


DANIEL J. HERMAN

# RIM COUNTRY EXODUS

A Story of Conquest, Renewal,  
and Race in the Making



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# *Rim Country Exodus*

A Story of Conquest, Renewal,  
and Race in the Making

DANIEL J. HERMAN



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# Contents

List of Illustrations vii

Acknowledgments ix

Introduction 1

## *Prologue*

1. Kinship, History, Home 19

## *Part I: Endings*

2. Conquest 53

3. Exile 90

4. Rebellion 104

5. Honor in Chaos 128

## *Part II: Beginnings*

6. Exodus 149

7. Old Lives, New Lives 175

8. Indians and Agents 205

9. Indians and Settlers 231

10. Conquering Children 253

11. Taking Charge 270

Conclusion: Paternalism, Resistance,  
and Race Remade 307

Notes 321

Index 377



# *Illustrations*

## **Figures**

- 1.1. Red Rock Country near Sedona, c. 1910 21
- 1.2. Montezuma's Well 23
- 1.3. Verde Valley ruins, 1877 29
- 1.4. Grenville Goodwin's handwritten notes 34
- 1.5. Watercolor from Grenville Goodwin's journal 35
- 2.1. Godigojo, Tonto Apache 57
- 2.2. General George Crook, 1882 64
- 2.3. General Crook and Indian scouts 65
- 2.4. Skeleton Cave Massacre, 1872 79
- 2.5. Apache Scout, Camp Verde 87
- 3.1. Indians gathered on muster day, c. 1875 93
- 3.2. Yavapai Indians, Rio Verde, c. 1874 97
- 3.3. Camillus Sidney Fly photo of San Carlos 103
- 4.1. Pedro, chief of the Horizontal Red Valley people 107
- 4.2. Dilzhe'e in face paint 116
- 5.1. Apache Kid, Say-es, Hos-kal-te, and other Apache defendants, 1889 133
- 5.2. Apache flutes 142
- 5.3. Apache women deliver hay to San Carlos quartermaster, 1887 143
- 6.1. Apache farms at San Carlos, c. 1880 151
- 6.2. San Carlos men digging a ditch, 1888 153
- 6.3. Nah-diz-az hanging, 1889 156
- 6.4. President Calvin Coolidge signs Coolidge Dam bill 173
- 7.1. Apache hunter disguised as deer 177
- 7.2. Marian William Fain with a large buck in Verde Valley, c. 1885 177
- 7.3. Sketch of gowas alongside wooden cabins 180
- 7.4. Yavapai family near Clarkdale, Arizona, c. 1925 183

- 7.5. Sketch satirizing BIA farming reports 187
- 7.6. Roosevelt Dam, c. 1915 190
- 7.7. Apache *gota* in front of a *gowa* at Roosevelt Lake 192
- 7.8. July 1926 *Progressive Arizona* cover image 193
- 7.9. Playing cards from Delshay's band, 1878 197
- 7.10. Apache scouts gambling 198
- 8.1. Charlie Nockeye, 1929 209
- 8.2. Traditional Apache baby carrier 216
- 8.3. Major Smiley, 1888 217
- 8.4. East Clear Creek Apaches, c. 1910s 228
- 9.1. Talkalai in Apache headdress, c. 1915, and "civilized" clothing, c. 1920 234
- 9.2. Obed Rabbit prison record 239
- 9.3. Annie, a Dilzhe'e woman 242
- 9.4. Apaches mix with settlers at a social gathering, c. 1900 244
- 10.1. Students at Camp Verde Indian School, 1912 255
- 10.2. Satirical sketch of young woman making bread 258
- 10.3. Rice boarding school 259
- 11.1. Chief Chilchinhuana with baskets 273
- 11.2. Apaches performing crown dance 279
- 11.3. Painted buckskin presented to Taylor Gabbard by Jack Tonto 281
- 11.4. Yavapai women selling baskets and other goods, c. 1930 283
- 11.5. Fine Apache basketry 283
- 11.6. Satirical sketch mocking Apaches who adopt white vices 291
- 11.7. Henry Chinn working on construction project 299

## Maps

- Map 1. Tribal territories of the Yavapai and Western Apache, c. 1850 16–17
- Map 2. Forts, roads, and reservations in central Arizona, c. 1874 50–51
- Map 3. John Gregory Bourke's map of troop movements in the early 1870s 76–77
- Map 4. Central Arizona in the early twentieth century 146–147

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# RIM COUNTRY EXODUS



# *Introduction*

ACROSS EAST-CENTRAL ARIZONA runs a long, cliff-like escarpment, towering at some points a thousand feet, elsewhere two thousand, over the surrounding countryside. In the middle of the state, just below Flagstaff, the escarpment falls back repeatedly at perpendicular angles where creeks—Clear Creek, Beaver Creek, Fossil Creek, Sycamore Creek, Oak Creek—cut deep canyons in their search for the ocean. At its eastern extremity, that escarpment—known as “the Rim,” or “the Mogollon Rim,” after an eighteenth-century New Mexico governor—buries itself in the morass of the White Mountains, cinder cones that rise to almost 12,000 feet. Above the Rim lies the Colorado Plateau, a vast highland dotted with mountains that stretches into Colorado and Utah. Below the Rim, to its south, lie more mountains. Close by are the Sierra Ancha and the Mazatzal; further afield are the Santa Therasas, the Grahams, the Mescals, the Pinal, the Galiuros, and the seemingly endless ranges that stretch into Sonora, Mexico. In the broad pockets between those ranges—pockets of plain and playa—is the great Sonoran Desert, with its forests of giant saguaro and slick-barked, bright green palo verde.

For many thousands of years, humans have flourished on the Rim and in the valleys and mountains below it. First came Archaic peoples, who used atlatls to take big game. Later came pueblo-building peoples—Hohokam, Mogollon, Sinaguan, Saladoan, Anchan—who dug irrigation ditches and built check dams and sowed the valleys with corn, beans, squash, and cotton. Living side by side with Sinaguas—likely intermarried with them—were Yavapais, migrants who came from the California deserts in perhaps the 1100s. Four centuries later, when Puebloan peoples had moved away—or died—came Apaches, migrants from Canada, exploiting a rich ecology left vacant by drought, war, and abandonment.

For the most part, Yavapais and Apaches lived separately. Yavapais populated the west and southwest part of Arizona, whereas Apaches—Athabascan speakers closely related to Navajos—populated the east and southeast. In the absolute center of Arizona—the Verde Valley and the Tonto Basin, below the Rim—the two peoples met, allied, and sometimes mixed. It is there that our story begins.

The Apaches who allied and sometimes intermarried with Yavapais were Dilzhe'es, or "Hunting People." Nineteenth-century Americans called them "Tonto Apaches," or "Tontos," a term they learned from the Spanish. In earlier centuries, it seems, the Spanish had derived the term "Tonto" from Chiricahua Apaches, who identified Apacheans to their north and west as a strange people who spoke a barbaric dialect. The Spanish translated the Chiricahua term for those peoples into "Tonto," meaning "foolish."<sup>1</sup>

Both the Spanish and the Mexicans of Sonora and New Mexico came into contact with "Tontos," but only rarely, only fleetingly. Not until the 1860s did Dilzhe'es—Tonto Apaches—and their Yavapai allies come into sustained contact with Euro-Americans. Once they did so, they found themselves participating in a drama that had begun centuries before when colonizers came to North America in search of farmland, timber, and minerals. By 1873, the Yavapai and Dilzhe'e had been conquered.

The story that appears in these pages examines that conquest. It is not, however, a story of conquest as such. It is a story of biblical proportion, a story of exodus. It follows Dilzhe'es and Yavapais as they were exiled and confined to a barren, alien reservation, as they beseeched agents and generals to be allowed to go home, and as they finally found freedom and returned to their promised land. Not less important, the story follows Indians as they—with settlers—created a new world in modern Arizona.

In many ways, then, this is a story of rebirth. It is a story of how Dilzhe'es, along with Yavapais and other Western Apaches, came to grips with dispossession. It is part of a new history of American Indians that focuses not on tragedy and victimization—though those are integral parts of Indian history—but on continuity. Indians did not disappear after conquest; they persisted. In central Arizona, they found ways to continue their sings and dances and their spiritual pilgrimages to sacred sites. They found ways, moreover, to hunt and to gather and to grow crops, much as they had done before conquest.<sup>2</sup>

Readers interested in that story—the story of how Apache and Yavapai peoples came to central Arizona, how they were conquered, how they were exiled, how they returned to their homeland, and how they found renewal—may wish to jump directly to the prologue. For those interested in the scholarly significance of this book, there is more to be said. The story presented here, after all, is not important solely for its chronicle of suffering and survival. It is also important insofar as it examines the history of race in one small part of the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century West.

There is already a vast literature on race, a literature mostly of recent stamp. Within that literature is a Tocquevillian split. “The lot of the Negro,” explained Alexis de Tocqueville in 1835, “is placed on the extreme limit of servitude, while that of the Indian lies on the uttermost verge of liberty. . . . The Negro, who earnestly desires to mingle his race with that of the European, cannot do so; while the Indian, who might succeed to a certain extent, disdains to make the attempt.” Indian activists of the 1960s and 1970s buttressed the distinction. The Indian ordeal, they insisted, was an assault on sovereignty, not a mandate of servitude. Thus blacks sought civil rights and integration, asserted Vine Deloria Jr. in 1969, whereas “Indians continued to withdraw from the overtures of white society and tried to maintain their own communities and activities.”<sup>3</sup>

Cued by such distinctions, modern historians tend to view American Indian history through the lens of colonialism. American Indian history is akin to studying Moghuls under the British or Congolese under the Belgians. Europeans ruled such peoples but did not own them. The basic struggle that colonized peoples wage is for self-rule and sovereignty. Historians tend to view African Americans, by contrast, as a people whose primary experience was captivity and subordination. To study African Americans is not to study a people fighting for sovereignty, but to study a people fighting caste: the codified and permanent—at least theoretically permanent—subordination of one group to another. Yet the experiences of American Indians and African Americans were in some ways not so different. So long as we are willing to look past Tocquevillian distinctions, African American history offers insight into the history of Indians in the West.

We already have, to be sure, a rich literature on contact, trade, war, and conquest in the American West. We have, too, a literature

on the discursive and scientific construction of race. Recent historians have also sketched a picture of Indian resistance and adaptation. Unlike their counterparts who study the American South, however, few historians of the West examine social practice. Few examine how Indians and whites interacted in the post-conquest era via work, leisure, gifting, trading, favors, even friendship. Historians offer full vistas of neither Indian-settler relations nor the making of race. Our understanding remains foreshortened, two-dimensional. We have a rich history of racial discourse but a poor one of race as it was lived.<sup>4</sup>

What historians of the West would do well to emulate are studies like Philip Morgan's magisterial volume, *Slave Counterpoint: Black Culture in the Eighteenth-Century Chesapeake and Low Country*, a book that examines a wide array of relations between blacks and whites in eighteenth-century Virginia and South Carolina. We need, too, a study of relations between Indians and Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) agents comparable to Eugene Genovese's classic study of master-slave relations in the antebellum South, *Roll, Jordan, Roll: The World the Slaves Made*. We need, moreover, to explore mundane relations between Indians and whites in the manner of Jeff Forret in *Race Relations at the Margins: Slaves and Poor Whites in the Antebellum Southern Countryside*, Mark Schultz in *The Rural Face of White Supremacy: Beyond Jim Crow*, and John Dollard in *Caste and Class in a Southern Town*.<sup>5</sup>

I do not pretend here to supply the whole of that missing historiography. By examining commonplace interactions between Indians, agents, and settlers, however, I claim to make a beginning.

In making that beginning, I seek to tell a fuller story of Yavapai and Dilzhe'e peoples. To accomplish that, it is important to recognize that nothing of what happened after conquest was unconnected to what happened before and during. Hence, Part I—"Endings"—comprises a narrative of conquest and its aftermath of confusion, demoralization, and attempts at spiritual revitalization. I write about those events primarily to testify to the chaos and suffering that Indians endured. Because this is not a book about conquest per se, however, I refrain from cataloging the vast details of battles, massacres, and negotiations. Although some of that detail appears—enough to draw a rough map of a bloody landscape—an exhaustive history of the conquest of central Arizona has yet to be written.<sup>6</sup>

In addition to conveying the depth of Indian suffering, I write about conquest to convey another point. Conquest and genocide were not one and the same. Arizona settlers spoke often and energetically for exterminating Indians. Sometimes settlers put words into action. The US Army, however, sought to isolate Indians on reservations. At times, commanders and troops exceeded that goal. At times, they veered toward genocide. But the army's goal—made paramount by General George Crook, commander of the Department of Arizona—was to defeat Indians without destroying them. What ensued was a shift from a genocidal racism premised on honor to a softer racism premised on conscience.

In investigating the shift from honor to conscience, this book follows from my previous book—*Hell on the Range: A Story of Honor, Conscience, and the American West*—which examines an Arizona range war (a war among settlers) and its legacy.<sup>7</sup> The two books go together; they evolved from a plan to write a panoramic history of east-central Arizona. The honor I describe in the first book—as in this—was not what we would call honor today. It was not merely dedication to principles. Nor was it courage in the face of adversity. Nor was it loyalty to friends, family, or allies. Honor was all those things, but it was much more.

Honor, according to historians and anthropologists, was a set of values, judgments, and behaviors more potent in the American South and Lower Midwest than in the North. At its most fundamental level, honor involved a distinction between the nobility of whites and the shame of blacks. Though the concept of “black” applied principally to African Americans, it could equally apply, depending on the situation, to Indians, Mexicans, or Chinese. Honor reduced racial others to savages, pariahs, or perhaps meek servants.

Honor sanctioned both slavery and Indian removal. Honor, however, involved more than race. For men, honor taught assertion, even aggression. Men often measured one another not via dedication to modesty, restraint, or sympathy, but via courage and bluster. Honor's theaters included duels, rough-and-tumble fights, and—in the Far West—gunfights, lynchings, and attacks on Indians. Proving valor—smiting enemies—took precedence over the sixth commandment. Male assertion took other forms, too. Those beholden to honor were likewise beholden to gambling, drinking, and bragging. Honor was not merely a paradigm of race or of assertion. Nor was it merely a

discourse or an ideology. It was a worldview, a way of life, an emotional posture in a sociological struggle for land and resources.<sup>8</sup>

What is critical to recognize here is that honor did not define settlers alone. Indian men—and sometimes women—adhered to their own codes of honor, codes that prescribed raiding and war. Apache and Yavapai honor—like that of whites—prescribed, moreover, ritualized drinking, gambling, even blood feuds. Among neither whites nor Indians, to be sure, was honor totalizing. Always it existed alongside other codes. Among Indians, men and women put a premium on sharing and generosity, communalism, sociability, diplomacy, and hospitality, not to mention wisdom and restraint. To be a headman or headwoman demanded all of those traits.

Settlers, too, put a premium on those behaviors, though they were apt to value individualism and self-help above sharing and communalism. What settlers also came to value—especially in the twentieth century—was “conscience.” It, too, was a worldview, a way of life, an emotional posture. Conscience meant restraint, modesty, sobriety. Conscience led men—and women—to repudiate gambling, drinking, gunfights, and lynchings. Its wellsprings were evangelical Christianity—Puritanism, Methodism, Baptism, and others—as well as the teachings of Enlightenment philosophers. In the early nineteenth century, conscience reigned among the flourishing middle classes of the Northeast and Upper Midwest. It took root elsewhere, too.<sup>9</sup>

Men of conscience sought to be productive. They celebrated piety, hard work, and dedication to calling. In those endeavors they found support and exhortation from wives, mothers, sisters, and daughters. Arizonans described conscience as “civilization.” Civilization, they believed, came with women. More specifically, it came with changing gender ratios. The settlers of frontier Arizona—the Arizona ruled by the mores of honor—were overwhelmingly male. In the late nineteenth century, however, women increased in number, authority, and power. Along with male reformers, they created a politics of conscience.<sup>10</sup>

Conscience came to Arizona, however, even before women gained authority. As I show in chapter 2, it came with General George Crook, a distinguished Civil War veteran who became the army’s premier Indian fighter in the West. Like many middle-class men of the North and Upper Midwest, Crook was abstemious, frugal,

modest, and utterly dedicated to his work. His work was killing Indians. At times, his dedication took him to the brink of genocide. In the end, however, Crook moved Arizona toward conscience. He subjugated Indians. In doing so he subjugated whites, too, or at least those who sought to exterminate “red” men.

Once Crook had confined Indians to reservations, he sought to exhort and to teach and, thereby, make Indians into self-disciplined producers. He sought to make Indians into a people who rejected drink, gambling, violence, and “superstition.” In short, he sought to make Indians into people of conscience. What he helped establish was paternalism. Though Crook resigned his Arizona command in 1886, BIA agents continued his work. They, too, were paternalists. They, too, embraced conscience. They, too, tended to be drawn from the middle class. They tended to be evangelical Christians who rejected drink, gambling, and violence. The reservation, however, was not the only place where paternalism evolved.

Part II of this book—“Beginnings”—explores the ways that Indians reconstituted old ways of life, and invented new ones, as they integrated themselves into an industrial economy. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, many hundreds—likely several thousand—Apaches and Yavapais abandoned the San Carlos Reservation in order to work for whites. Thousands signed on for work that transformed Arizona into a modern state, with railroads, highways, schools, courthouses, telegraph and telephone lines, monumental dams, and hydroelectricity.

Like Indians elsewhere, Apaches and Yavapais worked readily for white employers. Throughout the United States, Indians left reservations to work for whites. By the late nineteenth century, reservations had become porous. Indians came and went. In numerous states, Indians and whites became tied together in a common economic, social, and cultural universe. They met, they talked, they traded. At times they intermarried. To examine settler-Indian relations in central Arizona, then, is to examine one piece of a larger pattern of racial relations. Those relations were stitched, folded, and wrinkled into unique regional shapes. Sameness, however, lay beneath variation.<sup>11</sup>

Apaches and Yavapais, like Indians elsewhere, seldom received the full fruits of their labor. They worked at unskilled jobs, for low wages,

often seasonally. Few gained entrée to skilled or managerial positions. Whites conceived of Indians as day laborers. They made little investment in retention or training. Indians, meanwhile, seldom sought to climb the employment ladder. For the first generation that left the reservation, neither acquisition nor career advancement were important goals. They sought first and foremost to reconstitute old ways of life.

As I show in chapters 6 and 7, to work off the reservation was to escape the authority of agents. Off the reservation, Indians maintained old customs, rituals, songs, and dances. They hunted, gathered, and farmed small plots of land, as they had done before conquest. They also gambled and drank alcoholic brews made from corn or from mescal, brews that predated contact with Europeans. Off the reservation, finally, Apaches and Yavapais re-created the family networks that comprised the basic units of social life.

At the same time that Indians reconstituted old ways of life, they changed. They established new patterns of work, consumption, and social life. They also interacted with settlers, the very people who in earlier decades had called for extermination. What emerged was paternalism. On the reservation, agents and BIA employees sought to regulate Indian lives in ways large and small. Off the reservation emerged a different paternalism, one that defined Indians as inferiors yet gave them liberty.

On the reservation, agents sought to make Indians into farmers, Christians, and speakers of English while eradicating drinking, dancing, singing, and shamanism. Agents even sought to regulate Indians' sexual lives by intervening in marriage and divorce. Much of that is clear from extant scholarship. What tends to be discounted is the pliability of agency paternalism. Agents, like southern slaveholders, sought approval. To get it, they gave wards small freedoms, small privileges, small favors. Paternalism had loopholes. What I argue in chapter 8 is that agency paternalism gave subalterns a measure of cultural sovereignty. That, however, was not the sole outcome.

In the decades following conquest, Indian men sometimes lashed out against Indian women. Abuse came amid instability. Men lost status they had held via raiding and warfare (as well as diplomacy and negotiation). Women, meanwhile, lost much of their authority over farms, villages, and homes. The BIA diminished their power further by substituting patrilineal for matrilineal descent. Though Indians

resisted BIA rules, old patterns weakened. Atomic families began to hive off from matrifocal villages, leaving women without extended kin to protect them. Amid those changes, women gained powers, too. Women manipulated paternalism to gain protection. Time and again, women appealed to agents to rein in violent or promiscuous husbands. In effect, women asked agents to resolve problems that whites had helped create.

By making agents into protectors, women employed a patriarchal authority premised on conscience (the authority of agents) to soften a patriarchal authority premised on honor (the authority of Indian men). In doing so, women gave reservation authorities legitimacy. They gave paternalism as a system, moreover, a measure of stability.<sup>12</sup> If women used agents to gain power, however, they also helped men resist agents' authority. Often women assisted men in violating agency rules by gambling, drinking, and participating in dances and sings. Women, then, helped perpetuate old patterns of honor, health, and spirituality. When men treated them poorly, women asked agents to reel them in. When men treated them well, they sustained old traditions.

Outside the reservation, meanwhile, Indians became settlers' neighbors, employees, even friends. As I show in chapter 9, relations between Indians and settlers became personal, if not intimate. Settlers benefited from the cheap agricultural and domestic labor that Indians provided. The relationship was not limited to work. Settlers, like agents, offered rewards and favors: meals, money, protection from prosecution, aid in petitioning the government for pensions. Unlike agents, settlers wove no web around Indian lives. Settlers seldom sought to eradicate singing, dancing, gambling, or drinking.

What I argue throughout Part II is that we cannot understand American Indian history without understanding how Indians and whites interacted. In the reservation era—or, more properly, the “off-reservation era,” given the numbers of Indians who evaded government control—Indians and settlers became part of one another's lives. They learned peaceful ways to interact. They began to change one another in subtle ways. Far from calling for genocide, settlers learned toleration. At times they learned friendship.

Paternalism was elastic. Both on the reservation and off it, paternalism gave Indians leverage. We might, like Martha Knack, view

that leverage as “flexibility” or “evasive nonconformity.” Or, like Eric Meeks, we might call it “resistant adaptation.”<sup>13</sup> Or we might, as I do, call it cultural sovereignty. Those who left the reservation were particularly successful at creating that sovereignty. Off the reservation, they worked for whites yet, for the most part, they remained free to practice—and to modify—old ways of life.

To tell the story solely as one of negotiation and liberty, however, would be misleading. Paternalism was not benign. Like wet cement, it threatened to harden into caste. By offering Indians small rewards, small liberties, small latitudes, it gained stability. So long as Indians could reconstitute a semblance of their old lives, they could tolerate conquest. They remained poor, separate, even subservient, yet they remained. Whites, for their part, received rich rewards. They could display benevolence while withholding equality. Those with power offered kindnesses, indulgences, and favors to those without. Via paternalism, whites gained acceptance, even approval, from a people who, only a few decades earlier, had been driven from their lands. Not less important, whites received cheap labor.

Arizonans meanwhile put caste into law by banning interracial marriage, by denying Indians the vote, by refusing to educate Indian children, and by depicting Indians as buffoons in newspapers and popular literature. Caste grew stronger as settlers engaged in campaigns of reform. In the early 1900s, Arizonans—newly wedded to the dictates of conscience—banned boxing, gambling, liquor, and capital punishment, outlawed the “indiscriminate carrying of weapons,” and extended the vote to women.<sup>14</sup> Whereas in earlier years white Arizonans had often gambled, drank, and fought—both with Indians and with one another—they now sought to become “civilized.” Left outside that campaign—serving as a foil for that campaign—were Indians. Indians, it seemed, continued to gamble, drink, fight, and exploit their women.

By the 1920s, if not earlier, white Arizonans came to identify Indians with cultural patterns that they themselves sought to abandon. Indians seemed dedicated to honor (or at least certain cultural practices premised on honor). In some ways, white settlers were correct. Into the twentieth century, Apache men engaged from time to time in their own sort of vigilantism, the vigilantism of clan vengeance.<sup>15</sup> Some men, too, continued to prove honor via fighting,

drinking, and gambling even as they elsewhere remained dedicated to generosity, sharing, wisdom, and restraint. Though they worked assiduously, few Apaches dedicated themselves wholly to calling and thrift. They worked not to become respectable in the eyes of whites; they worked to perpetuate old ways of life.

Conscience created its own racial logic. Honor racism—the idea of a noble race and a shamed one—gradually eroded. Old racial concepts gave way to new ones. Via subtle shifts—sentiments, emphases, shadings—emerged a model of racial difference that emphasized not depravity but delinquency. Indians, it seemed, were capable of redemption, yet too often they remained dedicated to old ways. Too often, it seemed to whites, they refused conscience.

In regard to caste relations, Arizona came to resemble the Jim Crow South. In both regions, paternalism developed alongside legal discrimination. In both regions, reformers enacted literacy tests, forbade interracial marriage, and singled out racial others—whether black, Indian, or Mexican—as drinkers, gamblers, fighters, criminals, and, often, carriers of infectious disease. In both regions, reformers worked to “clean up” racial others through hygiene, sanitation, and moral improvement.

Caste relations in Arizona, however, were never as pervasive or powerful as in the South. Indians did not have to show constant deference to whites. Nor—with some exceptions—did Indians have to worry about lynch mobs. Lynching was a legacy of honor, a legacy that survived in the South long after it ceased in Arizona and the West. What matters here, however, is not whether Arizona was precisely like the South, but whether Arizona produced unequal social relations that promised to replicate themselves across generations. It did.

Race, scholars rightly argue, is socially constructed. Though small biological differences exist among humans, it is how we understand and categorize those differences that creates race. The only “black,” “white,” “brown,” or “red” races are those we imagine. In making those observations, however, scholars often overlook actual social relations.

Race and caste were not mere discourses. They were social practices. They took shape via work relations, play relations, gift relations, crime and punishment, forgiveness, charity. They took shape,

in short, around emotive performance. The practice of emotion—the sometimes creative, sometimes repetitive, and sometimes ritual enactment of human relations—became the currency of race, caste, and negotiation.

If scholars overlook social practice, they also, at times, overlook the fact that subaltern peoples do not always contest race and caste in ways we expect. Subalterns—in this case Indians—did not necessarily seek political or economic power. Nor did they condemn whites. Far from speaking of grievances, Indians sought settlers' goodwill.<sup>16</sup> What they also sought was social freedom. In pursuit of that freedom, they acceded to inequity. In the short term, they acceded to caste.

None of this is meant to suggest that Indians remained ignorant of white judgment. They understood their situation, but they—or at least the first generation who left the reservation—did not necessarily contest it overtly. Subsequent generations, however—especially the literate alumni of Indian schools—became eager to do so. As I argue in chapter 10, the alumni were products of the one paternalistic institution that resisted negotiation. Indian schools—those on the reservation and those off it, boarding schools and day schools alike—forced minions into obedience. Though recent scholars emphasize the ability of Indian children to negotiate and maneuver in schools, the dynamic in central Arizona was rigid. Not until the late 1920s did regimentation soften.<sup>17</sup>

In schools, conscience—the push to make Indians into disciplined strivers and models of virtue—begot chagrin. Taken from a familial environment of toleration and praise, children suddenly found themselves in an environment of discipline and contempt. Here, they were expected to subordinate sharing and communalism to individualistic effort and to substitute native spirituality for Christian dogma. That very environment—with its demands for obedience, for pliability, for meekness—became a springboard for efforts to challenge caste.

As I argue in the final chapter, it was Indian alumni who, in the 1920s and 1930s, led a campaign against agency officials and against mockery in the press. I argue, moreover, that schooling—and interaction with whites more broadly—led Indians, like blacks, to develop double consciousness. They remained proud of being Indian and deeply committed to sovereignty, yet they sometimes felt chagrin about their heritage. To resolve tension—to put away shame—some

sought to take control of tribal government. Others brought their dances and their art to a white public. Rather than practicing old crafts and dances in private, Indians transformed them—at least some of them—into public relations. Indians, too, participated avidly in horse races and rodeos. They made their art, their dancing, and their games into lessons for whites in beauty, power, and prowess.

Scholars sometimes view Indians as tourism's puppets.<sup>18</sup> Though that view is not altogether wrong, it begs for amendment. Whites held the preponderance of power in the tourist dynamic, but that did not make Indians powerless. Apaches and Yavapais, along with other Arizona Indians, again and again sought to interact with tourists and white locals at fairs, rodeos, and powwows. White organizers made sure to recruit Indians, but they could only do so because Indians wanted to participate. Indians participated to earn a wage. But they also participated to explain and interpret their lives—at least parts of their lives—to whites who thought they were savages. To explain and to interpret were not verbal acts. They were not discourse. They were emotive performance. They were social practice. They involved human beings, Indians and non-Indians, interacting on a level that—though amenable to conversation and description—was largely nonverbal. They allowed Indians to escape the confines of paternalism and caste, though they simultaneously gave Indians a pre-modern mystique.

By the mid-1930s, Apaches and Yavapais were moving away from caste relations and embracing sovereignty. They were not merely recreating their old lives; they were creating independence. Paternalism grew weak. The intensely human relations among settlers and Indians gave way to more impersonal encounters. Though Indians sometimes experienced that change as a loss, they embraced their sovereignty.

Indians and settlers together danced into modernity. They shaped one another's worldviews, ways of life, and emotional postures, though not always in obvious ways. Indian history and settler history cannot be separated. When historians write about the making of modern Indians, they are writing about the making of other Americans, too. Or at least they should be.


Before turning to chapter 1, a final matter deserves mention. I wish to stress that post-conquest Indian experience cannot be divorced from

pre-conquest experience. To comprehend American Indian history requires us to combine ethnographic description of pre-conquest life with historical analysis. Ethnographic description, then, becomes a baseline for measuring cultural shifts. It is a flawed baseline, to be sure. Nineteenth- and early twentieth-century ethnographers spoke Indian languages imperfectly and employed limited sources (a small number of informants). Ethnographers described, moreover, cultures in the throes of change. There had never been a pristine Indian culture, static and timeless, but change came more rapidly after contact with Europeans. Ethnographic description, nonetheless, gives insight into the Indian past. I therefore offer ethnographic description of the pre-conquest Dilzhe'e and Yavapai along with an account of their conquest and its aftermath.

In doing so, I parcel out ethnographic themes over several chapters. I hope thus to highlight both continuity and change. In chapter 1, I discuss Apache and Yavapai kinship, social structure, and creation stories in order to gain insight into who those people were and how profoundly they were attached to their homeland. In chapter 1, as well as in chapter 2, I discuss traditions of raiding, warfare, and diplomacy in order to understand Indian honor and Indians' reaction to the coming of whites. In chapters 3 through 6, I offer ethnographic portraits of Apache and Yavapai subsistence, farming, leadership, and gender roles, portraits that offer insight into continuity and change. I trust that readers will find the ethnography, thus organized, more a help than a hindrance.

Finally, I offer this caveat: Though whites' acts of kindness and reform were acts of paternalism, they were not acts of arrogance. BIA agents did seek to help Indians. So, too, did many settlers. Indian-white relations in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Arizona were richer, more complex, more subtle, and more humane than we have assumed. For all that, however, whites—settlers, agents, editors, popular writers—defined Indians as recalcitrant, dependent, even childlike (as well as noble, mystical, and artistic). Whites—together with Indians—constructed a fraught, contradictory, and ironic history of race, a history still in the making.

# *Prologue*





**Map 1.** Tribal territories of the Yavapai and Western Apache, c. 1850. Data taken from Sigrid Khera and Patricia S. Mariella, "Yavapai," in *Handbook of North American Indians*, William C. Sturtevant, ed., vol. 10, *Southwest*,



Alfonso Ortiz, ed. (Washington, DC.: Government Printing Office, 1983), fig. 1, and Grenville Goodwin, *The Social Organization of the Western Apache* (1942; reprint, Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1969), 4.



## *Kinship, History, Home*

IN 1867, PAULINO WEAVER—trapper, friend of Arizona Indians, and now US Army scout—lay dying in his quarters on the slopes of the Black Hills in central Arizona. For the past year, Weaver had been guiding the Arizona Volunteers and the US Army in their campaign against Yavapais and Dilzhe'es ("Tonto Apaches," as whites called them). Now delirious with fever—likely malaria—Weaver found himself nursed by a young Yavapai woman named Aha-sa-ya-mo. When death took him, Aha-sa-ya-mo departed quietly, climbing "Squaw Peak" as she returned to her people. One of the other scouts found Weaver's body the next day, noticing also that Weaver's quarters were in perfect order. Aha-sa-ya-mo had touched nothing, taken nothing, stealing away with only a broken heart. She had loved him but he was dead.<sup>1</sup>

So at least went the story told by an Arizona pioneer named Edmund Wells who, in the 1860s, had worked as a court clerk, rancher, and quartermaster's assistant for the army.<sup>2</sup> Though Wells likely romanticized the tale, it probably had some basis in truth. Wells noted that an eyewitness—a man named Joe Melvin—had seen Aha-sa-ya-mo as she ascended Squaw Peak on the day of Weaver's death. Melvin's camp mates, it seems, were also familiar with Aha-sa-ya-mo and her relationship with Weaver. The fact that she had taken none of his possessions struck Wells, and others, as a sign of her love.

From at least one standpoint, the romance seems strange. Weaver, born in 1797, was old by the time that Aha-sa-ya-mo supposedly fell in love with him, and he was far from being a beau ideal of masculine beauty. A soldier who knew him commented that he "wore his clothes 'til they fell off him, and if he had shook those long gray


whiskers of his all of a sudden I'll bet woodchucks, gophers and trade rats would have jumped out."<sup>3</sup> To the Yavapai, however, Weaver was—or at least had been—a powerful friend who gave access to trade and diplomacy.

According to Wells, the young woman had come to know Weaver years earlier when he was a genial trapper who spent time among her people. Rather than developing romantic love for him, she probably shared ties of fictive kinship. Rather than his lover, she may have been his daughter or niece. When she departed after his death, it seems, she took nothing away not because she had loved him in the conjugal sense, but because she was acting in concert with her beliefs.

To Yavapais and Dilzhe'es, the dead were fearsome beings. Often their souls wandered the earth with malicious intent. The living sought to escape the dead quickly; certainly they would take nothing from a dead person's estate. Though Apaches placed their dead under rocks and burned or abandoned their "wickiups," or *gowas*, Yavapais went further, cremating the body in its dwelling, along with the dead one's possessions.<sup>4</sup> Aha-sa-ya-mo did not set fire to Weaver's tent, perhaps fearing that the troops would misunderstand her intent. She left the body quickly, however, probably never uttering Weaver's name again.

Whether truth, fabrication, or some blend of the two, the story of Weaver and Aha-sa-ya-mo is poignant. The friendship and bitterness between men like Weaver and the Yavapai and Dilzhe'e underscored the terror and the tragedy of the 1860s. It also underscored the dim possibility of biracial intimacy. As in other parts of North America, white trappers in Arizona entered into what one scholar has termed a "middle ground," a place of accommodation and compromise.<sup>5</sup> Amid the pressures of settlement, that middle ground fast broke down, ending almost as soon as it had begun. When Aha-sa-ya-mo departed Weaver's tent, she was abandoning the last hope of her people for independence.

When Aha-sa-ya-mo left Weaver, she was also leaving the center of her world, the heart of the Yavapai homeland, a place her people had known for hundreds or even thousands of years. From Squaw Peak, she would have been able to look out over the red cliffs that enwall the Verde Valley to the north. To the Yavapai and their allies, the



**Figure 1.1.** Red Rock Country near Sedona, c. 1910, where Monster Slayer killed Eagle and made the world safe for humans. Sharlot Hall Museum Library and Archives, Prescott, Arizona.

Dilzhe’*e*—the Athabascan speakers whom Europeans called “Tonto Apaches”—the Red Rock Country was the site of an epic battle that had made the world safe for humans (fig. 1.1). Not far from modern Sedona, in a cave at a place now called Boynton Canyon, First Woman—“Old Lady White Stone”—was said to have made her home after a flood destroyed the Second World. Made pregnant by Sun and Cloud, she bore a daughter who, also made pregnant by Sun and Cloud, bore a son who changed the world. Yavapais know the boy as Lofty Wanderer (Skaatakaamcha). Dilzhe’*e*s call him Monster Slayer (Na-iz-*ġ*ane).<sup>6</sup>

When giant eagles killed Lofty Wanderer’s mother, it fell on Old Lady White Stone to raise the boy. In his youth, he made a pilgrimage to his fathers, who bestowed upon him great powers. He became Monster Slayer, an earth shaper. He made his grandmother young again and killed the eagles that had devoured his mother. A Dilzhe’*e* named Charlie Norman told anthropologist Grenville Goodwin in the 1930s that “you can still see [First Woman’s] house up in the cliff there,” referring not to Boynton Canyon, apparently, but to the canyon walls of Fossil Creek, another headwater of the Verde River.

The story differs slightly depending on the teller's tribe and band and the tale's translation into English. Na-iz-gane "lived there for a while also," reported Norman. "You can still see his footprints."<sup>7</sup>

In 1953, a Yavapai elder named Wemaya, or Dell Quail, regaled listeners with a somewhat different story of Lofty Wanderer. After making a mighty bow with magical powers, Lofty Wanderer shot flaming arrows in the four directions. The arrow that sailed north came to rest on the San Francisco Peaks, giant cinder cones that rise to almost 13,000 feet just outside modern Flagstaff. Another arrow fell on what settlers called Squaw Peak, a mountain that lies south of modern Camp Verde at the precise geographical center of Arizona. A third arrow sped east and south, landing on Four Peaks, the westernmost precipice of the Mazatzals. The fourth arrow sped westward toward Mingus Mountain in the Black Hills, future site of the copper-mining town Jerome. Thus Lofty Wanderer marked the sacred precincts of the Yavapai and Dilzhe'e.<sup>8</sup>

Eagle, seeing the flaming arrows, searched for the intruder who had shot them. Lofty Wanderer tied bloody deer meat to himself to lure the bird closer. Upon finding the boy, Eagle snatched him up and dashed him against the rocks. Lofty Wanderer, however, would not die. When Eagle tried to feed its catch to its hatchlings, the boy slew them. Then he slew Eagle and its giant mate. First Woman collected the dead birds' feathers, which became sacred. Lofty Wanderer remained at Eagle's nest, drawing a cross—symbolic of the four directions—on the palm of each hand and singing. By pressing his palms against the mountain, he forced it to go down while his grandmother was magically raised up. "The boy," said Wemaya, "was a great hunter and a great man, a medicine man, a doctor, just like Jesus Christ." From clay, the boy fashioned humans and animals. Then he and his grandmother went to live in the west, "toward the ocean," where they would live "until the end of the world."<sup>9</sup>

Just south of Boynton Canyon and the red rocks lies another site of great sacredness, an improbable sinkhole near modern Cornville, southeast of Sedona. To Yavapais and Dilzhe'es, it was the emergence place. Yavapais call it *Ahagaskiaywa*, "where the people came out." Dilzhe'es call it *Tusiich'il*, "where the earth cracks open." Settlers named it "Montezuma's Well," believing that those who had built pueblos in the area were relatives of the Aztecs. From wall to wall



**Figure 1.2.** Montezuma's Well, emergence place of Dilzhe'es and Yavapais. Photo c. 1915. Collection of Jeremy Rowe Vintage Photography (vintagephoto.com).

the sinkhole stretches 470 feet. From rim to bottom, it descends 170 feet, 55 feet of which are filled with spring water (fig. 1.2). It is a miraculous place, an oasis, with perpetually warm waters that spill out of the sink via a small cave. After they emerge from the well, the waters are shunted into travertine-coated irrigation ditches built by Hohokam settlers from the Salt River Valley more than a thousand years ago. Perched in the recesses of the sinkhole wall are mud and stone ruins built in perhaps 1300 CE by the Sinagua, a people ancestral both to Hopis and Yavapais who still live in the area. Only a few miles away lies "Montezuma's Castle," a Sinaguan complex—what whites call a "cliff dwelling"—artfully built into a massive pocket on the side of a bluff.<sup>10</sup>

According to Yavapais and Dilzhe'es, it was from Montezuma's Well that humans and animals emerged by climbing a tree—or perhaps a stalk of maize—that grew out of the First World deep below. Here was where Aha-sa-ya-mo's people and their Dilzhe'e allies had

come. If the well was the emergence place, however, it was also—from an archaeological perspective—a place where two peoples had gathered.<sup>11</sup>

For millennia, the ancestors of the people who became Dilzhe'es had been on the move, drifting east and south from Alaska. Likely they began to diverge from the Tlingit and Haida some 5,000 years ago, becoming the Eyak. The Eyak themselves then began to diverge, their southernmost branches evolving into what anthropologists call "Athabascans" at around the time of Christ. Later centuries brought more divisions. Many Athabascans remained in Alaska; others worked their way along the Pacific Coast chain, stopping when they reached northern California. Still others plodded on snowshoes into Canada, settling the area around modern Lake Athabasca and spreading eastward toward the Great Lakes. Europeans would know these peoples as Sarsi, Dogrib, Slave, and Yellowknife.<sup>12</sup>

Often Athabascans hunted the great herds of caribou, but survival dictated adaptability. With their well-honed skill with the bow, they took deer, elk, bighorn, antelope, even buffalo. As the climate warmed in the first millennium CE, the increasing scarcity of caribou may have required greater reliance on the latter animals, causing Athabascans to move south, perhaps all the way into the modern United States. These were the people who would become Apache and Navajo.<sup>13</sup>

By the time that Europeans entered North America—or shortly after—Athabascans were scattered along the Rocky Mountain cordillera from Alaska to southern Alberta to Colorado, New Mexico, and Arizona. Their migration was by no means monolithic. It likely consisted of trickles of people, family groups, moving in pursuit of game. In winter, extended family groups probably came together to camp, to share stories, and to marry. In summer, they spread out again, with loosely related groups following one another into game-rich frontiers. Perhaps they trudged eastward onto the Plains, where they took up buffalo hunting and continued to move south, becoming the people whom the Spanish called "Querechos." Or perhaps they threaded their way between the high mountains that enclose the Great Basin, sticking close to the flanks and foothills of the game-rich Rockies. Rather than entering the Southwest via the Great Plains,

they may have entered via the mountains of Colorado. Adding credibility to that theory is the similarity between Apachean and Puebloan religion, agriculture, and pottery, suggesting that Apaches learned those technologies in the Southwest rather than on the Plains.<sup>14</sup>

Precisely when Athabascans entered the Southwest is open to conjecture. Archaeologists date the earliest known Navajo site in northern New Mexico to between 1491 and 1541. Navajos, however, may have been the last Athabascans to enter. As late as the nineteenth century, it seems, a few still visited relations in Canada. If other Athabascans had entered the Southwest previous to 1500, however, they had come in small numbers and had quickly developed social and trade relations with Pueblos. Only after the Spanish arrived did Athabascans—called “Apaches” by the newcomers, likely a term derived from the Nahuatl term for raccoon or, perhaps, the Zuni word for enemy—become segregated in their refuges of mountain, canyon, and alluvial valley. By 1700, tribal differentiation was well under way. Certainly by that date, Western Apaches—including Dilzhe’es—had ceased to have contact with Lipans and Jicarillas of eastern New Mexico.<sup>15</sup>

At whatever date and by whatever route they arrived, Apaches did not come in barbarian hordes to attack peace-loving Puebloans, as scholars once conjectured.<sup>16</sup> The Apaches who filtered into Arizona did, however, enter a ghost world, a world littered with crumbling stone walls, abandoned cliff dwellings, burned villages, and lithic scatters. In the thirteenth century, the Ancestral Puebloan world—the world of the Anasazi, Ancha, Mogollon, Salado, and Sinagua—had quickly expanded. Prosperity encouraged building, colonizing, and migration. Just as quickly as populations had grown, they collapsed.

In the area around modern Roosevelt Lake, near the confluence of Tonto Creek and the Salt River, lived an especially interesting cultural complex that archaeologists in the 1930s called “Salado,” meaning people of the Salt River. What archaeologists took for a distinct people, however, soon became a puzzle. Archaeologists, notes one scholar, “have described Salado as everything from a mortuary cult to a characteristic assemblage of material culture, and assigned the cultural affinity of Salado to Hohokam, Mogollon, Anasazi, Sinagua, none of these, and all of these.” In the 1990s, when the Salt River Project sought to raise the level of Roosevelt Lake, it authorized a

massive archaeological canvas of the surrounding terrain to define who, or what, constituted “Salado.”<sup>17</sup>

The data created new riddles. What seems certain is that the Salado world was one of complexity. Hohokams colonized the area in the middle 800s, adding their cultural technologies to those of Archaic peoples already there. By 1000, contact between Tonto Basin and the Hohokam heartland in the Salt River Valley had ceased. A century later, the people of Tonto Basin began to erect giant masonry complexes and to fire elegant red-glazed pottery. Between 1250 and 1350, they were building “platform mounds,” literally platforms of earth and rock supporting masonry structures that likely served as foci for seasonal rituals. Perhaps the best word to use for the mounds is “temples.” Salados also made distinctive and exquisitely crafted red-on-black pottery. Similar architecture and pottery appeared in a great arc from central Arizona to southern New Mexico and into Chihuahua. There Indians built a great city—now called Paquime, or Casas Grandes—which some archaeologists believe to have been a spiritual hub of the Salado world.<sup>18</sup>

Archaeologists surmise that platform mounds facilitated religious integration, bringing diverse and querulous peoples into a spiritual whole. Peoples separated by language or political structure may become one through ritual. By now, Anasazis and Mogollons—who had mixed and intermarried—were filtering down from the northeast, refugees from drought. Populations soon grew so dense that settlers began to penetrate the uplands that loomed over Tonto Creek and the Salt River. Lacking irrigation, the upland peoples relied on rain to nourish crops. By 1350, they had built cliff houses and walled complexes in the recesses of the Sierra Ancha and Mazatzals. The architecture and the sites were defensive. Burned villages and skeletons displaying mortal wounds suggest war. Then came the consolidation of populations and the out-migration that turned the Salado world into a shell.<sup>19</sup>

In the midst of crisis, fragmentation must have led to chaos. Alliances and enmities constantly shifted. Populations had exploded in good years only to crash against one another during bad ones. Flood years followed drought years, causing gulying and erosion. Springs that once supported whole communities dried up. Game populations likely also declined, in part due to drought and in part

due to overhunting. The result was an epic struggle for resources. The Southwest saw wars, famines, perhaps cannibalism.<sup>20</sup> Then came abandonment.

By the mid-fifteenth century, the world of the “cliff dwellers” had shrunk to a fraction of its earlier size. Survivors moved and consolidated. Some went to the Hopi mesas of northern Arizona. Others migrated to the Rio Grande Valley, perhaps attracted by the religious movement—the *katsina* cult—taking shape there.<sup>21</sup> Others ended up at Zuni. Hohokams in the Salt River Valley disappeared altogether, hiving off into hunter-gatherer groups after repeated crop failures and war.

When and how Aha-sa-ya-mo’s people, the Yavapai, came onto the scene is open to conjecture. They may have descended from Hakatayan or Sinaguan peoples who had populated the Verde Valley in earlier centuries and who had built the cliff dwelling that whites came to know as Montezuma’s Castle. Buttressing that theory is the fact that Yavapais tell no story of displacing other peoples, perhaps indicating very ancient arrival. Alternately the Yavapai may have migrated from the lower Colorado River region sometime between 700 and 1600 CE, a theory that accords with the testimony of a late nineteenth-century Hopi man who claimed that Yavapais had arrived only “five old men ago.” A variation of that theory suggests that they entered the Colorado Plateau from California in about 1100 CE, then moved south into Verde Valley, where they displaced Sinaguas or perhaps intermarried with them.<sup>22</sup>

Whenever and however they arrived, they soon occupied much of central and western Arizona. In the Red Rock Country and Verde Valley—the Yavapai spiritual heartland—and thence as far south as the Bradshaw Mountains lived the Wipukepa, or Northeastern Yavapai. Their range overlapped with that of the Yavepe, or Northwestern Yavapai, who lived in and around the Black Hills at the south edge of the Verde Valley and thence south to modern Prescott. Closer to the Salt River Valley, in and around the Mazatzal and Superstition ranges, lived the Kwevkepaya, or Southeastern Yavapai. Finally, in the dry ranges to the west of modern Phoenix—particularly the Harcuvar and Harquahala Mountains—lived the Tolkepaya.<sup>23</sup> Each of the four subgroups spoke an upland Yuman language and all of them believed that their people had emerged from Montezuma’s Well. The name


they gave to the vast Yavapai territories—Ahagaskiaywa—was the same name they gave to the emergence place.<sup>24</sup>

The term “Yavapai” itself perhaps also referred to place. One scholar translates the meaning as “East People,” a name perhaps used by Yuman-speaking people farther west to describe their cousins who migrated into Arizona. The meaning of “Yavapai” is nonetheless a matter of debate. William Henry Corbusier noted that the Hualapai called the Yavapai *Nya-va-pe*, meaning “Sun People” or “East People,” but contended that “Yavapai” actually meant “Mouthy or Talkative People.” Still another scholar translated the name as “People of the Mountains.”<sup>25</sup>

Given their commonalities, it is not surprising that members of all four Yavapai subgroups saw themselves as one distinct whole. Adding to their unity were their ties to common allies: Dilzhe’es and Pinals to the east, Yumas and Mojaves to the west and south. Their friendship with the latter groups led Spanish explorers to call Yavapais “Apache-Yumas” and “Apache-Mojaves,” the former designation applying to Tolkepayas and the latter to Yavepes. American settlers adopted the same misnomers. Adding to the confusion was the tendency of Europeans to lump together Yavapais and Western Apaches under the name “Tontos.” Using written records from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries thus becomes an exercise in guesswork and deduction, if not futility.<sup>26</sup>

Entering central Arizona at the same time as Yavapais, or, more likely, a bit later, were Apaches. Taking advantage of mountain and desert biomes left unexploited for a hundred years or more, Athabascans claimed the ancestral territories of Anasazi, Mogollon, and Salado. By then, game populations had rebounded. If there was not more water, at least those water sources that remained were dependable. Near ruins, moreover, grew colonies of mescal, a type of agave whose roots could be roasted to produce a fibrous comestible that tasted like brown sugar. Likely the ancient peoples had somehow cultivated the mescal, along with corn and cotton.<sup>27</sup> Long after the corn and cotton were gone, the mescal continued to grow.

With their characteristic hunter-gatherer fear of the dead, Apaches initially remained aloof from the ruins (fig. 1.3). The availability of shelter and resources, however—mescal, arrowheads, chert, bits of shell and turquoise for ornamentation, metates for grinding seed and



**Figure 1.3.** Verde Valley ruins, 1877. In the background appears Camp Verde, established by American soldiers in 1864. Photo by George H. Rothrock. Collection of Jeremy Rowe Vintage Photography (vintagephoto.com).

corn, and irrigable land—proved inviting. The earliest confirmed Western Apache *gowa*—a tiny living quarters built of thatch—lies in the midst of Grasshopper ruin in central Arizona where Mogollons once thrived. The latest date at which the *gowa* could have been built is 1661, a date based on tree rings in a ponderosa pine that sprouted after the *gowa*'s abandonment. Radiocarbon dating from sites farther west, near Payson, similarly dates the Apache presence to somewhere between 1579 and 1793.<sup>28</sup>

According to one Dilzhe'e woman, her people went so far as to burn Puebloan ruins—perhaps to drive out ghosts—then danced within them. Cibecue Apache oral tradition also tells of Apaches warring against those they called the “Sand House” people, though by then the residents of the cliff dwellings and pueblos were likely not the same people who had built them. The Sand House people may have been other Apaches, or Yavapais, or O'odhams whom Apaches

pushed south toward the “boiling ocean.” Spanish accounts tell us that Apaches drove “Sobaipuris”—Tohono O’odhams—out of the Aravaipa and San Pedro River Valleys in the 1760s, making room for Apachean peoples known as Aravaipas and Pinals.<sup>29</sup>

Probably within a century after arrival, the Western Apache had become differentiated into four major “tribes” or subgroups, each divided into several bands. The easternmost were the White Mountain people, who seem to have dispossessed the Zuni of shrines and hunting grounds on Mount Baldy in the eighteenth century. Composed of two or perhaps three distinct bands, White Mountain Apaches congregated in the drainages of the White and Black Rivers, streams that flow west from the White Mountains. The White Mountain people controlled rich forests of fir and spruce and plentiful herds of deer and elk, as well as much of the steppe that lay around their mountain homeland. To their west were three bands that comprised the Cibecue Apache, each claiming a watershed running south off the Rim: Cibecue Creek, Carrizo Creek, and Canyon Creek. They, too, had access to forests rich in game, as well as to oak trees and piñon pines at lower elevations, trees that offered bounties of acorns and nuts. Due to their geographical proximity, Cibecues and White Mountain peoples traded—and often raided—together, often going as far as Sonora.<sup>30</sup>

To the south of the Cibecues were San Carlos Apaches, who consisted of two bands: Pinals, whose lands encompassed the Pinal and Mescal Mountains, and Aravaipas, who claimed the Galiuros, Aravaipa Canyon, and the San Pedro Basin. To the west of the Cibecues lived Dilzhe’es, who may have been the first Apaches to arrive in Arizona or, alternately, may have split off from Navajos. The clan-origin stories told by Dilzhe’es and other Western Apaches generally involve a descent to central Arizona from the north, where, some said, they, the Navajo, and the Hopi had been one people. A troublesome woman, explained a Dilzhe’e man in the 1930s, fomented a dispute between Apaches and Navajos, after which Apaches forced Navajos to move away. According to another version, it was the Dilzhe’e who moved away, crossing the Little Colorado River and heading south. That there were at one time strong connections between Navajos and Western Apaches is apparent from a number of clans common to both. If Dilzhe’es captured a Navajo in war, the captive maintained

his or her clan affiliation. Non-Navajo captives, by contrast, became members of their captor's clan.<sup>31</sup>

Even before they came into contact with Navajos—or perhaps before they split off from Navajos—Western Apaches had extensive contact with Hopis and Zunis. Dilzhe'es in particular stressed their Hopi ties. From Hopis and from other Puebloans, it seems, Apaches learned to farm and to worship the *gaan*, or mountain gods, whom Apaches emulated in “crown dances.” So too did Apache agricultural rituals seem derived from Puebloan types. Both peoples practiced the same sort of rain dances and used the same sort of ritual paraphernalia: prayer sticks, sacred cornmeal, feathers from eagles and turkeys. Likely, too, Apaches adopted the clan orientation of Puebloans, an orientation that early Athabascan arrivals seem to have lacked.<sup>32</sup>

Both Dilzhe'es and Yavapais traded extensively with Hopis and Navajos, swapping baskets, eagle feathers, buckskins, and red or black hematite (a mineral used to paint the body) in return for corn, blankets, wool, and firearms. As late as 1873, Hopis and Navajos, along with a few Zunis, appeared at the Rio Verde Reservation where they hoped to trade “muzzle-loading guns, powder, bullets, and percussion caps” for deer, otter, mountain lion skins, and baskets. When soldiers ordered them off, they insisted that they “were doing a legitimate business.” Likely they had been engaging in such ventures for centuries.<sup>33</sup>

The bonds between Apaches and Hopis suggest that Western Apaches had entered the Rim Country by way of the Hopi homeland. Once they reached the Rim's forests, they began to disperse. Whereas White Mountain and Cibecue peoples colonized the Rim's eastern extremity, Dilzhe'es colonized Tonto Basin. Dilzhe'e bands moved as far west as the Verde Valley and as far north as the San Francisco Peaks.<sup>34</sup> The entire region was dissected by canyons and rimmed with mountains, making it one of the most inaccessible parts of Arizona. It was so impenetrable, indeed, that it attracted no Europeans until the 1860s. To Dilzhe'es, it was home.

When Dilzhe'es met Yavapais, the two people seem to have mixed rather than warred, perhaps because they were already so much alike. Archaeologists find it almost impossible to distinguish between historic Apache and Yavapai campsites. The two peoples' projectiles, pottery, diet, even the roasting pits that they made to cook mescal,

were almost identical. What differences there were probably grew smaller over time. By the 1860s, when Americans began to migrate into Arizona, there were mixed bands in several drainages of the upper Verde, including Fossil Creek, Oak Creek, and the East Verde River. The Yavapai who became part of those bands were Wipukepa. Mixed bands likely also existed in the Mazatzal range, where Kwevkepayas and Dilzhe'es came into contact. Though for all practical purposes the mixed bands were a single people, individuals tended to retain loyalty to one tribe or the other. Though children grew up bilingual, they took on the tribal identification of their mother and favored her language. Headmen were known by two names, one Yavapai and one Apache. The bands themselves were known by a different name in each language.<sup>35</sup>

Some scholars maintain that Dilzhe'es dominated the mixed bands, at least insofar as the lingua franca became Apache. At the same time, Apache pronunciation became increasingly like that of the Yavapai, causing other Apaches to view the mixed bands as foolish, even barbaric; thus the Spanish term "Tonto." Yavapais, meanwhile, often became members of Apache clans. Among Apaches, each individual was born into his or her mother's clan, an affiliation that the individual carried for life. If children were born "of" the clan of the mother, however, they were born "for" the clan of the father. Children of Apache-Yavapai couples were either full members of a clan—if born to Apache mothers—or were at least connected to the clan of their father, if born to a Yavapai mother. The clans, like bands and family groups, derived names from the places with which they were associated. Among the principal Dilzhe'e clans were the "People of the Yellow Speckled Water" or the "Place of the Yellow Land" (near modern Payson), the "Line Scratched in the Earth" or "Crooked Waters" people (Verde Valley), and the "Very Sandy Place" people (lower Tonto Creek). Ideally, youths were to marry into their father's clan, which created close ties between groups who understood one another's ecology, topography, and subsistence.<sup>36</sup>

There were sixty Western Apache clans, about a dozen of which were represented among Dilzhe'es. The clan operated as guild, union, and cooperative. One might, for instance, ask a fellow clan member for food, for access to farming land, for help with child care, for assistance in hunting or gathering, or to join in war. Clans

in turn were organized into what anthropologists call “phratries,” meaning groups of between two and ten related clans. An Apache was not only required to marry outside his or her clan but also outside the phratry. The flipside of the marriage taboo was a familial tie to those tabooed. In times of stress or war, one could call on members of one’s phratry for help.<sup>37</sup>

Clans played critical roles in dances, too. Only members of particular clans could perform particular parts of a dance. Dances, moreover, often required members of one clan to pair off with members of the opposite sex from an unrelated clan. To show who was whom, participants identified their clan or phratry by the cut of their hair, the tilt or look of their headbands, emblems on their clothing, or, more commonly, their body paint. Charlie Nockeye, a Dilzhe’*e*, related to Grenville Goodwin in the 1930s that members of one phratry in the Verde Valley painted black and white spots all over their bodies (fig. 1.4). Members of another phratry, recalled Nockeye, identified themselves with “lots of zig-zag lines, up and down,” on the legs, arms, back, and face, always in either red, yellow, or white (fig. 1.5).<sup>38</sup>

Insofar as Western Apaches can be classed as a single people, it is only because clans and phratries tied them together. No band or family group was an island; every member was related to outsiders by clan. One addressed a fellow clan member using kinship terms. “Sister” or “brother” applied to clan members of one’s own generation; “nephew” or “niece” applied to those a generation down; “grandson” or “granddaughter” applied to those two generations removed. Youths used reciprocal terms—“aunt,” “uncle,” “grandmother,” “grandfather”—to address clan elders. The same reciprocal kinship terms might also be extended to members of one’s father’s clan. When an Apache met another Apache, he or she asked not “What is your name?” but “What is your people?”<sup>39</sup>

In addition to clan, there were family group and band affiliation. Among Dilzhe’*es*, Grenville Goodwin counted eleven bands and sub-bands, each of which claimed its own territory for hunting and gathering. Some Dilzhe’*es*, however, thought that he had exaggerated. They insisted that the bands were closely related, and did not necessarily see one another as separate. According to Goodwin, the bands averaged about four hundred members each prior to the holocaust of the 1860s and 1870s.<sup>40</sup>

CONTINUED FROM PAGE 272, Vol. 3.


My father's land, the land of the land I belonged to, went from the foot of ajil-cho, South to i-dell-mine, and over to ni-ild-ehi da-di-jol, where it ended. We used to go so far East as gas-Tain-di-g-un. In summer we used to live on the South foot of ajil-cho, and all this high, Terrence land South in our Territory. In winter we used to go to the North East, to the little draws and across the edge of the plain, around got-a-ah. Over at tee-da-gi-dee-lai, we used to go to gather hish. On the East side of ajil-cho we used to go to gather pinions. In our mind we went South, off the Nezajellon River, near the-dell-ah.

With our band all the clans were mixed in, because the na-ga-gi-ga and ya-ga-bah country people used to come up, and visit us. This way the young people would get acquainted, and intermarry.

To the West and South West of us lived the tee-bi-ehi people, but ya-ga, and Die-gi mixed up. Their country came up around Cal Cuel Canyon, and towards ajil-cho. I don't know how it was bounded on the West.

A short long blue ridge on the other side of the-ah-ah ha-ah, to the South, was na-ga-gi-ga, and ya-ga-lai-da country. They only went into this country in summer, time for about seven hunts, in winter also. There was no water in this country, so they didn't live there, only just went there to hunt.

To the South South again lived the gi-bi-gi



**Figure 1.4.** Grenville Goodwin's handwritten notes from his 1930s interview with Charlie Norman, a Dilzhe'e. Goodwin was among the first anthropologists to make a serious and comprehensive study of Western Apaches. Arizona State Museum, University of Arizona.




Figure 1.5. Watercolor from Grenville Goodwin's journal showing face paint patterns identifying tribal affiliation among Western Apache men. Arizona State Museum, University of Arizona.

Bands were in turn composed of “local groups” or “family groups,” called *gota* by Apaches. At a minimum they numbered some thirty people. A family group—those who inhabited a “rancheria,” to use the terminology of Mexicans and Americans—usually consisted of a headman and headwoman to whom were attached the headwoman’s relatives, including her mother and father; her daughters and their husbands and children; her sisters and their husbands and children; and perhaps her own and her sisters’ grandchildren. Family groups, explained Goodwin, “were the basic units around which the social organization, government, and economic activities of the Western Apache revolved.” The matrilineal structure of the family group meant that a single clan—the clan of the headwoman and her sisters—dominated the group and owned its farmlands. They and their kin likewise kept the story of the clan’s origin—a story explaining how the clan came to be associated with its farmlands—and possessed ritual knowledge connected with sacred locales.<sup>41</sup>

At a very fundamental level, Apaches saw themselves not as individuals but as members of a group of kin that included the family group, the clan, the phratry, and the band. Yavapais held similar loyalties, though those not tied to Apaches lacked any clan affiliation. In a sense, Apaches and Yavapais resembled Americans of the Old South, to whom extended family remained important—and honored—even as other Americans became increasingly individualistic and atomized. Apaches and Yavapais, however, went even further down the road of clan and kinship. Those were the ties that ensured survival. Those were the ties, too, that Dilzhe’es and Yavapais fell back upon when they met European invaders.

The impasse that Yavapais and Apaches met in the late 1860s was the culmination of three centuries of contact with Europeans. Until the Americans arrived, central and eastern Arizona had been relatively safe. Seamed by mountain and canyon, access was difficult. To the Spanish, it also seemed desolate. As early as 1540, Coronado and his men had penetrated eastern Arizona, an area they described as a vast *despoblado*, meaning a wilderness or unpeopled region. Perhaps the area still lay vacant after the Puebloan crises of the 1300s. More likely, the Apaches who now lived there chose to hide. It is also possible that a disease frontier had preceded the explorers, helping

create the despoblado that the Spanish “discovered.” At least as early as 1660, Arizona’s Indians fell victim to plagues of typhus, measles, smallpox, and other ailments introduced by Europeans, then spread from Indian to Indian.<sup>42</sup>

Even if their diseases arrived before them, the Spanish themselves did not appear in the Tonto Basin and Verde Valley—the Dilzhe’e and Yavapai heartland—until 1583, when Antonio de Espejo, a wealthy merchant, financed his own expedition into New Mexico and Arizona. In the Verde Valley, he met people who were likely Yavapai. As tokens of friendship, they brought him baskets of mescal and a bread made of piñon nuts. Espejo also found an Indian copper mine on the slopes of the Black Hills, an area that would later produce the boomtown of Jerome. Though he saw grapevines, walnut trees, hot weather, and thick-billed parrots—or perhaps macaws imported from Mexico by Puebloans—he found no gold or silver.<sup>43</sup>

A second Spanish expedition into the Verde Valley led by Captain Marcos Farfán de los Godos in 1598 also led to Indian displays of trade and goodwill. According to Farfán, Indians erected crosses along his path to show their friendliness to Christians. If the crosses were indeed erected for that reason—rather than as symbols of the sacred four directions—it seems clear that Indians had learned about Spanish obsessions from tribes to the south. Observing that the Indians also wore headdresses of painted sticks in the form of crosses—perhaps the masks donned by Apaches to emulate the *gaan*, or mountain spirits—Farfán called them *Cruzados*, or “People of the Cross.” He also made note of their custom of drinking a weak beer brewed from corn or mescal—*tulapai* and *tiswin*, respectively—at social and ceremonial occasions. Farfán’s superior, Juan de Oñate, labeled the Indians of the Verde Valley *Jumanas*, meaning “Drunken Ones.” After Farfán, few, perhaps no, Spanish journeyed into Yavapai and Dilzhe’e lands until Franciscans arrived in the 1770s. They, however, left behind no missions and no missionaries. Into the nineteenth century, central Arizona remained terra incognita.<sup>44</sup>

The Spanish did, however, experience sustained contact with Cibecue and White Mountain Apaches, whom they called “Coyoteros,” a reference to the Indians’ supposed relish for coyotes. Responding to slaving expeditions by the Spanish and their Pueblo allies, the Coyoteros—the Cibecue and White Mountain people—struck not only

into New Mexico but also deep into Sonora and Chihuahua, where they stole cattle and horses and took captives. In turn, Chihuahua and Sonora paid bounties on Apache scalps, creating a bitterness that boiled into killings and torture. Apache raids into New Spain, or, after 1821, Mexico, continued into the late nineteenth century, though Dilzhe'es and Yavapais seldom participated. Instead of launching expeditions into Mexico, Dilzhe'es and Yavapais attacked Akimel O'odhams and Maricopas and perhaps Opatas, who soon retreated from southern Arizona into Sonora.<sup>45</sup>

The long-distance raiding that became the hallmark of Apaches was almost certainly a post-contact phenomenon. Prior to when the Spanish introduced horses, it was difficult for nomadic Indians to carry booty home after a raid. That situation changed in the early seventeenth century, when Yavapais and Western Apaches obtained horses and learned to ride. They found their steeds, however, to be ill suited to the mountains and canyons of their homeland. They might ride horses back from raids and battles, but once home they often made captured horses into food, along with any cattle they had managed to steal. Horse meat, some said, tasted better than beef.<sup>46</sup>

Contact precipitated raiding for other reasons, too. In part, it was a reaction to Spanish slaving. Too, raiding was a reaction to shifts in the southwestern balance of power. With the arrival of the Spanish, sedentary tribes like the Tohono O'odham and Akimel O'odham gained cattle, sheep, goats, chickens, fruit trees, guns, and metal tools. After centuries of stasis or perhaps even decline, sedentary tribes grew suddenly prosperous. Raiding became a way for so-called nomadic peoples to redress the imbalance.<sup>47</sup>

Unable to stop or even to slow Apache raids, the Spanish shifted from attempts at extermination to attempts at pacification. To make enemies into friends, the Spanish traded arms (inferior ones that soon broke), food, and alcohol to Apaches willing to settle near presidios in southern Arizona. For a few decades—roughly 1790 to 1830—the strategy worked, though other factors also helped create a lull. After Mexican independence, the raiding resumed; indeed it became formulaic.<sup>48</sup>

Among Western Apaches and Yavapais, older women sometimes initiated a raid by complaining of food shortages in winter. Responding to their pleas, between five and fifteen men would convene to

plan a raid. Before leaving, Yavapai men—and probably Apaches—participated in critical rituals and protocols. They danced, sang, fasted, refused sleep and sex, even engaged in sham battles. They soon whipped themselves into a righteous anger, becoming very different from the pacific men they had been in camp. Mike Burns, a Yavapai captive who grew up with whites, recalled seeing men achieve such frenzy that they grappled with saguaro cacti until they became slick with blood, or until their comrades pulled them away.<sup>49</sup>

In a high pitch of fury and daring, men crossed mountains and deserts to seize resources from enemies and, if the opportunity presented itself, to attack them. The point of a raid, however, was not to kill enemies, though that might occur. The point was to pillage. Anthropologist Edward Spicer compares it to farming. Apaches and Yavapais did not intend to decimate enemies; they wanted them to continue to produce resources that Indians could harvest.<sup>50</sup>

When raiders returned from Mexico, they carried booty and herded livestock. Raiders returning from Akimel O'odham, Maricopa, or Hualapai territory, by contrast, brought fewer animals, though they managed to steal people. The booty was divided among kin who had supported the raid via chants, sings, and dances. Captives became the property of the family of the captor—in effect, they became slaves—though they might accede to greater status. Alternately, they might be ransomed or sold as slaves to other tribes, or put to death. Executions were sometimes performed at the behest of women who sought to avenge the death of a kinsman. It was vengeance, perhaps, that led to such decisions, but vengeance was primed by dearth. A captive alive was another mouth to feed; a captive dead was a spiritual conquest. Among Yavapais, it seems, those fated for execution were burned then ritually eaten, or, perhaps, eaten symbolically, via movements that mimicked consumption.<sup>51</sup>

Here, then, was honor. Men deemed it important to raid, to fight, and sometimes to kill. Women buttressed those predilections. Counterbalancing honor, to be sure, were prescriptions for restraint, wisdom, and diplomacy. For all that Yavapais and Dilzhe'es fought enemies, they also interacted with friends, including one another. They maintained peaceful relations with Hopis in particular. A man's status was not solely determined by prowess in combat, but combat was an integral part of life.

Often, combat was a by-product of raiding. At other times, combat involved war. Whereas raiding parties were recruited from family groups, war parties were recruited from larger clans and phratries, giving them more manpower. Many of the protocols that preceded raids also preceded war: singing, dancing, fasting, abstention from sex and food. Noted warriors exhorted younger men to “think of angriness, fighting, and death.” When they confronted the enemy, warriors continued to raise their spirits by shouting taunts and boasts. In battle, Yavapais, like Yumas and Mojaves, preferred to use war clubs, whereas Apaches relied on bows and lances. Often Apaches treated arrowheads with a deadly concoction of putrid deer liver and rattlesnake venom. When they fought, both Yavapais and Apaches might take prisoners but they might also kill women and children, reasoning that, without men to protect and feed them, they were better off in the next world. Neither Yavapais nor Apaches, however, took scalps, at least until they learned that custom from Europeans. Even then, they did not bring scalps back to camp but strung them to poles that were used in rituals meant to deprive enemies of power.<sup>52</sup>

Cycles of warfare in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, argues one scholar, created antagonistic cultures of honor. Spanish settlers, Puebloans, Apaches, O’odhams, Maricopas, and others engaged in a system of exchange that included human beings. Sometimes they raided one another. At other times they traded. Both sorts of relationship buttressed the patriarchal authority of men. Captive women and children, by contrast, became commodities, at least until they were incorporated into their new society via clan and kinship. Insofar as a “middle ground” developed in the Southwest, it was a middle ground defined by cross-cultural kinship, diplomacy, and recurrent (indeed ritual) bouts of warfare and aggression.<sup>53</sup>

When occasional parties of American trappers ventured up the Verde, Salt, and Gila drainages in the 1820s and 1830s, they, too, met raids. Raiding, however, was not automatic and inevitable. For time immemorial, Indian bands had insisted that interlopers ask permission to cross their lands or take resources. American trappers—either ignorant of the rules or contemptuous of them—neglected to ask. The harassment and skirmishing that resulted soon caused trappers to steer clear of the upper Salt and Verde, where Indians were hostile. Not all

trappers, however, steered clear. Kit Carson participated in an attack on the upper Salt that left twenty Apaches—probably White Mountain Apaches—dead. Retaliatory harassment ensued. The damage that the trappers inflicted, however, suggested a tilting balance of power.<sup>54</sup>

After trappers came government surveyors to scout wagon and railroad routes. Most of them crossed north of Yavapai and Apache lands, keeping contact minimal. Both Francois Xavier Aubrey and Lieutenant Amiel Whipple, however, found their survey crews embattled in the 1850s—likely by Yavapais and Dilzhe'es—on the upper Verde. For Indians, a more serious threat came from gold-rush emigrants who pushed toward California in the 1850s. Some 100,000 took the Gila Trail, following the lower Gila River to its confluence with the Colorado and making the crossing to California at modern Yuma.<sup>55</sup>

No emigrants passed through central Arizona. The terrain was too rough, the going too slow. It was gold-rush emigration nonetheless that brought Yavapais into conflict with Americans. As early as 1851, the Oatman family met an attack by either Yavapais or Dilzhe'es—probably the former—on the Gila Trail, leading to the capture and ultimate redemption of Olive Oatman, who carried facial tattoos for the rest of her life. Meanwhile, Yumas who for decades had been ferrying Americans across the Colorado for a fee suddenly found their operation displaced. The war began in the early 1850s after Yumas retaliated against a crew of American ferry-boat operators who had murdered one of their headmen. The conflict that followed nearly bankrupted California, which paid for a farcical militia operation. Then, in 1852, came the US Army to establish Fort Yuma, which ended Yuman control of the river and the crossing.<sup>56</sup>

In fighting the United States, Yumas brought Tolkepayas—the westernmost Yavapai—to their aid. The war ended with the crops and homes of the Yumas in ruins. Americans meanwhile allied with Akimel O'odhams and Maricopas who lived up the Gila River, in and near the Salt River Valley. In response, Yumas—with Mojave, Yavapai, and perhaps even Dilzhe'e help—moved up the Gila in 1857 to wage an offensive. The result was a terrible loss. After the initial surprise, O'odhams and Maricopas rallied, killing many dozens with war clubs (perhaps supplemented by guns).<sup>57</sup>

By the early 1860s, steamboats were plying the Colorado, making their way to La Paz, where prospectors made a small strike in

1862. In 1863, a bigger gold strike occurred in Yavapai territory near modern Prescott. Joseph Reddeford Walker, a much-traveled trapper and explorer, led a party of prospectors into New Mexico, then to Tucson, and finally up the Hassayampa River to its headwaters in the Bradshaws. Fresh from having participated in the capture and assassination of a Chiricahua leader, Mangas Colaradas, Walker feared Apache retaliation; thus he chose the roundabout route to his destination. When the party arrived, Yavapais warned them not to proceed. They did so anyway and found gold, one man taking \$350 worth from a single pan of dirt.<sup>58</sup>

Prospectors on a subsequent expedition in 1863—guided by Paulino Weaver—made a second strike just west of where Walker’s men had made theirs. One of the prospectors in the Weaver party, A. H. Peeples, took \$1,800 worth of placer gold in a single day, using a knife to pry nuggets from the ground. Before the year was out, Henry Wickenburg had located a third lode, this one in Tolkepaya territory near the future town that would bear Wickenburg’s name. Still another prospector made a strike in northwestern Arizona, near modern Kingman. By 1865, there were more than three thousand placer mines near the boomtown of Prescott alone. The rush to Arizona was on. Whereas in the 1850s Americans and Apaches had negotiated “calico treaties”—temporary peace agreements permitting trade and passage across Indian lands—gold rendered diplomacy moot.<sup>59</sup> If there had been a possibility for a middle ground to develop, it had passed.

To protect miners and to head off Confederate thoughts of annexing Arizona, Colonel James H. Carleton—in the midst of pursuing a war against Navajos—established a post near the gold region. The army called the post Whipple Barracks, naming it after the army surveyor who had crossed Arizona in the early 1850s and who had subsequently died at Chancellorsville. Less than a year earlier—in 1863—Abraham Lincoln had signed a bill creating Arizona Territory, separating it from New Mexico. The town that grew up alongside the fort—Prescott, named for William Hickling Prescott, chronicler of the conquest of central America—became Arizona’s capital.<sup>60</sup> Over the next two decades, miners, ranchers, and petty entrepreneurs made their way into Arizona, drawn by old strikes as well as new ones.

With the mining boom came the need to feed miners. As early as 1864, John Swetnam and eight others headed north from Prescott

to the Verde Valley to reconnoiter potential farming sites. After a two-day journey by horse, they found the valley rich with grass and water. Indeed it was a Shangri-la by Arizona standards, fed by no fewer than six perennial streams: East Verde River, Oak Creek, Beaver Creek, West Clear Creek, Sycamore Creek, and Fossil Creek. All flowed into the valley to join the Verde, thus offering opportunities for irrigation. What the surveyors may not have realized was that the Verde Valley hosted the densest population of Yavapais and Dilzhe'es in the territory.<sup>61</sup>

Immediately the surveyors headed back to Prescott to recruit settlers. When they returned to the valley, they used stones from ancient Puebloan ruins to build perimeter walls around sites where they planned to build cabins. In response to the settlers' push came a pull from Indians, who stole three oxen and a horse, putting arrows into all three of the oxen. The settlers recovered the oxen—none were killed—but soon lost nineteen more head, plus two horses. Soldiers from Whipple Barracks arrived to protect the settlers but they were too few and too slow to be useful. By year's end, Indians had stolen all but seven cows in a herd of sixty. They also took settlers' corn and barley. The losses added up to \$8,500.<sup>62</sup>

A party of militia sent out by Arizona's territorial governor, John Goodwin, meanwhile, managed to kill a peaceful Indian family in the Verde Valley, creating more turmoil. An army soldier also fell; he was the first American fatality in the Tonto Basin campaign. Responding to those "outrages" and other attacks to the west and south of Prescott, the territorial government called for genocide.<sup>63</sup>

"There is only one way to wage war against the Apaches," argued Sylvester Mowry, a prospector and speculator who gave an address on Arizona's wealth to the American Geographical and Statistical Society in 1859. "A steady, persistent campaign must be made," he reported, "following them to their haunts—hunting them to the 'fastness of the mountains.' They must be surrounded, starved into coming in, surprised, or inveigled—by white flags or any other method, human or divine—and then put to death." "Extermination," inveighed the *Arizona Miner* in 1864, "is our only hope, and the sooner the better." Governor Goodwin agreed. As part of an 1864 delegation to Washington, DC, he "took all by storm by advocating the extermination of the Indians."<sup>64</sup>

As if to accommodate territorial wishes, the army created not only Whipple Barracks—soon called Camp Whipple—but a whole series of forts in the central part of the territory. Camp Lincoln—soon to be Camp Verde—was established in the Verde Valley in 1864 to protect settlers. Camp McDowell, just east of modern Phoenix, was established in 1865. Camp Date Creek in west-central Arizona, the Tolkepaya heartland, was established in 1866.<sup>65</sup>

Fighting sometimes with soldiers and sometimes by themselves, a militia under the command of “Lieutenant-Colonel” King Woolsey, a southern immigrant turned rancher and land speculator, scoured the territory, killing every Indian they could find. The “handsome, stalwart, and energetic” Woolsey was particularly angered by raids on his ranch on the Agua Fria River north of the Salt River Valley, whence Yavapais stole several dozen cattle. In retaliation, Woolsey’s militia, composed of sixty whites and sixty Akimel O’odhams and Maricopas, located a mixed party of Yavapais and Dilzhe’es near Fish Creek in the Superstitions. After calling no fewer than thirty headmen into camp for a talk, Woolsey’s militia turned and slew them. According to some accounts, Delshay (“Red Ant”)—soon to become a powerful leader among Yavapai and Dilzhe’e—narrowly escaped. On another occasion, Woolsey turned loose pack mules laden with strychnine-laced *pinole*, an Indian flour made of corn and mesquite beans. Indians who were accustomed to scouring the militia’s campsites for scraps ate the pinole and died in large numbers. In journalistic reports, the two incidents coalesced into one, becoming simply the “Pinole Treaty,” or “Pinole Massacre.” For that sin, complained one of Woolsey’s men, the militia “was condemned by some psalm singing fanatics in the East.”<sup>66</sup>

From those exploits, Woolsey and his men went on to others. Woolsey’s raids extended across the territory from the Harquahalas in the west to Black River in the east. Initially his men worked alongside the California Volunteers, a US regiment sent to Arizona to drive out Confederates as well as to fight Indians. In early 1865, Arizona Territory replaced the California Volunteers with its own militia, the Arizona Volunteers, consisting of 350 Mexican, O’odham, and Maricopa troops. They answered to Second Lieutenants Primitivo Cervantes and Manuel Gallegos, who in turn answered to First Lieutenant John Van Der Meer. Van Der Meer reported to Captain

H. S. Washburn, who coordinated his plans with those of General John S. Mason of the US Army. On a visit to Fort Whipple, Mason assured settlers that all Yavapai and Apache men “large enough to bear arms . . . will be slain wherever met, unless they give themselves up as prisoners.” Though often barefoot, poorly clad, and ill fed, the Volunteers complied with his orders.<sup>67</sup>

The defense of the new settlements, then, was largely in the hands of Indian allies—O’odhams and Maricopas—who enlisted in the Volunteers. From the dawn of colonization, Europeans had exploited Indian antagonisms to further their interests. Arizona lay at the end of the long road of colonization but even there, the calculus of conquest remained unchanged. Whites exploited divisions among Indians to conquer them. Whites took advantage, too, of the sociology of honor—the expectation that men would be warriors and raiders—that prevailed in the Southwest.

Edmund Wells noted that O’odhams and Maricopas who joined the Arizona Volunteers were “dramatically inclined.” As if to illustrate honor, they “gave [Americans] pantomime exhibitions of ambushing the enemy and the attacks upon them.” Before going into battle, they also adhered to the Indian practice of rubbing armpits, elbows, wrists, and hip and knee joints “with sand to make them supple and submissive to the dexterous use of the bow and arrow and the lance, and flexible in their dashing attack.” If they subsequently met and killed their enemy, they were required to go through additional rituals of purification that might take them out of action for days at a time. Officers disliked the absences but had little choice but to permit them. Without Indian allies, the army could neither locate nor engage the enemy. Without Indian allies, the cost of fighting Yavapais and Dilzhe’es would rise enormously with no corresponding rise in effectiveness. Without Indian allies, finally, settlement and investment would go stagnant.<sup>68</sup>

Commanding officers also had little choice but to work with colorful trappers like Paulino Weaver, Ed Peck, and Dan O’Leary, who were the next best recruits to Indians themselves. Each of those men had forged personal relationships with Indians while they had trapped and prospected in earlier years. Of the three, it was Weaver who was closest to Yavapais, whom he had met in the 1830s.

Born in Tennessee and trained in the service of the Hudson's Bay Company, Weaver was himself half Cherokee, which perhaps enabled him to see civility in both the Indian and white worlds. In 1831, Weaver explored Arizona while en route from Taos, New Mexico, to California to buy horses. Three decades later, he returned as a scout for the California Volunteers. By 1862, he was operating a ferry on the Colorado and guiding prospectors into the territory's interior. Affable, talkative, and quick to share a story, Weaver could speak not only English but also Spanish and Yuman. He thus became a peacemaker, acting as arbiter in disputes among Yuman-speaking Yavapais as well as in disputes between Yavapais and settlers. Likely it was diplomatic skill that earned him the Yavapai name Quah-a-ha-na, meaning "Good Talker."<sup>69</sup>

"It is hard to ceep a hunkry Indian from stealing," Weaver once complained, "and almost as hard to keep the whites from making an indiscrimanade Sloghter of them for Stealing." His statement showed understanding. Settlement brought ecological disaster to Indians, whose game was killed off and whose gathering territories were suddenly circumscribed. It was often food that Indians stole, and they took it because they were hungry.<sup>70</sup>

To prevent both stealing and slaughter, Weaver wrote letters for friendly Indians to present to whites. Weaver even taught Yavapais a password to show friendly intentions: "Powlino, Powlino, Tobacco." Yavapais also learned to attach cedar twigs to G-strings as tokens of peace, though where they learned that practice is unclear. The twigs, the letters, and the password underscore the fact that not all interactions between Yavapais and settlers were hostile. From the outset of settlement, some Yavapais traded with whites and worked for them doing unskilled labor: chopping wood, hauling water, hoeing and picking, even building roads.<sup>71</sup>

The territory, however, was in the throes of hatred. Few whites could distinguish—or wanted to distinguish—peaceful Indians from hostile ones. As early as 1863, prospectors killed some twenty Yavapais, blaming them for stealing burros. A short while later, the burros turned up; they had wandered away. On another occasion, miners killed two Yavapai boys who had come to their camp out of curiosity. Settlers, however, were not always the instigators of violence. Yavapais, for their part, were divided by band. At any given

time, some bands warred with settlers while others sought peace. Even within a particular band, young men sometimes made war without authorization (to the degree “authorization” existed in tribal society). Weaver’s password, then, was of little use. Too often, settlers shot first and asked no questions.<sup>72</sup>

Weaver was locked into contradiction. He liked Indians; he socialized with Indians; he spoke for peace. Had settlement not proceeded at a white-hot pace, Weaver may well have helped create a middle ground—a place of parity and negotiation—much like the one that dominated New France in the 1600s. Settlement, however, did not slow, nor did Weaver try to slow it. Quite the opposite: He guided settlers to the promised land of gold and silver, ensuring that Indians would suffer. When Indians did suffer, and when they reacted with animus, Weaver sided against them.

Weaver became especially angered when Yavapai stole his cattle. When their leaders refused to make amends, Weaver led an attack against them. In retaliation, it seems, Yavapai killed Weaver’s adult son, Ben. Even as a government scout, however, Weaver continued to consort with the enemy. In particular he consorted with Delshay (“Red Ant”), who was half Dilzhe’e, half Yavapai. The acquaintance, it seems, preceded the Verde Valley campaign. Like others among his people, Delshay was astonished and furious when he learned that Weaver had offered his services to the army. According to Edmund Wells, however, the two men met sometime in the mid-1860s at the hot springs in the Verde Valley, where Delshay’s sister, now desperately ill, had gone to seek a cure.<sup>73</sup>

Like other stories in Wells’s reminiscences, the story sounds contrived. Wells was correct to suggest, however, that hot springs were often neutral places among Indians, places that enemies could go without fear of attack. According to Wells, the two men parleyed when Delshay was visiting his sister. Wells claimed that Weaver had family ties to Delshay of a sort. Delshay’s ailing sister was mother to Aha-sa-ya-mo and wife to Chalipun, a Dilzhe’e chief. Now on neutral ground, Delshay and Weaver treated one another “with civility and urbanity,” pledging themselves to keep women and children out of harm’s way.<sup>74</sup>


Whatever Weaver’s intentions, the Arizona Volunteers—though ordered not to—killed women and children with regularity. More

often, they captured children and sold them into slavery. In the single year of 1866, they captured or killed more than a hundred Yavapais and Dilzhe'es. The Volunteers were not uniquely evil or bloodthirsty. They were, however, products of two historical forces that combined into one great wave of violence: the historic animus between sedentary peoples of the Salt and Gila and upland hunter-gatherers, and the influx of settlers. Those two forces changed the territory forever. Weaver, even if he sought to protect Indians from the worst of the storm, accomplished little. Amid the brutality of the 1860s, Paulino Weaver's story ended. With him went the possibility of a middle ground, a realm of accommodation and compromise that would allow Indians to control the pace and the nature of change. Delshay, however, was not ready to capitulate. Weaver was dead, but Delshay's fight was only beginning.


PART I

*Endings*





**Map 2.** Forts, roads, and reservations in central Arizona, c. 1874.





## *Conquest*

IN FALL 1867, A SMALL GROUP OF INDIANS—Dilzhe'es and Yavapai—waving a white flag approached soldiers who were building a road through the Mazatzals of central Arizona. The officer in charge, Lieutenant R. C. DuBois, responded with his own white flag. One of the Indians ventured closer to DuBois, pointing to the young lieutenant's revolver. Realizing his meaning, DuBois laid aside the gun. Now standing at arm's length, the Indian thumped himself on the chest, then thumped DuBois on the chest, indicating that he desired a heart-to-heart talk. Somehow DuBois was made to understand that the Indians would come back with their war chief—Delshay—in four days. To demonstrate goodwill, DuBois gave them clothing and trinkets to take back to their camp.<sup>1</sup>

When Delshay appeared at DuBois's camp under a flag of truce on October 26, 1867, some of his men brought placer gold supposedly taken from Tonto Creek. The gold did not keep the soldiers from fuming. Whatever DuBois's promises were, they wanted no Indians in camp. They were especially incensed to see officers give up their tents to Indian headmen for sleeping quarters. Far from welcoming Delshay's people, the enlisted men called them "rattlesnakes" and gave them spoiled flour.<sup>2</sup> The troops' hostility, however, was not entirely shared by their superiors, who hoped to bring peace.

The Indian spokesman—Delshay—was, like DuBois, a young man. Though perhaps not a hereditary chief, Delshay, through courage and ability, had achieved the status of war chief. In part because he was half Dilzhe'e and half Yavapai—a bicultural man—Delshay led a bicultural, bilingual band. His influence, however, went beyond his band. According to army observers, Delshay and Chalipun—a

Dilzhe'e headman—were the most influential chiefs in the region. It is important to note, however, that Delshay was a war chief. His authority swelled in times of conflict but in peace he remained secondary.<sup>3</sup>

Certainly Delshay looked the part of war chief. Standing over six feet tall and sporting a pearl shirt stud in his left earlobe—a stud taken, presumably, from a white man killed in a raid—Delshay towered over soldiers. His gait gave him all the more authority. Rather than walk at an easy pace, Delshay moved at a trot, his broad, slightly stooped shoulders enhancing the appearance of forward motion. The trot testified to athleticism. Though a big man, Delshay could outrun the fleetest of his peers. Delshay's athleticism, in turn, testified to his honor. He was a man who refused to shrink from anger, from fighting, from death. No less important were his powers to bring rain and to prophesy. In one of his visions, he saw his people trapped like animals. His country became suddenly "bare and black. No living beings could be seen[, ] only above him the stars [appeared] as smokes."<sup>4</sup>

Despite the bleakness of his vision, Delshay hoped to gain a reservation in his homeland. For the next several years, Delshay and his people would pursue that goal by veering erratically from peace to war and back. Nothing stopped settlers. Nothing stopped troops. Americans were expanding; their population was exploding; their economy was booming. They were a proud, even a boisterous people, who saw themselves as examples to the world. They had proven, it seemed, the greatness of republican government, of Christianity, of the white race. To settlers and soldiers, Dilzhe'es and Yavapais were mere Indians, people who were barbaric, vengeful, treacherous. Whites conceived of themselves as a people of honor; they conceived of Indians, like blacks, as a people of shame. Delshay had little hope of prevailing over the tens of thousands of newcomers bent on his destruction. Even as the tide of settlement proved unstoppable, however, settlers found themselves frustrated.

Though settlers suffered no crushing defeat, they, no less than Yavapais and Dilzhe'es, were subdued by the army and its Indian scouts. Despite settlers' demands for genocide, the army's goal was to force Indians onto reservations without bankrupting the government. To accomplish that goal, the army recruited Yavapais and Dilzhe'es along with Cibecues and White Mountain Apaches as scouts. The scouts, no less than Delshay, sought reservations in their homelands and safety from old enemies, especially O'odhams and Maricopas. Even

as General George Crook, leader of the campaign against the Yavapai and Dilzhe'e, endorsed a campaign of cruelty—a campaign that today might earn him a trial for war crimes—he and his scouts staved off the genocidal directives of editors, governors, and settlers. Their victory was not just a victory over native peoples. It was also a victory over an old logic of honor, a logic of white dignity and “black”—or Indian—shame, a logic dictating that Indians must either be exterminated or removed. Crook's victory, in turn, set the stage for a new chapter in Indian survival, a chapter that began in the Verde Valley, continued with an exile to San Carlos, and concluded with a return.

Delshay's parley with DuBois was neither the first nor last time that Delshay negotiated with whites. According to Edmund Wells, Delshay had accompanied an Indian delegation to Washington, DC, in the late 1860s—shortly before or shortly after his meeting with DuBois—where he supposedly marveled over a printing press, impressed the president with his eloquence, and elicited comparisons to Daniel Webster, the orator from Massachusetts.<sup>5</sup> Though archival records fail to confirm the story, they do show that other Arizona Indians made the trip. Iretaba, a Mojave chief, journeyed to Washington in 1864, as did a Yavapai delegation the following year. Perhaps Delshay was among them. Anton Azul, chief of the Akimel O'odham, made the trip at about the same time. Nock-el-del-kinny and other Cibecue and White Mountain Apaches journeyed to Washington in the early 1870s. Whether or not Delshay accompanied one of those parties, he gained notoriety and grudging respect from American soldiers.

Relations between Delshay's people and the United States, however, were fraught. As early as 1866, Delshay—worn down by ceaseless attacks by the Arizona militia as well as O'odham and Maricopa forces—had sought peace at Camp McDowell, just east of modern Phoenix (not until 1890 would it be known by its present name, Fort McDowell). There Delshay discussed the idea of a reservation with Captain George Sanford. Sanford, however, lacked authority to negotiate. Neither did he have rations to offer Delshay's people. Worried that O'odhams would attack if he stayed at McDowell, Delshay returned to the mountains. No progress had been made. Worse, a Dilzhe'e war party—seemingly not connected with Delshay—killed the Arizona superintendent of Indian affairs, George Leihy, on November 18. The killers did not know who Leihy was.

They knew only that he was on the road with an Indian prisoner, and that he made an easy target.<sup>6</sup>

With Leihy dead, the conflict between the United States and the Yavapai and Dilzhe'e again became a war of attrition. Soldiers—some as Arizona Volunteers, some as army enlistees, some as “Yavapai Rangers” (the name given to an unpaid militia recruited in Prescott)—killed as many Indians as they could find. When they could find no Indians, they merely burned their fields and dwellings. In response, Yavapais and Dilzhe'es raided settlers in the Verde Valley then disappeared into the vast canyons along the Mogollon Rim. Like the soldiers who plagued them, the Indians burned crops that they could not carry away. On at least one occasion, the leader of the Arizona Volunteers thought to slow Indian raids by attaching an Apache corpse to a scaffold. The ghastly scarecrow was intended to deter warriors who were more frightened of the dead than the living. The ruse, however, had limited effect.<sup>7</sup>

In the midst of the campaign, the army decided to build a road between Camp McDowell and the Tonto Basin. Not only would the road carry troops and supplies into Tonto Basin, it would also promote immigration into the Dilzhe'e heartland. The road posed a direct threat to Delshay's band as well as at least four other mixed bands that ranged over the Mazatzals and Sierra Ancha (fig. 2.1). Among the threatened bands were those of Chalipun (“Buckskin Hat”), Chilchinhuana, and Oshkolte.<sup>8</sup>

Despite the threat posed by the road, Indians remained friendly—though aloof—toward the road crew. The Indians, it seems, still hoped that the army would negotiate a compromise, causing Delshay to send emissaries to DuBois. That hope briefly disappeared, however, when an O'odham party under Anton Azul—known for his loyalty to whites and his set of false teeth—arrived on a visit of curiosity. Finding the troops on good terms with Yavapais and Apaches, Azul's men became livid. Anger gave way to altercation as O'odhams pursued Yavapais and Apaches, striking two on the head with war clubs before DuBois commanded them to desist. When one of the attackers refused, DuBois raised his gun and threatened to shoot. It was an act of courage that ingratiated DuBois to Delshay and boded well for the future. For DuBois, however, the event took an ominous turn. In the middle of the fracas, blood spilled from his mouth. He was hemorrhaging from the lungs, likely due to tuberculosis.<sup>9</sup>



**Figure 2.1.** Godigojo, Tonto Apache. Photo by Henry Buehman, 1875. The man here identified as “Tonto Apache” is probably Dilzhe’e. His attire shows him to be a man of importance, possibly a headman. National Anthropological Archives, Smithsonian Institution, NAA INV 09834800.

