticism of al Ghazzali's philosophy was granted a fresh lease of life through the efforts of Ibn Rushd for another one hundred years.[5]

The *Tahafut al Falasifah* provoked a healthy criticism. Ibn Rushd wrote a rebuttal of it is 1180 in one of the greatest philosophical theological works, known as the *Tahafut al Tahafut* (Incoherence of the Incoherence), the *Tahafut al Tahafut* was rebutted by another *Tahafut* and so arguments and counter arguments went on for a long time[6] philosophy can not be killed by philosophy, for in the attempt to demolish philosophy, another philosophy comes up. The criticism of philosophy is a philosophy itself. In criticizing the philosophies of his predecessors. Ghazzali gave birth to a new philosophy.[7]

In this way Ghazzali's criticism had a positive role to evoke response from Ibn Rush, which gave philosophy a new life in the Islamic world.

After these preliminary remarks we can divide the sphere of Ghazzali's impact and influence on Ibn Rushd, into three headings. first there are several issues on which there is agreement between Ghazzali and Ibn Rushd. For example their views pertaining to kalam (Scholasticism), Varieties of Existences, Categories of people, and their verdict about Ibn Sina have many common points to share.

The second level of impact or influence becomes evident in several other issues, where the views of these philosophers seem in conflict to each other. Mysticism, classification and validity of sciences, Miracles and causation are such topics which are very prominent in this regard. Though the twenty points on which Ghazzali charged the Aristotelian philosophers expecially Ibn Sina and Al-Farabi; with incoherence and inconsistency apart from declaring them as infidels on three of these. Ibn Rushd follows with criticism and rebuttal of all these points. Much research has been done on almost all these aspects. We have chosen above topics under the title of conflict between the two philosophers.

Between these two extremes of agreement and conflict there are several points where a reconciliation between the views of the philosophers seems very evident. The issues like tawil. Accord between Religion and philosophy, intellect or reason etc. may be discussed in this regard.

Apat from these aspects, Ibn Rush had to respond to Ghazzali's decree against philosophy and

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philosophers. Which could amount to an accusation of kufr (Infidelity). If this accusation was true, the philosophers according to Islamic law would be put to death, unless they gave up philosophizing or proclaimed publicly that they did not believe in their philosophical doctrines.

Therefore, Ibn Rushd tried to accord reconciliation between various views of Ghazzali with his own and in his way attempted to safeguard philosophy. It is in this back drop that he attempts for a type of reconciliation with some of Ghazzali's theories and his attempt at showing harmony between religion and philosophy can be fully appreciated.

Since we want to confine our attention mainly to epistemological aspects of Ibn Rushd while showing influence or impact of Ghazzali on him, we will not deal with metaphysical or ethical issues in ths context. Moreover the main questions for which Ghazzali charged the philosophers of being irreligious amount to threem eternity of the world, denial of God's knowledge of particulars, and bodily resurrection. These questions have now merely a historical value and are not very relevant to the main subject of our reseach problem.

To start with there are several areas of agreement between Ghazzali and Ibn Rushd. For Example in chapter three of the *Faslal Maqal* which is clearly a conciliatory work, Ibn Rushd pays tribute to Ghazzali for his contribution to the development of the "sciences of asceticism of the future life",[8] Moreover, we find Ibn Rushd in agreement with Ghazzali on the need to avoid kalam. If Ibn Rushd's criticism lacks the moral condemnation which is characteristic of Ghazzali's position, Ibn Rushd's polemic disqualifies kalam on methodological grounds. In the *Fasl al Maqal,* his discussion of tawil considers three kinds of interpretative method regarding theological issues,"rhetorical, dialectical and emonstrative."[9] The mutakallimeen employ dialectical proofs which Ibn Rushd rejects as illegitimate, even though he was prepared, like Ghazzali, to extend a qualified tolerance to other aspects of kalam.[10] Ibn Rushd while showing the incompetence of kalam arguments explains:-

"From the forgoing it has become clear that the well-known methods adopted by Asharites for the knowledge of God are certain neither philosophically, nor by law. This would be quite clear to any one who would look closely into the kind of arguments advanced in the Divine Book about the knowledge of the existence of the creator".[11]

Ghazzalis' views vis-a-vis kalam are very similar to Ibn Rushd. Though Ghazzali allows indulgence in Kalam sciences at the time of urgency, yet he cautions against obsession with IImul al kalam. While explaining the need of IImul al kalam Ghazzali says:

"Therefore the introduction of new terms to signify a definite meaning is just as legitimate as inventing vessel of new shape and far from use in permissible things. If it is the meaning of these terms which is dangerous, we do not mean to attain through them anything except the knowledge of the proofs for the creation of the universe, the unity of the creator, and (the nature of) His attributes as they have come down to use in the Law".[12]

Ghazzali considers it obligatory to reply the questions of the misguided people and dispel the doubts or innovators. For example, the rejection of philosophers in the matters of the eternity of the world. His knowledge of Universals on the expense of particulars and resurrection of souls instead of bodies warrants our attention to study the arguments of the philosophers as they have expressed pertaining to these matters. In this way Ghazzali regards the study of IImul al Kalam as Fard al Kifayah, although according to Ghazzali its harm to common people is very enormous.[13]

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About the real status of Ilmul al Kalam, Ghazzali says:

"We return now to the science of scholastic theology (Ilam al Kalam) to say that it has advantages and disadvantages, usefulness and harms. With regard to its use fullness, whenever it is useful it is either lawful, or commendable, or obligatory, as the occasion demands. As to its harm, whenever it is harmful it is unlawful. Its harm lies in raising doubts and undermining the articles of faith by taking them out from the realm of certitude and determination. These things are lost at the beginning and their restoration by means of proof is doubtful, further more it varies with the individual".[14]

When both its harm and benefits are fully understood by a man, he should be like the Physician who is expert in the use of dangerous drugs, which he does not apply except to the right place only at the time of need.[15]

Still more degree of disgust can be imagined by Ghazzali's these remarks concerning 'kalam' or scholastic fanaticism, he says:

"As to the lay man who believes in a certain innovation he should be called back to the truth with kindness and tact and not with fanaticism, with soft words which are convinving to the soul and effective in the heart, words similar to those of the arguments of the Quran and the tradition, mixed with a little admonition and warning. This is much better than debate along the lines set down by the scholastic theologians".[16]

It means that the indulgence in acquiring Ilmul al kalam is justified only when need for refutation of innovators is felt. At that time, it may take a form of an act one of Fard al Kifayah. But at the same time Ghazzali warns:-

"For this is like drugs, and jurisprudence is like food, the harm of food is not dangrous but the harm of drugs is dangerous".[17]

According to Ghazzali the learned men of this science should confine their instruction to men who have the three following traits:

1. Devotion to knowledge and passion for it.
2. Sagacity, intelligence, and eloquence.
3. A man, by nature should be good, religious and pious, he should not be dominated by passions.[18]

Ghazzali justified the debate with innovators at the time of need by quoting the reports of Ibn Abbas's debate with the Kharijites, Ali's debate concering free will (Qadir) which show that their solution was of the clear and intelligent kind, carried out at the time of need. Ghazzali claims that:

"This is the rule of the creed which God imposed on man and the method of defending and preserving it".[19]

From these passages the following points became clear

1. Ghazzali made the rejection of the misguided people and innovators as an obligatory duty for the Muslim scholars, which can be only performed after the in-depth study of the former's views and thought patterns.
2. Ghazzali regards Ilmul al Kalam harmful for the common masses, but when the times demand regards, indulgence in this science for defending religion and combating innovators, necessary

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in order to dispel the doubts raised by the sceptics and heretics. In the same way, Sciences of the predecessors, for example, philosopher, (though these sciences are harmful for common masses) should be acquired for getting deeper insights in these sciences and this reliance on these sciences becomes obligatory when the circumstances demand.[20] The study of this science is analogical to Ilm al kalam, which aims at condemnation and rebuttal of the misguided people, Zanadiqh innovators.[21]

In this way this criticism of kalam occurs throughout Ghazzali's writings and is central to his thought. After his analysis of kalam in the kitab *Qawaid al aqaid,* he concludes:-

"Listen to one who has familiarised himself with the kalam and after a careful study and thorough investigation—has come to dislike it and has ascertained that the road to what knowledge really is closed from this direction".[22]

It is on grounds of its inability to provide a true knowledge of God that Ghazzali like Ibn Rushd passes an ultimately negative judgment upon kala, even while according it a qualified usefulness, in the hands of suitably learned scholars, in defending the varieties of revelation.

Ibn Rushd excludes kalam from treating basic theological questions. His criticism is based not only on its negative results, but on the wrongfulness of its arguments. In the *Tahafut al Tahafut* he often complains that the Mutakallimeen employ false premises in their arguments; on other occasions, he accuses them of falling back on acts of sophistry like the use of "transference".[23]

Ibn Rushd says:-

"When the theologians answered that will is a quality the nature of which is to differentiate the similar from the similar, in so far as it is similar, the philosophers objected that this is not understood or meant by the idea of will. They therefore appear to reject the principle which they granted them in the beginning (i.e. they reject the idea of a divine will, at least in the theological sense). This is in short the content of this section. It saves the arguments from the original question to the problem of the will, to shift ones ground, is an act of sophistry".[24]

In *Fasl al Maqal,* Ibn while discarding the arguments both of Mutazilities and Asharites as against the pattern established by the Quran says that their arguments lack "convincing truth-fullness", "universal acceptability righteous call" which is the raisin dater of the divine arguments of the book. He says:

"Their interpretations are neither generally acceptable, nor do they make any call to the righteous, nor are they right in themselves" It is for this reason that innovation has increased..."[25]

In *Manahijah al Adilah* he says:

"The Asharites are of the opinion that the verification of the existence of God cannot be attained but by reason. But about this they have adopted a method, which is not among the methods adopted by law, nor are the people invited through it to believe".[26]

According to J.P. Montada we can find no reasons for a polemic between Ibn Rushd and Ghazzali. Both agree that kalam is not the way to truth. Though they don not agree upon where the way to it is to be found. Montada says further than Ibn Rushd does not reject the intuitive knowledge of the sufi dhawa; nor Ghazzali the rational knowledge of the philosophers. Yet the polemic does take place because both are moving on a rational level and because Ghazzali in spite of his critique, makes use of

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kalam.[27]

Though Ibn Rushd does not reject mystical knowledge in an explicit manner, yet his views regarding mysticism are negative in nature as he does not consider mystical experience as a universally acceptable channel of genuine knowledge.[28]

"Burhan" according to Ghazzali is not less important for thelogians as it is for philosophers. Ibn Rushd and other philosophers have insisted on its use, while they laid emphasis on acquiring insight from the doctrines and sciences of their predecessors.

Since this enterprise encompasses all the modes and styles of arguments, their prerequisties, methods of evidence, it is not possible for an individual to undertake this responsibility, hence a person has to depend and rely on the efforts of his predecessors. Ghazzali has in the same way made deep study of and mastery over IImu al Kalam necessary and declared indulgence in it very urgent and as a Fard al Kifayah. So that the person involved in this enterprise may be able to establish an argument.

Ghazzali in the similar manner thinks that the misguided people should be combated with "Burhan" (demonstration), for the reason Ghazzali made it use for its own sake as an obligation as was done by Ibn Rushd that the search for "Burhan" from the books of the predecessor philosopher is an an obligation. Though Ghazzali assigns great importance to IImul al kalam, but at the same time, he cautions with against a dogmatic obsession with IIm-al-kalam. Ghazzali employed the same criterion for himself in these matters as he had done about the problem of concern with philosophy, especially the study of the Greek philosophy.[29] He says:

"The people who are busy with the recognition of the facts, they need a complete attention in this regard. The common people should be kept away from IIm-al_kalam as the children should be stopped from going near to the banks of river Tigress for the fear of their getting drowned there. The people, who are capable for undertaking study of these sciences are like the master divers, as this place is very dangerous and prone to slippery, as each person, who is weak in mental competence, presume that they are the best in mental capabilities as they are fully competent to comprehend all facts..."[30]

The crux of these discussions is that Ghazzali and Ibn Rushd both have allowed the study of the books of the predecessors for the sake of getting acquaintance with "Burhan" (demonstration), but Ghazzali allows this study to only a small quantity of people, who are well established in reasoning and in possession of vast information about religious matters. Even in that case he narrowed their scope, i.e. ift they are not prone to misguidance and he also precuations that the common masses should not follow them even in this restricted sphere. At the most he allowed it as a theoretical enterprise and prohibited from its practice. But so far as Ibn Rushd is concerned, he regards this study immune from all precautions for the superior class of people.[31]

We are led logically from the discussion of kalam to the classification or categorisation of people which was made by Ghazzali and Ibn Rushd on a somewhat similar plane. Because the indulgence in "demonstration" has been approved by both Ghazzali and Ibn Rushd from the people who are very sound mentally and fully conversant with the science of law. For the common masses both the thinkers consider following the authority (Taqlid) as the most safe course.

Ghazzali and Ibn Rushd agree that when revelation and reason run into a conflict with each other, the revelation should be interpreted metaphorically except when its conclusion is categorical. Here, Ghazzali gives revelation preponderance over reason, because, for him conflict with reason alone

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is not enough to justify the interpretation of a scriptural text. There needs to be additional evidence to justify the interpretation. Ghazzali holds that human beings, with regard to the understanding of the texts of the Divine law, fall into two categories; the generality of men and the "men of speculation." The duty of the masses is to follow the apparent meanings of the revelation and refrain from any attempt at their interpreation. But the duty of the men of speculation is to interpret those scriptural texts for which there is decisive proof to warrant their interpreation.[32]

Ghazzali says about the latter group and categorises them as:

"The men of speculation whose traditional belief has been troubled".[33] Ghazzali explains that the duty of the first of these two categories of people, the masses, is to follow the apparent (Literal) meanings of the Revelation and refrain from manipulation or even interpretation of it. They should also abstain totally from inquiry, involvement in theological discussion, and investiagtion of the "allegorical" texts (mutashabihat) of the Quran and the Hadith.[34]

As for the second category of people men of speculation, the theologians, they can investigate the meanings of texts of the Revelation according ot the dictates of necessity and interpret them on the basis of a decisive proof that justifies the interpretation.[35]

Ghazzali cities two examples from the past for this category of people thus:

"This is like what has been related about, Umar-God pleased with him that some one asked him about two conflicting verses of the Quran, and he struck him with a whip. It is also like what has been reported of Malik-God have mercy on him, that he was asked about the being firmly seated" (al Istiwa: i.e. on the throne), and he replied: The being firmly seated is something well known, and fait in it obligatory, but the modality is unknown, and inquiry about it is an innovation".[36]

Yet in another book i.e. *Al-Qistasal Mustaqeem,* Ghazzali classifies people at least into three categories from the point of view of calling them to God. There is a section of people who are to be invited to the way of Allah with "Hikmah" (wisdom). The second group of people will be invited to the way of God will good admonitions and sermonizing. The third group will be invited to the way of Allah by the help of "polemical argumentation".[37] At this place, also Ghazzali categorised people into common masses and men of demonstration. The former group must be invited to Islam with "Muazit-u-al al-Hasanah" (good admonition) while as the other groups are to be called unto the way of God with "Hikmah" (wisdom) and "Mujadilah" (Polemical demonstration) respectively.[38]

Yet from an another angle, Ghazzali shows cateogires of people from the point of view of various maladies i.e. spiritual and physical. These categories are comprising on common people, who because of various reasons are not able to acquire any kind of knowledge. Some people according to him are afflicted with disease of forget-fulness (Al Nisiyan) about their memories. There is another group of people who busy themselves whole of their lives, but do not understand anything, but due to their perverted natures (Fasadi amzajatihim) do not respond to any cure or treatment. The third category of the people is in between these two categories of people. These people are very clean and pure in their natures at beginning. But with the passage of time their natures get afflicted with various disorders by their indulgence in bodily and ostentatious luxuries, therefore such people are in earnest need of a passionate guide (Mualim Mushfiq).[39] Therefore, Ghazzali has mentioned about various categories of people and has shown their propensities and spheres of indoctrination accordingly. However, from the general classification, be categorises people into main two groups i.e. common masses and people of speculation. Ibn Rushd divided mankind into three categories instead of Ghazzali's two. The first two

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categories are basically the same as those of Ghazzali. The third cateogry however, is the "people of demonstration" (ahl al burhan) i.e. the philosophers. By implication, this suggested that Ghazzali, contrary to Ibn Rushd, disapproves of the philosophers being the interpreters of the scripture, or at least does not give them any distinct position higher than that of the jurists and theologians on the issue. However, the former suggestion, i.e. that he disapproves of philosophers, at least those who are not at the same time jurists or theologians, as interpreters of the scripture seems to be at least as likely. [40] The most complete expression of Ibn Rushd's reationalism is to be found in his Decisive treatise on Harmony of Religion and philosophy" a work in which he divides people into three categories"the rhetorical class", the "dialecticians" and the "demonstrative class" (Ahlu Tasdeeqh, Ahlu Mujadilah and "Ahlu Burhan). For the first category, the convictions are the fruit of rhetorical arguments to which they trun when they wise to convince their listeners of a certain point into account. The second category uses dialectical arguments," in the Aristotelian sense of the term, that is to say their opinions are based on "generally accepted" plausible premises, unsuitable for procuring true knowledge. Members of the third categoy reach their convictions through demonstrations based on sound premises.[41]

Ibn Rushd identifies the rhetoricians with the "overwhelming mass" with the "crowd," that is, the body of faithful, who do not aspire to the subtleties of theology, and even less to those of philosophy, The dialecticians are the representatives of speculative (Theoretical, theology) and those who belong to the demonstrative class "are the philosophers who in all societies, constitute a small intellectual elite which is alone capable of acquiring true knowledge".[42]

Ibn Rushd has taken strong exception to Ghazzalian explanations about the problem of interpreations. He does not support disclosure of demonstrative argumentation before common masses. But Ghazzali himself, as a matter of fact, has confined and restricted scope of several of his books to the elite classes only, instead of the common masses, as alleged by Ibn Rushd. For example Ghazzali has overtly declared that books like *Al Maznun Ala Ghair Ahlihi* and *Al Maznun al Sagheer* are strictly meant for the elite class only. While as in his another important book entitled *Iljam ul al Awam Ilmul al kalam* has warned against indulgence of common people in such "doctrinal absurdities" whateever Ghazzali has said in his books, Ibn Rushd in the same essay lays much emphasis that common masses should depend and rely only on the explicit transparent teachings of shariah and remain strictly attached to the religious obligations and duties, as this remains the only way for them a get guidance from. As far as the inerpreation or speculation about religious matters is concerned, it is wholly and solely the prerogative of the elite class i.e. well established scholars in religious discourse (Rasikhoon-fil-al-Ilm) as they; cannot rest satisfied merely with dialectical or rhetorical modes of argumentation, with which the scholastics or the Mutazilites and Asharites get satisfied. This class of people (Ahlul al Burhan) receive mental satisfaction by utilizing various means to interpret religious doctrines, apart from employing different styles, as merely dogmatic instruction is not sufficient for their fuller satisfaction.[43] Ibn Rushd says:

"We have said there that the law is of two kinds: exoteric and esoteric. The duty of the common people is to follow the exoteric law, while as the duty of learned men is to follow the esoteric one so the duty of the common people is to follow the meanings of the law in their literal sense, leaving aside every interpretation of it"[44] Here it should be noted that Ibn Rushd did not regard mystic knowledge as an esoteric knowledge in the manner of Ghazzali. He calls knowledge of interpretation as an esoteric knowledge, but for Ghazzali this knowledge is confined to the saints only. For example he says:- "Furthermore, the science of revelation is the science concerned with the saints and the favorites

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of God. It stands for a light which shines in the heart when it is cleansed and purified of its blame worthy qualities. Through this light is revealed the truth of several things, whose names have hitherto often been heard, and to which ambiguous and obscure meaning have been attached. Through it, those truths are classified until the true knowledge of the essence of God is attained together with that of His eternal and perfect attributes, His works of wisdom in the creation of this world and the hereafter as well as the reason for his exalting the atter over the fomer. Through it also is attained the knowledge of the meaning of prophency and the import of revelation".[45]

In this manner Ghazzali and Ibn Rushd though agree that the esoteric knowledge is the prerogative of selected or chosen few, yet the connotations of their views are very much different from each other. We will discuss Ibn Rushd's views vis-a-vis esoteric knowledge at different level later on. Here it seems pertinent to keep this difference between the meanings assigned by both the thinkers on esoteric knowledge in mind. Moreover, Ibn Rushd does not allow revealing an interpretation to the common masses as this may lead them to doubts and suspicions. he says:-

"The learned men are not permitted to expose their interpretations to the common people, as Ali (upon whom be peace) has said, "tell the people what they can understnad. Do you wish to give the lie to God and His apostle".[46]

Because according to Ibn Rushd the masses can graspthings of their senses; while as the learned men can go further, and learn by reasoning also, besides learning by senses: A learned man can derive benefits from the knowledge of the members of human and animal body thousand and one. Since the common people have limited reasoning power, they lack knowledge about a single things even".[47]

Ibn Rush says:

"For all that such a man (common man), can know about it is that is (the universe) has been made, and that there must be a maker of it. But, on the other hand the learned look into the universe, just as a man of knowing the art would do, try to understand the real purpose of it. So it is quite clear that their knowledge about the maker, as the maker of the universe, would be far better than that of the man who only knows it as made. The atheists, who deny the creator altogehter, are like men who can see and feel the created things, but would not acknowledge any creator for them, but would attribute all to chance alone, and that they come into being by themselves".[48]

Ghazzali, for the same reason, restricted the revelation of aspects of divine knowledge of very limited level. He says:

"....It is necessary that one who wants to teach the knowledge of these things (Attributes and Essence) to the common people should tell them as much as the law order to do, and that is only a confession of their existence without entering into details".[49]

With regard to the problems of Shariah the people are divided into three classes according to Ibn Rushd. He says:

"In the first place there are people who cannot notice any doubt arising out of them, especially in things which the law has left to be taken exoterically. These people are the greatest in number and may be described as the masses. Then the second group of men is one which has doubts, but has not power to solve them. These are above the masses and between the learned people. It is for them that there are found in the law allegorical sayings, and it is they whom God has ensured. For there is no allegory in the law for the learned or the common people, and it means that in this light that all the

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allegorical sayings of the Quran should be understood."[50]

Ibn Rushd cites an example as regards the law and says that the law is like the example of the bread of wheat which though useful cereal for the large number of human beings, may prove harmful to some. He says that such is also the case with religious teachings. It is useful for the many but sometimes becomes harmful to some.[51] According to Ibn Rushd the dogmatic and scholastic theologians have done in respect to the law, the worst treatment by interpreting much which they thought was not to be taken literally, and then said that their interpretation was the thing intended and that God had mentioned it parabolically only to test and try his creatures.[52]

Ibn Rushd discusses that the primary purpose of knowledge for the common people is action, so that what is most useful in action is not suitable for them. But for the learned men, the purpose of knowledge is both knowledge and action. The man who interprets anything of the law, thinking that his interpretation is the real purpose of it, and the discloses it to the common people, "is like a man, who finds a medicine which an expert physician had compounded to preserve the health of all, or of a majority of the people, then there comes a man with whom that medicine did not agree on account of the course-ness of his disposition. He presented it to some people, and then thought that by some drug, which the first physician had clearly specified, as composing that universally useful medicine, he did not mean the drug commonly known by that name but another which he really meant, but used this name for it by farfetched metaphor."

Ibn Rushd thinks that a change was made in "this great medicine" by the Kharijites. The Mutazilites and the sufis. Ibn Rushd alleged that Ghazzali explained philosophy to common masses and disclosed to them the opinions of the philosophers in *al-Maqasid al Falasifah* while as according to Ibn Rushd the law should be taken literally and the conformity of religion to philosophy should not be revealed to common people. He says:

"For by exposing the results of philosophy to them (common people), without their having intelligence enough to understand them, it is neither permissible nor desirable to expose any thing of this result of philosophy to a man who has no arguments to advance, for there are no arguments either with the learned people who have mastery over both the subjects, or with the common people who follow the exoteric of the law".[53]

But as we have shown in the foregoing pages that Ghazzali has himself warned that several of his books like *Al-Maznun Ala Ghair Ahlihi* and *Al-Maznun al Sagheer* and other books are not meant for common people. He wrote a separate book in which he tried to divet the attention of the common people from scholasticism and ratiocination. Therefore, Ghazzali can not be blamed for exposing the interpretation to the common people as alleged by Ibn Rushd.

In *Tahafut al Tahafut.* Ibn Rushd rejects as illegitimate the dialetical proofs which have been employed by the Mutakallimeen. Tawil (interpreation) he argues. Can only be undetaken legitimately by philosophers on the basis of natural understanding or demonstrative proofs:

"The dialectical way in the discussion is forbidden when talking about how the Creator knows Himself and the other beings, let alone putting it down in a book."[54] According to Ibn Rushd the only way to discuss these questions is by way of strictly philosophical reasoning, the 'Tariq al burhan'. Few people are capable of pursuing this path, for few possess the requisite moral and intellectual qualities. Where these are lacking. Ibn Rushd warns against any form of knowledge other than common sense understanding.[55]

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Ibn Rushd says:

"It is appropriate for you to keep yourself to the apparent meaning (Zahir) of the Divine law (shar) and not to look for these new dogmas (e.g., Asharism) in Islam: for if you adhere to them. you will be neither a man of certainty (Philosopher) nor a man of Divine law".[56]

Ibn Rushd states emphatically that the two kinds of interpretations, especially the demonstrative interpretations, should be restricted to their respective adepts, violating this leads both the one who expresses them and the one to whom they are expressed to disbelief. As the former by doing so falsifies the apparent meaning and thus fails to affirm the interpreation in the mind of the latter. Consequently, he leads him to disbelief, if the next in question deals with the fundamental of religion. The masses, therefore, should be told about matters that need allegorical interpretation that they are ambiguous and no one knows their real interpretation except God.

Ibn Rusdh says:

"Allegorical interpretation ought not be expressed to the masses nor set down in rhetorical books, i.e. books containing these two sorts, as was done by Abu Hamid. As for the man who expresses these allegories to unqualified persons, he is an unbeliever on account of his summoning people to unbelief".[57]

In the foregoing passage, Ibn Rushd pronounces Ghazzali to be "an unbeliever on account of his summoning people to unbelief" by expressing false allegorical interpretations concerning the principles of Islamm to the masses in rhetorical and dialectical books, i.e. *Faysal al Tafruqah* and *Tahafut al Falasifah* respectively. Like wise does Ibn Rushd tax Ghazzali with infidelity because of the latter's claim that some texts, (which Ibn Rushd perceives as out rightly conflicting with the scripture), do not admit of allegorical interpreation; and therefore they should be expressed to the masses in their apparent meaning, without interpretation. These are the same texts for which Ghazzali allegedly expressed false allegorical interpretation to the masses. They are the scriptural texts pertaining to:

i. The eternity of the world.
ii. God's knowledge of the particulars.
iii. And Corporeal resurrection.[58]

Before concluding this subject about the cateogries or classes of people, some important points warrant our attention. The first point is that Ghazzali wrote different books to meet the demands of various sections of people and explained the real import of each such books in their preface. Whether a book was meant for a rhetorical or dialectical class of people or demonstrative class was explicitly made evident by Ghazzali in his writings. He explains this fact in *The Jawahir al Quran* in the following manner:

"As for the first category of books is concerned i.e. to know the arguments or proofs of external religious commandments of Islamic faith, we have written a treatise on this subject in about 20 pages, which includes a portion of foundations of articles of faith in *Ihya.* Still for laying more emphasis on the same subject with sufficient evidential aspect, we have devoted our book *Al-Iqtisad Fil al Itiqad* consisting on more than a hundred pages, this book is a unique book, which encompasses the whole science of scholasticism and want to substantiate the subject about various sources of knowledge, though some points to this direction have already been mentioned regarding this subject in the chapters comprising on the first portion of *Ihya.* In al *Maqsad (al Asna)* some points relevant to knowledge have

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been already discussed. In intended to come out with more substantial facts with regard to gnosis, which do not in any way run contrary to my views except to our book entitled, *Al Maznun Bihi Ala Ghair Ahlihi.*"[59]

In the same book Ghazzali says in a similar way "The second purpose of my articulation was to establish evidence against the unbelievers and rebut them. To this objective IImul al Kalam owes its origin, which aims at rejection of misguidance, innovations dispelling doubts, the assignments which the Mutakallimeen have undertaken. I have elaborated this science in *Al Risalah al Qudsiyah* and in a higher level book *Al-Iqtisad Fil Itiqad.* The objective of this science is to safteguard the faith of the common people from innovative suspicions. This science does not aim at revealing the realities and facts, it is in one respect related to *Tahafut al Falasifah.* Still there is an another books entitled *Al-Mustazhari* in which we rejected the doctrines of the Batiniyyah sect. Whilebooks like *Hujjat al Haq. Qasimul Batiniyyah* and *Mufasilul al Khalaf* were written on theology".[60]

The second point which we want to mention is that the contradictions or inconsistencies which apparently are striking in his writings is not because of Ghazzali's instable temperament or for the desire of general acceptability, Ghazzali has rather deliberately adopted various style, modes and methods to address cross sections of society according to their mental level and intellectul competence.[61]

Shibli writes after quoting these passages that such extracts show explicitly that his books on beliefs (Aqaid) are of various grades. Few of these books are written keeping in view the taste and temperament of common people, others are a little higher in status. Still in some other books he has unveiled few of the secrets and revealed some mysteries, while as there are still other books, where Ghazzali unmasked some hidden facts openly.[62]

It means that is Islam there were two types of views held by Muslims from the very beginning. A group of Muslims viewed that there are no secrets or mysteries in Shariah. The beliefs of Shariah are understood by a commoner as by an elite, therefore the arguments to convince all the sections of people should be similar in all cases. There was yet another group among the Muslims, who thought contrary to this view.[63]

Ghazzali belonged to the second group of the people. For that reason he explained various religious doctrines according to the competence of the audience. For example he says in the perface of *Ihya*, that: "You should understand that the division of these sciences can't be ignored by any person of insight, but those people may, of course, deny it who have learnt some thing during their childhood and became attached to it".[64] Yet in more concrete manner Ghazzali has expressed the same view in *Jawahar ul al Quran,* as follows:

"The first imperative is to know the arguments in favour of external belief without worrying about discerning the mysteries in it. The second imperative, however, is to know their mysteries and secrets, levels of meaning and realities of their external aspects. But both these imperatives are not compulsory for the people."[65]

In *IIjam ul Awwam*, Ghazzali has dealt with this subject also. He says: "God has commanded the prophet to invite people to the way of God with wisdom and good sermonizing and argue with them in a beautiful way. Therefore, there is a group of people who are to be invited to the way of God by wisdom, others by good sermonizing and still others by good discussion."

In the same book, Ghazzali writes (published Egypt) that: "The second type of arguments are

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based on Kalami proofs, which are prevalent among the scholars and opposite of which is well-known." In *Jawahar al Quran)* he writes further: "The mention is made of the premises of both the groups and discussions relating to resurrection, Reward, Balance, path are made accordingly. It has external aspects which are like food for common people and also subtle secrets which are specific with sepcial people."

The quoting of all these passages was warranted only for removing the suspicion created by Ibn Rush about Ghazzali that he has exposed common masses to interpretation about esoteric matters, by which Ibn Rushd meant interpretation of various religious doctrines. But we have shown with ample evidence from Ghazzali's books that Ghazzali wrote different books to meet various religious, theological and intellectual challenges of his period, which were presented by the rising tides of heresy, innovation and atheism.

After dispelling doubts about Ghazzali's erudite controversial academic and scholarly career, we want to conclude the discussion with the following remarks: "Ghazzali and Ibn Rushd have similar views about the nature, requirements and determination of tawil with very little difference of opinion. About the application of the interpretation both the thinkers agree that, within the interpretation group, no one should charge another with unbelief merely because he considers the evidential proof the other has adduced in any particular case to be erroneous, as long as the text it question is susceptiable to interpretation. Like wise, they agree that the interpretation of scriptural texts whose apparent meaning is intelligible to all and sundry, and which therefore do not need or receive interpretation of any kind, is a sin, the gravity of which corresponds with the nature of the text interpreted. It is infidelity if the text deals with some thing secondary to them".[66]

Regarding the categories of people as discussed by Ghazzali and Ibn Rushd are virtually similar with some minor differences. We have discussed that in Ghazzali as well as Ibn Rushd there are the three dimensions, which require rhetorical, dialectical and demonstrative arguments respectively. Ghazzali regards jurist consultant and mujtahids to interpret the scripture, while as Ibn Rushd that the philosophers because of their disposition of Hikmah are entitled to demonstrated the allegorical meanings of the religious text. But the demonstrative class is there is both the thinkers apart from common masses who get convinced with rhetorical arguments only. Even among the common masses Ghazzali has classified pepole into at least three groups which need different kinds of introduction in religious matters. The problem of various types of existences or levels of existence is closely related to the concepts of tawil (interpretation) of Ghazzali and Ibn Rushd. As both the philosophers have talked about various categories of people, different types of Quranic verses, they have talked also about different varieties of existences.

As already said Ibn Rushd supports Ghazzali's classification of existences in *Manahij al addilah* while dealing with the perimeters of interpretation. He attempts to defend various interpretations and the interpreters against the alleged labelling of heresies and blasphemy on them on the basis of their demonstration about religious principles.

Before saying something about Ghazzalian classification of existences which was appreciated and approved by Ibn Rushd later on, let us have a brief account about the Ibn Rush's views on tawil as he has expressed in *Manahij al adillah.*

Ibn Rushd says that there are various things of religion in which interpretation is allowed and others where it is not allowed.

According to Ibn Rushd the things found in the law can be divided into five kinds of things:

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indivisible and the divisible. The second one is divided into four kinds. The first kind which is mentioned in the Quran, is quite clear in its meanings. The second is that in which the thing mentioned is not the thing meant but only an example of it. This is again divided into four kinds. First, the meanings which it mentions are only illustrations such that they can only be known by farfetched and compound analogies, which can not be understood, but after a long time and much labour. None can accept them but perfect and excellent natures; and it cannot be known that the illustration given is not the real things: except by this far-fetched way. The second is just the opposite of the former. They can be understood easily, and it can be known that the example is just what is meant here. Thirdly, it can be easily known that it is merely an illustration but what it is the example of is difficult to comprehend.

The fourth kind, according to Ibn Rushd is quite opposite to the former. The thing of which it is an example, is easily understood while it is difficult to know that it is an example at all. The interpretation of the first kind is wrong without doubt. The kind in which both the things are farfetched: its interpretation particularly lies with those who are well-grounded in knowledge, and an exposition of it is not fit far any but the learned. Ibn Rushd says that the interpretation of its opposite that which can be understood on both the sides—is just what is wanted, and an exposition of it is necessary.

The case of the third kind is like the case of the above. For in it illustration has not been mentioned because of the difficulty for the common people to understand it: It only incites the people to action. Such is the case with the tradition of the prophet. "The black stone is God's action on Earth" etc. etc. That which can be easily known that is an example, but difficult to know which it is example, should not be interpreted but for the sake of particular persons and learned men. Those who understand, that is only an illustration, but are not learned enough to know the thing which it illustrates, should be told either that it is allegorical and can be understood by the well-established learned be told either that it is allegorical and can be understood by the well-established learned men, or the iliustration should be changed in a way which might be near to their understanding. This would be the best plan to dispel doubts from their minds.[67]

After discussing these interpretations and the issues which warrant it, Ibn Rushd quotes Ghazzali's statement pertaining to various kinds of existence as follows:

"The law about this should be that which has been laid down by Abu Hamid (Al-Ghazzali) in his book, *Al-Tafruqa bainal Islam wal Zindiqah.* It is understood that one things has five existences which he calls by the name of essential (dhati), sensual (Hissi), rational; imaginative (khayali) and doubtful (Shibhi). So at the time of doubt it should be considered which of these five kinds would better satisfy the man who has doubts. If it be that which he has called essential than one iliustration would best satisfy their minds. In it is also included the following traditions of the prophet, "Whatever the earlier prophets saw I have seen it from my place here, even heaven and hell." Between my cistern of water and the pulpit, there is a garden of paradise" and "The earth will eat up the whole of a man except the extremity of the tail" All these, it can easily be known, are but iliustrations, but what is the thing which they illustrate, it is difficult to be comprehended. So it is necessary in this case to give an instance to the people which they may easily understand. This kinds of illustration, when used on such an occasion is allowable; but when used irrelevantly it is wrong.[68]

However, Ghazzali, according to Ibn Rushd has not decided about the occasion then both the sides of the question—the illustration and the iIlustrated-be both far fetched and difficult to understand. About which to Ibn Rushd, "but a doubt without any foundation. What should be done is to prove that

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the doubt has no basis, but no interpretation should be made, as we have shown in many places in our present book against the Mutakallimeen, Asharites and the Mutazilites".[69] Before embarking on Ghazzali's views on various levels of existence, we want to give more details about Ibn Rushd's views about interpretation.

Ibn Rushd holds that the fourth kind of occasions are quite opposite to the former. In this it is very difficult to understand that it is an example, but when once understood, you can easily comprehend the thing illustrated. In the interpretation of this also according to Ibn Rushd, there is a consideration: about those people who know that if it is an example, it illustrates such and such a thing, but they doubt whether it is an illustration at all. If they are not learned people, the best thing to do with them is not to make any interpretation, but only to prove the fallacy of the views which they hold about its being an illustration at all. Ibn Rushd thinks that is is also possible that an interpretation may make them still distant from the truth, on account of the nature of the illustration and the illustrated. According to Ibn Rushd, for these two kinds of occasions if an interpretation is given, they give rise to strange beliefs, far from the law which when disclosed are denied by the common people. Ibn Rushd includes Sufis and their learned followers among these people and says that when this work of interpretation was done by people who could not distinguish between these occasion, and made no distinction between the people for whom the interpretation is to be made, there arose differences of opinion, at last forming into sects, which ended in accusing one another with unbelief. Ibn Rushd calls this as a "pure ignorance of the purpose of the law".[70]

While concluding this discussion on interpretation Ibn Rushd says:

"From what we have already said the amount of mischief done by interpretation must have become clear to you. We always try to acquire our purpose by knowing what should be interpreted, and what not, and when interpreted, how it should be done; and whether all the difficult portions of the law and traditions are to be explained or not. These are all included in the four kinds which have already been enumerated".[71]

If these four kinds of occasions which necessitate interpretation are seriously studied, it will become clear than Ibn Rusd has followed Ghazzali in ascertaining the validity of interpretation.

Ghazzali maintains that where the evidence for the intended interpretation balances in strength against other possible meanings of the text in question, the mujtahid (the man of interpretative class) should then use his judgment to chose which ever of them he conceives to be the most probable. Ghazzali reinforces this position of his by saying that not every interpretation is acceptable by virtue of its supporting evidence. Rather, the attitude towards an interpretation in terms of acceptance or rejection must vary according to its strength and the strength of the evidence upon which it is based, yet, Ghazzali admit like, Ibn Rushd, that there are no clear-cut rules for the mujtahids regarding this issue.[72]

According to Ibn Rusd there is possibility of difference of opinion in matters of interpretation (Tawil) and according to shariah, a mujtahid is rewarded two fold, if his Ijtihad, is correct, other wise he deserves a single reward.

To make judgement about existence or be is the most important sphere for a Mujtahid according to Ibn Rushd. Therefore a "Mujtahid" who passes judgements on the problem of existence or being cannot be labelled as infidel in case he commits a mistake in his judgement. Ibn Rushd here refers to Ghazzali who had said that a person does not warrant allegation of blasphemy, if he confines his interpretation to the five levels of existences and a person who accepts or interprets shariah principles in

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light of any of these five levels of existence cannot be declared as an unbeliever.[73]

In *Faysal al Tafriqah,* Ghazzali, initially, divided existence into five different degrees all of which he claims to be unanimously recognized by all the Muslim schools of thought. In *Maqsad-al Asna,* Ghazzali gives imilar exposition to his views about existence. He says:

"The essence and limit of name is that the things have existence in senses and existence in minds, and existences in language. The existence in senses or sensible existence is the essential and real existence and the mental existence is an epistemological and imaginative existence. The linguistic existence is a verbal and argumentative existence".[74]

Ghazzali maintains that the first and the highest degree of existence is the essential existence (al wujud al dhati). It is the real existence, he observes, that is stands outside of sense and intellect. But both sense and intellect receive an image from it. Such an example is the existence of al-Arsh, the Throne, and the seven Heavens about which the prophet have given us information. These expressions, Ghazzali observes, signify really existing bodies regardless of whether or not they can be perceived by sense and imagination. Therefore, such words should not be interpreted in a way whatever, they should be accepted in their apparent meaning. Earth, animals and vegetables are also included in this category of existence. Ghazzali then goes on to state that sensible existence, (al wujud al hissi), is the next degree. This kind of existence, he explains, represents itself into the visual faculty of the eye but does not exist outside the eye. Thus, it is peculiar to only the person who senses it. An example of that is what a person sees in a dream or day-dream,[75] or as a sick man sees when he is awake. Some times the prophets and the saints in a waking condition see a beautiful figure, presumed to be of an angel, which brings forth the divine message to them. Mary (A.S) had such a vision about which God says:

"It appeared before her in a complete human form".[76] In the same way as the prophet (SAW) saw Jabrael (A.S) in different shapes, while he saw him in his real shape only twice, the other shapes in which the prophet (SAW) saw him were the symbolic existence (Mithali). In the same way a person sees the prophet in a dream, as the prophet (SAW) has said that if a person sees me in a dream, his seeing is real, as the Satan cannot take my shape. But the seeing of the prophet (SAW) never means that the scared body of the prophet (SAW) has come out of its scared abode and reached to the person who sees him in dream. But seeing the prophet (SAW) in the dream is in the sight of the seer or his senses only.[77] The third degree of existence is the imaginative existence, (al wujud al khayali). This type of existence is the image of sensible objects one creates in ones mind while those objects are absent from sensation.[78] For example you can create in your mind the images of an elephant and a horse if you close your eyes till you feel as you are perceiving these things and you imagine that these things are present in your mind not outside from it.[79] Following this existence in degree, is the mental existence (al-Wujud al aqli). This occurs, Ghazzali holds, when something has a soul, (ruh) an objective reality (haqiqah), and a meaning (ma na), but the intellect acquires only its meaning without its image being present in the imagination, or the senses or externally at all. For example, hand has both sensible and imaginative image, and it also has a meaning that stands for its essence. The meaning is the ability to strike, (al qudrat al al batsh). The ability to strike then is the "intellectual hand".[80]

In the same way the pen has both a sensible and an imaginative image; and it also has a meaning that stands for its essence. [81]That meaning is the ability to note down the sciences. This meaning is given to it by the intellect without its having any image of wood or bamboo or any other sensible or imaginative image apart from these.[82] The last degree of existence in Ghazzali's opinion is

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what he calls analogical existence (al wujud al shibihi). According to his definition, this kind of existence deals with any thing whose image and objective reality are not present in the senses, the imagination, the intellect or externally at all. But what is seen or felt in any one of these is something else which resembles it is one of its qualities or characteristics.[83]

Ghazzali believes that the first of these five degrees is not an interpreation, it is the real meaning and therefore the real existence. On the other hand, he believes that the rest of the degrees necessitate interpretation whose strength corresponds with the descending order of the kind of the existence to which it belongs.

To Ghazzali, the degrees of textual interpretation are parallel, in number and kind, with the degrees of existence maintains thus: when an existence mentioned in the Revelation (Quran and Hadith) is real, that is essential, it should not be interpreted. Instead it must be retained with its apparent meaning.[84]

Ghazzali then goes on to cite one example or more for each of the remaining four degrees of existence as applied to interpretation. We cite example from each as applied to interpretation.

He notes that there are several examples in the Revelation for sensible existence. One such existence is the one mentioned in the tradition which says thus:

"On the Day of Resurrection, death will be brought (to the presence of mankind) in the form of a black and white ram, and it will then be slaughtered (in a place) between paradise and Hell",[85] Ghazzali then points out that those scholars who adduce proof that death is an accident and therefore cannot be possibly transformed into a substance (which is the ram in this case) interpret the tradition to mean that: on the Day of Resurrection people will see the ram and believe it to be the death. This will eventually lead them to feel certainly; secure from death after it has been slaughtered but in reality, the ram and its slaughter exist only in their sense and not outside it. The existence in the tradition is thereby interpreted as sensible existence.

Nonetheless, those who have no evidence of the impossibility of the transformation of accident into substance believe that it is death itself which will be actually transformed into a ram on the Day of resurrection and then be slaughtered. This, of course, would mean an imaginative existence because it is not an interpretation but the literal meaning of the text.

For the imaginative existence, Ghazzali quotes as an example the tradition of the prophet that says:

"It seemed as if I ware looking at Yunis (Johnah), the son of Matta (Mathew), clothed in two 'aba' al qatwaniyah ("a wide striped white garment with short fringes.") making the talbiyah (I have answered your call, O' God I have answered) and being replied to by the mountains, and (it seems as if I heard) God the Exalted saying to him e.g. I have answered your call, O' Yunis".[86]

Ghazzali holds that this tradition informs about the existence of that figure in the prophet's imagination. Although the very image had existed in the past, even before the prophet's lifetime, it was no longer existing at the time he uttered the tradition in question. Ghazzali stresses that the word (ka anni), "it seems as if I", emphasizes the fact that the narration was not real but an imaginative experience.[87]

Ghazzali gives two examples from the tradition for mental existence. The first of these will be

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quoted here. "Whoever is take out of Hell fire shall be given, (as his portion) of paradise, ten times the equivalent of this world".[88]

Ghazzali then observes that the apparent meaning of the above tradition signifies that the position which will be given in paradise is going to be ten times the equivalent of this world in size. This would definitely represent both sensible and imaginative disparity. But one would find it difficult to reconcile this notion with what the Revelation apparently indicates, namely that the paradise is in Heaven. "How the, Ghazzali asks, "can the heaven be broad enough to contain ten times the equivalent of the world when the heaven also is part of the world".[89]

The only way to avoid this question being raised effectively is to interpret the tradition to mean abstract and mental disparity and not sensible and imaginative one.[90]

Ghazzali's argument on this example is founded on a linguistic ground: that Heaven is part of the world, whereas paradise is in Heaven. It would therefore be absurd that one could be given as his position of paradise, ten times the equivalent of the world because a part of something cannot be larger than it's whole. This is why Ghazzali is of the opinion that the text in question needs to be interpreted as the above.

It can be argued with good reason that the first premise of the forgoing argument that Heaven is part of the world, is false and subsequently so is the conclusion drawn from it. That is because throughout the Quran "Heaven" is referred to as an antonym or to say the least, as different entity from "the world". There are several verses of the Quran which substantiate this assertion:[91]

Moreover, contrary to Ghazzali's assertion, the Quran indicates in an evident way that this world will under go physical change and then be turned to be a part of the Heaven.[92]

Furthermore, it is noteworthy that the words dunya: "world" andakhirah "heaven" are not only antonyms and signify different entities and connotations as Quranic terms and connotations, but are also clearly differentiated in correct Arabic usage. The very roots of these words are indicative of their being antonyms.[93]

As for the analogical interpretation, Ghazzali continues, anger, craving, joy, patience and such attributes of God mentioned in the Revelation are typical samples of it.

Anger for example, Ghazzali illustrates, is the ebullition of one's heart blood because of the desire to gratify one's thirst for revenge. Imperfection and pain are inherent in this attitude. Therefore, those scholars who adduce proof that this very anger, because of its inherent imperfection, cannot be attributed to God as an essential, sensible, imaginative or mental attribute, interpret it to an another attribute that has some of the characteristics of anger i.e. the will to punish.[94]

Ghazzali then asserts that whoever confirms any of the texts of the Revelation to fall in one of the five degrees of existence, is a believer. However, he asserts equally that to reject all of these degrees of interpretation with regard to any revealed text under any pretext whatsoever, is outright disbelief and atheism.[95] Nevertheless, Ghazzali holds there are rules that safeguard interpretation. And as long as the rules are followed, one need not charge an exegete with infidelity. [96] The rules, as laid down by Ghazzali are as follows:-

1. One should not attempt to interpret a text (reduce its meaning to a degree less than that of the essential existence) unless there is apodeictic (demonstrable) proof of the possibility of the apparent essential meaning.

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2. In interpretation, one must start with the highest degree: sensible interpretation, unless one finds it impossible. Then, one should turn to the next degree: imaginative interpretation; and should no after that turn to the degree next degree to it unless one finds the second category to be an impossible interpretation, and so forth.

It is noteworthy that Ghazzali asserts that each of the higher degrees of interpretation automatically contains the meaning of the degrees below it. [97] Ghazzali then sums this second rule up by saying:

"Now it is not permissible to turn from one degree to what is below it except because of a warranting apodiectice demonstration".[98]

Ghazzali now points out that it is clearly around apodeictic proof that the controversy among the various Islamic schools of thought about interpretation revolves. That is because the Hanbalis for example, contrary to the Ashari's belief, hold that there is no apodeictic proof of the absurdity of God's being specified by the direction of "above". The Asharites on the other hand, as against the Hanbalis doctrine, assert that there is no apodeictic proof of the absurdity of the ocular vision of God in the hereafter. One gathers from these controversies. Ghazzali observes, that each group rejects what its adversary puts forth as decisive evidence. Yet, Ghazzali emphasizes, it is not proper for any group to charge another with unbelief because it considers the apodeictic proof the other group has adduced in any particular case to be erroneous. At the same time, Ghazzali is of the opinion that the supposedly righteous group may call the supposedly wrong group "erring" (dall), since in the opinion of the former, the latter has gone astray on the issue in question, or "innovating" (mubtadi) because in his own view, the group has initiated an opinion no pious Muslim predecessor had ever held.[99]

Ibn Rushd has complained also that the various sectarian divisions which emerged among the Muslims as the Mutazilites, the Asharites, the Kharijites, the Batinites, the Hassawites etc etc. and regarded misuse of interpretation as the sole cause of this division. He thinks that the disorder in religion takes place when interpretations are exposed which should not be exposed. Ibn Rushd supports Ghazzali when he says that if the interpretation is made, by the people who are entitled to interpret then there will be no disorder or division in the Muslim community.

To level a decree of blasphemy against other sections of people on the basis of interpretation has been disapproved both by Ghazzali and Ibn Rushd. Ibn Rushd says:

"He (Ghazzali) has also insisted upon the fact that he knew the cause of doing so, as he did in his *Al Tafruqa bain al Islamic wa zindiqah,* In it he has noted down many kinds of interpretations the upholders of which were not infidels though they may go against the consensus of opinion".[100]

Then Ibn Rushd defines interpretation which signifies the same sense as Ghazzali's definition as has been already seen in the foregoing pages. Ibm Rushd says:

"...extension of the significance of an expression from real to metaphorical significance, without forsaking therein the standard metaphorical practices of Arabic, such as calling a thing by the name of something resembling it or a cause or consequence or accompaniment of it, or other things such as one enumerated in accounts of the kinds of metaphorical speech".[101]

Ghazzali's definition stipulates that the interpreted meaning has to be supported by evidence. In other words, his definition stipulates that the interpreted meaning of an expression can only be resorted to when there is evidential proof that justifies it. This condition is not present in Ibn Rushd's definition. Naturally enough each of these two definitions has bearing on the position of its exponent in his theory

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of interpretation.

Ibn Rushd then observes:

"So we affirm definitely that whenever the conclusion of a demonstration is in conflict with the apparent meaning, it admits of allegorical interpretation according to the rules of much interpretation in Arabic. This proposition is questioned by no Muslim and doubted by no believer....indeed, we may say that whenever a statement in scripture conflicts in its apparent meaning with conclusions of demonstrations, if scriputre is considered carefully, and the rest of its own texts searched page by page, there will invariably be found among the expressions of scripture something which in its apparent meaning bears witness to that allegorical interpretation or causes close to bearing witness".[102]

The above statement represents the core of Ibn Rushd's thesis. There can be no real conflict between Scripture and reason. This position of Ibn Rushd on scripture Vs. Reason is essentially Ghazzali's position in *al Iqtisad*.[103]

We can draw a conclusion from the ongoing discussion that Ghazzali and Ibn Rushd agree that Revelation contains some contexts whose apparent meaning contradicts or appears ot contradict reason.[104]

In this way we have seen that Ibn Rushd accepts with approval the various kinds or categories of existences which have been discussed by Ghazzali in his *faysal al Tafruqah* and moreover, with little minor differences, Ibn Rushd accepts Ghazzalian views pertaining to interpretation as well.

Except in a few odd cases, Ibn Rushd's concept of Tawil, interpretation, is similar to that of Ghazzali. But when it comes to the method of application of the interpretation the two scholars are far apart. They both agree that scripture contains both apparent meaning and esoteric interpretation; their definition of interpretation is basically the same; regarding interpretation, they both divide scriptural texts into various similar kinds as already discussed in detail, and Ibn Rushd even actually adopts Ghazzali's rules of interpretation instead of formulating his own.[105]

However, according to J.P. Montada.

"Ibn Rushd was not prone to making wide use of Tawil: it becomes necessary only if the revealed text contradicts the results of demonstration. In such a case, he looked for the metaphorical meaning".

"On the other hand, Al-Ghazzali had frequent recourse to Tawil but never accepted, as did Ibn Rushd, that it can be used in order to cause reason to prevail over revealed texts when ever both are in apparent contradiction".[106]

After making this detailed discussion about Ghazzali and Ibn Rushd on the categories of existence vis-a-vis interpretation, the following points come inevitably to our notice:

From the statements and quotations of both the philosophers it becomes very evident that both the philosophers agree that demonstrative treatises and philosophical books must be consulted only by people who are competent for such studies. But such studies are prohibited in favour of incompetent and weak people. Naturally intelligent and religiously just and balanced persons can take this job in their hands. Ibn Rushd blames Ghazzali that he exposed common people to philosophy by expressing and explaining philosophical subjects in his books, and considered it possible for common people to pursue such sciences.

