MAKING MOROS

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Imperial Historicism and American Military Rule in the Philippines' Muslim South

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Preface

This book represents an attempt to highlight a critical but seldom discussed episode in Philippine history, concerning an important but often overlooked minority population. I came to my subject matter initially while working on a doctoral degree at Northern Illinois University. Though at the time I much preferred engrossing stories of nineteenth-century religious rebellions in northern Luzon, where I was fortunate to spend a significant part of my early adulthood, I soon found that Mindanao and Sulu were where my research needed to be done. I was particularly compelled very early on in my studies by a series of grant projects pioneered by Drs. Susan Russell and Lina Ong. These innovative programs gathered a disparate collection of Muslim, Christian, and Lumad (animist) youth and adults from across Mindanao annually and brought them to the United States for intensive courses in peace studies aimed at inter-ethnic and inter-religious dialogue. I took an immediate interest in the projects and soon found myself consumed by the experiences, concerns, and aspirations of the participants. Remarkable individuals such as Nazzarola Macalandong, Haji Abdulla Salik Jr., Muhammad ben Usman, Ro-Janna Jamiri, and many others revealed a side of the Philippines that I had not known outside of the rumors and stereotypes that typically characterized Muslim Mindanao. These experiences were further enhanced by a visiting Fulbright language teaching assistant named Soraya Pahm, a Muslim from Cotabato. Soraya had become a close family friend and spent hours at our home in DeKalb in deep conversation about her native land. It suddenly seemed very odd to me that Mindanao had not been my research choice to begin with. After all, my wife is from Dipolog City on Mindanao's northern coast. I had spent many months living there over the past several years, yet, during my previous trips to Dipolog, "Muslim" Mindanao still seemed very far away—somehow perpetually separate from the actual "Philippines." Now, however, it had become closer than ever before.

Inspired by these projects and experiences, I threw myself into the literature and sources concerning the Philippines' Muslim South. Scholars such as Peter Gowing, Patricio Abinales, Caesar Majul, Thomas McKenna, and many others led me deep into the fascinating history of Muslim Mindanao. In the course of these studies I was able to publish an article in the *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies,* which became the genesis of this work.[1] I felt as though I had begun pulling a research thread of indefinite length. Eager to take it further I applied for a Fulbright research grant to the southern Philippines. To my delight I was approved, and eight months later my family and I found ourselves in Mindanao. As the source materials slowly piled up I began to form a vague outline of the current manuscript; however, its chronological scope was much broader at the time. The final parameters of the current study became increasingly clear as I was able to integrate myself into various Muslim communities and mosques throughout Mindanao. As I listened to the Moros recount their own history under the American colonial regime, one particular period inevitably rose to prominence in our conversations—the era of military rule from 1899 to 1913, or the time of "Wood, Bliss, and Pershing," as they put it. Their historical memories of this period were infused with an odd sense of nostalgia that piqued my academic curiosities. Though military rule in Mindanao and Sulu was largely authoritarian and Americentric, most Filipino Muslims I spoke with tended to describe it in terms of a critical episode in *Moro* history rather than merely as colonial history, which characterized their memories of previous and subsequent periods. This was particularly important to my project since Moro voices from the period are scant and rarely candid. Nevertheless, as I delved into the historical sources I did indeed find a profound resonance among the Moros' popular historical memories and the policies, interactions, and discursive identity formations carried out under the American military regime. This work, therefore, represents an effort to reveal, expound, and explicate a critical period in Filipino Muslim history, as judged by the recollections of the Moros themselves and the archival records. Though it embodies a rather minute chronological episode in an otherwise protracted and incredibly rich history of the Philippines' Muslim South, the fourteen years of American military rule in Mindanao and Sulu stand as a significant and decisive formative period in the Moros' modern history and continue to exercise tremendous influence over their current identities and relations with outside groups.

This work was also deeply influenced by the pioneering efforts of postcolonial critics such as Frederick Cooper, Ann Laura Stoler, Nicholas Thomas,

Paul Kramer, and especially Dipesh Chakrabarty. Their radical reconceptualizations of colonial modernity, the relationship between metropole and colony, the nature of progressive historical time, and theories of discursive identity formation and colonial discourse have inspired this work to look at the southern Philippines from new and innovative angles. Their guidance was indispensible as I read through archival material and critically engaging the notions, ideologies, discourses, rhetoric, and actions of those who shaped the history explored in this book. It is my hope that this work will contribute in some way to furthering the field that they and others bravely pioneered.

Let me also offer a word on the unique nature, intent, and scope of the present work. *Making Moros* often finds itself in somewhat precarious circumstances for three main reasons—orientation, scope, and the subaltern voice. I acknowledged and assessed these potential difficulties at its inception; nevertheless, I decided to move forward with the project in an attempt to carve out a unique niche in the historiography, which I hope I accomplished in some small measure.

By far the majority of history written about the American colonial Philippines has been done by Americanists digging in American archives and telling a story of American empire. I am certainly not making a critique of these historians, as they have produced much profound scholarship and enriched the field beyond measure. However, it does situate me and my work as mildly anomalous. I am not an Americanist. I am a Southeast Asianist and a Philippinist by training. Hence, *Making Moros* is intended as a presentation of *Philippine* history under American rule rather than *American* history in the Philippines. While this slight shift in orientation may seem initially like a distinction without a difference, it has had a major influence on the work. Much of my research was conducted while on a Fulbright Research Grant to the Southern Philippines. Many of the theories and much of my interpretation of the sources were in part predicated on deep investigation in indigenous languages of Moro memory, culture, and underrepresented source material composed and read exclusively on the periphery. This includes publications such as *The Mindanao Herald*, a local newspaper composed, marketed, and oriented toward a specific readership in Moro Province during American military rule. Though "unofficial" in terms of their archival status, publications like *The Mindanao Herald, The Manila Times, The Daily Bulletin*, *Handbook and Catalogue of the Philippine Exhibit*, *Philippine Carnival*, *Official Handbook, The Official Souvenir Program of the Philippines Carnival*, etc. served as primary outlets for the military regime and revealed interactions among

the colonizers and colonized found nowhere else. Military officials wrote articles and editorials, manipulated information and public opinion, and most important of all, carefully crafted a narrative of the Moro that spoke with much more freedom and force than official reports ever could. In this sense, I openly employ and advocate the "Foucaultian sense" of the term *archive* demonstrated by Edward Said as an "enunciated field" of colonial records collectively contributing to and crafting the subjective colony.[2] This work is not intended as a sweeping examination of American empire, or turn-of-the-century America, or the American military, or any other Americentric mode of inquiry. Rather, it is simply intended as a study of American military rule in Moro Province, a small but critical portion of Philippine history that echoes loudly today. While Americans certainly play a prominent and strikingly visible role in the book, it is largely because that is where the sources lie. But this is not a study of Americans per se. It is a study of how American discourse and policy during military rule shaped the Moros' concept of themselves and the emergent postcolonial state in modernity. In this sense, the Americans are the necessary tools and medium of my message but not the focus.

Hence, one of the tensions of the book is my sustained effort to keep as much of the study as possible on the periphery while still providing an underlying context of American politics and culture to frame the discourse. To make this work primarily into a history of American empire would move the focus from the periphery to the metropole, giving the book a distinctly Americentric tone. In other words, it would turn this work into another "American history" of the Philippines, which is what I attempt to avoid.

A similar issue of focus and orientation also presents itself within the context of Philippine history. Much of the historiography concerning the Moros has been produced within a distinctly Manila-centric matrix, that is, as a subset of the postcolonial nationalist narrative imposed on minority populations throughout the islands. This historiographical lean has produced a pervasive teleology among works on the southern Philippines. It is difficult to tell the story of the Moros outside of the story of nationalist integration and conflicts with the state in the latter part of the twentieth century. There is, however, a great deal of critical and understudied history outside of the integration question. This is precisely why I chose the American military period. Those short fourteen years provide a somewhat isolated, very rare, but very telling look at the Moros outside of an all-consuming national narrative of the Philippines. To compromise this exceptionalism and subject this work to such a narrow concern would dilute the efficacy of my particular study and argument and

carry the book beyond its subjective and chronological scope. It would, I believe, also betray the desires and historical memories of the contemporary Moros that helped to provide context to my study in the first place.

Finally, a word on the subaltern voice. I am indeed an advocate of "new imperial history" and have the most profound respect for Dipesh Chakrabarty and other theorists of subaltern studies. I wrote this book in part to give voice specifically to the Moros. In my efforts, I have scoured the Philippines, the United States, and the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) for the smallest shreds of indigenous, organic textual source material. I have found, however, that it is a rare thing indeed. In its stead, I have pursued two courses. First, I attempted to seek context through historical memory among the Moros themselves, including deep participant-observation carried out in local languages within the ARMM, and in countless mosques, cafes, and homes across Mindanao. Much of this voice is included in the manuscript and provides a fundamental guidepost to the work. Second, I have employed the method of discourse analysis to coax the Moro voice from non-Moro sources. Through various official and unofficial sources (many of which have never been cited or used extensively) I have attempted to reveal the Moro in never-before-seen circumstances—county fairs, carnivals, world tours, expeditions, conversations with local officials, supernatural contests, and so on. These scenes have provided a third-person view of Moros that has not been shown before. I have also included a rich sampling of Filipino historiographical accounts and views of the Moros from both Filipino and Moro authors. Unfortunately, the subaltern voice must often be coerced from the sources by reading against the grain and between the lines and employing theories and strategies to make the subaltern heard within the history of ideas and discourse. The tension comes, however, when these methods butt up against profound source preferences that tend to marginalize sources composed and read on the periphery, either during the colonial era or after.

In the end, *Making Moros* attempts to present a case study of an exceptional period of anomalous colonial rule in the Philippines' Muslim South that began a very long and profound process of discursive identity formation among the Moros. It strives to explore this people outside of the themes and historiographical tropes that have served to define them as subsets of other histories and larger concerns. It attempts to locate the Moros in modernity as they positioned themselves in a collaborative colonial encounter and established the parameters of their own modern selves.

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Introduction

On the morning of 7 February 1911, two years before the end of American military rule in Mindanao and Sulu, more than ten thousand Filipino Muslims marched in solemn unity down the streets of Zamboanga, the colonial capital of Moro[1] Province. Most of them were dressed in full battle array, displaying "wonderful colors in apparel."[2] At their head were a number of distinguished sultans, headmen, and the illustrious "Princessa of Cotabato," who was "carried in a specially constructed palanquin" and attired "in silks carefully sought out to please her fastidious tastes." Though Filipino Muslims enjoyed a reputation for primitive savagery, unprovoked hostility, and stoic fearlessness, Americans in attendance watched the advancing Muslim ranks "spellbound as the tribes of picturesque Moro people passed by, unprepared for a spectacle of such unusual brilliance, color, and fascination." Far from the stereotypically emasculated and conquered subjects of an exploitive imperialism, Filipino Muslims proudly demonstrated an enhanced sense of ethnoreligious self-awareness and satisfaction as they marched swinging "their arms in an arch of 180 degrees." For many Americans the scene was truly moving. "[This event] may serve as a reminder of what we have," wrote one enthusiastic reporter.[3] *The Manila Times* immediately reported the procession as "the most spectacular [event] ever seen in the history of the islands,"[4] as pirates, warriors, marauders, and holy men all displayed themselves in full view of the colonial authorities.

However, despite its intimidating martial spirit and independent flare, the Muslims' parade, marking the opening of the Zamboanga Fair, actually embodied the culminating success of American colonial endeavors in the Philippines' Muslim South. In their efforts to epistemologically and logistically manage this historically "fierce" collection of Muslim tribes in Mindanao and

Sulu, the US military never strayed far from a pervasive discourse of imperial historicism. Discussed at length below, "imperial historicism," as it is used in this work, refers to a supposed universal ontology of temporal contextualization for every aspect of human culture, society, and in some cases biology. In other words, historicism, or the historicizing of various objects or populations, was an epistemological tool of imperialism meant to provide order and logic to a perceived universal chronology of evolutionary progress culminating in modernity. It was a product of Western Enlightenment notions of humanistic progress, and it continues to inform many of our contemporary concepts of "history," especially in the postcolonial world. Naturally, one's ability to assess the ebb and flow of stagist pasts required a particular detachment from the transitional narrative generally. This elevated sense of historical omniscience from the pinnacle of modernity underwrote the logic and purpose of American imperialism in the Philippines, particularly in the islands' Muslim South. American colonialists approached their subjects with the express purpose of establishing evolutionary status and then deducing the best possible means for enabling indigenous development into modernity. In essence, the entire colonial project was a matter of disentangling and ordering perceived temporalities. Only in this way could the world's "archaic" inhabitants hope to escape their inadequacy and join the ranks of the modern, in terms of both consciousness and material comfort.

The episode described in the opening paragraph provides an apt illustration of the US military's historicization and construction of Filipino Muslims as modern subjects during the critical first decade and a half of American rule. Images of Muslim savagery and pristine primitiveness were carefully preserved, domesticated, and reproduced in colonial fairs and elsewhere as symbols of imperial success, but also to demonstrate the Moros' immense potentials and capacities for modernity. The parading Muslims in Zamboanga represented a series of coded discourses suggesting a certain finality to their archaic ways. By "discovering," analyzing, describing, cataloguing, and displaying Filipino Muslims as ethnologically specific and temporally contingent subjects, colonial authorities attempted to dismantle notions of dynamic contemporaneity while contextualizing the Moros' culture and society as relics of a fading past. This sense of finality in turn introduced notions of transition as Filipino Muslims underwent redefinition in a perceived new phase of historical evolution. It was here, within this burgeoning era of transitioning temporality, that American imperialists began to see the possibilities of Moro modernity as reflections of their own progressive past. Despite

the Filipino Muslims' apparent exoticism and ethnic singularity, one reporter, upon observing the Moro procession, curiously wrote, "The imagination may play tricks, but . . . there is much in it all to call to mind a celebration in any town in Indiana, Illinois, or Ohio."[5] The reporter's remarkable sense of vertigo regarding such a bizarre association of spatially and, in their historicist view, temporally distant locations suggests notions of a significant temporal transition as Filipino Muslims engaged their evolutionary ascent into homogeneous modernity. This distinctive state of temporal transition framed a unique composite of what it meant to be "Moro" in the twentieth century. For their part, Filipino Muslims both embraced and resisted American attempts at social and ethnological engineering to produce a negotiated and discursive identity. However, the Moros' efforts always fell within the ubiquitous discourse of imperial historicism as established by American imperialists.

In this regard, the present work offers two overarching theses: first, imperial historicism, as *the* fundamental philosophy of American colonialism in the Philippines, represents a coherent and reliable discourse informing and underwriting the essential logic of the United States' colonial project in Mindanao and Sulu. Conceived in the metropole and maintained in the colony, historicism served as a remarkably consistent ideological guide in determining nearly every aspect of colonial discovery, assessment, and policy. Deducing, ordering, and treating perceived historically encoded taxonomies among Filipino Muslims was the ultimate rationale and self-assigned task of colonial administrators in the Philippines' Muslim South. Historicism as imperial discourse is the key to understanding the mind-sets, attitudes, rationales, and actions of both Americans and Moros as they negotiated their colonial encounter.

Second, American military rule in Mindanao and Sulu, though often overlooked in favor of more teleologically appealing and narratively friendly episodes of American imperialism, was the most critical period in the Filipino Muslims' modern history. "Moro" as an ethnological, sociological, and political category in modernity was firmly established during this critical period of military rule. American imperialists, often in collaboration with Filipino Muslims, carefully constructed a series of identifiable traits that came to define "Moro" as a distinct category and subject. Through the objective guise of modern science, colonial authorities created social and material "histories," socio-environmental analyses, and perhaps most important, "race traits" and cultural inclinations for Filipino Muslims. These findings all contributed to a static definition of "Moro" as a subject for modern governance. Though

Filipino Muslims resisted various aspects of this process, they more often than not embraced colonial efforts at identity formation. Constructions of "Moroness" frequently touched on aspects of a cherished Islamic heritage and fully distinguished Filipino Muslims from other Hispanized, Christian Malays. In some respects Moros and Americans achieved a strange sense of ideological symbiosis as one group mutually affirmed the other's vision of themselves. It is this unique relationship and the discourse that framed it that provides the subject matter for the present work.

Transcendent Progress and the Shaping of American Imperial Historicism

When American imperialists seized the Philippines at the dawning of the twentieth century, their guiding philosophy was predicated upon broadly conceived notions of cultural and political historicism. The unwavering self-assurance required to rule over millions of unfamiliar imperial subjects derived its potency from an unquestioned panoptic view of history. This concept of "transcendent progress," which John Schrecker so aptly describes, "asserted that the West was freeing itself from history, transcending it, and was entering an entirely new stage of human development, one that would be totally unencumbered by the problems and evils of the past."[6] From this elevated position of ahistorical modernity Western societies confidently assessed the aggregate of world history and promptly declared non-Western cultures to be relics "of a discredited past."[7] The inconsistency, however, in this transcendent narrative was that the modern West was still surrounded by a great number of "discredited" societies and, therefore, was still a participant in the archaic ebb and flow of transitional histories. It is precisely this tension and anxiety that underpinned the imperial projects of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. As Dipesh Chakrabarty observed, "historicism enabled European [and American] domination of the world in the nineteenth century" by positing "historical time as a measure of the cultural distance (at least in institutional development) that was assumed to exist between the West and the non-West. In the colonies, it legitimated the ideas of civilization."[8]

From an American perspective, this bifurcation of the world into modern and non-modern spheres would find its absolution in the inevitable and consuming march of modernity and history itself. Take for example David Prescott Barrows's declaration concerning the inevitability of an all-inclusive and homogenizing modern historical narrative.[9] "History," he wrote, "which

up to modern times is the story of the white man has now become the record of the fortunes of all races. For good or ill, all mankind has been drawn together into a common life and movement."[10] Barrows's comment reveals a number of insights indicative of the United States' larger imperial philosophy. Though he clearly articulates a racially exclusive sense of history, Barrows simultaneously acknowledges the homogenizing force of modern history, which is certain to incorporate the world's disparate populations while blurring or even extinguishing former notions of difference upholding structures of cultural and historical segregation. Barrows's statement also reveals an acknowledged position of privilege at the "end" (or perhaps forefront) of history. His historicist concept of non-Western societies is both perceived and interpreted from the supposedly instantaneous motionlessness of his present and is infused with a compelling teleology of modernity.

Similar rhetoric pervades much of the discourse concerning America's colonial legitimacy in the Philippines. Indeed, such sentiments are enshrined in President McKinley's Benevolent Assimilation Proclamation, which declared that the post-Enlightenment universals of "individual rights and liberties" were the "heritage of free peoples" regardless of race or color.[11] These "fundamental modern ideas," wrote another colonial official, "are not merely American or English, but are common to the modern civilized world."[12] The philosophical acrobatics of declaring the inevitability of universal principles while carefully maintaining racially exclusive access to these ideals is one of the most significant and telling aspects of American imperialism in the Philippines. This dilemma necessitates imperial historicism as an ideology and practice to maintain the overall imperial project.

While such radical historical realizations of inherent and potential racial equality might have given cause to cultural insecurities and reactionary isolationism (and indeed they did in many well-known xenophobic and racist episodes in American history),[13] American imperialists responded overwhelmingly with an optimistic and steadfastly confident crusading spirit.[14] The "manifest destiny" of their continental conquest, the might of their military, the wealth and innovation of their economy, and the progressive activism that witnessed slavery's abolition as well as a general rise in the education and health of the poor, all indicated the potential and responsibility of Americans to assist those who fell below the standards of modernity.[15] As the "heir of humanism,"[16] historicism prompted the "modern political subject" in late nineteenth-century America to pursue a "goal of social justice" enabled by "a certain degree of freedom with respect to the past."[17] This was certainly the

case in the colonies. As some scholars have pointed out, "the real importance of the Philippines to the United States has been moral and exemplary, rather than strategic or economic."[18]

Consequently, when American imperialists occupied their new colony, they, as Bernard Cohn has shown in the case of the British in India, "invaded and conquered not only a territory but an epistemological space as well. The 'facts' of this space did not exactly correspond to those of the invaders." Nevertheless, they "believed they could explore and conquer this space through translation: establishing correspondence could make the unknown and the strange knowable."[19] For American imperialists, this process of conquest and translation consisted of carefully, and often scientifically, discerning the civilizational status of the islands' various populations and then producing taxonomies capable of guiding the various methods and degrees of civilization required to complete the colonial project.[20] Indeed, "at the heart of America's orientation to empire was classification."[21]

These notions of discernable taxonomy are at the very core of American imperial historicism. As Dipesh Chakrabarty has pointed out, "history is important as a form of consciousness in modernity."[22] That is, history, as an empty, homogeneous, and secular entity, provides the "idealistic presupposition of the presence of an absolute principle which guarantees the rationality of history," and, consequently, humanity.[23] Put another way, historicism, as David Barrows's statement indicates above, holds that there "is only one history, from which there is no stepping out, which shapes both material conditions as well as ideas deriving from them and in turn acting upon them."[24] Thus, if American imperialists wished to understand the nature of their colonial possessions, both animate and inanimate, these items had to be seen, documented, and organized within "the context of a wider, universal historical development" circumscribing the aggregate of historical time.[25] The vastness separating cultures, environments, and other innumerable discursive factors occurring among colonizers and colonized was subsumed and neutralized by the universal nature of history. After all, "historicism is that standpoint which regards time as more fundamental than space."[26]

In addition to outward projections of power, the colonial project also became an exercise in self-examination as Americans studied their own historical path to modernity and strained to pinpoint and isolate corresponding historical moments among indigenous societies. In this way, as Edward Said observes, "the relationship between the 'West' and its dominated cultural 'others' is not just a way of understanding an unequal relationship between

unequal interlocutors, but also a point of entry into studying the formation and meaning of Western cultural practices themselves."[27] While this exercise in reverse translation frequently succeeded in maintaining and reaffirming the American notion of panoptic historical perspective and cultural superiority, it also occasionally revealed disturbing disruptions and anomalies in the historical narrative that threatened to unravel the tightly circumscribed concept of a uniform and interpretable progressive transitional past. American imperialists were often frustrated as they negotiated and manipulated their information to maintain a viable balance between the Oriental and colonial "otherness" of Filipinos and the simultaneously legitimating necessity of highlighting examples of transitional likeness to corresponding moments in Anglo-Saxon history. Their response to these anxieties was frequently to retreat to the safety of old colonial clichés and racist stereotypes as well as less comfortable admissions of doubt and colonial guilt. The fact that "the otherness [or likeness] of colonized persons was neither inherent nor stable" often upset the epistemological foundations of the American colonial project in the Philippines and caused imperialists constantly to reinvent and reorganize, though never abandon, their approach to colonial tutelage.

American Politico-Military Rule in the Philippines' Muslim South

One of the best cases for examining American imperial historicism and its accompanying tensions is found in the United States' politico-military rule of the Philippines' Muslim South from 1899 to 1913. Filipino Muslims provided a unique opportunity for American imperialists to test the efficacy and limits of their civilizing abilities. For more than three hundred years the Spanish failed to subdue the islands' Muslim populations and achieved only a superficial conquest by the closing decades of the nineteenth century. Thus, from the very beginning, Americans approached Christian and Muslim Filipinos as distinctly separate entities with separate histories. While waging a war of colonial occupation in the north, American policy-makers thought it best to neutralize the Moro threat by formally recognizing Muslim exceptionalism and promising provisional autonomy. This was accomplished by the Bates Treaty of 1899. This agreement was forged among Brigadier-General John C. Bates, the sultan of Sulu, and several minor Muslim chieftains on 20 August 1899.[28] In return for peaceful relations during the Philippine-American War, General Bates agreed to pursue an overall policy of noninterference in Islamic

religious and juridical affairs while formally recognizing the limited authority and sovereignty of Muslim leaders, who were allotted a monthly stipend in Mexican dollars. This arrangement, combined with the ever-present threat of insurgent violence throughout the islands and especially among Muslims, set the foundation for nearly 15 years of provisional military control in Mindanao and Sulu.

The bifurcation of the colony during these years has solicited far less study and analysis from scholars of Philippine history than the subsequent integration attempts that followed. The tendency in the literature has been twofold. First, scholars have typically assumed that the divergent administration of Mindanao and Sulu from the rest of the Philippines was a natural policy choice resulting from either "the centuries-old animosity between Muslims and Christian Filipinos"[29] or the necessity of creating an internal "imperial indigenism" [30] for the purposes of subverting the Filipinos' emerging national identity and placating domestic desires for colonial peace.[31] While these assumptions are certainly accurate in terms of broadly conceived rationales for split rule in the Philippines, they take for granted or ignore the nuanced and negotiated applications of American historicism and its power among Moro populations, which represented a critical epistemological point in the colonial encounter. Second, virtually all studies regarding American rule in Mindanao (with the notable exception of Patricio Abinales's work) exhibit a strong teleological reading of the current conflict among Muslim separatist organizations and the Republic of the Philippines. This tendency is likely the result of the "preoccupation of most scholars with Manila-centered and Manila-driven politics."[32] Indeed, even many Filipino Muslim scholars agree that histories involving Mindanao will always have immediate "political significance."[33] While certainly a variety of historical factors have contributed to integration conflicts in the latter half of the twentieth century among Muslim and non-Muslim groups in the Philippines, this does not mean that one should view all imperial histories in Mindanao as inevitably leading to the formation of Islamic national and international liberation groups fighting for autonomy against a centralist postcolonial state. Indeed, since American military rule in Mindanao was distinctly outside the overall integration attempts that characterized the United States' larger colonial endeavor in the archipelago, many scholars are not sure how to account for this phase of the colonial project. Consequently, the military regimes' nearly autonomous government in Mindanao between 1899 and 1913 is generally glossed over and categorized as an exercise in "pacification," "foundation-building," or the "predeces-

sor" of some future approach to colonial integration. This need to incorporate military rule into the larger narrative of colonial nation- and state-building in the Philippines ultimately downplays one of, if not the, most important periods in Muslim Mindanao's modern history. The 14 years of politico-military rule in Mindanao and Sulu were, in essence, the moment of imperial encounter between Filipino Muslims and the modern West, as Americans embodied it. It was a period of radical identity formation through a series of negotiated exchanges and cultural encounters, in which Moros were defined in relation to modernity, both by American imperialists and by the Muslims themselves. It initiated a profound process of reorienting Filipino Muslims' cultural and political affiliations from the Islamic Malay traditions to the south and west in the "Sulu Zone"[34] and beyond, toward the east and north where American notions of modernity, colonial governance, and ethnic historicism shaped an emerging dialogue of what constituted a "Moro."[35]

For the American military regime, the encounter represented an opportunity for an unadulterated attempt at genuine colonial tutelage without the inhibiting entanglements of gradually integrated indigenous governance. It was, in other words, the Americans' best occasion for directly applying their radical sense of humanistic social engineering,[36] while simultaneously providing the ideal circumstances to sidestep philosophically the antithetical authoritarianism that enabled their humanitarian project. Indeed, though military administration in the Philippines is typically thought of as something distinctly separate from and less ideologically driven than the civilian-controlled colonial regime at large, the evidence indicates otherwise.[37] Though certainly not uniform in every thought and deed, most military officials in Mindanao were largely the product of a vibrant turn-of-the-century socially conscious segment of American society. Most military administrators developed their views of the world within a distinctly bourgeois, New England–centered upbringing. These views were later shaped by experiences on the American frontier and were infused with the powerful social currents of progressivism, race theory, and the Social Gospel circulating among the upper and ruling class that filled the halls of West Point, the Naval College, and Ivy League schools along the eastern seaboard. In this sense, American military administrators in Moro Province were highly representative of a small but critically important slice of America's ruling class; a class that initiated, shaped, and later textually recalled the imperial experience. As such, they felt the compelling moral imperative of civilization and an acute sense of loyalty and responsibility to the larger humanistic and civilizing goals of America's

colonial project. These men were also, by virtue of their deeply bourgeois temporal consciousness, profoundly influenced by notions of cultural evolution and historicist transitions. However, their approach to achieving these ideals and implementing their philosophies was often starkly dissimilar to those in the broader colony.[38] In many cases, for American military officials, this meant pursuing a purer, more distinctly "American" colonial experience unencumbered by native power-sharing and forced integration into the colonial state.

Historicism as Discourse: An Amendment to "New Imperial History"

Recent historiographical trends regarding Western colonial projects of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries have tended to focus on the limits of imperial power and the ultimately discursive nature of colonialism in both metropoles and colonies. A great deal of what has been termed "new imperial history" has made significant strides in challenging narratives of resolute imperial oppression and inhibited indigenous agency. Ann Laura Stoler and Frederick Cooper, for example, offered a profound critique of mutually exclusive and/or dominant and subordinate colonial spheres. "Europe's colonies were never empty spaces to be made over in Europe's image or fashioned in its interests," they argued, "nor, indeed, were European states self-contained entities that at one point projected themselves overseas. Europe was made by its imperial projects, as much as colonial encounters were shaped by conflicts within Europe itself."[39] In an effort to eradicate these notions, the authors advocated including "metropole and colony in a single analytic field, addressing the weight one gives to causal connections and the primacy of agency in its different parts" rather than casting colonizer and colonized as antagonistic binaries.[40] By contesting hierarchical relationships of power and the assumed pervasiveness of colonialism as a hegemonic discourse, Stoler and Cooper offered a significant reassessment of Western imperialism.[41]

These ideas were also articulated well in Nicholas Thomas's work, *Colonialism's Culture: Anthropology, Travel and Government.* Thomas, in fact, took the notion of a nuanced, contested, and contingent colonial discourse a bit further than even Stoler and Cooper did in their later work. Thomas argued that postcolonial studies—while correct in their critique of hegemonic discourse—were still, perhaps unknowingly, employing categories and concepts that reaffirmed imperial structures and epistemological foundations.

He wrote, "A critique of colonialism—and particularly one of colonial *culture*—must deal with a wider range of events and representations, including some in which the critics themselves are implicated."[42] These "events and representations" included the "homogenization of racism" as a universal analytical tool, the persistent overestimation of Western power resulting in imperialism's "fatal impact" on indigenous societies, and the bifurcation of "metropole" and "colony" as distinct and hierarchical entities.[43] Like Stoler and Cooper, Thomas sought to mediate between the popular "public anger" of colonial histories and the "cooler scholarly project" of accurately interpreting the past while fully accounting for the validity of indigenous agency throughout the colonial experience.

This approach to imperial history has found an especially welcoming atmosphere in Southeast Asian studies. The syncretic and heterogeneous nature of historical influence and imperial intrusion in the region has allowed scholars to broaden their critique of monolithic structural discourses of imperial hegemony significantly. Craig Reynolds and Tony Day, for example, have challenged the imperial genesis and progressive narratives of state formation in Southeast Asia by exposing the confining teleology of the region's history as it relates to a continual preoccupation with Western imperialism and anticolonial nationalism.[44] Other scholars, such as Vicente Rafael and Reynaldo Ileto, have likewise successfully disaggregated imperial narratives while uncovering a much more contested, contingent, and discursive colonial experience in the Philippines specifically.[45] This is certainly the theoretical position of Paul Kramer's work on race-making in the American colonial Philippines. As a "transnational history of race and empire" Kramer's work challenges the exported and "exceptional" models of U.S. colonialism in the Philippines by disaggregating the previously assumed hierarchical discourses of power emanating from the metropole that dictated the depth and scope of racial construction in the colony. Kramer strives to recast "race as a dynamic, contextual, contested, and contingent field of power" not only in the Philippines but in the United States as well. In accordance with Stoler and Cooper's suggestion, Kramer strongly advocates "the necessity of examining metropole and colony in a single, densely interactive field." He states, "The racial remaking of empire and the imperial remaking of race, are not separable."[46] While Kramer and many others have demonstrated the pervasive propensity of subaltern classes to co-opt the discourses and symbolism of imperial rule and then appropriate these elements as a means of counter-hegemonic, anticolonial resistance, there is a danger of carrying these ideas too far.

By focusing too heavily on the discursive nature and multiplicity of discourses involved in the colonial experience, one risks diluting history to the point of utter incomprehensibility. As Kenneth Pomeranz has observed, by "focusing almost exclusively on exposing the contingency, particularity, and perhaps unknowability of historical moments—[such scholarship] makes it impossible even to approach many of the most important questions in history."[47] This is not to suggest, however, that scholars should reorient their work once again toward notions of colonial hegemony and distinct analytical fields separating metropole and colony. Rather, perhaps it would be beneficial to consider the possibility of a middle ground in which certain broad imperial cultures, discourses, and policies are conceived and developed at the core with remarkable consistency and persistence, but which also encounter a great deal of resistance, reappropriation, modification, and adaptation in the peripheries, all without ever really abandoning or diverging from their underlying foundations that inform and structure the colonial endeavor. The key to such studies would be to keep the focus on the periphery and extrapolate representative discourses from sources and encounters on site at the fulcrum of the imperial encounter.

American imperial historicism provides an excellent example of such cultures, discourses, and policies. Historicism represents a continuous and resolute thread running throughout the entirety of American colonial discourse during military rule in Mindanao. Though this paradigm is certainly mediated, adapted, and even contorted by factors influencing its application in the colony, it never becomes the entirely discursive, contingent, disordered, and unanticipated discourse constructed in and emanating back from the periphery, as new imperial history might suggest. Rather, historicism at its roots is an exclusive product of the metropole projected out over space and time, informing and structuring the rationality of American colonialism in Mindanao. It is the key to understanding the logical formation of a bifurcated colonial/non-colonial world as American imperialists perceived it. However, it must be observed on the periphery, with deep reference of course to the metropolitan and later nationalist narratives that interpret it, but without ever giving it over to the banal and falsely homogeneous teleologies that would dilute it.

Narrative Background and Scope and Sequence

When American military personnel arrived in Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago in 1899, Filipino Muslims numbered approximately three hun-

dred thousand.[48] Though American imperialists frequently referred to their Muslim subjects as "Moros" generally, there were at least 13 distinct ethnolinguistic groups inhabiting Mindanao and its satellite islands that identified themselves as Muslim. These were Tausug, Maranao, Maguindanao, Sama, Yakan, Jama, Mapun, Palawan, Molbog, Kalagan, Kalibugan, Sangil, and Badjao. Colonial authorities sometimes acknowledged these distinctions (Maranaos, Tausugs, and Yakans were designated as especially fierce tribes, for example) but typically treated the Moros as a relatively homogeneous population in terms of colonial policy and organization.

Islam first arrived in the Sulu Archipelago late in the fourteenth century when Arab and Malay merchants branched out from commercial networks in insular Southeast Asia to seek profits and converts on the eastern edges of their trading zone. The first significant Muslim presence in the southern Philippines is attributed to Makdum Ibrahim Al-Akbar, a Muslim merchant and missionary from Malacca who eventually settled in the Sulu Archipelago. Al-Akbar's efforts were followed by a number of Islamic pioneers who pressed further into the archipelago. The most notable of these was Abu Bak'r, a reported native of Mecca who standardized Islamic practice throughout the sultanate by introducing Arabic language and script, the Koran, Islamic legal systems, and Mosque culture.[49] Abu Bak'r's reign is generally considered to be the formative period of Islamicization by most Filipino Muslims. Though missionary contact with mainland Mindanao was certainly probable during these early phases of Islamicization, the formal introduction of Islam to Mindanao is historically attributed to Sharif Muhammad Kabungsuwan, who established a permanent Muslim settlement near Cotabato. While the past century has witnessed a great deal of romantic mythologizing concerning the spread of Islam in the Philippines, the time frame and processes of Islamicization outlined here are generally accepted.

Early Muslim missionary-merchants such as Abu Bak'r and others brought a syncretic brand of *Sufi* (mystical)[50] *Sunnah* (Sunni) Islam to the southern Philippines that had developed through a myriad of intercultural fusions throughout Southeast Asia. As a reaction to the material excesses of the Caliphate by the end of the first millennium C.E., Sufism represented a retreat to the perceived simplicity and personal revelation that characterized Muhammad's early life. By focusing on meditation, prayer, asceticism, and manual labor, Sufis aspired to abolish the self, thus rendering their minds and bodies as perfect vessels for the will of God, open to increased knowledge and personal revelation. As Sufism filtered through India and into Southeast Asia, it

developed an informal system of oral transmission through traveling teachers and mystics who demonstrated their deeper knowledge of Islam through miraculous healings, prophesies, and other spiritual manifestations. While Sufism has often been considered a direct affront to traditional Islam as conceived at the core (primacy of the individual over the Umma, search for further knowledge despite the doctrinal finality of the Koran, the apparent Indic and Christian ascetic influences, for example), Sufism was undoubtedly the driving force behind Islam's prolific expansion beyond the Near East.[51] For the purposes of this work, despite its debatable syncretisms, Islamic foundations such as a deep reverence for the Koran, the life and example of the Prophet Mohammad (Hadith), and various aspects of Shari'ah Law became firmly rooted in Moro tradition and framed their identities for centuries before Western contact.[52]

While Luzon and the Visayas succumbed to Spanish colonialism in the sixteenth century, Moros successfully resisted Hispanization for nearly three centuries. Only after 1848 and the advent of mechanized gunboats were the Spanish able to establish a sustained presence in Mindanao and Sulu. Even by 1896, however, Spain's suzerainty was nominal at best, with only a few garrisoned outposts in Jolo, Siasi, Bongao, Marawi, and Cotabato.[53] Despite the provisional nature of their actual intrusion, however, the Iberian "war against Islam" produced a galvanized Islamic consciousness within the Moros' historical memory. Muslim scholars such as Caesar Majul trace their modern ethno-religious political identities directly to this antagonistic relationship with Spain. "The Moro Wars left a deep imprint on the character of the Muslims in the Philippines," he declared, "which they still evince."[54] Many contemporary Moros continue to view the Philippine state's policies in Mindanao as an extension of Spain's original Catholic-driven attempt at Moro "genocide."[55]

Following the chaotic and bloody withdrawal of Spanish forces from their southern posts in 1899 after Spain's defeat to the Americans, the United States inherited a virtually autonomous collection of Muslim tribes fundamentally undisturbed by Western imperialism. Lacking an effective colonial infrastructure, the Americans neutralized the Moro threat by granting provisional autonomy and guaranteeing religious freedom through the Bates Treaty. Signed by Jamal-ul Kiram, Sultan of Sulu, and other minor datus, the treaty allowed American military forces to occupy Muslim areas without expanding the broader insurgency conflict raging in the north. On 30 October 1899, Mindanao, the Sulu Archipelago, and Palawan became the "Military District of Mindanao and Jolo," formally inaugurating American military rule

in the Philippines' Muslim South.[56] Not only was the American presence tolerated by Moros with little resistance during this initial contact but Filipino Muslims frequently "appeared enthusiastic about United States sovereignty, for it protected both Islam and their traditions from their hereditary enemies, the Christian Filipinos."[57]

While the Bates Treaty succeeded in its original objective of maintaining peace in Mindanao, by 1903 many aspects of the treaty had become politically untenable. American noninterference with Moro slavery, in particular, prompted strong calls for colonial authorities to abrogate the treaty and institute full colonial government in the Military District. By July of that year colonial officials eagerly set about instituting full American authority by reorganizing the Military District into a government entity known as Moro Province. President Theodore Roosevelt formally abrogated the Bates Treaty less than a year later, on 2 March 1904. Noncompliance among Muslim leaders served as the official rationale. From 1903 to 1913 Moro Province provided a separate and nearly autonomous military colonial regime in the Philippines' Muslim South. Though officially accountable to the Philippine Commission and structurally part of the colonial regime at large, military leaders in Moro Province enjoyed tremendous autonomy and conducted their imperial policies with very little interference.[58] Unencumbered by the competing interests and political maneuverings characteristic of civilian government in the north, only a small contingent of administrators governed Moro Province with remarkable coherence and efficiency. American military governors general presided over an appointed five-member legislative council. Council offices included secretary, treasurer, attorney, engineer, and superintendent of schools. These six officers administrated a provincial system comprised of subdivided districts with appointed military governors and staff, and organized municipalities. Moro populations living beyond these administrative zones were arranged into "tribal wards" based on ethno-linguistic affiliation as far as could be determined. Broadly, however, as a subset of the larger colonial apparatus Moros were governed as "wild peoples"—a distinction applied to those who fell outside the Hispanizing and Christianizing influences of Spanish colonialism.

During its ten-year existence, Moro Province employed only three governors general: Leonard Wood, Tasker Bliss, and John Pershing. Though each brought his own particular strengths and objectives, the three governors pieced together a surprisingly consistent and innovative period of military colonial rule. These men collectively represented a small but critically

important slice of America's ruling class that shaped the philosophical underpinnings of the American colonial project. Their distinctly bourgeois notions of historicist transition, civility and savagery, modernity and archaism, and paternalistic colonial tutelage expressed a coherent discourse of colonial thought representative of the yearnings, nostalgia, and aspirations of some of America's most powerful citizens.

Perhaps the most distinguished of the three governors, Leonard Wood, initiated military rule in Moro Province with a heavy-handed, no nonsense approach to colonial governance. Trained as a physician at Harvard Medical School in the 1880s, Governor Wood went on to an illustrious military career after volunteering for frontline action in addition to his medical duties during the frontier wars again Geronimo's Chiricahua Apaches. These campaigns resulted in a Congressional Medal of Honor. After the outbreak of the Spanish-American War, Wood organized and led the famous "Rough Riders" as commanding officer though his second in command, Theodore Roosevelt, derived most of the glory from their endeavor. Wood later went on to become governor general of Cuba (1899–1902) before being transferred to the Philippines in 1903. Though his tenure in Mindanao and Sulu was characterized by a distinctly ethnocentric, elevated sense of colonial superiority and paternalistic discipline, his devotion to the success of Moro Province and the "advancement" of Filipino Muslims into modernity is beyond dispute. Peter Gowing describes his disposition as follows: "His personality reminds one of the medieval Christian knights fighting the Saracens or of the Puritan reformers in Cromwell's England."[59] Governor Wood's regime effectively set the tone for the next decade of military rule by pursuing dissidents, implementing a strong sense of law and order, establishing schools, and providing the governmental backdrop for colonial engineering in the Philippines' Muslim South.

Wood's successor was in many ways his exact opposite. Known as the "Velvet Glove," Tasker Bliss had not seen action in any of the prominent military campaigns of his time. Though deeply committed to the military, Bliss was more of a diplomat and scholar than a traditional soldier. He excelled at languages and was fascinated by ancient history. Unlike Wood, Bliss took a deep interest in Moro culture and frequently solicited Muslim insights and concerns in councils and informal meetings. Though he certainly benefitted from the peace established under Wood, Bliss's regime witnessed a tremendous investment in education, infrastructure, and economic development that sent Moro Province surging ahead of its colonial contemporaries in the Philippines.[60] General Bliss's role as "peacemaker," diplomat, and curious scholar

enabled much of the discursive identity formation discussed in this work. His efforts to know and be known by his Muslim subjects opened an important dialogue of exploratory representation and ethnological discourse. Moros were as eager to tell General Bliss who they were as he and his contemporary Americans were eager to discover them.

Moro Province's third and final military governor, John J. Pershing, was an interesting combination of his predecessors. Like Wood, Pershing came to the Philippines with a distinguished military record forged on the American frontier and in daring exploits in Cuba as well as prior experience in Moro Province.[61] His martial spirit prompted a less benevolent and more distrustful approach to Moro leadership than that held by Bliss. Pershing's unyielding disarmament of Muslims and his heavy-handed treatment of noncompliant Moros during the Battle of Bud Bagsak recalled earlier episodes under General Wood.[62] However, in broader terms Pershing was not nearly as aloof from his subjects as Wood tended to be. Pershing's early work with African American and Amerindian education perhaps inspired a more connected relationship to his Moro subjects than mere colonial interest. In a letter to Governor General Cameron Forbes in 1911 Pershing positively opined, "Much can be done through the leading Moros by appealing to their reason and by taking them into one's confidence."[63] Like Bliss, Pershing sought a common humanity with Filipino Muslims beyond their official relationship, ethnocentric as it might have remained. No doubt due in large part to the efforts of his predecessors, Pershing's tenure is often judged as "the finest period in the history of the Province," a sentiment attested to by the plaza that continues to bear his name in Zamboanga.[64]

Though each of the governors acquired experience in various continental colonial contexts, their duties in Moro Province proved to be especially unique. Despite serving as the most apparent precedent for colonial administration in Mindanao, the army's continental Indian policies proved philosophically and historically inadequate to the more enlightened goals of the Philippine endeavor. Military officials openly acknowledged the "many mistakes" made "among the Indians" that supposedly led to their perpetual state of evolutional underachievement.[65] After making an extensive examination of American Indian policy at the outset of American colonial rule in the Philippines, Chief of the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes David Barrows concluded that, "[i]n spite of the excellent intentions . . . [American Indian policy] has not brought forth satisfactory results, and in a thousand cases has not done justice to the Indian." Consequently, "it might be stated that the policy of the

United States in dealing with the American Indian contains little that can be followed in governing the backward races here [in the Philippines]."[66] These mistakes could not be repeated in the Philippines' Muslim South. Administrative and social engineering policies in Mindanao would require a much more nuanced and tactical approach to colonial tutelage than the austere requisites of crude submission. Military authorities also looked to British Malaya in the early years of colonial rule for administrative insights and models for dealing with Muslim populations. However, after observing Britain's administratively disengaged system of ruling through subsidiary alliances, which achieved little social or economic advancement for colonized peoples, American military officials determined to implement their own brand of colonial evolutionism characterized by America's unique sense of transcendent modernity.[67]

Given this background, the present work proposes to tell the epistemological story of this critical period by examining its social, economic, and political corollaries. By grounding the abstract, theoretical study of historicism as imperial discourse with the more concrete archival items documenting its implementation, this study attempts to explicate the "what," "how," and especially the "why" behind American imperialism in Mindanao and Sulu and the formation of Moros as modern subjects.