On November 22, 1867, Delshay was again in the soldier’s camp to talk to DuBois. Delshay’s band was now under a flag of truce, having tentatively agreed to relocation on the Gila River. Delshay, however, told DuBois that he could not abide by the agreement. A reservation on the Gila, he insisted, would be vulnerable to O’odham and Maricopa raiders. DuBois, now with firsthand experience of intertribal hostilities, suggested an alternative reservation in Tonto Basin. Delshay liked the idea but wanted DuBois to visit his camp for a talk. Two days later, DuBois found himself undergoing the “roughest . . . journey of my life” as he ascended the Sierra Ancha for the meeting.<sup>10</sup>

At Delshay’s camp, DuBois found a hut and a fire prepared for him in advance. He also found Ashcavotil, a headman, who refused

to speak to DuBois until told of his bravery in stopping O'odham attacks at the soldiers' camp. After sitting down to talk, the men passed a pipe back and forth until midnight. During the previous weeks, DuBois had struggled to comprehend the Indians' language, apparently learning enough Apache or Yavapai to pick up a few words without an interpreter.<sup>11</sup>

In the course of the talk, the Indians told DuBois that they would refrain from attacks. They also agreed to return to the soldiers' camp to await approval of the new reservation. To keep them there, DuBois promised rations. He also arranged a prisoner swap in which Delshay's people exchanged two Mexican boys for two of their own taken by O'odhams. The exchange, promised DuBois, would be a first step toward stopping O'odham attacks. It would also be a first step toward a peace between Americans and the Yavapai and Apache.<sup>12</sup>

As was so often the case, the promise failed to hold. Though his superior, General Irvin McDowell, approved the plan for the Tonto Basin reservation, DuBois was transferred out of his unit for medical disability. His replacement, Major David Clendenin, promptly made the mistake of riding to a peace conference while Delshay walked, causing Delshay to feel slighted. He was an important leader and demanded respect. When it was not forthcoming, he backed out of the agreement. No doubt he also felt pressure from headmen and warriors who disliked the proposal in the first place. It was soldiers and settlers who were intruding on Indian lands, not vice versa, and the Indians were not willing to give up without a fight.<sup>13</sup>

In late March 1868, a new commander of Camp McDowell and the Verde subdistrict, Major Andrew Alexander, arrived on the scene for a talk with Delshay and Ashcavotil. Alexander was the third "headman" with whom Indians had met, causing them to become confused and suspicious. Individual relationships meant much in their world; trust had to be built and maintained over years. With DuBois gone, they feared betrayal. The new man did his best to confirm their fears by telling them that he could promise no specific lands for a reservation. The Indians would have to take what they could get. Frustrated, Delshay broke off talks and went home.<sup>14</sup>

Alexander meanwhile gathered a force of 175 cavalry. Though he regarded Delshay and Ashcavotil as friendly, he planned an offensive against other bands. Perhaps he also hoped to frighten Delshay and Ashcavotil into concessions. When Delshay saw Alexander's cavalry,

however, he ordered his men to flee. Delshay was certain that Alexander planned to attack. For his part, Alexander, seeing Delshay flee, became convinced that he was planning treachery. Each side miscalculated.<sup>15</sup>

On the next day, Delshay called for a conference. After reiterating his trust for DuBois and his doubts about Alexander, Delshay informed Alexander that he planned to make war. He and Ashcavotil together, he bragged, would exterminate the troops. Ashcavotil, too, “broke into the most abusive language.” Badly frightened, Alexander ordered his troops to fire. Delshay “dropped like a rock” then disappeared. Later he claimed that he had been hit six times. He, like his opponent, considered himself a victim of treachery; he was not prepared for the war he was promising to start. Delshay, it seems, had been bluffing, laboring under the theory that threats would give him a better position to bargain. In the climate of mutual fear and distrust, both he and Alexander again miscalculated.<sup>16</sup>

Despite his wounds, Delshay led an attack on the newly founded Camp Reno on the east slope of the Mazatzals on May 24. Likely his bullet wounds, now healing, had given him an aura of invulnerability. His power seemed strong. Ashcavotil, on the other hand, was busily seeking peace, offering to help soldiers in road construction, wood gathering, and adobe manufacture in exchange for seed and surplus tools. Either Ashcavotil’s people were desperate or, perhaps, their role was to profess peace while supplying intelligence to Delshay.<sup>17</sup>

Refusing to trust Ashcavotil, Alexander ordered his people, along with any Yavapai or Apaches who ventured into the soldiers’ camp on Mount Ord, to be imprisoned. In carrying out those orders, the troops managed to kill two Indians who tried to escape. One of them was Delshay’s brother, Rising Sun. After being warned not to run, he supposedly responded that he must try anyway. If he was killed, he observed, his bones would make neither silver nor gold. Two other emissaries from a Yavapai band not in alliance with Delshay or Ashcavotil were also captured. When guards came to disarm them, they feared the worst and rebelled. Both were killed.<sup>18</sup>

Three more Indians died during an attempt by Delshay’s men to run off the soldiers’ livestock. Skirmishing ensued over the next few months. General T. C. Devin meanwhile went ahead with Alexander’s planned expedition into Tonto Basin. The expedition failed; the scouts found little more than abandoned rancherias. Devin

nonetheless succeeded in opening a wagon road from West Clear Creek to the top of the Rim, explaining that building roads and trails into Indian country was “the most effectual mode of holding the Indians in check, next to fighting them.” Devin must have been pleased again when, in August 1868, the army’s work crew completed the final leg of the 67 miles of bone-jarring road from McDowell to Green Valley (modern Payson). Still another road—this one connecting Camp Verde with the Colorado Plateau—was beaten into the soil under orders from General George Stoneman, Devin’s replacement as commander of the Department of Arizona in 1870.<sup>19</sup> Despite Delshay’s resistance, the army advanced.

Three months later, on November 30, 1868, soldiers and Indians alike watched as a meteor “burst into a golden shower, with a rumbling noise resembling distant thunder, and a dull shock like the dying effort of an earthquake.” One soldier recalled that “the full moon was shining at the time, its light unobscured by cloud, yet the brilliancy of the meteor . . . eclipsed her beauty, and caused the night to shine as the day.”<sup>20</sup> We cannot know what Indians thought the meteor signified, though undoubtedly they saw it as an omen, likely an ill one. If night was becoming day for whites, day was becoming night for Yavapais and Dilzhe’es.

The year 1869, however, held promise. That spring, Alexander called in four chiefs for a talk at McDowell. Only Delshay and Chilchihuana showed up. Alexander gave an ultimatum. He would grant rations and a reservation at McDowell, but only if they surrendered unconditionally or signed on as scouts. Those who refused were to be killed on sight. He gave them sixty days to consider his “offer.”<sup>21</sup>

By the end of April, Delshay and Chilchihuana, along with Chalipun, had agreed to the ultimatum. They would accept a reservation at McDowell, despite their fears of O’odham and Maricopa attack. In the meantime, they agreed to cut hay and carry mail for the army between McDowell and Reno. In return the army agreed to pay the carriers \$25 a month plus rations. Though Delshay did not become a scout, he provided critical intelligence. Delshay and his allies, Chilchihuana and Chalipun, it seems, had decided that cooperation would gain more than resistance, though they had not abandoned their love for their own country in the Mazatzals, Sierra Ancha, and Tonto Basin. Other Yavapais and Dilzhe’es, meanwhile, prosecuted what

had now become a full-scale war, raiding all the way to Tucson in the south and the Hassayampa River in the west.<sup>22</sup>

On May 29, the Arizona *Miner* reported that Delshay's people were living up to their end of the bargain by cutting hay and carrying mail. Alexander was pleased. He now believed he could trust Delshay, though trouble erupted when a captive Yavapai girl whom the Alexanders had adopted—or, to use a more accurate term, enslaved—disappeared. Alexander's wife, Eveline, had thought the girl bright and attractive and hoped to transform her into a "civilized" being. Calling her "Patty"—short for Apache—Eveline cut her hair, bathed her, and began training her as a nurse to her newborn. When the girl refused to follow orders, a "good stout soldier" would pick her up bodily and deposit her outside. Eveline also threatened Patty with the guardhouse. Not surprisingly, she ran away. Delshay's mail carriers got the blame. Without waiting for explanation, Alexander ordered them to be arrested. Delshay then managed to locate the girl and bring her back, explaining that she had run away of her own accord and was living with Oshkolte's band.<sup>23</sup>

The "kidnapping" was not the only incident for which Delshay received blame. He was also thought to be an accomplice to mail theft and, more important, a raid that accounted for the loss of six cows and the death of a soldier. When a new man took over at Reno—Captain Patrick Collins—he accused Delshay of lying about his role in those outrages. Told that he must bring his people to McDowell and serve as a scout, Delshay fled to the Sierra Ancha. Among officers, meanwhile, he earned the sobriquet "the Liar." Though once the army's friend and employee, Delshay found himself to be the army's *bête noire*, an Indian who seemed to represent all that was worst in Indians: deceit, treachery, barbarism.<sup>24</sup> Rather than view Delshay as a leader struggling toward a political goal, officers fell back on the logic of Indian depravity.

Hope was not entirely lost. In November 1869, Delshay's people returned to Reno and again agreed to carry mail. Things had gone badly for Delshay. The army had continued to campaign in Tonto Basin, though they did not target Delshay's band. Prospectors, however, had begun to invade, sometimes with army escorts. On at least one occasion, Delshay befriended a prospecting party, but other encounters turned sour. In summer 1869, prospectors killed

five of Delshay's men. Another report put the number at twenty-five. Either way, Delshay found it necessary to seek army protection. At Reno, however, he met with another blow when the camp's surgeon, James Dunlevy, shot him in the chest, accusing him of having pilfered goods.<sup>25</sup>

Edmund Wells wrote about the incident from diary entries, though exactly whose diaries they were is unclear. After being shot, reported Wells, Delshay "walked slowly away until he was outside of the Post line when he gave a yell or two and started off on a bounding run, his people all following him in the same defiant spirit." Delshay, the supposed liar, had again been betrayed, and again sought refuge in the mountains. Oddly, he returned nineteen days later to let the surgeon treat his wound. Peace did not ensue. In the coming months, Delshay's men attacked troops at every opportunity.<sup>26</sup>

If times were hard on Delshay, they were not much better for the men at Reno. The troops were angry with their surgeon for his rash action, which threatened to foment more violence. In addition, they suffered from scurvy, an affliction caused by the shortage of fruits and vegetables. Unlike the Indians, Americans did not know how to harvest nutritious roots and greens from the land. From the outside, however, Reno appeared to be making progress. By December 1869, it could boast of having a sutler, a blacksmith, and a carpenter as well as teamsters, clerks, herders, and civilians working under contract. It also had a stable. What it lacked was pasture and water, which had to be hauled from a great distance away. The camp also smelled bad, perhaps due to poorly ventilated latrines and dumps.<sup>27</sup>

The troops, meanwhile, sustained casualties. A single ambush in March 1870 took the lives of five soldiers. To cut losses, the army decided in April 1870 to abandon Reno altogether, leaving it only as a substation for troops venturing out from McDowell. In June, Indians burned it down. Only crumbling adobe testified to Reno's past. The road into Tonto Basin remained open, but the hours and days of sweat and hardship that had gone into building the fort were in vain.<sup>28</sup>

Reno's demise did not stop the army's Tonto Basin campaign, but settlers wanted stronger action. To accommodate them, in 1871 President Ulysses Grant sent Lieutenant Colonel George Crook.<sup>29</sup> A West Point graduate, Crook had a long résumé of Indian fighting from both before the Civil War and after. He was not, however, an Indian hater.

When he had first served in California, Crook found Indians who were “forced to take the war path or sink all self respect.” Settlers, awash in “greed [that] was almost unrestrained,” respected no law. They raped and murdered Indians regularly and went unpunished. “It is hard to believe,” recalled Crook, “the wrongs these Indians had to suffer. . . . The trouble with the army was that the Indians would confide in us as friends, and we had to witness this unjust treatment of them without the power to help.” The army’s job was to kill Indians after they reacted to atrocities. As a consequence, “there was scarcely ever a time that there was not one or more wars with the Indians somewhere on the Pacific Coast.”<sup>30</sup>

After distinguishing himself in the Civil War, Crook had returned to the Indian wars, commanding a campaign against Modocs, Bannocks, and Shoshones. There he developed the tactic of severing his supply lines and following Indians wherever they went, giving them no time for hunting, gathering, or rest. Dividing his forces into small commands led by ambitious captains and lieutenants, he sent out men in all directions. Speaking of Crook’s tactical maps, one of his officers, A. H. Nickerson, wrote that “such a complication of eccentric and concentric trails were never before displayed on parchment.” To the tactic of what today would be called “search and destroy,” Crook added two others. He made mule packing into an art, teaching civilian packers to jettison superfluous material, and he recruited Indian scouts. The scouts became the eyes and ears of the troops. Crook drew many of his scouts from friendly Cibecue and White Mountain bands that lived to the east. He drew others from Dilzhe’e and Yavapai bands that wanted peace. Contrary to his predecessors, finally, Crook campaigned in winter and was known to march all day, all night, and all the next day.<sup>31</sup>

Crook was unique in other ways, too. He refused pomposity. There was nothing he hated more, noted one officer, than snobbery, pedantry, and pretension. In the field and at headquarters, he avoided uniforms and ceremony. He generally dressed in “the same style of canvas clothing as the men,” who were themselves dressed haphazardly. Uniforms gave way to a motley assemblage of whatever was comfortable for desert wear. John Gregory Bourke, Crook’s aide-de-camp, described his superior as “plain as an old stick.”<sup>32</sup>

Crook affirmed his egalitarianism by eating the same rations as his men. He scoffed at the epicurean tastes of fellow brass. Often he



**Figure 2.2.** General George Crook, pictured here in 1882. Arizona State Library, Archives and Public Records, History and Archives Division, no. 01-1444.

could be found in the evening at his small campfire, cooking game that he had killed during the day. His favorite pastime was hunting—often under the tutelage of Apache guides—though he eschewed the sort of hunting done by other officers, who made the chase into a social occasion rather than a serious and solitary affair.<sup>33</sup>

Crook's humble demeanor—along with his resolution—made itself known via a face that could almost, but not quite, be described as handsome. Bourke, ever the celebrant, described him as having “blue-gray eyes, quick and penetrating in glance, a finely chiseled Roman nose, a firm and yet kindly mouth, a well-arched head, a good brow, and a general expression of indomitable resolution, honest purpose, sagacity, and good intentions.” Crook also had all the dignity that came with the beard of an Old Testament prophet, which descended from his sideburns in two long segments. Apaches and Yavapais



**Figure 2.3.** General Crook recruited Indian scouts not only from outside Tonto Basin but also from defeated bands in the basin itself. Judging from clothing and hairstyle, these scouts—photographed at Camp Verde—include both Yavapais and Apaches. Photo by W. H. Williscraft, c. 1875. Sharlot Hall Museum Library and Archives, Prescott, Arizona.

(fig. 2.3) saw him differently. They called him “Old Woman’s Face,” a commentary on his wrinkled skin and his small eyes.<sup>34</sup>

Wrinkles or no, Bourke considered Crook a hero. Bourke likened Crook not only to Daniel Boone but also to Indians. On one occasion, an Apache who grew weary of Bourke’s ethnographic curiosity told him to take his questions to “Nantan”—“Great Man”—meaning Crook. Nantan, he insisted, was “more of an Indian than I am.”<sup>35</sup> Oblivious to what another ethnographer might have taken as an arrow of sarcasm, Bourke believed that the Apache had paid Crook a compliment. Perhaps he had, but one also sees in the exchange a subtle dig. Regardless of Bourke’s imaginings, Crook was no Indian;

he knew little of Apaches beyond what it took to succeed militarily. For Bourke, however, the idea that Crook was as Indian as Indians themselves—in his knowledge of the land, in his endurance, in his military bearing, in his refusal to bend or break—papered over any niggling doubts about conquest. Crook was as much the native, the man sprung from the land, the heir to the realm, as any Indian.

Bourke made sure readers understood that in other ways Crook was not Indian. As Bourke triumphantly remarked, Crook imbibed neither tulapai nor tiswin, beers brewed from corn and mescal, respectively. Though he occasionally drank to be sociable, he was a man of abstemious habits. He even refrained from stimulants, eschewing coffee and rarely sipping tea. Nor did he give way to curses and imprecations.<sup>36</sup> With his powerful self-control, his biblical rectitude, and his work ethic, Crook was very much the product of the conscience culture of the North. In politics, he was a Republican, and in person, a model of genteel deportment. To such a man, Indians could be sympathetic, interesting, and human. But they could not be equal, at least not in the here and now. Their behavior—drinking, gambling, killing “witches,” executing captives—seemed to represent all that the conscience culture of the North, and for that matter much of the rest of the United States and Europe, repudiated.

Never doubting his moral superiority, Crook treated enemy chiefs—men who came to him after months or years of war to talk of surrender—with reserve and contempt. Partly his demeanor was an act; he sought to make Indians think he was doing them a favor by allowing surrender. In one parley in Oregon, Crook refused to shake hands with his adversary, telling him that he’d have preferred that the man remain at war so that the army could kill his people. Behind the facade, however, Crook consistently permitted Indians to return to hunting and gathering, asking only that they refrain from attacking trespassing whites and let the army deal with them instead. In bringing an end to Indian wars wherever he went—except in the Dakotas in 1876—he was successful.<sup>37</sup>

After his arrival in Arizona, Crook determined that the heart of the trouble lay in Tonto Basin and the mountains that surrounded it, a country “so cut up with deep cañons that it can be crossed in few places only known to the Indians.” It was a huge area, made all the bigger by Crook’s generous definition. Tonto Basin, he explained, covered “the roughest country in the United States,” stretching “from the Little

Colorado to the western slopes of the Mogollon Range [the Rim]" and "from Camp Verde to New Camp Grant [on the Gila River]." <sup>38</sup>

When Crook and his staff arrived in 1871, they found a place where "hostility appeared to be the normal condition of everybody and everything, animate and inanimate." By now, even friendly Yavapais could expect nothing but lead when they came to white settlers looking for work. Killings by both sides were routine, though Yavapais and Dilzhe'es bore most of the death. Their frustration had long since turned to rage. On one occasion, Yavapais captured and tortured a young man—the son of a mining engineer—by shooting him full of arrows, purposely avoiding vital spots in order to watch him writhe. According to some reports, they cut off his lips—either before or after he died—giving him a gruesome appearance. <sup>39</sup> The story made the rounds in the territorial newspapers, though none managed to identify which band was responsible.

To settlers, the incident reinforced the notion of an irredeemable people, a people who deserved extermination. Such incidents became the milk of genocide, drunk heartily by men like King Woolsey and Governor John Goodwin. Their views conformed to the idea that some people—whites—merited honor, whereas others—Indians, blacks, Chinese, and almost anyone nonwhite—merited shame. Those to be shamed were those incapable of civilization. Like blacks in the South, they could choose subjection and servility or, like Indians, they could choose annihilation. There was no middle ground.

Crook's worldview was different. He sometimes echoed the rhetoric of genocide, to be sure. He described the Apache as a "tiger of the human race, a mean, sullen and treacherous savage," whose "treaties and agreements are made only to be broken whenever blood, lust, or tiswin moved him to the warpath." Bourke, however—Crook's spokesman and promoter—pointed out that Apaches were no "more cruel . . . than other nations of the earth have been." Once Indians surrendered, he added, Crook metamorphosed into a "more experienced brother . . . always ready to hold out a helping hand." <sup>40</sup>

Crook's plan for Indians—including Apaches and Yavapais—was not genocide, though in the short term it came close. In the long term, Crook, like other northern reformers, wanted to remake Indians in the image of conscience. To accomplish that, Crook commanded Indian men to refrain from abusing women, "no matter what the excuse." Crook also supported giving Indians the vote—immediately

after conquest—and dividing their reservations into small farms, privately owned. Indians, he argued, would thus learn the advantages of political participation, private property, and hard work. The existing system, he insisted, allowed settlers to exploit Indians by leasing their grazing and mineral rights or simply by trespassing. To cure trespass and to bolster Indians' self-worth, Crook refused to deprive Indians of guns. Indians, he argued, needed to police their own territories. They needed to take care of themselves.<sup>41</sup>

A severalty act became law in 1887, two years before Crook's death. What Crook perhaps did not understand, however, was that reservations with limited amounts of irrigable land—including almost all those in Arizona—made poor candidates for family farming. There was not enough arable land to divide. Realizing that fact, the government shrank from applying severalty laws to Apache lands. It did apply severalty laws elsewhere, however, creating a new nightmare for Indians, who lost two-thirds of their land, most of it sold off as "surplus" after allotment of farms to Indian families. That was an outcome that Crook did not live to see. Nor did he live to see Arizona Indians get the vote, which did not occur until 1948.<sup>42</sup>

Before all that, however, came the matter of conquest, which was Crook's forte. Among the first things he did on arriving was to fire fifty Mexican scouts employed at Fort Apache and hire Apaches in their place.<sup>43</sup> Then he traveled to Camp Verde, eager to start his campaign. What he found in his communications, however, unsettled him.

President Grant, responding to humanitarians, had decided to send a peace commissioner to the West. The commissioner, Vincent Colyer, was charged with offering an olive branch by setting aside reservations and providing food and annuities. Colyer's mission was nothing new; emissaries from Washington had been doing the same since the country's inception. What angered Crook was what he perceived to be Colyer's naïveté. Colyer seemed to blame whites while portraying Indians as above reproach. "I have visited seven-eighths of all the Indians now under our flag," reported Colyer on September 18, 1871, "and I have not seen a more intelligent, cheerful, and grateful tribe of Indians than the roving Apaches of Arizona and New Mexico." More upsetting to Crook was the fact that his plans for an offensive would have to be sidetracked until the peace plan proved unworkable. That it would prove unworkable Crook never

doubted; the question was only how long before it failed, and how many settlers would die as a result.<sup>44</sup>

Colyer's mission was precipitated in particular by one incident of unspeakable brutality. At the confluence of Aravaipa Creek and the San Pedro River, the government had set aside a small reservation for Pinal and Aravaipas as well as a few Dilzhe'es. The project was all the more successful due to Lieutenant Royal Whitman's oversight. Whitman, a New Englander who had been brevetted to colonel during the Civil War, showed great respect for Indians and endeavored to provide them rations and clothing. Settlers at Tucson, however, insisted that Whitman's Apaches were conducting raids in the south. To end the raiding they recruited an ad hoc militia composed of about 50 Americans and Mexicans and 80 O'odhams. The group convened on April 30, 1871, while the Apache men were away hunting. The militia proceeded to massacre women and children except those whom they could capture for sale in Mexico. In half an hour of orgiastic killing, they left 110 dead and carried 28 into slavery. The event became known as the Camp Grant Massacre.<sup>45</sup>

President Grant responded forcefully, threatening to declare martial law unless those thought guilty were arrested. Already he had declared martial law in parts of the South in order to defeat the Ku Klux Klan. Now he would do the same in Arizona. The territory stepped around his snare, however, by putting the men on trial in a local court, allowing an Arizona jury to exonerate them.<sup>46</sup>

The only one convicted of anything was Royal Whitman. Settlers accused him of being a drunk and of protecting Apaches only to have relations with their women. The army was unhappy with him, too. He soon found himself facing charges for conduct unbecoming of an officer. His court-martial, however, was an embarrassment. The offenses Whitman had committed, it seems, were to get drunk while en route to his post and to use bad language to superiors. Out of loyalty to Whitman, meanwhile, the chief of the slaughtered band, Eskiminzin, remained at peace. On June 8, 1871, however, soldiers mistakenly fired on his men, taking them for members of a hostile band. Eskiminzin then fled, stopping briefly at the house of a rancher, Charles McKenny, with whom Eskiminzin had a friendship. The two ate a meal together, then Eskiminzin rose and killed his old friend. "I did it," he said, "to teach my people there must be no friendship

between them and white men. Anyone can kill an enemy, but it takes a strong man to kill a friend.”<sup>47</sup>

Eastern reformers who had been pushing President Grant for a peace effort now went into action, getting Grant to send Colyer to tour the Southwest, meet with Indian delegations, calm fears and salve wounds, and set aside reservations. It was a difficult job. Colyer, however, carried it out with courage, if not with success. What he heard from Indians were stories of pathos.

In September 1871, the army dispatched an officer to Camp Reno where he was to fly a white flag and tell the Indians to come to Camp McDowell to meet with Colyer and his representatives. For days after, Dilzhe’es and Yavapai kept signal fires burning throughout the region, putting out the word to others who had not heard. On seeing the fires and the flag, one aging Dilzhe’e, called by whites “One-Eyed Riley,” walked with three others all the way to McDowell. There he hoped to tell the government that his people sought peace.

Indians were suffering, One-Eyed Riley told the commanding officer at McDowell. They were living on mountaintops, hiding. Women were forced to walk two to three miles to fetch water, making the trips only at night. They could neither return to their farms nor find game. When they slept, they scattered into small parties for fear they would be caught together and massacred. They hid small children and infants in holes in the rocks, hoping that they, at least, might survive if the soldiers came. The soldiers, he continued—he was openly weeping—had killed four of his children. He wanted to make a big peace and “roll a big rock on it, and make it last till the rain came and washed the rock level.” God, he explained, had “told him he must come into McDowell that day and do all he could to make the big soldier’s heart like his—ready to do what was right.”<sup>48</sup>

After the conference, One-Eyed Riley and his companions turned back toward the mountains to bring in their fellows, including the man whom the army most wanted to take the peace road: Delshay. A military escort accompanied them for a short distance, just far enough to prevent an ambush by O’odhams who had secreted themselves along the trail.<sup>49</sup>

One-Eyed Riley kept his promise. In late October, Delshay and his Dilzhe’e ally, Chalipun, along with their bands, ventured to Sunflower Valley in the Mazatzals, some twenty miles east of McDowell, for a

talk. After Captain James Curtis, commander of McDowell, presented each band with a sack of flour and some beef, Delshay began his discourse. He, like One-Eyed Riley, spoke of making a “big treaty” to be commemorated by the placement of a rock on the ground. Only when the rock melted, said Delshay, would he break the treaty. What he wanted was a reservation in the Mazatzals or in Tonto Basin, not at McDowell where his people risked attack. But “if the big captain at Camp McDowell does not put a post where I say,” he concluded, “I can do nothing more, for God made the white man and God made the Apache, and the Apache has just as much right to the country as the white man.” Chalipun, deferring to Delshay, seconded his message.<sup>50</sup>

Delshay’s request was not unreasonable. Curtis reported to Colyer that the Yavapais and Dilzhe’es “will never be contented near this post,” noting their desire for a reservation on Tonto Creek, where they had farmed for decades, if not centuries. “The whole country around Reno,” he continued, as well as Tonto Creek at the foot of the Rim and Greenback Valley in the Sierra Ancha, “is unsettled by whites.” There, he concluded, was where Yavapais and Apaches should have their reservation.<sup>51</sup>

Curtis expressed certainty that Indians were ready to make a “lasting peace” but feared they could not be made to stay long enough for such a thing to occur. Without rations from the army, hunger would force them back to the mountains. Worse, explained Curtis, they feared an O’odham attack. Their fears were justified. While camped at Sunflower, the Indians fled in the night, leaving meat on their cooking fires and bows and quivers hanging in trees. The “latest advices,” noted Colyer, showed that a party of O’odhams and Maricopas had traveled to Reno, where they had killed “thirty-two defenseless women and children.” Upon hearing of the attack, Delshay and Chalipun had fled in the night.<sup>52</sup>

Twenty-five miles upriver from Camp Verde, a similar meeting was taking place at “the Springs,” apparently a reference to the sacred hot springs that emerged across the Verde from the Fossil Creek confluence. A Yavapai headman named Soulay had come in, “so emaciated” that the officer in charge hardly recognized him. Soulay was “so weak [that] he lay down on the ground, his head resting under the shade of a sage-brush.” Many of his people, it turned out, were equally sick, ravaged by diseases that preyed on the malnourished.<sup>53</sup>

From his prone position, Soulay held a shaky finger toward “the valley of the Verde below,” pointing to where a white man had built a cabin. “Where that house stands,” he said, “I have always planted corn; I went there this spring to plant corn, and the white man told me to go away or he would shoot me.” Many whites, he continued, went into the mountains to hunt deer, killing much of the game and frightening the rest of it away. Even when Indians located deer, they could no longer approach close enough to hit them with arrows; the deer were too wary and frightened. Nor could Indians hunt with guns; whites refused them powder and lead. His people, concluded Soulay, could still find mesquite beans, mescal, and cactus figs, but those resources were not enough. Starving, the young men were killing stock. Soulay knew it was wrong, “but how could he stop it, or blame them, when they were all dying for food?” Soulay could see no future except death.<sup>54</sup>

Moved by such testimony, Colyer approved the creation of reservations at Camp Apache, Camp Grant, Camp McDowell, and Rio Verde. Settlers, still bent on genocide, reviled him for it. The Arizona *Miner* called him a “cold-blooded scoundrel” and a “red-handed assassin,” adding that settlers should “dump the old devil into the shaft of some mine, and pile rocks upon him until he is dead.” Though no settlers attacked Colyer, they threatened to lynch him. They also attacked Indians with whom he was associated. Near Date Creek, a Yavapai who carried a Henry rifle but who showed no sign of aggressive intent came to a tavern where Colyer had been staying. Three settlers, Colyer reported, rode up and demanded the rifle. When the man refused, they killed him. The very next day, a party of some twenty Yavapais came walking along the road looking for work, only to be met with gunfire from white farmers. Several more Yavapais were killed.<sup>55</sup>

Colyer had the power to hear testimony from soldiers and Indians, but he could not genuinely improve the situation. Certainly many of the soldiers—like Captain Curtis—were moved by the Indians’ plight. Some realized—as did Colyer—that the only possibility for peace lay in creating reservations on the Indians’ ancestral homelands. Neither Delshay nor Chalipun would come to McDowell; they were dedicated to their homes. They were too fearful, moreover, of O’odham attack. To assuage at least some Indians, Colyer could and did set aside reservations. He could not, however, relieve the pressures that had led

to turmoil. Indians could no longer hunt and gather. Their territories were circumscribed; their game was exterminated or driven away; their people were attacked at every turn. They were hungry, and they were angry. War was certain to return, and so it did.

Skirmishing between whites and Indians occurred throughout the territory almost as soon as Colyer left, causing Crook to prepare for action. Not yet ready to give up on peace, President Grant commissioned General Oliver Otis Howard, director of the Freedmen's Bureau and widely hailed as the "Christian general," to return to Arizona to negotiate. Howard was given the same charge as Colyer but with more power to dictate reservations. Arriving in early 1872, he moved Colyer's Camp Grant reservation to the area around the confluence of the San Carlos and Gila Rivers to put it farther away from settlers, hoping thus to head off trouble. The new reservation became known as San Carlos; it would soon become a holding pen for Apaches and Yavapais from throughout the territory.<sup>56</sup>

Howard also orchestrated prisoner exchanges between Apaches and Yavapais and O'odhams and Maricopas, as well as a trip to Washington, DC, for representatives from each tribe. He also carved out a short-lived reservation for Chiricahuas. What Howard proved unwilling to do was to establish a reservation in Tonto Basin, despite the wishes of Dilzhe'es and Yavapais. Rather than establish new reservations, as Colyer had done, Howard planned to consolidate Indians at San Carlos.<sup>57</sup> His refusal to create the long-promised Tonto Basin reservation proved decisive. For Dilzhe'es and Yavapais, the peace policy would soon turn to war.

If Colyer and Howard were humanitarians, they were ethnocentric humanitarians, men who saw only their own values and mores as they looked on the world. Emblematic of that ethnocentrism was one of Howard's signal accomplishments. Calling together Yavapai, Apache, O'odham, and Maricopa leaders, Howard got them to agree to stop warring. Indians from all those tribes continued to serve as scouts, but the tribes were officially at peace. In concluding their agreement, reported Howard, old enemies "double embraced each other." Apaches embraced O'odhams; Yavapais embraced Maricopas. "Even the Mexicans participated in the joy that became universal. I said to myself, 'Surely the Lord is with us.'"<sup>58</sup> Perhaps the Lord was with them—peace is a universal good—but the Lord did not take

the added step of making Howard understand the delicacy of peace. To Howard, Indians needed only to realize their common humanity. They needed to become, in effect, Christian brothers. They did not need reservations in their homelands, lands where their ancestors had lived and died, lands that contained all that was sacred. Once united in fellowship, thought Howard, Indians could live together on vast, consolidated reservations like San Carlos. To Howard, Indians were not Indians; they were people like himself who sometimes fell prey to anger and war. They only needed a good man to bring them to righteousness.

At the same gathering, Howard arranged for O'odhams and Mexicans to deliver up captives taken during the Camp Grant Massacre. When one girl shrieked and cried at being pried from the embrace of her adoptive family, a white civilian—a judge—lectured Howard for his inhumanity. It was an odd twist to the proceedings and a bitter drink for Howard, who genuinely sought peace and goodwill. Crook, though no friend to genocidal settlers, took the opportunity to make his own stab at Howard, telling him that citizens had suffered too much to stomach his sentimentalism. Howard, he jibed, thought he had been Moses to blacks; now he thought he was Moses to Indians. Howard wasn't quite in a league with "that spawn of hell," Vincent Colyer, but he was a grandiose fool all the same.<sup>59</sup> What Crook did not realize was that he himself was a product of sentimentalism, though his was the sentimentalism of a warrior. Through war, he believed, all things could be made right.

Though not officially required to stop campaigning while Howard met with Indians, Crook sullenly delayed until Howard departed. A short time later, reports echoed across the territory of Apaches ambushing a stagecoach, killing all six occupants, including a celebrated writer and explorer named Frederick Loring. The Mojave chief, Iretaba, fingered those Yavapais whom he thought guilty, though evidence suggested that the deed was done by Mexican bandits. Crook called together the suspects and arrested them, narrowly escaping an assassination attempt in the process. He also declared that Indians off the reservations would now be considered hostile.<sup>60</sup>

The campaign against Yavapais and Apaches thus resumed. Calling that campaign a "war," however, is misleading. It was little more than a prolonged massacre. Crook's soldiers and scouts, with their

enormous firepower and their endless supply of ammunition, food, and horses, became machines of execution.


To soldiers, it was high excitement. Few realized, or cared to realize, the magnitude of their enemies' suffering. Lieutenant Walter Schuyler—who would later become an advocate for Indians at Rio Verde—recounted his adventures in letters to his father. In one letter, Schuyler conveyed the feel of the campaign as well as the efficacy of Indian scouts. The letter concerned an expedition against “Apache-Mojaves”—the Yavepe subgroup of the Yavapai—in September 1872. The attacking force included Companies B, C, and K plus eighty Hualapai scouts. “In the dim moonlight,” recalled Schuyler, “the column presented a very weird appearance looking like an immense snake slowly dragging itself along.”

If you want to see the superlative of sneaking you ought to see one Indian hunt another. They crawled ahead of us like cats, and every little while when they saw something suspicious we had to lie down flat until they had reconnoitered the ground. Their signals were very pretty being perfect imitations of the whip-poor-will or a cricket. We crawled along in this way for 4 miles when the Indians told us that we were very near the [enemy] camps.<sup>61</sup>

The raid ended in success. The soldiers caught Yavapais in a cross-fire at dawn, killing some forty and capturing “a large number of children and 8 squaws.” Only one soldier was injured.<sup>62</sup>

After leading a devastating campaign against the Tolkepaya and Yavepe in the mountains and canyons west and south of Prescott, Crook's forces turned their attention to Dilzhe'es, Pinals, Wipukepas, and Kwevkepayas to the east. As he had done in Oregon, California, and Idaho, Crook broke up his forces into search and destroy units, directing them to draw a crazy quilt on the Arizona terrain as they crossed and recrossed one another's paths. The first objective was to push Indians east of the Verde. The second objective was to harass them until they could no longer grow crops, hunt, or even rest. Soldiers systematically destroyed crops and shelters, taking children into captivity and leaving women to suffer . . . or to die. Fearing their fate, it seems, Apache women sometimes joined men in battle. Soon they began to starve.<sup>63</sup>





**Map 3.** John Gregory Bourke's map of troop movements in the early 1870s shows the broken, mountainous terrain of Tonto Basin and the surrounding area. Nebraska Historical Society.

Crook's goal was not solely to wear down the enemy. He wanted decisive engagements, and got them. In December 1872, at a place now called Skeleton Cave—a broad, shallow cavity high on a wall of Salt River Canyon—some 110 Kwevkepayas and their Dilzhe'e allies gathered to escape Crook's forces. Apache scouts found them anyway. All night the troops marched toward the canyon, at last reaching their destination at dawn. "Down the slippery, rocky, dangerous trail in the wall of the gloomy canyon" went the soldiers. "The cold gray light of the slowly creeping dawn," recalled John Gregory Bourke, "made us think of the Valley of the Shadow of Death." Once in place, the troops formed two skirmish lines and began to fire into the cave amid a "fearful din from the yells, groans, and wails" of the women.<sup>64</sup>

The soldiers deluged the cave with lead, sending bullets and shrapnel ricocheting at a thousand angles (fig. 2.4). Other troops stationed themselves atop the canyon wall, whence they fired and rolled boulders onto Yavapai defenders. "The air was filled with the bounding, plunging fragments of stone . . . crashing down with the momentum gained in a descent of hundreds of feet. No human voice could be heard in such a cyclone of wrath; the volume of dust was so dense that no eye could pierce it." When the din eased, soldiers ventured into the cave, finding dozens of "men and women dead or writhing in the agonies of death, and with them several babies, killed by our glancing bullets, or by the storm of rocks and stones." Of thirty survivors, more than half soon died. To make them unrecognizable in the afterworld, O'odhams and Maricopas smashed their faces. In all, some ninety Kwevkepayas lost their lives.<sup>65</sup>

Though Crook had ordered troops to avoid killing women and children, at Skeleton Cave they gave little thought to such niceties. Briefly the troops had stopped firing to allow Yavapais to surrender up women and children. The soldiers, however, offered no terms but unconditional surrender. Fearing that soldiers would lure them out and kill them, Yavapais went on fighting. Dozens of women and children died in the attack. Humanity briefly glimmered, however, when a toddler, unsteady and confused, came walking out of the cave amid the din of battle. After a bullet grazed his skull, he began to wail. Deftly a scout named Nantaje climbed the rocks to fetch him from death, receiving a cheer from the troops when he succeeded. What the boy's fate was we cannot know. He may have grown up



**Figure 2.4.** General Crook's soldiers attacking Yavapais at Skeleton Cave. The scene—sketched by Frederic Remington for John Gregory Bourke's 1891 article in *Century Magazine*—depicts action and excitement rather than the horrors of the massacre.

with the family of a soldier, though it was common for soldiers to give captured children to settlers who needed their labor.<sup>66</sup>

Another small boy, Hoomoothyah (“Wet Nose”), captured in a skirmish a few days before the massacre, was still with the troops when they attacked his relatives. For some ghoulish reason someone took him to see the carnage. “I was shown where my grandpa lay,” he recalled, “and noticed at a distance that his body was in a little rock hole. Part of his head was in the hole. Someone told me that was the old man. I was at the west entrance of the cave and sat down crying to death.” His father, siblings, and aunts and uncles had been killed; he was now without family. Decades later, he came back to inter the remains.<sup>67</sup>

For a time, the boy remained with his captor, Captain James Burns. After Burns died of natural causes in 1874, another officer became his guardian. By then the boy had received the name “Mike Burns.” He subsequently accompanied Crook’s soldiers in their campaign against Sioux and Cheyenne, attended Carlisle Indian School, farmed in Ohio, gained a teaching certificate from a college in Kansas, returned to Arizona, and became a scout in Crook’s Geronimo campaign in the 1880s. Like Delshay and Chalipun, his fondest wish was to live in “that land of my mother’s home.” For the rest of his life, Burns lived at San Carlos, where he taught English and urged his people to send their children to school.<sup>68</sup>

Burns’s later life paralleled that of another Yavapai captive, Wasayja, who was taken by O’odhams in 1871 and sold for \$30 to an Italian-born photographer named Carlos Gentile. Gentile christened the boy Carlos Montezuma and put him in school, where Montezuma proved to be a brilliant student. His family, meanwhile, suffered a grim fate. His sisters, also captured by O’odhams, were sold into slavery in Mexico. His mother, hearing a rumor that Wasayja had been taken to San Carlos, walked there to find him. Apache scouts killed her on the way. As Mike Burns told the story, her husband soon succumbed to “the burden of his sorrows . . . and it was not long before he died.”<sup>69</sup>

Montezuma went on to unqualified success in the white world, taking a B.A. in chemistry from the University of Illinois and then an M.D., becoming the first American Indian to accomplish that feat. Like Burns, however, he did not wish to remain in the white world.

He returned to Arizona where he spent the rest of his life assisting his people. Whereas Burns served as interpreter and spokesman for San Carlos Yavapais, Montezuma served as physician and activist. Thanks to him, Fort McDowell Yavapais retained water rights in the twentieth century.<sup>70</sup>

In 1872, however, the order of the day was death. Three months after Skeleton Cave, Crook's Indian scouts—mostly White Mountain and Cibecue Apaches with a few Dilzhe'es and Yavapais mixed in—again found the enemy in an "impregnable" stronghold. This time, the stronghold was a basalt butte called Turret Mountain at the headwaters of the Agua Fria River. The soldiers climbed the butte hand over hand during the night, taking the mixed Yavapai and Dilzhe'e band by surprise at dawn on March 27, 1873. When the troops suddenly yelled and fired a volley, the surprised Indians "lost all presence of mind," wrote Crook. Some "jumped off the precipice and were mashed into a shapeless mass." Fifty Indians died, including all of the band's men. "Most" of the women and children were taken captive, though the total number of POWs was only fifteen. Official reports failed to specify how many women and children were killed. They noted, however, that no one escaped.<sup>71</sup>

Turret Mountain was the last of the major engagements, though smaller fights occurred regularly over the next few years. The Turret Mountain Massacre also marked a close to widespread resistance. Most Yavapais and Dilzhe'es outside Rio Verde surrendered within two weeks. They came to Rio Verde, recalled Crook, "emaciated, clothes torn in tatters, some of their legs . . . not thicker than my arm."<sup>72</sup>

Among those surrendering was Chalipun, with his band of three hundred. The army, he told Crook, had "too many copper cartridges." His people, continued Chalipun, had been unable to build fires without the smoke alerting scouts of their presence. They could not hunt without the report of their rifles giving them away. They could not hide in the snow-covered mountains; the scouts followed them there, too. He was surrendering not because he loved Crook, but because he feared him. Crook took Chalipun's hand, recalled Bourke, and told him that he would be the best friend Chalipun had ever had. Crook promised to teach him to farm and to make a profit from his produce, if only the Dilzhe'e would remain at peace.<sup>73</sup>

Delshay also surrendered in April 1873, though he was in the Canyon Creek area on the Mogollon Rim when soldiers caught up with him. A brief skirmish ensued before Delshay gave up. His people were then sent to Fort Apache, where they became *persona non grata* among Cibecues, at least one of whose scouts had fallen in the campaign against Delshay. Relatives of the dead sought revenge, forcing Delshay to move to Rio Verde in August.<sup>74</sup>

When he finally reported to Crook, Delshay made his own surrender speech. A year ago, he told Crook, he could boast of having 125 warriors and thought himself invincible. Now he had but 20. Whereas once they had easily eluded troops, now the ground “had gotten soft, they couldn’t put their foot anywhere without leaving an impression by which [soldiers] could follow.” Delshay was in tears. No longer could they sleep, he continued, even in their mountain refuges. When a coyote or a fox caused a rock to tumble down the hill, the men woke at once, fearing troops were upon them. Every rock seemed to become a soldier. Crook was unmoved. Delshay, he claimed, had the “worst reputation amongst all the Indians for villainry and devilry.” In camp, Crook referred to him as “the Liar,” an appellation that others had applied to Delshay in earlier years.<sup>75</sup>

Delshay had spent seven years veering between peace and war. Partly his erratic policies were clever dodges, meant to make the best of a bad situation. Only by alternating between friendship and animus could Delshay gain a reservation in the Tonto Basin home of his people, or so he must have thought. The officers who dealt with him, however, did their best to undermine good relations. After Lieutenant DuBois had won over Delshay, others broke the bonds of trust. Delshay was promised a reservation in Tonto Basin, then was told that he would have to move his people to McDowell, at the very edge of O’odham territories. Blamed for stealing a slave girl from an officer and for depredations against troops—rightly or wrongly, none of the troops really knew—Delshay blustered about returning to the warpath. When Major Alexander took him at his word and ordered his men to fire during a parley, Delshay was both wounded and betrayed. He had not really wanted war, it seems; he had wanted respect. He had wanted concessions. He had wanted to deal with an officer whom he trusted. He got none of those things. Then, when

relations between Delshay and the United States began to improve, the post surgeon shot him. The soldiers called Delshay “the Liar.” It was the army, however, that refused to follow a consistent policy, to abide by promises, or even to protect Delshay’s people from Indian enemies.

After Chalipun’s surrender, Delshay was in an even more precarious situation. Almost all Yavapais and Dilzhe’es—those who survived—were by April 1873 confined at Rio Verde. Few wanted war. Only Delshay and an occasional straggler remained outside, staving off hunger. Delshay’s great influence had dribbled away. Now he was a fugitive, a sideshow, an anachronism.

Shortly after Delshay’s people arrived at Rio Verde came a rumor spread by a headman named Chappo that the soldiers were inviting O’odhams and Maricopas to come up and kill them. Just such treachery, it seemed, had occurred at Camp Grant. On hearing Chappo’s tale, Chalipun and Delshay, with nine hundred others, fled to the mountains. Crook’s success seemed suddenly failure. Immediately he sent runners to denounce Chappo’s rumor. A sheepish Chalipun realized he had made a mistake. By September 1, almost six hundred Indians had returned, Chalipun and Delshay among them.<sup>76</sup>

Delshay’s return was short-lived. Believing him to be a threat, Crook ordered his arrest. Delshay, it seems, was telling his people that whites planned to send them to “desolate islands where they would all perish.” He was not far off the mark. The idea of banishing Apaches and Yavapais to desolate islands off California had great popularity. Through a Dilzhe’e spy who served as interpreter to the agency’s commander, Lieutenant Schuyler, Delshay learned of plans to arrest him during a roll call. On the day of the planned arrest, Delshay’s spy unloaded Schuyler’s gun. When Schuyler went to carry out the arrest, Delshay laughed while his men pulled out guns hidden in blankets. Enough Indians supported Schuyler, however—perhaps in part because he had participated in their dances and shown them respect—that Delshay’s people were themselves threatened. Their only recourse was to flee.<sup>77</sup>

Crook decided that Delshay would make no more trouble. When a small group of renegade Pinals sought to return to the reservation, Crook gave them an ultimatum. He would allow them to come

back under one condition: They must bring Delshay's head. If they refused, he would command troops to kill them. A short time later, a few furtive Apaches arrived at Rio Verde bearing a head wrapped in a rag. Unable to find Schuyler, they gave the bundle to Corbusier, the surgeon, saying only "Del-Cha" before disappearing. When he examined the head, Corbusier noticed the telltale white shirt stud in one of the ears. When Schuyler's scouts looked at it, they agreed with his identification; it was Delshay.<sup>78</sup>

Along with his demand for Delshay's head, Crook demanded the heads of other renegades, too, thus putting into practice a policy of decapitation. As late as October 1874, however, Crook doubted that Delshay was dead. A woman at San Carlos, he wrote Schuyler, "says that was her son's head that your Indians brought in for Delche & also the remainder of Delche's people say the same thing."<sup>79</sup>

Crook's decapitation policy in part reflected the fact that the renegade problem was growing worse. Schuyler reported some of the most intense campaigning of the war in December 1873 and January 1874, nine months after most Dilzhe'es and Yavapais had surrendered. Spring and summer 1874 were almost as busy, with Schuyler and other officers ranging through the Pinals, the Superstitions, the Mazatzals, the Galiuros, the Sierra Ancha, and the Mogollon Rim in search of Indians. The soldiers and scouts—many of them Dilzhe'es and Yavapais—ringed Tonto Basin, riding across some of the hardest terrain in the territory. In the seven months from November 1873 to May 1874, they killed perhaps 250 Indians.<sup>80</sup>

The killing became so mundane that the soldiers made a joke of it. After one arduous scout, the troops had only a single captive. When the unit got low on food, the commanding officer expressed regret for the capture, wishing he did not have another mouth to feed. Al Sieber, the German immigrant who was fast becoming the most celebrated Indian fighter in Arizona, offered to take care of the situation. At breakfast the next day, he shot the captive in the head. A trooper who had been sitting next to the captive remarked dryly that he wished Sieber had killed the man "before he got his belly full of grub." The joke, such as it was, belied Crook's orders to treat prisoners humanely. It also illustrated the callousness that, at other times, led soldiers to take trophies from the dead: ears, scalps, even genitals. Not all participated; only a small minority did so. None of

the field officers, it seems, thought to stop them. Crook's decapitation policy was itself a sort of trophy taking.<sup>81</sup>

In August 1874, another of Crook's celebrated fighters, Corydon Cooley, accompanied Cibecue scouts and five soldiers in an attack on the band of Chappo, the headman who had caused the flight from Rio Verde. "We killed the entire party," reported Cooley. After the engagement, one of the scouts removed Chappo's head to satisfy Crook's policy of decapitation. In the same letter, Cooley reported an attack on a rancheria in the Sierra Ancha, where his men killed ten and captured twenty-three blankets. "No prisoners," he added flatly. Cooley's Cibecue wife, Molly, subsequently found a pair of ears in her husband's bedding, a trophy he had taken to prove that his men had killed one of those on Crook's wanted list.<sup>82</sup>

Crook's decapitation policy was reaping its grim rewards. No fewer than seven heads would come to Crook before the year was out, including a second head that was said to be Delshay's. This time Crook believed he had gotten his man. The "bringing in of an extra head," he joked, "was not amiss." Both groups claiming to have killed Delshay, he explained, thought that they had assassinated the right man. That one was wrong—and that Crook had no idea who was murdered in Delshay's stead—did not stir his conscience.<sup>83</sup>

With the assassination of Delshay, the great war that had begun in 1866 was all but over. Outbreaks and skirmishes continued over the next few years, particularly after the killing of the Cibecue prophet, Nock-el-del-kinny. For all intents and purposes, however, the campaign to force Indians onto reservations had succeeded. For his success, Crook was promoted to brigadier general and sent to the Dakotas to fight Sioux and Cheyenne. Not until after the Cibecue outbreak of 1881–1882 would he return to Arizona.

What had not triumphed was a policy of genocide. Crook, for all his cruelty, for all his certainty that Indians must suffer and beg, was not an Indian hater of the classic American stripe. He was not a King Woolsey, intent on killing every Apache and Yavapai he could find. Neither was he a conscience man in the mold of Royal Whitman, Vincent Colyer, or Oliver Otis Howard. He expressed contempt for both extremes, as he perceived them, on the spectrum of Indian policy. To Crook, Indians were not a shamed people, a people incapable of civilization, forever sunk into bloodlust and barbarity. But

neither were they a gentle and tractable people who were victimized by whites. To Crook, Indians were both of those things and neither. Indians were savages who, by force, could be made civilized.

Crook's campaigns, moreover, relied on a promise. To bring Indians to submission, Crook needed Indian allies. He needed not just O'odhams and Maricopas—fighters from the western deserts—he needed Cibecues and White Mountain men from the forested country to the east. More important, he needed Yavapais and Dilzhe'es. To get them, he had to promise—implicitly if not explicitly—that they would have a reservation in their homeland. Only with the help of scouts could Crook win the war quickly and cheaply, and only with trust could he win over scouts.

Crook took advantage of something else, too: the honor culture of Indians. For centuries, southwestern peoples had engaged in raid and counter-raid. The raids were meant more for purposes of retaliation and revenue than for destruction of the foe. Yavapais and Dilzhe'es no less than Navajos and Mexicans participated. To end the raiding—and to make Arizona safe for settlement—Crook used the raiders themselves.

Crook's Yavapai and Dilzhe'e scouts—most of them recruited after the mass surrenders of 1873—took pride in their service. Their new role was not so different from their old role. Tribal identity had never been dominant. Loyalty to family, clan, and band came first, usually in that order (fig. 2.5). If saving one's family, clan, or band meant subjugating others, Indian men did not shrink from their duty. Via the army, moreover, a man could gain a reputation for courage no less than through traditional raiding and war. At the same time, he might save family or clan relatives who had not yet surrendered. A scout could divert soldiers from Indians whom he wanted to save. Too, he might personally lobby them to come in.<sup>84</sup> In their own cultural context, then, scouts were not necessarily turncoats; they were realists.

Had Crook not succeeded, territorial forces would have done so. The outcome might well have been the same one that took place in California in the 1850s and 1860s: genocide. A few Yavapais and Apaches would have survived, perhaps, but only by becoming meek and servile. Short of genocide, another possible outcome might have



**Figure 2.5.** In recruiting Indian scouts, General Crook took advantage of Apache men's dedication to individual honor as well as their loyalty to band or clan rather than tribe. Apache scout, Camp Verde, Arizona. Photo by W. H. Williscraft, c. 1875. Sharlot Hall Museum Library and Archives, Prescott, Arizona.

been deportation to some desolate spot far from Arizona. As late as 1893, the Arizona *Silver Belt* decried the government's reservation policy, insisting that Indians "are inimical to our civilization and incapable of assimilation." Apaches, explained the *Silver Belt*, still believed "in the reign of terror" rather than the reign of law. The editor allowed that extermination might be too extreme but insisted that deportation was not.<sup>85</sup>

Crook's conquest, to be sure, came close to genocide, though—unlike those who planned the Camp Grant Massacre—Crook did not make genocide a goal. The goal was to force Yavapais and Apaches

onto a reservation. Crook pushed toward that goal with all the tenacity of a military man. He ignored the possibility of peaceful solutions and reviled those who, like Colyer and Howard, thought them possible. Colyer and Howard themselves, sadly, fell short in part because they refused to create a reservation in Tonto Basin. Through all the fighting, it seems, only two things kept Delshay and Chalipun in the field: the hope for a reservation in their homeland and the fear of genocide. If Colyer or Howard or Crook had been able to put their minds at ease about those two things, they would have accomplished peace. That they did not do so—in particular that Crook did not do so—testifies to a lack of either will or understanding, or both.

What Crook's conquest ensured nonetheless was that Yavapais and Dilzhe'es would survive. It also ensured that their fates would continue to be entwined with those of settlers. Over the next few decades, settlers and Indians would find themselves locked in an economic and social embrace. Settler and Indian became opposites in a cultural dialectic. Each defined itself in opposition to the other, though they simultaneously developed shared identities and protocols for interaction.

The relationships between settlers and Indians, then, were far from utopian, but neither were they dystopian. The hate of the 1860s and 1870s fell into abeyance. By the 1890s, settlers and Indians had achieved a kind of normalcy. They worked together. In some places, their children played together. They helped one another in difficult times. They began to see their common humanity, though only through the dirty window of dominance and submission. All of that was made possible by Crook's terrible victories, victories that came very near genocide but that, ultimately, assured that genocide would not prevail. The same result could have been achieved via the olive branch, if only the government had understood the needs and desires of Indians and the complexity of relations among bands and tribes.

It was not solely racism that led to brutality. Conscience, too, led to brutality. Conscience begot a well-meaning ethnocentrism, an ethnocentrism that encouraged officers to believe that people of other cultures were at bottom the same as themselves. Indians, in the view of officers like Oliver Otis Howard, did not need reservations in their homelands. Nor did they need to continue to hunt and to gather. They could move where the government wanted them to

move, and they could sustain themselves by farming. White settlers did just that, and had done so for centuries. Surely Indians could follow suit. When Indians did not follow suit, it was only because they were behaving badly. They were indulging in savagery. They were acting like children. Officers could see things no other way. From their perspective, the solution was to reprimand, to scold, to punish, to fight.

In the end, the army prevailed. More specifically, General Crook and his Indian scouts prevailed. They prevailed over other Indians. They prevailed over settlers. They prevailed over humanitarians like Whitman, Colyer, and Howard. They were monsters and earth shapers. The world that they brought into being was by no means an easy one. It, no less than the world that preceded it, had its share of conflict and agony. It was a world that gave issue both to humane relations between whites and Indians and to a new sort of racism premised on conscience. It was a world that emerged from apocalypse.

## *Exile*

IF THE HORROR OF GENOCIDE lay at one end of Apache experience in the 1870s, the promise of maintaining a homeland lay at the other. That homeland would not take in the vast miles of canyon and mountain that Yavapais and Dilzhe'es had roamed before settlement. It would, however, take in 900 square miles along the Verde River, one of the most important watersheds in Arizona. The new Rio Verde Reservation—established at the behest of Vincent Colyer in 1871—followed the river upstream for 45 miles and extended outward from the river for 10 miles on each side. The agency itself consisted of a few adobe buildings, soldiers' tents, and one larger tent with a wood-plank floor that served as hospital. Situated at the foot of the pine-clad Black Hills near what is today the town of Cottonwood, the agency boasted access to a hot spring that flowed magically from cracks in the bedrock. Yavapais called it *aha-ka-roo-ya*, or “hot water,” and held that it had curative powers.<sup>1</sup>

It was a scenic place. Standing on the hills above the agency and looking north, one could see distant walls of rock that comprise the western wing of the Mogollon Rim. Here and there one could discern dark openings where deep canyons emitted small streams. Not more than 25 miles from the agency stood the red rocks of Sedona—sacred to Yavapais and Dilzhe'es—which soldiers gazed on with stupefaction. “Worn into the semblance of huge forts, castles, turrets, minarets, and numerous other shapes,” commented the post surgeon, William Corbusier, the red rocks at sunrise or sunset came out “in bold relief,” making one feel like “a Roman general amid the ruins of his former glory.”<sup>2</sup>

Yavapais and Dilzhe'es thought of the place differently. To them, the reservation was a familiar place, situated in the heart of a magical landscape, a place theirs from the dawn of time. Here—at Montezuma's Well—was where their people had emerged from the previous world. Here—at Boynton Canyon—was where Lofty Wanderer had killed Eagle. This was their homeland, a homeland that was not just place but bible. If whites read their origin stories and moral instructions from a book, Indians read theirs from topography. Every mountain, every rock, every spring had a story. As Yavapais and Dilzhe'es saw it, they had sprung from their land. They were autochthonous—born from their homeland.

The Christians who had come as conquerors, by contrast, had no homeland. With Good Book in hand, they were at home nowhere and everywhere. Their book was their home. Dilzhe'es and Yavapais, by contrast, could not move. Their text was their land, and their land could not travel. Each time the government had suggested that they move away—to Camp McDowell, or even farther afield—they had refused. They had fought in large measure to stay put. For a brief time, they had succeeded in retaining Rio Verde. The Yavapai and Dilzhe'e were defeated peoples, perhaps, but they remained within the bosom of their homeland. In 1875, however, they found themselves driven from their lands and exiled to a dry, hot reservation called San Carlos.


If the Rio Verde Reservation was home, it was a home that could be hellish. Corbusier reported that Indians already weakened by malnutrition during years of war now succumbed to malaria, dysentery, syphilis, and whooping cough at the agency. Others became sick from rations supplied by the army, the content of which was new to Indian stomachs. Then, in 1872–1873, an “epizootic”—a disease that afflicted first horses then humans—cut a swath through the population. Medicine men worked “day and night for several weeks,” chanting, shaking gourd rattles, sprinkling pollen, and exhorting, but with little success. Bodies were “left to mummify in the dry air,” remembered Corbusier. There were too few healthy Indians to gather wood for cremations. The living blamed the sickness on female witches. Several of the accused found themselves “tied up by

their wrists to trees, to be stoned to death.” Troops rescued some; others were killed.<sup>3</sup>

The threat of malaria, together with insufficient rations, forced hundreds of Indians to seek permission to leave the reservation during summer to hunt and to gather, though much of the game had been killed off by miners and ranchers. Sometimes, officers gave permission; sometimes they did not. When Indians left anyway, they found themselves wearing balls and chains and experiencing hard labor on their return. A few did not return. Some hid in the mountains; others fell victim to the guns of settlers, or to troops who scoured the countryside in search of “renegades.”<sup>4</sup>

Relations between troops and Indians, however, were not invariably bitter (fig. 3.1). “The vast majority of the Apaches were amenable to reason and friendly relations,” explained Corbusier, recalling the easier times that followed the disasters of 1873. Knowing Corbusier’s interest in natural history, Indians brought animals: mockingbirds, pack rats, coyotes, snakes. Indian children also crowded into Corbusier’s tent, demanding to hear the doctor or his wife play the melodeon they had brought from New Mexico. When Mrs. Corbusier unpacked a sewing machine and demonstrated its use, “they covered their mouths with one hand and drew in a sharp breath of astonishment.” At other times, Indians played practical jokes. After Mrs. Corbusier gave one woman a set of clothes for her infant, other women began to show up at her door with their own babies. When they, too, received garments, they would run away, giggling. At length Mrs. Corbusier realized that the baby was in each case the same one.<sup>5</sup>

As relations between troops and Indians softened, Yavapais decided to invite Corbusier and the post commander, Lieutenant Walter Schuyler, to a dance. It was “an unforgettable experience,” recalled Corbusier. With the moon in its first quarter and the night cool and crisp, the Indians gathered around a fire, keeping time “with the low beat of the drums. First one foot and then the other, raised in about a four-beat to the second step, the accent on the first beat, accompanied by the low, deep mumbled moaning undertone from every throat which swelled and died—swelled and died, like the rumble of distant thunder.” After observing for a time, the two white men entered, each pairing with a woman and taking four steps



**Figure 3.1.** Relations between soldiers and Indians at Rio Verde were not always antagonistic. This image shows Indians gathered on Muster Day, c. 1875. The fully loaded pack saddles lined up in the foreground indicate either an impending military campaign or the move to San Carlos. Photo by W. H. Williscraft. Collection of Jeremy Rowe Vintage Photography ([vintagephoto.com](http://vintagephoto.com)).

forward, then four backward, as the Indians chanted “*see-en-na, see-en-na, see-en-na, hay! hay! hay!/see-en-na, hab! hab! hab!*” followed by “deafening yells.” Observing Yavapai custom, the two white men gave their partners a reward—50 cents—then sat down to watch. “If we had been permitted to follow up the prestige and good will which it established with these Indians,” observed Corbusier, “conditions might have been different and much suffering and bloodshed averted.”<sup>6</sup>

With his entrée to Yavapai and Dilzhe’*e* society, Corbusier took copious notes, adding ethnographic understanding to empathy. In particular he made a careful study of Indian healing practices, reporting that “each medicine man has his twin or familiar spirit whose assistance [enables] him to counteract the influence of the evil and less powerful spirits.” The spirit, he reported, guided the shaman on a dream journey to the east, through spirit land, thus initiating him “into its mysteries.” The Indians also used “numerous charms” for hunting, war, love, and gambling, including rattlesnake fangs

“to ward off arrows and bullets.” Some carried crystals and green stones as talismans. Others made beads from certain roots, then fashioned the beads into necklaces. When the wearer became sick, the beads could be eaten to restore health. Medicine men also sucked arrow and bullet wounds, believing the wounds to be poisonous, and made incisions around swollen or abscessed tissue. “There is scarcely an Indian,” wrote Corbusier, who did not have “scars on his body remaining from the operation.”<sup>7</sup>

Perhaps eager to share their secrets—or perhaps eager to learn those of Corbusier—shamans came bearing gifts. Certainly they knew his powers. Some had seen him “kill” a rat with chloroform, only to resurrect it from the dead. One man brought Corbusier a pipe made of translucent green stone; others brought him crystals, which were said to have magical powers. Despite his failure to comprehend the Indian custom of giving gifts in return for sacred knowledge, Corbusier reciprocated with respect and attentiveness. In later years, he sought to prove that shamanic remedies—herbs, pollens, chants, fetishes—were “not superstitions after all.” They, too, helped heal the sick.<sup>8</sup>

Corbusier also took notes on the appearance of those around him. Yavapai men, he noted, were tall by nineteenth-century American standards, averaging 5 feet 8½ inches and weighing on average 158 pounds. Yavapai women, he added, averaged 5 feet 3 inches and 140 pounds. Apache men were somewhat smaller than Yavapai men; they tended to be just over 5 feet 6 inches, and were correspondingly lighter in weight. Other observers noted that Apaches had smaller ears, lips, mouths, hands, and feet than Yavapais, a fact in accord with the Apache disdain for big features. We should note, however, that observers often saw Indians who were no more than twenty years old and who were yet thin from war and disease. In flush times, they were likely to have been more robust.<sup>9</sup>

In addition to being bigger, noted Corbusier, Yavapais had larger, more rounded eyes than Apaches, whose almond-shaped lids gave their features an Asiatic cast. The two peoples also wore their hair differently. Yavapai men often grew locks to their waists, tying them into a queue with a piece of red flannel or silk or perhaps a bone stick, and sometimes adding a switch of “false” hair to give the queue greater length. Apache men tended to wear their hair shorter, though they

too cut their bangs at eye level to protect the iris from sunlight. To make their hair shiny and straight, both Apaches and Yavapais—men as well as women—washed it with soap made from yucca.<sup>10</sup>

In contrast to Yavapai men, women tended to cut their hair at shoulder level but wore it loose. If they were mourning, they cut it shorter. They were also more apt than men to tattoo their bodies. Married women often displayed seven lines running from lip to chin, “the outer one on each side frequently having a row of points directed outward.” Alternately, they might display “two zig-zag lines on each side of the chin, and three straight ones between these.” Apache women similarly decorated their faces, sometimes with “Greek crosses” (symbolizing the four directions) consisting of a single line of dots from nose to mouth and a double line from mouth to chin. Young women hoping to become mothers might add to that a tattoo of a child on their forearms.<sup>11</sup>

According to Corbusier, neither Yavapai nor Apache men tattooed themselves, though other descriptions contradict that judgment. Often, both Apache and Yavapai men had small tattoos on their temples, foreheads, wrists, arms, and elsewhere. Like the tattoos of Apache women, the men’s tattoos tended to take the shape of a cross, signifying the four directions, or a square, signifying the center of the world.<sup>12</sup>

In addition to tattoos, Yavapai and perhaps Apache men sometimes cut holes in their septums to accommodate small strings of beads. Men of both groups—as well as women—also painted themselves routinely for hygienic reasons and for decoration. When asked about it, they contended that the paint kept them warmer in winter and shielded them from the sun in summer. Their favorite color was red. Among men, a buckskin breechclout complemented the paint during summer. To the breechclout they often attached a distinctive “tail” that hung almost to the ground. In winter they added a Navajo blanket or deerskin poncho, or perhaps a buckskin jacket. Yavapai women wore “aprons” composed of two sheets of buckskin draped over torso and hips. Apache women wore buckskin tunics, often fringed at the waist.<sup>13</sup>

On their feet, Yavapais and Apaches—men and women alike—donned moccasins that rose to the knee, though in summer they might make do with moccasins that came only ankle high. The

“long-legged moccasins” of the Apache men were “held to the waist by a string, and turned up at the toes in a shield which protected him from stones and ‘cholla’ cactus.” Though to white observers all moccasins looked the same, Apaches could tell from a moccasin print the band affiliation of its owner.<sup>14</sup>

Almost without exception, Yavapais and Apaches—unless crippled, diseased, or aged—were physical prodigies. General Crook’s aide-de-camp, John Gregory Bourke, gave a description of Apache men that could apply equally to Yavapais. “Physically,” waxed Bourke, “the Apache is perfect; he might be a trifle taller for artistic effect, but his apparent ‘squattiness’ is due more to great girth of chest than to diminutive stature. His muscles are hard as bone, and I have seen one light a match on the sole of his naked foot.” One Apache recalled from experience that his people could easily travel on foot 50 to 75 miles in a day, alternately walking and doing a dogtrot. Bourke was more effusive, claiming that Apaches “would gladly travel hundreds of miles” in a day, “incurring every risk and displaying a courage which would have been extolled in an historical novel [by Sir Walter Scott] as having happened in a raid by [Scots] Highlanders upon Southrons.” General Crook added that he had seen scouts race up mountains 1,500 feet high without showing “fatigue or increased respiration.” Corbusier found, however, that their reputation for immunity to pain was grossly exaggerated. Though they sometimes appeared indifferent, he insisted they experienced the same degree of pain as any white person.<sup>15</sup>

To all appearances, the Indians at Rio Verde were no different than their ancestors. In reality, they were fast adapting. By 1873, they were digging ditches, planting vegetables, and holding trials by jury. Many—particularly Yavapais—began to appear on the reservation in the clothing of white settlers (fig. 3.2). They were also orienting themselves to the economics of white settlement. By spring 1874, after three years of sickness, fear, and occasional outbreaks, the Rio Verde Indians seemed on the verge of success. To escape the malarial environment near the hot springs, the government moved the reservation to the higher ground at the foot of Mingus Mountain. Then, putting into service “every conceivable sort of implement, from rusty and broken shovels to spoons,” the Indians dug a four-mile-long



**Figure 3.2.** Yavapai Indians gathered at Rio Verde reservation, c. 1874. Army scouts, identifiable by their tunics, stand in front. Photo by D. P. Flanders. Sharlot Hall Museum Library and Archives, Prescott, Arizona.

irrigation ditch, laughing and singing as they worked. For the second straight year, they harvested a fine crop of corn, potatoes, melons, and pumpkins, giving them a surplus to sell on the market. The Indian Bureau, however, was unimpressed.<sup>16</sup>

Influenced by Tucson merchants who prospered via contracts to supply rations and goods to reservations, the Indian Bureau sought to consolidate Apaches and Yavapais on the “sand waste” and “brackish” water at the confluence of the San Carlos and Gila Rivers. Consolidation, reasoned authorities, would reduce costs. Consolidation would accomplish much else as well. It would deny Yavapais and Dilzhe’es a reservation in their homeland, where they had a chance to prosper. It would also make liars of officers who, in exchange for surrender, had promised Indians land on the Verde. Perhaps most important, consolidation promised to enrich white merchants and farmers.<sup>17</sup>

Just when Rio Verde seemed sure of success came orders to abandon it. The ambitious civilian agent at San Carlos, John Clum,

succeeded in getting the Indian Bureau to order the removal before officers at Rio Verde knew what was happening. When Indians found out, recalled Corbusier, they were furious. Night and day the women “rent the air with their wailings.” Some of the young men—Dilzhe’es—appeared in war paint. At night torches lit up the camp, their flames accompanied by ominous chanting. Several groups headed for the mountains, though most returned before troops were dispatched to track them down.<sup>18</sup>

When a special agent appointed by the Indian Bureau to oversee the evacuation—a man named Levi Edwin Dudley—arrived at Rio Verde, several Indians cried “kill him! kill him!” Confusion, however, delayed action. When Dudley finally conferred with his charges, he sat himself on a buffalo robe, so drunk that he was forced to support his head with one hand. The Indians would be going to a healthier place, he told listeners, one less congenial to malaria. Dudley, it seems, failed to realize that the Gila River at San Carlos was itself a malarial environment.<sup>19</sup>

Disgusted with Dudley’s message, a headman called “Captain Snooks” made bold to respond, speaking haltingly at first, mixing Yavapai words with English. As he warmed to the occasion, his speech became more fluid, at last gushing out so fast that the interpreter failed to keep up. Corbusier, familiar with the Yavapai and Apache tongues, tried to record the speech. “They would not go where they would be outnumbered by their enemies,” Snooks began, explaining that “their fathers and grandfathers were born here and had died here; their wives and children were all born here.” He then “reminded the commissioner of the written promises that had been made to them when they were assembled here, that the country along the river and 10 miles on each side would be theirs forever.”<sup>20</sup>

The headman pleaded with the agent that his people be allowed to remain, then wondered why the agent bothered to call Indians “brothers.” “The white man when he meets his brother, always asks him to take a drink,” yet the agent had offered Snooks no drink. Then Snooks “begged the agent not to drink any more whiskey until after the conference the next day, so that he [Dudley] might know what he [Snooks] was saying.” It was a “masterpiece of oratory,” recalled Corbusier. Throughout the whole of it, he added, the agent acted as though he were asleep.<sup>21</sup>

Even if Dudley lacked power to change policy, he did have power to determine the route to San Carlos. Indians, accompanied by eighty troops, would take a direct line, he announced. Going on foot, they were expected to ford rivers and streams during high water and to pass directly across mountains. They would follow no roads, nor would they ride in wagons or on horses. The able-bodied along with the old, the young, the sick, and the pregnant would walk, carrying possessions on their backs. Corbusier argued against the decision, begging Dudley to requisition enough wagons to allow the trip to proceed on roads. "They are Indians," replied Dudley, "let the beggars walk."<sup>22</sup>

In February 1875, the Indians made preparations to leave, chanting, singing, and fasting for a day and night prior to departure. On February 28, the entire cohort of "jabbering, wailing, chanting, and protesting humanity" set out. The first problem that Dudley confronted was separating "Tontos"—Dilzhe'es and their Yavapai allies—from other Indians. The quarrels between the two groups likely originated before any whites arrived but grew worse in the 1870s. After assuming command, General Crook had recruited scouts from conquered bands to track down those who held out. Though the tactic proved successful, it deepened old rifts. Now, amid the stress of relocation, rifts became chasms.

What perhaps made matters worse was Crook's decision to let Indians keep guns even after they had agreed to live on the reservation. Crook had good reason for his directive: Indians who knew they would be able to keep their arms were more likely to surrender. Indians already on the reservation, moreover, were likely to rebel if they heard rumors of disarmament. By allowing Indians to keep their guns, Crook promoted trust. Before the forced relocation, that trust succeeded. On the long walk to San Carlos, however, the guns became problematic.<sup>23</sup>

To prevent war between the factions, Dudley ordered them to march on separate sides of the Verde. Many Yavapais—including members of three Yavapai subgroups, Tolkepaya, Yavepe, and Wipukepa—marched on one side, whereas Dilzhe'es and their Wipukepa and Kwevkepaya allies marched on the other. Keeping the cohorts apart, however, proved impossible; broken geography made hash of Dudley's plan.<sup>24</sup>

As the throngs of men, women, and children marched into the mountains, snow began to fall. The cold grew bitter. Medicine men “chanted incessantly” and tried to steer marchers away from “evil” places, recalled Corbusier. Others kept up a barrage of complaints aimed at Dudley, who was reminded repeatedly of the government’s promise that the Rio Verde would be their home. Toward the Rim they slowly moved, “foundering” as they climbed Cedar Mountain. One man carried his crippled wife in a basket strapped to his back, her legs hanging out over the sides. He struggled thus for the rest of the journey. When at last they passed over Cedar Mountain, they descended to Clear Creek, crossed its cold waters, and worked their way up Hackberry Mountain. The path was so treacherous that many of the cattle that came with the party had to be slaughtered en route.<sup>25</sup>

On March 5 the marchers crossed Fossil Creek then walked on to Strawberry Creek, its waters raging with spring melt. Al Sieber, one of Crook’s Indian fighters, asked Dudley to delay the crossing until the waters subsided. Dudley refused. He himself was lifted across by two soldiers on horses. When the Indians crossed they found themselves in frigid waters that came to their chests. Soldiers “plied back and forth carrying small children, babies, and the old and decrepit.” Ropes were thrown across the channel to assist the weak. The crossing took two days and caused a host of injuries and illnesses. On March 10, a similar scene occurred when marchers crossed the Salt River. There would be two more such crossings before San Carlos.<sup>26</sup>

Ten days after leaving, the marchers recrossed the Verde, again climbed the spurs that jut from the Rim, and confronted two more chasms, Rattlesnake Canyon and Hell’s Canyon. Already the expedition was running out of food, Dudley having failed to bring adequate provisions. Prohibited from hunting, the Indians ate whatever they could find along the trail. Hardship, however, caused tempers to flare. When Sieber killed a deer that strayed into camp, Dilzhe’es and Yavapais quarreled over who would take the meat, with Dilzhe’es coming out victors.<sup>27</sup>

That evening, the troops heard none of the usual laughter, chanting, and shouting, “only a low hum, like swarming bees.” When Corbusier went to check on a boy who had been hurt in a fall, he noticed some of the men covering up breastworks that they had

made in preparation for battle. A short time later, fifty naked Yavapai men ran past him at top speed, “yelling and brandishing their guns.” When they reached the “Tonto” camp, they dropped to their knees and began to fire. Though troops ordered them to cease, the men in blue were too few to have an effect. Close by, the agent and some of his assistants, lacking weapons, were reduced to huddling under a tree, praying and singing for the fighting to end. At last a tiny cavalry detachment approached, threatening to attack whichever side continued to fire. The battle came to a stop. Corbusier ran to the wounded, finding over two dozen Indians “lying in the ground in various stages of shock.” He counted four dead, all shot through the head. Others had been removed before he arrived. In a later account, a Yavapai man reckoned the Dilzhe’e dead at thirty.<sup>28</sup>

After regrouping, the Indians resumed the march, again with “Tontos” in the lead. The men carried wounded comrades like “dead deer” slung over their shoulders. Others were carried on litters. Amid the “wailing” and “piercing chants” of shamans, the marchers crossed to the Mazatzals, hugging the slope as they descended toward Tonto Creek where it joined the Salt. After fording Tonto Creek, they climbed again, now single file as they negotiated the steep grade. Each trooper carried a “crying, terrified child” on his horse. Once they watched as a mule lost its footing and tumbled to the waters below. As they slowly ascended, Indians, still painted for war, approached Dudley to curse him. From a distance, someone fired a bullet over his head. Badly frightened, Dudley marched far ahead, ostensibly to reach San Carlos first and gather supplies.<sup>29</sup>

Some three weeks after they had set out, the Indians neared their new home. Alerted by Dudley to their rebelliousness, John Clum, the San Carlos agent, rode 35 miles to Pinal Canyon, arriving “on a dark, blustery March night” to take charge. Campfires flickered up and down the canyon while angry voices echoed off rock walls. Only Clum’s disbursement of rations deterred new battles.

In his report, Clum stated that “the removal of the Rio Verde Indians . . . was effected with comparative ease and great satisfaction, nothing more serious than a fight among themselves while en route.”<sup>30</sup> His report was a lie. Clum—the first civilian agent at San Carlos—was engaged in his own war of words with the army over who should have charge of Indians. His report on the march,


like much of what Clum wrote, was intended to confirm the Indian Bureau's wise rule over reservations.

Mike Burns, a Yavapai who had been adopted by whites after the massacre of his band in 1872, made a different report in later years, finding in the testimony of his people a cruelty that even Corbusier failed to describe. "Some people were sick from that poison," he said, referring to the rations. "The soldiers just poke them with the gun to make them walk faster. But some of them just went down and died. So they leave them there. Like dogs. Like killed flies they leave them there, all the way down to San Carlos." In the three weeks between when Indians left Rio Verde and when they arrived at San Carlos, some 140 died. In those same weeks, 25 others emerged from their mothers' wombs into a realm of agony and despair.<sup>31</sup>

The debacle, however, was not at an end. Once the Indians had settled at San Carlos, Clum sought to confiscate their arms. Upon hearing his demand, they "leaped to their feet shouting angry protests and raced to their camps," causing "scenes of wildest confusion," with men "dashing about giving orders, [and] women tearing down the wickiups and packing their belongings." Fearing that Clum sought to kill them, many crossed the Gila, where they camped for two days. To enforce his directive, Clum withheld rations. He also announced that he would hire four Indians from among the newcomers as police, and that he would lend out guns for hunting. Perhaps more important, he directed the two factions to make permanent homes on opposite sides of the Gila, seeking thus to avoid conflicts.<sup>32</sup>

His tactics succeeded. After more than a decade of war, hunger, disease, death, and false hopes, Dilzhe'es and Yavapais had arrived at their fate. The long and wounding walk was complete. It was "about as ugly a job as was ever laid on the shoulders of a subaltern," recalled Charles King, one of the soldiers detailed to escort the Indians. John Gregory Bourke was more damning. "There is no brighter page in our Indian history," he wrote, "than that which records the progress of the subjugated Apaches at . . . Camp Verde, nor is there a fouler blot than that which conceals the knavery which secured their removal."<sup>33</sup> Though perhaps too sanguine about Rio Verde and too cavalier about equally foul blots, he was not altogether wrong (fig. 3.3).

For a brief period after they had experienced holocaust, Yavapais and Dilzhe'es could look forward to a peaceful existence in their



**Figure 3.3.** In this undated Camillus Sidney Fly photo—likely taken in the 1880s—San Carlos resembles an internment camp with a strong military presence. National Anthropological Archives, Smithsonian Institution, NAA INV 02008300.

homeland, near their emergence place and the site of their culture hero's epic battle with Eagle. There they could recuperate. There they could reconstruct the clan and kinship ties that bound them as a people. There they could hold dances and sings without interference . . . or at least without interference from officers like Schuyler and Corbusier. There, it seemed, Yavapais and Dilzhe'es could shape their own future, at their own pace, without losing their ancestral identity. And there they met betrayal.

## *Rebellion*

FOR ALL JOHN CLUM'S FINESSE as Indian agent, he found it impossible to dissolve the bitterness of his new wards. Time and again, Dilzhe'es and Yavapai fled the reservation. In February 1876, it was Clum's Indian police who chased "renegades" on the western border of the reservation, killing sixteen and capturing twenty-one. Later that year, fourteen US Army troops and twenty-six scouts killed seven and captured seven "renegades" in the Red Rock Country near modern Sedona. In September 1876, the famed guide and commander of Indian scouts Al Sieber went out with twenty-one Indian scouts. They killed five and captured thirteen just east of Camp Verde. In October 1876, twelve soldiers and twenty-one scouts killed eight and captured two. In January and February 1877, a captain from San Carlos took nine soldiers and twenty-nine scouts and scoured the Tonto Basin, killing eighteen and capturing twenty. Meanwhile, other Apaches on the reservation also fled. In 1877, it was the Warm Springs people who made a desperate effort to return to their New Mexico homeland. They failed. Then, in 1878, soldiers, with Dilzhe'e scouts operating out of Camp Verde, tracked down a band of Yavapai that had abandoned San Carlos two years earlier and traveled to Bill Williams Mountain. The soldiers and scouts killed seven men and captured seven women and children.<sup>1</sup> For the four thousand to five thousand Indians confined at San Carlos, the world remained chaotic, bloody, and desperate.

Part of the problem was insufficient rations. In August 1878, the Arizona *Silver Belt* reported that famine had forced the agent to give his wards fifteen-day passes to gather acorns. Those given passes included Yavapai, Dilzhe'e, Cibecue, and Pinal families whose

hunting and gathering territories lay west of the reservation. Some four hundred Indians, reported the *Silver Belt*, passed through Globe on their way to the Pinal Mountains. In October, the *Silver Belt* added that starving Indians had “cleaned the country of rabbits.” The *Silver Belt*, however, contradicted reports of an uprising. “Nobody hurt and nobody scared,” wrote the editor. In May 1879 that state of affairs changed when fifteen Apaches robbed the camp of two white men at Green Valley—soon to become Payson—firing at them then fleeing into the mountains. The Indians were said to have killed five horses and several cows at one ranch, then lit fires to cover tracks.<sup>2</sup>

More fires appeared in the Pinals in July 1879, supposedly started by Indians. Once again, the San Carlos agent—lacking rations for his charges—had been forced to free them to scour the mountains. In August, settlers encountered “swarms” of hungry Apaches—Dilzhe’es and Cibecues—near Globe and at Coon Creek at the foot of the Sierra Ancha. The Indians were said to be stealing watermelons and corn and setting fire to fences. When some raided near Payson, troops tracked them down and killed five. Others eluded detection, staying hidden in and around Rattlesnake Canyon and the terrible gorge known as Hell’s Gate.<sup>3</sup>

In 1880, a few renegades were said to have killed a settler and a number of cattle without being pursued. Innocents, however, paid the price. When an Apache named Nadiski—who had cooperated with authorities in bringing to justice two Apache murderers—received a pass to hunt, gather, and farm at his old home on Coon Creek, settlers turned him back, threatening to kill him. The pattern continued into the 1890s. Hungry Indians—often with passes—left San Carlos to hunt and to gather and to burn grass and timber, bringing them into contact with hostile whites.

According to the San Carlos agent, Apaches set fires to bring rain. According to settlers, Apaches set fires to destroy range. There were, however, other explanations. Apaches, like other Indians, had burned forests for millennia, thus clearing underbrush and creating habitat for deer and elk. Even without intentional burnings, the barrage of lightning that came with the summer “monsoons” sparked frequent fires. The natural fires, as well as those set by Apaches, explained why settlers found open, parklike forests in central Arizona, with sturdy, mature ponderosas standing many yards apart.<sup>4</sup>

In addition to fires, settlers had another concern. Hunger sometimes led Apaches to kill and eat settlers' cows, while bitterness led them sometimes to simply kill cows and leave carcasses to rot.<sup>5</sup> Even more frightening was the thought that bitterness might lead Apaches to kill settlers, a fear that roared through Pleasant Valley and the Sierra Ancha in 1881 after a Cibecue named Nock-el-del-kinny led a spiritual rebellion.

Like other Cibecues, Nock-el-del-kinny was friendly to the soldiers who arrived in his country in the late 1860s. He soon signed on as a scout for General Crook, earned the nickname "Bobby Do-kinny" among white troops, and was tapped by General Oliver Otis Howard to visit Washington, DC, where President Grant awarded him a peace medal. Likely he was also headman of the Canyon Creek band. Not until 1880 did he emerge as a shaman with startling revelations. Deeply impressed with Christ's withdrawal into the wilderness—something he perhaps learned about while attending school in Santa Fe—Nock-el-del-kinny spent day upon day meditating in the mountains. Then he returned to make a promise: He would restore the dead to life.<sup>6</sup>

As Lieutenant Britton Davis remembered the situation at San Carlos, "a feeling of restlessness, fear, and uncertainty for the future possessed the entire people." He added, "The attitude of all was that of watchful waiting, wondering what was going to turn up next." The restlessness that Davis detected was not solely the product of tensions with whites. The origins of Nock-el-del-kinny's movement, indeed, had roots in murky quarrels between Cibecue bands going back as far as the 1840s.<sup>7</sup>

Whatever the tensions among Cibecues, they wanted friendly relations with Americans. By the time that troops arrived, the Horizontal Red Valley band under Eskiltesela (fig. 4.1)—a man whom whites called Pedro, a name given him by New Mexican traders—had already entered an alliance with a snub-nosed prospector named Corydon Cooley. Cooley, Virginia born and college educated, had ventured to New Mexico in 1856 to prospect. In 1859 he had joined the Pike's Peak gold rush and clerked in a store for Ceran St. Vrain. During the Civil War, he joined Union forces in Colorado and New Mexico and saw action in several skirmishes. Still feverish with the



**Figure 4.1.** Pedro, chief of the Horizontal Red Valley people, in his “Washington costume”—apparently the attire he wore when he visited Washington, DC. Photo by T. H. O’Sullivan. Bancroft Library, Berkeley, California.

gold bug, he explored Arizona in the 1860s to search for the “Doc Thorne” placer mine, which was thought to be in Tonto Basin. In Arizona, he came into contact with Cibecue Apaches, for whom he became interpreter and advocate after US soldiers arrived in 1869.<sup>8</sup>

It was in that year that Major John Green led a small force into the White Mountains with orders to attack the Cibecue, who were said to be in a state of rebellion. Initially Green took Cooley for a gunrunner and threatened to execute him. Cooley, with help from Pedro and another chief—a man called Escapa by Apaches and Miguel by whites—proved himself innocent. In turn, Cooley helped Pedro and Miguel prove their friendliness to the United States. With the diplomatic skills of Cooley and the Cibecue chiefs, Green’s force

was able to reconnoiter Cibecue and White Mountain country. With permission from Esketeshelaw, chief of the Eastern White Mountain band, Green even located a site for a post. In 1871, Green's post on White River, a clear, cool stream that runs westward off Mount Baldy, became "Camp Apache," agency headquarters for the newly created Camp Apache Reservation. The reservation lay to the immediate north of San Carlos, with a common border on the Black River. In 1879, the post—and the reservation—achieved the loftier title of Fort Apache. Cooley, meanwhile, mastered the Apache language, did his best to promote a mineral boom, and, with a business partner, Marion Clark, operated a ranch and trading post near Forestdale, home to Pedro's people. He also married two of Pedro's daughters, thus cementing his alliance with the Horizontal Red Valley people.<sup>9</sup>

In part because of Cooley, the Cibecue and White Mountain Apaches avoided war with the United States. Cibecues, indeed, fought for Crook in Tonto Basin. Cooley himself took charge of Cibecue scouts, four of whom earned the Medal of Honor. The Cibecues' role in the war, however, did not lead all Dilzhe'es to consider them enemies. At least some Dilzhe'es—those connected to Cibecues by blood, marriage, or clan—fled to Cibecue country to escape San Carlos.<sup>10</sup>

Soon, however, trouble broke out in the territories of the White Mountain bands. In 1871, Esketeshelaw's band—who were friendly with Cochise's Chiricahuas and deeply affected by the Camp Grant Massacre—killed a civilian at Camp Apache, stole the agency's stock, and fled the reservation. Cibecue men joined soldiers in tracking down the culprits, killing six and taking captive fourteen. Two years later, after Esketeshelaw's band was again accused of stealing cattle, General Crook ordered both Cibecue and White Mountain peoples to locate themselves and their farms close to Camp Apache, where they could be watched.<sup>11</sup> The decision came as a blow to Cibecues, who lived many miles west of the agency. Crook's decision was especially troubling insofar as Cibecues had done everything in their power to help the United States. Now they would be forced to live side by side with a band that they had come to oppose.

In 1875, almost before the move to Camp Apache was complete, the Department of the Interior muddied the waters again by ordering that all Apaches in Arizona be concentrated at San Carlos. Shortly

after Yavapais and Dilzhe'es embarked on their long walk to San Carlos, the Cibecue and White Mountain people trudged south to the same place. Pedro's people, however, managed to get permission to remain at Camp Apache by agreeing to serve as scouts. Another Cibecue band—the Row of White Canes people whose chief was Eskininla, or “Diablo” as whites knew him—had likewise petitioned to stay, promising to forgo rations if they could live in their homeland. Diablo's band had proven just as loyal as Pedro's; it seemed wrong to require one to leave and let the other one stay. Angered at both the government and at Pedro's band, Diablo and his men briefly laid siege to Camp Apache in January 1876. When the attack proved fruitless, they surrendered and agreed to move.<sup>12</sup>

In part to reduce tensions, the San Carlos agent permitted Diablo's people to return to their farms during summers. Rather than improving the situation, the decision led to skirmishing. One battle—barely documented in government records—pitted Esketeshelaw's Eastern White Mountain band against Diablo's Cibecues. Eight men died in a fight that apparently broke out during a social occasion involving tiswin. One of them was the Cibecue headman, Miguel. Obligated by honor and motivated by anger, Diablo took revenge, though the casualties that followed went unrecorded.<sup>13</sup>

Then, on August 30, 1880, another battle erupted. As troops watched from walls of what had now become “Fort Apache,” Diablo's men attacked Pedro's. In the melee, Diablo was killed. Thirty-five of Diablo's men now marched westward to Forestdale to avenge themselves on Pedro's people, despite the fact that Diablo's band had started the fight.<sup>14</sup>

Vague reports filtered back to Fort Apache of numerous deaths. Whites learned that Petone—who had replaced Pedro as chief of the Horizontal Red Valley people—had fallen in combat, though how he fell is uncertain. According to a Mormon settler, Petone had died at the hands of one of his own, Alchesay, who shot him during a gambling dispute. Pedro, now elderly, was shot through both knees in the same fight, ostensibly while trying to break it up. Alchesay was badly wounded. Two others were also killed. The participants were said to have been drinking tiswin, though that alone cannot explain the fury. Other reports—likely more accurate—indicate that Petone died in combat with Diablo's avengers. Grievances between

bands and clans festered in the reservation era, exacerbated—indeed created—by poor decisions made by commanders and agents. Those poor decisions resulted from lack of understanding, and a corresponding lack of curiosity, about relationships among bands, clans, and chiefs.<sup>15</sup>

Though they had maintained a steady friendship with whites—they had even helped establish Fort Apache—the Cibecue were deeply troubled in 1881. Though not at war with whites or other Indians, Cibecues were at war with themselves. Even more trouble ensued when the government crowded a Chiricahua band—a people with whom the Cibecue had no traditional friendship—onto the farmlands of Pedro’s people.<sup>16</sup> Making matters still worse was the arrival of Mormons, who also contested the area.

