

Whaprier

Æt 68

Drawn by G F Watts

LIFE

OF

GENERAL SIR WILLIAM NAPIER

K. C. B.,

AUTHOR OF 'HISTORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR,' &c.

EDITED

BY H. A. BRUCE, M.P.

"Fierce warres and faithful loves."
Faery Queen.

IN TWO VOLS. — VOL. II.

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BIOGRAPHY

OF

SIR WILLIAM NAPIER.

CHAPTER XVI.

REMARKS ON THE 'HISTORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR.'

THE merit of the 'History of the Peninsular War' is best proved by the fact of its steady growth in popularity and fame; for seldom has a book been commenced with less immediate promise of circulation and favour. Even after the appearance of the first volume had proved the incontestable ability of the writer, the book had to fight its way to public favour against the prejudices which its peculiar political opinions created. The spirit of the work was directly offensive to the opinions of those times.

"It affected* Englishmen, because it assailed the still dominant policy of Toryism, and conceded infinitely more credit to Napoleon, to his system, and to the French army, than the still rabid anti-Gallic feelings of the country could pardon. It offended Spaniards, for it brushed away the brag of the nation, and reduced the enthusiasm and efforts of the patriot armies to dimensions more consistent with fact. Frenchmen it might possibly conciliate, for it recorded their military merits with a chivalrous apprecia-

* 'Times,' Feb. 14, 1860.

tion to which they were wholly unused in English writers; but to no other sympathies did it seem addressed. These opinions brought down on the author a perfect storm of obloquy. Among other imputations, he, the grandson of a duke and the great-great-grandson of a king, found himself charged with a malignant hostility to aristocratic birth,—an attack which he quietly repelled by observing that he was at least as nobly connected as the people he was accused of decrying.

"But, however the author might be infected with political heresy, his characteristic dedication of the work to the Duke, and the genuine sentiments with which its every page was underlaid, soon proved that its real and sole object was to erect a fitting monument of British glory achieved by British arms; and as the development of the History showed it gradually and triumphantly attained, the angry clamours of the Strangfords, the Beresfords, and the Percevals were left to die unheeded away. Against the current of popular and political prejudice, the work forced its way by its intrinsic fascinations to the summit of public favour; and though the ground had been occupied by favourite and attractive writers, the supremacy of Napier's History soon became incontestable. The truth is, besides the genuine nationality of its object and its tone, there was a dignity in the treatment, and a living verity in the descriptions, which led the mind unresistingly captive. Never before had such scenes been portrayed with such wonderful colouring. As event after event was unfolded in the panorama, not only the divisions and the brigades, but the very regiments and regimental officers of the Peninsular army, became familiarized to the public eye. Marches, combats, and battles came out upon the canvas with the fidelity of photographs; while the touches by which the effect was produced be-

spoke, not the ingenuities of historic art, but the involuntary suggestions of actual memory. The shrillness of Craufurd's scream at Busaco, as he ordered the Light Division to charge, was probably ringing in the author's ears as he wrote; and the whole scene upon the Coa, with the little drummer-boy beating the charge, the French officer, 'in a splendid uniform,' leaping on the bridge, and the surgeon tending the wounded in the midst of the fire, must have risen before his eyes as he drew it. For the sake of painting like this, for the sake of an eloquence unknown before, and devoted unreservedly to the recompense of British valour, people readily forgave the prepossessions or deficiencies of the work. If its spirit was haughty, it was also so national and so public that the very haughtiness was becoming; if its style trenched upon bombast, such loftiness of language did but correspond with the grandeur and heroism of the deeds described; and when the magnificence of its diction culminated into sublimity in the stories of Albuera and Badajoz, every reader felt that the theme and treatment were consistent with each other."

By the completion of this work Colonel Napier's fame as an author was completely established. The style was universally admitted to be as nearly perfect, regard being had to the nature of the subject, as any writing could be. "There is certainly no great quality in which it is deficient; it has ease, animation, brevity, correctness, and vigour, and these, taken together, in a greater degree than any other historical writer of English, except Raleigh and Hallam."*

Its historic accuracy as to facts was only established the more firmly by the inevitable attacks of men who, having been actors in the scenes described, found the parts they had played unnoticed, or thought them undervalued.

* John Stirling, in 'Athenæum.'

The only important criticism which has survived to the present time is that, owing to the author's partiality for Napoleon, he both laid out of sight the detestable criminality of his first aggression on Spain; and, still more, that he undervalued the patriotic efforts of the Spaniards, and dealt out very harsh judgment upon them. This opinion found so many supporters that Colonel Napier's biographer will here endeavour to show by a few extracts that these charges have no sound foundation. But before proceeding to do so it may be well to ask if the supporters of those charges were not themselves in the position of jurymen who come to try a cause with a strong prejudice in favour of one of the parties to the suit; and whether, while condemning the historian for unfair bias in favour of the French and against the Spaniards, their own judgment was exempt from strong national anti-Gallic prejudices, and unwarped by the romantic interest with which the general rising of the Spanish nation and the holiness of their cause invested the efforts of the patriots.

First, as to the charge that the author glossed over the criminality of Napoleon's aggression. In the very first chapter of his work are found the following paragraphs.

"Hence the craving of his (Napoleon's) military and political system, the dangerous vicinity of a Bourbon dynasty, and still more, the temptation offered by a miraculous folly outrunning even his desires, urged him to a deed which well accepted would have proved beneficial to the people, but enforced contrary to their wishes was unhallowed by justice or benevolence. In an evil hour for his own greatness and the happiness of others he commenced the fatal project. Founded in violence, attended with fraud, it spread desolation through the Peninsula, was calamitous to France, destructive to himself; and the conflict between his hardy veterans and the vindic-

tive race he insulted was of unmitigated ferocity; for the Spaniards defended their just cause with proverbial hereditary cruelty, while the French struck a terrible balance of barbarous actions." (Vol. i. p. 3, revised edition.)

"A cause manifestly unjust is a heavy weight upon the operations of a general; it reconciles men to desertion, sanctifies want of zeal, furnishes pretexts for cowardice, renders hardships more irksome, dangers more obnoxious, glory less satisfactory to the mind of the soldier. The invasion of Spain, whatever its real origin, was an act of violence repugnant to the feelings of mankind. The French were burdened with a sense of its iniquity, the British exhilarated by a contrary sentiment." (Vol. i. p. 5, revised edition.)

Read also the concluding words of the second chapter.

"With a strange accent he (Joseph) called from the midst of foreign bands upon a fierce and haughty race to accept a constitution which they did not understand, his hope of success resting on the strength of his brother's arms, his claims on the consent of an imbecile monarch and the weakness of a few pusillanimous nobles, in contempt of the rights of millions now arming to oppose him. This was the unhallowed part of the enterprise; this it was that rendered his offered constitution odious, covered it with a leprous skin, and drove the noble-minded far from the pollution of its touch!

"But a dislike to the war prevailed in the higher ranks of the French army; the injustice of it was too glaring." (Vol. i. p. 79, revised edition.)

"His invasion of Spain was at first viewed with anxiety, rather than with the hope of arresting it; but when the full extent of the injustice became manifest, the public mind was vehemently excited; and when the Spanish people rose against the man feared by all, the admiration

which energy and courage exact, even from the base and timid, became enthusiastic in a nation conscious of the same qualities." (Vol. i. p. 85, revised edition.)

Again :—"This constancy, although rendered nugatory by the vices and follies of the Juntas and leading men, hallowed the people's efforts, and the *flagitious violence of the invasion almost justified their ferocity.*" (Vol. ii. p. 13, 1st edition.)

That it cost the writer a struggle to write thus of the man he almost idolized is beyond a doubt, but it would be difficult to express reprobation more distinctly or in stronger language; and having thus delivered his verdict on the act of wicked aggression which produced the war, he proceeded to describe the struggle itself irrespectively of its origin, proclaiming however, in the second extract above given, that the arm of the invader must be weighted throughout its whole duration by a sense of the iniquity of his cause, while that of his opponent would be nerved by a contrary sentiment; and it is manifestly unreasonable and unjust to blame the author for not returning again and again during his narrative of the war to the consideration of its origin which he had dismissed.

Turning now to the charge that the author undervalued the patriotic efforts of the Spaniards, and showed a strong bias against them, the following extracts, out of many others of a similar tendency, are taken from the History.

"There is not upon the face of the earth a people so attractive [as the Spaniards] in the friendly intercourse of society. Their majestic language, fine persons, and becoming dress, their lively imaginations, the inexpressible beauty of their women, and the air of romance which they throw over every action and infuse into every feeling, all combine to delude the senses and to impose upon the judgment. As companions they are incomparably the

most agreeable of mankind, but danger and disappointment attend the man who, confiding in their promises and energy, ventures upon a difficult enterprise."* (Vol. i. p. 43.)

"The genius of the Spanish people is notoriously ardent, subtle, and vigorous." (i. 42.)

In another place the author speaks of "that susceptibility to grand sentiments which distinguishes the Spanish peasants. Although little remarkable for hardihood in the field, their Moorish blood is attested by their fortitude; men and women alike, they endure calamity with a singular and unostentatious courage. In this they are truly admirable." (iii. 20.)

"In bearing such privations (hunger, &c.) the Peninsular race is unrivalled." (iv. 63.)

"The Spaniards, with whom the sentiment of honour is very strong, when not stifled by the violence of their passions." (v. 185.)

So much for general attributes.

In extenuation of their shortcomings:—

"Constituted as modern states are, with systems ill adapted to nourish intense feelings of patriotism, *it would have been miraculous if real grandeur had been displayed by a nation which for two centuries had been debased by civil and religious despotism.* The Spanish character in relation to public affairs is marked by inordinate pride and arrogance. Dilatory, improvident, singly and in mass, they cherish an absurd confidence that everything suggested by their heated imaginations is practicable; they see no difficulties, and the obstacles encountered are attributed to treachery; hence the sudden murder of so many virtuous men in this commotion. Kind and warm in his attachments, savage in his enmity, the Spaniard is patient under privations,

* These are taken from the first edition, which called forth the criticisms.

firm in bodily suffering, prone to sudden anger, vindictive, remembering insult longer than injury, bloody and cruel in revenge. With a natural perception of what is noble, his promise is lofty, but, as his passions always overrule his reason, his performance is mean."

"When all patriotism is lost among the upper classes, it may still be found among the lower; in the Peninsula it was not found, but started into life with a fervour and energy that ennobled even the wild and savage form in which it appeared; nor was it the less admirable that it burst forth attended by many evils; the good feeling displayed was the people's own; their cruelty, folly, and perverseness were the effects of a long course of misgovernment." (i. 22.)

"Under such a system the peasantry could not be rendered energetic soldiers, nor were they active supporters of the cause; yet with a wonderful constancy they endured for it fatigue, sickness, nakedness, and famine; displaying in all their actions and in all their sentiments a distinct and powerful national character. This constancy, although rendered nugatory by the vices and follies of the Juntas and leading men, hallowed the people's efforts, and the flagitious violence of the invasion almost justified their ferocity." (ii. 13.)

With reference to the demeanour of the Spaniards during the struggle:—

"In Catalonia, the Somatenes were bold and active in battle, the population of the towns firm, and some of the Juntas apparently disinterested. The praise merited and bestowed upon the people of Zaragoza is just, yet Gerona more justly claims the admiration of mankind." (i. 88.)

At Gerona—"They fought bravely, they endured unheard-of sufferings with constancy; and their refusal to accept the armistice offered by Augereau is as noble and

affecting an instance of virtue as any that History has recorded." (iii. 15.)

At Badajoz—"The soldiers fought with surprising ardour, but the entire want of arrangement on the part of the generals, unworthy to command the brave men under them, ruined all." (iii. 435.)

At Albuera—"The Spaniards had been feeding on horseflesh, and were so attenuated by continual fatigue and misery, that, while enduring such heavy privations, it was a great effort of resolution and honourable to them that they fought at all." (iii. 364.)

"It must not be supposed that, because the guerilla system was in itself unequal to the deliverance of the country, and was necessarily accompanied by great evils, that as an auxiliary it was altogether useless." (iv. 52.)

"The calm resignation with which these terrible sufferings were borne was a distinctive mark of the national character; not many begged, none complained; there was no violence, no reproaches, very few thefts. But with this patient endurance of calamity, the Madrilenos discovered a deep and unaffected gratitude for kindness received at the hands of the British officers." (v. 257.)

"The Madrilenos have been stigmatised as a savage and faithless people; the British army found them patient, gentle, generous, and loyal." (v. 313.)

"The Spaniards, who cared so little for their own officers, with that noble instinct which never abandons the poor people of any country, acknowledged real greatness without reference to nation." (vi. 227.)

Hear in conclusion the author's own defence, published at page 213 of the 3rd volume:—

"I have been charged with incompetence to understand, and most unjustly with a desire to underrate, the Spanish resistance; but it is the province of History to record

foolish as well as glorious deeds, that posterity may profit from all; and neither will I mislead those who read my work, nor sacrifice the reputation of my country's arms to shallow declamation on the unconquerable spirit of independence. To expose the errors is not to undervalue the fortitude of a noble people. In their constancy, in the unexampled patience with which they bore the ills inflicted alike by a ruthless enemy and by their own sordid Governments, the Spaniards were truly noble; but shall I say that they were victorious in their battles or faithful in their compacts; that they treated their prisoners with humanity; that their Juntas were honest or wise, their generals skilful, their soldiers firm? I speak but the bare truth when I assert that they were incapable of defending their own cause! Every action, every correspondence, every proceeding of the six years that the war lasted, rises up in support of this fact; and to assume that an insurrection so conducted did or could possibly baffle the prodigious power of Napoleon, is an illusion. Spain baffle him! Her efforts were amongst the very smallest causes of his failure. Portugal has far greater claims to that glory. Spain furnished the opportunity; but it was England, Austria, Russia, or rather fortune, that struck down that wonderful man. The English, more powerful, more rich, more profuse, perhaps more brave, than the ancient Romans,—the English, with a fleet, for grandeur and real force, never matched; with a general equal to any emergency,—fought as if for their own existence. The Austrians brought 400,000 good troops to arrest the conqueror's progress; the snows of Russia destroyed 300,000 of his best soldiers; and finally, when he had lost half a million of veterans, not one of whom died on Spanish ground, Europe in one vast combination could only tear the Peninsula from him by tearing France along

with it. What weakness then, what incredible delusion, to point to Spain, with all her follies and her never-ending defeats, as a proof that a people fighting for independence must be victorious!"

Let us now turn to the Duke of Wellington, and ask what were his opinions as to the aid he derived from Spanish co-operation. Here follow a few of them.

Extracts from Lord Wellington's Correspondence, 1809.

"I come now to another topic, which is one of serious consideration—that is, the frequent, I ought to say constant and shameful misbehaviour of the Spanish troops before the enemy; we in England never hear of their defeats and flights. In the battle of Talavera, in which the Spanish army with very trifling exceptions was not engaged, whole corps threw away their arms and ran off *in my presence*, when they were neither attacked nor threatened with an attack, but frightened I believe by their own fire."

"I have found, upon inquiry and from experience, the instances of the misbehaviour of the Spanish troops to be so numerous, and those of their good behaviour to be so few, that I must conclude they are troops by no means to be depended upon.

"The Spanish cavalry are, I believe, nearly entirely without discipline; they are in general well clothed, armed, and accoutred, and remarkably well mounted; but I never heard anybody pretend that in any one instance they have behaved as soldiers ought to do in presence of an enemy. It is said that sometimes the infantry behave well, though I acknowledge I have never seen them behave otherwise than ill."

"Nothing can be worse than the officers of the Spanish

army; and it is extraordinary that when a nation has devoted itself to war, as this nation has by the measures it has adopted in the last two years, so little progress has been made in any one branch of the military profession by any individual."

"I cannot say they do anything as it ought to be done, with the exception of running away and assembling again in a state of nature."

"The Spaniards have neither numbers, efficiency, discipline, bravery, nor arrangement to carry on the contest."

1810.—"The character of the Spaniards has been the same throughout the war; they have never been equal to the adoption of any solid plan, or to the execution of any system of steady resistance to the enemy by which their situation might be gradually improved."

"The Spanish nation will not sit down soberly and work to produce an effect at a future period. Their courage, and even their activity, is of a passive nature; it must be forced upon them by the necessity of their circumstances, and is never a matter of choice or foresight."

"There is neither subordination nor discipline in the army either amongst officers or soldiers; and it is not even attempted (as, indeed, it would be vain to attempt) to establish either. It has, in my opinion, been the cause of the dastardly conduct we have so frequently witnessed in Spanish troops, and they have become odious to the country. The peaceable inhabitants, much as they detest and suffer from the French, almost wish for the establishment of Joseph's government, to be protected from outrages of their own troops."

"I am afraid the Spaniards will bring us all to shame yet. It is scandalous, that in the third year of the war, and having been more than a year in a state of tranquillity, and having sustained no loss of importance since the

battle of Ocaña, they should now be depending for the safety of Cadiz—the seat of their government—upon having one or two, more or less, British regiments; and that, after having been shut in for ten months, they have not prepared the works necessary for their defence, notwithstanding the repeated remonstrances of General Graham and the British officers on the danger of omitting them. The Cortes appear to suffer under the national disease in as great a degree as the other authorities,—that is, *boasting of the strength and power of the Spanish nation till they are seriously convinced they are in no danger, and then sitting down quietly and indulging in the national indolence.*"

The above extracts might be multiplied, but enough has been said to prove that if any bias hostile to Spaniards existed in the mind of Colonel Napier it was shared with at least equal force by the Duke of Wellington. But the truth is, no such bias existed; and there is not to be found in the History one statement in disparagement of the Spaniards which is not borne out by irrefragable facts. By furnishing the opportunity to England, Spain did certainly contribute to the overthrow of Napoleon, but it was in the same sense only as the boy who blows the bellows contributes to the magnificent anthem which peals from the organ. In many instances the author has been remarkably lenient, as, for example, in his observation above quoted in apology for the dastardly behaviour of the Spanish troops, both officers and men, at Albuera, which so nearly lost the battle. Also let the moderate remarks in the History on the behaviour of the Spanish troops at Talavera be contrasted with the Duke's strong expressions in the above extracts.

Again: with respect to the barbarities committed by the

Spaniards, the reader is referred to the opening of chapter iii. vol. i. for an account of the murders and massacres which took place at Cadiz, Seville, Carthagena, Grenada, Valencia, Badajoz, Talavera, and Corunna, &c., at which last-named place the able and honest Governor Filanghieri was tossed aloft and transfixed in his fall on the bayonets of the wild beasts who formed its garrison, and left to die. "Oh! mere misdirected energy," say the apologists, "and the certain deplorable result of centuries of political and priestly oppression." Be it so: but this misdirected energy is not a fit subject for historic laudation; and a nation, prone from ignorance and ferocity to such excesses, as the Spaniards were universally, would be pronounced *primâ facie* by any student of history as utterly incompetent, without many years of discipline, which should elevate them from the condition of moral infants to the standard of men, to organize and sustain such a struggle as was required to make head against such a power as France.

As regards the governing bodies of the nation, with few exceptions, no words are too strong to characterize their arrogance, folly, cowardice, treachery, and ingratitude to their deliverers, the British army and its great commander. As instances of the last vice may be cited their shameful conduct with reference to the British hospitals at Fuenterabia and at Santander. At the latter place the authorities, resolute to drive the hospitals from their town, suddenly, and under the false pretext of a contagious fever, placed all the British hospitals, with their officers and attendants, in quarantine. This was in January, 1813. "Thirty thousand men had been wounded since June in the service of Spain, and the return was to make those wounded men close prisoners, and drive their general to the necessity of fixing his hospitals in England. In

chapter vi., book 22, and chapters iv. and v., book 23, will be found ample confirmation of these remarks.

It will there be seen that, when preparing to enter France, the Duke was provoked to tell the Council of Regency that he had been most unworthily treated, even as a gentleman, by the Spanish Government; that he was compelled to tender his resignation as generalissimo of their armies in consequence of their repudiation of engagements entered into with him by their predecessors; that his resignation was actually accepted, although a new Cortes afterwards requested him to keep his command, and decided that the Regency was to be bound by its predecessor's acts; that when he invaded France he did so in greater dread of the enemy at his back than of the foe in his front; and that, even while encamped on French territory, he was induced by the menacing action of the Spanish authorities to warn the English ministry against the possible contingency of a war with Spain, and to propose seizing St. Sebastian as a security for the safe withdrawal of the British troops to England.

One of the ablest reviews of Napier's History* contains the following passages:—

"Now, it really seems a little unreasonable that men of skill and authority, overflowing with Jomini, and science, and literature, with Hannibal, and Frederick, and so forth, at their fingers' ends, should very violently condemn the unfortunate Spaniards because they had not knowledge and discipline by instinct."

"And again: when the historian narrates, with the horror of a chivalrous soldier, the cruelties committed by the Spaniards on the French, why does he represent the cruelties of the French as mere pardonable retaliations for these?"

* In the 'Athenæum,' republished in Stirling's 'Essays and Tales.'

For the first of these strictures there is not the smallest particle of foundation to be discovered in any line of the History. The extracts which are above given from it sufficiently prove that the author, while stating the fact of the absence of military knowledge and discipline, explained that it was impossible the Spaniards should have had those qualities at the commencement of the war. After it had continued three years, however, and it was apparent that Spain, torn by factions, continued as helpless as at the beginning, and that neither shame for her deficiencies nor any desire to amend them was visible; it would have been to abdicate the functions of an historian if the author had failed to mark with deserved reprobation the indolence and arrogant self-confidence out of which her incapacity arose.

With reference to the second stricture, let the author speak for himself in his reply to a similar charge urged by the 'Quarterly Review.'

"The critic accuses me of an unnatural bias, and an inclination to do injustice to the Spaniards, because I have not made the report of some outrages, committed by Soult's cavalry, the ground of a false and infamous charge against the whole French army and French nation. Those outrages which I did notice, and which he admits himself were vigorously repressed, were committed by troops in a country where all the inhabitants were in arms, where no soldier could straggle without meeting death by torture and mutilation, and, finally, where the army lived from day to day on what they could take in the country. I shall now put this sort of logic to a severe test, and leave the Reviewer's patriots to settle the matter as they can. That is, I shall give from Lord Wellington's despatches through a series of years, extracts touching the conduct of British officers and soldiers in this same Peninsula, where

they were dealt with, not as enemies, not mutilated, tortured, assassinated, but well provided and kindly treated."

Here follow twelve extracts, extending over three years, from the Duke's despatches, from which the two sentences following are alone quoted:—

"June, 1809. [To Lord Castlereagh.] There is not an outrage of any description which has not been committed on a people who have uniformly received us as friends, by soldiers who never yet for one moment suffered the slightest want or the smallest privation."

"May, 1812. [To Lord Liverpool.] The outrages committed by the British soldiers have been so enormous, and they have produced an effect on the minds of the people of the country so injurious to the cause, and likely to be so injurious to the army itself, that I request your Lordship's early attention to the subject."

Colonel Napier then goes on to say—

"Having thus displayed the conduct of the British army, as described by its own general, through a series of years; and having also, from the same authority, shown the humane treatment English officers and soldiers, when they happened to be made prisoners, experienced from the French, I demand of any man with a particle of honour, truth, or conscience in his composition, whether these outrages, perpetrated by British troops upon a friendly people, can be suppressed, and the outrages of French soldiers against implacable enemies enlarged upon with justice?—whether it is right and decent to impute relentless ferocity, atrocious villany, to the whole French army, and stigmatise the whole French nation for the excesses of some bad soldiers, prating at the same time of the virtue of England and the excellent conduct of her troops; and this too in the face of the Duke of Wellington's testimony to the kindness with which they treated our men, and in the

face also of his express declaration (letter to Lord Wellesley, 26th January, 1811) that the majority of the French soldiers were sober, *well disposed, amenable to order, and in some degree educated?* But what intolerable injustice it would be to stigmatise either nation for military excesses that are common to all armies and to all wars; and when I know that the general characteristic of the British and French troops alike is generosity, bravery, humanity, and honour."

The truth is, that Colonel Napier, abhorring from his soul every act of cruelty by whomsoever perpetrated, beheld the turmoil from the philosophic height and related it with the impartiality of the historian, while his critics threw themselves into the press, and regarded the various incidents with the eyes of partisans.

As a sample of Spanish ferocity towards their invaders, and as a melancholy cause for the terrible balance of barbarous actions which the French unhappily struck, take the following extract from the History:—

"On the line of march, and in Andujar, he had terrible proofs of Spanish ferocity; his stragglers had been assassinated, his hospital taken; sick men, medical attendants, couriers, staff-officers,—in fine, all who were too weak for defence,—had been butchered with extraordinary barbarity; four hundred had perished in this miserable manner since the fight at Alcolea. The fate of Colonel René was horrible. Employed on a mission to Portugal previous to the breaking out of hostilities, he was on his return, travelling in the ordinary mode, without arms, attached to no army, engaged in no operation of war, yet he was first *cruelly mutilated, then placed between deal planks and sawed in two!*" (Vol. i. p. 74, revised edition.)

Few books that have ever been published afford so true an index of the mind and character of the writer as does

the 'History of the Peninsular War.' Hatred of cruelty, love of clemency, pity for the oppressed, righteous uncompromising hostility to tyrants, chivalrous appreciation of an enemy, charity to the poor, tenderness to the weak, and general benevolence towards all mankind except the evil-doers, speak out from his pages in ringing accents. His political opinions, notwithstanding their unpopularity in high places, were set forth with the utmost fearlessness and honesty, careless whom he might offend when he was speaking truths, the acceptance of which he believed essential to the wellbeing of his countrymen and of the world. Colonel Napier's radicalism had for its principal characteristics a hearty appreciation of all that is grand and beautiful, and a firm faith in the glorious results to be achieved by the spread of education among the millions and their political emancipation. To raise the many, and not to annihilate the few, was its main object; and the foundation of his political creed was an undoubting belief in the capacity of human nature for progressive improvement in liberty and virtue.

The following extracts from his work will illustrate his political opinions; they are set forth in the story of his life, because many of them are such as would be little expected from him by those who may have been accustomed to confound him with the great mass of miscalled Radicals or Liberals.

Evils of Aristocracy.

"Napoleon's troops fought in bright fields, where every helmet caught some beams of glory; but the British soldier conquered under the cold shade of aristocracy; no honours awaited his daring, no despatch gave his name to the applause of his countrymen; his life of danger and hardship was uncheered by hope, his death unnoticed."

"In Spain, in 1813, Wellington was inimical to the constitution, because it admitted a free press, and refused to property any political influence beyond what naturally belonged to it—that is, it refused to heap undue honours, privileges, and power upon those who already possessed all the luxury and happiness that riches can bestow; it refused to admit the principle that those who have much should have more; that the indolence, corruption, and insolence, naturally attendant upon wealth, should be supported and increased by irresponsible power; that those who laboured and produced all things should enjoy nothing; that the rich should be tyrants and the poor slaves. But these essential principles of aristocratic government have never yet been, and never will be, quietly received and submitted to by any thinking people—where they prevail there is no real freedom. Property inevitably confers power on its possessors; and far from adding to that natural power by political privileges, it should be the object of all men who love liberty to balance it by raising the poorer classes to political importance; the influence and insolence of riches ought to be tamed and subdued, instead of being inflated and excited by political institutions."

"The emigration of the royal family of Portugal forced men to inquire how subjects were bound to a monarch who deserted them in their need? How the nation could belong to a man who did not belong to the nation? It has been observed by political economists that where a gold and paper currency circulate together, if the paper be depreciated it will drag down the gold with it, and deteriorate the whole mass; yet, after a time, the metal revolts from this unnatural state and asserts its intrinsic superiority; so a privileged class, corrupted by power and luxury, drags down the national character. There is, however, a point where the people, like the gold, no longer suffering such

degradation, will separate themselves with violence from the vices of their effeminate rulers. Until that time arrives, a nation may appear sunk in hopeless lethargy when it is capable of great and noble exertions."

"The French Revolution was pushed into existence before the hour of its natural birth. The power of the aristocratic principle was too vigorous, and too much identified with that of the monarchical principle, to be successfully resisted by a virtuous democratic effort; much less could it be overthrown by a democracy rioting in innocent blood, and menacing destruction to political and religious establishments, the growth of centuries, somewhat decayed indeed, yet scarcely showing their grey hairs."

"It seems nearly certain that one of his (Napoleon's in 1813) reasons for replacing Ferdinand on the Spanish throne, was his fear lest the republican doctrines, which had gained ground in Spain, should spread to France. Was he wrong? The fierce democrat will answer Yes! But the man who thinks that real liberty was never attained under a single unmixed form of government, giving no natural vent to the swelling pride of honour, birth, or riches—those who measure the weakness of pure republicanism by the miserable state of France at home and abroad when Napoleon, by assuming power, saved her—those who saw America, with all her militia and her licentious liberty, unable to prevent three thousand British soldiers from passing three thousand miles of ocean and burning her capital—will hesitate to condemn him. And this without detriment to the democratic principle which in substance may, and should always, govern under judicious forms. Napoleon early judged, and the event has proved he judged truly, that the democratic spirit of France, however violent, was unable to overbear the aristocratic and monarchic tendencies of Europe; wisely therefore,

while he preserved the essence of the first by fostering equality, he endeavoured to blend it with the other two; thus satisfying, as far as the nature of human institutions would permit, the conditions of the great problem he had undertaken to solve. His object was the reconstruction of the social fabric which had been shattered by the French Revolution, mixing with the new materials all that remained of the old sufficiently unbroken to build with again."

"Such were the men, calling themselves statesmen, who then wielded the vast resources of Great Britain." . . . "And to reduce these persons from the magnitude of statesmen to their natural smallness of intriguing debators, is called political prejudice! But though power may enable men to trample upon reason for a time with impunity, they cannot escape her ultimate vengeance; she reassumes her sway, and history delivers them to the justice of posterity."

"Such was the denuded state of the victorious Wellington at a time when millions, and the worth of more millions, were being poured by the English Minister into the Continent." . . . "And all this time there was not in England one public salary reduced, one contract checked, one abuse corrected, one public servant rebuked for negligence; not a writer dared to expose the mischief, lest he should be crushed by persecution; no minister ceased to claim and to receive the boasting congratulations of the Tories; no Whig had sense to discover or spirit to denounce the iniquitous system; no voice of reprehension was heard from that selfish faction, unless it were in sneering contempt of the general whose mighty genius sustained England under this load of folly."

"The English are a people very subject to receive and to cherish false impressions; proud of their credulity, as if

it were a virtue, the majority will adopt any fallacy, and cling to it with a tenacity proportioned to its grossness."

"A weak man may safely wear an inherited crown—it is of gold, and the people support it; but it requires the strength of a warrior to bear the weight of an usurped diadem—it is of iron."

"Gold is not always the synonyme of power in war, or of happiness in peace."

"Most surely all generals and politicians of every country, who trust to sudden popular commotions, will find that noisy declamations, vehement demonstrations of feeling, idle rumours, and boasting, the life-blood of such affairs, are essentially opposed to public exertions."

"In large communities, working constitutions are the offspring, and not the generators, of national feelings and habits. They cannot be built like cities in the desert, nor cast as breakwaters into the sea of public corruption; but gradually, and as the insect rocks come up from the depth of the ocean, they must arise, if they are to bear the storms of human passions."

"In 1813, the Portuguese Government neglecting to pay their troops, Wellington made an appeal to the honour and patriotism of the Portuguese soldiers whose time had expired. Such an appeal is never made in vain to the poorer classes of any nation; one and all, these brave men remained in the service, notwithstanding the shameful treatment they had endured from their own government. This noble emotion would seem to prove that Beresford, whose system of military reform was chiefly founded on severity, might have better attained his object in another manner; but harshness is the essence of the aristocratic system of government, and the Marshal only moved in the straight path marked out for him by the policy of the day."

"The great mass of men in all nations are only endowed with moderate capacity and spirit; and as their thoughts are intent on the preservation of their families and their property, they must bend to circumstances; thus fear and suspicion, ignorance, baseness, and good feeling, all combine to urge men in troubled times to put on the mask of enthusiasm for the most powerful, while selfish knaves ever shout with the loudest."

"Bad government is more hurtful than direct war; the ravages of the last are soon repaired, and the public mind is often purified and advanced by the trial of adversity, but the evils springing from the former seem interminable."

The Americans. "A people who, notwithstanding the curse of black slavery that clings to them, adding the most horrible ferocity to the peculiar baseness of their mercantile spirit, and rendering their republican vanity ridiculous, do in their general government uphold civil institutions which have startled the crazy despotisms of Europe."

Colonel Napier's admiration for—not Napoleon—but for the ideal Napoleon he set up for himself—was unbounded. The stupendous intellect and genius of the great conqueror, which were realities, were credited by him with all the unselfish desire for the improvement and happiness of mankind, which would have been his own motive of action had he possessed Napoleon's power. So it was that his Napoleon was an ideal character, and, like all his ideals of greatness, grand, good, and beautiful. He has himself supplied the reasons for this worship of his hero.

"While he (Napoleon) sacrificed political liberty, which to the great bulk of mankind has never been more than a pleasing sound, he cherished with the utmost care equality, a sensible good that produces increasing satisfaction as it descends in the scale of society."

"Self had no place in his policy, save as his personal glory was identified with France and her prosperity. Never before did the world see a man soaring so high, and devoid of all selfish ambition. Let those who, honestly seeking truth, doubt this, study Napoleon carefully; let them read the record of his second abdication published by his brother Lucien, that stern republican who refused kingdoms as the price of his principles, and they will doubt no longer."

"There is nothing more remarkable in Napoleon's policy than the care with which he handled financial matters, avoiding, as he would the plague, that fictitious system of public credit so fatuously cherished in England."

"The annual expenditure of France was scarcely half that of England, and Napoleon rejected public loans, which are the very life-blood of state corruption. He left no debt. Under him no man devoured the public substance in idleness merely because he was of a privileged class; the state servants were largely paid, but they were made to labour effectually for the state. They did not eat their bread and sleep. His system of public accounts, remarkable for its exactness, simplicity, and comprehensiveness, was vitally opposed to public fraud, and therefore extremely unfavourable to corruption. Napoleon's power was supported in France by that deep sense of his goodness as a sovereign, and that admiration of his genius, which pervaded the poorer and middle classes of the people; by the love which they bore towards him, and still bear for his memory, because he cherished the principles of a just equality. They loved him also for his incessant activity in the public service, his freedom from all private vices, and because his public works, wondrous for their number, their utility and grandeur, never stood still; under him the poor man never wanted work. To France he gave

noble institutions, a comparatively just code of laws, and glory unmatched since the days of the Romans. His *Cadastre*, more extensive and perfect than the Doomsday Book, that monument of the wisdom and greatness of our Norman conqueror, was alone sufficient to endear him to the nation. Rapidly advancing under his vigorous superintendence, it registered and taught every man the true value and nature of his property, and all its liabilities public and private. It was designed and most ably adapted to fix and secure titles to property, to prevent frauds, to abate litigation, to apportion the weight of taxes equally and justly, to repress the insolence of the tax-gatherer without injury to the revenue, and to secure the sacred freedom of the poor man's home. The French *Cadastre*, although not original, would from its comprehensiveness have been, when completed, the greatest boon ever conferred upon a civilized nation by a statesman.

"To say that the Emperor was supported by his soldiers is to say that he was supported by the people; because the law of conscription, that mighty staff on which France leaned when all Europe attempted to push her down,—the conscription, without which she never could have sustained the dreadful war of antagonistic principles entailed upon her by the Revolution,—that energetic law which he did not establish, but which he freed from abuses, and rendered great, national, and endurable, by causing it to strike equally on all classes,—the conscription made the soldiers the real representatives of the people. The troops idolized Napoleon; well they might: and to assert that their attachment commenced only when they became soldiers, is to acknowledge that his excellent qualities and greatness of mind turned hatred into devotion the moment he was approached. But Napoleon never was hated by the people of France; he was their own

creation, and they loved him so as never monarch was loved before. His march from Cannes to Paris, surrounded by hundreds of thousands of poor men who were not soldiers, can never be effaced or even disfigured. For six weeks, at any moment, a single assassin might by a single shot have acquired the reputation of a tyrannicide, and obtained vast rewards besides from the trembling monarchs and aristocrats of the earth, who scrupled not to instigate men to the shameful deed. Many there were base enough to undertake, but none so hardy as to execute the crime; and Napoleon, guarded by the people of France, passed unharmed to a throne whence it required a million of foreign bayonets to drive him again. From the throne they drove him, but not from the thoughts and the hearts of men."

The foregoing extract contains almost the only instance of special pleading to be found in the History; the French soldiers may, indeed, in consideration of the incessant activity of the conscription during the reign of Napoleon, be said in one sense to have been representatives of the people; and that the soldiers adored him is true; but it was for the glory he gave them as soldiers, the first object of a Frenchman's worship, not necessarily for the excellence of his moral qualities. And it is strange that the writer did not perceive that the system of conscription—an excellent, just, and beneficent system in defensive warfare—becomes, when combined with wars of aggression and conquest, the most hateful instrument of tyranny.

"In Napoleon's council were persons seeking only to betray him. It was the great misfortune of his life to have been driven by circumstances to suffer such men as Talleyrand and Fouché, whose innate treachery has become proverbial, to meddle in his affairs, or even to approach his court. Mischief of this kind however

necessarily waits upon men who, like Napoleon and Oliver Cromwell, have the courage to attempt, after great convulsions and civil wars, the rebuilding the social edifice without spilling blood. Either to create universal abhorrence by their cruelty, or to employ the basest of men, the Talleyrands, Fouchés, and Monks of revolutions, is their inevitable fate; and never can they escape the opposition, more dangerous still, of honest and resolute men, who, unable to comprehend the necessity of the times, see nothing but tyranny in the vigour that prevents anarchy."

"There were many traitors likewise to him and to their country, men devoid of principle, patriotism, and honour, who, with instinctive hatred for a falling cause, plotted to thwart his projects for the defence of the nation. In fine, the men of action and the men of theories were alike combined for mischief. Nor is this outbreak of passion to be wondered at when we consider how recently Napoleon had stopped the anarchy of the revolution, and rebuilt the social and political structure in France. But of all who, by their untimely opposition to the Emperor, hurt their country, the most pernicious were those silly politicians whom he so felicitously described as 'discussing abstract systems of government when the battering ram was at the gates.' Such, however, has been in all ages the conduct of excited and disturbed nations, and it seems to be inherent in human nature, because a saving policy can only be understood and worked to good by master spirits, and they are few and far between—their time on earth short, their task immense. They have not time to teach; they must command, although they know that pride and ignorance, and even honesty, will carp at the despotism that brings general safety. It was this vain shortsighted impatience that drove Hannibal into exile, caused the assassination of Cæsar, and strewed thorns beneath the

gigantic footsteps of Oliver Cromwell. It raged fiercely in Spain against Lord Wellington, and in France against Napoleon, and always with the most grievous injury to the several nations. Time only hallows human institutions. Under that guarantee men will yield implicit obedience and respect to the wildest caprices of the most stupid tyrant that ever disgraced a throne; and wanting it, they will cavil at and reject the wisest measures of the most sublime genius. The painful notion is thus excited, that if governments are conducted with just the degree of stability and tranquillity which they deserve, and no more, the people of all nations, much as they may be oppressed, enjoy upon an average of years precisely the degree of liberty they are fitted for. National discontents mark, according to their bitterness and constancy, not so much the oppression of the rulers as the real progress of the ruled in civilization and its attendant political knowledge. When from peculiar circumstances those discontents explode in violent revolutions, shattering the fabric of society, and giving free vent and activity to all the passions and follies of mankind, fortunate is the nation which possesses a Napoleon or an Oliver Cromwell 'to step into their state of dominion with spirit to control, and capacity to subdue, the factions of the hour, and reconstruct the frame of reasonable government.' Nor do I hold the conduct of Washington to be comparable to either of those men. His situation was one of infinitely less difficulty."

No one can have read Colonel Napier's writings without being struck with the unaffected love and admiration he had for the soldiers of the British army. Both his practice and theory were calculated to elevate not only their material condition but also their moral tone. In his earnest, lofty enthusiasm, he believed them capable alike of

the most heroic actions, and of the loftiest sentiments ; a wiser and nobler creed than that of those who hold that vice and ruffianism are necessary adjuncts of a soldier's character; for such a belief in men by a commander of the stamp of William Napier would go far to make them what they would feel proud of being thought to be.

The few extracts following from the History instance the feelings of the historian on this point, and his opinions with reference to war in general, and to our army in particular.

"It is said that no soldier can be restrained after storming a town, and a British soldier least of all, because he is brutish and insensible to honour. Shame on such calumnies! What makes the British soldier fight as no other soldier ever fights? His pay? soldiers of all nations receive pay. At the period of this assault (St. Sebastian) a sergeant of the 28th Regiment, named Ball, had been sent with a party to the coast from Roncesvalles to make purchases for his officers. He placed the money he was intrusted with, 2000 dollars, in the hands of a commissary, and, having secured a receipt, persuaded his party to join in the storm. He survived, reclaimed the money, made his purchases, and returned to his regiment. And these are the men, these the spirits, who are called too brutish to work upon except by fear! It is precisely fear to which they are most insensible."

"Captain Brotherton of the 14th Dragoons, fighting on the 18th at the Guarena amongst the foremost as he was always wont to do, had a sword thrust quite through his side; yet on the 22nd he was again on horseback, and, being denied leave to remain in that condition with his own regiment, secretly joined Pack's Portuguese in an undress, and was again hurt in the unfortunate charge at the Arapiles. Such were the officers. A man of the

43rd, one by no means distinguished above his comrades, was shot through the middle of the thigh, and lost his shoes in passing through the marshy stream; but refusing to quit the fight, he limped under fire in rear of his regiment, and with naked feet and streaming of blood from his wound, he marched for several miles over a country covered with sharp stones. Such were the soldiers. And the devotion of a woman was not wanting to the illustration of this great day (Salamanca). The wife of Colonel Dalbiac, an English lady of a gentle disposition, and possessing a very delicate frame, had braved the dangers and endured the privations of two campaigns with the patient fortitude that belongs only to her sex; and in the battle, forgetful of everything but that strong affection which had so long supported her, she rode deep amidst the enemy's fire, trembling, yet irresistibly impelled forward by feelings more imperious than horror, more piercing than the fear of death."

As specimens of heroic portraiture, in which Napier has probably never been surpassed by any profane writer, the reader is referred to the History for the characters of Sir John Moore, Lieut.-Colonel Macleod who fell at Badajoz, Lieut.-Colonel Lloyd and Lieutenant Freer, who were killed at the battle of the Nivelle.

As examples of the evil of committing the conduct of a great war to men ignorant of its first principles, take the following:—

"The slightest movement in war requires a great effort, and is attended by many vexations which the general feels acutely and unceasingly; but the politician, believing in no difficulties because he feels none, neglects the supplies, charges disaster on the general, and covers his misdeeds with words."

"The want of transport had again obliged the allies to

draw the stores from Elvas, to the manifest hazard of that fortress; and hence here (Badajoz), as at Ciudad Rodrigo, time was necessarily paid for by the loss of life—or rather, the crimes of politicians were atoned for by the blood of the soldiers."

"Why were men thus sent to slaughter when the application of a just science would have rendered the operation comparatively easy? Because the English ministers, so ready to plunge into war, were quite ignorant of its exigencies; because the English people are warlike without being military, and, under pretence of maintaining a liberty they do not possess, oppose in peace all useful martial establishments. Expatiating in their schools and colleges upon Roman discipline and Roman valour, they are heedless of Roman institutions; they desire, like that ancient republic, to be free at home and conquerors abroad, but start at perfecting their military system as a thing incompatible with a constitution, which they yet suffer to be violated by every minister who trembles at the exposure of corruption."

"Every British officer of rank knew that without powerful interest his future prospects and his reputation for past services would have withered together under the first blight of misfortune,—that a selfish government would instantly offer him up a victim to a misjudging public and a ribald press, with whom success is the only criterion of merit."

"The secret of making perfect soldiers is only to be found in national customs and institutions; men should come to the ranks fitted by previous habits for military service, instead of being stretched as it were on the bed of Procrustes by a discipline which has no resource but fear."

"War tries the strength of the military framework; it is in peace that the framework itself must be formed,

otherwise barbarians would be the leading soldiers of the world; a perfect army can only be made by civil institutions, and those rightly considered would tend to confine the horrors of war to the field of battle, which would be the next best thing to the perfection of civilization that would prevent war altogether."

"England stood the most triumphant nation in the world; but with an enormous debt, a dissatisfied people, gaining peace without tranquillity, greatness without intrinsic strength, the present time uneasy, the future dark and threatening. *Yet she rejoices in the glory of her arms! And it is a stirring sound! War is the condition of this world. From man to the smallest insect all are at strife; and the glory of arms, which cannot be obtained without the exercise of honour, fortitude, courage, obedience, modesty, and temperance, excites the brave man's patriotism, and is a chastening correction for the rich man's pride. It is yet no security for power.* Napoleon, the greatest man of whom history makes mention—Napoleon, the most wonderful commander, the most sagacious politician, the most profound statesman—lost by arms Poland, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and France. *Fortune, that name for the unknown combinations of infinite power, was wanting to him; and without her aid the designs of man are as bubbles on a troubled ocean.*"

In one point, and in one point only, did Colonel Napier violate the dignity and high judicial functions of the historian, in the bitter unmeasured censures he passed against Canning and Perceval; censures which bear the appearance of being directed not only against the political but also against the personal character of those ministers. That ample grounds existed for his censure of the rashness and ignorance with which they commenced the struggle in the Peninsula with 9000 men against the whole might of

the French Emperor is certain; but it is a blot on his great work, that the historian, while condemning the folly and mischief of their proceedings, should have omitted to attribute their shortcomings to ignorance, to our system of government, to other than moral defects, and to give them credit for that warm and generous sympathy with the Spanish patriots which was the undoubted spring of their actions.

That he should have been indignant with the statesmen who directed the war from home was just and natural. They are convicted in the History of such astounding ignorance of the first principles of war, of such amazing credulity in Spanish professions, and of such shameful mismanagement of the immense sums which were lavished on Spain at the outset of the struggle, that the successful prosecution of the war appears miraculous. Take a very few instances among many.

Sir Arthur Wellesley sailed from Cork in July, 1808, to land in Portugal, and drive the French out of the Spanish Peninsula. His force consisted of 9000 men. He was informed that General Spencer, who was on board ship at Cadiz with 5000 men, was at his orders.

General Spencer however had received instructions empowering him to act in the south, at his discretion, without reference to Sir Arthur's proceedings.

And Admiral Purvis was also authorised to undertake any enterprise in the south he might think promising, and even to control Sir Arthur's operations by calling for the aid of his troops, which aid the General was enjoined to give if demanded.

Sir Arthur had scarcely sailed when he was superseded and reduced to the fourth rank in the command of the expedition, by the appointment of Sir Hew Dalrymple as chief, and of Sir Harry Burrard and Sir John Moore as subordinates superior to himself.

The instructions given to Sir Arthur were absurd. The arrival of Sir Harry Burrard off the coast after Wellesley's victory of Roliça stopped him from inflicting a serious blow on the enemy; the arrival of the same General on the battle-field of Vimiero stopped him from following up the retreating French; and by the arrival of Sir Hew Dalrymple on the following day, the army thus fell successively into the hands of three men coming with different views, habits, and information, without any previous knowledge of each other, and brought together at a moment when it was probable they would all disagree.

Later, when the ministry ordered Moore to march into Spain, Sir David Baird was directed with reinforcements to Corunna, there to land, and thence to march through a most difficult country to join Sir John Moore, who, to effect this junction, must himself march over 250 miles of difficult country, and with the possibility that the point of concentration might be in possession of the French before either he or Baird could reach it.

Although Moore had been kept almost destitute of money, the ministers had saturated Spain with gold for the Spanish Juntas, which Sir John Moore was now actually obliged to get back for the subsistence of the British army in loans.

When Baird arrived at Corunna, he also was destitute of money, and all that Moore could spare him was 8000*l.* Mr. Frere, however, who arrived at Corunna about this time, was comfortably provided with two millions of dollars for the use of the Spaniards, and from him Baird was forced to borrow for the necessities of his English soldiers!

Again, after Sir Arthur's first successful campaign in Portugal, the same ministers, having 90,000 superb soldiers disposable for offensive operations, allowed Sir Arthur Wellesley to commence the campaign with 22,000, while

they devoted 40,000 of their finest troops to destruction at Walcheren, and employed 12,000, drawn from Sicily, in an useless descent on the southern extremity of Italy!

And yet, even up to the battle of Salamanca, Sir Arthur was more than once reminded by Mr. Perceval that the whole responsibility of failure would rest on his head.

These instances, a few among many similar, must be admitted to justify the censure though not the tone. The bitter feeling manifested by Colonel Napier towards Canning and Perceval was occasioned principally by what he considered their base surrender of Sir John Moore's memory to the attacks of his calumniators; but he himself admitted afterwards, in a letter to the son of Mr. Perceval, that some of his expressions were inconsistent with the dignity of history.

As regards the honesty and impartiality of the work there can be but one opinion. Sufficient extracts have been given to show how fearlessly he published political opinions which must have made him an object of suspicion and alarm to both the powerful parties in the state. That he could be impartial in his censure, and could blame as well as praise the Duke of Wellington, on whose personal favour the success of his whole future military career depended, is manifest from the following extract:—

"Such were the reasons assigned by the English general for his slack pursuit after the battle of Vittoria; yet he had commanded that army for five years! Was he then deficient in the first qualification of a general, the art of disciplining and inspiring troops; or was the English military system defective? It is certain he always exacted the confidence of his soldiers as a leader; it is not so certain he gained their affections. The barbarity of the English military code excited public horror, the inequality of promotion created public discontent; yet the General com-

plained he had no adequate power to reward or punish; and he condemned alike the system and the soldiers it produced. The latter 'were detestable for everything but fighting, and the officers as culpable as the men.' The vehemence of these censures is inconsistent with his celebrated observation, subsequently made, namely, that he thought he could go anywhere and do anything with the army that fought on the Pyrenees; and although it cannot be denied that his complaints were generally too well founded, there were thousands of true and noble soldiers, and zealous worthy officers, who served their country honestly and merited no reproaches. It is enough that they have since been neglected, exactly in proportion to their want of that corrupt aristocratic influence which produced the evils complained of."

The Duke of Wellington, writing to Mr. Dudley Perceval in 1835, stated, "Notwithstanding my great respect for Colonel Napier and his work, I have never read a line of it, because I wished to avoid being led into a literary controversy, which I should probably find more troublesome than the operations which it is the design of the Colonel's work to describe and record."

Yet there is little doubt that through Lord Fitzroy Somerset he made himself well acquainted with both the spirit of the work and with its account of the most important transactions of the war; and the following extract from a letter addressed to the author by Sir N. Trant expresses the Duke's opinion on the subject:—

"Allow me to explain what I meant with regard to Ferguson's expression to me. We were talking of your book, and giving you credit for the spirit of independence with which it is written. He said he had heard the Duke speak of it in the same sense and in these words:—

"'Napier may be somewhat radical, but, by G—, his

History is the only one which tells truth as to the events of the Peninsular War.'"

The obligations laid upon him by his historian, which the Duke could, however, but imperfectly appreciate, are well expressed in the following extract from the 'Edinburgh Review:'—

"Before Colonel Napier commenced his History, few persons had any accurate conceptions respecting either the character of the struggle which he describes, or of the parties by whom it was carried on. The few who did possess a knowledge of the truth were, from various reasons, unwilling to state it. Amongst these the most marked was the Duke of Wellington; and he, as the result has shown, was content with the renown he already possessed, and unwilling, when he desired rest from toil, to recall the recollection of the weakness, folly, and treachery, by which his efforts had been cramped, his victories often rendered of no avail, and his final success almost rendered impossible.

"The event was successful, and that was enough: all men were willing to afford him unbounded admiration and applause; and he was not anxious that this admiration and applause should be bestowed in consequence of a perfect conception of the many extraordinary obstacles which his genius and fortitude enabled him to surmount. The voice of truth was drowned by the shout of victory. Doubtless, for the personal comfort of the Duke of Wellington, this was a prudent course. For his country and for posterity, however, truth was needed; and even for his own renown it was not unimportant. The vulgar judged him by his success; they who thought, however, but who were necessarily ignorant of the true nature of the contest, underrated his worth; because, judging him by the means which they fancied him to have possessed, they deemed the result hardly adequate to those means. It was sup-

posed that he was lavishly supplied with money, men, and arms, by the most lavish government the world ever saw; that he wielded, without let or molestation, the whole power of England, Portugal, and Spain; that the ministry at home were at his absolute disposal; that Spain was his enthusiastic, ardent, gallant ally; and that, having, as his obedient supporters, two whole nations burning for independence, and ready with patriot ardour to sacrifice life and fortune in order to attain it—having also the finest army England could furnish, equipped with all that an army needed,—it was no marvellous feat of arms, slowly to win his way in six long years from Lisbon to Toulouse, and to be finally successful only because the army of Napoleon had been buried in the snows of Russia. The true history of his difficulties was needed to obviate these objections; and now, when this is known, it is found that a greater glory is really his due than that which the ignorant multitude bestowed on him merely because he was successful."

CHAPTER XVII.

CORRESPONDENCE—BATH ELECTION—AFFAIR OF THE 'CAROLINE.'

IT was at Hemelhempstead, in the house of his brother Captain Henry Napier, that the last pages of the 'Peninsular War,' containing the observations on the battle of Toulouse and the admirable comparison of the relative merits of Napoleon and Wellington, were written. They were written, like many another vigorous and glowing page of his works both before and after, in sickness and severe pain. Does physical suffering stimulate the mental powers, without even disturbing the judgment? It was from his sick bed, in the intervals of intense agony, that Walter Scott dictated two of his very best works—'Ivanhoe' and the 'Bride of Lammermoor.' And the last chapter of Napier's History bears the traces of the lassitude and irritation of illness as little as does the immortal page concluding the description of the battle of Albuera, which was composed in a rare interval of health, on a stormy day of March, as the author strode along an upland down in Wiltshire, battling with the equinoctial gale.

To Mrs. Napier.

"Hemelhempstead, March, 1840.

"I have been every day hoping to be able to write to you, but each night brought new pain, and now I am I fear worse than ever, as a very severe attack has settled in

my knee and my pain is very great. Dear Caroline, I wish I was with you; Henry makes himself quite a slave to me; but I feel my life ebbing away, and I want to be as much with you and my dear, dear children while I am in this world as I can. It is at night that I think of you all, and pray fervently and constantly that you may never have to endure the tortures I suffer. God bless you, my dearest wife! Give my love to Hanmer* and his wife, and tell them I am very sorry indeed not to be able to welcome her into our family, but you will make it a home for the time to her, and so will my good gentle girls. I feel assured that she will like them and that they will like her; tell me all about her."

"I am better, and hope that I shall have no relapse. I owe everything to Henry; when I told you he was a slave, I meant it literally. He would not let a servant come near me day or night. When you write to him, tell him that I know all he did, but it is hard to *say* thanks.

"I don't feel as if I said half enough to you and my darling children for your letters; but I mean you to tell them always how much I love them. I was this morning burning your notes and theirs, but it went against the grain to put them in the fire, and I kissed the little notes for 'Papa' over and over again first. I have so much to do (though I am getting stronger) that I feel rather overworked. I have corrected ten sheets of manuscript daily besides the proof-sheets and letters every day since I have begun to sit up."

"March 10, 1840.

"I have just finished all the corrections of the manuscript and the table of contents; my task is therefore completed at last, after sixteen years, and I think it was in

* Hanmer Bunbury, son of Sir Henry Bunbury.

March that I wrote the first page; I do not, however, feel at all elated in spirit. It is the last useful thing probably which I shall ever be able to do; but I should like to have finished it at home, and with you to speak to when I had done. Without you I could never have written it at all, and it would have been a pleasure to me to have told you so, for I love you deeply.

"My little Sudley's pranks amuse me much."

The following letter is from one of the most valued of Colonel Napier's old Peninsula comrades, whose name is often mentioned in the History:—

Colonel Charles Beckwith, to Colonel Napier.*

"MY DEAR NAPIER, "London, April 20, 1840.

"Many thanks for your kind letter, which gave me sensible pleasure. I shall apply to Boon, and as soon as I shall get a home I shall give the 'Peninsular War' a conspicuous place among my household gods, bound in calf and gilt. What furrows, according to Malebranche, my own or other people's ideas may have made in my brain, I cannot tell, but old Time is doing his work on the outer man; and sometimes a spring, sometimes a cog wanting, seem to indicate that all is not exactly as it should be, and that one day or other my locomotive will refuse to mount the inclined plane. My spirit, however, seems to accommodate itself to the external changes which the machine is necessarily undergoing, and I keep the even tenor of

* Major-General John Charles Beckwith, C.B., an excellent soldier, and a man of original character and vigorous mind. After serving, with much distinction, in many military expeditions throughout the Peninsular war, and at Waterloo, where he lost his leg, a strong religious attraction and sympathy with an oppressed people led him into the valleys of the Waldenses, where he spent the remainder of his long life, among a simple, warm-hearted people, to whom his genuine goodness and unceasing beneficence had marvellously endeared him. He died at La Tour, in Piedmont, January 19, 1862.

my way under circumstances which to many persons might appear least conducive to that enjoyment which even this life affords. I attribute this to clear distinct views of the end and objects of existence, and quiet perseverance in the lower range of duties which come more within our capacities than those of a more brilliant sort. To love the truth for the truth's sake and reduce it to practice seems to be the whole duty of man. I can have no way of ascertaining the truth but by direct revelation of God, and, having ascertained the fact of that revelation, I receive its facts and use them as I am directed. I have found my profit in the study of this science, and, by reasoning patiently from the known to the unknown, have arrived at that feeling of the subject which really constitutes knowledge, and which mere perception can never give. But it is not a complicated process, and no one understands it so well as the women and little children. Evil is disobedience, good is obedience; every good soldier wishes to obey his general. Willing, cheerful, affectionate obedience is the duty and interest of every man who loves his country and his brother soldiers; that noble feeling that leads the 43rd in beautiful array through the thickest of the fight, and fixes the powder-bags to the gates of Ghuznee; but how much more due to that glorious Being, the author of everything that can ennoble and adorn human nature, who at once launches into space these mighty orbs and takes care for little children! This great Being, as might reasonably be expected, has come down amongst us in human form to put the fact of His existence beyond all doubt, to inform us of the exact state of our relations to Him, to point out our real condition, and the mode of obtaining that happy immortality which all naturally desire; and whilst He has clearly explained to us that regret for past errors can never remove from us their con-

sequences, He has taken those consequences upon Himself, and has done for his children as their heavenly Father that which is beyond the power of an earthly one. Laws and philosophical systems but multiply our difficulties, and only serve to show more clearly the impossibility of complying with their injunctions. This He says in plain words, and promises to do that for us which we can never do for ourselves. 'Only believe what I say to you, and this faith shall restore you to your ancient condition, once more place you in close relationship with me, for you can have no existence independent of my power.' No man can desire more than to be the servant, and even the friend, of the great mighty God. No man can look to human compassion for the same mercy that he will find at the hands of Him who knows what we are made of, and who has a deep fellow-feeling with us. No man will lay down his life for us,—and He has done so. Morality commands us to save ourselves; religion saves us by its own power. The one enjoins us to do what none of us do; the other does what none can do for himself. Of writing many books there is no end, and much study is a weariness of the flesh; and there is more real talent and more profound wisdom in one line of a child's catechism than in all the tomes of all the Spinozas put together. Men may perplex and confound truths which are alike applicable to the wants and wishes of all, but man's folly can be no measure of the mercy and wisdom of God, and any one of these truths taking root in the mind may spring up into true intellectual life, the fear and the love of the Author of all truth. Write no more books, leave political men to mark out their own schemes, and avoid both men and matters that can only serve to irritate high-minded persons, and can produce no practical good effects on the last years of our existence. Women and children will feel more true

religion in one minute than men will wrangle out in a year. Some day or other we must all ground our arms, and it is our true wisdom to do so in time, and seated on the beach in the setting sun to look quietly and composedly on it as it descends below the horizon into those shades of night which must ultimately wrap us round. But as the twilight closes in, let us not forget that our orb of day may again spring up in brighter regions, and its eternal sunshine settle round our heads.

"I am sorry that I did not know of your whereabouts when you were here. I could easily have put myself in communication with you. I heard with pleasure of your interesting son, and hope your daughters are all likely to reward your affection, as I am sure they will do. Present my compliments and respects to Mrs. Napier, and thank her for the pleasure I had in her society when I visited Freshford. God bless you!

"Yours ever affectionately,

"CHARLES BECKWITH."

The eloquence and sincerity of Charles Beckwith failed to convince Colonel Napier that retirement from the turmoil of the world, in order that the evening of life may be undisturbed by worldly cares and anxieties, is the highest or noblest philosophy. What would become of mankind if the arena where must be fought out the great battle of right against wrong should be deserted by the champions of the good cause with—disguise it as we may—the selfish motive of rendering easier to their souls the struggle which all earnest men must wage to the end against their own infirmities? Rather did he emulate the heroism of those who, throwing themselves into the press of human affairs, strike with all their might, and to their

last hour, against ignorance, folly, oppression, and are able to say with Sir Galahad—

"So pass I hostel, hall, and grange,
By bridge and ford, by park and pale;
All armed I ride, whate'er betide,
Until I find the holy grail."

And those who thus fight on to the end, content to die in their harness and in the ranks of the faithful, will also be enabled to say with the pure knight—

"And stricken by an angel's hand,
This mortal armour that I wear,
This weight and size, this form and eyes,
Are touched, are turned, to finest air."

But the practice of Charles Beckwith was widely at variance with the precept it embodied, for he was one of this world's true reformers. For those who would know the great work he wrought during the last thirty years of his life, and the self-denial he practised among the Waldenses of the valleys of Piedmont, as well as the singular manner in which he was first drawn to the work, the interesting letter of the 'Times' Correspondent, dated Turin, 8th August, 1862, is given in the Appendix.

Colonel Napier was frequently urged to write the Life of the Duke of Wellington as well as that of Napoleon. In the course of the preceding year a proposal was made to him on the part of a French publisher to write an English Life of Napoleon. He invariably refused, however, for reasons which will be found stated in the following letter:—

To J. A. Roebuck, Esq.

"Freshford, April 27, 1840.

"I am glad you like the sixth volume, and that I have not shocked your notions except about Washington.

I think there is great force in what you say about Plutarch, and I believe he has done more than all the preaching in the world to make good men; but Washington has been ridiculously exalted by the Americans. What do you think of one of the most moderate of them having lately complained of Lord Brougham's injustice to Washington because he has not made him the best scholar and the most finished gentleman the world ever saw? My reason, however, for writing that sentence * was that it is, I think, a stain upon Washington. He had no relations except his wife, and to her he left the slaves. Franklin never soiled himself with any defence or countenance of slavery, and Washington ought from his commanding position to have endeavoured to brand the system, though I admit he was not powerful enough to put a stop to it. Another reason why I wrote it was, that at the time, the conduct of the Americans had been peculiarly base and cruel and violent towards the anti-slavery people, and I thought it not amiss to let them feel in a sensitive part how mankind generally abhorred their conduct.

"Excuse this blotted letter, but I am very weak and ill indeed, and very low-spirited about one of my girls who has been attacked with a dangerous inflammation of the lungs.

"About your proposal of my writing a Life of the Duke of Wellington, I would willingly do it if he would give me all the materials, but he would not. Rogers, the poet, wants me to write a Life of Napoleon, but the same bar occurs. Depend upon it, Waterloo has a long story of treachery and secret politics attached to it which will not be made known in our days, if ever. I have got a slight clue to some of it, and Colonel Lee (he who wrote one

* See 'Peninsular War,' vol. vi. book 23, chap. 5, in which Washington is compared with Napoleon and Cromwell, and is censured for bequeathing his slaves to his wife.

volume of Napoleon's Life, and then died, leaving a second volume nearly finished, but which his relations have suppressed) told me he had got at the whole both of Waterloo and Leipsic. This I am doubtful of, but I could not write at my ease under the impression that I was writing in the dark. And at all events my illness assumes now such a serious character of weakness that I am quite unable to commence the necessary inquiries or to make the journeys that would be required."

To J. A. Roebuck, Esq.

"May, 1840.

"As to my writing for him (the editor of the 'Edinburgh Review'), I do not know what to say. I will not undertake anything, yet I will not say no. At present I am correcting all the volumes carefully, and purifying them from all expressions unnecessary or *de trop*. After that I mean to write my Life, or a part of it at least, for I am like the lady who undertook to write St. Augustine's Life, and when a bishop observed that some passages were not quite what a lady should treat of, she answered, 'Oh, I mean to write him *en buste*.'"

To R. Marshall, Esq., Chairman, Leeds Reform Association,

"SIR, "Freshford, Jan. 14, 1840.

"I have just received your circular inviting me to attend a grand festival of Reformers at Leeds upon the 21st instant.

"It would give me great pleasure to assist in any measure or demonstration really calculated to forward the cause of Reform, but I can have no reliance on the efficacy of any meeting of Reformers where Mr. Daniel O'Connell is expected to bear a prominent part. I regret, therefore, to be compelled to decline the invitation."

Amongst the persons to whom Colonel Napier presented a copy of his History, General Shortall, Governor of the Magazine Fort in the Phœnix Park at Dublin, was one. The name may recall to many military readers a kindly old man of rather precise aspect, whose principal interest in life appeared to be to superintend the daily ceremony of relieving guard in his fort, and whose particular interest in that relief was displayed in his unfailing anxiety as to the relative position of the toes of the officer about to be relieved, and of a small piece of bone which he had caused to be let into the pavement to mark the precise spot. General Shortall had been Napier's commanding officer in the Royal Irish Artillery in 1800. They had never met since, but Colonel Napier always preserved a pleasing recollection of his kind old commander, which he now manifested by directing his publishers to send the general a copy of his work.

The Dublin agent of the publishers wrote back that the general had died ten days before, and that he would keep the copy on sale. A few days later the same agent wrote the following letter:—

"Dear Sir, "Dublin, May 2.

"A very awkward circumstance has happened in reference to General Shortall. His death was announced among the obituaries in all the papers last week, and lo! to-day there is a paragraph announcing that it is all a mistake, and that he is in perfect health. So the papers have first killed him and then brought him to life again. We pretend not to decide whether the worthy general be dead or alive, but if you will return the letter we sent back we shall have the book delivered to him whether *dead or alive.*"

The warm-hearted old gentleman was, however, alive, as the following testifies:—

"MY DEAR COLONEL NAPIER, "Phœnix Park, May 14, 1840.

"Nothing could be more grateful to my feelings than the assurance that you have retained me in your recollection for so long a period as forty years and upwards, which have now elapsed since I had the honour of your acquaintance. Your kind letter of the 12th instant has made me young again, although in my 78th year; and I feel most grateful for your truly valuable present that accompanied it, and which I shall regard and preserve while I live.

"Accept most fervent good wishes from, my dear Colonel Napier,

"Your much obliged and attached old friend,

"T. SHORTALL."

General Shortall's death took place, *bonâ fide*, in December, 1846; and, amongst the few legacies left by him, was one of 100*l.* to his "old brother officer and pupil in the Royal Irish Artillery, Major-General William Napier."

The following letters and extracts are from

Captain Henry Napier, R.N., to Colonel Napier.

"MY DEAR WILLIAM, "June 13, 1840.

"I am just returned from a three weeks' trip with Charles on his tour of inspection, and have seen some fine troops, all stanch;* the 98th in particular, Colonel Campbell's† regiment (whom I see you notice at the siege of St. Sebastian), reminds me of Shorncliffe and its heroes in 1804. Charles works too much; he is often not in bed

* Written during the Chartist agitation. Sir Charles commanded the northern district at this time.

† The late Lord Clyde.

until one or two, and always up at five or a little after, and is eternally writing, at an average about fourteen to sixteen hours a day. He has a cough, complains of short breath and weakness, and is allowing his zeal to carry him too far for his own health. I doubt his being able to go on thus. The fatigue of reading and writing is very great; for I see that as corporal punishment has diminished courts martial have increased, and he reads every word of all. His purse too is pretty well pulled by these visits of inspection; for he receives a travelling allowance that will not cover the bare posting, when forced to take four horses; and he and his aide-de-camp, all things included, cannot get out of an inn much under two pounds a day, although he burns tallow candles, and left the best hotel in Manchester because they objected to give them to him. He should have a quartermaster and travelling expenses, and then he would be the worst paid public officer in England for the work he does."

"October 14th.

"I am obliged to you for your advice about service, but if I once offer I must take what comes, and verily I do not feel up to it, especially when plagued with spasms which, as Emily can tell you, incapacitate me entirely; for to say truth they are very painful, and the idea of them puts me into something of the same state of terror, though with less reason, that you feel at the approach of your evil spirit.

"I think the French wrong in kicking up such a dust about an imagined insult. I see the two extreme papers of Paris, the 'National' and 'Quotidienne' say that we are right. However, right or wrong, I hope *we* shall lick them and I think old times will return to our navy—those old times 'when we never did right and never suffered wrong,' as old Admiral Colpoys used to say."

"Dec. 11, 1840.

"I sent the other day to Dr. Arnold a little plan and memoir that I had by me, of Charles's on the battle of Thrasymene, which he writes me word will be of the utmost use to him; but I will transcribe his answer, which will tell you what he wants. You may suppose by his words that he thinks *you* wrote the memoir I sent him, but he does not, for I particularly pointed out that it was not you but Charles. Dr. Arnold says, 'Your brother's name would insure my attention to anything of his on points of military geography; and it so happens that the battle of Thrasymenus was just one of the subjects on which I felt unsatisfied; for though I have been twice along the lake with Polybius in my hand, I had not time to explore the country, and I felt that the great point to ascertain was the precise line of the ancient road, the modern one not seeming to me to suit Polybius' account of the battle at all. I will, therefore, with your permission, thankfully avail myself of your offer, and will take the plan and memoir down with me into Westmoreland next week, when I hope to be able to make some progress with the subject. I am willing to flatter myself that the published volumes of my History will have convinced you that I take a very lively interest in military geography; and I believe that few unmilitary men have read Colonel Napier's History of the Peninsular War with greater care and delight than I have, or have more appreciated its excellence in this as in many other points. Your kindness encourages me to ask a further favour. I know of no published maps of Cæsar's operations near Dyrrachium, which are of any value as exhibiting the character of the ground. If any of your friends have unpublished sketches of this country, I should feel extremely obliged to you if you could procure me a sight of

them. I have not the time at command which is wanted for examining a country carefully; and though I could get to Corfu in our summer holidays, yet I much doubt the practicability of exploring the neighbourhood of Durazzo.'

"Now, if you can help him, I feel sure you will, as I know you have studied all Cæsar's and Pompey's operations, and I believe you think that the latter has not had justice done him as a general."

Colonel Napier to Captain Henry Napier, R. N.

"Freshford, Dec. 1840.

"I was too busy to write the other day, and I cannot now find time to write to Dr. Arnold; my mind is occupied and distressed with the plans I am about, and the correspondence I am engaged in with the Horse Guards. You can however tell him, that amongst the difficulties which the mutilated state of Cæsar's Commentaries raise up about his operations at Durazzo, is the account he gives of stopping up the course of the stream and rivulets, to deprive Pompey's camp of water, by raising barriers across the mouths of the valleys. This you know would be impossible unless the nature of the country gave him new channels for the water, or that he made those channels for himself. If the latter, his works must have been the most gigantic ever undertaken by an army, as indeed Lucan the poet says they were. It will be therefore worth Dr. Arnold's trouble to ascertain this on the spot. I imagine the Austrian government would give him full protection in surveying. Gleig, the 'Subaltern,' has lately travelled in that country, and could give him information; and, with Leake's Geography of Western Greece, he could easily make out what he wants. There is also Lieutenant Symonds, half-pay 60th Regiment, living in Hereford, a very learned man, perfectly acquainted with all ancient military affairs, and

well versed in military geography, who would be of infinite service to the Doctor if he applied to him, and he may use my name if he likes as having recommended him to apply to Mr. Symonds, with whom I correspond though I do not know him personally. Tell the Doctor to beware of falling into the error about Pompey being a bad general—he was a very great one."

"MY DEAR HENRY, "Freshford, Dec. 1840.

"I wrote to Mr. Symonds to say I had advised Dr. Arnold to apply to him, and he tells me in reply, that, if the Doctor does so, he will give him a number of sketches he has made about the second Punic War, and other matters which I am sure will be very valuable.

"When I wrote to you last, I forgot to say for the Doctor's information that Cæsar's battle of Pharsalia puzzles me, if, as the generality suppose, and as Colonel Leake says, it was fought on the Pharsalus side of the Enipeus river. Leake says he found the two camps, and has laid down the movements as if it was certain that the camps he found were Cæsar's and Pompey's; but they might be later camps. If the Doctor wished it, and I have more leisure—leisure of mind I mean, not of time—I could make him a little sketch, and explain my difficulties and views in opposition to Leake's. However, I only know Leake's by hearsay from Symonds; I have not read him." &c. &c.

The following letters explain themselves:—

To Major-General Lord Fitzroy Somerset, Military Secretary.

"Freshford, Nov. 26, 1840.

"I am painfully mortified to find that, in the selection of officers to receive additional pay for meritorious services, my name has been passed over to fix upon Colonel ——'s.

"I have never asked anything for myself, nor ever complained of neglect, although I won my lieut.-colonelcy at the storming of La Rhune, where Colonel —— served under me, and where, as the whole Light Division knows and would acknowledge, the most difficult part of the attack was given to the 43rd; and although almost every officer of my rank, who had served with any distinction in the war, was at the peace or has since been rewarded, myself excepted, either with promotion as king's aides-de-camp, many being thus pushed over my head, or with regiments or companies of the Guards, or inspecting field-officers' appointments, or inspectorships of clothing, or with governments.

"But I can no longer refrain from drawing the attention of Lord Hill to my claims, when I find that an officer is chosen for meritorious service in preference to myself, though his principal services in the field have been performed under my command, though he has never commanded a regiment in action, and never, I believe, received a wound; whereas I have commanded a regiment in many actions, and received three wounds, one of them so severe as to leave me but a miserably painful existence. Colonel —— has never gained an English decoration,—I have gained three.

"I would not be understood as touched with respect to the emolument, though my large family and straitened means do not give me a right to disregard that consideration entirely; neither would I feel mortified if the selection had been made with reference to the pecuniary means of the officers chosen; but this is not the case, because there are, amongst the selected, those whose pecuniary means are very much greater than mine. But when Colonel —— is selected in preference to me for meritorious service, though his best services were performed under my command, I

cannot but feel that a slur is cast upon my name; and, with this conviction, I should be devoid of all spirit and frankness if I did not complain."

To this letter Lord Fitzroy replied, that the conditions of the warrant, under which the rewards for meritorious services in the field were granted, distinctly specified that officers selected for such rewards must be full colonels in the army, holding the regimental rank of lieutenant-colonel; and that, moreover, they must have served for thirty years on full pay; and as Colonel Napier only held the regimental rank of Major, and had not completed thirty years' service before he went on half-pay, Lord Hill had absolutely no discretion in the matter. Colonel Napier was, however, requested to send to the Commander-in-Chief a detailed statement of his services, which he accordingly did send, and shortly afterwards Lord Fitzroy again addressed him in the following letter:—

"MY DEAR NAPIER, "Horse Guards, Jan. 4, 1841.

"The perusal of the very interesting memoir of your services afforded me the highest satisfaction; indeed I may say I scarcely ever read a paper which more fully engrossed my attention.

"Lord Hill desires me to inform you that he fully appreciates your services, and laments most sincerely that they should have entailed on you such constant and severe suffering. He always refrains from making promises, but he permits me to say that it would gratify him very much to be able to do something for you.

"Yours faithfully,

"FITZROY SOMERSET."

The sequel was, that a special grant of 150*l.* per annum (100*l.* being the regulated maximum for colonels) was con-

ferred upon Colonel Napier for his distinguished services, which was announced to him by Lord Hill in a letter dated 29th May, and which contained the following very gratifying paragraph:—

"In order that this reward may lose none of that value which was considered to attach to the publication of the names of the officers holding garrison appointments in the Army List, it is intended to insert in the Army List, under the head of Garrisons, the 'names of officers who have received rewards for distinguished services;' so that your name may be kept as constantly before the public as if a garrison appointment had been conferred on you."

Together with his official acknowledgment of the favour to Lord Hill, he wrote the following letter to Lord Fitzroy Somerset:—

"My dear Lord Fitzroy, "May 30, 1841.

"I have received from Lord Hill a letter informing me that I am to have 150*l.* yearly for my services, and in the most honourable manner to me.

"To Lord Hill and yourself I cannot but feel deeply indebted, and my gratitude is especially called for by the very honourable manner in which my services are acknowledged, and the entire freedom in which I am placed with respect to the world. No man can have a right to reproach me for accepting a pension, or to censure the bestowing of it, while I can reply by showing Lord Hill's letter and my own memoir of services. It is as a soldier that I am rewarded, and my conscience tells me that my best exertions were honestly given to my country. I am free, therefore, from any reproach of servility or unjust grasping, and this renders the favour conferred upon me greater than I can well express."

Colonel Napier to Sir Guy Campbell, Bart.

"MY DEAR GUY, "Bath, 1841.

"I had begun to write to you to wish you joy of Ned's* success in his examination, when a new matter came to employ my pen, as the gentlemen of the press have it. However, I won't give up my first employment, and I do wish you joy of Ned; depend upon it he is a working fellow, with a good heart and a bold spirit, and he will do you credit in the world.

"My other affair is that Lord Hill has at last caused something to be done for me, and in the handsomest manner. I have lately been engaged in a curious correspondence about myself. An old friend was so struck with the injustice and neglect I had met with that he put a plan in execution to have my name placed before the Queen, which from his court interest he was able to do. He did not tell me until it was actually in train, and then required me to leave it all to him. I consented on certain conditions, and he acted with great friendship; but the upshot was that I was to have a literary pension if I would write, to ask for it, to Lord Melbourne. This I could not stomach. I said I would not write to Lord Melbourne, nor would I *take* a favour from him; moreover, that I would never condescend to *ask* for a literary pension. I wrote my book as a speculation. It might be useful to the country and worthy of reward, but it gave an author no claim; and if it was thought proper to reward him, the opinion of its value must be declared by the country. With all that I had nothing to do, and would have nothing to do; my claims were military; I was used unjustly; I complained, and would complain until I got redress; but I would only seek for it, like a soldier, through the military

* Now Lieut.-Colonel Sir Edward Campbell, Bart.

chief. I was told I had many bitter enemies at court, and could not hope to succeed except by the ministers,—that it was a mere form, &c. &c. I was steadfast, and wrote a strong letter to Lord Hill, and the answer has just arrived. I am to have 150*l.* per annum for distinguished service as a soldier, and to be placed in the Army List under the head of Garrisons, the same as if I had a garrison appointment. I am thus placed above ——, and others of my rank, by having a higher rate of pension, and the honour being solitary makes it the more acceptable, and I am quite content; I am no longer marked as a black sheep.

"I am not able to write more, for since the pains have left my limbs a very heavy languor hangs about me, and my head is strangely affected. Pray tell Johnny of this,—I mean of the pension. I have obtained it fairly, both in the field, and latterly in this negociation; for if I had yielded I have good reason to believe I should have had 300*l.* a year; now I have only 150*l.*, but I can avow it to the world and show my scars for it, and I have at the same time expressed my contempt of the ministers. *You* can feel the pleasure of this,—others will call me a fool."

Lord Melbourne's ministry having during this session experienced several defeats, Sir Robert Peel succeeded in carrying a vote of want of confidence, on which ministers dissolved parliament and appealed to the country. Colonel Napier took a strong interest in the Bath election, and at the declaration of the successful candidates, Lord Duncan and Mr. Roebuck, he made a speech from the hustings, in the course of which he remarked severely on the late Whig ministry, stating that they had excited the people to insurrection in 1832. Some voices behind him called out that this was *false*, on which the speaker turned round and declared it to be true,

as he had the proofs; one individual, however, reiterated that it was false, and a "falsehood," several times, and with a manner so offensive that Colonel Napier lost his temper, and struck the man a blow which knocked him backwards. This person entered a criminal prosecution against Colonel Napier for the assault, and the case came on at the spring sessions of the following year, but a compromise was effected in court, both parties paying their own costs, the prosecutor first expressing his regret for having used insulting language to Colonel Napier, and Colonel Napier then expressing his regret that he had repelled the insult in the manner he had done. The actual words were, "Mr. S—— regrets to have made use of expressions offensive to General Napier; but he disclaims all intention of having given offence to General Napier by such expressions." "In consequence of the above expression of regret on the part of Mr. S——, General Napier regrets the mode in which he repelled the language used."

In July Colonel Napier attended a public meeting at Bath, at which the newly-elected members were present, and the following passages are extracted from his speech on that occasion.

(Referring to his having been interrupted in his speech from the hustings in the preceding month.) "The value of a public man's opinion is to be measured by the estimation in which it is held by the public; and I may therefore say, without vanity, that mine bears some value; for, though I have never thrust myself forward in public affairs, never spoken at any public meetings except those held in my immediate neighbourhood, and there only on particular occasions, I have had invitations from various parts of England, Ireland, and Scotland to attend great meetings and deliver my sentiments. That gives me a right to say I have some weight, but I will give you a

better proof. From seven great towns or boroughs I have received invitations to let myself be nominated as a candidate for representing them in Parliament. I refused all, for reasons not necessary to mention here; and on four of them I lay no great stress, because they were only proposals to take my chance with others; but the three remaining invitations were from influential men, the organs of bodies powerful enough to fulfil their promises; and this was proved by the result; for on my refusal they made like offers to other men, who did accept them, and were chosen.

"Now, the first of these places was this good city of Bath. There is a gentleman close by me who knows I do not fable; and when I declined the offer, your friend Roebuck was applied to, and was elected. And right glad I am that it was so, for I hold him to be a man more able than myself to serve you. The next place was the great city of Glasgow; and on my refusal there, and on my recommendation also, Lord William Bentinck was brought forward. They asked me if I thought he would do for them, and I told them I believed him to be a thoroughly honest man. The next place was Westminster, where Mr. Leader was chosen when I had declined. Have I not then a right to suppose that my opinions have some weight with the people? Have I not a right to declare those opinions as my judgment directs me? I am a follower of no man. I am a friend of the people. I have no personal ambition to gratify, and I abide by my own judgment. In declaring my opinions I am not to be bound by the convenience or the private personal arrangements of mere electioneering men. I choose my own time, subject only to your willingness to listen to me. The day of declaring the Bath poll furnished a good opportunity; I spoke, and was interrupted in the way you heard.

"Before I conclude I would address a few words by way of warning to honourable, brave men of all parties. My white hairs, blanched before their time by wounds and hardships endured in the service of my country, give me the right to address such men; and well I know that whether they be Whigs, Tories, Radicals, or Chartists, brave and high-spirited men, real lovers of their country, will never be wanted in England. To them then I say, Beware of coming storms,—times and events are approaching which will be far, far above the reach of mere party strife and factious bickerings—times and events which will involve the tranquillity of the whole civilised world. When those times come stand upon your honour. Remember that if we would claim the name of patriots, the greatness, the glory of England must be upheld amidst the political storm even as a mighty rock amidst surging waves and whistling winds. But how can this be done unless her children are interested in her welfare? And how can that be unless the working population, the toiling hardy sons of her strength, are made as free and equal in their political rights as her proudest nobles? I have served my country along with that class; I know them thoroughly; I have had them from all parts, of all crafts and trades. I have commanded them; tried them in all ways, in situations of peril and hardship, in all sorts of privation and misery that it is possible for the human frame to bear. I have seen them when writhing under the tortures of mangled limbs, even when their very heart's blood has been streaming out, shouting to those who were not disabled to go on for the glory and honour of England,—and with these words they died! and all this from men whose names were never likely to be known, so that their brave and noble qualities might be applauded. One instance I will give you in illustration,

for one fact is better than hours of declamation. There was a man in my own regiment named Eccles,—a man who very often got himself into scrapes, for he was young, wild, and reckless. On the 9th November, 1813, he committed a crime against military law, which I, as his commanding officer, could not pass over with impunity, and I delivered him over to a court martial which sentenced him to corporal punishment. It went against my heart, for orders were issued for battle next day. I thought it hard to give a man stripes on the 9th, and call upon him to fight for the glory of his country on the 10th. I said to him, 'I pardon you if you will behave well to-morrow, and justify that pardon.' Well, there was a rocky mountain on which the French were entrenched, and we could only get at them by passing between the lower rocks and a marsh, exposed to fire all the time. Towards this pass we ran at our utmost speed; I was then very strong and active, and carried no weight. I thought it shame to let a soldier, who carried fifty pounds, get before me in the attack, and I went ahead of all but one,—that man was Eccles. He was six feet three, straight, and well grown, and though he carried such a burthen I could never pass him. The enemy's fire came from our right, and on my right he kept, covering me with his body. We leaped together into the rocks, and then he fell like one dead from his exertions. Thus he repaid me for his pardon. He died afterwards a sergeant, and a pensioner on the Irish establishment, still young, but worn out by hardship. When I remember such proofs of generosity, courage, and devotion in the British soldier, how can I join in any cry against the working people? how can I fail to wish them well? how avoid aiding them to obtain their rights? Therefore, and therefore only, have I come forward as a public man."

When it is remembered that these sentiments were enforced by all the graces of natural eloquence and studied oratory, aided by a commanding person and a noble countenance, to which the earnestness and enthusiasm of the speaker lent a play of expression that was quite extraordinary; when it was at the same time so patent to all that he was actuated by the purest patriotism and the loftiest disregard of personal advantage,—for he was out of employment, and his future career as a soldier depended on the Government,—it must be admitted that the influence which he acquired over the lower classes, and which he conscientiously exercised for their good, is not surprising. He possessed all the ability, energy, and daring of Caius Gracchus, whose career in troublous times he might have imitated; although he never would have adopted the suicidal measure of the Roman Tribune of conferring on every needy citizen the legal right to public relief.

The last paragraph of his speech likewise suggests the thought, what a military leader this man would have made, who possessed the power of so stirring men's minds, and who, by such acts as he here relates, must have made himself adored by his soldiers! He possessed every attribute of a great and successful general. Many studious men who have gone into the science of war as into mathematics, make excellent generals—in their closets; while they may be utterly wanting in all the practical and physical qualities indispensable in a soldier. There have been many generals, on the other hand, as brave as their swords and as ignorant. But William Napier added to a theoretical knowledge of war which has never been surpassed and very rarely equalled, the calmest self-possession in the midst of danger, rapid perception, instant resolution, and the most heroic daring to execute the conceptions of his mind.

"To fight a successful battle upon just principles will indeed entitle a commander to high praise for talent, and the qualities of his mind must be various and rare. The greatest exertion of the most valuable, and even the most contradictory, endowments is requisite. In the midst of havoc and confusion his view must be rapid, and his decision and execution instantaneous; calmness must be his when all around is turbulence and horror, and the greatest impetuosity must be united with the most consummate prudence. But a battle may be won by accident without any exertion of these admirable qualities. Most battles are so won; there are very few great generals."

The quotation is from his own writings, and the qualities he describes as necessary to a great general he possessed in the very highest degree.

The following extract is from a letter written by General Brotherton to General Napier in 1844; it refers to the tribute paid by the Duke of Wellington in the House of Lords to Sir Charles Napier's victories in Scinde.

" . . . . The Duke," he says, " who witnessed and admired, as we all did, the three brothers in battle. I well recollect Busaco,—the intense anxiety of each of you alternately, not for self but for the brother in danger. It was there I saw you go down amongst the enemy, 'en sabreur,' with your glass to your eye, as coolly as if you had been dancing a quadrille. Well do I recollect the Commodore* also,—his grotesque figure and speeches. The four Napiers in the field that day were certainly no bad specimens of the race."

Colonel Napier to Sir Guy Campbell, Bart.

" July, 1841.

"Have you seen certain letters signed 'Hibernicus,' and 'Irishman,' in any of the Irish papers? Some corre-

* The late Admiral Sir Charles Napier.

spondent has sent me two by 'Hibernicus,' a third by 'Irishman.' They were enclosed in a blank sheet, and no indication of what paper they were cut out from. They accuse O'Connell of calling Lord Edward 'a miscreant,' and say that the man who betrayed him is O'Connell's boon companion, and a buffoon; that Lord Morpeth could not know what O'Connell and his friends really are, or he would never have invited him to his table, where probably the betrayer of Lord Edward has been sitting side by side with Lord Edward's daughter. He also says that the fellow's name is to be found, and the proof of his treachery, in Drummond's 'Life of Hamilton Rowan,' a work I had never heard of."

Lady Campbell to Colonel Napier.

"Dublin, Aug. 6, 1841.

"I have not an idea who the person is that is alluded to by 'Hibernicus.' I think however Mr. Moore knows, by some things Curran told me. I do not much wish to know the name of the betrayer of my father; I thought it had been ——, and that he was dead. Not that I doubt my powers of forgiveness. You know my profession of faith, dear William; you are one of the few to whom I have ventured to tell my feelings of religion, and you know it is because I feel my unworthiness that I seldom allude to those feelings. But forgiveness of injuries forms so great a part of what I conceive Christianity, that I should feel God had blessed me in giving me an opportunity of forgiving and doing good to one who had so deeply injured us. And I can have no opportunity of forgiving injuries done to *myself*, for I do not feel them. I can only therefore be tried by having to forgive those who have wounded me through those I love."

Colonel Napier to Lady Campbell.

"MY DEAR PAMELA, "Freshford, Aug. 10, 1841.

"Edward arrived here safe this morning, but he found us in terror,* and I have only been able to see him for a few moments, and have left him to the care of the girls, which I daresay he likes best. Charles is going to India; at his age, 61, it is scarcely to be expected that I shall see him again. Until this and Norah's illness happened I was in very good hopes and feelings; I was daily getting better and stronger, for the ague is, I think, a modification of my former severe pains, and so far an advantage notwithstanding the weakness accompanying it. I had gained my cause with the Horse Guards and some money, and I have been fortunate in getting a house to suit me in Bath. But I have always observed that a run of luck has been balanced in my life by a countercheck, and I dread for Charles and Norah.

"As to Ned, I will not read him any lectures; they never do good; but I will let fall expressions which will be remembered by him at other times. This is the plan I always follow with young men, and I think it answers better than any other. He is a very fine-looking lad, and by keeping up his vanity a little he will do all the better; I mean vanity as to his accomplishments. However, of one thing you may be certain, that nature gives or withholds the power of keeping up learning as much as she does the power of acquiring it, and if he has *the organ* he will use it; if not he will fall into what he has organs for. He has already proved that he has good organs for acquiring; and better, for making him a good honest fellow.

"I do not wonder at what you tell me of ——; she is,

* On account of the illness of a daughter.

I know, a real good girl, with a force of character very unusual, and whenever she is called out by circumstances she will come at the call. I am quite certain of what she is, for I studied her, and know she has a great deal in her. It is not talent exactly; she has not half of your talent, and yet she has plenty; but it is a quick perception of what ought to be done, a strong will to do it, and a light elastic spirit; but I should not like to see her tried by insolence or contempt. She will never bear either. She will bear anger, but it must be downright honest passion. There must be no deliberate injustice, no sneering, or she will repay it.

"I am wandering on, dear Pamela, about what you know better that I do. I wish I knew myself as well as I know other people, but I don't; there is some disease which is always in a contest with my natural disposition, and I am, when free from its effects on my brain and nerves, as different from what I am when suffering under it as if I were two different men,—I mean in mind; my thoughts become totally changed, and I cannot tell why. I am troubled also about the future. My last speech is sold and read all over England, and I am considered by the poor as their avowed champion; but my illnesses make me unfit to act, and I dread the danger to my girls of breaking out, and putting all I have to risk. Were I single and well, I might now play a great part, but my spirit sinks about my girls.

"The name of the man who betrayed your father is to be found in Drummond's 'Life of Hamilton Rowan,'—so says 'Hibernicus.' You may be forgiving, dear Pamela, but it is not necessary to find the villain you forgive sitting beside you at dinner. &c. &c. &c.

"W. NAPIER."

At this time the minds of public men in England were much occupied by a circumstance which threatened to produce war between England and America. During the Canadian rebellion, as is well known, bands of American citizens, calling themselves "Sympathizers," entered Canada at various points for the purpose of aiding the rebels against the British Government. The American executive endeavoured to restrain them, but was utterly powerless to do so. An American steamer, the 'Caroline,' had made several trips across the Niagara river which forms the boundary between Canada and the State of New York, conveying parties of armed brigands who were landed on the Canadian shore and who committed many atrocities. It is not surprising therefore that the Canadian Loyalists, for the protection of their lives and properties, should have organized an attack on this piratical vessel, which was to be seen moored at the American side of the river, a few hundred yards from their dwellings, and which was a standing menace and insult against them. The attack was made by night, and succeeded; the 'Caroline,' set on fire and adrift in the current, went over the Falls of Niagara. One of the actors in this exploit, Mr. Macleod, who acted under orders as an officer of Canadian militia, was in 1841 recognised and imprisoned in New York for his part in the affair, and there seemed every likelihood of his being hanged. Then ensued a conflict between State rights and the authority of the American Union. The Central Government disclaimed the action of the New York authorities, but acknowledged its inability to control them owing to a defect in the United States constitution.

The following letter is on this subject:—

To J. A. Roebuck, Esq.

"Aug. 28, 1841.

"Your view of the Macleod, or rather of the American question, is clear enough as regards the General Government, up to the point it has reached. No doubt the American Government has been and still is hampered by great difficulties; no doubt caution and forbearance are alike called for by reason and humanity. But do not these difficulties spring from the ill-understood notions of liberty entertained by the Americans themselves? They seem to imagine that to do whatever is agreeable or profitable to them is liberty, and make that word the justification of any wrong to others. But there are in justice and reason as solid grounds for restricting the liberty of nations for the benefit of the world at large, as there are for restricting the liberty of individuals for social good. If the several States, repudiating the decision of national questions, do nevertheless assume exclusive powers when placed by their own acts in collision with foreign nations, they are *de facto* sovereign states, and their union must be considered a league of independent nations, offensive towards the rest of the world as not holding themselves amenable to the common general law, offering no security for good behaviour, nor any fixed point upon which a suitor for national justice can take ground for negotiation. Such a league can only be upheld by force; the Americans must abandon it or bear the brunt of war, with the odium of being a barbarous community whose destruction or subjection to civilized international customs is absolutely necessary to the well-being of the world. For if their General Government is by the institutions of their country rendered powerless to amend wrongs to foreigners, it can only take rank with the barbarous Moorish piratical states.

"There is, you say, an amending principle in the Ameri-

can constitution, which will, if we are firm and temperate, correct this anomaly. This is scarcely to be doubted, although as yet that vital principle has not been manifested; but to stimulate its action a voluntary and complete apology should be offered by our Government for the attack on the 'Caroline,' which cannot be justified, though the provocation can be honestly pleaded. But if meanwhile the anomaly in the American constitution leads to the execution of Macleod, is England to bear the insult? Is she to proclaim herself no longer able or willing to protect her subjects from punishment when they have only obeyed her orders, lawful orders to them, though unlawful in their Government? I cannot conceive a greater degradation! The transaction would be one of cowardly cruelty on the part of the Americans, of cowardly submission on the part of England.

"The case of a spy or an incendiary is not, I think, in point. The spy goes disguised; he takes advantage of the civilized hospitality of the enemy to mix among his people; he lives with them; he calls himself their friend, a fellow subject; and *de facto* he is for the time being their fellow subject. He is then a traitor to them, and meets a traitor's death. The incendiary is in the same predicament. The law of nations in these cases is known and admitted without dispute. The spy or incendiary knows what he is going to do; he cannot be ordered on such a service; he is only tempted; he knows what his fate will be if detected; he is paid accordingly and never expects the protection of his Government. Moreover, in both cases the man is put to death, not for the acts of mischief he commits but for his treason. For if an officer clothed in uniform, and choosing to risk his life, enters an enemy's camp, and trusting to his address and boldness for impunity, discovers all the weak points (I have known an example), he cannot

if taken be injured according to the laws of war, because he acts under lawful orders. Quarter may indeed be refused to him, the right of refusing quarter being inherent to fighting men, but he cannot be judicially executed. So a town or magazine may be set fire to by troops, be they few or many, stealthily or openly, provided they are in uniform; nay! they need not be in uniform provided they do not enter the precincts of the enemy's lines as friends; and however barbarous or unnecessary the act may be, it is one recognised by the laws of war, and the perpetrators, if acting under orders, cannot be legally made responsible when taken prisoners, though quarter may be refused to them. This is the case of the 'Caroline.'

"But both sides have put themselves so much in the wrong, the English Government on the one part and the American people on the other, that it has become a Gordian knot only to be cut by the sword; that is, unless, what never happened yet, both sides agree to acknowledge their errors and make mutual amends. For if Macleod is put to death England must avenge the wrong or be degraded as a nation. And if the Americans, admitting the defect in their constitution, should proceed to remove it as offensive to civilization, that must take time, and England is dishonoured every hour that she permits one of her subjects to languish in prison under the constant fear of an ignominious death, because he obeyed his orders as a military man. If Macleod be acquitted, which will happen or not, it would appear, as the power of a certain faction predominates, his imprisonment, sufferings, and trial will still remain an insult to England.

"So also the affair of the 'Caroline' will remain a violation of international law on our part, mitigated however by the provocation. Amends may indeed be made to Macleod personally; the faulty institutions of the Ameri-

cans *may* be pleaded in apology to heal our wounded honour, and the correction of the defect will give weight to that apology and afford a security for the future: but until the attack on the 'Caroline' is atoned for, it can hardly be expected that the Americans *will* remedy their faulty institutions to relieve England from the difficulty brought on her by the Canadian Government. War, therefore, I look upon as extremely probable."

This letter was published in the 'Morning Chronicle,' and an article appeared in the 'Times' controverting Colonel Napier's arguments, and speaking of his suggested apology for the violation of American territory as "stark staring nonsense." To this he published the following rejoinder.

Colonel Napier in reply to the 'Times.'

"*Times.*—The republican sympathisers were the first aggressors.

"*Answer.*—That gave England no right to invade America.

"*Times.*—The destruction of the 'Caroline' was a matter of self-defence.

"*Answer.*—That is to be proved. If she had been destroyed out of American waters it would have been so. If she had been pursued into American waters when flying from an attack it would have been so. But she was deliberately attacked and destroyed in the American waters, without any previous demand for redress, without any proof offered, any declaration made, that she was a piratical vessel. Her destruction was therefore an attack on the American nation.

"*Times.*—The State of New York was bound to enforce the neutrality of its citizens.

"*Answer.*—Undoubtedly, if it could. An American general was sent with troops to enforce it. But the frontier is immense. The neutrality could not be enforced. Was bad faith on the part of the American Government suspected? If so, an energetic remonstrance, and notice of reprisals if redress was not granted, would have been the mode of proceeding according to international law. Was no deceit suspected? Then a demand for the surrender of the 'Caroline' and her crew as a piratical vessel, or the punishment of the pirates according to the laws of America, would have been the proper mode of proceeding. In either case the right of the American nation to have its sovereignty in its own waters respected would have been conceded; but the deliberate destruction of the 'Caroline' in those waters, being a complete act in itself, and not the continuation of an attack commenced before she took refuge in the American waters, was quite unauthorised by international law. Was it a matter of necessity? That necessity should have been shown, and an apology, founded on it, offered for the attaint on American sovereignty. Had this been done on the instant, no weakness or dishonour could have been imputed to England, and though it would be less graceful now, it is never too late to act justly and honourably.

"*Times.*—The Federal Government has explicitly recognised the right of England to insist *unconditionally* on Mr. Macleod's release.

"*Answer.*—This has no bearing on the question. The captivity and trial of Macleod, after the English Government had taken on itself the responsibility of destroying the 'Caroline,' is a violation of international law on the part of America, which the Federal Government does not defend, and which it endeavours to redress. But this in no manner justifies the previous violation of international law

by England. The Federal Government is willing to redress the injustice done to us, by releasing Macleod, but apparently is unable. We then on our part ought to express an equal willingness to redress the injury done to American sovereignty, either by showing the necessity, or pleading the provocation and apologising. In fine, if the 'Times' would adduce those proofs of the necessity for the destruction of the 'Caroline' *in the manner it was effected*, which have been laid down in Mr. Webster's letter to Mr. Fox as requisite to bring the act within the pale of international law, it would be more reasonable and more effectual than calling my proposal for an apology 'stark staring nonsense.'

"W. NAPIER."

Colonel Napier's frequent attacks of illness had now assumed such a serious and alarming character that he was much oppressed with gloomy thoughts on account of his family, which would have been left by his death in straitened circumstances. On his son's account in particular he felt the deepest anxiety, as, although he held an appointment in the Quartermaster-General's Office in Dublin, the duties of which he fulfilled most efficiently, he was liable to be removed at any moment if a new head of this department should object to him on account of his being deaf and dumb. These anxieties were communicated by Sir Henry Hardinge * to Sir Robert Peel, then Prime Minister, who declared to Sir Henry his determination to make a provision for the son in the event of Colonel Napier's death, in consideration of the father's claims on the country both as soldier and author. When Sir Henry communicated these intentions to Colonel Napier, the latter thought himself bound in honour to represent to Sir Robert

* Then Secretary at War; afterwards Field-Marshal Lord Hardinge and Commander-in-Chief.

Peel the political course he had always felt it his duty to follow in opposition to his government, and which he must in obedience to his convictions continue to pursue; and the following letters were the result.

To Colonel W. Napier.

"MY DEAR NAPIER, "London, Oct. 13, 1841.

"I think the enclosed note will put you completely at your ease as to Sir Robert Peel's sentiments; and as I can have no reserve with you on the subject, I send his note.

"After I had read it, I went to him and told him he had authorised me to say what I did. He observed that the sentiments and even expressions were accurate, but that he meant his intentions to be confined to your brother Charles, on the ground that your ignorance of his intentions would have been the best proof of his disinterestedness in doing what he thought right to you on public grounds *alone*."

Sir Robert Peel to Sir Henry Hardinge.

"MY DEAR HARDINGE, "Whitehall, Oct. 13, 1841.

"I did not think that you would mention to Colonel Napier what would be my intentions and feelings towards his son, should he be unfortunately left during my tenure of power without the protection of his father.

"I should certainly consider that he would have under such circumstances a very strong claim, altogether on public grounds, and I should appropriate as a provision for him some portion of that very limited fund which is now at the disposal of the Crown for the reward of public service and of literary and scientific merit.

"But so little wish had I to fetter in the slightest degree

the freedom of political action on the part of Colonel Napier, that though I might perhaps have allowed you to mention what passed between us to his brother, in order to relieve any fraternal anxiety on his part on his quitting England for a distant station, yet I should have demurred to your mentioning it to Colonel Napier himself.