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Ibn Rushd has made it explicitly clear that he is against proclamation of Greek philosophical books to those people who are not competent for it. He rather makes it obligatory for the Muslim heads to prohibit demonstrative books from the common people as well as Ghazzali's books.

He says:

"Hence, it is necessary for the doctors of Islam to prevent men, except the learned from reading, his books: as it is incumbent upon them to hinder them from reading controversial writings which should not be studied except by those fit to do so. As a rule the reading of these books is less harmful than those of the former. For the majority cannot understand philosophical books, but only those endowed with superior natures."[107]

In this way Ibn Rushd prohibited the study of Burhan Books for the common people. But if we look minutely, the same attitude has been shown by Ghazzali. He does not allow study of philosophy but only to the competent reader who can differentiate between truth and false hood and can distinguish right from wrong. He supports that people are known by truth not truth by the people. Though Ghazzali allows study of such books for the competent people to understand the nature of misguidance of the wrongful philosophy. But Ghazzali also observes that there are people who thought very crudulent, yet claim to be intelligent enough to involve in such stuides in order to distinuguish truth from falsehood, and they claim to know people by truth, rather the truth by people and consider themselves as the people of vision. Ghazzali stopped their way in front of them with a precaution, so that these deceived and enchanted men, with weak minds, so that they may not get in any trouble.[108]

Ghazzali has warned against study of Burhan Books by incompetent people in almost all his books. For example in *Al Munqidh,* Ghazzali says:

"It is customary with weaker intellects that to take the men as criterion of the truth and not the truth as criterion of the men. The intelligent man follows, Ali (may God be pleased with him) when he said "Do not know the truth by the men, but know the truth, and then you will know who are truthful" The intelligent man knows the truth, then he examines the particular assertion. If it is true, he accepts it, whether the speaker is a truthful person or not. Indeed he is often anxious to separate out the truth from the discouses of those who are in error, for he knows that gold is found mixed engraved with dross."[109] He says further:

"The majority of men, I maintain, are dominated by a high opinion of their own skill and accomplishment, especially the perfection of their intellects for distinguishing true from false and sure guidance from misleading suggestion. It is therefore necessay, I maintain, to shut the gate so as to keep the general public from reading the books of the misguided as far as possible",[110]

This total rejection about the study of all books by Ghazzali on philosophy leads us to following points.

First If Ghazzali prohibits study of all books on philosophy, is he exempted from this general rule. As we know that Ghazzali has not only gone through books on philosophy, but apart from writing a rejoinder to philosopher, he summed up their views in the *Maqasid al Falasifah,* which was followed by a rebuttal i.e. *Tahafut al Falasifah.* Secondly: Ghazzali made study of philosophical books objectionable to all and sundry in order to rescue them from falling in pitfalls and trouble therefrom. But at the same time he made it clear that if a person is not prone to fall in any trouble, he can study these books, as the main cause of trouble reamins there no more. He warned, however, that he feels that the

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people who are immune from these dangers are only few in number i.e. erudite scholars.

He says:

"In view of this danger the reading of philosophical writings so full of vain and delusive utopias should be forbidden, just as the slippery banks of a river are forbidden, to one who knows not how to swim".[111]

A perusal of these false teachings must be prevented just as one prevents children from touching serpents. A snake charmer himself will abstain from touching snakes in the presence of his young children, because he knows that the child, believing himself as clever as his father, will not fail to imitate him, and in order to lend more weight to his prohibition the charmer will not touch a serpent under the eyes of his son. Such should be the conduct of a learned man (Al A'Iim al Rasikh) who is also wise.[112]

From these passages, it seems that Ghazzali does not prohibit the study of the predecessor philosophers to the masters of sciences, rather to the weak intellect, by considering themselves equal to the learned ones. Otherwise no science or knowledge is blame worthy according to Ghazzali as he says:

"Knowledge is not held to be balme worthy except for one of three reasons. Firstly, if it leads to the harm of another, it becomes blameworthy, such as magic, talisman, sorcery, secondly it causes much harm to the acquirer, thirdly it becomes of no use to one who acquires it".[113]

It means that knowledge has an intrinsic value as long as it is not associated with any appendages which may affect it with the passage of time. Thirdly, Ghazzali regards preaching towards Islam with an argument as necessity and obligation. He shows that from Shariah point of view dispelling of doubts and confusions which disturb people in religious matters assumes an obligatory importance when times demand. If is for the same reason that he calls Ilmul al Kalam as a-Fard al Kifayah to dispel the confusion created by the heretical people and the innovators. Therefore when Ghazzali felt that some books of the philosophers are creating confusion in the minds of the Muslims by philosophy of Aristotle and his followers, he declared rejection of such people as an obligation on the Muslim schoars. Since this task warranted complete acquaintance with the books of the philosophers for reaching to the root cause of their misguidance, to which even the philosophers themselves could not reach. Therefore, under such circumstances, it becomes incumbent on a person who wants to defend Islam to study seriously the books of his predecessors.[114]

Ghazzali says:

"In a way this criticism is justified. Ahmad B. Hanbal once criticised al Harith al Muhasibi (may God have mercy on them) for his book, *The Refutation of the Mutazilah.* "It is a duty to refute heresy", al Harith replied, "certainly", said, Ahmad, "but you first give an account of their false doctrines and afterwards a refutation of them. How can you be sure what men will do? A man might read the false doctrines and grasp them with his understanding without turning afterwards to the refutations: or he might peruse the refutation without understanding its full import".

"Ahmad's observation is justified, but it applies to false doctrine which is not widely and generally known where such doctrine is widely known, it ought to be refuted, and refutation presupposes a statement of the doctrine".[115]

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Ghazzali's position vis-a-vis interpretation has become more evident after removing these doubts which would arise after reading the above mentioned remarks of Ibn Rushd. Ghazzali's approach to this problem is very similar to Ibn Rushd. In other words if we say that Ibn Rushd has consciously or unconsciously accepted Ghazzali's views about this problem word by word, it will be not an exaggeration. After endorsing Ghazzali's classification about various categories of existence, Ibn Rushd makes this classification as a guiding principle in elaboration of his views vis-a-vis interpretation.

Thought not directly related to this topic, Ghazzali's and Ibn Rushd's agrrement about condemnation of Ibn Sina and taxing him with blasphemy is somehow rooted in their concept of interpretation. There is agreement between Ghazzali and Ibn Rushd in condemnation of Ibn Sina, although the reasons for this condemnation are somewhat different. In *Tahafut al Tahaftu.* Ibn Rushd agrees with Ghazzali and joins him in condemning Ibn Sina as a disbeliever for his denial of bodily resurrection. Ibn Sina, he says, "merits more than any one else that the charge of disbelief should be laid against him, and he is liable to the penalty for unbelief in the religion in which he has been brought up".[116]

In advance of Ghazzali, Ibn Rushd even goes on to charge Ibn Sina with Zandiqah: (atheism) which is a stronger legal term than kufr, disbelief, he says:

"And the same may be said of the doctrine of the beyond in our religion, which is more conducive to virtuous actions than what is said in others. Thus to represent the beyond in material images is more appropriate than purely spiritual representation, as is said in the divine words: "The likeness of the paradise which those who fear God are promised, beneath it rivers flow." And the prophet has said "In it there is what no eye has seen, no ear has heard nor ever entered the mind of man. And Ibn Abbas said "There is no relation of the other world to this world but the names." And he meant by this that the beyond is another creation of a higher order than this world, and another phase superior to our earthly. He need not deny this who believes that we see one single thing developing itself from one phase to another, for instance the transformation of the inorganic into beings conscious of their own essences, i.e. the intellectual forms. Those who are in doubt about this and object to it and try to explain it are not those who seek to destroy the religious prescriptions and to undo the virtues. They are, as every one knows, the heretics and those who believe that the end of man consists only in sensual enjoyment. When such people have really the power to destroy religous belief both theologians and philosophers will no doubt kill them, but when they have no actual power the best arguments than can be brought against them are those that are contained in the Holy Book. What Ghazzali says against them is right".[117]

Herelysa Bello makes a very important remark when he says after quoting the above statement: that "The above passage appears to explain one of the reasons why Ibn Rushd departing from his habit, does not quote Ghazzali's discussion of bodily resurrection in the *Tahafut* before replying to him this time. There is no need to do that here because he only quotes Ghazzali's argument, when he does, in order to draw a counter argument against it, and that, as can be seen, is not the case here".[118]

Though Ghazzali and Ibn Rushd charged Ibn Sina with infidelity, but the reasons were different.

Ghazzali taxex Ibn Sina with disbelief because he denies a fundamental of IsIam, the scriptural texts of which are not receptive of the allegorical interpretation, Ibn Sina imposes on them. In this connection one should note that in *Faysal al Tafruqah,* he argues that the texts in question come down to us through innumerable corroborative reports, and according to Ghazzali a denial of such texts

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warrants taxation with disbelief because it implies the imputation of falsehood to the prophet.[119]

Ibn Rushd on the other hand condemns Ibn Sina as an infidel, not because he denies bodily resurrection but because he violates the rule of interpretation by revealing to the masses the demonstrative interpretation of the texts dealing with resurrection. This demonstrative interpreation, according to hi, aught to be restricted to the people of demonstration i.e. the Falasifah. He then says:

"It belongs to the necessary virtue of him (who belongs to the demonstrative class) that he should not despite the doctrines in which he has been brought up and that he should explain them in the fairest way, and that he should understand that the aim of these doctrines lies in their universal character, not in their elitism, and that, if he expresses a doubt concerning the religious principles in which he has been brought up, or explains them in a way contradictory to that of the prophets and turns away from their path, he merits more than anyone else that the charge of disbelief should be laid against him:"[120]

After these preliminary remarks it will be of a greater interest to try to know what are the actual grounds on which Ghazzali labels infidelity on Ibn Sina. Moreover we would also make a brief survey of the views of Ghazzali and Ibn Sina on the problem of bodily resurrection.

Ghazzali consider Al-Farabi and Ibn Sina as the chief representatives of Greek philosophy, because "in transmitting the philosophy of Aristotle, however none of the Islamic philosophers has accomplished anything comparable to the achievements of the two men named".[121]

However, Ghazzali more emphatically concentrated on Ibn Sina's views and refuted him. In the same way when Ghazzali attacks philosophers on their views regarding resurrection of souls, not of bodies, he is mainly attacking Ibn Sina's views about this problem. While enumerating the heresies of the philosophers which they have gone to the extreme and have, therefore, committed blasphemy, Ghazzali says about their views about bodily resurrection that:

"They say that for bodies there si no resurrection; it is bare spirits which are rewarded or punished; and the rewards and punishments are spiritual, not bodily. They certainly speak truth in affirming the spiritual ones, since these do exist as well; but they speak falsely in denying the bodily ones and in their pronouncements disbelieve the Divine laws".[122]

Ibn Rushd assumes that Ghazzali bases his taxation of these philosophers with disbelief on their violation of Ijma formed on these two questions. On this ground, Ibn Rushd argues that since it is impossible to form Ijma on theoretical matters because the scripture has, besides the apparent meaning esoteric meaning which aught not to be told to anyone who does not belong to the esoteric class, no definite ijma can be formed on these two questions because they are both of theoretical matters. Hence, Ghazzali's claim of Ijma on both of them is false, and therefore his condemnation of these two philosophers to infidelity for their violation of Ijma formulated on the two questions is unfounded. But Ibn Rushd is mistaken here. Because some of the fundamentals of Islam e.g. the belief in God, the Angels and the day of Resurrection, are theoretical matters, yet the Muslims have certainly established ijma on them.

Moreover, Ibn Rushd's claim that Ghazzali bases his condemnation of Ibn Sina and al-Farabi, for their theories of the eternality of the world and the denial of bodily resurrection, on their violation of Ijma is false. Ghazzali does not condemn the philosophers as infidels on those two accounts because of their violation of Ijma. Rather, he condemns them on the question because of their wrong interpretation

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and their contradiction of the text of the Quran, a measure which, Ghazzali contends, implies the imputation of a lie to the prophet (SAW) and therefore constitutes outright disbelief.[123]

After showing the reasons on which Ghazzali and Ibn Rushd have condemned Ibn Sina and taxed him with infidelity, it seems very natural to say few things about Ghazzali's and Ibn Sina's views about bodily resurrection.

Ibn Sina's statements in his *al shifa* and *al Najat* on the hereafter are ambiguous, if not outright contradictory, he seems to maintain that there is both bodily resurrection and immortality restricted to immaterial souls. The ambiguity seems deliberate and used as aprotective device against charges of irreligion. A careful reading of the psychological parts of these two works will show that his system cannot allow a doctirne of bodily resurrection. A very explicit denial of bodily resurrection is to be found in his short treatise called: *Risalah Adhawiah Fi Amr al Maad:* which as its title suggests, was written exclusively on his conception of the hereafter. Ghazzali's exposition and refutation of Ibn Sina's theory on bodily resurrection are in the main, based on this short treatise.[124]

But this theory can be refuted if Ibn Sina's views are deeply scrutinized in this regard. Ibn Sina divides the salvation of the world hereafter death consisting of three degrees or states, as salvation can never be without either completion in knowledge and practice, or incompletion in both of these two, or be completion in one of these, and incompletion in the latter one.

Then he divides this third degree into two parts, either it may be complete in knowledge and incomplete in practice or *vise versa*. Ibn Sina then divides this third degree into two varieties. That may be complete in knowledge, but incomplete in practice or vise versa: Then he says: "The degrees of the selves will be graded according to the division which has been made in the Quran. As the Quran says:

"And ye shall be sorted out into three classes. Then (there will be) the companions of the Right Hand. What will be the companions of the Right Hand?

And the companions of the left Hand, what will be the companions of the left Hand."

After wards Allah says:

"And those foremost (in faith) will be foremost (in the Hereafter). There will be those Nearest of All." (Al Quran 56:7:11)

Ibn Sina continues after quoting these Quranic verses: The people well-versed in knowledge and established in practice are those who have been called as "Saabiqoon" (the foremost), and they deserve the highest or the uppermost stage in the paradise full of pleasures.

These people are assoicated from the three world to the world of intellect and these people constantly refrain from the bodily concerns....These people are the foremost, and will be stationed in the uppermost stages in the paradise.

"The companions of the Right Hand", will be stationed at the middle stage, who get rid of the conerns with this transitory world and get related to the world of heavens, remain aloof from the pollution of the phenomenal world, damned in the house of destruction, where they will not ask for a single per-severance, but manifold instead."

These are the three degrees or states of the soul which Ibn Sina has inferred from the Quranic verses, though the influence of Plato in context of the first degree is still there, which indicates the transcendence of it from the vicinity of the bodies and the souls of heavens are there, but still he accepts

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that there will be sensuous pleasures from various delicious food stuffs, and varieties of the flesh of birds etc in favour of the people of the middle degree, here too he does not seem to be without influence from platonic views, when he confesses that the people of the middle stage will be raised to the degree of "Quswa" by their efforts to purge themselves from material aspects to the possible extent.[125]

Ibn Sina confesses that the people of the Lowest stage or degree will be given bodily punishments also. In this way he does not deny bodily resurrection in all cases, but only in few cases with relation to only few people. Therefore Ibn Sina does not warrant allegations of amputating falsehood on the prophets. Because he interpreted the Quranic verses in a philosophical manner under the influence of platonic schools of thought. This sort of interpretation had led Ibn Sina to hold the views that for a specific groups of the people there will be no bodily resurrection. But even these views don't amount to the denial of the prophetic teachings or an absolute rejection of bodily resurrection. But rather this philosophical interpretation is an attempt on the part of Ibn Sina to bring accord between religion and platonic thought. Therefore, he accepts that several people will get bodily resurrection, while other will be only resurrected spiritually. He does not oppose the spirit of the shariah in this regard as to hold solitude of the self or possibility of pleasures in the life hereafter as superior to the sensuous pleasures and does not challenge the shariah in any way.[126]

Ghazzali also says about the same fact that: Most of these things are not opposed to religion. We do not deny that the pleasures in the Herafter are superior to sensible pleasures. Nor do we deny the immortality of the soul separated from the body. But we know these things on the authority of religion, as expressed in the doctrine of Resurrection. No doubt, the Resurrection will not be comprehensible, if the immortality of soul is not take far granted. But we take objection, as we did before, to their assertion that mere reason gives them final knowledge of these things. Moreover, there are elements in this theory which do come into conflict with religion. From the earlier passages it has become clear that such views are the denial of the revivification of bodies, denial of physical pains and pleasures in hell and paradise, and the denial of the existence of paradise and hell as described in the Quran.

It is very clear that Ibn Sina does not deny resurrection of bodies, neither does he deny heaven or hell, nor the sensuous pleasures and physical penalty in the life hereafter death. Rather Ibn Sina compressed these beliefs about the second and the third stage of the life hereafter death, while as in the First stage he specifies it with the resurrection of the souls and spiritual pleasures. Whatever he speaks in this regard, he tries to refer repetitively to the Quran and the Sunnah of the prophet (SAW). Therefore, we find here a close and glaring similarity between Ghazzali and Ibn Sina, despite the fact that the former has taxed the latter with infidelity on his three theories, one of them being rejection of this bodily resurrection. Ibn Sina lays much emphasis on the fact, for us, that he believes in the resurrection of bodies as indicated by the Quran.....

He says:

"You must understand that life after is to be believed on the authority of Shariah as there is no other way to understand or know it except on the authority of Shariah or to believe in the statement of the prophet (SAW) about it, as has been indicated that the body will have its rewards and penalties with it at the time of resurrection, which is very evident,.....Shariah which has been brought to us by our chosen prophet (SAW), has elaborated on the condition of salvation".[128]

"Damnation which is directly related to body, which can be understood by reason as well as demonstrative analogy, which has been already established by the prophet (SAW), i.e. Salvation and

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damnation established for the self, though our imagination may not each to it at this stage as the reasons cannot be fully explained, in favour of it,....The Religious philosophers are inclined to establish the superiority of this aspect of spirtitual salvation in comparison to bodily salvation, which sometimes seems as they do not believe in the latter, or if they believe in it they don't make it superior to the former type of salvation....because it's priority etc." From this passage it is very clear that Ibn Sina does not deny resurrection of the bodies, but believes in this doctrine as demanded by Shariah, though he believed in the spiritual resurrection and salvation supported by rational arguments and endorsed by the prophets also. In this way he agrees with Ghazzali about the combined salvation, i.e. of soul and body in life hereafter, as both agree also about the superiority of the former on the latter. Therefore, Ibn Sina's views regarding this matter did not warrant the decree of blasphemy.[129] Despite this fact Ghazzali has taxed Ibn Sina with infidelity, which is a sheer injustice on his part. Taftazani defends Ibn Sina against Ghazzali's decree and says:

"Ghazzali has exaggerated in proving the resurrection of souls and description of various kinds of rewards and penalties from spiritual point of view, which sometimes led him to lapse into superstitions, it was for that reason, that some people start saying that Ghazzali is denying the resurrection of bodies, that was certainly an allegation against Ghazzali evident and unjustified, while as the fact is that Ghazzali has explained in *Ihya* and other books (this doctrine in a detailed manner) and regarded its denial tantamount to infidelity"?[130]

Turning to Ghazzali's concept of bodily resurrection, Al Taftazani says that Ghazzali believes in both kinds of resurrection i.e. resurrection of souls and bodies and describes what is the meaning of the renewal of the dead. He says:

"God will create from the dissolved particles a new body for the body and the sould will return to it which had departed from it at the disintegration of the doy, its being body of some else than its earlier body will not effect us, not is the renewal impossible.

The Quran and Hadith also support this view".

In replay to the philosophers, Ghazzali defends the doctrine which upholds that there is an immaterial, individual soul in his *Iqtisad-fi I' Itiqad (The Golden Mean of Dogmatics)*, a work of Asharite doctrine of resurrection. He states quite explicitly in this work that the doctrine he defends in the *Tahafut* is not the true doctrine and that he defended it, for the sake of argument, to show that even if one accepts the doctrine of an individual, immaterial soul, one can show that the philosophers have not demostrated the impossibility of bodily resurrection.[131] Ibn Rushd's position on bodily resurrection is confusing, inconsistent and seemingly contradictory. He has four diverse opinions about this question.

In his *Tahafut al Tahafut,* he agrees with Ghazzali in convicting Ibn Sina of infidelity on this question, but for a different reason from that of Ghazzali. He condemns Ibn Sina for disclosing the allegorical interpreation of the scriptural texts of bodily resurrection to the public, not for interpreting them allegorically as does Ghazzali.

In *Al Kashf an Manahij al Adillah fi 'Aqa: id al Millah,* Ibn Rushd endorses resurrection of souls in bodies other than their former bodies, but allows allegorical interpretation of the texts by the "people of interpretation." for example he says:

"The other party says that existence is physical only, but they at the same time believe, that the body will be different from our present body. This is only transient that will be eternal. For this also

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there are religious arguments. It seems that even Abdullah B Abbas held this view. For it is related to him that he said, "There is nought in this world of the hereafter, but name", it seems that this view is better suited to the learned men because its possibility is based upon principles, in which there is no disagreement according to all men, the one being that the soul in immortal, and the second is that the return of the souls into other bodies does not look so impossible as the return of the bodies themselves. It is so because the material of the bodies here is found following and passing from one body to another i.e. one and the same matter is found in many people and in many people and in many different times. The example of bodies cannot be found, for their matter is the same".[132]

In *Fasl al Maqal wa Taqrir Bayan Al shariah wa, I Hikmah min al ittisal,* he holds that the texts concerning bodily resurrection (but not the principle of resurrection itself), do not clearly and unmistakably belong to that category of the Divine law that aught to be interpreted, and hence there is controversy about their interpretation. Therefore, Ibn Sina is excused if he commits an error in their interpretation. In this matter then Ibn Sina does not commit any act of disbelief, since he believes in the principle of resurrection per so. He says:

"For, if one acknowledges the reality of the Day of Judgement, and then begins to apply the principles of interpreation to the description, and not its reality, he does not in any way deny it. A denial of its reality is infidelity, for it is one of the fundamentals of law, and it can be easily verified by any of the...methods of argument common to all men".[133]

In *Talkhis kitab al Nafs,* Ibn Rushd denies resurrection altogether since he maintains that the only active intellect that exists in every rational human being is eternal and separable. The rational soul, he continues, he two aspects: the practical and the theoretical. The former i.e. the practical aspect of the rational soul, which is responsible for every moral action, does not survive death. Neither do all the lower parts of the soul which contain memory.[134]

After giving the above details about the views of Ibn Sina, Ghazzali and Ibn Rushd, we arrive to the following conclusions:

1. Ghazzali and Ibn Rushd tax Ibn Sina with infidelity, but both for different reasons. Ghazzali taxes him for his denial of bodily resurrection while as Ibn Rushd for his disclosure of interpretation about it to the people not entitled to be addressed in such matters. But as we have shown above that Ghazzali has exaggerated about the bodily resurection, although Ibn Sina believes in bodily resurrection side by side with spiritual resurrection, though with several specification. Therefore, according to Taftazani and even Ibn Rushd, Ibn Sina does not deserve this decree against him as he does not disbelieve in the Day of judgement in principle.

Since Ibn Rushd's position vis-a-vis resurrection is confusing, therefore, though he agrees with Ghazzali in condemning Ibn Sina, but at other places defends Ibn Sina on the same issue.

It seems very remotely connected with the preceding discussions to talk about the views of Ghazzali and Ibn Rushd on Mysticism. But if we see minutely, Ghazzali's treatment of all other subjects is some how or the other related to his mystical approach in one way or the other. Actually Ghazzali became aware about the limitations of human observation, sense perception, reason and competence after a hectice intellectual pursuit and finally was attracted towards mysticism. The epistemological curiosity led him to mysticism and he regarded intuition or mystical experience as a valid source of knowledge.

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The intellectualized rationalism did not satisfy Ghazzali, he realized that sufis were truly godly, their life most unsullied, beautiful and pure, "illumined with the light that proceeds from the central radiance of Inspiration" He advanced "from witnessing forms and similitudes to stages where the power of the language fails and no rendering in words is possible." These transcendental experiences convinced him of the actuality of receiving knowledge that was beyond other human reasoning intellect.7

The essential feature of the "mystic consciousness" which is the acute consciousness of God and the belief in the capacity of the human soul to realize the living presence of God within it, purification of the soul is the first prerequisite and that is why Ghazzali had to free from "all engagements" and take the first step towards "Tazkia-al Nafs".[135]

As has been rightly siad that Ghazzali's final resort to sufi-mysticism was merely the result of his disillusionment with philosophical hair splitting of the Muslim adherents of Greek philosophy and his dissatisfaction with scholastic theology.

But this is only a part of the truth. Sufistic influences had all along been working upon hin mind right from his early childhood. We need only recall that his father was a pious dervish and his guardian a sufi devout, that in his youth he studied and even practiced sufism first under Yusuf al Nassaj in Taws and then under al Farmadhi at Nishapur and that his own brother Ahmad al-Ghazzali (d. 520/1126) made a name as a great sufi. It is also possible that he should have also learnt of sufism from his teacher Imam al Harmayn, for it is reported that the Imam himself had been the pupil of the renowned sufi, Abu Nuaim al Isfahani (d. 430/1038). So Ghazzali's eventual adoption of the sufi way of life was in reality a continuation of these early influences and not simply the consequence of his failure to find the philosophical solution of theological problems. Therefore Ghazzali's adoption of sufism never amounts to his rejection of philosophy, reason or science. Since in philosophy, almost all, what are designated natural sciences, were included, therefore Ghazzali's reliance on philosophical argumentation speaks amply about his adherence to this edifice of knowledge. In spite of his explicit official denunciation of philosophy, Ghazzali could never completely part company with it. His sufi mysticism was as much influenced by his thorough study of philosophy as by theology, in its final development it was the mysticism of a philosopher and a theologian.[136]

According to Ghazzali complete mystic' way' (or sufism) includes both intellectual belief and practical activity and getting rid of the obstacles in the self and in stripping of its base characteristics and vicious morals, so that the heart may attain to freedom from what is not God and to constant recollection of Him.[137]

Ghazzali went through the books of some stalwert sufi masters like *Quwat al Qaloob* of Abu Talib al Makki, Harith al Muhasibi, the various anecdotes about Junayd Baghdadi, Abu Bakr Shibi and Abu Yazid al Bistami. But despite Ghazzali's vast study of sufi doctrines, it become clear to him that sufi stages could not be reached by mere instruction, but only by transport, ecstasy, and the transformation of the moral being.

He says:

"It became clear to me, however, that what is most distinctive of mysticism is something which cannot be apprehended by study, but only by immediate experience (dhawq-literally, tasting), by ecstasy and by a moral change...There is a difference between knowing the true nature and causes and conditions of the ascetic life and actually leading such a life and forsaking the world".[138]

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In the above extract, Ghazzali lays emphasis on the fact that sufism is more a practical discipline than merely an intellectual enterprise. It is a "fruitional activity" or "experiential discipline", as it consists in experiences, rather than definitions. Moreover, it deals with ecstasy and intuitions than with discussions or intellecutal apprehensions. He says:

"I apprehended clearly that the mystics were men who had real experiences, not men of words".[139]

The way to salvation according to sufism is found in devotion and the conquest of one's passions, a procedure which presupposes renouncement and detachment from the worldly attraction. Ghazzali says:

"It was clear to me too that the key to all this was to sever the attachment of the heart to worldly things by leaving the mansion of deception and returning to that of eternity, and to advance towards God most high with all earnestness. It was also clear that this was only to be achieved by turning away from wealth and position and fleeing from all time consuming entanglements".[140]

After detaching one's from the mundane entanglements, a sufi proceeds to meditative practices and such things are revealed to him which are impossible to recount: Sufi realizes that mysticism is the path of Allah and sufis are the true pioneers on the path, as there life is the most beautiful and their conduct the most praise worthy.

Ghazzali says:

"...I learnt with certainly that it is above all the mystice who walk on the road of God, their life is the best life, their method the soundest method, their character the purest character, indeed, were the intellect of the intellectual and the learning of the learned and the scholarship of the scholars, who are versed in the profundities of revealed truth, brought together in the attempt to improve the life and character of the mystics they would find no way of doing so, for to the mystics all movement and all rest, whether external or internal, bring illumination from the light of the lamp of prophetic revelation: and behind the light of prophetic revelation there is no other light on the face of the earth from which illumination may be received".[141]

The first step in the way of the sufis in their cathartic method is to purge the heart of all that does not belong to God. Sufis get revelations when they set out on this path of sufism. The come to see in the waking state angles and souls of prophets, they hear their voices and wise counsels. By means of this contemplation of heavenly forms and images they rise by degrees to heights which human language cannot reach, which one cannot even indicate without falling into great and inevitable errors. The degree of proximity to Deity which they attain is regarded by some as intermixture, of being (haloul), by others as identification (Ittihad), by others as intimate union (wasl). But according to Ghazzali all these expressions are wrong. He says:

"With this first stage of the way there begin the revelations and visions. The mystics in their waking state now behold angles and the spirits of the prophets, they hear these speaking to them and are instructed them. Later, a higher state is reached, instead of beholding forms and figures. They come to stages in the way' which it is hard to describe in Language, if a man attempts to express these, his words inevitably contain what is clearly erroneous?"

Ghazzali continues:

"In general what they manage to achieve is nearness to God, some however, would conceive of

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this as 'inherence (haloul), some as 'union' (Ittihad) and some as connection (wasul) All that is erroneous. In my book, *The Noblest Aim,* I have explained that nature of the error here yet he who has attained the mystic state need no more than to say":

"Of the things I do not remember what was, was think it good, do not ask an account of it" (Ibn al Mutaaz)"[142]

OR

What I experience I shall not try to say: call me happy, but ask me nor more.[143]

According to Ghazzali, he who does not arrive at intution of these truths by means of ecstasy, knows only the name of inspiration. He says:

"The miraculous graces given to the saints are in truth the beginnings of the prophets: and that was the first 'state; of the Messenger of God (peace be upon him) when he went out to Mount Hira; and was given up entirely to his lord, and worshipped, so that the Bedouin said; Mohammad loves his lord passionately".[144]

Ghazzali thinks sufism is just a discipline which is subservient to prophethood. The state revealed to the initiated in ecstasy, and to him who is incapable of ecstasy, by obedience and attention, Ghazzali says:

"Now this is mytical state, which is realized in immediate experience by those who walk in the way leading to it. Those to whom it is not granted to have immediate experience can become assured of it by trial, (so contact with mystics or observation of them) and by hearsay, if they have sufficiently numerous opportunities of associating with mystics to understand that (sc. ecstasy) with certainty by means of what accompanies the 'states; whoever sits in their company derives from them this faith, and none who sits in their company is ruined".[145]

According to Ghazzali certainty reached by demonstration is knowledge, (IIm); actual acquaintance with that state is immediate experience (dhawq),; the acceptance of it as possible from hearsay and trial (or observation) is faith (Iman). According to Ghazzali, those are three degrees. He quotes the following Quranic verse for support:

"God will raise those of you have faith and those who have been given knowledge in degrees of honour" (Q.58, 12).[146]

Ghazzali concludes his views on sufism in the *Munqidh* by saying:

"....among the things that necessarily become clear to me from my practice of the 'mystic way' was the true nature and special characteristics of prophetic revelation. The basis of that must undoubtedly be indicated in view of the urgent need for it..."[147]

In Kitabual al IIm of Ihya Al-Din, Ghazzali while dealing with the definition of sufism, says:

"The sufis pointed to sufism as the branch of knowledge which was intended, some saying that it is the science where by the creature, realizing his position in relation to the divine, has a mystical experience (in communion with his God) other sufis said that it comprises knowledge what sincerity is and what the afflictions of the soul are, as well as being able to distinguish between the followers of God and the followers of Satan. Other again said that its was the esoteric Science whose acquisition was required only of the qualified, select few, and accordingly they dismissed the accepted meaning of the word in favour of its esoteric connotation".[148]

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Yet in a more explicit manner Ghazzali discusses the problem of intuitive knowledge in one of his other books. He indicates the stage which are found into the process of intuitive knowledge as follows:

"In his initial stages, the mystic, by concentrating on the perfect, eternal and absolute reality, loses even his self consciousness. He gets empty of feelings and even of ideas. He even ignores himself, as being now inside the Divine presence and living together with it and having communication with it. His physical being continues, but his individuality has departed, though for this fellow men he still has his physical body and appearance. This is a type of an ecstatic stage, of contemplation, Inspiration and illumination, which is most glorious attainment and very near to the goal of life,— a state of conentration, of unification, of libration, of discovery, of heightened, and intensified powers and without a burst of joy, of rapture and of radiance".[149]

Ghazzali explains the same point and says that it is a point with in the human-selves, which as the mystic holds, equally God's central reality and ours where spirit with spirit meets. Ghazzali says further:

"One who gets rid of his senses, in order to meditate over Divine Reality does not stand in need of his body or mind for spiritual subsistence, for it is the body which functions as the source of the diverting influences or preoccuptions".[150]

From the above discussion of Ghazzali's views about sufism and intuitive knowledge, we come to the following conclusions.

1. Sufism starts with purification of soul.
2. Ghazzali's sufism is replete with philosophical connotations.
3. Sufism is a practical activity not merely a theoretical enterprise.
4. A sufi receives inspirations and revelations only when he starts his journey to God.
5. In sufism there may come stage, when the sufi loses his consciousness and gets annihilated in presence of God.
6. Some times a sufi get rid of his sense perception and indulges rather in mystical intuitions.
7. Whatever the sufi revelations or inspirations are these, can't be expressed in an explicit manner, as these evade all articulations.

Ibn Rushd seems to be in disagreement and conflict with Ghazzali on this subject, as he thinks that through sufi ways, some intuitional facts may be discovered, yet much reliance can't be invested on it.[151]

Ibn TufayI regards sufism as a paradigm of knowledge to differentiate between the human world and Divine world. But Ibn Rushd is not satisfied with it as it is not open to all people. Moreover, Ibn Rushd relies always on rational approach and demonstrative argumentation for the discovery of truths and pursuit of reality. Ibn TufayI in the manner of Ghazzali too says that the revelations which are dawned on a Sufi defy all expressions and interpretations. In a mystical rapture (wasl or wajd) the experiences, which are had by a sufi are not expressible in human language. Ibn TufayI says:

"A person who wants to disclose these things to people is like a person who is attempting to achieve an impossible goal. He is like a man who wants to taste the colours as colours, or for instance

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thinks that blackness should assume a form of sweetness or bitterness. He says further that a person in such condition listens a voice, which he discerns, and if he remains constantly in this rapturous condition then he observes such things which can not be seen through eyes, listened be ears, nor apprehended by the heart".[152]

Since sufis follow the mystic way, they say that the knowledge of God is thrown into the soul from high above, after we have got rid of our earthly desires. But according to Ibn Rushd, this way is not accessible to all mankind, and it abolishes speculation for which people are exhorted all through the Quran.[153]

In *Al Kashf an Manahij il Adillah fi Aqaid il Millah, wa Tarif ma waqa fiha bi Hisb il Tawil min Shubhil Muzighah wa Bid ill Mudillah.* Ibn Rushd-expressed his opinion about sufism and the sufis. He challenges sufis and says that it is not a philosophical method, to which Ibn Rushd wants remain obediently adherent. He says:

"As to the sufis their method in theorizing is not a philosophical method—that is, made up of a number of premises and syllogisms".[154]

Ibn Rushd says that since the sufis think that their knowledge has been given to them by God, by revealing it on their hearts, therefore, it is confined to few people only.

He says:

"They (The sufis) maintain that the knowledge of God, or of anything existent, is found in our hearts, after its detachment from all physical desires, and concentration of mind on the desired object. In support of their principle the sufis bring many an argument from the exoteric side of Law. For instance they quote the Divine words,"And fear God, and God will instruct you",[155] and "whosoever do their best endeavour to prompt our true religion, we will direct them unto our ways,"[156] and again, "If ye fear God, He will grant you a distinction and may other verses of this kind which are considered to be helpful for their purpose."[157]

Ibn Rushd comments after quoting those verses and says:

"We say that this method, if we suppose it to be real, is not meant for all people. Had this method been satisfactory for all people than the philosophical method would have been quite futile, and its existence among the people would have been useless, and with it the existence of the Quran".[158]

Ibn Rushd says that since the Quran invites us to reason and demonstration, we cannot trust in a "subjective" discipline of sufism for acquiring knowledge. Because "For that (the Quran) always invites us to theorizing, judging, and admonishing by way of philosophy".[159]

In this manner Ibn Rushd discarded sufism as a universal paradigm of the true the religious realities, as he thinks philosophy is.

Since the sufis insist on self-control, and discipline as a prerequisite of the true knowledge, Ibn Rushd maintains in this regard:

"We of course do not deny that the control of physical desires is a condition for healthy thinking, as physical health is one of its conditions. For the control of desires is profitable in acquiring knowledge by itself, if it be made a condition of it, just as health is a condition for education, though it is not very useful for it. That is why our law has invited all us to this method and has insisted upon it, that is, for work, not that it is sufficient is itself, as these people think, but that it is useful for thinking as we

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have already discussed".[160]

Ibn Rushd thinks that the knowledge of the soul is not possible as that of the invisible Maker in case of many people is not possible.

It seems that Ibn Rushd does not see the sufis claim to attain knowledge of the soul tenable. He says:

"Now as the case of the invisible was unknown in the visible on the part of the many, and none knew it but those who were well grounded in knowledge, the law giver forbade an inquiry into it, as for example knowledge of the soul. If it be needful for the common people to know anything, then the law gives examples from the visible world. And if one example did not suffice for the understanding of the problem in view, then many examples are given..."[161]

Ibn Rushd counts Ghazzali's views on Knowledge by privacy, and divine subjects, among the reasons, which led to the confusions and divisions among Muslims. Ghazzali, according to Ibn Rushd himself has accepted that this sufi knowledge exists only by guesses and allusion, as opposed to certainties in other sciences. He says:

"Then in his *Mishkat ul Anwar* he mentions grades of men really knowing God. He says that all but those who believe that God is not the mover of the first heaven and that it is not He from whom this movement originates, and precluded from it. This is an explantion from him of men learned divine science. He has said in many places that divine science exists only by guesses, as opposed to certainties in other science".

He says further: "In his book *Munqidh min al Dalal* he has gone against the philosophers and maintained the knowledge can only be acquired by privacy and meditation, and that those in this rank are all very near to the rank of the prophets. He has mentioned this very fact in his *Kimiyai saadat*".[163]

Ibn Rushd regards this confusion which was adopted by Ghazzali in respect of sufism or divine knowledge, responsible for the divisions among the people. He says: "Men have become divided into parties on account of this confusion, one party chose to censure the philosophers, while the other agreed to interpret the law, and make it conform to philosophy. All this is wrong. The law should be taken literally, and the conformity of religion to philosophy should not be told to the common people":[164]

In this way Ibn Rushd has very grave disagreements with Ghazzali on the mystical experience and its epistemological validity. Ibn Rushd thinks that philosophy is the surest source of knowledge and sufis, on the other hand is confined only to few people. Sufi experience is based on subjective inspiration of a particular person, which cannot be communicated to other people as it evades all definitions and articulation. Therefore, speaking epistemologically, mystical experience cannot be entertained, as the knowledge of soul and divine matters is not possible and the Quran has also not ordained it according to Ibn Rushd.

So far we have dealt with the areas of agrrement and disagreement between Ghazzali and Ibn Rusdh in the foregoing pages. But if we go a littel deeper and scrutinize their actual teachings on various issues, we find that Ibn Rushd has reconciled with Ghazzali's position on the crucial subjects of affinity between Religion and philosophy and role and scope of reason in religious content apart from other subjects. Many scholars have located the differences between these two Islamic philosophers in style of expression and perspective. Katherine Parry thinks that all the mattters where we find any difference between these two thinkers is of stylistic and attitudinal in nature, but both the thinkers are

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right and justified on their part. Ghazzali insists on the unicity and non-duality of God and by implication, lays stress on getting one' relations severed from all other false gods and implication, lays stress on getting one's relations severed from all other false gods and goddesses. In the same manner, he rejected the necessary nexus between cause and effect, as it would amount to the belief that world is not dependent on God. Since according to Ghazzali, God is the Absoulte power, therefore. He cannot be regarded ignorant or negligent from the affairs of the world even for a moment. According to Ghazzali:-

"There is no possibility to deny that God has power over all things and affairs. [165]Therefore, the system of this universe is not self-sufficient, but rather God given."

If Ghazzali's arguments touch reasonableness, that is only on the matters, when he provides or presents argumentation on such topics which are beyond the sphere of expression. Hence logic gets curbed to some extent, as Ghazzali remains bound at such places by his scholastic limitations. Ghazzali had to present an orthodox interpretations of Islamic dogmas in the light of the Quran and Hadith to make these comprehensible for the believers. But so far the discussion about the Creator beyond the apparent world is concerned, and the reality behind it, Ghazzali seems successful to express his views on the subject. While as Ibn Rushd regards the phenomenal world, real as Divine Reality.[166]

Moreover, Ghazzali starts his journey from the Absolute Reality. But Ibn Rushd begins his search from material world as a true follower of the Aristotelain tradition of philosophy. With firm conviction that the Divine Nature can be revealed in the light of the natural laws, he adheres faithfully to the material reality of the world. Or he is always down to earth. Then supposing that the similar relations can be established at the higher stages of reality, he strives to attain knowledge pertaining to the divine Being. It is every ironical that some people regard Ibn Rushd as a supporter or advocate of science in contradiction to religion, hence they do not get convinced with the arguments of Ibn Rushd which he presents on his method and philosophy.[167]

Some Scholastic thinkers have also regarded Ibn Rushd's thought very dangerous. But the fact is that Ibn Rushd aimed at attaining knowledge of God through the knowledge of the nature. Ibn Rushd warns that if philosophy is laid in the hands of wrong people, then it will be very disastrous for right belifes. But if philosophy is given in the right hands, then it leads us to the knowledge of truth and reality. Therefore, according to Ibn Rushd, philosophy is not apposite to kalam, as both search for the same reality though their perspectives are different. Islamic revelation (wahy) is very vast, and through which the reality or truth can be observed from various angels, as the Absolute Reality is one and only one.[167]

Here we can easily observe that Ghazzali's kalam views and Ibn Rushd's philosophical ideas are identical about that Absolute truth and ultimate reality. Moreover, Ibn Rushd has reconciled his position with that of Ghazzali by justifying his views in support of philosophy and absoulte reality by quoting various Quranic verse in his support.

According to Ibn Rushd the conflict or disagreement of opinion between the Mutakallimeen and philosophers pertaining to the Eternity of the world or the createdness of the world, was just linguistic, verbal and semantic in nature and not a real one. Though the philosophers adhere to the doctrines of eternity of the world–they don't regard it as real eternal. i.e. essentially eternal because the philosophers in general believe in the originator or the creator of this Universe. Ibn Rushd says:

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"The creator preceded in time, and the real eternal is that whose existence does not depend on any other existent." Therefore, the Eternal in his view is only Allah, and the real created is that which we see in this Universe as water, air, Fire etc as all these are dependent for their existence on time, but what about time and the existence which precedes time, are those eternal or created"? are the questions which arise.

This problem thus controversial for some people who see these two close to the createdness, as their existence is acquired from Allah. Therefore, according to these people, these are created. There are others who regard their closeness to the Actual Real as not being precedent to time in regard to their eternity. Therefore, according to Ibn Rushd. their discussion about the eternity or createdness of the world remains merely a linguistic or semantic in nature. Moreover, he thinks that since the matter is based on linguistic dimensions and semantic aspects, therefore, on one should be declared as an infidel for advocating these views or beliefs. Since Ghazzali had issued decree of infidelity against the philosophers on the basis of these views. Ibn Rushd tried to reconcile the philosopher's on the basis of these views. Ibn Rushd tried to reconcile the philosopher's position vis-a-vis these issues with that of Islam. Therefore, he quoted several Quranic verses, which in Ibn Rush's view support doctrine of eternity of the world.

According to Ibn Rushd such verses indicate that the time used to be prior to this time, for the reason Allah created this world in six days, which means he created the world in a particular time of the time, this time was not known to as before the creation of the heavens. This is indicative of the orbital revolutions, and the orbital movements were not found prior to it, which also indicates that there was time before this time in which the heavens and earth were created. In the same way this verse says that there was an Existence before this Existence and that is the throne and the water.[169]

The same meaning is conveyed by the other verses. This verse indicates according to Ibn Rushd that Allah created the sky or the heaven from smoke[170] and not from nothingness (Al Adm-al-Mahaz). He thinks that the Mutakallimeen interpret the verses externally and in the Shariah there is no such teaching as the Allah was with the absoulte Nothingness (Admi-al-Mahaz).

In *Fasl al Maqal.* Ibn Rushd tries to prove that the conflict or the dispute pertaining to the eternity of the world or its createdness was a semantic one. (Nizahi al Lafzai). The views in this respect are not so diversified contrary and contradictory to each other which will warrant a decree of blasphemy against any one of the disputants. According to Ibn Rushd the world is not created in a real sense of the word (hadithun Haqiqah). But there is an aspect of similarity of it to its being eternal-real (Bil-Qadeem al-Haqiqi) and with the created real from another aspect, and in this way, it is a controversial subject. The opposition in this respect is rendered affected on one of the similitudes, but this opposition must not lead to the leveling of decree of blasphemy of the either disputants as there is not much difference, diversion and contradiction in their opinions.

After giving this detail Ibn Rushd proceeds ahead in order to reconcile his position on the matter with Islamic teachings. He regards that the world is eternal in a sense and created in a sense. Since the subject is controversial, therefore the decree of blasphemy cannot be leveled against any one even on it, as no agreement on this subject is found, which may be universal.[171]

He explains the matter and says further that the dispute between the philosophers and Mutakallimeen is only verbal, The Al-Hadith al Haqiqi (the Real created world) is precedent in time (Al-Masbooq bil Zaman) according to this view. Therefore, it can be said:

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"The time which is in other words, the quality or attribute of orbital movements and the Existence or Being (Al-Majud) which was prior to this time, are not in reality two real created things because of their not being precedent in time, therefore, not real eternals (Al Qadeem al Haqiqi) as the real eternals can never be acquired from a second things. Therefore, there is the possibility of their similarity with the real created from an angle and with the real eternal from an another angle. In this way the statement about their eternity or createdness is rather the preference of one of the two similitudes on the other, therefore, this dispute or conflict cannot be regarded as a real one, but only in case when the 'Hadity' (created) will be regarded as precedent with nothingness (Adm) and the eternal is that which was never preceded by nothingss, at that time this conflict and dispute will become a real one. But as long as the 'Hadith' is regarded as preceded by nothingness, and the eternal as not preceded by nothingness, this dispute and conflict will assume reality".

The Mutakallimeen know this matter by these two definitions i.e. 'Al Hadith is that which is preceded by nothingness, and 'Qadim' is not preceded by time, therefore, there is no relation between the two. It is in this background that the conflict ensued in the opinions of the proponents of createdness of the world and eternity of the world. According to the Mutakallimeen the Hadith (Createdness) is an attribute of the Being (Al Mujud) and it has been qualified by them with Adm (nothingness).

From this passage it has become evident that the Mutakallimeen understood Hadith in these senses only, the Hadith al Haqiqi according to them is that which is preceded by Nothingness (Adm) or which has come out from nothing to something. They don't regard time in the sense of 'Huduth or 'Hadith as has been done by Ibn Rushd, as he sees that it is very difficult, rather impossible to see the precedence of nothingness on Existence of a thing with out considering the factor of time.

The other philosophers than Ibn Rushd, see that what is preceded by Nothingness is preceded in the time as well, as they see a necessary relation between precedence in Nothingness and precedence in time as has been said by Tawsi in the commentary of Ibn Sina.

This is the opinion of the philosophers, but the Mutakallimeen don't take in the sense of its being 'al—Hadith', and what has been said by Ibn Rushd that the idea of precedence of 'Adm on the thing without the time is very difficult. This position cannot be accepted as it would entail very absurd consequences. Because if the precedence of everything over other things would have demanded time, then the precedence of the parts of the time would have been on one another as the requirements of the time. Then for each time would have been an another time as the prerequisite of the time. Then for each time would have been a time, and that is clearly impossible, and secondly that we can't say about Nothingness that it is temporal and qualified with time. as time is a matter of existence or being and 'adm' is not qualified with existence. However, Ibn Rushd's statement that every 'Hadith should have preceded by nothingness in time, is not correct, as precedence of nothingness of a thing on a thing without of regard to time is not difficult. It is not necessary that every precedent in nothingness must be precedent in time at one and the same time.[172]

In this sense the time which is the orbital movement (Harakatual al Aflak) and the orbit (falk) itself, will not be such created thing from nothingness without their being precedent in time. Therefore, the dispute in this regard between the philosophers and Mutakallimeen was only nominal but not a real one.[173]

Ibn Rushd having shown the views of the philosophers not liable to decree of blasphemy by reconciling their views to those of the Divine Book, has in a way tried to bring an accord between

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position of philosophy vis-a-vis shariah to adjust Ghazzalian allegations.

Now Ibn Rushd rejected the decree of Ghazzali against the philosophers for their belief in the eternity of the world, from one another angle. He says that the opinions or the views of the philosophers on which Ghazzali has objected to them are not quite evident from shariah commandments, therefore, any one opposing these matters does not warrant the decree of blasphemy.[174]

Ibn Rushd regards that from the Quranic point of view the being or existence is standing on two footings, the Mutakallimeen are interpreting those verse in which this subject is discussed externally, but Ibn Rushd cannot issue a decree against them on the basis of this interpretation as Ghazzali did about their view on the eternity of the world. Ibn Rushd regards them entitled to a single reward in case they have committed a mistake in their Ijtihad.[175]

In this way Ibn Rushd thinks about a belief which is clear and evident to a man on rational basis about a transitory and controversial matter, he is not liable to punishment as he is helpless there, and resposibility is valid only on matters on which a man is able to have control.

According to Ibn Rushd a man has no control over belief or disbelief, when he is supported by in an argument, being himself a rational person and able to argue, he may commit a mistake after observing all the necessary precautions in his argumentation and evidence to reach to a judgement (Tasdeeqh), he cannot be regarded responsible for a mistake if he commits one.

In this way Ibn Rushd proves that the statement about the eternity of the world's not opposite to Shariah as held by Ghazzali. Therefore, the philosopher's position vis-a-vis Shariah is made reconciled and the philosophers are shown to be not liable to the decree of blasphemy because of their adherence to this doctrine.[176]

But as a matter of fact that the problem of createdness of the world or its eternity is not the subject of Ijtihad, as the religious and Shariah teachings have clearly fairly made all details about the createdness of the world available without any suspicion, therefore for the same reason the IsIamic scholars regarded the belief in eternity of the world as denial of the Shariah laws.[177]

Though Ibn Rushd tried his best to reconcile philosophy with Shariah, but the verses which he quoted in his favour are not indicative of the eternity of the world, or its createdness, as those matters are not subjects of Ijtihad. Though Muslim Mujtahideen are different in their opinions about these matters but they are one on the problem of createdness of the Universe, rather all the great civilizations are one on this point. We find copious references about this belief in the religious teachings. For example, there are several prophetic traditions about this matter.

Imam Bin Hassain narrates that the inhabitants of Yemen asked the prophet of God (SAW) about the beginning of this matter (the universe). The Prophet (SAW) replied, Allah, the 'Exalted was prior to every thing, and Hish throne was on water"

In the Hadith of Zarain is narrated that he asked the prophet of Allah (SAW):

Where was our Lord before, he created the Universe, The Prophet (SAW) replied that the was in the "Amaa" (ether),[178] Ibn Jareer Al-Tabari also considers that there was an existence of the time before this time as was held by Ibn Rushd.[179]

He gave an example of the Hadith (createdness) of this time with the differences in the nights and days with light and darkness, and this time is not found apart from these two, as their createdness

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means the Huduth of time, but in this manner their togetherness as well, in the way one will be after the other, and this is not the sign of 'Huduth'. In this way no day was found unless there was a day, this being also a sign of createdness. But the existence before this time is not indicative of the eternity of any things, as the injections indicate explicitly that every things was preceded by adm' (nothingness) in the world, and if something were not preceded by this time, still there is no possibility or necessity of Ijtihad about the problem of "Huduth i al Alam" as it is categorically established by these Shariah injections with clear connotations.[180]

Therefroe, after scrutinizing the whole matter seriously despite Ibn Rushd's attempt at reconciliation between philosophers and Shariah, Ghazzalian decree of blasphemy against them seems more pertinent and conviving.[181]

There are several other issues, where Ibn Rushd argues that even though the Kalam theologians used different terms than the philosophers, they meant nearly the same thing.

Ibn Rushd says:

"Further, it is self-evident that all events have four causes, agent, form, matter, and end, and that they are necessary for the existence of the effects-especially those causes which form a part of effect, namely that which is called by the philosophers matter, by the theologians condition and substratum, (mahall); and that which is called by the philosophers form, by the psychological quality".[182] The Theologians do not admit forms, being universals, as for them there are no universal entities in real nature, and universals are psychological entities, things of the mind.[183]

In the same way, according to Ibn Rushd, the theologians acknowledge that there exist conditions which are necessary to the conditioned, as when they say that life is a condition of knowledge; and they equally recoginze that things have realities and definitions, and that these are necessary for the existence of the existent, and therefore they here judge the visible and the invisible according to one and the same scheme.[184]

Philosophers accept causality and therefore the existence of effects the theologians speak of signs, even though this also implies a kind of causality.

The main thrust of Ibn Rushd's argument comprises his criticism particularly of the theory of "habit" which was affirmed by Ghazzali also.[185] Ibn Rushd points to what he sees to be its inherent ambiguity. "I do not know what they (the Asharites) understood by the term "habit", whether they mean that it is the habit of the agent, the habit of the existing thing, or our habit to form a judgement about such things"?[186]

He, then argues that God cannot acquire a "habit" (adah) that would constrain Him. Unsouled being can not acquire "habit" either, because this would mean that it belongs to their nature. Of course, the human intellect is familiar with custom, but from it only a "hypothetical" knowledge is possible. If all knowledge were pypothetical, everything would be the case only by supposition and there would be no wisdom in the world from which ti might be inferred that its Agent was wise.[187]

Here Van Der Bergh has brought a very important point to our notice. He says:

"Averroes asks a good question:" What is really meant by habit, is it a habit in man or in nature? There is another question which has been asked by the Greek opponents of this theory, but which is not mentioned by Averroes. How many times must such a sequence be observed before such a

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habit can be formed? There is yet another question that might be asked: Since we cannot act before such a habit is formed, for action implies causation what are we doing until then"?