When Corydon Cooley told Mormons they were trespassing, they complained to their leaders, who in turn complained to Brigham Young. Not long before his death in 1877, Young fired off a letter to Cooley warning him that if he opposed the Mormons, “you will go down, become a pauper in the land and your family will disown you and you will die a miserable death.” Then came a “strange Indian” to Forestdale, “all dressed up and painted.” He spoke no English but he managed to convey a threat. He “give us to understand,” recalled a settler, that if Mormons did not leave they could expect death.<sup>17</sup>

The Mormons did not know precisely whom the painted Indian represented. From their perspective, relations were harmonious; the two peoples were farming almost side by side. The San Carlos agent, Joseph Capron Tiffany, however, determined that Forestdale was within reservation boundaries and demanded that Mormons leave. Threatened by both Indians and the government, Mormons reluctantly agreed to go, though not before several fell in the rebellion that was about to explode.<sup>18</sup>

Into this cauldron stepped Nock-el-del-kinny, promising a new birth for his people. In the immediate future, he promised to resurrect a pair of dead chiefs, both victims of Cibecue discord. He would sing back to life Diablo and Es-ki-ole, who had recently been killed in a quarrel. After those promises came another: Nock-el-del-kinny would bring all the Apache dead back to life. He also preached that Apaches—separated for hundreds of years by band and clan—must unite. They must fight one another no more. Excited by his powers

and encouraged by his message, hundreds gathered to partake in Nock-el-del-kinny's "wheel dance." Participants were told to arrange themselves in rows like spokes on a wheel. As they danced backwards and forwards around the center, Nock-el-del-kinny sprinkled them with sacred pollen and prayed to supernatural powers. Fortified with tiswin, the dancers performed until they dropped from exhaustion. Apaches called the new religious movement "na'ilde" or "bringing back the dead."<sup>19</sup>

Though his efforts to resurrect the dead seemed futile, Nock-el-del-kinny averred that their bones had stirred. With more singing and dancing, they would join the living. It was a strange rallying call for Apaches, given their traditional avoidance of all things associated with death. The shock of the previous decade, it seems, had shaken Apache culture to its roots. Perhaps, too, the idea of resurrection was becoming familiar to Apaches via Christian tales of Jesus, a story that seems to have intrigued Nock-el-del-kinny during his stay in Santa Fe.<sup>20</sup>

Bringing back the dead was not Nock-el-del-kinny's only answer to the crisis. Several men at Fort Apache claimed that Nock-el-del-kinny was predicting that whites would soon leave. One of the interpreters—a white man who, according to investigators, either misunderstood or may have been lying—offered a more frightening report. He claimed that Nock-el-del-kinny was telling followers that the dead would not rise until whites had been driven away. According to others, Nock-el-del-kinny was predicting the destruction of San Carlos. The soldiers, Nock-el-del-kinny supposedly claimed, would be gone by the time the corn ripened. After the dead had risen, they would join living Apaches in Tonto Basin—homeland of Dilzhe'es—whence they would attack their traditional Indian enemies and lay waste to whites.<sup>21</sup>

When Mormon settlers warned Lieutenant John Gregory Bourke of the danger posed by Nock-el-del-kinny, he "laughed their fears away thinking him only another of the countless imposters who spring up almost monthly among the Apaches, flourish for a day and disappear." If only the Indian agent agreed to pay Nock-el-del-kinny 50 cents for every soul he raised from the dead, figured Bourke, Nock-el-del-kinny's people would have soon discovered his fraud. Agent Tiffany, too, believed Nock-el-del-kinny to be a fraud who would soon be discovered and perhaps killed by disappointed

followers, who were contributing lavishly by Apache standards to Nock-el-del-kinny's fortunes. It was customary to pay shamans for their services and it was not unheard of to kill them should they fail to make good their promises. As Nock-el-del-kinny's message spread and his dances swelled, however, Tiffany became worried. Though White Mountain bands were not in evidence at the dances, Dilzhe'es, Cibecues, and others seemed to fall under his sway. According to one report, the Navajo, whose reservation lay to the north, and the Dilzhe'e at San Carlos—both influenced by Nock-el-del-kinny—were planning a breakout. Fearing the worst, Tiffany demanded Nock-el-del-kinny's arrest—or his assassination.<sup>22</sup>

After the San Carlos chief of Indian police, Albert Sterling, proved unable to take Nock-el-del-kinny into custody, Tiffany sought help from the army. The commander of the Department of Arizona, General Orlando Willcox, ordered Colonel Eugene Carr, a fifty-one-year-old West Pointer, decorated Civil War veteran, and commander of the Sixth Cavalry, to carry out the arrest. Though dubious about the danger posed by Nock-el-del-kinny, Carr went ahead. First, however, he asked Willcox whether he should dismiss his Cibecue scouts. Some were Nock-el-del-kinny's relatives; others were clan brothers. Some had even received passes to participate in Nock-el-del-kinny's dances.<sup>23</sup>

Complicating the relationship between Apaches and soldiers was a rumor spread by officers that reinforcements and cannons were on the way to Fort Apache. The lie was intended to deter Indians from rebelling. Instead, it caused them to fear that they were about to be attacked or forcibly moved. Though Carr was furious with his men for endangering the peace, there was some truth to the rumor; Carr had requested two pieces of field artillery and a Gatling gun.<sup>24</sup>

Willcox would have ordered Carr to recruit new scouts from another band but for the fact that the telegraph was down. Without an answer to his query, Carr resolved to march ahead. First, however, he conferred with his scouts, issuing each of them twenty rounds of ammunition to show his trust and assuring them that, no matter what Nock-el-del-kinny said, the whites were there to stay. Carr then presented his binoculars to each scout in order to show them a tiny comet in the night sky, hoping thus to match Nock-el-del-kinny's feat of predicting—or perhaps calling forth—an earlier comet.<sup>25</sup>

Carr also dispatched one of his most trusted Apache scouts, First Sergeant Mose, to talk to Nock-el-del-kinny before troops arrived. Mose—who insisted that Nock-el-del-kinny was innocent of threatening whites—was to assure the shaman that the troops would not hurt him if he would agree to return to Fort Apache. There he would be asked whether he had indeed said that the whites must leave. If he had not, he would be set free.<sup>26</sup>

By the time that Carr's cavalry arrived at Nock-el-del-kinny's village in late August 1881, Nock-el-del-kinny had agreed to go with the troops. According to Carr's report, the arrest was uneventful. In later years, however, an Apache named Tom Friday—who was not present at the event but who, presumably, bespoke Cibecue memory—reported that Nock-el-del-kinny had refused to go, whereupon Carr grabbed him by the hair and dragged him outside. Friday added that Carr had entered Nock-el-del-kinny's gowa brusquely, failing to observe the Apache convention of waiting for an invitation. Seeing the shaman humiliated, the Cibecues, including Carr's scouts, began to seethe.<sup>27</sup>

As Carr and his troops rode off with their captive, Apaches emerged in throngs. "There was a rustling among the crowd of watching Indians that reminded me of the buzzing of a rattlesnake," recalled one of the troops, adding that "the Medicine Man's wife ran ahead of him. She moved with a queer dance step and as she swayed she scattered the sacred meal about her." As Carr's men set up camp, a man on horseback—likely a chief—harangued the crowd at length, then, with a yell, pulled out his rifle. Either before that happened or shortly after, Nock-el-del-kinny's son, or perhaps a nephew or brother, tried to ride through the troops to rescue the shaman. According to Friday, one of the soldiers called the desperate youth a "bad name," committing another breach of propriety. When the youth continued, a soldier shot him down. Suddenly forced to take sides, Carr's scouts turned on the troops and fired. One of them, known to whites as Dead Shot, aimed his rifle at Captain Edmund Hentig and pulled the trigger. Hentig cried "oh my god" as he fell forward, mortally wounded. Nock-el-del-kinny's wife then tried to grab Hentig's pistol but was killed in the act. The troops quickly took cover and returned fire, causing the scouts to run down a hill to seek shelter. Seeing Nock-el-del-kinny crawling away, two soldiers

shot him, wounding him in the leg and neck. As winds kicked up great clouds of dust, the fight turned into a siege. Apaches fired from behind rocks and trees—often from great distances—until evening, then disappeared.<sup>28</sup>

For the first and only time in US history, Indian scouts had mutilated. The next day the scouts and the other attackers were gone, giving Carr the opportunity to retreat to Fort Apache. By then, six troopers were dead and another, shot in the gut, was well on his way. The soldiers had also lost forty-two horses and seven pack mules. Among Apaches, the only definite fatalities were Nock-el-del-kinny and his wife, though perhaps as many as eighteen were killed, including the young man who had tried to rescue the shaman. Nock-el-del-kinny himself had survived the two gunshots only to be bludgeoned to death in the night on orders from Carr, who did not want to risk alerting the enemy by firing a bullet. Apaches interpreted that act as an atrocity, an attack on Nock-el-del-kinny's soul. In later years, Cibecues recalled that a soldier had not merely crushed Nock-el-del-kinny's head but had severed it from his body. Apaches returned the favor by mutilating the body of Captain Hentig and crushing the skulls of subsequent victims.<sup>29</sup>

The outcome was a rebellion of uncertain dimensions that lasted until the end of September. Before Carr could return from the field, a Mexican who had grown up as an Apache captive informed the post that the Indians had turned hostile. Fearing an attack, the soldiers put themselves in a defensive mode. Will Barnes, a twenty-two-year-old telegrapher, volunteered to venture outside to look for Carr's command. Despite taking fire, he managed to climb a nearby hill from which he espied two of Carr's advance men. The rest of Carr's men followed at a distance.<sup>30</sup>

Barnes's courage earned him a Medal of Honor. Others were less fortunate. Three soldiers manning a ferry on the Black River, a tributary of the Salt, fell while hastening to the fort. Three Mormon teamsters also met their end as they traveled nearby, one of them apparently burning to death after angry Apaches chained him to his wagon and lit it on fire. A courier en route to Fort Thomas also met death. So did a ranch hand who failed to take cover when Apaches arrived.<sup>31</sup>

A short distance west of San Carlos, a group of Cibecues led by Na-ti-o-tish—likely with help from a few Dilzhe'es—approached

the cabin of William Middleton, asking to borrow a kettle. Though warned of an outbreak by two men who were now at his side—a messenger from Globe named Turner and a neighboring rancher named Moody—Middleton was inclined to trust the Indians when they professed ignorance of any conflict. Later that afternoon, they attacked, killing Moody with a shot to the head. William Middleton's eighteen-year-old son, Henry, though hit in the shoulder, managed to kill one attacker and wound another. Turner and the Middletons—there were six Middleton children at the ranch, including Henry—took cover in the cabin, then fled in the night. After hiding Middleton's wife and children in the brush, the two men hastened to the ranch of George Church. With Church in tow, they returned to rescue Middleton's family.<sup>32</sup>

After General Willcox received word of the Cibecue fight, he concentrated his cavalry at Fort Apache. His superior, Irvin McDowell, called in seven companies from outside the territory to reinforce forts whence troops had been sent into action. Indians who were away from the reservation with passes meanwhile rushed to San Carlos, offering to help defend it. They included Yavapais and Dilzhe'es, though Tiffany had doubts about Dilzhe'e loyalty. What ensued was prolonged confusion as those at San Carlos and Fort Apache struggled to determine who the enemy was. Nock-el-del-kinny's band was hostile, to be sure, as was the group led by Na-ti-o-tish, but what of other bands? Tiffany got word that Pedro's band had gathered at Cooley's ranch, professing loyalty, but he was inclined to think them involved in the outbreak. But what about Chiricahuas, Aravaipas, Pinals, and Dilzhe'es? Neither Tiffany nor Willcox nor Carr could be sure whom they were fighting (fig. 4.2).<sup>33</sup>

By September 29, some sixty Apaches who were thought to be participants in the outbreak had come to the agency to surrender. The rebellion was sputtering to its end even as William Tecumseh Sherman, commanding general of the army, was demanding a decisive engagement to teach the Apaches a lesson. Troops scoured the region but saw little action. Tiffany was receiving conflicting reports about who was involved from the various band chiefs. Some said Pedro's people were among the rebels, though fourteen of Pedro's men had come to defend Fort Apache. Others said that the responsible parties were the people of Sanchez, a Cibecue, as well as George and



**Figure 4.2.** After the Cibecue uprising in 1881, Dilzhe'e loyalty to whites was in doubt. The man pictured here, with his wife, can be identified as Dilzhe'e by his face paint. Photo by Frank A. Randall, c. 1886. National Anthropological Archives, Smithsonian Institution, NAA INV 02050400.

Bonito, who were White Mountain chiefs. Notified of the suspicions against them, George and Bonito agreed to surrender personally to General Willcox.<sup>34</sup>

Coming to Fort Apache to surrender were also several Cibecue family groups who had danced with Nock-el-del-klinny, including those led by Na-ti-o-tish, Es-ke-al-te, and Ne-big-ja-gay. Na-ti-o-tish, however, soon fled, as did George and Bonito, who, before going into hiding, told Chiricahuas that the soldiers were planning to kill them. Under the leadership of Geronimo and Naiche, about half of the Chiricahuas made a dash for Mexico, leaving a swath of dead settlers in their wake and setting off one last round of war between Apaches and the United States.<sup>35</sup>

In the confusion about what to do next, the army instructed Harry Clay Egbert, acting judge advocate general for the Department of Arizona, to investigate the outbreak. After hearing conflicting testimony, Egbert implicated George, Sanchez, Bonito, Na-ti-o-tish, and Pedro, along with some or all of the men in their bands. Although a number of Dilzhe'es were involved, the great majority were Cibecues. The investigation led to the imprisonment of sixty-eight men. Forty-one of them were confined at Fort Lowell in Tucson, where two prisoners promptly succumbed to pneumonia. A debate ensued about what to do with the rest, with Tiffany arguing for trials for only the ringleaders and General Willcox arguing for mass exile to Indian Territory (modern Oklahoma). After General McDowell sided with the agent, Secretary of War Robert Lincoln—Abraham Lincoln's son—chose to turn over the prisoners to Tiffany. In the court-martials that followed, the army convicted three scouts—Dead Shot, Dandy Jim, and Skippy—of mutiny and sentenced them to hang. A fourth scout, Mucheco, was sentenced to imprisonment at Alcatraz.<sup>36</sup>

The condemned men claimed innocence. One of them, however, Dandy Jim, refused to plead for his life, explaining that it would disgrace him. While awaiting his execution, he called out from a tiny window to a surprised woman—an officer's wife—who was passing by outside. When she approached, he reached out to hand her a string of turquoise beads and a piece of red glass, explaining that he wished to give them away before he died. Dead Shot had a different response; he managed to file down the links on his shackles and make a break for freedom. As he zigzagged toward a nearby canyon,

soldiers shot him twice. He survived to walk to the scaffold, accompanied by Dandy Jim. Skippy, however, found himself too weak to walk by himself and had to be helped.<sup>37</sup>

As he stood at the threshold of death, Dead Shot made a declaration. Since he had met the white people, he said, he had had good clothes and plenty to eat. Now, he concluded, he would repay that kindness with his life. A fellow prisoner from the guardhouse then sprang the trap door, having been promised his freedom for agreeing to be executioner. That night, a soldier named Anton Mazzanovich stole outside with two other men to disinter the scouts and “mount” their skeletons as curiosities. When they arrived at the graves, Mazzanovich and his companions found that the bodies had already been stolen. Years later, Mazzanovich saw the skeletons on display in Shakespeare, New Mexico, brought there by a Dr. Carroll who had served as surgeon at Fort Thomas. Carroll had paid three troopers \$25 apiece to dig up the bodies. He and Mazzanovich laughed about the escapade. Dead Shot’s wife, meanwhile, had hanged herself from a tree after her husband’s execution, leaving behind two small boys.<sup>38</sup>

Lieutenant Thomas Cruse, who had been in command of the scouts at the time of the rebellion, later wrote that he had “always regretted the fate of Deadshot and Skippy,” recalling that Dead Shot was “the sage of the Indian company” and Skippy “our clown and wag.” Cruse never believed that either man had played an “intentional part in the firing upon us,” explaining that “they were swept into the fight by the excitement and the force of evil circumstances.” Even General McDowell had pointed out that the scouts were not familiar with the articles of war; they did not know the penalties for mutiny.<sup>39</sup> When soldiers fired on their relatives, the scouts had little choice but to defend the latter.

Others maintained that the scouts had led troops into an ambush, though evidence was thin. It seems almost certain that the rush to find a military solution to the problem of Nock-el-del-kinny, coupled with indifference to the complexity of Apache culture and history, led to catastrophe. “The quintessence of idiocy,” Bourke called the government’s Apache policy; “poppycock sublimed into madness.”<sup>40</sup>

The fallout continued long after the rebellion. Not for two full years would all the Apaches who had fled during the crisis return to the agency. When in April 1882 some of the Chiricahuas came back to San

Carlos, they immediately turned back to Mexico. In their brief stay, they conferred with Na-ti-o-tish; killed Albert Sterling, San Carlos chief of Indian police, along with some of his men; and kidnapped a group of Warm Springs people, forcing them to become renegades. Three months later, Na-ti-o-tish and Arshay, a cousin of Nock-el-delklinny, and perhaps fifty to eighty others killed another chief of Indian police at San Carlos, Charles Colvig, and lit out for Tonto Basin.<sup>41</sup>

Once again, Na-ti-o-tish attacked the Middleton ranch, this time wounding Eugene Middleton (another of William's sons) as he and two others returned from warning nearby families of the outbreak. Inside the Middleton cabin were "rangers" from Globe who had arrived that morning. Seeing no Indians, they had rested and played cards until one of them climbed a hill to look around, causing a hidden Apache to fire. The shot missed and the ranger ran back to the cabin. A short time later, the three messengers came galloping back from warning their Pleasant Valley neighbors. In the chaos that ensued the Apaches managed to kill no settlers but did manage to run off the rangers' horses. After the Indians departed, the rangers walked fifty miles to the nearest town, receiving a round of jeers for their efforts. Within a year, the Middletons had abandoned Pleasant Valley.<sup>42</sup>

Unfazed by the standoff at the Middleton ranch, the rebels lay siege to McMillenville, a mining hamlet at the western edge of the reservation and a base from which prospectors invaded Indian land in search of minerals. The miners and their families "forted up" in the Stonewall Jackson mine, outwaiting the Indians, who moved on to Canyon Creek, where they killed a rancher. Then the rebels crossed back into Pleasant Valley, where they burned down the cabin of Al Rose and ran off his horses. Next, they attacked the Sigsbee ranch, killing and mutilating Will Sigsbee and a prospector named Louis Houdon before setting fire to two log houses belonging to Isadore Christopher. After that, the raiders turned toward the ranch of John Meadows, an ex-Confederate who had recently brought his family from California. Meadows and his son, Henry, were badly wounded. Both would die in a short time, though not before driving off the Apaches, who, in turn, besieged the Tewksbury cabin. Again they were driven off, this time without loss of life.<sup>43</sup>

In all, Na-ti-o-tish's force killed eight people and drove off over a hundred head of cattle. Farther east, near Forestdale, Apaches fired

on one Mormon settler and killed another after he approached them to inspect the brand on a cow they had killed. To attack his soul, they used rocks to smash his head to a pulp. After stripping the body of clothes, they dumped it in a stream, loading it down with rocks to keep it from floating, then moved off to plunder the home of another settler. According to Mormons, some of those involved later brought back the Book of Mormon they had taken from their victim, regretting that they had killed a good man. Almost undoubtedly the killers were Cibecues, though whether they were part of Na-ti-o-tish's outbreak is unclear.<sup>44</sup>

Now chased by 350 troops, including eight Dilzhe'e scouts under Al Sieber and twenty-six White Mountain scouts under Lieutenant George Dodd, Na-ti-o-tish decided to set a trap. As they followed a path that ascended the Rim, leveled out, then descended into a steep sandstone-walled canyon, the rebels saw their chance. The canyon walls rose some 700 to 1,000 feet on either side of Big Dry Wash—now known as East Clear Creek—forming an ideal setting for an ambush. Na-ti-o-tish's men hid amid rocks at the canyon's far rim, planning to fire on the soldiers as they strained to climb the steep grade. The soldiers and their scouts, however, deduced the plan, causing Captain Adna Chaffee to send two companies upstream and two more downstream while he himself held a body of troops at the crossing as a decoy.

As the climactic moment of the rebellion approached, a strange omen appeared. "Every star," recalled Lieutenant Britton Davis, "was plainly visible in the sky at three-thirty in the afternoon." The four companies detached by Chaffee forded the creek, climbed the far side of the canyon, and converged behind Na-ti-o-tish, taking his men by surprise. As Chaffee fired from below, the rest of the force attacked from above. It was a disaster for the rebels. Na-ti-o-tish was killed, along with as many as twenty-one of his men, whereas the US force suffered only two fatalities and seven wounded. One of those killed on the government side was a Dilzhe'e named Pete, who, on seeing relatives among the enemy, tried to run to them, perhaps to save them from death. Sieber shot him in the head before he achieved his goal.<sup>45</sup>

Na-ti-o-tish's rebellion had lasted twelve days, beginning on July 6, 1882, and ending on July 17 at Big Dry Wash. After that,

only the Chiricahua remained at war. The men who escaped capture that day melted into the reservation; little effort was made to track them. Cooley, getting word of the battle via his Apache contacts even before he heard about it from troops, assured the authorities that there would be no more trouble.<sup>46</sup> The movement—or rebellion—that had begun with Nock-el-del-kinny had at last ended, though tensions did not go with it. The Cibecues and their occasional Dilzhe'e allies would have no jubilee, no resurrection, no victory. They, too, felt the sting of conquest.

Nock-el-del-kinny was not the only medicine man to ignite a spiritual fire. Shamans with similar messages came and went over the next few decades, teaching their followers new dances, new ways to achieve renewal. Some predicted, like Nock-el-del-kinny, the demise of whites. One even preached the message of resurrection, instructing his followers to decapitate him and await his return to life. He did not return.<sup>47</sup> Never again, however, did an Apache shaman shake the authorities the way that Nock-el-del-kinny had.

If Apaches were to experience renewal, it would be a renewal that came in part by learning to live with whites. In the decades after Nock-el-del-kinny's death, Apaches explored their world anew, following vague paths of freedom from government rules. To capture freedom and to retain traditions, they learned to work for whites outside the reservation. Apaches became trackers, herders, crop pickers, road builders, construction workers, miners, and laundresses. Those who stayed on the reservation learned to become ranchers, running large herds of cattle on lands once home to deer, antelope, and elk. In doing so they enabled themselves to control the pace of cultural change. Even as their children were forced to go to school and speak English, Apaches held on to old ways. They continued to value sharing and communalism, to dance and sing, to drink tiswin, to gamble away possessions, and, occasionally, to take revenge on fellow Apaches. Wage labor and ranching became both journeys away from tradition and returns to it; they promoted both innovation and conservatism.

What neither Apaches nor whites realized was that their relationship was becoming a minuet. The two cultures began to change in relation to one another. If in a sense Apaches were becoming more

like whites, they were also becoming in some ways more different. And if whites were learning to accept Apaches as herders, domestics, and road builders, they were also learning to define Apaches as inferiors in new ways. In the coming years, settlers would increasingly come to see in Apaches some of the culture patterns that they themselves were rejecting. As whites, in short, became creatures of conscience—as they repudiated gambling, drinking, feuding, and capital punishment—Apaches seemed to remain dedicated to the codes of honor.

In the short term, however, the situation at San Carlos, if not Fort Apache, improved. Lacking confidence in General Willcox, General Sherman replaced him with George Crook. Crook immediately called together the Apaches and interviewed them about the causes of their dissatisfaction. Pedro, now so old that he had to use an ear trumpet, added his voice to those of the other chiefs and headmen who enumerated their woes.<sup>48</sup>

Sure that they could trust Crook, Apaches laid out their case. Whites, they claimed, were allowed to freely trespass in search of coal and copper. Too, the agent meted out stern yet arbitrary punishment, refusing to separate the innocent from the guilty. Worst of all, the agent and his employees were hawking “superfluous” annuities and rations off the reservation.<sup>49</sup>

Crook found the claims to be true. A grand jury also investigated, reporting in October 1882 that Tiffany and his employees had sparked the rebellion through acts of “fraud and villainy . . . practiced in open violation of law and in defiance of public justice.” Not only had Tiffany and his men sold Indian rations off the reservation, they had also taken a part interest in a mining venture premised on the redrawing of reservation boundaries so as to exclude its minerals. Tiffany, it seems, had placed signs on the southwestern portion of the reservation declaring it to be Indian land, hoping to keep out prospectors until he himself could file a claim.<sup>50</sup>

The prospectors came anyway, causing Tiffany to send troops to protect the area, though he dared not send Indian police for fear such an act would lead to a war. “The Indians were excited,” he reported in the midst of the Cibecue Rebellion; “they came to me saying if the government was going to cut off more mineral land and keep doing so they might as well die now as any time.” Likely the Indians who

threatened war were not Cibecues, whose homelands lay to the north of the coal deposits, but rather Dilzhe'es, Pinalis, and Yavapais, whose lands were farther south. Even if the intrusions on the coalfields did not lead directly to rebellion, however, they did lead to loud calls for Tiffany's ouster.<sup>51</sup>

Crook's aide-de-camp, John Gregory Bourke, was just as appalled as the grand jury that implicated Tiffany, though his strictures made a wider arc. Bourke found that, since he had left Arizona in the mid-1870s, the territory had been taken over by "lawless cowboys, rowdy miners, corrupt officials, and ruthless speculators" who craved Apache land and were willing to kill Indians to get it. Bourke in particular despised cowboys who, he wrote in his diary, "were more contemptible and cruel [than Apaches] with none of the elements of bravery and daring and with none of the excuses of savage patriotism." Even Will Barnes, the Fort Apache telegrapher freshly crowned with a Medal of Honor, insisted that the Indians who rebelled were "far more sinned against than sinning."<sup>52</sup>

Crook's sympathy for Apaches soon made him persona non grata. The *Silver Belt*, adding its voice to a chorus of Arizona newspapers, attacked Crook's authority as "aristocratic," demanding that "military Bashaws" be replaced by civilian agents. In theory, Crook had authority only over maintaining the peace and administering criminal justice on the reservation, though in practice those roles gave him significant power. Not until 1885, after another Chiricahua outbreak, did his authority over the reservation become total. Throughout those years, a white heat of anti-Crook invective inflamed the public, even after his temporary victory over Geronimo. The newspapers and the public cried repeatedly for the abolition of reservations. Indians—like blacks in the South who benefited from the Fourteenth Amendment—were getting special treatment, they argued. White settlers could use Indian land productively yet were shut out from its bounties. They were shut out even from grazing cows on Indian pastures. "It would seem," intoned the *Silver Belt*, "that the whites have no rights which the military are bound to respect."<sup>53</sup>

The *Silver Belt* expounded its arguments at length in September 1895 under the headline "Apaches Have No Vested Rights." Even the Mexican government had regarded Apaches as "Ishmaelites," complained the *Silver Belt*; Apaches held no tenure on the

land. Mexicans understood the “wicked and incorrigible” nature of Apaches, who now occupied the reservation “by sufferance of the chief executive of the nation.” The only obligation to them, it continued, was “the universal one of humanity.” Mexico had “unloaded its most objectionable Indians upon us, and the United States has received, clothed, and fed them, and in many instances favored them to the detriment and injury of its own citizens.” Apaches, it argued, should either become citizens and give up claims to reservation lands or be moved to islands off the California coast, or perhaps to Sacaton in southern Arizona, one of the driest spots in the territory. If Indians were not willing, troops could make them comply. If those plans could not be implemented, then at least the government could parcel out the reservation under the terms of the Dawes Severalty Act, which accorded each Indian head of family a 160-acre farm and opened “surplus” lands to settlement. Unfortunately for settlers, neither San Carlos nor Fort Apache included enough land suitable for farming—even for irrigation farming—to justify allotment.<sup>54</sup>

Crook was unmoved. In his view, the greed and special treatment were all on the side of whites. During his four-year tenure at San Carlos, Crook tried to be fair to his wards. He refused to disarm them lest whites trespass at will. He also opposed any diminution of the reservation. Even if the Apaches could not utilize their resources in the present, after all, they would do so in the future.<sup>55</sup> In the end, however, he failed to halt expropriation. If Apaches had valuable mineral lands, those lands were sure to be taken. There was one important victory, however, for Crook and like-minded agents. The Indian Bureau decided to lease grazing lands to white cattlemen rather than sell them outright. When the Apaches became herders themselves in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, they retained enough range to succeed.

According to John Clum, the celebrated civilian agent during the consolidations of the 1870s, the forced marches to San Carlos were “effected without the loss of a single life, and without destroying the property of civilians.”<sup>56</sup> He was wrong. Not only did consolidation—which soon yielded hunger and disease due to inadequate planning and rationing—lead to deadly attacks on settlers, it also led to Indian-on-Indian conflicts and reprisals. The causes of the

Cibecue Rebellion were complex, but certainly among the main causes was consolidation.

If there was a legacy to the Nock-el-del-kinny rebellion, however, it was not altogether one of defeat. If, on the one hand, the rebellion gave ammunition to whites who insisted that Apaches were savages, unfit for civilization, a people suited only to war, it also gave ammunition to those who wished to understand the reasons for Apache discontent and to protect Apache resources. If not for the rebellion, corruption would have continued unchecked.

There is, however, another legacy to consider. That legacy is encapsulated in the fate of the two orphans left by Dead Shot, one of the scouts executed for mutiny. After Dead Shot's wife hanged herself, her two boys were left to raise themselves. For some reason, Apache relatives did not take charge of the children. Perhaps Dead Shot lacked kin who would raise the children, or perhaps whites simply assumed that the boys were orphans, failing to understand the workings of Apache culture. Either way, the "half-naked, wild-eyed" boys fell under the purview of whites. For a time, the two lived with the post butcher, who, as one of the boys later recalled, "washed us, cut [our] hair, give us shoes, give us pants, give us coat, shirt, everything, all same White man." The butcher took the boys with him when he moved to a ranch north of the fort. Shortly after that, Will Barnes moved to the same area where he, too, became a rancher. As Barnes remembered it, he had become the boys' "godfather" at Fort Apache and he now took custody. When Grenville Goodwin interviewed one of the "godsons" in 1938, however, he insisted that his brother had stayed with the butcher, though the two were able to spend time together at Barnes's ranch.<sup>57</sup>

The boys "were very handy about the cow camp," wrote Barnes, "and as happy as larks to have horses to ride and plenty to eat." They also showed aptitude for invention. On one occasion, they trained milk cows to drag a sled holding a water bucket from the well to the ranch house. In general, however, it was the boy named Riley who was mechanically inclined, whereas his brother, Friday—named after the dark-skinned, servile character in Daniel Defoe's 1719 novel, *Robinson Crusoe*—was more studious. To reward his intelligence, Barnes sent Friday to school in the Mormon town of St. Joseph, but the boy soon walked back. In his 1938 interview, Friday recalled

that Barnes's mother—who had come to live on the ranch—had laughed out loud after receiving a note from the teacher regarding the boy's feckless act. Promising that she would teach him at home, Mrs. Barnes devoted two afternoons a week to lessons in reading, writing, and ciphering, to which she added religious instruction on Sundays.<sup>58</sup>

In 1888, the boys returned to the reservation. Barnes was happy to see them go; they had become difficult. Friday explained that his departure was occasioned by a whipping he had received from Barnes. Friday, it seems, had been playing with two "Mexican" (more likely New Mexican) children when he was supposed to have been working. "Mrs. Barnes cried, [and] I was sick on my back a long time where he whipped me. Then I ran away. I ran to Winslow and worked fifteen days on the railroad section. Mr. Barnes got me back. I worked three months then I ran away again to Winslow." At about the same time, Riley got into trouble with his custodian after the latter killed and skinned Riley's pet lamb. When Riley called him a bad name, his custodian made him return to the reservation.<sup>59</sup>

After Friday ran away a second time, Barnes contacted the Fort Apache agent, demanding that he take the boy back. The agent obligingly sent one of the scouts, along with Friday's brother, Riley, to escort him to the agency. On the return trip from Winslow, the trio sought to camp at Barnes's home but Barnes refused them, forcing them to continue another mile before they could rest. According to Barnes, however, he did give each boy a horse, a saddle, blankets, and food. His mother added to those gifts new clothes.<sup>60</sup>

A month later, recalled Barnes, "we were sitting in the house [when] we heard whistling outside, bugle calls, etc. Mother at once recognized who was coming." Outside appeared Riley and Friday, without horses, saddles, and clothes. They had gambled away everything. Each boy wore only a "G-string and moccasins, and red bands of flannel" on their heads, the emblem that Apache scouts wore to identify themselves to whites. "Mother was surely disgusted and scandalized," commented Barnes. Nonetheless, he and his mother permitted the boys to remain another month, after which Riley proposed that he and his brother return to the agency to serve as interpreters. After they left, Barnes did not see either of them until 1896, when he dined with Friday at Fort Apache. Friday—known as Tom Friday, the very man who provided the Apache account of

the Cibecue uprising—by then had a wife and two children. Though Barnes never again had contact with Riley, in the early 1930s Barnes did meet Riley's son, who was a scout at Fort Huachuca.<sup>61</sup>

The story encapsulates the relationship between whites and Apaches that developed in the post-conquest era. Indian agents, soldiers, and not a few settlers took a paternal interest in Apaches. They sought to teach them English and Christianity and the ethic of hard work. When Apaches engaged in their own traditions, however—when they chose “play” over work; when they gambled away possessions; when they engaged in traditional dances and sings; or, worse, when they engaged in feuds—whites were ready to dismiss them. They became “disgusted and scandalized,” and figuratively if not literally consigned Indians to the ranks of barbarism. There was humanity in the relationship between whites and Apaches in the post-conquest era. There were even mutual feelings of concern and loyalty, as we shall see. At the same time, however, whites measured their own high morals and purposes against the supposedly low morals and purposes of Indians. In the process, whites moved further toward conscience, repudiating old behaviors and values that many had once embraced.

## *Honor in Chaos*

NEVER AGAIN AFTER THE Nock-el-del-kinny rebellion did Apaches—other than Geronimo’s Chiricahuas—wage outright war. Resistance, however—even rebellion—did not end. It continued into the 1890s, along with the ethic of male honor that gave it countenance. Every few months, it seemed, a small group of Apache “criminals” from San Carlos would launch an attack. In February 1889, two Indians killed a freighter as he passed through the reservation. Three Apache men in turn located the murderers, killing one, capturing the other, and earning serious wounds in the process. Almost exactly a year later, several San Carlos men—said to be drunk on tiswin—killed a second freighter just west of Fort Thomas. A contingent of troops and Indian scouts promptly tracked down the culprits, killing two and capturing one near the Salt River. The Arizona *Silver Belt* identified the captured man, El-chees-choos, as “Tonto Apache.” Possibly he was Dilzhe’e, though whites sometimes applied the “Tonto” designation to Pinalis, Cibecues, even Yavapais.<sup>1</sup>

In July 1890, Gila County hanged El-chees-choos. He did not die, however, without a grim sort of victory. When a priest urged the condemned man to accept Christ and repent, he refused. He told the priest that, were he to live, he would happily convert. He was sure that Christianity “was good for this world.” He explained, however, that he would soon see God and would tell him his story. If God thought El-chees-choos must go to hell, it would be “alright.” El-chees-choos, however, insisted on his innocence. His companions, he claimed, had threatened to kill him if he did not assist in the attack on the freighter.<sup>2</sup>

Even as El-chees-choos abjured Christianity, his message bespoke another truth. In traditional Apache thought, there was no hell.

Neither judge nor judgment day determined one's spiritual fate. In speaking of judge and judgment, El-chees-choos—like many Indians before him—seems to have absorbed European ideas. Like many Apache spiritual teachers who came later, he conceived of an afterlife that was both Christian and non-Christian.

On the morning of his execution day, the guards offered El-chees-choos a dram of whiskey. He refused it. "You people are trying to make fun of me," he exclaimed. "I know that I have to die today. I don't want any whiskey and don't want to be made fun of." Later in the day, he partook heartily of a watermelon and played cards. When he arrived at the gallows, he smoked a cigarette and—through an interpreter—told the crowd that if they wanted to keep Indians from killing whites, they would have to hang them all. Then he walked alone to the noose, humming his death song, and died with hardly a sign of struggle.<sup>3</sup>

In the same month that El-chees-choos died—July 1890—came news of another murder. Ed Baker, a rancher in the Sierra Ancha, fell victim to "Tonto Apaches." The accused, however, were not Dilzhe'es but Cibecues who had been gathering acorns. All four—Guadalupe, Bat-dish, Bak-el-cle, and Nat-tsen (known to whites as "Dandy Jim")—received life terms. "The verdict," noted an observer, "was a complete surprise to many persons who heard the evidence and especially to the attorneys. No white man would ever have even been brought to trial on such flimsy evidence, let alone been convicted." Perhaps aware of the injustice, the legislature pardoned Nat-tsen in 1894. It seems, however, that he had oiled the wheels of justice by spinning a "Munchausen tale" of gold in the Sierra Ancha. After his release, he led a credulous party on a fruitless search. Shortly thereafter, he married an Apache woman who had been educated at a Nebraska boarding school. Neither love nor freedom, however, saved him from death. Nat-tsen and the three men who were tried alongside him all died of consumption in 1897. Two succumbed while in prison. Two others—Nat-tsen and Bak-el-cle, who was also pardoned—died at San Carlos.<sup>4</sup>

From the perspective of settlers, El-chees-choos and the four Cibecues accused of murdering Ed Baker were part of a pattern. In October 1890, the San Carlos agent reported that seventeen "renegades" had left the reservation and that fifteen others had been

killed. Those seventeen, he wrote, had “made several unfriendly visits to the reservation, killed several, carried women and girls off with them, terrorized good Indians, and tried to persuade the dissatisfied to join them.” The war between the United States and the Western Apache was over. The turmoil, however—and often the fighting—continued. To deal with the problem, agents banished renegades’ relatives and friends from Arizona.<sup>5</sup>

The most famous of the renegades became legendary. His Apache name may have been Haskay-bay-nay-natyl, though records conflict. Whites called him “the Apache Kid,” or just “Kid.” Born in the 1860s to Aravaipa parents, Kid spent part of his youth working for whites in Globe, where he learned rudimentary English.<sup>6</sup> In the early 1880s, he became a scout in the Geronimo campaign. Despite his loyal service, he became a fugitive in 1887 after taking vengeance on an Aravaipa man who had killed his father. Even amid the new dispensation brought by whites, Kid followed the lodestar of honor.

With several other scouts from his band, Kid had abandoned his post to avenge his father’s murder. Afterward, the scouts returned to San Carlos and surrendered their guns to Captain F. E. Pierce, who was accompanied by his chief of scouts, Al Sieber, and an interpreter. Several mounted Apaches who had come with the scouts, however—men related by kin or by clan—became angry when Pierce sent Kid to the guardhouse. One of the mounted men—perhaps more—fired on the whites without hitting them. In the confusion, Kid and the others escaped. Months later, after he and his fellow escapees had killed two settlers, he surrendered again, this time to troops and scouts who had located him in the Rincon Mountains near Tucson. Though a court-martial convicted him of mutiny and sentenced him to life in prison, the army freed Kid a year and a half later. Upon returning to San Carlos from the military prison at Alcatraz, he again met charges for murder, this time in a territorial court.<sup>7</sup>

Convicted anew in 1889, Kid, along with three co-defendants, was sentenced to seven years in prison. On the way to the penitentiary, however, he and eight others managed to overpower their guards. In the melee, the escapees killed two men—a guard and a sheriff—and escaped into the mountains.<sup>8</sup>

What ensued was an epic of flight, hiding, and vengeance. To settlers, the Kid, like Joaquin Murrieta, the famous California bandit,

seemed to lay behind every rock, every tree. Newspapers credited Kid with killings and crimes from Arizona's Rim Country to Sonora, Mexico. How many of those killings and crimes were his doing is uncertain. What is certain is that Kid committed crimes against other Apaches. In October 1890, the *Silver Belt* reported that he had killed a San Carlos man to get his horse and his moccasins. The victim's kin, in turn, promised to kill Kid. In 1892, Kid murdered an Apache woman and "outraged" her daughter. In 1893, Kid again appeared at San Carlos, where he kidnapped the wife of Tonto Bill. Tonto Bill and his kin pursued Kid into the Sierra Ancha. So, too, did Dilzhe'e and Yavapai scouts track him, though without success. According to Dilzhe'e testimony, however, the trackers succeeded in freeing five Indian women whom Kid had kidnapped and held in a cave.<sup>9</sup>

Responding to the outcry, the territorial legislature put up a \$5,000 reward for the capture or killing of Kid. No one earned the reward. Kid disappeared. In 1896, the army, responding to reports of renegades killing a settler in the southern part of the territory, tried one last time to locate Kid. In cooperation with Mexican troops, two companies of cavalry plus sixty Indian scouts marched into Sonora, where they killed a few "renegades," captured a boy and a few horses, then gave up the search.<sup>10</sup>

Perhaps Kid had gone to live with the last Chiricahuas who held out in the Sierra Madre. Perhaps he ended up living among the Yaqui, married to one of their women. Some speculate that he died of disease or wounds in the 1890s. Perhaps a Mormon colonist in Mexico killed Kid in 1904 or 1905. At San Carlos, rumors swirled of Kid visiting his mother and sister in the 1900s, after they had returned from exile in Alabama. According to one report, he visited the reservation as late as 1930.<sup>11</sup>

Even if Kid survived, his confederates did not. Gon-shay-ee, who fled with Kid after the attempted surrender at San Carlos in 1887, had given himself up voluntarily. He had even tried to convince Kid to surrender. The jurors who tried Gon-shay-ee for murder, however, extended no mercy. Gon-shay-ee and his counsel in turn appealed to the US Supreme Court, arguing that US courts held no jurisdiction. Gon-shay-ee, argued counsel, had transgressed territorial law, not federal law. The Supreme Court agreed, thus handing over to county courts all cases involving Indian defendants accused of committing

major crimes off the reservation. The case had enormous legal significance but changed little for Gon-shay-ee. Tried by an Arizona territorial court, he received a second death sentence. In the days before he was hanged, he clutched a photo of his two wives and three children “almost all the time.”<sup>12</sup>

Most of the men with Kid during his 1889 escape—when he and eight others had killed a guard and a sheriff while in transit to prison—likewise met bitter ends (fig. 5.1). In 1890, the *Silver Belt* reported that five of the escapees were dead. Among those who survived was a Dilzhe’e named Hos-kal-te. When two of his fellow escapees, Say-es and El-cahn, had sought food from Hos-kal-te’s kin, Hos-kal-te’s father-in-law had refused them. In pique, they killed him. Realizing his peril, Hos-kal-te surrendered to authorities, who then captured Say-es and killed El-cahn. Hos-kal-te was sentenced to twelve years for having killed an Apache pursuer.<sup>13</sup>

Old clan and band animosities, it seems, provoked new confrontations. The reservation was a hive of animus, much of it directed at whites but also directed at other Indians. The newspapers attributed Apache crime, meanwhile, to Apache shame. Indians, claimed the newspapers, could not be civilized. “Education of the Indian a Failure,” announced the *Silver Belt* in 1890. “Educated Indians,” it claimed, “are every day busily engaged in securing newspapers, containing accounts of the fear that their orgies create among their pale brethren, and which upon being read and rendered into the Indian vernacular by the graduates affords the untutored sons of the forest great amusement, and thus they are informed of the movements of the troops.”<sup>14</sup>

Where the *Silver Belt* got that information was left unsaid. Likely the report was mere rumor. Though Kid was reputed to be a graduate of Carlisle Indian School, he was in fact illiterate. So were his confederates. Even if educated Indians reveled in settlers’ fears, moreover, they were not doing so without cause. Literacy did not require Apaches to abandon their people. Likely it made them more aware of white contempt. Certainly education did not immunize Apaches, or Yavapais, from the anger that came with conquest.

In its haste to belittle Indian education, what the *Silver Belt* ignored was the fact that the occasional outbreak did not exemplify



**Figure 5.1.** Apache Kid (top row, fourth from left), Say-es, Hos-kal-te, and other Apache defendants, 1889. Sharlot Hall Museum Library and Archives, Prescott, Arizona.

“savagery” but rather “social outlawry.”<sup>15</sup> Apaches had no capacity to defeat settlers and soldiers. Nor even did Apaches have a sense of themselves as a unified people. What they did have was a sense of themselves as a people wronged. What they also had was a sense of honor that predated American intrusion. Those two factors, it seems, led even peaceful Apaches to lend occasional support to “outlaws” and “renegades.”

Perhaps realizing that fact, Brigadier General Benjamin H. Grierson in 1890 ordered seventy-six Apaches related to Kid by blood or clan to be removed from Arizona.<sup>16</sup> Though draconian and probably unnecessary, the order appeased settlers who feared and loathed Apaches. Kid, announced the *Silver Belt* in 1893, “is not wanting in friends whose skins are colored as his own and who live upon the bounty of the government.” Some of those friends may have been Dilzhe’es, though most Dilzhe’es wanted Kid captured.<sup>17</sup> It is

important to realize, however, that outlaws could not expect support from all Apaches, only those who were members of their family, band, or clan. Often, outlaws could not even expect support from them.

If Kid brought banditry to a pitch of bloodshed, most social banditry was less violent. In 1896, Apaches, rather than attacking freighters, began charging them a dollar for crossing the reservation. If the freighters refused to pay, Apaches ran off their animals.<sup>18</sup> Having given the freighters no permission to cross their lands, Indians demanded compensation.

The same bitterness that led Apaches to charge fees to freighters led them to steal or kill settlers' cows. Throughout the 1880s and 1890s, the *Silver Belt* complained bitterly of cattle theft by San Carlos men. Indians, claimed settlers, were inveterate thieves and liars. They were savages who could never be trusted. Only the army could control Indians, claimed settlers, yet the army refused.

Often, Indians were innocent of charges leveled by whites. "All the stories" about Apaches "committing depredations are purely false," insisted Brigadier General Grierson in 1890. Such charges, he continued, "are mainly put into circulation by alarmists and certain interested parties, who hope, by such methods to cause the removal of the Indians and the opening up of their reservation to settlement." There are too many accounts of Indian rustling, however, to dismiss them out of hand. At times, Indians testified against fellow Indians who had butchered settlers' cattle. Even when charges were accurate, however, they were clothed in hyperbole. They testified, according to the *Silver Belt*, not to a sociological problem but to "the unrestrained exactions of savages."<sup>19</sup>

What settlers ignored was that rustling was as much an act of protest among Apaches as it was among whites. Among settlers, small operators frequently stole cattle from big operators. Sometimes, small operators stole from one another. Cattle theft was a common way to get even with enemies. When Indians stole cattle, they were participating in an economy of honor—an economy of assertion and attack—that settlers themselves had helped create.

Settlers subjected Indians to rustling, too. In 1881, a man named Nadiski—either a Cibecue or a Dilzhe'e who had permission to keep stock in the Sierra Ancha—lost his cattle to white thieves. Settlers

went a step further by threatening to kill Nadiski if he did not return to the reservation, even though he had cooperated with whites during the Nock-el-del-kinny rebellion. The *Silver Belt* urged restraint. Threats against Nadiski, it argued, amounted to “barbarism; it is out-Indianing the Indian; it is, instead of being a proof of a superiority of a race, positive evidence of being on the same level.” The *Silver Belt’s* protests confirmed its anti-Indian position.<sup>20</sup> The point was not to suggest that Indians deserved equality; the point was to avoid hypocrisy. Whites must remain superior; Indians must remain shamed.

Rustling by settlers, meanwhile, differed from that of Apaches. In taking settlers’ cows, Apaches were not merely engaging in honor. They were responding to ecological conditions. Settlers’ cattle displaced deer and pronghorn. Deprived of game, Indians went hungry. To compensate, they killed beeves. Settlers’ cattle, moreover, recurrently wandered onto Indian pastures. Time and again, Indians or soldiers or both rounded up trespassing cattle and sent them back. On occasion, armed Indians gathered to stop white cowboys from herding cows across the reservation line. At other times, Indians killed and ate trespassing animals. On still other occasions, bitter Apaches went so far as to poke the eyes out of trespassing stock.<sup>21</sup>

By the 1890s, the problem was partly resolved when the BIA leased reservation land to white cattlemen. Even then, antagonism persisted. White lessees often ran more cattle than permits allowed or let cattle stray into closed areas. Not until the 1920s, when San Carlos Apaches ousted white lessees and stocked the reservation with their own herds, did old fires die out.<sup>22</sup>

Old fires did not die out, however, before violence erupted. In 1896, someone shot Bud Campbell, a former vigilante and close ally of a powerful cattleman named Jesse Ellison. Settlers blamed Campbell’s murder on Apaches, though later reports suggested that a white man was responsible.<sup>23</sup> It was Indians, however, whom Ellison and his family feared, given that their ranch was a stone’s throw from the western border of the reservation.

Throughout the 1890s and early 1900s, Cibecues—and likely a few Dilzhe’es—regularly visited the Ellison ranch. Apaches were as much a part of life on the ranch as cowboys. Sometimes Jesse Ellison hired them for odd jobs and perhaps as herders, though it was Helen Duett

Ellison, his daughter, known as Duett, who often supervised them. Indians, recalled Jesse Ellison late in his life, worked better for his daughter than they did for him. Indians also sold and traded vegetables, beadwork, and baskets to the Ellisons, encouraging Minnie Ellison—another of Jesse's daughters—to operate a small trading post.<sup>24</sup>

For the most part, relations were friendly. "Indians won't hunt us," Duett Ellison assured her fiancé, George W. P. Hunt, in June 1895; "they like us better than any one else." The nearby grave of one of the victims of the Nock-el-del-kinny uprising in 1881, however, suggested that her faith might be misplaced. In November 1895, wary friendship gave way to fear after an altercation in a Cibecue camp. Certain that Apaches were stealing cattle, Frank Ketcherside, William Voris, and Houston Kyle accompanied the sheriff onto the reservation, demanding that Indians turn over an accused rustler. During the argument that followed, Frank Ketcherside pulled his rifle, causing an Indian headman to grab the gun. Fearing for their lives, Ketcherside's partners shot the man, then wheeled their horses and fled.<sup>25</sup>

Though Cibecues claimed that the white men had committed murder, none were prosecuted. The white men, meanwhile, charged no fewer than twenty-seven Indians with attempted murder. Though the charges were dropped, several Indians were charged (and later convicted) for rustling. Full of fury and claiming innocence, the Cibecues rode with an army lieutenant to Pleasant Valley to identify their attackers. The white men, claimed Apaches, had broken the law by crossing into Indian land, then compounded their crime with murder. The Ellisons told the lieutenant that they had nothing to do with the incident. They failed, however, to convince Indians, many of whom knew Jesse Ellison's cowboys by sight. If something was not done about the murder, recalled settlers, Cibecue headman John Dazin threatened to be "a very bad Indian." Members of his band, according to the *Silver Belt*, meanwhile began killing and running off settlers' stock. Taking the hint, Voris and Kyle left the area until tempers subsided. Other settlers fortified up for over a month.<sup>26</sup>

In December, a rumor floated to Globe that the Ellison family had been massacred, causing the Associated Press to issue a story to that effect. While visiting Globe earlier in the month, however, Houston

Kyle had told George Hunt that the danger of Indian attack was remote. Still worried, Hunt sent Duett Ellison a rifle. By December 29, it seems, all was calm. Jim Ramer—the biggest cattleman in the area—had come to Globe to assure everyone that the threat had passed. Hunt told Duett Ellison to stay on her guard regardless, reiterating old prejudices about Indians. “When you think every thing is safe,” he wrote, “that is the time those murderous Apaches will get in their work. . . . They are all cowardly treacherous bloodthirsty savages and would no more think of murdering you all in cold blood than of eating.”<sup>27</sup> Settlers like Hunt transmuted Apache honor—Apache willingness to fight enemies—into Apache shame.

Bud Campbell’s murder occurred seven months later, causing settlers to conclude that Indians had taken revenge for the killing the previous November. “These red devils,” wrote Hunt to Duett, “will be quiet for a while and then some other one will fall a prey to their thirst for blood and vengeance.” In all likelihood, Campbell had been murdered by a white man. Fear, however, led to judgment.<sup>28</sup>

Settlers continued into the twentieth century to accuse Apaches of rustling, but Indian attacks became a thing of the past. Almost never did Apaches or Yavapais—either individually or collectively—do violence to whites. They continued, however, to do occasional violence to one another. Year after year came reports of disputes among Indians that led to assaults. Some disputes—likely most—stemmed from long-simmering hostilities between bands or clans. “An old Indian,” reported the *Silver Belt* in 1895, “stated that Globe is a better place to stay than the Cibicu country, now that there is so much trouble among the Indians.” The *Silver Belt* explained that there had been much friction among Cibecues—including “tulapai drinking, and some cutting”—since the killing of one of their chiefs. Conditions at Fort Apache, conjectured the *Silver Belt*, were ripe for an outbreak.<sup>29</sup>

Frictions were equally bad at San Carlos. In 1895—the same year that saw trouble among Cibecues—a mysterious group of Apaches who were said to be in the thrall of a Chiricahua renegade attacked Yavapais near the San Carlos River. The renegades killed one woman, seriously wounded another, and took a captive. The agency farmer, meanwhile, reported a “big tiswin drink” at a “Tonto” camp followed

by a row that left five women and several children dead. A number of Apache families, reported the *Silver Belt*, fled to Aravaipa Canyon, suggesting that the participants were not “Tonto” but Pinal or Aravaipa. Assuming the report had some basis in truth, it suggests the persistence of band and clan rivalries, rivalries that had become deeper and more bitter during conquest, when Apaches and Yavapais had sided against other Apaches and Yavapais.<sup>30</sup>

Even if the 1895 troubles were not the outgrowth of old rivalries, the 1899 attack on Talkalai was. Talkalai—a Pinal headman and friend to whites—was beaten and left for dead. Though he recovered, his antagonists forced him to move off the reservation. Similarly, in 1901, a half Dilzhe’e, half Yavapai man named Tonto Lewis shot and killed a Yavapai headman named Marshal Pete who, like Talkalai, was considered a collaborator with whites. Tonto Lewis, moreover, still felt the sting of the Yavapai attack on Dilzhe’es during the 1875 march to San Carlos. Similar frictions simmered near Fort Apache, where the agent reported in 1903 that “many places on the reservation have been pointed out to me where an Indian was killed because he belonged to a particular fighting band.” As late as 1912, the San Carlos agent reported a triple murder by a Dilzhe’e “for the purpose of wiping out old grudges,” though what those grudges involved went unreported.<sup>31</sup>

Clan rivalries were not the sole source of violence. Sometimes violence involved tensions between men and women. In 1895, a “melee” occurred at the “Tonto camp” near Globe. “Charley,” or “Tonto C.9,” a Dilzhe’e, “brought his six-shooter into play with telling effect,” hitting a woman in her right breast and an elderly man near the groin. Two others were pummeled with rocks.<sup>32</sup>

The event remains mysterious. No records explore its cause. What seems certain, however, is that the attack was a distortion of traditional honor. Men had once sought status—at least in part—via raiding, war, and occasional blood vengeance. Now denied old venues for honor and, perhaps more important, subjected to traumas and upheavals that accompanied settlement, they sometimes lashed out. Far from seeking to understand, however, the *Silver Belt* insisted that “there is no reason why a lot of drunken Indians should be quartered upon the community.” A year earlier, the *Silver Belt* had been more adamant. Decrying the expense of trying Indian-on-Indian cases

in county courts, it suggested that citizens “resort to gunpowder” to accomplish “justice.” Indians charged with crimes, it suggested, should be killed without trial.<sup>33</sup> It was Indian honor, perhaps, that led to Indian-on-Indian attacks. It was settler honor, however, that shaped public opinion. Settlers viewed themselves as a people of dignity; they viewed Indians as people of shame.

Along with its tirade against “drunken Indians,” the *Silver Belt* demanded that “Tontos” be forced to return to the reservation. The San Carlos agent obliged, sending Indian police to round up those implicated in the 1895 melee. Gila County sheriff John Henry Thompson meanwhile arrested William Miller, a “colored” man, for selling whiskey to those involved in the fracas. From settlers’ point of view, the problem lay not just with Indians; it lay with nonwhites more generally, including Mexicans and “colored” men who sold Indians liquor. The newspapers seldom lost an opportunity to publish stories of Indian intoxication and Mexican greed for Indian cash. Often they overlooked the fact that white liquor traders—wishing to avoid the taint of selling to Indians—wholesaled their product to Mexicans and blacks so that they, in turn, could sell to Indians.<sup>34</sup>

In at least two other cases, Apache or Yavapai men murdered youths returning from boarding school. Both cases seem to have been connected to marital woes. In 1893, a “Tonto” man called Goodlooking stabbed his young wife when she returned from the agency’s boarding school. According to the *Silver Belt*, she had sought a separation. After killing her, Goodlooking carefully set down his bow and arrows next to her, then tried to take his own life. He failed. After being taken into custody, he insisted on being promptly hanged. Other accused men admitted to similar crimes but refused to repent. Between 1880 and 1897 reports appeared of at least eighteen cases of Apache or Yavapai men murdering Apache or Yavapai women on or near the San Carlos Reservation. Some reports likely arose from mere rumors. A few involved attacks on “witches.” Most, however, seem to have involved what social scientists call “intimate violence.” The accused men—like Goodlooking—were often husbands, suitors, or sons-in-law of the victims.<sup>35</sup>

What the *Silver Belt* and the settlers who read it saw in Indian-on-Indian attacks—and especially attacks by Indian men on Indian

women—was savagery. They saw Indian shame, Indian bloodthirst, Indian criminality. What in fact was occurring was more complex.

Though Apache and Yavapai women had been far from powerless in the pre-conquest era, they had been marginalized by honor. Women and children were prizes in raids. They were captured, redeemed, bought, sold, traded, and at times enslaved. Most women and children did not experience capture and slavery, but, as James Brooks has argued, women and children were at times commodities.<sup>36</sup> The commodification of women was not totalizing; it did not wholly define women's place. Women held power by presiding over family groups, clan rituals, gatherings, and farm sites. For all their powers, however, women remained vulnerable into the reservation era.

It was women, meanwhile, who, over the centuries—via capture, enslavement, trade, and marriage—had extended the boundaries of kinship. Old enemies became bound via the strange familial ties of captivity, adoption, and redemption. A system of mutual raiding, abduction, and adoption prevailed among Apache, Navajo, Ute, Hualapai, O'odham, Maricopa, Pueblo, and Spanish and Mexican settlers. If enemy peoples became bonded in kinship, however, they remained separated by male honor.


Men gained honor via raiding and war. Headmen, indeed, often received names that signified honor. The Cibecue chieftain whom whites called Diablo had an Apache name that roughly translates as "Angry, Right Side Up." Pedro's Apache name meant "Angry, He Shakes Something." Among Dilzhe'es, meanwhile, were chiefs named "Angry, He Scatters About," "Angry, He Waves Something Long Back and Forth," and "Angry, He Sits Restlessly in One Place, then Another."<sup>37</sup>

The term "angry" did not mean "angry" in the simplest sense. It meant "courageous" or "ready for battle." Courageous men held honorable names, including names that were owned by families and parceled out to infants in the hope that they would live up to them. To do so required courage in raiding and war. It likewise required a man to take vengeance on those who injured his kin, his band, or his clan. Sometimes, a murderer or a thief could make amends with the family of the victim by offering payment. If payment proved impossible, the perpetrator or his kin—or even his fellow clan members—could expect blood vengeance.<sup>38</sup>

It is important to reiterate that honor was not the sole source of male status. Men gained status via generosity, restraint, and wisdom. They were diplomats as well as warriors. They settled disputes via arbitration and conciliation more often than they rose to fight. Headmen, as opposed to war chiefs, were particularly noted for their ability to resolve disputes. They were also noted for sharing food and possessions.<sup>39</sup> In the world that Indians now inhabited—a world dominated by settlers—Indian men continued to value generosity, restraint, and nonviolence. Amid the stress of conquest, however—amid death, displacement, racism, helplessness—anger, and honor, sometimes prevailed.

Women, meanwhile, held status not via raiding, war, or vengeance, but by presiding over gowas and farms and by “keeping” sacred curing rites and clan origin stories. They held status, moreover, via matri-focal and matrilineal social customs. Once married, Apache men went to live with the families of their wives, thus becoming providers for in-laws rather than for siblings and parents. A man’s children, moreover, traced descent through their mother’s line. Divorce, meanwhile, was quick, simple, and consensual. If such arrangements gave women power, however, they remained subordinate and marginal in other ways. Apache men, indeed, had the right to kill adulterous wives or, at the least, to cut off the tips of their noses.<sup>40</sup> In doing so, a man recovered his honor. Apaches and Yavapais, then, accorded both more power and less power to women than did whites.

Women’s status remained precarious—indeed became more so—in the reservation era. “Wives,” explained the Fort Apache school superintendent in 1902, “are usually bought as an ordinary animal.” His observation bespoke both bias and truth. Few men bought brides. When Grenville Goodwin studied the Western Apache in the 1930s, he noted that women had a great deal of freedom in choosing husbands. Girls, indeed, often initiated courtship. In still other situations, male suitors played flutes for their favorites, hoping to gain their affection (fig. 5.2). In all cases, however, Apache tradition demanded that prospective husbands offer gifts to the parents of their intended. Gifting was not the same as buying, but the line between the two could be a fine one. In oral history interviews conducted in the 1970s, at least two Dilzhe’e women recalled being forced to marry men they did not love.<sup>41</sup>



**Figure 5.2.** Apache men used flutes like this one to woo their favorites. Photo by Aleš Hrdlička, c. 1900. National Anthropological Archives, Smithsonian Institution, NAA INV 02034100.

What agents saw in Apache gender relations was exploitation and injustice, which in turn justified white authority. If Apache men abused their wives, then surely the government was right to intervene. What agents failed to understand was that, often, the same women who were “bought” came to hold high status.

Arizona settlers passed the same sort of judgment. Repeatedly, newspapers belittled Apache men for “enslaving” their wives. “When Indians returned from gathering foodstuffs in the mountains,” chided the *Silver Belt*, “they packed both ponies and women with sacks and baskets bulging with acorns and grass seeds.” The men who walked beside them, meanwhile, went “unincumbered [sic] by anything weightier than a ‘Gee-string’ save sometimes a gun, or a bow and arrows and the omnipresent butcher knife.” When Indians cut hay to sell at San Carlos, similarly, it was women who did the labor (fig. 5.3). When Indians brought hay into Globe, again it was the women who carried the loads on their backs, with a strap tied to their heads for leverage. They walked for miles and miles thus encumbered. “For cheap labor,” remarked the *Silver Belt*, Indian women “discount the ‘Heathen Chinees.’”<sup>42</sup>

In Globe, women also engaged in domestic service and did odd jobs. “The women” among the “Tontos” who camped near Globe, reported the *Silver Belt* in 1895, “are, as a rule, industrious and inoffensive, doing menial work about town,” whereas the “bucks . . . thrive without work, living off the industry of the squaws.” The



**Figure 5.3.** According to whites, Apache women performed slave labor for Apache men. Here, Apache women deliver hay to the quartermaster at San Carlos, 1887. Photo by D. A. Markey. Sharlot Hall Museum Library and Archives, Prescott, Arizona.

few Indian men who made a living by selling wood, meanwhile, were “blowing the proceeds for whiskey.”<sup>43</sup>

When editors, settlers, and agents witnessed Indian males lash out at women—or even at men—their judgment became all the more fierce. Neither editors, nor settlers, nor Indian agents sought to follow the problem to its source: old patterns of male honor destabilized by the traumas of conquest, settlement, and flux.


Apache women, too, experienced challenges. Newly imposed patterns of patrilineal descent undermined their power. The BIA recognized males as owners of farms and homes. BIA officials, moreover, insisted that Apaches trace descent through the line of the father. Though both matrilineal descent and matrifocal residential patterns persisted, they weakened. Men—especially those who left the reservation to find work—became less apt to live with in-laws or to serve them by hunting and gathering. With the disbursement of the *gota*—the extended family—moreover, women often lost the protection afforded by brothers, fathers, and fellow clan members. If a husband or another man abused them, they had few protectors.


Among Apaches, then, all was up in the air. In their new situation, neither men nor women experienced distinct gain, though both experienced loss. Gender relations oscillated. The old world had crumbled but a new one had not yet formed.

The net effect of Indian-on-Indian crime was not simply to force Indians back onto the reservation. The net effect was to encourage them to leave. Tensions did not dissolve off the reservation—assaults occurred there, too—but tensions on the reservation were greater still. By 1890, some five thousand Indians had been herded together at San Carlos. Rifts between clans and between bands deepened. Traditional gender relations came under attack. Agents denied—or tried to deny—Indians the right to drink, dance, sing, or conduct old rites. Whites, meanwhile, demanded Indian labor. The solution was not for Indians to return to San Carlos; the solution was for Indians to leave the reservation and take control of their lives.

PART II

*Beginnings*





**Map 4.** Central Arizona in the early twentieth century.





## *Exodus*

THE YEAR 1887 WAS A WATERSHED in Arizona history and perhaps in the history of the West. It was the year that a cabal of ranchers and their Mormon allies prosecuted a vigilante campaign against those they accused of rustling and horse theft. It was also the year that war broke out in Yavapai County between the Grahams and the Tewksburys, with dozens of partisans taking each side. In late 1887 and 1888, those two theaters of conflict merged and blended, yielding what one Arizona historian called “a bloody peak record that hardly could be approached.”<sup>1</sup> In making that judgment, he ignored the far bloodier Tonto Basin War of the 1860s and 1870s, in which the United States had subdued the Dilzhe’*e* and Yavapai.

In an adjacent part of Arizona—where the San Carlos River met the Gila River in the midst of the newly created San Carlos Indian Reservation—the year 1887 was a watershed of a different sort. It was in that year that an Indian visionary told Dilzhe’*es* and Yavapais to venture home. For more than a decade, Dilzhe’*es* and Yavapais had been yoked at San Carlos to Pinal Apaches, Aravaipa Apaches, White Mountain Apaches, Cibecue Apaches, Chiricahua Apaches, and Warm Springs Apaches. Eight peoples—nine, if one divides Yavapais into Kwevkepayas and Wipukepas—had been herded together in a desolate valley where they were expected to become Christians, farmers, and speakers of English. Dilzhe’*es* and Yavapais, however, were ill at ease.

At San Carlos, Dilzhe’*es* and Yavapais had no history, no friends, no bearings. Their sacred mountains and springs had receded behind each hill as they had marched to their new home, where the government promised to make them into citizens. When they got to San

Carlos, the agent made them give up their weapons, then assigned them farming lands along the Gila River. Immediately the two new peoples on the reservation met hostility from those already there. To Aravaipas and Pinals, the reservation was a familiar land, a place they had known before conquest. To Cibecue and White Mountain Apaches, it was not so familiar but it was close to their homeland, to which they were still permitted to venture. To Dilzhe'es and Yavapais, it was foreign land. They were outsiders, interlopers, aliens, and their fellow Indians refused to let them forget it.<sup>2</sup>

From as early as 1881, Dilzhe'es asked to go home. General George Crook, they insisted—the man who had conquered them—had told them that if they behaved well at San Carlos, they would be allowed to return. They need only learn to read and write and set a good example for others at San Carlos. Having done that, promised Crook, they could go back. As Mike Burns recalled the story, Crook had acknowledged that the Verde Valley is “yours . . . because you were the first man: [you] were on it: the waters: the timbers: grasses: all the fine pine trees: are yours.”<sup>3</sup>

By 1887, it seemed, a few years would stretch into eons. There would be no homecoming. As days rolled into decades, Yavapais added their voices to those of Dilzhe'es, begging to go home. Year after year, they beseeched agents to let them return and year after year they met refusal. At last, however, they would have their exodus.

The reason that agents refused to allow Yavapais and Dilzhe'es to go home lay not in their failure to fit themselves for “civilization.” Yavapais had proven to be “industrious and peaceably disposed,” wrote an agent in 1888, not to mention “less addicted to gambling, drunkenness, and fighting” than others on the reservation. Too, they were readily adopting the “apparel and customs” of whites. Dilzhe'es were equally tractable, it seemed. Agent P. P. Wilcox observed in 1883 that they “are so broken in spirit as to be easily held in subjection” and readily offered “efficient service against hostile tribes.” In 1892, another agent singled out Dilzhe'es for their devotion to farming, adding that they displayed “in some instances even considerable zeal.” Both peoples, indeed, were energetic farmers, obediently digging ditches that shunted Gila River water onto fields of barley, wheat, corn, and vegetables.<sup>4</sup>



**Figure 6.1.** Apache farms at San Carlos, c. 1880. Photo by Erwin Baer. Sharlot Hall Museum Library and Archives, Prescott, Arizona.

The Yavapais' and Dilzhe'es' willingness to farm, however, did not mean they were "broken in spirit"—perhaps it meant the opposite. Part of the reason for their readiness to farm was their eagerness to return to their homeland. The more they pleased government officials, the more likely they were to be granted their wish. At least that is what they believed. They also proved to be able cultivators because they had farmed long before conquest (fig. 6.1).

For hundreds of years, Dilzhe'es and Yavapais had cultivated small patches alongside desert creeks, growing corn, squash, beans, and melons. It was farming that encouraged partial sedentism, which in turn encouraged the creation of matrilineal clans. Village life in American Indian societies often fell under the purview of women, who—with assistance from family and clan—owned and maintained farms and homes while men were away hunting, trading, and soldiering. Just as clan affiliation descended from mother to child among Western Apaches, so too did farming plots descend from mother to child.<sup>5</sup>

Though Apaches of several clans shared farming villages in winter, usually a "nuclear" or "dominant" clan presided. From the nuclear clan came a head chief whose right of succession was largely hereditary. One of his jobs was to oversee the division of farming plots

among his people. Adding to the authority of the nuclear clan was a half mythical, half historical story of the clan's ancient origin, which was often—though not always—tied to the site of its farms.<sup>6</sup>

Farming sites were situated in desert or transition-zone lowlands near perennial waters where family groups coalesced in winter. There they lived in thatched huts that Apaches called *gomas* and Yavapais called *umas*. After the last of the killing frosts in spring, they planted crops, sometimes devoting 200 square yards to a single farm. Once seedlings appeared, they moved into the hills to dig out the roots of agave plants—mescal—which they roasted in pits. Mescal could be eaten immediately after roasting—it looked and tasted like sorghum—or beaten and rolled into sheets of dough which could be dried and stored underground. Then families spread out to roam the hills and mountains, gathering paloverde and mesquite beans and cactus fruit in the early summer and acorns in the early fall. The acorns, with various kinds of berries, were pulverized and baked into bread or dried for later use, when they could be hydrated into a sort of paste. Corn was processed in a similar way; in its baked form it was called *pinole*.<sup>7</sup>

Storing much of what they gathered, the family groups coalesced in fall to harvest crops, which comprised as much as a quarter of yearly caloric intake. Hunting was also significant. Small parties pursued deer, antelope, elk, and small game, though seldom the stigmatized javelina and porcupine. The Yavapai had their own distinctive hunting technologies. Often they went out in large groups that formed a circle around areas rich in game. Those in the circle gradually moved closer together, driving animals into a human net and dispatching them with clubs and throwing sticks. Yavapais added to their diet lizards, locusts, grasshoppers, caterpillars, and tortoises, all of them critical sources of protein in desert lands. Though the Apache—with their greater access to game-rich mountains—eschewed insects and did not practice the “circle drive,” they did develop a fondness for packrats, which they smoked out of their burrows. Fish, on the other hand—though abundant in mountain streams and desert rivers—were thought by both Apache and Yavapai to be poisonous. Apaches also refused to hunt “Mr. Bear”—an honorific extended to both grizzlies and black bears—because of its supernatural power.<sup>8</sup>

At San Carlos, Yavapais and Dilzhe'es proved to be ready farmers, though they did not give up hunting and gathering, as we shall



**Figure 6.2.** Though Apache men traditionally dug irrigation ditches, farming was largely women’s work. Pictured here are San Carlos men digging a ditch in 1888. Photo by Frank A. Randall. National Anthropological Archives, Smithsonian Institution, NAA INV 02049200.

see. Their farming tradition, however, differed radically from that of their conquerors. Perhaps most important, Yavapais and Dilzhe’es tended to view farming as women’s work. Men, to be sure, dug irrigation ditches (fig. 6.2), but women carried away the dirt in baskets. Women subsequently seeded, weeded, harvested, and cooked. In the reservation era, men took up some of those tasks. Under the goading of agents, they plowed fields with teams and then sowed seeds. At Fort Apache, however, a man’s involvement in plowing was sometimes limited to riding the plow horse while his wife guided the plow. Though both men and women helped with irrigation, women continued to perform the weeding and harvesting. Women, too, carried grains and vegetables to their gowas or, in the reservation era, to market in Globe.<sup>9</sup>

After years of studying the Western Apache, Grenville Goodwin insisted that many considered agriculture “almost . . . a luxury,” adding that “they could easily get along without it.” He exaggerated—agriculture was critical in warding off starving times that sometimes came in winter—but he conveyed an important truth. Because of its

relative lack of importance, agriculture was low-status work. “Rich men”—chiefs and family-group headmen—engaged in no farm labor at all before conquest. It was beneath their dignity. When they needed field laborers to help women, they recruited younger brothers, sons-in-law, maternal nephews, or clan relatives, paying them for the work. When they could not get kin, they hired “poorer people and those without farms.”<sup>10</sup>

Agents at San Carlos had only limited understanding of Yavapai and Dilzhe’e customs. Like the vast majority of Americans—both those who meant well for Indians and those who did not—they had no interest in the niceties of Indian culture. They made little effort to comprehend Indian practices and beliefs before instituting their program of “civilization.” Agents viewed agriculture, like Christianity, as a one-size-fits-all panacea. Farms, they believed, served as schools of individualism; thus agents parceled out land to particular families rather than to clans or family groups. Agents failed to comprehend that, though individual families had possessed usufruct rights to farms in pre-conquest times, farms were borrowed and shared among clansmen. Families without farms worked alongside—or sometimes for—those who had farms. Farming was a communal—and usually female—form of labor.<sup>11</sup>

To agents, Indian men who disliked or disdained to farm were obstinate, proud, and indolent. Neither Dilzhe’es nor Yavapais, however, refused to farm altogether. In the desperation of the 1870s and 1880s, they farmed energetically, with women continuing to provide much of the labor. In the short term, agents were little troubled by the Apache division of labor, probably because they realized that women greatly outnumbered men.<sup>12</sup> Among some Dilzhe’e and Yavapai bands, men had been very nearly exterminated. The resistance of men to the farming life would only become an issue in later years. At times, however, the Apache division of labor, as well as the Apache understanding of status, led to problems.


The most notable of those problems was the killing in 1887 of the San Carlos Agency farmer, Lieutenant Seward Mott, by a young Dilzhe’e named Nah-diz-az. Nah-diz-az, recently returned from Carlisle Indian School in Pennsylvania, became angry when Mott sent his father to the guardhouse for refusing to farm. As Nah-diz-az later explained, his father could not work—at least not efficiently—his

hand having been crippled in a struggle with a bear. In sending him to the guardhouse, Mott overreacted, likely because he had grown frustrated with Apache men's reluctance to farm. Perhaps, too, experienced officers had told Mott—who was fresh from the US Military Academy at West Point—that he would have to force Apache men to work the fields. Seeing his father humiliated, Nah-diz-az trailed Mott to a nearby farm and shot him. The first shot caused Mott to fall from his horse and begin running. Nah-diz-az pursued, firing four more shots. The wounds were mortal.<sup>13</sup>

Nah-diz-az's act was not unique. A Sioux man fresh from boarding school had killed a soldier in 1891 during the ghost dance crisis in part so he could claim a place for himself among his people. Indian children returning from boarding school came back to family and kin who looked upon them as strangers. At a loss for acceptance, youths often rebelled against agents and soldiers, if only by attempting to dress and behave like their elders. Whites called it "going back to the blanket." Nah-diz-az had been forced to leave his people at a tender age; forced to endure the discipline and the high mortality at Carlisle, where Apaches died in droves from tuberculosis and other diseases; then forced to find a place for himself on his return. Surely he was bitter. Witnessing his father's humiliation, he lashed out.

Nah-diz-az's actions, however, were not solely the product of his boarding school experiences. In some ways, he acted in accord with Apache concepts of honor. Important men did not deign to farm. Important men, moreover, did not accept taunts and insults from aliens, whether Indian or white. Insult led—in extreme cases—to individual combat. Nah-diz-az acted in concert with old ideals.

Whatever his motivation, Nah-diz-az soon found himself in the custody of Indian police, who delivered him up for trial. Initially a US District Court sentenced him to life in prison, but the decision was vacated when the Supreme Court determined that a territorial court should have jurisdiction. Tried a second time—this time in a Gila County court that was less apt to be impartial—Nah-diz-az was sentenced to death. The *Arizona Silver Belt*, far from displaying curiosity about the sociological roots of Nah-diz-az's rage, spoke of the "fiendish vengefulness of an Indian brute, the forfeit of whose worthless existence would be but a mockery of retribution for the valued life which he so relentlessly took."<sup>14</sup>



**Figure 6.3.** Troops stood guard as Nah-diz-az went to the gallows in 1889. Arizona State Library, Archives and Public Records, History and Archives Division, 97-6029.

In response to fears among Globe residents that Nah-diz-az's relatives would seek to avenge his death, the army sent a "suitable force of troops" to oversee the execution on December 27, 1889 (fig. 6.3). In keeping with the inroads of conscience, the hanging was to be as humane and painless as possible. County authorities were testing a new gallows designed to snap the condemned man's neck by jerking him upward as he reached rope's end, thus avoiding slow strangulation. As the executioner adjusted the black cap over Nah-diz-az's head, Sheriff Jerry Ryan shook his hand and told him goodbye. Nah-diz-az replied "Goodbye hell." Then the trap door sprang open, Nah-diz-az fell, and the rope jerked him upward eight feet, crushing his head against the crossbar. The scene was sickening.<sup>15</sup>

If the government's attempt to force Dilzhe'e men to farm caused bitterness, however, a bigger obstacle was the Gila River. In dry years the Gila ran at a trickle, allowing little water to enter ditches. In wet years, torrents spilled over banks, washing away check dams and spilling wildly across cultivated fields, carrying topsoil and seedlings into the abyss. The first flood came in 1881, destroying every dam

on the reservation and every vestige of crops planted by Dilzhe'es and Yavapais. One observer said it was the biggest flood in seventeen years. In 1884 came another disastrous flood. In 1886, it was heat and drought that killed crops. In 1891, the floods returned, destroying every dam, ditch, and farm on the reservation, along with the agency's gristmill. More floods came in 1892, 1893, 1896, and 1897, separated by drought years.<sup>16</sup>

With their centuries of experience in the Southwest—not to mention the know-how they had learned from peoples more ancient—Yavapais and Apaches already knew how to farm productively. They knew that small gardens near springs and creeks were far less vulnerable to cycles of boom and bust than large-scale farming on rivers. The government, however, stuck to its conviction that Indians must be farmers—not “gardeners,” as they had been before conquest, but farmers. For Yavapais and Dilzhe'es, the result was prolonged demoralization and a more urgent desire to return home.

The wish to return home would not reach fruition for many years. A pattern of leaving the reservation, however, began almost immediately. Almost from its outset, San Carlos was as much base camp as cage. Because the agency was perpetually short on rations, agents permitted Indians to leave in order to gather mesquite beans, acorns, and mescal, and to hunt. They also allowed Indians to work for whites, at least if whites made a written request for labor. As early as 1878, the San Carlos agent reported that requests for Apache labor came “by every mail.” Some of those requesting labor wanted single men; others wanted whole parties. Already in 1878, the agent reported that the number of rations distributed were four hundred less than the number of Indians at the reservation. The four hundred Indians who did not receive rations were off the reservation, working for whites. “They are almost without exception willing to work,” reported the agent, “and could constant employment be found for them they would be easily made self-supporting.”<sup>17</sup>

Working off the reservation soon became normal. Throughout the 1880s—with the exception of 1881–1882, when the Nock-el-klinny trouble occurred—Indians left in large numbers to gather food and to work for whites. They chopped and hauled wood; they made adobe bricks; they graded roads; they worked on construction

projects and on mines (though seldom inside them); they herded cows and goats; and they worked often as trackers for law enforcement officials who were hunting criminals or army deserters. Indian women, meanwhile, washed clothing and engaged in domestic work. A few became prostitutes. The only jobs that Indians rejected were those that demanded separation from kin for long periods of time.<sup>18</sup>

Indians did not necessarily have to leave the reservation to find work. The purpose of the agency, explained J. C. Tiffany, the San Carlos agent in 1881, "is to induce . . . Indians to labor in civilized pursuits. . . . No work must be given white men which can be done by Indians." Whites, to be sure, filled all the skilled jobs on the reservation, including blacksmith, mechanic, chief of police, fireman, harness maker, miller, baker, surgeon, farmer, matron, teacher, storekeeper, and school disciplinarian. White employees, however, hired Indian assistants.

Working for whites was not altogether new, at least not for Yavapais. Because their lands were among the first that whites took after the gold strikes, many of them had experience with wage work. They had gathered wood, graded roads, dug ditches, made adobe, and washed clothing. Both Yavapais and Dilzhe'es also had experience at trading with whites, a pursuit they resumed with eagerness. At Globe, Indians sold hay, barley, vegetables, turkeys, acorns, peaches, corn, melons, and wood. "They come with the product of their farms," reported the *Silver Belt* in July 1885, "and are welcomed by merchants and others who profit by their trade." They also came with the products of their hands, bringing bridles, quirts, buckskin clothing, moccasins, tobacco pouches, beadwork, and—most of all—baskets. With their profits, Indians bought cloth, clothing, coffee, tobacco, and tools. "No people in the world," insisted the San Carlos agent in 1883, "are more eager in pursuit of the nimble shilling" than Apaches and Yavapais.<sup>19</sup>

If it was economics that pulled Indians off the reservation, it was likewise economics that pushed them out. Traders on the reservation charged high prices. Sometimes they resorted to fraud. Sometimes Indian agents themselves engaged in fraud, using inaccurate scales to cheat Indians in beef sales. The *Silver Belt* equated the post traders' credit policies to usury. Indians could buy post goods on credit but only at high interest. The traders, however, were not always gaming

the system. What drove up prices was the cost of shipping to remote San Carlos. Unlike government-sponsored traders of the early nineteenth century, moreover, late nineteenth-century traders sought profit. They were not philanthropists; indeed they were monopolists who were licensed by the government. The lack of competition assured steady profit. When Indians got checks from the agency, they could cash them only with traders. Often the check simply went toward credit already extended.<sup>20</sup> Since few Apaches could read, they had little ability to check traders' books.

The system was not unlike the debt peonage that emerged in the South after the Civil War, when black sharecroppers, and often white sharecroppers, found themselves perpetually unable to pay merchants who extended credit at the beginning of the growing season. Whereas debt peonage kept sharecroppers tied to particular creditors year after year, rendering them unable to move away in search of better employment, debt seems to have had the contrary effect on Indians. They did not shirk debts; indeed they were scrupulous about paying.<sup>21</sup> To do that, they ventured outside the reservation.

Even as a few San Carlos Apaches continued to engage in clan feuds and social outlawry, far more of them sought to go home. On May 3, 1887, came their omen of change. An earthquake with a magnitude of perhaps 8.1 on the Richter scale shot outward from its epicenter at Bavispe, Sonora, causing boulders to plummet from the mountains near Tucson and artesian ponds to appear near Tombstone. In Phoenix, the quake shook church bells until they clanged loudly as if to sound the alarm. A Cibecue told Mormons that the earthquake was a sign that the earth was getting old, like a person. In just four years, he said, the earth would die.<sup>22</sup> Yavapai and Dilzhe'es took a different lesson from the quake.

For days at a time before the earthquake struck, a Yavapai shaman named Echawamahu ("Enemy's Head") had made daily journeys into the desert. In the evening he returned, carrying flowers and refusing food. Before the sun rose the following day, he would disappear again. "When anybody should happen to notice him," wrote Mike Burns, "he would be looking upward." Though he seemed to be speaking to the sky, no sound came from his mouth. After a month of his strange behavior, his people grew worried. They asked

a man named Shaie-haw to quietly speak to him. When Shaie-haw offered him food, Echawamahu refused it, explaining that the Great Spirit had given him plenty. He then told Shaie-haw to call a meeting the next morning at dawn where he would tell his “strange story.”<sup>23</sup>

Echawamahu instructed Shaie-haw to recruit Indians from four different camps. They must come, said Echawamahu, led by four youths, two boys and two girls, each arriving from one of the cardinal directions and each carrying a cross or a stick with a white cloth tied to its end. At the center of each cross, the youths were to place a small looking glass. Two more youths were to follow behind, beating drums. Behind the drummers would follow the people, “men and women, old and young.” When the people arrived, four young women were instructed “to march out . . . and receive them,” sprinkling each with sacred pollen. Echawamahu would situate himself at the center of his audience, his face painted yellow, eagle feathers dangling from his person. No one must touch him.<sup>24</sup>

Echawamahu told his Yavapai and Dilzhe’e audience that he had visited God, who promised to restore the people to their homeland provided that they followed his instructions. God would send a plague to destroy whites. He would make the foods of Indians bountiful again. One Yavapai man recalled a prophecy—though perhaps not from Echawamahu—that San Carlos would burn and its buildings would sink into the ground. The people, instructed Echawamahu, were to hold sacred dances and return to their homeland amid the cliffs and canyons of Arizona’s Rim Country. At midnight, the men took up their guns and fired into the air “for [a] sign of joy, sending up to heaven.” Echawamahu, meanwhile, dispatched runners to the far corners of the reservation to spread the word.<sup>25</sup>

Echawamahu continued to exhort after the 1887 earthquake, but he did not do so alone. Two shamans, reported the *Silver Belt* on July 2—one a Yaqui refugee from Mexico and the other a Yavapai, likely Echawamahu—told their followers that the earthquake signaled the imminent demise of whites and the renewal of Indian power. If soldiers attacked, prophesied Echawamahu, their bullets would melt in their guns. Both shamans offered messages of power and hope. Hundreds of Indians, added the *Silver Belt*, now congregated at Coyote Holes—site of Chalipun’s Dilzhe’e camp—at the reservation’s

western edge. There they danced and awaited the prophecies' fulfillment. By July 9, they had mysteriously departed.<sup>26</sup>

Echawamahu's message was not unique. In 1881, Apaches had heard the same sort of message from Nock-el-del-klenny. In 1889–1890, a kindred prophecy echoed across the West, sent by a Paiute named Wovoka. The Lakota Sioux received Wovoka's message with joy, adding to it their own pronouncement that sacred shirts worn by those who participated in Wovoka's ghost dance would be impervious to gunshots. The shirts, however, failed to stop the bullets and exploding shells that issued from the Seventh Cavalry at Wounded Knee.

When Echawamahu had his visions, the Wounded Knee Massacre was three years in the future. Authorities at San Carlos, however, already had experience with spiritual movements. Wishing to avoid another Cibecue Rebellion, the San Carlos agent let Echawamahu's people dance freely. He listened, too, to General Nelson Miles, who in 1886 had received Geronimo's surrender and who now scouted a site for a reservation on the Verde.<sup>27</sup> For several years San Carlos agents had granted Indians passes to leave the reservation to gather food and to labor for whites. Indians had proven to be eager workers and punctual in returning. Perhaps now, it seemed, they could be trusted with more freedom.

Miles recommended that Yavapais and Dilzhe'es be allowed to return to their homeland, where they would be under the watch of soldiers from Fort Whipple and Camp Verde. Arizona's governor, Conrad Meyer Zulick, quickly set himself against any such plan, as did white settlers. A "flurry of letters and petitions" to the secretary of the interior followed Miles's report. Indians, claimed settlers, "cannot be contented for [but] a short time no matter where they are. Their only ambition is to murder, steal, and plunder." It was a familiar refrain; it was precisely the language of genocide that had echoed across the territory in the 1860s and 1870s. It was also the language of honor. Indians were a shamed people, a people incapable of civilization. All the land in the Verde Valley, added settlers, had been claimed; there was no room for Indians, who were "thieving" and "murderous" and who would "corrupt the morals of our children and bring disease in our homes." The San Carlos agent disagreed. "The causes of [the Indians'] dissatisfaction are just,"

he reported to superiors, “and an effort should be made” to locate them in a better place.<sup>28</sup>

Settler resistance slowed the homecoming but the Yavapai and Dilzhe’e were not to be put off. “They have never been satisfied here,” wrote the San Carlos agent, Captain John L. Bullis, in 1889, “and I doubt if they ever will be.” Despite being industrious and eager to make the best of their situation, he explained, “they have always been anxious to return to the Verde country, from which they were removed.”<sup>29</sup>

When a new agent, Captain Lewis Johnson, took over in 1891, he immediately noticed a “spirit of dissatisfaction, bordering upon defiance,” that required “immediate attention.” After floods destroyed their dams and ditches, Johnson told Yavapais to move upriver and try again. Quietly, however, he granted passes to Yavapais and Dilzhe’es that allowed them to leave the reservation for an entire year. Now—with the authorization of the agent, the approval of General Miles, and the exhortation of shamans—began an exodus that continued for two decades. Though it is impossible to determine a precise figure, those who left numbered in the thousands. Some shuttled back and forth; some came back permanently; many stayed away.<sup>30</sup>

Among the Dilzhe’e holy men who led the way home was Henry Irving, whose Indian name was “Day-el-la,” or “that which does not grow tall.” In the early 1880s, he had enlisted eight times as an army scout, during which he suffered two major wounds, once when he was thrown from his horse, causing him to lose vision in one eye, and again when he was shot in the knee. Being a scout did not mean absolute loyalty to the United States. According to Irving’s grandson, he and his fellow scouts once robbed a wagon train carrying pay for buffalo soldiers, though they were forced to bury the money rather than spend it and risk detection. On another occasion, they located some of Geronimo’s men but purposely let them escape. To Chiricahuas, however, Dilzhe’es remained suspect. At San Carlos, Geronimo’s people did their best to make life difficult for Dilzhe’es, at least until the Chiricahuas were removed to Alabama in 1886.<sup>31</sup>

Irving’s descendants describe him as a healer and prophet who predicted both the invention of airplanes and the influenza outbreak of 1918, among other events. He was also a man who had the

gravity to draw his fellows back to the Rim Country. Born somewhere between 1844 and 1858 on Spring Creek in the Sierra Ancha—Dilzhe'es called it *tsa-to*—he grew up without a mother. She died two days after his birth, leaving his father and his mother's siblings to raise him.<sup>32</sup> Assuming the later birth date, he came of age in a time of crisis. Likely he became a soldier in the wars against invading whites. The fighting continued from the mid-1860s to 1873, when most Dilzhe'es—decimated and starving—surrendered to General Crook. For Henry Irving, surrender did not mean the end of war. He soon became one of Crook's scouts, the eyes and ears of troops who crisscrossed the territory in search of “renegades.” To whites, Irving had switched sides. Like other scouts, however, he continued to fight for his family and his clan and for a reservation in his homeland.

After Crook's campaign came to its end, Henry Irving would have accompanied his people to Rio Verde. After that reservation was abolished, he trudged to San Carlos. During his people's confinement there, he received the tag-band designation of S.E. 8. The tag-band designation identified him with a specific band, the S.E. band (apparently meaning San Carlos E band), and gave him an individual number. That information was in turn stamped on a metal tag. Indians were required to keep the tags on their persons so that they could be identified during musters. For purposes of dealing with whites, the tag-band designations often served in lieu of names.

Though Irving's S.E. tag band was mostly composed of Pinals, Grenville Goodwin identified him as a member of the “sixth semi-band” of “Southern Tonto,” a Dilzhe'e group.<sup>33</sup> How and why the government placed him in the S.E. band is a mystery. What is clear, however, is that government officials felt free to tinker with Apache social structure. The government also required that chieftainships—and indeed tag numbers themselves—be handed down from father to son rather than mother to son, thus helping put an end to matrilineal descent.

Even if Irving was not placed in his pre-conquest band, he seems to have held high status, albeit not that of a chief. In an effort to buttress its authority, the government chose chiefs who might or might not have been traditional leaders. Some were; others were not. Generally speaking, the higher one's traditional status, the lower

one's tag number. Band leaders—whether chosen by Indians, the government, or both—received the tag-band designation of 1. Given his tag-band designation of S.E. 8, we can surmise that Irving was a lesser leader.

Irving may have been a family group headman or subchief. Like most other Apache men of high status, he probably achieved his position via courage in war as well as by learning rituals that permitted communication with powerful forces. "All individuals," explained Grenville Goodwin and Charles Kaut, "had at their call a certain amount of 'power' or medicine" that enabled them to control fate "according to how much medicine they controlled personally, or could obtain from a relative or friend." Ritual knowledge could give one powers to find lost horses, to draw rain, to bring down deer, or to win at gambling. Each of those pursuits entailed a different ritual, each of which in turn offered access to the powers of a different "god" or "non-human being." Ritual—prayer, to give it a Western name—accomplished nothing in itself; it merely linked humans with the supernatural beings that controlled events. To attain ritual knowledge—to gain favors from nonhuman beings—one might seek the tutelage of a shaman over a period of months or years. Lesser powers might be learned from less powerful men. In return, one was expected to offer gifts—horses, meat, or perhaps silver coins—to the tutor.<sup>34</sup>

Men—and women, too, to a degree—were ranked according to how much spiritual power they controlled. Ritual knowledge, however, did not constitute the whole of leadership. Among Yavapais and Dilzhe'es, each family group—usually consisting of two to eight extended families—chose a male leader, called "rich man" or "strong man," or perhaps "our smart one." To be selected, he was expected to display "success in hunting and warfare, wiseness in speech, an even-temper, generosity" and "a strong backing of relatives or affinal relatives."<sup>35</sup> Here, then, was a definition of masculinity that complemented, or perhaps competed with, the ideals of honor. Bands and family groups did not choose chiefs solely for bravery or ferocity in combat; they chose diplomats. Irving fit that prescription.

Among the headman's duties was to rise early and lecture his people on right behavior. He reminded his people to respect their elders and to care for their relatives; to venture forth with attention to safety and caution; and to offer respect, prayer, and thanks to

supernatural beings. He might also arbitrate internecine disputes, as well as offer advice on when and where to hunt, gather, and move camp. Unlike a true medicine man, he did not specialize in curing rituals; he held “higher and more general kinds of medicine” that benefited the whole community. His wife, too, held status as a “rich woman” or “strong woman,” who was her husband’s equal in generosity and wisdom. She was additionally to serve as something of a quartermaster by leading gathering efforts and by making sure that each family had sufficient resources and tools. In social and ceremonial events, particularly the critical puberty ceremony for girls, she took the lead.<sup>36</sup>

Above the family-group headman stood the band chief, who, among Apaches (though not Yavapais), often held his position by right of inheritance through his mother’s line. His authority, however, required the consent of his people, who might choose their chief from among more than a single possible heir. Once chosen, he could expect to spend as many as six months under the tutelage of an older man—often a former chief—after which his ascension would be celebrated via feasting and holy songs.<sup>37</sup>

An Apache band chief had to display “a good mind, moral integrity and a manly character,” in the words of Goodwin. In consultation with family-group headmen, he made decisions on when to plant, when to irrigate, when to embark on trading expeditions, when to engage in diplomacy, and when and where to move camp. Families that refused his instructions might find themselves shunned or even banished. According to Goodwin, the chief could order an individual wrongdoer to be tied to a tree until he repented, or until the chief ordered his release. Though his authority was by no means paramount—family-group leaders and even individuals had the right to make their own decisions—there was no more powerful figure in Western Apache society than a band chief.<sup>38</sup>

Typically the band chief was most significant in winter, when his people gathered in desert valleys. After spring planting, families parted company as they headed to the mountains to hunt and to gather, at which time authority devolved to the family leader. In times of conflict, meanwhile, band chiefs acted in consultation with war chiefs, who were not true chiefs but powerful shamans. “Everyone,” recalled Charlie Nockeye, a Dilzhe’*e* who had lived in the Rim

Country before conquest, “knew who the chiefs were, even if they lived far off from your own chiefs.”<sup>39</sup>

Though Henry Irving does not seem to have been a band chief, he held high status. By the 1890s, however—when he returned to the Rim Country—traditional authority among Apaches and Yavapais was eroding. Among Yavapais, family-group leaders gave morning lectures into the 1930s. They did not, however, retain all aspects of their authority.<sup>40</sup> With the decline in activities that required decision making—hunting, gathering, war, raiding, diplomacy—and with agents parceling out rations, tools, and stock, the authority of chiefs and headmen steadily slipped.

We don’t know what level of authority Irving held in part because Apaches historically have been loath to speak of the dead. To mention the name of the dead was a grievous sin among Dilzhe’es, who considered it an invitation to the ghost to do mischief. Irving and other Dilzhe’e returnees exist as shadow figures, appearing here and there in the reminiscences of Indians and white settlers, in pension records, in criminal records, and occasionally in newspaper accounts. Often, the individuals mentioned in those records are hard to identify. Irving’s name, for example, sometimes appeared as Henry Campbell, the last name apparently taken from an officer under whom he served in the Geronimo campaign. Elsewhere his name appeared as Henry Evans, a variation of Irving. “Evans and Irving sound alike to me,” he told a Bureau of Pensions inspector in 1926, “and I really do not know by which name I have generally been called by the white people.”<sup>41</sup>

Whether he was a band chief or a family-group headman, Dilzhe’es remember Irving as a powerful man. He was not so powerful, however, that he met only success. When he first returned to the Rim Country with his wife, Natahway (called “Lizzie” by whites), and their children, he attempted to settle on Spring Creek, probably in the place where he had been born and where his mother had possessed a farm. Settlers there drove him away. Returnees who made their way back to Winslow, above the Rim, met the same fate. Other Dilzhe’es returned to the East Verde River, just under the Rim. Vilified by settlers, they too were forced to leave after the agent at San Carlos sent men to bring them back. The next year, the same group returned to the East Verde and the same agent sent men to fetch them back.<sup>42</sup>

The Rim Country remained a contested region long after the rebellions of 1881 and 1882. Interaction, however, was not always bitter. It became customary, for example, for settlers to permit Indians—like fellow settlers—to use their cabins when they were away. Either Cibecues or Dilzhe'es made regular use of one of the Tewksbury cabins on Cherry Creek, perhaps heartened by the fact that the Tewksburys were Athabascan on their mother's side. Occasionally, however, the practice of taking shelter in settlers' cabins led to violence.