"I am very sure, whatever part he takes in politics in the conscientious discharge of his duty, he will not obliterate the recollection of his distinguished gallantry as a soldier and of his high merit as the eloquent and faithful historian of the Peninsular War. I only know Colonel Napier in those capacities."

In anticipation of an army brevet promotion, Sir Henry Hardinge wrote to Colonel Napier as follows:—

"MY DEAR NAPIER, "London, Nov. 19, 1841.

"The brevet is settled, and your name will appear in the 'Gazette' of Tuesday as major-general.

"I would advise you to consider the service in time of peace which will best suit you. There will be a brigade vacant in Canada, two or three districts in Ireland, and Guernsey. As to the first, the breeze has blown over, and we are not likely to come to blows. The climate is trying, and you are not strong; and as your family is large, an Irish district or Guernsey would probably be most convenient; and in the event of any more active opportunity of service occurring, you would be in harness ready for a start."

On the 23rd November Colonel Napier became a major-general.

In August he had published an 'Essay on the Poor Laws,' and in September a pamphlet intituled 'Observations on the Corn Laws,' addressed to Lord Ashley

"because his persevering efforts to protect the factory children give him a just title to the respect of all persons who acknowledge the value of justice and benevolence in national policy."

Of these publications extracts are given in the Appendix. They are interesting not only as specimens of his style and manner in treating these subjects, but as reflecting the spirit of an era of intense political excitement; and perhaps most of all as showing on what arguments an acute and benevolent man, by no means averse from change, grounded his opposition to the two most beneficent measures of modern times, viz. the New Poor Law and the Repeal of the Corn Laws.

The following letter from Sir Henry Hardinge must have been read by him with peculiar pleasure:—

"MY DEAR NAPIER, "London, Jan. 3, 1842.

"I send you the enclosed. The Baron wrote to me, sending a letter of D'Urban's and an extract from your History. I sent the correspondence to Peel, and the result is that your record has obtained for this poor fellow the 100*l.* he required.

"I know you will be pleased to hear that you have been the means of assisting a worthy man."

This letter enclosed one from Sir Robert Peel:—

"MY DEAR HARDINGE, "Whitehall, Dec. 16, 1841.

"I have read the papers sent to the Treasury respecting the Baron de Linsten.

"I think the passage in Colonel Napier's work is decisive in his favour, and I will advance the whole sum the Baron requires, 100*l.*, from the Royal Bounty. Drummond will place it in your hands.

"I dare say Colonel Napier will be pleased that his record of the 'active benevolence' of a foreigner in the British service should procure a recompense for that officer some thirty years after the event."

In December and January General Napier was invited to attend political meetings at Birmingham and Southampton, but was unable to do so, and he shortly afterwards quitted Freshford for Guernsey, where he was appointed Lieut.-Governor. He did not however lose sight of the poor people among whom he had lived for ten years, and in whose behalf he had exerted himself so zealously, but employed his friend Captain Penruddock, R.N., as his almoner. He was not satisfied with coldly giving to the poor of the neighbourhood, but always made friends of them, and took a real interest in their joys and sorrows; and the numerous letters from Captain Penruddock attest not only the kindness and liberality, but also the careful discrimination with which Colonel and Mrs. Napier dispensed their charity. Captain Penruddock thus expresses himself in a letter written some months after their departure.

"I have to regret the absence of your family in common with all that I have spoken to. For myself, I rejoice in the beneficial contagion of example which improved my habits of acting and thinking; instead therefore of idle regrets, I count my gains while you remained near us."

The following letter from Sir George Napier, Governor of the Cape of Good Hope, is prophetic of the new duties and trials which awaited his younger brother:—

"My dear William, "Cape of Good Hope, Feb. 1842.

"Most heartily do I congratulate you on at last being a Major-General. . . . . Do you mean to ask for

service? Charles told me in his last letter that *he knew* Sir Robert Peel would employ you as soon as you became a general officer. I hope you may be employed if you wish it, as I know no man who will do his duty more scrupulously or more skilfully than yourself; as thank God my dear brother no man can ever say any one of us allowed our politics to interfere with our duties; for let us be Radicals, or Whigs, or Tories in our opinions, once we put on the red coat or blue, and accepted an appointment, I defy the world to say we ever swerved from what we considered duty; and it is the knowledge of this that makes me think Charles is right in saying Sir Robert Peel would wish to employ you, as he knows that honour and integrity are our guides.

"I hear you have been writing lately on the Corn Laws as well as on Macleod's case: pray desire your publisher to send me the pamphlets, as I wish much to see them.

"I expect to hear of Charles's arrival at Bombay every day. I think he has just arrived in time to be actively employed, as affairs are going badly in Afghanistan, and Lord Ellenborough told me when he passed by here that it was his intention to employ my brother in command the first opportunity he had. . . . . ."

CHAPTER XVIII.

LIEUTENANT-GOVERNOR OF GUERNSEY.

In February, 1842, General Napier was appointed Lieut.-Governor of Guernsey.

The following letter of acknowledgment to Lord Hill, then Commander-in-chief, was written shortly before his departure for the island:—

"My Lord, "March 28, 1842.

"As I find I cannot have the honour of expressing my thanks for your kindness towards me in person, I take the liberty of doing so in writing.

"When your Lordship obtained for me the allowance for distinguished services, and at the same time expressed your own approval of those services, and your regret that they had entailed upon me such severe sufferings, I felt that I had been more than repaid for anything I had done to serve my country. Since then I have been overwhelmed with favours, which would oppress me if I did not know that a zealous discharge of my duties would be the most grateful return I could make to your lordship; and you will permit me to add that a long and well-considered esteem for your lordship's public and private character makes me feel that favours received at your hands are honourable and not onerous."

He describes his arrival in a letter to Mrs. Napier.

"Guernsey, April 6, 1842.

"We landed under a salute of thirteen guns, after a smooth passage. I am very ill and shall hardly escape another attack; but I got up, dressed in full red, gold sash and all, did all the current business of the office in the town, paid some bills, rowed some cheats, put my carriage in the hands of a coachmaker, and then prepared to receive all the great people. At twelve o'clock came the dean and clergy in formal church dresses. The dean made me a speech. I smiled and bowed, and spoke my acknowledgments, conversed and did king,—Emily says very well; so does my secretary, whom I like very much, he is so very good-natured and willing to work. At one o'clock came the militia officers; I did still better with them. At two o'clock came the Bailiff and Jurats, and with them I was quite right. The little college boys shouted for me, and I spoke to them and got a holiday, for which I am much loved by said boys."

He threw himself into his new duties with all his heart and soul; the object he proposed to himself being, as always, to do good; to ensure the greatest possible amount of happiness and wellbeing to all who came within the scope of his influence, to remedy abuses, to curb injustice, to protect the weak. A strong belief in the capability of mankind for progressive improvement was one of the principal features in his character. This made him a Reformer; and Reform was the business of his life, in which he included not only the reform of public and private grievances, but eminently of the infirmities of his own nature. As a Reformer, then, he came to Guernsey, and very shortly became involved in disputes with the Royal Court, partly to maintain the prerogatives of the Crown, partly to oppose the unjust and oppressive measures of that body towards

those within their jurisdiction; and the statement of some few instances of the latter will show the nature of the evils he had to remedy.

General Napier landed in the island on the 6th April, and on the 7th he writes: "I have already ascertained that the defences of the island are in a very wretched state, and I have seen enough of the fort and entrenched camp to know that, in its present neglected condition and weak armament, it would be useless for offence and defence."

On the 27th.—"I have inspected the militia in a body and by regiments. They are fine men and willing, but somewhat discontented at the unequal pressure on the poor and rich of the militia laws, and at the neglect and decay of military spirit and feeling among the young gentlemen of the island. On the Queen's birthday review, seven or eight companies at least were commanded by sergeants. However, by some measures I contemplate, I think I shall be able to revive their military pride, and render the militia a really efficient force of 2500 fighting men."

A few weeks after his arrival in Guernsey we find him writing to Mr. Roebuck:—

"I am not well or comfortable here. I foresee great expense, and I feel it indeed already; so much so as to make me fear debt. Meanwhile, I am doing what I can to effect good, and though I have little hope of doing much, the pursuit of good is something in life."

Shortly afterwards he was seized with one of his dreadful attacks; and it was in June, when he was beginning to shake it off, that the author of this biography, then a young man of twenty-two, first saw General Napier, and was in his first interview much struck and captivated by the earnest gracious kindness of the General's manner of

receiving him. There was a gentleness of eye and indescribable look of eager amiability about the lines of the mouth; and altogether a most winning desire to please and to be pleased was apparent, arising evidently from extreme kindness of feeling. He was always particularly fond of the society of young men, and he would pour out for them a continous stream both of very interesting and of very funny anecdotes. No one ever had a keener sense of the ridiculous or a readier appreciation of true wit. Of Irish stories which abounded in the latter quality, he was remarkably full, and these he told with a relish and gusto that were most contagious. On this occasion he was in his bedroom, and was still suffering very acute pain, which he quite forgot when he became interested in conversation. He was just then much occupied with his cousin the Admiral's late successful campaign in Syria, declaring that it manifested great ability for military as well as for naval operations.

From the date of this first interview in June 1842, to the day of Sir W. Napier's death in February 1860, the author had the happiness and advantage of the closest intimacy with him, and cannot remember, during the whole of that period, to have received from him one unkind word or look. What wonder then that he should step aside from his work to dwell with chastened sadness on those early days,—to call to mind his tenderness, nobleness, greatness of mind and heart,—and to mourn so true and loving a friend who was so deeply loved and reverenced in return?

Before entering on General Napier's labours in Guernsey, it will be necessary to say a few words explanatory of the anomalous constitution of the island. The Royal Court was the Supreme Court of Judicature both in civil and criminal cases. It was composed of a President called the Bailiff,

and of twelve members called Jurats; this body likewise claimed the chief executive authority, and this claim brought them into constant collision with the Lieutenant-Governors of the island. Their powers in judicial cases were unlimited and irresponsible, and they were guided therein neither by any fixed system of law nor by precedent in criminal causes. The two law officers of the Crown, answering to our Attorney and Solicitor-General, were, *ex officio*, members of the Royal Court. Besides these, only six advocates had the right to plead. These were all appointed by the Royal Court, necessarily from among the friends and relations of many of the members or judges. These advocates combined the functions of our barristers and attorneys. The principal island families were all related to each other by blood, and the members of the Royal Court were invariably chosen from these families; and thus the humbler population was entirely at the mercy and caprice of an irresponsible oligarchy. Greater temptation to tyranny and injustice never was presented to any men than to the members of the Royal Court of Guernsey, and the inevitable result was that many instances of gross illegality and oppression were perpetrated under the sanction of the law.

Take the following extract from a Report of General Napier:—

"They (the Royal Court) sit first as *Magistrates*, with closed doors, to receive accusations—then as a *Grand Jury* in secret to decide whether trial shall be had—then they appoint the advocate for the accused. Then they constitute themselves the *Petit Jury* to try the cause; on the trial display either a profound ignorance of the law of evidence, or a total disregard of it. *Terrien*, the old Norman lawyer, and the practice of the present French courts; *Blackstone*, and the practice of the English courts, are taken as guides and authorities according to the pleasure or con-

venience of the court or the advocates; nothing is fixed, nothing is certain, save the unlimited irresponsible power of the Court.

"Witnesses are examined in French and in English without interpreters. The pleadings are in French, and thus a prisoner, if English, knows not what is said against him. The Jurats deliver their opinions in French, but not of necessity; one of them, ignorant of that language, always speaks in the English tongue.

"Having acted as Jurymen to acquit or condemn, they become Judges to sentence, all being decided by a majority of voices. They have the power of awarding, without check or control or revision or further warrant than their own sentence, fines, imprisonment, banishment, transportation, corporal punishment to any extent, and finally death. An appeal may indeed be made to Her Majesty in Council, but in practice this is a mockery, seeing that the sentence is instantly carried into execution. A striking instance of this happened during Sir James Douglas's government. A man was sentenced (May, 1836) to a severe flogging and transportation. Sir James thought the sentence barbarous, and appealed to the Home Secretary, Lord John Russell, who adopted his view and ordered the execution to be stayed. The reply was, 'We never wait; the man was flogged on the day sentence was passed.' Lord John then ordered that no such punishment should in future be inflicted without the sanction of the Secretary of State. Nevertheless, a man has been since flogged in defiance of this order; and if I may judge from the language of some Jurats, and from the violent letters and articles which appear in the newspapers, it is considered a proof of independence to treat the Secretary of State's interference in any matter with contempt.

"I shall now contrast the proceedings of the Court in three instances:—

"*First instance.*—Mr. G——, the son of a notary, and himself an advocate of the Royal Court, though a notorious brawler and drunkard, and frequenter of brothels and taverns, stabbed in a brothel an English youth named C——, on the night of the 31st December, 1842. The only provocation was, that C—— stepped between G—— and an unfortunate girl to save her from the stab he received himself. G—— then gave him another wound more severe than the first. The women present interfered, and C—— was by them led away to a surgeon. His wounds were dangerous. G——, having waited some twenty minutes, armed himself with a carving knife which he placed in his sleeve, his first weapon having been a clasped knife. He proceeded to a house a quarter of a mile distant, where he thought C—— was concealed; he searched several rooms, drew forth his knife, and declared 'he would kill the rascal if he could catch him.'

"This transaction soon became known because C——'s passage along the high road was marked by pools of blood. It was also openly spoken of the first day of the year at my general reception of the Guernsey people customary on that day. G—— was again seen on the evening of that day, drunk and brawling in the streets, by the constables. There could be no ignorance on their parts, yet they neither arrested him, nor showed any disposition to notice his crime, until the public indignation began to arise, and I intimated more than once that, as Lieut.-Governor, I would not suffer such negligence of justice. Mr. G—— was then brought before the Court; that is to say, four clear days after the perpetration of his violence. But he was instantly enlarged by the Court on his own father's bail, though Mr. C—— was in extreme danger. He was

afterwards tried and convicted; no extenuating circumstances appeared; the greatest tenderness was exhibited towards him throughout. Mr. H——, another English gentleman present at the stabbing, and whose evidence was well known to be more unfavourable to the accused than even the facts above-mentioned, was not called to give his testimony by the Procureur;* and, finally, Mr. G——, on being convicted, was sentenced to only two months' imprisonment, without any ignominious adjuncts of solitary confinement or peculiar diet, and he was told by one of the Jurats he would come out of jail without a stain on his character.

"The suspension of his functions as an advocate was afterwards obtained with difficulty from the Royal Court, by the strongly expressed opinion of Secretary Sir James Graham, transmitted to that body through me, and the newspapers displayed the utmost fury at his arrest and trial.

"*Second instance.*—Four soldiers of the 48th, three being very young men of excellent character, the fourth not bad, were accused by a Guernseyman, a noted drunkard and idler, of robbing him at night with personal violence. They were placed and kept in solitary confinement for eight days previous to the examination of the charge, and twenty-two days' common confinement after the examination, previous to the trial. The prosecutor was a near relative to one of the Jurats of the court.

"To impartial spectators it appeared that the matter was a drunken quarrel, and that the prosecutor, who had been drinking with the accused, had never been robbed at all. I speak advisedly. I ordered Major M'Leverty, 48th, and

* A law officer of the Crown, answering to our attorney-general. The law officers were also members, *ex officio*, of the Royal Court, and must always have had several relations among the jurats.

Fort-Major Bainbrigge, to attend the trial; and it so happened that Mr. Roebuck, M.P., being on a visit to me, attended also. The officers declared that no court-martial would have found them guilty. Mr. Roebuck declared that a conviction could not have been obtained before an English court of justice. The men were, however, convicted by a majority, several Jurats, and amongst them the relation of the prosecutor, acquitting.

"These young men, of such good character and of guilt in this instance so doubtful, were sentenced to three months' imprisonment, the first and last month to be solitary and on bread and water; having previously suffered a month's imprisonment, of which eight days solitary! They were released on the 17th ult. One of them is labouring under tympanitis, peritonitis, and disease of the mesenteric glands; his recovery is hopeless. I know the difficulty too well of proving his illness to be the direct result of his treatment in prison to attempt it, but he was healthy when he went into jail; he has come out to die.*

"The sentence of solitary confinement was not rigorously executed; but the change was very reprehensible in a moral view. They were placed two and two in small cells, sleeping in one bed, and had no exercise save the cleaning out their cells each morning, occupying some ten minutes. They were fed, without change, on bread and water during the first and the last thirty days, with thirty days' interval; and they solemnly declare that during their whole confinement no medical man visited them!

"*Third instance.*—On the evening of the 1st instant a row took place in the street leading to the barracks be-

* He died three months afterwards. On his deathbed, when he knew he had only a few hours to live, he declared solemnly that there had been no robbery, so far as he knew. His declaration was taken down and witnessed. The man who accused them of having robbed him committed suicide about a year afterwards.

tween some soldiers and townspeople, in which the soldiers were wrong, and behaved ill. Still it was a case of common assault, and the men were tipsy. Half an hour later, tattoo having sounded and the soldiers having gone to their barracks, two assistant constables, having a young man with them who said he could identify the culprits, reached the barracks and, producing their staves of office, demanded to see any prisoners in the guardhouse. They were shown some men just brought in for being late for tattoo. The young man identified three, and the constable demanded them. 'They are your prisoners,' said Major M'Leverty, the commanding officer, 'but they are drunk, the prison is far off; leave them here till they are sober, and I will be security for their appearance when sober.'

"The captain of the day also offered his security. 'No,' replied the constable; 'we will put them in prison, and we demand a guard from you to put them there.'

"This demand was acceded to under the impression that the 33rd and 34th articles of war left no option in such cases. The men, placed in prison on the night of the 1st January, were kept in solitary confinement *until the 8th*, and then examined. One of them distinctly proved an *alibi*, and was discharged. This innocent man was therefore kept in solitary confinement eight days, and for a common assault if he had been guilty. The other two were remanded, on the evidence of the young man who had made so gross an error with respect to one of the three,—remanded for a month previous to trial, having been already eight days in solitary confinement.

"The following significant facts demand attention.

"1st. On the 4th January Major M'Leverty attended the court to offer bail; he was not admitted inside, but the Queen's Procureur sent a message by the chief constable

to this effect,—'*He had better not interfere, no bail would be taken.*'

"The Major, acting under instructions, then wrote a formal demand to have the men admitted to bail; he addressed it to the Bailiff. On the 11th he received an answer to the effect that bail would be accepted, and an early assembly of the court held to enable the accused to ask to be admitted to bail themselves, and to appoint their advocate.

"2nd. The Queen's Procureur, 'ex officio' the public prosecutor, hearing from one witness that the two women supposed to have been insulted by the soldiers* lived in the Rohais-road, a fashionable place, laid great stress on the absolute necessity of calling them before the court. But when a subsequent witness declared that he knew them, that they lived in Horn-street, a notorious street for prostitutes, that they were prostitutes and were accompanying the soldiers voluntarily, the Procureur remained silent and never called them.

"3rd. The assistant constable's conduct towards Major M'Leverty was openly and decidedly approved by the court; and when he came out after the approval, he said, '*I am supposed to be against the soldiers, but it is not so; I am in other people's hands,*' or words to that effect.

"4th. One of the court was heard to say, 'We approved of the constable's conduct. They serve without pay. His time will be up in a month, and if we censured him we should get no other to serve.' This speech, of which there is no doubt, speaks volumes as to the state of the police and courts of justice here.

"Another great defect in the law is the want of power in the authorities to compel witnesses in criminal causes to remain in the island and appear at trial. The greatest

* The incident which caused the commencement of the "row."

criminals may thus escape the punishment due to their crimes by the absence of witnesses.

"WM. NAPIER."

Here was a goodly nest of antiquated laws, and illegal, partial, and oppressive administration of the same by a small family compact! General Napier was well fitted both by nature and education to cleanse it. His thorough acquaintance with constitutional law,—his careful study of all the best forms of government which have existed among different nations,—his distrust of irresponsible power in the governing class, and sympathy with the governed, arising from both the personal and borrowed experience that the latter will always, under such circumstances, be ill-treated by the former,—his courage, energy, and tenacity, peculiarly qualified him for the task of assailing and reforming the abuses and anomalies of the Guernsey institutions. But the nest which he disturbed was a hornets' nest, and the angry denizens never ceased to buzz, and to sting him to the best of their ability, up to the very last day of his government. It may truly be said that, owing to his increasing sufferings of body, as well as to his constantly thwarted efforts to do good, his residence in Guernsey was no bed of roses. But it must not be supposed that he was in antagonism to the island people generally; far from it, the people of the island liked and respected him always; the writer, who used to accompany him to all parts of the island, can testify to the marked respect and good-will with which he was invariably greeted by the country people. It was only the dominant governing *clique* of families all closely related, whose power and ancient privileges he attacked, and whose misgovernment he exposed, who thoroughly disliked and tried to thwart him. Among those who opposed him were many

excellent men, who were however penetrated with the most amusing ideas of the grandeur of Guernsey, and of the importance of its "alliance" to England; whose minds partook of the contraction of the small island in which they lived; and who, incapable of taking a comprehensive view, and looking on their privileges as an hereditary possession, were naturally inclined to regard the man who would deprive them of these as an unjust oppressor of their class.

It is not however intended to fatigue the attention of the reader with a minute detail of the endless controversies and differences which arose between the Lieut.-Governor and the Royal Court. Enough has been said to show how entirely destitute of justice and consistency the proceedings of that court could sometimes be.

General Napier's representations to the Home Office procured the appointment of a royal commission to inquire into the state of the criminal law; and as we know that human nature makes men very violent and very unjust against those who expose their misdeeds and who deprive them of cherished power, no further explanation is wanted of the causes of the dislike which was manifested towards General Napier by the leading men of the island, as well as by the newspapers, which were notoriously and completely under their influence. Indeed, the organisation of the Royal Court gave that body a power and influence, extending in all directions, similar to those possessed by the Venetian Council of Ten.

A few extracts from the Report of the Royal Commission above alluded to will show that General Napier's statements were not too highly coloured.

"It is sufficient to state that we found scarcely a single instance in which the law could be traced to a higher source than the discretion of the court, or in which

that discretion was secured from continual variation in practice.

"It is clear that the continuance of such a system is inconsistent with the administration of justice on any fixed principle, and that it tends to subject the court to the imputation of partiality or caprice."

"The Jurats are chosen from the most ancient and respectable families; but the limited number of the electors and the constitution of the elective body tend to make the office almost hereditary in some of them, and relationship, by blood or marriage, prevails to a considerable extent among the members of the court."

"In one case, an advocate of the Royal Court had stabbed an Englishman with a knife, on some fancied provocation, inflicting two wounds upon him. The circumstances of the case were of a nature which rendered the party wounded an unwilling prosecutor. The matter therefore, although known to the constables, was not in the first instance brought before the court. It becoming however afterwards the subject of public talk, the court directed an inquiry, which terminated in the trial and conviction of the offender. But it does not appear to have occurred to the court that the constable had been guilty of any dereliction of duty in forbearing to present the case as soon as he was aware of the crime."

This refers to the first instance of which the facts are related in General Napier's report above given.

"The vices of the present system are inherent in the institutions; and no mode suggests itself to us, by which the tribunal of bailiff and jurats should be continued, which would not perpetuate the most objectionable of its characteristics. We are decidedly of opinion that the judges ought to be lawyers; that they should receive their appointments direct from your Majesty, and not from the

election of the whole or any part of the community; above all, that they should not be, as they now are, virtually self-elected."

"In the constitution of Guernsey the political power resides almost exclusively in the same individuals who are intrusted with the administration of justice. The Bailiff and Jurats possess the legislative and to a great extent the executive power, as well as the judicial."

But the conclusion at which the Commission arrived on one point will appear strange to an English reader when he remembers that the community referred to formed a part of the British dominions at the distance of only twelve hours' travel from the capital of the empire, and that the period treated of was 1846.

The commissioners were naturally desirous to introduce trial by jury, but this would be to strike at the root of the authority of the Jurats.

Consequently the Jurats, as well as the law officers and advocates of the court, all concurred in opinion that it was incapable of being carried into effect in Guernsey; and the Bailiff, though less decidedly, appeared to take the same view. It was evident that the members of the Royal Court regarded the introduction of a jury as involving the destruction of their own functions as criminal judges. Every objection was therefore made to the suggestion.

"To another objection," add the commissioners, "urged with much earnestness, we attach no weight. It was said that the change would be inconsistent with the privileges of the island. If this expression means the privileges of any one class or body of men, we are persuaded that those who insist upon the claim would repudiate it if the supposed privileges were found to be inconsistent with the general good of the island. If it means privileges common

to the inhabitants, then the question is merely as before, whether the supposed privileges be beneficial or not. If not, that which is called a common privilege is simply a common grievance; if beneficial, the argument is superfluous. We point this out because, however obvious the answer is, the objection was sometimes suggested, and oftener we believe tacitly assumed, as an argument against other changes, where that which it was proposed to change would, in countries familiar with constitutional principles, have been attacked as an intolerable oppression."

The conclusion of the commissioners on this question of trial by jury is,—"And, however unwillingly, we feel ourselves compelled to adopt the opinion, almost unanimously expressed to us, of the unfitness of intrusting the body of the inhabitants of Guernsey, in their present state of intelligence and social feeling, with so popular an institution. We therefore are unable to resist a conclusion which, if less strongly vouched for, we should, as strangers to the inhabitants, have considered prejudiced and harsh, and which nothing that came under our limited personal observation would have authorised us to adopt."

The above extracts furnish of themselves very sufficient reasons why it would have been utterly impossible for so ardent a reformer as the Lieut.-Governor to live in peace with so antiquated, privileged, and obstructive a body as the Royal Court of Guernsey.

An extract from one of his letters, written soon afterwards, says,—"With these feelings (of the importance of their island) the higher classes seek to quarrel with every Lieut.-Governor. They call him the military chief, and generally consider him as a large muzzled dog, to be admired if he trots along the high road, but if he comes on the pathway everybody strikes him with a stick."

The militia was also another cause of discord between the Lieut.-Governor and the Royal Court. The Lieut.-Governor commanded the militia "ex officio," yet the duties and discipline of militia were regulated by ordinances of the Royal Court, obedience being enforced by fine and imprisonment, from any sentence of which there was no appeal.

As soon as he could leave the house after his illness, General Napier addressed himself to his military duties. He had found the militia, the real sinews of defence for the island in case of war, disheartened and ill-taught and rather ashamed of their business. There was a disposition to put down the militia in time of peace, and the island newspapers were, with that object, in the habit of ridiculing the force.

General Napier's efforts were directed to revive their discipline and military spirit, and successfully, although he was much embarrassed by a very insubordinate spirit amongst some of the officers, who were connexions and partisans of the members of the Royal Court. Although our relations with France were friendly at this time ostensibly, they were very uncertain. The ministry felt they could not implicitly rely on the friendly assurances of the French Government, at a time when the national feeling of enmity and resentment was evidently strong against England. The Duke of Wellington felt strongly the importance of the Channel Islands as outworks of England, and their unprotected condition made him anxious. General Napier's attention was therefore requested to the subject, with which he had indeed been busily occupied ever since his arrival. He had made himself thoroughly acquainted with the military capacities of the island for defence in the event of a war with France, as well as with those of Alderney and Sark, both

under his government; and also with all the tides and currents which affected the military considerations; and he prepared a very able and exhaustive memoir, embodying the real principles, and indeed most of the details, of the measures which would require to be adopted to place the island in a proper defensive condition.

On the 25th July he received an intimation that the Government had determined to send a mixed naval and military commission to report on a plan of improved defence, embracing both naval and military considerations, which should communicate and act in concert with the Lieut.-Governor. On the 30th July he sent the memoir he had prepared on this subject to the Home Secretary and the Commander-in-Chief, regarding which, in thanking him for it, the former says,—"I am quite amazed when I see the labour which you have bestowed on it, and when I reflect on the trouble which I have imposed on you. It is honourable however to put on record your opinions respecting a point of great national importance, which the first war with France will prove to be almost vital; and whether or no your plans be adopted and your warning regarded, I have not been negligent, and you have discharged your duty in a manner worthy of your reputation and of your name."

The Commission above mentioned consisted of Colonel Colquhoun, R.A., Colonel Cardew, R.E., and Captain Belcher, R.N.,* and they adopted and recommended all the measures proposed by General Napier with the exception of one relating to the site of a harbour in Alderney; and even this was subsequently adopted by a second commission which consisted of a naval officer and the eminent civil engineer Mr. Walker.

In August the Lieutenant-Governor was informed that the

* Now Captain Sir Edward Belcher.

Government had decided to arm and fortify the Channel Islands as speedily and secretly as possible; and, in accordance with General Napier's recommendations, the militia was made more efficient by the appointment of inspectors and drill sergeants, and by being armed with percussion muskets.

In September the Lieutenant-Governor's indignation was strongly roused by an act of extreme severity exercised by the Royal Court against a young gentleman, the son of an old and distinguished military officer resident in Guernsey. The young man, aged 19, in a foolish nocturnal frolic with some companions, wrenched off and carried away some knockers from the doors of houses in the town. He was arrested, tried before the Royal Court, and by that body sentenced for the crime of "brigandage" to one month's imprisonment, of which 15 days should be solitary, on bread and water. His father was ready to pay any fine, and one jurat voted for a fine, but the Court would listen to no intercession, incarcerated the poor lad in the common jail, and so affixed a stigma to him for the foolish thoughtless levity of a boy. When this severity is contrasted with the punishment awarded at a later period by this same Court to one of its own advocates for attempted and almost accomplished murder under very disgraceful circumstances—that sentence being two months' imprisonment without any adjuncts of solitary confinement or peculiar diet;—and when numerous other instances of its injustice were made known to the Lieutenant Governor, it is little surprising that he made strenuous efforts to deprive the Royal Court of Guernsey of a power which in many cases they were proved to have exercised with injustice and partiality.

Thus the whole history of General Napier's official life in Guernsey is one of continual disputes with the Court;

and as these can be of no interest to the great majority of readers, they shall be disposed of as shortly as possible, and the current of his non-official life shall be afterwards traced separately.

In March, 1843, an assembly of the Guernsey States in Parliament was held to deliberate on some proposed organic changes in the constitution. The Lieutenant-Governor opened the session with a speech from which the following extracts are made in proof of the practical sagacity and moderation of his own views as a reformer:—

"Sir, organic changes of ancient systems of government are always great experiments, which must be quite uncertain in their results. They must be experimental, Sir, because the example of one community, though it may serve as a guide, can never serve as a model for another community. The difference of habits, customs, manners, nay, even tradition, but still more old laws and their effects in forming the opinions, feelings, and character of the people, must be taken into consideration; you must modify your new system upon these things beforehand, or they will be found all-powerful in modifying the working of it afterwards. If you neglect them, you will inevitably be placed in permanent collision with that unconquerable power, the inert opposition of the social masses, and as a matter of course inevitably defeated. If, indeed, you only removed what was avowedly bad, you would not have to fear this power, because, though it has sometimes happened, it is not to be expected that a whole people will doggedly cling to what can be proved both by reason and experience injurious to them; but, Sir, it happens, in most ancient policies, that the good and evil are so blended, that it becomes extremely difficult to discover that two principles are at work together; and while striving only to eradicate the bad, you may tear away the good. Hence, Sir, would

it not be wise, when contemplating change, to look first steadily at what already exists—to look at it, Sir, without prejudice, without passion, and above all, without any of that fury—that ferocious enthusiasm, if I may use the expression—which seems to seize upon some men at the mere prospect of changes in government? Now, Sir, proceeding upon this principle, I think it will not be denied that Guernsey hitherto has been a most prosperous community—eminently so. And wise and reasonable it will be, I think, to seek out the causes of that prosperity, to fix them as marks not to be removed, not to be disturbed, not to be lightly meddled with, but so to conduct your reforms that greater scope and play should be given to those fountains of good will. Amongst the most prominent of those sources of prosperity I place the absence of taxation. Comparatively speaking, Guernsey has never either internally or externally been a taxed community. Here then is one guiding mark—one good to hold on to. But, Sir, of late years there have grown up two evils which go, in my opinion, directly to cut away that good; I mean paper money and a public debt. I know, Sir, that many persons think them benefits; but I am prepared by argument, by authority, and by a reference to the experience of all nations that have adopted them, to prove that they are evils; that they have a tendency to increase, that they are incentives to extravagance in governments, especially irresponsible governments; that they have been truly described as 'strength in the beginning, but weakness in the end.'

"Sir, the mention of unanimity leads me naturally to another prominent cause of your past tranquillity and happiness—the absence of any vehement display of political passions, and their sure attendants, political hatred and social discord. The restricted size of the community is adverse to the generation of such a miserable state of

affairs; but it is not an absolute bar to it, as the example of a neighbouring isle proves; and it appears to me that the commencement of such an unhappy condition may be produced by continuing the unwise—now at least unwise—distinction of town and country taxes; town and country interests; town and country parties. Sir, there is, there can be, but one real interest—that of Guernsey; and as words often make differences where things are the same, I hold that part of the proposed plan which offers equal rating, and one general common denomination for it, to be most judicious.

"I have now, Sir, to touch upon another cause of good—not indeed an undoubted, unalloyed one; but still one proper to notice, because I think I perceive in some quarters a desire to dash forward in what is called the road of improvement, without sufficient consideration as to the means necessary to arrive at the end of the journey; and accompanying this inclination with too much contempt for the frugal disposition of the native country population—a disposition which, whether natural to the race, or produced by the minute division of land, leads them rather to save than to venture; to prefer small but sure acquisition to risk for greater gain. This disposition may be carried too far; it is I know adverse to rapid national advancement. It may be 'too fondly nursed,' but it may be also 'too rudely crossed.' It may be opposed in some degree to national greatness, but I doubt if it is opposed to national happiness; and the words are not synonymous. In a national point of view, parsimony is better than extravagance; the miser more useful than the spendthrift. However, though I touch upon this point, as not to be wholly overlooked, I think the antagonistic disposition may be safely left to work in opposition, and we may hope that, acting like the winds and waves upon a ship, which is thus propelled in a

direction belonging to neither, the vessel of the state may reach a safe harbour.

"I have now, Sir, to treat a more important, and so a more dangerous subject of discussion, because I have always in my own country striven to enlarge the action of the very principle which here I am inclined to restrict. I perceive a disposition in certain quarters to hold the present plan of reform cheap, because it falls short of what they have demanded; and if it had been far more extensive, the same I imagine would only look upon it as a means to make further change. In fine, they desire—and I do not advert to it with intent to blame them—they desire to break down altogether your patriarchal system of government, to make room for the free and general play of the democratic principle. Sir, when I say I do not blame them, I mean the men, not the measures; for these last I hold to be unwise. I know that theoretically your present system is unsound; that an ambitious, violent bailiff, aided by a few unprincipled jurats, could without much difficulty work much partiality, much injustice, much wrong. But, Sir, I find that in practice it has been different; that your authorities, the members of your states, your courts, your bailiffs, allied to, intermarrying with, and in daily social intercourse with those they govern, have always displayed a parental not a tyrannical feeling; that they have exercised their authority mildly, too mildly sometimes, but generally beneficially. And, Sir, be it remembered that they are always at hand, always ready to dispense justice. Here, Justice never weeps over her votaries,* pining, hopeless, despairing, perishing from the law's delay. Is it then wise, is it reasonable, to dash this patriarchal system to the ground, and let in the foaming turbulence of democracy?

* This is rather at variance with some of the instances which have been given.

"Sir, I feel that I may be strongly questioned. Here I may be asked, how then are we to assimilate our ancient and decaying system to the advancing enlightenment of the age? Are you aware that there is but one sure guiding principle of government? That the only faithful guards of the people's right are the people themselves? That self-government is the only security for a nation's rights and welfare?

"Sir, I am aware of these truths. I have all my life maintained them in the abstract. But I reply that in all human institutions general principles must be modified by circumstances. The Deity Himself modifies His general principles. Self-government in its simple sense would be simply anarchy: you must modify the principle to organize society. Would you modify it as the ancient Athenians did? One of their greatest men, speaking of it as displayed there, called it 'madness confessed.' The multitude never can be fit to deliberate, and should never be employed in attempting what it cannot do wisely. Another modification then: representation? Ay! but representation may be of various kinds—responsible and irresponsible—for life or for a short time—which would you have? The multitude is incapable of deliberation; but the multitude can feel, it can be oppressed, it can suffer; and when it does so feel and suffer, it should have direct, quiet, but decisive means of redress; it should have the power of legally changing its representatives whenever they become unfaithful or incapable—that unfaithfulness or incapacity being proved by the fact that the multitude feels oppressed. Frequent responsibility of the representation, frequent responsibility of the governing powers, is of the essence of self-government. Most true! but here again, Sir, the application of the general principle must be modified by existing circumstances. Your clergy, as members of the States, your jurats, your bailiffs, your present douzeniers

are all chosen for life. How reconcile that with the principle of frequent responsibility? You cannot do it. Are you then reduced to the dilemma of rejecting altogether this essential principle of good; or sweeping away all your ancient institutions under which you have hitherto prospered so notably? I think not. I do not see the necessity of calling, as has been done in another place, upon the town and country to 'unite together and put down their common enemies—the court and the clergy.' I would advise rather that you should leave what has worked well alone, but that you should graft the better principle of frequent responsibility upon that old system by your new institution. In other words, I do not approve of electing your new cantonal douzeniers for life. Make them frequently responsible; and then you will have grafted a fair branch, which will, in conjunction with the perfect freedom of debate and the equal privileges of deputies, inevitably produce good democratic fruit.

"Such, Sir, are my sentiments; but if any person imagines that I thereby design to oppose reform, let him reject that error quickly. My discourse is meant only as an exhortation to discretion in the manner of your reform. To those, if any there be, who set themselves in array against the almost unanimous desire of the community for a change which is so evidently wanted—to those I say, Beware! Put not your untimely drag upon the wheel when the horses are high in blood and in full mettle; for they will plunge and break the machine to pieces; and that would be worse than going a little too fast on a smooth road.

"Sir, I finish with the earnest hope that whatever may be decided upon may be for the benefit of Guernsey."

(His Excellency, who was listened to with marked attention throughout, sat down amidst much cheering.)

In January, 1843, occurred the incident of stabbing by

one of the advocates of the Royal Court, which has been twice alluded to; and the arrest and trial of the criminal were attributable to the declaration of the Lieutenant-Governor that he would not suffer such a crime to remain without investigation in an island committed to his government.

In August happened the second case, detailed in General Napier's report above given, of three soldiers of the 48th being convicted on insufficient evidence of assault and robbery and sentenced to three months' imprisonment, one of whom came out of jail in a hopeless state and died soon afterwards.

In January, 1844, the third case related in the General's report occurred, of three soldiers of the 48th being arrested by a constable for assault and riot. These men were locked up in solitary confinement for eight days before their case was investigated; one of them then distinctly proved an *alibi*, and was discharged after suffering without redress eight days' false imprisonment; the other two were remanded for one month previous to trial, were then tried, convicted, and sentenced to two months' imprisonment. One of the two was, however, released in consequence of dangerous illness; and the representations of the Lieutenant-Governor to the Home Secretary procured for the other a pardon under the sign manual, addressed to the Lieutenant-Governor and the jailer, the terms of which directed the Lieutenant-Governor to cause the prisoner forthwith to be set at liberty. On the receipt of this pardon the General, accompanied by his staff, proceeded at once to the jail, showed the jailer the pardon signed by the Queen, and desired him to liberate this prisoner. The jailer refused to give him up, on the ground that he could only be authorised to do so by the Royal Court; and as he persisted in his refusal, the General sent off an officer full

gallop to the fort to bring a detachment of troops. The jailer then got frightened and released the man. The affair created a great excitement. The island newspapers, entirely under the influence of the Court, used very violent and seditious language against the Governor; and the antagonistic attitude assumed by the Royal Court and its partisans toward the Queen's representative became from that moment open and decided. The Royal Court claimed that a pardon even under the sign-manual could not be effective in Guernsey until after it had been registered by that body. And this formed one of the grounds on which afterwards an appeal to the Privy Council was founded against the Lieutenant-Governor and his acts.

The other grounds were as follow:—

The exercise of the right by the Lieutenant-Governor to send aliens out of the island on his own authority. This right he had found it expedient to exercise in one instance; it had been always vested in, and from time to time used by, the different Governors. And this right the Court now denied.

It was customary in Guernsey for the Lieutenant-Governor to hold what was called a conference with the Royal Court on any matters of important public concern. Such conference might be held either on the demand of the Lieutenant-Governor or of the Court. That body now claimed to name the time and place of such conference when it was demanded by the Lieutenant-Governor, admitting the right of the Lieutenant-Governor to name the time and place when it was demanded by the Court.

On the above three points an appeal was determined on by the Court to the Queen in Council, accompanied by bitter complaints against the Lieutenant-Governor for his unconstitutional action in the matter of the release of the soldier from jail, as well as in other matters.

Besides the points set forth in the appeal, several circumstances occurred during 1844 which tended to increase the feeling of ill-will with which the Court regarded a superior who showed that he was determined to *be* a governor and not a puppet.

General Napier rebuked the pretensions of the constable who had acted in the affair of the soldiers, to call for military aid at his own discretion; as well as his insolent demeanour towards the commanding officer of the 48th depôt; and he issued a general order forbidding such aid being afforded by the military except under certain specified circumstances, which were to be at the discretion of the officer commanding the troops. The Royal Court sustained their constable both in his demand for aid and in his demeanour; but the General enforced his order, and obtained a warrant for the same from the War Office.

The Court now commenced a violent agitation against the Lieutenant-Governor, and endeavoured to stir up the people to hold meetings in their different parishes to petition for his recall on the ground of his having violated the island constitution in the matter of the soldier's liberation from jail. One of the jurats from his place on the Bench deliberately accused the Lieutenant-Governor of making *ex parte* and false statements to the Secretary of State in order to degrade the authority of the Court. Papers were affixed to all the church-doors giving notice of the time and place of such meetings, and containing very violent inflammatory language. One clergyman, the Rev. Mr. Dobree, removed the notice from his church, and in its stead placed there another, warning his parishioners to abstain from attending such meetings, if they did not wish to render themselves culpable of "sedition, secret conspiracy, and rebellion," and stating that the notice he had

removed contained "false and seditious libels against the character of the Lieutenant-Governor of this island."

A vindictive prosecution was now commenced against Mr. Dobree, charging him with the infraction of an "ordonnance" directing the mode in which notices of public meetings were to be published. The report of the Criminal Law Commissioners, afterwards appointed, has the following notice of this circumstance:—

"The act charged against him was the taking from the frame in which notices are directed to be deposited, a notice of a public parochial meeting to be held in his own parish church. We have read the ordonnance with great attention, and cannot discover that it creates any such offence. Without his signature as Rector, no meeting could be legally held in the church. On his refusal to sign the notice it was signed by the constable and placed in the frame on Sunday immediately before Divine service: the frame itself being placed inside the church, and not near the principal door on the outside, as the ordonnance directs. Yet for the removal of this, as it appears to us, illegal notice, from a place where it had been improperly placed, Mr. Dobree was convicted and punished. It is impossible to avoid suspecting that his real offence in the eyes of the jurats was the refusal of his sanction to the meeting. This was resented by the partisans of the Royal Court, whose members were thus unfortunately called upon to act as judges in a matter too nearly affecting themselves to admit of their coming to an unprejudiced decision."

In May General Napier received from the Rev. Mr. Dobree an intimation that certain parties had been heard to threaten that they would either shoot the Lieutenant-Governor, or get others to shoot him, at the militia review which was to be held on the 24th, the Queen's birthday. This statement was confirmed by other evidence; and

although such threats might very well have been only an expression of the ill feeling which the Court and its partisans endeavoured to excite, without any real intention of putting them in practice, yet the occasion presented obvious facilities for their execution, and the General did not feel himself at liberty to disregard them. He however steadfastly refused to postpone the review, but communicated the state of affairs to the Home Secretary, who, in conjunction with the Duke of Wellington, taking a graver view of the case than that taken by General Napier, sent him positive orders not to hold the review on the day appointed; and not to hold it at all until the arrival of a regiment which had been ordered to proceed to Guernsey to strengthen his hands. The regiment came; it arrived before the letter. The Royal Court and its supporters were furious; the most violent and seditious language was employed by the newspapers endeavouring to incite the militia against the Royal troops in general, and against the Lieutenant-Governor in particular, and accusing the latter of stigmatizing the whole of the Guernsey militia with "disloyalty."

By order of the Secretary of State the parties accused of having used the above threats were tried by the Royal Court in July. There can be little doubt as to the fact of their having uttered the language imputed to them, whatever their real intentions may have been. The evidence was conflicting, and the accused were acquitted; but it was evident to all who witnessed the trial that there was a predetermination to acquit. In fact, several jurats, and among them the bailiff, before the trial took place, attended a public meeting, held ostensibly to adopt an address expressive of unchanged loyalty to the Queen, but also for the purpose of repudiating the charge of conspiracy which the Court party sedulously represented

General Napier to have made against the Royal Guernsey Militia as a body. The Royal Court, after consulting together, determined that there would be impropriety in their attending such a meeting in a body in their corporate capacity; but nevertheless the bailiff and several jurats attended in their individual capacity; and when, at the termination of the proceedings, three cheers were given for the Royal Court, the bailiff responded thereto by proposing "three cheers for the loyal Guernsey militia." This meeting was on the 2nd July; the trial of some of the Guernsey militia took place on the 13th; they were tried for sedition by the very judges who had thus significantly given proof of their feelings on the subject beforehand.

After the trial the Crown witnesses were persecuted with the greatest vindictiveness by the influential friends of the Royal Court; the Rev. Mr. Dobree was threatened with a prosecution for perjury, with the intention of founding on his conviction, of which they could feel assured, a petition to the Archbishop of Canterbury to deprive him of his gown; and this affair affords such a curious specimen of Guernsey justice that it is here detailed.

* "The Rev. Mr. Dobree was a principal witness against one of the parties accused. At the preliminary investigation he had given evidence, which his character as a clergyman rendered it difficult to discredit, and which uncontradicted would amount to proof of the charge. This, though taken at the secret sitting of the court, had unfortunately been divulged, by whose fault it did not appear; but it became the topic of public talk; and threats were held out that he would be indicted for perjury if he should persist in the same evidence on the

* Report of "Criminal Law Commission."

trial. His brother, a jurat of the Royal Court, thinking him mistaken, abstained from taking part in the preliminary investigation; but from a wish to save him from the threatened prosecution, after having in vain endeavoured to persuade him to quit the island, so as to avoid appearing as a witness at the trial, his brother proposed that he should procure the signature of the Lieutenant-Governor to a letter directing the law officers of the Crown to withdraw the prosecution, on the ground that so many connections of the accused were among the witnesses for the Crown as to make it difficult to obtain a conviction. It is only by keeping in mind the peculiar nature of the tribunal that we can understand how a judge could have permitted himself to make such a proposition to a witness, in a criminal trial of the greatest importance then pending before the court,—and only proves how imperfectly the duties of a judge may be understood by a jurat of the Royal Court."

The communication which the jurat made to his brother, the Crown witness, was in substance as follows:—

"I can't stay quiet and see you ruined without an effort to save you. The trial of the men accused of sedition must be stopped or you will be destroyed. The court feels it to be a question between your character and that of the island; and I need not tell you that in such a case you will go to the wall. The court will accept of the negative evidence of persons who will be brought before it in opposition to your positive evidence, and the accused will be acquitted. You will then be actioned for defamation of character and perjury, you will be found guilty and sentenced. The sentence will be made the ground for an application to the bishop to deprive you of your gown; wherefore your ruin is certain, unless some means are fallen upon to stop the trial, and to do this I give you a

rough draft of a letter for the Lieutenant-Governor to address to the law officer to effect our object."

This rough draft was placed in General Napier's hand, who verified the handwriting to be that of the jurat, the brother of the Crown witness.

The threatened prosecution of Mr. Dobree did not however take place, probably in consequence of the energetic representations of the above circumstance to the Secretary of State. With reference to this matter Sir James Graham declared in the House his full belief, after the trial had terminated in the acquittal of the accused, that a plot to assassinate the Lieutenant-Governor had actually been formed by a few persons, at the same time that he entertained the most entire confidence in the loyalty of the island generally. And, in answer to a letter from the Royal Court complaining of his statement, he reiterated his belief in the plot, stating that he had not formed it without due reflection or without communication with those who, from their habits and from their knowledge of the circumstances, were most competent to aid him in coming to a correct conclusion upon it."

No efforts were now spared to excite the inhabitants in general, and particularly the militia, to hatred and contempt of the Lieutenant-Governor's authority; and the newspapers were full of violent and seditious articles.

General Napier, therefore, to show his confidence in the militia as a body, ordered a general review of the whole island force, which took place on the 13th August, amidst pouring rain. On their assembling he formed them in a large square, and thus addressed them:—

"Guernsey Militia,—It seems that I am not a judge of a fine day; but I am a judge of what a soldier is, and what he ought to be. I will not keep you longer than necessary; but I wish to make a few observations to the

militia, and I will speak as loud and as distinctly as I can, so that all may hear me. I am anxious that every militia-man should hear me,—do you hear me from the outer ranks? (Cries of 'We hear you well.') I have been represented to you as an enemy of the militia and the island. I am not that; I am a friend of the militia. You have been most grossly and basely deceived by the reports of a set of unprincipled scoundrels,—villains totally devoid of all sentiments of honour, and regardless of character. When first I met the militia I expressed my delight at seeing such a fine body of men; but I thought they might be improved. I thought that my experience in war would enable me to give them some useful instruction, and I did so. Every time I saw you, whether at inspections, reviews, or sham fights, I remarked that you had improved. I saw that you became better and better, and that you were increasing in smartness, cleanliness, and in your manner of exercising, and I repeatedly expressed my warm admiration of these things. Was this the conduct of an enemy? And yet there are a set of calumniators who, by all manner of falsehoods, have been trying to make you believe I am your enemy. How can I be your enemy? Do you think I am a devil prowling about, sowing the seeds of discord, and seeking what mischief I can do? Amongst other falsehoods, it has been said that I was the cause of your meetings being suspended, and that I sent for the troops. This is false; I had nothing whatever to do with your meetings being discontinued; I had no part in it till I received the order from Her Majesty; nor was it at my request that the troops were sent to Guernsey. I did not apply for them; and I knew nothing about their coming till they had actually arrived. I have always had the most friendly feeling towards the island and the militia. I am not your enemy, nor do I believe that you

are mine. I have never doubted or distrusted you; and if you are my enemies, which I do not believe, I am certainly not yours. Now we will proceed to business for the Queen." This speech was followed by loud and general cheering; and thenceforward the relations between the Lieutenant-Governor and the militia were on a perfectly satisfactory footing. In riding home after the review the General took a circuitous road along which all the men of the south and west regiments (the last being the corps to which the officers who had been lately tried belonged) were proceeding in scattered parties to their homes, and these men again greeted him with shouts and wavings of their caps.

Meanwhile the address to the Queen, and petition against the acts of the Lieutenant-Governor, which have been above alluded to, had been intrusted to a deputation to lay before the Privy Council, and this deputation was actually in London for that purpose when the sedition case first arose.

The decision of the Privy Council was in favour of the Lieutenant-Governor in all the disputed points, excepting in one minor technical particular.

1st. His right to send aliens out of the island was completely confirmed.

2nd. The Lieutenant-Governor alone had the right to appoint time and place of conference with the Royal Court. The court had also claimed, with reference to this question, the right to speak in a conference with the Lieutenant-Governor through all its members in turn, which right General Napier denied. The Privy Council gave this right to the court, but gave at the same time the right to the Lieutenant-Governor to terminate the conference at any moment, thereby rendering it practically null.

3rd. The pretension of the Royal Court that the Queen's pardon required registration by that body before it could be effective was completely denied. The Privy Council declared that the jailer should have immediately obeyed the demand of the Lieutenant-Governor for the liberation of the prisoner on the production of the pardon; but that, as the jailer was not technically the Lieutenant-Governor's servant, he would not have been warranted in using military force.

In January, 1845, several petitions were presented in parliament by Mr. Roebuck from various individuals of Guernsey, complaining of tyranny and oppression on the part of the Royal Court. These were ordered to be printed; and the Government decided on appointing the Commission to inquire into the state of the criminal law in the Channel Islands, to which reference has been already made. The Commission did not, however, commence its labours until the following year; but the intention becoming known in Guernsey excited great consternation among a certain class, and the measure, which was justly attributed to the representations of the Lieutenant-Governor, coupled with the support he had received from the Privy Council, while it did not allay their dislike, inspired them with a salutary impression of his power and vigour.

The following letter is an amusing specimen of some of the functions he was called on to exercise:—

To the Right Honourable the Lieutenant-Governor, Isle of Guernsey.

"SIR, "Huddersfield, Yorkshire, 1845.

"I am wanting the firmness of character which would enable me to sink considerations of false pride, and as such I shall be obliged to abandon here, as I am not able to keep up a display above that of persons here of

moderate means; and having been informed that your isle (in a domestic point of view) for a person with 100*l.* *per annum is equal to* 200*l.* HERE, pardon me if I am taking too much upon myself to write to you, and humbly beg to ask you (or agent) your candid opinion as to cheapness of living, also if good untenanted houses are to be met with at the present time.

"I am, Sir,

"Your humble obedient servant,

"E. C——."

There does not appear any record of the answer which was returned, but we may feel certain that the letter was promptly and kindly answered, and the required information supplied.

During the whole of this year (1845) the island newspapers continued to publish articles, of which the tendency was to excite the people and militia of Guernsey against the Lieut.-Governor and the regular troops. These bore fruit in various ways. In February an unprovoked and cowardly attack was made by a civilian on a soldier, whose head was cut open with a bludgeon; though the assailant ran away he was identified, and sentenced by the Royal Court to fourteen days' imprisonment, of which the last week was to be solitary on bread and water; but this sentence was mitigated by them to 48 *hours'* imprisonment on bread and water; the leniency of the court in the case where a soldier was the sufferer forming a strong contrast to its severity in former cases where soldiers were, or were accused of being, the assailants.

In June a rather serious row took place on the race-ground during the races, between soldiers and civilians, which commenced in another entirely unprovoked assault on a soldier, and which was only terminated by the

personal exertions of the Lieutenant-Governor who happened fortunately to be on the ground. He ordered an officer to form all the soldiers into a body and march them to the fort, which being done, and when the men were marching off the ground, they were assailed by a low rabble with hisses, hootings, and insults of every kind; so much so that the men broke their ranks and fell upon those who were thus insulting them. With some difficulty the soldiers were again reduced to order and finally marched away, after having been vehemently reproached by the Lieutenant-Governor for their want of discipline. But the effect of the newspaper articles culminated in the following occurrence.

In November a private of the 27th Regiment, and a woman who accompanied him, charged a militiaman on oath with having pointed and snapped a musket at him on the high road, as he, the militiaman, was returning from an entertainment which had been given to the company to which he belonged by its officers. The musket fortunately burnt priming. The militiaman was tried and acquitted, but the impression was so strong that the soldier had been mistaken only in the individual, and not that he had made a false statement, that the court directed the colonel of the militia regiment to spare no efforts to discover the real culprit; but while the investigation was proceeding the militia captain commenced a prosecution against the 27th soldier for wilful and corrupt perjury. This captain had sworn at the trial of the militiaman that positively only *five* men of his company had quitted the place of entertainment before the rest of the men were marched home in a body; and that the accused was not and could not have been one of the five. The captain was accordingly held up in the island papers as the champion of the militia against the military. In

the course of the inquiry as to the real offender *ten* men of the militia company concerned acknowledged voluntarily that they had quitted the entertainment and gone home before the rest, and one of these was remarkably like the accused militiaman in face, figure, and in large bushy whiskers of a peculiar cut.

The 27th soldier and the woman were now brought before the Royal Court, sitting in private as a judicial court, to determine whether there was ground for a trial for perjury: they were rigorously examined separately; but their declarations were made so frankly, and were so borne out by circumstantial evidence, and by the admission by the ten militiamen in court of their having been absent, that the Court discharged them without a trial, and complimented them upon their frank and honest behaviour. General Napier then exercised the right which was vested in the Lieut.-Governor of dismissing the militia captain from his position in that force. The captain appealed to the Secretary of State against this act of authority on the part of the Lieut.-Governor, and received for reply, that Sir James Graham, "having made inquiry into the particular circumstances of your complaint, is not prepared to disturb the decision which the Lieut.-Governor has taken in your case."

Referring to the constant attacks made on General Napier in the newspapers, Sir James Graham wrote on the 2nd May, 1845: "I have seen with indignant feelings of reprobation the attacks which have been made in the local press on your motives and conduct; these attacks have, I fear, been countenanced in quarters from whence you were entitled to expect support in the maintenance of your just authority; but your distinguished services and established character place you above the reach of imputations affecting your personal honour."

The reasons why the editors of the papers referred to were not prosecuted for sedition or libel—for which they were undoubtedly actionable over and over again, and of which in England they would certainly have been convicted—are obvious. The articles were, in the opinions of the law officers of the Crown in Guernsey, clearly actionable, but they were of opinion that no good result would be obtained by a prosecution; because, first, it was extremely doubtful if the Royal Court, in its capacity as Grand Jury, would find a true bill; secondly, if a true bill was found, it was extremely doubtful if the same body, sitting afterwards as a Court of Justice, would convict; thirdly, it was certain in case of conviction, that the Royal Court would impose only a trifling fine which would expose the whole proceeding to ridicule; and even though the largest fine in the power of the Court were inflicted, it would be insufficient to check the evil. The libellers would triumph; the libels become more numerous and of a worse description; and the newspapers would increase in sale.

During this year, another instance occurred in which the Royal Court endeavoured to deprive the Lieut.-Governor of a constitutional right, viz. that of being present at all the sittings of the Royal Court, both public and private. General Napier, having thought it expedient to attend one of the private sittings, held for the preliminary investigation of some offence,—in other words, one of its Grand Jury meetings,—was informed by the Court that he must be considered to be present of courtesy and not of right. The General, feeling certain of his right, according to the tenor of the constitution, asserted that right in a letter to the Court; and having referred the case to the Secretary of State and English Crown law officers, was completely confirmed in that right by their opinion. He therefore

presented himself at the first private meeting thereafter of which he was cognisant, and addressed the Bailiff as follows:—

"Mr. Bailiff, I claim the right of being present at the private sittings of the Court; I claim it on the authority of the Crown officers in England, transmitted formally to me by the Secretary of State. The Court, I understand, deny this right,—I say, I understand so, for I have never received any formal and positive intimation that such is the case. I now ask—is it so?

"Sir, I am here to assert a right, and I shall therefore take this opportunity of stating my views. I am quite willing to admit that the opinion of the Crown officers, though backed by a Secretary of State, does not make law here for you; but it is good warrant for a Lieutenant-Governor to act, because his commission directs him to take orders from the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of State and the Crown officers are the responsible advisers of the Crown; I am therefore prepared to exercise the right I believe myself to possess. But, Sir, I am in no way desirous of infringing on others' rights; and if it can be shown that the Court view of this matter is the legal one, let it be so. I therefore offer this proposition. I will take my place *pro formâ*, and I will then retire and hold the exercise of my right in abeyance until the question be decided by appeal to the Queen in Council; but this appeal must be made within a reasonable time. I know that appeals are expensive, but I conceive that a case may be made out and referred to Council without an expensive appeal, and I am willing to forward that as far as I can."

No such appeal appears to have been made. Certain it is that General Napier exercised the disputed right on three different occasions; and afterwards declared his intention publicly, at a full meeting of the Royal Court, to

continue to exercise it on all fitting occasions as being a part of the prerogative of the Crown.

General Napier visited England this year for two months. During his absence eight officers of militia wrote letters to the acting Lieut.-Governor, resigning their commissions. These gentlemen were all closely connected with the Royal Court, and among themselves three of them bore the same name, and two out of the remainder likewise bore the same name. Before answering their communications the acting Lieut.-Governor referred their letters to the Secretary of State. The resignations of four of them, being couched in proper and respectful language, were accepted. But the letters of the others were, in the words of the Secretary of State, "couched in terms so disrespectful and improper, that, upon consideration, I have deemed it not consistent with my duty to advise Her Majesty to accept their resignations. It would not however be for the interest of the militia that they should retain their commissions. Her Majesty has been pleased to command that these gentlemen be displaced from their respective situations as officers in the Royal Guernsey Militia. You are desired to communicate without delay to these gentlemen, as well as to those whose resignations have been accepted, the decision of Her Majesty on their respective cases."

General Napier now urged upon the new Home Secretary, Sir George Grey, a measure which he had much at heart, and which Sir James Graham had acquiesced in,—the appointment of a second commission to inquire into the state of the civil law in the Channel Islands. This was not immediately conceded, and the Royal Court exerted themselves to stop the Criminal Law Commission, and procured an address to Her Majesty in Council from the States of the island, praying that their ancient laws

should not be interfered with. Their efforts however were unavailing, and the Commission repaired shortly afterwards to Guernsey and commenced its labours.

The hopes of the Royal Court were however revived by the change in the Home Department; and thinking that Sir George Grey might take a more favourable view of their grievances than Sir James Graham had done, a petition to the Queen in Council, professing to emanate from the inhabitants of Guernsey, of a very hostile character as regarded the Lieut.-Governor, was forwarded to the Secretary of State about the middle of July. All the points noticed in the petition had been already decided in favour of the Lieut.-Governor, either by the Privy Council or the Secretary of State, but were now resuscitated, and mixed with general charges of arbitrary demeanour. It is but fair to state that this petition, got up by some of the dismissed militia officers, was repudiated by the Bailiff and by all the respectable inhabitants of the island, with exception of the family clique, the partisans of the Royal Court.

But an opportunity was shortly to be afforded to General Napier of proving in the most public manner the falsehood of the assertion that the hostile petition emanated from the inhabitants of Guernsey.

He returned to his government in August, and one evening, the 30th, it was suddenly announced to him without any previous notice that the Queen's yacht, having Her Majesty on board, was in Guernsey harbour. He had only the night for preparation, but next morning the whole militia of the island, together with the military and civil authorities, were mustered to give Her Majesty the best possible reception under the circumstances. Notices had been sent off to all the different parishes, and the whole population of the island, excepting

the bedridden and infirm, flocked to the port to greet their Queen. And not only was Her Majesty welcomed with the greatest loyalty and enthusiasm, but the unpopular Lieut.-Governor was greeted over and over again with loud and universal cheers by the assembled crowds of civilians, as well as by that Guernsey militia which the newspapers had vainly endeavoured to excite against him. So remarkable indeed was the demonstration in his favour, when taken in connection with his alleged unpopularity, that he received letters from all quarters afterwards, both official and private, congratulating him on the satisfactory result; amongst others, from the Secretary of State and from Lord Fitzroy Somerset, alluding to the good spirit manifested by the militia, both as regarded loyalty to the Queen and respect for their Lieut.-Governor. And the thanks of Her Majesty were at the same time officially communicated to General Napier in the most gratifying manner.

The Criminal Law Commissioners had now arrived, and presented their credentials to the Royal Court at a full meeting; on which occasion General Napier is reported by the newspapers to have addressed them in the following words:—

"The Lieut.-Governor rose, and, addressing himself to the commissioners, said, that during the four years and a half of his official connexion with Guernsey, his whole exertions and his sole object had been to promote the prosperity and interests of the people of the island. He had therefore frequently urged upon the late Government, and the present, to cause an inquiry to be made into the civil and criminal laws. His representations had been attended to, and he therefore now hailed the coming of the commissioners and bade them welcome. He would illustrate his views of the matter before them in a familiar

manner. Before the introduction of the modern improvements in the means of intercourse, many people lived in a state of seclusion, shut out from communication with others. But in most houses they had a family clock, perhaps in an ornamented frame, and pretty to look at. But the works were sometimes rusty, the wheels perhaps were broken, the hands went too fast or slow, and sometimes stopped altogether. The master of the house had probably a watch of his own, and therefore cared but little about the irregularity of the clock, however much others might be inconvenienced by it. When, therefore, a clever mechanician arrived, and changed the wheels, and regulated the hands, and made the clock to go, he carried with him the thanks of the household. You, gentlemen, come among us with a higher mission; you come to regulate—not the hands of a clock—but the hands of justice, and you will be followed by the thanks and blessing of a whole people. I therefore again hail your arrival, and bid you welcome."

In November it was intimated to General Napier that harbours for warlike purposes were to be constructed at Guernsey and at Alderney on a large scale. The following is a portion of the despatch he wrote to the Home Secretary on the subject:—

"The memoirs which I delivered in to the Home Office more than four years ago will show the general plan of defence necessary for these islands, and their great importance to England's naval supremacy in these narrow seas. You will find that Alderney is of far more importance than either Guernsey or Jersey; and I repeat that if great harbours, at an enormous cost, are constructed without erecting simultaneously internal defences, it will be only working for France. *One hour and two large steamers* will suffice to place the French in Alderney,

which could never afterwards be recovered. The French are far more likely to attempt Alderney by a surprise, which would almost certainly succeed, than to attempt Guernsey and Jersey by a methodical operation of war; and Alderney, once in their hold, will insure the ultimate reduction of the other islands, or at least render them of no value.

"I beg of you to consider, that from La Hogue to the Bill of Portland is little more than fifty nautical miles;—that Alderney, with its Swinge and Race,* cannot be blockaded, and consequently fourteen or fifteen miles of the fifty will be in secure possession of the French, with harbours for fifteen or twenty large steamers of war;—that the sun rises at the back of this position, and consequently French steamers and privateers will see an English vessel two or three hours before she can be distinctly observed from Portland; that they will pounce upon her, and if an English steamer, or two, or three, follow to rescue, a safe harbour receives the prize and captors, while an overpowering force from Cherbourg can issue forth to cut off the pursuers' retreat. Say a whole squadron pursues; the French vessels may run for St. Malo, where an immense basin to contain a great fleet is nearly finished; the English squadron, once drawn into the Gulf of Avranches, if composed of sailing vessels, may be kept there for weeks, thus diminishing the English Channel fleet, and leaving the French Cherbourg fleet an open sea for action, or at least a fair chance to do mischief. What mercantile losses! what an immense expense! what dangerous chances are thus opened! what a number of ships of war must be employed! what difficulty of blockade!

"But if Alderney be secured, the chances are all on the

* Dangerous currents.

English side. The blockade of Cherbourg would be effectual from Alderney, without a greater expense than keeping one steamer off that harbour. Nay! by raising a tower on the Touraille Hill, or on Essex Heights in Alderney, Cherbourg may be looked into with a glass.

"The works I proposed for the defence of Guernsey were not lightly recommended. I founded them upon this consideration,—that with tides rising from 28 to 30 and even 40 feet, all security for the island from its rocks and tides disappears before steam. Works therefore which would force an enemy's fleet to touch at a given point or quarter, would, if they could be so constructed without any inordinate expense, be the proper mode of protection; and I have shown what works and the right site to effect this. My views, both for Guernsey and Jersey, as well as Alderney, have been confirmed by the Commissions sent out to verify them: among the most important was one on the Brehon Rock in the channel of the Little Russel; and one on the hill of the Druids' Altar, to defend the northern harbours of this island; the south side offers no temptation to an enemy; and hence, while the Brehon work would render the east side impervious to a fleet, the Druids' Altar would nearly do the same for the northern harbours; and the west side alone could be attacked. But the Brehon Rock standing in the midst of a terrible tide, the work cannot well be constructed in winter, and would under any circumstances require two years to complete it.

"The present harbour in Guernsey—I mean that now to be executed—is vastly larger than the one I contemplated, and in a different place, though very near. It will be a grand work; and in a warlike point of view infinitely better, concentrating all the power, naval and military, together, offering greater facilities for ingress and egress,

and greater space within. But it will cost, I judge, not less than 300,000*l.*, and will, with that of Alderney, swallow up the whole sum, viz. half a million, which I allotted for all the harbours and military works of Alderney, Guernsey, and Jersey. I am convinced that sum would secure all the three islands, but these greater harbours give more security if the military works necessary are also constructed. Nevertheless the question occurs—Can England in a war with France spare fifteen thousand troops and a great fleet merely to defend these islands? I doubt it.

"The harbour which the Bailiff will desire is that which I proposed; it will combine the mercantile interest of the island with its military defence: the State would in that case, as I formerly informed Sir James Graham, furnish 50,000*l.* on certain conditions, and the land recovered from the sea would sell, I have been and I believe truly informed, for 40,000*l.* more, whereas the highest estimate of the expense, namely, Mr. Walker's, did not exceed 150,000*l.*"

General Napier's term of office as Lieutenant-Governor, according to the usual custom, expired in April, 1847: the climate had never agreed with him, and the measures he had felt it his duty to take in the exercise of his functions had brought him into frequent collision with the principal island families. His representations had procured the appointment of a Royal Commission to inquire into the criminal law with a view to its reform; as well as a promise on the part of the Government of a similar Commission with reference to the civil law. Dissatisfied however with the slow reformation of evils the prevalence of which he so keenly felt and had so often urged, and doubtful of the support of a Government whose cautious action he construed into unwillingness to act, he quitted the island in September with the intention of resigning his post;

and fulfilled that intention by forwarding his resignation officially on the 1st of January 1848.

In announcing General Napier's retirement to the Duke of Wellington, then Commander-in-Chief, Sir George Grey stated—"It would afford me great satisfaction to learn that his distinguished services and merit had entitled him in your Grace's estimation to any military distinction and appointment which could be conferred upon him."

To which the Duke replied—"I have every desire to mark my opinion of his services when it may be in my power; and upon an opportunity offering of recommending them to the notice of the Queen, I shall avail myself of it with the greater pleasure from the knowledge that any act of favour which it may please Her Majesty to extend to him will be in accordance with your views and wishes."

The first vacant regiment, the 27th, was accordingly conferred on General Napier on the 7th February, and the first vacant K.C.B. shortly afterwards.

The biographer has thought it right, at the risk of fatiguing the reader in this chapter, to enter into many details of slight general interest, in justice to General Napier: the more so, because, until he obtained access to all the documents connected with the Guernsey official business, the writer, in common with many others, had received the impression that many of the differences which occurred between the Lieutenant-Governor and the Royal Court might have been avoided without sacrifice of principle, and were in fact due to the vehemence of General Napier's character. But a careful examination of the documentary evidence has convinced him that the commencement of these disputes was due to the Lieutenant-Governor's proper and conscientious exposure of abuses in the administration of justice; that throughout his connection with the island by far the greater number of points of

difference involved some important principle, nearly affecting the wellbeing of the inhabitants, military discipline, or the Royal prerogatives, which he could not conscientiously yield; and that a quiet life could only have been secured at the expense of the public good. Undoubtedly, the General's temper was fiery; and the peculiarly painful attacks from which he constantly suffered, which were aggravated by the dampness of the climate, rendered him more prone than he otherwise would have been to resent petty and designed annoyances, and increased his impatience with factious and selfish opposition offered by the few to measures calculated to benefit the community.

The termination of the rule of this stirring, vigorous, and uncompromising Governor was probably felt as a relief by the chief and subordinates of the Home Government. It was, however, otherwise regarded by the bulk of the inhabitants of Guernsey, who were still smarting under the operation of antiquated laws partially administered, and who were eager for reforms which demanded a resolute and powerful advocate. By these his resignation was felt as a public loss.

Among the many expressions of these sentiments received by General Napier at the time of his departure, the following letter from Mr. Le Cras, the editor of a Jersey newspaper, may be taken as a sample of the feelings which his labours had excited among intelligent and disinterested men.

"Jersey, Nov. 10, 1847.

"My inflexible devotion to the cause of law reform in Jersey during my long residence of nearly 30 years has exposed me to much persecution. I am not, however, vain enough to think that anything which I have done or could have done has had much influence on the destinies of the Norman Isles; because I am fully persuaded that we all

owe our redemption from the fangs of ignorance and despotism to your Excellency's great penetration, skilful tactics, and indomitable perseverance, which are without example in the history of our islands."

To sum up the results of General Napier's administration:—

He powerfully influenced the adoption by the States of the island of a new constitution, by which feuds between the country and town parties, which had lasted 80 years, impeding all improvements, were set at rest.

He devised a system of defence for the Channel Islands which was adopted by the Government, and has been partially executed.

He re-organised and re-armed the militia.

Finally, he procured the appointment of a Royal Commission of inquiry into the civil and criminal laws of the island, whose labours have done and are still doing much to remove the evils which so often excited his indignation.

And he left behind him a name, in no great favour certainly with the privileged classes, but which is still remembered with respect and affection by those whose good opinion he most desired to win—the poor and the oppressed.

CHAPTER XIX.

SIR CHARLES NAPIER IN SCINDE.

THE appearance of General Napier, when the author first made his acquaintance in 1842, was very striking. His countenance was certainly one of the most expressive ever seen,—terrible when angry,—but the depth of tenderness of which eye and mouth were capable was extraordinary:

"Lofty and sour to them that loved him not,
But to those men that sought him, sweet as summer."

This tenderness was, however, never so marked as when he was looking at, or talking with little children. At such times the expression which came over his face was wonderfully beautiful and touching. Towards these little creatures he had an eager way of stretching out his hands, as if to touch them, but with a hesitation arising from the evident dread of handling them too roughly. The same sort of feeling too he manifested in a minor degree towards small animals, little dogs, kittens and birds.

In height he was rather over six feet and still very erect, his shoulders were very broad and his chest remarkably deep; his limbs muscular, long, straight and slender. In short, a figure more graceful, and at the same time more commanding, it would be difficult to find; crowned as it was by a countenance in which great power and resolution were mingled with kindness and humour. His hair was even then quite white, but long, flowing and thick.

On horseback, in his general's uniform, he was the *beau ideal* of a military leader. In addressing bodies of men he used no action, but the expression of his features produced as much effect as his words; and he possessed in an eminent degree that gift which is the inseparable attribute of true enthusiasm,—of exciting it in those who heard him, and of carrying his audience along with him.

Like all men who get through much business, he was methodical in his habits, and exacted rigid punctuality in his household. As eight o'clock struck he might be seen in the morning entering the drawing-room, where he would write for an hour before breakfast. He would then pounce upon the newspapers with the greatest avidity: he took an interest in everything, and there was no public subject on which he did not think carefully, though rapidly, and form a decided opinion. The rapidity with which he would devour the contents of a newspaper was extraordinary, and the accuracy of his memory was proved by his remarks and by his repetition of all its most important contents. It was the same with a book. He read insatiably; looked to a new book as a child to a new pleasure, and when he got one, he would abstract himself on his sofa, very often until he had gone through it. Of course it is not pretended that he could read every word, but he would "tear out the heart of a book," and repeat to his hearers all the matter which they afterwards found on reading it to themselves to be the most important and interesting.

Twenty minutes being devoted to the morning newspaper he would then turn to his work, official writing and business, until luncheon; after which, when well enough, he either rode or drove to different parts of the island, and thereby made himself thoroughly acquainted by personal observation with all its features, principally in a military point of view. In these rides or drives some of

his family were always his companions, and his conversation on these occasions was sometimes full of anecdotes, both interesting and elevating; at others, he would give himself up to fun and jokes with all the zest of a boy. Indeed, throughout his long and painful life he never lost this peculiarity; even to the last he preserved a child-like freshness of heart, the sure sign of innocence and goodness.

On his return to the house he usually read again till dinner-time. At dinner, which when well he always enjoyed with a boyish appetite, his conversation was of the same nature as that above described. When the ladies quitted the dining-room, and he was left alone with a friend or guest, he would converse with him, if a civilian, on subjects of deep general interest,—if a military man, he delighted to discuss the operations of the great soldiers of ancient or modern times, and would enter into details of some prominent siege or battle, describing the movements, showing their object and effect, and never failing to enlighten the mind of his hearer as to correct military principles.

In the drawing-room he would then join in the general amusements or conversation; if children were present, they usually monopolized his attention; he joined heartily in their merry games, and his laughter was not less loud nor less joyous than their own.

But now a new interest and occupation arose, which was to end only with his life. His brother Charles had been appointed to a division of the Bombay army at the end of the preceding year; and Lord Ellenborough, detecting his genius, had sent him from thence to command the troops in Scinde. It was a critical time, and our supremacy in the East might well depend on the penetration, firmness and military ability of the officer selected for that employ-

ment; for the columns of Nott and Pollock had been committed in an advance into Afghanistan through dangerous passes, for the purpose of taking vengeance for the Cabul disaster, and of appeasing the manes of our countrymen who had perished so miserably and so uselessly in that deplorable tragedy.

From this time forth William Napier may truly be said to have lived a double life. It was as though he had said to his brother, "Henceforward your cares shall be my cares, your enemies my enemies, your quarrels my quarrels, your triumphs my triumphs." If there exists a mysterious influence by which two souls visibly divided can vibrate simultaneously to the same touch of external events, then such an influence, the magnetism of strong brotherly affection, caused the heart of William Napier to throb in sympathy with that of his heroic brother on the other side of the globe; and it may be said that the principal business of the remainder of his life was to vindicate the greatness of that brother and to establish his fame.

The letters which arrived from India by every mail towards the end of 1842 began now to be intensely interesting to him. Already, before he had entered on his new command, Sir Charles had passed through scenes of danger of an unusually appalling nature. As in the stories of the good knights of old who had undertaken the attack of some enchanted castle, sights and sounds of horror and of death started up in their path at every step to deter them from their enterprise; so in the path of Sir Charles Napier evil omens rose up thickly. Shipwreck and disease, cholera in its most awful form carrying off one-third of the crowded souls on board a small steamer, combined their horrors during his voyage from Bombay to Kurrachee. These dangers surmounted, a war-rocket which he was testing, and close to which he was standing, burst and tore

open the calf of his leg with a terrible wound two days after he landed. It may be imagined with what intense interest the letters detailing these events were read in the Government House in Guernsey, and how anxiously fresh tidings were looked for. Then came accounts of Sir Charles recovering with such marvellous rapidity from his wound, that four days afterwards he was journeying to Hydrabad;—of his interview with the Princes of Lower Scinde in their capital city, in which a few short months sufficed to place the small, spare, eagle-beaked and eagle-eyed Feringhee General, a conqueror;—of the turnings, doublings, and windings of the Ameers;—of the perplexities of Sir Charles, inexperienced as he was in Indian affairs, owing to the representations of political agents who believed in the sincerity of those princes and earnestly endeavoured to dissuade him from attacking them;—of his wonderful flank march into the heart of the desert;—of the capture and destruction of the desert fortress of Emaum Ghur, the stronghold of Northern Scinde;—finally, of the brilliant victory of Meeanee, where the English General with 2000 men, all told, of whom only 700 were Europeans, defeated 28,000 of the bravest and strongest warriors of Northern India.

It may be imagined with what mingled feelings of pride, exultation, and admiration, William Napier received the news of these achievements; justly appreciating, as he above all men could appreciate, the marvellous skill displayed by the general—that general his own brother, for whom he cherished romantic affection; and knowing at the same time as certainly as he could know any fact, both from his acquaintance with his brother's character and from his brother's own record of his feelings and motives, the perfect integrity and disinterestedness of his conduct throughout, and his intense anxiety to avoid the shedding of blood.

And as time passed on and Sir Charles Napier added a second victory scarcely less remarkable to the first, and by a series of brilliant and skilful operations completed for England the conquest of a new kingdom; when his brother found that the conqueror's deeds and motives were assailed by a party in Parliament, that they received no public recognition, that the successful general was even accused, shamefully and slanderously accused, of having forced on hostilities for the sake of prize money and personal glory;—is it surprising that the indignation, which he would have felt strongly in the case of any one thus unworthily treated, but which was intensified a hundredfold by the affection he bore the injured man, should have burst forth in no measured terms, as with an unanswerable force of facts and reasoning he confronted his brother's accusers?

"Oh, but he is too violent," was the objection of many, "and he thereby deprives the truth, which he has on his side, of a portion of its weight, and sometimes injures the cause he desires to serve." Well! we must take him as he was. He recked little of official conventionalities and etiquette, or of the injury which his neglect of these might bring on himself; he only knew and felt that his hero, who was wearing out his life in the service of a government which was so slow to acknowledge his great deeds, was being made the mark of factious calumny by men who, through him, desired to assail Lord Ellenborough and the Ministry; that this brother, who would go a mile out of his way to avoid crushing a worm, was held up to his countrymen as a bloodthirsty ferocious monster, careless of human life and human suffering, when he had his own selfish interests to serve. In such a cause as this William Napier would have confronted the whole world, regardless of any consequences; and under the influence of his strong and honest feelings, he spoke out strongly

and honestly. Too plainly no doubt they often spoke, both he and his brother, for their own material advantage; but this plain speaking which hindered their rise during their lives will establish their fame with posterity, the only fame really valued by either.

And no one can say, looking at what had been achieved by Sir Charles Napier, that his brother had not ample ground for indignation. Month after month passed away though Parliament was sitting, and finally the Session terminated, without any vote of thanks having been proposed for a series of brilliant operations, of which it may be now said advisedly and deliberately, that for political sagacity and military leadership the annals of British India can furnish no brighter record. Peerages had lately been sown broadcast for petty military and political services, unworthy even to be named with those of Sir C. Napier. To him and to his brave army alone an ungrateful country made no sign; and finally when, after the unprecedented lapse of a year, a vote of thanks was proposed in both Houses for the victories in Scinde; when the Duke of Wellington in one House, and Sir Robert Peel in the other, spoke in terms of warm admiration rarely heard in these assemblies, not only of his military skill, but of the political sagacity which they declared to have saved the army from destruction; when the calumnies of his enemies and his own integrity were made as clear as the sun at noonday, and only nine dissentients were found in both Houses to prop up with exaggerated *ex parte* statements the rotten cause of the deposed Ameers, and to discredit their conqueror;—after all this—all the laudation, enthusiasm, and cheering—what was the result? Sir Robert Peel in his speech had said that Sir Charles Napier had received the highest order of the Bath and a regiment, but "he did not at all mean to say that these were an adequate reward

for his great services." He forgot, however, to state that if Sir Charles Napier had remained in England, feeding sheep and growing turnips, the regiment must have been his according to the rules of seniority,—and for the rest, he was already a K.C.B.; and in the additional step he only received an honour in common with many respectable mediocrities who wore a diplomatic uniform, and whose services had been limited to bending their spines at some Grand Ducal Court. Yet from that time to the day of his death, this one step in the order of the Bath was the only public mark of approbation which Her Majesty was advised to bestow on her great and fortunate soldier.

Was this neglect creditable to Sir Robert Peel's ministry? Was it honest? Every member of that administration acknowledged the transcendent merits of the military and political operations in Scinde; in private letters, Sir Robert Peel spoke in terms of the warmest admiration both of the military and administrative ability of Sir Charles Napier,—not once but often. What then was the cause of this neglect? It was said that a general impression of the original injustice of our dealings with the Ameers kept the ministry from adequately rewarding the services which resulted in the final spoliation of their territory. But in this argument there is neither reason nor justice. To follow it out to its logical conclusion, England ought to have restored the conquered territory; no considerations of expediency should have induced her to retain it, and so to profit by great actions, which she was too prudish to reward on the score of public morality. And even setting this aside, and admitting the propriety of profiting by an injustice, the military operations were conducted in obedience to the orders of the Government itself. In the exercise of the wide discretionary power left to him by those orders, Sir Charles Napier, as was uni-

versally admitted, saved the army from a second Cabul massacre, and England from a second war to avenge it which would have been far more dangerous than the first; inasmuch as the victorious Beloochees would have combined with the vengeful Afghans and eager Sikhs—those Sikhs who were only then biding their time, and who afterwards singly shook our Indian supremacy till it oscillated and tottered on the fields of Ferozeshur and Chillianwallah, and only settled down again on its base in the battle-ground of Goojerat.

We now allow General Napier's letters to tell their own story.

To J. A. Roebuck, Esq., M.P.

"Feb. 14, 1843.

"You have, from merely reading Burnes' letters, come to exactly the same conclusion as to his character that I did from talking with him; he was a wild-headed chap, full of courage and energy in action, but self-sufficient to such a degree that he would almost quarrel with you or your looks, anticipating dissent from his opinions before he had wholly explained them to you. I remember he fell upon me for daring to doubt the genius of Alexander the Great, not that I had expressed any doubt of the same, but he thought I would, and attacked me beforehand; and it was only by the most strenuous protestation of my entire and profound admiration of the ability of the said Macedonian that I could appease him.

"With respect to Afghanistan, I will tell you what I said over and over again in Miss Williams's shop* when the war was beginning.

"The injustice of it is glaring; the impolicy as much so. Instead of giving you a position beyond the Indus, it will give you a war beyond the Indus; that is, in the

* A bookshop in Bath famous for political discussions.

heart of Asia,—a war in a country two thousand miles from any seaport, England's strength being in her fleets; you with an army eminently regular will have an irregular warfare in that part of the world which has been in all ages eminently irregular in its warfare; and you do this to provoke Russia, which is of all regular governments the one commanding or influencing the greatest number and the best of irregular warriors. And while you do this folly in Afghanistan, you neglect the Circassians, the bravest of men, who are actually doing that which you anticipated being able to do by your invasions of the Afghans, namely, checking the power of Russia. So much for the general view, and for the details the same folly prevailed. The Khyber Pass or the Ismail Derah road were the shortest lines, and we invaded the country by the Bolan; that is, we marched 1500 miles skirting the Punjaub both ways, where a powerful army was ready, if Runjeet Sing thought fit, to cut off all communication with India. The true principles of war required that we should have made Runjeet Sing our fast friend, and his country our base of operations, giving up our communication with India to his keeping;—or we should have first crushed him and the Ameers of Scinde; if he refused to let us into his country he was not a fast friend, and there was a ground of quarrel; but we had both his interests and his fears at our command to insure his alliance by the promise of future advantages on the side of Afghanistan, some money, and the dangers of a war with us. An army of reserve collected near Lahore would, in conjunction with promises, have secured our communications through his dominions. However, we penetrated to Cabul, and having taken possession of this country we proceeded, through the medium of our political military agents, to oppress and insult the tribes. I believe Lieutenant ——

and Mr. ——'s tyranny and cruelty have been quite insupportable. Sir William McNaughten had all the power, and thought himself possessed of all the talents of a great conqueror. There was a General Roberts who commanded the Soojah's force; he knew his business, he remonstrated against the false security of the Political agents; he objected to sending out small detachments in a hundred directions; and he desired to have fortified posts established; he was at first laughed at, then insulted, and finally Sir William McNaughten carried his annoyance to such a pitch as to refuse to have any communication with Roberts, an English officer, except through his interpreter. The understrappers followed up the tone of their leader, and many small detachments were actually sent out by them for the sole purpose of vexing Roberts. The latter, tired and indignant at this insolence, wrote one or two despatches to Lord Auckland pointing out these mischievous proceedings, and, declaring that some great disaster would occur, demanded leave to return to India. He obtained it and left Cabul two months before the catastrophe, thus saving his honour and his life. Move for his correspondence by all means. I think you will get all you want; the Government of course will be glad to let the cat out of the bag if you will hunt her for them.

"After Roberts's departure, the whole proceedings indicate folly, ignorance, and ferocity. Lord Ellenborough has done well, and Pollock seems to be an able officer. I am told a thousand Hindoo traders, who had come into Cabul on the faith of Pollock's promises of protection, were mercilessly slaughtered at the destruction of the Bazaar. I have seen a letter from Colonel Taylor, of the 9th Regiment, in which he rejoices that he was able to save his British regiment from the disgrace of being accessory to this butchery that took place.

"Lord Ellenborough appears to me to have done great things in getting the army out of Afghanistan at all, and I believe he desires to govern well. But is the war over? I doubt it. The Mahometan sepoys are not very true; the Afghans are brave, and driven to despair; the Sikhs don't like us; and the Scinde people hate us. The Beloochees hate us also. My brother Charles has a difficult game to play; not that he fears the enemy, but he sees great animosity; the favourable occasion may come, and our Indian army, I mean the Company's troops, are commanded by youths ignorant of war. The real power is in the hands of the native officers, resolute men, and for the most part Mahometans!

"I am, I fear, a cripple for life; my limbs don't recover their elasticity, and I cannot walk a mile without difficulty; as to pain, I am never free an instant from it. I hope you can read what I have written, but my hand is very weak and painful, it is difficult for me to write at all, and if I should lose the use of it, I shall give in like a cur, I think, and lie down to die, for I am tired of reading and I have no other resource."

The following letters are the more valuable as having been written before any outcry was raised against his brother in England.

To J. A. Roebuck, Esq., M.P.

"Guernsey, March, 1843.

"My brother Charles writes me word that he has taken possession of part of Scinde, which is now called the ceded territory, but which he calls the *seized* territory. The Indian papers have found out that he is a miserable fool, and knows nothing about the Indian policy—meaning the Indian Princes' mode of negociating—and that Major Outram did more for him in two hours than he did for

himself in two months with 7000 men! His story to me is somewhat different; he says, what old Indians call knowing the people means idleness, state, and folly wrung out in long despatches. Outram was only two hours in his camp when Charles carried him off with him on an expedition to the desert. I shall tell Emily to show you an account of it; I think it *Alexandrine*. His object is if possible to prevent a war, but that seems scarcely to be. He says Lord Ellenborough has done no injustice; but Lord Auckland he seems to think, though he does not say so, did; and from his injustice the necessity of the present case arises. Depend upon it Lord Ellenborough is active and clever, and the newspapers are wrong; but lying is the order of the day. The Duke, I see, confirms my notion of the folly of the unsafe long line of communication in the Afghan war."

To the same.

"April, 1843.

"I see you are interested about Charles's campaign. Don't fall into the error of believing that he managed the political part, of which he had the complete direction under the Governor-General, either weakly or unjustly. I will tell you the true story.

"Charles was ordered from Poonah to Scinde suddenly. He embarked in the 'Zenobia' at Bombay with about ten officers and 250 men, with their wives and children: the cholera broke out, and in four days about 150 soldiers, besides sailors, women and children, were dead! The engineer of the vessel died; the living could scarcely throw the dead overboard, for nearly all were sick; the vessel could not be cleaned; the stench, the cries, the horror, the lamentations of the women when in the night they threw the dead overboard, formed an appalling scene. Six of the officers died; the crew got mad and took to

drinking; even the mates were drunk. The Captain alone (Newman), one of those surprising men who are hidden in the obscurity of a low situation, worked the vessel. A storm came on at the mouth of the Indus, and the ship drove right upon Nearchus' rock, but Newman worked her off, and finally all the survivors were landed, but fifty died the next day. Charles immediately inspected the troops at Kurrachee, and attended rocket practice. The first rocket flew well; the second returned and cut the calf of his leg through to the bone, a jagged wound. Two surgeons were on the ground; they lifted him up and put him to bed in a bungalow, as they said, for three months and lameness for life. In three days it had healed by the first intention, and in a week he was on horseback, and with 100 irregular troopers as an escort, rode to Upper Scinde through the Beloochee territory at the moment when General England was retiring from Quettah and the population ready to rise in arms. However, he reached Sukkur safely, and soon afterwards had an interview with the Ameers. Now commenced his diplomacy.

"He found the politicals had been playing a ridiculous game which they and old Indians call *knowing the people*, viz., allowing the Ameers to infringe their treaty; a treaty, observe, forced upon them by Lord Auckland when Keane's army was about Hydrabad;—to infringe this treaty, I say, in the most open manner, until they could no longer remain quiet;—then a blustering interference and pull of the curb—from the Ameers pardon, submission, promises. Renewed indolence on the part of the politicals; renewed infringement; then the curb again, and so on. This he told the Ameers he would not suffer: they disbelieved him and went on, but he pulled them up at once before Lord Ellenborough. Now he says, 'I say nothing of the justice of Lord Auckland's treaty; my business was to see

it maintained;' and as letters were intercepted from the Ameers to the neighbouring powers proposing a combination to drive the British out of Scinde, Charles sent the draft of a new treaty to Lord Ellenborough. The latter adopted the idea, but altered the terms, and his orders were to enforce the new treaty. The Ameers accepted it without a murmur, but secretly raised troops. These Charles was ordered to disperse, and under the new treaty to occupy a certain ceded district on the left bank of the Indus, running up between the river and the desert from Roree towards Bhawulpore. Now Charles judged that to disperse the troops was to hunt a 'will-o'-the-wisp,' because his men were sickly: 200 out of 300 strong Irishmen of the 22nd Regiment down at once, and the other 100 convalescent; himself almost the only man of his army who had not had the fever! And the 'will-o'-the-wisp' had the river on the one side and the desert on the other to cross and run to the mountains, and this in the hot season. Thus he acted:—

"He fortified his camp at Sukkur, seized Bukkur on an island in the river, and Roree on the left bank. Then sending his moveable columns into the ceded district, he covered them with his position on the left bank.

"In this position he wrote to me as follows:—'You see I have seized what our treaty gives us, and I have covered it with my position. The Ameers threaten to attack me from Larkaana. Let them; it will be at their peril, for I can put them all into the Indus. In two hours I could bring on a war, and I believe I am the only man in the army who does not wish for one. If they attack me I can't help it, but I will shed no blood voluntarily, and all my efforts shall be to prevent the necessity of shedding blood. I will wait events in this position, but though they are barbarians I shall act as cautiously as if they were all French.'

"While in this state he contrived to draw off the most powerful of the Ameer brothers and bring him into his camp; but at the same time a young Ameer went off from Hydrabad to the desert with 2000 men, and fixed himself at Emaum Ghur, a celebrated fort, which no European had ever reached, and which the Ameers believed no European could reach. There he raised the standard of war, and Charles now judged that the best way to preserve peace was to dash after him to the desert and thus convince the other Ameers that no security for them was to be found there. Had he wished for war, he would have fallen on their troops at Dingee, where they all now collected in mass.

"On the 5th January Charles marched into the desert, taking with him the Ameer who had come over, as a guide. The first day's march was 22 miles; water was found, but not enough; and Charles sent back all but 200 irregular horse, 300 British infantry, and two 24-pound howitzers. With these and 88 camels he continued his march for two days more, at the rate of ten or twelve miles each day: forage then failed, and he sent back his horsemen, but persevered with his guns and the British infantry, 300; the enemy being 2000, and in a fort. The camels dragged the howitzers over the flat surface, the men dragged them up the hills of sand with a vigour and resolution worthy of Alexander's Agrians; the General working and feeding with them, share and share alike. The country is curious; the sand in ridges, like the seashore after certain tides; but instead of being inches high the ridges are from 50 to 100 feet high. Thus toiling they marched for four days more, and on the seventh from the time of starting reached the fort. The Ameer fled and the fort was destroyed. Charles wrote to me from its ruins, thus:—'I marched to give them a lesson upon their desert.

I destroy the fort because it can only serve to give the Ameers a post in the desert to oppress their miserable subjects, or to form a base to act against us. To-morrow I march either towards Dingee or Hydrabad, but my marches must be guided by where water is to be found, and that is uncertain. However, I think this blow will secure the quiet submission of the Ameers.'

"Having returned to the Indus, he took up a position between Sehwan and Hydrabad, and sent Major Outram to negotiate. I will not say anything against him till I know the facts and his instructions, but knowing as I do Charles's anxious desire for peace, it does seem strange that Major Outram should remain in the Ameers' capital against their orders and when they had an army there: he must, I think, have known that such an affront would produce an attack, and that an attack on an envoy must produce war.

"This happened, and Charles, though he had 5000 men at Sukkur and in the ceded district behind him, decided at once to march and attack the Ameers, who had 28,000 men, with his 2000, only 400 of whom could have been Europeans. He resolved on this daring step, because he felt that the whole country would rise if he retreated, and every man is armed. He marched, and though the enemy were more than ten to one and skilfully posted, he beat them after three hours' hard fighting with a loss of 256 men and 22 officers to himself, and of 5000 to them. Thus every man in his army must have brought down two enemies in fair fight. Soult had nearly 40,000 French veterans at Toulouse, he had fortifications and 100 pieces of artillery, and he only knocked over, in seven hours, 4600 of the Allies. Lord Clive, at the age of thirty-two, wavered and called a council of war, which resolved not to fight; he acquiesced, and it was not until twenty-four

hours afterwards that he broke out the hero he was;—a treacherous man to Omichund and sordid in some things, but a hero in fight.

"Charles Napier, at sixty-two, with eight deep wounds in his body and the weight of forty-nine years' service on his head (for he joined at thirteen years old), service in every climate, never wavered a moment, and won as great a victory from a far braver enemy. I have seen a letter from an officer in the 22nd Queen's Regiment, in which he says,—'The fighting in the Fulaillee was for three quarters of an hour hand to hand; the enemy repeatedly rushed amongst us and tried to wrench the muskets from our men: one fellow was stabbed in the pit of the stomach; he caught the musket with his left hand and writhed himself on the bayonet until he reached his assailant and cut him over the head with his sword!'

"The day after the battle of Plassey, Meer Jaffier, the traitor, came into Clive's camp with 10,000 horsemen, who had taken no part in the battle:—the day after the battle at Hydrabad, six sovereign princes came into Charles' camp and surrendered at discretion, rather than stand the storm he had threatened them with.

"Thus army and fortress went to the ground, and a kingdom is awaiting the decision of Lord Ellenborough, with a treasure large enough to pay Lord Keane's bill."

Sir Henry Hardinge to Major-General W. Napier.

"London, April 11, 1843.

"I have this morning read Sir George Arthur's communication, sending a copy of your brother's despatch to the Governor-General, detailing his brilliant and heroic achievement in the neighbourhood of Hydrabad.

"I congratulate you very cordially on this additional honour to your name, and which terminates the fighting

on our Indian frontier by a victory which will take its place in our Indian records by the side of Plassey and Assaye.

"I trust we shall shortly have the whole of these details, so honourable to your brother Charles.

"With regard to the political part of the business I see by the press that the Governor-General's policy will not be approved. Without entering into this part of the transaction, I merely write to add my mite to the many letters you must have received, rejoicing in Charles' splendid success.

"The march on camels into the desert to attack the stronghold of the Ameers shows that he has all the fire and energy of his first Peninsular campaign."

Did no prescience of his own coming glory whisper to the noble soldier who thus heartily expressed his sympathy in William Napier's joy, that a time was at hand—a time of danger and despondency on the banks of the Sutlej, when,—after a doubtful battle, the dead and wounded lying around him, the enemy's guns playing on his bivouac,—he was to commune with his own heart, and seek help and strength from the God of his nation through the long gloom of a terrible night—when he should strain his eyes anxiously, yet fearfully, for the dawn of that day which held within its closed hand two lots—one the destruction, the other the triumph, of England's power in Hindostan; when the angel of battles held in mid-air over the sleeping hosts the scales weighted with the destinies of the native of the soil, and of the hitherto all-conquering stranger; and weighted to all appearance so evenly that they trembled in the balance?

The following letter is from his old friend and comrade in many a hard-fought battle, Lord Fitzroy Somerset,

afterwards Lord Raglan. Neither time nor political differences had abated one jot from the friendship formed in youth, and in scenes of common danger and glory.

Lord Fitzroy Somerset to Major-General W. Napier.

"London, April 13, 1843.

"It had crossed my mind to write to you before I received your note, but not having heard from your brother, I refrained from doing so. Yesterday's mail however brought me a charming letter from him, dated Hydrabad, February 20th. He details his reasons for fighting in a very satisfactory manner, and altogether shows that he was fully equal to the difficulties of his position. Your brother Richard has seen it, and if I did not dislike parting with it just at present I would send it to you.

"Charles has done his work nobly, and this everybody feels, and I congratulate you from my heart on his well-deserved success. I have seen no account of his operations across the desert, the details of which must be very interesting.

"The whole press of India is occupied in the abuse of Lord Ellenborough because he would not allow the public officers to consider the press their first masters, and your brother comes in for a share of the slander in consequence of the Governor-General having given him his full confidence, and placed both the political and military authority in his hands; but this don't signify one pin.

"Rely upon it justice will be done to Sir Charles in all quarters. He says nothing about his health, which I trust therefore has not suffered."

The next letter is from another tried friend in war and peace.

Sir George Brown, Adjutant-General, to Major-General William Napier.

"Horse Guards, April 10, 1843.

"I consider the promptitude and decision shown by your brother Charles, in his late very brilliant exploit, so characteristic of *the family*, and so highly creditable to him, that I cannot refrain from congratulating you upon it.

"Many men placed in his situation and acting against such a superior force, might without reproach have declined attacking, and probably would, on the plea of waiting for reinforcements, have procrastinated until surrounded by overwhelming numbers. But Charles never seems to have hesitated a moment from the time he was informed of the attack upon the Residency, until he had beaten his enemy from the field and finished the war.

"The letters from India assert that his success is to be attributed to his own conduct and example, and it is said the day at Meeanee would have been lost but for his personal exertions in rallying some of the native troops which were in danger of being broken and borne away by the masses of brave savages opposed to them.

"There is, I am glad to inform you, but one opinion here in regard to the merits of this action, and that is, that we have had nothing nearly so brilliant since the Duke's days in the East."

J. A. Roebuck, Esq., to Major-General W. Napier.

"London, April 25, 1843.

"As to our proceeding in Scinde, there is, I find, a very general feeling of regret, because of the supposed service rendered to our army retreating from Candahar, by the Ameers. There is, however, but one opinion as to the marvellous gallantry and bold sagacity of your brother Charles. The vulgar wonder; but all thinking men

appear to me to understand the wisdom as well as the extraordinary boldness of your brother's movements. Doubtless we shall have talk enough about it by-and-bye. The Whigs are already beginning to open out upon Lord Ellenborough's war, and sharp criticisms will be hazarded thereon. The original treaty may keep the more wary of the party silent, but there are partisans enough to make a row. I shall take an opportunity of moving for all the papers, &c., that have passed during the various negotiations with the Ameers. This will explain the position of Lord Ellenborough and your brother when they came into power and command."

Sir Henry Hardinge to Major-General W. Napier.

"House of Commons, May 9, 1843.

"I have heard a report that a second battle was fought near Meerpoor, not far from Hydrabad, on the 24th March, and that our troops were defeated, and your distinguished brother killed.

"I don't believe a word of the disastrous part of the report. On the contrary, I believe that a battalion with some guns and cavalry having marched from Sukkur towards Hydrabad, he moved out, leaving 1000 men with his baggage and hospital, in order to protect the march of this force, threatened as it was by a large body of Beloochees;—that on the 24th he again attacked, and was again victorious.

"Sir G. Arthur, in a letter of 1st April, says he had a letter from Charles Napier, dated the 18th, in which he states his intention of moving to attack Meer Shere Mahommed of Meerpoor on the 24th. This account you will observe tallies with the report.

"You may be at ease, for I cannot trace the source of the report to any quarter entitled to credit. Sir G.

Arthur's official despatch is to the effect I have stated; but having heard this report last night I have spared no pains to endeavour to trace it, and I am quite convinced our gallant friend is alive, having reaped additional honours and further claims to public gratitude and applause."

Major-General W. Napier to Lady Campbell.

"May 17, 1843.