Moreover, Ghazzali has dismissed all natural phenomena as occurring through mere custom (Tard al adah), as he says:

"Rather their concomitancy is determined by virtue of following custom, like the burning of cotton when it touches fire and the occurrence of coldness in the hand when it touches ice. All this continues to happen by the ordinace of God..."[188]

Ibn Rushd attempts to reconcile with Ghazzali's view by calling it "nature" instead of "habit" or "custom" are used by the latter. He says:

"And if they call such a fact, habit, this may be granted, but otherwise I do not know what they understood by the term "habit".....whether they mean that it is the habit of the agent, the habit of the existing thing, or our habit to form a judgement about such thing? It is, however, impossible that God should have a habit, for a habit is a custom which the agent acquires and from which a frequent repetition of his act follows,....If they mean a habit in existing things, habit can only exist in the animated; if it exists in something else, it is really a nature".[189]

For nature, according to Aristotle is concerned, as habit with the invariable, as habit with the frequent. However, Aristotle often says that things that happen by nature happen invariably or in a majority of cases, and Ibn Rushd repeats this in the text.

We find an another example where Ibn Rushd tries to reconcile his position with that of Ghazzali on the problem of knowledge of particulars. Ibn Rushd shows that the philosophers are not entitled to the decree of blasphemy for their views about the divine knowledge about particulars, as was alleged by Ghazzali.

Ibn Rushd holds that if it be maintained that one does not become an unbeliver by ignoring consensus of opinion in interpretation, as no unanimity is possible in it, what shall we say of Muslim philosophers as Abu Nasr (Al Farabi) and Ibn Sina, for Abu Hamid Al-Ghazzali has charged them with positive infidelity in his book: *Tahafut al Falasifah* in regard to God's Ignorance of particulars among other things.[190]

Ibn Rushd replies that from that Ghazzali has said is not clear that he has charged them positively with infidelity. For according to Ibn Rushd, in his book' *Al Tafriqah bain al islami wal Zindiqah* ' he has explained that the infidelity of a man who ignores the concensus of opinion is doubtful. Moreover, it is difficult in Ibn Rushd's opinion to establish a consensus of opinion in such matters.[191]

Ibn Rushd attempts to exempt the philosophers from Ghazzali's allegations about their views pertaining to God's knowledge of particulars. He says that the philosophers are only of the opinion that the knowledge of God about particulars is quite different from ours.[192] For our knowledge is the effect of the existence of a thing. Such knowledge is produced by the existence of a thing, and changes with changes in the thing. On the other hand, the knowledge of God is the cause of an existing thing. Thus, according to Ibn Rushd, one who compares these two kinds of knowledge ascribes the same characteristics two two quite different things, He says further that when applied both to eternal and to transitory things the word knowledge is used only in a formal fashion, just as we use many other words for objects essentially different.[193]

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While concluding the discussion on God's knowledge of particulars, Ibn Rushd says:

"How can it be supposed that the peripatetic philosophers say that God has not knowledge of particulars when they are of the opinion that man is sometimes warned of the coming vicissitudes of the further through visions, and that the gets these admonitions in sleep, through a great and powerful Director, who directs every things? These philosophers are not only of the opinion that God has no knowledge of details such as we have but they also believe that He is ignorant of universals. For all known universals with us are also the effect of the existence of a thing, while God's knowledge is quite other than this".

"From those arguments it is concluded that God's knowledge is far higher than that it should be called universal or particular".[194]

Ibn Rushd tries to defend the philosophers against the charge of infidelity, therefore he laid down the theoretical framwork as has been shown to reconcile their position with Shariah. He is of the opinion that the position which has been established about the philosophers views pertaining to Divine knowledge of particulars, there is no call at all for the dispute on whether or not the philosophers should be charged with disbelief.[195]

In *Damimat al IImal al IIahi,* however, he raises a problem that might be posed against God's knowledge of the particulars as follows:

"The particulars inevitably include the occurrence of something or the existence of it after its inexistence. That in itself is a change from one condition to another. It follows therefore this that knowledge about the first condition (inexistence), has to be different from that about the second (existence) i.e. it is not only additional but also new knowledge How then can God be aware of a change in this reality without a corresponding change occurring in His eternal knowledge"?[196]

Ibn Rushd deems unconvinving Ghazzali's answer to this question namely, that knowledge and the object know are related in such a way that a change in one of two related things does not necessarily effect a change in the other. Thus, according to Ghazzali, a change in the object of God's knowledge does not effect any change in His knowledge. Ghazzali illustrates this answer with the example of an object moved from the right side of a person to his front, then to his left and so on while the person himself undergoes no change.

Objecting to this argument, Ibn Rushd observes that though the person himself has not changed, the relation of the object to him has changed from right sided to front-sided etc. Hence, since knowledge is the relation itself, it must change whenever the object changes from one position to the other.[198]

Ibn Rushd asserts that to resolve this problem, one has to recognize that where beings are concerned, the state of God's eternal knowledge is different from that of originated knowledge. The existence of being is a cause and reason for originated knowledge i.e. our knowledge or human knowledge, while the eternal knowledge is a cause and reason for the beings. If the coming into existence of being were to add to the eternal knowledge as it does to an originated knowledge, it would then follow that the eternal knowledge is an effect is an effect and not a cause of beings, and that is absured. The knowledge of God must therefore not be changeable at all.[199] No change, Ibn Rushd asserts, occurs in the eternal knowledge when the object of its knowledge results from the latter itself, just as no change occurs in an agent when his act comes into existence.[200]

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Ibn Rushd now points out that the error in this matter springs from drawing an analogy between the eternal knowledge and originated knowledge. This, he observes, is equal to making an analogy between the suprasensible and the sensible, an analogy whose falsity is indisputable. Therefore, the occurrence of change in knowledge when being change is an attribute of originated knowledge only and note eternal knowledge.[201]

Ibn Rushd then concludes that the philosphers hold that God knows the particulars, but with eternal knowledge which is constant and not subject to change as a result of a change in the object known. He emphasizes that the connection of the eternal knowledge with beings is different from the connection of originated knowledge with them. The former is that of a reason and cause of the latter, while the latter is an effect of the former.[202]

In the light of the foregoing discussion we can say that Ibn Rushd has tried to reconcile Ghazzali's position about eternity of the world, and God's knowledge of the particulars with that of philosophers.

In this way the debate between Ghazzali and Ibn Rushd constitutes the most profound encounter between theology and philosophy. Ghazzali's interest was religious and Ibn Rushd's was philosophical, but both worked in the philosophic medium and both upheld a unified out look on philosophy and religion.

For Ghazzali there was no conflict between faith and knowledge except in details and in the perversity of the followers of each school. For Ibn Rushd, philosophy was a means to strengthen faith and to deepen one's appreciation for truth. As a matter of fact, Ghazzali set the agenda for Ibn Rushd and hence books of both these thinkers are interlocked as the discussion goes on around the doctrines of philosophers. Only indirectly they refer to epistemology but the epistemological unity of religion and philosophy remains as a common feature of both the philosophers.

The general impression about Ghazzali is that he has denounced and condemned reason or intellect, while as Ibn Rushd has elevated it to the highest possible status. But as we have shown with ample evidences from the references from Ghazzali's books that he never rejected or condemned reason, though he does not blindly believe that reason is the absolute criterion of truth and certainty as was held by Ibn Rushd. According to Ibn Rushd religion is identical with reason as it invites us to ponder over the universal phenomena and never discards rational thinking.

Ibn Rushd insists that we must certainly avail the Greek philosophy, especially its positive elements to which the Greek thinkers have reached, despite their paganistic embellishment, as our religion does not prohibit us from acquiring, wisdom, whereever, we may find it.

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"As to theology (al Kalam) it is solely designed to safeguard the articles of faith which the followers of the usage of the prophet and righteous fathers transmitted down to us, and nothing else. Anything beyond this world be an attempt to reveal the truth of things in order than its proper way" (P-94, Al-Ghazzali of knowledge, Tr. Nabih Ahmad Faris).
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(The dogmatic ulama of scholasticism though have the talent to understand dialectical or rhetorical arguments, but are not able to comprehend the argumentative and deomostrative patterns and unable to use these) (p. 96, Vol. II, May-August, 1990 Aligarh).
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    Poetical arguments occupy the lowest step on the ladder because they take into consideration not the objective existence of objects, but their images, which are the results of the purest subjectivity. These arguments act, on people's imagination, nor their reason, inciting positive or negative emotions "poetical" and "rhetorical" arguments were identified with speculative theology". See Artur V Sagadeev, "Ibn Rushd and the Islamic philosophical tradition" Firmst Bond, 1987, pp. 53-54.
43. Barakat Mohammad Murad, "Ibn Rushd KA Difa-i-Falsafah", The Quaterly "Ayaat" Vol. II, May-August 1990, Aligarh, pp.96-97.
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53. Ibid, pp.184-189.
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    Ibn Rushd taxex Ghazzali with infidelity for setting down allegorical interpretations in popular writing. However, he excuses himself for also discussing demonstrative questions as such in a popular work with the justification that they are already being publicly discussed. Further more, he accuses Ghazzali of inconsistency in his writings as for as doctrine in general is concerned.

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To protect common people, who are not of the demonstrative class, Ibn Rushd suggests that books on demonstration, particularly those of Ghazzali, should be banned to them. For details see FasI, pp.61-62, Tr. G.F.

59. Shibi Noamani, Op. Cit, pp.131-132.
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(A famous latter scholar Ghayasuddin Mansual Dastaki Shirazi (D. 948) in his treatise of life hereafter (Maad) after quoting Ghazzali's "FaysI al Tafraqah" passed a degree of blasphemy against Ghazzali and counted Ghazzali among the greatest atheists and unbelievers because of his beliefs presented in this book.

But Mullah Sadra in his famous book Mubda Wa Maad (pp. 294-299, published Tehran) presented views of Ghazzali and those of Ghayasuddin Mansur both in detail in comparison to each other and interpreted Ghazzali in the real perspective vis-a-vis the allegation of the former scholar and criticized him for his allegations againsts Ghazzali".

(p. 438, Although Mulla Sadra in his book Mubda was Maad, pp. 293-99), and also in his treatise Mazahir "(which was published as a commentary on the former book (pp. 292-2). narrated Ghazzalis' views regarding the reality of bodily resurrection in detail and explianed and elaborated on it and on considered it against religion and Shariah". (pp. 438-39, Ghazzali Namah. By Jalal din Humai, Tehran, 1383 A.H.).

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100. Fasal al-Maqal tr. by Jamilur Rehman.
101. Ibid tr. Hourani, Op. Cit, p. 50.
102. Ibid, p. 51.
103. Ghazzali seems to have changed his opinion in a latter, two of his very last works: Al-Mustasfa and Al-Qistas. In those works, he suggests that scripture has to be given preponderance over reason, when the conclusion of scripture falls in conflict with reason, as long as the scriptural statement in categorical: carries an exact and unambiguous meaning (See Iysa Bello, pp. 67-68).
104. When contradiction occurs, the Revelation should be interpreted metaphorically except when its conclusion is categorical. Here, Ghazzali in Mustasfa (Al-Mustasfa Min Ilm-al-Usul, Cairo, 1902, Vol. I, pp. 388-9) and Qistas al-Mustaqim Cairo, 1925, pp.111-112) seems to have departed from his Asharite doctrine, by giving Revelution preponderance over reason. Ibn Rushd on the other hand maintains that the Revelation still has to be interpreted. (Fasl Haurant, p. 51).
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127. *Tahafut-al-Falasifah,* op. cit, p. 235.
128. Ibn Sina, *At-Najat,* p. 291.
    Even so, while philosophers from earliest times, up to and including al Farabi and Ibn Sina, are to be considered heretics, their works are not utterly devoid of truth. Truth and false hood lie side by side with in their works, and this is the essence of the problem. See, p. 211.
    Eric L. Ormosby, *Theodicy in IsIamic Thought, The Dispute over Al-Ghazzali's Best of All Possible World.*
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134. Ibn Rushd, *Talkhis Kitab al-Nafs* (ed. F. Ahwani) Cairo Egypt 1959, p. 70 see also Iysa Bello, pp. 138-139.
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8

IBN Taimiyah—An Introduction

Ibn Taimiyah's influcnce is reverberating and extended to the succeeding generations. Ibn Taimiyah by his single-minded devotion and idealism yoked with a strong practical sense, erudite scholarship and dauntless courage rescued the world of Islam from the rut of intellectual lethargy demoralization.[1]

"Taqi ud Din al-Subki wrote in his letter to al-Zahabi"

"I am fully aware that Ibn Taimiyah is an erudite scholar, his knowledge is profound and deep in all the religious and worldly sciences; he is mature in thought and sparking in intellect, and I also know that his scholarship is beyond all praise. I have always acknolwedge these qualities of Ibn Taimiyah before my friends and associates."[2]

He was a religious doctor, yet in reality he was a man who had come safe out of the enchanted house of philosophy. All his works are full of bitter condemnation of philosophy and yet he was a great philosopher himself.[3] He has been a source of inspiration for all Muslim thinkers "Who ever cared to restore Islam to its pristine purity."[4]

Ibn Taimiyah's name was frequently and reverently mentioned in the intellectual circles within the Mamluk dominions as well as outside.[5]

He never followed anyone on the basis of taqlid. He rather proclaimed freedom from all 'imitation', except that of the Quran, the Sunnah and the practice of the early Muslims, Conflicts with his contemporaries were witnessed for the same reason. Though he exposed the erroneous beliefs of his contemporaties, his intellectual stature, linguistic attainments and polemical skill were universally recognised.[6]

Ibn Daqeeq-al-Abd Faqi said:

"I have seen a man, in whom God has combined knowledge of all the sciences. Since he had good command on all the sciences, he could select any subject or science for deliberation at will."[7]

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He had a very strong personality with a formidable voice, fluency aided by a rough nature, but balanced by humbleness, "He was an Ocean without banks and a treasure of knowledge" Ibn Kathir writes:

"Among the jurists there was a group which was jealous of Shaykh Taqial-din, because of his distinguished position with the state, his exclusive role in commanding the good and forbidding the evil, the submission of the people to and their love for him, the great number of his followers, his defence of truth, his knowledge and his conduct."[8]

Thus Ibn Taimiyah's achievements in the intellectual and religious fields were quite extensive and varied. His mission was to thoroughly review the whole gamut of Muslim thought and life in the light of the Quran and the Sunnah as understood and interpreted by the elders (aslaf) of Islam, and show what was right and true and what was wrong and mistaken.[9]

He was always austere. He never joined the government service. But he was respected by the Government because of his self-denial. He was often consulted in the selection of the 'Ulama' to preside over important educational institutions and to be appointed to high offices in the judiciary.[10]

He was a staunch opponent of innovations and the heretical sects especially the Assassins, the Ahmadiyah and the Kisrawaniyan. He uprooted most of them from their settlements and persuaded the state army to exterminate as many of them as possible.[11]

Ibn Taimiyah being a chief spokesman of Hanbalism clashed with the other schools of jurisprudential though.[12]

He frequently gave legal opinions (Fatawa) which were written out in the form of books and tracts, which were widely circulated. This was perhaps the basic cause of conflict with the other 'Ulama' and the government, hence it led to his persecution at times.[13]

But this conflict didn't prevent him from addressing the rulers and the princes in frank and effective language. Several times, he met the Sultan in Cario and addressed him with great courage.

Similarly, when he met the Mengol Emperor, Qazan Khan, he spoke to him in the harshest language.[14]

He also helped the Muslim rulers in their Jehad against the Mangols. He was very instrumental in arousing the sentiments of Muslims against the Mangol invasion, therefore, his role in fight against the Mangols is not in any way meagre. He lived a very eventful life. A good deal of his life was spent in prison, where he wrote some of his important books.

His persecution began early in 698 A.H (1298), when the people of Hamah asked him for a legal opinion about the attributes of God. He gave his opinion in the form of a tract, al-Risalah-al-Hamawiyah at once sparked off the opposition of the jurists, headed by the Hanafite Qazi Jalal al-din of Damascus. He was brought before a council of judges and jurists to defend the views he had maintained in the tract. As a result, a heated debate took place, but Ibn Taimiyah defeated his opponents in the debate.[15]

In an other matter, he had expressed a legal opinion that no journey to a shrine, even if it be to the grave of the Holy Prophet of Islam could be undertaken as an act of devotion under the Shariah. He based his decree on the Tradition of the Prophet (SAW) in which he said:

"Do not saddle a dromedary except for three mosques, the Masjid-i-Haram (Kaaba), my own

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Mosque (Masjid-i-Nabawi) and the Masjid-i-Aqsa (Bait-ul-Muqaddas)" etc. etc.

The enemies of Ibn Taimiyah unearted this seventeen year old decree to discredit him among the ignorant folk. He was put behind the bars on the 7th of Shaban, 726 A.H. His brother Zainnd-Din Abdur Rahman Ibn Taimiyah was allowed to remain with him.[16]

Like his practical and dynamic career as a reformer, his scholarship and academic achievements were very great. By a penetrating criticism of all the excesses of the different sects of Islam, he led people of the fountainhead of the Quran and the Sunnah. Neither theology nor rationalism, neither Sufism nor even Greek logic and Philosophy escaped his scathing criticism. He executed this task with the dexterity of an expert, with the profundity of one who had penetrated to the remotest depths of these sciences and systems and with the enthusiasm of a true reformer calling every one to approach a fresh the Quran and the Sunnah. The Greek philosophy that was the main source of ideas for all these discussions, had in Ibn Taimiyah view been led astray by the idle imaginings and baseless arguments of the participants in them, whose vision has been clouded by their degenerate religion and culture. They had not come into contact with authentic revelation, consequently they were misguided and led astray all those who followed them. On the other had, Ibn Taimiyah found the only source of the knowledge of spiritual realities in revelation.[17]

Here a brief mention of the political and religious conditions of the Islamic world of Ibn Taimiyah's period in general and Egypt in particular will facilitate us to appreciate the role played by Ibn Taimiyah.

During the whole of this period, Iraq, Iran and Khurasan continued to smother under the despotic control of the Tartars. Baghdad was not restored to the Muslims until its Tartar ruler embraced Islam. The Abbasid caliph of Egypt himself led an expedition against Iraq and Baibers too made several attempts to regain Iraq, but none of these efforts proved successful. Mamluks, however, held the region of government over Egypt, Sudan, Syria and Hejaz.[18]

About twelve years before Ibn Taimiyah was born, the Mamluks had taken over the administration of Egypt and Syria.

When Ibn Taimiyah was born, Egypt and Syria were ruled by al-Malik-al Zahir Baibers and when the latter died, Ibn Taimiyah was fifteen years of age. Baibers was the first Mustlim soveriegn who consolidated his force to give many a crushing defeat to the enemies of Islam.[19]

As the political conditions were not in any way good, so were the religious conditions. The legalists debated simply about the correctness of their own interpretation, the disputation between the scholasticians was more often meant to prove that the other side had lapsed from faith.[20]

A section of the philosophers was busy in spreading its own agnostic ideas, overtly, and at times covertly, completely disregarding the prophetic teachings. There were others who wanted to reconcile religion with philosophy, giving, however, preference to reason over revelation. Both these groups were actually the followers of Aristotle and plats.[21]

Ilmal-al-Kalam came into existence in order to answer the questions raised by philosophy. But with the passage of time it absorbed the spirit of philosophy and itself turned into a theological philosophy, discussing those very questions, employing thesame claim of reasoning and trying, like philosophy, to ascertain the nature and attributes of the Divine being through the speculative categories of reasoning. ilmul-al-Kalam, too turned a deaf ear to the teachings of the prophets of God, and placing

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reliance on limited human intellect, tried to explain the inexplicable in terms of Greek metaphysical terminology borrowed from philosophy.[22]

Ibn Taimiyah says:

"So far as the "divinities" (Ilahiyat) is concerned, its principles are more corrupt than the principles of physics. Most of their sayings in this respect are the false conjectures (Zanoonu-Kazibah). Moreover, the propositions may be true and a demonstration (Burhan) may be composed from it."[23]

He says further:

"The divine knowledge (al-Ilm-al-Ilahi), for them is the knowledge acquired by Creator not the created." The supreme science for them is the first philosophy and the superior wisdom (al-Falsafatul-Aulawal-Hikmatul-al-'U'lya) and the metaphysics (Ilm Mab'ad al-Taabiat) by the consideration of argument. What is that from the point of view of "Being" which is known from them is "Al-Ilm-al-Ilahi." and the subject of this knowledge is "The absolute universal being" (al-Wajud-al-Mutlaq al-Kulli), which is divided into "Wajib" and "Mumkin" and "Qadim" and "Jawhar" and "Ard".[24]

Ibn Taimiyah believed that Islam was corrupted by theologians apart from philosophy and sufism and by all sorts of superstitious beliefs.[25]

In this way both politically and religiously speaking, the period of Ibn Taimiyah was marked by chaos and confusion.

Ibn Taimiyah was born in Mamluk Empire which comprised the present day Egypt, Syria, Lebanon and Palestine.[26]

Muslims were facing three grave dangers at the time of the brith of Ibn Taimiyah i.e. the crusaders, the Mangols and the internal dissensions.[27]

Ibn Taimiyah was born on 10th Rabi-ul-Awwal 661 A.H.[28] Others put it as 12th of Rabiul-Awwal 661 A.H. He belonged to a reputed family of theologians belonging to Harran near Edessa (Roha).[29] They are called Harraenians, because they belong to the city rather than the tribe Tummiyun, which indicates that it was not an Arab tribe, as Arabs generally preserve their genealogical lineage, which is not the case with the non-Arabs. There are, however, people who insist that Ibn Taimiyah was an Arab. Bahjat Al-Baitar, for example claims that he was a Numeri Arab.[30]

However, there are some scholars who believe that Taimiyah was the name of a clan; and that they were "most probably Kurds".[31]

Ibn Taimiyah's father Shahabud Din, Abdul Halim Ibn Taimiyah (d. 682 A.H.) was the preacher of the great Ummayad mosque and an instructor of Traditions in Darul Hadith Assa Kuriyah of Damascus.[32]

It is worth mention here that the family of Ibn Taimiyah left for Damascus along with his parents, because Harran was attacked by the Mangols, when Ibn Taimiyah was only 7 years old.[33] Historians have said nothing about his mother or her tribe. When Ibn Taimiyah's father died he was very young. His father died in 682 A.H. and at that time Ibn Taimiyah was in his twenties, and his mother was still alive. She lived to observe herself the greatest stature her son acquired. She even helped him in his Jehad and Ibn Taimiyah in return showed the greatest reverence to her. When Ibn Taimiyah was busy in his practical field in Egypt, he wrote a letter to his mother, which was full of love, gratitude and

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obedience. However, he didn't mention about his miseries, which would have perturbed her otherwise.[34]

In their way to Damascus. Ibn Taimiyah's family close to take away with them only the valuable treasure of books they had, but with no beasts of burden being available to pull the carts, they had themselves to perform that job.[35]

Abu Zuhra says:

"They had no animals to carry the luggages of books. Because the wealth of this family was not gold or silver, diamonds or jewelry or other type of worldly possessions, but the inhertitance of the prophets and the treasures of knowledge piled up together after centuries i.e. treasures of religious knowledge."[36]

Ibn Taimiyah's father, was invited to begin discourses on hadith in the great Ummayad mosque and the Darul-Hadith Assakuriyah which were attended by a large number of students and scholars.[37]

Ibn Taimiyah was educated in Damascuss. His father was a noted teacher of hadith and a renowned preacher in the central mosque of the city. His uncle Fakral-din too was a reputed scholar and writer. Thus Ibn Taimiyah was educated in the scholarly tradition of his own house.[38]

His studies were not confined to the Quran, Hadith and Fiqh, he also studied mathematics, history and literature and mastered all. He paid special attention to the Hanabilite Law, of which his father was an eminent exponet.[39] He gave special attention to the Arabic Literature and gained command over grammer and lexicology. He gained a sound knowledge of the entire collection of prose and poetry available at the time.[40]

The most important branch of study, to which Ibn Taimiyah devoted himself absolutely was that of theology (Aqa'id).[41]

Moreover, he witnessed debates between Asharites, Hanbalites and Mutazilites. He witnessed these intellectual disputes in the schools where he was educated, he acquired high proficiency in the subjects taught there, and became master of both the techniques, the rational philosophical and the traditional.[42]

It was logical that Ibn Taimiyah would have attended Hadith. He made special efforts to attain this science. He learnt it from his father. He had the Smaat from the great Sheiks of hadith. He listended from them the great books of Hadith like Masnad Iman Ahmad Ibn Hambal, Sahih Bukhari, Sahih Muslim, Jamah Tirmidhi, Sunan Abi Dawud, al-Nisai, Ibn Majah and Darqutni. Some of his contemporaties have mentioned that he memorised Al-Jamah Bayn-al-Sahiheen of Imam Hamidi, Besides Hadith he also got attracted towards Fiqh-al-Hanabli. His Fiqh can be called Fiqh-al-Hadith, the field in which his family had a reputation. He attained mastery over the science of hadith and became well versed in its minor and major subjects. He had a remarkable grasp of the traditions of the Companions of the prophet (Saw) and their followers (Tabieen) on the meanings of the Quranic verse, the Sunnah and the Fatawa.[43] Ibn Abdul Hadi relates that the number of Ibn Taimiyah's teachers in Hadith exceeds two hundred.[44] Among these are included such eminent doctors of Hadith as Ibn. Abd ud-Dayamal-Maqdisi and several others of an equal rank and standing.[45]

Ibn Taimiyah showed special interest in the exegesis of the Quran. He himself says that he had turned over the leaves of more than a hundred commentaries of the holy scripture.[46]

He says:

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"Sometimes I have gone through as many as hundred commentaries of a single verse of the Quran. After I have dipped into these pages I have supplicated God to enlighten me about the true content and significance of the Ayah."[47]

When his father died in 682 A.H/1283 A.C., Ibn Taimiyah had just completed his studies. He was then twenty-one years old. A year later he was appointed to the chair of Hadith which his father occupied in a number of leading traditionists of the time, such as Ibn Daqiq al-Id-Kamil al-din al-Zinklikani and Shams al-din al-Dhahabi.[48] Ibn Taimiyah delivered lectures in Arabic medium in the al-Jamah-al-Kabeer. People were attracted to him and he fascinated most of the students by his erudition. Friends and foes alike liked his scholarship. The follower of Sunnah and an innovator alike were attracted to him. He was attended by the students belonging to the Shiite denomination and the Ahl-al-Sunnah wal-Jamat. His lectures were of two categories. First type of lectures were meant for the elite class, which contained subtle facts, niceties and gems of wisdom. The second type of lectures were meant for the common people, based mostly on the items of guidance. Moreover, he used to write treatieses and replied through these the questions asked by the seekers of truth and even the opponents. He had good control over language. He was a remarkable orator and a prolific writer, as Allah combined in him a fluent orator and a versatile writer.[49] Ibn Taimiyah presents the purest and most rational image of Islam. He takes his fundamentals from the Quran and the Sunnah and the practices of the companions of the Prophet, and defends them strongly with the weapons of rationalism and philosophy, as his opponents defend their theses.[50]

He maintains that it is obligatory of search for such a knowledge which has been revealed by God on his prophet from the book and Hikmah and to reach to the knowledge what is inherent in the contents of the Quran and Hadith as the Companions and their followers have understood from these and as is explained by the people who followed them. When a person comes to know what the prophet (SAW) has explained, he has to attend the sayings of the people and their arguments. He will then testify these arguments on the basis of the contents of the Book and the Sunnah, in order to ascertain their validity from Shariah point of view. According to Ibn Taimiyah the sound and explicit reason is always in concordance with the prophet, and never opposes him in any case. As we know, Allah has sent balance with the Book and these both guide us to the path of guidance, Sunnah and knowledge. He siad further that the words have two aspects. One aspect is explicitly mentioned in the Quran and the Sunnah and the second is implicit therein. In order to explore the purport of the second aspect, the former will serve as basis. This has been the practice of all those who followed the path of guidance in view of Ibn Taimiyah.

Whaterver subject Ibn Taimiyah takes up, he presents in a few pages, all the connected material culling them from hundreds of volumes on different subjects. At times the material collected by him in a single volume is so extensive that it takes a long and intensive study to assimilate. The best example of such type of scholarship can be found in his *Minhaj-us-Sunnah* and *Al-Jawab-ul Sahih li-man Badala-din al-masih.* He gave a comprehensive treatment of every issue on which he writes, about speculative sciences, creedal subjects and religious aspects. However, the multitude of ideas and excess of details cloud the original theme and make it difficult for the reader to follow his thoughts. But it does not decrease the usefulness of his works. Each work of Ibn Taimiyah is a compendium of all the then available information on that particular subject. "But for these encyclopedic works of Ibn Taimiyah a log of precious thoughts, utterances and writings of the old would have been lost for ever."[51] One of his contemporary scholars and a famous dialectician Sheikh Safi ud-din-al-Hindi, once remarked; "Ibn

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Taimiyah, you are like a breezy bird, whenever I try to catch hold of you at one point you swiftly move on to another."[52]

Hafiz Abu Hafs al-Bazzar says:

"His oration had the force of the flood, the rising tide of the sea. When he spoke, it appeared that he was not here but some where else; his eyes half closed and the face radiant with a heavenly grace. His way of arguing always overawed his audience."[53]

Ibn Taimiyah dies in a prison. Zain-ud-din 'Abdur Rahman relates that after completing eighty recitals of the Quran, Ibn Taimiyah started it again with him. But he had not completed this recital of the Quran when the knell summoning him to heaven was sounded.[54]

Ibn Taimiyah was taken ill twenty-two days before his death. His health gradually deteriorated till his death occurred in the night of the twenty second of Zil-Qaada, 728 A. H. when he died his age was 67 years.[55]

So far as Ilmul-al Kalam is concerned, Ibn Taimiyah has put forward a scathing criticism against it. He has written several tracts, in which he exposed this science. In the *Minhaj al-Sunnah* as well as in his *Majmuat al-Tafsir,* he cites the opinion of Imam Ahmad and Abu Yusuf who said that he who would seek knowledge by the help of Ilmul-al-Kalam, would turn into an atheist. He also mentions the opinions of Iman Shafi, that theologians should be beaten with shoes and palm-branches, and paraded through the city so that people may know the consequences of the study of scholastic theology. In his *Tafsir Surat al-Ikhlas,* he tells us that the early leaders (aslaf) tabooed scholastic theology, since it was vanity, falsehood, and saying unfitting things about God.[56]

Ibn Taimiyah mentions that Abu Ismail al-Ansari said: "I came to know from Hussain Ibn Abi Amamatul-al-Maliki Who said:

"Allah's curse be on Abu Zarra Harvi who was the first person to take the science of Kalam to Harem. He was also the first person who spread it among the people of West. Despite the fact, he was among the pioneering persons of sciences and the Sunnah (Traditions). For example, he was one of the rawis (narrators) of Bukhari from his three Sheikhs. He entered Baghdad from Hirat and adopted the ways of Baqlani and took it (the Kalam) to the Harem."[57]

In the same way Ibn Taimiyah says:

"Some people presume that the religious leaders have condemned Ilmul-al-Kalam because it contains in it the innovative terms viz. substance, body and attributes and they claim that presence of such type of terms in any science warrants rejection. Because it is like acquisition of posts by the people, or armour by which people require for combating their enemies. This opinion has been expressed by the author of *Ihya* (Ghazzali) etc. But the matter is different here. Actually the rejection of kalam by these religious leaders was on different grounds, i.e. for the corrupt meanings inherent in the discussions and themes of Ilmal-al-Kalam more than for the presence of innovative terms in it. They condemned it also for its being consisting on the false and erroneous meanings which are in contradiction to the contents of the Book and the Sunnah. Since all the themes which fall in contradiction to the Book (the Quran) and the Sunnah, are utterly fallacious."[58]

Once, in answer to a question raised in Kalam, he said "The doctrine of the unity of God to the vain people is to enter into the discussion of atoms and accidents (Jawahir wa a'rad)." These terms did not exist in Islam during the time of the prophet. It was the Jahmites and the Mutazilites who first

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invented them; Jad Ibn Dirham was mainly responsible for this invention.[59]

Ibn Taimiyah refutes the views of al-Imam Hilli who expressed in his *Minhaj al-Karamah* that Hazrat Ali was the originator of theological Kalam. Ibn Taimiyah opposed this theory as Ali could not go against the Quran and the Sunnah, and none among the Companies (Sahabah) or their followers (Tabi'un) ever discussed the phenomenal nature of the world as derived from the origination of bodies (hudith al ajsam). He repeats in declaring that God was totally unlike men in His essence, qualities, and actions. The traditionists, the hermeneutists, the sufis, the four Jurists and their followers, never believed in anthropomorphism. The accusation that has been levelled at Jurists like Malik, Shafi Ahmad, and their followers, is based on sheer misunderstanding. These Jurists in affirming the divine attributes never maintained that these attributes resembled bodily forms.[60]

According to Ibn Taimiyah, it was Jad Ibn Dirham, a Jahmite, who first professed that "God is not seated on His Jhrone", and that "Istiwa, means Istaula," that is, God is the master of His Throne and not that "He is settled on it." This idea was then taken up by Jahm Ibn Safwan (d. 128/745) consequently, a new system of scriptual interpretation became popular at the close of the second/eighth century at the hand of Bishr Ibn Ghiyath al-Marisi (d. 218 or 219/833 or 834) and his followers. The Mutazilites doctrine of divine attributes was publically preached during the last part of the third/ninth century".[61]

According to Ibn Taimiyah scholastic theology came into existence at the end of the first/ seventh century. It was Ja'd Ibn Dirham and Jahm Ibn Safwan who introduced it, and eventually the pupils of 'Amr Ibn' Ubaid like abu al-Hudayl al- 'Allaf and others carried it on. The object of' Amr and Wasil in propagating the above theory was to introduce into Islam the idea that God's power is not unlimited and that sinners will abide in hell for ever.[62]

From the foregoing statements, it is evident that Ibn Taimiyah generally uses Kalam in its pre-Asharite Sense of Mutazilite theology, though later he does not spare the Asharite views either.[63]

The Mutazilite's doctrine of divine attributes was publically preached during the last part of the third/ninth century and then the Shite doctors, Mufid (Muhammad Ibn al-Numan al-Mufid (336-413/ 947-1022); Musawi and Tusi, adopted it.

The beliefs that God is eternal and that "He exists without his attributes" are dogmas of the Jahmites and the Mutazilites. In regard to God's knowledge, power, seeing, hearing, etc; the older ultra-Imami sect was down right anthropomorphisms, while subsequent generations went further and denied the existence of all divine attributes.[64]

The karramites, in his opinion, were anttropomorphists. The Sunnites were unanimous in declaring that God was totally unlike men in his essence, qualities and actions.[65]

According to Ibn Taimiyah the reality of the saying of the Jahmite suspenders is like the saying of Pharoah who rejected Creator. He was denying that God talked to Moses, or Moses has a God in the heavens. He intended to deny and challenge His worship and obedience and His being an authoritative Lord. Since the utterance of the suspenders (Jahmites) was tantamount to the syaing of Pharoad, the ultimate purpose of their saying was the rejection of the Lord of the universe, denial of His worship and His speach.[66]

Still Ibn Taimiyah is very harsh in his criticism of the philosophers, but he is mild in his critique of the scholastic theology. He regards a person seeking religion from the rational point of view

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as one who resembles a wood-picker during night.

Ibn Taimiyah rejects the view of the Jahmites and shows similarity between their views and that those of the Asharites and the Maturidians about the doctrine of Jabr (determinism). While as the Mutazilites didn't accept this position according to Ibn Taimiyah. They rather tread a straight path and didn't support suspension of the human choice, which amounts to the belief that the shariah is not to be discarded. They also don't allow two kinds of chioce i.e. freedom of will and shariah obligations are not considered by them as two things.[67]

Man according to Ibn Taimiyah is attributed with choice and is accountable fully for his all actions with his belief and faith that these actions are the creations of God and by His determining (Taqdir). He defended the idea of cause and showed the limits of reason which is different from the dialectical (Kalami) arguments and logical syllogisms as was held by others also. The reason to him is that natural disposition on which God has created us, which also enables us to perceive the rational matters in an evident and natural manner. Ibn Taimiyah used the word "al-Mizan" which to him indicates the power of reason or rationality, with which we are endowed by God and as is alluded in the Quranic verse.[68]

The Mizan to him is the rational faculty in a man which runs parallel to the Book i.e. Shariat, limiting the sphere of reason which allows side by side to accept everything which is beyond the capacity of reason from the way of revelation and sharh.[69]

While talking about the limits of reason, he says that there is no source of knowledge in religious matters except revelation. Reason as well as intuition is incompetent and far from giving certitude. What is given to us by the Prophet either in the form of the Quran or the Sunnah, provided it is from authentic sources, is a sufficient guide. It embodies the principles as well as the arguments in support of them, the necessary details along with the reasons behind them. Such arguments are absolutely convicting. They generate that sense of absolute certainty which theological or philosophical arguments that are often based on false premises fail to produce. If anything contributes besides the Quran and Sunnah to the understanding of the fundamentals of religion or its details, detailed structure, it is the consensus of opinion of competent men in the first three centuries of the history of Islam, men who remained unaffected by the corrupting influence of the foreign elements that subsequently crept into Islam.[70]

He demonstrated the baselessness of the claim of the philosophers that one could attain indubitable knowledge and have access to the truth only through reason. The necessary premises in the case of the thruths of religion were not available to the philosophers, and whatever they claimed to possess was unwarranted. He declared like Kant, that metaphysics was impossible. In the sphere of values, too, reason was not sufficient. The Aristotelian logic that was the mainstay of the philosophers was quite incapable of pronouncing anything about any existential proposition. It was only a formal system which had nothing to do with existence. The condemnation of traditional knowledge by the philosophers was based on conjectures (Zanniyat) which would rob human beings of the only true source of knowledge that they possessed. And he showed that the spell of rational discussions or theological interpretations had sapped all the dynamism of the Muslims. The God that they envisioned did not inspire them to discharge their duties of His vicegerent. Their conception of God was mutilated and failed to provide that ideal of living attributes which was essential to the religious life of man, involving intimate relationship with Him.[71]

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Ibn Taimiyah has not invested much reliance on reason, a total reliance in the judgement about beliefs and religious commandments from the authenticity or inauthenticity point of view. It is perhaps for the same reason that he opposed philosophers and criticised their method of argumentation and their premises on which they have based their conclusions. Moreover he exposed their erroneous conclusions from the methodology point of view also. Contrary to the dialectician's view, he holds that the Quran and the Sunnah of the Prophet lead us to the rational premises which lead to the straight path.[72] The Quran and the Sunnah lead people to the demonstration (Burhan) and clear arguments in support of religious principles.[73]

While elaborating the role of reason in religious matters, Ibn Taimiyah says:–

"The argument on the facts related to man's creation in pondering over of sense-perception and stability, is a right rational method, this is a Shariahi position also as the Quran has held and led and guided people to it, explained it, and invited to it, it is thus rational. For example, man's coming to life after being nothing, who is born and created from the siemen and the clout of blood, can't be known merely through the prophetic information. But the prophet argued on it, led to it, explained it, made it an evidence and this is a rational argument. Since the Shariah argued with it and commanded to take argument from it, in that case it is rational, as evidence is taken from reason. Moreover, most of the contenders of knowledge attain it, either through Shariah or reason, in that case to it is rational Shariah-i. In the same way there are other arguments which have been mentioned in the Quran also resemble these. For example, the argument on the formation of cloud and rain, which has not explained fully in the Quran. In this way such arguments, are rational and Shariahi at one and the same time:

Such type of verses were witnessed by the people until they became convinced that the Quran is true and authentic in its claims. These are the rational verse. We can argue on these subjects from rational angle and become convinced that the Quran is based an truth and still the arguments are Shariah-i as well, as the Shariah has commanded people by these arguments. Thus the Quran is replete with such rational verses which can easily be evidenced by reason, hence these verses are Shariah-i-also as the latter invested reliance on these and guided people towards these."[74]

Ibn Taimiyah in the same way has not accepted the scholastic treatment of the qualities of God. He says:

"A person who denies any of the qualities with which God qualified Himself like anger, happiness, love, enemosity etc etc. assuming that belief in these qualities entails anthropomorphism and resemblance. He will be questioned that since you accept that God has the qualities like will, speach, listening and sight with the consideration That what ever the qualities youhave mentioned are not like the qualities of creatures, can you say anything about the qualities which have been established by the Quran and the Sunnah, that there is no difference between these two type of qualities. If the reply is in negative, he will be told that you accept that God has the beautiful names like knowledge, life and power, while as human beings are also qualified by these names. But what is established for God from these names is not analogous to what is established from the names of the servant of God. Is the name and named exemplified with each other ? If you say that I don't establish for Him His beautiful names but I say that these are metaphorical or names for some innovations of him, as the statement of the extremist Batiniyyah and the philosophers. It will be said that there is need to believe that he is Haqq dependent by his own self and he is not resembling His attributes."[75]

Thus having demonstrated the incapacity of reason to reach the truths of religions, he opposed

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all shades of interpretation of the attributes and actions of God. The theological method, besides subjecting revelation to the unjustified authority of reason, involved a concept of God which was absolutely negative, and was quite incapable of generating that living response and close relationship that formed the essence of religion. The Asharites, in their endeavour to leaving others, had committed the same mistake on a smaller scale. Moreover, they had no criterion for making such a selection. Had Ibn Taimiyah stopped at this, he would have been an anthropomorphist. But he went on to affirm that although the attributes of God could not be interpreted they should not be understood in an anthropomorphic way. For, God, had said that nothing was like Him. The right course, therefore, lay between negation and anthropomorphism (Ta teel and Tamtheel).[76]

There was a group of Muslims who believed in the absolute Transcendence of God, whose philosophical origin can be attributed to Aristotle and his views about God. God is the Eternal Existent (Kayn Azli), perfect, without any beginning or end, without any action and devoid of will (Aml wal-Iradah). He is according to them without action, otherwise action warrants a need (Talb-li-Shiy), while as God must be devoid of any need. He is also without will (Iradah) as will amounts to the choice between two matters, i.e. good and bad, but God does not need any choice even. This Tanzih (Transcendence) reached to its absolute Abstraction (Al-Tajrid-al-Mutlaq), which virtually deprives God from His attributes of His Lordship (Sifatur-Rububiyyat) and led to a type of suspension (Tatil).

This view point was accepted by the Muslim philosophers like Ibn Sina, Mutazlites and Jahamites. The gist of their thought was that whatever occurs to your heart, God is different from that (Kuluma Khatara Bibali Ka-Fa-Allah u Ghaira Zalika).

There was, however, a different group who went to the other extreme and didn't confine to the denial of transcendance, abstraction and affirmation of the divine attributes, but rather exaggerated in the form of God's Essence (Dhat) and His qualities and reached to resemblance and corporeality (Tashbihwal Tajsim), reduced God to material body. They intepreted various Quranic verses to reconcile with their position. They have even gone to the extent of interpretation at the expense of linguistic logic and commonsense some times.

Their approach can be appreciated on this subject from their views about "Divine speach" (Kalam-u-Allah) as whether this is the speach in real or metaphorical sense (Haqeeqi, Au Majazi). A group of them believe that God is not resembling to God. His speach is not real, but is of the nature of revelation and Ilham. They interpreted the Kalam of God from the linguistic point of view and held that God is speaker by way of metaphor, not in real sense of the word. But the people of the sunnah rejected this view as it contradicts the common sense and the true logic. Moreover, it is a stretched aspect of interpretation and not supported by linguistic ruler also. They insisted that the statements like "Moses talked to God fully"[77] are in accordance with the linguistic laws and regulations and the actor is the real actor (Fail Haqeeqi) not a metaphorical one. There is, thus, no need to go away from these rules of language as the Quran is itself revealed in the Transparent Arabic Language.

The philosophers, however, held the view that Wajib-al-Wajud is one, without any shade of plurality, neither in action nor ideas and whatever the attributes are attached to Him are indicative of His Essence. The Mutazilites denied extra attributes and believed in the createdness of attributes (Khalq as-sifat). However, the extremist supporters of 'Tanzih' and 'Tajrid' have touched the boundaries of "suspension" (Tatil); actually by doing so they formed an image of the Hellenistic gods which remained in the blissful salvation.

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Perhaps these people don't know that the Quran has explained rational arguments, which are indicative of all these matters. These people in thier simplicity make the belief in the Prophet (SAW) obligatory as such, without any rational validity.[78] But Ibn Taimiyah tried, on the contrary, to reconcile the earlier efforts to his position on reason and shariah. According to Ibn Taimiyah, neither reason nor shariah on its own is able to reach to certain knowledge, therefore both are to be used for this purpose and religious truth can't be attained without combining the both.

When we apply this argument of Ibn Taimiyah on the problem of divine attributes, we find that he depends on the contents of the Quran and the sunnah on the attributes of God, therefore, these should be accepted literally. Moreover, he says that whatever has been believed by the predecessors should be accepted and whatever rejected, should not be accepted. If the Quran and the Sunnah is silent about any matter or matters, it should be accepted or rejected subject to its truth-value. On this ground he pleaded for the recognition of all those qualities with which God has qualified Himself or His Prophet has mentioned something along with the confession that "nothng likes Him"[79] and "Nothing equals Him"[80]; because His knowledge is different from human knowledge and His power likewise is not like man's power. In the same way, His sight, listening, hand and face are different from human beings. He says that these qualities indicate that to be existent by the essence of God, by which it is negated that they are other than the essence of God or something over and above the essence of God.[81] These are rather included in the very name of Essence (Musami-al-Dhat), he brings an evidence on it from Ahmad Ibn Hanbal as he provides an example of Nakhlah (palm tree) which has route, leaves, and fibres etc, but still we call it by the name of a Nakhlah (palm Tree). In the similar manner, for God are great analogies.[82] We don't say God and His light, God and His power, but rather we will say God, and it consists of all the qualities by implication. Whatever the qualities of God, whether eternally essential (Qademiyatun Azliat) are from Him are necessary for the essence as life and other qualities which are eternal in kind (Qadim al-Jins). His mentions also about the individual qualities in His Essence as knowledge; intention and speach. Knowledge is that of the Eternal kind of quality, which means God's gnosis of everything from very beginning.

Included in these are also those which occur by the occurrence of the informations and their recurrence as we find in such verses: "He (Allah) will know who believe and those who are hyprocrits"[83] when a man recites the Quran, he actually recites the speach of God, but in his own voice. The application of an utterance in the sense of its being the Quran is a narration from the speach of God, is not permissible, but only when the people ricite it or write it down in the scriptures. When a man recites the Quran, he actually recites the speach of God, but in his own voice. God speaks with a voice. He called on Moses with a voice and He will call His servants on the day of judgement. He speaks in His voice during revelation (Wahi). But his voice does not resemble the voice of his creatures in any sense.

When a man recites Quran, therefore he recites the Quran, he actually recites the speach of God, but in his own voice. A term utterance (qoul) will not be applicable on it, but only in the case when people read it or scribe it in the scriptures. But this does not deprive it from being the speach of God essentially, as the Kalam is attributed to the person who has uttered it for the first time, not to one who has uttered it in preaching or evidence (Mubaligan Aw Muodian.

Ibn Taimiyah thinks that the predecessor philosophers are ignorant about the divine matters and the views of most of them in this respect are superficial and confounded, because of their not referring to the prophetic guidance or because they have not received any Shariah. They relied merely on the opinions in these important matters too with the most erroneous ideas with rare exceptians. Aristotle's

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views about divinity are replete with futile and corrupt conclusions.[84]

As for the Muslim philosophers like Farabi and Ibn Sina are concerned, Ibn Taimiyah confessed their versatility in these matters. They were near the reality but they are as has been said:

"They may thus argue, but that argumentation does not lead us to any real meaning, if they argue from the Quranic information point of view not a demonstrative one. They don't discuss rational arguments for the affirmation of the lordship (Rububia), unity (Wahdat), of God, the prophethood and the life hereafter death (Maad). Their corrupt interpretations and approach is faraway from the Quranic way of arguments."

Ibn Taimiyah rejected also the people who exaggerate literal aspects on the expence of rationality dimension of them. By insisting on literal meaning of the verses, they have mixed up true and false tradition on one footing, from these rules of language as the Quran is itself revealed in the transparent Arabic medium. The philosophers held the view that Wajib-al-Wajud is One, without any shade of plurality, neither in action nor in ideas and whatever the attributes are attached to him are indicative of His essence. The Mutazilites denied extra attributes and believed in the creation of attributes (Khalq al Sifat). The extremist supporters of Tanzih and Tajrid have, touched the boundaries of "suspensin" (Tatil), actually by doing so they formed an image of the Hellenistic gods, bereft of any actions or powers, on their part, as the action necessitates will, but He is devoid of will according to them. This group of people was influenced by the Greek philosophy and the Christian doctrines. The Karamites, some ancient Sheites, Mujasamin like Hisham Ibn Hakim, and Hisham Ibn Salim al Jawaleeqi were also proponents of this theory.

It was during this period of extreme polarisation that Ibn Taimiyah appeared on the scene as a Mutakallim, a Salafi and Hambalite. It marked the emergence of intellectual renaissance, Islamic reformation and reawakening. He first got attracted to the study of Aristotelian logic, which being the basis of philosophy and during those days, the impact of the Greek thought had reached to far and wide in the Islamic world.[85]

Ibn Taimiyah did not respond to this philosophy with the traditional arguments, but disproved it on the rational grounds also and showed its falsity from a logical point of view as well.

He find a new line of argumentation of logic in his philosophy i.e. Islamic logic. He has put forward a Quranic way of argumentation in his discussion of Hadd (definition); when he tried to remove the contradictions and repetitions in the discussions of the scholastics in their arguments or adaptation of specific thinking styles and logical concepts. Some of them were led to similitude and confusion when they didn't find any satisfactory reply to their logical enquiries pertaining to religion as is the case of Jahm Ibn Safwan, who believed in the annihilation of hell and heaven or the which Abul Hudayl Allaf was led about the end of actions of the people of hell or paradise, Ibn Taimiyah did not accept the concept of Qiyas in its specific meanings, i.e. Qiyas ul Ghayb, alel-Hazir." or what we can't comprehend on what we can comprehend.[86] It is not true that divine knowledge resembles human knowledge i.e. to argue about God from the human angle or on the creator from the angle of the creatures. Such type of an argument he considered as erroneous and false, because it does not lead us to certainty, as the things based on false hood are themselves false.

Though Ibn Taimiyah rejected logical syllogism, but he didn't deny its importance in jurisprudence, though a qualified restriction. Ibn Taimiyah opposed Ibn Hazam Zahiri for his rejection of Qiyas altogether. He accepted the significance of Qiyas in the matters of Figh after also explaining its limits.

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After rejecting logical thought, he confronted the rationalist premises and beliefs far from these rules of language as the Quran in itself revealed in the transparent Arabic langauge. He confronted the rationalist's premises and beliefs for their corruption and being far away from the Quranic way of argumentation. He, however, rejected the people who exaggerated literal aspects on the expense of rationality dimension of them. By insisting, on literal meanings of the verses, he says that they have mixed up true and false traditions on one footing. They may thus argue, but that argumentation does not lead us to real meaning, if they argue from the Quranic information point of view, not a demonstrative one.

They don't discuss rational arguments for the affirmation of the Lordship (Rububiat) Unity (Wahdat) of God, the prophethood and the life hereafter death (Maad) as was done by some other philosophers who have interpreted most of the verses with their belief in accordance with the dictates of reason. On the other hand, the Asharites like Imam al-Harmayn, al-Ghazzali and Razi were led to a different type of interpretation of the attributes i.e. the positive attributes (al-Sifatul-al-Khairiyah) as other philosophers and the Mutazilites, except they are not close to their belief about other attributes.

Ibn Taimiyah regards all these groups as extremists in their investing an exagrated status to the reason alone in its approach to divine realities.

On the other hand, Ibn Taimiyah cautions against regarding reason as a sole source of knowledge in the matters beyond its scope, except in the cases supported by the tenets of the Quran, the Sunnah and sayings of the Companions without any tawil to which the rational requirements lead as he does not accept the claims of the pure ratinalism, for example, their sayings about individual substances, occurrence of the attributes or non-occurrence or whatever follows its process from the consequential point of view. It leads us to think that Ibn Taimiyah does not accept the mental abstractions vis-a-vis religious matters, especially relating to God, the most exalted. He also rejected the views of extremist views about the transcendence of the Essence of God to the extent of abstraction and suspension of His power and issue a decree of infidelity against such people.