Chapter one, "Imperial Taxonomies," examines American imperialists' attempts to define Filipino Muslims within a variety of intersecting categories using "objective" modern science. The burgeoning field of ethnology as a concrete social science was particularly important. American imperialists found particular value in the Moros' perceived primitiveness and martial spirit. As a socially and culturally "primitive" population, Moros offered military officials a unique opportunity for pure colonial engineering. Americans believed that Moros had not been corrupted by an archaic and overly parochial Spanish civilization, like their Christian counterparts in the north. Muslim spirits remained unbroken and their identities genuine. The raw materials ideally suited for a masculine and competitive modern subject, as judged by American historicism, remained active and unadulterated in Filipino Muslims. For many American imperialists, then, Moros had the distinct possibility of becoming a politically submissive yet unconquered people. To facilitate this delicate balance American ethnologists and military officials methodically constructed an academically defensible anthropological image of the Moro as a noble, primitive warrior, bursting with evolutionary possibilities. Colonial authorities were also careful to mediate this image and subordinate it to colonial rule through a series of symbolic conquests and dramatic reproductions

of Moro violence. Mock invasions, staged battles, and artistic reproductions of Muslim hostility and savagery froze an ideal archetype of the Moro as colonial subject. Since many of these images were inspired and encouraged by the Moros themselves, the process became in many respects a collaborative effort, with both Americans and Filipino Muslims each shaping evolving images of themselves.

Chapter two, "Disruptions," explores various elements of Moro civilization that complicated and unsettled American attempts to historicize Filipino Muslims and frame them as ideally primitive subjects. First among these was the Moros' rich and pervasive Islamic heritage. With numerous examples of Islamic art, literature, and political organization, as well as a developed sense of global awareness and connection within the larger Umma among Moro elites, American imperialists were often stymied in their attempts to craft and maintain notions of unalloyed Moro primitiveness.[68] The colonial regimes' primary response to this dilemma was to disassociate Moros from Islam by documenting their syncretic religious doctrines and practices. By positing Islam as a masked outlet for more visceral and underived primitive beliefs, the Moros' religion often became an effective anachronism by which Americans were further able to prove Moro primitiveness. This tactic did not always succeed in smoothing out aggravating disruptions in the imperial discourse, but it did allow Americans to subdue the anomalies within a probable historicist narrative, thus maintaining the logic of their project.

The second disruption discussed in this chapter arose with American attempts to historicize Moro slavery. Institutions of forced servitude among Filipino Muslims inspired the collective imagination of humanistic, socially minded American imperialists. However, while many anticipated a second emancipation in the Philippines, colonial officials in Moro Province encountered severe dissimilarities between accepted definitions and former practices of slavery in the Western world and those found in Mindanao and Sulu. Multiple ethnological studies and firsthand accounts revealed a much more humane and institutionally discursive form of slavery among Filipino Muslims than was ever the case in antebellum America. The disconcerting implications of American savagery and the historical proximity of Filipino Muslims to such a recent episode of American history made Moro slavery a confounding anomaly in the imperial historicist narrative. Faced with this disturbing conundrum, colonial officials began to look further back in the established chronology to locate the Moros' particular correlative historical

context. Eventually American imperialists felt comfortable placing Moro servitude within the archaic feudal system of medieval Europeans. Though this took some of the sting out of Moro servitude as an inhumane practice and cause for colonial intervention, it did maintain the fundamental logic of American imperialism, which rested on universal and progressive historical contextualization.

Finally, instances of misrepresentation and misinterpretation often troubled American imperialists as they crafted their ethnological and historicist narratives. Though colonial officials in Moro Province relied on modern science as an objective marker for their discoveries, they were mostly seeking out specific answers to particular questions and crafting preconceived conclusions. When the subjectivities of their efforts inevitably emerged, American authorities were faced with devastating implications for the imperial project. Colonial philosophy and policy were both predicated and contingent upon scientifically accurate information. If colonial officials had been misled by misrepresentation, faulty science, or their own false preconceptions, it threatened to unravel a tightly knit historicist narrative dependent upon a specific order and precise contextualization of innumerable factors. Rather than face such a devastating possibility, American imperialists simply reaffirmed their unyielding trust in objective science to see through all potential deceptions and mistakes. For colonial officials, their command of scientific theory and apparatuses allowed an ultimately unassailable omniscience over native populations and their environment, which preempted and exposed any significant attempts to disrupt the universal narrative of progress.

The third chapter, "Capitalism as Panacea," addresses proactive American attempts to tap perceived Moro potentials and forge modern subjects out of the supposed great synthesizing force of modernity—capitalism. Like the certainties of modern science, colonial officials in Mindanao and Sulu believed capitalist market systems dictated social laws regarding human progression. Work ethic, perseverance, competition, ingenuity, and refined material tastes were held as the hallmarks of a developed modern consciousness. American military officials saw these qualities inherent in Filipino Muslims. As allegedly natural, property-loving, money-minded entrepreneurs, Moros offered the exciting prospect of accelerated historical development. The various "barbarities" and sociopolitical anachronisms that purportedly kept Moros from civilization promised to evaporate under the indomitable synthesizing forces of mature capitalism. Put another way, American imperialists in Moro Province believed that centuries of historical evolution could be compressed into a

few short years when subsumed within the socially transformative powers of capitalism. Consequently, colonial officials exercised every effort to institute market systems, cash-based economies, commerce consortiums, and trade routes throughout Moro Province and the broader region. Much to their delight, these programs demonstrated immediate results. Military authorities proudly reported staggering economic figures as native industries burgeoned. Most encouraging, however, was a perceived dramatic transformation of the Moros themselves into proto-bourgeois modern subjects. Enhanced notions of public and private spaces, the eager adoption of labor-saving technologies, increases in material living standards, and a renewed competitive drive for monetary wealth suggested a profound modernizing transformation among Filipino Muslims.

As these changes became more apparent, however, and the Moros' supposedly unbridled primitivism appeared to fade into the banal homogeneity of bourgeois modernity, many American colonialists in Moro Province suffered intense feelings of regret and colonial guilt. Chapter four, "Modernity, Colonial Guilt, and the Price of Transcendent Progress," examines these sentiments within a broader context of antimodern depressions among American imperialists and the execution of an elaborate therapeutic ethos in the colony. In the closing decades of the nineteenth century the American bourgeoisie collectively entered into a deep state of psychosocial crisis. By 1880 most communities in the United States had become fully integrated into modernity as a distinctly unparalleled period in world history. Science, technology, secularization, and the domestication of western frontiers established a strange sense of ubiquitous homogeneity over the geographic and social expanse of the United States, which in turn prompted debilitating feelings of depression and loss. The American cultural response to this modernity crisis was to develop an elaborate "therapeutic ethos" aimed at recapturing the rugged, life-giving aspects of the United States' national past.[69] Adventurism, war, "Oriental religions," humanistic socially minded crusades, and a return to capitalist principles were among the most prominent therapies included in this ethos. The Americans' modern psychological baggage found its most effective remedy and most exquisite sense of loss in the islands' Muslim South. Indeed, one of the greatest ironies of the United States' colonial rule in the Philippines was that its humanistic, civilizing, and modernizing imperial project was in large part motivated by acute feelings of antimodernity and overcivilization. By re-creating a vicarious journey to modernity on mysterious peripheral frontiers, troubled Americans were able to recapture a sense of

purpose and relevance conspicuously absent from their modern lives. Colonial administration and tutelage reinforced ideas of American exceptionalism and superiority. It forced imperialists at home and in the colony to position themselves in relation to a world they had already supposedly transcended. Colonial engineering in Mindanao and Sulu provided a long-sought-after rationale for obtaining modernity in the first place.

However, while Americans watched their glorious national history reenacted in Moro Province, they likewise suffered again through its demise into modernity. The wild, untamed, liberated, and masculine nature of Moro existence, so carefully constructed, idealized, and preserved by American imperialists, threatened to slip into the bland banality of modern life as Muslim pirates, adventurers, and warriors succumbed to the omniscient and regulating gaze of modernity. The recapitulation of this demise caused deep feelings of nostalgic longing and colonial regret among imperialists in Moro Province. Yet, despite their doubts, imperial historicism provided Americans with the ultimate philosopher's stone capable of contextualizing colonialism's unpleasant details into an almost millenarian vision of homogeneous modernity. Though transitional pasts were difficult and unpleasant to pass through, American colonialists were convinced that these evolutions were necessary and would eventually culminate in a blissful future of collective transcendent progress. When the entire world's inhabitants shared the same elevated view from modernity's pedestal, Americans felt history's truths would emerge and their efforts would be justified.

"Epilogue: The American Military Period in Historical Memory" examines the contemporary relevance of the military regime's critical 14-year tenure in Mindanao and Sulu. Given the chronic and recent conflicts between Moros and the Philippine state, this chapter explores the historic and imagined subjectivities of Moro identity as they are interpreted by Filipino Muslims today. Much of the chapter's content is drawn from an extended research tour in and around the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). It relates a number of surprising insights and poignant recollections from various sultans, Muslim clergymen, and officials from political separatist organizations such as the Moro National Liberation Front. As Peter Gowing and others have noted, Moros harbored deep feelings of betrayal and missed opportunity after Moro Province passed to civilian government and "Filipinization" policies in 1914. These feelings persist today and continue to shape notions of "homeland," ethnic authenticity, and autonomy in the Philippines' Muslim South. Moros continue to view themselves as in-

dependent, unconquered, fierce defenders of Islam in a hostile postcolonial environment. The American military period in popular memory is not one of conquest and subjugation but, rather, one of agreement, compromise, and progress, set off sharply by nearly a century of unpleasant relations with the Philippine state. The accuracy of these popular images is of course open to debate. Nevertheless, they continue to exercise tremendous influence on the politics of history and identity throughout the Philippines.

1

Imperial Taxonomies

At the foundations of the American colonial project was a profound trust and reliance on scientific methods and scholarly theories. Indeed, history itself was viewed as a quantifiable entity, which only required correct interpretation and accurate measurement to comprehend fully. To facilitate their scientific colonial endeavor, American administrators looked to the burgeoning field of ethnology. For many Western imperialists, ethnological studies represented a critical field in the post-Enlightenment project of universalizing and quantifying humanity via social sciences. Ethnology opened an avenue of inquiry that purported to construct an inclusive narrative that both accounted for and rationalized the heterogeneity of a rapidly shrinking world. As a tool of imperialism, ethnology was "not merely a disciplined expression of a universal human curiosity, but a modern discourse that has subsumed humanity to the grand narratives and analogies of natural history."[1] Key to this project was the concept of "civilization." If ethnologists could identify concrete criteria applicable to the vast spectrum of human experience and order these criteria in an evolutionary sequence, then developmental trends could be established and the socio-scientific status of various populations deduced. Anthropologists Larry Wolff and Marco Cipolloni explain the theory as follows: "By the light of civilization, it was possible to discern a whole ordering of societies, around the globe and across the centuries: societies backward, primitive, savage, or barbarous. Indeed, the very concept of civilization presupposed a condition of uncivilized origins and more-or-less-civilized stages on the path toward the ultimate Occidental goal."[2] Hence, for American imperialists, ethnology represented a viable analytical field for measuring human progress—a field supported by the objectivity and transcendence of scientific law. "Civilization" as an autonomously immutable force crafting the course of human development provided the ultimate validation for

the United States' colonial endeavors. At the commencement of American rule in the Philippines, for example, President William McKinley appealed to the omnipotent powers of civilization in almost spiritual terms to justify the country's new imperial possession. In a speech before Congress in 1899, McKinley asked rhetorically, "Did we need their [the Filipinos'] consent to perform a great act for humanity? . . . Did we ask their consent to liberate them from Spanish sovereignty . . . ? We did not ask these; we were obeying a higher moral obligation which rested on us and which did not require anybody's consent. We were doing our duty by them with the consent of our own consciences and with *the approval of civilization* [italics added]."[3]

By constructing a number of discursive "academic representations," ethnologists and other colonial officials were able to establish a firm but flexible colonial discourse that underwrote the United States' imperial project in Mindanao.[4] While these officials conducted their work under the auspices of objective scientific discovery, observation, and measurement, in most cases they were looking for specific answers to particular questions. Notions of imperial historicism provided ethnological studies with an already constructed organizational matrix of knowledge including irreducible categories in both social and hard sciences. In most cases, imperial taxonomies simply required colonial officials to discover ways to contextualize their findings within preexisting, acceptable, and knowable categories. This approach naturally resulted in a self-sustaining imperial discourse that allowed flexibility to scientific discovery but at the same time funneled these conclusions into an overriding narrative of universal progress. By constructing, representing, reproducing, and analyzing Moro culture and society, American imperialists were able to create a supposedly dispassionate empirical scientific standard that established and maintained the rationales and power relationships of colonial rule. Nicholas Thomas explains the logic of imperial ethnological representation as follows:

> Depiction and documentation—through such media as colonial reports and artifact collections as well as actual painting, drawing and photography [one might also add the reproduction of native art forms such as dance and theater]—did not merely create representations that were secondary to practices and realities, but constituted political actualities in themselves. Travelers and colonists could regard a space and another society, not as a geographic tract, nor an array of practices and relations, but as a thing depicted or described, that was immediately subject to their gaze. Other peoples, cultures and cities

> could thus be subsumed to the form of a picture, and seeing a thing first as a representation and secondly as something beyond a representation created a peculiar sense of power on the side of the viewing colonist.[5]

By manufacturing and depicting academic representations of Moros, Americans were able to render their colonial subjects as comprehensible objects subject to the laws of social science and to establish hierarchical relationships of power. Colonial representation created the empirical context and observable data that served as the building blocks of ethnological studies but also embodied its conclusions. Thus, this process was cyclical and disjointed by nature since the academic representations that served as the basis for these broadly conceived scientific studies were themselves composites of innumerable minor encounters and academic or governmental quests for colonial discovery. Creating "the colonial subject," therefore, required imperialists to represent indigenous populations through a sequence of encounters and observations and then to situate them within and across a series of social-scientific categories that divulged their inherent characteristics and rendered them scrutable to colonial science.[6]

At its heart, however, determining degrees of civilization was a matter of relative comparisons. As Wolff and Cipolloni pointed out, "civilization" was "a standard that could be applied to all human societies according to its relative degree of presence or absence."[7] This meant that American imperialists were required to engage in a self-reflexive exercise as they negotiated the relative distance between their current position of transcendent progress, as well as significant events and developments in their own national history, and the temporal position of their colonial subjects. While such a socio-philosophical exercise could, and sometimes did, expose raw insecurities in the Americans' universal narrative and national identity of civilization, these worries were for the most part subsumed and neutralized by their unwavering faith in the consistency of natural laws dictating stagist histories in human development. Most Americans were not at all shy about the barbarity of their ancient Anglo-European past and frequently openly discussed uncivilized Anglo populations currently residing within the United States. In 1904 *The Mindanao Herald*, echoing an article originally printed in Philadelphia's *Evening Bulletin*, discussed the "primitive barbarism" of "white mountaineers" residing throughout the United States' southeastern states. Though the authors deemed these populations "worth educating and reclaiming to civilization," their uncivilized state was considered "disgraceful" to such a

"rich and progressive republic."[8] Americans also often went out of their way to highlight remnants of an Old World evolutionary history. An article in the 16 August 1900 edition of *The Daily Bulletin* in Manila, for example, reported with great curiosity "a survival from barbaric ages" in Russia "where animals are still sacrificed in honor of the 'Festival of the Oxen.'"[9] This recognition was not, however, relegated only to curious exposés in newspapers. Many officials recorded personal cultural reflections that included a firm awareness of their own evolutionary past. Russell Suter, an American civil engineer and "provincial supervisor" in Mindanao in 1903, offered the following insight in a letter home: "The funny part of it is that I feel as much at home here as though I had always lived in this place and have felt so ever since I landed. I suppose that some of my more remote ancestors used to throw cocoanuts at each other in their day, which may perhaps account for some of it."[10] By positing "civilization" as a universal constant both spatially and temporally, comparative histories acquired the necessary social and scientific parameters to validate colonial findings.

The Philippines' Muslim South provided Americans with their best opportunity to test the limits of their socio-scientific theories. Filipino Muslims represented a singular population that had, as of yet, not been conquered or tainted by archaic European cultures. If the United States were to succeed where Spain had failed, it would be precisely because of its highly academic approach to governance. "It behooves us," wrote Daniel Brinton in an 1899 article in the *American Anthropologist*, "to give them that scientific investigation which alone can afford a true guide to their proper management."[11] Like Brinton, most officials believed that "an acquaintance with the non-Christian tribes, with their customs and ideas, would make it possible to govern them better and more easily than would otherwise be possible."[12] By codifying indigenous peoples and cultures, colonial officials felt they could access an essential scientific key to unraveling the Oriental mind and facilitate an efficient and unprecedented colonial project. "There is no doubt," opined one American official, "that if careful ethnologic work had been undertaken and carried on among the Indians in the early days of the Republic many mistakes which have been made might have been avoided."[13] Hence, whatever missteps or indiscretions may have been committed in the United States' continental imperial past could now be rectified and even atoned for in the Philippines through the precision of scientific inquiry.

The processes of collecting and codifying the various scientific details and material artifacts of Moro civilization (however mundane) provided a valuable

corpus of knowledge that could be accessed and manipulated throughout the colonial period both to maintain and to validate the historicist assumptions of American imperialists. One of the Philippine Commission's primary purposes in creating a Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes in 1901was to

> conduct systematic investigation with reference to non-Christian tribes of the Philippine Islands, in order to ascertain the name of its tribe, the limits of its territory which it occupies, the approximate number of individuals which compose it, their social organizations and their languages, beliefs, manners, and customs, with special view to determining the most practicable means for bringing about their advancement in civilization and material prosperity.[14]

The Bureau was headed by the distinguished scholar and former Superintendent of Manila Schools David Barrows, who had conducted "special studies in ethnology at the University of Chicago" and carried out "practical field work among the Indians of the western United States." Barrows's enthusiasm for ethnology in Moro Province was unmatched. "[T]here is scarcely a mountain or an island in the entire archipelago that does not invite investigation," he declared in his inaugural report to the Philippine Commission in 1902. Moro Province was especially appealing because it was "still unexplored" in virtually every capacity. Hence, it was his express "intention to build up a collection containing everything procurable pertaining to the ethnology, demonstrating the geography, philology, and history of the islands." Barrows's enthusiasm was fueled in part by the highly advanced and scientific nature of American ethnology at the beginning of the twentieth century. "It can be asserted without national prejudice," he continued to the Philippine Commission, "that the science of ethnology has in recent years made its most significant progress in the United States, and that in the American school of ethnologists there is the greatest promise for the future of science." As with all other aspects of American culture and society, Barrows firmly believed that American social science was on the cutting edge of societal evolution and would prove Americans exceptional to the contemporary European circumstances of damaging, oppressive imperialism. Barrows explained:

> While in Europe anthropological students have necessarily been limited in their material to relics of prehistoric culture and to the physical types of their own race, in America they have been brought face to face with a great and intensely conservative race, with languages and institutions far removed from

> those of the Caucasian. Since the first settlement of white men in America the Indian has continually affected his history and has forced himself perpetually upon his attention. Thus with perhaps what will eventually be recognized as the greatest of all ethnological laboratories at his hand, the American student has possessed an inestimable advantage over the ethnologist of Europe with his far more limited material. . . . [Hence], [t]he most conspicuous work accomplished in America lies not so much in the field of physical anthropology, nor in the study of ethnological problems having a biological character, as it does in the investigation and illumination of the thought, spirit, and motives of barbarous society.

With these advantages, Barrows planned "to take the entire field force to Mindanao, for continued and more extensive investigations into this most promising of all scientific fields."[15]

In 1903, the Philippine Commission enhanced the bureau's focus via official act by renaming it the "Ethnological Survey of the Philippine Islands" with instructions to carry out "systematic researches on anthropology and ethnology among all the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands."[16] By observing, describing, defining, and cataloging cultural and material aspects of indigenous culture, American imperialists felt they could assign degrees of civilization to various native populations along a universal, chronological, evolutionary spectrum and thus implement the correct administrative methods to facilitate their development. "It is confidently believed," concluded an article in the 1904 Philippine Commission Report, "that the work of the [ethnological] survey will prove itself to be not merely scientifically valuable, but practically useful in the work of controlling and assisting . . . the uncivilized people of the islands."[17]

In addition to these administrative aims, however, ethnology also served as a critical site for defining the Americans as genuine imperialists, to themselves and to others. Consider the following appeal made by Merton Miller, the acting chief of the secretary of the interior in the Philippines in 1904: "The time is especially favorable now for building up a museum of ethnology because the great museums of the United States and Europe have not yet begun to make collections from the islands. When these museums have once begun collecting, the prices of many things will rise and it will be increasingly difficult to get them at any price."[18] Miller's statements reveal an acute anxiety concerning the United States' exclusive, or at least restricted, ethnographic ownership of the Philippines. Once other nations began collecting

and interpreting artifacts from the islands, the United States risked losing its epistemological monopoly in the colony.[19] The contingent nature of the American historicist narrative rested on a uniform and contextual analysis of the data. If the ethnology became a diffuse and discursive body of partial and competing analyses, then it threatened to unravel a tightly circumscribed imperial taxonomy.

Hence, one of the primary objects of early colonial rule in Mindanao and Sulu was to contextualize Moros within a variety of historical narratives that served to define Muslim populations according to the designs, capabilities, and historical paradigms of the colonial regime. This project often required a high level of descriptive dexterity. American imperialists struggled to locate Moros simultaneously within an identifiable and knowable historicist narrative of world, Anglo-Saxon, American, Malay, and Islamic history, while never estranging them from the exoticism and primitiveness that defined their imperial value. Though a great many highly technical ethnological studies were produced, the military regime in Mindanao and Sulu established its imperial taxonomies through a series of carefully constructed representations and symbolic conquests that continually reaffirmed notions of stagist histories and American cultural supremacy. In this sense, colonial officials and administrators were creating narratives not only about their Muslim subjects but also about themselves, as they probed the depths of their social theories.

The Romance and Potential of a Primitive People

Filipino Muslims had always provided American imperialists with an especially promising opportunity to test the efficacy and preeminence of their transformative tutelary abilities. As late as 1908, U.S. newspapers continued optimistically to tout Mindanao and Sulu as a "field for pioneer work." One subheadline billed Muslims as the "Filipinos Who May Accept Western Civilization, but Can't Be Subjugated." Another stated, "Many Officers Think They Will Surpass the Japanese When Trained and Equipped."[20] Americans viewed the Moros' fierce "savagery" as one of their greatest challenges—but also one of their greatest opportunities.

While centuries-long Muslim defiance of Spanish rule certainly contributed to the vilification of Moros as bloodthirsty thieves and pirates, it also placed them outside the debilitating corruption and exploitation of Spanish imperialism. In many ways, Filipino Muslims more closely fit the American

archetype of "colonial subject" than their Christian neighbors in the north. Though Moros were routinely disparaged as "savage," "defiant," and "ignorant," there remained something particularly honest and unadulterated about their exoticism that inspired the crusading imagination of American imperialists. Initial reports by the Philippine Commission took special note of the Moros' "warlike and hostile spirit," which produced "brave, dashing, and audacious" warriors. Unlike their northern brethren,[21] Filipino Muslims had the courage "not to fight a guerilla [war]." Instead, they "expose themselves to an attack by modern artillery. . . . They are easily whipped, and though the whipping may have to be repeated once or twice, its effect ultimately is very salutary."[22] Major Hugh Scott similarly raved about the Moros' "utter disregard of death," adding that "not only in battle was this apparent, but at all times." With his "razor-edged cleaver" the "Moro could cut a man's body in two at one stroke, after which he would chop his victim to bits to test the blade of his weapon against the bone."[23] In a similarly romantic tone Dean Worcester, secretary of the interior for the Philippine Insular Government, once boasted that "six Moros with barongs [a short sword unique to Filipino Muslims] could stampede any civilized town in the Philippines."[24] General Pershing echoed these sentiments again in 1913 when he stated, "The nature of the Joloano Moro is such that he is not at all overawed or impressed by an overwhelming force. If he takes a notion to fight it is regardless of the number of men he thinks are to be brought against him. You cannot bluff him."[25] Nor was this characteristic ferocity exclusive to Moro men. Military officials often found that Muslim women also "fought fiercely with knives and spears."[26]

Though individual acts of violence were officially condemned, such reports did inspire the American colonial imagination at home and abroad to consider the developmental possibilities for Filipino Muslims. Often encouraged by American colonial officials, *Harpers Weekly*, for example, wrote numerous romantic accounts of the striking Filipino Muslims. "The Moros have a manliness and independence of character not found among the Indians in the rest of the Philippines," stated one article.[27] Writing some years later in the same publication, Colonel Owen Sweet declared, "The Moro is brave to fearlessness, a born pirate, and essentially a first-class fighting-man. . . . He is a wiry, sinewy, and athletic fellow, very different from the Visayan or Tagalog, and quite different from the Filipino generally."[28] Similarly, in an extensive report highlighted in the *New York Times*, Thomas Millard described the Filipino Muslim as follows: "The Moro differs in some respects from any Oriental I have seen at close range. His eye meets yours without flinching, with the look

of a man who may at times have been defeated by superior force or skill, but who has never been subjugated."[29] Even Protestant missionaries and clergymen, who generally held Islam in deep contempt, could not help but praise the Moros' potentials upon catching rare glimpses of their rugged culture. Episcopalian bishop Charles Henry Brent, for example, who served as missionary bishop of the Philippines, told reporters in 1913 that "The Moro is by nature aggressive. . . . His prowess, daring, mental shrewdness and manual skill put him far ahead of most men of Malay origin. He has characteristics which, when properly trained, will be an asset of civilization."[30] Hence, for many Americans, and especially from an American military perspective, Moros had the uncanny potential of becoming a submissive but not conquered people. In his memoirs published in 1928, Major Hugh L. Scott recalled his time as a district governor in Moro Province and emphasized the primacy of this delicate balance:

> To be sure, it would not be so difficult to sweep the islands from stem to stern with fire and sword, but it has always seemed to me a poor diplomacy that seeks to civilize a country by killing everybody in it, to say nothing of the iniquity of destroying such a proud, brave, virile, and intelligent people as the Moros. To me the Moros were the most promising element, under proper guidance, to be found in the entire Philippine Islands. . . . I had a vast respect for a race so bold, tenacious and fearless of death. Moreover it was most important to preserve the pride of the Moros and safeguard it from attack from any quarter. One of the greatest mistakes made by our missionaries in our Indian country is their opposition to everything native—the notion that everything peculiar to the Indian must be broken down and destroyed, and their pride in the achievements of their ancestors must be preached against, derided, and wiped out.
>
> It is not possible to raise up any people who are destitute of pride; and pride once lost is one of the things most difficult to restore; it lies at the root of all formation of character; its possession is a priceless gift; and no effort should be spared to save it.[31]

Filipino Muslims provided American imperialists the raw materials needed to construct the modern colonial man. While newspapers and colonial officials in the northern islands complained of the inadequacies of their imperial subjects—"What they need is men among them," criticized one journalist. "Men who are not afraid of wrong, and who would die for their family and

homes. Men who would go to the end of the earth to avenge a wrong and who continually watch after each other's interest"—officials in Mindanao and Sulu believed they had found such a man in the Moro.[32]

Far from the emasculated and corrupted victims of Spanish tyranny so often portrayed in the north, Moros were thought to have retained a visceral and organic connection to the environment. They manifested a raw primitiveness full of potential. Take, for example, the following description from the 1900 Philippine Commission Report:

> conspicuous . . . for his sobriety, he [the Moro] nourishes himself with a handful of rice, with the fruits which he gathers in the forests, the herbs of the plain, and the little fish of the streams . . . when he is afloat satisfies his thirst with sea water. Extremely agile, he quickly ascends the mountains, climbs the highest trees, crosses the deepest and thickest mangrove swamps, fords the torrents, leaps across the small streams, and lets himself drop with the utmost coolness from a height of 15 or 20 feet . . . he swims like a fish, so that the crossing of a river, although be it wide and swift, is for him the most simple and natural thing in the world.[33]

Colonel Sweet echoed similar assessments for the American public when he described Moros as "the most perfect of aquatic beings. . . . He can no more drown than a fish. There is no record of a drowned Moro. He can dive to the bottom of the sea at depths of from twenty-five to one hundred feet for the valuable mother-of-pearl."[34] Though not an official ethnologist, Major Hugh Scott floated his own theories regarding the Moros' physical constitution when he wrote,

> The Moro appears to have a nervous system differing from that of a white man, for he carries lead like a grizzly bear and keeps coming on after being shot again and again. The only weapon that seems adequate to melt him immediately in his tracks is a pump-gun loaded with buck-shot. One Moro of Jolo was shot through the body by seven army revolver bullets, yet kept coming on with enough vitality and force to shear off the leg of an engineer soldier, more smoothly than it could have been taken off by a surgeon.[35]

The nearly superhuman abilities ascribed to Filipino Muslims in these cases reveal not only the exoticism and savagery of Moros but also their immense potential, once civilized. After all, civilization was not just a state of mind or

mode of consciousness, it was also manifested in one's embodiment. Recognizing this, the 1903 census took great care in describing the Moros' "physical characteristics," including "complexion," "hair," and physical build. "They are somewhat taller than the average Filipino," recorded the census, "straight and well formed, and often strong and stockily built, with well-developed calves."[36] Physical size, endurance, and abilities were critical indicators of a person's capacity for modern supremacy. However, unlike the savage or barbarian, civilized peoples were aware of the appropriate uses and restraints of physical power to manipulate or coerce the environment around them. While the Moros' physical strengths had the potential for violence, they also proved extremely useful if properly directed.

Primitivism also served a unique function by measuring, validating, and reaffirming notions of American progress. Colonial officials and Americans throughout the world carefully noted Moro reaction to the institutions, edifices, and technologies of the modern world, and they beamed with national pride at the perceived wonderment of their colonial subjects. In 1899 John Bass recorded for *Harpers Weekly* an encounter with Moro "chiefs" in Jolo on the American warship *Charleston.* "Big guns were fired for their benefit," he wrote. "One chief was allowed to pull the trigger of a Colt's automatic; they took electric shocks with delight; they wondered how you could touch a button and kindle a light at the mast-head; they stared at the mysterious box that produced wind. In no instance did they show fear, but they understood the great power back of these details—the power of civilization."[37] Similar accounts are scattered throughout the records. One journalist described an instance in which American sailors played a phonograph for a group of Yakan Moros. "One old pirate," he recorded, "after hearing a tenor solo asked the Governor why they kept that man in that small box when he was howling so, and all seemed wonderstruck that the Americans could get a man in such a small space." Highly Orientalist reports like these thrived on the childlike "wonderment" of "Moros who had never before beheld a white man." Colonial officials, struck by their own novelty, happily assisted as Muslims made modern discoveries. Such intercultural breakthroughs also offered Americans an exciting and vicarious opportunity to rediscover and review narratives about themselves. The fact that Filipino Muslims "were treated to surprises over which they went into ecstasies of enthusiasm" spoke volumes to American imperialists regarding the magnitude and unprecedented nature of their own modern civilization.[38] Cultural comparisons and their attendant reactions became a way to measure American progress in relative terms—the

more amazed the Moros appeared, the greater the evolutionary distance between them. These encounters also provided valuable evidence of the Moros' "fearless" approach to and acceptance of modernity and its technologies.

This phenomenon distinguished itself in the American popular consciousness most profoundly during the worldwide tour of Jamal-ul Kiram II, Sultan of Sulu. Kiram II ascended to the Sultanate in 1884 after a succession struggle involving a number of competitors. After obtaining a firm hold on the throne, the sultan made a critical Hajj to Mecca to bolster his credentials. Upon his return he found the northern islands in the throes of revolution against Spain and enjoyed a powerful bargaining position against the waning colonial power.[39] This position changed drastically, however, when the Americans arrived in Sulu in 1899. Nevertheless, Sultan Kiram was able to negotiate successfully for his continued rule as well as financial support and eventually became quite adept at charming and manipulating his colonial governors and the American public at large.[40] "With the exception of the Filipino leader Aguinaldo," announced an article in the *New York Times* in 1910, "no man . . . has been so extensively described in American newspapers and magazines [as Sultan Kiram II]." The American public was in fact so enamored with the sultan that his "fame made him the chief character in one of the most popular comic operas written . . . in years."[41] Similar to other newspapers whose accounts were published in the Philippines, the *New York Times* spared no details in describing the sultan's astonishment at the United States' awesome achievements. Kiram II "was the first Sultan of his country to gaze into the muzzle of a 12-inch gun," the *Times* falsely speculated. "When he was told that the great gun could throw a 1200-pound projectile ten miles he didn't believe it. He said no one but the devil could accomplish such a feat as that." For an engaged public, the sultan's tour revealed how even the simplest and most mundane implements of modernity had a civilizing power scarcely realized by most Americans. The *New York Times* related another story in which a simple "X-ray machine proved a powerful factor in the pacification of the Sulu Islands." Quoting Major Scott, the newspaper reported the incident as follows:

> "I took him to the general hospital in Manila," said Major Scott, and told him "I am going to let you look into a box and . . . you will see every bone in your own hand."
>
> "That is entirely impossible," the Sultan answered, holding his right hand up to the light, "for look now and you see no bones at all."

> "Wait and see," replied Major Scott and then he told Kiram II to put his hand in the machine. The Sultan did so and peeked through the aperture and sure enough he saw the bones in his own hand. He almost collapsed so great was his surprise.
>
> "The Sultan never forgot that X-ray experience," Major Scott said yesterday, "and afterward when he did not seem inclined to do what I told him, saying that it was impossible, I only had to recall that incident of the bones in the hand and he did it."[42]

These instances of Moro amazement and conversion to modernity inspired many Americans, who often found it difficult to gauge their achievements and sometimes doubted the validity and efficacy of colonial endeavors. The fact that Sultan Kiram II, for example, found New York City to be "a million times greater" than he "ever dreamed it was" reassured American imperialists of the legitimacy of their colonial project and the real potential of Filipino Muslims.[43] It also reinforced an abstract conceptualization of distance, both physical and temporal, between metropole and colony. When the sultan's tour ended in October 1910 he recounted glowing reports to *The Manila Times* of "the magnificent buildings, parks and boulevards of New York, Washington, and Chicago which made him realize that America was truly a wonderful country." "Now that I have seen the United States," he declared, "I return to my native home thoroughly converted and for all time pro-American. . . . I intend to devote the rest of my life in uplifting my people in modern ways and in teaching them peaceful pursuits."[44] The apparent innocence and honesty of his wonderment struck colonial authorities and other Americans as pure truth springing forth from an objective observer who might have been better off diminishing the supposed greatness of his colonial occupiers. Rather, his pro-American conversion suggested to American colonialists the sheer power of modernity on a pristine mind open to its possibilities. The sultan served as a kind of metaphor for the entire Muslim South, which was itself participating in an osmosis of modern exposure.

As a relatively unspoiled population "living not so far from nature," Moros also exhibited the qualities instilled in them by their environment.[45] American imperialists in Mindanao took special note of the perceived connection between environment and culture and its impact on social evolution. Unlike the "so densely populated" and overly Hispanized northern islands, Mindanao remained a rugged frontier full of possibilities and unspoiled opportunities for conquest and colonial constructions.[46] A land and climate so hardy

and "remarkably salubrious" as Mindanao naturally produced a population to match. Notions of environmental influence found especially fertile ground among American colonial officials and residents in Mindanao. By emphasizing the virginity of their colonial frontier, Americans were able to relive a nostalgic and cherished aspect of their own national past. In 1905, citing an article originally published in *The Manila Cable News, The Mindanao Herald* printed an extensive piece outlining the creation of a unique "American character" forged on the continental frontiers:

> American character as a separate and distinct racial feature had its origin early in the colonial history of the United States. It was the product of the physical and geographical conditions of the country acting upon the civilization brought there by settlers and immigrants. The first American, as the term is used today, received his character from the American wilderness. Nature held the chisel and wielded the hammer that differentiated him from his brother born and reared in Europe. . . . His conflict was with the forces of nature and in that conflict his character was forged.

This narrative of "pioneers," "adventurous spirits," and American "forefathers [who] conquered the wilderness" excited American imperialists, "who had not been without a frontier until within the last decade" of their national history.[47] The unsettled dangers of nascent modernities on the periphery animated colonial aspirations and recalled romantic images no longer found in the "civilized" United States. The colonial census claimed that "every [Moro] when outside of his house or away from home is armed either with a kris or barong, the two weapons of warfare."[48] "Like a western mining-camp of old," reminisced an article in *Harpers Weekly*, "Sulu is full of Adventure. A native is quick to draw his knife, just as an American desperado was to draw his revolver."[49] Seeing themselves on the double frontier of both colonial administration and tropical environments affirmed notions of America's rugged adventurous spirit, despite the increasingly flattened cultural stasis of "transcendent progress."

By linking ethnological data regarding Moros to their uniquely conducive environment, American imperialists were also able to place Filipino Muslims within a recognizable tried and true historical narrative played out in Anglo-Saxon history on the United States' western frontier. After all, concluded an article in *The Mindanao Herald*, frontier life "has been the magic caldron into which has been poured a great stream of immigration . . . [and] out of which

has come in the second generation Americans bearing the mind and stamp of American character."[50] Moros, however, had even greater evolutionary advantages than these immigrants because of the pristine nature of their native environment. In his memoir of the Philippine Constabulary, Colonel John Roberts White expressed these assessments as follows:

> Just as the American of the Western Frontier in the nineteenth century expressed the quintessence of the Anglo-Saxon racial characteristics—individuality, adventurousness, and the desire to build from fresh material—so the Moro was the Malay frontiersman of the Far East; in him the Malay traits blossomed into a virile race with a leaning toward warfare and piracy as national professions.[51]

Thus, Filipino Muslims had the singular opportunity of becoming co-participants, albeit junior partners, with American colonial frontiersmen in a proven path toward civilization. The rugged process of shaping, and being shaped by, Mindanao's virgin frontiers offered both American imperialists and Filipino Muslims the extraordinary prospect of repeating and creating, respectively, a grandiose national history. The conspicuous primitivism of both Moros and their geography promised American colonialists the opportunity for an expedited developmental process unlike any seen in colonial history.

Symbolic Conquests and De-mythifications

Subduing a wild frontier and the "wild people" it produced required American imperialists to carry out a systematic scientific exploration of the land that would render it knowable and therefore manageable. Given the perceived intimate connection between Filipino Muslims and their environment, colonial officials considered it a unitary and mutually constitutive task to unravel the mysteries of both the Moro mind and its environment. "The interior of Mindanao is terra incognito," announced an official "Description of the Customs and Habits of the Mohammedam People of Mindanao," "many parts never having been visited by civilized man." These undomesticated and undisciplined surroundings rendered the "Moro character . . . complex, [and] quite beyond . . . comprehension."[52] Thus military officials found that by exploring, naming, de-mythologizing, domesticating, and indeed conquering the geographic domains of Mindanao and Sulu they were able to reveal the

inner workings of the inscrutable Moro and discipline him and his environment in the ways of modernity.

Imperial epistemological conquests of the natural world have been a subject of great interest in colonial literature. Bernard Cohn's excellent study of Great Britain's "survey modality" of colonial governance in India, in which botanical specimens, geological analysis, archeological finds, and mapping served to organize British rule throughout the subcontinent, has demonstrated the efficacy and pervasiveness of such methods.[53] Likewise, Thongchai Winichakul's and Benedict Anderson's landmark respective examinations of the development of "cartographic discourse" and the reconstruction of "property-history" in Southeast Asia have also shown the lasting significance of spatial boundaries.[54] American imperialists were not exempt from these colonial techniques and pursued them systematically in Mindanao. Colonial officials took great care not only to explore and survey the land technically but also to seek out opportunities to penetrate the mysterious, demythologize the terrifying, and scientifically to secularize the various mythological aspects of Mindanao's geography. By symbolically and academically conquering the land and its indigenous myths, American military officials believed, they could begin the process of reconstructing and domesticating Mindanao and its peoples.

Local newspapers in Mindanao tracked the military's explorations with great enthusiasm and printed extensive articles recounting the "geological reconnaissance" of "imposing mountain[s]" and "impenetrable jungle[s]."[55] These accounts found their popularity not in the tedious recounting of geological finds and cartographic achievements but in the triumphant tone of epistemological validation through a modern, secular, and scholarly conquest. Despite warnings of evil spirits, mythical creatures, and "the existence of man-sized monkeys," military explorers actively sought out opportunities to engage Mindanao's seemingly foreboding landscape.[56] Such expeditions were sometimes even celebrated throughout the archipelago. In 1911 the *Manila Times* printed a compelling account of Major E. R. Heiberg's "Conquest of Mt. Matutum" in Cotabato. It is worth noting that Major Heiberg was the district governor of Cotabato at the time. Despite warnings from "native Bilaans [priests] that bees as big as birds and flying deer were among the strange creatures to be encountered at the top," Major Heiberg and his team of fellow Americans, native Philippine scouts, members of the Moro constabulary, and indigenous *cargadores* subdued the "mysterious mountain." In a post-expeditionary report Lt. Carter, a member of the ascending

team, admitted that the "strange forest was certainly a place to terrify the superstitious mind." However, the elevated view from Mt. Matutum's summit allowed Major Heiberg and his team (including Filipinos and Moros) a commanding view of the environment below, which dispelled all mysteries and doubts regarding the perceived impenetrability and mysticism of Mindanao's interior. In case the newspaper's readership was unable to deduce the expedition's significance, the article ended with an obvious conclusion: "The expedition proved that there was no forbidding wall of rock surrounding the peak which the native Bilaans believed would bar anyone from reaching the top of the mountain. Neither was there any of the strange creatures said to be inhabiting the region like the flying deer and the bees big as birds with a sting so sharp it could kill a man." [57]

Though American imperialists approached these demythologizing expeditions with a high degree of certainty regarding their preconceived scientific and secular conclusions, there is an evident tension throughout the records in which Americans never quite totally discounted the possibility of indigenous supernatural forces, which added additional weight to imperial triumphs. The *Manila Times*'s statement cited above illustrates this tension nicely. The fact that the *Times* went out of its way to clearly establish the demythologizing results of Heiberg's expedition indicates at least the consideration of such possibilities to begin with. *The Mindanao Herald* also published strange accounts highlighting the potency of supernatural native forces. In an article entitled "Moros Remove a 'Hoodoo,'" for example, the newspaper dedicated much of its front page to a "strange story" in which Moros on the island of Basilan defied secular Western logic by removing a curse from their village. Having discovered an adulterous and incestuous (under Moro law) relationship in their community and believing that such an offense would cause pollution and grave misfortune, village Moros resolved to execute the offenders. However, knowing the weight and consequences of American objections to such practices, the village headman sought advice from a local European planter. After being told the nature of the offense and the bad luck that would surely plague their village, the planter, being a modern and "educated man, laughed their superstitions to scorn and warned them of the deed they contemplated." Being thus educated on the "absurdity of their superstitions," the "Moros left in an apparently satisfied mood." Almost immediately, however, the village was struck with a severe drought that crippled prospective harvests. Once again the headman sought out the European planter and solicited his approval to execute the couple, knowing the planter's authorization could soften

a potential American rebuke. As before, the planter counseled the superstitious Moros, "declaring that the rain would come whether the guilty couple were executed or not." Several days later the rain finally came, prompting the planter to visit the Moro village. His findings were reported as follows:

> Upon arriving at the headman's residence he [the planter] called out to him that the rain had come. The chief replied with a dubious sort of a smile, but did not make any remark. Desirous of impressing the villagers with the fact that they had been misled by their superstitions, the planter asked that the guilty couple be brought forth and exhibited to the village, but the chief replied that was impossible, as the offenders had been executed by drowning (the customary procedure in such cases) on the day previous to the rain storm.
>
> The planter severely rebuked the chief for his action, but the latter called his attention to the fact that *the rain had come*, which was the object the community desired to achieve.

Despite the apparent gravity of this deviation from American colonial law, the paper speculated that "it is hardly possible that any of the offending parties will be dealt with in a rigorous manner."[58] Perhaps acquiescing to the superiority of indigenous supernatural powers in this particular instance, the colonial regime demonstrated an almost henotheistic approach to the relative and competing strengths of civilization and native superstition.