"Your letter just come, but I cannot answer it as I wish; I am ill, very ill, and desponding about Charles. The report of his death has too much probability. He writes to me on the 17th March, '30,000 Beloochees are within twelve miles of me, and I must fight them;' and I know from Sir G. Arthur, date 1st April, that on the 24th March he did fight another great battle, and won it; the rumour said three days' fighting, which discredited it as a hyperbole; but I know that a detachment was coming to join him from Sukkur, and was attacked on the march, and he went to its succour; thus the three days' fighting are made out. His letter to me is his story to protect his memory from defamation, and already that defamation is in full cry in almost all the papers. If one presentiment has proved true the other may. I am desponding, but I am ill.

"I agree with you about Macaulay, but not in your choice of his 'Lays.' The 'Virginius' is a speech in verse, and a very powerful one; the most poetic part of his book is the description of the two horses at the Lake Regillus. In all else you are right to the inward core of your heart, which never was wrong yet outside or inside. God bless you, dearest Pamela; I am very miserable."

To J. A. Roebuck, Esq.

"Guernsey, May 18, 1843.

"I have been, and I am very ill, and most desponding about the rumour of my brother's death. The three days'

fighting, which seemed to throw discredit on it, gives me more fear than anything else, because he expected a detachment from Sukkur, which was attacked. This would account for the three days, for he certainly went out to relieve it.

"I have a letter from him dated 18th March. It contains a long statement of all his movements, his motives, and his battle, and he sends it to me that *I may* defend his memory from the slanderers who are attacking him in the press. He wants me to publish it at once, but I have sent it to the Duke, being resolved to ascertain what he has the heart to do before I take the matter in hand myself.

"Charles tells me he has a *broken hand*, but whether broken in battle or before he does not say. He complains bitterly of the inexperience of his officers. Their zeal and courage are extraordinary, but these lead them to come to him for information upon every point of their duty, and what with the pain of his hand, the heat, and the real difficulties of his situation, he is scarcely able to bear up. He says, 'The Ameer of Meerpoor is with 30,000 Beloochees within 12 miles of me, and I must fight him or lose all my posts and communications. If I win, the country will probably be quieted; if I lose, I have Hydrabad which I have entrenched to fall back upon.'

"His generalship was greater in the battle (Meeanee) than he has stated in the despatch. On the left of the enemy there was, as you know, a wood; it was filled with men, and surrounded by a wall 10 feet high. In this wall they had broken an opening to sally out from and take his army in flank as it advanced. He reconnoitred the wall himself under a heavy cannonade, and saw that it was not loopholed; he even approached the breach in it so close as to discover that the enemy had raised no banquette to

fire over the top from. In an instant he took his measures, and thrust an European company into the breach with orders to let nothing come out. He thus cut off from the battle, and paralysed, 5000 of the enemy's army during the action, for he made his own advance at the same time against the front or rather centre of their position.

"Why did Lord Clanricarde put off his motion? I feel very uneasy about the matter. They fired the park guns for China and Cabul, but not for his victory. No thanks of Parliament have yet been voted. The 'Times' and 'Morning Post' attack the campaign, and the ministers are silent. I have heard they mean to make him a baronet. He of course will do as he pleases; were it offered to me in his place I would return it with a request that it might be given to Mr. Colburn to bestow on his favourite novel writer.

"Charles tells me Outram has fallen into the common error of supposing that injustice has been done to the Ameers, and talks of them as the people of Scinde. Now, this is Charles's description of the two people.

"About 60 years ago the Talpoor family conquered Scinde, and ever since that period oppression and blood-shed have been the practice of the conquerors. The Scindian is a fine, industrious, good fellow. The Beloochee is a fine-looking fellow, but a robber; he stalks about with sword and shield, a brigand, and nothing more. He never works, but robs the Scindian for his own, or his master's profit, and heads go off for the slightest delay. The Ameers are turning the whole country into a wilderness for nothing, and the Scindian race is actually being extirpated by these robbers. The hunting grounds so much talked of is a district which the treaty forced them to give up to the Bhawulpore Rajah (*not to us*), they

having taken it from him by force not long ago; it is therefore only an act of restitution.

"The defence of the Residency was owing entirely to my brother's prudence, for, being suspicious of the Ameers' faith, he sent the European company to protect the envoy after he had begun his negotiations, and they only arrived just in time. If you meet Outram give me your opinion of him; he is, I hear, brave and adventurous to insanity, spearing tigers single handed, &c."

To the same.

"May, 1843.

"I did not know you were Queen's Counsel, but I rejoice at it. Of course you have sold yourself; everybody but the Whigs sell themselves; they, poor people, give themselves away for the good of the country, and much good they do it—Afghan war to wit.

"I have just seen a letter from Charles, written to my sister before the action, and a postscript after it. Before it he says, 'If the Ameers will fight, let them. I know I am so strong in discipline I must crush them. If I fail, it is because I have not head enough for the matter, and my career will be over. A young general may recover a failure, an old one cannot, and the Government would be wrong to give me an opportunity.' After the action he says, 'I have ridden over the field, and beholding the hideous carnage I asked myself, Am I guilty of this slaughter? My conscience answers, No! I did everything I could to avoid it.'

"What you tell me of the Education Bill is just what I expected. It is part of the revolution; yet I hope the Church may beat the Dissenters on this occasion. I have written twenty letters this day, and been engaged in military affairs also; excuse me for being so brief, I am tired."

Lord Fitzroy Somerset to General W. Napier.

"London, May 5, 1843.

"I return the letters you sent me from your brother, and one copy of the article from the 'Sun;' the other I will send him. His letters are, indeed, most interesting, and afford ample evidence of his being equal to every difficulty he had to encounter. His answer to the Ameers is highly characteristic. I must beg your young ladies' pardon, but I don't think their uncle ugly as represented in the 'Illustrated News.' The author of that portrait—it is too good to be called a caricature—has given Sir Charles the most piercing eyes and a most expressive countenance; and I make no doubt the Ameers when they saw him felt they could not play fast and loose with such a man.

"I suppose we shall have the mail to-morrow; the telegraphic despatch arrived yesterday, and by that it appears that Lord Ellenborough has annexed Scinde to the British possessions in India, and appointed Sir Charles governor of the province. The press is again at work in abuse of Lord Ellenborough, notwithstanding that it cannot be in possession of any accurate information on the subject of Scinde, and so far as I have seen, none of the principal newspapers have inserted in their columns the able article that appeared in the 'Sun' from your notes."

To Lady Campbell.

"June 9, 1843.

"I can now answer your letter with freedom. The second victory won by Charles has fallen like the morning dew upon my feelings which were clothed in gloom and fear before. You, dear Pamela, touched upon all the fine points of his despatch with the sure and nice tact of a woman who has the springs of greatness in herself as well

as the impulses that belong to her sex. Is he not a great man? Good and great! What energy at sixty-two, and with eight deep wounds, to make that march in the desert by which he baffled the plan of campaign formed by the Ameers, and gave them another chance of submitting without a fight! Do you know the particulars? No! very few do know them. . . . . And now, dear Pamela, a second victory against nearly as great odds! and his noble and wise instructions to the politicals under him. 'The conquest of a country is convulsion enough to a people without adding to their disturbance by interfering with their social habits and customs. Do not make any but absolutely unavoidable changes.' . . . . . The old Greek said that a herd of deer headed by a lion were more dangerous than a herd of lions led by a deer. The sepoys are not deer, but the Beloochees are lions, and the Ameers deer. Only Shere Mohamed of his whole race had courage to appear in the battles. Terrible lions, however, are the Beloochees; heads and limbs go clean off at the stroke of their swords; they ask for no quarter, and they give none; and even in defeat, after the first battle, went off so closely together and so savagely that Charles feared to provoke a second battle by following them with his small exhausted force. But when he had 5000 men in the second battle, observe his energy. The battle was over about one o'clock. The wounded were gathered in and taken care of, the ammunition replenished by the next day, and on the second day he writes his despatch with his infantry 20 miles and his cavalry 40 from the field of battle.

"Would you believe that a regiment and a grand cross was all they intended to give him for the first battle? What they will do now remains to be seen.

"Lord Exmouth was made a Lord for beating the

Algerines with a fleet of 20 sail-of-the-line, *i.e.* four hours' cannonade! Lord —— was made a Lord for ——; Lord ——! need I go on? Lord —— and his wife were both made Lords for ——. Charles Napier, for a battle like Poictiers which has given us a kingdom as large as England and Scotland, and as fertile as Egypt, has not yet been even mentioned with praise by the Government!"

The controversy which arose between General Napier and Major Outram is so well known that it would appear like a tacit admission that the General was wrong if no mention was made of it in his Life. It is not by any means the desire of the biographer to revive contention over their honoured graves; and the allusion that is made to it here is for the purpose of showing that General Napier was long in doubt before he would allow himself to be so convinced of the reality of his ground of complaint, as to take the decided part he afterwards adopted. Major Outram made no secret at any time, either in Scinde with Sir Charles Napier, or afterwards in England, that he did not approve the policy which Sir Charles had pursued towards the Ameers. This did not prevent him from being on terms of warm friendship with Sir Charles Napier, and after his arrival in England he frequently gave expression to his feelings of regard and admiration for the General, at the same time that he announced his dissent from his political course. The alleged ground of complaint against him was, that in his communications with the India Board authorities, he had secretly accused Sir Charles Napier of withholding his (Major Outram's) despatches from the Governor-General for the purpose of misleading that nobleman, at the time when he was publicly professing his admiration for Sir Charles' character.

The following letters refer to this point:—

From Lord Fitzroy Somerset.

"Horse Guards, June 2, 1843.

"I have just received your note of yesterday, and have had an opportunity of showing it to the Duke of Wellington, who desires me to assure you that he is quite certain that Major Outram does not hold the language imputed to him by your correspondent.

"Your brother Charles is about to be appointed colonel of the 97th Regiment."

From General Napier.

"MY DEAR ——, "Guernsey, June 8, 1843.

"I send you my brother Henry's account of a dinner where he met Outram. I fear he has been belied; the affair is very strange, and I will certainly prove it if possible. How infamously cruel it will be if —— has done him wrong in this matter! and yet what motive could —— have for doing so? I feel that I owe Outram a shot through the head, or great reparation, for the feelings I have entertained towards him since the information reached me about —— and him, and I am quite ready for either.

"I trust you will be able to make out the matter, and be able to bring it home to one or the other, or at least get such a clue as will enable me to tax one or the other with it; unless, what is possible, somebody has made a mistake from Outram's avowed difference as to Scinde politics. This, however, is scarcely possible; ——'s expressions are too clear and too direct as to the part which Outram has played, to be a mere blunder as to the political difference which does exist between them."

From the same.

MY DEAR ——, "Guernsey, June, 1843.

"I am in high spirits, as you may suppose, at the good news* just received. What a strange fabrication

* The battle of Hydrabad.

about the battle! it must have been concocted with care, for it exactly tallies with my brother's preparations and expectations and intentions, such as he wrote them to me on the 18th March, six days before the date fabricated. He told me then that his reinforcements were five days off, but that as soon as they came up he would fight again. I do not understand it any more than I understand Outram's affair. I wrote to Lord Fitzroy on getting your letter, and told him what I had heard. He, as I expected, told the Duke, who sends me word he is convinced Outram *does not* hold the language attributed to him!

"Did —— (whose authority I have not quoted to the Duke) hear Outram himself speak in that way? It is very strange; but if Outram was playing a double game, he would be shy of the Duke as fearing his sagacity and openness. Yet I cannot perceive what advantage he proposes to draw from the false accusation against Charles. He must know it will be contradicted and exposed. It is altogether very strange, and I fear some secret cabal is at work to deprive my brother of the honours he has so honestly won. However I am prepared to meet them in every way."

From the same.

"MY DEAR ——, "Guernsey, June 10, 1843.

"I am convinced that Outram has been calumniated. The enclosed letter will, I think, added to the Duke's assurance and the former letter from my brother Henry, go far to convince you also of this. But, then, why has he been calumniated? It is a very mysterious affair, but we shall be able, I think, to get at the bottom of it."

The following note, written by Major Outram to Mr. Richard Napier to allay the anxiety of the family as to the falsely reported death of Sir Charles Napier, and

enclosed in the foregoing letter, shows the terms in which he was accustomed to speak of his late chief: —

Major Outram to Richard Napier, Esq,

"DEAR SIR, "London, May, 1843.

"I only received your note late last night on my return home, and regret much that you should have been so long in suspense regarding your noble brother, who is, I confidently trust and believe, in good health and doubtless victorious.

"The only information we received in Bombay up to our departure on the night of the 1st April, was that brought by a native cossid to Kurrachee, alluded to in the 'Times.' The addition of his death originated God knows where, but certainly not from the only source it could have arisen from had it been true; for I saw the despatches from the authorities at Kurrachee containing all the information they had received, and with the exception of the cossid alluded to, whose information they reported, no other communication had been obtained.

"However Sir Charles and I differ on Indian politics, he is, I consider, the dearest personal friend I have, and I should mourn his loss almost as much as any members of his family; but I have no fears on the score of the report you allude to, although I certainly fear that the worry and exposure he will be subjected to, in the conduct of his most arduous task in such a climate as Scinde, must sorely try his health."

From General Napier.

"MY DEAR ——, "Guernsey, June 18, 1843.

"With respect to Outram, I am still all doubt. I see all that might be said as to his motives:—but then, his

whole life and reputation, and the continual deceit towards Henry! It is too monstrous to be believed without the most distinct proof.

"Believe me, I care not for his enmity, if he has it, to Charles, nor for his difference of opinion as to political matters in Scinde: this difference he makes no secret of whatever. The only point is the positive accusation, which must never be lost sight of, that Charles withheld his despatches to mislead the Governor-General, and did so mislead him. This is a distinct direct charge of the worst nature. I have written to Charles for authentic disproof of it."

From the same.

"MY DEAR ——, "Guernsey, Aug. 18, 1843.

"I am greatly disquieted by this turn of affairs. The information about Outram conveyed to me by you from ——, makes it impossible for me to rest quiet until next session of Parliament. Expecting day after day a discussion in the House that would bring the truth out, I have forborne to take any step upon the subject; but I must now ask your permission to write to ——. I mean to call upon him as a man of honour to let me use his authority: for if the accusation of Outram was made in confidence, —— should never have let me know of it; if made without concealment, there can be no reason for shrinking from giving his authority for the fact. If he declines answering my appeal, I must go to Outram and tell him I have heard the assertion but cannot give my authority; wherefore if he chooses to deny it, I will take his authority for fixing the calumny upon ——. This I have a right to do, for —— has given me hard and revengeful thoughts towards Outram, who had been recommended to my esteem and good-will by my brother Charles as his friend."

This painful controversy, which thus arose between the two brothers, Charles and William, and a man who has gained the respect and admiration of thousands, and who possessed in a very remarkable degree the quality of conciliating the warm affection of those about him, is here dismissed.

In this world of imperfect faculties, at the best we see through a glass darkly. Who shall say confidently that the judgment he forms of his neighbour is correct? Who is there that knows his own heart, much less another's? How many noble natures are doomed to grieve on account of misconceptions of their motives or actions, which are never to be removed in this state of being! In that other to which we are hastening, the mists of passion, of prejudice, of imperfect knowledge, will all be dispersed, and alienations which have arisen between natures formed mutually to honour and love each other will be removed. Let us hope that this which has been here referred to, may be one of them.

To his Son.

"Guernsey, June 27, 1843.

"I have not heard from you nor written to you since your uncle gained his second glorious victory. He is a great general, a man of great thought and great daring; he reasons well beforehand, makes fine arrangements and clever combinations to obtain his object, and he has the courage of a lion and the perseverance and endurance of a wolf-dog to fight and pursue his enemies. You may have read in some of the papers that the war was unjust. Do not believe this. It is said by bad people who were robbing the Treasury in India and abusing the army. Lord Ellenborough would not let them do so any longer; he drove them from their *prey;* they were feeding on the

public wrongfully, he would not let them do so. He praised the army because it was good, and encouraged it; and now, because your uncle has by his victories proved that Lord Ellenborough was right, the dishonest people abuse him and say the war was unjust; and they can get the Indian newspapers to print all their falsehoods, because many of the editors are officers who have been cashiered and turned out of the army for bad conduct, and of course are all ready to abuse the good officers who turned them out for their bad deeds. If your uncle had been defeated, they would have said that the war was just, but that he was a fool and a coward; but as they cannot say that he is either the one or the other now, without being laughed at, they say the war was wicked, which is, however, as untrue as it would be to call him a fool or a coward.

"We have had a grand sham fight here. I send you a printed order for it which I wrote, and a sketch I made to teach the officers. It was a very pretty sight, and your corps—the artillery—did very well indeed. I made a speech to the men after the review, and they cheered me long and loudly. I think they like me."

To J. A. Roebuck, Esq., M.P.

"Guernsey, Nov. 30, 1843.

"I do not know what to say about the garbling of Napoleon's Memoirs by Louis XVIII. I should say not *by him*, but they have been garbled; with the exception of a passage, however, about Châteaubriand, I should say not added to. Some praise of Louis XVIII. himself may have been added, but generally speaking the books bear the marks of Napoleon too much not to be genuine. The 'Egyptian Campaigns,' two volumes, have been suppressed by Bertrand: these things show what fellows he

had to deal with, and how difficult it was for him to trust any person.

"I am sorry Peel's position is so difficult; but if he has real energy and character, he may lead the people against the house of Russell, and with success I think.

"A letter from Charles of the 20th October. In strong health again, but troops very sickly. No particular news, but a resolution, if they make him a peer, not to accept a pension from the English starving people: from the fat people of Leadenhall Street he would take it, as he has given them a million a year.

"The 'Bombay Times' full of proofs that it always praised Sir C. Napier, and that my attack on it is unjust! It says I am a liar!

"Charles's letter contains the following passage: 'As to thanks of Parliament, as they have not been given, I need not say anything about them. Our medals, on the other hand, have given us great delight. I can now wear my red ribbon with pleasure, and as I wrote to Lord Ellenborough, I can look Tim Kelly and Pat Delane of the 22nd in the face, which I could not do till they had their medals. I am really so excessively gratified at getting these medals that as far as I am concerned I want nothing more.'

"My wish is, if possible, that you should see Peel, and let him understand that I feel my brother is exposed to every obloquy that the Whigs can pour upon him,—that Government may say they will protect him, but can they protect him? If these people get free play at him, he will be proclaimed to England and the world as a man of blood and injustice, but being a successful soldier the Government protects him. But he loves a fair fame with the world better than honours and rewards.

"However, as you know, I do feel confidence in Peel, and that he will, when Parliament meets, do

justice to Charles' character as well as genius, and not suffer calumnies to prevail; and I have suppressed my own strong inclination and my brother's desire to have something published in his defence, entirely from respect to Peel and the wish to avoid giving him any embarrassment."

As an instance of Sir Charles' difficulties and responsibilities, and of the outcry against him which he would have had to encounter if he failed in any part of his work, the following extract from the letters of a friend of the family is given. It was written to General William Napier in July, when the accounts of a third battle were expected in London:—

"As soon as I heard that the mail had arrived, I went to ——,* and found that he had not seen the newspapers or despatches, having been in the House all day. But he said he had seen Baring (Secretary to the Board of Control), who had read the 'Times,' and that it appeared that the affairs in Scinde were in a very unpromising condition: that Ali Moorad had deserted and deceived Sir Charles Napier; that Shere Mohammed was advancing with 20,000 men, and that another battle was expected. 'This desertion of Ali Moorad,' he said, 'is just what Outram all along predicted. He told Napier that he would be deceived by him, but Napier would not listen, and despoiled the other Ameers to give their property to this fellow. If he has deserted, Napier will be in a very critical position, and open to much animadversion.'"

The reported desertion of Ali Moorad was entirely without foundation; that prince continued the steadfast and useful ally of Sir Charles as long as the latter

* A member of the Indian Government.

remained in Scinde, and was afterwards treated with great ingratitude and injustice by the English Government.

The writer then goes on to say—

"This speech making me anxious, I proceeded to the House, and publicly asked Peel what he knew. His answer was, that despatches had arrived at the India House, but had not yet been sent to him. In about half an hour after he beckoned me to him and said, 'I have just received the despatches, and here they are; I know your anxiety on this matter, and I am desirous of relieving it and that of others whom you may see. The whole of the statement in the papers is grossly exaggerated. There will be no battle and Shere Mohammed has sent word to Sir C. Napier that he is coming to surrender himself and his sword to him.' Shortly after we went out of the House, and in the lobby he again stopped me, saying, 'I have now read the despatch; it is perfectly satisfactory, and is of a later date than the reports in the "Times."' He then read part of it to me, and stated in so many words, 'Ali Moorad has not deserted; Shere Mahommed is not in open hostility, but has sent to express his unconditional submission. Pray tell those who may be anxious (alluding to some members of the family in London) that everything is perfectly satisfactory.'"

This letter shows the sort of treatment Sir C. Napier would have met with at the hands of the Board of Control, notwithstanding his great victories and arduous operations to follow them up, if he had been mistaken in that most ticklish of commodities—the faith and conscience of an Eastern prince. It also proves how dangerous was the responsibility which he, inexperienced in Indian matters, and taking counsel of his unaided sagacity alone, assumed, in acting in opposition to the urgent and oft-repeated representations of his political adviser. This disregard of

responsibility and of personal consequences is the very highest and most unusual of that aggregate of rare qualities which go to make up the character of a great commander. But woe to the English general who, assuming such responsibility, should afterwards be unfortunate! He would meet with little mercy and consideration from his countrymen.

Thoughts such as these, excited by the attacks made on his brother in the 'Times,' and in the House of Commons by the Whigs, joined to the delay in voting the thanks of Parliament, kept the mind of William Napier in a state of great anxiety and excitement during the whole of 1843. The long delay, however, which occurred in publicly acknowledging his merits was far more conducive to the justification of Sir C. Napier's policy, and the establishment of his fame, than the most immediate recognition would have been. Certainly, never did the political and military acts of any man receive a more thorough sifting than did those of the conqueror of Scinde; and the result was, that in February, 1844, just one year after his first battle, the thanks of Parliament were voted to him and his army in a manner so gratifying as even completely to satisfy his brother.

At this time also, General William Napier had a peculiar personal grievance to complain of, which, to those who have read his services, must indeed appear extraordinary. The letter will explain itself.

Major-General W. Napier to Lord Fitzroy Somerset.

"Guernsey, Oct. 11, 1843.

"You have always been too warm and sincere a friend to me to let me take the step I am about to do without first communicating with you; but after many days' consideration, and strong efforts to suppress any feelings which

might cloud my judgment, I can see no other line to follow, except that of remaining quiet under what I consider an injustice that carries dishonour with it.

"You will feel at once that I allude to the recent honours of the Bath.

"General —— is undoubtedly an older general than I, but he had only two decorations and I have three. Colonel —— was not even a Companion of the Bath, and known to the world by a defeat. Numbers of general officers, having but one decoration, are K.C.B.'s. Both my brothers were so made when they had but one medal each. There are only two generals, I believe, who have a greater number of decorations than myself without corresponding honours.

"This is the state of the case, and when men of fewer pretensions are made Knights Commanders, it is impossible not to feel the neglect as a stigma. It is, however, Her Majesty's right and pleasure, which cannot be questioned without disrespect, to bestow honours upon some and deny them to others, and I entirely agree with you that honours asked for are not worth having.

"There remains then but one way, namely, to forward my cross of Companion of the Bath to the Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief, and pray of him humbly to move Her Majesty to remove my name from the order of the Bath. I am prepared to endure any consequences that may result from this step, rather than what I feel to be a slur; and I do think that the very moment, when my brother has so largely added to the glory and dominions of England, is not well chosen to degrade me.

"Whatever becomes of me, I shall never cease to remember your kindness with the same warm feelings."

With reference to what is above said concerning Her

Majesty's right and pleasure, it is an axiom of our Constitution that the Crown is the fountain of honour, but it is well known that the recipients of honour for all public services are selected and recommended to the Crown by its responsible advisers. The just indignation which William Napier expressed was therefore directed against the ministry; and it is probable that the neglect by that ministry of his brother Charles gave additional force to a slight, which otherwise, although he felt it deeply, he would not have made a subject of complaint. The friendly persuasions of Lord Fitzroy, however, joined to indications that the Government was about to do his brother justice at last, and to a fear of in any way injuring his cause, prevented him from pressing his own grievance.

The following letter to his son refers to a plan of accompanying his brother-in-law to Canada:—

"MY DEAR SON, "Sept. 4, 1843.

"I am very much grieved that you are not comfortable in your present situation. I have made an effort to relieve you from it, but I fear that it will not be successful, and that you must give up the notion of going to Canada. I am not *quite* certain, but it is most likely that you will not be able to go to Canada. I have no object but how to provide for you and your sisters, and I seek to save and to gain as much money for you as I can. But it is very difficult to keep what I have got, and more difficult to get more. I would willingly sacrifice my life to secure you a good living, but there is no way of doing so but with care and time and patience. It is our fate to struggle, and you must not give up your situation until I am sure of getting a better for you. I will struggle for you as long as I live, and leave you as much as I can when I die."

At Sir Robert Peel's request, conveyed through a com-

mon friend, General Napier sent, for the Prime Minister's perusal, his brother's letters, which were returned with the following letter:—

Sir Robert Peel to Major-General William Napier.

"SIR, "Whitehall, Jan. 8, 1844.

"I am very much obliged to you for having sent me the accompanying letters. I have read them with great interest. They are very remarkable for the unpremeditated proof they exhibit of the heroic spirit of a true soldier.

"Comprehensive views of public policy, affectionate tenderness in the relations of domestic life, and a discriminating appreciation and grateful acknowledgment of the merits and services of companions in arms.

"They account for success in war, which could hardly have been hoped for but from the combination of great military experience, untiring energy, and the cautious estimate of risk and danger, with the most striking personal example of fortitude and desperate valour.

"I think you were quite right in dissuading the publication, which your brother contemplated from the chivalrous desire to protect another from injustice."

The following are extracts from letters written at this time to Mr. Roebuck:—

"Guernsey, Jan. 8, 1844.

"I am very ill and very low, though better than I was. I am writing from my bed, to enclose you part of a letter that will interest you. Send it me back, don't forget. The writer is Colonel Shaw Kennedy, the man who organised the police of Ireland, and resigned because the Act had never been attended to either in letter or spirit, and he would not lend himself to the humbug. He is therefore

authority upon Ireland. He has been all his life a reasonable Government man; that is, he, upon principle, supported Government whenever his honourable feelings were not shocked by evil measures. He is a man of great knowledge and thought, of great humanity, and courage indomitable. It was he who made that desperate rush at the breach of Badajoz; he was then Shaw only; he is now Shaw Kennedy. He is rich, honourable to the very letter and essence, and possessed of qualities of head and heart seldom exceeded. It is therefore, I think, you will be pleased to see how exactly he agrees with you* about the policy adopted towards Ireland."

*Jan. 21, 1844.

"You also would smile to have heard me, two days ago, proclaiming my doubts if I could justify Lord Ellenborough in taking advantage of treaties so iniquitously obtained from the Ameers by Lord Auckland. But I have since well considered the matter, and you will see some of my arguments in the original MSS. of my work. Justice is a wide word. The people flocked to our camps for protection against the Ameers' tyranny. It was abstractedly right to protect them, but international justice, *i. e.* restricted justice, interfered to bar this. Well then, international justice demanded the strict execution of treaties, however unjustly forced by a former governor on the Ameers. Lord Ellenborough's necessity was great; danger on every side; they owed him tribute; he offered them remission of tribute for cession of land, and he gave that land to the friend who had the original right to it. He guaranteed their territory on conditions, but they broke those conditions, and were secretly preparing for war. He ordered, not war, but a demonstration. That spark fired

* In disapproval of the Government measures with respect to the Repeal agitation and "monster meetings" in Ireland.

the train, and the Ameers attacked first; for remember that Emaum Ghur belonged to Ali Moorad, and he went with Charles and consented to its destruction. The attack on Outram was the first act of war. At all events, Charles is free from blame; he said early and truly, 'I am here, not to discuss, but to maintain former treaties.' If I do not mistake, the secret intercourse with Persia and Runjeet Singh was the only *political* breach of treaty advanced by Lord Ellenborough: the other griefs were all violations of the *commercial* treaties, which were never forced on the Ameers; they adopted those treaties voluntarily and before Lord Auckland's intimidation.

"This makes a very important consideration in the argument of justice.

"I am not comfortable here. I see clearly that Graham, ignorant of the real state of affairs here and of what I have done, supposes me to be querulous because I am in bad health, and only looks at affairs through that medium. If I had remained, after the manner of the old rat in the fable, who gave notice he was going to consider the public weal, and desired not to be disturbed, and was finally found in the middle of a Stilton cheese, I should have been considered a very safe and prudent governor."

"Feb. 8, 1844.

"Your letter this morning was a great pleasure, and I most anxiously look for this night's debate. I feel the Queen's speech as real and honest compliment, which must more than make up for all past delay; and I now see that, without the papers which have been produced it would have been impossible to do justice, but meanwhile Charles might have died. The Duke, whose word is fate as to fame, might have died, and thus the intrigues against him might have succeeded. Hardinge, however, writes

me word that the intrigues here have raised Charles' fame, by drawing forth replies which his modesty kept back before."

"Feb. 11, 1844.

"Your letter has made my heart swell more than I thought it was capable of—yet I know not what I can say more than I have already said. Sir Robert Peel's conduct and expressions touch me, and I should like to tell him so. I am in need of the kindness of friends, for I am weighed down by the expectation of my brother's death. I have got several large packets from him, and it is evident that his health is gone, and that any honours that may be intended for him will come too late, as might have been expected in such a climate, and with such work. Purgatory to him, without as it would appear any paradise afterwards, for he must come away or die; the latter most likely before he can do the former. I will not enter further into the matter, because I am busy with the History. In it you will find ample cause to admire his genius and indomitable energy, and ample ground for exclaiming about the recompense he seems likely to have. Fifty years has he served, and now 6000*l*, saved since he went to India, is all he is likely to leave to his children beyond his glorious name,—but they are girls."

"Lord Ashley speaks* of the harsh tone adopted towards the Ameers when prisoners, by Sir C. Napier. Does he know that they were only prisoners in name? That they were intriguing in Hydrabad, sending emissaries into the country, and encouraging and giving information to Shere Mohammed's army to enable it to destroy the British? That Sir Charles might justly have ordered them to be killed for their abusing the generosity with which he

* Debate on the Queen's speech.

treated them? They were precisely in the position of Photinus at Alexandria, when he was killed by Cæsar; it is most ungenerous to give this colouring to an act of leniency, and hold up Sir C. Napier to public odium, by misrepresenting the real state of the case.

"In a council held before the battle of Meeanee, the Ameers decided that all men, women, and children of English race or service should be collected in one mass and slaughtered in a heap on the field of battle after the victory, of which none of them doubted. '*So shall we make it famous.*' But the General! He was to be preserved alive, and to be led with a ring and chain in his nose through the streets in triumph. Nusseer opposed this as barbarous; he was overruled, and then said, 'Let it be of gold, as more honourable.' 'No (said Shadad, with an oath), of iron and heavy.' Now, with a full knowledge of this intended barbarity, the General gave them back their swords, each sword worth several thousand pounds from the jewels studding it. He remained several weeks in a tent, with the mercury at 112, in artificially cooled places, rather than intrude upon the Ameers in their palaces. He threatened them, and justly, when he found they took advantage of his generosity to intrigue with the people about his army, and to hold intercourse with his enemies outside; he might, I again say, by the laws of war justly have killed them. It is very easy for Lord Ashley to talk about hardships in words, as if the Ameers were shut up safely in Dorchester jail: though even there, I suspect, they would receive from the visiting magistrates harsher language, and harsher treatment also, than they have had from Sir C. Napier. But his position, exposed to the underhand practices of the Ameers, was one of infinite danger and difficulty, and none but the highest minded could have refrained from punishing them instead

of confining harshness to words. I speak advisedly. I know that his position was one of extreme danger, and not even in his battles did he display more firmness than he did at Hydrabad between those battles.

"He ungenerous to prisoners! He has not at this moment six thousand pounds in the world of his own; and yet he gave back, besides the Ameers' swords, the swords of four hundred minor chieftains, each sword worth from 50*l.* to 300*l.* He forbore all vengeance for their projected barbarities towards himself and his soldiers, and their women and children; and he bore with unexampled firmness their attempts to destroy his army, while nominally his prisoners, though treated by him with all respect due to sovereign princes. I again say he might justly have killed them. They merited death. Let Lord Ashley recollect, that to prevent the women and children's throats being cut, to prevent the cruelty intended for himself (the ludicrous imagery only adds to its shocking character), Sir C. Napier fought one against twenty, and very hardly won his battle.

"His threats to the Ameers, so far from being meant as harshness, were the reverse; he endeavoured by frightening them to keep them quiet, that he might not be forced to send them prisoners on board his steamers to stop their dangerous intrigues."

Sir Henry Hardinge to Major-General W. Napier.

"War Office, Feb. 15, 1844.

"I received your note, and you will probably by this time have read the report of the debate on the vote of thanks. Nothing could be more eloquent and touching than Peel's speech. Pray tell Mrs. Napier, with my respectful admiration for all *her* labours with her pen, that she will find in the 'Morning Chronicle,' but not in the

'Times,' Peel's opinion of the '*eloquent, faithful, and impartial historian*' of the Peninsular War.

"The old Commodore* made an excellent speech. Perhaps you may not be aware that I was standing close to your brother Charles, and had been talking to him, at the time he was wounded at Busaco—that being my first acquaintance with the Commodore.

"We are to have another attack on the policy of the affairs in Scinde. Colonel Outram left a protest here before he sailed for India.

"When you write to Charles, say how much I admire *all* his proceedings."

The debate on the Queen's speech took place the 8th February, the vote of thanks was proposed on the 15th, and the following is extracted from Sir Robert Peel's speech on that occasion:—

. . . . . "With the policy of the measure in the carrying out of which that army was engaged, I have nothing to do on this occasion; whether it was justifiable to exact from the Ameers a cession of their territory, in lieu of the tribute already paid, is in my opinion a question which ought to be altogether forgotten in this matter. (Cheers.) I now only call the attention of the House to the conduct and merits of the gallant men who performed the first duty of the soldier, namely, obedience to lawful authority; and the mode in which they exhibited that obedience entitles them to the public acknowledgment for which I now ask. (Hear, hear.)

"The gallant commander got his instructions from the Governor-General, and also had his authority from the ex-Governor-General. . . . .

"In the first battle, where the disparity was greatest,

* Admiral Sir C. Napier.

the force consisted of British troops and partly of sepoys, and it is most gratifying to think that there was no disproportion of valour between the sepoys and Europeans; that animated by the example of their officers, both sepoys and Europeans showed an equal degree of courage and determination. But at the same time justice requires that we should not overlook the great cause of victory. The victories of Meeanee and Hydrabad are each, in my opinion, mainly to be ascribed to the example set by that gallant officer who was responsible for the issue of the conflicts. It is most fortunate that at such a crisis, and under circumstances of so much hazard, the command of the British army was committed to one of the three brothers who have engrafted upon the stem of an ancient and honourable lineage that personal nobility which is derived from unblemished private character, from the highest sense of honour, and from repeated proofs of valour in the field, which have made their names conspicuous in the annals of their country's glory. (Cheers.) Each of these brothers learnt the art of war under an illustrious commander.

"During the whole of those memorable campaigns of which one of them has been the faithful, impartial, and eloquent historian, the exploits of those three brothers entitle them to the gratitude of their country. (Hear, hear.)

"In almost every action of the Peninsula they gave proofs of their military skill and valour. In the actions at Corunna, Busaco, and Ciudad Rodrigo, and during the operations of the Pyrenees, no British officer was more prodigal of his blood in the cause of his country than were each of the officers to whom I have referred. (Hear, hear.)

"Sir, the officer who had the command of our Indian army bears a name, than which there is none more con-

spicuous in the bright pages which contain the records, whether in the military or the naval annals of this country, of desperate and successful warfare.

"Sir, when we read the account of a naval action in which in the course of five minutes, with a force wholly unable—except as directed by the utmost skill and valour—to compete with the enemy—in the course of five minutes signal victory has been achieved, the glories of St. Vincent have been revived, and by the mere effect of that victory a change in a dynasty has taken place—when we read the account of such an action, we find that the commander bore the name Napier. (Loud cheers.) Nay, even in more limited and circumscribed operations, we have similar indications of bravery. When in the course of last year it became of the utmost importance to show to a misguided multitude what was the inherent strength of the law and of the civil power when directed by the consciousness of right and by consummate skill and valour: even in that case, in a more limited sphere, when one man attacked hundreds with six constables, and captured more of the party to whom he was opposed than the men whom he commanded, I could not help thinking that the man who set this courageous example in the maintenance of the civil law bore the name of Napier.* (Cheers.) Sir, I say that in the record of gallant exploits, civil, military, and naval, I am justified in asserting that there is no name which will stand more conspicuous than the name which is borne by the gallant officer who commanded in the battles of Meeanee and Hydrabad. I believe that those who bear that name, stimulated by the example of their predecessors, will continue to exhibit the same

* Captain Napier, chief constable of Glamorganshire, whose vigorous conduct on this occasion effectually suppressed the "Rebecca" disturbance. His brother, Sir Robert Napier, has earned an undying name in India and China.

courage and resolution in their country's cause, and that the motto which they bear on their shield—'Ready, aye, ready'—will be not only their motto, but the characteristic of their conduct. Sir, the gallant officer, Sir Charles Napier, when he was called upon to take the command, had attained the age of sixty-two years; he assumed it when shattered in the service of his country; and it is to that gallant spirit, controlled and directed,—it is to the example that he set to the troops, inspiring, as it did, confidence in their commander, that we must mainly attribute, in my opinion, the success of our arms in the actions of Meeanee and Hydrabad. . . . . .

"Sir, there is one point to which I am particularly desirous of adverting. If it could be imputed to Sir Charles Napier that he had rashly sought a conflict, that he had needlessly brought the British army in contact with the force of the Ameers, I doubt whether any praise which we could bestow on his valour would compensate for the painful reflections to which such a conviction in his own mind would give rise. But I think it is impossible to peruse all the papers and to consider the position in which Sir Charles Napier was placed, without coming to a conclusion, not only that the wisest course which Sir Charles Napier could take was the encountering at once the enemy without delay, but that if he had pursued any other course the safety of the army would have been compromised. . . . . In estimating the conduct of Sir Charles Napier I do not think the chief praise is due to him for military skill or personal valour; I think the chief praise is due to him for the judgment which he displayed in so critical a position.

"Knowing how fearful might have been the consequences of a repetition of the disaster at Cabul, he had the moral courage, on his own responsibility, to act in opposition to

the advice which he had received, and to commit both the army and his own reputation to the fate of war; and it is for the exhibition of moral courage which he made in determining upon the attack, that I think Sir Charles Napier especially entitled to our thanks." (Cheers.)

After some hesitation General Napier wrote to thank Sir Robert Peel for the warm terms in which he had spoken of his brother and of his family, and the following is the reply he received:—

Sir Robert Peel to Major-General William Napier.

"Whitehall, March, 2, 1844.

"If in the attempt to do justice to the distinguished merits and brilliant services of your brother I have gratified your feelings, I rejoice the more in the opportunity which I have had of placing upon record my own sentiments and those of the Government with regard to the conduct and achievements of Sir Charles Napier.

"My satisfaction is not abated by the frank and honourable explanation of the motives which induced you to pause before you expressed to me your personal acknowledgments for the manner in which I had discharged a public duty."

To J. A. Roebuck, Esq., M.P.

"Guernsey, Feb. 28, 1844.

"The debate has been glorious for Charles. To have the Duke and Peel and Hardinge speak so warmly in praise; to have —— and —— abuse so spitefully; to have only nine opponents;—this is what I could wish; and of those nine, five are probably mere abstract abhorrers of war generally. The number of the minority is not enough for party—not enough even for faction. With

respect to Lord Howick's characterising his battles as 'a wanton shedding of blood in the Almighty's eyes,' I have sent Hardinge some extracts from Charles's letters upon this same shedding of blood.

"I am not a little proud that the Duke has fixed on the same points of military excellence that I did in my letter to you of last year. You see he says that the march into the desert was a surprising exploit.

"Mrs. Roebuck says you have shown Peel the commencement of my work;* I am glad of it, and I wish he would read it all before I publish, but he cannot have time. I should like him to know I have not stolen from the Duke. So much for professional vanity.

"I feel a strong desire to give the calumniators a hit; but to assail men for speeches in their proper places is bad policy, a bad system; it leads to suppress public spirit and freedom of discussion. However, I will give them one cuff in the History.

"I have written to Lord Fitzroy about the Bath riband for myself; that is, I have told him I look on the Duke's speech as ample honour for the whole family, and that henceforth I will be silent on any point affecting my own claims. He can now do me no wrong. In fact, I feel quite content not only with the honours conferred, but with the warm interest which so many public men have shown for Charles. It is this which makes honours comfortable. There is no faction, no partisan feeling mixed up. The thing has been done handsomely and generously, with feeling. I want no more."

The following letter from Sir Charles Napier was addressed to a Prussian military officer, the Baron Von Orlich, who had been sent by his Government to accompany Sir

* 'Conquest of Scinde.'

William Nott to Afghanistan, but arriving too late for that purpose, went with Sir Charles to Scinde as Honorary Aide-de-Camp, and is specially interesting as containing Sir Charles's opinion of his brother's qualifications for command in the field:—

Sir Charles Napier to the Baron Von Orlich.

"Hydrabad, June 25, 1843.

"Many thanks for your obliging letter. I wish you had been with us at Meeanee and Hydrabad. Your great king's *instructions* were with me. On a campaign a general should never cease to refer to first principles, and it is only by constantly consulting the axioms of such great men that we learn to do our work. You will see that those great manœuvres, 'order arms,' 'stand at ease,' were not much practised by us!

"How we laughed when we heard of your witty observation; at least I did, for I knew very well that it was *well deserved.*

"I do not know who the commander was at your reviews, but I do well know that when *we* so assemble, we generals do not know how to manœuvre troops, for we *never read,* we English soldiers; we trust to God and the queen like good Christians and good subjects. However, with small bodies of 10,000 men we do pretty well, but I do not believe we have a living general that could wield 100,000, except the Duke of Wellington, and perhaps Lord Seaton and my brother who wrote the 'History of the Peninsular War,' and whom I believe to possess extraordinary military abilities. However you may judge by his History, for no man can write a good book on any subject he does not thoroughly understand. But still we have *no practice.* The Duke is the only man among us who has ability and practice united, and he is a phenomenon, and my observa-

tion applies to ordinary English generals; and to tell you the truth, my good friend, I do not think your Continental generals a bit better! We are all too old before we obtain command, and have not the necessary physical strength nor the habit of command, both of which are required. Why! I was fifty-four before I was a Major-General. I am now past sixty, and a great deal too old for my work. I ought to be sent home to England to sit in an arm-chair and cough my way to the churchyard.

"When I go home I mean to pay a visit to the land of the great king, and hope to meet with you at Berlin. I shall call upon my ancient *Aide-de-Camp*."

During this year all the time General Napier could snatch from his vexatious official business and the frequent attacks of his old illness, was devoted to his work the 'History of the Conquest of Scinde.'

In October Lord Ellenborough arrived in England, having been recalled by the Directors of the East India Company in the exercise of a power of which they have, fortunately for our Indian Empire, since been deprived;—a power exercised on that occasion not only against the wish of the Government, but that of the people of England.

Major-General W. Napier to the Earl of Ellenborough.

"MY LORD, "Guernsey, Oct. 17, 1844.

"I congratulate you on your safe arrival in England, where I trust your great services and character will be duly appreciated.

"I address you thus early because my object is to offer you in time my assistance, if you should think fit to accept of it.

"I believe my brother has informed you that I have

commenced a history of his campaign in Scinde. I thought to have finished it long ago; but vexations on a small scale, of the same nature as those you have encountered in India, have so frequently interrupted me that I have only completed the First or *Political* part, which in a post octavo form would perhaps furnish one hundred and fifty printed pages—perhaps more.

"I sent a rough copy to my brother for his observations thereon; and it was through my old and steadfast friend Sir H. Hardinge that I transmitted it, begging of him to read it during his voyage. He read it before he went, and wrote to me that he liked it much; and now my brother has sent me his observations, and a most urgent request that I would at once publish the political part, and defer the military part for another time. His object is this: the military part relates only to himself, and he has not been attacked for that; the political part relates to your proceedings more than to his; and I think that if it were published previous to your meeting your enemies in parliament, it would induce thinking men to look for your parliamentary proceedings with a right feeling—in fine, that it would help to stem the torrent of abuse and calumny poured against you by a malignant faction.

"My Lord, my brother has a profound esteem and admiration for your character and ability, and he has created the same sentiment of esteem and admiration in my mind, which the examination of your policy in composing my history has in no degree lessened. I am therefore not only willing but anxious to follow his advice if your Lordship sees no inconvenience; and that you may the better judge, I will with your leave send you the manuscript, which, being in a fair legible hand, will not, I hope, offer too much trouble for perusal. My opinions are fixed, and I shall be ready to support them; and though I mean my work to be a record of my brother's great actions, it will be

a source of gratification to me if by thus publishing the first part separately I can, as he supposes, in any manner aid your lordship in the contest which awaits you.

"Posterity will do you full justice, but I wish to see your malignant enemies confounded now as well as hereafter, and if I can contribute to that result, I desire nothing better."

From the Earl of Ellenborough to General W. Napier.

"SIR, "London, Oct. 19, 1844.

"I had the honour of receiving yesterday your letter of the 17th.

"The suggestion made by Sir Charles Napier that the political part of your intended history of the late transactions in Scinde should be published at once with the view of correcting public opinion with respect to my conduct in reference to these transactions, is in full accordance with his generous character.

"I have, however, no fear of meeting Parliament without such aid, and I earnestly beg that you will not on my account deviate in the slightest degree from the line you would take for the purpose of producing your work under the most favourable circumstances.

"I believe you know that I am very anxious that you should at some leisure time undertake the history of the war in Afghanistan. It is most desirable that its events should be so placed on record as to deter all future Governments of India from errors similar to those there committed. This was the object of my proclamation of the 1st October, 1842."

From General William Napier to Lord Ellenborough.

"MY LORD, "Guernsey, Oct. 24, 1844.

"I was not so presumptuous as to think *you* needed my aid, but there are people prepared to assail you and my

brother also with a virulence and falsehood that no scruples of justice will restrain, and you will not have the means of knowing how they work, and perhaps would disdain to notice them if you did know. They are numerous, but I think I have power to put the means of defeating their efforts into the minds of a more numerous set of honest men, and, finding it is my brother's wish that I should do so, I will; for though your lordship is good enough to consider my interest in the matter, I do not find that you anticipate any inconvenience in my doing so, which was what I desired to know. The political part treats precisely, though on general principles, of the impolicy of the Afghan war, and I am vain enough to think it gives a new view of the subject."

The Earl of Ellenborough to General W. Napier.

"SIR, "London, Oct. 26, 1844.

"I had the honour of receiving to-day your letter of the 24th. It is certainly a matter of satisfaction to me that you have decided upon publishing at once the first part of your intended History.

"I do not know whether you are aware that no arrangements were made with the Sikh Government for the maintenance of our communications through the Punjaub with the army in Afghanistan, till after the capture of Cabul. The arrangement was subsequently made by Mr. Clerk.

"You may not know that, besides the obvious objects of the formation of the army of reserve, there was that of supporting, by the presence of that army, the authority of Shere Singh who was faithful to us, especially against the Sindanwallah family, by which he was afterwards assassinated. It became known to the Government of India after Shere Singh's death, that the minister Dhyan Singh had, while our troops were traversing the Punjaub on their return, proposed to attack them in detail. He proposed

this, deluded by the Indian press into the belief that we meant to attack the Sikhs; but Shere Singh relied on us, and so did the old chiefs of Runjeet Singh's Durbar, and the proposal was negatived; but Shere Singh strongly represented to the Foreign Secretary, who visited him at Lahore after the armies had repassed the Sutlej, the extreme embarrassment which the assertions of our press—that we intended to attack him—created in all his dealings with his own chiefs and army.

"Our retiring army was followed at the distance of two or three days' march by 20,000 Sikh troops, detached from the force at Peshawur which consisted of 30,000 men when I landed, and when we had (28th February, 1842) only 4000 men there of whom 1800 were in hospital. The presence of the Sikhs in such force at Peshawur was always a matter of much anxiety to me. I do not know whether it appears in the published papers that it was by my direction that General Pollock got the 5000 Sikhs who advanced to Jellalabad (without any instructions from me) to pass to the left bank of the Cabul river, so as to clear his rear as far at least as Peshawur, and to leave to us all the resources of the right bank.

"You are aware that Lord Auckland was in negotiation for the cession to us of Shikarpoor, and you know therefore that the permanent occupation of Scinde was a part of the policy with respect to Afghanistan, of which the Court of Directors never expressed their disapproval.

"If the two armies had been withdrawn from Jellalabad and Candahar without a forward movement upon Ghuznee and Cabul, my idea was to move them by the Gomul pass, always used by Sultan Mahmood, upon Ghuznee, and thus to have one central line of operation instead of two from the extreme flanks. I never intended to withdraw altogether without striking a great blow.

"I wish I could have seen you to have talked over the

whole affair, but you will not hesitate to ask anything you wish to know, and I will tell you all I am at liberty to tell."

This was the commencement of an intercourse which lasted throughout the life of William Napier. These two distinguished men had many points of resemblance in their character—the same energy, fearlessness, honesty, disregard (where necessary) of responsibility, as well as untiring industry and great powers of mind. Lord Ellenborough, too, possessed a knowledge of military affairs almost unexampled in a civilian: as General Napier used to say, he possessed a natural genius for war, and would have made a great name as a soldier if he had been destined to the career of arms. The letter given immediately above proves of itself that Lord Ellenborough had mastered the correct principles on which war should be conducted, and he exposes in that letter a glaring instance of incapacity on the part of the Indian Government, namely, the committal of an army in the heart of Afghanistan without having previously ta[illegible] measures to secure its retreat into India by the shortest road. It is true an agreement had been entered into, after the capture of Cabul, with the Sikh Government for the march of our returning force through the Punjaub. This was after our army had proved victorious. But what if it had been beaten? the Indian newspapers all the while telling the Sikhs that, when once the Cabul business was settled, we should attack them. It may excite a smile when we consider with what an infinitesimal amount of wisdom the world is governed; but it makes one shudder to think in what incapable hands the lives of thousands upon thousands of brave men were then committed, when the consequences of disaster would have been a war of extermination throughout all northern India.

The principal domestic event of General Napier's life during 1844 was the marriage of his third daughter. She was one of those blessed natures which appear almost to have escaped the taint of original sin; which, apparently marked out from their birth by God as His own, seem to have no natural temptations to fight against. She was early taken away to a home more befitting her nature than this world could afford; and on the memorial stone which marks her grave the only words inscribed are those which express at once her earthly life and its promised reward—"Blessed are the meek, blessed are the pure in heart."

In his letter to Lady Hester Stanhope, from which extracts have been made,* the proud father draws this picture of his daughter, then eighteen years old :—

"My third daughter is an Arab girl; tall, dark-haired, with dark earnest eyes, rich glowing complexion, brown but delicate, fair broad forehead, small feet and hands, and a head like an antique set on the throat of a wild deer. She is symmetry itself, body and mind. No very great grasp of thought, but such a justness of judgment and language that to do or say a foolish thing, or even to avoid doing and saying exactly what she ought, would be impossible for her. With all this she is simplicity itself, although arrived at the age of eighteen. Do not think I exaggerate: in my life I have never seen a more exquisite piece of humanity within the bounds of every-day life; for I do not pretend that she has an extraordinary genius. It is her perfection in her kind that is so admirable."

When she married, her husband's regiment was in Canada, and her father's agony of grief at the parting was terrible to witness. Accustomed to repress much manifestation of his feelings, they would occasionally

* See vol. i. p. 532.

master him and burst forth in a manner that showed their intensity, like the hidden fires of a volcano which burn all the more fiercely for their long compression.

After his daughter had left him on this occasion, her husband, returning to say some forgotten words, found him sunk down on the floor, his back against the wall, and sorrowing with the Patriarch's grief for his child—"If I be bereaved of my children, I am bereaved."

In November the first part of the 'History of the Conquest of Scinde' was published, and was received by the public with avidity. It combined with extraordinary beauty of language a masterly analysis of the policy of the Indian Government before and during Lord Ellenborough's rule, and presented a vigorous justification of the political conduct of that nobleman, and of Sir Charles Napier under him; and it was attacked with all the violence that was to be expected from the partisans of the East India Company, as well as from the opponents of the English ministry. It was ever the fate of General Napier to write of contemporaneous events, the actors in which were still living, and therefore inevitably to wound the self-esteem of many among them.

This danger was heightened by the circumstances under which the work was composed. It was in its very design and conception not only a history of the war in Scinde, but a defence of a brother unjustly assailed and cruelly misrepresented; and it cannot be denied that every page smacks of its origin. The exposition of the policy which led to the occupation and conquest of Scinde is admirable; the battle scenes are not surpassed by the finest pages of the 'Peninsular War,' and the military genius of the writer never deserts him. But the calmness of the historian is too often wanting, and, looking back on events already becoming distant, it is impossible to deny that the

judgments of the writer are sometimes warped by his passions, and that the motives and actions of honourable men are not unfrequently visited with unmerited rigour.

The wounded feelings of brotherly affection which the preceding correspondence displays, the indignation naturally excited by the imputation of base motives to one whom he knew to be wasting his health and strength in the earnest discharge of his duties, the very intensity of his love for the hero of his book—all these sentiments combined to disturb the equanimity of his judgment, and deepened the colours with which he painted the errors and follies of those who were hostile to his brother's feelings or person. In spite, however, of this almost inevitable drawback, it may be fearlessly asserted that no event of Indian history has been recorded with such vigour, animation, and fidelity, as the story of the conquest of Scinde.

The following extracts from his journal to his wife are without date, but appear to have been written during the interval of his departure from Guernsey and his resignation of the governorship:—

To Mrs. Napier.

[London to Guernsey. Date uncertain.]

"I saw Lord Ellenborough; he told me the Duke puts Meeanee above all his own battles, and is mad to get everything relating to it; but he also told me that the ministers were afraid of everything, and did not support him."

"I was stopped yesterday in the street by a hard, iron-looking, grim working-man, who called out, 'Do I see Colonel Napeer?' 'Yes; I have a recollection of your face, but I forget your name!' 'Oh! I am one of

your Bath friends, one of them as will stick by you to the death; gie us your hand. I am a going to the House. I'se got a ticket, so I can't wait any longer; but us doant forget 'ee!' These are the men who will bring up little Johnny's Whig policy.

"I found an Indian sitting on the Athenæum steps to-day, very black and very handsome, and a good aspect. He had a young tawny child in his lap about a year old. I gave him a shilling; it should have been half-a-crown, but one gets so trained in London to give only a small sum to a beggar. Perhaps I shall meet him again; he shall have half-a-crown then for Charles's sake, as well as his own. He seemed very much pleased with the shilling though."

"I am oppressed at once with shame and joy. I would not on my own account have gone to Sir John Hobhouse; you know why. But for Charles's sake I bent my stubborn soul to ask an interview. He received me with a total forgetfulness of what I published against him, and of all former coldness. He received me with frank and honest pride of forgiveness; entered into Charles's case warmly, indignantly, and declared that he should not be trampled upon nor whispered down. If there is truth in man he means to do justice. Now you know why I am down with shame at having attacked this man, and why I am joyful for Charles. God bless you, my own good wife."

"After I wrote to you yesterday I felt Sir J. Hobhouse's affair so strongly, that I sent him the following note; and this morning I finished and sent him a new summary of Charles's services, better and stronger than the old one, and of eight sheets. I was very vehement about Charles to Hobhouse:—

"'My dear Sir John,—I was so moved this morning, that I could not express my feelings towards you as I ought to have done. If in an evil mood I spoke ill of you, I have been punished by you in the manner that bites deepest into the soul. I feel now the bitterness of my attack, and the nobleness of your revenge. I would never have gone to you for myself, but I did for my brother; and that is my consolation. I gave you credit for being above personal feelings where justice was involved, and I was not mistaken. But the frank, cordial warmth of your reception was more than mere justice, and believe me it will not be easy to efface it from my mind.—Yours, &c.'

"These are nearly the words, perhaps not exactly, for I write from memory. The Duke of Richmond will to-night or to-morrow speak about Charles."

"Henry is just come back from leaving Bam * at the Naval School, and is rather low about it; and I am not fit to help him out of it. The time I left my poor Johnny at Kilburn, and actually hid from him, comes back to me. It was an evil hour, and I never think of it without a cold stream through my veins. Give him my love now, though it will do him but little good, I fear. I meant him good then, but it was not good. Well, this is a world of darkness and error for men; nothing can be foreseen, and all must be endured."

"My Louy's letter was delightful to me. I have sent it to Bessie—the 'apple of my eye' Bessie! How I do love my girls! I never know which I love best—the one that writes or talks to me. I want to be with them. I am sick to see them."

"I went to the Horse Guards, and was received with open

* His youngest son, Henry—now Lieut. R.N.

arms by MacDonald and Brown. My paper on flogging had created enthusiasm; they had shown it to ministerial people and the Duke; it was perfect. They wished to G— they could have written such a paper; it did me honour—it was marvellous, not a word to be changed, and I had written it in twelve hours. 'Oh! no,' said a civilian, 'impossible; don't tell me that.' The fact is, I wrote it in *two hours and a half;* but I had to copy it out fair, and that made it appear twelve hours, as the night intervened. However, I am not yet satisfied. The Duke had not then read it, but he was to do so, and if he liked it to take it down to the House of Lords, and make use of it. Now, he may not like it as well as MacDonald and the others, but still I think they would not have been so enthusiastic and unmitigated in eulogium if they were not sure it would suit the Duke."

"I saw the Horse Guards people, and inquired about my paper on corporal punishment. It had been shown to the Duke, but I doubt if he praised it. They said he did, but so evasively they said it that I asked the question direct, 'Did he put his finger on any part which he disliked?' 'Oh! no; he could not, it is perfect; nobody could find fault with it. Fitzroy,* indeed, said it was a pity you did not mention regimental courts as well as district courts; but we answered, "Oh, Napier treats it in a philosophical and general manner; he did not wish to enter into particulars more than he could help,"' which is true. But it is curious Fitzroy's objection had struck me while writing it; but I could not at the time recollect all the particulars of regimental courts. It shows his acuteness. MacDonald told me he had given it to Mr. Horsman, a clever ministerial man, who admitted that it was so able as to knock

* Lord Fitzroy Somerset.

him over in his prejudices which were strong on the other side. And finally, my paper has just been put into the Prime Minister's hands, who has promised to consider it attentively and give his opinion; and it is expected I shall thus decide the question. All this is flattering, and if it inclines them to do Charles justice I shall be glad."

"I was flattered a few days ago. I met old Broderip at the Athenæum; he was talking to Young the actor, who called him off after a little, and sent Broderip back laughing to me. 'Well, Beak, what makes you laugh?' 'Ay! remember I am a Beak, and don't fight Young for what he said of you.' 'What was it?' 'He asked me, "Who was that fine old cock that spoke to you?" "*That* an old cock! why, it's General Napier, author of the 'Peninsular War'?" "Oh! d— the Peninsular War! he is a fine old game-cock, and nothing else; and you may say I said it. Look at him, beak and feathers; he's a d—d fine old cock!"' Wasn't it funny? Tell Pammy of it."

"I have met two Bath gentlemen (Doctor Watson and Doctor Brown); both glad to see me and eager to renew acquaintance, though both opposed in politics. This is pleasant."

"Mr. Young comes into my head again. His Excellency the game-cock! that fine old cock his Excellency! Pammy must laugh at it as much as I do."

During the whole of the autumn and winter of 1844 General Napier was a constant invalid, and this expression in his case signifies great bodily torture. The writer during the winter of 1842-3 had helped to nurse him through one of his painful attacks. It appeared like inflammatory rheumatism or gout of the worst description,

aggravated by neuralgia. Any sudden noise would at such times produce a terrible prolonged cry from the sufferer, not of bodily pain, but of nervous agony, much worse, quite involuntary and irrepressible. He had no more power to prevent it than he would have had to prevent a bell from sounding when struck by the hammer. Between the worst paroxysms, and when comparatively easy, his mind worked with amazing activity. To convey any idea of the extraordinary force, beauty, and justness of his language on these occasions, is beyond the power of the pen which attempts feebly to describe him. Sometimes he would relate the beautiful visions which under the influence of the narcotic presented themselves to his imaginative brain; and the writer has heard him reciting in a low voice a sort of epic for an hour at a time, while the narcotic was commencing to operate, and while a storm of wind and rain dashed against the windows, which he said always at such times excited him pleasurably. Often has he talked to the writer for three hours together, almost literally without a pause or break, on ancient and modern generals, statesmen, systems of government; and one night is particularly remembered during which he spoke what, if written, would have been a valuable essay on the history and influence of money, and on the operation of our financial laws regulating its use. He was especially warm in admiration of the statesmanship of Cæsar, and with reference to this point in particular, of Cæsar's measures to remedy the universal destruction of credit, and the ruinous depreciation of all commodities in Rome, consequent on the civil commotions. William Napier was essentially a hero-worshipper; Cæsar was probably on the whole his favourite among the ancients. A hero and a reformer himself, he had all a soldier's admiration for the transcendent military genius of the great Roman con-

queror; all a reformer's sympathy with Cæsar's struggles against the oligarchical faction; all a reformer's delight in the great and beneficent popular measures which he forced through with such indomitable energy and courage. But that which he dwelt on as the most admirable quality of the great Roman was his remarkable moderation and clemency towards his enemies in the most intoxicating moments of success. Napoleon was called by Pitt "the child and champion of democracy;" the description would serve for Cæsar. Napoleon was unquestionably his hero *par excellence*, but he only gave to him a larger niche in his heart than to the ancient, because he knew more of him; and the broad points of resemblance in the character of those giants of history, their vast intellect, their promptitude, energy, force of will, their clemency, their practical sagacity, and the democratic element which led them to improve the condition of the masses—these were the points which inspired him with a feeling amounting almost to worship.

During one of the night conversations referred to above, and while under narcotic influence, General Napier was speaking of a future state and speculating as to our condition therein. "Well, I think we may go on from step to step—gradually growing better, but very slowly. What am I now? a bundle of pain and misery: and what will be my next step? I suppose I shall be a little—a very little—better and happier than I am now, though low enough, I expect. Or will it be a large, dreary, flat plain of oblivion—without memory—without hope—without knowledge—without desire? Well!—if so, I shall be *out*, that's all—and what am I that will be out?—My pain!"

In speaking of his sufferings, he used to say he thought he was called on to bear more acute prolonged pain than most men, but it was difficult to decide on such a matter,

because there could be no absolute standard by which to compare the amount of pain suffered by two different persons. He had asked several medical men on the subject, who all gave it as their opinion that the pain he endured was most unusual; and one, a very eminent physician, told him that he had never in his long experience met but one man who was exposed to anything like the same amount of physical pain. They judged from the nature of his disease and the external symptoms, which were aggravated in their effects on the brain by the extraordinary sensibility of his nervous system, increased as that was by the pressure on the spine of the bullet which had lain there since the fight of Cazal Nova. But, he went on to say, he could give an instance which would afford an approximate idea of his individual power of endurance. When he was a young man in France, in company with some of his own and some French officers, a very large stone, or rather piece of rock, was by accident dashed down suddenly full on to his foot. Any one could conceive how great the torture of this would be, but from a feeling of pride which was heightened by the presence of the French officers, he neither changed countenance nor paused in the conversation he was carrying on, although it was found afterwards that the bones of the foot were crushed, and he was lame for months. "And now," he said, "I can assert positively that the suffering I endured at that moment was not to be compared to what I now bear for long days together. However, it may be that from the derangement of my nervous system, and the wearing effect of my illness, I may not be so powerful to endure now as I was when young and vigorous; and the pain may simply be more unendurable to myself, without being therefore positively greater in degree."

He talked much of Sir Walter Raleigh, for whose genius

he had great admiration, and during one of his fits of suffering he would say of him, "Sir Walter Raleigh! ah! his was a grand life—he was a happy man—had a noble mind—a fine person—resolute, enterprising—a learned man, too. Yes, his was a grand and happy life. True, he was put in prison by that brute James, but he was able to *laugh* at their prison. They all feared him, and because they feared him they put him to death; but he was able to *laugh* at their death. When brought out to execution, he behaved with such a lofty contempt of death and of their power to injure him! He felt the edge of the axe, and said, 'A sharp remedy, but a sure one!' Yes, he was a happy man—he had no pain," &c.

No words can however give an idea of the extraordinary and touching effect on his hearers of those fragments spoken in a deliberate, dreamy, melodious voice—like slow and melancholy music, or the "sough" of an evening summer breeze through the trees of a forest.

The following narrative by one of his daughters gives a very touching proof of his brotherly affection and devotion:—

"One winter at Guernsey, during one of his longest and most painful illnesses, which lasted for months, my sister and I used to sit up with him by turns in an adjoining room in case of his calling for us, our own rooms being too far off for us to hear him when he called. Yet he could not bear the idea of our sitting up, as he feared for our health; and it made him so unhappy to think we did not go to bed, that we never undeceived him. One night I heard him call out with that peculiar wild cry with which he often used to start out of a troubled uneasy sleep when the intense pain overcame the influence of the strong opiates, and I went to him. He believed himself to be sinking; and after bidding me send to awaken my mother and Catty

(the others being absent or ill) his whole thoughts and feelings seemed engrossed with the idea that he should not be spared to finish the justification of uncle Charles' career in India. I remember well now some of the broken expressions of love and admiration for his brother that came from his lips, all the while mingled with groans of pain, and entreaties and commands to us that his papers should be published, and everything done to clear uncle Charles' name from any blame. It was during the first time my uncle was in India, and my father had then a presentiment that he would not live to return, as he had been very ill."

The next letter was dictated by General Napier during this illness to "Tom Moore," in reply to one from the poet complimenting him on the execution of the 'Conquest of Scinde,' just before published. They had been near neighbours at Devizes, and great friends:—

"My dear Moore, "Guernsey, Dec. 16, 1844.

"I am too ill to write, but I dictate these truths. First: I hope your new neighbours of Battle may prove more agreeable than we your old ones were, but they will never be more attached to you and yours than we were. Secondly: I like flattery. Thirdly: I like it better from you than from most people, but not even from you will I take it to the extent of being placed above you as a writer.

"I am a poor glowworm, who in its literary travels sheds a small, it may be a pleasing light, upon one or two perishing leaves of history.

"You belong to the skies, and I would say you are like those twin stars of different colours revolving round each other which Herschel has discovered. But the simile is not complete. I must wait until Lord Rosse's great tele-

scope discovers three or four stars revolving together, and then I'll say they are like you,—poetry, history, music, and wit, revolving round each other; each distinct and perfect to those who have visions strong enough, yet commingling their separate rays as they move round, so as to offer one bright object in the system which belongs to the sun of genius. And having thus in imitation of Mrs. Malaprop, made you, like Cerberus, three or four gentlemen in one,

"I remain yours always and truly,

"WM. NAPIER.

"PS.—Lady Lansdowne was, is, and will be as long as she lives, one of the most delightful women that ever obtained unalloyed praise of men without seeking for it. I can say no more."

The following letter refers also to the publication of the first part of the 'Conquest of Scinde:'—

Lady Campbell to Major-General William Napier.

"DEAR WILLIAM, "Jan. 9, 1845.

"A happy new year to you, and peace! I was pleased to hear from you at any rate, for it is but seldom we communicate, and that makes me often sad. I believe truly that you felt sorrow at being obliged to give me pain, but I am very sure you felt it a duty. I will not deny that I felt wounded and sorry and grieved, for the Aucklands have been kind and good and pleasant to me; and I have both respect and regard for him, and therefore I grieve. Your attack is very violent and home, and done in a masterly manner; but you need not shake your enemy so when you have him by the throat: it is not noble to turn the vial of your wrath upside down that no drop of bitterness may be lost. My dear William, you know I cannot be angry with you, only grieved. I sometimes think I once

was in Heaven and accustomed to peace, and that I did something wrong and was driven forth to wander among striving and contentious spirits; for my soul is vexed within me when I see fierceness and violence at all, and how do I suffer when I see it among those I love! And now let me tell you how delighted I was with every other part of your 'Scinde.' How I love and glory in dear, good, kind, great Charles, and how beautifully you set him forth! It must have been pleasant to write: the very reading of it put me in a glow. It is perhaps very impertinent in me to tell you that *sometimes* your metaphors and imagery run away with you and startle my critical taste, and yet it is a glorious richness and abundance. But you know, William, I consider your fame mine:

> 'For we were nursed upon the self-same hill;
> Together both, ere the high lawns appear'd
> Under the opening eyelids of the Morn,
> We drove a-field, and both together heard
> What time the gray fly winds her sullen horn.'

And this makes me jealous of every little speck. Metaphors frighten me and put me in mind of the waistcoat pockets of Lord Castlereagh's crocodiles; and I sound them and turn them, and if they do not ring quite true throughout I disapprove.

"How is dear Johnny? I trust better. I was just going to write to you about him when I found you have got him home. I cannot bear that ——, except that he is a most foolish old human being—I was in common parlance going to say *foolish old woman*—but self-respect forbids it.

"Guernsey does seem a little caldron. I cannot bear your being worried by such people. It is almost time but I am only now beginning to know the little mean wickednesses that the world is full of.

"Ever your affectionate cousin,

"PAMELA CAMPBELL."

Captain Henry Napier had now completed the 'History of Florence' on which he had been engaged for some years, but could not undertake its publication for want of funds. His brother William tried to persuade him to publish, offering to take one-third of the risk, and said he was sure their brother Charles would gladly take another third. Captain Napier would not consent to this, and his brother then made the proposal contained in the following letter:—

To Captain Henry Napier, R.N.

"Guernsey, May 12, 1845.

"I did not like to say anything to you until I was certain, but I can now tell you that I have 1100*l.* at your service for a year and a half certain, perhaps longer: it is in the Dutch funds, and consequently gives me about 4 per cent. If that will suit you, take it; and there will be time to write to Charles, who is richer than I am, to continue the loan at the end of that period. You can give me whatever security is necessary in case of accidents—I suppose a common bond of the cheapest kind,—and I will pay the expense. Don't make any ceremony; I shall lose nothing, and only change from a Dutchman to you. I wish you were as fat as one."

General Napier, struggling against his increasing bodily infirmities and his official vexations, continued to work at the completion of his 'Conquest of Scinde;' but at times he felt as if he must withdraw from Guernsey, the climate being peculiarly unfavourable to him. In July he writes: "I fear it will be impossible for me to remain here: my girls' welfare has hitherto forced me to bear it, but I cannot go on much longer, this climate destroys me. Ague every day for several hours, and the same at night, destroys my energy altogether. I am very ill indeed."

To his other labours was added in the course of this year that of supporting the accuracy of various statements in the 'History of the Peninsular War;' amongst others of one which had been published in 1831, relating to the capture of a howitzer at the combat of Sabugal. Napier in his History assigned the honour of the exploit to the 43rd regiment; Colonel Gurwood, after fourteen years' silence on the point, claimed it for the 52nd; and he printed a pamphlet for private circulation, in which, besides the matter of the howitzer, General Napier's credibility was assailed in respect to his relation of the assault of the lesser breach at Ciudad Rodrigo.*

Among many other letters which the historian received in support of his version of the capture of the gun, the following is given as a specimen as to the substance of those testimonies:—

Major-General Brown, A.G., to Major-General W. Napier.

"Horse Guards, June 21, 1845.

"I have not seen Gurwood's pamphlet nor heard much about it, although I understand it is handed about amongst his friends.

"I have shown your note and spoken on the subject of it to Patrickson and Duffy, and shall not fail to write to Gilchrist.† You may depend upon it there is but one sentiment in the minds of all those who know anything of the matter who are unconnected with the 52nd, and that is, that the howitzer was as safely deposited under the fire of the 43rd, when the 52nd—or a portion of it—came up, as if it had been drawn to the rear of the regiment. Neither was this point ever questioned at the time, or, as far as I know, for five-and-twenty years afterwards. The 43rd never

* Referred to in vol. i.

† Old 43rd officers.

retired further than behind the little stone wall to renew their formation, which had been somewhat broken in driving the enemy over the hill and taking the said gun on the crest of it. Had they anticipated this nonsensical hubbub after such a number of years they might easily have hauled it with them, but, not doing so, they left it where it was perfectly secure from any enemy so long as they were enabled to keep their position—within forty yards of their front and immediately under their fire. I am satisfied this is the account that must be given of the transaction from all disinterested men who are acquainted with the facts."

To the pamphlet above mentioned, and in answer to a letter from Colonel Gurwood which appeared in the 'United Service Magazine,' General Napier made the following rejoinder:—

To the Editor of the 'United Service Magazine.'

"SIR, "Guernsey, Aug. 1845.

"I have only this day seen Colonel Gurwood's letter in your number for the current month. My answer shall be short.

"1st. I repeat that to circulate privately amongst friends a pamphlet containing many strong letters and positive assertions which could thus scarcely reach the persons most interested in their perusal—containing also my private letters not written for publication—is scarcely meeting the question fairly. A pamphlet in which a deceased general officer of distinguished courage and great ability is directly charged with being stimulated by drink to a display of courage in battle, should have been publicly put forth, or not at all.

"2nd. Colonel Gurwood complains that my version of his claim is too free. This, I think, is rather fastidious.

To say one regiment retook and kept a gun which another regiment had lost, is surely not unfairly described as a claim for the capture of that gun on the part of the first-named regiment.

"As to the inaccuracy of my description of the storming of the little breach at Ciudad Rodrigo, it certainly involves what I have stated as Colonel Gurwood's claim, because he positively asserts that he was twice up the breach before the storming party arrived, and that he was the first to force it. I published a very different version of that event, and the matter is not to be peremptorily decided in Colonel Gurwood's favour. I gave my authorities; I adhere to them; I think them good, much better than Colonel Gurwood's recollections, wounded severely in the head as he was. I adhere to them in my right of judgment as an historian, because I consider them even better than Colonel Gurwood's and Pat Lowe's mysterious co-reminiscences, so carefully separated by him from living testimony, and having reference, I must suppose, to a ghost,* as he seems to shudder at the mere mention of them.

"3rd. I repeat it was not I, but Major Mackie, who disputed Colonel Gurwood's right to the Governor's sword. I gave Colonel Gurwood the credit in my History. Major Mackie called upon me as a matter of justice to publish his contradiction of my statement, and I know not why I was to refuse him. Why was I to adopt Colonel Gurwood's cause and tell Major Mackie, a well-known honourable officer, that I did not credit his statement? I did not retract what I had said of Colonel Gurwood's exploits,

* In the pamphlet referred to, page 50, Colonel Gurwood said:—"The facts, as I now state them, I can support by living testimony, as well as by the proof of my having been wounded at the top of the breach,—and by another, which I do not like to put to paper, and which I never told to human being till I read your appendix;—but to this there is a witness in the person of Pat Lowe, to whom I have never dared to speak on that subject since that eventful night."

though I had only his assurance for them. Those exploits were no doubt often published by him in books and in society without contradiction, previous to Major Mackie's claim in my work; but when that officer, admitting that Colonel Gurwood had captured the Governor and received his sword, affirmed that the merit of this capture belonged to himself, and gave facts and reasons in detail in support, it is too much to say that I am responsible for his statement, published at his express desire in contradiction of my historical statement in favour of Colonel Gurwood. I was not bound, nor was I asked, to decide on the accuracy of Major Mackie's statement by him or his friends. I told those friends that they must defend his statement if it was questioned, and I know that they have been and are prepared to do so. It is not his brother's fault if an answer to Colonel Gurwood's pamphlet has not yet appeared; it is not my fault if Major Mackie disputes Colonel Gurwood's claims. What right has Colonel Gurwood, with his array of French colonels and ghosts and clairvoyants, to insist on my taking on myself to reject Major Mackie's and his friends' testimony on a fact of which I can have no personal knowledge? His observation on the length of time which elapsed between the storming of Ciudad Rodrigo and my publication of Major Mackie's statement, is not reasonable: I could not publish it before I received it. Colonel Gurwood calls it an attack upon his honour, yet he left it unnoticed for five years. I am not the guardian of his honour nor did I assail it. My business as a historian was to deal with facts, and certainly Colonel Gurwood's attacks on my work, mixed with the Duke's Despatches, and to be found in other places also, gave him no claim upon my forbearance.

"4th. Colonel Gurwood alludes to an article on the Duke of Wellington's Despatches published in the 'Lon-

don and Westminster Review,' and bearing the initials 'W. F. P. N.,' as if he was only half entitled to attribute it to me. He need use no delicacy; I wrote that article, and I wrote my initials in full that no doubt might arise as to the author. I sent my name to the editor, but the rule of the Review was only to admit initials.

"5th. With respect to the Sabugal affair, I said I had authority, strong and to me conclusive, as to the taking of the howitzer. I say so again. I have that authority. I have not published the letters furnishing that authority, because Colonel Gurwood, by publishing without consent my private letters, which suppose that personal disputes may arise, has put the writers of those letters in a different position. When they wrote them they knew not how positive the 52nd officers were on the subject, and therefore I did not choose, nor do I now choose, to force them disadvantageously into a disagreeable controversy by publishing communications written when circumstances were different. I was not at Sabugal; I state nothing of my own knowledge; but the officers by whom I have been guided in my statements are for the most part alive: they know what they have said and written to me, and I expect them to respond to my appeal. If they do not, the 43rd regiment must bear the stigma of having accepted from the Duke of Wellington the credit of an exploit belonging to another regiment.

"6th. Colonel Gurwood quotes the 52nd records of the battle of Sabugal: that is not evidence. The 43rd records will tell another story; but I believe I am not in error when I affirm that Major-General James Ferguson, who was a captain in the 43rd at Sabugal, commanded the 52nd when the passage quoted was first inserted in the regimental records, and immediately caused it to be erased as inaccurate.

"Sir, I have now done with this subject. Colonel Gurwood may amuse himself with private or public pamphlets, but I will not go on for a life repeating what I have already published so often, namely—that I adhere to my authorities, and Colonel Gurwood may shake them if he can. He has not shaken my convictions.

"WM. NAPIER."

The above letter is given partly as an instance of the difficulties a writer of contemporaneous history must expect to encounter, partly because an impeachment of General Napier's accuracy as to the point adverted to having been inserted in a work of so much weight as the Duke of Wellington's 'Despatches,' an account of his life should contain his own justification from the charge of inaccuracy. The dispute concerning the captured howitzer at Sabugal is a curious example of the vitality of the *esprit de corps*—that spirit which breathes life into the regimental system of the British army—which could induce officers to stand up so warmly for the honour of their respective regiments twenty-five years after the exploit which was the subject of controversy. And all the points referred to in the foregoing letter show the difficulty—almost the impossibility—of sometimes reconciling the testimony of two men of undoubted honour and truthfulness, on events which passed under their eyes in the heat and excitement of battle. The allusion to "clairvoyants" in General Napier's letter will not be understood without the following narration, which will be admitted to be very remarkable in whatever point of view it may be considered.

Colonel Gurwood was very much disturbed in mind by the denial of his claim by Major Mackie to the honour of having captured the Governor of Ciudad Rodrigo and having received his sword, and spared no pains in searching for

evidence to substantiate his statement. While prosecuting this search in Paris (one of the witnesses required being a French officer whose life Gurwood had saved during the storm) he was invited to spend the evening with a Mr. Marcillet. The assembly consisted of ministers of state, ladies of distinction, officers of rank, and celebrities of different professions; and amongst the amusements of the evening an exhibition of the clairvoyant "Alexis" formed the principal. Gurwood, being asked by the host if he would like to question him, put some trifling questions, which were answered with such accuracy that he was induced to go deeper. His curiosity and interest were so deeply excited by the result that he had several subsequent interviews with Alexis, who detailed many occurrences in Gurwood's early life, and amongst others a voyage to South America during which the ship in which he sailed was in great danger. The subject of Ciudad Rodrigo was then entered upon, and the answer of Alexis to questions concerning the French officer whom Gurwood was anxious to discover—Colonel Husson—were such as to afford a clue by which that officer, who had been with the Governor of Ciudad when he surrendered, was shortly afterwards found, and confirmed Gurwood's statement on that head. Again, on being questioned with respect to the Governor's sword, he described the arrangement of different military weapons which were hung up in a closet in Colonel Gurwood's house in London, and the order in which they were placed. The first was described by Alexis as a sword which had been presented by Napoleon to General Barrié (the Governor), with respect to which he entered into the following minute particulars, namely—that a Toledo blade had been substituted for the original blade, which was broken; that a piece of ebony bearing an inscription had fallen out and been lost. He then gave the inscription, which was written down from his words, and added that it was very different

from the inscription "now on the sword." Inquiry was afterwards made at St. Cloud, where the sword, having been an *épée d'honneur*, was recorded, and the account of Alexis, both as to its having been presented to General Barrié by the Emperor, and the inscription on it which had been lost in Spain, was literally confirmed.

Many other curious things were told him by Alexis. He described accurately the Tower of London of which Colonel Gurwood was Lieutenant-Governor, and read inscriptions on the walls of a large room, stating that one of them was in Hebrew. He described Lady Jane Seymour, wife of Henry VIII., and declared that she did not die in child-birth, but was poisoned, exclaiming with agitation, "I see her being poisoned," &c. &c.

The above account in substance, with many additional circumstances, was published in the pamphlet to which General Napier refers in the foregoing letter.

There is no doubt that Colonel Gurwood was deeply impressed by the communications of Alexis, and the whole story must be regarded as very extraordinary, whether by those who believe in the *bonâ fide* nature of the transaction, or by others who, seeing nothing in it but a fraud, will marvel that a man like Gurwood should have allowed himself to be so practised upon.

The following letters, which passed two years earlier, are here published with reference to the subject rather than the date.

Lord Brougham to Major-General William Napier.

"MY DEAR GENERAL, "Grafton-street, March 25, 1843.

"I have been much urged by the friends of Lord Lynedoch to give him an opportunity of entering into some kind of controversy with you on St. Sebastian.* I have abstained from saying a word, because the lying papers

* Lord Lynedoch commanded the besieging force.

chose to propagate a low and ludicrous falsehood of a duel with an old blind man of ninety-six or seven. However, he seems bent on the combat, and I find from many communications since it was mentioned that some take part with you and some with him in the matter. I shall, however, keep out of it—as I gave no opinion of my own, but only said I was sure any wrong conduct could never be justly imputed to him.

"Yours very truly,

"H. BROUGHAM."

Major-General Napier to Lord Brougham.

"MY DEAR LORD BROUGHAM, "Guernsey, March 30, 1843.

"I thank you for your letter, though it has given me great pain. You will readily believe that I have the greatest respect, a respect amounting to veneration, for that glorious old soldier Lord Lynedoch. This on public grounds; and, privately, I have great reason to be attached to him. He was kind to me whenever he had an opportunity of being so; he may forget it but I do not; he has always been kind in the extreme to different members of my family, who were thrown in his way more often than I was. Lastly, he was the friend of Sir John Moore, whose sentiments upon every subject carry an indescribable authority with them.

"To enter into a paper controversy with such a man, when extreme age and infirmity are hastening him to the grave, would be, of all painful results from my authorship, the most painful; and indeed I could never do myself justice. I must suffer therefore from the conflict, and if you have any influence to stop it you will confer a great obligation on me; and I do not hesitate to say that you will also prove yourself a much better friend to Lord Lynedoch than any of those who are urging him to the controversy.

"It is now three years since my work has been completed, and several times I have been informed that the excellent old man was inclined to dispute what I had published about St. Sebastian; but always his real and judicious friends—and no man has more or warmer friends—have prevented him. Depend upon it, that those who continue to urge him now are vain and ignorant people, ignorant at least of the subject they undertake to *advise* upon,—perhaps I should say to *importune* him upon,—for it is evident that he is not so much inclined to begin as they are.

"What have I said? That Lord Lynedoch's own notions of war were far preferable to those of the people about him, but the latter often persuaded him to change his own just views for their imperfect plans; hence all this trouble. It is not his but their own satisfaction, under his name, that they seek.

"What I have published I can support; everything I have stated is correct; and the whole would bear a gloss much more offensive to Lord Lynedoch's '*amour propre*' than I have given to it. I strove to avoid the least appearance of disrespect; but to have given unmixed praise to Lord Lynedoch would have been to censure unjustly the Duke of Wellington. There were great faults committed at St. Sebastian, great errors; but they were all deviations from the instructions given by the Duke; and my authority is Sir Charles Smith of the Engineers, whose plan of attack was adopted by the Duke, under whose direction as chief engineer present the siege was commenced, though not carried on to the end; but through him *all* the Duke's instructions passed during the operations. He has written to me lately offering to stand forward in defence of what I have published on the subject, if a controversy should be unhappily commenced; but he also deprecates such a controversy, and for the same rea-

sons that I do. Lord Lynedoch knows him well and knows his ability and resolution too; and it is curious that very recently Smith dined with the venerable Peer, two other military friends only being present; and though the conversation turned upon the exploits of his long life, and that of St. Sebastian was mentioned, not an allusion was made to my work; a strong proof, I think, that there still exist the same just notions of what is fitting in Lord Lynedoch's mind, though some persons about him are still ready to break down his sounder judgment by their weak counsels.

"Pray excuse this long explanation: I am disgusted by the prospect of a controversy with that brave old man."

The next letter refers to a libel on Sir Charles Napier, which was copied from the French newspaper, the 'Siècle,' into 'Galignani.'

Major-General William Napier to the Editor of the 'Times.'

"SIR, "Guernsey, Aug. 1845.

"In Galignani's newspaper of the 18th instant I find this extract from the French journal called the 'Siècle:'—[Here follow extracts from the 'Siècle' and 'Galignani.']

"This intolerable calumny on the part of the 'Siècle,' repeated and countenanced by Galignani and addressed to the civilisation of Europe, demands that I should give it a formal contradiction, affixing to it the character it merits of gross and malignant falsehood. Atrocities! What were they? Can one be mentioned? Let the 'Siècle' state one act deviating in the slightest degree from honour, generosity, or good discipline! General Sir Charles Napier never committed, nor suffered any one under his orders to commit, any such act. He warred in Scinde justly; he

was not an oppressor. He fought two battles: the first, which lasted more than four hours and a half, he won with two thousand men against twenty-eight thousand brave warriors; the second, which lasted above three hours, was won with five thousand against twenty-six thousand. He has made two campaigns in Scinde; and governed that country, after having conquered it, for more than two years. During those campaigns and that government, no woman, no child, has been killed, oppressed, injured, or insulted; no man was killed or hurt save on the field of battle.

"Even that perverse, unmitigated calumniator, the editor of the 'Bombay Times,' never dared to assert more than that some of the officers of the army had seduced the women of the ameers at Hydrabad to live with them; and his mendacious accusation was instantly and publicly met with an indignant denial, published by the officers of the army, all of whom put their names to the document! No man in that army had ever seen one of the women!

"Now, Sir, I will place the French Colonel Pélissier's conduct in juxtaposition with Sir Charles Napier's, and let Europe judge between the British and French officers.

"Colonel Pélissier invaded certain Arab tribes because the French had commanded an aggressive war on the Arab people; and if the French newspapers on the occasion are to be believed, Colonel Pélissier roasted alive eight hundred helpless men, women, and children, with their cattle, rather than delay even for a few days his march of devastation against other tribes.

"General Napier invaded certain Belooch tribes because they had wantonly, and without the slightest provocation, descended from their mountains upon the territory of Scinde, plundered it, destroyed many villages, and murdered men, women, and children in the most barbarous

manner. They were not Scindian Beloochees; no war had been made upon them, no insult had been offered to them; they had commenced the contest, and he crossed the desert and entered their mountains to check their aggressive warfare.

"I possess a private journal of General Napier's operations on that occasion, written by himself, in which he set down almost hourly his views, his hopes, his determinations. During his surprising expedition which lasted fifty-four days, he encountered difficulties of the most oppressive nature. For first, he had to cross a desert nearly a hundred miles wide, not less desolate and arid, and in a hotter climate, than that of Africa; he had to march his troops and transport his supplies over it, and then to assail numerous robber tribes moving amidst stupendous rocks, where more than one imperial army had in former days been destroyed, and where recently those robbers had cut off many British detachments. His troops had to dig day after day for water; they were constantly on half rations; the Indian newspapers had all predicted his defeat and ridiculed the enterprise as that of a madman; his army, officers and men, brave and enduring to the last degree, obeyed his orders, sustained every fatigue, and bore every privation with unbounded devotion and courage; but had no hopes of a successful termination to their labours. He stood alone in his hopes and resolution to persevere; and when, by his firmness and his masterly combinations, the enemy, whose power to destroy his troops by starvation and fatigue had been represented as insurmountable, were themselves reduced to the last gasp by misery and famine—that is to say, when he was on the point of reaping the fruits of his indomitable resolution by their surrender—I find the following passages in his journal, the familiar style of which proves the sincerity of the feeling:—

"'February 1st. The rascally camel-men (commissariat) have, to the tune of 500, refused to bring provisions beyond Shahpoor' (this was a place midway in the desert, and the army was then in the mountains, as wild and as sterile as the desert), 'and I am fairly put to my trumps. Well! exertion must increase. I will use the camel corps (a fighting body), and dismount half my cavalry. If need be I will eat Red Rover' (his charger) 'sooner than flinch before these robbers.'

"'February 3rd. I knew I was right. I have intelligence that Beja' (the great chief of the tribes) 'and all his men are at Mundo, a place twenty miles in advance, dying of hunger. *Many expire daily.* Come! I will wait. Let them fast. In four days the pass will be secure, and then I am at you, Beja, and mean to give you a bellyfull. Aye but there are his women, and be hanged to them! I must get them and the children out of the way, even though he escape!'

"This was General Napier's rule of action.

"Colonel Pélissier's is but too well known, if the charge against him is not an invention of the French editors, which the falsehood of their charge against Sir Charles Napier gives me the right to suspect.

"W. F. P. NAPIER, Major-General,
"and brother to Sir Charles Napier."

The operations of Sir C. Napier which are referred to in the foregoing letter, were undertaken in January, 1845, and are related at length in the work which his brother William published at a later period, 'The History of the Administration of Scinde.' This campaign in the Cutchee Hills is one of the most extraordinary military achievements on record, and is well worthy of the careful study of the military student. Of this Lord Ellenborough says

in a letter, "His campaign in the hills was, as a military operation, even superior to that which was for ever illustrated by the victories of Meeanee and Hydrabad."

The Secretary of the British Museum to Major-General William Napier.

"SIR, "British Museum, June 27, 1845.

"I am directed by the Trustees to call your attention to the following passage, which occurs at page 9 of your work entitled 'The Conquest of Scinde. Part I.'

"'Mehemet Ali's faults were not the only objects of animadversion. A professional gentleman, living in Egypt, and not unwilling to be quoted as authority for the fact if its accuracy should be questioned, affirmed that *the comptrollers of the British Museum had directed the engineer employed to remove objects of ancient art from Egypt, to cut the statue of Sesostris into four pieces, that it might be sent to England more cheaply!*

"'The engineer refused compliance. Let antiquarians look to this matter. One rude British soldier prevented the Vandalism; another tells them of it.'

"You have been entirely misinformed. The Trustees, whom it is presumed you mean by the comptrollers of the British Museum, never gave directions for cutting into pieces the statue of Sesostris, or any other statue in Egypt.

"Your own sense of propriety will, the trustees are confident, lead you without delay to take every step in your power to counteract the injurious tendency of the incorrect statement to which you have given publicity.

"I have the honour to be, &c.,

"J. FORSHALL, Secretary."

and in one of the most cruel periods of them, was deemed barbarous, and yet it is now repeated and Soult defends it! for I conclude that there can be no doubt of the main fact. I hear the Indian abuse of Charles is undiminished and unmitigated, and yet I cannot help thinking that even that press will exclaim against such calumny as the French are endeavouring to fix upon him and England. Yet, when the 'Morning Chronicle' said that Lord Ellenborough found an instrument in Charles ready to execute all his behests, '*per fas et nefas*' (an expression signifying that a person is ready and willing to commit the most horrible crimes against God or man at the will of another), I don't wonder at the French following the example."

During Captain Napier's absence in Dublin, his children stayed with their uncle's family in Guernsey, and his brother writes in reply to the foregoing letter—

"Your children make mine quite happy here, and I don't think we can do better than keep them together as long as they are pleased. As for me, I am too much shaken, body and mind, to have much to do with either yours or my own. I am three quarters of the twenty-four hours in bed with ague, and the other quarter writing and fighting with the Court here."

The following refers to the receipt from India of a parcel of the 'Englishman' newspapers, published at Bombay, which contained an abusive critique of the first part of the 'Conquest of Scinde.'

way by arms, piled faggots at the entrance of the cavern, fired them, and smothered the whole multitude of men, women, and children. Only one escaped. When some of the adventurers brought to the camp their pillage, and told how they had got it, they excited universal indignation. Bayard went to the cavern with the provost marshal, and hung at its entrance two of the wretches who had lighted the fire.—Sismondi, Repub. Ital., chap. 106.

From Major-General William Napier to the Editor of the 'Englishman.'

"SIR, "Guernsey, Oct. 1845.

"I have the honour and pleasure of acknowledging the reception of a large parcel of the 'Englishman,' for which present I presume I am indebted to your munificence.

"I am bound, Sir, to return you my best thanks for having in so obliging and frank a manner furnished me with undeniable proof how justly in my 'History of the Conquest of Scinde' I have described the Indian press, of which you are, I hear, a distinguished member. It is delightful, Sir, to have the correctness of my opinion on that point, viz. the character of the Indian press, thus confirmed by so good an authority as yourself, and in such a natural unpretending manner, without labour or art, yet incontestably convincing.

"Pray, Sir, continue to send me these vivid self-expositions of your merit as a journalist. I should be happy to read them, provided, as on the present occasion, I am not to pay for them: that would be rather a waste of money because my convictions are already entire, and, however delightful your *naïveté* may be, it is scarcely worth purchasing."

The Sikh war now broke out. So early as February, 1844, Sir Charles Napier had predicted this war as inevitable. In June, 1845, perceiving that the storm was about to burst, he proposed to the Governor-General to organize an auxiliary force in Scinde; this proposal was not assented to at the time from fear of alarming the jealousy of the Sikhs; but Sir Charles was informed that he should have six weeks' notice for the organization of his field force before the commencement of hostilities. The Sikhs, how-

ever, were too sudden in their movements to permit of this notice being given, and the news of the battle of Moodkee, fought on the 18th December, was the first intimation Sir Charles received that the war had commenced. He then got together in a wonderfully short space of time a force of 15,000 men, perfectly armed and equipped, with which he moved up the Indus with the intention of creating a diversion in favour of Sir Henry Hardinge's army on the Sutlej by marching on Moultan and Lahore.

Meanwhile, however, the battle of Ferozeshah had been fought, and Sir Charles, suddenly summoned to the Governor-General's camp on the Sutlej, found that the war had been virtually terminated by the victory of Sobraon.

The following letter to his son-in-law affords an admirable commentary on these operations:—

"Guernsey, March 1, 1846.

"In case you have not an Indian map I send you the above tracing, and with it I will now give you the view I took of what ought to be Hardinge's plan of campaign; not a view taken after the event, but sent to my brother the beginning of last month in anticipation of what I supposed Hardinge would do. I think the operations themselves have been faulty, because a false conception of the military and political position of affairs was originally formed, rather than from any great tactical error in the details; of which, however, I cannot now judge in default of knowing all the circumstances.

"1st.—I set down as an axiom that, if the conduct of the Sikhs gave us a right to assemble an army on their frontier, we had a clearer right to look to the safety of that army when it was there. This must be the answer to any objection as to violating their territory in the following plan.

"2nd.—To cover and protect our country, that is to say, the country from Sirhind to Delhi, &c.; and to prevent the enemy's cavalry from ravaging it and raising insurrections in Oude, Gwalior, &c. &c.; it was imperative to take a defensive position unless we resolved to declare war, pass the Sutlej, and march on Lahore. But that defensive position should also be an offensive position if action became necessary; and how to combine those points without losing sight of military principles was the problem to be solved. Now we had on the Sutlej the posts of Loodianah and Ferozepore, but the latter was only a military point, too distant to be easily succoured, and so placed as to give all advantages of ground to the Sikhs. For they could menace it from Lahore with the whole army in two marches, and either attack and overwhelm it, or, continuing their straight march (while menacing that point) up the Sutlej to Loodianah, menace or attack that point, passing their irregular cavalry, 20,000, over the Sutlej on both sides, and spreading over the country between that river and Delhi, while the regular army attacked Loodianah and Ferozepore. The British army, if it attempted to succour both those places, must divide, and the portion moving by long marches to Ferozepore must lend its right flank to the Sutlej, which is fordable in many places, a proceeding quite contrary to military principles: and neither that portion, nor the one which succoured Loodianah, could prevent the cavalry from crossing on both flanks without disseminating the troops; and this would give the Sikhs, covered from observation by the Sutlej, the power of uniting in two marches, or rather one and a half, at either point, and overwhelming the portion opposed to it, while the irregular cavalry turned the flanks and devastated the country behind, cutting off communications exciting insurrections, &c.

"3rd.—Ferozepore is fortified, but not as it ought to be; it is an important point on the Sutlej with respect to Lahore, to Bhawulpore, and to the communications by land and water with Scinde. It had boats for a bridge over the Sutlej, which is there 270 yards wide in the low-water season: that was right, but war with the Punjaub has been a sure event for more than a year back, and the whole power of India was behind Ferozepore. To make it secure, the works should have been such as not only to protect stores and troops from anything but a regular siege, but the boats for a bridge also. The latter should even have been drawn upon land and protected by embankments and batteries. I will soon show you why. Ferozepore though an important point was beyond the operations of the grand army. It should have been occupied by a corps of occupation, composed of all arms, and commanded independently by an able officer. The base of the main army, or rather its place of arms, should have been Sirhind, which should have been fortified so as to resist the enemy's irregular cavalry and protect the stores.

"4th.—These things premised, a powerful advanced guard should have been placed in Loodianah with an entrenched camp, and protection for boats to form a permanent bridge there also. The stores necessary for the whole army should have been pushed forward there and protected by fortifying part of Loodianah itself, or by the entrenched camp; and the supplies forwarded when wanted from Sirhind, which is only one forced march behind Loodianah. Meanwhile the cavalry should have been disposed on the Sutlej above and below Loodianah, and in the latter place a field pontoon train should have been placed besides the boats for a permanent bridge.

"5th.—In this state—suppose the Sikh cavalry at-

tempted to pass above or below, our cavalry would be on the watch to meet them. If the Sikhs passed above, not only the cavalry on the river, but the Sirhind force, the Loodianah force, and the cavalry force below Loodianah, could converge to attack them, and they would be enclosed between our troops, the river, and the mountains. Suppose they passed below Loodianah,—then the cavalry, the Loodianah and Sirhind troops, and the Ferozepore troops, would converge to enclose them between the desert and the river.

"6th.—Suppose (as actually happened) the whole Sikh army kept together. We should have had Lahore swarming with spies, and the moment the Sikh army received ammunition and pay, and marched towards the Sutlej, war should have been taken for granted. The troops at Sirhind should have been moved up to Loodianah; the cavalry on the Sutlej called into the same place; and Ferozepore being left to its own resources, the army should have crossed the river, and marching down the *right bank* have thrown its pontoon bridge across the Beas river, and there taking post 'à cheval,' have sent forward all the cavalry with field-pieces to ascertain the position of the Sikh army. If it had crossed the Sutlej, half a march would then have placed its stores, reserves, and communications in our power, and we could either have followed it to the left bank, or marched on Lahore which would be only two marches off, whereas Sirhind and Umballa would be, for the enemy, four or five. If it had not crossed already, it would not dare to cross with the Ferozepore people in its front and the main army on its flank and rear. Negotiations could then have been commenced, or, if that was not desirable, everything would be in favour of the British.

"7th.—For, if the Sikhs turned on the army at the

Beas, they would find it in position behind that river with a free retreat to Loodianah; and the Ferozepore people, throwing their bridge, would be behind them. If the Sikhs, as is not probable, fell back and entrenched themselves in front of Lahore, the whole army could unite in two days in their front and deliver battle with Lahore as the prize of victory; and in case of defeat having the bridges of Ferozepore and Loodianah for retreat.

"This is my plan. Give my love to my child. I am far from well, going down hill visibly and painfully to myself, and my affairs here are unsatisfactory. I fear I must soon resign my government."

This was as perfect a plan of a campaign as it is possible to conceive, whether for preventing a collision by demonstrating to the Sikhs the hopelessness of contending with England; or, if they were infatuated, for terminating the war by one great blow. It is one thing to admire and appreciate the excellence of a plan when matured and displayed; another, to conceive it originally. As he says in his letter to Lady Hester Stanhope, God had certainly given him the head and heart of a warrior; and none but himself could know fully the anguish of mind he endured, conscious of his own gifts, in being debarred from playing a notable part in the great deeds which his bodily infirmities reduced him to the necessity of admiring at a distance, or, as in the case of his brother Charles, of simply recording.

From Major-General William Napier to Lord Cottenham.

"MY LORD, "London, July 27, 1846.

"Being entirely unknown to you, and without the slightest title to address you, it may happen that I shall be judged presumptuous; but I would rather it were so

than fail in aught towards the gentleman who is the subject of this letter.

"My Lord, the Reverend Richard Walter is curate of the vicarage of Woodbridge, near Daventry.

"He was wounded, being then a lieutenant, at the battle of Trafalgar; he took holy orders and has for many, very many years, performed the duties of a curate at Woodbridge. He has a large family—a very small stipend. The vicarage is vacant and in your Lordship's gift. I pray of you before you dispose of it to inquire as to Mr. Walter's character. You will find that he is one of those rare combinations of strong sense and childish simplicity of character, which are oftener described than met with in real life; a man of unbounded benevolence, natural piety, and unrepining humility; of an earnest mind; indefatigable, not in polemics, but in care for the moral and bodily welfare of his flock; a good man, and charitable in word and deed.

"I do not presume to ask for Mr. Walter's preferment, but I do ask of your Lordship to inquire. You will find Mr. Walter such as I describe him.

"I remain, with a full sense of the freedom I have used," &c. &c.

It is pleasing to know that this appeal was successful.

Major-General W. Napier to Lord Lyndhurst.

"My Lord, "Guernsey, Aug. 27, 1846.