Ibn Taimiyah also waged a relentless war against the mystics; spoke and wrote incisively against their foremost leader (Imam) and philosopher, Muhiyyal-din Ibn al-Arabi, made a determined effort to counter his thought and opinions. He persuaded the rulers to put an end to their impostures and trickeries.[87]

He reviewed the ideas and practices of Sufism, and showed what was consistent with Islamic principles and acceptable and what conflicted with them and had to be rejected. His criticism covers the entire fields of Sufi thought and life.[88]

But we should note it that at times, he is bitter, but on the whole he is sympathetic. He says:

"Some people accept everything of Sufism, its right as well as wrong; others reject it totally, both what is wrong and what is right, as some scholars of Kalam and fiqh do. The right attitude towards Sufism, or any other thing is to accept what is in agreement with the Quran and the Sunnah, and reject what does not agree."[89]

He also says:

".....They (Sufis) utterly perverted the Islamic faith and Shariah by incalcating the philosophy of Pantheism (Wahdat al-Wujud) and union (Wahdat al-Suhud) and asserted that the tenets (nusus) of the Quran and the Sunnah and the injunctions (ahkam) have an external meaning and a hidden one; their

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Shuyukh (teachers) being the only ones to know the hidden one. These views had taken a firm grip over the minds of the ignorant masses, especially in Egypt..." The Sufis were equally active in Syria, butIbn Taimiyah had almost briken their power there.[90] Ibn Taimiyah's times were notorious for the spiritual acrobatics of the mystics, their extreme indulgence in heretical intrpretations, absolute imitation (al-Taqlid al-mutlaq) in matters of belief and in the method of understanding.[91]

According to Ibn Taimiyah the pantheism "which was advocated by Ibn Arabi (d. 638/1240), Ibn Sabin (d. 667/1269), Ibn Farid (d. 577/1181), al-Hallaj (executed in 309/922), and a few others, its origin could not be traced to early Islam, Pantheism is based upon two wrong principles which are against Islam, Christianity, and Judaism, and are contradictory to rational and scriptural arguments.[92]

Some pantheists profess the doctrines of incarnation (hulal) Unification (ittihad), or other closely related doctrine like Unity of Existence. They maintain that "existence" is one, though there are two degrees of it. It is necessary in the creator and contingent in the creation. To this group of pantheists Ibn Taimiyah assigns Ibn Arabi, Ibn Sabin, Ibn al-Farid, Tilimsani etc. Ibn Arabi distinguishes between existence (Wajud) and affirmation (thubut) saying that "Substances" do exist in Non-Being (adam) independent of God, and that the existence of God is the existence of the substances themselves: the creator needs the substances in bringing them into existence, while the substances need Him for obtaining their existence which is the very existence of Himself.[93]

Al-Qunawi (d. 673/1274) and his followers made a distinction between "the general" and "the particular" (al-Itlaq w-Al-Tayin). They maintained that the Necessary. One is unconditionality identical with the existing things in general. To Ibn Taimiyah thes are fantastic imagining, because what is general in concept must be definite in individual.[94]

Ibn Sabin and his followers hold that "the Necessary" and "the contingent" are like "matter" and "form". Ibn Taimiyah considers this view absurd and self-contradictory. In his opinion, it leads to the theories of incarnation and unity of existence. These people are the pantheists who failed to conceive of the divine attribute called al-mubayanah li-al-makhluqat, different from originated things. They knew that God exists and thought that His being is the same as His existence, just as a man looks to the ray of the Sun and calls it the Sun itself.[95]

Ibn Taimiyah lays emphasis on the point that there must be a distinction between the creator and the created; they can not be one and the same.[96]

According to Ibn Arabi, nonexistence is a positive thing even in its state of non-being.[97] He further maintains that the existence of such things is the existence of God Himself; they are distinguished by their essential characteristics which persist in the void, and are united with the existence of God, who knows them. Regarding the above doctrine of Ibn Arabi, Ibn Taimiyah remarks that the Jews, the Christians, the Magians, and even the heathens never maintained such a belief. He, therefore, calls it a pharaonic theory which had also been held by the Qaramatians.[98]

According to Ibn Taimiya, Ibn Arabi's theory, reveals two things when analysed

(i) Denial of the existence of God, and

(ii) Denial of His creation of creatures.[99]

Besides, according to Ibn Taimiyah, Ibn Arabi maintains that Sainthood (wilayah) is better than Prophethood (nubuwwah) and that Sainthood will never come to an end, whereas prophecy has already been terminated.[100] Ibn Taimiyah then gives varius explanations of the Pantheistic views of Ibn

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Arabi, and declares them absured. He compares Ibn Arabi to the deaf and dumb, and quotes the verse of the Holy Quran, "Deaf, dumb, blind: therefore, they shall not retrace their steps from error."[101]

He also objected to the views of the Sufis, who used to say about the trust (Tawakul) and denied the causes as such, while as some of them accepted determinism (al-Jabr) instead. On the other hand, Ibn Taimiyah showed that Tawakul does not mean denial of the causes, therefore, the belief in Qadar is baseless in the sense that man has no will or choice and freedom.

Thus Ibn Taimiyah divides the sufis in three categories. In the first category of sufis whom he calls Mashaikh 'I-Islam, Masha' ikh 'l-kitab wa' l-sunnah and A 'mmat' L-huda[102]. He includes Fuzail Ibn 'Ayad (d. 187/802), Ibrahim Ibn Adham (d. 160/777) 'Shaqiq' l-Balkhi (d. 194/810), Abu Sulayman L-Darani (d. 203/844), Ma 'ruf' I-Karkhi (d. 220/835), Bishr 'l-Hafi (d. 227/841), Sari' l-Saqti (d. 253/867), al-Junayd Ibn Muhammad (d. 289/991) Sahl Ibn Abdullah 'l-Tastari (d. 283/896) and 'Umar Ibn Usman,' l-Makki, (d. 291/903). Later Sufis whom he places in this category are: 'Abdul-Qadir' l-Jilani (d. 561/1166), Sheikh Hammad 'l-Dabbas (d. 525/1130), and Sheikh Abu' l-Bayan (d. 551/1156). According to Ibn Taimiyah, these sufis were never intoxicated and they didn't lose their sense of discrimination nor they said or did anything against the Quran and the Sunnah. Their lives and experiences conformed with the Shariah and were Mustaqim- 'l-ahwal.'[103]

The second category of sufis "experienced fana and intoxication (Sukr) which weakened their sense of discrimination, and made them utter words which they later realised to be erroneous when they became Sober.[104]

Some of them also did things under intoxication which the Shariah does not allow, but sooner or later they came to their senses and lived well. In this category Ibn Taimiyah mentions, Abu Yazid 'l-Bistami (d. 261/875), Abu' l-Husain 'l-Nuri (d. 295/97) and Abu Bakr al-Shibli (d. 334/946). But he neither censors their experience of Fana and Sukr, nor condemns what they said or did in that state. Instead he offers apology for them on the ground that they were intoxicated (sukran) and had lost control over reason.[105]

However, Ibn Taimiyah directs his criticism to the third category of sufis who have believed in ideas and expounded doctrines that contradict Islamic principles or who have indulged in practices that are condemned by the Shariah. The first Sufi in this group is Al-Hallaj (d. 309/922). Ibn Taimiyah says that Hallaj believed in the doctrine of particular incarnation (hulul khass) on the pattern of the Chiristian belief regarding Jesus. He also charges him of indulging in practices such as magic and sorcery.[106]

Ibn Arabi, sadr 'l-Din' l-Quniwi, Ibn Sabin and Tilmisani were criticised by Ibn Taimiyah for expounding the doctrine of one being (wahdat-al-wajud) Ibn Taimiyah discusses the basis concepts of Wahdat-al-Wujud, which they hold in common, indicates the points on which they differ, examines their ideas on rational grounds and shows their incompatibility with Islamic principles.[107]

About Ibn Arabi Ibn Taimiyah says:

"....of all the exponents of Wahdat-al-Wajud he is close to islam, that many of his ideas are correct, that he distinguished between the manifest (al-Zahir) and the objects of manifestations (mazahir), and accepts the commands and the prohibitions (of the shariah) and other principles as they are. He recommends many things in Suluk which sufi leaders have prescribed concerning good behaviour and devotion. This is why a number of people drew upon his writings in their suluk and benefit from them, even though they do not know their real import.[108]

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Ibn Taimiyah, however, criticises Ibn Arabi for believing that Wajud is one, that the Wajud of the world is same as the Wajud of God, and that the objects are God's determinations. He explains the difference between God and the world with reference to the essence of things even though they have no footing in existence. The doctrine identifies the existence of everything, however rubbish and filthy, with the existence of God, and ascribes all the attributes of things, good and bad, to Him:

"It is God who is beautiful and ugly, perfect and imperfect, righteous and wicked; it is he who believes in everything, true and false, faith and infidelity; it is he who commits right and wrong and is rewarded or punished; and it is he who feels pleasure or pain, is happy or miserable". This is not an inference, Ibn Taimiyah says, from Ibn Arabi's doctrine, but what he has himself stated.[109] Ibn 'Arabi's' doctrine contradicts the basic principles of Islam;

It justifies polytheism and idolatry, denies any real difference between tawhid and shirk, and dubs the Prophet's call to worship one God as a trick (makr).[110] He asserts that this Wahdat-al-Wajud is the absolute truth, that all other beliefs are partially true, and that the prophets including the seal of the prophets, get truth from him, although he receives the Shariah from him and is subject to his authority. He claims the position of the seal of the saints for himself.[111] He invokes the preordination (qadr) of God to candone wrong beliefs and evil practices, and explains away punishment in the hereafter.[112]

Ibn Taimiyah denounces these ideas as Kufr and Zandaqah[113]. However, he does not find fault with Ibn 'Arabi's' life and behaviour. Of the expounders of Wahdat-al-Wajud, there in only one. Tilmisani, whom he calls wicked (fajir) for his antinomian attitudes.[114]

He praises Sufis like Abudl Qadir Jilani who did not fall in errors, and believed in qadr but adhered to the Shariah, who was intensely conscious of God's rule, yet worked against what was false and evil.[115] One of the main objects of Ibn Taimiyah's commentary on a part of his *Futah 'l-Ghayb'* is to show how the Sheikh has steered clear of the dilemma in which others have fallen.[116]

Ibn Taimiyah notes that the Sufi experience of fana and baqa happen to the travellers of the Sufi path. They become so much immersed in God that they forget themselves and the world, and feel that they have lost themselves and became one with God. This is the state of self-effacement (Istitam) and union (Jam). Many Sufis in this state lose their sense of discrimination and pronounce: "I am God" and 'Clory to me.' Some make loud claims: 'I would put my tents at Jahannam' (to save men) others commit objectionable acts. Ibn Taimiyah says that such words and behaviours are not to be censored, and the Sufi is to be excused on the ground that he is not in his proper senses.[117] Ibn Taimiyah calls this experience fana Shuhudi, because it is a matter of perception (Shuhud) only. The sufi sees that he has lost himself and became one with God, which does not however mean that he believes, or that he is really one with God. But the experience may lead and has led sufis to believe that they are one with God. This belief may take different forms. One is that God has entered into the Sufi as Hallaj believed, or that he has entered into the world. The other is that God and the world are really one Being, and there is no difference between the servant and the Lord.[118] This is fana Wajudi of the people who believe in Wahdat-al-Wajud.

They develop this belief:

"Due to the weakness of their heart which fails to see things as they are, and does not perceive the difference in union or multiplicity in unity."[119]

Neither of these two fanas was known, according to Ibn Taimiyah to the prophet or his

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companions:

"The companions had a perfect faith and a strong conviction.They never lost their reasons nor went into Swoon; they never felt intoxicant, experienced effacement or got mad in love. These things first approved at the time of the tabiin (the following generation) among the intensely devoted (ubbad) men of Basra."[120]

Some sufis consider that the fana shuhudi is the goal of sufism, but Ibn Taimiyah says that one has to go beyond Fana Shuhudi, disentangle himself the second time (farq thani), reffirm his servant hood, and carry out the will of God in such a way as if he has no will of his own. The goal of perfect sufis in the effacement of will, fana Iradi, which he defines as a state in which "one loses every interest in what God does not command; engages in what he orders; turns away from worship and worships God alone; and gives up every obedience and obeys Him only. It is a state in which one depends on no one but God; loves no body except him and the prophet; fears nothing...and pleases no ne except him. This is the fana which the Quran and the Sunnah teach, the fana dini and fana-Shari, which was the state of the prophets, their companions and the rightly guided sufis."[121]

Ibn Taimiyah does not deny extra revelatory ways of divine guidance or Kashf. Referrring to the Quranic verse (42:51) he says God talks to man in three ways: from behind aveil, through an angelic messenger, or through secret communication (iha). The wali shares into the last one.[122] The first two are for the prophet only. But the Sufi Kashf is not infallible and certain. Certitude belongs to the prophetic wahy only. Ibn Taimiyah quotes a number of sufis on its point. Abul Hasan 'l-Shadhili (d. 656/1258), for instance, says:

"We have been assured of the truth of the Quran and the Sunnah, but the truth which is revealed in Kashf and Ilham is not guaranteed.[123]

According to Ibn Taimiyah the greatness of a saint lies not in fana Wajudi or Shuhudi, it lies in serving God. He says:

"God is the servant of God, and in the service of God lies his perfection and glory. The more one serves God, the more perfect one is. If he thinks that he can transcend the boundaries of servant hood, or that transcendence is a mark of perfect, he is most ignorant, and most removed from the right path."[124]

The measure of a saints greatness is his faith and his obedience to God. Mirachles are no criterion. He says:

"Revelation of secrets (Kashf) or control over events (tasarruf), are not necessarily better than the acts which do not produce these things. If a Kashf and tasarruf is not helpful for religion it is a worldly thing: a lot of infidels, pagans and men of the book perform them, whereas may Muslims don't."[125]

He says further:

"The best of the saints of God are those who follow the prophet most closely; that is why, Abu Bakr is the greatest Wali after the prophets."[126]

He says at other place:

"There is no way to God, except following the prophet externally and internally."[127]

The way to know what the inner realities of religion such as renunciation (Zuhd), abstinence

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(wara'), love (mahabbah), trust (tawakkul), resignation (rida), sincerity (Ikhlas), thankfulness (shukr) and patience (sabr) are in the Quran, the Sunnah of the prophet, and the lives of the companions. The more one moves away from this period, the more is the meaning of these realities influenced by external factors such as philosophical ideas, sufi practices and experiences, doubtful traditions and ascetic tendencies.[128] One has to be very cautious going through, for instance, Ghazzali's Ihyal-ulum[129]. In Ibn Taimiyah's views the Quwat-i-l-Qulub[130]. Of Abu Talib'l Makki (d. 386/996) is comparatively free from external influences, although it, too, has a lot of weak and unsound traditions."[131]

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45. Abn Zuhra, Op. cit, p. 693.
46. Qamaruddin, Op. cit, p. 4.
47. *Saviours of Islamic Spirit,* Op. cit, p. 76.
48. "Ma Araka Ya Ibn Taimiyah Ila Kal Asfoor Hathu Aradtu An Aqbaztuka min Makanin Yafiru Ilaa Makanin Aakhir". *Tabaqatul-al-Shaifiat,* Vol V, p. 240 and *Nuzhatul-Khwatir,* Vol. II, p. 14.
49. *Al-Kawakib-ul-Duriyah,* p. 155.
50. *Saviours of Islamic Spirit,* Op. cit, p. 59.
51. Ibid.
52. Serajul Haq, Op. cit, p. 799.
53. Ibn Taimiyah, *Muafiqat Sahial Manqul Li-Sarih-al-Maaqul.*
54. Ibid.
55. M.M. Sharif, Op. cit, p. 800.
56. Ibn Taimiyah, *Minhaj-al-Sunnah,* Vol. I, pp. 172-74.
57. Ibid, p. 172.
58. Ibid, Vo. IV, p. 144.
59. M.M. Sharif, Op. cit, p. 800.
60. *Minhaj-al-Sunnah,* Vol. I, pp. 172-74.
61. Ibn Taimiyah, *Majmu-Atulal Rasail-al-Kubra,* Vol. I, p. 144.
62. Abu Zuhra, Op. cit, p. 212.
63. *Al-Hadeed,* Al-Quran.
64. Umaruddin, Op. cit, p. 922.
65. Ibid, p. 722.
66. Ibid, p. 723.
67. Abu Zuhra, Op. cit, p. 213.
68. Ibn Taimiyah, *Mujmatul-al-Risail-al-Kubra, Risal-atul-Maarajal-Wasul,* p. 182.
69. The Allah says:–

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"We will show them the signs in the Cosmos and in their own selves, so that they may know clearly that (what the prophet says, is true." and "Is your Lord not able to save you, surely he is witness on everything.".

70. Ibn Taimiyah, *Kitabu-Nubuwat,* p. 48.
71. Ibn Taimiyah, *Minaj-al-Sunnah,* Vol. I., p. 175.
72. Umaruddin, Op. cit, p. 723.
73. Kalam Allahu Musa Takleema.
74. Ibn Taimiyah, *Risalatul Maaraj-al-Wasul,* p. 184, in *Majmatul-al-Rasial-al-Kubra,* Vol. I.
75. Laisa kamithli shayin.
76. Wa Lum Yakunu Kufwan Ahad.
77. Zayidatun Alal Al-Dhat.
78. Wa Lil-Allah Al-Mathlil-al-Aala.
79. Al-Quran.
80. Wa Lahmi Jamalin Ghata Fi Rasi-Jabalin Wa Urwanhu La Sahala Fa Yartaqa Wa La Sameena Fa Yaqalee, *Majmatul-al-Risail-al-Kubra,* Vol. I, p. 186.
81. Mohammad Ibrahim Dakruri, *al-Aql Wa Majaluhu Enda Ibn Taimiyah,* Maharjan-Ibn Taimiyah, Cairs, 1963.
82. Aw ma Nudri Kuhu Ala ma Nudri Khu.
83. Qamaruddin.
84. Abdul Haq Ansari, Op. cit, p. 147.
85. *Majmu Fatawa Shayk I-Islam.* Ibn Taimiyah, compiled by Abd, I-Rahman, I-Asimi and his son, Riyad Vol. X, p. 82.
86. Qamaruddin, Op. cit, p. 9.
87. Ibid, p. 6.
88. *Majmu tu al-Rasail,* ed. Muhammad Rashid Rida, Cario, 1922-30, p. 66 Vol. I.
89. Ibid, p. 67.
90. Ibid.
91. Ibid.
92. Ibid, p. 102.
93. Ibid, Vol. IV, p. 6.
94. Ibid, p. 17.
95. Ibid.
96. Ibid, p. 58.
97. Al-Quran (II-18).
98. Rashid Rida, *Majmuat l Rasail Wa L Masail,* Cario, Vol. I., p. 179.
99. *Fatawa Sheikh l-Islam,* Vol, Vol. X, pp. 516-17.
100. Ibid, pp. 220-221.
101. *Al-Rasail-wal-Masail,* Vol. I, pp. 81-83.
Fatawa Shayk l-Islam, Vol. X, pp. 383 and 557.
102. *Al-Rasail Wal-Masail,* Vol. I, pp. 81-83.
Fatawa Shayk, l-Islam, Vol. XI, p. 18.
103. Abdul Haq Ansari, Op. cit, p. 148.
104. *Al-Rasail Wa, l-Masail,* Vol. I, p. 176.
105. Ibid, Vol. IV, p. 78.

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106. Ibid, pp. 79-90.
107. Ibid, p. 59-72.
108. Ibid Vol. Vol., pp. 42-43.
109. *Fata Wa-Shyak l-Islam,* Vol. XI, p. 385, Vol. X, p. 339.
110. Abdul Haq Ansari, Op. cit, p. 149.
111. *Fatawa,* Op. cit, Vol. X, p. 668.
112. The Commentary of *Futuhl Ghayb* is included in *Fatawa* Vol. X, pp. 455-549.
113. *Fatawa,* Vo. X, p. 340 and *Al-Rasail,* Vol. I, p. 168.
114. *Fatawa,* Vol. X, pp. 219-222, *Al-Rasail,* Vol. I, p. 168.
115. Ibid, p. 338.
116. *Fatawa,* Vol. X, p. 220.
117. *Fatawa* Vol. X, p. 498, and p. 220, *Rasail,* Vol. I, p. 166, p. 497, and p. 167, *Fatawa,* Vol. X, pp. 218-338.
118. *Al-Rasail* Vol. IV, p. 64.
119. Ibid Vol. IV, pp. 62-63.
120. *Fatawa,* Vol. X, pp. 544-545.
121. *Fatawa,* Vol, XI, p. 348.
122. Ibn Taimiyah, *Kitabal Raddal al-Mantaqiyin,* ed. Sharfuddin, Beruit, p. 516.
123. Ibn Taimiyah, *Al-Furqan Bayn Awliya Allah Wa Awliy, L-Shaytan,* ed M. Abd, L-Wahhab, p. 145.
124. *Fatawa,* Op. cit, Vol. X, and XI.
125. *Fatawa,* Vol. X, pp. 551-52.
126. Ibid, p. 551.
127. Abdul Haq Ansari, Op. cit, p. 153.

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9

Philosophy of Ibn—Taimiyah

Philosophy was very much prevalent during the times of Ibn Taimiyah. Not only the philosophers, like Ibn Sina, Al-Farabi, and Ibn Rushd had advocated the cause of philosphy among the Muslims, but theologian philosophers like Ghazzali and Razi were also influenced by philosophical Sciences. A section of the philosophers was busy in spreading its own agnostic ideas, often overtly, and at times covertly, completely disregarding the prophetic teachings. There were others too, who wanted to reconcile religion with philosophy, for they had assumed the superiority of reason over faith. Both these groups were, however, fossilised followers of Aristotle and Plato, they held the two in the highest esteem as fount of all wisdom, and their theories as inviolate immutable.[1]

Greek philosophy had so powerfully captured the minds of the scholars and doctors of relgion that even it's greatest critic, Ghazzali had not succeeded in completely shaking off the influence of Greek metaphysics and ethics in his famous work Ibya ul-Uloom.[2]

Ibn Taimiyah says:–

"Loo at the followers of Aristotle. They are following him blindly, while many of them know full well that their master's theories are wrong. Still it is their pious belief which prevents them from refuting them inspite of the fact that many wise men have proved that there are undeniable and indubitable errors in his logical system, and they support them only for the reason that they are associated with his name. In metaphysics also Aristotle and his followers have committed blunders."[3]

According to Ibn Taimiyah, the philosophy, which has been developed by al-Farabi, Ibn Sina, Ibn Rushd, Sharwardi al-Maqtul and others is the blue print or Muslim version of the periptatic philosophy, which has been received from Aristotle, who is considered tobe the First Master by them.[4]

Qammaruddin says:–

"So far as Muslim philosophers are concerned, they were undoubtedly influenced by Greek thinkers."[5]

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Ibn Taimiyah says about these philosophers:

"These philosophers have mixed the truth which they have received from religion with the falsity based on their erroneous philosophical principles. They attempted at bringing an accord between religion and philosophy, but at the expense of religion. They attended the Quranic Verses and interpreted them with very farfethed and formal explainations in order to reconcile these with their philosophical principles."[6]

He crticised the philosophers for their ignorance of the real prophetic teachings and says:

"I mean the rational sciences which have been elaborated by the prophets for the people with rational demonstrations about the matters of knowledge of God. His unity, the gnosis of His Names and Attributes, the prophethood and the prophesies, life after death and about all the matters relating to the aims of actions which inherit a man the salvation in life hereafter. Most of these matters have been explained by the prophets by help of rational arguments. These are, thus, the religious. Shari and divine rationalities, philosophers have not even smelt their smell. They don't have any knowledge about the sciences which indicate about these subjects. As far as the gnosis specific with the prophets and the informations they have related about the unseen matter is concerned, it is one of the great aspects, which is superior to philosophy".[7]

According to Ibn Taimiyah, Aristotle and his earlier followers have not proved any "action of God" nor have established His being the "inventor", as they wre ignorant about the gnosis of the Divine Being. Therefore, their statements contain lot of corruption. But, Ibn Sina and his followers have made God as the "inventor" at least, still, it created contradiction in his statement about the subject. For example, Ibn Taimiyah says:

"The one, whom they prove as the being without the positive qualities according to some of them as Ibn Sina and his followers and according to other He is both with positive and negative qualities. In the external world, it has no reality as its proof in the external world is not possible. This is merely a matter which in, reality, is only mental abstraction. On this point, Ibn Sina was contradicted by Ibn Rushd etc among the philosophers. They said that (Ibn Sina's Statement) is not the statement of the leading philosophers, but merely the view of Ibn Sina and his followers. It is for the same reason that Abul Barakat, author of the *Al-Muatabar* has not relied on it, as he was the most accurate from among these people to the right position for his insight and his unliking for *Taqlid* of the predecessors, despite their ostensible claim that no taqlid is possible in rational matters."[8]

About the Absolute Being the position of philosophers has been commented upon by Ibn Taimiyah as follows:

"The Absolute Being is with the Absolute condition, or with the condition of regarding the positive aspects in first instance, a condition known bythe explicit reason as to be excluded in the external world. Because, it is merely found in the mind. It is from that which they have determined in their Greek logic and have explained that the Absoluteness as an Absoluteness as an Absolute man with the condition of Absoluteness and the Absolute being with the condition of Absoluteness and an Absolute animal with the condition of Absoluteness, and an Absolute body with the condition of Absoluteness and this is merely in the mind not in the perception of the people."[9]

At an another place he says:

"When a rationalist considers their saying fully, it becomes clear to him that this One whom

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they want to prove, is a concept of His being only in the minds not in perception (Fil Azhan La fil-al-Ayan)".[10]

There were other attempts made by the predecessors of Ibn Taimiyah in order to refute Greek philosophy. Ibn Bakr Baqi-lani composed Waqaiiq, in the fourth century to refute Aristotle and demonstrated the superiority of Arab philosophy over the Greek thought. In the fifth century, Abdul Karim Shahrashtani wrote a monograph to contradict Proclus and Aristotle in which he brought out the contradictory features of their philosophical thought in accordance with the rules of Logic. Then, by the end of that century Ghazzali rose to refute the Greek philosophy. Abu Barrakat Baghdadi took up the tradition further ahead through his renowned work entitled "Al-Mutabar" in which he disproved a greater part of the Aristotelian thought. Fakhruddin Razi, also, in the same century, proved his worth as an indomitable advocate of the Asharites and dialecticians by holding up philosophy to a severe reprobation.[11]

There is no doubt that Ghazzali smashed the undue vanity shrouded around Greek philosophy in general and Aristotelian philosophy in particular. He also attacked the very foundations of the Greek thought. But this is also true that he mixed several of their pronciples with the Islamic teachings and made the former at part with the latter. Because before, Ghazzali, the Islamic Scholars were not ready to accept the inclusion of the Greek philosophical principles into the body of Islamic teachings.

Ibn Taimiyah Says:

"No one among the theoreticians from among the Muslims, was attracted towards the ways of the Greek (Sciences). Even the Mutazilites, the Asharites, the Karamites, and Shiites and all people having any insight, used to dislike it, by explaining its corruption. Abu Hamid Ghazzali was the first person to have mixed their logic with the principles of the Muslims".[12]

Ghazzali considers mastery over the Greek logic as a prerequisite for getting command over religious Sciences. He writes, for, example, in the prelude to his *al-Mustasfa,* after explaining the logical principles that:

"To master religious knowledge, a man should be fully well-conversant with Greek logic."[13]

It was because of this reason that the Greek Sciences were not subjected to the criticism it deserved by Ghazzali even:

The Scholastics after Ghazzali, followed him for many years to come. After Ghazzali, the worthmentioning name is of Abul Barakat Baghdadi, who went through the books of Aristotle directly, and pointed out their technical shortcoming. But his too was an insignificant effort in comparison of the vast spread and expansion of Greek Sciences, inorder to arrest the innovative and heretical influence of these sciences.

On the other hand, Aristotle was still regarded by the coterie of philosophers in Islam as a "prince of philosophers" and an infallible teacher beyond every reproach. Al-Farabi wrote about Aristotle and Plato:

"Both these philosophers are the founders and perfecters of philosophy, and its principles and premises," for every a priori "principle and hypothesis of philosophy can be traced to them."[14]

Abu-Ali Sina was a still more ardent admirer of Aristotle who wrote: "Not addition could be made to the researches of Aristotle in philosophy despite the passage of such a long time after him."[15]

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In this way Ibn Sina was very much influenced by Greek philosophy. He has talked in his philosophy with a compound speach of his predecessors and whatever occurred to him, like his views about prophethood, secrets of verses and dreams. Moreover, he has discussed also about "philosophy" and "Logic". He has talked about "Wajib-al-wajud" and other similar issues also. But, it seems an addition to Aristotle and his school of thought, as there is no mention in their discussion about "Wajib-al-Wajud" nor about the commandments of the Wajib-al-Wajud. They have rather, mentioned just about the "First cause" (al-ill-al-Aula) instead and have proved it from the angle of its being teleological cause (Ilatum Gayatun) for the movement of the spheres which moves these for being resembling to it.

Ibn Sina, has discussed about the other divine matters also like prophethood, life after death, Shariah, the subjects about which his predecessors had said nothing, as their minds could not reach to the dimension of such topics. In these matters, Ibn Sina has availed from the Muslims, rather than his predecessor Greek philosophers. He has also availed from the atheists who were associated with the Ismaili sect of Muslims. Because his family members were from among the followers of al-Hakim al-Ubaidi (known commonly as al-Hakim bi-Amril-Allah, 375-410, the sixth Abeedi Batiniyyah caliph from the Egyptians). This family was very famous for its atheism among the Muslims. They were rather concealing their infidelity in their core of hearts.[16]

But Ibn Sina, despite his taint of atheism and concealed infidelity, was more knowledgeable about God than his predecessor philosophers like Aristotle and his followers.[17]

Ghazzali too was, in a sense, advocating the Greak philosophy indirectly. Because of his indulgence in a section of his life in these sciences, many theoreticians were persuaded to include the Greek logic in their Sciences. A group of people, who adopted the ways of these people from the latter generations assumed that there is no other way than this and the terms which they claimed from "Hadd" and "Burhan" etc are the real terms established near the intelligent people. But, Ibn Taimiyah, thinks that, perhaps, Ghazzali didn't know that the stalewarts and wise people among the Muslims etc have always shown the defects of these sciences and abused these as well. Muslim theoreticians had written several treatises on this Science.[18]

The purpose of Ibn Taimiyah in explaining this was "to show that the books of Abu Hamid have though mentioned and included various aspects from their false doctrines, by quoting their this passage or that portion, but at the end, he provided them with a befitting criticism and explained that their methods were consisting on ignorance and blasphemy, hence warrant condemnation. Moreover, he realized that their corruption was more severe than that of the methods of the Muta-Kallimeen. It was for the same reason that when Ghazzali died, he was busy in reading of the Bukhari and the Muslim.[19]

At other place Ibn Taimiyah shows the lurking influence of philosophy on Ghazzali in the following manner:

"Abu Hamid differentiates between the world of creation and the world of command. He includes the bodies (al-Ajsam) in the world of creation, and souls and intelligences in "the world of command" (Alam-al-Amar). This is also not from the religion of Muslims. Because everything except God is a creation or created according to the belief of the Muslims, "while as God is the creator of everything."[20]

Ibn Rushd's reverence for Aristotle knew no bounds. He considered him as the man whom God permitted to reach the highest summit of perfection in wisdom and intellect. He ascribed even the qualities and attributes of God to him. According to Lutfi Jamahu "had Ibn Rushd been polytheist, he

would have raised Aristotle to the position of the Lord of all lesser gods."[21]

Nasir ud-din Tawsi and his followers regarded Aristotle as the Agent intellect whose findings were the touch stone of reality. Their defence of Aristotle against the criticism of Fakhruddin Razi served to give a new lease of life to the Aristotelian thought in the East.[22]

Ibn Taimiyah was born ten years before Tawsi breathed his last, Aristotelianism dominated the intellectual and literary scene owing to the influence exerted by Tawsi and his followers.

Ibn Taimiyah himself has maintained that Hassan Ibn Musa al-Naubakhti had written his *Kitab al-Ara's w-al-Diyanah* pointing out the fallacies of Aristotle. The famous Muslim Physician and philosopher Abu Zakariyah al-Razi was a great opponent of Aristotle's philosophy and supported Pythagoras. In his opinion, Aristotle "had not only ruined philosophy but had also perverted it's very principles." Ibn Hazm Andalusi and the Mutazilite al-Nazzam were also against the philosophy of Aristotle. Abu Ali al-Jubbai left a book in refutation of Aristotle's book *De generation et de coruption.*[23]

But the criticism of Greek philosophy which was made by Ibn Taimiyah was unique in all respects. It was all pervasive and encompassing. It was devastating and scathing. In his reputation of Aristotelian philosophy and logic, Ibn Taimiyah left about five independent books in addition to what he wrote against them in many other writings. In the *Tafsir Surat al-Ikhlas* he also sheds sufficient light on his views on philosophy and theology. Sulaiman Nadvi rightly writes that: "Though he was a religious doctor, yet in reality he was a man who had come safe out of the enchanted house of philosophy. All his works are full of the bitter condemnation of philosophy and yet he was a great philosopher himself. He has amusingly described the confusion and amazement of the philosophers in his book "*Kitabul-Aqlwa'n-Naql.*"

He has written a whole volume "*Ar-Radd alal-Mantiqiyin*" in refutation of Aristotle's system of Logic. A perusal of the book gives the reader the impression that in reality he was the first founder of Mill's system of Logic and the forerunner of Hume's philosophy.[24]

Ibn Taimiyah in the manner of Ghazzali has classified various subjects like physics, mathematics, metaphysics and logic and has evaluated the status of each from rational and religious point of view. He talks about the concepts of intellect and intelligences in the context of Greek influence on the Muslim philosophers. However, he makes difference between Aristotelian and other versions of Greek philosophy.

To start with, the classical conception of philosophy as the mother of all sciences is also accepted by Ibn Taimiyah. He has no objection so far as physics is concerned, when it does not meddle with the religious affairs. He says:

"A greater part of the discussions of these philosophers relating to physics is quite clear, detailed and convincing. They possessed intellect and aptitude to understand these subjects and, instead of being predisposed to any particular view, they seem tobe searching for what is right and correct.[25]

At an other place, he says about thephysical sciences, their utility and futility, if not pursued in proper perspective. That:

"They (philosophers) have good understanding in the matters of physical sciences. This is the actual field in which they have encyclopaedic knowledge. They have spent their lives in the study of these sciences and have passed good portions of their lives in its acquisition."[26]

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The theory of the atoms was held by most of the scholastic theologians including the Jahmites, the Mutazilites, and the Asharites. Some of these atomists held that bodies were combinations of atoms existing by themselves, and that God does not destroy any of them. He destroys only the accidents (a'rad), namely, their union (Ijtima), their separation (iftiraq), their motion (harakah), and their rest (Sukun). Others maintained that atoms are phenomenal: God created them exnihilo, and once they came into existence they are never destroyed, though accidents may be destroyed. This view was held by most of the Jahmites, the Mutazilites, and the Asharites. Most of them, further, believed that it was supported even by Ijma (consensus). Ibn Taimiyah rejects this theory on the ground that it is an innovation and that early Muslims know nothing about it. Further, he says that the theologians are not unanimous on the subject, some of them totally deny the existence of atoms and the composition of bodies from them.[27]

About the theory of the body, some opine that a thing, which is definite or which has dimensions is called a body, while others say that it is a combination of two atoms, whereas some people maintain that it is a combination of four atoms or more up to thirty-two. Besides these a class of philosophers holds that bodies are formed not of atoms but of matter and form, while many other scholastics and non-scholastics profess that bodies are neither a combination of atoms nor of matter and form. Even al-Juwayni doubted the combination of matter and form, though it is reported that he himself transmitted this as a view accepted by Ijma (consensus).[28]

Ibn Taimiyah discusses also the theory of the similarities of bodies, which was popular among some Muslim philosophers. The upholders of this theory profess that bodies of all kinds are at bottom alike, bcause they are the combinations of atoms which are themselves like one another. The differences between one body and another is the difference of accidents (a'rad) only Ibn Taimiyah rejects this theory on various grounds. One of the ground is that the upholders of this theory maintan that to each individual body God gives accidents (a'rad) peculiar to itself. According to them, the species (Ajnas) cannot change from one into another. If it is argued against them that since all bodies are phenomenal and all phenomenal things turn from one to another, it necessarily proves the change of species, they would say in reply that matter (maddah) in all kinds of creation is the same. It is the quality (sifat) that change due to union (ijtima) separation (iftiraq), motion (harakah), and rest (sukun), while matter (maddah) remains unchanged at all stages of creation.

To Ibn Taimiyah, this argument is a mere assumption of the philosophers who have observed only the phenomenal change in things without having any knowledge whatsoever of the essence which they claim remains unchanged. These philosophers, further assert that all things are combinations of atoms preserved in matter, and that on the basis of this theory they are divided into two groups. One group maintains that the atoms of which a body is constituted will be destroyed and then created afresh, while the other maintains that the parts of a body are separated but will again be united in the next world. Unfortunately the latter have to answer a riddle. If a man is eaten up by an animal and then the animal is eaten up by another man, then how would he be raised on the day of resurrection ? In reply some of them say that in the human body there are certain parts that cannot be dissolved and in these aprts there is nothing of that animal which has been eaten up by the second man. Ibn Taimiyah objects to this and points out that according to the Scientists (uqala) there is nothing in the human body that cannot be dissolved and that, according to the aslaf (earlier writers), the fuqaha (jurists), and also the people in general, one body (jism) turns into another by losing its identify completely. On the basis of this, jurists discussed the problem whether an impure thing may become pure when it is changed into another, for example, they agreed that if a pig falls into a salt-mine and becomes salt, it will be lawful

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for a Muslim to eat that salt. Thus, Ibn Taimiyah comes to the conclusion that the arguments in favour of the theory of the similarity of bodies are not sustainable. He believes that bodies are dissimilar and interchangeable.[29]

Ibn Taimiyah refutes the philosophical interpretation of the necessary cause also He says that if by "necessary cause" the philosophers mean an existence which has no "will" and no "power", then such an existence bears no meaning, nor has it anysignificance externally, much less can it be existing necessarily, Ibn Rushd and other philosophers contradict these changes in their discussion of this problem. They postulate of the outset "a final cause" or "illat-al-ghayah" and then other final causes to assist it in creation (Khalq) which needs volition (Iradah). And since they interpret the final cause as mere knowledge and "knowledge" as the "knower" it becomes totally absurd and contradictory, because we know necessarily that volition (Iradah) is not identical with volant, nor knowledge with the knower. With these philosophers, says Ibn Taimiyah, heterogeneous expressions may hve only one meaning; by knowledge they mean power or volition, by attribute they mean the knower, by power they mean powerful, by volition the volent, and by love the lover. Granted that there is a being without "will" and "choice" it is impossible for such a being to create this universe, because such a necessary cause needs its own causes and they cannot be independent.[30]

In this way Ibn Taimiyah has discussed the views of the philosophers, scholastics and theologians about physics and physical sciences.

He has, in the same way discussed their views about Mathematics. He has assessed the importance of this important branch of science and has put forward arguments in its support. For example, he says:

"These matters and like aboutwhich the mathematicians have discussed is a rational affair in which all the intelligent people are one. There is no one among the people who does not know something about mathematics as it is necessary in knowledge and necessary for action. For the same reason they say in their discourse that is the 1/2 of 2. There is no doubt that their all propositions are compulsory in which there will be no contradiction at all.[31]

Thus the mathematical formulas dealing with numerals are quite convincing and are unanimously accepted by all scholars. Every man has to have some knowledge of these for one needs them for conducting his daily business as also for further studies. Who can dispute that one is not half of two ? In fact, their equations are acceptable, for they have no inexactness to which any objection could be raised.[32]

While the philosophers bringing their mind to bear upon Physics show their mettle, but, according to Ibn Taimiyah they appear to be unenlightened folk without any knowledge of what constitutes the truth. He says:

"Very little of metaphysics has been handed down from Aristotle, but even that contains numerous faulty concepts".[33]

He gives a general description about their ignorance about the metaphysical realities, he says:–

"So far as the knowledge of God is concerned, these unlucky appear to be deprived of the truth. They have no knowledge of the angels, divine scriptures, and prophets of God, for they had heard nothing about these either in favour or against them. Only some of the later philosophers acquainted with the revealed religious have spoken about these matters".[34]

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For example, he says about Socrates and Plato, that they were well acquainted with the religious matters. He says:

"The earlier philosophers before Aristotle believed in the resurrection of the bodies as the philosophy of Socrates Thales and other similar stalewart philosophers indicates".[35]

Otherwise the philosophers of Aristotelian tradition "...say about the "Wahid", that only the singular will come out from the singular. But this singular in that case is rendered qualitiless, and bereft of all attributes. He is singular being, attributed with all the negations. Moreover, the reality of this singular being is just a mental abstraction. What else Being which is a Created One, is more complete than this idea, which has no reality in the external world."[36]

The philosophers have discussed the divine being in the context of syllogistic reasoning, which according to Ibn Taimiyah is most unlikely. He says, for example:

"As is evident that the Divine knowledge is not amenable to be argued in the context of the analogical syllogism (Qiyas-Tamsili); in which the basis and the branches (of a science) are equal, nor can it be discussed in the context of Inclusive syllogism (Qiyas-i-Shamuli) in which its particulars are equal. Since God is not analogous to any other thing. Therefore, he can't be considered while employing analogies. He can't even be included under universal syllogism in which all individuals are considered equal. It is because of this reason that a group of philosophers and Scholastics has tread the trodden path in the divine matters, and have not arrived to certainty by their philosophizing, rather their arguments are contradictory. The philosophers have been overtaken by perturbance, perplexity and difficulty after their earlier high sounding and pompous proclamations."[37]

While discussing the views of philosophers about divine attributes. Ibn Taimiyah says:

"These [philosophers] say that the prophet was not knowing the meaning of these verses (about attributes), nor his Companions were conversant with their meaning. It amounts to saying that the prophet was not knowing the meaning of what he was deliberating in his traditions on the attributes (of God). But, rather, his speach in this matter was not even comprehended by himself".[38]

Some of the greatest philosophers have clearly stated that there is no way known to them to reach the certitude of knowledge in matters pertaining to theology. The utmost claim that they make is that whatever they say is nearer to reason.

"This obviously, means that the philosophers have nothing but depend on conjectures and presumptions to solve the metaphisical riddles, but, as the Quran declares, specious reasoning can never take the place of divine revelation." Comments Ibn Taimiyah.[39]

According to Ibn Taimiyah when an educated person makes a close study of the Aristotelean metaphysics, he reaches to the conclusion that there was none more ignorant of the gnosis of God than these philosophers.[40]

To compare knowledge obtained through the Prophets of God and philosophers, Ibn Taimiyah gives an example of comparison between a black smith and a angel or a land lord and an emperor. He says:

"In fact there can be some resemblance between petty land lords and Emperors for the former too administer a small estate but the philosophers are completely unfamiliar with the message of the prophets. Even the pagans and the Jews and Christans know more about God. His nature and attributes

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than these philosophers do. I do not mean to charge these philosophers of being ignorant of the knowlege revealed to the apostles of God. For that is vouchsafed to the Prophets alone. They are even ignorant of the knowledge diffused by the prophets in regard to the nature and attributes of God. Prophethood and hereafter which can, to an extent, be comprehended through reason. Even these are a sealed book for the philosopher, much less the things which are unseen and beyond the ken of human perception and are known to the Prophets through revelation. There can in fact be no comparison between the philosophical, metaphysical doctrines and the teachings of the prophets of God".[41]

The philosophers are unfamiliar with the unseen realities taught by the prophets as also with those comprehensive natural laws which develop all beings and creation and whose knowldge could have helped them to correctly categorise all the existing things. Only he can be capable of attaining it who can encompass the whole varied existence but the philosophers have but little knowledge of mathematics and the laws related to it. This in fact shows their comprehension of just a small part of the general causes and principles of natural phenomena. But:

"...the existence of beings and causes not known to man far exceed that of which he has any knowledge. Thus all those persons whose knowledge is limited like that of philosophers are taken by surprise when they are told that numerous other objects such as prophets, angels, empyrean, heaven and hell also exist. They are surprised because they believe that nothing exists beyond what they know. This is also the reason why they try to interpret the facts of unseen realities told by the prophets in the light of limited knowledge of things they possess. Their arguments are really useless for they have no positive evidence of the non-existance of any thing. It is not necessary that whatever we do not know does not have any existence. Their denial of the unseen realities is like the denial of the Jinn by a physician on the ground that the medical science does not afford any evidence of their existence, although medical science does not prove their nonexistence too. Similar is the case with others possessing knowledge in a particular branch of science. Whatever, they find out outside the compass of their own knowledge, they deny simply out of their ignorance of it. The fact is that man has not been as much mislead in owning and accepting the things as in denying that of which he has no knowledge. This is a common weakness and natural propensity of human beings which has thus been spoken of by God:

"Nay, but they denied that, the knowledge where of they could not compass and where of the interpretation (in events) that not yet come unto them."[42]

The ancient Greeks were a heathen people keenly interested in Sorcery. They worshipped idols along with the stars and that is why they turned to astronomy. It was because of their belief in the Occult influence of the stars upon human beings that they had built numerous temples for star worship.[43]

At another place he says:

"Many of their ancient and later priests promoted idolatrous practices. They called the stars as lesser gods and prescribed different religious rites for their worship. Those among the Muslims who have taken to their ways neither forbid polytheistic practices nor consider unity of Godhead an essential part of one's faith."[44]

The angles are a different species of creatures, who are distinct from the human beings. In the same way the Jinns are also a different created species of God. But under the spell of rationalism, some of the Muslim philosophers even denied these two species and called these "The hidden faculties" of human beings, instead. But Ibn Taimiyah has discussed these matters in a detailed manner in various of his books and has brought home the fact that rejection of such matters is based on the sheer ignorance of

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these people.[45]

In the same way Ibn Taimiyah says that the people who say that "the intelligences and souls have emanated from God, have suggested for Him sons and daughters without any knowledge. Though these people don't ostensibly suggest anything like sons or daughters as the inventor for all that which is other than God. But these people have presumed that one of the sons i.e. "The Intelligence" is creator of all that which is existing other than God. They have suggested that Intelligence is like masculine and the soul (al-nafs) like feminine. They have elaborated upon it, while as the pagan ARABS USED TO ENDORSE THAT God has created the heavens and the earth and brought these into existance, before their non-existence. They have never claimed that they are eternal and co-eterna with God, or that they will always remain with Him."[46]

These philosophers called the First Intelligence, the Lord (Rabb) of all the worlds—super natural and natural (al-Alwi Wa al-safli) and in the same way every intelligence until it reaches to the Active (Intelligence), about which they suppose that it is governing the things which are below the moon.

In the same way the people who uphold the doctrine of eternity of the world, they have but to accept an Agent other than God. Aristotle and his followers regard heaven with its movement, as an agent of these movements and whatever is created by them. In the same way, whosoever, associates a partner of God from the Intelligences and souls makes it shifted to the creation with the occurrence of the thing, and that is permanent with the occurrence of that thing. And who says from them about the reassembling with it and who may be called by the self existent Being. Both the groups in reality don't prove that God has created anything nor that He has not created anything.[47]

Ibn Taimiyah concludes this discussion and says:

"[all the details] have proved it that the polytheism and infidelity of these people is more (dubious) that the Paganism of theArab polytheists. The declaration of these polytheists of the intercessors between (God and the World) is much based infidelity from the Arab polytheists."[48]

He says further:

"Yaqub Ibn Ishaq al-Kindi was a philosopher of Islam in his times. I mean a philosopher in Islam, otherwise, there are no philosophers from the Muslims, as some noted Jurist of our time has (rightly), said when he heard that Ibn Sina is among the philosophers of Islam, he replied: "Islam has no philosophers."[49]

Ibn Taimiyah has objected to the fabrication of hadith by the Muslims philosophers, which is adovated by these people in favour of their theory of Intelligences. He says that some people have fabricated a hadith in favour of ten intelligences and heavens. But he has shown on the basis of his research (from various books) and claims that this is a fabricated hadith. He has gone to the extent of saying that this hadith has been fabricated in the third Hijri A. H. and the first person who used this narrations was Daul Ibn al-Mehsabar in his *Kitab al-Aql.*[50]

The philosophers following the Aristotelian thought didn't adopt the view held by the earlier masters and precursors of philosophy who believed in the creation of the universe and the existance of a super natural world apart from the terrestial one. "They had spoken of the celestial world in a langauge which confirms the description of heaven given in the traditions like wise, the ancients also believed in the resurrection of the dead as the writings of Socrates and some other philosophers affirm."[51]

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Ibn Taimiyah emphatically denies that Aristotle and any share in prophecy. Aristotle's contemporaties were worshippers of planets and were unaware of the prophets like Abraham or Moses. Unlike Empedocles, pythagoras, Socrates, and Plato who believed at least in the origination (huduth) of the celestial spheres, Aristotle professed "the doctrine of the eternity of the heavens, which, according to Ibn Taimiyah clearly shows that he had no share of Wahi al-mushtarak."[52]

Ibn Taimiyah says that the philosophers claim that the Quran came with the rhetorical methods and sufficient principles which suffice for the satisfaction of the common people. They say that the scholastics profess the polemical methods. But in their opinion, the philosophers are the only people who are endowed with demonstration. But, according to Ibn Taimiyah, the philosophers are far away from demonstration in divine matters (Ilahiyat) and universals (al-kuliyat). No doubt, the philosophers have a contribution in physics and they have a distinction in this field, but no command over the subject of theology (Ilahiyat). They are rather the most ignorant people in this field and far away from the truth in this sphere. The sayings of Aristotle, their teacher on the subject are very less. Therefore their views about this subject are the most erroneous. Ibn Taimiyah suggests that the older philosophers who had visited Syria and the adjoining lands were influenced by the teachings of the Prophets. But Aristotle did not get an opportunity to go outside Greece. In *Nadqh-ul-Mantiqh,* he writes:

"Those who have complied the history of philosophy say that the earlier masters like Pythagoras, Socrates and Plato had visited Syria and other countries, where they learned of the spiritual view from the companions and followers of Luqman, David and Salmon. But Aristotle never went to the countries where Prophets had lived and preached, nor did he benefit from the teachings of the prophets in any other way like his predecessors. He subscribed to the cult of star worship and formulated the rationalist view which was blindly accepted by later philosophers."[53]

It is now an admitted fact that the whole philosophy of the Arabians was drawn from Aristotelianism and the neo-Platonic thought. Ibn Taimiyah says in this regard that:

"The philosophical concepts adopted by Al-Farabi (Al pharabius), Ibn Sina (Avicenna), Ibn Rushd (Averroes) and Suharwardi were wholly borrowed from Aristotle whom these philosophers have named as the "First Teacher."[54]

Ibn Taimiyah argued that the Aristotelian concept of God reduced His to a mere imaginary being. He says:

"When a man endowed with reason reflects over their concepts of God, he comes to the conclusion that such a God can exist only in one's imagination for He can't have any objective existence".[55]

Ibn Taimiyah holds that the philosophical concept of God, divests God of all virtues, power and attributes. This concept of God is not only unbecoming, "but also derogatory of even a sentient being much less the creator and master of the universe." He laments that the Muslim philosophers subscribing to the Greek philosophic view were simply blind followers of Aristotelianism who over looked this ibherent contradiction of the Greek thought. He deplores that in abjuring their faith in the revealed truth, the philosophers had renounced a blessing from God which would have really lighted their path to the certitude of knowledge."[56]

Ibn Taimiyah maintained that the unseen realities could not be explained in the light of causal relationship recognised as the guiding principle in Greek thought. In a dissertation on ***Nubuwat,*** he

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laments that Ibn Sina "held the view that of the numerous potentialities of soul which differ among individuals, one is prophethood". He contended:

"Only a man completely ignorant of the reality of Prophethood can reason in this manner. This is as if a man who is aware only of the poets, tries to prove that the jurists and physicians are also like them even this similiture does not fully bring out the absurdity of Ibn Sina's reasoning, for the difference between a prophet and a non-prophet is much more marked and wide than that between the jurists and physicians and the poets. The followers of the Greek philosophers don't possess even a vague notion of the prophethood but they try to other philosophers too who subscribed to the same view. Ibn Sina assigns it a bit higher status consisting of a three fold characteristic. The first one, which he calls theopneust faculty of the prophets, depends on the development of their understanding as good sense or practical sagacity. The second characteristic of the prophets delineated by Ibn Sina is theophany or the faculty to conceive of something known to them which takes the form certain celestial forms in their imagination and is experienced through a subjective condition. These sensations reassemble the visions in the dreams in which a man beholds other and talks to them but whatevr he sees has only a subjective existence for nothing afford proof of its existence with the help of philosophical principles which do not possess the remotest idea of its essence and reality.[57]

He says further:

"Of all these groups those far away from the substance and reality of Prophethood are the followers of Greek philosophy, Batiniyyah and atheists. To them the faculty engaged by all human beings and also constituting the basis of prophethood is the visions during sleep. In fact Aristotle and his immediate followers have not discussed prophethood at all, while Al-Farabi considers it simply a kind of dream. There are other philosophers too who subscribes to the same view. Ibn Sina assigns it a bit higher status consisting of a three fold characteristic. The first are, which he calls theopneust faculty of the Prophets, depends on the development of their understanding without the aid of formal instruction but, he also holds it to be of the same nature of goods sense or practical sagacity. The second characteristic of the Prophets delineated of Ibn Sina is theophany or the faculty to conceive of something known to them, which takes the form of the certain celestial froms in their imagination and is experienced though a subjective condition. These sensatias reseble the visais in the dreams in which a man beholds others and talks to them but whatever sees has only a subjective existence for nothing exists besides him. It means that according to these philosophers, whatever, a prophet witnesses or hears is purely a subjective phenomena as nobody else shares his experience. These internal sensations are of an esoteric nature without any extrinsic reality. But persons mentally deranged owing to illness or lunancy can also have similar experiences. The third characteristic of the Prophets, according to Ibn Sina is the power possessed by them to interpose in the material world which causes events contrary to customs.[58]

This is thus the explanation of miracles worked by the Prophets, for in their view, every contingent is an emanation from human, celestial or physical forces operating in the world.

According to the philosophers even the internal experiences of the Prophets proceed from Active Intellect.[59]

Ibn Taimiyah Says:

"Thus, when these philosophers, came to know the teachings of the prophets, they tried to reconcile these with their own philosophical concepts. For this purpose, they took up the statements of the prophets but interpreted them in the light of their own philosophical doctrines. In other words, their

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explanations amount to an exposition of philosophers' view-point in the words and pharaseology used by the Prophets. Employing the expressions and dictions used by the Prophets and philosophers have camposed numerous treatises and dissertations. Any body, who is not aware of the purpose and design of the Prophets and philosophers and the difference between the two comes to believe that the Prophets meant what has been explained by the philosophers. Quite a good number of persons and sects have been misled by these writings. One can clearly discern this duplicity in the works of Ibn Sina and his followers."[60]

In this *Minhaj Sunnah* as well as other books, Ibn Taimiyah boldly declares that philosophy and theology have no place in Islam, and that theologians like Juwayni, Ghazzali and Shahrastani, who devoted their lives to these sciences, ultimately understood their defects and returned to the Quran and the Sunnah. Shahrastani confessed that it was folly to discuss theology, al-Razi, in his opinin cantradicts himself in matters of theology and admitted his perplexity.[61]

Iman Razi openly confessed when he had grown old that after pondering over the Scholastic and philosophical subtleties he had reached the conclusion that these could neither quench one's thirst nor cure the sick. The reasoning of the Quran, he admitted, was the most convincing. Look at the Quranic verses "Naught is as his likeness."[62]

Or "they cannot compass it in knowledge."[63]

Emphasising negation of simititudes of God or those affirming his attributes, such as.