In March 1887, Apaches who were said to be members of Chalipun's Dilzhe'e band took over the empty abode of a French immigrant named Charles Boquet. Boquet had homesteaded on a lush spring at the foot of the Sierra Ancha, where he planted orchards and grapes. Apaches, undoubtedly, had farmed there before conquest. When Boquet returned to his cabin, reported the *Silver Belt*, the Indians fired on him. The same party then attacked ranchers Charles Monck and Charles Parker, though none of the men were hurt. Settlers forted up at points of safety but the danger passed without further event. At other times, interactions were merely tense, as when Cibecues under Lu-pe sought in 1889 to "take possession" of ranches on Coon Creek, a place where they had traditionally planted crops. When Lu-pe's people insisted that their farms lay within the reservation, troops came from San Carlos to tell them otherwise.<sup>43</sup>

The altercations in Pleasant Valley and the Sierra Ancha stirred the newspapers to invective. The Florence *Enterprise* limited the people's options to two: Exterminate the Apache, or remove them. The *Silver Belt* demanded that Indians be forbidden to hunt deer in the Sierra Ancha, which "are the only hunting grounds we have." Elsewhere the *Silver Belt* piped up for bigger appropriations for rations, theorizing that desperation led Indians to leave the reservation. Tom Graham—who would soon appear at the center of a bitter feud among settlers—meanwhile feared that an outbreak was imminent. Noting the mysterious absence of Apaches from Pleasant Valley in summer 1886, Graham insisted that things were "too quiet." The government, he demanded, must keep Apaches permanently away.<sup>44</sup>

Henry Irving, survivor and scout, was not long deterred. He may have returned to the reservation after his forced removal from Spring Creek but he did not stay there. For several years he seems to have

found jobs off the reservation, supplementing his wages with what he could take in hunting and what his wife and children, and probably their relatives, could gather from the countryside. In that regard he was part of a larger pattern. Thousands of Indians—not just Dilzhe'es and Yavapais, but others, too—left the reservation to hunt, gather, and work, especially in the booming mining district of Globe.

Irving, perhaps because of old ties to Yavapais, lived for a time in Bloody Basin at the edge of the Bradshaws, southwest of the Rim Country. By 1912, he and his family were again ensconced at Spring Creek, now apparently with the tacit okay of settlers. Then, in 1915, he managed to buy a plot of land near the hamlet of Payson, a few miles below the Rim, where he built a cabin and grew peach trees. He “was the first Indian to stay in town,” recalled Teresa Boardman, a Payson settler.<sup>45</sup>

Irving and his people were not merely pushed away from San Carlos by other Apaches nor were they merely pulled by the impetus of wages. They came back because they were “homesick.” What homesickness meant was attachment to sacred geography. For Apaches, the land was—and, for many, remains—a cultural map. In his study of the Cibecue, a people closely related to the Dilzhe'e, anthropologist Keith Basso found that place names were invariably attached to historical stories. To know a place and its name was to know one's culture and one's history. Each place—and the story attached to it—provided a moral. An adult might draw out a place name and “shoot” it at a youth during conversation to offer a lesson without resorting to confrontation.<sup>46</sup> To tell the story of a place—indeed merely to mention it—was to affirm right behavior.

Beyond serving as a cultural map—a manual of behavior, one might say—the land held all that was sacred. In the heart of the Verde Valley lay the emergence place, Montezuma's Well, sacred to Yavapai and Dilzhe'e. Northwest of the well lay the Red Rock Country near Sedona, where Lofty Wanderer had slain Eagle. High in the mountains that symbolized the four corners of the Yavapai and Dilzhe'e sacred world, moreover—the San Francisco Peaks, Squaw Peak, Mingus Mountain, and Four Peaks—lived *gaan*, or mountain spirits, who had taught humans to plant and to hunt.

Much as Puebloan peoples imitated *katsinas* in sacred dances, so Apaches portrayed *gaan* by donning intricate headdresses and masks

in healing rituals. Yavapais, too, heeded gaan, though they thought of them differently. To Yavapais, they were *kakaka*, or “little people,” who had eyes and mouths but lacked noses. Only three feet tall, the *kakaka* were said to inhabit sacred mountains and Puebloan ruins. At times they made keening sounds in the mountains or appeared as whirlwinds. They took great interest in human affairs and sometimes offered help to mortals. *Kakaka*, moreover, made their presence known by carving glyphs on sacred rocks.<sup>47</sup>

To Yavapais and Dilzhe'es, the Verde Valley and Tonto Basin, along with the mountains surrounding them, were charmed and wondrous. They lived in a world infused with history and magic. The land was a bible. To gain medicinal powers, one might sleep in sacred caves. To heal from wounds or disease, one might bathe in the hot waters that sprang from the ground near the Verde. To commemorate the land's sacredness, Yavapais and Dilzhe'es employed geometric forms—crosses, diamonds, and squares representing the four directions and the middle of the world—in rituals and ceremonies. Often they tattooed those forms onto their faces, arms, and hands, making their bodies into living glyphs, maps of the sacred.<sup>48</sup>

By the 1890s, the Yavapai and Dilzhe'e found themselves at last able to return to their spiritual cradle. “It was like the Israelites being drawn home,” testifies Vince Randall, a Dilzhe'e born in 1940 who became a junior high teacher. “God gave them this land, and sanctified this land. Just like those guys who wandered for forty years and came into Israel. This was home.”<sup>49</sup>

Family by family, Dilzhe'es and Yavapais filtered back. Jim Allen, the oldest living member of Payson's Dilzhe'e community in 1972, recalled that in 1896 he had walked with his mother and relatives from San Carlos to the East Verde, where they met his father and other Dilzhe'es. By that time, he recalled, there was already a Dilzhe'e camp at Birch Mesa, just west of Payson. Other early returnees included George Shaw, who began farming on West Clear Creek in 1892, probably at the same site where his people had farmed before conquest. There was also Dili Calbalechia—known to whites as Delia Chapman—who was apparently a Dilzhe'e headwoman. She and her family moved back to the East Verde, where they filed a homestead claim in the early 1900s. Still others set up camp on Webber Creek and on Spring and Tonto Creeks, near the hamlet that whites called

Gisela. There, the women cultivated corn, squash, beans, and vegetables, while the men killed turkeys and deer and worked for white ranchers. In July 1897, the *Silver Belt* reported that Indians returning to the sites of their pre-conquest farms had established perhaps a dozen camps in the Verde Valley.<sup>50</sup> The numbers continued to grow thereafter. By 1910, at least half the Dilzhe'es and almost all of the Yavapais who had once lived at San Carlos had made their way home.

For whites, the return seemed to be both blessing and curse. In Payson, settlers took fright when some hundred Indians appeared shortly after the end of the Indian wars, likely in the 1890s. The town itself, recalled Pearl Hilligas Morison, had a population of barely 100. To head off trouble, settlers appointed a delegation to approach the Indians. To show that they were friendly, the white delegates brought children. The Indians explained that they were merely gathering piñon nuts; they intended no trouble. With permission from settlers, Indians continued to gather without incident.<sup>51</sup>

The large party that appeared in Payson had left the reservation only temporarily. Others left permanently. By 1900, the Prescott *Courier* could report that more than two hundred Indians were working for whites in the Verde Valley. They were washing clothes, digging stumps, and doing "all matter of work of which they are capable." The *Courier* reiterated, however, that Indians were "savages" who would eat a "week-old carcass of a cow." Some of them, it added, had told settlers that they would again possess the valley. "The Verde Valley was their former home and hunting, murdering, and scalping ground," intoned the *Courier*, and it was not likely that any had become "sufficient of a Christian" to forgo revenge. The only remedy, it seemed, was to have troops march from Fort Whipple to keep Indians in line.<sup>52</sup>

The dire warnings from the *Courier* reflect bafflement. Only a few years earlier, Indians had been conquered and removed. Now they were coming and going, appearing seemingly everywhere. Indians leaving the reservation en masse was not something that whites had envisioned. The authorities, however, did not seek to stifle the trend. Indeed they encouraged it by keeping Indians in flux.

Flux came in part from upheaval at San Carlos. In 1884, a large number of "San Carlos" Apaches—a term that now covered Pinals, Aravaipas, and sometimes Dilzhe'es—had to give up their farms to

Chiricahuas and Warm Springs Apaches. Those displaced were bitter toward the new arrivals. This was the second time in a decade that Dilzhe'es had been uprooted. By the late 1880s, the problem had dissipated with the removal of the Chiricahua and the Warm Springs people. Now, however, a new sort of displacement loomed: White settlers upstream on the Gila were diverting water to their crops, so much so that Apache ditches were wont to run dry. In 1913, the San Carlos agent reported that upstream diversions meant that "water often fails when it is most needed."<sup>53</sup>

Variations on the displacement theme had come with regularity since the reservation's inception. Settlers tirelessly lobbied to have the reservation reduced in size. The reservation, they insisted, held coal and silver. There was also good grassland that Indians—according to settlers—would not use. "Open the Indian reservations," demanded the *Silver Belt*, adding that Arizona Indians "have a larger acreage per capita . . . for their use than in any other political division of the Union." Only a government "hostile to its own people" would deny settlers additional Indian lands.<sup>54</sup>

Sometimes agents spoke against the reductions; sometimes they spoke in favor. Sometimes they bribed Indians to give up land. More often Indians simply accepted reductions as fait accompli. Though General Crook fought reductions, going so far as to evict miners from the reservation, his tenure was brief and his powers limited. Six times the government cut down the San Carlos Reservation—in 1873, 1874, 1877, 1893, 1896, and 1902—thus stripping it of grazing lands and mineral resources, including coal, copper, and silver.<sup>55</sup>

The 1874 cession gave investors the rich copper deposits that spawned the towns of Clifton and Morenci. It was the 1896 cession, however, that Indians most resented. At last the *Silver Belt* and the mining investors it represented got the coalfields they had so desperately wanted. The government promised Apaches revenues from ceded lands but, as of 1913, none had arrived. Though the "inexhaustible" supply of coal proved a bitter disappointment, the so-called Mineral Strip turned out to have a few meager copper and gold mines. Ultimately, however, it was not prospectors who took possession but ordinary homesteaders. Despite its mistaken rationale for seizing the land, the government made no effort to give it back. Indians, noted the San Carlos agent—especially Yavapais who had

been located on the Mineral Strip—felt “badly treated.” Believing that the government would not give them a fair shake, many abandoned the reservation.<sup>56</sup>

Then came the bold plan for a dam on the Gila. Though the dam was not built until the 1920s, surveys began in the 1910s. Dilzhe’es, noted the San Carlos agent in 1913, feared that their lands “are to be submerged.” That fear, he explained, was already causing many to move back to their “old hunting grounds in the Verde Valley.”<sup>57</sup> In the main, Apaches opposed the dam—it offered them no benefit—but believed it would be built anyway. They were correct.

Though the agent recommended that the dam be built upstream of the reservation—whence it could benefit San Carlos Indians—his suggestion carried no weight. On March 4, 1930, former president Calvin Coolidge, having come to Arizona to commemorate the new dam that bore his name, “smoked the peace pipe with the Pimas [Akimel O’odham] and Apaches and was adopted by both tribes.”<sup>58</sup> Coolidge, if not the Indians with whom he smoked, remained oblivious to the suffering that the dam had inflicted (fig. 6.4).

To accommodate the dam, Dilzhe’es again found themselves pulling up stakes and moving closer to the agency, where they were crowded together with Aravaipas and Pinals. The waters pent up behind the dam helped them not at all. The entire flow was diverted to farmers to the west and south, near the burgeoning cities of Case Grande and Tucson. Though the Akimel O’odham on the Gila received waters (in effect, they were reimbursed for water taken by whites who were farming upstream), white settlers benefited most. Profits from the electricity produced by the dam, moreover, went to utility operators rather than to San Carlos Indians. Despite forceful protests from agent James Kitch, reservation Indians received no royalties, only discounted power for the school at Rice and the new agency, which Kitch had moved to Rice to make way for the reservoir.<sup>59</sup>

Thanks to land reductions and the building of Coolidge Dam, the majority of Dilzhe’es were “totally without lands they can call their own” as late as 1937. Though the BIA had promised to dig wells and develop desert lands for their occupancy, it failed to do so. It failed, indeed, even to consult Indians working off the reservation whose homes were to be inundated. Those who remained on the reservation, moreover, continued to experience discrimination from other



**Figure 6.4.** President Calvin Coolidge signs the bill authorizing construction of Coolidge Dam on the Gila River, June 7, 1924. Neither federal nor state officials worried about the dam's impact on those at San Carlos. Library of Congress, American Memory Collection.

Apaches, who tended to dominate tribal courts and law enforcement and who viewed Dilzhe'es as outsiders.<sup>60</sup>

Dilzhe'es responded by leaving. To the government and to the territory, it was a boon. Not only were working Indians able to live without rations and annuities, they were actively engaged in building the territory. By the turn of the century, the Indian labor force in Arizona was second to none in importance. Not only Apaches and Yavapais, but also Tohono O'odhams, Akimel O'odhams, and Maricopas left their reservations to work for whites. Navajos, Hualapais, and others, too, engaged in wage labor, though their distance from markets and, at least for Navajos, their success at herding on their own lands made wages less critical.

In the waning decades of the nineteenth century—just a few short years after the conquest—Indians and settlers found themselves locked in an uneasy embrace. Settlers needed Indians for labor and trade; Indians needed settlers for wages and supplies. Indians also

needed settlers for something else. Indians wanted to escape the confinement, the tedium, the regimen of reservation life. They wanted freedom. They wanted to move across the land, as they had done prior to conquest. They wanted, finally, to escape the inter-band and inter-clan tensions of the reservation.

If the abandonment of the reservation relieved tensions, however, it also represented a threat. The government had not planned on it. Congress and its bureaucracy envisioned Indians becoming virtuous farmers, each family tucked away on a 160-acre plot. Things weren't working out that way, nor could they given Arizona's aridity and its calamitous swings between flood and drought. Far from being government drones, Indians became free agents. They wandered. They explored. They tried out new avenues, new modes of existence. They did not behave as conquered people; they simply took a new tack toward freedom.

So the Yavapai and Dilzhe'e left the reservation in droves, along with hundreds of other Apaches who simply wanted to find work. Settlers, along with agents, worried what to do. Yes, they agreed, it was a good thing to have Indians earning their bread by the sweat of their brow. Yes, it was a good thing for Indians to voluntarily relieve the government of its duty to provide annuities and rations. As early as 1901, the San Carlos agent ceased to distribute rations altogether, reasoning that Indians could now be self-sufficient.<sup>61</sup> Indians off the reservation, however, were Indians outside of government control. BIA agents—who shuttled in and out of San Carlos every few years—knew not what to do. For all their clever policy, for all their dedication to reforming Indians, they had lost control.

## *Old Lives, New Lives*

EVEN AS APACHES AND YAVAPAIS returned to their homeland, they seldom returned to pre-conquest farms. White ranchers and farmers, having found that the most valuable lands were those where Indians had lived, promptly fenced them off. Indian returnees found themselves to be trespassers. Settlers in particular resented competition for water. In some cases, they gave Indians permission to locate on traditional farming sites; often they did not. The only places open, it seemed, were national forest reserves.<sup>1</sup>

Not only did returnees meet guns and fences upon their return, they met ecological change. In the 1870s—shortly after conquest—the Verde Valley was “a hunter’s and stockman’s paradise,” recalled one settler. Rivers and creeks teemed with trout. Quail and rabbit raced ahead of intruders, taking refuge in knee-high grass. While mule deer ranged the valley, black bears and grizzlies trundled in and out of the high country. No doubt the absence of Indian hunters allowed game to proliferate. What also allowed game to proliferate was ecological vitality. The valley—with its thick grass, its junipers, its cypress, its cottonwoods—soaked up water like a sponge. Rather than running into rivers and creeks, water nurtured grasses and game, along with mosquitoes that carried malaria.<sup>2</sup>

The settlers who, in the 1870s and 1880s, claimed the region’s vitality for their own purposes were “God fearing folk who had a family and a little grub stake.” Almost two-thirds came from the South and Lower Midwest (the Old Confederacy and the border states of Missouri and Kentucky). A few came from California or Oregon, having migrated there in the 1840s or 1850s from the Midwest or

South. In the Verde Valley, they farmed, ranched, freighted, and prospected. They also claimed land via squatter's rights.<sup>3</sup> A family need only choose a site, then pitch a tent or build a log house. Preemption rights guaranteed title to those who held on.

Initially, settlers sent produce, beef, and game to the post at Camp Verde as well as to the territorial capital at Prescott. By the 1890s, they had an even better market: the boomtown of Jerome. Built on Cleopatra Hill, Jerome became a hub for Arizona's copper industry. As early as the 1870s, prospectors had discovered—or “rediscovered,” since Indians had long known of them—rich ores on Mingus Mountain. Jerome's boom came two decades later, when American companies strung the country with electrical wire. Copper from the mines went into wires, cables, and coinage. Cattle prices, meanwhile, began to rise after a prolonged recession.<sup>4</sup> Farmers and ranchers began to prosper.

What had been an ecological paradise fast became purgatory. “Most everybody,” recalled Charles Douglas Willard, “brought cattle, horses, or sheep . . . and the stock soon trampled the spongy land down to solid ground, causing rain water to run into the river channel.” Farmers, moreover, chopped down trees that anchored soil. The river—confused by new conditions—carved new channels across the valley, sometimes cutting downward and sometimes spreading out. Settlers, too, cut dozens of channels in the form of irrigation ditches. By 1928, there were sixty-seven of them. With thousands of acres in cultivation and thousands more given over to stock, the deer disappeared (figs. 7.1 and 7.2). So did the trout. By the 1890s—when Indians began to return—even the cattle found life difficult. There was no longer enough grass to sustain them. What became abundant was erosion and flooding.<sup>5</sup>

What Indians returned to was not the place they had left. They returned to their homeland, but it was a homeland that offered few resources. Indians could still hunt and gather in the hills. In some places they could grow melons, squash, corn, and beans. Scarcity, however, became their daily bread. In the drought years of the early 1900s, recalled one settler, many Indians died of hunger. Settlers either lacked surplus or refused to share.<sup>6</sup> For Indians, hunting and farming no longer offered a future. The future lay in wage labor. It lay, moreover, in making accommodations with whites in order to



**Figure 7.1.** Apache hunters sometimes disguised themselves as deer. Returnees to the Verde Valley and Rim Country, however, found few animals to hunt. Sharlot Hall Museum Library and Archives, Prescott, Arizona.



**Figure 7.2.** Verde Valley settlers killed native herbivores for food and for market, displaced them by clearing farms and digging ditches, and replaced them with cows, horses, pigs, sheep, and goats. This photo shows Marian William Fain with a large buck in Verde Valley, c. 1885. Arizona State Library, Archives and Public Records, History and Archives Division, 01-4657.

maintain traditional ways of life. What accommodation produced was a contradictory brew of old and new, tradition and invention, autonomy and caste.

When Indians reappeared, few settlers saw them as helpful. Usually they saw them as threats. Nettie Gowett recalled that her family had several Indian scares as they crossed the continent, but the worst was in the Verde Valley. Her boy, she recalled, once came running into the house, dragging his sister and screaming that there were Indians everywhere. Nettie clasped the children in a firm embrace, fully expecting to die. She looked up to see Indian faces in the window, laughing and trying to communicate that they wanted melons and vegetables.<sup>7</sup>

In subsequent years, when Indians had reestablished themselves in the valley, Nettie's daughter, Lenora, went to an Indian camp and asked to see a scalp. An old woman grinned and plucked a sack from the ground, but a "buck"—the ubiquitous and derisive term for an Indian man—"shook his head and she put the sack down." Lenora believed that he had talked the old woman out of showing her a scalp. Since Yavapais and Dilzhe'es had almost never taken scalps, however, the old woman had surely misunderstood. Likely the sack held something edible, something with which an old woman hoped to please a little girl.<sup>8</sup>

Fear of Indians, however, was simply part of being a settler. W. A. Jordan and Tack Gaddis had a scare when they were digging potatoes. Glancing up from their work, they thought they saw cowboys approaching. Then they realized their mistake. The riders were bare-headed; they were Indians. While Gaddis hid in the brush, Jordan fetched his shotgun. He was just ready to load buckshot "when here they came, swarming up," each man with "a gun laid across his saddle." Their leader was "a tough-looking pill," with his face and arms smeared with blood.<sup>9</sup>

When Jordan aimed his gun at the Indian leader, he "threw up his hands, waving a piece of paper, and shouted in English, 'Don't shoot. Don't shoot.'" The paper was a note from an officer attesting to the bearer's friendliness. The Indians had been catching mockingbirds to sell to whites as pets when they had come upon a deer. After killing the deer, they had painted blood on their faces "to bring good

luck.” To whites, they looked like they were painted for war. After producing the paper, the lead Indian asked Jordan for a skillet and salt. Upon receiving them, he cooked a strip of venison for the white men. “This was my first and last Indian scare,” recalled Jordan. “The settlers were in no danger from this friendly band of hunters, but they were so wrought up over the stories of massacres and murders that the Indians themselves were in the greatest danger.”<sup>10</sup>

When they met hostility, returnees often picked up and moved. Dilzhe’e historian Vince Randall’s grandparents, after being chased out of the Verde Valley, settled near Payson, just south of the Rim. Subsequently they moved again. From Payson they relocated to the East Verde, then to a place near the Mormon town of Pine. Around 1910, they found themselves on Fossil Creek, where Randall’s grandfather found work building a small power plant. Soon they moved again, this time to Perkinsville to work on the railroad that served Jerome, then to Clarkdale, where smelters converted ore into copper.<sup>11</sup> Like other returnees, the Randall family transformed hostility into acceptance by selling their labor.

Dollie Hale, daughter of a settler family in Gisela, witnessed that transformation firsthand in the early 1890s. Her initial experience with Indians, she recalled, was when she was four or five years old. An Indian approached her family’s ranch house, holding forth a note attesting to his need for a job. By 1904, the San Carlos agent could report that thirty-eight Dilzhe’es had located near Gisela, though Hale put the number at one hundred. They appointed a man whom whites called “Louis”—perhaps “Tonto Lewis,” the man who had killed Marshal Pete—to be headman. Louis “was a good man,” recalled a US Forest Service ranger, “and tried to be friendly with the cattlemen to prevent any of his band from stealing from or in any way antagonizing them.” Far from being antagonistic, returnees became indispensable. Hale testified that one cattleman, Jim Holder, had “an entire village of Indians working for him” (fig. 7.3). All of them, bragged the San Carlos agent in 1904, “are in a prosperous condition.”<sup>12</sup>

Witnessing the trend of Indians leaving San Carlos, agents pondered its effect. Apaches who had left the reservation, insisted San Carlos



**Figure 7.3.** Indian returnees to the Verde Valley constructed their own villages on US Forest Service lands. This sketch from George Laben’s 1925 annual report on the Camp Verde Agency shows gowas alongside wooden cabins. Superintendent of Indian Affairs Annual Narrative and Statistical Field Agency Reports, 1907–1938, National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, DC.

agent George Corson in 1902, “are much better laborers than the Mexicans.” Another agent was less optimistic. “Very few of them,” he lamented, “have proper conception of laying up for the future, either money or provisions.” Still another agent reported in the 1920s—wrongly—that Indians off the reservation “are busy at work and have little or no time for dancing,” referring to traditional rites practiced by Indians for centuries. The flipside of industriousness, however, was exposure to “bad company.” Indians near the copper mining town of Miami, reported the San Carlos agent in 1913, were doing too

much drinking, thanks to readily available liquor and the immoral sorts willing to sell it.<sup>13</sup>

The contradictory comments came in different years, even in different decades, but they reflected an ambivalence that was constant. Agents thought it good for Indians to leave reservations; agents thought it bad for Indians to leave reservations. They were never quite sure. What seemed clear as of 1902, however, was that “in the past ten years hundreds [more likely thousands] have sought homes and employment” off the reservation, “and none . . . have ever come back.”<sup>14</sup>

That agents had no clear policy was not lost on settlers, who shifted from a focus on genocide to a focus on control. As early as the late 1870s, the Arizona *Silver Belt* protested that Indians were “roaming at will” in the streets of Globe and were sure to make trouble. Many of them, insisted the *Silver Belt*, did not have passes; they were renegades. The government, it insisted, must take them back. Thirty years later, the same fear persisted. In 1902, agent Corson pointed out that most Indians, “by their quiet, unobtrusive behavior and willingness to work . . . have made many friends,” but added that “some few [white] persons have gratuitously constituted themselves into their enemies.” Having received petitions alleging “all sorts of wrongdoing” by Indians, Corson was forced to investigate. His findings were exculpatory; most of the charges were “gross exaggerations, and in the majority of cases without foundation.”<sup>15</sup>

To dampen anxieties, agents sent troops or Indian police to round up those who had left without permission. By the early 1890s, however, the Indian wars seemed a thing of the past. Neither agents nor officers worried about an outbreak. The government planned to withdraw its troops. Settlers promptly rose in one shrill chorus: Keep the troops, they demanded. The fact that money could be made by supplying the troops did not discourage demands for their continued presence. The troops left San Carlos regardless. By 1895, none remained.<sup>16</sup>

The troops' departure made both settlers and agents all the more desperate to exercise control. Even as agents encouraged Indians to find work off the reservation, they worried that the result would be “poor farming and poor stock-raising” on the reservation. More

important, Indians would return to their dances and drinking. They would return, feared one agent, to the “customs of their early wandering and savage life.” Off the reservation, Indians would lack the family ties and responsibilities that begot civilization. They would be unloosed from conscience.<sup>17</sup>

The solution, wrote one agent in 1913, was to allot family farms at San Carlos. That strategy “would tend to bring the Indians back on their own, and stop the increasing hostility of the white settlers among whom the Indians have been locating.” If Indians did not come back, they would have to be forced. “Remedial legislation” to authorize “the guardian” to bring back “the ward,” argued the San Carlos agent in 1914, was a “necessity.” Indians were slipping through legal cracks. Though agents repeatedly brought back “stray” Indians in the 1880s, they found themselves unable to do so in the 1900s. The Supreme Court recognized Indians’ freedom to leave reservations, even without passes. Neither could Arizona force Indians to stay on reservations (fig. 7.4). Indians were not Arizona citizens. Having no authority, officials left matters to the BIA. Indians, insisted one agent, were “without a country.”<sup>18</sup>

To counter the problem of Indians moving away, San Carlos agents sought BIA funding to pay Indians for on-reservation work. In the 1920s and 1930s, the agency promoted Apaches to skilled and semi-skilled positions, including assistant matron (who acted as midwife, nurse, and sanitary inspector), disciplinarian, work camp supervisor, truck driver, dairyman, seamstress, chief clerk, and policeman. Other reservation-bound Indians quarried tufa, herded livestock, and operated a sawmill.<sup>19</sup> Off-reservation employment, however, continued to boom. By 1928, San Carlos men worked in rail yards, machine shops, mines, construction crews, and limestone quarries. Indian dance troupes, moreover, routinely traveled to Phoenix and other southwestern cities to perform devil dances—later called crown dances—in which men emulated gaan. Their pay was \$5 a day.<sup>20</sup> At least half the population of San Carlos continued to live off the reservation.

The solution to the conundrum of Indians leaving the reservation, finally, was to create a new reservation. If Indians would not come to the agency, the agency would come to them. In 1907, the government opened a day school in Camp Verde, where Dilzhe’es and Yavapais



**Figure 7.4.** Beginning in the 1890s and continuing into the 1920s, Dilzhe'es and Yavapai left San Carlos and returned to their homeland in the Verde Valley, where they worked for whites. Pictured here is a Yavapai family, the Wathogomas, near Clarkdale, Arizona, c. 1925. Sharlot Hall Museum Library and Archives, Prescott, Arizona.

had congregated. In 1910, the government went a step further; it made the day school into a “postage-stamp” agency comprising 18 acres. The agent housed himself in an adobe building abandoned by the army, a place “unfit for human habitation.” In 1914 and again in 1916, the government bought more land upstream. All told, the two tracts—the Camp Verde and Middle Verde Reservations—totaled

476 acres. On those two plots, a succession of agents sought to locate perhaps 400 Dilzhe'es and Yavapais on a few paltry farms with even paltrier claims to water.<sup>21</sup>

Dilzhe'es and Yavapais recalled that General Crook had promised that they could return to Rio Verde after a few years at San Carlos. If the new reservation was the fulfillment of that promise, it was parody. Rather than a forty-five-mile strip along the Verde, Indians received what amounted to a vacant lot. From the government point of view, however, the new agency was not about fulfilling promises; it was a way to gather loose Indians. It failed, however, even to do that.

The first Camp Verde superintendent, Taylor Gabbard, found that most Indians in his charge "are not living on" the reservation, adding that "their villages are scattered from three to forty-two miles apart." Gabbard added that in the past year his charges had held at least half a dozen traditional dances. The Indians were so poor, he reasoned, that their dances—which took them away from jobs and required them to pay shamans—could do little to harm their finances. It was "extremely difficult," however, "to ascertain . . . the effects of these dances on the morals of the Indians."<sup>22</sup> Worse, Gabbard, unlike agents elsewhere, had no court of Indian offenses. He managed to hire but one Indian policeman, Jack Tonto, who received \$240 a year. Though able, Jack Tonto could police only the agency itself. He had no power to police Indians who lived elsewhere.<sup>23</sup>

At every turn, it seemed, Gabbard met failure. Part of the problem was lack of land. The original 18 acres "is just about enough land on which to bury [the Indians] if they were all dead," complained Gabbard's successor, Joe Taylor. Even when the government added the second plot, the reservation's arable acreage could accommodate only 25 families. Though the new plot consisted of 458 acres, only half could be irrigated. Lack of equipment and, at least in 1910 and 1911, lack of an agency farmer, made success more difficult. More to the point, Indians preferred to work off the reservation.<sup>24</sup>

In 1917, Taylor reported that he was trying to teach Indians "to abandon [their] slipshod careless methods of farming." The next year, his report was equally bleak. "We have about 20 or 25 Indians who elect to farm," he explained, "and of this number two of them are excellent farmers, three are medium, and the others are just Indians."

Indians, he added, could “readily sell almost anything the country will produce,” but most of the crop went to their own consumption.<sup>25</sup>

Despite Indians’ lack of enthusiasm, agents continually asked the government to buy more farmland. Farming, they reasoned, tied Indians to place. Farming meant fathers, and often mothers, staying at home to take care of children rather than traveling to distant camps. Farming kept Indians out of trouble. It kept them from sings, dances, gambling, and *tiswin*.<sup>26</sup> Farming meant conscience. Hence it became the BIA’s panacea. Both the BIA and its agents were deeply imbued with the Jeffersonian idea that farming made men virtuous citizens of republican America.

Indians—even Indians in the Verde Valley, where farming could be productive—saw things differently. Routinely they complained about agricultural work. In 1920, they refused to service their ditches, arguing that the government should pay them for their trouble. Profits from their farms, responded agent Taylor, was pay enough. In 1921, agent C. V. Peel reported that he, too, had to prod Indians into farming. “No matter what or how much one does for the Indian,” he complained, “he does not appreciate it; rather the more you do for him the more he expects.” A year later, agent J. O. Barnd reported that “the custom” at Camp Verde was to let white farm instructors plow fields and cut hay “while [Indians] lay under the shade and watched him.” Most Indians at Camp Verde, added Barnd, “are transients [sic] that come for a short season to live in idleness until they spend the money they have earned at the round-ups, or road work.” Rather than farm, men preferred to “allow the land to go to Johnson grass” to provide pasture for ponies.<sup>27</sup>


Whether or not Indians appreciated their efforts, agents continued to promote agriculture. With each failure came a new plan. Agents purchased prize chickens—Rhode Island Reds—and Holstein milk cows for their wards. As early as 1920, Camp Verde Indians kept over 500 chickens plus 70 turkeys and a few ducks. Even as agents complained that Indians should pay for farm equipment, moreover, the agency provided plow horses, plows, and work tools at cost. Agents also promoted the idea of growing vegetables and fruit. In the late 1910s and early 1920s, Joe Taylor oversaw the planting of peach, pear, plum, and apple trees, plus 5,500 strawberry plants. That

plan paid off when, in 1922, the agency housekeeper, with Indian help, produced “over two hundred quarts of plum and apples and pears.” To set an example, one agent sent the agency farmer to local towns to sell surplus. Another agent planned a yearly agricultural fair, thinking to “stimulate more industerious [sic] and keen competition of farm products among those Indians.”<sup>28</sup>

For a brief moment, it looked like farming would succeed. Indians, bragged J. O. Barnd in 1922, “have gotten many days ahead of the white farmers in [doing] their share of the work on the dam and ditches.” Indians and whites, he explained, collectively managed irrigation works, with Indians doing more than their share. Indians, it seemed, were becoming steady farmers. The story’s subtext, however, was very different. Indians sought to finish quickly so that they could work off the reservation.<sup>29</sup> They were not necessarily dedicated to farming; indeed, they worked hard so that they could escape farming’s tedium (fig. 7.5).

By 1927, it was clear that neither carrot nor stick would transform Camp Verde Indians into successful farmers. “It is not believed,” lamented John Brown, “that up to [this] date the products of these small Indian farms have justified the labor expended by the Indians or the money expended by the government.” Two years later, Brown directed his agency farmer to enroll Indians in a cooperative whose members would plan what and how much to plant and harvest, thus requiring communal commitment. Cooperation, reasoned Brown, might bring success. Indians thought otherwise. “They said they was not white men,” reported the agency farmer, “and did not want to join no organization.”<sup>30</sup>

The cause of Camp Verde’s failures did not reside solely with Indians. They worked energetically on some projects—growing and selling alfalfa, for one—though not on others. No matter how much or how little they worked, however, they could not stop the arsenic and sulfuric acid that issued from the smelter at Clarkdale. Jerome’s minerals required processing. Investors cut costs by placing the smelter near the mines. Indians, with white farmers and ranchers, paid the price. By 1922, smoke had begun to kill Indians’ orchards. All the peach trees died. So did most of the apple trees. When a smoke-laden fog settled over squash plants, their leaves wilted within



**Figure 7.5.** Sketch from George Laben's 1925 annual report on the Camp Verde Agency satirizing BIA attempts to demonstrate farming success at Camp Verde. Superintendent of Indian Affairs Annual Narrative and Statistical Field Agency Reports, 1907–1938, National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, DC.

minutes. Even alfalfa failed. The valley's grasses and browse died with its crops. Though smelter owners denied responsibility, university experts disagreed. After ranchers sued, the smelter owners were forced to buy smoke easements.<sup>31</sup> On the Camp Verde Reservation, however, the farming experiment had failed.

To blame woes solely on smelting would be mistaken. On the whole, Indians rejected the idea of intensive farming. Farming remained a low-status occupation. Apaches and Yavapais deemed it suitable for women, older men, and the poor, but not for young and hardy men. Some men, to be sure, some of the time, signed on as laborers for white farmers, but such jobs were temporary and

seasonal. Most work came during harvests. After laborers received pay, they were free to depart. Indians, then, worked occasionally as farm laborers even as they resisted becoming farmers.

To be rich by Apache and Yavapai standards was to be free from agricultural labor. Agents and farming instructors did not understand. And because they did not understand, agents created irony: They turned themselves into hired help. Hierarchy was inverted. From the perspective of settlers and agents, “lazy” Indians were sponging off white labor. From the Indians’ perspective, white officials were doing women’s work. Surely the Indians who lay in the shade and watched the agency farmer work the fields shared a chuckle. The whole social order must have seemed upside down. Boss became worker; conquerer became conquered. Or so it might have seemed.

At San Carlos, the farming experiment was likewise coming to an ignominious end. Realizing that floods and droughts made farming on the Gila problematic, Indians and agents hit upon another idea. As early as 1922, five Apaches—including a Dilzhe’*e*—petitioned the commissioner of Indian affairs to loan the tribe money to purchase cows and build herds. Indians sought to be cowboys. In 1924, agent James Kitch accommodated them by replacing herds owned by white lessees with herds owned by Indians. Rather than maintain a tribal herd managed by a white supervisor—a system tried by Kitch’s predecessor—Apaches created family-based cooperatives. Extended families became businesses. They decided when and where to move stock, which animals to cull and which to breed, and what and when to sell. Though he was no anthropologist, Kitch understood that one need not make Indians into individualists to make ranching succeed; one need only make ranching coincide with Indian social structure. Dilzhe’*es*, however, found themselves left out of the earliest stock cooperatives, their population at San Carlos being too small and their range too poor.<sup>32</sup>

The experiment proved a success. Indian men took to ranching with joy. “These Indians,” reported Kitch, “are especially cattle men.” The agency’s white herding supervisor, added Kitch, “stated . . . that he never found a bunch of Indians more willing or better workers, with less complaint, than these Indians . . . in their annual roundup.”<sup>33</sup>

Ranching, as Peter Iverson suggests, resembled hunting. It allowed men to engage in the adventurous and dangerous work that

they had done before conquest. Ranching involved riding horses. Ranching involved scouring the land. Old tensions between bands and clans—tensions that festered in villages along the Gila—began to ease. The success of ranching, moreover, meant more jobs on the reservation, thus bringing men back from off-reservation work, at least during roundups.<sup>34</sup> Ranching—not farming—anchored Indians to San Carlos.

Seeing the success of ranching at San Carlos, Camp Verde agents pushed in the same direction. As early as 1917—several years before San Carlos turned to full-scale ranching—Joe Taylor got the US Forest Service to grant Indians grazing permits for one hundred cows. The animals, however, were not forthcoming. In 1922, the Forest Service again granted a permit, asking only that Indians cull “ponies”—small, wiry horses of Spanish derivation—that proliferated on government land. The experiment, however, made little progress. Both private and public lands were fully stocked. Indeed they were overstocked.<sup>35</sup> At San Carlos, by contrast, there were thousands upon thousands of prime acres. Indians there needed only to remove white lessees to make way for their own herds. No such acreage was available near Camp Verde.

Poor prospects for ranching and farming made Camp Verde Indians all the more dedicated to working off the reservation. Their reasons for doing so, however, were not purely economic. Working for whites, explains Dilzhe’e historian Vince Randall, became a way to gain whites’ respect. Respect came from clearing roads, digging ditches, pitching hay, chopping wood, and washing clothes. Camp Verde’s Indian policeman, Jack Tonto, meanwhile painted icons on buckskins, which he sold to whites for \$10 apiece. “No unusual methods are being used to induce them to make greater efforts toward self support,” reported Taylor Gabbard. “Almost every opportunity to work for fair wages has been eagerly taken, except when the employer was known to be unfair or the place of employment remote.” Of several hundred off-reservation Dilzhe’e and Yavapai men in the 1910 census, only a handful failed to list an occupation.<sup>36</sup>

By working off the reservation, Indians—those from San Carlos and from Camp Verde—gained freedom. At Roosevelt Dam especially—where construction stretched from 1903 to 1911—Apaches




**Figure 7.6.** Apaches provided critical labor in the construction of Roosevelt Dam, here pictured c. 1915. Sharlot Hall Museum Library and Archives, Prescott, Arizona.

found ways to practice traditional customs and modes of living. “Tonto Dam,” as it was initially called, was to be the biggest dam in the world. Its purpose was not only to stop the Salt River from flooding the Salt River Valley—site of the rapidly growing metropolis of Phoenix—but also to provide irrigation and power to settlers (fig. 7.6). The dam’s locale, however, was arid, remote, and undeveloped. As a consequence, it drew few laborers. Apaches filled the void. Eager to work off the reservation, they approached the Bureau of Reclamation’s supervising engineer, Louis Hill, informing him that they had once possessed the entire area. Surely they deserved to be hired over “Mexican and hobo whites.” Hill seems to have agreed, offering Indians \$1.50 a day for unskilled labor, about 25 to 50 cents less than what white workers got. Because insufficient rations had left Apaches malnourished, insisted Hill, they could do less work than whites, hence lower pay. Later, he raised their wages to parity.<sup>37</sup>

Despite low wages, Apaches flocked to the site. According to one estimate, some 2,000 of the 5,000 laborers who worked on the dam were Indian. With so many Apaches laboring at the dam, as well as on a new railroad line, the San Carlos agent could report that “the reservation is pretty well depleted of able-bodied men and boys.” Dilzhe’es and Yavapais from Payson, Gisela, and the Verde Valley also worked on the dam. “Being nomadic by choice and tradition,” explained the San Carlos agent, “they take their families with them.” At job sites, Apaches reconstituted gotas, the extended family groups of Apache tradition. If a man’s family could not accompany him, noted agent Kitch, he became discontented and returned to the reservation.<sup>38</sup>


In six Indian work camps near the dam, Apaches built gowas of stick and brush, arranging them thirty to fifty feet apart in accordance with old codes of sociability and privacy (figs. 7.7 and 7.8). Members of the same extended families—the gota—hived off from one another, creating small villages within a village. An individual gota, or perhaps a related group of them, produced single work crews of ten to twelve men. Headmen—chosen by their people—became foremen and supervisors. Workers, meanwhile, shared jobs. An Apache man, reported a missionary, might work for two to three months, then turn over his job to another, usually one of his kin or clan. Since workers dedicated wages not only to themselves but also to relatives, a shared job supported multiple families.<sup>39</sup>

At its peak, the largest camp held between 240 and 400 people, mostly men. Though they had initially brought women, children, and older relatives, San Carlos agent George Corson sent police to bring back those not employed. The fact that he had no right to do so, it seems, failed to stop him. Corson particularly insisted that children be left in reservation schools while their fathers worked far away. The absence of children and older persons skewed the camps, making them less like gotas and more like barracks. When Luther Kelly replaced Corson at San Carlos, however, he proved more willing to let families remain away. Apaches, in turn, resumed old customs. They held traditional dances; participated in the “rising upward” religion taught by a prophet named Daslahdn; manufactured and consumed tulapai; and practiced old funerary customs, including burning a dead relative’s dwelling and ritually “killing” his implements to keep away his ghost.<sup>40</sup>



**Figure 7.7.** Apaches re-created the *gota*—the extended family—even off the reservation. Here, members of a *gota* stand in front of a *gowa* at Roosevelt Lake. Photo from *Progressive Arizona*, November 1929. University of Arizona Special Collections.

Some fifteen years after Roosevelt Dam's completion, the Bureau of Reclamation built a new dam on the Gila—Coolidge Dam—in the heart of San Carlos. That dam, too—the very one that displaced scores of Dilzhe'es and Yavapais—employed large numbers of Indian workers. A select few Apaches—perhaps those who had acquired skills at Roosevelt—made \$7.20 a day. Contractors subsequently hired Indian workers for the Horse Mesa, Mormon Flat, and Stewart Mountain dam projects, which lay downstream from Roosevelt. There, as at Roosevelt, Indians lived in camps separate from whites. Archaeological evidence, however, suggests that they ceased to re-create *gotas*, perhaps because clan and kinship ties had begun breaking down, or perhaps because work crews at those dams were smaller than at Roosevelt. Enough Indians worked on the later dams, however, that the BIA established field schools nearby to accommodate their children.<sup>41</sup>



**Figure 7.8.** The cover image on the July 1926 issue of *Progressive Arizona*—a magazine dedicated to automotive tourism—was derived from the photo shown in figure 7.7. Southern Pacific Railroad (now Union Pacific) produced the image as part of a campaign to promote tourism. University of Arizona Special Collections.

To build dams required grading roads, building power lines, cutting diversion channels, making lime and cement, and constant maintenance. Dams created many jobs. The majority of Indians, however, worked elsewhere. Year in and year out, Indians signed on for road crews, earning between \$1.50 and \$2.00 a day. In 1913, they helped build the smelter in Clarkdale, the very smelter that destroyed their

crops. By 1921, agent Peel could report that 50 Camp Verde Indians worked in construction, making \$3.50 a day, whereas 75 worked in and around the smelter at \$4 a day. Ten others worked as cowboys, earning \$2 a day. Twenty-four worked as agricultural laborers. The men got \$2.50 a day; the women received \$1.50. In all, 160 Indians were employed. Though the Camp Verde reservation was tiny, noted Joe Taylor in 1919, “we have more opportunities for work here . . . than any place I have ever seen in the Service.”<sup>42</sup>

Coupled to the industry of the men was that of the women. Often, wives accompanied husbands in the field, camping with them near job sites. When they could, they brought their children. When the agency threatened to seize children and send them to boarding schools, however, Indian couples began leaving them on the reservation in the care of older females.<sup>43</sup>

Women, meanwhile—both older ones who remained on the reservation and younger ones who traveled with husbands—did more than cook and care for children. The 1910 census listed thirty-two Apache and Yavapai women who lived outside reservations (in and around Globe, Camp Verde, and nearby towns) as domestics. Domestics constituted 11 percent of adult Indian women in those precincts. Others probably engaged in domestic work but did not report it. Domestic work was equally important for women on the tiny Camp Verde reservation, fifteen of whom worked as domestics in 1921. Their wages came to \$1.50 a day. Given that Indian schools encouraged girls to seek domestic work, those numbers likely grew in later years.<sup>44</sup>

So, too, did Apache and Yavapai women sell baskets. The 1910 census listed “basket making” as the occupation for fifty-six women living off the reservation (about 20 percent of adult women). The proportion of basket makers on the Camp Verde Reservation, where forty women worked at making baskets in 1923, was even higher. Their profits that year came to \$600. The average basket sold for between \$5 and \$15 in 1922, but a good one went as high as \$85. Realizing the potential for profit, dealers in Globe and Phoenix bought baskets in quantity.<sup>45</sup>

Recognizing the value of Indian labor—and the desire of Indians to work outside the reservation—the BIA hired an overseer of labor

for Arizona reservations in the early 1920s. San Carlos provided the overseer a home base and paid half his wages; the BIA's industrial work program paid the other half. The overseer was expected to place not just San Carlos Indians, but all Arizona Indians, in jobs. With contacts throughout the state and an REO Speed Wagon to move to and fro, the overseer became a success. By 1926, agent Kitch could brag to the commissioner of Indian affairs that his charges "earned during the last fiscal year more money than any other reservation in the country."<sup>46</sup>

Kitch celebrated the fact that off-reservation jobs greatly reduced the number of rations he supplied to indigents. Indians—especially Dilzhe'ees and Yavapais—were becoming self-sufficient. What Kitch left unsaid was his tendency—and that of the BIA—to push Indians into low-paying, marginal work. Certain that Apaches, even educated Apaches, were incapable of white-collar jobs, Kitch shunted them into unskilled labor.<sup>47</sup> Like Hispanics, Japanese, Chinese, and Filipinos, as well as blacks and poor whites in the South, Apaches became part of a vast reservoir of migrant workers, moving seasonally from job to job.

To cotton growers, Indian labor was a blessing. "We will be able to handle as many [Indian cotton pickers] as you can provide," promised P. R. Milnes, Arizona immigration commissioner, in a letter to San Carlos agent A. H. Symons in 1921. Arizona's cotton growers would need some 10,000 workers, he noted. Because of recession in the postwar years, however, wages had fallen. At the rate of 2 cents per pound of cotton picked, an "ordinary picker" could make just \$2 a day, half the wage of a man on a road crew. The pay was so low that officials encouraged whole families to work together in the fields. By doing so, promised Milnes, they could expect "what could be reasonably termed fair compensation."<sup>48</sup>

Even when whole families worked together, they did not prosper. In 1922, Indians found that employers were charging \$2.50 per person for transportation between Phoenix and Globe, where Indians congregated in search of work. Employers, moreover, provided few jobs for women, despite promises to do so. They also deducted money for health services. When Apaches complained, the superintendent of the Arizona Cotton Growers Association, Charles Dagenett, "lost his temper." Apaches in turn abandoned the fields, leaving growers desperate.<sup>49</sup>

One year later, the situation showed little improvement. Growers employed men for only two or three days a week. Of the \$3 a day that they could make (cotton prices, and hence wages, having risen), the Arizona Cotton Growers Association took out \$1 for board and 5 cents as “hospital deduction,” along with a 2-cent deduction for transportation to the fields. “It appears [to be] a general opinion among the Indians,” wrote Kitch in 1923, resorting to the classic understatement of the bureaucrat, “that they do not make sufficient money to have any left [over].”<sup>50</sup>

Kitch, to be sure, talked up the cotton picking. Thanks to cotton, he noted in 1924, more Apaches worked off the reservation than ever before. Indeed, he could brag by 1926 that, in the past year, San Carlos Indians had earned over \$400,000. Field work, he explained—referring both to picking and to “cleaning” fields of brush after harvest—was well suited to older men and women who could do no strenuous work. Kitch, however, either ignored or failed to realize how strenuous cotton picking can be. Cotton picking defines “back-breaking” labor, as countless field workers have attested. Because picking was stressful—and because it connoted low status—Apaches preferred roadwork and construction. They also preferred other work because cotton picking left them in poverty. In one instance, noted Kitch, an Apache picker was forced to walk 150 miles from the Salt River Valley to San Carlos when his job ended; he was too poor to pay for a ride.<sup>51</sup>

For Indians, the result was a strained independence, or perhaps even a strained dependence. As one historian writes of Cheyenne agricultural labor in the twentieth-century Midwest, “the farmers and the BIA personnel, who sometimes [were] the same people, provide[d] just enough support . . . to keep the labor pool viable but not enough to make laborers independent of the system.”<sup>52</sup> A similar phenomenon occurred in Arizona.


Low pay was not the sole drawback. Forced to leave their homes for four to five months to pick cotton, wrote Kitch, Apaches became “demoralized.” At work camps, moreover, Indians met new forms of paternalism. The overseer and other BIA officials inspected camps routinely to ensure that they offered adequate shelter, potable water, firewood, and sanitation. Kitch instructed the overseer to recruit philanthropic organizations—particularly Rotary and women’s clubs—to assist. Surely their philanthropy improved the camps. The flipside,

however, was snooping. With whites patrolling the camps, Indians found it more difficult to manage their lives.<sup>53</sup>

If Indians left reservations to escape white oversight, then, they were likely disappointed. Reconstituting tradition in the cotton fields was as difficult as reconstituting tradition at the agency. Whether or not white inspectors patrolled, however, Apaches found ways to live by their own lights.

In the cotton fields, Apaches attained marginal freedom. Elsewhere, they attained more. By the late 1920s, many of them—those on the reservation and those off—possessed cars, allowing them to travel to job sites. Just as important as the economic advantage was the social advantage. Cars allowed Indians to travel many miles to socialize, to play sports, or, at times, to gamble (figs. 7.9 and 7.10). Most of all, cars allowed them to live their own lives.<sup>54</sup>

The freedom to travel, meanwhile, enhanced the freedom to drink. Apaches and Yavapais made “splendid workers,” noted an observer in the 1920s, but their love for alcohol “retards their progress.”



**Figure 7.9.** Apaches and Yavapais created playing cards like these from par fleche, copying motifs from cards brought by the Spanish. The two shown here are a Sota (jack, knave, or page) of Coins and a Two of Cups. These cards, collected in 1878, came from Delshay’s band. National Museum of Natural History, Department of Anthropology, Smithsonian Institution.



**Figure 7.10.** Despite opposition from agents, Indians continued to gamble both on and off the reservation. Pictured here are Apache scouts. Photo by Camillus Sidney Fly, no date. National Anthropological Archives, Smithsonian Institution, NAA INV 02008000.

Drinking was not new to Apaches and Yavapais. In the mists of the past, the technology for manufacturing tulapai—a weak beer brewed from corn—had made its way out of Mexico and into the Southwest. Tiswin—a related drink brewed from mescal—also became popular. Alcohol soon became entwined with Apache and Yavapai ritual. Apache men passed around tulapai or tiswin at curing sings. They drank at weddings. They partook before hunts, raids, and war. They used tiswin and tulapai to pay farm laborers. They partook, too, at funerals. “It is believed,” reported ethnographer Albert Reagan, “that it will aid the departing soul in going to the good place.” The mourners, added Reagan, drank four times to honor “the gods who hold up the four corners of the earth.”<sup>55</sup>

Like whites, men invited one another to drinking parties. When relatives gathered, they shared tulapai or tiswin (terms that whites used interchangeably). Women, too, partook, though seldom with the thirst of men. Turning down an invitation was bad form. It was

rude. “Drinking cliques,” wrote a San Carlos physician, “often form on the basis of these pressures for sociability among kin.”<sup>56</sup>

If men drank most of the brew, women manufactured it. Sometimes men helped; often they did not. To make tulapai, it was necessary to soak corn until it sprouted. The sprouts then had to be dried and ground into meal. The meal might then be mixed with small amounts of various roots, barks, and perennials, including locoweed, with its psychoactive properties. After boiling the concoction in a vat, the brewer poured off the liquid into smaller containers (tin cans in post-conquest times). The solid material left behind was again ground into paste. Then the brewer combined liquid with solid and boiled it again. After that, the brewer set aside the concoction and allowed it to ferment. Fermentation occurred quickly, often in a day. The result was a weak beer that tasted like yeast.<sup>57</sup>

Dilzhe'es, according to one agent, regarded tulapai “as beneficial to their health and a source of much comfort.” Apaches also claimed that it was nutritious. Likely it was. Grenville Goodwin, the anthropologist, suggested that tulapai and tiswin had kept Indians alive during starving times of old. Though their alcohol content was low—perhaps 3 percent—they offered carbohydrates and minerals. The purpose of tulapai and tiswin, however, was to achieve an altered state. Before a planned event, men fasted for several days. When they imbibed, they became quickly drunk.<sup>58</sup>

By appointing inspectors to arrest Indians who made, sold, or drank alcohol, the BIA sought to stymie old customs. The special agents, however—who were employed principally during the Prohibition era—were stretched thin. There were too few to thoroughly police Indian camps. Despite incessant BIA prodding, moreover, local law enforcement officials seldom bothered themselves with Indians. Local officials—sheriffs, constables, police, justices of the peace—“pay no attention” to Indian crimes “unless a white person is aggrieved,” noted an irate agent in the 1910s. James Kitch heartily agreed, lamenting in 1929 that local officials were “inclined to overlook infractions of law” in labor camps since Indians were “no direct menace” to whites.<sup>59</sup>

Law enforcement officers gave several justifications for their reluctance to prosecute. Until 1917, when the state tardily included tiswin and tulapai in its 1915 Prohibition law, state and county officials

regarded Indian drinking as legal. Even when Indian drinking was deemed criminal, local officials asserted that Indian courts should handle infractions. It was too much to ask whites to pay higher taxes so that county courts could try Indians for petty crimes, even though whites had no qualms about profiting from Indian labor and trade. Taxpayers, complained the *Silver Belt* as early as 1894, were “fleeced by oppressive court charges” in order to discipline savages.<sup>60</sup> Below those legal and political rationales lay prejudice. Though in the twentieth century whites spoke less and less of banishing or exterminating Indians, they spoke often of Indian delinquency. Whites regarded Indians as “just Indians,” people too sunk in vice to be subject to laws.

Local officials proved equally indifferent to punishing Indians for assault, rape, or murder of fellow Indians. As late as 1934, Payson whites merely convened a coroner’s jury to investigate the murder of an Apache by a fellow Apache. No trial followed. Even when courts prosecuted Indian-on-Indian crimes, sentences tended to be light. When convicted of murdering another Indian, noted Kitch, Apaches never received life sentences. Most were sentenced to ten years, which became seven with good behavior. Though Indian-on-white assaults and murders led to speedy convictions and, often, death sentences—even when evidence was weak—Indian-on-Indian crimes were another matter.<sup>61</sup> Victims held no special importance; they were Indians. Neither did perpetrators merit special concern; they confirmed suppositions about Indian savagery.

One particularly tragic incident illustrates white indifference. In February 1906, a “Tonto” named Chuna Bakah—a laborer at Roosevelt—sought the assistance of an Arizona Ranger named Holmes. A Pinal man, S.B. 24, had stabbed Bakah’s wife and was threatening to do worse. Holmes showed little interest, merely directing Bakah and the men who accompanied him to tie up the culprit and bring him in the next day. Bakah, however—who spoke English—insisted that Holmes come at once. Shamed into action, Holmes followed to Bakah’s camp. It was now after 8 p.m.; darkness limited visibility to a few feet. When an Apache woman pointed out the assailant, Holmes turned his lamp in that direction. He saw three men together, one holding a gun. On impulse Holmes pulled his pistol and fired five times, killing the man with the gun. The dead man was Matze,

stepfather of Bakah's wife. Matze, reported Chuna Bakah, "never did anything wrong, never mad, and never fight with anybody. . . . Wherever he goes everybody laughing for he joke all the time." Matze had held the gun to protect his daughter from S.B. 24. A coroner's jury forced Holmes to explain his mistake, but courts took no action.<sup>62</sup>

Local authorities showed indifference in other ways, too. Agents complained repeatedly that they freely awarded marriage certificates to underage girls. On other occasions, local authorities failed to prosecute Indians for illegal cohabitation. Often, local authorities looked the other way when Indians gambled or drank, even though Arizona had banned gambling in 1907 and Indian drinking tardily in 1917. Local authorities, moreover, refused to require off-reservation Indian children to attend public school, despite the fact that—as agents pointed out—compulsory education applied to Indians as well as whites.<sup>63</sup>

To Indians, freedom from prosecution was a positive good. Off the reservation, and often on it, they followed their own customs in matters of marriage and divorce. They sought shamans for curing rites. They continued dancing, singing, gambling, and drinking brews of corn and mescal. Dilzhe'es in particular, complained a Camp Verde agent, located themselves just outside reservation boundaries in order to escape "the rules or laws of the Federal government." Because they were not Arizona citizens, he added, Indians believed that they need not obey state law, either. The state, he lamented, confirmed them in that opinion. So long as Indians conducted "vices" among themselves, authorities let them be. "It is the same," he concluded, "at Clarkdale, Prescott, Mayer, Turkey, and Camp Verde."<sup>64</sup>

For prosecuting minor crimes, indeed, Indian courts often proved more effective—and more stern—than state courts. Indian police, to be sure, sometimes looked the other way when relatives consumed tulapai or kept children out of school. On the other hand, Indian police sometimes proved more gung-ho than did whites. On one occasion, the San Carlos chief of police failed to "use as much diplomacy as he should" in arresting men for drinking tulapai. The chief and his deputy shot off one man's finger and shot another man in the abdomen and face. When a crowd of one hundred threatened to kill the entire police force along with the agency's white employees, the agent put his erring officers in jail. He then sent them to Roosevelt

Dam, where they could work quietly for wages until tempers subsided. Rather than charging the agent and his police with brutality, the BIA accused them of negligence in prosecuting Indians for liquor. Not long after that brouhaha, the agent—A. H. Symons—was gone.<sup>65</sup>

It was an odd episode. The eagerness of police to use force suggests animus between their clans or bands and those of the drinkers. What it also suggests is how dictatorial an agency could become. The fact that Indians gathered to protest, forcing the agent to send his policemen far away, however, suggests that dictatorship had limits. Resistance worked. The BIA's scolding of agent Symons for his lackluster tulapai prosecutions, on the other hand, suggests that Apache resistance itself had limits. An agent might concede ground to angry wards, but the BIA took back the ground. What is most noteworthy, however, is that BIA police took more vigorous action against law-breakers than did state, county, or city authorities.

Had off-reservation authorities shown greater zeal for prosecuting Indians than for prosecuting whites, one might infer racism. The absence of zeal, on the other hand, was its own sort of racism. Off-reservation authorities deemed Indians savage, undisciplined, unimportant. White authorities made no attempt to understand the sociology of Indian offenses in order to curb them. By allowing Indians to "be Indians," whites constructed caste. Whites enforced the law only on fellow whites and on Indians who committed crimes against whites. Subjection and obedience to law came to define "whiteness" in an ethnic Arizona populated by Italians, Slavs, Irish, Cornish, Basques, and Germans. By being left outside—or at least partly outside—the law, Indians inhabited a netherworld of "not white," a lower caste perceived as unruly, savage, unworthy of justice.

By moving off reservations, Indians chose their way of life, guided themselves into the future, conserved tradition. We should not too readily assume, however, that they always preferred to remain outside the law's purview. Kitch insisted, probably accurately, that Indian victims of assault, rape, or murder, along with their relatives, wanted attackers to suffer the wrath of the law.<sup>66</sup> If Indians were to give up clan retribution, they needed other modes of redress. Certainly they did not want authorities to intervene in every tulapai gathering, every gambling event, every traditional sing or dance. They did, however, want justice.

By escaping reservations, Apaches and Yavapais—and Indians elsewhere—shepherded themselves into an alien world. But they simultaneously shepherded themselves into caste. They picked cotton, graded roads, and made baskets. They worked wherever and whenever whites called them to work. For the most part, they made decent wages, or at least wages decent for unskilled work, which was in great demand in labor-poor Arizona. Yet employers seldom sought to integrate Indians into skilled or managerial positions. Seldom did they train Indian workers in the intricacies of technology and accounting.

Beyond the lack of investment, employers often discriminated. Sometimes they paid Indians lower wages than they paid whites. Even on the reservation, Indians received lower wages than white BIA employees, prompting complaints throughout the 1920s. Sometimes, too, it seems, mining companies did not offer Indians the medical care that they extended to whites. Mining unions, meanwhile, protested against Indian employment, even though Indians gravitated into jobs that few whites wanted. During recessions, Indians were the first to lose jobs. In good times, they were the last to be hired. “We want to give our people [white union members] employment,” wrote R. D. Kennedy of Globe, a labor official, to agent Symons in May 1921, “so would request that you discourage as much as possible the Indians from going to work.”<sup>67</sup> Indians, like Mexicans, got shunted into nonwhite status, a status with connotations of both caste and class. Indians, to be sure, lacked training and expertise, but they also lacked opportunity. Employers hired Indians for unskilled positions but invested nothing in Indian workers. Even unions refused them help.

For Indians, the benefits of working off the reservation outweighed the evils. Freedom was more important than equality. Indians’ first priority was not to become prosperous, disciplined, and politically active, but to re-create old ways. Those old ways included hunting, gathering, and communalism. They included, moreover, brewing tulapai and participating in games of chance. To re-create old ways, however, Indians had to create new ones. They had to leave the reservation and find work.

Even on reservations, Indians found ways to be both wage workers and traditionalists, both innovators and conservatives, both

antagonistic to white agents and friendly to them. To achieve freedoms on reservations, however, required that at least some Indians leave them behind. Had Indians taken no work outside reservations, agents would have found it easier to control their lives. Leaving the reservation gave Indians the ability to escape agents. It gave them, too, leverage over agents. If agents were tyrants, Indians could depart. Local authorities seldom prosecuted Indians for minor crimes. State and local authorities let Indians dance, engage in shamanism, gamble, even drink, so long as they did so quietly, among themselves, with no public show of disobedience.

Because Indians did not want to stay on reservations—and because the government wanted them to become independent—agents accepted Indian liberty. Camp Verde Indians, noted agent John Brown in 1927, had “scattered throughout the northern portion of the state,” where they worked for whites. “Their residence is movable,” he mused, “and most of the time is unknown. These belong to the group whose slogan for years has been ‘Let my People go,’ and my plan is to let them go as long and as far as they like so long as they obey the laws of the land and do not become public charges.”<sup>68</sup>

Yet in leaving reservations and working for whites, Apaches made a devil’s bargain. Though settlers no longer sought to exterminate Indians, they defined Indians as a lower order, a people suitable for unskilled labor but not for social equality, nor even for equal treatment under the law. Though whites learned to interact with Indians in ways humane and peaceful, they also made Indians into targets for reproach, sarcasm, and ridicule.

## *Indians and Agents*

BOTH INDIANS WHO LEFT RESERVATIONS and those who stayed achieved freedoms. Both remained dedicated to tradition. Those who stayed, however, faced a battery of restrictions. With the help of Indian courts and Indian police—jobs sought after for their steady pay—agents sought to stamp out gambling and drinking, and to minimize, if not abolish, dancing. Agents, however, did more than campaign against “sins”; they spun webs around Indians’ lives. What the BIA created was a paternalism not unlike that of the Old South, where powerful planters monitored impoverished slaves. Unlike slaveholders, agents sought to teach wards self-reliance. The point was to free Indians of government control. In ways subtle and overt, however, it was control that agents made paramount.

One of the things that agents sought to abolish was Indian religiosity. To regain power—to regain health and well-being—Indians, both on and off reservations, resumed old rituals, sings, and dances. They returned, moreover, to their shamans, their healers. Because shamans opposed “progress,” however, agents sought their defeat. What agents did not understand—or understood too well—was how central shamanic ritual was to Indian identity.

The most complex rituals involved curing. When a Dilzhe’e felt himself called to be a shaman—a “singer”—he located the nest of a mockingbird. In the nest he placed four stones or beads—blue, black, yellow, and white—signifying the four directions. Approached thus, the mockingbird gave the boy the power of song. His education, however, had only begun. With tutelage from a master, the boy had to learn dozens of chants, some with as many as thirty-two verses. He

learned not just words, but tone, tempo, and pitch. He also learned to manufacture talismans. To take away disease, a singer might pass wooden hoops—painted in the four sacred colors—over the afflicted person. He might use sand paintings, or paintings on buckskins. In addition he used animal talismans: bear claws, eagle feathers, bird skins, shells, fossils, crystals. Sometimes the singer used live animals. Fort Apache shamans used striped snakes and sand lizards. In addition, there were medicine hats, fetishes, tokens, staffs, and bags.<sup>1</sup>

To agents, shamans were enemies. To Indians, they were guides. They brought people from misery and despair to hope and power. The most important shamans were prophets. Even after Nock-el-del-kinny's death, Indian prophets came forward. Echawamahu, the Yavapai shaman, had called followers to leave San Carlos. In the twentieth century emerged an even more popular shaman, a Cibecue named Daslahdn who, with several disciples, taught the "rising upward" religion. Those who dressed in white and danced a special dance, he preached, would be lofted into the sky. A flood would meanwhile purge the earth, allowing the saved to return to live in peace and prosperity. Death, claimed Daslahdn, would not touch them; they would live forever. "Earth, it moves, it moves," sang the dancers; "black sky, it moves, it moves; sky standing; sky standing; they are talking about the sky standing."<sup>2</sup>

Agents and missionaries did their best to discredit the movement but it spread regardless. For several years, the dancing continued. Daslahdn and two disciples, however, died in quick succession, leaving a Cibecue named Big John and a few others to continue the movement. When no cloud came to loft the dancers into the sky, the faithful grew restive. When Big John left his Cibecue wife for another woman, the dancers deserted him.<sup>3</sup> The movement dissolved, only to emerge a decade later in a different form.

In 1916, a White Mountain shaman initiated the movement called "It Is Going to Happen." Like Daslahdn, he taught dancers to dress in white. He also instructed them to carry bags of cattail and corn pollen. On the appointed day, he prophesied, the dead mother of a distinguished scout would return to earth on a white horse. She, it was said, would escort the faithful into heaven. The sun, meanwhile, would destroy both God and Satan, ushering in a millennium. Other shamans—including a Cibecue named Taylay—joined

the movement, teaching their own variant prophecies. Some said an Apache deity would lift the faithful into the skies; other said it would be Jesus. When no deity appeared, the movement—like the “rising upward” religion—dissolved.<sup>4</sup>

The impulse behind the movement, however, survived. In the late 1910s, it was Silas John Edwards—or just “Silas John”—son of a shaman and scout, who launched a revitalization movement. He had climbed a rainbow, he claimed, to receive a message from Yosn’, the Apache giver of life. Silas John’s teachings—called “Silas John, His Sayings”—were syncretic. They blended Christian themes with traditional Apache spiritual practice. Impressed by an image from a Bible depicting Moses attaching a brass snake to a cross in order to heal the Israelites, Silas John made the snake into a holy icon. Silas John, indeed, used live snakes in rituals intended to heal the sick. The cross, too, became a powerful icon, partly because it signified the four directions and partly because of its association with Christianity. Silas John’s followers carried small crosses made of wood and painted with snake motifs in red, yellow, black, white, and blue. Eagle feathers—symbols of the culture hero Monster Slayer, *Na-iz-ġane*—fluttered from the ends of the crossbars. Each Sunday, the faithful gathered for worship on consecrated ground.<sup>5</sup>

San Carlos agents sought in vain to stop the new religion. In 1920, the agent forbade Silas John to hold dances until late fall, when snakes went into hibernation. In the next dozen years, agents found other pretexts. They jailed Silas John for holding dances, for assault, for wife abuse, for desertion, for illegal cohabitation, and for selling alcohol. Between 1920 and 1932, he spent twenty-three months under lock and key. His imbroglios spread his fame. He was magnetic. Women came under his sway. He left one wife, then another. Indians at Fort Apache accused him of sleeping with teenagers. Agents and missionaries castigated him. One agent sought to have him declared insane. Still his popularity soared. Not until 1933 did whites finally silence Silas John by convicting him—probably wrongly—of murdering his wife.<sup>6</sup>

What matters is not merely Silas John’s popularity; what matters is that his movement taught collective salvation. Like slaves in the antebellum South, Apaches placed little emphasis on individual sins. Collectively, not individually, they would be saved. Much as slaves


viewed themselves as a Mosaic people, soon to be led out of bondage and into the Promised Land, so Apaches and Yavapais saw themselves as peoples about to be led out into heaven, or, failing that, to a new earth of peace and plenty. Missionaries pushed in the other direction, working to instill Indians with an individual relationship with God, an individual sense of guilt, sin, conscience, good. Agents promoted missionaries and attacked Silas John, but with limited success.

Far from being neutralized, the movement spread. In 1922, Camp Verde Apaches raised funds to bring Silas John to their reservation, where he could teach his religion. They may or may not have succeeded; no records confirm any meeting. Dilzhe'es—many of whom visited San Carlos or had relatives there—learned Silas John dances regardless. Some Yavapais did likewise. Silas John followers were soon “dancing several hours each Saturday evening and on Sunday morning, and were making *tiswin* and *tulapai* and becoming intoxicated.” “The men,” noted Camp Verde agent J. O. Barnd, “play on a drum made of a kettle with a cloth or a leather stretched over it. The women dance with their arms around each other, while the men sway their bodies back and forth and around.”<sup>7</sup>

Aware, it seems, that if he forbade Silas John dances, Dilzhe'es would hold them off the reservation, Barnd made a deal. If the dancers would refrain from beating drums and from drinking, and if they would allow agents to inspect their meetings, he would allow services on both Saturday nights and Sunday mornings. To this, the dancers agreed.<sup>8</sup>

What Barnd may not have realized was that the movement involved more than dancing. Following a bureaucratic model common among whites, Silas John's followers appointed a president, assistant president, treasurer, assistant treasurer, and secretary, as well as official members and delegates. Beyond merely creating a bureaucracy, they created a way of life. Women received a white stone tied to an eagle feather—called *yoolt kie*—that they were to wear on their chests. The white stone and feather marked “the woman's way.” Men received turquoise stones tied to eagle feathers that marked “the man's way”; they, too, wore it on their chests.<sup>9</sup>

Silas John taught curing rituals, too. When a Camp Verde woman, niece to a Dilzhe'e named Charlie Nockeye (fig. 8.1), came down with tuberculosis, Nockeye performed Silas John's special sings. He



**Figure 8.1.** Charlie Nockeye, former scout and returnee to Verde Valley, both befriended settlers and embraced the Silas John movement. This photo appeared in *Progressive Arizona* in November 1929. University of Arizona Special Collections.

directed his niece, moreover, to wash her white stone every morning and to apply tule pollen—*hoddintin*—to her cheeks. Nockeye sang and beat a drum, telling his niece “I’ll worship and you follow me.” To be healed, he told her, she must talk to *clees*, the “big rattlesnake.”<sup>10</sup>

Nockeye’s niece, however, had begun attending Christian services, which she continued to do during her illness. When her fellow Christians counseled her against Silas John’s teachings, she became ashamed. At last she told her uncle that she had chosen to follow the Christian way. For “a long time” he remained silent, secluding himself in a separate room. When he emerged, he directed her to put away her yoolt kie. She should speak to the yoolt kie, he told her, then hide it forever. She did so. Soon she was well.<sup>11</sup>

With agents and missionaries fighting Silas John at every turn—indeed fighting all shamans—it is hardly surprising that Indians became conflicted. They developed what scholars—taking their lead from the great African American writer and civil rights activist W. E. B. DuBois—call “double consciousness.”<sup>12</sup> Double consciousness grew from conflicting loyalties. On the one hand, one might be black, or Indian, and proud to be so, but on the other hand, one was also American and perhaps Christian. Both Indians and blacks sought to retain traditional values, practices, and behaviors, but they also sought respectability in the culture at large. Pride in one’s heritage stood cheek by jowl with self-doubt.

Such tensions were often internalized. They could, however, lead to quarrels between individuals. In 1923, for example, one Howard Dunn, abetted by Allan and Fred Brooks, stabbed a Dilzhe’e named Charles Baker at a camp near Miami. Dunn and the Brooks brothers, it seems, had become bitter that their cousin, Baker, refused to attend an “Indian dance” held on Sundays. Almost certainly the dance was a Silas John ceremony. By making Sunday into a sacred day, Silas John both borrowed Christian teachings and competed with Christianity.<sup>13</sup>

On four successive Sundays, Dunn had come to Baker’s gowa to fetch him to the dance. Each time Baker refused, telling Dunn “this is no way to do. . . . You are supposed to worship [the Christian God] and be good.” On the last of those occasions, Baker asked Dunn “what is the reason you come after me and run after me all day long? Now, I don’t want you to run after me no more, better go home, don’t bother me.” Baker then gave Dunn a shove. Dunn promptly stalked off to get a gun, saying only “we are men, we’ve got the gall to fight each other. We are men.” The “pagan” Dunn returned not with a gun but with a knife, with which he stabbed the Christian man, Baker. Though Dunn failed to kill Baker, the wound became infected. Baker died of sepsis in the Globe hospital.<sup>14</sup>

The argument between Baker and Dunn was not solely about religion. It was about solidarity. Christianity pushed Apaches apart, even Apache kinsmen. In refusing to participate in Silas John dances, Baker refused solidarity. To do so was no minor matter. Spiritual movements had unified diverse Indians for centuries. In the twelfth century, or perhaps the sixteenth, depending on how one counts, a prophet named Daganawida is said to have recruited a disciple

named Hiawatha. Together they united five warring peoples—Iroquois speakers—into a confederacy. In the eighteenth century, a Delaware named Neolin spawned a similar movement that united Indian peoples against British colonists. In the early nineteenth century, yet another prophet, a Shawnee named Tenskwatawa, spawned a movement that united tribes against Americans.

The movements of Neolin and Tenskwatawa dissipated after battlefield defeats, yet prophets continued to appear, uniting Indian peoples and giving them spiritual identity. Many of those prophets preached peace. The Seneca prophet Handsome Lake, for example, blended Christian teachings with native rituals, thus creating “the Good Way,” a religion that gave new hope, new solidarity, to Iroquois peoples without putting them at odds with whites. Wovoka, the Paiute prophet, similarly taught Indians to work cheerfully for whites. Someday, he promised, whites would go away and the buffalo would return. His doctrine, however, was not war.

Neither did Silas John preach war. What agents found disturbing about his movement—and Indian dances and sings generally—was not their violence but their “immorality.” Indian dances, according to a 1921 BIA circular, “involve acts of self-torture, immoral relations between sexes, the sacrificial destruction of clothing or other useful articles, the reckless giving away of property, the use of injurious drugs or intoxicants, and frequent or prolonged periods of celebration which brings the Indians together from remote points to the neglect of their crops, livestock, and home interests.”<sup>15</sup>

Even dances that did not lead to those evils promoted “superstitious cruelty, licentiousness, idleness, danger to health, and shiftless indifference to family welfare.” Dancing, finally, created “savagery” and demoralization.<sup>16</sup>

In battling Silas John, agents battled “savagery.” They also battled Apache solidarity. Silas John sought to unite bands and clans. Indeed he sought to unite Apache tribes: Cibecue, White Mountain, Pinal, Aravaipa, and Dilzhe’*e*. He sought, moreover, to unite Apaches at Globe, Superior, Roosevelt, and camps elsewhere. New rituals promised to save Apaches not by lifting them into the skies, but by uniting them in the here and now.

In forbidding Indians to embrace Silas John, agents kept Apaches divided, dependent, and subordinate. Here, as elsewhere, Indians

fell victim to caste. In spiritual matters, agents allowed Indians to act independently but not collectively, leaving them with limited choices. Yes, Indians could leave the reservation and follow the Silas John religion, but they could do so only by working for whites in low-skill occupations.

The Silas John religion, however, was the only force for unification. Christianity, oddly, could play that role, though not the Christianity preached by whites. "The Missionaries have been among us," wrote a group of twenty-five San Carlos men to agent Ernest Stecker in 1921, "a failure it seems. . . . So in the year 1920, we have called together a few of our leading Indians and decided to take this step, to hold a Prayer Meeting every Sunday which is open to all our Indians who desire to come there." "Heretofore," they explained, "we have been worshipping things such as the sun, the different movements of clouds, winds, stars and many other things which God created." Now, they wished to hold services in Apache in order to "teach every one of our Creator and the life of Jesus Christ." They also sought to teach Indians "to do away with all evil habits, such as drinking, stealing, and finally [to] influence [Indian people] to live a clean life, a Godly life." What they did not want was help from missionaries. "It will not be well," they explained, "to force civilized church work on our people, who have for past unknown ages, been untouched by such proceedings; we desire to take [conversion] step by step, and if fate does not interfere hope to induce our Apache Indians to live a pure Christian life, such as they never dreamed of." What the petitioners sought, finally, was permission to worship each Sunday on their own "Prayer Grounds."<sup>17</sup>

One year later, a different group—twenty-four men from the Rice subdistrict, many of them Dilzhe'es—presented Stecker with a similar petition. We "beg of you," they wrote, "to give us the same Privilege [sic] as the San Carlos District Indians, to have our Religious Sermonies [sic] and without being molested by Agitators, and We do solomly [sic] Promise that we will carry out, abide and do just what you tell us, as we are anxious that we have Your Approval, first."<sup>18</sup> No records show whether Stecker approved either petition, though he probably did. The petitioners proposed to bring the very morality that agents promoted.

There is a subtext, however, that suggests something else. The San Carlos petitioners sought to ban missionaries from their services. The

Rice petitioners, similarly, sought to ban “agitators.” Precisely who agitators were is a mystery, though the term may well have referred to missionaries. Indians wished to avoid white oversight, it seems, because their worship involved dancing. The Apaches “have a kind of religious sect,” admitted agent James Kitch in 1925—apparently referring to Christian ceremonies at San Carlos and Rice—“and in a mild way indulge in singing at their meetings and sometimes a few steps.” He noted, however, that Apaches held no “snake dances” (Silas John rituals) nor did they participate in “give aways” or other “objectionable features.”<sup>19</sup>

Whatever the case, the message was clear: Apaches wanted Christianity, but they wanted it on their own terms. They wanted to worship in their own way. Though Indians, or at least some Indians, embraced Christianity, they gave it a very different iteration than did whites. They made it into a force not of division and alienation, but of solidarity and continuity.

What Kitch’s observations also suggest is that, though agents wanted to ban dancing, they found it impossible to do so. From as early as the 1910s, San Carlos agents were allowing dances throughout the year, though only when approved, monitored, and relatively brief, and never on Sundays. Agent A. H. Symons justified the practice, explaining that dancing must be eliminated gradually, not all at once. Kitch agreed, finding that, by 1924, dancing at San Carlos was “indulged in but once a year and [is] under supervision and [does] no possible harm to the morals or industrial conditions” of Indians. Neither Lutheran nor Catholic missionaries, he added, objected to Indian social dances, though they objected to religious ones.<sup>20</sup> Likely Kitch understated the amount of dancing. Certainly he knew that Christian Indians continued to dance on occasion. In all likelihood, pagan Indians, too, continued to dance, though not with Kitch’s blessing or knowledge.

If Kitch grudgingly allowed the occasional dance, Camp Verde agents went further. “I am a little short on argument,” noted agent Joe Taylor in 1915, “to convince [them] of the evils of [dancing] when those in authority[,] . . . who are supposed to lead [them] to higher things, engage in similar amusements with greater frequency.” Five years later, Taylor reported that Apache dances “are always conducted in a very commendable way, [and] are far more decorous than

the frequent ones which are held by the white people,” whose events included “rowdiness and bootlegging.” C. V. Peel, who succeeded Taylor at Camp Verde, showed even greater appreciation for Indian dances. “They danced for rain,” he observed, “and endeavored to show their appreciation to God for what he had done for them, etc. Their dances are always very orderly and the only damage done is to themselves, which is brought about by their staying up all night.”<sup>21</sup> At Camp Verde, agents even allowed Silas John dances.

Off the reservation, Indians needed no permission. On Beaver Creek—some fifteen miles from the Camp Verde Agency—Dilzhe’e dancers met regularly. “This is on privately owned land,” complained agent John Brown, and “not subject to the jurisdiction” of agents. Settlers, it seems, made no objections to the dances, so long as they countenanced no violence toward whites. The Wingfield family, owners of a dry goods store, went so far as to supply groceries to Dilzhe’e dancers, thus providing materials for the feasting that accompanied ceremonies.<sup>22</sup> On the reservation, Indians danced under the oversight of agents. Off the reservation, they danced freely.

In sum, agents failed to ban shamans. They failed, indeed, to dampen Indian worship. Whether Indians joined the Silas John movement, became Christians, or remained attached to local shamans, they followed independent paths in matters of the spirit. In other realms, however, they met other challenges.

In other arenas, too, agents sought to construct webs around Indian lives. One of those arenas was sex. By gathering sexual gossip and by disciplining delinquents—or at least those believed to be delinquent—agents exerted paternal authority. In 1921, for example, agent Symons refused to allow a girl to return from Phoenix Indian School to her lover’s home at San Carlos, arguing that he was not “well qualified to furnish the social condition that would be best for the young girl.” Symons could not force the girl to return to school. At sixteen, she was no longer subject to compulsory schooling. She was old enough to marry. Symons, however, directed her to return to her parents.<sup>23</sup>

A similar situation occurred three years later when a Camp Verde man impregnated a fifteen-year-old girl from San Carlos. Agent Kitch initially threatened to charge him with statutory rape. Instead, Kitch

required him to marry his lover. Kitch then lobbied the BIA to allow white employees to adopt the baby, they having grown fond of it while giving it care. A decade later, Kitch dealt with similar imbroglio. On hearing that an Indian policeman was sleeping with a school girl at Rice, Kitch fired the policeman and put him on a blacklist. After Kitch determined that the girl had “a reputation,” however, he cleared the man for employment.<sup>24</sup>


Subsequent situations prompted like responses. In 1934, a young woman named Ruby Beauty left her husband for another man. Though her husband offered to take her back, she instead fell in love with a third man. She sought not only a divorce but also an immediate marriage to her new beau. Kitch refused, fearing that her feckless behavior might provoke tensions between the families and clans of her lovers.<sup>25</sup>

Even the appearance of misconduct prompted intervention. In 1925, Kitch scolded the Indian seamstress at Rice for “dancing cheek to cheek” with the teenage son of the disciplinarian. Though Kitch approved weekly “entertainments”—including couples’ dancing—he demanded strict oversight. In matters moral, believed Kitch, the school must set an example. Kitch went so far as to chide a Gila County public school teacher stationed at Rice—her classroom was for children of white employees—for going hunting with a sixteen-year-old Indian boy named Carter Newlove.<sup>26</sup>

Indians on the reservation—and sometimes off it—had only to look over their shoulders to see their agent’s scolding visage. He regulated, or at least tried to regulate, marriage and sex. He dictated how many cattle Indians could sell or butcher. He interfered in child-raising practices (fig. 8.2). He forbade Indians to buy corn, fearing they might use it to make tulapai. He corresponded with employers, recommending that they hire only Indians whom he approved. Men who drank or who refused to put their children in school could expect no jobs. Agents even monitored Indians’ financial affairs. During the 1930s, hundreds of Apache and Yavapai men worked for the Indian Emergency Conservation program administered by the Civilian Conservation Corps in concert with the BIA. The BIA held back \$10 a month from each man’s salary as savings. When laborers petitioned for their savings to purchase cars or pay debts, Kitch urged the BIA to refuse. The savings, he argued, must be used for “actual



**Figure 8.2.** BIA agents wove webs around Indian lives even as they sought Indians' goodwill. This photo from James Kitch's 1924 annual report is captioned "Old style of baby carrier, which we are trying to abolish." Superintendent of Indian Affairs Annual Narrative and Statistical Field Agency Reports, 1907–1938, National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, DC.



**Figure 8.3.** Major Smiley, here pictured in 1888, served as a scout and later returned to Verde Valley. When he asked the San Carlos agent in 1930 to release his savings so he could purchase a car, the agent refused. National Anthropological Archives, Smithsonian Institution, NAA INV 9949000.

emergencies or necessities,” never “luxuries.”<sup>27</sup> To Kitch’s way of thinking, neither cars nor debts met that standard.

Old men, too, could expect no “luxuries.” When in 1930, an elderly Dilzhe’e named Major Smiley (fig. 8.3), a former scout and now a pensioner, asked the agent to release his savings so that he could buy a car, the agent turned him down. “You ought to leave [your savings] here until you die,” inveighed the agent, “so that you might have a decent funeral. . . . We cannot buy cars for everybody.” The answer must have given the old man pause. He was not asking the government to buy him a car; he was asking for his own money. Traditional Apache funerals, moreover, cost nothing. Relatives of

the deceased destroyed his or her possessions and abandoned, or burned, his or her gowa. Agents, however, wanted Indians to be buried in coffins.<sup>28</sup>

Leisure activities received similar scrutiny. To the many “requests for pool halls on this jurisdiction,” Kitch said no. Pool halls, he feared, would promote gambling. Though card games were permitted, players were forbidden to exchange money. The height of paternalism, however, had come with agent Symons’s 1921 ban on soda pop. In a bulletin “TO ALL TRADERS ON SAN CARLOS INDIAN RESERVATION,” Symons insisted that soda, though not “intoxicating or injurious,” corrupted Indian morals. “Indians,” he explained, “will stand at the counter and spend his [sic] last nickel for drinks when his family needs it for rations.”<sup>29</sup>

Traders reacted with scorn. Indians, noted one trader, bought many items that were less essential than soda, yet no one sought to ban those items. When Indians did buy soda, he added, they often gave it to children. Too, if Indians were to be denied soda, they would ship it from Globe. Reservation Apaches were already purchasing soda in Globe, which they then dispensed at ball games and dances. Most damning was the trader’s closing statement: “When an Indian comes into the store after a day’s work in the hot sun and sees other people enjoying a cool drink and is refused the same privilege [sic], it is going to cause him to feel pretty sore, and as the feeling at present is anything but amiable, I do not feel like antagonizing them any more.”<sup>30</sup>

Paternalism had limits; even the commissioner of Indian affairs knew that. The ban on soda was a step too far. Just three months after Symons announced his ban, Commissioner Charles Burke directed him to repeal it.<sup>31</sup>

What matters is not simply the pettiness of rules or their repeal. What matters is the pattern. Whether by banning gambling or pool, liquor, or just soda, agents promoted a sociology of conscience. They sought to make wards into models of middle-class deportment. Under the direction of agents, Indians would save money rather than spend it recklessly. They would devote themselves to steady habits rather than immediate pleasures. They would marry suitable mates and stay loyal. They would work with purpose and commitment, not for quick gratification. As sternly as they fought Indian “sin,” however, agents left loopholes. Paternalism was not absolute.

The analog that comes to mind is the antebellum plantation. In his classic study, *Roll, Jordan, Roll: The World the Slaves Made*, Eugene Genovese demonstrated the powerful bonds that plantation paternalism created. Masters measured themselves via the love of their slaves . . . or at least the pretended love of their slaves. If slaves learned to feign love, however, they also learned obligation. Masters cultivated obligation by giving slaves extra food, hand-me-down garments, alcoholic beverages, small wages. Often, masters turned a blind eye to slaves' covert sojourns at night. At times, masters gave slaves more. After hearing complaints, masters might well fire cruel overseers.<sup>32</sup> Even those who despised their enslavement, then, could become emotionally attached to enslavers (though seldom with the purity that masters imagined).

Masters also gave slaves a measure of religious freedom. Slaves—by manipulating masters who craved affection and respect—gained the wherewithal to worship, unwatched, unmolested, in forests and fields. The religion that slaves preached, to be sure, did not countenance paternalism. With its Old Testament emphasis on the deliverance of Jews from bondage, slave religion taught collective salvation. Blacks—like Apaches—were to be saved not as individuals, but as a group. They were to be saved, moreover, from whites.<sup>33</sup>

The promise of liberation did not necessarily trump paternalism. If religion unified slaves behind a message of deliverance, paternalism kept them separate. Paternalism taught slaves to value masters' goodwill. It taught slaves to serve masters rather than defy them. The benevolence of paternalism, along with its wrath—whippings, mutilations, lynchings—kept North American slaves from revolting (unlike in Brazil and the Caribbean, where slave revolts were frequent). Not all slaves were beholden to masters; perhaps a minority were. Or, more likely, slaves' impulses were mixed; sometimes they despised masters, sometimes they felt loyalty. What matters is that the psychology of paternalism—and the obligation it instilled—gave the system ballast.<sup>34</sup> It created emotional bonds where none should exist. It gave specious legitimacy to a system that accorded some men vast rights and others none at all.

A similar sociology appeared on reservations. Like masters, agents, with other Indian Service employees, created what one scholar calls "intimate colonialism." By establishing personal relationships with

Indians, they became “federal fathers and mothers.” Being fathers and mothers, however, did not make employees into dictators. Unlike antebellum planters, Indian Service employees could not wholly act the part of lesser gods, endowed with powers of love and wrath, decision and judgment. They remained under the direction of the commissioner of Indian affairs, who took orders from the secretary of the interior and the president. Year in and year out, the commissioner sent circulars—orders—to employees in the field.<sup>35</sup> The BIA developed policy; agents implemented it. Agents, unlike planters, were employees. “Intimate colonialism” remained bureaucratic.

Insofar as agents were employees, they resembled plantation overseers. Like overseers, agents might be fired or transferred if complaints from subalterns reached a high enough pitch. Even agents who won approbation—or seeming approbation—from wards held limited tenure. An agent might remain two, three, four years, a decade, but seldom longer. Short tenure, along with the vast size and population of many agencies, worked against “intimate colonialism.” Agents and employees could not always develop the sort of personal relations that masters developed with slaves. A small agency like Camp Verde encouraged close relations. San Carlos, which was far larger, made such relations difficult.

If BIA authority and the sometimes impersonal nature of agent-Indian relations worked against paternalism, however, other factors sustained it. Agents, indeed, had more reason to practice benevolence than did slaveholders. Unlike planters, agents could not arbitrarily order canings, whippings, or executions. In cases of minor infractions, they deferred to Indian courts (though agents’ recommendations carried much weight). In cases of major crimes, agents deferred to state and federal courts. Agents lacked power to coerce. Just as important, they lacked incentive to coerce.

Unlike antebellum masters, agents sought no profit. If a slave refused to work, a master’s profits declined. To make slaves work, masters resorted to whips (although, one hastens to add, profits suffered when masters became overbearing; slaves found ways to slow down). Agents, by contrast, received fixed salaries, no matter how hard Indians worked. At least in some situations, then, agents had incentive to prevail via kindness. The inverse, however, was equally true: No profit motive compelled agents to wheedle Indians into

backbreaking work. No profit motive compelled either kindness or scolding.

To reduce the dynamics to profit, however, is too simple. Equally important was socialization. Slaveholders learned to be benevolent—and often cruel—masters from the time they were children. Agents came from a different environment. Many came from the North or Midwest, where they had absorbed the lessons of conscience and self-help. Even as they sought Indian gratitude, they trained wards for independence. In allowing, then encouraging, Apaches and Yavapais to leave San Carlos, agents hoped to achieve just that. Agency schools—by teaching Indian children lessons in farming, construction, stock raising, cooking, domestic work, and “good” morals—reinforced the message.

Whatever the differences between master and agent, between slave and ward, between South and West, paternalism offered similar rewards. Both systems—plantation and reservation—gave sufficient reward to “king and commoner” to ensure at least some continuity. Not all Indians—nor all slaves—appreciated white paternalists. Indians, like slaves, had mixed and complex emotions. At times they resented white authorities; at other times, they gave them praise. Enough Indians submitted to paternalism enough of the time, however, that the system gained traction. As late as the 1930s—when a handful of Apaches took control of San Carlos and Camp Verde—others prized continuity, fearing calamity if the government abdicated its role.<sup>36</sup>

On both reservations and plantations, stability came from elasticity. Paternalism was a system of trades: Superiors offered small liberties in exchange for honor and approval. Planters “paid” for goodwill. Agents proved equally malleable. They proved so malleable that, far from promoting individualism, they at times bolstered communalism.

Consider Camp Verde. Much as Apache and Yavapai men had brought home horses and cattle, so now agents brought chickens and cows. Much as women had grown corn, melons, and beans, so now agents offered seeds and saplings. Agency farmers, indeed, went so far as to plow and harvest. Agents also brought funds for new buildings, new housing, new tools. In 1922, agent Barnd oversaw construction of a common root cellar at the agency’s school. There Indians could store produce. Barnd even set up a cooperative store. As of 1923,

Indians could put \$1 into a general fund that the agent used to buy wholesale goods in Clarkdale, which he turned over to Indians at cost.<sup>37</sup> Despite the failure of large-scale farming, meanwhile, Indians re-created the communitarian life they had known before conquest. The resources that they produced on farms, bought with wages, or received from the BIA were shared. What agents bolstered, ironically—what Indians used agents to bolster—was Indian tradition.

Even religion fit the pattern. Despite opposition to “pagan” ceremonies, agents allowed Indians to conduct old sings and dances. The Camp Verde agent even allowed Silas John dances, though he reserved the right to inspect them. If agents monitored dances on the reservation, however, Indians danced privately off the reservation, on private lands. At Fort Apache—and doubtless at San Carlos—Indians did not even need to find private land.<sup>38</sup> The reservation was so large that Indians could hold dances in secret, trusting in geography to keep them hidden. By both manipulating agents and escaping them, Indians created a measure of religious freedom. By both manipulating agents and escaping them, moreover, Indians buttressed communalism.

Settlers and Indian reformers cried foul, arguing that the BIA was doing too little to civilize its wards. According to the Arizona *Silver Belt*, the BIA was transforming Indians into dependents. By treating Indians as “mendicants and incompetents, incapable of working out their own deliverance,” the government made reservations into a “humiliating failure.” Despite the efforts of Indian schools, it concluded, the reservation’s “demoralizing influence” reversed any progress.<sup>39</sup>

Agents fretted that settlers were right. Whether settlers and agents realized it or not, however, reservations were precisely what allowed Indians to “work out their own deliverance,” to the degree that was possible. Reservations did not make Indians into ardent farmers and petty entrepreneurs, but they gave them protection. What was important was not whether Indians farmed for market and became individualists. What was important was that Indians insulated themselves from racism and chaos. Change swirled around them. Everywhere they met aliens: alien people, alien customs, alien values, alien expectations, alien work regimens, alien economics. In the face of all that, the reservation was a boat; communitarianism was an anchor.

Both by attaching themselves to reservations and by working outside, Indians moderated the pace of change. They achieved, finally, a measure of sovereignty.

Sovereignty did not mean harmony. In many cases, it meant conflict, particularly between women and men. Throughout the 1910s, 1920s, and 1930s, Indian gender relations continued to drift and to oscillate. Off the reservation—as well as on it—men struggled to define new roles, new authority. No longer were they warriors, raiders, and diplomats. Women, meanwhile, were no longer exclusive proprietors of farms, gowas, and gotas. Sometimes off-reservation Indians could recreate the gota in new settings; sometimes they could not. Often, men took wives with them when they left the reservation but were forced to leave older relatives behind. In doing so, couples achieved cultural freedoms and economic rewards, but they also gave up something. They gave up, in particular, the protection and stability offered by kin, clan, and village. Though familial institutions remained powerful, they lacked the strength of pre-conquest times. As a consequence, domestic quarrels sometimes got out of hand.

One incident illustrates the situation. In 1913, a Dilzhe'e, Jim Charley, was convicted of killing his wife, known to the courts as T.A. 23. The killing occurred near Globe, where an Indian work crew was erecting power lines. Charley and several male friends were drinking tulapai and whiskey. Among the group was Ben Benson—a Dilzhe'e—whom Charley, it seems, believed to have slept with his wife. When Charley sought to lure Benson away from camp—perhaps to attack him—his wife followed. Charley ordered her to go home but she refused. Enraged, he knocked her down and began kicking her. Benson intervened but not before the woman was badly injured. "If I kill her," Charley told Benson, "it is none of your business. She is my wife."<sup>40</sup>

Later in the day, Benson returned to Charley's camp with two Apache boys to move the woman to another camp. One of the boys, however, refused to help, arguing that Charley had every right to kill his wife. With just one boy helping, Benson could not move the injured woman. As a last resort, he asked Charley to help. Instead, Charley attacked him with a rock and knocked him unconscious, telling those in camp that "if I killed him it is nobody's business."