"I read with a deep interest your indignant defence against what you deemed a calumnious attack. With much truth you said, the calumny once launched might spread and live while the defence was overlooked. Malignancy is a more active passion than the love of truth. But, my Lord, if you expect the sympathy of generous minds, your indignation at public calumnies should extend beyond your own defence. Read therefore the accom-

panying letter,* and learn to what an infamous depth of falsehood men in authority (not a hot-tempered party politician, but men forming a council of government) have descended. It was, my Lord, during the existence of the administration of which you formed a part, that this odious scheme for destroying the character of Sir Charles Napier was in activity. I have appealed to Sir John Hobhouse for justice, and he has responded to that appeal as an English gentleman ought to do, but has great difficulties to encounter and may be baffled. In that case I will invoke Parliament, and the power of public justice; and I now bespeak your Lordship's support if I am driven to such a course. I do so because I think I see in your defence of yourself the outbreak of a spirit impatient of such vile arts, and because the man for whom I ask your support has illustrated the Government of which you formed a part by victories, unparalleled, if the disparity of numbers and hard fighting combined be considered; because he conquered a great kingdom for England, and has since ruled it for good with a happy energy; and has therefore a glorious claim to the support of every public man of generous temper."

Lord Lyndhurst to Major-General W. Napier.

"SIR, "Sept. 4, 1846.

"I beg to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, containing an extract of a communication from Sir C. Napier. I need scarcely add that I, in common with every man of ordinary sense and information in this country, entertain the highest opinion of the character, talents, and eminent

* From Sir Charles Napier, complaining of accusations made against him in the Indian papers and by secret informers to the Indian Government, for which there was not a shadow of foundation; particularly one which accused him of restoring the transit duties in Scinde, and attributing to him improper motives for doing so. This false accusation had drawn forth a letter from the Board of Control, reprimanding him for doing what he had not dreamt of doing, and calling for his explanation.

services of that most distinguished officer; and if I can at any time be of service to him in Parliament, you and he may command my zealous assistance. He is entitled to this from me as a member of the late Government; he is still better entitled to it from his brilliant and extraordinary achievements, and the skill and success with which he has administered the difficult government intrusted to him. I readily sympathise with him in the annoyance and indignation which he feels at those unjust charges, particularly as coming from such a quarter; happily, however, they receive no credit here.

"I beg," &c. &c.

Major-General W. Napier to Lord Lyndhurst.

"My Lord, "Guernsey, Sept. 7, 1846.

"Your letter is such a one as I expected from a man of your spirit and sense; for indeed, my Lord, a cold ungenerous feeling is not wisdom where the character of a man of history is involved. You say, 'Happily, however, these charges receive no credit here.'

"But, my Lord, you see that, whether credited or not, they are used by the Secret Committee and others for annoyance and insult. I will say no more on that head. An accelerated death from the pressure of climate, vexations, labour and wounds, neglect and calumny, is, I foresee, to be my brother's fate; but he has always lived for honest fame, careless of ease or safety; and to prevent that fame from being tarnished by powerful calumniators was the object of my letter to your Lordship, and shall be the business of my remaining life."

Major-General W. Napier to Sir John Hobhouse.

"My dear Sir John, "Guernsey, Oct. 1846.

"Relying entirely on your generous efforts to do justice to my brother, I yet think it good to let you know how

worthy of your aid he is. You have seen the account of the devastation of the cholera at Kurrachee, but you have not seen an account of his exertions on that miserable occasion.

"The Quartermaster-General of his troops writes that the pestilence was so dreadful, men's heads were turned; fear overcame them; the soldiers, and even the assistants of the hospitals, rushed to seize the spirits delivered for the sick; the population fled into the desert; and a madness, which menaced the total destruction of the army and the town, had commenced, and nothing but the General's ability and energy could have stopped it. He visited the hospitals three times each day, and personally assisted in applying remedies; and it was touching to see even the dying men looking at him and blessing him for his care and sympathy. Europeans, Sepoys, and even the Beloochees, called him by name in their agonies, and expressed their sorrow that they died thus instead of falling under his command in the field. Do not suppose that his were mere ostentatious visits at his convenience. The hospitals were two or three miles from his residence, and one mile apart from each other; hence his visits were journeys of fifteen or sixteen miles in the day, great part on foot, and with the thermometer standing at 120° *in the shade!* at a time also when his own family was exposed to the pestilence. One of his two nephews who constantly went with him, buried his little daughter of two years old in the evening, and the *next evening* was buried himself by her side, having meanwhile persisted in keeping his uncle company at the hospitals! Think of the energy, the resolution, and the public principle of a man who, at sixty-four, and of the most acute natural sensibility, could thus rise above all family feelings, all bodily infirmities,—for he was very ill himself,—and perform his public duties with such a power of will and command, that even the madness of fear and

despair was arrested by his influence, and the soldiers of different nations and religions bent under his ascendency in resignation to a death most terrible and appalling in its form—and with no other murmur than a wish to have fallen under his command in battle! I appeal confidently to your heart and head, Sir John;—is this man, so distinguished in war, so able in government, so heroic, so full of fortitude in calamity, so regardless of everything but his public duty, a fit subject for calumny and persecution and wrongs and neglect? He tells me he is making out an exact statement of the financial condition of Scinde to send home, as an answer to the Parliamentary papers obtained by Hume. He tells me also that he has now completed a system of canals, sluices, and bunds, which will commence working the beginning of the ensuing year, and will be in full activity in less than ten years. It will give a complete command of the waters, and is so solidly and carefully arranged, that he speaks with confidence of the revenue being raised in a very few years to *one million*, and promising an incalculable profit finally from the wonderful fertility and resources of the country. The command of the waters being complete the unhealthiness of the country will be arrested, because the operations of the natural irrigations are as follow: the Indus overflows the land, and the crops, mixed thickly with weeds, instantly spring up in a surprising manner, but then the waters abate and the terrible sun burns up the land. Now if the overflow take place again within a reasonable period, the fertility is immense, and all is well; but this does not always happen, and when the second overflow comes at last, the crops and weeds are dead and their decomposition produces pestilence."

The publication of the second part of the 'Conquest of

Scinde' drew upon the author more than one bitter and angry correspondence, in which the strength of his expressions was more in accordance with that of his just and natural indignation against his brother's traducers than with conventional usage, and these will not here be farther alluded to.

The following letter, so full of wisdom, learning, and eloquence, embodies his opinions on corporal punishment in the army, a subject to which the public attention was directed by some recent instances, and against which a strong agitation arose. The opinion is all the more valuable, because he, of all men, could never be suspected of a leaning to the side of unnecessary cruelty; but his natural feelings and instincts were overruled by his experience and by his calm and deliberate judgment.

To the Editor of the 'Times.'

"SIR,

"The present very sudden and vehement public cry against corporal punishment in the army has arisen partly from ignorance, partly from humane feelings shocked by the false representations of designing persons. A question so seriously involving the welfare of—I will not say the British army—but the British empire, should however be discussed with more calmness and reason.

"That the cry is founded partly in ignorance is clear from this fact, that the ameliorations proposed in some of the public papers as things to be adopted immediately, such as the health certificate of the surgeon previous to punishment, are actually in force; and the system of courts martial requires only to be stated, to convince men not swayed by momentary passion, that the utmost regard for justice, tempered with mercy, is the characteristic of our military trials.

"For first, the military instructions inculcate forbearance and gentleness towards soldiers; a paternal exercise of authority to reclaim, and prevent as much as possible the necessity of any punishment.

"Now suppose the necessity to arise.

"The commanding officer of a regiment applies to the general officer for a district court martial. To obtain this he must state in writing the offence, the names of the witnesses, the nature of their testimony, and the character of the accused extracted from the defaulters' book.

"The general officer, after examining these things, and taking into consideration the character of the commanding officer, whether he be a calm firm man or a hasty violent one,—a man experienced in soldiers' habits and feelings or a youth of a zealous but ill-judging mind,—thinks fit to order a court martial. It is composed of officers of different regiments who can have no ill will or favour towards the accused; men of honour, not restricted by technical rules of evidence, but sworn to do justice according to their conscience and the custom of war.

"Meanwhile the soldier is furnished with a list of witnesses against him, and he is allowed to name those witnesses he desires to call in his favour; and if he asks for the aid of a friend to assist him in preparing his defence, it is granted. Be it remembered also, that generally speaking the witnesses are the prisoner's comrades, men in the same predicament as himself; and he is solemnly asked on the assembly of the Court if he has any objection to any officer present sitting on his trial. If he says 'No,' the Court then sits, having before it the surgeon's written certificate that the prisoner is in a state of health to endure corporal or other punishment.

"If the man is too dull or timid to conduct his own

defence, he is invariably assisted by the President or other member of the Court on all points which go to elucidate the truth.

"The Court comes to its finding; but before passing sentence, supposing that finding to be 'Guilty,' *oath* is made by a competent person that the prisoner had been warned that all former offences and convictions would be produced against him. Those offences, if any, are then produced and sentence is passed. The President then waits, with the minutes of trial (most carefully taken down, no interlining or apparent carelessness being allowed), on the general officer, who always questions him and often consults with the commanding officer besides, on the man's general habits, before he confirms or revises the finding and sentence. At the foot of the minutes he writes his remarks upon any irregularity; often he pardons; often reduces the sentence; he cannot aggravate it. Mercy is in his single power, but for severity many must combine. The checks do not end there. The proceedings of the Court are sent to the Judge-Advocate-General in England, a lawyer, who will interfere with illegal proceedings. They likewise go to the Commander-in-Chief, from whom emanate the instructions as to the necessity of a paternal and reclaiming discipline, and who will visit on the commanding officer the sin of frequent and unnecessary punishment. But it will be said, it is not the military courts but the military punishment of flogging that is offensive; a punishment un-English, degrading, brutish, and unnecessary.

"First, is it un-English? It has been an English punishment from the earliest records of our history. It is a domestic punishment. It is used in all schools. It is not long since women were flagellated in public under sentence of the civil court. It is only two years since twelve dozen lashes, with a whip far heavier than the military whip, was

inflicted in a gaol by the mere order of a magistrate without a previous trial. There is a charge now pending in the House of Commons against an infliction of a like nature in the Penitentiary. It is the common punishment in all our penal settlements.

"Degrading! Sir, it is the crime that degrades, not the punishment. The man is flogged because he has degraded himself. Is the severely flogged prisoner who is in gaol, less degraded than a soldier flogged in a barrack-square for thieving? Or is it meant that a civilian is so far below a soldier in dignity of character that the punishment which is just for one is totally inapplicable to the other? If the soldier is, and certainly he ought to be, of a higher character than the civilian in his class of life, the military offence is more heinous, inasmuch as he degrades, not himself only, but his comrades, by making them perforce the comrades of a thief. The argument of degradation begins at the wrong end; the theft is the degradation, not the punishment—whether that punishment be in a prison under the civil law, or in a barrack-square under the military law. *Brutal and unnecessary!* Abolish it in your households, your public schools, in your prisons, in your penal settlements, and then we meet on fair ground; but come not with eyes inflamed with passion, and hands red with the blood drawn from helpless children and prison delinquents by the lash, to stigmatize the military system for doing that publicly and with caution and after trial, to keep armed men in subordination, which you do in civil life without trial and secretly; when you have corrected the 'brutal unnecessary' civil discipline, take the following facts into consideration before you meddle in military discipline, or you will meddle to your own hurt.

"The British empire is one of the greatest magnitude;

and, being scattered all over the earth, depends more than any other great empire known to history upon the goodness of its army and navy.

"No army was ever yet good or formidable without discipline.

"Discipline is preserved by punishments or rewards, or by both together. Let us look back for examples of these different methods followed by great men or nations, and draw conclusions from their results.

"Alexander the Great governed his troops entirely by the hope of rewards, and he overcame the earth. Yet in six years he had to encounter two or three mutinies, which even his superhuman energy, his wonderful successes, his unbounded generosity, his kingly dignity, and the awe inspired by the belief of his divine nature, scarcely sufficed to quell; and the moment he died, his army became the lords and oppressors of the earth, partitioning it at their pleasure, setting governments up and pulling them down.

"Is the British army to become like the Macedonian?

"Hannibal was the greatest of all commanders, but how he governed his troops is not known: his system, whatever it was, died with him; but in his father's time promises of rewards seemed to be the chief spring of the Carthaginian discipline; and when those promises were not fulfilled the army mutinied, and it was long doubtful whether the state or the army was to be destroyed.

"Look to the discipline of the nation that conquered the world and held it in subjection for many centuries; that discipline which enabled the Roman soldier,—though inferior in bodily strength and courage and numbers to some of its enemies,—to overcome them all. How few mutinies ever took place with Roman armies! and always against the General, not the State, and from some cause extraneous to the national discipline.

"That discipline included stripes!

"The Romans in ancient days,—Tamerlane and the Janissaries of Soliman in the middle ages,—employed stripes for discipline; so do the English and Americans of modern times.

"It is said the best continental armies do not so—this is not true generally; but the British army has always overthrown every army it encountered. The British army is therefore the best army, and one to give, not take lessons; moreover, continental armies are fostered in a way not agreeable to British feelings. The military profession is the highest in honour on the continent; its members look down on civilians and treat them with contempt, and they are supported by the government in so doing. Would you have that distinction introduced into England? There was, if there is not now, an order in Prussia, directing a military officer who should be pushed in the streets by a civilian to put his sword through him.

"The best continental armies do not use the lash! What armies are they? The Russians use the knout. The cane is used by the Austrians, and is not entirely banished from the Prussian army. The Swedes, the Danes, inflict blows. The Portuguese and Spaniards strike on the breast and back with the flat of a sword, a terrible punishment. The French hang heavy weights to the legs, and use a variety of punishments which our soldiers would consider more degrading than the lash. I will give an illustration of this.

"During the occupation of France, a commanding officer ordered a soldier into the *Bull-ring*. This was simply moving in heavy marching order round a circle in the barrack-yard, a punishment invented to avoid flogging. The man had been distinguished in Spain by his courage and talents, and he was of a proud disdainful character.

He stepped up to the commanding officer and in a loud voice declared he would not go into the Bull-ring. The order was repeated: he replied, 'I won't; that is insubordination, and you must have me flogged.' The order was again given: the man dashed his musket down at the feet of the colonel and cried out 'I won't go; that is mutiny; you must now shoot me:' and the soldiers, all veterans, called out '*It is mutiny,—shoot him!*'

"Let us now consider what a British army is drawn from. The people of the three kingdoms are the strongest, the hardiest, and the most headstrong people in the world; a people given to intoxication; always taught to consider independence as a virtue; and of late years indeed to look on the higher classes as their enemies. As soldiers, you require of them at once to abandon all such thoughts, and to yield implicit obedience to restrictions on their natural habits and feelings; to lead a monotonous and uneasy life at home—one of hardship and privations and dangers abroad. You require them to march, to fight, to starve, to encounter storms at sea and pestilence on land; to abandon their native country and friends for years, for life! You give them little pay, few promises of reward, and still fewer rewards; and when worn out and miserable, and racked with pain from hardship and wounds, you send them in poverty to their native place, there to be despised and insulted; treated with scorn when he can serve no longer, he pines the lowest of the lowly. And now you raise a cry against the discipline by which only a man with so few hopes and so many privations, and so black a future, can be kept in due subordination!

"You say a better system of rewards and a milder discipline will bring a better class of men into the army, and corporal punishment will become unnecessary. But you do not give the rewards, and you take away the means of discipline.

And what is meant by a better class of men? The labouring, the working man, is in every point of view a better man for military purposes than the younger sons of tradesmen or farmers. First, he is quite as moral, generally more docile and hardier to endure; and in all nations patriotic devotion has resided more firmly with the poor than with the rich. The national spirit, the vital energy of patriotism, has always been with the poor of any country,—not always with the great and rich.

"But rich or poor, educated or uneducated, to make an army efficient, soldiers must be kept in subordination, because their life is one irksome to natural feelings. Their enthusiasm and courage may be excited by hope of rewards, but their fierce passions must be suppressed by fear; or woe to the country where they quarter!

"Ay! let them be kept in subordination, but not by stripes.

"To this it may be answered, that in all ages and in all nations stripes have been the punishment recurred to as the most fitting for military correction and example. Do away with this punishment in all other branches and cases, and still it ought to remain in the military code, restricted indeed in severity so as not to exhibit cruelty, but not so restricted as to excite ridicule and contempt;—restricted also to certain crimes which are degrading, viz.—

"Insubordination, which is degrading because it is contrary to the soldier's oath, contrary to the military character, contrary to the welfare of the country. Perjury, dishonour, and want of patriotism, combine to make military insubordination degrading.

"Outrage of women, which degrades men below the level of brutes, and plunges a soldier in the depth of infamy.

"Thieving, which needs no comment.

"Many substitutes for corporal punishment have been introduced, and many more proposed. They are however generally only fitted for quiet quarters in peace-time; and it appears dangerous to change to a severe code in war, when so much more is exacted of the soldier, and when, the enthusiasm of his nature being then awakened, the novelty of the punishment is sure to produce discontent. The heroic and grand feelings stirred by war, silence petty expedients and should not be cooled by any additional severity.

"The machinery of an army should act regularly: it is the only way to inure men to its pressure.

"Prompt, severe, and if the expression may be used, staring punishment, is absolutely necessary to keep in order both the sneaking and the hardy villains, who will and must always be found mixed with good men in the ranks of an army; and no punishment is so prompt and effectual as the lash. The cruel system of picketing, practised many years ago by the cavalry, presented nothing but the infliction of pain without the benefit of example. The man suffered terrible torture, and it was most injurious to his general health; but if he was hardy, a few drops of perspiration on his brow alone indicated his pain. But in flogging, the stripping of the man's back, the formal arrangements, the cutting of the skin, and the sight of the blood, is a great example to check offences as well as a severe punishment; and when kept within bounds, there is no injury to the general health. In most cases a few days suffice to restore the man to his duty.

"Sir, I offer these considerations with a very long experience of the feelings and habits of soldiers. I have never incurred the dislike of troops under my command either in peace or war; I have often had proof of an opposite feeling; and I have a profound sentiment of admira-

tion and attachment for the British soldier, founded entirely on my knowledge of his noble qualities, one of the most prominent of which is just appreciation of the necessity of discipline.

"W. NAPIER."

Since the foregoing letter was written there have been many improvements effected in the lot and prospects of the soldier by successive Secretaries of War, amongst whom the late lamented Lord Herbert stands pre-eminent. Nor should the share of the present Commander-in-Chief be forgotten in the good work which has been effected. Many of the alterations which have rendered the soldier at once more comfortable and more respectable originated with him, and in all he has warmly co-operated. Sir W. Napier, during the Duke of Cambridge's command of the army, expressed frequently to the author his warm and cordial approval of His Royal Highness's administration; no small praise from one whose standard was so high, and who was certainly not over indulgent to the weaknesses or shortcomings of men in power.

The marriage of General Napier's fifth daughter to Mr. Philip Miles, M.P. for Bristol, took place at the close of this year.

The year 1847 finds General Napier still occupied in fighting his brother's battles.

General W. Napier to the Editor of the 'Times.'

"SIR, "Guernsey, Jan. 6, 1847.

"In your journal of January 5th there is a leading article touching the expenses of Scinde, founded avowedly on your own correspondent's communications.

"I cannot believe you have any desire to give currency to the injurious falsehoods against Sir Charles Napier which continually issue from the degraded Bombay press,

and therefore I claim confidently the insertion of this letter.

"Your correspondent is deceiving you; and as he says facts are stubborn things, I give you the following list of them.

"1. Not a soldier has ever been raised in consequence of the conquest of Scinde except one Belooch battalion. The military expense is therefore not an expense of Scinde. Had that country never been conquered, the same, or rather a larger force, must have been kept up on the frontier.

"2. The large force now in Scinde is in consequence of the Punjaub war, and is not required for Scinde at all.

"3. Sir Charles Napier has for two years been urging the reduction of the force in Scinde to 5000 men,—the same number proposed by Lord Auckland to hold Sukkur and Kurrachee only, before the conquest. The troops are now to be reduced to 8000, probably on account of the more peaceable aspect of the Punjaub.

"4. The Scinde revenue is most flourishing. After paying the whole expense of the civil government, the police 2400 strong, and public works of a permanent nature, a surplus has been regularly paid to the general treasury of India.

"The exact amount of this surplus for the financial years ending April, 1844, and April, 1845, I have not at this moment at hand; but the surplus for the year ending April, 1846, was 310,000*l.* sterling! and that for April, 1847, will probably be 360,000*l.* sterling! Thus little short of 800,000*l.* will have been paid into the general treasury of India from Scinde in four years, during which, war, pestilence, and locusts have visited the country.

"The people are now happy and contented because they are governed with justice; they were, before the conquest,

miserable; and so far from the 'merchants visiting Scinde under the Ameers to improve commerce,' as your correspondent has it, they were driven from the country by the tyranny and exactions of the Ameers; and they have since flocked and are now flocking to Scinde under the protection of Sir C. Napier. In like manner artisans and cultivators are coming back."

This letter was in answer to statements of the 'Times' Bombay correspondent, and published by that journal to the world, to the effect that Scinde was a useless and expensive incumbrance to England, and that it never would be otherwise. Indeed it appears as though no man had ever had more persistent and unscrupulous enemies than Sir Charles Napier; their tenacity was doubtless in some measure to be ascribed to fury at the severe castigation many of them, especially those of the Indian press, received from General Napier in the 'Conquest of Scinde.' After they had exhausted their personal calumnies against the conqueror of Scinde, they took every possible means to depreciate the value of his achievements. The most disingenuous reasoning was employed to prove that Scinde was an enormous and useless yearly expense to the Indian Government. The whole expense of the troops quartered there was unfairly charged against that province; unfairly, because, if they had not been employed in Scinde, they must have been employed and paid elsewhere, except one Belooch battalion which has since done good service in the Indian mutiny. The fact also was completely ignored that, but for the complete subjugation of Scinde, double the number of troops there stationed during the Punjaub war would have been required elsewhere to neutralize the active hostility of the Ameers, who would unquestionably have made common

cause with the Sikhs; and that Scinde gave us a commanding strategic position on the flank of the Sikh army, which would have enabled Sir Charles Napier to convert decisively to our favour the operations of the Sutlej, if these had been of doubtful result.

The preceding letter was published by the 'Times,' with a leading article supporting the view taken by its correspondent.

Major-General W. Napier to the Editor of the 'Times.'

"SIR, "Guernsey, Jan. 13, 1847.

"To undertake a controversy with an editor in his own journal would be a folly. I shall therefore merely say that I am content to let my letter, which you have fairly published, stand against your article of the 12th instant.

"The question is, not whether you place any reliance on my statements, but whether the public will rely on them, in opposition to the assertions of your nameless 'correspondent.'

"I never supposed you had, personally, ill will towards Sir Charles Napier; but your 'correspondent' has misled you. Three millions! Why, Sir, the whole expense of all the troops, *quartered* though *not wanted* in Scinde, would not reach one-third of that sum.

"One word more as to the onus of proof. You adopted the assertions of a nameless correspondent. I deny their accuracy. It is for him to prove their correctness. He cannot."

Major-General W. Napier to the Duke of Wellington.

[Extract.]

"Guernsey, July, 1847.

"With respect to the regular military state of this island, it is very bad; the mania for economy in the wrong

place went so far that the hinges and locks of copper of the powder-magazine were sold, and iron replaced them! Some repairs and improvements have,—owing I believe to my repeated reports and memoirs,—been made in Castle Cornet and Fort George, but neither is in a state of defence. Upon this head, and on the defence of the Channel Islands, separately and as a group, and their influence upon the naval supremacy of England, I gave in memoirs five years ago to the Home Office and the Horse Guards; and my object now is to request your Grace's perusal of them. I am convinced they are right in military reasoning. My view is that by a few works well placed, instead of the multitude of ill-placed works now here, the enemy might be forced to assail the island in a given quarter, where the whole island force could meet his disembarkation with advantage, and without losing its retreat on the main fortress. That fortress, if put in good order, might hold out three weeks or more, because the ground offers an entrenched position outside for 1200 men, nearly inaccessible, and capable of preventing an investment. The great fault of the fortress is that, being only of the third order, it requires a garrison of the second order; and there are no provision magazines.

"The defence of Jersey is more difficult. An enemy cannot be prevented from landing, and I think the works now commencing at St. Catherine's Bay ill judged. Noirmont promontory is the point of real interest. The island of Alderney is however the key of the group, and the most important as affecting the naval supremacy of England in the Channel. It may easily be made impregnable; it cannot be blockaded, and it offers means for a large war harbour. In the hands of the French it would be a bridle on our commerce in the narrow channel between La Hogue and Portland Bill. In our hands it would be a bridle on

Cherbourg: if a tower one hundred and fifty feet high were erected on the Touraille, Cherbourg harbour would be looked into at only sixteen miles' distance, and a fleet of war steamers lying at Alderney would be always ready to follow the French fleet.

"The Admiralty have conceived all its importance, but the naval works commenced there and projected here are on an immense scale; and if the works of land defence do not go on *pari passu*, those works will be for the French! The works projected here are not begun, and would require several years to complete. The ordnance works have been laid down *on paper*, and, I do not hesitate to say, on too small a plan. The economy which renders a sea battery inefficient is misplaced.

"If Alderney be taken, not an unlikely event seeing it is but eight miles from the French coast, it can never be recovered; and then, increased facilities for a descent on England between Portsmouth and Dover would render it necessary to consider how London could be protected. If indeed 30,000 manœuvring troops could at once assemble, 80,000 enemies might, I think, be fended off from London, provided Chatham and Woolwich were in a state of defence; which places, if garrisoned by a mixed force, with armed vessels in the Thames below London and in the Medway, would secure the left flank. The St. Catherine's Docks and other water-cuts would, with a few well-placed forts, form an entrenched position to be manned by armed citizens and gentlemen, forming a base for the regular army to operate from, on the flank and rear of an enemy endeavouring to pass the Thames between London and Kingston. Chelsea College, the Penitentiary, and Hampton Court, offer entrenched posts for the armed masses which might be assembled along the left bank of the river to oppose a passage; and there would be no want of horse-

men for patroles. But could 30,000 troops be assembled? I fear not. I am however going beyond my province, and forget that I am writing to the Duke of Wellington. Upon the Channel Islands I can speak with more freedom, and I earnestly entreat attention to my memoir.

"PS.—Touching the invasion of England, I have seen in the secret archives of the Bureau de la Guerre a small book, made up for Napoleon, containing drawings coloured, and sections of those drawings, of every kind of vessel, from a ship of the line to a fishing-boat, with explanatory references and directions for making them by the shortest and most convenient method fit for the reception of artillery, infantry, cavalry, and stores. The quantity of each, and their best distribution, are very exactly defined both in the text and drawings; and a great expedition could be thus prepared in the shortest time with great ease. I have heard Algiers called the weakness of France! Strange weakness, which has given 200,000 hardy practised soldiers to that country, and formed fifteen or twenty young generals to the habits of war, and kept the *bureaux* in the practice of administration to armies and navies!

"W. N."

The Duke of Wellington to Major-General W. Napier.

"My dear General, "London, July 29, 1847.

"I have received your letter upon various matters, political as well as military, in the Channel Islands. I am no longer called to Her Majesty's councils, and I have nothing to say to the political matter in my official capacity, however interesting it might be even to the military defence of these important islands.

"I have long turned to them my attention, and am perfectly aware of their value to the honour, the essential

interests, and the safety of this country; and more particularly of that of Alderney to which you have adverted; and even in the very views taken by yourself, I have repeatedly urged the Government to lose no time in constructing harbours of refuge in these islands!

"The main defence of these islands must be their own native militia. It will be a great object to have that in good order and good temper at the moment of danger.

"I do not much like interfering in matters not under my official control; but if you will be so kind as to let me know officially what is necessary to be done, first in Guernsey, but in all the islands, to put the militia in an efficient state, I will represent it to the Government and will endeavour to prevail on Her Majesty's servants to attend to the matter. If I should succeed, you will have rendered to your country the service of rendering this militia force effective. But I recommend that facts should be adverted to only as evils or remedies, and that complaints of individuals or establishments should be omitted, particularly in relation to bygone transactions.

"There is not leisure for discussing old complaints."

CHAPTER XX.

POLITICAL SPECULATIONS. SIR C. NAPIER.

We are now arrived at the commencement of 1848, that year when thrones tottered and despots trembled, making solemn promises in their adversity which were easily forgotten in their more prosperous fortune. The eyes of reformers everywhere, but especially in Italy, had been fixed by the liberal measures of the lately elected Pope Pius IX.;—that amiable and well-meaning, but most weak and vacillating man, whose rash hand fired a train communicating with the hidden mines, which presently exploded more or less destructively under nearly every throne in Europe.

Such an ardent reformer as General Napier was not likely to contemplate with indifference the rising of the European bondsmen for freedom. The first fruits of the Papal policy, viz. the struggle of the Sicilians against the sullen and soulless tyranny of Ferdinand, excited in him the most eager sympathy; and his despair at their final overthrow, and at the cruelties which marked the triumph of despotism, was almost equal to that of the unhappy victims.

Then came the sound of the French explosion booming o'er the water, announcing that a king was, for the sixth time within the period of sixty years in the history of that unstable people, rejected by the French as their ruler; that Louis Philippe, the sagacious, politic, powerful mo-

narch, was a fugitive and a wanderer up and down the shores of the English Channel, in search of a passage to that country where in his youth he had found an asylum, and where he at length landed safely under the unpretending name of Smith.

England itself began to be uneasily stirred. The 10th of April was fixed by an "oppressed people" as their day of fearful reckoning with a "bloated aristocracy." The day approached and there was much anxiety; but of the many triumphs which England has been fated to record in her annals, the historic page bears none more truly great and pure than that of the 10th of April, 1848, when the only guardians of the peace who appeared in the streets of London were private citizens, and among them the present Emperor of the French, and when the only weapons employed were the shafts of a ridicule which utterly discomfited the foolish actors in that silly demonstration, and took away the occupation of their vain and unprincipled leaders for ever.

And here let it be recorded at this solemn moment,* while peace or war with America are yet trembling in the balance, that in New York on the occasion referred to people were far more anxious and fearful for the result than in London. When the steamer appeared in the harbour which was known to be the bearer of the tidings of quiet or revolution in England, the whole population flocked to the quays, agitated and eager; and when the words were hailed from the ship "All right in England," one great sigh of relief seemed to break from the multitude, and "Thank God!" "Thank God!" was heard from many a lip. England did then for once meet with real sympathy from Americans.

General Napier had resigned his government at the

* Written pending the settlement of the 'Trent' difficulty.

close of 1847, and in May 1848 he was made a K.C.B. as a mark of Her Majesty's approbation on quitting his command.

The following notes on the state of Europe were written by him about this time:—

Notes in anticipation of the state of Europe, A.D. 1848.

" June, 1848.

" France is in a state of revolution approaching anarchy. What will it end in? To form a guess, it is necessary to analyse the political elements and classify them by masses. 1. The National Assembly, the Executive. 2. The Republicans. 3. The Army. 4. The Working Men. 5. The Bourbonists. 6. The Napoleonists.

" The Executive is an emanation of the National Assembly and Provisional Government. It stands in place of the last, and does not either guide or control the first; it will share the fate of the Assembly, whatever that may be. The National Assembly has no coherence, no natural strength, no moral power. It has no coherence, because of its numbers, 900, which must generate factions, and because of its expense being paid, which must degrade it in time in the public opinion; it can have no moral power, because it is neither guided nor controlled by the Executive, nor yet does it guide, oppose, or control the Executive in the interest of the public; it is in fact one and the same thing with it, and must render all executive measures slow and uncertain and feeble, or sudden and fierce; it has no natural strength, because it has been chosen suddenly in a republican view and a republic is not the wish of the great body of the people of France; because it has enormous expenses to provide for and no money; because it has an immense army which it cannot satisfy, and a garde mobile which it overpays; because

it dare not lay on heavy taxes which would offend every party, and it cannot be vigorous in any manner since it is the representative of every party in the State, and consequently cannot combine for vigorous measures which must of necessity affect some or other of the great parties which it represents.

"The National Assembly therefore cannot govern. To do that it is necessary to have a fulcrum on which the political lever can be placed for action. The National Assembly has no fulcrum.

"*The Republicans.*—They are fierce, energetic, noisy, and have the power of the name. France is *de facto* a Republic; but it is only in Paris that the republicans are numerous, and even there not the most numerous; and they have no fulcrum but terror.

"They carry with them the weight of the labour question, which is insoluble; and the weight of anticipated blood-spilling, of attacks on property, and even on intelligence and knowledge; in fine, the weight of all the horrors of the first revolution. This weight of sin is too great for their strength: their fulcrum of terror is not in proportion to the weight they must lift: they may do great mischief and retard the settlement of the State, but they will render it impossible for a republic to exist.

"*The working men.*—This is one of the difficulties raised by the Provisional Government which will destroy the National Assembly as a government, which gives strength to the republicans of Paris, and will finally cause the nation at large to seek for another and more vigorous form of government. One hundred and twenty thousand men paid by the State for being idle and riotous is a madness which must spread universal anarchy, or be put an end to.

"But how can it be put down? By an armed force only,

or at least a government supported by an armed force. Will the government recur to the army? Then the Republic is gone when soldiers coerce the people. And what is to be done with the soldiers? Will 600,000 armed men condescend to remain quiet, or only use their arms against their countrymen, to please 900 civilians erected in times of anarchy into a government? Will they be content to receive ten sous a day pay when the garde mobile receive thirty sous? Can their pay be raised without financial ruin? Can the pay of the mobiles be reduced without mischief? Will they be content without a war? and if they go to war, will not their favourite general soon become the monarch of France? But who are they to go to war with? Russia is too far off, and there is no other nation except England which has not adopted, or is not adopting, the principles of free government.

"It is I think evident from all this that France cannot remain in her present state, and that, tired of commotion and frightened for the future, she will seize the first opening offered for having a settled and firm government, and will rally round whoever offers it with a tolerable prospect of success, unless she is meanwhile precipitated into a war with England. At present only three parties are visible capable of supplying this want of France—viz., the older Bourbons, Louis Philippe, and the Napoleon family.

"The first party has money but is weak in numbers, and, since the recent revolution, has no foreign support except in Russia, which is however too cunning to involve itself deeply in support of such an interest. The shame of taking back a Bourbon and the real dislike to the family, young or old, which pervades the mass of the French people, will prevent the restoration of either branch; and neither the Duke of Bordeaux nor any of Louis Philippe's family have character or talents to overcome those feelings in the nation.

"There remain the Buonapartists; and the struggle will be between them, the terrorist republicans, and the present government or rather system of government. I have shown that the present system cannot last, and that the nation at large looks anxiously for a means of extinguishing the terrorists. A Buonaparte uniting the lustre of the name with some talent would be accepted at once by the army and the people, by foreign nations, by everybody except the terrorists, with satisfaction, provided he does not thrust himself forward in an untimely manner. If he shows himself now he will be powerless; he will thereby lose the moral effect of his name, and appear, not as the representative of the great man, but as a forward, vain, and ambitious youth. Let him wait until, pushed to the wall, France sees no other resource against anarchy and terror than a restoration of monarchical authority, and she will naturally turn her eyes on the representative of the great Napoleon, and choose him herself without his appearing to seek the aggrandizement, because in him she will find some talent, considerable energy, and a good character, and also one who will unite more discordant elements than any other person. The proof of talent and fitness for the occasion then in Louis Napoleon or some other of his family, will be shown by passiveness now and energy hereafter; for once chosen, he must be prepared with a system of well-considered energy.

"VIVE NAPOLÉON!

"But, when chosen, what will he be called—what must his system be? Will he be Napoleon the Third, or Dictator, or Consul, or President? Shakespeare asks, 'What's in a name?'—nothing, if you refer to the essential qualities of the thing; but a great deal if you refer to its effects on men's minds. To call a rose a thistle will not deprive it

of its sweet odour, but to insist on all mankind calling it a thistle would be madness.

"In favour of Napoleon the Third would be the taking away the appearance of being an upstart, and it would gratify the proud recollection of the Buonapartists by perpetuating the hero's name and dynasty. Against it would be the despotic idea contained in the title and the general tendency of the world towards equality and the extinction of titles; against it, also, would be the want of an hereditary and territorial aristocracy to stand between the sovereign and the people. An emperor jostled in the streets by a working man would soon become ridiculous; and his system must be founded on the new ideas of equality and liberal government. *Dictator*, or *Consul*, would satisfy the theatrical vanity of France; and *President* would not satisfy that vanity, especially as it would be borrowed from America; but Consul would, from the associations of ideas, be considered as a step to becoming Dictator and render the nation uneasy and suspicious. Dictator would satisfy most of the conditions of the problem; it would please vanity, it would give a firm executive without an odious name. But shall he be a Dictator for life only? or hereditary? or only for a period?

"The last would expose the nation during every period to the dangers of convulsion, not only from the sudden and fiery ambitious temper of the people, but also from the intrigues of surrounding nations. America is no example in point: she is not surrounded by dangerous neighbours; and she had no ancient associations of idea like France to contend with when she adopted the system of rotation; it grew naturally out of her revolution, and moreover it will probably not last many years longer.

"A dictator for life only would be still more dangerous. Poland is an example in point; and in France, where the

whole people and not the nobles only as in Poland, would have to vote, it would be impossible.

"26th June.—The turn which the convictions in France seem to be taking is in favour of a General rather than the young Napoleon, but this cannot be judged yet with any certainty: the people of France are opposed in feeling to the Republic, and it is that Republic which has just got the upper hand in Paris: it is true that a republic of terror, which is more dreaded and disliked, has been put back, but the French generally will dislike the notion of troops slaughtering the Parisians: the troops in distant parts may take a different view of matters: other Generals may think their chance as good as Cavaignac's or Lamoricière's: and when things, as they must do, become more menacing to the tranquillity of the whole kingdom, Napoleon's name will again be heard.

"Meanwhile war is impending. France cannot support 600,000 men in arms without a war. She may and will probably demand Savoy as a balance to the kingdom of Lombardy: or she may enter Italy, which will give rise to great combinations.* She must then, I think, also enter Germany; and if she does, she will go with the German republicans in a crusade against thrones.

"Now look to the north: Russia has a good cause in aid of Denmark; she can involve Sweden, Denmark, and herself in war with Prussia and Germany, certain that France by interfering will only render the matter more perplexing and inextricable.

"She can then use the 50,000 men she must keep in Poland as her aid to Sweden and Denmark: it will give her a force of 100,000 allies to fight distracted Germany; and Russia can support that force without trenching upon her main army — which I take to be 200,000 good

* A remarkable prophecy.

troops; and which she can, and will I think, suddenly move upon Constantinople, aided by her fleet in the Black Sea. Who can stop her? Not England, with her pitiful Mediterranean fleet, and Ireland in commotion. Not Austria, for she is distracted and torn up as an empire, and Radetzky, I imagine, is now only fighting to save appearances and gain some compensation for the loss of Italy. France may indeed interfere with Russia; she may put 15,000 men on board her fleet and go to Constantinople, but then there must be negotiation with the Turks—slow work and dangerous for Turkey: to be effectual in her interference she must get England to co-operate. But suppose her troops on board and sailing: may not Russia, by a secret negotiation with France, procure sealed orders for the Admiral to bring up left shoulders at sea and land in Egypt, where she would be at once firmly established; and she and Russia would laugh at England, and easily justify their policy. Much will however depend upon the value the Emperor Nicholas puts on his projects in the north of Europe. He may consider the gain of territory there, which would make him preponderate in the Western world, a greater thing than the gain of Constantinople, which would make him master of the Eastern world. He may, from fear of the spread of revolutionary principles, concentrate all his efforts on the side of Germany; and in that fear overlook the fact that Constantinople will give him in time the command of Europe as well; and with this additional advantage—that he will find his capital in the midst of a people used to a despotism almost as bad as his own. Meanwhile the republican bubble has burst: soldiers raised by Louis Philippe have been employed by Lamartine to slaughter the men of the barricades? How will this affect the rest of France? How affect the rest of the army, removed from the in-

fluence of the personal anger engendered by insults in Paris? The red republic will meet no favour in France, but a great slaughter will affect men's minds, and take perhaps some new aspect, no matter how unreasonable, which will give rise to new combinations of political passions. One thing appears to me certain: no government resting on the basis of a massacre of the Parisians can last long. Will the Mobiles become the nucleus of a Pretorian guard? I can conceive no mode for France to get out of her difficulties and avoid a civil war, except a foreign war; and even now that is uncertain, because the civil war is in fact commenced at Paris, and will perhaps spread too rapidly to be extinguished by any means. Meanwhile it may be worth noting a small cloud menacing the interest of England, which in the event of a war with France might become very formidable. England has, by a timid and ungenerous policy, been false to her engagements with Denmark; Russia and Sweden have seized the opportunity of appearing, and being in reality, the saviours of that country. Here, then, is a triple alliance of maritime powers; and it only wants the junction of Holland to reconstruct the quadruple alliance or armed neutrality of former days, against the maritime supremacy of England. I do not understand Lord Palmerston's proceedings, unless they are the result of conscious weakness or the secret feeling that England cannot go to war. If that is not the motive of his conduct to Denmark, it must be that, fearing a quadruple alliance, he wishes to give Germany a sea-coast, knowing she cannot be for many years a formidable maritime power; and that meanwhile she will weaken the maritime power of Sweden, Denmark, and Russia, if she obtains an opening for being one; and by thus favouring Prussia, Lord Palmerston hopes to influence Holland; but Prussian influence over Holland is through the king only,

and he is not in favour with the nation, which is moreover discontented with England now on account of her settlement in Borneo, and the evident intention of establishing herself firmly in the Indian Archipelago.

"What would be the consequence to England if, at war with France, and on uneasy terms with America, the four northern maritime powers were to unite against her?"

Continuation of Notes in anticipation.

"Oct. 27, 1850.

"The cloud mentioned in my former notes as arising over Denmark seems now ready to burst in a storm over Europe.

"1st. France and Russia are in concert to force Prussia to give Denmark peace, and England is invited to join them. England cannot do so without great danger; she would thus lend herself to the aggrandizement of those powers, when it is her interest to prevent such aggrandizement at the expense of Prussia. But she cannot in honour abandon Denmark, and it remains to be seen if her interference singly can effect a peaceable termination to the great difficulty under consideration.

"That will, I think, depend upon the views of Russia.

"There can be no doubt that Russia is ambitious of getting to Constantinople, and that the occasion is most favourable. For she can offer France—about whose desire to go to war there can be little doubt—the Rhenish provinces of Prussia, while she takes the Polish provinces of that power; and then in concert with France she can safely move on Constantinople, offering France herself Egypt in payment for her aid.

"2nd. What are the resources, what the difficulties, of this line of policy?

"Russia and France can bring about 1,000,000 of fighting men into the field, and they will have the whole

Danish army besides, and probably the Swedes and the Dutch also.

"Prussia can produce about 500,000 men for a short time, but she cannot bear the expenses of a long war, and England will not be able to subsidise her.

"But Prussia looks to be head of the German empire, and is supported by all the German liberals—a great and terrible force, but equally terrible for herself as for others.

"She will have also the power of exciting the Poles to rise; but then she must offer them an independent existence, and her king must take the title of Emperor of Prussia or Germany, and King of Poland. These elements of revolutionary war will be difficult to excite by a nation without money-capital like Prussia, and the shock of arms will probably break her army to pieces, and introduce a general revolutionary tone of opinions in Germany and Poland, in Bohemia and Hungary, and in Italy also, in which Prussia will disappear altogether, as if no such state existed.

"It is therefore probable, if Prussia is governed by reason, that she will avoid this danger and submit; but I believe her ambition, and extreme military arrogance and vanity, will not let her submit.

"3rd. Now let us look at Russia: her ambition is undoubted, her military power immense, and everything promises success externally; but there may be internal dangers which the Emperor Nicholas is afraid to light up by engaging in a great war of opinion. If these considerations weigh with him, he will cover them with a pretended moderation, and only increase his preponderating influence in Germany by negotiations, while he prepares other opportunities. But will his nobles agree to this? The extension of Russia to Constantinople is not a personal ambition, it is a national one. Can he dare to refrain? It is hard

to judge here, the knowledge of the interior politics of Russia is wanting.

"4th. Austria must also be looked to; how will she behave? I think, from Schwarzenberg's character and her own political position, she will join Russia, and accept of the guarantee of France and Russia for Italy and the concession with it of Bosnia and Servia.

"5th. What can England do? Remonstrate, inveigh, menace! She cannot go to war on one side or the other, but she must not let Russia get into Constantinople, and France into Egypt. How prevent the first? Russia is too well prepared, and too near, to be forestalled there. She must keep her forces well in hand, talk big and seem to look to the north only; but if war begins, dash into Egypt and keep it, acknowledging the supreme authority of the Porte.

"W. N."

Sir Charles Napier, having resigned the government of Scinde, had sailed from Bombay in January, and his arrival in England was anxiously looked for by his brother.

When he first set foot in Scinde he found society without the protection of law. Slavery was widely spread; murder, especially of women, of almost daily occurrence; robbery universal: the only law was that of the strongest.

When he quitted Scinde, he left it without a slave. The turbulent Beloochees, whom he had found with sword and matchlock—the licensed robbers and oppressors of the poor—had been compelled by him to shoulder the spade and mattock, and were submissive to a constable's staff.

He had in short found a divided population: misery and servitude on the one hand, on the other a barbarous tyranny. He left an united, regenerated people, rejoicing in a rising civilisation, the work of his beneficent genius.

His system of government to which these almost marvellous results were attributable, was one of the most even-handed justice tempered with mercy, of untiring labour, inflexible resolution, and the whole directed by an administrative ability rarely equalled. "No one," said Sir Robert Peel, "ever doubted Sir C. Napier's military powers, but in his other character he *does* surprise me. He is possessed of extraordinary talent for civil administration."

Sir Charles arrived in England in June, and went through the usual routine of eating and drinking which is the inevitable tax to be paid by every Briton of distinction, and seems indeed to be as inseparable a part of the constitution as king, lords, and commons.

At one of these feasts, Sir Robert Peel in a public speech addressing himself to Sir C. Napier, said, "he had not received the honours and rewards to which his great actions had entitled him." At a dinner given to Sir Charles by the Junior United Service Club, Sir William, being a guest, spoke as follows in returning thanks for his health being drunk:—

[Extract.]

". . . . And since you, my lord, have been good enough to allude to my literary labours, I will say that I did endeavour to tell the story of British triumphs in the Peninsula and elsewhere (looking to Sir C. Napier) in a manner becoming the subject. I failed because the subject was too great for my powers, but I did my best; and the errors, numerous as they are and could not fail to be in so extensive and difficult a work, were unintentional, for I wrote in all truth and honour, guided by the remembrance of a saying addressed to me by a military friend, a man of keen judgment and disposed to enforce his advice by strong illustrations when he was in earnest. 'You,' said he, 'are

going to commence a contemporary history—a difficult affair: do not hope, do not expect, do not try, to please everybody. God Almighty does not please all men, how then should you?'

"Well, gentlemen, bearing this striking illustration in mind, I did not write to please anybody; but I did endeavour to write that no man should have just grounds to be displeased with me. In that also I fear I failed, but as I have already said, not intentionally. I wrote in all truth and honesty of purpose.

"But, my lord, I am talking too much of myself; I am forgetting the force of a proverb which I ought to feel in this presence more strongly than on any other occasion. I mean that proverb which says there is all the difference in the world between sayings and doings. I am but a sayer, and I am in the presence of doers; I have merely recorded the great actions which others present have performed, and therefore I will cease to speak of myself; for pleased, gratified as I am and must be—or I should not have the feelings of a man—at the compliment I have received, I am infinitely more pleased, more gratified, by the opportunity which your kindness has given me of beholding the honourable manner in which the gallant officer in whose honour this banquet has been given, has been received by his brothers in arms on his return from India.

"That return has been to me a marvel and a wonder: I had long given him up as lost. I looked upon him for years as a man standing on the confines of two worlds—the world of the living and the world of the dead; and it was only from time to time that I could know to which he belonged. But always I took the gloomy view and supposed him dead, for he was, I knew, exposed to the sweeping edge of the sword from which he never shrunk; and amidst herculean labours exposed also to wasting pestilence

from which I knew he never would shrink; and there are those here present who know how he met and strove against the cholera when thousands were swept away, and all were bent beneath the deadly blast.

"Lastly and worst of all, I knew he was exposed to the poisonous breath of calumny: that he was assailed by the foul and dishonourable practices, the open and secret practices, the base enmity of those who owed him every honour and every gratitude. And that I knew would press on his generous spirit more heavily than any danger or any difficulty.

"But, gentlemen, he has returned; and there he sits with the rays of an honest glory around him strong enough to dispel the foul vapours of calumny.

"That glory has been pronounced honest by the Duke of Wellington in the House of Lords, by the two Governors-General under whom he served, by the Senior United Service Club at a recent banquet, and by you, gentlemen, this night in social intercourse.

"All, all have declared him a good and gallant soldier; and who shall gainsay their judgment? Neither you, gentlemen, nor those other persons I mentioned, have looked with apathy or supercilious insolence on his deeds; you have not judged great battles, bravely and skilfully won against overwhelming numbers, as flagitious deeds dishonouring to the country! You have not considered the conquest of a great kingdom in a just war, and its able, peaceable, successful government for five years afterwards, as inexpiable offences; and it is when men like you—men of action—when men like the Hero of the hundred victories, men who have served and commanded—greatly and successfully commanded—proclaim a general's merits, that he may let his thoughts swell, and with decent pride and without vanity say, 'Yes! I am a good and approved

soldier, for I have been declared so by the officers of the British army and the British navy!' The British navy! The British army! Oh, gallant company! What a rushing sound of glory comes with those simple words! That navy! that army! which has made the British empire what it is—ay, and will keep it so!—not indeed the most military, but the most warlike, the most powerful, the most formidable that ever yet sent its legions over the broad surface of the earth conquering and to conquer!

"Gentlemen, I again thank you; and I drink to your health this hearty wish—that you may retain your present health and vigour of body and mind, until the coming generation may be able to see and tell their children what manner of men they are who in the olden times led the way to victory in a thousand battles.

"And, my lord and gentlemen, while giving utterance to that wish, let me add to it a few words expressive of my attachment and admiration of those gallant men—the sailors and soldiers—at whose hands so many great actions have been achieved. Well you know what fighting men they are and ever have been. Well you know how they have followed wherever you have led, without a thought whether that leading was to be through the destructive waters of the ocean in its rage and wildness, or through the wasting fire of the deadly breach.

"Well you know that wherever a British officer has raised his battle-cry, and that has been wherever danger was rifest in every quarter of the globe, instantly it was answered by the loud, pealing, rattling shout of the British sailor and soldier, ready to do and dare—ay, and doing and daring—everything that man may do or dare.

"And now, when those devoted men have spilt their heart's blood for their country's cause, they are to be called human butchers! But they are not so, they are props

and stays of England's glory and prosperity; honour to them, they deserve all honour!"

Meanwhile the weak and wicked proceedings of a small knot of Irish enthusiasts had culminated in the bloodless "cabbage garden" rebellion; and Mr. Smith O'Brien, with his associates, was committed to be tried for high treason.

Sir William Napier was summoned as a witness for the defence; and as the circumstances attending his appearance at the trial excited much comment at the time and subjected him to severe animadversion, some explanation is required to place his conduct fairly before the reader. During the troublous times which preceded the passing of the Reform Bill, and while a popular insurrection seemed imminent, Colonel Napier received from the private secretary of Lord Melbourne, then Home Secretary, a letter containing questions and suppositions so extraordinary, so unjustifiable in his opinion, even when proceeding from a familiar acquaintance, as to excite in him much indignant feeling, and moreover a conviction that this gentleman was acting as the secret organ of the Ministry. The letter pointed to the possibility of Colonel Napier's joining and leading an insurrectionary movement. It was written (as its author afterwards stated) in a moment of giddy excitement, and without the knowledge of Lord Melbourne; and the indiscretion of making a communication so inconsiderate was frankly acknowledged, while the construction attempted to be fastened upon it was solemnly repudiated. Of the sincerity and truth of this disclaimer there can be as little question as of the extreme indiscretion of the communication. To Colonel Napier it was highly offensive, as involving a doubt of his loyalty and good sense. He was, moreover, prepared, by his mean opinion of the Whigs at all times since the death of Mr. Fox, and especially at that

moment, for any amount of disloyalty and treachery on their part. He believed them to be trafficking for their selfish ends with the honest enthusiasm of the masses, and to be ready to avail themselves even of their insurrectionary violence, in order to pass a measure which would transfer to the Whig party the power and emoluments of office. He had no special knowledge at that time—he had afterwards—of the frank, loyal, and chivalrous character of Lord Melbourne. It must also be admitted that it was a characteristic of his mind readily to believe any good of those whom he loved, any evil of those whom he disliked. He disliked and distrusted the Whigs; and this letter was to him therefore "confirmation strong as proof from Holy Writ" of the treasonable designs of that hated party. Nor was he probably uninfluenced by the knowledge that his views and objects were mistaken by many who could not appreciate the nobleness of his aims and the elevation of his character. The following anecdote, given on the best authority, is a proof of the extent to which this mistake had been carried. Colonel Shaw Kennedy, having in those uneasy times military charge of Manchester and all Lancashire, was in frequent personal communication with the authorities at the Home Office. On one of these occasions he was informed by the Under Secretary of State that it was supposed that Colonel Napier might lead fifty thousand men against London. Colonel Shaw Kennedy replied that he had received a letter from Colonel Napier on the subject, from which it appeared that some such proposal had been made to him, and that he had answered it by severely rebuking those who had made it, and had explained to them fully the madness and wickedness of their scheme. Colonel Kennedy added that nothing could be more fortunate than that these men should have applied to Colonel Napier; for, knowing him intimately, and being

quite aware of the strong Liberal opinions he held, he also knew that there was no man in England who could be more thoroughly trusted than Colonel Napier to oppose all attempts at insurrection or revolution; and that his great talents and influence with the people made him most useful in averting the danger which the Government feared. Colonel Shaw Kennedy further requested the Under Secretary to communicate this assurance to the Ministry, giving his name as a pledge for its truth.

Strong, therefore, in these convictions, Colonel Napier informed his correspondent that if ever men's lives were put in jeopardy by the Whigs for doing that which they themselves, for their own party purposes, had encouraged the people to do in 1832, he would, if called upon to do so, produce the letter. Mr. Smith O'Brien's brother became acquainted with these circumstances, and on his application Sir William permitted him to show the letter to the counsel for the defence; and, although no man in his senses could see in it, whatever its true interpretation might be, any excuse or palliation for the offence with which the Irish rebels were charged, it was thought that, if skilfully used, a great effect might be produced by reading it to the jury. Sir W. Napier was therefore summoned to produce Mr. ——'s letter; but the Judge very properly refused to admit it as evidence. It found its way, however, into the 'Freeman's Journal,' with the following comments from the editor:—

"Before we place this remarkable document before the public, it is due to the gallant, brave, and generous soldier to whom it was addressed, to state how its existence became known, and the circumstances under which its contents have been divulged. The gallant Napier returned an independent reply to Mr. ——, stating that he had received his sword from the hands of his Sovereign and

that against that Sovereign he would never unsheath it. The Whigs, through the secretary of their chief, applied to the loyal soldier requesting that the letter should be returned, in order that the written evidence of the 'conspiracy' might be destroyed. Colonel Napier's reply was worthy his brave deeds and honoured name. He peremptorily refused—stating, at the same time, that he would never divulge its contents, or allow it to be made public, until the Whigs should capitally prosecute a British subject for the offence of which they themselves were guilty. But the same soldier's honour that pledged him to secrecy under certain circumstances pledged him to render this letter and the conspiracy it disclosed matter of history whenever the Whigs should dare attempt to deprive of life a British subject, whose only imputed crime was to follow the course of policy adopted by themselves in '32. That daring attempt—daring as coming from conscious conspirators—has been made upon the life of Smith O'Brien, and the gallant General has kept his word."

The publication of the letter and the editor's remarks were thus noticed in a letter from

Sir William Napier to the Editor of the 'Dublin Evening Mail.'

"SIR, "Oct. 7, 1848.

"I have this instant been shown the weekly 'Freeman's Journal,' containing a letter from Mr. ——, which I was by process of law compelled to produce at Clonmel on the trial of Mr. Smith O'Brien.

"I had no communication whatever with any editor or any person connected with newspapers, and I know not how that letter has been obtained by the 'Freeman's Journal;' but the reply attributed to me by the editor, being wholly imaginary, calls for an immediate contradic-

tion; and as I am told the promptest mode of making that contradiction public will be through your journal, I request as a favour that you will publish the following observations:—

"1st.—I did not return 'an indignant reply' to Mr. ——; I merely made some ironical and scornful remarks upon the implied supposition that I should co-operate in arms with a Birmingham attorney* and a London tailor† against the Duke of Wellington.

"2nd.—I did not state that 'from my Sovereign I received my sword,' &c. &c.

"3rd.—The Whigs did not 'apply to me requesting that the letter should be returned,' &c. &c.

"4th.—I did not at any time promise or state 'that I would never divulge its contents or allow it to be made public,' &c. &c.

"I did not pledge myself to secrecy under any circumstances, or in any manner, nor did I ever maintain any secrecy in the matter."

Sir William's private "notes" on the above transaction are here given:—

"Mr. —— was a familiar acquaintance. I had often conversed with and written to him upon politics generally, but never in a particular manner; and during the Reform agitation my opinion was that the Whigs meant to deceive the people on the question, and to make use of that agitation for their own party purposes. My speeches at Devizes and Bath went to awaken that notion in the public mind, and I was in consequence obnoxious to the whole Whig faction. I could not then, with any decency, correspond with the private secretary of the chief of that party, Lord Melbourne, which I was publicly assailing. I neither

* Mr. Parkes. † Mr. Place.

sought for nor provoked such a letter from Mr. ——. When I received it I was indignant at the supposition that I could be so devoid of judgment and right feeling as to place myself at the head of an armed insurrection to co-operate with a London tailor and a Birmingham attorney to attack the army to which I belonged, and to destroy the chief under whom I had so long served, and whom, though I differed with him as to the necessity and justice of reform, I had never ceased to admire and venerate for his abilities and greatness of character.

"Mr. ——'s letter was not marked 'private' or 'confidential.' I had never seen Mr. Parkes. I was not bound to keep it a secret, and I did not do so. I answered it scornfully; I showed it to many persons at the time; I told the Duke of Wellington of its contents in 1839; in 1841 I publicly mentioned the subject of it on the hustings of Bath. A Whig partisan, a great miller and corndealer named Amram Sanders, backed up by a body of the Whig faction, called out that *I lied* in asserting that the Whigs had encouraged insurrection. I answered, 'Sir, you know not what you say; I have the proof in my pocket.' 'That is a lie, also,' was his reply; whereupon I knocked him backward with a blow on the face; he prosecuted me, but dared not go through with the trial. I was in court to plead my own cause in person, and the Whigs feared the exposure.

"Mr. —— afterwards spoke to me about his letter, and I promised him I would not stir more in the matter, *unless* I was called upon legally, where men's lives were put in jeopardy by the Whigs for doing that which they, the Whigs, had, for their own party purposes, provoked the people to do.

"But supposing Mr. ——'s letter had been marked confidential'? Has any man a right to involve another

in a knowledge of treasonable projects, and plead the sacredness of private communications to bar exposure? His letter was unprovoked by me, and he had so mistaken my disposition and actions as to suppose me to have been urging the movement towards civil war; when, as I can prove by my speeches and other documents, I was exerting myself to check that tendency. And I have a right to say, that the great influence which I suddenly obtained over the Reformers at the time was used by me to check and deter men from a resort to arms, while I forwarded the cause of Reform to the utmost of my ability.

"This statement, which is the exact truth, exonerates me from any charge of betraying private confidence.

"In the recent case of Smith O'Brien I was compelled by law to appear; but I did so willingly. I saw Cain on the judgment-seat condemning for murder, and I pushed aside his cap to let all men see the mark on his brow.

"WM. NAPIER."

To Mrs. Napier.

"I feel tolerably safe from an attack to-day, and my hope is to get to Clonmel in strength. I shall not be there I believe before the 29th. Yesterday Mr. O'Brien called on me with his solicitor, and the latter, after giving me the subpœna in form, offered me 25*l.*, with a declaration that my further expenses would be paid into the bargain. You and the girls must forgive me for wasting your means, but I could not take money from a man struggling for his brother's life; and, moreover, I did not like to have so much connection with an insurgent as to have his money. I mean that, being an officer on full pay as colonel, I thought that I was not entitled to do anything but what was called for by a regard for truth, justice, and humanity; and that taking money, however legal and usual, would

be in a degree becoming united with Mr. S. O'Brien's proceedings. The Rev. Mr. O'Brien remonstrated with me and said it was a matter of business, but the tears were rolling down his face while he pressed it; and when I told him his necessary expenses must be too great for me to add to them, his emotion, though he was silent, showed me that I was right. I, however, told his solicitor, to ease his scruples, that being unable from weakness to look after myself in difficult travelling I would allow him to find the means of travelling to Clonmel, and give him the trouble of procuring a good bed, well-aired, for me. Ask Katty if this meets her approbation, for she is a great authority with me in points of honour. I go nowhere, for if I went out I might meet with people who would argue upon the right I had to do what I am doing, and disputes might make me go beyond what I have a right to do, to show that I would not be bullied. My path is a very narrow one and requires very careful movements; and to do Mr. O'Brien justice, he is as delicately sensible of this as I could be, and gives me no annoyance. I am reading Anne's book* again, and I am more than ever struck with its power of reasoning, its beauty of language, and the erudition displayed."

The following letter was in answer to a proposal that he should undertake to write a work on the 'Philosophy of War.'

Sir William Napier to Lord Frederick Fitzclarence.

"My dear Lord Frederick, "Blackheath, 1848.

"I have been hindered by business from replying to your letter before, and I am not now able to do so as I wish. Many years ago I was offered nearly *carte blanche*, in point

* 'Woman's Rights and Duties,' by Mrs. Richard Napier.

of money, to write upon the subject you speak of; but, after due consideration, I refused. Strategy cannot well be treated in a cursory manner, nor without dogmatising; but how can a man who has never commanded an army in the field dare to dogmatise on such a subject? A great and successful commander may do so safely, no other person can.

"'The philosophy of war' is to me a phrase of extensive signification. It involves a preliminary investigation of the human mind as to why men engage in warfare at all. Then would come the distinctions between religious wars, civil wars, wars of aggression and aggrandisement, wars of defence, wars of folly, and wars of necessity. Then the progress of the art! its varying phases in different degrees of civilization, how far it can be carried on by barbarous nations, how far it depends upon civil institutions and the progress of the sciences; how much it depends on such extraneous matters, and how much upon original genius in a general. And all reasoning on these points must, to carry weight, be supported by illustrations taken from history and experience. What an overwhelming labour! Can any man treat it satisfactorily? There is no work on the 'Philosophy of War,' I believe, in any language. I have often heard literary men regret this; but I believe they have not considered the subject, and have not seen the reason. I believe the greatest genius would shrink from it, as beyond the power of man to treat with accuracy and authority. Bacon, who has considered all things belonging to philosophy, has not touched upon it. That could not be from negligence. I do not think it can be done, and at all events I feel that I cannot do it in a way satisfactory to myself and the reading world; and I have long made a resolution never to publish my views on any subject I do not thoroughly understand, or at least think I understand.

"What do you think of the Italian Mediation?* Will Lamoricière and Changarnier, &c., let it end peaceably? The 'philosophy of war' should teach us that 500,000 men in arms, with several young generals in power, are not the best ingredients for a peaceable mediation."

Sir Charles Napier had hardly set foot in England, when, to add to the turmoil of the Chartist agitation and the Irish "rebellion," and to the anxieties occasioned by the state of the Continent convulsed from end to end, the news was received of the perfidy of Moolraj at Moultan and of the murder of two English officers at that place. The East India Company treated this as a partial and insignificant outbreak, but the accounts which Sir Charles received from a trustworthy native correspondent led him to consider it as very serious. It is not generally known that the Duke of Wellington, in the same view, urged upon the East India Directors to send Sir Charles Napier at once to India as Commander-in-Chief. But that body was not as yet reduced by the necessities of its position to stomach such an humiliation. The Directors told the Duke that Moultan had been represented to them as a very weak place; but the Duke had examined the plans with Sir Charles, and when the latter said he should not care to attack it with less than 15,000 men, the Duke added, "Ay! and with a covering army besides to keep the country quiet during the siege." Things, however, remained as they were, and Sir Charles, instead of being exposed to the perils of the Sikh cannon, had to encounter those of English feasts far more distasteful to him for some months longer, until the whole country was startled from its propriety by the battle of Chillianwallah.

Towards the end of 1848, a body, calling itself the

* A proposed mediation between Sardinia and Austria.

Liverpool Financial Reform Association, undertook the reform of the abuses of the State, and amongst them of those of the army. The tracts published by the Association on this matter abounded with ridiculous mistakes and gross misstatements. They particularly attacked the system by which the soldiers of the army were clothed through the medium of the colonels of regiments, and the writers employed very unjustifiable means to hold up to public scorn the conduct of the colonels in this respect.

In an evil hour the Association sent its tracts to Sir William Napier, himself one of the calumniated clothing colonels, which occasioned his publication of a series of letters in the 'Times,' which will be found in the Appendix.

The news of the battle of Chillianwallah was received in London in March, 1849. The public was alarmed and angry, and in its anger forgot to be just towards the noble veteran who had commanded the British forces on that occasion. A general cry arose over the length and breadth of the land for Sir Charles Napier, and was listened to in Leadenhall Street in sullen gloom, but with the consciousness that the time had arrived when the Court of Directors would be compelled to make a practical recantation of their offensive charges against the hated General. At this time they were particularly sore against Sir Charles, in consequence of a victory he had obtained over them with respect to the amount of his share of the Hydrabad prize-money. The Court of Directors had been named trustees of that prize-money; which, a celebrated person observed, was "like making the wicked uncle the trustee for the babes in the wood;" and they had, against all precedent, decided that the General was entitled only to receive one-sixteenth of the whole, in place of one eighth which was his proper share. The matter was so clearly an injustice, that the Treasury reversed the decision of the Court of

Directors and apportioned to Sir Charles one-eighth. Still smarting from this defeat, they were now called on to undergo a yet greater humiliation, in themselves nominating the man they feared and hated to the chief command of their armies. When first proposed to them by the Duke of Wellington the recommendation was declined. Sir George Napier was suggested, and reluctantly accepted. But he "loved his country and his brother too well to step into the place of the best man; he refused." Long was the hesitation, and grievous were the faces they made, before they could be induced to swallow the unpalatable physic which was prescribed by the unanimous cry of England; but it was done at length, and Sir Charles was named Commander-in-Chief in India. Even then however the ill-will of the Directors was manifested by their resolving that the Commander-in-Chief in India need not necessarily be a member of the Supreme Council; and that therefore Sir Charles Napier should not be so, thus seeking to deprive him of much of his dignity, and of its accompanying emoluments. But on Sir Charles declaring distinctly, that under such an indignity he would refuse to go to India, even though he had been appointed Commander-in-Chief, the Directors were obliged to submit and to withdraw their resolution.

And so, in less than a year after his return to England, at the age of sixty-seven, suffering most painfully from old wounds, and labouring under a mortal internal disease, Sir Charles Napier again quitted his family and country, and, in the words of Thackeray, "he took his two towels and his piece of soap and his scimitar, and went away to the ship that was to carry him to the sea."

With reference to the battle of Chillianwallah, the following letter was written by Sir William Napier:—

Sir William Napier to the Editor of the 'Times.'

"SIR, "March, 1849.

"When an angry sense of disaster in war gets possession of the public mind, the army engaged is judged in mass and condemned as a defeated body, particular instances of virtue being disregarded in the general feeling of mortification. This is not good. Heroism comes out clearer when fortune bears hardly, than when she is favourable; it is then of a sublimer nature, more chastened and purified for immortality. Permit me then, through your journal, to give the world a statement of the touching circumstances attending the death of those intrepid soldiers Brigadier Pennycuick and his self-devoted heroic son, in the recent battle on the Jhelum, introducing it by a rapid sketch of the General's previous services.

"He entered the army in 1807. His first campaign was in Java, in 1811, and he was wounded severely, having fought so well as to draw forth the public approbation of Sir Samuel Auchmuty and the celebrated Colonel Gillespie.

"In 1811 he was at the storming of Djokjo Kerta.

"In 1813, having command of a small detachment, he displayed such skill and courage, defeating an immense body of insurgents, that he obtained the thanks of the Commander-in-Chief and the Government of Java, and the public approbation of the Governor-General of India, Lord Hastings—no mean judge of military merit.

"He fought again with distinction in 1814, at the assault of Boni in the Celebes; and during 1825 and 1826 he served against the Burmese.

"In 1839 he fought under Sir John Keane and Brigadier Willshire, at the storming of Ghuznee and Khelat, and was the foremost man to enter the last-named fortress.

"In 1841 he marched out of Aden at the head of 600 men, and gave a signal overthrow to the Arabs.

"In 1846 he served under Sir Charles Napier in Scinde, and gained the esteem of that General.

"In 1848 he commanded a brigade in the Punjaub under Lord Gough; and on the 13th January, 1849, he died in battle, thus closing a career, full of honour, with a soldier's death; and upon his yet warm body fell his young son, a boy worthy of such a father.

"Let the moving, the painful, but glorious story be simply told.

"The 24th regiment marched on the 13th January against the Sikh army; it was, unsupported, exposed to the full sweep of Sikh batteries and to the deadly play of their destructive musketry. More than one-half of the regiment went down in ten minutes; the remainder, still stricken by the artillery, assailed by thousands of infantry, and menaced by swarms of cavalry, could no longer keep their ground. The elder Pennycuick had fallen, and two soldiers attempted to carry him off while still breathing, but the Sikhs pressed them so closely that, unable to contend, they dropped their honourable burden and drew back. The gallant boy, the son of the noble dead, only seventeen years old, now first aware of his misfortune, sprang forward sword-in-hand, bestrode his father's body for a moment, and then fell across it, a corpse!

"Such, Sir, is the simple tale of the deaths of that brave old man and his boy; and if it is not sufficient to obtain for them the honest fame for which they fought so well, and died so well,—if it does not swell the hearts and moisten the eyes of their countrymen,—I know not why generous impulses are component parts of human nature.

"And the grief-stricken widow, the bereaved mother! Is she single in her sorrows? Alas! no. The widow of the brave Cureton; she also has lost her son as well as her husband on those fatal fields of the Punjaub. Con-

solation to them must come from God; but the glory of a nation's gratitude and praise should illumine the graves of their husbands and children.

"W. N."

The next letter expresses a "Soldier's" horror of the interference of "Politicals" with the conduct of a campaign.

Sir William Napier to the Editor of the 'Times.'

"SIR, "March 14, 1849.

"The letter of 'Indicus' in your journal of this day seems to me to prove the justice of the public feeling against the employment of the persons called 'Politicals' in India. He says 'the Politicals *implored* Lord Gough not to attack the enemy,' and '*wrung* from him a promise,' —that 'Sir Henry Lawrence *urgently represented*,' &c. And in the public despatches we find that Major Mackeson, being in the camp, 'refused to enter into negotiations with Shere Singh;' that 'he *informed* the Commander-in-Chief that Chuttur Singh was coming down to join Shere Singh,' and therefore *urged* Lord Gough to advance and give battle.

"I ask if war can be successfully conducted in that manner? Is a commander-in-Chief to be a mere puppet in the hands of half-a-dozen young men, chosen because of their having a smattering of languages, or, if you will, because of their promising qualities?

"War is the most precarious, the nicest of all arts; not only because of the intrinsic difficulties of organizing and governing great bodies, but because one General has to contend against the genius of another General and the energy and combined force of his army. It may be said they are therefore on an equality. True, if there are no 'Politicals' on one side. But, Sir, one General may

judge rightly, another wrongly; the last, surely, if he is governed by 'Politicals,' because secrecy, unity, and promptitude, both of conception and execution, are essential to success; and a blot will be hit with the force of 50,000 men.

"If young officers or civilians, elated and vain of being pushed beyond their regular station, and not habituated to command, are suffered to '*advise*,' to 'urge,' to 'remonstrate,' to 'inform,' how can a General thus pestered succeed? If he is a man of genius and energy he will not bear such interference; the submitting to it is proof positive of his incapacity or his weakness. Look not to what Sir H. Lawrence or others have advised; look rather to what happened at Cabul,—to what would have happened in Scinde if the 'Political' had there been listened to; look to what has occurred in the Punjaub.

"When the successors of Alexander disputed for command, Eumenes set up a tent with an altar to that hero, pretending to receive orders from his ghost! The 'Politicals' had better do something of that sort than set up a commander in the flesh who is to move only as they direct.

"W. N."

Captain Henry Napier, R.N., to Sir William Napier.

"May, 1849.

"Fanny has heard from Charles on his route near Benares; all well. He gives no news, but mentions a letter which he had received from Lady Sale, telling him that the Punjaub was by no means quiet. I have seen a copy of his speech at a dinner given him by the Military Club in Calcutta. It is a calm and somewhat grave and severe address on discipline, and the necessity of kindness to, and increased intercourse with, the native troops,

ending with a panegyric on Lord Ellenborough of a very high character. This was apparently received with shouts."

Sir George Napier to Sir W. Napier.

"1849.

"I received your letter at Oaklands, but could not write then to thank you much for your kindness. All you say is very true, but I think the time is past, as I ought to have made my statement to Lord Stanley before he made his motion in the House of Lords.*

"As to my own feelings about the Cape, my dear William, I must fairly tell you, as I did Charles, that I have none. I know I did my duty to the best of my judgment, and received the approval of all the four Secretaries of State under whom I served, viz., Lords Glenelg, Normanby, John Russell, and Stanley. Now this perfectly satisfied me, and I am quite content. I want nothing, shall never ask for anything, and certainly shall never be again *offered* anything after declining India! Had I your talent for writing, or were I in the high position Charles's great abilities and splendid career have conferred on him, probably I might feel as you do on the subject, my dear Bill; but as it is I am content; at the same time I must and will ever feel your affectionate kindness to me. God bless you!"

During 1849 Sir William moved with his family to Scinde House, Clapham Park, called by the cabmen *Shindy House*, and here he remained during the rest of his life. He now became quite unable to walk out of doors, and the only exercise he could take was in his carriage, drawn by a pair of dun ponies of which he was extremely fond, which equipage, with its noble and re-

* Relative to the Cape of Good Hope.

markable-looking freight, was a familiar object to the dwellers in the neighbourhood for ten years. Here he was often visited, on occasions of military or political interest, by many of the ablest men in England, eager for his opinions and experience. He had a very extensive acquaintance also among young military officers, whom he delighted to see at all times, and with whom he would discuss all the current military topics. And thus, although withdrawn from active public life, and indeed from the world, into which it may be said he had scarcely entered since the commencement of his History, he still continued to exercise no trifling influence on public opinion. From this retreat came from time to time to the public a reminder in some trumpet-like letter to stir men's spirits, such as that on the Pennycuicks and Cureton. But his principal occupation continued to be the championing of his brother Charles against all the world, for which he was not long without finding occasion; and the establishment of that brother's fame on a durable basis by his 'History of the Administration of Scinde,' and 'Life of Sir Charles Napier.'

Much of his time, too, was given to old soldiers, men who had served well, and who, afterwards discharged on account of disability, became destitute and were thrown on the parish. Much time did he devote and many letters did he write in their behalf, as the officials of the Adjutant-General's office, and as Mr. Moorhead, the secretary of the Chelsea Board, could testify; and he generally had the satisfaction of interfering successfully for these poor applicants.

"From very early days," writes his daughter, "I can remember old Peninsula soldiers used to visit him,—sometimes only for the pleasure of seeing again their old commander,—and he was always glad to see them, and talk of the war, asking after their comrades, and recalling with them many incidents of the campaigns, or of special feats

of strength or daring by soldiers or officers. Many poor fellows also who were in want, went to him for help, and to ask him to appeal for them about pensions or employment; and never did an old soldier leave him unaided. If sometimes he found himself to have been deceived, it used to annoy him for days, as he said he had wasted money or interest on a bad man that might have served a good one."

When residing at Clapham, so near to London, these visits and applications increased in frequency. To see an old 43rd man (and they were never beggars, he said) was a real delight to Sir William; and when he was laid helpless on his sick bed, his hands distorted and crippled from the effect of his long suffering, if a 22nd man called who had fought at Meeanee or Dubba or in the Hill campaign, he would send for him, and say it was always a pleasure to him to see and honour a brave soldier, and especially one who had served under his brother, and that, crippled as it was, he must give him his hand. Many old soldiers owe to his exertions whatever ease and comfort they have had in their declining years; but his efforts would not have been so successful if they had not been met with equal warmth of feeling on the part of the Adjutant-General Sir George Brown. And it is right to mention that the secretary of the Chelsea Board, Mr. Moorhead, warmly co-operated in the efforts of those two distinguished officers, and looked upon no trouble as misplaced to promote their objects.

The following is a specimen of some of the cases:—

From Richard Ogden, Pensioner, 43rd Regiment, to Sir W. Napier.

"MAY IT PLEASE YOUR HONOUR, "June, 1850.

"I humbly beg leave, in writing these lines and sending them to you, to inform you how I am situated. I

am discharged with a pension of five pence per diem only, after serving 14 years and 10 months. My service in the Peninsular war entitled me to the war medal, which they have given me, with nine clasps or bars upon it, but no other remuneration but the five pence per diem. I am now 67 years old and cannot get any employment in consequence. My wife has been ill these last four years, not able to do anything. I have lately lost a fine young man, a son of mine, which would have been a great help to me; but the Great Disposer of all events has been pleased to take him from me; he died on the 11th January last. I have repeatedly made application to the parish for relief but they will not grant me anything; they tell me I am a pensioner, and must make it do; that is only 2*s.* 11*d.* per week to keep me and the wife upon, and to pay rent and taxes. I am truly sorry to say, in consequence of my deplorable condition, my clothing, and the wife's too, are gone; we don't get half meat. I therefore humbly make my case known to you; you have seen me a different man when I was under your command; you have been a friend to me before, for which I return you my most sincere thanks. It certainly puts me to the blush when I repeat the application, but I hope you will forgive me, as it is real poverty and distress compels me; your goodness in taking notice of these lines (I perhaps may never trouble you again), and by addressing to me,

"Richard Ogden,

"Pensioner, five pence per diem, late 43rd Regiment,

"Bolton-le-Moors."

Sir William sent the above to the 'Times,' with the following letter from himself:—

To the Editor of the 'Times.'

"May I request your insertion of the following letter? It is from an old and an excellent soldier. Messrs. Cobden and Bright, &c., have, it is said, petitioned that no instrument of war shall be allowed a place in the Great Exhibition of 1851. If they do not also forbid military and naval men from appearing there, I think poor Ogden and his *nine war clasps*, his *five pence per diem*, and *his taxes*, might be exhibited as a specimen of an honoured and well-provided English veteran!"

Madame d'Orville to Sir W. Napier.

"SIR, "Liverpool, June 26, 1850.

"Will you have the great kindness to accept the enclosed two shillings for Richard Ogden. I wish it was in my power to give more, for I am a soldier's child myself, and feel warmly interested in every old veteran. I am a German, but if I were an Englishwoman I would be proud to be the countrywoman of a General as great and kind-hearted as you are.

"I am, Sir, your obedient servant,

"MARIE D'ORVILLE."

Sir W. Napier to F. Pigou, Esq.

"MY DEAR SIR, "Scinde House, 1850.

"I must begin by correcting an error as to fact. I never led Samuel Harris into action; he was not of my regiment; Ogden was the man I alluded to. I know of Harris only from Mr. Jessopp, to whose unwearied kindness he owes everything, your great bounty included. I transmit Mr. Jessopp's statement. It is strange that Mr. Rich should defend the way soldiers, at least the Peninsula soldiers, have been treated. I have indeed known of a Life Guardsman who was discharged with half-a-crown

pension per diem because he was *too fat* to ride; but the Peninsula men who served their fourteen years of war, which ruined their constitutions, and with their wounds earned their discharges, got five pence per day only, from a people who lately gave 100 guineas for one dish only at a great banquet. And why did they get only five pence when the regulations allowed six pence? Because the clerks, to make things easy, divided without authority the pensions into two classes, odd and even, and gave the odd to the Peninsula men, and the even to the militia! It was the late Colonel Gurwood who discovered this very odd proceeding, and got it made right.

"I send you another case for Mr. Rich. A soldier of my regiment, Thomas Curry, medal with twelve bars, several wounds, 70 years old, a wife,—and five pence a day. General Brown, the Adjutant-General, has got a small increase of pension for this poor fellow on my making his case known to him. (Brown was in the battalion of detachments spoken of, and also in the 43rd.) But let Mr. Rich consider Curry's case; and as his name is also the name of a dish, compare it with the 100-guinea dish at the York banquet, but I suppose he will stick to the last as a *Rich* dish.

"God forgive me for making such bad puns! but a bitter feeling sometimes turns to humour to avoid cursing."

The following was in answer to a proposal that he should write a sketch of the Duke of Wellington's career for a public journal, in anticipation of the Duke's death, and not to be published until that event should happen:—

"My dear Mr. ——, "Scinde House, 1850.

"Your letter stirred up my ambition for a moment and gratified my vanity, but wiser thoughts brought both.

down again. I know, indeed, many things that would give interest and piquancy to a sketch of the Duke's life during the Peninsular war and the Waterloo campaigns, and I could write a smart thing; but not what it ought to be from me with pleasure. It would be repugnant to me. For, at the risk of being laughed at, I confess to so strong a feeling of personal attachment towards the Iron Duke that I could not work on the contemplation of his death. Moreover, I will never write a mere panegyric, and the Duke is, like other men, not faultless; and when I remember that, after every action where I or my brothers were wounded, he, in the midst of all his great affairs, used to write, at the same time as his despatches, letters to assure my poor old blind mother that our hurts were not dangerous, merely because she in former times had been kind to him as a boy, I could not find it in my heart deliberately to condemn, or even to praise him, in anticipation of his death.

"Altogether I am not fit for the task you propose, and you must excuse me from attempting it, though I repeat that you have stirred both my ambition and my vanity.

"W. N.

"PS. It may perhaps aid whoever undertakes the sketch if he looks at a review of the Duke's Despatches which I published in the 'London and Westminster Review' of January, 1838."

The following letter on the manœuvre which won the battle of the Nile for Nelson is published, because it controverts the very generally received idea that the breaking the enemy's line on that occasion, and the ranging up of the English vessels between him and the shore, was the plan of attack deliberately conceived by Nelson:—

To the Editor of the 'United Service Magazine.'

"SIR, "Feb. 11, 1850.

"The writer who has reviewed Thiers' work in your number for this month very properly censures Alison and Thiers for making it Nelson's plan to get inside the French line at the Nile, and the former writer for repeating the exploded story of Nelson saying, '*Where there is room for the enemy to swing there must be room for us to anchor.*'

"If you will turn to your own Magazine for September, 1837, you will find a conclusive letter on this subject from *General* Sir Charles Napier. I say conclusive, because the authority was Sir Thomas Foley himself.

"To that I may add that Sir Thomas Foley acted on the knowledge acquired from an old chart which he happened to possess. He judged also, from long experience of the French, that they would not have the shore side of their vessels cleared for action; and so it happened.

"This was undoubtedly a stroke of genius, but, viewing the affair without that, Lord Nelson's real plan of battle seems the better one, manifesting more of the great Captain. I am not a naval man; but supposing the five French ships on the right, which did not take any part in the action, had slipped their cables and beat up to engage the English vessels on the *outside* of the line, the latter would then have been placed between two fires also, and, in the event of disaster, neither they nor the vessels inside could have got off. Depend upon it Lord Nelson was really a great captain, and not a mere fighter only.

(Signed) "ASPIC."

In July Sir William received letters from his brother in India, announcing that, in consequence of his having been unjustly reprimanded by the Governor-General, Lord

Dalhousie, he had resigned his high post, and that he only continued to hold office until the arrival of his successor. As this was a matter afterwards much talked of, and as, in consequence of the production of a minute of the Duke of Wellington's by the East India Directors *after Sir Charles Napier's death*, which minute was adverse to Sir Charles on the point in dispute between him and the Governor-General, Sir William published a pamphlet in defence of his brother, it is necessary here to give a rapid abstract of the circumstances which induced Sir Charles Napier to resign his office in India.

It is well known that when he arrived in that country he found the Sikh power had been completely broken by Lord Gough at the battle of Goojerat; and he consequently had to occupy himself with the ordinary duties of commander-in-chief in time of peace; but the state of feeling among the native troops was very ticklish and uncertain, and more than once within the few preceding years there had been indications, and even acts, of mutiny.

By a regulation of the Indian Government, sepoy as well as European regiments were entitled to increased pay when serving beyond the frontier of the British dominions. Under this regulation the troops stationed in the Punjaub received that increased pay up to the period when the Punjaub was annexed. When that country was declared an integral part of the British Eastern empire the *extra* pay was suddenly stopped. And how was it stopped? No account was taken of the feelings of human nature in general, which never willingly accommodate themselves to any diminution of creature comforts once enjoyed. No account was taken of the susceptibilities of the sepoy soldier in particular, which had already, on more than one occasion within Sir C. Napier's own experience, manifested themselves in open mutiny on this very ques-

tion of reduction of pay. The extra pay was simply stopped by a dry official order, without explanation, without reflection on the danger of tampering with the pay of mercenaries who, while they were bound by no tie of fidelity but their pay, had many grounds of estrangement in differing religion, colour, and race; mercenaries too of such power, that, once aroused, nothing could control them.

Although Sir C. Napier disapproved, as any man of common sense must have done, of this "modus operandi," he set himself to enforce the order and to repress the mischief he feared would result from it. The discontent, as he foresaw, spread widely. Two regiments at Rawul Pindee, and Wuzeerabad, in the Punjaub, refused to receive the reduced pay, and an active correspondence was discovered to exist between them and other corps, some of them already in the Punjaub, others under orders to proceed thither.

The 41st Native Infantry at Delhi, 400 miles from the other malcontents, refused to enter the Punjaub without the higher pay; and it was well known that many other regiments were prepared to follow their example. Sir C. Napier, by dexterous management, checked the disaffection in the 41st and the regiment marched. But another regiment, the 66th, just arrived from Lucknow, broke out into open mutiny and actually attempted to seize Govind-Ghur, one of the great fortresses in the Punjaub, which was in the midst of the most disaffected portion of the Sikh population.

The danger was very menacing, yet by tact and firmness it was averted. The severest punishment which the Government could inflict on a whole regiment was to disband it; but the disaffected felt sure this measure would not be resorted to, as the discharged soldiers must

be replaced, according to immemorial usage, by men of the same race and religion, their brothers and cousins. Indeed, the Brahmins openly boasted that the Government could get no soldiers if they chose to stop recruiting.

Sir C. Napier, however, broke through the trammels of Indian routine, disbanded the 66th, and gave its colours and number to a Ghoorka battalion which thenceforth became the 66th Native Infantry.

By this move he checkmated the mutineers. To have disbanded the regiment as a solitary measure would only have been productive of mischief; the sepoys felt sure that the Government could not go on playing that game; they could not disband a whole army; but when they found that Government was prepared to replace them by men of a different race, they trembled to incur the same penalty as the 66th had suffered, and murmuring was at an end. It should here be mentioned that the Ghoorkas make far better and braver soldiers than the Bengal sepoys generally.

The Governor-General approved of Sir C. Napier's action of disbanding the 66th; but disapproved of his adoption of the Ghoorkas in their place, the only thing that could give point or efficacy to the measure.

Now comes the point to be particularly observed.

Twelve days before the mutiny of the 66th at Govind-Ghur a new commissariat regulation of the supreme Government, unimportant in itself, came into operation. This regulation caused the usual allowance made to the sepoys for purchasing their food to vary with the market prices of the places where they were stationed. It happened that its operation in the Punjaub itself would be to diminish, to a very trifling extent indeed, but still to diminish, the pay of the sepoy in that province.

Sir C. Napier judged that to promulgate and enforce this

ordinance, at a time when, as was proved twelve days later by the Govind-Ghur mutiny, very serious disaffection existed on account of the reduction of pay already enforced, would make the smouldering embers of sedition blaze forth, and would be in fact an act of judicial madness. It was not the amount, for that was trifling; it was the fact that it was a further reduction made while the sepoys were in an angry and suspicious mood that constituted the danger.

Sir C. Napier consulted Sir Patrick Grant, Adjutant-General in India; Sir Walter Gilbert, commanding in the Punjaub; and General Hearsay, commanding at Wuzeerabad: all informed him that the new regulation was unknown to the sepoys, and that to enforce it in the actual temper of their minds would be highly dangerous.

Sir Charles therefore took on himself to suspend the operation of this as yet unknown measure until its impolicy could be represented to the supreme Government. The whole sum thus withheld from Government amounted only to a few pounds.

For thus overstepping his legal powers Sir C. Napier was, by the Governor in Council, publicly and offensively reprimanded, the general order conveying the reprimand being signed by a major in the Indian army under his command. He was forbidden ever again to exercise his discretion in such matters, under any circumstances; and the Commander-in-Chief immediately tendered his resignation of a post which he could no longer occupy with advantage to the public, or with honour to himself.

These are facts which every one can verify; no ingenuity can pervert them; and any mind endowed with reasoning powers and not blinded by prejudice, which may investigate all the circumstances connected with this assumption of responsibility, must arrive at the conviction that Sir C.

Napier was wholly and absolutely in the right, and that an officer in his situation would be unworthy to be trusted with any command, who would not act in the same manner in like circumstances.

Sir Charles accordingly returned to England in the following March (1851), but it was not until after his death in 1853 that the Directors of the East India Company produced a private minute of the Duke of Wellington's which was in substance adverse to Sir Charles.

Sir William was greatly grieved by this discovery. Two of the strongest feelings of his nature were thus placed in direct antagonism—love of his brother, and the attachment and admiration for his old leader, which was for him almost a religion. In such a case, however, he could feel no hesitation. It added greatly to both the pain and difficulty of his task that the Duke was also dead; but he undertook and accomplished the most complete vindication of his brother against the Duke's opinion, in a pamphlet entitled 'Wellington and Napier,' which for temperance, force, and argument, is superior on the whole to any of his controversial writings.

The following extracts are given as a specimen:—

"Here are a Governor-General and the supreme authorities of a great empire publicly arraigned by their late Commander-in-Chief for mischievous ignorance, for factious proceedings, internal misgovernment, and oppressive external policy. How do they reply? By *reading*, after death, a censure of the Duke of Wellington's, which was never made known in its entirety to Sir C. Napier during life, but is now palmed on the public with all the cunning and cowardice of dishonesty. Had it not been for the manly opposition of Mr. Lewin and Mr. Sergeant Gazelee, the Duke of Wellington's minute would have been read, and the proprietors would have dispersed with an impres-

sion that Sir C. Napier had been condemned by that great man; yet unable, from a mere reading, to appreciate the weakness of, or know the grounds upon which the censure was founded. This foul course has thus been denounced by a statesman of eminence:—'I do not remember a scene more disgraceful to the actors in it than that which seems to have taken place at the India House the other day. Had a minister in Parliament acted as the chairman did, there would have been a cry of indignation and disgust from both sides of the House. . . . . Why was this memorandum withheld in its entirety from Sir C. Napier during his life? Nothing but the substance of the conclusion was ever communicated to him. Why is it produced now in all its length and condemnation? Justice to Lord Dalhousie, it has been answered, compelled its delivery to the Directors by the Board of Control. But where was that sense of justice when the same Board refused Sir C. Napier the copy of a minute drawn up by Lord Dalhousie in Council, and surreptitiously placed on record when Sir C. Napier had quitted India, and could neither acquire an official knowledge of its contents, nor place an answer on record as one of the Council?'"

Analysis of the Duke's memorandum.

"It is with forbearance and uneasiness this document is approached, for to evince irreverence towards the author of it would be neither seemly nor wise; and personal feelings would prompt rather to the endurance of wrong than failure in respect for the foremost man in England. Nevertheless, the Duke of Wellington, though confessedly the greatest, was not the only great man of our country; nor has he or any human being a title to overbear justice and reason by mere weight of position. Sir C. Napier was also a great man, in glorious achievements approaching the Duke, perhaps inferior only in opportunity; his equal in

public devotion and integrity, and certainly not behind him as to legislation and government, if success be a criterion of merit. Both are in their final resting-places—the one beneath the cupola of St. Paul's, beside the embalmed body of Nelson; the other laid by the festering corpse of some brave unnoticed private soldier in an obscure churchyard at Portsmouth—no mean association for either. Yet the arranged pomp of Wellington's interment was not more solemn than the affecting tribute of esteem offered by the countless multitude, voluntarily assembled, silent and mournful, at the private burial of Sir Charles Napier.

"Both died without knowledge of what either could say in support of their views on this question; for, though each has told his story, Sir C. Napier's posthumous work, curtailed by sickness and death, was never seen by the Duke; nor was the nature of the Duke's memorandum ever made known to Sir Charles beyond the substance of the conclusion; the process by which that conclusion was reached was not given. Had it been otherwise, he would have answered it with a force and clearness of explanation which none can now do for him; and the great authority of the Duke is thus brought to bear, after death, with undue weight in censure.

"But is this authority good beyond the name? And shall the dead man's brother be deemed irreverent, if in defence he brings forward truth to repel the injurious power of error proceeding from such a source? Not justly can it be so. Yet shall the glorious man be separated from the vicious document, and even from himself, where a want of harmony with the general tenour of his great intellect is evident—a distinction not to be omitted in the consideration of a work written when the mental beam was hastening towards reabsorption in the divine essence from whence it originally emanated.

"An ancestor of Sir C. Napier, the first lord of the name, a great statesman and well acquainted with factions, has laid down the following maxims respecting state affairs, and singularly applicable are they here in favour of his descendant:—

"'*Errors are induced by false information, which is always to be expected in matters of state, where private ends are to be gained.*

"'*Truth can hardly be obtained, to the disadvantage of powerful men, when such men are the sources of the information on which the cause is to be judged; and it is never to be expected from factious men.*'

"Applying these maxims to the Duke's memorandum, it will be found that he accepts Lord Dalhousie's information implicitly, although coming from a powerful man, having a direct family connection with himself, which could scarcely fail, though perhaps imperceptibly, of influencing him."

. . . . . .

(*Conclusion.*)—"Here, then, we have the Duke of Wellington deceived into sustaining a miserable intrigue to the detriment of the man he had himself forced to accept the situation from which he was now bowing him out with a censure—the bow open, the grounds of the censure secret; for he received Sir C. Napier on his return with an open hand and brow, and never made the slightest allusion to his own memorandum, or to any dissatisfaction with his conduct.

"'It is useless for me to go back to India; I have too many enemies there to let me do public service,' was Sir C. Napier's remark when the Duke pressed the situation on him. A laugh of derision at his mention of enemies, and '*If you don't go, I must,*' was the reply.

"Sir C. Napier had just right to count on support after that; yet, on the first occasion, the Duke of Wellington,

on one-sided information, supported those very enemies he told Sir C. Napier to despise! But enough has been said, —more perhaps than the wronged man would have said himself, if death had not laid him at rest in ignorance of what was to be contended against: for always he looked towards the quarter from whence this blow has come with a generous humility."

The following letters to Mr. Samuel Gurney were provoked by the accusation made against military governors, as being more prone than civil governors to resort to the sword for the settlement of disputes.

To Mr. Samuel Gurney, Chairman of the Peace and Aborigines Society.

"RESPECTABLE FRIEND, "Nov. 12, 1851.

"The 'Times' has made thee assert at a meeting of the above society as follows:—

"'That since 1837 there has been at the Cape "a constant reference to the sword."

"'That it was a bad principle to have all governors sent to the Cape military men. That where military men were employed, they would only have recourse to the sword. That men of commerce, men of Christian principles, should be employed instead of military men. That Lord Glenelg's policy was a Christian one, and the only sure and just policy.'

"Now, Friend, Justice, which is the favourite child of Christianity, should have deterred thee from this vilification of all the Cape Governors. There was one of them at least who acted according to thy own views of what is fitting to be done. Sir George Napier succeeded a governor who had just terminated a war, and was succeeded by a governor who instantly commenced a war; but his government of nearly seven years was one of peace with

the Caffres, and it began in that very year of 1837 which thou hast fixed as the epoch for a 'constant reference to the sword.' Moreover, it was a government conducted on Lord Glenelg's Christian policy, which, be it said, did not fail in Sir G. Napier's hands, though Lord John Russell has thought fit to assume the contrary in Parliament. How is it that these things were unknown to thee, Friend?

"Sir G. Napier had no recourse to the sword because he deeply felt the awful responsibility of an appeal to arms without absolute necessity, and because he judged that one month of hostilities would be more costly and more hurtful to the colonists than ten years of Caffre depredations; yet he did not supinely neglect those depredations; he always sought, and generally obtained, redress—but peaceably, and often he found the savage more reasonable and just than the civilised man. And while he thus staved off war he was active in peaceable legislation.

"He enforced the abolition of slavery without commotion.

"He reduced the paper money debt from 200,000*l.* to less than 100,000*l.*, and, coincidently, he abolished all taxes, relying for revenue on import duties only.

"He gave municipal governments to all the towns and villages, and he earnestly urged the Home Government to give a representative assembly to the colony.

"He found the public schools languishing, with only a few hundred scholars; he revived them, nourished them, reformed them, and left them flourishing, with upwards of 12,000 attending pupils.

"Here then, Friend Gurney, we have, instead of 'a constant recourse to the sword,' peace, education, reduction of debt and taxes, self-government by municipalities, and an effort to obtain general representation. And if thou

wouldst know what he was thought of personally, I answer that the coloured people looked on him as their friend and protector; that the Caffres respected his authority; that men of all political opinions gave him a farewell dinner when he resigned his command; and his most active political opponent there bore public testimony to the integrity, the purity of his government, its freedom from all jobs and favouritism; and when he embarked the humbler classes attended him in crowds to the shore, and even in boats to the ship, with all demonstrations of attachment.

"In behalf of an absent brother, then, I say that these things, Friend Gurney, thou shouldest have known and considered before uttering thy sweeping assertion that, 'from 1836, constant recourse was had to the sword,' and that 'all military governors would appeal to this weapon.'

"And now, Friend, one word as to thy comparison of military and commercial persons.

"What manner of men be they who have supplied the Caffres with the firearms and ammunition to maintain their savage and deplorable wars?

"Assuredly they are not military.

"W. NAPIER, Lieutenant-General."

Mr. Samuel Gurney to Lieutenant-General Sir W. Napier.

"RESPECTED FRIEND, "Lombard-st., 11 mo. 20th, 1851.

"I have read with much interest thy letter addressed to me, and which appeared in the 'Times' newspaper on the 18th instant.

"I did not intend to say, neither do I believe I did say, that there had been a constant reference to the sword since 1837 by the Government of the Cape of Good Hope.

"I did state that the period from that date to 1846 was one of prosperity to the colony, and of peace and com-

parative order in our connexion with the Caffres, and this owing to the wise and Christian policy then adopted.

"I am rejoiced to find this view confirmed by thy valuable letter, and that the then governor, Sir George Napier, is so honourable an exception to what I enforced—the impolicy of employing military men for such appointments. Trained up as they are to the sword, they are far too liable to look to the sword for the settlement of international disputes.

"I am, however, glad that any presumed inadvertence of mine has elicited such a letter from thee.

"It is a clear confirmation of the value of Christian policy, that to do justice, to act righteousness, and to dispense mercy, is the sound ground to take in the settlement of our disputes with the Caffres. We have unhappily vacated it, but we cannot too soon revert to it.

"Thy account of Sir George Napier's government is so much to the point that I must repeat some of thy paragraphs.

"'A government conducted on Lord Glenelg's Christian policy, which did not fail in Sir George Napier's hands.

"'Sir George Napier had no recourse to the sword, because he deeply felt the awful responsibility of an appeal to arms.

"'Because he judged that one month's hostility would be more costly and more hurtful to the colonists than ten years of Caffre depredation.

"'That he did not neglect those depredations; that he generally obtained redress, and often he found the savage' (have we a right to call them savages?) 'more reasonable and just than the civilised man.

"'The coloured men looked upon him as their friend and protector.

"'That the Caffres respected his authority.'

"Then, as to the colony itself:—

"'He enforced the abolition of slavery without commotion.

"'He found the schools languishing with only a few hundred scholars: he left them flourishing with upwards of 12,000 scholars.'

"It is therefore quite clear that during this period there was not

"'A constant reference to the sword, but instead,—peace, education, reduction of taxes.'

"But what is the result of giving up this policy and resorting again to the sword, as was the case in 1846, about the time of the retirement of Sir George Napier? Destruction to the prosperity of the colony—harass to our soldiers—bloody war with the unfortunate Caffres—bloody to them and bloody to ourselves.

"Such is the feeling that has arisen from this terrific state of things, that it is said that the present Governor has published in a government notice that 'he will expel for ever these treacherous savages,' whom 'he will destroy and exterminate.'

"But why are the Caffres so exasperated? Because the Christian policy adopted by Lord Glenelg has been given up, and we have again by the sword taken possession of territory unjustly—territory that had been previously given up to them, after conquest, on the ground of justice.

"How will the people of England rest satisfied with this? How will they bear the continuance of our present heavy taxation for this purpose—the destruction and extermination of the Caffres? Would they not rather desire that the history of the happy reign under which we live should not be tarnished with so foul a blot, but that the crown of our beloved Queen should be adorned with the bright jewels of justice, mercy, and righteousness?

"I am with esteem, thy friend,

"SAMUEL GURNEY."

Sir William Napier to Mr. Samuel Gurney.

"RESPECTABLE FRIEND, "Nov. 21.

"If the reporter of thy discourse has put words into thy mouth which were not uttered, he is to be blamed; and so far thou art exonerated from the charge of injustice; but thou dost again, without solid foundation, vilify military men, saying, 'They are far too liable to look to the sword for the settlement of international disputes.'

"I say unto thee in reply, that since the days of Marlborough military men have never had recourse at all to the sword for the settlement of international disputes, and it is not becoming to charge them with it as an offence.

"Mark, Friend: political and commercial men they are who have always had recourse to the sword. The soldier makes war, but he does not declare it. The political men declare war, and generally for commercial interests; but when the nation is thus embroiled with its neighbours, the soldier saves it from danger. He draws the sword at the command of his country, but he has nothing to do with the sin, if it be one, of having 'recourse to the sword for the settling of international disputes.' He fights sternly to save the nation from the consequences of its own act, namely—declaring war; but he loves not war. Why should he? What does he gain by it? Death, wounds, pain, disease, premature old age and poverty, insult when his services are no longer in request. Is that justice, Friend? Is it creditable?

"Thou hast said, 'Military men are far too liable to look to the sword,' meaning, of course, more liable than politicians and commercial men. Was George Grenville, whose Stamp Act produced the American War of Independence, a military man?

"Was the Hon. Company of Traders, which, from a factory on the Hooghly, extended its bounds by wars to a mighty empire, composed of military or commercial men?

"Was Warren Hastings a military governor? Was Lord Wellesley one? Was it a military governor who declared war against China to enable iron-headed old rats to smuggle opium, in defiance of the laws of that great state and of morality?

"Were they military governors who commenced the Afghan war, the Punjaub war? Were those military or commercial men who established and carried on the slave-trade with all its African wars?—that trade which has recently been declared by Lord Palmerston to be unapproachable in atrocity, though all the other crimes of all nations, in all times, were heaped together for the comparison.