"Then, (He) mounted the throne"[64] or "Unto Him good-words ascend."[65] or "who is in the Heaven"[66] and you would arrive at the same conclusion as reached by al-Razi, Ghazzali. Ibn Aqeel has also drawn similar inferences, for instead, this is an incontrover tible truth."[67]

Ibn Taimiyah concludes:

"They followed neither the path of the rationalists nor the teachings of the prophets with the result that, on the one hand, they deviated from their ingeneous nature, and, on the other were also deprived of the conviction imparted by the Shariah. Their rationalism led them only to uncertainity and unnecessary quibbling and hair splitting of imaginary issues."[68]

Ibn Taimiyah strongly pleaded that the Quranic reasoning was not only most appropriate but also most convincing for the avouchment of metaphysical and unseen realties and religious truths. He says:

"The arguments put forth by the Quran are much more assuring and carry a deeper sense than the propositions of the philosophers and dialecticians. At the same time, the former do not suffer from paralogism which is a common feature of logical disputatins"[69]

At another place he says:

"Knowledge of the reasons advanced by the Quran as well as the self-evident marks and signs adduced in support of the existance of God. His sustatention of the world, His Oneness. His knowledge and power and the possibility of resurrection and retribution in the Hereafter is essential for acquiring the noblest human qualities."[70]

In support of his contention he cites the example of the different forms of reasoning employed in support of the existance of Divine Being and His attributes which also bring out the difference between the philosophical and Quranic concepts of God head."

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The Quran is elaborate where it, affirms Divine attributes but makes only a cmpendious reference where the negation is stressed (Naught is as His likeness), this being also the way of the prophets who explicate in detail what He is and are concise in describing what He is not on the other hand, their rivals and opponents (the Greek philosophers) pay more attention to the denial of His atributes but make only a passing reference where they have to aver them.[71]

Since the philosophers have denied the positive attributes of the Divine Being, no relation with God could be developed according to Ibn Taimiyah. Their insistance on negative attributes couldn't help in the direction of developing "any conscious relationship with God expressing itself in their intellectual ideas and moral aspirations or a heartfelt longing for His propinquity.[72]

Because "a hundred thousand negatives could never be equal to a single affirmation".[73]

Thus we find that Ibn Taimiyah has discussed all the important branches of philosophy like physics, Mathematics and Metaphysics in detail and has provided with the positive as well as negative dimensions of each subject from rational and religious point of view. But despite Ibn Taimiyah's condemnation of Philosophers especially their mataphysical and theological theories, "he was a man who had come safe out of the enchanted house of philosophy. All his works are full of the bitter codemnation of philosophy and yet he was a great philosopher himself."[74]

But the greatest contribution of Ibn Taimiyah to philosophy was his criticism of logic which he made in various of his books.

Ibn Taimiyah's criticism of logic was his profoundest and most original work. He was opposed to extreme rationalism. Like Kant (d. 1804), he did not believe that reason could drive us knowledge of Ultimate truths. He was opposed to logic in its applications to the truths of religion or ultimate truths. He was not against reasoning as such, but believed that is was not confined to the Aristotelian logic or Syllogistic reasoning. Logic, he demonstrated, was not a measure of the truth or reality. It was only a means of judging the consistency of arguments. It's constant use sharpened the intellect and assisted in discovering fallacies in reasoning. It was, however, absolutely incapable of proving the existance of a thing. It was neither a source of existential nor valualtional knowledge.

Logic was an artificial human device. It was possible to arrive at the truth by means other than the method of logic. The wise men of all nations had arrived at the truth without using Aristotle's logic. An intelligent person did not need Greek logic and a dull man could noot derive any benefit from it. Moreover, logic had to depend on terms for expressing truths about ideas, terms setup artificial boundaries which stood in the way of our analysis of the reality. This was a serious shortcoming of logic. Further, logic distorted facts by its division of reality into substances and qualities, which were not separate and unconnected in reality as logic, therefore, was not only incapable of revealing the truth or the reality, it also distorted and mis represented it. This view of Taimiyah is some what like Francis Herbert Bradley's (d. 1924) criticism against logical or rational way of thinking. But Ibn Taimiyah did not go to that extreme to which Bradley want in denouncing all the truths known by the human intellect.

In the opinion of Ibn Taimiyah, logic was also not in conformity with reason, because reason could not be subordinate to principles laid down by one man. Reason had its own nature and it had its own methods. Its course and functioning could be determined by any one. The lines prescribed by Aristo telian logic were too narrow for reason and in fact reason was not restricted to these ways along. In essence this is the same criticism as has been levelled against Aristtotelian logic by J.S. Milled (d. 1873) and other modern logicians like Bertrand Russell and Lizzie Susan Stebbing (d. 1943). It is

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however, suprising that while criticising Aristotelian logic Ibn Taimiyah recognized the truths of mathematics and physics as has been already discussed.

Aristotelian logic was too narrow and all the ways of reasoning and knowledge were not confined to it. Syllogistic reasoning, as Bertran Russell says was not the only for of reasoning. Some times men were content with one premise only. Again men differed according to their level of intelligence, consequently they need different approaches for arriving at the truth. Therefore, the syllogistic approach was bound to be inadequate.[75]

The earlier communities used to know the things without this invention and even after the generality of the community knew things without knowing these devices of Aristotelian machinations and when these people ponder themselves, they found that they know the facts of the things without this device.

The logicians say that the logic is the measure of rational sciences and its considerations save mind from going astray in thinking process, as the prosody is the measure of poetry, etymology the measure of the simple and compound Arabic terms. In the same way the instruments of time, are the measures of time. But Ibn Taimiyah says:

"The matter here is different. The rational sciences are learnt by the natural dispositions by the methods of perception, on which man was shaped which don't depend on the artificial measures set by a particular person. Because no one can be followed in rational matters in contradiction to Arabic language principles. This has had been the habit of the cammunity, which just know by only listening and its principles and rules can be known only through investigation (Istaqrai); contrary to the ways, the value of measured items is known, or land scaling and numbers these need perhaps all these rational aspects. But the things which are measured or weighed is a habitual matter as habits of people regarding language."

Ghazzali was one of the important Muslim thinkers, who supported logic as an indespensable subject for every academic and intellectual activity. In *al-Mustasfa,* Ghazzali says:

"Logic constitutes the fundamental discipline in every branch of knowledge. Anybody who is not well-versed in this science can never be sure of the knowledge gained by him".[76]

In *Maqasid-al-Falasifah,* he observes:

"So far as the logical premises and its a priori principles are concerned, most of them are undoubtedly tested and true. Only seldom is there any mistake in them. Whatever differences the doctors of faith have with the Greek masters of logics, these relate to the terminology used by the two without and divergence of opinion in regard to it's aims and objectives. All are agreed that this science is meant to reach conclusions by connected though."[77]

Ibn Rushd went to the extent of saying that logic opened the way to reality which could not be reached without its help even by the elite much less the laity.[78]

Ibn Taimiyah for the first time attacked logic, though philosophy was attacked earlier by the people. He made a minute and critical study of it and expressed his independent opinion about it.[79] He has amusingly described the confusion and amazement of the philosophers in his book *Kitabul-Aql Wa' n-Naql.*[80] In *Ar-Raddo' alal-Mantiqiyin,* he discussed logical propositions like prosyllogism, major, minor and middle terms, conclusions etc and showed their defects and limitations to demonstrate that the importance accorded to logic by the Muslim Scholars was far in excess of its real worth. In the opinion

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of Ibn Taimiyah it was neither the measuring rod of rationality nor its method of reasoning provided the surest way to attain credance, nor yet true knowledge.[81] He says:

"These scholars claim that logic constitutes the criterion of discursive knowledge which saves one from committing mistakes in the same way as the rules of meter and rhyme help in lyrical camposition or the etyomology and syntax in the learning of a language or else mechanical instruments in ascertaining the hours of the day. But this is not correct, for the knowledge is achieved through perception and ratinal faculty endowed to human beings by God. Its acquisition does not depend on the rules formulated by another person. It might be necessary to imitate the Arabs for learning Arabic langauge for the simple reason that it is the dialect of a nation which has to be heared and copied, but that cannot be true of discursive knowledge....The people before the inception of Greek logic possessed which have endeavoured to reach the truth of the mater without taking its help. Among every nation one can find sages who reach the core of realities without learning Aristotelain logic. A little reflection by these people would convince them that they attained the knowledge possessed by them without recourse to this man made science."[82]

Logic was taken by the dialecticians as an instrument to develop the unknown or metaphysical truths from the known concepts. Practically in the same way as the fundamental rules and principles of other sciences are employed to acquire further knowledge in these subjects. It is worthy of notice that Ibn Taimiyah did not admit this proposition.

He says:

"It is clear that the scales designed to weigh fire-wood, metals and stones cannot be used for weighing silver and gold. The truth enunciated by the prophets and the reality of prophet-hood is even finer and more precious than gold is considered among the metals. Your logic cannot, therefore, be employed as balance for the latter because it comprises both human ignorance and extremism. It is neither aware of their weights and measures nor is it capable of describing them. This is a science of ignorance for it denies that which is truth; and breeds extremism and obstinancy for it rejects that which is indispensable as well as inherent in human nature. No science can do without these imperative truths for human excellence and nobility depend on them."[83]

Now we will give a little detailed resume of the basic views of the philosophers on logic and the criticism of the Ibn Taimiyah thereto.

To start with, the main targets of Ibn Taimiyah's refutation were the "definition" and "Syllogism" of Aristotelian logic. In his *Kitab ar-Raddo ala al-Mantaqiyyin,* Ibn Taimiyah says that according to Aristotelian logic, Knowledge is of two kinds, namely, based on cocepts (Tasawwur) and that on judgement (Tasdiq), both of which are either immediate (badihi) or mediate (nazari). It is evident that all kinds of knowledge cannot be immediate of self-evident. Similarly, all kinds of knowledge cannot be mediate or acquired as in that case, to gain the knowledge of a mediate concept, one would have to depend on another mediate concept leading to a circle (Daur) or endless chain (Tasalsul) both of which are logically impossible. Logicians further hold that the concepts and the judgements which are mediate (Nazari) require some means to reach them, and therefore, the way through which concepts are reached, is called *Hadd* (difinition); and the way through which judgements are arrived at is called *Qiyas* (Syllogism). However *Hadd* and *Qiyas* are the two fundamental bases on which the whole structure of Aristotelian logic stands. In order to refute the Aristotelian logic, Ibn Taimiyah endeavoured to demolish these fundamental bases at four points which serve as the four main chapters of his *Kitab-ar-Raddo,*

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'alal-Mantiqiyyin'.

I. The desired concepts cannot be obtained except by means of definition (Hadd).

II. Definitin gives the knowledge of concepts.

III. The desired judgement cannot be obtained except by means of syllogism.

IV. Syllogisim gives the knowledge of judgement.

It may be noted here that of the above propositions the first and the third are negative, while the second and the forth are affirmative. The main targets of Ibn Taimiyah's refutation were the "definition" and "Syllogism" of Aristotelian logic.

The first basic proposition of the logicians that concepts can't be obtained except by means of definition has been refuted by Ibn Taimiyah on the following grounds:

> I. "It is negative proposition for which the logicians have not advanced any proof (dalil). Such a negative proposition can not be accepted as the basis of positive knowledge. Therefore, the very first proposition of Aristotelian logic is based on a wrong foundation. Hence, such a logic can not be treated as a science which, according to the logicians, only protects human understanding from committing mistakes."[84]
>
> II. When the definition is the word of the definer, the definer will understand the thing defined either with the help of a (previous) definition or without any definition. Now, if he understands the thing defined by a previous definition, then his words in the second definition will be as good as his words in the first definition which will necessarily lead to a circle (Daur) or endless chain (Tasalsul) in the reasoning process, both of which are impossible. If he understands the object defined without any definition, then the assertion in the proposition that 'concepts' can not be obtained except with the help of definition stands refuted.[85]
>
> III. People of different branches of learning and professions know their affairs well without taking recourse to definitions.
>
> IV. No definition universally agreed upon has yet been found. For instance, nobody has so far been able to offer any definition of the two famous terms "man" and "sun" on which all could agree. In philosophy, theology, medicine, grammar, etc; many contradictory definitions have, thus, come down to us.[86]

Now, the logicians maintain that knowledge is dependent on concept (Tasawwur), but as no agreed definition of anything has get been made, Ibn Taimiyah declares that no concept in the proper sense of the term has yet been formed. Similarly the logicians believe that judgement is dependent on concept (Tasawar), but since concept has not yet been obtained, judgement also has not yet been arrived at. The result is the opinion of Ibn Taimiyah is the type of sophistication."[87]

Definition is a mere statement of the definer. For example, when man is defined as "rational animal" it is a statement that may be right or wrong. It is a mere assertion without any proof. The listener may understand it with or without its definition. In the former case he known it without proof, which may or may not be correct, while in the latter case the definition serves to purpose. Logicians say that definition neither rejects the proof nor needs it. Unlike syllogism (Qiyas), definition can be rejected by refutation or contradiction. To this Ibn Taimiyah replies that when the defines fails to advance any proof in favour of correctness of the definition, the listener cannot understand the object defined by a

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mere definition which may or may not be correct.[88]

If the conception of the object defined is attained by the definition, then it is obtained before one has known the correctness of the definition, since the knowledge of the correctness of the definition is not attained except after one has known the object defined. The knowledge of the object depends on the knowledge of thing (named) and of its attributes which the logicians call essential attributes (Al-Sifat-al-Dhatiyyah) and names as "the parts of definition," "parts of quidity," etc. If the listener does not know that the object defined is attributed with those attributes, he cannot conceive it. If he knows that the thing is attributed with those qualities, he has known them without any definition.[89]

Ibn Taimiyah then advances four similar arguments and proves definitions do not offer true significance of the objects defined.[90]

The third proposition of the logicians that judgements cannot be attained except by means of syllogism, has been refuted by our author on the following grounds.[91]

It is an uncertain claim and a negative proposition in favour of which they have not advanced any proof. According to Ibn Taimiyah, both the self-evident (Badihi) and the acquired (Nazari) forms of knowledge are relative. If some people failed to attain judgement without the help of sylogism, it does not mean that nobody from among the children of Adam knows the judgement without syllogism.

Knowledge of a thing does not depend on a particular syllogistis process of thinking. Khabar al-Mutawatir (Universally accepted traditions and experiences) gives the knowledge of judgements, which syllogism does not. To one a premise is perceptible, while to another it is not. Therefore its (natijah) is independable.[92]

Ibn Taimiyah admits that when the premises are correct, the conclusions are also correct, but then he does not admit that knowledge depends on syllogism.[93]

According to the logicians, the syllogists process of gaining knowledge requires two premises, but Ibn Taimiyah says that such knowledge may be attained by one, three, or even more premises according to the needs and requirements of an agrument. Some persons, he adds, may not require anypremise at all, since they know the matter by some other source (e.g., Intuition). The saying of the prophet:

"Every intoxicating thing is wine and all kinds of wine are harmful," does not, in anyway, support the syllogistic process in gaining knowledge of a thing. Every Muslim known that wine (Khamar) is unlawful, and he does not stand in need of two premises to prove that all intoxicating drinks are unlawful.[94]

The very first figure of syllogism, therefore, says Ibn Taimiyah, does not require the round about way of inferences for obtaining the conclusion.[95]

The logicians claim that ratiocination gives the benefit of perfect knowledge, and that it deals with the knowledge of "Universals" the best of which are the ten intellects (al-Uqul al-Ashrah) which do not accept any change or alteration and through which the sould (al-Nafs) attains perfection. The "Universals" are attained by intellectual propositions which are necessary, such as "All men are animal", and every "existing thing is either necessary or possible," and the like which do not accept any change. Ibn Taimiyah opposes this claim on the following grounds.[96]

According to the logicians. Since ratiocination deals always with intellectual maters having no

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connection with the physical world, it gives no knowledge of existing things. We may, therefore consider it useless for all practical purposes.

Ratiocination does not help in understanding the Necessary Existent (Wajib al-Wujud); the ten intellects (Al-Uqul al-Ashrah), the heavens (Al-Aflak); the elements (Anasir Arabaah); or the created things (Muwalladat) in the animal, vegetable and mineral kingdoms.[97]

The science of the divinity to logicians is not to be called metaphysics (Ilm ma bad al-Tabiah), but some name it as "The science of divinity", the subject matter of which is the "simple universals", which they divided into "necessary, possible eternal, accidental, essence, accident" all of which have no existence in the physical world.[98]

The logicians admit that divine knowledge is not objective. It follows that it has no existence either in the intellectual or in the physical world. It is a "Universal knowledge" which does not exist except in imagination. Therefore, there is nothing in this knowledge for the perfection of the soul.

Perfection of the soul depends an both knowledge of God and virtuous action (Amal Salih), and not on philosophy. Knowledge also cannot elevate the soul. Good action must be there because the soul has two functions, one theoreitical and the other practical. Services of God consist of knowledge of God and love for him, and God sent the prophet to call people to worship Him. Similarly, faith (Iman) in God does not mean knowledge of God only as the Jahmites believe. It consists of both knowledge and practice.[99]

The fourth proposition of the logicians, that syllogism gives the knowledge of judgements (Tasdiqat), has been refuted by Ibn Taimiyah in the fourth section of his book where he discuss the topic elaborately in about three hundred pages.[100]

In this section, he seeks to prove the futility of syllogism in attaining knowledge, and often ridicules the renowned logicians by citing their alleged death-bed recantations.[101] He considers the syllogistic process of thinking artificial and useless. In his opinion, God has endowed human beings with necessary knowledge "to understand their Creator and His attributes. But man invented, from the very early times various sciences which the Shariah of Islam does not required for the guidance of mankind."[102]

Syllogism does not give the knowledge of existing things even when it is apparently correct. Since knowledge or judgement may be attained even by a single premise without understanding the syllogistic process. Here, Ibn Taimiyah blames the philosophers who, from differences in the movements of the stars, inferred that there are nine heavens and that the eight and the ninth heavens are the Kursi (Chair, and the 'Arsh' (Throne) of God, respectively. He hates Aristotle and his followers for believing in the eternity of the world. (Qidam al-Alam) though most of the philosophers were against this view. They put forward further different theories regarding the life span of this world based on the calculations of the movements of the heavens. Some said that the world would be destroyed after twelve thousand years, while others held that it would last upto thirty-six thousand years and so on. To Ibn Taimiyah these infereneces were baseless and unfruitful.[103]

Ibu Taimiyah considers Aristotle to be ignorant of the science of divinity and acuses Ibn Sina of having adulterated it with heretical views of the Batiniyyah who interpreted Islamic Shariah according to their whims and false ratiocination. Some of them, according to him, said that the prophet was the greatest philosopher, while others went so far as to say that the philosophers were greater than prophets.

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Sufis like Ibn 'Arabi, Ibn Sabin,' Al-Qunawi, Tilimsani, etc. followed these heretical views of the Batiniyyah and used Inslamic terms in naming their theories. Some of these Sufis, namely Ibn Sabin and his followers, did not distingwish between Islam and other religions like Christianity and Judaism. Followers of any religion could approach them and become their disciples without changing their faith.[104]

Coming back to the discussion, Ibn Taimiyah says that logicians claim that the concept of quidity (ma-hiyyah) can be arrived at by definitions which are composed of genus (Jins) and differentia (fasl). The logicians themselves have admitted that this sort of definition is either impossible or rarely found. But he opines that the true significance of things may be achieved by men without definition and therefore, concepts are not dependent on definitions."

To the logicians, correct definitions are the combinations of genus and differentia, but that which is simple and unitary, like each of the "intellects" (uqul), has no definition, still they define it and hold it to be a concept. This shows that sometimes concepts do not need definition. If this is possible, then the specieis which are nearer to perception and are visible, can be conceived in a way which is surer and better than the type of knowledge which is derived from the conbination of genus and differentia.

The definition of a thing consists of several terms each of which indiacates a definition meaning. Unless a man knows the terms and their meaning before hand, it is not possible for him to understand the definition itself. For instance, a man who does not know what bread is cannot know it by its definition. Here Ibn Taimiyah makes a distinction between concept (Tasawwur) and differentation (Tamiz) and sides with the Mutakallimin (Scholastic theologians) who hold that things are actually known by differentia and not by definition.

When the definition is the word of the definer, the definer must have the knowledge of the object defined before defining it. It is, therefore, wrong to say that the concept of a thing depends on definition.

Concepts of existing things are derived either through external senses or through internal senses, none of which stands in need of any definition. Here Ibn Taimiyah observes that what ever cannot be known through the senses can be known through valid inference but not through definition.

Logicians say that a definition should be rejected by means of refutation and contradiction. Ibn Taimiyah argues that refutation or contradiction is possible when one has already formed a conception of the object defined. So it is proved that concepts may be formed without the help of definition.

Knowledge of a particular thing may be self-evident to some, but acquired by others. Similarly, things which are not-self-evident to some may be self-evident to others who would, therefore, need no definition for their knowledge of them. Hence, it is wrong to say that knowledge depends on definition.[105]

The "Universals" are attained by intellectual propositions which are necessary, such as "All men are animals," and "Every existing thing is either necessary or possible", and the like which do not accept any change. Ibn Taimiyah opposes this claim on the following grounds.

According to the logicians, since ratiocination deals only which intellectual matters having no connection with the physical world, it gives no knowledge of existing things. We may, therefore, consider it useless for all practical purposes.

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Ratiocination does not help in understanding the necessary Existent (Wajib al-wujud), the ten intellects (al-uqul al-Ashrah), the heavens (al-Aflak), the elements (anasir Arbaah) or the created things (Muwalladat) in the animal, vegetables and mineral kingdoms.

The science of divinity of the logicians is not the knowledge of the creator nor that of the created. They call it metaphysics (Ilmu ma bad al Tabiah), but some name it as "The science of divinity" the subject-matter of which is the simple "universals" which they divide into "necessary, possible, eternal accidental, essence, accident," all of which have no existence in the physical world.[106]

To Ibn Taimiyah knowledge of the particular is surer than knowledge of the universal. Therefore, there is not much benefit in the study of inductive logic in which knowledge of the individual leads to knowledge of the universal. Moreover, knowledge of the individual is more quickly than knowledge of the universal which is often gained (by common sense or intuition) without undergoing any syllogistic process.[107]

Ibn Taimiyah opines that is syllogism (Qiyas) conclusion may be drawn out of one term only, and that it does not require Sughra and Kubra (minor and major) terms for drawing conclusions, because he who knows the universal quality of a class also knows that this quality is available in every individual.[108] Ibn Taimiyah further believes that the teachings of the prophets include all the scriptual and the rational proofs. In support of his views, he cites a number of Quranic verses e.g.

"Lo; Those who wrangle concerning the revelation of Allah without a warrant have come unto them, there is naught else in their breasts but (the quest of) greatness, which they shall never attain to."[109]

"And when their messengers brought them clear proofs (of Allahs" Sovereigenty), they exalted in the knowledge they (themselves) possessed and that which they were want to mock befell them."[110]

Keeping in view the real existance of concepts, Ibn Taimiyah adds that the philosophers divided knowledge of things into three classes: physical, mathematical and philosophical. Of these philosophical knowledge deals with some theoretical problems relating to the existance of simple universals.[111]

IT has nothing to do with practical purposes and is, therefore useless.[112]

Ratiocination, in the opinion of Ibn Taimiyah has not proven the existence of the Creator. The universals, according to the logicians, have no independent external existence. They exist intellectually, and can't, therefore, prove the existence of a definite being distinguishable for the rest of existence.[113]

Moreover, in syllogism a complete concept of the middle term saves us from logical inference. Because a person who knows that wine, certainly knows already that every intoxicating (drink) is forbidem (without going through the syllogisgic process of thinking).[114]

Such are the arguments of Ibn Taimiyah in proving his assertion that syllogism does not give us the benefit of a new judgement.

Ibn Taimiyah refutes the philosophical interpretation of the necessary cause. He says that if by "necessary cause" the philosophers mean an existence which has no "will" and "no power", then such an existence bears no meaning, nor has it any significance externally much less can it be existing necessarily. Ibn Rushd and other philosophers contradicted themselves in their discussion of this problem. They postulate at the outset "a final cause" or "Illat al-ghayah" and then other final causes to assist it in

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creation ((Khalq) which needs volition (Iradah). And since they interpret the final cause as mere "knowledge" and the "Knower", it becomes totally absurd and contradictory, because we know necessarily that volition (Iradah) is not identical with knowledge, nor knowledge with the knower. With these philosophers says. Ibn Taimiyah, heterogenous expressions may have only one meaning, by knowledge they mean power or volition, by attributing they mean the attributed. Just as by knowledge they mean the knower, by power they mean powerful, by volition they mean volent, and by love they mena lover. Granted that there is a being without "will" and "choice" it is imkpossible for such a being to create universe, because such a necessary cause needs its own causes and they can not be in dependent.[115]

Having demonstrated the incapacity of reason to reach the truths of religions, he opposed all shades of interpretation of the attributes and actions of God. The theological methods subjecting revelation to the unjustified authority of reason, involved a conception of God, which was absolutely negative, and was quite incapable of generating that living response and close relationship that formed the essence of religion. The Asharites, in their endeavour to interpret some attributes of God leaving others, had committed the same mistake on a smaller scale. Moreover, they had no criterian formaking such a selection. Had Ibn Taimiyah stopped at this, he would have been an anthropomorphist. But he went on to affirm that although the attributes of God could not be understood in an anthromorphic way. For, God had said that nothing was like Him, The right course, therefore, lay between negative and anthromorphism (Ta'teel and tamtheel).[116]

To sum up the views of Ibn Taimiyah on the subjects of theology, philosophy and logic we can say that according to him there is no source of knowledge in religious matters except revelation. Reason as well as intuition is in competent, and far from giving certitude. What is given to us by the prophet eithr in the form of the Quran or the Sunnah (provided it is from authentic sources), is a sufficient guide. It embodies the principles as well as the arguments in support of them, the necessary details along with the reasons behind them. Such arguments are absolutely convincing. They generate that sense of absolute certainty which theological or philosophical arguments that are often based on false premises fail to produce. If anything contributes besides the Quran and Sunnah, to the understanding of the fundamentals of religion or its structure, it is the consensus of opinion of competent men in the first three centuries of the history of Islam, men who remained unaffected by the corrupting influence of the foreign elements that subsequently crept into Islam. Ibn Taimiyah applied these principles, so consistently and adduced the most convincing and original arguments, both traditional and rational, to establish their validity.

He demonstrated the baselessness of the claim of the theologians and philosophers that one could attain indubitable knowledge and have access to the truth only through reason. The necessary premises in the case of the truths of religion were not available to the theologians and the philosophers, and whatever, they claimed to possess was unwarranted. He declared like Kant that metaphysics was impossible. According to Ibn Taimiyah, in the spheres of values, too, reason was not sufficient.

The condemnation of traditional knowledge by the philosophers was based on conjectures (Zanniyat) which would rob human beings of the only true source of knowledge that they possessed. Ibn Taimiyah showed that the spell of rational discussions or theological interpretations had sapped all the synamism of the Muslims. The God that they envisioned did not inspire them to discharge their duties as a vicegerent on the earth. Their conception of God was mutilated and failed to provide that ideal of living attributes which was essential to the religious life of man, involving intimate relationship with Him. Ibn Taimiyah attributed man with choice and accountability for his all actions with His belief and faith that these actions are the creations of his determining (Taqdir). He defended the idea of cause and

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showed the limits of reason which is different from the dialectical (Scholastic) arguments and logical syllogisms as was held by others also. The reason to him is that natural disposition on which God had created men, which also enables them to perceive the rational matters in an evident and natural manner. Ibn Taimiyah used the word "al-Mizan", which indicates the power of reason or rationality, with which we are endowed by God and as is alluded in the Quran also. The mizan (balance) to Ibn Taimiyah is the rational power which runs parrallel to the Book, i.e; Shariat, limiting the sphere of reason which allows side by side to accept everything which is beyond the capacity of reason from the way of revelation and sharh.

He also objected to the Sufis who used to say about the Tawakul (Trust) and denied the causes as such, while as some of them accepted determinism (al-Jabr) instead. He showed that Trust does not mean denial of the causes, therefore, the belief in 'Qadar' is baseless in the sense that man has no will or choice and freedom, it is a mystification of His power and issues a decree of infidelity against such people.

He did not accept the claims of the rationalists about individual substances, occurrence of the attributes or non-occurrence or whatever follows its process from the consequential point of view. It means that Ibn Taimiyah does not accept the mental abstractions vis-a-vis religious matters, especially relating to God, the most Exaled. Moreover, he rejected the view of extermists about the transcendance of the Essence of God to the extent of abstraction and the suspenders of His power.

Ibn Taimiyah considers Aristotle responsible for all the corruption and futility in which the Greek philosophy is shrouded. The other Greek philosophers like Empedocles, Pythogoras, Socrates and Plato believed in the origination of the celestial spheres. But Artistotle professed the doctrine of the eternity of the heavans. He was followed by Muslim philosophers like Al-Farabi, Ibn Sina, Ibn Rushd, Fakhruddin Razi and even Ghazzali (in some cases). But the most ardent follower of Aristotle was Ibn Sina (who in turn was also a Batiniyyah and a Ismaili). Since the Aristotelian philosophy had no influence of the prophetic teachings on it, it spread the most abnoxious doctrines about the divine being and religious matters among the followers of this philosophy. Though, Ibn Taimiyah does not find any tangible basis to criticise the physical and mathematical Sciences developed by the Greeks, but he definitely finds a good reason to condemn their mataphysics and epistemology. Their metaphysics is the worst-kind of admixure of polytheism and attheism, not known even to the Arab pagans of the Age of ignorance. The doctrines of intelligences and souls are fraught with the highly condemnable beliefs of the Aristotelian philosophers and their Muslim adherents from rational and religious angle, these ideas are amenable to several criticisms. There is no basis for the schollastic theology in Islam according to Ibn Taimiyah.

However, Ibn Taimiyah's criticism of logic was his profoundest and most original work. He was opposed to logic in its application to the truths of religion or ultimate truths. He was not against reasonings as such, but believed that it was not confined to the Aristotelian logic or syllogistic reasoning. Logic, he demonstrated, was not a measure of the truth or reality. It was only a means of judging the consistency of arguments. Its constant use sharpened the intellect and assisted in discovering fallacies in reasoning. It was, however, absolutely incapable of proving the existence of a thing. It was neither a source of existential nor valuational knowledge.

Logic was rather an artificial human device. It was possible to arrive at the truth by means other than the method of logic. The wise men of all nations had arrived at the truth without using

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Aristotle's logic. An intelligent person did not need Greek logic and a dull man couldn't derive any benefit from it.

Moreover, logic had to depend on terms for expression truths abut ideas. Terms set-up artificial boundaries which stood in the way of our analysis of the reality. This was a serious short coming of logic. Further, logic distorted facts by its division of reality into substances, atributes, and qualities, which were not separate and unconnected in reality as logic made them appeart to be logic, therefore, was not only incapable of revealing the truth or the reality, it also distorted and thus misrepresented it. In the opinion of Ibn Taimiyah, logic was also not in conformity with reason, because reason could not be subordinate to principles laid down by one man. Reason had its own nature and it had its own methods. Its course and functioning could be determined by anyone. The lines prescribed by Aristotelian logic were too narrow for reason and in fact reason was not restricted to these ways along. Sometimes men were content with one premise only. Again, men differed according to their level of intelligence, consequently they needed different approaches for arriving at the truth. The syllogistic approach was bound to be inadequate. Thus, by a penetrating criticism of all the excesses of the different sects of Islam, he led people to the fountain-head of the Quran and the Sunnah. Neither theology nor rationalism, neither Sufism nor even Greek logic and philosophy, escaped his scathing criticism. He executed this task with the deterity of an expert, with the profundity of one who had penetrated to the remotest depths of these sciences and systems, and with the enthusiasm of a true reformer calling every one to approach afresh the Quran and the Sunnah.

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10

Rational Sciences in Medieval India

Muslims have 'provided an independent, separate system of ideas and science' which was however, largely inspired from the basic Aristotelian philosophical principles and Neo-plationists. In the fields of medicine, Hippocrates and Galen was a special concern of the Muslim medical men. In Geometry, Euclid, in Geography and Astronomy, Ptolemy and in Mechanics Archimedes have attracted Muslims the most. However, the Muslims produced a huge mass of Literature and transmitted this literature on philosophy and science to the following generations.

IsIam had had a great role to play in almost all fields of knowledge and science. When Greek philosophy, Indian medicine and Iranian mysticism reached Muslims, they picked all these sciences without any hesitation and harnessed them in their own scheme of things. We find that in the history of IsIam, there were various rational schools, which flourished along with the theological sciences and jurisprudence. Muslims followed prophet's tradition "that the word of wisdom is the lost She camel of a believer, wherever he finds it, he is more entitled to retain it." Robert Briffault says in his famous book the Making of Humanity; "The light from which civilization was once more rekindled did not arise from any embers of Greco-Roman culture smoldering a mid the ruins of Europe, nor from the living death on the Bosporus. It did not come from the North, but from the Saracens. It was under the influences of the Arabia and Moorish revival of culture and not in the fifteenth century, that the real Renaissance took place. Spain, not Italy, was the Cradle of the rebirth of Europe."[1]

So far as philosophy and rational sciences in India are concerned, philosophy is the only non-theological subject in which Indian scholars writing in Arabic have taken much interest–an interest which is next to that manifested by them in religious studies. Though many a book has been written on this subject in India, yet we must not expect anything quite new and different from what had been achieved in that direction outside India. Arabic books written in India date from the eleventh century of the Christian era, when Arabic learning had reached a limit beyond which it failed to progress further. Since that century the activities of the Muslim world have been largely confined to the making of commentaries and the reproduction of old materials. Moreover, it must also be borne in mind that

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philosophy is a subject in which even the early Muslim scholars in the centres of Islamic learning achieved nothing original.[2] Anyhow when Muslim philosophers like Kindi, Farabi, Ibn Miskawaih, Ibn Sina and Ibn Sina and Ibn Rushd produced so little that is original, how can anything new be expected from Arabic writers in India? If Farabi and Ibn Sina have expanded the philosophy of the Greek philosophers in their writings, Indian authors have only performed a similar service for a later generation in India. Dr. Zubaid Ahmad's these remarks, however, shouldn't be mis construed for the support of the Orientalist propaganda that the Muslim philosophers were merely the translators and the transmitters of Greek books, and have not provided any original works of their own. I have disproved this allegation in my research thesis by showing the novel contributions of Muslims to the world philosophy. Indian scholars have shown greater and keener interest in the study of logic than in physics and metaphysics. I think that Muslim logicians have added something to that knowledge of logic which they learnt from the Greek.[3] There is no doubt that the Muslims elsewhere also have made substantial additions to logic. For example, Al-Farabi has given logic that status of reality in itself, instead of considering it as a method to reach to the truth or reality Ghazzali has included logic in the discussions of jurisprudence and called its role 'essential for eaching to the authentic conclusions in this subject. Ibn Taimiyah wrote a voluminous book and criticized the very essence of the Greek logic and paved way, to quote lqbal for the inductive method, which was adopted by the Western science in the subsequent period. If scholastic theology be included in philosophy, then it may be said that the Muslim scholars have somewhat tried to solve some old problems under the guidance of their creeds and dogmas, in ways different from those of the Greek philosophers.[4] Moreover, as a matter of fact, in the context of Islamic world, philosophy has been separated from the theological and metaphysical discussions. Ibn Sina, Al-Farabi, al-Kindi and Ibn Rushd have mentioned the religious concepts and have come out with their metaphysical explanations of the same. The doctrines of soul, God, prophethood, resurrection, divine knowledge, miracles, jubr and Ikhtiyar (freedom and determinism) etc. have had been at the very root of the philosophical discussions of Muslim philosophers. However, they have tried to bring affinity between these two realms of human guidance. Ibn Rushd's *Fasl al-Maqal* is a tract in point. In Iraq the rational sciences started developing from third century A.H. Mamoon Rashid showed great interest in the development of rational sciences and Greek Philosophy from this period. From this time onwards, people remained constantly immersed in studying of these subjects. During the reign of Mutawakil Billah, philosophy reached to harrean and after some time entered in Baghdad. This was during Mutwakil Billah (279 AH/ 289 AH), that philosophy had made inroads in Baghdad clandestinely. From this period onwards, philosophy started making its appearance in the Islamic countries.[5] This is true that upto third century A.H. there is no trace of philosophical or rational discourses in the context of India, but same applies to Iraq and Iran, where these sciences had not become wide spread till then. However, the science of Traditions and Fiqh was in vogue not only in these places, but in Sindh and Multan as well.[6]

Along with Fakhurl Islam Bazudis, *Kashful Asrar* (Asooli-Bazudi) and Hissamesuddin's Hissami, Ghazzali's *Mustasfa* was necessarily to be consulted by the Jurists. But as in well knows, *al-Mustasfa* could not be understood without a substantial knowledge of logic. Moreover, *Sharah-i-Shamasia* of Qutbudin Razi, which was probably written in eighth century and was prescribed for the madrasahs during Firoze Shah Taughlaq's period in eighth century. Though the Arabic madrasahs were flourishing in India from sixth cenutry A.H, the question is how Asooli Bazudi could be taught without the help of commentaries like *Sharah Shamsia* and *Sharah Sahaif* before eighth century A.H. It is understood that Kalam was quite prevalent with the *Tamhid,* Ibu Shakoor Salmi, but no mention of any

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book on logic or rational sciences is mentioned along with it. There was a great interaction between the scholars of Arab, Baghdad and their counter parts in Sindh and Multan. The earliest record of an Arab scholar Qazi Musa Ibn Yaqub al-Thaqfi was brought to India by Muhammad Ibn Qasim and after the conquest of Sindh, he was made Chief Justice of Sindh by Mahmad Ibn Qasim in 93 A.H. After this period, the names of Qazi Ibn Ali al-Shawarib and Sheikh Bahawdin Zakaria Multani's predecessor is noteworth. Because their successors were playing very prominent role in the scholarly cricles of India. In Fifth century A.H. Ibn Rihan Al-Biruni arrived India and he not only mastered Indian philosophy and astronomy but taught Indians Muslim Mathematics and astronomy. But seen in the proper perspective the intellectual exchange between the Persia and Indian intellectual sciences goes back to the first century A.H. to Tenth century A.H. i.e. much before the Mughals. Therefore, the claim that the rational sciences started flourishing in India from the later part of 9th century is an unsubstantiated one. Many Indian scholars went to Iraq and Iran and mastered the sciences of theology and poetry there. There are some people who say that Imam Auzayie was basically a descendent of the family of Sindh Masudi calls the founder of the Mutazilite schools of scholastic theology Umaru Ibn Ubaid an India from the family of a Sindhi father. Starting from Fiqh, Kalam was included in the Jurisprudential discussions, which paved the way for the employing of logic, finally leading to the pure metaphysics. Because prior to the Mughals, to facilitate the teaching of relgious beliefs and doctrines, the rational sciences worked as preliminary source. After fifth century onwards, logic had become the basic ingredinet of the study of sources of Fiqh, before this period logic among the philosophers and dialecticians among the scholastics was prevalent in order to arrive at rational demonstration or jursitic in reference during their discussions. Ghazzali included philosophy and rational sciences in the general teaching course of the madrasah education and made logic the essential part of Fiqh, for which has has been criticized by Ibn Taymiah. Since philosophy and Qaramiatanism or Batinism became intertwined to the extent that to differentiate between the two impossible. Therefore, in the Islamic society the title philosopher became as despicable as that of a Bihilist or a Qaramaitan. It was for this reason that even the philosophers were not daring to call themselves philosophers. Rather they preferred to call themselves 'Faqih' or 'Danishmand'.

It were the Qaraimatian Fadayean, who had killed Sultan Shihabuddin. After their conquest of Multan, philosophy became popular once again. Thus the efforts of the Qaramaitans and Imam Razi were instrumental in spreading the philosophical and rational science not only in Ghur but in the conquered lands including India.[7]

Imam Majduddin, son of Imam Khatiruddin Fakhrul Zuhad, Mohammad Ihn Abdul Malik al-Jurjani about whom 'Aufi writes: He was scholar of all sciences, rational and religious from Lahore. After training their members in the rational sciences, the Batins and the Ismailies, sent their preceptors to various parts of the world. It is in this connection that the Ismaili propagandists started pouring in the areas of Sindh and Multan from fourth century A.H. Ismailies and the Qaramatians were more inclined towards the advancement of philosophical sciences from the 3rd century A.H. Sharistain writes: "The old Batinies mixed up their writings with the statements of the philosophers and started authoring books on the same pattern".[8] The used to equip their adherents with the subjects of mathematics and rational sciences. As is well known, the Ismailies have always been inclined towards philosophical thinking and wherever the Ismailis have gone, they have cultivated philosophy and other rational disciplines within their circles. During the Ismaili rule in Multan and Mansurah, Sindh (348/ 960-417.1026), philosophy and other rational sciences flourished with a greater pace.

Since the Muslims had to confront the Brahman and Buddhist cultures in India, which were

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philosophical in orientation, therefore the Muslims were bound to adopt the philosophical and dialectical methods to explain Islamic beliefs to the Indian audiences. In this respect, the earlier acquaintance with the Greek philosophy made their job easier, because Muslims had already established strong centres of philosophical learning at Badhdad, Khuransa and Central Asia. Thus, the established IsIamic intellectual traditions were transmitted into the Indian subcontinent gradually through various channels.[9]

Before the invasion of India by Mahmud of Ghaznah it was the Ismaili propagandists who introduced Muslim philosophy in India. About Qasim Ibn Hawshab, sent al-Haytham, from Yamen as a missionary in India, About Qasim was a famous Yamani Ismaili leader and this missionary was sent to Sindth in 270/883, which was followed by such other missions. Hohm Ibn Shayban, was an Ismaili commander, who was commissioned to Sindh by the Fatimid ruler of Egypt, who gained controlled of Multan of 366/977. When Mahmud of Ghaznah invaded Multan in 401/1010, he got the control of this Ismaili state, and the Ismailis were forced to move to Mansurah, where they "established themselves as an organized community"[10] Mahmud Ghaznvi (ruled 388/998-421/1030) conquered the Western part of India in 412/1021, and appointed Qadi Abul Hasan Shirazi, a Persian official, as governor in Lahore. Muhmod Ghaznvi was not happy with philosophy and philosophers. Still he loved IIm and Ulama and he would invite some scholars to his court by force even. The centre of all cultural and intellectual activities shfited from Multan and Mansurah to Lahore. A good collection of books in various disciplines was brought to Ghaznah, because whole libraries fell to Mahmood in the course of his conquest of various kingdom and Sultanates. His son Ma'sud (ruled 421/1031-432/1041), continued this trend of patronizing philosophy and rational science in his kingdom. It was during his reign, that philosophical sciences were transmitted from Ghaznah and Khurasan into India, in this process the Persian secretaries who came to Lahore with Ghaznavids played a significant role. It was through their agency that the books of al-Kindi, al-Farabi and Ibn Sina were brought ot India. In the subsequent times Lahore became a great cultural and intellectual centre and was called. "Ghaznah-khurd' (smaller Ghaznah). With the passage of time, the later Ghaznavid rulers reconciled themselves with philosophy and other intellectual sciences. The greatest philosopher in the court of Khusraw Malik (ruled 555/1160-582/1186), was the Jamal-al-falasifah (the beauty of the philosophers); Yousuf Ibn Muhammad al-Darbandi, who had profound knowledge of philosophy. There flourished also other great philosophers during this period like Shayk Safi al-Din Gazruni etc. Among the mystical thinkers of this period was Shayk Abul Hasan Ali-Hujwari, whose Kashf-al-Mahjub deals with mystical and metaphysical issues such as the theory of knowledge, the Essence and nature of God, His attributes, the soul and the eschatology etc.[11] Because till then 'the philosophy' had reasserted itself in an 'indirect manner' to examine the 'received notions by fresh assessment. 'Sufism, had, however, had achieved a strong position before the Ghorian conquests of North India, forcing a compromise with orthodoxy. Here Ghazzali had been the spokesman of reconciliation. There were, thus two camps of the religious people, which had emerged with the later developments in Islamic community of India. One group was called the 'Danishmand' or 'Ulama' and the second the 'Darveshes' or 'Sufis' to quote Nizammudin Auliya (F.H.) This is a fallacious view that "...in Sufis no room was for reason, science or logic"...(F.H.). According to Prof. I. Habib, since India became a cultural part of the Islamic world only with the establishment of Delhi Sultanate (1206), what it received was post-Ghazzalian Islam. The Arabic corpus of Greco-Islamic philosophy and sciences, indeed became available to it, but with some exceptions, notably in medicine, this heritage lay under severe censure". For example Irfan Habib argued that way to effect this censure was Nizammudin's (d.1325) opposing philosophy.

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The Ghaznavid rule in India came to an end in 583/1186, when Mahammod Ghuri succeeded in getting control of Lahore, and other places. The Ghurids, not only maintained Ghazanavid standards of learning, but established new centres where eminent scholars taught the rational sciences. The founder of the Ghurid dynasty, Sultan Ghiyath-al-Din (ruled 558/1163-599/1203) was a great patron of knowledge and science. Scholars of various schools of thought thronged to his court and many works were dedicated to him, like the Muwaqif of Qadi 'Adud al Din Ibn Ahmad al Iji 583-603 and the Lataif of Imam Fakhr al-Din Razi (543/1148-606/1210). Lahore was the capital of the latter Ghazni rulers, and there was a proper arrangement for the various notables attached to the royal court when, in Khurasan, philosophy became wide spread due to the efforts of Abul Abbas al-Lukri, Lahore and other Indian cities were bound to get it's impact. Though there is no record available with us, indicating the range of this influence still Aufi has mentioned the name of a poet calligrapher Yousuf Ibn Mohmud Darbandi, who was famous by the title of Jamal-al-Falsasfa (Beauty of philosophy). This indicated that during that period, in Lahore, there were other eminent philosophers, who were very much involved in philosophical activities. Barani makes Mahmud put them (Philosophers) at par with the Brahman as enemies of Islam and so fit for slaughter. Mahmud claimed to have exited the Mutazilities from Khwarzim and regretted that "Ibn Sina (Avicenna), the reviver of the Greek Sciences and the chief of the philosophers of Islamic countries, had not fallen into his hands to be killed and taken to pieces by him". The animosity to secular sciences and rationalism was by now quite wide spread especially after Ghazzali (d.1111), and was fully shared by the sufis.[12] The animosity, however, was rather against the permissive ways and atheistic trends coupling with these developments and perpetuated under the garb of philosophy by the advocates of so called rationalism, Sabrerattling against religious trends The Philosophers, who were constantly with Muhammad Ibn Tuqhaluq, were responsible for putting these ideas in his mind. These philosophers—mischief mongers, enemies of stability and respectability—should be rooted out from society and philosophy should be tabooed in the interest of stability.[13]

Muhammad Taghuluq was a revolutionary in politics and a rationalist in religion. Ibn Battuta's Muhammad bin Tughluq is a man of scholarly temperament, generous to a fault, but eventually a tyrant. Barani has particularly mentioned the following philosophers, Sad, Ubaid, Najm Intishar, Maulana Najm ud-Din.[14] The Celebrated philosopher and savant, Fakhrudin Razi, and the famous classical poet Nizami Uruzi adorned the Ghoride court and have paid deserving tributes to the mental qualities of their friend the patron.[15]

During the Ghurid period, apart from Shafi school of thought, Asharism also got a strong hold. Since, Asharism is a middle course between the extreme transcandalism of the Mutazilities and the philosophers on the one hand and the authropmrphism and similitude of the Hambilities and the Karamites on the other, therefore, a great intellectual and scholastic debate was initiated in Ghor, intensified after the arrival of Immam Razi. Imam Razi was responsible for spreading philosophy in the province of Ghor and the domains under the Ghorids. After the death of Shabuddin Ghori, the Qaramaitans tried to capture Multan once again, which was conquered by Shabiuddin Ghor in 571 A.H. from them. The Qramatians were successful in their mission.[16] After the death of Ghayasudin, Sultan Shabuddin Ghori continued the patronage of Imam Razi and Razi used to stay mostly in the garrison of Mohammad Ghori. When the Sultan came to India to take the Khakhars to task, Razi accompanied him and when the Sultan died at Damyak, Razi was in the garrison at the time. The latter part of Sixth century saw the culmination of rational sciences, which was the period of Imam Razi. Many people from various parts of Islamic world, were attending his lectures. From seventh century onwards, his

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disciples started dispersing to various parts of the Islamic world. Since this was the period when the Tataries were posing the great threat to the whole Islamic world, within West Egypt and in the East only India were Spared from their sabre rattling. Therefore, many disciples of Razi arrived in India were spread the sciences of philosophy and rational sciences. Qutbuddin Razi's, (student of Taftazani (d. 792) many disciples came to India, like Mir Fazhllah Anju, who was the teacher of Feroz Shah Bahman, who taught him learning from the former rational sciences and mathematics. Imam Razi first attended the court of Bahaudin Sam Ghuri at Bamyan and authored a treatise entitled "Bahaiyah" The king's favourable posture for the Islamic scholars was much more, during his reign. Imam Razi wrote a treastise entitled as Bahaiyah. From Bamyan, he went to the court of Ghayasuddin who bestowed on him great honour and got madrasah constructed for him in Herat, although most of the time he used to remain in the court of Ghayassudin at Ferozekoh, where he remained mostly engaged in the polemical discussions with the leaders of Karamite masters. The history shows that there had been close relations between Iran and India especially during the Moghal period in the matters of exchange of knowledge and transfer of intellectual sciences. The masters of various sciences have remained attached to the Moghal courts and thus the exchange of knowledge has remained their basic concern. Ghuri invaders of India brought with them all the rational and religous sciences to India and filled all the Indian cities with mosques and the madrasahs as has been alluded by Hassan Nizami in "*Taj al Maasir*". Sultan Shihab al-Din Muhammad Ghuri (ruled 599/1203-602/1206), had a, sympathetic attitude towards the rational sciences. Imam Fakhr al-Din Razi was Muhammad Ghuris favourite, and the Sultan used to attend to the weekly lectures of the Imam with great respect. In 601/1205, when Muhammad Ghuri visited India for the last time, Razi accompanied him and stayed in Lahore for about six months. During his stay at Lahore, the local scholars and students of various sciences benefited from contact with the Imam.

During the slave rule, the capital was moved from Lahore to Delhi and this it became a centre of intellectual and cultural activities, and the Islamic sciences flurished under imperial patronage. Hasan Nizami and Fakhri-i-Mudabbir dedicated their works to Qutb al-Din Aybak (ruled 602/1206-607/ 1210). Iitutmish (ruled 607/1211-637/1236), had deep interest in mysticism. Fadil Muyyid Jurjani had translated Ihaya al-ulum, of Ghazzali, into Persian and dedicated it to Sultan Iltutmush, in the same way, the Sirr-i-maktum of Razi was translated into Persian at the insistence of Rukh al-Din Fayroze Ibn Iltutmush. Sultan Iltutmush built two madrasahs, called Mu'izziyyah and Nagiriyyah, in the capital for the teaching of theology and rational sciences. During Nasir al-Din Muhammad Shah's rule (ruled 644/ 1246-664/1266), Allamah Qutb al Din Kashani came to Multan from Iran and the Sultan built a madrasah for him where the Shaykh worked as Shaykh al-Jamiah (head of the institution). Amir Khusraw, Said Mantiqi, Barani and Nizam al-Din Awliya were some of the well-known personalities of the Khilji period. Ala al-Din Khilji (ruled 695/1296-715/1316) built an important centre of learning called Madrasah-yi-hawd-i khass, where religious and rational sciences were taught under imperial supervision. Ghiyath al Din Tughluq in 720/1320 seized power and ruled the country for about ninety-six years (720/1320-818/1416). He patronized sufism, theology, poetry and philosophy. That Ghiyath had great respect for the intellectual sciences is clear from the fact that he appointed Ilam al-Din the eminent philosopher and logician of the time, for training of his on, Muhammad Ibn Tughluq, in philosopher and logician of the time, for training of his son, Muhammad Ibn Tughluq, in philosophy and logic. Muhammad Tughluq (ruled 725/1325-752/1351) studied logic and speculative philosophy under Shaykh Ilm al-Din. The famous logician of the period, Said Mantiqi and the poet Ubay, had access to the emperor and the emperor used to spend most of his time in studying philosophical works and

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discussing issues relating to congnition and reason with these. He deputed Allamah Muin al-Din to bring Qadi Adud al-Din, the author of theological and philosophical work, *al-Mawqif,* from Shiraz. But the latter declined to come and preferred to stay in Shiraz. Firuz Shah Tughluq (ruled 752/1351-790/ 1388), continued the trend of cultivating the rational sciences. In 775/1373, he founded a new city, Junur in the eastern part of India. Junpur surpassed even the capital with regard to the study of the rational sciences. He founded about thirty new colleges in various parts of the empire. He was also interested in Indian philosophy. Some of the works which were discovered during the conquest of Kangra in 762/1361 were translated into Persian from Sanskrit on his orders.