“He has no close relations,” added Charley, thus issuing a taunt, an insult, and a statement of fact. Among Apaches, those without relatives were without power, without significance. A man without relatives could expect neither family nor clan to aid against enemies. Charley’s wife died the following morning. Though he met no retribution from Benson’s relatives, the county court found Charley guilty of murder.<sup>41</sup>

If Benson was without clan avengers, so was Charley’s wife. When a man killed his wife—when he committed an honor killing—her relatives were not obliged to avenge her. Before Charley was convicted, however, one of the victim’s kinswomen pursued her own sort of justice. Ke-in-a-ki, the victim’s aunt, attacked Charley’s sister, Na-nitro-ki. In tears, Ke-in-a-ki approached Na-nitro-ki’s camp, saying “I want you to kill me, too. . . . I came over here to get killed, too.” She sat on a bucket, sobbing and cursing her adversary. Na-nitro-ki called the murdered woman an adulteress, then ran away. Ke-in-a-ki pursued, caught up, and stabbed her. The wound, though deep, turned out to be minor. The court found Ke-in-a-ki guilty of assault.<sup>42</sup>

Why did Ke-in-a-ki single out Charley’s sister? Why did no one intervene? Such mysteries seem beyond answer. What we can say, however, is that the incident illustrates confusion. Charley was confused by his wife’s defection. Benson was confused about how to defend T.A. 23 from her outraged husband, who, according to some Apaches, had the right to kill his wife. Ke-in-a-ki was confused about justice. Her niece had been murdered. In her agony, she wished to die. But she also sought vengeance. To take vengeance on Charley, however, must have seemed daunting. She instead took vengeance on his sister, whom she blamed for turning Charley against his wife.

The murder of T.A. 23 was not the only instance of domestic violence. The *Silver Belt* reported at least eleven attacks by Indian men on Indian women—usually the perpetrator’s wife—between 1912 and 1925. Agents reported others. The most notorious case was Henry Early’s 1919 killing of his wife and her two alleged lovers at a road camp near Roosevelt, though other cases were equally sanguine. Whether Apache men attacked their wives more often than white men attacked theirs is impossible to say without further study. Whatever the comparative rate of domestic violence, it is clear that at least some Apache men remained attached to a patriarchal honor

that occasionally spawned bloodshed. Some Apache men, moreover, remained attached to clan vengeance against men who killed other men. The Henry Early killing very nearly led to a counterattack by the kinsmen and clan relatives of the dead men.<sup>43</sup>

Comprehending the instability, friction, and even danger that came with living off the reservation—or even on it—women sought agents' assistance. In 1926, the Fort Apache agent wrote the San Carlos agent, James Kitch, on behalf of an Apache woman who had asked him for help. She had married a Dilzhe'e who lived near Camp Verde. He, however, had abandoned her, taking her earnings and some of her horses. On the mistaken premise that her husband was enrolled at San Carlos, the Fort Apache agent asked Kitch to counsel him to resolve matters with his wife.<sup>44</sup>

Four years later, Kitch received a similar letter from a Dilzhe'e woman who had been abandoned by her husband. Rather than ask Kitch to counsel her husband to return, she asked him to help her find a job. Meanwhile she lived at her father's camp near Globe. In 1933, Kitch stepped into yet another quarrel when he sent a letter to a Dilzhe'e husband via the Payson justice of the peace. The letter is not extant, but the response is. After the justice of the peace had the man's literate son read Kitch's letter aloud, the man asked his son to write a reply. If his wife would return "without delay," promised the man, he would be "good" to her.<sup>45</sup>

John Brown, Camp Verde agent and superintendent of the Phoenix Indian School in the late 1920s and 1930s, received similar queries from women living off the reservation. In 1929, a Yavapai woman asked Brown to counsel her husband to give up his mistress. The mistress, she explained, was a fourteen-year-old Indian girl who lived in Clarkdale. The Yavapai woman assured Brown that her husband still professed to love her, but he was swayed by relatives who preferred that he remain with his mistress. The girl, she insisted, was "a harlot." In the next sentence, however, she cast blame on her husband. "No young girl," she insisted, would be "safe there" if her husband was allowed to continue sleeping with his mistress. Brown replied that, since the husband lived off the reservation, he could not arrest him; only state authorities could do that, and they refused to act. Brown did write him a letter, however, threatening to have him prosecuted for statutory rape if he did not return to his wife.<sup>46</sup>

In 1931, Brown read another entreaty. An Indian woman—apparently a Yavapai—wrote from Mayer to report being hit in the face by a young Indian man. “We don’t want [him to] stay here in Mayer [and] fight with a girl,” she insisted. “He hit me on my face make me sick.”<sup>47</sup> There is no record of what action Brown took. Records do show, however, that Indian women continued to seek help.

Women who remained on the reservation proved equally adept at seeking assistance. When in 1920 a San Carlos man sold a horse that belonged to his wife, she sought divorce. She also asked agent Symons to forbid him to sell more horses. In 1921, Symons placed himself at the center of a different sort of struggle on behalf of Indian women—and simultaneously a struggle for his own hegemony—when he sought to send several “older girls” to the Phoenix Indian School to prevent them from being “let out”—prostituted—to adults. Assuming the girls, or young women, involved themselves with adult men, they may have done so voluntarily, though no records confirm that speculation. Symons, at any rate, thought that this particular “custom” demeaned women and should stop immediately.<sup>48</sup>

In 1932, a marital dispute again demanded agent Kitch’s attention. A Dilzhe’e father reported to Kitch that his daughter’s Cibecue husband was abusing her. Kitch instructed the agency farmer at Cibecue to look into the matter, but the farmer found no evidence to confirm the charge. Kitch found in 1934, however, that his own decisions contributed to trouble. When a woman complained that an Apache man had thrown her out of his home, pulling out wads of her hair and kicking her in the face, Kitch inquired as to the cause. The woman had gone to her attacker’s home seeking beer. The attacker—angry that Kitch had chosen the victim’s husband, an expert plasterer, over him for construction projects—exploded.<sup>49</sup> Having helped create tension, Kitch sought to defuse it. More important, he sought to protect women from abuse.

Time and again, agents came to the aid of Indian women, whether to help them find jobs off the reservation or to protect them from abuse and infidelity.<sup>50</sup> Agents, however, could only help those who sought them out. Without intelligence from Indians, they could do little. It is impossible to say how many women—or their relatives—approached agents about problems. Some took their cases directly to tribal court. Others remained silent. Some, however, sought agents’ assistance.

Both on and off the reservation, women—at least some women—transformed paternalism into protection. They sought to use agents to buttress their power in a world of uncertainty. Apache and Yavapai gender roles continued to bend and oscillate. New stresses—repeated dislocations, racism, subjection—exacerbated frictions. Some women gained power by working in the homes of whites, thus earning both wages and access to intermediaries. Yet Apache women, like white women, continued to meet occasional abuse and neglect from men. By seeking agents' help, women sought to improve their lives.

It is important to note that women were not necessarily taking sides in a battle against male “delinquency.” When Apache and Yavapai men treated their wives well—when they protected, cared, and provided for them—women sought no help from agents. Women, indeed, helped men engage in illicit activities. Women brewed tiswin and tulapai for male social gatherings. Women gambled alongside men. Women accompanied men to dances and sings. Women did not oppose things traditional. They simply played off one sort of patriarchy—that of agents—against another sort of patriarchy—that of Indian men. By creating competition between agents and Indian men, women gave themselves a modicum of power (fig. 8.4).

Indian men sought assistance, too. Frequently men asked agents to help them find jobs. Sometimes they asked for help in finding jobs closer to home. Sometimes they asked for help with enlisting in the National Guard or the US Army. Often they asked agents to intervene in financial matters. Time and again, business and financial institutions—automobile dealers, banks, savings and loans—signed up Indians for services. Indians bought cars on credit, purchased bonds, deposited money in savings. Often, however, they did not understand contractual obligations (creditors were notorious for failing to explain). When Indians failed to make payments—or when a depository went bankrupt—Indians lost investments. In those situations, agents stepped in. Though they could not always recover investments, agents helped debtors in another way. With authority from court decisions and the BIA, they barred creditors from entering reservations to repossess property. If creditors loaned money to Indians who failed to make payments, they could expect no help from the government.<sup>51</sup> Let the seller beware.

At times, men—like women—even sought agents' help in their marital lives. In 1939, a Camp Verde man asked the San Carlos agent



**Figure 8.4.** Apache and Yavapai women sometimes appealed to agents to control abusive or philandering husbands. At other times, women helped men engage in “illicit” traditions, including gambling, making *tulapai*, and holding sings and dances. The Apaches in this photograph by Reverend E. E. Guenther, c. 1910s, are from East Clear Creek. They are likely members of the Two Hills in a Row clan. Sharlot Hall Museum Library and Archives, Prescott, Arizona.

to help him get back his wife. His wife’s father, he insisted, had forcibly taken her to San Carlos. Though she wanted to return to her husband, her parents forbade her to do so until the husband paid them for her care. “There may be some other reasons for this trouble that I do not know,” he concluded.<sup>52</sup> No records show whether the agent took action.

Men also sought agents’ help in quarrels with other men. Rather than resort to violence, men sought mediation. To some extent, men had always preferred mediation, but honor compelled them at times to fight. Now, however, they sought agents’ help in keeping

the peace. In 1938, a Dilzhe'e at Camp Verde, Jack Gilson, told the San Carlos agent that another Indian "was going to kill" him. Gilson hoped the agent would fetch the aggressor and take him to San Carlos. "What kind of a boy is he?" asked Gilson. "Find out and write me again. P.S. Also send me the name of chief of police—Indian."<sup>53</sup>

Seven years earlier, the very same Jack Gilson, then a mere boy, had corresponded with a different agent. Early in 1932, Gilson had appeared at the Phoenix Indian School, apparently to visit siblings, or, perhaps, to see whether he might want to attend. The supervisor, Carl Skinner, then drove Gilson back to Camp Verde. A few days later, Skinner sent the boy a note asking how things were at home. "I am surely sorry," he wrote, to learn that the boy's father was in jail. "Everyone tells me," continued Skinner, "that [he] is a fine man and a good worker and that he gets into trouble only when he drinks. . . . I am counting on you, Jack, and I know that you are going to let whisky alone."<sup>54</sup>

Skinner must have been surprised at the response. After proposing to visit Phoenix Indian School again "for a couple or three days at most," young Gilson noted that "these white people is duging [sic] Indians [sic] graves out I think that [is] what there [sic] doin'." An archaeological team under University of Arizona's Byron Cummings was excavating the area around Montezuma's Castle. When Indians—including Gilson—objected, Cummings agreed to cease exhuming human remains. Pot hunters, however—men eager to sell ancient pottery to collectors—continued to exhume. "The Indians," noted Skinner in 1934, "have been quite worked up . . . because of the grave robbing. . . . This seems to be a new 'racket' for the earning of bread and butter by someone up in that part of the country." Skinner—perhaps thanks to a boy's letter—asked the commissioner of Indian affairs to investigate the robbing and appoint Indians to guard burial sites.<sup>55</sup>

The boy Gilson's concern over grave robbery illustrates the power of Indians to appeal to agents' paternalist sympathies. Other appeals were prosaic but equally telling. Apache prisoners in the federal penitentiary at Leavenworth, Kansas, asked the agent to put them in touch with friends and relatives. A prisoner in a local jail, meanwhile, asked agent Kitch to lobby for his early release. Kitch agreed to do so, though his effort did not succeed. Camp Verde Indians, meanwhile, asked agents to investigate thefts that they attributed

to fellow Indians. Still others asked for the dates of Indian school dances, or for accommodations at the Phoenix Indian School, or for information on sick relatives in distant towns. One Camp Verde man asked his agent for baseball mitts, bats, and balls. "This Indian here likes to play ball. We got no money to buy . . . so if you help us n [sic] sent [sic] gloves to us, we'll be alright. . . . If you sent us your old gloves We Might Play You too.<sup>56</sup>

What developed, finally, was not wholly a paradigm of ruler and ruled. On one level, agents spun webs around Indians' lives. Agents mediated almost every facet of Indian life, from religion to sex. Agents imposed conscience. At the same time, agents—like antebellum planters—gave wards liberty. To earn goodwill, agents offered protection, favors, small freedoms. Indians, it seems, turned paternalism to their own ends. In particular they gained religious and social freedom. They continued to hold dances and sings, to participate in Silas John rituals, even to create Apache idioms of Christianity.

On still another level, paternalism offered Indians a way to negotiate gender. Women especially sought agents' help, help that gave them new powers precisely when they were losing old ones. Though they often remained keepers of *gota* and *gowa*, those institutions had weakened. Some women continued to practice shamanism—particularly rites connected with female puberty, fertility, and love—but they no longer anchored clans and bands to geographical place.<sup>57</sup> In the new regime, men, too, lost powers. No longer could men demonstrate honor by seizing livestock and captives. No longer did male honor permit attacks against wives, even in cases of adultery. No longer did men mediate relations with other tribes. No longer did they decide when and where to move camps. So long as they remained on the reservation, moreover, they no longer could avoid farming.

Amid the tensions stirred by changes in gender relations, women used agents to shield themselves from infidelity and abuse. Men sometimes used agents to the same ends. Agents became intermediaries in Indian efforts to negotiate honor, marriage, and gender more broadly. To describe paternalism as it developed on the reservation, however, is to understand only one aspect of a broader phenomenon. Paternalism also developed outside.

## *Indians and Settlers*

FROM THE 1860S THROUGH THE 1880S, settlers had called for the extermination of Apaches and Yavapais, or, at the least, their banishment from the territory. Settlers had quickly realized, however, that they benefited from Indian labor. As early as the 1880s—perhaps earlier—settlers and Indians entered a sort of truce. Indians would work for whites. Whites, in turn, would allow Indians to make camp near their settlements, far from reservations. Both, meanwhile, sought ways to interact. What soon emerged was a fascinating give-and-take between Indian and white, a relationship of humanity and paternalism, attraction and contempt, obedience and resistance, kindness and ridicule. What developed was a special sort of paternalism—a paternalism neglected by scholars—marked by sympathy, toleration, even goodwill. Unlike the paternalism of agents, the paternalism of settlers made few demands. Unlike agents, settlers seldom insisted that Indians give up dancing, gambling, or drink. Toleration, however, did not yield equality. For all its humanity, settler paternalism tied Indians to caste.

To understand settler paternalism, we might begin by examining relations between settlers and Apaches on the Mineral Strip, the area squeezed from San Carlos in 1896 to make way for mining. There, Apaches who had ventured off the reservation encountered the Claridges, a Mormon family who ran cattle and goats. Despite their fear of Indians, the Claridges learned to be friends with them. Mark Claridge, head of the family, accomplished that by giving Apaches small gifts, including horseshoes. Claridge saved old horseshoes specifically for Savvy Mucho, a shaman and band chief with multiple wives.<sup>1</sup>

The Claridges also provided medical advice and remedies gleaned from a manual. On one occasion, two Apache women brought the Claridges a small boy who had trouble breathing due to an acorn lodged in his nose. The Claridges made him sniff cayenne pepper. The tactic succeeded; the boy sneezed and sent the acorn hurtling. The Claridges also assisted an elderly Apache woman who was nearly blind. Those who came to gather acorns found themselves barred from one particular area on the Claridge ranch: that place was reserved for the old woman, who patiently crawled on hands and knees, searching out acorns with her hands. “Oh-h-h, acorns mucho,” she would tell the Claridges, even when few could be found.<sup>2</sup>

Alongside the Claridges’ kindness lurked both curiosity and contempt. Far from extending mere charity, the Claridges made Savvy Mucho perform dances for small sums, even for bananas (fruits imported via refrigerated boxcars). Savvy Mucho became a spectacle, not unlike Indians who danced for tourists in subsequent decades. Like tourists, the Claridges demeaned Indians by forcing them to perform sacred rituals for tiny rewards. The pathos of a powerful man dancing for food—a man who received too little from the government to stave off hunger—escaped them. Rather, it seems, they saw humor. Humor pushed settlers away from Apaches; it defined the social divide; it separated “we” from “they.” The title of Junietta Claridge’s memoir, indeed, was “We Tried to Stay Refined.”<sup>3</sup> In the midst of Indians, settlers reaffirmed their own concept of civilization.

The spectacle offered by Savvy Mucho, however, has two meanings. If, on the one hand, Savvy Mucho became an object of humor, one suspects that he also became an object of curiosity. He, in a sense, was educating the Claridges. Though he spoke no English, he communicated via dance. Just as Yavapais at Rio Verde had drawn Lieutenant Walter Schuyler and William Corbusier, the camp’s surgeon, into their dances, so Savvy Mucho drew in the Claridges. Unlike Schuyler and Corbusier, the Claridges did not dance with Indians, but they surely came away with greater understanding.

Savvy Mucho’s dancing presaged a cultural activism that Apaches and Yavapais—and other Indian peoples—made paramount in the twentieth century. By dancing, as well as by selling crafts and art, Indians challenged the stereotype of “savage.” Even if tourists found Indian dances to be strange and exotic, they began to conceive of

Indians in new ways. Even as some tourists judged Indian ritual to be absurd, others developed curiosity. They sought to understand, to find meaning, to become educated.

The Claridges, it seems, did not take the full leap from condescension to curiosity. Or if they did, they did not say so. What appears in the memoir, finally, is a muted paternalism, a paternalism that recognized Indians' humanity but denied status. The Claridges offered gifts and favors, but they did so from a position of superiority.

In Globe evolved a similar paternalism. Even as the *Arizona Silver Belt* mocked Indians by publicizing stories of their drinking, quarreling, and ignorance, townsfolk offered Indians groceries and small loans. In neighboring Miami, another copper town, settlers went so far as to build a wood-frame house for Talkalai (fig. 9.1), an elderly Pinal whom they dubbed "the Great Peacemaker" because of his role as scout, San Carlos chief of police, and admirer of white civilization. Three companies donated lumber while other Miamians donated labor and furniture. What whites neglected to donate was a title, leaving the property open to later claims.<sup>4</sup>

It may have been Talkalai's friendship with whites that earned him reproach from fellow Apaches. San Carlos Apaches had attacked Talkalai in 1899, breaking his jaw. Believing he would be killed if he remained at San Carlos, Talkalai moved to Miami. Around his new home—"Talkalai's Camp"—orbited relatives and friends, including Dilzhe'es, who became beneficiaries of the headman's largesse. Like other Apaches, Talkalai refused to horde goods. He gave liberally. As a result, the San Carlos agent asked townsfolk to restrict charity. The more Talkalai got, argued the agent, the more he gave away. To address his concerns, townspeople established a committee to oversee Talkalai's affairs.<sup>5</sup>

The largesse of Miamians was by no means exceptional. When an indigent Indian boy appeared near the rail station, white railroad workers "petted and pampered" him, gave him food and clothing, and hid him from truant officers. When Indian women in work camps experienced difficult deliveries, physicians from Globe or Miami came to their aid, charging nothing. When Indians found themselves destitute and out of work, whites offered food and small sums and wrote letters to agents asking for help. "Every day," reported a minister in Globe, "Indians come to me and want money or food, or they



**Figure 9.1.** Talkalai, the Pinal headman who lived out his years in the mining town of Miami, here appears in an Apache headdress (left, c. 1915) and in “civilized” clothing (c. 1920). Talkalai epitomized the double life that Apaches led after conquest. Photographers unknown. Collection of Jeremy Rowe Vintage Photography ([vintagephoto.com](http://vintagephoto.com)).

offer baskets for sale. I help them as much as I can, but have just about reached the limit.” The minister’s letter ended with a plea for the agent to take Indians back to the reservation, where they could receive rations.<sup>6</sup>

Settlers in the Verde Valley—site of Camp Verde and Clarkdale—displayed similar benevolence. They wrote letters on behalf of Indians who sought jobs, pensions, or relief. They drove Indian children to school. They offered money “in slim times” and sometimes donated food for Apache sings, especially for the annual summer rain dances. In Clarkdale, whites donated building materials for an all-Indian church put up in the 1930s. In the 1950s, Clarkdale whites spoke proudly of “our Indians,” boasting of their progress and prosperity in comparison with other tribes. The tendency to distinguish “our

Indians”—special Indians—from others had its roots in the paternalism of earlier decades.<sup>7</sup>

The same pattern appeared in Payson, Gisela, and ranches in the Sierra Ancha. “There is 20 [Dilzhe’es] at my ranch,” wrote Mrs. R. M. Grantham in 1921, and “they havent [sic] any worke [sic] and no money. . . . [M]y husband R. M. Grantham is feeding them . . . but I hope there can be something done for them[.] [T]hey have good land and water if you could fence it and give them seed. They seem to want to work.”<sup>8</sup> To Mrs. Grantham—a product of decades of white stereotyping—the fact that Indians wanted to work came as a surprise. Important here, however, is her effort to help them.

In Payson, as elsewhere, settlers wrote letters to agents on behalf of Indians in their midst. In the early 1920s, such duties fell to Jay Vann, Payson’s justice of the peace. When Henry Irving sought to apply for a pension for his service as a scout, Vann—with several other whites—helped him complete the paperwork. Vann, indeed, became a sort of unofficial agent. When agent A. H. Symons proposed a visit in order to gain insight into Indian needs, Vann promised to assemble Dilzhe’es. “They are scattered out . . . all the way from a mile to 15 miles and it will take some time to assemble them,” he warned. Most “have families and homes” on Tonto Creek and the East Verde, he explained, where they cultivated crops. Until the 1921 recession, they had made a good living. Now they were suffering. “A delegation,” he added, “called on me this morning” to ask him for financial assistance as well as to write a letter to the agent. “These Indians do not want to leave here,” he concluded.<sup>9</sup>

In 1925, another Payson man, a merchant, wrote the San Carlos agent on behalf of Indians. A recently deceased Dilzhe’e, he explained, had left \$150 in a bank that had subsequently gone into government ownership. The man’s former employer, the Fossil Creek Power Company, convinced the government to recover the money and distribute it to the man’s family at \$10 a month. For some reason, however, the government had stopped paying until winter, leaving the widow bereft. “She will be in great suffering when it does not come,” warned the writer.<sup>10</sup>

Far from condemning Indians, settlers spoke of their affection for Indians and their desire to help them. In oral history interviews conducted in 1970–1971, whites repeatedly remembered kindnesses

to Indians and the Indians' grateful responses. Settlers remembered loaning hunting rifles to Dilzhe'e men. They remembered loaning their schoolhouse to Dilzhe'es to use for curing ceremonies. They remembered shielding Dilzhe'es from merchants who attempted to cheat them. They remembered helping former scouts file paperwork to claim pensions. They remembered a Dilzhe'e woman cradling a white infant. They remembered settlers helping deliver Dilzhe'e babies. They remembered Indians giving gifts.<sup>11</sup>

The bonds between settlers and Apaches were not always deep, but they were personal. Julia Randall, for instance—not to be confused with the Dilzhe'e Randalls—recalled that, when her father was bedridden in 1914, Dilzhe'es sent a delegate “to tell us how sorry they were, because they felt like he'd been a great help to them in their struggle for existence.” Randall's father, a storekeeper, had helped several former scouts claim pensions. The relationship between the Randalls and Dilzhe'e returnees, indeed, had become close enough that an Indian woman, having just divorced, hid her possessions at the Randalls' home, fearing that her husband would claim the property.<sup>12</sup> Like women from San Carlos, she used powerful whites to shield herself from patriarchal abuse.

An even closer relationship developed between Geraldine Morrison and Ola (Burdette) Smith. As a girl, Geraldine played with Apaches and learned to speak their language “pretty well.” In later years, Geraldine's Dilzhe'e friend, Ola, worked in Geraldine's home doing ironing. Ola named her own daughter “Jerry,” short for Geraldine. Their friendship—though hedged by a relationship of employer and employee—was not unique. Mae Holder Haught, for example, became friends with a Dilzhe'e named Edna Chitten. When Mae's daughter, Pat, admired a tightly woven basket that Edna had made for her own daughter, Edna made a second one for Pat.<sup>13</sup>

Mae Haught's parents had similarly close, but strained, relationships with Dilzhe'es. Mae's mother, Mrs. Holder, sewed dresses for Dilzhe'e women, including some who worked for her washing clothes. Mrs. Holder, moreover, let her children play freely with Dilzhe'e children. “We [children] spent half our time at the Indian camp,” recalled Mae Holder Haught. In 1905 or 1906, Mrs. Holder even helped a Dilzhe'e woman deliver a half white, half Indian baby. When Mrs. Holder showed great affection for the baby, the mother

suggested she adopt it. Holder's husband refused. He was willing to raise an Indian child, he told his wife, but not the child of a "bad white father."<sup>14</sup>

Mae Holder Haught's husband, Walter, remembered similarly close relations with Dilzhe'es. Indian men—in pairs—visited the Haught place in the early twentieth century to borrow a Savage .303 rifle and a few extra cartridges for deer hunts. They could not get guns elsewhere, it seems, because state law prohibited the sale of any firearm over .22 caliber to Indians. When they returned, the Indians engaged in reciprocal gifting, bringing one deer for themselves and another for the Haughts. They also brought back both shells and unused cartridges. Being expert hunters, the men seldom used more bullets than those loaded in the gun. The Haughts, meanwhile, routinely gave Indians milk and salted meat.<sup>15</sup>

The bonds between settlers and Indians persisted into the 1960s, even as Payson grew into a tourist resort. When Teresa Boardman entered a nursing home, a Dilzhe'e friend sent her a note telling her he was glad that she was getting good care. It was Boardman who had helped Apache children enroll in Payson's public school in the 1920s. Though settlers had insisted that Indians were "dirty" and refused to let them enter, Boardman offered to serve as nanny. In the morning, she would feed several Dilzhe'e boys and "see . . . that they take baths," then send them to school. "People kicked about it," she recalled, but the arrangement succeeded.<sup>16</sup>

In return for good treatment, Dilzhe'es gave protection. Consider an incident in the life of Henry Irving—among the leaders of the return to the Rim Country—who in the 1910s returned to his birthplace in the Sierra Ancha, whence he had been driven out at gunpoint in the 1890s. It was there—on upper Spring Creek—that Irving killed an Apache named Van Wilson in late December 1912. Gila County promptly appointed a coroner's jury to investigate. The jury reported that Irving was blameless. Four men, it seems, including Wilson, had attacked Irving in his camp. Though shot through the abdomen, he managed to kill one attacker and drive away the others.<sup>17</sup>

An earlier court case sheds light on the incident. In early December 1912, Irving, with his wife, Lizzie, and one of his daughters, testified against four Apache men who were accused of killing a calf belonging to a rancher. Irving's wife testified that she had heard a shot, then,

later, observed the accused men carrying a carcass. She followed the men's tracks to where they had killed the animal, retrieved the hide, and gave it to her husband. Not knowing how to read the brand, Irving took it to a white rancher. When charges were pressed, the Irvings—despite death threats—became key witnesses. The accused men received sentences of one year each.<sup>18</sup> Though Van Wilson was not among the convicts, he was among those who sought revenge.

This fascinating case reveals much. At least some Dilzhe'es killed cattle either to take vengeance on whites or to compensate for the lack of deer. The case also shows that some Dilzhe'es allied with whites. Irving and his wife realized that ranchers would tolerate no rustling, as witnessed by the numerous cases brought against Apaches. The prosecutions, however, had not stopped the rustling. A Dilzhe'e named Otto testified that others at Spring Creek killed beef all the time.<sup>19</sup> Rather than participate in rustling, Irving sought to end it.

If Irving sought to protect whites—and thereby protect his own people—so did Obed Rabbit, a former scout. Though imprisoned for rustling in 1913 (fig. 9.2), he subsequently served as a tracker for the Arizona Rangers in one of the most infamous crimes in early Arizona history, when a white man murdered a white woman and her daughter in Tonto Basin. Rabbit also sought to protect his white neighbors in the hamlet of Rye. Pearl Hilligas Morrison recalled that Rabbit became "very upset" at hearing that a white man had trespassed on the Hilligas ranch, killed a house cat, and stolen a horse. Rabbit, who had seen the culprit on the road, "would never forgive himself" for failing to anticipate that the man would commit crimes.

Rabbit's response testifies to sincerity. Settlers and Indians were not equals, but neither were they enemies. Another of Pearl Hilligas Morrison's stories underscores those points. Morrison's family developed close relations not only with Rabbit, but with a man known to whites as "Chop Wood Jim." "Chop Wood Jim," recalled Morrison, "that was Mama's pet. He just about lived in our back yard."

He called my mother "Sistie-Sistie" [sister]. And Mama would say, "Well Jim, poor old Jim. You haven't had any—well, Sister will fix you something." And he'd sit down there in the sunshine and he'd chant, or something. Their saying is peculiar,

Name of Convict *Obed Rabbitt* : Alias : Registered No. *4219*  
 Property found on Convict  
 Expiration of Sentence with Credits *Min + Max 12/12 - 14*  
© 1905, The McNeil Company, Phoenix.

## STATE PRISON AT FLORENCE, ARIZONA

### DESCRIPTION OF CONVICT

*From Dec 13<sup>th</sup> 1913*

Crime *Grand Larceny* : Sentence *Not less than one nor more than one year* : No. of Commitment *2129*  
Received *Jan 20<sup>th</sup> 1914*

From *Gila* County: Race *Apache Indian* Nativity *Arizona* : Religion *None*

Age *30* yrs. : mos. : Height *5 ft. 8 1/4* inches: Weight *162* lbs.: Complexion *Dark* : Expression

Size of Head *17 1/2* inches: Forehead *High*: Color of Hair *Iron Grey*: Color of Eyes *Brown* : Size of Foot *8 1/2*.

Physical Peculiarities : Carriage *Slightly Stooped*: Condition of Teeth *Fair*

Scars and Deformities *2 Tac. up. L. arm, sc. L. side stomach, several small sc's from burns top lower L. arm, small sc. middle chest, small sc. R. breast, small sc's front up. L. leg, several small sc's L. knee, sc. out side L. buttock, sc. R. side neck below ear,*

India Ink Marks *Several distinct tattoo marks inside lower L. arm, small distinct marks inside lower R. arm*

Legitimate Occupation *Laborer* : Knowledge or Other Trades

Temperate *No* : Tobacco *Yes* : Opium *No* : Beard Worn When Received *None*

Married *Yes* : Wife Living *Yes* : Has Children *No* : How Many : Has Parents *No*

Name and Address of Nearest Relative *Brother-in-Law, John Mutton, Globe Arizona*

Can Read *No* : Write *No* : Where Educated : What System

Had Former Imprisonment *No* : in What Prison

When and How Discharged



#### PRISON RECORD

*To Prison 12-13*

*Trans to Roosevelt 1/6 1914*

*Paroled Dec 12 4 24 portion of sentence*

**Figure 9.2.** Prison record of Obed Rabbitt, who served a year at the state penitentiary in Florence after being convicted of rustling. Rabbitt later befriended settlers and served Arizona by tracking criminals. Arizona State Library Archives and Public Records, History and Archives Division, 97-1365.

you know [imitates chant]. He'd smile, and one of us girls would go out in the yard, and he'd say, "Hello, Hello, Hello." . . . And Mama'd fix him a meal and take it out to him. And if it was cold, he'd come in on the back porch. Mama'd bundle him up, you know. . . . And they [whites] would say, "He works your mother," you know. . . . But in many instances, he showed where he really did like us. . . . And when we lost the little boy—my sister's little boy . . . he was ten years old when we lost him, and . . . this old Indian had heard about it, and he came, and he sat out in the back yard and didn't let on much—and all of a sudden, he burst out in the most pitiful cry that I ever heard [imitates cry]—like that. And oh, it's awful to hear an Indian cry, you know, gets under your skin. . . . But he was trying hard to tell us how he felt.<sup>20</sup>

There is much here that suggests affection. Drawing on his own cultural training, Chop Wood Jim addressed Mrs. Hilligas as affinal kin, a sister. To an Apache, a brother-sister relationship was a powerful bond. It was a bond of equality. Morrison's mother reciprocated; she, too, called herself "sister." Her understanding of that term, however, surely differed from that of Chop Wood Jim. To settlers—especially those who were Baptist, Mormon, or Catholic—"sister" implied Christian charity. It implied kindhearted giver and thankful recipient. It could even—among fellow Christians—suggest equality. Insofar as the Morrises referred to Chop Wood Jim as "Mama's pet," however, they suggested his inferiority. There is much in Morrison's anecdote, indeed, that betokens paternalism and dependency, relations that sustained caste in the South. Chop Wood Jim bears passing resemblance to the kindly Uncle Tom of Harriet Beecher Stowe's *Uncle Tom's Cabin* (1852), an aging dependent, affectionate to whites and in need of charity.

The Chop Wood Jim anecdote, finally, suggests ambiguity. Do such stories demonstrate paternalism? Shared humanity? Were Indians manipulating whites for their own purposes? Surely all three processes were in play.

It is not difficult to argue that paternalism and obligation appeared in the Rim Country. To understand the implications of that relationship, we might consult a classic work on black-white relations

in the 1930s South: John Dollard's *Caste and Class in a Southern Town* (1937). Whereas recent scholars have sought to understand the contingency of race—the constructedness of “red,” “black,” and “white”—Dollard, by taking up residence in a small Mississippi town, sought to understand caste's stability. While we need not review all his arguments, one stands out. According to Dollard—who based his findings on extensive interviews with blacks and whites—white landowners and black tenants participated in the “angel system,” whereby a white man would take a poor black man under his wing. The angel offered employment. He offered money in times of need. He might also offer protection from the law, even in cases of murder, so long as the murder was a black-on-black crime. What the angel withheld was equality.<sup>21</sup>

The angel system, argued Dollard, together with a lax criminal justice system that seldom prosecuted black-on-black crimes, taught blacks to channel aggression toward other blacks. If a black man attacked a white man, he was likely to be convicted or lynched. If a black man attacked a black man, however, the law paid little attention, particularly if the aggressor had an angel. Whites, in turn, argued that blacks were like children: impetuous, given to quarrels, unable to delay gratification. Dollard recognized that blacks understood the sociology of caste and rebelled against it. They were not “infantilized.” Whites, however, smashed small acts of rebellion with great force.<sup>22</sup>

The angel system had its corollary in Tonto Basin. Rim Country whites were themselves mostly transplants from the South and Lower Midwest. They had arrived with distinctly southern ideas about race and paternalism. Not surprisingly, Rim Country whites, like the so-called angels in the South, loaned Indians small sums of money, gave them hand-me-down clothing, and shielded them from the criminal justice system when they committed minor crimes.<sup>23</sup> In turn, Indians like Chop Wood Jim affirmed their affection. Dollard noted similarly that, in the 1930s rural South, genuine affection existed between whites and blacks. He added, however, that the angel system anchored blacks to the South's low-paying, seasonal agricultural economy. Blacks trusted southerners to help them. What, on the other hand, would northerners offer? Indians, too—though they understood white power and prejudice—trusted white neighbors.



**Figure 9.3.** Pictured here is a Dilzhe'e named Annie—perhaps Annie T.A. 30, a headwoman, homesteader, and close relative of Chop Wood Jim—who worked for the Wilbanks family in Gisela in the 1920s. Sharlot Hall Museum Library and Archives, Prescott, Arizona.

Paternalism helped tie Apaches and Yavapais to low-paying, seasonal labor, much as it tied blacks to similar jobs in the South (fig. 9.3). Ranchers admitted that they gave Indians permission to camp and farm on their lands for just that reason. Riley Neal's father encouraged Indians to camp on his land near Gisela in the early 1900s so that "when he'd want somebody to work, [they would] be handy." "People used to hire [Indians] because they'd work cheap,"

added Dollie Neal Hale. "They were good workers, doing farm work. Some of them hired out as cowboys."<sup>24</sup> Yet paternalism offered Indians an advantage: It gave them autonomy.

Despite the genocidal rage of the 1870s, an ethic of toleration flourished in the early twentieth century. "Communication with . . . whites at that time—in the early days," noted Melton Campbell, leader of Payson's Dilzhe'e community in the early 1970s, "was very good. . . . The Indians and the white man got along real good. . . . Because the old ranchers and the old Indians, they grew up together." One settler child, indeed, had learned from his Apache friends how to use a bow and arrow. He became so skilled that he took small game. A number of whites, meanwhile, learned the rudiments of the Apache language. A few became fluent. Dollie Neal Hale recalled that, in the 1920s, her children attended school with Apaches on the East Verde. "We thought," she recalled, "that [Apache children] would learn to talk English from the children—but just the other way around. The white children learned to talk Apache."<sup>25</sup>

Consider, too, the story of the Wingfields. In the 1890s, they had forbidden Dilzhe'es to live on their lands. A few decades later, however, they provided groceries for Dilzhe'e rain dances, creating an annual tradition that lasted for many years. Settlers assisted Indians who wished to hold dances on other occasions, too. For many years, Indians congregated on private land—owned by whites—on Beaver Creek, where they could freely hold dances. On one occasion, Indians, finding that rain was hampering a curing sing, approached trustees for the East Verde District to see "if they could go to the schoolhouse." The trustees agreed to the request and the sing concluded under the schoolhouse roof.<sup>26</sup>

The good relations that Melton Campbell described, then, were not solely relations of paternalism and dependency. Settlers and Indians "grew up together." Settlers and Indians recognized one another as human. Their children played together. They engaged in bartering and trade. At least once, Apaches attended a masquerade party, where settlers wondered why they did not remove their masks (Apaches, no less than settlers, were curious about strange customs). On rare occasions, Indians and whites made love, despite strong biases against racial mixing.<sup>27</sup> The sorts of social relations that developed in the Verde Valley, Payson, Globe, and other settlements were



**Figure 9.4.** For the most part, Indians and settlers socialized among themselves. Here, however, Apaches mix with settlers at a social gathering, c. 1900. Sharlot Hall Museum Library and Archives, Prescott, Arizona.

both paternalistic and not paternalistic; both personal and distant; both friendly and strained; both humane and unequal (fig. 9.4).

Paternalism is not the only paradigm that describes Indian-settler relations. Recent scholars of southern history have begun to examine relations between blacks and poor whites. Their findings are surprising. Despite the stereotypical idea that plantation owners sheltered blacks whereas poor whites despised them, poor whites and blacks often engaged in friendly interactions. In the antebellum years, they participated in a shadow economy of smuggling and pilfering. They drank together. They sometimes ate together in black cafes and kitchens. Occasionally they fought one another after quarrels. White men and black men, it seems, equally absorbed the South's culture of honor, which demanded a scrap to avenge an insult or a wrong. At times, poor whites and blacks made love. On rare occasions, poor whites sheltered runaway slaves.<sup>28</sup>

A similar pattern prevailed in the early twentieth century. Blacks and poor whites—though often at odds—participated in one another's

lives. Their relationships did not create equality. In many ways, their relationships buttressed inequality. Poor whites demanded black deference.<sup>29</sup> Their relationships, however, were conflicted, emotionally complex, and deeply personal.

One might argue that the same was true for Indians and settlers in early twentieth-century Arizona. The patterns, however, differ. Indians and settlers seldom shared meals, seldom drank together (except in mining camps), seldom fought one another, and participated in no shadow economy, unless it be the occasional sale of liquor by a white to an Indian. As in the South, however, the two groups participated in legal trade relations, with Indians exchanging baskets, beaded apparel, and labor for food, necessities, and money.<sup>30</sup> Though the relationship between Indians and settlers—like relations between blacks and whites—could be humane, they were not equal.

Often, relations were strained. Though Indians never mentioned old animus directly, it did not disappear. Julia Randall, for example, recalled that Chop Wood Jim would “slip up to the window, and say ‘boo,’ you know, before you knew he was there. That was our experience with the renegade type. . . . He didn’t dare do anything else.” Chop Wood Jim—the same man who befriended the Hilligas family and mourned piteously when they lost a child—seemed threatening to the Randalls. On one occasion, Chop Wood Jim even seemed threatening to Pearl Hilligas Morrison. When Pearl’s friend tried to photograph him, Chop Wood Jim cried “no, no, no no.” When the girl persisted, he “came right at her and shook her to pieces.” Older Apaches feared being captured on film; photos could do evil. “We thought [Chop Wood Jim] was a gentle old soul,” recalled Morrison, but gentleness did not make him inert.<sup>31</sup>

Chop Wood Jim’s acts of assertion seem pale next to those of others. The Burdette boys—Dilzhe’e boys—once threw pieces of a cow carcass into the well of a settler family. When the water became rancid, the settlers—the Randall family—were forced to clean out the well. The Burdette boys apparently considered it a great joke, though the act also implied rebellion. “Rascals,” laughed Julia Randall in her 1970 interview. Other boys—and men—meanwhile continued to kill and eat settlers’ cows. Despite the vigilance of ranchers, reported Riley Neal, a settler who spoke fluent Apache, young Dilzhe’es seldom got caught. On at least one occasion, however, an Indian

rustler admitted his crime. After killing and butchering an animal, Tom Peoria, a Yavapai whom whites recalled as cheerful and friendly, turned himself in. Upon hearing of Peoria's confession, a Dilzhe'e man joked that he "isn't fit for [an] Injun."<sup>32</sup>

As late as 1932, Fred Armer complained to agent James Kitch that young Indians were "roping our cattle and killing" cows and eating the beef. "Please send a policeman after the stray indians here," he insisted. "The Cattle Inspector was down and [the Indians] promised they would quit. But the next day they were roping calves again. I went over there but the men hid out. There is going to have to be something done because I have tried to stop them."<sup>33</sup>

On rare—very rare—occasions, tensions led to violence. During a Sunday picnic in the 1900s or 1910s, Pearl Hilligas Morrison's mother noticed some Indian children tormenting a rabbit. Instead of confiscating the animal, she offered them food if they would give it to her. The children consented. Delia Chapman—a Dilzhe'e whom Mrs. Hilligas employed as laundress—demanded that Hilligas give back the rabbit. She refused. A quarrel ensued, ending with Chapman, brandishing scissors, in hot pursuit of Hilligas, who escaped by diving through an open window. The next day, Chapman came to apologize. She offered to wash Hilligas's clothes, but Hilligas turned her down. Chapman, recalled Pearl Hilligas Morrison, broke into tears, causing her mother to relent. Having found forgiveness, Chapman went back to being "her jolly old self."<sup>34</sup>

The story is rich. Certainly it suggests inequality. Chapman worked for Hilligas. To do so required Chapman to renounce pride. It forced her, indeed, to renounce her authority over nephews, nieces, and grandchildren. Other Dilzhe'e women—at least some of them—refused to make the same bargain. They refused to do domestic work for whites altogether.<sup>35</sup> To maintain her livelihood, however, Chapman chose to apologize. But she did more than that; she broke into tears. The relationship between the two women was personal, emotional, and deeply human. They were bound by a complex mix of paternalism and friendship.

Those observations do not exhaust the story's meaning. The story also suggests the basis for continuing divisions. Settlers conceived of Indians as cruel. To save the rabbit was to affirm moral standards that defined white conscience. Whites sought not only to "civilize"

Indians, but to civilize themselves. Being civilized meant being kind. Acts of cruelty—to animals or to humans—seemed to epitomize barbarity. In the 1910s, Arizona settlers voted to ban boxing, abolish the death penalty, and make the penal system more humane. In American cities activists joined the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, which came to the United States in 1866. In rural Arizona, few people joined the SPCA, but they sometimes espoused the same lessons. As conscience came to the fore in Arizona, Indians became foils. Indians, it seemed, remained dedicated to harshness, even violence.

In Arizona's Rim Country, then, conscience enhanced difference. The creation of difference, however, was more complex than that. Whites sought to demonstrate humanity toward both animals and Indians. Humanitarianism justified authority. Cleanliness sustained the same paradigm. Whites were clean—or so they believed—whereas Indians were dirty. White children who played with Indians, indeed, could expect a “delousing” by parents once a week. Cleanliness justified white power.<sup>36</sup> Cleanliness and conscience—when folded into paternalism—yielded hegemony. Relations between Indians and settlers could be human, friendly, even loving. But they could not be equal.

Rim Country race relations, however, did not duplicate those of the South. Unlike the paternalism described by Dollard, Rim Country paternalism did not require Indians to address whites as “boss” or “master.” Rim Country paternalism, for the most part, demanded neither Indian obsequiousness nor arrogance by whites. “We were always taught to respect the Indians, and to never speak rude to them,” recalled Pearl Hilligas Morrison. Oral history interviews indicated that most settlers treated Indians the same way. Morrison noted, however, that a few settlers, on seeing an Indian, would exclaim: “What do you want? Why are you hanging around here for? Now you git.”<sup>37</sup>

Morrison's recollections of whites driving away Indians show the limitations of paternalism. Some of the animus from the 1870s remained. What Morrison's recollection also reveals is why full-scale paternalism—a paternalism that demanded absolute subservience, as in the South—could not exist in the Rim Country. Settlers feared Dilzhe'es. Even after conquest, there remained the semblance of a balance of power. As occasional attacks on settlers in the 1890s

seemed to prove, Apaches could strike back against those who wronged them. Some two decades later, another imbroglio led a Sierra Ancha rancher to shoot an Apache in the leg. Fearing retaliation, other settlers warned the shooter to flee. He did so.<sup>38</sup>

Fear of retaliation was not the only deterrent. Far more important were the army and the BIA. Without those guardians, settlers would have felt free to invade reservations and work camps, as indeed whites had sometimes threatened to do in the nineteenth century. General Crook and some of his successors at San Carlos went so far as to arm Apaches so that they could chase away trespassing whites. In later decades, Indian police—under the direction of BIA authorities—routinely evicted trespassers. Though Indian police could not jail recidivist trespassers, the BIA pursued civil actions against them that led to fines.<sup>39</sup> Meanwhile, agents sought to protect Indians from unfair accusations. Though neither firmly nor consistently on the side of Indians, the BIA—like the Freedman’s Bureau of earlier decades—sought to protect nonwhites from aggression.

To maintain good relations with settlers, meanwhile, Indians for the most part practiced scrupulous honesty. Though a Payson storekeeper once caught several Indians stealing bolts of fabric, most settlers testified to Indian probity. Apaches, insisted Walter Haught, never stole anything from his family. Haught’s wife, Mae, however, added that Indians sometimes got blamed for thefts they did not commit. Another settler, Thomas Watson Holder, agreed. Indians, he recalled, were “the most trustful people that we had around us.”<sup>40</sup>

If Indians and settlers trusted one another, however, they also stayed apart. In small ways—and sometimes large ways—Indians asserted independence. According to settlers, for example, Dilzhe’e men forbade women to speak English with whites. Even educated women stayed mum. When a Dilzhe’e woman approached Lena Hampton to sell her a basket, the woman resorted to signs. Hampton agreed to buy the basket only on the condition that the woman speak English. To this bargain she agreed, admitting that she had attended school in Nebraska. “Those squaws,” recalled Hampton, “absolutely would not talk.”<sup>41</sup>

Men, too, sometimes preferred not to speak English, even when they could do so. “It wasn’t considered smart,” recalled Julia Randall, though they could not entirely avoid it.<sup>42</sup> What seems likely is

that Indians—even educated Indians—did not command the range of English nouns and verbs known to native speakers. What also seems clear is that Indians took pride in their own language. Though they knew English, they preferred not to speak it. To do so—to do so consistently—was demeaning.

For formal occasions, Dilzhe's appointed an interpreter, a Carlisle alumnus and court translator named Constant Bread. On less formal occasions, hand signs sufficed. When Indians wanted to buy items from sales catalogs, they pointed to the objects. White freighters, recalled Melton Campbell, "done [their] best to match up whatever . . . was needed, and . . . brought [it to] them." For other transactions, Indians patronized storekeepers who spoke Apache, or at least the rudiments of it.<sup>43</sup>

Despite Indians' pride—and despite the humanity of settler-Indian relations—Indians became enmeshed in caste. Almost as soon as Indians returned to the Verde Valley, settlers had demanded that they go back to the reservation. Indians, insisted settlers, would corrupt their children.<sup>44</sup> Indians, they insisted, drank and gambled and engaged in savagery. Though settlers learned to negotiate with Indians and to regard them as friends, they continued to insist that Indians were "unclean." When agent Joe Taylor first arrived at Camp Verde in the 1910s, he noted that Indian dirtiness "was a common topic of conversation among white people." He added, "Many thought if an Indian traveled the public highway and they passed him on the windward side they ran a great risk of infection."

They seemed to act as if they wanted the Indian branded "unclean, unclean," not so much as to his personal habits, but every imaginable communicative disease was supposed to be lurking in some portion of the aboriginal anatomy of the Indian, and that it lurked there for no other purpose except to watch for its chance to transfer itself to some unsuspecting white.<sup>45</sup>

What resulted was segregation. "The manners, habits and customs of these Indians," wrote Camp Verde agent Taylor Gabbard, "are so unlike those of the white people that there is very little intermingling of races." Agent Kitch noted the same phenomenon, adding that Arizona's legislative prohibition on "miscegenation"—cross-racial

marriage—strengthened the divide. Kitch reiterated his observation in 1927, when he found that “a sentiment exists in [the white community] against the intermingling of races.”<sup>46</sup>

That proscription was not solely a case of whites shying from Indians. Indians also shied from whites. “It would be difficult,” commented agent J. O. Barnd in 1922, “to persuade even the most forward of these Indians to take part in a social way in the [white] community for it has not been the custom and they feel that it is not for them to intermingle with the white people.” Even in the late 1910s and 1920s, when many Yavapais and a few Dilzhe’es converted to Christianity, they remained separate. In Clarkdale, Indians erected their own Baptist church. In Camp Verde, Indians attended Baptist services with whites, but each group sat on opposite sides of a central aisle. A few Camp Verde Indians also attended a Presbyterian church, but outright conversion was spotty and slow. Dilzhe’es in particular remained dedicated to traditional dances, sings, and spiritual beliefs.<sup>47</sup> At San Carlos, meanwhile, Indians held their own Christian services—in Apache—without white missionaries.

Paternalism did not mean integration. There is reason to argue, indeed, that Indians and whites became more separate in the 1910s and 1920s than in earlier decades. Throughout those decades, whites became ever more attached to the prescriptions of conscience. Whereas whites in the 1880s and 1890s were given to drinking, gambling, feuding, and vigilantism—behaviors that scholars call “honor”—they began to reform themselves as early as 1907, when Arizona banned gambling. The territory also passed a local option law, which, in 1911, allowed the Camp Verde precinct to declare itself dry. Three years later, Arizona men voted to give women the vote. Women, in turn, voted for Prohibition. In 1915, Arizona went dry.<sup>48</sup>

White men—guided by white women—became increasingly dedicated to temperance, frugality, and peaceful relations with one another. Whereas in the 1880s settlers had engaged in range wars, gunfights, and lynchings, by the 1910s they had banned both boxing and capital punishment. The legislature, meanwhile, passed gun control laws intended to prevent cowboys from shooting up towns and intimidating respectable sorts. As late as the 1910s, “rough-necks” from Texas repeatedly shot up the town of Payson. “They’d come into Payson shooting,” recalled one settler, “and they’d leave

shooting.”<sup>49</sup> Both law and custom, however, had begun to change. Gradually—and sometimes not so gradually—settlers jettisoned old social patterns associated with honor, patterns that defined them as “uncivilized,” patterns that harkened back to the antebellum South and Midwest.

The change did not occur in a vacuum. As settlers evolved, so too did their relations with Indians. Julia Randall, for instance, recalled that Indians repeatedly gave her mother “a long-winded tale that they needed money, their checks hadn’t come in, and they would like to borrow a dollar or two.” Randall’s mother happily loaned out the money until “she discovered that the dollar or two went to the bootleg merchants.” “That,” recalled Randall, “was the end of the Indian giving.” Her mother—who wore a white ribbon on her arm connoting her dedication to Prohibition—“just didn’t believe in liquor. . . . She didn’t let them have another dime.”<sup>50</sup> Toleration for Indian behaviors, it seems, continued in the twentieth century, but it came with judgment.

Settlers, too, associated Indians with violence and wife abuse. Ira Murphy recalled witnessing an Apache knock down his wife and begin “stomping” her. Murphy, who was driving from Payson to Pinetop, jumped from his car to stop the attack. When he returned, his passenger remarked “Oh, that’s just the Indians. They all do that.”<sup>51</sup> Settlers, it seems, regarded Apaches as peculiarly violent, a people unlike themselves. The Arizona State Teachers College at Flagstaff (now Northern Arizona University) confirmed that supposition in a pamphlet it printed in 1939 called *The Apache*. “The Apache,” according to the pamphlet, “is still given to flaring rages of anger and jealousy. In the absence of his ancestral outlet of warfare he occasionally turns on his own tribe, his family, his friends.”<sup>52</sup>

The combination of paternalism and derision rendered Indians into objects of charity and reform. On the reservation, trained “matrons” inspected Apache homes and Apache children, making constant recommendations to improve hygiene, sanitation, and nutrition. Off the reservation—and on it—came other reformers to the rescue as well. “The numerous health associations, social workers, juvenile clubs, red cross societies, etc.,” noted the Camp Verde agent George Laben in 1926, “are well meaning in their line of sanitary labors.” The reformers, however, restricted their contact with Indians

to “a day or two ‘sort of outing,’ and their elaborate write up follows, elaborating to the American public through the daily press the good they have done to the poor Indian.”<sup>53</sup>

Reformers, thought Laben, were going through the motions. Their chief purpose was to laud themselves. The reports they produced “through the daily press,” however, had another effect.<sup>54</sup> Readers learned that Indians forever needed help. Indians needed perpetual reform. Indians consistently fell short of civilization. They represented what “civilized” Americans were not. They lived amid squalor and poverty. They suffered from parasites and disease. Perhaps more damning, they gambled; they drank; they assaulted one another. Despite many favorable stories about Indians in the newspapers, Indians remained anchored—in the minds of whites—to cultural corruption.

At the very moment that whites sought to reform themselves—at the very moment that they banned gambling, alcohol, boxing, and capital punishment, worked to control gun violence, and gave women the right to vote and participate in government—Indians seemed to take another path. White reform pivoted at times on the idea of Indian depravity. Newspapers hammered home that message. Even as newspapers began to run stories favorable to Indians, they continued to run stories that made fun of them, as we shall see. By making Indians into foils for “civilized” whites, newspapers—and readers—created a new logic of racial difference. No longer did Arizonans demand annihilation or removal. Arizonans did, however, identify Indians with backwardness, obstinacy, chaos.

## *Conquering Children*

PATERNALISM—AND INDIAN NEGOTIATION with paternalism—emerged both on the reservation and outside of it. Neither of those paternalisms required Indians to be wholly subservient. Both offered freedoms, rewards, even subtle improvements in Indian lives, especially for women. Both established a system of rewards for paternalist and minion alike, a system that fostered stability, even caste. There was another paternalism—another institution of conscience—that proved more absolute, more hurtful, more bitter. It was the sort of paternalism that governed Indian schools, both on the reservation and off of it, both day schools and boarding schools.

From the outset of the reservation era, Apaches and Yavapais resisted the schools. At San Carlos and Fort Apache, Indians stymied agents for decades. According to agents and teachers, it was shamans and old women who posed the biggest obstacle. At their urging, Apaches did everything they could to keep children away from schools. Parents, with elders and shamans to back them, routinely told children to feign sickness. According to one ethnographer, parents sometimes tried to make children sick by requiring them to immerse themselves in cold water before physicals. The ethnographer may or may not have been right. Immersion was more than a way to make children sick. It was a time-honored way to prepare boys for the hardships of adulthood.<sup>1</sup>

Even if parents were not making children sick, they routinely hid them from truant officers and police. When San Carlos agent John Bullis proposed sending children to boarding school in 1890, he found that he could scarcely visit his wards without “girls and boys [dodging] behind the nearest object as if avoiding the plague.”<sup>2</sup> The

BIA's superintendent of Indian schools met similar resistance when he toured San Carlos in the same year. Indian parents, he found, "filed objections [to schooling] that were pointed and threatening." One man waited in ambush, gun in hand, in order to kill the superintendent as he departed the reservation.<sup>3</sup>

Indians continued to resist schooling into the twentieth century. As late as 1907, only 244 of 635 school-age children at San Carlos were attending. At Fort Apache, agents were forced to send Indian police to the far corners of the reservation to round up families with school-age children and make them return to their farms, where their children would be near day schools. Still Apaches resisted. In 1912, the proportion of San Carlos children attending school was less than half. The numbers were similar at Fort Apache.<sup>4</sup>

One reason to abandon the reservation, then, was to keep one's children away from school. Escape, however, was short-lived. By 1910, the government had established two day schools for those who had left San Carlos: one at Camp Verde and another at Mayer, where Yavapais congregated. The government added a third day school at Clarkdale in 1914. The day schools, reported Camp Verde agent Taylor Gabbard, could serve half the Indian population in the area. Often, however, parents refused their services. "Rovers"—Indian men who took their families off the reservation in order to work—usually took children with them, thus keeping them out of school. Even families who stayed on the reservation kept children home. "If these Indians were left to themselves as to school matters," lamented Camp Verde agent Joe Taylor in 1918, "we would not have ten children" enrolled.<sup>5</sup>

When children in the Verde Valley or other off-reservation sites did attend (fig. 10.1), they could expect the same regimen of instruction that their San Carlos cousins received. Girls, in addition to reading, writing, and arithmetic, learned sewing, laundering, cooking, and "general housework." Boys learned "industrial" work: "farming, herding, dairying, carpentring [sic] and painting." Students also assisted in maintaining facilities. They could not expect those facilities, however, to be new or even sufficient. In 1916, Joe Taylor described the school buildings at Camp Verde and Clarkdale as "old board shelters." They were "erroneously designated by some people as houses," he added, "but to so refer to them is sacrilegious." Two



**Figure 10.1.** Students at the Camp Verde Indian School in 1912. A decade later, many Apache and Yavapai children attended public schools. Camp Verde's public school, however, continued to exclude them. Photo by Axton. Sharlot Hall Museum Library and Archives, Prescott, Arizona.

years later, Taylor noted the addition of a new schoolhouse with two cottages, a barn, and a “domestic science kitchen.”<sup>6</sup>

What schools also taught was discipline. The demands of paternalism in schools were strict, unbending. Teachers forbade children to speak Apache or Yavapai. When children misbehaved, officials inflicted corporal punishment. At San Carlos and Fort Apache, they sometimes consigned children to barbed-wire pens or solitary confinement. Sometimes they even shackled children to balls and chains. Such practices may have occurred at the Camp Verde, Clarkdale, and Mayer day schools, too, although no records tell the story.<sup>7</sup> Corporal punishment, however, did not wholly define the Indian experience with BIA schools.

Some scholars insist that Indian students, like their parents, found ways to resist educational tyranny. They might run away. They might practice passive obedience. They might engage in their own religious

rituals. Parents, meanwhile, often voluntarily sent children to boarding schools. The schools offered food, shelter, and warmth, necessities that parents sometimes had difficulty providing. Many parents, moreover, wanted their children to be educated. Some scholars go so far as to argue that students made the schools “Indian” rather than the schools making students into “whites.”<sup>8</sup> To some extent, the Arizona schools bear out those observations. Students and parents found ways to resist, to subvert, and sometimes to make use of schools for their own purposes. For all that, however, schools were places where Indians had little control.

Arizona’s Indian schools—particularly the Rice boarding school, the Fort Apache boarding school, and the Phoenix Indian School—made Indian children feel the yoke of inferiority. There—not in the day-to-day regulation of Indian adults—was where conquest cut deepest. Though schools could not deny parents and students the means to resist, negotiate, or subvert the system, they could retard such efforts. Schools gave Indians little room to slow or to shape social change. Schools denied parents, moreover, the means to instill pride and confidence in their children. That schools broke down rather than lifting up their charges was borne out in agent George Laben’s report on the Camp Verde and Clarkdale day schools in 1924. Children at the Indian schools, he noted, were self-conscious, bashful, and exquisitely sensitive to ridicule.<sup>9</sup>

If Indian children were more sensitive to ridicule than white children, the fault was not wholly that of teachers. Ridicule was no light matter in Apache society, particularly among boys and men. Friends could joke and tease one another, but others—whether whites or fellow Indians—were expected to show respect. When respect faltered, conflict might ensue. Male honor demanded—at least on some occasions—retaliation for slights.

The Apache code of respect and cordiality came from child rearing. Like many Indian peoples, Apaches and Yavapais treated children with affection and tolerance. Though parents praised children for accomplishments, they usually refrained from punishing them for failures. Only severe transgressions earned reprimand.<sup>10</sup> Indian children—unlike many white children—did not expect stern rebukes. They carried that expectation into adulthood. Though headmen could take disciplinary actions against members of their groups,


discipline was rare. Decision was by consensus, not by authority. When Indian children entered schools they met the reverse. There, command was absolute. There, they learned to think of themselves as inferior. And they learned anger.

Boarding school was more injurious than day school. When San Carlos students returned from boarding schools, noted one school superintendent in 1899, they acted out their injuries by falling “into mental and moral decay.” At Fort Apache, similarly, boarding school alumni showed “little respect for the dignity of common labor,” according to agent C. W. Crouse. They seemed to think “that to increase a person’s wants increases his sacrifices; that if he does not want much he will not need to sweat to work much. Their view of life is akin to that of the tramp.” At Camp Verde, added Taylor Gabbard, those who returned from boarding school proved “more difficult to manage and . . . less industrious than the adult Indians who have never attended school.” The *Arizona Silver Belt*, not surprisingly, turned the psychological puzzle into prejudice. “The Carlisle graduate gravitates upon reaching San Carlos,” inveighed the *Silver Belt*, “from the finished gentleman to the breech clout buck.”<sup>11</sup>

Part of the reason that boarding school returnees returned to Indian ways was a new sort of ridicule. Whereas once they had faced disapproval from teachers, they now faced disapproval from kin, clan, and traditionalists. “Those who have been away to school,” noted Camp Verde agent J. O. Barnd in 1922, “do not . . . practice what they have learned as long as the old people ridicule their new fangled ways.”<sup>12</sup> Like Nah-diz-az, killer of San Carlos Agency farmer Lieutenant Seward Mott, boarding school returnees wanted to reclaim their place among their people. They wanted to escape from an environment of shaming to an environment of sympathy and respect. That they refused to live up to the standards of Indian agents is hardly surprising (fig. 10.2).

Even if Indians held little power within the schools, they held the power to leave school behind. They resisted by “going back to the blanket,” in the damning words of whites. Day school students did much the same thing. For them, however, dislocation and transition were less abrupt.

Perhaps the most dramatic rejection of forced schooling came at the Rice boarding school in 1929, the largest school on the San



**Figure 10.2.** In this sketch from George Laben's 1924 annual report on Camp Verde, a young woman educated in home economics at an Indian school practices a traditional form of making bread. Laben satirized both Indian students who "went back to the blanket" and schools that taught them little. Superintendent of Indian Affairs Annual Narrative and Statistical Field Agency Reports, 1907–1938, National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, DC.

Carlos Reservation (fig. 10.3). Throughout the decade, agent James Kitch had reported problems at Rice. The school was perpetually overcrowded; its buildings had fallen into disrepair; it lacked equipment for proper vocational instruction; it lacked good lighting and ventilation. As a result of poor sanitary conditions, reasoned Kitch, students succumbed to tuberculosis at an extraordinary rate.<sup>13</sup>

Accustomed to an Indian diet, pupils also refused to eat much of the food prepared by the staff. For the most part, the children restricted themselves to meat, potatoes, and beans, forcing staff to change menus. If alien food could be challenged, however, alien rules remained in place. Parents, meanwhile, had to request permission



**Figure 10.3.** At Rice boarding school on the San Carlos Reservation, Indian children were indoctrinated into chagrin. Collection of Jeremy Rowe Vintage Photography ([vintagephoto.com](http://vintagephoto.com)).

before visitations. When they did visit, they were forbidden to “picnic” on school lawns due to the threat of littering. When children violated school rules, parents lost the right to visit; officials considered visitation a privilege, not a right.<sup>14</sup> What resulted was a sociology of chagrin. School officials seemed bent on humiliating—consistently, though not always purposely—both students and parents.

The sociology of chagrin found expression in other ways, too. Rather than being mere students—in the way that white children were students in their public schools—Indian pupils found themselves required to perform manual labor. Chores included minor construction, maintenance, and stock raising. Indian pupils, for example, cared for chickens owned by white employees. The employees, in turn, sold eggs and meat to the school or, at times, to Indian families. Employees also kept their own pigs, goats, and cows, all of which ate government feed. The employees’ mess, meanwhile, received free milk from the school’s herd of dairy cows, which was tended by Indian pupils.<sup>15</sup> Indian children worked to support white employees.

With the school in disrepair and employees taking advantage of both students and the government, Rice became subject to “a complete taboo” by Apaches, according to Kitch. In effect, Indians boycotted. Enrollment dropped from 180 in 1927 to 132 in 1928. Kitch responded with a firm hand. He abolished much of the work regimen assigned to students, insisting that maintenance and construction be assigned to regular employees. He also managed to have Gabbard transferred. With Gabbard went most of his staff, who either resigned or transferred to other posts. Meanwhile, Kitch lobbied the BIA to modernize the school.<sup>16</sup> Another of Kitch’s policies, however—strictness and corporal punishment—undermined his reforms.

What Kitch failed to realize was that corporal punishment was part of the problem. It epitomized the sociology of chagrin. One incident in particular illustrates the situation. When in December 1928 word got back to the Rice principal, W. E. Snooks, that two angry girls had conspired to “beat up” the school matron, then run away, he took dramatic action. He “spanked” (or “beat,” in the words of witnesses) one of the girls with a “shingle” (a “club,” said witnesses) and chained the other to her bed. Beating and chaining, according to Indians, had become standard. Snooks took such harsh measures in part because his boss, James Kitch, had criticized the previous principal, Taylor Gabbard, for laxity. By failing to inflict corporal punishment, claimed Kitch, Gabbard had encouraged students to run away. Gabbard, however, had refrained from corporal punishment precisely because his predecessor had used it too often, causing children to do just that: run away.<sup>17</sup>

When word of Snooks’s cruelty—and Kitch’s defense of it—reached BIA headquarters, the commissioner of Indian affairs, Charles Burke, prepared to act. Having received such reports from elsewhere, too, Burke issued circular 2526 on January 10, 1929, barring corporal punishment in Indian schools.<sup>18</sup> Indian children, it seems, had resisted and won. With or without corporal punishment, however, tensions at Rice continued to mount, finally reaching a boiling point on a Sunday in early March of 1929.

By some odd twist, it was on that very day that the BIA’s inspector of schools arrived at Rice, where he found “the school . . . wholly beyond the bounds of control.” Taking advantage of the absence of principal Snooks and some of his staff, students had visited a

nearby Indian camp where they drank tulapai. After returning to school, several girls got into a fight. When the inspector arrived, some fifty female students “were excitedly milling around” while the staff sought to restrain a “fighting, drunken girl.” A group of boys, too, arrived, in various stages of intoxication. When told to disburse, the students “defiantly” refused. Into this melee stepped “the school policeman . . . in a drunk condition, and six little girls who smelled of *tulapai*.”<sup>19</sup>

Had the incident affected only staff-student relations, it would have been worrisome enough. But it did not affect only staff and students; it affected the community. On being apprised of the situation, San Carlos parents—along with their children—were “openly defiant,” demanding “that no one can be punished.” To say “that the situation was appalling,” wrote Kitch, “is not an exaggeration.”<sup>20</sup>

Over the next several years, Kitch managed to improve the situation. Though the BIA continued to forbid the most severe forms of corporal punishment, Kitch found other ways to address problems. With waters from Coolidge Dam now inundating old San Carlos, Kitch moved the day school there to Rice. To accomplish that, he enlarged the Rice campus. At the same time, he reduced the number of boarders, making Rice—now renamed San Carlos—principally a day school. Kitch also made sure that students had access to approved entertainments, reasoning that children ran away due to lack of “proper play and amusement.” The agency built a new auditorium, purchased Victrolas, imported a piano, and instituted more sports and games.<sup>21</sup>

Two conclusions seem certain: Children and parents had resisted poor conditions and the lack of respect that poor conditions implied, and once those conditions improved, resistance diminished, albeit gradually. By 1933, citizen observers—members of the women’s clubs of Globe—could report being “impressed” with the condition of the dormitories, the quality of food, and the “manners and general attitude of the children.” Apache parents, they added, were “now taking pride in their children and in their appearance and will . . . make every effort to retain them as day school pupils.”<sup>22</sup> With improvements to facilities and a ban on corporal punishment, the sociology of chagrin was on the wane. By then, however, it had shaped the lives of two generations.

Another reason that San Carlos parents began to accept the Rice school, however, had nothing to do with reforms. Parents feared the alternative. If children did not enroll there, the BIA might send them to boarding schools off the reservation. The children of Indians who already lived off the reservation met the same fate. In 1922, agent Barnd directed no fewer than thirty children of “nomads”—Indians who worked outside the reservation—to be sent to the Fort Mojave boarding school in the southwestern corner of the state. Other children—especially those deemed incorrigible—got sent to the Phoenix Indian School. Still others were packed off to Truxton Canyon (in northwestern Arizona), Albuquerque, or Riverside, California. A few traveled farther afield, enrolling at Haskell Institute in Kansas or Carlisle in Pennsylvania.<sup>23</sup>

In the 1920s, the BIA at last determined that no student could be sent to an off-reservation school without permission from parents. But children did have to attend school on the reservation until they were sixteen. The only exceptions were for those who married at a younger age; they were free to find work and set up house. To avoid school, complained San Carlos agent A. H. Symons in 1921, Apaches would routinely “get married” just “as soon as they get big enough.”<sup>24</sup> Part of what Symons noticed was simply Apache tradition. Though men tended to wait until their early twenties to get married, women married at younger ages. Insofar as the desire to avoid school offered additional incentive to marry young, marriage itself became a form of resistance. It did not lead, however, to change. Indians used marriage to escape the system rather than challenge it.

Indians at off-reservation schools found other ways to make choices, though they, too, had little impact on the sociology of chagrin prior to the late 1920s. One way to exert choice was to transfer from an unsuitable boarding school to a better one. A Dilzhe’e named Nina Datai, for example, transferred from the Fort Mojave boarding school to the Truxton school in 1924. Datai’s father, it seems, requested the transfer, and Camp Verde agent George Laben agreed to it. The Fort Mojave principal, William Thackray, promptly cried foul, insisting that young Nina wished to remain at his school. The problem, he explained, lay with Nina’s uncle, William Datai, a former Fort Mojave student.<sup>25</sup>

Years earlier, when William Datai had tried to enroll at Mojave, Thackray had refused him, claiming that he was an army deserter. Thackray, it seems, proved correct. After a court-martial, Datai served time for desertion, then returned to Mojave. Being both a veteran and an ex-convict, Datai had toughened. When he saw the school disciplinarian “correcting an Apache boy,” Datai “stepped up and gave the disciplinarian two fearful blows on the mouth.” For that infraction Datai “was made to lug an ‘Oregon Boot’ [ball and chain] for two days,” then he was expelled. Neither Datai nor his brother—Nina’s father—forgot or forgave. The two men, it seems, encouraged several Apache children to abandon the Mojave school. Laben, the Camp Verde agent, assisted them by ordering several transfers, including that of Nina.<sup>26</sup>

In general, the BIA discouraged transfers. Indeed it forbade transfers during the school year. During summer breaks, however, the BIA allowed students—with parents’ permission—to seek admission to new schools. It refused, however, to publicize its policy. If too many students transferred, havoc would ensue. No school would be able to count on stable enrollment. The BIA would be forced to make constant adjustments to school budgets.<sup>27</sup> Left unsaid was the fact that a policy promoting transfers would have forced school officials to abandon the sociology of chagrin. Fostering student loyalty would have demanded new policies.

In one way, however, chagrin was finally weakened. After 1929, the BIA refused to endorse corporal punishment. Though Burke’s successor as commissioner of Indian Affairs, Charles Rhoads, wavered, forceful protests from John Collier, executive secretary of the American Indian Defense Association, convinced the BIA to renew the ban. Both agent Kitch at San Carlos and supervisor John Brown of the Phoenix Indian School—who after 1927 was also in charge of Camp Verde—protested mightily. “Many of our boys,” lamented Brown, “become tramps and then criminals because we are forbidden to use jails or corporal punishment.” Without corporal punishment, he insisted, school discipline broke down. “We are dealing with a primitive race whose children do not understand the finer points of good conduct.”<sup>28</sup>

Brown could not understand that it was chagrin—not just via corporal punishment, but a whole range of actions and behaviors—that

alienated Indians. In schools, paternalism defied negotiation. What reigned was a kind of tyranny. Children suffered. They lacked hope. To compensate, they ran away. Or they slugged disciplinarians. Or they drank tulapai and got into fights. For many, school became punishment. None of that entered Brown's thinking.

To agents and to the BIA, the answer to the shortcomings of Indians was more schooling. "I am intensely interested in the education of each and every one of our subjects," wrote Joe Taylor in 1919, "whether they desire such education or not." Without education, Indians would fall prey to "bolshevism, iwv [Industrial Workers of the World] isms, and a few such like degenerate and moribific [sic] ideas and movements." Education, he explained, would solve the problems of capital and labor. It would save the nation from great social upheavals of the European variety. "It will continue us as The Great Christian Nation of the World."<sup>29</sup>

The 1917 Russian Revolution was fresh on Taylor's mind. So, too, it seems, were the IWW-inspired strikes in Arizona's mining towns. Taylor's fears, however, were misplaced. Though a few Indians came under the IWW's sway, most took no interest. What did interest them was re-creating a facsimile of their pre-reservation lives. Taylor himself, along with a long line of agents, inadvertently helped foster an Indian communalism with roots in the pre-conquest era. He brought resources to the reservation—much as men had brought resources from raids—which were then shared. Indians, meanwhile, continued to gamble, dance, hold sings, engage in traditional marriage and divorce, and avoid farming if they could do so. Indians, moreover, worked off reservations with great industry and commitment. They worked in order to escape the reservation. Contrary to agents' constant advice, Indians seldom saved wages to achieve middle-class status (though they did save to buy cars).

It was that very ability to negotiate with agents—the ability to manipulate paternalism—that made reservations tolerable. Because Indians achieved a measure of freedom on reservations, they became not prisons but refuges (or perhaps some odd combination of the two). School, however, was something else. At least until the 1920s, Apaches avoided it—or helped their children to avoid it—when they could do so.

Under no scenario would schooling have been an easy proposition. Apaches resisted it—bitterly, energetically—from the outset. School officials, quite naturally, resorted to coercion to force children to attend, to speak English, and to behave as whites wanted them to behave. Coercion, shaming, and corporal punishment, however, made things worse.

At least some agents—particularly those at Camp Verde—soon came to realize that the schools were failing. With Indians continuing to flee the reservation into the 1920s—and taking their children with them—agents had to rethink their strategy. The solution was to put Indian children in public schools near where their parents worked. Throughout the 1910s and 1920s, the Camp Verde agent—as well as the San Carlos agent—communicated with public school officials to ensure enrollment. Though agents detected “very little manifestation of race prejudice existing among a majority of the [white] people,” they had only limited success. Even if white people were not—from their own point of view—racially prejudiced, they balked at having Indians in their schools. “Until the Indians become more cleanly in his [sic] habits and person,” wrote Joe Taylor in 1914, “he will not be welcome.”<sup>30</sup>

Most public schools, meanwhile, refused to require Indian attendance, claiming that the federal government had sole responsibility for its wards. Though agent Barnd pointed out that state law could compel Indian children to attend public schools—even children who resided on reservations—both school officials and agents agreed that the time for enrollment had not come. In 1921, indeed, not a single Indian child attended a Yavapai County public school. “Because the Indians are oftentimes a little lousy and not any too clean,” wrote Camp Verde agent C. V. Peel, “the whites object to them mingling with their children.” That was not the situation everywhere, however. The Gisela public school—which lay in Gila County just east of the Verde Valley—enrolled ten Dilzhe’e along with eleven white children as early as 1919.<sup>31</sup> To charter a school district, settlers needed Indians to attend.

After 1922, the situation improved. By 1926, George Laben could report that every Indian child under his jurisdiction who resided in a public school district was enrolled in a public school. The only public

school that refused to enroll Indian children was Camp Verde, whose staff continued to argue that Indian children were “dirty.” The aim of placing Indian children in the public schools, explained Laben, was “to cultivate a true loyal sentiment between the Indian and white children.” Public schooling, he argued, would accomplish more than that. It would offer Indian children better facilities. It would teach them “neatness and cleanliness”; “a wider acquaintance with individuals”; “a cultivation of boldness of action, manners, speech”; and “the elimination of bashfulness, seemingly now so prevalent.”<sup>32</sup>

Laben went on to praise Indian students, though only by resorting to racial definition. Those in the public schools, he insisted, “have out-generated the Mexican children in their daily book work and grades. They are clean, mannerly, quick to answer questions and active. They are well dressed and in some instances [wear] stylish garments. None have had the itch, impetigo, pediculosis, ringworm, trachoma or otitis media.” He attributed their health to visits by the agency’s field nurse and to regular examinations by mining company doctors at Clarkdale.<sup>33</sup>

The reason that agents pushed Indian children to attend public school was not solely because it would lead to psychological growth. The strategy was also one of economy. By closing schools at Camp Verde and Clarkdale in the mid-1920s, the BIA saved money. Agent Kitch of San Carlos likewise sought to save money by encouraging off-reservation Indians to place their children in public schools rather than send them back to the reservation. Though the federal government paid tuition to state authorities, it sought to wean itself from the education business.<sup>34</sup>

By the late 1920s, agents could claim success. Apache children attending public school in Globe, according to the government’s Meriam Report, were cheerful, outgoing, and conscientious. Too, they had overcome their “customary shyness.” One particular Globe teacher, it seems, along with another in Clarkdale, had great success with Indian pupils. When teachers showed interest in the children and their families—rather than inflicting a regimen of impersonal discipline—they could make school enjoyable. Gym equipment—including basketball courts—had the same effect. Apache children loved outdoor games that gave them both an escape from scolding and a forum for success. Apache children were not, however, fully

accepted. Though agent Laben hoped that public schooling would “cultivate a true loyal sentiment between the Indian and white children,” most schools relegated Indian pupils to all-Indian classrooms, thus segregating them from whites.<sup>35</sup>

There was another problem with relying on public schools. Despite the cheerful optimism of agents, many Indian parents who resided off the reservation made no effort to put children in public schools. Agent Kitch speculated in 1924 that of 140 San Carlos children whom he knew to be living off the reservation, very few attended public schools. A year later, he bragged that Apache children “mix splendidly with white children” at public schools, where Indian enrollment had risen in the past year from 14 to 82. Those numbers, however, were deceptive. Kitch estimated that another 117 children between ages six and eighteen who lived off the reservation simply could not be located. Very few, he admitted, were in school.<sup>36</sup>

The BIA, meanwhile, kept most of its schools open. It retained both boarding schools and day schools throughout Arizona. It also established field schools near construction sites where Indians congregated. There, Apache children continued to be shunted into non-academic training.

The Apache must be taught, inveighed Fort Apache agent C. W. Crouse, that there was as much dignity in herding cows as in “doing the work of the literary teacher, the clerk, or the physician.” Indian boys, agreed San Carlos agent Kitch, had “little or no opportunity to rise above the manual arts”; thus boys received training in farming, carpentry, and industrial labor but not in accounting, mathematics, history, or literature. Agents and teachers expected girls, meanwhile, to learn little more than domestic labor.<sup>37</sup>

Indian children, then, were told to expect modest success in school—and in life—but no more. Indeed the San Carlos agent recommended in 1927 that the whole of the instructional program beyond fourth grade be restricted to vocational skills. As Alice Littlefield writes of Indian education in Michigan, the effect of schooling “was not so much assimilation as proletarianization—the formation of subjectivities and dispositions appropriate to workers.”<sup>38</sup> To simplify, the effect of the schools was to teach children inferiority.

Again and again, agents complained that BIA schools were failing. The pupils rebelled, ran way, or refused to learn. When they

went home, they went back to being Indian. They showed little ambition. They worked, to be sure, but they did so for their own reasons. They worked to escape the reservation, to pay for groceries, to buy cars and consumer goods, and to maintain an Indian way of life. What agents could not understand was that it was the schools themselves that had failed. Too often, the schools coerced rather than exhorted. They condemned rather than praised. They scolded rather than sympathized.

Public schools, perhaps, offered healthier psychological environments for Indian children than did Indian schools. Because public schools geared curriculum and strategies to white students, they emphasized exhortation, praise, even sympathy. Even there, however, Indian children were segregated and subjected to corporal punishment. Public schools, indeed, permitted limited forms of corporal punishment—particularly paddling—for decades after it was banned in Indian schools.<sup>39</sup> Throughout the early twentieth century, moreover, public schools accommodated only a small fraction of Indian children.

For all their deficiencies, Indian schools were not without impact. They taught the basics of literacy and arithmetic. They taught children the skills necessary to make a living. They taught punctuality. They taught, too, good hygiene and good nutrition, though in doing so they defined Indian elders as dirty and ignorant. The schools, in short, taught the constellation of behaviors and values that comprised conscience, or at least its middle-class American iteration. They neglected, however, one of conscience's key components: sympathy.

In theory—in the minds of reformers—conscience was to be inculcated not via threats, insults, slaps, or whippings, let alone balls and chains. Conscience was to be inculcated through exhortation. In the Indian schools, however, reformers—precisely because they viewed Indians as incorrigible and delinquent—resorted to shaming. In that sense, the schools resembled antebellum plantations—with their emphasis on coercion—rather than modern institutions of learning. By shaming students, schools widened the divide between white and Indian.

What was perhaps most important about schooling was that it made Indian children aware of white contempt. Whereas older Indians sought to escape white oversight and reconstitute tradition,

children, as agent Laben noted, became exquisitely sensitive to white ridicule. Indian children, more than their elders, developed double consciousness. Even those in public schools fell victim. According to teachers, Indian students in Globe and Miami—who donned stylish, modern garments for school—displayed embarrassment when seen on weekends in traditional attire.<sup>40</sup> They were Indians—and proud to be Indians—yet they felt the weight of white judgment.

In an ironic way, Indian schools achieved their goal. Though they did not create strivers, they created individuals who craved respect. They created individuals, indeed, who sought to take control of the reservation. At San Carlos, it was the educated generation that led the campaign to take control of administration and governance.<sup>41</sup> It was they who became most active in contesting agents, insisting time and again that the BIA relinquish authority. By immersing children in a sociology of chagrin, by fostering shame and powerlessness—by training Indians to resent paternal authority—reservation authorities fostered opposition.

## *Taking Charge*

IN 1929 CAME A FASCINATING LETTER to San Carlos agent James Kitch. Its author was Edward Fulwood of Globe, a former law enforcement officer and now a Spanish interpreter for the Gila County court. Fulwood, who claimed to speak Apache, gave Kitch a full—too full—report on Indians living in the vicinity of Globe and Miami. A change for the worse, he reported, had come over Apaches. They were beginning to get the idea that they were the white man's equal.<sup>1</sup>

Fulwood's letter was a litany of trouble. Young Apaches, he reported, had learned to pretend to be Mexican in order to buy whiskey. They had also begun to frequent pool halls, where they palled with whites. "After a few games of cards or pool, the boot legger comes in. . . . The party starts." Cars made things worse. Once filled with alcohol, Indians drove to other camps where they "start the peaceful Indians going bad." Indians drove, too, to mining camps like Jerome, where they socialized with union men. A few Apaches and Yavapais, it seems, had even made friends with members of the Industrial Workers of the World, the so-called Wobblies.<sup>2</sup>

Fulwood knew of what he spoke. Though the IWW had become a shell of its former self after the government arrested its leaders in 1917, Arizona's mining camps still brimmed with agitators. The agitators, insisted Fulwood, taught Indians "to make trouble." "The I.W.W.'s," he explained, made Indians "feel a social equal. . . . if his pale face partner tells him it must be so and he is made to believe it." At the instigation of Wobblies, he continued, Indian workers had attacked his friend, a mine owner, who was forced to take refuge in a rock cabin. When the sheriff arrived, Indians told their "story in a different way." The sheriff made no arrests. Labor radicals, insisted Fulwood, coached Indians to lie.<sup>3</sup>

Fulwood's letter is rich with meaning. First and foremost, it links settler paternalism to agency paternalism. Though settlers and townsfolk offered Indians favors, assistance, and toleration, they sometimes implored agents to bring Indians under control. The two paternalisms—one that developed on the reservation, the other that developed outside—did not always work at cross-purposes.

What the letter also suggests is that Indians—young men in particular—were becoming more assertive, more aggressive. They mixed easily with white laborers. Like whites, they became alert to slights. They became alert to exploitation. Though no records indicate Indian participation in the many strikes and protests that occurred in Arizona's copper towns, Fulwood's letter suggests that Indians no longer worked without question. Whereas an earlier generation had sought off-reservation work in order to reestablish cultural sovereignty, the younger generation sought more. They sought good wages and work conditions. They sought not just toleration, but respect.

The quest for respect—indeed the demand for respect—energized young Indians throughout the state. In 1930, Gordon Sapp, a writer for a tourism magazine, interviewed an educated San Carlos man named Thomas Dosela. Dosela, wrote Sapp, bitterly objected to the building of Coolidge Dam, which had driven his people from their farmlands and forced them into "every canyon" to eke out a living. More eloquent, however, was an Apache named John Felix whom Sapp encountered "in a small mining town" near San Carlos. "I hate all of you white men," Felix told Sapp. "Yes, you can smile, for you speak as the gods of my father."<sup>4</sup>

You are all-powerful. You pounce upon my people as the hungry mountain lion rips the deer to pieces. You make movies and write weird tales in your newspapers about the Apaches. And what do you always say? "Massacres! Painted bodies! Wild savages!" . . . You forget that, though the homes of my people are far from your towns, the Apache is an American, just as the white man. You forget that we're fighting for a living just as your farmers and workingmen are. You shroud the Indian in mystery when he is only human, loving his family as the white man does and caring for his children.<sup>5</sup>

Felix, wrote Sapp, “was trying to reason things out, as he had been taught in a government school, but the emotional heritage of his fighting forefathers would not be downed. . . . He had received a coating of the white man’s social creed by education, but he always remembered that he was an Apache—and he was proud of it.” Sapp was likely correct. Like other educated Indians, Felix experienced acute double consciousness. He was Indian and American. He was proud of his heritage yet sensitive to ridicule. From another perspective, however, Sapp demonstrated the very prejudice that Felix decried. To Sapp, Felix was a “son of the wild canyons and mountains.”<sup>6</sup> Once a savage, forever a savage.

Indian assertion came not only in pool halls, in parties, or in interactions with reporters. It came in almost every interaction with whites. Assertion appeared particularly in litigation. In 1920, for example, an Apache named Grover Cleveland—named for the former US president—died instantly when the sewer ditch that he was digging collapsed. What ensued was a long struggle by his heirs for indemnities.

Initially, the city of Miami—for whom Cleveland had been working—agreed to pay \$4,000. Seven months later, the family still awaited the money. Cleveland’s wife, daughter, and grandchildren were now surviving on charity, along with a \$500 loan from a group of businessmen. To hasten the settlement, Cleveland’s nephew, Francis Taylor (a.k.a. Francis Dia), got himself appointed executor of the estate and hired an attorney. The attorney argued that Cleveland had severed ties to the reservation in order to live a “civilized” life; hence he and his heirs had the rights of US citizens. No longer were they wards. They could sue, and be sued.<sup>7</sup>

San Carlos agent A. H. Symons took a different view. He insisted that Cleveland and his wife, as well as Francis Taylor, remained San Carlos Indians despite living off the reservation. In view of that fact, Symons instructed the US district attorney—acting for the BIA—to pursue a settlement. The BIA determined that the appropriate indemnity would be \$5,000, which was to be paid to a trust in care of the San Carlos agent rather than to Cleveland’s family. Mrs. Cleveland, warned Symons, “has a number of relatives lying around” who, with the settlement, “expect to buy themselves new automobiles and live high.”<sup>8</sup> Symons held low regard for Apache generosity.

It was Symons and the BIA that prevailed. Miami paid the claim to the trust and the San Carlos agent disbursed it. For Francis Taylor and for Mrs. Cleveland, however, there was some fruit beyond money. They had tested their wills against the BIA and the city of Miami. Briefly, they had tasted independence and legal rights. The courts defined them as wards, but they had proven themselves to be autonomous actors.

Indians became autonomous in other ways, too. Realizing that they could be neither free nor secure so long as they lived on the property of whites, Dilzhe'e returnees to the Rim Country and Verde Valley claimed lands of their own. Annie T.A. 30 (her tag-band name) obtained a special use permit for 2 acres of Tonto National Forest land as early as 1909. Chilchihuana, a pre-conquest headman (fig. 11.1), filed for a 10-acre homestead in Greenback Valley in the Sierra Ancha in 1916. Ed Gilson, a literate Dilzhe'e, attempted the same thing at the headwaters of Salome Creek. He eventually received title to 68 acres. Delia Chapman filed for a site on the East Verde in the early 1900s. She apparently received no title, but filed another claim on



**Figure 11.1.** Chief Chilchihuana, father of Henry Chinn, here engages in cultural activism by showing off exemplary baskets, presumably made by his female relations. Photo by Kathryn T. Dodge. National Anthropological Archives, Smithsonian Institution, NAA INV 02061600.

Fossil Creek in 1919. Both claims, it seems, were pre-conquest farms that Dilzhe'es had reoccupied.<sup>9</sup> By filing, she protected their rights.

Henry Irving, similarly, purchased two lots near Payson for \$20, where he erected a wooden house comparable to that of whites. "My house, my land, and my peach trees," he liked to tell whites. Soon his land became a magnet for friends and relatives (those in his extended family and clan), who put up gowas near Irving's house. From Irving's land—whites called it "Indian Hill"—returnees ventured out to find work at local ranches and mines. Indians, reported Teresa Boardman, came and went constantly. "This cousin came and the other cousin—oh, they must have had cousins coming by the millions. I never saw anything like it."<sup>10</sup>

By possessing land, Dilzhe'es escaped caste and dependency. With land of their own, they did not need to plead for the right to use the lands of whites. Owning land, moreover, allowed Apache headmen and headwomen to re-create old patterns of kinship, clan, community, and leadership. It also allowed them to re-create old patterns of communalism. The people who gathered on Indian Hill, recalled Ola Smith, "were all one family, one group, they helped one another. They helped gather in the plants from different places, helped each other like that."<sup>11</sup>

We should not, however, paint too rosy a picture of Indian homesteading. In 1913, the San Carlos agent noted that:

When an Indian off the Reservation undertakes to acquire a homestead he is often harassed by certain of the white settlers . . . until he gives up the struggle and usually becomes a squatter on land nobody else wants, and lives as best he can. With all of the opposition, antipathy and "fleecing" the Indians meet off the Reservation . . . it is small wonder that he goes back to his aboriginal practices and hunts game—in the form of cattle belonging to someone else.<sup>12</sup>

Like African Americans who attempted to homestead after the Civil War, Indians met a resistance—at least initially—that relegated them to a lower caste, a caste forbidden to own land.

Even when they succeeded in establishing claims, few managed to keep their parcels for more than a few years, or, at most, a couple of decades. Delia Chapman, for example, found it impossible to

improve her claim—at least to the standard demanded by homestead law—after her husband died. In 1929, Chapman, blind and nearly ninety, accompanied her son-in-law, Jack Francis, to the office of the Tonto National Forest ranger to see whether she could still gain title. For the past ten years, she had been living with her son's and daughter's families rather than on the claim. Other Dilzhe'es who had lived on the claim, it seems, had also departed, likely to find work. Francis told the ranger he wanted to "improve the place and make a home for himself and [his mother-in-law], but he and all her other people are not able to finance the improvements needed and get food at the same time." "The fences are all down and part of the wire has been removed," noted the ranger. "The two houses that are on the place are hardly worth repairing."<sup>13</sup>

The ranger recommended granting title regardless, hoping that Chapman could sell it and support herself from the proceeds. Not until 1934, however, did she receive title. By then, it seems, Chapman's relatives had reoccupied the place. In 1943—when she was nearly 100—Chapman sold her land for \$500.<sup>14</sup>

Henry Irving's land met a different fate. In 1932, a white interloper deposed him from Indian Hill. Though Irving regained possession, his heirs lost the property in the 1940s by failing to pay property taxes. The heirs, it seems, did not understand their obligation; no one explained it. Eager to develop the property, a local man bought it for a fraction of its worth and forced the Indians to leave. Though some Payson residents opposed the seizure, they could not prevent it. The Indians—stunned and mystified—"didn't argue when we brought the bulldozers in."<sup>15</sup>

If Indians were gaining—and losing—property, meanwhile, they received something seemingly more secure in 1924: US citizenship. Though the vast majority of Indians remained affiliated with reservations, they now gained the right to vote, assuming, that is, they could pass Arizona's literacy test. "The First Indian Registrant Is for Democrats," proclaimed the *Arizona Record* on July 10, 1924. After that man—Manuel Victor of Rice, once a Silas John supporter—registered, the county recorder introduced him to "almost every person in the courtroom."<sup>16</sup>

The *Record*, however, could not resist a bit of sarcasm after San Carlos Indians held a meeting in which they determined not to register and vote en masse. "Ah, Apache Indians have held counsel!" declared

the *Record*. It went on to quote Willie Stevens, a San Carlos man who served as Gila County's Apache interpreter, who explained that "Indians are not especially concerned about politics." Most San Carlos Indians, insisted Stevens, wanted the same rights and privileges as whites. Some feared, however, that citizenship might mean the abolition of the reservation. Others—likely those accustomed to working outside the reservation—wanted full citizenship and freedom from ward status. "Indians really do not know what to do," concluded the *Record*, "but it is certain that few Indians will vote at the coming election."<sup>17</sup>

At Camp Verde, only one Indian voted, a Carlisle graduate. Many others failed the literacy test, which required them to read and explain part of the state constitution. Those who failed, noted Camp Verde agent George Laben, had attended boarding schools in Phoenix, Truxton Canyon, Fort Mojave, Santa Fe, and Kansas. "Not a glittering; but a dark monument to those Indian schools, their friends and their educational facilities," he lamented. What he might have added was that their failure was a dark monument to the sociology of chagrin. So, too, was it a dark monument to the state of Arizona, which dedicated few resources to Indian education, yet required Indians to take a literacy test that many whites would have failed.<sup>18</sup>

If San Carlos Indians were ambivalent about voting, meanwhile, whites expressed strong opinions. "Many have questioned the right of Indians . . . to register and to vote," reported the *Prescott Evening Courier* in 1924. That questioning became more insistent over the next few years. Indians, inveighed the *Arizona Silver Belt*, "retain the irresponsible relationship of a favored child of a paternal government." Until they were willing to pay state taxes and live under state law, they should not vote. Indians, it added, "do not want to vote. A class of citizens who are indifferent to the exercise of the franchise has repeatedly proven to be dangerous to the state and a very undesirable element in society." The *Silver Belt*, however, failed to give examples of that danger. In Phoenix, by contrast, state legislators worried that Apaches—former enemies to whites—actually would want to vote.<sup>19</sup>

Left unsaid by both the *Silver Belt* and the legislators was the fact that the counties and the state complained incessantly of being forced to police Indians off the reservation and to try Indian cases. Indians, perhaps, did not wish to live under state law, but the state had made it difficult for them to do so. Left unsaid, too, was the role

Indians had played in building a modern state, with dams, highways, bridges, mines, smelters, and power plants. Left unsaid was the fact that Arizonans made great profits from Indian labor. Left unsaid, finally, was the need of the poor and the marginal for representation.