In the vast majority of cases, however, American imperialists enthusiastically reported the inevitable triumphs of civilization over indigenous beliefs but without ever absolutely dismissing such superstitions as utter fiction. An article in *The Mindanao Herald*, for example, reported on the death of a Maguindanao Moro chieftain named Mustapha. "A cruel, spacious savage, he ruled his people with an iron hand," reported the paper. "Mustapha was considered the most valiant Moro in the Maguindanao country and was held in superstitious awe by the people." His perceived power was in large part derived from a local belief that the headman was "under the protection of a giant alligator,[59] which used to visit him at night and counsel him, lending its aid in overcoming his enemies." While making a tour of his district, American governor John Finley did indeed encounter a large reptile near Mustapha's home. However, "contrary to the general expectation, it did not rush upon and devour the Governor, nay, it scampered away as fast as it could, and the Governor's reputation as a man of valor was greatly enhanced thereby."[60] A similar supernatural duel occurred in 1905 between Governor Scott and the

famous "Anting-anting Man" in Jolo. According to *The Mindanao Herald* a Moro "priest" of Arab descent named Hadji Habib Muhamad Masdali had been "stirring the people up against the American authorities" by claiming to possess charms of invulnerability. After counseling with the mystical priest, a local Moro datu named Laksamana Usap began to reconstruct a critical cotta (fort) destroyed by the Americans years earlier. Upon hearing reports of this rebellious act Governor Scott ordered Muslim leaders in Jolo to confront Usap and dismantle the cotta to avoid a confrontation with U.S. forces. Though none of them refused outright, the order was never carried out. Many of the datus were convinced that the rebels "had just perfected a charm which would render the governor's cannon useless." Governor Scott responded by ordering several artillery placed into position, after which he "invited several friendly dattos to accompany him and see the gun[s] shoot" and "how the charm would work." Much to the Americans' disappointment the datus were "positively delighted when the first charge failed to explode." Emboldened, they then informed Governor Scott that functional cannons would not matter anyway since "Usap had a charm whereby he could catch all the cannon balls." Despite their confidence, however, the Moro gathering was soon "undeceived" of their superstitions by the might of American military technology, which blasted the cotta open. Even after the rebels were captured, however, Hadji Masdali boasted that he had placed a charm on the boat designated to transfer him to prison and swore that it would never reach its destination. Again, much to the chagrin of the Americans, as the boat was "leaving . . . it ran aground on a sand bar, and the Hadji 'made good' again—for a minute." Nevertheless, as with earlier setbacks, American ingenuity eventually triumphed by dislodging the boat and transporting Masdali to a secure guard house in Jolo, effectively proving the superiority of modern American technology and civilization.[61]

The fact that the alligator's actual existence and reaction to the U.S. colonial presence, as well as the multiple temporary victories of Hadji Masdali were recorded in such detail by the colonial paper reveals an interesting tension in the Americans' historicist narrative of discredited societies. It would seem, from these and many other similar reports, that the triumph of Western, American civilization was found in overcoming and indeed discrediting the old sources of power and legitimacy in archaic societies, rather than simply exposing their outright fiction. American imperialists in Mindanao felt compelled to overcome indigenous forces in a metaphorical or actual battle of civilizations. Superior, rather than singular, truths and powers established

American superiority in their own minds as much as it did in their native subjects. The seemingly subtle nuance of this vacillating historicism actually spoke volumes to American imperialists, who staked their faith on civilization's ability to triumph over darkness and superstition, whether actual or fictitious.

Once the land was conquered and demythologized, American colonial officials exercised great efforts to domesticate and control it through agriculture, horticulture, and mapping. The records are replete with urgent references regarding the need to till the soil and carve civilization from Mindanao's rugged landscape. Though farming and the establishment of modern spaces is discussed further in chapter three, the domestication of the environment in urban spaces deserves mention here. From very early on in the United States' rule in the Philippines, American officials expressed desires to shape colonial municipalities by creating spheres of domesticated and controlled natural environments. Public parks embodied this approach. In Manila, colonial authorities considered "the development of the parks . . . as one of the most essential features of municipal progress and of the general comfort and well-being of the inhabitants." Hence, municipal architects recommended that "the very best skill and experience should be employed in such an important work." These officials believed that their efforts would be "repaid an hundred fold" by producing familiar spheres of civilized husbandry and spatial arrangement on the unsophisticated colonial periphery.[62] Carefully cultivated trees, hedges, and flowers, as well as strategically placed barriers and aesthetic objects, gave the semblance of bourgeois modernity to formerly inadequate indigenous spaces. This symbol of American power served as a constant reminder of the colonial regime's power over both natural and man-made environments. Parks created urban spheres of domesticated space where civilization and the naturalized world were synthesized into something distinctly modern.

In Mindanao these projects had added significance. One of the very early resolutions of the Legislative Council of Moro Province was to compose "a map and plans for Zamboanga," including the width and location of streets and designs for the "construction of parks," all designed "for beautifying the water front and the town."[63] Similar projects were carried out in other municipalities throughout the province. This organization and domestication of marked spaces not only reaffirmed notions of American power but also lent perspective to seemingly provincial Moro populations who could scarcely conceive of the vast expanse of American influence and the ultimate inevitability of civilization's global conquest. At an agricultural fair in Jolo,

a chronically disruptive area of Moro Province, military officials offered a group of Filipino Muslims the humbling perspective of geographic location and relative significance on a global scale. "A large map of the world formed an interesting study for the Moros," read the report. "The Island of Jolo is of course but a speck and it was interesting to watch the Moros come to the conclusion that theirs after all must be a small world."[64] By domesticating and provincializing both the Moros' tangible and abstract notions of their environment and geographic significance, American imperialists were able to locate Filipino Muslims within a broader historicist narrative that affirmed a process of transition in the colony.

However, as with indigenous folk beliefs, colonial officials were also careful not to discount totally or to annihilate traditional native spaces. Since the idea of civilization was contingent on relative comparisons, colonial officials required the constant presence of indigenous elements to guide their imperial historicism. This included preserving native art forms, architectural designs, and traditional communities.[65] By 1908, the Sulu Archipelago, thought to contain some of the fiercest Moros, witnessed a rise in a sort of anthropological tourism. Curious Americans of all kinds booked passage on sea vessels traveling between Zamboanga and British North Borneo. The "picturesque" simplicity of Muslim villages in Sitanki, Cagayan de Jolo, and Tucbuck solicited glowing reports. "The scenery of this region is most wonderful," reported an article in *The Mindanao Herald*, "and an opportunity is here offered to see the water Moro as he really is."[66] This desire to see the Moro "as he really is," that is, before American tampering, illustrates a few of the insecurities inherent in American imperial historicism, which required the constant reassurance of comparisons, be they natural, artificially preserved, or even constructed.

By exploring, discovering, mapping, representing, and reconstituting the natural and supernatural spaces of the Philippines' Muslim South, American military officials attempted to subjugate their domain to certain epistemological parameters. Though these boundaries did not always preclude the existential possibility of indigenous forces as a general rule, they did always ensure that such possibilities were made subject to and domesticated by modern civilization. This unique tension maintained a perpetual sense of mystery and discovery in Mindanao and Sulu, while also providing constant affirmations of U.S. authority and colonial legitimacy. In the grand competition of metaphysical realities and evolutionary temporalities, the "discoveries" and symbolic conquests of American military authorities always ensured the primacy of transcendent modernity.

Preserving Savagery and Domesticating Violence

While American imperialists in Mindanao saw the reformation and modernization of Filipino Muslim society as inevitable, they were also careful to maintain the Moros' fierce and independent character. According to the Americans' historicist notions, it was precisely these inherent qualities that embodied the Moros' potential for becoming an independently modern people. The Moros' courage, grit, and especially their fighting spirit were traits that American military officials saw in themselves and which they credited with creating the grandeur of the United States' modern empire in North America and now in Asia. Like the American forefathers who fought Amerindians, Mexicans, and the very forces of nature to conquer the American frontier and develop qualities necessary to transcend archaic historical consciousnesses, the Moros' propensity for violence and martial culture suggested a fast track to modernity.

However, actual violence on the part of the Moros of course posed a severe and unacceptable challenge to colonial rule. Hence, American military officials in Mindanao and Sulu had to find ways to preserve but also domesticate Moro savagery and violence. The tenuous objective of subduing but not conquering, and therefore emasculating, Filipino Muslims required a careful preservation of the Moros' visceral masculinity and raw potential. This necessitated circumscribing Muslim fierceness within the confines of strict military rule while negating the obvious disruptive effects of actual violence. American officials managed this fragile predicament largely by preserving, exhibiting, and re-creating implements and episodes of Muslim savagery and violence in controlled and carefully choreographed productions. David Brody has effectively demonstrated the value of colonial spectacles as "visual scapes" that "most influenced Americans' perceptions of the Orient" and "created a space for a dialogue about empire that words alone could not nurture."[67] These contrived exhibitions demonstrated American military power to control the uncontrollable and discipline the unpredictable. By authorizing symbolic and controlled episodes of violence, military officials were also able to co-opt Moros in creating discursive colonial representations of Muslim fierceness. Moros were well aware of their infamous reputation as brave and ferocious fighters and took particular pride in distinguishing themselves as such. Most Filipino Muslims gladly accepted opportunities to reaffirm narratives of Moro gallantry and autonomous ethno-religious identities. Like their American governors, Moros also felt the need to reiterate ideas, histories, and self-perceived ways of being that highlighted their cultural

distinctness. In this way, Moro identity formation was a highly cooperative phenomenon that drew from collaborative efforts and mutual affirmations of inherent exceptionalism.

From the outset of American rule in Mindanao, military officials were fascinated with Moro weaponry and military tactics. Barongs, krises, spears, shields, and other native armaments were collected and displayed prominently in colonial homes and offices. Many of these items still adorn display cases in Philippine universities throughout the islands. American imperialists also compiled detailed accounts of Muslim cottas—native forts constructed from clay and bamboo—and wrote extensively on the terrifying prowess of Moro warriors. Native martial dances depicting warfare, piracy, and executions were performed regularly for visiting dignitaries and accompanied most public celebrations. Take, for example, the program of events organized to welcome "the Honorable Secretary of War, William H. Taft" during his 1905 visit to Zamboanga, which was typical of many such events. For two days Taft was entertained by staged productions of Moro violence including "Moro combat in *vintas* [small boats]," Moro artillery demonstrations, and "a number of native dances" depicting various scenes of combat. After witnessing this demonstration Taft exclaimed, "This will open their eyes!" He was speaking of American politicians who doubted colonialism's value. "This will give them an idea of what we are capable of doing."[68] Very soon these interests found broader and more official expression in grand expositions sponsored by the colonial regime in both the United States and the Philippines. The most widely known of these was the Louisiana Purchase Exposition at the St. Louis World's Fair in 1904.

Commemorating the centennial of the United States' first massive territorial expansion, this exposition provided an ideal showcase to demonstrate the humanitarian and financial fruits of America's recent Asian colonial acquisition. Set on 47 acres and containing thousands of entries including "economic maps," "charts, statistical illustrations, photographs, descriptive catalogues," indigenous structures and implements,[69] as well as live native subjects from a variety of ethnic groups, the Philippine exhibit at St. Louis attempted to express profound conclusions regarding "paths to progress" and the historicist narrative shaping American imperialism in the Philippines.[70] Moro Province provided 393 exhibits, including two assemblages of Muslims from the Lanao and Cotabato Districts intended to represent "typical Moro groups."[71] The exhibition was located in the southern end of the "education building" on the fairgrounds. Though these exhibits from Moro Province were deemed

"first-class in every respect," many colonial officials from Mindanao considered the overall experience at St. Louis to be a disappointment.[72] Billed as "the 'Norsemen' of the Orient, adventurous navigators and fierce fighters" in the official *Handbook and Catalogue of the Philippine Exhibit*, Moro expositions received only scant attention and drew patrons mainly from those already familiar with the southern islands.[73] "Our exhibit was too far removed from the main grounds and buildings," complained *The Mindanao Herald*. Rather than viewing the "valuable exhibits to be found on every hand" in the Mindanao section, "morbidly curious" Americans were consumed with the "naked dog-eating Igorrotes" of the northern highlands.[74] Mindanao officials derived their disgust of the Igorrot exhibit in part from a mild rivalry with similar colonial projects in the northern highlands of Luzon.[75] Nevertheless, the St. Louis World's Fair offered an unprecedented opportunity to demonstrate two distinctly "savage" peoples and the possibilities of colonial tutelage under military administration. While American public interest swayed heavily toward the highland tribes, many Americans in Mindanao felt that the most valuable aspects and significant achievements of the U.S. colonial experience so far had been passed over in favor of lesser colonial objects. "Considered as a whole," opined the *Herald*, "Philippine participation at the Louisiana Purchase Exposition has been a very costly and unsatisfactory experiment."[76] The majesty and potential of Mindanao's lands and native populations had been underrepresented.[77] The Moros' ferocity and independent spirit had not been correctly articulated or displayed—a mistake colonial authorities in Moro Province would not repeat.

Opportunities for grand expositions of domesticated Moro savagery and violence proved more effective in the Philippines. These elaborate productions spoke specifically to colonial officials and native populations more attuned to the nuances and histories distinguishing indigenous ethnic groups. While the merely curious Americans in St. Louis may not have entirely grasped the weight and significance of the Moros' unique character, those in the colony seemed to revel in the choreographed violence that bespoke narratives of imperial triumph and domesticated savages, but without the deflating realizations of broken subjects and cultural annihilation. The most striking and elaborate of these demonstrations occurred during large colonial carnivals and fairs. Beginning in 1908 the colonial administration organized a massive international spectacle known as the Philippines Carnival. Though interesting and exotic exhibits were gathered from across the islands, Filipino Muslims took center stage at this display of American colonialism.[78]

Emblazoned with images of fully costumed Moros prominently displaying their large bladed barongs, *The Official Souvenir Program of the Philippines Carnival* advertised a schedule of events replete with theatrical performances highlighting Moro savagery and violence.[79] A mock battle between "the wild tribes of the hills and the fierce Moros . . . using their native weapons," for example, attracted great attention among carnival goers.[80] However, the most indelible performance was a staged episode in which a group of "Joloano Moro pirates" attacked and looted a sea vessel in Manila Bay "in the custom of the good old days before the strong hand of law and order was extended over these people."[81]

Following the resounding success of the first Philippines Carnival, officials in Moro Province repeated their exposition in 1909, but on a much grander scale. Purporting "to teach the greatest object lesson of history," carnival organizers in Manila allowed Moro Province a prominent role in the colony's unprecedented festivities, with an enhanced emphasis on mock violence.[82] Exhibit organizers from Moro Province constructed a "picturesque and striking" edifice of "Moorish design with mosque like dome, and minarets." The interior contained a variety of Muslim artifacts highlighted by a vast collection of "laid weapons" and "*langkas*" (brass cannons).[83] While tribal dances and artifact displays attracted significant attention, it was the massive staged productions of Moro savagery that elated audiences. Building on the piracy and looting performance staged at the Carnival of 1908, organizers thrilled observers with a full-fledged Moro attack on the City of Manila. At nine o'clock in the morning on 28 January 1909 Muslim "pirate ships" containing over two hundred Moros entered Manila Bay and "swiftly sailed up the river Pasig . . . with battle flags flying." Landing below the historic Bridge of Spain, the Moro pirates disembarked and, "in full battle array, advanced through the main thoroughfares . . . encountering the least resistance." Swiftly capturing the Escolta and Plaza Goiti, the invaders then "swept across the Sta. Cruz Bridge" and turned their might on the Carnival grounds. With "agongs and tom-toms sounding a savage beat" and brass *langkas* blasting occasional salutes from the ships, the Muslim warriors brandished bladed weapons, spears, shields, and battle flags as they advanced on the awestruck crowds.[84] Once they had entered their place of prominence at the festival, the Moro warriors spent the next few days performing a variety of fierce native dances, including the "warrior's dance," the "sword dance," and the much acclaimed "pirate dance" that portrayed "seafaring Moros executing their captives or leading them to slavery."[85]

These productions consisted of more than mere representations, however. Moro participation in the Philippines Carnival of 1909 was a concerted effort to establish a broader narrative concerning Moros and the U.S. colonial mission in Mindanao. Though these cultural representations were not wholly constructed, they were contrived and selectively deployed to demonstrate American preeminence and Moro potential. "It was arranged," announced *The Mindanao Herald*, "that the picturesque people from the Moro Province make their entrance into the Capital of the Island in as striking and novel manner as possible." "This entrance of our well behaved Moro citizens into Manila in all the regalia of the ancient pirates, their forefathers, promises to afford a distinctly interesting and novel sensation to the visitors and people of Manila."[86] Moro warriors were encouraged to display their weapons openly and to "make plenty of noise as in wartime . . . beating agongs [and] pounding drums" as they pressed upon the Carnival patrons.[87] The fact that such savagery and violence was enacted by "well behaved Moro citizens" who had been domesticated, but not irrevocably subjugated, by American military officials demonstrated the thrilling possibilities of accelerated transition through a modernizing historicist narrative. To enhance the point, American military assemblages performed their own martial feat at the Carnival by laying siege to the "City of Tomorrow" for enthusiastic crowds. "Combined units of cavalry, artillery, infantry, navy and scouts poured a steady fire on the objective from every vantage point," reported the *Manila Times*. "At the close of the sanguinary fight . . . the City took fire and for several minutes those who were so fortunate as to be present witnessed one of the most beautiful sights ever presented to a holiday-making throng."[88] This "thrilling" and "spectacular" episode could not help but establish a significant and obvious connection among American imperialists and observers to the Muslims' similar feat only three days earlier. While the American military demonstration was clearly meant to show the surpassing might of the colonial regime's martial abilities, it also illustrated an important object lesson of relative comparisons and Moro potentials. For American imperialists, the only thing separating the Moro and American military sieges was a relative, malleable, and negotiable distance of historical time, manifested primarily in modern technology and tactics. At their foundations, both groups ultimately held the same inherent qualities—namely, courage, purpose, and an indomitable martial spirit.

The following year, administrators in Moro Province attempted to tighten this evolutionary historical gap slightly by presenting a company of 50 Muslim

soldiers from the Moro constabulary at the Manila Carnival of 1910. Though these soldiers wore the "usual khaki uniform with puttees," "double belt ammunition," rolled "blanket," and "haversack," the company was conspicuous in their red fezes and bare feet. "This fez in the Philippines is peculiar to the Moro constabulary soldier," explained an article in *The Philippine Monthly*, "because he is a Mohammedan, and his religion will not allow him to wear any other headgear excepting the turban." As for the lack of boots, the "reason for the men being barefooted is easily understood," continued the article, "no Moro ever uses footgear; from childhood up he runs barefooted like all savages; and the sole of his foot soon hardens; boots lame him, and make him footsore; moreover, in marching through the dense forests of Mindanao along trails that are narrow and steep, he can get a better hold with a bare foot than he can with boots." Hence, though the martial depictions of Moros in 1910 demonstrated advancement over the purely "native" exhibitions in 1908 and 1909, colonial officials were still careful to maintain a sense of savagery and visceral physical primitiveness in their offerings. The barefooted, "Mohammedan" warrior was still at the core of the constabulary soldiers. In this sense, so too was the tendency for violence. Yet, as with previous demonstrations, the careful and disciplined colonial tutelage of military officials in Moro Province was able to circumscribe and harness Moro potential without destroying it. The "Moro as a disciplined soldier was untried," continued *The Philippine Monthly*, betraying a sense of caution in its observation, "his loyalty, when once he had gotten a modern weapon in his hand was a matter of grave conjecture, and his peculiarities as a Mohammedan, as well as his bellicose disposition, had alike to be taken into consideration."[89] Yet, the Moros' participation in the colonial fair was peaceful and disciplined and, for military authorities, aptly illustrative of their unique evolutionary tendencies. Once again, American officials in Moro Province were able successfully to construct a win-win historicist narrative in which both colonial subject and imperial master were placed in a progressive and transcendent, respectively, position within an evolutionary chronological spectrum affirming the possibilities of imperial tutelage.

Though Moros rarely objected to these representations and often actively sought out opportunities to reaffirm identities and cultural narratives about themselves, not all of the military's historicist acrobatics came without challenges. When dealing with the more unsavory aspects of Muslim culture (from an American perspective), colonial officials often found themselves in difficult philosophical and administrative situations. These disruptures in

the imperial historicist narrative required a significant amount of theoretical dexterity and historical manipulation to smooth out. Nevertheless, the tenacity of their historicist discourse maintained a fundamentally coherent colonial philosophy despite the obstacles it encountered.

2

Disruptions

While colonial officials in Mindanao often succeeded in constructing a reified, homogeneous, and philosophically manageable Moro, these officials also encountered severe challenges to their imperial taxonomies and disruptive anomalies in an otherwise fluid historicist discourse. Though circumscribed within a narrative of primitivism, savagery, and uncontaminated potential, Filipino Muslims proved much more heterogeneous and complex than American imperialists would have liked. Moros exhibited certain cultural and historical characteristics that could not be ignored or overshadowed by colonial narratives and dramatic representations of primordial, untamed ignorance. Filipino Muslims often pressed the definitional parameters of "civilization" by challenging notions of an impoverished Moro past and uncivilized practices when compared to those of the United States. Islamic civilization and Moro slavery in particular caused great difficulties for American imperialists who sought simple epistemological contextualizations of discernable historical and contemporary Moro characteristics. The specter of misrepresentation also plagued colonial officials as Moros both embraced and resisted imperial taxonomies, thus proving troublesome as objectified colonial subjects.

To overcome these difficulties American imperialists had to locate and synthesize such disruptions within a comparative context of knowable histories. This meant critically evaluating their own American and broader Anglo-Saxon pasts to pinpoint similar episodes of development in the master narrative of evolutionary history. The danger, however, of relating anachronistic points of connection along parallel (if unsynchronized) historical trajectories, was the ever-present possibility of revealing anomalies and disjunctures in their own narrative of progress. These inconsistencies threatened not only to undermine the legitimating historicism of the imperial project but also to

destabilize the Americans' own sense of teleological history that supported their current notions of anti-historical motionlessness and panoptic hegemony. In the end, however, disruptive anomalies and subaltern challenges were effectively subsumed and managed by a malleable and adaptive historicist discourse that was able to maintain the integrity of the United States' colonial project in Mindanao and Sulu.

Challenging Islamic Authenticity

Primitive though the Moros may have appeared, American colonial officials could not ignore the foundational influence of Islam in virtually every aspect of Moro life. Much of the scholarship over the past 110 years concerning Filipino Muslims has tended to view Islamicization in the islands as a relatively organic phenomenon driven by uncoerced conversion. Its adoption, therefore, is considered volitional and was presumably accomplished according to the desires and dictates of indigenous societies. This interpretation has prompted scholars to allow Filipino Muslims possession of their own history. That is, the perceived historical trajectories of "natural" indigenous development are thought to have been fundamentally undisturbed by the advent of Islam, thus allowing Moros to maintain their independent spirit. This view contrasts sharply with the perceived religious origins of Christian Filipinos, which are typically regarded as coerced and ultimately, for good or evil, disruptive to normative or authentic historical development.[1] Though Filipino Muslims have assumed the mantle of this paradigm over the past 50 years, its origins are found in the Americans' struggle to locate Moros within simultaneous narratives of primitivism and Islamic civilization. Though colonial officials ultimately came down on the side of primitivism to preserve their imperial historicism, the notion of a self-consciously historical Muslimness among Moros has persisted.

In 1905 Najeeb Saleeby,[2] a Syrian-born American physician and superintendent of schools in Mindanao and Sulu, wrote a scholarly and insightful study of the "History, Law, and Religion" of the Moros as part of the government's serial "Ethnological Survey Publications." "With Islam came knowledge, art and civilization," he announced in the manuscript's introduction. Unlike the parochial Spanish imperialists, Saleeby argued, "the Mohammedan conqueror of Mindanao was neither an admiral of a fleet nor a leader of an army of regular troops. He had no nation back of him . . . nor a royal treasury

to support his enterprise. His expedition was not prompted by mere chivalry or the gallant adventures of discovery. He was not looking for a new route to rich lands nor searching for spices and gold dust." Rather, early Muslim settlers came to the islands seeking peace and "a new land to live in." Out of these early efforts "a new dynasty which stood for Islam, for progress, and for civilization arose on the ruins of barbarism and heathenism."[3] Saleeby's account of Islamicization in Mindanao and Sulu bespoke a familiar narrative to Americans. Like the English pilgrims who also merely sought out a place to settle and practice their religion, early Filipino Muslims were pioneers of an emerging civilization in the islands just as the pilgrims were in North America. Despite a fundamental difference in faith, the evolutionary march of secular homogeneous time presented an interesting historical intersection that encouraged prospects of historically correct development.

Interestingly, despite repeated references to non-modern and non-Western "civilization" and assertions of viable political and legal indigenous institutions, Saleeby's highly sympathetic work was tolerated and even embraced by many colonial officials who seemed to recognize and appreciate the Moros' Islamic edge. Over the 15 years of politico-military rule in Mindanao, colonial officials often pointed to Islam as a positive cultural influence among Moros. In 1901 the Philippine Commission reported that the "Mohammedan race . . . is somewhat more civilized than were the other" tribes and "ought to be cited among the people which have most deeply impressed their characteristics in these islands."[4] The following year the Legislative Council of Moro Province further enshrined Islamic history and symbolism in the colonial regime by creating the province's official seal. Act no. 4 of the legislative council declared, "[t]here shall be in the center of the seal a design showing a Moro vinta in a foreground of sea, a crescent in a background of sky, laid over this a map of the Moro Province, and over the whole a kris and a barong crossed."[5] By choosing to display in an official capacity the emblems of the Moros' religion and martial spirit, military officials created an established visual connection between these aspects of Moro society and implied their mutually constitutive relationship. Similarly, *The Mindanao Herald* often credited Islam with infusing "iron into the Moro blood" and supplying "a long felt want in the Moro character."[6] The "superior latent qualities of these Moros . . . hearken back to the early Arabic traditions," argued one article. "And while they have none of the Arabic blood they do have much of their instincts and training."[7] In 1911, General John Pershing confessed to a group of distinguished Muslims, "I believe that the Moros should live according to the teachings of the

Koran, because I think that the Koran is the best book that they can follow."[8] The idea that Islam endowed Filipino Muslims with "power and passion" and "made them dominant everywhere south of the Visayan Islands" simply inferred that "Mohammedanism" had prompted Moros to cultivate certain characteristics conducive to modern, secular tutelage.[9]

There were also examinations linking Filipino Muslims to a much larger global Islamic history. Edmund Arthur Dodge, for example, located Moros within a broader contemporary Muslim world characterized by the powerful Ottoman Turks.[10] General George Davis testified before a Senate committee that the Moros "appear to be as firm in their adherence to the rules laid down by the prophet as were the Medes and Persians to their laws . . . the principles of which have been cherished for more than a thousand years."[11] Ethnological outlines in *The Mindanao Herald* also described Moro religious habits and practices similar to those of Turkish and Arab Muslims.[12] Since the military regime maintained a strict policy of tolerance and noninterference regarding the Filipino Muslims' (tolerable) religious practices (slavery and polygamy being the two most identifiable exceptions), the Moros' spiritual heritage was often considered inconsequential to the larger colonial project of modernization.

Yet, despite the secular nature of these assessments, allusions to alternative historical narratives and non-Western civilizing influences on Filipino Muslims also caused a degree of uneasiness among American imperialists, whose sense of historicism did not always account for non-Western cultural development. By compromising the opportune primitiveness of Filipino Muslims and preempting the Americans' civilizing project, Moro affiliation with Islam at times threatened to undermine the legitimacy and purity of the imperial project in Mindanao and Sulu. Consequently, colonial officials also strove to disconnect Moros from the broader achievements of Islamic civilization by highlighting their syncretism and heterodoxy. These efforts, however, did not represent an evolving reactionary stance to epistemological challenges as they congealed over the course of imperial discovery. Rather, there seems to have been a simultaneous recognition and rejection of the Moros' Muslimness as American imperialists struggled to contextualize the evolutionary requisites of civilization. Filipino Muslims exhibited viable political organization, law codes, writing systems, and literature, and the theology of a world religion credited with disseminating ancient ideas that inspired the European Renaissance and Enlightenment.[13] Ethnocentric as they might have been, American imperialists still desired to maintain an objective

and scientific assessment of their social sciences. Hence, while they could not simply ignore Islamic civilization among the Moros, they could find ways to discredit it. These seemingly contradictory approaches to Islam often occurred simultaneously as imperialists struggled to smooth out the lumps in their historicist narrative. Praising on the one hand and discrediting on the other became a delicately negotiated philosophical exercise to maintain the Americans' exclusive civilizing hold on Filipino Muslims. Within this discourse Islam eventually came to embody a masked outlet for more visceral and underived primitive beliefs. In this way the Moros' religion often became an effective anachronism by which Americans were further able to prove Moro primitiveness.

Heterodoxy and syncretism were perhaps the most apparent means for separating Moros from their religion's broader historical achievements. By establishing notions of superficial conversion, misappropriation, and syncretic corruption, colonial officials were able to discredit the ideals, institutions, and accomplishments of Islamic influence in Mindanao and Sulu. Despite its emphasis on Islamic civilization among the Moros, for example, Saleeby's study rendered itself more palatable to American imperialists by pointing out the "definite limit" of Islam when confronted by Spanish Catholicism. "Like a tree stunted in its growth," argued Saleeby, Islam among the Moros had "reverted to its wild nature and grew thorny and fruitless."[14] Heterodoxy also became a theme of the *Philippine Commission Reports* at various times. In the 1904 *Report*, Governor of Moro Province Leonard Wood argued,

> Moros are, in a way, religious and moral degenerates. They profess Mohammedanism, but practice only those precepts of the Koran which suit their individual cases. . . . Evidently the first Mohammedan priests brought with them to these islands the teachings of the Koran in more or less purity, and also certain of the Mohammedan Laws, but since that time, so far as can be gathered from the traditions of these people, they have gradually fallen away from the religious teachings and most of the laws which are founded in the Koran have fallen into disuse and been forgotten, so that at the present time there is little or nothing left of them. Those that are left relate principally to the plurality of wives, the control and protection of their concubines, and laws regulating property in slaves. In short, nothing has been found worthy of codification or imitation, and little or nothing which does not exist in better form wherever humane, decent, and civilized laws are in force.[15]

By attacking the authenticity of the Moros' Islamic practices, American imperialists could systematically marginalize the nagging challenges to their civilizing imperial narrative. Political institutions, literary traditions, law codes, and a shared global consciousness within the Islamic *Umma* proved illusory and inauthentic when contextualized within a discourse of syncretism. Though such assessments compromised notions of pure Moro primitiveness, they did allow for a sort of feral savagery that also lent itself to a genuine imperial project.

As the source of the Moros' Islamic identity, their knowledge and adherence to the Koran became an essential target for colonial officials seeking to disassociate Filipino Muslims from their religion. The 1903 census, for example, observed that "although the Koran is regarded with great reverence, they [the Moros] are as a rule densely ignorant of its teachings, and are not steadfast in the practices of the Mohammedan faith."[16] This "ignorance" derived in large part from the Moros' inability to understand the languages of their faith. "The religious ignorance of the Moro of the Philippine Archipelago is universal and almost absolute," continued the census, "even in relation to affairs concerning Mohammedanism, since all his instruction, and little it is, is reduced to the poor reading of the Koran without understanding what he reads."[17] Other reports cited similar failures in religious teaching. "Services are held by the Imams or priests," reported an ethnological description in *The Mindanao Herald*, "who read selections from the Koran in Arabic or Malay, neither of which are understood by the average listener."[18] When estranged from the languages of international Islam,[19] Moro indigenism became a source of inadequacy and primitivism. "There is no object whatsoever in attempting to preserve the native [Moro] dialects," suggested a *Report of the Philippine Commission*, "as they are crude, devoid of literature, and limited in range. . . . There is little or nothing of a historical character which has been made of record, and absolutely nothing in the way of literature. The language is limited and crude and is not believed to present any features of value or interest other than as a type of savage tongue."[20] Moro illiteracy and indigenous linguistic poverty effectively allowed American imperialists to extract Filipino Muslims from any type of global context and isolate them comfortably within the parameters of American colonial influence and a historicist narrative of primitivism.

This was not necessarily an attempt to discredit Islam as such, however, but rather to discredit Moros as genuine Muslims. If employed in a proper and controlled atmosphere, Islam proved very useful to military officials who were ultimately seeking a secular modernity for Filipino Muslims. Their approach was

typical of many nineteenth- and twentieth-century Orientalist colonial projects, especially those originating in predominantly Protestant nations, whose subjects had developed an unexpected historical and theological alliance with Islam against the iconography and "popery" of the Catholic Church.[21] In his 1829 work, *Mohometanism Unveiled*, for example, the English missionary Charles Forster viewed Islam as a sort of "half-way house" in the Muslims' historical development. Islam's perceived partial truths and Hellenistic influences were thought to awaken certain latent civilized attributes among Muslims. "It is only by fairly acknowledging what they have," argued Forster, "that we can hope to make them sensible of what they have not."[22] Given this relatively tolerant historical view of Islam, it is not surprising that the Legislative Council of Moro Province went so far as to approve the use of the Koran in Moro public schools in 1903; with the caveat, however, "that Arabic characters be not taught in the Schools, but that all . . . Moro children . . . be taught in English, or in the Sulu and Maguindanao dialects, using Latin characters."[23] Hence, even indigenous languages could be used when engaging Islamic texts as long as American officials could craft and control the discourse by containing and interpreting the Moros' sense of Muslimness through familiar literary mediums. By doing so, colonial authorities could effectively isolate Moros from larger narratives of competing civilizations and maintain a sense of primitiveness conducive to their particular colonial project.

Unfamiliarity and nonconformity with Koranic teachings also opened the way for American imperialists to underscore primitive animism and superstition, rather than Islam, as the driving force behind Moro religiosity. "Their religious beliefs are very confused, and they greatly neglect their religion," reported the Philippine Commission in 1901. "Their superstitions are ridiculous." Colonial authorities crafting these reports diligently collected stories and documented instances of superstitious misunderstanding and deviations from fundamental tenets and doctrines of Islam. In the same Commission Report of 1901 American officials even went so far as to include a story that occurred nearly 20 years prior to their statements in which the Moros behaved "very superstitious[ly]." "They fear Seitan (the devil) greatly," read the report, "and appease him."

> During the cholera epidemic of 1882 the Moros of Panigayan, of whom the half died, turned loose boats filled with food upon the sea, in order that when he encountered them the devil would be content with the food. They also hung food upon the trees for the same reason. On that occasion the sherif [Muslim priest] did a good business, for he sold clear water which cured. In order to obtain the cure they had to recite certain Moorish phrases.[24]

Most subsequent descriptions of the Moros made sure to include similarly unambiguous references to their state of superstitions syncretism.[25] "All the tribes have numerous superstitions," reported the 1903 census, for example. "Among them it is customary to fly white flags from their houses at the time of an epidemic, to keep off evil spirits. They also sometimes outfit a boat with clothing, food, water, and money, and turn it adrift . . . [so] that when the evil spirit who sends the plague meets this boat he will be appeased by its contents and will not visit the settlement." Yet, despite these and other precautions the Moros also exhibited a profound sense of religious fatalism, claiming that "if God wishes them to die they will be unable to prevent it, and if he does not, they will live." These seemingly odd intersections of supernatural faith suggested an incoherent belief system among Moros that produced "superstitious and unprogressive" responses to the world around them.[26] In a letter home in 1903, Dr. George W. Robinson of the U.S. Marine Corps in Moro Province closely linked the Moros' sense of religious fatalism with their supposedly stagnant culture. "[T]here is sure to be lots of sickness among the white people," he reported; "of course the natives don't mind it much. They are used to it. Even if they all took sick and died they would not try to stop it as it is Allah's right to take them and it is of no use to try and escape it. They do not believe in medicine. They think if they are taken sick there is no use taking medicine for if the spirit of the great prophet is after them they must go." Like his military superiors Dr. Robinson linked much of the Moros' fatalism to a perceived ignorance of the written word, including the Koran. "[I]t would be worse than useless to try to sell any books of learning out here," he opined. "These people would not know what a book was. If they saw it they would think it was something to eat."[27] Far from the disciplined cultural structures of traditional Islam, the Moros allegedly languished in a sort of syncretic limbo uncondusive to growth or progress. Americans further illustrated Moro heterodoxy by pointing to an abundance of religious transgressions common to Filipino Muslims. The most egregious of these were gambling, drinking, adultery, and especially the enslavement of other Muslims, all expressly forbidden by the Koran.[28]

As with the competing power of civilization, discussed in the previous chapter, American imperialists could also sometimes slip into a competitive sense of henotheism with Islam in this respect, using Moro religious mythology to illustrate the creed's ultimate subservience to a Western civilization that was fundamentally based on a Judeo-Christian mythology of its own. Though such discourses were rarely employed by the very secular military

officials in Mindanao, other colonial authorities did engage these metaphorical spiritual contests for broader consumption. Dean Worcester's widely read volume, *The Philippine Islands and Their People* (1909), contains one particularly interesting instance. Worcester related the following story he gathered from a Moro "informant" concerning an epic battle of wits and power between Jesus and Muhammad:

> Mohamoud [sic] had a grandson and granddaughter, of whom he was very fond. As he was king of the world, Christ came to his house to visit him. Mohamoud, jealous of him, told him to prove his power by "divining" what he had in a certain room, where in fact, were his grandchildren. Christ replied that he had no wish to prove his power, and would not "divine" (*divinar*). Mohamoud then vowed that if he did not answer correctly, he should pay for it with his life. Christ responded, "you have two animals in there, different from anything else in the world." Mohamoud replied, "No, you are wrong, and I will now kill you." Christ said, "Look first, and see for yourself." Mohamoud opened the door, and out rushed two hogs, into which Christ had changed his grandchildren.
>
> Moros are forbidden to tell this story to infidels, because it shows that Christ outwitted their great prophet.[29]

Like the Americans' competitive struggle between the abstract forces of civilization and manifestations of indigenous supernatural powers, Worcester's account includes an implicit assumption that the Moros had always secretly known the ultimate inadequacy of their belief system. The fact that this tale was widely known among Filipino Muslims but also carefully guarded against outsiders suggested to Americans a certain resistant acquiescence among Moros to the inevitability and superiority of Judeo-Christian civilization. Such accounts further reaffirmed imperialist notions of shallow Islamic conversion.

Thus separated from the theological and textual foundations of Islam by an apparent state of heterodoxy and syncretism, Moro political institutions and legal codes could also be discredited as corrupt deviations. Colonial censuses and Commission Reports commented extensively on the Moros' propensity for governmental organization but also greatly lamented the chaotic abuses resulting from oppressive despots and arbitrary law codes. "The Moros have no comprehension of the word government," reported the census of 1903, but recognized "only a central power." "Moro datos . . . notorious for their cruelty" were often blamed for the Muslims' antiprogressive tendencies. "I do

not think it would be an easy task to find a haughtier people than the Moro datos," continued the census. "As a rule they are a miserable set, but believe themselves as important as Russian czars. . . . They are considered impeccable, and however great their faults may be they are not considered responsible for them." The Moros' general anti-Islamic practices and vices were credited to this pernicious system of despotic rule. Drunkenness, gambling, theft, rebellion, and a host of other socially destructive practices were typically traced back to influential headmen. "What we have said relative to the character of the Moros . . . is to be said principally of their datos and panditas. These are, moreover, the only zealous guardians of their traditions, superstitions, and hatred of Christianity. . . . [T]he dato is the only one interested in the maintenance of slavery."[30] Without significant checks on the datus' power, American imperialists argued against the existence of any type of legitimate law code, Koranical or otherwise. "After a year of diligent investigation and study . . . it has been found that the Moros and other savage peoples have no laws—simply a few customs, which are nowhere general," stated Leonard Wood in the Philippine Commission Report of 1904. And even these "customs" were deemed "undesirable from every standpoint of decency and good government." However, always mindful of the realities of historical evolution, Wood made sure to soften his reproach by reaffirming Moro potentials: "With all their faults the Moros are brave and resolute, and under good laws and an honest government will in time give a good account of themselves."[31] Thus, even though Moros claimed legitimately autonomous governmental systems and institutions based on over a millennium of Islam civilization, colonial officials were able effectively to discredit such claims and preserve a sense of hopeful primitiveness among Moros by employing discourses of syncretic heterodoxy backed by allegedly objective scientific ethnological studies and a perceived distance of historical time.

By divorcing Filipino Muslims from both the contemporary *Umma* and Islam's rich cultural legacy, American imperialists were better able to maintain the historicist narrative that validated colonial rule. Syncretic primitivism provided far fewer philosophical obstacles to the Americans' sense of imperial historicism than did trying to sift through, negotiate, and contextualize centuries of Islamic influence. By positing Islam as a masked outlet for more visceral and underived primitive beliefs, the Moros' religion often became an effective anachronism by which Americans were further able to prove Moro primitiveness. Hence, though the Moros' Islamic cultural heritage created disruptions in an otherwise tightly circumscribed historical narrative,

American imperialists were able deftly to negotiate a simultaneous acceptance and rejection of this Islamic legacy that both recognized and discredited its ultimate transitionary historical influence.[32]

Contextualizing Moro Slavery

When it became widely known among American policy-makers and journalists that Filipino Muslims practiced a particular form of forced servitude, the prospects for a truly liberating and uplifting colonial project gained much credibility. Having eradicated slavery only three and a half decades earlier in their own country, liberal American crusaders now turned their gaze outward and began to see the inevitable project of human emancipation in increasingly global and historicist terms. As early as March 1899, the *Chicago Daily Tribune* and *New York Times* began printing articles happily anticipating the declaration of "Another Emancipation Proclamation" in the Philippines. These publications, and many others,[33] heralded the opportunity for colonial rule in Mindanao as another potentially defining moment in the modern history of human freedom, if only U.S. policy-makers had the courage to act. "The attention of the authorities," read a particularly exuberant article, "has been called to the fact that slavery is rampant in Sulu, Mindoro, Tawi-Tawi, and other of the Philippine Islands. The opportunity to be entered in history as a slave liberator is now presented to President McKinley, as it was to President Lincoln."[34]

It should be noted that Americans had been highly cognizant of slavery in the Muslim world for at least a half century prior to the U.S. occupation of the Philippines. In his excellent work *The Cultural Roots of American Islamicism*, Timothy Marr explores the popular, socially minded uses of Islamic civilization among American progressives, particularly abolitionists and members of the temperance movement in the nineteenth century. Purported Islamic barbarities such as slavery and the oppression of women provided a convenient and powerful foil against similar practices in the United States. Abolitionists often shamed American slaveholders by pointing out the stark inhumanity of their institution even when compared with similar practices in the Muslim world. In this way Islamic civilization in the Near East provided a damning standard by which social activists could accurately measure American hypocrisy and lingering archaic barbarities.[35] When Americans were at last able to abolish institutionalized slavery in the United States, their comparative relationship with the Islamic world took on a new dimension of superior-

ity and tutelage that sought to bring similar social triumphs to the "archaic" parts of the Muslim world. Indeed, Moro slavery became one of the primary underlying social issues of American imperialism at large. In his book *The Embarrassment of Slavery: Controversies over Bondage and Nationalism in the American Colonial Philippines*, Michael Salman finds that "[a]ntislavery ideology and the history of abolition shaped Americans' debate on U.S. colonial rule in the Philippines." Notions of bondage and emancipation in the United States and the Philippines "became points of social, cultural, and political conflict in a series of intertwined American and Philippine histories."[36] Slavery, in all its varying manifestations, became a standard of Filipino archaism and barbarity and a primary justification for American imperialism. Yet, specters of this depraved institution also simultaneously haunted American imperialists with images of their own relatively recent uncivilized past. Nevertheless, slavery served ably as a universally condemnable practice and a cause for imperial actions.

Hence, for American imperialists in Mindanao, more so than any other place in the colony, slavery represented an easily identifiable and genuinely archaic practice that fundamentally legitimated the military's unique colonial project. There was little disagreement, even among anti-imperialists, concerning slavery's iniquitous and socially destructive hostility to modern civilized society. When combined with the Moros' ethnologically verified primitiveness, slavery completed and authenticated notions of an ideal colonial project in Mindanao and Sulu. Opportunities for such dramatic and progressive reforms were indeed rare in other parts of the islands and were coveted by those seeking to make a significant impact for modern humanity. The problem, however, was that "slavery" in the Philippines often failed to conform to many of the Americans' contemporary or historic notions of the institution. As military officials began providing voluminous accounts, assessments, and recommendations for the treatment of this problem, they, along with a majority of policy-makers, found themselves under intense pressures from within the colonial regime and without to abandon their policy of noninterference in Moro religious institutions.[37] As a possession of the United States, the Philippines was placed within the jurisdiction of the Constitution's 13th Amendment forbidding slavery. To allow it in any form was considered offensive to the great sacrifices and progress achieved during the Civil War. These pressures produced a host of contradictory descriptions of Moro slavery as military personnel and colonial officials scrambled to locate Moro servitude within a comprehensible historical and contemporary context.

Despite the immediately hopeful desires of many Americans to encounter and eradicate indigenous evils in the Philippines, a number of early official accounts of Moro slavery tended to downplay its severity while equating it with less atrocious types of servitude. General Arthur MacArthur, for example, shortly after his release as military governor of the islands, testified before a Senate committee in 1902:

> The Moros are a Mohammedan people; they are a patriarchal people. They live in these relations [of servitude], as I said before, and it is most unfortunate that the English word "slave" is ever used there, because it is very misleading in its meaning. They are not slaves in the sense ordinarily employed, so far as their association with their owners is concerned. They are not slaves in the way that is meant by anyone who is familiar with what slavery was in the United States before the civil war; and to that extent it is very unfortunate that we have adopted that phrase.[38]

Similar assessments were recorded in the *Report of the Philippine Commission* in 1901, the census of 1903, and various press outlets in the United States. The Philippine Commission asserted that Moro slaves were "not ordinarily badly treated."