"And think not, Friend, though I have confined my justification of military governors to Sir George Napier, that he only can claim exemption from thy censures. Inquire, and thou wilt find it is not so. Cease therefore, if thou wouldst be counted amongst the just, to vilify soldiers. And, Friend, thou hast not yet answered my question, what manner of men be they who supply the Caffres with arms and ammunition?

"W. NAPIER, Lieutenant-General."

From Sir G. Napier to Sir W. Napier.

"Nice, Nov. 23, 1851.

"I have just read in 'Galignani' your letter in the 'Times' to Mr. Gurney; and I hasten to thank you most sincerely for it, as nothing has so clearly placed my administration in its true light as you have done. I daresay you will be attacked by some of the family enemies for

this; if so, I shall be very much vexed that your affection for me should be the cause of any annoyance to you in that way.

"My wife desires me to give you her most affectionate love, and to say she had been bubbling up with indignation at my name never having been mentioned as having kept peace for so many years, but now your letter has delighted and contented her!

"So we are all three Lieutenant-Generals at last!"

Captain Henry Napier, R.N., to Sir W. Napier.

"London, Nov. 18, 1851.

"I have been so unwell that I have not been able to congratulate you on your promotion; and the same reason prevented me from doing what you (I see in to-day's 'Times') have done much better.

"There is one thing you might have said in addition about the schools—that all religious sects, classes, and colours, sit down together in perfect harmony to be taught by their various instructors.

"Do you know that George also built a pier at Table Bay, at his own risk I believe, which by making the anchorage more safe increased the commerce? You are aware that Table Bay is a very dangerous anchorage for any ships in certain winds. No men-of-war are allowed to remain there. I was once wrecked there in a merchantman, to the assistance of which I was sent with a part of the Clorinda's crew. She had got ashore, and while we were trying to get her off, during which my boat was dashed to pieces, a gale came on, the vessel was soon knocked to pieces, and we were obliged to save ourselves by a hawser from the foremast-head to the shore—as good as tight-rope dancing (considering the height, the wind, and the waves), but without the pay. I was young and

active then and it was no trouble to me, but I could not do it now. Some could not *then* though both young and strong, and we were forced to have a basket for them. Oh, dear! how these recollections bring up the scenes of other times—the joys of our 'dancing days!'"

Sir George Napier to Sir W. Napier.

"Nice, April, 1852.

"I have just read Sir W. Molesworth's speech on the Caffre war, and nothing can be more clear and correct in every particular; his description of the country and the *bush* is perfect, as well as his account of the inhabitants, &c.; and I feel highly grateful to him for, and flattered by, the manner in which he was so kind as to speak of me!

"Had the Duke of Wellington ever seen the 'Cape bush,' he would not have said what he did about making roads through it; the thing is quite out of the question. I tried in every way, but failed, because *you cannot burn it* on account of the nature of the wood, and consequently every bush and every tree must be dug up from the root —no easy job; and when the road is made at an enormous expense, and in years of time, why! it is avoided by the enemy, and rendered dangerous to the troops by the Caffres, who lie all around perfectly concealed in the bush where our soldiers cannot penetrate! I am quite sure the Duke has been misled, like many other people who have been in India, and think that the Cape bush is nearly the same as the Indian jungle, whereas it is totally different in its nature and growth; however, it would I suppose be very imprudent to say this against his Grace's authority; but he will find that what Sir William Molesworth says is the fact, and that General Cathcart will not be able to make the roads through the bush which

the Duke at present thinks practicable. You may rely upon it that Sir Harry Smith would never have delayed one day in making roads, had it been feasible.

"Now, my dear Bill, I must again thank you for your letter to 'Friend Gurney,' as I attribute any praise I have got either in the House of Commons or out of it for my government of the Cape, to that calm and clear exposition of my six years' administration of the affairs of that unfortunate colony, which I had the satisfaction of leaving free of debt, and in a flourishing, contented condition. Now, alas! how different! General Cathcart will have no bed of roses; but if he is a sensible, steady, even-tempered man, and strongly imbued with a sense of justice and impartiality to black and white races, he will get through his difficulties. But should the Whigs come into office again, and Lord Grey be Colonial Secretary, I much doubt if anything will save the colony. As to keeping British Caffraria unless at an enormous expense, that cannot be done. I would make the colonial boundary the Keiskama river, which could be defended with 3000 troops. I would recompense the poor ruined farmers on the frontier by giving them the old neutral ground, or that land which lies between the Fish river and the Keiskama, as an indemnity for their losses in the war, upon condition that all the houses they build are to be made defensible by a wall all round, properly loopholed, and enclosing a sufficient area to hold their sheep and cattle. And then as an advanced defence, I would offer the present rebel chief, A. Pretorius, and his Boers, the whole of the Guika Caffres' country from the Keiskama to the great Kei river, over which I would force Sandilli and his tribes. I would let the Boers govern themselves and settle matters in their own way with the Caffres, only letting them know that they were not to expect or

ask the Government to give them assistance in defending their property—they must depend on themselves. However, it is useless for me to bother either you or myself with these things; 'let them look out as has the watch,' as Jack says.

"As for Harry Smith, I am glad to see Lord Grey is abused by everybody for the harsh unjust manner of his recall. In my opinion, the great mistake Smith made was in ever giving in to Lord Grey's folly of withdrawing a single soldier; and when the war did break out, he should have at once acknowledged his error in sending troops home, and boldly demanded reinforcements to the extent of 5000 troops at once. I still hope he may be able to finish the war before his successor arrives, for till lately he had not force to do more than he did."

In 1851 Sir William completed and published the 'History of the Administration of Scinde.' This work, mainly designed to record the gradual introduction of good government into the region lately desolated by the Ameers, contains also in the sketch of the Hill campaigns one of the most graphic military narratives ever written. We prefer that its character should be given by a master-hand; and for this purpose introduce here, out of its chronological order, a letter from Mr. Carlyle in acknowledgment of a copy of the work presented to him by the author.

Thomas Carlyle to Sir William Napier.

"DEAR SIR, "Chelsea, May 12, 1856.

"I have read with attention, and with many feelings and reflections, your record of Sir C. Napier's Administration of Scinde. You must permit me to thank you in the name of Britain at large for writing such a book; and in

my own poor name to acknowledge the great compliment and kindness implied in sending me a copy for myself.

"It is a book which every living Englishman would be the better for reading; for studying diligently till he saw into it, till he recognised and believed the high and tragic phenomenon set forth there! A book which may be called 'profitable' in the old Scripture sense; profitable for reproof, for correction and admonition, for great sorrow, yet for 'building up in righteousness' too—in heroic manful endeavour to do well, and not ill, in one's time and place. One feels it a kind of possession to know that one has had such a fellow-citizen and contemporary in these evil days.

"The fine and noble qualities of the man are very recognisable to me: his subtle piercing intellect turned all to the practical, giving him just insight into men and into things; his inexhaustible adroit contrivances; his fiery valour; sharp promptitude to seize the good moment that will not return. A lynx-eyed fiery man, with the spirit of an old knight in him; more of a hero than any modern I have seen for a long time. A singular veracity one finds in him; not in his words alone, which however I like much for their fine rough naïveté; but in his actions, judgments, aims; in all that he thinks and does and says—which, indeed, I have observed is the root of all greatness or real worth in human creatures, and properly the first (and also the rarest) attribute of what we call *genius* among men.

"The path of such a man through the foul jungle of this world,—the struggle of Heaven's inspiration against the terrestrial fooleries, cupidities, and cowardices,—cannot be other than tragical: but the man does tear out a bit of way for himself too; strives towards the good goal, inflexibly persistent till his long rest come: the man does leave his mark behind him, ineffaceable, beneficent to all

good men, maleficent to none: and we must not complain. The British nation of this time, in India or elsewhere,—God knows no nation ever had more need of such men, in every region of its affairs! But also perhaps no nation ever had a much worse chance to get hold of them, to recognise and loyally second them, even when they are there. Anarchic stupidity is wide as the night; victorious wisdom is but as a lamp in it shining here and there. Contrast a Napier even in Scinde with, for example, a Lally at Pondicherry or on the *Place de Grève*,—one has to admit that it is the common lot, that it might have been far worse!

"There is great talent in this book apart from its subject. The narrative moves on with strong weighty step, like a marching phalanx, with the gleam of clear steel in it;—sheers down the opponent objects and tramples them out of sight in a very potent manner. The writer, it is evident, had in him a lively glowing image, complete in all its parts of the transaction to be told; and that is his grand secret of giving the reader so lively a conception of it. I was surprised to find how much I had carried away with me, even of the Hill campaign and of Trukkee itself; though without a map the attempt to understand such a thing seemed to me desperate at first.

"With many thanks, and gratified to have made this reflex acquaintance, which if it should ever chance to become a direct one might gratify me still more,

"I remain always yours sincerely,

"T. CARLYLE."

Sir W. Napier to Viscount Palmerston.

"MY LORD, "Scinde House, Jan. 1852.

"The minds of men are never so comprehensive of injustice to others as when they are themselves suffering

from injustice. I therefore take the liberty of offering you the accompanying volume,* showing how a great man has been illused by those who have also proved to be your Lordship's enemies.

"To this I will add, that I deeply deplore the removal from power of the only English minister who, with genius to comprehend, has had resolution to attempt guiding as well as controlling, the terrible elements of disorder which are abroad, and hourly increasing in power.

"In France there is now a man of the same stamp; and I trust and believe that this country will support your Lordship as France has supported him."

In April news arrived of the loss of the troop transport 'Birkenhead' in Simon's Bay, Cape of Good Hope, and of the extraordinary discipline and devotion displayed by the troops on board. These consisted of detachments from several regiments, which were proceeding to reinforce their respective corps during the Caffre war. They were nearly all young soldiers, almost recruits, and were commanded by Major Seton of the 74th regiment. The circumstances were briefly these. The 'Birkenhead,' having struck a rock, began to fill and to sink rapidly in deep water. The bay was full of sharks. It was a question only of minutes. Seton ordered the men to "fall in" on deck, which they did under their officers as if on parade. Having said a few words as to their bearing as British soldiers, and the necessity of order and quiet, he gave orders that all the women and children should go on board the boats, which had been lowered and which barely sufficed for their accommodation. During this time the officers and men stood in their ranks, silent, awaiting orders. They saw the boats about to leave the ship, they knew there were no

* History of the Administration of Scinde.

others for them, they saw the sea rising rapidly higher and higher up the vessel's sides. *There was not a word or a murmur.* When the water was within a few feet of the deck, Lieutenant Lucas, one of the officers who had gone to make some report to Major Seton on the poop, said to the Major on shaking hands with him, "Well, Major, I hope we shall meet ashore." "*I'm afraid not, Lucas, for I cannot swim,*" was the reply. The officers and men may almost be said to have gone down with the ship in their ranks. Their noble commanding officer, one of the most gifted and accomplished men in the British army (it is within the knowledge of the writer that he was so) was drowned.

Sir William wrote the following letter on this subject. When it was written he was not aware of the fact that Major Seton was the officer commanding, and that all the measures taken were taken under his orders.

To the Editor of the 'Times.'

"SIR, "Scinde House, April, 1852.

"Were the Whigs still in office, we should doubtless have a letter from Lord John Russell talking of '*discretion*,'* and from Lord Grey a '*despatch*,'* censuring Captain Wright and Lieutenant Girardot for not being drowned when the 'Birkenhead' went down. But, under the present ministers, it may be hoped that the matchless chivalry of Captain Wright and Lieutenant Girardot, and the responding generous devotion of their men, who went down without a murmur rather than risk the safety of the women and children in the boats, will meet with some public honour and reward—honour for the dead as well as for the survivors; for surely the occasion was great and noble, and

* Alluding to a recent despatch from Lord Grey to the Governor of the Cape, Sir Harry Smith.

the heroism unsurpassable in the most noble of the noblest.

"W. NAPIER."

Although admired and praised, the survivors did not seem destined to reap any substantial reward for their heroic conduct, for this sort of heroism was beyond the ken of the official mind. The Duke of Wellington was Commander-in-Chief at the time, and he was very chary of recommending officers for promotion as a reward for any special service not before the enemy. But Sir William felt so strongly on the subject, that he wrote letters to every member of Parliament with whom he was acquainted in both Houses; amongst others, to Lords Hardinge and Ellenborough in the Lords, and to Lord Palmerston and Mr. Henry Drummond in the Commons, who all lent their influence to forward his object. Mr. Henry Drummond brought the matter before the House of Commons, and the result was that after some delay the two officers above-named received promotion, and all the survivors pecuniary compensation for their losses.

In the introduction to the 'Battles and Sieges in the Peninsula,' which he afterwards published, Sir William has thus alluded to the 'Birkenhead' catastrophe:—

"For the Great Captain who led the British troops so triumphantly, this record gives no measure of ability. To win victories was the least of his labours. Those who desire to know what an enormous political, financial, and military pressure he sustained, what wiles he circumvented, what opposing skill he baffled, what a powerful enemy he dealt with and overcame, must seek the story in the original History from which this work has been extracted.

"For the soldiers it is no measure of their fortitude and endurance: it records only their active courage. But

what they were, their successors now are—witness the wreck of the 'Birkenhead,' where four hundred men, at the call of their heroic officers, Captain Wright and Lieutenant Girardot, calmly, and without a murmur, accepted death in a horrible form rather than endanger the women and children already saved in the boats. The records of the world furnish no parallel to this self-devotion!"

The following letter is from Sir William's old friend General Shaw Kennedy. The latter part, relating to a possible war with America, and our prospects under such a contingency, will be read with interest, and not without thankfulness for that energetic national spirit displayed in the Volunteer movement, and the wise foresight of successive Governments, which by increasing our military force by sea and land has enabled us to be magnanimous and forbearing under insult, firm and fearless against wrong or menace.

Major-General Shaw Kennedy to Sir William Napier.

"Gloucester, Aug. 13, 1852.

"I left Kirkmichael on the 5th of last month, and have by twelve days' journey got this length on my progress to Exeter or Torquay, our intended winter quarters.

"I had an exceedingly strong wish both when I was at Birmingham and at Cheltenham, to have gone on to London, by which I would have had an opportunity of seeing you. But that was plainly beyond my strength, and I had, reluctantly, to give up all ideas of attempting it. I do not conceal from myself that the chances are very small that I shall get through the winter and early spring, compared with those against my doing so; and it would have afforded me a great deal of pleasure and satisfaction to have seen you. Although this is my deliberate opinion it will create no despondency; I shall exert myself to prop up my health

to my utmost; and if I get pretty well through the winter and early spring, I may afterwards be able to get to London.

"My present object must be solely that of getting on to Exeter, for a very slight change either of the weather or my health may make that impossible, although I am now within four hours' run of that place by railway.

"It would be wise for a sick man not to distress himself about public matters, but I cannot help feeling uneasy as to the *military position* of this country. We seem ready to run the chance of engaging in the most formidable wars, and equally determined not to provide the means of carrying them on.

"Of all human calamities that can befall this country, I think that a war with America will in the end prove the greatest; yet we have already risked it for some codfish and mackerel. From the moment we go to war with America, we must, unless insane, prepare for the possibility of one with France at the same time. We should then require 150,000 men in England, of either regular troops, or militia constantly embodied, 50,000 men in Ireland, 50,000 in Canada, and 50,000 men in our other colonies, and 100,000 seamen.

"But the people of this country think that a small British force can beat anything, and the ministers truckle to that public folly and most alarming delusion: if they do so while the Duke of Wellington is alive—whose letter shows that he endeavoured to correct this folly—what chance is there of their eyes being opened, except by surpassing calamities?"

Sir W. Napier to Major-General Shaw Kennedy.

"My dear Shaw, "Scinde House, Aug. 14, 1852.

"Your letter has pained me in every way, though I do hope your anticipations will not be found true: you

have frequent attacks, but you rally again, which proves that life is strong and the disease not overwhelming. As to your state of mind, I perfectly comprehend it, having for several years experienced the same feelings. To men of our age and experience of the world, death is not personally a thing to be dreaded; but those we leave behind make it so. In that respect you are better fortified than I am. My children are all women, except one; and my son, though a resolute man, is too unsuspecting, and he has now two children, girls!

"Your view of public affairs is exactly mine. That we shall have a war with America I fear, because they are wrong in principle, and we in the fashion of defending our rights. There is no cause for war, but there is a dispute, and both sides, being right—*in a way*—will be obstinate. How are we to meet it? We can have no chance except by an enormous exertion, calling forth all our military resources, and directing them in a well-considered plan under able executive officers.

"Have we those officers? No! We may have some incipient generals, but they will only be brought out by the progress of war: and war with America will be a close and sudden conflict, like a *duel à l'outrance*. Have we men to form a great plan and provide for it? No! The Duke is old, and who else is fitted for the task that is likely to be employed? Nobody! Have we a national feeling, or national unity, to engage in and support such an effort as is required? No! Ireland is more with our enemies than our friends, and the national spirit and intellect is more mercantile, mechanical, and literary than military. Yet our soldiers are as brave and devoted—perhaps more devoted than they ever were; witness the 'Birkenhead' and other affairs I have heard of.

"I gave the Duke of Wellington the plan for attacking America in case of a war, about twenty years ago. It was

a very extensive one, and he told me that he had prepared something of the same kind himself, but the time was not ripe. Whether he meant a plan like mine, or merely that he also had thought of the matter, I know not. My plan would still do, though the difficulty is very much enhanced from the increase of American power since then; but it is one that only a warlike nation, directed by a great man, could undertake.

"However, America is open to heavy blows. California may be taken; the blacks may be raised in arms; Spain would be our ally; many English sailors would not fight against us; and if France could be kept quiet, we might strike heavily. But the 'Times' is doing all it can to provoke Louis Napoleon and disgust the French nation, and altogether we are in an unsatisfactory position."

The following short and interesting summary of the services of the friend to whom the foregoing letter is addressed, was drawn up at a later period by Sir William, much aggrieved on his account when passed over in the distribution of the Order of the Bath: —

"This statement is made without the knowledge of General Shaw Kennedy."

"W. NAPIER.

"Lieut.-General Shaw Kennedy was in the 43rd regiment during the Peninsular war. He was on General Robert Craufurd's staff, and certainly his most confidential officer, displaying great intelligence, great zeal, and undaunted courage on very many occasions.

"He was at the storming of Badajoz, and made a desperate attempt to carry a smaller breach on the left of the main one: for his gallantry and exceeding coolness, see my History of the War, p. 119, book xvi., chap. v., small edition. His name was then *Shaw* only. The story

was told by Captain Nicholls, Shaw's comrade, when dying.

"In many battles afterwards Shaw Kennedy was distinguished, and especially at Waterloo, where, as Assistant-Adjutant-General, he formed under the eyes of Lord Wellington a new order of battle with a large body of troops, which resisted after a heavy cannonade one of the most formidable charges of cavalry ever poured along a field of battle. The Duke never forgot this service. The battle was scarcely over when Shaw Kennedy, then only a captain, had an opportunity of displaying his moral courage and sagacity in the following manner:—Scarcely had the firing ceased, when General Kilmansegge* of the Hanoverian service came to him, and offering his sword said with great agitation 'I am ordered into arrest by the Duke; what are your orders for me? It is the Adjutant-General's duty to enforce an arrest.' Captain Shaw sternly answered thus:—'Go, Sir, to that cottage,' pointing to a near one, 'and remain there till I come back to you.' The General looked surprised, but went without an observation. Shaw rode hard to find the Duke, and at last discovered him in a cottage, surrounded by his staff, and drying himself before a fire. Walking straight up to him, Shaw began the following dialogue:—

"*S.*—'Your Grace has put General Kilmansegge in arrest?'

"*D.*—'Yes; for behaving ill before the enemy.'

"*S.*—'Your Grace has made a mistake.'

"*D.*—'What do you mean?'

"*S.*—'I saw the General during the whole battle, and no man could behave better.'

"*D.*—'He withdrew his brigade from under fire.'

* General Kilmansegge commanded the Hanoverian brigade of the Light Division, of which Captain Shaw was Assistant Adjutant-General.

"*S.*—'He did so wisely. They were young troops, and were going to break and run under a heavy cannonade. The General saw this, and to save the bad effect of such a disbanding withdrew them in order behind a rising ground.'

"*D.*—'General Alten who commanded the division reported to me that Kilmansegge behaved ill.'

"*S.*—'There must be some mistake. General Alten was wounded and carried to the rear before the event happened.'

"*D.*—'But the General should have reported to me his movement and the reason; therefore I am in the right to blame him.'

"*S.*—'Your Grace would be so if he had neglected to do so, but I carried the report to you myself.'

"Here the Duke appeared staggered, and after a time said, 'What kind of man is General Kilmansegge?' Shaw replied, 'An old man full of honour, and has fought a battle for every white hair on his head.'

"Again the Duke seemed staggered, and at last said, 'Is he fit to command a division?' Shaw stepped back saying, 'Your Grace must excuse me: I came here to state truth and not to give presumptuous opinions.' 'Well,' said the Duke, 'you may go back to him and say he has been wronged, and may choose between a court-martial and the command of the division!'

"Shaw galloped back, and then was seen why he had so sternly ordered the General to remain in the cottage. He found him, as he had expected to find,—and therefore had fixed him to one spot for fear of losing him,—putting a loaded pistol to his head after having written a defence of his conduct. Shaw tore it from his hand.

"Lord Wellington, after the fall of Paris, appointed Shaw Kennedy, then a major, to be military agent and

English commandant at Calais during the occupation of France. This was a very difficult office. He had to control and conduct the whole communications of the British army at Calais, where there was a French garrison, and he did it for several years in the most trying circumstances with perfect success, though many dangerous accidents happened, which were all staved off by his prudence and extraordinary firmness.

"The Duke did not lose sight of him. When the Manchester troubles began, the Whig ministers asked for an officer of intelligence and firmness to be a military political agent at that town, and he recommended Shaw Kennedy, who for years preserved the district under very trying circumstances without bloodshed.

"When the Irish constabulary was projected, to Shaw Kennedy was confided the raising and organization of it; but when he had completed it, he was forced by intrigues to resign. Since that he has met with great injustice. He was passed over by a junior for a regiment, though he has since obtained one; and he is now passed over in the distribution of the Order of the Bath, while men of not half his claims have received those honours. He is perhaps, with the exception of Lord Seaton, the very ablest officer in the service, as well as one of the most deserving: but ill health from wounds and hardships has disabled him of late years from serving."

To the above interesting sketch may be added that on the 10th April, 1848, great anxiety was felt as to the peace of Liverpool, and in the course of the night before a Queen's messenger was sent to General Shaw Kennedy to Hastings, desiring, by order of the Duke of Wellington, that he should proceed to Liverpool to take the command of the troops there. Shortly afterwards, when the insur-

rectionary movements occurred in Ireland, the Duke selected two general officers, of whom General Shaw Kennedy was one, Lord Hardinge the other, to proceed to Ireland to assist in suppressing that movement. Illness, however, prevented General Kennedy from going to Ireland, as it afterwards prevented his accepting the post of Governor and Commander-in-Chief in the Mauritius. In 1851 he was offered and accepted the command of the troops in Scotland, but illness again interfered, and since that time his life has been one of incessant suffering, which has not however been able to subdue his mind, or to destroy his interest in what is passing in the world from which he has withdrawn. It will be remembered that from his sick room issued in 1859 by far the ablest essay on the 'Defences of England' which has yet appeared.

The incident below related was sent to Sir William by the Adjutant-General, Sir G. Brown, with the following note:—

"MY DEAR WILLIAM. "Horse Guards, July 24, 1852.

"This story of the 'bull' it appears to me will be so much to your taste, that I have had it transcribed for your edification. It reminds me of poor Dal's 'Well done, my buff!' of former days.

"Yours truly,
"G. BROWN."

Extract from Major-General Sutherland's Confidential Report of the 5th Foot,* 1852.

"A circumstance occurred during the march of a company of this regiment from Mahebourg to Port Louis, which, as characteristic of the coolness and firmness of the British soldier in situations of sudden difficulty, in my opinion deserves to be recorded.

* Enclosed by Sir G. Brown.

"Whilst the company was *en route* in a bright moonlight, in column of sections, it was suddenly charged from a side road by a vicious bull that took a sergeant up between his horns, pinned a private up against a wall, narrowly missing his body, and then ran through the column to the front, tumbling the men over in all directions about the road. After running forward some distance, he was seen returning at a furious pace towards the head of the little column, when the officer on the impulse of the moment ordered, 'Prepare for cavalry!'—was promptly obeyed—and the formidable animal unflinchingly received on the bayonets of the leading section, with such firmness that one bayonet, after penetrating to the heel in the animal's head, broke off short, and some nine others were bent nearly double!

"The weight and impetus of the huge animal, and the check he received, were so great, that the assailant and assailed were rolled over and over—the bull not recovering himself until he had tumbled into the third section, when he scrambled away to the rear, avoiding the rear-guard; and after some short time was seen lying quite dead of his wounds on the road, whilst all the soldiers providentially escaped without any serious injury."

In September the great Duke died, and on the 18th November Sir William attended the funeral officially, having been one of the general officers selected to carry bannerols on the occasion. His brother Charles was there as pall-bearer, and with Sir William and other of the Duke's old officers hung over the coffin in St. Paul's when it was lowered into the vault. As the mortal remains of their great commander descended inch by inch amidst solemn and mournful music, until at last only a yawning gap appeared on the brink of which stood the veteran pupils of the Duke's own school,

each one felt what a gap had also been created in his heart by the disappearance of their hero from among them; and suppressed sobs broke from labouring decorated breasts, and tears rolled down bronzed and wrinkled cheeks, as they thought of the days of old.

How Sir William Napier was affected by the death of the man whom he had loved and reverenced from his youth, and whose great deeds he had written in imperishable characters, is thus described by one of his daughters:—

"He was at Oaklands with his brother Sir Charles when the news arrived of the Duke's death. It reached my aunt when the two brothers were out driving together, and on their return she and I went into the hall to tell them of it. My uncle gave an exclamation of surprise and grief; but I never shall forget my father's choked cry of 'Dead! oh God!' He staggered back against the wall deadly pale, and so faint that we had to support him to a sofa, where he lay for hours quite overwhelmed with grief and the sudden shock of the intelligence."

Another of the great Duke's most distinguished pupils—the late Lieutenant-General Sir Harry Smith—happened to be at Oaklands at the same time. This meeting—the first for many years—with his old and valued friend and comrade of the light division, was one of extreme pleasure to Sir William, and it may easily be conceived what a point was given by the death of their chieftain to the memories which the two brothers and Sir Harry interchanged on the old Peninsula days.

Although at the great man's funeral none were more affected than himself, Sir William yet found time while in the cathedral to take note of what seemed to him the miserable and starved appearance of the Chelsea pensioners who attended, and it made such an impression upon him, that he represented it to his friend Adjutant-General Sir G.

Brown, and begged him to make inquiries as to the treatment the old men received at the hospital. This Sir George did, and communicated the result to Sir William:—

"MY DEAR WILLIAM, "Horse Guards, Dec. 9, 1852.

"I send you the reply to my reference to Chelsea respecting your *starved* pensioners. After what is stated by our friend Moorhead, I trust you will be ashamed of having allowed so much scope to your lively imagination.

"The fact is, it was the Dean of St. Paul's who was to blame for leaving the windows in the dome open and freezing us all to death. I never was so cold in my life."

Mr. Moorhead to Lieutenant-General Sir G. Brown.*

"MY DEAR SIR, "Royal Hospital, Chelsea, Dec. 8, 1852.

"I think the best answer I can return to your letter in order to enable you to satisfy Sir William Napier that our old veterans in this house are neither starved for want of sufficient food, nor yet pinched with cold in consequence of having a short supply of good warm clothing, is to send you a statement of their daily ration, and a list of the articles of clothing in each man's possession, and worn by him as his own feelings may prompt. On the morning of the Duke's funeral, those who attended it previously to starting breakfasted off cocoa, &c., and each man carried in his pocket sandwiches composed of bread and half a pound of fine round of beef, previously prepared for the purpose, and on their return home received in addition the whole of their usual daily ration. It cost us 8*l.* for omnibus hire to Charing Cross, where they joined the procession. Besides the order of our Board to make them comfortable, Lord

* Enclosed by Sir G. Brown.

Hardinge personally expressed his wish to me that they should be made so, and everything was done with that view. But notwithstanding the admirable arrangements made by the military authorities, the old men were kept standing some hour and a half at Charing Cross, and probably from their great age and debility became tired and chilled, and not so smart and fresh in their appearance and looks as when Sir William knew some of them in bygone days. But there have been no complaints, and they were most delighted and proud at the honour conferred upon them."

During this year Sir William Napier drew up a memoir on the defence of the country against a French invasion, too long to be given here. The concluding paragraph is—

"I think the true defence of the country is to be found in volunteer corps and an increase of the regular army, not in a militia. The Government has rejected the volunteers evidently from political feeling, fearing they would demand an extension of reform. The militia, *if they are raised*, may be found more dangerous. But in any circumstances a well-considered plan should be formed at once, and a certain expense incurred."*

The following letters on this subject were written in the course of 1852, before the Duke of Wellington's death:—

To Lieutenant-General Shaw Kennedy, C.B.

"Scinde House, — 1852.

"With respect to invasion, I have been convinced all along that Napoleon has not the smallest intention to go to war. He dare not give a general a great command; he is not a general himself, and his uncle left him no hope of glory that would be more than a rushlight to the sun.

* The memoir will be found in the Appendix.

But that uncle has left him great plans in detail for the prosperity of France in peace, and he will endeavour to follow them. Still we ought to be prepared.

"My notion is that the great arsenals, naval and military, should be fortified and defended by naval troops, workmen and artillery, &c., aided by volunteers; that London should have a defensive line of forts and connecting curtains, drawn from the Thames near the Surrey Docks and Canal, using the latter as ditches, to the Thames above Lambeth. You will see the docks and canals give great facility, and will shorten very much the heavy works. Well, man these works with citizens, volunteers, and some artillerymen, and an army of 100,000 men must check at them for some days at least. But I would have double *têtes de pont* made at all the bridges above the works, and an entrenched camp on the right bank, where twenty or thirty thousand regular troops could take post on the flank of the enemy, ready if he assailed London to fall on his flank, and if he turned on them to fight, or cross the river and take post there, having the Millbank Penitentiary and Chelsea Hospital, and perhaps other points, fortified for the time.

"Now mark: the French would land between Dover and Portsmouth, and march on London straight; they dare not entangle themselves with the Medway, Thames, Chatham, &c., because of the works and ships of war on both rivers. But when at London, they might meddle with Deptford and Woolwich, neither of which is or can be effectually fortified. I meet them thus: fortify on the other side of the Thames, in the Essex marshes, two forts of refuge, where all the guns and stores should be sent across on the first alarm of invasion. Frigates, sloops, and gunboats would then secure the river below London down to Chatham. The line of works and Surrey Canal would

secure London, with exception of some part of the southern suburbs. The regular army would secure the Thames above, with the aid of *têtes de pont* and gunboats, and the enemy would be forced to go as high as Chertsey to pass; but then the Regulars could take a new position towards Hampstead, previously prepared with field-works and fortified houses, while the citizen-volunteers defended the houses of Park-lane, the palaces, Piccadilly, and Pall-Mall, where the club-houses are absolutely forts.

"Meanwhile England would gather, and the *coup* would fail.

"If they sent an auxiliary force to the Severn, the Holm islands, armed with heavy shell-guns, and flanked by two hulks prepared as batteries, would baffle the attempt. They could not land on the left bank of the Severn below these islands; there are no harbours. They must land on the other bank and march to Gloucester, where a *tête de pont* might stop them until the Welshmen gathered on their backs. I have not considered Liverpool.

"They might go to Milford Haven, but that would not be very important. If they went to Ireland, I know not what to say or do!

"This is of course only an outline. I want to hear your views about the naval armament and other points.

"Observe that I propose nothing outrageously expensive, and I have another plan for opposing a landing. The railroads on the south coast are made generally to hand; but I would make branches to run parallel to the coast, where landings could take place; fortify stations with Napoleon's coast-forts and towers, and level the southern banks of the railroad to a glacis with a covered-way. There should be also esplanades formed at points fitting for artillery batteries. Thus by signal, troops, guns, &c., could move to any point and plant batteries and take a

fortified position quicker than an enemy could land; and yet, if beaten, could reach the entrenched camp at the bridges above London, for after defence."

To the same.

"Scinde House, — 1852.

"I have been seriously uneasy about you, but I hope the present weather will let you escape from the chillness of the north. For myself, I daily give way, and repeated and torturing attacks are quite depriving me of the use of my limbs, especially my hands; and what I am to do when I can neither write, paint, or hold a book, I know not.

"Your notes agree with my views, I see, in all points; but what a Government is ours, if, while pretending to defend the country, it is afraid to arm volunteers! We cannot be defended except by volunteers; and if they want any political changes, they ought to, and must in the end, have them; for they, the volunteers, are the nation, and their volunteering shows that they are so, and feel themselves to be so.

"As to the south side of London, your indication would I think be too difficult; the hills are so built upon and so irregular, that the enemy could easily break in at some points: unless the whole was one fortified line and clear, irregulars would be deceived and forced, and the houses beyond the line are too many and scattered to be destroyed.

"We both agree that preparation and expense should be devoted now, more to forming strong points and a theatre of war between the coast-line and London, in which an enemy should find himself entangled and liable to be opposed at every move, *i.e.* London, Dover, Chatham, Portsmouth; on the Medway, on the Thames.

"As to showing my notes, do what you like, but keep a

copy, for you will never get them back from the Horse-Guards. The Duke has never shown a disposition to act on any plan emanating from me, though I have sent him plans on several different military subjects. I do not, therefore, expect he will take any notice of my notes, though in all his communications with me he has never hinted that he thought my views weak or ill-founded; on the contrary, he has paid me some strong general compliments.

"But I am clearly of opinion that you should show your own notes, whether you show mine or not, and I leave the latter entirely at your discretion."

*To the same.**

"MY DEAR FRIEND, "Feb. 18, 1853.

"Your letter has given me the deepest anxiety, but I still hope the weather has had more to do with your feelings than you imagine; all the medical men agree that it has been most depressing and wearing to invalids. I had been uneasy at not hearing from you, and desired Norah to write some time ago; but the time of my girls has been taken up in attending their aunt, who has been, and is, very alarmingly ill, and she forgot it. I have also been confined to bed with my old attack and a new one added, namely, that whenever digestion ceases vomiting begins, and continues with pain for several hours, leaving me very incapable of exertion. My brother Charles has also been very dangerously ill. In fine, everybody suffers, and thence I still draw hope that you are not intrinsically so bad as you seem to think, and that spring will restore you at least to bettered condition and bettered hopes. We are however all now old, and our early life wore us out prematurely. I look forward with little hope for myself, but without dismay, and I think you do the same; and

* The Duke of Wellington died in the interval since the preceding letter was written.

certainly you have passed a life of honour and service, that entitles you to look at events with the same calm superiority that has ever marked your conduct upon all occasions. I will not continue however in this strain.

"I have read ——'s report and sent it to him. It is an engineer's, not a general's report. He is mistaken in supposing that great supplies need be landed, or much time consumed in disembarkation. From steamers, by means of moveable bridges, troops and field-artillery can march out by sections wherever they can bring the head of the steamer to touch. I have had practical proof of this given me by Sir E. Belcher. The only obstacle will be to find room for many steamers together, but it is astonishingly easy for steamers to find places; and as for stores, ammunition is all that need be landed; three thousand cavalry in England would bring in provisions enough anywhere in a few hours.

"Again, he is wrong in his choice of a camp to cover London. I know the country well. This is a *tormented* country—not a continuous position—and it would require a very light manœuvring army to take up a position at all, much more to fight it; and, if beaten, both sides would go together into London. Moreover, it would not be necessary for the enemy to attack his works or positions. An enemy could there move across the fields, as well as on the high roads, and menace the Upper Thames, when our army would be obliged to abandon the position, or the enemy would pass the Wandle (or Wans), a *canal river*, and not wider than a canal in the low ground about Wandsworth, where there are plenty of trees and houses to form as many bridges as he wishes, and thus pass between our right flank and the Thames, and not only turn the position but cut off our army from London. He has, I see, adopted my line of defence as a second position, but that is not good alone, unless the regular army is entrenched as I proposed on

the flank at Wimbledon and Richmond Park, to menace the enemy. He makes no use of the population, and it would take 80,000 men to fight in the ground he proposes with any chance of security. It would be better to let the armed population act there irregularly, occupying the houses, and retiring on the second line. The roads, public and private, are intricate beyond conception from their number, but the fields are all drained and firm, and the houses innumerable. Such a country is exactly fitted for irregulars, but the reverse for an inferior regular army; and my opinion is, that no greater mistake was ever made than by Lord Derby in refusing and discouraging the formation of rifle corps. London could furnish 200,000 young men willing to fight anything; and it would be fatal to fight a decisive battle with *regulars* only to cover London, unless we are equal to a battle in numbers and position. Our object should be to engage the population in the work, and keep our army free on the flank to aid. If the population fails, the army could still keep together for the defence of the country; but if it is beaten in a great battle and driven into London, the enemy would conquer the country as well as the capital.

"Ireland will always be our weakest point; I did not touch on it in my notes; I cannot see my way there.

"I hope this will not tire you. I would not have entered into the subject if I had not thought from your letter that the subject gives you interest; but I feel heavy, and fear I have not been very clear. I am so weak as to be incapable of a journey, or I would go down to you; but the result would be useless to either of us, even if I could get there, which I much doubt.

"Believe me now, as I have ever been,

"Your attached friend,

"W. NAPIER."

To the same.

"Feb. 1853.

"Finding from your dictated letter that the discussion does not tire you, I will add some explanation to what I said in my last.

"I judge that you agree with me about ——'s plan; but in saying that the enemy could easily pass the Wandle to penetrate the low ground and get in rear of our position, it may be asked why he should pass that river to repass it again in attack? My reason for that is as follows:—

"If he attacked between the Wandle and Tooting, our troops could be concentrated there for defence; but if he passed the Wandle, he would obtain command of the Upper Thames, and so force the defending army to abandon its position to oppose a passage of the Thames; and if the defending army did not do so, then the enemy could force the right flank by the low ground in repassing the Wandle.

"—— has left out of his calculation two points of importance. His left and right flanks are both covered not only by rivers and canals, but by railroads parallel to those rivers and canals. I considered the advantages of this, but still it gives too great an extent of ground to defend, and we cannot have a manœuvring army, and should not put our defence on the chances of a decisive battle.

"You never sent me your notes. I am persuaded your information as to the time required for disembarkations will confirm my views. As I told the Duke of Wellington, the French have a book which I have seen containing drawings made for Napoleon of every description of vessel or boat known before steamers, so arranged and fitted as

to contain in the best form soldiers' arms, artillery, stores, in short, everything belonging to war, with instructions on each page facing the drawings for fitting and altering them in the quickest manner. The steamers can all have falling bridges like the ancient galleys, one on each side of the bow, on which four soldiers abreast can march on shore, and those steamers can tow craft of all kinds fitted as directed in the book mentioned above; and field-pieces can be put together on the decks of the steamers to wheel out by the bridges as on a road. A large steamer can convey, for a short voyage, 2000 men easily; and a small steamer can convey fifty pieces of field-artillery, all ready with ammunition, to move on shore."

To the same.

"May, 1853.

"I hope this wintry weather has not hurt you as much as it has me. I feel very ill.

"I am reading Murray's 'Despatches of Marlborough.' I am amazed at the genius of Marlborough: his plan of sending secretly 20,000 men to Eugene in 1706, and going himself to put an end to the war in Italy, and from thence after raising the siege of Turin to enter France, as no doubt he designed, was almost equal to Hannibal's march. Only think of a man with a powerful enemy in his front in the Low Countries, projecting the passing an army of 20,000 men secretly by a flank march across the front of the two French armies on the Moselle and Upper Rhine, besides deceiving the army in his own front, to fall upon Italy! Yet it was perfectly well reasoned. He would of course have ended the war in Italy, because Eugene did so later without his help, and then they would have fallen on France with at least 70,000 men, entered Lyons, and probably besieged Toulon; and if they took it the

English fleet would have joined them, and reinforcements have come by sea. Meanwhile there would have been a rising in the Cevennes to aid them, and the war would have been terminated by a great battle, which Marlborough and Eugene would have won, for who in France, except Berwick, was fit to oppose them? He was, as you know, stopped by the Prince of Baden's bad generalship or treachery, and his 'pis aller' was the battle of Ramillies! I do not however understand how he let the French army reassemble after that battle: he had them in flight amongst all the rivers, of which he had the command near their sources, and I think he should have followed them closer and destroyed them."

To the same.

"May 18, 1853.

"It is very painful to me to hear that your strength decays, but it is impossible for any invalid not to feel feeble with this continued east wind. I also am becoming very weak, partly from the weather, but more so from a new disease, viz. vomiting for several hours every night. I was glad to see your writing steadier and firmer than it has been of late, and certainly your mind is as clear as ever, for your character of Murray is a model of force and perspicuity.

"I have not yet got to Oudenarde in the Marlborough Despatches; but I have no doubt you are right, as he showed the same want of vigour after Ramillies, as I before observed, and certainly there must have been strong reasons to justify him for not attacking Vendôme and the Duke of Burgundy between Ghent and Bruges after Oudenarde, the more especially as they were notoriously in dispute with each other. It is true Berwick was coming up with a reinforcement, and he was a formidable enemy; but

his forces were neither so near nor so numerous as to be very formidable at the moment to Marlborough.

"It is, however, difficult to judge of the embarrassments caused by the Deputies and the factions in Holland, which had their representatives amongst the Dutch generals with the army.

"I do not think Marlborough was a greater general than Wellington, because the latter had to contend with men who, from their own talent, and from the system of war introduced by Napoleon, and superintended by him, gave few opportunities of striking decisive blows; whereas the generals opposed to Marlborough and their system gave him almost daily the finest opportunities; but I think Marlborough was a man of a finer and more subtle genius, not personally so hardy and resolute, and in character infinitely below Wellington, but still more capacious of mind. By character I mean not only honour and nobleness, but daring in the treatment of obstacles; and I think both of them inferior to Napoleon and Oliver Cromwell. Either of those men would not only have put down the Deputies, would have fought in despite of them (so would Wellington), but would have made themselves masters of Holland, and probably of France also, by entering Paris at the head of troops devoted to them personally. Marlborough sought to conciliate and evade the opposition of those people, though it is said he had a design and hopes of making himself Stadtholder. The result is, that he appears a less great man than he really was.*

* "I quite agree that the Duke of Marlborough is the greatest man that ever appeared at the head of a British army. He had greater difficulties to contend with, in respect to his operations and the command of his troops in the field, than I had. I had no Dutch deputies to control my movements or intentions, whether to fight or otherwise; but, on the other hand, I had armies to co-operate with me, upon whose operations I could not reckon, owing to the defective state of their discipline and their equipments, and their deficiencies of all kinds. I could not rely upon ten thousand of them doing what five hundred ought to do; or upon their doing anything, much

"As to your opinion of the generals of the world, I would add to your list and reverse the order.

"I would say Hannibal the first of all, Napoleon second, Alexander third, and Cæsar fourth. Hannibal first, because he did the most; for the maintaining an army of different nations in Italy for fifteen years, and against Romans—certainly the bravest, the best armed, the most subordinate, and most politic people of the world—is an exploit almost beyond belief. The difficulty of it was never so strongly brought to my mind as by a quotation from some Latin author whose name I forget, but who incidentally says Hannibal never sat down to a meal while he was in Italy, except at Capua, always taking them standing or walking while transacting business! Capua, then,—where that ostentatious fool as to military affairs, the classical Livy, says the veterans of Hannibal were effeminated by luxury, as if one or two good meals could hurt those hardy fellows,—afforded the only moments of relaxation for mind or body Hannibal took in fifteen years!

"Alexander never made an error, never missed an opportunity, never lost a battle, was never driven back from a town; and it is impossible to say therefore that he could not have done what Hannibal did; but he did not do as much, his difficulties were far less; therefore I place him below Hannibal.

"Napoleon's exploits were certainly much greater than Alexander's; the state of civilization offered infinitely greater obstacles to his success, and he had neither the name and authority of a legitimate monarch, nor the disciplined troops handed down to Alexander by Philip.

less upon their doing what ten thousand ought to do. The Duke of Marlborough did not labour under this inconvenience."—(Sep. 18, 1836.) Extract from a Memorandum on the Duke of Marlborough by the Duke of Wellington—'*Miscellanies*,' by Earl Stanhope, 1863.

Moreover, the invasion of Asia had been projected and reasoned out by Jason of Pheræ, by Agesilaus, and by Philip, and its practicability proved by the 'Ten Thousand.' Napoleon's operations were improvised and changed continually: in fine, he was Hannibal's co-equal, though he never did so much individually.

"Cæsar in genius was the equal of any, perhaps in variety of genius more than the equal of any; but in military matters he sometimes failed, especially against Pompey, who would certainly have beaten him, or rather who did beat him, at Dyrrachium, and would have entirely destroyed him if he had been master of his own movements; but with all the violent foolish Romans, all potentates, generals, and politicians, thinking themselves his equals, and even his superiors, and badgering him day and night, he got bewildered, and had no fair play for his genius which was certainly great. Cæsar beat him by superiority of character rather than by superiority of military skill.

"This is a long letter, but I think you take an interest in such discussions, and I write in hopes to amuse you." *

* To these estimates of great generals may be added a portion of his comparison of Napoleon and Wellington. "That he was less vast in his designs, less daring in execution, neither so rapid nor so original a commander as Napoleon, must be admitted; and being later in the field of glory, it is to be presumed he learned something of the art from that greatest of all masters. Yet something besides the difference of genius must be allowed for the difference of situation; Napoleon was never, even in his first campaign of Italy, so harassed by the French as Wellington was by the English, Spanish, and Portuguese governments; their systems of war were however alike in principle, their operations being only modified by their different political positions. Great bodily exertion, unceasing watchfulness, exact combinations to protect their flanks and communications without scattering their forces; these were common to both: in defence firm, cool, enduring, in attack fierce and obstinate; daring when daring was politic, yet always operating by the flanks in preference to the front; in these things they were alike. In following up a victory the English general fell short of the French emperor. The battle of Wellington was the stroke of a battering-ram,—down went the wall in ruins; the battle of Napoleon was the swell and dash of a mighty wave before which the barrier yielded, and the roaring flood poured onwards covering all."—*Peninsular War*, book xxiv., chap. 6.

To the same.

"June 4, 1853.

"Your son was here yesterday, and I was very sorry to hear from him that you had fallen back again, but I hope it is only from the sudden change to cold weather: here everybody has felt this change severely.

"Since I wrote to you I have read Marlborough's letters on Oudenarde, and I agree with you that he did not make the most of his victory.

"The French army lost, he says, 7000 prisoners, besides 800 officers. Berwick rallied 3000 stragglers, and there must have been at least 2000 deserters and other stragglers. Five or six thousand killed and wounded above those who were made prisoners would not be any exaggeration; and hence we may say the French army was reduced by 20,000 men for the first week after the battle.

"Their army took position behind the canal of Bruges; a long line and not fortified; for Marlborough says weeks after, 'They are fortifying the canal.' Surely such a master of manœuvre could with a victorious army have forced that line. It is true they had a fortress at each end, but so had he—Ostend and Antwerp—and Holland behind them, and Prince Eugene's army coming up to Brussels; their army, having lost 1200 officers, could not have made much resistance, and in case of defeat, without retreat, must have been destroyed. Marlborough lost a time in destroying the French lines which should have been employed in preventing them from raising new lines behind the canal. He seems to have turned his mind entirely to preparation for the siege of Lille, a great affair certainly, but a very dangerous one, much harder to accomplish than the final destruction of the French army at the canal.

"Taking this neglect, together with a like failure after

Ramillies, I should say he did not understand how to improve a victory, but Blenheim forbids that conclusion. I therefore judge that some political reasons, either general or personal, swayed him,—probably the first, as no party seems powerful enough in England or Holland to have stood against him; if he had destroyed the French army, I mean, none could have prevented him from moving afterwards into France.

"Altogether he is a mystery; and perhaps the key is to be found in his wanting courage to strike at the right time. I think he had great personal ambition, and may have looked to be king of Holland; but when the time for a decisive stroke came, or rather when he should have brought affairs to the crisis for that decided stroke, he had not courage. There is however another solution. He was getting *old*, and he was *gouty;* two desperate antagonists to ambition."

To the same.

"July 4, 1853.

"I was in hopes to have heard from you as a proof of your being better; I would have written before now, but I have been very ill, and as you see scarcely able to hold a pen; and I write now more from the fatigue of doing nothing than with the object of hearing from you; and I think perhaps my views of our present state of affairs may amuse you for half an hour. I will first however say something that has entered my mind, and is in unison I know with the opinions of eminent medical men; namely, that a long continuance of even wholesome diet of one kind is injurious, and that you should cautiously for a time change your farinaceous food for a meat diet. However, men generally know how to meet their own physical wants in regard to food better than their advisers.

"As to politics, there is a great deal of the usual over-

wise and over-subtle speculation going on about Russia. To me it is clear that Nicholas has an object in view, that he has long prepared for it, and will gain it. Further, I think that object is not Constantinople now; although, if a war begins, and if the Russians are as some say fanatical about the Eastern churches, he may be forced to go to Constantinople—but I do not believe in Russian fanaticism.

"If on the other side the Mahometans are fanatical—and that I believe—there will be a great war, and none can foresee its termination, nor the many new combinations which will spring up.

"But viewing the matter as Nicholas desires it to be viewed, I think I see my way clearly.

"He settled with Austria when he oppressed Hungary for her that she was to aid his views; and now she must do so, because those views will enforce the faith of Austria. What are they? To prepare the way for the future occupation of Constantinople without difficulty. The first step towards that is to seize the Principalities, and that he is going to do. He will then have surrounded Hungary on the north, east, and south, and will occupy the only two defiles leading through the Transylvanian mountains into that country. He has already for a long time secured the Montenegrins in his interest, and thus he has the power to crush Servia. In this position he holds Austria at his mercy, for any resistance on her part will give him an excuse for raising Hungary, and, even from the mouths of the Cattaro, exciting Italy to insurrection. Austria, therefore, is his slave, and he cuts Hungary and Servia off from Turkey morally and physically, and from all the rest of the world also. He gains a base unapproachable for a future invasion of Constantinople, and a line of operations which will turn the Balkan by land. And there he may

strengthen himself and bide his time, when England and France are not friendly, and when the Porte must be weaker than it now is.

"How is Nicholas to be opposed? In the Baltic he is safe, and can destroy our trade; yet we must keep a large fleet to watch him, for fear of his invading our eastern coast. In the Black Sea he can destroy our trade; and the allied fleet must beware of passing the Dardanelles, much more the Bosphorus, unless with a land force to ensure retreat. Can Turkey supply such a force? Not to be depended on! The Turkish army will be on the Balkan; it must go there, and yet can do little against the occupation of the Principalities, and, if it fights in those places without an English or French force to aid it, will be beaten. The only way, it appears to me, for checking Russia is by Circassia, and I am glad to see a Turkish army is being assembled at Erzeroum. But all these combinations on our side require strict friendship with France, and great operations, neither of which our Government is capable of; and hence England will probably, after a great deal of boasting, give way; and France will say, and justly, she must obtain compensation to balance Russian acquisition. Where can that be found? Egypt!

"This seems to be a possible termination of this turmoil.

"July 5.

"I left off yesterday abruptly from pain; I am better to-day, and resume my Eastern speculations. I showed that Russia holds Austria in chains; but she has also means of reward. Austria has long coveted Bosnia and Servia, and Russia will be able and willing to give her one of them at least. But there remains to consider the disposition of the people of the Principalities. The Bulgarians some time since were horribly treated by the

bent with suffering, his snow-white hair and beard flowing in the wind — standing at his brother's grave and striving to find utterance for the feelings with which his heart was bursting. Few brothers have ever been so beloved or so faithfully served as was the dead man by him who now stood raining tears on his coffin. "Soldiers!" was all he could say, "there lies one of the best men—the best soldiers—the best Christians—that ever lived; he served you faithfully, and you served him faithfully. God is just."

These few lines he addressed to his wife:—

"August, 1853.

"His long agony is past, ours is beginning.

"He died under the colours of the 22nd; Montague * placed them over his head while he was yet breathing, and he and I are now going to place him under the picture, with the Belooch sword beside him, and to dress his bier with shields. These shall be his honours, and none can step in between him and them."

Lord Hardinge, then Commander-in-Chief, as soon as he heard of Sir Charles Napier's death, wrote the following letter. He afterwards attended the funeral.

Viscount Hardinge to Sir W. Napier.

"MY DEAR NAPIER, "Sept. 2, 1853.

"Your anticipations when we last met have proved but too true, and the country, the army, and his family have sustained a most irreparable loss. He had the rarest combination of great qualities of any of our contemporaries, and I will not attempt to do justice to them after the eloquent tributes paid to his transcendent merits by every one who writes on so fertile a subject.

* Colonel MacMurdo, C.B.

"My immediate object is to request permission of Lady Napier and the family to pay him the last duties of friendship and professional respect by attending the funeral, and also to know from you, whether, in taking the Queen's pleasure on the vacancy in the 22nd, you will allow me to propose you to be their colonel. That regiment is associated with his splendid achievements in the East, and you are the best successor I can name—for no two brothers ever were more devotedly attached, and the regiment, proud of him, will be rejoiced to have you."

Sir William accepted gratefully the colonelcy of the 22nd Regiment, and thus communicated his appointment to the commanding officer, as below:—

To the Officer Commanding 22nd Regiment.

"SIR, "Scinde House, Oct. 1853.

"You will have seen by the Gazette that Her Majesty has been graciously pleased to transfer me from the 27th to the 22nd Regiment.

"This I regard and know to have been done in testimony of Her Majesty's sense of my deceased brother's services, and in that view it will no doubt be gratifying to the regiment. In any other view it can only excite regret, for assuredly in reputation, position, and influence, my inferiority must be felt.

"My pecuniary connection with the regiment will not, I believe, commence before 1855, but my interest in its fame and well-being commenced from the moment of my appointment; and so far as the influence generally allowed to the colonel of a regiment goes, it shall always be exerted to forward the prosperity of the 22nd.

"This is not saying much; but it is, unfortunately, all that I can say.

"Believe me yours very faithfully,

"W. NAPIER, Lieut.-General."

The following letters were written by Sir William after the funeral.

To Major-General Simpson, Commanding at Portsmouth.

"SIR, "Sept. 8, 1853.

"Permit me to offer to yourself and your staff the grateful thanks of the late Sir C. Napier's family, and to express a hope that you will make known to the officers and soldiers under your command who attended at his funeral, the grateful sense entertained for that honour. Certainly, he was in life a good soldier and good comrade; and most alleviating to our grief it was to see the attendance of good soldiers and good comrades, in honour of a man who lived with soldiers from his infancy, fought with them, bled with them, and led them to victory.

"Believe me," &c.

To the Worshipful the Mayor of Portsmouth.

"SIR, "Oaklands, Sept. 8, 1853.

"Great sorrow deadens the mind to outward circumstances, but no grief could produce insensibility to the generous public feeling displayed towards the late Sir Charles Napier by sympathizing multitudes of countrymen assembled this day at his funeral. His family cannot, in gratitude, forbear giving some expression to their feelings, and no mode appears so proper to effect that object as my addressing you upon the subject.

"Sir C. Napier served his country long, bravely, successfully, and with entire devotion; and now his countrymen have acknowledged and honour his merit.

"This is the reward, the fame he always strove to deserve."

The moment Sir William returned to his own home, he set to work to prepare for the press the book which his

brother had left not quite completed, viz. 'Defects, Civil and Military, of the Indian Government.'

Sir William's dedication was as follows:—

"The author of this book is dead. The care of putting it through the press is mine, and to the people of England it is dedicated; because it exhibits faction frustrating a great man's efforts to serve the public, and shows how surely the Directors of the East India Company are proceeding in the destruction of the great empire unwisely committed to their misgovernment."

The last paragraph of Sir Charles' writing commences with these words:—

"A wronged man I have been, more wronged than this work tells of, for ever the public good has guided me in suffering as in action; but when falsehood is in vigorous activity, with encouragement and support from power, the dignity of human nature gives a right without imputation of vanity to avow good services. To me also as an inspired truth has come that passionate burst of eloquence with which Charles Fox repelled foul enmity: '*There is a spirit of resistance implanted by the Deity in the breast of man proportioned to the size of the wrongs he is destined to endure.*' That spirit prompts me to vindicate a claim to better usage."

We may conceive the feelings which filled the tender and impetuous heart of his editor as he transcribed these true and forcible words; he felt that a sacred trust was by them committed to his charge, and he devoted a great part of the remainder of his life to redeeming that trust by setting before the world, in the history of the wronged man's life, the truth and justice of his complaint.

On the 13th of October, his brother Charles having died on the 29th August, Sir William was summoned to the deathbed of another brother. Captain Henry Napier,

R.N., had been for many years a martyr to painful illness, but nothing in his state of health at this time indicated that his sufferings were near their end. He died from breaking a blood-vessel, and his brother, who hastened to his bedside, arrived too late to see him alive. An accomplished sailor in his early years, but afterwards, by the peace and by want of interest, laid on the shelf with others who were compelled, with him, to endure the mortification of seeing their old ships given to youths unborn or at school when the discarded men were upholding their country's honour before the enemy, Captain Napier turned, like his brother William, to literature, and chose for his subject the history of Florence. Portions of Florentine history have been treated of by many celebrated writers; Captain Napier's History, founded on the most laborious and accurate researches, drawn from many rare and curious materials, obtained partly by fortunate accidental purchases, partly by pursuit and investigation among the archives, antiquities, and public libraries of Florence and other towns of Italy, is the most complete record of the wonderful existence of that wonderful state—its rise, progress, and decay; its institutions, customs, manners; its commerce; its wars, dissensions, vicissitudes; its greatness and its crimes.

His brother Henry's death, following so soon upon that of Sir Charles, was a terrible blow to Sir William; few even of those who knew him most intimately could at all estimate the depth and poignancy of his feelings at the loss of those he loved. Only his own immediate family, accustomed to watch him with incessant anxious tenderness, could guess, and none could wholly know, the sorrow he endured. At a later period, while watching by his side during illness, in the stillness of the night, his biographer had glimpses of the wild and passionate grief which swept

through his heart as he mourned the dear ones who had departed from him. But he made no show of these feelings to the world, and rarely gave them expression even in his family.

The publication of Sir Charles's posthumous work excited much attention in England. The 'Indian News,' in a review of the book at the time, used these words: "There is no question but that, if this book had appeared before the passing of the India Bill, it would have produced a great impression throughout England as regards the East India Company, and that impression the most unfavourable."

Sir William wrote the following letter in reply to a critique:—

To the Editor of the 'Press.'

"SIR, "Scinde House, Oct. 1853.

"The writer of the notice in your journal, upon the late Sir Charles Napier's posthumous work, is sufficiently able, and in most points impartial enough, to call for a refutation of a very ill-founded conclusion at which he has arrived on false data. He says—'No ill-treatment, no aspersions would have extorted from the "Iron Duke" written words of angry complaint; while his rival loved to wage war with the pen as well as with the sword.'

"Should this have been written of a dead man, without the support of facts? Yet facts are entirely opposed to the writer, and sound conclusion also, even though the facts had been more sufficing for his inference.

"First—If his remark about 'loving contention with the pen' be applied to any part of Sir Charles Napier's Indian career, it is without a shadow of excuse, save that the writer may have been misled by the shameless falsehoods of the dead General's assailants. He never entered

into any controversy regarding either his government of Scinde, or his chief military command of India. He never published any controversial work on either point; for the posthumous work reviewed has been published by his friends, and was, as indeed it is declared in the book itself, written solely as an explanation due to the people of England, to account for his resigning a command bestowed by them with acclamation.

"Let us come to the 'Iron Duke.' When that great man had received a dukedom from the Sovereign, forty thousand a-year from the country—when he was placed at the head of the army, was a minister himself, and bowed to by ministers of all parties—when in fine he was on the pinnacle of fame of power and of riches,—to complain would have been ridiculous. What had he to complain of? But in earlier times was he silent when wronged? Read his letter upon being removed from the promised command of the expedition to Egypt by the Red Sea. Read his continual and bitter complaints, when in Portugal, of the Government of the day as to personal ill-treatment. Finally, read the following letter dated January, 1805, published in Earl de Grey's 'Characteristics,' page 53.

"'In regard to staying longer, the question is exactly whether the Court of Directors or the King's ministers have any claim upon me to remain for a great length of time in this country. I have served the country in important situations for many years, and have never received anything but injury from the Court of Directors, although I am a singular instance of an officer who has served under all the governments; and there is not a single instance on record, or in any private correspondence, of disapprobation of any one of my acts; or of a single complaint, or even a symptom of ill-temper, from any one of the political or civil authorities with whom I have served. The King's

ministers have as little claim upon me as the Court of Directors.'

"Now mark the difference of position. At that period the 'Iron Duke' had been made a Knight of the Bath, then a far higher honour than now. He had received without stint the thanks of Parliament, and had a large party in Parliament ready to defend and support him against his enemies; and they did support him, and a few years after gave him the command which led to such fame and fortune.

"Sir Charles Napier, having exactly the same grounds of complaint, and greater claims than the Duke had at that time, had no party, not even a single member in Parliament, to defend and support him against ill usage of the grossest kind. Slander, neglect, injustice, the thanks of Parliament withheld for a year, and every indication of virulent enmity on the part of the Directors,—yet he made no complaint, and the Duke did.

"If the writer of the notice be a mere seller of phrases without regard to truth, these observations will be thrown away, but his remarks will then be of no consequence; if he is as I believe a well-intentioned critic, he will feel that he has too lightly drawn a false conclusion.

"W. N."

To the Editor of the 'Press.'

"Sir, "Oct. 1853.

"While thanking you for the insertion of my letter, I must with all friendly feeling and really without any 'Napier love of controversy' point to some unsustainable parts in your observations.

"If the exposing of Sir J. W. Hogg's attempt in the House of Commons to injure Sir C. Napier be taken as coming within the reviewer's notion of 'love of contro-

versy,' then a parallel is to be found to it in the Duke's Despatches, complaining of and even menacing Lord Holland for attacking him about Ney.

"You say,—'He who allows his nearest relative to write in his defence with his cognisance, &c., may be fairly held responsible for the writing itself.'

"I do not assent to this doctrine; but admitting it, then the Duke of Wellington is fairly to be held responsible for the complaining angry speeches in defence of him made by his brother Lord Wellesley in the House of Lords during the Peninsular war.

"Finally, Sir C. Napier never did appeal to the people through the press on behalf of his claims; he never even knew anything of what I wrote until he read it in print—strange as you may think that to be. But if by his claims be meant claims to honours or rewards, I have never appealed for him; my only appeals have been to public justice against slanderers and infamous intrigues employed to ruin him. His claim to reputation as a great general and statesman I have indeed upheld, and will do so again; but so doing, I only place myself alongside of those who have claimed reputation for the Duke by recording his actions.

"W. N."

To Major-General Shaw Kennedy, C.B.

"MY DEAR SHAW, "Scinde House, Oct. 1853.

"I am writing my brother's Life. I hope I shall live to finish it. In his journal, when he commanded in the north, I find the following, which gives me so much pleasure that I extract it for you:—

"'I have read a report of Colonel Shaw Kennedy to the Commissioners of Police, telling them how to treat rioters. He was long at Manchester. This report is a most

masterly affair, and I have felt more at home since I read it. But my task is harder than his, for I have a greater power against me. He had to deal with working men fighting with their masters. I have to deal with a large mass of the people avowedly arming to overthrow the constitution. However this able man lays down a few general principles and gives a few facts which are of great value to me, ignorant as I am of the people I have to deal with. I got it from Colonel Rowan. I believe the Secretary of State never saw it nor the Horse Guards either; it is worth their reading.'"

Sir W. Napier to Captain Rathborne.

"My dear Captain Rathborne, "Jan. 30, 1854.

"A dislike to emotions which a recollection of the past would not let me suppress prevented me from thanking you as I wished to do this morning.

"You have shown yourself a true and steadfast friend of the dead man. Many he benefited in life; but those who have acknowledged those benefits by their actions since his death are not so numerous as to make it difficult to reckon them. Your earnest feelings have come to me with a great power of consolation; and your ability and knowledge have come with equal force and power in aid of my present task. I owe you this expression of my sentiments and acknowledgments. Sincerely I hope you may never require such aid, but, if you do, I will not be I hope behindhand in rendering it to you, if in my power."

In some of the newspaper notices of Sir Charles Napier's death, the circumstance of his having been taken prisoner at Corunna was mentioned, and of his having been afterwards set at liberty by the French commander; but this generous act was wrongly attributed to Marshal Soult.

Sir William wrote a few lines to the papers which had made the mistake, stating that it was Ney and not Soult by whom the Napier family had been laid under such deep obligation. This letter was seen by Ney's son, the Prince de Moskowa, and drew from him a warm letter of acknowledgment, to which the following is a reply.

To the General Prince de Moskowa.

"PRINCE, "Scinde House, Oct. 1853.

"I had the honour of receiving your letter yesterday, and beg to express my pleasure at finding you understand English so well, as it enables me to write in return with more freedom than I could have used in the French language.

"It would have been inexcusable for any of my late brother's family to have suffered the generosity of your great father to pass to the credit of another man; and therefore, although in deep affliction, I hastened to rectify the error of the public journals; and so far from thinking the performance of that duty merited your amiable and graceful declaration of thanks, the latter imposes on me a new obligation to your illustrious family.

"You speak, Prince, of having been several times in London without having seen me. Probably I was not in England, having been for five or six years Lieutenant-Governor of Guernsey, and my abode in England was until lately very distant from London. Your arrival was therefore unknown to me, or assuredly my respects should have been paid—not without some title, as I had the honour of being presented to you many years ago at the house of the Princess your mother in Paris. Since then I have again had the honour of paying my respects to the Princess at Barège.

"Should you, Prince, once more visit London, it will

be my eager wish to offer in person the assurance of my gratitude to your family. Meanwhile, as I am on the point of publishing a posthumous work of my dead brother, containing some interesting matter about India, I hope you will allow me to present you a copy, and accept it as a mark of respect. You will find in it proof that the illustrious and generous Marshal Ney did not protect an unworthy or a common man.

"I remain, Prince, with every feeling of grateful esteem," &c.

The following letter, on the regimental training of our young officers, was written some time in 1853.

To the Editor of the 'Naval and Military Gazette.'

"SIR,

"Introducing the letter of 'Veritas,' you say, the late Duke of Wellington opposed '*as contrary to our national feelings*' the having officers taught practically the whole routine of regimental discipline, from the first position of the drill squad to marching in the ranks and mounting guard with the privates—which you nevertheless think would be useful.

"Did the Duke really object? He must have known that at Shorncliffe Sir John Moore introduced and rigidly enforced that very system, and thus formed the British regiments of the Light Division, who were perhaps, or rather certainly, the best instructed, the most efficient military body in the field that modern times has produced—not excepting Napoleon's Guard, as Lord Seaton well proved with the 52nd Regiment at Waterloo.

"The officers of those regiments, the 43rd, 52nd, 95th Rifles, were never averse to or mortified at being made to acquire, amidst the private soldiers, a complete knowledge of what as officers they were to exact from, and superintend with, those privates. Never did the system

lead to disrespect or undue familiarity on the part of the soldiers; on the contrary, it produced the natural effect of knowledge combined with power—willing and entire obedience from the soldiers, while the officers were proud of their acquirements, knew their men, and were known to them; knew when to exact and when to relax, and were in every sense commanders. This knowledge carried them through many a hard struggle when ignorance would have gone to the wall.

"Much, very much, now forgotten and unknown, did Sir John Moore do for the British army, and I may perhaps hereafter recall some of it to public recollection. At present I halt at this point.

(Signed) "ELIAN."

Sir William had in one of his late publications animadverted strongly on Sir Walter Scott for his ingratitude to Charles James Fox, in that he accepted from him an office, that of Clerk of Session, in 1806, and afterwards composed a violent and vulgar Tory song of exultation over the Whigs, for the dinner given by the Tories in honour of the acquittal of Lord Melville.*

Sir William received the following letter on this subject:—

"SIR, "Edinburgh, Jan. 1854.

"I make no apology for troubling you with this note.

* It is unfortunate for Scott that the very worst lines he ever wrote should have attracted such special notice, and affixed a stain on a character of so much kindliness and generosity. It is difficult to believe that the unlucky "Tallyho" was an exulting allusion to Fox's declining health. Here is the doggrel which perilled his fair fame:—

"In Grenville and Spencer,
And some few good men, Sir,
High talents we honour, slight difference forgive;
But the Brewer we'll hoax,
Tallyho to the Fox,
And drink 'Melville for ever' as long as we live."

"You will find the song you have lately alluded to set out at length in Lockhart's Life of Sir Walter, Edinburgh, 1839, vol. ii. page 323; and you will there find that Scott had regretted the production, and that it had given much offence; *but* that he was aware of Fox's illness at the time is questionable: I say questionable, for from Lord Holland's volume we are led to think that it was in June, 1806, the family became alarmed.

"Lockhart says, 'This song gave great offence to the many sincere personal friends whom Scott numbered among the upper ranks of the Whigs; and, in particular, it created a marked coldness towards him on the part of the accomplished and amiable Countess of Rosslyn (a very intimate friend of his favourite patroness, Lady Dalkeith), which, as his letters show, wounded his feelings severely; the more so, I have no doubt, because a little reflection must have made him repent not a few of its allusions.'

"Scott was gazetted Clerk of Session on 8th March, 1806; the song was sung by Ballantyne, his publisher, on 27th June, 1806.

"Yours, &c.

"J."

The writer of the following letter, which refers to the same subject, was the late venerable and talented Mrs. Fletcher of Lancrigg in Cumberland, the widow of Angus Fletcher, advocate, of Edinburgh.

Mrs. Fletcher to Miss Napier.

"My dear Miss Napier, "Lancrigg, Jan. 4, 1854.

"Mrs. Davy sent me your letter about Mr. Scott's 'song' last night, and it brought to my mind what Edinburgh was forty-eight years ago, when the bitterness of party spirit blighted the fairest forms of society I can conceive upon earth.

"We all know that Mr. Scott was a Tory, but the political element was not predominant in his nature. He was rather a Royalist among the Roundheads from early training and from poetical association, than a vulgar brawler for Church and King, or a servile tool of the Dundas faction when that faction governed Scotland. It is most certain however that the song in question was written by him, and sung at the dinner given by Mr. Dundas's friends after his (so called) acquittal on the impeachment; and this after Mr. Scott had accepted the office of Clerk of Session from the Whig administration. I well remember the disgust the leaders of that party felt and expressed on that occasion, and can mention in corroboration of Mrs. ——'s remarks that my friend Allan Cunningham having offered me several years after Sir W. Scott's bust, executed by Chantrey about that time, my husband would not allow me to receive it, saying he 'should be ashamed to have a bust of the author of that song under his roof.'

"I well remember the most liberal and high-minded of the Whig party were proud of Mr. Fox's superiority to party prejudice when he signed the patent for Mr. Scott's appointment: they had not at that time any dislike to Scott; and to the best of my recollection, Lord Lauderdale told me that when some of Mr. Fox's Cabinet objected to Mr. Scott's appointment on the ground of his being a Tory, Mr. Fox replied, 'That may be, but he is also the author of the *Lay of the Last Minstrel*,' and immediately signed the patent.

"Mr. Lockhart accounts for Scott's rampant Toryism from resentment at the illiberal remarks the Whigs made on his appointment, and he testified this resentment by the indecent exultation expressed in that vulgar song at the Melville acquittal dinner. The song was sung in June, 1806. Two years after, in 1808, Scott published

'Marmion,' and at page 10 in the introduction to the first canto he pays a tribute to the genius and the patriotism of Fox not unworthy of him.

"Believe me yours most truly,

"ELIZA FLETCHER."

Meanwhile we had drifted into the Russian war; an army was sent out to Turkey, and the country felt the strain of maintaining it in its full numbers, and replacing the waste of sickness and battle.

In December, in consequence of the difficulty of obtaining recruits, the Government introduced into Parliament the 'Foreign Enlistment Bill,' against which Sir William raised his protest in the following letter:—

To the Editor of the 'Times.'

"SIR, "Dec. 1854.

"The War Minister, with a strange confidence, told his brother lords, that except Lord Hardinge no officer of capacity and experience remained in England with whom he could consult to avoid the errors he had committed. All were in the Crimea!! He must now be taught that there are officers still in England with indignation enough to rebuke the grovelling spirit which has dictated the degradation of the country and the army by the introduction of foreign soldiers to fight our battles, at the very moment when the steam of heroic blood spilt at Inkerman makes England snort and start like a war-horse in the midst of carnage.

"I will not say that the German Legion in the last war were not good and trusty soldiers—their cavalry was excellent; but despite of the Duke of Richmond's generous eulogium, I will with Lord Ellenborough say that neither they nor any foreign troops were able to equal the

fighting of the British soldier. That legion was well composed, was indeed a national force, with high moral motives, and with gentlemen of their own country as officers; they were thus presented in the best possible form that foreigners could assume in another nation's service; and gallant things they could and did do, but emulate the terrible fighting of the British soldier they could not. And shall a mere mercenary band, picked up for gold, without national feeling, poor miserable hirelings, selling their limbs and lives, ay! their very souls, for lucre,—ready without a cause, if paid, to murder, to slay, or to be slain, and of course ready to change sides for higher pay if good occasion offered—shall such varlets stand in line beside our noble soldiers who fight shouting 'England! England!' and dying murmur, 'We have done our duty!'

"When did German or Switzer, Prussian or Austrian, stand before the gallant French in equal battle? And those brilliant, fierce, impetuous French—could even they sustain the might and terror of British battle? though, glorious soldiers that they are and ever have been, they returned to the combat as unceasingly as waves beating against rocks. Such as they are indeed fit and worthy to stand abreast with the unconquerable *red line that never yields;* and together they will trample in the dust any troops in the world that presume to oppose them. But let them not be shamed by finding a hired third-rate, selected from inferior sources, between themselves and their British comrades. Let them not be told to depend on the dressed-up foreigners, poor frauds like the camels of Semiramis accoutred as elephants, and sure to leave dark silent gaps where loudest shouts and fiercest fires should stream forth in the hour of need. Shall the stern infantry of Inkerman striding in blood—shall the proud cavalry of Balaklava—those noble horsemen who accepted not an

order but a doubtful sign only, to go bounding in, as it were, to the open jaws of death—shall they have as comrades the refuse hirelings of Germany and Switzerland? God forbid!

"You, Sir, say that the Ministers will go out if the country refuses to accept their degrading measure. So let it be. Let them slink away, while the universal shout arises of '*God and our right, and St. George for merry England!*'

"WM. NAPIER, Lieut.-General."

To the Earl of Ellenborough.

"Dec. 1854.

"You have put a grave question to me, and one very hard to solve well. First, what is the cause of the difficulty in recruiting? It is said, the high value of peaceable labour. Is it so? A recruiting officer of a very large district tells me that there is no bar to getting recruits but the absurd official tests imposed: he says that numbers of fine strong young men come to him, but he is obliged to refuse them for a slight squint, a small varicose vein, and such like blemishes, not defects. In actual war, the chances of their being killed before these blemishes become serious defects should certainly operate to have them accepted. The men go away dejected and angry, and of course prevent others from presenting themselves.

"Now for the remedies spoken of.

"1st. A high bounty never effects much: the men get drunk, and the bounty wanes away under charges for kits, &c. &c., and, as now discovered, tempts rogues to desert to re-enlist. High pay, as you observe, is obviously beyond our means; no nation can sustain the charge of a large army with very high pay. Moreover, it makes the soldiers careful, thoughtful, and not so willing to seek death and

wounds, when they must thus relinquish much comfort in life. To make a good fighting soldier, you must inure him to hard living and work, not comfortable idleness. But what all soldiers think of and look to is provision for old age and its infirmities—the pension. Let that be good, and above all sure, and not depend as it does now on all sorts of minute rules and regulations, which are by some of the subordinates taken advantage of to repel soldiers—not all however: Mr. Moorhead, the secretary, is a man full of feeling and honour and energy in favour of old broken veterans: before his time insult and rebuke and denial were but too common. Numbers of old, miserable, Peninsular veterans are still alive, wounded, crippled with rheumatism, begging, without pensions,—and they talk very bitterly.

"To the certainty of a pension I would add, that it should never be taken away; if they become chargeable to the parish, it should be looked on as a pay of honour. Parish officers sometimes treat them very harshly.

"Your plan seems to me an advisable one also, and it is in principle I believe adopted in Russia. The Russian soldier gets a double allowance, or even more, of bread on actual service the moment he crosses the frontier. But there will be much arrangement required. How will you manage troops in a Kaffir war? If they fight they will expect the pay. Again in Canada they would be on the defensive within the Queen's dominions. Perhaps it would be best to say, from the moment a shot is fired. You see also the double pay would be given when there was little power of spending it. However, I do not say it would not be good, but I am sure that amending the recruiting examinations, and insuring pensions for service of a short nature, as well as for wounds, if that service be actual fighting, would be the best temptation.

"The militia used to be a certain resource; I was much employed in getting volunteers, and always found them ready to go in numbers."

The following paper, in defence of his cousin the Admiral against the ignorant and ungenerous attacks of the press, was written in the autumn of 1854:—

On the Baltic Fleet.

"1854.

"Public opinion in England is a myth, presenting Zoroaster's *Orimanes* and *Arimanes*—the principles of good and evil. The good is the influence of the thoughtful sound-judging men in the community, which percolates, slowly indeed, but generally surely, through the outward crust of folly to the national intellect.

"The evil is a loud obstreperous cry, which on every great event bursts forth, overpowering sense and facts; it might be typified by a huge donkey, with cloven hoofs planted in dogged semblance; tail stretched out stiffly behind, and long ears poked forward to catch every flying falsehood—something of devil and ass combined, braying with such full satisfaction at its own perceptions that the voice of reason cannot be heard; a woodcut of his at once ridiculous and malignant figure would form an appropriate heading for the 'Times.'

"When the Baltic fleet was first assembled, how loudly, how fiercely did this donkey Arimanes bray! 'Never were there such ships afloat;' they could of themselves, like the groom's favourite horse, '*do anything but speak and clean knives.*' They were not, indeed, to sail overland to Moscow, but they were to screw through Cronstadt to St. Petersburg. The Czar was sick, was panicstricken, was mad; his ministers, his generals, his public servants were all knaves and fools; his soldiers—if he had any, which was

doubtful, and he certainly had no seamen—were more than half-starved, without shirts or shoes, and entirely indisposed to fight; his fortresses were built only to crumble from the shaking of their own guns, and his artillerymen were doomed to be stifled by smoke in their own casemates before the masonry fell.

"Great was Arimanes' discontent to find that his brays were not bullets, nor the sails of the ships wings. 'Why were not Sweaborg and Cronstadt laid in ashes? Everybody except the Admiral knew—especially the midshipmen—that it was only necessary to shout before them, and like the walls of Jericho they would tumble down. Granite was a poor contemptible material,—a finger might be thrust through it. Look at Bomarsund! that settled the question as to granite against ships. Behold also how Sebastopol is going to be taken: it has not indeed yet fallen, and there is an army besides the fleet before it; but it will be reduced immediately by a fleet and an army, and of course Cronstadt and Sweaborg can be at once taken by a fleet without an army; the Baltic ships could go through such flimsy structures as ducks go through foam in a pond.' Such was substantially, nearly textually, the language of the 'Times,' that most potential of Arimanes' notes; but truly it would tax the strength of ducks to plough through the foam of that journal.

"Time wore on; Sebastopol did not, perhaps it will not fall; our ships fell before its walls, which by the way are not granite but limestone; and Arimanes' bray having subsided for the moment, the voice of Orimanes may be heard. Let us therefore take advantage of this lull to give a calm statement of facts.

"The Baltic fleet was a very magnificent one so far as ships and guns went, but the manning of it was defective to a much greater extent than the public was permitted to

know: Arimanes' bray was too loud. The men were brave and willing, although not very well treated, for they were refused pea-jackets to protect them from the cold of the North Sea, to which they were certainly sent a month too soon; but they were not *men-of-war's-men*, not even seamen for the greater part, and presented a heterogeneous mass, demanding much care, skill, and practice to make them work together efficiently. The Admiral, well aware of the deficiency and the difficulties in the way of a brilliant warfare, was not elated by the cry of the moment above a regard for reason; and when maudlin Ministers, at the Reform Club dinner, shouted out '*Go it, old Charley!*' his answer was a model of sarcastic wisdom. He heard the bray, knew it was not the lion's roar, and told them, not that he would take St. Petersburg with his fleet, but that he would, if they came to his farm, teach them how '*to rear young lambs!*'

"The fleet sailed by order, too soon as before said, and beset with stormy weather, fogs, currents, and rocks, oftener than once escaped destruction by a supreme fortune against all probability. However, fine weather came at last; the Russian fleet, although at first more than double the number of the British, was blockaded; explorations were made, soundings taken, and a knowledge of the navigation —suppressed by the removal of lighthouses and buoys— restored and enlarged, while the men of the fleet were exercised in gunnery and seamanship without cessation. What then was to be done? Assail Cronstadt and Sweaborg? 'Certainly,' quoth Arimanes, 'they were only built for show.' It did not strike him that so active a monarch as Nicholas was not likely to let Cronstadt, covering his capital and within forty miles of his palace, be rendered useless by corrupt superintendence; nor that Sweaborg was not a Russian-built fortress, having been constructed

under a Swedish government by a celebrated engineer, who superintended the details himself, and rested his reputation on them. Part of it is cut out of the living rock indeed; but what then? Mr. Oliphant had informed the world that Sebastopol was all rubbish, and therefore Sweaborg could not withstand the broadside of a single man-of-war.

"Logical Arimanes! It did not occur to him that neither Cronstadt nor Sweaborg could be approached by ships except through narrow channels rife with sunken rocks, where not more than three vessels abreast, if so many, and in some places only one, could pass, exposed to an overwhelming fire before they could get near enough to batter the walls: it did not occur to him either, that behind those fortresses were many powerful ships of war—drawing less water than ours and better fitted for the shallow waters—ready to come out and fall on our battered and dismantled fleet after its fight with the fortresses should be decided. No! all that was nonsense. Bomarsund had been taken by troops, and the others could *therefore* be taken without troops. Granite was weak against wood. The question was decided! Stop, Arimanes. If the question between wood and granite had been decided, that between heavy ships and shallow narrow channels with sunken rocks had not been so; granite above water was crumbled under your bray, but granite below water remained intact. Moreover, Bomarsund did not even touch the question of granite above water. It was not a granite fortress, it was of rubble *cased* with granite; and even thus, when the shot struck the centre of a slab, no harm was done; it was only by striking the jointings that an impression was made, for then the rubble behind gave way, and the granite slab, turning round, fell out. 'Pooh!' said the braying one; 'it is only Admiral Napier's

want of resolution and dash that saved Cronstadt and Sweaborg!' Indeed! How then did it come to pass that Lord Nelson, Lord St. Vincent, and Lord Collingwood never attacked and took Brest and Toulon? They are not so strong as the Russian fortresses. 'Oh! the ships of the present day are ten times as powerful for offence as the ships of those days. But they were far better manned, and the artillery for defence has progressed in the same proportion as that for attack.

"The Baltic fleet is now coming home, and the services of its veteran commander may be thus summed up:—

"He has caused the thirty sail, composing the powerful Russian fleet, to shrink like rats into their holes; he has taken Bomarsund, caused Hango to be blown up, interrupted the Russian commerce, and for six months has kept in a state of inaction certainly eighty or ninety thousand good troops; viz. twenty thousand at Helsingfors, fifteen thousand at Abo, and forty thousand at Cronstadt, besides smaller corps protecting Revel and other places. He has restored and enlarged the knowledge of the Finland Gulf to navigation; has ascertained what large vessels can do there, and what they cannot do; where they can act alone, where with troops, and where gunboats can be used with effect. He carried out an ill-manned undisciplined fleet; he will, if not assailed by storms, bring back unharmed, a well-organised, well-disciplined one, with crews well exercised in gunnery and seamanship: in fine, a fleet now really what it was falsely called when it started, that is to say, one of the most irresistible that ever floated on the ocean for all legitimate purposes of naval warfare."

The following letters are to his son-in-law, who had married Sir William's youngest daughter, Norah, in August, 1854:—

To H. A. Bruce, Esq., M.P.

"Oct. 21, 1854.

"In speaking of the war, pray remember that I have always reserved the slowness or stupidity of the Russian generals as matters not to be calculated one way or the other. I only speak of what Canrobert or Raglan would do in Menschikoff's place, and all moral force is with us. You will remember that long ago I told you the Russian general should entrench a camp perpendicular to the works of Sebastopol. Had he done so at the vale of Inkerman, the allies could not have made the flank march, nor secured a good position on the north side. Sebastopol is not taken yet; the job will be tough; but we have an entrenched position—at least I suppose it is or will be entrenched—which no force can beat us out of: but I fear fevers and a long siege, and the Russians being reinforced inside present an army, not a garrison. Still moral force is three-fourths in war, and great things may be effected by the best troops and generals against inferior men, in despite of obstacles.

"Pray from time to time inquire about old Evan Jones;* it would grieve me to hear of his being in want."

"Nov. 1854.

"I am sorry Evan Jones is so far off, as I wished Norah to see him. . . . Your tactics for the battle† would have exposed the French too much, and their task was difficult enough as it was. The battle was, however, certainly fought without much skill, since not more than 15,000 British and 10,000 French were engaged, and no Turks; that is to say, more than 30,000 men were made no use of. Still it may be better as it is, for, though more Russians might have been disposed of by another mode of

* A veteran of the 43rd. † Alma.

operation, they will never want men, and the result of the battle against such odds will shake their *morale* worse than that of one skilfully conducted. We cannot break down their immense numbers, but we can break and have broken their courage. I mean this in reference not to Sebastopol only, but to the general war.

"My notion of the battle would have been as follows:—

"1st. The Turks and 2000 French to have been placed on the right, to keep the left of the Russians in check, while the fleet threw shells, &c.

"2nd. The right of the French army to have been opposite the village in the centre, their left extending to where Brown attacked.

"3rd. The British should then have marched diagonally by columns, right in front, to turn the pinnacle marking the Russian right; I say right in front, because of the Russian cavalry, for thus the columns could wheel up on their right, continually outflanking the pinnacle and enclosing it. Harding,* you see, says that it was so designed,† but that fear of the Russian cavalry prevented the movement, and made them take the bull by the horns. This only shows a want of tactical skill. The ground on the British side of the Alma was lower and more practicable for cavalry than the other side; consequently, as the 4th Division and our cavalry kept the Russians in check there, they would have done so beyond the river, and a strong advanced guard of all arms would have protected the main movement.

* Colonel Harding, 22nd regiment.

† It must be borne in mind that Lord Raglan was obliged to concert his movements with the French. If the flank march round the Russian right was intended, the reason of its not being executed was that the British were hurried into action by repeated messages from St. Arnaud. The French had committed themselves on the right, and demanded that we should support them. But, if the manœuvre to turn the Russian right *was* intended, it could only have been safely executed in the manner proposed by Sir William, our attack on the Russian right being the signal for the French attack on the centre,—whereas the allies reversed this mode of proceeding.

"Now when the pinnacle was enveloped, and the firing there begun (not sooner), the French in the centre should have advanced, and as soon as they were well engaged the Turks on the right should have advanced in their turn.

"In this manner the strength of the position would have been turned, and the whole Russian army driven into the sea.

"As to the present prospect—the chances are *physically*, I should say, against us, except in the enormous power of our battering guns; but the moral power is on our side, as evinced by Raglan's march across the Inkerman valley. Napoleon says, moral power is three-fourths of strength in war. Behold the proof! The allies have been able to make a confused tumultuous march, through forests and rocks, between the fortress and the outside army of Russians, and with safety, when 5000 men in order would have defeated them. They have thus gained a new base and communication with the fleet, a position of siege, and easy means of getting their huge guns into battery; and all this without a stroke, when it ought to have cost them two battles and a week of difficult operations!

"You will ask why I say *physical force* is against us. I will show you—always, however, basing my reasoning on the imperfect information we have as to the Russian strength, and the nearness or otherwise of their reinforcements: if my facts are wrong, my tactics go to the ground.

"You will remember I told you that the Russians ought from the first to have entrenched a camp perpendicular to the fortress, or at least so near it that no investment could be made without driving their army out of it. Had they done so at the Inkerman valley, Raglan could not have made his flank march, and he could not have attacked Sebastopol on the north until he dislodged the enemy from the camp; but this last would have cost more than a week's operations and a battle; and the enemy could have still

retreated safely to the Baktscheserai. But Menschikoff, as he did not oppose the landing, should have fortified his position on the Belbec which is said to be stronger than the Alma; thence, if beaten, he could have retreated with his right wing to the Inkerman camp, and with his left to Sebastopol—north side—from whence it could have joined him safely on the Inkerman position. The delay thus occasioned to the allies would have given time for his reinforcements to come up, and the siege could not have gone on without more battles.

"Well, he did not do so, but he has still 24,000 men outside, and about 26,000 inside: the investment is too wide for our numbers, and the south side only is attacked; consequently Menschikoff can, if he has a head, connect his right with the north side and from thence supply help to the south, and at the same time by frequent attacks delay the progress of the siege. Suppose we attack him: he can retreat, and delay occurs which will give time for his reinforcements to come up. These are coming from the east and north. If he goes back to Baktscheserai and if he only stops there without aiding the garrison, we must detach 20,000 men to drive him beyond Simpheropol, and thus prevent his receiving reinforcements from one of those quarters, for Simpheropol is the central point of junction. He will naturally go northwards as his strongest line, and we must keep our covering army at Simpheropol. Then we shall have only 30,000 men for the siege until our reserve arrives which will raise us to 45,000. Meanwhile his reinforcements will join him, and he can advance with 60,000 men, for they say 40,000 are at Perekop; and in that case we must advance with 30,000 to join the covering army, leaving 15,000 to protect the works and Balaklava—50,000 against 60,000 in a battle, with the chance of 15,000 more joining the enemy from the east,

and a siege afterwards—tough job! There are however many turns in war. Moral force is ours; the reinforcements may be all a humbug, and the defence of the place feeble. I fear sickness most."

"Dec. 1854.

"I was glad to see your hand, but put your letter into the fire; my horror of your disease* is intense, not for myself, but others. I can never forget the deaths of the beautiful little girls at Bath, that I saw dancing with my girls on the Wednesday in health and gaiety, and all dead on the Saturday following! Mine only escaped. Your account of the risk you still run is also disagreeable; however, I hope you are past the bad time.

"All I wish is, that you should not let that really brave and good fellow, Black Charles,† be run down unjustly or betrayed. As to your general view, I meddle not with it; but it is time that the best blood of England and untold treasure should not be made the sport of ignorant men merely because they are lords. It is no consolation to the miserable relations of the killed, nor to the starving thousands, to be told that the War Minister had no experience, and that he will do better now."

"Jan. 1855.

"About 24,000 of our men landed in the Crimea; two cavalry regiments, three or four infantry regiments, and some convalescents have since joined, and yet after the battle of Inkerman not more than 10,000 or 11,000 men were in the ranks: hence the army was diminished by nearly 18,000 men.

"The French cannot have lost less; add the loss of the Turks and the navy, and we have nearly 40,000 men *put aside* though not all absolutely lost in less than two

* Scarlet fever. † Admiral Sir C. Napier.

months, merely to obtain a parallel of attack against Sebastopol, the works of which we have not yet hurt. How can any nation sustain such a drain? You will say—the Russians cannot either. Yes, they can; they are on the defensive and at home; we have to send our men and to supply them at the distance of about a month's voyage! besides the time lost before we hear of the want of aid.

"Alexander landed in Asia to conquer the Persians with 36,000 men—Hannibal descended on Italy to conquer the Romans with 26,000 men—Bonaparte attacked the north of Italy with 25,000 men. Now, if they had been drained in the same proportion to their force, how could they have succeeded? How could Lord Wellington have carried on the war in Spain at that rate? How could Frederick of Prussia have made the Seven Years' war at that rate? There is something wrong in our proceedings, some want —we are not warring like the great generals of the world."

The following letters from Sir William Napier refer to the adoption of the Minié rifle as the weapon of our army. The first appears to have been written in 1853.

To the Editor of the 'Naval and Military Gazette.'

"Sir, "1853.

"The Minié rifle seems to be established by experiment as a real improvement on fire-arms, and is likely to supersede the old musket. I am sorry for it; not sorry that the better weapon should be adopted, but sorry that the improved weapon should have been invented. It will not serve England; take the following reasons.

"A musket, which at 800 yards will enable its handler to knock down a man with tolerable certainty, must paralyse the action of cavalry against infantry, and of artillery within that range. No close reconnoitring can take place,

as the generals would inevitably be killed, and hence battles will be more confusedly arranged, more bloody, and less decisive. Now also remark that an English army abroad can never be so numerous as French, or Russian, or Prussian, or American armies; and as our only real superiority lies in our resolute courage to close with the bayonet — for Frenchmen at least never shrink from fire—the new weapon will be all in favour of the superior numbers.

"Talking of the bayonet, are there any survivors of Captain Tovey's company of the 20th Regiment, men or officers, to say how many on both sides fell by the bayonet in his charge at Atalosti in the Pyrenees? Yet it is no matter how many or how few fell by that weapon; it was *the fear of it* in English hands which gave us victory, and the Minié rifle will probably deprive us of that moral force.

(Signed) "ELIAN."

To the Editor of the 'Naval and Military Gazette.'

"SIR, "January, 1855.

"As one of the persons who thought and still think that the Minié rifle is not adapted for general warfare, though excellent for particular purposes, I must take the liberty of making some remarks on Colonel Leach's letter on the subject.

"I am not aware that any person has said that '*our infantry would become prone to fight at long distances*;' but I, for one, did say that our *opponents* would be both prone and able to fight at long distances, and thus baffle our national rush and charge,—which is a very different view of the matter: not that I uphold the old heavy musket, but the simple weapon against the complex one; let the former be improved in its kind.

"Again: the Colonel asks of me amongst others, if the

battle of Alma has not proved that he was right in denying our anticipations. I answer that one swallow does not make a summer, and, if it did, Alma was not that swallow; as the following comparative statement will prove.

"At the Alma 48,000 allies were engaged against 50,000 Russians; the latter in an entrenched position, and therefore unable without yielding up that position to retire firing long Minié shots. The Russian loss was 6000, that of the allies about 3500.

"At the battle of Salamanca there were about 42,000 fighting men on each side, for the Spaniards were not engaged. The time occupied was as nearly as possible the same as at the Alma; but above 8000 French went down, and above 5000 allies. Here then the musket proved more destructive than the Minié.

"At Albuera the relative numbers were about 32,000 allies and 24,000 French; the fighting was for about four hours, the same as at the Alma; the allies lost 7000, the French 8000. Here again the clumsy old flint musket did more execution than the Minié; and be it remembered that at the Alma the greatest carnage seems to have been by artillery, which was not the case either at Salamanca or Albuera.

"At Sauroren the French were 25,000, the allies 12,000, the time about three hours; the allies lost 2600, the French considerably more. Here again the musket did more execution than the Minié, and it was all musket-work.

"At Bayonne, General Hill had but 14,000, and about 18,000 French were engaged; allied loss 1500, French above 3000. At Orthes there were 38,000 on each side; allied loss 3500, French loss above 4000. In both of these instances again the musket proved itself the more deadly weapon.

"The Minié, therefore, has yet to be proved as a fit weapon for manœuvring armies in a fair campaign, and ultimate moral effects cannot be determined, as Colonel Leach supposes, by one battle, but by several campaigns.

"This view however by no means leads to the assumption that the old musket should not be improved by lightening and fashioning it of a better pattern, an object at which Colonel Leach has strenuously and meritoriously aimed.

(Signed) "ELIAN."

To the Editor of the 'Naval and Military Gazette.'

"SIR, "January, 1855.

"In answer to Colonel Leach, I will only say I think a sufficient number of inductive facts have not yet been obtained to arrive at a sure conclusion as to the merits of the Minié weapon for general warfare. Nor do I think such facts can be obtained without the experience of several campaigns by manœuvring armies. Colonel Leach thinks differently, and the general opinion is entirely with him and against me.

"I should, perhaps, stop here, but cannot refrain from adding one observation upon another general opinion which has some bearing on the case.

"It is constantly proclaimed that the dress of our officers, so different from that of the men, exposes them in an extraordinary manner to the deadly fire of the long-range Minié. Now, Sir, in the battle of the Alma, our generals, with their shining epaulets, their plumed hats, their prancing chargers, and their attendant staff and orderlies, would it might have been supposed have been devoted to certain destruction. On the other hand, the Russian generals dressed themselves so exactly like their men as to be hardly distinguished from them even when

taken prisoners. Yet at the Alma all our flaming generals escaped the Minié at least, for Sir De Lacy Evans's hurt seems to have been a contusion from a stone; while two Russian generals were mortally wounded and taken we know, and several more might have been.

(Signed) "ELIAN."

Sir William gives in another letter the following instance of the great distance to which one of the old muskets had been known to carry.

"Most of the old Peninsulars who were at Fuentes Onoro must have known of the immense distance at which Julian Sanchez' lieutenant was killed by a corporal of the Guards. The vapouring fellow had ridden close up to the French cavalry line, brandishing his sword and menacing their troopers, who were probably laughing at him at the time. The Duke was earnestly watching them as they were coming out of a wood; and this grotesque figure was continually passing before the field of his telescope, disturbing his vision. The distance may be guessed when with his keen eye and a telescope to boot he mistook him for a Frenchman, and in his impatience exclaimed 'Will nobody put that dancing fellow aside?' 'I will, Sir,' said a corporal of the Guards with a grave stern air, and stepping forward two paces levelled his musket in the most formal manner, and the Guerilla fell dead from his horse. It was thought at the time to be a mile; it could not be less than three-quarters."

The above opinions as to the general adoption of the Minié, or rather Enfield rifle, as the weapon of our army, have never, it must be remembered, been yet tested by actual experience. Indeed the Indian mutiny and the late China campaign furnish some instances in support of the view that it is not for general purposes superior to an improved

smooth-bore musket. These however are only a few facts on one side of the question; and the astonishing results obtained at Hythe under General Hay would seem to furnish an overwhelming mass of evidence on the other side. And yet the China troops had all had the benefit of the Hythe training.

It appears unquestionable that the general adoption of the improved rifle musket by foreign armies renders its use by our own troops an imperative necessity; no less is it certain that in its handling the British soldier will always maintain the pre-eminence. But Sir William Napier's principal objection to, or rather his lament over, its invention—that the national rush with the bayonet and the close fighting in which the British excel, and by which they have won many a battle when apparently hopeless, will have less scope—is not the less founded in reason. It is a grave consideration; and the wonderful improvement which has also been effected in artillery confirms and increases what cannot but be regarded as an abstract disadvantage to ourselves. The improved artillery and small arms have introduced new features into war, which can only be fully elucidated, as Sir William Napier says, by the aggregate experience of several campaigns by manœuvring armies; and all thinking military men look anxiously to obtain the results of such experience, before they can feel safe in dogmatising on the subject. It may however be asserted, that general strategy must assimilate itself to the principles on which Napoleon declared that war should be conducted in a mountainous country: that is to say, the task of a commander must be to occupy positions in which the enemy will be forced to attack *him*, rather than to attack strong positions occupied by the enemy. The new arms undoubtedly confer on the defensive an advantage it did not before possess; for what

troops, though the bravest in the world, could hope successfully to attack a position, if before they could come to close quarters they had to march over a mile of open ground, exposed to the fire of modern guns which should be protected from counter fire by earthworks?

Here follow letters and extracts from letters to General Shaw Kennedy, about this time.

To Lieutenant-General Shaw Kennedy.

"MY DEAR SHAW, "Scinde House, January, 1855.

"I did not trouble you with my views at the first projection of the Crimean affair; and since then I have been so ill as nearly to give up all thought but of death, which would certainly release me from horrible sufferings, and a future worse than the past. Caldecot has just come, and tells me you have a desire for my opinion. I wrote it to my son-in-law day by day before events happened, so I may honestly say it is not formed 'après coup.' I will not give it you in detail, I am too weak, but the heads of it.

"1st.—Odessa, or Turkey in Asia, were more likely points for great operations.

"2nd.—St. Petersburg was the point to send an army against, because, landing in Finland, and a great treaty made previously with Denmark and Sweden, it would have not only taken St. Petersburg, but have brought all the Russians up from the south.

"3rd.—The Crimea being chosen, our force was too small, our information defective, and the whole enterprise ill-considered.

"4th.—At Alma the French should have taken our ground, while the Russian left was held in check by the Turks and the fleet. The British should, by an oblique movement with a powerful advanced guard, have turned the position, and when their attack began the French

should have taken it up: the Russians would have gone into the sea.

"5th.—The allies should have left two divisions and the marines to keep the field of battle and help the wounded, and pursued with the rest even that night.

"6th.—The march to Balaklava was bold and good, but the whole army should have been set to work to fortify it and the communications, so that a few men could defend it, before the attack of the place was formed—that is to say, unless the place could be taken by a coup-de-main.

"7th.—The moment Balaklava was safe, or even before it, 25,000 men should have followed up the retreating Russians, attacked them, and driven them towards Perekop, if they could not be dispersed by a battle.

"8th.—The place was too large for investment, therefore camps should have been fortified and reinforcements sent for. Meanwhile troops should be in hand to reinforce the covering army, and fight the Russians when their reinforcements came up; but to delay these, Eupatoria should have had a corps of all arms of 12,000 men to act on the flank of the reinforcements and delay their march.

"9th.—On the 20th October I wrote 'The siege will prove a tough job; a storm will fail; it is an army entrenched that we shall attack. I expect to hear soon of great cavalry actions.' Lord Raglan's despatches soon after arrived using the same words as to the town, and telling of the cavalry fight. I now see nothing favourable, except the French reinforcements.

"10th.—I do not believe the Russians had 60,000, nor that they lost 15,000. And where were our other troops when 8000 were exposed for three hours, and finally 15,000, to the attacks of 40,000 Russians? for that number I believe in: the field of battle is only six miles by four!*

* Meaning the ground occupied by the allies, from which reinforcements might be drawn.

"11th.—The Russians may fail in provisions and in ammunition; if not we shall fail."

"Jan. 1855.

"I hear you have been very ill, but are getting better again. I have not written to you because my hands are always in such pain: they are going fast, and all the use I can make of them is to finish my brother's Life. Two volumes I have written, and fear there will be two more, but hope to do it in one.

"—— says you hold the same opinion as I do about Lord Raglan and Lord Lucan: but as —— is not always the most precise in his views, I will tell you what I really think.

"1st.—Lord Lucan obeyed *Captain Nolan's* order, not Lord Raglan's.