By the late 1920s, Arizona's legislature and state supreme court had denied the vote to Indians—both on and off reservations—who had not dissolved ties with their tribes. Even as Arizonans extended the vote to women, they withdrew it from Indians. The timing was more than coincidence. The politics of conscience demanded that white males extend the vote to those deemed virtuous—white women—while denying it to those deemed delinquents, namely Indians. Not until 1948 did the court guarantee the vote to Indians, regardless of whether they lived on reservations.<sup>20</sup>

Whether Indians did or did not vote, they sought independence and respect. That Indians asserted new rights, however, was not the only matter at issue. Equally important was how whites interpreted Indian assertion. One could argue that Apaches were neither more nor less assertive than they had been in the past. What was new about their assertion, perhaps, was that whites took notice. Often, whites were its target.

Whereas in the past, Indian work crews had placed camps a mile or more away from the camps of white workers, now they mixed freely.<sup>21</sup> That in itself was assertion. Whites did not take notice of Indians merely because of proximity, however; whites took notice because they were in the throes of ambivalence. They were ambivalent about Indians. More than that, they were ambivalent about themselves. They had begun to question—and even to outlaw—their traditional devotion to drink, gambling, physical assertion, and male domination. Whites' discourse about Indians was a discourse about themselves.

Whites' ambivalence about Indians played out especially in newspapers, which by the 1910s had begun to produce stories both favorable to Indians and antagonistic to them. Two decades earlier, the papers had almost always vilified Indians. On the rare occasions that they reported favorably, the stories concerned individuals, not tribes or groups. In 1897, the *Silver Belt* saluted Antonio Apache, who claimed to be Chiricahua. As a boy, reported Apache, he had been captured and sent to Virginia, whence he had run away to

Philadelphia. Somehow he attained an education. Upon returning to Arizona as a representative of Chicago's Field Columbian Museum, he met the editors of the *Silver Belt*, who found his "physical development perfect," "his mind . . . retentive and well poised," and "his carriage and address . . . easy and pleasing."<sup>22</sup>

Apache subsequently married the daughter of a Cibecue chief (though the two never lived together as husband and wife), then traveled to New York City where he tried to interest investors in Arizona mines. It was there that a reporter investigated his background and concluded that his heritage was Asiatic or North African. Antonio Apache, it seems, was among the first in a long line of faux Indians—people who claim Indianness to gain celebrity—that stretches into the present. In the 1910s, he was playing Indian roles in fairs and carnivals in Los Angeles.<sup>23</sup> What is important here, however, is that the *Silver Belt* praised him not as an Indian per se, but as an Indian divorced from tribal culture.

In the 1910s, a different discourse appeared. Newspapers began printing articles that praised Indians who remained tied to tribe. "Friendly Indians Save Lives of Travelers," reported the *Verde Copper News* of Jerome in February 1918. "Indians Wear Blue of Navy," it announced two months later. "Indians Will Take Part in Frontier Show," enthused the *Prescott Evening Courier* in 1924. "Navajos Plan Novel Program," it explained in a follow-up: "Solos, Dances, and Stories Will Feature Opening Night at the Carnival." Not to be outdone, the *Arizona Record* reported in the same year that "Indian Trailers Hunt Santa Fe Robbers." A few months later, the *Record* again gave Indians positive mention: "Famous Apache Chief Will Be Baptized at Tucson by Bishop" was its headline.<sup>24</sup>

The most pervasive stories about "good Indians" were those concerning Indian roles in pageants, festivals, and rodeos. By the 1920s, Indians participated in festivals and tourist events throughout the state. Byron Cummings, for example, the pioneering archaeologist, asked San Carlos agent James Kitch to send twenty Apaches to perform the "devil dance" at the annual state pageant in Case Grande.

Originally serving as a healing ritual to be performed for the sick, or, at times, for girls who were coming of age, the devil dance retained its pre-conquest trappings. Whites found it fascinating. The dancers—stripped to the waist, their chests painted in "weird, colorful designs,"

their hips and legs covered with buckskin skirts and moccasins, their faces hidden behind masks, their heads topped by elaborate “crowns” made of cactus wood—became embodiments of the *gaan*. After a clown arrived to prepare the ground, the dancers emerged at dusk, seemingly out of nowhere. While the clown weaved in and out between them, the dancers sang and stepped rhythmically in counts of five. They sang to the sun and stars, to the four winds, to the “black” East, to the “yellow” West, and to the “white” North, but never to the “blue” South, whence came evil. The songs often continued through the night.<sup>25</sup>

Dance troupes likewise performed before hundreds or even thousands of spectators at Phoenix Indian School, at the annual Indian powwow in Flagstaff, and at the San Carlos Fourth of July celebration. Pride in such dances soon led to competitions. When a San Carlos troupe received an invitation from Phoenix to perform the devil dance, they reported “great joy.” “We Apache Indians,” bragged Thomas Enfield, a San Carlos man, “always won [more] dances then [sic] any other tribe in United States of America.” The San Carlos tribal council, meanwhile, designated the performance the “crown dance,” fearing that whites might construe the word “devil” to mean evil (fig. 11.2).<sup>26</sup>



**Figure 11.2.** In crown dances—called “devil dances” prior to the 1940s—Apache men emulated *gaan*. In the early twentieth century, Apache troupes began performing crown dances for audiences throughout the Southwest. Photo by Edward Sheriff Curtis, 1898. Library of Congress American Memory Collection.

Just as Indians took pride in performing dances in public, so, too, did they take pride in demonstrating horsemanship and crafts. At San Carlos fairs, Indians put on rodeo events and displayed fine baskets, bows, arrows, “and every kind of Indian relic.” In Prescott, Viola Jumulla, a Yavapai headwoman, not only displayed and sold basketry and “authentic Indian costumes,” but also used such occasions to explain her people’s customs and way of life. Indian women at Globe, Camp Verde, and Clarkdale participated in the same transactions, though their conversations with buyers were rarely recorded. Men sometimes sold their own works of art. Jack Tonto of Camp Verde both gave away and sold buckskins on which he painted exquisite and colorful faunal and human iconography (rather like sand paintings) (fig. 11.3). Silas John, the powerful religious leader, meanwhile manufactured and sold hat bands, belts, and watch fobs made from rattlesnake skins.<sup>27</sup>

Artists from other tribes, too—even those whose tribal lands were distant—engaged in cultural activism. Navajo weavers and silver-smiths, along with Navajo dancers, reported the *Evening Courier*, appeared at Prescott’s annual Frontier Days celebration. Navajo textiles had become so famous that they merited special stories. “Navajo Rug for Dance Is Shown at Owl,” bragged the *Courier* in 1924.<sup>28</sup>

Modern scholars argue that the tourist trade made Indians into props. Indians were mysterious, inscrutable, unknowable. They were sage and mystic, perhaps, but not modern. Indians became the object of the tourist “gaze,” a sociological exercise in which tourists gazed upon Indians and, in doing so, confirmed suppositions about Indian otherness. The gaze was one-way; Indians lacked the power to tell whites who they were. Tourists “toured”; Indians were “toured upon.” Indians—and their real lives of poverty, struggle, and ethnic pride—disappeared in a haze of spectacle. To the degree that Indians capitalized on tourism, they made themselves caricatures.<sup>29</sup>

As much power as the gaze hypothesis holds, it fails to recognize that Indians promoted tourism. They took pride in their art, their dancing, their horsemanship. They took pride in explaining their lives, whether by displaying and selling baskets, pots, and jewelry or by holding dances at powwows, fairs, dedications, and ceremonies or by participating in rodeos. Whites bought Indian arts and crafts and viewed Indian performances in order to gain access to aesthetic



**Figure 11.3.** Jack Tonto, former scout in the Geronimo campaigns and Indian policeman, presented this painted buckskin to Taylor Gabbard, the first Camp Verde agent. With its sun, moon, snake, and *gaan* motifs, it suggests the power of Apache tradition. The cross on the head of the *gaan*, upper right, is a pre-Christian motif. Other images—a bull and a man roping a horse—suggest the changed world of 1908. Photo by Peter Bugg. Phoenix Public Library.

power. Indians likely conceived of such transactions as something more. In the pre-conquest era, trade had cemented friendships. Trade was not solely an economic activity; it was a social and political activity. Though trade became increasingly commercial and impersonal in the twentieth century, it held at least some of its former connotations. Trade created friendship (figs. 11.4 and 11.5).

Cultural activism had begun almost as soon as Indians had been conquered. Throughout the Great Plains, Indians flocked to tryouts for Wild West shows as early as the 1880s. Just as show promoters needed Indians to attract white patrons, so Indians needed Wild West shows to show whites who they were. In the shows, Indians reenacted attacks on stagecoaches and on soldiers, thus displaying athleticism and daring. Afterward, “dead” Indians and “dead” whites rose and shook hands, thus displaying rapprochement. Behind the scenes, whites toured Indian encampments, where they met Indian performers and their families. Though the BIA set itself against Wild West shows—agents argued that the shows encouraged Indians to indulge in savagism—Indians persisted in joining. Wild West shows allowed cultural activism.<sup>30</sup>

Indian participation in southwestern tourism followed the same pattern. In effect, Indian artists and performers forced whites to reconsider who they were. Indians became participants—not full participants, but participants nonetheless—in a discourse about race that whites had monopolized for centuries. By appearing at fairs, festivals, and rodeos, by displaying and selling baskets, jewelry, and paintings, by performing public dances, Indians engaged in public relations. They attested to their own differences: their ties to the land, their spiritual ethic, their aesthetic sensibilities. They defined difference not as savagism but as civilization: Indian civilization.<sup>31</sup>

As early as 1918, cultural activism had an impact. The BIA in that year decided not to ban traditional Indian dances thanks to a complaint from the Arizona Archaeological Society. Inspired by the “Hopi Indian [snake] dance which attracts so much attention each year,” the society argued that traditional dances and rituals “had an uplifting effect upon the Indians who believed in them devoutly.” Thirty years later, Indians were dancing in public venues all over Arizona. Indian craftspeople, meanwhile, became mainstays of the annual Arizona State Fair in Phoenix. In 1948, the fair included



**Figure 11.4.** In displaying and selling baskets and manufactures, Indian women taught whites to regard them as something more than savages. The women here are Yavapais who lived in or near Prescott, c. 1930. Sharlot Hall Museum Library and Archives, Prescott, Arizona.



**Figure 11.5.** Apaches sold fine basketry to white tourists at Rice as early as the 1910s. Photographer unknown. Collection of Jeremy Rowe Vintage Photography ([vintagephoto.com](http://vintagephoto.com)).

sand painters, weavers, silversmiths, and basket makers from across the state, each of whom displayed wares and chatted with viewers. Indians, explained the *Evening Courier*, displayed “natural talents and productive versatility” in making the tools that allowed them to survive in the “arid deserts and rugged mountains.” Those who attended the fair got not only a glimpse of Indian arts, crafts, and healing rituals, but also a lesson in Indian dignity.<sup>32</sup>

Thanks in part to cultural activism, the public, in concert with popular travel writers and tourist promoters, peppered BIA agents and school supervisors with letters asking for information on Indians, particularly Apaches. In 1934, a high school student from southern Arizona informed agent Kitch that “our graduating class this year has chosen for our theme The Builders of Cochise County. We are especially interested in getting detailed information on the personal side of the Indian chief Cochise himself, his character, ability, family life, and so on. We are not interested in any stories of warfare, but want to know about his kindlier nature.” Mrs. Henry L. Taylor, a teacher in the “Indian Room” in a Globe public school, had a similar request. Having been asked by the Globe Women’s Club to give a talk on Indian music, she sought information from John Brown, supervisor of the Phoenix Indian School. From Waitsfield, Vermont, meanwhile, came a letter to Brown asking for information on indigenous land rights. For a high school debate, the writer’s team sought to defend the position that “Indians should not have been deprived of their lands.”<sup>33</sup>

Writers and publicists, too, bombarded agents with queries. In 1936, Leslie Gregory, a field representative for the Federal Writers’ Project of the Works Progress Administration, asked Kitch to help organize a “powwow” at San Carlos, where Gregory hoped to interview “old Indians.” In the Federal Writers’ Project guide to Arizona, Gregory proposed to tell “the truth about the Apaches.” Through both the guide and magazine articles, he hoped to publicize “the messages [that] the Apache Chiefs and Oldtimers may want to send to the white brethren,” thereby creating “something of great value toward better understanding.” Dan Williamson, similarly, a Globe justice of the peace, put together a slide show of “old time San Carlos Indians,” which he showed to both Indians and whites in the late 1930s.<sup>34</sup>

The fascination with things Apache went beyond Arizona. Gertrude Knott, an organizer for the National Folk Festival of 1935, informed Kitch that Apaches “are supposed to be among the most colorful” Indians in the United States. The festival’s organizers, she explained, wished to display “traditional [Apache] things so that they might be handed down as living examples of the early social customs upon which our country has been founded.”<sup>35</sup>

Knott’s words were the culmination of an interest in Indians—and a sympathy for their way of life—that had taken root in the late nineteenth century. From the 1880s through the 1930s, a succession of writers interpreted Indians for a reading public. George Bird Grinnell wrote about the Cheyenne and the Blackfeet. Walter McClintock also wrote about the Blackfeet, whereas Frank Bird Linderman wrote about the Flathead, the Crow, the Cree, and others. Charles Fletcher Lummis and George Wharton James, meanwhile, traveled among the southwestern tribes, then converted their experiences into books. Popular writers, notes Sherry Smith, “asserted Indians’ humanity, artistry, community, and spirituality.”<sup>36</sup>

Gregory and Knott had ample precedent. Like popular writers who came before them, they participated in a powerful American critique of the modern era, a critique of materialism, utilitarianism, hollow spirituality, and the breakdown of community. They participated, moreover, in a celebration of folklife and folk culture that emerged in the 1930s. They participated, too, in a project to save a “vanishing America,” an America of backwoodsmen, hunters, cowboys, Indians, and buffalo.<sup>37</sup>

It would be mistaken, however, to suggest that the critique of the modern, the 1930s celebration of folklife, and the desire to conserve a vanishing America comprised the whole of white interest in things Indian. Indians themselves sought recognition and understanding. They created a stream of cultural activism that writers and publicists could tap. Though Indian artists—whether Apache basket makers or Navajo weavers—received only a fraction of the actual value of their products, they challenged whites to think of them in new ways.<sup>38</sup>

Amid praise for Indians, however, sounded notes of derision. Arizona’s newspapers, despite printing many stories favorable to Indians, also publicized a long list of Indian sins. “Indian Arrested Sunday

Night,” reported the *Evening Courier* in January 1924. The man arrested, it seems, had broken windows in a pool hall, then struck the proprietor. The cause of his wrath went unreported. “Armed Indian Killed in Duel by Officers,” chimed in the *Arizona Record* in May. An Indian farmworker had made threats against locals, causing officers to descend on him. Instead of surrendering, he engaged them with a gun. He was not the only aggrieved Indian farmworker. Also in 1924, the *Evening Courier* reported that a group of Indian farmworkers had run away from the Salt River Valley after being accused of gambling. The BIA’s labor overseer, however, managed to round them up in Prescott and send them back. Other stories—following timeworn tradition—alerted readers to the evils of Indians buying whiskey from Mexicans.<sup>39</sup>

In 1918, the *Verde Copper News* offered commentary on more distant Indians. “Oakhlahoma [sic] Indians Not Like Arizona Brethren,” it opined. A small group of Creeks, it reported, had engaged in a draft riot in which they killed three white farmers. “Woman at Bottom of It,” declared the story’s subtitle. The woman, explained the *Copper News*, had told Creek men that, not being US citizens, they had no obligation to fight US wars. By drafting them, she declared, the government was engaging in “robbery.”<sup>40</sup> Whereas many San Carlos Indians volunteered to serve during World War I, the Creeks, it seemed, had moved toward sedition. Though the story reflected well on Arizona Indians, it implied that they must continue to toe the line. Their patriotism remained suspect.

Another genre of newspaper stories consisted of firsthand accounts of aging settlers who recalled battles with “savages.” Dr. J. M. Swetnam, reported the *Copper News*, had carved out a farm in the Verde Valley in 1865, lured by high prices in Prescott for barley, wheat, and corn. “There were many times,” Swetnam recalled, “when the handful of white men” in the valley “fought even a hundred Indians.” Charles Clark, president of the Arizona Pioneers’ Association, likewise recalled the Indian wars. In the pages of the *Evening Courier*, he reported his family’s flight from their ore mill near Globe in 1881, when Apaches led by Na-ti-o-tish had escaped the reservation. When Clark returned, he found that “the destruction of my home was complete.” Renegades had broken the stove to bits, broken the dishes, “batted the cooking utensils until they were

useless, slashed rugs, [and] curtains.” For some reason, however, they had left the mill untouched.<sup>41</sup>

Newspapers, then, kept old fears alive. The papers kept alive, moreover, old stereotypes of Indians as gamblers, drinkers, shirkers of work. Those stereotypes no longer dominated the papers. Most stories that cast Indians in unfavorable light were mere posts, their headlines small, their placement toward the back of the paper. The fact that they appeared, however, ensured that the “Indian question” remained open. Indians seemed eager to demonstrate friendship by dancing, by showing art, by serving in the military, even by rescuing lost travelers. But Indians seemed equally intent on vice, indulgence, and defiance.

Stories of white vices and crimes appeared in the papers, too. Those stories, however, did not identify the race of wrongdoers. A white criminal was merely a criminal; an Indian criminal was always described as “Indian.” Stories about white wrongdoers, moreover, seldom involved satire. Indian misdeeds, by contrast, became excuses for mockery. By portraying Indians as humorous rogues, newspapers taught white readers to think of Indians with a smile and a laugh.

Since at least the 1860s—when President Grant initiated his peace policy—cartoonists and writers had developed a stock character named “Lo.” “Lo” was short for “Lo! The Poor Indian,” a lament that settlers attributed to naïve eastern reformers. “Those who content themselves that there is no such thing as civilizing the Indians,” chuckled the *Silver Belt* in 1897, “should stand on Main street [in Yuma] . . . and watch poor Lo as he speeds up and down that thoroughfare on his bicycle.”<sup>42</sup>

When readers came across “Lo,” they knew to curl their lips in a smirk. Likely they also smirked when, in 1898, they read that San Carlos Apaches had held a vote “to determine whether the noble red man wanted the choo-choo horse to cross the reservation.” Equally satirical was a story from 1900 headlined “Geronimo a Poker Sharp.” The aging leader, reported the *Silver Belt*, kept his fellow Apaches at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, “broke nearly all the time.” With his earnings he had purchased “the finest wardrobe of any Indian on the reservation.” “He feels prouder of his trophies,” continued the *Silver Belt*, “than a small boy does of his first pair of pants.” In a contradictory reference, however, the *Silver Belt* noted that he gave part of his winnings “to civilized Indian children to spend for an education.”<sup>43</sup>

Almost two decades later, the mockery continued. In 1918, shortly before an armistice ended World War I, the *Verde Copper News* announced that an “Awful Fate Hangs Over Heads of Indians. Grim privation, distress and destitution beyond the comprehension of a Belgian, a Serbian or an Armenian is faced by the Indians living along the Verde river.” Denied the right to buy alcohol, it seems, a few Indians had resorted to drinking cologne. After an intoxicated Indian resisted arrest, a local judge forbade Indians to purchase cologne and “flavored extracts.” The judge, laughed the *Copper News*, “could have burned every wickiup on the Verde without bringing upon himself half the unpopularity which he acquired” by banning sales of cologne. “Apaches Stirred to Aboriginal Depths,” declared the *Copper News* in a follow-up story.<sup>44</sup>

Even as newspapers sometimes reported favorably on weddings of Christian Indians, they proved eager to satirize the domestic woes of others. In 1912, the *Silver Belt* sought to produce snickers from a story about an Apache woman angrily tearing apart her son-in-law’s gowa. Seven years later, it wryly reported that “the tulapai party staged last night was a social triumph from the Indian standpoint. . . . The tulapai had a vigorous jolt and the fighting was good as a result, the squaws naturally getting the worst of the arguments in all cases.”<sup>45</sup> Such stories represent a mere sampling; the *Silver Belt* was seldom at a loss for wry commentary on Indians.

Not to be outdone, in 1918 the *Copper News* reported the misfortunes of a Yavapai named Sam, who, upon returning from a three-week absence, found that his “frau had flown.” She had moved in with a younger man. “The warrior instinct, which had been dormant in [the husband’s] breast since the last raid of Geronimo, suddenly came to life. He leaped for the younger Indian.” His wife, however, intervened, driving him into the street. “Rocks of various sizes,” chuckled the *Copper News*, “were bounced from Sam’s anatomy.”<sup>46</sup> Whites, by implication, did not involve themselves in violent altercations.

Sarcasm continued into the 1920s, even as Indians gained US citizenship in 1924. In April 1925, the *Silver Belt* reported that a road crew had taken time off to participate “in a show, party, pow-wow, or possible ‘snake dance’ [Silas John dance] held in honor of ‘Chief White Mule.’” Settlers, meanwhile, learned to mockingly emulate

Apaches in a dance called the “flea-hop” that originated in New York City. “Did you ever see a bunch of wild Apache Indians dance?” asked the *Arizona Record* in July 1924. “Well, if you watch whites do the flea-hop, you’ll see what that looks like.”<sup>47</sup>

The fact that newspapers portrayed Indians as ridiculous stood in the way of equality. Satire relegated Indians to the status of a lower caste even as favorable coverage gave them dignity. Mockery, however, burst forth not only in newspapers. Mockery emerged on the reservation itself, when agents and staff belittled their wards. George Laben, the Camp Verde agent in the mid-1920s, was particularly given to parody. Where other agents emphasized Indian “progress” in their annual reports, Laben emphasized the opposite. Laben’s 1924 and 1925 reports both began with a sarcastic disclaimer:

All matters here-in treated have defectiveness which the narrative aim is to endeavor to remedy by debating the salient points of their defectiveness, thus in the course of time bring to those conditions such alternations as in the main will prove denominating which is hoped will have a tendency to bring to the front more improved and modern methods, there-by causing to stand out as a monumental attempt of this narrative to bring about the necessary improvements that the Government ward Indian is entitled to. . . . All other details, which may appear in the narrative are only placed there for attractiveness. None are in no way intended to reflect upon the Service, the Employees or the Ward Indian. With this view in mind; this narrative is respectfully submitted.”<sup>48</sup>

“None are in no way intended to reflect upon the Service, the Employees or the Ward Indians.” The double negative told Laben’s truth: He intended not only to satirize bureaucratic prose, he intended to satirize the Indian Service, its employees, and the Indians it served. In his reports, Laben emphasized Indian delinquency. Indians, he reported, continued to drink, gamble, and live in squalor. In case Laben’s data failed to show sufficient hopelessness, his illustrations underscored the point. Laben, a talented sketch artist, spiced his reports with depictions of Indian life. Again and again, he portrayed Camp Verde Indians as backward, indolent, and confused.<sup>49</sup>

Laben's captions made clear his contempt. The caption for a sketch depicting a giant whiskey jug standing on two thin legs, with two tiny men passed out on either side, read: "Mr. Tiswin or Tulapai, alias, White Mule: The Apache Indian's delight. To the tune of the little Brown Jug; 'Tis you who makes my friends; my foes. 'Tis you who makes me wear old clothes. Here you are, so close to my nose; So tip her up, and down she goes.'" Below a sketch of an Apache gowa, Laben wrote "a more progressive home of the Apache Indian on the Camp Verde Indian reservation, Arizona." The caption for a sketch showing an Indian woman rolling dough outside a gowa read "Home Economics, as applied by the average Indian girl in her reservational home, after graduation from our big Indian schools" (see fig. 10.2). Below a sketch of a young Indian man sitting on a fence, smoking a cigar (fig. 11.6), Laben wrote "the graduates of our Indian vocational schools are making rapid progress along some lines of educational and social culture."<sup>50</sup>

The image of Indians that appeared in newspapers and agency reports, then, was positive and negative, respectful and mocking. If we assume that newspapers and agency reports shaped—and reflected—the minds of white Arizonans, we find ambivalence, ambiguity, confusion. No longer did settlers demand annihilation or banishment, yet neither did they view Indians as social partners. Among Indians, meanwhile—many of whom read newspapers, if not agency reports—what developed was double consciousness.

On the one hand, Indians—like blacks—became self-conscious, perhaps even embarrassed, about their cultural traditions. Camp Verde Indians, noted agent Joe Taylor in 1914, "always show a great degree of shame" when caught drinking or gambling. In the company of whites, Indians—like blacks—felt beholden to white norms, white values, white speech ways, white dress ways. At both Camp Verde and San Carlos, Indians had begun dressing like whites by the 1890s.<sup>51</sup> Reservation Indians retained old norms, old expectations, old pleasures, yet they sometimes conformed to white expectations.

Rather than merely escape oversight by whites, Indians increasingly sought their respect. More and more, Indians realized that they lived in a white-dominated world. Whites dominated not merely

"A 1924 Indian Vocational Graduate,"



"The graduates of our Indian vocational schools are making rapid progress along some lines of educational and social culture".

**Figure 11.6.** In this sketch from his 1924 annual report on Camp Verde, George Laben mocks young men who asserted social equality by adopting white vices. Superintendent of Indian Affairs Annual Narrative and Statistical Field Agency Reports, 1907–1938, National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, DC.

with military force, but with opinion, gossip, discourse. Aware of white contempt, white praise, and white curiosity, Indians sought—at times—to project a progressive image. Yet, like southern blacks, they were unwilling to jettison old ways of life.

One way to resolve that tension was to display and sell baskets and art and to hold public dances, thus giving new meanings to things Indian, meanings that transcended the label of “savage.” By giving whites a window into their lives and cultures, Indians could make themselves both Indian and American. Yet the two identities—Indian and American—existed in tension.

It was precisely that tension that led Indians into small acts of rebellion. When in 1929 Edward Fulwood wrote agent Kitch about a new generation of hard-drinking, hard-partying, pro-union Apaches, he was writing about men in the throes of an identity crisis. Eager to be accepted by white laborers, they gravitated to pool halls where they smoked, gambled, and drank moonshine. Aware, meanwhile, of white contempt, they rebelled through assertion. Theirs was not the assertion of politics or economic ambition; theirs was the assertion of honor, an assertion of manly bonhomie and a readiness to fight.

In embracing honor, Indians drew from their cultural past. The honor of drinking, gambling, and rough-and-tumble fighting carried over from pre-conquest days. Honor was not merely Indian, however; it was endemic among whites, too. Settlers—or at least the males among them—participated in a culture that valued strong drink, quick fists, hale courage, and the willingness to risk loss, whether in cards or in combat.

By the early twentieth century, however, settlers were moving away from honor. By banning gambling, drinking, boxing, and capital punishment, as well as by giving women the right to vote, settlers sought to replace rites of assertion with rules of moderation. They embraced conscience. Conscience, in turn, marked the hegemony of the middle class, a class defined by restraint, sobriety, rectitude, and literacy. One might argue that conscience came from women, who became a bulwark for Prohibition. Whether the new morality was middle class, female, or something broader, however, it had the same impact. The more Indians asserted themselves via honor, the more “uncivilized” they seemed in the eyes of whites.

Not all Indians thronged to pool halls and bootleggers. Many of the older generation remained on the reservation, where—like many who abandoned the reservation—they remained true to their heritage. They continued to hunt and to gather. They continued to engage in sings and dances. They continued to brew tulapai and to gamble, though not in the company of whites. Far from seeking white society, they avoided it. They sought to reconstitute old customs and old rites, privately, secretly, both on the reservation and off it. To some extent, white settlers helped Indians accomplish just that. Settler paternalism was premised on toleration. If Indians wanted to hold sings, settlers made no effort to interfere. Those Indians who reconstituted their pre-conquest lives, however—no less than those who rebelled through toughness and assertion—found themselves judged.

For the first generation of Indians who left the reservation, white opinion had mattered little. What mattered was to remain Indian, even as authorities created an obstacle course of laws, rules, and bureaucracy. By taking advantage of paternalism—by manipulating both settlers and agents who sought Indian gratitude—Indians managed to re-create their old lives, if only in limited ways. In the very act of re-creating old lives, however, they guaranteed their marginalization.

For the generation of Indians educated in schools, hewing to old ways was even more problematic. Few wished to sever themselves from their culture and their elders. Yet most became acutely aware of white opinion. Some—like their elders—campaigns against bias by selling baskets and art and by holding public dances and sings. For some, however, that sort of activism was not enough.

Another way to resolve double consciousness was to sign up for the military. In the service, Indians could fight for the United States while taking pride in their warrior tradition. Though many San Carlos men volunteered during World War I, few Camp Verde men followed suit. Other Indians resolved double consciousness by becoming cowboys and ranchers. Indians, both on and off the reservation, regarded cowboying as superior to farming, roadwork, or mining. At San Carlos in the 1930s, indeed, small boys idolized cowboys—along with shamans—and emulated them in play.<sup>52</sup> By cowboying and ranching, Indians remained Indian. They could remain people who scoured the land, free, independent, powerful. They depended

no longer on wild game or on livestock captured in raids. They did, however, herd cattle. By cowboying, moreover, Indians associated themselves obliquely with the white idols of novel and screen.

There were other ways, too, to resolve the tension between being Indian and being American. One of the most renowned Indians of the early twentieth century, a Yavapai named Carlos Montezuma, called for the abolition of reservations. Montezuma saw his own life as exemplary, noting that he had “passed from the Apache grass hut through the different stages of development among enlightened people.” After being captured by O’odhams as a child, Montezuma was purchased by a traveling photographer named Carlos Gentile. Gentile arranged for the boy’s education. Soon the boy demonstrated high powers of intellect and, as a young man, gained admission to medical school. After taking his MD, he served as a BIA physician, then returned to Arizona to live among his people.<sup>53</sup>

Despite his fierce opposition to the reservation system, Montezuma did not dedicate his life to abolishing it. Quite the contrary: He worked diligently, feverishly, to protect the land and water rights of Yavapais (and a few Dilzhe’es) who lived on the Fort McDowell reservation near Phoenix. He believed, nonetheless, that only immersion in white culture—the immersion he had received—would cure the “Indian problem.” “If the choice of my life had been left to my mother and father or to myself,” he wrote in 1898 in the *Silver Belt*, “I would not be here.” He would not be, in other words, a physician and public intellectual. Montezuma went on to declare that reservations should be thrown open to settlers, who would become “examples” to Indians. Settlers would “bring in the light of civilization.” They would teach the Indian to earn his living “by the sweat of his brow.” The reservation, he continued, “is a demoralized prison; a barrier against enlightenment, a promoter of idleness, beggary, gambling, pauperism, ruin and death. It is a battlefield in which ignorance and superstition are massed against a thin skirmish line sent out from civilization.”<sup>54</sup>

When Montezuma wrote those words, he must not have realized how many Indians had abandoned San Carlos. Thousands of Apaches and Yavapais already lived among settlers. His ideas comported with those of eastern reformers who understood little of Indian culture,

and who had little appreciation for it. Yet there was something redemptive in his pronouncements.

Like the great abolitionist Frederick Douglass, Montezuma portrayed himself as a man of conscience, a man of ambition, a man of sobriety, thrift, and steady habits. Just as Frederick Douglass, in his autobiography, argued that enslavement made men ignorant, dependent, and corrupted at times by drink, so Montezuma argued that reservations made Indians ignorant, dependent, and given to vice. Just as Douglass used the example of his life to show racist whites that African Americans could transcend slavery, Montezuma used the example of his life to show that Indians could transcend reservations. Indians, he suggested, could be people of conscience, if only whites would give them real educations rather than the “whitewash” offered by Indian schools.<sup>55</sup>

Though he lived primarily at Fort McDowell, Montezuma appeared at San Carlos in 1920. There he became an instant hero to Indians, several dozen of whom would trail behind as he moved about the reservation. He also became a bitter opponent to agent Symons. When, on one occasion, Indians gathered to receive cattle that they had purchased from the BIA, Montezuma told them to stop. The cattle had grown fat on Indian grass, he declared. The BIA had no right to charge Indians for animals that—in effect—they already owned. According to Symons, Montezuma told Indians that “the white man is simply on the Reservation for what he can get,” and “that the Government of Washington is an Imposter, [and] that the Indian people should be set free.”<sup>56</sup>

Apparently planning to devote his twilight years to work at San Carlos, Montezuma petitioned for admission to the San Carlos “tribe” in 1921. To accomplish that, he submitted affidavits from Indians who verified that he was related to those on the reservation. One elderly man testified that Montezuma’s mother was “Tonto Apache,” perhaps meaning Dilzhe’e. Montezuma himself—after searching out living Indians who had known his family—came to believe that he was Pinal, likely because of his mother’s affiliation. Most evidence suggests, however, that he was Yavapai.<sup>57</sup>

Whether Montezuma was Yavapai, Apache, or both, Symons opposed his petition, arguing that he had severed ties with any

reservation—had indeed become a US citizen—by living elsewhere during his youth and early adulthood. A few Dilzhe'es, too, opposed Montezuma's admission.<sup>58</sup> Why they did so is lost to history. Perhaps they simply agreed with Symons. Perhaps, too, they viewed Montezuma, like his fellow Yavapai, as alien. Only a few Yavapai remained at San Carlos, and they had little political clout. Or perhaps Montezuma's opponents resented his campaign to abolish reservations.

The opposition, however, had little impact. All three San Carlos districts—Bylas, Rice, and San Carlos—gave majority votes in favor of admission. The final decision, nonetheless, was left to the BIA. In 1924, after years of indecision and wrangling, it denied Montezuma's petition.<sup>59</sup>

Despite failing to enroll at San Carlos, Montezuma had devoted his life to fighting the stereotypes and the mockery that appeared in the papers and, at times, in the agency itself. He was no fool. No savage. He rebelled against white prejudice very differently than did the young Indian men in Globe who gambled, drank, and socialized with labor radicals. He rebelled by being a model citizen, a perfect incarnation of the self-made man celebrated in nineteenth-century literature.

Mike Burns—another Yavapai who had been captured as a boy and raised by whites—led a less flamboyant life at San Carlos, where he served as an interpreter and English teacher. He also became an outspoken critic of corporal punishment in Indian schools. Burns, like Montezuma, sought out those who had known his family, though few had survived the Skeleton Cave Massacre of 1872. Burns also devoted his time to writing an epic memoir in which he defended his people from charges of savagery. Indians had fought whites, he wrote, only because whites killed their people and stole their children.<sup>60</sup>

Burns criticized white reformers who espoused conscience, too. "Most all supposed Christian men and women," he wrote, "all talk kind and say they will pray for you all the time but still not in their hearts; not sincerity." Rather than converting, Burns remained dedicated to Yavapai belief. The creation story, he explained—the battle of Lofty Wanderer against Eagle—"does not look as real natural facts but it is the way that the Indians [have heard] their stories from their ancestors. I believe it just the same way as . . . the white people have

their old stories.” “I am not ashamed,” he added, “that I am . . . Indian.” Being Indian made him proud.<sup>61</sup>

Other Indians followed in Burns’s and Montezuma’s footsteps. In 1897, the *Silver Belt* reported that Morgan Toprock, “a full-blooded Apache” from San Carlos who had graduated from Carlisle, planned to study law in Chicago under Montezuma’s care. Whether Toprock was able to carry out his plan is unclear. In later years, however, he became a leader at San Carlos. In 1922, he lobbied against requiring Indian children to attend off-reservation schools unless parents gave permission. Toprock, with several allies, asked the BIA to enlarge the Rice school to accommodate children in higher grades. That way, they would not have to leave their families. The alien climates that children met at off-reservation schools, contended Apaches, made them sick. When the children died, lamented one old woman, “their bodies [were] buried in a strange land.”<sup>62</sup>

For his troubles, Toprock earned derision. Toprock, noted agent Ernest Stecker, was “a Carlyle [sic] graduate, but not an uplifter.” Stecker denied Toprock’s requests, insisting that conditions at off-reservation boarding schools had improved. The assistant commissioner of Indian affairs, however, countermanded Stecker at least partially. The BIA, he promised, would accede to parents’ wishes “unless in cases where the best interest of the children would require that they go elsewhere for further education.”<sup>63</sup>

Some Apaches, then, demanded respect by drinking, partying, and brawling in mining towns. Some, like Carlos Montezuma, demanded respect by incarnating the self-made man. Some—including both Montezuma and Toprock—demanded respect by challenging the BIA. None of them, however, led a successful push against BIA rule. If the rough men who frequented pool halls gained respect from white laborers, they lost the respect of white paternalists—including BIA agents—whose judgments of Indians as delinquents only hardened. Montezuma, perhaps, gained the respect of some of those same paternalists, but his sweeping indictment of reservations had little impact. Like mining-town roughs, he failed to gain the respect of BIA agents. His indictments, moreover, tended to undermine Indian sovereignty, something most Indians refused to abandon. It was a very different reformer, a Dilzhe’e named Henry Chinn—the son

of Chief Chilchinhuana—who succeeded. It was Chinn who waged a relentless and successful campaign against BIA paternalism—and in particular against agent Kitch—in the late 1920s and early 1930s.

To say that James Kitch disliked Henry Chinn would be an understatement. From 1925 until his death in 1943, Chinn fired off letters, petitions, and complaints to Kitch and to the commissioner of Indian affairs. Born to a powerful Dilzhe'e band chief in the 1870s, Chinn grew up at San Carlos and was educated at a boarding school. When he returned, he read and wrote proficient English. He retained, however, close ties with his brother—a medicine man—and with traditional Apache culture. In his youth, Chinn married a Pinal woman and, in keeping with Apache tradition, went to live with her people on Gilson Wash.<sup>64</sup> Perhaps because he married outside his group, he came to see himself as spokesman for the whole of San Carlos.

In the early 1920s, agent Ernest Stecker made Chinn into a confidant and a paid employee. Chinn, in turn, named one of his sons Stecker Chinn. When Symons took control of San Carlos, however, he refused Chinn employment. Kitch followed suit. Chinn, they contended, showed poor character. They said he drank tulapai and refused to work.<sup>65</sup>

Chinn may indeed have indulged in tulapai—he was arrested for that offense on at least one occasion—but the charge that he refused to work was untrue (fig. 11.7). Perhaps he refused to farm. Perhaps he refused to do menial labor. But he worked tirelessly on policy questions. By the late 1920s, if not earlier, he had a coterie of perhaps a dozen men who met almost daily to discuss policy. Though lacking BIA sanction, his group called themselves the San Carlos Business Committee. Members included Morgan Toprock, Manuel Victor, Robert Roy, Charles Naltway, Mary Sago, Charley Sago, Coley Sago, Juan Walter, Mike Nelson, William Duster, Oliver Belvado, and John Rope.<sup>66</sup> Most, like Chinn, had attended boarding school.

With Chinn as spokesman, the group lobbied Indians, agents, and the BIA. “Due to his continuous correspondence with high officials and others in the East,” lamented Kitch, Chinn gained inordinate influence among Indians. The reverse, however, was equally true: Chinn’s committee gained popularity precisely because it became a mouthpiece for Indians who felt silenced.<sup>67</sup>



INDIAN LABORERS WORKING AT PUBLIC ROAD CONSTRUCTION.

HENRY CHILCHUANA, THE APACHE INDIAN RAILROAD BOSS, WITH HIS KINSMEN WORKING ON A GOVERNMENT ROAD IN ARIZONA.

**Figure 11.7.** The bottom photo indicates that, in young adulthood, Henry Chinn—here called Henry Chilchuana, “Railroad Boss”—worked on construction projects. Later in life, Chinn busied himself with policy, challenging agent James Kitch at every turn. National Anthropological Archives, Smithsonian Institution, NAA INV 02018203.

Time and again, Chinn brought grievances from rank-and-file Indians before Kitch. He complained that a Globe hospital had released an Apache woman without treating her ailment. He lobbied Kitch to force the railroad to pay damages for cows killed on reservation tracks. He reported hunger among his fellow Apaches.<sup>68</sup> By no means was Kitch indifferent. The issue, however, was who should be in a position to help. By assisting individuals, Kitch perpetuated paternalism. In making himself ombudsman, Chinn fought back.

As early as 1925, Chinn and his committee petitioned the BIA for compensation for lands flooded by Coolidge Dam. “We have learned to love and revere this spot,” they told the commissioner of Indian affairs. “There our children have been born and grown to manhood and womanhood. There our fathers and mothers have lived, died and are now buried.” If in its wisdom the BIA decreed that a dam must flood their lands, the Indians would consent. But they demanded compensation. They proposed to use that compensation, moreover, to buy out the leases of the Chiricahua Cattle Company, a white-owned operation, thus opening up tens of thousands of acres for Indian cattle herds.<sup>69</sup>

“During all of these years that we have been wards,” remonstrated the committee, “we have not had any voice in . . . reservation affairs.” With the appointment of Kitch, things had gotten worse. Kitch, complained the committee, “seems entirely out of sympathy with Indians.” He was especially indifferent to “our graduates from the various schools,” who, upon returning to the reservation, “have not received the encouragement due them.” Now that the federal government had granted them citizenship, educated Indians “want our rights to free speech, and free assemblage, protected, and we petition you to help us to get it.”<sup>70</sup> Even if Kitch did not want to listen, boarding school alumni forced him to do so.

Over the next decade came a stream of protests and recommendations from Chinn and his committee. They called for restoration of the Mineral Strip lost in 1896. Failing restoration, they demanded compensation. They called on Kitch to organize sales of tribal timber to provide much-needed capital for reservation projects. They asked the commissioner of Indian affairs to investigate negotiations that led to unfair allocations of power—and profits—from the plant at Coolidge Dam. Again and again, they insisted that Kitch employ

Indians for reservation construction projects. In 1929, Chinn sought permission to travel to Washington, DC, to meet with the commissioner of Indian affairs. The BIA refused him.<sup>71</sup>

To Chinn and his committee, Kitch responded with frustration and anger. Chinn, he wrote the commissioner of Indian affairs in 1930, “is continually objecting to everything and for quite a period of time last winter made almost weekly requests for information.” Kitch accused his predecessor, Stecker, of assisting Chinn in his crusade. Many of Chinn’s letters, admitted Kitch, were in his own handwriting, but others, he complained, were in the handwriting of Stecker. Kitch contended, moreover, that Chinn was receiving advice from “some outfit in the east,” apparently the Indian Rights Association. “Henry,” he concluded, “is not the best educated Indian in the world.”<sup>72</sup>

Kitch also accused Chinn of laziness. Chinn, he pointed out, lived in a camp with his wife, his brother and his wife, his mother, and an “aged aunt.” Because Chinn refused to work to support them, argued Kitch, the government had to provide rations. Chinn, he declared, “is not inclined to manual labor of any nature.” Kitch subsequently learned from the agency physician that Chinn had severe diabetes and high blood pressure and could work at only light tasks. That fact, however, did not alter Kitch’s opinion. When Kitch denied him both clerical and groundskeeping jobs, Chinn rededicated himself to activism.<sup>73</sup>

Making little headway with Kitch, Chinn and his business committee made bigger gambits. In 1933, they recruited Phoenix attorneys who promised to sue the government for inadequately compensating the “Apache Nation”—the term used by Chinn’s committee—for the Mineral Strip. Kitch stridently opposed the deal. Chinn’s group, he argued, was trying to force the tribe to pay lawyers. Kitch, himself an attorney, insisted that the BIA already represented Indians in litigation for free. He insisted, moreover, that no self-designated committee could conduct tribal business.<sup>74</sup>

What Chinn and his committee complained of was not simply the injustice of the Mineral Strip seizure. They complained that the tribe’s economic progress—as well as its independence from BIA authorities—was too slow. When during a meeting with Kitch one of Chinn’s allies “raised the question as to the progress of the Indians in recent

years,” Kitch “started to explain the increase in cattle, grazing acreage, establishment of pensions and other matters of benefit to the Indians which had been acquired during the past few years.” On hearing this self-defense, Chinn “vigorously objected and walked away.”<sup>75</sup>

“To completely put a stop” to Chinn’s ambitions, Kitch called together the San Carlos people in April 1933 and asked them to elect an official business council, one endorsed by the BIA. The move was strategic. Kitch knew that Chinn and his group were popular in only one of the three districts on the reservation. Old divisions among clans, bands, and pre-conquest tribes remained strong. Realizing, it seems, that Kitch would use the meeting to weaken him, Chinn refused to attend. Some of Chinn’s supporters, however, sought election to the new business council. As Kitch had anticipated, they lost.<sup>76</sup>

Crippled but still game, Chinn employed his own strategic maneuver in July, when he got Kitch to call another tribal meeting to discuss plans for the cattle industry. Kitch—partly at the instigation of Chinn’s business committee—sought to make the reservation economically self-sufficient via ranching. His plan, however, cost Indians’ money. Rather than the government giving cattle to Indian families, the families had to pay to build their herds. In theory, each family group would gradually purchase enough cattle for a viable herd. Each group would then become self-supporting, relying only on themselves for fencing, branding, and roundups. The plan, however, involved a slow transition. For the time being, a staff consisting of two white bosses and eight or more Indian cowboys continued to handle the tribal herd.

At the July meeting, Chinn’s group held numerical superiority. Many of those from other parts of the reservation were doing reforestation work far from the agency. Taking advantage of the situation, Chinn proposed that Kitch fire the white range bosses and replace them with Indians. Chinn also proposed to hire new cowboys who would rotate every month, allowing large numbers of men to share salaries. When put to a vote, Chinn’s proposal prevailed 72 to 49.<sup>77</sup>

The vote was advisory. Kitch reported the meeting and the vote to the commissioner of Indian affairs but steered the wheel of policy straight ahead. Chinn, meanwhile, continued to barrage Kitch with suggestions and complaints. Kitch, he inveighed, acted too slowly in moving white lessees off the range. Kitch did little, he continued, to

fight the constant rustling by white ranchers. Kitch favored whites in awarding construction jobs and contracts. Kitch failed to secure adequate compensation for the Mineral Strip. Kitch was half-hearted in pursuing indemnity settlements in cases of Indians killed on the job.<sup>78</sup>

Kitch refuted each charge, carefully, exhaustively, in long letters to the commissioner of Indian affairs. One such letter—one among many—ran to fifteen typewritten pages. What is clear from Kitch's refutations is both his own efficiency and his irritation with critics. Kitch's signal accomplishment was creating the tribal cattle industry. Hundreds of Indians, eager to become self-supporting ranchers, became ardent allies in that project. Kitch worked for his wards in other ways, too. Despite Chinn's accusations, Kitch's letters prove that he had vigorously protested each of the injustices that Chinn listed.<sup>79</sup>

Kitch was right. Not all of Chinn's accusations were fair. To read the contest between the two men as a story of Indian ingratitude, or of agent ineptitude, however, would be wrong. The force behind Chinn's criticism was not solely his judgment of Kitch; it was his longing for autonomy. Chinn wanted Indians to control their destinies. He wanted Indians—knowledgeable Indians like himself—to shape policy, make decisions, take power. In attacking Chinn's character and rejecting his leadership, Kitch sought to maintain his authority. In effect, he sought to maintain paternalism. Chinn, in turn, pushed all the harder in the opposite direction.

The struggle came to a head in 1934. In that year, the BIA, now under the leadership of John Collier, announced a "New Deal" for Indians. Under the provisions of the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA), Indians could draw up constitutions and establish tribal councils to govern themselves. Unlike earlier tribal councils, the new ones would not be mere government pawns. They would not be advisory bodies making recommendations. They would make law. Tribes, moreover, could establish themselves as corporations in order to promote business. Just as important, the IRA protected Indian lands. During the five decades after the Dawes Severalty Act, the government had parceled out tribal lands to individual Indians who often sold them or lost them in court. "Excess" lands—those not parceled out—had been opened to white settlement. Under the Indian Reorganization Act, however, tribal lands would be owned by the tribe.

The Dawes Act had not affected San Carlos or Camp Verde, whose lands were never allotted. Because good farmland was so limited at both reservations, there was not enough to provide for each head of family. Indians feared, however, that the government might allot their lands in the future. To prevent that from happening—and to take control of their own affairs—they embraced the IRA.

Chinn quickly took up the IRA's banner. As early as December 1933—in anticipation of the IRA's passage—San Carlos Indians voted on a constitution. Rather than leave voters with only one choice—the constitution offered by the official business council—Chinn offered an alternative constitution. Chinn, it seems, drew up the document in consultation with one of the Phoenix attorneys, Lemuel Mathews, whom he had sought to hire in earlier years. Indians at Fort McDowell had already adopted a similar constitution. Much to Kitch's chagrin, San Carlos voted for Chinn's constitution, 271 to 200.<sup>80</sup>

Since San Carlos had yet to adopt the IRA, the vote, once again, was advisory. Kitch required Chinn and his supporters to work with the official business council to draw up a compromise constitution that drew from both documents. Kitch objected particularly to provisions in Chinn's document that barred government employees from serving on the tribal council (meant to safeguard against conflicts of interest). Such a provision, argued Kitch, would disqualify more than five hundred San Carlos Indians. He also argued against Chinn's provision that required anyone working on the reservation to first get permission from the tribal council. "That," complained Kitch, "would completely destroy authority of the Secretary of the Interior under Civil Service regulations for appointment." Kitch objected, moreover, to provisions that barred the dismissal of council members for cause, that required at-large elections rather than allocating representation by district, and that allowed the tribal council to grant marriage certificates.<sup>81</sup>

The compromise constitution included none of the provisions that Kitch found objectionable. Chinn, however, accused Kitch of opposing adoption of the IRA, which, in turn, would weaken the constitution's legal authority. According to Chinn, Kitch had told the official business council not to endorse the IRA. Kitch remonstrated to the commissioner of Indian affairs that he supported the bill's

adoption and had said as much to the business council. To assuage Chinn, however, Kitch allowed him and his supporters to attend the BIA's Indian council in Phoenix, a conference in which BIA spokesmen explained the IRA to representatives from the tribes. It was at that conference—in March 1934—that Kitch's official business council endorsed adoption of the IRA (even though the bill had not yet passed Congress). Chinn and his supporters—Charles Dustin, Donald McIntosh, Victor Manuel, Mike Nelson, Stephen Smith, and Morgan Toprock—“were [also] permitted to sign.”<sup>82</sup>

With the business council's endorsement, the tribe planned to vote on the IRA in October. Chinn promptly asked Kitch for permission to visit the various Indian work camps—hundreds were employed in conservation work in distant parts of the reservation—to lobby for adoption. Kitch gave him approval, provided him a car, and made sure that Chinn received room and board at the camps. Kitch refused, however, to pay Chinn a salary.<sup>83</sup>

If Chinn was disappointed with Kitch's refusal to pay him, he was pleased with the vote on the IRA. On October 27, 1934, San Carlos adopted the IRA, along with its new constitution, by a margin of 504 to 22. Subsequently San Carlos Indians made June 18—the day in 1934 that President Roosevelt had signed the IRA into law—into a day of celebration. They called it “Emancipation Day.”<sup>84</sup>

Chinn went on to serve on both the business council and the tribal council. For a time, he served as tribal chairman. He went on, moreover, criticizing Kitch, who had tried to invalidate Chinn's election by insisting that, as a Dilzhe'e, he could not represent Gilson Wash, which was populated by “San Carlos” Apaches (Pinal and Aravaipas). The assistant commissioner of Indian affairs, however, refused to back Kitch, noting that he had allowed another Dilzhe'e—James Smiley—to serve on the tribal council under similar circumstances.<sup>85</sup> Chinn at last had his victory.

With the adoption of the IRA and his election to the tribal council, Chinn had won. In a sense, Kitch had won, too. Despite Chinn's accusations, Kitch strongly supported economic development and the IRA. Chinn and Kitch, however, were not the only victors. What had prevailed was Indian assertion. Older Indians asserted themselves by resurrecting pre-conquest customs, behaviors, and religious rites, as

well as by embracing a peculiarly Indian form of Christianity. Younger Indians—those with educations—helped their cause by writing petitions to agents demanding independence from white missionaries. They petitioned, too, for tribal ownership of the cattle industry, thus laying the groundwork for Kitch's policy of removing white lessees and turning over herds to Indians. Other young Indians asserted themselves in a very different way. They gambled, drank, and socialized with whites. Carlos Montezuma, by contrast, asserted himself by becoming a model of conscience, probity, and hard work. Mike Burns asserted himself by decrying white injustice, by criticizing Christian hypocrisy, and by embracing the Yavapai creation story. Another group of Indians, meanwhile—a group consisting of Henry Chinn and his supporters—asserted themselves through politics. They put San Carlos on a path toward sovereignty.

White ambivalence toward Indians did not disappear upon the IRA's adoption. Into the 1940s, newspapers printed stories that both praised Indians and—at least implicitly—criticized them. By 1948, however—the year that the Arizona Supreme Court guaranteed reservation Indians the right to vote—the papers tended to present Indians in a favorable light. They printed numerous stories about Indian arts and crafts, Indian participation in festivals and rodeos, and the politics and economics of reservations. Old stereotypes were giving way to a richer, fuller, more nuanced understanding of Indians and their problems. Neither the 1940s nor subsequent decades flowered with racial harmony. It was in those decades, however, that Indians—following the lead of activists from earlier decades—left paternalism behind.

# *Conclusion*

## Paternalism, Resistance, and Race Remade

BETWEEN 1864 AND 1934, Dilzhe'es and Yavapais experienced conquest, removal, return, and renewal. Central Arizona settlers meanwhile shifted from discussions of genocide to acts of paternalism to promoting tourism. They shifted, moreover, from a racial logic premised on honor—a logic that prescribed genocide—to a racial logic premised on conscience, and, finally, to a genuine (though constrained) appreciation for Indian peoples.

During that entire history, Indians struggled for a way forward. They fought the government, they scouted for the government, and they sued for peace in hopes of gaining a reservation in their homeland. In 1871, they succeeded. President Grant set aside the vast Rio Verde Reservation for Dilzhe'es and Yavapais. What President Grant gave, however, he took away. In 1875, Dilzhe'es and Yavapais found themselves embarking on a long, agonizing walk to a distant, dry reservation, San Carlos. When they arrived, they began almost immediately to petition to go home. Sometimes they ran away. Sometimes they left the reservation with permission. In the 1890s and 1900s—after perhaps the most brutal half century in their history—many hundreds returned to their homeland in the Rim Country and Verde Valley.

Once home, Indians found new obstacles. Settlers fenced them out of prime farming sites near creeks. Often settlers drove them away. Even when settlers allowed them to stay, returnees met hardship. Though they could still hunt in the mountains, the vast populations of deer, elk, and antelope had given way to sheep, goats, and cows. Unable to sustain themselves solely by hunting, gathering, and farming, Indians had to learn new ways to interact with whites. They

had to find ways to be of use. They had to offer their labor. They had to help build the very society that displaced them.

What developed was paternalism. Settlers, despite their initial fears of Indians, soon came to trust them. Indians worked for settlers as herders and crop pickers. Settlers paid them not only in wages but also in kindnesses and small favors. Indians reciprocated. What developed was friendship. But what also developed was caste. Whites and Indians developed a paradigm for social relations that was, for the most part, humane and tolerant, but also unequal. In a sense, Indians became dependents. They needed jobs. Sometimes they needed other things, too: small loans, guns for hunting, protection from the law, protection from abusive husbands, protection from the BIA's attempts to do away with dancing, singing, gambling, and drinking.

On the San Carlos and Camp Verde Reservations developed a different paternalism. Indian agents—men dedicated to conscience—were charged with molding Indians into Christians, farmers, and speakers of English. To do that, agents sought to abolish Indian culture. They left room, however, for negotiation. Paternalism on the reservation, though overbearing, did have holes. Like antebellum slaveholders, agents wanted approval. To get it, they offered favors, even freedoms. Agents helped Indian women deal with abusive men; they helped both women and men find jobs; they protected Indians from creditors; they helped Indians gain pensions; they established cooperatives; they sold farm goods at cost; they allowed dances and sings. At times, agents buttressed not individualism and self-help but communalism and tradition. Often, Indians manipulated agents to their own ends.

For their every indulgence in traditional behaviors, however, Indians received judgment. Agents continued to view them as spendthrift, sinful, childlike, incorrigible. Agents, in short, viewed Indians through the lens of conscience. If Indians gained the right to remain Indians—if they forced agents to allow them to engage in old patterns, old traditions—they simultaneously guaranteed that agents would find them wanting. They guaranteed the perpetuation of a paternalism premised on conscience.

Agency paternalism was not the same as that of slaveholders. It was not a paternalism that marked one race with honor and another with

shame. It did not relegate racial others to permanent subservience. But it sometimes came close.

Paternalism—the paternalism of conscience—lay at caste's core. Paternalism created social relationships—human relationships—that were humane yet unjust. Paternalism rewarded paternalist and subaltern alike even as it created a vast gulf between them. Paternalists gained subalterns' goodwill (at least a modicum of it). Paternalists were benevolent, good, giving. Subalterns were tractable, modest, grateful. So long as subalterns received the fruits of charity and negotiation—and so long as they could retain old cultural patterns—they could accept the status quo (albeit sometimes grudgingly). So long as paternalists earned Indians' goodwill, they could perpetuate inequality. Such behavioral prescriptions did not apply everywhere and always; they were open to challenge. But they applied often enough to create a measure of stability in the early twentieth century.

For women, paternalism offered practical advantages. Amid the storm of social change, Apache and Yavapai gender relations shifted and warped. Men lost powers they had once held. No longer did they gain status through raiding, warfare, and diplomacy. No longer did they bring back captive women, children, or livestock. Women lost power, too. No longer were they keepers of agricultural villages. No longer did they possess farms. No longer did women hold unchallenged authority over gowas and gotas. In other ways, however, gender codes persisted. Women remained farm laborers, gatherers, and basket weavers. Men remained hunters, shamans, and political authorities. As gender relations oscillated, however—and as Indians experienced the stresses of conquest, exile, and exodus—men occasionally resorted to violence.

Women found themselves caught between two sorts of patriarchy: an indigenous patriarchy that accorded men the power to inflict corporal (or even capital) punishment on wives, and an agency patriarchy that made BIA officials into arbiters of economic, sexual, and social relations. Women were caught between an older patriarchy premised on male honor and a newer one premised on conscience. Denied power both by Indian men and by agents, women played them against one another. When husbands were abusive, wives recruited agents to restrain them. When husbands acted as partners

and protectors, women conformed to old roles. They farmed, they prepared food, they manufactured baskets and clothing, and they sometimes prepared tulapai and tiswin for male rituals and male social affairs. Rather than working with agents to “civilize” men by forcing them to stop dancing, singing, drinking, and gambling, women helped men participate in those very activities.

In seeking agents’ assistance, however, women gave paternalism stability. Paternalism did not offer justice, perhaps, but it offered rewards. It helped define gender. It gave women a small measure of power. It gave order to the chaos that followed conquest. It also played a role in relegating honor killings to the past.

None of this is to suggest that Indians—male or female—capitulated to white domination. Resistance, however, tended to be oblique, indirect. Indians resisted by re-creating old social patterns, old traditions, old ways of life. Those old ways, however, led whites to continue to identify Indians as delinquents in need of reform. At times, Indians also protested white domination more directly, as when they rustled cows, befouled wells, or directed travelers’ cars into mud bogs, then demanded money to pull them out.<sup>1</sup> Those acts, too, tended to harden white judgment. At the same time that whites judged Indians as delinquents, however, they cultivated their loyalty. Both agents and settlers gave Indians jobs. Both agents and settlers did Indians favors. Indians, in turn, gave whites deference and thanks. Indians protected settlers from rustling, gave them small gifts, even taught them their language.

Paternalism and resistance were not necessarily at odds. They could work in tandem. Paternalism bred resistance, perhaps, but resistance bred paternalism. Indian resistance gave ammunition to whites who believed that Indians needed reform. The more Indians danced, sang, gambled, and drank, the more their white agents sought to guide them. The more that Indians reconstituted old social behaviors, the more they seemed—in the eyes of settlers and agents—to be delinquent and incorrigible.

Unlike agents, settlers looked the other way when Indians danced, sang, drank, gambled, or feuded. If settlers tolerated Indian behaviors, however, they remained judgmental. Settlers made Indian “delinquency” a yardstick for their own civility. Precisely when settlers became paternalists—in the 1890s, 1900s, and 1910s—they

sought to do away with “uncivilized” behaviors. They banned drinking, gambling, and boxing; they passed gun control laws; they gave women the right to vote; they abolished capital punishment. White reform suggested Indian dereliction: thus the mockery of Indians in the press. Whites rejected old patterns of honor and moved toward conscience. In doing so, they moved toward a racial logic based on conscience. They moved, moreover, toward paternalism. Though paternalism was built on decency—it was far removed from the genocidal racism of earlier decades—it was also built on inequality. Amid that shift, race was remade.

White paternalism and Indian resistance worked symbiotically to create caste. Settlers and Indians were drawing lines between one another. Some lines were hard, some were softer, but they added up to a wall. Here, finally, was race as it was lived. Though many modern scholars—rightly—seek to understand the construction of race through discourse, race was a deeply personal phenomenon. The idea of racial difference gained traction not only via discourse, but via interaction, behavior, emotion. Paternalism—and through it, caste—became an emotional engine that produced, among Indians, both resistance to whites and loyalty to them. It produced among whites, meanwhile, both goodwill toward Indians and harsh judgment of them. The result was a shaky stasis of domination and submission.

At the same time that the wall of caste was rising, other forces were knocking it down. One of those forces was Indians themselves. The alumni of Indian schools—both boarding and day schools—sought to overthrow paternalism and take control of the reservation. Those alumni had come of age in an institution that denied them freedom. Though the schools, too, were places of resistance and negotiation, they were essentially authoritarian. Teacher-student relations were less porous, less forgiving, more domineering than relations between agents and adults, or between settlers and Indians living off the reservation. Those who came of age amid intolerance were apt to become rebels. In the Indian schools, students learned to feel insignificant, embarrassed, harassed. Meanwhile, they learned to read and write, skills that gave them power. Once they reached maturity, they—like Henry Chinn, Morgan Toprock, and Manuel Victor, or for that matter like Carlos Montezuma and Mike Burns—used their emotions and their skills to contest agents’ authority.

Other Indians took action in a different form. By selling baskets, painted buckskins, beaded pouches and moccasins; by performing crown dances (“devil dances”) in public forums; by appearing in rodeos, fairs, and powwows, they engaged in cultural activism. White travel writers like Charles Fletcher Lummis and George Wharton James—along with the Santa Fe and Southern Pacific Railroads—were already giving the Southwest a pre-modern, spiritual, authentic mystique. They did so with Indian help. Indians—not just Apaches or Yavapais, but peoples throughout the Southwest—defined themselves through art, ritual, and athleticism.

The relationship between Indians and whites became increasingly commercial. Unlike paternalistic relations between settlers and Indians, commercial relations tended to be pro forma. They were brief, even fleeting. They involved, nevertheless, not just cash transactions, but emotional transactions. Those transactions left whites with new ideas—or, rather, new feelings—about who Indians were. Transactions between Indians and tourists created relations that transcended paternalism. In buying baskets and observing crown dances, tourists learned to view Indians as something other than delinquents in need of reform. Whites came to appreciate Indians as artists and performers. That appreciation, in turn, led whites closer to appreciating—not merely tolerating, but appreciating—Indian values and traditions.

What was occurring was a dialectic. When Apaches and Yavapais abandoned San Carlos, their priority was to reconstruct old ways of life. To accomplish that, they entered into paternalistic relations. Paternalism, however—though it led settlers to tolerate Indian customs and traditions—involved judgment. At times, Indian-white relations broke down barriers. When white children learned to speak Apache from their classmates in public schools, or when white adults bragged of their collections of fine Indian baskets, they veered toward appreciation for Indian culture.<sup>2</sup> Elsewhere, however, paternalism led to bias. Toleration and appreciation could blend and merge, but for the most part they remained separate.

In presenting their culture to whites via arts, crafts, and athleticism, Indians shared neither their spiritual secrets nor their private selves. Whites saw an abbreviated Indianness, a symbol of Indianness. Indians did, however, put forward an image that reflected who they were. The image was authentic even as it was shaped and advertised

by white promoters. Though we think of tourist interaction as shallow, its outcomes were profound.

Behind tourist interactions lurked change. Indians grew increasingly concerned with education, sobriety, respectability. When San Carlos Apaches formulated their own sort of Christian worship—barring white missionaries—they moved toward conscience. Apaches promised to give up drinking and gambling and “live a pure Christian life, such as they never dreamed of.”<sup>3</sup> Apache conscience, however, took peculiar forms; its iteration differed from that of middle-class whites.

To Apaches, Christian worship included traditional dance. They perpetuated some customs while altering others. Indians made themselves more like whites without becoming white. Tourism—and Indian participation in it—led to the same dialectic. Though dancing, singing, gambling, and drinking did not disappear, they changed. Certain rituals, like crown dances and girls’ coming-of-age rituals, became more public. Others—especially those involving gambling and drinking—became more private, more closeted. Gambling and drinking—though they did not cease—held an increasingly marginal place in Apache and Yavapai culture. Healing rituals, meanwhile, declined in number and frequency, though not because Indians no longer viewed them as important. They declined simply because fewer men—and women—had the opportunity to learn old songs.<sup>4</sup>

The culmination of those trends—the culmination of cultural and political activism—came in the 1930s, when Franklin Roosevelt appointed John Collier as commissioner of Indian affairs. Collier—himself influenced by Indian cultural activism—believed that Indians had a special role to play in the United States. They retained a strong sense of community even as the rest of the nation veered toward individualism. Indians retained an understanding of the sacred and the beautiful even as white Americans grew secular and materialistic. Rather than force Indians to assimilate—rather than force Indians to be individualists and materialists—Collier sought to protect their cultures. Collier’s Indian Reorganization Act (IRA)—which became law in 1934—ended the allotment and sale of reservation lands; promoted Indian arts and crafts, along with tribal businesses; and guaranteed tribes constitutional self-government.

What Collier recognized—thanks in part to Indian activism—was the anachronistic patterns of BIA rules, restrictions, and moralizing.

BIA policy had always been anachronistic. Precisely when the BIA sought to make Indians into dedicated yeoman farmers—even on lands unfit to be farmed—the nation at large was becoming urban and industrial. By 1920, urbanites outnumbered rural residents. In proportion to the total working population, the number of farmers—already a minority in the late nineteenth century—steadily declined. In popular fiction, farming became increasingly associated with poverty, demoralization, ignorance, and stagnation. From the 1870s through the 1920s—despite interludes of prosperity—farm prices slipped, leaving millions in poverty.<sup>5</sup> For the BIA, however, the solution to the “Indian problem” continued to be farming.

In trying to make Indians into farmers, the BIA was fighting the tide of American history. Perhaps that is another reason that Apaches and Yavapais showed so little enthusiasm for the BIA’s efforts. Anachronistic policy, however, did not end with farming. In imposing the mores of conscience—in battling pool halls, liquor, sexual adventure, and consumerism—Indian agents summoned the past to ward off the future.

The values that the BIA sought to promote—the values of conscience—were Victorian. In the early twentieth century, Arizona settlers embraced those values. They rejected their own patterns of honor, patterns that involved drinking, gambling, feuding, and violence. Between roughly 1900 and 1918, Arizonans abolished drinking, gambling, boxing, and capital punishment. They created gun control laws. They gave women the right to vote. And they pushed Indians to the cultural margins. Even as white women gained the right to vote, Indians lost that right. Indians lost the right, too, to purchase firearms and ammunition above .22 caliber.<sup>6</sup> Whereas for whites, gun control meant proscriptions on carrying guns in public places, for Indians those laws meant no guns at all, or at least none big enough to hunt big game.

In the 1920s, however, Americans—including Arizonans—moved in a different direction. Though the United States became a dry nation in 1920, the tide of modernity rolled on. Americans of the Jazz Age became avid consumers. They bought cars, refrigerators, and washing machines, not to mention the most fashionable clothing. Often it was not one’s hard-earned savings that allowed such purchases; it was the vast credit made available by banks and businesses.

Advertising—which grew exponentially—glorified the new ethic. Advertisers and popular writers, moreover, taught Americans a new ethic of sex. Women—far from being the “passionless” paragons of the Victorian era—were increasingly apt to take lovers, to use birth control, to put off marriage, to become “flappers.” Men learned to remake themselves in the mold of movie actors and sports heroes. In cities and towns, members of both sexes congregated in jazz clubs, speakeasies, and gambling dens.<sup>7</sup>

The BIA persisted in its quest to make Indians into Victorians precisely when white Americans rejected Victorian values. The fact that BIA agents were fighting history, it seems, never occurred to them. Rather than blaming Indian “misbehavior” on advertising, movies, and the larger shift in white norms, agents often blamed Indians. Rather than reshaping policy, agents redoubled their efforts to fight Indian depravity.

By celebrating Indian culture, Indian art, and Indian spirituality, Collier put the BIA on a different tack. When agents dragged their feet in carrying out his program, he issued stronger commands. “There are Government schools,” complained Collier in a BIA circular from 1934, “into which no trace of Indian native symbolism or art or craft-expression has been permitted to enter.” Indians, he worried, continued to believe that “their native religious life and Indian culture is frowned upon by the Government.” They continued to believe that they were still required to ask permission from agents before “they hold dance ceremonies of native religious or folk significance.” Collier demanded that agents widely publicize his new policies. “No interference with Indian religious life or ceremonial expression will hereafter be tolerated,” he inveighed. No longer, moreover, were BIA schools to deny Indians the right to speak native languages. Indians, wrote Collier, should be “fluent and literate in the English language and fluent in their vital, beautiful, and efficient native languages.” Indian arts and crafts, finally, “are to be prized, nourished and honored.”<sup>8</sup>

In formulating those policies, Collier seemed to recognize the powerful connection between white Americans and Indian artists. Implicitly his policies reflected the trajectory of white culture. The tourist journey to the Southwest—the journey to Indian reservations, trading posts, pueblos, dude ranches—was very much the fruit of

the 1920s celebration of social freedom. Oddly, that very search gave Indians new powers to shape white ideas about who Indians were and what they offered “civilization.” Understanding both the power of tourism and the power of Indian tradition, Collier made the BIA—for the most part—less intrusive, less paternalistic, less invasive. Far from trying to make Indians into paragons of Victorian conscience, Collier celebrated their communitarian ethics and their animistic religions.<sup>9</sup>

For San Carlos and Camp Verde Indians, the IRA was a watershed. Political activists like Henry Chinn succeeded in getting their people to adopt a constitution and create self-government. For other Indians, the IRA offered a different affirmation. If the political activists had won, so, too, had the cultural activists. Thanks to decades of public dances, art displays, and commercial transactions with tourists, Indians had convinced whites to see the beauty, the importance, the good of their cultures. Here, then, was race remade yet again.

As Philip Deloria suggests in a brilliant volume on American cultural history, *Playing Indian*, whites eagerly purchased the cultural product that Indians produced. In the twentieth century, whites ceased to view Indians as an “exterior other” who demanded conquest. Unlike their Revolutionary and early national forebears, moreover, whites ceased to employ the Indian as a symbol of national identity, a symbol that suggested their own indigency and difference from the Old World. What whites sought instead was the Indian who stood outside time, the pre-modern, spiritual, animistic Indian, the sort of Indian who could be found in southwestern tourist venues.<sup>10</sup> To reduce the dynamic solely to cultural longings among whites, however, does injustice to Indian agency.

Indian cultural activists—basket makers, weavers, silversmiths, painters, dancers, rodeo performers—teamed with Indian political activists to set the stage for sovereignty. They suffered setbacks, to be sure. In the late 1940s and 1950s, the federal government reversed course and sought to “terminate” tribes by ending federal recognition. Even in the depths of termination, however, there remained a reservoir of public goodwill for Indian peoples. The government’s shift back to self-determination in the Kennedy and Johnson years came as welcome relief to both Indians and many whites.

None of this is meant to suggest that Indians were, or are, solely artists, craftspeople, mystics, or environmentalists. The role that cultural activists carved out for themselves was both liberating and limiting. Cultural activists and white consumers entered a *de facto* agreement: Whites expected Indians to embody pre-modern, communitarian, spiritual virtues, but they did not expect Indians to become doctors, lawyers, accountants, and teachers. Indians, in turn, could freely, proudly, loyally perpetuate their cultures and traditions, but only by renouncing materialism and ambition. When Indians became doctors, lawyers, journalists, and teachers, they seemed—to whites—to be less Indian. Those contradictions continue to sow confusion in the present.<sup>11</sup>

The question that begs answering, finally, is how did the history of race in the West resemble, or not resemble, that of the South? More particularly, how did relations between Indians and whites in central Arizona resemble relations between blacks and whites in the Jim Crow era? In many ways, the histories of the two regions ran parallel. Paternalism developed along similar lines.

In Atlanta, black women—like Indian women—became domestics. Black women and white women developed close ties. White employers provided not only pay, but also small gifts: hand-me-down clothing, loans, food. Black women, in turn, gained a modest sort of power. At day's end, they brought home wages to black families in black communities.<sup>12</sup> At day's end, Indian domestics likewise brought wages home to Indian camps, Indian homes, and Indian families. Domestic work gave Indian women—like their black counterparts in the Jim Crow South—the power both to liberate themselves from male authority and to reconstruct Indian community.

Both southern blacks and Arizona Indians, moreover, defined themselves via dancing. "African Americans," writes Tera Hunter, "danced in public places near the railroad depot downtown, in halls, bars, and in the privacy of their homes, much to the chagrin of the police." Certain that late-night revelry bred crime and made blacks susceptible to infectious disease, whites sought to close down "negro dance halls." To whites, dancing confirmed that blacks were dirty, incorrigible, delinquent. Though unable to close the dance halls, officials hit upon the strategy of taxing them at high rates.<sup>13</sup> If dancing

was a way to resist paternalism, then, it simultaneously strengthened white judgment. Early twentieth-century Apaches and Yavapais would surely have understood that dialectic. They, too, sought places to dance—albeit for spiritual reasons—outside the purview of whites. They, too, resisted paternalism by dancing. And they, too, buttressed the very concept of deviance that gave paternalism strength.

In the rural South, some of the same patterns appeared. One of the best studies of the rural South is still John Dollard's 1937 book, *Caste and Class in a Southern Town*, which offered a portrait of life in rural Mississippi. Though his scholarship is dated—he emphasized the continuity of caste rather than its contingency—Dollard demonstrated that caste offered rewards for both blacks and whites. For blacks, the rewards were small but critical: jobs, loans, protection from the law. For whites, the rewards were much greater: unquestioned deference, economic hegemony, sexual privilege (whereas white men were free to sleep with black mistresses, no black man could enter a liaison with a white woman).<sup>14</sup> A similar logic of caste came to Arizona.

Recent scholarship on southern history has moved away from the paradigm of caste and toward the concept of black agency and resistance. Blacks, argue historians, never accepted caste. They repudiated it sometimes covertly, stealthily, and sometimes boldly and actively. Whites, meanwhile, worked tirelessly to construct a discourse of black inferiority. Sometimes that discourse defined blacks as bestial. Sometimes it defined them as pliable, simple, “Uncle Toms.” That discourse, in turn, spread across the nation in the twentieth century. Different groups—former Confederates, western settlers, women's rights activists, scientists—all used the myth of black inferiority to advance their own goals.<sup>15</sup>

We would do well to remember, however, that discourse and contestation are not the sole forces in racial history. Race relations—whether paternalistic or egalitarian—come from emotional, personal, profoundly human interactions. Sociology consists of more than words and ideas; sociology consists of patterns of interaction. The interactions that yield paternalism leave subalterns with feelings of anger and resentment, but also gratitude and friendship. The same interactions leave dominant peoples with feelings of friendship and benevolence, but also judgment, even scorn. Such interactions—and

the emotions they spawn—tend to perpetuate themselves across the years. Resistance—though it appeared in both Arizona and the Jim Crow South—did not necessarily create change.

What did create change was cultural activism. For Indians, that activism was a *de facto* public relations campaign that included public dances, public festivals and powwows, and public sales of beadwork, baskets, weavings, and jewelry. For blacks, an equivalent activism came during the Harlem Renaissance, when writers and poets presented black culture and black art to a white public. Music, too, became a forum for cultural activism: Whites flocked to hear jazz and blues performed by blacks. Like Indians, blacks found their art typecast as “primitive.” Whites sought out the “primitive” to compensate for their own sense of alienation and stagnation. Black writers, poets, artists, musicians, and dancers proved willing, even eager, to share their “primitive” culture with whites, but they resented the limitations that came with it. Whites, it seemed, refused to see blacks as simply “writers,” “artists,” or “musicians”; whites conceived of them as “black writers,” “black artists,” or “black musicians.” Despite its shortcomings, black cultural activism helped lay the groundwork for the civil rights movement, when blacks stormed the racial barricades.<sup>16</sup> In doing so, they acted in concert with white allies, allies they had cultivated in earlier decades.

In Arizona, similarly, Indians toppled paternalism—or at least pushed it far enough to guarantee its fall—through political activism. Henry Chinn, Morgan Toprock, Manuel Victor, and many others challenged BIA paternalism. They challenged, too, the racial divide. They succeeded in part because cultural activism had shaped white thinking. Whites had learned to conceive of Indians as something other than savage. Though newspapers continued to propagate a discourse of both Indian virtue and Indian sin, many whites had come to see Indian peoples as unique, talented, good. In Indians, whites saw virtues they had lost: community, artistry, spirituality. What is important here is that whites learned to think of Indians thus not simply through discourse, not simply from words that they read or spoke, but through emotional interactions. Whites learned how to think of Indians by watching them perform at rodeos and festivals, by buying their handiwork, by engaging in impersonal yet meaningful acts of exchange.

White Arizonans, then, moved from genocide to paternalism to hedged appreciation. They moved, too, from honor to conscience to consumerism. Their trajectory was not always straight. From the 1890s through the 1920s, paternalism in some ways became stronger. The gulf of caste widened. The more Indians resisted whites by practicing old customs, old rituals, old games, the more whites rallied to paternalism. Whereas once whites had considered Indians to be a shamed people, a people sunk in barbarity and blood, whites increasingly came to think of Indians as mere incorrigibles, people in need of guidance and reform. Only decades of Indian activism—both cultural and political—changed their minds.

Through that change, finally, came the renewal of Dilzhe'e and Yavapai peoples. They had known conquest and exile. They had met success in their attempts to go home. They had experienced paternalism and caste. They had returned to old ways, old social structures, and old religious practices even as they adopted new ones. And they had become foils in a white drama—a moral drama—about honor and conscience, and about race. Gradually, almost glacially, and not without detours, they achieved a sovereignty that was both cultural and political. Though that sovereignty is fragile, it is theirs.

# Notes

## Abbreviations

### *Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) agents and officials*

AAA	A. A. Armstrong (Fort Apache)
AHS	A. H. Symons (San Carlos)
ALM	Albert L. Myers (San Carlos)
CES	Charles E. Shell (superintendent of Truxton Indian School)
CHS	Carl H. Skinner (Phoenix Indian School)
CIA	Commissioner of Indian Affairs
CLD	Charles L. Davis (Fort Apache)
CVP	C. V. Peel (Camp Verde)
CWC	C. W. Crouse (Fort Apache)
EF	Emery Fraily (agency farmer, Camp Verde)
EHH	E. H. Hammond (superintendent of Indian schools, Southwest District)
ERM	Ernest R. McCray (San Carlos)
ES	Captain Ernest Stecker (San Carlos)
FEP	F. E. Pierce (San Carlos)
GDC	George D. Corson (San Carlos)
GJL	George J. Laben (Camp Verde)
HLH	H. L. Hart (San Carlos)
JBB	John B. Brown (Phoenix Indian School and Camp Verde)
JBK	James B. Kitch (San Carlos)
JCT	J. C. Tiffany (San Carlos)
JJT	Joe J. Taylor (Camp Verde)
JLB	John L. Bullis (San Carlos)
JOB	J. O. Barnd (Camp Verde)
JWN	Captain J. W. Nicholson (acting agent, San Carlos)
LJ	Lewis Johnson (San Carlos)
LSK	Luther S. Kelly (San Carlos)

PPW	P. P. Wilcox (San Carlos)
SR	Sedgwick Rice (San Carlos)
TES	Theodore E. Shipley (overseer of labor)
TPG	Taylor P. Gabbard (Camp Verde)
WD	William Donner (Fort Apache)
WET	William E. Thackray (Fort Mojave Indian School)

*Newspapers, Magazines*

ACC	Apache County <i>Critic</i>
AG	Arizona <i>Gazette</i>
AR	Arizona <i>Record</i>
ASB	Arizona <i>Silver Belt</i>
PEC	Prescott <i>Evening Courier</i>
SJH	St. Johns <i>Herald</i>
VCN	<i>Verde Copper News</i> (Jerome)

*Commissioner of Indian Affairs Published Reports*

ARCIA	Annual Reports of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs
FAAAR	Fort Apache Agency Annual Report
SCAAR	San Carlos Agency Annual Report

*Superintendent of Indian Affairs Annual Narrative and Statistical Field Agency Reports, RG 75, US National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, DC (microfilm, 1907–1938)*

ANRCV	Annual Narrative Report for Camp Verde
ARCVIS	Annual Report, Camp Verde Indian School
ARSCFAA	Annual Report of Superintendent in Charge of Fort Apache Agency
ARSSCFAA	Annual Report of School Superintendent in Charge of Fort Apache Agency
ARSSCR	Annual Report of Superintendent of San Carlos Reservation
ARSSCS	Annual Report of Superintendent of San Carlos School
ASRCV	Annual Statistical Report for Camp Verde
ASRSC	Annual Statistical Report for San Carlos

*Records of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (RG 75), US National Archives and Records Administration, Riverside, California*

PAORPIS	Phoenix Area Office Records, Phoenix Indian School
PAORSCA	Phoenix Area Office Records, San Carlos Agency
PAORSCACCF	Phoenix Area Office Records, San Carlos Agency, Central Classified Files
SCPC	Phoenix Area Office Records, San Carlos Program Correspondence (uncataloged)
TAR	Truxton Agency Records

*Other Archival and Print Collections*

AHS	Arizona Historical Society
ASLAPR	Arizona State Library, Archives and Public Records
ASMA	Arizona State Museum and Archives
ASU	Arizona State University
CMKP	Charles M. King Papers, Huntington Library
GCCR	Gila County Criminal Records, Arizona State Library, Public Records and Archives
GGP	Grenville Goodwin Papers, Arizona State Museum and Archives
GWPHC	George W. P. Hunt Collection, Arizona State University, Department of Archives and Manuscripts
HBL	Harold B. Lee Library, Brigham Young University
HL	Huntington Library
HOHIT	Houser Oral History Interview Transcripts, North Gila County Historical Society
IMOI	Ira Murphy Oral Interviews
LR	Letters Received, 1881–1907, Office of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, US National Archives, Washington, DC
NGCHS	North Gila County Historical Society
RRC	Ryder Ridgway Collection, Arizona State University
RSCA	Report on San Carlos Agency (Grenville Goodwin)
SBC	Stan Brown Collection, North Gila County Historical Society
SHM	Sharlot Hall Museum
UASC	University of Arizona Special Collections
WCBC	Will C. Barnes Collection, University of Arizona Special Collections
WSSP	Walter Scribner Schuyler Papers, Huntington Library

## Introduction

1. Keith H. Basso, “Western Apache,” in *Handbook of North American Indians*, William C. Sturtevant, ed., vol. 10, *Southwest*, Alfonso Ortiz, ed. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1983), 488; Britton Davis, *The Truth about Geronimo*, M. M. Quaife, ed. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1963), 1; Grenville Goodwin, *The Social Organization of the Western Apache* (reprint, Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1969), 6.

2. On the history of Euro-American ideas about Indians, see Robert Berkhofer, *The White Man’s Indian: Images of the American Indian from Columbus to the Present* (New York: Knopf, 1978). Only in the past few decades have historians examined Indians in the reservation era, leading to an emphasis on survival rather than disappearance.

3. Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, 2 vols., Phillips Bradley, ed. (New York: Knopf, 1945), i, 346, 347; Vine Deloria Jr., *Custer Died for Your Sins* (reprint, Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1988), 9.

4. In an effort to supply the missing dimension of lived experience, a Cibecue woman named Eve Tulene Watt, with assistance from Keith Basso, produced a fascinating family memoir, *Don’t Let the Sun Step Over You: A White Mountain Apache Family Life, 1860–1975* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2004). I consider my book to be a scholarly counterpart to Watt’s memoir. I do not claim, however, to give an Apache or Yavapai perspective on the past. My own cultural history and scholarly training make my perspective that of a white academic. I am quite certain that, in rendering this history, I have lost much of its nuance and at least some of what might be obvious to a modern Dilzhe’e or Yavapai. To locate that which I missed, readers should consult Watt’s fine book, not to mention elders at Camp Verde, Payson, and San Carlos, some of whom are recording their stories for posterity.

Scholars who write about war, peace, trade, and negotiation in the West—“West” meaning Indian-held areas throughout North America into which settlers advanced after 1598—include Richard White, *The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650–1815* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1991); James Brooks, *Captives and Cousins: Slavery, Kinship, and Community in the Southwest Borderlands* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001); Ned Blackhawk, *Violence over the Land: Indians and Empires in the Early American West* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006); James H. Merrell, *Into the American Woods: Negotiators on the Pennsylvania Frontier* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1999).

Important works on the discursive and scientific construction of race include Berkhofer, *White Man’s Indian*; Robert E. Bieder, *Science Encounters the Indian: The Early Years of American Ethnology* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1986); Roy Harvey Pearce, *Savagism and Civilization: A Study of the Indian and the American Mind* (reprint, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988); Curtis M. Hinsley, *The Smithsonian and the American Indian: Making a Moral Anthropology in Victorian America* (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press,

1981); Bruce R. Dain, *A Hideous Monster of the Mind: American Race Theory in the Early Republic* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002); Peter Silver, *Our Savage Neighbors: How Indian War Transformed Early America* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2008); Nancy Shoemaker, *A Strange Likeness: Becoming Red and White in Eighteenth-Century North America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004); Elliott West, "Reconstructing Race," *Western Historical Quarterly* 34, no. 1 (spring 2003), 7–26.

Scholars who write about Indian resistance and adaptation in the post-conquest period include Martha C. Knack, *Boundaries Between: The Southern Paiutes, 1775–1995* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2001); Brian Hosmer and Colleen O'Neill, eds., *American Indian Culture and Economic Development in the Twentieth Century* (Boulder: University Press of Colorado, 2004); Alice Littlefield and Martha C. Knack, eds., *Native Americans and Wage Labor: Ethnohistorical Perspectives* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1996); Eric V. Meeks, *Border Citizens: The Making of Indians, Mexicans, and Anglos in Arizona* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2007); David Rich Lewis, *Neither Wolf nor Dog: American Indians, Environment, and Agrarian Change* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994). Several of those books employ colonial theory, as does an excellent case study of recent mint: Jeffrey Shepherd, *We Are an Indian Nation: A History of the Hualapai People* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2010). Perhaps because oral history projects involving both settlers and Indians—the sort of oral histories used in this book—are rare, none of those monographs offers a close examination of commonplace white-Indian negotiation. One hastens to add, however, that scholars have produced monographs that explore commonplace negotiation among Mexicans, European immigrants, and American-born whites. Those include Kathleen Benton-Cohen, *Borderline Americans: Racial Division and Labor War in the Arizona Borderlands* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), and Linda Gordon, *The Great Arizona Orphan Abduction* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999). Both, however, tend to emphasize the genesis of racial discourse rather than emotive performance.

5. Philip Morgan, *Slave Counterpoint: Black Culture in the Eighteenth-Century Chesapeake and Low Country* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998); Eugene D. Genovese, *Roll, Jordan, Roll: The World the Slaves Made* (New York: Pantheon, 1974); Jeff Forret, *Race Relations at the Margins: Slaves and Poor Whites in the Antebellum Southern Countryside* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2006); Mark Schultz, *The Rural Face of White Supremacy: Beyond Jim Crow* (Urbana: University of Illinois, 2005); John Dollard, *Caste and Class in a Southern Town*, 3rd edition (New York: Anchor Books, 1957; reprint of 1937 edition). Cathleen Cahill's *Federal Fathers and Mothers: A Social History of the United States Indian Service, 1869–1933* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011) does a fine job of examining relations between the Indian Service and its Indian employees. Despite her case study of the Hoopa Valley Reservation, her book primarily focuses on the workings of the Indian Service, not Indian experience.

6. Accounts of the Indian wars of central Arizona include Timothy Braatz, *Surviving Conquest: A History of the Yavapai Peoples* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska

Press, 2003); Jim Schreier, *Camp Reno: Outpost in Apacheria, 1867–1870* (Tucson: Arizona Historical Society, 1992); Donald Worcester, *The Apaches: Eagles of the Southwest* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1979); John Gregory Bourke, *On the Border with Crook* (New York: Charles Scribners Sons, 1891); Edmund Wells, *Argonaut Tales: Stories of the Gold Seekers and the Indian Scouts of Early Arizona* (New York: F. H. Hitchcock, Grafton Press, 1927); Dan L. Thrapp, *Al Sieber: Chief of Scouts* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1964); Dan L. Thrapp, *The Conquest of Apacheria* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1967). Also worth examining is Stan Brown's fine manuscript on the Dilzhe'e during the early stages of the Tonto Basin campaign, "They Would Not Be Conquered: A History of the Pre-Reservation Tonto Apaches," typescript, SBC. I draw heavily on Brown in chapter 2.

7. Daniel Justin Herman, *Hell on the Range: A Story of Honor, Conscience, and the American West* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010).

8. What I call "emotional posture" the sociologist Pierre Bourdieu calls "habitus." See Richard Jenkins, *Pierre Bourdieu* (London and New York: Routledge, 2002), 70, 75, 78; Pierre Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1977); Pierre Bourdieu, "The Sentiment of Honor in Kabyle Society," Philip Sharrard, trans., in J. D. Peristiany, ed., *Honour and Shame: The Values of Mediterranean Society* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966), 192–211. In his recent history of emotions in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century France, William Reddy describes an "emotional regime," a theoretical construct akin to what I term "emotional posture" and "emotive performance." Reddy's study, however, differs profoundly from this one. He contends that bourgeois sensitivity to public honor and public shame became more acute after the French Revolution, leading to the privatization of sentiment. He departs in that way from American historians, who associate public honor and shaming with rural and pre-industrial settings, particularly the Old South. William M. Reddy, *The Navigation of Feeling: A Framework for the History of Emotions* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001). See also William M. Reddy, *The Invisible Code: Honor and Sentiment in Post-revolutionary France, 1815–1848* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997).

On the relationship between honor and violence, gender, and race in the American South, see Sheldon Hackney, "Southern Violence," *American Historical Review* 74 (1969): 906–25; Bertram Wyatt-Brown, *Southern Honor: Ethics and Behavior in the Old South* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982); Bertram Wyatt-Brown, *Yankee Saints and Southern Sinners* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1985); Kenneth S. Greenberg, *Honor and Slavery* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996); Richard E. Nisbett and Dov Cohen, *Culture of Honor: The Psychology of Violence in the South* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1996); Grady McWhiney, *Cracker Culture: Celtic Ways in the Old South* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1988); Dick Steward, *Duels and the Roots of Violence in Missouri* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2000); Timothy H. Breen, "Horses and Gentlemen: The Cultural Significance of Gambling among the Gentry of Virginia," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3rd ser., 34 (1977): 239–47. Southern honor, contend some historians—of which dueling was but one

aspect—helped precipitate the Civil War. In Mississippi, voters responded favorably in the 1850s and 1860s to politicians who decried slavish submission to Northern self-righteousness and who appealed to honor. Christopher J. Olsen, *Political Culture and Secession in Mississippi: Masculinity, Honor, and the Antiparty Tradition, 1830–1860* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000). In Texas, meanwhile, lynchings—rituals of shaming that undergirded honor—gained popularity amid successive campaigns against Indians, Unionists, and blacks. William D. Carrigan, *The Making of a Lynching Culture: Violence and Vigilantism in Central Texas, 1836–1916* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2004). The racialized codes of honor that prevailed among Arizona settlers came with immigrants from Texas, the South, and the lower Midwest and rooted themselves in the fertile soil of resource competition. Herman, *Hell on the Range*, chaps. 1–2, 5, 9. On genocidal behavior by Arizona settlers and their Indian allies, see Karl Jacoby, *Shadows at Dawn: A Borderlands Massacre and the Violence of History* (New York: Penguin Press, 2008), 112, 116–17, 119, and Part I of this book.

I wish to note here that to employ “honor” as an analytical category is to risk reductionism. Those steered by honor, like all peoples, negotiate with others and with their world in complex ways. Their cultures, moreover, change over time. It is important to note, too, that individuals often hold contradictory ideas and ways of being. Honor is not totalizing. The scholarship on American honor nonetheless suggests the transmission of honor across decades, even centuries.

9. The literature that describes conscience is vast and diffuse. An excellent starting point is Wyatt-Brown, *Yankee Saints*.

10. On the rise of Arizona’s conscience politics, see Herman, *Hell on the Range*, chap. 11.

11. To comprehend Indian work patterns in the post-conquest era, see Hosmer and O’Neill, *American Indian Culture*. Scholars who employ modernization and dependency theory, argue Hosmer and O’Neill, too often categorize “traditional” or “pre-modern” Indians only in opposition to a western norm of “modern.” Such scholars suggest that the degree to which Indian societies remain “traditional” is the degree to which they remain outmoded. Indians, however, do not necessarily see any gulf between their traditions and their search for prosperity. Often, they pursue economic reward in ways that are neither “modern” nor “traditional” but are uniquely indigenous. Thus, Plains women have linked ceremonial with commodity production (Tressa Berman, “All We Needed Was Our Gardens: Women’s Work and Welfare Reform in the Reservation Economy,” 133–55). Tlingits have engaged in commercial fishing even as they have sought to protect old subsistence patterns (David Arnold, “Work and Culture in Southeastern Alaska: Tlingits and the Salmon Fisheries,” 155–83). For the Pomo, Concow, and Yuki of northern California, entry into the labor market allowed the acquisition of important lands and the resurrection of old customs (William Bauer, “Working for Identity: Race, Ethnicity, and the Market Economy in Northern California, 1875–1936,” 238–57). In each case, commercial activity operated in concert with tradition.

Similar arguments appear in various essays in Littlefield and Knack, *Native Americans and Wage Labor*: The Mi’kmaq of Maine, for example, picked crops

for whites, which broke down traditional village authority but bolstered tribal identity (Harald E. L. Prins, “Tribal Network and Migrant Labor: Mi’kmaq Indians as Seasonal Workers in Aroostook’s Potato Fields, 1870–1980,” 45–65). The Southern Paiute engaged in multiple sorts of work for local whites, which allowed them flexibility, adaptability, and cultural continuity (Martha C. Knack, “Nineteenth-Century Great Basin Indian Wage Labor,” 144–76). The Laguna of New Mexico worked in large numbers for the Southern Pacific Railroad, which led them to establish a new community in Los Angeles. That new community, however, was predicated on old models of kinship and culture (Kurt M. Peters, “Watering the Flower: Laguna Pueblo and the Santa Fe Railroad, 1880–1943,” 177–97). The Timbisha of Death Valley, California, likewise engaged in a variety of labor, especially construction. In their work camps, they engaged in gambling and drinking, though not, it seems, to the detriment of their work. They maintained, moreover, their traditional social structure of loose-knit, migratory families (Beth Sennett, “Wage Labor: Survival for the Death Valley Timbisha,” 218–44). Also see Knack, *Boundaries Between*; Meeks, *Border Citizens*; Lewis, *Neither Wolf nor Dog*; Frederick E. Hoxie, *Parading through History: The Making of the Crow Nation in America, 1805–1935* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

12. In colonial Mexico, argues Steven Stern, women contested patriarchal abuses by seeking help from Spanish authorities. Authorities, in turn, defined themselves as beneficent paternalists, protectors of women. “In societies profoundly divided by color and class, elites characteristically sought legitimacy—in their own eyes as well as those of subordinates—by presenting themselves as paternal patrons who helped their unfortunate inferiors and clients and who tolerated some of the less serious foibles of childlike peoples.” Steven J. Stern, *The Secret History of Gender: Women, Men, and Power in Late Colonial Mexico* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995), 304.