> The large majority of slaves held to-day have sold themselves for debt or are the children of those who have so sold themselves, the obligations of parents being inherited by the offspring. . . . In the majority of cases slaves are treated kindly, and they are frequently allowed time and opportunity to earn money so that it is possible for them to redeem themselves if they desire to do so. The casual observer finds it impossible to distinguish them from members of the family to which they belong. Military officers everywhere expressed the opinion that Moro slaves were, on the whole, so well satisfied with their lot that if they were all set free, the majority of them would promptly return to their old masters and voluntarily take up their old life again.[39]

The census described a similarly intimate domestic arrangement in which "Master and slave usually live in the same house, eat the same food, and exist upon the same plane. Their simple wants are provided for them, and undoubtedly many bond servants prefer the secure and easy life they lead in the household of a stronger master."[40] Likewise, and despite America's popular fervor on the subject, *Harpers Weekly* also printed articles early in the colo-

nial period highlighting a more nuanced approach to Moro servitude. "Slavery in the Sulus is by no means the dreadful thing that the word suggests," argued an article in 1899. "It is merely because we have no more accurate word to describe the condition that . . . the word 'slavery' [is used]."[41] While America's collective aversion to slavery was rarely challenged, reports such as these did call into question the overzealous tendency generally to equate all forms of forced servitude with antebellum American slavery. Nuanced assessments of the cultural and economic aspects of Moro servitude threatened to unsettle familiar narratives of evolutionary history and problematized the Americans' unique form of imperial historicism.

Despite these early attempts to ascertain the fundamental aspects of Moro servitude, American officials effectively abrogated the Bates Treaty in 1903. Shortly thereafter the Legislative Council of Moro Province passed "An Act defining the crimes of slave-holding and slave-hunting and prescrib[ing] the punishment therefor" under the direction of Leonard Wood. This act prescribed a maximum penalty of 20 years in prison and ten thousand pesos fine for the crimes of slave trading or slave holding.[42] While these measures formalized the colonial regime's opposition to slavery in Mindanao and Sulu, their application and prosecution proved extremely difficult. Clear-cut instances of formal slavery, as Americans understood it, were rare and difficult to establish. Shortly after passing the above act, Colonel W. M. Wallace sent a message to the Sultan of Jolo assuring him that "[t]he foregoing [law] does not apply to people who have agreed to work for a certain person for a certain length of time to cancel a debt. They are not slaves. Such people, if they run away, might be compelled to return and complete their contract."[43] Similarly, Governor General William Taft sent a telegram to Leonard Wood expressing his concerns about the implications of the law. "The language of the Act . . . is not sufficiently accurate to prevent its application to persons innocent of intent to enslave or connive at slavery," opined Taft.[44] In other words, without a fundamental understanding of Moro servitude, the colonial regime was often as likely to prosecute innocent Muslims as it was to punish an actual slaveholder. It should also be noted that Taft's nuanced evaluation of Moro slavery provided ammunition for his political rivals. In 1908 Democratic senator Ben "Pitchfork" Tillman announced in the *Chicago Tribune*, "I am . . . surprised that the party which gathered so much glory from the destruction of slavery in this country and which has control of our foreign affairs has done nothing to put an end to slave trade there [in Mindanao]. Why don't the men responsible for Philippine government enforce the law? The islands are governed by Secretary Taft under the president."[45]

The problem was that what American authorities often interpreted as slavery was in fact a multifaceted system of patron-client relationships.[46] Rather than the typical forms of chattel slavery etched in the social consciousness of American crusaders, a majority of Moro "slaves" were actually bonded servants paying off social or economic debts.[47] And though slave-hunting and human trafficking still occurred during the American colonial period, these cases were relatively infrequent, and easily identified and prosecuted by authorities without much dispute. It was the more mundane practices of bondage and servitude, however, that problematized the Americans' emancipation project. The fact that indigenous patron-client social structures underpinning Moro servitude contrasted sharply with notions of chattel slavery as practiced in the American South severely complicated supposedly translatable transcultural historicist narratives. Moro slavery "differs materially from the institution of Negro Slavery as it formerly existed in the United States," affirmed the census of 1903, "and in many cases the bondage is almost nominal."[48] In a similarly comparative tone *Harpers Weekly* concluded, "slavery in the Sulus cannot be called an arduous occupation. The slave eats and sleeps in the same house as his master; he is treated more like a retainer than as a slave." In fact, continued the article, "the system of employing Chinese labor throughout the East is . . . much more iniquitous than Sulu slavery." Lacking an absolute commodification of human beings strictly as objects of ownership and trade (though this did sometimes occur), Moro servitude diverged sharply from plantation slavery in the United States. This apparent distinction was commonly recognized by those who actually witnessed the practice. The American general public in St. Louis, for example, who anticipated seeing "for the first time . . . human being[s] held in slavery" at the 1904 World's Fair, were rather unimpressed by the "horrors" of Moro slavery. "They appear to take their bondage in a matter of fact way," reported the *New York Times* in a somewhat short and mundane article. "If they chafe under their restraint they show no evidence of it."[49]

The apparent nonconformity of Moro servitude with the type of "slavery which at one time existed in America" produced a variety of alternative and competing interpretations from military colonial officials as they struggled to contextualize the practice within a knowable history.[50] Despite the increasingly obvious distinction between Moro and American forms of slavery, however, many colonial officials insisted on looking to the United States' own immediate antebellum past and celebrated triumph over African enslavement in the American South. As with the conquest of the western frontier, the

United States' successful defeat of slavery recalled a triumphant era of critical historical development. Repeating this episode in the Philippines offered an opportunity to re-create and relive a glorious and progressive national past. If possible, Moro social evolution was always to be translated and contextualized within an American historical narrative first, to ensure a certain path to modernity. Hence, American imperialists exercised every effort to synchronize these unparalleled histories in order to reaffirm their self-acknowledged transcendent progress.

While American imperialists strove to maintain their image of absolute superiority, it was also occasionally acceptable to reveal moments of historical savagery and past mistakes to facilitate an imperial teaching moment, as it were. The struggle with Moro slavery offered several such moments. While interrogating the well-known Moro leader Panglima Hassan, for example, Major H. L. Scott openly confessed, "In our country we had much trouble ourselves about the slaves; we fought big battles in which more people were killed in one battle than there are in Jolo [al]together. One time we have been savages; we know better now."[51] While Major Scott's admission, and others like it,[52] certainly maintained an imperial sense of evolutionary historical distance and paternalistic moral superiority, it also contained the potential for an unnerving and disruptive series of incongruent associations that threatened to unravel the homogenizing historicist narrative of American colonialism. By locating Moros at such a close historical distance in terms of institutionalized slavery, imperialists risked compromising the Moros' "primitiveness" and the indefinite nature of the colonial project, as well as the Americans' seemingly intranscendable distance from the debilitating effects of "savagery." Likewise, the dissimilarities between American and Moro slavery were too obvious to ignore. The numerous accounts of benevolent and often symbiotic master/slave relations among Filipino Muslims contrasted sharply with the brutal history of American enslavement of Africans—a history that was widely and unquestionably accepted among imperialists. Indeed, the collective abhorrence of slavery born out of the American experience was, in many cases, at the very heart of the colonial project in Mindanao and Sulu. Hence, such unfavorable associations, along with the disruptive anachronisms inherent in the comparison of developmental historical trajectories, presented a precarious and untenable assessment of Moro slavery.

By 1904 colonial authorities began to abandon efforts to locate Muslim slavery within recent American history. Instead, many officials attempted to recast the practice in terms of older, but still familiar, forms of institutionalized

oppression. J. G. Harbord, for example, after spending a great deal of time associating directly with Moro communities as the assistant chief of the Philippine Constabulary, reported to the Philippine Commission that Moro slavery "and its evils have been greatly exaggerated." Harbord suggested that what colonial officials had initially interpreted as slavery was actually more akin to "the peculiar institution of villanage [that] survived the passing of the feudalism of the Middle Ages," and which "lingered in England until the days of the Stuarts." Such an assessment was decidedly convenient as it effectively allowed a significant amount of historical space while still maintaining the familiarity necessary to affirm an imperial historicism. It also diluted the severity of "slavery" as an object of immediate concern and allowed military officials the latitude to pursue less combative policies of emancipation. Most officials had also realized by this time the ultimate intractability of Moros on internal issues such as slavery and polygamy. By recasting enforced servitude as "part of their rude feudalism" that "will endure for several generations" as it did in Europe, colonial officials could both familiarize Moros and maintain the potential for an ultimately successful colonial project.[53] Perhaps anticipating such difficulties two years earlier, General George Davis suggested the necessity of a more protracted discourse of historical evolution for Moros:

> The student of history knows that the transition from patriarchal form and mediaeval feudalism to a government of law was slow in the extreme even with the Caucasian race. How many of us have seen the failure of attempts to make self-governing citizens quickly out of the breechclouted, naked savages. . . . That much success can be obtained with this generation I do not expect. Our only hope is with the rising generation and those to follow.[54]

The transition from "abomination" to "historical stage" in American imperial discourse softened the thorny irritations of Moro servitude and smoothed out unsettling disruptions in the historical narratives. "Slavery is not merely an institution it is also a stage in evolution," agreed an ethnographic account of the Moros in 1904, "and many of the slaves of this region are yet at the low stage of development at which the mild slavery in which they live suits them better than freedom."[55] The Americans' legal and philosophic deemphasis on Moro slavery is evidenced well by the relative absence of slave cases within the tribal ward court system after 1904. In the 1906–1907 fiscal year, for example, out of the 294 cases submitted to the courts in the Lanao District only eight dealt with some form of slavery.[56]

While many officials such as Scott and Harbord attempted skillfully to negotiate these imperial tensions, many others simply retreated into the apparent safety of racial superiority by demeaning Moros as inherently and perpetually inferior. Such diatribes are sprinkled throughout the documents and serve as symbolic manifestations of American anxieties concerning a variety of unsettling incongruities inherent in the colonial project. General Tasker Bliss, for example, while serving as the commander of the Department of Mindanao, argued that the Moro mind was something "that the Christian can scarcely conceive of." "The case of the Moro is not settled by civilizing him," he declared; "all the agencies and results of western civilization may be accepted by the Oriental without bringing him one step nearer to western ideas."[57] While such racist assessments did not fully threaten the colonial legitimacy of the United States per se, they did severely undermine deeply held concepts of historical transition and American exceptionalism. By casting colonial subjects as immutable racial "others" beyond the redemptive powers of American tutelage, Bliss briefly blurred the necessary distinction between the United States and other vulgarly exploitive imperial powers. Such a blow to the national-colonial self-image was not acceptable as a mainstay of imperial thought. Nevertheless, racial distinctions remained a selective tool throughout the colonial period in Mindanao and Sulu as the Americans pursued "the racialization of territory and the territorialization of race."[58]

Misrepresentations

Though the American military regime's discourse of imperial historicism was frequently constructed and maintained without extensive conversation with Filipino Muslims, it did not occur in a vacuum. Recent literature in colonial studies and empire in the Philippines has shown the pervasive tendency (consciously or unconsciously) of colonial subjects to reorient and appropriate discourses and symbols of imperial control. Reynaldo Ileto's award-winning work, *Pasyon and Revolution*, for example, persuasively demonstrates this phenomenon as Filipino revolutionaries reappropriated and transformed religious mythology and iconography to produce a distinctly revolutionary form of indigenous folk Catholicism.[59] Vicente Rafael has also written extensively on the roles of language, theater, and cultural translation in the Philippines' struggle against empire.[60] The United States' military regime in Mindanao and Sulu likewise experienced this phenomenon. With a

heavy dependence on ethnological data and other scientific findings to guide its notions of historical development, American imperial discourse was highly contingent on the accuracy of initial findings, which could be conclusively contextualized within a burgeoning corpus of concrete "facts." False findings and data adjustments caused a disruptive ripple effect throughout the discourse that complicated imperial taxonomies and policies.

The difficulty, however, often resulted from over-cooperation on the part of the Moros rather than their resistance. Rather than presenting themselves as static objects for observation and inquiry, many Filipino Muslims actively engaged American efforts to discern and codify Moro culture. Many Moros gladly embraced colonial representations of warlike savagery and aided American officials in their exhibition. However, when it became obvious that certain representations did not conform to the desired types, or even to the realm of normative possibilities, this introduced unsettling prospects of false or inaccurate data and fundamental misunderstandings of the Moros' evolutionary status. An account of such "native representations" in *The Mindanao Herald* provides an apt illustration of this dilemma.

In 1906 colonial authorities organized one of many "agricultural fairs" in Jolo. In what was described as their "first attempt to make a formal exhibit of the handicraft and husbandry of the Jolo Moros," Filipino Muslims from across the island were encouraged to bring their products for display and competition. "All had something to show," reported the paper. However, rather than presenting traditional samples of quality produce and livestock, the Moros' "idea was to show something abnormal." "They evidently had gotten this idea from the constant reiteration of the directors of what to show," reasoned the reporter. He then described the exposition:

> The poultry show started with a chicken dyed red and blue with one wing and a featherless hairy rooster. An enterprising Moro who took in this exhibit evidently got the idea that the prize for poultry was to be awarded on the lack of feathers. If so he has the prize safe, for he came the next day with a chicken plucked absolutely bare.
>
> If this chicken does not die before the end of the fair he has a good chance at some of the poultry prizes for the only other exhibits in this department were two roosters that had extra sets of legs.

Though amusing, this episode illustrates a significant potential for disruption in the Americans' ethnological understanding of Filipino Muslims. It is clear that

the Moro participants in this agricultural fair were trying to impress American authorities by displaying the most irregular, exotic, and outrageous exhibits they could find or produce. And why not? After all, American imperialists were constantly and selectively seeking out the most primitive, savage, and unfamiliar aspects of Moro culture to produce an ideally pristine colonial subject. Under normal circumstances colonial officials might have enthusiastically embraced the Moros' efforts as further evidence of alien exoticism. However, in this situation it was obvious to American organizers that the chickens' irregularities were not standard; rather, they were highly anomalous or artificially contrived. These contrivances automatically begged the question of what other exoticisms the Moros might be misrepresenting as "normal." Perhaps more unsettling still was the possibility that Filipino Muslims had been feeding imperialists an artificial discourse from the beginning. Rather than "discovering" answers to particular ethnological and scientific questions, Americans had to consider the possibility that their dispassionate findings were simply the result of shrewd subaltern maneuvering by Moros. If such was the case, American imperialists would have to reassess the entirety of their imperial historicist narrative as a series of false conclusions rippled through otherwise synchronized comparative histories.

Ultimately, however, the Americans' sense of transcendent, panoptic modernity excluded such unnerving possibilities. Considering the advanced techniques, instruments, theories, and comprehensive knowledge possessed by American imperialists, they felt confident that there was very little the Moros could actually hide from them or convincingly misrepresent. The entire phenomenon of "discovery" for American imperialists was not simply contingent on relative perspective but was viewed rather as a disinterested, objective scientific experience. Discovery and truth did not belong to Americans or to Moros but was held as an independent entity, self-existent beyond human observation. Hence, while military explorers in Mindanao often preceded their findings with the characterizing adjective "native" (e.g., "native" lake, "native" river, "native" mountain, "native" village, etc.), they did not concede these discoveries to indigenous populations in any fundamental sense. Take, for example, Captain Jennings's "discovery" of Lake Lanao in 1907.[61] While Moros certainly knew the location and potential uses of this lake for centuries, they had not "discovered" it in any true sense of the term as far as Americans were concerned. Though Moros obviously "knew" of its existence, they could not give accurate measurements of its circumference or depth, neither could they provide evidence of water temperature or zoological or geological taxonomies therein, nor analyze it in scientific comparison with other such bodies of water in Mindanao or around

the world, which would have allowed them to give it context and relevance. The same was true for mountains, forests, and oceans as well as plant and animal life throughout the islands, and certainly for the Moros themselves. For American colonialists, Mindanao and Sulu were essentially considered "vacant lands" full of numerous "latent" undiscovered possibilities.[62] The fact that "no white men had" scientifically probed their depths effectively negated any possible misrepresentations in their academic discourse.[63] After all, unknown facts could not be misrepresented facts.

This exclusivity of "discovery" was also strictly applied to social science and ethnology. As far as American colonialists were concerned, Moros did not "know" themselves any more than they "knew" their environment. Their culture, religious beliefs, social relationships, and political organizations were waiting to be discovered in a fundamentally modern scientific manner, just as their native soils were. Viewed in such a way, it became very difficult for Americans to imagine Moros intentionally or effectively misrepresenting themselves or creating a subversive subaltern infiltration of the imperial scientific discourse. After all, it was a discourse they were unqualified to participate in. It required perspective and modern scientific knowledge, qualities and skills the Moros lacked. Consequently, though American imperialists occasionally encountered disconcerting incongruities in their colonial discoveries, these disruptions were effectively subsumed within a broader historicist narrative. The Americans' sense of ahistorical omniscience and the unquestioned objectivity of modern science rendered their imperial projects beyond dispute from unqualified subaltern subjects.

Though American imperialists faced a variety of perplexing tensions and stark contradictions in their imperial epistemology, it should also be recalled that the historicism that buttressed their sense of "transcendent progress" was, at its heart, an active, consuming, and indeed inevitable phenomenon. Thus, when nagged by setbacks and minor failures, colonial officials could take faith in the abstract and seemingly omniscient forces of historical transition and modernity. In a certain sense, American imperialists felt they were merely tools of these autonomous forces, which needed only to be introduced and properly administered for a time to produce their transformative effects. While many colonial administrators placed their hopes for Filipino progress in education, popular government, and Protestant evangelization, military colonial officials in Mindanao ultimately laid their trust in the influential powers of capitalist market systems and the alluring prospects of wealth and consumption.

3

Capitalism as Panacea

Though military colonial officials in Mindanao and Sulu certainly advocated and pursued policies designed to instill a sense of individual civic identity, democratic awareness, and modern education, the obstacles obstructing the institutionalization of these attributes among Moros were initially much greater than in the north. The military regime's policy of noninterference (directly) with Moro religious and political institutions made social engineering a more difficult task. In the face of such impediments, American administrators began to look more broadly at the foundational principles and incentives of modernity. In their view capitalism in particular proved to be the most promising and dynamic force for progress and peace in the Philippines' Muslim South. All minor disruptions and incongruities encountered at various points in the Americans' historicist narrative were eventually consumed and neutralized by the overwhelming power of modern capitalism to force progressive historical conformity. While Moros may have evaded or misunderstood Western appeals for modern governmental rationalism and civil society, American imperialists felt confident that Filipino Muslims could not resist the indomitable transformative influence of modern capitalism.

Capitalism's supremacy as the impetus and great synthesizing force of modernity had long been a mainstay of the United States' imperial historicism. Weberian-esque notions of Protestant individualism and "the spirit of capitalism" significantly informed and maintained American visions of humanistic triumph and post-Enlightenment progress.[1] The upward momentum of capitalist competition and development was largely regarded as the animating force behind modern progress. Those who shunned it risked falling by the wayside of history. "The strife of the great nations the world over is now for trade," argued an article in Manila's *Daily Bulletin*. "In this strife we must either take part or content ourselves with isolation that means destruction."[2]

The apparent intimate connections among wealth, enlightenment, competition, and supremacy are ubiquitous throughout the records. "[T]he history of the nations teaches us that the enjoyment of liberty by any people is directly dependent upon their enlightenment," declared an article in *The Mindanao Herald*, "enlightenment which betokens intellectual and industrial development. The modern world is a vast and varied workshop where all the nations of the earth strive together for the mastery of industry. Victories are won and conquests are made, not by soldiers and warships, but by the immeasurably more powerful armies of industry and fleets of commerce."[3] This emphasis on competitive capitalism provided American imperialists with a distinct sense of owning their own history. The United States' rise to prominence as an imperial power could be meticulously detailed through a litany of identifiable cultural qualities and a pervasive ethos of "hard work and self-help," rather than the fickle fortunes of history. "[N]o other way has yet been found to master the world," declared one American imperialist, "than the old and familiar way of first becoming able to take care of and master one's self."[4]

In their typically self-reflexive manner, American imperialists always looked to their own history to validate broader imperial paradigms. Since it was *universal* historical evolution that dictated the ebb and flow of global development, Americans referenced their own progressive pasts, taking special notice of transitioning populations within metropolitan society to chart colonial policies. Within this context the United States' uneducated and indigent masses provided valuable reference points for imperial social engineering. The effects of capitalist competition and increased opportunities for wealth on the American poor and ignorant inspired imperialists and found voice in colonial newspapers. "[C]rime everywhere [is] decreased," trumpeted one article, with "less drunkenness and less tendency to crime." The prospects for acquiring material wealth brought "with it a feeling of hope that it is now easier to earn a living than to steal it."[5] Capitalism thus provided a valid purpose-driven support system for sociohistorical advancement, which could be understood by even the most primitive minds. Desires for wealth and material comfort were considered innate characteristics common to all humanity. They represented the seeds of a modern consciousness. Capitalism distilled all of the abstract rationales for modern existence into simple visceral desires. Yet these basic yearnings, through participation in a competitive capitalist system, eventually brought forth a multiplicity of civilizing characteristics seemingly unconnected to mere financial want. Work ethic, responsibility, patriotism, familial affections, and a sense of ongoing self-improvement (one

might say social evolution) naturally sprang forth from premodern individuals who allowed capitalism to release their modern consciousness.

After reaching its fullness in elite metropolitan circles, the civilizing and uplifting powers of wealth, industry, and consumption proposed to penetrate even the darkest corners of the globe through colonialism and elevate the most ignorant savages to an exalted state of civilization. In his exceptional critique of historicism and the history of capital, Dipesh Chakrabarty explores the Western "tendency to think of capital in the image of a unity that arises in one part of the world at a particular period and then develops globally over historical time, encountering and negotiating historical differences in the process."[6] According to this traditional Western paradigm, once capitalism encounters a premodern or uncivilized society, "a struggle ensues . . . in the course of which capital eventually cancels out or neutralizes the contingent differences between specific histories."[7] In other words, capitalism had the power to transcend the historical lag separating modern and premodern societies. It was a purging agent that eliminated the archaic, unjust, and inefficient elements of primitive societies and then replaced them with the progress, work ethic, and upward mobility necessary to initiate modernity. "The Filipinos can never become a strong, robust, self-reliant people without working as we have worked," editorialized *The Mindanao Herald,* "and without that training which comes with work . . . work—which has made the Aryan people the arbiters of the destiny of the world. . . . Work, hard work, is necessary to the higher development of all physical, mental, and moral life."[8] Hence, for many American imperialists, teaching Filipinos how to become hard-working, industrially minded citizens of a modern capitalist world was the fundamental underlying objective of the entire colonial project. In the Americans' estimation, to be truly modern was to have the ability to bring all things under subjection and utilize the social and material worlds for comfort and human progress. "There is but one way to reclaim this unfortunate country," opined one American, "and that is through the medium of material prosperity, which after all, is the only civilizer."[9]

Notions of capitalist civilization found special meaning and application in Mindanao and Sulu. Without access to the standard social engineering methods such as Protestant evangelization and the imposition of proto-democratic institutions, military officials were forced to find secular, extra-governmental methods of colonial tutelage. Capitalist integration was ideal. In fact, the absence of competing and convoluted methods of colonial engineering offered an opportunity for a much more focused and effectual modernizing regime

in Moroland. It simplified colonial objectives and proposed to lay the foundations of modernity first before burdening colonized populations with institutions and civic responsibilities for which they were unprepared. "War and agriculture are enemies," remarked one American imperialist, pointing out a simple truism, "and the latter will create the necessary additional desires or appetites that go to make up civilization among the Moros."[10] By providing simple choices and incentivizing civilization through appeals to an already innate desire, colonial officials could more easily direct Moros through their social transitions. Introducing wealth and industrialization would "disarm oriental prejudice and convince the native that western ideas are safe, practical, and useful," eventually including ideas such as state bureaucratic controls and civic institutions. By laying a strong market-oriented foundation first, imperialists believed they could initiate a transformative process that at once both subdued and prepared Filipino Muslims for modern civil society.

As stated in earlier chapters, Moros offered American military officials the exceptional possibility of becoming a subject, but not a conquered people, under colonial rule. Their fiercely independent character and rugged masculinity reflected qualities that Americans saw in themselves and to which they credited the audacious triumph of their own modern nation-state. American imperialists believed that if Filipino Muslims could just catch a glimpse of modernity's potential wealth then they would be instantly converted to ideas of change and progress. In the *Report of the Philippine Commission* in 1904, for example, Leonard Wood argued, "unless he [the Moro] has before him the example of what can be done in this really remarkable country it is not believed that his present primitive methods will be materially changed." Wood believed that if Filipino Muslims could only "see the results of better agricultural methods and better industrial methods generally," then their "ambition would be stimulated and . . . development would be comparatively rapid."[11] Many colonial officials heartily agreed with Wood that the "greatest portion of unrest" among Moros spawned directly from a "lack of commercial relations"[12] and affirmed that "employment, with the opportunity to accumulate property," would "be the great civilizer" in Mindanao and Sulu.[13] Indeed, even the tropical climate, which provided "little encouragement to either energy or ambition,"[14] could be easily overcome by a "moral life, with plenty of hard work" resulting from a strong capitalist ethic.[15] This approach was aptly illustrated during a visit by Zerah C. Collins of the Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA) to Mindanao in 1903. Accompanied by a military escort, Collins brought with him many of the typical biases and skepticism for Moro

religion and culture that characterized most Americans outside Mindanao. However, after observing the conditions and people in Moro Province he too demonstrated a softened sense of humanistic equality and potential material progress. In one particular instance some of his military companions suggested that he exhibit a zonophone to "impress these savages with our superior skill as a people." He recorded the subsequent interaction:

> One old sultan was especially interested in the machine and I asked him why the Moros did not make them. He said, "No got." I pointed to the brass and said, "Got this?" "Yes." Then to the iron; "Got this?" "Yes." Then to the wood; "Got this?" "Yes." Then to the cloth; "Got this?" "Yes." Then I tapped my forehead: "Moro got this?" The old fellow's leathery face broke into a grin and he shook his head. He saw the point.[16]

Thus for Americans such as Collins, it was not inherent savagery, per se, that ultimately kept the Moro from civility but rather an acute ignorance of the affluent and technological possibilities of modernity. This enduring faith in ingenuity and the productive use of the material world to produce prosperity through the magic of capitalist market systems gradually became the obvious panacea for a diverse set of inhibiting factors to Moro civilization.

Moros as Natural Capitalists

The colonial regime's high estimation of Muslims as natural entrepreneurs further enhanced American military officials' tremendous faith in the sheer power of capitalist modernity in Mindanao and Sulu. Spanish chroniclers had long stereotyped Moros as greedy and ambitious people who fed their appetites through the acquisition of loot and slaves. Though Americans roundly condemned these characteristics as a matter of principle, such traits did offer a glimmer of potential for industry and wealth if properly directed. Filipino Muslims demonstrated a number of positive traits to hopeful colonialists, indicating natural inclinations toward a market-oriented, wealth-driven approach to modernity. These proclivities were not without historical precedent. The premodern Malay-world trading system was unrivaled in its expanse and volume of both products and participation. Muslim Malay traders facilitated a truly global free market system ranging from Africa's east coast to the Middle East and southern China.[17] Filipino Muslims were, in a historical

sense, direct products of this trade and continued to contribute to its vitality. Islam's broader history also enjoyed significant credentials as a natural and inherently proto-capitalist culture. As Bernard Lewis observed, "Qur'anic approval of buying and selling is amplified in a large number of sayings, attributed to the Prophet and to the leading figures of early Islam, in praise of the honest merchant and of commerce as a way of life."[18] Thus acknowledged as shrewd and assertive traders, Moros soon captured the imagination of colonial officials by demonstrating an uncanny aptitude for modern ingenuity, American-style work ethic, and desires for bourgeois comforts. These proclivities and desires offered a distinct possibility for bridging the gap between archaic and modern consciousnesses among Moros and setting the groundwork for a full-fledged modern society.

Perhaps the Moros' most fundamental quality was an intense aspiration for wealth. Colonial officials frequently wrote glowing reports of the Moros' "desire to make money"[19] and their "brave and industrious" character.[20] "The Moro people are entirely self-supporting," wrote Major Hugh Scott, "and are very industrious."[21] In 1906 the Philippine Commission similarly concluded that "The Moro has a great desire to acquire money and to keep it, and this assists in making them respond to encouragement in the desired direction," that is, toward becoming a modern individual.[22] Wealth as a civilizing force found deep roots in the Americans' ethnological evaluations of Filipino Muslims. The noted and "much traveled professor of anthropology at the University of Chicago," Frederick Starr, "gave individual instances of the industry, morality, intelligence, and executive capabilities of the wild tribes, mentioning as proofs of civilization the fact that he had met . . . Moros worth hundreds of thousands of dollars."[23] The fact that wealth and civilization were so directly correlated in an allegedly scientific ethnological study by a top U.S. anthropologist speaks deeply about the primacy of material acquisition as a fundamental basis for modern progress. After comparing these findings with other groups throughout the islands it became clear to American officials "that the Moro is the most prosperous of the wild men. . . . and possess[es] more actual worldly possessions than any individual tribe, even though the tribe is six or eight times more numerous."[24] Filipino Muslims' desires and nascent abilities to extract and accumulate capital portended great possibilities for American imperialists whose ethnological taxonomies strained for evidences of modern inclination. Rather than finding primitive satisfaction in subsistence living, the Moros demonstrated an upward thrust toward the material possibilities of modernity. They only lacked guidance and market mechanisms to allow these qualities to flourish.

Much to the Americans' delight, the Moros' aspirations for wealth seemed to manifest more than mere idle longing. Muslim yearnings for increased standards of living prompted them to engage the means to their objective. These included hard work, an inquisitive proclivity toward ingenuity and labor-saving technologies, and a firm trust in the Americans' economic system. The most frequent and radiant praise from American colonists was directed at the Moros' determined work ethic. "The Moro is a ready worker, anxious always to make money, and strong and energetic," declared *The Mindanao Herald*. "He is perhaps the best laborer found in the Philippines."[25] The paper's ethnological accounts further pointed out that the Moros already had "among them [pre-colonial] carpenters, blacksmiths, silversmiths, bricklayers, tailors and even gunsmiths of fair ability" who were viably "industrious" prior to American inducement.[26] The census similarly observed an inherent "recognition of the necessity for trades and crafts men in even the small division of labor which their social organization affords."[27] Colonial officials welcomed these characterizations and included them whenever possible in official reports. "The Moro is a hard worker," wrote one administrator, "and a natural artisan in various lines. He is fond of money and will work hard to get it."[28] Another praised the Muslims' "great desire to work" and added that the only difficulty among them "has been to stop them [from working] in order to keep within appropriations."[29] General Pershing in particular extolled the Moros' inherent potentials with glowing affection. "The Moro is naturally an industrious man," he wrote to a colleague in 1910. "No one can be associated with the Moros for any length of time and not feel that they are superior in that regard to any other Philippine people."[30] His outward praise was not exclusively voiced to fellow Americans either. While speaking to a gathering of Filipino Muslims in the Lanao District, Pershing lauded the Moros' progressive character and encouraged their financial success. "I wish to impress upon the Moros here that this country is the country of the Moros; that they are a strong race of people, in fact, the strongest race that I have seen in the islands. For this reason, it is their duty to have more children in order that they may cultivate all the land around the Lake."[31] For these colonial officials, the rugged, enterprising attitude of self-made men that created an American empire manifested itself in the Moros' natural approach to work and material acquisition. Seizing the bounty of the earth and conforming the material world to the modern dictates of comfort and style through sheer work and an imposing will swelled military officials with high colonial aspirations.

The Muslim work ethic was further enhanced by the Moros' aptitude for modern ingenuity and labor-saving methods and technologies. Even in the metropole very early in the colonial period, Americans anxiously observed their Muslim subjects and extolled the Moros' perceived natural ingenuity. An article in the *Chicago Daily Tribune* in 1904, for example, featured a large illustration of two smartly clad Moro children thoughtfully considering a little "native cart" they built from bamboo and nipa "with spool wheels." The younger of the two appears to be no more than three or four years old and the other no more than eight. Despite their youth, however, they gaze critically on their design as if profoundly considering possible improvements. Before giving detailed descriptions of this and other "unique contrivances," the article declares that, "of all Uncle Sam's younger generation the little brown Moro lads of the Philippines are most resourceful in creating amusing toys when their opportunities are taken into consideration." While the paper's observation was obviously a racial one, it does contain an apt example of the Americans' sense of humanistic equality with regard to technological innovation. It also reveals the pervasiveness of imperial historicism throughout metropole and colony, which itself exudes a certain logic of historically contextual equality. The first half of the article is dedicated to describing "modern" toys. The author makes no specific references to ethnicity, nationality, or color in describing the modern youths that create or use them (although it can perhaps be assumed that he means "Americans," given the accompanying illustrations and failure to indicate otherwise). He simply opens the piece by remarking, "What a difference there is in the ideas of the youth of today and the youth of twenty-five or thirty years ago." His purpose is not to distinguish the said youths horizontally across a spatial geography of continents or ethno-linguistic groups but, rather, to distinguish them vertically in a temporal sense according to their position on a progressive historical narrative. His treatment of the "Moro lads," however, requires a complex intersection of somewhat unsynchronized historical trajectories that ultimately become contingent on spatial and cultural location. The Moro children are unabashedly included and even placed at the top of "all Uncle Sam's younger generation" as the "most resourceful." Yet, their ranking is inevitably contextualized by the spatially and temporally contingent "opportunities" (one might substitute "circumstances") that must be "taken into consideration," thus allowing for the geographic, cultural, and historical distance between metropole and colony. Nevertheless, the evidences and potentials of modernity are both openly and implicitly acknowledged. The Moro is simply viewed as progressing on a sep-

arate but similar historical trajectory that travels predictably toward a singular modernity but extends and contracts at different rates, thus distinguishing the Moros' contingent "opportunities." Ultimately, however, the accelerating influences of colonialism promised to negate these contingent differences and bring Filipino Muslims into the full fellowship of modernity. The natural ingenuity of the "Moro lads" provided the best evidence of these potentials.[32]

In the colony, Americans took special note of these qualities and catered to the Moros' keen interest in increased production and surplus agriculture. Given their natural inclinations, colonial officials believed, Filipino Muslims needed only exposure to modern techniques to be instantly converted. "If he [the Moro] could see the results of better agricultural methods and better industrial methods generally," asserted the Philippine Commission in 1904, "it is believed that his ambition would be stimulated and that his development would be comparatively rapid."[33] A year later the Commission reiterated its proposition, affirming that, "The Moro in general will work if he sees pay ahead. If modern methods of agriculture could be introduced in such a way as to be applicable to the conditions, the saving of labor and increased products would give a healthy impetus to good order and improvement among the Moros."[34] Pershing added his own enthusiastic endorsement in a letter to W. A. Keay in 1910. The Moros were "anxious to learn modern methods of agriculture, and are keen to accumulate money and property," he wrote.[35] The frequency with which these colonial officials deployed the term *modern* in the context of Muslim exposure to agricultural and industrial innovations reveals the exciting possibilities of historical contraction and expedited evolution. Modernity, after all, was more than a mere state of consciousness, or if it was, it could not be maintained as such. Being "modern" meant participating and creating modernity in the material world, which included accessing technology and wealth.

American officials were further inspired by the fact that the Moros' inclinations to work and progress materially occurred in spite of a relatively debilitating environment and savage upbringing. Though military authorities considered Mindanao far more conducive to industry and indigenous development than the northern islands, largely due to its sparser population and virgin interior, Mindanao and Sulu were still located in the tropics, which supposedly bred indolence, savagery, and poor health. Notwithstanding, the Moros had already naturally begun to overcome these environmental disadvantages and aspired to something more than mere subsistence. Census takers observed this tendency very early, characterizing the Moros as "victims

of environment," "living as they do in a land of surprising fertility, where the climate offers but little encouragement to either energy or ambition, there is not great effort to better the conditions into which they are born. . . . It must be remembered that industry would profit a man very little under the circumstances of life that beset these people, yet upon many occasions individual Moros have been known to do very hard work."[36] This disposition for hard work was the key. No matter the environment, a truly modern man could subdue the earth to his will and craft order and comfort from chaos. Leonard Wood put this notion succinctly when he said, "A moral life, with plenty of hard work, will be found to counteract in most cases of the so-called demoralizing effects of the Philippine climate."[37] At its foundation, then, the Americans' colonial ideology in Moroland was fundamentally humanistic in its approach, regarding the potentials and abilities of colonial subjects as ultimately independent from spatial contextualizations. As one colonial official put it, "The [Moro] people are not vicious or intractable. They are simply underdeveloped."[38]

Finally, military authorities in Mindanao beamed as the Moros' entrepreneurial spirit distinguished them sharply from northern Christian Filipinos. American imperialists in Luzon and the Visayas constantly lamented the indolence and mischievous subversion of Christian Filipino laborers. Newspapers supported by the colonial regime pleaded with government officials and investment capitalists to import more dependable labor from elsewhere in Asia. Consider the following tirade from Manila's *Daily Bulletin*:

> The Filipino race is indolent. . . . He [the Christian Filipino] is not a success as a field laborer. . . . [He] cannot be induced to toil for a certain agreed-upon wage for weeks or months at a time. It is rarely that a native laborer can be induced to engage himself in manual labor for more than from two to four days during a week. . . . To hold before him as an inducement of steady labor a reward in the shape of compensation does not appeal to him. . . . His necessities being few, and his country rich, he does not find the same hard struggle for existence as does his brother in a more fibrous climate or in more thickly populated countries.[39]

Indigenous apathy and indolence became a theme in most assessments of the islands' economic potentials outside of Mindanao. "Trickery of Native a Source of Danger," "Scarcity of Draught Animals and Indolence of Natives the Cause of Present [Rice] Shortage," blared subheadlines from Manila.[40] "The

Filipinos have to be taught to work," pleaded another article.[41] The northern Filipinos' seeming indifference to wealth, industry, and labor baffled many colonialists. The "inducement" of financial rewards seemed to have no appeal at all, which cast serious doubts on their abilities to compete in a modern industrial world. Officials in Mindanao, conversely, not only felt that they had inherited a more promising colonial subject in the Moro but that the efficient and purpose-directed military administration allowed them to create a coherent atmosphere of colonial development without the irritating and inhibiting interruptions of civil government. "Down there [in Mindanao] everybody seems to be filled with the spirit of thrift, the ambition to do things; to get results; to drive out poverty and usher in plenty," wrote one American, comparing the various parts of the colony:

> One hears from that quarter no lamentations and not much noise of any kind. A sort of a hum of industry is about the only impression one gets by examining the dispatches and letters from the Moro Province. . . . [W]hile the greater part of the intelligence of the other sections of the country continue to chase rainbows and tilt with windmills, the Moro Province is disposed to get down to work and look after the material foundations.[42]

This attitude and approach, argued many Americans in Mindanao, was the key to colonial success throughout the islands and should be adopted by all governmental sectors. "The example set by [the leadership in] Zamboanga is one that other sections of these islands might well follow," admonished a writer for *The Mindanao Herald*. "There is a cheerfulness about Moroland that indicates a brand of prosperity in the atmosphere and we only hope it will become contagious and infect Luzon."[43] The military regime's efforts to create an authentic colonial experience in Mindanao promised genuine and dramatic results. Colonial officials enjoyed a focused and autonomous form of colonial government and a promising indigenous population; all that was yet required was to implement correct intuitions, opportunities, systems, and atmosphere to release and guide the Moros' natural path to modernity.

Market Systems and Moro Exchanges

American officials in Mindanao and Sulu were quick to nurture the Moros' predisposition for capitalism through a variety of means. Filipino Muslims'

natural inclination and preexistent understanding of market systems made the promotion of domestic commerce a natural policy choice. Early in 1901 colonial officials found that the only means to improve relations with resistant Moros in the Lanao region of Mindanao was to offer trade. "Glad to report all Moro tribes in Jolo and Mindanao sincerely friendly to Americans except Moros of Lake Lanao whose relations with Americans are improving with establishment of weekly markets for them on North and South coasts," reported William Taft in a cablegram to Secretary of War Elihu Root.[44] The Moros' interest in trade suggested a basic congruity with mankind's natural yearnings for material wealth. It confirmed the universality of the Americans' imperial narrative of social evolution and Muslim potential. "The market place is a time-honored institution the world over," reported *The Mindanao Herald* enthusiastically, "and in no people does it appeal more strongly than to the Moro. It is to him the ancient forum where commercial and social interests mingle."[45] By appealing to an "ancient" predisposition to engage in commerce, military officials felt they had accessed an essential alternative to raw colonial coercion, one that allowed a more natural or indigenously dictated path to Moro development. By allowing Moros to do what came "naturally," American imperialists could facilitate rapid social evolution without the coincident confusion and struggle entailed in forced submission to foreign governmental institutions. It was the panacea for inhibited social progress.

Responding to the supposed "natural" Moro inclinations toward trade and commerce, on 3 September 1904 the military regime opened the first "Moro Exchange" in Zamboanga. Its festive inauguration was accompanied by the "presence of the gaily-clad Moros in their different tribal costumes," "long haired Yacans" with their "superior physique and . . . peculiar bright red" ethnic clothing, and numerous speeches of praise and optimism by colonial officials. It was perhaps fitting that tribal "Spear Dances" commemorated the Exchange's opening ceremonies, with "every Moro present being anxious to display his proficiency with the weapon as well as his grace and agility." Like these productions of domesticated violence, the market system was further evidence of the Moros' raw, visceral, and unlimited potentials and the military regime's adept abilities to guide and domesticate them in the ways of advancement.[46]

Originally the brainchild of John Finley, a district governor in Moro Province, the Moro Exchanges consisted of several primary structures specifically designed for commerce, as well as a number of other buildings intended for lodging travelers and storing various commodities. These markets were designed to engender feelings of safety, fairness, entrepreneurial opportunity,

and accommodation for Filipino Muslims and various hill tribes that wished to trade.[47] Anxious to provide a welcoming atmosphere to Moros in particular, colonial administrators made every effort to "give due consideration to the Moslem faith of the Moros" and to "exhibit a fair measure of respect for their religion and their customs" by maintaining "sanitary" facilities and even access to halal foods for devout Muslims.[48] In terms of colonial policy, however, the Moro Exchanges had two overarching purposes. First, they were intended to purge indigenous populations of archaic and inhibitive practices through economic incentive. And second, they were meant to serve as a "great educator" of economic modernity, thus giving life to all subsequent aspects of civilized society.[49]

Finley and other colonial officials felt that the specters of class oppression, chronic debt, and slavery were the primary causes of the Moros' archaic and debilitative society. Fortunately, however, all of these ills were essentially economic in nature and could be quickly remedied by instituting fair, well-regulated markets throughout the province. By providing a level playing field and impartial means of exchange, colonial authorities proposed to break cycles of class tyranny and eliminate the causes of debt and slavery. "The market had been built for the use of the non-Christian people of the District of Zamboanga," reported *The Mindanao Herald* on opening day, "to sell their products at fair prices, which they would be permitted to enjoy themselves, and 'no Sultan, nor datto, nor panglima, nor person of any sort, will be permitted to interfere with . . . the enjoyment of . . . legitimate rights.'"[50] The noncompetitive, forced extraction of wealth from Moros by those in authority represented a severe corruption of the free market. Forced by artificially inflated prices and manipulated supplies to succumb to predatory lending, many Moros found themselves in perpetual debt to headmen and capricious foreign merchants. "Heretofore the inhabitants of the interior of the island have been at the mercy of the Chinese trader for a market for their goods and these, when sold, were seldom paid for except in merchandise at many times its real value," concluded one article. "The result of this system was to keep the native continually in debt to the trader for advances made, which, strange to relate, did not stimulate him to great industrial activity."[51] As a remedy, one of the Moro Exchange's primary functions was to establish a daily "average market price" for traded commodities and ensure the equality of exchange.[52]

Establishing a truly free market system also required colonial officials to convert Moros away from their traditional bartering practices into a fluid cash economy. "It is hoped," wrote one American, "that the Moro will become

accustomed to coming here and to give up bartering which is the cause of constant trouble and also causes the existence of slavery."[53] "As matters are now," added another, "commerce among these people consists of bartering one article for another. . . . This method keeps the people poor, as the merchants charge very high prices for their goods and the Moros have no one else to purchase from."[54] Paying for "their goods in coin" offered a measure of consistency to Mindanao's economy and standardized the means and accounting of exchange.[55] It also introduced concepts of investment and finance capital on a small scale, allowing Moros to diversify their ventures and create wealth through a variety of means. Most fundamentally, however, a standardized cash-based economy began the process of critical economic integration. Like the universal ideals that guided their abstract colonial historicism, American imperialists viewed capital and market participation as the monetary universals of the material world. Commerce served as modernity's universal language, and capital was its grammar. No one could fully expect to be "modern" unless they were able to participate in the global financial discourse. By giving Filipino Muslims the tools and systems to create capital and wealth, colonial officials believed they had equipped Moros with the essential building blocks of modernity. The Moros were, in essence, entering the universal narrative of progress from which they had been excluded for thousands of years.