"2nd.—He should have put Nolan in arrest for insolence, and put his *whole* cavalry force slowly in motion, with outguards and reserves, sending a well-mounted officer to Lord Raglan to say what he was doing, and to bring back a confirmation or rescinding of the order—telling Lord Raglan that if he confirmed it he ought to send for more cavalry to England.

"3rd.—It is not just to condemn Lord Lucan for not communicating with the French cavalry; the order implied that his *flank was safe, as the French were there:* at least I would so have interpreted it."

"February, 1855.

"Like you, I never looked at the subject * in detail, always taking for granted that it was impossible to stem favouritism: but now I think public opinion may be brought to bear on it and give it a check. To abolish it is impossible.

* "Purchase" in the army.

"My own private views have been that a few commissions, with a donation of 100*l.* to each, should be reserved in regiments for men promoted from the ranks: one-third at least of the remainder for regular promotion by seniority, and the rest for purchase.

"If we adopt, as some people wish, the plan of giving every soldier a chance of commissions, we republicanise the army, and then we must republicanise the Government; for the army is the principal support of the aristocratic form of our Government. But, though a republican form of promotion is absolutely necessary if you want an army to be constantly at war and conquering, it is a very bad form for peace and at home. Excite the ambition of men with arms, and you will be governed by the sword.

"W. NAPIER."

The advocates of a general system of promotion from the ranks may argue—if, as Sir William says, to republicanise an army is to render it a conquering army—that is precisely the object for which armies are maintained: employ therefore the means to that end. This would not be fair argument, however, from his words. First, in the sense in which he employs the term, it is not our object to make the British army a "conquering army," although it may appear paradoxical to say at the same time that it is our object to ensure that our army shall conquer when it meets a foe. The difference consists in this: Sir William meant a conquering offensive army. Ours should be a conquering defensive army. France offers an example of the first, and the army is unquestionably the master of France, as well as the master of the master of France. The ambition of men with arms in their hands being roused into vigorous activity by the military constitution, it is necessary to provide from time to time food for that ambition, or like the serpent

the army will turn its fangs on the breast that has nourished it.

The republican constitution alluded to as necessary to be given to an army "constantly at war and conquering," is not only to enable it to conquer, but to induce the soldiers to serve at all under the dangers, hardships, and privations of constant warfare.

The plan proposed by Sir William Napier, viz. the combination of purchase and seniority, is the most practical yet suggested, and the only one that is free from all the evils which have been urged against the alternative systems of promotion by selection and promotion by seniority. The confident advocates of sweeping changes will do well to consider that there never was a more ardent reformer than William Napier throughout his whole life; and at the same time none have ever brought a more subtle intellect to the study of the military institutions both of ancient and modern nations, or been more intimately acquainted with the spirit of our own.

Early in 1855 the condition of the army in the Crimea led to the formation of a society calling itself the Army Reform Association. A printed circular having been sent by the secretary to Sir William Napier, he returned the following reply:—

To the Secretary of the Army Reform Association.

"Sir, "Scinde House, Feb. 1855.

"I have to acknowledge your circular inviting me to aid an association for reforming the organization of the British army.

"If the persons composing the Society are military, their proceeding is an act of grave insubordination; if they are civilians, they are incompetent persons, perniciously meddling with what they do not understand.

"If the Association has for object to do away all civil interference with military matters, to put an end to boards, to the commissariat depending on the Treasury clerks, &c. &c.—in fine, to obtain the appointment of a minister of war, being *a military man*, with complete control of every branch of the military service, and to prevent for the future the armies of England being sacrificed to the unavoidable ignorance of ministers of war who only begin to learn their duties when they take office—if such be the object of the Association, it will pursue a course beneficial to the country."

Mrs. H. A. Bruce to Lieutenant-General Shaw Kennedy.

[Extract.]

"March, 1855.

"When I was at Clapham, my father, who I am sorry to say is far from well just now, begged I would tell you that he has not written to you of late, as he has been suffering so much that writing was a great exertion to him, and he believed it was the same with you; but he often longs to talk over the present state of the war with you. He told me to say that the siege of Sebastopol has no parallel that he knows of in ancient or modern history except the siege of Troy, where the principle the Greeks pursued was much the same as that of the allies—besieging a fortified town on one side only. And the positions of the two towns appear to him very similar, both besieging forces having sea communications, and both strong in themselves; and they had the Paphlagonians and others to help them. But he fears the siege promises to be nearly as tedious as that of Troy, which lasted ten years and was taken only by stratagem at last. A hopeful prospect for our army!"

To Lieutenant-General Shaw Kennedy.

"Scinde House, March, 1855.

"I was delighted to see what I thought your hand, and proportionately disappointed and grieved to find it was dictated.

"I said 'Troy,' because there the Greeks with a large fleet besieged without investing, and it cost them ten years and a stratagem to succeed.

"It is now just a month since I told my son-in-law, who brought me questions from members—his being, 'What is to be done?' I told him, 'Break up the siege, and begin again from Eupatoria.' We do not differ I see, and Lord Seaton last week agreed with us that so we ought to proceed.

"You rate all the numbers too high, I think—the allies certainly: the French have lost a great many more men than they admit.

"As to an assault and escalade, it cannot I think be done. The fronts are all mined, and the Russians have now adopted what I thought they ought to have done long ago, viz. counter-attack. Their doing it now is proof I think that their internal defence is complete and their forces strong.

"As you say, it is hard to decide what a Russian general should do. I would on the first embarkation concentrate in the interior, so as to secure a retreat; but the vital blow would be to push an army through the Dobruschka, and menace Varna and Shumla. However, I suspect their positions at Simpheropol and Baktcheserai and on the Belbec are very strongly entrenched, and I suppose Sebastopol is still a great magazine.

"I have just read Lord Lucan's evidence, and think it the best that has been given; he is evidently a good soldier and a good administrator."

CHAPTER XXII.

DOMESTIC SORROWS. — LIFE OF SIR C. NAPIER.

IN September General Sir George Napier died suddenly at Geneva. His active military life was passed principally in the 52nd, and, until Sir John Moore's death, he served constantly under that great man. With the 52nd he went to Sicily under Moore, and with that general to Sweden in 1808; thence to Lisbon, and being made aide-de-camp to Moore served through the Corunna campaign; was beside his general in the battle, by his bed when he died, and by his grave when he was buried. He afterwards served with the 52nd through the Peninsular war, and was shot through the upper part of the thigh at Busaco, while actually leaping sword in hand upon the head of General St. Simon's column of attack, as related in one of his brother William's letters * to their mother.

He was engaged in all the light division combats during Masséna's retreat up to Cazal Nova, where his arm was broken by a shot. In that fight, his company being forced back, he saw his lieutenant—Giffard—fall, and four Frenchmen attempting to plunder the body. Running back sword in hand, George Napier drove the Frenchmen back, raised the still breathing Giffard, and with the assistance of a sergeant brought him off. He died instantly. Napier's

* Dated January, 1811.

company buried him with their bayonets under fire, and then giving three cheers rushed at the enemy again.

At the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo he was again wounded in the same arm, but continued to do his duty in the trenches, and led the light division stormers to the assault of the lesser breach, where the same arm was shattered by a grape-shot which necessitated its amputation.

The following is one of the numerous letters Lord Wellington addressed to Lady Sarah Napier on similar occasions:—

"My dear Madam, "Gallegos, 20th January, 1812.

"I am sorry to tell you that your son George was again wounded in the right arm so badly last night in the storm of Ciudad Rodrigo, that it was necessary to amputate it above the elbow. He, however, bore the operation remarkably well, and I have seen him this morning, quite well, free from pain and fever, and enjoying highly his success before he had received his wound. When he did receive it, he only desired I might be informed that he had led his men to the top of the breach before he had fallen.

"Having *such* sons, I am aware you expect to hear of those misfortunes which I have more than once had to communicate to you; and notwithstanding your affection for them you have so just a notion of the value of the distinction they are daily acquiring for themselves by their gallantry and good conduct, that their misfortunes do not make so great an impression upon you.

"Under such circumstances I perform the task which I have taken on myself with less reluctance, hoping at the same time that this will be the last occasion on which I shall have to address you on such a subject, and that your brave sons will be spared to you. Although the last was the most serious, it was not the only wound which George

received during the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo; he was hit by the splinter of a shell in the shoulder on the 16th.

"I have the honour to remain, &c.

"WELLINGTON."

George Napier, now a lieutenant-colonel, was present as second in command of the 52nd under the late Lord Seaton, at the battle of Orthes; subsequently as lieutenant-colonel of the 71st regiment at the battle of Toulouse.

When he became a major-general in 1837 he was appointed Governor of the Cape, where he enforced the abolition of slavery, gave municipal institutions to the colony, introduced and successfully fostered a new system of district and other schools, formed a road commission, and commenced several great public works for opening the country to trade and commerce; improved the management of the revenue, paid the colonial debt, and abolished internal taxes, relying solely upon duties; and more than all this, kept the colony free from Caffre wars for nearly seven years.

In 1849, being at Nice, he was offered the command of the Sardinian army by Charles Albert, but declined it, not liking to war except for his own country.

During the panic occasioned in England by the battle of Chillianwallah, Sir George Napier was offered the chief command in India, but refused it, and his brother Charles was appointed.

When the Russian war broke out he offered his services, but they were not accepted, and he continued in private life until his death; and when that occurred it is probable that he did not leave behind him a single enemy.

His death left Sir William Napier the sole survivor of that noble band of soldier brothers whose bravery, whose wounds, and romantic mutual affection were as household words in the camp of the great Peninsular army.

Few episodes in history are so elevating, and at the same time so touching, as the account of the early military career of Charles, George, and William Napier. Sir Charles Napier has left in his journal the most simple and eloquent record of their fraternal love, their heroism, their fortitude, their carelessness of self, their devoted worship of duty and honour.

And now the survivor, old, bent, and feeble in body, but with eye undimmed and spirit unquenched, was left to think of the days when, commencing life in all the flush of their youth and strength and noble aspirations, each of them felt with Hotspur as if—

> "'Twere an easy leap
> To pluck bright honour from the pale-faced moon."

England, whose vines bear such clusters, whose mothers bring forth such sons, will never call in vain for men worthy to uphold her honour abroad, or to defend her sacred soil; and though their names are yet concealed behind the veil of the future, we may hope and confidently believe, that when the emergency shall arise, the mantle borne by those noble soldiers, transmitted to them his illustrious pupils by their great master, will be found to have devolved on shoulders worthy to bear it.

To H. A. Bruce, Esq., M.P.

"Sept. 19, 1855.

"I see to-day that it is *said* Gortschakoff is retreating to Perekop. I do not believe this; but, if true, he is very weak in numbers.

"Now I think I see a great movement for the allies, but fear there is no general nor government capable of it, unless Napoleon will put himself at its head.

"We should seize Taganrog and the mouth of the Don as a base, and collect there an army and fleet of gun-

boats, steam-tugs, &c., and in the spring imitate Alexander's march down the Indus.

"If the whole force of Russia was poured on us, what could they do? Our flotilla, besides being an immense field-battery, would carry us to the side where the Russians were not, or were weakest; but my notion is, that 30,000 French and English and Sardinians (I would have no Turks) could fight and beat all the Russian forces.

"There is water carriage to within 200 miles of Moscow, and I believe a *canal* quite to that city, and the passage would be through the richest and most fertile provinces of Russia. Moreover, if necessary, we could raise the peasantry in rebellion, and I have no doubt take with us 50,000 Cossack cavalry, were it only for plunder, though that would not be good; better to enlist the people on our side. This would render us masters of Russia's future as well as present state, and we could from Moscow liberate Poland, Finland, &c. Suppose Moscow fired—what then? We move down the Don to a warmer climate, and, by our fleet, never leave a sick man behind, going or coming back. Our cavalry could feed itself."

"Sept. 20, 1855.

"Until the real state of the Russians is known, no good opinion can be given. Did they give up the south side from want of stores, from panic, or from mutiny? or, as I suppose, because from the Malakoff our guns could break their bridge, and they feared to be cut off? It is evident however that they had no need, militarily speaking, to give way. Why did they not mine the Malakoff, and erect behind it cavaliers, mounds equal in height, to have embrasures opened when the French got the Malakoff, and then to spring the mine?

"Now, having said that no good opinion can be given,

I will say what may be done according to appearances. Suppose the Russians have provisions, they may have, and probably have, camps entrenched at Baktcheserai and Simpheropol, and holding Mackenzie's Heights and the northern works they have thus a fortified line, cutting the allies off by land from Eupatoria, and able to offer a front either way, that is by holding their camps with moderate forces, and keeping a strong reserve to reinforce whichever should be attacked—the distance not being more than one long march to Simpheropol, and less than one to Baktcheserai; they could never be surprised in either camp with a good look-out.

"The notion of going to Eupatoria I do not think good; it is not strategic. An army coming down from there must attack a strongly entrenched position on the Belbec with the northern forts behind, and be meanwhile exposed to a flank and rear attack from Simpheropol. If it attacks the latter, its flank and rear is exposed to the Belbec as well as to the camps at Mackenzie's Heights and Baktcheserai; and if we succeed, the Russians could still retreat by their internal roads, avoiding Perekop. But if we entrench a camp between Arabat and Kaffa, we advance on a battle front while the Eupatoria garrison molests the enemy's rear. If we are beaten—no harm—our entrenched camp is behind us: if we take Simpheropol, we drive the enemy into the northern forts, and our cavalry, of which we should have 20,000, will command the whole country, and the Russians must starve or surrender."

"Sept. 24, 1855.

". . . . . Without more certain knowledge of affairs it would be impossible to plan a campaign; and if I had it and drew up the best plan possible, it would not be adopted. I have given to Lord Ellen-

borough at different times my views, at his own desire, and he has I believe enforced one or two minor points about the soldiers. The great error from the first was the making a siege of what was a cavalry affair. M'Murdo has in writing my opinion, dated 23rd October, that great cavalry affairs would happen, and Balaklava did happen, but that was not what I meant. I told Lord Ellenborough when Kertsch fell, and I think I told you also, that 60,000 men should have been entrenched between Arabat and Kaffa, and 20,000 cavalry launched into the Crimea, supported slowly by the infantry. Simpheropol might have been taken, but, at all events, that cavalry would not have allowed long lines of *arabas* loaded with stores to traverse the Crimea: if the Russian cavalry came out it would have been smashed, and the Russian camp been blockaded. Well managed, our troops would have collected all the resources of the Crimea for their own use; Eupatoria on one side, Arabat on the other, would have been points of support and safety; they could not have been hurt, and their success would have forced the Russians to abandon the garrison of Sebastopol, and come out in mass to open the communications, which however they could not do against 20,000 active and superior horsemen. As to following the Russians now, it cannot be done if they have a large army; what the French and Sardinians may be I know not, but ours is not a *manœuvring army*.

"I do not like the suppression of our losses. Three times they have given the officers' names, but no numbers of men lost. Why is Windham mentioned as the only man who led? Why was he not supported? Was he driven out by cannon or the bayonet? Who caused the confusion in the trenches? . . . . . I cannot understand the Russian movement. There must have been panic, or mutiny, or treason. There was no appa-

rent military reason why they should have gone away as they did."

"Sept. 1855.

"I have divined the plan of the allies; it is not unmilitary, but its success will depend upon hard fighting and skilful combinations, rather difficult ones to hide. If the Russians have a *head* and *numbers*, both indispensable, they will make the affair a very dangerous one.

"The plan is this: 20,000 men from Eupatoria are to menace the rear of the Russian position at Simpheropol; while all the rest of our armies—that we can spare from guarding the guns and stores and shipping at Sebastopol and Balaklava—march by the sea-coast to Alouschta, and from thence turn up upon Simpheropol. Perhaps some smaller corps may move by a shorter line, but the object is to cross the mountains and gather for an attack on Simpheropol, while the Eupatoria people menace, as I said, the rear. A great battle won, this will place the Russians at our mercy; they must surrender. But the march is one of 100 miles, by not good roads, and the Russians with good information will have only 40 miles to march on good roads. Then come these questions—Have they fortified a position at Simpheropol? Have they a large army? If they have both, the battle is *to be* won.

"The allies will probably have smaller columns marching over the mountains between their main line of march and the Russians, partly to deceive the latter, partly to cover their main line, partly to relieve it from too many troops.

"With all this, if well managed, the operations may very probably end in a great victory. And then why did we waste a year before Sebastopol?

"W. NAPIER."

Sir W. Napier to ———, Esq.

"SIR, "Scinde House, Dec. 8, 1855.

"Your printed letter, touching the granting of orders and pensions to the soldiers, has just reached me. It suggests in my opinion an admirable mode of giving the utmost latitude to the power of jobbing favours, and, in conjunction with the editors of newspapers, of insulting and ruining the British army.

"The British soldier is now as he ever has been the best and bravest of the world, and therefore wants no stimulus to heroic deeds or patriotic devotion. What he wants is a good pension and respect in his old age after serving his country, and fair-play while serving it; and it is not by decorations given to a few under pretence of superior merit (chosen nine times out of ten without merit), that the great body of the soldiers will be benefited or pleased.

"Sir, you are meddling with dangerous matters, and you are not well informed of the past. Lord Raglan's mention of Corporal Quin in his despatch is *not the 'first time on record of a Commander-in-Chief having so done.'* The late Sir C. Napier was the first general to do so; his despatches from Scinde mentioned several soldiers by name, and the exploits they had performed. One of them, John McCartine, 22nd Regiment, is now living at No. 14, Cumberland Street, Sulicoats, Hull."

To the same.

"SIR, "Scinde House, Dec. 18, 1855.

"I like your second letter much better than your first, but I do not like giving the sixpence a day to men on actual service; it is generally spent in drink, and it is a bad principle to pay soldiers extra for *fighting;* it will

teach them to consider that as an extra duty, instead of as being their main duty. I confined myself to your proposition about crosses, and again say it is dangerous ground, and not needful. You do not guard against its abuse. Who is to choose men? You say the cross of the Bath has been abused shamefully as to officers lately. True, and how much more will it be as to soldiers! Again I say, give the soldier the assurance of a good pension for *retreat-service*, and respect in his parish in his old age. That is what he wants and should have.

"Crosses to the soldier is a French invention which springs from their revolutions, and is essentially revolutionary—well applied by them because their troops were *beaten* at first and required stimulants; because they were engaged against the whole world in arms; because their conscription presents men of all ranks to serve as privates. It was a revolutionary measure, I say, and will if introduced into our army produce revolution; if you make your army democratic, you must make your government democratic also; you are meddling with a dangerous tool. An army required to conquer the world, or to try and conquer it, requires these stimulants; but an army like the British does not require them: the British soldier is equal to any daring without them. Mr. Smith painted my portrait; I am not aware of his having painted any portrait of my daughter."

Sir W. Napier to Viscount Hardinge.

"My dear Hardinge, "Feb. 1856.

"As you know I have never besieged the Horse Guards, my approaches are now made with hope in favour of Lieutenant-Colonel John Cooke whose case touches me deeply. He was formerly in the 43rd, and is a man of great intrepidity, of high honour, and of long and

good service—*fifty years*, and *ten general actions!* He has been employed on several military missions, especially one to Constantinople under the late Brigadier-General Considine. And that his conduct was meritorious, and his general career a worthy one, the enclosed little printed correspondence will vouch. In 1844 he applied for the vacant Town-Majorship of Hull, but the post was then abolished, and Lord Fitzroy offered him that of a gentleman-at-arms, which he now has. But it was accepted under a positively implied promise that in due time he would be made one of the Yeomen of the Guard. This has not been fulfilled, and an officer who had been a volunteer in the Light Division when Cooke was a lieutenant and certainly a more distinguished man then and afterwards, without detriment to the other be it said, was placed over his head in the vacant post of yeoman which he had expected.

"In 1854 Lieutenant-Colonel Cooke was enrolled for the Good Service Pension, but has not obtained it.

"Now mark the result. When he entered the corps of gentlemen-at-arms he did not owe a penny; but the expenses of uniforms, new uniforms from changes, carriages, a fixed residence for reception of orders and that of some cost as respect for the court dictated, threw him into debt necessarily, for the salary is only 69*l.* per annum. Hence, in 1855, his commission (that of Regimental Captain) was sold, he paying back to the country 511*l.*, the difference of a former exchange. The remainder scarcely more than covered his debt, incurred entirely and perforce by his attendance on the court; for I can assure you that I never saw a more prudent, honourable, exact man than Lieutenant-Colonel Cooke; it is notoriously his character.

"Thus, under promise and hope of advancement, and

with the best intent to serve him, he has been as it were lured to heavy misfortune; his money, his commission, his advancement, all gone, and poverty before him. Surely you will agree—I know you will, Hardinge, for I know your secret heart—that this should not be; that so good, so brave, so true and excellent an officer should not be snuffed out and cast aside to pass into an old age of privation, after expectations founded on assurances from Lord Fitzroy. I earnestly entreat of you to give him either the Good Service Pension or the post of Yeoman of the Guard; both together would not exceed his real merits."

The following letter refers to the case of the widow of an officer in the army, whose claim to the usual pension had been advocated for several years by Sir W. Napier (the widow having been an inhabitant of Guernsey and married there), but always denied by the War Office because of her inability to furnish legal proof of the marriage.

To the Right Hon. Sidney Herbert.

"SIR, "Scinde House, May, 1856.

"I have to thank you for the attention of sending me a letter relative to Mrs. McDonald's case, and enclosing the opinion of the Solicitor of the Treasury.

"Your letter induces me to address you privately, as giving me a freedom of noticing the matter which I could not have under an official form; and as I have had nothing to say to the case for some time, your reference to me appears, and I hope is, a proof that you feel how hard it is upon the poor woman to be deprived of a pension as the widow of an officer because she cannot prove her marriage, although she was, strange to say, twice married to the same person.

"I feel sure, Sir, that your benevolence of mind shrinks

from the laboured special pleading of Mr. ——'s letter, which would seem rather directed against the escape of some great criminal arraigned at the bar of justice, than a fair and gentle exposition of a poor destitute widow's claim to a bounty which she certainly is *de facto*, if not *de jure*, entitled to. There is not a doubt, from the testimony and belief of I may say the whole island of Guernsey, as to her first marriage; for I can assure you that hundreds of persons, high and low, foremost amongst whom was the Dean of Guernsey, came forward to testify to its having taken place. Many persons had been present at it, and all recollected it; and the reason of this eagerness to witness in her favour was that she had been a servant remarkable for her beauty and dignity of mind and prudence of conduct; and many of the upper classes attended her wedding to show their respect.

"A curious train of circumstances—the death or absence of those who solemnized or were more immediately connected with the ceremony, and the improper pride of her husband which led him rather to be ashamed afterwards of having married a servant—has placed her in her present predicament. To sum up the facts,—she was certainly married twice; the second marriage is proved legally, but a little too late for her claim; the first marriage was in time, but, as above said, involved by accident in legal doubt, though morally certain. May I not then, with strength, put it to your known gentleness of heart and just feelings whether such a case, though denied as one of technical right, may not be made one of favour?"

The great and good man to whom the above was addressed—great in his gentleness and goodness, apart from his brilliant and practical intellect—who would seem to

have been lent to his country for a space to set forth in his daily walk the beauty of the weightier matters of the law—"judgment, mercy, and faith"—and to afford his countrymen a shining example of the power and dignity that reside in benevolence and gentleness, allowed the force of the above appeal for the poor widow, and shortly after announced to Sir William that a special pension had been granted to her.

At this time a greater sorrow than had yet visited it overshadowed in its approach the family of Scinde House. Sir William's third daughter had for some time been in weak health; and now, in the spring of 1856, the medical men pronounced that her recovery was impossible, and that her life could not be prolonged many months. Sir William therefore, with his family, removed into the country to be near his daughter. On the first visit which he paid her, when he had risen from the seat of his carriage and was about to descend the steps, the sight of the house where his child lay dying so overpowered him, that he fell backwards, extended at full-length on the floor of the open carriage as if he had been struck down by a sudden heavy blow. The heavy fall in his then crippled state must at any other time have caused him dreadful agony, and it did in all probability injure him seriously and permanently, but he felt nothing at the time, and hardly seemed to be sensible of its having happened. Here day by day he came until the end, which took place on the 8th September; and the daily spectacle of mortal weakness and suffering, borne with an unsurpassed meekness and patience, and upheld not by man's pride, but by weak woman's strong faith, produced a softening influence on his soul which was never impaired, but which strengthened him to bear the long and sore trials which yet awaited him.

The family returned to Scinde House in September, where Sir William addressed himself with increased diligence to the completion of his brother's biography, and found, as Lady Napier told the author, some comfort in his grief from the task of transcribing the many beautiful passages of his brother's journal which are remarkable for their strong Christian faith. Outwardly there was little change in his appearance and manner, certainly none but his family could have fathomed the depth of his sorrow; and only in unguarded moments, or when under narcotic influence, did he betray the load he carried at his heart.

His old and valued friend Mr. Savage Landor published about this time a letter concerning the King of Naples, which justified tyrannicide and excited a good deal of public disapprobation.

To W. Caldecot, Esq.

"MY DEAR CALDECOT, "Scinde House, Nov. 18, 1856.

"This is the anniversary of the battle of Nivelle in which I won my Lieutenant-Colonelcy. I was then strong and swift of foot; only one man got into the rocks of La Rhune before me, and he was but a step; yet eight hundred noble veterans, strong as lions, were striving madly to be first. I am now old, feeble, bent, miserable, and my eyes are dim, very dim with weeping for my lost child, and my brain is weak also: I cannot read with pleasure, and still less can I think and judge of what other people write. You must not, therefore, expect from me an essay on Landor's noble letter; and it would require an essay, it is so full of meaning. I call it noble, while differing in many points pushed out by him like needles against the world and its opinion and conventionalism; I call it noble, I say, because it is not Landor's

writing, but Landor himself, bold, generous, brave, and reckless, where his feelings as a human being are stirred; reckless in expression only, not in deeds. He is unpopular for his tyrannicide letter; yes, and deservedly so; it would be a bad sign of public feeling if he were not so, for tyrannicide means assassination, and that gives a licence to every violent passion. There is no law, no justice, no generosity of feeling that is not violated by a licence, an excuse for assassination. I have no objection to the death of King Bomba, or any other ruffian; hang them as high as Haman; but once allow of their assassination and the best man in the world is no longer safe—because an enemy will call him a tyrant and plunge a knife into his throat. Well, but this mistake does not make Landor obnoxious to me, or you, or anybody that knows him, because it is not his feeling, and we know that if he saw tyrannicide lifting the knife he would step between and receive the blow himself rather than let it fall on the man it was aimed at. No! it does not spring from anything savage in his nature, but the contrary; it is a mere wild cry of rage at seeing his fellow creatures so tormented by a monster; it is the sign of his deep honest human nature, of his compassionate heart, that urges him to spring forward and tear the wrongdoer; and because he can't do that, it makes him roar with a chained lion's fury.

"Many of his opinions on art—indeed, most of them—I agree in, and also in his estimate of writers, Wordsworth especially; but not Byron; but again, I say, his letter is Landor, bold, original, and vigorous in right and wrong alike. He is like an oak with many gnarled branches and queer excrescences, but always an oak, and one that will be admired for ages.

"Emerson is a fop in literature; his crotchets are not

like Landor's; they have no trunk, no strength, no originality; he is 'out of the way,' indeed, but nobody cares for that; he is not missed, and is certainly not worthy of Landor's letter."

William Napier's friends were falling thickly around him: his brothers, Charles, Henry, George, all gone; then Lord Raglan; and now the Commander-in-Chief, his old and tried friend Lord Hardinge, left the stage on which he had acted with so much success and honour. All who have read the relation of the battle of Albuera in Napier's History will remember that a large share in the honour of that victory is assigned to Colonel Hardinge, and the circumstances on which the historian's dictum was founded. The newspaper notices of Lord Hardinge's career having quoted Napier's account of the transaction, gave rise to the publication of the following letter from Sir William.

To the Editor of the 'Times.'

"SIR, "Oct. 1856.

"The authority of Colonel Wade having been produced in your paper to impugn my statement of the late Lord Hardinge's part in the battle of Albuera, I request you will give insertion to the following observations.

"Colonel Wade's letter was published years ago, in 1841, by Sir Lowry Cole, together with a correspondence between him and Lord Hardinge and myself. It rests therefore with the representatives of Lord Hardinge, not with me, to vindicate his fame. But they cannot be expected, and they ought not to be called upon, to undertake such a controversy in their present affliction, while their father's body lies still unburied. I will therefore state some facts to show that Colonel Wade's letter is not more conclusive now than it was when first pub-

lished; first however be it remarked, that your writer has fathered a military ignorance on me which belongs to himself. I never said Lord Hardinge *executed a manœuvre* which gained the day, but that he urged an attack; very different matters these. Now for my statement.

"All that I have published about Lord Hardinge came from himself; and it was given me expressly for my History. Colonel Wade could not know what passed between Colonel Hardinge and Lord Beresford; he could not be sure even of all that passed between Colonel Hardinge and Sir Lowry Cole; and he acknowledges that the latter was urged by the former to make the movement. Now, long after my volume was published, Sir Lowry Cole, whom I knew from childhood, met me in the street and laughing shook his hand at me, saying 'I have a crow to pluck with you about Albuera.' I found he meant that he had received *no orders*; that his movement was a voluntary decision. My answer was this—'All I have said is from Hardinge; write to me a contradiction or correction, and it shall be published in my next volume.' His reply was —'No, no! it is not of such consequence.' Years after, as I have already said, Lord Hardinge gave a public explanation in the papers, and maintained his position as the author of the movement.

"This would be enough, if so much difference did not prevail as to the essential difference between the merits of Lord Hardinge's part and Sir Lowry Cole's in the battle.

"Lord Hardinge's great merit was not the conception or the execution of the Fourth Division's attack—nor in the pushing Abercrombie's brigade into renewed action, a merit which nobody has disputed—but in the resolution not to let Marshal Beresford's desponding view of the crisis

prevail. He saw the battle might still be won if all the spare troops were pushed into action, and decided for Beresford that it should be so; but it was *neck or nought*, and had it been *nought* Beresford's superior judgment would have been justly extolled.

"Sir Lowry Cole, yielding to urgent exhortation, executed one part of Hardinge's conception, as Colonel Abercrombie did another part. With both it was an intrepid resolution: with Cole morally so as well as physically. He had been posted at an important point with positive orders; he was menaced by an enormous body of cavalry; he could not see and could not know the exact state of the battle on the hill above, but he knew it was almost desperate for the allies; he could not know what reserves Soult had in hand, for he had only arrived from Badajoz as the action began; he could not be sure that an infantry column would not suddenly turn the hill and in conjunction with the cavalry charge his right flank: yet, with these dangers staring him in the face, he decided to mount the hill and assail double, more than double, his own force, supported by a powerful artillery and already more than half victorious! It was a great action! And so was Hardinge's,—a stroke of genius for which he has been long and justly eulogised.

"W. NAPIER, Lieut.-General."

Sir W. Napier to ——.

"SIR, "Scinde House, Jan. 17, 1857.

"My inclination would be to aid you, but you will see the impossibility of my doing so as you desire, when I put the case in its true light. An officer of General ——'s staff told me what Mr. Murray has reported to you. I repeated it because it was not told in confidence; and I had the right to say in a casual conversation what I had heard,

especially as Mr. Murray first told me that *your* authority for the fact mentioned was General ——. But to drag my informant into so public and bitter a controversy, in which he must appear as the condemner of his general, would be inexcusable and cannot be done.

"I wish also to put myself right with you upon the opinion I expressed of your book. I said that you had given me the only clear notion of the battle of Inkerman; and I expressed my satisfaction at your defence of my dear and lamented friend Lord Raglan upon many points where he had been so foully misrepresented, especially by the French; but I must guard myself from being supposed to have given an unrestricted approval of a work which has been so impugned, until the disputed facts are successfully supported. With this explanation I hope you will be content, and not feel that I have wished to do or say anything not agreeable to you or to depreciate your work; which, for anything yet said, appears to me very valuable as a testimony to the merits of Lord Raglan and the British army."

In the spring of 1857 the two first volumes of the 'Life of Sir Charles Napier' were published; and besides the general sentiment of admiration for his character which these volumes created,—presenting as they did chiefly in the strong and simple language of his own journals, the force, the truth, the lofty disregard of self, the self-reliance, indomitable resolution, the subtle intellect, the womanly tenderness, and the strong and simple faith, which went to make up his grand and powerful character, —they drew upon the author many bitter attacks from the friends of those who were purposely assailed, as well as expostulations from those who were unintentionally aggrieved.

The catastrophe in which the Government of the East India Company finally disappeared had been foreshadowed by Sir C. Napier in warnings which will be found dispersed through all his writings from the first moment of his acquaintance with India. The first mutterings of the storm, caught by his prophetic ear but by common men disregarded, had been heard in the capricious and insolent tendency to mutiny on slight pretences manifested by the native troops on different occasions between 1843 and 1850. In 1850 his vigour and sagacity conjured the tempest which under another man would probably have antedated the Indian mutiny by seven years; and for a reward he was driven from his command by an insulting public reprimand which degraded his authority. Twice did he triumph over the powerful corporation which hated and thwarted him, even though his efforts were in their behalf: once in his lifetime, when the English people forced the Directors to put him at the head of their armies; a second time after his death, in the lamentable proof of the truth of his repeated warnings which they had contemptuously rejected. Strangely enough, the Indian mutiny, the vindicator of Sir Charles Napier's forebodings and of the course he had pursued in 1850, burst upon the country just as the volumes which afforded proofs of his prophetic sagacity were passing through the press; and coming at this time they produced a powerful influence on public opinion, and as much as actual events opened men's minds to the impossibility of continuing the old system of government of India.

Probably a book of more intense interest, and one more elevating in its tendency, than the 'Life of Sir Charles Napier,' has not issued from the English press during the present century. Sir William himself however felt that it was too long for the general reader, and expressed a

vain hope that he should be able to finish it in three volumes. All those who loved him regretted also that this grand and touching story was occasionally marred by bitter onslaughts on his brother's adversaries, and the unnecessary imputation of odious motives. Even when the indignation was just and natural, its too frequent repetition was vexatious to the reader. But when the deep and passionate love for his brother is remembered, and in what a turmoil of bitter strife over that brother's reputation, under what domestic afflictions, what stress of physical suffering, this work was composed, criticism will give place to admiration at the courage, devotion, and genius expended on this monument to a brother's fame.

From among the innumerable letters which followed the publication of the 'Life of Sir Charles Napier,' a few of the more interesting are selected.

Sir W. Napier to the writer of the Notice in the 'Ecclesiastic' on Sir C. Napier.

"SIR, "Scinde House, March 7, 1857.

"A copy of the '*Ecclesiastic*,' containing a notice of the life and character of my brother Sir C. Napier, has reached me—from what quarter I know not, but strong feelings impel me to address you on the subject.

"Standing on your rock of faith—it is not mine and was not his—your appearance is nevertheless in my eyes Apostolic, and your words — beautiful in composition, more beautiful from their simple sincerity—flow with such gentleness of teaching, and such tenderness for what you consider failings, such brotherly love and praise where you see merit, that I listen with far more satisfaction to your reproof than to the praise of others. But reproof is not the just word: you do not reprove, you lament error, in

kindness and compassion, and with a humility that produces the same feeling in me, and I offer you—not thanks—but reverence.

"You mark as 'strong language,' some objectionable words in his description of my brother George's vehemence of riding and fighting. You are right; but in the commencement of the work I gave notice that such passages would occur, because he was never able to throw aside the habit of swearing which was so common in his early days: he has however condemned it himself in his journal more than once.

"You may say—why then publish them? In his last will he expressly enjoined on whoever should use his papers for publication (and he knew well I would, if life were spared me, do so) to employ his own words, however objectionable in taste or feeling; because he *had* used them, and he would not be presented to the world better than he really was. Truthfulness was his rock.

"I remain, Sir,

"Your obliged and grateful servant,

"W. NAPIER."

The Rev. Archer Gurney to Sir Wm. Napier.

"DEAR SIR, "March 11, 1857.

"So suffer me to call you—many thanks for your kind and generous letter, a letter characteristic of a Napier. I do not at all know who forwarded the '*Ecclesiastic.*' My tribute to a good and great man whom England shall ever delight to honour in the years to come, was far too slight and insufficient for me to think it worthy of any notice.

"Your communication, which it touched me much to read, shall be strictly private. The editor had opened the first letter, I find; I have therefore written to him, begging him not to mention it, nor will I do so to any one,

not even to my mother and brother—though they would I know delight to hear of it, if not to see it—unless indeed you were to send me an express authorization.

"But one expression grieves me. 'It is not your rock.' Must this be so?

"For the departed hero let me say, so great a heart cannot be eternally parted from its Maker—I do not, I will not believe it. I might predicate the same of yourself. Here or hereafter, be the prediction orthodox or no, you shall *see*. If a few words of good will spoken by a most unworthy servant could win such return, what will—what must not, when once fully known, the unspeakable goodness of the MASTER whose name is Love?"

Sir W. Napier to the Rev. Archer Gurney.

"DEAR SIR, "March 12, 1857.

"My notice as to the letter being private was simply lest you might think I meant it for publication, but it gratifies me to find you think it worth showing to others of your family.

"You say a passage in it *grieves you*, and it grieves me to think you have so mistaken my meaning in that passage. Let me hasten to undeceive you. I alluded solely to your peculiar tenets as to the *Church*, surely not to the faith in God. When the third and fourth volumes of the 'Life' appear—and that will be soon—you will see how deep, how intense was Sir Charles Napier's religious feeling. Let this suffice, for even on those points of Church discipline to which I alluded, it would pain me to make a remark that might seem to censure your views or even oppose them; not that I do presume to censure, but in explaining my own views I might seem to do so. My own religious opinions are founded on long-considered

grounds—I am past seventy-one and in very bad health, yet they do not shake."

The Rev. Archer Gurney to Sir Wm. Napier.

"DEAR SIR, "March 13, 1857.

"Thanks for the permission accorded. I rejoice that I should have misunderstood your reference to the Rock. That we may meet in a better world, cleansed and purified by the all-sufficient Sacrifice, is and shall be (D.V.) the daily prayer of, dear Sir," &c. &c.

Sir William Napier to the Rev. Archer Gurney.

"DEAR SIR, "March 16, 1857.

"I am induced to reply to your last note, because I find from a conversation with a friend that I was not acquainted with the full meaning and force of some of your expressions in the review. Believe me, the objections you made to some of my brother's sentiments were regarded by me as solely directed against his not accepting a claim by the ministers of the Church to a divine succession of authority. It had no allusion to faith in the Divine Being or Beings.

"I will not further enter into the subject, but will only pray of you to believe it was ignorance, and really meant only as showing that we were not of what is called the High Church; but neither am I against it."

Sir W. Napier to the Editor of the 'Times.'

"SIR, "May, 1857.

"David Hume, the historian, was not a hired tutor; he was the friend of the Hon. George Napier's father, and as such superintended the son's education. Of his con-

nection with Lord Lynedoch I know nothing beyond what has been said in my brother's letter: he probably heard it from his father; perhaps from Lord Lynedoch. If 'XI.' will look in a work called 'An Asylum for Fugitive Pieces,' vol. iii. page 59, published in 1785, by Debrett, he will find verses to the memory of David Hume—there spelt Home—written by the Hon. George Napier, which show the intimacy and veneration he had for the man who taught him."

From Captain Walker, R.E., to Sir W. Napier.

"SIR, "St. George's, Bermuda, April, 1857.

"It is with great pain that I have just read in the 'Life of Sir Charles Napier,' written by you, a sentence which from the pen of an ordinary man might be of no consequence, but, proceeding from that of one of the greatest men and generals of the age, and inserted without comment by the historian of the Peninsular war, it is necessary for the son of a gallant officer now more than fourteen years in his grave, to do his utmost to clear the memory of his father from the stigma that might attach to it. I allude to page 97 of the first volume of your work, wherein Sir Charles writes that he had 'heard officers and soldiers jeer at Colonel Walker for sheltering himself behind General Fane's horse at Vimeira.' It does not appear that Sir Charles was himself at Vimeira, or that he had any personal knowledge of the truth of this, which is most decidedly a base calumny, probably invented and propagated by some of those who had been offended by Colonel Walker's strict but necessary discipline.

"It is unlikely to be true, for at Vimeira Colonel Walker was no raw soldier on his first battle-field; he had previously served with credit in India, Flanders, and Egypt. He was moreover a mounted officer, and the

amount of shelter he could therefore receive from General Fane's horse must have been very slight. I have always heard from military men, that it was at my father's suggestion that Sir Arthur Wellesley permitted that brilliant charge of the 50th Regiment which decided the fate of a French column of upwards of 4000 men at Vimeira, and which charge Colonel Walker led sword in hand.

"I am able to quote other authority as a record of my father's intrepidity, to wit—Sir John Jones's account of General Walker's assault of the San Vincente Bastion at Badajoz, and the bayonet wounds and bullets he received in his efforts to rally his men: also Major-General Lewis, in his work in the 'Aide Mémoire' upon escalade, says,—'This is a history of what has been done with a scanty supply of ladders; when therefore we have 'impossible' things of this sort to accomplish, let us recollect what Hill did at Almaraz, Picton and Kempt at the Castle of Badajoz, Walker at the Bastion of San Vincente.'

"At Orthes also when in command of a division, General Walker received a musket-ball in his leg at the commencement of the action, and continued to ride all day at the head of his troops (though he fainted from loss of blood at the end of the action): this was not the conduct of a man who would shelter himself behind another man's horse.

"But most fortunately I am able to quote Napier against Napier; to appeal from Napier's gossip to Napier's History, book xvi. chap. v.: "In the last of these combats, General Walker, leaping forward sword in hand at the moment when one of the enemy's cannoneers was discharging a gun, fell covered with so many wounds, that it was wonderful how he could survive.' Again—'Who can sufficiently honour the intrepidity of *Walker*, of Canch, or the resolution of Ferguson of the 43rd?'

"General, it is now more than fourteen years since my dear and honoured father died. Most of his friends and comrades have now followed him to their eternal rest; but there are yet I believe many men left still who will deny that a braver soldier ever lived than George Walker, or that the intimate friend till death, of Murray, Paget, Cole, and Hill, that the man whom Wellington selected for commands, could ever have been guilty of the action attributed to him in the Memoir of Sir Charles Napier.

"Your work, Sir William Napier, will have many readers, will probably pass through many editions, both on account of the brave man and great general whose life it records, and for the style and merit of the author, the historian of the Peninsular war. I therefore beg a simple act of justice—that in your future editions you will add a note of testimony to my father's intrepidity, and redeem from a wicked stigma the memory of a man who has recently been quoted in the newspapers of the day, as an instance of one of those generals of the olden times who disdained not *to lead* his men to the assault, who scaled the parapets, and fell covered with wounds at the head of his brigade.

"Should you be pleased, Sir William, to give me a few lines of assurance that you will comply with the request I have made (because I consider it my duty to the memory of one most dear to me, but I trust with every due respect to yourself and your distinguished brother), I shall feel deeply indebted to you, and shall remain, Sir, ever," &c.

To Captain Walker, R.E.

"MY DEAR SIR, "Scinde House, Clapham, May 26, 1857.

"Your letter has taken me by surprise: permit me to point out why.

"The remark which has called it forth passed without a note by me because I looked upon it, and do so still, as a soldier's joke, one of those pieces of military humour, so frequent in regiments, which are indications of good fellowship and carry with them nothing but friendly mirth. Believe me that the one in question must always be looked upon as of this nature, and that to have made a note or excuse of any kind would have given it an appearance of a designed stigma by Sir C. Napier.

"Pray consult some judicious friend upon the subject in this view; and if you still continue sensitive, tell me so; but I again warn you that in my opinion it will give point and meaning to a harmless joke of soldiers. Your father's character for bravery, active vehement bravery, is well known, and the joke published by the same man who speaks of him as I have done in my History, at once gives the true meaning, and shows that no slight was ever designed by Sir C. Napier.

"Believe me to be, what I feel I am on this occasion,

"Yours very sincerely,

"W. NAPIER.

"P.S.—Looking at your letter, I find the date 24th of April; this is unfortunate, as I have some fear though no certainty that a second edition of my work may be called for before I hear from you, and shall be at a loss for your decision; however, if too late, I can still do what you wish in another volume."

Captain Walker to Sir W. Napier.

"MY DEAR SIR WILLIAM NAPIER, "June 18, 1857.

"I had great satisfaction in receiving by the last mail from England your kind letter (dated May 20th),

which assures me that the remark relative to my father was only a camp joke.

"At the same time it is evident, from the manner in which Sir Charles Napier alluded to it, that it was such a joke as he could not bear to hear passed on himself; therefore, and because also there are few now alive who know what my dear father's real character for courage was,—as you describe it, 'well known for bravery, active, vehement bravery'—I must still solicit the favour I before asked, and which you have kindly promised to grant should I continue to press it—namely, to correct by a note in your second edition any erroneous impression which might be formed by the readers of the paragraph as it originally stood.

"In asking this, I have taken your advice and consulted a judicious friend (my present commanding officer), and by his opinion I now act.

"It will be easy for you, my dear Sir, to write such a note as will convey to the public the same impression of my father as you yourself have.

"Should your second edition have appeared previous to your receipt of this note, I trust you will permit me to publish your letter to me, unless you kindly prefer to do so yourself, a course which will have far greater weight with the public and be more gratifying to myself."

Sir W. Napier to Captain Walker, R.E.

"MY DEAR CAPTAIN WALKER, "Scinde House, July 13, 1857.

"Your letter has just reached me, a fortnight too late for the second edition; but that is of no consequence, as I had in pursuance of my promise put a note having the meaning you wish: I did so, as being the sure side.

"As to publishing my letter, you are welcome to do so."

*Mrs. Outram to Sir W. Napier.**

"SIR, "June, 1857.

"In the review of your 'Life of Sir C. Napier,' published in the '*Times*' newspaper, there are these words from your brother's pen: 'Outram's brother cut his throat.' This brother was my beloved eldest son, who died in India, 1829, of *jungle fever as I was told and believed*, but so deep was my affliction at his loss that no one ventured to give me particulars of his death, or even to name him to me. For nearly thirty years I have mourned his loss as perhaps no other mother ever mourned; for perhaps none ever lost so gifted a son, so distinguished for rare talents, and generosity and kindness of heart, and devoted to a mother widowed at twenty-five years of age, and from prosperity and adulation left to struggle against poverty and entangled affairs, with five orphans. But this eldest son was the polestar of my existence, pointing with such promise to future brightness, that I was enabled to submit to privations and difficulties, looking forward to his brilliant career ending my misfortunes. And there are those yet living who know that such hopes were not the sanguine dreams of a mother's partiality. At the India House his career at Addiscombe may be traced, which he left at

* This painful correspondence is not inserted without the permission, nor indeed otherwise than by the desire, of Mrs. Outram. That venerable lady, in authorising its publication, expressed a wish that, as the unhappy manner of her son's death had already been published, the present occasion might be taken of explaining under what circumstances it occurred. Most readily is this act of justice done to a public servant, whom a premature death, under circumstances unusually painful, cut off in the commencement of a career which might have rivalled that of his distinguished brother. In the delirium of fever, and just before committing the fatal act, Mr. Outram had scrawled a few lines expressive of his remorse at having embezzled a sum of public money. The existence of this writing led to a strict investigation of his accounts, the result of which was the complete exoneration of his memory from a charge made by himself under the delusion of fever; and this result was officially announced to his family in a letter which bore the strongest testimony to the worth and character of the deceased officer.

seventeen years of age, having become the head of the whole school in *nine* months, in place of remaining the usual term of three years. He carried off every prize but one given for 126 boys, and the character he left behind may also be found at the India House. Many of the directors evinced for him a fatherly kindness—mothers held him up for the imitation of their sons, and *I* was too proud a mother! He was received in India as a phenomenon and with marked kindness by Governor Elphinstone, who will now, I feel assured, give him his tribute of affection and admiration. Had Sir John Malcolm lived longer he meant to have written a memoir of him; for loving him, as he told me, as a son, he wished his talents and nobleness of mind to be recorded. Would that his life had been spared to have acted on this kind intention! some consolation might have been given me in my present deep affliction, by knowing that the world had such a testimony of the worth of the departed, to do away the horrible conclusions that may be drawn by reading your relation in the public newspapers of the manner of his death—first made known to me by the medium of a public newspaper.

"Pray, Sir, understand the nature of my feelings, and the reason of my thus addressing you. What I have just reason to complain of is—your having brought the circumstance recklessly before the public eye without noting any of the mitigating circumstances that attended the death of my son when he destroyed a life that, if spared, might have been a blessing to thousands, and saved his unhappy mother from a shock which she feels may send her to her grave; for after eighty years of trial and sorrows, the human frame must sink under such an attack. You and I, Sir, will never meet in this world;—in that one to which we are both, perhaps, rapidly approaching, earthly feelings and vindictive passions must then be over; but

their effects remain; we must give an account of our own 'trespasses.' I trust you will repent of having destroyed the peace of a widow who never offended you, and whose gray hairs you are bringing with sorrow to the grave.

"MARGARET OUTRAM."

One of Sir W. Napier's oldest and most intimate friends says of him, "William Napier was one of the most vehement of men, and one of the most warmhearted—so that an error on his part became an agony. I have seen him throw himself on the ground bathed in tears when he thought he had done an injury; as in a late instance when he learned that he had inflicted a pang on the mother of Sir James Outram; his grief was extreme, and he did all he could to make atonement."

The answer which Sir William sent to the foregoing letter was as follows:—

To Mrs. Outram.

"MADAM, "June 4, 1857.

"Your solemn, and to me terrible letter, has reached me, and to it I can give no answer.

"I hope God will pardon the pain I have given you, though unintentional; I say unintentional, as it was a careless transcribing of a passage never intended for publicity, and to which publicity ought not to have been given.

"I pray God may alleviate the suffering of your aged heart, and the self-reproach I feel.

"I can say no more.

"W. NAPIER."

Mrs. Outram to Sir W. Napier.

"SIR, "June 10, 1857

"Your answer to my letter demands an acknowledgment. Aware in my own long life of having committed

many errors, I am ready with my whole heart to pardon injuries done to me, particularly if atoned by regret or repentance.

"It is due to your feelings and my own to assure you that your answer to my letter soothed and gratified me, as expressed like a soldier and a Christian gentleman. All I have to rejoin is to express my regret that your feelings and my own have been so much pained, and to assure you of the *entire* forgiveness of

"Yours truly,

"MARGARET OUTRAM.

"PS. I am now anxious to bury this sad affair in oblivion."

It is pleasing to record that the intercourse, commenced so sadly, did not altogether terminate with the above correspondence. A year later Sir William, when lying very ill, received a most kind and cordial letter from the same lady; and he held her in the highest esteem and reverence to his death.

Early in 1857 Ali Moorad, the only one of the Scinde Ameers who remained faithful to the British during the struggle in 1842, came to England, to push personally his claims to redress for the injustice with which he had been treated by the Indian Government. His services had been of great value to Sir Charles Napier and to England; but he had lately been deprived of his dominions by the Governor-General on a charge of forgery, which he emphatically denied. The evidence which existed on both sides was carefully examined by Sir William, who admitted Ali Moorad's claim to his good offices for his brother's sake, and resulted in convincing him of the absolute falsehood of the charge. He accordingly lent the Ameer all the aid, both of his influence and his pen,

in prosecuting his claims; but notwithstanding these, and his appeal to Parliament, justice was so slow that Ali Moorad returned to India, there to await the decision on his case. The author was present at the first interview between Sir William and Ali Moorad at Scinde House. The Ameer came to luncheon by appointment, and brought with him his interpreter and his medical attendant, all being in the Indian dress with flowing robes and turbans, which gave rise to an amusing mistake.

When Ali Moorad was announced, Sir William rose and advanced towards him with the painful effort which it now cost him to walk a step, holding out his hand, and his face animated with the expression of sensitive eager kindness for which it was remarkable. After having greeted the Ameer the latter turned to introduce his two attendants, and making a gesture towards one who wore a most undeniable black beard he distinctly pronounced the words "*my daughter*." "Eh, what!" said his host, regarding with great astonishment this hirsute female variety, "*your daughter!*" evidently accepting for a moment as a startling fact the assertion of the Ameer, which the dress did not instantly invest with that absurdity which an European dress would have done.

It was "my doctor" the prince was introducing, and the mistake occasioned a good deal of merriment in which the Indians joined very heartily.

On his arrival in Scinde Ali Moorad wrote a very grateful letter of thanks, to which the following is a reply:—

To His Highness Meer Ali Moorad.

"HIGHNESS, "Feb. 1858.

"Your safe arrival in your own country is for me agreeable news. Your remembrance of me personally is

an honour and a kindness. It would be more pleasing to me if I had done anything to merit your good will by having forwarded your interests. Your treatment was unjust, but I had no power though I had much good will to help your cause.

"You tell me you have hopes now, and that your reception at Bombay and at Kurrachee has been such as you wished, and honourable.

"Highness, there was a wise man in our country who said, '*The promises made in adversity are forgotten in prosperity.*' And again: '*Fear makes men liberal of words, but when the danger passes the words are forgotten.*'

"Highness, I offer my thanks to you for your kind letter, and my hope that you may be successful and happy.

"W. NAPIER."

Always watchful for his brother's fame, Sir William detected during this year an underhand attempt to depreciate the value of Scinde as an imperial acquisition, and to throw doubt on the public faith of Sir Charles Napier's administration. It was as follows.

A motion having been made in Parliament for a return of Land Tenures in India, in the return, when presented, Scinde was omitted by name, and included under the head of Bombay, and a direct charge was made that, contrary to the established law and in order to swell the revenue so that an importance not due to it should be attributed to his conquest, Sir Charles Napier had created a monopoly of grain to sell at famine prices. This charge had been originally made by the Bombay Government in 1846, and completely refuted by Sir Charles himself, who left on record, however, in a letter which his brother now published, his belief that the charge would nevertheless

be used to vilify his character after his death. Mr. Bruce made a motion in the House for the production of Sir Charles Napier's refutation of the calumny which had been reproduced by the Indian Directors in the return in question. The answer was that no such refutation had been found; it was not at the India House, or at Calcutta, or Bombay; so at least said the Directors who had seats in the House of Commons.

This then was the case. The Indian Government made a serious charge against Sir C. Napier in 1846. Sir Charles refuted that charge. The Indian Government, as is notorious, bore Sir Charles no good will. In the archives of that Government the charge was hoarded up. Eleven years later that charge was reproduced and printed on the authority of the Indian Government in a parliamentary return. The refutation made by the accused man on being demanded by his friends "could not be found." This is a case in which "he who runs may read." Only facts are stated; conclusions may be drawn by the reader.

Sir William Napier published a pamphlet on this subject, clearing his brother's memory, and proving to demonstration the following facts:—

That under the Ameers those tyrants determined the prices at which their grain should be sold, these being always above the regular market price, which was of course regulated by the relative pressure of demand and supply; and as no voluntary purchasers could therefore be found for the Ameers' grain, they made their Kardars responsible for the money, and no grain was allowed to be sold until after theirs was disposed of. The consequences were much oppression and suffering, under the influence of which the land was gradually becoming a waste.

One of the first acts of Sir C. Napier's administration

was to take off the taxes levied by the Ameers upon imported grain; and he further exerted himself to reduce the price generally by liberal measures towards the cultivators of the land. The only enactment by which the price of grain in Scinde could be raised, emanated from the Bombay Government, the authors of the charge against Sir Charles. The latter advocated free trade in grain and admitted it into Scinde free of duty; the only tax upon it was levied at Bombay; and the testimony of Colonel Bathborne, who had been a collector in Scinde under Sir Charles Napier, showed that the prices at which grain was invariably sold in Scinde were lower than prevailed in any part of the Presidency of Bombay, and that there was not a shadow of foundation for the charge of monopoly or interference with the natural causes which regulate prices, except in the liberal measures above referred to in aid of the cultivators.

If Sir Charles Napier's administration had been such as was described by his traducers, some trace of its evil effects would be found in the reports of his successors. Yet, two years after Sir Charles left Scinde, his successor, Mr. Pringle, who had no personal acquaintance with him, wrote as follows: "I can wish nothing better for the interests of our newly acquired provinces in the Punjaub than that they may have the benefit of the same just and strong government which was so successfully applied to the introduction of order here." Mr. Frere, who succeeded Mr. Pringle, expressed himself in similar terms.

"In the face of such evidence," to quote the words of an article in the 'Sun' newspaper at the time, "and of Sir Charles's own refutation of the calumny concocted against him, it would be almost incredible but for Mr. Ewart's returns and Mr. Willoughby's speech in the House of Commons, that such persistency in wrongdoing could be exhibited as has been shown by the Court of Directors."

To Lady Napier.

"Clapham, July, 1857.

"I have read Mr. Lawrence's* Life; it is well and simply told by Mr. Prescott; pray tell Mrs. Lawrence that I find in it the proof of what I always thought, that Mr. Lawrence was a wise, and good, and generous, and amiable man, and that I am proud of having known him; and still more so at his having a kind feeling towards us. He really was a thoroughly good and amiable man.

"Lord Ellenborough was very eloquent and copious on India; he thinks it gone; the next mail will tell.

"We are all agog about news which everybody expects this day; I doubt its coming until Monday, from the general law of disappointment. . . . . This month, forty-two years ago, I first knew ——, and I think so long a friendship should bear more fruit than words. He has given me many presents, and I have therefore written to him to ask if he is pressed for money, —I suspect he is,—and to offer him 200*l.* I doubt his accepting it, but I feel sure I ought to offer it; I feel sure you will approve.

"I expect all my darlings, large and small, on Sunday.

"I am very low about a sad event which vexed us on coming down this moment. One of the poor little birds is lying dead, and the other standing over it trying to bring it to life again; it is very piteous. I do hate to have pets of animals; this pains me as much as the loss of poor Cardinal did.

"There is no news, and I cannot write much. I am so vexed about the poor little creature; and you and my Katty will be so vexed that it weighs on me."

The following letters from an old 43rd veteran will be read with interest:—

* Late American minister in this country.

To Sir Wm. Napier.

"DEAR SIR, "Sowerby, Dec. 24, 1857.

"A few remarks from an old soldier of the 43rd, who fought with you in several battles in the Peninsular wars. I belonged to Captain Duffy's company, which went abroad with the 1st Battalion in 1809 from Colchester, commanded by Colonel Giffard and Major McLeod. We landed at Lisbon, marched to Talavera, reached there on the 29th July; the battle was over, but we buried the dead. Then at Alameda on the 24th July, 1810,* when Colonel Hull took the command, Captain Dalzell and Captain Cameron were killed, and Colonel Hull lost his horse; your company and Captain Duffy's covered the bridge, and I recollect your stripping a dead man's belts off and putting them on yourself, and then gave the command for the 43rd to charge. We drove the French back and then retired over the bridge, where Colonel Hull was killed. We fought them again at Busaco, and won the victory, when both you and your brother Charles were present. Then we retreated to Torres Vedras to the defence lines. I was at the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo on the 19th January, 1812, where poor Craufurd was killed; and at Badajoz, on the 6th April, we went left in front; and Colonel McLeod, Mr. Target, and Mr. Harvest were all killed together; and I was wounded going up to the breach, but did not get wounded again until I got to Toulouse on Easter Sunday, though I was at the battle of Salamanca and at the siege of St. Sebastian, and had a narrow escape. I recollect you having the command at Gallegos after the retreat from Madrid. We went from Gallegos to Vittoria, where we fought the French again, and won; also on the Pyrenees, Nivelle, Nive, and

* The Coa.

Toulouse. I left France when Napoleon was sent to Elba in 1814, for America, and fought the Yankees on the 8th January, 1815, at New Orleans, when the Yankees threw an unmerciful shell, which took away both legs of Lieutenant Darcy, and wounded Captain Simpson; and lastly got on to the plains of Waterloo on the 20th June, too late to fight, but in time to assist in burying the dead. I got discharged in May, 1816, and was 36 years without pension. But in 1852 I had granted nine pence a day, and by the influence of Sir James Ferguson and other friends got it augmented to one shilling per day, for which I am very thankful in my old age. I am proud to wear the medal that I got with ten clasps for actions that I fought in. I hope those few remarks from an old veteran of 70 summers will be accepted by an old soldier, and I remain,

"Yours respectfully,

"WM. KERSHAW (late 43rd)."

To Sir Wm. Napier.

"MY DEAR SIR, "Sowerby, Jan. 6, 1858.

"I duly received your kind letter and present you sent me by Colonel Orange. I am sorry to hear that Sir William is infirm in his old age, for never a better or a braver man commanded a regiment when he was young. I remember all the persons you named in your letter very well; it is quite possible for me to be mistaken about the circumstance I named about Sir William taking a dead man's belts at Alameda, and that he might have been binding up the wound of some unfortunate fellow. But I am persuaded of one thing, that is, if Sir W. had not ordered us to charge the French at

the time, they would have peppered us in retreating over the bridge.

"My object in writing to Sir William was not for any pecuniary assistance. I had understood for several years that Sir W. had gone to rest with his fathers, but, conversing with Dr. Alexander of Halifax a few weeks ago on the battles of the Peninsula, he mentioned Sir W.'s name, and told me that he had just got published the Life of his brother Charles, and that he was still living in the vicinity of London. He gave me the address of the publisher of the work, and I wrote for Sir W.'s address, just that I might let him know that I was living, and had not forgot all our young day exploits. But I must express my gratitude to Sir W. for accepting my letter, and to Lady Napier for the trouble she has had in replying; and hoping that you both may enjoy every earthly felicity for a many, many years, I must not at the same time forget to say that my kind partner in age sends her kind wishes, and respects also.

"I remain, yours faithfully,

"Wm. Kershaw.

"PS. I should have mentioned your brother George in my letter, but I was not certain whether he lost his arm at Busaco or not, but I know he was Captain of the 52nd Regiment."

The name of Colquhoun Grant is familiar to all readers of Napier's History; the following interesting account of his services was drawn up by his friend and forwarded to the Duke of Cambridge, in the hope that it would give weight to an application for promotion on the part of Sir Colquhoun's son, then a cornet in the "Bays," who appears to have inherited the enterprising nature of his father.

"Statement humbly presented for the consideration of H. R. H. the General Commanding-in-Chief.'

"The late Brigadier-General Colquhoun Grant was an intimate friend of mine, which enables me to make the following statement with a sure knowledge; but, for the estimation in which he was held by the Duke of Wellington, I doubt not that a reference to Lord Seaton, Lord Downes, and Sir George Scovell will obtain a corroboration of my assertions.

"Grant served as a regimental officer in the West Indies, real service against an enemy; and also on the staff of Sir George Prevost, who very highly esteemed him.

"In the Peninsula he was soon selected by the Duke of Wellington as one of his *exploring* officers, men of whom the Duke in after times said to me, '*No army in the world can produce the like;*' and he particularly dwelt on the merits of Colquhoun Grant and Waters. I say *exploring* officers, because Grant was also employed to conduct a great portion of the secret intelligence, and it might be supposed he acted personally as a spy. There was a Grant who did so, and a very remarkable man he was in his line; but Colquhoun Grant, though he repeatedly penetrated the enemy's lines, and even passed days in their cantonments, was always in uniform, trusting entirely to his own personal resources, and with reason, for his sagacity, courage, and quickness were truly remarkable,—scarcely to be matched. A curious adventure illustrating at once his qualities and his services has been by me related at length in my History of the war.

"As conductor of the secret intelligence, Grant, besides his own personal exploits, displayed a surprising skill; I have seen letters from Alcaldes and other agents of his, from all parts of Spain, conveying intelligence sure and

useful, and it is worth noting that he told me his best, indeed his only sure spies, were men who acted from patriotism and would not accept money; his talent in discovering them was not the least of his merits. These are indications of the man's character, but my object is to draw H. R. Highness's attention to points little known where Colquhoun Grant's efforts in the public service were eminently advantageous, and the knowledge of which may influence H. R. H. favourably for his son, Cornet Grant.

"When Marmont came down on Beira in 1812 the Duke of Wellington's operations and designs were seriously affected, because from the Spaniards' conduct Ciudad Rodrigo was in great danger of being taken by a coup-de-main; and Almeida also from its weakness was in like danger; and the rapidity necessary to succour those places was very embarrassing. In this difficulty Colquhoun Grant, as shown in my History, daringly entered the enemy's cantonments, and then perseveringly hung upon his flank, watching his every movement, counting his numbers, and, finally ascertaining that his scaling ladders were left in Tamanes, assured the Duke that no coup-de-main was designed, and that Marmont's force was not such as to menace a serious invasion of Portugal; thus time was given for arrangement, and a regular movement was made, which accident alone prevented from being fatal to the French army.

"A more remarkable fact remains to be told, one little known.

"When Napoleon returned from Elba the Duke instantly called Grant from the Military College at Farnham to Belgium to take charge of the intelligence department. Before a week had passed he discovered and engaged a man and his wife, people peculiarly fitted for his purpose, to go to Paris as spies; from thence they transmitted

constant and sure intelligence, having by some means access to the French Bureau de la Guerre. On the 15th June the man sent a note, which I have seen noted thus by the Duke of Wellington in his own hand, '*Received from Grant June 18th, 11 o'clock*,'—that is to say, just as the battle of Waterloo was commencing. This document and its story is remarkable. Had it been received as it ought to have been two days before the battle, no surprise of the allies could have happened; and the great battle would probably have been fought and easily won on the banks of the Sambre. The contents ran in substance and I think nearly in words, besides a great deal of minor information, thus: '*Les routes sont combrées de troupes et de matériel, les officiers de toutes grades parlent haut que la grande bataille sera livrée avant trois jours.*'

"Why was this important notice withheld from the Duke until it was too late? Grant was far in advance of the British outposts to be near his agents; other agents were employed by the Duke in various directions, and to ensure the regular transmission of their reports, General Dombery was placed at Condé (I think) as an intermediate authority. That General mistook his position, and fancied he was to judge of the importance and value of the reports. Hence, on receiving Grant's important letter, he sent it back saying, that so far from convincing him that the Emperor was advancing for battle it assured him of the contrary. Grant instantly conveyed the letter direct to the Duke, but it only reached him on the field of Waterloo! too late to be useful, but furnishing a convincing proof of Grant's great talent; for never was intelligence more complete, more exact, or more important, procured for a general in such grave circumstances.

"At Paris after the battle Grant's services were again very advantageous to the army. The allies, as happens

in all armies, were very diligent in appropriating the spoils of war without much regarding the British rights; the troops were aware of this, and discontented, thinking their interests were neglected by the Duke. But secretly Grant was set on the watch, and he and his agents were everywhere, prying and taking notes of all guns and stores improperly removed from the British stock. I was with him when he in person detected guns being carried away in boats on the Seine. He thus enabled the Duke to obtain restitution in money, I believe, and so saved the army from loss.

"After the European war Grant went to India, and served as a Brigadier-General in the first Burmese war, moving his column by Arracan; there he was stricken by fever, which brought him home, and soon after sent him to his grave.

"July, 1857."

The publication of Marshal Marmont's 'Memoirs' called forth the following notice from Sir W. Napier. It bears no date, but appears to have been written about this time:—

"NAPIER AND MARMONT.

"*To the Editor of the 'Daily News.'*

"SIR,

"At page 178, vol. iv., of Marshal Marmont's 'Memoirs,' my 'History of the Peninsular War' is censured by the Marshal, because I said that his movement to succour Soult in 1811 was a result of orders to co-operate with that Marshal. Marmont declares it was voluntary, and thus avenges the supposed wrong, which however is no wrong at all, seeing that co-operation does not necessarily imply a special operation.

"'Lieutenant-Colonel Napier, in his very poor (*très médiocre*) work, in which error as to facts and want of sincerity dispute with ignorance of the elementary rules of art,' &c.

"This is simply Marshal Marmont's opinion, which need not disturb me, it being clear that it results from my having questioned his talent as a general. To retort would be easy, but I think his 'Memoirs' are really very clever, though not very modest or honest.

"Ignorant of war I may be, but think not, having practised and studied it under very good masters. Some of my knowledge also was acquired by observing Marshal Marmont's own method of warring,—for he was a very expert general, though not a great captain. Aiming always at great things with more vanity than power, he fell short of the sublime and tumbled into the ridiculous. His *quid pro quo*—or, in English, his *tit for tat*—is, however, fair. I wrote that he was not a great general; he says that I am no judge, and no general at all. I never indeed had an opportunity of proving my qualifications, like Marshal Marmont, by losing a great battle—he never gained one as an independent commander—but at Salamanca I aided to beat him. He was at the head of forty thousand gallant soldiers and had the initial movement, yet was beaten in forty minutes. My opinion of his military talent was then formed,—and right or wrong, has been held in common with Napoleon, Soult, and Wellington.

"The charge of error as to facts may be true, though he does not instance any save the insignificant one of saying Napoleon gave him orders. This I have touched on. Of his own inaccuracies I could offer many examples, but will content myself with one, because it could hardly have occurred innocently. He writes that two English divisions

—the Fifth and Light—in retiring from Castrejon four days before the battle of Salamanca, were overwhelmed (accablées) by the fire of his artillery! Commanding a regiment that day in the Light Division, the 43rd, I know and declare that not more than a dozen cannon-shots were fired, and not one man in either division was touched!!

"His imputation of insincerity—meaning wilful falsification—touches character; and were Marshal Marmont still living, one proof of my sincerity should be to tell him how little such an accusation troubled me, coming from a man chiefly known to fame for military mishaps, and faithlessness to his benefactor, his sovereign, and his country."

Sir W. Napier to Lieut.-Colonel Rathborne.

"1858.

"I have read your article; it is a very laborious one, and must have cost you great research and great care. You are I think too hard on Fox's bill.* As to the commercial point I agree with you, but I suppose his design was to make thus a commencement for getting rid of the Company altogether.

"The political part of his bill I like better than your plan of a single minister. He, indeed, gave the council to his own friends, and they would have given strength to the Whigs; but the men were high in rank and fortune and character, and therefore men not likely to permit dirty jobbery or to pass over great injustice in India; and a council immediately under the eye and hand of Parliament. Had he put the power into the hands of a minister to pass with a change of ministry, it would have been useless for governing India, and the patronage would have been entirely employed for home influence.

* India Bill.

"A council of great men of high rank and fair character would have felt that to govern so great an Empire well, with all its wars and policies, was worthy of attention; it would have interested them *per se* more than their petty home politics; they would have felt themselves sovereigns, and the House of Commons would have been their public opinion to keep them in order. Still they would have done wrong; it must be so. A great empire held by arms at a distance never can be governed well or honestly or beneficently, and will always be found a weight and a crime and a corrupter of national morality; wherefore I care not if we lose India."

CHAPTER XXIII.

ILLNESS — CORRESPONDENCE.

DURING these two last years, 1857 and 1858, Sir William had been becoming more and more feeble. He still continued his daily drives, but the exertion necessary to reach the carriage was painful, and the effort to walk up and down stairs between his bed-room and drawing-room was extreme. But he clung to his drives as the only physical pleasure left him, except the occasional cessation of his pains, and even wet and foggy weather could rarely cause him to relinquish them. And so his life went on day after day—too often a night of restlessness and sickness followed by a day of pain—hardly any respite. But with his sufferings, so also did his patience and fortitude seem to increase, and his mind to become more cheerful and serene. His uncommon mental activity and vigour were likewise unabated, and he continued to take the keenest interest in every public event, as well as in what passed around him. The visits of children were a never-failing delight, and it was truly affecting to witness the gentleness and love expressed towards those little creatures in his face and manner.

"It dwells on my mind," writes one of his daughters, "as a prominent trait in his character, the manner in which out riding or driving he would look out for little children on the road; the delight, tender and keen, that he took in watching them and their movements and in see-

ing them happy and amused; and the vexation and anger or terror excited in him if he saw them treated with negligence and want of thought for their comfort, or ill-treated, or in danger. He used to apply all sorts of pet and fanciful names to them; he used to say that character is as much shown in childhood by the walk as by almost any outward sign, and he would watch the way little children put down their feet, saying he could tell the disposition of a little creature by its manner of doing so—if resolute, cheerful, active-minded, sedate, or domineering, &c. These observations with similar ones on animals, his habits of watching picturesque effects of light and shade, of forms in clouds, trees, and all else belonging to an artist-pleasure in nature, and of examining and explaining the country from a military point of view—supposing it to be occupied by armies—made his drives a keen pleasure to him up to within a very few months of his death; and the variety and originality of his conversation at such times made them events to be held in marked remembrance by his companions, even by those to whom they were not a precious recollection of a parent.

"He used almost always to stop the carriage if he saw beggars whom he thought in real distress, and give to them, especially if there were children. Now and then if driving fast or occupied in thought he would pass them, and he afterwards, struck with the idea that they had looked sickly or in real want—not like common trampers—would turn back, and if he failed to meet them again he was unhappy and self-reproachful for hours after."

The same daughter writes: "I remember when we were in Guernsey at the time of the famine in Ireland how acutely he felt the sufferings of the Irish: he showed his feeling in deeds as well as words. One instance of the sensitive tenderness of his heart and of the depth of his

feelings which comes back to my recollection, is, that more than once during that time, having opened the newspaper before he began his breakfast, he would, on reading some of the accounts of the suffering, turn from food unable to touch it, and hurry almost choking with emotion from the room, saying he could not eat while he thought of little children starving.

"Not three months before my father's death he saw in a newspaper an account of a railway porter at the Clapham Common station having, by a brave action, saved the life of a poor woman who had got confused and was crossing the line, in spite of a warning, just as a train was coming. The young man rushed to her and pushed her down just as the train passed, and so saved her. My father sent me to the station to inquire into the truth of the anecdote, which I did of another of the railway servants of whom I had some knowledge. He told me the story was quite true, and that when the train rushed past it was within an inch of the porter's body, he being between it and the woman; that he was a very young man, steady and worthy in every way, and an excellent son. My father was delighted at the account, and sent me again the next day to give him a sovereign from him, and to tell him how glad he was always to hear of a brave action. The young man, whose name I think was Hirams or Hyams, was very young and quiet-looking: he seemed pleased and surprised at the message and the money, and, on my asking him what made him think of doing as he had done, he said very quietly that he did not think at all, only it was dreadful to see a fellow creature cut to pieces, and he seemed quite unconscious of having done anything remarkable. His fellow servant told me that the gentleman who saw the action and wrote the account of it in the paper, collected a small sum for him also.

"Nothing annoyed my father so much with us, when children, as want of civility or courtesy to those below us. He did not like to see us forget to answer, by gesture or word, any of the poor people's salutations as they passed us. He always taught us to be particular in our demeanour towards the aged and infirm, and always made us step aside to let pass any who bore a burden, saying, 'It is for *you* to let them pass; you should not give them the trouble of getting out of your way, they have enough to do without that.'"

Sir William Napier had been a great sufferer during the whole of 1858, but in October he was attacked by so violent a paroxysm of illness that his family became seriously alarmed. For weeks together he lay on the verge of death, and his recovery on this occasion was due under Providence to the unremitting care and great skill of Mr. Tayloe, his medical attendant. When the author of this biography was first summoned, he had been alarmingly ill for forty-eight hours, and the opiates which were administered to still the pain had affected the brain so that he would take no nourishment; and at the very time when Mr. Tayloe thought that some hours' quiet sleep were absolutely indispensable to life, his brain, rendered unusually active by the morphia, would allow him no rest. He had talked incessantly for six hours in a loud strong voice before the present writer arrived, and he continued to talk in the same way for four hours afterwards; and, although a lowering illness was added to his other symptoms, his physical strength was so wonderful that there was no appearance of sinking. He took hardly any nourishment, hardly any sleep, and he spoke incessantly: his brain appeared to be the seat of vitality and to keep him alive. Night after night, sitting by his bedside, has the author listened to him for hours together without a pause. He spoke much

and often of his own shortcomings. With reference to a passionate temper, he said "I think a madman who is well treated in an asylum, and knows that he is so, has a happy lot. We who are not called mad—at one moment we are fierce and proud, raging and thirsting to thrust a sword through and destroy people who have never done us any harm; and the next moment perhaps doing all we can to help and cherish the same people. What sense is there in that? that is not a sane proceeding!"

Again: "As I lie here and think of my past life, I feel very small, very small indeed. I try to remember if I have done any good, but the evil far overbalances it. We shall all be weighed in the balance and found wanting: in the eye of the great good God earthly goodness can have no positive existence, yet He sees and makes allowance for us all—giving more credit for good, and less blame for evil, than our fellow-creatures' harsh judging would have done. Men should strive after those priceless virtues of patience, wisdom, charity, self-sacrifice. In looking back on my life, it would be a comfort to me now if I could remember to have done a perfectly self-sacrificing act—if I could think I had been ready and willing at any moment to lay down my life for another person's good. I try to remember, but I can't remember that I ever did. I have often run into danger and exposed myself to pain, sometimes to save others. Yes! I have done that—but there was always a springing hope, a sort of conviction, that I should escape; and that being so, away flies the merit. The nearest thing I ever did to absolute self-sacrifice was at Cazal Nova, when I received in my back the ball that lies there still." And here he related the incident which will be found at page 55, vol. i. of this biography.

It was necessary, to prevent the faithful and attached attendant who could alone minister to all his wants and

who had done so for years, from being completely worn out, that others should remain with the sufferer at night, so that George Gould (that was the name of this excellent man) should get rest when his service was not absolutely needed; and it was during these night watches in particular that was first revealed to the present writer, in all its intensity, the deep human tenderness with which William Napier's soul was filled. His bearing under an unexampled accumulation of trials would be almost incredible if not seen, and the author will always remember, as one of the most impressive lessons of his life, the fortitude, patience, cheerfulness, and consideration for those around him, with with which his sufferings were borne. On one occasion when momentarily mastered by the excessive irritability and pain of his disease, he betrayed impatience with "George" for some involuntary awkwardness which caused him acute pain, and he bewailed and grieved over this incident for half an hour after, calling himself very hard names, and could not be satisfied until a message had been taken to his attendant to beg his forgiveness. Sometimes he would desire that his family should pray for him, "as it cannot be but that the prayers of so many innocent people should be heard by God!" Generally however his mind was cheerful and serene, and even when almost at the worst he used to expect the morning newspaper eagerly and have it read to him. He often used to send for some of his children or sons-in-law, particularly in the evening, to talk to them. "If it does not tire you," he would say, "I should like to talk to you for half an hour, as it gives me the only relief from my pain." The half-hour would be insensibly prolonged to an hour—to two hours; and the listener could not weary, his discourse was always so original and interesting, and the language so strangely beautiful and unlaboured. The great men of the world was his favourite theme. He

had studied all their characters, knew intimately the circumstances of their career. Once, it was in the afternoon before dinner, he had been talking to the writer for an hour, comparing the features of the ancient Greek and Roman character, and their great men; the listener being called away to dinner, his place was taken by George Gould, and when he returned after the lapse of an hour Sir William was still speaking on the same subject, and had continued to do so, the attendant said, without a break.

Contrary to all expectation he rallied from this attack, but he never again left his bedroom except to be carried down to the carriage for his drives, which he resumed daily when his health and the weather admitted of it; but the whole course of 1859 was only one succession of painful attacks after another, less violent however and dangerous as the weather became warmer. His having lived through the previous winter seemed a miracle, and none of his family could expect that he would survive another.

*Sir W. Napier to Lady Campbell.**

"DEAREST PAMELA, "Feb. 1, 1859.

"I am propped up to write to you the only word that comes unbidden to me. Rejoice, yes, rejoice! Weep for yourself, but rejoice that the light of your eyes has disappeared, that your angel has been spared the lingering agony that mine suffered.

"Pamela, I bent over her one day as she was lying on a couch under the shadow of a tree, and a smile came, I know not why,—it was involuntary, but came over me suddenly, and instantly was returned by one that never belonged to earth. I saw it come down from heaven and

* On the death of Lady Campbell's daughter, a very dear friend of his own child, whom in disposition she greatly resembled.

settle on her beautiful countenance for a moment; it told me not to grieve! But I do grieve, yet not for her now that her suffering is over; and I say to you again, dear friend, rejoice that your angel has escaped from the agony of a lingering dissolution, and has left all tears behind for you and others: weep for yourself, but not for her.

"You say, God help you—He has helped her; do not weep for that.

"Yours always,

"W. N."

The following letter was in reply to an American lady unknown to him, who had written in terms full of warm admiration for Sir Charles after reading his 'Life:'—

To Mrs. Greene.

"March, 1859.

"Being on my death-bed, so far at least as to be certain that I can never rise from it with a sensation of calm health, your letter comes to me at a moment when every feeling is open to affection, and none of a contrary nature ought to be entertained. Far then from requiring an apology, it carries consolation, because it is the natural expression of woman's character such as I have always found it.

"Many persons in his own country and in other countries also, have for years been continually reviling my brother, without ever having pointed out a vile action or sentiment upon his part which could furnish a foundation for their enmity.

"To find, then, a lady of another nation, evidently capable of discriminating, voluntarily offering a tribute of unfeigned esteem, is surely what I have a right to reflect upon with pride, while the gentleness and warmth of the communication were a breath of new life, showing me that

there are persons possessing the same goodness and nobility of mind, with whom his reputation and real goodness of heart will not fail to be handed down hereafter.

"You are right, madam, in thinking that I have a great mass of interesting materials sufficient for several volumes, and the first was nearly finished when the hand of Heaven was laid too heavily on me to hope ever to finish it. It is possible his sons-in-law may do something hereafter, for it is but copying that remains to do. Some consolation is thus supplied, but it is very small; and I should wish to do it myself, thinking I could select best, from my intimate acquaintance with his feelings.

"Much also would I like to have such letters as you have consoled me with this day, but it is now sixteen months since I have been stricken with disease which leaves no hope. I am at this moment compelled to return my thanks by the hand of my daughter—Miss Caroline Napier—and with them hope you will accept those of Lady Napier and all my family. I am told the etiquette in your country is different from that in this, but, as I am nearly seventy-four and have many grandchildren, perhaps you will receive my offering of warm affection, which indeed at any rate I should offer, out of a heart to which sincerity is dearer than forms."

The following letters, dictated by Sir William—for he never again held a pen—refer to General Shaw Kennedy's pamphlets on the defence of England, and to the Italian campaign of this year: —

Miss Caroline Napier to Lieutenant-General Shaw Kennedy.

"Scinde House, April 29, 1859.

"Papa has this morning dictated the enclosed remarks to me, and desires me to send them to you, and to say they will explain what seems to puzzle the 'Times' to-day, viz.

the ease with which France transports troops by sea. Papa is intensely interested in the war, as no doubt you are too. I think he has had rather more ease, or I should say less intensity of suffering, this last week, but I fear there is no lasting improvement, such as would avail against changes of weather or exposure to cold.

[Dictated Message.]

"Years ago I told the Duke of Wellington that I had seen in the French War Office a small book of Napoleon's, which completely explains the rapidity and order with which France sends maritime expeditions of troops. This book in manuscript gave on each leaf a sea vessel, so as to run through the whole range of maritime constructions, commercial or warlike, from a row-boat to a first-rate three-decker. Then a water-coloured drawing, evidently done secretly and not by an artist, of a section of the vessel above, in which section was painted the distribution of troops and stores, all in the most exact and economical manner as to space, together with the alterations and fittings up, to put everything in the most perfect order for embarkations, disembarkations, and voyages long or short. It was the most complete manual possible of maritime expeditions."

To Lieutenant-General Shaw Kennedy.

"Scinde House, May 17, 1859.

"I found your pamphlet exactly what I expected, and always do expect from you on the subject of war, or indeed any subject to which you give your attention. I should like much to discuss it with you, but am so totally broken down, body and mind, that I cannot do so. I will however make a few observations.

"The first and most important of which is, that I fear it

will never be adopted. You will be accused of desiring to turn England entirely into a military nation, and consequently to establish a military despotism. Look in Lord Cornwallis' Memoirs for the violence excited by the Duke of Richmond's proposal to fortify Portsmouth only.

"Again, your estimate of construction will by folly and jobbings and contractors, &c., be raised probably tenfold.

"With regard to the plan of defending London by forts, and Woolwich, it will be good if you have men; but you will not have them unless the action of the Government is most vigorous and well-directed as to the volunteer corps.

"Did I send you to read my proposal for the defence of London? It was in principle the same as yours, though without forts, and fitted rather for a second and interior line to yours, with the addition of an entrenched camp at Richmond for the regular forces, and also a series of camps to enable the troops to move round London, and present at any point a defence on the same principle as that to the south, viz. for volunteers to defend the houses, while the regular troops threatened the flank of the attack from the different entrenched camps, according to the points menaced by the enemy.

"This, however, was designed merely as a temporary defence when it should be thought that a sudden invasion was imminent.

"With regard to the volunteer corps in the country: If they have long-range rifles—and we ought to have a million of them at least in different stores ready for the occasion—they would make the volunteer corps much more formidable now than they could have been in former times; combined with Armstrong's lightest gun they would enable volunteers safely to approach within shot of a column in march, on the flanks and rear, and yet would be too far off for the enemy to detach flanking

parties against them; and cavalry would be a lost arm in this country of hedges and ditches, if detached against them.

"I imagine, indeed, that if the French cavalry went very far, the volunteer cavalry and yeomanry, mounted on far better horses, and armed with a spear and a light rifle, might turn upon them and beat them. Certainly the French cavalry would tire their horses out and soon ruin them; and if they kept with the column of march, what a slaughtering game a few Armstrong guns, attached to the volunteer corps, and magnificently horsed, could play on the enemy's line of march!

"I now come to a point which you seem to have passed over. You should, I think, have central entrenched camps of militia and regulars, from whence to issue forth against an enemy's flank or rear, who should attack any of your fortified points. Bletchingley appears a most favourable situation for one, to aid in all your south-eastern defences which form a circle at equal distances from Bletchingley, and I think we ought to add some purely military railroad to the actual conveyances of this country.

"Your reasoning on Torbay is admirable, and the plan of campaign for the enemy seems to me perfect; but I think that to baffle it in some degree there should be another entrenched camp about Somerton or Taunton, in which to collect all the disposable forces of the west, and so endeavour to cover Bath and Bristol, while it delayed the march of the French.

"I perceive that you don't touch upon any invasion north of the Severn and the Thames; but have you considered the possible chance of a Russian army joining in an invasion?

"I think 20,000 men per mile in line of battle must be an error in your writing. Surely, this is too many? I

should say nearly the double what is necessary in taking up a position.

"I could say a great deal more if I was stronger, but I am not able to go on, and so must end with a reiteration of my sense of the excellence of your plan; and I say, publish it by all means, for there is nothing in it that can do harm. Torbay is the only delicate part, and it is folly to suppose the French ignorant of the facilities it affords for landing; and your plan of campaign is much more likely to do good by opening the minds of the people of England as to what they may have to encounter, than it can do harm by teaching the enemy. Such teaching as that will be an old story to a great military nation like France; will make them neither stronger nor weaker, but it will infinitely strengthen England by making the people think.

"With respect to the Somerton camp baffling the enemy's operations, I do not mean or expect that troops could be gathered there in sufficient numbers to move out and give battle, but merely to defend their camp while the stream of war passed by, and then to issue out, following the enemy, annoying his rear, retarding his march, and picking up his stragglers; in short, to be a *hanger-on.*"

To the same.

"May 23.

"As to the 20,000 men, I viewed them as lines drawn up in battle array, but of course there are positions where 50,000 men might be placed with advantage, and other positions where 1000 men would be sufficient. There are many battles of ours where your proportions were not observed, though upon the whole yours prevailed, and form a good general guide. At Busaco, for example, we had fewer, and in the first of the Torres Vedras lines,

and in Soult's lines on the 10th November. However, entrenchments make a difference of course; strength of ground does so also. Again, Wellington's position to resist Soult's attack when the battle of San Marcial was fought, had much fewer men than your roll would give. So also Soult's positions at the battle of Vera were much more thinly manned. But it is useless to discuss this point; you lay down a good guide, and the nature of the position must regulate the adaptation.

"Yours ever,

"W. NAPIER."

The following was to his son-in-law in answer to his remarks on the prospects of the Italian campaign.

"April, 1859.

"1st.—I fear the Austrians; their troops are more numerous and some say better than the French, and they have laid their head of war on to Piedmont skilfully and strongly.

"If they lose a battle their retreat is sure with plenty of rivers, behind which they can make it in order, until they come to their great block of fortresses on the Adige. They cannot be turned by the right of the Po, because they have occupied strongly Piacenza and the great pass of Stradella, which would give them time to throw their main body over the Po, and fight a battle on advantageous ground.

"2nd.—They have thrown an immense garrison into Venice,—an army in fact; and I hear that Trieste belongs to the German confederation, which will bar Napoleon's stroke on that side; he dare not meddle with it.

"This reduces the chances of war to a great battle on the Piedmontese side of the Ticino, without much chance of its being decisive for the allies, even if they win it.

"However, to make more chances, I think the allies will take a main position on the side of Genoa but without passing the mountains; Genoa will be their base, but their position will be some place about Gavi between Tortona and Alessandria, north of the mountains, if those places are fortified, or indeed whether they are or not, following Joubert's campaign but without its errors. The French-Roman army can then come upon their flank to operate on their right or reinforce them.

"There must, of course, be a defensive corps in the Alps to secure the communication with France.

"The Emperor is a great imitator of 'my Uncle,' and it is likely enough that he has played the game that 'my Uncle' played before Marengo, viz., persuading his enemies that he was unprepared until he could strike.

"A general insurrection of Italy will offer new combinations. I fear the Swiss, as they have I believe 30,000 mercenaries at Naples and Rome; and if they are in danger by an insurrection the Swiss nation may join the Austrians.

"The Austrians have probably, though I know it not, covered Milan on their right flank up towards the lakes with a moveable corps. Having thus as it were hedged themselves on their flanks and rear, they have thrown in mass the main body of their immense force upon the centre of Piedmont, where the great plains extending from the Ticino will enable them to manœuvre all arms with facility and freedom, and overpower any force that is likely to be opposed to them for a fortnight at least.

"The Piedmontese forces should be concentrated in mass at any point from whence they can safely cross the Po, and gain the hills between Alessandria and Novi, without being intercepted by a superior force. From this position they should watch like hawks for any Austrian

division that may commit a mistake within half-a-day's march of them, and fall upon it at the run. If they fail, or even if they strike a good blow, they should detach a strong corps to Turin, and with their main body gain the positions near Alessandria.

"Meanwhile, they should detach a moveable corps, probably Garibaldi's people and the refugees, to cross the upper Ticino and operate towards Milan so as to threaten the Austrian communications; but I would not expect much from this except in the way of raising insurrections, as probably the Austrian covering troops would be too many for them; and I would not detach any sound fighting troops beyond the reach of recall for the great battle that must be finally fought, and to win which will require every soldier they can concentrate.

"Now let us see how the Austrians may operate. If they march in mass on Turin, the detached corps and spare soldiers on that side may, I suppose, particularly if there is a citadel there, keep the Austrians in check for a couple of days, and then fall back to join the French, who by that time would be over the Mont Cenis in sufficient force, with the aid of the mountain fortresses, to sustain the Austrians' attack until the rest of their army arrive.

"Meanwhile, the French who have landed at Genoa would have reinforced the Piedmontese at Novi, and forced the Austrians to employ a great covering army on that side to watch them; otherwise the allies would march on their rear and communications, in which case the Austrians would have to divide their forces and deliver two battles at the same time, at two different points, with insecure lines of retreat from both, inasmuch as the country behind them to the Ticino is an open plain; though probably their superior cavalry and guns would render those retreats safe enough.

"If they did not fight these battles, they would probably plunder Turin of any military stores that may have been left there, raise contributions, fall back without fighting, and, concentrating their whole force on the Ticino, await the battle, which the allies must deliver or remain idle in Piedmont, unless they have some opening to push in one mass along the right bank of the Po, leaving always a strong covering force for Genoa.

"I do not however think that the allies can do this; it would require a very great general, and a completely organized army, to be decisively successful. It would depend on a few hours' time sooner or later on many points, and be most dangerous all through, and must finally end in a great battle about the Mincio, which might probably, considering their organization, be better fought on the Ticino. The great pass of Stradella would alone bar this line of operation.

"I have written this very loosely, being quite unable to go over the map with a compass. It gives a general idea of what I think ought to be the plan of the campaign, but an accidental combat or a mistake of a march might alter everything.

"W. NAPIER."

The receipt of the following letter, as one proof of the practical results of his brother's labours in India, and as a tribute to his memory, was very gratifying to Sir W. Napier.

*Major Bruce * to Sir W. Napier.*

"DEAR SIR, "Lucknow, July, 1859.

"I am solely indebted to the commanders it has been my good fortune from time to time to be placed under for at last succeeding to a position in which I was

* Chief of Police in Oude.

able to imitate a police system founded upon that which has become famous in Scinde.

"It is to the advantage of serving under commanders of renown and able regimental officers, much more than to personal merit, that the majority of officers who rise owe their success.

"When I inform you that I was in humble rank for seven years under Sir Charles Napier in Scinde, and that my regimental commander was Fitzgerald, well known to you by both name and deed, I have no occasion to add more in explanation of my rise to my present post. I have taken the liberty of enclosing, under another cover, the rules and regulations of a police which I trust some day will deserve all the fame due to an offshoot from one of the institutions founded by Sir Charles Napier's genius."

Sir W. Napier to Wm. Sharpe, Esq., Editor of 'Recollections by Samuel Rogers.'

"MY DEAR SIR, "Aug. 6, 1859.

"I write to you with some familiarity, and some trust that you will accede to my wish of having the enclosed letter printed in any new edition of your work.

"I say with trust, because of my intimacy with your deceased brother Sutton; my friendship, I may say, if constant familiarity and several acts of kindness on his part justify the assertion.

"As to Rogers, I was intimate with him for more than fifty years, and always my liking and reverence for him increased, because I had continued proofs that genius and honour were so yoked together in him, that you could not perceive the one without feeling the other.

"That he was friendly towards me was proved, not only by our general intercourse, but by the fact that a

few months before his death when he could not walk, he endured the fatigue of driving to visit me here, a distance of five miles. I dictate this, having been for more than a year and a half lying on a sick bed, in great suffering, and unable to move my limbs.

"I will however ask you whether you have purposely, or by accident, omitted a very remarkable saying of the Duke which Mr. Rogers has often read to me from his MS., namely, that 'George IV. was the finest gentleman in Europe for four hours, and the greatest —— in Christendom for the other twenty.'

"Believe me, dear Sir, to be, with all the feelings of goodwill which my recollections of your brother excite," &c. &c.

Letter enclosed referred to in the above.

To W. Sharpe, Esq.

"Sir, "Aug. 6, 1859.

"In your publication, page 205, I find a remark by the Duke of Wellington on me and my 'History of the Peninsular War,' which, coming from such a quarter, must for general and careless readers deteriorate the value of my work.

"The Duke's criticism is set down by Mr. Rogers as having been made in 1827. It could then have only been by anticipation, arising doubtless from some misplaced warmth of expression on my part when conversing with him on my intended History, which I very often did. The proof is that my first volume was not published until 1828, and in writing my book I always referred to him personally upon disputed points, and always received verbally or in writing the most complete information, which I followed implicitly.

"Moreover, I deny the fact anticipated. Let the in-

stance where I have adopted a newspaper report without other confirmation be cited.

"To be swayed by my own views and feelings is only to be like all my fellow beings, and to that I have nothing to answer.

"Your obedient servant,

"WM. NAPIER, Lieut.-General."

To the same.

"MY DEAR SIR, "Aug. 17, 1859.

"I am only able to dictate, but I must express my gratification at your accepting my assurance of the friendship that I entertained for your brother * and your uncle. The former and I used constantly to dine together at the Athenæum along with a most agreeable French friend of his, Merimée the author, and those pleasant dinners, and the joyous intercourse they promoted, remain strongly in my mind as forming some of the most agreeable portions of my life: he was very kind to me in actions also, having lent me at times his cabriolet, and even sent a very excellent groom that he had to overlook and arrange the embarkation of my horses at Southampton, when I was proceeding as Lieutenant-Governor to Guernsey: in fine, he seemed constantly to court my society in the club in preference to many others, and it was a great pleasure and gratification to me always that he did so. I mention this to show you that I think I don't presume too much that he had a friendship for me, as I undoubtedly had for him.

"As to Mr. Rogers, veneration was mixed with my familiar intercourse, and he used to tell me many curious anecdotes about my own family, with which I was not before acquainted, particularly about Mr. Fox, who was my wife's uncle and my own cousin. Mr. Rogers seemed

* The late Sutton Sharpe, of the Chancery Bar.

to take great pleasure in the society of my daughters, and we possess copies, very finely bound, of his poems and their magnificent illustrations, which he presented to them; and he was not in the habit of making many presents of that kind.

"I think with you that the Duke was criticising what might be the case by anticipation, for I was at that time rather hot in politics, and not seldom the Duke used to amuse himself by exciting me for a laugh, and long before my book came out he knew the substance of it from my repeated conversations with him as to the main points. In fact, up to the Convention of Cintra all that relates to him and his operations, and intercourse with Government, may be almost said to have been written under his dictation. *A propos*, you say in a note that I give the story of the double spy * somewhat a different version from Mr. Rogers's account, from *hearsay*. My hearsay was precisely the same as Mr. Rogers's, namely, from the Duke direct; and the difference is the natural result of a man telling the same story at different times. Mr. Rogers never gave me his MSS. to read, but used to read them out to me when, as very often happened, I used to dine alone with him, and listen with delight to his keen and agreeable humour of conversation, the most agreeable to me of any displayed by the great wits of the time.

"I was unfortunate in having been too ill—indeed I was knocking at death's door, and it seemed not unlikely the knock would be answered—to write to you before your second edition, but I feel pretty certain there will be a third edition; for your book opens a large field for reflection, and is very instructive as well as amusing."

In May of this year took place the death of a man for

* At the battle of Sauroren.

whom Sir William had for many years felt a great affection and interest, Mr. Robert Leslie Ellis, well known in the literary world, though lost to it for years before his death by illness of an unusually painful and distressing nature. He was only forty-one when he died. Colonel Napier first made his acquaintance when living at Bromham, and returning one day from a visit to Bath told his family—"Oh! I've seen such a boy!" He had some acquaintance with Mr. Ellis the father, had met him in the street that day, and the boy, then fourteen, with him. He said—"Such a proud, bright, clever, beautiful boy." He had been talking with the father on some rather abstruse subject, when the boy at a pause made some very profound remark. Colonel Napier was struck, and turned to him, saying, "Hullo, my little man, what do you know about it?" "Well," said the father with quiet pride, "he does know something about it, as you will see if you try." Colonel Napier talked to him for some time, and returned home in astonishment at the boy's information, thought, and originality. From that time he never lost sight of young Ellis, and when the family removed to Freshford they used to meet frequently in Bath; Colonel Napier never returning home after such a meeting without saying, "I've seen *my* boy to-day." A great fondness sprung up between the two, and young Ellis paid several visits to Freshford of a few days' duration. It was Colonel Napier's delight to draw him out on every subject, and sometimes to endeavour to puzzle him, in which he rarely succeeded; and it was very interesting to see the elder man dealing thus, and triumphing in the baffling of his own attempts to puzzle the younger. Mr. Ellis's career at Cambridge justified his friend's high opinion. He was the senior wrangler of his year, but this fact is but a poor test of his remarkable intellect. Indeed, he went to Cambridge

at between nineteen and twenty already a senior wrangler in knowledge; and when he went in for his examination he was suffering from serious illness which had entirely incapacitated him from all preparation. In 1849 he was attacked between Nice and Genoa by so violent a rheumatic fever that his life was in great danger, and was only preserved to survive in helplessness, suffering, and finally in blindness. Yet he undertook the editing of Bacon's works in conjunction with Mr. Spedding and Mr. Heath, his share being the philosophical portion; but he was unable to complete his task. During the latter years of his long illness he mastered the Chinese language, and printed a pamphlet on the Chinese roots.

The following are extracts from two letters written by him, the first shortly after the death of Sir William Napier's daughter, Mrs. MacDougall, in 1856.

[Extract.]

"Dec. 5, 1856.

"'So calm the waters scarcely seem to stray,
And yet they glide like happiness away.'

"'The waters of Babylon are all that we love, and that passes away from us. Let a man consider whence comes his happiness and if it will abide with him alway; if not, it is of the streams of Babylon—let him sit down by it and weep.' (St. Augustine on the Psalms.)

"For my own part, the waters of Babylon have long flowed away from me, but have not left me without the power of feeling for those whom they are even now deserting."

"My dear Sir William,

"Why write what will give you pain? And yet I wish to tell you that my doctor answered an inquiry which

I put to him a few days ago by informing me of what is in effect my death warrant. Fragile as my thread of life has for years been, both he and I were surprised by the symptoms which establish that fact, and I feel it is much harder to bear to know that life is actually ebbing away than that it is merely precarious.

"But from the first I have tried 'to give up my broken sword to Fate, the conqueror, with an humble and a manly heart,' and by GOD'S help will try to do so to the end.

"I am not just now particularly suffering; ten days ago I was terribly.

"I have always thought the better of myself for your good opinion, and in my own way would try to bear what I have to bear bravely, if only to be not altogether unworthy of a man who is of your family.

"R. L. ELLIS."

He died on the 12th May, 1859.

Sir W. Napier to Sir John Philippart.

[Dictated; too ill to write.]

"SIR, "Aug. 1859.

"The pitiful falsification of some writer in the 'Saturday Review' about 'the Napiers' and the militia, which you have justly contradicted, would not have been worth notice if it were not likely to be injurious to the public welfare that such a contemptible endeavour to be smart and pert should be allowed to go forth as 'the Napiers'' real opinion about the militia.

"It is utterly false.

"If I recollect aright, in my History I say that the militia of that day only differed from the regulars in name. And recently I have written, though not published, essays on our defences, some of which have been shown to the military authorities, and which contemplate a good militia

as an essential part of our safety. My two deceased brothers held the same views; and my nephew, Colonel George Napier, who commanded a brigade of militia at the Aldershot Camp, has always spoken of them as a most efficient force. Moreover, I have recently been in close correspondence with General Shaw Kennedy, who did me the honour to consult me on some points of his profoundly able and well-reasoned military memoir, and I have entirely concurred with him as to the necessity of having militia and volunteer corps, the last of which I have long advocated earnestly, and look upon as the surest auxiliary defence that we could have.

"With many thanks for your defence, I, as one of 'the Napiers' thus rudely lumped together by the Saturday Reviewer, remain." &c.

To Lieut.-General Shaw Kennedy.

"Aug. 22, 1859.

"Your supplement has just reached me. It completely tramples down the criticisms upon your work.

"I thank you sincerely for the mention you have made of me, and it is a great pain to me that I have not been able to do what I wished with regard to your Essay, viz., write an article upon it for some periodical. I attempted it so far as to try and compose an article in my head, with a view to dictation, but I could not go on; it brought on a swimming of the brain, and my room turned round like a teetotum. I can get on for a short time when the subject is simple, but to treat your work as it ought to be treated is beyond my power of concentration. However, it seems to go on at a gallop, and has not met yet with the abuse I anticipated, and will I hope go on still faster.