13. Knack, *Boundaries Between*, 221, 311; Eric V. Meeks, “The Tohono O’odham: Wage Labor and Resistant Adaptation, 1900–1930,” *Western Historical Quarterly* 34, no. 4 (2003), 468–89.

14. Martha Menchaca, “The Anti-Miscegenation History of the Southwest,” *Cultural Dynamics* 20, no. 3 (fall 2008), 291–93, 295, 297, 301–3; James H. McClintock, “The Pleasant Valley War,” *Arizona Cattleman*, Mar. 1, 1918, 4–5, typescript, WCBC, box 11, folder 70; Herman, *Hell on the Range*, 248–51.

15. My understanding of Indian honor draws on Brooks, *Captives and Cousins*.

16. Indians, noted a Tonto Basin settler, almost never spoke of old animus. Riley Neal, Payson, October 27, 1970, HOHIT, 141. In arguing that Indians who left the reservation did not initially contest caste status, or at least not directly, I acknowledge an intellectual debt to Walter Johnson, whose 2003 essay “On Agency” shaped my thinking about Indian-settler relations. In critiquing scholars’ elision of human agency with the actions of autonomous, liberal actors (the sort of actors whom Enlightenment thinkers presumed to be universal), Johnson suggests that resistance is not necessarily an attempt to gain “rights” in the liberal sense of the term. Resistance can take non-Western forms that don’t necessarily lead to “liberation.” Walter Johnson, “On Agency,” *Journal of Social History* 37, no. 1

(fall 2003), 113–234. I argue here that for most Apaches who had experienced conquest in the 1870s, resistance became not so much a quest for liberal rights as a quest for cultural autonomy. Their children, however, sought both.

17. According to K. Tsianina Lomawaima, “Indian people made Chilocco [boarding school] their own. Chilocco was an Indian school.” See K. Tsianina Lomawaima, *They Called It Prairie Light: The Story of Chilocco Indian School* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1994), 167. Lomawaima emphasizes the power of students to resist, negotiate, and subvert the school, despite the school’s military discipline and obsessive paternalism. Other monographs that examine racism, coercion, and resistance include Scott Riney, *The Rapid City Indian School, 1898–1933* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1999); Brenda J. Child, *Boarding School Seasons: American Indian Families, 1900–1940* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1998); David Wallace Adams, *Education for Extinction: American Indians and the Boarding School Experience* (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1995); Clyde Ellis, *To Change Them Forever: Indian Education at the Rainy Mountain Boarding School, 1893–1920* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1996).

18. In the past decade, historians and anthropologists alike have argued that Indians remained relatively powerless in the reservation era. For whites, to view a Puebloan dance or to buy a Navajo rug was a way to push Indians away, to make them seem mysterious, pre-modern, archaic, spiritual, but other. Tourists refused to see the reality of Indian lives. On tours conducted by the Fred Harvey Company, Indians became another form of southwestern scenery. David M. Wrobel, “Introduction: Tourists, Tourism, and the Toured Upon,” in David M. Wrobel and Patrick T. Long, eds., *Seeing and Being Seen: Tourism in the American West* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2001), 18. Several essays in the same volume make similar arguments: See Hal Rothman, “Shedding Skin and Shifting Shape: Tourism in the Modern West,” 100–20; Leah Dilworth, “Tourists and Indians in Fred Harvey’s Southwest,” 142–64; and Sylvia Rodriguez, “Tourism, Whiteness, and the Vanishing Anglo,” 194–222. Margaret Jacobs, by contrast, notes that Indian women gained a modicum of power by “marketing their ethnic identity for tourists.” Margaret Jacobs, *Engendered Encounters: Feminism and Pueblo Cultures, 1879–1934* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1999), 148, 149–79. In general, however, Jacobs identifies whites—anti-modern feminists in particular—as drivers and shapers of the tourist trade, downplaying Indian agency.

## Chapter 1

1. Edmund Wells, *Argonaut Tales: Stories of the Gold Seekers and the Indian Scouts of Early Arizona* (New York: F. H. Hitchcock, Grafton Press, 1927), 475–76. After coming to Arizona in 1864 in search of gold, Edmund Wells became clerk of the first territorial legislature and invested in a small herd of cattle. He then worked for the army as a quartermaster’s assistant at Camp Whipple, issuing supplies to soldiers and learning firsthand their tales of combat. His reminiscences, *Argonaut Tales*, were published in 1927, meeting prompt accolades from Arizona

historian and poet Sharlot Hall. Newspaper clipping, undated and untitled, folded into HL copy of Wells, *Argonaut Tales*.

2. Wells went on to become an Arizona judge and Republican candidate for governor in 1912. Kate Ruland-Thorne, *Gold, Greed and Glory: The Territorial History of Prescott and the Verde Valley, 1864–1912* (Baltimore: PublishAmerica, 2007), 127–28.

3. Quotation from Ken Edwards, “Paulino Weaver: The Legendary ‘First Settler’ of Prescott,” Sharlot Hall Museum, [http://www.sharlot.org/archives/history/dayspast/text/2000\\_12\\_03.shtml](http://www.sharlot.org/archives/history/dayspast/text/2000_12_03.shtml) (accessed June 20, 2008).

4. Sigrid Khera and Patricia S. Mariella, “Yavapai,” in *Handbook of North American Indians*, William C. Sturtevant, ed., vol. 10, *Southwest*, Alfonso Ortiz, ed. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1983), 48.

5. Richard White, *The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650–1815* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1991); James Brooks, *Captives and Cousins: Slavery, Kinship, and Community in the Southwest Borderlands* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001). On the ritual interaction that creates middle grounds, see Douglas C. Comer, *Ritual Ground: Bent’s Old Fort, World Formation, and the Annexation of the Southwest* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996).

6. A variant phonetic spelling for the Dilzhe’c Monster Slayer is *Na-ya-nez-ane*. Thomas B. Hinton, “The Yavapai-Apache Community of the Verde Valley, Arizona,” typescript, ASMA, folder A-1167, 27, 31.

7. Interview with Charlie Norman, GGP, MS 17, no. 34, Notebook Series A, vol. 4, 12. Norman speaks of an “evil woman” rather than a monstrous eagle who was eating people. Versions of the tale vary according to the teller and the translator. For Yavapai versions, see Khera and Mariella, “Yavapai,” 1983, 51, and Mike Burns, *The Journey of a Yavapai Indian: A 19th-Century Odyssey* (Princeton, NJ: Elizabeth House, 2002), 123–25. Other Western Apaches told much the same story of a Monster Slayer. See John G. Bourke, “Notes on Apache Mythology,” *Journal of American Folklore* 3, no. 10 (July–Sept., 1890), 209–12; Keith H. Basso, “Western Apache,” in *Handbook of North American Indians*, William C. Sturtevant, ed., vol. 10, *Southwest*, Alfonso Ortiz, ed. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1983), 477.

8. Joe Sparks, “The Yavapai-Tonto Apache Indian Community at Payson, Arizona: A Position Paper,” 1972, submitted to the Chairman of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, United States Senate, from Joe P. Sparks, Attorney for the Yavapai-Tonto Apache Indian Band at Payson, Arizona, March 1972, SBC, box 1, folder 15.

9. Hinton, “Yavapai-Apache Community,” 29–31.

10. Alan Ferg, “The Beginning of Western Apache Ethnoarchaeology: The Goodwin and Sayles 1937 Verde Survey,” in Stephanie Michelle Whittlesey, Richard Ciolek-Torrello, and Jeffrey H. Altschul, eds., *Vanishing River: Landscapes and Lives of the Lower Verde Valley—The Lower Verde Archaeological Project* (Tucson: SRI Press, 1997), 236; Wells, *Argonaut Tales*, 347.

11. Rituals performed at the well, it seems, could also end drought. William Henry Corbusier, “Indian Language Vocabularies,” handwritten ms., HL, HM 63693–636709, folder 63694.

12. Richard J. Perry, *People of the Mountain Corridor: Western Apache Heritage* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1991), 22, 34–35, 55–57, 59, 73, 76, 102–3, 105.

13. Perry, *People*, 109, 111, 120.

14. Perry, *People*, 5, 16, 117–18, 130, 135, 140–41; David R. Wilcox, “The Entry of Athapaskans into the American Southwest: The Problem Today,” in David R. Wilcox and W. Bruce Masse, eds., *The Protohistoric Period in the North American Southwest, A.D. 1450–1700*, Arizona State University Anthropological Research Papers No. 24 (Tempe: Arizona State University, 1981), 213, 215, 217–18, 219–20, 222–25, 233; James H. Gunnerson, “Southern Athapaskan Archaeology,” in *Handbook of North American Indians*, William C. Sturtevant, ed., vol. 9, *Southwest*, Alfonso Ortiz, ed. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1983), 163; Dolores A. Gunnerson, “The Southern Athabascans: Their Arrival in the Southwest,” *El Palacio* (Nov.-Dec., 1956), 351–52, 357, 360; Morris E. Opler, “The Apachean Culture Pattern and Its Origin,” in *Handbook of North American Indians*, William C. Sturtevant, ed., vol. 10, *Southwest*, Alfonso Ortiz, ed. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1983), 382–83, 385; Robert W. Young, “Apachean Languages,” in *Handbook of North American Indians*, William C. Sturtevant, ed., vol. 10, *Southwest*, Alfonso Ortiz, ed. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1983), 393.

15. Wilcox, “Entry of Athapaskans,” 216, 227; Opler, “Apachean Culture Pattern,” 384–85; James Gunnerson, “Southern Athapaskan Archaeology,” 162; Dolores Gunnerson, “Southern Athabascans,” 246; Basso, “Western Apache,” 464; F. W. Hodge, “The Early Navajo and Apache,” *American Anthropologist* 8 (1895), 239; Perry, *People*, 2; Donald Worcester, *The Apaches: Eagles of the Southwest* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1979), 29. Some scholars—in particular a “glottochronologist” named Harry Hoijer—have attempted to date the differentiation by evaluating linguistic differences among Athabaskan groups. For an evaluation of those efforts, see Perry, *People*, 48–49; Opler, “Apachean Culture Pattern,” 368–69; Albert H. Schroeder, “Navajo and Apache Relationships West of the Rio Grande,” *El Palacio* 70 (1963), 17; Isidore Dyen and David F. Aberle, *Lexical Reconstruction: The Case of the Proto-Athapaskan Kinship System* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1974). On ethnogenesis among Athabaskan speakers in Texas and New Mexico, see Gary Clayton Anderson, *The Indian Southwest, 1580–1830* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1999), 105–127.

16. For a discussion of the theory of conflict between Athabascans and Ancestral Puebloan peoples, see Wilcox, “Entry of Athapaskans,” 214–15.

17. Stephanie Whittlesey, *Rivers of Rock: Stories from a Stone-Dry Land—Central Arizona Project Archaeology* (Tucson: SRI Press, 2003), 235–42 (quotation on 235).

18. Curtis F. Schaafsma and Carroll L. Riley, eds., *The Casas Grandes World* (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1999).

19. Stephanie Whittlesey and James Jefferson Reid, *The Archaeology of Ancient Arizona* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1997).

20. See Glen E. Rice and Steven A. LeBlanc, eds., *Deadly Landscapes: Case Studies in Prehistoric Southwestern Warfare* (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2001); Steven A. LeBlanc, *Prehistoric Warfare in the American Southwest* (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1999); Christy G. Turner II and Jacqueline Turner, *Man Corn: Cannibalism and Violence in the Prehistoric Southwest* (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1998).

21. E. Charles Adams, *The Origin and Development of the Pueblo Katsina Cult* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1992).

22. Corbusier, "Vocabularies," 106; Khera and Mariella, "Yavapai," 39–40; Stan Brown, "They Would Not Be Conquered: A History of the Pre-Reservation Tonto Apaches" typescript, SBC, 31; Timothy Braatz, *Surviving Conquest: A History of the Yavapai Peoples* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2003), 26–27.

23. Khera and Mariella, "Yavapai," 38–39; Braatz, *Surviving*, 31–32, 38–39.

24. Braatz, *Surviving*, 26.

25. Hinton, "Yavapai-Apache Community," 16; Corbusier, "Vocabularies"; Braatz, *Surviving*, 38–39.

26. Khera and Mariella, "Yavapai," 53; Braatz, *Surviving*, 38, 41–42, 154.

27. Richard Ciolek-Torrello, comp., *Heritage Overview of the Piedmont of the Sierra Ancha and Cherry Creek Geographic Study Areas* (Tucson: Statistical Research Inc.), Technical Report 99–65, 64.

28. Wilcox, "Entry of Athapaskans," 235; Ferg, "Western Apache Ethnoarchaeology," 236–37; J. Jefferson Reid, "Wickiup 2 the Grasshopper Spring Site and the Dating of Western Apache Occupation," in Whittlesey, Ciolek-Torrello, and Altschul, *Vanishing River*, 198; Brown, "Conquered," 28; David A. Gregory, "Western Apache Archaeology: Problems and Approaches," in Wilcox and Masse, eds., *Protohistoric Period*, 258, 264–65.

29. Albert B. Reagan, *Notes on the Indians of the Fort Apache Region*, Anthropological Papers of the American Museum of Natural History, vol. 31, part 5 (1930), 288; Brown, "Conquered," 27–29; Albert H. Schroeder, *A Study of the Apache Indians, Parts IV and V* (New York: Garland Publishing, 1974), 353; Hodge, "Navajo and Apache," 231, 233; Perry, *People*, 7; Basso, "Western Apache," 465.

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## Chapter 2

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9. Wells, *Argonaut Tales*, 430; Schreier, *Reno*, 4–5, 10.

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14. Brown, “Conquered,” 196–97.

15. Schreier, *Reno*, 12–13.

16. Schreier, *Reno*, 12–13.

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32. Nickerson, “George Crook,” 32; Bourke, *Border*, 109.
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36. Nickerson, “George Crook,” 32; Bourke, *Indian Country*, 14.
37. Nickerson, “George Crook,” 11–12; Britton Davis, *The Truth about Geronimo* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1929), 41; Kate Ruland-Thorne, *Gold, Greed, & Glory: The Territorial History of Prescott & the Verde Valley, 1864–1912* (Baltimore: PublishAmerica, 2007), 53–54. Walter Schuyler, a lieutenant under George Crook, explained to his father in 1874 that Crook wished to subdue Yavapai and Dilzhe’e holdouts “without killing very many.” Walter Schuyler to George Washington Schuyler, San Carlos Agency, April 25, 1874, WSSP, box 1.
38. Schmitt, *Crook*, 179, 183.
39. Nickerson, “George Crook,” 13, 16–17; Thrapp, *Conquest*, 133.
40. Crook quoted in Wells, *Argonaut Tales*, 422; Bourke, *Border*, 112, 114–15.
41. Burns, *Journey*, 213–24, 221; George Crook to Walter Schuyler, Prescott, July 16, 1873, WSSP, box 1.
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57. Howard, “Report,” 155, 157; Robinson, *General Crook*, 140.

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59. Schmitt, *Crook*, 167–69, 172–73; Charles M. Robinson III, *The Diaries of John Gregory Bourke*, vol. 1: November 20, 1871 to July 28, 1876 (Denton: University of North Texas Press, 2003), 51 (“spawn of hell”).

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61. Walter Schuyler to George Washington Schuyler, near Camp Hualapai, Arizona Territory, September 29, 1872, WSSP, box 1.

62. Walter Schuyler to George Washington Schuyler, near Camp Hualapai, Arizona Territory, September 29, 1872, WSSP, box 1.

63. Thrapp, *Conquest*, 120–22.

64. Bourke, *Border*, 190, 195.

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66. Bourke, *Border*, 182, 196; Robinson, *General Crook*, 127–28; Bourke, *Indian Country*, 22; “Joseph Charles Crane,” in Bonnie Peplow and Ed Peplow,

eds., *Pioneer Stories of Arizona's Verde Valley* (n.p.: Verde Valley Pioneers Association, 1954), 120.

67. Burns, *Journey*, 5–6.

68. Burns, *Journey*, 220–22, 227, 231 (quotation), 232–33, 235–37; 254–58.

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81. Davis, *Truth*, 50; Brown, “Conquered,” 133.

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## Chapter 3

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3. Mike Burns, *The Journey of a Yavapai Man: A 19th-Century Odyssey* (Princeton, NJ: Elizabeth House, 2002), 112, 114–15; Corbusier, *Verde to San Carlos*, 16–17, 31.

4. Corbusier, *Verde to San Carlos*, 33, 61; W. S. Schuyler, Second Lieutenant, Acting Agent, “Rio Verde Indian Agency, Arizona Territory, July 28, 1874,” ARCIA, 299; J. Williams, US Special Indian Agent, “Office of Agency of Rio Verde Indian Reservation, Ariz. Ter., September 1, 1873,” Report 58, ARCIA, 287–88; Timothy Braatz, *Surviving Conquest: A History of the Yavapai Peoples* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2003), 146–47.

5. Corbusier, *Verde to San Carlos*, 62, 225, 244–45, 250.

6. Corbusier, *Verde to San Carlos*, 32–33. Corbusier likely encouraged Schuyler to know his charges better and extend sympathy to them. Schuyler’s training and demeanor, however, had taught him to favor military means to resolving problems. “Indians,” he once told his father, “know two emotions, fear and hate, and unless they fear a person they despise him, and show in every way they can their contempt for his authority.” Walter Schuyler to George Washington Schuyler, Rio Verde Agency, July 6, 1873, WSSP, box 1.

7. Corbusier, *Verde to San Carlos*, 43–46; John Gregory Bourke, *On the Border with Crook* (New York: Charles Scribners Sons, 1891), 128, 134.

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9. William Henry Corbusier, “Indian Language Vocabularies,” handwritten ms., HL, HM 63694, 106–8; Grenville Goodwin to Morris E. Opler, April 15, 1932, Bylas, Arizona, in Morris E. Opler, ed., *Grenville Goodwin among the Western Apache: Letters from the Field* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1973), 32; Grenville Goodwin, *The Social Organization of the Western Apache* (reprint, Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1969), 462–63.

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13. Corbusier, “Vocabularies,” 107–9; John G. Bourke, *General Crook in the Indian Country* (Palmer Lake, CO: Filter Press, 1974; offprint of article from *Century Magazine*, 1891), 13; Hinton, “Yavapai-Apache Community,” 20; Brown, “Conquered,” 65.

14. Corbusier, “Vocabularies,” 107, 109; Bourke, *General Crook*, 13; Hinton, “Yavapai-Apache,” 20; Brown, “Conquered,” 65.

15. Bourke, *Indian Country*, 13; Jason Betzinez, *I Fought with Geronimo* (reprint, Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1987), 60; Joseph Fish, “The Fish Manuscript, 1840–1926,” typescript, ASLAPR, 30, fn. 9; Corbusier, “Vocabularies,” 123.

16. Joseph Fish, “The Fish Manuscript, 1840–1926,” typescript, ASLAPR, 515–16; J. Williams, US Special Indian Agent, “Office of Agency of Rio Verde Indian Reservation, Ariz. Ter., September 1, 1873,” Report 58, ARCIA, 287; Corbusier, *Verde to San Carlos*, 17, 244; Hinton, “Yavapai-Apache Community,” 8; Bourke, *Border*, 215–17; Martin F. Schmitt, ed., *General George Crook: His Autobiography* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1986), 183. In 1947, the Indian Bureau was officially named the Bureau of Indian Affairs.

17. J. Williams, US Special Indian Agent, “Office of Agency of Rio Verde Indian Reservation, Ariz. Ter., September 1, 1873,” Report 58, ARCIA, 287; Bourke, *Indian Country*, 23; Bourke, *Border*, 216–17; W. S. Schuyler, Second Lieutenant, Acting Agent, “Rio Verde Indian Agency, Arizona Territory, July 28, 1874,” ARCIA, 299; August V. Kautz, *Report of Colonel August V. Kautz, Eighth U.S. Infantry, Brevet Major-General (Assigned) Commanding Department of Arizona for 1876–77* (Prescott, AZ: publisher unknown, 1877), 15; Khera and Mariella, “Yavapai,” 41; John Bret Harte, “The San Carlos Indian Reservation, 1872–1886: An Administrative History,” PhD dissertation, University of Arizona, 1972, 229.

18. Corbusier, *Verde to San Carlos*, 266.

19. Corbusier, *Verde to San Carlos*, 266–67. For Dudley’s reports on the removal, see Harte, “San Carlos Indian Reservation,” 225–30.

20. Corbusier, *Verde to San Carlos*, 266–67.

21. Corbusier, *Verde to San Carlos*, 266–67.

22. Corbusier, *Verde to San Carlos*, 267. Dudley blamed Crook for the lack of wagons. See Harte, “San Carlos Indian Reservation,” 229.

23. George Crook to Walter Schuyler, Prescott, July 16, 1873, WSSP, box 1; George Crook, *Annual Report of Brigadier General George Crook, U.S. Army, Commanding Department of Arizona, 1883* (n.p.: publisher unknown, 1883), 14–15.

24. Corbusier, *Verde to San Carlos*, 270–75; Burns, *Journey*, 130.

25. Corbusier, *Verde to San Carlos*, 270, 274–75.

26. Corbusier, *Verde to San Carlos*, 274–75.

27. Corbusier, *Verde to San Carlos*, 275.
28. Corbusier, *Verde to San Carlos*, 276–77; Burns, *Journey*, 126–29.
29. Corbusier, *Verde to San Carlos*, 278–79; Burns, *Journey*, 130.
30. John P. Clum, “San Carlos Agency, Arizona, October, 1876,” ARCIA, 10.
31. Braatz, *Surviving*, 145 (Burns quotation), 175–76; Hinton, “Yavapai-Apache Community,” 10–11; Corbusier, *Verde to San Carlos*, 273.
32. Donald E. Worcester, *The Apaches: Eagles of the Southwest* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1979), 180–81 (quotation); John P. Clum, “Office of United States Indian Agent, San Carlos, Ariz., September 1, 1875,” ARCIA, 215–16; Harte, “San Carlos Indian Reservation,” 232–33; Burns, *Journey*, 132.
33. Charles King to George O. Eaton, Camp Douglas, Wisconsin, August 3, 1928, CMKP, HM 63684; Bourke, *Indian Country*, 23.

## Chapter 4

1. John P. Clum, SCAAR, 1876, 11–12; August V. Kautz, *Report of Colonel August V. Kautz, Eighth U.S. Infantry, Brevet-Major General, (Assigned.) Commanding Department of Arizona for the Year 1876–77* (Prescott: no publisher, 1877), 2–13; H. L. Hart, SCAAR 1878; *ASB*, November 28, 1878, December 6, 1878, March 15, 1880, May 15, 1880, October 23, 1880; Timothy Braatz, *Surviving Conquest: A History of the Yavapai Peoples* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2003), 217.
2. *ASB*, August 1, 1878, October 17, 1878, April 18, 1879, May 30, 1879, August 22, 1879.
3. *ASB*, August 22, 1879; Joe Sparks, “The Yavapai-Apache Indian Community at Payson, Arizona: A Position Paper,” 1972, submitted to the Chairman of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, United States Senate, from Joe P. Sparks, Attorney for the Yavapai-Tonto Apache Indian Band at Payson, Arizona, March 1972, SBC, box 1, folder 15, 11; Joseph Fish, “The Fish Manuscript, 1840–1926,” typescript, ASLAPR, 516–17.
4. A. A. Armstrong, FAAAR, 1899, 150–53; A.A. Armstrong, FAAAR, 1900, 189; C. W. Crouse, FAAAR, 1902, 148; C. W. Crouse, FAAAR, 1904, 133; C. W. Crouse, FAAAR, 1905, 160; *ASB*, July 4, 1879, June 21, 1890.
5. Joseph Fish, “The Fish Manuscript, 1840–1926,” typescript, ASLAPR, 609; *AG*, May 24, 1881, August 15, 1882; *ASB*, October 15, 1881, May 31, 1884, July 26, 1884, October 4, 1884, April 25, 1885, June 5, 1886; Harold D. Jenkerson, “Pleasant Valley Feud,” typescript, NGCHS, I, 158.
6. Charles Collins, *Apache Nightmare: The Battle at Cibecue Creek* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1999), 6; John Gregory Bourke, *General Crook in the Indian Country* (Palmer Lake, CO: Filter Press, 1974; offprint of article from *Century Magazine*, 1891), 15; William Burkhart Kessel, “White Mountain Apache Religious Cult Movements: A Study in Ethnohistory,” PhD dissertation, University of Arizona, 1976, 6, 62.
7. Britton Davis, *The Truth about Geronimo*, M. M. Quaife, ed. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1963), 43; H. B. Wharfield, *Alchesay: Scout with*

*General Crook, Sierra Blanca Chief, Friend of Fort Apache Whites, Counselor to Indian Agents* (El Cajon, CA: Col. H. B. Wharfield, 1969), 1; Collins, *Nightmare*, 6; Lori Davisson, “New Light on the Cibecue Fight: Untangling Apache Identities,” *Journal of Arizona History* 20, no. 4 (1979), 424, 428–30.

8. H. B. Wharfield, *Cooley: Army Scout, Arizona Pioneer, Wayside Host, Apache Friend* (El Cajon, CA: publisher unknown, 1966), 2, 5, 6, 8–9, 62.

9. Collins, *Nightmare*, 6; Davisson, “New Light,” 423–24, 431; Wharfield, *Cooley*, 1, 18, 22, 29, 39.

10. Collins, *Nightmare*, 7–8; Wharfield, *Cooley*, 39; Mike Burns, *The Journey of a Yavapai Indian: A 19th-Century Odyssey* (Princeton, NJ: Elizabeth House, 2002), 103.

11. Collins, *Nightmare*, 8; Davisson, “New Light,” 433.

12. Davisson, “New Light,” 438–39; John P. Clum, SCAAR, 1875, 218.

13. Collins, *Nightmare*, 8; Davisson, “New Light,” 423, 433–34; Grenville Goodwin to Morris Opler, April 4, 1932, Bylas, Arizona, in Morris E. Opler, ed., *Grenville Goodwin among the Western Apache* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1973), 26–27.

14. Collins, *Nightmare*, 10; Davisson, “New Light,” 423, 433–34, 436.

15. Wharfield, *Alchesay*, 1–3, fn. 4; Wharfield, *Cooley*, 60; J. C. Tiffany, SCAAR, 1881, 10; Collins, *Nightmare*, 10.

16. Wharfield, *Alchesay*, 15.

17. Wharfield, *Alchesay*, 15; Joseph C. Porter, *Paper Medicine Man: John Gregory Bourke and His American West* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1986), 161–62; David Edward Adams, memoir, typescript manuscript, David Edwards Adams Papers, AHS, box 1, folder 1, 9.

18. Wharfield, *Alchesay*, 15; David Edward Adams, memoir, typescript manuscript, David Edwards Adams Papers, AHS, box 1, folder 1, 9.

19. J. C. Tiffany, US Indian Agent, SCAAR, 1881, 10; H. B. Wharfield, *Cibicu Creek Fight in Arizona: 1881* (El Cajon, CA: publisher unknown, 1971), 26; John R. Welch, Chip Colwell-Chanthaponh, and Mark Altaha, “Retracing the Battle of Cibecue,” *Kiva* 72, no. 2 (2005), 141–42; Collins, *Nightmare*, 16.

20. James T. King, *War Eagle: A Life of General Eugene A. Carr* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1963), 197; Kessel, “Cult Movements,” 62.

21. Accounts of what Nock-el-del-kinny actually prophesied vary wildly. See King, *War Eagle*, 89–99; Anton Mazzonovich, *Trailing Geronimo*, revised edition (Los Angeles: Anton Mazzonovich, 1931), 119; Wharfield, *Cibicu*, 26; Kessel, “Cult Movements,” 65; Forrest W. Meader, “Na’ilde’: The Ghost Dance of the White Mountain Apache,” *Kiva* 33, no. 1 (1967), 15–24; Collins, *Nightmare*, 18–23.

22. Bourke quoted in Wharfield, *Cibicu*, 26; John Bret Harte, “The San Carlos Indian Reservation, 1872–1886: An Administrative History,” PhD dissertation, University of Arizona, 1972, vol. 2, 608; John Gregory Bourke, *General Crook in the Indian Country* (Palmer Lake, CO: Filter Press, 1974; offprint of article from *Century Magazine*, 1891), 15; King, *War Eagle*, 198; Collins, *Nightmare*, 16, 18, 23–27, 30; Kessel, “Cult Movements,” 65.

23. King, *War Eagle*, 198–99, 204; Collins, *Nightmare*, 32–33; William B. Kessel, “The Battle of Cibecue and Its Aftermath: A White Mountain Apache’s Account,” *Ethnohistory* 21, no. 2 (spring 1974), 125. Kessel’s article relies on Grenville Goodwin’s interview with Tom Friday.

24. Paul J. Scheips, “Will Croft Barnes and the Apache Uprising of 1881: Adventures of a Soldier and Versatile Citizen of the Southwest,” Huachuca Seminar, no date, <http://www.army.mil/History/Html/schieps.html>, accessed October 1, 2007, 8; Collins, *Nightmare*, 27–28; King, *War Eagle*, 200–201.

25. Collins, *Nightmare*, 38.

26. Collins, *Nightmare*, 32–33; King, *War Eagle*, 198; Wharfield, *Cibicu*, 24, 32; Scheips, “Barnes,” 17.

27. Collins, *Nightmare*, 44; Kessel, “Battle,” 126, 128. Friday confused Carr with Captain Edmund Hentig, though clearly Friday referred to the officer who came to arrest Nock-el-del-kinny. Apaches no less than soldiers confused the names and identities of cultural others.

28. Wharfield, *Cibicu*, 35, 39–43; Welch, Colwell-Chanthapongh, and Altaha, “Retracing,” 146; Kessel, “Battle,” 131.

29. Collins, *Nightmare*, 47–56, 61; Kessel, “Battle,” 127; Welch, Colwell-Chanthapongh, and Altaha, “Retracing,” 146.

30. Scheips, “Barnes,” 5–7, 22–23, 28–29.

31. Scheips, “Barnes,” 32; Collins, *Nightmare*, 70, 75.

32. Collins, *Nightmare*, 78–81.

33. Collins, *Nightmare*, 90, 95, 97–98. Wharfield asserted absolutely that none of Pedro’s people were involved in the rebellion, noting that the government brought no charges against them. Wharfield, *Alchesay*, 19–20

34. Collins, *Nightmare*, 111, 114, 119, 123–27, 133, 149, 180.

35. Collins, *Nightmare*, 127, 129, 131, 133, 151–53.

36. Collins, *Nightmare*, 179, 184–92, 197–98, 200, 206; Wharfield, *Cibicu*, 10; Harte, “San Carlos Indian Reservation,” vol. 2, 649.

37. Wharfield, *Cibicu*, 91–92; Mazzanovich, *Trailing Geronimo*, 205–6.

38. Collins, *Nightmare*, 201; Mazzanovich, *Trailing Geronimo*, 205–7.

39. Collins, *Nightmare*, 191–92, 204 (Cruse quotation).

40. Bourke quoted in Porter, *Paper Medicine Man*, 308.

41. Keith H. Basso, “Western Apache,” *Handbook of North American Indians*, William C. Sturtevant, ed., vol. 10, *Southwest*, Alfonso Ortiz, ed. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1983), 481; Davis, *Truth*, 10; Joseph Fish, “The Fish Manuscript, 1840–1926,” typescript, ASLAPR, 618–19.

42. Lizzie T. Middleton, “Second Fight with the Apaches at the Middleton Ranch,” typescript, CWC, AHS, box 8, folder 89.

43. Michael R. Meise, “The Battle of Big Dry Wash: Arizona’s Last Great Apache Fight,” *Journal of Arizona History* 39, no. 1 (spring 1998), 23–28; Davis, *Truth*, 10–12.

44. Meise, “Big Dry Wash,” 28; Jo Ann F. Hatch, *Willing Hands: A Biography of Lorenzo Hatch Hill, 1826–1910* (Pinedale, AZ: Kymera Publishing Company, 1996), 165; Andrew Locey Rogers, “Diary of Andrew L. Rogers, 1882–1902,”

typewritten, HBL, 39; “An Indian Scare and Raid,” *Hi-Lights*, vol. II, no. 1 (March 1957), 44; Edward Wilson, *An Unwritten History: A Record from the Exciting Days of Early Arizona* (Phoenix: Sentinel Company, 1915), 11–18.

45. Davis, *Truth*, 19; Meise, “Big Dry Wash,” 28, 30, 35–40, 43.

46. Wharfield, *Cooley*, 69. On the Battle of Big Dry Wash, see Fort Verde State Park Repository holdings, <http://cip.lib.az.us/index.cfm?event=ViewRepository&cid=366&cid=0>.

47. Grenville Goodwin and Charles Kaut, “A Native Religious Movement among the White Mountain and Cibecue Apache,” *Southwestern Journal of Anthropology* 10, no. 4 (winter 1954), 393–94.

48. Wharfield, *Cooley*, 70.

49. *ASB*, January 10, 1880, January 24, 1880, February 14, 1880.

50. J. C. Tiffany, SCAAR 1881.

51. J. C. Tiffany, SCAAR 1881; Collins, *Nightmare*, 141; Frank C. Lockwood, *The Apache Indians* (1938; reprint, Norman: Bison Books, 1988), 244–45. For a defense of Tiffany’s actions, see Harte, “San Carlos Indian Reservation,” vol. 2, 605–77.

52. Bourke quoted in Porter, *Paper Medicine Man*, 148, 152; Wharfield, *Alcheyay*, 24; Martin F. Schmitt, ed., *General George Crook: His Autobiography* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1946; reprint, 1986), 243; Scheips, “Barnes,” 67, fn. 60.

53. *ASB*, May 12, 1884, August 9, 1884, September 28, 1895, November 9, 1895; SCAAR, 1885.

54. *ASB*, March 29, 1884, September 28, 1895, November 11, 1895, December 14, 1895, November 4, 1897.

55. *ASB*, April 3, 1886.

56. John P. Clum, SCAAR, 1877, 34.

57. Will C. Barnes, *Apaches & Longhorns: The Reminiscences of Will C. Barnes*, Frank C. Lockwood, ed. (1941; reprint, Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1982), 121–27; Kessel, “Battle,” 129–32. Goodwin’s interview with Tom Friday is Kessel’s chief source.

58. Barnes, *Apaches & Longhorns*, 122–24.

59. Barnes, *Apaches & Longhorns*, 123–24; Kessel, “Battle,” 133.

60. Barnes, *Apaches & Longhorns*, 123–24.

61. Barnes, *Apaches & Longhorns*, 123–25.

## Chapter 5

1. B. H. Grierson, “Report of Brigadier General B. H. Grierson, Brevet Major General, US Army. Comprising a Summary of Events. Department of Arizona. From September 1st, 1889 to July 1st, 1890,” HL, 10–11; *ASB*, July 26, 1890.

2. *ASB*, July 26, 1890.

3. *ASB*, July 26, 1890.

4. *ASB*, July 19, 1890, July 26, 1890, October 25, 1890, November 8, 1890, November 22, 1890, April 6, 1895, April 27, 1895, February 4, 1897; Jess G.

Hayes, *Sheriff Thompson's Day: Turbulence in the Arizona Territory* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1968), 13, 56; Clare V. McKanna, *White Justice in Arizona: Apache Murder Trials in the Nineteenth Century* (Lubbock: Texas Tech University Press, 2005), 175.

5. JLB, SCAAR, 1890.

6. Sherry Robinson, ed., *Apache Voices: Their Stories of Survival as Told to Eve Ball* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2003), 79.

7. Clare V. McKanna, *The Court Martial of Apache Kid, Renegade of Renegades* (Lubbock: Texas Tech University Press, 2009), 125–39.

8. B. H. Grierson, "Report of Brigadier General B. H. Grierson, Brevet Major General, US Army. Comprising a Summary of Events. Department of Arizona. From September 1st, 1889 to July 1st, 1890," HL, 6–7. On Kid, see Jess G. Hayes, *Apache Vengeance: The True Story of Apache Kid* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1954); Phyllis de la Garza, *The Apache Kid* (Tucson: Westernlore Press, 1995); and McKanna, *Apache Kid*.

9. *ASB*, July 26, 1890, September 20, 1890, October 10, 1890, October 29, 1892, June 3, 1893, June 17, 1893, July 1, 1893; Melton Campbell interviewed by Nicholas P. Houser, Payson, Arizona, November 18, 1970, HOHIT, 237.

10. *ASB*, September 1, 1894, September 8, 1894, June 1, 1895, May 7, 1896, July 2, 1896; LJ, SCAAR, 1892, 221; LJ, SCAAR, 1893, 122.

11. Thomas B. Hinton, "The Yavapai-Apache Community of the Verde Valley, Arizona," typescript, ASMA, folder A-1167, 12; Ernest R. McCray to Dan Nicholas, San Carlos, August 13, 1940, SCPC, box 1, folder 053; Quentin Foley to Indian Agent, Tucson, May 10, 1954, SCPC, box 1, folder 053; Robinson, *Apache Voices*, 79–85.

12. *SJH*, August 16, 1888; McKanna, *White Justice*, 82–93.

13. Hayes, *Sheriff*, 18–19; *ASB*, September 20, 1890. In the latter, Hos-kal-te is identified as "T.B. 60," or "Tonto B.60," the band designation and number by which the government identified Indians at San Carlos.

14. *ASB*, December 6, 1890.

15. On social outlawry, see Eric Hobsbawm, *Primitive Rebels* (Manchester: University of Manchester, 1959), chap. 2.

16. B. H. Grierson, "Report of Brigadier General B. H. Grierson, Brevet Major General, US Army. Comprising a Summary of Events. Department of Arizona. From September 1st, 1889 to July 1st, 1890," HL, 11.

17. *ASB*, June 17, 1893. The *Silver Belt* reported that "Tonto B.4, who has a ranch on the San Pedro, is suspected of harboring and assisting the Kid." *ASB*, July 1, 1893.

18. *ASB*, March 21, 1896.

19. B. H. Grierson, "Report of Brigadier General B. H. Grierson, Brevet Major General, US Army. Comprising a Summary of Events. Department of Arizona. From September 1st, 1889 to July 1st, 1890," HL, 28; *AG*, May 24, 1881, August 15, 1882; *ASB*, June 6, 1879, July 17, 1880, April 5, 1884, August 2, 1884, June 18, 1887, September 17, 1887, February 16, 1889, April 4, 1891, December 7,

1895; Allen Frost, “Diary of Allen Frost,” typescript ms., part 2, vol. 5 (1886–1890); HBL, 762 (October 11, 1895); Robert Carlock, *The Hashknife: The Early Days of the Aztec Land and Cattle Company, Limited* (Tucson: Westernlore Press, 1994), 6. Gila County criminal records from the 1890s and early 1900s teem with indictments of Apaches for larceny, mostly involving cattle theft. The list of cases—only a few of which include testimony—is far too long to transcribe here.

20. ASB, October 15, 1881. Arizona’s first state historian, James H. McClintock, contended that Nadiski, angry at his people’s eviction from their Sierra Ancha home, led the 1882 outbreak from San Carlos. James H. McClintock, *Arizona: Prehistoric, Aboriginal, Pioneer, Modern: The Nation’s Youngest Commonwealth within a Land of Ancient Culture* (Chicago: S. J. Clarke Publishing Co., 1916), 2 vols., vol. 1, 239. Neither the army nor the *Silver Belt*, however, identified Nadiski with the outbreak.

21. George Crook, “Annual Report of Brigadier General George Crook, US Army, commanding Dept. of Arizona,” 1883, HL; JCT, SCAAR, 1881, 9; ASB, July 5, 1884, August 2, 1884, June 3, 1893.

22. LJ, SCAAR, 1892, 126; ARSSCR, 1914; William Burkhardt Kessel, “White Mountain Apache Religious Cult Movements: A Study in Ethnohistory,” PhD dissertation, University of Arizona, 1976, 82.

23. George W. P. Hunt to Helen Duett Ellison, telegram, July 9, 1896, GWPHC; George W. P. Hunt to Helen Duett Ellison, Globe, Arizona, July 9, 1896, GWPHC.

24. Kartus, “Helen Duett Ellison Hunt,” 42; Helen Duett Ellison to George W. P. Hunt, Grasslands [Pleasant Valley], Arizona, July; 22, 1895, box 5, folder 6, GWPHC; Helen Duett Ellison to George W. P. Hunt, n.p., September 15, 1895, box 5, folder 6, GWPHC; Robert Vooris oral history interview with Clara Woody and Dale King, May 20, 1957, at Gila Pueblo near Globe, Arizona, Woody Papers, AHS, box 16, folder 64, 31.

25. Helen Duett Ellison to George W. P. Hunt, Grasslands [Pleasant Valley], Arizona, June 26, 1895, box 5, folder 6, GWPHC; ASB, February 8, 1896.

26. Helen Duett Ellison to George W. P. Hunt, n.p., November 9, 1895, box 5, folder 6, GWPHC; Helen Duett Ellison to George W. P. Hunt, n.p., December 18, 1895, box 5, folder 6, GWPHC. ASB, January 4, 1896, January 18, 1896, April 30, 1896.

27. George W. P. Hunt to Helen Duett Ellison, Globe, Arizona, December 15, 1895, box 5, folder 6, GWPHC; George W. P. Hunt to Helen Duett Ellison, Globe, Arizona, December 22, 1895, box 5, folder 6, GWPHC; Helen Duett Ellison to George W. P. Hunt, n.p., December 24, 1895, box 5, folder 6, GWPHC; George W. P. Hunt to Helen Duett Ellison, December 25, 1895, box 5, folder 6, GWPHC; George W. P. Hunt to Helen Duett Ellison, Globe, Arizona, December 29, 1895, box 5, folder 6, GWPHC.

28. George W. P. Hunt to Helen Duett Ellison, Globe, Arizona, July 9, 1896, box 5, folder 6, GWPHC; Helen Duett Ellison to George W. P. Hunt, n.p., July 10, 1896, box 5, folder 6, GWPHC.

29. ASB, June 8, 1895.

30. ASB, May 18, 1895.

31. Mike Burns, *The Journey of a Yavapai Indian: A 19th-Century Odyssey* (Princeton, NJ: Elizabeth House, 2002), 98–99, 133; Jennie Parks Ringgold, “Chief Talkalai,” typescript ms., RRC, MSS 68, box 3, folder 5, 2; SCAAR, 1895; CWC, FAAAR, 1903, 117. For other reports of Indian-on-Indian assaults, see ASB, January 21, 1893, September 1, 1894, August 20, 1897. Also ALM, SCAAR, 1892, 125; AAA, FAAAR, 1900, 190; Joseph Fish, “The Fish Manuscript, 1840–1926,” ASLAPR, 519.

32. ASB, October 19, 1895, October 26, 1895.

33. ASB, April 14, 1894, April 21, 1894, October 19, 1895, October 26, 1895.

34. ASB, October 26, 1895, February 15, 1896.

35. ASB, May 8, 1886, August 16, 1890, October 25, 1890, February 4, 1893, July 8, 1893, April 18, 1895, January 1, 1896, January 4, 1896, January 17, 1896, April 30, 1896, May 14, 1896, November 11, 1897; JCT, SCAAR, 1880, 6–7; Albert L. Myers, SCAAR, 1896, 121; Territory of Arizona v. Nasho, T.E. 22, 1896, GCCR.

36. James Brooks, *Captives & Cousins: Slavery, Kinship, and Community in the Southwest Borderlands* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002). For a different perspective on the cycles of war in the colonial Southwest, see Ned Blackhawk, *Violence over the Land: Indians and Empires in the Early American West* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006). Blackhawk contends that colonization created disruption and violence even outside the colonial periphery.

37. H. B. Wharfield, *Alchesay: Scout with General Crook, Sierra Blanca Apache Chief, Friend of Fort Apache Whites, Counselor to Indian Agents* (El Cajon, CA: Col. H. B. Wharfield, 1969), 1, 3, fn. 4, 41; Grenville Goodwin, *The Social Organization of the Western Apache* (reprint, Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1969), 580–81.

38. Grenville Goodwin, “The Characteristics and Function of Clan in a Southern Athabascan Culture,” *American Anthropologist* 39, no. 3, part 1 (July–Sept., 1937), 398, 402–3; John G. Bourke, “Notes upon the Gentile Organization of the Apaches in Arizona,” *Journal of American Folklore* 3, no. 9 (April–June 1890), 119; William Henry Corbusier, “Indian Language Vocabularies,” handwritten ms., folder HM63694, HL, 121.

39. Grenville Goodwin, “Report on the San Carlos Indian Reservation,” typescript, 1937, ASMA, 28.

40. Albert B. Reagan, *Notes on the Indians of the Fort Apache Region*, Anthropological Papers of the American Museum of Natural History, vol. 31, part 5 (1930), 301; Clare V. McKanna Jr., *Homicide, Race, and Justice in the American West, 1880–1920* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1997), 135.

41. CWC, FAAAR, 1903, 118; Goodwin, *Social Organization*, 299, 300, 315–16, 318, 367, 370, 539; Reagan, *Notes on the Indians*, 291, 296; Bourke, “Gentile,” 120; Ola Smith, interviewed by Nicholas P. Houser, assisted by Mrs. Vinnie Ward, translated by Chief Melton Campbell, Payson, Arizona, November 16, 1970, HOHIT, 208; Mrs. Martha Johnson, interviewed by Nicholas P.

Houser, assisted by Mrs. Vinnie Ward, translated by Melton Campbell, Payson, Arizona, October 20, 1970, HOHIT, 224.

42. *ASB*, August 8, 1879, March 6, 1886, March 5, 1887, August 3, 1895; Arizona State Teachers College at Flagstaff Bulletin, *The Apache*, vol. 20, no. 1 (August 1939), 11; Britton Davis, *The Truth about Geronimo*, M. M. Quaife, ed. (1929; reprint, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1963), 44–45.

43. *ASB*, October 19, 1895.

## Chapter 6

1. James H. McClintock, “The Pleasant Valley War,” *The Arizona Cattleman*, March 1, 1918, 4–5, typed transcript, WCBC, box 11, folder 70. On the Rim Country War, see Daniel Justin Herman, *Hell on the Range: A Story of Honor, Conscience, and the American West* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010).

2. Charles Collins, *Apache Nightmare: The Battle at Cibecue Creek* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1999), 14; B. H. Grierson, “Report of Brigadier General B. H. Grierson, Brevet Major General, US Army. Comprising a Summary of Events. Department of Arizona. From September 1st, 1889 to July 1st, 1890,” HL, 13–14; Grenville Goodwin to Morris Opler, April 4, 1932, Bylas, Arizona, in Morris E. Opler, ed., *Grenville Goodwin among the Western Apache: Letters from the Field* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1973), 26–27.

3. Thomas B. Hinton, “The Yavapai-Apache Community of the Verde Valley, Arizona,” typescript, ASMA, folder A-1167, 10; Mike Burns, *The Journey of a Yavapai Indian: A 19th-Century Odyssey* (Princeton, NJ: Elizabeth House, 2002), 118–19, 126.

4. PPW, SCAAR, 1883, 8–10; JLB, SCAAR, 1888, 7; LJ, SCAAR, 1892, 220.

5. Morris E. Opler, “The Apachean Culture Pattern and Its Origin,” *Handbook of North American Indians*, William C. Sturtevant, ed., vol. 10, *Southwest*, Alfonso Ortiz, ed. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1983), 370; Grenville Goodwin, “Report on the San Carlos Indian Reservation,” typescript, 1937, ASMA, 99, 101, 103–4.

6. Keith H. Basso, “Western Apache,” *Handbook of North American Indians*, William C. Sturtevant, ed., vol. 10, *Southwest*, Alfonso Ortiz, ed. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1983), 465; Opler, “Apachean Culture Pattern,” 370; Goodwin, “Report,” 98.

7. Goodwin, “Report,” 97, 102; John Gregory Bourke, *On the Border with Crook* (New York: Charles Scribners Sons, 1891), 120; Stan Brown, “They Would Not Be Conquered: A History of the Pre-Reservation Tonto Apaches,” typescript, SBC, 48, 87; Sigrid Khera and Patricia S. Mariella, “Yavapai,” *Handbook of North American Indians*, William C. Sturtevant, ed., vol. 10, *Southwest*, Alfonso Ortiz, ed. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1983), 45–46; Edward Palmer, “Customs of the Coyotero Apache,” *Zoe: A Biological Journal* 1, no. 6 (August 1890), 161–72; Grenville Goodwin to Morris Opler, May 22, 1933, Colorado Springs, in Opler, *Grenville Goodwin*, 34; Hinton, “Yavapai-Apache Community,” 19; Timothy Braatz, *Surviving Conquest: A History of the Yavapai*

*Peoples* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2003), 29–30, 36; Albert B. Reagan, *Notes on the Indians of the Fort Apache Region*, Anthropological Papers of the American Museum of Natural History, vol. 31, part 5 (1930), 292–95.

8. John G. Bourke, “Notes upon the Gentile Organization of the Apaches of Arizona,” *Journal of American Folklore* 3, no. 9 (April–June 1890), 124; Britton Davis, *The Truth about Geronimo*, M. M. Quaife, ed. (1929; reprint, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1963), 44; Basso, “Western Apache,” 468; Brown, “Conquered,” 48, 87; Khera and Mariella, “Yavapai,” 45–46; Palmer, “Customs,” 161–72; Grenville Goodwin to Morris Opler, Colorado Springs, May 22, 1933, in Opler, *Grenville Goodwin*, 34; Hinton, “Yavapai-Apache Community,” 19; Braatz, *Surviving*, 29–30, 36; Reagan, *Notes on the Indians*, 292–95.

9. Opler, “Apachean Culture Pattern,” 371; Goodwin to Opler, May 22, 1933, Colorado Springs, in Opler, *Grenville Goodwin*, 44; Goodwin, “Report,” 101–2, 105; Reagan, *Notes on the Indians*, 291, 299; Palmer, “Customs,” 162.

10. Goodwin to Opler, Colorado Springs, January [no day given], 1934, in Opler, *Grenville Goodwin*, 53; Goodwin, “Report,” 33, 101–11; Braatz, *Surviving*, 32–33, 35.

11. Goodwin, “Report,” 97, 105.

12. Goodwin, “Report,” 8.

13. *Honor the Past . . . Mold the Future* (n.p.: Gila Centennials, Inc., Celebration Committee, 1976), 35; Clare V. McKanna Jr., *White Justice in Arizona: Apache Murder Trials in the Nineteenth Century* (Lubbock: Texas Tech University Press, 2005), 110, 114–17.

14. *ASB*, March 12, 1887, May 21, 1887, May 25, 1889, June 22, 1889.

15. B. H. Grierson, “Report of Brigadier General B. H. Grierson, Brevet Major General, US Army. Comprising a Summary of Events. Department of Arizona. From September 1st, 1889 to July 1st, 1890,” HL, 7; Jess G. Hayes, *And Then There Were None: A Long Buried Chapter in Apache History* (Globe, AZ: Tyree Printing Service, 1965), 13–15.

16. JCT, SCAAR, 1881, no page; Joe Sparks, “The Yavapai-Tonto Apache Indian Community at Payson, Arizona: A Position Paper,” 1972, submitted to the Chairman of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, United States Senate, from Joe P. Sparks, Attorney for the Yavapai-Tonto Apache Indian Band at Payson, Arizona, March 1972, SBC, box 1, folder 15; Braatz, *Surviving*, 181, 182; PPW, SCAAR, 1884, 7; Basso, “Western Apache,” 468; William Burkhardt Kessel, “White Mountain Apache Religious Cult Movements: A Study in Ethnohistory,” PhD dissertation, University of Arizona, 1976, 79; *ASB*, February 28, 1891; ALM, SCAAR, 120.

17. *ASB*, October 10, 1878; HLH, SCAAR, 1878, 7; E. F. Kellner to Capt. A. R. Chaffee, Globe, Arizona, August 4, 1879, in Camp Apache Agency—Account Book, 1874–1897, handwritten ms., RRC, box 10, folder 6, Letters Received since July 19, 1879, 80; JCT, SCAAR, 1880, 5.

18. *ASB*, December 6, 1878, September 1, 1894; HLH, SCAAR, 1878, 7; JCT, SCAAR, 1880, 5; ALM, SCAAR, 1892, 125; E. F. Kellner to Capt. A. R. Chaffee, Globe, Arizona, August 4, 1879, in Camp Apache Agency—Account

Book, 1874–1897, handwritten ms., RRC, box 10, folder 6, Letters Received since July 19, 1879, 81; Braatz, *Surviving*, 183; Basso, “Western Apache,” 484.

19. *ASB*, July 25, 1885, September 22, 1894; JCT, SCAAR, 1880, 5; Kessel, “Cult Movements,” 114; Jess G. Hayes, *Sheriff Thompson’s Day: Turbulence in the Arizona Territory* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1968), 64; Braatz, *Surviving*, 129–30, 182, 199; PPW, SCAAR, 1883, 9.

20. Davis, *Truth*, 42; SCAAR, 1914; *ASB*, October 5, 1895.

21. Bourke, *Border*, 124; Lewis Meriam, comp., *The Problem of Indian Administration: Report of a Survey made at the request of Honorable Hubert Work, Secretary of the Interior, and submitted to him, February 21, 1928* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1928), 694.

22. “Palominas Area History,” <http://www.palominas.com/history01.htm>, accessed May 29, 2008; Joseph Fish, “History of the Eastern Arizona Stake of Zion; Early Settlement of Apache County,” handwritten ms., ASLAPR, 63.

23. Burns, *Journey*, 280–83 (numbered 266–69).

24. Burns, *Journey*, 280–83 (numbered 266–69).

25. Burns, *Journey*, 280–83 (numbered 266–69).

26. *ASB*, July 2, 1887, July 9, 1887; Burns, *Journey*, 285 (numbered 271), 289 (numbered 275).

27. Burns, *Journey*, 289–90 (numbered 275–76), 292–93 (numbered 278–79), 282–84 (numbered 296–98).

28. *ASB*, September 10, 1887; Yavapai County Petitioners to US President and Interior Secretary, August 1, 1887, no. 21756, LR; Yavapai County Petitioners to President Benjamin Harrison, February 27, 1889, no. 7096, LR; J. C. Bristow to Mr. President, Feb. 27, 1889, no. 6532, LR; L. M. Olden to President Harrison, March 9, 1889, no. 7935, LR; D. J. Eaman to John Noble, March 6, 1889, no. 7090, LR; W. F. Wilbur to President Cleveland and Interior Secretary, August 1, 1887, no. 21756, LR; N. O. Murphy to Interior Secretary, May 2, 1889, no. 12573, LR; Lewis Wolfley to Interior Secretary, June 11, 1890, no. 18664, LR; George Hance to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, October 23, 1901, no. 61033, LR; E. B. Ketcherside to Interior Secretary, May 17, 1899, no. 24889, LR; Yavapai County residents to Interior Secretary, July 10, 1899, no. 56845, LR; W. J. Nicholson to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, June 9, 1899, no. 27727, LR; W. J. Nicholson to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, October 12, 1899, no. 51058, LR; Payson residents to San Carlos Agent, July 14, 1900, no. 37073, LR. See also “Field Notes, Mojave-Apache Indians,” in Thomas Ryan, Acting Interior Secretary to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, September 21, 1903, no. 60571, LR; JLB, SCAAR, 1888, 8.

29. JLB, SCAAR, 1888, 8.

30. The San Carlos agent reported that 600 had left by 1898. Census numbers for San Carlos show a decline from a peak population of 5,190 in 1897 (not including some 600 Yavapais who had already left the reservation) to a low of 2,353 in 1912. Some of the decline may be attributable to high mortality, especially among infants, as well as to the departure of non-Dilzhe’e, non-Yavapai men and their families. The government relocated Chiricahuas, Warm Springs, and some Cibecues and White Mountain Apaches, though all of them left before 1897. The

number of Yavapais enrolled at San Carlos decreased from 1,050 in 1886 to just 53 in 1904. Dilzhe'es decreased from 900 in 1886 to 560 in 1905, though surely several hundred remained enrolled at San Carlos even though they lived elsewhere. Some never enrolled at San Carlos at all; they remained hidden in the vastness of the Rim Country. The total number of those leaving the reservation, then, was at least 1,500 and perhaps as many as 3,000. *ASB*, May 29, 1886; *LJ*, SCAAR, 1892, 219; *ALM*, SCAAR, 1897; *LSK*, SCAAR, 1905, 176; SCAAR, 1912, 32–33; SCAAR, 1913; *SR*, SCAAR, 1898, 130; Braatz, *Surviving*, 5, 211–13; Hinton, "Yavapai-Apache Community," 13–14.

31. Melton Campbell, November 18, 1970, HOHIT, 237; Stan Brown, "Notes Regarding the Life of Henry Irving/Evans, Patriarch of the Payson Tonto Apache Tribe," SBC; Leslie E. Gregory to Will C. Barnes, Globe, Arizona, January 20, 1935, WCBC, box 1, folder 9; Everett Randall, interviewed by Daniel Herman and Don Decker, Cornville, Arizona, August 11, 2004; JOB, ANRCV, 9.

32. Brown, "Life of Henry Irving/Evans."

33. Interview with Henry Irving by Grenville Goodwin, GGP, ms. 17, no. 34, Notebook Series A, vol. 4; Brown, "Life of Henry Irving/Evans"; Alan Ferg, "The Beginning of Western Apache Ethnoarchaeology: The Goodwin and Sayles 1937 Verde Survey," in Stephanie Michelle Whittlesey, Richard Ciolek-Torrello, and Jeffrey H. Altschul, eds., *Vanishing River: Landscapes and Lives of the Lower Verde Valley—The Lower Verde Archaeological Project* (Tucson: SRI Press, 1997), 217.

34. Grenville Goodwin and Charles Kaut, "A Native Religious Movement among the White Mountain and Cibecue Apache," *Southwestern Journal of Anthropology* 10, no. 4 (winter 1954), 386; Grenville Goodwin to Morris Opler, January 1934, Colorado Springs, in Opler, *Grenville Goodwin*, 53; Keith H. Basso, *The Cibecue Apache* (New York City: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1970), 38–40.

35. Goodwin, "Report," 28.

36. Donald E. Worcester, *The Apaches: Eagles of the Southwest* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1979), xiv; Basso, "Western Apache," 472, 477; Khera and Mariella, "Yavapai," 48; Goodwin and Kaut, "Religious Movement," 387.

37. Goodwin, "Report," 44–45; Grenville Goodwin, "Characteristics and Function of Clan in a Southern Athabascan Culture," *American Anthropologist* 39, no. 3 (1937), 400–401.

38. Goodwin, "Report," 44–46.

39. Goodwin and Kaut, "Religious Movement," 387; Goodwin, "Report," 28; Basso, "Western Apache," 470–71; Braatz, *Surviving*, 36–37; Goodwin, "Clan," 400; Charlie Nockey, interviewed by Grenville Goodwin, handwritten ms., GGP, MS 17, no. 34, Notebook Series A, vol. 4, 127.

40. Khera and Mariella, "Yavapai," 48.

41. Deposition of Henry Evans or De-ja-li-a, Case No. 20923, sworn before G. W. Uline, inspector of Bureau of Pensions, November 11, 1926, at Camp Verde Agency, in Brown, "Life of Henry Irving/Evans."

42. Nicholas P. Houser, "'The Camp'—An Apache Community at Payson, Arizona," *Kiva* 37, no. 2 (winter 1972), 68–69; Sparks, "Yavapai-Tonto Apache Indian Community."

43. ACC, July 8, 1886; SJH [citing Florence *Enterprise*], March 31, 1887. Also ASB, November 17, 1883, December 11, 1886, March 12, 1887, March 19, 1887, August 25, 1888, May 4, 1889, March 8, 1890. Boquet's name also appears as "Bouquet" and "Boquot."

44. ACC, July 8, 1886; SJH [quoting Florence *Enterprise*], March 31, 1887; ASB, December 11, 1886.

45. Teresa Haley Boardman, interviewed by Ira Murphy with Margaret Taylor Murphy. Transcribed 1995 by M. Furtkamp, assisted by Mrs. Murphy, in *Rim Country History*, NGCHS, 2–3. Houser, "The Camp," 70.

46. Keith H. Basso, "Stalking with Stories': Names, Places, and Moral Narratives among the Western Apache," in Keith H. Basso, *Western Apache Language and Culture: Essays in Linguistic Anthropology* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1990), 99–137.

47. Opler, "Apachean Culture Pattern," 373; Richard J. Perry, *People of the Mountain Corridor: Western Apache Heritage* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1991), 153; Brown, "Conquered," 30, 57–59; Khera and Mariella, "Yavapai," 52. According to some reports, Yavapais conceive of *kakaka* and *gaan* as separate, the *kakaka* having taught Yavapais of the *gaan* long ago. Kate Ruland-Thorne, *Gold, Greed, and Glory: The Territorial History of Prescott and the Verde Valley, 1864–1912* (Baltimore: PublishAmerican, 2007), 23.

48. Khera and Mariella, "Yavapai," 51; Edmund Wells, *Argonaut Tales: Stories of the Gold Seekers and the Indian Scouts of Early Arizona* (New York: F. H. Hitchcock, Grafton Press, 1927), 443.

49. Vince Randall, interviewed by Daniel Herman, Camp Verde, Arizona, September 6, 2003.

50. Sparks, "Yavapai-Tonto Apache Indian Community," 16; Hinton, "Yavapai-Apache Community," 12–13; Teresa Haley Boardman, interviewed by Ira Murphy with Margaret Taylor Murphy, place not specified, 1973/1974, typescript transcription, NGCHS, 2; Roscoe Wilson, "Arizona Days—Indian Friends Are True Friends," *Arizona Republic* Sunday Magazine, January 23, 1972; Ola Smith Casey, Payson [?], October 21, 1970, HOHIT, 71–73; ASB, July 8, 1897. On the San Carlos Reservation Census, 1914, Dili [Delia] Chapman appears as T.E. 3. Her low number connoted high status.

51. Pearl [Hilligas] Morison, Payson, October 26, 1970, HOHIT, 101–2.

52. ASB, February 1, 1900, reprinting article from Prescott *Courier*.

53. ASB, March 1, 1884; FEP, SCAAR, 1886, 39; GDC, SCAAR, 1902, 163; ARSSCR, 1910, 1; ARSSCR, 1913.

54. ASB, February 10, 1898, March 3, 1898.

55. Harry T. Getty, *The San Carlos Indian Cattle Industry*, Anthropological Papers of the University of Arizona, no. 7 (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1963), 8.

56. ASB, February 19, 1881, March 5, 1881, June 14, 1884, January 7, 1897; John Bret Harte, "The San Carlos Indian Reservation, 1872–1886: An Administrative History," PhD dissertation, University of Arizona, 1972, vol. 1, 184–85; Kessel, "Cult Movements," 58; Getty, *Cattle Industry*, 8; ARSSCR, 1913; Khera

and Mariella, “Yavapai,” 41; Joseph Fish, “The Fish Manuscript, 1840–1926,” typescript, ASLAPR, 613. See also Harry T. Getty, “Changes in Land Use among the Western Apache,” *Indian and Spanish American Adjustments to Arid and Semiarid Environments, Contributions*, no. 7, Clark S. Knowlton, ed. (Lubbock, TX: Committee on Desert and Arid Zone Research, no date).

57. SCAAR, 1913.

58. Nelson T. Schwartz to Superintendent of Phoenix Indian School, Marcelline, Cass County, Michigan, no date, PAORPIS, 003, box 7, folder Misc. Corr. S FY 1930 [1/2].

59. JBK to CIA, San Carlos, May 9, 1928, Oct. 12, 1928, Nov. 24, 1928, July 12, 1930, August 19, 1930, Sept. 4, 1930, March 6, 1933, PAORSCACCF, box 7.

60. JBK to CIA, Rice, Oct. 12, 1928, August 29, 1929, July 12, 1930, July 28, 1930, Sept. 4, 1930, March 6, 1933, PAORSCACCF, box 5; SCAAR, 1913; SCAAR, 1914; JBK, ASRSC, 1929; JBK, ARSSCR, 1929; Perry, *People*, 186; Goodwin, “Report,” 9, 12–13, 15; Charles B. White, *An Outline of San Carlos Apache Culture. Report for Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Public Health Service, Division of Indian Health* (Phoenix: Indian Health Area Office, no date), 5; Sparks, “Yavapai-Tonto Apache Indian Community,” 11.

61. Perry, *People*, 181; GDC, SCAAR, 1902, 162.

## Chapter 7

1. Thomas B. Hinton, “The Yavapai-Apache Community of the Verde Valley, Arizona,” typescript, ASMA, folder A-1167, 13; Nicholas P. Houser, “The Camp’—An Apache Community at Payson, Arizona,” *Kiva* 37, no. 2 (winter 1972), 68.

2. Albert Thompson, “How the Jim Thompson and Abraham James Families Came to Oak Creek,” in Bonnie Peplow and Ed Peplow, comp., *Pioneer Stories of Arizona’s Verde Valley* (n.p.: Verde Valley Pioneers Association, 1954), 137–39; “Charles C. Stemmer and the Verde Valley,” in Peplow and Peplow, *Pioneer*, 112–13, 115–16.

3. Peplow and Peplow, *Pioneer*, xi. Among those residents of the Verde Valley and Tonto Basin whose state of birth can be identified in the 1910 US census, 61 percent came from the Lower Midwest (Missouri and Kentucky) and South (states that joined the Confederacy in 1860–1861). Those figures exclude foreign-born individuals, who comprised 3 percent to 5 percent of the population. The figures also exclude residents—mostly children—born in the Far West (Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Oregon, Nevada, Utah, Washington). Because the census gives the birth states of the parents of each resident, however, we know that 62 percent of all US-born parents of Verde Valley and Tonto Basin residents came from the Lower Midwest and South. See 1910 United States Census for Cherry Creek, Cline, Cottonwood, Tonto National Forest, Payson, Strawberry, Pine, Starr Valley, Camp Verde, Clarkdale, Fossil Creek, Gisela, Middle Verde, Oak Creek, Pleasant Valley, Red Rock (likely Rim Rock).

4. Daniel Justin Herman, *Hell on the Range: A Story of Honor, Conscience, and the American West* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010), 50–63.

5. Charles Douglas Willard, “Charles Douglas Willard,” in Peplow and Peplow, *Pioneer*, 149–50; “Charles C. Stemmer,” in Peplow and Peplow, *Pioneer*, 115; Peplow and Peplow, *Pioneer*, xiv, 109.

6. Riley Neal, Payson, October 27, 1970, HOHIT, 136, 138, 141, 148.

7. Lottie McLennan and Nettie Gowett, “Westward,” in Peplow and Peplow, *Pioneer*, 155–57.

8. Lenora Bristow Lee, “Looking Back across the Years,” in Peplow and Peplow, *Pioneer*, 134.

9. W. A. Jordan, “Reminiscences of W. A. Jordan: My Only Indian Scare,” in Peplow and Peplow, *Pioneer*, 99–101.

10. W. A. Jordan, “Reminiscences of W. A. Jordan: My Only Indian Scare,” in Peplow and Peplow, *Pioneer*, 99–101.

11. Vince Randall interview with Stan Brown, at Randall’s home between Cottonwood and Clarkdale, Arizona, October 10, 1997, typescript, SBC, 6.

12. Dollie Hale quoted in Joe Sparks, “The Yavapai-Tonto Apache Indian Community at Payson, Arizona: A Position Paper,” 1972, submitted to the Chairman of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, United States Senate, from Joe P. Sparks, Attorney for the Yavapai-Tonto Apache Indian Band at Payson, Arizona, March 1972, SBC, box 1, folder 15, 16; Roscoe Wilson, “Arizona Days—Indian Friends Are True Friends,” *Arizona Republic* Sunday Magazine, January 23, 1972; LSK, SCAAR, 1904, 151.

13. AAA, FAAAR, 1900, 188; GDC, SCAAR, 1902, 162; ARSSCR, 1913; ARSSCR, 1927.

14. GDC, SCAAR, 1902, 163.

15. *ASB*, October 24, 1878, August 1, 1879, April 16, 1881, March 22, 1884, April 19, 1884; GDC, SCAAR, 1902, 163.

16. *ASB*, September 22, 1894, September 29, 1894, October 20, 1894.

17. ARSSCR, 1910, 3; ARSSCR, 1913, n.p.; “Report of the Board of Indian Commissioners,” ARCIA, 1904, 11.

18. ARSSCR, 1913, n.p.; ARSSCR, 1914. Among the court cases that gave Indians the right to leave reservations was *United States ex rel. Standing Bear v. Crook* (1879).

19. JCT, SCAAR, 1881, 7; LSK, SCAAR, 1904, 152; ARSSCR, 1922; AHS to CIA, San Carlos, July 22, 1921, PAORSCA, box 2; JBK to CIA, San Carlos, November 19, 1924, PAORSCA, box 3; JBK to CIA, San Carlos, October 5, 1925, PAORSCA, box 4; JBK to CIA, San Carlos, October 10, 1933, PAORSCA, box 8; JBK to CIA, San Carlos, October 4, 1933, PAORSCA, box 8.

20. TES to JBK, San Carlos, June 30, 1928, in “Annual Report of Indian Employment for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1928,” ARSSCR.

21. JJT, ANRCV, 1915, 1; GJL, ANRCV, 1926; JBB, ANRCV, 1927; Sigrid Khera and Patricia S. Mariella, “Yavapai,” in *Handbook of North American Indians*, William C. Sturtevant, ed., vol. 10, *Southwest*, Alfonso Ortiz, ed. (Washington,

DC: Government Printing Office, 1983), 42–43; Hinton, “Yavapai-Apache Community,” 14, 66–67.

22. TPG, ANRCV, 1911, 1–2.

23. TPG, ANRCV, 1910, unnumbered.

24. JJT, ANRCV, 1914, 6; JJT, ANRCV, 1916, 5; JOB, ANRCV, 1922, 11; JBB to CIA, March 6, 1929, PAORPIS, Misc. Correspondence, 1928–1929.

25. JJT, ANRCV, 1917, 6–7; JJT, ANRCV, 1918, 5; JJT, ANRCV, 1919, 7.

26. CVP, ANRCV, 1921, 9; JOB, ANRCV, 1922, 9; GJL, ANRCV, 1925.

27. JJT, ANRCV, 1920, 8; CVP, ANRCV, 1921, 9; JOB, ANRCV, 1922, 11; JBB to CIA, November 16, 1927, PAORPIS, box 10, folder Nov.–Dec. 1927; JOB, ARCVIS, 1922, 11.

28. TPG, ANRCV, 1913, 13; JJT, ANRCV, 1920; CVP, ANRCV, 1921, 9; JOB, ANRCV, 1922, 8, 10, 13; GJL, ANRCV, 1924; GJL, ANRCV, 1925.

29. JOB, ANRCV, 1922, 11.

30. JBB, ANRCV, 1927; Emory Frailey to L. B. Miller, Camp Verde, May 15, 1929, PAORPIS, Misc. Correspondence, 1928–1929.

31. CVP, ANRCV, 1921, 10; JOB, ANRCV, 1922, 10–12; GJL, ANRCV, 1924; Peplow and Peplow, *Pioneer*, xiv.

32. Thomas Dosela, Stephen Smith, Morgan Toprock, John Rope, and Nathan Naltazan (a Dilzhe'e) to CIA, San Carlos, November 8, 1922, SCPC, 1900–1969, box 5, folder “San Carlos Apache Tribal Relations (Business Committees) 1921 to 1936”; JBK to CIA, San Carlos, May 1, 1933, PAORSCACCF, box 8. In this 25-page letter, Kitch describes the history, status, and prospects of cattle ranching at San Carlos.

33. JBK to CIA, San Carlos, July 18, 1924, PAORSCACCF, box 3.

34. Peter Iverson, *When Indians Became Cowboys: Native Peoples and Cattle Ranching in the American West* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1994); Harry T. Getty, *The San Carlos Indian Cattle Industry*, Anthropological Papers of the University of Arizona, no. 7 (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1963). On the conversion to ranching at Fort Apache, see T. R. McGuire, *Mixed-Bloods, Apaches, and Cattle Barons: Documents for a History of the Livestock Economy on the White Mountain Reservation, Arizona*, Arizona State Museum Archaeological Series, no. 142 (Tucson: Arizona State Museum, 1980).

35. JJT, ANRCV, 1916, 5–6; JJT, ANRCV, 1917, 7–8; JOB, ANRCV, 1922, 10, 12.

36. “The old guys earned the respect of the settlers by working for them,” explains Randall. Vince Randall, interviewed by Daniel Herman, Camp Verde, Arizona, September 6, 2003; TPG, ANRCV; United States Census, 1910, Special Inquiries Relating to Indians, Gila and Yavapai counties, Arizona precincts of Beaver Creek, Camp Verde, Copper Hill, Gila County (balance of county), Globe, North Globe, Tonto National Forest, Yavapai County Township (13 north, range 3, east, Dist. 125); Yavapai County Township (balance), Dist. 123.

37. A. E. Rogge, Melissa Keane, D. Lorne McWatters, et al., *The Historical Archaeology of Dam Construction Camps in Central Arizona*, vol. 1, *Synthesis*,

Dames & Moore Intermountain Cultural Resource Services, Research Paper no. 10 (1994), 241, 244, <http://babel.hathitrust.org> (accessed August 17, 2010).

38. Ira Murphy, “Stories of Payson,” binder of stories from *Mogollon Adviser*, NGCHS; LSK, ARSSCR, 1904, 152; JBK to CIA, San Carlos, August 1, 1933, PAORSCACCF, box 8. US census data for 1910 confirm that, at least in some places, Indians reconstructed *gotas* off the reservation. Of 945 Indians living off the reservation, 65 were 60 years old and over (about 7 percent of the total population and about 10 percent of all adults 18 and over). Many were in their 80s; the oldest was 101. It is worth noting, however, that older Indians often did not know their ages, or at least could not translate them into Gregorian calendar years. Census takers or respondents, or both, must have guessed. Some 376 Indians living off the reservation in northern Gila and western Yavapai counties, meanwhile, were under 18 (40 percent). At least some off-reservation communities, then, were multigenerational and were—judging from the number of female elders—anchored around a matriarch. United States Census, 1910, Special Inquiries Relating to Indians, Gila and Yavapai counties, Arizona precincts of Beaver Creek, Camp Verde, Copper Hill, Gila County (balance of county), Globe, North Globe, Tonto National Forest, Yavapai County Township (13 north, range 3, east, Dist. 125); Yavapai County Township (balance), Dist. 123. Because the author was forced to deduce the gender of a few subjects from illegible marks, the data may be slightly compromised.

39. Rogge et al., *Historical Archaeology*, 246, 252, 277–78.

40. Rogge et al., *Historical Archaeology*, 108–9, 245–46, 249, 252.

41. Rogge et al., *Historical Archaeology*, 278. JBK reported that 150 San Carlos Apaches were employed on the Stewart Mountain dam site in 1929. JBK to CIA, San Carlos, September 12, 1929, PAORSCACCF, box 6.

42. TPG, ANRCV, 1910, 12, 13; Hinton, “Yavapai-Apache Community,” 60–61; Khera and Mariella, “Yavapai,” 43; JJT, ANRCV, 1917, 8; JJT, ANRCV, 1919, 3; JJT, ANRCV, 1920, 9; CVP, ANRCV, 1921, 10; CVP, ANRCV, 1921.

43. JOB, ARCVIS, 1922, 6–8.

44. TPG, ANRCV, 1911, 12; CVP, ANRCV, 1921, 10; United States Census, 1910, Special Inquiries Relating to Indians, Gila and Yavapai Counties, Arizona precincts of Beaver Creek, Camp Verde, Copper Hill, Gila County (balance of county), Globe, North Globe, Tonto National Forest, Yavapai County Township (13 north, range 3, east, Dist. 125); Yavapai County Township (balance), Dist. 123. The 86 Indians counted in the Camp Verde precinct may or may not have lived on the reservation. I include them here as “off-reservation.” Among them were 7 domestics and 11 basket makers. Most of the domestics washed clothes in the homes of whites. A few took in wash and worked at home.

45. United States Census, 1910, Arizona precincts of Beaver Creek, Camp Verde, Copper Hill, Gila County (balance of county), Globe, North Globe, Yavapai County Township (13 north, range 3, east, Dist. 125); Yavapai County Township (balance), Dist. 123; JOB, ANRCV, 1922, 6, 13; JOB, ANRCV, 1923; ALM, SCAAR, 1892, 125; LSK, SCAAR, 1904, 152; ES, ARSSCR, 1915; JBK, ARSSCR, 1925; Eva Ingle, Payson [?], Dec. 12, 1970, HOHIT, 272.

46. JBK, ARSSCR, 1925; JBK to CIA, San Carlos, September 5, 1924, PAORSCA, box 3; T. E. Shipley to CIA, Rice, November 23, 1929, PAORSCA, box 6; JAK to CIA, San Carlos, December 20, 1926, PAORSCA, box 5.

47. JBK, ARSSCR, 1927; JBK, ARSSCR, 1929; JBK to CIA, San Carlos, May 12, 1934, PAORSCACCF, box 8.

48. P. R. Milnes, Arizona Immigration Commissioner, to AHS, Phoenix, July 7, 1921, PAORSCACCF, 003, box 1; P. R. Milnes, Arizona Immigration Commissioner, to AHS, Phoenix, July 15, 1921, PAORSCACCF, 003, box 1.

49. ES to CIA, San Carlos, September 13, 1922, PAORSCACCF, box 3.

50. JBK to CIA, San Carlos, November 7, 1923, PAORSCACCF, box 3.

51. JBK to CIA, San Carlos, September 5, 1924, PAORSCACCF, box 3; JBK to CIA, San Carlos, December 20, 1926, PAORSCACCF, box 5; ES to CIA, San Carlos, September 13, 1922, PAORSCACCF, box 3; JBK to CIA, San Carlos, November 22, 1923, PAORSCACCF, box 4.

52. John H. Moore, “Cheyenne Work in the History of US Capitalism,” in Alice Littlefield and Martha C. Knack, eds., *Native American Wage Labor: Ethno-historical Perspectives* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1996), 140.

53. JBK to CIA, Rice, July 29, 1929, PAORSCACCF, box 6; T. E. Shipley to CIA, Rice, August 12, 1929, PAORSCACCF, box 6; Kitch to CIA, Rice, January 15, 1930, PAORSCACCF, box 6.

54. JBK, ARSSCR, 1929.

55. ARSSCR, 1914; Albert B. Reagan, *Notes on the Indians of the Fort Apache Region*, Anthropological Papers of the American Museum of Natural History, vol. 31, part 5 (1930), 315–16; Grenville Goodwin, “Report on the San Carlos Indian Reservation,” typescript, 1937, ASMA, 75–76. On historic and modern drinking patterns among southwestern Indians, see Jack O. Waddell, Michael W. Everett, Donald Nelson Brown, et al., eds., *Drinking Behavior among Southwestern Indians: an Anthropological Perspective* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1980).

56. Charles B. White, “An Outline of San Carlos Apache Culture,” Report for Dept. of Health, Education, and Welfare, Public Health Service, Div. of Indian Health (Phoenix: Indian Health Office, no date), 6.

57. Arizona State Teachers College at Flagstaff Bulletin, *The Apache*, vol. 20, no. 1 (August 1939), 8; Reagan, *Notes on the Indians*, 291, 293–94, 298, 319; Edward Palmer, “Customs of the Coyotero Apache,” *Zoe: A Biological Journal*, vol. 1, no. 6 (August 1890), 170; TPG, ANRCV, 1911, 4; Goodwin, “Report,” 75–76; White, “San Carlos Apache Culture,” 6.

58. TPG, ANRCV, 1911, 4; FAAAR, 1901, 191; Goodwin, “Report,” 75–76; John Gregory Bourke, *On the Border with Crook* (New York: Charles Scribners Sons, 1891), 183.

59. CES to CIA, Truxton, date obliterated (in file 1912–1913), TAR, 003, box 1; Mrs. Dona Gordon to Charles Wagner, Kingman, Arizona, September 9, 1918, in TAR, 003, box 2; JBK to CIA, San Carlos, June 16, 1924, PAORSCACCF, box 3; J. P. Dillon, US Marshal, to AHS, Phoenix, October 7, 1920, PAORSCACCF, box 1; AHS to Henry Larson, Chief Special Officer, Suppression of Liquor Traffic,

BIA, San Carlos, February 4, 1921, PAORSCACCF, box 1; JBK to CIA, San Carlos, April 7, 1928, PAORSCACCF, box 5; JBK to CIA, San Carlos, March 6, 1933, PAORSCACCF, box 8; JBK to CIA, San Carlos, September 7, 1933, PAORSCACCF, box 8; JBK to CIA, Rice, July 29, 1929, PAORSCACCF, box 6.

60. *ASB*, April 14, 1894.

61. JBK to CIA, San Carlos, December 1, 1928, PAORSCACCF, box 6; JBK to CIA, Rice, November 11, 1929, PAORSCACCF, box 6; JBK to CIA, San Carlos, November 28, 1930, PAORSCACCF, box 7; Walter and Mae [Holder] Haight, Payson, January 10, 1971, HOHIT, 344–45. On the high rate of conviction for Apaches charged with murdering whites in Gila County, Arizona—and the much lower rate of conviction for Apaches accused of murdering fellow Apaches—see Clare V. McKanna, *Race, Homicide, and Justice in the American West, 1880–1920* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1997), 150–53.

62. Coroner's jury report for Matze, GCCR, 1906.

63. JWN, FAAAR, 1900, 201; JJT, ARCVIS, 1917, 3; AHS to Clerk of the Superior Court, San Carlos, November 30, 1920, PAORSCACCF, 003, box 1; CLD to AHS, Whiteriver, November 23, 1920, PAORSCACCF, 003, box 1; GJL to EHH, Camp Verde, November 25, 1924, TAR, box 11, folder 056; Joseph M. Holub [?], Assistant US Attorney, to AHS, Phoenix, December 27, 1920, PAORSCACCF, box 1.

64. JOB, ARCVIS, 1922, 1; JJT, ARCVIS, 1917, 1; JJT, ARCVIS, 1918, 1; JBB, ANRCV, 1927, PAORPIS, box 10; JBB, ARCVIS, 1927.

65. JBB, ARCVIS, 1927; CWC, ARSSFAA, 1903, 119; CWC, ARSSFAA, 1904, 133; JBK to CIA, San Carlos, December 9, 1924, PAORSCACCF, box 3; AHS to CIA, San Carlos, July 25, 1921, PAORSCACCF, box 2; Bourke, *Border*, 225–26.

66. JBK to CIA, San Carlos, January 21, 1929, PAORSCA, box 6.

67. R. D. Kennedy to AHS, Globe, May 16, 1921, PAORSCACCF, 003, box 1; GDC, SCAAR, 1902, 161; J. H. Crickenberger, Truxton Canyon agent, to W. M. Saben, Manager of Phelps Dodge, Valentine, Arizona, November 22, 1938, TAR, box 45; JBK to CIA, San Carlos, June 5, 1924, PAORSCACCF, 003, box 3.

68. JBB, ARCVIS, 1927.

## Chapter 8

1. Keith H. Basso, *The Cibecue Apache* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1970), 40, 47; Thomas B. Hinton, "The Yavapai-Apache Community of the Verde Valley, Arizona," typescript, ASMA, folder A-1167, 27; Albert B. Reagan, *Notes on the Indians of the Fort Apache Region*, Anthropological Papers of the American Museum of Natural History, vol. 31, part 5 (1930), 302, 304–5, 320; William Burkhardt Kessel, "White Mountain Apache Religious Cult Movements: A Study in Ethnohistory," PhD dissertation, University of Arizona, 1976, 44–45; Arizona State Teachers College at Flagstaff Bulletin, *The Apache*, vol. 20, no. 1 (August 1939), 14; John Gregory Bourke, *On the Border with Crook*, (New York: Charles Scribners Sons, 1891), 128, 134.

2. Kessel, "Cult Movements," 7, 104–5.
3. Grenville Goodwin and Charles Kaut, "A Native Religious Movement among the White Mountain and Cibecue Apache," *Southwestern Journal of Anthropology*, 10, no. 4 (winter 1954), 393–94.
4. Kessel, "Cult Movements," 7–8, 127–31, 135; Goodwin and Kaut, "Religious Movement," 387–88.
5. Goodwin and Kaut, "Religious Movement," 388; Kessel, "Cult Movements," 153, 156–57, 175–76.
6. Kessel, "Cult Movements," 8, 158; ES to CIA, San Carlos, January 30, 1922, PAORSCACCF, box 2; CIA to ES, Washington, DC, May 11, 1922, PAORSCACCF, box 2.
7. ES to CIA, San Carlos, January 30, 1922, PAORSCACCF, box 2; JOB, ARCVIS, 1922, 2.
8. JOB, ARCVIS, 1922, 2.
9. Hinton, "Yavapai-Apache Community," 25–26.
10. Hinton, "Yavapai-Apache Community," 25–26.
11. Hinton, "Yavapai-Apache Community," 25–26.
12. W. E. B. DuBois, *The Souls of Black Folk* (Chicago: A. C. McClurg & Co., 1903), chap. 1. On double consciousness, also see Lawrence Levine, *Black Culture and Black Consciousness* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977), chap. 3.
13. AHS to CLD, San Carlos, February 7, 1921, PAORSCACCF, 003, box 1. The Brooks brothers were members of the T.A. tag band. US Indian Census, 1914, San Carlos, accessed via ancestry.com.
14. Coroner's jury report for Charles Baker, 1923, GCCR.
15. BIA Circular No. 1665, April 26, 1921, PAORSCACCF, box 2.
16. BIA Circular No. 1665, April 26, 1921, PAORSCACCF, box 2.
17. Petition to Superintendent in Charge, San Carlos Indian Agency, San Carlos, August 29, 1921, SCPC, box 5, folder "San Carlos Apache Tribal Relations, Business Committee, 1921–1936."
18. Petition to ES, Rice, Arizona, January 18, 1922, SCPC, box 5, folder "San Carlos Apache Tribal Relations, Business Committee, 1921–1936."
19. JBK to CIA, San Carlos, March 25, 1924, PAORSCACCF, box 3; JBK, ARSSCR, 1925.
20. Timothy G. Mackey, principal, San Carlos School, to Dan R. Williamson, San Carlos, March 17, 1937, PAORSCACCF, 003, box 1; Johnson Mull, William Mull, Glen Hanicy, et al., to JBK, Six Miles, Arizona, July 19, 1930, PAORSCACCF, 003, box 1, folder "Miscellaneous (Indian) March 28, 1925 to October 10, 1935, 3/3"; ARSSCR, 1911; AHS, ARSSCR, 1921; JBK, ARSSCR, 1924; JBK, ARSSCR, 1924.
21. JJT, ANRCV, 1915, 2; JJT, ARCVIS, 1915, 1; JJT, ARCVIS, 1920, 1; CVP, ARCVIS, 1921, 1–2; ES to CIA, San Carlos, January 30, 1922, PAORSCACCF, box 2.
22. JBB, ANRCV, 1927, typescript, PAORPIS, box 10.
23. AHS to JBB, San Carlos, June 29, 1921, PAORSCACCF, 003, box 1.

24. JBK to CIA, San Carlos, May 26, 1924, PAORSCACCF, box 3; JBK to CIA, San Carlos, May 15, 1934, PAORSCACCF, box 8; JBK to CIA, San Carlos, December 20, 1930, PAORSCACCF, box 7.

25. JBK to CIA, San Carlos, May 15, 1934, PAORSCACCF, box 8.

26. JBK to CIA, San Carlos, March 4, 1925, PAORSCACCF, box 4; JBK to CIA, San Carlos, June 10, 1924, PAORSCACCF, box 3; JBK to CIA, San Carlos, May 5, 1924, PAORSCACCF, box 3.

27. AHS to Livestock Sanitary Board, San Carlos, February 16, 1921, PAORSCACCF, 003, box 1; Rice principal to AHS, San Carlos, October 4, 1920, PAORSCACCF, box 2; AHS to San Carlos Reservation traders, San Carlos, May 18, 1921, PAORSCACCF, 003, box 1; EF to CHS, n.p., September 26, 1934, PAORPIS, Misc. Corr. C, box 2; AHS to Max Fiedler, San Carlos, April 14, 1921, PAORSCACCF, 003, box 1; JOB, ARCVIS, 1922, 13; L. A. Dorrington to CIA, San Carlos, February 6, 1923, PAORSCACCF, box 3; JBK to CIA, Rice, February 28, 1930, PAORSCACCF, box 6; JBK to CIA, San Carlos, April 13, 1934, PAORSCACCF, box 8.

28. JBB to Major Smiley, Phoenix, July 30, 1930, PAORPIS, 003, box 7; Major Smiley to JBB, Camp Verde, July 24, 1930, PAORPIS, 003, box 7.

29. JBK to CIA, San Carlos, March 3, 1927, PAORSCACCF, box 5; AHS to San Carlos reservation traders, San Carlos, April 26, 1921, PAORSCACCF, 003, box 1.

30. W. E. Tiffany to AHS, Rice, April 28, 1921, PAORSCACCF, 003, box 1; R. L. Rupkey to AHS, San Carlos, April 29, 1921, PAORSCACCF, 003, box 1.

31. CIA to AHS, Washington, DC, July 15, 1921, PAORSCACCF, box 2.

32. Eugene Genovese, *Roll, Jordan, Roll: The World the Slaves Made* (New York: Random House, 1976), 113–49; Philip Morgan, *Slave Counterpoint: Black Culture in the Eighteenth-Century Chesapeake and Low Country* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998), part 2.

33. Genovese, *Roll, Jordan, Roll*, 232–79.

34. Genovese, *Roll, Jordan, Roll*. Even Frederick Douglass attested to such bonds. Frederick Douglass, *The Autobiography of Frederick Douglass, an American Slave: Written by Himself*, David W. Blight, ed. (reprint, Boston and New York: Bedford Books, 1993), 45, 50, 80–81.

35. Cathleen Cahill, *Federal Fathers and Mothers: A Social History of the United States Indian Service, 1869–1933* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011), 17, 32, 168; JBB to Malcolm McDowell, Secretary, Board of Indian Commissioners, Phoenix, December 27, 1929, PAORPIS, 003, box 1, folder Misc. Corr. A.

36. Grenville Goodwin, “Report on the San Carlos Indian Reservation,” 1937, typescript, ASM, 21.

37. TPG, ANRCV, 1911, 9; JJT, ANRCV, 1919, 1; JOB, ANRCV, 1922, 1, 11; JOB, ANRCV, 1923.

38. CWC, FAAAR, 1904, 133.

39. ASB, February 24, 1898.

40. State of Arizona v. Jim Charley, T.A. 20, 1913, GCCR. Benson was a member of the T.G. tag band. Census of the San Carlos Indian Reservation, 1906 (Apache, Mojave, and Yuman Indians, 1904–1912), accessed via ancestry.com, June 2011.

41. *Charley*, T.A. 20, 1913, GCCR.

42. *Charley*, T.A. 20, 1913, GCCR; *ASB*, April 2, 1913.

43. *Globe Democrat*, September 28, 1911; *AR*, January 13, 1924; *ASB*, December 24, 1912, April 17, 1913, October 19, 1915, October 29, 1915, January 7, 1916, February 24, 1919, February 25, 1919, February 27, 1919, March 3, 1919, March 8, 1919, August 4, 1919, September 23, 1919, December 31, 1924, February 25, 1925, February 28, 1925, March 17, 1925, May 29, 1925; JBK to CIA, Rice, November 21, 1929, PAORSCACCF, box 6; JBK to CIA, San Carlos, November 28, 1930, PAORSCACCF, box 7. For reports of male-on-male attacks—attacks born of honor—see *ASB*, December 24, 1912, December 2, 1919, February 5, 1920, December 26, 1924.

44. CLD to JBK, Whiteriver, Arizona, November 29, 1926, PAORSCACCF, 003, box 2.

45. Edith M. Allen to JBK, *Globe*, May 31, 1930, PAORSCACCF, 003, box 1; F. Kenneth Irving to JBK, Payson, Arizona, December 13, 1933, PAORSCACCF, 003, box 1.

46. Mrs. N. H. Quail to JBB, Prescott, October 11, 1929, PAORPIS, Misc. Correspondence Q; JBB to Mrs. N. H. Quail, Phoenix, October 19, 1929, PAORPIS, Misc. Correspondence Q.

47. Rosey Wilson to JBB, Mayer, May 30, 1931, PAORPIS, Misc. Correspondence W, box 9.

48. Byron A. Sharp, Superintendent of Salt River Indian School, to AHS, Scottsdale, Arizona, December 31, 1920, PAORSCACCF, box 1; AHS to CIA, San Carlos, May 20, 1921, PAORSCACCF, box 2.

49. WD to JBK, Whiteriver, March 30, 1932, PAORSCACCF, 003, box 1; JBK to WD, San Carlos, March 21, 1932, PAORSCACCF, 003, box 1; JBK to CIA, San Carlos, March 20, 1934, PAORSCACCF, box 8.

50. In addition to examples described in the text, see JBK to John C. Gung'l, US District Attorney, San Carlos, March 26, 1929, SCPC, box 11, folder “March 1, 1929 to March 30, 1929”; JBK to JBB, San Carlos, January 16, 1929, SCPC, box 11; JBK to JBB, Rice, June 3, 1930, SCPC, box 12.

51. CHS to Jack Hardy, General Foreman, Verde Copper Company, Phoenix, August 15, 1933, PAORPIS, 003, box 1, Misc. Corr. C.; ERM to Yavapai County Board of Social Security and Welfare, San Carlos, November 21, 1938, PAORSCACCF, 003, box 1; Arizona Quick Silver to San Carlos agency, telegram, August 2, 1939, PAORSCACCF, 003, box 1; Newton Kindelay to CHS, Bear Canyon Work Camp #3, San Carlos reservation, January 20, 1936, PAORPIS, 003, box 3, Misc. Corr. K; JBK to CIA, San Carlos, April 17, 1932, PAORSCACCF, 003, box 1; JBB to First National Building & Loan Assoc., Phoenix, October 23, 1930, PAORPIS, 003, box 3; CHS to Sam Jack, n.p., May 9, 1936, PAORPIS, 003, Box 3, Misc. Corr. J; JBK to CIA, San Carlos, November 12, 1926,

PAORSCACCF, 003, box 1; JBK to Russell More, San Carlos, January 4, 1934, PAORSCACCF, 003, box 1; H. E. DeMund to Rep. John R. Murdock, Phoenix, April 26, 1938, PAORSCACCF, 003, box 1; John Herrick, Assistant CIA, to H. E. DeMund, Washington, DC, June 18, 1938, PAORSCACCF, 003, box 1. In a 1920s decision, the Arizona Supreme Court declared reservation Indians to be government wards and hence ineligible to vote, even after the United States had extended citizenship to American Indians. The Arizona decision, it seems, voided business contracts with Indian wards and gave the BIA the legal right to deny creditors admission to the reservation for purposes of replevin. JBK to First National Bldg & Loan Ass'n, San Carlos, September 28, 1932, PAORSCACCF, 1913–1952, 005, box 13; JBK to United States Attorney, San Carlos, October 7, 1932, PAORSCACCF, 1913–1952, 005, box 13.

52. R. D. Holtz, Truxton Canyon supervisor, to ERM, Valentine, August 15, 1939, PAORSCACCF, 003, box 1.

53. Jack Gilson to Lewis F. Brown, Camp Verde, November 28, 1938, PAORSCACCF, 003, box 1.

54. CHS to Jack Gilson, Phoenix, April 7, 1932, PAORPIS, 003, box 2, Misc. Corr. G.

55. Jack Gilson to CHS, Rimrock, May 3, 1932, PAORPIS, box 12; CHS to CIA, Phoenix, June 30, 1934, PAORPIS, box 12.

56. John A. Day to AHS, Leavenworth, Kansas, November 15, 1920, PAORSCACCF, box 2; JBK to L. R. Nelson, San Carlos, May 15, 1932, PAORSCA, 005, Misc. Chron., folder May 2, 1932, to May 28, 1932; JBK to EF, San Carlos, May 16, 1932, PAORSCACCF, 003, box 1; JBK to TES, San Carlos, January 9, 1933, PAORSCACCF, 003, box 1; Mrs. Arthur Harris to CHS, Clarkdale, March 14, 1934; Eula Engle to CHS, Nogales, May 17, 1935, PAORPIS, box 3, Misc. Corr. L; Scotty Smith to CHS, Camp Verde, April 3, 1932, PAORPIS, 003, box 8, folder Misc. Corr. S.