Aside from correcting indigenous social ills, the Moro Exchanges also served as "a great educator" in the ways of civic and economic modernity.[56] Though the markets were officially projects of the colonial regime, "the government itself would not interfere with the people, save to correct abuses," promised American authorities.[57] Like Vicente Rafael's study of the collaborative census project in the early colonial period, in which "collaboration was seen as an index of the success of [colonial] tutelage" and the proposed "culmination of colonial rule, self-government" was "achieved only when the subject ha[d] learned to colonize itself." American officials in Mindanao regarded the Moro Exchanges as a critical lesson in self-government.[58] "The place will have Moro police and Moros to clean the market," reported an article six months prior to the exchange's initial opening. In addition, "The buildings are to be put up by subscriptions from the Moros."[59] By adopting a policy of distant oversight and noninterference, colonial officials acknowledged both the universal processes of laissez-faire capitalism and the Moros' natural evolutionary tendencies to choose wealth and modernity over barbarity and subsistence. "In opening the market the government had in view the advancement of the material welfare of the non-Christians of the district," announced *The Mindanao Herald* on the

market's inauguration. "It would demonstrate to them that their best interest lay in helping to build up their country by putting their hands to the plow and engaging in honest toil, rather than by trying to tear it down by constantly fighting among themselves. They had now an incentive to work and it remained with them whether the market would be a success or not."[60] The colonial regime's decision to allow Moros a tremendous degree of provisional authority over the exchanges, and their professed willingness to see the project fail if Muslims proved inadequate to the task demonstrated remarkable faith in the compelling and transformative powers of capitalism. Highly regarded economic phenomena such as investment and profit return in both labor and capital served as a guarantor of the projects' viability.

For nearly a year leading up to the exchange's inaugural opening in Zamboanga, colonial officials solicited "subscriptions" to fund the project. "It is better that the Moro should subscribe to it than for the government to put up that amount," explained one American, "as when the Moro sees that by his own efforts and money that he is making money it will teach him to be industrious and thrifty."[61] Demonstrating remarkable shrewdness in their colonial tutelage, military officials were not about to exchange socioeconomic cycles of dependence on local strongmen for similar dependence on mechanisms of the colonial state. Therefore, the military regime's aims were perhaps less Machiavellian than in Rafael's description of census takers in the north, which desired the "Filipinos[']' recognition of their subordination to and desire for white authority" through collaboration. The Moro Exchanges in the Philippines' Muslim South were meant to provide enabling circumstances for natural evolutionary development. Military authorities felt that micromanagement and coerced conformity to colonial objectives bred only resistance and would ultimately stunt development. If given the appropriate conditions to develop "naturally," Moros would eventually conform to the standards of modernity rather than strictly to the standards of colonial rule—which was of course the ultimate goal.

Much to the delight of colonial officials, Moro Exchanges received broadly enthusiastic support from Filipino Muslims. Nearly six months before establishing the first Exchange at Zamboanga, military authorities had already received 600 pesos in voluntary support from anxious Moros and anticipated another 1,000 pesos before its official opening.[62] After cheering "lustily" at its inauguration, Moro visitors to the Zamboanga Exchange quickly crafted urgent petitions for Exchanges in their own districts.[63] Reporting on five distinguished headmen from the Lanao District, *The Mindanao Herald* stated, "The

Moro Exchange seems to have claimed their attention to the exclusion of all else, and they have petitioned the government to establish one at Marahui [*sic*]."[64] Similarly fervent requests occurred shortly thereafter in the Illana Bay region and Basilan. Datus in Illana Bay wanted Moro Exchanges so badly they were willing to "subscribe the necessary funds if the Government would grant their request."[65] In Basilan, after hearing "of the benefits to be derived from such a market place," Moro headmen "took readily to the idea and promised to build the exchange." "They seem to have gone to work at once," reported the *Herald*, "for a few days ago a messenger reported to the Governor that the building was finished and ready for business. It is a large building constructed of hardwood and with a cogon roof."[66] By 1908 there were 25 Moro Exchanges[67] scattered throughout Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago.[68] "Probably no governmental policy since the American occupation of the islands has produced such prompt and beneficial results to the native people as the Moro Exchange system," praised *The Mindanao Herald* in 1906 while contemplating the great social and economic changes occurring among the Moros.[69]

Very soon after establishing the Moro Exchanges colonial officials began to note significant economic growth and increasingly peaceful relations throughout Moro Province. In the 1905–1906 fiscal year the Moro Exchanges reported 289,481 pesos in sales, a tremendous amount by any standard.[70] The Exchange in Zamboanga was so successful in its first year that the market's superintendent received an immediate 50 percent raise in salary.[71] Established markets in perennially disruptive areas such as Jolo, for example, reported an outpouring of participation and support for the colonial program. "The Sulu Moros are pleased with the Exchange," acknowledged one American colonialist. "They know that they can come to the Exchange and sell their products for what they are worth." On the Jolo Exchange's first anniversary, officials cited total business at 362,892 pesos, with transactions in July 1906 alone amounting to 34,507 pesos.[72]

Designed to instill "industry among the Moro" and "inculcate habits of thrift and economy," the allure of lucrative commerce at the Exchanges quickly "stimulated the supply" of various commodities throughout the province.[73] The Zamboanga fishing industry, for example, went from "nothing" in 1904 to more than 100,000 pesos annually in 1910.[74] In 1906 Moro Province exported over 200,000 pounds of coffee, as well as significant amounts of hemp and jungle products, including lumber, cultivated by Moros.[75] With such dramatic increases in supply, independent intra-district and even international trade began to burgeon forth from networks established at the various Moro

Exchanges. "A very valuable trade has sprung up between Zamboanga and Jolo through the agency of the Moro market in this city," reported an American from Jolo, and "excellent prices [are] being paid the Joloanos who come laden to our shores with fruits, pearl shells, and other articles too numerous to mention, carrying back to their homes in lieu thereof good coin of the realm."[76] Colonial officials were quick to seize on the climate of economic momentum and established international trade routes with British Malaya, Hong Kong, Australia, and other entrepots throughout the region.[77] In an effort to integrate various Muslim groups fully into the nascent regional commerce, Moro Province administrators purchased a steam vessel (the *Borneo*) and leased two smaller launches to facilitate broader trading routes. They also subsidized multiple shipping lines and solicited patronage from trading powers such as the British and the Chinese.[78] By 1911 exports from Moro Province reached an unprecedented 5,816,778 pesos annually, with this figure reaching nearly 6.5 million pesos by the end of politico-military rule in 1913.[79] Filipino Muslims had quickly proved their natural aptitude for modern commerce and surpassed most American expectations in only a few years. Indigenous plantations and fisheries were turning out unprecedented amounts of product, and new commodities such as timber, pearls, hemp, and palm oil were fast becoming industrial mainstays of the southern economy.[80] Brass manufacturers in the Lanao and Cotabato regions, for example, enjoyed tremendous growth, selling 20,000 pesos' worth of brassware at the Zamboanga Fair in 1911 alone. These financial successes in turn led to formal credit markets and institutional lending systems. In 1906 Zamboanga "secured a branch of the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China," considered "one of the strongest [lending institutions] in the world."[81] Similarly, in 1913 General Pershing responded to Moro cries for financial institutions by allowing The Bank of the Philippines to open a branch in Jolo. During its first month in operation the institution took in over 60,000 pesos in deposits from anxious Moros.[82]

Aside from increased wealth, however, the Moro Exchanges and nascent market systems in Moro Province created an atmosphere of cooperation and peace that portended great possibilities for rapid civic and social development. As early as 1905, military colonial officials extolled the seemingly magical effects of market systems on the Moros. "The natives are becoming more amenable to the laws," wrote one official, "and seem to appreciate more than ever before the rights of other people, [and] the great advantages of peace, good habits, and industry." He also happily reported, "the stealing of carabaos [water buffaloes] and slaveholding have decreased" since the Moros

have been able "to engage in agricultural pursuits and to gather produce from the seas and to bring the results of their labor into town."[83] In a "Decennium" edition of *The Mindanao Herald* celebrating ten years of "successful" military rule in Mindanao and Sulu, the paper extolled the ripple effects of economic growth throughout all facets of colonial society:

> It has been found that these [Moro] people are open to the creation of a wide range of necessities: children who worked in the field take kindly to school; the necessity for better food inculcates a spirit of good house-keeping; the benefits of good government demand a monetary return from the individual citizen, and thus there is given a powerful incentive to work for the means to support this new order of affairs.[84]

By 1910 General Pershing even "noted an improvement in the houses and in the manner of dress of the Moros," attributing these advancements to "the increasing prosperity of the people."[85] Americans were not the only ones to notice such changes. Many Moro leaders similarly began to internalize the connection between a capitalist work ethic and modern societal reformation. In a letter to Major Hugh Scott the noted Tausug dato Muhammad Salip Sakib declared to his followers that it is good "to endeavor to farm, to plant because such activities are good work. Do not engage in gambling or telling lies, much more so, stealing."[86] Thus, material wealth was not an end unto itself but, rather, a critical evolutionary key that promised to open doors, focus minds, and implement a variety of otherwise intangible qualities that defined stable modernity.

Additionally, the bitter antipathies that formerly characterized Moro relationships with other indigenous groups and with each other now rapidly declined. With an opportunity to achieve real wealth, the islands, "which were formerly inhabited by lawless people who were practically pirates[,] are now the scenes of peaceful activity on the part of Moro fishermen," reported the Philippine Commission in 1906.[87] Even the Subanos and other hill tribes felt secure enough to engage fully in the new market system.[88] "People are coming in to trade who never before saw men meet without fighting and who never saw the seacoast," observed *The Mindanao Herald*.[89] Recalcitrant Moros willingly turned in firearms and abandoned their cottas. "[F]rom all appearances an era of peace and prosperity . . . has begun," announced one American triumphantly.[90] While some of these reports were somewhat overstated, the financial records cited above and judiciary accounts do indicate tremendous

gains in interregional trade, economic advancement, and civil peace. In the Lanao District, for example, only 294 cases were submitted to the tribal ward courts in the 1906–1907 fiscal year, with only six involving homicide, 14 dealing with assault, six for robbery, and a paltry seven cases regarding hostility to the colonial regime.[91] John Finley's original vision of market remedies and economic social engineering seemed to have found fruition in the Moro Exchanges. Yet, despite capitalism's proficient "invisible hand," colonial officials still found many opportunities to tutor Moros in the ways, attitudes, and styles of economic modernity.

Expositions and Fairs

In addition to the abstract forces of capitalism and institutionalized market systems, economic modernity also required a certain mind-set: a particular approach to innovation, technology, and especially competition. According to the Americans' worldview, the modern global system functioned in consonance with multiple dialectical processes that exposed victors and vanquished in accordance with their relative abilities to master innovation and control capital. It is worth recalling the sweeping statements cited in the opening pages of this chapter, which lent rationale and perspective to the colonial project. "The strife of the great nations the world over is now for trade," argued an article in Manila's *Daily Bulletin*. "In this strife we must either take part or content ourselves with isolation that means destruction."[92] Despite their notions of transcendent progress and contemporary ahistoricity, American imperialists fully realized that the functional aspects of modernity were not static but required constant vigilance to maintain effective control of peoples and societies in a state of temporal lag. These functional aspects often included conventional conflict but were increasingly subsumed within the parameters of economic power. "The modern world is a vast and varied workshop," declared an article in *The Mindanao Herald,* "where all the nations of the earth strive together for the mastery of industry. Victories are won and conquests are made, not by soldiers and warships, but by the immeasurably more powerful armies of industry and fleets of commerce."[93] Hence, Moros had to be educated in a variety of intangible mind and skill sets preparatory for full participation in the modern economic world. A fundamental understanding of appropriate and contextual competition and rivalry, labor-saving innovation and modern technology, as well as a deep realization

of their own potential and the ultimate wisdom of the colonial regime in capitalist development, all promised to give Moros the qualities required not only to participate in capitalist market systems but to control the circumstances of history that dictated their emergent world.

Consequently, military authorities supplemented Moro Exchanges and other market development projects with more structured educational programs. In addition to smaller measures such as general stores, trading posts, and standardized currency, the colonial regime pursued broader policies designed to cultivate indigenous economic modernity. Following the success of Zamboanga's Moro Exchange in 1904, military colonial officials established a "commercial museum" for "the instruction and guidance of natives . . . and opening the way for progressive development in various branches of industrial economy."[94] By witnessing a codified scientific taxonomy of their own environment, Moros were encouraged to "discover" Mindanao in the way Americans purported to "discover" it through colonial exploration. Instruction on soil types and mineral content added tangible value to the earth and provided a utilitarian basis for the Moros' connection to modern property. Similarly, the introduction of species, genus, and phylum for a variety of plants and animals created a vast corpus of knowledge meant to guide Filipino Muslims in subjugating their environment. Power in the modern world required functional scientific knowledge that allowed one to command conformity from the earth's various elements, including those composing humankind. By providing these forms of knowledge in a specialized, objective scientific atmosphere, colonial officials hoped to tutor Moros in a fusion of universal principles without resorting to basely coercive imperial policies. Regarding the more abstract, intangible skills, however, military authorities found that old-fashioned American-styled "county fair[s]" and expos were their greatest tools.

During 1–4 August 1906, the District of Cotabato held the First Annual Moro Agricultural Fair. "It has been the busiest, gayest, happiest, and most instructive four-days-period in [the district's] experience," reported *The Mindanao Herald*, "and marks the complete restoration of peace, industry, [and] the pursuit of happiness in the great Rio Grande Valley." Punctuated by vast participation and many impressive displays, the event "looked like a typical, up-to-date country fair back in God's country," recounted one enthusiastic American.[95] Repeatedly heralded as "a great success," Agricultural Fairs were quickly organized in other places throughout the province. In October 1906, for example, Jolo held a "very successful District Fair," resulting in "peace and

increased prosperity" throughout the district.[96] While Jolo and other cities received high praise for their events, military officials in Zamboanga determined to set the standard for tutelary, participatory exhibitions. "[The] Agricultural Fair and Industrial Exposition at Zamboanga will be the most successful event held in these parts since the coming of the Americans," boasted the Zamboanga-based *Mindanao Herald* in October 1906.[97] Designed "to promote a wholesome and progressive industrial spirit among the natives," the Zamboanga Fair provided "a bewildering maze of exhibits, each seemingly more interesting than the first," as Moros from across the Province poured into the capital city to participate in and observe the spectacle.[98] "[C]rowds . . . thronged the building during every moment of the three days of the fair," reported the *Herald*, "the Moro market . . . being crowded to suffocation. . . . Soldiers, sailors, Moros, pagans, sultans, princes, dattos and other chieftains were present in great numbers and the latter apparently greatly enjoyed the attention they were attracting to themselves." In all, the spectacle offered "five of the most strenuous and exciting days within the memory of the oldest inhabitant[s]" of the capital city.[99] "The Fair was the largest in every way ever held in the Islands," wrote Pershing to the editor of a travel magazine. "The exhibits were most wonderful in their attractiveness. . . . The spacious grounds were packed with people both day and night. The electric lights proved a great source of wonder and the Moros considered 'turning of night into day,' as they called it, the most startling thing they saw."[100]

By gathering disparate groups of Moros under the banner of progress, industry, and wealth and then subjecting them to the possibilities of modernity, colonial officials hoped to create a set of circumstances that would open the Moros' minds to peace and enlightenment. "Such gatherings throughout this Province are the means of bringing Moro chieftains together who never in their lives met except on the field of battle," wrote an American observer at the Jolo Fair. "In getting together on friendly ground they have discovered, much to their surprise, that the other fellow doesn't grow horns. The result is peace and increased prosperity."[101] The Philippine Commission Report of 1906 similarly observed, "Nothing but good can result from the freest intercourse among these people [at the Fairs]; it will tend to break through the feeling of prejudice, bigotry, and hostility, which is due to their isolation."[102] In Cotabato, Moros "numbering over two thousand [came] together in friendship and good fellowship, to become better acquainted and unite under the guidance of the District Governor, into a movement looking to the prosperity of the country."[103]

For Americans, "looking to the prosperity of the country" was the critical key. The prospects of wealth and industry were thought naturally to open the native mind to rational calculation and higher cognitive reasoning. The incentives of wealth and modernity presented a clear choice to Moros and opened their consciousness to rational decision making. Surrounded by the material possibilities of the modern world, colonial officials found that Moros at the Agricultural and Industrial Fairs could "be talked to and reasoned with while they are in an attitude of mind open to reason."[104] Prompted by the precision of modern innovation and its attendant opportunities, Moros were thought to access a natural inclination in their evolutionary selves that led to a higher form of modern consciousness. Colonial officials hoped they would become omnivorous calculators, assessing social, political, religious, and all other aspects of their lives against the foundational prospects of profit and loss. Such was the modern man. Moros only needed to be shown the intimate details of such incentives along with their own potentials and means to obtain them. Consider Tasker Bliss's opening remarks at Zamboanga's Agricultural Fair and Industrial Expo in 1907:

> Your opportunities [speaking to the Moros in attendance] lie before your very eyes in the form of unlimited natural wealth which requires only the labor of your hands and the intelligence of your brains to convert into a treasure beyond the dreams of avarice . . . with the labor of an intelligent people to dig out the untold wealth from the mines, carve it from the products of the forests, and rap it from the plantations so that the roads that we build may be thronged with an industrious population bringing this wealth to the market, and your harbors may be crowded with ships to carry it abroad and to bring in return an equal wealth from foreign shores. . . . God has done for you all that is in the power of omnipotence to do in the way of favorable climate, fertile soil, and valuable products. The rest is in [your] own hands.

In accordance with the pervasive historicism informing the Americans' capitalist logic of development, Bliss effectively linked labor, intelligence, industry, trade, and the divine will of an omnipotent creator as the ideal nexus of emergent modernity. Moros simply had to gain a fundamental understanding of the potentials previously unknown to their primitive selves, and act on them in an intricate combination of calculated investments. All of this, however, was certain to remain ineffectual without another omniscient force—the transcendent perspective of the colonial state. In his "Oration" Bliss was

sure to include this critical link in no uncertain terms: "In order that we may accomplish all this, let me earnestly advise you to cheerfully, and without reservation, accept the government under which you are living, and under which you continue to live. You must bury all petty social and religious prejudices and meet together with the government on common ground to work for the welfare and development of the Moro Province."[105] In other words, colonialism provided the catalyst for accelerated development. What took centuries for Western populations to discover and perfect could now be disseminated quickly and effectively if only indigenous populations were willing to submit. Agricultural Fairs and Industrial Expositions served as the mechanisms of that dissemination.

While Zamboanga's event was the most grandiose, all of the fairs contained two fundamental elements meant to engender a certain modern economic consciousness among Moros. First, at their foundation, all of the fairs were essentially competitions. Moros presented themselves and their products for scrutiny not only by colonial officials but also by fellow Muslims and other indigenous peoples as well. Evaluation, judgment, and ranking served to create a broad set of standards and expectations for industrial development and to engender a sense of relative value in Filipino Muslims. "The object of the Government is to stimulate the native peoples to adopt more modern agricultural methods by the offering of prizes for the best exhibits of native produce," explained *The Mindanao Herald*.[106] At the inaugural fair in Cotabato "over one hundred datus . . . brought something to exhibit, products of the soil, the forest, the loom and the forge."[107] In addition to inspection by colonial authorities, each of these displays was "eagerly examined by the many thousand Moros who assembled at Cotabato."[108] This meant that not all determinations of quality and rank were solely the domain of colonial officials. Headmen were forced to subject their products to the collective estimation of all potential market participants, including social underlings and rivals. And though patron-client relationships may have solicited particular indigenous praise for certain displays, official American judges and awards determined the ultimate objective value of all exhibits, thus negating any archaic social corruptions to the impartial free market system. Monetary compensation drove this point home as the final arbiter of value. At the Zamboanga Fair exhibits were given awards according to "the best possible development in manufacture and cultivation, and in the preparation of the raw products for market." These "exhibits may [then] be sold at the discretion of the owner," announced *The Mindanao Herald*, "after being passed upon, numbered and

tagged by the Judges."[109] In this way American officials were able to establish standards and values of various commodities and then allow natural market forces to affirm their valuations. The actual prices paid for various products according to rank are unavailable; however, judging by the level of participation, the monetary incentives must have been at least adequate. In any case, American observers were pleased to report that "there was more or less disappointment among those who received no prizes, yet in general the decisions of the committee were received in a sportsmanlike manner."[110] In other words, though the Moros felt passionate about competing for awards and monetary gain and were disappointed by inadequacy, they also demonstrated a "sportsmanlike" respect for the supposedly disinterested market forces and representatives that ranked their entries.

In addition to its market context, competition also permeated other aspects of the Agricultural Fairs, especially entertainment. Native groups were often pitted against each another in athletic contests and feats of skill that many colonial subjects "had never before witnessed." Nevertheless, in Cotabato "Manobo and Tiruray, Bilan and Moro vied with one another in excelling at jumping, running, climbing the greased pole, and other plays that have always seemed to be the exclusive enjoyments of children of civilization."[111] Likewise, at the Zamboanga Fair, Moros participated in "sports, races, throwing and tying . . . [and] tree-climbing contests."[112] While these events held special significance at the colonial fairs, athletic competition was ubiquitous throughout the military regime's tenure in Mindanao and Sulu. Most important events were preceded and followed with races, contests, and various sports demonstrating the Moros' physical prowess and aptitude for competition. Baseball in particular caught the Moros' collective imagination, which thrilled colonial officials. After witnessing "a game of baseball between the Filipino and Moro boys of the Zamboanga Public Schools" in 1905 (which the Moros won 10–9), Rajah Muda Mandi was "so well pleased with the result that he created Mr. James Gallagher, teacher of the Moro Boys' School and manager of the ball team, a datto, and conferred upon him the Order of the Dried Fish."[113] Later that year *The Mindanao Herald* reported that, "Zamboanga has entirely succumbed to the base ball craze. . . . Even the Moros have caught the craze, and yell as loud as more civilized fellow-enthusiasts."[114] As "the exclusive enjoyments of children of civilization," athletic contests, and especially the competitive complexities of America's pastime, embodied the aggressive mind-set lauded by American imperialists. To be modern was to be competitive, but appropriately so. Appropriate competition entailed strict

adherence to rules and governing institutions. Raw aggression was seldom productive; however, aggressive competition within a guiding system was the fundamental basis of upward mobility in the modern world.

Second, Agricultural Fairs provided a stark contrast between the modern and the archaic. Regarding Moros as rational creatures with a "mind open to reason" amid expositions of modern innovation, colonial officials believed that "bringing together types of savagery and civilization" would provide an obvious choice for even the most nascent forms of modern consciousness.[115] By exhibiting the Moros' "antiquated methods" and products alongside the latest "modern agricultural implements" from the United States, colonial authorities attempted to illustrate the apparent gapping divide between what is and what could be. As one of the primary measures of civilization spanning the colonial phenomenon, technology represented an essential key to expedited historical evolution.[116] If Moros could adopt and understand the mechanized instruments of Western modernity then they could own the means to coerce obedience from the world and its archaic remnants, which was essentially to become modern. It was not enough simply to expose Filipino Muslims to more advanced technology, however. The Moros' "antiquated methods" and products had to be revealed in contrast. That is, they needed to be discredited by comparison. To escape the debilitating strangle of their supposedly archaic lives Moros had to come to know conclusively of their own inadequacies and choose to adopt modernity while understanding the logic of their choice. Hence, military officials were thrilled when a "dealer in [modern] farm implements . . . sent over a considerable number of implements as samples" to the Cotabato Fair, and after the demonstration all were "sold immediately" to anxious Moros.[117] Modern agricultural machinery continued to proliferate beyond the fairs as Filipino Muslims flooded to Moro Exchanges in search of "agricultural implements" and "improved methods of tilling the soil."[118] Demonstrating again their natural inclination for economic modernity, Filipino Muslims readily assumed the fundamental means of modern production and bolstered American hopes for genuine sociohistorical contraction.

Given the colonial regime's objectives of stimulating Moros to innovation and production, reconciling them with former rivals, educating them in the ways of modern competition, and convincing them of their own burgeoning potentials, military authorities considered the Agricultural Fairs and Industrial Expos as "an unqualified success."[119] Rather than appealing to abstract notions of civic modernity and proto-democratic colonial intuitions often

attempted in the north, military officials in Mindanao preferred instead to focus on what they believed to be the natural democratic tendencies and institutional building blocks of modern capitalist market systems. Fairs and Expos served as a critical schoolmaster.

Modern Spaces

As Moros became increasingly amenable to the notions and practices of economic modernity, colonial officials attempted to instill in them a sense of modern bourgeois identity, complete with notions of public and private space and delineated possession. The essential relationship of individuality, private property, and freedom was an indispensable developmental objective for American imperialists in their historicist approach to civilization. Conceptions of delineated public and private spaces created the essential mind-sets of both civic and social modernity. "The modern public/private split fundamentally relates to the positioning of the individual with regard to the (modern) state, that is, the casting of the individual into the role of the citizen," writes Dipesh Chakrabarty.[120] In the case of Moro Province, colonial citizenship became increasingly connected with market participation and individual property rather than with institutionalized civic mechanisms of state, the former serving as a fundamental segue to the latter. In terms of a developing social modernity, Chakrabarty similarly notes, "The modern individual . . . whose political/public life is lived in citizenship, is also supposed to have an interiorized 'private' self. . . . The bourgeois individual is not born until one discovers the pleasures of privacy."[121] The "pleasures of privacy" include individual holdings, delineated property, and personal financial ambitions but also the various bounded categories and social arrangements of modern society. Patri-focal nuclear families provide perhaps the most identifiable industrial social development.[122] Colonial officials believed that if, through economic modernization, they could get Moros to conceive of and understand the abstract spatial dimensions of modernity, then the subsequent aspects of modern bourgeois citizenship would follow.

Introducing the advantages of a sedentary lifestyle was foremost among the colonial regime's initial objectives. American officials often cringed at the Moros' "old wandering, irresponsible life," which was starkly at odds with the perceived "Anglo-Saxon instinct for a freehold."[123] Though Filipino Muslims frequently resided on ancestral lands in organized communities, the

impermanence of their structures and inconsistency of their production on non-delineated and unowned land suggested a certain chaos unconducive to modern society. Hence, military authorities exercised "every effort to assist and encourage settlement" of wandering populations "where their work [could] be supervised and instruction in modern agricultural methods given." If "properly treated" (meaning educated in the value and spatial relevance of landholdings), Moros could "be weaned from the habits of their ancestors and become attached to their land."[124] By surveying both the land, in all its critical scientific taxonomies, and the labor performed on it, in all its critical socioeconomic aspects, colonial officials felt they could meld the Moros' modern spatial consciousness to notions of private property and labor-based ownership. "The Moros have, as I have seen, the habit of changing from one place to another—one year they are here, and another year there," observed General Pershing at a meeting of leading Moros in the Lake Lanao region. "I desire that the Moros occupy all the land in the Lake region," he instructed.

> They should settle on tracks of land and prepare to live there permanently. . . . Each Moro should begin now to look for a piece of land upon which to settle, and should start to cultivating it, in order to demonstrate that he lives there and has a right to claim it. And later it will be given him. The Moro will be given a deed to the land, after which nobody in the world can take the land away from him. . . . When the Moros occupy the land permanently, they will have the opportunity and the time, and also the money to construct better and larger houses. If they keep changing about as they do now, then they do not need good houses.[125]

Pershing's instructions aptly illustrate the Americans' conceptions of private property rights and the abstract parameters and requisites of private ownership. Once Filipino Muslims applied consistent labor to a bounded plot of land they were able to "demonstrate" legitimate residence and establish a viable claim to it. Labor and production were the critical requisites. Unused land was essentially unowned land. After verifying possession through invested labor, Moros could then be given the ultimate certification of private ownership—a legal deed, "after which nobody in the world can take the land away." The colonial regime's assumed power to verify private ownership of bounded properties through a codified legal system inseparably linked Moros to the economics of citizenship in a modern bureaucratic state. By legally tying Filipino Muslims to state-certified plots of private land and the income they pro-

duced, colonial authorities created a situation of alliance, if not dependence, in which Moros were forced to support the legitimacy of the colonial regime. Private land represented nascent citizenship to a modern government.

Private holdings also created a sense of independence and individuality that Americans considered essential to modern life. Clearly delineating "mine" from "yours" with recognizable physical boundaries and legal claims established individuals as independent and viable entities. It provided a source of identity and established something of tangible value to cultivate and defend. In essence, private land created men as far as Americans were concerned. "Get him [the Moro] firmly seated in the saddle as a free holder," trumpeted *The Mindanao Herald*; "make him a man, a home owner, and he becomes a quiet, orderly citizen who produces something."[126] In terms of modernity, then, a real man was an "owner" who verified his citizenship through production. Private land, and the wealth derived from it, became the measure of one's relative degree of citizenship, in relation to the state and to the larger competitive world that judged according to one's ability to accumulate and use capital. Hence, the "district governors [in Moro Province] are making every effort to settle individual Moros upon individual holdings and to encourage them to build fences, mark off land, and establish themselves as freemen," reported the Philippine Commission in 1906.[127] In the closing years of military rule, colonial authorities engaged a massive homesteading program to settle Moros on delineated holdings. By 1913 over one thousand plots had been surveyed and settled in Cotabato, with similar projects taking root in Davao, Lanao, and Sulu.[128] Pershing explained the project's value:

> The effort to fix Moros upon their land is a very important step toward their civilization and should continue until the head of every Moro family becomes settled down on land that will pass from father to son in perpetuity. When this is accomplished, there will be reasons to hope that the common, individual Moro may eventually achieve industrial emancipation. His tendency under such conditions would certainly be in the direction of unrestricted thought and action, and even though not unfettered socially, he should at least become a free creative entity of constant material benefit to his community.[129]

The tensions among economic, sociological, and abstract individual confinement and emancipation embodied in Pershing's statement are instructive. Modern economic ownership and freedom for American imperialists had the odd paradoxical requisite of enclosing one's self within a physically and legally

demarcated sphere of material ownership. This bounded area represented the expanse of modern private spaces and the physical location of Chakrabarty's "interiorized 'private' self." Thus, while American imperial historicism was fundamentally temporal rather than spatial, the location of physical actors within the temporal narrative did have bearing on the rate and efficacy of historicist evolution. Space (that is, modern space) and time did have a critical relationship in emerging modernity.

Private spaces did not exist simply in relation to other private spaces, however. The state, as a representative institution of the collective citizenry, also commanded spaces in the name of the public. In 1911 General Pershing admonished leading headmen in the Lanao District regarding their unauthorized use of Mindanao's forests. Emphasizing the regulated nature of public lands and property, Pershing demanded that woodland trees "cannot be cut without permission" from the colonial regime. "[I]f a Moro wishes to cut any of these trees," he explained, "he must obtain permission [from] the Governor." As leading citizens in a collective polity, Moro chiefs were encouraged to look after the "preservation of the forests" as a shared public possession, rather than as the special right of social elites.[130] The Philippine Commission articulated this idea directly in 1907. "It is the right and duty of the government to regulate the working of the forest products by the native," asserted the Commission Report, "so that he shall not destroy the source of supply or, if destroyed, shall renew it. The whole civilized world has an interest in these products, and neither native nor white man should be permitted to destroy the source of supply."[131] Marine products and crop production were similarly regulated throughout the colonial period.[132] These regulations were designed to carve out governmental jurisdictions amid seemingly chaotic free-fire economic zones. Where private space denoted personal freedom and economic autonomy, public space represented the parameters of individual liberty. Regulation and oversight of public domains provided a check on reckless capitalism and monopolistic, nonmarket extractions of wealth from non-bounded lands. Forced to work particular plots through good and bad years rather than constantly moving to different sites for easier wealth extraction, Moros were required to invest heavily in their private material interests. This was calculated to instill a sense of individual stewardship, accountability, and fairness throughout the system.

Colonial taxes were likewise connected to the realm of public spaces as a shared resource for the entire community. After chastening the Lanao headmen for not facilitating and enforcing cedulas (a form of identification indi-

cating tax-paying status) in their districts, Pershing explained that, though burdensome, cedulas provided critical access and rights to shared public space. "This cedula is a piece of paper saying that one is a part of the government, and everyone who has one . . . has a voice in the government, an interest in the government, and the government is obliged to afford protection to each man who has a cedula. It is a letter of identification. When a Moro has a cedula, everybody knows that he is a good Moro." If "protection" and limited democratic participation were not sufficient, Pershing further pointed to mutual benefits derived from state-funded infrastructure projects. "We are going to construct highways here," he pointed out, "the Moros know well where the money paid for cedulas is spent. Therefore, there is no reason for their not paying their cedulas." While private property figured prominently in the Americans' colonial configuration of evolutionary society among Moros, it could not stand as a viable institution without shared and highly regulated public spaces. These communal realms could be theoretically accessed by all who entered a social contract with the government; performing the duties of citizenship, however nominal it might have been. Private holdings were upheld and structured by their relationship to these public spaces, which represented a circumscription of individual economic rights and the interdependency of the market system. Hence, as a form of economic democracy, private holdings and the regulation of public domains ensured that each producer would receive his or her due according to the level of labor and care exercised. By controlling laziness and graft through private and public spaces, colonial officials hoped to level the social playing field and allow truly industrious and gifted Moros to rise to the top.

Public spaces also further underscored the singularity of personal autonomy within the private sphere by contrasting it with a highly controlled public realm. This had the additional desired effect of teaching more abstract civic lessons regarding the metaphysical spaces inhabited by the government and the individual, especially among Muslims. The Sultan of Sulu outlined this lesson concisely when he wrote to American authorities: "As for the government, there are two: first, the government on Earth. Second, the government in Heaven. . . . Thus, whoever follows the laws of the Governor will be happy on earth and whoever follows the laws of God will be happy in Heaven."[133] The Sultan's recognition of delineated governmental space in the broadest cosmic sense indicated a significant victory for American tutelage regarding its internal and external spatialization of authority. The modern public and private individual were indeed two separate personae, embodying two distinct roles

within modernity. Hence, the bifurcation of public and private offered concentric circumscriptions of various rights and oriented Moros toward certain forms of economic and civic integration congruent with transcendent modernity.

Taken together, the colonial regime's economic policies in Moro Province came to represent an essential microcosm of capitalist synergy as envisioned by American imperialists. The economic innovations wrought throughout Mindanao and Sulu during the American military's administrative tenure both reaffirmed and legitimated their enduring faith in the transformative powers of capitalism and its necessity in the broader narrative of socio-racial development. The notion that Moros were "simply undeveloped" proto-capitalists allowed military colonial officials to circumscribe the various anomalies and disruptures inherent in the colonial project within a single causality. It also provided an avenue for imperialists to access the seemingly inscrutable and dissimilar "Oriental mind," while producing valid and quantifiable results. These results, and the transformative effects of colonialism in general, however, often surprisingly caused mixed feelings among many imperialists who had come to admire the rugged primitivism and rustic existence of Filipino Muslims. This particular tension was perhaps one of the most interesting incongruities of the colonial project and reveals an especially poignant view of American historicism and the inevitability of modernity.

4

Modernity, Colonial Guilt, and the Price of Transcendent Progress

One of the greatest ironies of the United States' colonial rule in the Philippines was that its humanistic, civilizing, and modernizing imperial project was in large part motivated by acute feelings of antimodernism and overcivilization. Though American imperialists openly celebrated their position at the pinnacle of history and frequently evoked a sense of historical omniscience to legitimate their colonial rule, "transcendent progress" was not without inherent difficulties. Beginning in the late nineteenth century many Americans began to experience severe psychological pains associated with total modernity. The character-shaping rigors and sense of exploration that defined their historical journey to modernity became nothing more than epistemological relics. The flattened stasis of the modern world brought with it a terrifying sense of loss of purpose and direction. With unprecedented advances in knowledge and technology, the universe and humankind's place within it became a matter of simple, mundane science. There were no more mysteries. One's social and scientific taxonomies were firmly established, and therefore so was one's relevance (or nonrelevance) in relation to similarly anonymous integers on governmental censuses or company payrolls. Individual identities became abstractions, even to a Supreme Creator who simultaneously looked upon billions of similar "humans." In such a state of crisis, even if depressed Americans wished to distinguish themselves by forging their individual identities through strenuous ordeals, such opportunities had become increasingly rare as domestic frontiers closed and the ubiquitous gaze of modern governmentality penetrated every corner. Americans were suffocating.

One of the primary remedies for this psychosocial crisis was a strong, crusading, humanistic desire for socially minded empire. Re-creating a vicarious

journey to modernity on mysterious peripheral frontiers gave purpose and relevance to many troubled Americans. Colonial administration and tutelage reinforced ideas of American exceptionalism and superiority. It forced imperialists at home and in the colony to position themselves in relation to a world they had already transcended. Colonial engineering provided a long-sought-after rationale for obtaining modernity in the first place. As with so many other abstract aspects of American imperialism, politico-military rule in Mindanao and Sulu provides the clearest case of these epistemological forces at work. As discussed throughout this work, American imperialism in Moroland offered the purest opportunity for a genuine and uncompromised colonial project. It was also carried out by men who in so many ways personified the elite bourgeois culture that became both the arbiter and the victim of America's modern consciousness. The Americans' modern psychological baggage, as demonstrated among these men, found its most effective remedy and most exquisite sense of loss in the islands' Muslim South. While Americans regarded the Moros' rugged primitiveness and rough-hewn masculinity as amenable avenues to modern citizenship, these admirable characteristics also represented a sense of lost reality—a connection to a simpler and less epistemologically heterogeneous time. Hence, American officials in Mindanao often experienced a sense of imperial schizophrenia. As they ardently pursued the systematic annihilation of archaic and "discredited" cultures and replaced these with the flattened stasis of capitalist and scientific modernity, imperialists were occasionally plagued with moments of lucidity when the realities of the colonial project revisited the passing of their own simple and cherished past in favor of a doubtful present. Intense feelings of nostalgia, longing, and regret often haunted Americans imperialists as they imposed the hollowness of modernity on colonized peoples in Mindanao and Sulu.

Drawing primarily on the seminal works of T. J. Jackson Lears and others such as Richard Hofstadter, Goran Blix, and Gail Bederman, in this chapter I examine the Americans' fundamental compulsions to empire among Filipino Muslims as it relates to what Jordan Sand has referred to as the "epistemology of loss" or Renato Rosaldo's "imperialist nostalgia," as well as the ultimately troubling consequences of imperial historicism, as Moro Province "progressed" and eventually came to an end in 1913.[1] Though these authors' works do not deal specifically with empire, their insights and conclusions provide illuminating correlations with the military's imperial actions, policies, and rationales in Muslim Mindanao. Imposing modernity and civilization on colonial peoples as a form of antimodernism due to overcivilization

among imperialists is one of the most interesting historical conjunctures in the Philippines' entire colonial history.

The Crisis of Modernity and Empire as a Way of Looking Back

Beginning in the late nineteenth century, many Americans collectively entered into a deep state of psychosocial crisis. By 1880 most urban communities in the United States had become fully integrated into modernity as a distinctly unparalleled period in world history. Science, technology, secularization, and the domestication of western frontiers established a strange sense of ubiquitous homogeneity over the geographic and social expanses of the United States, which in turn prompted debilitating feelings of depression and loss. T. J. Jackson Lears's works, *No Place of Grace: Antimodernism and the Transformation of American Culture, 1880–1920*, and "From Salvation to Self-Realization: Advertising and the Therapeutic Roots of the Consumer Culture, 1880–1930," in particular, skillfully capture the incidents and effects of this crisis. As it relates to this work and American imperialism in Mindanao, the periodization of Lears's examination is especially relevant. Military rule in Moroland spanned from 1898 to 1913, almost exactly the height of the modernity crisis. When overlaid with the historicizing epistemologies, policies, and aspirations of military colonial officials discussed throughout previous chapters, Lears's findings, though not demonstrably oriented toward explaining empire, illustrate a considerable connection between imperialism in Mindanao and Sulu and the acute psychosocial therapeutic needs of a nation in crisis. Colonial taxonomies, mythologies, and policies in the islands' Muslim South presented the purest expression of these therapeutic needs.

In his works Lears highlights at least two critical overarching developments in late nineteenth-century America. The first is unprecedented scientific progress and "industrial technology." The seemingly infinite world of scientific discovery and its application to the "practical concerns of making a living" unleashed a broad economic culture of mechanization and labor-saving dependence on mass-manufactured items. As "entrepreneurs, engineers, and economists hailed the whole industrial apparatus of advancing capitalism," the United States found itself carried away in a "second industrial revolution." This economic and technological upheaval "struck more rapidly than the first; its reach was broader, [and] its technology more sophisticated."[2] With "indoor plumbing, central heating . . . , canned foods," and other "pleas-

ant amenities" becoming more and more commonplace, Americans gradually lost the traditionally mundane objectives of everyday life.[3] Personal labor was no longer intimately and tangibly bound to one's dwelling, diet, or general comfort. It all became a muddled abstraction as the nature of labor and gain became fully integrated into a modern capitalist system.

The second critical development was an increased secularization of the world. This was perhaps the natural result following rapid scientific discovery; nevertheless, "the secularization of liberal Protestantism" left many Americans in search of meaning and purpose. As "God's hand" was reduced to a coherent set of natural scientific laws and the "psyche . . . displaced [the] soul," more and more Americans began to question their relative existence and the validity of their realities. "Religious beliefs have historically played a key role in defining an individual's sense of reality," explains Lears. "Without distinct frameworks of meaning, reality itself becomes problematic; the individual slides into normlessness, or anomie."[4] Without the "intense spiritual ecstasy of communion with God," and in a universe whose intriguing mysteries had become scientifically demystified, Americans experienced the crushing realization of utter insignificance in the broadest sense.[5] The secularizing truths of modern science revealed troubling contextualization as many Americans questioned their place and purpose within transcendent modernity. As Goran Blix has pointed out, the concept of "modernity" itself in the late nineteenth century was designed "to boost [Americans'] somber historical self-image." It represented a "desperate desire to mold a shapeless present into a visible historical formation."[6] In a sense, transcending "history" also meant transcending a long-accepted reality, which left many Americans lost and depressed.

Though it is not discussed specifically by Lears, historians such as Richard Hofstadter have demonstrated how the domestication and eventual close of the western frontier also contributed significantly to America's modernity crisis.[7] Ever since colonial times nascent Americans believed their unique national character was crafted and discovered on the rugged edges of the western wilderness. The critical links among America's ascendance, American exceptionalism, and the expanding continental frontier are embodied in Frederick Jackson Turner's famous "frontier thesis." Delivered at the American Historical Association meeting during the Chicago World's Fair in 1893, Turner's paper, "The Significance of the Frontier in American History," argued that the United States' uniquely advanced civilization was ultimately contingent on westward expansion.[8] Though his conclusions have been roundly critiqued by

modern historians, Turner's thesis spoke at the time to a deep sense of loss and insecurity among many Americans.[9] By 1893 much of the western frontier had been domesticated and placed firmly within the various scientific and governmental matrixes that defined modernity. National development and expansion as a character-defining process gave way to banality and stasis in a geographically bounded modernity. Without a periphery to define the cultural significance and emanations of the civilized core, the narrative of American national development ground to a halt, perhaps providing the primary impetus for historicist claims of transcendent progress. As with Francis Fukuyama's "end of history," Americans could no longer see a clearly laid out future, only the nostalgic images of a terminal past.[10]

Combined, these unprecedented historical developments "promoted a spreading sense of moral impotence and spiritual sterility—a feeling that life had become not only overcivilized but also curiously unreal."[11] Burdened with the "diffuse fatigue" of a secular, materialistic, and banal modernity, "Americans began to imagine a self that was neither simple nor genuine, but fragmented and socially constructed."[12] Identities became codified and flattened in a number of intersecting serialities,[13] without regard to individuality or autonomous selfhood. Opportunities to craft new identities also became increasingly rare and out of reach. Many Americans responded to these feelings by slipping "into immobilizing, self-punishing depressions"—the most notable and widespread of which was known as "neurasthenia" or "nervous prostration."[14] Characterized by a "paralysis of will" and an acute detachment from "real life," neurasthenia ravaged the American bourgeoisie with new modern terrors.[15] Educated, capitalist-minded professional populations in metropolitan areas of the Northeast were especially susceptible to this severe form of nervous prostration, which confirmed neurasthenia as "a product of overcivilization."[16] Gripped by the weightlessness of their modern existence, Americans desperately sought some manner of therapeutic release. These efforts eventually crystallized into a set of psychological and social endeavors Lears refers to as the "therapeutic ethos."

Though he focuses his study primarily on the development of American consumer culture and the emergence of modern advertising, Lears does outline several aspects of the therapeutic ethos that are especially pertinent to the United States' imperial tenure in Mindanao and Sulu. While suffering the crippling effects of neurasthenia and other forms of modern depression, Americans turned both inward and outward, into both the future and the past, to find therapeutic relief. Though their treatment regimen began at home in

the United States with various attempts at personal development and rediscovery of self, their efforts soon found full expression overseas in imperial settings. The initial impulse of many antimodern Americans was to return to a simpler past, or at the very least to the basic tenets of American ascendance. "[S]imple and childlike rusticity" promised to elevate Americans above the vacuous and "artificial amenities of civilization" as they sought "regeneration through preindustrial craftsmanship and a pastoral 'simple life.'"[17] The benign and uncomplicated existence "enjoyed by farmers, children, and others 'close to nature'" was thought to revitalize mental and physical health without the unpleasantness of "fundamental social change."[18] In historicist terms, however, Americans were not merely searching for temporary relief from modernity by nostalgically revisiting "simpler times" in their ascendant history. Many were ardently yearning for an actual retreat from the evolutionary culmination of modern consciousness. Overcome with the trite demythologizing tendencies of post-Enlightenment rationality, Americans sought out "a parallel recovery of the primal, irrational forces in the human psyche, forces which had been obscured by the evasive banality of modern culture."[19] The historicism of such possibilities, however, rendered them impossible from a state of transcendent modernity. Thus, elite bourgeois Americans were forced to experience these psychological liberations vicariously through active participation in evolving premodern narratives.