"I always advise people to read it more than once, for

that one or even two readings will not give them a just idea of its depth, and the laborious inquiries and accumulation of facts upon which your conclusions are founded. It opens a vast field for reflection and speculation, and it is a subject I should have liked to dilate upon if I had only a slight degree of strength, but I am very ill and weak indeed.

"I am sorry to see some people are throwing stones at you on account of your plan of march for the French from Torbay, but, for the reasons I have mentioned before, my conviction remains unshaken that you are right, and that it is one of the points of your work which will do most good, by concentrating the wandering minds of ill-instructed people upon a reality which would have entirely escaped them in mere general reasoning."

Miss Caroline Napier to Lieut.-General Shaw Kennedy.

"Dec. 14, 1859.

"My father having seen in the 'Times' of this morning the leading article, bids me write and tell you how rejoiced he is that your idea is evidently guiding the public and Government, and in a measure prevailing, though at nearly treble the expense estimated as requisite by you; but, were it three or four or ten times as much, it ought to prevail, for it is no mere scheme of defence, but the invention of a grand system for a great military nation, on the soundest principles, grander than Vauban's.

"As far as he can see, they are likely to take but part of it, and on the lowest view of it, and will probably not have the comprehension to adopt it throughout in all its parts; but you must not think he ever could be satisfied with its being partially adopted, or other than thoroughly accepted, although glad it should have any weight; for he can look on it in no other light than as one of the grandest

and most comprehensive systems ever thought of for a nation. If they take part of it only, they make, he says, only a temporary system of defence, whereas yours is the creation of a permanent system for a hundred years to come."

*Sir W. Napier to the Earl of Ripon.**

"MY DEAR LORD, "Scinde House, 1859.

"You were good enough to speak to me on military subjects a year or two ago. This leads me to offer you a point for consideration which to me seems very important, though I have not seen or heard of its being taken into the plans of defence which are now being pressed on Government from all quarters. I mean the part which the Isle of Wight may be made to play in favour of invasion. The island is, as you know, highest in the centre, offering a commanding platform for an entrenched camp with advanced batteries, not beyond cannon range, as cannons are now made, from Portsmouth and its harbour. In one night the French could throw 20,000 men with guns and stores on to the island, establish batteries on the coast, and entrench a camp on the higher ground. Thus posted, our guns could not hurt them, because they would be dotted about, but Portsmouth and its shipping would be overwhelmed by fire, and it would require 50,000 men to displace the enemy—say fewer, 40,000, or even 30,000, and the operation would be what the French call a major one, which will draw all our efforts and force to that field, leaving the main French army free play elsewhere. The thing is worth consideration.

"Believe me, yours sincerely,

"W. NAPIER."

* Now Earl de Grey and Ripon.

Notes on same subject.

"The distance from Ryde to Portsmouth would be some five miles—under six. French rifled cannon will throw shells that distance.* But the shelling of Portsmouth is not absolutely necessary to the success of their enterprise. No vessels could pass up or down the narrow channel; no ship could come out, save to fight, from Portsmouth or Southampton, and Lymington could be commanded, as it were, for an ulterior descent on England, being only four miles distant from Yarmouth. Great forces must therefore be gathered both at Portsmouth and Lymington: first to watch; secondly to attack, when time was ripe. Meanwhile the enemy would entrench and form heavy batteries, and the waters would be forbidden waters, unless mixed with blood.

"For provisions they could not fail.

"To enter on details of what the enemy could do is not to be done without careful topographical considerations, but to the great general points we must add the chances from the action of his powerful fleet.

"To obviate the danger, a commanding convenient platform should be intrenched somewhere about Newport and Carisbrooke Castle, to hold 5000 men, regulars and militia, besides the volunteers of the island, which might be 5000 more. These need not be put into camp until war is inevitable, but straight short communication should run from the camp to the practicable landing-places. There are not, I believe, many places for a large disembarkation, but these should be defended by Martello towers, one to each; or earth forts with deep ditches; and not only should heavy guns be planted (one on each would do), but the island volunteers should be taught to serve them, and

* A mistake.

have besides a battery or two of Armstrong's lightest guns to run down from the intrenched camp, and swarm round the fort or Martello tower. Old hulks, covered with iron on one side, would perhaps be as good as forts or towers, if moored at the entrances or approaches to the points favourable for disembarkation.

"The great object would be to compel the enemy to a long pull of boats in landing, which would give free play to the Armstrong field-guns.

"As long as the intrenched camp remained untaken, the enemy could be assailed from Portsmouth or Lymington with facility; but if the French once established themselves, our task would take time and greater preparation, to the danger of other parts of our coast: both Lymington and Portsmouth must then be defended strongly—one to save the arsenal, the other to prevent the landing; but if the island is well prepared for defence, the enemy would probably not attack it; and instead of being a way to open a door into England, it would be a large cavalier or outwork covering and protecting Portsmouth.

"W. NAPIER, General."

Sir W. Napier to the Editor of the 'Times.'

"SIR, "Nov. 1, 1859.

"As an inhabitant of Surrey I naturally look with great interest to the progress of the County Rifle Corps, from whose courage and military skill I expect protection in case of invasion. It was therefore with some disposition to laugh, but greater disposition to cry, that I read the following speech delivered by a Mr. Wise at Dorking, in which, deviating from a consideration of farming—it being an agricultural meeting—he launched forth the following passage:—

"'That he could venture to say that, at all events, not

a man of the Surrey Rifle Volunteers would hide behind a bush or a tree.'

"Savouring too much of Mr. Anthony Weller's notion of his son's letter—that is to say, 'werging' rather too much, not on poetry but the melodramatic patriotism of Sadler's Wells,—this claptrap may do mischief.

"Mr. Wise is, no doubt, able to sustain his name in all things relating to agriculture; but he woefully belied it by treating of warlike matters, upon which he is so profoundly misinformed that he must be conscious of his inability to discuss any military point, and should therefore not have spoken at all. Mr. Henry Drummond with his keen pointed good sense instantly pinned this 'flying folly of the wise;' but still it was received with loud cheers from the meeting, and may mislead many people. The following remarks are designed to counteract its mischievous tendency.

"Instead of asserting that Surrey riflemen would never hide behind a bush or a tree, he should have expressed his earnest hope that they would do so, and the teaching them 'how to do it' is of vital importance. This truth may be illustrated by the following anecdote:—

"At the battle of Fuentes Onoro the 71st Regiment was strongly engaged, and lost a great many men. It was relieved by the 43rd after the battle, and its Colonel, Cadogan, observing a 43rd soldier looking intently upon the body of a 71st man who had fallen in a gap of the wall, said to him 'That was a brave man.' 'Yes' was the reply, 'and I was just thinking he was too brave; he pushed into that gap and got killed, instead of keeping behind the wall and killing his enemy.'

"Sir, the art of hiding behind trees and bushes, rocks, sticks, and stones, is the very essence of modern warfare. The teaching regular soldiers how to move in masses is an

absolutely necessary foundation to support the superstructure of real warfare, which is, in fact, this very hiding behind sticks and stones. A great deal is said about bayonet charges and solid onsets of heavy columns, but much less of that takes place than is supposed by men who only read of war; three-fourths of every battle between regular armies depend upon the stick and stone practice, and the whole of a battle, as between volunteer rifle corps and regular troops will depend upon the former's skill in hiding. This is called light infantry work—a very applicable name in the days when heavy armour was worn by the main battle of pikemen, and lightly armed troops were employed for the more fatiguing work of covering the marches of the heavy body; but now that all soldiers are armed alike they should all be taught alike, and skirmishing well is, I say again, three-fourths of a battle.

"But, apart from Mr. Wise's military notions, I find that the making men good shots is placed above the art of manœuvring irregular corps. It should be just the reverse. To be a good shot is a very good thing, but is of less importance than the art—using a slang expression—of 'bringing the shooters to the scratch.' This is much the most difficult also; for Englishmen are almost sure to have a natural disposition to fire well, and with very little teaching, having their rifles constantly in hand, will become good marksmen. Still, the more teaching the better, provided the higher branch of their business be not neglected.

"An invading enemy's column must generally march along the main roads; it will therefore be well for volunteer officers, either singly or with their companies, to examine all the roads leading through their county upon London or any other great town, and thus ascertain all the points of advantage offered for hiding behind sticks and stones —Mr. Wise's dictum notwithstanding; and to trees and

bushes should be added railroads, banks, houses public or private, bridges, &c., from whence their rifle-balls will pitch into the enemy's columns. All ranges are good, but the longest range is best here, because it will give time for the riflemen to retire from the enemy's sharpshooters, and to find a new stick or stone for hiding. And be it remarked that in examining the county our volunteers should look well to the line of their retreat, choosing that which will be the most difficult country for the enemy's riflemen to follow, or that which will lead the enemy towards the rear of his line of march, and that also which will enable the volunteer most readily to join other volunteer corps acting in the same way. Thus they will inevitably enforce delay on the enemy, who cannot advance until he recalls his skirmishers, or they will be left behind to be overwhelmed by the accumulating numbers of our riflemen. Accumulation in this case will be most efficacious, but the forming large bodies of riflemen to move about in masses under the command of one man cannot be too strongly deprecated; it will be entirely opposed to the vital principle of rifle warfare, and will only make bad regulars instead of good irregulars. It is not meant, however, that there should not be commanding officers of large bodies, for that will be essential to concert and combination; but in the actual fighting and minor movements small bodies only should be employed; the seeking or declining a fight should be left entirely to the inferior commanders with small bodies, whose intelligence would thus be very soon awakened to what was right, and those endowed with a natural talent for war would very soon be distinguished and looked to both by their friends and enemies.

"I feel sure that with this system England may be successfully defended against any numbers, but I do not think London can be defended so easily; it is too near

the coast, and there must be for its defence combinations between the regular army outside and the metropolitan volunteers inside, who must be taught how to occupy lines of houses, and docks, and canals, and bridges; and the best of those lines should now be examined and marked out upon maps for the instruction of the City volunteers, if any should be enrolled. For my part, I think all able to bear arms should be enrolled in time. I hope it will be so, for assuredly a very dangerous crisis is impending.

"I am, Sir, yours obediently,

"W. NAPIER, Lieutenant-General."

To the Editor of the 'Times.'

"SIR, "Nov. 9, 1859.

"Allow me to amend my first letter on a point of importance.

"In 1805 the volunteers were formed in regiments of 1000 strong, and even in larger masses, clothed in red, and armed, accoutred, and drilled like regular troops. Of use they were, displaying the moral power excited by the danger of invasion; but as soldiers mere mimics, without solidity to support the regular army, and offering points of weakness to the enemy, because having neither artillery nor cavalry of their own they required the aid of those arms of war from the regulars; for it is by fine combinations of infantry, cavalry, and artillery that battles are won. Soon all would have had to trust to their legs; for be it known to Mr. Wise that absolute running away at the right time is also an essential part of warfare, to be learnt with care, though a battle is not the best school for the first lesson.

"The regular artillery would then have feared to close on the French masses, trusting only to the support and protection of unwieldy, untaught, ill-commanded mobs of volunteers.

"Now, acting as riflemen, the volunteers will be independent of the regular army, yet support it; and having free play for their own natural intelligence, it will in each be developed according to mother wit—though it is not every mother that gives her son military wit, as proved by Mr. Wise. They would also more easily escape from the evil of incapable commanders, and yet give full play to their own usefulness.

"Thus it would be:—

"A rifle infantry man takes post under cover half a mile from a French column of march, and he plumps into it every shot, or knocks over the men and horses of the artillery and cavalry, if at all exposed to his fire. At the same time one or two of Sir William Armstrong's lightest guns, which are said to be of sure stroke at two miles' distance, and may be drawn by two horses, can take post a mile or more behind the riflemen, pounding the enemy's column and protecting our own skirmishers from cavalry, which however could make but little impression, giving as they would do half a mile start to the volunteers in *running away*, if such running should be expedient.

"It may be said that the French have rifles and long-ranging guns also. True; and it would be a fair fight between the riflemen on each side; but the heavily loaded Frenchmen would soon tire, and the main column must halt to rally them again. Thus the long-ranging arms, pushing the volunteers into their natural career, have quadrupled their power; and all former points of weakness being swept away, they will be a real support to the regular troops, instead of a drain and a burden.

"The delay thus enforced on the enemy must be made also under the destructive fire of the Armstrong gun, which would hit always, and never be hit by a counter gun of the same range, for the columns of the enemy could not hide, they must be perforce of Mr. Wise's school; whereas the

Armstrong gun could and would hide, and, having fired, remove to another place to fire again, so that the enemy's shot, directed only by the smoke, would strike an empty nest.

"Each gun, whether manned by volunteers or militia artillerymen—and there are many good ones,—should be attended by small corps of volunteer cavalry always moving with it, ready to support the skirmishers and protect the gun from accidental roving detachments of the enemy's horsemen. We also should have roving horsemen —ay, and fighting horsemen, numerous and bold. They would soon teach the French cavaliers how much a good horse has to do in warfare; horses never blunder if their riders be earnest and strong-willed.

"The last 'Gazette' having given me a step of rank, my signature will be in future

"W. NAPIER, General."

These letters were the occasion of numbers of letters from all quarters being addressed to Sir William, which required to be answered—and the following are selected as specimens:—

Miss Napier to H. Drummond, Esq.

"DEAR SIR, "Nov. 7, 1859.

"My father Sir William Napier, being even more than usually suffering to-day, begs me to write for him, as he does not feel able even to dictate. He thanks you for your letter; but as to dress, he would suggest, that while it is such as is fit for service he would encourage all the smartness that can be combined with that fitness; the volunteers must be attracted to join entirely by moral means, and if their dress be ugly and unattractive in the eyes of lasses, it will not be attractive for the men. In this view it is a

moral influence not to be disregarded. The time will come when nothing will be cared for but the utility of the dress —that will be when actual service itself comes."

Sir W. Napier to J. B. Winder, Esq.

[Dictated.]

"SIR, "Nov. 16, 1859.

"I have been confined to my bed by constant illness and severe sufferings for nearly two years, and am only able to write by dictation. In this state, I find it very difficult to notice the very large amount of correspondence brought upon me by my public letters on volunteer corps; nevertheless, I make an effort to reply to your letter, for its good sense gives it importance.

"I think the authorities are in error, and that the very reverse of their system should be adopted. I go so far as to think that volunteers should be allowed even to change their corps if they thought another was better taught.

"The teaching you mention is derived from a pamphlet of my brother. He substituted those movements for *eighteen* which the regulars are taught. He proposed them also when the rifle was by no means perfected, if indeed it is so now; the short-range arms the nwould have compelled volunteers to close very near the enemy to be of use, and of course compelled them to adopt some of the regular drill. The long-range arm renders this unnecessary, and demands individual intelligence, not formal movements. It is for that reason that I object to the gathering of large masses of volunteers; the men cannot be sufficiently instructed to act like regulars, and not one commanding officer would be able to handle them if the men were instructed. I do not mean to say that they should never be accumulated in masses in real warfare; on

the contrary, if they can by their desultory warfare entice the enemy in small bodies to attempt to drive them away, then they ought suddenly to accumulate and overwhelm the pursuers. But to come to that point, irregular movements of all kinds, springing from the individual intelligence of the volunteers, should be adopted, and form the main object of their previous instruction, and that instruction should be practical, after the manner I have pointed out in my public letters.

"You, Sir, have fallen into the error widely inculcated by the newspapers, that the Zouaves are irregular and not well taught. It is just the contrary; they are formidable because they are better instructed, *far better instructed* than the other troops. They are instructed with reference to their business, and not in direct opposition to it, as your authorities seem desirous to impose upon you. I am however sorry that you have quitted your corps, for even a bad system is better now than none. It will improve by degrees, and it *is* organization, without which we are lost; for the danger is very imminent and our enemies are very powerful."

Miss C. Napier to Colonel Le Couteur, Jersey.

"Nov, 16, 1859.

"The long-continued suffering and illness my father has undergone render him incapable of writing except by dictation, and even that, with the mass of correspondence his two letters on volunteers have entailed on him, is too great an exertion. He has therefore desired me to reply to your letter for him, and to tell you that he well remembers seeing the lads of the 5th regiment of Jersey militia at their elementary drill on your lawn, and saying that a nation so trained would become the most powerful in the world for defence.

"He says he can quite believe that the Court* are by their interference injuring the militia, and if they differ from you as to the system of training, he feels sure they are wrong, as it is a subject you are well acquainted with.

"When he was Lieutenant-governor of Guernsey he thought the Jersey militia very good, though capable of becoming better, not by alteration, but improvement. His instructions for volunteer corps would not, he thinks, apply to Guernsey and Jersey, where the small space requires regular forces, of which the militia would form a very good portion.

"My father's opinion is, that not only lads of the age you speak of, but all in the nation capable of bearing arms, should be trained."

From William Kershaw to Sir W. Napier.

"HONOURED SIR, "Dec. 12, 1859.

"I take up my pen to let you know that I, William Kershaw, pensioner, late of the 43rd Foot, who served with you through the Peninsular war, am still alive and tolerably well. I was much pleased to see in the 'Times' of Nov. 1, 1859, that there was one, viz. your honourable self, that knew the practical part of the light infantry, notwithstanding the Surrey gentleman's speech, in which he declared that 'he could venture to say, at all events, not a man of the Surrey Rifle Volunteers would hide behind a bush or a tree.' Now, if the gentleman had been with you and I at the battle of the Coa or Almeida, he would have known the benefit of hiding behind bushes, &c., and I shall never forget that you, Sir William, pulled off your sash to bind up the wound of a fallen man. After we had crossed the bridge Colonel Hull was killed and we were

* Royal Court of Jersey.

ordered to get behind the walls and keep a constant fire upon the bridge. I was at the back of a wall, when one of the 95th was with me, and the 95th man's gun was but of short range, and I fired and wounded a French officer who was coming to charge the bridge. The 95th man said he would go a little nearer, through a gap; so he went and was killed. We retreated to Busaco, fought the French and conquered, and from thence we went to Torres Vedras, where we formed our defence-line of sticks and stones, and Missena durst not fight us."

The following admirable instructions for the training of volunteers were dictated by Sir W. Napier about six weeks before his death for the guidance of his son-in-law Mr. Bruce, who was engaged in the formation of a volunteer corps:—

"Dec. 1859.

"My own practice was very simple and effective in war; it embraced of course the regular light infantry drill, but that you must learn from the regulations; to teach it is far beyond my strength.

"Suppose 100, or 60 men, to form a company; let them be *two deep*, it is the only good formation. They must know how to advance, to open out their ranks, and to skirmish; that is, they must be taught all that on open parade ground, which is however mere stage effect.

"They must always have, or ought to have, a reserve.

"All the modes of wheeling to change front in line at open order are fudge, save as any and all movements requiring intelligence are useful to awaken that intelligence.

"I told my men off by numbers 1, 2, 3, &c., and practised them to suddenly run back or to advance, in the most confused mobbish manner; to rally readily, or to seize an advanced position. The first man who arrived at a rallying

place served as a point on which the others formed, without confusion, because taught to know their relative places from the first man. For this object I made them always take the same post in line on parade, *i. e.* No. 6 was always No. 6, and so forth: if for example No. 6 arrived first, No. 10 or 12, or any number who came next, could form at his proper distance from the first, leaving space for the others to fall in without confusion as they came up. My command would be—Soldiers, do you see the enemy's skirmishers advancing to that hedge, bank, ditch, rocks, or whatever the cover might be? Yes! Well, forward at speed and line that hedge, &c. In an instant the race fired them; they used to dash furiously forward, even on parade, and in battle generally gained the ground first.

"With this practice your men will soon acquire an eye for good cover, and, joined to the other plan for rallying, will be perfect skirmishers, provided they are first awakened by other more mechanical drillings to understand their business as soldiers, and very little will do that.

"Suppose you are beaten, and the enemy begin to outflank you, your reserves must move out rapidly to extend and meet the flankers; but suppose you have no reserve, you are outflanked, you retreat. A formal retreat by alternate ranks such as an adjutant teaches will expose you to great loss and confusion; and if the enemy knows his trade, he will run in on you as hounds do when close to a fox; and this you also when master should do to him in reversal of the Christian doctrine; that is, you must do to him what you would not like him to do to you.

"If your flanks are too far off for the voice, send officers and wave your sword, pointing to your cover behind, and blowing your bugles, and pointing to the bank, hedge, or rocks you design for a stand. Off they go in mobs, reserve and all, at a pace that the French can't follow (at least

they couldn't in Spain) so quick as not to allow you time to rally according to my plan, upon No. 1, 5, 15, or any number who gets first. The pursuers would look ahead and keep their formation for fear of cavalry and reserves.

"Hidden cavalry may be suddenly launched against you in small bodies, then it is that small squares of *fours* or *sixes*, &c. &c., can be brought into play; and a steady rifleman with a sword-bayonet or simple bayonet will beat one if not two cavalry men. I speak of things I have seen, without imagination; horses will not hurt a man if he avoid them.

"Your mountains offer the finest practising ground. Put a company high up, and send another from below to creep up, to get behind rocks, to endeavour to outflank, to engage sharply with the skirmishers in front—while the reserve or a few unobserved skirmishers get above its enemy, and then the front skirmishers must slide off rapidly towards those who have so got up.

"All this is for attack; for defence there are many dodges to be added; rolling down stones, &c.; in fine, the exercise of common sense and observation.

"As to the higher parts of warfare, my two letters must suffice as indications to be worked out according to the nature of the country and personal intelligence of the leaders; but if the volunteers are to be massed under lord-lieutenants, &c., they will commit errors, get confused, and be beaten with terrible loss.

"Look at the great roads along which columns and guns must move, and you will find plenty of points near railroads, enclosures, buildings, &c., or even having only stiff clayey ground in front, where 100 men and an Armstrong gun well managed would plague an enemy wondrously.

"As for your corps, invent any and everything that

seems good for awakening intelligence beyond routine. Having two parties, the one to defend, the other to attack your mountains, is better than one side only, and the greater number of corps you can get to join you in such practice the better. One thousand men will teach their officers and themselves better than one hundred; but one hundred will go a great way.

"As to facings, *right about face* is enough; two deep is the proper formation in line, but twenty if you like in skirmishing. Teach how to march in open column, and how at quarter-distance to form a square; teach sectional formations, these are indispensable; but you may teach more if you like, and ought to teach more if you can; all teaching at the right time brings out the men's intelligence, but the really useful should be taught first.

"If you are on the defensive on a height, use as few skirmishers as you can, and make your supports strong if you can give them cover from the enemy's skirmishers; this will enable you to fall with fresh men on the enemy's tired skirmishers when they approach the summit of the height you are defending.

"As to the English regular manœuvres, Major Hopkins' military figures will teach you, practically as it were, in a very short time, the whole system and a great deal more than is necessary. If you would like to communicate with him I am sure he would give you advice, and he is a master of the subject. Send a copy of these notes to him with a large margin, he will add his notes. Lord Clyde succeeded Hopkins in command; and he told me he had formed his own system previously, but found Hopkins' system so perfect, that he adopted it in preference to his own.

"Finally, the great principle of war is the same whether applied to 100,000 men or to 100 volunteers—namely, to

push your strongest mass upon the weakest part of your enemy; and it must be applied to skirmishers in this manner.

"If you spread skirmishers out and merely skirmish to your front according to parade teaching, you do away with half their personal intelligence and half their rapidity, and parade rules are not always applicable to fighting ground. My notion therefore was not to break down all formality of movement and formation, for they are good beginning, and awaken the men's minds to their business; my object is to go beyond them, and whether advancing or retreating, to gain my point by the rush of a mob; the men being, from my previous teaching, able to re-form rapidly in regular order and overwhelm the scattered enemy.

"You see, therefore, that what you have to do is to watch and entice the enemy to spread out, having for yourself the power of suddenly concentrating in the most rapid manner; that is, you gain the speed of irregularity and yet divest it of confusion.

"Slow marching is an abomination; quick marching, or double quick, is the right; but not much of the latter; or at any rate not when the men have their packs on, or you will hurt their health."

The foregoing was the last paper he ever dictated. Lady Napier's health had been such as to occasion much anxiety to her family during the greater part of the year 1859. A dropsical tendency which had manifested itself sixteen years earlier, but which had been counteracted by the watchful care of her husband and children, had reappeared, and the symptoms were alarming though not immediately so. It was not thought either prudent or necessary to disturb Sir William's mind with the tidings, and when Lady Napier's daily visits to him were necessarily discon-

tinued, he imagined some ordinary ailment to be the cause. But a few days after the date of the last letter, Lady Napier was seized with sudden insensibility, and continued in that state so long that her medical attendant thought it very doubtful if she would ever recover from it; it became therefore imperative to inform Sir William of her real condition. That announcement was accepted by him as his own summons; from that moment it appeared as if he gave up all thought or desire of life. He who had shown wonderful fortitude under his own sufferings, and even to the very last, when not in the worst paroxysms, manifested such a springing elasticity and cheerfulness of mind, now at last gave up the struggle. He refused all nourishment as loathsome to him, turned his face to the wall like the Israelitish king, and almost literally grieved his life away. For days after his wife's danger became known to him he would see no one; and when his son-in-law on first arriving went to him by the doctor's wish, in the hope that he might be roused to talk, he found him with tears rolling slowly down his cheeks, thinking, as he said, over forty-eight years of married happiness which was coming to its end. After all his long pains, it was not his disease but sorrow which overcame his extraordinary strength and vitality; and had it not been for the departure of hope and the desire to live, it is probable that he would have lingered on for some time longer. It is a remarkable circumstance which now as he writes occurs to the author's memory, that during Sir William's long and terrible illness of the previous winter, when his condition appeared quite hopeless to all, he said, "My life for some years back has not been a very enviable one; still, bad as it was, and worse as it must be if I survive this attack, I feel as if I should like to live for a few months longer. I should feel that a few months more of life, seeing my friends—hearing

what is going on in the world—and finding much enjoyment, as I have always done, in spite of my pain—would be a great boon—*a great boon.*" And so strong was his hearer's belief in the efficacy of the sick man's strength of will, that he communicated to the rest of the family his conviction, based on Sir William's words, that he would recover from that attack.

Contrary to expectation Lady Napier became better, but as she lay in one room and her husband in another it was doubtful which would first break by death the strong chain of forty-eight years' riveting which bound them together.

After lying in the state above described all January, on Friday the 10th of February Sir William's great strength began to yield. During the last two weeks, to the inexpressible comfort of his children, all acute pain appeared to have departed. On Sunday morning, the 12th, death was evidently very near. His wife was wheeled into his room on a sofa and placed beside his bed, where she remained about an hour. He did not speak, but she said he certainly knew her; and thus they took their silent farewell of a companionship which had so greatly blessed their earthly pilgrimage. His face had worn all day that indescribable expression of peace and ineffable rest, which often marks the countenances of those in their latest moments who have gone through very prolonged sufferings; and at about four o'clock in the afternoon he breathed his life away so gently that it was impossible to say when the breathing ceased. His children, grandchildren, sons and daughter-in-law, were with him at the last; and his son held a mirror to the placid lips for many moments, before he could feel assured that he had really lost a father.

The funeral, which took place at Norwood, was strictly private, but all the surviving veterans of the old Light Division who were within reach, voluntarily attended at the cemetery to pay the last mark of respect to their comrade. Among those who thus attended were Sir Charles Yorke, Sir Harry Smith, Sir Thomas Brotherton, Sir John Wilson, Sir Charles Gore, Sir Duncan Macdougall, and Colonel John Cooke; and Sir Robert Gardiner being prevented by illness, his son Lieut.-Colonel Lynedoch Gardiner came as his representative. The scene was affecting and impressive, and no doubt fancy and memory were busy with the brains of those veteran mourners. Doubtless, in seeing the coffin lowered into the grave, they became again in memory the young and ardent soldiers who had gone up gaily, with their lives in their hands in company with the dead man, against the chosen battalions of France. In fancy they might again behold that form, now cribbed in such narrow compass, in all the flush and pride of its youth and strength and beauty and daring, bounding with its uncommon activity up the steep rocks of La Rhune, or riding calmly, as at Salamanca, for three miles in front of the unwavering line of the 43rd under a heavy cannonade.

One of them could picture to himself the battle-field of Cazal Nova, where he first saw his departed friend stretched under a tree, as he supposed in the agonies of death, with a bullet in his spine, that fatal bullet which was the cause of his suffering after life. Another might again see him, as he has described, with his glass in his eye, going down among the enemy at Busaco *en sabreur* as gaily as to a dance, and only anxious about his brothers. And then the words of the solemn service would recall them to reality, and the mournful cry "Vanity of vanities, all is vanity" would echo through the darkened chambers

of their hearts. Vanity? Yes! of all pertaining to the flesh: but blessed be God, this life is not all—not even much; and there are things which nor time nor death can tarnish or destroy. The upright spirit; the lofty aims; the noble denial of self; the protection of the oppressed; the largeness of heart towards the humblest and weakest of God's creatures; the constant, sincere, and disinterested labours for the happiness and improvement of his fellow-men; the conquest over himself; the patient endurance of his long agonies and the humble faith in which they terminated —these will bear fruit for ever. For such men death is a rest from their labours, and "their works do follow them."

Among the family mourners was one whose features bore unmistakeably the Napier mark. It was Mr. Richard Napier, now left the sole survivor of the brotherhood, between whose members had existed an affection of which earth furnishes few examples. The tie between Richard and William Napier had withstood the tug and strain of seventy years, and as the survivor left his last brother in the grave, his feelings were as warm and fresh as when the two boys played together at Celbridge.

Richard Napier, like his brothers, had earnest aspirations after fame, and was endowed with an intellect and talents which justified his ambition. His youth was spent in Ireland, and like the rest of his family his tastes were military. Disappointed in his early wish to enter the army, he went to Oxford, where he took a first class, and was afterwards elected a Fellow of "All Souls." He ultimately embraced the legal profession, but circumstances over which he had no control delayed his call to the Bar until he was thirty years of age. This profession he was forced early to abandon, and thus, with probably equal power to win distinction, he was unlike his brothers confined to a strictly private life. His inclination pointed to

politics and literature, in both of which he was by his knowledge and talents eminently fitted to shine; but threatened blindness compelled him to renounce those pursuits also, and forced him to comparative idleness at the very age when he should have reaped the fruits of earnest thought and study.

This is all that may be here said of one still living, whose life has not been productive of scenes in which the public may claim to be spectators. It only remains to add, that he bore the disappointment of early hopes and ambitions—a disappointment whose keenness none but himself could rightly estimate—with the lofty philosophy of a truth-seeker who, loving knowledge for its own sake, finds more happiness in the pursuit than in its more tangible rewards; and those who knew him best have doubted whether to mourn that he was denied the joys of fame, or to rejoice that his varied powers and intense affections were left undisturbed to endear and embellish the relations of private life.

Besides those who have been named as present at Norwood, was one humble and not the least sincere mourner, Shadrach Byfield, an old soldier of the 41st regiment whose acquaintance Sir William first made at Bath in 1838, for whom he had interested himself to procure an increase of pension, and who, among others, had been a pensioner of his own since that time. The old man had come up from near Bath when he heard of the death of his benefactor, for the purpose of following him to the grave.

Yet a few short weeks, and that grave must again open to receive all that was mortal of the loving and faithful woman who had been for William Napier his comforter in pain and sorrow, the helper of his literary labours, and the good genius and blessing of his life. Lady Napier died

on the 25th March. In six weeks from the time of her husband's death they were again united by the removal of the veil of flesh which had sundered them for a while.

Her intellectual power, and her labours in aid of her husband's literary task, have been already remarked upon; but it was in her family and household that her rare womanly virtues were peculiarly displayed, dispensing around her an atmosphere of love and peace. The beautiful image of family unity became in the household over which she ruled a living reality. Petty envies and jealousies never disturbed its serenity. A large and God-like charity, not warping the judgment, but "covering a multitude of sins," was the virtue inculcated by the mother, and a lesson faithfully learnt by her children. The servants, too, felt truly that they were members of the family; they were always so treated, and felt their interests were the same. During the last few years, owing to continual illness and the constant succession of family visitors, the work of the servants was very severe, but they saw it was still harder for their young ladies, and never was a murmur or unwilling look encountered in that household. At the sad final break up of the establishment three of the servants had been in the family for 19 years and one for 16 years.

This was the sort of democracy which William Napier upheld all his life, and practically illustrated in his dealings with those below him. The poor of the neighbourhood, wherever they lived, had their wants relieved and were always treated with respect and courtesy by him and his so long as they were just and kind in their own walk, but were encountered as enemies if guilty of oppression.

Sir William's love and admiration of soldiers was a feeling which he shared with both his brothers, Charles and George. There was no sham sentiment about these

men, and what they said they felt with all their hearts and souls.

The three brothers resembled each other in most points of their nature; but George's pursuits did not expose him to the same antagonism as the other two experienced: equally beloved by his friends, he made no enemies.

The similarity of the characters of Charles and William was very striking. To say they had faults is only to admit that they were human; but their faults were those of noble and generous natures; and their most ardent opponents, enemies now no longer, could never accuse them of anything mean, little, or selfish.

A notice of Sir William Napier which appeared in the 'Daily News'* concluded with the following paragraph:— "We have many gallant men left, as we always have had, and always shall have; but there never have been any, and there never can be any, like the Napiers. They were a group raised from among the mediæval dead and set in the midst of us, clothed in a temperament which admitted all the ameliorating influences of our period of civilization. They were a great and never-to-be-forgotten sight to our generation; and our posterity will see them in the mirror of tradition for ages to come. We are wont to say that tradition is old, and has left off work; but it is not often now that tradition has such a theme as the Napiers. It will not be willingly let die till tradition itself is dead."

The life of Sir William Napier divides itself into three strongly and distinctly marked periods. As the Light Division accounts for one period, and his 'History' for a second, so the defence of his brother's fame was the absorbing business of the third. But, running through all, was a spirit of warm and active benevolence towards

* Attributed to Miss Harriet Martineau.

his fellow creatures, and a passionate love and admiration for true greatness. It was the former sentiment which induced him to throw himself with such ardour into politics, without any aim or prospect of personal advantage. It was the latter which plunged him into such a passion of grief when he received the tidings of the death of Napoleon, that great ideal whom he had never seen.

His love of art was extreme; and he was a close and correct observer of nature. He was one of Turner's greatest admirers, and with reference to this the following anecdote is communicated by one of his daughters:—

"When Admiral Sir Edward Codrington came to Guernsey officially, he and papa and his son and daughter and myself went over to Serk. Coming back in an open boat at about 8 p.m., there was a beautiful golden sunset on a calm summer sea, just crisped with the ripple of an evening breeze. Sir Edward was criticising Turner as extravagant and unnatural; and my father said that he was thought so because few had observed nature so closely under so many aspects and tried to paint some of the rarer ones—yet not so rare either were observation keener. Sir Edward said 'Well, General, but now those *reds*, those blazing reds,—you must allow those are overdone.' My father looked round and, pointing with his hand to the sea towards the east, said 'Look there!' As every little ripple rose it was a triangle of burning crimson sheen from the red sunset light upon it, of a brilliancy not even Turner himself could equal in his most highly-coloured picture. The whole broad sea was a blaze of these burning crimson triangles, all playing into each other, and just parting and showing their forms again as the miniature billows rose and fell. 'Well, well!' said Sir Edward, 'I suppose I must give up the reds, but what will you say to his yellows? surely they are beyond

everything!' 'Look there!' said my father, pointing to the sea on the western side of our boat, between us and the setting sun,—every triangular wave there, as the ripples rose, was in a yellow flame, as bright as the other was in red, and glittering like millions of topaz lights. Sir Edward Codrington laughed kindly and admiringly, and said, 'Well! I must give in—I've no more to say; you and Turner have observed nature more closely than I have.'"

If he had devoted himself to painting he would have excelled; and his statuette of Alcibiades, in virtue of which he was made an honorary member of the Royal Academy, called forth the warm encomium of Chantrey; and may bear favourable comparison with the work of many distinguished sculptors. His friend Mr. Jones, late President of the Royal Academy, says of him, "William Napier's talent in drawing was very considerable, and if he had studied for the profession of painting I believe he would have been very successful; he had perseverance, assiduity, and elevated thought. His disposition led him to admire the grand and to approach the terrible in the subjects he endeavoured to depict. His admiration of the Elgin Marbles was extreme; and he made a beautiful drawing of the horse's head, and portions of the Panathenaic procession, also of the Theseus. I think he would have continued his studies in art, and would have done so vigorously, if he had not commenced his 'History of the Peninsular War;' yet, when the study and occupation of that great work tired his mind, he sought refuge and refreshment in painting." The same friend writes, "At the commencement of my dear wife's illness William Napier, knowing the expenses attendant on illness, came to me, and with his usual and long experienced cordiality offered me three hundred pounds in aid of my finance,—

he was not rich in anything but generosity,—fortunately I did not need the friendly assistance, yet he well knew my very limited means. You may tell this example of friendship to anybody."

In Sir Willam Napier's judgment of men's actions and motives there was occasionally a tendency to over subtlety, and he would sometimes search too deep for that which might have been found on the surface if he had been content to seek it there. This tendency, however, is very rarely to be met with in his great work, although it does exist in a few instances.

The key to the interpretation of much of his character, particularly as to those impulsive feelings which brought him occasionally before the public, is to be found in his intense hatred of oppression and injustice. From his childhood he adopted as his rule of action the motto, "Parcere subjectis et debellare superbos." The readiness with which any story of oppression or wrong was received—sometimes on insufficient evidence—and the fierceness with which it was resented and denounced, all resulted from a tenderness of nature, which, towards the weak and helpless, and remarkably towards women, children, and animals, was absolutely womanly. Yet all excess is evil. A little more patience of mind, a less decided tendency to believe evil of those in authority, especially if they bore a name or belonged to a party in the State which he distrusted or disliked, would have saved him from many a harsh and hasty judgment, and from much self-reproach for pain and censure unjustly inflicted. But his feelings were keen, his nature vehement, and he could not always brook the wise delay and the cool reflection which should precede attacks on personal character.

The activity of his mind to the very last was extraordinary. None who might read the clear and vigorous

letters which from time to time, up to within a few weeks of his end, he addressed to newspapers or private friends, could at all guess the state of torture in which the writer lay, or could appreciate the sublime victory obtained by the indomitable soul over the weak and helpless body.

To him the British army owes much, for having recorded, in the most perfect military history ever yet written, the greatest series of events in our military annals.

To him the British people owed the truer appreciation of her own warlike sons by the justice which was for the first time rendered to the great military qualities of her enemies in the field.

To him finally,—and this would have been his proudest boast,—the private soldier owes more than to any other man; for his was the first voice to advocate the right of the private soldier to share individually in the honours, as he has always done in the dangers, of the battle-field; and it is remarkable that this right was first practically admitted and stamped as inalienable by his brother in the despatch of the victory of Meeanee.

The love and the reverence with which he inspired those who thus came in contact with him partook of the feelings with which a clansman regarded his chief.

Of his own family, where the feelings he inspired are beyond expression here, it is superfluous to speak. But for the numerous friends who used to repair to his bedside to hear words of wisdom, clothed as they involuntarily were with marvellous force and eloquence, his removal has created a gap that can never be filled. But his words and his memory will live in their hearts, and his name will never be forgotten so long as and wherever the English language shall be read.

APPENDIX I.

CHARACTER OF LADY LOUISA CONOLLY, BY MRS. RICHARD NAPIER.

Leaving the contemplation of feverish excitement, fantastic and complicated subtleties, angry zeal, and dissocial passions, I turn to the records of memory, where are graven for ever the lineaments of one who was indeed a disciple of Christ, and whose character seemed the earthly reflection of his. Wherever there was existence her benevolence flowed forth, never enfeebled by the distance of its object, flushing the least of daily pleasures with its warmth. Her views rose to the most comprehensive moral grandeur; while her calm uncompromising energy against sin was combined with an overflowing sympathy for weakness and woe. She spent her life in one continued system of active beneficence, in which her business, her projects, her pleasures, were but so many varied forms of serving her fellow-creatures; never for a moment did a reflection for herself cross the current of her purposes for them. Her whole heart so went with their distresses and their joys that she scarcely seemed to have an interest apart from theirs. The simplicity of her character was peculiarly striking in the unhesitating readiness with which she received, I might even say, with which she grasped at, the correction of her errors, and listened to the suggestions of other persons. One undivided desire possessed her mind—it was not to seem right, but to do right.

What heightened the resemblance between her and the model she followed was, that her counsels came not from a bosom that had never been shaken with the passions she admonished, or the sorrows she endeavoured to soothe. Her character was one of deep sensibility, and passions strong even to violence; but they were controlled and directed by such vivid faith as has never been surpassed. Her long life had tried her with almost every pang that attends the attachment of such beings to the mortal and the suffering, the erring and perverse; and when those sorrows came that reached her heart through its deepest and most sacred affections,

the passion burst forth that showed what the energy of that principle must have been that could have brought such a mind to a tenour of habitual calmness and serenity. When every element of anguish had been mingled together in one dreadful cup, and reason for a week or two was tottering in its seat, she was seen to resume the struggle against the passions that for a moment had conquered. The bonds that attached her to life were indeed broken for ever, but she recovered her heartfelt submission to God, and she learnt by degrees again to be happy in the happiness she gave.

It was this depth and strength of feeling that gave her a power over others, seldom surpassed I believe by any other mortal. In her the erring and the wretched found a sure refuge from themselves. The weaknesses that shrink from the censure or the scorn of others could be poured out to her as to one whose mission upon earth was to pity and to heal; for she knew the whole range of human infirmity, and that the wisest have the roots of those frailties that conquer the weak. But in restoring the fallen to their connexion with the honoured, she never held out a hope that they might parley with their temptations, or lower their standard of virtue; a confession to her cut off all self-delusion as to culpable conduct or passions.

While she inspired the most uncompromising condemnation of the thing that was wrong, she never advised what was too hard for "the bruised reed;" she chose not the moment of excitement to rebuke the misguidings of passion, nor of weakness to point out the rigour of duty.

But strength came in her presence; she seemed to bring with her irresistible evidence that anything could be done which she said ought to be done. The truths of religion, stripped of fantastic disguises, appeared at her call with a living reality; and for a time at least the troubles of life sank down to their just level.

When our sorrows are too big for our own bosoms, if others receive them with stoicism it repels all desire to seek relief at their hands, but the calmness with which she attended to the effusions and perturbations of grief seemed the earnest of safety from one who had passed through the storm. The deep and tender expression of her noble countenance suggested that feeling with which a superior being might be supposed to look down from heaven on the anguish of those who are still in the toils, but know not the reward that awaits them.

Everything petty seemed to drop off from her mind; but she imbibed the spirit of essentials so perfectly, she followed it throughout with such singleness of heart, that its influence

affected her minutest actions, not by an effort of studied attention, but with the steadiness of a natural law. Nature and revelation she regarded as the two parts of one great connected system; she always contemplated the one with reference to the other; her views were therefore all practical and free from confusion, and nothing that promoted the welfare of this world could cease to be a part of her duty to God.

It was her maxim that the motive dignified the action, however trivial in itself; and all the actions of her life were ennobled by the motive of obedience to an all-powerful Being, because He is the pure essence of wisdom and goodness. In the virtues of those who had not the consoling belief of the Christian, she still saw the handwriting of God, that cannot be effaced from a generous mind; and she used to dwell with delight on the idea that the good man, from whose eyes the light of faith was withheld in this life, would arise with rapture in the next, to the knowledge that a happiness was in store for him which he had not dared to believe.

It was not the extent of her intellectual endowments that made her the object of veneration to all who knew her; it was her extraordinary moral energy. The clear and vigorous view she took of every subject arose chiefly from her habit of looking directly for its bearing on virtue or happiness; she saw the essential at a glance, and could not be diverted from the truth by a passion or a prejudice. Hence, also, her lofty undeviating justice; her regard to the rights of others was so scrupulous, that every one within reach of her influence reposed on her decisions with unhesitating trust; nor would the certainty that the interests of those she loved best were involved have cast a shadow of doubt over her stainless impartiality.

She could be deceived, for she was too simple and lofty always to conceive the objects of base minds:—

> "And oft, tho' wisdom wake, suspicion sleeps
> At wisdom's gate, and to simplicity
> Resigns her charge, while goodness thinks no ill
> Where no ill seems."—*Paradise Lost.*

Nevertheless, she generally read the characters of artifice and insincerity with intuitive quickness, though it was often believed she was duped by those whom she saw through completely. Of this she was aware, but she was so exempt from all desire to prove her sagacity that she never cared to correct the misconception; and she held that it was neither useful nor quite justifiable to expose all the pretences we may discover, till it became necessary to set the unwary on their guard.

She never renounced the innocent pleasures or pursuits of life, nor the proprieties of a distinguished station; though she partook so little of its luxuries that she could pass from the splendour of her own establishment to one the most confined, apparently without sensibility to the change.

Wherever she moved she inspired joy and cheerfulness, yet she was by no means unreserved except to those she tenderly loved; and it was surprising how any manner so gentle could at the same time oppose a barrier so impassable to the advances of the unworthy. She enjoyed the beauty of nature with passion. Her mind at an advanced age had all the elasticity and animation of the prime of life; and she could be led to forget half the night in the excitement of conversation. Happy were the hours spent with her in the discussion of every subject that could call forth her opinions, and her wide knowledge of the eventful times in which she had lived!—hours that exalted the feelings, informed the understandings, and animated the playfulness of younger minds, who found that forty years of difference between their age and hers took nothing from their sympathies, but added a new and rare delight to their intercourse.

But she is gone! To those who knew her, her counsels are silent and her place void, but there remains the distinct consciousness that to them had been given a living evidence of the true Christian spirit; for if hers were not true, then may error be more excellent than truth! Far distant, and with unequal steps, they endeavour to follow her course; and perhaps the distaste with which they turn from the defective and ill-proportioned models that are forced on their admiration, is scarcely consistent with the charity she always taught.

APPENDIX II.

NOTES OF CONVERSATIONS WITH THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON.

THE army embarked at Cork was not intended for South America nor for any especial purpose. Lord Wellington had given this information to Miranda by the direction of the English Ministers, all idea of revolutionizing South America being at an end.

General Anstruther's army had been embarked and had sailed for the coast of Portugal, and he was met by a schooner, sent in search of him by Lord Wellington, and directed upon Macaira (or wherever he landed).

Sir John Moore's army was a welcome and unexpected succour (a Godsend).

General Spencer's army was sent to the Tagus in consequence of the opinion of Sir Charles Cotton that there were only 4000 men in Lisbon. General Spencer was right not to move in the South. All nations give up the war into the hands of the British when joined by them; 4000 men as a principal army would have been ridiculous, Junot would have marched his whole force against him, and some shame always attends a retreat.

BATTLE OF VIMIERA.

The position of Vimiera was very strong, forming a half-circle with its back to the sea, having a strong height in the centre in front of the town, a church and churchyard to cover the left. The left of the army very strong ground, the right also strong.

The French attacked Lord Wellington at Vimiera; their centre column was beat back with great loss very easily; they attacked again on the left feebly, and made another attack in which Brennier was taken. Brennier asked the English whether the reserve had attacked; from which Lord Wellington found out that the whole French army had attacked him. The French were not aware of the ravine between the left and the corps in advance of our centre, and this ruined their combination.

Lord Hill at the end of the battle was two miles nearer Torres Vedras than the enemy.

Lord Wellington's intention was to push his army (Lord Hill following with the rest) along the two roads of Torres Vedras and Mafra to get to Lisbon before the enemy, who must have passed to the other side of Monte Junsa, and could only have got to Lisbon afterwards along the banks of the Tagus. Lord Wellington did not conceive there would have been the least danger in this movement, because with a small portion of his force he had beaten the enemy at Vimiera, fresh troops had since landed, and more were expected under Sir John Moore. Sir Harry Burrard prevented him from putting the plan in execution. Burrard consulted with Lord Wellington on the day before the battle of Vimiera, and then went to the ships. He remained with his army. Sir Harry Burrard was wrong to interfere with him at all; General Murray and General Clinton both supported him in his declining to pursue.

Lord Wellington had intended on the morning of the battle of Vimiera to march to look out for the French and to attack them, when a German officer of Dragoons came galloping in a great fright at midnight informing him that the enemy were advancing to attack the English, and would be there in an hour, 20,000 strong, and saying he had seen them. This was exaggerated by fear, for they did not attack till two hours after day, and had not 20,000 men.

INSURRECTION OF PORTUGAL.

Lord Wellington never thought much of the insurrection in Portugal; in fact there was no insurrection.

It is true that Junot and the French officers thought a great deal of it, and were frightened at it; but it was equally true that the English did not know of their alarm,* and did not suspect it, because in fact the insurrection was nothing.

CONVENTION OF CINTRA.

General Spencer was the first man who spoke to Lord Wellington about the convention. Sattaro, the Portuguese commissary, told him (Lord Wellington) before the battle of Vimiera that the French would enter into a convention if they were tried, and then General Spencer spoke.

Lord Wellington thought the convention quite right, for the following reasons:—the greatest objection made to it was that the articles were bad; Lord Wellington thinks they were badly worded rather than bad in themselves; the French were in possession of a great many fortified places, very strong, and it would have taken a year to get them out of them. It would have been madness to have thought of carrying a battering train to besiege them, from the information received as to the state of the roads, which told so much against them that Sir John Moore was afraid to carry field artillery.

Certainly an able, active general of determined character could have crossed to the other side of the Tagus, or could have gone up in boats to Abrantes, for the English army had never quitted the mountains about Lisbon, and he might with the Russian sailors have formed an army of 33,000 or 34,000 men at least, based upon the fortress of Elvas. The English army at that time, after Sir John Moore's arrival, was not above 24,000 men, consequently it was a great advantage to us to get the French out of the country by

* See Convention of Cintra.

a convention, clean, and without loss to us.* Lord Wellington thinks that even if the enemy had been cut off and dispersed after the battle of Vimiera the convention would still have been right. If the sieges had been undertaken they would have given time to Bonaparte to crush the army.

The English people were mad at that time, and gave a proof of it by calling it the Convention of *Cintra*—Cintra having nothing to do with it at any time. No person in the army at that period had any doubt of the propriety of the convention, though many abused it afterwards.

The conduct of the court in the inquiry into the Convention of Cintra was unfair, their report was not luminous, Lord Moira's detailed reasons were ill founded, and Lord Wellington considered himself unjustly used.

GENERAL FREIRE'S ADVICE.

General Barnard Freire wanted Lord Wellington to go into the middle of Beira with his army; he refused, thinking that he should have to trust to the Portuguese for provisions if he quitted his ships, and that they would not supply him. His object was to strike the blow at the enemy as near to Lisbon as possible.

MOORE'S CAMPAIGN.

Lord Wellington fought the battle of Busaco politically, and looks upon Sir John Moore's advance to Sahagun to have been performed on the same principal.

Sir John Moore was afraid to carry field artillery in consequence of the information he had received on the state of the roads. Lord Wellington thinks he was quite right under such information to send the artillery the way he did; in fact, Lord Wellington's army made the roads which we acted upon afterwards.

Lord Wellington thinks that Sir John Moore could not have fought, as his army was unprepared to fight; but he thinks that he committed a fault in not considering his march upon Sahagun as a movement of retreat, and arranging the march of his columns and all the halts beforehand in case of such retreat; but (adds he), this opinion is formed from great experience in the art of war, and especially in that peculiar war adapted to Spain, and formed "après coup."

BATTLE OF TALAVERA.

In the plan of campaign for Talavera it was arranged, with the

* For an additional reason see, under the head of 'Insurrection in Portugal,' the opinion of Lord Wellington and of the French on the insurrection.

approbation of the Junta, that Venegas with his army, consisting of 25,000 men of the best Spanish troops, should move along the south of the Tagus as high as he could, for instance to Trebleque, in order to draw Sebastiani along the other bank away from the King's army, which last might be attacked by Cuesta and Lord Wellington.

If Sebastiani quitted the Tagus to join the King, Venegas was to cross and enter Madrid.

Lord Wellington and Cuesta acted upon this plan, but the Junta secretly ordered Venegas not to move and not to inform either Cuesta or Lord Wellington of his secret orders. Lord Wellington imagines that their vanity convinced them that he and Cuesta were sufficient, and that they thought it a master-stroke to save Venegas the chance of a defeat.

Cuesta had not more than 35,000 men in the battle of Talavera. The town and convent made the position strong; and Lord Wellington would have manœuvred with his right, and have driven them upon the mountains if they had forced his left.

Cuesta was an obstinate old fool. Having 35,000 men at first, he lost 5000 by his folly in pursuing Victor with imprudence from Talavera on the 25th and 26th. 10,000 of his men, and all his artillery, fled on the night of the 27th as far as Oropesa, and with them the Adjutant-General O'Donoghue. Cuesta took post between the heights on the French side of the Alberchi and the river, and was with difficulty persuaded by Lord Wellington to quit it. He said he had made that Englishman go down on his knees first.

The Spaniards were posted by Lord Wellington on the right among olives and ditches safe from attack. On the evening of the 27th the British cavalry and advanced guard retired skirmishing to the position. The French deployed their cavalry and skirmished with pistols to make the Spaniards retire. These, to the amount of 10,000, fired and fled, but were not pursued as the night was setting in; the British cavalry were posted on the flank of the road, and the ditches rendered it unsafe at each side. A field entrenched battery was erected at the junction of the allied lines, but, as the artillery all ran away with the infantry, it was not mounted. A large convent was also occupied by the Spaniards between the position and the town.

Lord Wellington thinks his plan was good upon the data he possessed, but he admits that if Jourdan's plan had been followed it would have ruined him, as he could not have got back. (*Vide* Jourdan's plan).

Lord Wellington did not know Soult's force; guessed it was 20,000 men. Lord Wellington was in march to attack him, but

was advised by Cuesta that he was too strong; and he passed the Tagus at Arzobispo.

Cuesta lost his guns on the left side of the Tagus; the French did not take them until they were informed of their being there by the trumpeter who went with Gordon as a flag of truce.

Cuesta also left them at the foot of the pass of Mezza de Ibor, although within range of the other side of the Tagus. Lord Wellington persuaded him to remove them.

ALMEIDA AND THE COA.

Col. —, of Almeida, was very negligent in not putting some men into the windmill in front of the works. It would have delayed the investment, and have given time to General Craufurd to withdraw his division in safety. General Craufurd had proposed to hold his position there, and thought he could do so if Lord Wellington gave him two regiments of Caçadores to watch his right and left. Lord Wellington answered that if he thought he could hold it he would give him two divisions, but he was sure he could not, and he desired him not to try it. Lord Wellington's intention was to place him on the Monte Negri, on the left bank of the Coa, intending by that means to hold open the communications with the place, or to force the enemy to invest it with a very large body of troops, but he found General Craufurd so beaten and dispirited by the affair of the Coa that he gave up that idea.

He had some thoughts of moving himself with his whole army up to the Coa, passing the bridges and fords by force and carrying off the garrison. This could have been done, because the enemy had not a great force at the investment, but the affair of the Coa, and the blowing up of the magazine, destroyed this project.

BUSACO.

Lord Wellington fought the battle of Busaco politically.

COLONEL SQUIRES. SANTAREM.

Colonel Squires was wrong in thinking that by passing the Tagus and taking up the line of the Zezere Lord Wellington could have shut up Masséna's army at Santarem.

Lord Wellington's plan was to have 10,000 men opposite to Santarem, and to move with the rest of the army by Rio Mayor, attacking the right of the enemy, and throwing him upon the Tagus.

This could have been easily done when he received reinforce-

ments, as Ney's corps spread as far as Tomar; but Sir John Yorke took six weeks instead of six days to get to Lisbon with the reinforcements, and when he arrived Masséna had moved. Still Lord Wellington thinks he might have carried off his main body if he had attacked him. Colonel Squires' plan would have been good if Lord Wellington had had men enough to keep a corps on the left bank of the Tagus also.

Lord Wellington received an odd report at that time from General Lundey to the following effect:—"The enemy are about to move either to their front, to their right flank, to their left flank, or to their rear."

MASSENA'S PLANS.

Masséna's great object was to keep a footing in Portugal in order to produce an effect, and for this purpose he took up several positions, particularly one at Guarda, but was turned out of all of them, although he really had a force superior to that by which he was pursued. He could not have crossed the Estrella mountain and come down upon the Tagus as it was said he intended; he could not have passed the mountains, he could not have found subsistence. Soult was too much for Marshal Beresford in the south.

SURRENDER OF GENERAL IMAS.

General Imas was communicated with by letter by a confidential officer, and by telegraph, and was told that the French had retreated, in spite of which he surrendered 9000 men to about 12,000, and, having made a point of being allowed to march his men through the breach, he was obliged to break down a breach himself in order to do it.

The Cortes would neither shoot him nor break him; his trial lasted through the whole Peninsular war.

BATTLE OF SABUGAL.

The divisions were tolerably compact on the evening before the battle of Sabugal.

MARMONT IN 1811.

When Marmont came down in 1811 Lord Wellington remained with two divisions, and two brigades of cavalry, in position in front of Guinaldo for two days, in order to cover the retreat of the Light Division, compromised by the oddity of General Craufurd, and thus kept in check with less than 14,000 men an army of more

than 60,000. When General Craufurd arrived Lord Wellington retired, and it is curious that the French retired on the same night. They afterwards returned and made a sharp attack, but were repulsed with considerable loss.

General Rénaud, the Governor of Ciudad Rodrigo, was taken by Don Julian Sanchez at that time.

HEIGHTS OF PALMELA.

Lord Wellington fortified the heights of Palmela because, although Admiral Berkeley had informed him elaborately that he could at any time take the ships out of the Tagus when the heights of Palmela were occupied by the enemy, yet he afterwards informed Marshal Beresford and some other general that he could not do it. Lord Wellington received this information from Beresford at Pero Negro, and ordered the heights to be strongly fortified, thus securing Lisbon.

BATTLE OF SALAMANCA, AND SUBSEQUENT OPERATIONS.

Don Carlos d'España had withdrawn the garrison from Alba de Tormes before the battle of Salamanca, and did not tell of it when he found out that it was wrong.

Lord Wellington's intention was to retire if Marmont had manœuvred well, to advance when Marmont retired, and so to keep the French army constantly concentrated, and to relieve the other parts of Spain, ready himself to give battle if a favourable opportunity offered. He thinks that Marmont acted foolishly in passing the Douro; he should have passed at Toro at once, being a day's march in advance, which he lost by retracing his steps to Tordesillas. Lord Wellington thinks that Marmont did not know of the near approach of the King and the dragoons from the north, as Lord Wellington had intercepted all his letters. The dragoons did not join until two days after the battle, that is four ordinary marches. General Pakenham and the 3rd Division were left at Cabrarisa, in front of Salamanca, to watch a rearguard of Marmont's, and afterwards put into a wood, and hid until the moment of attack, which arrived when Lord Wellington had finished his dinner; he having then observed the separation of the enemy, and Marmont's approach to the high road leading to Ciudad Rodrigo. The enemy could not have kept together if no battle had taken place.

Soult retired from Andalusia the moment he heard of the battle of Salamanca. Lord Wellington remained at Madrid until he heard of his moving past Grenada, and then went to the army

opposed to Clausel, who had returned, raised the siege of Zamora, and threatened Astorga. Clausel displayed much ability in taking up positions every day or night in such a manner as to require a flank movement to dislodge him. If Soult had not quitted Andalusia Lord Wellington intended to have taken 20,000 men from the army, to have quitted Madrid, leaving what he calls a "tête de cantonment" about Toledo, Madrid, &c., and to have marched against Soult in conjunction with Hill.

Lord Wellington stayed too long at Salamanca in November, 1812.

PASSAGE OF THE TORMES.

Lord Wellington thought that Soult intended to entrench his camp with a tête de cantonment after having passed the Alba at Mozarbes, and to operate upon Lord Wellington's communications with Ciudad Rodrigo. Lord Wellington, finding this, passed actually round his left wing, and established himself in the rear of it on the first evening of the retreat; a strange thing for Soult to permit.

RETREAT FROM THE HUEBRA.

In the retreat from the Huebra the generals of division consulted and agreed to disobey Lord Wellington's orders, and to move upon a different road. They did so, and got into a scrape, from which they did not get out until Lord Wellington set them to rights. When he first found them he asked them gravely what they intended to do next, and, as they did not know, hoped that in future they would obey his orders.

VITTORIA.

In 1813 the second line moved to pass the Douro; the first line did not stir until the second was up to the river. When the first line moved, the French thought that the whole army was there. General Graham had 40,000 men, and the initiative was taken so much in advance that no danger accrued, as the enemy were surprised; otherwise the manœuvre was not certain of success, though not very dangerous. Lord Wellington himself quitted Hill and went to the Esla; at the passage of the Douro he threw over his bridge at Pollos, he might have done it at Toro; if prevented at the latter place he had no other way of getting the French out of the line of the Douro, as by the right the country of Avila is very mountainous and difficult.

General Hill had 26,000 men in front of Salamanca. He tried to

break the squares of the enemy's infantry (in retreat) with his cavalry, but failed every time.

Lord Wellington thinks it a bad manœuvre, not to be done without a mass of artillery.

Burgos was not in a state of defence, and therefore the French did right to blow it up, as it would have cost 3000 men to defend it for eight or ten days; and Lord Wellington would have made a point of it, which would have enabled him to intercept the corps moving from Madrid. As soon as it was blown up all the army moved upon the Ebro.

After the battle Clausel should have moved upon Suchet, and, in conjunction with him, have held Saragossa, manœuvring upon our rear. This would have caused great jealousy on our part. Clausel might have had orders not to do so, as Soult moved as soon as his corps joined him.

Mina pursued him alone after Tudela, and imposed upon him by making him believe that the English were after him. Clausel, thus deceived, destroyed his cannon and baggage. Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz being in our possession left us at liberty to move where we pleased.

SAUROREN.

After the defeat of Soult at Sauroren he sent his artillery by the Roncesvalles road, and retired by St. Estevan himself. He halted in that town, and the next evening Lord Wellington came upon the heights overlooking St. Estevan, at the head of the valley, with Lord Hill's corps upon his right, and the 3rd, 4th, and 6th Divisions upon his left. Lord Wellington now expected to be able to capture Soult and his army, as General Graham's corps and the Light Division were moving upon the left of the Bidassoa, and ought to have seized the bridge and to have stopped all egress by the narrow road running between scarped rocks and the right bank of the Bidassoa. Lord Wellington had given orders to keep the troops concealed behind the hills until the Light and General Graham's Divisions had established themselves on the French route. An aide-de-camp told him that four gendarmes were in the valley. "Let them alone," was the answer. Soon after, three soldiers of our army who had, contrary to orders, straggled into the valley, were observed to be taken and carried off by the gendarmes. No sooner had these men been carried into St. Estevan than the French army began to débouch from that town. The Light Division were in sufficient time to have stopped the enemy; so were Longa's corps; but the former was commanded by Charles

Alten, whose obstinate stupidity no officer and no representations could overcome. He suffered the French to defile within pistol-shot on the narrow road, where six men could not pass abreast, without attempting to interfere with them.

Longa excused himself as being too weak, although it was impossible for the French to get at him.

ORTHEZ.

At Orthez, Marshal Beresford's corps being across, rendered the passage by the other divisions less dangerous; but still it was a delicate manœuvre.

MISCELLANEOUS.

LORD WELLINGTON'S COMMAND OF SPANISH ARMIES.—BALLESTEROS.

When the command of the Spanish armies was offered to Lord Wellington by the Cortes he did not immediately accept it, as he wished to have it arranged in such a manner as that he should have a corps of Spanish troops constantly in the field in British pay, that is, paid from our subsidy; but that he should have the entire direction of them himself. He was willing to leave any particular body under the direct control of the Cortes. He did not get them settled until after the retreat from Salamanca, when he went to Cadiz for the purpose.

When Ballesteros heard that the Duke was appointed to command he remonstrated with the Cortes, and sent in his resignation to them. Lord Wellington wrote to him to move upon Chinchilla Castle, in order to prevent the army from Valencia from moving the direct road upon Madrid. Ballesteros had 10,000 or 12,000 good troops. He did not answer Lord Wellington, neither did he move, otherwise the French would have had a long détour, and might have been stopped altogether.

(*Note.* NAPIER. This seems odd, as Hill might have moved there, and stopped them also.)

GALICIA.

Galicia never did anything for Lord Wellington, but might have done much.

All the meat latterly came out of Galicia.

SOULT IN 1812.

Lord Wellington would have fought Soult in 1812 if the latter had attacked him; and he thinks he would have beaten him in that position, in which case Madrid would have been his again.

CADIZ.

The ministers were always wishing to occupy Cadiz. Lord Wellington thinks this a folly. It was rather a burthen to him. Either General Spencer or General Anstruther was intended to command the garrison; thinks it was Anstruther; he came out with the appointment.

FRERE'S PLAN FOR ALBUQUERQUE IN LA MANCHA.

Mr. Frere's plan for Albuquerque to manœuvre in La Mancha was taken from a French emigrant, and was calculated upon an idea of mountains being there, which was not a true one.

PORTUGAL.

Portugal is not capable of being defended on the frontier. It may be too easily penetrated in many points. The Portuguese and Lord Wellington separated good friends before Vimiera; and General Trant got some of their troops for him.

THIÉBAUT, ST. CYR, &C.

Lord Wellington admires Thiébaut's description of Junot's invasion.

St. Cyr's plan of not using his artillery in order to raise the morale of his troops was great nonsense. Every battle has its crisis, in which every effort in your power must be made use of to win, therefore St. Cyr talks nonsense. Battles are dangerous operations, and a trifle may lose them; for instance, being on one side of a ditch instead of another.

Our habit of reconnoitring by single officers is peculiar to us, and admirable.

CARTHAGENA.

Carthagena was occupied for a short time only by us. It was not much in the French line, and was unhealthy.

WATERLOO.

NOTE SENT FROM LONDON, MAY, 1835.

Wellington would have fought the battle of Waterloo on the French position instead of his own *if* his cavalry had held their ground the day before.

APPENDIX III.

QUESTIONS BY COLONEL NAPIER.	ANSWERS BY THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON.
1. *Was the advance from Coimbra decided, on political grounds, because of the conspiracy in Soult's camp, or on military reasons—or from both?*	The operation upon Oporto was undertaken upon military grounds exclusively. See Despatches at the time. I positively refused either to retard, to accelerate, or to check my movement in reference to the communications existing with the disaffected in the French army.
2. *Sir John Cradock found great difficulty in getting up the supplies—was any peculiar exertion made by the Duke for that purpose; or did he march, trusting to his own activity and the zeal of the army to overcome difficulties, or to bear privations?*	I know nothing of Sir John Cradock's difficulties. We experienced many. But having determined to drive Soult from the north of Portugal, the difficulties of the enterprise were not of a nature to prevent our attempting it. The transactions of the Commissariat will best show the difficulties of those days.
3. *Were any particular measures taken to deceive Soult relative to the intended movement?*	It is certainly true that many in the French army knew that we were in force upon the Mondego and the Vouga, and that Soult did not. We turned the enemy's right by the lake of Aveiro, and his left by the operations of Lord Beresford; but the main body advanced along the high road from Coimbra and Oporto. We did not arrive upon the Vouga till late in the evening before the first attack, in order that the French videttes might not see our troops. The Portuguese under General Trant were there, and our intention was to surprise the French cavalry next morning. We did not succeed in this object; but we only just failed. But the French cavalry must on that day have seen the whole corps, even including the troops which proceeded by the lake Aveiro. The subsequent operations were pushed on with as much celerity as possible: and, in fact, Soult got the last of his troops over the Douro and destroyed the bridge only an hour or two before we were in Villa Nova.
4. *Was the passage of the Douro attempted because the enemy appeared*	The passage of the Douro was attempted because the localities gave

to be retreating from that town, or from any reliance on the conspirators in Soult's camp?

great facilities for the performance of the operation. The convent of Serra, in Villa Nova, commands all the town and the surrounding country on the opposite bank.

There was immediately opposite to this convent an unfinished building of considerable size, called the Seminary, or Jesuits' College. This was enclosed by a high stone wall, having an iron gate opening upon the high road from Oporto to Vallonga.

There was an easy access from the river to this building. The wall enclosed a considerable space of ground, enough to form in it at least two battalions, or possibly 300 yards long, along the river, and the depth about half the space. The building was within musket-shot of the iron gate. It commanded everything in its neighbourhood, excepting a mound at about the distance of a cannon-shot; which however had not space enough upon its summit to place a gun upon it.

The guns at the convent in Villa Nova commanded the whole enclosure of the Seminary, and they enfiladed and defended the left of its wall, so that an enemy could not attack on that side. The right of the troops which passed over to this seminary (which in fact made an admirable *tête de pont*) was protected by the passage of the Douro higher up by Lieut.-General Sir John Murray and the King's German Legion, supported by other troops . . . . . .

. . . . . .

so that in fact the troops in the Seminary could be attacked only by the iron gate from the high road.

The attack was continued for a length of time, but principally to cover the retreat of the enemy from the town; at last, when they evacuated the lower part of the town, there was a general waving of handkerchiefs in the windows, and a hurrah in the town! The boats were sent over from the right bank of the Douro, of which we had but few before, and the troops were carried over in large bodies. The attack was discontinued upon the Seminary by the enemy; our troops formed and moved forward, and the enemy was pressed in his rear.

5. *Why did the Duke halt next day?*

The halt was made the next day, first, because the whole army had not crossed the Douro, and none of its supplies and baggage; secondly, on account of the great exertion and fatigue of the preceding day, particularly the last; thirdly, because we had no account of Lord Beresford being in possession of Amarante, or even across the Douro, we having in fact outmarched everything; and, fourthly, the horses and animals required a day's rest as well as the men.

6. *What was the real cause of Beresford's delay at Chaves, when he ought to have been at Villa del Rey before Soult was at Montalegre?*

I never knew the cause of Lord Beresford's delay, if there was any. After Soult's escape by the bridge of Misarella, which was accidental, nothing could have stopped him.

I don't recollect what force we had

for this operation north of the Mondego. There were some Portuguese militia under Trant, and some Portuguese infantry with me, and some with Lord Beresford, but they were in their infancy. Soult must have been stronger than Lord Beresford and I together.

The relative numbers and the nature of the troops must be considered in all these cases; and this fact moreover, that, excepting to attain a very great object, we could not risk the loss of a corps.

However, Soult suffered very handsomely in his retreat. He lost vast numbers of men and horses, and all the *matériel* of his army.

7. *Was not the Duke displeased with Colonel Mayne for destroying the bridge of Alcantara?*

Colonel Mayne was ordered to destroy the bridge of Alcantara, but it was under different circumstances. He had not concealed his instructions—the French knew of them; and that the bridge was ready loaded with a mine. General La Pipe was sent with a division to make a false attack upon the bridge, in order to induce Colonel Mayne to blow it up, which he did. The French general had orders, however, to destroy it if Mayne did not.

We were in fault in not sending orders to General Mackenzie not to allow the bridge to be destroyed as soon as we reached the Tagus; but he must have gone there with his whole division. After all, I am not quite certain that the French did not suffer in the end more inconvenience from the want of this communication than we did.

COLONEL NAPIER TO LORD FITZROY SOMERSET.

July 5, 1833.

My dear Lord Fitzroy,

When our army was on the Caya, June and July, 1811, *the* 1*st Division was at Portalegre. Lord Londonderry says it was to be at hand in case the enemy* demonstrated *towards the Tagus. I do not take such liberties with the* Mathematics, *but I think they must have been kept there:* 1*st, to be ready to move upon Marvao in case the enemy attempted to turn our left by Albuquerque; and,* 2*ndly, I think that they would not have been kept there at all if Lord Wellington had not been assured that the French were spreading and not going to attack, otherwise I think*

NOTES AND REPLIES BY THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON.

July 8, 1833.

It would take me some time, and require more reflection than I can at this moment give to the subject, to answer Colonel Napier's Memorandum.

As well as I recollect, our position in 1811 *was* a "bully." It was very strong however, and supported by Campo Mayor, and by Elvas on its right.

The object was to oblige the French to concentrate their forces. If I recollect right, the two armies of Soult and Marmont joined, and both touched us. We then retired. They separated, and each went to his own province.

it would have been dangerous to keep them at such a distance.

Was not Lord Hill's position beyond the Caya exposed, if Soult had crossed the Guadiana in force by the fords above Jerumenha? It appears to me he might thus have invested Elvas, or obliged us to fight on that side, and that in fact Lord Wellington bullied *both him and Marmont.*

Yours sincerely,

W. NAPIER.

The 1st Division was at Portalegre, and, as well as I recollect, we had another between Campo Mayor and Portalegre to observe the rear of the position, and the movements of the army of Portugal under Marmont.

When I shall have a little more leisure, I will endeavour to recollect these movements; but I perfectly recollect the position in front of Campo Mayor.

WELLINGTON.

Feb. 1839.

If you can answer the question, I want to know what the march of the 3rd Division was on the 31st July, 1st and 2nd August, because I find that Division ordered on the 30th, in the evening, to march on the 31st from Zubiri towards Roncesvalles. But in the Duke's Despatches he tells O'Donnel he did not know the true state of General Hill's position until after these orders were issued.

I don't recollect the march of the 3rd Division on the days mentioned.

Now I find, in a note of conversation with the Duke many years ago, that he brought the 3rd, 4th, and 6th Divisions upon Soult's left at San Estevan, on the 31st of July in the evening, and that Soult only escaped by an accident, some of our soldiers straggling and giving the alarm.

W. NAPIER.

This is true.

We arrived at the débouché of the valley of the Bidassoa early in the afternoon of the 31st July. We halted there for an hour. Soult was at Estevan with his army. Three of our men were carried off who were plundering an orchard. Soult marched the moment he received the intelligence.

WELLINGTON.

PS.—*You would be surprised to know the number of persons I have applied to personally and by letter, to ascertain the march of the 3rd Division, and without success. Nobody seems to know anything about it.*

BATTLE OF VIMIERO.

I don't think Sir Harry Burrard landed till the morning of the battle.

I intended to march, but not to attack on the morning of the battle till I went on board the ship on the evening before the battle. I was forbidden to march, and returned to my quarters, intending to obey orders. In the night I heard of the movement of the French; the army was under arms in the morning, and I sent to Sir Harry Burrard who landed in the morning.

Anstruther had joined. I went to Lourinha on the 18th to facilitate his landing and junction.

I think Acland landed either before or during the battle. I believe the former.

I knew on the evening of the battle of Roliça, on the 17th, that Loison was in movement somewhere in the neighbourhood of the field. I was therefore cautious in my movements on that day; the next morning moved towards Anstruther to secure his landing and junction.

I had reason to believe that, altogether, Junot would have about 18,000 men, which is I believe the number he had.

WELLINGTON.

COL. NAPIER TO LORD F. SOMERSET.	ANSWERS BY THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON.
Nov. 1838.	
I am somewhat at a loss to ascertain the number of Spanish troops under the Duke's command at the period of the battles in the Pyrenees; and I therefore have set down what I suppose to be nearly the mark, and I shall be much obliged to you to tell me if I am much in error.	
1. *Part of Mendizabel's people engaged in the siege of Santona* 6,000	
2. *Giron's army, including the remainder of Mendizabel's, Long, &c.*..... 10,000	2. I should say 8000. They never had them under arms.
3. *Morillo's Division at Roncesvalles* 4,000	
4. *Abispal's army of reserve at Pampeluna* 10,000	4. 7000 or 8000 at most.
5. *Carlos d'España's Division in march for Pampeluna.* 5,000	5. 4000.
6. *Mina, Empecinado, Duran, Goyan, &c. &c., Aragon*... 15,000	
Total..... 50,000	
—of which 24,000 *were in line during the operations, and the remainder engaged in blockades, sieges, and desultory warfare on the rear and right flank.*	There was at that time in Catalonia the first army under Copons, the best of them all; it had 10,000 men.
I find that the siege of St. Sebastian was not carried on at all in accord with Lord Wellington's views, and that the deviations from his instructions	There was, besides, a division of 4000 men under Colonel Manso in Catalonia.
	The 3rd army in Valencia, under the Duke del Parque, afterwards un-

were most injurious to the success of the operation; which I am sorry for, as I am quite tired of pointing out mistakes, but justice must be done, and the saddle put on the right horse, or rather horses, *though some of the defaulters are scarcely entitled to be likened to* that *particular quadruped.*

W. NAPIER.

der the Prince of Anglona, in Catalonia, Aragon, and Navarre.

I should think that the 3rd army had 8000 men. It never was brought all into line.

Whittingham and Roche each commanded a division of Spanish infantry, besides the cavalry under the first, say 5000 men each.

These acted under Sir John Murray and Lord William Bentinck. They were paid out of the Spanish subsidy, clothed, and ought to have been an effective army.

We never saw the Empecinado, Goyan, &c., but they were somewhere in Castile.

Mina followed Clausel out to Jaca, and we did not hear much of him afterwards till the winter and spring of 1814.

WELLINGTON.

S.S. Dec. 24, 1838.

I send answers to Colonel Napier's last questions. In one of his papers he asks about the period of Carlos d'España joining at Pampeluna. He had certainly arrived before the battle was won. I cannot say whether he had before it began.

By-the-bye it is certain that Abispal had only 7000 men.

WELLINGTON.

BATTLES OF THE PYRENEES.

QUESTIONS.	ANSWERS BY THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON.
1. *Lord Wellington says that Vera and Echallar were indispensable posts to cover the siege of San Sebastian.*	In answer to the 1st Question, I should consider the supposed march and the great road impracticable; there being an opposing army in the field.
Am I right in supposing that, if they were not held, the French army could have been thrown into the Bastan and the valley of the Bidassoa, and then crossing the mountains by the pass of Donna Maria have seized the great road of Irurzun, bringing up left shoulders, and operating on the rear of the be-	The height of Vera covers the approach to Lezaca; which was the débouché of the communications across the hills with Passages and San Sebastian. As well as I recollect there was a horse-road from Vera to Irun along the Bidassoa.

sieging army by that road and by the pass of Zubietta at the same time?

It must always be observed that the siege of San Sebastian was not raised till the order of the night of the 25th, or morning of the 26th. The firing was discontinued for want of ammunition after the failure of the storm.

The embarkation of the guns, stores, &c., and the turning of the siege to a blockade, was not ordered till the night.

It was therefore necessary to protect the approaches to Passages and St. Sebastian.

2. *Why did the 6th Division remain until the morning of the 27th at San Estevan instead of marching on the evening of the 26th?*

Marshal Soult was appointed to command the French army on the frontiers of Spain early in July. He arrived on the 13th. He announced himself to his army on the 23rd.

His first measures indicated an intention to operate with his right. He collected bridges at Orogne, &c.

3. *Why did that Division march into the valley of Lanz instead of going at once by Lizasso and Marcalain—which last road it was afterwards obliged to take, thus losing time?*

The allied army was engaged in the siege of St. Sebastian and the blockade of Pampeluna. In order to cover these operations the passes in the Pyrenees were occupied from Roncesvalles to St. Sebastian.

Sir John Byng with his brigade at Roncesvalles.

Sir L. Cole with the 4th Division to support him. The 3rd Division at Olague to support the troops in advance.

General Campbell in the Alduides.

Sir Rowland Hill in the Valley de Bastan and Puerto de Maya communicating by his right with General Campbell.

The 7th Division on the left of the Valley de Bastan, covering Vera and Echallar.

The 6th Division at St. Estevan.

An attempt was made to take St. Sebastian by storm on the 25th of July in the morning, and failed.

I went there afterwards. The ammunition having been expended, the discontinuance of the fire upon the place had become necessary, till a supply should be received from England.

On my return to Lezaca I heard of the attack on the Puerto de Maya. It was reported to have failed.

It had succeeded; but the enemy had been subsequently driven off.

In the night accounts were received from Sir Rowland Hill, stating that Sir L. Cole had been attacked at Roncesvalles; and that having retired, he, Sir Rowland, had withdrawn the troops from the Puerto de Maya.

I sent orders immediately to raise the siege of St. Sebastian, to embark the guns and stores, but to maintain the blockade of the place.

I went in the morning of the 26th to Sir Rowland Hill's corps.

Thus then Marshal Soult on the 25th July broke in upon our line, at the ame moment that we failed in our attempt to take St. Sebastian by storm.

Our right was turned. The troops at Roncevaux retired, and rendered necessary the retreat of Sir Rowland Hill's corps from the Valley de Bastan.

The object was to save the blockade of Pampeluna by collecting as soon as possible the largest body of troops.

Sir Thomas Picton did not stand in any position after Sir L. Cole, with the 4th Division, Byng's and Campbell's brigades, had joined him; and it was not known on the night of the 26th, at Sir Rowland Hill's quarters, what was the precise position of the troops of the right of the army, or the intentions of Sir Thomas Picton.

I ordered Sir Rowland Hill to retire upon Lizasso early on the 27th; and the 6th and 7th Divisions, and all the disposable troops, to move upon Ostiz in the valley of the Lanz.

I did not learn more of Sir Thomas Picton till I reached the quarters of General Long at Ostiz on the morning of the 27th, where I heard that he had fallen back upon the heights of Huarto.

I went on immediately by the valley of the Lanz to join him.

I left orders at Ostiz to the Quartermaster-General to wait at Ostiz, and to halt all the troops till I should ascertain the state of things between Ostiz and Sauroren.

The French army were taking up their ground on the heights on the left of the road while I was riding along the valley of the Lanz. It was obvious that no troops could follow by that road.

I wrote the orders to turn everything at Ostiz by the other road, upon the bridge of Sauroren. Lord Fitzroy Somerset carried them, and quitted the village by one road while I joined the army by another, and the detachment of French cavalry entered the village by a third.

Thus then it will be seen that the original intention was to collect the army as soon as possible to avoid false movements; and to move this 6th Division by the valley of the Lanz.

The execution of this design was prevented by the movements of Sir Thomas Picton, and Marshal Soult following him so quickly.

4. *Did General Alten lose his way, or did the order to march upon Lecumberri fail to reach him? I ask this because I find that the Light Division wandered very much after quitting Vera, and I suppose that his orders were to cover the right flank of Sir Thomas Graham by guarding, first, the passes of Zubietta and Goritz; and secondly, as this flank advanced on the right, the great road to Irurzun.*

I cannot recollect any order to the Light Division. They were placed under the general direction of Sir Thomas Graham.

He may have given them orders.

There was great difficulty in reaching them after the battle. It was wished to bring them down to the Bidassoa to intercept the retreat of the enemy.

5. *What was the nature of the intelligence sent to Lord Wellington by Abispal, which induced the former to move some of the 6th Division behind the heights of San Cristoval; that is to say, by Berioplana. The intelligence I mean was brought to Lord Wellington by Camac?*

I don't recollect any such communication.

The 6th Division were ordered from the valley of the Lanz for the reasons above stated. They arrived on the ground most opportunely on the morning of the 28th.

The armies were so near each other that I saw Marshal Soult; and so distinctly as to know him by sight from that view of his person.

I don't recollect any deviation from the original route from Ostiz.

6. *I cannot discover any good reason why Picton did not draw Campbell's brigade from Engui on the night of the 26th, and then with the* 17,000 *men he could thus have had, disputed the heights of Linzoin with Soult on the 27th.*

I cannot give any answer to these questions.

I do not think he could have been forced in front, and Soult could hardly have turned him to any purpose by descending the valley of Urroz. If Picton had held his ground it is probable the 6th Division might have joined him, and perhaps that was the object of its moving into the valley of Lanz.

7. *It appears to me that Soult failed in not attacking Sir L. Cole on the evening of the 26th at Linzoin before the 3rd Division joined him from Zubiri.*

APPENDIX IV.

NOTES ON THE DEFENCE OF THE COUNTRY.

I BEGIN with the Channel Islands, which are more immediately connected with the defence of England, and even of London, than is generally supposed; at least Alderney is. As to Jersey and Guernsey, having made them a study for five years, I am convinced that they must fall to France whenever she chooses to annex them, because steam gives her such an *expeditious* force that she can throw ten or twelve thousand men into either in a few hours; and the militia, though good men and able to fight, are and must be so badly officered, that I doubt their being able to resist the sudden well-concerted attack of a superior French force, even with the aid of a British regiment. The safety of either island would

then depend on their fortresses. That of Guernsey is the weakest; the Jersey one is strong. Either might be held for three weeks against open force if prepared beforehand, but they will not be so prepared; and the magazines in Guernsey, the bomb-proof in the fort, are very dangerous. Moreover if Jersey falls, and it is the most exposed, Guernsey must in time follow, for England can never, in a war with France begun by an attack on those islands and accompanied by a menacing demonstration against Ireland and the south coast of England, undertake such a major operation of war as the reconquest of Jersey.

This reasoning does not apply to Alderney. Its size is such that, although within eight miles of French harbours, from whence steamers can come over in an hour, it can be entirely and completely defended. A memoir on that subject, sent in to the Government by me, showed how the defence could be made good, and recommended the construction of a large steamer harbour and specific works for the security of the island. The harbour has been commenced, the works of defence have been neglected; the consequence of which will likely be that when the harbour is finished, the French will seize the island, and thank us for having made the harbour for them. Now let us examine the value of Alderney in the two suppositions of its being a French or an English island.

1st. *As a French island, with the harbours finished.*—Alderney is less than three miles long, I think, but certainly so little above that measure that it offers a strong position for five thousand men; it is about a mile and a half wide at the broadest part, and there are heights which look into both the great harbours at each side of the island, where troops could land; hence, double batteries and heavy shell-guns would secure those harbours, which are, from the violence of the tides and the currents and the dangerous rocks outside, difficult to invade and not to be blockaded. There is indeed at one end of the island, called the Chanque, a sheltered rather than a quiet piece of sea, where I am told Sir Sidney Smith during the late war remained for some weeks with a frigate, but that does not prove that a blockading squadron could so remain; and if it could it would have to work up on either side against the Race one way, and the Swinge of Alderney the other, to intercept French vessels attempting the relief of the island, and could never do so effectually even with steamers; to retake Alderney therefore, if once it fell and was fortified and garrisoned, would be nearly impossible. *As a French island* it would with its harbour nearly intercept the Channel trade, because from Alderney, taking

in the Casket rocks, to Portland Bill, is only fifty-seven miles; and when the sun rises with an east wind vessels going up or down that narrow passage would be seen three or four hours from Alderney before they could be perceived from the English coast; hence, a French steamer would always be in readiness, and able to issue out like a spider and seize the vessel. If followed by an English one, five or six more steamers would aid, and, if opposed by a superior force, have a safe refuge, while heavy ships-of-the-line from Cherbourg could menace to cut off the English pursuers.

2nd. *As an English island.*—The harbour finished, and the works I recommended completed, the garrison need not be above a thousand with the island militia, because the harbours are few and easily defended, the works themselves would be strong, and the attack would only be by surprise, as great preparations would give timely warning. Now the Tourel Hill, a sugarloaf one, is so situated that if a tower one hundred or one hundred and fifty feet high were constructed on it, an observer with a good telescope could, through a break in the French hills, see into Cherbourg harbour. Hence, if eighteen or twenty steamers were always in Alderney harbours, we should have without expense a blockading squadron watching Cherbourg; the distance is only twenty-seven miles I think round Cape la Hogue, and consequently, besides the Tourel Observatory, one steamer could always be on the look-out. This would be a bridle on the Cherbourg fleet; for if it came out, the steamers of Alderney would follow in a few hours and hover on its rear, sending off expresses to the English Channel squadron as to its direction; it would then be difficult to effect a sudden landing in England of any importance without a fight between Dover and Portland; and I suppose that west of Portland would hardly serve the French, for any great operation must be designed to act against London, and certainly no widely extended movement could effect the capture of London, as it would give time for the whole strength of England to be assembled in opposition. It has generally been taken for granted that France would invade with a principal army and one or two accessories. This I do not think she will attempt; that would be a regular invasion of England, and she must confine herself to a coup-de-main against London or she will do nothing. A buccaneering warfare she may certainly undertake, but then she must confine her efforts to that; to capture London she must devote her whole strength and all her subtlety of warfare. But she may detach twenty thousand men to menace Liverpool or land in Ireland. If the last she will probably succeed, and the mode of opposing her there depending upon a

complete change of policy, which cannot be established for years, and which will not be tried, renders the question too great to be discussed here. I therefore look upon Ireland as indefensible at present, and confine myself to England. A recent work by a Swiss officer contemplates an auxiliary force landing in the Avon to take Bristol. That would be a folly. By erecting shell-gun batteries on the Holme Islands in the Severn, and mooring a hulk fitted as a floating battery between those islands and the Welsh shore, no flotilla with troops could reach the Avon, and, as there are no landing-places on the Somerset side of the Severn, the enemy must land on the right bank and march on Gloucester, where a bridge and a few works would stop him for a day or two, while the Welshmen were raised on his back. He might indeed go to Milford Haven by land or water, but the loss of that naval arsenal would not affect the general defence. The foregoing reasoning brings the attack to the southern coast between Dover and Portland, and I leave out the chance of a Brest or a Toulon fleet proceeding against Ireland, because the attack on London must, as I have said, be made by a concentration of all the naval and military forces of France, and all the military subtlety of France combined, to have a good result. If Alderney is French, the chances and combinations will be greatly multiplied against England; if English the contrary; but I suppose a landing to be effected to the amount of eighty thousand men; how are they to be opposed?

Between Portsmouth and Portland.—It will be necessary to have a strong force to observe the former, if, as it should be, it is well fortified and garrisoned by dockyard-men, armed citizens, marines, and volunteers from the country. From any point west of Portsmouth the enemy would probably move in a direct line upon Chertsey and pass the Thames there, and it would be the most difficult operation to meet, as will be seen further on. If the French disembarked eastward of Portsmouth, as they probably would, it is unlikely they would do so very near Dover, not only as they would find at that harbour a naval force—I suppose the new harbour to be finished—but as it would oblige them to leave a detachment to watch Dover, and lengthen their march to turn the navigable part of the Medway. Having thus brought the invaders to the coast, it remains to consider how they might be opposed on the hypothesis that Portsmouth, Dover, and Chatham are in defensible condition, and garrisoned with marines, citizens, yeomanry, and volunteers, and with detachments of artillerymen; leaving,—say forty thousand regulars in hand to protect London.

I do not think with such a force that we could oppose an invading army of eighty thousand in a pitched battle between the coast and London; for though there are strong ridges in the way, every position could be easily turned in England from the number of roads; some disaster, or at least some disorder, would happen, and a retreat which would influence the fears of the Londoners perniciously; but on the coast something might be done. For the lines of railways do now run along the coast a great way, and I would propose to add branches to run along those parts which are accessible to disembarkations, and not now within reach of the existing lines. Suppose the outward bank of those railroads reduced in height so as to form a glacis, and that the stations and other chosen points were fortified with Napoleon's coast forts, having shell-guns; ten thousand men with field artillery could be moved along the railroads to any point signalised as attacked or going to be attacked, and with the forts could offer a powerful resistance without being compromised. Let it be supposed that from fortune, or the pressure of superior numbers, the French effect their landing and march on London. How is that immense capital to be protected? Entirely to protect it is impossible, and its outskirts must be resigned to the enemy; yet the following system might effectually delay the occupation until the strength of the country could gather round the invaders, always supposing them to be only double the regular force in defence, that is to say, forty and eighty thousand; but the same system would continue good, and rather would become more sure if the relative forces are raised on both sides.

Portsmouth, Dover, and Chatham being garrisoned, and the Medway provided with armed vessels as high as the depth will admit, the enemy must turn the navigable part of that river, and certainly would never throw himself between it and the Thames, except to seize the stores at Woolwich and Deptford. Those two places cannot be secured by works, and I would therefore construct a large work in the Plaistow and East Ham levels on the opposite side, which could be easily done as they are marshes, and into that work I would pour all the spare guns and valuable stores on the first alarm. The enemy would then have no business on the side of the lower Thames, which could be secured by armed vessels from Sheerness to the Tower. He would therefore march against Southwark. To oppose him I would take the Greenland Docks as the left of the line of defence, and from thence have a rampart running behind the Surrey Canal, which, with the docks, would furnish a wet ditch as far as Walworth, three miles. From

Walworth to Vauxhall Bridge would be one mile more, which could be easily fortified, because there are open spaces such as Kennington Common, and several large buildings, the railway station, &c. We should thus have a regular line to be defended by the citizens. To prepare it beforehand would not be, I imagine, very expensive, and with the volunteer corps habituated to take up their positions along it, and having all the great buildings and houses best suited to aid, marked previously with a plan for rendering them available when the war came, I doubt if an army of eighty thousand men would venture an assault, especially if a second line behind the Thames were prepared, each bridge being to be forced, and the armed vessels aiding in defence. This would, however, be only an auxiliary. From Vauxhall Bridge to Battersea Bridge is two miles, the bridge being in the bottom of a loop. Chelsea College is near it on the right bank as the Penitentiary is to Vauxhall, and would serve as a support to a bridge-head at Battersea if the bridge was not destroyed; but I think it would be best to destroy it as being too near the enemy. But from Vauxhall to Putney Bridge is only four miles, and at the latter I would have a bridge-head, and another at the Suspension bridge of Barn Elms, and another at Kew, both of which are in deep loops of the Thames. These to be occupied by volunteers. And to cover those bridges and works I would draw an entrenched camp from Putney to Richmond, only three miles, and the ground all favourable both as to fighting and expenses. Into this camp the regular forces should retire before the enemy, as he advanced from the coast. With reasonable strong works the army could there defy an attack, and, lying only four miles off from the enemy, he dare not storm the suburb of Southwark. He would then manœuvre to pass at Chertsey or Walton, for if the Kingston and Hampton bridges were broken, and Hampton Court itself garrisoned by volunteers, he could hardly pass nearer than Walton with the regular army on his flank. But he would pass, and the regular army must repass also to the left bank, when the contest would become more complicated, and the defence more difficult. I would have, however, another entrenched camp at Primrose Hill and Hampstead, into which the army should move at once, and thus be again on the enemy's flank, while he was opposed in front by the volunteers and citizens, occupying Chelsea Hospital, the Penitentiary, the Horse Guards, Buckingham Palace and St. James's, Apsley House, and the houses of Park Lane up to Paddington, behind the canal of which, and the Western Railroad, the regular army would be ready to act, having the camp at Hampstead behind

it. To turn this line and drive the army from Hampstead would be a great operation, and give time for the country to put forth its strength; for the French, if only eighty thousand strong, would never dare to detach corps of any strength in the face of thirty or forty thousand British troops posted as I have pointed out. If the camp was not forced it would flank any attack on the north. The difficulty and expense of getting the works executed beforehand, and the impossibility of executing them after the landing, form the objections to this plan; but if you will look at the maps you will see that the greatest difficulty and the most expensive works will be in the borough of Southwark; and that the Surrey Canal, and the open spaces about Vauxhall Bridge, furnish great facilities.

There is, however, another view to take, which I have never heard alluded to even, but which appears to me very important. Suppose the French were to throw thirty thousand men into the Isle of Wight, expel the inhabitants, and entrench themselves there? That would so menace Portsmouth that all the regular forces of England would necessarily be assembled there, and the rest of the coast would be left open to the great disembarkation, and thus, not eighty, but one hundred and fifty thousand men might be directed on London.

I give you this memoir just as it comes from my head in the rough, knowing you can test it by reference to details as well as general principles; and I will only add that I think the true defence of the country would be found in volunteer corps and an increase of the regular army, not in a militia. The Government has rejected the volunteers evidently from political feeling, fearing they would demand an extension of reform. The militia, *if they are raised*, may be found more dangerous. But in any circumstances a well-considered plan should be formed at once, and a certain expense incurred; and I am inclined to think such combinations as I have indicated would be the most sure and the cheapest.

WM. NAPIER.

April, 1852.

APPENDIX V.

ESSAY ON EDUCATION OF THE DEAF AND DUMB, AND GENERAL EDUCATION OF CHILDREN.

PREFACE.

IF there be no innate ideas, as Mr. Locke teaches, it follows that new-born children are of themselves free from the taint of moral evil, and that the vices which are gradually developed in them must be the result of bad education. It behoves philanthropists therefore to look to this point with all care.

Every human being certainly, and probably every animal, educates itself; that is to say, they are provided by nature with certain instincts and faculties which, being most powerful in early life, stimulate and urge them to acquirements, and accordingly in the first four or five years they acquire more than they do in all the after years of their life, however long that may be; they learn to stand, to walk, to use their hands; they acquire the faculty of speech, the application of thought; a knowledge of distances, of colours, of textures, the distinctions and resemblances between different objects in nature; they become acquainted with most of the passions and their expressions; in fine, the germs of all physical and metaphysical knowledge, and the germs also of all virtues and vices, are implanted in their minds during that period; and all the rest of their lives only suffice to give precision to some of the original ideas which they have attained while the mind was fresh from the Creator's hands. Now, the great moving power of this acquirement is imitation. It is thus a knowledge of sounds, for example, is acquired, or all beings would use the same language, as all know that water is different from land, trees from animals, stones from air. Imitation gives experience and produces and confirms ideas and thoughts, and thought is education.

The principal part of education is therefore an original work of Nature, and her process, necessarily the best, should be carried out by man, and not as is but too generally the case thwarted and counteracted.

It is not meant that because Nature teaches all persons by the

same method, that all are alike capable of profiting from her lessons. The power of imitation, and the development of thought attendant upon it, are much greater in some persons than in others, but the process of teaching is the same. Thought or mind is the result of an action of the brain, at least it is so to all seeming, for if a portion of the brain be destroyed, the power of thought is weakened upon some points, though not upon others; and if the whole brain be deranged, all the thoughts are deranged; if it be destroyed, thought is, to all human perception, destroyed also; it has fled.

The power of thought may and will be by education developed to the utmost extent of which each brain is susceptible from its natural conformation, but not beyond that; and this action may be developed for good or for evil by a good or bad education. For if its powers are concentrated upon the imitation of bad examples, it must necessarily produce evil, and vice versa. But there is another consideration springing from this, and scarcely less important. The brain may be educated to think well without thinking strongly; and thence the man becomes a weak and vacillating creature, incapable of the exertion which makes either a clever or a really good man, for to be passively good is not to live but to vegetate: this is better than being actively evil, but it is not useful goodness, and it is always liable to be moved to evil by the influence of active wickedness. Hence, to produce the strongest thought of which the brain from its original conformation is capable becomes a serious part of education. It is in fact to produce fixed principles; and this can only be done by gradual training of the body as well as the mind: with bad health the brain must be weak.

It must not be objected that many celebrated geniuses have been weak of body, that many men while sinking into the grave have exhibited amidst their bodily sufferings the utmost strength of mind.

In the first case nothing is proved except that the brain had been originally very powerfully constituted, but it would have been equal to still greater exertions if the body had been equally strongly constituted; in the second case the illness of the body attacks the brain last; and the argument I use does not so much relate to the effect of corporeal weakness upon an adult brain of strength, as to the effect of illness upon the growing and acquiring brain of infancy and youth.

Continual exercise of body in combination with exercise of the thinking faculty is absolutely necessary to the production of a strong, healthy, sound brain; and the system of shutting children

up in close rooms in silent uniform study and discipline, without regard to the varieties of mind, seems to me to be directly opposed to all sound principles of education, because it is directly opposed to the operations of Nature, *who* excites them to activity, and noise, and observation, and imitation, each according to its peculiar original formation, and always shows her dislike to, and punishes by disease of body or mind, abstract thoughts, silence, and sedentary pursuits. To lead children into the fields, to point out and explain the visible operations of nature, to teach them by conversation with the natural objects before their eyes, to encourage them to work in gardens, to teach them gymnastics, and to explain the true principles of what they see and do, at the very time of their seeing and doing (reserving the teaching by books until a later age, when their own thirst for further knowledge will inevitably lead them to such study), seems to me the true mode of education. It is nature's mode, it is in strict accord with the Baconian or inductive system of philosophy, namely to provide by observation a sufficient number of facts before reasoning to a conclusion; whereas the present system of commencing with books, besides the injury it does to the physical constitution, is the forming a system *à priori*, to be verified by the scholar by observation afterwards. This is a false philosophy; and moreover the cares and exigencies of life will seldom give him time or inclination to examine facts thoroughly, and thus the man passes through life with perhaps a false and faint notion of the things he has been taught, and with a judgment weakened and perplexed, if not prejudiced, by systems which he has been forced to take upon trust, and which his every-day experience teaches him are not so certain as he once believed.

It may be supposed that the deaf and dumb are entirely precluded by nature from the benefits of education, and doomed to rank only just above the mere animal creature: but the goodness of the Deity is not so confined, and if the principles of education laid down above be, as I believe, sound and true, the deaf and dumb are especially susceptible of being taught to good purpose. For first, the deprivation of hearing renders their other senses peculiarly sensitive and vigorous, and imitation, nature's great educational lever, is more powerfully exerted through the eyes than through the ears. The sense of their deprivation also renders them eager to acquire knowledge, and docile and grateful to their teachers; they take a superlative delight in the beauties and secrets of nature, and all teachers of the deaf and dumb know that they have a natural tendency towards and a love of virtue. Deceit they abhor, but their original disposition is changed when they are suf-

fered to grow up without teaching; and the reason is plain; their eager temperaments, their anxiety to gain knowledge, their sensitive feelings, the impossibility of expressing their sentiments and wants and of conveying their ideas to others, together with the continual mortification and ill-usage they meet with, render them morose and sullen, or violent and passionate; and they are finally driven to deceit as their only safeguard against the injustice and selfishness of the world. In their early age they are enamoured of goodness and more than commonly vehement in their pursuit of virtue and knowledge. They have also the advantage of never hearing anything that can corrupt their minds, and are therefore in a manner fitted, as it were, by nature for good impressions through education. To be charitable to them and to foster institutions well calculated to alleviate their infirmity is therefore a godlike charity. "Thrice blessed," for the giver will receive his reward if he be patriotic, and none can be so in the true sense if he be not charitable, by contributing to instruct a multitude. Alas! that they are a multitude of persons who by his generosity will become the best kind of citizens, while he rescues from misery so many unhappy creatures.

It has been observed that no very great man has sprung from the class of deaf and dumb people, and an absurd and cruel argument has from this been drawn, that at best they will be scarcely entitled to rank amongst intelligent beings; but this is equally heartless and foolish. Those people who are capable of contributing to the general well-being of society without having the ambition to overtop their neighbours are undoubtedly the most useful citizens. Ambition is not so much the offspring of great mental powers, as of vanity stimulated by the admiration of mankind, who never fail to applaud the man while they condemn the action.

Now, the deaf and dumb are by their infirmity in a great measure precluded from this stimulus to ambition; they are conscious also of their want of power to compete in turbulent scenes with men complete in their formation, and are content to be useful without being pernicious by aiming at a superiority which they never can attain. The male part are therefore generally quiet, contented, and industrious; and the females more than ordinarily affectionate and devoted to their domestic duties, being cut off from all that foolish flattery which ruins through the hearing.

They are also more dependent, and therefore more grateful for the protection afforded them by the male sex, and cling more fondly in proportion to those who are attached to them.