The period of Ibrahim Shah Sharqi (ruled 804/1402-844/1440) was the golden age of Junpur. During his reign, scholars and philosophers of great repute settled in Junpur. Qadi Shihab al-Din Dawlat abadi, Sayyid Ashraf Jahingir simnani, and others were some important figures of this period. Significant works were composed in theology, mysticism, logic and philosophy. Sikander Lodhi (ruled 894/1489-932/1517), was inclined towards the rational sciences. He invited shaykh Abd Allah Tulunbi and his brother Shaykh Aziz Allah Tulubi from Multan to Agra. These two philosophers introduced the systematic study of the rational sciences in India. Shaykh Abd Allah Tulabi composed many works related to logic and philosophy of which *Badi al-Mizan*, a commentary on the famous work on logic, *Mizan al-Mantiq* is worth mentioning. It was by his recommendations that al-*Mawaqi* and *Matali*, the famous theological and metaphysical works of Qadi Adub al-Din were included in the syllabus of the educational institutions and thus studied throughout the country. A traditionalist and a philosopher, Rafi al-Din Shirazi, a student of Dawani was invited from Shiraz to each Hadith and related subjects. The emperor was attracted to attend the lectures of Abd Allah Tulunbi on philosophy and hikmah. Sikander Lodhi was interested in other philosophcial traditions also, many works of Hadith, philosophy were translated into Persian on his order.

The Moghuls inherited the tradition of patronage of science and knowledge from their ancestors. (889-1483-937/1530) in herited Amir Taymuri's (d. 807/1405) tradition of cultivation of rational sciences, because scholars and philosophers like Sad al-Din al-Taftazani and al-Sharifal Jurjani were in the court of Taymur. Himayun was defeated and replaced by Sher Khan Suri in 947/1540. Sher Khan, had profound knowledge of Arabic and Persian literature because he had studied the rational sciences at Junpur. He gave special attention to the cultivation of philosophical, theological and metaphysical sciences. Himayun regained power in 950/1550, and important scholars and administrators like Bayrum Khan, Sayyid Ali, and Abd Samad came with him from Persian. These scholars brought with them the newly developed philosophical tradition of Persia and introduced it in India. The golden age of rational sciences in India starts with Jalil al-Din Akbar (ruled 961/1556-1014/16606). By that time philosophy and other rational sciences dominated even the imperial court. The meetings of the Ibadat Khanah (worship places of Akbar) were devoted to theological and philosophical discussions. Philosophers and scholars belonging to other religious like Hinduism, Buddhism, Zoroastrianism and Christianity were freely participating in the intellectual activities of the court. Mir Fath All Shirazi, Shaykh Mubark Naguri, his son Shaykh Abdul Fadl and Shaykh Faydi were the eminent exponents of Aristotelian and illuminist philosophy and Ibn Arabi's mysticism in the court of Akbar. The other learning centres which developed during this period, were found in Delhi, Junpur, Siyalkot, Sirhind, Deccan and Kashmir. Jahangir and Shah Jahan continued this philosophical leaning to flourish. Dara Shiknh, had a strong background in Islamic metaphysics and Hindu philosophy. He composed some valuable works which deal with metaphysics and rational philosophy. His *safi not al-awliaya, sakinal al awliaya, Risalah*

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haqrnama, Majma *al-bahrayn* and *Hssant al-arifin* are of great value. He also tranlsated the Upanishads into Persian under the title *Sirr-i-Akbar.* (The Great secret) or *Sirri-i-asrar* (The secret of the secrets). The *Bhagavad Gita* and the oga *Vasistha* were also translated into Persian at his insistence.[17]

The most important role in cultivating the sciences during the Ghurid and slave period was played by those scholars and philosophers who migrated to India from Iraq, Iran, Transoxiana, Samarqand, Bukhara and Ghaznah because of the Moghal invasion of those areas. Balbon period shelter for them and facilitated their teaching of religious and philosophical subjects also, which in turn, helped the process of speculative philosophy, gnosis and scholastic theology to enter into a new phase in the subcontinent. The works of well known philosophers, mystics and the loginess such as Abul Hosam Ashari, Abu Mansur al-Maturid Imam al-Tahawi, al-Kindi, al-Farabi, al-Ghazzali, al Biruni, and Imam Razi, along with commentaries on their works, reached India through these immigrants and began to be studied throughout the empire. Balban, made Delhi a set of intellectual and cultural activities in Muslim East. Many Iranian scholars came to India like Maulan Sadr Sharif Samarqandi, who was well versed with philosophical, mathematical and stornomical subjects. Therefore, he was given the epithet of Munjam. He came to Duca during the period of Sultan Alavdin Hassan Ghangoh Bahmini and remained on the post of Sadra Mamlikat for a quite long time. In seventh century, Muhqiq Tusi revived Ibn Sinas philosophy in Iran. His Tafrid-Fi-al-kalam is a very important book in rational sciences. It was adorned with the commentaries and elaborations by the Muslim scholars which became famous in India during 9th century. In eighth century, many disciples of Tusi came to India and gave the rational sciences a great boast. The disciple of Muhaqia Tusis disciple Qutbuddin Sheirazi was Maulana Jalaluddin Rumi who came to India and became the rector of the Madrasah of Feroz Tughluq and introduced Sharh Shamsia in the madrasah syllabus. Among his famous students were Sheikh Ibn Jamal Multani and during that period flourished famous scholars like Maulana Najmuddin Samarqandi who was appointed a principal of Bala Band Seeri Madrasah of Feroz Tughluq. Feroz Shah Bahmani's court attracted many Iranian scholars like Hassan Ibn Ali Gilani, Syed Mohmud Chi, in whose custodianship Feroz Shah Bahmani has constructed an astrolobe, which was the first of its kind in India. Taflazamis other disciple Maulan Mus al-Jaabari came to India and taught Maulan Fatohullah Mullani. His third famous disciple was Maulana Sonaullah Multani, who was to Iran to lear under Taffaza and after returning back and laid much stress on the rational sciences. Among his students were Maulana Samanu-ddin and Maulana Fathaullah. Maulana Asdullah and Maulana Azizullah were students of Maulana Fathaullah, who went to Delhi and studied rational sciences. Maulana Aziz ullah is disciple was Miayan Hatem Sambhali, who was master of rational and traditional sciences. Mullah Sadra was very famous in India. The Indian scholars wrote on his books about 24 commentaries. There was a close relation between Iran and India during medieval times. Maulana Abu Mehfooz al-Karim thinks that about 24 commentaries have been written on Mulla Sadra's *Sharah Hidayatul-al Hikmah* in India. He says that when the works of Mulla Sadra reached India, they were received well by the Indian scholars and included in the courses of schools and madrasahs of m Dars-i-Nizamia.

Two famous disciples of Dawani came to Gujrat. Abul Fazl Asturabadi and Abul Fazl Gazruni. Their disciples respectively were Asif Khan (Abdul Aziz Khan Ghujrati), and Sheikh Mubarak. The third students was Mullah Umad Tarmi, he also reached to Gujrat. His disciple was Maulana Wajihiud-din Gujrati, who was a prolific writer and has authored many books. A part from books on philosophy and mathematics and astronomy, he wrote commentaries on several books.

Another student of Dawani was Khwaja Jamaluddin Mahmmodul Shirazi, who after undergo-

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ing the oppression of the Safavids, came to India via Mecca, accompanied by Mir Rafiuddin. Among the disciples of Khawaja Jamalludin were Mirza Jan Shirazi, whose important disciples included Mir Zahid and Shah Waliullah. Dawani's disciple Hussain Mabazi wrote a commentary on the Athiruddin Ashari's book "Hidayatul-al Hikmah", which became famous with the title of Maabaz, this book became prevalent in the India content and was included in the Madrasahs.

From Transoxiona many scholars like Maulana Younis Samarqandi, who was well versed with philosophical sciences, came to Sindh, when Mirza Shah Hussain studied under him "Sharah Mawaqif". After the defeat of Ibrahim Loodi at the hands of Babur in 933 A.H, the Mughal rulers facilitated the arrival of important Transoxionian scholars to India, which included Zainuddin Khwafi, Maulana Mohammad Khurasain, Maulana Mohmad Sayeed Turkustani and Maulana Abul Baqa Khurasani. Turkstani was a famous rational scholar. The other scholars of Transoxiona who came to India, when the Uzbik dynasty took the reigns of government in their hands, were Qazi Nizamuddin Badakshi, Hafiz Kumakki, Mirza Muflis Izbik, Qazi Abdul a-Samih etc. In the same way scholars from Iran also came to India, which included Mohammad Sharif Amli, Hayati Koshi, Maz-and-rani, Abdul Ghani Yazdi etc. During the Mughal ruler Himayaoon, the scholars of mathematics and astronomy were patronised by the kinds as he himself was a good scholar of these two sciences. He invited Maulana Ilyas Arbabeili from Ardabail Shiekh Mohammad Ibn Ali Samarqandi and Mor Abdul Iateef Qazwini are some other important scholars of this period. Sheikh Mohammad Ibn Ali Samarqandi wrote an important book Jawahar-al Uloom, which he dedicated to Himayoon. In eleventh century A.H, Shah Jahan sent Jan Spar Khan to Iran as an ambassador in 1056 A.H. With Jan Sapar Khan Mohammad Farooq Mussharaf and Muhib Ali also went to Iran, these two had a boasting claim on the mastery of rational sciences. The Caliphasultan who was one of the important scholars of Iraq, asked their opinion about Ghazzalis decree of infidelity against Al-Farabi and Ibn Sina. But these two sholars could not give any satisfactory reply to this query. Vizier Saadullah khan wrote to Abdul Hakeem Siyalkoti about the same problem upon their incompetence to come out with any positive reply. When Shah Jahan was told about this episode, he was very much disappointed. It was on the instance of Vizier Saadullah Khan that Abdul Hakeem Siyalkoti was exhorted to write a detailed tract on this subject. Siyalkoti wrote his famous treatise *Al-Duru-Saminah* as the response to the extortion. This treatise consists on three subjects i.e. Divine knowledge, Bodily and spiritual resurrection and createdness of the world. Since, Siyalkoti laid much emphasis on Divine knowledge, this topic became favourite subject of the subsequent scholars. It set agenda for Mullah Bihari's "Sullam u al-uloom, where he starts his books with the statement that "The exaltedness of Allah has no limits or boundaries". During Jahangir's and Shah Jahan's reign Iranian scholars used to arrive to India uninterrupted. Sheikh Abu Tuarb Shirazi, Syed Taqiudin Shirazi, Sheikh Jamaludin Shirazi, Sheikh Taqiuddin Tastari, Sultan Hussain Yazdi, Mullah Furukh Haravi, Maulana Kamaludin Nishapuri, Hakeem Mohammad Masoon Tastari, Mir Mohammad Hashim Gilani, Mulla Murshid Shirazi were some such important Iranian scholars. From Bulk many scholars started pouring in after Shah Jahan conquered it, like Mulana Awaz Wajih Blkhi; Abul Falh Gilani, Hakim Human, Qazi Mohammad Yazdi, Mir Murtaza Sharifi, Sheikh Hussain Baghdadi, Mirak Abdul Baqi, Maulana Abdul Khaliq Gilani and Maulana Najmuddin Tastari were some important Iranian scholars, who came to India from outside, especially from Iran. The eleventh century Iranian scholars like Sheikh Bahaudin Aamli and Mir Damad had a great impact on Indian scholars. Mir Damads Sirat-i-Mustaqim in Kalam and "Al-Ufqal-Mubeen" in philosophy exerted great influence on Indian scholars. Many Indian scholars went to Iran to study under Mir Damad. Mir Damad was well received by the Indian scholars. Mullah Mahmood Jaunpuri has praised Mir Damad and called him "a prudent and capable

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erudite scholar of philosophical principles", who "could traverse the terse land of reality and explored the oceans of wisdom by his deep penetrative insights implying his nature ratiocination.

However, Mir Baqr Damads view point about eternity of the time "Haduth-i-Dahri) was rejected by Mulla Mahmood Jaunpuri, which falls in between the views of Qudm-i-Zaman and Haudth-i-Alam. Mir Baqar was not happy with Razi's views of Zaman-i-Dahar and Sarmad, as later called them futile expressions. Maulana Fazl Haq Khyr abadi was the pioneer of this school of thought, who write a commentary of Mir Damads "Al-Ufq Mubeen: Khayrabadi was staunch opponent of the very existence of temporality. "The existence of temporality seems or resembles and most weak existence in itself, as its existence is not vien in perception. Because Mullah Mohammad Jaunpuri believed in the Old Ibn Sinian theory of the eternity of the time. However, in twelfth century Mullah Amanullah Banarsi, tried to evaluate views of both Mir Baqar Damad and Mullah Mahmood Jaunpuri. There was another group of the people, who did not agree with the theory of Huduth-i-Dahri, who denied not only eternity of time, but even denied contemporariness of time. (Maat-e-dahar). Qasim Kohi was a master of rational sciences Badawni writes about him. "He was well versed in the sciences of Tafsir, astronomy, Kalam and tasawuf". Even the poets were impressed by the philosophy which had become prevalent during Akbar's period. For example Fazi says:

In the Ain Abul Fazl takes special care to stress his knowledge of the classical Graeco Islamic scientific tradition, and a tradition hostile to him records that he had brusquely brushed aside Ghazali's criticism of the scientists with the short remark that "he had spoken non-sense".[18] He goes to the extent of saying. The true, the just sovereign shall not seek popular acclaim through opposing reason (aql).

We can see that despite Abul Fazl's extensive use of Sufic concepts and beliefs, he remained steadfast in his allegiance to reason and science. One major factor here was the opposition that rationalism offered to orthodox traditionalism, regarded by Akbar as his major enemy. Abul Fazl quotes among Akbar's happy sayings the following: "The case of pursuing reason (aql pazhohi) and rejection of traditionalism (taqlid), is so clear that it does not need any argument from me. If tradition is to be held excellent, all Prophets would have just followed their ancestral customs."[19]

("..Sufis of all shades had been one with the theologians in denying the autonomy, let alone the supremacy, of the realm of reason"). Abul Fazl took delight in the fact that his son 'Abdur-Rahman, though an Indian by birth, has a Greek temper (mushrib), that is, a philosophical or scientific bent. [20]

Abul Fadl was, thus a rationalist par excellent, who tried to keep the doors of 'how' and 'why' open against the dogmatic following of the scholars of various religious and mystical denominations. But some times, he also considers reason in capable to take us close to the Universal truth. [21]

"What a firm background of the Arabic language he turned to study of religion and philosophy. He reflected for some time in the secrets of the Platonists (Ashra-qiyan). The wide trousers of the sufi and the wondrous observations of Perpetuities. He condemned Firdousi as a seller of words and once charged Imam Ghazzali of uttering non-sense".

But despite his deep appreciation of Greek philosophy, he had to rely on the Wajudi doctrines of Ibn Arabi, the Illuminist theories of Suharwardi and other such subjects. His Slander against Ghazzali was not substantiated, because Ghazzli's arguments against philosophers were very scathing and penetrating that Macdonold had to confess that even Ibn Rushd seems a beggarly compiler before him. The failure of the rebellion 1580-81 discouraged the ambitious and adventurous elements in the country. The governing classes fostered by Akbar and Abul Fadl's Ishrqi philosophy which was based mainly

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upon Jala al-Din Dawani's (1427=1503) works, compatible with their economic and political ambitions. Long before, Mulsim Jursts had recognized that the Sultan was "the shadow of God", but Abul Fadl, on the basis of the ideologies of the Ishraqi thinkers, expressed the view that "Royalty is a light emanating from the incomparable God? a ray from the sun, the illuminator of the universe, the index of the book of perfection, the receptacle of all virutes. Modern language calls this light farr-i-Izidi (the Divine Light), and the tongue of antiquity called it Kiyan Khwaal (The Sublime halo) Faidi, asked, "Althogh kings are the shodow of God on earth, He Akbar is the emanation of Gods light. How then can we call him a shadow"?[22]

As an educational reformist, he introduced the works of the later Persian philosophers such as Sa' d al-Din al-Taftazani, al-Sharif al-Jur jani, Jalal-al-Din Dawani, Sadr al Din Sharazi and Ghizath al bin Mannsur al Shirazi and made them a necessary part of the curriculum. Apart from these official contributions, he produced several philosophical graduates, whom he used to teach in his private capacity and wrote some valuable commentaries and glossaries on the most difficult philosophical works sharah al-Muwaqif of al-Sharif al-Jurjani and Sharah Mullah Jalal al Dawani are two such important books.

Mirza Muhammad Zahid Harawi, was a distinguished philosopher of the age of Shahjahan and Awrangzeb and a former teacher of Shah Abd al-Rahim, father of Shah Waliullah Mirza Muhammad Zahid studied under his father. Qadi Muhammad Aslam and Mulla Muhammad Fadil Badakhni, before becoming the disciple of Mulla Sadiq Halwai of Kabul. He went to Transoxiana and joined the circle of Mirza Jan Shirazi, a well-known philosopher of Central Asia.

Mirza Muhammad Zahid emerged as a notable scholar of peripatetic philosopher, Ishraqi, Hikmah, Asharite and Maturidte Kalam, and Logic and taught these subjects privately in his free time, as he was working as a Qadi at the imperial court in his offical position. He wrote glossaries on Jalal al-Din Dawani's commentrary on Hayakil al-Nur of Shuhrawardi Maqtul, on the Tajrid of Nasir al Din al-Tusi, on Allamah Dawani's commentary on al-Tahdhib on the Sharh al-mawaqif of al-Jurjani and on Tasawwur wal tasdiq of Qutb al-Din al-Razi. Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindi's (971/1564-1034/1624) greatest contribution in the field of IsIamic Thought is his exposition of the concept of Wahdat al-Shuhud (Unity in perception), He severly attacked the well-known metaphysical concept of Wahdat-al-Wujud (Unity of Being) of Ibn Arabi. For him, the doctrine of Wahdat al-Wajud was a subjective experience where in the mystic and the object of love became identical and where the mystic realizes one overwhelming reality. This state of identity is not a permanent one, it is transient and temporal. The higher state accordingly is that of sevitude (abidiyat) wherein neither the transcendental nature of indinity of God is degraded nor the continent and accidental position of man and other creatures is elevated to the realm of transcendence or infinity.

Shaykh also criticized the doctrine of Wahdat al-Wajud from the ethical point of view. The pantheistic union of God and humanity for him, negates the idea of human individuality as well as the position as the responsible being before God. It also makes it difficult to evaluate the morals of individuals and thus negates the whole idea of reward and punishment in the hereafter. Furthermore, this conception denies human freedom. Most of the philosophical and theological thoughts of Shakh Ahmad are xpounded in his Maktubat (Epistles). His other important philosophical books include Risalah Mabda wal-maad, Risalah rubaiyyat etc. etc., which deal with metaphysical and philosophical issues in a very subtle mystical manner. Qutb al-Din Ahmad Ibn Shah Abd al Rahim, known as Shah Waliullah

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(1114/1703-1176/1762), attempted to reconcile the two apparently contradictory doctrines of Wahad al-Wajud of Ibn Arabi and Wahdat al-Shuhud of Shaykh Imam Sirhindi, which is the first effort in the area. Before Sirhindi, the doctrine of Wahdat al-Wajud of Ibn Arabi was in no way acceptable to the mutakallimun (Muslim scholastic) shykh Sirhindi, by introducing Wahat al Shuhud, opened a new factor of controversy even among the Muslim metaphysicians. The exponent of each of these doctrines was aggressively critical of the others. It was Shah Waliullah whose rational explanation of both the doctrines and their reconciliation resolved the controversy. The positive effect of his reconciliatory efforts was two fold. On the one hand, it brought about harmony between the opposing groups of the metaphysicians on the other hand it legitimized the doctrine of Wahdat al-Wajud among the Mutakalimun.[23]

His magnum opus Hajjatullah i.e. Baligah, which ranks with Ihayal ulum Din of Imam Ghazzali as a classic on the religious philosophy of Islam usheredin the dawn of a new era in the intellectual history of modern Islam. "He adopted an integralisti approach which looked at man and his environment from all possible angle, biological, psychological moral, sociological humanistic, metaphysical and economical in a synthetic manner and then evaluated the role of religion in building of morally autonomous personality of an individual and in establishing a healthy moral order of society".

The he surveyed all areas of tension and conflict in the contemporary Muslim thought and earnestly strove to bride the guld between the ulama-i-zahir and the ulami-i-batin, the jurists and the mystics, the ahaL-i-hadith and the ahL-ur-rai, the believers of Wahdat Wajud and Wahdat Shud.

A few decade before him, a French philosopher-physician Bernier had noticed that in India a great conflict was going on between those who believed in What ul-Wajud and those who disagreed with the doctrine. Shah Waliullah's Powerful pen resolved that controversy and created an amicable atmospher between the various silsilahs, a contribution, which cannot be over emphasized.

S.A. Razi

Sufic Language helped the translators to make the philosophical terminology of Sanskrit works intelligible to Muslims. The introductions to the translations, as well as original works about them written later on, sought to emphasis that the philosophical a subtle Hinduism is essentially monotheistic. The Muslim elite freely drew upon translations of the Sanskrit works in their writings and quoted Hindu mythological stores in their conversation and letters and drew morals from them. When Mirza Aziz Koka criticized Jahangir for ignoring the Rajputs, the emperor advised him to have faith in the Divine will and to take the lesson from the Holy God enabled Rama to defeat Ravana, the boy Krishna to kill the serpent Kaliya, and Arjuna to fight his enemies.[24]

A large number of Hindus who learnt Persian acquired copies of the translations of their own sacred works and thus obtained first hand information about their religion and philosophy, for which they had formerly had to depend upon the Brahmans, for Sanskrit was then as now known to scholars only. Many leading Hindus who studied Muslim history, theology, philosophy and Persian poetry evinced considerable interest in Sufi thought. In Akbar's time, Manohar, the son of Lon Karan, the Raja of Sambhar, wrote excellent Sufi poetry. Even Badauni acknowledged the merits of such masterly verses as, "The Sheikh is boastful of his religion. The Brahman brags of his idolatry. He who is intoxicated with the beauty of the friend has not to do with idolatry or religion. "*Muntakhab u tawarikh.*"

The attitude of Abdul fadl, Faidi, Fatullah Shirazi, Hakim Hamam, Sheikh Muhibullah IIlahabadi,

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Sheikh Abd al Rahman Chesti, Miyan Mir and Mulla Shah among the Muslims reflect the new intellectual and religious movements, cultivating an interesting in the Hindu way of life, and seeking points of similarity in different religious differences to the background. It was not a scientific approach, but was a pragmatic and designed to reduce the religious tensions. The local influence on the development of Muslim intellecutalism is reflected prominently in the writings and activities of Muslim philosophers, historians and mystics of India. This pragmatic approach has resulted in the production of a huge mass of Persian and IsIamic literature, which has illuminated the way before the subsequent Muslim and non-Muslim scholars to formulate their theories about the vital themse of relgions, spirituality and morality.

The Mughal elite, because of their absorption with Hindu and Muslim mystic thought, were always seeking an authority who had achieved oneness with the Divine Being—the perfect man. (Insan-e-kamil of Ibn al Arabi Jali and their followers).

Abul fazl and such other scholars came to the rescue of these kings and provided for them a compendium of a pluralist philosophy, developing later on in the captivating doctrine of Din-i-Ilahi and paving the way for further developments like Bhakti Movement and Sikhism. However, these theories have, on the other hand given birth to the puritanical movements like Wahdat-ul-Shahud (Unity of perception) of Sheikh Ahmad Sirhindi, Shahwaliullahi school and the Mujahiddin Movement of Balakot.

Rationalism nevertheless survived under the patronage of the Sultans, whose interest in medicine and astronomy kept the sciences active in at atleast a limited sphere. To Baranis consternation, his own patron Muhammad Tughluq was an unasahd believer in maqulat (application of reason) and allegedly preferred them to the dictates of manqulat (the received texts) Barani freely attributed the cruelties suffered by the religious scholars at this Sultans hand to this fatal weakness in his views.

The reaction against the excessive modes of rationalsim, was however, sign of the living relgions spirit of IsIam, which unlike the moribund religions has not allowed philosophy to replace it and banish it from the practical concerns of human life.

Fathullah Shirazi

The most outstanding Irani intellectual at Akbar's court was Mir Fathullah Shirazi. He first immigrated to the court of Abdul Shah of Bijapur, but in 1582 moved to Akbar's court and became the spear head of all the intellectual movements there. Excellent in all branches of philsophy, he was an eminent authority on Avicina's works and Ishraqi theosophy. In mathematics astronomy, and mechanics he was unique both in Iran and in India. Many reforms were organised by Abdul Fazl maintaining the canges in the currency, and the introduction of the solar Ilahi Calendar.

Fahtullah Sheirazi died in 22, January 1589, while Akbar was on tour in Srinagar. (Jamadi a thani 997. He was buried in Takhti Sulaymani there. To Shaikh Faizi and Abul Fazl, it was a personal loss. Faizi wrote a touching elegy. Akbar paid tribute in a manner of the story in Mathew's Gospal xiii,46. He remarked that the Mir was a philosopher, physician and astronomer and added:

"Had he fallen into the hands of Franks, and they had demanded all my treasures in exchange for him, I should have gladly entered upon such profitable traffic, and have bought that precious jewel cheep".

"If the old books of wisdom had disappeared, he could have laid a new foundation of knowledge, and would not have wished for what had gone".[25]

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His actual and immediate sources of inspiration were the achievements of the Arabs and the Persians, who revived and transmitted their knowledge to the world. "Equally well-known has been Fathullahs Takmilah-i-Hashiyah, an extension of Dawwanis commentary on Tuftazanis Tahzibul Mantiq. He also wrote a super commentary on the same by the title "Hashiyah Bar Hashiyah Ala Tahzibil Mantiq". Fatullah's Treatise in metaphysics seems to have stirred up an ugly controversy between two rival sects of religious philosophers. The title of the work is not known. It was written by the order of Ali Adil Shah in answer to a question regarding to physical nature and reality of the heavens, namely whether or not the heavens were penetrable and in what way the communion of the divine spirits with the illuminated humans of the earth could be explained.[26] Mir Fathullah Shirazi was another disciple of Khwaja Jamaludin Mahmood, who later on became also the student of Mir Ghaysa-ud-ddin Mansur, and also availed the scholarly training from Maulana Kamaludin Masud Shirwani and Maulana Kurd. First Mir Fathullah Shirazi's student Amir Anautullah came to Deccan and became a courtier of Ali Aadil Shah, who invited his teacher to Daccan as well, who later on went to Gujrat to Abud Rahim Khan-Khanan and in 991 A.H. went to the court of Akbar on his invitation. He was given great respect by Akbar and made the rational sciences prevalent in India. Azad Bilgrami says: "He made books of the later scholars of Iran like Dawani, Mir Sadruddin, Mir Ghayasuddin Mansur, and Merza Jan popular in India, and got these books included in the syllabus." Mir Fathullah Shirazi (d 998/1590) was born in a scholarly Sayyid family in Shiraz, Persia. He was provided with the best possible education at that time and studied under the famous philosopher, Jamal al-Din Mahmud, a student of Jalal al-Din Dawani, Malana Kamal al-Din Shirazi, Maulan Kurd and Amir Ghiyath al-Din al-Mansur Ibn Mir Sadr al-Din al-Dash Laki Shirazi. He came to India at the request of Abul Shah, governor of Bijapur and worked at Bijapur as and adviser to the ruler as well as principal of the official state school. He moved to the imperial court of Akbar in 991/1583, after the death of Adil Shah, where he was received with honour and made incharge of religious affairs and endowments. He worked with Rajah Todermall to organise the revenue system.

Mulla Mahmud Junpuri Faruqi

Mullu Mahmud Junpur Faruqi (1015/1603-1062-1652) was a prominent philosopher and metaphysician of Shan Jahan's period. He received his early education under his maternal grandfather Shaykh Shah Mahmmad. For higher education, the Mulla joined the intellectual circle of Ustad al-Mulk Shaykh Mohammad Afdal, who was a well-known philosopher of his time. He studied the religious sciences under Mullah Shams Nur Bronvi of Junpur. At the early age of twenty years, he started teaching and soon was reconginzed a good scholar of rational and theological sciences. He had the honour of attending the lectures of Mir Damad on metaphysics and philosophy, when he made a temporary stay at Isfahan while he was on his way to Meccan, and disagreed with Mir Damad's doctrine of huduth-i-dahri (eternal creation), at a very young age. Mir Damad was very much impressed by the Mullah. Mula Abd al-Hakim Sialkoti was another theologian, Logician and metaphysician of the Moghul period, a contemporary of Sirhhindi. He studied all branches of philosophy under Shaykh Kamal al-Din and theology also under him. He was the most influential scholar in the court of Shah Jahan. His most important works are Hashiya-Yi Sharh hikmat al-ayn, Hashiya al Sharah Mawaqif of Allamah al Jurjani, Hashiya-Yi Sherifiyyah, Hashiya-Yi Sharh-i-Shamsiyyah and Durrat al-Thaminah. He died in 1076/1556 at Siyalkot and is buried there.[27]

His philosophical stature was acknowledged by his contemporaries also. His teacher Shaykh Muhamad Afdal used to say about him and his fellow student Mulla Abd al-Rashid Junpur: "Since the

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time of Allamah al-Taftazani and Mir Sayyid al-Sharif al-Jurjani, no two great scholars of such a high level have come together in one city as Mulla Mahmud and Shaykh Abd al-Rashid".[28]

Mulla Mahmud died at the young age of forty seven, still his contribution to philosophy and metaphysics was very significant. He also composed some original works on logic, theology, metaphysics and speculative philosophy. This Shams al-bazighah has been considered one of the most basic works in traditional Muslim philosophy in the sub-continent and the neighbouring countries. It was destined to be studied along with the *Sharah-i-hidayat al hikmah* of Sadr al-Din Shirazi, in the traditional madrasah in the eastern Muslim world. The other important works of Mulla Mahmud Junpuri are such as *al-hikmat al balighah, al-Faraid fi Sherh al-Fawa'id, Raisalat al-dawhat al miyadah fi haqiqat al-Surah wal-maddah, Risalah fil-qader* and *Risalah taqsim-i-niswan.*[29]

In the philosophical and literary subjects, he had a comfortable mastery. It will not be unfounded boast, and the soil of Jounpuri rivaled with Shirazi when we talk about Mulla Junpuri.[30] Maulana Abdul Hay expresses similar views about him. Mulla Junpuri's reputation has increased with the passage of time. He has been called the doyen of Ishra-qieen (IIluminists) and the critic of Peripatetics by a contemporary historian. Shahjahan invited him to Delhi and was received by Vizier Saadullah Khan and later given place near the royal throne in the court of Shah Jahan. After this event Mullah Jaunpuri started his teaching career in the royal madrasah of Jaunpuri. However, he was invited by the king off and no to his court, where the Emperor and his ministers would avail his erudite scholarship. The prince Mohammad Shujah was his disciple and Amirul-Amra Shaista Khan read whole *Al-Faraid* under his instructions. Even Vizier Saadullah Khan was the disciple of Mulla Jaunpuri and he had related the scholarly traits of the Mullah to the emperor.[31] Mullah Jaunpuri defeated an Iranian scholar Akhmaj, who had baffled almost all Indian scholars in the matters related to philosophy and rational subjects. But Mullah Jaunpuri after debating the views on Hayula, its existence and denial, the Mullah presented him important tract entitled Al-Dawhat al-Miyadah-fi-Haqigat-al-Surah wal-Maddah apart from presenting other substantial arguments on the existence of Hayula, which led the Iranian scholar to accept his defeat in the following world: "I have seen very few young people like (Mullah) him from Iran to India". He requested the Emperor to send the works of Mullah Mahmud Jaunpuri as a gift to the king of Iran through him.

India has not produced equal of Jaunpuri in its IsIamic period. He was born in a village of Gohnah, Mohmadabad. His contemporary Shah Abul Khayr Faruqi called him by the epithets like "Imam-i-Azam" (the Great Leader), "Maulana-i-Mukarram" (The respected preceptor), Jamiah Manaqib (a man of many qualities), *Aftab-i-Mashriq wa maghrib,* (the sun of the East and the West and the blazing candle of IsIamic community. Quoting *Maasir al-Karam* he says further: "Mullah Mahmood was not only a pride for his teacher, but even for the old philosophers and scientists. He was the Shahnshaw of the kingdom of knowledge and had no equal in philosophy. The people of insight couldn't find any other philosopher of his mental and intellectual calibre and there was no person, who could counter his views throughout the seven continents. Maulana Abdul Hay Faruqi (d. 1301 A.H) says: "He was the Allamah of his times, most learned, and erudite scholar of rational sciences and a philosophical geneous of Jaunpur. (Tr Mulla Mahmud Jaunpuris Shams Bazigah). He was the deep ocean of mystical science (Ulum-i-Haqiqiah), the minaret of guidance, the leader of erudite scholars."[32]

Azad Bigrami says about him: "He was a unique scholar from the scholars of eastern part of India, a critic of the Illuminists, the terminus of the peripatetic philosophy. There is no other example of these two Faruqis, Sheikh Ahmad Sirhindi, and Mullah Mahmood Jaunpuri, one in the esoteric subjects

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and the other in the philosophical and literary one". The author of *Tajali-a-Noor,* Maulana Khayr al-din Mohammad Jaunpuri says, "He became famour in the nook and corner of India. When Islam made its advances in India, there has had been no philosopher or scientist like Mulla Mahmood. He rejected doctrine of Tawhid-i-Wajudi, while as his contemporary Mullah Abdul Hakeem Siyalkoti was it's great advocate. This doctrine was quite prevalent in India milieu and its inception can be traced back to Firoze Shah Taghluq. During the reign of Akbar, this doctrine were very much in vogue, because Akbar used to get instruction in this subject from Sheikh Tajuddin Zakaria Ajodhini in his solitary meetings with the latter. Sheikh Muhibullah Allahabadi, the preceptor of prince Darasukhow was the staunch supporter of this doctrine, and was called Sheikh Ibn Arabi II because of his mastery of this doctrire. Mohammad Salih Kamboh has also endorsed the great stature of Mullah Mahmood not only in purely religious science like Tafsir, Hadith and Sufism, but has even shown his mastery over purely natural sciences like physics, and mathematics as well. He also, was quite conversant with astronomy, as his suggestion to the king to establish an Astrolab shows.

Mullah Jaunpuri did not agree with Mir Baqar Damad's theory of Huduth-i-Dahri. First he explained his position in a very luced manner and then resorted to the views of Mir Baqar Damad and came out with his mature criticism. He says about Mir Dama. "After the earlier stalwarts of knowledge and wisdom had passed away, their best successor was Mir Baqir Damad, who was quite conversant with the realities of the universe etc". Then he comes out with his critical views against Mir Baqar Damad. He wrote a very significant treatise on the problems of determinism and freedom (Risalah Jabr wa Ikhtiyar) in Persian. Mullah Mahmood explained the theory of the Mutazilites about this matter and indicated that from one angle man is free and from the other he is determined. All the actions of a man are entailed with some cause and the cause is his power and will's relation to the performance of the actions. Since will is posed towards it's existence and non-existence. Therefore, it is necessary that there must be some preferable cause, which is outside the chain of man's power and will. Therefore, this cause has relation with the power and will of Allah. He says further that the deep consideration of the universe, makes it clear that all the created laments of the universe are linked by the chain of cause of causes and the master of the causes. Therefore, when the power and will of human being is related to the action with all its external causes, the occurrence of act takes place and when this relation is not found, the occurrence of action becomes impossible. In the religious and rational sciences, Mullah Muhmood Jaunpuri was quite erudite, as far as the subjects of Tafsir, Hadith and Hikmah are concerned, he was master of these as well. It was because of this reason that despite Maulan Abdul Hakeem Siyalkoti's comprehensive scholarly stature, he endorsed the greatness of Mullah Mahamood. Thus he was a great scholar, a superb researcher and a perfect explorer. Moreover, he was a monotheist and a gnostic, that Malvi Abdul Hakeem had no standing before him to enter into a polemical discussion on these issues. He has rather said that Mulah Mahmood is "an angelic soul." Though Mullah became more famous because of his philosophical works, he was equally a great theologian and a sincere sufi. Haji Abiul Khayr calls him "a surging ocean in the sciences of reality," i.e spiritualism.

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11

Social Philosophy of Ali Shariati

Dr. Ali Shariati (1933-1977) was born in Mazinan, a suburb of Mashad, Iran, graduating from college in 1960, on a scholarship he pursued post-graduate studies in France. Dr. Shariati, an honours student, received his doctorate in sociology in 1964.

Raised in an atmosphere of social commitment, Shariati was heavily involved in political activities during his secondary school years. From the very beginning he was motivated by revolutionary zeal, and it was because of this that he became one of the three most active members of the New IsIamic Revolt centre at that time. It was through this centre that he came in contact with the ideas of the "IsIamic Revolutionary Movement of the Socialist Worshippers of God", the admiration for which might have motivated his first important work, *A History of the Evolution of the philosophy,* published in 1955.

In Europe, after his arrival, Shariati, joined the confederation of Iranian students, a revolutionary organisation opposed to the pahlavi regime. Later, on he was one of the founders of the Iranian National Front in Amerca, established in 1967 and shortly after the formation of Iranian National Front in Europe, Shariati's revolutionary activities were inspired by the West Indian Frantz Fanon, and Omar Ouzgam of the ALF.[1] His friendship and close association with Fanon led to the translation of the latter's famous book. "*The Wretched of the Earth,* entitled as (Dozkhyan-i-Arazi) into Persian.

"Shariati, in the context of his contemporary socio-political situation was a rebel, a reformer and mujtahid."[2]

Shariati felt deep anguish for the common man. He applied his knowledge in the analysis of the socio-political miseries of his people and country and propounded an alternate course. For the same reason his deep concern for the common and poor men and contempt for the system were reflected in all his lectures and writings.

However, Shariati being deeply interested in his religion and culture, never looses sight of the fact that Islam was no longer studied as a world-view or ideology, because the study of Islam was

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reduced to the study of rituals. Such a situation had led to the creation of, what Shariati calls in one of his lectures as, "Mosaic culture", in the Muslim world, a culture that is confused and rudderless, a culture lacking both the ability and confidence to think for itself and to direct its own affairs.

Ali Shariati studied various philosophical and sociological trends during his stay in France. He was exposed to Karl Marx's revolutionary philosophy and Sartre's thoughts on existentialism.

Being deeply concerned with the conditions of common masses, he was naturally attracted to Marxian philosophy. It is perhaps for the same reason that we find that Ali Shariati has tried to trace out the material aspects of IsIamic religion. He says that about 60% of Quranic teachings deal with material aspects of human welfare. In his earlier stages. Shariati regards Abu Zar Ghafari as the first socialist in IsIam. Moreover, Shariati, like Marx, was critical of the negative role of religion. For example, in one of his lectures he says, while mentioning the plight of an unknown slave who was killed while carrying heavy rocks to build to Pyramids for the Pharaohs of Egypt, 5000 years ago:

"It concerns me because it relates to my class, community, country and history...Great prophets came with promises for our deliverance but some of them proceeded to the palaces."

"Again, in the name of charity, the representatives of the "gods" and the sucessors of the Prophets began to loot us. Again, in the name of holy wars, we were pushed into the battle fields. We had to sacrifice our innocent children for the "God", temples and idols".

"How could I return to those temples which were built to enslave me? Shall I join those who claim to be examples of our national freedom but, in essence, are attempting to gain their inhuman privilages of the past?

"The civilizations, educational systems and religions have made human beings into animals interested only in financial secuirty or selfish and heartless worshipers or men of thought and reason who lack feelings, love and inspiration."

"Although we are not in physical slavery, we are truly destined with a fate worse than yours: our thoughts, hearts, and will power and enslaved. In the name of sociology, education, art, search for freedom love of exploitation and love of individulas, faith in humantarian responsibilities, and belief in one's own school of thought are entirely taken away from within our hearts."

"Now, we, in the name of party, blood, land and system against system under go divisions so that each one of us can be easily taken into service."

In his different lectures (compiled by Hamid Algar under the title on *The Sociology of IsIam.* Mizan Press, 1979) Shariati had dealt with philosophy of history. Here he seems very close to the materialist interpretation of history. Quoting the instances of Abel and Cain. Shariati shows that Cain represents the stage of feaudalism, at he possesses land and property, while Abel represents the class of labourers, having all the characteristics of 'have nots'. In this way the conflict between the two represent a class conflict. The property determine the over all-behaviour and attitude of both the symbolic figures according to Shariati, i.e. that the rout of conflict was the property. It stems from the feaudal mentality of Cain who deprives Abel from his genuine rights and compells him to surrender before his authority and command. But Abel did not submit, hence the conflict. In the same way Ali Shariati highlighted the importance of masses in bringing about revolutions. Shariati says: "Generally, the people addressed in every school of thought and religion are the fundamental and effective factor of change of that society in that school of thought. According to this, we see that in all the various parts of

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the Qur'an, the people (al-nas) themselves are addressed. The Prophet is sent on a mission to the people. He speaks to the people. He is questioned and investigated by the people. He is a transition factor to promote the people. The people are responsible for society and history." He continues:

"The word, people is a valuable word. The only word that is close to it, is mass (Tudah). In sociology, mass means that body of the people without any regard to class distinction or indicators which would distinguish them from other human groups. Therefore, mass means people without considering the special classical form or group of their society."[4]

He talks of the mustadafin (the opressed) and equates them with the believers or 'momineen' and equates, the 'mustakbereen' with 'kafreen'. And according to Shariati, true Prophets have always sided with 'mustadafeen'.

Alin Shariati has expressed the view that when a class or a community becomes deprived of material resources, it loses all its cultural and historical significane and is reduced to a skelton in the museum of history. Same is the case with an individual. He says:

"When a person becomes poor, the good things that he does are looked down upon, while some one who has power and wealth can force his defects on others as art, his nonsense as good conversation, his rude behaviour as philosophy science and religion."[5]

In other words, Shariati views that it is the possession of material resources, which shapes and forms the trends in the society. Here also we discern that Shariati seems to be deeply influenced by Marxian thought, especially by *Economic and philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*. In this way, it is the person who has command over material resources that sets all super structural models let prevail in society in Mehdi Bazargan's language.[6]

Shariati was fully aware of the perennial conflict between the forces of status quo and change or between conservatism and radicalism. Between the protagonists of the two-revolutionist and the modernst—he added a new synthetic person "Inner Radical". The Inner Radical believes in the complete transformation of the human condition and pursuit of a total revolution in reflection, perception, ideology and cultural revolution. Shariati is severely critical of any system, religion, social or political which exploited or tyrannized the man. For the same reason Shariati discuss the "most important pillars" of Islam, which have lost their significance due to the lethargy on the part of Muslims themselves and the motivated attempts of the Orientalists.[7]

Shariati says:

"Unfortunately, the teaching of the concept of Tawheed is limited only to elementary schools. Beyond that is may be spoken of at the philosophical and theological discussions held by religious leaders; but such discussions are totally foreign and inapplicable to the lives of the people. In other words, only the existence and oneness of God are considered not **TAHWHEED** in its real sense. As for the concept of Jihad, it is absolutely forgotten and buried in the graveyard of history. The fundamental principle of Jihad, encouraging to do good deeds and to avoid wrong deeds "(MARUFA) is only applied when blaming the friends instead of when correcting the wrong doers. And lastly, 'Hajj' is viewed as the ugliest and most illogical action that Muslims perform yearly."[8]

Giving a totally unique and revolutionary explanation of Surah "Zilzal", Shariati says that this is what the Prophet brought when Islam, "the real sense of submission", was revealed to him, submit to that which gave you roots, the one God and not the multiple forms which attract one away from one's

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roots. Strengthen your roots and your earth so that when there is a 'mighty shaking', as the Qur's an so firmly announces, which at one level can be interpreted as an "awakening of consciousness", your roots will hold, you will prevail, the outer winds, storms, lightening and thunder cannot pull you away."

The consciousness or awakening is, thus, a basic aspect of Shariati's social philosophy. Shariati does not turn his back to the hard realities of life and from realistic attitude, yet, he says:

"But as apposed to realism, Islam does not accept the status quo but changes the realities. It changes their essence in a revolutionary way. It carries realities along with its idealistic goals, its real desires, which are non-existent by themselves. Unlike realists. Islam does not submit to it. Islam does not turn away from realities as Idealists do. It seeks them out...Islam uses that which hinders the idealists as a composite for its own ideals."[9]

It is here that Shariati develops the concept of IsIamic social justice. In Islam it is not sufficient to tell one's own self, "thou shall not do this or that, "for there is a commitment which each individual is bound by and that is to be an active participant in society opposing social ills. That is, one should say to one self,"thou shall not be an oppressor", and one is equally obliged to say to one self: "Thou shall help the oppressed."[10]

Shariati realized that concepts must be tested according to the cultural and social criterion of a given environment. He, was able to redefine the basis of his people, his society and his society's perception of itself. He awakens latent ideas. His goals was the development of a dynamic social environment, which would be embedded in the historical background and conscience of that society.[11]

Jalal Aali-Muhammad in his two books *Gharb Zadagi* and *Dar Khidmat-wa Khayanat-i-Roashanfikran* had also presented similar views. But Dr. Shariati has fuller command on language and captivating style of expression with his comprehensive awareness of the contemporary philosophical and sociological trends. But being less concerned with economic aspects of his times. Shariati could not provide an eloborate system of Islamic social Philosophy and change.

Murtaza Mutahhari, Baqar Sadar and Talaqani have dealt with the economic aspects in an Islamic social system in more detail though in religious and theological framework. But Ali Shariati has evaluated the whole social aspects of Islam and has provided a new radical interpretation of the sociological implications of the concepts of "Migration", "Shahadat" "Velayat" "Shoura" "Khilafah" "Immamat", etc. etc. which is more than the traditional explanation of the limits of velayat, denying the blind following of religious "Ulema" without limiting their roles and status. He supports himself with some instances of Islamic history and highlights the importance of "shura" instead of arbitrary leadership of clergy. It was a revolutionary aspect of his bend of mind. He says:

"We see that even knowing the position of the prophet, he permitted the people to vote and express their opinions. He valued the vote of the majority in social affairs. Thus counsel by council (shura) in IsIam is the most important principle in running society, while leadership of social group is a universal principle. The Traditions (Sunnah) of the Prophet show how much important Muhammad (S.A.W.) placed in his personal actions on counsel and a yielding to public opinion and the votes of the majority. On the other hand, Shariati mentions the issue of 'Velayat' (the issue of selection by appointment) and says that is cannot be denied that the prophet has given stress upon particular persons for the continuation of his mission. But here he makes it secondary.[12]

Shariati does not agree with the idea of unquestionable authority of any porson, no matter how

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higher his status may be. It is perhaps for the same reason that after Iranian revolution, some radical people have claimed to be followers of Shariati when those were arrested for their rebellion against the authority of clergy.

It may be, perhaps, for the same reason that Ali Sahriati has been side tracked in Iran and his influence has been bracketed due to his radical and unorthodox views.[13]

In his detailed study of Shiism, Shariati makes a meaningful contrast between the early shiism of the Companions of Ali (Tashayyu-Alawij and the opponents of it (Tashyyu-e-Safavi). The latter made shiism the idealogy of the rulers, made it the religion of mourning, distorted the principle of Immanat, and rejected the principle of accountability and commitment to the poor.

According the Shariati the prophets belonging to the Abrahamic tradition came from the oppressed humanty. He makes a very interesting comparison between the Oriental, the Persian and the Abrahamic Prophets. The former belonged to the rich classes and the latter to the class of the disinherited. The Prophet of IsIam, like his perdecessor. Moses, again a liberator of the oppressed people, addressed himself to what the Aristocratic Quraish called, the 'ignoble' (Arazal-i-Nas) those who were dispossessed, who toiled and were deprived of the fruits of their toil.[15]

But the above discussion should not lead us to think that Dr. Shariati was a complete followers of Marx. No doubt, Shariati was inspired by Marxian philosophy, especially by its humanistic aspects. But in *Marxism and other Western Fallacies* (Tr. be Campbell Mizan, U.S.A.), Shariati seems to be engaged in showing that Marxism seeks to perform the Promethean function of freeing humanity from the shackles of religion. Shariati says:

"It is vulgar to criticize the weakness and corruption of the religious classes and to infer from it that religious studies are futile. To identify the role in society played by the Christian clerical class in the Middle Ages with that of Jesus, the Messiah, in the Palestine of two thousand years ago is, if not tendentious, indicative of utterr ignorance "

Shariati has provided three main concepts on which he develops his criticism against Marxism and propounds his own concept of social change. These are, 'Khilafah', 'Taqwa' and 'an-Nas'.

(a) ***Khilafah***- According to Islam the human being is vicegerent of God on earth. Its existence is not a matter of accident but there is a purpose behind it, i.e. to fulfil the will of God on earth by establishing a just society.

(b) ***Taqwa***- This is described as God-consciousness or the recognition and attempt on the part of human beings to implement God's will into all spheres of life.

(c) ***al-Nas***- All humanity is one-hinted community, irrespective of ethnic or other differences. It has to overcome the mistakes of its ancestors who defied God by lowering His status to that of a man, an idol or exclusive concern for a particular race only. This means all humanity is invited by Islam to join together in the obedience of one and only one God. In practical affairs, this means all human beings are equal and no one has a higher or a lower status determined by race, sex, colour, economic status or religion. Therefore, everyone is responsible for his/her own actions, both individually and collectively. Utilizing the above concepts, Shariati intends to develop an Islamic view of humanity which stands in total contrast to the other views. His purpose is:

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1. To do away with the narrow view of humanity present in medieval Islamic thought, which developed during the period of crisis of the Caliphate and continues even in modern times.
2. The Muslims being part of the third world have become the victim not only of colonialism but also of neocolonialism both politically and ideologically. Shariati seeks to pull the Muslims out of this situation.[16]

Shariati's comprehensive and humanistic understanding of Islam is reflected in his realization that humanity as a whole faces common problems of freedom, equality and justice, in response to which there have appeared three-dimensional approaches of mysticism, Marxism and existentialism. The issues addressed by the above three intellectual currents are not restricted to West, infact, they extend to all humanity. Islam no doubt addresses itself to such problems and offers scope for responding to them. Yet in its expressive aspect of Islamic thought it has failed to answer these questions, and as a result its own community finds itself caught between differeing world views. The reason for this is the non-use of 'Ijtihad' and the lack of confidence in its own thought process evident in the contemporary world. Islamic thought is highly repetitive rather than creative and developmental, and this is what he aspires the contemporary Islamic thought to do. That is, instead of simply condemning or shunning what other ideologies address themselves to, it should develop and project a positive Islamic responses. Shariati attempts to provide an intelligent Islamic view of humanity in terms pertenent to todays' rationalism. Inspite of being so vocal in his criticism of Marxism and the Ulema, Shariati fails to concern himself with the burning issues like feduel land-lordism, just labour-employee relationship, ownership and management of capital vis-a-vis religion, society and state etc. His silence on these key concerns of the time reduces sometimes his criticism to mere rhetoric.

In this way though Shariati was very much concerned with the ills of society, he could not provide any comprehensive concept of social change based on the principles of social justice and welfare in religious framework.

However, shariati provided a unique blend of social justice and Islam and in this way tried to evolue a new approach towards the problems faced by humanity in general and Muslims in particular.

II

Ali Shariati's Views About Existentialism !

In this article I have tried present the views of Dr. Ali Shariati, an Iranian scholar, and revolutionary, which he expressed at various occasions concerning the modern western philosophies, especially Sartre's existentialism.

Existentianlism is a new philosophical movement adhered by people like Kier-Keguaard, Heidegger, Jaspers and John Paul Sartre. Sartre is the most ardent representative of the atheistic trend in this philosophy.

Dr. Ali Shariati has pointed out the positive points of this movement. But he seems to be critical of the various conclusions, which Sartre has drawn. Despite an enormous relevance of existentialism to the mechanised West, according to Shariati, East does not need such philosophy. Where all the spiritual values are flourishing with their full vigour. Ali Shariati has remarked a very significant point when he claims that Existentialism owes its roots to the Oriental thought as we find the problems

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discussed in this philosophy are already found in abundance in our Sufi traditions.

To begin with, Existentialism is the philosophy which declares as its first principle that existence is prior to essence. This is, presumbly, a technically accurate principle, yet as simple and intelligible as "2 and 2 are 4."

The world of Matter was regarded fundamental reality by Naturalism, guided by mechanical laws. Man was considered a small fragment, a part of a huge machine; completely determined in all respects. On the other hand, Idealism had not done any good to man; man was taken as "mere medium for manifestation of reason."

Existentialism revolted against the naturalistic and idealistic trends and tried to safeguard the "free status of man." Existentialists streesed man's concrete existence, his contingent nature, in personal freedom, and his consequent responsibility.

William Barett says that "news of Existentialism arrived after the second world war. Existentialism is the best in the way of a new and creative movement that these rather inspired post war years have been able to turn up. We have to say at least this is a spirit of cool, critical assessment, even when we acknowledge all the frivolous and sensational elements that got attached to it."

Jean Paul Sartre writes about Existentialism:"In any case, we can begin by saying that exstentialsim, in one sense of the word, is a doctrine that does render human life possible; a doctrine also, which affirms that every truth and every action imply both an environment and a human subjectivity."

The theist as well as the atheist Existentialism have one thing in common i.e. the belief that existence comes before essence." or if you will, "says Sarte," that we must begin from the subjective."

Dr. Ali Shariati was born in 1933 in a village called Mazinan in the Eastern part of Iran, in the desert region known as the Kavir. His first teacher was his father, Muhammad Taqi Shariati. Shariati left for *Mashhad* with his father to get himself well-versed with religious teachings and subjects. At a very age he showed an interest in going beyond the traditional. He completed his elementry and high school in Mashhad. After graduating from College in 1960, on a scholarship he pursued graduate studies in France. Dr. Shariati, an honors student, received his doctorate in sociology in 1964. Dr. Shariati was mrtyred on June 19, 1977 in England. Dr. Shariati studied and examined many philosophical, theological and social schools of thought with an Islamic view.

Shariati was neither a reactionery fanatic who opposed anything that was new without any knowledge nor was he from the so-called Westernised intellectuals who imitated the west without independent judgement.