In the late nineteenth century these yearnings found expression in socially conscious humanitarian causes. Driven by a paternalistic desire to crusade against injustice and poverty, eager Americans attended "to the plight of slaves, prisoners, mistreated animals, and the insane."[20] Though their efforts were undoubtedly philanthropic in many respects, they were also therapeutic. By diving into the seamy underbelly of lagging premodernity, bourgeois Americans were able to experience a measure of "real life" while maintaining the comfortable historicism of social and evolutionary distance that justified their paternalistic forays. In the closing decade of the nineteenth century, for example, "legions of sheltered young people searched in the slums for the intense experience they felt they had been denied at home."[21] These endeavors were further enhanced but also complicated by the stark contrasts encountered in such premodern spaces. Bourgeois luxury and its emphasis on comfort produced an acute "sensitivity to suffering" and a consuming need to "avoid both physical and emotional discomfort."[22] Hence, though they detested the weightlessness of bourgeois material comfort and safety, affluent Americans simultaneously suffered from an extremely low tolerance for the

difficulty and pain they would inevitably encounter if they abandoned it. The therapeutic compromise of this conundrum emerged as a humanitarian mission to experience the realities of premodern life while striving to alleviate suffering among those in a state of historical or social lag. In this way the depressed American bourgeoisie was able to engage "real life," reestablish a sense of relevance, and maintain the elevating political and social credentials of bourgeois modernity that validated their paternalism.

Despite the prevalence of premodern populations within the United States, dissatisfied Americans increasingly looked to foreign frontiers and exotic cultures to cure their modern depressions. As with domestic humanitarian crusades, the increasingly global application of America's therapeutic ethos was riddled with contradictions. On the one hand, mental health professionals and others encouraged anxious Americans to "cultivate relaxation and repose" by imitating "Oriental people, the inhabitants of the tropics, and the colored peoples generally" to learn from their simpler approach to life. "Oriental religious belief[s]" were particularly popular.[23] As increased mobility and communications exposed more and more Americans to the vast varieties of society and culture across the globe, many sought out alternative interpretations to reality. The thought of places not yet codified or standardized by modernity inspired a new sense of mission and discovery among the American bourgeoisie.

By orienting themselves toward foreign frontiers, Americans also gave vent to other avenues of therapeutic release. Many of these sought out modern relevance in the form of binary distinctions with archaic foreign populations. Though antebellum, color-based racism as a social ideology was considered barbaric and unfashionable among the educated American bourgeoisie, increased global exposure and the modernity crisis gave rise to a new type of racism based on the historicism of social evolution. Ethnocentrism as a form of psychosocial therapy "met less obvious social and psychic needs" among troubled Americans. By "defining idleness, irresolution, avarice and other moral shortcomings as 'race traits' confined to inferior stock," explained Lears, "racists reaffirmed a masterful, virtuous mode of identity for those who had lost a solid sense of self."[24] Asserting sociocultural and evolutionary superiority over "backward" populations reinserted Americans into the historical narrative of progress. Paternalistic racism endowed modernity with a critical rationale. As a transcendently modern population, bourgeois Americans expanded their global orientation and consequently found themselves in the midst of archaism and barbarity. These historical anachronisms were set off

nicely in the form of racial differences. "Asian," "African," "Anglo-Saxon," and other racial groupings came to embody their own sets of homogenous cultural and evolutionary traits. These in turn bred subsets until the same socially scientific governmental grids that defined "serial" modernity also came to define racial categorization.[25] Historicist ethnocentrism gave Americans the contextualization or "sense of self" they desperately sought and justified expansion into peripheral global frontiers.

The United States' therapeutic ethos and its increasingly global orientation were enhanced further by a therapeutic return to the foundational principles of American ascendance and exceptionalism. Capitalism was particularly important. "In 1876, some Americans celebrated the centennial of *The Wealth of Nations* as enthusiastically as that of the Declaration of Independence. If one document declared political freedom, it was said, the other affirmed economic freedom; the two were intertwined."[26] For many Americans, the United States' condition of transcendent modernity was essentially a form of economic modernity, which made all the political and social aspects possible. Capitalism provided a perpetually dynamic aspect to an otherwise prosaic modernity. While luxurious decadence achieved through capitalist market systems ultimately proved weightless and banal, the eternal animating competition of free enterprise continually reinvented and validated the participants' sense of self and relevance. Capitalism ensured a constant source of upward mobility and relative, hierarchical contextualizations by elevating victors over vanquished and exposing strengths and inadequacies.

Finally, a return to martial values and the character-building crucibles of conflict represented a vital aspect of America's therapeutic retreat into foundational principles. For "those who craved authentic selfhood, the warrior's life personified wholeness of purpose and intensity of experience. War promised both social and personal regeneration." Americans historically perceived their ascendance in terms of a series of battles, both conventional and otherwise. Wars against Britain, France, Mexico, Barbary pirates, American Indians, secessionist rebels, and the elements of the western frontier all contributed to a proven "superior" American character embodied by the northeastern bourgeoisie. Finding much of the Western Hemisphere increasingly suzerain to their broad authority by the end of the nineteenth century, bourgeois Americans turned to domestic wars against poverty, ignorance, and barbarity. However, without the actual sting and finality of real conflict, these crusades retained a certain degree of weightlessness and contributed very little to America's rugged character. Waging wars against abstract socioeconomic

incongruities within the United States simply added to rather than alleviated the sense of inauthenticity produced by existing in governmentally mapped spaces. Lears explains the therapeutic need for conflict:

> As the rationalization of culture increasingly has reduced more and more existence to banal routine, life at war has sometimes seemed to promise authentic experiences no longer available in everyday life: the opportunity for moral and physical testing, the sheer excitement of life amid danger and death. Above all, war has offered men the chance to escape the demands of bourgeois domesticity and reintegrate a fragmented sense of self by embracing a satisfying social role. As heroic actors in a "theater of war" and members of a tight-knit (though manufactured) male community, men have sometimes temporarily eluded the contradictions and confusions of modern culture.[27]

For disheartened Americans, then, war promised one of the most authentic experiences one could possibly have. The severity and finality of armed conflict propelled warriors out of the safe and ordinary confines of modernity and into the unpredictable, exhilarating contingencies of battle. It is little surprise then that, in the months leading up to April 1898 and the United States' war with Spain, a cacophonous cry for war rang out from many socially minded corners of bourgeois America.[28]

Given the attitudes, aims, taxonomies, interpretations, and policies of military colonial officials in Mindanao and Sulu discussed in previous chapters, it is not difficult to see how Moroland served as a particularly apt site for America's therapeutic needs. Located on the distant unsubdued periphery of a distant colony periphery, Moro Province offered an exotic frontier filled with adventure and unknown possibilities. The land was unexplored and undiscovered. By penetrating mysterious mountains and jungles, colonial adventurers were able to replicate defining moments in the United States' westward expansion. As in Lewis and Clark's unearthing of western America, colonial explorers felt they were entering a spatial realm beyond the surveying gaze of technical modernity. For they, and those that followed their expeditions, were stepping out of the hollow existence of modern life and into a viable reality. "The first American, as the term is used today," read an article in *The Mindanao Herald*, "received his character from the American wilderness. Nature held the chisel and wielded the hammer that differentiated him from his brother. . . . Mountain and forest and stream and the wild beasts of the wilderness as they came from the hand of the Creator surrounded him."

Thus, though civilization was held as mankind's highest achievement, his (or her) potentials were not a product of it. Rather, their modern characters were derived from the realms beyond man's scrutinizing grasp "as they came from the hand of the Creator." As the accepted crucible of American exceptionalism and greatness, the frontier spoke therapeutic comfort to American imperialists who longed for a return to the rugged, character-forming life.

Moro populations similarly presented an uncanny therapeutic combination of mysterious primitiveness and martial spirit (or at least the materials to successfully construct such qualities through ethnology). Encumbered by the soft luxury of material modernity, Americans admired the Moros' primitive connection with the environment and their technology-free struggle for mastery and survival. Coercing sustenance from the land with their hands rather than labor-saving machines called forth a not-too-distant era in the United States' history when Americans were likewise forced to negotiate their survival with the harsh realities of an uncaring environment. These realities again presented themselves in Mindanao. "There is something in the far east that brings out the latent elements of character," asserted *The Mindanao Herald*.

> "At home" the deeper impulses become sluggish and the surface takes on a conventional form. The man that is seen is the make-up that fits the surroundings, but there is another man within, and over here he generally comes to the top. The dregs come with the pearls and it is a queer mixture that confronts us. Rugged courage coupled with the vices of primitive man, and executive ability together with a disregard of politeness and printable language, that would be admirable for its sheer force if it were not so unquotable.
>
> According to the law of evolution a man's circumstances call out in him those qualities that are best fitted to succeed then and there and frontier life has always been rich in picturesque characters. The Philippines are no exception to this rule.[29]

The frontier ethos of the Philippines' Muslim South echoed American bourgeois yearnings for a return to the rigors of the "strenuous life" and contact with primal man. American icons such as Theodore Roosevelt[30] and G. Stanley Hall[31] called vigorously for "racial recapitulation" and revitalizing forays into a more savage past to stave off effeminate modernity and its character-destroying tendencies.[32] Mindanao, with its virgin land and propensity for frontier violence, provided the ideal crucible for resurgent

American masculinity and character. Men could again become "men," and Americans could act like "Americans."

The Moros' intimate association with the land also revealed strange supernatural occurrences and mystical powers that filled the secular void tormenting many Americans. Contests between the unseen powers of secular modernity and indigenous animism, as demonstrated in the first chapter, opened the metaphysical doors of possibility. Though scientific modernity typically won out, the mere suggestion of competing mystical and mythological forces gave an aura of mystery, contingency, and abstraction to otherwise mundane rational discoveries. The fact that a supernatural world merely existed filled a critical therapeutic void among American imperialists hungry for something beyond themselves. Consider Major Hugh Scott's romantic aspirations for a shared afterlife with his Moro wards:

> [T]hey have all killed enough Spaniards and Christian Filipinos to entitle them to many white horses with green manes, and to high rank in Mohammed's paradise. And if, as they believe, their Allah will receive with favor their blood-stained souls in that hereafter, I know that, although I am an unbeliever of the unbelievers, a dog of a Christian, and an eater of pig, when my time comes to move toward that bourne from which no traveler returns, if I can but meet them riding on their white horses in that realm beyond the stars, I will not be allowed to trudge on alone, tired, dusty and thirsty, but the feet of their "gubnor" will be raised off the ground and I will be taken care of in the company of the faithful.[33]

Scott's sense of shared spiritual space (conceptualized within an Islamic rather than Christian framework no less!) indicates notions of a common spirituality made accessible not through the scientific probing of modern science but through the mysterious, mythical, and romantic spaces of the Philippines' Muslim South. The extension of this spiritual frontier within a continuing colonial context proves immensely therapeutic as Scott describes a circumstance of fantasy, rest, brotherhood, and even patronage in the afterlife. For him, and many other colonial officials, the Moros held the keys to a world no longer accessible to them from the pinnacle of transcendent modernity.

Filipino Muslims also offered therapeutic qualities by challenging colonial officials with an established historical colonial narrative of unpredictable violence and fanatical insurgency. Moro Province allowed military authorities to act on their own martial desires by subduing isolated insurgencies and hunting down outlaws. The unpredictability and danger of intractable Mo-

ros added a true sense of stark reality to colonial life in Mindanao. Though conventional warfare was relatively infrequent, colonialists typically felt they had to remain martially minded against the ever-present threats of fanatical killers and piratical raids.

The colonial regime's pervasive accounts of juramentados provide the best example of this type of therapeutic sensationalization. *Juramentado,* a Spanish term meaning "oath taker," was applied to Filipino Muslims who, in a fit of rage, engaged in killing sprees of infidels that usually ended in their own deaths.[34] Considered a religious rite by some Moros, "running juramentado" was part of the larger concept of jihad against those who would pollute or oppress Muslim communities. Such suicide attackers typically engaged in elaborate rituals prior to their assaults, including ritualistic cleansing, shaving, binding the body to prevent blood loss and prolong their attacks, donning symbolic clothing and magic amulets, reciting prayers, and polishing and sharpening weapons, which usually consisted of a kris and a barong. Once prepared, the juramentado found a cluster of Christians and, shouting "*La ilaha il-la'l-lahu*" (There is no God but Allah), dispatched as many of the enemy as possible before meeting his desired martyr's death.[35] Though such actions terrified most Americans, there was also a strange sense of morbid delight surrounding the spontaneity, audacity, and religious mysticism of the Moro killers that pervaded colonial and mainstream American newspapers. *The Mindanao Herald*, for example, printed sensational accounts of juramentado rituals performed in "the deserted forest, [with] the moonlight adding its rays to the weird and fantastic scene." "At nightfall in the magic splendor of the moon," reported the paper, "reverberates in the depth of the forest, warlike sounding metal like the everlasting lamenting echo of ever wandering souls, the priest congregates all the fame thirsting youths, [and] speaks of the strong ones who died a noble death in front of the enemy's steel . . . imagination crazes them; they convulsively grasp their krisses (sword) and imagine themselves feeling the cold sweat of death on their forehead. From the damp vapor of the night come voices installing valor into their hearts."[36] Thus prepared, the Moro juramentado became the embodiment of fanatical determination, pushing the human body beyond limits scarcely conceived by most colonialists. The fearlessness of the attacks and the unflinching endurance of pain inspired Americans' popular imagination and swelled a curious admiration for the dreaded killers. Virtually all news accounts of juramentados included references to their relentless attacks despite receiving multiple gunshot wounds. "The Lieutenant emptied his .38 cal army revolver[37] into

the desperado, without having the effect of stopping him," read one article.[38] Another account related the story of a juramentado who "fell with four bullets in his body" but did not die. After he was "carried to the post hospital, in a dying condition and placed upon the operating table," several "physicians were about to make an effort to save the Moro's life when the latter revived sufficiently to secure his brass betel-nut box and hurl it with great force at the head of the surgeon. . . . Having thus done his enemies all the harm he could, the Moro calmly turned his face to the wall and gave up the ghost."[39] In yet another instance a juramentado was shot, "the ball shattering the wrist of [the] Moro, who never paused, but continued in pursuit of the soldiers." It "was not until seven bullets had entered his body, that his flight was stopped."[40] The fact that searing lead did not impede juramentados but, rather, "seemed to give added impetus" to their attacks suggested and confirmed notions of superior physical abilities born out of the Moros' rugged environment and masculine culture.[41] Official reports often described these attacks as if they were perpetrated by ghosts or phantoms. The Philippine Commission Report of 1901, for example, vividly depicted the prototypically vicious Moro warrior who

> crouches, leaps up suddenly, turns, leaps from side to side, with the quickness of thought, laughing at the strokes of his opponent. It seems that he flees, when he suddenly rushes furiously upon his enemy, and hardly has he delivered his blow when he is seen ten paces away, leaping and whirling again, all of this accompanied by sharp cries and horrible grimaces, which serve . . . to confuse and alarm the adversary.[42]

Such images excited and terrified Americans who relished the reality of unexpected conflict thought to lurk around every corner despite generally good relations between the colonial regime and Moros.

American readership in the United States was likewise entertained with elaborate stories of the southern Philippines' "warlike atmosphere" where "no soldier or foreigner shall ever be without arms." "The reason for these extraordinary precautions," reported the *New York Times*, was the "juramentado, a type of religious fanatic who occasionally gets it into his crazy head to draw his barong and run amuck . . . without the slightest warning." Unlike *The Mindanao Herald*, however, which never reported more than six or seven bullets required to stop the juramentado, the *Times* rumored "that it sometimes takes a score of bullets to bring them down."[43] Compared to a "mad dog" or

"enraged tiger," juramentados presented the American public with an exotic and terrifying vicarious experience on a distant and mysterious periphery.[44] The novelty of savage violence in Mindanao and Sulu revealed an exciting parallel world to members of the American bourgeoisie much different from their own but also strangely within their grasp. It offered a therapeutic escape supposedly beyond fantastic fictions and the nostalgic lore of earlier times into an actual physical space inhabiting the same temporal world they occupied. It gave them a view into "real life" beyond their modernity.

These perceptions of prevalent violence carried a great deal of therapeutic weight and facilitated the rejuvenating thrill of the warrior life for American colonialists. In addition to numerous articles documenting the infamous deeds of juramentados, newspapers such as *The Mindanao Herald* similarly presented daily readers with gratuitously bloody tales of murder, rape, infanticide, and piracy, thus allowing a massive public readership to engage collectively in common threats and acts of terrible frontier violence. Though military authorities strove to domesticate many of these scenes of savagery through staged reproductions, the recapitulation of these acts also served as a critical therapeutic reminder of the actual possibilities of violence, thus connecting American officials to the harsh realities of conflict. Moros therefore embodied a dual therapeutic function as savage warriors. On the one hand they were considered worthy foes on the battlefield when opposing the colonial regime. On the other hand, when in alliance with colonial authorities, the Moros' martial spirit served as a historical reflection of the United States' arduous ascent into modernity and allowed dissatisfied American imperialists to relive these glorious, romanticized pasts.

Finally, colonial rule among Filipino Muslims offered a sort of social and moral redemption of capitalism as a foundational principle of American ascendency. As a product of capitalist market systems, material modernity had come to represent a hollow and disappointing fiction to Americans suffering with antimodern depressions. The secure banality of modern homes, possessions, and mundane occupations transformed capitalism from a dynamic, individualistic phenomenon into a predictable scheme producing typically modern systemic classifications and anonymities. By returning to Adam Smith's original economic principles of dynamic free market synergy, many Americans hoped to recapture the vitality of American ascendance. The military regime's economic policies in Moro Province represented renewed proof of capitalism's developmental capabilities. Emerging standards of modernity, civilization, and prosperity among Moros provided a conclusive link in the minds of colo-

nial administrators regarding transcendent capitalist progress and the keys of American superiority. Lingering doubts associated with antimodern depressions were soothed as colonial officials witnessed Filipino Muslims rise out of archaic "poverty" and into material modernity. In this way Moro Province served as a form of validation for American ideals and principles that had come under suspicion during the modernity crisis. The universals of American civilization were indeed proved to be true *universals* for imperialists as they applied them to foreign populations and cultures. Though these conclusions required a great deal of philosophical acrobatics and raw coercion at times, troubled Americans needed a sense of vindication as they struggled in their temporal transcendence. Moro Province provided that sense of vindication.

The great irony of the United States' therapeutic ethos in the Philippines, however, was that the very purpose of the colonial project was systematically to dismantle the "simpler," more "traditional," and more "natural" existence that imperialists sought out and consequently discovered in the islands with the same hollow modernity that caused their angst to begin with. Americans were not only vicariously reliving a nostalgic past in Moro Province but were also actively recapitulating its gradual extinction. The uncanny schizophrenia of this colonial approach can be understood only in light of the Americans' unwavering sense of historicism. Though Americans both embraced and rejected modernity in various ways, there was little debate regarding its ultimate inevitability. The pervasive acceptance of stagist histories and temporal progression left very little latitude for alternative theories of modernity or perpetual stasis. Though colonialists strove to preserve certain temporally specific materials and cultural aspects of indigenous societies through ethnology and museums, these efforts emerged specifically due to an implicit knowledge that such items would not survive the inevitable progression of time. Given the ultimate determination of modernity, then, American imperialists could seek out their pasts in foreign spaces only within an overarching context of terminal temporality, while justifying their endeavors by facilitating "correct development." These tensions were not unconscious, however, and caused intense episodes of remorse and longing as imperialists witnessed the Moros' transition into modernity.

Antimodernism and Colonial Guilt

Anti-imperialists and later Filipino nationalists often pointed out the stark incongruities between American imperialism and the ideals of freedom and

self-determination that defined American exceptionalism.[45] While race, culture, political structure (or lack thereof), and relative technological advancement often blurred the lines for applying these ideals to foreign populations, the inconsistencies inherent in colonial rule were frequently too apparent simply to rationalize away. One of the great paradoxes of U.S. colonialism, of course, was that its civilizing mission and the means for accomplishing that mission were often ideologically incompatible. Developing democratic institutions and peaceful civil society from authoritarian rule and military suppression created an extremely uncomfortable case of the ends justifying the means. The same was also true with social engineering and modernization projects. The purposeful disruption and annihilation of indigenous cultures and institutions in favor of something painfully foreign created a sense of tyranny among many American officials. Not only were they dismantling "exotic," "mysterious," and "simple" cultures that brought them therapeutic relief, but they were replacing these with the same tediously homogenizing modernity that destroyed their own sense of self and purpose. By postulating imperialism as a necessary evil, colonial officials called forth all of the inherently disruptive and disturbing aspects of imperial rule while simultaneously maintaining the accepted inevitability of historicist transition that legitimated colonial possession. It was here, somewhere between the "ends" and the "means," that American imperialists in Moro Province wrestled with their imperial subjects, and with themselves, over the meanings and consequences of imperial historicism.

In 1904 Leonard Wood informed the Sultan of Sulu in no uncertain terms that the United States had become the supreme authority in the islands. "I am going to be frank with you," he said. "At present your rights as a nation are nothing. . . . I believe we are here forever, unless some greater country comes and drives us away; we do not know any such country."[46] Wood's nationalistic hubris early on in his tenure as governor general of Moro Province rested on an absolute certainty of the archaic, barbaric, and inadequate nature of Moro culture and the superiority of American modernity. His sentiments were typical of those of most officials who had not yet grown to appreciate the quaint antimodern qualities Americans sought out and established among the Moros. Wood saw very little worth preserving and felt that the historical gap separating Moros from Americans in terms of culture, politics, and technology justified paternalistic authoritarian rule. By the end of his tenure, however, Wood recorded a poignantly candid assessment of American imperialism in Moro Province that was uniquely uncharacteristic of the man dubbed "The Mailed Fist."[47] In his report to the Philippine Commission in 1906, Wood offered the following observation:

> No official of the American Government of the islands can deny that he is part of a despotic machine, that he is himself in greater or lesser degree a despot, though we may hope that he will become known in history as one of that class of despots who have left a part of the world better than they found it. His only excuse—and that of the Government which has put him here—for playing this part is that he is ruling these people for their own good. His declared intention is that he plays the part only until he has developed an intelligent community and that then he will place the government in the hands of the majority of this community. It does not lie in the mouth of anyone to accept the position of a despot and to perform the first act of all despots, good or bad, viz., to tax the people for his pay without their consent and then to refuse to accept any of the responsibilities that the universal human conscience imposes upon a despot. It would seem, therefore, to be our bounden duty to do as rapidly as possible those things that we are convinced would be done by the intelligent majority into whose hands we hope to deliver the government.[48]

The uncertain and humble tone embodied in this statement is indicative of that of many officials who spent significant periods in Moro Province. Wood's admissions of despotism are enhanced by his implicit skepticism of "declared intentions[s]" and his desire to create an "intelligent majority" of natives as rapidly and constructively as possible. Arrogant projections of perpetual imperial rule and nonexistent indigenous national rights are conspicuously absent in Wood's struggle with notions of colonial tyranny. His report aptly illustrated an emerging line separating the abstract ideals and necessities of civilizing colonialism and the unpleasant realities entailed in the process.

Other governors general similarly struggled with these ideological and moral dilemmas; however, as with almost all other aspects of American colonialism, appeals to concrete historicism helped to rationalize and soothe the uncomfortable inconsistencies. In 1909 Governor Bliss offered the following logic in an article written for *The Mindanao Herald*:

> There are certain evolutional changes through which society must pass in its onward march from barbarism to civilization. One of these stages has always been some form of despotism, such as feudalism, servitude or despotic paternal government. . . . If we apply our own system of government to these wild peoples we demoralize, we extirpate, and we never really civilize. . . . Whatever system we eventually adopt, one founded on nature as a guide is more likely to succeed than by suddenly thrusting upon these people a form of government adapted to a race that has reached a higher plane of civilization.

> If we are satisfied that we are right in assuming the government over these savage races and occupying their country, and if we further consider it our duty to do what we can to improve our rude subjects and raise them up toward our own level, we must not be afraid of the cry of "despotism," but must use the authority we possess to induce them to work, which they may not altogether like, but which we know to be an indispensable step toward their moral and physical advancement.[49]

The use of imperial historicist rationales in this piece provides an important insight into the relative contingencies of temporal-specific forms of government and appropriate levels of oppression. Though Bliss clearly established the United States' ahistorical sense of civilization and the omniscience of elevated modernity by claiming to comprehend the "evolutional changes through which society must pass . . . from barbarism to civilization," he also made the uncanny argument that colonial tutelage required Americans temporarily to shed their civilization and assume archaic forms of government. The notion that Moros must pass through historicist political forms such as "despotism," "feudalism," and "servitude or despotic paternal government" before attaining modern civilization carried with it an implicit argument that American colonial rule must assume these forms in succession to act in accordance with "nature." According to this logic, treating Moros as political and social equals would actually be the severest and cruelest form of political tinkering, as it would thrust them into "unnatural" evolutionary circumstances and inevitable bloodshed. Hence, Bliss urged his readers not to be "afraid of the cry of 'despotism'" as long as Americans maintained a firm historicist understanding regarding the nature of stagist histories and the necessary exceptions to American ideals inherent to colonial tutelage. While such rationalizations are often dismissed as mere self-comforting intellectual gestures, colonial officials such as Bliss were well aware of the dangers and moral implications of stepping outside the bounds of modern civilization. In a 1907 speech in Zamboanga before a large crowd of Americans, Europeans, Filipinos, Moros, and others, Bliss cautioned:

> To my American and European friends, who have inherited as their birthrights the fruits of long ages of increasing civilization . . . in your hands [lies] an immense power for good or evil. Let us all use this power for good. Let not the future historian say that the American nation has travelled half-way around the earth in order to degrade and debase a people instead of exalting it; let us not graft the vices of the west upon those of the east; let us be just and

> honest in dealing with our less advanced neighbors; let us be satisfied with just profits, and instruct them in improved methods.[50]

Here Bliss demonstrated a number of tensions plaguing both American imperialism as a concept and notions of ahistorical omniscience that supported it. While acknowledging the superiority of the United States' "immense power," Bliss also simultaneously conceded the ultimate amorality of its colonial authority. In essence, his statement definitively dispelled the inherent righteousness of modernity underwriting the logic of American imperialism. The power for good or evil was effectively equal. In this sense modernity was not necessarily an inherently beneficial universal humanistic triumph but, rather, simply an abstract development with the ambiguous potential for good or ill. It is also important to note Bliss's concern for the evaluations of a hypothetical "future historian." Having insinuated himself, along with the colonial project at large, back into a developing historical narrative, Bliss felt the acute pressures of history's judgments on a broadly contingent future in Moro Province. Though neither the nationality nor ethnicity of this hypothetical historian is mentioned, one can assume it could be American, Moro, Filipino, or anyone else who might have attained a sense of historical comprehension through their modern consciousness. In this way Bliss's concerns implied a potential for "good" and "bad" modernities, or perhaps at least corrupted semblances of true modernity. In any case, the reckless certainty of imperialism as the necessary catalyst for correct historical development and civilized global modernity began to give way to doubts and contemplative regrets in Moro Province by at least 1903. While the moral and epistemological uncertainties of America's modernity crisis gave rise to crusading imperialism as a form of therapeutic relief, these misgivings also plagued the imperial project itself, often intensifying rather than relieving the stress of modern habitation.

The most concentrated episodes of colonial regret, however, usually accompanied poignant realizations of cultural annihilation among Moros. While imperial historicism confirmed the ultimate impermanence of historical episodes, it also created a sense of melancholy longing for extinguished or passing histories. As Peter Fritzsche's insightful work, *Stranded in the Present: Modern Time and the Melancholy of History*, explains, in modernity the "past and present floated free from each other. . . . The past was conceived more and more as something bygone and lost, and also strange and mysterious, and although partially accessible, always remote. [This] disconnection from the past was a source of melancholy."[51] Anthropologist Renato Rosaldo

explored a similar concept in his work on "imperialist nostalgia." According to Rosaldo, imperialist nostalgia "revolves around a paradox: . . . someone deliberately alters a form of life and then regrets that things have not remained as they were prior to his or her intervention." The incongruity of these feelings among imperialists derived in large part from a deep identification with and investment in indigenous cultures as a reflection of themselves and their own histories. Hence, "[w]hen the so-called civilizing process destabilizes forms of life, the agents of change experience transformations of other cultures as if they were personal losses." However, despite the pain of loss, imperialist nostalgia is also ultimately therapeutic. "Nostalgia," continues Rosaldo, "is a particularly appropriate emotion to invoke in attempting to establish one's innocence and at the same time talk about what one has destroyed."[52] In other words, nostalgia mediates notions of despotism and destruction by asserting genuine feelings of investment, admiration, love, and longing for things lost to the present. It serves a form of penance without the necessary restitution; it absolves by constantly affirming the inevitability of progressive time despite a deep longing for stasis.

Hence, while Americans watched their glorious national history reenacted in Moro Province, they likewise suffered again through its demise into modernity. The wild, untamed, liberated, and masculine nature of Moro existence threatened to slip into the bland banality of modern life as Muslim pirates, adventurers, and warriors succumbed to the omniscient and regulating gaze of modernity. "There must have been some barbaric splendor about these old pirate states when at the height of their power and daring," reminisced David Barrows in a census report in 1903. "There is something almost melancholy about their decadence. Theirs were the only political achievements of any consequence ever made by people of the Philippines, but their passing none the less marks a gain for civilization."[53] Again, as with Bliss's statement, Barrows regarded "civilization" or evolutionary modernity as a sort of sad but inevitable development requiring difficult sacrifices and doubtful results. His nostalgic longing for a history in which he has no personal stake demonstrates a distinctly modern sense of historicism. Considering himself in a state of ahistoricity Barrows conceptualized his estrangement from the past in the broadest sense. As Walter Benjamin, Benedict Anderson, and others have pointed out, modern subjects conceive time as empty and homogenous. The past represents a temporal space that can be observed and even manipulated, but ultimately delimited and permanently estranged from those with a modern historical consciousness. Barrow's longing was a product of this estrangement.

Similar laments are sprinkled throughout the records. In 1908 a reporter for *The Mindanao Herald* wrote a heartfelt and deeply sympathetic piece concerning the pacified pirate island of Sitanki in the Sulu Archipelago. "Sitanki was the great rendezvous of the Moro pirates for centuries," he recorded:

> Its reefs are still covered with the wrecks of numberless ships which the Moros captured in the old days when piracy was a profession with these people. The old men delight in recounting the big sea fights in which they participated in earlier days. . . . Considering the birth and training of the sons of the old sea fighters we cannot help feeling a touch of sympathy for them in their efforts to break the charm of a thousand years of ancestral history. They were not merciless always. Datu Jutu has a beautiful, large solid silver platter presented him by the English government for his "bravery and humanity" in saving the lives and caring for the passengers and crew of a wrecked sailing ship.[54]

The author's sentimental and regretful nostalgia for the Moros' fading history is apparent. His longings are amplified by the temporal gravity of modern change. Inducing Moros to abandon "a thousand years of ancestral history" in favor of a recent and relatively short-lived modernity exposed stark incongruities in the perceived logic of historical relevance. The primacy of temporal location in historicist rationales demanded an appreciative recognition of the Moros' historical longevity. Though considered archaic, the romanticization of Moro culture as an actual and valuable piece of history prompted a ripple of less critical reassessments. In this case, the author points to the pirates' inherent sense of morality and respect for human life. The fact that Datu Jutu was recognized for "bravery and humanity" by a modern imperialist nation that supposedly understood those qualities in their fullest humanistic sense problematized binary assessments of barbarity and civilization. Though these qualities may have represented nascent Moro potentials for modern civilization, the article's melancholy tone suggests, rather, that the United States was perhaps destroying something already valuable.

These feelings reached their zenith in Vic Hurley's deeply sentimental tribute to Filipino Muslims entitled *Swish of the Kris: The Story of the Moros*. Published in 1936, more than two decades after Filipinization and Moroland's full integration into the Philippine state, Hurley's book nostalgically celebrated the Moros' distinguished history while chronicling its lamentable destruction. "The Moros are a grand people," he praised in the book's opening pages. "Everything written about them, almost, has been authored by their enemies. They

are feared and hated by the Filipinos. They were feared and hated by the Spaniards. . . . Every one of them is valiant. There never was a Moro who was afraid to die. Death on the field of battle is a privilege, and they guard their privileges jealously."[55] Set against this romantic portrayal, Hurley offered profound arguments in favor of a genuine and legitimate Moro civilization while extending pointed indictments against the United States' dispossession and forced integration of Filipino Muslims into a hostile and contrived colonial state. In many respects Hurley's work was a reaffirmation of Saleeby's early assessments of Moro civilization. "Early Mohammedan missionaries [to Mindanao] were a sturdy lot," he echoed. "They came into raw countries without ships or armies or governments to back them. . . . The priests of Mohammed were among the most potent spreaders of civilization in the history of man. . . . [They] brought culture and writing and the arts. . . . They were not destroyers."[56] However, like Saleeby, Hurley softened his advocacy by admitting to theories of Moro degeneracy. "As is often the case with a free, wild people," he wrote, "they have degenerated under the stultifying inhibitions of civilization."[57]

Hurley's most powerful argument in favor of Moro civilization, and most indicative of American colonial guilt in Moroland, employed an interesting comparison of simultaneous and intersecting global historical trajectories to prove the viability of Muslim culture in the Philippines. His argument rested on "the unsuccessful Spanish conquest of Moroland" as "one of the most remarkable resistances in the annals of military history" that had not "been equaled in the whole bloody history of military aggression." "The Moro set a new historical precedent," stated Hurley:

> He survived. His religion survived. The Mayas, the Aztecs and the Incas fell before the Toledo steel of the Spaniards, and their language and institutions perished with them. Their temples were destroyed and their literature burned by over-zealous bishops of the Romish church. A few of their cities remain, desolated sepulchers of an ancient civilization which melted before the fanaticism of the conquistadors. Not so with the Moros.

Considering the Social Darwinist underpinnings of American imperialism and historicism, Hurley's logic provided remarkable parity for Filipino Muslims. As a preeminent early-modern power, Spain proved itself (in Social Darwinist terms) by subduing culturally and politically "inferior" or "inadequate" populations. The Moros, however, did not succumb. For Hurley, this fact suggested a significant degree of civilizational equivalency between

Spaniards and Moros born out of the indisputable crucible of raw conflict. Such an assessment required a radical reconsideration regarding the historicist logic of American imperialism in Mindanao and Sulu. Given this state of equivalency and the premodern consciousness it necessarily entailed, Hurley was able to challenge the moral configuration of American imperialism in Moroland. "When we consider the fact that the Moros not only had never heard of the Treaty of Paris but were in total ignorance that any such country as the United States existed, we can understand the prompt nature of their resistance. They were logically unable to understand how any nation who had never subdued them had the right to cede their territory over to another power." By purchasing Mindanao and Sulu from Spain, the United States effectively sold "out the Moros' own country from underneath them. . . . without their knowledge or their consent." And, according to Hurley's logic, the Moros' knowledge and consent was a product of their cognitive early-modern consciousness, equal to that of Spaniards. Therefore the "Moro had the right to resist."[58]

At this point in the book Hurley becomes particularly mournful as he concedes the Moros' defeat to a technologically superior nation. "Maudlin sympathy, however would be wasted upon the Moros," he resolves. "They are among the hardiest of all the races of man. But the fact remains that this little group of unorganized Malays went against the Gatling guns and artillery of the most powerful nation in the world. They died on their own soil before the superior weapons and armament of an invading army. They pitted a *kris* against a krag rifle."[59] Though Hurley's characterizations and emphasis on military showdowns are overly dramatic and often misplaced considering the relatively peaceful transition to colonial rule in Moro Province, his indictment of American imperial aggression effectively created another instance of historical equivalency. "The American was equally as culpable as the Spaniard," he wrote. "The Spaniard brought religion at the point of an arquebus. The American brought law to an inferior and minor people at the point of a Krag. Our claim on Mindanao and Sulu was weak indeed." Though the criteria of this comparison is slightly different from his martial evaluations of Moros and Spaniards, Hurley essentially argued for little difference between American and Spanish imperialists in terms of ambition or morality. Taken together, the logic of these equivalencies placed Moros in an unprecedented position of parity with Americans—that is, Moros were equal to or superior to Spaniards, Americans were no better than Spaniards; hence, Moros were equal to Americans. Hurley uses this parity later in his book to object vehemently to Muslim integration into an independent Philippines state. How-

ever, the overarching romanticization and melancholy lamentations for a passing Muslim culture embodied in Hurley's work ultimately allude to deep anxieties and regrets born out of the military regime's modernization policies in Moro Province. While these misgivings were enhanced by contrived images of pristine primitiveness and noble warriorhood, there remained a fundamental sense that something valuable and genuine had been assimilated and lost into the banal congruity of modernity.

Despite their struggles with doubt and regret, however, American historicism provided imperialists with the ultimate philosopher's stone capable of contextualizing colonialism's messy details into an almost millenarian vision of homogeneous modernity. Though transitional pasts were difficult and unpleasant to pass through, American imperialists were convinced that these evolutions were necessary and would eventually culminate in a blissful future of collective transcendent progress. When all the world's inhabitants shared the same elevated view from modernity's pedestal, Americans felt history's truths would then emerge and their efforts would be justified. Consider the following words of encouragement printed in *The Mindanao Herald* in 1906:

> Perhaps in the sifting of centuries, when all people shall be on the same plane of progress, and when in the great age of civilization, the truth shall be no longer hidden behind the clouds of competition, of ambition and greed, the mead of praise shall be accorded, and America shall survey its work with the loving glance of the master who knows his hand has done well, and that the once insensate marble itself fells the glow of joy and pride in its new form and beauty.[60]

This passage offers one of the greatest examples of American imperial historicism in Moro Province. The notion that history would be justified when it ceased to exist as a transitional phenomenon was at the heart of the United States' imperial efforts. By hastening the development of "archaic" societies, Americans hoped to finalize their own ascent into transcendent modernity and thereby escape the unpleasantness of evolutionary change. Military colonial rule among Filipino Muslims embodied these notions and expressed their deepest longings and highest hopes but also their most depressing realities.

Conclusion

Two years prior to the end of military rule in Mindanao and Sulu, a grand council of "Leading Sultans, Dattos, Headmen and other Prominent Moros of the District of Lanao" met with the last military governor general of Moro Province, John Pershing. The meeting was filled with lavish outpourings of rhetorical affection and native pledges to adhere more closely to American desires and principles. Of all the testimonies, however, Datu Asam's remarks represented profound evidence of lasting American influence in the Philippines' Muslim South. Recalling "an oath of friendship upon the Koran" made to the American regime, the Datu admitted that had he "carried out the advice of the General more closely" he "would have been more prosperous." The problem, he deduced, was that he had "been more or less following the old customs of his ancestors." However, now that he understood the requisites of progress he pledged "to cut away from those old ties and follow the American ways." While this statement may appear to be an admission of ethnic or cultural inferiority on the part of Datu Asam (and would likely be interpreted this way by many historians), it was not. The Datu's remarks indicated a profound and nuanced understanding of historicism as the fundamental logic of American rule. The reason for the apparent gap between their respective populations, he continued, was that "the Americans have only one custom, while the Moros have two, one good and the other evil [i.e., one modern and the other archaic], and as soon as they can break away from the evil one they will be just as prosperous as the Americans." After all, he argued, "the thoughts of the Americans are the same as those of the Moros, but the only defect the Moros have is the two customs. The reason that the Americans prosper as they do is because they have only one way of doing things. The Moros have two, one good and the other bad. As soon as the Mo-

ros can weed out this bad spirit, there will be no more robbing, murdering, etc."[1] American officials could not have asked for a better or more succinct summation of their theoretical colonial project in Moro Province. Prominent elements of fundamental humanistic equality in Asam's statement were contexualized, not along crude racial or national boundaries but according to historicist notions of varying temporality as evidenced by the more concrete aspects of their respective societies. From an American perspective, the internalization of historicist paradigms among Filipino Muslims represented a critical success in their colonial tutelage. While much of the islands' northern inhabitants muddled through the shallow institutional semblances of modernity, military officials in Moro Province felt that Filipino Muslims had learned the fundamental intangibles of a modern consciousness—namely, the ability to recognize and interpret one's own temporal location.

The preceding chapters have attempted to argue two overarching principles. First, imperial historicism, as a coherent and continuous discourse, originated in and emanated from the metropole with remarkable consistency, while providing a foundational rationale for virtually every policy and project in Moro Province between 1899 to 1913. As a case study, American military rule in the Philippines' Muslim South represents an important amendment to recent trends in "new imperial history." In this case colonial discourse was not an utterly discursive phenomenon characterized "by new and renewed discourses and . . . subtle shifts in ideological ground."[2] Neither was it an episode of competing "colonialisms" in chronic disagreement regarding the logic of their imperial project.[3] Rather, the American military regime in Moro Province represents an instance of consistent imperial philosophy just as colonial officials imagined it. Granted, its limited time period and narrowly circumscribed group of administrators places it slightly outside the broader colonial critique of new imperial historians such as Stoler, Cooper, and Thomas. For this reason, "amendment" is perhaps the best word to describe its contribution. Nevertheless, one must not discount the valuable singularity of particular episodes as components of a larger colonial phenomenon. Indicative or not, American colonialism in Mindanao and Sulu embodied a trans-global discourse at the very foundation of modern concepts of space, time, and power. In this way its singularity is highly representative.

Second, this work elucidates and analyzes the most critical period in the Moros' modern history. Scholars have typically concentrated much of their work on analyzing integration policies after 1913. These efforts are commonly an attempt to work backward from the outbreak of violence between Muslims

and the Philippine state in the 1960s. The 14 years of military rule are usually ignored or given only passing mention as a period of deferment that idly preceded the official history of Moro integration. This approach is incorrect. Moros, as an ethno-religious population, were defined and in turn defined themselves within modernity and its institutional mechanisms of state during military rule. That is, "Moros," as conceived by themselves and others, during these critical years took on specific content and forms that set the parameters for future integration. Their sense of history, ethnicity, religious identity, and political orientation as a collective modern consciousness were established during these formative years. All other aspects of their history since 1913 cannot be effectively understood outside of this context. The U.S. military's historicization and construction of Moros as a distinct population in the islands have exercised tremendous influence over their recent history and will continue to do so as the Philippines struggles to reconcile its postcolonial incongruities.

Epilogue

The American Military Period in Historical Memory

In January 2008 my family and I had the privilege of traveling to Marawi City as guests of the Sultan of Tugaya. I first met the Sultan in Manila in October of the same year I was preparing to move my family down to Cagayan de Oro to continue my research in Mindanao, and he was searching for potential tenants to lease an idle second home just outside that city. We met in a high-rise "apartelle" building in San Juan. Though he seemed a bit weak and nervous from fasting during Ramadan, his demeanor maintained a particular enthusiasm that came to characterize his personality. He shared this apartelle with his cousin, an exceptionally thoughtful and soft-spoken man affectionately known as "Doc." As we talked we soon discovered the incredibly fortuitous nature of our association. Both Doc and the Sultan are Maranao Muslims from Marawi, and each exercises a great deal of influence within their community—the Sultan as a political and financial figure in Lanao and Doc as a high-ranking member of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and a close advisor of the Muslim rebel leader Nur Misuari. I had trouble hiding my excitement while trying to broker a lease agreement. However, I was not alone in my eagerness. Somewhat to my surprise, the Sultan went on for the next two hours explaining to me how important it was that Americans again become aware of the Moros' plight. "God has brought us together," he reiterated throughout the evening.

The next night I again found myself spending several hours with Doc and the Sultan. We trolled around Quezon City in his minivan, chatting, while soft, melodious, sing-song Koranic recitations wafted from the vehicle's rear speakers. I listened mostly as the Sultan rehearsed a litany of evidences indicating his power and prestige as a monarchical figure in the Lanao Region of

western Mindanao. Despite his self-congratulatory tone, however, the Sultan's conversations intermittently exhibited a deferential quality, particularly when speaking of his religious devotions or his affection for the United States. In the late 1990s the Sultan spent a couple of weeks in Washington, D.C., and he has never forgotten the experience. He enjoyed reminiscing about traffic patterns, pedestrian walk lights, the National Mall, and the general cleanliness of the city. "I can't believe how orderly it was," he repeated time and again throughout the evening, carefully regulating his accent on each word. "That is what we need in Lanao—order! You Americans are so orderly." He was also incurably enamored of the young presidential candidate Barack Obama, who he was quite certain was a Muslim. Despite my best attempts to correct this misconception, the Sultan was fully convinced that anyone with the name Barack Hussein Obama had to be a Muslim, whether I chose to accept it or not. As a self-described "doer," the Sultan sent numerous emails to the campaign pledging his unyielding support and dutifully printed out and carefully preserved each manufactured response as evidence of his burgeoning relationship with the future "Muslim" president of the United States.

Throughout our time together I was continually surprised and often taken aback by the Sultan's fondness for the United States and his intense affinity for embassy and military contacts. Nearly every time we met, he requested that I immediately email "the embassy" and let them know that I was with the Sultan and that he was a gracious and pro-American host. Despite my attempts to assure him that I did not have any significant connections at the American embassy in Manila, he persisted. I typically ended up sending these emails to the Fulbright headquarters in Makati, which usually solicited a somewhat confused response such as "OK" or "good to know." However, as I was able to integrate myself into various mosques and Muslim communities throughout the region, I increasingly found the Sultan's sentiments to be relatively typical, though usually without his characteristic level of enthusiasm. Imams, Maulanas, teachers in the madrasas, merchants, and many others frequently exhibited a sense of fondness and respect when talking about the United States. Unlike most of the Philippines' fixation with American popular music, Hollywood movies, and athletic spectacles (which the Moros seemed to care very little for), the Filipino Muslims' partiality lay in their perceptions of stability, order, and fairness associated with the U.S. military.