There is, however, one capital point in the education of the

deaf and dumb, which has been, but ought never to be lost sight of, I mean coercion. Corporal punishment, violence, anger of any kind, should never be displayed towards them, nor indeed towards any children. What can be more insensate than the system of public schools, where hundreds of boys, no two of whom have exactly the same feelings, passions, powers, or judgment, are all taught upon the same plan, and all governed by fear, while at the same time they are exhorted to discard fear and be manly. They are taught to despise the pain by which they are to be coerced; and their fortitude makes that which should be a shame a subject of glory.

They are essentially formed to learn by kindness; any violence appears to them, who can only behold it in all its deformity (and even the most legitimate anger is deformity to the eye), as a gross injustice, an exertion of brute power, without right or benevolence. To use corporal punishment to the deaf and dumb is a cursed thing, void of all reason and humanity.

It is also a pernicious system to teach them entirely in the house: the best, the most natural, the surest, the quickest, the most grateful and benevolent mode is to teach them abroad in the fields; their enjoyment of nature is exquisite, and their desire of knowledge increased tenfold at these times; but if it were not so there is a vital point in question. Let any man picture to himself a deaf and dumb child rendered blind by close application to his books at home, when his eyes would be strengthened by exercise, and his intellect enlarged by taking him abroad and giving him exercise of body as well as mind. Let him consider what a miserable wreck would thus have been made by his folly, and he will, I think, at once agree that it is through natural objects the deaf and dumb ought to be taught.

In the foregoing observations I have not touched upon religion, because I do not wish to entangle the subject of education with sectarian questions; but it is clear that the greatness and goodness of God cannot be better taught than through His visible works, and that the peculiar tenets of any sect will not be worse understood, or less implicitly believed, if learned during joyous and happy strolls in the meadows, while the mind is contented and the body light and healthful, than if taught in a house, when confinement and overstrained attention has rendered the body languid, and overburthened the power of thought. Religion should go to the heart, and it will find entrance there when the heart is expanded and joyful better than when it is contracted and oppressed.

APPENDIX VI.

ON LORD CORNWALLIS'S MILITARY OPERATIONS IN IRELAND DURING GENERAL HUMBERT'S INVASION.

SIR,*—Your last number contains an article on the defence of Ireland during the late war, which, though written with great urbanity of style, requires some comments.

In the first place, the writer, after saying that Colonel Napier was chief field engineer of the army in Ireland at the period of Hoche's invasion, proceeds to describe the absurd and unmilitary state of the engineer defences in the northern parts, from which it might be inferred that under Colonel Napier's superintendence the service had suffered from such ridiculous proceedings and culpable ignorance. Now, Sir, at the period of Hoche's menaced invasion, the late Colonel G. Napier was a half-pay infantry officer residing near Dublin; but his great capacity, his experience, and extensive knowledge of every branch of military affairs, and his commanding character, had in a manner obliged the Government of the day to seek his assistance at that critical period. The office of chief field engineer was actually created for the purpose of giving him an opportunity of assisting in the military operations.

A quarrel with Lord Carhampton, the particulars of which may be seen in the Appendix to Moore's 'Life of Lord Edward Fitzgerald,' induced him to refuse the salary, and the departure of the French fleet put an end to his functions in a few weeks after his appointment. It is plain therefore that he could have had no hand in the follies of the day, so humorously and truly described by your correspondent.

The next point on which I wish to comment is the censure upon Lord Cornwallis's military conduct during Humbert's invasion. The writer of the article in question is evidently a candid as well as a sensible man, and I think I can convince him that Lord Cornwallis's military conduct in this instance was quite worthy of his great and deserved reputation.

* It is not known to what publication this letter was addressed.

1st. He censures Lord Cornwallis for having sent a militia instead of a regular force to fight the enemy at Castlebar, describing his lordship as having, *after* the affair of Castlebar, put in motion ten thousand men to stop the progress of eight hundred French troops whose cause was hopeless. Humbert's corps was, I believe, nearer eighteen than eight hundred men: but leaving that point aside, I shall proceed to give you a short abstract derived from unquestionable sources of the real state of affairs, and conduct of Lord Cornwallis:—

The rebellion of '98 had just been crushed, and Lord Cornwallis's wise and humane measures of conciliation were beginning to take effect, but the spirit of disaffection to the Government was not subdued; many bands of insurgents were still wandering about, many chiefs still at large, and burning to renew the contest if a favourable opportunity offered.

On the 24th August intelligence reached the Castle that Humbert had landed at Killala Bay; the information as to his numbers was not precise, but they had been well received. The troops were at this time in march for the different permanent stations allotted to them after their late campaign against the insurgents. The first thing was to order the army to concentrate again; posting, however, sufficient bodies in certain places to check any insurrectionist movement. Then General Lake was ordered to Galway to assemble a force there. General Nugent was directed to draw troops from the north, and assemble them on the side of Sligo. General Taylor, then at Sligo, was directed to feel for the enemy but not to commit himself; and General Lake was particularly warned not to risk an action before assembling a force sufficient to ensure success, as the actual state of the country was such that any check at the beginning might produce serious consequences. Meanwhile the main army marched to concentrate at Longford or Athlone, and all troops that could be spared from the garrisons and interior districts were directed on the Shannon. On the 26th the troops began to concentrate on that river, and Lord Cornwallis, although suffering from the gout, arrived in person.

Thus far it would appear that neither activity nor intelligence were wanting. The enemy was hemmed in on the right and left by Lake and Nugent, and Taylor, with a column of observation, put upon his track; the main army concentrating in his front in the centre of Ireland, ready to march where circumstances should require, and by its power and rapidity checking any disposition of the people to rise in favour of the enemy: and so far from Lake

being sent with an insufficient force to combat Humbert, he was especially desired to avoid an action.

Now began the errors, not of Lord Cornwallis, but of his lieutenant. On the 26th he received intelligence that Humbert had not advanced beyond Ballina; but at the same time information arrived that General Hutchinson, who commanded in Galway, had moved from thence with a small force to Castlebar, thus courting an action with troops inferior in number and quality to the enemy at the most critical moment.

On the 27th news arrived that Lake, having joined Hutchinson at Castlebar about eleven o'clock at night, and much fatigued with constant travelling, had no time to correct the position of the troops which was bad, or to make any arrangements, for at five o'clock next morning he was informed that the enemy was near, and at seven o'clock Humbert, who had made a forced march by an unguarded mountain road, fell upon him and totally routed his force, taking nine pieces of artillery. General Hutchinson had detached a good many troops to his front in observation; and hence not more than eleven hundred infantry were engaged, and these behaved generally very ill. The negligence of the general was, however, the primary cause of the disaster. The artillery stood manfully to their guns, and Captain Shortall,* a very intrepid officer who commanded them, was desperately wounded and taken while himself firing the last round.

The accounts received of the amount of the French force, and of the number of insurgents who had joined them, was still very vague: it was said that many of Lake's troops had joined the enemy, and that he had been followed up and again beaten at Hollymount, thus causing some alarm for the safety of Athlone, which was in itself incapable of defence. The army therefore crossed the Shannon and took post in front of that town on the 28th, and on the 29th marched to Ballinamore, where Lake and Hutchinson joined it. As no certain intelligence of the enemy's numbers or march could be obtained, the army halted and was organized in brigades; but General Robert Craufurd was detached with a body of cavalry by Ballinrobe to Castlebar to seek for the French, and to follow them where they went.

On the 31st the main body also advanced, and on the 1st September encamped beyond Tuam, where it was joined by General Hunter with two regular regiments, which compelled a further

* Afterwards General Shortall, whose death, in 1846, has been noticed in this biography.

halt, as these regiments had marched without stopping from Wexford to Tuam; and as General Taylor's corps, which had come down from Sligo to Boyle, was considered too weak, Lake was sent to command it, taking with him a reinforcement of infantry and sixty cavalry.

Here there is a third epoch. The main army having closed in with the enemy, he was confined to a corner, and by means of Craufurd's cavalry on the left, and Taylor's, now Lake's corps, on the right, hemmed in on both flanks, and cut off from communication with the other parts of the island. On the 3rd September, the French being by the reports still at Castlebar, the army marched to Hollymount, and Lake advanced from Boyle to French Park. At Hollymount General Craufurd joined, confirming the report that the enemy were still at Castlebar, and it was expected that they would fight. But at five o'clock in the evening reports arrived that they had marched from Castlebar at four o'clock in the morning, in the direction of Swineford; but as their route had not been watched long enough to ascertain whether their march was upon Sligo, Killala, or the Shannon, patrols of cavalry and scouts were sent out to gather intelligence, and Craufurd with his dragoons followed through Castlebar. Lake also was directed to close upon the enemy and harass him, but not to risk an action.

These previous movements had drawn what may be called his line of investment down to the left flank, and in some measure opened a way for the enemy to the Shannon; wherefore, against the opinions of the general officers who all wished to march in a direct line after Humbert, Lord Cornwallis resolved to move towards Carrick-on-Shannon where he had stores and a garrison, by the way of Ballyhannis and French Park, for he dreaded lest Humbert should cross that river by a forced march and penetrate the county of Longford, where, as well as in Leitrim, he knew that a plan had been prepared for an insurrection which was ready to break out, and which did partially commence a few days after. Then the French might have penetrated to Dublin where there was a large party ready to receive them. Thus the whole island would have been thrown into commotion, and before it could have been quieted the armament from Brest would have arrived. On the other hand, if the French aimed only to regain Killala or to take Sligo, a few marches gained by them would be of no consequence. On this ground Lord Cornwallis, with equal prudence and firmness, moved on the 5th to Ballyhannis, where he ascertained that the enemy's direction was on Sligo, and that Lake was already at Ballaghy in pursuit. From Ballyhannis General Moore was sent

at his own request with 2000 men and some artillery to reinforce Lake, while the main army marched to Carrick-on-Shannon. Meanwhile Humbert marching rapidly reached Coloony Bridge on the 6th; where Colonel Vereker with 300 of the Limerick militia having rashly opposed him, was beaten with the loss of 60 men and two guns; and the French general instead of pushing for Sligo marched upon Drumahair, and then turning to his right did, as Lord Cornwallis had foreseen, make for the Shannon, which he crossed at Ballintra on the 7th, and endeavoured to break down the bridge behind him; but during this time Lake had pursued him step by step, and Craufurd with his cavalry prevented him from breaking the bridge, followed him over the Shannon, and harassed him incessantly. Lord Cornwallis, having on the 7th heard of Humbert's movement upon Ballintra, recalled Moore (who had reached Coloony) by Boyle-upon-Carrick, and as Humbert was now pushing for Mohil and Granard—the very centre of the disaffected districts—the main army made a night march for the latter place, and reaching Johnstown, was thus again placed between the enemy and Dublin. Meanwhile Craufurd, having for two days vexed the rear of the enemy, pressed him so closely that at Ballinamuck, half way between Mohill and Granard, Humbert gave up the game, and after a partial action with Lake's advanced guard, surrendered. The French lost very few men; but no quarter was given to the unfortunate insurgents, and the field of battle was covered with the slain. Some accounts make the number of dead amount to four thousand!

Thus, Sir, I have shown—

1st. That Lord Cornwallis, so far from sending Lake with militia to fight the French at Castlebar, did positively forbid him to fight at all.

2nd. That the 10,000 men were put in motion long before, and not in consequence of the affair at Castlebar.

3rd. That it was not to crush a few hundred wandering French, but to prevent a great insurrection, and to avoid a dangerous war, that so many men were employed.

That every effort was made to close with Humbert that prudence dictated, both by the judicious employment of masses and of moveable columns.

And when it is considered that even the regular army generally was in a very disorganised and undisciplined state, and that the irregulars were from their violence, ferocity, and insubordination, more likely to create than suppress a serious insurrection, while many of the militia were actually joining the enemy, I think it must be admitted that Lord Cornwallis' conduct was at once

vigorous, prudent, and military. I know that it was approved of by Sir John Moore at the time, and by other able and practised men. His own after judgment on the affair (and considering his experience and character that should weigh for something in the scale) was, that if it were to do over again, he would have patrolled more carefully to his right after passing Tuam, by which he would have sooner known of Humbert's march from Castlebar.

As to the French general's conduct, I really cannot see that his marches were so unmilitary: he might, and, as he was a *corps perdu*, he ought certainly to have pushed at once without delay from Killala either against Sligo or into the disaffected districts of Leitrim and Longford; but setting that aside, it was not very bad with his small force to make a forced march, beat a corps hanging on his right flank, and having thus drawn the main body of his enemy to that side, turn to the left, defeat another body at Coloony, and then passing the Shannon by long marches endeavour to reach Dublin. If he failed, it was because his adversary with greater means was as active and vigilant as himself.

W. N.

APPENDIX VII.

SIX LETTERS, IN VINDICATION OF THE BRITISH ARMY, EXPOSING THE CALUMNIES OF THE LIVERPOOL FINANCIAL REFORM ASSOCIATION.

[*Notice.*—As no public measures founded on falsehood can ever benefit the working or any other class of people, or indeed any persons save those who promulgate such falsehoods for their own private ends; these letters, exposing the malignant calumnies upon the army, published by President Gladstone and his Financial Reform Association, are offered to the public.

March, 1849.]

To the Editor of the 'Times.'

Dec. 29, 1848.

SIR,—The Liverpool Financial Reform Association has transmitted to me its tracts, desirous, I suppose, to fix my attention on

the statements relative to the army; and truly I find something very worthy of attention in the following paragraph, introduced after an assertion that the Colonels of regiments supply bad clothing to obtain greater profits:—

4th Tract, page 52.—"It is also necessary to remark that the clothes provided by the Colonel are only a part of what the soldier wears. All linen, flannel, hosiery, shoes, forage caps, stocks, brushes, combs, and small articles, besides at least one cloth overall for Dragoons, and occasionally trousers for infantry, are provided by the Quartermaster and his chief the Clothing Colonel, and paid for out of the soldier's pay by daily stoppages. The profits accruing from these regimental clothes-shops afford an inducement to the heads of that department of the service to be continually devising changes in the style of dress, of underclothing, of boots, of shoes, and other necessaries, so that the men are obliged to purchase new articles and submit to stoppages in payment of them, while the articles set aside and declared to be unregimental are yet in good condition—in many cases not half worn."

In opposition to this statement I offer the following facts, and call upon the public to say what the honour of that association can be, which thus, knowing the truth, publishes the false; or, what its title to guide and instruct the nation, if in ignorance, arising from want of due inquiry, it scruples not to vilify and insult officers having the honourable claim of long and arduous services to the respect of the people.

First, as to the injurious assumption that Colonels profit by furnishing bad clothing to their regiments.

The clothing of the army is settled by the Queen's Government. The Colonels have only to furnish it according to the royal warrant and established pattern. It has been the same from time immemorial. It is, as to texture and value, superior to the clothing of any continental army; and to protect the soldier from unfair practices in the supply, the following checks have been provided:—

A permanent board of General Officers, sitting in London, receives samples of every article, and, if according to the royal warrant, those samples are sealed and transmitted to the regiments as a test for the examination of the clothing for the year; but not until the clothing has been again checked by the examination of the Inspecting Officers of Army Clothing, a different body from the Inspecting Board of Generals. When the clothing reaches the regiment a board of officers, assisted by the master tailor and shoemaker, sits to examine if the articles agree with the sealed patterns; if not, the whole, or part, as the case may be, is thrown back on the

Colonel's hands, and he must provide better articles and settle as he can with the clothiers.

The interest and pride of the Lieutenant-Colonel and Board of Regimental Officers are evidently involved in this examination. They naturally desire the soldier to look upon them as protectors of his rights; while to the Horse Guards and the public they wish to present a well-dressed and contented corps. The check does not stop there. The General Officer commanding is bound, at his half-yearly inspection, to ascertain whether the Queen's regulations have been obeyed; whether the soldiers have any complaints to make; and he transmits formal reports of these things to the Commander-in-Chief. Nor is this duty lightly performed. Nothing is more frank and just than the intercourse on such occasions between the General and the soldiers. The officers are ordered to retire. The General remains alone with the men; he invites, he encourages them to state their just grievances if they have any. Nay, if they only think they have cause of dissatisfaction, his duty is to listen patiently and show their errors if there be error.

So much for profit derived from bad clothing. Let us now examine the paragraph quoted from page 52, Tract 4.

The paragraph assumes that Colonels of regiments, officers who have passed their youth in honourable service, do, in their old age, abandon all sense of justice and decency, to eke out their allowances with miserable frauds on the soldiers by whose valour they have been raised to the situation they thus disgrace. Are there even seeming grounds for such a revolting insolence of falsehood? Let the following statement of facts answer :—

1. The extra articles of clothing, termed in military parlance "necessaries," are not provided by "the Quartermaster and his Chief the Clothing Colonel." They are not provided by the Colonel at all. They are obtained, under the control of the Captain, by the Pay-Serjeant and the men themselves; and the Queen's regulations strictly command that the best and cheapest articles should be provided. The Quartermaster is absolutely forbidden to traffic; his stores are resorted to, because the articles are strictly regimental in fashion, and, being purchased wholesale, better and cheaper; but the price is fixed from time to time by the Lieutenant-Colonel, assisted by a Board of Officers; in any case, the Colonel has no partnership in or control over the sales or purchases; his operations are confined to the general clothing establishment by the Queen's warrant. So entirely unconstrained are the soldiers, that good men, and generally married men, are allowed and even encouraged to purchase for themselves, and when the Pay-Serjeant

is employed to buy (at the retail shops) for the company, one or more soldiers, shoemakers, tailors, or other handicraft-men, go with him to overlook and advise him as to the bargains!

2. The Royal regulations admit only of a specified number and fashion of necessaries for a soldier. The Colonel, who is never with the regiment, knows nothing of this supply, nothing of the cost, nothing of the arrangements as to form, fashion, change, or duration. Such matters belong to the interior economy of regiments, and, subject to the regulations, are under the control of the Lieutenant-Colonel and the Captains.

But there may be abuses. Look at the checks.

1. A Captain orders a soldier to take a new pair of trousers—but within the regulations; he cannot travel out of them as to form or number. The soldier demurs, appeals to the commanding officer; he decides against him; the man can still appeal to the Inspecting-General, or he may have a Court-Martial on the case, though that in a doubtful matter would be hazardous; but he is not debarred by any fear from complaining by letter to the Commander-in-Chief.

Is this official protection all he has to rely upon? No; there is for the Lieutenant-Colonel a personal motive to do justice to the soldier. All complaints made to the Inspecting-General must be reported to the Horse Guards, and many of them would seriously affect his reputation and prospects. It is the same for the Captain, who has also a pecuniary interest to restrict rather than to augment the soldier's expenses. Foul dealing cannot be hidden. Each soldier has a little book of his accounts, signed by the Captain; the Inspecting-General compares this with the Captain's books signed by the soldier, and a reference to the regimental defaulter's book would show whether the man was well or ill behaved; if the former, it would give weight to his complaint. Again, the Inspecting-General, if he find the aggregate debt of a company of one hundred men to exceed 10*l*., must make a special report of the fact, and if no satisfactory explanation were furnished, the Lieutenant-Colonel and Captain would incur the Commander-in-Chief's displeasure.

The Captain's pecuniary interest is powerfully in favour of the soldier. If a man dies or deserts, his accounts are immediately made up, and the credit balance transmitted to the Secretary-at-War for the heirs, or, failing of heirs, for the public Treasury. But if there be a debt balance the Captain loses it, and the expense of the man's funeral also, and there an end. He must therefore be at once both stupid and dishonourable to cheat the soldiers and take money out of his own pocket to put in that of his Colonel, a

man whom he has probably never seen, may never see, and from whom he can scarcely hope any benefit.

Such, Sir, is the system established for the protection of the soldier, who has also the guarantee—no slight one in the British army—of his officer's honour as a gentleman. Will those persons who have so wantonly and so recklessly assailed that system and that honour make public their system towards the poor labouring men, women, and children, from whose ceaseless toil they derive their own riches? Will they publish a true detailed account of their truck system? Will they state what care, what money, what help, what protection, they bestow on their sick labouring people when profits are falling?

W. NAPIER,
Major-General, Colonel of the 27th Regiment.

To the Editor of the 'Times.'

SIR,—It would seem that the Financial Reform Association required time to digest my answer to their tract; or, it may be, there was difficulty in finding a person bold enough to assume the responsibility; a numerous body of Englishmen must contain many men who would feel the disgrace attaching to false accusations. Meanwhile, the Association, has readily obtained the anonymous aid of the *Daily News*—a journal which has cordially abused me and my brother Sir Charles Napier since its first appearance, and will doubtless continue to do so until it goes out; but very heartily we hope it may do the writer good, as we are sure it does us no harm.

The *Daily News* says that, with a superabundance of logic, I have proved it is not the Colonels but the Captains who profit from the "*perquisites*" derived from the sale of necessaries. My whole letter proves that there are no perquisites at all. Let that pass.

President Gladstone says, the Tract No. 4 did not assert that Captains had a pecuniary interest in such sales, but that the Quartermasters had: and he asks, "What is the insult?" "What is false?" A reference to the tract will show that the Association expressly charges the "Quartermaster and *his chief the Clothing Colonel*" with having a fraudulent pecuniary interest. That is the insult! That is false! The Colonel, as I have shown, has not even a knowledge of, much less an interest in, such matters; and the Quartermaster could not defraud the men if he were so inclined.

In another place the President says "I pronounced it to be false" of the Association to assert that, "in cases where no profit arises to the Colonels because of the superior quality of the clothing, allowances are made to him accordingly." I know of no cases where no profit arises, and I did not even allude to that part of the subject.

The President says that I have proved too much in showing how the Clothing Board protects the soldier, because eleven out of nineteen of that Board have regiments! And while he makes this broad insinuation that the eleven are therefore sordid knaves, he takes no notice of the fact that the Inspectors of Army Clothing, none of whom have regiments, form a distinct body established to check the Clothing Board. There are several other slips of this kind which for brevity I do not notice; but with these specimens of congenial rhetoric, I may without injustice call the writer in the *Daily News*, and President Gladstone, cater-cousins at least. What indeed is Mr. Gladstone's letter but a long, angry, wilful misconception of my statements and their object?

It would perhaps be difficult to prove that the present system of paying Colonels and clothing their regiments is not the most economical for the public, and the safest for the soldiers; but what had I to do with the system established by the Sovereign for the clothing of her troops, beyond showing that the Colonels faithfully execute their orders, and do not defraud the soldiers? And, "*à propos des bottes*," what had I to do with the management of estates in Tipperary? The President must when he wrote that have been dozing over Shakspeare, and dreaming of *Falstaff's* hostess and *Prince Hal's* leather jerkin; but I doubt if his new reform coat will prove a good robe of endurance.

The Association distinctly asserted, and entered into minute details to give an appearance of accurate knowledge, that Colonels of regiments issued bad clothing for the sake of profit; and further, that they carried on, in conjunction with the Quarter-masters, a sordid, gainful, and fraudulent trade. I have exposed the baseless nature of this malignant accusation. How has the exposure been met? Mr. President Gladstone steps out like one of Homer's heroes, leaving his associates in a cloud—of devil's dust perhaps—and with gibes and evasions, and references to extraneous matters, insinuates that all the British officers are tyrannical; and this with just as much truth as there is in his former charge of fraud, which he now tacitly abandons without the grace of acknowledging the error.

A writer in the *Times*, signing himself "A late Colour-Serjeant

of the 43rd," has shown very clearly how honestly the soldier is protected in the expenditure for his extra food. I propose in a future letter to show how he is protected in the Government contracts for his rations; and also how he is protected in his general rights, and from the oppression of officers, by the military law and customs; thus meeting this new charge of tyranny. Meanwhile, as facts are the best arguments, I will leave Mr. President's ebullitions to work themselves clear, merely remarking that when the pot boils the scum runs over, and proceed to state an occurrence curiously coincident with the writing of my first letter.

Three regiments, and it is understood two others are in the same predicament, received their clothing some months ago. That clothing had passed the Board; had passed the Inspectors of Clothing; had passed the Regimental Board of Officers; had been received by the men and worn for several months; when by experience it was discovered that the cloth was not so good as it ought to have been. None but a very skilful manufacturer could, without the test of wear, have discovered the defect: but it was thus discovered, and a report was immediately made of the fact to the Commander-in-Chief, who at once ordered the clothing to be returned to the Colonels, directing them to provide new and better. And to prevent Mr. President from using this fact as a proof that the Colonels do seek to cheat the men, I will follow the rejected clothing to its ultimate destination. The bargains made by Colonels with their clothiers are so stringent that they in turn throw this clothing upon the latter, who, equally provident, throw it on the manufacturer.

W. NAPIER,

Major-General, Colonel of the 27th Regiment.

Jan. 6, 1849.

PS. I happened to have read Mr. Gladstone's letter in the *Standard*, and wrote this my answer before I saw the comments in the *Times*, which are more forcible, and have the advantage of emanating from an uninterested quarter; but having commenced I will with your permission proceed, and in due time give my third letter alluded to above; the public will then have at least undeniable facts on which to form its judgment of the British military system as regards the protection of the private soldier.

To the Editor of the 'Times.'

SIR,—I once heard a gentleman declare that his breeches were quite spontaneous. I think I have now a key to his meaning in

the so-called scarlet trousers of the 11th Hussars, upon which President Gladstone fastens with as much ire as a gobble-cock would if they were really scarlet; but unhappily they are *crimson* and not *extras*, for the men have no others and the colour costs the public nothing. The President's scarlets are spontaneous.

But if the Colonels of Cavalry do not cheat the public in scarlet inexpressibles, they do by horse-dealing! That is false in letter and spirit, and therefore, in the President's own words, "worse than an insult." The Colonels cannot profit by such transactions. I challenge Mr. Gladstone and his calumniating tractarians to proof.

Well, then, the Hospital stoppages! I answer, that the officer and the soldiers are treated alike: the soldier is maintained from the hospital stoppages when sick; the officer maintains himself; neither pay for medical aid or medicines.

Let me now recall to recollection the rejection of clothing by three regiments, mentioned in my letter. The stern guardianship of the Commander-in-Chief prevented bad clothing being foisted on the soldier. But by whom was the attempt made? Not by the Regimental Officers, for they reported the wrong; not by the Clothing Colonels, for they threw it on the clothiers; not by the clothiers, for they threw it on the manufacturer. Thus it is traced home to that class of which this slanderous Association seems to be principally composed. I do not impute wilful dishonesty, though there are such things as "shoddy" and "devil's dust;" for I am told certain processes in dressing cloth may by accident be too long continued and cause deterioration without visible sign thereof.

Food and tyranny come next. The Colour-Serjeant late of the 43rd has shown in the *Times* that the daily expenditure of a soldier for coffee, vegetables, &c., is managed under the supervision of the men themselves; that the accounts are examined and recorded by the Captains, who are responsible to the Commanding Officer and the Inspecting General for their correctness. The Government rations of meat and bread are managed by contracts founded on returns from every military station of the average prices for the half-year, and of the actual cost of the double ration to the soldier. This last varies, but can never exceed 6*d.*; if accidental circumstances raise it higher, the Government pays the difference; but very seldom it reaches that figure. The rations must be of just weight and good quality. The Commanding Officer can order a Board to sit on each delivery: if it condemns, the rations are rejected, and he purchases the best he can obtain

at any price, charging the cost to the contractor; if he neglects this duty, the soldier may lawfully complain to the General.

President Gladstone says a soldier dare not complain; and I will not say Regimental Officers and Serjeants cannot make a soldier who does so wretched if, corporately and individually, they abandon all sense of justice, truth, honour, humanity, patriotism, and obedience to their Sovereign's orders; for all those duties would be violated. I will not say, either, that isolated cases of oppression do not occur; I have detected such. But I will show that the law, the custom, and the regulations of the army are calculated to prevent abuse of power, and do practically protect the soldier. Exceptions may be adduced. Over-sensitive soldiers may complain of injured feeling, and hasty-tempered civilians may clamour about the natural rights of Britons; but our profession is a terrible one, in which natural rights have no place; we have only conventional rights. War requires a stern organisation, fitted to raise men above the ordinary weaknesses, wants, and emotions of humanity; it will not admit of delicate consideration for bodily suffering or nice sensibilities; the soldier must do or die. But he has undoubted conventional rights; and respect for them is essential to that moral influence of command without which the force of armies would waste away like snow in the sun.

Justice is the characteristic of our military system. The Mutiny Act fixes the military crimes and punishments. The Articles of War, founded on that Act, issue from the Sovereign's will, but in contravention of the Act would be of no legal force. The military regulations issue from the Commander-in-Chief; a perusal of them will show that they inculcate gentleness of command; a reclaiming and preventive rather than a punishing discipline. But occasions for punishment must arise. The commanding officer can only deal with minor offences, and with those only by Court-Martial, for I do not hold slight every-day irregularities as offences. When a serious offence happens he must apply to the General for a District Court-Martial, stating in writing the nature of the offence, the names of the witnesses, and the nature of their testimony, and the character of the accused extracted from the "Defaulters' Book." If the General, after duly considering the temper, age, and military experience of the commanding officer, grants a Court-Martial, it will be composed of officers from different regiments having, for the most part, no knowledge of the accused; and they are not restricted by technical rules of evidence, but are sworn to do justice according to their conscience, the Articles of War, and the custom of war. The accused is previously provided with a list of the witnesses against

him, and he may name those in his favour, and they must attend; and be it recollected also, that on both sides they are generally soldiers, comrades, in the same predicament, and seldom without a secret knowledge of the truth. The names of the officers on the Court are also given to the prisoner, and if he requires the aid of a friend, officer, civilian, or soldier, he is not to be denied.

When before the Court he is asked if he objects to any of his judges? If he says "No," the trial goes on; the surgeon's certificate, that the prisoner's health will admit of punishment, being however first recorded. If he is incapable, from dulness, fear, or ignorance, to conduct his own defence, he is assisted by the President or some other members of the Court on all points necessary to the elucidation of truth; but there is, thank Heaven, no special pleading. Gentleness and patience I have ever observed to characterise the bearing of the judges, as a body, towards the prisoner. The opinion of the youngest is taken first; and after the finding, but previous to sentence, it is deposed on oath that the prisoner has been warned that all former offences would be considered; an apparently harsh measure, yet of military necessity, the object being to form good soldiers: reiterated offences make a bad one.

When sentence is passed, the President waits on the General with the minutes carefully taken, without interlining or erasures. The General ascertains in doubtful cases the feeling of the Court irrespective of the military formula of decision, and often he consults the commanding officer as to the man's general habits and temper. If he is dissatisfied with the trial, he directs the proceedings to be revised, giving his reasons in writing on the face of the minutes; once he can do this, not oftener. If he approves he writes so at the bottom of the minutes, confirms the sentence, and directs the time and place of executing it. But often he pardons, often he mitigates; he cannot aggravate punishment. Mercy is in his single will, but many must combine for severity, and keep within legal bounds, for illegal military sentences are within the revision and redress of the common law. The minutes of trial are also sent to the Judge-Advocate-General, a lawyer, who will detect and reform illegal passages. They go also to the Commander-in-Chief, who, were it only for the support of his own authority, will not suffer his orders for exercising a benign discipline to be violated with impunity: he will visit the sin of frequent or unnecessary punishment on the head of the commanding officer.

General and Regimental Courts-Martial differ from District Courts-Martial only in their power, and that the first have a legal assessor, the Judge-Advocate, to advise them on trial; and the

second is composed entirely of the prisoner's own officers, by which he generally gains, unless he is an incorrigible offender. In capital offences the sentence is generally referred to the criminal judges of the land; and all trials by Court-Martial, all offences, save of the most trifling nature, all punishments, are recorded in the regimental books, which the Inspecting General must examine and report upon twice a year to the Commander-in-Chief.

The customs of the army are also generally favourable to the soldiers; where they are not the regiment gets a bad name. Thus, if a soldier thinks himself obnoxious to his Captain, or to any particular officer or serjeant, upon stating reasonable grounds he is removed to another company; and often do men write to the Commander-in-Chief to be removed to other regiments—a request seldom denied.

A contradiction has, I have been told, been given to my statement, that the General orders the officers to retire when he invites the soldiers to state their grievances. I know not if many generals hold this practice to be unnecessary; but during the six years I was a general on the staff I invariably enforced it; and during the many long years I was a regimental officer I never saw it neglected. Yet it is only a form of inviting confidence. British officers are incapable of attempting—and, if capable, they dare not in the presence of their general—or, if daring enough in such wrong, they could not intimidate their men on such occasions: the British soldier is a rough and dangerous customer to misuse where his established rights are concerned.

You will comprehend, Sir, that I do not write thus for President Gladstone and his associates of penny wisdom and pound calumny; they cannot understand what components go to form a good army, nor can they understand the value of one when it is formed. I write to satisfy the non-military public that the organisers and leaders of the national troops do not betray their trust.

I have served regimentally in the artillery, the cavalry, and the line; in heavy and in light corps; on the staff in a subordinate capacity, and as general officer. I have in peace and war seen the working of our military system under the Duke of York, the Duke of Wellington, Sir John Moore, and General Robert Craufurd, all rigorous disciplinarians though of different methods; the three last of superlative mastery in their art. I have, while in retirement, uninfluenced by military associations, and from the midst of passionate politicians whose prejudices and sympathies were all opposed to our military system, observed its progress; I have studied assiduously the systems of other nations, both ancient and modern,

and I have never been able to reach any conclusion unfavourable to the British system.

There is always some national idiosyncrasy, if I may so speak, to which military discipline, in its vulgar sense, must be subservient, if you would have a good army. The French, a vivacious, criticising people, demand a polite but familiar equality; and their discipline, stern and positive on all vital points, opens a vent for this mental steam, compensating the inconvenience by working with what is called French honour; a mere conventional phrase for the pride which every people possesses though the outward demonstration be different. The British soldier has a stern, indomitable sense of his rights according to the conditions of his servitude; a pride that discipline neither ought to attempt, nor can subdue or lower. It may however be enlisted on the side of discipline, and for nearly fifty years that I have been an officer, I have observed a gradual progress towards harmonising the vital requirements of discipline with the noble, generous temper of the British soldier, who will bear with a careless fortitude any privation but that of justice. When his sense of decency and self-respect is no longer outraged by the barrack regulations for married men; when better occupation than drilling, alternating with drinking in public-houses, is provided in peace-time for the soldier, the British military system will be most excellent. I mean, however, better military teaching by giving occupation, not with books and theories—though I will not call that amiss—but by the assembling of large camps of all arms, the habituating the soldier to the labour of constructing field-works, the usage of military tools, and the practice of gymnastics. I would have also an organisation of handmills for the grinding of corn, and teach him the manipulation of bread-making, to render our armies less dependent upon fixed magazines.

It is in bivouacs during the night that the soldier's real feelings are let loose, with as much freedom and wit, though with more decency, than Cæsar's veterans used towards that commander in his triumph. Then it is that officers hear home truths, and wise ones will profit from what they hear; the men relate their own adventures without reserve, and make them the vehicle for sarcasms bitter and original. Officers of high and low rank have I heard made the subject of their scathing scorn or irrepressible hatred; but never did I hear the general system of the army condemned, beyond the half-jocular, half-melancholy declaration of some poor suffering fellow (alluding to the king's bounty)—"That he wished the man had his money again."

Look now to history. Alexander the Great was unquestionably

the commander in whom were united the greatest number of excellent qualities, natural and adventitious, for insuring the devotion and exciting the spirit of his troops. He was ostentatiously religious; he was beautiful and strong of person; a king and a conqueror when scarcely out of boyhood; hardier than the hardiest of his warriors, braver than the bravest; of inimitable dexterity and prowess in single combat; unmatched as a skilful captain; eloquent, generous to prodigality, and of adroit familiarity with his soldiers. Yet they would not pass the Hyphasis—they would not go to the end of the world.

Scipio, Lucullus, Cæsar — scarcely inferior to the Macedonian in personal advantages and attractive grace—equal in capacity for war, though armed with all the terrors of Roman military law, the sternest the world ever beheld and based upon the profound veneration of the Roman soldier for his military oath—were yet thwarted by mutinies when at a distance from Italy.

When has that happened to British generals? Have not many of them, of meaner intellect and slighter courage than the meanest of Alexander's body-guards or the dullest of Cæsar's centurions, led the British troops to conquest without having to silence a murmur, under privations and dangers and fatigues not less terrible or wearing than what those ancient mutineers would not endure, and to distances from their native country which surpass the incursions of Alexander? The British army has conquered an empire scarcely inferior to the Macedonian's beyond that river which his soldiers refused to pass. How have such results been obtained? Solely by the justice of the British military system. The soldier knows that his rights, according to the conditions of his servitude, are secured; he is not menaced nor cajoled, but his just conventional rights are respected, and he, a truly gallant man, respects his oath to serve faithfully till death.

W. NAPIER,
Major-General, Colonel 27th Regiment.

Jan. 10.

PS.—Since writing the above I have seen Mr. Cobden's sneer at "colonels who supply clothes and get the profits of tailors, and whom the soldiers would not obey." I answer, that is better than supplying falsehoods to get the profits of agitation; and most assuredly I would not recommend Mr. Cobden to try the force of his "unadorned eloquence" on the parade of the 27th Regiment in opposition to my orders.

W. N.

To the Editor of the 'Times.'

SIR,—The Financial Reform Association has not retracted its calumnies, yet it is unable to defend them; for of the one effort made by President Gladstone, it may, in imitation of Thiers' maxim "That the King reigns but does not govern," be said, "The President writes but does not answer." Potential of assertion, he appears content to wallow in slander; but will those who work with the Association in sincerity of principle consent to be thus involved in secret unmanly support of injurious falsehoods? To Mr. Cobden, indeed, this question is not put; he works openly enough in his vocation: Agitation, profitable Agitation, which I think the late Mr. Charles Buller with an unadorned eloquence of expression once characterised by two energetic words. But have those financial reformers who honestly seek the public good, considered how the Tract 4 has dishonourably committed them to slander, conveying insults the least offensive of which offered by one of them personally would have drawn down instant chastisement, where age and wounds had not bereft the insulted officer of power to inflict it? That foulness gentlemen should throw from them quickly, or there is no epithet of scorn and contumely inapplicable to them collectively and individually: and the sputter-mud of the *Daily News* will not hide the disgraceful stain.

Here, in the hope of giving a useful lesson, let me show Mr. Gladstone how frankly honest men desirous to open the public mind proceed. There is a point of our military system which might with reason have been assailed, but the Association, by its ignorant neglect, has demonstrated the stupid recklessness with which it has seized upon the subject it has so dishonourably handled. The serjeants of the army can be reduced to the ranks without trial, by the sole authority of those clothing colonels whom Mr. Cobden says, "the men would not obey." I again advise him not to try conclusions on that head. This arbitrary power is ancient, probably conferred when persons of influence and rank raised regiments bearing their names and commissioned by them. In some rare cases it may be beneficial; it cannot be altogether commended. The Commander-in-Chief has not such authority; he must apply to the Sovereign; and he naturally regards it with jealousy, and wisely discourages the exercise of it by the colonels. Serjeants are a very important class in the military hierarchy; they should be respectable and respected; their tenure of rank should not depend upon the pleasure of a man judging their imputed de-

linquency at a distance, and from *ex parte* statements. So strongly is this felt, that the colonel's power is exercised with great reserve and caution: yet it is exercised. I return to the main subject.

In my former letters all the pretended facts and unfounded assertions put forth by President Gladstone and his associates have been refuted in detail, with exception of that which imputes profits by horse-dealing, at the expense of the public, to clothing colonels of cavalry; and I might pass that also, because I have logically thrown the onus of proof on President Gladstone. But he has not had the temerity to accept my challenge; and my object being to disabuse the public mind rather than to confound such an antagonist, I will first state the foul, positive, reiterated accusation, and then refute it by authentic details.

Tract 4, p. 57—"It is customary to purchase two-year-old fillies and colts for low figures; get a summer's grass and a winter's hay and corn for them out of the regimental forage allowance without any cost to the head colonel (who, besides dealing in clothes, deals in horses); he pockets the difference between the price of the filly or colt and the sum of 26*l.* 5*s.* allowed for the purchase of a full-grown horse."

President Gladstone's letter.—"It (the Tract) states that the clothing colonels of cavalry regiments are also horse-dealers, that they have a profit on colts and fillies, purchased young and fed at the regimental charge. The expression 'horse-dealer' may be unpalatable, but it is true."

To these statements I have given, and I again give, an unreserved and positive contradiction; they are false in letter and spirit. Behold the proof! The clothing colonel has absolutely nothing to do with the remounting of his regiment; that duty and the responsibility rest entirely with the lieutenant-colonel. The late Sir W. Payne Galway once interfered; the lieutenant-colonel (Brotherton) resisted, and the Horse Guards decided against Sir William, on the express ground that the lieutenant-colonel was responsible to the Government. Thus calumny the first falls to the ground, or rather on the heads of the calumniators. The clothing colonels are not horse-dealers, and can gain no profit. The lieutenant-colonel selects the horses under the following regulations, which preclude the possibility of profit to any person save the regular dealer, and give very little to him.

1. The horses are all purchased at fairs by the dealer, attended generally by an officer, not necessarily, but to save the dealer from the risk of buying horses sure to be rejected. The price allowed for heavy and light regiments is 26*l.* 5*s.*, and on that sum the

dealers make their profit; they make little by the trade, and often lose money.

2. No horse can be accepted *under* "rising three," none *over* "rising seven years." And there is an allowance to the dealer of half-a-crown per horse for every eighteen miles complete after the first eighteen of the journey from the fair or place of inspection to the regiment. The officer who accompanies the dealer also receives eighteenpence per mile travelling expenses to and fro, but those expenses are never to exceed 1*l.* per horse purchased, per annum.

3. On home service the purchase-money is paid by the regimental paymaster under control and responsibility of the commanding officer, but by bills on the agent at three days' sight in favour of the dealer; the particulars of the transaction for which each bill is drawn are inserted in the pay-lists, and thus go under the revision of the Secretary-at-War and Paymaster-General.

4. When horses join a regiment none can be turned to grass without special permission from the Secretary-at-War.

5. When horses become unfit for service an application in writing to sell must be made through the Inspector-General of Cavalry, whose especial business it is also to ascertain that no horses are admitted under fifteen hands, and of activity, strength, and quality fit for the service. When cast, the sale is made by auction, under the superintendence of an officer—the time, place, and auctioneer being all appointed by the Secretary-at-War.

The only exception to these rules is the Household Brigade; each regiment composing it receives 140*l.* per troop, and the produce from sales of cast horses to cover all expenses. This arrangement, only practicable with stationary regiments, gives greater latitude as to price and management, yet the War Office finds it on the whole less expensive than the general system. That general system, however, secures economy and good horses, as was very clearly demonstrated some years back, when the French and Belgian Governments sent agents to purchase remounts in England: they paid 35*l.*, instead of 26*l.* 5*s.*, and yet got but the refuse of our fairs!

President Gladstone's expression, "Fed at the regimental charge," would imply frauds in the forage accounts, as if the officers, like rogue ostlers, cribbed from the horses' food. An insinuation worthy of the source it comes from, which may be safely left to the feelings of English gentlemen for refutation.

President Gladstone says—The Association "is well aware that *any title* which they may possess to public confidence must rest altogether upon *strict veracity and careful adhesion to facts.*" It is

clear, therefore, the President and his Association have no title whatever to the confidence of the public, and so I leave them to its contempt.

W. NAPIER,
Major-General, Colonel 27th Regiment.

Jan. 18, 1849.

To the Editor of the 'Times.'

SIR,—President Gladstone's letter in your journal of this day ends with a flourish, reminding me of the French caricature, wherein a man, being down and held by the throat, says to his adversary "I forgive you, let this end." But, Sir, I, having the President by the throat, mean, paradoxical and savage as it may seem, to choke him for the sake of morality. Seriously, Sir, I ask your favour for this letter, because if such flagitious effrontery as the President displays were to escape public exposure, there would be a public wrong.

I might, in reply to his long, discursive, and evasive story, relative to the plan of clothing regiments through their colonels, be content to say, as I did in my second letter, I have not to do with that; it is travelling out of the record; on which nothing appears but the question whether colonels honourably fulfil the conditions of the clothing warrant and obey the military laws and regulations. I repeat, however, that it will be difficult to produce a plan more economical for the public or more safe for the soldier, and in proof I refer those desirous of information to the evidence taken by the parliamentary committee of 1833 upon army and navy appointments. But I will not let the President off from exposure.

He gives extracts from the evidence of Mr. Hebbert, army-clothier, before that committee, designed to show that the Inspectors of Army Clothing are negligent and dishonest. And this is in answer to my statement that they form a check upon the colonels! This is matchless, even in the proceedings of profitable agitation. Mr. Hebbert's evidence, as may be seen by reference to pages 75, 76, 77, and 78, was directed specifically against the Inspectors of the East India Company's clothing, and the Inspectors of the Ordnance and Tower; and the following questions and answers place the mark of shame indelibly upon President Gladstone's forehead:—

"*Question* 688.—You have stated that the system of inspection by Ordnance Inspectors is deficient; do you consider this objection to apply to the military officers who are the Inspectors of Army Clothing?

"*Answer.*—Not in the least; more careful and vigilant men could not be found in the exercise of their duties.

"*Question* 689.—General Campbell and Colonel Duffy are the Inspectors?

"*Answer.*—Yes; I consider that the supplies of the army generally have been benefited by the very sound judgment they have exercised in the matter of supplies; but I consider the inspection of army clothing does not terminate with the inspection of it by the Army Inspectors; a second inspection of it invariably takes place after the supplies are sent to a regiment. The sealed patterns, with which the Inspectors compare the supplies, are also sent to the regiment, and a board, consisting of the three senior officers of the regiment and the quartermaster, assembles to compare the supplies with the sealed patterns, and they undergo a very rigid inspection at that period, and I consider the responsibility of the army-clothier does not even then cease, and that he is answerable for the well-wearing of the clothing up to the end of the time it has to wear."

One more specimen. The President writes thus:—"'But,' says Sir William, 'the colonels have no interest in sending inferior clothing to their regiments.'" This assertion, attributed to me and fixed by marks of quotation, is nowhere to be found in my letters; neither is there in them any expression which could have misled the President. It is a wilful misrepresentation, like all his assertions, of which I will now give a summary:—

1. President Gladstone and his associates charged the colonels with habitually and sordidly supplying bad clothing to their regiments.—I have shown the rigorous checks provided to bar such wrong.

2. They charged the clothing colonels and quartermasters with league and partnership to defraud the soldiers in their extra clothing.—I have shown that the colonels have no connexion whatever with the supply of such extras, and that the checks provided render it nearly impossible to perpetrate the alleged frauds.

3. They charged officers generally with tyranny,' and said the soldiers dared not complain.—I have shown that the military laws, customs, and regulations are all preventive of oppression; that the soldiers are invited to complain of real grievances at proper times; that they do often complain and are redressed.

4. They charged the colonels of cavalry with this tyranny and those frauds, and, in addition, with being sordid horse-dealers and cribbers of forage, at the expense of the public.—I have shown

that the colonels have nothing to do with the buying or selling of horses for their regiments, and that the Lieutenant-Colonel is under such regulations and supervision that he could not, if so inclined, commit wrong.

5. They especially charged the 11th Hussars with wearing scarlet breeches, extras, thinking no doubt they were a remnant of the Babylonish petticoat, to the damage of the soldier and the public.—I have shown that the breeches are crimson, not extras, and do no damage to the public or the soldier.

6. They charged the officers with obtaining medical aid without payment, whereas soldiers were forced to pay.—I have shown that neither officer nor soldier pays for medical aid.

7. They asserted that the soldier is generally ill-treated.—I have shown that even to the minutest points of his expenses,—his clothing, his food, his rights of all kinds,—the utmost care is taken to render him strict justice.

8. The President says I have garbled my extract from the Association tract, which is not true.—I have shown how he garbled his own extract as to the "Quartermaster and his Chief the Clothing Colonel."

9. The President has, as I have shown above, given a forged quotation from my letters.

10. The President has disgracefully falsified the evidence of Mr. Hebbert.—I have exposed him.

President Gladstone prides himself upon keeping his temper; better to have lost it or told the truth; for he has placed himself in the painful position of having deliberately, coolly, and without the palliation of heated passions, published ten malignant and injurious falsehoods!

I remain, Sir, yours,

W. NAPIER,

Major-General, Colonel of the 27th Regiment.

Jan. 30.

PS. President Gladstone's last letter first informed me the Liverpool Financial Reform Association had answered my letters, and I have consequently only now seen that precious production, which contains but two points worth notice: one—the hit about turning tailor myself, after expressing my contempt for one of the fraternity. The old saying that two of a trade can never agree might apply here, and a tailor with a sword might be more ridiculous than a colonel with a pair of shears; but whether as tailor or colonel, I could not desire to take in hand a hotter or a heavier goose than President Gladstone.

The second point is the assertion that I formerly wrote in the newspapers against "military abuses."—I never wrote on that subject in the newspapers, or in any other medium of publication. I never wrote upon it at all.

The Association is certainly, to use its own comical expression, "effecting the education of public opinion" in a very remarkable if not a very honourable mode.

W. N.

Feb. 1.

To the Editor of the 'Standard.'

SIR,—It may be superfluous further to notice the Liver-puddle and its solemn dingy goose; but many persons, while discarding with scorn their foul accusations, think the mode of clothing regiments through the Colonels objectionable; and I desire to show that the men who established it understood their task, which was, to protect the public and the soldier from fraud and cupidity. The system itself is coeval with the existence of a standing army, but the peculiar regulations were established in 1707, and must therefore have had John Duke of Marlborough's approbation, if not his devisement at the beginning, as it has the approbation of Arthur Duke of Wellington at the end of one hundred and forty years' working, during which period the British army has been, and still is, the best clothed in Europe; and intermediately it has had the approval of the Duke of York and of Sir David Dundas as Commanders-in-Chief; of Sir James Pulteney and Mr. Windham as Secretaries of War.

That an officer of high rank should be made clothier, seems on the surface a ridiculous and objectionable system; but troops must be clothed as well as armed by a General who intends to win, and he might be as truly described and ridiculed as an armourer or a cook, for looking to such matters and drawing bills for their cost. Yet this objection of shallow wit, together with the seeming impolicy of placing the interests of Colonels and their duty in opposition, has many times caused the matter to be referred to Parliamentary Committees and Royal Commissions for investigation and revision; six or seven have examined the matter between 1746 when the first was appointed, and 1833 when the last sat, and always with the same result, namely, that the plan was good and the objections of no force.

The reasons in favour are many and strong, even though it should be admitted as a basis that officers, after losing their best blood, many of them their fortunes, and all of them wasting their

youth and manhood in the service of their country, shall be turned adrift to starve, as sometimes sporting dogs are when the season is over. But if that is not to be the established treatment, it is evident that the Clothing Colonel's interest and comfort would both be promoted by granting him a regular fixed salary as a general officer, free from the trouble and risk of clothing his regiment; and the following observations will show that it is not for his benefit, but for the protection of the public and of the private soldier, the system has been established.

A certain number of Generals do thus receive a provision of something less upon an average than 1000*l.* per annum, *after* having served upon an average more than 45 years; and the appointment to regiments being a species of lottery, having the authority of ancient customs and exciting hope in all though the reality comes to comparatively few, suffices to content the rejected with a very low scale of remuneration. If the system were changed, there could be no just ground for refusing all Generals an equal and much higher rate of pay; for it cannot be said that 400*l.* per annum, given after perhaps 50 years' work to a man covered with wounds and who has done the State good service, is an adequate provision.

Under the present system the Colonels are so many guardians of the soldier's interest; they are responsible in character and in fortune for the goodness of the supplies; and to those influences are added supervision and checks which render sordid frauds nearly impossible. Every Colonel is stimulated by his own interest to watch closely the conduct of his clothier; each clothier is a contractor, subject to rigorous investigation, and upon whom failure is visited instantly with penalty of forfeiture of his goods and the loss of future employment. But failure of one contract would only affect one regiment, and that temporarily, a point of great importance.

Change this system for one of general contract. There must be a Government Board, half civil, half military, with chiefs and subordinates and clerks and messengers, involving an immense correspondence, accounts, stationery, postage, and law-proceedings; and all those persons must be well paid or they would inevitably pay themselves out of the contract, and not only must they be well paid, but have superannuation pensions after a certain number of years. There must be great storehouses at home and abroad; storekeepers innumerable, checking officers, guards, lights, and fuel; there must be insurance against fire, destruction by insects, by negligence, by time, by accident; and there must be an

immense accession of trouble and difficulty for inspection and for the fitting of clothing because of the accumulations in masses of the articles. There must be expenses of freight, of shipping and unshipping, of wharfage and demurrage, and of sea and land insurance, or losses attending the transmission of the stores to all parts of the world, all of which now fall on the Colonels. Finally, if the great contractor fails, the whole army suffers at once, and for a long time.

The above are the surface objections to a general contract system; below that surface would run the currents of jobbing, bribery, and electioneering interests; and where would be the soldier's chance of protection? Now he has his own established right of complaint; the vigilance and professional spirit of the regimental officers; the honour and sense of duty of the Inspector-General; the power of the Commander-in-Chief; the supervision of the Board of General Officers, checked by the Inspecting Officers of Clothing; the honour and pecuniary interest of the Clothing Colonel—all working in his favour: and so rigorous are the conditions to be fulfilled, that the responsibility of the Colonel never ceases until the clothing has been worn long enough to vindicate its goodness.

None of those checks would exist with a Government contract, or avail if they did exist. The Inspectors would be of the Board, and their certificate would at once suffice for the payment before the clothing reaches the soldier; or interest must be paid for the delay. The irresponsibility and consequent arrogance and negligence of great Government Boards are proverbial. Would a Clothing Board, with all its inevitable secret electioneering and trade interests and jobbing, ever listen to the complaint of a soldier? No; though it were backed up by the Commander-in-Chief. What endless correspondence would ensue; what proofs and arguments given that all was right, that no injury had been done, that the Board had followed the usual course, and that all was right! The soldier has now his ultimate appeal to the Commander-in-Chief. Then he would only have it to the House of Commons, where Mr. Cobden would of course be ready to defend the great contractor who had subscribed to his testimonial.

But there is experience in favour of the present system. The Guards' clothing and equipment were taken from the Colonels and put under the Secretary-at-War; the cost to the public was immediately augmented. The Artillery, the Marines, and the Veteran battalions, under the Ordnance Board, were certainly not better, the evidence would go to show them worse, supplied than

the Line and at a greater expense. Let the numbers of men be increased from a few thousands in England to two hundred thousand scattered over the globe, and the defects and expenses will increase in a geometrical proportion.

In fine, it is evident that the actual system is better, because many contractors are engaged competing for the Colonel's patronage—not by tenders, which bring all sorts of adventurers into the field, but by a steady well-understood community of interests, depending on good faith to the soldier and the Colonel, and under the strictest supervision of men having a professional duty, and summary power, to enforce fair dealing.

To return to the puddle and its goose. They find an inconsistency, because in my 'History of the Peninsular War' I wrote thus—"The British soldier conquered in the cold shade of aristocracy;"—and now I write, that I can "come to no conclusion unfavourable to the British military system." This is an instance of malignant ignorance overshooting its mark. The "cold shade" belongs to the political not the military system, which involves only the intercourse of command. But the passage is simply an eulogium upon the fortitude and spirit of the British soldier; it does not follow that the French system was applicable to the British army, or a better system. The French army, taken by conscription from all classes alike, excited by a revolutionary frenzy, and having to maintain the very existence of its nation against the banded monarchs of Europe, required, if I may so express it, an extraordinary regimen; but though brandy will nerve a man for momentary desperate exertions, it will weaken him if given every day. Shower military rewards and honours upon every daring, ambitious, reckless fellow, and such men would flock to the army as they do now to California; and if they were not satiated, which would be impossible, would soon make the sword govern.

But setting aside these general considerations, and admitting for argument that the "cold shade" appertained to the military not the political system, it had reference exclusively to the soldiers of the Peninsular war. And I pray you to mark how many gleams of sunshine have since been let in:—

1. The institution of Colour-Serjeants bearing marks of honour, having higher rank and increased pay.

2. Good-conduct stripes for privates, conferring honour and increase of pay.

3. Gratuities and pensions publicly bestowed on non-commissioned Officers for meritorious services.

4. Higher rates of pensions, and character allowed to weigh in the claim.

5. A greater number of commissions appropriated for non-commissioned Officers, and a considerable allowance of money for an outfit.

6. Courts-Martial more carefully regulated; corporal punishment restricted to a few crimes, and almost obliterated from the military code.

7. Limited service substituted for unlimited.

8. Regimental schools for soldiers' children, and libraries for the men.

9. War-medals granted to all soldiers, instead of being restricted to a few Officers.

10. Last, not least, mentioning by name those soldiers who have distinguished themselves in battle—first done by Sir Charles Napier, and apparently likely to be adopted generally.

I now repeat, without the slightest inconsistency, that I am unable by comparison to arrive at any conclusion unfavourable to the British military system.

As to the false and ribald statements concerning my own and my brother's careers, contained in the seventh Tract of the Association, they are as false and contemptible as the anonymous abusive letters with which the partisans of the Association have assailed me. But the reasoning of the Association comes simply to this: If I would acknowledge that myself and my brother Officers were justly charged with the vilest sordid frauds upon the soldiers, and gross violation of our duty to the Sovereign and to the public, then this Association and its President would receive me with open arms as a worthy coadjutor!

W. NAPIER,

Major-General, Colonel 27th Regiment.

Feb. 14.

APPENDIX VIII.

SELECTION FROM MS. NOTES ON 'MÉMOIRES DE NAPOLÉON.'

TEXT.

Les institutions militaires des Anglais sont vicieuses: 1°, *ils n'opèrent leur recrutement qu'à prix d'argent, si ce n'est que fréquemment ils vident leurs prisons dans leurs régimens;* 2°, *leur discipline est cruelle;* 3°, *l'espèce de leurs soldats est telle, qu'ils ne peuvent en tirer que des sous-officiers médiocres; ce qui les oblige à multiplier les officiers hors de toute proportion;* 4°, *chacun de leurs bataillons traîne à sa suite des centaines de femmes et d'enfants; aucune armée n'a autant de bagages;* 5°, *les places d'officiers sont vénales: les lieutenances, les compagnies, les bataillons s'achètent;* 6°, *un officier est à la fois major dans l'armée et capitaine dans son régiment; bizarrerie fort contraire à tout esprit militaire.* —(Mélanges, Montholon, vol. i., p. 249.)

NOTES BY COL. NAPIER.

This is not sound criticism. The recruiting by money obtains stouter and more willing men. The taking men from prisons was under the extreme pressure of Napoleon's warfare; it had its advantages also: it gave many stout men, saved punishment, and enabled Government to employ the good regiments on service—for the prison men were not, except in a few cases, sent to the regiments of character; moreover the system was soon laid aside, and does not belong to the English military institution. The discipline *was* cruel, it is so no longer, but is very just. The non-commissioned officers were, and are, excellent. In Spain the baggage was not unreasonably great. The system of purchase is a very difficult question, involving national customs and feelings: I am inclined to think it good, but it should not be pushed too far. The brevet rank is a consequence of purchase; it opens promotion for long service without money.

No doubt the English military institutions are anomalous, and in some points defective; but all military institutions must be influenced in some degree by national manners and customs. England has sent forth at all times soldiers capable of conquering every enemy; her institutions cannot therefore be very bad, or the soldier himself must be infinitely superior to all other men.

Les officiers des compagnies se dégraderaient s'ils se mêlaient des détails du décompte du soldat; ils deviendraient sous-officiers; le Sergent-major

This is one of the things that depend on national customs. In the British army the best effects are produced by the rule that officers and not

est propre à ce service. — (Mélanges, Montholon, vol. i. p. 250.)

sergeants shall settle personally with their men. The officer's honour is a safeguard for the man, who has besides the right to complain to his commanding officer and to the inspecting general if he is wronged; this practice also brings the officer more in contact with his men, and makes them acquainted with each other's characters: there is nothing a soldier abhors so much as an officer who is mean or tricky about money; hence the love and esteem of the soldier is a premium for honour in the officer. Notwithstanding all these precautions, the soldier is sometimes defrauded by sergeants; what would it be if the latter had entire control of the payments! The British officer is proud and disdainful; it is good to bring him perforce into contact with the poverty and wants of the poor soldier: the French officer is familiar with his men off duty; it may therefore be proper to keep them asunder in money matters; but I have no doubt, from what I have heard, that the French soldier's security for his pay is not so good as the British soldier's. The conscription also must be considered; the French soldier is often of higher rank in society and better educated than his officer—hence a necessity for keeping the latter from the temptation of defrauding his men. In fine, military institutions are like constitutions, the growth of national manners under different systems of pruning and training. This general rule will, however, be an infallible guide in all services. The soldier cannot have too much reverence and esteem for his officer: the officer cannot be esteemed if he is not just; he may be esteemed without being loved. To be both he must not keep aloof from his men.—*W.N.*

En Russie nos pertes furent considérables, mais non pas telles qu'on se l'imagine. 400,000 *hommes passèrent la Vistule;* 160,000 *seulement dépassèrent Smolensk pour se porter sur Moskou;* 240,000 *hommes restèrent en réserve entre la Vistule, le Borysthène, et la Dwina. La moitié de ces* 400,000 *hommes étaient Autrichiens, Prussiens, Saxes, Polonais, &c. &c. La campagne de* 1812 *en Russie coûta moins de* 50,000 *hommes à la France actuelle.*—(Mélanges, Montholon, vol. ii. p. 55).

I know this to be correct; I have seen the original states of the army; the Emperor's private states, which could not be wrong. I mean as to the 400,000 men. What proportion passed Smolensk I only know from this account.

La mort du Duc d'Enghien doit être attribuée aux personnes qui dirigeaient et commandaient de Londres l'assassinat du Premier Consul . . . . elle doit être attribuée aussi à ceux qui s'efforcèrent, par des rapports et des conjectures, *à le présenter comme chef de la conspiration; elle doit être éternellement reprochée enfin* à ceux qui, entraînés par *un zèle criminel,*

Talleyrand and Fouché.

This is pointed at St. Real, the Grand Judge. He held back the

n'attendirent point les ordres de leur souverain pour exécuter le jugement de la commission militaire. Le Duc d'Enghien périt victime des intrigues d'alors. Sa mort, si injustement reprochée à Napoléon, lui nuisit, et ne lui fut d'aucune utilité politique. Si Napoléon avait été capable d'ordonner un crime, Louis 18me et Ferdinand ne règneraient point aujourd'hui; leur mort, on l'a déjà dit, lui a été proposée, conseillée même à plusieurs reprises.—(Mélanges, Montholon, vol. ii. p. 335.)

Duke's letter to Napoleon, and also the judgment of the Court-martial, which by the law of France is always executed within a certain time without confirmation, unless a superior order forbids it. This very curious history was known to Joseph Bonaparte, and it will be probably told some day in his memoirs: it was told by Joseph to a friend of mine, Mr. Cowell. Joseph's story runs thus:—He was at his house at Marfontaine near Paris, when information reached him that some remarkable event had happened. He repaired to the Tuileries, and went towards his brother's room: suddenly Josephine came out of a side-room in her bedgown, and in a hurried manner said "Go to him—be quick—the Duc d'Enghien is a prisoner; the Boiteux (Talleyrand) is with your brother and is giving him bad advice." Joseph went hastily into the Emperor's room, and there was Talleyrand, who on seeing Joseph left the room, but in passing gave a significant sneering smile. Joseph understood this to mean "You are too late, I have settled the affair." In this notion he walked straight up to the Emperor, and repeated some lines from a French poet which had been a favourite declamation with both of them when they were boys. Napoleon smiled and replied, "That did very well for boys, but Talleyrand has been putting the matter in its true light; he says the Duke is accused of plotting my assassination and raising a civil war; that any man of less degree would be put to death for this, and there would be neither reason nor justice in permitting the Duke, merely because he is a Bourbon, to commit such crimes with impunity." Joseph instantly repeated the verses again, the purport being that an enemy in your power ought to be spared. "Ah, yes!" replied Napoleon, "but justice must first be satisfied. The Duke must be tried: the proofs are complete, and he will certainly be found guilty; but then I can pardon him;" and he repeated the verses himself; he added—"I am even anxious to attach him to me, and to give him high command." Satisfied with this assurance, Joseph retired, and that evening went to different "salons," principally among the Royalists. To his astonishment he found the latter willing to urge the Duke's execution. Talleyrand and Fouché had been giving the cue to their opinions and language: they said—"If any of us had been engaged in such an affair, no mercy would be shown us; but because he is of royal blood he is to be pardoned." Joseph told all those who were anxious for his life that he would not be harmed in any way, and he endeavoured to raise a feeling of pity for him; for, trusting to Napoleon's assurances, he wished to soften the angry feeling which Talleyrand and Fouché had raised by their villanous proceedings: they hoped thus to force the Emperor into a bloody course. Joseph slept that night at Paris, but he was suddenly awakened in the morning by a message from Josephine to say that

something dreadful had happened. He hastened to the palace, and had just reached his brother's room when the door opened violently, and the Emperor appeared in a state of uncontrollable passion, pushing St. Real the judge out, and, as Joseph thought, striking him. Joseph went to his brother and sought to soothe him, but he could get no answer from him: he continued to repeat, "He has destroyed the finest moment of my life." At last he suddenly ceased this exclamation and said, "Well! the wine is drawn—we must drink;" then, assuming a peculiar marble look which belonged to him when his resolution was fixed, he commenced speaking of other subjects, and from that hour to his death Joseph never could obtain any explanation of his violence to St. Real. On quitting Napoleon he learned that the Duke had been shot an hour before. However, in after years when Joseph was an exile in America, he met St. Real, then also an exile, and heard from him this explanation. "I was troubled to find that the general opinion of the 'Salons,' and especially of the Royalists, was against the Duke. I knew that Talleyrand and Fouché were at work exciting this feeling. I knew also that the Emperor was inclined to mercy, and that there would be a cry and a faction if the Duke was pardoned: I thought to save the Emperor from this inconvenience, and from the annoyance of deciding; so I kept back the sentence of the court-martial until that sentence had been executed; and you saw the effect on the Emperor."

Napoleon was so firm and proud a man that he would never attempt to clear himself. He knew that if he threw the blame on St. Real the world would only say he sacrificed his tool. Therefore he kept silence, but he has in his Memoirs hinted at the truth, using the initial S. for St. Real. This has given rise to the belief that he meant Savary, but it is an error. St. Real was the judge whose business it was to bring the judgment to the Emperor for his final determination; and as that was not given, the sentence was executed as a matter of course according to the French law.—*W. N.*

THE BATTLE OF THE NILE.

Le projet de l'Amiral était d'attaquer de vaisseau à vaisseau chaque bâtiment Français, jetant l'ancre par l'arrière, et se plaçant en travers de la proue des Français. Le hasard changea cette disposition. Le Culloden, *destiné à attaquer* le Guerrier, *voulant passer entre son gauche et l'île, échoua.*

This is true.

Le Goliath, *qui le suivait, manœuvrant pour se mouiller au travers de la proue* du Guerrier, *fut entraîné par le vent et le courant, et ne jeta l'ancre qu'après avoir dépassé et tourné ce vaisseau. S'apercevant alors que la batterie gauche ne tirait pas, il se plaça bord à bord avec lui, et le désempara en peu de temps.* Le Zélé,

This is an error. Sir Thomas Foley had an old chart, by which he knew there was water enough inside: the famous manœuvre and the speech attributed to Nelson are vulgar errors. The first belongs to Foley; the last was not made *before* the fight, at all events. Nelson even told Foley afterwards he did not know what he was

deuxième vaisseau Anglais, suivit le mouvement du Goliath, *et se mouillant bord à bord* du Guerrier, *qui ne pouvait pas répondre à son feu, il le démâte promptement, &c.*—(Gourgaud, vol. ii. p. 183.)

at when he saw him passing between the island and the French fleet, and that if he had known he would have stopped him; or if he could have got a signal ready he would have recalled him: it was the last expression, I think. Was Nelson wrong? I believe not. The attack thus led by Foley was contrary to the principle of battles at sea; Nelson's own plan was better; and if Villeneuve had come up, it would have been found so. Foley and the ships inside the line could not have beaten back against the wind; and to run down the French line in that narrow passage would have been very dangerous: they must have remained and continued their fight. Meanwhile, Villeneuve, who had only about one mile to beat up with plenty of sea-room, would with fresh ships have placed Nelson and the vessels which followed him on the outside of the French line between two fires, just as Foley had placed the French left: then if Villeneuve was beaten, he would have gone off, as far as sea and wind were concerned; but if Nelson and Foley were beaten, they would have had no retreat. On the other hand, Foley said he trusted to the known habits of the French who seldom got more than one side of their ships cleared for action; and so it was on this occasion.

Sir Thomas Foley, being shown this account of the battle by General Sir C. Napier, admitted that it was generally very accurate, though there were some errors of detail. He was a very simple-minded, brave, and honest man. He cherished the memory of Lord Nelson, and had no vanity. His friends, knowing the share he had in the action, forced an acknowledgment of it in the House of Lords; but Foley never disputed that Nelson's plan might have been better, though he gave the reasons above stated for his own enterprising movement.

Alexandre, Condé, ont pu commander dès leur plus jeune âge: l'art de la guerre de terre est un art de génie d'inspiration; mais ni Alexandre ni Condé, à l'âge de 22 ans, n'eussent commandé une armée navale. Dans celle-ci rien n'est génie ni inspiration; tout y est positif et expérience. Le général de mer n'a besoin que d'une science, celle de la navigation. Celui de terre a besoin de toutes, ou d'un talent qui équivaut à toutes, celui de profiter de toutes les expériences et de toutes les connaissances. Un général de mer n'a rien à deviner; il sait où est son ennemi; il connâit sa force. Un général de terre ne sait jamais rien certainement; ne voit

In land operations the natural obstacles are, generally speaking, subordinate to the efforts of man; at sea they control his powers. A general can move his army anywhere and anyhow, because it is a sentient machine, and the loss of some of its component parts is not irremediable: an admiral can only evade natural obstacles; he cannot overcome them: winds, waves, rocks, are his masters; his army is of wood and iron, nonsentient, and it goes to wreck altogether, or is saved altogether; it cannot lose a part and remain available for service: a ship goes down altogether. A general's genius may rise above impediments of nature; an

jamais bien son ennemi ; ne sait jamais positivement où il est, &c.—(Gourgaud, vol. ii. p. 189.)

admiral's genius consists in yielding to them, and hence he cannot give full scope to his natural courage or enterprise. He is always restricted by fear of a master whose orders cannot be contradicted—Nature!

Ces pays (Africa and Asia) étant habités par des hommes de plusieurs couleurs, la polygamie est le seul moyen d'empêcher qu'ils ne se persécutent. Les législateurs ont pensé que, pour que les blancs ne fussent pas ennemis des noirs, les noirs des blancs, les cuivrés des uns et des autres, il fallait les faire tous membres d'une même famille, et lutter ainsi contre ce penchant de l'homme de haïr tout ce qui n'est pas à lui. Mahomet pense que quatre femmes étaient suffisantes pour atteindre ce but, parceque chaque homme pouvait avoir une blanche, une noire, une cuivrée, et une femme d'une autre couleur. Sans doute il était aussi dans la nature d'une réligion sensuelle de favoriser les passions de ses sectateurs ; et en cela la politique et le prophète ont pu se trouver d'accord.—(Gourgaud, vol. ii. p. 261.)

Perhaps also because the new religion being to be propagated by the sword, the men would be swept away in far greater numbers on both sides than the women; and it was necessary to sustain the races without a general depravation of morals, by permitting polygamy, though Mahomet's great genius led him to restrict it to four wives. Did he overlook the terrible results of lowering the character and position of women? or was he unable to correct the manners of his people? Probably the latter, for he always treated his own wives with great distinction.

Le Général Hoche mourut dans ce temps subitement à Mayence. Beaucoup de gens ont cru qu'il avait été empoisonné ; cette opinion n'est pas fondée.—(Montholon, vol. iv. p. 268.)

Marshal Soult told me that he was with Hoche when his death happened; that his (Soult's) belief, and Hoche's also, was that he was poisoned by the councils. Soult gave me many strong proofs that this opinion was correct; amongst others, he pointed to the fact that three surgeons opened the body; two were ignorant army surgeons, the other was an eminent person of Mayence: the two first declared against poison; the last positively declared that the traces of poison were evident: the opinion of the two first was published, the opinion of the latter suppressed! Hoche, before he died, told Soult he had been poisoned by agents of the councils.—*W. N.*

Mais Pitt redouta le degré de puissance où la France pouvait s'élever si on lui laissait tranquillement établir sa révolution ; et il ne songea pas qu'il mettait en péril la destinée de l'Europe entière, s'il parvenait à l'armée contre la liberté Française.—(Montholon, vol. v. p. 146.)

An error. Pitt did not want to go to war. He was forced to it by Lords Spencer and Fitzwilliam, who were the chiefs and organs of the aristocracy, or rather of the borough oligarchy of England.

L'enthousiasme guerrier, et surtout l'enthousiasme révolutionnaire que la France avait déployé depuis la bataille de Jemmappes, dut faire prévoir qu'au moment d'un danger plus sérieux dont l'armée de Clairfayt et celles des émigrés faisaient la ménace, une grande démonstration nationale de défense, une insurrection unanime pour l'attaque, se déploiraient dans toute la France.—(Montholon, vol. v. p. 147.)

Mr. Fox warned Pitt that it would be so if he turned the French spirit and enthusiasm from internal changes to war; and he added that they would then overrun Europe in the strength of their enthusiasm. He was derided and abused; and Burke, who predicted that France would be blotted from the map of Europe, was listened to and became a prophet in Israel.

Si les opérations de la Basse Vendée eussent été, comme cela devait être, combinées avec celles de la Haute Vendée où commandait Cathélineau, la République était infailliblement vaincue, mais il manqua toujours un Prince à la tête de la cause Vendéenne. Les Royalistes le demandèrent sans cesse à l'Angleterre, qui le leur montra une seule fois, et ne le leur donna pas; ce qui fut un raffinement nouveau en fait de cruauté politique. — (Montholon, vol. v. p. 209.)

This is not a just accusation. It was the extreme cowardice of the French princes that retained them. See Puissaye's 'Memoirs,' a scarce work. Joseph de la Puissaye, the great Breton chief, who planned the expedition to Quiberon, himself told me that it was the cowardice of the princes that ruined the affairs of the Royalists. Puissaye also showed me a letter signed by Louis the Eighteenth, directed to the Chief of the Emigrant troops, instructing him to use Puissaye and then assassinate him. La Puissaye has been abused and I believe most unjustly by the French Royalists. To me he appeared a very able and very honourable man, calm and dignified in the extreme, and most commanding in manner.—*W. N.*

APPENDIX IX.

NEW POOR LAW.

THE social contract necessarily implies a Poor Law; for no sane person would resign his natural rights and accept society without a guarantee against starvation. Ask a red Indian to relinquish his hunting-grounds, and he will reply, "How then am I to live?" All nations in all times have admitted the principle of a Poor Law. The hospitality of barbarous nations, the charities inculcated by

Christian and Mussulman societies, the original appropriation of tithes, the benevolent bequests and institutions of the dark and middle ages, the public distributions of corn, the general feasts, the sacrifices of the ancients where the multitude were fed with the victims, the Roman institution of patron and client, the latter being obliged to portion the poor daughters of the former, were all indirect acknowledgments and modifications of the principle of a Poor Law, viz. that no man ought to starve in the midst of abundance.

Poverty was always most welcome at the feasts of the great men of antiquity. Their object was popularity, and they knew that no ruling man could be popular if the poor were starving. Their feasts were therefore a homage to the principle of a Poor Law.

> "Even I, Metrobius, though a scrivener, hoped
> To pass a cheerful and a sleek old age,
> And live to my last hour at Cymon's table."
>
> *Plutarch's Life of Cymon.*

Metrobius was evidently an abuse of Cymon's Poor Law; yet this very abuse proves the principle. Cymon felt that he and other rich men could not be safe if the poor were not cared for, and he accepted Metrobius as a necessary evil. . . . . .

The social right of man to be fed is abundantly evident; but in England the poor have a legal right also, one of ancient date, and as valid as the right of property. That this should be well considered in discussing the nature of the new Poor Law is evident; but most especially is it necessary to consider it at this time, when the same school of political economists, from whence issues the present attempt to abolish the right to subsistence from the land inherent in the poor, openly profess the doctrine that "no right whatever exists in man, save what is created by law;"* as if thought, and the actions arising from thought, which are the results of the divine law of creation, were not antecedent to human laws; as if the right of making laws were not prior to the right conferred by law, the former being a right springing from thought, which is the gift of the Creator; as if property, which is the result of labour and accumulation, was not the parent instead of the offspring of law; for why should men make laws to secure that which had no existence? The first right of man is his right in his faculties to procure himself subsistence, and to defend himself from danger. This springs from divine, not human law; and it

* Mr. Warburton's speech in the Commons.

is vain to plead the helplessness of infancy, until it is proved that the first man was born, not created. . . . . .

Recent inquiries seem to prove, in opposition to the doctrine of rent advanced by the economists, that in Asia certainly, and some learned antiquarians think in Europe also, the social right in the land followed the right of nature, that it was vested in the labouring part of the community. It was indeed subjected to certain charges and conditions with respect to the community at large, but the people who laboured had the ownership, and the charges imposed were only a kind of mortgage on their labour. Thus rents, taxes, &c., were charges on the labourer, but charges which did not affect his ownership; they could not, by the original constitution of the society, be levied until the labourer had first taken his subsistence from the produce of his labour; and this seems consonant to natural justice and reason, since he, from whose industry spring all enjoyments, should have the first right at least to as much as would support his existence. But when the land was all occupied, the right of the surplus population to *exist* was still imperative, and hence the absolute necessity of a Poor Law, or, what some nations have resorted to, the destruction of children. Indeed this horrible alternative has lately been seriously argued and recommended in a book pretending to be written by one Marcus, no unlettered man nor weak sophist, though cold-blooded, calculated murder is his object. This dreadful alternative is perhaps the strongest of all proofs of the necessity and justice of a Poor Law; for man cannot have the right to take life except in defence of life; and while there is enough to feed all, there can be no defence of life pleaded. All that can be said is, that the laws of society have, by some means or other, been placed in opposition to nature, justice, and benevolence; and that hence a necessity has arisen too strong for humanity to contend with. Such a plea belongs however only to barbarians; the highest exercise of reason is civilization, which consists in exploring all the resources of nature to benefit mankind; and this has never yet been done by any nation to such an extent as to afford even a plausible excuse for declaring that the general welfare demands particular cruelty and injustice. . . . . .

The intolerable cruelty of many masters of workhouses, especially towards women and children, has been and is daily brought to light; few, if any, have been punished. I have myself seen a poorhouse where the chapel has a screen some seven feet in height, erected to prevent the poor from even seeing their wives and daughters while at Divine service, although they have been

carefully separated all the week. May not the unfortunate creatures exclaim, What justice! What religion! What reason is there in this? Why are we so tormented? You have prohibited us from ever working on the Sabbath-day because it is contrary to the Christian religion which is declared part and parcel of the law of the land; and yet you now deny us that relief which the same Christianity enjoins; and you punish us in direct violation of its command, which says "Whom God has joined, let no man part." What justice is there here? Yes! says the economist—even while he is, as a Poor Law commissioner, recommending a shilling a-week as sufficient for the subsistence of a poor woman, and yet taking nineteen shillings a-day for his own living at an inn besides his regular salary—yes! there is justice! You might have saved in your younger days, and you have no right to come upon my generosity now. What! economists? Have you not made us lose day after day in attendance on your courts of law as witnesses or bound prosecutors? Have you not forced us to become special constables and militiamen? Have you not pressed us to serve in your ships of war? Give us back the time we wasted on your courts of law! Give us back our youthful strength worn out in the militia! Give us back our limbs lost on your quarter-decks! Give us back our brave sons slain in your defence, slain in battles which you forced them to fight, even when the injustice was so apparent that their souls sickened at the task! Give us back the capital which we, by our labour, have added to your general stock during lives extending to seventy and eighty years! Give us back the twelve shillings out of every eighteen that we earned, and which you took away from us in taxes to carry on useless or unjust wars or to fill the pockets of non-producers like yourselves! It is you who come upon our pocket, not we who come upon yours. You taxed our youth, and strength, and time for your own behoof; and now when, bowed with age and tormented with pains, the result of incessant toil, we demand what by the ancient law of England belongs to us of right as much as your estate belongs to you, you revile us as criminals. . . . . .

What! exclaims the economist, shall I suffer shameless women to obtain by their vices greater sums through the Poor Law than honest matrons are able to obtain by their labour? Shall I permit dissolute men to idle and spend at the alehouse the time which should be spent in getting money to support them in age? Shall I let the reckless ruffian riot by anticipation on the substance of the poor honest drudge, whose utmost efforts can now but barely keep him from the gulf of pauperism into which the ruffian wilfully plunges?

Not so, oh economist, not so! The 43rd of Elizabeth enabled you to avoid those evils. Thou shalt find work or food for the poor applicant, it tells thee, and the sturdy vagrant shall be punished! But thou, rigorous reasoner, thou punishest all alike, the worthy and the unworthy. In thy sight all are criminal! . . . .

You say the magistrates abused their power in favour of the poor, and you have therefore deprived them of those powers. The abuse was at least on the side of humanity, but it has been greatly exaggerated. The magistrate's own interest as a ratepayer interfered to check his humanity, which after all was never proverbially overflowing, though his fears of poaching made him appear sometimes kinder than his nature. Abuses indeed crept in through his means; but what abuses have you not substituted as a cure for his? The guardians of the poor, so called in your nomenclature, are the paymasters, men with a direct interest to be harsh and severe to the poor. They are guardians of their own pockets, though with a cruel irony they are called guardians of the poor. They are principally farmers also, men made selfish from the precarious nature of their calling and the constant watching and parsimony necessary to ensure success. They have great power as employers of the labouring poor, great power vested in them by law over these labourers. They are sure of aid and sympathy from their landlords, who are the magistrates; and to all this you add the power of guardians, with a direct pecuniary interest to save in the rates, and to force or influence their labourers to take low wages: and this you call "raising the condition of the labourers." . . . . . .

Instead of the cumbrous, unjust, one-sided machinery of guardians employed to defend their own pockets, let two officers be elected for each union, the one to be called the guardian of the paymasters, the other the guardian of the poor. And that the persons eligible to elect these guardians may be easily known, let the amount of rates or of rent be used as the measures of eligibility. All persons below a given standard to be deemed nonpaying electors, all above to be deemed paying electors; from the last all the rates are to be taken, from the former nothing.

These two guardians should have considerable salaries, be forbidden to have any trade or pursuit other than their duties during their period of office, which should last three years. The object and duty of the first should be to defend the paymasters from any imposition by idle knaves or wilful beggars; of the second, to urge and defend the legal claim of the paupers. These two men would therefore be in a constant state of collision; and as the poor would

die while they disputed, the magistrates, not less than two being on the bench, should be the arbitrators, and their decision final on *the case* but not on the *principle*. The cases thus decided by the magistrates should be sent up to the Commissioners in London, who would either receive and class them if in accord with the governing principle, or, if anomalous, annul them as precedents and state the true law. Thus the interest of both sides would be cared for, anomalous decisions rendered null, tolerably fair arbitrations brought into activity; and the head Board, if composed of men of reasoning powers and general views, supplied with the necessary facts to form general laws upon the solid foundation of experience.

OBSERVATIONS ON THE CORN LAW.

[Extracts.]

IT is evident that foreign corn must be sold cheaper than home-raised grain, or it will not affect the labourer at all: and if it is sold cheaper the English producer must lose by the competition. Farmers, in the natural course of things, gain by good and lose by bad seasons, so do consumers. Now the letting in of foreign grain, although tantamount to a succession of good seasons for the consumers, is tantamount to a succession of bad seasons for the farmer, because his expenses will remain nearly the same, and the foreigner carries off the profit of the abundance. The home farmer must then meet this competition by improving his system of farming and by lessening his outgoings. What are those outgoings? Rent, taxes, tithes, rates, seed-corn, repairs, and labour. His expense in seed-corn will be lowered according to the price of his produce, so also his rent *may* be reduced; but the wages of labour *must* remain stationary, or the doctrine, that wages will fall with the price of corn, be admitted. But if the carpenter's, wheelwright's, smith's, and ploughman's wages be not reduced, the farmer suffers by the competition of foreigners; and if the employer be impoverished by any other mode than the giving of high wages, the labourer cannot thrive; in this case the principal source of his subsistence will go to the foreign labourer. And if the farmer does reduce the labourer's wages, the value of labour sinks with the value of corn, and the cry of cheap bread for the labourer is a delusion. Rent, seed-corn, labour, may fall with the price of grain, but tithes and taxes must increase. Tithes, because they are now generally paid in money upon composition, and consequently more wheat when

grain is cheap must be sold to pay the composition. Taxes increase for the same reason, unless their nominal amount be reduced; but this remedy cannot be pleaded by the corn-law ministers or their supporters, because their avowed object was to enable the people to pay the taxes as they are. . . . . It is the weight of taxation which renders a corn-law necessary to the agriculturist. Why should he otherwise fear the foreigner in his own market? His soil is rich, his climate not unfavourable generally; his skill, his capital, his industry, his means of communication and transport superior. Why should he fear? These questions lead to a most important disturbing influence upon the law of demand and supply, namely, the scarcity or abundance of the circulating medium of exchange. If that be contracted, the wages of labour will be nominally low, even when the demand for labour is greater than the supply. And if money be plentiful, the price of labour will be nominally high, though the supply of labour should be greater than the demand; and as the price of food must be affected by the same cause, it may happen that the labourer is better off with low wages than with high wages. Indeed it must so happen when changes in the quantity of money afloat cause fluctuation of prices. For while the nominal price of food mounts rapidly with the augmentation of money, the wages of labour, like Prayers pursuing Injustice in the prosopopœia of Homer, follow slowly, because many labourers' engagements are for fixed terms, and because all have to contend against the disinclination of employers to increase their own expenses. So when the nominal price of food falls from the scarcity of money, the wages of labour descend nearly as slowly as they rose in the other case; not quite, however, because the employer has greater power to right himself.

But the Bank has the power of enlarging or contracting the circulating medium at its pleasure, and this by many millions in a few months. This enormous power, or screw as it has been called, acting alike upon the price of food and labour, is sufficient to render corn-laws quite unavailing; a few years back the operations of the Bank, combined with good seasons, reduced the price of bread to one penny in the pound, which is lower than the most sanguine anti-corn-law politicians pretend to expect from the importation of foreign grain. The corn-laws, therefore, as they affect the farmer and labourer, are neither so hurtful nor beneficial as they are supposed to be; they are controlled by the Bank. . . . . What then? says the political economist. Our commerce will be increased, the surplus agricultural labourers will

be absorbed by our manufactories, and the country will be generally benefited. Let us therefore examine the question on the manufacturing side.

Is it a national benefit to have hardy ploughmen turned into squalid weavers, crowded together in misery and immorality, begetting beings still more miserable and squalid than themselves, toiling incessantly in heat and dust and gloom, without a glimpse of green fields or clear running waters to cheer their sight; the burring of machinery to stun their brains instead of the notes of birds to greet their ears; the harsh commands and spying watchfulness of avaricious masters and overseers ever present to them instead of the gracious presence of nature with her gentle beauties and delights such as God has presented them for the enjoyment of man, to cheer and sustain his faculties; their only pleasures those of debauchery, of sensuality, gross and debilitating, because for no others have they time granted them, and some solace the human animal must have. . . . . But the end of government is to render the present race happy as well as the future, and riches accumulated in few hands do not constitute national happiness or national strength; moreover, this absorption is imaginary, it will not take place; the only absorption will be by death from misery, or the absorption of the Whig Bastilles, called workhouses. Can it be believed that the horny-handed peasant will be able to turn at once to the delicate manipulations of the cotton factory? or that he will not languish and become unhealthy from the change of occupation and loss of pure air? All persons who have lived near manufactories know with what passionate eagerness the operatives in them seize any opportunity to obtain work out of doors,—and now the out-of-door labourers are to be driven to the manufactories, and this misery and degradation to thousands is to be called a national benefit. . . . . The law of demand and supply will undoubtedly, on an average of years, regulate the prices of manufacturing labour, but there are so many operatives, and the increase of population, in despite of emigration, tends so constantly to deteriorate their condition, that they are always losing ground, and are at last driven to the lowest scale of existence—the penny a day of Mr. Mark Phillips—and thus wages are finally regulated by the price of food. In fine, the power of the master is uncontrollable, for the workman lives from hand to mouth, while the master can afford to wait. "Give me ten shillings." "No! eight is enough." The operative knows his labour is worth more, and returns home full of pride and wrath, saying he will fight it out. Alas! poor man! you are unfit for any other trade. You have no

money wherewith to emigrate. Your master goes home to claret and venison. His idleness is cheered by his library, or the musical parties of his wife; *he* has a hundred thousand pounds in the funds, and can afford to wait. You go to a weeping wife, to children crying for bread; your pride and stubbornness keep you up the first day, but the second and third come with pinching pains to yourself, increased wailings from your wife, while your children with haggard looks make piteous appeals to you for food: you yield, and your master triumphs! . . . . . The abstract good or evil of corn-laws which forbid men to benefit from the abundance which the Deity has poured out for their enjoyment in different parts of the globe, is a question distinct from the matter which has been treated of in this paper. Our factitious state forbids the consideration of any great political economical question on its abstract merits alone. What it has been intended to show here is—

1. That the corn-law is a natural effort of the landlords to protect themselves.

2. That this effort is ineffectual against the power of the Bank, with an imperfect gold circulation; and consequently that all parties attach too much importance to the law as a protection.

3. That a repeal of it will not only not benefit labourers, it will hurt them unless taxes are reduced at the same time.

4. That the cry of cheap bread for the labourers is a delusion, raised by master manufacturers for their own behoof, adopted by the late Whig ministers to keep themselves in office, and viewed with satisfaction by all persons of fixed incomes arising from the funds or mortgages.

5. That to augment the cotton manufactures at the expense of agriculture will prove a national error; and to augment them without adequate protection to the miserable children employed therein will be a national crime.

The cry of "unrestricted trade," taken in the universal sense given to it by its present supporters, is only another name for unrestricted wickedness: unrestricted barbarity towards children in factories—unrestricted poisoning with opium in China—unrestricted slavery in the Brazils—unrestricted cruelty and swindling in America.

APPENDIX X.

THE LATE GENERAL CHARLES BECKWITH.

Turin, Aug. 8.

THE pressure of political events has hitherto prevented my doing justice to a subject in which some English readers will not fail to take considerable interest. I allude to the death of General Beckwith, who expired on the 19th of July last, at Torre, the principal town or village, the little capital of the Waldensian territory, or Protestant district of the Pinerolo valleys.

General Beckwith was a man unlike any other man, one who, having once hit upon a scheme of enlightened benevolence, worked at it with all the enthusiasm and tenacity of a fixed idea, and so shaped his course of life as to make the pursuit of that idea its exclusive object. In the eyes of so-called practical men General Beckwith was no better than a monomaniac; judged by a more righteous standard, he was a man who had found his own sphere of real, positive, permanent usefulness, and, having no earthly ties, no demand on his time or his pecuniary means, spent his all and himself upon his favourite object with a steadiness of purpose and devotion of feeling which partake of genuine heroism.

General Beckwith entered the army at a very early period of his life, and made the Peninsular campaign under Wellington, who seemed to look with interest on the warlike career of the young officer. In 1815 he was on the field at Waterloo, and lost one of his legs in the battle. He retired on half-pay as a colonel, and was a frequent visitor at Apsley House. One day, having called on his chief, he was requested to walk into the library and wait for his Grace, who was at the time particularly engaged. That quarter of an hour's waiting, as I have heard Beckwith himself frequently relate, was the turning crisis in his existence. To while away the time he glanced at the well-filled shelves, and took down a book, the first which came to his hand. It happened to be *Gilly's Waldenses*. The Colonel glanced at its contents, and turned over a few leaves, when, being summoned to the Duke's sitting-room, he laid down the volume. The book had, however, made a deep impression upon the mind of Beckwith, who bought it at his bookseller's, read it with deep attention, courted its reverend author's acquaintance,

and ransacked libraries for other works bearing upon the subject. After reading all he could find about the Waldenses, he determined to become acquainted with them, crossed the Channel and the Alps, and went up to the valleys, as so many English tourists did before, and continue to do after him. This, his first visit, happened in the summer of 1827, and he then only stayed three or four days. But he came back in the following year, and abode in the valleys for three months; presently he made it a point to spend among his Waldensian friends no less than six months every year. Before long his home was permanently established at Torre, and he never moved hence except when his journeys could be made profitable to the people among whom his lot was cast.

It is not easy to enumerate the blessings which Colonel, later General, Beckwith's presence sowed among the Waldenses. In a Protestant community, he conceived, where religion addresses itself, not to the senses, as Catholicism does, but to the reason and understanding, the daily bread for the people must be instruction. The Waldensian ministers or pastors were not unmindful of popular education, but they were poor, and not altogether free from that sloth and carelessness which take away so much from the merits of the Italian character. Their schools were as ill-built as barns, and as dirty as stables. Beckwith stirred them up to reconstruct them. He gave aid and encouragement, but, faithful to his good English notions, he would only help those who were willing to help themselves; where the people collected the materials for the school, there the good patron supplied the money for the building. He called them together, held meetings, now of the pastors, now of the flock, stimulated their religious zeal, appealed to local and sectarian emulation, and never rested till, at the end of a few years, partly with the people's own means, partly by lavishing his own income, and by applying to his object the contributions of other English friends of the Waldenses, he opened or restored no less than 120 district schools. He then proceeded to the improvement of the parochial schools, and exerted himself to enlarge the college and divinity school at Torre. In all these endeavours he was powerfully seconded by his assiduous correspondent, Dr. Gilly, the Dean of Durham, the man who by his writings and by his incessant cares most powerfully contributed to stimulate the sympathies of English Protestants in behalf of their fellow worshippers of the Pinerolo valleys.

Towards the year 1846, when Beckwith perceived that the first steps taken by Charles Albert towards a more liberal policy opened a fair chance for the establishment of full religious toleration in

Piedmont, in favour of the Waldenses, or "primitive Christians of the Alps," he seemed guided by an instinct which told him that the Waldensian Church should be nationalized. The mountaineers of the Pinerolo valleys are pure Piedmontese, and in their uncivilized state they speak the harsh patois common to all other subalpine valleys; but, since the Reformation of Luther and Calvin, and still more since the pestilence of 1620, which swept away all their native pastors, Genevese and other French ministers were introduced to take care of the flock of this so-called "Israel of the Alps," so that, since that time, both the Church service and all religious and other instruction were carried on in the French language, and this had thus become tolerably current in the valleys. The time had now come, Beckwith conceived, to substitute Italian instead of French in the Waldensian system of education. For that purpose he originated the scheme of sending six young pastors to study at Florence, with a view especially of making them proficient in the pure Tuscan dialect. These, on their return, opened a philological school at Torre, which was attended by the parochial and district teachers at their holiday time of the year. By that means the people became sufficiently conversant with Italian to attend services in this their national language, and a thorough revolution was operated in the whole system of Waldensian education.

This important change was hardly accomplished, when, after 1848, it became possible to open a Waldensian church, chapel, or "temple," in Turin; and the tasteful building in the ancient Lombard style which so agreeably strikes the eye of the stranger as he walks along the Viale del Re, rose mainly under the auspices of General Beckwith, who, upon the building being achieved and consecrated, took up his residence in Turin, where he spent the winter months for the best part of his remaining existence. In summer he was invariably to be found in the valleys, more permanently at Torre, but indefatigably scrambling over hills and dales to visit the schools which he had caused to flourish, unbroken by old age, and unimpeded by his wooden leg, which he used as freely as he could have done the flesh and bone of the natural limb left behind under the sod, together with that of the Marquis of Anglesea and of so many of their brave fellow-combatants near Belgium's capital.

Beckwith was already well-stricken in years, when, in the midst of all this life of active charity and usefulness, rather late, he perceived that "it was not good for man to be alone," and came to the resolution to choose a partner for the brief span of days that might be left to him. He opened his mind to his excellent friend the

pastor, M. Meille, on the subject, and told him how he had made up his mind to close his career among his chosen people, and how, dreading he might find no English helpmate willing to "rough it" with him in the valleys, he deemed it wise to look for a companion among the Waldensians. He therefore made choice of a village damsel, of no lofty birth or extraction, but a well-educated person according to the notions of the land, and one who showed herself in every way calculated to sweeten his cup of existence during the ten or eleven years of their wedded state. For some years General Beckwith seemed to feel the need of a change of air and residence, and went repeatedly and stayed at Calais, where, it was supposed, time would eventually estrange him from his beloved home in the valley; but, when he became aware that his end was drawing near, he recrossed the Alps in great haste, and never stopped till he saw himself at Torre, where illness slowly wasted him away, and he died among the blessings of the whole population, whose real father he had for so many years proved himself.

So died General Beckwith, a man whose life had been the pursuit of what the world may possibly call "a hobby;" but the aim of that hobby was the complete emancipation, the thorough regeneration of a people, who, with good instincts, with uncorrupted manners, and with the inestimable blessings of a pure faith long established among them, laboured, however, under the evils of extreme poverty and ignorance, and were, perhaps, too far sunk into inertia and apathy ever to recover by their own virtue, and without the stirring energy, the example, the unwearied courage and constancy of the veteran soldier, of the sturdy Englishman.

APPENDIX XI.

[THE following letter is the last written by Sir W. Napier in defence of the accuracy of his great work. He knew not who his assailant was on this occasion, and committed no slight injustice in confounding him with the writer of the article on the 'Life of Sir C. Napier' in the same Review. It is now well known that the author of the article on the Administration of Lord Liverpool (*Edinburgh Review*, January, 1859), from which was taken the paragraph commented on in the following letter, was no less a man than Sir George Cornewall Lewis. It is probable that he never

saw this letter; had he done so, even his cautious mind would have admitted the sufficiency of the evidence on which the impugned statement was made.]

To the Editor of the 'Naval and Military Gazette.'

SIR,—In your recent number of the 'Naval and Military Gazette' is one of those generous defences so frequently made by you against slanderous assaults on myself and my brother, the late Sir Charles Napier.

My present assailant in the 'Edinburgh Review' is probably he who criticised the 'Life of Sir Charles Napier,' and but for your observations should not have been noticed by me; for truly the criticism on the 'Life' was not of a nature to make any man of sense uneasy, and the present attack seems even more unworthy of notice. On your head, therefore, be this letter; for it is your notice that has set my pen in motion, or rather set my tongue going, being still incapable of moving my limbs.

You quote the Reviewer as saying, "General Napier states that Marshal Beresford had prevailed upon the Portuguese Regency to send 15,000 men of the old Portuguese troops, completely equipped, to the Duke of Wellington, before the battle of Waterloo; that the only real business which Mr. Canning had to transact in his embassy was to procure the execution of the agreement; and, although nothing but an order for embarkation was needed, he frustrated the whole affair by making it the subject of diplomacy.—(*Hist. of Penins. War*, vol. iv. p. 140.) As General Napier quotes no authority for this statement, his habit of decrying all civil and of extolling all military officers leaves us in uncertainty as to its credibility."

Now, judging from the time when the writer must have composed his attack, I think, with you, that he anticipated no answer—"dead men tell no tales;" and I was then so near that security for him as to have my duration of life calculated on hours, not days, by my medical friend Mr. Edward Tayloe, whose skill, nevertheless, baffled his apprehensions. Wherefore I say, that being also of a very mature age (74), it might have been hard for me to seek for and quote from original documents returned many years ago to their owners—most of those owners also being now no more. Happily, this attack is easily disposed of, both by inference and reference.

It is well known that I have had many controversies in defence of my work on the Peninsular War, and I have never failed to pro-

duce authority, of more or less weight, in support of disputed facts. This gives me a title to credence where I have not quoted authority, unless good authority be adduced in contradiction. Now, my present assailant offers no authority, not even his own name; he, an anonymous writer, not pretending to any personal knowledge of the fact in dispute, requires the public to disbelieve my assertions (put forth in an elaborate work), which have for twenty-four years been allowed publicity without contradiction.

In my main work, and in my long and bitter controversy with Marshal Beresford, I gave him sore displeasure. Can the Reviewer think that the Marshal, being so offended, and who wrote, or caused to be written, several pamphlets against me, would have failed to contradict my statement at once, on a point like the one now in dispute, when his simple assertion would have been both damnatory and decisive?

Here let me do justice to Marshal Beresford, and this opportunity of doing so gives me great pleasure. Knowledge obtained from a common friend empowers me to say that Marshal Beresford, when in declining health, often conversed about his own career in arms—certainly a remarkable one, whatever military faults he may be charged with—and frequently referred to my work as authority on facts. I do not mean that he admitted the justice of my censures on himself; but, notwithstanding his natural anger, he would not refrain from praise where he thought it merited. This is also his own eulogium, and for that reason it is mentioned.

So much for inference—now for reference.

My authority was the personal assurance of the late Lord Stuart de Rothesay, who was officially mixed up with the matter—an assurance which a careful examination of the original documents in his ambassadorial archives confirmed. Those, and his private papers, were placed by him in my hands *without restriction*, and can therefore be honourably referred to now, though I did not name my authority then, to avoid involving him uneasily with a family into which his daughter was at the time about to enter by marriage. Moreover, knowing how true the facts were, it seemed unnecessary to support them until assailed.

Indeed, after their publication, Lord Stuart de Rothesay told me that the late Lady Canning, with a natural and even praiseworthy anger—seeing she knew not the truth—was only prevented from commencing legal proceedings against me by his assuring her that what I had said was true. Lord Stuart's frank, manly character is well known, and hence the 'Edinburgh' gentleman's anonymous doubts as to my veracity are not of much weight. Wherefore,

again I say, on your head be it that my present tediousness is bestowed on the public.

Now allow me two "*last words!*"

The anonymous gentleman who has such serious doubts of my accuracy does not, I see by your quotation, hesitate to call the Spanish peasantry *stupid*. The Spanish peasants, men and women alike, and most especially those of Old Castile, are unsurpassed even by the Irish in quickness and subtle wit, gaiety and exuberance of imagination, and are also unapproachable in dignity and refinement of manners—no small proof of their intelligence. Call Cervantes a dullard!

My real last words must now touch a subject unconnected with the Reviewer, but injuriously affecting the character of a great man.

You have given a long extract from a paper called the 'Telegraph,' in which, among many other doltish and offensive absurdities, and injurious aspersions on the character of the old Peninsular troops, the editor of the 'Telegraph,' having for authority a work called 'Paris Revisited,' written by one Scott, asserts that the Duke of Wellington had the women of his army flogged in support of discipline!!

The Duke of Wellington would have given his own body to the scourge sooner than have thus outraged all the manly feelings of his brave soldiers, for he was essentially a gentleman. Let shame, therefore, attend this brutal slander for the duration of its evil literary existence.

WILLIAM NAPIER, Lieutenant-General.

February 14, 1859.

THE END.

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