Ali Shariati had mastered (in every sense of the word), the intellectual legacy and activity of the West, and, eschewing opologetics, superficial modernism, and the mechanical compiling of "the best of both world", he was able to set against it a coherent, fresh, and powerful vision of the spiritual and philosophical essence of Islam, a vision that millions of Iranians found inspiring and convining. A large number of the secularly educated intelligentia who had become alienated from Islam, and therby from their society and the masses of the Iranian nation—were drawn again to Islam as the pivotal point of both personal existence and national destiny by the eloquence, range and originality of Shariati's thought. He had a style unique among modern Muslim thinkers.

In a book *Marxism and Western Fallacies* (which is tranalated into English by Hamid Algar), Dr. Shariati has exhaustively and intimately dealt with marxist and Existentialistic philosophy subject-

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ing them to an Islamic critique but never without compassion for the pain and hope behind them.

Ali Shariati has given a long lecture on "Existentialism". He has also reffered to this school of philosophy oftenly in his lectures. According to Ali Shariati Existentialism is different in its view point about the man from both materialistic and naturaistic interpretation of man Shariati is of the opinion that despite difference between opinion of the theistic and atheistic existentialists "existemialism has victimized the higher reality of man too". According to him "The reason why Sartre unlike the naturalists, thinks of man as a unique creation in nature is because he believes that man must be made to shape his destiny and thus fill the gape left by the absence of God in nature. Shariati continues: "even though sartre thinks of man as an independent being free to chose, and unique in nature, his concept in man's existence proceeds essence tends to victimize man's state of being too."

While exposing the Existentialist view of man, Shariati quotes an example of a chair given by Sartre to be shaped by a carpenter. But according to Shariati "man is the opposite of the process involved in making a chair or anything else. First, he exists then he develops essence." Although Existentialism goes beyond the determinations of matter and nature, it limits man's evolution to the stage of essence-discovery, not beyond it so it ignores mans' higher potentiality and quest. After discussing fully the absurdities of "Marxism". "Historicism", "Sociologicism" and Biologism". Shariati dealt with Existentalism and criticized it in the same manner. He with a sound belief declares that "Existentialism and Hippism are the dead ends of the same road."

Shariati seeks to roots of much of Western philosophy in Eastern thought. He subscribes to the claim that "a number of existentialist thoughts and concepts have their roots deep in Eastern philosophy, but according to him, "they have been presented to the East in such a way as though they were entirely new to the Eastern mind." So according to Shariati many of the philosophical and ideological trends of west owe their origin to East which is not given even a hint of acknowledgement. But on the contrary, he pitties the so-called Eastern scholars, who are committed to importing western ideas. He regretts and says that, "if those bafled scholars" had a little insight into the philosophical and spiritual traditions of the East, they would known that the roots of existentialism had to be embedded in Eastern thought. He says further. "Not being familiar with the philosophical history of the East, they are responsible for their having introduced existentialism to the East in a grosely superficial way."

In a praiseworthy tone, Ali Shariati exposes the relevance of Existentialism in the context of western society. "However irrelevant it may be to our social conditions." says Shariati, "Existentential-ism has presented idea of subjectivity in the materialistic and industrialized West, so far as its philosophical and psychological and artistic dimensions are concerned."

From kier-Keguaard to Sartre and Japers, existential movement has revealed itself as an extended type of self-awareness in philosophy protesting and resisting the pressures of the existing materialistic world and its emphasis upon consumerism, which is responsible for breading self-exhaution and decadence in human society.

If on the one hand existentialism is full of profundity and meaning in the realm of spiritual needs of the West. "But on the other hand, it is "in constrast to the spiritual experience and teachning of the philosophy of the East. It is immature." An anxiety resulting from the assumption of human estrangement from the physical world, or from mans' lack of purpose and direction in life, or from any sense of despair and forlorness, these are the most central topics of existentialism, these topics says, Shariati, "are also common in Islamic Sufism, in Taoism, in Buddhism and in many other Eastern

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mystical doctrines with much more depth in experience and insight."

According to Dr. Shariati, Heideggar is much more significant and Existentialist than Sartre. He says that although Heideggar called "Sartre his bright student in existentialism, but he regretted that Sartre had marred his existentialism by blending it with Marxian Materialism."

About the precedence of Existence to essence. Shariati believes that Mullah Sadra long before, existentialists concerned it.

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12

Semantic Philosophy and Quranic Studies

Semantic Philosopy and Quranic Studies

I

In this paper we will first of all discuss the problem of Language in the general and Quranic context. Languate is a means of communication and based on common signs which are adopted for conveying different senses to each other by human beings. Semantic philosophy with its various brances will engage our attention and we will attempt to show how semantic philosophy is just a get of theories of meaning rather than a fulfleged philosophy. Then we will discuss the Quranic Semantics with special reference to the views of a great Japanese Semantic philosopher Toshihiko Izutsu. Who relates semantics of the Quran with its Quranic Weltan chauung or world view and shows that the main constituents of this "world view" are the key words like "Islam", "Allah" "Nabiy" and "Iman" etc.

We will also attempt to explain the progess of transposition of the pre-Islamic Arab Linguistic categories, which were adopted by Islam with several changes here and there and these categories like "Allah" (in the metaphysical context) and "Taqwa" (in the ethical context) were adjusted in the scheme of new IsIamic world-view, by uprooting them from their pagam origons.

A comparative study of the Quranic Sciences has been made with various semantic theories after this general survey of the subject. In this respect two key-terms "Allah" and "Taqwa" have been analysed in their historical context and it has been praved that these two terms were very much prevalent among the Arabs, Islam adopted these concepts and terms with necessary modifications and alterations and accomodated these in its own scheme of world view.

After this detailed discussion, an attempt has been made to meet the challenge of the logical postivism and emotivism and the problem is probed in context of religious and the Quranic Studies and it has been shown that Islam provide its own criterian for justifying its claims. A brief account of Tawil and mystic interpretation has been also discussed in this particular subject. The views of Izutsu, Marcel, Hossein Nasr C.A. Quadir and Osman Bakr have been presented to elaborate our position to show that religious language is cantaining "Wisdam" not merely ideas, which has different paradign than merely

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the linguistic one for justifying it teachings.

After this discussion a brief account of the sciences has been presented which have been traditionally adopted by the scholars to promote and popularise Quranic Studies. The linguistic tools, methods, and paradigms have been discussed to show the importance of liguistic analysis in the context of Islamic studies in general and the Quranic studies in particular. Before concluding the whole discussion a special reference has been made to two famous Indian philologists i.e. Shah Wali-ullah Delhvi and Nawab Siddiq Hassan Khan.

Language is a system of verbal signs recognized by common consent as the means of communication among all individuals belonging to one community. It is in this sense a social fact, 'fait social' as defined by Dur kheim in his ' sociology'. It is a symbolic system to a community, to which every member of the community must resort in talking with others if he wishes at all to make himself understood. There can be no inguistic communication unless the two persons involved in speech (Kalam) resort to the same system of signs. The Quran shows the clearest consciousness of this fact, and it possesses most evidently the concept of language understood in the sense of this modern technical term 'Langue'. The Quran bases its conception of Revelation and prophetic mission on this very idea. It starts from the recognistion of the fact that each "people" (qaum) has its own langue, and it attachs a great significane to this fact in regard to the phenomenon of prophetic mission.[1] Thus in the Surah Ibrahim we read:

> "We never send an apostle except with the language (i.e. language) of his people, so that he might make the message intelligible".[2]

As the peoples of the world differ in colour, according to the Quran, so they differ in language and for that reason the Quran counts the 'colour and language' of the people among the 'signs' (Ayat) of God (xxxiv) 21/22).[3] According to the Quran no adequate understanding, i.e. communication, is possible where there is no common language. (xviii, 92/93).[4]

The Quranic view of this problem is based on the very clear cultural consciousness that each nation has its own language, and Arabic is the language of the Arabs, and it is in this capacity, only one of the many languages. Moreover, quite naturally, the fact that the Quran was revealed in the Arabic language was taken by the Arabs as the strongest evidence that it was superior to all other languages. It was regarded as the sacred language. And sooner or later the non-Arab Muslim also had to admit, because of their ardour and veneration for the scared Book, the natural superiority of this language. And thus the Arabic language qua language ended by assuming a high religious value. This process is admiably well depicted with all its theological implications by Fakhr-al-Din-al-Razi in his "Great commentary "Mafa teh al-Ghayb."[5] The Quran states in unambiguous terms in a form of story that at the dawn of creation Allah taught Adam the names of things. 'Adam', by the way, in a symbol for mankind, while the names of things signify the elements of knowledge, both worldly and non-worldly.[6]

After this preliminary discussion pertaining to the problem of language, we will deal with the various dimensions of semantic philosophy with special reference to the Quranic studies and will show that how Muslims have developed various semantic theories to discuss various Islamic sciences and the Quranic commentaries.

The semantic philosophy was introduced in Europe in the 19th and 20th century and this philosophy can be understood in the back drop of western Empiricism. In the earlier times people used to rely mostly on reason or experience to philosophize. The semantic and the alied philosophies,

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however changed the psychological analysis and converted it into a linguistic philosophy or "Linguistic Analysis."[7]

The importance of language and the linguistic terms, terminologies, philology, denotations and ennotations of the terms etc. assumed very profound importance. The second important dimension which was brought to fore by this philosophy was the Doctrine of elimination of 'Metaphysical propositions' and the use of common sense vocabulary and scientific precision was given the highest priority. In this respect the writings of G.E. Moor, especially his theory of 'Indefinibility' of Good' and logical postivism can be presented as representative trends. According to G.E. Moore the concepts must be clarified before claiming any specific meaning for them.[8]

According to logical postivism the only meaningful sentences are the factual, positive, verifiable and testable sentences of the empirical sciences. All other sentences are emotive and therefore non-significant and meaningless. Among the latter are included the sentences of meta physics, ethics, aesthetics and religion-in fact all value sciences. The school originated in the Vienna Circle, Founded by M. Schilick in 1924, whose members included Bergamann, Carnap, Feigl, Godel, Hahn, Newrath and Waisman, A.J. Ayers' book "language, truth and logic" (1949), is a force ful exposition of logical postivism, but wittgesteins' Tracticus logico-philosophicus (1921) may be considered: the 'bible' of this school of thought.[9]

Later on Gilbert Ryle in his two books i.e. "The concept of mind" and "Taking sides in philosophy" eloborated the linguistic philosophy to a great extent and enriched it's theories as an editor of the renowned philosophical journal 'Mind.'[10]

"Semiotics" is one branch of semantics. It is the theory about the metapors and symbols, part of which is related to the rules of Grammar and second part with pragmatics, which is the study of purport of meaning-ful sentances and their influences. According to H.G. Grice, when we analyse the meaning of a sentence, we must also consider the impression or the influence it exerts on the lisners. This process can be understood in the communication between human beings and animals.[11]

Quine in his book "Tow dogmas of Empiricism" declares that according to Tenets of Empiricism no difference between synthetic and Analytic sencences can be maintained nor the theory of harmonious meanings of the statements can be entertained, which was a special view point of carnap, as he regards that the singular sentances have no separate meaning fulness. The description of this theory can be seen in his thesis of "Indeterminancy of Radical Transition" according to which a sentence has different dimentional meanings. In Quine we discern a revolt against the theory of meaning, propositions and necessity.[12] In the same way wittgenstein, (according to this theory of "ideal language)" regards the topics and subjects of traditional philosophy like morality devoid of scientific meaning and confined philosophy only to the critique of language and reached close to solipsism.[13]

Emotivism holds that ethical utterrances are non-significant. They express the attitude of a speaker and are therefore moving. To support an ethical sentance by a ' reason' is to mention a fact that will influence the corresponding attitude. Emotivism leads to and is also the result of relativism. It's chief representatives are David Hume, A.J. Ayer, Bertrand Russell and C.L. Steven son.[14] with this account of semantic philosophy and its allied subjects, no systematic, well-knit definition can be entertained. It rather leads us to a very confused state of mind. Prof. Toshihko Izutus, a well known Islamologist of Japan says, perhaps for the same reason: "Unfortunately, what is called semantics to day is no bewideringly complicated. It is extremely difficult if not absolutely impossible, for an out sider

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event o get a general idea of what it is like. In other words, we have as yet no nealty organised uniform science of semantics; all we have in our hands is a number of different theories of meanings."[15]

"Then what is a working definition of semantics.? Prof. Izutsu says: "...Semantics as I understand it is an analytic study of the key-terms of a language with a view to arriving eventually at a conceptual grasp of the weltan-schaunng or world view of the people who use that language as a tool not only of speaking and thinking, but more important still, of conceptualizing and interpreting the world that surrounds them, semantics, thus understood, is a kind of 'weltan-schauung-slehre', a study of the nature and structure of the world view of a nation at this or that significant period of its history, conducted by means of a "methodological analysis" of the major cultural concepts the nation has produced for itself and crystallized into the key-words of its language."[16]

Now when we apply this semantic philosophy to the Quranic science, it becomes necessary to understand the Quranic weltan-schaunng or the picture of the universe which is portrayed. Semantics of the Quran should be understood only in the sense of the Quranic Weltan Schaunng or Quranic world-view, i.e. the Quranic vision of the universe. It would deal mainly with the problem of how, is the view of this scripture, the world of being is structured, what are the major constituents of the world, and how are they related to each other. It would in this sense, be a kind of antology a concrete; Living and dynamic antology, and not the kind of static systematic antology constituted by a philosopher at an abstract level of meta-physical thinking. It would form an antology at the concrete level of being and existence as reflected in the verses of the Quran.[17]

With this back drop it can be appreciated that in Quran there are terms of words like "Bayan" "Mubean", "Ta'aseer" "Bayanah" "Burhan" etc. which indicate that the Quranic teachings are very clear and evident and not fraught with any canplicacy or ambiguity. Secondly, the Quran has also encouraged pondering over its teachings and contents, which is called "Taddabur" in the Quranic context, which indicates that deeper consideration and meditation is a prerequisite for understanding the Quranic Weltan Shaunng.

According to Izutsu, the Quran has used the words, like "Islam" "Nabih" "Iman", "Kafir" "Allah" etc. at their proper places. These words are interconnected and inter-dependent for their meanings. These words can't be taken aut of their particular conceptual context, as these are not individual terms, which could be understood aut of their context.[18]

The terms which appear in the Quran were very much prevalent before Islam in one or the other form. Islam adopted these terms, but changed their essence to the extent of altogether different connotations. These words themselves were in current use in seventh century, if not within the narrow confines of the mercantile society of mecca, at least in some religious circle or other in Arabia, only they belonged in different conceptual systems. Islam brought them together, combined them all into an entirely new, hither to unknown conceptual net work."[19]

This transposition of concepts, and the fundamental displacement and rearrangement of moral religious values which ensued from it, that so radically revolutionized the Arab conception of the world and human existence.

From the view-point of a semantist who is interested in the history of ideas, it is this and no other thing, that gave the Quranic vision of the universe so markedly characteristic a colouring.

For example the name of Allah, was not at all unknown to the pre-Islamic Arabs. This is

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evidenced by the fact that the name appears not only in pre-Islamic poetry and compound personal names but also in old inscripting. At least some people or some tribes in Arabia believed in a god called Allah and even seem to have gone to the extent of acknowledging him as the creator of heaven and earth, as is easy to see from some of the Quranic verses.[20]

This was a key-term which play a decisive role in the formation of the Quranic world-view. Allah in any way was not a new coinage. When the Islamic revelation began to use this and other words, it was the whole system, the general context in which they were used that struct the meccan polytheists as something quite strange, in familar and, therefore, unacceptable, and not the individual words and concepts themselves.

This age old system of religious values was gravely endangered when it was proclaimed by the prophet of IsIam that this supreme God was not only supreme in the relative sense of the highest in the hierarchy but absolutely supreme, and also unique i.e. the one and only God in existence, degrading thereby all other gods to the position of "Batil" "false" as opposed to Haqq "real" in other words, "mere names", without any reality, mere productions of fancy and imagination. If the Arabs were to accept this new teaching, the general situation would have to suffer a complete change, and repurcussions would not only make themselves felt in the relatively confined domain of religious ideas but practically in all spheres of life, both social and individual, would have to be thereby effected.

The elements of the universe came without one single exception, to be uprooted from their old soil, and transplanted into a new field, each one of them was assigned a new place, and new relationships were established between them. Concepts that had formerly been quite foreign to each other were now brought into close connection, contrariwise, concepts that had been closely related to each other in the old system came to be separated in the new one.

The acknowledgement of the position of Allah as the sole lord of the whole universe deprived all the other so-called gods (a' Iihah) of all reality. They were now "mere names", not corresponding to any real entities existing outside of language. In the terminology of modern semantics, we should say that in this conception, the term ilah (pl. alihah), when applied to anything other than Allah Himself is nothing but a word having connotation but no denotation. In surah Yousuf, we read "That which you worship apart from him is nothing but names you have named, yourselves and your fathers. God has sent down no authority touching them."[21]

It is to be noticed that all these are but a small part of the universal rearrangement of concepts and redistribution of values brought about by the new teaching of Islam, which redically altered the nature of the Arab conception of the world.[22]

On the other hand this new conceptual system changed their moral and religious values. For example, the term "Taqwa" which was very common among the pre-Islamic Arabic people also underwent a great change Prof. Izutsu says in this context. "...the basic semantic core of the word 'Taqwa' was in jahiliyyah "self-defensive attitude" of a living being' animal or man, against some destructive force coming from outside" This word comes into the Islamic system of concepts carrying with it this very basic meaning. But there, under the over whelming influence of the whole system, and particularly by the fact of its being been now put into a spacific semantic field composed of a group concepts having to do with "belief" which is peculier to the Islamic monstheism, it comes to acquire an extremely important relgious meaning: Taqwa, passing though the intermediate stage of the pious fear of divine chastisement on the day of judgement, ends by meaning a personal piety, pure and simple.[23] In the

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context of Quranic semantics Izutsu has discussed problem of day of judgement as well he says:

"Thus, to take a typical example regarding the knowledge of the Hour (al-sa'a'h),....they were told that Allah alone knew when and no one else in the world, not eve the prophet himself. (xxxiii/v.63) "Man will ask thee about the Hour. Answer, the knowledge of it is only with Allah, what can make thee know? It may be that the Hour is nigh.[24]

Most of these (customs, belifs, ideas) Islam rejected positively as essentially in compatible with Divine Revelation but it also..adopted a considerable number of them with modification in: form and substance and succeeded in making out of them high moral ideas to be in corporated into a new code of Islamic ethics.[25]

In this way these terms which were used in the pre-IsIamic Arabia were changed from their original context and were used in a altogether "different" context. This change in the process of "Transposition" is known as the influence of "content on the meanings of the words and terms".

After observing these various view regarding the semantics of the Quran we can conclude this topic with the remarks of Izutsu, who says "The semantical analysis of the Quran does not mean a lexicographical treatment of the whole Koranic vocabulary i.e. a study of all the words that happen to be there in the Koran, but it means an analytic and systematic study of only the most important words that seem to play a decisive role in characterizing the dominent role that runs through, permeats and dominates the whole Koranic thought."[26]

II

With this background when we compare the Quranic sciences with semantic philosophy, we face many problems. In the Quran we find that no doubt the linguistic forms have been used to prove or to establish metaphysical or supernatural themes and the principle of varifiability is revelationary paradigm, rather than the experiment or empiricism as held by these philosophies. Therefore, when we make a comparison between these two subjects i.e. semantic philosophy and Quranic studies, we have to keep the difference between the two world-views of the western atheism and materialism and Islamic monotheism and spiritualism in mind. Otherwise our attempts will lapse into a dilemma and a categorical mistake, will be commited. The appearant, ostensible similarities in such subjects should not bewitch us, as there are cardinal distinctions betwee the two. For example, (as has been already discussed, the ideas of God is very basic in the Quranic semantics, but about the same idea a prominent logical postivist A.J. Ayer says:

"We cannot entertain any empirical propositions about God, as the concept is beyond and verification paradigm, being metaphysical, hence meaningless."[27]

In the same way the moral cocepts or values are very important in the Quranic lingustic frame work, but the logical postivists claim that even these are meaning-less: they say

"Philosophy is a continous process of analysis and only the natural science-propositions can be declared meaningful. To find or expect the similar meanings in ethica, metaphysical and aesthetical statements will entail us in a discussion about the world which is beyond our perception."[28]

Though the comparison between these two systems of semantics is very difficult, yet there are some important areas which can be compared and help may be sought from modern semantic theories. For example, the various shades of meaning of the Quranic terms, to search out the hidden etymological and syntaxual dimensions in the Quranic verses, to interpret some of the allegorical verses of the Quran,

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to find meanings and significance in the broken letters (Muqqatat) and explain the meanings of the unique and uncommon, words of the Quran (Mufaradat and Gharaiyb).

The Quran has provided its own criterion of truth who is different from the logical postivistic "verifiability" principle. And provided its own scheme about verifying it's teachings.

Almost all problems have been declared as out of the shpere of semantic analyis by Rudalf Carnap, which consitute the very basis of Islamic Semantics. He says: "The other terms of metaphysics are also without meaning as Absolute ideas, infinite, Existence, Nothingness, thing-in-itself, Absolute soul, objective existance, substance, Being-for itself "Emanation etc. These terms are senseless as we cannot determine valid of their truthful condition. These terms are just like those of forged terms."[29]

The Quranic position in contrast and comparison to these theories is very clear. It is believed that the knowledge of the nature of Allah, the destingy of the human soul, the creation of the universe, the life in hereafter and of other problems of transcendental natural comes directly from Allah and is indisputable in principle Metaphysicians do discuss these problems but since the problems are transcendental, trans-empirical and suppo-mundance, they defy all attempts even those of the best intellects of the world, and are therefore regarded as insoluble, though acknowledged as the perennial problems of philosophy. It is because the discussion of the fundamentals that is to say, of the perennial problems of philosophy, at the hands of metaphysics had yielded no fruitful results, that metaphysics has been pronounced as non-significant and non-cognitive, and the metaphysical propositions as non-sensical. In addition to sense experience and reason the Muslim philosophers have recognized institution as an avenue of knowledge and therefore, what has been pronounced as non-significant and non-cognitive on the grounds that it is in verifiable and non-empirical can still be meaningful, once it is granted that knowledge can also be gained through any by 'Wahy' (revelation). The revealed knowledge is absolutely certain, indubitable and eternal. Hence, these problems which are metaphysical in nature cannot be discussed or argued-intellect is too puny to understand to problems, since they are profound, mysterious and Transcendental.[30]

According to Cabriel Marcel (1889-1973), a French philosopher, questions relating to the nature of Allah, destiny of the human soul and the life hereafter are not 'problems', they are 'mysteries' in capable of being solved through the teachinques of inductive or deductive reasoning. Mysteries defy secentific or rational explanation and can be explained by an individual only through the strength of his imagination backward into remote past and forward into the unfathmoble future. One has to soar on the wings of imagination to lift the veil and witness reality, embedded in the 'mystry' in all its nakedness and pristine glory.[31]

Moreover, religious language is not non-congnitive and that the meaning of religious language can be determined by ways other than conceptual analysis: Lingustic Analysis, has done a good job in the realm of physical sciences. But has failed badly in the other fields of knowledge, like spirituality, morality and inuition.

The Quran presents before us many of its verses which lie beyond the competence of the method of Taffsir to reveal their meanings.

As applied to the Holy Book itself, where the method of Tafsir ends that of Ta'wil or hermeneutic interprelation begins which refers to the knowledge of the inner meaning of the sacred text. It is therefore concerned with the esoteric dimension of the Quranic reality, called "Tariqah" or "Tasawwuff" (sufism), which is submission to the objective revelational level of Insan with respect to both thought

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(Iman) and action (am al).[32]

The Quranic view divides the present world in which man lives into two halves: "The Domain of the unseen" (alam al-ghayb) and "the Domain of the visible ('al am al-Shahdah)—this is the major conceptual opposition discernible in the world-view of the Quran.

And these are the two basic forms of the whole world of beings which is nothing but the main stage on which the aforesaid Divine Commedia is enacted." Of these two, only the visible part is at man's disposal, while God reigns over both of them, as we are told, for example, in Quran at Zumar.

"Say—o Allah! Then creator of the heavens and the earth! than who knows the unseen (al-ghayb) and the visible (al-Shah-adah)."[33]

It is to be remarked that this distinction itself is meaningful only in reference to the basic epistemological capacity of the human mind. It is in other words, a distinction made purely from the human point of view, for, from the stand point of God, there can be noghyb at all. He is ommiscient, as the Quran declares so categorically and so repeatedly. All encampasses everything in knowledge:

According to Dr. Osman Baker the methodology of Tafsir of the Holy Book, as it has been developed traditionally, includes, especially the method of linguistic analysis. After dealing with various aspects of the Semantics of the Holy Quran viz-a-viz western Semantic philosophy an account of this traditional methodology of linguistic analysis naturally demands our attention.[34]

In this way we can say that the Quran as the revealed book of Allah solves the mysteries of life and death in categorical and unambiguous terms. Besides the Quran, there is the Sunnah, that is to say, the traditions, which record either the sayings or the doings of the prophet. In eddition to the Quran the Sunnah, there is shariah—the parth of duty outlined by the Quran and elaborated by the Sunnah of the Holy prophet. Besides the Quran, the Sunnah and the Shariah, there are ilmal-Ladunniy; and Hikmah, spiritual knowledge and wisdom, which can be obtained through the long continued practices of piety and righteousness.[35]

It must be known at the outset that the Quran was revealed according, to the linguistic paradigin of the Arabs. They had full command on their language, therefore they could easily understand the message of the Quran.[36]

III

For understanding the Quranic teachings, the knowledge of Arabic Language and its grammar, etymology and phrasiology is a prerequistite. The prophet has not taught the Arabic recitation of the Quran, only but its meaning too. The Quran in this manner was conveyed to them in letter and spirit. These Qurance verses bring this fact to fore.

"An apostte from Allah, reciting pure pages"[37]

II "————for surely he revealed it to your heart by Allahs' command——" [38]

III "So we have made it easy in your tongue that they may be mindful."[39]

According to the Quran itself, a man can't poner over a message, unless he understands it. For the same reason it has been said that "Allah revealed the "Arabic Quran" os that it may become intelligible to the people."

Moreover, the prophet determined the actual purport of various Quranic terms. Still there are

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some very common words find in the Quran. What should be our attitude towards such words:

Shah Walliallah says:

"Some times the difficulty in understanding a word or term stems from its being an uncommon word. The meanings of these words must be ascertained from the narrations of the companions (Shahabah) and the followers of the companians (Tabee'n) or the masters of these sciences."[40]

According to Ibn Taimiyah in the tafsir of even the older commentrators, we come across a difficulty in the interpretation of a word or term, itself, as there is possibility of more than one meanings of the same word.

For example the term "Qaswarah" which indicates both a person with an arrow and lion at one and the sametime. In the similar manner the terms like "As-Asah" also pose problems, as it means both the beginning and the end of the night. In case the meaning of the term is established, but only one singular meaning is to be accepted about such terms and in that case the meanings to such terms which have been assigned to them by the Fathers will be accepted."[41] We can't take the literal meanings of words in all cases. For example the "Quran" "Salat" Zakat" and "Hajj" are such words whose literal meanings are different from their technical usages, which are assigned by the Sharah Science.

-Ilm al- Ishitiqaq is also known as "Ilm al-Sarf" which deals with the usage of words and their applicability for different meanings from their original not meanings. The main purpose of "Ilm-al-Ishitiqaq' is to acquaint the student with a comprehensive knowledge of Arabic words and derivatives as well as to develop in him the aptitude of deriving unknown or from known words." As such this discipline is pursued mostly by the scholars and not by the general reader who contents himself with acquiring knowledge of only the conventional meanings of the words of the language.[42]

There is a verse in the Quran were the word "(Qist)" has been used for two altogether different senses at two places."In the first verse as a transgressions", and at other place the same word "Qist has been used for "Justice."

For such and other reasons the need for developing rules of grammar in the Quranic context was felt. Al-Zarakhshi says:

"A person who is not well conversant with the rules of Arabic grammar and language, should not venture to make the commentary on Quran. Ordinary acquaintance with the language will not be sufficient, as a single term of the Quran may possess possibility of various meanings (from varies etymological dimensions). Ever since the science of Arabic grammar and philosogy was invented by Abu Aswad al Du' ili of Basra, philosogical studies continued to be pursued by the Arabic scholars with great zeal and devotion. As a result, a large number of authors flourished who wrote books on different aspects of Arabic philology. They also laid down definite rules and principles of Arabic grammar."[43]

The term philology is used to denote all the sciences connected with the study of the Arabic language like grammar, lexigraphy, syntax, and style, etymology and rhetoric etc. etc. And since the source of all religious laws is the Quran and the Sunnah which are in Arabic, knowledge of all these science is necessary for religious scholars. Al-Miz-har-fil-Ulum-il-Lughah by Jalal-Din al-Suyti, according to Nawab Siddiq Hassan Khan of Bhipal is the first comprehensive book on the principles of Arabic philology.[44]

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Islamic scholars have proved with ample evidence that the miracle of the Quran lies in its language and eloquence. Hamidudin Farahi says:

"Unless a person is fully acquainted with the pre-Islamic poetry and the eloquence of the Arabis, complete understanding of the Quran is not possible. In case the statements and narrations of the campanians of the prophet and their followers don't throw light on the meanings of a Quranic verse, or for that matter, their sayings seem osensibly at variance to each other, then the return is to be made but to the Quran, the Sunnah and the Arabic Lexigraphy and phrasology. The unique (Mufradat) words will be understood by the help of dictionaries as well.[45]

Hazzrat Ibn Abbas said:

"The Arabic poetry is the register of the Arabs, when a complicacy arises in understanding the Quran, we approach it."

The other sciences for understanding Arabic books were also developed by the Arabs. According to Ibn Khalun the 'Ilm al-Bad' (the Science of rhetorial figures) is a sub-divison of 'Ilm al-Bayan (the Science of style) which originated in Islam after Arabic philology and Lexigraphy. It is included among the philological sciences as it is mainly concerned with words and ideas they convey and are intended to indicate. Rhetoric figures deal with the ways of the artistic ambelishment of speech. Moreover, a very important science was developed by the Arabs i.e. 'Ilm-al-Sarf (the science of etymology).[46]

There were people who indulged in explanation and eloboration of the uncommon words (Ghraybul-al-Quran). These people represented various tastes and interests of the scholars. Among them are included both the scholastic and juristic scholars. The tastes and interests of these scholars are depicted in these books, which they have written as commentaries on the Quran. Such two representative commentaries on Quran are written by Muhmud Bim Omar al-Zamakhshri (D538) and Muhmad Bin Abdullah Aaloosi (D1270) respectively, in the former commentary the author has put forward a linguistic interpretation of the Quran, laying emphasis on the historical and eloquence aspects of the Quranic language and in the latter commentary we find a sufistic interpretations of the Quran which is known also as "Tafsir Ishari" as well. [47]

There were many attempts made by Indian scholars to write books on Quran and the Quranic sciences. The most important work has been done in this field by Shah Walliullah of Delhi, who made a persian translation of the Quran with important exegesical notes. The second important work he did was to write a comprehensive book various Quranic sciences entitled "Al-Fauz-ul-al-Kabir" Fiu sul-al-Tafsir" In this short, but comprehensive book, Shah Walliullah has given novel interpretations and explanations to the problem of Tafsir, as *'Nasikh wal-Mansukh," Mutu Shiabiat and Muh Kamat" Mufradat and Gharayb"*. etc. etc.

The second important figure in this field was Nawab Siddia Hassan Khan of Bhopal who played more or less the same role in South Asian as was done by Rifaah al- Tah Tawi, Ahmad Faris al-Shidyaq and Muhamad bin Ali ai-Shwakhani etc. in raising the standared to Arabic Quranic philological studies in their respecitve lands. He wrote many books on the subject. One of his important books in this field is "Al-Bulaghah fi-usual-il-Lughah. He championed the cause of Arabic and IsIamic learning. He contributing to the popularization of Arabic and Islamic studies by writing, collecting, Translating and publishing books on both secular and religious subjects. He wrote on variety of subjects namely the Quran, Tradition jurisprudence, history, sufism, literature. He wrote about 3 hundred books on these

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subjects Arabic Persian and Urdu languages.[48]

Conclusion

Language is not only a tool of communication but also a great evidence of the creation of God. The Quran mentions that after the creation of man, he was not only taught "speach" (Bayan), but was best wed with the speaking organ lips and tongue (Lisanan wa Shafatain." The language is this sense can be regarded as a great favour of God, bestowed on man. All the languages have been recognized by the Quran as the signs of God on earth. Therefore, the superiority of any language qua-language can't be accepted in this broader Quranic frame work. We are told why an Arabic speaking prophet has been sent to the Arabs with an Arabic Revelation as follows:

"We have sent this down as an Arabic Quran that you may understand"[49] prophet (SAW) has made it clear that no edge can be given to an Arab on non-Arab in the same manner a red-complexioned man can't be treated superior to a black-complexioned man. Therefore, the bigotary or prejudice on the name of language is not allowed according to the lenets of IsIam.

Adam has been taught the names of all the things and the descriptions of those things may be made in different ways. But the content of the "names" remains same in all cases.

Therefore, this view about "Human Langue" is based on a realistic ground and in agreement with the demands of social cousciousness apart from being in consonance with the social philosophy of Durkheim and prof. Leo-Weisgerber of Bonn who since many years, has constantly emphasised the significane of human language as an intellectual process of world-formulation.

The Western somantics is merely concerned with the limited sphere of the analysis of language and in the words of wittgenestein, the sole remaining task for philosophy is the analysis of language. This was not the case always. Even in the eighteenth century philosophers considered the whole of human knowledge, including science to be their field and discussed questions such as: did the universe have a beginning? However, in the nineteenth and twenteeith centuries, science became too technical and mathematical for the philosophers. Where once language was symbolic, suggestive and provacatives, not it became prosaic and mathematical. As a symbol, language turns human mind to something sublime and noble, and by its imagery it suggests a world of reality, Transceding the world of appearance. But when it becomes mathematical, it loses its power to lift the human mind above the mundane and to furnish glimpses of what is transcendental and yet immanent. Under the influence of logical postivism and its offshoots, efforts was made, by people like carnap (1891-1970) in the United states to reduce all meaningful language to the language of mathematics.

But the semantics of the Quran is not governed by these limitations and restrictions. It is rather, related to a 'concrete' living and 'dynamic' antology and not the kind of this static systematic antology constituted by a philosopher at an abstract level of mathematical thinking. It provides a world view and according to Dr. Daud Rebbar "what is expected of a great book of revelation is not absolute logical consistency" but consistency of the dominance of an idea. Prophets do not offer philosophy, they offer wisdom of a type, a wisdom which has a dominant note."[50]

Moreover, al metaphysical and ethical levels Quran provides a complete set of spiritual and mystic guidelines and man can become capable of catching and receiving communications from the realism of the supernatural and the transcendantal. What is needed is that a person should first detach himself from the mundane reality and then align himself with the spritual and the Divine reality. Thus a

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person will remain under the shadow of the sacred.

It is in this sense that the mystic exegesis of the Quran is on paramount importance and interest to a semantist."Moreover, God reveals Himself, but he does so only through his "AyAt" "signs" And man is allowed to know God only through the 'ayat', that is natural things and natural phenomona understood as so many "signs" indicative of Divine goodness, majesty and power."

These all subjects have been discussed in detail by the scholars of the Quranic Science. They have remained closely attached to the basic frame work of the Quranic world-view and have presented their views to substantiate the teachings of the Quran by their theoririzations and analysis. They developed various philological and semantic throries to express their beliefs. Ilm-al-Istiqaq' Ilm al-"Sarf"; "Nasikh wal-Man sukh", Ilm al-Badi" and Ilm" al-Balaga" were employed for this process. Lang before these sciences were developed al-Farabi had made a classification of the science of language as follows:

Syntax, Grammar, pronounciation and speach and poetry.

Many people like Jalaluddin Suyuti; Burhanudd in Zarakshi, Ibn Taimiyah, Shah-Walli Ullah Dehlvi and Nawab Siddiq Hassan Khan also contributed substantially in this field.

But the final remark deserves our attention that the language in which the revealed knowledge is communicated may not be clear or may be ambiguous; what is needed to make such knowledge clear and definite one. Eloborate and complicated instruments of modern researches, enquiries in the fields of linguistic, may not be enough or the old interpretations may not meet the requirements of the age we are passing through. Hence to tely entirely on the past precedents and solutions of these problems may be disasstrous.[51]

The methodlogy of Tafsir of the Holy Book, as it has been developed traditionally, including, especially the method of linguistic analysis, must constitute integral component of the over all methodology of Islamic science, that is to be revived in the modern world.

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Appendix—I

The Sources of Iqbal's Thought

There is a controvery on the originality of Iqbal's philosophy and thought. The queries were raised, whether Iqbal was deep rooted in the basic Islamic traditions of the Quran and Hadith ? Or was he basically an eclectic thinker, who has drawn deeply from the Eastern and Western sources without any qualifications. Or was he an original thinker, who has harnessed all positive and progressive elements of religion, philosphy and Sufism in his system of thought in a very creative manner and came out with an altogether new philosophy of his own. In the following pages we shall try to determine the real position of Iqbal vis-a-vis his sources of inspiration.

To begin with, the Quran, the traditions of the prophet and the mystic philosophy of Maulana Rumi are the cardinal and fundamental sources of Iqbal's thought and poetry. Iqbal gave altogether novel interpretation to various Quranic verses. He in the same way developed a very innovative concept of time on the basis of a "hadith-i-Qudsi". As far as influence of the Rumis' poetry on Iqbal is concerned, we find that Iqbal not only quotes different verses of Rumi in his lectures, but also uses the similies, metaphors, phrases and even the titles adopted by Rumi to elaborate on various of his theories. The western sources from which Iqbal drew largely found their place among just as a "supplmentary methodological data" in order to make his Islamic themes explicit in a terminology with which the modern mind was conversant.

"Every speculative system known to the world", says B.A. Dar, "is invariably based on one or more fundamental principles a thinker accepts as basic and on which he builds the whole superstructure of his philosophy. In the course of its composition he is bound to be influenced by his predecessors".

No philosophical system of the world is absolutely original. Iqbal is not an exception. The thought system of Iqbal is inspired and enhanced by his predecessors, as he is an eclectic philosopher. To be an eclectic is not any deficiency, all great philosophical thinkers were in one way or the other eclectic. This may be the case of Plato, Kant, Ghazzali or Ibn Sina.

But it should be noted that Iqbal's method of acquisition of thoughts and concepts was critical and according to the norms he had prescribed for his thought system. Iqbal's thought system was based on cardinal Islamic traditions and values. But in the exposition of them, he borrowed the style from the western scholars and philosophers.

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This is the secret behind is reputation and recognition in the contemporary world, both East and west.

Iqbal is a Muslim and as such he was thoroughly conversant with the cultural history of Islam in all its aspects. This culture he imbibed during his early years partly through he influence of his parents and mostly from his contact with his famous teacher at Sialkot.

The study of the Quran, the traditions of the Prophet and the Persian mystic writings, all these form the solid background of his thought.

The atmospher in which he was brought up served for him as the starting point and the critics shall be saved much misunderstanding if this basic fact is fully grasped. It was only after he had undergone this preliminary training that he began the study of Western philosophy and, of course, he studied it critically according to the particular point of view which Islam had engenedered in him.

Here I want to mention one very important fact i.e. Iqbal regarded the Western civilization as the culmination of the scientific spirit which ws generated by the teachings of the Quran. He has expressed this fact in his classic *Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam* as follows:

"The most remarkable phenomenon of modern history, however, is the enormous rapidity with which the world of Islam is spiritually moving towards the West. There is nothing wrong in this movement, for European culture, on its intellectual side, is only a further development of some of the most important phases of the culture of Islam." In a more convincing way the same fact is brought out by Iqbal when he says:

"The political fall of Islam in Europe unfortunately took place, roughly speaking, at a moment when Muslim thinkers began to see the futility of deductive science and were fairly on the way to building inductive knowledge. It was practically at this time that Europe took up the task of research and discovery. Intellectual activity in the world of Islam practically ceased from this time and Europe began to reap the fruits of the labours of Muslim thinkers....It is not at all an exaggeration to say that the fruits of modrn European humanism in the shape of modern science and philosophy are in many ways only a further development of Muslim Culture."

Moreover, Iqbal's concern with the views of the European philosophers is governed by the Prophetic guideline i.e.

"A word of wisdom is the lost property of a believer, wherever he finds it, he must pick it up" Here a very important explanation warrants our attention. In the Quran there is this categorical statement:

"On this day, have I perfected your religion". It means that religion is sent now in perfect form. Muslims don't need extraneous sources of guidance in fundamental matters, although, they may of course, look for guidance which is not found in the Quran and the Sunnah, in terms of technology, science and new concepts. In other words, in material development they can look to the East and the West. For good guidance believer may seek wisdom wherever it comes to him.

These are the things which are not considered fundamental, but supplementary, or instrumental things to make our life better in material terms.

Iqbal's concern with or acquisition of the Western thoughts is indicative of this second category of the matters, while as his fundamental source of inspiration was the Quran and the traditions of

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Prophet Muhammad (SAW). I am not in full agreement, with those writers who are of the opinion that Iqbal derived much from the philosophical trends of the West without examining them critically while as we know that he did not agree with those philosophical notions of the western thinkers which are contrary to the tenets of Islam.

Dr. Taseer's statement That "Iqbal tried to reach the real spirit of European Culture and then presented Islam in the light of modern European thoughts", however, does not mean that Iqbal was the blind supporter of European Culture and philosophy, he, on the contrary meant by appreciating European culture and thought that there are some elements of relevance between Islam and this culture and thought system.

As Iqbal himself says:

"I never begged any one for eyes to see with. I never looked at the universe but through my own eyes". Dr. Ali Shariati evaluates the status of Iqbal in the following words:

"Iqbal as a Philosopher, went to Europe. He understood European philosophical thought. He was a philosopher of the Twenteith Century. But he never remained subservient to the Western thought. He rather, conquered the West".

So this assumption is totally fallacious and misleading that the philosophy of Iqbal is the echo of Bergson, Neitzshe, and other European philosophers. But he was above all an original thinker. In spite of his erudition and vast culture, he never echoed borrowed ideas. However, we cannot deny that the philosophy of Iqbal finds its roots in Quran, atleast, in its broader outines. The poet refers to it unceasingly and he has scattered throughout his works copious notes which bear witness to his anxiety not to deviate from the way marked out by the prophet. Prof. Asloob Ahmad Ansari writes:

"....the fundamental and perennial sources of inspiration for Iqbal as poet and thinker is the Quranic and the personality of the holy prophet, Mohammed" On the same subject another scholar of Iqbalian studies. Prof. Sabih Ahmad Kamali says:

"Iqbal is an author whose works in prose and verse furnish, evidence of a deep and persistant Quranic influence".

He writes further:

"In a study of the Quranic influence on Iqbal, his lectures may serve as convenient point of departure. Short of writing a regular and full commentary (Tafsir), he has had occasion in them for the reaffirmation of much of what he had learned from the Quran as a result of his life-long devotion to it. Unlike his poetical writings (in Urdu and Persian), the lectures present him as a methodical analyst of the Quranic dicta quoting chapter and verse, and providing lucid translations (which seem to be his own)".

Nicholson in his translation of Iqbal's *Asrari-Khudi* has tried to reach the reasonable assessment of Iqbal's philosophy and its real nature. He says that: Iqbal has drunk deep European literature, his philosophy owes much to Nietzsche and Bergson and, his poetry often reminds us of Shelley. Yet he thinks and feels as a Moslem, and just for this reason his influence must be great. He is a religious enthusiast inspired by the vision of a new Mecca, a world-wide theocratic utopian state in which all Moslems no longer divided by the barriers of race and country, shall be one." He continued:

The cry "Back to the Koran, Back to Mohammad" has been heard before and the responses

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have hitherto been some what discouraging."

If we consider, for example, only the following verse of the Quran, which has been cited in the *Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam,* Iqbal's innovative interpretation of the Quran will become evident. About the famous "Taqwin Passage" (Quran 95, 4-6) Iqbal says:

"Endowed with a most suitable adjustment of faculties, he (man) discovers himself down below in the scale of life surrounded on all sides by the forces of obstruction. "That of the goodest fabric we created man, then brought him down to the lowest of the low".

And how do we find him in this environment" A "restless" being engrossed in his ideals to the point of forgetting everything else".

Iqbal believed that the Quran supported him in his dynamic view of reality.

"To my mind", said Iqbal,

"Nothing is more alien to the Quranic outlook than the idea that the Universe is the temporal working out of preconceived plan. The Universe, according to the Quran, is liable to increase. It is a growing Universe and not an already completed product which left the hand of its maker ages ago, and is now lying stretched in space as a dead mass of matter to which time does nothing, and consequently is nothing".

In these two passages, we fairly come across with Iqbal's treatment of the themes of man and the Universe on the authority of the Quranic teachings. He goes to a greater length in discussing the rise and fall in the Quranic scheme of things and also deliberates on the nature of this Universe in the framework of the revealed book in a convincing manner.

Yousuf Saleem Chisti remarked that whaever Iqbal said in his two famour poetic books *Asrar-i-khudi* and *Ramoze-Bay-Khudi* was in one way or the other originally derived from the view point of a Muslim. He made the Quran the foundation of his philosophic though Iqbal's poetry consists of five broad topics 1. Affirmation of Ego 2. Consciouness of Ego. 3. Training of Ego. 4. Completion of Ego. 5. Fruits of the Comletion of Ego. Then the said author has traced out the Quranic roots of each and showed that all the views and themes of Iqbal's poetry are derived and inspired by the teachings of the Quran.

Iqbal wanted honestly to convey the Quranic message to the humanity. Iqbal feels embarassed if his poetry is seen and regarded for some other purpose rather than this.

Iqbal has relied on the prophetic traditions for developing his important theories pertaining to the themes of time and space, morality and culture etc. apart from his complete reliance on the Quran. In this, way the Sunnah or the prophetic traditions were his second source of inspiration. To explain this point we find a reference to a prophetic tradition in the following verses of Iqbal:

"Our time, which has neither beginning not end.

Blossoms from the flower-bed of our mind.

To know its root quickens the living with new life.

Its being is more splendid than the dawn life is to Time, and time is of life.

'Do not abuse time' was the command of prophet".

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In his lectures Iqbal refers to this Hidith with more details. He says:

"In fact, this mysterious swing and impulse of the universe, the noiseless swim of time which appears to us, human beings, as the movement of day and night, is regarded by the Quran as one of the greatest signs of God".

"God causeth the day and the night to take their turn. Verily in this is teaching for men of insight (24:44)".

"This is why", says Iqbal, "the prophet said: "Do not vilify time, for time is God". And this immensity of time and space carries in it the promise of a complete subjugation by man whose duty is to reflect on the signs of God, and thus discover the means of realizing his conquest of nature as an actual fact".

In *Bhukhari,* a Hadith is narrated from prophet by Abu Hurairah: that Muhammad (SAW) said:

"God says that the son of Adam teases me (when) he abuses and vilifies time (Inspite of that) I am Dahr, the affair is in my hand, I alter and change nights and days".

In the explanation of this Hadith, Hafiz Hajar al-Asqalani says:

"The people (pagan Arabs) used to say that days and nights destroy us and we are killed and survived by them. It means that the abuse of the time was the teasing of the Pagan Arabs".

The meaning of "Anna-Dahr" says Khittabi "is, I am the master of time, God controls and maintains the affairs which are attributed to time. So one who abuses Dahr assuming that it is the performer of these affairs actually abuses God, so to abuse time is synonymous with the abuse of God who is their performer".

That God is "Dahr", indicates that good and evil, happiness and grief which is attributed to time, its real originator is God. So when any one abuses the origination, he abuses God indirectly. The other meaning of this Hadith is said to be that the control and maintencance, which is seen in the universe, is generated by God, He has grip over the affairs of the Universe.

In Sahih Muslim the same hadith is narrated as follows:

"The meaning of the Hadith Qudsi is that the man abused time, while as Allah has been identified with time as He controls days and nights. In an another narration of the same Hadith, Allah says that a man teases me when he abuses time, inspite the fact that I am (Master of) time as I change days and nights." Yet is an another narration of the same Hadith Allah says that man teases me by saying 'curse be on time'. Therefore none of you should say curse be on time as Allah is the (Master of) time and he changes days and nights. Moreover, He says when-even I will like I will cease their revolution".

As already mentioned Iqbal has given a novel interpretation to this Hadith which, in some cases seems in contradiction with the classical interpretations of the same as rendered by Asqalany, Khittabi and Abu-Muslim-Al-Asfahani etc.

Maulana Rumi's Mathnawi can easily be regarded as a third source of Iqbal's inspiration. It can be considered a model for Iqbal's use of Quranic elements. Iqbal has described himself as the Rumi of the modern age. The impact of Rumi on Iqbal is very glaring and evident in almost all aspects of

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Iqbal's philosophy. His views about intuitions, infinte Ego, biological evolution etc. are largely influenced by Rumi's *Mathnawi*. According to Ali Shariati Iqbal was very fond of Maulana Rumi and was his follower.

This introduction to the sources of Iqbal's philosophical development show clearly that the main sources of Iqbal's thought are Islamic ones.

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Appendix–II

Ghazzali and Natural Sciences

It is a great irony on our part that we have never tried to assess and determine the actual stand point of our classical Muslim thinkers on the basis of in-depth researches by relying on the original writings of the thinkers. Contrary to it, we accept the distorted, maligned andsometimes forged portryats of them, rendered by the hands of the orientalists and other vested interests. Same is the case with one of the greatest intellectuals of Islam and Hujjat-ul-Islam, Immam-abu Hamid Ghazzali. Peter Avery and John Health Studds in their introduction to the English version of the "The Rubaiyat of Ommar Khayyam" have deliberately attempted to distort and misrepresent Ghazzalian position vis-a-vis sciences. We are quoting them so that the discussion we are going to make on "Ghazzali and Natural Sciences" will become more relevant and interesting:

"Ali Ibn Zaid narrates a meeting between Khayyam and the philospher Al-Ghazzali, which seems to have been unfruitful and unfriendly. Al-Ghazzali wrote a work, "Tahafat al-Falasifah" (Destruction philosophorum) which aimed to demolish the philosphy of Avicenna. It would have been surprising of this opponent of the Greek learning had felt any sympathy for a man like Khayyam, when he somewhat perfunctority asked a question on astronomy. "Khayyam,'s answer as so prolix that he appeared to be dodging the issue and he had not finished speaking when a muezzin gave the call to mid day prayers from a nearby mosque. Al-Ghazzali immediately rose to his feet and said, "Truth has come and falsehood vanished, verily what is false is bound to vanish" a quotation from the Koran by which Al-Ghazzali implied the falsity of Khayyams' opinion."

This is all on the basis of which some people think that Ghazzali was responsible for the arrest of scientific discoveries among the Muslims.

In the following pages a brief survey of Ghazzali's treatment to the natural sciences is made to ascertain his actual position vis-a-vis natural sciences.

At the outset I want to make two very important methodological observations, which can prove helpful for discussing any of the various scientific or philosophical aspects of Al-Ghazzalis' life. First is that in Ghazzali's times mathematics, physical sciences and philosophy were not yet totally distin-

**Lec. S.H. Instt. of Islamic Studies University of Kashmir, Srinagar.*

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guished from one another.[1] Second is that the study of the development of Islamic Sciences is a task that need to be carried out in a proper manner and by Muslims themselves, that is, those who have breathed in the atmospher of Islamic Culture and their intellectual maturity in this environment and are intimately familiar with these sciences. This task can never be carried out in a adequate manner by an orientalist who has grown up in some other intellectual environment and breathed in another atomsphere.[2]

If we notice keenly the classifications of science which Ghazzali has rendered in his various books a glaring excellence of Ghazzalis' methodology becomes discernible which warrants for our profoundest appreciation. Ghazzali gave his conclusions about philosophical sciences in his 'Al-munqidh minal dalal' (deliverer from error). According to Ghazzalis' classification the philosophical sciences were six in number i.e., mathematics, logic, natural sciences, theology (or meta-physics), politics and ethics. In this book, according to M. Watt, al-Ghazzali retains his philosophical and intellectual bonesty.[3] In "Tahfatul al-falasifah", Ghazzali accepted the findings of mathematics, science and logic and employed the weapons of Aristotelianism against the Greek philosophy, mainly its version as propounded by Ibn Sina and Farabi Ghazzali argued against the philosophers' position with regard to religious doctrines point by point and revealed both its self-contradictions and its in sufficiency from the religious and philosophical point of view.[4]

"Al-Ghazzali has been acclaimed as the greatest Muslim after Muhammad (SAW), and is certainly one of the greatest".[5] This statement of Watt shows the religious and intellectual importance of al-Ghazzali as admitted also by some moderate and unbiased western scholars. To quote Watt again, he was one of "the great intellectuals of Islamic Society."[6] Some of the western scholars and their baffled Muslim followers, regard Ghazzali as one of the spiritual personalities of Islam yet do not give him any philosophical and scientific status, for example, Henry Corbin prefers to all him "The most ardent critic of philosophy.[7]" But al-Ghazzali's intellectual and scholarly attainments show that apart from his "great rectitude", he embodied in his person and doctrine "a synthesis between heartfelt religious piety and philosophical objectivity; and an almost scientific precision in the manner in which he gave expression to it."[8]

His critique of knowledge, in which he showed the scope and limits of human knowledge in the manner reminiscent of Bertrand Russell is evidently an aspect of philosophy not merely of theology.[9]

We can also appreciate Ghazzalis' contribution to science and philosophy through his book *'Maqasi-dul-al-Falasifah'*, (the aims of the philosophers) is which Ghazzali gave an objective statement of the doctrines of Physics, logic, meta-physics, ethics and epistemology without any criticism of his own.[10]

Ghazzali, no doubt argued powerfully against Neoplatonism in "Tahafat", but on the other hand, he was carried away by admiration for Aristotelian syllogistic logic and wrote several books about it and thus introduced it to other theologians and jurists for whom the books of the philosophers were inaccessible or technically difficult.[11] For example, he wrote "Miyarul al-Ilam" and "Al-Qistasul-Al Mustaqeem" on the subject. In this way al-Ghazzali used superior Neoplatonic including Aristotelian methods and concepts which he had learnt from Ibn Sina and others.[12]

According to Ibn Khaldun "Ghazzali was the first theologian to write according to the way of the moderns."[13] It is for these reasons that al-Ghazzali is described as a "prophetic-intellectual". He spoke to his follows in terms of the highest thought of his time.[14]

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It was al-Ghazzalis' introduction of the methods and vocabulary of philosophy whch made possible the further development of the Kalam in the works of Fakhra al-Din al-Razi, al-Jili, al-Taftazani and others.[15]

According to S. Kocabas, Ghazzali was indeniably one of the greatest thinkers of the eastern world of Islam in the classical period.[16] Nasr says that much studies have not been devoted to thephilosophical dimensions of this "opponent of philosophy.[17]

He says further that in Ghazzalis' writings there is much concern for the question of knowledge and gnosis and his writings in this field have wielded much influence upon later Islamic philosophers and theologians, such as Mulla Sadra and Shah Waliuallah of Delhi. Likewise Ghazzali was concerned with the classification of the sciences.[18]

According to Nasr Ghazzalis' significance in the Islamic intellectual tradition needs to be reappraised. He was not only an opponent of Islamic philosophy or the science. Nor was he simply the savour of Islamic thought against the attacks of reason. Least of all was he simply a forerunner of Descartes. Ghazzalis' thought is possessing many dimensions and his impact upon the later Islamic thought including philosophy is much more extensive and nuanced than is reflected in most of contemporary scholarship concerning him.