Upon probing these sentiments further I discovered a particular affinity for the American military period at the beginning of the century in the Moros' historical consciousness. It stood as a kind of brief golden age in popular

memory as Filipino Muslims' recounted their four-century struggle with Spanish colonial aggression and an "anti-Muslim" postcolonial state. Wealth, prosperity, peace, order, and religious freedom came to characterize the Moros' memories of that short period. And though the American military certainly engaged in brutal suppressions and vicious massacres, many Moros view the confrontations as an epic meeting of savage and fearless equals who, through the crucible of battle, came to respect one another. It is rare, for example, upon entering a mosque or engaging in any extended conversation with Filipino Muslims, not to hear the story of the .45 caliber in Moro Province.

According to Filipino Muslims (and the story is substantiated in Vic Hurley's work), when American military personnel reached Mindanao their standard issue sidearm was a .38 caliber revolver. Very soon, however, the Americans discovered that the .38 was virtually ineffective against a determined and fearless juramentado who continued his advance despite receiving several shots to the torso and limbs. The military responded by issuing the more powerful .45 caliber weapon to guarantee that such targets fell upon impact. This bit of mythology has reached paramount status in the Moros' popular images of themselves and their relationship of perceived mutual respect with the U.S. military. Popular images of the American frontier west are also alive and well throughout the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao and elsewhere in the Philippine south. Ron Edgerton, for example, has demonstrated the ubiquity of the "American West" in popular culture in Bukidnon and elsewhere in Mindanao.[1] Many Muslims in the Cotabato and Lanao regions today have a surprising knowledge of "outlaw" country music artists of the 1970s such as Willie Nelson and Waylon Jennings.

Perhaps the most astounding affirmation of these sentiments came with our trip to Marawi City with the Sultan in January 2008. After meeting in Iligan my family and I rode up the twisting mountain roads with the Sultan's son and his bodyguard. Upon arriving in Marawi we were greeted warmly, and after the Sultan made his usual request for me to "email the embassy," he took us on a tour of the city before providing lunch at a restaurant near the Mindanao State University campus. As we wound our way through the city on broken cement roads and across dirt paths the Sultan apologized profusely for the impoverished and "backward" state of affairs in his home province. "This place could be a paradise," he repeated longingly after each disparaging remark while grimacing at the broken-down wooden structures and dilapidated roads. We countered these remarks with observances of the stunning natural beauty of Marawi and its rustic qualities, which set it apart

from the urban chaos found in many of the nation's larger cities. These gestures somewhat ameliorated his self-conscious deprecation of Lanao's poverty, yet he could not keep from commenting on the way things "could be" and "should be." Later on that evening while sitting around a heavy wooden table after dinner, our conversation again turned toward the difficult state of affairs in Marawi and the Lanao Region generally. Problems with poverty, violence, exploitation, lack of education, and a general inability to break out of old patterns of failure consumed our dialogue. While the Philippine state and the Philippine army bore many of their most intense and often most insightful condemnations, there was a particularly keen sense of self-reflective assessment that indicated an acknowledged degree of conscious autonomy and accountability. After contemplating many of their criticisms I offered a hypothetical question: Would things be different if the government suddenly conceded to the MNLF and granted full autonomy to Muslim Mindanao as an independent state? Would Sharia Law, Islamic leadership, banking, and bureaucracies eventually lead to peace, order, and prosperity throughout the region?

The Sultan and Doc considered my hypothetical scenario carefully for several seconds. The Sultan then let out a slow breath and stated flatly, "No, nothing would change, I think." Doc nodded in reluctant agreement.

"Then what *would* change things?" I asked, mildly exasperated by their sense of hopelessness.

Though I might have expected what came next, I did not. Without much hesitation the Sultan leaned forward and flatly stated, "We need to become a colony of the American military again." Doc immediately affirmed his cousin's assertion with an audible "yes."

I sat silently, a bit uncomfortable at the prospect; nevertheless I pursued the idea out of curiosity. "Why?" I asked. "How could the U.S. military help?" Doc and the Sultan then went on to explain the potential role of U.S. forces as a protector, to keep the Philippine Army from ravaging local Muslim populations and to beat back radical terrorist groups that threatened the political legitimacy of organizations such as the Moro National Liberation Front and Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) when trying to negotiate peace with the Philippine government. Their dialogue was peppered with wistful thoughts of prosperity and peace of mind coupled with nostalgic references to heralded governors general such as John Pershing and Tasker Bliss.[2] I listened intently, scribbling in my bound notebook as quickly and efficiently as possible. By the trip's end I was fully convinced of the primacy and contem-

porary relevance of the American military period in historical memory in Moroland. The Sultan's words were confirmed (though not so candidly) again and again in mosques, cafes, and markets throughout Mindanao.

While much of the preceding evidence is anecdotal in nature, it is representative of a much larger and pervasive trend in the historical consciousness of Filipino Muslims. With the United States' increased interest in Islamic political movements around the world following 9/11, America's historical involvement in the Philippines' Muslim South has found new resonance throughout Mindanao and Sulu, as many Muslims recall the idealized period of peace and prosperity under military rule. For American and Filipino policy-makers and analysts unfamiliar with the significance of the military period in popular memory, Moro enthusiasm for the U.S. armed forces is often baffling. In 2004, for example, an astounding survey revealed that 42 percent of Filipino Muslims welcomed a sustained U.S. military presence in Mindanao and Sulu.[3] Since that time the Moros' hopes and expectations for an intercessory advocate in the form of military occupation have only risen. U.S. military advisors and soldiers throughout the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) have actively engaged in humanitarian and developmental projects over the past seven years while simultaneously directing the blunt, and often abusive, force of the Philippine Army toward radical terrorist groups such as the Abu Sayaff and away from non-belligerent Muslim communities within the ARMM. These efforts have curried trust and support from increased numbers of Filipino Muslims while feeding notions of an unfinished colonial project in Mindanao and Sulu.[4] In November 2008 Muhammad Ameen, chairman of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front Central Committee secretariat, announced on the organization's website that the United States held "an unfinished obligation to the Moro people" for turning "them over to the Filipinos." His statement also praised remarks by U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice at the 16th Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Lima, Peru, which Ameen interpreted as legitimate concern for a peaceful and just Mindanao. "[It] is a rare occasion that a high American official ever make[s] a statement of the resolution of the Moro problem, and therefore, this deserved commendation and appreciation," stated Ameen. The Moro leader did not merely view U.S. interest as a potential bonus, however, but rather, as a critical component to any conceivable solution. "This historical error must be corrected immediately," he warned, "or the fighting in Mindanao escalates."[5]

The "historical error" Ameen referred to occurred in October 1913. After winning a majority in Congress in 1911 and the presidency in 1913 with the

election of Woodrow Wilson, American Democrats were eager to expedite Philippine independence and allow greater Filipino control of the colony. This process, known as "Filipinization," brought an effective end to military rule in Moro Province. Wilson's new governor general of the Philippines Francis Burton Harrison, a congressman from New York with no experience in the islands, appointed Frank W. Carpenter to oversee the transition in Moroland. A career military man and a highly intelligent individual, Carpenter was an excellent choice. He possessed impeccable diplomatic skills and spoke both Spanish and Tagalog fluently.[6] Yet, despite his abilities, Carpenter could not ameliorate the long-term negative effects of Filipinization in Mindanao and Sulu. By 1920 all Muslim districts in the Philippines' south were governed by Christian Filipinos. Though some Moro leaders such as Hadji Butu, Datu Piang, and Datu Benito attempted in good faith to integrate themselves into the new democratic system,[7] it was clear to most Muslims that their ancient sovereignty as a distinct people in the islands was fading into a larger Filipino-controlled state. As early as 1910 Moro leaders were making dramatic guarantees of allegiance to the United States and vowing to "fight if the Americans withdrew" and left them under Filipino control.[8] By 1920 exasperated Moros were trying all possible avenues to rekindle their former state of affairs. Consider the following lament of Arolas Tulawie, a Moro from Zamboanga who wrote to John Pershing in 1923 concerning the Muslims' plight under the new regime:

> It is myself and many others of my people who wish those days or rather those conditions [of military rule were] with us again. Not that we have not made any progress, but we believe that we should have made much more if we had been left under the wise guidance of Americans instead of Filipinos who do not have any idea of managing their own people. Since you have left Zamboanga, we were under an American governor but this governor was governing the Moros merely for the pleasure of the politicos in Manila.[9]

Such petitions and appeals continued steadily throughout the first half of the twentieth century, including many attempts to separate Mindanao and Sulu legally from the emerging Philippine state.[10] The pleas, however, were largely ignored as Manila became the seat of a rapidly and highly centralized state. Postwar policies carried out by the now independent Republic of the Philippines aimed specifically at asserting political sovereignty and enforcing a national vision of ethno-cultural homogeneity. Anomalous minority populations

were coerced into conformity through migration, infiltration, democratic exclusion, and often brute force.[11] The state made it clear through these policies that the Philippine nation was no longer a colony. Filipinos were no longer a muddled collection of distinct ethno-linguistic groups ruled by American authority. They were now supposedly a single homogenous nation, ruled by an independent state in the "center" of the country.

Northern Filipinos, perhaps sensing a current resurgence of the American imperial period in popular memory in Mindanao, often chafe under evidences of "misplaced" Moro loyalties. The MILF's desire to negotiate with the Philippine state on "U.S. military bases" and the fact that they do not "take the U.S. presence with a modicum of concern" touch on sensitive issues of political sovereignty and national identity.[12] Some observers such as Archbishop Orlando B. Quevedo interpret the U.S. military's relationship with Filipino Muslims as a subtle imperialist trick to subvert Philippine sovereignty by taking advantage of a vulnerable and ignorant population. The archbishop's references to the United States' "hidden hand" pursuing its "own interest" without regard to or understanding of the actual situation in Mindanao speak to the insecurities and perhaps embarrassment surrounding the Moros' persistent detestation of any type of political or cultural integration into the Philippine state.[13] Though colonial and postcolonial tinkering by U.S. agencies has certainly proved to be a legitimate concern for Philippine authorities, the archbishop's words do sound remarkably similar to nationalist rhetoric of the early twentieth century that accused the American military of fomenting ethno-religious divisions between Christians and Muslims. "[R]ivalry and intestine struggles between Filipino Christians and Filipino Gentiles [Moros], cannot be more disconsolating—they tell us. . . . But it is all due to the work of the partizans [*sic*] of the prevailing regime, who do not lose an opportunity to sow discord and hatred between the baptized natives, on one hand, and Moroism, on the other," blasted an editorial in the nationalist *La Vanguardia* in 1910. "Our [Moro] brothers demand our aid and protection," trumpeted another article from the same paper, proposing to assume the mantle of paternalism from the Americans.[14] The nationalist myths of racial unity and a shared colonial past undergirding the current Philippine state rest on at least a minimum acceptance of sovereign borders, shared histories, and broad racial affiliation within the political context of citizenship. From a Filipino majority perspective these requisites have never been met. In this regard the Moros' national affinity seems to have been oriented decidedly toward the formerly imperialist United States rather than to the Philippine state. Consider, for

example, the collective pleas of the Lanao District Datus in a letter to President Franklin Roosevelt in 1935: "The Moros (Islam) of Mindanao and Sulu can be compared to a small child lost in the thick forests who does not know where to go. The Americans are equivalent if not more than our fathers and mothers who taught us the right thing to do. . . . It is not . . . right that parents should abandon their child when the child can't yet live out in this cold and cruel world." However, while Moros are often portrayed as antinationalists who have subverted ethnic and national ties to religious concerns and foreign patrons, this image is not entirely accurate. In fact, notions of "nation," "race," and "patriotism" within the context of an anachronistic "historic" Philippines are alive and well among Moros. The legitimating question for them, however, is one of ethnic authenticity and disrupted historical trajectories.

Establishing the "Real Filipinos"

Imperial Impact and Ethnic Authenticity

Over the course of the twentieth century Filipino Muslim intellectuals and political leaders have constructed their historical identities and contemporary ethnicities around pervasive notions of historical exceptionalism. This idea of exceptionalism asserts that the Moros' fierce and persistent resistance to Spanish imperialism preserved a high degree of indigenous authenticity relative to their Christianized counterparts who capitulated to and collaborated with Western intruders. Moro resistance, therefore, prevented Filipino Muslims from falling under the same imperially conditioned consciousness of religious bigotry and conquest that has historically shaped the minds of their Christian neighbors. By adopting a discourse of relative authenticity, Moros present an alternative reading of the integration conflict in which the Filipino Muslims are the vanguards of an historic nation, while Christian Filipinos represent a deviant ethno-national identity. Of course this paradigm is plagued by an uncomfortable sense of schizophrenia in which Moros lay historical claim to a nation that they simultaneously reject. Consider the following passage from Cesar Adib Majul, one of the most prolific writers on the subject:

> The history of a conquered people who ultimately revolted has now merged with that of another who had remained unconquered. . . . When some Muslims at present do not appear too happy in being called "Filipinos," it is not

> that they do not desire to be involved or participate more intimately in the body politic; rather it is simply the recognition of the fact that their ancestors were never subjects of Felipe, the Spanish Prince. . . . That other Christian natives are still willing to keep the name because their ancestors were subjects of the Spanish Monarch, is no criteria why Muslims should follow likewise.[15]

The image of a late-coming, historically corrupted past merging with an unconquered, genuine one leaves little question regarding the legitimacy of authentic nationalism in an era of "historic" nation-states. Invented traditions, nationalist myths, and ethnic links to a preserved past all carry added weight among Filipino Muslims due to a perceived tradition of colonial resistance.

Hence, though neither Islam nor Christianity are indigenous to the archipelago, their relative impact on the islands' history is often judged by perceived degrees of conscious acceptance. The extent to which native agency is credited with determining Filipino conversion largely dictates assumptions of indigenous authenticity and ethno-national legitimacy. Most scholars (including Filipino Christians) generally describe Islamicization in the Philippines as a relatively organic and largely internal phenomenon driven by uncoerced conversion. Muslim scholars often echo Saleeby's claim that Islam came to the archipelago under a banner of peace, devoid of ulterior political or economic motives.[16] Its adoption, therefore, was volitional and accomplished according to the desires and dictates of indigenous societies. On a theoretical level, this interpretation allows Filipino Muslims possession of their own history. The perceived historical trajectories of "natural" indigenous development are therefore thought to be fundamentally undisturbed by the advent of Islam. Scholars such as Cesar Majul and Peter Gowing trace out a generally seamless historical narrative for Filipino Muslims in which their "older history" as an "identifiable community" bravely persists against destructive forces from without.[17] Thus, though scholars acknowledge Islam's transformative effects on the southern Philippines, their analyses are carefully confined within accepted notions of indigenous agency and authenticity.

Conversely, Chistianization is uniformly regarded as coerced and irreparably disruptive to indigenous societies. The Christian Filipinos' apparent collaboration with Spanish Catholics often prompts feelings of ethnic betrayal among Muslims. Cesar Majul, for example, castigates early Christian converts "who, in spite of similarity of race and of a basic cultural matrix, have allowed themselves to be used as tools of imperialistic powers," declaring, "Catholicism had likewise become a source of identity for them and this

was the way the Spaniards wanted things to be."[18] For most scholars, Western imperialism and Christianization, specifically, represent a critical departure from the natives' supposed natural social and political development. The impact of the West allegedly "caused the fragmentation" of a relatively uniform indigenous-centered and locally dictated historical path.[19] Those who fell to Western influence are often considered the products of a divergent or deviant historical trajectory, resulting in superficial or inauthentic indigenous identities. These assumptions have led scholars such as Peter Gowing to proclaim, "It is manifestly true that Christian Filipinos, compared with Muslim Filipinos, have moved further away from what Luis Ma. Guerrero has called 'the preconquest Malay traditions.'"[20] Christian divergence from a presupposed indigenous historical trajectory, however, is not regarded as an alternative historical consciousness and identity but as a decidedly binary antagonist to Filipino Muslims' "preconquest Malay traditions."

While there is no historical precolonial basis for the Philippines' current territorial boundaries, there is no evidence either of an overarching ethnic, linguistic, cultural, political, or religious unity among the archipelago's inhabitants before the coming of the West. Moro claims of historical authenticity routinely employ anachronistic notions of a historic "Philippine nation." This predisposition to view Filipino history in terms of *national* history reinforces notions of ethnic betrayal by Christians and reaffirms Moro claims of ethno-national authenticity. "Historically," wrote Pangalian Balindong, "the Filipino Muslims of yore down to modern times had played and displayed a prominent and unequalled role in the preservation of the Faith and in intense patriotic defense of this country against foreign dominations."[21] Similarly, Cesar Majul claimed, "Islam . . . emerged as a rallying ideology which, with patriotism, served as a force against Christianity and colonialism."[22] "Patriotism" and "national" defense indicate notions of a self-conscious and historically essentialist nation that was collectively recognized by the various inhabitants of a geographic space that, coincidentally, became the colonially constructed Republic of the Philippines. In this sense, the current Philippine state represents a usurpation of an essential historical national identity. Such claims are, of course, extremely problematic; nevertheless, their circulation buttresses allegations of national betrayal and of counterfeit ethno-religious national consciousness by Christians.

Despite their weaknesses, the intellectual trends discussed above have persisted and continue to exercise tremendous political currency among those involved in the integration struggle. In cases such as the Moro conflict, one cannot overstate the paramount importance of perceived historical grievances.

By creating and supporting uniform historical narratives predicated upon reified and sharply distinguished historical actors, political activists are able to maintain seemingly logical and justified conclusions concerning victimization and oppression. Perhaps in an effort to swing the pendulum away from these misleading trends, recent scholarship has moved away from analytical models based predominantly on identity formation and politics.

In his excellent work on Muslim integration in the Philippines, Patricio Abinales soundly rejects "the use of identity politics and economic change as dominant independent variables" in analyzing the Mindanao conflict.[23] In their place the author offers an extremely insightful study that disaggregates the processes of state formation in the Philippines and localizes integration struggles to the "peripheries," where social, political, and religious distinctions are negotiated and defined.[24] Abinales's case studies involving ambivalent relationships between the fledgling Philippine state and local strongmen reveal discourses of power independent of homogenizing classifications. His findings severely undermine appeals to historic, or current, ethno-religious identities, and negate notions of an imperially constructed conflict.

Abinales's work is supported by the earlier findings of authors such as Kenneth Bauzon, who concluded that scholars "mistakenly attribute the cause of the conflict to religion, even though the religious character that the conflict has assumed is merely a perceptual tool with which the protagonists have viewed, and continue to view, the realities around them."[25] Bauzon based his findings on the assumption that Moros are still fundamentally animists and only employ Islam as an identity because of its powerful political currency.[26] Though approached from widely differing angles, both Abinales and Bauzon marginalize socially constructed identities as the catalytic factor in Mindanao's integration struggle.

Certainly Bauzon and Abinales are correct in their disaggregation of state formation and belief systems. Breaking apart the simplified processes and simplistic structural interpretations of a seemingly binary conflict forces a much more nuanced and honest assessment of historical events. However, one should take care not to discount socially constructed identities completely. Fictional as they may be, "the use of identity politics" as a "perceptual tool" spawns from a very real and extremely cherished historical consciousness among Filipino Muslims. To assert that their ethno-religious character represents some kind of false consciousness, or simply a politically expedient tool to be wielded during struggles for power, risks committing gross mischaracterizations. One cannot conclusively decipher integration struggles in the

southern Philippines by marginalizing or extinguishing socially constructed identities. Rather, scholars must embrace the validity of these distinctions while carefully contextualizing them in the proper historical perspective.

In the early 1980s Filipino historian Samuel Tan suggested in a series of essays that scholars of Philippine history move away from notions of a national meta-narrative. Instead, he advocated utilizing local histories and oral traditions as "the basis of Philippine historiography."[27] Tan argued that "the relative unimportance given to oral literature or materials raises the question of relevance of national histories to national integration since a great number of ethnic groups in the archipelago have not as yet developed their own histories."[28] He felt that if local historical narratives were given primacy, then broader connections would naturally emerge, eventually formulating an inclusive sense of national history. While both intriguing and insightful, his admonitions prove problematic due to their reliance on an overly teleological reading of Philippine history and the assumed inevitability of the nation-state. Rather than recognizing the Philippines as a colonial construction, Tan claimed:

> It is equally evident throughout the breadth of Philippine history that the different regions of the archipelago, where state constructions had been going on since pre-Hispanic times, had looked towards the establishment of each of their stage patterns as the national system . . . the regional historical processes were meant to be national in direction or goal.[29]

By reinserting the Philippine nation-state as the ultimate and natural culmination of heterogeneous regional histories, Tan simply reified old contested notions of national identity and historical development as well as anachronistic conceptions of the nation-state. If Moro and Christian Filipinos (as well as a variety of other ethno-linguistic groups) are currently disputing the validity and applicability of the homogenizing term "Filipino," then it appears very unlikely that "regional historical processes were meant to be national in direction or goal."[30]

Perhaps the most effective means to contextualize and understand the integration conflict in the Philippines properly is to localize and decentralize national history without subverting it to an inevitable teleology of the nation-state. As already discussed, historians have attempted to explain the integration conflict either by reifying historical actors, processes, and identities (Majul, Gowing, etc.), or by disaggregating historical components to reconstruct a

different path to these reified conclusions (Tan), or by marginalizing notions of sociopolitical and ethno-religious identities and therefore risking the marginalization of their relevance (Abinales, Bauzon). In all cases the authors have neglected to cast Philippine national history in terms of an utterly discursive national history that did not necessarily contribute in every respect to the current state. Put another way, the Philippines is what it is because of a long series of interrelated but ultimately discursive events, which followed no predetermined teleological path to national fulfillment. The current Philippine nation-state is the sum total of innumerable internal and external historical variables, but perhaps more important are the tangential and fractionary factors that did not contribute. The current nation does not represent any kind of historically encoded "natural" or "abnormal" entity resulting from "normal" or "deviant" historical trajectories. Rather, the Philippine nation-state is the product of millions of heterogeneous processes and historical actors responding to various stimuli in an attempt to order and manage the world as indigenous populations encountered it—the Republic of the Philippines is simply how we choose to categorize these discursive efforts.

It must be remembered, however, that the various identities and ideologies assumed by these historical actors are not simply superficial constructions that must be discarded to arrive at the meat of "real" history. To the contrary, these presumably exterior historical trappings are the modus operandi that dictate and order the course of historical development. Identity, culture, ideology, and the like compose the aforementioned variables and stimuli of history. Filipinos then, whether Christian or Muslim, cannot be categorized by teleologically confining historical narratives or by historically deterministic events. Neither can they be strictly circumscribed by imposed or historically self-proclaimed identities, which are of course not static but continually reconstructed and reiterated depending on the particular circumstances of the historical moment.

For Filipino Muslims, then, the American military period in historical memory represents a rare instance in which Moros were acknowledged and recognized for what they "are" and what they "could be," rather than seen as a defective version of a particular ethno-colonial type. That is, while Spaniards viewed Moros as repugnant heathens, and modern Christian Filipinos regard them as backward, recalcitrant nonconformists spoiling an otherwise coherent national polity, the American military is perceived as approaching Filipino Muslims as unique and inherently valuable. This view is of course itself problematic, considering the arguments and evidences laid out in this

work demonstrating the careful construction and historicization of Moros to produce their current meaning and context. Nevertheless, the collaborative efforts entailed in that process between 1899 and 1914 produced a lasting image and historical connection that has not faded. As Patricio Abinales observed recently in *The Manila Times*, "the [American] empire's legitimacy is [at] an all-time high now in Muslim Mindanao," and though Filipino nationalists "have tried to undermine this . . . they have not made any dent in this favorable sentiment towards the United States."[31]

Notes

Preface

1. "Imperial Historicism and American Military Rule in the Philippines' Muslim South," *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, 39, no. 3 (Oct. 2008): 411–29.

2. Betty Joseph, *Reading the East India Company, 1720–1840: Colonial Currencies of Gender* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 15.

Introduction

1. The term *Moro* has a long and contentious history. During the Spanish colonial era it was employed as a pejorative indication of the southern Malay's socio-racial difference from and inferiority to Christianized Filipinos. During this period, the epithet *Moro* embodied all the antipathies and condescension associated with the Spaniards' expulsion of Muslim "Moors" from southern Spain in the fifteenth century. During the twentieth century, however, Filipino Muslims have embraced the term *Moro* as a proud indication of their difference and their unique history. They frequently refer to themselves as Moros and call their geographical sphere of influence "Bangsamoro"—the "Moro Nation." Hence, this paper will employ the term freely as an expression synonymous with "Filipino Muslims," "Muslim Malays" in Mindanao and Sulu, and a collective reference to the various ethno-linguistic groups in the southern Philippines that profess adherence to the religion of Islam.

2. "Grand Opening of Zamboanga Fair," *The Manila Times*, 7 February 1911, in *50 Years with the* Times, compiled by Raul R. Ingles, part I, January 1 to June 30, 1911, 76, Rare Book and Manuscript Section, National Library of the Philippines, Manila, Philippines.

3. "The Zamboanga Fair," *Chicago Daily Tribune*, 24 April 1911, 8.

4. "Grand Opening of Zamboanga Fair," *The Manila Times*, 7 February 1911, in *50 Years with the* Times, 76.

5. "The Zamboanga Fair," *Chicago Daily Tribune*, 24 April 1911, 8.

6. John E. Schrecker, *The Chinese Revolution in Historical Perspective* (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2004), 100.

7. Ibid.

8. Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), 7.

9. David Prescott Barrows was appointed by the Taft Commission as chief of the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes in 1903. During his tenure he was instrumental in establishing the Moro Province in Mindanao and Sulu. As a trained anthropologist (with a Ph.D. from the University of Chicago, 1897), Barrows also heavily influenced the ethnological taxonomy of the Philippine Islands under American rule and published these findings initially in the colonial census of 1903. Barrows also served as the general superintendent of education in the Philippines (1903–1909), where he continued to show a particular interest in the islands' minority non-Christian populations. For a thorough account of Barrows's views on the Philippines, see his book *History of the Philippines* (New York & Chicago: World Book Company, 1924).

10. David Prescott Barrows to Professor Frederick Starr, 26 April 1907, in David Prescott Barrows Papers, Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.

11. President William McKinley's "Benevolent Assimilation Proclamation," 21 Dec. 1898, in *Documentary Sources of Philippine History*, comp., ed., and ann. Gregorio F. Zaide (Manila: National Book Store, 1994), 408–11.

12. *Report of the Philippine Commission* (hereafter cited as *RPC*), 1906, pt. 1 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1907), 374.

13. Consider, for example, the following declarations from the Democratic Party Platform of 1900: "The Filipinos cannot be citizens without endangering our civilization; they cannot be subjects without imperiling our form of government . . . . We are not opposed to territorial expansion, when it takes in desirable territory which can be erected into states in the Union, and whose people are willing and fit to become American citizens. We favor trade expansion by every peaceful and legitimate means. But we are unalterable opposed to the seizing or purchasing of distant islands to be governed outside the constitution and whose people can never become citizens." See "Extract from Democratic Campaign Book—1902," "Democratic Platform. Adopted at Kansas City, July 4, 1900," in Bureau of Insular Affairs, RG 350, Box 1, Special Records Relating to the Philippine Islands, National Archives, College Park, Maryland.

14. For an excellent discussion of the United States' emerging imperial zeal during this period, see Warren Zimmermann, *First Great Triumph: How Five Americans Made Their Country a World Power* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2002).

15. The tensions among humanitarianism, racism, and the imperial project are highlighted quite well in Kenton Clymer, "Humanitarian Imperialism: David Prescott Barrows and the White Man's Burden in the Philippines," *Pacific Historical Review* 45, no. 4 (1976): 495–518, as well as in Rodney J. Sullivan, *Exemplar of Americanism: The Philippine Career of Dean C. Worcester* (Ann Arbor: Center for South and Southeast

Asian Studies, University of Michigan, Michigan Papers on South and Southeast Asia, No. 36, 1991).

16. Dwight E. Lee and Robert N. Beck, "The Meaning of 'Historicism,'" *American Historical Review* 59, no. 3 (April 1954): 572.

17. Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe*, 244.

18. James C. Thomson Jr., Peter W. Stanley, and John Curtis Perry, *Sentimental Imperialists: The American Experience in East Asia* (New York: Harper & Row, 1981), 106.

19. Bernard S. Cohn, *Colonialism and Its Forms of Knowledge: The British in India* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), 4.

20. Vicente Rafael's collection of essays, *White Love and Other Events in Filipino History* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000), provides an excellent examination of the American colonial project in the Philippines as it related to humanitarian and civilizing ideals in the metropole and their logistical application in the colony.

21. Donna J. Amoroso, "Inheriting the 'Moro Problem': Muslim Authority and Colonial Rule in British Malaya and the Philippines," in *The American Colonial State in the Philippines: Global Perspectives*, ed. Julian Go and Anne L. Foster (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003), 119.

22. Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe*, 87.

23. Pietro Rossi, "The Ideological Valences of Twentieth-Century Historicism," *History and Theory* 14, no. 4, Beiheft 14: Essays on Historicism (Dec. 1975): 17.

24. Prabhat Patnaik, "Historicism and Revolution," *Social Scientist* 32, no. 1–2 (Jan.–Feb. 2004): 30.

25. Helen P. Liebel, "The Enlightenment and the Rise of Historicism in German Thought," *Eighteenth-Century Studies* 4, no. 4 (Summer 1971): 359.

26. F. H. Heinemann, "Reply to Historicism," *Philosophy* 21, no. 80 (Nov. 1946): 251.

27. Edward W. Said, *Culture and Imperialism* (New York: Vintage Books, 1993), 191.

28. By the time of his negotiations with the Sultan of Sulu in 1899, John Bates was already a seasoned and highly regarded officer in the United States Army. He rose to prominence during the Civil War while contributing significantly to the fall of Richmond. Like many other army officers in the Philippines, he distinguished himself in military operations against various Indian tribes on the American frontier and in the military administration of Cuba. In this sense, he was considered ideal for the Philippine campaign and negotiations with the islands' supposedly "savage" populations. He later served briefly as chief of staff of the United States Army in 1906. He passed away in 1919.

29. Peter G. Gowing, "Muslim-American Relations in the Philippines, 1899–1920," in *The Muslim Filipinos*, ed. Peter G. Gowing and Robert D. McAmis (Manila: Solidaridad Publishing House, 1974), 40. See also Peter G. Gowing, *Mandate in Moroland: The American Government of Muslim Filipinos, 1899–1920* (Quezon City: Philippine Center

for Advanced Studies, University of the Philippines, 1977), and *Muslim Filipinos—Heritage and Horizon* (Quezon City: New Day Publishing, 1979).

30. Paul A Kramer's recent work, *The Blood of Government: Race, Empire, the United States, and the Philippines* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006), provides an excellent discussion of this subject within the context of racial construction in the colony.

31. A Filipino named Sixto Lopez, for example, gave a rousing speech to the New England Anti-Imperialist League in 1900 in which he somewhat misleadingly claimed, "even the Moros of Mindanao . . . acclaimed Aguinaldo and were prepared to recognize his government." Such sentiments at home and in the colony fostered a deep examination of the U.S. imperial legitimacy in the Philippines. See Sixto Lopez, *"Tribes" in the Philippines* (Boston: The New England Anti-Imperialist League, 1900).

32. Patricio N. Abinales, *Images of State Power: Essays on Philippine Politics from the Margins* (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1998), 38.

33. Michael O. Mastura, "Muslim Scholars and Social Science Research: Some Notes on Muslim Studies in the Philippines," in *Muslim Social Science in ASEAN*, ed. Omar Farouk Bajunid (Kuala Lumpur: Yayasan Penataran Ilmu, 1994), 151.

34. See James Warren's three books, *The Global Economy and the Sulu Zone: Connections, Commodities, and Culture* (Quezon City: New Day, 2000), *The Sulu Zone, 1768–1898: The Dynamics of External Trade, Slavery, and Ethnicity in the Transformation of a Southeast Asian Maritime State* (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1981), and *The Sulu Zone: The World Capitalist Economy and the Historical Imagination* (Amsterdam: VU University Press, 1998), for a comprehensive discussion of the "Sulu Zone" as a vital economic and cultural geographic region in the Malay world.

35. David P. Barrows, *History of the Philippines* (New York and Chicago: World Book Company, 1924), 348.

36. For an excellent examination of the historical development of the United States' social sense of humanistic equality, see Gordon S. Wood, *The Radicalism of the American Revolution* (New York: Vintage Books, 1991).

37. Amoroso, "Inheriting the 'Moro Problem,'" 121.

38. Ibid.

39. Ann Laura Stoler and Frederick Cooper, "Between Metropole and Colony: Rethinking a Research Agenda," in *Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World,* ed. Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1997), 1.

40. Ibid., 4.

41. See also Ann Laura Stoler, "Rethinking Colonial Categories: European Communities and the Boundaries of Rule," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 31, no. 1 (Jan. 1989): 134–61, and *Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power: Race and the Intimate in Colonial Rule* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2002), as well as Frederick Cooper, *Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, His-*

tory (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2005).

42. Nicholas Thomas, *Colonialism Culture: Anthropology, Travel and Government* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), 2.

43. Ibid., 14–17.

44. See Craig J. Reynolds, "A New Look at Old Southeast Asia," *Journal of Asian Studies* 54, no. 2 (May 1995): 419–46; Tony Day, *Fluid Iron: State Formation in Southeast Asia* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2002); and Tony Day and Craig J. Reynolds, "Cosmologies, Truth Regimes, and the State in Southeast Asia," *Modern Asian Studies* 34, no. 1 (Feb. 2000): 1–55.

45. See Vicente Rafael, *Contracting Colonialism: Translation and Christian Conversion in Tagalog Society under Early Spanish Rule* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), and *Nationalism and the Technics of Translation in the Spanish Philippines* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005); Reynaldo Clemena Ileto, *Pasyon and Revolution: Popular Movements in the Philippines, 1840–1910* (Manila: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1979), and *Filipinos and Their Revolution: Event, Discourse, and Historiography* (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1998); Paul A. Kramer, *The Blood of Government: Race, Empire, the United States, and the Philippines* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006).

46. Kramer, *The Blood of Government*, 2–5.

47. Kenneth Pomeranz, *The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World Economy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), 8.

48. *Census of the Philippine Islands*, 1903, vol. II (Washington: United States Bureau of the Census, 1905), 15.

49. Samuel K. Tan, *Sulu under American Military Rule, 1899–1913* (Quezon City: University of the Philippines, 1968), 1–3.

50. For a detailed discussion of Sufism, see the following works: Shaykh Fadhlalla Haeri, *The Elements of Sufism* (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1999); Julian Baldick, *Mystical Islam: An Introduction to Sufism* (New York: NYU Press, 2000); Idries Shah, *The Way of the Sufi* (New York: Penguin, 1991); and J. Spencer Trimingham, *The Sufi Orders in Islam* (London: Oxford University Press, 1998). For a telling look at Sufism in Southeast Asia specifically, an excellent case study is provided by M. C. Ricklefs, *The Seen and Unseen Worlds in Java, 1726–1749: History, Literature and Islam in the Court of Pakubuwana II* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1998).

51. See *The Heritage of Sufism*, ed. Leonard Lewisohn (Boston: Oneworld, 1999); Hussin Mutalib, *Islam in Southeast Asia* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2008); *Islam in Southeast Asia: Political Social and Strategic Challenges for the 21st Century*, ed. K. S. Nathan and Mohammad Hashim Kamali (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005); *Readings on Islam in Southeast Asia*, ed. Ahmad Ibrahim, Sharon Siddique, and Yasmin Hussain (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1985).

52. Gowing, *Mandate in Moroland*, 8–9.

53. Ibid., 12.

54. Caesar Adib Majul, *The Historical Background of the Muslims in the Philippines and the Present Mindanao Crisis* (Marawi City: Printed Under the Auspices of the Ansar El Islam as a Background Material on the Occasion of Its Second National Islamic Symposium and Third Foundation Anniversary, 1972), 12.

55. From the preface to *The Muslim Filipinos*, ed. Peter G. Gowing and Robert D. McAmis (Manila: Solidaridad Publishing House, 1974), viii.

56. Ibid., 37.

57. Brian McAllister Linn, *The Philippine War, 1899–1902* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2000), 180, 226. See also *RPC*, 1902, pt. 1, 15.

58. Kramer, *Blood of Government*, 218.

59. Gowing, *Mandate in Moroland*, 108–10. For an excellent summation of Leonard Wood's life and career, see Jack McCallum, *Leonard Wood: Rough Rider, Surgeon, Architect of American Imperialism* (New York: NYU Press, 2006).

60. Gowing, *Mandate in Moroland*, 167–69. For one of the few biographical works published about Tasker Bliss, see Frederick Palmer, *Bliss, Peacemaker: The Life and Letters of General Tasker Howard Bliss* (Whitefish: Kessinger Publishing, LLC, 2007).

61. Pershing served at various stations throughout Moro Province between 1899 and 1903, including Zamboanga, Iligan, and Camp Vicars in the Lake Lanao region. See Donald Smythe, "Pershing and the Disarmament of the Moros," *Pacific Historical Review* 31, no. 3 (Aug. 1962): 241–56.

62. Gowing, *Mandate in Moroland*, 230–42. For three good biographical works on John J. Pershing, see Donald Smythe, *Pershing, General of the Armies* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007); Gene Smith, *Until the Last Trumpet Sounds: The General of the Armies John J. Pershing* (Hoboken: Wiley, 1999); and Frank E. Vandiver, *Black Jack: The Life and Times of John J. Pershing* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1977).

63. Pershing to William Cameron Forbes, July 28, 1911, Pershing Papers, Box 379, quoted in Smythe, "Pershing and the Disarmament of the Moros," 246.

64. Ibid., 209.

65. *RPC*, 1904, pt. 2, 571.

66. *RPC*, 1902, pt. 1, 684.

67. Amoroso, "Inheriting the 'Moro Problem,'" 121.

68. Samuel K. Tan, *Sulu under American Military Rule, 1899–1913* (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1968), 1.

69. See T. J. Jackson Lears, "From Salvation to Self-Realization: Advertising and the Therapeutic Roots of the Consumer Culture, 1880–1930," in *The Culture of Consumption: Critical Essays in American History, 1880–1980*, ed. Richard Wightman Fox and T. J. Jackson Lears (New York: Pantheon Books, 1983).

1: Imperial Taxonomies

1. Thomas, *Colonialism's Culture*, 6.

2. Larry Wolff and Marco Cipolloni, "Preface," in *The Anthropology of the En-*

lightenment, ed. Larry Wolff and Marco Cipolloni (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), xi–xii.

3. William McKinley, "Concern for the Filipinos," a speech before Congress, Feb. 24, 1899, Congressional Record, 2214, RG 350, entry 33, box no. 1, Bureau of Insular Affairs, Special Records Relating to the Philippine Islands, Quotations from Speeches and Statement by the President of the U.S. Concerning the Philippine Islands, 1900–1904, National Archives, College Park, Maryland.

4. Jan van Bremen and Akitoshi Shimizu, "Anthropology in Colonial Contexts: A Tale of Two Countries and Some," in *Anthropology and Colonialism in Asia and Oceania*, ed. Jan van Bremen and Akitoshi Shimizu (Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press, 1999), 8.

5. Thomas, *Colonialism's Culture*, 111–12.

6. The best examination of this phenomenon in the Philippines is found in Vicente Rafael's article "White Love: Census and Melodrama in the U.S. Colonization of the Philippines," in his volume *White Love and Other Events in Filipino History* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000), 19–51.

7. Wolff and Cipolloni, "Preface," in *The Anthropology of the Enlightenment*, 10.

8. "Where Civilization Is Needed," *The Mindanao Herald*, 25 June 1904, 4.

9. "Ancient Sacrificial Rites in Russia," *The Daily Bulletin*, 16 August 1900, 4.

10. "Surigao in 1903: The Letters of Russell Suter," *Kinaadman: Journal of the Southern Philippines* XI (1983): 85.

11. Daniel G. Briton, "Professor Blumentritt's Studies of the Philippines," *American Anthropologist,* New Series, 1, no. 1 (January 1899): 122.

12. *RPC*, 1904, pt. 2, 571.

13. Ibid.

14. See Act No. 253 of the Philippine Commission, quoted in Michael O. Mastura, "Muslim Scholars and Social Science Research: Some Notes on Muslim Studies in the Philippines," in *Muslim Social Science in ASEAN*, ed. Omar Farouk Bajunid (Kuala Lumpur: Yayasan Penataran Ilmu, 1994), 153.

15. *RPC*, 1902, pt. 1, 306–7, 679–88.

16. See Act No. 841 of the Philippine Commission, quoted in ibid.

17. *RPC*, 1904, pt. 2, 571.

18. Ibid., 567–68.

19. There also seems to be an urgent concern regarding the Americans' ethnological contributions to a broader global imperial scientific community. Miller's desire to "furnish an important contribution to the ethnology of the Pacific" demonstrates an interesting layered approach to imperial discourses as American imperialists spoke among themselves, to other colonial powers, and to the subjects they ruled. See ibid., 571.

20. Thomas F. Millard, "Fighting Moros Not Assimilated," *Chicago Daily Tribune*, 15 March 1908, A-2.

21. See Kramer, *The Blood of Government*, 130–45.

22. *RPC*, 1903, pt. 1, 81.

23. Hugh L. Scott, *Some Memories of a Soldier* (New York: The Century Company, 1928), 312, 283.

24. "Ownership Right: Road to Conquest," *The Manila Times*, 11 October 1910 in *50 Years with the* Times, part II, July 1 to December 31, 1910.

25. John Pershing to Cameron Forbes, 28 February 1913, quoted in Nasser A. Marohomsalic, *Aristocrats of the Malay Race: A History of the Bangsa Moro in the Philippines* (Quezon City: VJ Graphics Arts, 1995), 26.

26. "A Little Scrap on Basilan," *The Mindanao Herald*, 11 July 1908, 1.

27. John F. Bass, "Jolo and the Moros," *Harpers Weekly*, 18 November 1899, 1158ad.

28. Colonel Owen J. Sweet, "The Moro: The Fighting-Man of the Philippines," *Harpers Weekly*, 9 June 1906, 0808d.

29. Thomas F. Millard, "The Taming of the Moros of the Philippines," *New York Times*, 15 March 1908, SM8.

30. Ralph M. Whiteside, "Bishop Brent's Solution to the Philippine Problem," *New York Tribune*, 20 October 1913, 4, quoted in Kenton J. Clymer, *Protestant Missionaries in the Philippines, 1898–1916: An Inquiry into the American Colonial Mentality* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1986), 72.

31. Scott, *Some Memories of a Soldier*, 312–13.

32. "McKinley's Re-election," *The Daily Bulletin*, 9 November 1900, 4.

33. *RPC*, 1901, vol. III, 371.

34. Sweet, "The Moro: The Fighting-Man of the Philippines," *Harpers Weekly*, 9 June 1906, 808d.

35. Scott, *Some Memories of a Soldier*, 316.

36. *Census of the Philippine Islands*, 1903, vol. I, 563.

37. John F. Bass, "Jolo and the Moros," *Harpers Weekly*, 18 November 1899, 1158ad.

38. "Agricultural Fair a Success," *The Mindanao Herald*, 18 August 1906, 1–2; "Yakans Will Attend Fair," ibid., 3 November 1906, 1.

39. In January 1899, for example, Emilio Aguinaldo crafted a letter to the Sultan that read, in part: "[T]he Filipinos, after having thrown off the yoke of foreign domination cannot forget their brothers of Jolo to whom they are bound by the ties of race, interest, security and defense in this region of the Far East. . . . I therefore in the name of all the Filipinos very gladly offer to the powerful Sultan of Jolo and to all brothers who acknowledge his great authority, the greatest assurance of friendship, consideration and esteem." The letter was never sent. See "President Aguinaldo Solicits Muslim Cooperation (Malolos, January 19, 1899)," in *Documentary Sources of Philippine History*, ed. Gregorio F. Zaide and Sonia M. Zaide (Manila: National Book Store, 1994), 20.

40. Gowing, *Mandate in Moroland*, 28–37.

41. "Sultan of Sulu Has His Dream at Last," *New York Times*, 24 September

1910, 1. Concerning the comic operettas, see also Gowing, *Mandate in Moroland,* 47.

42. "Sultan of Sulu Has His Dream at Last," *New York Times*, 24 September 1910, 1.

43. "New York's Marvels Awe Sultan of Sulu," ibid., 25 September 1910, 1.

44. "Sultan of Sulu Ends World Trip," *The Manila Times*, 31 October 1910, in *50 Years with the* Times, part II, July 1 to December 31, 1910.

45. *Census of the Philippine Islands*, 1903, vol. II, 27.

46. "The Moro Territory," *The Mindanao Herald*, 29 July 1905, 4.

47. "American Character and the Philippines," ibid., 12 August 1905, 9–10; "What These Islands Offer," ibid., 5 August 1905, 4; "Editorial Comment," ibid., 2 September 1905, 4.

48. *Census of the Philippines Islands*, 1903, vol. I, 564.