57. Lee Bread, Payson [?], January 10, 1971, HOHIT, 303.

## Chapter 9

1. Junietta Claridge, “We Tried to Stay Refined: Pioneering in the Mineral Strip,” *Journal of Arizona History* 16, no. 4 (winter 1975), 417–18.

2. Claridge, “Refined,” 417–18.

3. Claridge, “Refined,” 418.

4. ASB, September 20, 1919; Frank M. Sullivan to AHS, Miami, June 9, 1921, PAORSCACCF, 003, box 1; Grenville Goodwin, *The Social Organization of the Western Apache* (1942; reprint, Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1969), 580.

5. Jennie Parks Ringgold, “Chief Talkalai,” ms. 68, typescript, RRC, box 3, folder 5; AHS to Gila Grocery Company, San Carlos, no date [c. 1920], PAORSCACCF, 003, box 1; AHS to H. O. Fitzsimmons, San Carlos, May 12, 1921, PAORSCACCF, 003, box 1; AHS to CIA, San Carlos, December 21, 1920, PAORSCACCF, box 2; ASB, September 20, 1919, September 24, 1919, October 7, 1919, November 25, 1919, December 2, 1919, January 7, 1920, January 10,

1920, January 13, 1920, February 2, 1920, February 3, 1920, February 11, 1920. The US Indian Census Schedule for 1924 (Apache & Mojave Indians, 1920–1924) (accessed via ancestry.com) shows at least one member of the T.A. tag band living in Talkalai's camp.

6. JBK to CIA, San Carlos, no date [c. 1929], PAORSCACCF, box 6; Dr. Clarence Gunter to JBK, Globe, October 11, 1928, PAORSCACCF, 003, box 1; JBK to H. S. Fairbanks of the Southern Pacific Co., San Carlos, October 19, 1929, PAORSCA, SCPC, box 11; JBK to S. V. Polluck, Superintendent of Fort Grant Industrial School, Rice, July 10, 1930, SCPC, box 12, folder "Misc. Chrono. July 1, 1930 to July 31, 1930"; Dr. Clarence Gunther to JBK, Globe, January 19, 1931, PAORSCACCF, 003, box 1; H. G. Fitzsimmons to AHS, Miami, May 9, 1921, PAORSCACCF, 003, box 1; H. C. Kitz [?] to AHS, Globe, May 6, 1921, PAORSCACCF, 003, box 1; Clifford C. Faires to AHS, Globe, no date [c. July 1921], PAORSCACCF, 003, box 1.

7. Thomas B. Hinton, "The Yavapai-Apache Community of the Verde Valley, Arizona," typescript, ASMA, A-1167, 37, 39–40; CHS to CIA, Camp Verde, March 13, 1934, PAORPIS, box 2; [illeg.] to Stecker, Phoenix, February 15, 1922, PAORSCACCF, 003, box 1; VCN, May 25, 1918.

8. Mrs. R. M. Grantham to AHS, Roosevelt, July 22, 1921, PAORSCACCF, 003, box 1.

9. Stan Brown, "Notes Regarding the Life of Henry Irving/Evans, Patriarch of the Payson Tonto Apache Tribe," SBC, 9; Jay F. Vann to AHS, Payson, May 25, 1921, PAORSCACCF, 003, box 1; AHS to J. F. Vann, San Carlos, May 19, 1921, PAORSCACCF, 003, box 1.

10. Ralph Hubert to JBK, Payson, June 27, 1925, PAORSCACCF, 003, box 1.

11. Walter and Mae [Holder] Haught, Payson, January 10 or 11, 1971, HOHIT, 314, 341, 345–47; Riley Neal, Payson, October 27, 1970, HOHIT, 142; Dollie [Neal] Hale, Payson [?], Oct. 26, 1970, HOHIT, 127; Hinton, "Yavapai-Apache Community," 39–40; TPG, ARCVIS, 1911; Joe Sparks, "The Yavapai-Tonto Apache Indian Community at Payson, Arizona: A Position Paper," 1972, submitted to the Chairman of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, United States Senate, from Joe P. Sparks, Attorney for the Yavapai-Tonto Apache Indian Band at Payson, Arizona, typescript, SBC, box 1, folder 15, 21–22; Brown, "Life of Henry Irving/Evans," 9–11.

12. Julia Randall, Payson [?], Oct. 21, 1970, HOHIT, 83–84; Julia Randall, Payson, 1973/74, IMOI, 211–12.

13. Walter and Mae [Holder] Haught, HOHIT, 346. Glenda Riley argues that white women crossing the West in wagon trains developed friendly relations with Indian women, going so far as to show them how to "use needles and bake yeast bread." Indian women, for their part, taught whites "how to prepare and preserve foods, find and use roots, brew herbal medicines, and create a baby jumper suspended between bedposts." Riley suggests, then, that women—white and Indian—were more apt to engage in friendly relations than were men. Glenda Riley, "Sesquicentennial Reflections: A Comparative View of Mormon and Gentile Women on the Westward Trail," in Dean L. May and Reid L. Nelson, with

Richard Lyman Bushman, Jan Shippo, and Thomas G. Alexander, *The Mormon History Association's Tanner Lectures: The First Twenty Years* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press), 119. In the Rim Country, cross-racial friendships developed among both sexes.

14. Walter and Mae [Holder] Haught, HOHIT, 335, 341.

15. Walter and Mae [Holder] Haught, HOHIT, 314; JBK to Hill Bros. Fur Company, San Carlos, January 29, 1931, SCPC, box 13, folder "Misc. Chrono. January 2, 1931 to January 30, 1931."

16. Teresa Haley Boardman, Payson, 1973/74, IMOI, 5.

17. Coroner's inquests for Gila County, case no. 888; Sparks, "Community," 22; Brown, "Notes"; ASB, December 24, 1912.

18. Territory of Arizona v. Tom Hansen, S.N. 48, San 6, Herbert May, Lawrence Steele, GCCR, #A, case no. 96A.

19. *Hansen*, GCCR, #A, case no. 96A. Rustling by Apaches continued in later decades. ASB, December 24, 1912, October 9, 1915, October 18, 1915, October 25, 1915, April 25, 1919, May 7, 1919.

20. Pearl [Hilligas] Morrison, Payson, Oct. 28, 1970, HOHIT, 109–10.

21. John Dollard, *Caste and Class in a Southern Town*, 3rd edition (New York: Anchor Books, 1957), 212. Dollard's *Caste and Class* was first published in 1937.

22. Dollard, *Caste and Class*, 274–79. The infantilization theory emerged in the 1950s. See Stanley Elkins, *Slavery: A Problem in American Institutional and Intellectual Life* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959).

23. Julia Randall, HOHIT, 84, 85. Between 60 percent and 62 percent of settlers in the Rim Country and Verde Valley who appeared on the US census for 1910 came from the South and Lower Midwest (Missouri and Kentucky). The mining town of Globe, by contrast, had a high percentage of foreign-born residents. See 1910 US Census for Cherry Creek, Cline, Cottonwood, Tonto National Forest, Payson, Strawberry, Pine, Starr Valley, Camp Verde, Clarkdale, Fossil Creek, Gisela, Middle Verde, Oak Creek, Pleasant Valley, Red Rock (likely Rimrock), and Globe.

24. Riley Neal, HOHIT, 138; Dollie [Neal] Hale, HOHIT, 125.

25. Melton Campbell, Payson, Arizona, October 18, 1970, HOHIT, 11; Riley Neal, HOHIT, 141; Pearl [Hilligas] Morrison, HOHIT, 106–7; Lee Bread, HOHIT, 296, 298; Thomas Watson Holder, Payson, January 12, 1971, HOHIT, 351; Dollie [Neal] Hale, HOHIT, 131.

26. Vince Randall, discussion with Daniel Herman, Camp Verde, Arizona, September 6, 2003; Hinton, "Yavapai-Apache Community," 39–40; Dollie [Neal] Hale, HOHIT, 127.

27. Mrs. Doris Sturgis, Payson [?], Arizona, October 20, 1970, HOHIT, 64; Julia Randall, HOHIT, 88; Riley Neal, HOHIT, 151. JOB reported in 1922 that 19 mixed-blood Indians were enrolled at Camp Verde. JOB, ASRCV.

28. Philip Morgan, *Slave Counterpoint: Black Culture in the Eighteenth-Century Chesapeake and Low Country* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998), part 2; Jeff Forret, *Race Relations at the Margins: Slaves and Poor Whites in the Antebellum Southern Countryside* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2006).

29. Mark Schultz, *The Rural Face of White Supremacy: Beyond Jim Crow* (Urbana: University of Illinois, 2005).

30. Riley Neal, HOHIT, 142; Dollie [Neal] Hale, HOHIT, 128; Ola Smith, Payson, Arizona, November 11, 1970, HOHIT, 216.

31. Riley Neal, HOHIT, 141; Julia Randall, HOHIT, 83; Pearl [Hilligas] Morrison, HOHIT, 120.

32. Julia Randall, HOHIT, 84; Pearl [Hilligas] Morrison, HOHIT, 111; Riley Neal, HOHIT, 142.

33. Fred K. Armer to JBK, Payson, April 12, 1932, PAORSCACCF, 003, box 1.

34. Pearl [Hilligas] Morrison, HOHIT, 95.

35. Lula Randall, Centerville, Arizona, December 12, 1970, HOHIT, 279.

36. Walter and Mae [Holder] Haught, HOHIT, 335; Thomas Watson Holder, HOHIT, 358. In the Jim Crow South, too, hygiene and cleanliness became discourses of hegemony. Tera W. Hunter, *To 'Joy My Freedom: Southern Black Women's Lives and Labors after the Civil War* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), 186–90.

37. Pearl [Hilligas] Morrison, HOHIT, 113.

38. Jess G. Hayes, *Sheriff Thompson's Day: Turbulence in the Arizona Territory* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1968), 54; E. C. Conway, conversation with Daniel Herman, Greenback Valley, Arizona, August 10, 2004.

39. Thomas A. Flynn to AHS, Phoenix, January 10, 1921, PAORSCACCF, 003, box 1. See, for example, *ASB*, January 4, 1896, February 8, 1896, April 16, 1896, May 26, 1896.

40. Walter and Mae [Holder] Haught, HOHIT, 325; Thomas Watson Holder, HOHIT, 351.

41. Lena Hampton, HOHIT, 402–3.

42. Julia Randall, HOHIT, 84.

43. Melton Campbell, Payson, Arizona, November 8, 1970, HOHIT, 428.

44. Timothy Braatz, *Surviving Conquest: A History of the Yavapai Peoples* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2003), 219.

45. JJT, ARCVIS, 1920, 4.

46. TPG, ANRCV, 1911, 10; JBK, ARSSCR, 1924; JBK, ARSSCR, 1927. On Arizona's anti-miscegenation statutes, see Martha Menchaca, "The Anti-Miscegenation History of the Southwest," *Cultural Dynamics* 20, no. 3 (fall 2008), 291–93, 295, 297, 301–3. The American pseudo-science called eugenics, popular in the early twentieth century, likely heightened fears of miscegenation. See Edwin Black, *War against the Weak: Eugenics and America's Campaign to Create a Master Race* (New York: Four Walls and Eight Windows, 2003).

47. JOB, ARCVIS, 1922, 8; JJT, ARCVIS, 1914, 1; JJT, ARCVIS, 1915, 2; JJT, ARCVIS, 1916, 2; JJT, ARCVIS, 1917, 2; JJT, ARCVIS, 1920, 1–2; CVP, ARCVIS, 1921, 7.

48. Daniel Justin Herman, *Hell on the Range: A Story of Honor, Conscience, and the American West* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010), 248, 250; TPG, ARCVIS, 1911, 3. On Arizona reform, see David R. Berman, *Reformers,*

*Corporations, and the Electorate: An Analysis of Arizona's Age of Reform* (Niwot: University Press of Colorado, 1992).

49. Herman, *Hell on the Range*, chaps. 9, 11; James H. McClintock, "The Pleasant Valley War," *Arizona Cattleman*, Mar. 1, 1918, 4–5, typescript, WCBC, box 11, folder 70; John S. Goff, *George W. P. Hunt* (Cave Creek, AZ: Black Mountain Press, 1987), 18–19; Berman, *Reformers*; Pearl [Hilligas] Morrison, HOHIT, 101–6 (quotation on 105).

50. Julia Randall, IMOJ, 211–12.

51. Ira Murphy anecdote recorded in Julia Randall, IMOJ, 212.

52. Arizona State Teachers College at Flagstaff Bulletin, *The Apache*, vol. 20, no. 1 (August 1939), 6.

53. GJL, ARCVIS, 1926.

54. GJL, ARCVIS, 1926.

## Chapter 10

1. Albert B. Reagan, *Notes on the Indians of the Fort Apache Region*, Anthropological Papers of the American Museum of Natural History, vol. 31, part 5 (1930), 313–14; Donald Worcester, *The Apaches: Eagles of the Southwest* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1979), xv.

2. JLB, SCAAR, 1890, 12.

3. ASB, April 5, 1890; ASB, May, 10, 1890; Reagan, *Notes on the Indians*, 313–14.

4. CWC, FAAAR, 1902, 149; CWC, FAAAR, 1904, 132; CWC, FAAAR, 1907; ARSSCR, 1912, 13.

5. TPG, ARCVIS, 1910; TPG, ANRCV, 1914, 1; JJT, ANRCV, 1918, 4; CVP, ARCVIS, 1921, 6; JOB, ARCVIS, 1922, 7, 8.

6. ALM, SCAAR, 1892, 126; CWC, FAAAR, July 10, 1907; TPG, ARCVIS, 1910; TPG, ANRCV, 1911, 7; JJT, ANRCV, 1916, 4; JJT, ANRCV, 1918, 1; JJT, ANRCV, 1920, 5; JOB, ARCVIS, 1922, 8; JBK, ARSSCR, 1924.

7. Grenville Goodwin, "Report on the San Carlos Indian Reservation," typescript, 1937, ASMA, 31; Edward Palmer, "Customs of the Coyotero Apache," *Zoe: A Biological Journal*, vol. 1, no. 6 (August 1890), 164; Keith H. Basso, "Western Apache," in *Handbook of North American Indians*, William C. Sturtevant, ed., vol. 10, *Southwest*, Alfonso Ortiz, ed. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1983); Richard J. Perry, *People of the Mountain Corridor: Western Apache Heritage* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1991), 181.

8. On the strange mix of coercion, racism, pliability, negotiation, and irony at the boarding schools, see K. Tsianina Lomawaima, *They Called It Prairie Light: The Story of Chilocco Indian School* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1994), 167; Scott Riney, *The Rapid City Indian School, 1898–1933* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1999); Brenda J. Child, *Boarding School Seasons: American Indian Families, 1900–1940* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1998); David Wallace Adams, *Education for Extinction: American Indians and the Boarding School Experience* (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1995); Clyde Ellis, *To*

*Change Them Forever: Indian Education at the Rainy Mountain Boarding School, 1893–1920* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1996). Robert Trennert notes that some Indians recalled their boarding school experience with nostalgia. Robert A. Trennert, *The Phoenix Indian School: Forced Assimilation in Arizona, 1891–1935* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1988).

9. GJL, ARCVIS, 1924.
10. Goodwin, "Report," 31; Palmer, "Customs," 164.
11. Lydia Hunt Wright, ARSSCR, 1899, 168–69; CWC, FAAAR, 1904, 132; TPG, ANRCV, 1911, 8; *ASB*, November 8, 1890.
12. JOB, ARCVIS, 1922, 6.
13. Superintendent of San Carlos to CIA, San Carlos, July 26, 1922, PAORSCACCF, box 3; JBK to CIA, San Carlos, December 15, 1923, PAORSCACCF, box 3; JBK to CIA, San Carlos, February 27, 1925, PAORSCACCF, box 4.
14. JBK to CIA, San Carlos, June 23, 1928, PAORSCACCF, box 6.
15. JBK to CIA, San Carlos, December 4, 1926, PAORSCACCF, box 5; JBK to CIA, San Carlos, May 31, 1928, PAORSCACCF, box 5; JBK to CIA, San Carlos, May 11, 1929, PAORSCACCF, box 6; A. M. Gray to AHS, Rice, April 28, 1921, PAORSCACCF, box 1; JBK to CIA, San Carlos, February 27, 1924, PAORSCACCF, box 3.
16. JBK to CIA, San Carlos, February 23, 1928, PAORSCACCF, box 5; JBK to CIA, Rice, August 29, 1929, PAORSCACCF, box 6; JBK to CIA, Rice, October 25, 1929, PAORSCACCF, box 6.
17. JBK to CIA, San Carlos, June 4, 1924, PAORSCACCF, box 3; JBK to CIA, San Carlos, December 27, 1928, PAORSCACCF, box 6. For Kitch's defense, see JBK to CIA, San Carlos, January 11, 1929, PAORSCACCF, box 6; ES to CIA, San Carlos, July 26, 1922, PAORSCACCF, box 3.
18. Robert A. Trennert, "Corporal Punishment and the Politics of Indian Reform," *History of Education Quarterly* 29, no. 4 (winter 1989), 603.
19. H. H. Fiske, Inspector, and JBK to CIA, San Carlos, March 9, 1929, PAORSCACCF, box 6.
20. H. H. Fiske, Inspector, and JBK to CIA, San Carlos, March 9, 1929, PAORSCACCF, box 6.
21. JBK to CIA, San Carlos, April 12, 1929, PAORSCACCF, box 6; JBK to CIA, San Carlos, January 3, 1927, PAORSCACCF, box 5; JBK to CIA, San Carlos, May 25, 1929, PAORSCACCF, box 6.
22. JBK to CIA, San Carlos, October 10, 1933, PAORSCACCF, box 8.
23. JOB, ARCVIS, 1922, 7.
24. AHS to EHH, San Carlos, May 26, 1921, PAORSCACCF, box 1.
25. WET to EHH, Mohave City, Arizona, November 25, 1924, TAR, 056, box 11.
26. WET to EHH, Mohave City, Arizona, November 25, 1924, TAR, 056, box 11.
27. EHH to W. A. Light, Truxton Agency supervisor, Flagstaff, September 20, 1924, TAR, 056, box 11.

28. JBB to Malcolm McDowell, Secretary, Board of Indian Commissioners, Phoenix, December 17, 1929, PAORPIS, Miscellaneous Correspondence A 1928–1936, box 1. Corporal punishment at the Phoenix Indian School in the 1920s created a storm of protest by Collier and others. Trennert, “Corporal Punishment,” 612–17.

29. JJT, ANRCV, 1919, 6.

30. CVP, ARCVIS, 1921, 6; JJT, ANRCV, 1914, 4; TPG, ANRCV, 1911, 7; JJT, ANRCV, 1919, 6.

31. JOB, ARCVIS, 1922, 7; JOB, ASRCV, 1922; CVP, ARCVIS, 1921, 6; Gisela School Records, SBC, box 1, folder 16.

32. GJL, ARCVIS, 1924; GJL, ARCVIS, 1925; GJL, ARCVIS, 1926.

33. GJL, ARCVIS, 1926.

34. JOB, ARCVIS, 1922, 6; ARSSCR, 1927.

35. GJL, ARCVIS, 1924; JOB, ARCVIS, 1922, 7–8; JBB, ARCVIS, 1927; Lewis Meriam, comp., *The Problem of Indian Administration: Report of a Survey made at the request of Honorable Hubert Work, Secretary of the Interior, and submitted to him, February 21, 1928* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1928), 695–96.

36. JBK to CIA, San Carlos, September 8, 1924, PAORSCACCF, box 3; JBK, ARSSCR, 1925.

37. JJT, ARCVIS, 1919, 6; CWC, FAAAR, 1904, 132; JBK to CIA, Rice, April 19, 1930, PAORSCACCF, box 6.

38. ARSSCR, 1927; Alice Littlefield, “Indian Education and the World of Work in Michigan, 1893–1933,” in Alice Littlefield and Martha C. Knack, *Native American Wage Labor: Ethnohistorical Perspectives* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1996), 102.

39. Trennert, “Corporal Punishment,” 595–96, 617.

40. Meriam, *Problem*, 697.

41. The Meriam Report supports the assertion that younger, educated Indians were becoming more assertive about managing reservation affairs. Meriam, *Problem*, 671–72, 697–698 fn. 11.

## Chapter 11

1. Edward D. Fulwood to JBK, Globe, March 6, 1929, PAORSCACCF, 003, box 1.

2. Edward D. Fulwood to JBK, Globe, March 6, 1929, PAORSCACCF, 003, box 1.

3. Edward D. Fulwood to JBK, Globe, March 6, 1929, PAORSCACCF, 003, box 1.

4. Gordon Sapp, “The Red Struggle,” *Progressive Arizona and the Great Southwest* 10, no. 11 (Nov. 1930), 12–13, 28.

5. Sapp, “Red Struggle,” 12–13, 28.

6. Sapp, “Red Struggle,” 12–13, 28.

7. H. C. Mitz to AHS, Globe, December 27, 1920, PAORSCACCF, box 1; AHS to Thomas A. Flynn, San Carlos, January 11, 1921, PAORSCA, box 1; AHS to Mayor of Miami, San Carlos, April 18, 1921, PAORSCA, box 1; AHS to Jacobs & Partridge, San Carlos, April 18, 1921, PAORSCA, box 1; AHS to Thomas A. Flynn, US District Attorney, San Carlos, April 29, 1921, PAORSCA, box 1; Jacobs & Partridge to AHS, Globe, April 19, 1921, PAORSCA, box 1; A. R. Edwards to AHS, Miami, June 1, 1921, PAORSCACCF, box 1.

8. AHS to Thomas A. Flynn, San Carlos, January 29, 1921, PAORSCACCF, box 1; J. H. Langston, Asst. US Attorney, to AHS, Phoenix, April 20, 1921, PAORSCACCF, box 1. On indemnity cases for other Indians killed on jobs, see JBK to CIA, San Carlos, April 2, 1931, PAORSCACCF, box 7; JBK to CIA, San Carlos, May 11, 1933, PAORSCACCF, box 7; JBK to CIA, San Carlos, June 28, 1933, PAORSCACCF, box 7.

9. Joe Sparks, “The Yavapai-Tonto Apache Indian Community at Payson, Arizona: A Position Paper, submitted to the Chairman of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, United States Senate, from Joe P. Sparks, Attorney for the Yavapai-Tonto Apache Indian Band at Payson, Arizona, March 1972,” SBC, box 1, folder 15, 20; Nicholas P. Houser, “The Camp’—An Apache Community of Payson, Arizona,” *Kiva* 37, no. 2 (winter 1972), 69–70; Melton Campbell, Payson, Oct. 18, 1970, HOHIT, 5; Julia Randall, Payson, Oct. 21, 1970, HOHIT, 78, 89.

10. Sparks, “Yavapai-Tonto Apache Indian Community,” 20; Houser, “The Camp,” 70; Teresa Haley Boardman, IMOI, 2–3.

11. Ola Smith, Payson, November 16, 1970, HOHIT, 210.

12. ARSSCR, 1913.

13. J. H. Sizer to JBB, Phoenix, November 21, 1929, enclosing memo from R. I. Stewart, Forest Ranger, Pine District, Tonto National Forest, to Supervisor Swift, Pine, Arizona, November 16, 1929, in PAORPIS, 003, box 7, folder Misc. Corr. S for Fiscal Year 1930; JBB to US Land Office, Phoenix, November 29, 1929, in PAORPIS, 003, box 7, Misc. Corr. S for Fiscal Year 1930.

14. JBK to Carl Skinner, San Carlos, October 13, 1934, PAORSCA, 003, box 2, Misc. Corr. C; Sparks, “Yavapai-Tonto Apache Indian Community,” 21.

15. JBK to Supervisor of Forests, Tonto National Forest, San Carlos, June 16, 1932, PAORSCACCF, 005, box 13, folder “Misc. Chrono. June 1 to June 29, 1932”; Julia Randall, HOHIT, 86–87; Paul and Rose Burdette, Payson [?], Oct. 27, 1970, HOHIT, 162; Doris Sturgis, Payson [?], October 20, 1970, HOHIT, 61–62.

16. *AR*, June 29, 1924, July 6, 1924, July 10, 1924, July 11, 1924; CLD to AHS, Fort Apache, October 15, 1920, PAORSCA, 003, box 1, folder 2/2 (2/13/12 to 12/31/20).

17. *AR*, July 25, 1924.

18. GJL, ARCVIS, 1925.

19. *PEC*, July 3, 1924; *ASB*, February 28, 1925, March 7, 1925.

20. JBK, ARSSCR, 1929; Edward H. Peplow Jr., *History of Arizona* (New York: Lewis Historical Publishing Company, 1958), vol. 2, 33.

21. Melton Campbell, HOHIT, 5.

22. *ASB*, November 11, 1897. For more praise of detribalized Indians, see *Pick and Drill*, October 2, 1897.

23. A. R. Glaze to Indian Agent, Fort Apache Indian Agency, Los Angeles, February 19, 1920, Fort Apache Subject Files, box 19, folder “Antonio Apache”; Superintendent of Fort Apache Agency to A. R. Glaze, February 24, 1921, Fort Apache Subject Files, box 19, folder “Antonio Apache.”

24. *VCN*, February 2, 1918, April 27, 1918; *PEC*, June 9, 1924, July 1, 1924; *AR*, March 9, 1924, June 17, 1924.

25. Claude C. Cornwell, “Apache ‘Devil’ Dance,” typescript, SCPC, box 7, folder 072, “Indian Customs: Dances”; JBK to CIA, San Carlos, December 12, 1935, SCPC, folder “San Carlos Apache Tribal Customs (Feasts, Fiestas, Festivities, 1928–1958).”

26. JBK to CIA, Rice, February 8, 1930, PAORSCACCF, box 6; Thomas Enfield to JBB, San Carlos, October 29, 1930, in PAORPIS, 003, box 2, Misc. Corr. E; H. C. McQuatters, President of Flagstaff Celebrations, Inc., to TES, Flagstaff, June 4, 1935, SCPC, box 7, folder 072, “Indian Customs: Dances”; JBK to CIA, San Carlos, December 7, 1935, SCPC, box 5, folder “San Carlos Apache Tribal Customs (Feasts, Fiestas, Festivities, 1928–1958)”; Ruth Underhill to ERM, Denver, April 19, 1945, SCPC, box 7, folder “Indian Customs: Dances”; Ruth Underhill to ERM, Denver, April 23, 1945, SCPC, box 7, folder “Indian Customs: Dances”; Ruth Underhill to ERM, Denver, March 23, 1945, SCPC, box 7, folder “Indian Customs: Dances”; Yavapai County *Messenger*, May 14, 1948.

27. TPG, ANRCV, 1910; *PEC*, May 14, 1948; William Burkhardt Kessel, “White Mountain Apache Religious Cult Movements: A Study in Ethnohistory,” PhD dissertation, University of Arizona, 1976, 113.

28. *PEC*, June 9, 1924, June 11, 1924.

29. David M. Wrobel, “Introduction: Tourists, Tourism, and the Toured Upon,” in David M. Wrobel and Patrick T. Long, eds., *Seeing and Being Seen: Tourism in the American West* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2001), 18; Hal Rothman, “Shedding Skin and Shifting Shape: Tourism in the Modern West,” in Wrobel and Long, *Seeing and Being Seen*, 100–120; Leah Dilworth, “Tourists and Indians in Fred Harvey’s Southwest,” in Wrobel and Long, *Seeing and Being Seen*, 142–64; Sylvia Rodriguez, “Tourism, Whiteness, and the Vanishing Anglo,” in Wrobel and Long, *Seeing and Being Seen*, 194–222. For a more nuanced study of Navajos in the tourist trade, see Laura Jane Moore, “Elle Meets the President: Weaving Navajo Culture and Commerce in the Southwestern Tourist Industry,” in Mary Ann Irwin and James F. Brooks, eds., *Women and Gender in the American West: Jensen-Miller Prize Essays from the Coalition of Western Women’s History* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2004), 281–300. Moore suggests that Navajos who wove rugs and made jewelry for Fred Harvey tourist hotels exerted at least some control over their working lives. The Fred Harvey Company, however, manipulated both Indian artisans and the “scenes” in which they worked. Though tourists saw Navajos working in seemingly domestic environments, those environments were stylized and contrived. Navajo janitorial work, in particular, was hidden from the tourist view.

30. L. G. Moses, *Wild West Shows and the Image of American Indians, 1883–1933* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1996); Clyde Ellis, “Five Dollars a Week to Be ‘Regular Indians’: Shows, Exhibitions, and the Economics of Indian Dancing, 1880–1930,” in Brian Hosmer and Colleen O’Neill, eds., *Native Pathways: American Indian Culture and Economic Development in the Twentieth Century* (Boulder: University Press of Colorado, 2004), 156–83; Louis S. Warren, *Buffalo Bill’s America: William Cody and the Wild West Show* (New York: Knopf, 2005), 190–210.

31. On the contradictory and problematic impact of tourism, see Hal K. Rothman, “Pokey’s Paradox: Tourism and Transformation on the Western Navajo Reservation,” in Hal K. Rothman, ed., *Reopening the American West* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1998), 90–121.

32. *VCN*, April 18, 1918; *PEC*, October 28, 1948.

33. Mary McMillen to JBK, Douglas, Arizona, April 12, 1934, PAORSCACCF, 003, box 1; Mrs. Henry L. Taylor to JBB, Globe, February 21, 1928, PAORPIS, 003, box 8, Misc. Corr. T; Una Farnsworth to US Indian School [in] Phoenix, Waitsfield, Vermont, October 21, 1927, PAORPIS, 003, box 2, Misc. Corr. C; JBB to Una Farnsworth, Phoenix, November 1, 1927, PAORPIS, 003, box 2, Misc. Corr. F; Nolan Davison to San Carlos Indian Reservation, Lake Arthur, Louisiana, May 12, 1938, SCPC, box 5, folder “San Carlos Apache Tribal (Customs) 1934 to 1955.” For other such letters, see PAORSCACCF, 003, box 2.

34. Leslie E. Gregory to JBK, Globe, January 18, 1936, PAORSCACCF, 003, box 1; Dan R. Williamson to JBK, Globe, February 18, 1937, PAORSCACCF, 003, box 1.

35. Gertrude Knott to JBK, St. Louis, January 10, 1935, PAORSCACCF, 003, box 1.

36. Sherry L. Smith, *Reimagining Indians: Native Americans through Anglo Eyes, 1880–1940* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 5.

37. See T. J. Jackson Lears, *No Place of Grace: Antimodernism and the Transformation of American Culture* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981); William Stott, *Documentary Expression and Thirties America* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986); Lee Clark Mitchell, *Witnesses to a Vanishing America: The Nineteenth-Century Response* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981); Smith, *Reimagining Indians*.

38. I take my lead from Kathy McCloskey, “The Devil’s in the Details: Tracing the Fingerprints of Free Trade and Its Effects on Navajo Weavers,” in Hosmer and O’Neill, *Native Pathways*, 92–112. McCloskey notes that even as Navajo weavers ramped up production, they became poorer. She also notes, however, that, for Navajo women, weaving remained a sacred activity into the twentieth century even as anthropologists and museologists demeaned it as commercial.

39. *PEC*, January 12, 1924, January 21, 1924, January 30, 1924; *AR*, May 18, 1924.

40. *VCN*, June 18, 1918.

41. *VCN*, May 28, 1918; *PEC*, July 13, 1924. For other such stories, see *ASB*, January 30, 1915, May 9, 1919.

42. *ASB*, May 6, 1897 (reprinting an article from the *Yuma Sun*).
43. *ASB*, February 2, 1898, May 17, 1900.
44. *VCN*, March 14, 1918, March 15, 1918.
45. *ASB*, November 30, 1912, August 4, 1919.
46. *VCN*, May 16, 1918, August 16, 1918.
47. *ASB*, April 30, 1925; *AR*, July 1, 1924.
48. *GJL*, *ARCVIS*, 1924, 1925.
49. *GJL*, *ARCVIS*, 1924, 1925, 1926.
50. Illustrations discussed here appear in *GJL*, *ANRCV* and *ARCVIS*, 1924. For more illustrations, see *GJL*, *ANRCV* and *ARCVIS*, 1925–1926.
51. *JJT*, *ANRCV*, 1914; *SCAAR*, 1888, 7; *CWC*, *FAAAR*, 1904, 132; Arizona State Teachers College at Flagstaff Bulletin, *The Apache*, vol. 20, no. 1 (August 1939), 7.
52. Grenville Goodwin, *The Social Organization of the Western Apache* (reprint, Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1969), 504–5, 511, 569; Thomas B. Hinton, “The Yavapai-Apache Community of the Verde Valley, Arizona,” typescript, *ASMA*, folder A-1167, 37–38.
53. *ASB*, March 19, 1898. On Montezuma, see also Peter Iverson, *Carlos Montezuma and the Changing World of American Indians* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1982).
54. *ASB*, March 19, 1898.
55. *ASB*, March 19, 1898.
56. *AHS* to *CIA*, May 14, 1921, *PAORSCACCF*, box 2.
57. Iverson, *Montezuma*, 155, 160.
58. Supervisor of San Carlos to *CIA*, San Carlos, December 15, 1921, *PAORSCACCF*, box 2. Those who opposed Montezuma’s admission were Joseph Chinn, Benjamin Norman, and Melvin Sisto, among others.
59. Iverson, *Montezuma*, 159.
60. Mike Burns, *The Journey of a Yavapai Indian: A 19th-Century Odyssey* (Princeton, NJ: Elizabeth House, 2002), 121; Robert A. Trennert, “Corporal Punishment and the Politics of Indian Reform,” *History of Education Quarterly* 29, no. 4 (winter 1989), 600–601.
61. Burns, *Journey*, 125, 233, 237.
62. *ASB*, September 30, 1897; Supervisor of San Carlos to *CIA*, San Carlos, July 13, 1922, *PAORSCACCF*, box 3.
63. Supervisor of San Carlos to *CIA*, San Carlos, July 13, 1922, *PAORSCACCF*, box 3; E. B. Meritt, Asst. Commissioner of Indian Affairs, to *ES*, Washington, DC, June 17, 1922, *PAORSCACCF*, box 2.
64. Meeting of the Business Council, May 5, 1936, *SCPC*, box 3, folder “1936–1940.”
65. *JBK* to *CIA*, San Carlos, September 24, 1930; *JBK* to *CIA*, San Carlos, February 11, 1933, *PAORSCACCF*, box 8; *JBK* to *CIA*, San Carlos, November 7, 1933, *PAORSCACCF*, box 8.
66. *JBK* to *CIA*, San Carlos, March 5, 1931, *PAORSCACCF*, box 7; *JBK* to *CIA*, San Carlos, June 5, 1933, *PAORSCACCF*, box 8; *JBK* to *CIA*, San Carlos,

November 7, 1933, PAORSCACCF, box 8; Full Committee of Twelve appointed by San Carlos Indians to Senator Ralph H. Cameron, San Carlos, June 12, 1925, SCPC, box 1, folder 053, "Statistics: Historical Data."

67. JBK to CIA, Rice, February 6, 1930, PAORSCACCF, box 6.

68. JBK to Henry Chinn, Rice, February 5, 1930, SCPC, box 12, folder "Misc. Chrono. February 3, 1930 to February 28, 1930"; JBK to Henry Chinn, San Carlos, January 14, 1931, SCPC, box 13, folder "Misc. Chrono. December 2, 1931 to January 30, 1931"; JBK to Henry Chinn, San Carlos, April 6, 1931, SCPC, box 13, folder "Misc. Chrono. April 1, 1931 to April 30, 1931."

69. Full Committee of Twelve appointed by San Carlos Indians to Senator Ralph H. Cameron, San Carlos, June 12, 1925, SCPC, box 1, folder 053, "Statistics: Historical Data."

70. Full Committee of Twelve appointed by San Carlos Indians to Senator Ralph H. Cameron, San Carlos, June 12, 1925, SCPC, box 1, folder 053, "Statistics: Historical Data."

71. JBK to CIA, San Carlos, September 12, 1927, PAORSCACCF, box 5; JBK to CIA, San Carlos, September 30, 1927, PAORSCACCF, box 5; JBK to CIA, San Carlos, February 25, 1928, PAORSCACCF, box 5; JBK to CIA, Rice, October 5, 1929, PAORSCACCF, box 6; JBK to CIA, Rice, November 26, 1929, PAORSCACCF, box 6; JBK to CIA, Rice, July 25, 1930, PAORSCACCF, box 6; JBK to CIA, San Carlos, November 25, 1930, PAORSCACCF, box 7; JBK to CIA, San Carlos, February 11, 1933, PAORSCACCF, box 8; JBK to CIA, San Carlos, November 16, 1933, PAORSCACCF, box 8.

72. JBK to CIA, San Carlos, January 23, 1928, PAORSCACCF, box 5; JBK to CIA, San Carlos, September 24, 1930, PAORSCACCF, box 6.

73. JBK to CIA, San Carlos, February 6, 1930, PAORSCACCF, box 6; JBK to CIA, San Carlos, February 7, 1930, PAORSCACCF, box 6; JBK to CIA, Rice, March 26, 1930, PAORSCACCF, box 6; JBK to CIA, San Carlos, March 5, 1931, PAORSCACCF, box 8; JBK to CIA, San Carlos, November 7, 1933, PAORSCACCF, box 8; JBK to CIA, San Carlos, November 16, 1933, PAORSCACCF, box 8; JBK to CIA, San Carlos, July 9, 1934, PAORSCACCF, box 8.

74. JBK to CIA, San Carlos, June 5, 1933, PAORSCACCF, box 8; JBK to CIA, San Carlos, June 17, 1933, PAORSCACCF, box 8; JBK to CIA, San Carlos, April 26, 1933, SCPC, 1900–1969, box 5, folder "San Carlos Apache Tribal Relations (Business Committees), 1921–1936."

75. JBK to CIA, San Carlos, September 24, 1930, PAORSCACCF, box 7.

76. JBK to CIA, San Carlos, June 17, 1933, PAORSCACCF, box 8.

77. JBK to CIA, San Carlos, July 17, 1933, PAORSCACCF, box 8.

78. JBK to CIA, San Carlos, February 11, 1933, PAORSCACCF, box 8.

79. JBK to CIA, San Carlos, February 11, 1933, PAORSCACCF, box 8.

80. JBK to CIA, San Carlos, December 4, 1933, PAORSCACCF, box 8.

81. JBK to CIA, San Carlos, February 14, 1934, PAORSCACCF, box 8.

82. JBK to CIA, San Carlos, August 10, 1934, PAORSCACCF, box 8.

83. JBK to CIA, San Carlos, December 17, 1934, PAORSCACCF, box 8.

84. JBK to CIA, San Carlos, October 28, 1934, PAORSCACCF, box 8; Charles MacPhee Wright to A. E. Stover, June 13, 1949, SCPC, 1900–1969, box 5, folder “San Carlos Apache Tribal Customs (Feasts, Fiestas, Festivals)”; A. E. Stover to Wm. H. Zeh, Regional Director, San Carlos, June 9, 1948, SCPC, 1900–1969, box 5, folder “San Carlos Apache Tribal Customs (Feasts, Fiestas, Festivals).”

85. William Zimmerman, Assistant CIA, to JBK, Washington, August 11, 1936, SCPC, 1900–1969, box 5, folder “San Carlos Apache Tribal Relations (Business Committees) 1921 to 1936”; JBK to CIA, San Carlos, December 18, 1936, SCPC, 1900–1969, box 5, folder “San Carlos Apache Tribal Relations (Business Committees) 1921 to 1936.”

### Conclusion

1. ASB, March 22, 1919, March 24, 1919, April 8, 1919, April 22, 1919.
2. Julia Randall, Payson [?], Oct. 21, 1970, HOHIT, 92; Mrs. Pearl [Hilligas] Morrison, Payson [?], Oct. 28, 1970, HOHIT, 108; Riley Neal, Payson, October 27, 1970, HOHIT, 150.
3. Petition to Superintendent in Charge, San Carlos Indian Agency, San Carlos, August 29, 1921, SCPC, box 5, folder “San Carlos Apache Tribal Relations, Business Committee, 1921–1936.”
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# Index

Page numbers in italics refer to illustrations.

- African Americans, 3, 5, 123, 274  
Aha-sa-ya-mo, 19, 23, 47  
Akimel O'odhams (*see also* O'odhams), 38, 39, 41, 44, 55, 172, 173  
Alchesay, 109  
Alexander, Andrew, Maj., 58–60, 82  
Alexander, Eveline, 61  
Allen, Jim, 169  
American South: compared to  
    Arizona, 11, 195, 241–47, 251, 317–18; honor culture of, 244, 308, 326–27n8; race relations in, 4, 241–45, 247–48, 317–18, 376nn12–16  
Angel system, 241  
Annie, 242, 273  
Apache, Antonio, 277–78  
Apache clans: and farming, 151–52; functions of, 32–33, 40; origin stories of, 30, 36, 141; protect women, 223; and raiding and war, 40; and vengeance, 10, 132, 140, 202, 224–25  
Apache Kid, 130–34, 133  
Apaches (*see also* Dilzhe'es): become more assertive, 270–71, 277, 292, 306; conquest of, 3, 4, 40–89; drinking by, 197–99, 223, 229, 245, 270, 288, 289, 306, 310; facepaint patterns of, 35; farming of, 14, 150, 151, 151–57, 174, 184–85, 309; fear dead, 28; flutes of, 142; gender relations among, 8, 14, 140–44, 153–54, 223–27, 309–10; help build modern state, 7, 189–94, 277; honesty of, 159, 248; honor among, 39, 86, 130, 135, 137–44, 155, 224–25, 230, 256, 292; and Industrial Workers of the World, 264, 270; matrifocality of, 36, 143; matrilineality of, 143; migrations of, 1–2, 24–15, 28, 31; old ways of life of, 8, 11; organization of, 2, 25, 30, 33, 36; orient selves around conscience, 313; origins of name, 25; petition Ernest Stecker to allow Christian worship, 212; public interest in, 285; raiding by, 8, 38–39, 309; as ranchers and cowboys, 121, 293–94, 302; religious beliefs of, 9, 169, 207–8; and resistance to schools, 253–63, 267; rustling by, 134–35, 237–38, 245–46; at San Carlos, 73, 128–44; seek respect from whites, 270–71; sharing and generosity of, 6, 10, 272, 274; social outlawry of, 128–34; spousal abuse among, 8, 140–42, 223–27, 251, 308; take control of San Carlos reservation, 221, 298–306; violence among, 139–41, 210, 223–26, 252, 309; women of, 6, 8–9, 140–44, 143, 153, 194, 223–27, 228, 230, 309–10  
Apaches, divisions of. *See* Aravaipas, Chiricahuas, Cibecues, Dilzhe'es, Pinals, White Mountain  
Aravaipas, 115, 130, 170, 172, 305  
Arizona Cotton Growers Association, 195, 196  
Arizona *Miner*, 43, 61, 72

- Arizona Rangers, 200–201, 238
- Arizona *Record*: commends and mocks  
 Apache voters, 275–76; reports  
 derisively on Indians, 286, 289;  
 reports favorably on Indians, 278
- Arizona *Silver Belt*: belittles Indian  
 boarding school alumni, 257;  
 belittles Nah-diz-az, 155; Carlos  
 Montezuma publishes editorial in,  
 294; charges BIA with pauperizing  
 Indians, 222; charges John Dazin's  
 band with rustling, 136; compares  
 Apaches to Ishmaelites, 123; com-  
 plains that Indians have too much  
 land, 171; criticizes Gen. Crook and  
 Army, 123; decries Apache men's  
 exploitation of women, 142; decries  
 BIA policy, 87; decries educated  
 Apaches, 132; decries violent alterca-  
 tions among Apaches, 137, 138–39,  
 140; demands that Indians return  
 to San Carlos, 139, 181; identifies  
 Apache attacker, 128; mocks Indians,  
 233, 287–88; opposes attacks  
 on Nadiski, 135; opposes Indian  
 suffrage, 276; recommends ban on  
 Indian deer hunting, 167; remarks  
 on Indian shamans, 160–61; remarks  
 on Indian trade, 158; remarks on San  
 Carlos traders' policies, 158; reports  
 attacks by Indian men on Indian  
 women, 224; reports hunger at San  
 Carlos, 104–5; reports on Apache  
 Kid, 131, 132, 133; reports on  
 Indians returning to old homes, 170;  
 salutes Antonio Apache, 277–78
- Arizona Supreme Court, 131, 155,  
 182, 306
- Arizona Volunteers, 44–48, 55–56
- Ashcavotil, 57, 58, 59
- Athabascans, 24, 25
- Automobiles, impact of, 197, 217, 270
- Azul, Anton, 55
- Bakah, Chuna, 200–202
- Bak-el-cle, 129
- Baker, Charles, 210
- Baker, Ed, 129
- Banishment: threat of against Apaches,  
 83, 87, 124
- Barnd, J.O. (Camp Verde agent):  
 comments on racial segregation,  
 250; comments on ridicule of Indian  
 students, 257; complains of Indians'  
 refusal to farm, 185; reports on  
 Indian ditch work, 186; reports on  
 Silas John dances, 208; wants public  
 schools to enroll Indians, 265
- Barnes, Will, 114, 123, 125–27
- Basketmaking: and Chilchinhwana,  
 273; as cultural activism, 284, 293,  
 312, 316, 319; as means of resolving  
 double consciousness, 292, 293;  
 displayed to whites, 280, 283; as  
 women's work, 194, 203
- Battle of Big Dry Wash, 120–21
- Beauty, Ruby (Apache woman), 214
- Benson, Ben, 223–24
- BIA agents: anachronistic policy of,  
 314; attempt to instill conscience,  
 8, 218, 221, 309, 314–15; attempt  
 to regulate sexual relations, 214–15;  
 ban drinking, 215; ban soda pop,  
 218; bar replevin, 227; become hired  
 help for Indians, 188; compared to  
 slaveholders, 219–21, 308; complain  
 that Indians make poor farmers, 186;  
 and indemnity cases, 272–73; mock  
 Indians, 289–92; recommend allot-  
 ment, 182; recommend legislation  
 to bring back Indians, 182; regulate  
 Indians, 8, 213–18, 216; reinforce  
 Indian communalism, 221–22,  
 264, 308; seek to assist Indian men,  
 227–28, 310; seek to protect Indian  
 women, 225–27, 309–10; and Silas  
 John religion, 207–10, 222; want  
 public schools to enroll Indians,  
 265–66; worry about Indians leaving  
 reservation, 179–81
- Big Dry Wash, 50 (Map 2), 120,  
 344n44, 345n45
- Big John, 206
- Black Hills, 19, 22, 27, 37, 90
- Boarding schools (BIA): alumni of,  
 12, 311; mocked by George Laben,

- 291; resistance to, 297; scholarly literature on, 329n17; threat of enrollment at, 194, 262
- Boardman, Teresa, 168, 237
- Boquet, Charles, 167
- Bourke, John Gregory, Maj.: belittles Nock-el-del-klenny, 111; comments on forced removal from Rio Verde, 102; comments on Gen. Crook, 63, 66, 81; comments on Indian cruelty, 67; criticizes Arizonans, 123; criticizes Army policy, 118; describes Apache men as prodigies, 96; describes Skeleton Cave Massacre, 78–79; map of Tonto Basin Campaign, 76–77 (Map 3)
- Boynton Canyon, 21, 22, 91
- Bradshaw Mountains, 27, 42
- Bread, Constant, 249
- Brooks, Allan, 210
- Brooks, Fred, 210
- Brown, John: asked for information on Apaches, 284; assists Indian women, 225–26; comments on farming at Camp Verde agency, 186; comments on Indians dancing off reservation, 214; comments on Indians leaving reservation, 204; defends corporal punishment, 263
- Burdette boys (Dilzhe'es), 245
- Bureau of Indian Affairs: appoints liquor inspectors, 199; conscience and, 6; consolidates Apaches at San Carlos, 97; evicts white trespassers, 248; hires overseer of labor, 194–95; and “intimate colonialism,” 219–20; mocked by George Laben, 289–91, 291; pays Indians lower wages than whites, 203; protects Indians from whites, 248; scholarly literature on, 4
- Burke, Charles, 218, 260, 263
- Burns, Mike: accepts Yavapai creation story, 296; assertion of, 306, 311; career of, 80, 81, 296–97; comments on forced relocation, 102; criticizes Christians, 296; defends Indians from charges of savagery, 296–97; recalls Gen. Crook’s promise, 150; recounts story of Echawamahu, 159–60; relatives die at Skeleton Cave, 80
- Calbalechia, Dili (*see* Chapman, Delia)
- Calico treaties, 42
- California Volunteers, 44, 46
- Camp Apache (*see* Fort Apache)
- Campbell, Bud, murder of, 135–37
- Campbell, Henry (*see* Irving, Henry)
- Campbell, Melton, 243, 249
- Camp Date Creek, 44, 72
- Camp Grant Massacre, 69, 74, 87
- Camp Grant Reservation, 72
- Camp Lincoln (*see* Camp Verde)
- Camp McDowell (*see* Fort McDowell)
- Camp Reno, 59, 60, 61, 62, 70, 71
- Camp Verde (Army post): Army campaigns near, 104; connected by road to Colorado Plateau, 60; establishment of, 44; geographical situation of, 67; ruins near, 29; scout at, 87
- Camp Verde (town of): benevolence of settlers in, 234; enacts prohibition, 250; geographical situation of, 22; Presbyterian church at, 250; public school refuses to enroll Indians, 266
- Camp Verde Reservation: agents promote communalism at, 221–22, 264, 308; attempt to create cattle industry at, 189; creation of, 182–84; dancing at, 213–14, 308, 310; day school at, 254, 255; employment nearby, 194; failure of farming at, 185–87; grave robbing near, 229; mocked by George Laben, 289–91, 291; reformers visit, 251–52; segregation at, 249–50; Silas John dances at, 208, 222; smelter smoke kills crops and trees at, 186–87
- Capital punishment, 10, 314
- Carlisle Indian School, 132, 154, 249, 262, 276, 297
- Carr, Eugene, Col., 112–14
- Caste: in Arizona and Jim Crow South, 11, 317, 319; contested

- obliquely, 12; creation of, 202–3, 308–11; and denial of right to own land, 274; and paternalism, 10–11, 309–11, 318, 320; and social relations, 11, 12, 202–3, 308–11, 318, 320; scholarly interest in, 3; and segregation, 249–50
- Caste and Class in a Southern Town*, 4, 241, 318
- Chagrin: sociology of, 259, 261, 262, 263, 268, 269, 276, 311
- Chalipun (Dilzhe'e headman): agrees to ultimatum, 60; band members attack ranchers, 167; fear of genocide, 88; flees then returns to Rio Verde, 83; in peace talks with U.S., 70; refuses reservation at Ft. McDowell, 72; relationship with Delshay, 47, 53, 60, 70–71; surrender speech to Crook, 81; threatened by Army road, 56
- Chapman, Delia, 169, 246, 273, 274, 275
- Chappo (Apache headman), 83, 85
- Charley, Jim, 223–24
- Chilchihuana, 56, 60, 273, 273
- Chinn, Henry: accused of drinking, 298; combats paternalism, 298–306, 311, 319; criticizes Kitch, 300–306; demands compensation for Indians, 300, 301; lobbies for Indian Reorganization Act, 304–6; ombudsman for Indians, 298–306; photograph of, 299; puts forth draft constitution, 304–5; relationship with Ernest Stecker, 298, 301; son of Chilchihuana, 298
- Chiricahuas: 2, 110, 117, 118, 121, 123, 128, 162, 171
- Chop Wood Jim, 238–39, 240, 241, 245
- Christianity: and Apache dancing, 213, 313; and Apache unity, 212–13; Bible as home to believers in, 91; and character of U.S., 264; and double consciousness, 209–10; and Nock-el-del-kinny, 111; and religious syncretism, 128–29; at San Carlos, 212–13, 230, 306; Indian conversion to, 127, 154, 212–14, 230, 250, 313
- Cibecue Apaches: accused of murdering Ed Baker, 129; called *Coyoteros*, 37; called "Tontos," 128; charged with attempted murder, 136; conflicts among, 137; contest farms with settlers, 167; and Corydon Cooley, 85, 106–8, 115, 121; and Delshay, 82; and Ellisons, 135–36; ordered to relocate at Fort Apache, 108–9; place names of, 168; rebellion of, 112–21, 122; relations with Dilzhe'es, 108, 114, 115, 117, 120, 121; scout for Army, 54, 63, 68, 81, 86, 108, 112, 117, 126–27; shamans of, 206–7; territories of, 30–31
- Cibecue Rebellion, 112–15, 122, 125, 161
- Claridge, Junietta, 232–33
- Claridge, Mark, 231–33
- Clarkdale: Apaches work in smelter at, 193; BIA school at, 254, 255; Dilzhe'es locate at, 179; Indian church built at, 250; Indians in public schools of, 266; law not enforced on Indians at, 201; philanthropy of settlers in, 234–35; photograph of Yavapai family at, 183; smelter at causes plants to die, 186–87; Yavapai domestic quarrel at, 225
- Cleveland, Grover (Pinal man), 272
- Cleveland, Mrs., 272–73
- Clum, John, 101–2, 104, 124
- Collier, John: and BIA reform, 315–16; and Indian Reorganization Act, 303, 313, 315; lobbies for ban on corporal punishment, 263; promotes Indian cultures, 315–16
- Colonialism: historiography of, 3
- Colorado Plateau, 1, 27, 60
- Colvig, Charlie: murder of, 119
- Colyer, Vincent: and conscience, 85, 89; envoy to Indians, 68–73, 74; establishes Rio Verde reservation, 90; refuses to create reservation in Tonto Basin, 88

- Communalism, 6, 203, 264, 274, 308
- Conscience: BIA agents' authority premised on, 11; and Carlos Montezuma, 295; and caste, 309–11, 318, 320; and cleanliness, 247, 249, 251, 317–18; as emotional posture, 6, 326n8; and ethnocentrism of Army officers, 88; and gambling, drinking, gunfights, lynching, 6, 250–52, 277, 292, 296, 308, 314; and Gen. Crook, 6, 88; and humanitarianism, 247; imposed by BIA agents, 7, 88–89, 218, 230, 308, 313; Indians' seeming refusal of, 11, 122, 308, 309; origins of, 6; of settlers, 247–48, 250–51, 277, 292, 310–11; and Indian suffrage, 277; and modesty, sobriety, restraint, 6, 277, 292, 308; replaced by consumerism, 320; and schools, 253; and white women, 6, 292, 315
- Consolidation: policy of, 125
- Consumerism, 314, 320
- Cooley, Corydon, 85, 106–8, 110, 115, 121
- Cooley, Molly, 85
- Coolidge, Calvin (US President), 172, 173
- Coolidge Dam, 172–74, 192, 261, 300
- Corbusier, Mrs., 92
- Corbusier, William Henry: describes Rim Country, 90; ethnographic study by, 93–94; identifies Delshay's head, 84; observations on shamans, 93–94; participates in dance, 92, 232; remarks on meaning of term "Yavapai," 28; reports Apache and Yavapai fury over removal, 98; reports on "epizootic," 91; with Indians during relocation, 98–101
- Corson, George: compares Indians to Mexicans, 180; refutes reports of Indian misdeeds, 181; requires Indians to return from Roosevelt Dam, 191
- Cotton picking, 195
- Cowboys, 135; idolized by San Carlos boys, 293
- Coyoteros* (*see* Cibicue Apaches)
- Crook, George, Gen.: allows Indians to keep guns, 99, 248; appearance of, 64–65; and conscience, 5–7, 55, 64, 66, 67, 88–89; criticizes Pres. Grant's peace emissaries, 68–70, 74; decapitation policy of, 84–85; and Delshay, 82–85; describes Turret Butte Massacre, 81; and genocide, 67; ideas about Indians and Indian reform, 67–68; and Indian scouts, 63, 65, 68, 78, 81, 86, 87, 89, 108, 163; and Indian wars of Pacific Coast, 63, 66; personal habits of, 63–66; philosophy on Indians, 85–86, 88; photograph of, 64; promises Dilzhe'es and Yavapai that they will return to Rio Verde, 150, 184; sent to Arizona, 62–63, 67, 122; sentimentalism of, 74, 88; surrender of Dilzhe'es to, 163; tactics of, 63, 75
- Crown dances, 279; become more public, 182, 278–79, 313; as cultural activism, 278–79, 292, 312–13; description of, 278–79; Hopi origins of, 31
- Cruzados*, 37
- Cultural activism: and basketmaking, 283; contradictions of, 317; examples of, 279–84; as form of agency, 284–85, 292, 306, 312, 316, 319; and Harlem Renaissance, 319
- Cultural sovereignty, 8, 10, 230, 316, 320
- Dagenett, Charles, 195
- Dancing: of African-Americans, 317; before raids and warfare, 39, 40; BIA agents worry about, 180, 184, 185; BIA attempt to ban, 144, 205, 211; and Christian worship, 213; as cultural activism, 13, 231–32, 278–79, 280–83, 287, 292, 293, 312, 316, 319; off reservation, 214; newspaper derision for, 288; performed for settlers, 232; at Rio Verde, 92–93, 308;

- at Roosevelt Dam, 191; in Silas John religion, 207–8, 210, 211; settlers' toleration for, 231, 232, 243, 308, 310
- Dandy Jim, 117–18
- Daslahdn, 191, 206–7
- Datai, Nina, 262–63
- Datai, William, 262–63
- Davis, Britton, Lt., 106, 120
- Dawes Severalty Act (General Allotment Act), 124, 303
- Day-el-la (*see* Irving, Henry)
- Day Schools (BIA): at Camp Verde, 255, 256; at Clarkdale, 254, 255, 256; at dam construction sites, 192, 267; at Mayer, 254, 255
- Dazin, John, 136
- Dead Shot, 113, 117–18, 125
- Deloria, Phil, 316
- Deloria, Vine, Jr., 3
- Delshay: appearance of, 53; and Army road crew in Mazatzals, 53, 59; assassination of, 84–85; attempted arrest of, 83; called "The Liar," 61, 82, 83; capture of, 82; fears genocide, 88; and Paulino Weaver, 47–48; in peace talks, 60, 70–72; prophecies of, 53; relations with Army, 53–61; shot in chest, 62, 83; surrender speech of, 82; talks with Dubois, 53–58; territories of, 56; as war chief, 53
- Despoblado*, 36, 37
- Devil dance (*see* Crown dances)
- Dia, Francis (*see* Taylor, Francis)
- Dilzhe'es (*see* also Apaches): abandon San Carlos, 162, 166–74, 307; and Apache Kid, 131, 133; bands of, 33; called "Tontos," 2, 28, 32, 99, 128, 129; at Camp Verde agency, 182–84; and Cibecue Rebellion, 114, 115, 116, 117, 120, 121; clan relations of, 32–33, 36; and conflict with explorers, 41; confused with other Apaches, 128, 170; conversion to Christianity, 250, 313; and cotton picking, 195–96; die of hunger, 176; displaced by Coolidge Dam, 172; drinking by, 197–99, 245, 288, 289, 306, 310; driven away by settlers, 179, 307; and Echawamahu, 160–61; emergence place, 23 of; facepaint of, 35; farming of, 96–97, 150–57, 153, 176, 184–88, 230, 309; fear dead, 166; fight with Yavapais, 100–101, 138; flee San Carlos, 104, 166–68; forced removal from Rio Verde, 98–103, 109, 307; friendship with Hopis, 39; help build modern state, 7, 189–94, 277; homeland of, 30, 31, 90–91, 168; homesickness of, 168; homesteading of, 273–75; honesty of, 248; honor among, 39, 86, 135, 137, 140–44, 155, 224–25, 230, 256, 292; hunting of, 152, 177, 307, 308, 309; leave San Carlos to find food, 105, 157; mass surrender of, 81; men's status among, 140–44, 153–55, 223–27, 230, 309; migrations of, 2, 24, 25; mixed (part Yavapai) bands, 32; moderate pace of change, 222–23; and Nock-el-del-kinny, 111; and peace talks with Vincent Colyer, 70–71; petition Ernest Stecker to allow Christian worship, 212; photograph of, 57; physical appearance of, 94–96, 116; pre-conquest history, 13–14; and public schools, 265–67; refuse to speak English, 248; relations with Cibecucs, 108, 120, 121; relations with settlers, 243–44, 244, 245–46, 248; relations with Yavapais, 31, 32, 99; religion of, 91, 169, 207–8; rustling by, 134–35, 237–38, 245–46; at San Carlos, 123, 149–150; scout for Crook, 81, 86, 162–63; and spousal abuse, 223–26, 251, 308; subsistence strategies of, 152–53; tattooing of, 95; use settlers' cabins, 167; violence among, 138, 210, 223–26, 309; and wage labor, 7–8, 92–96, 121, 157, 179, 189–204, 241–43, 270–71, 307–8; and wars and raiding, 38–40, 46–48, 53–62, 63–89, 309; women seek

- agents' protection, 223–27; women's work, 194, 310
- Discourse, concept of, 13
- Dollard, John, 4, 241, 318
- Dosela, Thomas, 271
- Double consciousness, 12, 210, 269, 272, 290, 291, 292–94
- Drinking: agents seek to ban, 205; by boarding school students, 261, 264; and fraternization with settlers, 245, 270; and honor, 5; and Indian assertion, 292, 296, 306; Indians persist in, 143, 252; settlers judge Indians for engaging in, 11, 139, 288, 289; settlers reject, 10, 250, 314; settlers tolerate among Indians, 204; and women, 9, 310
- DuBois, R.C., Lt., 53–59, 82
- Dudley, Levi Edwin, 98–101
- Dunlevy, James, 62
- Dunn, Howard, 210
- Eagle (monster), 21–22, 91, 103
- Early, Henry, 224–25
- Earthquake of 1887, 159
- East Verde River, 32, 42, 166, 169, 235, 273
- Echawamahu: prophecies of, 159–61, 206; rituals of, 160–61
- Ecological conditions, 46, 135, 175–76
- Edwards, Silas John: accused of crimes, 207; and Apache solidarity, 210–12; bureaucracy of, 208; and Christianity, 207, 209, 210, 212–13; curing rites of, 208; dances of ridiculed by newspaper, 288; and double consciousness, 209; gender and, 208; influence at Camp Verde, 208, 222; sells goods to whites, 280
- El-chees-choos, 128–29
- Ellison, Helen Duett, 135–37
- Ellison, Jesse, 135–36
- Ellison family, 135–36
- Emancipation Day (San Carlos), 305
- Emotional practice, 11, 319
- Emotive performance, 12, 13, 319, 326n8
- Escapa, 107, 109
- Eskiltesela (Pedro): and Cibecue Rebellion, 115, 117; leader of Horizontal Red Valley people, 106, 107; meaning of name, 140; testifies to Gen. Crook, 122; wounded, 109
- Eskiminzin, 69–70
- Evans, Henry (*see* Irving, Henry)
- Extermination (*see* genocide)
- Felix, John, 271–72
- Fires (set by Indians), 105
- First Woman (Old Lady White Stone), 21
- Fish Creek Massacre, 44
- Flea-hop (dance), 288–89
- Forestdale, 108, 109, 110, 119
- Fort Apache: agent's help sought at, 225; and 1881 Cibecue Rebellion, 115; Cibecues help establish, 108, 110; Colyer creates, 72; Diablo's men attack, 109; farming near, 153; Indians removed from, 109; Nock-el-del-kinny ordered to, 113; school at, 154, 256, 257
- Fort Apache Reservation, 108, 124
- Fort McDowell, 44, 55, 56, 58, 60, 70, 71, 72, 82, 91
- Fort McDowell Reservation, 81, 294, 295, 304
- Fort Mojave boarding school, 262, 276
- Fort Thomas, 114, 118, 124
- Fort Whipple, 42, 43, 44, 45, 161, 170
- Fossil Creek, 1, 21, 32, 42, 71, 100, 274
- Four Peaks, 22, 168
- Friday, Tom, 113, 125–27
- Fulwood, Edward, 270, 292
- Gaan*, 31, 37, 168–69, 182, 279, 279, 281
- Gabbard, Taylor, 184, 189, 249, 257, 260
- Gaddis, Tack, 178
- Gambling: agents attempt to ban, 205; and assertion, 292, 296,

- 306; Apache par fleche cards, 197; Apaches persist in, 121, 197, 197, 264; Arizona bans, 250, 314; as form of resistance, 296; and honor, 5; refusal to prosecute Indians for, 201; and ritual power, 164; by scouts, 198; settlers' judgment of, 249, 252; settlers' toleration for, 308, 310; and women, 9, 310
- Game, extermination of, 72–73
- Genocide: calls for, 8, 43, 54, 67, 72, 87, 161; Crook and, 6; and honor, 5, 67; Indians' fear of, 88, 90; and shift to paternalism, 9, 307
- Geronimo, 117, 123, 128, 161, 162, 166, 287, 288
- Gila River: Americans venture up, 40, 41; construction of dam on, 172–74, 300; flooding of, 156–57, 188; Indian farms on, 150; malarial environment of, 98; New Camp Grant (San Carlos) placed on, 67, 73, 97, 149; sedentary tribes located on, 48; waters taken by settlers, 171
- Gilson, Ed, 273
- Gilson, Jack, 229
- Gisela, 170, 179, 191, 235, 265
- Globe: Apache attack on, 286–87; Apache Kid works at, 130; Apache women bring crops to, 142, 153; execution of Nah-diz-az at, 156; Indian delinquency in, 270; Indians in public schools of, 266; Indians laborers transported from, 195; Indians work at, 168, 194; melee in Indian camp near, 138; paternalism at, 233–34, 243
- God, 206, 212, 214
- “Going back to the blanket,” 155, 258, 258
- Gold, 37, 42
- Gon-shay-ee, 131–32
- Goodlooking, 139
- Goodwin, Grenville: on Apache farming, 153; explains Apache courtship, 141; explains Apache social organization, 36; identifies Henry Irving as Dilzhe'e, 163; interviews with Dilzhe'es, 2, 17, 34; interview with Tom Friday, 125; on powers of band chiefs, 165; on ritual knowledge and power, 164; watercolor of Apache facepaint, 35
- Goodwin, John, Gov., 43, 67
- Gotas: defined, 36; disbursed after conquest, 143; habitations abandoned, 59; reconstituted at work sites, 191; women's roles in, 223, 230, 309
- Gowas: built near farming sites, 152; burned after death in, 20; dated to 1661, 29; mocked by BIA agent, 290; at Roosevelt Lake, 192; torn apart by angry woman, 288; women's roles in, 153, 223, 230, 309
- Gowett, Lenora, 178
- Gowett, Nettie, 178
- Grant, Ulysses S., President, 62, 68, 106, 287, 307
- Grantham, R.M., Mrs., 235
- Green, John, Maj., 107–8
- Greenback Valley, 273
- Green Valley (*see* Payson)
- Gregory, Leslie, 284
- Grierson, B.H., Gen., 133, 134
- Hale, Dollie Neal, 179, 243
- Harlem Renaissance, 319
- Harquahala Mountains, 16 (Map 1), 27, 44
- Hassayampa River, 42, 61
- Haught, Mae Holder, 236, 248
- Haught, Pat, 236
- Haught, Walter, 237, 248
- Headmen, 36; characteristics of, 6, 154, 164–65; duties of, 164–65; and land claims, 274; loss of authority of, 166; as wage laborers, 191
- Headwomen, 36; characteristics of, 6, 165; duties of, 165; and land claims, 274
- Hentig, Edmund, Capt., 113, 114
- Hill, Louis, 190
- Hilligas, Mrs., 239–40, 246
- Hoddintin*, 209
- Hohokam, 1, 23, 25–27

- Holder, Mrs., 236
- Holmes (Arizona Ranger), 200
- Honor: among Apaches and Yavapais, 6, 39, 45, 86, 135, 224–25, 230, 256, 292; among settlers, 55, 139, 161, 250–51, 310–11, 320; Apache Kid and, 130; and Apache naming conventions, 140; destabilization of, 138–44, 223, 230, 320; gives way to conscience, 10, 250–51, 292, 310–11, 320; and race, 5–6, 67, 308, 320; scholarly literature on, 326–27n8, 328n15; and violence, 5–6, 86, 250–51, 292
- Hoomoothyah (*see* Burns, Mike)
- Hopis, 23, 27, 30, 31, 39, 282
- Horizontal Red Valley People, 106, 107, 109
- Hos-kal-te, 132, 133
- Howard, Oliver Otis, Gen.: and conscience, 85, 89; ethnocentrism of, 74–75, 88; negotiations of, 73–75; and Nock-el-del-kinny, 106
- Hualapai, 28, 39, 75, 140, 173
- Hunting, by Indians, 72, 73, 93, 152, 164, 175, 177, 178, 307, 308, 309; by settlers, 177
- Indian Bureau (*see* Bureau of Indian Affairs)
- Indian courts, 205
- Indian crafts, 13, 279–84, 287, 312, 316, 319
- Indian delegations to Washington, D.C., 55, 73, 106
- Indian Emergency Conservation program, 215
- Indian police, 104, 119, 184, 201–2, 205, 248
- Indian Reorganization Act, 303–6, 313, 315
- Indians, newspaper depictions of: positive, 277–78, 306; derisive, 285–89, 290, 306
- Indian schools (BIA), 255; bashfulness of students at, 256; and conscience, 12, 253, 268; corporal punishment in, 255, 260–61, 265, 268; curriculum of, 267–68; discourage transfers, 263; and double consciousness, 12, 269, 272; inadequacy of, 254–55; Indian transformation of, 255–56; instill chagrin, 12, 257, 259, 261, 262, 263, 268, 269, 276, 311; instruction at, 254, 267; and lack of sympathy, 257, 311; negotiation in, 12, 253–63; and paternalism, 12, 253–69, 311; resistance to, 253–68; students avoid, 262; students perform manual labor at, 259–60
- Indian scouts, 97, 217; Henry Irving as, 162–63; importance of to Gen. Crook, 65, 86, 87; lead troops to Skeleton Cave, 78; lead troops to Turret Butte, 81; lead troops to Yavapes, 75; rebellion of, 112–14; replace Mexican scouts, 68; save boy, 78; sentenced to death, 117–18
- Indian Service (*see* Bureau of Indian Affairs)
- Industrial Workers of the World, 264, 270
- Interracial marriage and procreation, 10, 11, 108, 236–37, 243, 244, 249–50
- Intimate violence: defined, 139; instances of, 223–26, 309
- Irving, Henry: attack on, 237; builds house, 274; descendants lose property of, 275; returns to Spring Creek, 167, 168; status of, 162–66; tag band name of, 163; testifies against rustlers, 237–38
- Irving, Lizzie (Natahway), 166, 237
- “It Is Going to Happen,” 206
- Jerome, 22, 37, 176, 179, 186
- Jesus, 111, 128, 207, 212
- Jim Crow South (*see* American South)
- Jordan, W.A., 178–79
- Jumanas*, 37
- Jumulla, Viola, 280
- Kakaka*, 169
- Katsina* cult, 27, 168
- Ke-in-a-ki, 224

- Kitch, James: and Coolidge Dam, 172, 261, 300; assists Indian women, 225–26; attempts to regulate sexual relations, 214–15; bans pool halls, 218; on cotton picking, 196; and creation of stock industry, 188; defends corporal punishment, 260, 263; on “miscegenation,” 249–50; opposes Henry Chinn, 298–306, 299; on “religious sect,” 213; on Rice school, 258, 260, 267; on whites’ refusal to enforce laws on Apaches, 199, 200; touts off-reservation employment, 195, 196
- Kwevkepayas, 27, 32, 75, 78, 149
- Kyle, Houston: murder of, 136–37
- Laben, George: authorizes students to leave Ft. Mojave School, 262–63; belittles do-gooders, 251–52; drawing of Dilzhe’e village by, 180; on failure of boarding schools, 276; on Indian children’s bashfulness, 256, 269; on Indians in public schools, 265–66, 267; mocks Camp Verde people, 187, 258, 289–90, 291
- Law enforcement: and Arizona’s reluctance to police Indians, 199–200; on reservation, 201–2
- Leihy, George: murder of, 55–56
- Lewis, Tonto, 138
- Literacy tests, 11
- Lofty Wanderer (*see* Monster Slayer)
- Loring, Frederick: murder of, 74
- Lummis, Charles Fletcher, 285, 312
- Maricopas: and honor, 40, 140; Apache raids on, 39; attack Apaches near Camp Reno, 71; in Arizona Volunteers, 44–45; defeat Yumas, 41; disfigure dead, 78; feared by Dilzhe’es and Yavapais, 54, 57; leave reservation to work for whites, 173; ritual preparations for war, 45; as scouts, 86; visit Washington, D.C., 55
- Matze, 200–201
- Mayer, 201, 254, 255
- Mazatzal Mountains: Army builds road through, 53, 56; Army campaigns in, 84; Delshay attacks post in, 59; Dilzhe’e and Yavapai love of, 22, 60; Dilzhe’es and Yavapais seek reservation in, 71; home to Kwevkepayas, 27; mixed bands in, 32; parlay in, 70; and Rim Country geography, 1; walled complexes in, 26
- McDowell, Irvin, Gen., 58, 115, 117, 118
- Medicine men (*see* shamans)
- Meriam Report, 266
- Mescal, 28, 37, 152
- Mexicans: accused of selling liquor to Indians, 139; and Apaches, 123–24; in Arizona Volunteers, 44; and Camp Grant Massacre, 69; compared to Indians, 180, 266; and honor, 86, 140; and peace with Apaches and Yavapais, 73, 74; scouts fired by Gen. Crook, 68; suspected of murdering Frederick Loring, 74; trade captives, 58; whites view as shamed race, 5
- Miami: agrees to pay indemnities, 272–73; and bad influence on Indians, 180; Indian delinquency in, 270; townfolk largesse to Indians, 233
- Middle ground: concept of, 20, 40, 47
- Middle Verde reservation (*see* Camp Verde reservation)
- Miguel (*see* Escapa)
- Miles, Nelson, Gen., 161, 162
- Mineral Strip, 171, 301, 302
- Mingus Mountain, 22, 96, 168, 176
- Mockery: of Indians, 12, 287–92
- Mogollon Rim: and Tonto Basin, 67; Dilzhe’e returnees driven away from, 166; geography of, 1; Henry Irving leads return to, 163, 168, 237; Indians return to, 307; location of Battle of Big Dry Wash, 120; road built to summit of, 60; as seen from Verde Valley, 90; soldiers campaign in, 84
- Mogollons, 1, 25, 26, 28, 29
- Mojaves, 28, 40, 41, 75

- Monster Slayer, 21–22, 91, 168, 207  
 Montezuma, Carlos: abhors reservations, 294; and Indian rights, 294–95; assertion of, 294–95, 306, 311; connection to Dilzhe'cs, 295; criticizes BIA, 295; life of, 80–81, 294; at San Carlos, 295  
 Montezuma's Castle, 23, 27, 229  
 Montezuma's Well, 22–23, 27–28, 168  
 Morison, Pearl Hilligas, 170, 238–39, 245, 247  
 Mormons: killed in Apache uprisings, 114, 120; and meaning of “sister,” 240; report Cibecue prophecy, 159; said to have killed Apache Kid, 131; threaten Corydon Cooley, 110; and paternalism, 231–32; warn of Nock-el-del-kinny, 111  
 Morrison, Geraldine, 236  
 Mott, Seward, Lt., 154–55, 257  
  
 Nadiski, 105, 134–35  
 Nah-diz-az, 154–56, 156, 257  
 Na'ilde' (*see* Nock-el-del-kinny)  
*Na-iz-ane* (*see* Monster Slayer)  
 Na-Nitro-ki, 224  
 Nantaje, 78  
 Na-ti-o-tish, 114, 115, 117, 119–21, 286  
 Nat-tsen, 129  
 Navajos: and Apaches, 2, 30–31; Army campaigns against, 42; arrival in Southwest, 25; and honor, 86, 140; migrations of, 24; public performances and displays of, 278, 280, 285; work off reservation, 173  
 Neal, Riley, 245  
 Ne-big-ja-gay, 117  
 New Camp Grant (*see* San Carlos Reservation)  
 Nock-el-del-kinny: and *Na'ilde'*, 110–13; Army's military solution for, 118; arrest of, 113–14; assassination of, 85, 113–14; biography of, 106; impact of, 125, 136, 157; preaches Apache unity, 110; predicts whites will leave, 111; promises to bring dead to life, 110–11; similarity to Echawamahu, 161; visits Washington, D.C., 55  
 Nockeye, Charlie, 33, 165, 208–9, 209  
 Norman, Charlie: and story of Monster Slayer, 21–22, 34  
  
 One-Eyed Riley, 70, 71  
 O'odhams (*see also* Tohono O'odham and Akimel O'odham): in Arizona Volunteers, 44–45; called Sobaipuris, 30; and Camp Grant Massacre, 69; disfigure dead, 78; and honor, 140; and prisoner exchange, 58; relations with Apaches and Yavapais, 73, 54, 55, 57, 70, 71, 72, 82; ritual preparations for war, 45; scout for Crook, 86  
 Oshkolte, 56, 61  
 Overseer of Labor (BIA), 194–95  
  
 Paternalism: and angel system, 241; and caste, 10, 308–11, 318, 320; challenges to, 297–98, 318; and cultural practice, 13, 309; and Dead Shot's sons, 125–27; and Indian policy, 7–9; loopholes in, 8, 218, 230, 253, 308; manipulation of, 264, 308; power of, 221, 230, 309, 318; on reservation, 218–21, 230, 271, 308–9; and resistance, 310–11, 318; settlers and, 231–52, 271, 309; and schools, 253–69; and stability, 309, 311, 318  
 Patriarchy, 227, 309  
 Patty, 61  
 Payson: Apaches return to, 170; domestic squabble at, 225; early Apache habitation of, 29; Henry Irving as resident of, 168, 275; relations between settlers and Apaches at, 235, 243; settlers robbed at, 105; shot up by cowboys, 250–51; theft at, 248  
 Pedro (*see* Eskiltesela)  
 Peel, C.V. (Camp Verde agent), 185, 194, 214, 265

- Peoria, Tom, 246
- Pete, Marshal (Yavapai headman), 138
- Philanthropy, 196–97, 232–36
- Phoenix, 55, 159, 172, 190, 194, 195, 276, 282
- Phoenix Indian School: Apaches dance at, 279; criticized by George Laben, 276; Indians seek accommodations at, 230; makes children feel inferior, 256; visited by Jack Gilson, 229
- Pinals: and Carlos Montezuma, 295; Army campaigns against, 75; called “San Carlos Apaches,” 170; Camp Grant reservation established for, 69; crowded with Dilzhe’es at San Carlos, 172; and Henry Irving, 163; told to bring Delshay’s head, 83; “Tonto” designation applied to, 128, 138
- Pinole*, 44, 152
- Pinole Massacre, 44
- Plantations: compared to reservations, 219–21
- Playing Indian*, 316
- Pleasant Valley, 106, 119, 136, 167
- Powwows: Indian participation in, 13, 279, 280
- Prescott, 27, 42, 43, 56, 75, 201, 283
- Prescott *Courier*: reports derisively on Indians, 286; reports favorably on Indians, 278, 280, 284; reports on Indians working in Verde Valley, 170; reports white opposition to Indian suffrage, 276
- Prescott *Evening Courier* (see Prescott *Courier*)
- Prohibition, 199–200, 250–51, 292
- Proletarianization, 267
- Public schools: corporal punishment in, 268; Indians in, 165, 237; refuse to enroll Indian students, 201, 255, 265; segregation in, 268; sympathy in, 268; whites resist Indian enrollment in, 237, 265–66
- Puebloans, 1, 25–27, 36, 37, 40, 140
- Quail, Dell (Wemaya): and story of Lofty Wanderer, 22
- Rabbit, Obed, 238, 239
- Race: social construction of, 11–12, 14, 310–11, 316–20
- Racism, 5, 11, 202, 227, 265–66
- Rancherias* (see *gotas*)
- Randall, Julia, 236, 245, 248, 251
- Randall, Vince, 169, 179, 189
- Randall family (settlers), 245
- Red Rock Country, 21, 27, 104
- Renegades: attack on whites, 128–134; leave Rio Verde, 92; pursued by Henry Irving, 163; pursued by Indian police, 104–5
- Resistance: indirectness of, 310; and paternalism, 310, 318; scholarly literature on, 328–29n16
- Rice, 172, 212, 213, 215, 283
- Rice Indian School: corporal punishment at, 255, 256, 260–61, 265; diet at, 258; expanded and improved, 261; parents’ right to visit, 258–59; positive report on, 261; problems at, 258, 260; rebellion at, 257–61; student drinking at, 261
- Riley, 125–27
- Rim Country (see Mogollon Rim)
- Rio Verde Reservation, 93, 97; Chappo’s flight from, 85; Delshay arrives at, 82; description of, 90; Dilzhe’es and Yavapais submit to, 81; “epizootic” at, 91–92; establishment of, 72, 90, 307; and Gen. Crook’s promise that Indians can return to, 184; head of Delshay brought to, 84; Indians removed from, 97–103, 125, 307; Indians trade at, 31; irrigation of, 96–97; malaria at, 91–92, 96; punishments at, 92; success of, 96–97
- Rising Upward religion, 191, 206–7
- Rodeos: Indian participation in, 13, 278, 280, 306, 319
- Roosevelt Dam: Indians help construct, 189–90, 190
- Row of White Canes People, 109
- Rustling, 134–35, 237–38, 245–46

- S.B. 24, 200–201
- Salado: growth and decline of, 25–26;  
 populate Rim Country, 1; replaced  
 by Apaches, 28
- Salt River, 26, 40, 48, 78, 100, 128
- Salt River Valley, 23, 26, 27, 44, 190,  
 196
- San Carlos Business Committee, 298
- San Carlos Reservation: abandoned  
 by Yavapais and Dilzhe'es, 7, 157,  
 162–74, 182, 307; called New  
 Camp Grant, 67; and cattle industry,  
 135, 302; Christianity at, 212–13,  
 230, 306, 313; consolidation of  
 Indians at, 74; constitution of,  
 304–5; construction of Coolidge  
 Dam on, 172–73, 300; and control  
 of Indians, 103, 174; corruption at,  
 122–23; dancing at, 161, 213,  
 279, 308, 310; and Dawes Act,  
 124, 304; Dilzhe'es and Yavapais  
 removed to, 55, 91, 97–103,  
 307; farming at, 151, 153, 171,  
 188; flooding at, 156–57, 188;  
 Indian fairs at, 280; and Indian  
 Reorganization Act, 305; Indians  
 absent from, 104–5; killing of chief  
 of police at, 119; malaria at, 98;  
 Mike Burns at, 80, 81; Mineral  
 Strip removed from, 171, 301, 302;  
 murders on or near, 139; and Nock-  
 el-del-kinny, 112; reduced, 171;  
 resistance to schooling at, 253–64;  
 shamans predict destruction of, 111,  
 160; and social outlawry, 128–34;  
 stock industry at, 188–89; tensions  
 on, 174, 189; traders at, 158–59;  
 troops abandon, 181; whites trespass  
 on, 123
- San Carlos River, 73, 97, 137, 149
- San Francisco Peaks, 22, 31, 168
- Sapp, Gordon, 271–72
- Savvy Mucho, 231–32
- Say-es, 132, 133
- Scalping, 38, 40, 84, 170, 178
- Schuyler, Walter, Lt.: allows dancing,  
 103; attempts to arrest Delshay,  
 83; participates in dance, 92, 232;  
 recounts adventures, 75; reports  
 campaigning, 84
- Segregation, 249–50
- Settlers: and angel system, 241; assist  
 Indian women, 236; assist Indians,  
 236, 243; and cleanliness, 247, 249;  
 collect Indian baskets, 312; conflicts  
 with Indians in Verde Valley, 43,  
 56, 175, 307; and conscience, 247,  
 250–51, 309, 310–11, 315; fear  
 Indian returnees, 170, 178–79,  
 245–46, 248, 307; geographical  
 origin of, 175–76; and honor, 55,  
 139, 161, 250–51, 310–11, 320;  
 and humanitarianism, 247; judge  
 Indians, 246–47, 249–52, 310–11;  
 learn Apache, 243, 312; lobby for  
 reduction of reservations, 171; on  
 Mineral Strip, 231–32; paternal-  
 ism of, 231–252, 307–9, 310–11;  
 relations with Indians, 7, 14, 88–89,  
 121–22, 173–74, 243–50, 310–11;  
 renounce honor, 250–51, 292,  
 310–11, 320; toleration for Indian  
 practices, 250–51, 271, 310–11;  
 trade with Indians, 245, 248
- Sex: regulation of, 214–15, 230
- Shaie-haw, 160
- Shamans: Camp Verde agency, 184;  
 defy BIA agents, 214; exhort  
 Yavapais and Dilzhe'es to leave San  
 Carlos, 160, 162; and plague at Rio  
 Verde, 91; at powers of, 164–65,  
 205; practices of, 93–94, 205–6;  
 spiritual movements led by, 110–12,  
 121, 159–61; talismans of, 93–94,  
 205–6; women among, 230
- Shaw, George, 169
- Sherman, William Tecumseh, Gen.,  
 115
- Sieber, Al, 84, 100, 104, 120, 130
- Sierra Ancha: Apache Kid pursued in,  
 131; Apache love for, 60; Apaches  
 attack settlers in, 167; Army cam-  
 paigns in, 84; DuBois and Delshay  
 parlay in, 57; Henry Irving born  
 in, 163, 237; murder of rancher in,  
 129; peopling of, 1; rancher shoots

- Apache in, 248; settlers in, 106;  
walled complexes built in, 26
- Sinagua, 1, 23, 25, 27
- Sister, cultural meanings of, 240
- Skaatakaamcha* (see *Monster Slayer*)
- Skeleton Cave Massacre, 78, 79, 81,  
296
- Skippy, 117–18
- Slaveholders: and paternalism, 8, 205,  
219–22, 308
- Slaves, 39; compared to Indians,  
219–21
- Smiley, Major, 217, 217
- Smith, Ola Burdette, 236, 274
- Snooks, Captain, 98
- Snooks, W.E., 260
- Sobaipuris (see *O'odhams*)
- Social outlawry, 128–34
- Soda pop, ban on, 218
- Soulay, 71–72
- Southern Pacific Railroad, 193, 312
- Sovereignty, 8, 10, 230, 316, 320
- Spanish: and honor, 40, 140; call  
Dilzhe'es "Tontos," 2; exploration  
by, 36–38; pacification policy of, 38
- Spring Creek, 163, 166, 167, 169, 237
- Squaw Peak, 20, 22, 168
- Stecker, Ernest, 212, 297, 298, 301
- Sterling, Albert: murder of, 119
- Suffrage, 10, 275–77
- Swetnam, John M., 42, 286
- Symons, A.H.: asked to discourage  
Indians from seeking work, 203;  
assists Indian women, 226; bans  
soda pop, 218; complains of Apaches  
avoiding school, 262; criticizes Car-  
los Montezuma, 295; directs Apache  
girl to return to parents, 214; and  
indemnity case, 272; proposes  
graduate elimination of dancing,  
213; visits Payson Dilzhe'es, 235
- T.A. 23, 223–24
- Tag bands, 163–64
- Talkalai, 138, 233, 234
- Taylor, Francis, 272, 273
- Taylor, Joe: allows dancing, 213–214;  
comments on Indian shame, 290;  
comments on opportunities for  
work, 194; complains of public  
schools' refusal to enroll Indians,  
265; complains of Indian resistance  
to schooling, 254–55; complains  
that reservation too small, 184; fears  
Indians will become radicals, 264;  
and planting of orchards, 185
- Thackray, William, 262–63
- Tiffany, Joseph Capron, 110, 111–12,  
115, 117, 122–23, 158
- Tiswin* (see also *Tulapai*): consumption  
of mocked by George Laben, 290;  
continued consumption of at San  
Carlos, 121; history of, 198–99; in  
Silas John rituals, 208; and Nock-el-  
del-kinny's wheel dance, 111; noted  
by Spanish, 37; uses of, 198–99; and  
violent altercations, 109, 128, 137;  
women and, 227, 310
- Tocqueville, Alexis de, 3
- Tohono O'odham (see also *O'odhams*  
and *Akimel O'odhams*), 30, 38, 173
- Tolkepayas, 28, 41, 42, 99
- Tonto, Jack, 184, 189, 280, 281
- Tonto Basin: defined by Crook,  
66; explored by Spanish, 36–37;  
importance to Apaches and Yavapais,  
60, 71, 82, 169; military campaign-  
ing in, 58–59, 61–62, 84, 104;  
murder in, 238; Na-ti-o-tish flees to,  
119; Nock-el-del-kinny prophesies  
return to, 111; paternalism in, 241;  
reservation proposed in, 58
- Tonto Creek, 26, 53, 71, 101, 169,  
235
- Toprock, Morgan, 297, 298, 305,  
311, 319
- Tourism: and Indian dances, 232,  
312–13; promotion of, 193; and  
power, 13, 280–83, 312–13,  
315–16; and race, 280–81, 312–13,  
315–16; scholarly literature on,  
329n18, 371n29, 372nn30, 31,  
36, 38
- Truxton Canyon boarding school,  
262, 276
- Tucson, 42, 61, 97, 117, 130, 159, 172

- Tulapai* (*see also Tiswin*): and conscience of Crook, 66; consumed by students, 261, 264; consumed by workers at Roosevelt Dam, 191; George Laben mocks Apache consumption of, 290; and Henry Chinn, 298; Indian police make arrests for consumption of, 201–2; manufacture forbidden by San Carlos agent, 215; manufacture of, 198–99; noted by Spanish, 37; used in Silas John rituals, 208; uses of, 198–99; women and, 198–99, 227, 228, 310; and violence, 137, 223–24
- Turret Butte Massacre, 81
- Two Hills in a Row Clan, 228
- US citizenship extended to Indians, 275
- US Forest Service, 179, 180, 273
- US Supreme Court, 131–32, 155, 182
- Uwas* (Yavapai dwellings; *see also gowas*), 152
- Vann, Jay, 235
- Verde Copper News*: publishes historical stories on Indian attacks, 286–87; reports derisively on Indians, 286, 288; reports favorably on Indians, 278
- Verde River: Apache bands located near, 32; Crook pushes Indians east of, 75; Dilzhe'es and Yavapais required to march on separate sides of, 99; ecologically compromised, 176; fed by perennial streams, 43; hot springs near, 47, 71, 90, 169; Rio Verde reservation located on, 90, 97; survey crews attacked on, 41; trappers journey to, 40
- Verde Valley: Apache phratries in, 33; Camp Verde established in, 44; Dilzhe'es and Yavapais raid in, 56; ecological change in, 175–76; explored by Spanish, 37; farmed by Indians, 185; Gen. Crook promises Indians' possession of, 150; homeland to Yavapais and Dilzhe'es, 20, 168–69; and Indian history, 27, 31, 55; Indian-white relations in, 243, 249; malaria at, 175; philanthropy of settlers in, 234–35; public schools in, 265–66; settlers reconnoiter, 42–43; Yavapais and Dilzhe'es return to, 170, 209, 307
- Victor, Manuel, 275, 298, 305, 311, 319
- Wage labor (by Indians): as attempt to gain white respect, 7–8, 121, 176, 178, 189, 270–71, 308; and autonomy, 7–8, 121, 176, 178, 243; cotton picking, 195–96, 203; at dams, 189–90, 192–93; de facto truce with whites, 121, 176, 178, 231, 308; importance of to Arizona, 7–8, 173; and Indian eagerness to work off reservation, 189, 264; jobs off reservation, 7–8, 9, 121, 157–58, 176, 178, 179, 182, 192–94; jobs on reservation, 182, 203; and job sharing, 191; and lack of social mobility, 8, 203; and paternalism, 242–43, 264; pay for, 8, 192–95; scholarly literature on, 327–28n11; significance of, 7–8, 121, 203–4
- Walker, Joseph Reddeford, 42
- Wasayja (*see* Carlos Montezuma)
- Wathogoma family (Yavapais), 183
- Weaver, Paulino: death of, 19; as guide, 19, 45; life of, 46; relationship with Aha-sa-ya-mo, 19–20, 47; relationship with Yavapais, 20, 45–48
- Wells, Edmund, 19, 20, 45, 47, 55, 62
- Wemaya (*see* Quail, Dell)
- West Clear Creek, 42, 60, 100, 169
- Wheel dance, 111
- Whipple Barracks (*see* Fort Whipple)
- White Mountain Apaches: attacked by trappers, 41; contact with Spanish, 37; differentiated from other Apaches, 30; journey to Washington, D.C., 55; ordered to relocate to Fort Apache, 108–9; populate White Mountains, 31; pursue

- Na-ti-o-tish, 120; at San Carlos, 149, 150; scout for Army, 54, 63, 68, 81; and Silas John, 211
- White Mountain Reservation (*see* Fort Apache Reservation)
- Whiteness: legal construction of, 202
- Whitman, Royal, Lt., 69, 85, 89
- Wild West shows, 282
- Willcox, Orlando, Gen., 112, 115, 117, 122
- Wingfield family, 214, 243
- Wipukepas, 27, 32, 75, 99, 149
- Women (Indian): as keepers of *gota* and *gowa*, 230, 309; and matrifocality, 36, 143; and matrilineality, 8, 143; seek help from agents, 225–27, 230, 309; as shamans, 230; side with men against agents, 227, 228, 310; status of, 140–41, 309; work of, 194
- Woolsey, King, 44, 67, 85
- Wovoka, 161, 211
- Yavapai and Apache tribal areas, 16–17 (Map 1)
- Yavapai Rangers, 56
- Yavapais: abandon San Carlos, 162–74, 307; accused of atrocity, 67; alliances with other tribes, 41; arrival of, 1, 27; atrocities committed on, 72–73; bilingual bands of, 32; called “Ton-tos,” 28, 99; at Camp Verde agency, 182–84; and Carlos Montezuma, 294–95; and Cibecue Rebellion, 115; conflicts with American explorers, 41; and Crook, 65; dancing of, 92–93, 144, 184, 308, 310; delegation of travels to Washington D.C., 55; die of hunger, 176; drinking by, 197–99, 245, 288, 289, 306, 310; and Echawamahu, 160–61; emergence place of, 23; executions by, 39; farming of, 14, 72, 96–97, 150, 157, 176, 184–88, 230; fight with Dilzhe’cs, 100–101, 138; flee San Carlos, 104, 168–69; forced removal from Rio Verde, 98–103, 109, 307; gender relations among, 223, 309–10; help build modern state, 7, 189–94, 277; homeland of, 20, 90–91; hunting of, 152, 307, 308, 309; hygiene among, 94–95; ideas about death, 20; leave San Carlos, 105, 157; mass surrender of, 81; massacred at Turret Butte, 81; meaning of name, 28; moderate pace of change, 222–23; and Paulino Weaver, 20, 46; and peace talks with Vincent Colyer, 70–72; and peace with O’odhams and Maricopas, 73; physical appearance of, 94–96; praised by San Carlos agents, 150; pre-contact history of, 13–14; raiding by, 38–40, 309; relations with miners, 42, 46–47; religion of, 91, 169, 207–8; at San Carlos Reservation, 73, 123, 149–50; scout for Crook, 81, 86, 97; and Silas John, 208; similarity to Apaches, 31; spousal abuse among, 225–26, 308; subgroups of, 27–28; subsistence strategies of, 152; tattooing of, 95; trade relations of, 31, 245; and wage labor, 7–8, 121, 157, 192–95, 203–4, 241–43, 270–71, 308; and war with whites, 46–48, 53–62; wars of 1870s, 63–89; women seek agents’ protection, 225–26; women’s work, 194, 310
- Yuman language, 27
- Yumas, 28, 40, 41

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