Nasr brings this important point to our notice that Ghazzali defended reason and its role in acquiring knowledge although he pointed out the necessity of making reason subservient to both revelation and the intellect. He also not only defended logic but wrote several important works on it. In both of these attitudes he stands with philosophers against certain theologians and jurists. Furthermore, Ghazzalis' criticism of philosophy was itself of a philosophical character. The philosophic nature of Ghazzalis' criticism can be seen especially in the discussion of the 'created' or 'eternal' nature of the world, a discussion to which Ibn Rushd was to return in detail in his *'Tahafut al-Tahafut'*. Ghazzalis' philosophical concern can be seen also in his poemical works against Ismalism.[19]

However, Ghazzali objects only the claim of a class of people who believe in the superiority to others due to their indulgence in natural sciences.[20]

A great Jewish scholar Hawa Lazarus says that Ghazzali saw no contradiction between the rational and the traditional sciences, and he believed that they complemented each other. No man should content himself with the study of only one of them. The rational sciences are compared to food, while as the traditional ones are compared to medicine, and the human body needs both.[21]

Ghazzali says, "how can we oppose intellect or reason, when Allah has praised it".[22] He says further "that the example of reason is that of an eye and that of Shariah is that of the sun"[23].

According to M.N. Roy al-Ghazzalis' views were a long ahead of his time. Experimental science as he visualized, was not yet possible. In the absence or infancy of technology, the nature of object could not be so mathematically ascertained as the philosopher wished. Therefore in his later years, al-Ghazzali, fell into mysticism, but his fall was not more strikingly inglorious than that of Kant. Objective drawbacks clipped the interpid wings of the soaring spirit of the Arab thinker, whereas subjective predilection of class interest overwhelmed the critical genius of Kant.[24]

It is the criticism of Ghazzali, which some people take as a negative point of his thought, but in fact Ghazzalis' attack on philosophers was not, in all respects, destructive, but it also possessed constructive and positive elements as well, despite harsh tone and insufficiency of argumentation.[25]

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Ghazzali highlighted the lofty aspects of philosophy as well as religion and marked the distinctions and particularities of both. He elaborated the objectives put forward by the philosophers in such a detailed manner that his analysis is a unique master-piece.[26]

To quote Hawa Lazarus once more; "It should be remarked here that though he deals mainly with philosophical terms concerned with metaphysics, that holds true also for other philosophical disciplines such as logic. It is well-known fact that al-Ghazzali tried to propagate this science, as well as mathematics and other sciences among the masses and fought the prejudice of the theologians against these sciences. He even considered this prejudice to be a sin that endangers and weakens religion unnecessarily.[27]

M.N. Roy further says that he anticipated Descartes, in reducing the standard of truth of self-consciouness. He stands out as the connecting link between the antiquity and modern scepticism.[28]

He comments further, "the principle of acquiring exact knowledge, started nearly a thousand years ago by the Muslim savant, still holds good as then; and the scientific out-look which makes such knowledge possible, is still comparatively rare among the Indians, who even in these days of the twentieth century allow themselves to be impressed by feats of magic and spiritual charlatanism, and credit-self consciouness, he found the judge of correctness of the perception of sense.[29]

It becomes quite evident a fact that to allege Ghazzali as the opponent of reason and science is figment of imagination of these scholars, who don't know exactly the essence of Ghazzalis' works. It is convincingly put forward by Hawa Lazarus, M. Watt, Hossein Nasr, M.N. Roy, Prof. Ab. Salam and many others that Ghazzali was in no manner anti reason or anti science rather he provided a strong argument in their favour.

The problems of epistemology are the most important problems of philosophy. Ghazzali solved the problem of knowledge and certitude by affirming a degree of comprehension that left no room for doubt, a comprehension that is the essential apprehension of things. Ghazzali was in search of such knowledge which would not leave any room for doubt.[30] He says:

> *"I am looking for knowledge of what things really are, a I must undoubtedly try to find what knowledge is, that knowledge in which the object is disclosed in such a fashion that no doubt remains alongwith it".*[31]

Since Ghazzali was a scholar, jurist, he had to deal with logical questions considerably.[32]

Ghazzali produced a number of legal works, such as Al-Basit, Al-Waziz, which are among the fundamental works on the Shafi's school of Fiqh. 'Al-Mustasfa' is Ghazzali's outstanding contribution to the sources of Islamic law and continues to be regarded even after 900 years as the most important work on the basiscs of jurisprudence in Islam.[33]

As regards mathematical and other natural sciences Ghazzali sees no scope for objection. In "Tahafut" he says:

> "As regards mathematics, there is no point in denying or opposing in it".[34]

About the matters which are established by astronomical and mathematical evidence, which have no room for doubt, Ghazzali has no intention to dispute them. Contrary to this, he regards it a great harm to religion that some people may criticise these matters in an immethodical manner, for example as in the case of Lunar eclipse some people refute the beliefs of philosophers about this matter, but

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Ghazzali makes strong objection to these people and says that when astronomical and mathematical evidences have established the beliefs of the philosophers, there is no scope for such opposition.[35] In this way his views about astronomy and mathematics are of progressive kind.

Geometry and arthmatic are to Ghazzali subjects of philosophy, to debarring them from people will prove harmful except, from the person who might be led by their study to blame worthy sciences.[36]

About physics, Ghazzali held that only some of its parts may contradict the Law and the true religion, and are, therefore, futile. Ghazzali classified these all subjects under different sciences. He says further that in it we study the qualities of the different substances, their properties, transmutation and change. This part according to Ghazzali resembles the researches of physicians except that the physician studies the human body, particularly the cause of its diseases and cures, while as physists study all substances from the stand point of change and motion.[37]

Ghazzali gives more importance to the motive of a man rather then assessing people by indulging in particular branches of science. It is for the same reason that Ghazzali says:

> *"The physician can come closer to God through his knowledge and would be rewarded for it because he labours for God. The magistrate, too, mediates between his subjects for the sake of God and would therefore meet His approval and be rewarded, not because he holds answerable according to the science of religion, but because he is entrusted with a work intended to draw men closer to God."*[38]
>
> *In this way Ghazzali says that no subject itself is praiseworthy or blameworthy, what makes it so is the intention or the use of it. Even theology can become a veil in the attainment of true knowledge, if the intention of its possessor is not good. Ghazzali has gone to the extent of saying that even the knowledge of magic is better than ignorance, as knowledge leads to dynamism and ignorance to inertia and stagnation.*[39]

Therefore, the main objective of Ghazzali's classification and rebuttle was rather to save Muslims from the doubts and deviations which are created by the irresponsible and unqualified adherence of the philosophers to the foreign philosophy, without subjecting these alien thought patterns to evaluation and criticism. Therefore, he launched his scheme for wholesome reform. He needed an ideologically motivated team of devoted workers which he fortunately found in a large number of his disciples, like Imam Abu Tahir Ibrahim, Qadi Abu Nasr Ahmed Bin Abdullah, Abu Mansur said bin Muhammad, who purified the society on the one hand, and on the other ran the affairs of the state on true Islamic lines. Thus, before his death, al-Ghazzali, had already done more than necessary to awaken the sleeeping conscience of the Muslim world, and bring about a pleasant revolution both in thought and action of the faithful. The exalted idealism which breathes in the teachings of al-Ghazzali, did not only inspire the actions of his contemporaries but during the century following his death, it also modelled the time of noblest men in Islam. Sovereigns like Salahudin Ayyubi and heroes like Nurruddin Zangi have found is it their guiding star.[40]

Ghazzali calls knowledge to be a value in itself. His discussion concerning this aspect is very interesting. In his classic "Ihya ul Uloom al Din". Ghazzali, gives a full detail of the sciences included among "Fard-al-Kifayah". He says:

> *"It should be known that a necessary duty is not distinguished from other duties except when the different sciences are enumerated. These are divided in relation to the kind of duties we*

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are considering into Shariyah (ordained) and ghayr Shariyah (Mundane) sciences. By Shariyah sciences I mean these which have been acquired from the prophets and are not arrived at either by reason, like arthmatic, or by experimentation, like medicine or by hearing like langauge".[41]

Ghazzali further gives another classification of sciences Shariyah (Ordained) and ghayr shariyah (Mundane). To him mundane sciences are sub-divided into praiseworthy (Mahmud) and blameworthy (Madhmum) and permissible (Mubah) sciences.

Praiseworthy sciences are those on whose knowledge the activities of life depend such as medicine and arithmatic. These are such kind of sciences which prove meritorious in our life if not obligatory.[42]

Ghazzali elevated all beneficial sciences to the status of praiseworthy knowledge. He says,

"Sciences whose knowledge is deemed as "Fard al-Kifayah", comprises every science which is indispensable for the welfare of this world, such as medicine which is necessary for the life of the body, arithmatic for daily transactins and the division of legacies and inheritances, as well as others besides".[43]

The very name of praiseworthy sciences is related to the transmission of knowledge that determines the welfare of the mundane world. Medicine, artithematics etc. can be included in this category.

Moreover, Ghazzali includes the sciences of agriculture, weaving, politics even cupping and tailoring among the sciences which are the "Fard al-Kifayah".

He observes with this regard,

"No one should be astonished if we say that medicine as well as arithmatics are of the sciences which are 'Fard al-Kifayah', because the fundamental industries are also the same, such as agriculture, weaving, politics, even cupping and tailoring. For should a town lack cupper extinction would overtake its people and they would be driven to expose themselves to destruction. He not He who has sent down the malady also sent down the remedy, given guidance for its use, and prepared the means for administering it ? It is not therefore permissible to expose oneself to destruction by neglecting the remedy".[44]

To Ghazzali religious sciences are never separated from mundane activities but deal with them adequately. As there is a closer link in the affairs of life, the sciences too should treat life in its wholeness, Ghazzali holds:

"Upon my life I declare that jurisprudence is also concerned with religion, not directly but indirectly. Therefore, the affairs of this world, because this world is the preparation for the hereafter, and there is no religion without it.

"Furthermore, the state and religion are twins. Religion is the foundation while as the state is guard, that which has not foundation will certainly crumble and that which has not a guard is naught".[45]

Ghazzali was not happy with the state of affairs of the Muslims of his period as almost all students were interested in the science of jurisprudence on the cost of all other beneficial and praiseworthy sciences. He says with a regretful manner:

"How many a town has no physician except from among the followers of protected religions (dhimmah) whose testimony according to the laws of jurisprudence, should not be accepted. However,

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we see no Muslim practising medicine, but on the contrary all ravel in jurisprudence, especially in controversy and polemics".[46]

These all facts, observations by the great scholars and the quotations from the books of Ghazzali lead us to conclude that Ghazzali's approach to sciences, including natural sciences was never negative. Since in the times of Ghazzali these sciences were included in the study of philosophy, therefore, Ghazzali's concern with philosophy and classification of its various branches explains fairly his positive and scientific approach to natural sciences.[47]

To blame Ghazzali for the decadence and degeneration in the Muslim world is a share ignorance and travesty of the facts, there were other external reasons like the Mangol Invasion, etc. responsible for this state of affairs.[48]

Let us try to discover this great genius and profound intellectual from his original and principal works and achievements. By relying on the sterio-type distorted writings of the orientalists, no fruitful and authentic work can be done pertaining to the remarkable aspects of the personality of Immam Ghazzali. Ghazzali showed the limitations of philosophy and science. He gave to all branches of sciences their due recognition vis-a-vis Shariyah Sciences.

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    "Were any one to say to you that the Middle Ages are sterile, quote to him one of the names already mentioned or any of the following; al-Razi, Thabit Ibn Qurrah, al-Farabi, Ibrahim Ibn-Sinan, al-Masudi, al-Tabari, al-Biruni, Ibn-Sina, al-Ghazzali, al-Zarqali...These men had no contemporary equivalents in the West. In their day the most original and most pregnant works of science were composed in Arabic by them. Obviously they were endowed with a great talent of native scientific aptitude". p. 233.
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Appendix—III

Indo-Iranian Relations—An Intellectual and Philosophical Legacy of Interaction Between Iran and India During Medieval Period

There had been cultural and intellectual exchanges between Iran and India from the times immemorial. During the Medieval period, Ghorids, Ghaznavids, Sultans and Mughals have facilitated this process of health and promising exchange between these two great countries in a clandestine manner. We find that from Imam Fakhruddin Razi to Fataullah Shirazi, a galaxy of Iranian scholars and scientists have substantially shaped the edifice of knowledge in a phenomenal manner, and the philosophical and scientifc traditions of Iran coupled with the significant intellectual developments which took place in Iran, have influenced India in more than one way. Firstly, many Iranian scholars, philosophers and scientists arrived to India and established their own centres, where they taught rational sciences to their Indian counterparts. Secondly, the disciples of some stalwart Iranian luminaries, such as Jalaludin Dawani, Sharif Jurjani and Mir Damad, came to India and exerted tremendous influence on the advancement of the intellectual trends in India. Thirdly, the important philosophical treatises of the Iranian scholars where translated into Indian languages and thus dissemination of the ideas contained there in was made possible, resulting in an unparalleled interaction which came to fore in the subsequent years during the medieval period. In this paper we will mention some of the aspects of this intellectual and philosophical exchange between Iran and India.

To start with Imam Razi, and Iranian philosopher, was responsible for spreading philosophy in the province of Ghor and the domanis under the Ghorids. The latter part of sixth century saw the culmination of rational sciences, which was the period of Imam Razi. Many disciples of Razi arrived in India and spread the sciences of philosophy and rational sciences in India. Moreover, Qutbuddin Razi's many disciples also came to India, like Mir Fazhllah Angu, who was the teacher of Feroz shah Bahman. The history shows that there had been close relationship between Iran and India especially during the Moghal period also in the matters of exchange of knowledge and transfer of intellectual sciences. The masters of various sciences have remained attached to the Moghal courts and thus the exchange of knowledge has remained their basic concern. Imam Ghazzali's book Ihya Ulum al-Din was translated

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into Persian by Fadil Myyid Jurjani, which had a great impact on the development of rational sciences in India. Qutb al-Din Kashani came to Multan from Iran during Nasir al-Din Muhammad Shah's rule (644/1246-664/1266) and the Sultan built a madrasah for him, where the former worked as Shaykh al Jamiah (head of the institution). Muhammad Tughluq (ruled 725/1325-752/1351) deputed Muin al-Din to bring Qadi Azdul al-Din, the author of theological and philosophical work al-Mawaqif, from Shiraz. But the latter declined to come and preferred to stay in Shiraz. Shaykh Aziz Allah Tulumbi recommended that al-Mawaqif and Matali, the famous matephysical and theological works of Qadi Azdul al-Din should be included in the syllabus of the educational institutions in India, and thus studied throughout the country. A traditionalist and a philosopher, Rafi al-Din Shirazi, a student of Jal uddin Dawani was invited Shiraz to each Hadith and related subjects in India. Sikandar Lodhi (ruled 894/1489-932/1517) was interested in philosophical traditions and many works of Hadith, philosophy etc were translated into Persian on his order.

The Moghals patronized Iranian scholars like the disciples of Sad al-Din al-Taftazani and al-Sharf al-Jurjani, as the both were the important lights in the court of Taymur and when Himayun came to India, he was accompanied by important Iranian scholars like Bayrum Ḵhan, Sajjd Ali and Abd Samad, when he regained power in 950/1556. These scholars brought with them the newly developed philosophical traditions of Persia and introduced these in India. The golden age of rational sciences in India starts with Jalal-Din Akbar (ruled 961/1556-1014/1606). Mir Fath Allah Shirazi was an eminent exponent of Aristotellian illuminist philosophy and Ibn Arabi's mysticism in the court of Akbar. He was an important Iranian philosophers and scientist. In the same way the most important role in cultivating the sciences during the Ghurid and Slave period was played by the scholars and philosophers who migrated to India from Iran. The works of well known philosophers, mystics and the logicians such as Abul Hasan Ashari, Abu Mansur al Matruidi, Imam al-Tahawi, al-Kindi, al-Farabi, al-Ghazzali, al Biruni, and Imam Razi, along with commentaries on their works, reached India through these immigrants from Iran and other parts of the Muslim world and began to be studied throughout the empire. Balban made Delhi a seat of intellectual and cultural activities in Muslim East. Many Iranian scholars came to India like Maulana Sadr Sharif Samarqandi who was well versed with philosophical, mathematical and astronomical subjects. Therefore, he was given the epithet of Munjam. He came to Deccan during the period of Sultan Alaudin Hassan Ghangoh Bahmini and remained on the post of Sadr Mamlikat for a quite long time. In seventh century Muqiq Tusi revived Ibn Sina'a philosophy in Iran. His Tafrid-Fil al-Kalam, was very important book in rational sciences. It was adorned with the commentaries and elaborations by the Muslim scholars, which became famous in India during 9th century. In eighth cenutry, many disciples of Tusi came to India and gave the rational sciences a great boast. The disciple of Muqiq Tusi's disciple, Qutbuddin Shirazi, was Maulana Jalauddin Rumi, who came to India and became the reactor of the Madrasah of Feroz Taghluq and introduced Sharh Shamsia in the Madrasah syllabus. Among his famous students were Shaykh Ibn Jamal Multani and during that period flourished famous scholars like Maulana Najmuddin Samarqandi who was appointed a principle of Bala Band Seeri Madrasah of Feroz Tughluq. Feroz Shah Bahmani's court attracted many Irianian scholars like Hassan Ibn Ai Ghilani, Syed Mohmud, in whose custodianship Feroz Shah Bahmani constructed an astrolable, which was the first of it's kind in India. Taftazani's other disciple Maulana Musa al-Jabari came to India and taught Maulana Fataullah Multani. His third famous disciple was Maulana Sonauollah Multani, who had gone to Iran to learn rational sciences. He returned to India and laid much emphasis on the rational sciences. Among his students were Maulana Samanuddin and Maulana Fatahallah. Maulana Abullah and Maulana Azizullah in turn were the students of Maulana Fatah Allah, who went

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to Delhi and studied rational sciences. Maulana Azizullah's disciple, was Miyam Hatem sambhali, who was the master of rational and traditional sciences.

Mula Sadra was very famous in India during medieval period. The Indian scholar wrote on his books about 24 commentaries, as Maulana Mehfooz al-Karim claims that "about 24 commentaries have been written on Mula Sadra's Sharh-Hidayatul al Hikmah in India". He says further that when the works of Mulla Sadra reached India, they were received like hot cakes by the Indian scholars and included in the courses of schools and madrasahs of Dars-i-Nizamia. Apart from Mulla Sadras' tremendous influence, which was received by the Indian scholars, Jalaluddin Dawani has also exercised remarkable impact, as mentioned earlier. Two famous disciples of Dawani came to Gujrat, Abul Fazl fazl Asturabadi and Abul Fazl Gazruni. Their disciples respectively were Asif Khan (Abdul Aziz Khan Ghujrati), and Shaykh mubarak. His third student was Mullah Umad Tarmi, who also reached to Gujrat. His disciple was Maulana Wajihiuddin Gujrati, who was prolific writer and has authored many books. Apart from books on philosophy and mathematics and astronomy, he wrote commentaries on several books. Another student of Dawani was Khawaja Jamaluddin Mahmmodul Shirazi, who after undergoing the oppression of the Safavids, came to India via Mecca, accompanied by Mir Rafiuddin. Among the disciples of Khawaja Jamalludin were Mirza Jan Shirazi whose important disciples included among others such luminaries like Mir Zahid and Shah Waliullah. Dawani's another disciple Hussain Maibazi wrote a commentary on the Athiruddin Asharis book "Hidayatul al-Hikmah", which became famous with the little of Maibazi, and became prevalent in the Indian Sub continent as it was included in the syllabi of the Madrasah Education in India. Among the other famous Iranian scholars, who came to India during the medieval period included Mohammad Sharif Amli, Hayati Koshi, Mazandarani, and Abdul Ghani Yazdi etc.

In eleventh century A.H. Shah Jahan sent Jan Spar Khan to Iran as an ambassador in 1056 A.H. with Jan Spar Khan Mohammad Faroq Mussharaf and Muhib Ali also went to Iran, these two scholars and a boasting claim on the mastery of rational sciences. It is said that one caliphasultan, an important scholar of Iraq, asked their opinion about Ghazzali's degree of infidelity against Al-Farabi and Ibn Sina. But these two scholars could not give any satisfactory reply to this querry. Vazier Sa'adullah Khan wrote to Abdul Hakeem Siyalkuti about the same problem upon their incompetance to come out with any positive reply when Shah Jahan was told about this episode, he was very much disappointed. It was on the instance of Vizier Saadullah Khan that Abdul Hakeem Siyalkoti was exhorted to write a detailed tract on this subject Siyalkoti wrote his famous treatise Al-Duru Saminah as the response to the exhortation. This treatise consists on three subjects i.e. Divine knowledge, Bodily and spiritual resurrection and createdness of the world.

Since, Siyalkoti laid much emphasis on Divine knowledge, this topic became favourite subject of the subsequent scholars. It set agenda for Mullah Bihari's "Sullam ul-al-uloom" where he starts his books with the statement that "The exalttedness of Allah has no limits or boundaries". During Jahangir's and Shah Jahan's reigns Iranian scholars used to arrive to India unintreruptedly. Shaykh Abu Turab Shirazi, Syed Taqiudin Shirazi, Shaykh Jamaludin Shirazi, Shaykh Taqi uddin Taslari, Sultan Hussain Yazdi, Mullah Farukh Haravi, Maulana Kamuhdin Nishapuri, Hakeem Mohammad Masoon Tastari, Mir Mohammed Hushim Gilani, Mullah Murshid Shirazi were some such important Iranian scholars. Moreoverver, Abul Fally Gilani, Hakim Human, Qazi Mohammad Yazdi, Mir Murtaza Sheirifi, Shaykh Hussain Bagdadi, Mirak Abdul Baqi, Moulana Khaliq Gilani and Maulana Najmuddin Tastari were some very significant Iranian scholars, who came to India from Iran during the medieval period.

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The eleventh century Iranian scholars like Shaykh Bahundin Aamli and Mir Damad had a very enduring impact on the Indian scholars. Mir Damad's Sirat-I- Mustaqim in Kalam and Al-ufq-al-Mubeen" in philosophy exerted great influence on Indian intellectuals and scholars. Moreover, many Indian scholars went to Iran to study under Mir Damad. Mir Damad and his philosophy was well received by the Indian scholars. For example, a very renowned Indian philosopher Mullah Mahmood Janupuri has praised Mir Damad and called him "a prudent and capable erudite scholar of philosophical subjects, who could traverse the terse lands of reality and explored the oceans of wisdom by his deep penetrative insights implying his mature ratiocination". However, Mir Baqr Damad's viewpoint about eternity of the time was rejected by Mullah Mahmood Jaunpori, which falls in between the views of Qudm-I-Zaman and Huduth-I-Aalim. Mir Baqar was not happy with Razi's views about Zaman-I-Dahar and Sarmad, as latter called these futile expressions and speculative jargons. However, Maulana Fazl Haq Khayrabadi was the pioneer of this school of thought, who wrote a commentary on Mir Damads "Al-ufq-Mubeen". Khyrabadi was a staunch opponent of the very concept of "existence of temporality", as he believes that this type of existence of time is the most weak existence in itself, as it's existence is not given in our perception. However, Mullah Mahmood Jaunpuri believed in the Old Ibn Sinian theory of eternity of the time. But it was in twelfth century that Mullah Amanullah Banarasi, tried to evaluate views of both Mir Baqar Damad and Mullah Mahmood Janupuri. There are another group of people, who did not agree with the theory of Huduth-I-Dhari" (createdness of time), and did not deny only the views about the eternity of time, but even denied the theory of contemporariness of time (Ma' at-e- dahri). Abul FazL, a famous court philosopher of Akbar was a staunch follower of Jalal al-Din Dawanis (1427-1503) Ishraqi philosophy. Moreover, as an educatinist and a reformer, he introduced the works of the later Persian philosopher, such as sad al-Din Taftazani, al-Sharif al-Jurjani, Jalal al-Din Dawani, Sadr al-Din Shirazi and Ghizalth al-bin Mannsur al-Shirazi and made them a necessary part of curriculum, Apart from these official contributions, he produced several philosophical graduates, whom he used to teach in his private capacity and wrote some valuable commentaries, and glossaries on the most difficult philosophical works like Sharh-al-Minwaqif of al-Sharif-al-Jurjani and Sharah Mullah Jal-al-Dawani, the two prominent Iranian scholars. Miraza Muhamad Zahid Harwi, a distinguished philosopher of period of Shah Jahan and Aurangzeb also wrote glossaries on Jalal al-Din Dawanis' commentary on Hayakil al-Nur of Sahrawardi Martul, the Tajrid of Nasir al-Din al-Tusi, and on Dawanis' commentary on al-Tahdib on the Sharh al-Mawaqif of al-Jurjani, and on Tasawwur wal Tasdiq of Qutb al-Din al-Razi.

The most outstanding Irani intellectual at Akbar's court was Mir Fatahullah Shirazi. He first immigrated to the court of Abul Shah of Bijapur, but in 1582 moved to Akbar's court and became the spearhead of all the intellectual movements there. Excellent in all branches of philosophy, he was an eminent authority on Avicinas' works and Ishraqi theosophy. In mathematics astronomy, and mechanics he was unique both in Iran and in India. Many reforms were organised by Abdul Fazl maintaining the changes in the currency, and the introducting of the solar Illahi Calendar.

Fatullah Sheirazi died in 22 January 1589, while Akbar was on tour in Srinagar. (Jamadi al thani 997). He was buried in Takhti Sulaymani there. To Shaikh Faizi and Abul Fazl, it was a personal loss. Faizi wrote a touching elegy. Akbar paid tribute in a manner of the story in Mathew's Gospel xiii, 46. He remarked that the Mir was a philosopher, physician and astronomer and added: "Had he fallen into the hands of Franks, and they had demanded all my treasures in exchange for him, I should have gladly entered upon such profitable traffic, and have bought that precious jewel cheep", "If the old

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books of wisdom had disappeared, he could have laid a new foundation of knowledge, and would not have wished for what had gone".

His actual and immediate sources of inspiration were the achievements of the Arabs and the Persians, who revived and transmitted their knowledge to the world. "Equally well-known has been Fatuallahs Takmilah-i-Hashiyah, an extension of Dawni's commentary on Tuftazanis Tahzibul Mantiq. He also wrote a super commentary on the same by the title "Hashiyah Bar Hashiyah Ala Tahzibil Mantiq". Fatullah's treatise in metaphysics seems to have stirred up an ugly controversy between two rival sects of religious philosophers. The title of the work is not known. It was written by the order of Ali Adil Shah in answer to a question regarding the physical nature and reality of the heavens, namely whether or not the heavens were penetrable and in what way the communion of the divine spirits with the illuminated humans of the earth could be explained. Mir Fathullah Shirazi was another disciple of Khawaja Jamaludin Mahmood, who later on became also the student of Mir Ghayasa-ud-ddin Mansur, and also availed the scholarly training from Maulana Kamaludin Masud Shirwani and Maulana Kurd. First Mir Atullah Shirazi's student Amir Anautullah came to Deccan and became a courtier of Ali Adil Shah, who invited his teacher to Deccan as well, who later on went to Gujrat to Abud Rahim Khan-Khana and in 991 A.H. went to the court of Akbar on his invitation. He was given great respect by Akbar and made the rational sciences prevalent in India. Azad Bilgrami says: "He made books of the later scholars of Iran like Dawani, Mir Sadruddin, Mir Ghayasuddin Mansur, and Merza Jan popular in India, and got these books included in the syllabus." Mir Fathullah Shirazi (d. 998/1590) was born in a scholarly Sayyid family in Shiraz, Persia. He was provided with the best possible education at that time and studied under the famous philosopher, Jamal al-Din Mahmud, a student of Jalal al-Din Dawani, malana Kamal al-Din Shirazi, Maulana Kurd and Amir Ghiyath al-Din al-Mansur Ibn Mir Sadr al-Din al-Dash Laki Shirazi. He came to India at the request of Abul Shah, governor of Bijapur and worked at Bijapur as an adviser to the ruler as well as principal of the official state school. He moved to the imperial court of Akbar in 991/1583, after the death of Adil Shah, where he was received with honour and made incharge of religious affairs and endowments. He worked with Rajah Todermall to organise the revenue system.

To conclude, Iranian scholars, philosophers, scientists and sufis and the most and up-parallel impact on almost all-philosophical, scientific and mystical schools and trends, which emerged in India in due course of time. In the above pages we have mentioned some areas by this clandestine influence, which was actively received by Indian philosophers during medieval period. However, the sufistic and mystical influence, which was the catalyst force for the formation of all Indian sufi orders has not been discussed, as this needs a separate research paper and falls out side the scope of the present deliberation. Otherwise, no sufi thought or order of India can be studied without its Iranian inspiration or influence. Even sufi poetry, which developed in India had an unequivocal impact of its Iranian counterpart. However, the most significant impact of Iranian philosophy and thought was evidently conspicuous an almost all the rational sciences, which flourished in India during Medieval times.

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Appendix—IV

"Sufism in Kashmir The Lesser Known Aspects of Some Sufi Orders"

The history of Sufism in Kashmir is spread over a long period of time starting from Bulbul Shah to the Sufi poets. Sufi saints are still inspiring people of Kashmir by their subtle mystical insights. The Suharwardi, Naqashbandi and Qadri Sufi orders have also played a very great role in the process of Islamisation of Kashmir. This process was taken to it's logical conclusion by the localized Rishi version of Sufi teachings, and a central figure in this regard was Shaykh Nooruddin, popularly known as Nund Reshi. Islam came to Kashmir from Central Asia and later on was accommodated within the Kashmirian ethos, which was shaped by diverse factors over a large period of time. The influences from Hinduism, Budhism, and Zoroastrainism were received, by the local people of Kashmir. Even the Sufis and imbibed some elements, which were considered anti-Shariat by some authors. For example, Mirza Haider laments about the "UN-Islamic and anti-Shariat ways of Sufis."[1]

Moreover, the secularization process started with the coming of the sufis from other parts of Islamic world. According to G.M.D. Sufi:

> "...These Syeds and their followers seem to have stimulated the tendency to mysticism for which Buddhism and vedantism had already paved the way".[2]

Another authors says,

> "Popular saint singers, became the apostles of a synthesis and rapprochement, aided by common points in Advaita and Sufism".[3]

But it should not be miscontrued by this fact that the role of Islam was marginalised and overshadowed by the local influences, as the problem of sufism is to be viewed always in its global perspective, and Kashmir was not an exception to it. Since the Suharwardi, Naqashbandi, Qadiria, Kubarawi and Rishi schools of Sufi thought flourished side by side in Kashmir, the interplay of various foreign and local elements in the flouring of Kashmir mysticism can easily be discerned.

Sufism came to Kashmir after the emergence of Khanqahs and Silsilas had taken form at various places in the Islamic world. Though "almost simultaneously with the foundation of Muslim rule

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in Kashimr (720/1320), Sufism was introduced there. Still there are evidences that Islam had made its inroads long before the establishment of Muslim rule in Kashmir. But there is no doubt that the systematic and well-organised sufi activities began only towards the end of the fourteenth century. Hence forward sufis like Saiyid Ali Hamadani, Mir Muhammad Saiyid Jaamaluddin Bukhari and Saiyid Ismail began to enter Kashmir in quick succession.[4] One important ideological framework, which can be discerned running through the all activities of foreign and local Sufis and mystics in Kashmir, was based mainly on the works of Ibn 'Arabi and the Kashmiri Sufis seem to have taken little notice of Shaykh Alaud-Din Simani's criticism of Wahdatual-Wajud of Ibn Arabi." A different trend, which emerged after the coming of the Sufis from Persia and Central Asia, was the crude synchronized form of it, which came to force with the development of an indigenous sufi order known as the Rishism.[5]

To start with let us take a close view of some Sufi stalwarts. Much research work has been done on the Kubarawi and Rish mystical movements of Kashmir. The monumental works of Prof. M. Ishaq Khan, titled as "Kashmir's Transition to Islam—The role of Muslim Rishis" (published by Manador Publication Delhi, 1994, and 1999, 1) Sufism in Kashmir of Prof. A.Q. Rafiqi, (Bhaitiya Publishing House, New Delhi) are the books in point. Therefore, I have confined my attention to lesser-known history of Sufism in Kashmir. The role of Sufis belonging to the Suharwardi, Naqashbandi and Qadiri orders have been elucidated in the following pages.

Sayyid Sharfuddin 'Abdur Rahman, (d.1327 CE), popularly known as Bulbul Shah, was given the title of Bilal, because his extreme love of the Prophet. He was the disciple of the Suharwardi Sufi, Shah Nimatullah Wali Farsi. Bulbul Shah succeeded in attracting to Islam Rinchen Shah (1324 CE), who was instrumental in popularizing Islam in Kashmir, Parimu Says:

> "By sheer accident or manipulation, it so happened that Rinchana's eyes fell on Bulbul Shah, a Muslim Fakir, so he became a Muslim and adopted the name Sultan Sadruddin"[6]

It is said that after Rinchen came to the throne, he held discussion with both Hindu and Buddhist priests, in order to ascertain truth but none could satisfy him. Finally, he decided to accept the religion of the first person that he should see the next morning. That person was Bulbul Shah, a Suharwardi Saint, who at that time was offering prayers near the royal palace. Rinchen immediately went to him, and after inquiring about his religion, accepted Islam.[7] Thus Bulbul Shah, the first Suharwardi Sufi, was able to convert Rinchen to Islam apart from some 10,000 concerts, including Rawanchandra, the brother-in-law of Rinchan. Rinchen, in turn, granted the revenues of certain villages to Bulbul Shah for his maintenance and also built a Khanqah for him near his own palace.[8] Attached to the Khanqah was a large Langer-khanah (kitchen) known as Bulbul Lankar, where the poor were fed free of cost twice a day.[9] A mosque was also built near the hospice by Rinchen, (Sadruddin, the new name given to him by Bulbul Shah), where he offered congregational prayers at appointed times. Though Prof. Rafiqui attributes Rinchen's conversion to Islam, to "political reasons",[10] but the real motive behind the conversion seems to be spiritual yearning of the kind rather the "political expediency".[11]

Thus, the first Suhrawardi Sufi, of whom we have any record to have entered Kashmir, was Bulbul Shah, who by converting the king,"increased the prestige of Islam and led to the acceptance of the new faith by some of the nobles and, according to one tradition, by 10,000 inhabitants of the valley.[12]

Bulbul Shah led a life of complete self-abnegation and preached against superstitious and

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charlatans widely prevalent amongst the Kashmiri's of his period. He helped the poor, and showed immense love towards the down trodden.

During the reign of Sultan Zainul Abidin (1420-70), another Suharwardi saint, Saiyid Muhament Isfahani, (or Rifai, b.735/840) arrived in Kashmir. He was the disciple of Saiyid Jalaluddin Bukhari of Uch, popularly called Makhdin Jahaniyan (1308-84). Sayyid Muhammad lived a life of retirement. He first took up his residence in Srinagar and later on entered the village of Khanpur (Baramullah). Since he applied himself to the most austere spiritual exercises, he is known as Janbaz (one who stakes his life).[13] It is said that he came to Kashmir with about 150 saints and entered into Kashmir, from Shopian in A.H. 827 (1421 A.D.). He was very fond of providing food to the poor from his Langar, the place where he stayed was called Khanpur, meaning "a place of earting". He established a preaching centre in Baramullah and constructed a mosque and an Eid-gah as well.

The other Suharwardi Sufis who came to Kashmir are:

Saiyid Ahmad Kirmani. He came to Kashmir during the reign of Sultan Nazuk Shah (1529-30,1540-52). A Khanqah was built for him at Narwara, in Srinagar and an annual grant was assigned to it from the state revenue for the maintenance of his Langar. Among his disciples was Baba Masaud, popularly known as Narwar Sahib".

Another important Suharwardi Sufi was Siyid Jamaluddin Bukhari, who arrived in Kashmir in the first half of the sixteenth century. Among his disciples, was Sheikh Hamza Makhdum. Shaikh Hamza was born in (900/1494) at Tujar, near sopore Saiyid Jamaluddin, before his departure from Kashmir, gave the Shaikh authority to enroll disciples into the Suharwardi order. Sheikh Hamza considered the zikr (remembrance of the name of God) to be medicine for the ailment of the heart on the one hand, and strongly disapproved of Sama (mystical music) on the other. Shaykh Hamza is popularly known in Kashmir as Mahbubul Alam (beloved of the world). He died in 984/1576. He was buried on the slope of Koh-i-Maran in Srinagar, where in his liftetime he used to spend long hours in mediation. [14] Makhdum Hamza called upon people to lead a virtuous life, pay the religious taxes and acquire knowledge.[15]

Among the disciplines of Sheikh Hamza are Sufi's life Baba Dawud Khaki, Maulana Shamsudin Pal, Khwaja Ishaq Qari, Khwaja Hasan Qari and Baba Haidar Tulmuli. Of these the most distinguished was Baba Dawud Khaki. (d. 1585 A.D)[16].

He is author of a number of books like Dasture-u-Salikin, Virdul-Murdidin, Qasida-I- Jalaliyya ect, Baba Daud was an outstanding poet as well.

Baba Daud approved of Sama, which was denounced by his teacher Shaykh Hamza and the other Shrawardi Sufis. He argued that Sama, stimulates love when heard within the iimits prescribed by the Sufi masters.[17] He upheld Zikr-I-Kalbi (inward remembrance of God), and believed that the latter was meant for beginners alone.[18]

Like, the Suharwardi Sufis, he believed that the renouncement of the world did not mean that one should go naked or wear a Longota, (the narrow strip of cloth). Renunication in fact demands nothing but sincereity on the part of the devotee, wealth in itself was no obstacle to the mystical path.[19]

The Naqashbandi order was introduced in Kashmir during the reign of Sultan Sikander (1389-1413). It made it's presence felt with the advent of Khwaja Mahmud towards the close of the sixteenth century.[20] Naqushbandi order was introduced in Kashmir by Saiyid Hilal (d. 861/1457).

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Saiyid Hilal left only one disciple, named Mir Saiyid Amin, popularly known in Kashmir as "Wusi-Sahib'. He led a life of retirement at Asham. After the death of Saiyid Hilal, Saiyid Amin moved to Srinagar and confined himself to a room near Koh-i-Maran. Saiyid Amin seems to be an ardent advocate of the doctrine of Wahatul-Wujud (Unity of Being). Some of his verses seem very pertinent to be quoted. For example,

> "The world and the man of the world one endowed with the essence of the Eternal, if you look deeply (you) look deeply (you) will find everything in the human being".

He says further, "The entire Universe is with me. My abode is beyond lamakan (spaceless world). O'alim (religious scholar) ! My body is (itself) a universe. Know ! The soul of universe is my soul".[21] He was a broad minded Sufi, above all religious prejudices. He says,"Do not scorn infidelity to those who have found out truth, it is not different from faith". Again he says, "To an arif (Gnostic) the difference between the mosque and temple are meaningless. Men endowed with spiritual eminence, find both good and even identical". About the mystical union with God, he says, "I want visal, (union). I do not want either this world or the other. I worship God, I do not worship houses or walls". He was killed in 1984 along with the fifteen members of the family. He was later buried at 'Allkadal.[22]

Another Naqashbandi saint was Khwaja Khawand Mahmud (d. 1642). He did not stay in Kashmir for a long period and soon left for Agra. However, in the seventeenth century, he made several visits to Kashmir, and helped in the popularization of Naqashbandi order in Kashmir.[23]

The impact of Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindi was reflected on the Sufis of Kashmir also. For example, Shaykh Murad Teng was the disciple of Shaykh Abdul Ahad Sarhindi Faruqi, who was the son of Shaykh Ahmad Sarhindi. Apart from this influence, he imbibed impact from Muhamad Yousuf Kawsa, Mulla Abdullah, Khwaja Muhammad Naqashbandi etc.[24] Shaykh Ahad Sarhindi came to Kashmir and Shaykh Murad went to Sarhind along with his peer in 1081 AH and returned back to Kashmir after getting complete Sufi training and the latter of authority to initiate others in the order of the Sufis he belonged to. Among his illustrious disciples was Khwaja Azam Deedh Mari, who is a famous Kashmiri historian. He remained in the company of his Shaykh for twelve years. Among the novices of Shaykh Murad were other people like Khwaja Sayyid Sharif, who died in 1114 A.H.[25]

The Qadiri order was introduced in Kashmir in the second half of the sixteenth century by Sayyid Niratullah Shah Qadri. Before coming to Kashmir, he was living in India, where he was a disciple of Shaykh Muhammud Dervesh Qadiri. Saiyid Nimatullah did not stay long in Kashmir and soon left for India. Among his disciples in Kashmir was Shaykh Mirk Mir. He was the son of one Saiyid Shamsud-din Andrabi, whose ancestors had migrated to Kashmir from Andrab, Khurasan Iran, in the reign of Sultan Sikander. Shayk Mirak Mir spent most of his time in meditation at a Khanqah in Srinagar, known as Khanqah-i-Andrabi. He died in 1582 A.D, and was buried at Mallaratta in Srinagar. Another Qadri saint, who came to Kashmir in 1581 A.H. from somewhere in India, was Saiyid Ismail Shami. He did not stay long in Kashmir and returned to India, but during his brief stay there, he firmly laid the foundation of the Qadiri order, therefore his disciple Mir Nazuk Niyazi. Mir Nazuk did not approve of the practice of Sama, unlike the first Qadiri saint in Kashmir, Sayyid Nimatullah. He died in 1614 A.D and was buried at Qazi Kadal in Srinagar. Mir Nazuk's Khanqah at Khanyar, in Srinagar was taken up by his eldest son. Mir Yousuf (d.1617) who was initiated to the Qadiri order in Kashmir.[26]

Apart from the above Qadri saints, mention may be made of Mulla Shah Badakshani, stayed in Kashmir for more than 22 years. He was among the disciples of Mian Mir Qadri. In this way Suhar-

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wardi, Naqashbandi and Qadir saints were very important Sufi orders, which influenced Kashmir in several ways and prepared the way for the sufistic interpretation of IsIam, which was the hallmark of the Kubarawi and Rishi Silsilas (orders) of Kashmir.

Sheikh Noor-ud-Din—The True Missionary of IsIam in Kashmir

Sheikh Noor-ud-Din (RA) was born about 600 years before, still his influence is found intact on almost all aspects of the life of Kashmiris. In our modern period, the consumerism, materialism, violence, immorality, extravagance, ostentation, hypocrisy and bigotry have taken hold of new generations. Despite our claims that we are Muslims, the demands of our faith are not being fulfilled and a dichotomy is found in our claims and actions. There is a temptation on the part of some people who want to save the forests from destruction to use Noor-ud-Din's couplet for this puspose which is *"A'nn Poshi Teli Yeli Wa'nn Poshi"* and the people who want to uphold the banner of justice, use a verse attributed to Sheikh *Krai Khute Boud Chu Insaf* (Justice is superior to meditation). Though these couplets. According to Ghulam Nabi Gawhar are 'invented' or 'coined' by various people and latter attributed to Sheikh. But if we observe honestly, there is no doubt that the relevance of Sheikh Noor-ud-Din is glaringly found to almost all aspects of our life in this crucial stage of our history. The social evils like extravagance, inequality, moral turpitude in our youth and the permissive tendencies in our new generation, all are addressed by the Sheikh in his captivating poems. The political oppression and the exploitation which could make its inroads in the society has been made prophecy of by the Sheikh; *Moor Sa' Nzi Wadi Aasi Sorsund Taj*. How far should a wife remain content with her lot and that can be an appalling tragedy of a community, when with the licentious attitude a misguided mother and a rogue daughter will move around with strangers, hand in hand and the ostentatious moorings of the rich to run in the mad race to show off their ill earned wealth.

Maji Kori Athwas Karith Nairan,

Doh Dan Baran Gairan Sa'eth.

The religious scholars who pretend to be learned and wise easily mix up with the devil himself, who are more concerned with the beautiful turban bulges and flaunted about to be wrapped is short cloaks are only few subjects with which the Sheikh was concerned. The Sheikh was concerned. The Sheikh has addressed the people who are the custodians of the religion that they, "still go on eating, with no appetite and have made their religious knowledge to serve as a means to earn a living" and are busy in "out-tricking one another".

Moreover, the Pagan practices of the yore (*Hindian Hanz Kami Traitou*) and the caste like features of a so-called "Muslim society" have found mention here. On the other hand, the real *Tawheedi* approach to life in all its manifestations and the transitory status of mundance luxuries which are the *sine qua non of* our materialistic culture, still attract us in Sheikh's poetry.

The most important relevance to our society of the Sheikh is the peaceful and missionary approach to the preaching of Islam. In the hostile environs, Sheikh by his word and deed could attract not only the common Kashmiris, who were not able to understand the scholarly erudite lectures and sermons of Sufi saints, as their language happened to be either Persian or Arabi with the possible exception of Syed Hussian Simnani, but drew even die-hard Brahmins to his fold, like Bamal Din who was a respectable Brahmin saint before his conversion to IsIam. He is said to have embraced Islam only

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after a good deal of discussion with the Sheikh. The greatest service to Islam which was rendered by the Sufis and Rishis. was by way of peaceful and missionary activities. Thomas Arnold has attributed conversion to Islam to the missionary and *Dawah* works of the saints, and Sheikh-ul-Alam in the real sense of the term had conveyed the message of Islam to the servants of Allah with "beautiful sermonising and words of wisdom." In the earlier stage though the Sheikh had renounced the world and called worldly life "a hallow bubble" and this act on the part of the Sheikh was voluntary. But latter he realised that the forests are the places for jackals and monkeys. He recollects an earlier tie of spiritual ebb and flow, when his love was not perfect, and how he sought to assuage his anguish by retiring to the cave "Nasr Baba, it did not believe me to retire to the jungle, although it was a significant act of the worship.

Lo ! it was an ignominy "But the truth was revealed only after introspection."

He after spending almost seven years in a cave at Koimoh, alongwith his disciples Baba Nassr-ud-Din, Baba Qutb-ud-Din and Baba Taj-Ud-Din- left on a tour of the valley during the reign of Sultan Ali Shah, and established several centres in order to teach people the rudiments of Islam. He went Anantnag, where he made prophecy about Baba Harde Rishi, a great saint who appeared almost 200 years after the Sheikh and is buried at the same spot where the Sheikh had rested, entered into a discussion with Bum Sadhu, a Yogi of Khai village. Then the Sheikh alongwith Taj-ud-Din, Qutab-ud-Din and Nassr-ud-Din crossed over to Palmod, a small village in Kishtwar and crossed the difficult terrain of Pir Panchal range of mountains where Jai Singh the only son of a local Jagirdar was cured by the Sheikh. In 1417 to 1418, the Sheikh established another sub centre at Mukhta Pukhri, near Soura, Srinagar, where Ludi Raina, Raja of Madew Wardawan and Yawan Mats (Shanga Bibi) embraced Islam by the efforts of Sheikh.

He is also believed to have visted Draigam (Budgam), where Tuli Raina with his 800 to 1200 Brahmin followers entered into a dialogue with him regarding religion, spiritualism, existence of God and life after death. After his hectic dialogical process, the Sheikh was able to persuade them to embrace Islam and deputed them to various places for missionary activities. The Sheikh left for Gohan Ladi forests. (Baramulla) to establish an ther sub centre of the Rishi movement. It is said that during his final visit, Sheikh visited almost every village of the valley of Kashmir though he had turned so weak that his disciple Baba Nassr had to carry him in a basket on his shoulders from one village to another, he halted at a number of places in order to meet people and preach the basics of Islam Prof. Khan says, "Noor-ud-Din undertook a series of long apostolic journeys through out the length and breadth of the valley. There came a number of villages in Kashmir which still preserve the memory of his visits." In his missionary and apostolic zeal and zest the Sheikh adopted the most vital tools of *dawat* and during his peripatetic vists', he attracted the humble and the ignored, who were held in contempt in the caste ridden society of Kashmir.

Adam came as the first ancestor of man
Mother Eve followed suits,
Where from were the low caste born then?
How can members of the same family jeer at one another.

However, it was not always that only the "Plebian masses were attracted to the Sheikh only, but he had to impress Brahmins, who were well-versed in their religious traditions like Kantha Pandit (Qutub-ud-din). The discussion which took place between Sheikh and Kantha Pandit is a testimony to

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the apostolic message of the Sheikh.

"One day a religious man approached him and asked: ' What his concept of Muslim was. The Sheikh replied that a Muslim is one whose body emits fragrance, who attends with reverence the wise discussion of the wakeful, who is free from anger, but full of pious deeds; who performs his duties to earn his livelihood; who controls his mind; who puts up with harsh word or insult; who preaches what he practises; shares his meals with others; who fasts on holy days; bows in prayers; gives up anger, greed, attachment, arrogance or egotism. A Muslim values not himself even at a 'Kowril' who does run the race with others in giving respect, remains in the company of the good and abandons the company of the wicked, restrainful and concerned making beautiful exposition of things for others in which he first believes himself, doesn't look with covetous eyes at things that belong to others, who is not tempted by the sight of wealth, always in search of truth etc." It was such a beautiful expounding of the definition of the Muslim that the Kanth Pandit accepted IsIam and was named Qutub-ud-din, who later became the Scribe of Sheikh Noor-ud-din.

Kasheere Pheurus Ande Ande
Kansi Ma Kọrum Brandey Trave
Jandas Karim Yeli Paivandi
Toti Doupham Fand'i Aaw

Thus the relevance of Sheikh and his spiritual mission is very much to our society. Being the *Alamdaar* of Kashmir, He has given the Kashmiri people their religious identity in keeping with the glorious traditions of Islam and the ethos of the people of valley.

The *Weltanchuung* which has been presented before us by the Sheikh as in true spirit of Islam and the traditions of spiritualism which were prevalent not only in India but in Central Asia and other parts of the world, and was the legacy of the spiritual office of the Prophet (SAW) as the preaching of Islam was continued in the subsequent period not by kings but by these spiritual heirs of the Prophet (SAW).

Sheikh-ul-Alam has aligned himself with the Central Asian Sufis and has himself recommended *Khat-i-Irshad* from no less than a saint Syed Mohammed Hamdani to indicate that his mission was in complete consonance with the message of these Sufis, who were the torch bearers of Islam in the Valley of Kashmir.

The Wahdat-al-wajud (Unity of Being) philosophy was advocated by almost all Sufis, which has several resemblances with Hindu Vedanta, darshan. Even the famous 'Kubarawi, Sufi Siyyid Ali Hamadani (1314-1384) was an ardent advocate of the same philosophy. Although Sayyid Ali's teacher Allaudin Simnani was fiercely opposed to the theory of Wahdat-al-Wajud. He wrote a tract in defense of the Wajudi doctrine, entitled as "Risala-I-Wujudiyya". He wrote two commentaries on Ibn Arabi's acclaimed" Fusus-al-Hikam". According to Farooq Bukhari, Sayyid Ali was the first to introduce Ibn Arabi's thoughts in South Asia.

The Wujudi trend of philosphy is also adopted by the founder of Rishi movement of Kashmir, Shaykh Noorudin (d 1440 CE), in the fourteenth century. He says, for example, "After abandoning myself, I found the Being (Mujud). And he says further.

"I Looked for my benevolent God with an undivided mind, and then alone of recognized the reality of my own self". And he also says,

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"Oh fool ! why do you want to waste your life in seclusion. Learn self-introspection and talk to God, who is within you".

Thus, Sufism in Kashmir was unique in the sense that unlike the central Asia, it accommodated Suharwardi, Naqashbandi and Qadiri orders within the broader framework of Islam and developed it's own school called Rishism, which was the culmination of the indigenous mystical ethos fruitioned into a universal phenomena.

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Hamid Nassem was born in Doabgah Rafiabad, Kashmir in 1958. He completed his early education in his home state. Later, he secured M.A.'s in Muslim Philosophy and Theology from Aligarh Muslim University, winning Gold Medal for academic brilliance. He has received his Pre. Ph. D. and advanced diploma in Mass Media from the prestigious J.N.U. New Delhi. He was awarded Ph. D. Degree on the **Philosophy of Ghazzali and it's Impact on the Western Philosophers** by the University of Kashmir in 1996. He was a research fellow at I.I.I.S. New Delhi. (now a part of Hamdard University) in 1987-89.

Dr. Hamid Naseem is now a Reader at the University of Kashmir in Islamic Studies. Apart from his formal academic achievements, he has won the admiration of his peers with his brilliant debating, oratory and contributions to reputed research publications. He has also visited Islamic Republic of Iran in 1996. He has ten books to his credit.

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