49. "Jolo & the Moros," *Harpers Weekly*, 18 November 1899, 1159ac.

50. "American Character and the Philippines," *The Mindanao Herald*, 12 August 1905, 9–10.

51. John Roberts White, *Bullets and Bolos: Fifteen Years in the Philippine Islands* (New York: The Century Company, 1928), 194.

52. "The Moros," *The Mindanao Herald*, 20 February 1904, 4.

53. Bernard Cohn, *Colonialism and Its Forms of Knowledge*, 7–8.

54. See Thongchai Winichakul, *Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-Body of a Nation* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1994), and Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (New York: Verso, 1983), 170–78.

55. "From Malindang to Mount Apo," *The Mindanao Herald*, 11 January 1908, 1.

56. "Explorations in Western Mindanao," ibid., 25 May 1907, 3.

57. "Conquest of Mt. Matutum, Cotabato," *The Manila Times*, 31 October 1910, in *50 Years with the* Times, part I, January 1 to June 30, 1911, 331.

58. "Moros Remove a 'Hoodoo,'" *The Mindanao Herald*, 21 October 1905, 1–2.

59. It is likely that this was actually a Philippine crocodile, since alligators are not indigenous to the islands.

60. "Death of Datto Mustapha Productive of Good Results," *The Mindanao Herald*, 8 April 1905, 1–2.

61. "An Anting-Anting Man," ibid., 21 January 1905, 1–2.

62. P. G. McDonnell, Committee on Public Works to the Office of the Municipal Board, City of Manila, 19 Oct. 1903. BIA/DC Burnham Papers, Rare Books and Manuscripts, Filipiniana Division, National Library of the Philippines, Manila.

63. Minutes of the Legislative Council of the Moro Province, 12 September 1903, in the Leonard Woods Papers, reel 1, Microfilm Section, National Library of the Philippines, Manila.

64. "Agricultural Fair at Jolo," *The Mindanao Herald*, 27 October 1906, 2.

65. "The Weavers," ibid., 19 September 1908, 4.

66. "Thirteen Days of Genuine Pleasure," ibid., 11 January 1908, 2.

67. David Brody, *Visualizing American Empire: Orientalism and Imperialism in the Philippines* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010), 3.

68. See "Programme of the Entertainment in Honor of the Honorable Secretary of War, William H. Taft, Who Was the First Civil Governor of the Philippine Islands under the American Administration, and Party, on Their Visit to Zamboanga, the Capital of Mindanao, August 17–18, 1905," *The Mindanao Herald*, 12 August 1905, 5.

69. "The St. Louis Exposition," *The Daily Bulletin*, 15 February 1903, 9.

70. Kramer, *The Blood of Government*, 230–32.

71. *RPC*, 1904, pt. 2, 569.

72. "Moro Industrial School Exhibit at St. Louis Fair," *The Mindanao Herald*, 29 October 1904, 1.

73. *Philippines: Handbook and Catalogue of the Philippine Exhibit*, St. Louis, 1904, from Records of the Bureau of Insular Affairs, Special Records Relating to the Philippine Islands, Miscellaneous Records, ca. 1893–1932, RG 350, Box 2, United States National Archives, College Park, Maryland, 161.

74. "Editorial Comments," *The Mindanao Herald*, 15 October 1904, 3.

75. Moro Province officials derived much of their antipathy for their counterparts in Mountain Province from a perceived tendency by the latter to exploit the exoticism and curiosity of their subjects without making any significant investment in their development. Take, for example, the following editorial comments published in *The Mindanao Herald* in 1905: "We are in receipt of vol.1, 'The Bontoc Igorot,' published by the Ethnological Survey, doubtless at the expense of many thousands of dollars, the expenditure of which would have been infinitely more beneficial to the dog-eating head-hunters had it been expended in opening up and developing their section of the country. Perhaps such stuff as that being dished up by the Ethnological Survey has its place in the world, but it should be the result of collegiate rather than governmental research. If the people who pay for such useless and expensive appendages as the Ethnological Survey had any influence with their masters, the superimposed governors, that bureau would be traded off for a 'yaller' dog and the dog instantly shot." See "Editorial Comment," *The Mindanao Herald*, 10 June 1905, 4. For an account of military policies and accomplishments in Mountain Province, see Frank Lawrence Jenista, *The White Apos: American Governors on the Cordillera Central* (Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 1987).

76. "Commentary," *The Mindanao Herald*, 15 October 1904, 4.

77. From an internal standpoint, however, many colonial authorities did consider the St. Louis Exposition to be an invaluable positive influence on their Moro participants. Military officials reported to the Philippine Commission, "The Moros who went to the St. Louis Exposition . . . seem to be benefited by their visit, and their influence among their friends has been good. No case has been brought up to me showing an intentional wrong by any one of the Moros who visited the United States.

Now, many of the influential Moros want to visit the United States, and I recommend that arrangements be made for a number of headmen and important datos to visit the States next summer . . . . A visit of this sort, I believe, would be very beneficial for this section of the Moro country." *RPC*, 1905, pt. 1, 345.

78. Moro participation in the 1908 Philippine Carnival was vehemently protested by independence-minded Christian Filipino politicians in Manila. Fernando Ma. Guerrero, a well-known member of the Philippine Assembly, introduced a bill calling for the "absolute prohibition of the exhibition . . . of members of the non-Christian tribes . . . any place within the jurisdiction of the Philippines islands under any pretext whatever." The bill also sought to institute fines of between 1,000 and 3,000 pesos and prison terms of between 6 and 12 months for offenders. Though the bill was defeated, it illustrates the acute discomfort experienced by many Christian Filipinos at colonial representations of savagery and cultural comparisons between Muslim and Christian Filipinos. See "Don't Want Moros at Carnival," *The Mindanao Herald*, 18 January 1908, 4.

79. *The Official Souvenir Program of the Philippines Carnival*, February 27–March 3, 1908, from the American Historical Collection, Rizal Library, Ateneo de Manila University, Philippines.

80. "A Continual Round of Pleasure," *The Mindanao Herald*, 4 January 1908, 2.

81. "Preparations for the Carnival," ibid., 18 January 1908, 5.

82. *Philippine Carnival*, Official Handbook, Manila, February 2–9, 1909, from the American Historical Collection, Rizal Library, Ateneo de Manila University, Philippines, 1.

83. "Carnival Exhibit of Moro Province," *The Mindanao Herald*, 16 January 1909, 1.

84. "Moro Invasion," *The Manila Times*, 28 Jan. 1909, in *50 Years with the* Times, part I, January 1 to June 30, 1909, 72.

85. "Bayanihan: Moro Style," *The Manila Times*, 31 January 1909, in ibid., 83.

86. "Plans for Arrival of Moro Delegation in Manila," *The Mindanao Herald*, 23 January 1909, 1.

87. "Moro Invasion," *The Manila Times*, 28 January 1909, in *50 Years with the* Times, part I, January 1 to June 30, 1909, 74.

88. "Carnival Day," *The Manila Times*, 2 February 1909, in ibid., 88.

89. "Our Mohammedan Soldiers," *The Philippine Monthly* 1, no. 12 (Oct. 1910), 38–39.

2: Disruptions

1. See, for example, Cesar Adib Majul, *Muslims in the Philippines* (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1973); Majul, "The Muslims in the Philippines: An Historical Perspective," in *The Muslim Filipinos*, ed. Peter G. Gowing and Robert D.

McAmis (Manila: Solidaridad Publishing House, 1974); Majul, *The Historical Background of the Muslims in the Philippines and the Present Mindanao Crisis* (Marawi City: Printed Under the Auspices of the Ansar El Islam as a Background Material on the Occasion of Its Second National Islamic Symposium and Third Foundation Anniversary, 1972); Pangalian M. Balindong, *Potential Dynamics of Muslim Role in Nation Building: Unity in Diversity* (Marawi City: Printed Under the Auspices of the Ansar El Islam as a Position Paper on the Occasion of Its Second National Islamic Symposium and Third Foundation Anniversary, 1972); Peter G. Gowing, *Muslim Filipinos—Heritage and Horizon* (Quezon City: New Day Publishing, 1979); B. R. Rodil, *The Story of Mindanao and Sulu in Question and Answer* (Davao: MINCODE, 2003).

2. Najeeb Saleeby was a Syrian-born American physician with a degree from the American University in Beirut. Perhaps due to his own Arab roots, Saleeby became intensely interested in Filipino Muslims and served as the superintendent of schools in Mindanao and Sulu for a number of years before becoming the first medical director of the University Hospital in Manila in 1907. His tireless advocacy for education and health care as well as his deep-seated respect for and defense of Muslim populations in the Philippines have made him an especially noteworthy participant in the American colonial project. His three most influential written works are *Studies in Moro History, Law, and Religion*, Department of the Interior Ethnological Survey Publications, IV, pt. 1 (Manila: Bureau of Public Printing, 1905); *The History of Sulu,* Filipiniana Book Guild, Publications No. 4 (Manila: Filipiniana Book Guild, 1963); and "The Moro Problem: An Academic Discussion of the History and Solution of the Problem of the Government of the Moros of the Philippine Islands (1913)," *Dansalan Quarterly* 5, no. 1 (1983). Also, for an interesting discussion of Saleeby's philosophies and work among the Moros, see Jeffery Ayala Milligan, "Reclaiming and Ideal: The Islamization of Education in the Southern Philippines," *Comparative Education Review* 50 (2006): 410–30.

3. Saleeby, *Studies in Moro History, Law, and Religion*, 11, 51.

4. *RPC,* 1901, vol. III, 338.

5. *RPC*, 1903, pt. 1, 481.

6. "Historical Section," *The Mindanao Herald*, 3 February 1909, 10; "The Moros," ibid., 20 February 1904, 5.

7. "Give Moros Try at West Point," *The Mindanao Herald*, 13 June 1908, 1.

8. "Remarks of General Pershing" at a "Meeting of the Leading Sultans, Dattos, Headmen and Other Prominent Moros of the District of Lanao, Held at Marahui [Marawi], I., May 29–30, 1911," in Pershing Papers, Microfilm and Microfiche Section, Philippines National Library, Manila. American promotion of the Koran was also often a manipulative attempt to coerce Moros into accepting certain colonial policies and restrictions by using their doctrinal points against them. Consider the following advice given in an ethnological account of the Moros printed in *The Mindanao Herald*: "the Koran is everywhere regarded with profound reverence, and this fact may

sometime be used to great advantage by the American Government when it is desired to reform a law or legislate against a vice. . . . [the] precepts of the Koran would be a surer method of preventing opposition than any other that could be used." See "The Moros," *The Mindanao Herald*, 12 March 1904, 6.

9. *Philippines: Handbook and Catalogue of the Philippine Exhibit*, St. Louis, 1904, from Records of the Bureau of Insular Affairs, Special Records Relating to the Philippine Islands, Miscellaneous Records, ca. 1893–1932, RG 350, Box 2, United States National Archives, College Park, Maryland, 161.

10. See Edmund Arthur Dodge, "Our Mohammedan Subjects," *Political Science Quarterly* 19, no. 1 (March 1904): 20–31.

11. *Affairs in the Philippine Islands, Hearings Before the Committee on the Philippines of the United States Senate*, 57th Congress, 1st Session, Doc. No. 331, Part 3 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1902), 2127.

12. "The Moros," *The Mindanao Herald*, 2 April 1904, 5.

13. For an excellent discussion of the intimate connection between writing systems, literature, and civilization as judged by European imperialists, see Walter D. Mignolo, *The Darker Side of the Renaissance: Literacy, Territoriality, & Colonization* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995).

14. Saleeby, *Studies in Moro History, Law, and Religion*, 51.

15. *RPC*, 1904, pt. 2, 557.

16. *Census of the Philippine Islands, Taken under the Direction of the Philippine Commission in the Year 1903*, vol. II (Washington: United States Bureau of the Census, 1905), 571, 574.

17. Ibid., 574. American officials in Moro Province estimated Moro literacy at 8 percent; however, it is unclear whether this included recognition and comprehension or simply the ability to identify the written word. See "The Schools of Moroland," *The Mindanao Herald*, 3 February 1909, 35.

18. "The Moros," *The Mindanao Herald*, 12 March 1904, 5.

19. For an exceptional discussion of Malay in this context, see James T. Collins, *Malay, World Language: A Short History*, 2nd ed. (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 2000).

20. *RPC*, 1904, pt. 2, 582.

21. Bernard Lewis, *Islam in History: Ideas, People, and Events in the Middle East* (Chicago: Open Court Publishing Company, 1993), 10.

22. Charles Forster, *Mahometanism Unveiled* (London, 1829), quoted in ibid., 9.

23. Minutes of the Legislative Council of the Moro Province, 9 December 1903, in Leonard Woods Papers, reel 1, Microfilm Section, National Library of the Philippines, Manila.

24. *RPC*, 1901, vol. III, 372, 377.

25. Two extensive ethnological reports in *The Mindanao Herald*, for example, spent a great deal of time on the Moros' largely heretical practice of Islam. See "Long

Haired Yacans on Basilan," *The Mindanao Herald*, 26 December 1903, and "The Moros," ibid., 12 March 1904. See also *RPC*, 1901, vol. III, 370–77.

26. *Census of the Philippine Islands*, 1903, vol. I, 571–72.

27. George W. Robinson to "Friends," 8 May 1903, George W. Robinson Papers (1 folder), Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan.

28. See "The Moros," *The Mindanao Herald*, 9 April 1904, 5.

29. Dean C. Worcester, *The Philippine Islands and Their People* (New York: Macmillan, 1909), 202.

30. *Census of the Philippine Islands,* 1903, vol. II, 569–81; see also "The Moros," *The Mindanao Herald*, 9 April 1904, 5, and "Conditions in Sulu Islands," *New York Times*, 26 May 1901, 5.

31. *RPC*, 1904, pt. 2, 577.

32. It should be noted that debates regarding Islamic syncretism and doctrinal deviation among Filipino Muslims are still alive today, and not only among non-Muslim observers. Moros are often chastened by Arabs and other Near Eastern Muslims while on Hajj for their perceived lack of religious understanding and syncretic tendencies. Mosques throughout the ARMM are also frequently visited by foreign Islamic scholars promoting education and doctrinal conformity. While various religious practices and doctrinal understandings are certainly unique to the southern Philippines' particular brand of Islam, many scholars have suggested that the spirit of the Moros' religious devotions should take precedence over any single-minded adherence to religious dogma when judging degrees of Muslimness. "[T]here is no question about the psychological disposition of the ordinary person to be Muslim," wrote Peter Gowing in the 1970s, "which is, in the final analysis, the only valid degree of 'Muslimness' that can be judged." See Peter Gowing, "Moros and Khaek: The Position of Muslim Minorities in the Philippines and Thailand," in *Readings on Islam in Southeast Asia,* compiled by Ahmad Ibrahim, Sharon Siddique, and Yasmin Hussain (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1985), 127.

33. See "Conditions in Sulu Islands," *New York Times*, 26 May 1901, 5; "Plans for Abolishing Philippine Slavery," ibid., 21 December 1901, 8; "America Abrogates Treaty with Moros," ibid., 15 March 1904, 5.

34. "Slavery in the Philippines," *Chicago Daily Tribune*, 5 March 1899, 50.

35. Timothy Marr, *The Cultural Roots of American Islamicism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

36. Michael Salman, *The Embarrassment of Slavery: Controversies over Bondage and Nationalism in the American Colonial Philippines* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2001), 20, 28.

37. The Bates Treaty promised a policy of noninterference within Moro society and made special efforts not to infringe on cherished Muslim traditions and institutions. Regarding slavery, the treaty did not suggest its abolition but required only that slaves be allowed to purchase their freedom at a fair market price (Article X). See

Gowing, *Mandate in Moroland,* 319.

38. *Affairs in the Philippine Islands, Hearings Before the Committee on the Philippines of the United States Senate*, 57th Congress, 1st Session, Doc. No. 331, Part 2 (Washington: Government Printing Press, 1902), 1962.

39. *RPC*, 1901, vol. III, quoted in "Plans for Abolishing Philippine Slavery," *New York Times*, 21 December 1901, 8.

40. *RPC*, 1901, vol. III, 375; *Census of the Philippine Islands,* 1903, vol. II, 570.

41. "Jolo and the Moros," *Harpers Weekly*, 18 November 1899, 1158ad; see also "Experiences in the Philippines: A Quaint Trial in Moroland," ibid., 14 May 1904.

42. Dean Worcester, *The Philippines Past and Present*, vol. 2 (London: Macmillan, 1914), 513.

43. *RPC*, 1903, pt. 1, 493–94.

44. William H. Taft to Leonard Wood, 21 October 1903 in Minutes of the Legislative Council of the Moro Province, 28 October 1903, Leonard Woods Papers, reel 1, Microfilm Section, National Library of the Philippines, Manila.

45. "Island Slavery Known to Taft," *Chicago Tribune*, 28 January 1908.

46. Identifying patron-client relationships as an academic model for understanding Southeast Asian social and political relationships was first pioneered by Carl Landé who, in his book *Leaders, Factions, and Parties: The Structure of Philippine Politics* (New Haven: Southeast Asian Studies, Yale University, Monograph No. 6, 1964), attempted to explain the Filipinos' apparent lack of political class consciousness. This work was quickly followed by M. G. Swift's *Malay Peasant Society in Jelebu* (London: Athlone Press, 1965), and Herbert Phillips, *Thai Peasant Personality* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1965). However, for one of the best studies and explanations of patron-client relationships in Southeast Asia, see James C. Scott, "Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia," in *Friend, Followers, and Factions: A Reader in Political Clientelism*, ed. S. W. Schmidt et al. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1977), 123–46, as well as his seminal work, *The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976). For specific treatment of the Philippines, see Donn V. Hart, *Compadrinazgo: Ritual Kinship in the Philippines* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1977).

47. For a wide-ranging discussion of the forms and practices of slavery in the Philippines and the Malay world, see *Slavery, Bondage, and Dependency in Southeast Asia,* ed. Anthony Reid (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983); James Warren, *The Sulu Zone, 1768–1898: The Dynamics of External Trade, Slavery, and Ethnicity in the Transformation of a Southeast Asian Maritime State* (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1981); *Asian and African Systems of Slavery*, ed. James Watson (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980); and Ghislaine Loyre, "The Place of the Slave among the Muslims of the Philippines, 16th–19th Centuries," *Kinaadman: Journal of the Southern Philippines* XX (1998): 73–99.

48. *Census of the Philippine Islands,* 1903, vol. II, 570.

49. "Slaves at St. Louis Fair," *New York Times*, 5 May 1904, 3.

50. *RPC*, 1903, pt. 1, 492.

51. Ibid., 528.

52. See for example, *Hearings Before the Committee on the Philippines of the United States Senate,* 57th Congress, 1st Session, Doc. No. 331, pt. 3, 1902, 2144.

53. *RPC*, 1904, pt. 3, p.123. However, similar assessments were briefly alluded to prior to Harbord's official report. In 1899 *Harpers Weekly* located Moro slavery somewhere "between the serfdom of the Middle Ages and the peonage of Mexico." See "Jolo & the Moros," *Harpers Weekly*, 18 November 1899, 1159ac.

54. *Affairs in the Philippine Islands, Hearings Before the Committee on the Philippines of the United States Senate*, 57th Congress, 1st Session, Doc. No. 331, Part 3 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1902), 2127.

55. "The Moros," *The Mindanao Herald*, 19 March 1904, 5.

56. Gowing, *Mandate in Moroland*, 191.

57. *RPC*, 1907, pt. 1, 393.

58. Kramer, *The Blood of Government*, 162.

59. Reynaldo C. Ileto, *Pasyon and Revolution: Popular Movements in the Philippines, 1840–1910* (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1979).

60. See Vicente L. Rafael, *Contracting Colonialism: Translation and Christian Conversion in Tagalog Society under Early Spanish Rule* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1993); *The Promise of the Foreign: Nationalism and the Technics of Translation in the Spanish Philippines* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005); and "Census and Melodrama in the U.S. Colonization of the Philippines," in *White Love and Other Events in Filipino History* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000).

61. "Explorations in Western Mindanao," *The Mindanao Herald*, 25 May 1907, 2.

62. "Spirit of the Island Press," ibid., 27 October 1906, 4.

63. "From Malindang to Mount Apo: Mr. W. D. Smith Tells of an Interesting Trip through Little Known Regions of Mindanao," ibid., 11 January 1908; "The Moros," ibid., 20 February 1904, 5.

3: Capitalism as Panacea

1. See Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, trans. Stephen Kalberg (Los Angeles: Roxbury Publishing Company, 2002).

2. "The Plain Truth," *The Daily Bulletin*, 14 May 1900, 4.

3. "Public School Entertainment," *The Mindanao Herald*, 24 February 1906, 1.

4. "Self-Education," *The Daily Bulletin*, 14 July 1906, 4.

5. "Our New Prosperity," ibid., 18 August 1900, 3–4.

6. Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe,* 47.

7. Ibid.

8. "The Gospel of Work," *The Mindanao Herald*, 12 August 1905, 5.

9. "Editorial Comment," ibid., 10 June 1905, 4.

10. E. F. Glenn to Tasker Bliss, 10 February 1909, Tasker Bliss Papers, Microfilm and Microfiche Sections, National Library of the Philippines, Manila.

11. *RPC*, 1904, pt. 2, 589.

12. *RPC*, 1906, pt. 1, 355.

13. *RPC*, 1905, pt. 3, 118.

14. *Census of the Philippine Islands*, 1903, vol. II, 566.

15. *RPC*, 1904, pt. 2, 590.

16. New Release, 31 October 1903, News Service of Massachusetts and Rhode Island YMCA, YMCA Records, quoted in Clymer, *Protestant Missionaries in the Philippines*, 71.

17. See Anthony Reid, *Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce*, 1450–1680, vols. I–II (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988); and Robert B. Marks, *The Origins of the Modern World: A Global and Ecological Narrative from the Fifteenth to the Twenty-First Century* (London: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2007), 33–36.

18. Bernard Lewis, *Islam in History*, 96.

19. *RPC*, 1905, pt. 1, 345.

20. *RPC*, 1906, pt. 1, 352.

21. Scott, *Some Memories of a Soldier*, 283.

22. Ibid., 385.

23. "Starr Admires Model Moro," *Chicago Daily Tribune*, 30 November 1908, 4.

24. "Straight Talk from Davao," *The Mindanao Herald*, 4 July 1908, 1.

25. "Spirit of the Island Press," ibid., 8 December 1906, 4.

26. "The People of Mindanao and Jolo," ibid., 12 December 1903, 5.

27. *Census of the Philippine Islands*, 1903, vol. I, 566.

28. *RPC*, 1906, pt. 1, 376.

29. *RPC*, 1905, pt. 1, 338.

30. John J. Pershing to W. A. Keay, 5 May 1910, in John J. Pershing Papers, Microfilm and Microfiche Section, National Library of the Philippines, Manila.

31. Meeting of the Leading Sultans, Dattos, Headmen, and Other Prominent Moros of the District of Lanao, Held at Marahui [Marawi], I., May 29–30, 1911, in Pershing Papers, Microfilm and Microfiche Section, National Library of the Philippines, Manila.

32. "The Workshop of the Modern Youngster," *Chicago Daily Tribune*, 20 March 1904, A2.

33. *RPC*, 1904, pt. 2, 589.

34. *RPC*, 1905, pt. 1, 345.

35. Pershing to Keay, 5 May 1910, in Pershing Papers.

36. *Census of the Philippine Islands*, 1903, vol. II, 566.

37. "Gov. Wood Will Return," *The Mindanao Herald*, 12 August 1905, 4.

38. *RPC*, 1906, pt. 1, 355.

39. "Chinese Immigration," *The Daily Bulletin*, 15 February 1903, 1.

40. "The Hemp Industry," ibid., 3; "Importation of Rice," ibid., 16.

41. "Filipino Labor," ibid., 17 September 1903, 3.

42. "Spirit of the Island Press," *The Mindanao Herald*, 26 January 1907, 4.

43. "Manila and Moroland," ibid., 26 August 1905, 2.

44. William Taft to Elihu Root, cablegram, 9 April 1901, in Bureau of Insular Affairs, Special Records Relating to the Philippine Islands, RG 350, Box 1, Corr. Of the Philippine Commission, 1900–1906, National Archives, College Park, Maryland.

45. "Moro Exchange System Revised," *The Mindanao Herald*, 4 July 1908, 1.

46. "Open for Business," ibid., 3 September 1904, 1.

47. *RPC*, 1906, pt. 1, 340.

48. Finley to Pershing, 10 February 1910, Pershing Papers.

49. *RPC*, 1906, pt. 1, 345.

50. "Open for Business," *The Mindanao Herald*, 3 September 1904, 1.

51. "Moro Exchange a Success," ibid., 17 March 1906, 3.

52. *RPC*, 1906, pt. 1, 376.

53. "The Moro Exchange," *The Mindanao Herald*, 19 March 1904, 1.

54. "The Moro Exchange," ibid., 7 May 1904, 6.

55. "Moro Exchange a Success," ibid., 17 March 1906, 3.

56. *RPC*, 1906, pt. 1, 345.

57. "Open for Business," *The Mindanao Herald*, 3 September 1904, 2.

58. Rafael, *White Love*, 26, 22.

59. "The Moro Exchange," *The Mindanao Herald*, 19 March 1904, 1.

60. "Open for Business," ibid., 3 September 1904, 1–2.

61. "The Moro Exchange," ibid., 3 September 1904, 2.

62. "The Moro Exchange," ibid., 19 March 1904, 1.

63. "Open for Business," ibid., 3 September 1904, 2.

64. "Want an Exchange," ibid., 14 January 1905, 1.

65. "Zamboanga District Progressing," ibid., 30 December 1905, 2.

66. "Yacans Build Exchange," ibid., 14 December 1907, 3.

67. By 1910 the Moro Exchange system was revamped, and Moro Exchanges eventually gave way to "Industrial Trading Stations." The two entities were virtually the same in function and purpose and ultimately produced the same results. One important difference, however, was an increase in government regulation of the industrial trading stations, which were placed under the provincial "Industrial Office." The Industrial Office also strove to integrate remote areas into the trading system and attempted to protect native agriculture and manufactures by carefully watching domestic and foreign markets. See Gowing, *Mandate in Moroland*, 228–29.

68. *RPC,* 1908, pt. 1, 376.

69. "Moro Exchange a Success," *The Mindanao Herald*, 17 March 1906, 3.

70. *RPC*, 1906, pt. 1, 381.

71. Minutes of the Legislative Council of the Moro Province, 28 December 1905, Woods Papers.

72. "Moro Exchange at Jolo," *The Mindanao Herald*, 6 July 1907, 2; *RPC*, 1906, pt. 1, 381.

73. "Moro Exchange a Success," *The Mindanao Herald*, 17 March 1906, 3.

74. John Finley to John Pershing, 10 February 1910, in the Pershing Papers.

75. *RPC*, 1906, pt. 1, 342.

76. "Pelis Pirates Are Again Busy," *The Mindanao Herald*, 22 December 1906, 1.

77. *RPC*, 1906, pt. 1, 349.

78. Gowing, *Mandate in Moroland*, 189.

79. Ibid., 212; Abinales, *Making Mindanao*, 20–21.

80. Abinales, *Making Mindanao,* 20–21.

81. "Editorial Comment," *The Mindanao Herald*, 8 December 1906, 4.

82. Gowing, *Mandate in Moroland*, 227.

83. *RPC*, 1905, pt. 1, 341, 343.

84. "A Decennium," *The Mindanao Herald*, 3 February 1909, 1.

85. "Pershing Pleased with Mindanao," *50 Years with the* Times, October 25, 1910.

86. Muhammad Salip Sakib to Major Hugh L. Scott, "Letter 7," in *Surat Sug: Letters of the Sultanate of Sulu*, vol. II, trans. and ed. Samuel Tan (Manila: National Historical Institute, 2005), 87.

87. *RPC*, 1906, pt. 1, 341.

88. Ibid.

89. "Spirit of the Island Press," *The Mindanao Herald*, 8 December 1906, 4.

90. "More Rifles Turned In," ibid., 25 November 1905, 3.

91. Gowing, *Mandate in Moroland*, 191.

92. "The Plain Truth," *The Daily Bulletin*, 14 May 1900, 4.

93. "Public School Entertainment," *The Mindanao Herald*, 24 February 1906, 1.

94. *RPC*, 1905, pt. 1, 342.

95. "Agricultural Fair a Success," *The Mindanao Herald*, 18 August 1906, 1–2.

96. "Editorial Comment," ibid., 27 October 1906, 4.

97. "Fair Committees Working Hard," ibid., 13 October 1906, 1.

98. Ibid., 3; "Agricultural Fair a Great Success," ibid., 16 February 1907, 1.

99. "Agricultural Fair a Great Success," ibid., 16 February 1907, 1.

100. Pershing to The Editor of "Travel," McBride, Winston & Co., 8 April 1911, Pershing Papers.

101. "Editorial Comment," *The Mindanao Herald*, 27 October 1906, 4.

102. *RPC*, 1906, pt. 1, 380.

103. "Agricultural Fair a Success," *The Mindanao Herald*, 18 August 1906, 1.

104. *RPC*, 1906, pt. 1, 380.

105. "Oration Delivered at the Opening Ceremonies, Zamboanga Industrial and Agricultural Fair, Tuesday, February 12, 1907, by Brig. Gen. Tasker H. Bliss, U.S.A., Governor of the Moro Province," *The Mindanao Herald*, 16 February 1907, 2.

106. "Zamboanga Industrial Exposition," ibid., 6 October 1906, 1.

107. "Agricultural Fair a Success," ibid., 18 August 1906, 2.

108. *RPC*, 1905, pt. 1, 342.

109. "Fair Committees Hard at Work," *The Mindanao Herald*, 27 October 1906, 1.

110. "Agricultural Fair a Great Success," ibid., 16 February 1907, 1.

111. "Agricultural Fair a Success," ibid., 18 August 1906, 2.

112. "Agricultural Fair for Zamboanga," ibid., 1 September 1906, 2.

113. "Local Notes," ibid., 1 April 1905, 5.

114. "The Base Ball Tournament," ibid., 23 September 1905, 2.

115. *RPC,* 1906, pt. 1, 380.

116. For an excellent discussion of technology as a measure of civilization at and during the colonial encounter, see Michael Adas, *Machines as the Measure of Men: Science, Technology, and Ideologies of Western Dominance* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990).

117. *RPC*, 1906, pt. 1, 380.

118. *RPC*, 1908, pt. 1, 376.

119. "Agricultural Fair at Cotabato," *The Mindanao Herald*, 4 August 1906, 1.

120. Dipesh Chakrabarty, "The Difference—Deferral of a Colonial Modernity: Public Debates on Domesticity in British Bengal," in *Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World*, ed. Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1997), 374.

121. Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe*, 35.

122. For an engaging discussion of the development of the modern family, see Alan MacFarlane, *Origins of English Individualism: The Family, Property, and Social Transition* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1978), as well as Edward Shorter's much discussed volume, *The Making of the Modern Family* (New York: Basic Books, 1975).

123. "The Moros," *The Mindanao Herald*, 5 March 1904, 5; "Spirit of the Island Press," ibid., 12 August 1905, 12.

124. "Zamboanga District Progressing," ibid., 30 December 1905, 1.

125. Meeting of the Leading Sultans, Dattos, Headmen, and Other Prominent Moros of the District of Lanao, Held at Marahui [*sic*], I., 29–30 May 1911, in Pershing Papers.

126. "Give Us a Territorial Form of Government," *The Mindanao Herald*, 12 August 1905, 4.

127. *RPC*, 1906, pt. 1, 354.

128. Gowing, *Mandate in Moroland*, 224.

129. Quoted in ibid., 224–25.

130. Meeting of the Leading Sultans, Dattos, Headmen, and Other Prominent Moros of the District of Lanao, Held at Marahui [*sic*], I., 29–30 May 1911, in Pershing Papers.

131. *RPC*, 1907, pt. 1, 389.

132. See *RPC*, 1904, pt. 2, 654–56.

133. Muhammad Salip Sakib to Major Hugh Scott, "Letter 1," in *Surat Sug*, vol. II, 75.

4: Modernity, Colonial Guilt, and the Price of Transcendent Progress

1. Jordan Sand, review of *New Times in Modern Japan*, by Stefan Tanaka, *Journal of Japanese Studies* 32.1 (Winter 2006): 155–59. For a more comprehensive look at Sand's arguments concerning the consequences of material and social modernity in Japan, see *House and Home in Modern Japan: Architecture, Domestic Space and Bourgeois Culture, 1880–1930* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003); Renato Rosaldo, "Imperialist Nostalgia," *Representations* 26, Special Issue: Memory and Counter-Memory (Spring 1989): 107–22.

2. T. J. Jackson Lears, *No Place of Grace: Antimodernism and the Transformation of American Culture, 1880–1920* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), 8.

3. T. J. Jackson Lears, "From Salvation to Self-Realization: Advertising and the Therapeutic Roots of the Consumer Culture, 1880–1930," in *The Culture of Consumption: Critical Essays in American History, 1880–1980*, ed. Richard Wightman Fox and T. J. Jackson Lears (New York: Pantheon Books, 1983), 7.

4. Ibid., 6, 9.

5. Lears, *No Place of Grace*, 6.

6. Goran Blix, "Charting the 'Transitional Period': The Emergence of Modern Time in the Nineteenth Century," *History and Theory* 45 (Feb. 2006): 57.

7. See Richard Hofstadter, "Cuba, the Philippines, and Manifest Destiny," in *The Paranoid Style in American Politics* (New York: Knopf, 1965).

8. For the original paper, see Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1893, in United States Congressional Serial Set, no. 3170; for an expanded and more thorough discussion of his thesis, see Frederick Jackson Turner, *The Frontier in American History* (Henry Holt & Co., 1920).

9. A useful look at Turner's Frontier Thesis in modern historiography can be found in *The American Frontier: Opposing Viewpoints*, ed. Mary Ellen Jones (San Diego: Greenhaven Press, 1994).

10. See Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Harper Perennial, 1993).

11. Lears, *No Place of Grace*, 5.

12. Ibid., 48; Lears, "From Salvation to Self-Realization," 8.

13. For an engaging discussion of this particular historical development, see

Benedict Anderson's brilliant article, "Nationalism, Identity, and the Logic of Seriality," in his volume *The Spectre of Comparisons: Nationalism, Southeast Asia, and the World* (London: Verso, 1998).

14. Lears, *No Place of Grace*, 47.

15. Lears, "From Salvation to Self-Realization," 7.

16. Lears, *No Place of Grace*, 51.

17. Ibid., 57.

18. Lears, "From Salvation to Self-Realization," 11.

19. Lears, *No Place of Grace*, 57.

20. Ibid., 12.

21. Lears, "From Salvation to Self-Realization," 10.

22. Lears, *No Place of Grace*, 12.

23. Ibid., 52, 57. See also Carl T. Jackson, *The Oriental Religions and American Thought: Nineteenth-Century Explorations* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1981).

24. Ibid., 108.

25. Thomas, *Colonialism's Culture*, 94–97.

26. Lears, *No Place of Grace*, 19.

27. Ibid., 98.

28. For insightful discussions of the conditions leading up to the Spanish-American War, see Philip S. Foner, *The Spanish-Cuban-American War and the Birth of American Imperialism, 1895–1902* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972), and Walter LaFeber, *The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860–1898* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1963).

29. "Spirit of the Island Press," *The Mindanao Herald*, 12 August 1905, 10.

30. Roosevelt's presidency during the formative years of American colonialism in the Philippines was highly appropriate, considering his embodiment of the philosophical principles and ideologies that undergirded the imperial project. Though articulated years before the American colonial occupation of the Philippines, his notions of masculinity and the American frontier character seemed especially applicable to Moro Province after the closing of the western American frontier. For the best example of these notions, see Roosevelt's four-volume work, *Winning of the West*, vols. I–IV (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, Presidential edition, 1995).

31. G. Stanley Hall was the preeminent child psychologist of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In addition to serving as president of the American Psychological Association and Clark University, Hall pioneered psychological theories of race-making during adolescence. Concerned with the emasculating effects of modernity on young boys, Hall advocated maintaining the Darwinistic struggle for racial supremacy by exposing young men to savagery, thus honing their competitive skills. By maintaining a visceral connection with primitive man (known as racial recapitulation), Hall believed that young American men would not lose their competitive edge and succumb to racial suicide. See G. Stanley Hall, *Adolescence: Its Psychology and Its*

Relations to Physiology, Anthropology, Sociology, Sex, Crime, Religion, and Education, vols. I–II (New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1904).

32. Both of the men discussed above are analyzed exceptionally well in Gail Bederman's *Manliness & Civilization: A Cultural History of Gender and Race in the United States, 1880–1917* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995).

33. Scott, *Some Memories of a Soldier*, 416.

34. Also related to the phenomenon of *juramentado* was a Malay concept known as "amuck." When a native "ran amuck" he, like the juramentado, engaged in crazed killing sprees, although, unlike in the cases of juramentados, these massacres were indiscriminate and unaccompanied by religious preparations or fanaticism. Rather, they were explosive manifestations of pent-up frustration, shame, or depression acted out in violence and suicide. Hence, Filipinos, Moros, and even Americans theoretically had the potential to "run amuck." Such acts of irrational violence were often attributed to weak mental conditions or the tropical heat, which made one's head "hot" and drove the sufferer to insanity. Often, however, the concepts of *juramentado* and amuck were conflated in colonial reports as intertwined acts of a deranged mind particularly associated with overly religious Moros. See, for example, "Ran Amuck in Jolo," *The Mindanao Herald*, 21 January 1905, 1; "Private Morse Stopped Him," ibid., 29 April 1905, 1; "His Head Was Hot," ibid., 15 October 1904, 1; "Moro Runs Amuck," ibid., 19 December 1903, 1; "American Soldier Ran Amuck," ibid., 22 April 1905, 1; "Why Moros Run Amuck," ibid., 22 December 1906, 1; "Filipino Runs Amuck," ibid., 5 May 1906, 3; etc.

35. Vic Hurley, *Swish of the Kris: The Story of the Moros* (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1936).

36. "The Juramentado," *The Mindanao Herald*, 26 December 1903, 2–3.

37. When traveling throughout the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao today, one encounters Moros of all tribes who rarely fail to relate a well-known story of the American .45 caliber in Mindanao and its relation to juramentados. According to many accounts, the standard American issue Smith and Wesson .38 caliber sidearm proved largely ineffective against the raging juramentados. Given the bravery and resilience of these attackers, American military personnel were forced to adopt the more powerful Colt .45 caliber. Such stories provide Filipino Muslims with a sense of pride and a reaffirmation of certain cultural narratives regarding their martial spirit and fierce religious devotion. See Hurley, *Swish of the Kris*.

38. "Officer Boloed," *The Mindanao Herald*, 2 July 1904, 2.

39. "Ran Amuck in Jolo," ibid., 21 January 1905, 1.

40. "Juramentado in Jolo," ibid., 9 April 1904, 1.

41. "Moro Runs Amuck," ibid., 19 December 1903, 1; "Juramentado at Jolo," ibid., 22 December 1906, 3.

42. *RPC*, vol. III, 1901, 373–74.

43. "The Taming of the Moros of the Philippines," *New York Times*, 15 March 1908, SM8.

44. See also "Ceremonial Vows of the 'Juramentado,'" *50 Years with the* Times, June 13, 1911, 333–34.

45. See E. Berkeley Tompkins, *Anti-Imperialism in the United States: The Great Debate, 1890–1920* (Philadephia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1970).

46. Quoted in Gowing, *Mandate in Moroland*, 107.

47. Ibid., 141.

48. *RPC*, 1906, pt. 1, 368.

49. "The Government of the Moro Province and Its Problems," *The Mindanao Herald*, 3 February 1909, 4.

50. "Oration," *The Mindanao Herald*, 16 February 1907, 3.

51. Peter Fritzsche, *Stranded in the Present: Modern Time and the Melancholy of History* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004), 5.

52. Rosaldo, "Imperialist Nostalgia," 108.

53. *Census of the Philippine Islands*, 1903, vol. II, 467.

54. "Sitanki: A Busy Little Island," *The Mindanao Herald*, 11 July 1908, 1.

55. Hurley, *Swish of the Kris,* 10.

56. Ibid., 41.

57. Ibid., 239.

58. Ibid., 160, 174–75.

59. Ibid., 175.

60. "White Man's Burden," *The Mindanao Herald*, 18 August 1906, 3.

Conclusion

1. "Meeting of the Leading Sultans, Dattos, Headmen, and Other Prominent Moros of the District of Lanao," in Pershing Papers.

2. Stoler and Cooper, "Between Metropole and Colony," 18.

3. Thomas, *Colonialism's Culture*, 9.

Epilogue

1. See Ron K. Edgerton, "Americans, Cowboys, and Cattlemen on the Mindanao Frontier," in *Reappraising an Empire: New Perspectives on Philippine-American History*, ed. Peter W. Stanley (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984).

2. Pershing Plaza, for example, is still a revered and highly advertised landmark in Zamboanga City today.

3. "And What of America?" *The Manila Times Internet Edition*, 29 August 2008, available from <http://www.manilatimes.net/national/2008/aug/29/yehey/moro/20080829moro2.html>.

4. Astrid S. Tuminez, "The Past Is Always Present: The Moros of Mindanao and the Quest for Peace," Working Paper Series, no. 99, May 2008, Southeast Asia

Research Centre, City University of Hong Kong, 14, 20.

5. "MILF Says US Govt Has Unfinished Obligation to Moro People," *The Manila Times Internet Edition*, 1 December 2008, available from: <http://www.manilatimes.net/national/2008/dec/01/yehey/prov/20081201pro1.html>.

6. Gowing, *Mandate in Moroland*, 260–61.

7. Ibid., 273–74; Abinales, *Making Mindanao*, 45–93. See also "Moro in Philippine Senate," *New York Times*, 22 November 1916, 8.

8. "Moros Like Our Rule," *New York Times*, 25 August 1910, 4.

9. Arolas Tulawie to Pershing, 20 May 1923, in BIA Records, File no. 5075–139A, quoted in Gowing, *Mandate in Moroland*, 327–28.

10. See "Moros under Filipino Rule," *New York Times*, 2 November 1923, 16; "Moros on the Warpath," ibid., 29 May 1926, 14; "Plea to Keep Philippines Intact," ibid., 1 August 1926, X8; "Philippine Yanks Ask Separation of Moro Islands," *Chicago Daily Tribune*, 3 September 1926, 1; "The Moros," ibid., 11 September 1926, 8; "Free Philippines Feared by Moros," *New York Times*, 10 February 1933, 10; "Moro Leaders Shift Position; Oppose Philippine Freedom," ibid., 27 April 1933, 8; "Philippine State Would Face a Tangle of Racial Issues," ibid., 27 August 1933, XX9; "Our Moro Allies," ibid., 6 May 1942, 20; "The Colonization of Mindanao," *The Common Wealth Fortnightly*, 4, no. 10–11 (Nov.–Dec. 1930): 33–37.

11. See Abinales, *Making Mindanao*, 94–133.

12. "The Bangsamoro Crusible (II)," *The Manila Times,* 13 September 2008, available from <http://www.manilatimes.net/national/2008/sep/13/yehey/opinion/20080913opi2.html>.

13. "Judging the MOA-AD: Today's Parable," ibid., 28 August 2008, available from <http://www.manilatimes.net/national/2008/aug/29/yehey/moro/20080829moro4.html>.

14. "The Greatest Iniquity," *La Vanguardia*, 31 August 1910, 1; "At Any Cost . . . ," ibid., 2 September 1910, 1.

15. Cesar Adib Majul, *Muslims in the Philippines* (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1973), xii, 346.

16. Pangalian M. Balindong, *Potential Dynamics of Muslim Role in Nation Building: Unity in Diversity* (Marawi City: Printed Under the Auspices of the Ansar El Islam as a Position Paper on the Occasion of Its Second National Islamic Symposium and Third Foundation Anniversary, 1972), 8–9.

17. Gowing, *Muslim Filipinos,* 11–12; Cesar Majul, "The Muslims in the Philippines: An Historical Perspective," in *The Muslim Filipinos*, ed. Peter G. Gowing and Robert D. McAmis (Manila: Solidaridad Publishing House, 1974), 11.

18. Cesar Adib Majul, *The Historical Background of the Muslims in the Philippines and the Present Mindanao Crisis* (Marawi City: Printed Under the Auspices of the Ansar El Islam as a Background Material on the Occasion of Its Second National Islamic Symposium and Third Foundation Anniversary, 1972), 13.

19. Majul, *Muslims in the Philippines*, preface, xi.

20. Gowing, *Muslim Filipinos,* 165. See also the preface of *The Muslim Filipinos*, ed. Peter G. Gowing and Robert D. McAmis (Manila: Solidaridad Publishing House, 1974), xi.

21. Balindong, *Potential Dynamics of Muslim Role in Nation Building,* 8.

22. Majul, "The Muslims in the Philippines," 6.

23. Abinales, *Making Mindanao*, 2–3.

24. Ibid., 14.

25. Kenneth E. Bauzon, *Liberalism and the Quest for Islamic Identity in the Philippines* (Durham: Acorn Press, 1991), 57.

26. Ibid., 63.

27. Samuel K. Tan, *Selected Essays on the Filipino Muslims* (Marawi City: University Research Center, Mindanao State University, 1982), 17.

28. Ibid., 16.

29. Ibid., 26.

30. Ibid.

31. Abinales, "And What of America?"

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